

New Distinctions:

The Impact of Class and Race on
the Cultural Preferences of Youth
in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte

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Thesis Presented for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the Department of Sociology

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

February 2015

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Abstract

Sociological treatments of the reproduction of social inequality in South Africa largely focus on its historical, political and economical aspects while references to popular culture are commonly used to describe differences, often in combination with racial discourse, rather than explain them. As a result much of South African cultural sociology, especially with regards to youth culture, is entailed in in-depth ethnographic descriptions of particular subcultures. Less common is scholarly work dealing with the role of taste and cultural preferences in the reconfiguration of common perceptions of ‘otherness’, both in class and race terms.

This dissertation shifts the focus towards the structural aspects of popular culture and, particularly, youth culture. First, inspired by Bourdieu’s work on distinction, it explores the segregating potential of contemporary youth culture in South Africa, especially where class and race connotations meet. It then follows this thread of adapting Bourdieu’s work to contemporary South African youth by identifying the media as a crucial factor alongside family and school for the preservation of racialised class characteristics. In a third step it takes the observations made in the South African context and compares them to youth culture in Brazil in order to establish the existence of common structures of difference that exist in different countries as a result of glocalization.

The thesis established in this dissertation is that the cultural preferences of youth often come with class and race connotations. This interplay between class and race can be explained historically as well as structurally through media consumption, which plays a significant role in the way young people learn to dress, speak, carry themselves and generally position themselves in relation to others. Due to global cultural flows these processes do not remain purely local phenomena but they find expression in localised forms as common structures of difference around the globe, thus structurally undermining local efforts to build a non-racial, non-classist society.

These conclusions are based on primary research using a multi-method approach combining surveys on taste and racial attitudes with school-going youth in South Africa (Cape Town, n=1196) and Brazil (Belo Horizonte, n=860) with in-depth focus group interviews (only Cape Town). Using descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis (survey data) combined with qualitative data analysis (interviews) it was possible to demonstrate that there are clear differences in the cultural and media preferences of South African youth along class and race lines, which are reflected, to a lesser extent, in the cultural and media preferences of Brazilian youth.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank my parents – without their support this thesis would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank my supervisor, Professor Jeremy Seekings, for giving me the freedom to follow my interests and pushing me when I was getting stuck. His help in securing funding and getting me to Brazil will also remain unforgotten.

In Brazil I would like to thank Fabrício Mendes Fialho and Rodrigo Ednilson de Jesus who helped me with my research in Belo Horizonte and making me feel at home.

I would further like to extend my gratitude to everyone who gave me advice, constructive criticism and encouragement related at seminars, workshops and conferences.

Among my friends, there are many, too many to mention, I would have to thank for keeping me sane over the years, but I would like to mention especially Andrew Singleton, who actually read through the entire thesis, as well as Alex MacKay, Aara Welz, Mariagrazia Galimberti, Sam Smith and Tom Herbstein who made me go the final stretch.

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1. Introduction

At the FIFA World Cup 2010 the world saw a new South Africa. Visitors from home and afar enjoyed the tournament in state-of-the-art stadiums, FIFA gave the country a near-perfect '9 out of 10' for hosting the event, the cities where matches were being held were shining and the roads connecting them in a better shape than ever before. It was also a remarkably peaceful event in spite of fear-mongering articles in foreign newspapers predicting a chaotic tournament marked by crime and violence. But above all visitors remarked positively on the friendly atmosphere and the hospitality of South Africans. Although the divisions of the past were still visible to those who cared enough to venture outside the hotels, stadiums and bars, South Africa was portrayed to be on the path of overcoming its divisive past and becoming a united nation. The other image that was brought to fans in the stadiums and on the TV screens was that of a cosmopolitan and open South Africa steeped in its African heritage.

The tone was set by the tournament's opening concert: local bands and musicians shared the stage with African and international, mostly American, big names such as Amadou and Mariam, Black Eyed Peas and John Legend. The highlight was the rendition of the tournament's hymn *Waka Waka (This Time for Africa)*, performed by Colombian Pop star Shakira together with local Afropop outfit Freshlyground, known for its up-beat African sound. The images of black and white South Africans performing on stage with Shakira in front of a world audience encapsulated exactly how the organisers wanted the world to see the new South Africa: united, proud of its heritage and open to the world.

It was a persuasive message and many South Africans started to believe in the possibility of a new national identity as the glaring evidences of social inequality, the endless political debates and allegations of corruption and the constant fear of crime moved to the background at least for a little while and made place for a feeling of lightness and privilege of being part of this beautiful nation. Of course the fuzzy warm feeling did not last and as soon as the circus left town old routines and habits kicked back in. Nonetheless the experience of the World Cup served as the reminder of an old belief: differences can be overcome when they are taken from the political and existential to the trivial so they can be celebrated, cherished and even laughed about in good humour. Accordingly, differences are no longer measured in socio-economic inequality or used to discriminate others but are moved into the realm of taste and cultural preferences.

In South Africa this belief is often expressed in conjunction with a second one: while older South Africans will probably always be marked by the experiences of the past and never really be able to forget their suspicions of 'the other', young South Africans who grew up after the end of apartheid are much more likely to just move on and ignore their differences as they are allowed to attend the same schools, make friends with whomever they want to, watch the same things on television and surf the same internet. The undeniable socio-economic inequality that affects young South Africans as much as older generations is commonly explained through the injustices of the past, the political blunders of the present or a combination of both but rarely are matters of taste and cultural preferences taken into the equation.

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Taste and cultural preferences are thus at the intersection of the two narratives that many South Africans employ when they project an optimistic future for their country. And as I found during my research with adolescents they are also used to explain the continuance of perceived segregation; as I chatted with a group of kids during a break at one of my visits to a school in one of Cape Town's wealthier neighbourhoods I remarked on the fact that students clearly seemed to group according to the colour of their skin. But the kids I was talking to were quick to explain: "They just like different music and dress differently than us, but this has nothing to do with race."

This short anecdote points to the heart of what this thesis sets out to achieve. It aims to untangle the common assumptions and beliefs surrounding the role of taste and cultural preferences and unravel the divisive potential of popular culture by applying Bourdieu's concept of distinction in the context of South African school-going youth and, in a second step, test the universality of the found patterns of distinction in a comparison with findings from research on youth in Brazil. The motive behind the study stems from the observation that the role of popular culture continues to be underestimated in the debate on social inequality in South Africa. Currently this debate is largely divided into two intertwining strands: socio-economic inequality and racial discourse, which do not leave much space for a) the role of popular culture not only as a sign but also a cause of social inequality and b) the impact of cultural globalisation on the imagery and fabric of inequality in South Africa.

For a better understanding of how assumptions of the unifying force of popular culture sometimes clash with reality it is worth reading the following exchange from an interview with two boys who consider themselves white.

Interviewer: Let me ask more directly: do you think that there is a white and black music taste?

*Peter:*¹ Yes, definitely! I cannot spin a yarn about that, but there is a big difference.

Tom: It is starting to whiten, a little bit, but generally, I mean, it's...

Peter: No, the white is starting to darken. I mean I had Eminem on my list. If we start listening to Rap, they start listening to classical music and stuff, and eventually there is gonna be a grey area in the middle, where we all come to.

Tom: Yes, white people listening to white rappers and black people listening to black rockers.

Peter: Yes, black rockers and black composers. And eventually it's everybody listening to exactly the same stuff.

Peter's surprise about his own choice of Eminem as one of his favourite musicians is understandable if one considers the other names (including Andrew Lloyd Webber, Beethoven and

1. The names of interviewees are colour-coded in terms of racial self-classification: African/black, coloured, white, refuse. See page 31 for a description of the operationalisation of race and the usage of racial descriptors in this thesis.

Johnny Cash) on his list of favourite musicians. But it becomes even more interesting in light of his and his friend's awareness of racialised differences in music taste such as the assertion that classical music is essentially "a white thing". Moreover, Peter makes the observation that "the white is starting to darken", citing his own fondness for Eminem as proof and implying a process of homogenisation which would eventually result in the disappearance of distinctions altogether and the emergence of a single universal taste. The deciding point here, which is not completely clear from the excerpt but from the interview in its entirety, is the disapproval and the sense of loss expressed both by Tom and Peter in expectation of a post-racial (grey) future.

But this brief discussion between two schoolboys in Cape Town about what constitutes black and white music goes beyond racial stereotypes as there is a clear hierarchy in the way Tom and Peter differentiate between classical music, Rock and Rap that aligns with the classic notions of 'highbrow' and 'lowbrow' in cultural sociology. With reference to Bourdieu one could argue that the exchange between Tom and Peter can be made sense of in terms of cultural capital and habitus, one giving currency to taste and cultural preferences in the establishment of power relations in society alongside economic and social capital, the other reproducing the same established structures of inequality over time. In the example above it is the apparent loss and transformation of the established power structures and the loss of distinction between 'low' and 'high' that prompts the two boys to contemplate the supposed bleakness of a non-racial and egalitarian society.

The exchange gains another dimension with the boys' reference to Eminem. As arbitrary as the example might seem, it is actually not. Eminem personifies the often unacknowledged racial fault lines in popular culture exactly because he is seen to have crossed them so convincingly without losing (street-)credibility.² This can be, and indeed is by many, seen as proof that race, and with it class and gender, is indeed losing currency in an increasingly postmodern society in which individual choice (agency) is replacing systemic determinism (structure). Eminem's special status suggests that distinction, understood in a Bourdieuan sense, has not lost its meaning entirely; his crossing of the line (quite literally, according to the movie *8 Mile*) between white and black also carries class connotations as he struggles (so the legend, or movie, goes) to gain credibility among black rappers who, justifiably, stress the combined economic burden of being poor and facing discrimination for being black, while the rest of society sees in him a hopeless trailer park boy.

Beyond the question whether Bourdieu's concept of distinction is still relevant in contemporary society, the example of Eminem in the context of a conversation between two South African

2. Gary Taylor (2005: 347) dedicates the epilogue of his book *Buying Whiteness* to the racial conundrum that is Eminem. Providing his interpretation of the name Eminem, he writes:

In racial slang, an "oreo" is someone "black on the outside, white on the inside," an African American who has internalized Anglo standards of behavior. (I once encountered a black man wearing a satirical t-shirt that identified "OREO" as "America's favorite cookie.") By contrast, whatever its glossy surface, an M&M is always chocolate – and therefore black – on the inside. A white man internalizing black standards, Eminem turns the racial oreo inside out.

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teenagers also raises the matter of locality. The fact that Peter mentioned an American artist as opposed to a South African can again be considered a coincidence, but given the pervasiveness of global (largely American and European) popular culture in South Africa the transposition of global mediascapes onto local contexts is a phenomenon that demands investigation. To make the point more precise and contextualise it in the study's comparison between Cape Town (South Africa) and Belo Horizonte (Brazil): Would Tom and Peter's conversation be possible, and meaningful, between two schoolchildren in a similarly privileged setting in Belo Horizonte? And if yes: Do school and family still occupy the primary role in the making of distinctions, as maintained by Bourdieu, or have they been joined by the media as a socialising force?

The thesis established in this dissertation is that the cultural preferences of youth often come with class and race connotations. This interplay between class and race can be explained historically as well as structurally through media consumption, which plays a significant role in the way young people learn to dress, speak, carry themselves and generally position themselves in relation to others. Due to global cultural flows these processes do not remain purely local phenomena but they find expression in localised forms as common structures of difference around the globe.

What is the relevance of this thesis? It adds to our understanding of the challenges on the way towards a non-racial, non-classist society in the presence of a wide-held conflation of race, class and youth culture in the public perception, perpetuated by the media on a local and global scale. Even when we slowly seem to move away from the crude racism of the past, race-thinking continues to exist in a way that benefits some and not others as the currency of cultural capital depending on the colour of your skin:

Skin colour acts as a form of embodied capital that disrupts and lessens the worth of the cultural capital held by black middle classes. They are perpetual outsiders because of their race, irrespective of class status, and this contributes to their hesitation about comfortably self-identifying as middle class. Again, it is important to stress that the decisions and perceptions that lie behind these racial stereotypes and low expectations are seldom explicitly named. (Rollock 2014: 248)

Although the thesis does not show the extent to which the interplay between race, class and youth culture has an actual impact on young people's life chances or reproduce social inequality, it does provide a solid starting point for further research in this direction.

What is novel about this thesis is that it does not treat youth culture in the tradition of cultural studies – focussing on the meaning of cultural consumption and expression of a particular sub-culture or “tribe” – but from the vantage point of structuralism in a Bourdieuan tradition concerned with how power relations and social order are maintained over generations. Within this theoretical framework – which itself is not a popular one in South African cultural sociology – the thesis diverts significantly from “classic” Bourdieu with its main subjects being youth and race alongside class, requiring adjustments of some of the ideas found in Bourdieu's conceptual toolbox. The novelty of the theoretical framework is reflected in the research design, combining qualitative focus group interviews and quantitative survey results, with the latter producing a unique dataset of young people's cultural preferences. Finally, the thesis is novel in terms of its

comparison of the attitudes of youth in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte, which is a more unusual comparison than one might expect given the commonalities between South Africa and Brazil.

For the sake of coherency the thesis is broken down into three topics. The first concerns the relationship between race, class and cultural preferences in the context of South African youth. The second is about the role of the media in shaping the imagination, expectations and values of youth in terms of class and race. The third deals with the phenomenon of “common structures of differences” in different parts of the world, referring to the comparability of racialised and class-based tastes and cultural preferences of youth in South Africa and Brazil. Together the three topics, which are discussed in detail below, add a cultural facet to the study of social inequality in South Africa beyond political, economical, historical and anthropological aspects. The result is a structural understanding of the role of culture in the reproduction of power relations in contemporary society that makes sense of, but is not restricted to the South African case. With its emphasis on race, this thesis also yields new insights into the ways modern society is constantly re-racialised, which sometimes leads to the erosion of ideological and political notions of race and othering, but also produces new barriers and divisions.

The relationship between class, race and cultural preferences of youth

Taste is commonly seen as a matter of personal choice, in the sense that someone’s liking or disliking for a particular writer, piece of music, cuisine etc. is a fairly arbitrary decision based on her or his inherent characteristics, in biological or cultural terms or a combination of both. Sociological theory on the other hand has always pointed out the social origins of different priorities in cultural consumption and activity, be it through Marxist interpretations of class consciousness, Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony, Weber’s sociology of religion or Durkheim’s notion of the “collective consciousness”. When it comes to questions regarding taste among adolescents in Western societies, subcultural theory has been dominating the debate since its inception at Birmingham in the 1970s at least in British and arguably also recent South African sociology, promoting a neo-Marxist understanding of youth which portrays the tension between subcultures and the dominant mainstream as a form of class struggle. During the 1990s poststructural elaborations and critiques of subcultural theory have shifted the focus towards the agency of the individual and put more emphasis on hybridity and multiplicity. In recent South African youth studies the influence of (post-)subcultural theory is evident in ethnographically rich descriptions of particular youth subcultures (or “scenes” or “tribes”) such as Hip Hop, Punk or Kwaito as well as rather celebratory accounts of South African youth supposedly overcoming racial and social-economic barriers in favour of a shared South African identity (Gamble 2008).

However, recent work on taste and society suggests a ‘material’, or structural turn in cultural sociology as well as youth studies. A large part of the relevant literature is directly or indirectly inspired by Bourdieu’s work on class distinction embodied through cultural consumption and passed on in childhood through the habitus – Bourdieu’s term for the subconscious acquisition of certain patterns of preferences, dispositions and taste as a consequence of someone’s position in the social hierarchy. Bourdieu’s theoretical framework is appealing to social researchers who are not prepared to either ignore structural constraints in the determination of cultural prefer-

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ences or to reduce the complexity of class determinacy to a matter of rigid categorisation. Although the theory in its original form has been criticized for its negligence of structural factors other than class – e.g. gender and ethnicity – contemporary interpretations have proven to be quite capable of accommodating such criticism, exemplified in the South African context by Nadine Dolby's (2001) groundbreaking work on race and taste at a mixed school in Durban. This thesis is inspired by Bourdieu's class distinction as it seeks to reveal and illuminate some of the fundamental structural associations between taste and class among South African youth. It also builds on Bourdieu's work by shifting the focus to the deep racialisation of South Africa's class structure.

The decision to follow a Bourdieuan approach has repercussions on theoretical, conceptual and methodological levels, each of which are explained in detail at different points in the thesis. The first part of the literature review (pages 60 to 73) outlines the current state of South African youth studies by separating the body of literature broadly into different strands, some firmly steeped in the subcultural tradition of describing and interpreting youth culture, others geared towards a Bourdieuan understanding of South African youth culture and those not touching on matters of taste, or only peripherally, but dealing with the social stratification of South African youth, and its impact on youth identities, more generally. The distinction between (post-)subcultural and structural interpretations of youth culture is further accentuated in the first two sections of the theory chapter (pages 40 to 55) tracing the separate, if occasionally intersecting, developments of cultural studies (and subcultural theory) and cultural sociology. The discussion of Bourdieu's relevance in contemporary South Africa also brings to light some of the conceptual and theoretical disharmonies which can arise due to a too literal application of Bourdieu in the local context and the conceptual challenges of employing Bourdieu's class distinction in the realm of youth studies. On a methodological level, Bourdieu's influence is visible in the contextualisation of rich qualitative insights (in the form of interview data) in a quantitative framework (in the form of survey data), which is further documented in the first part of the chapter on research design (pages 10 to 12). The actual findings with respect to racialised class distinctions are to be found in chapter 6 (pages 106 to 153) where some of the most fundamental notions of difference and othering among South African youth are traced.

The role of the media in maintaining distinction

Applying Bourdieu's concept of class distinction in the contemporary South African setting poses the challenge of accommodating and modifying some of the idiosyncrasies of Bourdieu's work, which are partly a result, or at least further accentuated, by historical developments, including the intensification of media flows due to technological change. To Bourdieu the different media forms merely constituted another set of fields (and as such they were autonomous entities, each defined by its own rules and structures). And although they share a certain degree of homology (common patterns) between them and other fields related to taste, these interrelations, according to Bourdieu, are not to be understood as causalities, as for Bourdieu the development of dispositions towards specific taste preferences is first and foremost a function of the habitus. In-

deed, as Bennett *et al* (2009: 23) point out in their book on class and taste in contemporary Britain, Bourdieu's *Distinction* preceded the rapid rise of radios and television sets in France's living room during the 1960s, and certainly the spread of digital media and communication over the last two decades which are argued to have created and sustained transnational identities:

A particularly important aspect of this point concerns the way in which global flows disrupt national boundaries, and unsettle what Bourdieu takes to be the natural national boundaries that define cultural fields. This is especially true when account is taken of global diasporas and, as a consequence of this, the multiple ethnic differentiations of national populations and of their cultural practices.

Because of these developments, and also considering the fact that South Africa already had a long history of media segmentation, the point is made that in contemporary societies the media substitutes, or at least supplements, some of the functions of the habitus, in the sense that the socialisation of children no longer occurs exclusively within the family, school or even broader social environment but at least to some degree as a result of exposure to the media. Access to media itself varies significantly depending on the parents' position in the class hierarchy as certain media forms remain inaccessible to children in poor families while others become redundant for the wealthier parts of society. Therefore, assuming that television, radio, internet, magazines and other forms of media are arguably the principal access points to popular culture for the majority of adolescents, the argument is made that media segmentation is not just another form but also a determinant of class distinction. This causal equation is reflected in the thesis structure: the second section of the literature review (pages 73 to 77) outlines the history of media segmentation in South Africa in the context of colonialism and apartheid and, following the arguments of Barnett (1998), maintains that economic imperatives are responsible for the reproduction of segmentation in democratic South Africa. Chapter 7 (pages 154 to 184) then presents the survey findings on differing media preferences in relation to racialised class distinctions and taste.

“Common structures of difference” in the cultural preferences of youth

Bourdieu's description of France's cultural setting in the 1960s depicts it as a relatively closed system; this was before globalization became the buzzword it is today and the idea of global cultural flows had no relevance in *Distinction*. Yet today any work involving taste and popular culture without a reference to globalisation would be incomplete. In this thesis, the global understanding of youth culture is represented by the notion of “common structures of difference”, coined by Kjeldgaard and Askegaard (2006: 235) in an article on the similarities of young people's consumption patterns in Denmark and Greenland:

In summary, the concept of youth and youth culture is always constructed in relation to local sociocultural conditions. Youth in the Western highly industrialized world is shaped by the social conditions of late modernity. In other cultural contexts, youth means something very different, depending on the sociocultural historical development and its relation to modernity. Nevertheless, these local youth cultural projects are structured by the global ideology of youth encompassing identity, stylized consumption, and cultural innovation. The global youth segment therefore emerges as a transnational market ideology through the dialectical process of glocalization. The empirical part of the study analyzes the

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different discursive manifestations of the ideology of youth. These manifestations are organized by key structures of common differences but as they are articulated in different cultural contexts.

An example of “common structures of difference” would be Greenlandic Rock, as Kjeldgaard and Askegaard found locally produced Rock to be at the same time an important aspect of young Greenlanders’ sense of national identity, a form of self-expression (of the experience to be young) as well as a global identity marker being “(...) a key characteristic in the history of Western youth culture” (Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006: 243). Accordingly, local Rock scenes, as in South African and Brazil, might sound, look and feel considerably different from each other, yet they fulfill very similar functions in their respective contexts and also in relation with other styles and groups as they are rooted in a shared of experience of global capitalism and (late) modernity.

The conceptual tool of “common structures of difference” which can be found in separate locations is also useful because it summarises some of the main points of the globalisation debate in recent years. This debate is defined by two almost antagonistic ideas: homogeneity and hybridity. The first, commonly mentioned in the same breath with “Americanisation” or “McDonaldisation”, implies that globalisation is leading to a global state of sameness. The other, often in association with the notion of “glocalisation”, maintains that globalisation acts as a catalyst for individualism, and global cultural flows are tapped into by individuals by choice as the idea of a singular identity is replaced by fluid, multiple identities. On a broader level it also means that global cultural flows are always adapted to local conditions (hence the term “glocalisation”). The idea of “common structures of difference” acknowledges the specificity of locality but at the same time does not ignore the underlying, fundamental structures of global capitalism producing, among other things, comparable notions of racialised class distinction around the globe. Here the idea of common structures of difference links to the role of the media in maintaining distinction as it is through the media that local trends become globalised and global trends localised, while the media channels themselves are becoming increasingly fragmented, thus reinforcing pre-existing notions of difference.

This hypothesis is tested in the comparative part of the thesis which takes the findings from the analysis of young Capetonians’ taste and media preferences and contrasts them with those of a sample of school-going teenagers from Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The comparison is valid and meaningful given the structural commonalities between the two countries and research sites which are marked by extraordinary diversity and inequality due to their colonial past as well as their own historical particularities, especially in terms of two markedly different histories of race relations. These are outlined in the third section of the literature review (pages 77 to 85), while the theoretical aspects of cultural glocalization are further discussed in the last section of the theory chapter (pages 55 to 59). The actual comparison of findings on taste and media preferences takes place in chapter 8 (pages 186 to 214).

Overall, the presentation of the empirical data becomes increasingly abstract as it begins with strongly localised discourses of difference and othering and ends with the structural-comparative aspects of cultural globalisation. The empirical evidence presented in chapters 6 to 8, supported

by secondary literature, is enough to answer all three research questions affirmatively: cultural capital creates divisions among South African youth, media consumption affects the habitus of young people and the relationships between taste, class and race observed in South Africa are, to varying degrees, also valid in Brazil. More specifically, the South African data shows that white, coloured and black respondents have differing preferences in terms of role models and music taste. These differences only partly follow the highbrow/lowbrow distinction and are mostly within the realm of popular culture. However, these differences become more nuanced if one takes locality into account – coloured and especially white survey participants demonstrate a higher interest in global (mostly American) popular culture and a lower interest in South African popular culture than their African/black peers. Simultaneously, white students are in the majority at the most prestigious (in terms of school fees) schools in the sample and a certain level of assimilation (not to be understood as emulation though) can be observed among non-white students at those schools, suggesting a correlation between institutional cultural capital (schooling) and embodied cultural capital (tastes, cultural preferences) that leads to the recognition of white tastes as legitimate culture, and consequently, the reproduction of racialised hierarchies of privilege. A side-effect of these findings is the need for a re-evaluation of the concepts of cosmopolitanism and cultural omnivorousness which are commonly associated with middle- and upper-class. The results show that (mostly white) middle- and upper-class survey participants indeed open toward foreign influences but only at the expense of familiarity of local trends and cultural knowledge. The media consumption of South African youth reflects and, as it is the argument here, helps to produce this sort of racialised class distinctions. On a purely socio-economic level lower-class youth are largely excluded from certain types of media, including online media and satellite television, and their arguably more ‘global’ content. On top of that, the mediascape in South Africa is extremely fragmented with television and radio stations targeting narrowly defined audiences. As a result, young South Africans tap into very different ‘cultural flows’ depending on their position in society, further supporting the habitus argument.

Very similar observations, in their own frame of reference in terms of racial classification, can be made in Belo Horizonte. Even though examples of racialised class distinction as well as media consumption are less obvious, arguably due to a generally level of cultural homogeneity including the same language, the same trends can be noticed: better-off, mostly white respondents at better schools have a very selective taste when it comes to local cultural productions and are generally more interested in global (American) popular culture. The similarity of the findings in the research settings suggest a more universal association between whiteness and middle-class which is worth investigating as racialised forms of social inequality often continue to persist in countries with levels of ethnic and racial diversity.

The research for this thesis included the use of primary data collected through a survey at six schools in Cape Town and a series of face-to-face interviews in 2007 and 2008. The findings from this data are contrasted with those obtained during a second fieldwork period 2008 and 2009 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in order to establish the universality of found structures of taste and difference in an increasingly globalised world.

2. Research Design

2.1 Preliminary Considerations

Inspired by Bourdieu's *Distinction*, this study aims to reveal the structures underlying the differentiation of taste patterns among young Capetonians, to contextualise them within racialised notions of difference, and to compare the found structures of difference with findings from a survey and interviews conducted in Belo Horizonte. This requires a methodological framework which can combine the abstraction necessary for structural analysis with a qualitative approach in order to contextualise the structural patterns. In order to ensure a certain degree of comparability it was decided to use a rather straightforward and ultimately workable research design in the form of surveys and semi-structured focus group interviews which would allow for meaningful comparisons between the two research sites.

As much as the methodology was guided by Bourdieu's work, special attention was paid to adjusting his framework to the study's specific requirements and the conditions in which it was carried out. A useful guideline in this respect is Douglas B. Holt's (1997) article *Distinction in America? Recovering Bourdieu's theory of tastes from its critics* which provides valuable advice for applying Bourdieu's theoretical framework in a contemporary setting:

(1) *Measure cultural objects at a level of specificity that allows for inferences regarding embodied tastes.* (Holt 1997: 117)

A disregard for this rule is evident in the typical music taste question found in some market and social research surveys ("What types of music do you like?") followed by a list of broad music genres. The problem with this question is that it often conflates sub-genres which can have distinct audiences. A good example is Hip Hop, which could be divided into a whole plethora of sub-genres. For the purpose of this study it is at least necessary to distinguish between local "conscious" Hip Hop and American commercial Hip Hop.

In order to achieve this sort of refined categorisation in the survey the questionnaires included a number of questions which asked respondents to rate a large number of cultural objects (such as music artists or television shows) which were then grouped into broader categories according to the ratings and the specific context in which the survey was conducted. Another way was to ask open-ended questions about the respondents' favourite brands, idols and sports teams, and to create categories according to the answers to these questions, in some instances by using factor analysis.

The subsequent interview sessions provided a further opportunity to validate the resulting categories by means of triangulation as they were frequently employed by both the interviewer and the interviewees in narrative accounts and re-examinations of the topics covered in the surveys.

(2) *Ascribe object meanings only with respect to interpretive communities.* (Holt 1997: 118)

Again, this is a rule which is often overlooked in secondary analyses of data on cultural preferences and taste where inferences are drawn without any deeper inquiry into the socio-cultural frame of reference in which the study has been conducted. For example: a white teenager from one of Cape Town's affluent suburbs who is listening to Driemanskap, a Hip Hop group from Gugulethu, poses a different analytical challenge than a black kid from that very township. Once

more it is the qualitative component of the study as well as diligent background research through literature surveys, discussions with experts and observations on site which ensure an appropriate contextualisation of the generalised survey results and enable a more meaningful interpretation than the simple presentation of tables, figures and numbers could provide.

(3) *Triangulate across consumption fields.* (Holt 1997: 118)

Studies of youth culture are almost always inextricably linked to music tastes and preferences, for the simple reason that different music scenes are the most obvious and accessible expressions of different taste patterns and stylistic/aesthetic differentiation. The strong conceptual link between studies of youth culture and music is therefore fully justified and only becomes problematic when the two are being used synonymously without any further consideration of other forms of cultural consumption and activities which might not necessarily be linked to a music scene.

In order to avoid the pitfalls of a one-dimensional account of South African youth, the survey questionnaires include a wide range of questions on consumption fields which are not directly related to music, such as media, idols, brands, sports and religion. The interview sessions were also structured in a way that encouraged discussions of topics which are not music-related.

4) *Construct questions based upon ethnographic description.* (Holt 1997: 118)

A pilot study involving 30 (10 of each population group: black, coloured, white) first-year students at UCT was conducted prior to the actual fieldwork, which provided important ideas for the final survey design. Respondents were asked to comment on the questionnaire's form and content after completing. This led to the re-formulation or deletion of some questions and the introduction of others into the questionnaire. Furthermore, before commencing fieldwork the author attended all sorts of youth events and hangouts, spoke to musicians and experts in the field and conducted a survey of the relevant literature on South African youth culture. In Brazil a similar procedure was followed, with the exception that the survey design was largely determined by the one which had previously been used in Cape Town. Nonetheless, an effort was made to contextualise the questionnaire and edit it in accordance with experiences made in Cape Town.

A further point, which is not mentioned by Holt, concerns the comparative nature of this study. Throughout the thesis, generalisations are made about South African and Brazilian youth based on data collected in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte. From a statistical standpoint these generalisations, and the comparisons between them, are of little value given the sampling method employed for this study (see the following section). Strictly speaking, the results presented in this thesis are only representative of the sample of adolescents that participated in the two surveys, and they are not even representative of youth in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte. An additional factor is that Cape Town is far from being typical of South African society with a much smaller black population, proportionally, than the rest of the country, which, in comparison to other metropolises like Johannesburg and Durban, is under-represented in the middle and upper classes. Hence any class/race correlations among the results are likely to be exaggerated and inflated in a general South African context.

Against this background it needs to be emphasised that the quantitative results presented in this thesis are not meant to exactly map the tastes and preferences of young South Africans and

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Brazilians. Statistics often suggest a level of accuracy which is unrealistic, especially where ‘soft’ concepts such as taste are concerned. What they do reflect, however, are general trends with regard to race, class and taste, that are validated by the qualitative analysis of the interviews (in Cape Town) as well as secondary literature throughout the thesis.

With this in mind, any discussion of statistical results applies to the respective survey sample first and foremost. Generalisations to a greater population (Cape Town, Belo Horizonte, South Africa, Brazil and beyond) are made with the clear understanding that they are not conclusively proven true, but only supported by the statistical results.

2.2 Survey Samples

2.2.1 Cape Town

The latest census (Stats SA 2012) shows that the metropolitan municipality of Cape Town had 3,740,026 inhabitants in 2011, making it the second biggest in South Africa. Of those, 39% were African/black (South Africa: 80%), 42% coloured (South Africa: 9%) and 16% white (South Africa: 9%). The differences in the racial breakdown between Cape Town and South Africa reflect the city’s exceptionality due to historical reasons. Cape Town’s class structure remains largely unequal and racialised, with the city’s white population mostly (albeit not entirely) representing the upper classes and African/black residents the lower classes while coloured people can be found at every level (Seekings 2010).

Given these characteristics it is worth pointing that Cape Town differs from other cities in South Africa not only demographically but also in the spatiality and political importance of class, race and cultural divides, which needs to be considered when evaluating the study’s findings on a national scale. This is best illustrated in a comparison of Cape Town with Johannesburg:

In the first place, where choice of residence in better-off neighbourhoods is available, shared culture, language, and religion appear to play a significant role in the decision-making process in Cape Town. This in turn suggests that residents in middle and higher income neighbourhoods perceive themselves as both neighbourhood and city level to be culturally and linguistically diverse and at times deeply divided along cultural lines of cleavage. Residents of these neighbourhoods express pride and derive substantial self-esteem not only from their class positions but also from their linguistic and religious affiliations, revealing a degree of conformity with Glazer’s model of a ‘divided city’. Such a trend appears to be much less pronounced in Johannesburg where cultural identities are domesticated and accordingly lived out in the private domain. (Bekker and Leildé 2006: 163)

Respondents were recruited from six public schools in the Greater Cape Town Metropolitan Area. The survey sought to include all 10th graders at all six schools as well as all of the 11th graders at two of the schools, Atlantic and North, where there were too few 10th grade pupils. The survey thus aspired to be a census in selected grades in selected schools.

Table 2.1 *Response Rates by Schools (Cape Town)*³

	Population	Sample	Response Rate
Atlantic High	200	175	88%
Flats High	276	207	75%
Macassar High	343	271	79%
Northern High	334	186	56%
Southern High	216	180	83%
Khayelitsha High	220	177	80%
Total	1,589	1,196	75%

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007


Sampling took place at school level with the aim of having a stratified sample of schools in terms of racial composition and class. A list of secondary public schools in Cape Town was obtained from the Western Cape Education Department. In discussion with colleagues with experience in the education sector, a smaller number of these schools was shortlisted and roughly classified as either predominantly African, predominantly coloured or predominantly white (in terms of student population) and then sub-divided into more and less expensive schools (based on the school fees relative to the group's average). One school in each group was then randomly chosen for the survey. Despite these measures the survey is not representative for all schools or even of all 10th and 11th graders in Cape Town because of the small sample size of only six schools. Also, the data has not been weighted to change the balance between the six schools. In order to achieve greater representativeness, sampling on an individual level would have been necessary with the risk of losing insights into the effect of schooling on race and taste, which are considered crucial for the questions at hand. The other reason to pursue the school-sampling strategy was to ensure easy and reliable access to a relatively large number of youth through the schools, thus facilitating follow-up research in the form of focus-group interviews and later surveys.

The following figures and paragraphs give a descriptive summary of the six selected schools, in terms of the racial and class composition of their pupils.

3. Numbers for Atlantic and North include grade 11 pupils.


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Figure 2.1 *Spineplot: School by Race (Cape Town)*⁴



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Figure 2.2 *Spineplot: School by Class (Cape Town)*⁵



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

4. Axes show percentages, bars actual frequencies. Missing values for the race variable are excluded. Totals for schools including missing values (N/missing): Atlantic (175/5), Flats (207/9), Macassar (271/17), Northern (186/8), Southern (180/1), Khayelitsha (177/10). For a definition of the race variable see page 31.
 5. For an operationalisation of the class variable see page 34.

The six schools included in the sample span much of the spectra of race and class in contemporary Cape Town and the distributions in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2 illustrate the ongoing association between class and race in post-apartheid South Africa as a result of apartheid. But the numbers depicted above also speak of the changing nature of this relationship and the increasing inequality within the different race groups, thus blurring and blending the colours of social division in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). For example, the sample distributions show a sizable proportion of black students at a middle-/upper-class school like Atlantic High. While some of these learners do not necessarily come from a middle- or upper-class background and are only able to attend the school by means of a scholarship or some other form of sponsorship, there is still a number of black students who live in the same neighbourhoods and under the same living conditions as well-off white or coloured students. Even more pronounced is the heterogeneity of the group of coloured survey participants who can be found in virtually all social strata.

But the increasing complexity of the class/race relationship in South Africa and Cape Town also makes it difficult to capture all of its hues and shades in a small sample of six schools. One important missing puzzle piece is private schools which were not included in the sample. These are attended primarily by students from affluent families, mostly white, but also by coloured and black schoolchildren whose parents are sceptical of a perceived influx of students from poorer social backgrounds at formerly 'good' public schools. It is worth mentioning though that Atlantic High is certainly *en par* (at least in terms of school fees) with the most prestigious private schools in Cape Town and Southern High and Northern High are also former Model C schools with still relatively high school fees, which arguably largely mitigates the omission of a private school in the sample. Further, Afrikaans-speaking white youth are arguably underrepresented in the sample. However, the language variable used in the analyses does not reflect language proficiency but language preference and in fact there is a significantly higher proportion of white students with one or both parents being native Afrikaans-speakers (and presumably being Afrikaans-speakers themselves) than those preferring Afrikaans over any other language (including English). While in the analysis reference is made to the link between language, media preferences and taste patterns, it would be interesting to examine to what extent the shift towards English (which can also be observed for African and coloured respondents) is a function of increased exposure to global popular culture and English-language media. Finally, one needs to mention the sparsity of very poor coloured respondents in the sample. Notwithstanding the fact that many coloured respondents, especially from Flats High, come from relatively poor families, there are only a few participants who come from the most destitute parts of the coloured areas on the Cape Flats associated with very high levels of unemployment and crime.

The following paragraphs are intended to provide more vivid descriptions of the schools and the neighbourhoods that surround them.

Atlantic High

Atlantic High is situated in one of Cape Town's wealthier areas close to the Atlantic seaboard

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and not too far from the city centre. It is a predominantly white area well accessed by tourists and mostly European foreigners. Although Atlantic High is, like the other schools in the sample, a public school, its annual school fees are at the top end of the spectrum, comparable to those of expensive private schools, and significantly higher than at the other schools included in the study. Accordingly, to a visitor, the school premises and facilities seem to be of a very high standard in general and especially in relation to those of the poorer schools in the sample.

Atlantic High is a former Model C school, one of the historically white schools which experienced preferential treatment during apartheid. After 1994 Atlantic High, like many other former Model C schools, experienced an influx of non-white students from less privileged areas. This happened partly due to the 1996 South Africa Schools Act which provided fee exemptions for low-income parents in an attempt to desegregate the school system. At the same time, parents made use of the now open school system in order to ensure a better future for their children by sending them to what were perceived as 'better schools'. This trend occurred throughout all levels of the school system, as described by Jane Battersby (2004: 80):

Parents from historically disadvantaged communities in the city send their children to Model C schools, usually at considerable cost, even if they are on reduced fees, because they believe it will provide their children with opportunities they themselves did not have, opportunities to be counted equal with white children on entering the workforce. These schools represent high quality teaching, better discipline, safety; a chance to better oneself through one's children. This phenomenon is not limited to Model C schools. Children from black African communities are sent to historically coloured schools, children from poor and gang-ridden coloured communities are sent to schools in wealthier coloured suburbs, filling the gaps left by children from these areas leaving to go to Model C schools.

This shift in the South African school system left Atlantic High's student body much more diverse in terms of race and class than during apartheid, even if white students still predominate (in terms of numbers). Comparing Atlantic High's student body to those of the other schools (apart from Northern High) in the sample, Atlantic High's composition of learners in terms of race and class is indeed quite mixed (see figure 2.1 and table 2.2 on page 14).

Northern High

Northern Suburbs High is the school with the second highest school fees and represents the second of the three former Model 'C' schools in the sample. The school is located at the Atlantic seaside between the city centre and Cape Town's Northern Suburbs, a decisively Afrikaans area of Cape Town. Because of its location and efforts of desegregation, Northern Suburbs High draws a similarly racially diverse student population as Atlantic High (although with a greater proportion of coloured students) and is even more diverse in terms of class, which is especially true for the white students, who, at Northern Suburbs High, are more likely to come from a 'working class' or lower middle-class background than at Atlantic High. In table 2.2 on page 14 this is reflected by a larger proportion of learners living under 'medium' conditions than 'good' or 'very good' ones.

Southern High

If one compares Atlantic High or Northern High with the third historically white school in the sample, Southern High, the biggest difference between the two is the much larger proportion of coloured students there; today about two-third of the sample at Southern High are coloured and only about ten percent are white. This can be partly explained by the schools proximity to the coloured residential neighbourhoods on the Cape Flats, just across the highway that divides these historically coloured areas from the formerly white areas in the Southern Suburbs. It is also an example of the broader shift in South Africa's school system after 1994, where the intake of non-white learners into a formerly white school would cause many parents of white children to send their offspring to other, even more expensive schools, as, to them, the increasing number of non-white learners at the old school would be perceived as a 'down-grading' of that school (Battersby: 2004). The result in this case is then that a formerly homogeneous white school has become an almost homogeneous coloured school – an unintended and paradoxical outcome for a process of 'desegregation'.

The consequence is that today, at least by looking at the racial composition of the respective sub-samples, Southern High seems to be more similar to Cape Flats High, a historically coloured school, than to the other two formerly white schools. This is noteworthy for various reasons. First, to the visitor, the general impression of the two school premises could not be more distinct in comparison. Whereas Cape Flats High is housed in a simple one-storey brick construction next to an open field, Southern High's driveway, flanked by old trees and a green lawn, leads to an impressive ivy-clad building emanating the image of an old English boys' school. This difference in appearance is even more accentuated by the spatial proximity between the two schools which are only about five minutes apart by car on the very highway that separates them. The separation is also reflected in the survey results by the fact that a considerable proportion of students at Southern Suburbs High lives on the historically white side of the highway and enjoys better living conditions compared to learners at Flats High who almost all live in neighbourhoods reserved under apartheid for coloured residents.

Flats High

Flats High is a historically coloured school located at the border between the Southern Suburbs and the Cape Flats. Its school fees are significantly lower than those at the other schools described so far and much closer to those at the two township schools in the sample. Most of the parents of the children at Flats High are blue-collar workers living in nearby neighbourhoods marked by high unemployment. What generally distinguishes Flats High from the other schools is that it is a dual medium school, which means that learners can choose to be instructed in either English or Afrikaans. Accordingly the survey results show that there is a higher proportion of students choosing Afrikaans as their preferred language than at the other schools, although this proportion is still modest given the fact that almost nine out of ten (84%) respondents at Flats High indicate that at least one of their parents speaks Afrikaans but more than half (59%) of those respondents choose English over Afrikaans as their preferred language.

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Khayelitsha High

Khayelitsha High is located in the southern part of Khayelitsha. Despite the relative poverty of its neighbourhood with high unemployment and poor public service delivery, to the visitor the school seems to fare better than many other township schools (including Macassar High, see below). The school opened only a few years ago and therefore the building and classroom facilities seem to be in the same or even better condition than at Flats High. Also, the numerous academic achievement awards in the entrance hall, the perceived cleanliness of the premises and the impression that the respondents at Khayelitsha High seem to be more fluent and comfortable to speak in English (9% prefer it over other languages – usually Xhosa) than their counterparts at Macassar High (where only 2% show a preference for English) contribute to the feeling that this school offers a better learning environment than other schools in the area. But this sense of relative privilege is not reflected in their social backgrounds with living conditions as poor and unemployment of parents as frequent as at Macassar High.

Macassar High

Macassar High is the largest school included in the study and provides the largest number of survey participants (271 out of 1196; 23%), although only 10th graders were included. It is also the school with the lowest school fees. To the visitor the school premises do not look overly destitute on first sight. Yet the lack and poor condition of classroom facilities such as chairs, tables, educational posters on the wall and often even doors separating the classroom from the noisy hallways as well as the large class sizes are clear signs that a lack of resources is negatively affecting the learning environment there. As has been noted earlier, the respondents from Macassar High do not distinguish themselves distinctively from Khayelitsha High students in terms of race and class. One difference though, apart from (yet related to) language preferences, lies in the birthplaces of respondents: both schools cater for large groups of Xhosa-speaking economic migrant families from the Eastern Cape, but the proportion of respondents at Macassar High who were born outside Cape Town (presumably in the Eastern Cape) is almost half of the total subsample (47%) opposed to just over one-third (37%) at Khayelitsha High.

2.2.2 Belo Horizonte

According to the latest census (IBGE 2011), Belo Horizonte has a population of 2,475,440 inhabitants. The Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte (MRBH)⁶, including surrounding cities, has a total of 5,497,922 inhabitants, which makes it the third most populous metropolitan region of Brazil. The city itself is the sixth most populous of the country. In terms of racial composition (census 2010): 47% of the city's population are white (Brazil: 48%), 42% are 'brown' (*pardo*; Brazil: 43%), and 10% black (Brazil: 8%).

Respondents from six schools from the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte were included in the sample; two private schools in Belo Horizonte itself and four public schools from Cont-

6. 'Belo Horizonte' is used to refer to the entire metropolitan region.

agem (population 617,741), a largely industrial town bordering the city of Belo Horizonte to the West.

Table 2.2 *Response Rates by Schools (Belo Horizonte)*


	Population	Sample	Response Rate
BH East	196	185	94%
BH West	233	213	91%
FUNEC East	127	102	80%
FUNEC North	143	120	84%
FUNEC South	107	89	83%
FUNEC West	179	151	84%
Total	985	860	87%

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

The geographical distribution of the schools is not entirely arbitrary due to a concentration of expensive private schools in Belo Horizonte's city centre and public schools in the urban periphery which Contagem is considered a part of. Another fact which needed to be taken into consideration is the smaller variability of quality and fees among public schools in Brazil, or at least Belo Horizonte; whereas in South Africa it is not uncommon to find public schools, usually former Model C schools, which rival the environment, equipment but also the fees of private schools (e.g. Atlantic High) the schism between public and private schools is arguably much more defined in Brazil. As a result one can find a large degree of uniformity among the free yet rather basic public state schools and a large degree of variability among the private schools which offer a range of educational environments reaching from state school level to the extremely expensive and prestigious. Therefore the decision was made (in contrast to the sample of schools in Cape Town) to include private schools in the sample – one (BH East) considered to be attended primarily by children from middle-class families, the other (BH West) by those from upper-class backgrounds. The public schools in the sample were chosen following the advice of Rodrigo Jesus (then working at the Observatorio da Juventude at Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, UFMG), today head of the Observatorio da Juventude at Universidade Federal dos Vales do Jequitinhonha e Mucuri, UFVJM) and Juarez Dayrell (Professor of Education at UFMG and author of *A Música Entra em Cena*) using, for the sake of practicability and feasibility, a network of public schools in Contagem: Fundação de Ensino de Contagem (FUNEC).


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Figure 2.3 *Spineplot: School by Race (Belo Horizonte)*



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Figure 2.4 *Spineplot: School by Class (Belo Horizonte)*



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

The greater homogeneity of public schools in Brazil and the relative heterogeneity of private schools are reflected in the student bodies shown in the figures above. Whereas three out of the four public schools share almost identical features in terms of class and race, one private school, (BH East) shows much greater diversity, at least in class terms, than the other. The only exception to this pattern seems to be FUNEC West with a rather curious mix of very poor and fairly well-off students. In fact, both the regular pattern and the exception are determined by geographical factors: unlike their private counterparts public schools derive their students from the immediate neighbourhoods and since the class variable is based entirely on the respondents' place of residence it is not surprising to see a large degree of homogeneity among them. Thus the reason for FUNEC West's relatively diverse student body is its location among three neighbourhoods with fairly disparate socio-economic characteristics. On the other hand, BH West's seemingly exceptional wealth of its students is not a sign of localism – although the large majority of its students live in rich areas, these areas are not necessarily in close proximity to the school.

What the two private schools have in common, apart from being private, is their religious background which they share with many private schools in Brazil (international schools representing another large sector of private education), but although their religious character is certainly visible in the schools' public image (references to God and Christian values are common in the schools' brochures and on their websites) it does not influence their admission criteria or curriculum in any way that would affect the validity of the survey sample. What arguably counts more if one compares them to the state schools in the sample are their facilities and equipment, albeit here, too, they differ from each other in significant ways. BH West, founded almost hundred years ago, is located in one of Belo Horizonte's oldest neighbourhoods, occupies a historical building with an imposing portico as its entrance and offers the whole range of the Brazilian educational system from pre-school to higher education. The classrooms are well-equipped and students have access to different kinds of laboratories, a library, sports facilities, creative environments and recreational areas. BH East is situated in one of Belo Horizonte more recent and affluent developments. Although its history and building do not evoke the old-world charm of its counterpart in the Western part of the city, its facilities are nothing short of impressive: the outside recreational area, shaded by palm trees, comprises numerous swimming pools, tennis-, soccer- and basketball-courts and a large playground for the younger schoolchildren, while inside the students have access to a modern library, computer labs, multiple 'creative spaces', an auditorium and a large, state-of-the-art theatre. For school functions and pedagogical workshops two large and beautifully kept premises outside of town are available.

It is by describing the luxury at the private schools (especially at BH West) in such detail that the true chasm between a private and public school education in Brazil becomes apparent. While the four public schools in the sample are endowed with the basic equipment and facilities required for an everyday school life (no missing classroom doors like at Macassar High, for example), the

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resources are definitely limited⁷. Overall, the apparent uniformity of their student bodies (see page 20) extends to their physical presence in a curious fashion; all the buildings have in common a concrete-gray functionality, and the recreation area is usually an asphalt soccer or basketball court encircled by the classrooms. So although on first sight the difference between the two types of school used in the survey seems to be a regional matter (Belo Horizonte vs Contagem) it is really a question of class, status and centre/periphery. It is thus noteworthy that while numbers of self-reported black (*preto* or *negro*) respondents are indeed low at all the schools in the sample, they are especially so at the private schools.

Belo Horizonte's comparable size, polarisation into a relatively wealthy center and a relatively poor periphery and its relatively mixed overall population were the main reasons to use it as Cape Town's counterpart for the comparative aspect of the thesis.

2.3 Data Analysis

Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative analysis is based on the transcripts of 23 interviews with 58 members of the Cape Town sample in one-to-one and group sessions. Interview candidates were selected purposefully according to their racial self-description given in the survey questionnaire and in some cases according to their music preferences with the aim to end up with a fairly representative subsample of the greater sample. In the case of the group interviews the decision was taken to form homogeneous groups in terms of gender and race in order to provide the interviewees the necessary comfort to speak about personal taste as well as racial issues. In some instances this strategy certainly worked and it can be assumed that because of it some statements, especially regarding race and 'others', were made which might have not been made in a 'mixed' setting.⁸ The sessions were held on the school grounds and recorded using digital video and/or audio equipment for the sake of easier transcription; the recordings were deleted after the completion of the study.

The interviews themselves were semi-structured; they followed a certain agenda covering the three research questions, but the interview participants were allowed to stray from the interview schedule as long as the discussion continued to be of relevance to the study.

Table 2.3 Interview Schedule⁹

7. On an anecdotal note: the actual gravity of the financial woes facing these schools was made clear to me on my second visit to FUNEC West when I attended a staff meeting during which a dramatic budget cutback with possible lay-offs was announced. The announcement was met with tears and anger.
8. The decision to have homogenous groups is at the expense of insights which could have been gained from observing the possible change in attitude and self-projection in a more diverse setting; ideally future studies with a similar methodological approach should incorporate both types of groupings.
9. The schedule was developed in consultation with Sue Moses (2010), co-author of *Growing Up in the New South Africa* and Daniel Beatty, director of local youth market research company InstantGrass. Larry Strelitz (2005), author of *Mixed Receptions* shared his own experiences conducting interviews on media consumptions with adolescents. Further inspiration came from David Gauntlett's (2005) *Moving Experiences*.

Activity	Time	Description/Questions
Compiling music charts	5 Mins	The participants are given large sheets of paper and asked to compile a music chart with the Top Ten of their favourite music bands and artists.
Discussing music charts	20 Mins	The charts which were produced during the preceding exercise are put on a board/wall next to each other. The participants are then asked to comment on their respective charts and discuss the reasons for the differences between them.
Creating poster collages	15 Mins	A selection of youth and lifestyle magazines together with a large sheet of paper, scissors and glue is given to each participant. They are then asked to cut out images of people and things they identify with or aspire to and create a poster collage with them.
Discussing poster collages	20 Mins	Again the posters are put on a board/wall next to each other, and the participants are asked to comment on their posters.
Discussing media	20 Mins	The charts and posters are used as the point of departure for a discussion on music, fashion, youth culture, media - in how far they are influenced by 'Western' ideas and images and to what extent they affect race relations among young South Africans. Questions include:
Discussing American influences	20 Mins	-Why do people listen to different kinds of music and wear different kinds of clothes? -Do you think that your generation is more influenced by the media than previous ones? If yes, in what ways? -Are South African youth becoming like American youth?
Discussing 'race'	20 Mins	-In what ways are South African youth distinctively 'African'? -Why are most Hip Hop artists black and most Rock artists white? -Are South African youth still racially divided? If yes, why?

The resulting transcripts were coded using a partly premeditated/partly evolving set of themes associated with youth culture, identity, authenticity and race. The coding of qualitative data basically consists of cutting the text into categories and rearranging it into themes and patterns (Miles and Huberman 1999: 56). Ideally, the development of the categories and the categorisation of the text should happen simultaneously, as if the evolving patterns would come out of the text itself. In reality, or at least in this case, categories start to emerge with the stating of the research question and evolve into key concepts during the interviewing and transcription process. Over the course of coding, reevaluating categories, creating new ones and re-coding the data, the initial set of key concepts turns into a differentiated and cross-referencing system of concepts, ideas, and patterns. For this the qualitative data analysis software TAMS Analyzer (Weinstein 2006) was used. The development of the qualitative analysis process is illustrated by comparing the initial and final code sets. The initial set comprised a handful of codes, for example: brands, music,

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race, taste. The final list of codes has dozens of codes, of which, for the sake of clarity, only an exemplary fraction is being presented below. It is crucial to understand that this is not a random list of associated terms and ideas in connection with youth culture and race but an exemplary list of key themes and patterns (organised in so-called code sets) which emerged from the interviews and as such it does not aspire to represent an universal meaning of what ‘youth culture’ is or of any of the other terms listed in the table, but can only be really understood and evaluated in combination with the coded interview transcripts. Thus the table below has been included only for the sake of transparency in the research process which is sometimes lacking in descriptions of qualitative research methodologies.

Table 2.4 *Code list examples*

Parent Level	Second Level	Third Level
brands	dontLike	
	like	
	names	
factorOthering	class	
	culture	
	language	
	personalChoice	
	race	
	tasteStyle	
keywords	americanisation	
	crime	
	gangsterism	
	gender	
	unequalAccess	
localGlobal	global	negative
		positive
	local	negative
		positive

After the coding it was still necessary to bring the rather denotational categories of meaning into a relational form. The first step was to create a co-coding frequency report with the help of the analysis software, which shows how many times a passage of text has been coded with each pair of codes, helping to see what codes might be related with each other. The resulting patterns were identified in the actual texts and the corresponding text passages were compared with the field notes. At this stage incidences of certain ‘clusters’ of codes began to emerge from the data and themes started to develop. Using the themes as headings, text excerpts deemed representative for the data set as a whole were collected in a database which served as the starting point for the discussion of the qualitative as well as survey data.

It is noteworthy that focus groups were also conducted in BH, but with less success than in Cape Town. Four students were hired to conduct the interviews, but unfortunately two of them never provided transcripts of their interviews. The transcripts of the other two students were very informative and provided the author with useful insights regarding young Brazilians' attitudes towards class, race and youth culture, but overall the collected material was simply not enough for a meaningful analysis.

Statistical Analysis

Considering the explicit use of Bourdieu's theory and conceptual framework in this thesis it would only seem natural to adopt his preference for correspondence analysis (CA) and multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) for analysing, interpreting and presenting the survey data collected for this study. Both methods are indeed highly useful for detecting and visualising hidden structures in nominal data and they certainly remain valid options for anyone working with data on taste and cultural consumption (see, for example, Bennett et al. 2009). But it does not represent the only possible, and sometimes even not the most appropriate, method for dealing with this kind of data. This is the point made by Chan and Goldthorpe (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007; see also Chan 2010) in a reply to a critique (Wuggenig 2007; see also Peterson 2007) of an article titled *Social stratification and cultural consumption: the Visual Arts in England* (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007) in which they used latent class analysis (LCA) for identifying the main categories of visual arts consumers and multiple regression analysis in order to test the relative strength of a set of independent variables for predicting someone's association with one of those categories. Defending their chosen method against claims by Ulf Wuggenig (2007) that their statistical analysis was incompatible with some of the more intricate points made by Bourdieu, they maintain that multiple regression analysis (MRA) has certain advantages over CA and MCA as it allows one to compare the relative impact of individual independent variables and to establish (or rather presume) causality within the observed relationships between variables.

[O]ur approach does not imply, as Wuggenig would suppose (p. 309), 'treating reified variables like agents', or accepting a 'Newtonian logic of regression', or believing that causal explanations can be directly cranked out of statistical analyses. The idea is, rather, to obtain as refined an understanding as possible of the statistically demonstrable relationships that arise in the patterning of cultural consumption and in its social stratification, so that, in the next stage of the research process, explicit (and testable) accounts can be advanced of the mechanisms that give rise to these relationships in terms, ultimately, of the action and interaction of the individuals involved. (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007: 324)

For very similar reasons as given by Chan and Goldthorpe the statistical analysis of the survey data presented in this thesis relies mainly (apart from simple bivariate analysis) on MRA. First of all it allows one to draw conclusions about the 'net effects' of stratification variables, that is the relative strength of the individual variables, on cultural consumption, opposed to what Chan and Goldthorpe call their 'gross effect'. Moreover, as opposed to CA and MCA which can only describe a general relationship between a set of variables, regression analysis, requiring a dependent variable and a set of independent variables, enables one to make inferences about the causal dir-

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ection of a relationship between two or more variables. This difference is indeed relevant with respect to the earlier assumptions about the causality between taste and media consumption (see page 46).

Another problem with CA and MCA in the given context is the lack of a suitable status variable. Bourdieu could use and elaborate on Weber's distinction between class, understood as a function of the market, and status, in the sense of honour and prestige, by using professions as an indicator for social status and correlating it with class and cultural capital. This way he was able to show that although general correlations between the three exist, these are non-linear and conditional. For example, while better-off people generally have more refined tastes than those who are worse off, the old-rich are certainly more discriminating than the newly-rich. And certain groups like teachers and artists might be middle- or even lower-class but have distinctively avant-gardist tastes. Putting class and status into relation to each other and mapping various cultural activities along their axes allowed Bourdieu to make the highly intricate (and slightly cryptic) visual representations of taste patterns found in *Distinction*. The problem with a study of youth tastes, however, is the lack of a meaningful measure of status. What is social status among youngsters? Although prestige certainly plays a decisive role in the social relations among teenagers – 'coolness' comes to mind – a valid, reliable and quantifiable variable for this kind of status remains elusive. Therefore, in this study, matters related to status are dealt with primarily in two ways: (1) school is considered a proxy for both social status and institutionalised cultural capital, and (2) findings of the qualitative research are used to clarify the somewhat blurry relationship between class and status

The class variable itself is reason for a further special characteristic of most of the regression models used in this thesis. As stated in the introduction one of the main concerns of this thesis is to explore the relationship between class, race and taste, assuming that cultural consumption is strongly influenced by class while the nature of this relationship depends on someone's cultural background, which is also – arguably in South Africa more than in Brazil – a matter of race. Therefore it is necessary to compare the impact of class on taste and cultural preferences between race groups. In the South African case this is being complicated by the particularly strong association between race and class, as basic assumptions about sample size and frequency counts required for the kind of statistical analyses applied in this thesis are easily violated. More precisely it is the virtual absence of white and coloured respondents among Xhosa speakers and at township schools and their weak presence among the poorest within the sample which result in two rather distinct research settings rather than a single one which could be easily captured in regression analysis. In order to account for the particular characteristics of the Cape Town sample, but also given the research questions at hand, the decision was taken to run separate regressions in sets of two: one including only respondents from city schools (Atlantic High, Northern High, Southern High, Flats High), the other including only black respondents. The first model gives insights into the effects of class, race and cultural background among those who at least share a fairly comparable school experience (even though the discrepancy in most aspects between Atlantic High, for example, and Flats High is still quite extreme) whereas the second

model provides insights into the class and school experiences of black respondents.

In the Belo Horizonte sample diversity and inequality are still significant but less dramatic than in Cape Town, allowing for unified regression analyses when required.

The extensive use of MRA in this thesis calls for some guidance on how to interpret its results. MRA examines the effects of multiple independent variables (predictors) on the value of a dependent variable, or outcome. It calculates a coefficient (in this thesis odds ratios are shown) for each independent variable, as well as its statistical significance, to estimate the effect of each predictor on the dependent variable, with other predictors held constant. The meaning of this is best explained with the use of an example: table 6.3 on page 113 shows the effect of a series of independent variables (race, language, gender, school and class) on two different outcome variables (first: the respondent has at least one “mediated” idol, second: does the respondent have at least one “acquired” idol)¹⁰ for two different subsamples (first: only respondents at city schools, second: only respondents categorised as African/black). Therefore the table effectively shows the results of four different regressions based on the combinations of dependent variables and subsamples. Looking at the independent variables we see that all the values of the categorical variables are shown, for example instead of just “race” we find “African/Black”, “White” and “Coloured”. We also notice that the first regression (second column) does not give a result for the “Coloured” value, which makes “Coloured” the so-called base value in this case, meaning that the results for “White” and “African/Black” show the relative increase in odds of a black or white city school respondent having a mediated idol in her list compared to a coloured respondent. In the given example we see that the odds ratio for African/black respondents at city schools is 6.443, meaning that the odds of an African/black respondent at a city school to have a mediated idol is more than six times higher than those of a coloured respondent at a city school. We can also see that this finding is statistically significant as the p-value is 0.031, meaning that the probability that we are observing a change in the dependent variable due to a change in the independent variable (here: “change” from coloured to African/black) and not just as a result of pure chance is very high (probability = $1 - 0.031 = 0.969$ or 97%). The cutoff point for accepting results as statistically significant is commonly set at p-value of 0.05 (in other words: a probability larger than 95%). What is important to understand is that the results for the individual variables show the net effect of a variable, keeping the other independent variables constant. If we look further down the table we find the result for class: an odds ratio of 0.970 and a p-value of 0.057. These results differ from the ones discussed above in two important ways. First, the odds ratio is smaller than 1, meaning that it actually reflects a decrease by the factor 0.03 (1-0.097) in the odds of having a mediated idol with every increase in the class variable by 1. This appears to be a very small decrease compared to the increase we observed with African/black respondents. The difference lies in the type of variable – while in the earlier case of African/black we could only observe a change from 0 to 1 in the independent variable, the class variable is a

10. “Mediated” in the context of this thesis refers to references that have been adopted from the media or public sphere, “acquired” to those that have been acquired through family or schooling.

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continuous variables taking values from 0 to 100, so changes in the variable can be larger than 1. The second difference to our observations on African/black respondents is that the result for the class variable is, strictly speaking, not statistically significant, given its p-value of 0.057. However, in this particular case the decision was made to accept the result as statistically significant due to the extremely tiny margin between the p-value and the confidence level of 95%.

2.4 Key Concepts

2.4.1 Youth

‘Youth’ is a notoriously elastic and ambiguous term which is being applied to different age groups depending on the context and purpose of the publication in which it occurs. At times it is even a contested category as social scientists from the Global South challenge the Northern association of youth and adolescence with leisure and freedom (Tyyskä 2005). In this thesis ‘youth’ or ‘adolescents’ primarily refers to ‘teens’ (15-19) opposed to ‘young adolescents’ (10-14) and ‘young adults’ (20-24). In order to account for the unusual variability of South African and Brazilian life trajectories, exceptions are made for young adolescents whose classmates are predominantly older than them and young adults who are still in grade 10 or 11 (grade 2 or 3 in Brazil). It needs to be noted that the proposed usage of the term ‘youth’ in this thesis differs from what many South Africans understand under youth, as a lot of political commentary, including newspaper articles and scholarly work, describes young adults up to the early 30s as youth due to South Africa’s particular social dynamics which tend to leave young women and especially men in a state of prolonged youth:

The collapse of employment opportunities can prolong ‘youthhood’, by delaying economic independence, marriage and household formation (Hunter, 2007; Seekings, 2008; Klasen & Woolard, 2009). For many youth there is no straightforward pathway to adulthood but instead a permanent state of uncertainty or stagnation. This has been described as “sitting” in Africa (Langevang, 2008) and a “culture of waiting” in India (Jeffrey, 2008, 2010). (Dawson 2012: 32)

2.4.2 Class

Seeing that this thesis borrows heavily from Bourdieu in its theoretical framework, the question arises to what extent it makes use of his conceptualisation of class. What it does not try to do is to take the class categories Bourdieu developed in the context of 1960s France and use them in the context of contemporary South Africa and Brazil. The crux of Bourdieu’s work in terms of class is not a map of social class that can be simply foisted on different societies. Instead it is his theoretical work and conceptual tools that make it possible to derive distinctive categories of social order inductively from knowledge about people’s economic wealth, social connectedness and cultural preferences within the frame of reference in which they are being applied. At the heart of Bourdieu’s approach to class is the aforementioned separation between economical, social and cultural capital. Different combinations and clusters of the three types of capital lead to the establishment of a class hierarchy. The usefulness of this type of work is evident in recent efforts

by Bennett et al (2009) and Savage et al (2013:223) to redefine the British class system:

[Bourdieu] differentiates between (1) economic capital (wealth and income), (2) cultural capital (the ability to appreciate and engage with cultural goods, and credentials institutionalised through educational success), and (3) social capital (contacts and connections which allow people to draw on their social networks). Bourdieu's point is that although these three capitals may overlap, they are also subtly different, and that it is possible to draw fine-grained distinctions between people with different stocks of each of the three capitals, to provide a much more complex model of social class than is currently used.

There have been recent attempts to resurrect class in South Africa, too. Seekings and Natrass (2005: 255), following a more neo-Weberian approach by building on Goldthorpe's (1997) work on class and using occupation (notably on a household, not individual, level) as the defining characteristic, arrive at seven class categories broadly correlating with income distribution with a bit of overlap between neighbouring classes.

Alexander et al (2013), in their book *Class in Soweto*, approach class from a neo-Marxist angle and define it using nine broader employment categories assigned to individuals (rather than households), accounting for the high levels of unemployment, marginal employment and a relatively high mobility of individuals between occupational categories, including unemployment, among Sowetans. They also ascribe crucial value to the notion of agency in their conceptualisation of class, recognising the potential of class consciousness as an identity marker and a source of political activism. This aspect of the work done by the fine team of researchers behind *Class in Soweto* is also evident in their emphasis of subjective class identity; Phadi and Cleruti (2011), in an earlier publication based on the Soweto dataset, discuss the permeability of middle-class identity, while Wale (2013) draws on qualitative interview data in order to demonstrate the usefulness of 'affordability' as a concept in linking perceptions of class mobility defined in cultural vs economic terms.

What these publications have in common, and what sets them apart from this thesis, is that they are primarily concerned with defining class systems that have meaning and reserve applicability beyond a particular research setting. The particular use of class in this thesis is far more pragmatic in its usefulness restricted to the specificity of the study's research design, meaning that its conceptualisation and operationalisation of class arguably has little significance outside the context of this study. This is not to say that its observations on class are meaningless. Instead, what it means is that one needs to consider the context in which these observations were made before trying to extrapolate them to a greater population.

Context indeed matters in the pursuit of a useful treatment of class, especially if the context is a study of school-going youth. This particular study population comes with certain caveats for the definition of class as common measures of class (e.g. occupation, employment categories, economic capital, living standard) are not always immediately applicable or only through a proxy (e.g. parent/caretaker or household). This challenge was further exacerbated by the study's research design as the surveys were conducted at schools, without the possibility to interview the children's parents or caretakers, and the questionnaires were self-administered, adding a relatively

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large degree of inconsistency and subjectivity to the way in which class-related questions were answered. This is also true for a question that asked respondents to self-identify themselves in class terms (which of course is a very subjective question) to which most respondents, regardless of their actual socio-economic background, answered that they are middle-class.

In the end, after much experimentation with all the different questions that were intended to help with the construction of a rich and meaningful class variable, the respondents' residence (the neighbourhood they live in) emerged as the most reliable, valid and ultimately practical measure of class by matching the respondents' answers to this question with neighbourhood-level living standard data measures from the census (see the operationalisation of class in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte on pages 34 and 37). The disadvantage of these measurements is that they are relatively coarse as they do not account for class variation within neighbourhoods. Their advantages are that they are reliable because they are grounded in census data and they are meaningful because they are based on living standard which directly relates to the lived experiences of respondents.

2.4.3 Race

A useful way of starting to conceptualise race involves comparing it to its conceptual sibling: ethnicity. The point can be made that race is commonly used as a social category, defined from the outside, based on phenotypes, and often in order to exclude a certain group of people from privileges, while ethnicity is associated with a shared belief in a common identity within a group, often in order to strengthen the position of a minority in society. Accordingly, the main distinction between race and ethnicity lies in the nature/culture dichotomy; whereas race is mainly, if not purely, associated with natural and physical classifications of humankind (phenotype), ethnicity is preoccupied with culture as the reference point for differentiation (Wade 1993; Hall 1996; Banton 1998; Fenton 2003; Gunaratnam 2003). Certain strands of Black Consciousness literature acknowledge the political interest behind racism (often seen as a direct by-product of historical capitalism), but diverge from the strict race/ethnicity binary by maintaining that race can serve as a powerful tool to create a strong identity of blackness in opposition to the dominance of whiteness in the social sphere (Fanon 1986; 1991; Gilroy 1993; Du Bois 1999; Biko 1987). Both viewpoints, to a lesser and greater extent, support the idea of race being a historically shaped construct, which is unlikely to vanish but is being re-fashioned and re-valued over time.

In the South African context it needs to be pointed out that under apartheid race was not merely a social construct based on biological traits and phenotypes but politically and legally enforced, making it arguably the deciding criterion for one's position in the social order (Posel 2001: 55). In the same vein, it is widely acknowledged that apartheid's race politics were not merely ideological but rather essential to the maintenance of an exploitative capitalist system dependent on the constant supply of cheap labour (Wolpe 1972).

Despite the abundant use of racial descriptors in this thesis the author fully acknowledges the historicity of race and rejects any notion of race grounded in biology. He therefore also recogn-

ises the shifting meaning of race, not only of the concept in its entirety over time, but also situationally on an individual level (see page 79 for a discussion of the fluidity of race in Brazil). Nonetheless he is also conscious of the continuing significance of essentialised race-thinking in South Africa and elsewhere. And as much as this author subscribes to the humanist vision of a world without racial classifications, he is also cautious of simply ignoring race and its immense significance for many in South Africa and elsewhere. Although a post-racial society remains the goal for anyone who believes in egalitarianism, ignoring race in contemporary society can have the adverse effect of what it is supposed to achieve in the presence of a racially defined hierarchy of privilege:

Although as an ideal the race neutral vision remains a valuable guidepost for the future of any healthy multi-racial democracy, in practical terms it functions [...] to cast a blind eye toward the enduring problem of racial injustice. Moral prescriptions about skin color being of no consequence and symmetrical discourses of treating everyone the same – prescriptions that adhere strongly to egalitarian, democratic, and even anti-racist discourses – are thereby put in the service of defending the consequences of the historical violation of race neutrality. (Ansell 2006: 352)

2.5 Operationalisation

2.5.1 Cape Town

Race

One challenge that occurred during the writing up of the thesis was to find a way of using the term “race” and racial descriptors in a way that does justice to the social constructedness of the concept. Two options seemed plausible: (1) to use quotation marks for race and racial categories, and/or (2) to use more precise descriptions such “respondents who classified themselves as coloured”. In the end the decision was taken to refrain from both and instead make the author’s stance on this topic explicit (which is done here). In the opinion of the author, the use of quotation marks for racial descriptors can suggest a certain artificiality of the concept race that sets it apart from other social categories used as identity markers, be it in terms of gender, nationality, language, religious beliefs, sexuality etc. The social constructedness inherent to all of these identifiers, and their exclusive potential, are understood and acknowledged, yet they are very ‘real’ to those who identify with, or are affected by them. The same is true for race, hence it should not be treated differently from other social constructs used as social categories. The second option, using more precise descriptions in lieu of racial descriptors, is a good way of dealing with the risk of further essentialising notions of race through writing, yet even though some effort was made in parts of the thesis to do it justice, it was ultimately found to be impractical in a thesis that contains references to race in virtually every other sentence.

In practice, the race variable used in most of the analysis is a composite of two different questions; one being subjective (“When you think about race, how do you classify yourself?”), the

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other objective (“How do other people see you in terms of race?”). For both questions respondents could choose from *African*, *Coloured*, *White*, *Black*, *Indian*, *I refuse to define myself or others in racial terms* or *Other* with the option to write down their own description. The consolidated variable gives priority to the reply to the first, subjective, question if it is one of the four core categories *Black*, *Coloured*, *White* or *Refuse*. If the reply to the first question is either *African* or simply missing and the reply to the second question is not missing, it was coded according to the second question, given that African is a broad category which lends itself to various (e.g. geographical) interpretations. Finally, those who describe themselves as *Indian* were grouped with those who ticked *Other* and *African* and *Black* were grouped into *African/Black*.¹¹

11. One exception to these rules is a group of 17 respondents at Khayelitsha High and Macassar High who described themselves as white. One can safely assume that none of the learners at those particular schools would objectively be described this way, and there are only three possible reasons why some of them responded “white”. First, they did not take the question seriously, misunderstood the question or they simply ticked the wrong box by accident. Second, they either wanted to make a point about the perceived irrationality of the question. Third, they in fact identify themselves with being white. While the second and third possibilities might apply in some of these cases, it is more likely that the great majority falls into the first category. As the 17 cases would account for about nine percent of all observations of white, the decision was taken to exclude these observations from any analysis involving the race variable by coding them as ‘missing’.

Table 2.5 Consolidated Race Variable (Cape Town)

How do you see yourself?	How do others see you?								Total
	African	Coloured	Indian	White	Black	Refuse	Other	Missing	
African	118	11	0	9	49	4	1	3	195
Coloured	2	324	5	15	9	5	2	10	372
Indian	0	1	13	0	1	1	1	0	17
White	0	10	0	148	4	1	5	5	173
Black	33	13	3	7	187	5	0	6	254
Refuse	11	24	1	15	16	41	2	3	113
Other	0	4	0	3	1	1	3	3	15
Missing	4	4	0	4	7	1	0	37	57
Total	168	391	22	201	274	59	14	67	1196

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Table 2.5 shows a high degree of consistency in self-identification and self-reported identification by others which is in line with other studies on race in post-apartheid Cape Town and South Africa (Seekings 2008: 6).

It is important to note that different versions of the consolidated race variable are used throughout the analysis, as it is not always useful, necessary or possible to retain all categories in certain kinds of statistical analysis. For descriptive purposes, as in figure 2.1 on page 14, sometimes the 'long' version with all categories (except missing values) is being used. In other cases a 'medium' version is used which excludes the *Other* category. The most common, however, is the 'short' variant which consists only of the three largest groups, *African/Black*, *Coloured* and *White*, which cover over 80 percent of the whole sample (including missing cases). This also means that just short of 20 percent of the sample were not considered throughout most of the analysis. The decision for this was based on the lack of information about why respondents chose not to classify themselves in racial terms as unfortunately no follow-up questions were included in the questionnaires and the topic was also not discussed in the focus group interviews. What can be said looking at table 2.5 is that a much larger proportion of coloured and white respondents, compared to African/black respondents, seemed to refuse classifying themselves, but even this is not entirely certain as almost half of the refusing group also refused to say what, in their opinion, others think of them in racial terms. Despite the negative impact the relatively high non-response rate to the race questions might have on the analysis, it can be argued that asking them this way was still the right thing to do from an ethical point of view, especially in the context of young respondents, where the further naturalisation of race-thinking through strict categorisation would be a highly undesirable side-effect of this sort of research.

The following table shows the differences between the three race variables and can be used as a reference for the frequency distribution of the race variable shown in a table or figure.

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Table 2.6 *Race Variables (Cape Town)*

Race	n	Long	Medium	Short
African/Black	437	38.1%	39.3%	43.9%
Coloured	374	32.6%	33.6%	37.6%
White	184	16.1%	16.5%	18.5%
Refuse	118	10.3%	10.6%	
Other	33	2.9%		
Missing	50			
N	1196	1159	1126	1008

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Ethical questions about asking teenagers to identify themselves in racial terms arose at the beginning of the research process. Allowing respondent to “refuse to define myself or others in racial terms” was one of the measures to alleviate these concerns. Survey participants were also debriefed after the survey, and the use of racial terms was discussed during the debriefing.

Class

In this study, ‘class’ is synonymous with ‘living conditions’, since the nature of the survey allows only for limited information about the respondents’ actual social-economic situation. Data on the employment of their parents has been collected, but it is very subjective and partly incoherent. Moreover, there is no data on household income, which would have helped in compiling an actual class variable.

Instead respondents were asked which suburb or neighbourhood they live in. This information was aligned with an index on living conditions in Cape Town’s suburbs which was compiled as part of a study commissioned by the City of Cape Town using census data from 2001 (Romanovsky and Gie 2006). The index takes into account the level of education, unemployment, household income, unskilled employment, housing and access to public services in a neighbourhood. In nine out of ten cases the suburb given by the respondent could be successfully matched with an entry in the index list. The remaining missing cases (119) were imputed using replies to some of the survey questions about the respondents’ actual living conditions – ratio of people per room at residence and access to water, electricity and sanitation – as well as her or his school. The ‘raw’ living condition index was then grouped into five categories (‘Very Low’ to ‘Very High’) with fairly equal frequencies. Table 2.2 on page 14 shows the distribution of the class variable.

The use of living conditions as a proxy for class has theoretical implications for the interpretation of the results presented below. For one, it does not comply with traditional Marxist notions of class, in which the subject’s positioning in society is essentially determined by her or his relationship to the means of production. In the case of schoolchildren this would have been a problematic approach anyway, although the parents’ occupation could have fulfilled that role (see above for reasons why this was not feasible), and in a way the use of living conditions on a

neighbourhood level is closer to a Weberian understanding of class in the sense of shared life chances. The fact that neighbourhood-level data on living conditions (especially in heterogeneous neighbourhoods) obscure the actual living conditions of the individual is largely mitigated by the strong correlation between neighbourhood income and occupational class as well as education (life chances) in Cape Town. According to the Cape Area Study 2005 (CAS) 22% of people living in Cape Town's neighbourhoods with the highest income (top quintile in terms of neighbourhood income) belong to the upper or semi-professional class compared to 14% living in neighbourhood with the lowest income (bottom quintile). Similarly, 80% of residents in the high-income areas have matric¹² opposed to 23% in the low-income neighbourhoods.

Social Status and Institutionalised Cultural Capital (School)

The conceptual difficulties of coming up with a meaningful variable for social status when dealing with a sample of teenagers have already been discussed earlier (see pages 25 to 28). The decision to use schools as a proxy is a compromise which might not be entirely satisfactory but necessary given the circumstances. In practice the variable is applied in two different ways due to the decision to distinguish between city and African/black samples in regressions. In the first, city mode the schools are used individually, their effect in the regressions discussed according to racial and class compositions and their position in school-fees based ranking (Atlantic High, Northern High, Southern High, Cape Flats High – in this order). In the second mode which looks only at African/black respondents, city schools and township schools are grouped in a binary variable reflecting the fundamental differences between the two types.

Language

The respondents were asked to give their preferred language, i.e. the language in which they think and dream, out of a list including all of South Africa's official languages and some general categories (e.g. 'other European language' and 'other (South) African language'). Nine out of ten respondents chose one of the three major languages in the Western Cape: Afrikaans, English or Xhosa. Another eight percent answered the question technically incorrectly by ticking more than one box (the instruction to the question in the questionnaire asked to tick only one box only), but two thirds of those (61 cases) ticked 'English' as one of their choices. It was decided to treat these bilingualists as English speakers seeing that they are influenced by English to the extent that it impacts on their innermost thoughts and dreams. Overall, the proportion of respondents falling into the three main categories comes to 95 percent. Excluding other or missing observations (65 cases) results in the following composition of the basic language variable.

12. Matric is the qualification received on graduating from high school in South Africa.

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Table 2.7 *Language Variable (Cape Town)*

Language	n	%
English	639	56.5%
Xhosa	410	36.3%
Afrikaans	82	7.3%
N	1131	100%

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

For the regression analyses, however, a more meaningful version of the language variable was used. Assuming that taste preferences, especially when it comes to the impact of foreign influences on taste, are associated with a preference for English over someone's native language, the actual language variable consists of three categories: (1) native English speakers whose parents' first language is already English, (2) 'preferring' English speakers who prefer to speak English but whose parents are not native English speakers, and (3) those who prefer to speak a language other than English.

Gender

Gender is coded in a dummy variable 'Male'. 55 percent of respondents are female, 45 percent male.

2.5.2 Belo Horizonte

Race

Given the greater fluidity of racial categories in Brazil compared to South Africa, the decision was taken to ask the respondents an open-ended question in addition to the subjective and objective¹³ questions and to base the race variable used in the statistical analyses primarily on the cleaned replies to this question. Interestingly, over eighty percent of the open-ended replies are common racial descriptors, most in line with the racial classifications used in the census. About another nine percent either did not answer the question at all or used race-unrelated terms (i.e. by writing down the name of a famous local football team). Thus only (given the alleged invisibility of race in Brazil) about eleven percent expressed indifference (e.g. by writing "human" or "Brazilian") or openly refused to answer the question in racial terms. If the open-ended question was answered ambiguously (empty or refusal/indifference) the reply to the subjective, closed-ended question was used for classification. If this one also did not fall into one of the main categories, the objective question was used. As with the Cape Town survey, different versions of the race variable are used for different purposes; the 'long' version consists of all (grouped) categories, the 'medium' version dispenses with the *Other* category (*Indígena* and *Amarelo*) and the

13. The subjective question is equivalent to "How do you classify yourself in racial terms?" and the objective to "How do other people see you in terms of race?". Respondents could choose from one of the census options (Branco, Preto, Pardo, Amarelo or Indígena) or indicate that they refuse to define themselves or others in racial terms.

‘short’ variable does without the *Other* and *Refuse* categories. In discussions of the survey results sometimes the term “mixed” is used for *Pardo/Mestizo* in order to account for the fluidity of this particular category. In addition, and with reference to some studies suggesting that the crucial racial divide in Brazilian is between white and non-white, a binary variable is also used in some parts of the thesis.

Table 2.8 Consolidated Race Variable (Belo Horizonte)¹⁴

Race	n	Long	Medium	Short	Binary
Preto/Negro	85	10.1%	10.5%	10.7%	50.4%
Pardo/Mestizo	317	37.5%	39.1%	39.8%	
Branco	395	46.8%	48.8%	49.6%	49.6%
Refuse	13	1.5%	1.6%		
Other	35	4.1%			
Missing	15				
N	860	845	810	797	797

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Class

The class variable is an index of census variables on neighbourhood-level which are fairly comparable to the components used for the Cape Town class variable. The difference between the two class variables is the lack of individual socio-economic indicators in the Brazilian case, leading to a coarser measure of class (based purely on someone’s place of residence) compared to the Cape Town data (based on someone’s place of residence and her or his responses to a bunch of questions related to their standard of living and parents’ employment) and the inability to impute missing values from the additional variables.¹⁵ The four components of the class index derive from the components of the Human Development Index (HDI) and include the percentage of individuals over 25 with less than eight years formal education, the unemployment rate among 18-59 year old individuals, the percentage of households with less than two minimum incomes, and the percentage of individuals in informal employment. For descriptive purposes a grouped version of the raw class variable is sometimes used (see figure 2.4 on page 20).

Social Status (School)

As with the Cape Town survey, social status is not easily conceptualised and operationalised in research context based on a school setting with teenagers as survey participants. However, Belo Horizonte’s particular school system actually helps to justify the choice of schools as proxy for

14. Comparing these proportions with the results of the Belo Horizonte Area Study it appears that white (branco) respondents are somewhat oversampled at the expense of black (preto) and ‘mixed’ (pardo) respondents: Preto 20%, Pardo 46%, Branco 34%. This is arguably due to the larger student bodies of the two private schools in the sample which have proportionally fewer poor and black respondents than public schools.

15. The individual socio-economic questions were excluded from the Brazilian questionnaire as the original (Cape Town) version was considered too lengthy.

2. Research Design

social status. Unlike with the Cape Town survey, private and public schools were included in the sample as the public school system in Brazil generally covers a far narrower segment of society than the one found in South Africa with its legacy of 'good' and expensive former Model C schools. Incidentally private schools in Belo Horizonte are concentrated in the wealthy parts of the metropolitan area (southern part of the city centre) whereas public schools are found in the urban periphery, including Contagem where the public schools in the sample are located (see pages 18 to 22 for a detailed description of the schools). The geographical characteristics of the sample then allowed for a binary distinction between private and public schools which not only reflects the centre/periphery character but also the very real connotation of social privilege associated with living and going to school in Belo Horizonte's wealthy city centre as opposed to the industrial working-class setting commonly associated with Contagem.

3. Subcultures or Cultural Omnivores?

3.1 The View from Within: (Post-)Subcultural theory

Early Youth Studies and Subcultural theory at the CCCS

The first place to look for a comprehensive and coherent interpretation of youth culture is in the archives of the (now defunct) Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham. It was here during the 1970s and early 1980s that subcultural theory was established as an autonomous academic field and ‘subculture’ and ‘youth culture’¹⁶ were given the meaning of youth cultural practices shaped by their social contexts. Before, these terms were used ambiguously by writers within the fields of sociology, psychology and criminology, generally in order to explain social deviance and delinquency among youth. The earliest usage of the term ‘subculture’ in the negative sense can be traced back to the beginnings of urban sociology at the University of Chicago in the 1920s, where the formal study of youth as an autonomous subsection of society (not just as a developmental phase) began (Blackman 2005). Although the researchers of the Chicago School (Burgess 1923; Shaw 1930) were preoccupied with the negative aspects of youth, their studies can be seen as a precursor to the work at the CCCS as their authors did not try to understand ‘deviance’ as a consequence of psychological deficiency but as the result of its socio-economic context.

Largely unrelated to the Chicago School but similar in its approach and conclusions is the work on youth and delinquency by American functionalists. Talcott Parsons used the concept of ‘youth culture’ in order to describe the intermediary life stage between childhood and adulthood with its own set of values and rules. Building on Parson’s functionalism a body of work in criminology set out to explain the higher prevalence of crime in lower social classes compared to upper classes. In *Social Theory and Social Structure* (which borrows from an earlier article from 1938) Robert K. Merton (1957), a former research student of Parsons, basically reiterates the findings of the Chicago School on deviance which stressed social causes opposed to individual characteristics. Approximately at the same time Albert K. Cohen (1956) made use of Merton’s (1938) earlier work in a study of juvenile gangs, titled *Delinquent Boys – The Subculture of the Gang*. Cohen, like Merton, focusses on class structure but the explanatory part of his analysis goes beyond the purely structural and includes psychological causes as he identifies peer influence and the striving for social status as two crucial variables behind lower-class crime.

Another influential work on the pressures of peer culture which helped to reinforce the idea of youth as separate from the realities of adult life was *The Adolescent Society* by James Coleman (Coleman 1961). Coleman, who is best known for his work in educational sociology, gave voice to concerns about a supposedly widening gap in beliefs and values between youth and their parent generations in the early 1960s. The psychological aspects of Cohen’s and Coleman’s work are

16. Although subcultural studies are not restricted to youth, the terms ‘subculture’ and ‘youth culture’ are sometimes used interchangeably as much work on subcultures focusses on teenagers and young adults. Youth culture, however, is also used in a much broader fashion in order to separate the experience of growing up from adult life. And Bourdieu, as discussed on page 48, did not engage much with the cultural preferences of youth at all. Here the term youth culture refers to the taste and cultural preferences of youth in general.

reflected in a strain of psychological and psychoanalytical studies on youth delinquency which was prominent in Britain from as early as the 1920s (Burt 1925) until the formation of subcultural theory at the CCCS. These studies were later criticised or rejected due to their tendency to associate working class behaviour with psychological deficiency (Blackman 2005).

British subcultural theory, following the general trend towards cultural studies, developed out of a desire to overcome the pathological interpretation of subculture in favour of a semiotic reading of subcultures characterised by stylistic differences, as proposed by Phil Cohen (1992, first published in 1972) in the groundbreaking article *Subcultural Conflict and Working Class Community*. The change from subculture or youth culture in the singular to subcultures in the plural is thus more than just a semantic phenomenon as it meant the study of different youth subcultures according to their inherent sets of rules, hierarchies and rituals. Subcultures were no longer seen as dangerous deviations from the mainstream or the results of psychological deficiencies, but as autonomous cultural bodies that could be studied 'from within'. Structural anthropology, with its key concepts bricolage and myth in the tradition of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966), contributed much to this theoretical framework. The aim was a semiotic reading of subcultures, an interpretation of youth culture as style and language, which was achieved by Dick Hebdige (1979) in *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* portraying Punk rockers' appropriation and reworking of common cultural objects into spectacular demonstrations of public resistance to mainstream culture.

Another major theoretical influence on British subcultural theory, reflected in the notion of resistance, is cultural Marxism. In the context of class friction and the challenging of social norms and values in 1960s/1970s' Britain, authors associated with the CCCS made use of Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony in order to interpret the emerging wave of youth movements challenging the social conventions of the parent generation (e.g. punks, skinheads, mods) as a resistance of working class youth to dominant social forces.¹⁷ In their use of cultural Marxism they borrowed heavily from the work of Raymond Williams (1977), who proposed a view of popular culture which does away with the notion of cultural texts as the work of individual authors in favour of an analysis taking into account the "(...) complex relationships between authorial intent, institutional process and aesthetic form" (Osgerby 2004: 115), resulting in the seminal collection of studies on subcultures by CCCS authors, *Resistance Through Rituals* (Hall and Jefferson 1976).

The relative optimism of the CCCS authors with regard to working class youth is evident in their portrayal of adolescents as critical and discerning consumers of media and popular culture. Despite their clear Marxist affiliations the CCCS authors eschewed the pessimistic notions of Marxist theorists associated with the Frankfurt School, which is exemplified in the work of Theodor Adorno (1991). Central to Adorno's claims was an interpretation of the rise of commercial popular culture and the commodification of culture as the demise of 'high culture' and the standardization of socio-cultural processes through the 'culture industry' in the interests of the dominant

17. It can be argued that the structural analysis of youth, with its emphasis on class differences, which was crucial to early American sociological studies of youth, has found its continuance in British subcultural theory. But where the former was preoccupied with supposedly 'deviant' cultural practices of the working class, British subcultural theory offered a positive reading of working class youth culture as legitimate and socially acceptable.

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classes in capitalist societies:

The Marxist version of the 'mass culture' thesis, then, saw popular music as a bland, standardised product working in the service of capitalism. From this perspective, popular music (in common with other branches of the 'culture industry') was criticised for not only underpinning the operation of an exploitative capitalist market, but also for fostering banal conformity among its audiences. (Osgerby 2004: 111)

The CCCS authors confirmed the growing significance of the media and consumerism in the making of youth identities but, influenced by Raymond Williams, they did not make any qualitative difference between 'high' and 'low' culture and refused to portray consumers of popular culture as passive victims of that process. Instead they saw the media and outlets of popular culture, such as music and fashion, as sites of competition between different subcultures fueled by social friction in British society. To them subcultures were not just inventions of the media industry but also ways of life, acquiring their own sense of authenticity. It is at this point where the idea of a singular youth culture opposed to adult generations is substituted by a fractious array of multiple subcultures in competition with each other.

It is noteworthy that the different publications associated with the CCCS were not always consistent with each other and partly even critical of some aspects of what would become known as subcultural theory. This is certainly true for Angela McRobbie and Jenny Garber's (1976) chapter on girls and subculture in *Resistance and Rituals*. Arguing from a feminist standpoint they raise objections against the portrayal of subcultures as purely or mainly masculine phenomena and the lack of critical engagement with some of the sexist elements in subcultures encountered by their fellow researchers in Birmingham.

Another point of contention was the very concept of subculture itself, first formulated by Paul Willis who points to the paucity of explanatory potential of subcultural theory with respect to the logical counterpart of subculture – the mainstream:

There has not been a vigorous analysis of the status of the culture a sub-culture is supposed to be 'sub' to. The notion implies a relative positioning which seems to give an altogether misleading sense of absoluteness and dominance of the main culture. (Willis 1972: : xlv-xlvi)

Indeed the idea of subculture as a form of resistance was about to receive much criticism once postmodernism established itself as one of the leading paradigms in the 1980s and 1990s.

Post-structural critiques of subcultural theory

The main point of criticism targeted at the Birmingham School concerned its portrayal of subcultures as a form of working class resistance based on neo-Marxist ideas. Central to post-structural

turalists' arguments was the image of the 'tribe' or 'neo-tribe'¹⁸, opposed to subculture, as the organising principle for youth in an increasingly consumerist society. The change of label was meaningful as it represented a shift from a Marxist-influenced view of youth culture (the notion of subcultures as a form of resistance towards the dominant culture) to a Weberian approach that devalued the political aspect of youth culture in favour of individual agency and hedonistic consumerism:

Secondly, given that in studies which use 'subculture' in relation to youth, music and style there is a grounding belief that subcultures are subsets of society, or cultures within cultures, such a concept imposes lines of divisions and social categories which are very difficult to verify in empirical terms.

(...) On the contrary, it seems to me that so-called youth 'subcultures' are prime examples of the unstable and shifting cultural affiliations which characterise late modern consumer-based societies. (Bennett 1999: 605)

The new emphasis on agency and fluidity implies a greater autonomy of youth in their search for identity in tune with a South African trend analyst's assertion that "a person isn't isolated in his or her music or fashion taste any more" (Gamble 2008: 205), meaning that someone's association with a certain 'tribe' is no longer absolute and is lived through consumption and performance. If the emergence of youth subcultural theory meant the breakdown of youth culture into multiple subcultures, then post-subcultural theory brought the level down to the smallest possible entity – the individual teenager within its immediate locality.

3.2 The View from Above: Bourdieu's Distinction in Contemporary Society

The Problem with Free Choice in Highly Structured Societies

As a result of the postmodern notion of fluid identities, one common perception of youth today, in South Africa and elsewhere, is that they are far more flexible in their lifestyle choices than earlier generations. From a seemingly endless pool of trends, fashions and styles they pick and choose whatever they like and accommodates their individual taste, independent of their financial means and/or cultural background. This biased view of youth shown in glossy magazines and music clips on television disregards the very real social, economical and cultural restrictions young people find themselves in. David Hesmondhalgh (2005: 25), in a critical review of old and new literature on subcultures, scenes and tribes, brings this scepticism towards a purely individualistic interpretation of youth culture to the point when he asks: "But what of the factors that might limit or constrain such choice: poverty, addiction, mental illness, social suffering, marginal-

18. The term 'tribe' originates from the book *The Time of the Tribes* (first published in French in 1988) by the Italian philosopher Michael Maffesoli (1996). It is noteworthy that although Maffesoli indeed discusses the consequences of a celebration of consumerism for society, he does not make any direct references to youth culture as such. In fact, the use of Maffesoli by, for example, Bennett (1999b) in his description of postmodern youth tribes is rather questionable as he does not pay attention to most of the nuances and influences in Maffesoli's work. This becomes evident if one contrasts the book's subtitle *The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society* with the proclamation of free choice in post-structural portrayals of youth.

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isation, disempowerment, unequal access to education, childcare and healthcare, and so on?”

The disregard for structural causes in most (post-)subcultural writing manifests itself in the level of analysis; studies of subcultures, scenes or tribes mostly deal with only one particular group in contrast to what is usually referred to as ‘the mainstream’ and are ethnographic in nature. Thus they often provide very detailed accounts of the dynamics within that particular group, and the symbolic meanings of commodities within those group dynamics, but they provide little insight into the general consumption patterns of youngsters. Two examples in point are the studies of Haupt (2008)¹⁹ and Basson (2007) on South Africa’s local Hip Hop and Punk scenes, respectively. Although these are two very different and distinct subcultures, they are both being portrayed as deviations from the norm and as some form of resistance to the prevailing social order in South Africa. Basson (2007: 82) writes in the conclusion to her paper:

Originally inspired by the immediate novelty of taking pride in their national identity after the transition, these individuals eventually came to question their minority status and to what extent they were a part of the African Renaissance. As a small group of mostly white middle class males, punk gives them a space that allows them to enjoy being different from the norm. Their punk disguises arm them with the weapon of ridicule, allowing them to comment on the world around them and negotiate their identities in the new South Africa.

Haupt (2008: 217) also stresses the importance of difference and resistance in his description of conscious Hip Hop in South Africa:

Whilst it is largely true that a significant aspect of hip-hop has been co-opted by the mainstream media, certain forms of hip-hop continue to offer meaningful avenues of expression and critical engagement for a specific set of subjects. This is so partly because ‘conscious’ hip-hop artists have aligned their work as artists with their identities as activists and educators. The work produced by these subjects thus does not hinge upon the articulation of counter-hegemonic positions exclusively, but relies on a measure of social action as well. This issue is worth consideration in the South African context due to the fact that marginal subjects are not merely dealing with inequalities produced by global capitalism and US cultural imperialism. They also have to negotiate the legacy of apartheid.

Basson and Haupt describe Punk and conscious Hip Hop as avenues for those feeling marginalised by the current political imperatives. The reasons for the sense of marginalisation experienced by their study subjects certainly differ: white middle-class kids trying to come to terms with the political change in post-apartheid South Africa vs black kids resisting the neo-liberal economic climate. Yet the main theme providing the backdrop for both scenes is resistance to the social norm – the mainstream – and a coming to terms with South Africa’s dark legacy of apartheid.

Given the emphasis on resistance it is not surprising that both authors borrow heavily from the

19. Adam Haupt’s (2008) book *Stealing Empire: P2P, intellectual property and hip-hop subversion* deals with a far wider range topics than just South African Hip Hop, and Haupt has published several articles specifically dealing with local music scenes. Nevertheless the book does include an extensive treatment of the theoretical and ideological ideas behind ‘conscious’ Hip Hop which incorporates some of the main arguments from Haupt’s earlier papers on the subject.

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CCCS archives, albeit not entirely uncritically (especially Basson stresses the advantages of focusing on youth identities instead of subcultures or scenes). Thus they are both exposed to much of the criticism which classic subcultural theorists are confronted with, such as being subjective in the definition and description of the group in question, over- or misinterpreting the symbolic processes within the group and failing to provide a firm understanding of what these groups are actually opposed to – the so-called mainstream. This last point, referring to the schism between subcultures and mainstream, proves indeed problematic for both Basson and Haupt. Basson (2007: 81) herself doubts that South African punks actually know what they stand against:

So, why do a group of youths who appreciate their country and its creative benefits have a preference for a discourse and disguise that gives them the freedom to comment and criticise, more or less undetected? Perhaps it reflects a sense of uncertainty about where they stand in the current context and an insecurity to oppose anything directly.

Haupt's book, on the other hand, is much clearer about what is understood under the 'mainstream' and contains a full chapter about what he calls the 'Empire', in dependence on Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's book of the same name about the economic, military and cultural hegemony of capitalist societies at the end of the 20th century. It basically combines a pessimistic neo-Marxist critique of neoliberalism, corporate globalisation and social injustice with an optimistic reading of global networking and shared experiences through globalisation as promising avenues for anti-capitalist political protest and activism. Haupt (200: 85) interprets this combination as a fruitful coming-together of neo-Marxism and poststructural theory:

On the one hand, Empire adopts a Marx-inspired emphasis on class and economic relations in order to explain the ways in which dominant global interests regulate the lives of subjects. This emphasis accounts for both class disparities within nation-states and disparities between wealthy countries of the northern hemisphere and poorer countries of the southern hemisphere. On the other hand, Empire also adopts post-structuralist thinking by looking at decentred networks of power (the power of transnational corporations, which transcends national boundaries, for example) in a globalised world as well as at multiple, network-oriented challenges (such as media activism, social movements' use of digital media or counter-discursive art) to imbalances that are created by neo-liberal economic policies.

According to Haupt's interpretation of 'Empire', globalisation represents simultaneously the main cause of as well as solution to global injustice, and conscious Hip Hop provides a creative way for educating young people about the perils of capitalism and possibilities for counter-hegemonic activism. Thereby he offers a sophisticated and refreshed version of subculturalists' interpretation of subculture as a form of class-based resistance which manages to incorporate the global aspect of youth culture and media dissemination today. Yet despite its ambitious theoretical framework, Haupt's work on South African youth cannot escape the claims made against a Marxist depiction of youth culture altogether. On first sight his description of conscious Hip Hop as a counter-discursive movement that arises from within the hegemonic core might delude the clear boundary between mainstream and subculture, core and periphery, but in the end it is

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built on the same bipolar world view characterising much Marxist writing. In the context of popular culture the concept of 'Empire' evokes, arguably not entirely unintentionally, an imagery loosely associated with one of the most successful franchises of Western popular culture – Star Wars. The intergalactic war between the evil empire and brave rebels serves as the ideal metaphor for the kind of narrative tools employed by Haupt, in which the supposedly morally superior rebels reject the dominant empire's all-embracing, homogenising and remarkably faceless power in favour of individualism and self-determination.

As intriguing as it is to gain insights into the motives and strategies of young South Africans who deliberately refuse to 'fit in', ultimately these studies leave much room for speculation about whether they are representative for the whole of South African youth, and if not, where the majority of South African youngsters is located in the cultural landscape between periphery and mainstream. The argument made here is that a Marxist conceptualisation of youth culture, or subcultures, does not provide the best way to understand the very real structural variables underlying the distinctions between the various taste groups found in South Africa today. What is proposed instead is a theoretical approach which borrows from Bourdieu the emphasis on social stratification, cultural capital and reproduction of class consciousness and enhances it with recent insights into the importance of supposedly secondary factors (such as race, ethnicity, gender, and education) while showing sensibility towards local contexts within a globalised and increasingly mediated world.

Towards a New Paradigm

One of Bourdieu's greatest accomplishments was to provide a powerful set of tools for deciphering the role of taste in the reproduction of social inequality. Leaving the dualism of Marxist cultural analysis behind, he offers a far more nuanced understanding of how taste serves as the intermediary in the exchange between economic and cultural capital:

If it is true, as I have endeavoured to establish, that, first, the dominant class constitutes a relatively autonomous space whose structure is defined by the distribution of economic and cultural capital among its members, each class fraction being characterized by a certain configuration of this distribution to which there corresponds a certain life-style, through the mediation of the habitus; that, second, the distribution of these two types of capital among the fractions is symmetrically and inversely structured; and that, third, the different inherited asset structures, together with social trajectory, command the habitus and the systematic choices it produces in all areas of practice, of which the choices commonly regarded as aesthetic are one dimension – then these structures should be found in the space of life-styles, i.e., in the different systems of properties in which the different systems of dispositions express themselves. (Bourdieu 2010: 257)

Bourdieu's differentiation between economic and cultural capital (alongside social capital) is crucial as social inequality is commonly understood in economic terms whereas the importance of culture is often underestimated or misunderstood. (Bennett et al 2009: 11) Cultural capital is measured in an individual's cultural preferences, dispositions and knowledge, accumulated

primarily during childhood. It comes easily, almost naturally as it is indeed embodied, to those who grow up in an environment already rich in cultural capital (in the family, school or usually a combination of both). And its value is not merely nominal but translates into socio-economic advantages as those rich in cultural capital share similar tastes and preferences which helps, for example, in job interviews, business negotiations or, for that matter, any situation in which the perceived ‘cultured-ness’ of someone might count in her or his favour.

It is worth mentioning that definitions of cultural capital, by Bourdieu himself and others, are relatively fluid and shift over time. For example, Lareau and Lamont (1988) maintain that in Bourdieu’s earlier writings cultural capital was primarily understood as a measurement of informal academic standards as social attributes, and only encompassed cultural preferences more generally, as both indicators and determinators of class, in *Distinction*.²⁰ Thus they propose a definition of cultural capital that focusses on its exclusive properties and function which resonates with its usage in this thesis:

[W]e propose to define cultural capital as *institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion*, the former referring to exclusion from jobs and resources, and the latter, to exclusion from high status groups. (Lareau and Lamont 1988: 156)

The clearest definition by Bourdieu himself with regards to the forms of cultural capital (not so much its function) is to be found in *The Forms of Capital* (Bourdieu 1986), in which he distinguishes between three types of cultural capital: *embodied, institutionalised and objectified*:

Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee.

In a recent article on the intergenerational reproduction of cultural capital Kraaykamp and van Eijck (2011) maintain that the distinction between the three states of cultural capital has often been neglected in favour of a more selective *pars pro toto* conceptualisation that focusses on only one of the three forms. In their own analysis of the interrelationships between the three types across multiple generations of participants in the Family Survey in the Netherlands they find that while the reproduction of cultural capital across generations is a universal phenomenon, the de-

20. On the origins of Bourdieu’s ambiguous use of cultural capital as a concept:

[I]n Bourdieu’s global theoretical framework, cultural capital is alternatively an informal academic standard, a class attribute, a basis for social selection, and a resource for power which is salient as an indicator/basis of class position. Subtle shifts across these analytical levels are found throughout the work. This polysemy makes for the richness of Bourdieu’s writings, and is a standard of excellence in French academia (Lamont 1987a). However the absence of explicit statements makes systematic comparison and assessment of the work extremely difficult. (Lareau and Lamont 1988: 156)

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gree of this transmission is different for each form of cultural capital (Kraaykamp and van Eijck 2011: 225). A similar point regarding the multi-facetedness of cultural capital is made by Bennett et al (2009: 257), adding technical, affective, national and subcultural forms of cultural capital to the list.

In the light of Kraaykamp and van Eijck's and Bennet et al's findings it appears fruitful to think about the value of a conceptual differentiation between embodied, institutionalised and objectified cultural capital in the context of contemporary South African youth. Here, embodied cultural capital could refer to what is commonly seen as the 'proper' way of carrying oneself (behaviours associated with the dominant classes) as opposed to physical expressions of being part of a particular subculture, such as a particular way of walking or talking. For example, interview respondents sometimes mentioned the walk of so-called 'wannabe gangsters', and others talked about the slang that they were using instead of "proper English/Xhosa/Afrikaans". Or, being true to Bourdieu's assertion that embodied cultural capital also takes "the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind", one could make distinctions between those who prefer to listen to Jazz and Classical Music opposed to others who are into Pop, Rock or Kwaito. Accordingly, embodied cultural capital often goes hand in hand with a particular form of objectified cultural capital, for example in terms of clothing: neat and tidy shirts and chinos vs hip hoppers' baggy pants and branded T-shirts or skinny jeans and black shirts worn by emos.

By now the question arises: can Bourdieu's intricate theory of how cultural capital constitutes the dominance of the middle- and upper-classes in society be reduced to broad distinctions between mannerisms and clothing styles of South African youth? And indeed, the distinctions described above appear to be merely anecdotal and lacking the hierarchical element of Bourdieu's class-based analysis. The argument here is that class distinctions are indeed more opaque but nonetheless present among youth, and they become discernible if one takes the third, institutionalised, form of cultural capital into the equation. In this regard the school remains the primary location where institutionalised cultural capital is evident. There are clear class differences between schools (with school fees being the simplest differentiator) as well as varying levels of adaptation by children to the respective school conditions, as children of parents with a high level of institutionalised cultural capital (i.e. children of parents with tertiary education and respective cultural preferences) are more likely to feel at home in the elitist environment found at the supposedly 'better' schools.

The hypothesis here is that some forms of embodied and objectified cultural capital correlate with institutionalised capital. In other words: certain styles and fashions are more common at upper-class schools than at lower-class schools.

The reason for the lack of clarity around youth culture and cultural capital stems from Bourdieu's treatment of youth in his work, or rather the lack thereof. In fact he has surprisingly little to say about the tastes and cultural preferences of young people as he is first and foremost concerned with class and social origin, which are both, in his framework, primarily correlated with occupational categories which do not apply to school-going youth. This goes hand in hand with

the transitional nature of youth itself; whereas Bourdieu is preoccupied with established and fairly static types of distinction, different subcultures and adolescents' allegiance to them have a more fleeting character. Accordingly, the opacity of cultural capital in the reproduction of social inequality is even more distinctive if one tries to find it among adolescents: Bourdieu measures cultural capital in terms of the appreciation of 'highbrow' culture such as fine art and classical music – visits to the opera, museums and art-galleries, for example – but such activities arguably do not represent an appropriate yardstick in a contemporary assessment of youth tastes. Activities and preferences that do apply to the majority of adolescents South Africa and elsewhere – e.g. popular music, fashion, going out, sports etc. – are classified as 'lowbrow' by Bourdieu, and as such do not count towards cultural capital:

It is important to note in this context that we believe that lower class high status cultural signals (e.g., being streetwise) perform within the lower class the same exclusivist function that the legitimate culture performs in the middle and upper-middle class. However, for the purpose of clarity, the term cultural capital is not applied to these signals because they cannot be equated with the legitimate culture. A new concept needs to be coined for these signals; "marginal high status signal" is a potential candidate. (Lareau and Lamont 1988: 157)

An alternative description for "marginal high status is "subcultural capital", coined by Sarah Thornton (1995) in order to describe the transformative nature of cultural capital depending on the situation. For example, as useful it is to know how to behave and talk 'properly' in a formal setting such as a job interview, the same knowledge is useless in the context of a graffiti contest where another form of (sub-)cultural capital ('right' way of talking, walking and dressing) is required. The concept of subcultural capital is highly evocative of Prudence Carter's (2003: 138) distinction between dominant and non-dominant forms of cultural capital, which arguably is particularly relevant in the context of youth:

The term "dominant cultural capital" corresponds to Bourdieu's conceptualization of powerful, high status cultural attributes, codes, and signals. Cultural capital provides individuals with an ability to "walk the walk" and "talk the talk" of the cultural power brokers in our society. Similarly, "non-dominant cultural capital" embodies a set of tastes, or schemes of appreciation and understandings, accorded to a lower status group, that include preferences for particular linguistic, musical, or interactional styles. Non-dominant cultural capital describes those resources used by lower status individuals to gain "authentic" cultural status positions within their respective communities. Different, though interconnected, these two forms of capital represent variable cultural currencies, the benefits of which vary, depending upon the field in which the capital is used.

Given the described incompatibility between Bourdieu's theoretical work and the context in which it is being applied here, it is necessary to go beyond the low- and highbrow dualism in Bourdieu's conceptualisation and look for distinction within popular culture. In its original form cultural capital implies a 'highbrow' form of cultural knowledge that one either acquires early-on during childhood due to the 'right' upbringing or through other (usually monetary) means later in life. Moreover, cultural capital is considered a currency that has real economic value as it eases the access to economic and social capital, thus helping to reproduce patterns of inequality in

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society. Popular culture, on the other hand, does not qualify as highbrow and therefore, according to Bourdieu, is not compatible with the tastes and cultural preferences of the dominant classes in society. The point is that this conceptualisation of cultural capital is generally outdated and certainly when it comes to the cultural preferences of teenagers in contemporary South Africa. In this context one really needs to look at divisions within popular culture that carry different connotations – some are congruent with the tastes of the dominant class (or its offspring), others are not.

An avenue for resolving the apparent contradiction between the old static lowbrow/highbrow dichotomy and the fluid nature of young people's cultural consumption patterns is to think along the lines of acquired and mediated cultural preferences. The idea behind it is that while the distinction between what constitutes lowbrow and highbrow in the context of contemporary youth culture is increasingly difficult or even impossible to make, it is still worth distinguishing between cultural preferences that are largely acquired through the "traditional" transmitters of cultural capital – school and family – and those that are primarily adopted from the media or, more generally, the public sphere. This distinction is arguably less normative than the old lowbrow/highbrow dichotomy, corresponds with the idea of subcultural capital (or non-dominant cultural capital) but at the same time continues to offer the possibility of distinguishing between forms of cultural consumption in terms of their accessibility and availability depending on someone's position in the class hierarchy. The actual usefulness of the acquired/mediated conceptualisation will be tested in the empirical chapters.

Any reconfiguration of cultural capital requires a rethinking of habitus. As with cultural capital there is no singular definition of the concept by Bourdieu himself. In *Distinction* he focusses on the function of habitus "(...) to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste), that the represented social world, i.e. the space of life-styles, is constituted." (Bourdieu 2010: 166) More generally, habitus represents the capacity of the individual to simultaneously produce and distinguish between cultural activities and it is principally formed through early socialisation at home and at school. To Reay (2004), summarising the different ways in which Bourdieu himself employed habitus, it is a multi-faceted concept: embodied, a form of agency, a compilation of collective and individual trajectories as well as a complex interplay between past and present. Using her own earlier research on the role of gender and race in the classroom as an example she makes the argument that although Bourdieu himself focussed on social class his broader definition of habitus is "(...) primarily a method for analysing the dominance of dominant groups in society and the domination of subordinate groups" (Reay 2004: 436) which encompasses race and gender alongside social class. Accordingly, instead of applying a static notion of habitus it is necessary to reconsider its meaning in a particular research setting in all its manifestations. In its embodied form habitus bridges the gap between the individual and society as it reveals the imprint of society onto the individual body in ways "of standing, speaking, walking and thereby of feeling and thinking" (Bourdieu 1990: 70). In terms of agency Reay (Reay 2004: 433) warns the reader not to reduce habitus to mere determinism as Bourdieu himself has emphasised that although habitus con-

strains the possible range of actions and choices of the individual it does not prescribe the strategies or principles behind them, leaving the door open to a good degree of uncertainty and indeterminacy. And indeed, as the data presented later will show, individual taste and preferences rank highly among young South Africans, and determinacy is maybe less obvious in the choices of individuals but more in the structural consequences through the reproduction of social inequality. Reay (2004: 433) is even more specific by distinguishing between collective and individual habituses, following Bourdieu's own ambiguity regarding the uniformity as well as singularity of habituses within a cultural grouping. Finally, Reay (2004: 433) points to the permeability of habituses over time due to their links with individual histories. Family and school as the earliest forms of socialisation certainly lay the foundation for a habitus but later reconfigurations are always possible depending on the current environment in which an individual finds her- or himself in. This is an important point with regard to the role of media consumption in the making of habitus as influences from outside the individual's immediate social environment become increasingly more significant. This thesis is also an attempt to incorporate alternative forms of socialisation, such as media consumption, in a contemporary and updated interpretation of habitus. This point is further strengthened by Bennett et al (2009: 27), criticising Bourdieu's insistence (at least in *Distinction* – his later definitions of habitus became more flexible) that the appropriation of tastes and distinctions, the forming of habitus, entirely depends on someone's objective class position:

This denies the autonomous force of cultural trainings related to gender, ethnicity and religion, and provides little scope for the capacity of trans-national cultural flows to dismantle habitus that are defined in terms of their relations to classes within a purely national conception of the social.

A second point of criticism by Bennett et al (2009: 27) concerns Bourdieu's tendency to emphasise "(...) those aspects of the tastes or patterns of cultural participation that *most distinguish* a particular class from other classes at the expense of other tastes or practices its members share with members of those other classes." In other words: the idea that particular forms of habitus can be ascribed to entire population segments becomes increasingly untenable if one considers not only the gaps but also the overlaps in the dispositions of groups defined by their position in the class system. And again one can argue that this is especially true in terms of youth whose dispositions fall primarily within the realm of popular culture.

The discussion of the applicability of Bourdieu's work in contemporary South African and Brazil also relates to the current debate on cultural omnivores, which divides the contemporary Bourdieu-influenced literature into two strands (see also Petev 2010); while more 'conservative' proponents of the homology theory distinguish between the qualitative cultural consumption of lower- and upper-class, a large and growing body of sociological work suggests that the very idea of class distinction – different taste preferences as a result of class hierarchy – is losing importance as an increasing number of surveys on cultural activities show an inflation of so-called 'cultural omnivores' in Western societies. Coined by Richard A. Peterson (1992; see also Peterson and Kern 1996) in the article *Understanding audience segmentation: From elite and mass to omnivore and*

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univore, the term cultural omnivore describes a segment of middle- and upper-class, well-educated individuals who consume large volumes of culture across a wide range of cultural activities and outlets (opposed to less-educated ‘univores’, see Bryson 1997; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007). Since then the idea of the cultural omnivore has been used and recycled in order to account for the increasingly blurred dividing line between ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ (Sullivan and Katz-Gerro 2007; Bellavance 2008; Van Eijck and Lievens 2008; Garcia-Alvarez, Katz-Gerro and López-Sintas 2007). Here, again, the question arises whether the ‘highbrow’/‘lowbrow’ dichotomy can actually capture the kind of popular culture assumedly popular among teenagers – what is high and what is low if one compares 50Cents with Alicia Keys? Yet while it is true that evaluative conceptualisations of taste differences are losing significance (albeit perhaps not entirely), the continued existence of taste differences in an absolute sense is arguably still valid. Also, the observation that better-off individuals have a wider range of, access to, and consequently consume more popular culture only supports the claims regarding the causal relationship between class and cultural consumption and does not negate the basic proposition of an interrelationship between social hierarchy and symbolic expression of status through cultural activities *per se*:

Moreover, the taste for varied cultural styles and forms, from soap opera to opera, can itself be seen as a marker of cultural superiority and difference from more restricted tastes and, therefore, another example of the persistence of relations between culture and social stratification. Even omnivoric consumption habits, in other words, adhere to a logic of distinction not least because the high volumes of cultural consumption across a range of forms marks the omnivour as culturally distinguished. (Chan and Goldthorpe 2004). (Prior 2005: 133)

Nonetheless, the cultural omnivore debate does bring up a number of issues of relevance to the research questions posed in this thesis. The most crucial concerns the fact that although the ideal measurement of ‘omnivouresness’ remains contentious, it is often just about the quantity of cultural consumption, whereas questions about particular genres or types of popular culture are usually left unattended. For this thesis, which puts emphasis on the role of race in youth culture, the interesting question would be whether and to what extent a privileged social position enables and encourages a young South African to adopt tastes outside of her or his immediate social and cultural environment. In practice: is a child from a privileged background more likely to listen to music associated with a different race group than its own? And is this relationship between race, class and taste symmetrical or are those from one group more likely to change their tastes than those of another group? And what would this mean for the perception of race and social status in this particular case? For example: we might find that there is a considerable degree of overlap in taste in American music among schoolchildren at more expensive, relatively diverse schools regardless of someone’s racial (self-)classification but the question is whether this is also true for local tastes, i.e. would a child from an Afrikaans background visiting one of Cape Town’s better schools become a Zola (Kwaito/Hip Hop artist and TV celebrity) fan as easily as it might become an Eminem fan? And would a black child from one of Cape Town’s townships visiting the same school start listening to Kurt Darren (Afrikaans singer) or rather Mariah Carey?

Following the criticisms of cultural capital and habitus and the arguments made by the

proponents of cultural omnivoresness the need for a reconfiguration of Bourdieu's conceptualisation of cultural capital and habitus for the purposes of this study becomes self-evident. This involves the inclusion of identity markers such as race and gender as identity markers alongside class, a rethinking of the meaning of lowbrow and highbrow and the recognition that habitus is not a fixed constant but open to varying influences from the media and global cultural flows. When making this reconfiguration of Bourdieu's theory it is worth remembering that Bourdieu himself did not see it as a universal blueprint but as a conceptual toolbox which needs to be adjusted to each specific research situation. Diane Reay (2004) makes this point by citing Bourdieu himself:


I blame most of my readers for having considered as theoretical treatises, meant solely to be read or commented upon, works that, like gymnastics handbooks, were intended for exercise, or even better, for putting into practice... one cannot grasp the most profound logic of the social world unless one becomes immersed in the specificity of an empirical reality. (Bourdieu 1993: 271 in Reay 2006: 339)

The two diagrams on the next page illustrate exactly how Bourdieu's tools are put into practice for the purposes of this thesis.²¹

21. Although Bourdieu probably would have never approved of a diagram portraying his intricate links between social origin, class, habitus, taste and cultural capital as causal relationships, a simplified and visual depiction helps to clarify the basic logic behind the suggested changes to his theory in order to make it work in the context of contemporary South African youth culture.

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Figure 3.1 *Theoretical Framework: Bourdieu original (left) and Bourdieu updated (right)*²²



What does a structural approach add to the debates both on youth culture and social inequality in South Africa? First of all there are Bourdieu's concepts of cultural capital and habitus, as opposed to subculturalists' Marxist notions of (dominant) mainstream and resistance, which signify this thesis' most fundamental rupture with the bulk of literature on South African youth culture. Whereas the latter approach is responsible for a multitude of highly engaging and useful in-depth studies of various sub-segments of South African youth, the former promises an account of the structural interrelationships between sub-segments of South African youth culture without neglecting the supposedly dominant mainstream in favour of an often romanticised subculture. This paradigm shift also entails methodological consequences²³; whereas the humanist tradition of cultural studies has largely been focussing on in-depth, usually descriptive and/or qualitative accounts of singular groups, a structural approach tries to capture as large a segment of the whole population as practically possible through abstraction, typically by using social surveys. This form

22. Race and gender are understood as social constructs in the two diagrams. Whereas both are related to physical characteristics (physical gender and phenotype) to more (gender) or less (race) extent, ultimately these only become meaningful when they are recognised as such in a particular setting. The interpretation of their meanings depends on the social position of the individual.

23. See subchapter 2.3 on page 22 for a detailed account of the methodology employed in this thesis.

of abstraction does not necessarily have to be undertaken without further contextualisation and in isolation from qualitative underpinnings of the patterns found in the statistical analyses of surveys (which is often the case with the strictly statistical analyses employed by many American cultural sociologists), but can be done in fruitful synthesis with qualitative accounts of the research object, as demonstrated by Bourdieu himself in *Distinction* (Holt 1997: 118).

But most importantly a Bourdieuan approach promises insights into the ways social inequality is being reproduced through culture alongside historical and economical factors. This study aims to fulfill this promise by putting cultural capital and habitus into practice in the context of South African and Brazilian youth. With regard to cultural capital this is achieved by examining the relationship between embodied and institutionalised cultural capital and by including race in the analysis as a variable separate from, yet closely associated with class (chapter 6 on pages 106 to 153). As for habitus: what this study cannot do is to look at the role of the family in the making of 'distinctions'. Instead it offers valuable insights into the significance of media consumption, which is usually treated as just another form of cultural preference but is here hypothesised to play a crucial role in the making of habitus itself (chapter 7 on pages 154 to 184).

What then remains is to extend the examination of the cultural and social stratification of South African youth by putting its results into a comparative perspective (chapter 8 on pages 186 to 214). Sometimes the topicality of the globalisation debate obscures the fact that cultural globalisation often occurs unevenly due to large degrees of variability in access and cultural differences in the local context. In this respect Bourdieu provides little help and the relevant debates on cultural globalisation, homogenisation and glocalisation promise to offer better assistance.

3.3 The Extended View: Cultural Glocalization

Given the apparent universality of certain trends in popular culture, and particularly youth culture, comparative studies of the phenomenon continue to be surprisingly scarce. From a historical perspective this might have at least partly something to do with the development of (post-)subcultural theory as the precursor to contemporary studies of youth culture. Having its roots partly in the critique of particular strands of American sociology as well as psychology and being associated with one particular university in Britain, Birmingham, subcultural theory is a quintessential British phenomenon. The social context of the early 1970s in which it was formulated is crucial for understanding the CCCS authors' emphasis on class in their analyses as this time in Britain was marked by a sense of desperation on behalf of the struggling working class. Thus for Hall, Hebdige and others, at least at the time, British youth culture was best explained from within British society with little regard for global cultural flows that were either influencing or influenced by British popular culture. This is also evident in the ethnographic data collected by various subcultural theorists which is based on the descriptions of a few chosen subcultures in selected cities in England. Despite these conceptual restrictions to the British context, subcultural theory has assumed quasi-universal currency which is also visible in South African youth studies where the term subculture is often used self-explanatory and indiscriminately with no or only brief reference to the British focus of the CCCS, thus implying the existence of some sort

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of parallel between 1970s British and contemporary South African youth.

Post-structural critiques of subcultural theory, themselves to a large extent originating in Manchester, are associated with a much stronger emphasis on the importance of locality and actual research carried out in local 'scenes' rather than trying to generalise large mass youth movements through the concept of subculture. Also, the poststructural critics of the 1990s were much more aware of cultural globalisation and how it influenced and was being influenced by local cultural events. In regard to the heightened role of consumerism and commodification authors like Bennett and Peterson noted the interplay between the local and the global as an exchange, where youth would inscribe 'local meanings' onto global cultural phenomena (Bennett 1999; Bennett and Peterson 2004).

This heightened sensibility towards global cultural flows, however, cannot deter from the fact that most of the actual data on which post-structuralists base their arguments can only be fully validated in the British context. In the 1990s this meant a fascination with the then new and burgeoning Rave and club culture that seemed to confirm all notions of a politically largely uninterested, hedonistic and consumerist generation of youth. References, including full-fledged ethnographic studies, to Rave and clubbing have been made in virtually every major publication on British youth culture during the 1990s and early 2000s. And just as modernist subcultural theory has been criticised for being biased towards British working class youth culture, so can postmodern youth studies be argued to over-emphasise the importance of a hedonistic Rave and clubbing lifestyle. Further, by presenting the act of clubbing and attending raves as the defining pastime of British youth post-subculturalists fall into the same pitfalls of cultural elitism as subculturalists before them; by equating Britain's nightlife economy with its youth culture they are neglecting all those who do not happen to be into raving and clubbing.

Structural studies of popular culture influenced by Bourdieu, too, rarely deal with cultural globalisation or include comparisons between different localities. A recent welcome and important exception is *Social Status and Cultural Consumption 2010*, edited by Tak Wing Chan (2010), consisting of a series of articles testing, in different countries (the United States, France, Chile, Hungary, The Netherlands and England), three hypotheses on the relationship between social stratification and cultural consumption: (1) individualisation (no or weak relationship), (2) 'homology' (consumers of mass vs consumers of elite culture) and (3) 'omnivore-univore' (consumers of mass and elite culture vs consumers of only mass culture) (Petev 2010: 1). The results show that in most countries (The Netherlands and Hungary showing some divergence, but primarily among the older population) the omnivore-univore hypothesis proves the most suitable one, but only with the addition of two categories of cultural consumers: 'paucivores' (well-off individuals with a limited range of cultural consumption) and 'inactives' (less privileged individuals who do not engage in any form of cultural consumption apart from watching television). Further, Chan and his colleagues could make the observation that habits of cultural consumption extend to other social activities such as sports, self-education etc.

The fact that these observations apply to individuals from a range of different countries brings

us to the actual point of contention in the debate on cultural globalisation; the theorisation of cultural globalisation as a homogenising or heterogenising force. The first is associated with Westernisation, Americanisation and cultural imperialism. It implies the notion of cultures as discrete entities with definite spatial locations and a cultural exchange between ‘the West and the rest’ which is largely unidirectional and associated with a sense of threat and loss of indigenous traditions and ways of living (Schiller 1976; Tomlinson 1991; Ritzer 2000). The second is linked to notions of hybridity, creolisation and ‘glocalisation’. It suggests an understanding of cultural globalisation as a ‘global *mélange*’ – all that is local is in the process of being globalised and all that is global is becoming localised, hence ‘glocalisation’ (Nederveen Pieterse 1995; Robertson 1995; Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 1996).²⁴

While the homogenisation argument has lost popularity and the division between the two strands has generally become increasingly blurred, both could easily be applied to the South African context. Considering the omnipresence of ‘Western’ (that is European and American) influences in music, fashion styles, advertising and language in South Africa, and especially among its youth, it is tempting to sympathise with the homogenising approach when thinking about the impact of cultural globalisation there. Yet, taking a closer look at culture in South Africa and the various changes it has undergone before and after the advent of colonialism, the ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm 1988), engineered cultural segregation and other cultural flows from outside which not so much seem to penetrate but weave into the larger cultural fabric, one is inclined to agree with Roland Robertson, one of the first ‘glocalisation’ theorists:

[The nostalgic paradigm in Western social science] is a manifestation of the not always implicit world view that suggests that we – the global we – once lived in and were distributed not so long ago across a multitude of ontologically secure, collective, ‘homes’. Now, according to this narrative – or, perhaps, a metanarrative – our sense of home is rapidly being destroyed by waves of (Western?) ‘globalization’. In contrast I maintain – although I can present here only part of my overall argument – that globalization has involved the reconstruction, in a sense the production, of ‘home’, ‘community’ and ‘locality’ (...). To that extent the local is not best seen, at least as an analytical or interpretative departure point, as a counterpoint to the global. Indeed it can be regarded, subject to some qualifications, as an aspect of globalization. (Robertson 1995: 30)

In the case of South African youth culture the ‘qualifications’ Robertson refers to are reflected in the unequal access to media due to historic injustices, the national broadcaster’s implementation of cultural diversity policies, the conscious choice of artists and audiences between more local or global content and international media corporations’ well-calculated marketing strategies. The image of a global *mélange* when writing about cultural globalisation should not divert from the

24. Although the debate on cultural globalisation only blossomed during the 1990s it is interesting to observe the parallels to the youth (sub-)culture debate as both underwent the epistemological pendulum swing from (neo-)Marxist critiques of neoliberalism (the “subculturalists” and “homogenists”) to postmodern celebrations of the individual agency (the “postsubculturalists” and “heterogenists”) back to the middle where structural constraints meet notions of plurality.

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fact that much glocalised culture is conceived and controlled centrally as part of some or other agenda and that the dissemination of these contents often occur universally or in very similar and comparable circumstances in different locations. What is then required in order to get to grips with these shared experiences of cultural globalisation in different parts of the world is to shift the focus from singular localities to a more multi-sited and comparative approach, as it is done in this thesis.

The comparison between the role of global popular culture in the remaking of young people's racial identities in South Africa and Brazil serves as a good example: young South Africans and Brazilians grew up in highly racialised and unequal societies despite two almost diametrical histories of race relations (Ribeiro 1995), resulting in a very strong public awareness of race in South Africa and a much weaker one among Brazilians (Santos 2006). It is therefore interesting to see that certain aspects of youth culture seem to play out in very similar ways in front of these two somehow comparable, yet completely different backgrounds. So the following citation from a relatively recent article on hip-hop in Brazil reminds one strongly of the literature on South African hip-hop (see page 69):

The "making of race" in hip-hop culture involves becoming *consciente* (conscious) and enjoying togetherness. While in the US scholars and rappers alike have argued that hip-hop's rearticulation of the "ghetto" is a central and essential factor in the identity formation of "nigga" (...), in Brazil the centrality of *periferia* has influenced the currency of *preto*, *negro* (both meaning "black") and more recently, *mano* ("brother") as alternatives to traditional notions of blackness in Brazil. (Pardue 2004: 257)

And in the conclusion:

The "hip-hop nation" is not a homogenous set of styles, ideas and practices. An attention to mediation provides a better understanding of how social groups "locate" diaspora and "reterritorialize" cosmopolitan expressive forms. (Pardue 2004: 278)

Accompanying the localisation of global trends are reports about recent shifts in the racial perceptions of young South Africans and Brazilians which has been partly ascribed to global influences (Sansone 2003; Telles 2004: 101). Also, the glocalisation of Brazilian music styles abroad and at home is well-documented (Magaldi 1999; Perrone and Dunn 2002). What the putting-together of these mosaic stones suggests, and what has been so poignantly described by Kjeldgaard as Askegaard as "common structures of difference", is a form of glocalisation which does indeed incorporate the localisation of global trends (and vice versa) but at the same time acknowledges the structuring power of global capitalism as socio-economic inequalities produce similar notions of privilege and disenfranchisement. In other words: while cultural globalisation does not lead to the complete annihilation of local particularities (South African Hip Hop still 'feels' different from Brazilian Hip Hop) it does create comparable and compatible hierarchies and systems of meaning in which race, class and social status play the crucial roles (e.g. Hip Hop understood as the black voice from the periphery). Thus style and taste function as guides to the individual to find her or his place in the immediate as well as global society:

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In this globalizing era of rapid technologically mediated communication, we must think of style as not only relevant to the construction of local identities and the gaining of local status (as in Rose 1994, above); as not only a system of distinction and aesthetics organized around locally relevant principles of value (as in Irvine 2001); as not only the property of local speech communities or locally situated communities of practice (as in much of the sociolinguistic and linguistic-anthropological literature). Rather, we must also view style, as theorized by global Hip Hop youth, as glocal distinctiveness, where members of the Global Hip Hop Nation put style to use in order to distinguish themselves from adherents to other possible styles in their local arenas as well as to simultaneously contrast with and connect themselves to a global network of practitioners, each claiming their “own style” (or what U.S. rapper KRS-One [1996: 60] refers to as a “my-style” and a “your-style”). (Alim, Ibrahim and Pennycook 2009: 109)

A comparative study of taste, like the one presented here, provides us with the rare opportunity to trace the transnational boundaries of the much spoken about “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) and their very concrete limitations in the form of structural constraints such as the huge socio-economic inequality found in countries like South Africa or Brazil, which to large degree determines the level of access to such communities. At least in the particular case of South Africa it also opens up the debate about the true nature of cosmopolitan identities given their exclusivity both in a symbolic and materialistic way. This is achieved mostly in chapter 8, where the emphasis is on the comparison between the distribution of cultural capital among South African and Brazilian school kids. This chapter also deals with the question to what extent the other two parts – the racialisation of class distinction based on aesthetic taste and the role of the media as the gateway and gatekeeper of cultural flows shaped by socio-economic inequality – are the consequences of cultural globalization and signs of so-called “common structures of difference”. These do not necessarily imply complete cultural homogeneity but rather localised expressions of a shared symbolic hierarchy with regards to social stratification and difference in a wider sense, and especially in connection with racial discourse.

4. Youth, Social Inequality and Race in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte

While the preceding chapter dealt with the theory informing this thesis, the purpose of this chapter is to present the empirical literature relevant to each of the three research questions. It is therefore divided into three discrete sub-chapters. The first consists of a survey post-Apartheid South African youth studies, further sub-divided into literature on race, class and schooling and a more discursive body of literature dealing with South African youth culture. The second traces the history of racialised media segmentation in South Africa and describes how this segmentation persists today. The third sub-chapter describes the commonalities and differences between South African and Brazilian race-thinking and provides a broad outline of the youth scene in Belo Horizonte.

4.1 Youth in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Race, Class and Schooling

In the journal article *Beyond Heroes and Villains: The Rediscovery of the Ordinary in the Study of Childhood and Adolescence in South Africa* Jeremy Seekings (2006) traces the development of South African youth studies since the 1970s. He argues that there has been a significant paradigm shift since the end of apartheid as the earlier depiction of South African youth was defined by the highly politicised environment of apartheid, in which academic (and public) interest in youth focussed first and foremost on the images of young black South Africans as “heroes or villains” – freedom fighters or tsotis (gangsters) – despite the lack of evidence that actual full participation in the freedom struggle, as hero or villain, was overtly common among young South Africans (notwithstanding the fact that the great majority of black youth was directly affected by apartheid and the freedom struggle in some way or the other). Seekings argues that although “moral panics” portraying adolescents as either perpetrators or victims of crime, sexual violence, moral degeneration etc. continue to surface from time to time, a burgeoning of youth-orientated surveys and qualitative work on growing up in South Africa has resulted in a more factual and less agitated concern with the actual challenges ordinary young South Africans face every day. A large part of this work, especially the large scale panel surveys, is primarily concerned with ‘hard’ data on young people’s health, education, living conditions and integration in the labour market, or what Seekings (2006: 14) calls “the parameters of the social and economic lives of children and adolescents.” But questions related to popular culture, taste and identity, including changes in racial attitudes, are usually dealt with in ethnographic studies (with the exception of experimental research by social psychologists or economists), often conducted at schools.

The pioneering work in this respect is by Nadine Dolby (2001) who spent the year of 1996 at Fernwood High (pseudonym) observing the teachers’ attempts to keep alive the school’s white/middle-class image although the majority of students at the time was black and the remaining white students coming from poor families. One of the key findings of her study is that although students at Fernwood High refuse to define themselves and others according to old apar-

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theid categories and instead use references to cosmopolitan tastes and styles in music and fashion, these new descriptors are just as much racialised.

Like clothing, musical taste is linked to collective, racialized identities. In general terms, most Fernwood students would agree that Africans listen to rhythm and blues, “slow” music such as Whitney Houston, some rap, and what is known as “local” music, which is sometimes sung in Zulu, sometimes in English, or a combination of the two. Coloured students’ (and in this case, coloureds’ and Indians’ taste differs) musical tastes are similar to Africans, except for the absence of local music. White music takes several trajectories, and includes rave, heavy metal, “mellow” music like the Cranberries, and for a small minority of white students, gangsta rap. (Dolby 2001: 72)

Dolby’s work is of special importance for this thesis not only because of its originality and relevance ten years after its publication, but also because it is inspired by Bourdieu’s ideas around taste, class distinction and habitus. Thus Dolby’s reasoning for approaching the thorny issue of racial identities in South Africa from the angle of taste could also be used as a template for the motivation behind this thesis:

By using Bourdieu’s idea of taste, I switch the focus away from the essences of cultural identity, and towards what James Clifford (1988) refers to as the “processes” of identity. Second, such essentialist cultural paradigms posit a homology between a “people” and a “place”. Our ideas of culture are tied to geography and to territory, even as we struggle to retheorize a world in which these links are weakened (if they ever existed in a “real” sense). Taste, in contrast, allows me to interpret race through a paradigm that is significantly more deterritorialized. By using taste, I do not jettison the specific context of South Africa and the cultural fields in which students maneuver. Instead, I mean to signal that race is significantly (though never entirely) divorced from a specific and narrow geographical place; instead, race is formed through the global/local nexus of taste practices, which are then given life in the particular context of Fernwood. (Dolby 2001: 16)

Dolby is not simply replicating Bourdieu’s studies in 1960s France at a high school in Durban; instead she uses Bourdieu as a way to generalise the very specific, localised observations on race dynamics at that school to the point that they can be understood as local expressions of a global race/taste discourse. A crucial difference between Dolby’s work and this thesis lies in the methodology and research design, with important consequences for the type of conclusions one can draw from the respective research efforts. Dolby spent an entire year at a single school in Durban precisely so she could observe the institutional dynamics between the school and the learners using ethnographic methods. For this thesis the decision for the school as the research site in was first of all a matter of logistics and feasibility in the pursuit of reaching large numbers of youth in an organised setting for a survey (not taking into the account the qualitative methods also used for this thesis). The difference in data produced by the two approaches falls within the longstanding debate of qualitative vs quantitative research methods, which very briefly can be described as the tension between depth and breadth of empirical data. As a result Dolby’s work is arguably more susceptible to questions to what extent Fernwood High is exemplary of other schools in South Africa while the research presented here is more geared towards describing

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broader patterns of othering but less their nuances in the lived experiences of South African youth.

Subsequent school-focussed literature on South African youth identities rarely make the connection between local and global discourses of difference, at least not in such detail. For example, Dawson (2003), in her dissertation on youth identities at a school in Johannesburg, makes very similar observations as Dolby on racialised taste patterns among teenagers, here exemplified by music preferences:

Learners also linked 'race' to music preferences. They were convinced that certain 'races' like certain music genres. For example, in a discussion on fundraising activities, one of the respondents in Group A mentioned that part of the entertainment was a boereorke. The girls claimed that they didn't feel as though they fitted in and that 'it chased all the coloureds and the blacks away.' On a similar note, during a discussion on the music played at the matric farewell, the girls in Group E (African girls) claimed that 'we [black learners] never get to choose much.' 'And the music is white,' added another girl. 'Yes,' agreed a third, 'It's just rave. Even if we have these sokkies, discos, whatever ...' 'Even if they play our music,' continued her friend, 'it's half a song and its [sic] ridiculous. Then they just play one song or half a song and the rest of the night is boere music'. By this, she meant any type of music that she assumed was enjoyed only by white people, for example, rave and heavy metal, and not 'boeremusiek', which is a specific type of music style. When probed about what was meant by 'our music', one of the girls answered, 'house music, kwaito, R&B.' (Dawson 2003: 89)

Dawson's work echoes Dolby's (and this thesis') findings in that the interviewed schoolchildren make racial distinctions based on music and fashion tastes, and not necessarily in political terms. Unlike Dolby, however, Dawson does not attempt to embed her findings within the frameworks of class distinction or the greater globalisation/glocalisation debate, which shall not distract from its usefulness as a detailed and accurate account of the significance of popular culture in the re-shaping of racial discourse in South Africa.

Similar is true for Jane Battersby's (2004) study of non-white children at former Model C schools (previously privileged under apartheid) in Cape Town, in which she concludes that the influx of non-white students at these schools has not led to much racial desegregation and that non-white students have to adapt to the cultural values of those schools which have remained largely unchanged since apartheid²⁵. Vandeyar (2008: 291), who carried out fieldwork at three desegregated schools in Tshwane, comes to the same conclusion:

25. This and the following references dealing with interracial contact at schools are vaguely related to a body of literature in social psychology which probes the applicability of the "contact hypothesis" (Allport 1954; see also Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) at desegregated schools. The hypothesis is that intergroup contact on equal terms reduces prejudice and promotes integration. As useful and insightful the relevant studies are (see, for example, *Journal of Social Issues* 2010, volume 66, issue 2 on interracial contact in South Africa), numerous studies presented in the remainder of this chapter and elsewhere (Erasmus 2010) contradict the applicability of the hypothesis due to the historical imbalances of status engrained in race-thinking. The findings presented later in this thesis only add to the skepticism as crucial markers of difference ultimately go beyond the sphere of immediate contact and are at least partly determined by mediated impressions of taste and style.

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As appears to be the trend in the vast majority of desegregated schools in South Africa, students are expected to adjust their outlooks and their identities, molding themselves to the cast of the dominant culture. Consequently, this study found that assimilation is still the dominant approach at schools (Carrim, 1998; Vally and Dalamba, 1999). Essentially, students are expected to act and behave “white”. Students wanting to “fit in” are placed under tremendous pressure to confirm and be absorbed into the system.

The fact that in desegregated schools assimilation still means that non-white pupils are expected to adapt to what is seen as white culture is highly relevant to this study as it poses the question to what extent the perceived ‘whiteness’ is in fact a representation of a racialised understanding of class, in which white indeed signifies the ‘upper’ classes. Drawing on a wealth of interview and survey material collected throughout a 15-years period at schools primarily in Cape Town but also Johannesburg and elsewhere, Soudien (2010) confirms the dominance of ‘whiteness’ at desegregated schools in South Africa, as implied in the title of his article *The Reconstitution of Privilege: Integration in Former White Schools in South Africa*. Yet Soudien’s analysis, thanks to the abundance of qualitative data at his disposal, manages to make fairly fine-grained distinctions between different strategies schoolchildren, white and non-white, employ in order to cope with the challenges of transformation and assimilation at desegregated schools, leading to a variety of “complex identity formations” (Soudien 2010: 352) determined by race just as much as gender or class.

Another study of schoolchildren in Cape Town (more specifically the Fish Hoek Valley outside Cape Town) by Imke Gooskens (2006) is more optimistic about the changing nature of race at mixed schools, asserting that “(...) in individual interactions and in talking about relations with peers and friends of different backgrounds, young people strongly emphasise being the same, ‘wish away’ or ignore race as a factor in their lives, but simultaneously use racial name-calling in subversive and humorous ways.” However, Gooskens acknowledges that structural challenges such as spatial segregation and the lack of mobility, as well as the validity of racial discourse among the parent generation puts limits to the children’s non-racial ideals. She emphasises that racial differentiation among those children is not a carbon copy of apartheid racism, but is fluid and open to reinterpretation (Gooskens 2006: 44).

Gooskens’ ethnographic work is in fact part of a larger long-term project dealing with adolescents at three different locations in the Fish Hoek valley which culminated in the book *Growing Up in the New South Africa: Childhood and Adolescence in Post-Apartheid Cape Town* (Bray et al. 2010). The book, which is largely based on quantitative data – mostly from the Cape Area Panel Study CAPS conducted by the University of Cape Town’s Centre for Social Science Research, CSSR) – and rich ethnographic data obtained during a fifteen months fieldwork period in the neighbourhoods Masiphumele, Ocean View and Fish Hoek close to Cape Town, offers unique and multi-faceted insights into ordinary young South Africans’ hopes, worries, problems and achievements. It also deals with the continuing salience of racial discourse among youth, occasionally by reference to racialised class distinctions defined by style and taste:

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Darren lives in Fish Hoek and would be classified coloured, but actively tries to dissociate himself from the behaviour of a group of ‘coloureds’ at school (who are mostly from Ocean View and are considered ‘common’). He describes the group as follows:

They walk with a bounce like in American movies, speak loudly, use a mix of lazy English and kombuis Afrikaans, are disrespectful towards teachers, and think they are cool, but generally act very immature. [Kombuis is Afrikaans for ‘kitchen’, in this case indicating a simplified, slang form of the language.] (Darren, boy, aged 17, Fish Hoek)

Racial stereotypes are sometimes expressed in association, or even synonymously, with assumptions about someone’s socio-economic background, which, again, poses the question to what extent contemporary racial differentiation among South African youth can be divided from its geographical context and considered as a consequence of global capitalism. This theme is further discussed in Bray et al’s (2010: 150) description of sites of consumption, e.g. the shopping mall, frequented by the adolescents in the valley.

Teenagers across the research sites had clear ideas about which clothes shops were to be avoided because they carry a certain class stigma, and in which ones they aspired to shop. There were strong similarities in the brands and shops favoured by all young people, suggesting a shared link with the broader world beyond of modern urban youth. Yet this relationship with a wider consumer culture is largely played out within existing peer networks from each community, and independently of their peers from other neighbourhoods (although there are some exceptions regarding tastes in fashion or music that arise in the context of a mixed school environment; see below). Young people’s abilities to fulfil aspirations to buy and wear these goods are, of course, tied to economic means. Unsurprisingly, middle-class children shopped much more frequently and extensively with their parents and on their own. The fact that a number of very poor children alluded to their discomfort at being among attractive goods that they could not afford suggests that consumption habits served to reinforce boundaries between children from different neighbourhoods. On Fish Hoek Main Road, patterns of consumption separate the spaces that young people use. Young residents of Masiphumelele and Ocean View tend to frequent the supermarket and games shops at one end of the high street, whereas middle-class children are to be found in the banks, boutiques and cafes at the other end.

Bray *et al* directly address the consequences of economic inequality on consumption patterns and use of public space reinforcing class divides between youth. But they are quick to point out that matters of taste are not merely a function of social stratification, but “largely played out within existing peer networks from each community”. This observation is as important as it is accurate and poses a substantial challenge to any examination of taste patterns, since peer effects are difficult to operationalise and measure. Furthermore it can be argued that peer networks, at least in the South African context, are defined by spatial and social constraints, so they too ultimately only reflect the more general divisions found in South African society. Nonetheless, the observation serves as a crucial reminder that generalisations about taste seldom exactly match the actual preferences of individuals (or close networks of individuals for that matter), but that shall not

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distract from the fact that general trends related to social stratification (i.e. gender, race, ethnicity and class) do exist. It also underlines the need for more sophisticated analyses of data on taste suited for understanding the exchange of preferences through networks.

In their discussion of racialised consumption patterns Bray *et al* also look towards the possibility of consumption as the birthplace of a shared identity in the sense of a common (middle-)class consciousness adopted by young South Africans regardless of their cultural backgrounds. Here they refer to Lucert Nkuna's (2006) research at the The Zone, the youth-orientated section of the Rosebank shopping mall in Johannesburg, where she follows up on an earlier study by Sarah Nuttall (2004) on Y-Culture. Following her own qualitative research (observation and interviews) over an extended period and a survey with 212 participants, Nkuna comes to a number of intriguing findings. In her conclusions she manages to identify a common middle-class identity which transcends racial and gender divisions:

The Zone is emblematic of the new South Africa. It could not possibly have existed before 1994. Here, blacks and whites now have friendships based on equality, and, for the most part, men treat women with respect. The culture is also about age. The Zone youths are a generation that have grown up together in the post-apartheid era. Whilst the new culture is racially and gender inclusive, it is also, in particular, class exclusive; the culture of a relative thin layer of late teens and early twenties. What distinguishes these multi-racial, middle-class, male and female youths is identification with Model C English, R&B music and relatively costly brands. These signifiers include and exclude, carving out The Zone identity. Americanised, global youth culture provides ready-made signifiers, but South African inflexions – especially in fashion – can add to local and, more particularly, black self-confidence (and, since fashion is gendered, specifically black female pride). Globalisation is implicated in the identity of The Zone, both through the range of cultural options it provides and through the inequalities it intensifies. (Nkuna 2006: 999)

But despite noticing a sense of a shared identity among the kids frequenting the mall, Nkuna makes sharp observations on the fine intricacies of taste distinctions between different groups of kids at the mall, both in terms of class and race, at other points in the article:

An interesting development has been the advance of two subcultures, at least among the young men. These are the 'amabourgeois' and the 'amatsatsatsa', with the latter probably a reaction to the former. 'Amabourgeois', which predominates The Zone, is seen as a white thing, as 'expensive', so is probably only a conscious style among the black and coloured youth. There are some Indian amabourgeois, but they do not try to get attention by the way they dress like black and coloured youth. The amatsatsatsa are keen followers of fashion, but are not 'high class' people, or do not wish to appear so, avoiding expensive brands. (Nkuna 2006: 1001)

The point here is not to prove some form of inconsistency or contradiction in Nkuna's writing – in fact her work stands out as one of the most detailed and accurate depictions of South Africa's consumerist middle-class culture – but to reiterate the complex entanglement of race and class consciousness in contemporary South Africa. There is no doubt that a shared class identity is helping young South Africans to see their commonalities, yet, as the continuing salience of race

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in formally desegregated places attests to, it is at times the class identity itself which is seen as racialised (i.e. ‘middle-class being a white thing’) and exclusive. Moreover, as Nkuna points out, today’s youth identities are no longer the product of purely South African contestations but a conglomeration of local and global influences.

Another attempt at grasping the complexities of growing up in post-apartheid South Africa, Crain Soudien’s (2007) *Youth Identity: Schooling, Culture and the Making of Youth Identity in Contemporary South Africa*, recognizes the importance of globalization in the making of post-apartheid youth identities through “cultural borrowing and adaptation” as well as “individualism”. In combination with individualism, adaptation does not mean the mere copying of European or American trends, but the agency of the individual to blend these international trends with local ones into “new ways of being South African”. But Soudien also recognizes that the specific social circumstances in South Africa make it generally easier for white youth to ‘play’ with these new identities than for their black peers – a crucial point as this thesis’s findings on unequal accesses to global cultural flows will show. Thus Soudien (2007: 38) is careful not to simply conflate global and local discourses of difference but to evaluate local identities in the light of multiple, including global, sources.

We would make a grave mistake to see South African youth simply as southern versions of their globalized cousins in the UK and the USA. We would also be mistaken to see them as card-board cut-outs on the landscape of South Africa’s racial history.

Soudien’s concern about contemporary South African youth understood merely as an offshoot of European and American popular culture is justified given the tendency in much public debate to portray South African youth as passive consumers of American Hip Hop, RnB, movies and television series. Nonetheless, as Soudien agrees, it is necessary to acknowledge and identify the mediated global influences in their identity make-up. In this respect, studies on particular South African ‘subcultures’, often associated with a particular racial group, prove to offer a fresh perspective.

Melissa Steyn’s (2001) *Whiteness Just Isn’t What It Used To Be* offers an interesting perspective on the pervasiveness of the association of whiteness with dominance. While the book is primarily concerned with a very specific aspect of race-thinking and only very peripherally (if at all) with youth culture, consumption or class and does not contain a single reference to Bourdieu it provides a solid understanding of the historical and ideological foundations of the perceived normality of white privilege that, one could argue, is also evident in the racialised class hierarchies described in this thesis. Steyn achieves this by first outlining the historical roots of a white “master narrative” that developed primarily through the contrast with and ultimately the dehumanisation of “the other” in the course of colonialism. The main part of the book, however, is a collection of various sub-narratives of white South African identity in post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, by revealing the heterogeneity, constructedness and unevenness of whiteness, she manages to unmantle its monolithicity and, ultimately, supposed naturalness. At the same time she opens herself up to criticism that her presentation of “ideal-types” of white discourse helps to normal-

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ise the very narratives behind them, thus limiting the exploration of alternative forms of white identities on an individual level:

Steyn as well as Nakayama and Krizek pointedly discusses the danger of discursive overdetermination, and yet in the very act of drawing together general lines of discursive confluence, based on valid and fairly extensive fieldwork, the conditions are necessarily created for exclusion. The analytical move is from a general theory of the origins of whiteness (in the case of Steyn especially), to particular and variable examples of whiteness, and then back to a more general mapping of the terrain based on groupings of the particular. My problem with this procedure, rich and revealing as it is, remains that such general mapping tends to become a function of its own supra-narrativity, perhaps to some extent at the expense of the more variable narrativity of the particular in its own domain before and beyond the capture and rewriting of particular narratives in the larger act of mapping. (de Kock 2006: 185)

de Kock's point serves a good reminder to always remember the fragility and complexity of studies of identity, be it through discourse analysis as in Steyn's case or in an empirical study such as this one.

Youth Culture

The racialisation of South African youth culture, understood within the context of cultural globalization, is neither a new nor particularly uncommon phenomenon, if one takes into account the large body of social-anthropological work on urbanisation and Africans' (selective) appropriation of western culture during the industrialisation period in Southern Africa. An early and classic example is Monika Hunter's monograph on the influence of Western culture on township dwellers in 1930s urban East London which repeatedly refers to the growing significance of European and American culture and the disappearance of 'tribal' culture:

There is little Native dancing. ...Young people gather in private houses, particularly on Friday and Saturday evenings, for parties, but here European fox trots [sic] were more often performed than the old Bantu dances. And the music is European and American ragtime. About the street one more often hears ragtime hummed than an old Bantu song. (Hunter 1936: 127)

East London deserves a special mention due to the depth of social-anthropological and sociological research conducted there (Reader 1960; Mayer 1961; Pauw 1963; Ntsebeza 1994; Bank 2006), but the significance of American and particularly black American influences on township youth during apartheid is also well-documented for other locations such as Soweto (Glaser 2000) and Sophiatown (Coplan 1985; Hannerz 1994; Nixon 1994) in Gauteng and the Cape Flats in Cape Town (Wilson and Mafeje 1967; Ngcokoto 1989; Gainer 2000). The preoccupation of academics with the Westernisation of African identities, in its worse forms uncomfortably reminiscent of the colonial fascination with the contact between 'European civilisation' and 'African primitivity', took a turn when white supremacy in South Africa ended and academics discovered that "whiteness just isn't what it used to be" (Steyn 2001) and being coloured is not less a vulnerable position after the end of apartheid (Erasmus 2001; Adhikari 2005).

Still, the first wave of post-apartheid literature on 'new' subcultures concerned mostly the

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Kwaito movement. Commonly understood as the sound that accompanied South Africa's discovery of a national discourse which went beyond the trenches of apartheid logic, Kwaito embodies the antithesis of the heavily politicised atmosphere of the apartheid years, in that it meant the celebration of freedom and hedonism, and the reinterpretation of the urban peripheries, the townships, as sites of cultural innovation and 'coolness'. As such it is usually, and sometimes negatively, stylized as the triumph of commercialism and materialism over ideology among the first generation of young black South Africans who experienced their formative years without having to fight against the oppressive laws of the previous regime. But despite kwaito's focus on fun and having a good time a (relatively small) number of Kwaito songs deal with the legacy of apartheid in terms of racism (e.g. *Kaffir* by Arthur Mafokate) or the challenges of growing up in the townships (e.g. *Mdlewembe* by Zola). In the same vein it would be misleading to automatically dismiss Kwaito as music without meaning because of its general focus on beats instead of lyrics (Peterson 2003; Mhlambi 2004; Allen 2004), or to locate it merely in the post-apartheid period without making references to its roots in *marabi* dance, *mbaqanga* and bubblegum music (Boloka 2003). While it is necessary to acknowledge the musical complexity of Kwaito and of its meaning in the lives of black urban youth during the 1990s, it is undeniable that this post-apartheid generation was more prone to consumerism than their parent generations, especially from the late 1990s onwards. Part of this development was an opening-up to foreign, especially US or Western, influences, which are evident in the music (House and Hip Hop), fashion (streetwear) and language (urban lingo), making it at once a truly cosmopolitan and distinctively South African phenomenon. Another sign for the paradigm shift in the cultural, especially musical, sector that occurred during the 1990s was a process of intensifying commodification and commercialisation, exemplified by the way in which one of the first Kwaito groups, Boom Shaka, was assembled by music producer Don Laka in 1993 in a similar fashion as British and American boy groups at the time. A further example is the emergence and growing success of Gauteng radio station YFM and associated youth magazine YMag which captured the spirit of Kwaito and gave it a name – Y Culture (Nuttall 2003; 2004; 2008). Young South Africans' insouciance at embracing the non-values of consumerism and materialism has been poignantly noted by Gavin Steingo (2005: 351) in the article *South African Music after Apartheid: Kwaito, the "Party Politic," and the Appropriation of Gold as a Sign of Success* in which he points to the inversion of gold as a symbol of oppression to one of success in the imagery and lyrics of Kwaito. A more positive reading of the consumerist inclination of South African black youth is presented by Bhekizizwe Peterson (2003: 210).

For one, the preoccupation with consumption can be interpreted as an acceptance of the larger societal ethos that informs many South Africans of different backgrounds and ages. Alternatively, even in its most nihilistic forms, the celebration of consumption in black youth may attest to their courage and commitment not to give in to the conditions of poverty and strife found in the townships. The success of many artists, actors and soccer stars affords them a measure of upward social mobility, a change in class and status that many find difficult to negotiate.

Material wealth becomes a symbol for success and "upward social mobility" in a time when

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poverty is rife but expectations are high. Ideological battles of the past give way to the consensus of consumerism – yet consumerism itself is usually stylized and comes in different flavours and colours.

But the rise of consumerism does not go unchallenged in the new South Africa as another strand of literature dealing with Hip Hop is witness to. Following the example of US American Hip Hop, local Hip Hop started at the fringes of society and urbanity in the early 1980s where black youth were looking for a way to vent their anger and frustration with being disadvantaged in an unfair and unequal society. In this case “black” was the racial identity deliberately chosen by those early rappers in the Cape Flats – according to apartheid’s crude categorisation they would have been considered coloured. Hip Hop provided members of bands such as Prophets Of Da City and Black Noise to distance themselves from a perceived illicit partnership between the coloured population and the white regime and to align themselves with the Black Consciousness Movement. The 1990s saw the expansion of popular Kwaito artists such as Zola and Bongo Muffin into Hip Hop territory and today genuine Hip Hop crews such as ProKid and Driemanskap are successfully rapping in the African vernacular in order to reach a large and growing audience of fans who appreciate the depth, sincerity and relevance of much local Hip Hop.

But despite South Africa’s strong tradition of so-called conscious Hip Hop, the controversy about hip hop’s role as an effective agent for the perceived Americanisation of South African youth continues to simmer at the surface of much public debate. The negative perceptions of Hip Hop are at once acknowledged and challenged by Adam Haupt (2008: 392) who has written extensively on South Africa’s, and especially Cape Town’s, Hip Hop scene over the years:

However, black urban youth’s fondness of African American popular culture and counter-cultures developed within the broader context of the rise of US cultural imperialism. In the years that preceded the decline of apartheid, the SABC shifted from offering just one TV channel to presenting its viewers a choice of three TV channels: TV1, TV2 and TV3. While these channels seemed to be interpellating viewers along the lines of language, race and culture, what is more significant for the purposes of this chapter is that SABC programming made use of a large amount of US content. By the late 1980s, viewers watched a range of shows, such as *Solid Gold*, *Fame*, *The Cosby Show*, *Miami Vice*, *Wiseguy*, *Spencer For Hire*, *A Man Called Hawk*, *The Tracy Ullman Show*, *Cheers*, *Hill Street Blues*, *Knight Rider* and *Magnum PI*, to name a few. In an informal discussion I had with former POC MC and producer Shaheen Ariefdien, he recalled that a similar pattern was emerging in the time that he spent in the former apartheid homeland Bophuthatswana (with his musician father Issy Ariefdien). The homeland’s TV and radio programming offered consumers an impressive range of entertainment that was mostly obtained from the US. His way of making sense of these changes in South Africa, which had introduced TV programming only in the late 1970s, was that the apartheid government was dazzling its citizens with US entertainment while the townships burned; in short, it was offering citizens spectacle as a means of diversion. At the same time, the previously isolated apartheid state was now also giving viewers a glimpse of less-restricted societies abroad as well opening the door to US cultural imperialism.

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In the article Haupt goes on to further problematise the growing influence of American Hip Hop on young South Africans' gender roles, as young men are increasingly adopting the macho tough men attitude of famous gangster rappers. In his book *Stealing empire: P2P, intellectual property and hip-hop subversion* (Haupt 2008: chapter 5) he contrasts these hegemonic depictions of masculinity with the critical feminism of local Hip Hop crew Godessa, making the point that Hip Hop can offer a vehicle to educate young South Africans about local issues despite (and perhaps also because of) its association with the bling-bling trope found in its commercial strain. The theoretical assumptions and implications of Haupt's work (discussed on page 44) aside, his rich and detailed account of the local Hip Hop scene offers intriguing insights into the ambiguity and ambivalence in South African youth studies which is often encountered at the junction of supposedly local authenticity and global homogeneity. This is also the impression taken from Gary Pritchard's (2009: 54) discussion piece *Cultural imperialism, Americanisation and Cape Town hip-hop culture*, which he concludes as follows:

As hip-hop culture makes increasing inroads into popular culture worldwide, it is easy to overlook, or discount altogether, the importance of local cultural forms, an interrogation of which is necessary when exploring questions of Americanisation or cultural imperialism. My experiences have convinced me that hip-hop cannot be viewed simply as an expression of American culture and, in Cape Town at least, it takes on new meanings and provides a platform for local expression.

But Hip Hop is not a prominent subject only because of its transnational relevance (see also Bennett 1999; Osumare 2001), but also, in the South African context, because of its popularity among coloured youth. This phenomenon has been discussed, among others, by Daniel Hammett (2009: 413) in *Local beats to global rhythms: coloured student identity and negotiations of global cultural imports in Cape Town, South Africa*:

Coloured students professed their liking for hip-hop because of the style and 'bling' culture associated with it. They also drew on narratives on urban marginalisation in rap lyrics to claim commonalities of experience. Within these processes, black American musicians are being consumed and claimed in certain ways by coloured youth that render race as ambiguous. Black Americans are conceived of differently to black South Africans – the tensions around marginalisation and un-entitlement expressed against the black majority in South Africa (Hammett 2008) are passively invoked in coloured student's claims on narratives of urban marginalisation in black American popular culture.

Hammett's observations are a perfect example for the intricacies of South African youth's racial identities; coloured kids identify with the discourses of aspiration portrayed in American Hip Hop apparently in the same fashion as black youth celebrate consumerism and materialism as a way out of the "ghetto" (township). At the same time there is an emphasis on the discourse of marginalisation inherent in the "ghetto" imagery, expressing a real sense of being disadvantaged in the face of black political and white economic dominance in contemporary South Africa (Battersby 2003).

Given the relative wealth of literature on Kwaito and Hip Hop, the tastes of young white South

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Africans are fairly underrepresented in current youth studies. Dolby (2001), drawing on her field-work at Fernwood High, discusses young white South Africans' identities and taste preferences in a separate journal article in which she proposes that they are best understood through a global image of whiteness:

While whiteness is often analysed as a phenomenon that is contained within the nation (Giroux, 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Hage, 1998), here the nation is abandoned [10]. Instead, the framework for interpreting whiteness both refuses and stretches beyond the nation-whiteness is able to reposition itself as part of a global whiteness that promises the power and privilege unavailable within the confines of the nation [11].

For white Fernwood youth, the only way to rescue a sense of a 'white' self is to connect to whiteness outside of South Africa's border-specifically to the global flow or 'scape' (Appardurai, 1996) of white popular culture that unites white youth around the world. These desires for escape, for breaking the bonds and bounds of blackness, manifest themselves in the limited public arenas of the school where students have outlets for expression. Cultural practices, below I discuss the example of the school fashion show, become a way for white students to assert a collective racial self that attempts to burst out of the blackness in which it feels encased.

The notion of a "global image of whiteness" is popular in recent works on white South African identity. It has been discussed in detail by Melissa Steyn (2001) in her book *Whiteness just isn't what it used to be: white identity in a changing South Africa* and is also a common theme in Soudien's (2007; 2010) work on South African youth. Gary Baines (2008: 110), in a book chapter on popular music and whiteness in South Africa, contextualises the notion of a global image of whiteness in the music tastes of white South Africans and somewhat qualifies it by distinguishing between English and Afrikaans speakers:

Music, then, is capable of creating and reinforcing an awareness of shared experience among individuals irrespective of their geographical location. Thus English-speaking listeners living in apartheid South Africa were able to affirm an identity which was not 'first and foremost South African' (Muller, 1997: 8). They were able to imagine themselves as part of a world-wide Anglophone community, differentiated from white English-speakers elsewhere only by virtue of the fact that they happened to be resident in South Africa. Many white Afrikaans-speakers, especially amongst the youth, also listened to Anglo-American popular music. But not all whites identified with Europe or regarded themselves as being rooted in that continent. Their heritage tied them to Africa and this did not prompt a sense of cultural inferiority. In fact, some whites took pride in music performed and produced by South African artists and identified with their music.

The stark contrast between supposedly black, coloured and white tastes, and especially music tastes, depicted here shall not detract from transformative and integrative potential of music in post-apartheid South Africa. For example, Christopher Ballantine (2004), in *Re-thinking 'whiteness'? Identity, change and 'white' popular music in post-apartheid South Africa*, chronicles the success of white musicians from Johnny Clegg to Syd Kitchen and Koos Kombuis who either completely adopt neo-traditional African music styles, incorporate stylistic elements in their music or use language,

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both in terms of lyrical content and dialect, in order to overcome old barriers between racially defined music styles. More recent examples coming to mind are the Folk/Afropop group Freshly Ground, afrockers The BLK JKS from Johannesburg, and Rave/Hip Hop success story Die Antwoord. But Ballantine (2004: 112) also recognises that some bands are rather naive (to the point of sheer ignorance) in their attempts at incorporating the “African exoticism” in their songs:

More problematic yet is the unashamed ethno-tourism – voyeurism by another name – of the largely white audiences that patronise some of the offerings at a festival such as Rustler’s Valley. Sound Journey (ca. 1999) is a record of one of those events: it presents black South African ‘pre-colonial’ music as romantically exotic, linking it implausibly to markers of ‘primitive’ music (panpipes, didgeridoos) from elsewhere in the world, and exploiting it for the entertainment of modern, global, middle-class sensibilities.

Other groups, Ballantine (2004: 113) notes, shed their South African identity altogether:

Fourthly, just as some South African whites think of themselves as somehow ‘American’ or ‘British’, so too do some popular-music groups shape themselves according to foreign sounds and images. For instance, Just Jinger’s *Something for Now* (1998) is clearly rooted in US rock and valorises ‘jumpers, coke, sweet Mary Jane’; Sugardrive’s *Sand Man Sky* (1997) is a grunge album; while Amersham (1998, 2000), *Tree* (1999) and *Point Sirens* (1999) all decisively orient themselves towards The Beatles – and, in the case of *Point Sirens*, towards Crosby, Stills and Nash as well.

These examples show that musical hybridity is not yet considered an entity in itself, in the sense that essentialised notions of what constitutes black or white music continue to persist and a crossover between the two is still seen as exactly that. To a large extent this has something to do with South Africa’s particular history, the bluntness and intensity of social engineering at the roots and heart of its society. But there is also another dimension to it, one informed by global capitalism and a globally shared class imagery which finds its expression, for example, as “ethno-tourism” in the “modern, global, middle-class sensibilities” described by Ballantine. However, on the local level, these shared sensibilities do not necessarily manifest themselves uniformly but rather help to further define and accentuate the fault lines between separate identity groups in South Africa, as evident in the three major discourses of identity commonly associated with South African youth today and briefly touched on in the preceding paragraphs: aspiration, marginalisation and escape. The first, aspiration, refers to the triumph of consumerism and materialistic desire among the post-apartheid generation. Although often, and perhaps rightfully so, portrayed as a sign of the demise of idealistic imaginations of South Africa rising beyond the pragmatic, and maybe short-sighted, logics of modern capitalism, it can also be interpreted as a move away from the painfully political era of apartheid and as an expression of the hopes and dreams this transition has brought to places where there were none before. Accordingly, these hopes and dreams – cast in images of material wealth – are to be found in the Kwaito and Hip Hop videos played late at night on national television. The flipside of aspiration, however, is disillusionment – a feeling expressed by many, often coloured, youth who feel betrayed and marginalised

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by the post-apartheid governments and seek recognition in the angry contempt for mainstream society expressed in Hip Hop – either by embracing the gangster imagery and symbolism of mostly American Gangster Rap or the political consciousness of mostly local Hip Hop. In contrast, white South African kids often have no qualms about adopting a firmly middle-class identity – as long as it is framed within a global image of whiteness where Africa only has a place in the realm of exoticism and the “ethno-tourism” described by Ballantine.

Although these admittedly rather coarse depictions of South African youth seem to be merely discursive and based primarily on sentiments and vague ideas of race and class consciousness rather than facts, it is one of the main intentions of this thesis to ground these discourses in objective observations on structural inequality which is assumed to qualify and determine access to different cultural flows – for example and most importantly through the media. The following section provides an overview of the historical origins of South Africa’s notoriously segmented media sphere which continues to be segmented not despite but also because of global trends in media broadcasting.

4.2 Media Segmentation in South Africa

“Whenever I switch on the TV I see apartheid.” – This line by Cape Town comedian Nik Rabinowitz is remarkable. Because what he means is not the dark legacy of the old South Africa casting its shadow on today’s news through stories of poverty, crime and HIV. Instead he is referring to the fact that one can usually watch the evening news simultaneously in at least three different languages followed either by a hip Kwaito show recorded in Soweto, an Afrikaans slapstick comedy or an American action movie with Steven Seagal. The results presented in chapter 7 show that the punch line is not far from reality – at least the teenagers included in the survey seem to make their choices what to watch on television largely according to ethnic and linguistic characteristics. Yet media segmentation is not a new phenomenon nor is it specific to South Africa. To a large extent it is the result of the increasing commercialisation of the public sphere, the commodification of popular culture and the establishment of transnational target audiences sharing similar taste patterns. Nonetheless the history of public broadcasting in South Africa helps to understand the findings presented in this thesis and puts them into a more meaningful context, as it highlights and illustrates the issues of inclusion and exclusion in terms of media access.

The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was established in 1936, based on the same principles as the British Broadcasting Corporation (and various other public broadcasters throughout the Commonwealth). The ideals behind the ‘Reithian’ principles (named after their author Sir John Reith) are national unity and public education, meaning that public broadcasting in South Africa, just like in Britain, needed to be universally accessible in order to establish a single public sphere and instill normative values in society. However, the way these principles were applied in practice stands in stark contrast to their inclusivity, as only English- and Afrikaans-speaking (white) South Africans were considered full citizens and thus to be part of the united nation in the making – African languages or the concerns of black South Africans were not taken into account in the broadcaster’s programming. This fatal flaw in SABC’s set-up

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was to be exploited by the National Party government under apartheid when racial segregation was increasingly formalised and institutionalised. The bias towards Afrikaans in national broadcasting and the restriction of African languages almost exclusively to regional stations serving the so-called homelands were not merely a reflection of apartheid and its divisive policies but were in fact crucial and effective tools in achieving the apartheid ideal of racial segregation. In his seminal paper *The Constant Companion of Man: Separate Development, Radio Bantu and Music* Charles Hamm (1991) is making some discerning observations on the austerity in the public broadcaster's decision for separate broadcasting. According to Hamm, the first wave of Rock'n'Roll in the late 1950s was seen as a threat to the morality of young white South Africans by the conservative press, the apartheid government and the Afrikaaner church (Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk), and all potentially 'corrupting' music was to be banned from SABC. Nonetheless, by the mid-1960s the most popular radio station among young white South Africans was the Mozambican LM which played all the 'bad' music the conservative government did not want white South African youth to hear.

The SABC intervened on the cultural level by refusing to play certain types of contemporary popular music, on grounds that 'a high proportion of [it] is morally unacceptable' (AR 1967, p. 32), and by offering in its place 'something more than mere beat music . . . in harmony with and linked to a constantly growing desire in young people nowadays for programmes of a more serious kind' (AR 1966, p. 6), always in keeping with the ideology of Separate Development. Taking as a guide its own position that 'our broadcasting service for Europeans must emphasise . . . our two different cultures and languages' (AR 1959, p. 4), the SABC developed separate strategies for its 'white' services. (Hamm 1991: 155)

In contrast, the so-called Bantu stations were considered to cater for the tastes of the black population. In practice this meant a lack of educational programmes, a virtual absence of foreign news, a focus on local (referring to the bantustan, not South Africa) 'events', and an emphasis on agricultural topics. Accordingly, most of the music was either traditional African, choral or popular, as the tastes of white and black South Africans were considered too different by the Minister of Post and Telegraphs, Albert Herzog, cited in Hamm (1991: 156), who supported the amendment of Broadcast Act of 1936 which allowed the formal segregation of public broadcasting into black and white radio stations. The amendment was passed in 1960, formalising Herzog's sentiments towards what he saw as unsurpassable difference in black and white tastes:

The Bantu experts will tell you – and we all know it – that the taste of a White Man is not the taste of a Bantu. The taste of a Bantu is not the taste of a White Man. We live in totally different spheres; you can almost say that we live in different civilisations. I do not for a moment allow myself to be told that these programmes which are broadcast for our Europeans can give great satisfaction to the Bantu because we as Europeans do not understand the desires and tastes of the Bantu. (Debates 1960, pp. 2445-7)

It is worth making a note of the self-contradicting dualism – racial segregation under the cloak of national unity – at the roots of South African broadcasting in order to fully understand the recent debates about the transformation of South Africa's mediascape after apartheid. The process

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which led to the new South African Media Charter was a challenge between the three main stakeholders in the public broadcasting environment which brought the old tensions to the fore. On the left one saw the civil society organisations in favour of a pluralistic solution (including more scope for commercial broadcasters), somewhere in the middle the commercial broadcasters calling for more deregulation and commercialisation, and on the right individuals from the ANC who demanded the same control over the broadcaster for the new government as it had been available to the old regime.

The resulting media charter, which was adopted in 1992, can be seen as a victory for the civil society organisations, as it “(...) recognised the right to receive and disseminate information as a basic requirement of democratic citizenship and participation, and established a commitment to an independent public service broadcaster regulated by an independent body (ANC, 1992)” (Barnett 1998: 555). This meant that the Charter’s commitment to independency was regulated by the Independent Broadcasting Act (IBA) which prescribed the establishment of a government-independent board responsible for the broadcaster’s programming following the old Reithian principles of national unity and public education. But the development from a government-controlled state broadcaster to an independent one serving the public, as enshrined in the Media Charter and the IBA, has not meant an end to the controversy and debates surrounding the broadcaster’s future on account of at least three conflicts in connection with the Charter itself. First, the Charter’s commitment to national unity is riddled with the fundamental contradictions at the heart of the idea of the Rainbow Nation itself as it concedes equal priority to the recognition of the country’s diversity in terms of language and culture as well as the project of nation-making and the pursuit of a singular South African identity. A case in point is the establishment of three TV channels (instead of two, as originally prescribed in the Charter), two of which (SABC 1 and SABC 2) broadcast in a multitude of languages while the third station (SABC 3) broadcasts in English only. As much as this approach serves the protection of minority groups and the preservation of cultural identities, it proves to be a major stumbling block on the path towards a single public sphere as individuals continue to consume public broadcasting according to their language preferences. The second conflict lies in the Charter’s provision for the further commercialisation of the country’s broadcasting environment, both within the public broadcasting network and through the licensing of new privately-owned stations, namely eTV and the subscription-based satellite service DSTV. This point is related to the first conflict insofar as the high costs associated with producing local content in various languages (as required by prescribed quotas) increase SABC’s already strong dependency on non-fee income sources and the need to compete with the newly-established stations for advertising revenue through the introduction of popular and cheaper foreign (mostly American) programmes, as they can be found mostly on SABC 3. Moreover, the addition of subscription-based satellite services translates into profound doubts about the universality of access, as it creates a real divide between rich and poor in terms of access to non-SABC, foreign channels and programmes. The third source of conflict lies in the questionability of the broadcaster’s independency, as the filling of key positions with ANC-members within the organisation and on the regulation board over the years has

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aroused suspicion over the network's credibility especially among the non-ANC constituency, possibly driving them towards the private networks and stations.

For the aforementioned reasons South Africa's mediascape today is a far cry from the Reithian ideal of a strong and independent public broadcaster sustaining a single public sphere. Instead it appears fragmented along the intersecting lines of language, class and culture. In an almost prophetic article Clive Barnett predicted in 1998 that the restructuring of South Africa's of mediascape and the project of nation-building would not be a mutually beneficial endeavour:

The economic policies of the ANC-led government, shaped by broader international processes, is leading to the increasing commercialisation of the broadcasting system even as it embraces a new public service credo. On the other hand, the task of nation-building has to address a series of sub-national identities which reflect entrenched patterns of socioeconomic division. To a considerable extent, in South Africa cultural and linguistic differences correspond with stark and entrenched socioeconomic inequalities. The interaction of the economic dynamics of commercialised broadcasting with the structure of social economic and cultural differentiation thus render it difficult for the broadcasting system to successfully bind together diverse identities and audiences into a single national public while at the same time maintaining financial viability. (Barnett 1998: 568)

Barnett's analysis of the South African broadcasting environment suggests that the old South Africa's social frontiers of class and race will continue to exist not only despite, but actually because of the further commercialisation of the South African media due to the conflation of the two factors in the South African context. The accuracy of his prediction is readily discernible in the annual reports of the All Media and Product Survey (AMPS) conducted by the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF), which gathers all sorts of data on South Africans' consumption behaviours, including media consumption, showing that South Africans have indeed very different media preferences depending on race. It is also reflected in the qualitative data collected by Larry Strelitz (2002; see also 2004; 2005; 2008) for his PhD titled *Where the Global Meets the Local: South African Youth and their Experience of Global Media*. The interviewees, all students at Rhodes university at the time, had strong associations with particular television and radio shows, to the point that some of them, all black, male and from rural areas, referred to the television viewing room of their residency as the 'homeland' where they would watch South African soap operas, African language news and soccer. Absent from their TV diet were any foreign television series or shows.

Faced with an institutional culture in which they feel white and black middle-class norms dominate, they have felt the need to consolidate and signify their difference. The nightly ritual of local television consumption in the 'homeland' is one of the means of achieving this. As Thompson notes (1995: 204), migrant populations – these students have 'migrated' to Rhodes University – often display a strong quest for roots. (Strelitz 2002: 164)

The image of the viewing room as the 'homeland' – a term deeply steeped in South Africa's history of formal racial segregation – is fitting, as it underlines the continuing segregation of South Africa's mediascape despite the political transition from apartheid to democracy. Also, Strelitz

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does not reduce the observed differences to a matter of racial preferences, as he points to the salience of class distinction in the students' choices. For example, he reports that the group of young men was critical of what they described as middle- and upper-class 'coconuts' – black students who preferred to speak English over African languages and adopted most of the habits of traditionally white South Africans studentship such as drinking and wearing certain kinds of clothing. Furthermore, Strelitz's account illustrates the unequal access to global cultural flows among young South Africans, lending further support to the claim that media preferences are not simply homologous with aesthetic taste patterns *per se*. Instead they reflect social inequalities and regulate the ways in which young people interact with the local and global spheres, thus further accentuating notions of difference.

The magnitude of media fragmentation described here is certainly particular to the South African context, and so are the levels of inequality and the omnipresence of references to race and racial differences. Nonetheless, there are certain elements to the South African case which are observable in other parts of the world as consequences of global capitalism and globalisation. These include increasing levels of social heterogeneity (both in terms of economic inequality and cultural diversity) and consumerism, especially among younger generations. These commonalities provide the necessary space for a comparative perspective based on the assumption that the racialisation of taste patterns and media segmentation is itself largely a product of cultural globalisation resulting in 'common structures of difference'. However, any comparison of this kind requires a careful consideration of the fundamental differences in the cultural make-up (especially regarding matters of identity and racial discourse) of the two settings in questions, in this case South Africa and Brazil.

4.3 Brazilian Connections

Despite the shared colonial history, socioeconomic similarities and racial diversity of the two countries, sociological comparisons between South Africa and Brazil, especially with regard to identity and race, are still remarkably rare. In fact, direct comparisons are virtually non-existent; two of the more resourceful books on the topic include USA in the comparison, and a working paper by Jeremy Seekings takes Nigeria into the equation. The first of the three, *Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States* (Hamilton et al. 2001), is an edited volume covering mostly the economic aspects of racial inequality in the three countries. The second book, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* by Anthony Marx (1998), looks at the historical and political roots of formal discrimination in South Africa and the United States, and, in contrast, the alleged lack thereof in Brazil. Marx argues that in order to overcome the political divisions between the different parts of the white population in South Africa and United States, it was necessary to unite them in the face of a common 'threat' – black people. The resulting institutionalisation of racial discrimination in the two countries (albeit in different forms and to varying degrees) led to formal resistance and the Black Consciousness movement, and ultimately to the deeply ingrained racial consciousness which is still present in the United States and especially South Africa, yet is perceived to be largely absent in Brazil. Seekings, on the other hand, makes the point that South Africa's racial

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heterogeneity in combination with its historical class/race overlap is making far-reaching redistributive policies possible (well-off whites willing to concede the need for economic transformation and blacks showing intra-group solidarity), whereas in Brazil the lack of political power based on strong racial identities preempts pro-poor policies. What these comparisons show, and what is crucial to understand before any further comparisons are made, is that although the two countries share many socio-economic characteristics, the racial discourses in the two countries vary significantly.

The demographic and socio-economic similitudes between the two countries are deceptive in that they seem to suggest that also their racial compositions would be fairly similar. But this would mean to ignore the particularities of race in South Africa and Brazil, which are best to be contrasted in order to be fully understood. This has been achieved by Ribeiro in an unpublished, yet excellent summary of the two countries' intellectual origins of race thinking. By citing two sociologists who contributed immensely to the definition of the racial imaginary and vocabulary in their respective countries, Ribeiro manages to reveal the crucial contradiction between South African and Brazilian racial discourse: the rejection vs the celebration of hybridity based on pseudo-biological grounds. First Ribeiro dissects the work of Geoffrey Cronjé, one of the founding fathers of South African sociology (Uys 2009: 237), who is also known as "the mind of apartheid" (Coetzee 1991).

The blood of whites has to be kept pure. Cronjé's nemesis is therefore first and foremost blood-mixing (*bloedvermenging*). It has a strong connotation of complete loss of self and identity: Coetzee warns us that the prefix *ver-* has a perfective force. Vermenging therefore implies a mixture that cannot be undone, an irreversible state of affairs. For Cronjé, blood-mixing is inevitably detrimental and ultimately leads to a state of *mengelmoes* or total lack of differentiation. Coetzee (p.11) tells us that *mengelmoes* comes from Dutch/Afrikaans *mengel* (mixing up), cognate with English 'mangle', and *moes*, cognate with English 'mush'. In colloquial usage the term is always derogatory, implying a 'mixture in which not only individual character but all original structure have been lost; what is left is shapeless, undifferentiated and pulpy – much like faeces, in fact' (id).

Cronjé's portrayal of *bloedvermenging* as the ultimate loss of identity is contrasted with Gilberto Freyre's notion of *mestiçagem* as the ideal (and idealised) source of Brazilian identity, depicted in his seminal work *Casa-Grande e Senzala (The Masters and the Slaves)* (Freyre 1986, originally published in 1933).

In the works of Brazilian sociologist, anthropologist and writer Gilberto Freyre blood-mixing (*miscigenação* or *mestiçagem*) is elevated to the level of an unequalled virtue that would have saved Portuguese civilisation in the tropics and in Europe from the ethnocentrism, narrow-mindedness and utter prejudice of civilisations of North European origin such as those of the United States or South Africa (Freyre, 1971: 137ff, 1980: 320-1). For Freyre fluidity is not to be checked, on the contrary it is good that there should be a free flow, that the white blood of Luso-Brazilian masters should mix with that of African slaves and Indian women to form a pliable, vigorous, flexible race and most – most importantly – a truly unique civilisation in the tropics. (Ribeiro 1995: 5)

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Freyre's idealistic depiction of miscegenation is said to be at the heart of Brazil's founding myth, and Brazil has indeed often been presented as some sort of racial paradise in comparison to the United States and certainly South Africa. Yet the image of Brazil as a 'racial democracy' has long suffered severe cracks in the face of clear evidence, including census data, that non-white Brazilians have always been and still are more likely to live in poverty, be unemployed, live in poorer neighbourhoods, have worse education etc. than their white compatriots (Hellwig 1992; Skidmore 1972; 1983; 1993; 2003; Hess and Matta 1995; Cleary 1999; Reichmann 1999; Sansone 2003). But it was only after Brazil's transition to democracy that the government started to move away from the self-image of racial harmony and acknowledge that racial discrimination is real and rife in Brazilian society, leading to the introduction of affirmative action laws in the early 2000s (Htun 2004) in spite of the opposition of those who consider the fluidity of Brazilian (non-)racialism as a value threatened by the introduction of rigid racial categories necessary for the implementation of race-based affirmative action (Kamel 2006).

The more intricate arguments against or in favour of race-based affirmative action aside, the two standpoints perfectly reflect the conundrum of race in the Brazilian context; on the one hand, racial discrimination in virtually all spheres of Brazilian public life – from the labour market to media representation – is well-documented by scholars and acknowledged by most Brazilians and the government. Nonetheless, Brazilians are generally ambiguous at classifying themselves or others and most deny discriminating others in terms of race. It is this fluidity, or hybridity exemplified by the image of the *mestizo*, which poses the greatest challenge to students of Brazilian race relations as it is seen almost as the polar opposite of South Africa's or even the United States' rigid classification system. Yet, despite the apparent vagueness of the concept in the Brazilian setting, it is crucial to recognise its evaluative hierarchy, which Skidmore (1972: 3) is able to describe so poignantly while explaining the position of the *mulato* in Brazilian society:

Such behavior suggests that a mulatto, whose phenotypical features had given him social access about which he felt insecure, might find this mobility endangered by having his social status redefined through the exposure of his family origin. The result was a subtle and shifting network of color lines, which created ambiguity and tension for all mixed bloods. Evidence of this tension can be found in the large Brazilian folklore about the 'untrustworthy' mulatto. His neuroses have been poetically pictured in Freyre's *The Mansions and the Shanties*. He is the central figure in Brazil's 'racial democracy', because he is granted limited entry into the higher social establishment. The limits on his mobility depend upon his exact appearance (the more 'Negroid', the less mobile) and the degree of cultural 'whiteness' (education, manners, wealth) he has been able to attain. The successful application of this multi-racial system has required Brazilians to develop an intense sensitivity to racial categories and the nuances of their application.

What Skidmore hints at in his article from 1972, and which is supported by recent works on class and race in Brazil, is the existence of a black-white-continuum which does allow for greater mobility depending on phenotype and social status (the Brazilian saying "money whitens" comes to mind) but is nevertheless fundamentally discriminative in that black, with negative connotations,

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is seen at the lower end and white, with positive connotations, at the upper end of the stratum. In practice, this combination of mobility and hierarchy can have consequences (such as the ‘adoption’ of differing racial identities by members of the same family (Harris, Consorte, Lang and Brne 1993: 452)) which are not entirely, yet relatively unusual in the South African context where the definitions of racial categories are far stricter and accounts of ‘race-change’ as a way to circumvent oppressive racial policies during apartheid rather anecdotal. But it also means that the multitude of race/colour terms used by Brazilians when asked about their race is not the sign of complete indifference or unawareness that it is sometimes portrayed to be. In fact, one could argue that the Brazilian ingenuity of creating new and surprising racial descriptors – asked for their skin colour participants in the 1976 survey came up with 134 different terms from *acastanhada* (cashewlike tint; caramel coloured) over *fogoio* (florid; flushed) to *vermelha* (reddish) – is partly due to attempts to ‘whiten’ their racial identity. This is also the observation made by Livio Sansone (2003) who conducted a survey with 1024 participants in two different locations in Brazil, in which the respondents were asked to self-classify themselves, friends, family members and neighbours in racial terms. Sansone found that although the range of replies was surprisingly broad – 36 distinctive terms were provided – 91 percent of informants used eight terms (*moreno, pardo, branco, preto, negro, dark, light moreno, mulato*) which are more or less compatible with the official census classification comprising *branco, preto, amarelo* and *pardo*. But even with the other 28 terms included, Sansone was able to recode the replies into four main categories of the black-white-continuum comprising 98 percent of the informants (so only two percent described themselves outside the continuum): *branco* (white), *moreno (mestizo)*, *mulato/pardo* (dark *mestizo*), *preto/negro* (very dark/black). What is maybe most disconcerting, apart from the sheer variety of hues and shades, to students of South African or American race relations is the subdivision of the ‘mixed-race’ category, for which a whole range of possible terms seems to apply: *moreno, mestizo, pardo, mulato* – each with its own nuances and subclassifications. Sansone argues that usage of one of these terms is not necessarily as arbitrary and unsystematic as it might seem, and the long lists of racial terms found in many quantitative studies, including the census, are rather misleading because most of them are used only by tiny fractions of the population. Also, according to Sansone, some of them use qualifying attributes only to underline or illustrate, in a humorous fashion, their association with one of the more common racial descriptors (e.g. ant-coloured = dark *moreno*). And again others, such as *mulato*, are common in some regions but hardly used in others. Yet Sansone does not suggest that a straightforward simplification of the race classification system, such as the essentially three-tiered census (white, mixed, black plus Asian and Indigenous) or even a bi-racial (black and white) classification, is necessarily the best way forward. Instead he argues that it is necessary to acknowledge and study the nuances of what he calls “native terms” (as opposed to superimposed ‘official’ categories) as they provide rich information about the subtle racial discrimination which is indeed more prevalent in Brazilian society than commonly assumed. In his own research, for example, he notices that many informants in poorer neighbourhoods classified themselves, their family and neighbours ‘lighter’ than in the opinion of the interviewer, but when asked about the neighbourhood in more general terms,

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they were much less reluctant to ‘admit’ that most of its inhabitants were of a ‘dark’ colour. Sansone also gives a whole array of examples of the role of context in which race questions are being asked. These include certain themes (e.g. carnaval being a ‘black thing’), situations and places:

The streetcorner and the neighborhood are generally seen as liminal spaces in which it is less necessary to use “white” codes. This liminality is constructed in opposition to the outside world, above all the *cidade alta* (neighborhoods where more wealthy people live), contacts with bureaucracy (for example, the solicitation of documents and the processing of requests), the search for work, and, for some, contacts with the police. (Sansone 2003: 44)

Furthermore references to *mestiçagem* are sometimes used in order to avoid black or white descriptors (which can be insulting):

The responses regarding color are influenced as much by somatic preference than by the discourses of racial democracy and the celebration of *mestiçagem* (racial mixture). Relations of friendship, just as the fear of offending someone, can bring someone to classify a neighbor’s family with a term held as positive – above all, *moreno* in the place of *preto* and *mista* or *misturada* in the place of white or black. Those who an individual shows affection for (for example, close relatives or boyfriends and girlfriends) and/or respect (for example, a boss or employer), one tends to give a few “advantage points” on the chromatic scale – defining them as lighter than they actually are. (Sansone 2003: 45)

Sansone’s dissection of the Brazilian race categories is discussed here in such detail not because his observations are necessarily fully applicable to Brazil in general, but because he manages to acknowledge the existing fluidity of race in the Brazil context while pointing out the subtle yet evaluative connotations associated with certain shades of skin colour. Some of these connotations are directly linked to class in the sense that wealth and “spaces of wealth” are considered to be first and foremost in the white domain while poverty and street life are commonly associated with blackness. In a similar vein this thesis, although focussing on South Africa and Cape Town, promises to shed new light on the significance of such generalisations for young Brazilians today, and in what ways they might be associated with actual taste patterns and certain forms of popular culture, as the existing literature in this respect is rather sparse. Although there is an abundance of literature on ‘AfroBrazilian’ culture, other aspects of cultural globalization, popular culture, and especially youth culture, are rarely discussed, despite matching findings by Sansone and Telles (2004) that the influx of foreign trends and cultural flows appears to have significant influences on young people’s racial imaginary; both authors report of the tendency among young black Brazilians to prefer the term “*negro*”, associated with music and culture in general, instead of “*preto*”, which has a lower-class connotation. Telles speculates that this could be the sign of a growing black political consciousness among black Brazilians due to the growing influence of the US American civil rights movement. Other literature points to the growing popularity of black American music and youth culture, i.e. Hip Hop and Funk, among young Brazilians (Sansone 2003; Pardue 2007; Gordon 1999; Pieterse 2010; Pardue 2004; 2004). Juarez Dayrell’s (2005) *A Música Entra em Cena* deserves a special mention as it chronicles the history of the Rap and Funk scene in Belo Horizonte, where the Brazilian data for this thesis has been collected. Dayrell, who in the theoretical part of his book often refers to the much debated idea of multiple subcultures

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in the Birmingham tradition (Dayrell 2005: 35), makes a couple of observations which are of direct relevance to this study. The first concerns the shared origins of Brazilian Funk and Hip Hop – black American music. This might seem self-evident but it is noteworthy as it goes hand in hand with another point by Dayrell that Funk and Hip Hop are to be understood as creative expressions of the marginalised and disadvantaged. So even though it is not an autonomous theme in Dayrell’s book, the connection between social inequality and racial differentiation and discrimination is certainly an important factor in his account of Belo Horizonte’s youth scenes, as evident in his description of the early Hip Hop events in Belo Horizonte.

The dances were performed by youth from the periphery, mostly blacks. There were spaces where the entry of a white person was frowned upon, being a cause for fights. There was an identification of black, or “brown”, music with blackness and with a black imagery – especially bell-bottom pants, platform shoes, the use of braces, a black or white jacket and a hat – representing a positive black identity.²⁶ (Dayrell 2005: 48)

The other point of relevance made by Dayrell is his distinction between Hip Hop and Funk as separate styles despite their shared origins. According to Dayrell (2005: 51) the fundamental difference between the two styles lies in their ‘messages’; whereas Funk is more about rhythm and dance, Hip Hop focusses on lyrical, often socially conscious, content. Here the parallels to South Africa’s Hip Hop and Kwaito scenes are impossible to ignore; the romanticisation of local Hip Hop as authentic and conscious versus the somewhat derogatory portrayal of Kwaito and Funk, respectively, as consumerist music without meaning. It has been shown earlier that reducing South Africa’s Hip Hop scene to local, conscious Hip Hop can be problematic as it means to banalise and underestimate the impact of commercial, ‘mainstream’, Hip Hop. It has also been argued that Kwaito and local House music are not devoid of symbolic value, even though Hip Hop, both commercial and conscious, is sometimes portrayed to better reflect a certain ‘ghetto’ authenticity. A similar thing seems to happen in the case of the Brazilian Hip Hop/Funk dichotomy, as most scholars, like Dayrell, seem to restrict their textual analyses to the supposedly more meaningful conscious Hip Hop, while commercial Hip Hop, i.e. Gangster Rap, is often confined to the realms of aesthetic and moral judgement.

This last point is supported by looking at one of the very few (or only?) direct comparisons of South African and Brazilian youth culture; Edgar Pieterse (2010: 440) argues that Hip Hop represents a crucial means of expression for marginalised youth in Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro:

These four dimensions of hip-hop – specificity, open discourse, multi-layered discourse and ‘shine-ism’ – make it a complex and dynamic form of popular culture, and one which offers a rich reservoir of materials for identity construction. Hip-hop offers not only insights and perspectives on the working of the world, but also how to ‘hold’ oneself – politically, stylistically, ideologically, socially, psychologically – in that world. The case studies from Rio de Janeiro and

26. Os bailes eram freqüentados por jovens da periferia, na sua maioria negros. Havia espaços onde a entrada de um branco era mal vista, sendo motivo de brigas. Havia uma identificação da black music, ou “brown”, com a negritude e com um visual black – especialmente calças bocas-de-sino, sapato plataforma, o uso de suspensórios, blazer preto ou branco e chapéu –, o que marcava uma identidade negra positiva.

4. *Youth, Social Inequality and Race in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte*

Cape Town underscore how politically conscious hip-hop offers a coherent ideology to resist the truncated realities of drug gang-dominated everyday spaces and lifestyles in pursuit of tougher alternatives.

Pieterse's work is groundbreaking because he demonstrates impressively the similarities in daily experiences and attitudes of kids growing up in the urban peripheries (favelas and townships) of developing societies by capturing the aesthetics, practices and symbolism of Hip Hop as a form of political resistance to the social inequality defining both South Africa and Brazil. But Pieterse, too, focusses mainly on the so-called 'conscious' Hip Hop, although he does acknowledge the great (and arguably more problematic) influence of commercial gangster Rap and RnB on adolescents. In this sense Pieterse's work is simultaneously remarkably innovative because of its comparative character and fairly 'conservative' in that it relies on a rather optimistic reading of local Hip Hop as a particular subculture with its own set of rules and values, separate from the mainstream. As it has been discussed before, such in-depth accounts of particular youth scenes are necessary in order to understand the lived realities of young people today and Pieterse's work is especially useful as it provides such rare glimpses into the world of youth in two so separate yet similar locations. But focussing on the specificity of Hip Hop, and especially one very specific strand of this genre, also carries the risk to look past some of the more general and structural characteristics of adolescents, especially those who grow up in the perceived mainstream. For example: while Hip Hop and, to some extent, the Funk movement are fairly well-documented as creative expressions of resistance by the marginalised and disadvantaged, any scholarly work on Brazilian Rock, Punk, Crossover etc. is extremely scarce despite a strong Brazilian tradition of Rock, and especially Heavy Metal.

An exception is *Mercadores de Sentido: Consumo de Mídia e Identidades Juvenis*, in which Veneza Ronsini (2007) contrasts the consumerism of hip hoppers with the anti-materialism of young punks in Brazil based on interviews with youth in two cities in Rio Grande de Sul: urban Santa Maria and the more rural Caçapava do Sul. Interestingly, Ronsini is inspired by two theoretical strands which are also relevant for this study. For one she refers directly and extensively to sub-cultural theory in the tradition of the CCCS in Birmingham by incorporating significant parts of its conceptual framework in her own research. However, she also acknowledges the narrowness of the original approach taken by Hebdige and others who focussed mainly on the cultural symbols in the lives of white working class young men, and she is careful to make conceptual distinctions between "subcultures", "countercultures" and "styles" as she discusses her study object. And she also goes beyond the conceptual and theoretical limits of subcultural theory by incorporating the work of other sociologists and social anthropologists such as Geertz, Elias and, most importantly, Bourdieu. In many ways Bourdieu's presence in Ronsini's work resembles the one in this study; she uses his interpretation of taste in order to make class distinctions which are not solely determined by Marxist interpretations of class as division of labour but the expression of cultural dispositions passed on through the habitus as a result of the individual's position in the triangulation of economic, social and cultural capital. This allows her to make observations of class differences in relation with popular expressions of youth culture and taste.

4. *Youth, Social Inequality and Race in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte*

Hip-hop is a style that allows youth from the periphery to communicate with those from other social classes, especially from the middle class, in danger of being downgraded (Bourdieu, 1991, p.145-152) and deterred from their class trajectory as their purchasing power decreases and they fail to obtain the school qualifications necessary for employment. The irreverent but careful visual presentation of hip-hoppers avoids the aesthetic intolerance towards the taste of the petty bourgeois, unlike punk which symbolizes a challenge, and, consequently, the perception of the working classes that it refers to. As the communication between classes increases, class conflict, previously a matter of expressive intentions of cultural styles, is being replaced by milder forms, as evidenced by the replacement of baggy clothes of hip-hop, inspired by the clothing of black American prisoners, through sportswear brands like Nike or Adidas.²⁷ (Ronsini 2007: 178)

Although it is not a major theme in Ronsini's work, the extension of the taste/class association by race and gender as additional factors of taste preferences certainly shine through, offering a good example for the applicability of the proposed theoretical framework influenced by Bourdieu also in the Brazilian setting. This impression is further strengthened by the work of Jessé Souza (Souza 2006; 2004) who also makes use of Bourdieu's theory of class distinction in order to explain the causality between race and the reproduction of social inequality in Brazil, as opposed to other studies which merely describe the relationship between race and class, i.e. black and disadvantaged, in absolute terms.

In the specific case of Brazilian social formation skin color is a secondary aspect in relation to class *habitus*, but that obviously does not mean that racial prejudice does not exist or is unimportant. It just means that the invisibility of cultural and symbolic "class racism", specifically by those authors who "buy" into the economic/Marxist conceptualization of class and become Marxists without knowing it, makes "race" the only dimension where the symbolic and cultural dominance is made visible. This visibility of race is achieved by non-economic means. Ignoring the logic of (especially modern) social hierarchy (dominance), which is based on the naturalization and opacity of its "evaluative hierarchy" anchored in institutions and made possible by unconscious institutional and

27. O hip-hop é um estilo que permite a comunicação dos jovens da periferia com jovens de outras classes sociais, especialmente com os de classe média ameaçados desclassamento (Bourdieu, 1991, p.145-152), sujeitos a interromper a trajetória de classe pela queda do poder aquisitivo familiar e pela insuficiência da titulação escolar para obtenção de emprego. A irreverente mas cuidadosa apresentação visual dos hip-hoppers evita a intolerância estética ao gosto pequeno-burguês, ao contrário do punk, que simboliza um desafio a ele e, por consequência, ao modo de percepção das classes populares que o têm como referência. À medida que a comunicação entre as classes aumenta, os conflitos de classe manifestos pelas intenções expressivas dos estilos culturais vão sendo substituídos por formas brandas, como atesta a substituição das roupas largas do hip-hop, antes inspiradas nas roupas dos negros norte-americanos encarcerados, pelos trajes esportivos de marcas como Nike ou Adidas.

4. *Youth, Social Inequality and Race in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte*

social practices, allows “race” to be the only visible indicator of a logic of social hierarchy (dominance) which goes far beyond “race”.²⁸ (Souza 2006: 90)

Together, Ronsini and Souza offer an excellent blueprint for implementing a Bourdieuan interpretation of the racialised class distinction visible in young Brazilians’ taste preferences. They provide a possibility to go beyond mere descriptions of subcultures, as useful and important as they are for understanding the actual life experiences of adolescents, and begin to understand the naturalisation of social inequality and discrimination in contemporary society. Moreover, because of the recognition of social structure (opposed to individual agency or the totality of economic interpretations of class) as the deciding factor behind racialised class distinction, it becomes possible to elevate the discussion from the national to the transnational level, as structures can be compared and local conditions be separated from the global effects expected to produce common structures of difference in different locations around the world.

28. [A]inda que a cor da pele seja um dado secundário, no caso específico da formação social brasileira, em relação ao habitus de classe, isso, obviamente, não significa dizer que o preconceito racial não exista ou que seja de pouca importância. Significa apenas que é a invisibilidade dos aspectos culturais e simbólicos do “racismo de classe”, precisamente por aqueles autores que “compram” o conceito economista de classe do marxismo e se tornam marxistas sem o saber, que torna a “raça” a única dimensão onde a dominação simbólica e cultural é tornada visível. Essa visibilidade da “raça” é conquistada pela de natureza não-econômica. É o desconhecimento da lógica da dominação social especificamente moderna, baseada na naturalização e na opacidade de sua “hierarquia valorativa” ancorada institucionalmente e tornada possível por práticas institucionais e sociais consumadas pré-reflexivamente, que permite que a “raça” possa ser o único índice visível de uma lógica de dominação social que lhe ultrapassa de muito.


5. Race and Identity in Numbers

Moving from the historical and conceptual underpinnings of differences in racial classification and segregation between South Africa and Brazil this chapter is concerned with the empirical characteristics of the respective survey samples in terms of identity and race. Supported by interview material the numbers presented in this chapter paint a very vivid and intricate image of South African and Brazilian ‘race relations’ from the perspective of youth, highlighting the similarities and differences between the two research settings.

Identity

Before discussing race itself it is necessary to look at its status and importance for the schoolchildren who took part in the two surveys compared to other ways of differentiating oneself from others. For this purpose respondents in both surveys were asked to choose from a list one description that best describes themselves culturally. In Cape Town, the list consisted of 23 different options which comprised descriptors related to race, ethnicity (Xhosa, Afrikaans, Zulu etc), language, religion, heritage (European/African) and youth culture as well as the possibility to provide their own open-ended response if required.²⁹ Figure 5.1 below shows the proportional distribution of responses for each race group.

Figure 5.1 Bar: Identity by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

29. Gender was purposefully not included in the list, as it represents a too strong primary identifier.

The most obvious insight taken from the graph above concerns the astonishing discrepancy between the separate groups; the majority of black respondents identifies itself through ethnicity (or culture), in this case Xhosa, followed by a very mixed range of responses mostly made up of references to Africa, youth culture, race and nationhood. Coloured respondents on the other hand identify themselves through religion (four out of ten, split into half between Christians and Muslims) followed closely by race (coloured). The most heterogeneous group, however, is made up of white respondents; the most popular choices were within the realm of youth culture (a quarter of responses), followed by a patchwork of choices in the eleven to seventeen percent range excluding only ethnicity.

Apart from the unexpected strong religiosity of coloured respondents these patterns are actually in line with common perceptions of each population group. The choices of black respondents reflect the strong identification with supposedly traditional values and local popular culture described later in the discourses of taste and identity in Chapter 6. As with the choices of coloured respondents; although the dominance of religion in this group cannot be easily explained and requires further exploration, the relatively strong self-association with 'colouredness' as a source of identity can be interpreted as the desire to be recognized as an independent 'reified' group alongside (not between) the fixed black/white-binary. The multiplicity of identifiers among white respondents then refers to their ambiguity and ambivalence towards their status in South Africa.

Overall race does not seem to represent the most important way for defining oneself in relation to others for the great majority. However, the variation of choices across groups suggests that racial identity does in fact influence to a large degree the way in which Cape Town's youth see themselves and others. And indeed, to say "I am Xhosa" or "I am African" does carry racial connotations, even if those are undefined, subconscious and unintended, and to say "I am coloured" is of course a far more obvious example of expressing one's racial identity. In comparison, white respondents in general seem to be much less aware of their racial classification, yet one needs to keep in mind that "Afrikaans- or English-speaking" and even more so "European" are markers of identity which in the South African context are often used to substitute the primary race descriptor as they signify what one is not: not Xhosa-speaking, not African. The question then is whether references to popular culture are a truly post-racial way of asserting one's identity. The answer to that question becomes more complex if one considers that almost three quarters of those white respondents who chose youth culture as the main identifier described themselves as either punker, rockers, surfers or skateboarders (not hip hoppers, gangsters, etc.) in response to a separate question. One interpretation would be that young white South Africans have largely moved beyond race as a dominant identifier and are more readily adopting new ways of distinguishing themselves from others. An alternative explanation lies in scholarship on whiteness, revealing how the apparent colour-blindness of many whites in the United States (Gallagher 2003) as well as in South Africa (Steyn 2001) is either a result of the historical "invisibility" of whites as the dominant reference group in colonial race-thinking, a tendency of whites to avoid association with "old" identity markers associated with whiteness or a combination of both. The truth arguably lies somewhere between these two explanation, in that non-racial ways of self-identi-


5. Race and Identity in Numbers

fiction indeed offers young white South Africans an opportunity to disassociate themselves from the apartheid discourse and practice of race-categorisation, albeit arguably often in denial or ignorance of privilege derived from being white.

Therefore: apart maybe from religion which has to remain a blurry category, “I am South African” is arguably the only expression which clearly articulates a determination to move beyond old markers of separation towards a shared identity (and even this can be disputed, as the expressed intention does not say much about the willingness to make real changes in day to day life).

In contrast the choices of the participants in the Brazilian survey are remarkably different.

Figure 5.2 Bar: Identity by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Unlike their South African peers, respondents in Belo Horizonte answered the identity question almost uniformly independent of their racial self-classification; about three out of five, irrespective of race, describe themselves first and foremost as either Brazilians or “*Mineiros*” (referring to the regional identifier associated with the federal state Minas Gerais which Belo Horizonte is the capital of). Additionally one fifth of the sample chooses religion to do so, and overall less than one out of ten uses a racial identifier, leaving only a ten percent margin for the youth culture category.


Together the two figures summarise the main difference between South Africa’s and Brazil’s discourses of identity despite their shared characteristics of racial diversity and economic inequality: a strong sense of national identity and a sense of homogeneity in Brazil versus a fragmented national self-image and the preeminence of cultural, ethnic and racial identifiers in South Africa.

This offers an intriguing premise for applying the findings of the Cape Town survey and interviews in the Brazilian context as one can indeed assume two very different conceptual understandings of race and identity in the presence of objectively shared conditions in terms of diversity and socio-economic inequality.

Racial Classification

The theoretical and historical as well as actual difference between the two locations with regards to racial classification have already been discussed on pages 31 to 34 in the methodology chapter and on pages 77 to 85. But apart from merely classifying themselves respondents were asked the questions why they did it the way they did (e.g. because of apartheid, physical characteristics or culture) and what the most importance influence is for how they see themselves and others in terms of race (e.g. family, friends or the media).

Figure 5.3 Stacked Bar: Reasons for Racial Self-Classification by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007


The bar chart above shows some remarkable (and statistically significant, see χ^2 test) differences in the reasoning behind racial self-classification between population groups. Half of the African/black respondents note “Heritage/Family” or “Culture” (both with equal proportions) as the main impetus behind the way they classify themselves in terms of race. The same applies only for roughly a quarter of white and coloured respondents, respectively. Especially the relatively high proportion of “Culture” is noteworthy as it fits the assumption that black respondents tend to articulate their choices and preferences in cultural or ‘traditional’ terms. Overall, “Physical characteristics” is the reason mentioned most frequently, but the relative frequency varies significantly from group to group; three out of five white respondents mention it as the main reason as

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opposed to only one out of five black respondents while coloured respondents are somewhere in-between with one-third of their group giving the same answer. White respondents' preference to ascribe race to physical characteristics leaves room for debate; on the one hand it can be interpreted as a rejection of race as a mutable, perhaps even dispensable, construct. On the other hand it could signify a certain pragmatism, or even indifference, towards race issues. In any case, the other potential answers are generally more relevant to coloured than white or black respondents; the way society (or 'other people') sees oneself is the deciding factor for more than two out of five coloured respondents, and almost one out of ten coloured respondents thinks that historical reasons, i.e. apartheid, play the most important role. Equally one out of ten coloured respondents plainly refuses to make any judgements based on race, a sentiment shared by a marginally smaller proportion of black respondents and a substantially smaller proportion of white respondents. The tendency of coloured respondents to name socio-historical reasons supports the notion that coloured youth continue to feel disadvantaged in South African society.

As interesting as these findings are on their own, it is ultimately once again their incongruity which sets them apart from the results for the same question asked in Brazil.

Figure 5.4 *Stacked Bar: Reasons for Racial Self-Classification by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)*



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

The responses of the Brazilian survey participants, independent of their racial classification, to the same question resemble those of white South African respondents; three quarters base their racial (self-)classification on phenotypes, between eleven and fourteen percent claim they learnt it from their family, presumably their parents, while a small minority ascribe it either to cultural


factors, the ways others see them or they refuse to answer the question.

The emphasis on phenotype shared with white South Africans is noteworthy because if it is true that Brazilians are indeed less aware of race and phenotypes are simply registered as what they are without the deeply engrained racial connotations one finds in South Africa, does this mean that a majority of white South Africans in the sample has actually abolished ‘race thinking’? The following section will explore this question in more detail as respondents were provided with very straightforward questions regarding their attitudes towards race and ‘interracial contact’.

Racial Attitudes and ‘Othering’

In both questionnaires, respondents were presented with a list of statements on race issues in South Africa (e.g. affirmative action, the role of white and black South Africans in the country’s development) and Brazil, to which the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a 5-degree Likert scale. These questions have been selected from a number of previous social surveys on race and/or discrimination in South Africa and elsewhere.

Figure 5.5 Dotplot: *Racial Attitudes by Race (Cape Town, Means)*³⁰



Source: *Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007*

The list exhibits a number of general trends. First of all, black and white respondents generally

30. Statements are abbreviated. See the questionnaire in the appendix for the complete wording; Symbols show group means based on a five-degree Likert scale: (1) “Strongly Disagree” (2) “Disagree” (3) “Neither agree nor disagree” (4) “Disagree” (5) “Strongly Disagree”.

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find themselves at opposites when asked to indicate their level of agreement with statements concerning affirmative action and the consequences of apartheid, while coloured respondents on average are located somewhere in between. A large degree of disagreement exists, for example, about the statements that “whites are richer than blacks due to historical injustices”, “all were victims of apartheid” and “without black people South Africa would not be as developed as it is today”.


On the other hand, statements with a reconciliatory character and/or implying a sense of ‘moving forward’ generate the highest levels of agreement among the three groups. For example, the respondents largely agree that “South Africans should stop blaming the past” and that “everyone born in Africa is an African”. Also, albeit to varying degrees, respondents mostly oppose affirmative action policies and racial quotas on in labour market, in access to education and especially professional sports.

These findings in combination appear ambiguous, but they do support the view that while young South Africans have differing perceptions of race and racism in the past and present, a majority also shows clear intentions to move beyond the racial divide of the past, even if this intent is sometimes expressed in contradiction with deeply ingrained beliefs and stereotypes about ‘the other’.

However, there are also some other curious, intuition-defying, findings. For example, when confronted with the rather problematic statement (problematic as its negation implies outright racism) that given the same education and opportunities black people are just as competent as white people, on average black respondents show a lower level of agreement than coloured and white respondents. As will be shown with the results for questions on interracial dating and marriage, this self-discriminatory trend among black respondents needs to be treated most carefully, as one cannot conclusively estimate the consequences of the (mis-)wording of the questions and statements nor the actual motivation behind the different ways respondents interpret and answer them, but one cannot ignore the consistency in which this pattern occurs for a series of distinct questions. Another example are the statements “If it wasn’t for white people South Africa would not be as developed as it is today” and “If it wasn’t for black people South Africa would not be as developed as it is today”. At their core sits the deeply problematic assumption that whether or not colonialism and apartheid were ultimately morally ‘wrong’, both were in a sense inevitable in order to ‘civilise’ and ‘develop’ South Africa which is why South Africa today enjoys a better infrastructure and economy than other countries in the region.³¹ Although the arguments in favour of this theory are laden with flawed arguments, misuses of historical facts and theory and skewed ideologies, they are a good example of some of the preconceptions that continue to persist and thrive in South Africa (and elsewhere) today, as the following figure demonstrates.

31. See, for example, Moll (1991) for a rebuttal of this theory.

Figure 5.6 Level of agreement with opposite race development thesis (Cape Town, Percentages)³²




Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

About three out of five of black and just under half of white respondents do not discriminate in the question which of the two groups is more responsible for the country’s development. The proportions of those who put their ‘own race’ ahead of ‘the other’ are also relatively similar with about three out of ten for both groups. The most significant difference, however, reveals itself in the “self-discriminatory” category where respondents chose the other group to be more responsible for development than their own; one out of four black respondents (dis-)agreed with the statements accordingly, compared to only six percent of white respondents. Again one needs to take into account the possibility of misinterpretation either due to unfortunate wording or English-language deficits on behalf of the respondents or a combination of both. Nonetheless, as these separate observations are consistent with each other, one needs to consider the self-discriminatory tendency among black respondents as an unexpected and unintended, yet noteworthy finding of the study.

Another finding worthy of further investigation is the attitude towards affirmative action; Figure 5.7 shows the level of disagreement with the three statements referring to affirmative action and racial quotas in the labour market, in education and professional sports for each race group.

32. Values are percentages reflecting the difference between the levels of agreement for the two assertions “South Africa would not be as developed without blacks/whites”: (+) own group > other group, (0) own group = other group, (-) own group < other group.

Figure 5.7 Bar: *Affirmative action/Racial quotas (Cape Town, Percentages)*³³



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Without going into the debate on affirmative action in too much detail, the use of apartheid categories to determine previously disadvantaged groups deserving advantages in the access to higher education and employment is obviously problematic if the pursuit of a non-racial society, as it is enshrined in the constitution, is meant to be of the highest priority. The matter is commonly portrayed to be especially unpopular among young white South Africans who see themselves discriminated because of political crimes committed before their time. The common counter-argument is that young white South Africans keep on benefitting from the social and economic capital acquired by their parent generations during decades (or even centuries if one extends the argument to the beginning of colonialism) of racial oppression, thus offering them a wider range of life chances than previously disadvantaged South Africans despite the economic discrimination they face in the form of affirmative action.

Thus race remains a contentious subject among young South Africans. Even though children and youth would rarely directly admit that they are discriminating racially in any way, race is and remains one of the key variables that young South Africans make use of in order to make sense of their surroundings. And more often than not this way of making sense of one's own position in society is interlinked with a hierarchical understanding of economic privilege and disadvantage, as expressed in the following excerpt of a conversation between girls at Southern High.

33. Bars show percentages of individual groups in agreement with the respective statement.

Interviewer: What do you think about South Africa in the moment? Are you happy here?

Lucy: No.

Interviewer: Why?

Lucy: It's a white apartheid.

Catherine: It's what?

Lucy: It's a white apartheid.

Catherine: Ja, it's getting terrible...

Later in the interview:

Interviewer: So what are the bad things in the moment?

Danica: Infrastructure, I think. The roads are atrocious.

Chantal: Jobs. There are not really a lot of jobs. And quite a few people, they have a good job right now, but there are people within the business, they are trying to cause trouble for them. And things like that are very easily caused here in South Africa, people get jealous very easily and they try to take jobs away because there aren't many job opportunities.

Interviewer: So is that what you mean by white apartheid?

Lucy: It's just like everything has been changed around. Look, in the past the blackies were like "All these nice cars the whiteys go around with". Now you see a nice car – "Oh my word, damn cool car, and oh, it's them in the car!"

Catherine: (Laughs and nods heavily.)

Lucy: It is! If you look at the staff in most companies, they are all black people. They are. And if you want to study at UCT, it's like a whole big thing, I mean, to get in, they have to base certain things on race and who is an international student and stuff like that. I mean i know someone who passed matric with 101 percent and then she could not get into the study she wanted to study because of that.

A similar a sense of being marginalised in the new South Africa is observable among coloured youth. In fact, the choice of green as the colour marking the voices of coloured interviewees throughout the thesis (in combination with blue representing black and yellow representing white) is not entirely arbitrary, as it underlines the notions of 'being in the middle', fluidity and hybridity associated with coloured identities in South Africa, which have been poignantly summarised by Zimitri Erasmus (2001: 13): "For me, growing up coloured meant knowing that I was not only not white, but less than white; not only not black, but better than black". The sense of incompleteness as well as the hierarchy of colours referred to in her assertion stem from old racist assumptions about miscegenation and race-mixing which presuppose a fixed and essentialised racial binary of black and white. Within this discriminatory system only black and white are granted the spurious luxury of certainty and stability, whereas colouredness remains a blurred category characterised by uncertainty and vagueness. Historically, the ambiguity of coloured as a racial category was reinforced by apartheid laws which granted those classified as coloured more rights than those classified as black, but still less than whites. This led to a rift within the col-

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oured community between those seeking to erase ‘coloured’ as a product of colonialism and apartheid and to align themselves with the black consciousness movement and others aiming to reify it as a self-assertive identity with its own culture, language and customs. However, according to Daniel Hammett (2010), in practice the “erasure/reification binary” (the term used by Hammett) often makes place for a more fluid, and complex, interpretation of colouredness which enables the individual to choose strategically between different notions of colouredness depending on the situation. Crucially, these contradictions and slippages within the formation of coloured identity have been carried into the post-apartheid era as the political change is often not perceived to have improved the vulnerability of coloured identity in South Africa despite the exploration of new avenues towards a redefinition of coloured identity by some.

Fear of African majority rule, perceptions that Coloureds were being marginalized, a desire to counter pervasive negative stereotyping of Coloured people, and attempts at capitalizing on the newly democratic environment in pursuit of political agendas have all played a role in fueling Coloured assertiveness in the new South Africa. It has become commonplace for Coloured people disaffected with the new South Africa to express their disgruntlement by lamenting that “first we were not white enough and now we are not black enough.” (Adhikari 2005: 176)

The “disgruntlement” and feeling of being marginalised all over again described by Adhikari are certainly evident in many of the interviews with coloured adolescents³⁴:

Clara: First it was white racism, now it’s black racism. Coloureds will always be in the middle.

Charney: We are always in the middle.

Later in the interview:

Interviewer: You said earlier that as coloureds you are always in the middle. Can you explain to me what you mean by that?

Charney: They always make more of the whites and the blacks, and then they never look at the coloureds. And whatever I say, or whatever we say, is like neverminded. Our opinion never counts. It is always what the whites and the blacks say. We also have the education that they have, but it is because they look at our background, and they look at our skin colour, and then they just say no.

Often the perception of being discriminated is related to a perceived disadvantage in the labour market:

Interviewer: Do you feel that by being coloured you are disadvantaged today?

34. Hammett’s (2010: 256) analysis of interviews with coloured schoolchildren in Cape Town reiterates the theme of marginalisation detected in the interviews at hand:

The invocation of coloured-as-marginal or as ‘the twilight people’ (Adhikari, 2005) was frequently evident, with students stating that ‘I am proud to be one [a coloured] although at times we don’t get some of the privileges that the Africans nowadays get’ (Sun Valley Student 1), and ‘A coloured is someone that is never seen or listened to, it is someone that is caught in between the blacks and the whites’ (Sun Valley Student 2).

Natasha: My mother works, she works in this department somewhere, where they handle bursaries and job opportunities, and she says that at the moment, if you are coloured you have more chances of getting in. Now that is where the race thing falls in again. You are white and you may be more skilled than a black man, but that black man will get the post according to his race. And I think that's unfair, because, I mean, why don't you give the job to the person more skilled, because he will do a better job at what he is doing. So my mom said if I move it's much better, because at the time I am grown up it's gonna be like Oh you have to be a black or you have to be a white and the coloureds are gonna be out again, so she says it's kind of messed up there.

Adrianna: Ja, because at the moment, it's like a ladder where the blacks are right on top, and the coloureds in the middle, and the whites are at the bottom.

Natasha: We are always in the middle.

Adrianna: So, there is never gonna be chance where we are, like, on top.

What is particularly interesting about this last exchange is Natasha's assertion that being coloured (thus previously disadvantaged) is actually an advantage on today's labour market in terms of affirmative action policies. But instead of taking this fact at face value she manages to turn it into a possible future disadvantage, thus reaffirming the sense of marginalisation expressed in the statement "We are always in the middle". Natasha's pessimism serves as an example for the ways in which "race is being reworked as a divisive and exclusionary political identity [and] mobilised through discourses of marginalisation and perceptions of 'un-entitlement' to socio-economic citizen rights" (Hammett 2010: 256). But according to Hammett the usage of race as a potentially "exclusionary political identity" in association with "discourses of marginalisation" is complemented by a second theme: "the apolitical conceptualisation of race (of being coloured) linked to taste and socio-cultural influences and the 'politics of aspiration'" (Hammett 2010: 256):

The conception of colouredness amongst other groups of students varies and is often less political in nature. For many youth, the construction of racial (coloured) identity is about negotiations and appropriations of taste, style and cultures of consumption. In these practices, being young and coloured is associated with particular 'politics of aspiration' (Steingo, 2005) and the expression of identity through appeals to images and imaginaries of success and aspiration that conflate taste and race (Dolby, 2001; Hammett, 2009). Amongst these students, being coloured is associated with the consumption of specific musical genres (Western hip-hop and rap music primarily) and fashion/brand label clothing and accessories. As one student explained, 'Our coloured people like to wear like Levi's and Billabong – we like good stuff' (Robert, interview, 13 September 2005). For these youth, race does not have an overt political meaning; being coloured is defined in relation to consumption and given new socio-cultural meanings. (Hammett 2010: 256)

The survey results and qualitative data presented later confirm the "politics of aspiration" of coloured as well as black adolescents in the form of brand-consciousness and consumerism, but they also show that the persistence, and to some extent re-invention, of racial differences can only be understood in the interaction between local discourses of nationhood, alienation and be-

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
longing on one side and global notions of cosmopolitanism and imagined communities on the other side. Many white adolescents, for example, are seriously disconnected from many events and developments in their own country – on a political and cultural level. On the other hand, they are often passionate about local music and trends – as long as they take place in a distinct space which takes its cue from a global image of whiteness providing stability and support in a moment in a time when the self-assuredness of whiteness, in South Africa and elsewhere, is showing cracks in the face of what is perceived as the growing dominance of African-American popular culture. But whereas white South Africans only relatively recently started to show signs of self-doubt in face of a changing political landscape (at least on a large scale – alternative youth movements such as Punk or Voëlvry already existed in the 1980s), colouredness in South Africa is inherently entangled in a discourse of erasure and reification as a result of the vagueness, ambiguity and vulnerability associated with being the hybrid category within an essentially binary concept of race. This sense of being in the middle, or being left out and neglected, is at the core of a discourse of marginalisation which continues to define the making and re-making of coloured identities in South Africa. While a minority of coloured youth seeks to overcome this vulnerability by aligning themselves with black South Africans through Black Consciousness ideology in the tradition of Cape Flats Hip Hop, the majority seeks to escape the South African context altogether by connecting with American Hip Hop, Gangster Rap, RnB and the crass materialism associated with those music styles. By doing so they, too, allude to a sense of blackness which goes beyond the pseudo-biological categories established during colonialism and apartheid. But often the self-identification with blackness is restricted to a cosmopolitan understanding which encompasses a certain American ghetto imagery but not necessarily the lived realities of fellow South Africans.

Given this background and the dichotomous nature in which the arguments for or against affirmative action are usually framed, the results shown in figure 5.7 on page 94 can be considered to be somewhat remarkable. The majorities of all three race groups demonstrate discontent with the existence or introduction of affirmative action in access to education and employment, as well as racial quotas in national sports teams selections, even though these levels are considerably higher for white (more than nine out of ten across the board) than coloured (around two-thirds for education and employment; closer to nine out of ten for sports) and black respondents (more than half for employment; roughly three out of five for education and sports). In essence, despite the presence of a significant discrepancy in the levels of (dis-)agreement with affirmative action policies in accordance with how they affect members of the individual groups differently, the majority of respondents does actually oppose them, which can be seen as a general preparedness among the participants of the survey to move beyond racial discourse and racial markers in ensuring a just and fair distribution of life chances in South African society.

Thus, despite clear differences in the evaluation of the past and the acknowledgement of racial problems in the present (members of all three groups feel discriminated) the main impression from the chart is that young South Africans, at least those participating in the survey, are generally prepared to leave the old racial divides and move forward.

But it also needs to be said that it is relatively ‘easy’ to agree to these reconciliatory notions and sentiments unless one harbours serious reservations about the project of nation-making and democracy-building in a non-racial, new South Africa. Whether they have actual consequences in the way South Africans, and in this case South African youth, approach ‘others’ in real life situations is the subject of a series of survey questions in which respondents were asked if they would mind someone from a specific race category to marry a close family member and what they think about dating someone from a specific group. And as the following figures show: it is still far from common, at least for the survey participants, not to discriminate when race matters become personal.

Figure 5.8 Pie: *Interracial Marriage within Family by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Black respondents are generally least discriminant of new family members from another race group than their own. In fact, and in line with the earlier observations about self-discriminatory tendencies among black respondents, a marginally bigger proportion (about one percent difference) of that group prefers a white over a black new family member. And again: the possible reasons behind these numbers are manifold; there might be problem with the actual wording of the question and its answers which makes them difficult to understand correctly for non-native English speakers, or a more nuanced understanding of marriage as an institution might exist among some respondents which is in contradiction to the crude racial categorisation and blunt directness of the question itself. Arguably a part of the discrepancy can be explained by these and similar reasons, yet one also needs to take into consideration that coloureds are the least popular among black respondents by a considerable margin which negates the assumption that the ques-

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
tions were answered uniformly and in disregard of racial categories.

In any case, the results for coloured and white respondents speak a clearer language; only about half of the respondents in these groups would not mind if a close relative married a black person. This is a very low proportion considering that the admission of actually 'minding' is a rather problematic statement to make. Less surprisingly, members of both groups are generally open towards intra-racial marriages with nine out of ten coloured and almost all white respondents having no objections against a coloured relative marrying a coloured partner or a white relative marrying a white partner, respectively. Differences occur, however, when the question is about marrying someone from the other group; compared to the low level of tolerance towards black partners, coloured respondents are relatively accepting of white partners; three-quarters would not mind. White respondents on the other hand show a significantly lower tolerance level towards coloured partners; only two-thirds do not mind.

In summary one can say that the group which experiences the highest level of acceptance amongst all groups, white respondents, is the one which is the least tolerant of 'outsiders' in their own families, whereas those who are most tolerant of 'others', black respondents, are the ones which experience the least tolerance among the other groups. Coloured respondents share whites respondents' ambiguity towards black South Africans, but also experience less acceptance among white respondents than vice versa.

One needs to keep in mind that coloured and especially white students in the sample are the ones most exposed to interracial contact on a daily basis as most of them frequent more diverse schools than most of the black kids in the sample. These findings are therefore fairly discouraging with regard to the hopes and expectations associated with children of the post-apartheid generation who were supposed to overcome political and cultural differences inherited by colonialism and apartheid in a sort of playful way, simply by going to the same schools. This pessimistic outlook becomes even more valid if one looks at the respondents' willingness to date someone from another group.

Figure 5.9 Pie: *Interracial Dating by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

The results shown in the pie graphs above largely resemble those shown in figure 5.8 on page 99, with two noteworthy exceptions: while both coloured and white respondents already show little tolerance towards interracial marriages involving black individuals within their own families, these levels are even lower in terms of dating. Just under one third coloured and over one-quarter of white respondents would not mind dating a black person.

An additional question concerning the survey participants' tolerance towards 'others' within their own social environment was about their preference of living in a 'mono-racial' opposed to a 'mixed' neighbourhood. About one out of six black (17%), one out of five (22%) and one out of four (24%) white respondents said that they would actually prefer to live in a neighbourhood with only members of their 'own race'. These again are high figures, and taking into account the results for marriage and dating one can assume that they would be even substantially higher for certain group-specific combinations among white and coloured respondents.

In summary: the notions of 'colour-blindness' and 'moving forward' observed in the ways especially white respondents answered questions on racial categorisation and racial attitudes are to a large degree refuted by the level of discrimination found in the responses to the marriage and dating questions. Even if there exists a certain shared willingness to move beyond racial discourse, stereotyping and 'othering' based on race continue to be common practice in South Africa. Given the persistency of 'race thinking' and racial discrimination in South Africa, it will be interesting to see whether similar observations can be made for the Brazilian context.

5. Race and Identity in Numbers

Figure 5.10 Dotplot: Racial Attitudes by Race (Belo Horizonte, Means)³⁵



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008


In general, the respondents in Belo Horizonte responded far more homogeneously to the attitudinal probes, arguably partly due to the absence of some of the more controversial statements referring to South Africa’s much more recent and immediate troublesome history of institutionalised racial discrimination. Even more so, the generally strong support for “White people are richer than black people due to historical injustices” and “Black people are as competent as white people” and the general lack of agreement that Brazil would not be developed without either black or white people are strong signs that the earlier observed non-racialism is also prevalent here. Nonetheless there are two related points in Figure 5.10 which speak against the often-cited image of Brazilian racial harmony: respondents from all groups strongly disagree that racial discrimination does not exist in Brazil, and *negro/preto* respondents feel significantly stronger discriminated than their *pardo* or white counterparts (the respective Mann-Whitney statistic comparing the two means reports a p-value of 0.000).

Thus, despite the general sense of non-racialism apparent in the data, there is strong evidence that the respondents’ own perceptions of race and racial discriminations do not necessarily coin-

35. Statements are abbreviated. See the questionnaire in the appendix for the complete wording; Symbols show group means based on a five-degree Likert scale: (1) “Strongly Disagree” (2) “Disagree” (3) “Neither agree nor disagree” (4) “Disagree” (5) “Strongly Disagree”.

side with this impression, leading the discussion to the marriage and dating questions introduced in the Cape Town section earlier.

Figure 5.11 Pie: *Interracial Marriage within Family by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)*




Source: *Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008*

Although the overall picture looks very different from Figure 5.8 on page 99, there are certain similarities; *negro/preto* respondents, like black respondents in the Cape Town sample, are the least discriminating group, a small proportion of *pardo* survey participants show an animosity towards marriages with a *pardo* individual, whereas a similarly small proportion of white respondents have the same sentiments towards *pardo*, and, to a much greater degree (seventeen percent) towards *negro/preto* people. Even if these numbers are low compared to the Cape Town numbers, they do not correspond with the image of non-racialism which has so far dominated the analysis of the Belo Horizonte data. Instead they are much more in line with the acknowledgement of race issues seen in Figure 5.10 on the previous page and the feeling of being discriminated of *negro/preto* respondents. This trend becomes more pronounced as respondents are asked about their preparedness to get involved with a member from a different race group.

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Figure 5.12 Pie: Interracial Dating by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Again, as it has been the case with the Cape Town sample, the dating question produces an exaggerated version of the marriage graph; while *preto/negro* respondents continue to be largely insusceptible to racial discrimination when it comes to dating, already one out of ten *pardo* respondents claims to be have second thoughts when considering dating a *preto/negro* boy or girl. Accordingly, about the same proportion of white respondents feels that way about *pardo* individuals. But the most intriguing finding concerns white respondents' attitude towards dating someone who is classified as *preto/negro*; just above a quarter of them have doubts when it comes to that. While this is still a far cry from the three quarters of white South African respondents who are not sure about dating a black girl or boy, it certainly represents a significant deviation from the non-racism evident in the previous figures.

Summary

In summary, the discrepancy in the ways respondents from the two samples define themselves – distinctive heterogeneity across race groups in Cape Town and strong homogeneity in Belo Horizonte – sets the tone for the remainder of this section; for South Africans ethnicity, race, religion and youth culture, depending on their racial classification, are the most important sources of identity. And although race as direct reference only matters for coloured respondents, the point can be made that the other markers are often used in order to make distinctions which are at least related to the discourse of race in the South African context. Identity in Brazil, on the other hand, is first and foremost defined by a strong sense of nationhood and regionalism; about

sixty percent of the respondents, irrespective of race, use the identifiers “Brazilian” or “*Mineiro*” in order to define themselves, racial classification is used only in about ten percent of the cases.

A similar pattern can be seen when it comes to the reasons for the ways in which respondents classify themselves and others; whereas a majority of black respondents mention heritage, family or culture as reasons, a relatively large proportion of coloured respondents names society, and an even larger proportion of white respondents, six out of ten, mentions physical characteristics. But the Brazilian respondents, regardless of race, top even that figure as three quarters of them use the phenotype above anything else in order to classify themselves and others in terms of race.

Regarding the results for the attitudinal questions/statements one needs to distinguish between differing interpretations of South Africa’s past, which understandably does not apply to the Brazilian context, and a shared general interest in overcoming the racial divide and to move forward, which seems to resemble the general sentiment in the Brazilian sample. Yet both sets of results are showing signs that the positive intentions are not necessarily reflected in day to day experience; especially Brazilian respondents concur that racial discrimination does prevail in society.

The last part of the chapter supports this impression both in Cape Town as well as Belo Horizonte; when the survey participants are asked to indicate whether they would mind or not mind if people from different racial categories than their own married into their families or whether they would mind or not mind becoming involved with someone from a different group an intriguing, and worrying, common trend begins to reveal itself: black respondents (*negro/preto* in the Brazilian context) generally do not mind in both instances, but coloured (or ‘mixed’ in the Brazilian context) and especially white respondents are particularly sceptical about having a black person in the family or dating one themselves.

To interpret this last finding simply as white (and coloured) racism would be understandable, yet it arguably does not do justice to the complexity of the issue as it ignores the role of deeply ingrained hierarchies of race which are related to deeply ingrained hierarchies of class representations. This point leads to the heart of the thesis – the relationship between cultural capital, social inequality, class and race.

6. Distinction

The premise of this thesis relies to a large extent on the assumption that the differences in taste and cultural preferences of South African youth follow class distinctions. However, a large and growing body of literature suggests that in Western societies these very same class distinctions are becoming increasingly opaque as the traditional bearers of elitist tastes are being replaced by cultural omnivores – individuals who seemingly no longer differentiate between high- and low-brow in their cultural consumption (see page 51).

The case of South African youth presents a fascinating opportunity to apply and test the idea of the cultural omnivore. Although it has attracted many supporters, the concept has not gone unchallenged even in the North-American context where it first originated. It is also very rarely applied in unequal societies such as South Africa, although its basic premise – members of middle- and upper-class adhering to a non-distinguishable mix of low- and highbrow tastes – resonates very much with common assumptions about the possibility of a unified public sphere as a result of a growing middle-class in South Africa. Furthermore, according to proponents of the theory, what distinguishes the cultural omnivore from his or her antipode (the cultural univore), is not only a wider range of cultural preferences and activities but also a higher tolerance for those with other tastes than his or her own, which is a desirable attribute in a nation marked by diversity.

One of the very few applications of the theory in South African scholarship is an investigation into the preferences for art performances of 500 attendees of the National Arts Festival in 2008 (Snowball, Jamal and Willis 2010). Art performances were categorised into seven types:

- Movies/Films
- Classical music concerts
- Musical theatre or musicals
- Modern or contemporary music concerts or Rock/Pop concerts
- Fine art exhibitions
- Dance, physical theatre, or Ballet
- Stand-up comedy

Apart from questions on attendance the questionnaires distributed among festival goers included statements such as “Going to live theatre performances temporarily takes me away from life’s hassles” and respondents were asked to indicate how descriptive these statements were of themselves on a 5-degree Likert-scale. It also included socio-demographic questions on home language (as a proxy for race and cultural differences), household income, age groups, sex and nationality.

The findings of the study were that festival-goers by and large (92%) can be described as some form of cultural omnivore in the sense that they invariably attended both popular as well as high culture events, but the authors distinguish between three types of omnivores: modern omnivores (attending at least two of: movies, popular music, comedy), traditional omnivores (attending at least three of: classical music, musicals, art, dance) and actual cultural omnivores (attending at least four of: movies, popular music, comedy, classical music, musicals, art, dance). Regression

analysis using binary variables for attendance as dependent variables and socio-demographic indicators as independent variables showed several statistically significant results with, for example, age being an important (and intuitive) predictor for someone's attendance at classical music concerts. Overall, the authors conclude that "[f]indings, for the most part, did not show Bourdieu-like "high" and popular culture consumption patterns that varied mainly according to indicators of social class, like education and job" (Snowball, Jamal and Willis 2010: 482), thus supporting the optimistic notion of the homogenising effect of cultural omnivorousness.

However, whether these findings can actually be extrapolated to South African society at large is questionable. First, as the authors themselves admit, the sample is biased towards a "(...) relatively wealthy and well-educated minority of South African society and it is thus unknown whether similar patterns can be found in a random sample of South Africans" (Snowball, Jamal and Willis 2010: 482). To illustrate this bias: 82% of the sample were English-or Afrikaans-speaking (as home language), 42% were between 18-25 (reflective of the festival taking place in Grahamstown, a university town) and 30% earned more than R20,000 per month. According to the authors the sample therefore represents primarily an upper-class constituency, thus interpreting the finding that the vast majority of respondents are some sort of cultural omnivores (according to their own definition) as evidence for the validity of the omnivore hypothesis in the South African context. But this conclusion can be challenged for at least two reasons: (1) It can be argued that the very attendance of an art festival itself constitutes a very 'bourgeois', 'highbrow' cultural activity which takes precedence over the attendances of single events within that festival. Attendance of live art performances is generally a very narrow measurement of cultural consumption as it requires a much higher level of interest, initiative and resources to attend an event – especially a ten-day art festival – than listening to music or reading a book. The point that attendance within the festival is secondary is further strengthened by the fact that the National Arts Festival is specifically designed to showcase the entire range of cultural performances (from popular to high) and visitors are actively encouraged to venture outside their comfort zones and explore new forms of cultural expression. (2) Given the nature of the festival, the authors arguably employ a rather loose definition of cultural omnivorousness by collapsing 'modern' and 'traditional' omnivores into the same category. In a way it seems as if 'modern' and 'traditional' are only synonyms for the classic high- and lowbrow categories, raising doubts about the legitimacy of describing members of either group as omnivores. Furthermore, the classification of events used here goes primarily along a 'vertical' axis in that it essentially maintains Bourdieu's hierarchy of low- and highbrow cultural consumption but it does not provide much 'horizontal' differentiation by dividing at least some of the individual types of events into sub-genres. For example, it would be interesting to know whether attendants of contemporary music concerts, regardless of their socio-economic or cultural background, went to see the same artists. But even with this knowledge the findings would have been spurious in that they could easily reflect just a measurement of curiosity rather than actual taste. After all, a white middle-aged professional watching a show by a local Hip Hop group from Khayelitsha at the National Arts Festival is a very different thing from a black teenager from that very township downloading and listening to every song of

6. *Distinction*

the band on her cellphone. Or to further illustrate the point: a classical music concert or a fine art exhibition held in a township would also likely draw a large audience but one would not necessarily describe all attendants as connoisseurs of classical music or fine art and therefore as cultural omnivores.

Atkinson (2011), in his pointed critique of cultural omnivorousness, goes even further by making the argument that not the consumption of different forms of culture is the deciding factor but, using music as an example, the genesis of musical proclivities, which often can only be revealed through qualitative accounts:

Specifically, the very inculcation of cultural capital in childhood, the formation of symbolic mastery, dovetails with an apprenticeship in classical music, manifest in, above all, a proficiency in playing classical music on ‘noble’ instruments—whether piano, cello, clarinet, viola or orchestral percussion—or if not that, then a serious pursuit of ballet, always started in early life with the encouragement or even exhortation of parents eager to invest capital and strengthened through frequent contact with the paraphernalia of music. (Atkinson 2011: 175)

Although this chapter cannot provide the depth of analysis Atkinson demands³⁶ it does offer a critical application of the omnivore hypothesis in the South African context, which goes beyond mere exercises of categorisation. The purpose of this in relation to the larger thesis is to gain a nuanced understanding of the unifying but also divisive nature of popular culture, especially with regard to racial differences. Just as much as an optimistic reading of cultural omnivorousness evokes hopes of greater homogeneity among future generations of South Africans, a pessimistic reading of distinction would imply a continuation of the fault lines of class and race running through society to this day.

To this end this chapter consists of the analysis of three survey questions: “*Who are your idols?*” “*What music do you like?*” “*What are your favourite brands?*” All three questions refer to the embodied form of cultural capital (“long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body” according to Bourdieu) in terms of the broader definition of cultural capital that includes dispositions to certain forms of popular culture that go beyond the ‘classic’ distinction between lowbrow and highbrow and do justice to the context of contemporary South African youth culture. Apart from merely describing the racialisation of South African youth culture, special attention is given to testing the relationship between embodied and institutionalised cultural capital (schools attended by respondents) using regression analysis. The statistical analysis of the survey results is supported by interview excerpts grounding the statistical results in lived experiences of South African youth. Here a discursive approach is employed in order to demonstrate the ongoing salience of racial divisions in South African youth while showing the diversity of individual tastes and cultural preferences within these subdivisions.

36. Despite his advocacy for qualitative research Atkinson (2011: 185) does acknowledge the need for quantitative research on distinction:

The lesson is thus that quantitative research—necessary for displaying national patterns and international comparisons—must be alive to possibilities for a more nuanced analysis.

6.1 Who are your idols?

While music taste remains the litmus test for testing hypotheses of distinction, the survey questionnaire was designed to also include other aspects of taste relevant to youth. One of them has been surprisingly neglected in studies of distinction and omnivorousness: fandom. Although there is a large body of work on the subject it is commonly in literature on identity and mostly in connection with sports, and virtually non-existent in studies of taste and distinction. Interestingly, one of the very few exceptions is the survey conducted by Smith (2011: 123) for her PhD thesis on media consumption of black youth around Durban, in which she asked the questions “*Who is/are your role model(s)?*” and “*What television personality would you most like to be like?*” But while the results to these questions will be discussed below, it is worth mentioning that Smith did not relate them to distinction either.

In order to get the most accurate impression of fandom at the surveyed schools the respondents were asked to write down up to five names as a response to the open-ended question “*Who are your idols?*”³⁷. The inclusion of the question in the questionnaire was rather experimental as the quality and the very nature of the results were unpredictable. The experiment was a success in the sense that the clean³⁸ list of responses comprises 942 individual names which can be matched with a celebrity using Google and Wikipedia. Table 6.1 lists the ‘top idols’ for each race group in order to illustrate the choices made by the respondents and to give a first impression of their variability across the different groups.

37. The full question: “In the space below please provide us with a list of your idols. It can include any local or international celebrity (for example a famous politician, writer, musician, television- or film star), who is important to you. You can write down up to five names. Please write each name on a separate line.”

38. Apart from correcting spelling mistakes and substituting nicknames and pseudonyms with full names, data cleaning also meant the replacement of musicians’ names with band names, where applicable, in order to avoid multiple mentions of different members of one and the same band. Mentions of family members and friends were retained although they do not represent celebrities. 38 names were either invalid (illegible or abstract) and a further 35 names could not be matched with a celebrity.

6. Distinction

Table 6.1 *Top Idols (Cape Town)*³⁹

Rank	African/Black	Coloured	White
1	Zola	Nelson Mandela	Nelson Mandela
2	Nelson Mandela	Beyonce	Oprah Winfrey
3	Beyonce	Oprah Winfrey	Jessica Alba
4	Oprah Winfrey	Akon	Lance Armstrong
5	Rihanna	T Pain	Angelina Jolie
6	Ntando	Jessica Alba	Charlize Theron
7	DJ Sbu	Chris Brown	Eminem
8	Eminem	Tupac	AB de Villiers
9	Menzi Ngubane	Mariah Carey	Bob Marley
10	R Kelly	50Cent	Johnny Depp
11	Rebecca Malope	Christiano Ronaldo	Kelly Slater
12	Sonia Sedibe	Jennifer Lopez	50Cent
13	Thabo Mbeki	Tyra Banks	Beyonce
14	Jackie Chan	Ciara	Natalie Du Toit
15	Chris Brown	Rihanna	Nirvana
16	Mandoza	Angelina Jolie	Red Hot Chili Peppers
17	50Cent	Timbaland	Sandra Bullock
18	Justin Timberlake	Justin Timberlake	Slipknot
19	Usher	Pharrell	Tyra Banks
20	DJ Fresh	David Beckham	Victor Matfield
...	Halle Berry	Usher	
...	Steven Seagal		

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

A glance at Table 6.1 reveals a number of intriguing links between the choices respondents make regarding their favourite idols and discourses of identity and difference. The most consistent choices across all three groups are Nelson Mandela and Oprah Winfrey. Mandela's popularity is self-explanatory given South Africa's recent history but Oprah Winfrey's case is particularly interesting as she managed to command a great presence in South Africa's public life in recent years through numerous well-publicised visits to the country, attendance at major events, involvement in charity and the opening of a school for gifted girls from disadvantaged backgrounds. Her actions have gained her great popularity and respect among many South Africans,

39. Mentions of family members, especially parents (either as "parent", "parents" or "mother", but notably never "father") have been removed from these lists, but it is noteworthy that they are the most frequent choice among white respondents.

If a column shows more than 20 names it means that the last ones are tied in the 20th rank in terms of frequency counts.

including most of the interview participants who would acknowledge her positive involvement in South Africa to the extent that one interview participant was absolutely convinced that Oprah was actually from South Africa. Oprah's popularity in this survey directly matches the findings of Smith (2011: 123), who in her own survey on media consumption of Durban youth also found Oprah to be the best-liked TV personality.

Beyond these two iconic figures the similarities between the separate lists become incoherent and partial; there are a few shared names of Hip Hop and RnB stars, especially between black and coloured respondents, but other than that mostly differences stand out. The most obvious, for example, concerns the numbers and rankings of South African celebrities in each list. While black respondents have eight South Africans among their top idols, including then president Thabo Mbeki, coloured respondents have none, apart from Nelson Mandela, and white respondents have five: Mandela, two rugby players, a Hollywood actress and a swimmer, all of them white (apart from Mandela).

Of course these lists are merely for descriptive and illustrative purposes as they cover only a part of all the mentions made by the survey participants. For a more reliable and meaningful analysis it was necessary to condense the data by grouping the individual idols in categories.

- Society: Politicians, social movement leaders and historical figures
- Culture: Artists, writers, poets, classical musicians
- Religion: Religious figures and leaders
- Family: Parents, grandparents, siblings, extended family
- Sports: Active sportsmen, sports legends, sport functionaries
- Media: Actors, film and TV characters, TV and radio presenters
- Music: Singers, bands, musicians (excluding classical music)

Table 6.2 shows the percentages of respondents mentioning the separate categories at least once in their list of idols, by race.

Table 6.2 *Mentions of Idols by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*

	African/Black	Coloured	White	Total
Music	87	73	47	75
Media	58	59	49	57
Society	43	23	29	33
Sports	13	25	31	21
Family	5	13	21	11
Culture	6	5	11	7
Religion	1	2	5	2
Total	894	667	291	1852
Cases	418	335	150	903

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

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Similar to the lists of individual idols before, the separate frequency distributions summarised in Table 6.2 show both similarities regarding the most popular categories and clear differences regarding the less frequent choices. The greatest commonality is that media (especially actors) and music stars together represent the most popular choice of idols regardless of race. The society category is also relatively popular among members of all three groups but is marginally topped by sports celebrities among coloured and white respondents.

Overall the most fundamental difference between the three groups is the sheer number of idols mentioned; black respondents wrote down 4.5 names on average, coloured 3.8, and white only 3. Accordingly a χ^2 -test on the number of idols mentioned and race reports a statistically significant result ($p=0.000$). This pattern will continue throughout the rest of the analysis as white respondents consistently tend to provide less responses to open-ended questions (see section 6.3 on brand preferences on page 134) and be less ‘enthusiastic’ about distributing scores for music acts (see the following section on page 121). Although it is ultimately impossible to tell whether this is due to a flaw in the research design or a genuine and meaningful difference in the way members from different groups answer survey questions, one could explain the discrepancy by a general lack of engagement with popular culture in general, or a sense of complacency (or disillusionment), among better-off youth (which are mainly represented by white respondents in the sample), in line with some of the characteristics describing cultural omnivores in Western societies (see chapter 3.1 on pages 40-43). This point is further supported by the greater range of choices across all categories among white and, to a lesser extent, coloured respondents compared to black respondents; whereas the preferences of the latter group centre around media, music and society, almost a third of white respondents mentioned a sportsperson and about a fifth a family member⁴⁰. And even though only five and ten percent of white respondents named a religious or cultural figure, respectively, these ratios are still considerably higher than those for black respondents, which adds further plausibility to the prevalence of cultural omnivores among better-off, white respondents in line with the results by Snowball et al (2010).

In order to explore the interplay between race and class as well as language, gender and schools in more detail a series of logit regressions has been conducted. To this end, the various categories of idols were grouped into two categories, respectively speaking to forms of cultural capital that is acquired (society, culture, religion, family) or mediated (music, media, sports) – see page 50 for a discussion of mediated (adopted from media/public) vs acquired (acquired through school/family) cultural preferences. The two sets of regressions determine the probabilities of having at least one ‘acquired’ or ‘mediated’ idol in the list for two different subsamples; one looks only at city schools (all schools but township schools), the other only at African/black re-

40. The low frequency of mentions of parents (especially fathers) for black respondents is in contrast to the findings of Smith’s (2011: 123) survey, in which “(...) the overwhelming majority of respondents in both urban and peri-urban sites indicated their ‘mother’ (specifically) was their role model.” Whether this is a result of the different wording of the question – Smith used “role model” instead of “idol” and did not ask specifically for names of celebrities – or different sampling or a real difference between youth in Durban and Cape Town can ultimately not be determined.

spondents (see the discussion on pages 25 to 28 for more details). Concerning the expected results it is possible to distinguish between two sets of hypotheses: either one expects a direct positive correlation between class and taste assuming a linear change in quality from acquired to mediated (following ‘classic’ interpretations of class-based distinction) or a more complex relationship in which acquired cultural capital is positively associated with class but mediated cultural capital is neutral.

Table 6.3 *Logit: Idol Acquired/Mediated (Odds Ratios, Cape Town)*

<i>Subsample</i>	Mediated		Acquired	
	<i>City Schools</i>	<i>African/Black</i>	<i>City Schools</i>	<i>African/Black</i>
Race: African/Black	6.443*		1.650	
	(0.031)		(0.198)	
Race: White	1.689			
	(0.226)			
Race: Coloured			1.319	
			(0.317)	
English: Native	0.552	(omitted)	1.288	0.387
	(0.372)		(0.435)	(0.115)
English: Preferred				
English: Other	0.327	1.822	0.945	0.579
	(0.145)	(0.605)	(0.884)	(0.222)
Male	1.720	0.338	0.418***	1.320
	(0.115)	(0.200)	(0.000)	(0.168)
School: Southern/Flats	4.191**			
	(0.003)			
School: Townships	(omitted)	0.700	(omitted)	1.169
		(0.878)		(0.784)
School: Northern/Atlantic			2.924***	
			(0.000)	
Class	0.970	0.976	1.021**	1.005
	(0.057)	(0.521)	(0.004)	(0.616)
Observations	539	384	539	408
Pseudo R ²	0.108	0.060	0.112	0.009

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

On first sight the findings seem to support the omnivore thesis: class does not affect mediated but only, statistically significantly, acquired choices (the null-hypotheses that a negative relation-

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ship exists between class and mediated and none between class and acquired are both negative).⁴¹ However, this interpretation, based purely on the statistical significance of the class variable, is misleading for a number of reasons. First, although the class variable is insignificant at the $p < 0.05$ level, it proves to be significant at the $p < 0.06$ level, which is good enough to accept the first null-hypothesis and thus reject the omnivore hypothesis. But in any case the formal evaluation of the class variable shall not distract from the race effect which makes a straightforward interpretation of Table 6.3 difficult. First of all, not only are the predictive values of the two African/black models very weak (Pseudo $R^2 < 0.12$) but they also do not report any statistical significant independent variables, suggesting that black respondents make very similar choices, independent of their socio-economic background or where they go to school. Accordingly, black respondents at city schools are six times more likely to have a mediated idol compared to coloured respondents, controlling for class, school, language and school, allowing for the interpretation that black respondents are generally far more likely to have a mediated idol than white and coloured respondents. Between coloured and white respondents a significant difference in their choices of mediated and acquired idols is not directly discernible, yet students at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are about four times more likely to have a mediated idol than their peers at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic), who are three times more likely to have an acquired idol.

Thus, one can draw the following conclusions based on the results in Table 6.3. A statistical relevant relationship between class and the quality of taste, here exemplified by the choices of idols made by respondents divided into mediated and acquired, does exist but it is intercepted by race in two different ways: class does not matter among black respondents who generally have a much higher appreciation for mediated idols compared to their coloured and white peers. But among those visiting city schools class does matter; in line with previous findings on the class/taste relationship respondents from poorer families (more accurately: adolescents staying in poorer suburbs) are more drawn towards mediated idols and less acquired idols than kids from wealthier families (areas). And although a direct relationship between race and class is not discernible, an interaction between race and schools certainly exists; controlling for class, among other variables, respondents at the predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are far more likely to have a mediated idol and those at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) are more likely to have an acquired idol. From these two findings we can also infer that white respondents at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are more likely to have a mediated idol (Mann-Whitney test: $z = 1.816$, $p = 0.069$) and less likely to have an acquired idol than their counterparts at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) (Mann-Whitney test: $z = -2.482$, $p = 0.013$), while coloured respondents at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) are less likely to have mediated idols than their coloured peers at predominantly col-

41. The seemingly weak change in the odds ratio for the class variable can be misleading, considering it applies to a scale from 1 to 100. For example, in the case of the city schools/acquired scenario an odds ratio of 1.02 means a doubled increase in odds (to have an acquired idol) for a respondent with class = 79 (staying in Wynberg), compared to class = 29 (staying in Guguletu), since $0.02 * (79 - 29) = 1$.

oured schools (Southern/Flats) (Mann-Whitney test: $z=-3.444$, $p=0.001$) and more likely than them to have an acquired idol (Mann-Whitney test: $z=3.811$, $p=0.000$). These findings support the assumption that a correlation between embodied cultural capital (idols) and institutionalised cultural capital (schooling), as discussed in subchapter 7.8 on pages 186 to 214, does indeed exist. The qualitative difference in idol choices notwithstanding, the two most popular categories among respondents from all backgrounds are the music and media ones, including famous actors. In order to get a better understanding of the heterogeneity within these broad categories, one of them (music) is being subdivided into separate genres, as seen in the following table.

Table 6.4 *Mentions of Music Idols by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*

	African/Black	Coloured	White	Total
RnB	49	55	10	47
Hip Hop	33	60	21	41
Kwaito/House	57	2	1	31
Pop	13	28	28	20
Afropop	22	0	1	12
Rock	3	7	58	10
Gospel	15	2	0	9
Total	693	373	85	1151
Cases	361	242	71	674

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Some of the interview excerpts exhibited various ways in which adolescents regularly make reference to music in order to express how they perceive themselves in society, but also how they see ‘others’. Music is often used as a shortcut to convey assumed knowledge about different segments of society and more often than not these differentiations have racial connotations. Using these connotations as the backdrop for meta-narratives of racial identity carries the risk of over-generalising certain trends and ignoring the nuances and variety of music tastes among the separate groups. The proportions of frequency distributions in Table 6.4, however, largely justify or at least support the assumptions behind the race/taste binaries described by the interviewees; singers and bands of (predominantly) local music genres such as Afropop, House/Kwaito and Gospel are almost exclusively favoured by black respondents. Representatives of other styles dominated by North American artists, such as Hip Hop and RnB, are relatively popular among all race groups, but especially among coloured respondents, whereas Rock singers and bands are idolised most strongly by white respondents. The most ambiguous genre is Pop, likely due to the broad definition of that category, followed by Hip Hop and RnB which are both especially popular among black and coloured respondents. With regards to the class-based hypotheses on taste preferences, these clear differences further illustrate the need to discuss class effects on taste in relation to race and racialised class status. Accordingly, Table 6.5 summarises the regressions testing the strength of the correlation between race and two of the ambiguous music idol cat-

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egories in combination with other structural factors, such as class, among respondents at city schools.

Table 6.5 *Logit: Idol Music Categories – City Schools (Odds Ratios, Cape Town)*

<i>Subsample</i>	Hip Hop	RnB
	<i>City Schools</i>	<i>City Schools</i>
African/Black	0.765 (0.483)	1.037 (0.928)
White	0.261*** (0.000)	0.186*** (0.000)
Coloured		
English: Native	1.370 (0.349)	0.908 (0.785)
English: Other	2.008 (0.079)	2.043 (0.083)
Male	3.028*** (0.000)	0.242*** (0.000)
School: Southern/Flats	1.820* (0.029)	3.252*** (0.000)
School: Northern/Atlantic		
Class	0.984* (0.015)	0.991 (0.189)
Observations	539	539
Pseudo R ²	0.161	0.231

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

The race-based differences in music idol preferences evident in the cross-tabulations are repeated in the regression results: although there is no statistically significant difference between black and coloured respondents when it comes to Hip Hop and RnB idols, the odds for a white respondent to have a rapper or RnB singer on her or his list is only about a fifth of those for a coloured respondent, controlling for language, gender, school and class. Class itself does matter, statistically speaking, at least with regards to Hip Hop; although the odds ratio seems marginal it represents a 0.16 decrease in odds for each one-step increase on the 100-levels class scale. For the RnB variable class does not show significance, which is arguably partly due to the strong gender effect: the chance that a boy has a RnB idol is a fraction (0.2) of that of a girl. Moreover, while exponents of both genres are very likely to be popular among respondents from predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats), this is especially true for RnB, as the odds in this case are more than three times higher compared to predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic).

So just as with general idol categories before, it makes a difference what kind of school you go to: white kids going to predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) are much less likely to have a Hip Hop (Mann-Whitney test: $z=4.180$, $p=0.000$) or RnB idol (Mann-Whitney test: $z=4.791$, $p=0.000$) than white kids going to predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats), while coloured kids going to predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are more likely to have a Hip Hop (Mann-Whitney test: $z=-2.606$, $p=0.009$) or RnB idol (Mann-Whitney test: $z=-3.538$, $p=0.000$) than their coloured peers at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic). These findings give way to a similar preliminary conclusion like the previous results from the general idol regressions: both class and race are valid predictors for determining someone's choice of a Hip Hop or RnB artist, yet the most intriguing result is found in the actual variability of these seemingly fixed associations when they are compared across different types of school. Again, a certain hierarchy is discernible, in that respondents at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are inherently more strongly associated with the Hip Hop and RnB idols category than those at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic). The implications of these findings with regards to cultural omnivorousness, the interplay between embodied and institutionalised cultural capital and distinction within popular culture will be discussed at the end of this chapter on pages 150 to 153.

As much as the findings presented in Table 6.5 provide a good understanding for the distinction between white and coloured, they do not satisfactorily answer the same questions concerning black respondents. Therefore Table 6.6 presents a series of regression models restricted to black respondents.

Table 6.6 *Logit: Idol Music Categories – African/Black (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)*

	Afropop	Kwaito/House	Hip Hop	RnB
<i>Subsample</i>	<i>African/Black</i>	<i>African/Black</i>	<i>African/Black</i>	<i>African/Black</i>
English: Native	0.927 (0.959)	2.071 (0.276)	1.175 (0.792)	0.709 (0.584)
English: Other	4.734 (0.137)	2.374 (0.090)	0.611 (0.285)	0.673 (0.398)
Male	0.267*** (0.000)	1.661* (0.015)	2.427*** (0.000)	0.262*** (0.000)
School: Townships	6.153 (0.115)	6.020* (0.011)	0.807 (0.725)	0.859 (0.799)
Class	1.011 (0.527)	1.006 (0.611)	0.997 (0.802)	0.989 (0.282)
Observations	408	408	408	408
Pseudo R ²	0.095	0.056	0.039	0.080

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007


The most fundamental result emerging from Table 6.6 is the general homogeneity of black re-

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spondents in their choices of music idols, if one ignores the gender effect (boys are far more likely to have a Hip Hop or Kwaito idol than girls, who are more likely to have a RnB or Afropop idol). Language or class play hardly any significant role, but schooling – institutionalised cultural capital – is important in the case of Kwaito and House music, which are far more popular among those who visit one of the schools in the townships. This last finding lends further support to the assumption that schooling does indeed influence taste and it does so in correlation with racialised perceptions of class representations, which will be discussed in detail at the end of the chapter.

So far the results have helped a lot to gain a better understanding of the interaction between race and class in the making of young people’s taste preferences, here exemplified by their choices of idols. They have also revealed the importance of gender dynamics in the process. One aspect, however, which has not received enough attention is the question of locality: do black respondents really have more South African idols than coloured and white respondents as implied by the list of top idols on page 110?

Figure 6.1 Bar: Mentions of Idols Grouped by Origin by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Black, coloured and white respondents have in common a strong preference for non-South African (mostly North-American) musicians and actors (media and music). But only large proportions of black respondents also favour South Africans in those categories, while the numbers of coloured and white respondents are marginal, which perfectly reflects the impression gained from the list of idols on page 110. They do show sizable support for South African representatives of the society category, but again the proportion of black respondents exceeds this by the

factor two. About one out of ten white respondents gave the name of a foreign celebrity in the society and culture category while only a small minority of coloured and black respondents made a similar choice.


What these numbers show is an association between local and global cultural preferences and race, adding a further dimension to the nature of distinction and probing the validity of cultural omnivorousness among young South Africans (especially white young South Africans). The question is whether the simple distinction between 'low' and 'high' culture really does justice to the diversity of cultural activities today as aspects such as locality can be argued to matter just as much as their perceived cultural value. In the concrete case of South African youth: Would it be valid to describe middle- and upper-class South Africans as cultural omnivores just because they are knowledgeable both of popular and more 'sophisticated' music or does it matter that they are likely to be knowledgeable of only a particular kind of popular music (mostly American and South African Pop and Rock) but do not know much of the South African music enjoyed by the majority of their peers (for example House and Kwaito)? This question leads to further questions regarding the notion of cosmopolitanism which is often associated with cultural omnivorousness (Cheyne and Binder 2010: 3). As Cheyne and Binder (2010: 2), in their article on the importance of locality in American elite taste for Hip Hop music, observed: cultural omnivores in the States do not indiscriminately appropriate forms of popular culture such as Hip Hop but according to certain criteria:

Elite critics' writings signal to readers cultivating omnivorous taste a logic of appropriation that incorporates or rejects rap music based on three place-based criteria. They write that rap must be produced in local places, not in corporate studios for the national market, to be authentic; that "the ghetto" is a site from which rap full of personal meaning emerges; and that foreign rap is aesthetically innovative and politically important when compared to domestic production.

This is not to say that the same criteria apply to South African youth with a relatively wide range of cultural preferences, but place and locality certainly matter when it comes to distinction among South African youth. Asked directly whether they connect more with American than with South African popular culture, the following results emerged:

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Figure 6.2 *Local vs American Cultural Preferences*



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Figure 6.2 allows for two basic yet crucial observations. First, there is a general preference for American music, television and movies across all three groups. However, and this is the second observation, black respondents show much lower levels of preference than their white and coloured peers. One reading of these findings is that, compared to coloured and white youth, black adolescents feel ‘more at home’ in the new South Africa. A more nuanced reading goes further by questioning the common notion of cosmopolitan identities being associated with cultural omnivorousness. What seems to be emerging instead is a sense of disconnectedness of middle- and upper-class (and especially white and coloured) youth from the discourse of cultural identities, and ultimately nation-making, in South Africa. It relates to what Soudien, in his work on old and new forms of privilege at South African schools, refers to as “Global Whiteness”:

The first is referred to as Global Whiteness – an association with successful White middle-class lifestyles elsewhere in the world and a dissociation from Black South Africa. This discourse has come to be associated particularly, but not exclusively, with English-speaking White South Africans. Ambiguity of identity is a persistent theme in this group. Levels of identification with Africa were found to be low. (Soudien 2010: 354)

But before these observations are thoroughly discussed at the end of the chapter, the following section will look at music taste more closely.

6.2 What music do you like?


The gradual shift from idols in general to the focus on music in the previous section is not accidental, as music, and the styles and scenes associated with music, is considered to be the most immediate but also most layered and meaningful representation of youth culture. Bourdieu, too, gave music a special status among the different forms of cultural consumption, writing in *Distinction* that “nothing more clearly affirms one’s class, nothing more infallibly classifies, than tastes in music” (Bourdieu 2010: 10), and the first pages of *Distinction* are dedicated to class differences in music taste. But of course Bourdieu’s idea of such differences were very different to the ones to be measured here; his analysis dealt with the familiarity with classical pieces such as *Well-Tempered Clavier*, *Rhapsody in Blue* and *Blue Danube*, none of which could be expected to be recognised by more than a very small fraction of the participants of this survey.

Regardless of whether his analysis of the cultural preferences of French was biased towards an overly elitist understanding of culture, a strict division into lowbrow and highbrow forms of culture as envisioned by Bourdieu simply would not lead to any meaningful results in any contemporary context. Yet, as the results to the idol questions show, differences between cultural preferences still exist and they correlate with class as well as race and gender. To what extent they are indeed signs of real distinction will be further explored in this section using statistical analysis of two survey questions on music as well as qualitative analysis of interview material on music taste.

The first survey question on music taste asked respondents to choose their favourite music styles. The results show a correlation with race, in line with results taken from the All Media and Product Survey (AMPS) 2007 (SAARF 2007), in which participants were asked the same question. Although the question posed to the schoolchildren offers more possible answers than the one posed in the AMPS, the results for the most popular choices do corroborate, as the following two charts show.


6. Distinction

Figure 6.3 Bar: Music Genres by Race (AMPS, Percentages)⁴²



Source: AMPS 2007

Figure 6.4 Bar: Music Genres by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

42. Weighted data based on a sample of 16-19yrs olds in Cape Town (applies also to the other AMPS graphs).

The numbers depicted in Figure 6.3 need to be treated with caution. The genres are broad and the distinctions between them vague. This is especially true for House music which incorporates and influences many other electronic music styles, such as Kwaito and Trance which were also included in the list of possible answers. In general, most of these broad classifications can be reclassified into more refined sub-categories. Further, in both surveys the question allows for multiple choices, which makes it easy for respondents to make light-minded selections, especially those who like to say that they “like a bit of everything”, even if they tend to listen to one kind of music more frequently than others.

Therefore the survey included a second, more nuanced measure of music taste by asking respondents to rate a total of 42 bands and musicians with scores from 1 (“Awful!”) to 5 (“I love that stuff!”). The list of artists was compiled using current music charts and feedback from the pilot study, and incorporates local and international artists which were classified according to genres.

Table 6.7 *Music Genres (Cape Town)*

<i>US Hip Hop</i>
50 Cent, Eminem, Kanye West, Pharell, Run DMC, Timbaland, Tupac Shakur
<i>US Pop/RnB</i>
Gwen Stefani, Kelly Clarkson Black Eyed Peas, Beyonce, John Legend, Justin Timberlake, Mary J Blige, R. Kelly, Rihanna
<i>South African Hip Hop⁴³ / Kwaito</i>
Bongo Muffin, Brasse van die Kaap, Driemanskap, Godessa, Pitch Black Afro, Skwatta Kamp, Tumi, DJ Sbu, Kelly Khumalo, Mafikizolo, Ntando, Zola
<i>South African Pop/Rock</i>
Bloc Party, Green Day, Linkin Park, Beatles, The White Stripes, The Dirty Skirts, Fokofpolisiekar, Just Ginger, Springbok Nude Girls, The Rudimentals, Danny K, Freshlyground, Karin Kortje

For each genre a composite variable was compiled by calculating the mean of the scores for all (non-missing) artists in that group. In order to account for missing values (meaning that the respondent does not know the respective band or singer) the resulting values for each genre were multiplied by the square root of the ratio between the number of bands the respondent attributed scores to in that genre (the non-missing values) and the total number of bands in that

43. It is worth mentioning that South African Hip Hop is in itself a very fragmented category with artists from both ends of the spectrum. The diversity of the genre is described by Künzler (201141):
 [C]ontemporary South African rap is more about individual identity than group identities. It is a tool for young South Africans to construct an individual urban and ‘modern’ identity that is both South African and global, with its membership of Hip Hop culture. In the field between resistance and affirmative co-optation, rappers produce discourses that are not concordant, but polyvocal. South African rap music is thus a contradictory form of cultural expression.
 This diversity, however, shall not distract from local hip hop’s advocacy for the marginalised as a common denominator.


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group⁴⁴. Respondents who did not give scores to any of the bands of a certain genre, but who rated other bands outside of that genre were then given the lowest value for that music category, assuming that someone who does not know any of the bands of a genre generally does not like it very much. Those respondents who did not rate any of the bands in the whole list (21 cases) were given missing values across all music categories. The resulting values were then cut into five groups, thus producing ordinal variables taking values from 1 (very low preference for genre) to 5 (very high preference)⁴⁵. The following figures demonstrate that while the more refined music taste variables corroborate with both the AMPS and YCS results above, they provide greater accuracy and more nuances than the conventional music taste measure.

44. Example: a respondent gave Eminem five points but did not rate any of the other American Hip Hop artists. His or her total score x for the American Hip Hop genre would therefore be $x = \sqrt{1/7} \times 5 = 1.9$. For someone who rated all American Hip Hop artists with 5 the equation would be $x = \sqrt{7/7} \times 5 = 5$.


45. A decision had to be made whether to create groups which correspond to the distributions of the 'raw' genre variables (by using fixed intervals for the cut-off points) or groups with (fairly) equal frequency counts (thus distorting the measure used for the 'raw' variables). Both methods are equally valid in their own ways but in the end the decision was to use the latter, as the first option would have resulted in variables having categories with very low frequency counts (especially at the extreme ends), which in turn would have prevented them from inclusion in regression models.

Figure 6.5 Grouped Means: US Hip Hop (Cape Town, Means)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007


Figure 6.6 Grouped Means: SA Hip Hop/Kwaito (Cape Town, Means)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007


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Figure 6.7 Grouped Means: RnB/US Pop (Cape Town, Means)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Figure 6.8 Grouped Means: Rock/SA Pop (Cape Town, Means)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

The operationalisation of the music taste variables used in the figures allows us to discern not only the likes, but also the dislikes of the survey participants, which, according to Bourdieu (1984: 56), are a much more effective measure of taste in any case, as “[i]n matters of taste (...) all determination is negation; and tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes”.

Overall the results for the separate variables are largely coherent and correspond to the findings of the idol question presented on pages 109 to 120; characteristics in terms of language, class and schooling associated with a specific population group correspond with the likes and dislikes of the members of that group and vice versa. The only exceptions are, to varying degrees, American Hip Hop and RnB, for which it is difficult to make definite judgements purely based on mean comparisons. Therefore a series of regressions on the music variables have has been conducted using binary versions of the music scores (respondents with scores above the respective mean of the ‘raw’ genre variable were coded as ‘fans’).

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Table 6.8 *Logit: Music Taste (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)*

<i>Subsample</i>	US Hip Hop	US Pop/RnB	Rock/SA Pop	US Hip Hop	US Pop/RnB	SA Hip Hop/Kwaito
	<i>City Schools</i>			<i>African/Black</i>		
African/Black	0.761 (0.466)	1.092 (0.804)	0.168*** (0.000)			
White	0.124*** (0.000)	0.274*** (0.000)				
Coloured			0.290*** (0.000)			
English: Native	0.417* (0.022)	0.580 (0.089)	0.705 (0.220)	0.681 (0.550)	0.633 (0.484)	0.078* (0.031)
English: Other	0.361* (0.017)	0.476* (0.050)	0.376** (0.005)	0.552 (0.218)	0.543 (0.223)	0.359 (0.350)
Male	2.344*** (0.000)	0.380*** (0.000)	0.881 (0.475)	3.468*** (0.000)	0.408*** (0.000)	0.325* (0.014)
School: Southern/Flats	0.980 (0.937)	1.242 (0.375)				
School: Northern/Atlantic			1.411 (0.141)			
School: Townships	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	0.866 (0.808)	1.094 (0.880)	19.126*** (0.000)
Class	1.017* (0.011)	0.995 (0.422)	1.004 (0.483)	1.016 (0.129)	1.000 (0.961)	1.018 (0.178)
Observations	605	605	605	413	413	413
Pseudo R ²	0.149	0.122	0.110	0.091	0.037	0.209

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

While the regression analysis confirms the previous observation that the members of the different population groups generally stick to ‘their’ respective music genres, it is white respondents who show the largest aversion to music other than ‘their own’; the chances of a white respondent being a fan of American Hip Hop or RnB is only a fraction (about an eighth and a quarter, respectively) of that of coloured respondents. In comparison, coloured and black kids going to city schools do not have significantly different preferences concerning these two music genres. Also not a surprise is white respondents’ strong preference for Rock music and local Pop acts compared to the other survey participants.

The results for the gender variable is mostly, but not entirely, consistent with the previous findings; a preference for American Hip Hop strongly correlates with being male, and RnB with being female. However, Kwaito and local Hip Hop, contrary to the idol results, are also associated

with being female, which cannot be easily explained, but it necessary to keep in mind that the question for someone's role model is likely to elicit far more gendered responses (as one would expect the respondent to name idols of her or his own gender) than the music question (as being a fan of a musician of the opposite gender is arguably more common).

The language variable deserves a greater deal of attention than it received for the idol regressions, as non-English (preferring) speakers at city schools are substantially less fond of the mostly American bands and musicians (and local Pop stars) in the list than those who do prefer to speak English (either because they are native speakers or adopted English as their first language). The only, but intriguing, exception is American Hip Hop, which is preferred by 'English-adopters' even compared to native English speakers.

Despite some differences the results so far are largely in line with the results for the music idol categories. However, a look at the class variable gives a slightly different impression than the one taken from the idol regression; whereas the category of Hip Hop idols is negatively associated with class, the relationship is inverted when it comes to American Hip Hop as a genre. Although apparently contradictory on first sight, the discrepancy can at least be partly explained by the different delimitations of the variables; the one includes Hip Hop musicians, including South African ones, in general, while the other includes only American rappers. Nonetheless, one crucial difference in results between the two sets of regression cannot be explained away that easily – the lack of statistically significant results for the school variables. In the case of the music idol categories it was possible to make out a distinct fluidity in respondents' otherwise seemingly fixed, race-based choices depending on the racial composition of their schools. In short: white kids going to predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) would make different, 'more coloured', choices than their peers at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic), and vice versa. Also, African/black respondents at township schools are far more likely to have local idols, or local music idols, than their African/black peers at city schools. Although the last observation holds true in the regressions on music variables (no relevant effect of being at a township school on American Hip Hop and RnB preferences, but strong effect on local Hip Hop and Kwaito among African/black respondents), the other scenarios do not apply, or at least not to the music variables used for the regression analyses. Arguably in this case the composition of the variables somewhat distorts the results, as they capture only a very broad definition of what constitutes a 'fan' of a genre (music genre score above the mean) and ignore any subtleties within the two groups defined by the binary. Accordingly, a series of Mann-Whitney tests on each 'raw' (un-grouped) music score variable produces different results: white kids going to predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) distribute lower scores to American Hip Hop ($z=2.643$, $p\text{-value}=0.08$) and RnB ($z=2.112$, $p\text{-value}=0.035$) and higher scores to Rock ($z=-3.063$, $p\text{-value}=0.002$) than white kids at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats), which is in line with the previous observations on music idols. Doing the same comparisons for coloured respondents, however, yields far more ambiguous findings, as they are statistically insignificant for Rock ($z=0.744$, $p\text{-value}=0.457$) and RnB ($z=-1.226$, $p\text{-value}=0.220$). The only case in which the result is statistically significant is American Hip Hop, however contrary to expectations, as

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coloured kids at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) turn out to have a weaker preference for American Hip Hop than those at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) ($z=2.447$, $p\text{-value}=0.014$).

Although these results are congruent with the positive association between class and American Hip Hop, the analysis of the quantitative data on music taste yields mixed results with respect to the relationship between embodied and institutionalised capital. In terms of cultural omnivorousness the results are clearer though; although better-off, mostly white, respondents demonstrate a broad taste in different kinds of music, their preferences are nonetheless clearly demarcated from those of coloured or African respondents. The best way to make sense of this is by understanding the meaning of cosmopolitanism in the local context. For that it is worth having a look at some of the individual ratings for local bands and musicians.

Table 6.9 Local Bands/Artists Ratings (Cape Town, Percentages)

	African/Black	Coloured	White	Total
<i>Brasse vannie Kaap</i>				
Awful	17	11	27	17
Don't like it	9	7	11	9
Neither	6	15	7	9
Like it	4	21	5	11
Love it	3	21	3	9
Don't know it	61	26	47	45
<i>Freshlyground</i>				
Awful	8	12	16	11
Don't like it	13	16	17	15
Neither	23	27	24	25
Like it	23	16	20	20
Love it	19	4	10	12
Don't know it	13	25	13	18
<i>Ntando</i>				
Awful	4	21	24	14
Don't like it	5	9	7	7
Neither	11	7	5	8
Like it	21	2	1	10
Love it	53	2	0	24
Don't know it	6	60	62	37
<i>The Rudimentals</i>				
Awful	15	17	20	17
Don't like it	9	10	7	9
Neither	8	6	15	8
Like it	1	1	12	3
Love it	1	1	13	3
Don't know it	65	65	33	59
<i>Zola</i>				
Awful	2	24	33	16
Don't like it	1	13	10	7
Neither	5	15	11	10
Like it	13	9	2	9
Love it	76	5	1	35
Don't know it	3	35	42	22
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

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Among the five bands shown in the table are the three local favourites (measured by the percentage of respondents who like or love the band/musician) for each population group: Brasse van-nie Kaap (Hip Hop, coloured), Freshlyground (Afropop/Crossover, white) and Zola (Kwaito, African/black). Apart from the fact that white respondents are far less enthusiastic about local bands in general (see discussion on page 112), maybe the biggest surprise here is that the most popular band among white respondents is a multi-lingual Afropop group with a multi-racial cast of members. Moreover, unlike the other bands presented here, Freshlyground also manages to gather a sizeable number of followers of coloured and especially African/black respondents behind them; in fact a larger proportion of African/black respondents than white respondents is in favour of the band. Looking at Freshlyground's popularity across all three groups in isolation could lead to the impression that South African youth is indeed overcoming the frontiers of the past with cultural omnivorousness paving the way. But a look at the other results in the table tells a different story – not only are the respective favourites of each group (with the exception of Freshlyground) unpopular but overwhelmingly unknown to outsiders. In this light Freshlyground's popularity maybe needs to be reconsidered following the findings of Cheyne and Binder (2010) on the selective appropriation of Hip Hop in American elite tastes, where a sense of a “rugged authenticity” and “aesthetic innovation and oppositional politics (...) unaffected by commercialization” determine whether a rapper is considered worthy of a review by an established cultural critic. In this case the argument can be made that Freshlyground manages to bridge and encompass a certain local authenticity and cosmopolitan imagery. A similar conclusion is offered by Balfour (2012: 132), writing in *Freshlyground and the possibilities of new identities in post-apartheid South Africa*:

In South Africa, and with particular reference to Freshlyground's *Nommula* (2004), it is clear that contemporary culture responds to the legacy of politicisation and activism arising from the Apartheid past, anticipates the new socio-economic and political constellations of power (in the form of neo-liberalism, its elites, and interests) that appear to support a Western conception of Cosmopolitanism as a vehicle for identity. This conception is challenged on every aspect of its formation (its insistence on an absence of connection, isolation, individuality, and its aspiration to willed migration) to suggest another form of the cosmopolitan self, equally located within the global middle class.

Ultimately it is the association with cosmopolitan middle-class – also apparent in some of Freshlyground's lyrics (Balfour 2012: 128) – which makes the group so popular among middle-class (and often white) young South Africans, which was arguably their core support base from the beginning (in its initial years the band was known for almost relentlessly touring Cape Town's live venues popular with students). Therefore its real achievement in bringing together South Africans from different backgrounds is not a bridging from lower-class audience to middle-class white youth but the opposite: the broadening of its audience from a fairly narrow middle-class fan base beyond racial and class divides.

The Rudimentals are an example of a band that has not quite achieved this step yet (at least not at the time when the survey took place). Although it is a racially mixed Ska band proud of its

Reggae roots, its popularity among the non-white section of the sample is virtually non-existent. This is not to say that the live audiences at its shows are not fairly diverse (at least by Cape Town's standards), yet it has its roots in the same circuit of live venues frequented by student bohemia as Freshlyground but without having gained the same recognition beyond its core audience.

Some of this certainly has something to do with language. Freshlyground is the only true multi-lingual group in the mix, with lyrics in English and Zulu. The effect of language, and how it affects reception and understanding of lyrics, is only partially captured by the survey, yet it is safe to assume that the use of the vernacular in much South African music is likely to deter many white and coloured youth from getting into Kwaito, Spaza etc. This is at least the sentiment of some of the interviewees:

Interviewer: What radio are you listening to by the way?

Thobani: Umhlobo Wenene.

Mfundo: And whites can't listen to Spaza because it is Xhosa. They can't listen to it, so they will listen to those other stations.

Solomon: And I think people who play Rock music, a lot of them they are wild.

Interviewer: So you think it is a language thing too?

Mfundo: Ja, I think so. Because you can't listen to something that you can't hear.

And:

Emile: (Talking about his personal top ten on his poster) Freshlyground, that is a South African band, they incorporate Jazz and all that. Not Kwaito. Kwaito is like rapping in other languages, I can't understand what they are saying.

Randall: You can't understand what they are saying. You can't listen to something that you can't relate to.

Interviewer: Like Zola? Not a good option?

Randall: No, because you go to a township and you do the survey there, you will get a different response, maybe there will be more Kwaito, because it is all in their language and they respond better to their music.

Interviewer: Do you think it is going to change or stay the same?

Edwin: It is going to stay like that.

Randall: It is going to stay like that, because people these days, they do not encourage others to listen to our own music, because some of us are too stubborn, because they don't want to change, they don't want to take a chance to change. And they stay with their own music.

So language is certainly a crucial part of any explanation for why tastes in local music are still so divided in post-apartheid South Africa but it does not explain the divergence of tastes in non-South African music. And the rare cases where preferences overlap (Freshlyground) do not really present themselves as examples of omnivorousness as they tend to be expressions of a cosmopolitan middle-class taste first and foremost. Hence the preliminary conclusion that when it comes to popular culture (fandom, music), various forms of distinction are very much alive

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among young South Africans while cultural omnivorousness applies only in a very narrow manner that ignores the extremely selective choice of non-elite tastes even when language barriers are taken into account.

So far the analysis has focussed on intangible preferences and tastes (especially in music) but has neglected the very real and materialistic aspects associated with consumerism. Therefore the following subchapter aims to extend the argument by looking at the brand choices of survey respondents.

6.3 What are your favourite brands?

The examination of the idol and music questions has led to some intriguing findings on racialised status hierarchies which sometimes, but not always, coincide with actual class differences as one can observe a shift in respondents' taste patterns, as a form of embodied cultural capital, depending on the racial make-up of the school they attend. It has also provided good arguments against the usage of the concept of cultural omnivorousness in relation to elite tastes. Yes, better-off youth do demonstrate a remarkable openness towards foreign and some selected local music and idols but the overlap between their taste patterns and those of lower classes is ultimately almost negligible. Differences in music taste and fandom aside, so far no attention has been given to objectified cultural capital. In the context of youth (and also beyond that), one form of objectified cultural capital that almost obtrudes itself is branding as the very purpose of brands is to signify status and lifestyle. It is thus incomprehensible why the sociological study of brands is still in its infancy. As David Holt (2006: 300) maintains in a brief introduction to the sociology of branding:

While marketing gurus assign to brands near-religious powers, academics and critics have largely ignored brands except to shake their heads in disgust. As poignant symbols marking out where capitalism meets consumerism, it is hardly surprising that brands often stand accused as the capitalists' weapon of choice to prey upon anxieties and concoct false desires. But the most common academic stance is simply to ignore brands as too crass and too popular to deserve serious inquiry. I am not aware of a single academic article in the top social science journals devoted to the study of brands. It is as if Marx chose to ignore the rise of factories in industrializing England because they were too ubiquitous, or Simmel dismissed the rise of money economies because currencies had become too popular to be a legitimate object of study.

Indeed, academic literature on branding remains remarkably sparse, except for work on brand reception in marketing related journals (e.g. *Journal of Consumer Research*), anthropological studies of material culture in the vein of Appadurai's (1986) *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* and a body of literature on consumer culture (Arvidsson 2006; Lury 2004; Moor 2007). Although the topics of most of this literature rarely relate directly to the questions posed in this thesis, they sometimes nevertheless provide insights which are surprisingly close to the arguments laid out in this thesis. Narunsky-Laden (2008: 128) in article on commercial media and identity, interpreting Appadurai on consumption:

Appadurai's view of practices of consumption as a 'force of habituation', as a central means of regulating, among other things, 'the rhythms of accumulation and divestiture that generate particular states of material wealth' (Appadurai 1997: 26), converges with my own view of consumer culture as a means of regulating procedures of change, thereby increasing the stabilising effect of the emerging social order, and standardising global structures of common difference(s) in the age of globalisation (Wilk 1995).

But in the end sociological work on branding in connection with distinction or cosmopolitanism is restricted to a handful of publications, one of them a study of the interplay between global brands and cosmopolitanism using the example of two 'global' coffee brands in Toronto. While the object of investigation has little to contribute to the subject matter of this thesis – neither Starbucks nor Second Cup have branches in South Africa – the findings do resonate with some of the observations made earlier:

Expressed as a style and displayed through taste, consumers are distinguished by their hip, metropolitan worldliness, especially in contrast to an imagined rural and working-class parochialism. As Binnie et al. (2006) indicate, being cosmopolitan has become a desirable point of distinction for new middle and gentrifying classes. (Bookman 2012: 14)

If a tendency towards (supposedly) global coffee brands is an indication of cosmopolitanism and a "point of distinction for new middle and gentrifying" classes in Toronto, can a similar conclusion be drawn with regard to the brand preferences of South African youth? In other words: can we expect better-off youth to have more 'cosmopolitan' brand preferences (whatever these would look like) than their less privileged peers? Or will we find that cultural omnivorousness also encompasses brand preferences, blurring the lines between elite and lower-class as well as African/black, coloured and white tastes? An interesting twist to these questions is provided by Renée Gosline (2009) in a paper dealing with the question of how luxury brands maintain their authenticity and symbolic value when counterfeits become barely distinguishable from the originals. His findings suggest, in short, that individuals usually have no clue whether a luxury item is 'real' or 'fake' when they see it out of context. But as soon the same object is shown in usage, with someone holding or wearing the object, they usually become very confident about their classification of the object. Gosline (2009: 8) sees this as evidence "(...) that lower status groups, even when they come to possess symbols of the elite, are eventually exposed because their true selves and "habitus" are inevitably revealed (Bourdieu 1984)". So according to Gosline, simply owning a luxury item, fake or real, is not enough; instead it is the 'proper' way of wearing or handling the object that matters. Hence it might be the case that the relationship between class and brand preference is not as straightforward as it might seem.

But brands, especially clothing brands, are infamous for another form of distinction as they are known to be the source for much bullying at schools despite the prevalence of uniforms at South African schools. How quickly observations on someone else's clothing style can turn offensive and into racial stereotyping is illustrated by the following excerpt of an interview with a group of girls at Northern High.

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- Lucy:** If you get a black person, he would probably like Kwaito, but I don't know what they are singing.
- Chantal:** And House.
- Catherine:** Ja, and House.
- Chantal:** And the way they dress, it's also, like...
- Catherine:** It's different.
- Interviewer:** How different?
- Danica:** It's their clothings.
- Chantal:** They would wear the Grasshoppers and the...
- Catherine:** No, that's for the coloured people.
- Lucy:** What I find most obvious with black people is that black people are allowed to wear bright colours.
- Danica:** Makes them stand out even more. (laughter)
- Lucy:** They do, honestly...
- Catherine:** It's honest!
- Lucy:** They wear orange, and green!
- Catherine:** Orange, ja – au.
- Lucy:** And it's not green, like that green (points to her jacket). It's like lawn green...
- Danica:** They don't take pride in their clothes. Like other people...
- Lucy:** Some black people dress very nice.
- Catherine:** Like Miranda. She dresses nice.
- Danica:** But Miranda is a white person.
- Catherine:** Ja, Miranda is white inside. (others laugh in approval)
- Chantal:** Ja, and then, I mean you get the coloured people who try to be really girly, white. And the boys they try to be, white boys, they try to be coloured, and they wear the Krugers and they wear their hair this. They hang out mostly with a different race group. They think it's cool, because... Most of my friends are coloured, but I didn't let them change me, I didn't let them make me dress this, didn't let them sort of influence me, you understand?

This exchange contains a number of instances in which the margins between harmless commentary on other people's taste and actual racial discrimination become precariously narrow. Danica's comment that the bright colours black kids at their school allegedly wear "makes them stand out even more" is a sign that the presence of black kids at a formerly white school continues to be considered to be somehow unusual at best and not quite right at worst by at least some of the white children (and perhaps parents and teachers) at the school. Danica also maintains that "they [black kids] don't take pride in their clothes" which is only somewhat, but not entirely, disputed by Lucy who says that at least "some black people dress very nice". But even her partial objection to Danica's generalisation is further diminished by Catherine's remark that Miranda, a black girl, does indeed dress nice, but only because she "is white inside". The discussion is concluded

by Chantal's admission that most of their friends are coloured, but she "didn't let them change her, didn't let them sort of influence her". The interview shows just how deep the racialisation of style is embedded in the consciousness of South African youth, even to the extent that certain brands are assigned to a particular group (Grasshoppers, Krugers = coloured), providing a backdrop to the open-ended survey question ("What are your favourite brands?") on brands, to which respondents could provide five brand names. In total 294 unique and valid brand names (brands that could be identified using Google and Wikipedia; 153 names, in many cases music bands or generic identifiers, could not be identified or were considered invalid) were mentioned by the respondents; Table 6.10 lists the Top 20 brands for each race group.

Table 6.10 *Top Brands*


Rank	African/Black	Coloured	White
1	Nike	Nike	Billabong
2	Adidas	Billabong	Nike
3	Levis	Roxy	Roxy
4	Puma	Quicksilver	Puma
5	Lacoste	Levis	Quicksilver
6	Daniel Hechter	Adidas	Levis
7	Converse	Puma	Samsung
8	Polo	Samsung	Adidas
9	Billabong	Lacoste	Guess
10	Samsung	Timberland	Sony
11	identity	Nokia	YDE
12	Reebok	Converse	Mr Price
13	Uzzi	identity	Apple
14	Carvela	Sony	Lacoste
15	Kurt Geiger	YDE	Volcom
16	K-Way	Guess	identity
17	Roxy	Hemisphere	Dolce & Gabbana
18	Nokia	Diesel	Sissy Boy
19	Armani	Reebok	Woolworth
20	LG	Aca Joe	Converse
...	Sony		Element
...			Foxy
...			LG
...			Lizzy
...			O'Neill

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

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Most of the listed brands are fashion or clothing labels, apart from a few electronics and cell-phone manufacturers, such as Sony, LG, Samsung, Nokia and Apple. The most popular brand is Nike; other brands which are relatively successful across the board include Adidas and Puma as well as Levi's. Non-South African names dominate the list, even though a handful of local retail fashion stores and clothing brands also feature. Beyond these commonalities there are clear differences in the types of clothing brands preferred by the three race groups. More specifically there are two large categories of brands which hardly overlap: luxury fashion design labels such as Lacoste, Daniel Hechter, Polo, Kurt Geiger, Armani etc. preferred by African respondents and surf brands such as Billabong, Quicksilver, Roxy etc. preferred by coloured and especially white respondents.

Taking into account all the brand names mentioned by respondents shows that the Top 20 list captures the complete image quite accurately; fashion and clothing brands (here subdivided into two categories including Shoes/Sneakers) indeed represent the most popular choices by comprising just about three quarters (78 percent) of mentioned brand names, followed by cellphones (including network operators such as Vodacom, MTN and Cell C) with nine percent, electronics manufacturers with seven percent and others (five percent). This pattern does not change much between the different population groups; focussing on fashion and clothing brands, however, brings back some of the themes from the interviews discussed in the previous section.

Figure 6.9 Bar: Fashion Brands by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)⁴⁶

Source: *Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007*

Figure 6.9 is another example for the generally lower response rate (here: number of replies to open-ended questions) of white respondents. Accordingly, black and coloured respondents answered more enthusiastically by providing an average of four to five brand names compared to three to four for white respondents (excluding those who did not give any valid names at all). But the two clearest results regarding fashion preferences are clearly discernible: African respondents show a much stronger liking for expensive ‘luxury’ brands such as Lacoste and Polo than their coloured and white peers, who in turn prefer surf brands such as Billabong and Quicksilver. These findings seem to be at least partly counter-intuitive; while the popularity of surf brands among white and coloured respondents does not surprise, black respondents’ penchant for particularly expensive brands does not seem to fit the correlation between class and cultural capital, knowing the unequal race-class distribution in the sample.

In fact these results are very much in line with Bourdieu’s own observations on cultural consumption:

In cultural consumption, the main opposition, by overall capital value, is between the practices designated by their rarity as distinguished, those of the fractions richest in both economic and cultural capital, and the practices socially identified

46. The subcategorisation of clothing brands is primarily based on Wikipedia entries and/or the information provided on a brand’s website. “Luxury” describes expensive high fashion labels, “Urban” is for trendy and hip youth-orientated brands, “Skate/Surf” and “Jeans” are self-explanatory. Arguably the most diffuse category is “Casual” with brands which would not easily fit in one of the other categories, such as outdoor-orientated brands or large retail chains.

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as vulgar because they are both easy and common, those of the fractions poorest in both these respects. In the intermediate position are the practices which are perceived as pretentious, because of the manifest discrepancy between ambition and possibilities. In opposition to the dominated condition, characterized, from the point of view of the dominant, by the combination of forced poverty and unjustified laxity, the dominant aesthetic – of which the work of art and the aesthetic disposition are the most complete embodiments – proposes the combination of ease and asceticism, i.e. self-imposed austerity, restraint, reserve, which are affirmed in the absolute manifestation of excellence, relaxation in tension. (Bourdieu 2010: 171)

And:

As much as by the absence of luxury goods, whisky or paintings, champagne or concerts, cruises or art exhibitions, caviar or antiques, the working-class lifestyle is characterized by the presence of numerous cheap substitutes for these rare goods, ‘sparkling white wine’ for champagne, imitation leather for real leather, reproductions for paintings, indices of a dispossession at the second power, which accepts the definition of the goods worthy of being possessed. (2010: 387)

Bourdieu’s description of the consumption patterns of the rich and the poor resonate with the findings in two ways. First, the preference of the richest for the rare and distinguished does not really have an equivalent in a study of brand preferences. Granted, there are luxury brands portrayed to be rare and distinguished but the very idea of a brand goes against what Bourdieu is describing here, especially in a time and place where the search for the authentic, natural and organic has acquired the status of the truly distinguished, exemplified by the many weekly organic ‘neighbourhood markets’ frequented by the hip and affluent. Another example of this penchant for the rare and distinguished is the following excerpt from an interview with three girls from Atlantic High.

Interviewer: Why do you think people are listening to different kinds of music? Or, for example, why would someone not know The Wild Eyes⁴⁷ necessarily?

Susan: Well, depends, I was raised... my father is into very old Punk and stuff. Because my friends and I are into the local music scene and we came across The Wild Eyes and it struck me, some people maybe prefer more Hip Hop, where there is not so much instruments...

Kerry: It is more accessible, popular music. And it is harder to find our bands that are playing or old music, unless you have the resources.

Susan: And the band, The Wild Eyes, they have a certain image and people with a certain image follow them, so someone with a different look or being used to a different scene might feel uncomfortable at a place like Evol, which is where The Wild Eyes play.

The second point by Bourdieu that relates to the results shown here concerns the desire of the

47. The Wild Eyes is a local Indierock outfit known for its norm-defying goth aesthetics with a small but devoted following which largely centres around the alternative Friday night hangout Evol. At the time of the interview the band had left for London in search of a larger audience and commercial success (they returned three years later).

members of the dominated classes for the symbols of material wealth, even if they can only afford cheap copies, which alludes to a discourse of aspiration that is very current in South Africa today and also evident in the depictions of logos of expensive clothing brands such as Lacoste and Diesel and images of expensive handbags, shoes, watches and cellphones on the posters by black respondents produced during the interview.

One poster (Picture 6.10 on page 148) stands out as it is less cluttered with objects but features an image of a joyous Obama family accompanied by Oprah Winfrey⁴⁸, nutritional information, a surfer and the Billabong logo. The maker's commentary on his choice of images serves as a reminder that aspiration is not always simply a matter of materialistic desire:

Interviewer: Can you tell me something about your posters?

Masande: When I see this picture I see a happy family (picture shows the Obamas with Oprah, this was before he became the presidential candidate), but me, I never had the chance my family go out and enjoy – me and the family. And even on Sundays we don't go to the table. Everyone goes to be in the bedroom, all eat alone or in the lounge.

Ja. And also there is Chris Brown, new artists, promising artist, young, my age.

Interviewer: How old is he?

Masande: Eighteen. But has nice style. And these nutritions here – that's with black people, don't want nutrients, they all eat junk food.

Interviewer: You like healthy?

Masande: Ja, I like healthy food. We also taught in school about healthy food. This food is probably from another country, I would like to taste other country food. Also, I would cook for them South African food. I never had the chance to taste other country food. This one is a sport brand (Billabong). Mostly this sport brand is with coloureds, I don't know why. Quite a little of black people want this sport brand. I would love to ask why the coloureds like this sport brand, and why black people don't like this sport brand. It's a surf brand.

Interviewer: How big is Loxion Kulcha?

Masande: Ja, this brand, when it came out it was very popular. But now it is not anymore. And you know, it is because of the price of it.

Interviewer: Is it expensive?

Masande: It's not that expensive. It is maybe about R50. I don't know why, a lot of black people, they want expensive clothing.

Interviewer: So you think that making it cheaper actually made it less attractive?

Sizwe: Ja.

Masande's affinity for Billabong is also not arbitrary, as in another part of the interview he expresses the wish to learn surfing, even though (or maybe because) he has observed that "this sport is mostly done by white people". But he is also critically aware of the importance of ex-

48. Barack Obama had not even entered the presidential candidate race and was virtually unknown to most people (including myself) at the time of the interview.

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pensive brands among his peers and even claims that Loxion Kulcha, the most prominent brand targeting explicitly urban black youth, has lost a lot of its popularity because it is actually too cheap, which relates directly to Bourdieu's observation on cultural "activities which are perceived as pretentious, because of the manifest discrepancy between ambition and possibilities". Dolby (200171) made the same observations during her time at Fernwood High:

For African students, however, social status is intimately connected to the price one pays for a particular commodity. African students are more likely than coloureds to bypass American jeans and identification, instead preferring European names such as Giorgio Armani and Daniel Hechter. Zola, an African girl, comments on this phenomenon, explaining that whites don't dress in style, and buy jeans that are R50 or something. But when you are black [African], you are wearing R50 jeans, people are going to say mmm, that's ugly. We are looking for labels and names. We just look for the label, and the label counts, and it costs as well.

The results gained from the brand preference question appear somewhat messy and contradictory to the other results for role models and music. Although there are some clear differences in brand preferences between members of different racial groups, they are partly non-intuitive as many black respondents seem to prefer luxury brands but have little desire for surf brands, which are big among coloured and white respondents. However, it does start to make sense if one considers brands less as an expression of selfhood and rather as a sign of *aspiration*. The form of aspiration itself then largely depends on the position of the individual in society; the status symbols of the upper classes are arguably less alluring for someone who is already immersed in a middle- or upper-class lifestyle as opposed to someone to whom they represent real and tangible change in the quality of living. One way to think about this phenomenon is through McCracken's (2008: 104) concept of 'displaced meaning', describing "[c]onsumer goods [as] bridges to these hopes and ideals". According to McCracken displaced meaning usually refers to a place or a point in time, such as a "golden age" or a "glorious future". In the case of township youth the desire for luxury brands can be argued to refer to the unfulfilled promise of a prosperous future following the successful struggle for political freedom.

Therefore one must be careful not to mistake the aspiration of working-class African/black youth as an aspiration to be white when racial connotations enter the quotation. As Narunsky-Laden (Narunsky-Laden 2008: 142), referring to the advertising campaign by the South African brewery Hansa in which old notions of South African identities are being challenged and re-articulated⁴⁹, writes:

49. The messages circulated by the campaign included these two (see Narunsky-Laden 2008: 125):

1) I HATE BEING BLACK. If it means some people think they know my criminal record. My rhythm. My level of education. Or the role affirmative action has played in my career. I'm not someone else's black. I'm my own. I LOVE BEING BLACK.

2) I HATE BEING WHITE. If it means some people think that I'm not a real South African. That I'm a racist. Privileged. Paranoid. Or Baas. I'm not someone else's white. I'm my own and I LOVE BEING WHITE.

This implies a *newly normative use of black identity mediated by popular global notions of what 'being black' might mean in the global arena today*, and presents another form in which black South Africans might proclaim social membership in South Africa's middle class(es), while distinguishing their own collective identity therein. In this sense then, the appellation 'black' is optimised not as a racial category in a discriminatory or sectarian sense, but rather as a viable cultural option, one that is increasingly aspired to, and proudly so. It seems to me that decision by black South Africans to choose to identify themselves as 'black', by producing cultural artefacts and commercial media products intended also, but not exclusively, for black readerships, resonates with the Hansa advertisements, and echoes the inclusion there of being 'black' and being 'white' as equally viable middle-class options.

Following Narunsky-Laden's interpretation of black middle-class consumption patterns it is worth remembering that the racialisation of class distinction does not imply a homogenising process leading to a complete absorption of socio-cultural differentiators into either a non-descript or essentially white middle-class identity. However, this shall not distract from the required additional effort of non-white members of the middle-class, who are expected to constantly confirm their class identity whereas white members are commonly expected to just fit in.

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Picture 6.1 Poster – Lucy (1062), Northern High



Picture 6.2 Poster – Dexter (1121), Northern High

FALSE IMPRESSIONS
 BLINK 182
 ANGELED 7FOLD
 ANGRER AND AIRWAYS
 FOKOFFPOUSIEKAR
 ALL STAR FUNK FOUR
 PLUS44
 SUM 41
 ATREYU
 ANOTHER BOUND TIDE
 7th SON
 CHANGE OF PLAN
 ALL AMERICAN REJECTS
 METALLICA.



Picture 6.3 Poster – Susan (53), Atlantic High



1. Joy Division
2. The Beatles
3. John Lennon
4. Simi Hendrix
5. The Wild Eyes
6. Rob Zombie
7. The Cramps
8. Fly Paper Jet
9. The Doors
10. Sonny Horror

Picture 6.4 Poster – Cameron (664), Southern High



- Linkin Park
 Just Jinger
 30 seconds to mars
 Sean Kingston
 Keane
 T-Pain
 My chemical Romance
 Plain white T's
 The Parlotones

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Picture 6.5 Poster – Hendry (233), Cape Flats High



Picture 6.6 Poster – Randall (238), Cape Flats High



Picture 6.7 Poster – Melissa (257), Cape Flats High



Picture 6.8 Poster – Natasha (1059), Southern High



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Picture 6.9 Poster – Tanja (161), Atlantic High



Picture 6.10 Poster – Masande (1400), Macassar High



Picture 6.11 Poster – Cecilia (162), Atlantic High



- * Jozi
- * Lebohang Mashile.
- * Ntsiki Mazwai.
- * Drie Manskap.
- * Ne-yo
- * DJ Fresh.
- * Kent fonik
- * R. Kelly.
- * Lebo Mathosa.

Picture 6.12 Poster – Mzamupheli, Khayelitsha High

THINGS THAT I like in my life time

1. 50 CENT
2. Jay Z
3. Young buckz
4. Nas
5. Chris Brown
7. Z poc
8. Usher
9. Kanye West
- 10 M.O.P. AfterMorth.

6.4 Discussion

The findings presented in this chapter reflect the deeply embedded racialisation of South African society across and along socio-economic stratification: a long history of divisive and discriminatory policies has created a situation in which racial descriptors are still largely synonymous with class identifiers, despite good (and bad) efforts of the democratically elected governments since the end of apartheid to undo the injustices of the past. In this sense the observed differences in cultural preferences between black, coloured and white respondents could be simply ascribed to class differences. However, the evidence shows that it is not that simple; it is true that class plays a crucial role, but the link between race and class is so intricate that race itself has become a pivotal signifier in the representation of class, as whiteness is still largely associated with the dominant, and coloured and black, to differing degrees, with the dominated class, even where actual class differences do not apply.

There are two major factors contributing to this perception. First, there is the link between schooling (or institutionalised cultural capital) and embodied cultural capital in the form of role models, music and brand preferences. For example, the two schools with the highest school fees, Atlantic High and Northern High, have the highest proportion of white students in the sample of schools and, consequently, the highest prevalence of cultural preferences attributed to white students. Their role models are often writers, historical or religious figures or their own parents as opposed to celebrities from music, film and sports. Most of their role models are from overseas; American or European, not South African. They prefer mostly American Pop and Rock music as opposed to Hip Hop, RnB and Kwaito. And their favourite brands are surf labels such as Quiksilver and Billabong. But the results also show that such racially defined disposition are not static as students tend to adopt the taste of the predominant race group at their school, i.e. non-white students at predominantly white (and upper-class) schools are more likely to have a preference for white tastes than their peers at predominantly non-white school. By the same token white students visiting predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) are more likely to share the preferences of that group: music and movie stars as role models, American Hip Hop and RnB for music. And although black respondents generally appear relatively homogenous in their taste preferences there is clear evidence for stronger local preferences among respondents at township schools compared to their peers at city schools.

But all this variance occurs within the racialised hierarchy of class distinction with white middle- and upper-class tastes representing the dominant class at the most prestigious and expensive schools. The continuance of white middle-class traditions at (previously) predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) has been problematised elsewhere as well as its immediate impact on the well-being and academic performance of non-white students. (Battersby 2004; Dolby 2001; McKinney 2007; Soudien 2007; McKinney 2010) It has also been noted by Soudien (2010: 355) that the 'assimilation' of non-white students at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) is clearly asymmetrical:

It was not surprising, therefore, that relationships between White and Black students at school were delicate. While there were many crosscultural and crossrace friend-ships, the terms of these were often asymmetrical. The Coloured youth had to fit in with what their White friends required. (It was rare that the new friends were African.) A girl at this school (commenting on her Coloured classmates) said, “Some of them can be very good, they’re very smart, they know how to behave themselves They don’t come out of very good homes That’s what the difference is.” Comments of this nature were common.

But what has been somewhat obscured by focussing on the school setting are the broader consequences of maintaining not just school traditions but entire sets of cultural preferences as ostensibly superior over others. Unfortunately this thesis does not provide the required scope either, yet it is worth having a look at studies such as Hunter and Hachimi’s (2012) work on the South African call centre industry, where they identify the ‘skill’ of having a ‘Model C’ English as the most important employment criterion:

In South Africa, we found that what is important for young people’s access to Anglophone service work is the acquisition of English language skills through schooling in desegregated English-medium institutions. This is one reason why access to high-quality English has become a key form of class differentiation for black South Africa.

Yet South Africa historically had a larger settler population than most colonial societies and we have shown how language can also be used to preserve white privilege, since white South Africans still have the greatest ability to utilize (and define) prestigious English. (Hunter 2012: 563)

The second crucial finding is that the conditions for the continuance of old power structures have their roots outside the South African context as much as within. One can discern a link between middle-/upper-class, whiteness and dominance which blends with the historical make-up of South African race relations but is ultimately the combined outcome of South Africa’s particular history and a universal phenomenon that legitimates the global image of whiteness as representative of the dominant class. In other words: while the strong association between class and race in South Africa has its roots in the country’s particular history, it is reproduced through global popular culture under the disguise of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism suggests a certain openness towards global trends, values and experiences. But while it is true that upper-class survey participants are generally drawn towards international (mostly American) role models and music, lower-class participants also have non-South African idols and listen to non-South African music. Again, the full extent and nature of class distinction with regard to locality only becomes apparent when it is combined with race. Battersby (2004: 283) reports from her field-work at a former Model C school in Cape Town:

All black African and coloured pupils are exoticised within the school, treated almost as permanent exchange pupils, visitors from other cultures to inform local pupils of the places they don’t, can’t or won’t go to. When speaking to a group of Grade 11 pupils about their plans for the future, one white girl said she wanted to go travelling because she was bored with Cape Town. A black African pupil within the group interrupted and put it to her that she didn’t really know Cape

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Town at all, she only knew the parts that were culturally white. This sense of the school being a white place where pupils from other backgrounds could enter to teach about their lives was reinforced by some of the teaching. In a history lesson on anti-apartheid protests for example, the teacher brought in black African pupils from an adjacent classroom and called on them to 'Toyitoyi' for the class.

Racial distinctions are arguably more accentuated in South Africa than in, for example, Britain or the United States for historical and linguistic reasons but these examples nevertheless point to a gap in the otherwise vigorous and thriving scholarship on distinction and cultural omnivorousness as race and ethnicity are rarely touched upon. In any case, they raise serious doubts about the appropriateness and validity of the image of the cosmopolitan omnivore, as the much-cited openness to cosmopolitan tastes appears to have a far lesser known counterpart – a disinterest (bordering to ignorance) in local trends and cultural activities that exist outside the immediate and familiar environment of the individual.

Looking at these facets of distinction – the racial connotations of class and the combination of familiarity with cosmopolitan middle-class tastes and ignorance of local or national cultural knowledge – goes a long way in describing two separate realities of South African middle-class youth today. One is the in-between state of the children of South Africa's new black middle-class portrayed by Kopano Matlwa in her semi-autobiographical book *Coconut*, in which the protagonist Ofilwe feels trapped between what she sees as her African origins and the expectations of (white) middle-class. She feels neither there or here, prompting her to question her own identity. Her inner conflict illustrates the complexity of distinction and takes it to a personal level rarely accessed by academic work.

Ofilwe's struggle stands in contrast to the other reality of at least some white South Africans: an effortlessness to 'just fit in', an almost natural knowledge of how to behave and what to say at dinner parties, public events or job interviews. However this easiness is often complemented by a certain sense of alienation, maybe even isolation, in the greater South African public sphere. Juxtaposed like this, if one would really want to talk about cultural omnivores in South Africa, one would arguably find them among the so-called "coconuts" or urban black South African youth in general, following Ndlovu (2011: 273) writing about the bilingualism of amaZulu:

[T]his bilingualism reflects the postmodern fluidity and cultural omnivorous (Sullivan and Katz-Gerro 2007) nature of the South African black, urban middle class, and now black urban youth in a far more globalised South Africa. The postmodern fluidity and cultural 'omnivorousness' of this audience is anchored by *Isolezwe's* editor, Thulani Mbatha, when he makes reference to this paper's target audience:

The modernising Zulu is ... [s]omeone who may go back home to the rural areas to slaughter a cow to the amadlozi [ancestors], but is equally comfortable taking his family out for dinner and a movie in a shopping mall. (Tolsi 2011: 2)

Black South African youth's allegiance to both local trends as well as cosmopolitan dispositions adds to critical engagements with the very idea of cosmopolitanism, expressed by Skrbis and Woodward in their qualitative analysis of focus group interviews with 76 participants in the Aus-

tralian city of Brisbane:

At the heart of the idea of ‘openness’, the sentiment at the very centre of conceptions of cosmopolitanism, is a fragile commitment to the broad gamut of cosmopolitan experiences and ideals. Everyday ideas about openness as expressed within the talk of our participants seems to be a most brittle form of cosmopolitanism, fractured by deeply structured feelings and allegiances regarding self and others, benefits and dangers, and local and global, which seem to inhibit the full expression of cosmopolitan openness. (Skrbis and Woodward 2007: 744)

In the end there is no competition for the title of the ‘true’ South African cultural omnivore, but the search for him helped to get to the point of this chapter, which was to demonstrate the very real taste distinctions along class and race lines separating South African to this day. Cultural omnivorousness and cosmopolitanism then might be useful to describe the preferences of middle- and upper-class youth but they do not provide a solid basis for a non-racial and shared identity for South African youth.

What this chapter did not deal with is the genesis of cultural capital. According to Bourdieu someone’s habitus en- or disables a person to make the ‘right’ choices in terms of ‘legitimate’ cultural consumption and the ‘right’ assertions of other people’s choices. Habitus itself is deeply engrained in the individual’s psychological and physical make-up due to early exposure to or absence of so-called ‘legitimate’ culture through family upbringing and schooling. But if one accepts the premise that cultural capital is not only an indication of ‘legitimate’ culture but also certain forms of popular culture which are to some degree neither the direct outcome of schooling nor upbringing, then it is worth considering a third formative influence on youth today: media consumption, which is being dealt with in the next chapter.

7. Recasting Race

The separation of taste and media into two individual chapters signifies the special role media consumption plays in young people's lives today. On the one hand, someone's preference for a certain radio or TV channel seems to be just as much a matter of taste as someone's fondness for a particular celebrity, music style or band. On the other hand, it is media itself which is often seen as the main driver in the dissemination of trends, ideas and fashions. Moreover, media consumption differentiates itself from taste in that it is ultimately a function of access, considering that someone needs the financial and practical means for watching television or listening to the radio. This is especially true in a highly unequal society such as South Africa's, where access to satellite TV or the internet is a given for a small wealthy minority and out of reach for the great majority, and where public broadcasting, and reception, of television and radio is traditionally fractured into different segments based on language and other cultural criteria.

Seen in this light media takes on a function in relation to habitus not unlike that of the educational system in that it has a crucial formative effect on how one perceives and is perceived by the world, yet the level of access to it largely depends on the depth of one's pockets. Of course the kind of impression the two entities leave on a child or adolescent are very different – the privilege of visiting a good (middle-, upper-class) school is perceived to add an acquaintance and familiarity with the tastes of the dominant class to an individual's persona that can rarely be 'learnt' at a later stage in life, whereas media consumption is commonly seen to leave only a fleeting familiarity with popular culture – magazines, movies, music, websites. However, if it is true that the knowledge of certain forms of popular culture itself has the capability to be recognized as legitimate cultural capital, as the previous chapter set out to demonstrate, then the familiarity with a certain type of music played on the radio, television series or even online services like Facebook, Twitter or Instagram indeed becomes a function of habitus just like subconsciously knowing how to behave in a fine-dining restaurant or making small talk with a potential future employer. The purpose of this chapter is to make this very link between taste and media consumption and preferences visible through the lenses of class and race. However, lacking an operationalisation of habitus, the difficulty here is to actually 'measure' the effect of media consumption on respondents' dispositions and the way they perceive themselves and others. Therefore the statistical analysis in this chapter is mostly exploratory in that it attempts to demonstrate a causal link between media consumption and taste, which is further substantiated using interview material on respondents' media preferences.

It is worth mentioning that the singling out of media consumption from general cultural consumption has no precedent in Bourdieu's work. Most of what he had to say about the media was in relation to cultural production (Bourdieu 1993; 1996) rather than cultural consumption, but even that was not much:

For all its strengths, however, Bourdieu's sociology of cultural production has important limitations when it comes to analysing contemporary cultural production. It is simply astonishing how little Bourdieu has to say about large-scale, 'heteronomous' commercial cultural production, given not only its enormous social and cultural importance in the contemporary world, but also its

significance in determining conditions in the sub-field in which he is clearly much more interested, restricted production. The result is that Bourdieu offers no account of how the most widely consumed cultural products – those disseminated by the media – are produced. While Bourdieu’s work on cultural consumption is remarkably comprehensive, covering everything from rugby to Rocco and His Brothers, from Pernod to Petula Clark, his coverage of cultural production is highly selective, and very much focused on restricted production. (Hesmondhalgh 2006: 217)

This silence on media consumption, especially as a part of habitus, has been kept up in most of the literature on distinction despite the ever-growing public attention given to the impact of the media on today’s youth. One of the very few scholars open to the idea of considering media consumption as part of the habitus is Nick Couldry (2004: 358):

For habitus is fortunately not tied to Bourdieu’s controversial belief that the taste dispositions of social classes are shaped decisively by the early differences in their material conditions of existence; it can also be used more generally to understand the range of “generative structures” (McNay, 1999, p. 100) that shape dispositions. Even if a problem with Bourdieu’s account of class-specific habitus in the arena of taste is that it ignores how mass media have aided the de-differentiation of taste boundaries (Wynne O’Connor, 1998), there is huge scope for investigating how media might have changed the fundamental conditions under which dispositions of all kinds are generated.

Whether mass media has indeed “aided the de-differentiation of taste boundaries” as Couldry says with reference to Wynne and O’Connor’s (1998) *Consumption and the postmodern city* is debatable. The argument presented here, and substantiated by the survey results below, is that narrow-casting – the splitting of media channels into specialised outlets to cater for well-defined target audiences – is in fact reinforcing existing taste boundaries. And if we accept the premise that the media has a formative effect on contemporary youth, then South Africa’s notorious media segmentation (see pages 73 to 77) is likely to affect children from different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds in different ways. In fact many interview participants were very much aware of the fragmentation of South Africa’s mediascape, which is illustrated by the following excerpt:

- Interviewer:* Why do you think that is? Why do you go to one school and people like Rock music, and then you go to another school it is RnB, Hip Hop...
- Yolanda:* I think we are not listening to the same radio. Other people, they listen to other radio, so they are dependent on the music they gonna play, so we depend on our radio.
- Amanda:* And most of the time, we as black people, we don’t have DSTV, so they see so many things on DSTV, they watch DSTV. So, many people see that and do what they do.
- Interviewer:* So you think it makes a difference if someone has DSTV, for example, which is international television, I guess.
- Amanda:* Yes. Because on DSTV you see lots of things, lots of things, but on the TV we watch, we don’t see many things. We always watch news.
- Yolanda:* So on DSTV you watch the thing that you want to watch. Soccer, movies,...

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While many interviewees were of the opinion that it is ultimately their personal preference whether they liked a particular channel or radio station more than other channels and stations, others agreed with Amanda and Yolanda that it is also at least partly a matter of economic constraints. And not only do at least some youth have a pretty good understanding of the ways in which the South African mediascape is fractured along the lines of class and race, but they are also aware of, and often condone, the marketing strategies of media producers targeting their audiences based on these criteria.

Interviewer: What about population groups, or racial groups, do you see any differences?

Charlene: Yes, definitely. Most of the blacks, or African, they would read Babe, or True Love. I think, magazines are designed they are targeted at specific racial population groups.

Kerry: Yes, definitely. Definitely.

Susan: You have to design it for the market, so you know exactly how you want to sell it.

Interviewer: But do you think - it is divided, South African youth, do you think that is a good thing?

Charlene: Probably, because you can't exactly have a black, or African, or coloured person who does not have as much income as someone else to buy the exactly same magazine.

Susan: And he still has the choice.

Charlene: The choice is their's, it's just up to you.

Interviewer: (Talks about the once planned but eventually abandoned merger between YMag and SL, one commonly perceived as a "black", the other as a "white" youth magazine.)

Kerry: I heard about that. Also for Cosmopolitan, if they put a black girl on the cover, even if it is Naomi Campbell, the sales decrease so much.

Interviewer: You say that's just how it works.

Charlene: It just makes it easier for the consumer and the producer.

Kerry: People are just attracted to things that are similar to them.

What is perhaps most disconcerting about this exchange between schoolgirls from Atlantic High is the way in which they talk about South Africa's racialised class structure as a matter of course, in the sense that "a black, or African, or coloured person (...) does not have as much income as someone else". Surely such statements are not far off the mark; African or coloured South Africans are generally poorer than their white compatriots for obvious historical reasons. But it is the way in which race and class become entangled in the sense that black is seen as an equivalent for 'poor' and white for 'wealthy' to the extent that class consciousness becomes a matter of black and white, and black and white becomes a matter of status.

In the face of such confusion the analysis in the remainder of this chapter largely examines the combined effects of race and class as well as status, language and gender on respondents' media preferences. Where appropriate they are enhanced by including music taste as an independent

variable. The chapter's empirical part is divided into two sections dealing with traditional (television, radio, music television) and new forms of media. Where available (television, radio, new media) the section begins with data on young people's quantitative usage of this particular media form (how much?), followed by the presentation of data on the qualitative differences (what kind?). As in the previous chapter the empirical results are presented in a concise fashion for the sake of clarity and coherence. Their theoretical implications and connotations are discussed in more detail at the end of the chapter.

7.1 Television and Radio

Television

One part of the literature review (pages 73 to 77) outlined the various tensions surrounding South Africa's public broadcasting agency, beginning with the principles of inclusiveness and national unity governing the public broadcaster and the repeated betrayal of these principles throughout history, the opening-up of broadcasting to commercial demands and pressures and the ongoing debate over the public broadcaster's political independency in the face of repeated attempts by the ruling party to interfere in its programming. It has been argued that all these factors contribute to the current fragmentation of the mediascape on the basis of language, economic inequality and cultural differences, thus rendering the quest for a single public sphere in South Africa difficult to impossible.

South Africa's television industry is a good example of this in the face of an astonishing degree of multilingualism compared to a relatively small number of channels: SABC 1 broadcasts mainly in Nguni languages (isiZulu, isiXhosa, isiSwati and isiNdebele), SABC 2 in SeSotho and Afrikaans, and SABC 3 in English. All three channels, but SABC 1 and 2 more than SABC 3, have a high quota of local content, including a whole range of ever-popular soap-operas. eTV is the only commercial channel and broadcasts almost exclusively in English, showing mostly Hollywood and B-grade American productions alongside a few popular local soap-operas. M-Net is a subscription-funded digital satellite channel which used to provide a daily two-hourly open time slot until shortly before the survey was carried out. But the vast majority of its programme then, and all of it now, was and is accessible only by means of set-top decoders together with a monthly subscription. DSTV is another subscription satellite which incorporates all of South Africa's public as well as M-Net channels, but overall offers a much wider range of nearly 100 video and 78 audio channels (at the time when the research was conducted). Among others, subscribers have access to a variety of movie channels with the latest offerings from Hollywood, multiple sports channels featuring international sports events, as well as major news channels from the UK and USA and elsewhere, such as BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera.⁵⁰


Besides the fragmentation of channels in terms of content and the exclusivity of much international programming due to the high costs of satellite TV, traditional broadcasters are also af-

50. In the survey questions M-Net and DSTV are grouped into one category as they are often mentioned synonymously.

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ected by the increasing popularity of new media, most importantly the internet, as sources of information and entertainment. It is arguably a combination of all these factors which leads to the disparities in self-reported television consumption shown in the graph below.


Figure 7.1 *Tabplot: Television Consumption by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*⁵¹



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Despite the growing competition from alternative media forms, watching television generally continues to be a favourite pastime activity among South African youth. Over half of the participants in the survey admits to watching more than two hours of television every day. White respondents watch less television than black and coloured respondents (based on self-reported estimates), but still more than half of them say that they spend more than one hour per day in front of the television screen. Far more striking than the differences in quantity are the differences in the quality of television consumed, as the respondents were also asked to pick their favourite television channel. Again the results do not reflect the actual viewing behaviours but only the preferences of respondents; respondents were able to choose a favourite channel despite spending more time watching a different channel, not having a TV at home, or, if they chose the satellite channels, not having a subscription to Mnet or DSTV.

51. Due to the nature of the research design, accurate measures of media consumption were impossible to obtain. Dedicated media market research studies such as AMPS usually use 'peplemeters' and diaries, among other methods, in order to measure actual listening and viewing behaviour. For this study it was necessary to rely on self-reported estimates, which are subjective at best and incorrect at worst, but ultimately in line with the AMPS results for the same questions.

Figure 7.2 Stacked Bar: Television Channels by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007


The stark discrepancy in respondents' channel preferences represents on one level the language gap between the three population groups; almost three-quarters of black kids like to watch SABC 1 which broadcasts in Xhosa, among other languages, whereas the vast majorities of coloured and white respondents prefer English language channels such as SABC 3, eTV and M-Net, and to a much lesser extent SABC 2 which broadcasts partly in Afrikaans⁵². But it also demonstrates the inequality of access to newer (and more expensive) forms of media and communication (see also figure 7.9 on page 181); about two out of three white respondents prefer satellite TV over any of the free television channels compared to one-third of coloured respondents and only just about one out of twenty black respondents.

The absoluteness of the contrasts depicted in Figure 7.2 is somewhat qualified by the AMPS data on viewing habits. Here the respondents (16-19 year olds in Cape Town) were asked to name the TV channels they had tuned into the previous day.

52. The lack of popularity of SABC 2 is arguably partly due to the undersampling of Afrikaans-speaking whites.

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Figure 7.3 Bar: *Television Channels by Race (AMPS 2007, Percentages)*



Source: AMPS 2007

Coloured youth turn out to be far more avid TV watchers than their black and white peers, most of them having watched more than one channel that day. Both black and white respondents, on the other hand, mostly stuck to a particular channel – SABC 1 for African/black and satellite TV for white kids, which is both in line with the favourite choices of black and white kids in the survey. Arguably the biggest discrepancy between the two surveys lies in the coloured kids’ lack of preference for SABC 2 and the high viewing rate for that channel among coloured respondents in the AMPS survey. But overall the interrelationship between race, language and TV programming was also recognized by some of the interview participants.

Interviewer: (Referring to media segmentation) Do you think it could have a negative effect?

Mfundo: I think it does not have a negative effect, because what I watch on SABC 1 is Xhosa and white people watch Afrikaans and English. And SABC 1 is benefitting all of us. So if I can’t watch SABC 3 and watch Afrikaans I will not hear anything and I am not interested in Afrikaans.

Solomon: I think it does have a negative effect. Because I mean the shows on SABC 1 are always interested in what the Zulu and Xhosa culture are doing, and SABC 2 will be giving you things that are based on the Afrikaans culture, so we get to learn about all the cultures by watching SABC 1 so we don’t know much about the other cultures.

And:

Interviewer: Why do some people watch different channels than others? Where do you think this is coming from?

Abigail: It could be races. Coloureds watch eTV, and then you get South Africans or people who watch SABC 1 because it plays, how can I say, African programmes. You get the Africans who watch SABC 1 because SABC 1 plays more African programmes. And SABC 3 would get Indians watching, because SABC 3 has Indian programmes. And eTV, most coloureds would watch that.

And:

Megan: Yes, SABC 1 is mainly for the black people. 2, okay I think the 2 has gotten into Afrikaans now because of having watched it lately. I have been watching it lately and they are bringing a lot of Afrikaans shows and stuff, but I think, mainly it is because of the one race that's just been shown lately, like the blacks and stuff, that has kind of been more on TV, so I think they are trying to level the thing out.

Annalishka: Even if it is made for the coloureds, they got a lot in their language on that channel.

Megan: And 3 is American and...

Annalishka: ...eTV is for the coloureds, mainly.

Megan: Ja. This is more, like, the movie channel.

Megan speaks about the “one race that’s just been shown lately, like the blacks and stuff” and by that expresses her disapproval with a perceived loss of representation of what she considers to be her own group – (white) Afrikaans-speakers. She does recognise the presence of Afrikaans on SABC 2 as an attempt “to level things out”, even though her friend Annalishka is quick to point out that this is primarily aimed at the coloured population by drawing a distinction between white audiences as a whole and Afrikaans-speaking coloureds. They are adding to this somehow confusing mix references to locality and content which are not further explained in detail as if no further explanation is needed. It is this self-explanatory manner which shows how natural the intersections of race, class, media and taste appear at least to these two girls, and arguably to most South Africans.

The girls’ references to Afrikaans illustrate the importance of language as the most influential factor in South Africa’s television segmentation. In fact, the overwhelming popularity of SABC 1 (which broadcasts a lot of its content in Xhosa) among African/black respondents and the general disregard for SABC 2 render a further investigation of these channels’ (lack of) popularity among other groups unnecessary and also impractical as very low frequency counts make regression models unstable. Therefore the following analyses focus on the relative preferences for SABC 3, eTV and DSTV/Mnet within the city schools sample, and SABC 1 and eTV among African/black respondents. They follow the same logic and questions as the ones in the previous chapter on taste by comparing the strength of the separate influences on respondents’ television viewing preferences. However, this time the effect of schooling (or institutionalised cultural capital) does not have priority. Instead the focus is on the effect of class as an indication of access, especially with regard to satellite television as it has a higher economic barrier than the other channels. The hypothesis is that class has a negative effect on the preference for satellite TV in comparison to other channels. The only other difference to the previous regression models lies

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in the dependent variable (discrete with more than two categories opposed to a binary) which requires a multinomial regression instead of a logit regression. In practice, a multinomial regression compares the discrete values of the variable against a chosen base outcome through a series of logit regressions. By shifting the base outcome it is possible to obtain a complete set of binary comparisons between all the values.

Table 7.1 *Mlogit Regressions: Television Channels (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)*

<i>Base</i>	SABC 3		Mnet/DSTV	SABC 1
	eTV	Mnet/DSTV	eTV	eTV
<i>Subsample</i>	<i>City Schools</i>		<i>African/Black</i>	
African/Black	0.587 (0.415)	0.587 (0.382)	1.774 (0.312)	(omitted)
Coloured			1.774 (0.108)	(omitted)
White	0.751 (0.518)	1.332 (0.423)		(omitted)
English: Native	0.596 (0.247)	1.231 (0.633)	0.484* (0.047)	3.142 (0.161)
English: Other	2.052 (0.234)	1.744 (0.354)	1.176 (0.722)	0.710 (0.580)
Male	2.905*** (0.000)	2.558*** (0.001)	1.135 (0.581)	2.959*** (0.000)
School: Southern/Flats	2.102 (0.057)	0.587 (0.120)		(omitted)
School: Northern/Atlantic			0.279*** (0.000)	(omitted)
School: Townships	(omitted)	(omitted)	(omitted)	0.305 (0.089)
Class	0.969** (0.005)	0.995 (0.676)	0.974** (0.001)	0.988 (0.356)
Observations		551		396
Pseudo R-squared		0.177		0.135

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Leaving SABC 1 and SABC 2 out of the analysis allows one to focus on some of the more nuanced findings on television preferences. For once, the degree of the racialisation of TV channel preferences is indeed strong, but not as strong as the first impression would suggest, if one takes into account gender, language, class and schooling. The odds ratios for the race variables remain remarkable; for example the chance of white respondents preferring eTV (which has been de-

scribed as the “coloured TV channel” in one of the interviews) over SABC 3 is about three quarters of that of coloured respondents, and black respondents’ score is even lower at about 60 percent of that. At the same time black and coloured respondents’ odds to choose eTV over Mnet/DSTV are about three quarters greater than that of white respondents (the fact that the ratios are equal is coincidental, just as the black respondents’ equal odds ratios for the SABC 3 vs eTV and SABC 3 vs Mnet/DSTV comparisons). But the strong indication for racialised television preferences notwithstanding, the corresponding p-values do not show statistical significance. Class, on the other hand, is a statistically significant independent variable in two of the three city schools regressions. Here a positive relationship between class and satellite TV is expected, but it holds true, at least statistically significantly, only in comparison with eTV, not with SABC 3, thus the hypothesis (positive effect of class on preference for satellite TV, no effect on comparisons of ‘free’ channels) would have to be rejected if one does not distinguish between separate channels. Instead it is eTV which shows a negative correlation with class, even if compared to other free channels. This holds true if one compares eTV with SABC 1 among black respondents, even though this result is also not statistically significant. Further, kids attending predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) are much less likely (odds ratio of 0.28) than those at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats) to prefer eTV over Mnet/DSTV (controlling for class as well as race, language and gender). Thus all evidence points to a special status of eTV among the expected results for the other channels.

Exactly why eTV is increasingly popular among poorer respondents can arguably not be explained without a more detailed content analysis of the programmes shown on each channel, but the finding in itself is enough to illustrate that media preferences, like taste, are not necessarily a direct function of race, class or gender, but the result of an intricate interplay between all factors as well as the actual content (in this case TV programming such as movies, series, soap operas, talk shows, news and sports). But what is certain is that the respondents’ choices have much to do with locality as African/black respondents tend to watch more ‘homegrown’ television than coloured or white kids. This is in line with the findings of the previous chapter in that it implies a certain connection between whiteness and middle-class cosmopolitanism, which was also observed by Strelitz (2005:133) during his work on the media consumption of South African university students:

Carol, a white female middle-class student, wrote that her favourite programme was the American sitcom *Friends*. Her essay gave the reasons for this preference and also offered reasons for her rejection of local television productions as being inappropriate to her identity as a ‘global being’:

South African productions seem to place their emphasis on providing viewing material which depicts life as experienced by the working-class majority in our country. My reality, on the other hand, is not reminiscent of this way of life, and it is in this context that I relentlessly turn to foreign (mostly American) programmes for my television entertainment. I experience myself as a ‘global’ being. On this note I identify more with the ‘cliquey’ and humorous bunch of ‘twenty-somethings’ of *Friends*, with their

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
smooth American accents, than with, what seems to me, the comparatively primitive actors and actresses in local productions such as *Isidingo*.

Carol's frank admission summarises in one paragraph the racialised nature of class distinction among South African youth. First, she manages to establish a dichotomy of white middle-class and black working-class without even mentioning race directly. Then she makes the link between whiteness and cosmopolitanism and describes her own detachment from local productions. It is also noteworthy that Carol's choice of her favourite television series is hardly arbitrary, as the virtual absence of non-white characters in *Friends* has made the show the subject of academic debates (see Chidester 2008). This is not to say that white youth such as Carol consciously avoid programmes with black actors and Carol would probably outright refuse any such claims⁵³. Instead the point is again that the conflation of race and class connotations has become so entrenched that it appears normal and somehow 'natural' to young South Africans (and arguably young people elsewhere).

Radio

The point has been made that new forms of media influence the ways in which people entertain and inform themselves to varying degrees, depending on access. It is already possible to see this effect in the respondents' self-reported time spent watching television, and it becomes even clearer if the same question is asked about radio consumption.

53. The *Bill Cosby* show, for example, was highly successful American series that featured only African-American actors. It is however of relevance to this study that there is controversy about the show due to allegations that it portrayed an African-American family in an essentially white middle-class setting. (see Gray 1989)

Figure 7.4 *Tabplot: Radio Consumption by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*


Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Over half of the black respondents say they spend at least one hour every day listening to the radio. Two thirds of coloured respondents acknowledge that they do so for at least half an hour a day. In contrast, three out of five white respondents say they listen to the radio for half an hour or less daily (almost half of those maintain that they never listen to the radio). These numbers alone represent an important indicator for the chasm between young people's mediated realities in South Africa, as radio broadcasting can be argued to be the most localised, immediate and, importantly, affordable mass medium. In combination with white and coloured respondents' strong affinity for (mostly international) satellite television, one can see how the racialised local/global dualism discernible in respondents' tastes and cultural preferences (see previous chapter) is also caused by different degrees of local and global media consumption, which itself is at least partly a function of economic inequality.

Respondents were also asked to choose their favourite from a list of popular radio stations broadcasting in Cape Town, based on the AMPS results for tracking South African radio listening habits.

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Figure 7.5 Bar: Radio Stations by Race (AMPS 2007, Percentages)



Source: AMPS 2007

The qualitative difference is defined by the radio stations' use of language and music; even though it might often seem that most radio stations play the same commercial hits over and over again, one can find very specific differences in their musical content, also and especially among Cape Town's most popular stations. Also, although all stations are required to adhere to the same regulations for local content quota (25% for commercial stations, 40% for public and community stations), there are still enormous discrepancies in the amount of local and international music aired from station to station.

The language factor is easily discernible, as Umhlobo Wenene is the only station in the list which does not broadcast in English (its programming is in Xhosa instead). The taste factor requires some background information about the music programming of the stations; Umhlobo Wenene, Bush Radio and Metro FM, the favourite radio stations among black youth, play local and global Hip Hop, RnB as well as Kwaito. 5fm, the radio station listened to mostly by white kids, plays a lot of American Pop and Rock music, and Good Hope FM, popular among coloured kids, has a lot of American RnB on its playlists.

Table 7.2 *Radio Stations by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*

<i>Stations</i>	African/Black			Coloured	White	Total
	<i>All</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Townships</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>All</i>
Good Hope	12	42	8	71	20	36
Umhlobo Wenene	36	6	40	0	0	16
Kfm	15	4	17	5	13	11
Heart	0	0	0	12	0	5
5fm	3	10	2	10	63	16
Metro	10	17	9	0	0	5
Bush Radio	22	19	23	1	1	10
Cape Talk	1	2	0	0	3	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
n	389	48	341	336	156	881

$\chi^2 = 863.7291$ $p = 0.000$ (whole sample)

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

The responses to the radio question match the AMPS results fairly accurately; the favourite radio stations for each group are almost always the ones which the members of the group listen to most frequently. An exception are Heart's overall low popularity (even among coloured respondents) as well as black and white respondents' disproportionate disregard for Cape Talk and Kfm, respectively. Nonetheless these divergence are not contradictory to the AMPS results, as absolute preferences do not necessarily reflect actual listening behaviours. The most intriguing results, however, concern black respondents' division into Good Hope, Umhlobo Wenene, Kfm or Metro listeners depending on whether they attend a city or township school. A similar division was observed by Smith (2011: 104) in her study of black youth's media consumption in KwaZulu-Natal.

So to a great extent respondents' radio preferences really seem to be based on race. But again certain cleavages, such as the schism within the African/black population, do not seem to be easily explained by the race factor alone. Moreover, there are good reasons to assume that radio preferences correlate with music preferences. As discussed earlier, the relationship between music taste and media preferences might yield an answer to the question whether media consumption affects habitus, even though habitus itself is not included in the statistical analysis.

In order to do the peculiarities of city and township schools justice, separate analyses were conducted, as with the previous regressions. Also, not all radio stations could be included in the analysis as the wider range of choices and the resulting lower frequency counts prohibit the use of certain categories in the analysis from a statistical standpoint. It is only possible to use them in this way by applying them in race-defined subsamples, which has been done with some of them using only an African/black subsample.

Given the virtual ubiquity of radios in South Africa, the class variable, as a proxy for access, is

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not expected to yield interesting results. Instead the main hypothesis for this set of regressions concerns the relationship between music taste and radio station preferences: a preference for Good Hope FM and Kfm is assumed to correlate with a preference for Hip Hop and RnB while the same is assumed to be true for Rock and South African Pop and 5FM.

Table 7.3 *Mlogit Regression: Radio Stations – City Schools (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)*

Base	Good Hope FM		5fm
	Kfm	5fm	Kfm
African/Black	2.403 (0.303)	2.495 (0.149)	0.909 (0.924)
Coloured			0.944 (0.914)
White	7.931*** (0.000)	7.483*** (0.000)	
English: Native	0.429 (0.139)	0.534 (0.172)	0.804 (0.730)
English: Other	0.228 (0.062)	0.336 (0.080)	0.679 (0.660)
Male	0.903 (0.777)	1.184 (0.542)	0.763 (0.467)
School: Northern/Atlantic			0.538 (0.235)
School: Southern/Flats	1.058 (0.907)	0.569 (0.120)	
Class	0.989 (0.413)	1.010 (0.406)	0.979 (0.192)
US Hip Hop/RnB	0.376* (0.011)	0.237*** (0.000)	1.588 (0.248)
Rock/SA Pop	2.671* (0.014)	3.774*** (0.000)	0.708 (0.426)
Observations		531	
Pseudo R-squared		0.312	

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Good Hope represents the most popular radio station among all respondents attending one of the city schools, mainly due to its great popularity among coloured kids, almost three quarters of whom chose it as their favourite. This is reflected in the regression analysis: compared to coloured youth, white adolescents are almost eight times and African/black ones more than twice as likely to pick Kfm or 5fm as one of their favourite radio stations. It is however noteworthy

that the results for African/black survey participants at city schools are statistically insignificant, shifting the focus to the music taste variables which actually turn out to have a significant impact on radio preferences, as expected. Here it is very clear that fans of the two genres associated with ‘coloured tastes’ – American Hip Hop and RnB – are indeed far more likely to listen to Good Hope than one of the two ‘white stations’, which, consequently, are positively correlated with the ‘white genres’ Rock and local Pop. This association between music taste and radio preferences was also noted by some of the interviewees.

Interviewer: What is your favourite radio channel?

Everyone: Goodhope.

Interviewer: Why do you prefer Goodhope?

Clara: I like its music.

Charney: But if you look at 5fm, it is the same. It is similar. But 5fm also plays more Rock, and if you listen to Goodhope, it is RnB, which we like.

Clara: And it is fun because they talk a lot of nonsense. They make jokes.

Interviewer: But again, why do you think different people listen to different radio stations?

Marieke: Different kinds of music. Their tastes are different.

And:

Interviewer: What are your favourite radio stations by the way?

Ricardo: Goodhope FM (others agree). And Heart. Some of us listen to 5fm because of the Rock. Some of us.

Hendry: I do.

Interviewer: Why do you think that is?

Cheslyn: They got good songs that we know. Lots of songs that people like.

Interviewer: So is it just the music?

Hendry: And sometimes the way they speak.

And:

Interviewer: Why would you not listen to 5fm for example?

Mzawupheli: What I don’t like about 5fm is sometimes when I tune to 5fm I hear Rock’n’Roll. I don’t like Rock’n’Roll, most of the time I listen to RnB so stations like Metro FM, Kfm, they specialise mostly on RnB. So that’s why I tune into them.

Given the semi-universal accessibility of radios, it does not surprise that class does not have a major influence on respondents’ choice of their favourite station, as its actual influence has already been discussed in relation to white respondents’ low interest in radio as a medium in general. The same is true for the statistical insignificance of the school variables, although it is possible to recognise a somewhat expected trend in favour of Good Hope among respondents at predominantly coloured schools (Southern/Flats).

The muteness of the gender variable then seems somewhat surprising considering the great gender effect on music taste, but taking into account that radio stations usually cover a range of related genres (e.g. Hip Hop and RnB) explains why boys and girls tend to tune into the same

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stations. It is more worthwhile to pay attention to the language variables, despite their formal lack of statistical significance, as the odds of preferring Good Hope over 5fm or Kfm are strongly increased for those who prefer to speak a language other than English. Given Good Hope's popularity among coloured youth this applies first and foremost to Afrikaans-speakers – in fact one can assume that the Xhosa-speakers falling into the same category are the reason why the language variable misses statistical significance at the 0.05 level by small margins.

Table 7.4 *Mlogit Regression: Radio Stations – African/ Black (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)*

	Good Hope			Umhlobo Wenene		Metro
	Umhlobo Wenene	Metro	Bush Radio	Metro	Bush Radio	Bush Radio
English: Native	6.957 (0.156)	2.231 (0.522)	2.269 (0.479)	0.321 (0.391)	0.326 (0.353)	1.017 (0.988)
English: Other	5.082 (0.084)	0.952 (0.949)	1.443 (0.613)	0.187 (0.073)	0.284 (0.146)	1.515 (0.574)
Male	0.525 (0.104)	0.731 (0.504)	0.590 (0.193)	1.393 (0.400)	1.125 (0.694)	0.807 (0.602)
School: Townships	10.452* (0.046)	0.956 (0.964)	6.846 (0.075)	0.091* (0.046)	0.655 (0.729)	7.159 (0.083)
Class	0.986 (0.452)	0.983 (0.297)	1.005 (0.757)	0.997 (0.875)	1.020 (0.304)	1.023 (0.221)
SA Hip Hop/Kwaito	12.170** (0.008)	8.375 (0.076)	3.134 (0.143)	0.688 (0.779)	0.258 (0.137)	0.374 (0.424)
US Hip Hop/RnB	0.370* (0.027)	0.837 (0.746)	0.658 (0.371)	2.263 (0.058)	1.778 (0.061)	0.786 (0.599)
Observations	366					
Pseudo R-squared	0.102					

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

The impression of language and music taste being the major factors behind radio segmentation is reinforced by black respondents' respective preferences. The preference for a language other than English, in this case Xhosa, translates into five times higher odds for preferring Umhlobo Wenene over Good Hope, and a decrease of odds by more than eighty percent for preferring Umhlobo Wenene over Metro. Simultaneously, the odds for having a preference for Umhlobo Wenene over Good Hope is more than tenfold for fans of local Hip Hop and Kwaito, whereas a penchant for American Rap and RnB decreases the likelihood by about two thirds. Similar ratios, albeit to lesser degrees, also apply to Metro and Bush Radio.

But the decisive result concerning class and status lies in black respondents' division into Umhlobo Wenene or Bush Radio listeners depending on the type of school they are attending. While someone's residence (expressed in the class variable) does not matter, the odds of prefer-

ring Metro vs Umhlobo Wenene is only a tenth and Bush radio vs Metro seven times higher among township school kids compared to their peers at city school. In combination with the results for the language and music taste variables this speaks of a qualitative distinction which cannot be explained through varying levels of access alone.

It shows that media segmentation must be interpreted as two separate, yet mutually reinforcing, processes. On the one side there is the issue of uneven access – despite celebratory or gloomy (depending on the viewpoint) depictions of the media’s ubiquity in young people’s lives, real and significant differences in the accessibility of certain media forms persist. Then the results presented in this section largely reflect another process; even with regard to a virtually truly ubiquitous media outlet as the radio (and in a similar fashion: television) strong differences between different groups and strata of youth remain. While they can be interpreted first of all in racial terms as a consequence of the intentional targeting of specific audiences by the stations themselves (primarily through music and language), they are, at least among black kids, crosscut by differing perceptions of status and locality (going to a former Model C school, liking American Rap and listening to Metro as opposed to attending a township school, listening to Kwaito and tuning into Umhlobo Wenene).

The combination of these two processes is then responsible for some of the rather muddled descriptions of contemporary South African youth: while racial differences in taste and media consumption are often acknowledged in public debates on South African youth, homogenisation through Westernisation (and supposedly accompanying social ills such as moral demise, increasing individualisation or, on a more positive note, the breaking down of racial barriers) usually takes the centre stage. The impression gained from the data presented here is that homogenisation does not really take place:

Media discourses on consumption in South Africa are not perceived reductively as a straightforward insistence by Africans on ‘going West’ (see Nyamnjoh 2000: 9-10), but rather in terms of the ways they enable people to devise new ways of doing things in life (see Even-Zohar 1997), and access new resources and sets of strategies directed at the social and individual production of selfhood (Laden 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). In this regard we should be attentive to the transformative power and local reworkings, not merely the culturally homogenising effects of commercial media discourses, consumer culture and patterns of consumption, and their impact(s) on people’s senses of social membership and individual selfhood. (Narunsky-Laden 2008: 127)

However, the rejection of homogenisation shall not distract from the constraints to consumers’ options as a result of limited access and narrow-casting. An example of the explicit targeting of certain audiences by television and radio channels is the promotional campaign for *Yizo Yizo*, a highly popular drama series in a township setting, which aired on SABC 1:

The national radio station MetroFM, with the largest youth listenership in the country, broadcast a talk-show the day after each week’s episode. A further feature of the multi-media profile for *Yizo Yizo* was the release of a soundtrack CD, which became one of the fastest-selling music CDs in the country. Both the soundtrack CD and the *Yizo Yizo* magazine illustrate the explicit use of popular

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commercial media formats to support the primary objective of stimulating discussion of the television series. The music soundtrack from *Yizo Yizo* is particularly important. It features local kwaito music, which is a distinctively South African hybrid form of pop music, mixing elements of imported house, hip-hop and rap with homegrown traditional and pop music styles (Stephens, 2000). The use of township dance music in the television series was an integral element of the ‘reality-effect’ created around the programme, and thus a key element in both building a large youth audience and in realizing the objective of stimulating discussion about real-world social and policy issues. (Barnett 2004: 261)

The result of this explicit targeting of specific audiences clearly goes against the Reithian principles of public broadcasting – national unity and public education (see page 73). Instead of supporting the process of nation-building by creating a single public sphere, South African media, including its public fraction and especially television, has reached a level of fragmentation that allows society – ‘the audience’ – to split up into individual groups defined by race and class and have them retreat into their respective imagined communities. And even though this is not a development unique to South Africa as it is part of a universal process, its consequences are arguably even more significant here than elsewhere, as the national media, for historical reasons, never even had a common base to begin with.


Music Television

Another good example of narrow-casting is music television. In the relatively short period of its existence as a distinct media outlet, its mother channel MTV has branched out into a network of regional, national and specialised channels, creating an even less transparent myriad of competitors on the way. (Osgerby 2004: 42) In South Africa today subscription to a satellite service gives one access to a whole range of different music channels, some of them part of the larger MTV network, others owned by local media companies.

Despite the potentially wide range of music channels on offer, it is at the same time the most exclusive domain of media culture as it is affected by the ‘satellite divide’, meaning that the inequality of access to satellite TV affects the pair of graphs below more than the other AMPS/YCS combinations shown before. AMPS data is based on actual viewing behaviour and, presumably the lack of DSTV/M-Net set top boxes in black and coloured households does not provide for meaningful observations on preferences for a certain channel. Moreover, AMPS data for 2007 is only available for two channels: MTV and MTV Base.


In this case the type of question asked in the YCS proves to be more appropriate, because one can assume that many kids who do not have satellite TV at home still know most of the music television channels and have a preference for one over the others based on the kind of music that is played there. So while the lack of access shows itself in a relatively small number of valid responses for black respondents (258 out of a total subsample of 435), there are very clear differences in preferences if one compares them across racial categories.

Figure 7.6 Bar: Music Television Channels by Race (AMPS, Percentages)



Source: AMPS 2007

Figure 7.7 Stacked Bar: Music Television Channels by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

7. Recasting Race

Channel O and MK89 (of which Channel O is by far the more popular one) are the two genuinely South African stations on offer and the favourites among the black kids in the sample; more than half prefer them over the MTV/VH1 channels. Channel O focusses heavily on local music, featuring Hip Hop and Kwaito stars, most of them black. MK89's programme is also distinctively local but far more diverse in terms of music (in fact it shows mostly South African Rock, but its overall popularity is too weak to warrant a separate category).

More than half of the coloured respondents mentioned MTV Base as their favourite channel, which is the African offshoot of MTV and as such offers a heavier focus on supposedly 'black music styles' such as RnB, Hip Hop, Reggae and Dancehall. Moreover it plays originally African sounds, e.g. Kwaito, Zouk, M'balax and Afrobeat and regularly features African and South African artists. In a way it can be described as a hybrid between MTV Europe, above, and Channel O, below, as it offers both a heavy rotation of international, largely American, black musicians as well as local talent.

Eight out of ten white respondents prefer to watch MTV or its smaller sister channel VH1. MTV is the oldest and globally most popular music channel, symbolising the global conquest of American pop culture in the 1980s and 1990s. Today there is not one single MTV anymore, as the company offers a plethora of regionally flavoured offshoots of its mother channel around the world (with MTV Base being the African version). In fact the MTV broadcasted on South Africa's satellite service (alongside MTV Base) is MTV Europe and as such it features mostly American and English, and hardly any local or other African content. One can certainly expect to see more mainstream American Pop and Rock on this channel than on MTV Base and Channel O.

Given this background, and because of the low cell count for white respondents who prefer to watch Channel O/MK 89 (five), it has been decided to include the music taste variables instead of the race variable in the respective regression model in order to ensure robustness.

Table 7.5 *Mlogit regressions: Music Television*

<i>Subsample</i>	MTV/VH1	Channel O/MK 89		MTV Base
	MTV Base	MTV/VH1	MTV Base	MTV VH1
	<i>City Schools</i>	<i>African/Black</i>		
African/Black	4.146** (0.005)			
Coloured (White)	3.873*** (0.000)			
English: Native	0.766 (0.448)	2.734 (0.420)	0.200 (0.064)	13.675 (0.051)
English: Other	1.046 (0.924)	3.516 (0.254)	0.530 (0.250)	6.636 (0.083)
Male	1.134 (0.575)	0.966 (0.923)	0.913 (0.779)	1.058 (0.891)
School: Northern/Atlantic (School: Southern/Flats)	0.677 (0.173)			
School: Townships	(omitted)	0.171 (0.084)	0.237 (0.126)	0.721 (0.747)
Class	1.000 (0.957)	0.990 (0.527)	1.001 (0.963)	0.989 (0.499)
US Hip Hop/RnB	2.819*** (0.000)	0.987 (0.972)	1.758 (0.125)	0.561 (0.204)
Rock/SA Pop	0.552* (0.012)			
SA Hip Hop/Kwaito		1.494 (0.598)	1.269 (0.749)	1.178 (0.852)
Observations	475		247	
Pseudo R-squared	0.208		0.056	

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

The music taste coefficients in table 7.5 further validate the underlying assumptions with regard to the hypothetical triangular relationship between race, taste and media preference. Each one-degree increase on the five-degree scale for American Hip Hop (associated with coloured) means that the probability of preferring MTV Base over MTV/VH1 increases by almost two-thirds, whereas the probability of preferring Channel O/MK 89 over MTV Base decreases by almost 40

7. *Recasting Race*

percent (with the control variables kept at their means). Accordingly, a higher Kwaito/South African Hip Hop score (associated with black) results in a higher probability of having a preference for MTV Base over MTV/VH1 as well as a preference for Channel O/MK 89 over MTV Base and MTV/VH1. At the other end of the musical spectrum, a higher Rock/South African Pop score (associated with white) decreases the probability of watching both MTV Base or Channel O/MK 89 by about 40 percent but does not make a significant difference for comparing the two non-white channels directly. The only music style which is not positively associated with a single channel is RnB/American Pop. It does, however, cause a slight (about 18 percent) yet statistically significant decrease in the probability of preferring Channel O/MK 89 over MTV Base. As for the control variables, only class proves to be of importance in predicting someone's favourite music television channel. There is no significant difference in the comparison of MTV/VH1 and MTV, but Channel O proves to be more popular among socio-economically weak respondents.

Overall, one needs to keep in mind that the principal factor with respect to music television is the highly uneven access due to socio-economic constraints, which is reflected by the low response rate for that particular question for coloured and especially black respondents (three out of four and six out of ten, respectively, opposed to more than eight out of ten for white respondents). Furthermore, the explicit racial narrow-casting behind the station's programming cannot be emphasised enough, as Stadler's (Stadler 2008: 13) description of Channel O suggests:

Channel O, a digital satellite television (DSTV) channel offered by the pay-TV company MultiChoice Africa, has incorporated popular terminology that references black identity and the impact of globalisation in its marketing campaigns. This channel addresses a young, upwardly mobile, predominantly black audience with advertising strategies that demonstrate an awareness of the discourse of cultural imperialism. The advertisements feature coconuts that do not have white centres: they are chocolate all the way through. In other words, Channel O represents itself as actively resisting domination by foreign media products that feature and address white people. The caption beside the chocolate-centred coconut reads, 'Channel O. Uncolonized: Get back to black', meaning that watching the black-oriented programming will enable the black audience to avoid the internalisation of white culture. Because Channel O is an expensive satellite service rather than being free-to-air, it is likely that its well-to-do audience members are (or are in danger of becoming labelled) coconuts. In this instance the media is encouraging black viewers to return to their roots, and to value their own identities and cultures.

According to Stadler the very access to Channel O sets its black viewers apart from those who do not receive satellite television and is enough to label them 'coconuts'. And in an almost ironic twist, Channel O's (self-)advertising draws a very clear line between its targeted audience – young, black, upward-mobile – and white viewers. This way it seemingly eschews having to imitate the symbolism of white middle-class and is able to offer an alternative middle-class identity to the one described in this study so far. But even if this is an exciting development worth of further investigation, it needs to be emphasised that this alternative class identity is also deeply

steeped in racial and (post-)colonial discourse – the abandonment of race altogether does not seem to be a viable option for media companies in order to attract sizable audiences.

7.2 New Media and Communication


Over the last two decades there has been a shift from ‘traditional’ media (television, radio, print) to modern Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The abundance of information and distraction found online and the immediacy of modern communication by SMS, email and social network sites have changed the consumer behaviour of individuals around the globe. New media distinguishes itself from traditional media primarily in that it is highly individualised and multi-faceted, leading Castells (2009: 64) to remark that “[we] do not “watch” the Internet as we watch television. In practice, Internet users (the majority of the population in advanced societies and a growing proportion of the third world) *live* with the Internet.”

One needs to keep in mind, however, that accounts of the growing dominance of online media are usually based on the experiences in developed countries where internet access, cellphones and satellite television are relatively affordable and generally widespread compared to other parts of the world where they remain out of reach for most people. For example, a study of the link between computer usage and cultural capital in Flanders (Belgium) does not produce any significant results, which the authors largely ascribe to the virtually universal access to ICT in Flanders (Tondeur and Sinnaeve 2010: 13). In South Africa, on the other hand, the high costs associated with having personal internet access have created a real digital divide⁵⁴ which is also easily detectable in the graph below.

54. It needs to be said that thanks to the tremendous developments in the mobile market and the virtual ubiquity of cellphones in South Africa a much higher proportion of South Africans from low-income backgrounds can be found online today compared to when the fieldwork for this study was conducted (see Kreutzer 2009). But whether mobile access to the internet is indeed equivalent to the ‘full’ online experience and leads to an equal decrease in traditional media consumption is still open to debate.

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Figure 7.8 *Tabplot: Internet Consumption by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

The differences in internet consumption between the three main population groups are astonishing: over half of the white respondents report accessing the internet at least twice and half of those even at least four times a week. In contrast, three out five black respondents say that they never go online and only one out of four coloured respondents visits the web at least twice a week. But of course the graph is problematic – primarily internet consumption is not assumed to be a function of race but of economic factors and actual access to the internet. Whether this is true is subject to the following series of regressions testing the relationship between race, class, access and internet consumption in combination with a number of control variables. Since we are dealing with an ordinal dependent variable an ordered logit regression is the appropriate method here.⁵⁵

55. An ordered logistic regression (ologit) basically consists of a series of logits, stepwise (starting with the lowest level) grouping the individual levels of the dependent variable and comparing them with the group of higher scores. Since the coefficients (here: odds ratios) presented here only reflect a single equation for all levels of the dependent variable, their interpretation is not as straightforward as with the other regression models used in this thesis and will therefore be done in more general terms.

Table 7.6 *Ologit Internet Consumption (Cape Town, Odds Ratios)*

<i>Subsample</i>	<i>City Schools</i>	<i>African/ Black</i>
Race: African/Black	0.680 (0.276)	(omitted)
Race: Coloured	0.497** (0.002)	(omitted)
(Race: White)		(omitted)
English: Native	0.917 (0.748)	1.044 (0.941)
English: Other	0.714 (0.311)	0.391* (0.034)
Male	1.875*** (0.000)	1.589* (0.036)
Class	1.013* (0.045)	1.005 (0.590)
School: Southern/Flats	0.805 (0.337)	
School: Townships	(omitted)	0.603 (0.381)
(School: Atlantic)		
Internet: Home	4.389*** (0.000)	2.434** (0.002)
Observations	529	351
Pseudo R-squared	0.114	0.053
Brant $p > \chi^2$	0.977	0.941

Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

The results for these regressions are slightly ambiguous when it comes to the race and class effect but are clear regarding the importance of access for internet consumption. As for race: white respondents indeed spend far more time online than their black and coloured peers, even controlling for access and economic background, but only the results for coloured respondents are statistically significant. Class, although statistically significant in the city schools model, has only minor effects on time spent online, arguably due to the strong access effect: having an internet connection at home increases the odds by factor four among city school students and factor two among black kids. Despite their ambiguity these results largely fit expectations, but what is rather unexpected is the significant effect, both in absolute as well as statistical terms, of the gender variable: according to both regressions boys spend significantly more time online than girls. This

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leads to a topic which has been neglected in the discussion of the media results so far: gender differences in media usage among adolescents have been a matter of academic debate at least since McRobbie and Garber (1976) drew attention to the lack of engagement with gender issues in subcultural theory. The early studies on subcultures conducted at the CCCS were male-centric, with some explicitly focussing on stereotypical representations of masculinity such as the biker movement. Initially the role of women and girls had been somewhat neglected and misrepresented in some of these accounts, in the sense that men (or boys) were seen to live out their subcultural identities in public whereas women (or girls) were assumed to be restricted to the privacy of their own four walls (or the bedroom, to be more specific) (Frith 1978: 64). McRobbie and Garber (1976; McRobbie 1978) objected to this passive and negative characterisation of young women by emphasising the crucial role they played in the sexual revolution as well as in the fashioning of a counter-hegemonic youth style in all sorts of public spheres, from fashion to music. Post-feminist writers in the 1990s extended the arguments by their feminist predecessors by highlighting the social independence and sexual self-confidence of young women at the time in a variety of different contexts such as the Riot Grrrl movement, the Rave movement and also through the emergence of the so-called girls groups, such as the Spice Girls. It is noteworthy that these positive accounts of the new feminine, bordering to the celebratory, were often in line with the generally (overly) optimistic elucidations of post-subcultural theory. More recently the focus of attention has been readjusted to the actual differences in the ways young women and men are using and perceiving old and new forms of media and communication without questioning the fundamental equality between men and women in the making and representation of popular culture. For example, there is a large and growing body of literature which describes (Park 2009), sometimes explains and occasionally disputes (Gross 2004; Shaw and Gant 2002) the discrepancy in the ways young women and men use the internet. While the extent of this discrepancy is under discussion, virtually all studies (almost all of which have been conducted in the US or Europe) confirm the results presented here that male respondents spend more time online than female respondents. While some more recent studies have shown that there are either no differences in internet usage by gender or that the gender gap is rapidly narrowing, the results presented here are remarkably similar to slightly earlier studies from overseas which recorded a marked difference in the frequency and ways young men and women were using the internet. Other recent studies maintain, however, that while the frequency of internet usage, in the USA at least, is today fairly equal among youth regardless of gender, there is still a distinction in the quality of internet usage with boys spending more time online for entertainment while girls are using it more for information. Unfortunately the data on internet usage from the Cape Town Youth Culture Survey does not allow for such detailed analysis and thus the actual qualitative differences in usage can only be speculated about, but the actual difference in online time between boys and girls points to a real and relevant variation between boys' and girls' media usage.


The language factor deserves attention too, as Xhosa-preferring black respondents spend significantly less time online than their English-preferring peers. However, here one needs to question the direction of causality between the dependent and independent variable: do kids spend

more time online because they prefer to speak English or is it the other way around: they start preferring English because they use the internet? The collected data alone does not provide definite answers to this question, but the findings do imply a further mode of distinction among black respondents based on language preferences.

But as interesting as these results are they are also somewhat unidimensional as they do not tell much about the actual accessibility of new media and communication, especially beyond internet access. For this purpose four additional questions were asked about the respondents' access to new forms of media and communication⁵⁶:

1. *Do you have satellite TV (DSTV) at home?*
2. *Where do you have access to the internet?*
3. *Do you have a personal email address?*
4. *Do you have a cellphone?*

Figure 7.9 Bar: Satellite TV, Internet, Email and Cellphone (Cape Town, Percentages)




Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Figure 7.9 shows that while cellphones are quite common among all survey participants, satellite TV, internet access at home and a personal email address are not. Using a scale based on the four variables it is possible to obtain a more detailed image of the inequality of access.

56. Only questions 1 and 3 result in binary variables. In order to answer the cellphone question respondents could choose from ordered categories (“<R30” “R30-R100” “R100-R200” “>R200”) or the response “No cellphone”. Here it will also be treated as a binary variable (“Cellphone” / “No Cellphone”). The internet question allowed for multiple responses. Here we only look at the option “Internet at Home”.

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Figure 7.10 *Tabplot: Access to Satellite TV/Internet/Email/Cellphone by Race (Cape Town, Percentages)*



Source: Cape Town Youth Culture Survey 2007

Looking at the combined access variable⁵⁷ stratified by race reveals remarkable differences between the groups. White respondents in the sample have access to at least one of the four commodities, and more than two-thirds have access to three or all of them. On the other hand, almost the same ratio of black respondents has access to only one or none, and only about one in ten enjoys access to three or all forms of media and communication. Coloured respondents are somewhere in the middle; compared to black respondents the ratio of those who are very well-connected (three or more out of four) is three times higher, but at the same time almost half of them only have one or none of these means at their disposal.

As opposed to television and radio, internet access at home, satellite television and cellphone ownership (at least at the time when the fieldwork was conducted) are affordable to only a fraction of South Africans, so again the apparent racial divide can be argued to be a function of class differences first and foremost. But as it also has been argued before: racialised access to (new) media, even if it is due to socio-economic reasons, leads to an uneven distribution of cultural capital along racial lines and ultimately the reproduction of an unequal and racialised class structure in South Africa. Even more so if one considers computer literacy as part of an updated understanding of cultural capital and a requirement for many skilled jobs. A study on the computer attitudes of schoolchildren in South Africa conducted at six middle-, upper-class, predominantly

57. Please note that only cases with non-missing values for at least three of the four composite variables were included. If only one was missing, the empty variable was randomly filled with 1 or 0 (Yes or No).

white schools (Northern/Atlantic) and two township schools has shown that pupils from less privileged schools are significantly disadvantaged in this respect, even if they have at least some computer access at school:

This research did not reveal gender differences in computer attitude, but showed differences in attitude towards computers between schools with students from a different social status. The computer attitude of the students from the two township schools was lower – but still positive – than the computer attitude of students from the other schools. These students also had less access to computers at home and at school and, therefore, less computer experience. As mentioned by Ordidge (1997), access might have a direct influence on actual use of computers and students' computer attitude. Nevertheless, the results did not show a negative attitude of students from the township schools towards computers. What is more, students in these schools showed a relatively high interest in computer-related careers. (Bovée, Voogt and Meelissen 2007: 1774)

It is also worth keeping in mind that if levels of media access, especially to online media, are as unequal as they are described here in an urban setting, then the experiences of South Africa's and global media by members of the urban and rural population must be worlds apart. (see Tlabela, Roodt, Paterson and Weir-Smith 2007)

7.3 Discussion

The results presented in this chapter speak of a fragmented mediascape with the fault lines along class, race, language and, at least with regard to internet usage, gender divisions. They show that the contradiction inherent in the policies governing South Africa's public broadcasting – catering for multiple audiences in terms of culture and language while promoting national unity – extends to South Africa's mediascape in general and is further exacerbated by the class-based schism between local and global media:

National unity as the normative ideal of broadcasting and telecommunications policy has come under increasing strain due to a complex combination of technological change, shifts in regulatory policies, corporate restructuring, and the globalization and deterritorialisation of cultural identities (Morley and Robins, 1995). Policy goals of integration [of] different social groups 'vertically' into a single nation-state are increasingly in tension with the 'horizontal' integration of individuals and social groups across national boundaries that transnational systems of production, distribution and consumption of cultural commodities has facilitated (Collins, 1991). (Barnett 1998: 553)

What this means is that the one of the most promising catalysts of national unity, the media, has become one of the most polarising forces in South African society. The consequences can be seen in the figures and graphs presented in this chapter: African/black respondents' preference for SABC 1 and local radio stations partly broadcasting in the vernacular in contrast to whites' preference for satellite television and online media.

Accordingly, the results presented in this chapter with regard to race are very clear: it is a highly consistent predictor for the amount, type and content of media consumed among the survey participants. On its own this basic observation would be an extremely essentialist interpretation of

7. *Recasting Race*

race and its function in media consumption. Clearly, one does not listen to the radio or surf the internet more often just because one is black or white. But if one contextualises these findings within a discourse of locality, cosmopolitanism and local (self-)alienation, then it is possible to locate them along an axis of media penetration ranging from the local (radio) over the national (television) to the global (internet). They also shed light on the role of the media in the afro-/eurocentric dichotomy which largely defines the racial imagery, sense of nationhood and the meaning of 'home' in South Africa. More specifically, it is possible to make a connection between the self-identification of black youth within local discourses and a preference for local content available on radio and television as well as between white youth's self-identification with cosmopolitan notions of whiteness and individualism and a preference for satellite television and the internet. The absence of colouredness from the dichotomy is not entirely arbitrary as it reflects the inconsistent and contrary position articulated by many coloured youth (and also shared by many white, especially Afrikaans-speaking youth). It reflects a deep sense of belonging in South Africa together with a definite feeling of alienation which appears to cause many to break away from the South African national discourse either through complete withdrawal into highly localised, immediate structures (for example, the *hokke*, or hangouts, in the Cape Flats described by Salo (2003: 361)), or through the identification with external ones, exemplified by the popularity of American Hip Hop among coloured youth.

An insightful account of how television can change young people's self-perceived position in society, and how socio-economic boundaries can prevent them from 'living' this change, is provided by Elaine Salo (2004: 30) in her work on young women in Manenberg, a suburb in the Cape Flats notorious for crime and gangsterism:

Access to new cultural capital through television programmes free the young women, at least temporarily, from the stifling constraints of the local social and moral norms. These Rio Street adolescents' transformation and renovation of the local domestic and public spaces through their consumption of TV programmes and popular music often inspire the more adventurous few to find their way across the city to the cosmopolitan nightclubs or trendy beachfront neighbourhoods. However their physical and social journey into these spaces is bedeviled by the gap between their know-how of the South African cosmopolitan style and spaces and their lack of the material resources required to actually inhabit this world.

Salo's account of young women trying to emulate the lives they watch on television and how they often fail due to socio-economic constraints but also because of their lack of the appropriate mannerisms and styles (cultural capital) is a good reminder that media does not only have a socialising function (*habitus*) but is itself an indicator of cultural capital; the familiarity with certain media outlets (think: Mail & Guardian vs Sun; Isidingo vs Twin Peaks) can create distance or proximity toward members of the dominant class. Another example is computer literacy – second nature to many who grew up with computers at home but an 'acquired' skill at best to those who have computer access only in public places.

8. Common Structures of Difference?

Before going into the taste patterns and media consumption of Brazilian youth it is worth recapitulating the difference between the public perceptions of race in South Africa and Brazil: the fluidity of racial descriptors in Brazil. Whereas race represents a crucial part of identity for most South Africans due to the strict, all-determining racial classification system imposed during colonialism apartheid and its retention in important parts of public life (e.g. labour market) since the end of apartheid, it can be argued that Brazilians are generally less immediately aware of their own race or that of others. Basically, asking a stranger about her or his race in South Africa would cause confusion because in most cases the answer to this question would be assumed to be obvious. In Brazil the same question would cause no less confusion, but because in most cases the other person would probably not immediately understand what is meant by the question. As a consequence, many Brazilians refrain from classifying themselves in terms of a black/white (or *preto/branco*) dichotomy in favour of one of the 'mixed' (e.g. *pardo* or *mestizo* categories). Given this fundamental difference between South African and Brazilian race-thinking, it might appear futile to search for racialised taste patterns in a society that seems to value hybridity more than anything else. However, although conscious racial categorisation remains foreign to many Brazilians, the subconscious association of different shades of skin colour with positive or negative connotations and socio-economic connotations is very much alive in Brazil. Peter Fry (2005: 257), in his book on the persistence of race in Brazil, provides several examples of advertising campaigns with explicit references to the association between class and race. Here is one of them:

In the first half of 2000 a series of posters, aimed at portraying the subway as a means of rapid transportation, appeared in Rio de Janeiro. Among others, there was one of a white guy who claims that it is the cookie seller who likes traffic jams, and one of a young black man who catches the subway because "eating breakfast in a hurry is a pain." Again a shift toward the counter-intuitive. The middle-class white boy wants to distance himself from potential stigmatization by being stuck in a traffic jam, while the black guy, who is probably a worker (because of the blue collar of his shirt), is more concerned about having breakfast unhurriedly. In this poster, the black person is not in a Candomblé temple, nor on the football field, but sipping a cup of coffee before boarding a mode of transport that can be used by everyone.⁵⁸

As much as the portrayal of a black young man in a subway on his way to work might be an improvement over stereotypical depictions of Afro-Brazilians performing rituals or chasing a ball, the class/race hierarchy is certainly not challenged by these two images – white: middle-class,

58. No primeiro semestre de 2000 apareceu no Rio de Janeiro uma série de cartazes visando projetar o metrô como meio rápido de transporte. Entre outros, havia o de um rapaz branco que reclama dizendo que quem gosta de engarrafamento é vendedor de biscoito e o de um jovem negro que apanha o metrô porque "tomar café da manhã com pressa faz mal". De novo uma mudança rumo ao contra-intuitivo. O menino branco de classe média quer se distanciar da estigmatização possível por estar perto de um engarrafamento, enquanto o negro, provavelmente trabalhador (pela sua camisa blue collar), está mais que preocupado em tomar o seu café da manhã sem pressa. Neste cartaz, o negro não está num terreiro de candomblé, nem tampouco no campo de futebol, mas sim na sua copa tomando café antes de embarcar num transporte que pode ser usado por todos.

black: working class. This class/race nexus in Brazilian public consciousness represents the reference point for the comparison between youth in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte, making for an intriguing, if challenging, premise for the analysis of the rest of the Brazilian data. In essence, the Cape Town data has revealed a certain dualism in the way racial identities of youth are reinforced and reformed. On the one hand, there are deeply racialised discourses of identity which link the historical racial segregation in South Africa, post-apartheid notions of nationhood, belonging and alienation as well as different, equally racialised, interpretations of locality along the local/global-continuum. On the other hand, one finds the deeply embedded social inequality, based on class but also historically racialised, which is responsible for the unevenness of access to certain kinds of cultural flows. These two dynamics are at the root of a racialised hierarchy of privilege; cultural omnivorousness and cosmopolitanism disguise the ongoing stereotyping of blackness as essentially local, lowbrow, economically disadvantaged and whiteness as essentially global, highbrow, economically privileged. The purpose of this chapter is to test whether these discourses of race, class and locality are unique to the South African context or whether it is possible to identify a certain universality by establishing 'common structures of difference' (see pages 55 to 59) in Brazil.⁵⁹

8.1 Who are your idols?

The responses given to the idols question by the Cape Town sample exhibited a number of intriguing characteristics in terms of mediated and acquired classifications of taste and racial distinctions. These are expected to be less explicit in the Brazilian case given the greater conformity of the sample. However, a glance at the lists of idols compiled by the respondents indicates that these expectations are not entirely accurate.

59. At this point it is necessary to reiterate the statistical results presented in this thesis are not strictly representative of any population beyond the sample of adolescents in Cape Town and Brazil. Generalisations and comparisons are based on general trends that emerge from the survey data in combination with qualitative data and secondary literature and should be treated as such. See page 11 for a longer discussion of this point.

8. Common Structures of Difference?

Table 8.1 *Top Idols (Belo Horizonte)*⁶⁰

Rank	Preto/Negro	Pardo/Mestizo	Branco
1	Beyonce	Ivete Sangalo	Ronaldo
2	Claudia Leitte	Ronaldo	Ivete Sangalo
3	Ivete Sangalo	Beyonce	Claudia Leitte
4	NeYo	Rihanna	Barack Obama
5	Ronaldo	Angelina Jolie	Bob Marley
6	Cristiano Ronaldo	Claudia Leitte	Angelina Jolie
7	Rihanna	Deus	Jesus
8	Deus	Jesus	The Beatles
9	Exaltasamba	Bob Marley	Cristiano Ronaldo
10	Jesus	Chris Brown	Jorge e Mateus
11	Sorriso Maroto	NX Zero	Kaka
12		Sorriso Maroto	Brad Pitt
13		Britney Spears	Kleber
14		Cristiano Ronaldo	Britney Spears
15		Justin Timberlake	Deus
16		NeYo	Gisele Bundchen
17		Bruno Gagliasso	Juliana Paes
18		Jorge e Mateus	Lionel Messi
19		Kaka	Victor e Leo
20		Kleber	

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Compared to the lists compiled from the responses of young Capetionians, the choices of the Brazilian respondents differ with a stronger emphasis on local names like Brazilian Pop (Axé) singers Claudia Leitte or Ivete Sangalo, soccer stars like Ronaldo or Kleber and religious figures among all survey participants. But the common passion for Brazilian music and soccer cannot divert from the fact that there also significant discrepancies. For example, five of the eleven names on the list of black respondents do not appear on that of white respondents, among them RnB stars Beyonce and Rihanna and rapper NeYo who all can also be found on the list of ‘mixed’ respondents. Accordingly, white respondents chose a number of mostly foreign names which did not appear on the list of black (Bob Marley, Angelina Jolie, Britney Spears) and that of ‘mixed’ respondents (Barack Obama, The Beatles, Brad Pitt). The choices of ‘mixed’ respondents, finally, represent a mix in themselves with Brazilian Emo rockers NX Zero, American Pop star Justin Timberlake, telenovela star Bruno Gagliasso and local soccer hero Kleber being ex-

60. The complete list of names, after cleaning, comprises 833 individual names. The lists presented only show names which were mentioned by at least ten (five in the case of black respondents because of their considerably weaker representation in the overall sample) members of a subgroup.

clusive to that group.

However, the names shown in the list represent only about a quarter of all the responses. For a more comprehensive account the replies were grouped by type.

Table 8.2 *Mentions of Idols – Belo Horizonte (Grouped by Type, Percentages)*

	Preto/Negro	Pardo/Mestizo	Branco	Total
Music	86	80	69	75
Media	27	35	43	38
Soccer	29	27	34	31
Society	11	14	18	16
Culture	7	13	17	14
Religion	16	14	9	12
Family/Friends	10	4	7	6
Sports	4	3	9	6
Total	139	518	690	1347
Cases	73	272	336	681

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Comparing the results for Cape Town and Belo Horizonte with regard to the choices of idols reveals broad commonalities but also some significant differences. In both cases singers and film or TV stars represent the majority of choices made by the respondents with the difference that the South Africans named substantially fewer music stars (47%) than their Brazilian peers (75%), whereas South African black and coloured kids had more movie stars (58% and 59%) than the respective groups in Belo Horizonte (27% and 35%). A further peculiarity of the Brazilian sample is the popularity of soccer players (here treated separately from other sport stars in order to underline the sport's dominance) who turn out to be far more well-liked than political or historical figures.

In the South African case it was possible to make a reasonably straight-forward connection between the respondents' choices and racialised patterns of mediated and acquired idol preferences. In this case, however, the situation is different because of the small subsample of black respondents. For these reasons here and in the following regressions the focus – in terms of race – is on the differences between white and non-white respondents.

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Table 8.3 *Logit: Idol Acquired/Mediated (Belo Horizonte, Odds ratios)*

	Mediated	Acquired
Race: White	0.911 (0.764)	1.106 (0.569)
Male	1.000 (1.000)	0.930 (0.660)
Class	0.998 (0.738)	1.004 (0.242)
Private School	1.344 (0.506)	1.676* (0.035)
Observations	658	658
Pseudo R-squared	0.001	0.027

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

The regressions show that there is virtually no difference between white and non-white respondents' preferences for acquired (society, culture, religion, family) or mediated idols (music, media, soccer, other sports). In fact, the overall results are pretty much meaningless given the extreme low Pseudo R² values. The only vaguely interesting result is the statistically significant coefficient for private school kids (students at one of the Belo Horizonte schools) who are sixty percent more likely than public school kids to make an acquired choice, which is both broadly in line with the cultural omnivore argument (better-off individuals have both low- and highbrow preferences) and the results of the Cape Town survey (kids attending predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) make more acquired choices). Nonetheless, race itself does not factor into the equation at all. In line with the Cape Town analysis music idols category was further broken down into individual genres.

Table 8.4 *Mentions of Idols – Belo Horizonte (Grouped by Music Genres, Percentages)*

	Preto/Negro	Pardo/Mestizo	Branco	Total
Rock	27	48	50	46
Rnb	37	27	16	23
Pop	11	17	24	20
Axé/Forro	16	18	20	19
Hiphop	24	19	12	17
Mpb	19	11	13	13
Samba/Pagode	21	18	5	12
Sertanejo	11	11	11	11
Gospel	11	11	4	8
Total	111	380	350	841
Cases	62	211	224	497

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

The crosstabulations of music genres by race show a different picture, as racialised preferences for certain music genres, both local and foreign, are easily discernible. For example, half of the white and ‘mixed’ respondents chose a Rock idol compared to a quarter of black respondents. Almost two out of five black, one out of four of ‘mixed’ and less than one out of five white respondents had a RnB singer on their list. And while about one out of five black or ‘mixed’ survey participants is a fan of a Samba musician, the same applies to only one out of twenty white respondents. These numbers resemble the Cape Town results (African/black and coloured: Hip Hop/RnB; white: Rock; African/black: local). Whether they hold true in regression analysis involving class, gender and school variables is subject of the following table.

Table 8.5 *Logit Idol Categories: Music Genres – Belo Horizonte (Odds Ratios)*

	Axé/Forro	Samba/Pagode	RnB/Hip Hop	Rock
Race	1.106 (0.690)	0.305** (0.001)	0.525** (0.001)	1.122 (0.522)
Male	0.308*** (0.000)	0.255*** (0.000)	0.747 (0.124)	0.771 (0.122)
Class	0.995 (0.335)	1.014* (0.046)	0.998 (0.595)	0.994 (0.129)
School	1.396 (0.331)	0.199*** (0.001)	0.757 (0.321)	1.160 (0.554)
Observations	658	658	658	658
Pseudo R-squared	0.044	0.148	0.036	0.006

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

The regression analysis mostly, but not entirely, supports the impression gained from the


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crosstabulation as Samba, RnB and Hip Hop prove to be significantly less popular among white than non-white respondents. However, for the overall most popular genre – Rock – the results are statistically insignificant and the Pseudo R² is extremely low. Here one needs to take into the consideration that the fault line does indeed not run between white and non-white kids but rather black and non-black kids (see Table 8.4 on the previous page), thus rendering results for the race variable practically meaningless.

But apart from race it is also worthwhile contemplating the supposedly contradictory class and school results for Samba/Pagode stars which are mentioned often by respondents from better off backgrounds but less from private schools visiting kids. Here it is crucial to remember that the class variable used in the Brazilian survey is rather crude (using only neighbourhood-level survey data as a proxy), and given low odds ratio and weak significance it is best not to over-interpret this finding.

Another way of differentiating idol choices is by dividing them into local and foreign celebrities, which in the South African revealed some striking differences between black respondents on one side and coloured and white respondents on the other side.

Figure 8.1 Mentions of Idols – Belo Horizonte (Grouped by Origin, Percentages)



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

The differences found in the Belo Horizonte sample might not be as dramatic as in Cape Town, but they are remarkable nonetheless. First, local politicians and historical figures are generally unpopular compared to foreign (mostly American) ones (to a good part due to Barack Obama’s popularity in the wake of his presidential election that happened shortly before the fieldwork

period). Second, while local and foreign actors and other cultural proponents (other than singers) enjoy the same degree (or lack) of popularity among non-white respondents, foreign ones are definitely more popular among white respondents. Third, local and foreign musicians are equally popular among ‘mixed’ respondents, black respondents prefer local talent, whereas half of the white sample picked a foreign singer or band, but less than two out of five a local.

Table 8.6 *Logit Idols – Belo Horizonte (Odds Ratios)*

	Culture/Film/TV (BRA)	Music (BRA)	Culture/Film/TV (Foreign)	Music (Foreign)
Race: White	1.266 (0.256)	0.655* (0.017)	1.601* (0.014)	0.851 (0.344)
Male	0.280*** (0.000)	0.443*** (0.000)	0.522*** (0.000)	0.746 (0.065)
Class	0.998 (0.576)	0.997 (0.508)	1.001 (0.756)	1.000 (0.931)
Private School	0.980 (0.944)	0.500** (0.005)	1.912* (0.014)	1.243 (0.364)
Observations	658	658	658	658
Pseudo R ²	0.058	0.079	0.050	0.006

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

If tested in combination with the usual set of control variables, the relationship between race (here again coded as white/non-white due to the small sample of black respondents) and locality proves to be statistically significant; the odds of white kids to have a Brazilian music star on their list is a third less than that of non-white kids, while they are sixty percent more likely to have an American actor (or generally foreign ‘cultural’ personality). Also fitting the earlier findings from both the Belo Horizonte and Cape Town samples is the statistical significance of the school variable; compared to public school youth, kids at private schools are only half as likely to have chosen at least one Brazilian music star, but almost twice as likely to have one choice from the foreign culture, film and television category.

In summary: the idol choices of the Brazilian kids, classified by race, differ from those of the South African sample in significant but not opposite ways. While the acquired/mediated distinction is less nuanced in Belo Horizonte than in Cape Town, it is possible to identify statistically preferences of non-white respondents for local music (and especially ‘traditionally’ black Brazilian music styles such as Samba and Pagode) and RnB and Hip Hop. In a study of the empowerment of black Brazilian youth through Hip Hop lyrics, Jennifer Roth-Gordon (2012: 38) writes:


Brazilian hip hop’s iconic figures of the *mano* (black brother) and the *playboy* (white wealthy male youth) draw on the North American binary to reject the past and present push to whiten. Seen most often on album covers and in glossy magazine photo spreads, Brazilian rappers (who all identify as *manos*) generally sport ‘bling’ in the form of rings and chains, heavy sweatshirts or extra large clothing,

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and US style ski caps or baseball hats. The playboy – the target of their mockery and not an assumed identity (see Roth-Gordon, 2007a) – is described in rap lyrics as a male youth who is preoccupied with ‘fashionable’ preppy clothes and expensive imported commodities. The successful racialized opposition of these figures thus relies on competing patterns of global consumption and bodily aesthetics, including hairstyle.

As has also been emphasised in the case of youth in Cape Town, the tendency of better-off and white kids to favour foreign (mostly American) influences does not mean that members of lower classes and non-white youth do not identify with foreign influences at all. In fact, it is the disregard of white respondents for local trends and their selectivity when it comes to global cultural goods (mirrored by working-class selectivity, as described by Roth-Gordon) that is most remarkable, and which, at least in the opinion of this author, poses a real challenge to the notions of middle-class cosmopolitanism and cultural omnivorousness. The responses to a number of direct questions regarding respondents’ attitude toward local vs global popular culture reinforces this impression.

Figure 8.2 Dotplot: *Subjective Attitudes towards Westernisation (Belo Horizonte)*



Source: *Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008*

The pattern above resembles the one of the Cape Town sample (see Figure 6.2 on page 120) to a remarkable degree, with white respondents being most in favour of American content, black (*preto/negro*) least in favour, and ‘mixed’ (*pardo/mestizo*) somewhere in between. The following subchapter explores these themes with regard to music taste in more detail.

8.2 What music do you like?

Music and dance have always had a special meaning for Brazil's national identity with the complexity of the country's social structure deeply embedded in its rich and vast music scene. Accordingly, in Brazil music is always a reflection of the performer's social origins, which, of course, is very close to what this thesis sets out to show with regard to taste and class distinction. Maciel (2006: 253) goes so far to identify the "rhythm" of the dance styles of the 'underclass' (*subcidadania*) as part of Brazilian society's greater "choreography".

The chords of the rhythms of the underclass reveal that there are various dances and different ways of dancing that play roles which are correctly reflected in its precarious habitus.

That's how the revealing accounts of a situation of social inequality, domination and exploitation are duly choreographed by the dominating and the dominated, exploiters and exploited, as "variations of steps and rhythms." These are so "naturalized" that the majority already knows how to dance.⁶¹

For most Brazilians it is not unusual to associate local music styles with certain population groups defined by class or race/ethnicity. Hence the more interesting question is whether a similar phenomenon can be observed for popular music styles that have their origin outside the Brazilian context and are associated with youth first and foremost. According to Pedrozo (2011: 119) class distinctions among Brazilian youth are certainly rife with lower classes emulating upper classes in the pursuit of acceptance.

Although consumption is central to young people's identity creation, the processes of youth identification and belonging are deeply associated with class boundaries in Brazil. Young people's identity construction is incorporated in their cultural specificities and, in Brazil, the local context of inequalities affect the way youngsters deal with subjective matters. Fear of exclusion was verbalised in some discourses especially among low income interviewees. Discrimination is visible between upper and lower classes and even among members from lower classes; therefore, there is a need to emulate upper classes, as a matter of fitting in. As Brazilian society is highly consumerist as respondents mentioned, people attribute importance to being 'cool' and fashionable.

Although Pedrozo's statement strikes a chord with some of the findings presented so far, it is debatable if "emulating" is the right word and concept for, for example, the kind of assimilation observed in Cape Town (e.g. non-white kids at predominantly white schools (Northern/Atlantic) having more global tastes than their peers at non-white schools), as it implies a sort of homogenisation taking place. As Jennifer Roth-Gordon has pointed out above, some black youth who feel marginalised feel empowered by Hip Hop exactly because it challenges the norms and values of the dominating class. The results for the idol question support this assumption enough to war-

61. Os acordes dos ritmos da subcidadania revelam que existem várias danças e diferentes dançantes que desempenham papéis devidamente inscritos em seus habitus precários.

É assim que os fatos reveladores de uma situação de desigualdade social, de dominação e exploração são devidamente coreografados por dominantes e dominados, exploradores e explorados, como "variações de passos e ritmos". Estes são tão "naturalizados" que a maioria já sabe como dançar.

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rant further investigation of racialised music taste patterns. However, secondary data from Belo Horizonte Area Study (BHAS) 2005, in which respondents were asked what kind of music they listen to, does not necessarily substantiate the impression of racialised taste patterns in Brazil.

Table 8.7 *Music Genres by Race (BHAS 2005, Percentages)*

	Preto	Pardo	Branco	Total
Sertaneja	71	69	64	68
Romantica	65	68	66	67
Religiosa	66	65	52	61
MPB	41	53	56	52
Samba	48	42	46	45
Pagode	54	41	34	41
Classic	29	35	43	37
Rock	19	31	35	30
Jazz	17	21	26	21
Rap	17	14	11	14
Funk	19	13	9	13
Total	889	2054	1505	4448
Cases	199	453	341	993

Source: Belo Horizonte Area Study 2005

Apart from some spurious findings for Classic, Jazz (preferred by white respondents more than ‘mixed’ or black respondents), Rock (disliked by black respondents) and Pagode (preferred by black respondents) the results of the BHAS do not indicate any significant differences in music taste depending on race. Two points need to be taken into account though: the question is very broad and allowed for multiple choices, making it easy for the respondent to tick a box even if she or he does not ‘really dislike’ a particular genre but is also not exactly a fan. The other issue is the survey’s broad sample in terms of age – adolescents are not included and young adults represent only a fraction of the sample, making it difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions for that group alone. These issues notwithstanding the available data does at least not contradict the findings of the survey for music styles.

A similar question (“*What music style do you prefer?*” – multiple choices were possible) was posed to the schoolchildren.

Table 8.8 *Music Genres by Race – Belo Horizonte (Percentages)*

	Preto/Negro	Pardo/Mestizo	Branco	Total
Pop/Rock	44	59	66	61
Pagode/Samba	64	50	48	50
Axé/Forro	48	45	49	47
Hip Hop/RnB	55	46	45	46
Musica Eletronica	36	45	48	46
Sertaneja	34	41	48	44
Gospel	56	39	25	34
Funk	38	36	30	33
Bossanova/MPB/Jazz	28	27	37	33
Total	343	1230	1567	3140
Cases	85	317	395	797

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

The relations between group preferences for individual genres reflect the same patterns as the findings for the music idol question (see Table 8.4 on page 191). Furthermore, they are mostly, if not completely, in line with the results of the Cape Town survey; those music styles commonly associated with black (Samba, Hip Hop, RnB, Gospel) are indeed most popular among black respondents, whereas those associated with white are generally preferred by white respondents (Rock, Sertaneja, Bossanova, MPB). As much as these findings support the argument of common structures of difference, some of the issues with the BHAS data also apply here: broad categories and the possibility of multiple options invite respondents to make thoughtless choices. Therefore the survey incorporated the same fine-grained measurement of music taste based on individual bands and musicians as the Cape Town survey before (see page 123 for a description of how these variables were compiled). The following table shows the grouping of bands and musicians into genres, based on Wikipedia classifications.


8. Common Structures of Difference?

Table 8.9 *Music Genres (Belo Horizonte)*

Axé/Pagode/Samba
Chiclete com Banana, Claudia Leitte, Exaltasamba
Brazilian Hip Hop/Funk
Nação Zumbi, Marcelo D2, O Rappa, Racionais MC's, Rappin' Hood
Brazilian Rock/MPB/Sertanejo
Ana Carolina, Caetano Veloso, Tom Jobim, Seu Jorge, Capital Inicial, Fresno, Jota Quest, NX Zero, Skank, César Menotti e Fabiano, Edson e Hudson, Jorge e Mateus
US Hip Hop/RnB
Tupac, 50 Cent, Akon, Black Eyed Peas, Eminem, Ne-Yo, Timbaland, Beyonce, Chris Brown, John Legend, Justin Timberlake, Rihanna
US Pop/Rock
Amy Winehouse, Britney Spears, Kelly Clarkson, Evanescence, Green Day, Linkin Park, Metallica, My Chemical Romance, The Beatles

Just like with the Cape Town survey the 'new' music variables provide a much more accurate and precise measurement of music taste, as can be seen in the following graphs.

Figure 8.3 *Grouped Means: Axé/Pagode/Samba (Belo Horizonte, Means)*




Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Figure 8.4 Grouped Means: US Hip Hop/RnB (Belo Horizonte, Means)



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Figure 8.5 Grouped Means: US Pop/Rock (Belo Horizonte, Means)



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008


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Figure 8.6 Grouped Means: Brazilian Hip Hop/Funk (Belo Horizonte, Means)



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Figure 8.7 Grouped Means: Brazilian Rock/MPB/Sertaneja (Belo Horizonte, Means)



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

If one compares the graphs with those for the Cape Town sample (see pages 125 and 126) one recognises immediately the fundamental difference between the two locations; while the group means for the Cape Town sample are generally widely dispersed, the ones from the Belo Horizonte survey centre around the general mean, meaning that the music taste of the Cape Town sample is much more heterogeneous than that of the Belo Horizonte sample in all relevant aspects. Nonetheless, a few notable deviations from this rule stand out: a marked preference for American Rock and Pop among white respondents compared to non-white respondents, the same for Brazilian Hip Hop and Funk and black respondents as well as a generally strong gender impact (apart from American Rock and Pop). Whether these observations remain valid in a logit regression analysis in which these factors are being combined is subject of the following table.

Table 8.10 *Logit Regression: Music Genres (Belo Horizonte)*

	Axé/Pagode/ Samba	BRA Hip Hop/Funk	BRA Rock/ MPB/Sertaneja	US Hip Hop/RnB	US Pop/ Rock
Race: White	1.024 (0.887)	0.828 (0.246)	1.555** (0.008)	0.879 (0.424)	1.319 (0.085)
Male	0.465*** (0.000)	1.917*** (0.000)	0.370*** (0.000)	0.608*** (0.001)	0.737* (0.042)
Class	1.010** (0.006)	0.999 (0.883)	1.005 (0.143)	0.999 (0.771)	1.002 (0.550)
School	0.698 (0.122)	1.207 (0.410)	0.660 (0.077)	1.138 (0.571)	1.203 (0.415)
Observations	750				
Pseudo R-squared	0.032	0.020	0.048	0.012	0.013

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

What is maybe the crucial insight to be taken from Table 8.10 is the sparsity of statistically significant results apart from the gender variable that produces strong results for every single category. The race effect, however, is far weaker than for the Cape Town sample, with the only ‘truly’ significant result being white respondents’ preference for Brazilian Rock, MPB and Sertaneja. Arguably American Rock and Pop can be added to the list given its p-value bordering on statistical significance. In contrast, the results for the gender variable are very clear: boys prefer Brazilian Hip Hop and Funk while girls prefer all the rest. But then the opposite is true for the class and school variables which virtually have no effect on music taste whatsoever (the result for Samba/Pagode might be statistically significant but the effect is weak nonetheless). Overall the lack of validity is supported by the very low pseudo-R² values.

Thus, generally, taste differences in Belo Horizonte, at least with regards to music, are indeed much less distinct as it is the case in Cape Town. Yet the association of white respondents with specific cultural flows, namely Rock and Sertaneja, but not Hip Hop and Pagode or Samba, is remarkable. Norbert Wildermuth (2008: 361), in his work on media consumption of Brazilian teen-

8. *Common Structures of Difference?*

agers, explains the very specific connotations of Pagode in comparison to Rock by referring to the statements of one of his interviewees, Ana Paula:

I like rock. I listen to Bon Jovi, Guns'n'Roses... Linkin Park, music like that, you know? ... But things like brega, pagode, I hate [with emphasis] brega and pagode.

I hate. I really don't like it. When I'm at a party and it is played, I can listen to it, I can dance to it, normally... I can dance pagode sometimes, but brega I really don't like. – Those people who really like brega and pagode, they also love to dress indecorous. It's terrible, I just hate it.

He then provides an explanation for Ana Paula's strong distaste for brega:

In Recife, pagode and brega is the music of the (lower income) masses, of the public dance hall, where the beer is cheap, the dresses short and the dance floor an arena for close physical contact.

[...] For Ana Paula and Rosina, pagode and brega signify the sexual availability of lower class girls, of female 'cheapness', as we were told.

Together with an abundance of evidence for the purposeful self-“whitening” of many Brazilians the observed link between whiteness, locality and social status indicates the existence of a racial hierarchy not that different from the one described in the South African context. To what degree this phenomenon is the result of two largely independent processes or caused mainly by largely homogeneous global cultural flows is the topic of the next subchapter focussing on media access and consumption.

8.3 Media Access and Communication

South Africa and Brazil's media spheres distinguish themselves from each other in many crucial ways. While South Africa's media is marked by a long and continuing history of fragmentation (by default during apartheid, today because of the trinity of economic constraints dictating the reform and governance of South Africa's public broadcaster, political agendas – some in the name of nation-building – and uneven access to certain media forms due to socio-economic inequalities), Brazil's mediascape is defined by a large degree of homogeneity characterised by the virtual absence of a popular public broadcaster (Brazil's first and only public station, TV Brasil, was only founded in 2007 and is readily accessible in only some municipalities or by cable and satellite TV), the relative irrelevance of subscription-based cable or satellite TV, and, most importantly, the dominance of the Globo Network (*Rede Globo*). Given the fundamentally different context in Brazil, even the slightest variation in television preferences can be considered significant and meaningful.

More space for variance can be expected with regards to radio consumption. Here mainly regional and specialised channels are the most popular, posing the question whether the same triangulate relationship between race, music taste, radio preference observed in the Cape Town will be seen in Belo Horizonte.

That aside, the role of the Brazilian media in fostering racial stereotypes has been repeatedly the subject of public debate over recent years as white Brazilians are claimed to be over- and black Brazilians often misrepresented in television shows, tabloids and news stories:

Projected mainly as a phenomenon of life in the urban centres of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the discursive practices of Brazilian television reproduce a stereotyped dichotomy between the white, prosperous, modern and rational south, and the black, impoverished, archaic but colourful north-east of Brazil. Optimistic perspectives on a globalized mediated consumer culture – which claim that it in principle enhances multiple identifications, thus providing young people with the means to explore and negotiate the ‘local-global’ contradictions of a rapidly changing society in a creative way – need to be qualified. (Wildermuth 2008: 366)

Interestingly, Wildermuth, who conducted a series of interviews on media consumption with adolescents in Recife in Northern Brazil, makes reference to the local-global continuum, even though his criticism points to the representation of racial stereotypes in the media, not to the unequal access to media which is focussed on in parts of this thesis.


In the same vein as Wildermuth, in an article that very convincingly demonstrates the extent of racial discrimination on the Brazilian labour market and the indifference of Brazilian towards this discrimination, dos Santos and Silva (2006: 14) blame explicitly the media for this sort of indifference by writing that “[w]e are socialized not to regard Afro-Brazilians as ordinary citizens, our equals in law, because the Brazilian mass media have made them either invisible or stigmatized and, as their brainwashed consumers, we are simply unaware of any discrimination against them.”

Television

As discussed earlier, huge qualitative differences in the preferences for TV channels are not expected among Brazilian youth. This, however, does not negate the possibility for observations of more general trends in adolescents’ media behaviour.


8. Common Structures of Difference?

Figure 8.8 *Tabplot: Television Consumption by Race (Belo Horizonte)*



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Compared to the Cape Town sample differences in the self-reported amount of time spent watching television varies only insignificantly between the three population groups. Although a slightly positive trend from white to ‘mixed’ to black can be observed, it affects basically only the two highest categories, i.e. the percentages of black, ‘mixed’ and white respondents spending at least one hour per day watching television are all virtually the same, providing a first indication of the homogeneity of Brazilian television viewers, which is further explored in the following graph.

Figure 8.9 Stacked Bar: Television Channels by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)⁶²

Source: *Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008*

The previously mentioned dominance of Rede Globo is confirmed by the preferences of the respondents; the majority prefers it over any other other channel. But again, the devil is in the detail: one out of five black respondents prefers Brazil's second most popular channel, Rede SBT, or MixTV. 'Mixed' respondents show a slightly lower proportion, while only six percent of the white respondents made the same choice. The difference seems small, but it is intriguing, especially concerning MixTV which is an openly accessible, youth-oriented music channel similar to MTV Brasil. Therefore the following regression analysis includes two music variables for the direct comparison of the two music channels in addition to the usual control variables.

62. The complete list of TV channels available to respondents comprised the following: Rede Globo, Rede Record, Rede SBT, Rede Bandeirantes, TV Cultura, Rede Minas, MixTV and MTV Brasil. Those channels which do not appear in this graph had been excluded from the statistical analysis due to extremely low frequency counts.

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Table 8.11 *Mlogit Regressions: Television Channels (Belo Horizonte, Odds Ratios)*

<i>Base</i>	Rede Globo			Rede SBT		MixTV
	Rede SBT	MixTV	MTV Brasil	MixTV	MTV Brasil	MTV Brasil
Race: White	0.533 (0.133)	0.425* (0.043)	0.982 (0.948)	0.797 (0.694)	1.842 (0.201)	1.949 (0.187)
Male	2.382* (0.019)	0.490 (0.085)	2.696*** (0.000)	0.206** (0.003)	1.132 (0.777)	5.319*** (0.001)
Class	1.009 (0.349)	1.001 (0.865)	0.987* (0.023)	0.993 (0.553)	0.978* (0.037)	0.984 (0.120)
School	0.053*** (0.001)	0.410 (0.125)	1.843 (0.099)	7.780* (0.044)	35.020*** (0.000)	5.107* (0.017)
Music: US Pop/Rock						3.798** (0.008)
Music: US Hip Hop/RnB						0.088*** (0.000)
Observations			641			630
Pseudo R ²			0.076			0.154

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008


The regression results indeed show a statistically significant negative association between white respondents and MixTV in relation to Rede Globo. However, the comparison of MixTV and MTV Brasil does not reveal any meaningful race effect. On the other hand, the inclusion of the two music variables confirm the assumption that the preference for one of the two music channels is to a large part determined by music preference, and here race does come into play again as the two crucial music variables themselves come with racial connotations. Moreover the school effect suggests that mostly kids from private schools favour MTV Brasil over other channels⁶³, including MixTV. So while the overall dominance of Rede Globo is undeniable, there are at least traces of evidence that suggest a tendency of racialised preferences which correlate with social status in the form of the school variable. The only contradictory factor is the lack of a clear class influence, as the results actually indicate a negative, counterintuitive relationship between the class variable and preference for MTV Brasil. But the actual effect is in fact so weak that it is largely negligible. Besides the results for race, class and school, the clearest findings are then in relation to the gender variable: Rede SBT and MTV Brasil are considerably more popular among male respondents, whereas MixTV is favoured by female respondents. While intriguing and noteworthy, such results cannot be interpreted without a much more detailed content analysis of the actual programming of these stations.

63. The unusually high odds ratio for the comparison of Rede SBT and MTV Brasil must not be taken at face value as it is due to very low, and therefore distorting, frequency counts.

Radio

Radio broadcasting plays a pivotal role in the South African mediascape due to its quasi-universal coverage and accessibility, especially compared to other, more exclusive media forms such as television and certainly satellite TV and the internet. In Brazil, radio has a significantly lower priority given the popularity of television and a generally better accessibility of the internet. Nonetheless, it still represents a useful measure for respondents' overall media behaviour, especially if contrasted with data for television and internet usage. It is in this context that the results of the figure below are useful for estimating variances in local and global content consumption between groups.

Figure 8.10 *Tabplot: Radio Consumption by Race (Belo Horizonte)*




Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Even if the radio does not enjoy the same status in Brazil as it does in South Africa, the numbers presented here are nonetheless remarkable, as they reflect a very similar racialised local/global skewness as previously identified within the Cape Town sample, albeit to a considerably lower degree: half of the white respondents never or rarely (less than 30 minutes per day) listen to the radio compared to one third of black and slightly more than that of 'mixed' respondents. The question is whether these quantitative differences translate into qualitative ones as members of different groups prefer different radio stations.

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Figure 8.11 Stacked Bar: Radio Stations by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Compared to the Cape Town sample, the differences in radio preferences are certainly far less pronounced among the Brazilian respondents. Especially the ‘mixed’ subsample does not have a clear favourite. Among black respondents Extra FM is the most popular with just about a quarter of votes, while just above one third of white respondents chose Jovem Pan FM as their number one station. These are relatively small margins – a regression analysis including music variables for control (music is the deciding content, at least for youth, when it comes to radio) will show whether they are large enough to be statistically significant.

Table 8.12 *Mlogit Regression: Radio Stations (Belo Horizonte, Odds Ratios)*

	Mix FM		Jovem Pan FM	98 FM		Extra FM
	98 FM	Extra FM		Extra FM	Jovem Pan FM	Jovem Pan FM
Race: White	1.653 (0.103)	0.668 (0.219)	1.377 (0.265)	0.404** (0.007)	0.833 (0.527)	2.063* (0.020)
Male	1.609 (0.106)	0.500* (0.038)	2.045** (0.009)	0.311*** (0.001)	1.271 (0.368)	4.091*** (0.000)
Class	1.007 (0.328)	1.006 (0.399)	1.016* (0.012)	0.999 (0.939)	1.009 (0.145)	1.010 (0.168)
School	1.092 (0.839)	0.961 (0.932)	2.727* (0.011)	0.880 (0.790)	2.496* (0.022)	2.836* (0.019)
Music: Axé/Pagode	1.068 (0.827)	13.374*** (0.000)	0.928 (0.789)	12.518*** (0.000)	0.868 (0.611)	0.069*** (0.000)
Music: US Hip Hop/RnB	0.533* (0.043)	0.483* (0.031)	1.210 (0.523)	0.907 (0.775)	2.269** (0.004)	2.503** (0.005)
Music: US Pop/Rock	2.320** (0.006)	0.449** (0.009)	1.353 (0.274)	0.193*** (0.000)	0.583 (0.063)	3.015*** (0.000)
Observations				499		
Pseudo R ²				0.170		

Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008


Extra FM and Jovem Pan FM are indeed the two stations which show the most distinctive characteristics in terms of statistical significance. When compared directly it is revealed that Jovem Pan FM's listeners are mostly white, male, go to private schools, do not like Axé or Pagode, but do like American music of any kind. This last observation on music seems contradictory as one is used to the distinction between American Hip Hop and RnB on one side and Rock and Pop on the other side when it comes to the racialisation of music, as mentioned at various points throughout the thesis. But here the emphasis lies on the duality of local (Axé/Pagode) and foreign music which becomes apparent if one takes a snapshot of the two music top tens promoted on their respective website in early March 2011: whereas Extra FM's list features eight songs by Brazilian singers and bands, one by Shakira (Colombia) and the latin-flavoured "Alejandro" by Lady Gaga, Jovem Pan FM's comprises only a single Brazilian group (NX Zero) and nine US American singers and bands. Thus the message is clear and consistent with the other findings so far; media and taste preferences might be far less racialised in Brazil than in South Africa, but this does not mean that race does not factor at all. Instead one can observe a triangular relationship between racial identity, taste and locality which resembles that of South African society to a surprising degree.

8. Common Structures of Difference?

New Media and Communication

After having established crucial signs for common structures of difference between Cape Town and Belo Horizonte in terms of taste patterns as well as media preferences this last subchapter focusses on accessibility of new forms of media and communication. Again, the levels of inequality discernible in the South African context when it comes to internet access and satellite TV are not to be expected in Brazil where internet connectivity in most urban areas has reached first world levels at much lower costs than in South Africa. Nonetheless, the digital divide between rich and poor has still not been bridged and satellite TV is in Brazil, as in South Africa, a luxury good reserved for those who can afford it. But first a look at the (self-reported) amount of time spent online by survey participants:


Figure 8.12 *Tabplot: Internet Consumption by Race (Belo Horizonte)*



Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

As expected, the differences in internet consumption are far less dramatic than observed in the Cape Town sample with half of black respondents, three out of five 'mixed' and three out of four white respondents being online most days of the week. Accessibility to other forms of communication is also much more equal than what one is used to in South Africa, as the following graph shows.

Figure 8.13 Bar: Satellite TV, Internet, Email and Cellphone (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)




Source: Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008

Cellphones and personal email addresses are highly common among all survey participants. More substantial differences prevail with regards to internet access and satellite TV at home, but both on fairly high levels, especially when compared to the South African data (see Figure 7.9 on page 181). An index based on the four individual variables illustrates this.

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Figure 8.14 *Tabplot: Access to Satellite TV/Internet/Email/Cellphone by Race (Belo Horizonte, Percentages)*



Source: *Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008*

As mentioned above: the differences in access to new media and communication take place on a fairly high level, but they nonetheless exist, with twice as many white adolescents, proportionally, having full access compared to ‘mixed’ and black kids. This privileged position of white respondents translates into a statistically significant relationship between ‘white’ and access in an ordered logit regression analysis.

Table 8.13 *Ologit Access to DSTV/Internet/Email/Cellphone (Belo Horizonte, Odds Ratios)*

Race: White	1.695** (0.002)
Male	1.199 (0.264)
Class	1.023*** (0.000)
Private School	8.162*** (0.000)
Observations	757
Pseudo R ²	0.248
Brant p>chi2	0.156

Source: *Belo Horizonte Youth Culture Survey 2008*

Given the inclusion of class and the school variable (both of which show strong and significant results) in the regression, the strong effect of race may come as a surprise, as access (not usage) really can be expected to be determined by socio-economic factors only. To some extent this is arguably due to the strong correlation between the three independent variables, but it also refers back to the findings for television and radio consumption at the beginning of the chapter if one takes questions of locality into consideration. This leads to a further validation of the common structures of difference hypothesis as discussed earlier and the realisation that media access is in itself a form of privilege reserved to the better-offs and well-educated:

While lower-class Brazilian youth, in general, seek to maximize the uses of television, the middle and upper classes have a broader potential choice. That means, in practice, a greater opportunity to use other media, print and digital, to cultivate social relations and develop a specific forms [sic] of knowledge, skills and cultural capital. Poor young people in Brazil are thus disadvantaged, deepening existing disparities that are, for example, created in parallel by unequal educational opportunities. (Wildermuth 2008: 365)

Wildermuth's link between class, education and media consumption is crucial as it reinforces the point that the differences in media (and, consequently, popular culture) consumption is not just a reflection of different tastes, but has real and significant consequences for sustaining social inequality in Brazil and elsewhere. Exposure to different types of media does not only lead to different sets of dispositions understood as a cultural capital on an ideal level, but in a time in which the ability to process and filter information at an ever-increasing rate is a prerequisite for many careers it has become a necessary and vital skill.

8.4 Discussion

The comparison of the Cape Town and Belo Horizonte datasets not only confirms the common structures of difference but also further supports the arguments that a) the racialisation of class distinction contributes to the reproduction of social inequality, and b) that the unequal distribution of cultural capital through the media, partly due to unequal access to the media, help to further 'normalise' racialised class distinctions. The found similarities between the two research settings, despite the fundamentally different discourses around race and nationhood found in both, elevate the points made in chapters 6 and 7 to a universal level, in that it is possible to identify shared experiences of a heavily mediated popular culture which, despite all appearances of being 'open' and indiscriminate, reinforces existing taste boundaries along race and class lines around the globe. At the same time, this chapter has also shown that these shared experiences always need to be contextualised and 'made sense of' within their local settings. Concretely, what this means in this case, is not to superimpose one racial classification, with all its history and local meaning, from one place onto another. For example, although it seems obvious at first sight, it would be wrong to equate the social position, and associated taste patterns, of the colored population in South African with that of so-called 'mixed' Brazilians, as one is the consequence of racial essentialism whereas the other originates in a tradition of cultural hybridity. With this sensitivity toward locality in mind, what emerges as the most uniform common denominator is the meaning of whiteness in the two locations. Apart from being the color code for the dominant

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class in both settings, which is not exactly a groundbreaking revelation given their shared colonial past, whiteness is universally associated with a middle-class worldliness and openness, which have been identified by some academics as cosmopolitanism and cultural omnivorousness. However, what is suggested instead, based on the empirical evidence from Cape Town and Brazil, is that the position of privilege of whiteness translates into a highly selective awareness especially of local trends and cultural flows. This selective awareness is hinted at by Paulo Simões (2006: 7) in the introduction to a special issue of *Latin American Perspectives* on race and equality in Brazil:

[M]iscegenation in Brazil has resulted in an extremely complex set of categories based on race, color, physical characteristics, wealth, and social rank. Yet such statements by prominent Brazilian media figures as “Branco é quem tem dinheiro” (A white is one with money) and “Eu sempre trabalhei como uma negra” (I have always worked like a black woman) reveal that inequality is based not entirely on Malthusian or Ricardian theories of wages or analyses of poverty but on discrimination tied to *both* biology and class. In Brazil, a dark skin continues to be associated with poverty and social inferiority. Unfortunately, the categorization of social status based on one’s degree of “whiteness” and economic class standing prevents persons of different classes and “races” from joining to rectify the situation and causes people of the lighter-skinned higher classes to dissociate themselves (culturally, politically, and physically) from the most undervalued “black” classes.

As much as the dominant class, which is defined in socio-economic terms but has the cultural markers of whiteness, appears to be tolerant, inclusive and worldly, it really distinguishes itself from the dominated class through the disassociation from the reality of the dominated class which has the cultural markers of blackness (or rather ‘non-whiteness’ in other contexts).

This disassociation is to a large degree the function of a deep-seated bias in the media sector in terms of access as well as content:

[T]he role played by the media today is equivalent to that played in the past by religious organizations, educational institutions, and the arts. In other words, the questionable use of images that focus on the otherness of nonwhites has a basis in other images crystallized by different means that have, over time, caused racism to seem quite natural. The absence of any collective indignation at this stage of affairs results from our ideal of the Brazilian, created to satisfy the needs of the dominant culture and those alone. (dos Santos and Silva 2006: 24)

The comparability between these insights and those gathered in South Africa is interpreted as indication of the ‘common structures of difference’ that exist due to glocalisation. In other words: although the appearance and quality of racialised hierarchies of privilege reflected in taste and cultural preferences always differ depending on local contexts and histories, they share a common reference point in the link between whiteness and middle-class.

9. Conclusion

The roadmap for this thesis has taken the reader from relatively detailed and dense descriptions of differences in taste and cultural preferences of South African youth to reasonably fluid accounts of the role of media in (re-)creating these differences to fairly abstract comparisons between South African and Brazilian youth culture. It is now the aim of this conclusion to demonstrate the relevance of each of these themes for a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations in the pursuit of an egalitarian and post-racial society.

On the most basic level the observations documented in this thesis provide at least partial answers to some of the questions which, from time to time, tend to arise in public debates on the state of the youth, the social responsibility of the media and the persistence of social inequality in South Africa and elsewhere. For example, one of the hopes expressed in many readers' letters, opinion pieces and around dinner tables is that South Africa's deeply-engrained racial divisions will start to disintegrate almost naturally as an increasing number of schoolchildren attend desegregated schools where they learn to live in harmony with complete disregard for old racial stereotypes. Academic work in this regard is often less optimistic, not least because desegregation at schools occurs only selectively, unevenly and sometimes with unintended effects, but still gives credit to the notion that even if racial 'othering' is not disappearing altogether, its quality is changing away from outright essentialising, politically-motivated racism to a more fluid, 'playful' and ultimately less discriminatory racial 'banter'.

The findings presented in chapters 6 and 7 support this view at least partially: most participants in the focus group discussions did not make any direct references to race when talking about difference unless they were prompted, and those who did usually made them in connection with music and fashion while politics rarely entered the frame. But the findings go beyond these merely descriptive accounts of more or less racialised forms of youth culture as they link them to representations of class, and it is here, at the junction of class and race, where the divisive nature of the seemingly harmless and playful racial banter becomes apparent. The first tenet of the argument made here is based on the recognition that there is an inherent hierarchy in the perception of racialised forms of youth culture largely in line with class-centred analyses of taste and cultural preferences inspired by Bourdieu. Of course, and it has been discussed in length in the literature review (see page 48), the application of Bourdieu's theoretical framework to the contemporary South African context does not come without its own flaws and incongruities. Nonetheless, some of its main elements are certainly discernible as embodied and objectified forms of cultural capital (for example consumption patterns, fandom, clothing styles, music tastes as well as ways of talking and even walking) which correlate with institutionalised cultural capital, i.e. schooling. What this means is that the cultural preferences of white youth participating in the survey commonly prevailed at the most prestigious schools (measured in school fees) and non-white learners at those schools distinguished themselves from their non-white peers at predominantly coloured and black schools, respectively. This is not to say that they simply mimic their white friends at those schools – the broad distinctions in taste and cultural preferences between the three groups are still valid – but coloured learners at predominantly white schools (Northern/

Atlantic) are more likely to be into American Rock and Pop, name writers or historical figures as their idols and prefer surf brands for clothing. Similarly, black kids at those schools tend to have a preference for American celebrities and music opposed to their peers in the townships. These findings resonate with the relevant literature on desegregated schools, showing that non-white kids at predominantly (or at least historically) white schools often struggle “to fit in” (Dolby 2001; Dawson 2003; Battersby 2004; Soudien 2010), and it is not far-fetched to assume that this feeling of being sidelined continues to hamper the affected children’s self-confidence and ultimately life chances.

The findings in chapter 6 also contradict an assumption associated with the significance of economic development for nation-building; a common belief that racial differences can be overcome as South Africa’s middle-class continues to grow, absorbing old differentiators of class and race in the process. In cultural sociology this assumption is mirrored in the concept of the cultural omnivore – Peterson’s (1996) name for members of the middle- and upper-class, who show little concern for old divisions between supposedly high- and lowbrow cultural activities. In many ways the cultural omnivore thesis seems to hold true in the case of South African youth; if one looks at the cultural consumption of the better-off students in the survey then one can indeed detect a broad range of cultural preferences, spanning from admiring novelists to listening to popular Rock and Pop music. If anything, there is a bias towards popular culture across the entire sample, making it difficult to distinguish between so-called highbrow and lowbrow cultural preferences, as one might expect in the context of contemporary South African youth. More meaningful distinctions only start to reveal themselves once one looks past the old high- and lowbrow divide and begins to differentiate in terms of genres, artists and localities: better-off respondents, regardless of their race, generally have a higher preference for foreign (mostly American) idols and music than their poorer peers. Racial differences, however, further reinforce these divisions as coloured and white respondents, regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds, show higher preferences for cultural imports than their black peers. Accordingly, music taste is broadly divided by race with coloured and white respondents showing a dislike for local House and Kwaito. Using the same broad strokes, white respondents have a preference for Rock and Pop, while coloured respondents are very much into Hip Hop. And even where the analogy seems to fall apart, its basic logic remains. Freshlyground’s success (see page 132), for example, can be easily portrayed as a prime example of cultural omnivorousness – the image of young South Africans from all sorts of backgrounds dancing to a local, multi-racial Afropop band sharing the stage with Shakira during the World Cup ceremony seems to defy all the divisions described above. But details matter: most importantly, the appropriation of Freshlyground by South Africa’s middle-class youth preceded its (purported) success among lower-class constituencies, not the other way around, and its entire ‘packaging’ – the constellation of band members, venues for performances, lyrics – is designed to make it accessible to (white) middle-class South

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Africans and alludes to a cosmopolitan middle-class taste (Balfour 2012).⁶⁴

This idea of a cosmopolitan and omnivorous middle-class taste then becomes highly problematic, as it implies openness and tolerance in the presence of selectivity and exclusion:

[I]f agents at first offer labels and descriptions of their tastes that indicate breadth and mix, and thus apparently omnivorousness, then, as has been argued here, this is not because of novel experiences provided by global media or a drive to blend disparate genres, but because perception focuses on that sector of the field of musical production catering to one's tastes, excluding all others as beyond the pale. It truly is a mix, but only through a scheme of perception – a subjective field of possibles, as I have called it elsewhere (Atkinson, 2010) – disposed to attend to and discern the differences and similarities amongst products and constructed genres that are, ultimately, similarly situated and consumed on the basis of similar aesthetic orientations. This is, if you like, the phenomenology of the short-range omnivorousness – and thus, I would add, not really omnivorousness at all – discovered by Bennett et al. (2009). (Atkinson 2011: 184)

Of course language matters a great deal when it comes to selectivity, especially in South Africa, yet it does not explain the different preferences for non-South African music, for example. Instead it is useful to look at the channeling and reception of cultural flows more generally. This brings us to the second part of the thesis, which is about media consumption. The underlying assumption here is that while schooling and family continue to be crucial for a child's socialisation, the media has acquired a far more important role than it used to when Bourdieu wrote *Distinction* as it represents the primary channel for the sort of cultural flows that find their expressions in individuals' tastes and cultural preferences described in chapter 6. Yet to talk about 'the media' as a singular entity having some sort of homogeneous effect on youth's taste patterns is misleading as it obscures the multiplicity of the media and the unevenness of media access, which is to a large extent determined by socio-economic factors. And because South Africa's class structure is so deeply racialised the media further amplifies the uneven distribution of cultural capital along racial lines, as described above. These links between media, taste and class are to be found in the results of chapter 7, which show that black kids listen to radio far more often than white or coloured kids. White kids also watch significantly less television than their coloured and black friends, and when they do, they more often than not tune into (subscription-based) satellite channels broadcasting mostly foreign (American and British) content. In return, white kids spend more time online as they usually have internet at home as well as an email account, confirming notions of a digital divide going through South African society. Going beyond mere medium types, which first and foremost are a function of socio-economic possibilities, further substantiates the impression that South African youth's racialised taste patterns are reflected in its media consumption: Black respondents show a penchant for SABC 1, radio stations Umhlobo Wenene

64. A similar, albeit more complex, point can be made with regard to Die Antwoord's success in recent years. Little attention is being paid to Die Antwoord here as the group did not exist (at least not in its current reincarnation) when the empirical research for this thesis took place. Please consult Claire Scott's (2012) *Die Antwoord and a delegitimised South African whiteness: a potential counter-narrative?* for a thorough discussion of Die Antwoord's meaning for white youth's identity.

(township schools), Bush Radio, Metro FM, Goodhope FM (city schools) and South African music channel Channel O; coloured respondents for private TV station eTV, satellite TV, Goodhope FM and Hip Hop channel MTV Base; and white respondents for satellite TV, 5FM and European MTV as well as VH1.

Arguably, the relationship between taste and media consumption is not a one-way street and it is rather mutually reinforcing: one listens to a certain radio station because it plays the music that one likes and this in turn strengthens the preference for this particular type of music. Similarly, using music preference variables as predictors for media consumption implies a false sense of causality and admittedly goes against the grain of the basic argument that different levels of access to certain media types and contents are partly responsible for the uneven distribution of cultural capital. Nonetheless, chapter 7 achieves at the very least four things: First, it shows that media consumption is indeed partly determined by socio-economic conditions. Second, it confirms the role of language in media fragmentation. Third, it establishes a homology between taste patterns and media consumption. Finally, by linking the three previous axioms, it demonstrates that South Africa's extreme inequality and diversity causes uneven media access, which is at least partially responsible for the uneven distribution, and reception, of cultural flows in a similar way as early-age socialization at home and in school. By doing that it does not provide the final answer to the question about the impact of the media on the continuance of divisions among youth in terms of class and race, but it offers a solid reference point for further investigation of this relationship.

If one acknowledges the particularity (extreme inequality and diversity) of the South African, and especially the Capetonian, case, then the question arises to what extent the findings of this thesis can be extrapolated to other settings. In the pursuit of an answer to this question the thesis aimed to establish whether one can speak of common structures of difference in the cultural preferences of youth in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte. The basic idea behind "common structures of difference", a term borrowed from Kjeldgaard and Askegaard (2006), is that as much as youth identities are shaped by local conditions, the dissemination of cultural influences via global gateways (i.e. media) produces comparable youth ideologies around the world:

[T]he concept of youth and youth culture is always constructed in relation to local sociocultural conditions. Youth in the Western highly industrialized world is shaped by the social conditions of late modernity. In other cultural contexts, youth means something very different, depending on the sociocultural historical development and its relation to modernity. Nevertheless, these local youth cultural projects are structured by the global ideology of youth encompassing identity, stylized consumption, and cultural innovation. The global youth segment therefore emerges as a transnational market ideology through the dialectical process of glocalization. (Kjeldgaard and Askegaard 2006: 235)

Accordingly, the comparison of taste patterns and media consumption of schoolchildren in South Africa and Brazil, two developing countries marked by inequality and diversity (yet very different histories of race relations), promises to shed light on whether the insights gained in chapters 6 and 7 are particular to South Africa only or provide some general understanding of

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the relationships between class, race and taste among youth.

Given the differences in race relations, and even basic understandings of race, between South Africa and Brazil, it was questionable whether the search for racialised taste patterns would yield any meaningful results at all. Nevertheless, even though the findings for schoolchildren in Belo Horizonte are less pronounced than they are for Cape Town, they do support the earlier findings; white respondents and generally respondents from private schools are significantly less likely to have a Brazilian music star as an idol and more likely to have chosen a foreign (mostly American) writer, politician or film star compared to their non-white peers or those attending public schools. White kids in Belo Horizonte also tend to listen to Rock, Sertaneja and MPB. And with their counterparts in Cape Town they share a certain disregard for radio and television in favour of online media. In short: even though the racial differences in taste and media consumption are weaker in Belo Horizonte than in Cape Town, they are still discernible and follow the same patterns as those in Cape Town.

At this point it seems appropriate to emphasise the limitations in the generalisation of the findings presented so far. The most important one is that this thesis deals specifically with young people of school-going age in South Africa and Brazil, and therefore its findings cannot simply be assumed to be true outside that context. This is especially the case in terms of the thesis' usefulness for making observations on class structure and distinction on a more general level. Class in the context of youth needs special treatment and in return any claims made with regard to class in this should not be interpreted as absolute truths about the actual class structure in South Africa, Brazil or elsewhere. Similarly, any claims with regard to distinction, cultural capital and habitus should be treated accordingly. For example, the lack of evidence for true cultural omnivores in this thesis does not mean that the omnivore hypothesis has been conclusively refuted for the South African and Brazilian case. Instead what can be deduced from the findings is that in the context of South African and Brazilian youth an overly optimistic conceptualisation of cultural omnivores as fundamentally more tolerant of other forms of cultural preferences is not supported by the empirical evidence. If the concept can be retained at all in this particular context then in the sense that better-off children at the more expensive schools do have a wider range of cultural preferences, yet they are also highly selective within that wider range, and, as a consequence, cultural omnivorousness itself becomes a form of distinction. This is also one of the observations made by Bennett et al (2009: 189) in their description of the British professional-executive class:

They may now have wider tastes in addition, but command of consecrated culture remains a token of distinction which probably has not yet ceased to function as an effective form of cultural capital. They also express some tell-tale dislikes of popular forms. So, because their preferences are disproportionately within the realm of legitimate culture, it seems likely that their pluralism contains the elements of distinction rather than being an expression of pure tolerance.

Another limiting aspect of the thesis is that it does not account for the entire range of cultural preferences and, especially, activities open to young people in South Africa and Brazil. To a large extent this shortcoming lies in the limited scope of the chosen research design. For example,

there are certain practical, logistical and material constraints for how long and complex a self-administered questionnaire for respondents of school-going age can be, thus limiting the number of questions on cultural activities. There is also a certain limit to the actual length of the dissertation itself, necessitating economical decisions about what to include in the presentation of findings.

Despite these limitations there are a number of methodological and theoretical novelties in this thesis that arguably balance its limitations. For one, it goes beyond the often rather discursive treatments of youth culture and racial identities and grounds its insights in a rich and in many ways unique set of quantitative and qualitative data in the form of two surveys and a series of focus group interviews. The analysis of the quantitative data relies heavily on multiple regression analysis, allowing for observations on the relative importance of the various demographic variables, most notably class and race, which goes beyond what purely descriptive statistical methods can achieve. The qualitative data adds an element of triangulation and grounding in reality that is sometimes lacking in purely quantitative accounts of class distinction. In terms of theory: the thesis makes heavy use of Bourdieu's conceptual toolbox but not without pointing out its limitations in the study's context, offering a number of enhancements to Bourdieu's original theory: a rethinking of lowbrow and highbrow in the form of acquired and mediated cultural capital and, related to that, a re-evaluation of the role of the media in upholding class distinctions that continue to carry racial connotations, not only on a national but also on a global level in the forms of common structures of difference. But arguably the most important addition was the focus on race itself as it has been proven to be a very powerful instrument in explaining forms of distinction that would have been obscured by a purely class-based analysis of the cultural preferences of South African and Brazilian youth. This is not to say that race substitutes class as the most important factor for distinction, but it adds to its explanatory power.

In order to illustrate this last point it helps to tell the story of Mbulelo and Kurt. Mbulelo lives in one of the better-off parts of Langa, Cape Town's oldest township, and Kurt lives in one of the poorer parts of Bellville, a sprawling working-class suburb North of Cape Town. The two boys have a lot in common: they are both 13 years old and have an intact family with parents who care about them. Their parents are hard-working but money is tight – they can pay the rent for the small brick and mortar houses the families live in and the boys never have to go to bed with an empty stomach but there is no money for books, trips to the museum, theater or cinema, an internet connection or DSTV. Kurt likes the music that is playing on his favourite radio channel 5FM, which is mostly American Rock and Pop, and he listens to some of his parents' sokkie⁶⁵ records. His idols are Nelson Mandela, singer of Maroon 5 Adam Levine and rugby player Jean de Villiers. In his free time he likes to play rugby and watch American series and 7de Laan on eTV and SABC 3. Mbulelo prefers to listen to Hip Hop and Kwaito on his favourite radio channel MetroFM but he also likes the gospel music that his mother is playing every Sunday. His idols are Nelson Mandela, rapper El Nino of Driemanskap, a local hip hop band, and soccer star Li-

65. Sokkie is a type of Afrikaans folk music.

9. Conclusion

onel Messi. He watches mostly South African soap operas on SABC 1 and SABC 2 and likes to play soccer with his friends after school.

At the start of grade 8, marking their first year in high school, a major event occurs in the boys' lives. Their parents have been studying and earning qualifications via distance learning over the years, finding new and much better-paid jobs in the city as a result. This enables the families to move to a wealthier neighbourhood in the Southern Suburbs and even pay the school fees for Leafy High, a relatively prestigious former Model C school. At the beginning both kids find it difficult to fit in at their new school. Most of their new classmates come from middle-class families. They talk about the restaurants they visit with their parents, the music videos and documentaries they watch on DSTV and the holidays they have been on. They also seem to be on Facebook and Twitter a lot, unlike Mbulelo and Kurt who are on Mxit which works fine on their relatively cheap phones. Mbulelo and Darren slowly adapt to their situation – the fact that they soon also get DSTV and internet at home and smarter phones helps – but overall Kurt has an easier time adapting than Mbulelo; he is used to speaking English at school, the teachers are not unlike the ones he had at primary school, the rules are also familiar and rugby plays a big role at Leafy High, making him a popular figure among his peers. Mbulelo on the other hand struggles with the language barrier, he finds it difficult to follow the teachers, often he feels uncomfortable as the traditions of the school seem strange to him and he has difficulties finding friends he can play soccer with after school. As a result Mbulelo continues to get slightly worse marks than Kurt although both boys are smart and diligent students. But soon enough they begin to feel at home at their new school as they make friends who share their hobbies and tastes in music and clothing and they also develop new interests and hobbies, such as going to the weekly neighbourhood markets, surfing, going to the movies and attending live music gigs. Over the years, however, Kurt and especially Mbulelo are losing many of their old primary school friends as their interests start to diverge – their old friends care little about the boys' new interests and the boys begin to care less about their old hobbies. Their music taste also changes as they are able to watch music videos on DSTV and YouTube and download the latest records of the coolest bands, some of them rather obscure and only familiar to the ones in the know. Mbulelo and Kurt eventually start to hang out from time to time. They even swop a few MP3s and they like some of the music the other one is listening to, but not enough to make a huge dent in the playlist of the other one's iPod. And when they start going out on weekends they often find themselves at different places as their other friends do not like the places the other one is usually hanging out at. "Its not our vibe," they like to say.

The highlight of their final school year is a two-week exchange programme with a private school in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. They are fascinated by Brazilian culture and the hospitality of their hosts. Mbulelo is surprised by the similarities between the Brazilian and South African hip hop scene. Kurt is taken to a sertaneja concert, which reminds him a lot of a sokkie festival he once visited with his parents.

After they finish matric Mbulelo and Kurt apply to study at one of Cape Town's better universities. Both their applications are unsuccessful; in the case of Mbulelo, who never completely over-

came his uneasiness with certain teachers and school traditions, the matric results were insufficient. Kurt, who had good but not great matric results, was told that his application did not succeed in terms of the university's new admission policy. Before sending out their applications to other, less prestigious universities they visit a job fair. Kurt gets into a conversation with a fund manager working for a large asset management firm. The manager likes Kurt and offers him a six-month internship at his firm, which would help Kurt with the following year's application to his preferred university. Mbulelo on the other hand has a chat with the recruiter for a well-know advertising school in Cape Town. It turned out that they have met before, at a hip hop concert they both attended. Mbulelo becomes convinced that advertising is what he wants to do for a living and goes home with the school's application forms.

Of course the story of Mbulelo and Kurt is exaggerated and the lived experiences of many young people comparable to them look very different in reality. But the purpose of using these typecasts is to bring a point across which lies in the omission of a crucial signifier throughout the entire story: race. Without race the story can be read simply as a story of "up-classing" – two boys make the transition from a working-class to a middle-class background and end up making choices that will help them secure their new position in the social order. And up-classing is indeed the main theme of the story. Adding race to the equation, however, we can see a crucial subtext full of texture and meaning: the difficulties Mbulelo is facing at his new school as he is confronted with notions of white privilege, the separation from old friends as he turns, in the eyes of his old friends, into an 'amabourgeois' (Nkuna 2006) or a 'Coconut', a black person who is perceived to act white, as described in Kopano Matlwa's (2007) book of the same title. The story shows the potential unifying effect of a shared middle-class background but it also shows that within this shared class background, which sets Mbulelo and Kurt apart from their old friends, race remains a potentially divisive force in the form of taste patterns. It further provides an example of the possible consequences of the effect race has on the currency of cultural capital on the labour market, where it plays into Mbulelo and Kurt's decision-making and, ultimately, their future.

It needs to be pointed out that this thesis does not provide evidence for significant assumptions made in the story. It does not account for the academic performance of black youth at predominantly white schools, nor for the consequences of racialised class dispositions on the labour market. But it does help us to understand the interplay between class and race in young people's cultural preferences and improve our grasp of the role of the media and global cultural flows within this dynamic: as much as cultural preferences – a liking for gangster rap, a penchant for opera or a passion for soccer – are commonly understood as individualistic expressions, they are, in fact, manifestations of a highly racialised, classist and, ultimately, unequal social hierarchy. One of the most important institutions, alongside and partly replacing family and schooling, through which notions of difference are being normalised, is the media where glocalisation and the fragmentation of channels create the appearance of an increasingly homogenic global consciousness while in fact establishing common structures of difference.

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Appendix

Interview Participants

ID	Name	School	Gender	Age	Race	Language	Class
17	Tom	Atlantic	Male	17	White	English	Very High
24	Charlene	Atlantic	Female	17	Refuse	English	High
53	Susan	Atlantic	Female	16	White	English	Very High
61	Kerry	Atlantic	Female	17	White	English	Very High
69	Peter	Atlantic	Male	16	White	English	Very High
203	Clara	Cape Flats	Female	15	Coloured	English	High
221	Marieke	Cape Flats	Female	15	Coloured	English	Medium
232	Emile	Cape Flats	Male	15	Coloured	English	Low
233	Hendry	Cape Flats	Male	15	Coloured	English	Medium
238	Randall	Cape Flats	Male	15	Coloured	English	Medium
239	Craig	Cape Flats	Male	17	Coloured	English	Medium
240	Chelsea	Cape Flats	Female	16	Coloured	English	High
257	Melissa	Cape Flats	Female	17	Coloured	English	Medium
260	Cheslyn	Cape Flats	Male	16	Coloured	English	Low
291	Wendy	Cape Flats	Female	16	Coloured	English	Medium
302	Justin	Cape Flats	Male	15	Coloured	English	Medium
304	Ricardo	Cape Flats	Male	16	Coloured	English	Medium
307	Edwin	Cape Flats	Male	16	.	Afrikaans	Medium
308	Charney	Cape Flats	Female	15	Coloured	English	Medium
327	Daniel	Cape Flats	Male	16	Coloured	English	Medium
328	Abigail	Cape Flats	Female	16	Coloured	English	Medium
345	Gershwin	Cape Flats	Male	15	Coloured	Afrikaans	Medium
369	Vanessa	Cape Flats	Female	16	Coloured	English	Medium
371	Neil	Cape Flats	Male	15	Coloured	Afrikaans	Low
377	Marcel	Cape Flats	Male	15	Coloured	Afrikaans	Low
387	Caroline	Cape Flats	Female	17	Refuse	Afrikaans	Medium
392	Jocelyn	Cape Flats	Male	17	Refuse	English	Low
513	Dave	S Suburbs	Male	16	White	English	High
540	Terrence	S Suburbs	Male	16	Black	Xhosa	Very Low
554	Burton	S Suburbs	Male	15	Coloured	English	High
560	Megan	S Suburbs	Female	16	White	English	High
575	Eugene	S Suburbs	Male	15	Coloured	English	High
664	Cameron	S Suburbs	Male	15	White	English	High
753	Solomon	Khayelitsha	Male	17	Refuse	Xhosa	Very Low

776	Mcebisi	Khayelitsha	Female	16	Black	.	Very Low
801	Asandiswa	Khayelitsha	Female	16	Black	Xhosa	Very Low
809	Mfundo	Khayelitsha	Male	16	Refuse	Xhosa	Very Low
817	Simphiwe	Khayelitsha	Male	16	Black	Xhosa	Very Low
825	Wandile	Khayelitsha	Male	17	Refuse	Xhosa	Very Low
828	Thobani	Khayelitsha	Male	17	Black	Xhosa	Very Low
853	Zonke	Khayelitsha	Female	16	.	English	Very Low
861	Noxolo	Khayelitsha	Male	19	Black	Xhosa	Very Low
1050	Kwanele	N Suburbs	Male	16	Black	.	Very High
1059	Natasha	N Suburbs	Female	15	Coloured	.	Medium
1062	Lucy	N Suburbs	Female	18	White	English	Very High
1068	Danica	N Suburbs	Female	16	White	English	Very High
1071	Siyabonga	N Suburbs	Male	.	Black	.	Medium
1113	Adrianna	N Suburbs	Female	17	Coloured	English	High
1119	Catherine	N Suburbs	Female	17	White	English	Very High
1121	Dexter	N Suburbs	Male	16	White	English	Very High
1122	Michael	N Suburbs	Male	16	White	English	Very High
1221	Yolanda	Macassar	Female	19	Black	Xhosa	Very Low
1247	Amanda	Macassar	Female	16	.	Xhosa	Very Low
1298	Pamela	Macassar	Female	16	Black	Xhosa	Medium
1320	Vuseka	Macassar	Female	16	Black	Xhosa	Medium
1381	Sizwe	Macassar	Male	17	Black	Xhosa	Medium
1397	Unathi	Macassar	Female	15	Black	Xhosa	Very Low
1400	Masande	Macassar	Male	18	Black	English	Very Low

Appendix

Survey Questionnaire and Informed Consent Sheet: Cape Town

Media Consumption and Identity of Youth in Cape Town

Information Sheet for Participants

Hello, I am Jan Schenk. I am a PhD student at the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town and conducting a study on the influence of global media on youth identities. For this purpose I am collecting data on media consumption among youth and certain aspects which are considered to be important in the making of young people's selves, such as culture, ethnicity, language, social-economic background, etc. The same research is being carried out in Cape Town and Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in order to compare the similarities and differences of young people's experiences with global media in two different locations.

Should you decide to participate in my study, you can do so in two ways:

- (1) **Survey:** After everyone in the classroom has finished reading this information sheet, I will distribute a survey questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of a long list of questions about popular culture and identity. For example you will be asked what music you like, what your favourite radio channel is, and so on. If you do not like to take part in the survey, just return the empty questionnaire.
- (2) **Group Interviews:** In addition to the survey I am also conducting group interviews at a later stage. The interviews will be done in groups of 4-6 people of similar age and take between one and two hours. They will be conducted either on the school premises or at a different location, in which case I will either provide you with transport or compensate you for the the transport costs. In these group sessions you will be asked to discuss similar topics as in the survey, such as music, fashion, youth culture and so on. If you would like to take part in one of the group interviews, please follow the instructions on the first page of the questionnaire. Please note that you would have to fill out the questionnaire in order to be allowed to take part in a focus group interview.

If you decide to participate in one of the group interviews you will automatically stand the chance of winning a new Apple iPod Nano 2GB. The winner will be chosen from among all the participants of the group interviews. Please note again that you would have to complete the questionnaire in order to be allowed to take part in a group interview.

On the first page of the questionnaire you will be asked for your name. In case you want to take part in one of the group interviews you will also be asked for a contact number, so I have a possibility to contact you for the setting up of the interview meeting. Please note that this personal information will only be accessible by myself and that it will be deleted at the end of the study. In general all the information obtained from you will be kept highly private and confidential.

I would like to videotape the group interviews so that I can listen to and remember what you have said, and think about it again afterwards. Again, these video recordings will only be accessible by myself and never be used in public without your explicit consent.

For my final report, I would like to quote some of the things that have been said by the various participants in my study, but your name will never be mentioned without your consent!

Please understand that your participation to this study should be entirely voluntary. Declining to take part in the research will NOT affect you in any possible way! If you wish to participate but, at any given time, you do not want to answer a certain question, or you decide you do not want to be part of the research anymore, please just tell me so and we will respect your choice!

If anything is still unclear and you would like more information about this research, please feel free to **contact me on 021 650 2323 or 082 584 0465**, and I will try to answer your questions.

THANK YOU!

YOUTH CULTURE SURVEY 2007

QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions:

On the following pages you will be asked to answer questions either by ticking boxes or writing something down. You can tick boxes any way you like, for example by making a cross (x) or a check mark (✓). Sometimes you are allowed to give more than one answer to a question, in which case you will a comment at the end of the question.

Please note that this is not a test or exam and there are no wrong or right answers in this questionnaire. Please just try to be honest in answering the questions. If you have any questions before, during or after filling out the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to ask me.

You have read the information sheet and you understand and agree to the following terms:

- (1) It is your free decision to take part in this survey and you do not expect or receive any advantages or disadvantages of any kind by taking part.
- (2) You are free not to answer a question if you do not want to.
- (3) The information I am giving on this sheet and in the questionnaire will be kept confidential and private. My name will never be mentioned without my consent.

If you agree to the points above and you want to take part in the survey, please provide with me with the name of your school, your class and your name. I need this information so that I know how many students of each school and class have taken part in the survey. We will delete your name after we have completed the study.

School: _____ **Class:** _____

Name: _____

If you want to take part in one of the group interviews, please provide me with a contact telephone number, where I can reach you, in order to organise a meeting with you. I will keep the number confidential and delete it after the meeting. Please note that you would have to complete the questionnaire before you can take part in an interview.

Telephone Number: _____

If you do not have contact number but you want to take part in one of the group interviews, please tick the following box and I will try to contact you through the school.

You do not have a contact number, but you want to take part in a group interview.

1. Are you male or female?

- 1 Male
2 Female

2. How old are you? (Years)

3. Where were you born? If you were born outside of South Africa please name the country where you were born. If you were born in South Africa, please name the (closest) city and the province where you were born.

4. How long have you been living in Cape Town? (Years)

5. What is the name of the suburb or district you are living in?

6. How do you get from your home to school every morning? You can tick more than one box, if necessary.

- 6.1 Walking
6.2 Bus
6.3 Minibus
6.4 Train
6.5 Car (myself)
6.6 Car (parent)
6.7 Bicycle
6.8 Other:

7. Which one of these languages would you describe as YOUR language – the language of your innermost thoughts? Please tick only one box.

- 1 English
2 Xhosa
3 Zulu
4 Afrikaans
5 N Sotho / Pedi
6 Sesotho / Southern Sotho
7 Setswana / Tswana
8 Sindebele / Ndebele
9 Siswati / Swazi
10 Tsonga / Shangaan
11 Venda
12 Other South African, African language
13 Any other European language (French, German etc.)
14 Any Indian / Asian language (Hindi, Urdu etc.)
15 Other language

8. And which one would you describe as your PARENTS' language? You can tick more than one box if your parents speak different or multiple languages.

- 8.1 English
8.2 Xhosa
8.3 Zulu
8.4 Afrikaans
8.5 N Sotho / Pedi
8.6 Sesotho / Southern Sotho
8.7 Setswana / Tswana
8.8 Sindebele / Ndebele
8.9 Siswati / Swazi
8.10 Tsonga / Shangaan
8.11 Venda
8.12 Other South African, African language
8.13 Any other European language (French, German etc.)
8.14 Any Indian / Asian language (Hindi, Urdu etc.)
8.15 Other language

9. In most households there is one or more persons who earn the living for the rest of the household. This person is referred to as the "breadwinner" in a household. Who is/are the breadwinner(s) in your household?

- 9.1 Father
- 9.2 Mother
- 9.3 Yourself
- 9.4 Sibling
- 9.5 Grandfather
- 9.6 Grandmother
- 9.7 Other family member
- 9.8 Someone else
- 9.99 Don't know

10. What kind of employment does/do the breadwinner(s) in your household have?

- 10.1 Regular pay job
- 10.2 Work for several employers
- 10.3 Odd jobs
- 10.4 Work for self
- 10.5 Work for family business
- 10.6 Pensioner
- 10.7 None, unemployed
- 10.99 Don't know

11. What exactly is the job(s) or profession(s) of the breadwinner(s) in your household? Please write down the job title or a short description: (e.g. primary school teacher, cashier at supermarket, ...)

12. How many people stay at your residence?

--

13. How many rooms does your residence have? Please include bedrooms, living rooms, kitchens, lounges dining rooms as well as backyard shacks if they are part of the household. Exclude bathrooms, toilets and passages.

--

14. What is the most often used source of drinking water in your residence?

- 1 Tap inside house
- 2 Tap in yard
- 3 Tap outside yard (i.e. public)
- 4 Other
- 99 Don't know

15. Does your residence have a flush toilet?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 99 Don't know

16. Is your residence connected to an electricity supply?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 99 Don't know

17. How much time do you spend listening to the radio?

- 1 Never or almost never
- 2 Less than 30 minutes per day
- 3 Between 30 and 60 minutes per day
- 4 Between 1 and 2 hours per day
- 5 More than 2 hours per day
- 99 Don't know

18. How much time do you spend watching TV?

- 1 Never or almost never
- 2 Less than 30 minutes per day
- 3 Between 30 and 60 minutes per day
- 4 Between 1 and 2 hours per day
- 5 More than 2 hours per day
- 99 Don't know

19. How often do you go the movies?

- 1 Less than 4 times in a year
- 2 About once or twice in 3 months
- 3 About once a month
- 4 More than once a month
- 99 Don't know

20. Do you have a personal email address?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 99 Don't know

21. How often do you read magazines?
(e.g. YOU, Cosmopolitan, SL,...)

- 1 Almost never or never
- 2 About once a month
- 3 At some days during a month
- 4 Most days of a month
- 99 Don't know

22. How often do you usually read newspapers?
(e.g. Cape Times, Cape Argus, Die Burger,...)

- 1 Almost never or never
- 2 About once a week
- 3 At some days during a week
- 4 Almost daily or daily
- 99 Don't know

23. Approximately how much money do you spend on cellphone usage per month?

- 1 Less than R30
- 2 R30-R100
- 3 R100-R200
- 4 More than R200
- 5 I do not own a cellphone
- 99 Don't know

24. How often do you surf in the internet?

- 1 Never
- 2 About one day per week
- 3 About 2-4 days per week
- 4 More than 4 days per week
- 99 Don't know

25. Where do you have access to the internet? You can tick more than one box, if necessary.

- 25.1 Home
- 25.2 School
- 25.3 Internet Cafe
- 25.4 Public institution (e.g. library, community centre)
- 25.5 Friend's place
- 25.6 Family member's place
- 25.7 Other
- 25.8 None
- 25.99 Don't know

26. Which of these radio stations is your favourite one? Please tick only one box.

- 1 Good Hope FM
- 2 Umhlobo Wenene FM
- 3 Kfm
- 4 HEART
- 5 5 FM Music
- 6 Metro fm
- 7 Bush Radio
- 8 Cape Talk
- 9 None
- 99 Don't know

27. Which of these TV channels do you spend the most time watching? Please tick only one box.

- 1 SABC 1
- 2 SABC 2
- 3 SABC 3
- 4 eTV
- 5 Mnet/DSTV
- 6 None
- 99 Don't know

28. Which of these music channels is your favourite one? Please tick only one box.

- 1 MTV
- 2 MTV Base
- 3 VH1
- 4 MK 89
- 5 Channel O
- 6 None
- 99 Don't know

29. Do you have satellite TV (DSTV) at home?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 99 Don't know

30. Below you see a long list of magazine and newspaper titles. Please tick only those titles, which you are reading on a regular basis.

- 30.1 Cape Times
- 30.2 Cape Argus
- 30.3 Sowetan
- 30.4 Die Burger
- 30.5 Sunday Times
- 30.6 Heat
- 30.7 People Magazine
- 30.8 You
- 30.9 Drum
- 30.10 Huisgenoot
- 30.11 Bona
- 30.12 Glamour
- 30.13 Jet Club
- 30.14 'O' The Oprah Magazine
- 30.15 SL
- 30.16 Hype
- 30.17 YMag
- 30.18 Blunt Magazine
- 30.19 Zig Zag
- 30.20 Cosmopolitan
- 30.21 True Love
- 30.22 Marie Claire
- 30.23 Elle
- 30.24 Men's Health
- 30.25 FHM
- 30.26 Other:

31. Young people often see themselves as part of one or more youth cultures or 'tribes', for example Hip Hop, Skater or Punk. What is your 'tribe'? Leave the box empty if you feel that you do not belong to a certain 'tribe'.

32. For some people being part of a certain youth culture has a great influence on the way they dress, talk and think, while for others it is less important. How much does your youth culture(s) affect you?

- 1 Very important
- 2 Quite important
- 3 Neither important nor unimportant
- 4 Not very important
- 5 Not at all important
- 99 Don't know

33. Below you see a list with different music styles. Please tick the styles you are listening to.

- 33.1 Kwaito
- 33.2 Rap/Hip-Hop
- 33.3 House
- 33.4 Trance
- 33.5 Guitar Rock (including Nu-Metal, Punk and Indie)
- 33.6 R&B/Soul
- 33.7 Pop
- 33.8 Gospel
- 33.9 Jazz and Blues
- 33.10 Afrikaans Music
- 33.11 African Music
- 33.12 Reggae/Ska
- 33.13 Classical Music
- 33.14 Other:

45. In the space below please provide us with a list of your idols. It can include any local or international celebrity (for example a famous politician, writer, musician, television- or film star), who is important to you. You can write down up to five names. Please write each name on a separate line.

- 45.1
- 45.2
- 45.3
- 45.4
- 45.5

46. Please write down your favourite brands. These can include any consumer brand you can identify with (for example clothing, technology or lifestyle brands). Again, you can write down up to five brand names. Please write each name on a separate line.

- 46.1
- 46.2
- 46.3
- 46.4
- 46.5

47. Please write down your favourite sport clubs. These can include any club, local or international, of any kind of sports.

- 47.1
- 47.2
- 47.3
- 47.4
- 47.5

48. Below you can see a list with local and international musicians and music bands. Please tell us for each band or musician how much you like him/her/them by giving each of them a score between 1 and 5. If you do not know an artist or band, then please leave the respective box empty.

Ratings:

Empty = I don't know her/him/them

1 = It's awful!

2 = I don't like it very much.

3 = I don't really like or dislike it.

4 = I like it.

5 = I love that stuff!

Artists/Bands	Score	Artists/Bands	Score
50 Cent		Kelly Clarkson	
Beyonce		Kelly Khumalo	
Bloc Party		Linkin Park	
Bok van Blerk		Mafikizolo	
Bongo Maffin		Mary J Blige	
Brasse vannie Kaap		Ntando	
Danny K		Pharell	
Dirty Skirts		Pitch Black Afro	
DJ Sbu		R.Kelly	
Driemanskap		Rihanna	
Eminem		Run DMC	
Fokofpolisiekar		Skwatta Kamp	
Freshly Ground		Springbok Nude Girls	
Godessa		The Beatles	
Green Day		The Black Eyed Peas	
Gwen Stefani		The Rudimentals	
John Legend		The White Stripes	
Just Ginger		Timbaland	
Justin Timberlake		Tumi	
Kanye West		Tupac Shakur	
Karen (Pop Idol)		Zola	

49. Now you are asked to rate TV-shows (soap operas and talk shows) using the same rating system as on the previous page. If you do not know a certain show, then please leave the respective box empty.

Ratings:

Empty = I don't know her/him/them

1 = it's awful!

2 = I don't like it very much.

3 = I don't really like or dislike it.

4 = I like it.

5 = I love that stuff!

Show	Score	Show	Score
7de Laan		Passions	
Backstage		Rhythm City	
Beverly Hills 90210		Scandal!	
Days of our Lives		Sopranos	
Egoli: Place of Gold		Talk with Tumi Makgabo	
Friends		The Bold and the Beautiful	
Generations		The Fresh Prince of Bel Air	
Isidingo		The Oprah Winfrey Show	
Muvhango		The Tyra Banks Show	
Mzansi		The Young and the Restless	

50. Some people say they come from a certain culture. For example, someone might say "I am culturally Zulu" or "I am Muslim" or "I am a Hip-Hop fan". Please look at this list below and tick the option which best describes how you classify yourself culturally. Please tick only one box.

- 1 African
- 2 Afrikaans-speaking
- 3 Afrikaner
- 4 Black
- 5 Christian
- 6 Coloured
- 7 English-speaking
- 8 European/Western
- 9 Gangster
- 10 Hip-Hop
- 11 Hlubi
- 12 Trance/House
- 13 Kwaito/Y-Culture

- 14 Malay
- 15 Mfengu
- 16 Muslim
- 17 Rock/Punk
- 18 Rastafarian
- 19 South African
- 20 Surf-/Skateboarding
- 21 Tsotsi
- 22 White
- 23 Xhosa
- 24 Other:

- 99 Don't know

51. When you think about race, how do you classify yourself? Please tick only one box.

- 1 African
- 2 Coloured
- 3 Indian
- 4 White
- 5 Black
- 6 I refuse to define myself in racial terms
- 7 Other:

52. Which of these options best explains why you classified yourself in the way you did in the previous question?

- 1 The previous (apartheid era) classifications
- 2 Physical characteristics (such as skin colour)
- 3 The way society or other people see me
- 4 Heritage or family (grandparents, parents)
- 5 Culture
- 6 I refuse to define myself in racial terms
- 7 Other:

53. How do other people see you?

- 1 African
- 2 Coloured
- 3 Indian
- 4 White
- 5 Black
- 6 I refuse to define myself in racial terms
- 7 Other:

54. What about race relations in South Africa today? Would you say they are better than they were 5 years ago, worse, or about the same now as then?

- 1 Worse
- 2 About the same
- 3 Better
- 99 Don't know

55. And what about in 5 years time? Do you think race relations in South Africa will be better than now, worse than now, or about the same as now?

- 1 Worse
- 2 About the same
- 3 Better
- 99 Don't know

56. What, in your opinion, is the most important influence for how you see yourself and others in racial terms? Please tick only one box.

- 1 My family
- 2 My friends
- 3 Music
- 4 TV/Radio
- 5 The media
- 6 Politicians
- 7 The past (apartheid)
- 8 School
- 9 Church
- 10 Sports
- 11 I do not think about myself or others in racial terms
- 99 Don't know

57. When or where do you have the most contact with members of other racial groups? Please tick only one box.

- 1 At school
- 2 While doing sports
- 3 At church
- 4 When I am going out at night
- 5 While hanging out with my friends
- 6 During work
- 7 I do not have contact with other groups
- 99 Don't know

58. How often do you hang out with members from other racial groups than your own?

- 1 Never
2 Sometimes
3 Often
4 All the time
99 Don't know

59. How many of your friends are from other racial groups than your own?

- 1 None
2 A few
3 About half of my friends
4 Most of my friends
99 Don't know

60. How often do you visit your friends who are from other racial groups at their homes?

- 1 Never
2 Sometimes
3 Often
4 All the time
99 Don't know

61. How often are you being visited at your home by your friends who are from other racial groups than your own?

- 1 Never
2 Sometimes
3 Often
4 All the time
99 Don't know

62. How often do you text or phone your friends who are from other racial groups than your own?

- 1 Never
2 Sometimes
3 Often
4 All the time
99 Don't know

63. Do you think that most people in South Africa would mind or not mind if one of their close relatives married someone of a different race or ethnic origin?

- 1 Most people would mind a lot
2 Most people would mind a little
3 Most people would not mind
99 Don't know

64. Would you mind if one of your close relatives would marry a black/African person?

- 1 I would not mind
2 I would mind a little
3 I would mind a lot
99 Don't know

65. Would you mind if one of your close relatives would marry a coloured person?

- 1 I would not mind
2 I would mind a little
3 I would mind a lot
99 Don't know

66. Would you mind if one of your close relatives would marry a white person?

- 1 I would not mind
2 I would mind a little
3 I would mind a lot
99 Don't know

67. Would you mind dating a black/African person?

- 1 I would not mind
2 I would mind a little
3 I would mind a lot
99 Don't know

68. Would you mind dating a coloured person?

- 1 I would not mind
2 I would mind a little
3 I would mind a lot
99 Don't know

69. Would you mind dating a white person?

- 1 I would not mind
 2 I would mind a little
 3 I would mind a lot
 99 Don't know

70. If you had a choice, would you prefer to live in a neighbourhood with people of only your own race, or in a mixed neighbourhood?

- 1 Own race only
 2 Mixed neighbourhood
 99 Don't know

71. People sometimes think of themselves as being in a class. Would you say that you are in the upper class, middle class, working class or lower class?

- 1 Upper class
 2 Middle class
 3 Working class
 4 Lower class
 5 Other:

- 99 Don't know

72. So far we have asked you a lot of questions about your race, culture and class. Now we would like to know how you would like other people to see you. Do you want to be seen in racial, cultural or class terms? Please tell us by indicating which is the most important, the second most important and the least important to you. Please tick only one box in each column and row.

	Most Important	Second Most Important	Least Important
--	----------------	-----------------------	-----------------

- | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 72.1 Race | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 72.2 Culture | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 72.3 Class | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 72.99 Don't Know | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

88. What religion do you belong to?

- 1 Christian
- 2 Hindu
- 3 Jewish
- 4 Muslim
- 5 Other
- 6 None

89. Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms and so on, how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?

- 1 Once a week or more
- 2 2 or 3 times a month
- 3 Once a month
- 4 Several times a year
- 5 Less frequently
- 6 Never
- 99 Don't know

90. Some people feel very strongly about their religious beliefs even if they don't go to church or mosque. Other people say that their religious beliefs are not important to them. How important are your religious beliefs to you?

- 1 Very important
- 2 Quite important
- 3 Neither important nor unimportant
- 4 Not very important
- 5 Not at all important
- 6 I don't have any religious beliefs
- 99 Don't know

91. What sport(s) do you practice? You can tick all sports which you either practice regularly in your free time or as the member of a sports club. You can tick more than one box, if necessary.

- 91.1 Soccer
- 91.2 Rugby
- 91.3 Cricket
- 91.4 Basketball
- 91.5 Volleyball
- 91.6 Hockey
- 91.7 Athletics/Swimming/Running
- 91.8 Boxing
- 91.9 Tennis
- 91.10 Dancing/Aerobics/Ballet
- 91.11 Skateboarding
- 91.12 Surfboarding
- 91.13 Other
- 91.14 None

Survey Questionnaire and Informed Consent Sheet: Belo Horizonte

Ficha de Informações para Participantes e Parentes

Olá, eu sou Jan Schenk. Eu sou um estudante do curso de doutorado em Sociologia na Universidade de Cidade do Cabo (África do Sul) e estou realizando um estudo sobre a influência da mídia global sobre as identidades juvenis. Para isto estou coletando dados sobre o consumo de mídia entre os jovens, além de outros aspectos que são considerados importantes neste processo, tais como a cultura, etnia, língua, condição socio-económica, etc. A mesma pesquisa foi realizada na Cidade do Cabo e está sendo feita em Contagem e Belo Horizonte, para comparar as semelhanças e as diferenças das experiências dos jovens com a mídia global.

Depois que todos os alunos na sala de aula terminarem de ler essa nota informativa, vamos distribuir os questionários a vocês. Os questionários são compostos por uma longa lista de questões sobre cultura popular e identidade. Por exemplo, você será questionado sobre quais músicas gosta, qual é seu canal de rádio favorito, e assim por diante. Se você não quiser participar desta pesquisa, basta devolver o questionário vazio. No entanto, gostaríamos de reforçar que sua participação é muito importante para nós.

Na primeira página do questionário solicitarei o seu nome. Observe que ele só será acessível a mim e que ao final do estudo ele será apagado.

Por favor, entenda que a sua participação neste estudo deverá ser totalmente voluntária. A desistência em participar, não irá afetá-lo de nenhuma maneira possível! Se você deseja participar, mas em determinado momento, não quiser responder a uma determinada questão, ou se você decidir que não quer participar mais, por favor, diga-me isto e eu vou respeitar a sua escolha!

Se alguma coisa ainda está pouco clara e se você quiser mais informações sobre esta pesquisa, não hesite em contactar-me em 03191418008 ou pelo email (jcschenk@gmail.com), e vou tentar responder às suas perguntas.

OBRIGADO!

CULTURA DA JUVENTUDE - PESQUISA 2009

QUESTIONÁRIO

Instruções:

Nas páginas seguintes você será convidado a responder algumas perguntas, marcando alternativas ou escrevendo por extenso. Você pode marcar as alternativas do jeito que você quiser, fazendo um **X** ou uma marca de verificação (✓). Em algumas questões, você pode marcar mais de uma opção, casos em que você vai encontrar um comentário perto das questões.

Por favor, lembre-se que este não é um teste ou um exame, e não existem respostas certas ou erradas neste questionário. Por favor, basta ser honesto para responder as perguntas seguintes.

Se você tiver alguma dúvida antes, durante ou após o preenchimento do questionário, por favor, fique a vontade para perguntar ao professor ou a mim.

Você leu a ficha e você compreende e concorda com os seguintes termos:

- (1) É de sua livre decisão participar deste estudo e você não espera receber quaisquer vantagens ou desvantagens, de qualquer natureza, participando.
- (2) Você está livre para não responder a qualquer pergunta, se você não quiser.
- (3) As informações que você está dando a esta ficha e ao questionário são confidenciais e privadas. Seu nome jamais será mencionado sem o seu consentimento.

Se você concorda com os pontos acima e quiser participar da pesquisa, forneça-me o nome de sua escola, a sua turma e seu nome. Preciso destas informações para que eu saiba quantos alunos de cada escola e turma participaram desta pesquisa. Vou apagar o seu nome após a conclusão deste estudo.

Escola: _____ **Turma:** _____

Nome: _____

1. Qual é o seu sexo?

- 1 Masculino
2 Feminino

2. Quantos anos você tem?

3. Em qual bairro você mora?

4. Quanto tempo você ouve rádio diariamente?

- 1 Nunca ou quase nunca
2 Menos do que 30 minutos por dia
3 Entre 30 e 60 minutos por dia
4 Entre 1 e 2 horas por dia
5 Mais do que 2 horas por dia
99 Não sei

5. Quanto tempo você assiste televisão diariamente?

- 1 Nunca ou quase nunca
2 Menos do que 30 minutos por dia
3 Entre 30 e 60 minutos por dia
4 Entre 1 e 2 horas por dia
5 Mais do que 2 horas por dia
99 Não sei

6. Com qual frequência você vai ao cinema?

- 1 Nunca ou quase nunca
2 Cerca de uma vez por mês
3 Alguns dias por mês
4 A maior parte dos dias de um mês
99 Não sei

7. Com qual frequência você lê revistas?

- 1 Nunca ou quase nunca
2 Cerca de uma vez por semana
3 Cerca de duas a quatro vezes por semana
4 Mais do que quatro vezes por semana
99 Não sei

8. Onde você tem acesso à internet? Você pode marcar mais de uma opção, se for necessário.

- 8.1 Em casa
8.2 Pelo telefone celular
8.3 Na escola
8.4 Lan House
8.5 Instituição pública (por exemplo: biblioteca, centro comunitário)
8.6 Casa de amigo
8.7 Casa de parente
8.8 Outro lugar
8.9 Não tenho acesso à internet
8.99 Não sei

9. Com qual frequência você acessa a internet?

- 1 Nunca ou quase nunca
2 Cerca de uma vez por semana
3 Cerca de duas a quatro vezes por semana
4 Mais do que quatro vezes por semana
99 Não sei

10. Você tem um endereço de e-mail pessoal?

- 1 Sim
2 Não
99 Não sei

11. Você tem televisão por cabo ou satellite em casa?

- 1 Sim
2 Não
99 Não sei

12. Você tem o seu próprio telefone celular?

- 1 Sim
2 Não
99 Não sei

13. Quanto você gasta com telefone celular por mês (em Reais)? Você não precisa responder a esta pergunta se você não tiver um telefone celular.

14. Os jovens geralmente se vêem como parte de uma ou mais culturas ou tribos juvenis, como por exemplo Hip-Hop, Skatista ou Punk. Qual é a sua tribo?

--

15. Algumas pessoas que fazem parte de culturas juvenis, sofrem uma grande influência sobre o que elas vestem, como andam e como elas pensam. Quanto importante a sua cultura juvenil é para você?

- 1 Muito importante
- 2 Pouco importante
- 3 Indiferente
- 4 Não muito importante
- 5 Nada importante
- 99 Não sei

16. Qual destas estações de rádio é a sua favorita? Por favor marque apenas uma opção.

- 1 Radio Oeste FM
- 2 Mix FM
- 3 98 FM
- 4 Oi FM
- 5 107 FM
- 6 Rádio Favela
- 7 Extra FM
- 8 Inconfidência FM
- 9 Rádio Itatiaia
- 10 Jovem Pan FM
- 11 Rádio Liberdade
- 12 BH FM
- 13 Nenhuma
- 99 Não sei

17. Qual destes canais de televisão é o seu favorito? Por favor marque apenas uma opção.

- 1 Rede Globo
- 2 Rede Record
- 3 Rede SBT
- 4 Rede Bandeirantes
- 5 TV Brasil
- 6 TV Cultura
- 7 Rede Minas
- 8 MixTV
- 9 MTV Brasil
- 10 Nenhum
- 99 Não sei

18. Abaixo você verá uma lista com diferentes estilos musicais. Por favor, marque o estilo que você prefere. Você pode marcar mais de uma opção.

- 18.1 Axé
- 18.2 Bossanova/Jazz
- 18.3 Forro
- 18.4 Funk
- 18.5 MPB
- 18.6 Pop
- 18.7 Hip Hop/Rap/RnB
- 18.8 Rock (incluindo Punk, Nu-Metal, Indie...)
- 18.9 Emo
- 18.10 Samba
- 18.11 Musicá Eletronica
- 18.12 Sertaneja
- 18.13 Pagode
- 18.14 Gospel
- 18.15 Outro:

19. No espaço abaixo, por favor faça uma lista dos seus ídolos. Ela pode incluir qualquer celebridade internacional ou nacional que seja importante para você (Por exemplo, um político famoso, um escritor, um músico ou ator). Você pode escrever até cinco nomes. Por favor escreva cada nome em uma linha separada.

19.1 _____

19.2 _____

19.3 _____

19.4 _____

19.5 _____

A lista abaixo contém uma série de afirmações. Por favor, indique (✓) se você concorda totalmente, concorda em parte, discorda em parte, discorda totalmente ou nem concorda e nem discorda com cada uma das afirmações.

	1 Concorda totalmente	2 Concorda	3 Nem con- corda e nem discorda	4 Discorda	5 Discorda totalmente	99 Não sei
20. Prefiro assistir canais de tv estrangeiras, mais do que canais brasileiros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21. Eu prefiro assistir programmas de televisão americanos mais do que programmas brasileiros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. Eu prefiro ver filmes americanos mais do que filmes brasileiros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. Eu prefiro ouvir música americana mais do que música brasileira.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Eu prefiro ouvir estações de rádio que tocam mais música americana do que música brasileira.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25. Eu prefiro músicas, tv e filmes americanos mais do que músicas, tv e filmes brasileiros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. A moda dos jovens brasileiros está se tornando americana.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27. A atitude dos jovens brasileiros está se tornando americana.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28. Jovens brasileiros têm mais coisas em comum uns com os outros do que com os seus pais.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29. A juventude no Brasil tem o seu próprio estilo; brasileiro, e não americano.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

30. Algumas pessoas dizem pertencer a uma certa cultura. Por exemplo, alguns dizem: 'Eu sou evangélico' ou 'Eu sou do Hip-Hop'. Por favor, dentre a lista a seguir marque uma opção que melhor descreva como você se classifica culturalmente. Marque apenas uma opção.

- 1 Africano
- 2 Amarelo
- 3 Asiático
- 4 Branco
- 5 Brasileiro
- 6 Católico
- 7 Emo
- 8 Europeu
- 9 Funkista
- 10 Hip Hop
- 11 Indígena
- 12 Mineiro

- 13 Pardo
- 14 Preto
- 15 Protestante
- 16 Punk
- 17 Rock
- 18 Surfista/Skatista
- 19 Rastafari
- 20 Outro

99 Não sei

31. A seguir, você poderá ver uma lista com músicos e grupos musicais internacionais e nacionais. Por favor, responda para cada músico ou grupo musical o quanto você gosta dele, dando a cada um uma nota entre 1 e 5. Se você não conhece não precisa dar nota.

Notas:

Em Branco = Eu não sei quem é.

1 = Ele/ela é horrível!

2 = Eu não gosto muito.

3 = Indiferente.

4 = Eu gosto dele(a).

5 = Eu adoro, é muito legal!

Artistas/Bandas	Nota	Artistas/Bandas	Nota
2 Pac		John Legend	
50 Cent		Jorge e Mateus	
Akon		Jota Quest	
Amy Winehouse		Justin Timberlake	
Ana Carolina		Kelly Clarkson	
Beyonce		Linkin Park	
Black Eyed Peas		Marcelo D2	
Britney Spears		Metallica	
Caetano Veloso		My Chemical Romance	
Capital Inicial		Nação Zumbi	
César Menotti e Fabiano		Ne-Yo	
Chiclete com Banana		NX Zero	
Chris Brown		O Rappa	
Claudia Leitte		Racionais MC's	
DJ Marlboro		Rappin' Hood	
Edson e Hudson		Rihanna	
Eminem		Seu Jorge	
Evanescence		Skank	
Exaltasamba		The Beatles	
Fresno		Timbaland	
Green Day		Tom Jobim	

32. Agora, você irá classificar programas de tv (novelas e programas de auditório) usando o mesmo sistema da questão anterior. Se você não conhece um determinado programa, não precisa responder.

Notas:

Em Branco = Eu não sei quem é.

1 = Ele/ela é horrível!

2 = Eu não gosto muito.

3 = Indiferente.

4 = Eu gosto dele(a).

5 = Eu adoro, é muito legal!

Programa	Nota	Programa	Nota
A Grande Família		Grey's Anatomy	
A Lei e O Crime		Hannah Montana	
As Visões da Raven		Malhação	
Betty Feia		Maysa	
Caminho das Índias		Ó paí ó	
Capitu		Os Simpsons	
Caras e Bocas		Paraíso	
Chamas da Vida		Prison Break	
CSI		Revelação	
Dicas de um Sedutor		Senhora do Destino	
Dr. Hollywood		Toma Lá Dá Cá	
Dr. House		Três Irmãs	
Eu, a Patroa e as Crianças		Um Maluco no Pedaco	

33. Quando lhe perguntam a sua raça, o quê você responde?

34. Quando você se classificou na pergunta anterior, o que – desta seguinte lista – você levou em consideração em primeiro lugar?

- 1 Características físicas (cor da pele, cabelo, etc.)
- 2 Sua família (pais, avós)
- 3 Cultura
- 4 A forma como as pessoas o vêem
- 5 Recuso a definir-me racialmente
- 6 Você pensou em outra coisa:

35. Usando agora as opções nesta lista, você diria que é (por favor marque apenas uma):

- 1 Branco(a)
- 2 Preto(a)
- 3 Pardo(a)
- 4 Amarelo(a)
- 5 Indígena(a)
- 6 Recuso a definir-me racialmente
- 99 Não sei

36. Quando falamos em raça ou na cor das pessoas é importante saber como as outras pessoas nos vêem. Desta lista, em qual raça ou cor as outras pessoas lhe classificam (vêem)?

- 1 Branco(a)
- 2 Preto(a)
- 3 Pardo(a)
- 4 Amarelo(a)
- 5 Indígena(a)
- 6 Recuso a definir-me racialmente
- 99 Não sei

37. Na sua opinião, o quê mais te influencia na forma como você se classifica e classifica os outros racialmente?

- 1 Minha família
- 2 Meus amigos
- 3 Música
- 4 Televisão/Rádio
- 5 A mídia
- 6 Os Políticos
- 7 Escola
- 8 Religião
- 9 Esporte
- 10 Não penso sobre mim ou outros em termos raciais.
- 99 Não sei

38. Você acha que a maioria das pessoas no Brasil ligariam ou não ligariam se um de seus parentes próximos (irmãos, filhos) casasse com alguém de outra raça?

- 1 A maioria das pessoas ligaria muito
- 2 A maioria das pessoas ligaria um pouco
- 3 A maioria das pessoas não ligaria
- 99 Não sei

39. O que você pensaria se um de seus parentes próximos (irmãos, irmãs) se casasse com uma pessoa negra?

- 1 Eu ligaria muito
- 2 Eu ligaria um pouco
- 3 Eu não ligaria
- 99 Não sei

40. O que você pensaria se um de seus parentes próximos (irmãos, irmãs) se casasse com uma pessoa parda?

- 1 Eu ligaria muito
- 2 Eu ligaria um pouco
- 3 Eu não ligaria
- 99 Não sei

41. O que você pensaria se um de seus parentes próximos (irmãos, irmãs) se casasse com uma pessoa branca?

- 1 Eu ligaria muito
- 2 Eu ligaria um pouco
- 3 Eu não ligaria
- 99 Não sei

42. O que você pensa de namorar uma pessoa negra?

- 1 Eu ligaria muito
- 2 Eu ligaria um pouco
- 3 Eu não ligaria
- 99 Não sei

43. O que você pensa de namorar uma pessoa parda?

- 1 Eu ligaria muito
- 2 Eu ligaria um pouco
- 3 Eu não ligaria
- 99 Não sei

44. O que você pensa de namorar uma pessoa branca?

- 1 Eu ligaria muito
- 2 Eu ligaria um pouco
- 3 Eu não ligaria
- 99 Não sei

45. Se você pudesse escolher, você preferiria morar em um bairro com pessoas somente da sua raça, ou em um bairro com pessoas de várias raças?

- 1 Somente da minha raça
- 2 Um bairro com pessoas de várias raças
- 99 Não sei

Abaixo está uma lista com uma série de afirmações que outras pessoas fazem. Por favor, indique se você concorda totalmente, concorda em parte, discorda em parte, discorda totalmente ou nem concorda e nem discorda com cada uma das afirmações.

	1 Concorda totalmente	2 Concorda	3 Nem concorda e nem discorda	4 Discorda	5 Discorda totalmente	99 Não sei
46. A discriminação racial não existe no Brasil.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
47. O acesso ao ensino superior deve basear-se apenas sobre os resultados do vestibular e não quotas raciais.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
48. O acesso ao emprego deve basear-se apenas nas competências e não em quotas raciais.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
49. Brancos no Brasil são mais ricos do que negros devido as injustiças históricas.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
50. Com a mesma educação e as mesmas oportunidades os negros são tão competentes como brancos.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
51. Se não fosse pelos brancos Brasil não seria tão desenvolvido como é hoje.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
52. Se não fosse pelos pretos Brasil não seria tão desenvolvido como é hoje.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
53. Eu sinto que as pessoas do meu grupo racial estão sendo discriminados.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
54. No Brasil não falamos o suficiente sobre questões raciais.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

55. Qual é a sua religião ou culto?

- 1 Catolicismo
- 2 Evangélico
- 3 Espiritismo
- 4 Afro-brasileira
(Candomblé, Umbanda,...)
- 5 Outra
- 6 Nenhuma

56. Para além das ocasiões especiais como casamentos, funerais, batizados e assim por diante, quantas vezes você assiste reuniões ou cultos de sua religião?

- 1 Uma vez por semana (ou mais)
- 2 2 ou 3 vezes por mes
- 3 Uma vez por mes
- 4 Alguns vezes por anno
- 5 Com menos freqüência
- 6 Nunca
- 99 Não sei

57. Algumas pessoas se sentem muito religiosas, mesmo que não freqüentem a igreja. Outras pessoas dizem que suas crenças religiosas não são importantes para eles. Quão importante suas crenças religiosas são para você?

- 1 Muito importantes
- 2 Mais ou menos importantes
- 3 Nem importantes nem irrelevantes
- 4 Pouco importantes
- 5 Não tenho crenças religiosas
- 99 Não sei