A STUDY IN CHRISTIANITY, MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LIBERATION THEOLOGY OF JOSÉ MIGUEZ BONINO

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This study examines the seminal thought of a leading Protestant exponent of Latin American liberation theology, José Miguéz Bonino. It shows that, by a dialectical use of Marxist theory he is able to rediscover a basic and essential Christian understanding of history which requires that Christians be actively engaged in its shaping. Miguez Bonino's choice of the biblical category of the Kingdom of God is examined and is seen to constitute a departure from and an improvement on the conventional model of the Exodus used by most liberation theologians.

The Marxist critique of idealism in traditional theology is accepted and serves as a starting point for a revised Christian interpretation of history. The unity of history is traced as originating in the prophetic teaching which linked political happenings with divine sovereignty. The crucial rediscovery of apocalyptic in contemporary European political theology is seen as an important step in the direction taken by Miguez Bonino as is the theological reflection on "thinking in two spheres" by Dietrich Bonhoeffer.

The use which Miguez Bonino makes of the concept of the Kingdom of God to emphasize the eschatological significance of human historical action is also outlined. The Marxist emphasis on human responsibility for historical initiative is taken as the point from which to expound an understanding of the Kingdom of God in which the account of the tension between the present age and the future age in apocalyptic is important as is the contrast between continuity and discontinuity in the Pauline concepts of "body", "Resurrection" and "works". Again, Miguez Bonino's indebtedness to Bonhoeffer, this time in his polarity of the ultimate and penultimate is acknowledged.

Miguez Bonino's distinctive exposition of the Kingdom as a call to effective action to articulate Christian love is also examined and compared with other models. Political engagement is seen to require
mediations in the form of social analysis, theological interpretation and ideology. Sacralization and fanaticism are avoided by the application of ethical criteria and the submission of the mediations to divine judgement. In this regard Míguez Bonino's preference for Marxism is scrutinized and an alternative suggested.
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to set out the results of an examination of three themes around which José Miguez Bonino builds the main structure of his liberation theology. It is therefore essentially thematic in its treatment.

It is the opinion of the writer that Miguez Bonino's attempt to develop a theology of historical engagement represents a significant contribution to the contemporary theological debate, and that the crux of his theological thought is to be found in his understanding of the category of the Kingdom of God as he reinterprets it by means of a dialectical use of Marxist theory.

This basic starting point leads him to explore the question of idealism and the dualistic nature of reality to which idealism gives rise. The Marxist critique of religion takes issue with traditional (Augustinian) theology at this point. Miguez Bonino accepts the Marxist criticism and his discussion of the unity of history provides us with our first major exploration with his thinking. Because his style is so concise and he expresses himself in almost summary fashion, much of our study takes the form of an elucidation or expansion of Miguez Bonino's thought.

In our treatment of this first major theme therefore we find it necessary, for example, to delve into the Augustinian and Platonic roots of much western theology and to trace its development through Luther and Calvin.

A second methodological procedure we have adopted alongside this thematic treatment is to explore the work of other theologians for comparative purposes. This we feel enables us to highlight the significance of Miguez Bonino's distinctive contribution to the debate and also furnishes us with insights into the points of departure he makes when he concurs with the work of other theologians as well as the improvements or points of
difference when he takes issue with them. Consequently our examination in this first theme leads us, for example, to compare the usage of apocalyptic by Panenberg and of eschatology by Moltmann with Miguez Bonino's reflections. We also take note of the contrasting emphasis of Bultmann in his existentialist interpretation of history and this throws into bold relief the point which the political theologians of Europe as well as the liberation theologians are making.

Our project necessarily involves a description and analysis of the Marxist interpretation of history at the points where Miguez Bonino engages in dialogue with it. Here again we find it useful to compare the thought of Ernst Bloch with that of the theologians who have discovered in his philosophy points of convergence and divergence both with orthodox Marxism and with biblical faith.

A further step in this comparative style of proceedings is taken when we examine the way in which Miguez Bonino uses the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer upon whom, as we shall see, he relies very heavily, if indirectly.

The thesis then, sets out to elucidate and explain the seminal thought of a theologian whose own style is so succinct as to appear almost disjointed in places. At times we may even be seen to take the debate further than does Miguez Bonino. However in addition to being expository, thematic and comparative in method an attempt is also made to evaluate critically the selected themes which Miguez Bonino outlines. These methodological features are repeated throughout the study and, having acquainted the reader with the signposts he may expect to find, we do not consider it necessary to elaborate further at this point on the way in which they have been used through the second and third themes (which deal with historical engagement and ideological mediations respectively).

However, the reader may well be wondering at this point why, of all the available expositions of liberation theology, the present writer should
have chosen a short section from the work of Jose Miguez Bonino as the subject for this study. One reason is that we consider Miguez Bonino's theology generally to represent a way of dealing creatively with the challenge which Marxism presents to theology today and the selected passage constitutes a particularly significant attempt on his part to address the crucial question of historical engagement as it has emerged in Christian theology and Marxist theory. In this respect Miguez Bonino shares in the liberation theology project with other Latin American scholars who are working in situation which bears some resemblance to the South African context. Recently attempts have been made to relate Marxist type analyses of the Southern African situation to the task of theology in this part of the world, (1) and this development highlights the importance of liberation theology for Southern Africa. Miguez Bonino adopts a dialectical approach to Marxism and consequently comes to the conclusion that - as with the Marxist view of the role of philosophy - the task of theology is "not merely to interpret the world but to change it". It is important therefore that any attempt to do theology in Southern Africa has to take note of the efforts of theologians in similar situations in other parts of the world.

Then secondly, in Miguez Bonino's interpretation primacy of place is given to the kingdom of God. By adopting this central biblical category he represents something of a departure from the majority of Latin American liberation theologians.

A recent critical evaluation of some of these theologians by J.A.Kirk (2) has shown that liberation theology seems to regard the Exodus as a "privileged text". Kirk has demonstrated that this approach leads to a distortion of the biblical view of man. He concludes that a greater emphasis on the finality of Christ - derived from the centrality of the Kingdom as the hermeneutical key which the Bible itself prefers - would
lead to a liberation theology with a more comprehensive concept of liberation. We believe that Miguez Bonino makes good this deficiency in the passage we have chosen to study.

In the third place we take issues raised in Miguez Bonino's theology to explore because he is one of the leading Protestant thinkers in the Latin American liberation theology movement. He believes he has a distinctive contribution to make from this Protestant perspective and it is our contention that he is justified in this claim.

It is also of some interest that Miguez Bonino is a president of the World Council of Churches and it would appear that the standpoint he has articulated has influenced contemporary ecumenical theology and policy.

Furthermore Miguez Bonino is a Methodist, and since the present writer belongs to that communion he feels a certain sympathy towards the writing of a person from his own ecclesiastical family. There is perhaps more significance in Miguez Bonino's denominational allegiance than might appear at first. In the Republic of South Africa Methodism is one of the largest Christian denominations and it may well therefore be expected to produce theologians who will look to Miguez Bonino as a pioneer thinker for guidance and orientation. His handling of the crucial theme of historical engagement in terms of the political involvement required by the Kingdom could well therefore exercise a growing influence on those who seek to do theology in this sub-continent.

This leads us to a further consideration. The church-state tension which has existed in the Republic of South Africa for some years has resulted in a growing importance and significance being given to contextual
theology. In other words the writer sees a great need for serious theological reflection on the historical situation in which he lives. Such reflection appears to have advanced more rapidly in Latin America than it has here and the seminal thought of a leading theologian from that continent may well provide prophetic insights which are so necessary in this context since it has both similarities with and differences from the Latin American scene. Except in the brief postscript, however, we confine our attention to Miguez Bonino's exposition in the hope that other students and theologians will develop the relevant themes in relation to the Southern African context in the future.

The quintessence of Miguez Bonino's attempt to formulate a theology of historical engagement is found in the seventh chapter of his book Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation. Here, under the heading "Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engagement" (3) he sets down the three themes which have been selected as the subject of this study. We believe that this passage constitutes the focal point for his exposition of liberation theology, a contention which is further substantiated by the fact that this chapter, in a revised and somewhat expanded form was selected for publication in the composite volume Frontiers of Theology in Latin America. Its title here is "Historical Praxis and Christian Identity" (4) and in the course of our present project we will have frequent occasion to refer to this version of Miguez Bonino's presentation.

Our objective then, is to demonstrate that in the category of the Kingdom of God as he interprets it in the above section Miguez Bonino has found a biblical theme within which to work out an acceptable theology of historical engagement. By using Marxist analysis as a hermeneutical
tool he has re-interpreted the Kingdom of God in a way which maintains both the Christian identity of liberation theology and the contemporary relevance of the message of the Kingdom. Put in another way, by using this thematic centre Miguez Bonino has been able to develop the basis for a liberation theology which, without surrendering the tension between them, holds together creatively the priority of divine initiative on the one hand and human engagement on the other.

Furthermore the re-interpretation of the Kingdom theme enables him to meet the Marxist criticism of religion at three important points. In the first of these, the question of historical dualism, Miguez Bonino claims that a distinctively Christian view that history is one is better maintained by understanding that God opens history to the future and involves himself with man in a polemical and dynamic engagement and interaction. An examination of this claim forms the basis of our second chapter.

Then secondly where Marxism alleges that Christianity only offers a significant future after death and therefore minimizes present human suffering which leads to despair and resignation Miguez Bonino asserts that because the Christian concept of the future envisages a consummation in the Kingdom it underlines the significance of present deeds which are integral to that Kingdom since it has already begun. Our third chapter develops this theme.

In our fourth chapter we set out Miguez Bonino’s response to the Marxist claim that Christianity is ideologically bound to capitalism and thereby supports the oppression and exploitation of the poor by the rich. He counters this with ethical criteria derived from the teaching of Christ.
about the Kingdom by which to evaluate any given praxis, and delineating the difference between the absoluteness of the final Kingdom and the relativity of the present human endeavour which seeks to set up signposts pointing to that Kingdom in the form of ideological and political mediations.

Our final chapter seeks to evaluate some of the main issues raised by Miguez Bonino in the chapter under review and concludes with some indications of the directions in which a theology of historical engagement would need to go.

A short postscript will suggest some very tentative ways in which this theology of engagement could relate for a background to "doing theology" in the crisis of Southern Africa today. The contemporary liberation struggle here certainly has its counterpart in the field of theological reflection. Before embarking on the main themes of our study, however, it is necessary to sketch some of the background to Miguez Bonino's theology and his dialectical response to Marxism. We turn, then, in our first chapter to this more general picture of Miguez Bonino and his role in the liberation theology enterprise.
CHAPTER ONE

MIGUEZ BONINO AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY

The contemporary movement amongst liberation theologians in Latin America to create a theology from within their socioeconomic situation of oppression and exploitation represents one of the major trends in present-day theological debate. Indeed, so radically different are its presuppositions, categories and methodology, that any student familiar with traditional theological thought is immediately struck by these dissimilarities.

The Latin Americans have deliberately and self-consciously chosen their path of divergence. Although most, if not all, of them are familiar with the work of the major Catholic and Protestant theologians of Europe and North America they have put their efforts into a theological enterprise which is distinctly new and different. Because of this, they are in the process of creating a theology which promises to become the first major theological development of the Christian era to emanate from outside the traditional home of theology in Western Europe or North America.

Liberation theology is essentially a response to and reflection on a human historical situation which is very different from that pertaining on either side of the North Atlantic. It purports to be a theology "from below" by which it means from the point of view of the poor and exploited masses as a group or class. The questions it sets out to answer therefore are posed not so much by people who are finding it difficult to believe but by those who are finding it difficult to accept that their lot must be forever to provide others with wealth whilst they themselves live in
squalor and poverty. This difference has been well described by Gutierrez when he said:

"A goodly part of contemporary theology seems to take its start from the challenge posed by the nonbeliever. The nonbeliever calls into question our religious world, demanding its thoroughgoing purification and revitalization. Bonhoeffer accepted that challenge and incisively formulated the question that underlies much contemporary theological effort: How are we to proclaim God in a world come of age? In a continent like Latin America, however, the main challenge does not come from the nonbeliever but from the nonhuman - i.e. the human being who is not recognized as such by the prevailing social order." (1)

In this chapter we try, firstly, to sketch very briefly the main features of this Latin American context out of which liberation theology arises and the consequent rationale for its methodology.

In the second section we will outline the way in which Miguez Bonino himself conceives his theological task before going on to a brief summary of the chapter from his work which we have selected as the focal point for this study.

In a situation where the burning questions are being formulated in relation to the economic dynamics at play rather than the rationality of belief the leaven in the lump comes from the Marxist interpretation of society. Our fourth section seeks to spell out the way in which Miguez Bonino responds to this Marxist challenge. This will give us a broad perspective from which, in the subsequent chapters, we will move on to explore the main issues which Miguez Bonino's theology raises.

1. THEOLOGY AS REFLECTION ON PRAXIS

The concern of liberation theologians is to establish a different purpose and object for their theology. Their aim was described succinctly by
Hebblethwait~ when he said that for the theologians of liberation, "Theology is not just something that goes on in the head. It is not a theology about liberation; it is a theology for liberation." (2) It arises therefore not so much over the coffee cups in university seminar rooms but rather in the slums and back streets of the sprawling cities of Latin America. Here a growing number of Christians have become involved in the struggle for political liberation. These Christians, writes Miguez Bonino have "interpreted their Christian obedience in terms of a whole-hearted and passionate participation in a socio-political-cultural process which we call 'the struggle for liberation'." (3)

The struggle arises from the conditions of poverty, disease, illiteracy, exploitation, social and educational discrimination and political oppression which prevail in varying degrees in different parts of Latin America. (4) According to Miguez Bonino (who is clearly indebted to Marxist analysis) this state of affairs has been brought about by its historical development since the era of Spanish colonial rule when the semifeudal form of society that pertained in Spain was extended to Latin America. The pattern ensured that the vast proportion of fertile land was owned by a small elite of rich families. It also led, inevitably, to a situation where the vast majority of the population were and remain excluded from property ownership. The result was the creation of a two-class society of lords and servants with the addition in more recent times of a dependent middle-class generated by modernization. (5)

In the nineteenth century Latin America went through a neo-colonial phase, when, under the influence of Western industrial expansion it became involved in supplying raw materials for the markets of Western Europe and North America. The influence of the Protestant liberal outlook was wel-
comed as a concomitant component of this economic development, and it also served as a stimulus to the urge for emancipation from Spanish domination. In this shift from Spanish political control to economic interaction, Latin American countries became economically dependent on the nations of the West. The needs and preferences of the new economic partners (or masters) determined the development and modernization of Latin America. (6)

As a further consequence Míguez Bonino argues, "democracy" became a hoax for the majority of the peasant and Indian workers who were "simply incorporated as cheap labor for production. Their condition was, if anything worse than it had been before under a sometimes more or less lenient paternalistic system. A free press, free trade, education, politics - all the 'achievements' of liberalism - were the privilege of the elite. For the growing Latin American masses, undernourishment, slavery, illiteracy, and later on forced migration, unemployment, exploitation, crowding, and finally repression when they claim their rights - these are the harvest of one century of 'liberal democracy'" (7)

The conclusion to which the liberation theologians have come is that Latin American underdevelopment is the inevitable corollary of the industrial and economic expansion of North America and Western Europe. Indeed, development and underdevelopment are now seen as inadequate categories for describing the Latin American reality. (8) The preference is for the terms "domination" and "dependence". (9)

The failure of development programmes has added further to the sense of frustration experienced by Latin Americans. Being under United Nations leadership in the nineteen fifties, these programmes were based on the belief that third world countries could solve their problems by means of accumulating capital and utilizing technology and planning. In fact the differences between the "have" countries and the "have-nots" only
increased and with serious results. As Miguez Bonino describes it:

"Social unrest is rampant on the continent, and populist regimes have been replaced, with the aid and support of the U.S.A. by military, repressive governments which can guarantee the stable conditions required by foreign investment." (10)

The relationship of dependence and domination is exacerbated by the manipulation of military and political power on the part of the North Atlantic countries in the pursuit of their economic interests. The total process is seen as due not so much to the wickedness or evil intent by the more powerful nations but rather as "the normal and unavoidable consequences of the basic principles of capitalist production as they work themselves out in our global, technological time". (11) This system demands by its very nature, increasing profits, the concentration of economic power and the need to discover cheaper labour in order to reduce costs. What has happened is that as the work force of the powerful nations has enhanced its own bargaining power and thus developed its political and economic muscle, the continued growth of these countries has been made possible by the discovery and use of the much cheaper labour force available in the third world.

This whole historical development has had its counterpart in the religious consciousness of Latin America. (12) The colonial age was dominated by traditional Roman Catholicism and the indigenous folk-religion which grew up under its influence. Using popular motifs which were predominantly magical and mythical its objective was to enable its followers to cope with natural events and historical occurrences. These were interpreted as the outworking of such supernatural forces as saints, God, demons and spirits. Religious activities such as prayers, pilgrimages and rituals were the praxis appropriate to this understanding. The new shift in emphasis under the impact of the neocolonial age with its religious counterpart in Protestantism saw an updating within Catholicism. The
new consciousness centred on individual subjectivity and personal relations, with a strong emphasis on moral considerations. It aimed to offer the individual personal integration as well as inner harmony and peace. (13)

In the most recent history of Latin America, the disillisionment following the failure of developmentalism to "produce the goods" has led to the search for liberation. Boldly adopting a Marxist social analysis the proponents of liberation have perceived that

"Only a radical break from the status quo, that is, a profound transformation of the private property system, access to power of the exploited class, and a social revolution that would break this dependence would allow for the change to a new society, a socialist society - or at least allow that such a society might be possible." (14)

The values and attitudes of capitalist society are, moreover, seen to be creating a culture characterized by artificiality, the drive to success accompanied by a dehumanizing effect on those pursuing it, economic wealth as the yardstick of success "and the resignation of responsibility for the world and one's neighbour" (15). The effect of this latter characteristic is that it dulls the sensitivity and awareness of the people concerned to their own condition of exploitation and dependence. It furthermore drains away any sense of need to affirm their authenticity as self-respecting masters of their own fate. Indeed, "it destroys the very core of their humanity: the decision to stand up and become agents of their own history, the will to conceive and realize an authentic historical project." (16) This has given rise, however, to a new consciousness in which men are dissatisfied with their situation of dependence and passivity. They are no longer prepared to accept a condition in which they are reduced to merely responding to the needs and historical acts of others.
This reaction has been manifest in three directions. The first has been the disillusionment of the petit-bourgeoisie of the towns following the failure of economic "progress" to provide them with the consumer products of the modern age. The second has been the developing conflict of interests between the local middle and small industry which is non-monopolistic on the one hand and the large monopolies on the other. The third component has been the rising sense of anger at the injustices of the system growing in the minds of the younger professionals, students and academics, to which we have referred earlier. Together these constitute an incipient revolutionary consciousness which has been taking shape in the struggle for liberation.

According to liberation theology the proper Christian response to this consciousness is to challenge both the colonial and neo-colonial interpretations of religion. It has to affirm that

"life is not any more lived in the dichotomy of a natural and a supernatural world; historical facts can and must be modified through historical action. Individual and interpersonal conditions and relations are shaped and find significance in a polis, a total, organized and intentional social formation. A meaningful Christian faith, therefore, has to be mediated through historical and political participation." (17)

Liberation theology has arisen as the rational reflection on this political engagement. Basic to its methodology is the awareness that historical praxis precedes the reflective process which relates the Christian faith to concrete political action. The perspective, therefore, for theological reflection is this historical engagement on the part of Latin American Christians in response to the suffering and oppression of the poor. In what has now become a well-known passage, Gutierrez has described this process:

"The point of departure of our theological reflection is the process of liberation in Latin America. More concretely, it is the engagement in this process which
Latin Americans are assuming. Even more precisely: it is the engagement of Christians in the process of liberation. This I would call the major fact of life of the Latin American Church in recent times." (18)

The development of Christian awareness to this point in Latin America followed by a process of searching for an authentic Christian response to the appalling socio-economic conditions prevailing in the continent. It began with a vague and generalized concern with social issues which led on to active engagement in works of social service. From the experiences, insights and frustrations derived from social activity there developed the awareness that structural factors were conditioning the social forces at work in the situation. There followed the realization that the political realm was the primary determining structure and that socio-political analysis was a necessary prerequisite for any theological reflection which sought to come to grips with the complex socio-economic and political situation. (19)

2. MIGUEZ BONINO’S THEOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE

Miguez Bonino has indicated how he became involved in this theological enterprise. In 1971 he was invited to speak on "New Theological Perspectives" at an ecumenical conference in Peru. (20) In presenting this paper he crystallized for himself the basic lines of the new theology and posed some critical questions of his own. The reaction from some foreign theologians was quite strongly critical. They found the "new positioning of theology" involved in formulating the theology of liberation to be unacceptable. But Miguez Bonino confesses to having found himself unable to do theology from any other perspective. (21) He states his basic convictions in regard to this stance in three propositions.
A. "There is no direct route from divine revelation to theology; the mediation of some praxis is inevitable." (22) This cuts right across the traditional "idealistic" methodology of theology. Any theology which purports to work out its formulations first and to prescribe action arising from those theoretical positions is thus disqualified. In this way "it marks the end of any theology that claims to be self-nurturing and self-sufficient or to operate in some autonomous sphere detached from historical praxis." (23) This assertion can be seen to have implications in that (a) on the epistemological level it utilizes the sociology of knowledge; (b) on the historical level it draws attention to the relationship between the church or the individual Christian and the processes of theoretical thought that are taking place in the Christian community; and (c) with regard to biblical theology it explores such important issues as the relationship between faith and obedience and also between truth and knowledge. In a further elaboration of this insight Miguez Bonino declares:

"Latin American theology of liberation is beginning to emerge (as all theology?) after the fact, as the reflection about facts and experiences which have already evoked a response from Christians. This response, undertaken as Christian obedience, is not the mere result of theological deduction, or of political theory. It is a total, synthetic act, many times going far beyond what one can at the moment justify theologically. Then, as one is called to explain, to understand the full meaning or to invite other Christians to follow the same path, a theology is slowly born". (24)

Stated in other terms, "theology is properly the critique of the praxis of the life of the believing community." (25)

B. "The area that defines this praxis, and hence the critical plane on which reflection is projected, is the socio-political one." (26)

The church has traditionally concentrated on relating the biblical witness to the individual and spiritual realm to the exclusion of the corporate and public. However the political sphere is the one in which
people assume responsibility in shaping the world and directing history. Again there are three consequences which follow:

(a) Theology works within the political realm and is conditioned by the conflicts and ethos of that realm. This involves an admission and a critical examination by the theologian of his own "bias" or presuppositions. It also involves an evaluation of theological formulations according to the ideological background of the theologian, and an admission of suspicion on this count. "Very correctly, we cannot receive the theological interpretation coming from the rich world without suspecting it and, therefore, asking what kind of praxis it supports, reflects or legitimizes." (27) As we shall see, Miguez Bonino gave expression to such a suspicion in his treatment of Moltmann's political theology. (28)

(b) Theological reflection utilizes socio-political tools and categories in its operation. It recognizes that the political sphere involves structures, ideologies and power and these are analyzed and studied in particular by the social sciences. Indeed it is the evolution of these sciences that has given impetus to the liberation theology movement by discovering categories previously closed to theological thought. The voice of the social sciences is thus the first and preliminary theological word of liberation theology. But whilst it accepts the validity of these sciences as theological data it only accepts them critically and dialectically. They provide theology with a more complete and critical view of history together with a set of analytical and diagnostic instruments which uncover hidden dynamics and structural processes. They also describe how systems work and relate to each others. (29)

The liberation theologians are by no means unaware of the debate over the impartiality of science. Their choice of Marxism as a rational analysis of the politico-economic functioning of society arises from their conten-
tion that if it provides an accurate and functional description of the contemporary Latin American reality then it is a useful tool for a Christian since he is committed to a life of "efficacious love" (Miguez Bonino). In order to understand the dynamics that are the causes of oppression and suffering he must use the most effective analysis available.

(c) We have to discard the notion that theology can opt out of the task of reflecting on political responsibility and be nontemporal. It has at the same time to make some concrete commitment. In the Latin American situation it chooses the struggle for liberation. The reason for this is made clear in the chapters that follow in this study. (30)

C. "Starting from this basic outlook, we must critically reread and repossess biblical and theological tradition and also the Christian community to which we belong". (31) The perspective arrived at after opting for a definition of theology as reflection upon praxis, and after delineating the socio-political realm as the sphere of that praxis, is a vantage-point from which to re-interpret the scriptures and re-evaluate previous theological positions. Three tasks suggest themselves. (a) The examination of scripture and theological thought becomes an ongoing task. The socio-political standpoint and the history-creating engagement provide new hermeneutical insights which continually need to be applied in this reflection. Such a project will use the diagnostic criteria thus discovered, and uncover the hidden ideological presuppositions of the participants in the debate. (32) (b) This will also bring to light the emphasis on liberation in both the Bible and theology and will thus open up new interpretive possibilities for the current liberation project. (c) A new study of Latin American religious history needs to be undertaken making use of these perspectives "in order
to find the root causes of the factors which both impede and encourage the dynamics of liberation that are operative in present day Christianity." (33)

3. "KINGDOM OF GOD, UTOPIA AND HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT"

Miguez Bonino outlines the task he sets for himself when he declares:

"the issue is how we are to understand the active and dynamic presence of God's kingdom in our history so that we can adapt our witness and activity to it, particularly at this concrete moment in world history when we must profess our faith and serve the Lord in Latin America." (34)

Here he immediately focusses the thrust of his theological reflection on the Kingdom of God in relation to the Latin American historical context.

In preparation for our detailed examination and critique of the three major sections of this chapter we will now take a preliminary look at Miguez Bonino's exposition.

In the introductory paragraphs to the chapter he notes the claim made by Engels that Christianity began with a socialist ethos but, because of its religious origins, lost its way in other-worldliness. The need for historical engagement contained in the eschatological hope of the Kingdom gave way to a "spiritualized and individualistic hope for immortal, celestial life." (34) The presupposition on which this hope was based was the dualistic belief in two worlds. The earthly life of the believer was seen as merely a preparation for the "heavenly" life, and human community existence was an incidental structure necessary to provide the ways and means of achieving this. This focus on a personal afterlife in Christianity led to the passive acceptance of and resignation to the contemporary historical and political conditions however unjust or inhuman these might have been. This attitude was in sharp contrast to the Marxist approach which came to emphasize the need to change those human structures
which prevented human liberation in history.

Miguez Bonino asserts that such accommodation to circumstances is not an essential consequence of the gospel and proceeds, in three important steps, to map out a theological route which leads away from resignation towards creative historical engagement.

The first of these (which we look at in our next chapter) is the rejection of dualism, or the idea of two histories, one sacred and the other secular or profane. In the Old Testament God's action and man's combine to create history. God's sovereignty is not coterminous with history, but it acts and reacts polemically with man's co-operative will and also his stubbornness. Here history "is precisely, this conflict between God and his people in the midst and in relation to all peoples." (36)

Miguez Bonino points out two further factors in this regard. The one is that prophetic interpretation is part of God's call and invitation rather than a commentary on it. The second is that this single historical thread is political in character. God is conflictively and assertively involved in the total life of the individual and the community and consequently he is busy "erecting the signs and the road of his coming final victory, His kingdom." (37)

Miguez Bonino believes that the change in climate which appears in the transition from the Old to the New Testament derives from the problems which the Gentile Christians had (and have) of relating their faith (which is grounded in the historical events recorded in the Bible) to their own national historical traditions. A duality of histories is thus involved and whilst we Gentiles can perceive God's saving action at work in Israel's history and in Jesus Christ it is a much more complex and difficult act of faith to see this activity in our own community life. Historically a
distinct dualism appears with Augustine who identifies the Kingdom of God with the history of faith and relegates the secular history to "a general episodic framework devoid of eschatological significance: a mere stage".

(38) Miguez Bonino rejects this dualistic line and affirms the eschatological significance of general human history and goes on to cite Gutierrez, Moltmann and Metz as contemporary examples of "monist" responses which assert the cruciality of historical action. His formula is that God acts and calls within the whole of history and man responds in the secular structures, his faith providing the motivation.

In the second step (which we shall examine at greater length in our third chapter) Miguez Bonino deals with the problem of having to maintain a Christian identity while seeing the Kingdom of God in general history as a whole. European theologians generally refrain from ascribing any causal connection between socio-political action and the Kingdom of God. Miguez Bonino refers to the Pauline concepts of "body" and "resurrection" and shows how these imply a polarity of continuity between the present and the eschatological future. In this tension he discerns a model for the relationship between history and the Kingdom of God. The latter, from this perspective, can be seen to be fulfilling and perfecting general history and eliminating its sin. If the Kingdom moreover, is a call to commitment the question then arises as to how we can most effectively produce the quality of life which has eschatological reality.

The answer to this question (which comprises his third step and our chapter four), lies in historical mediations, by which he means making a choice for and commitment to a specific political ideology, and utilizing the best socio-political analytical tools that are available. In working out this position he takes issue with Moltmann who, in "The Crucified God had tried to overcome the tension between identity and relevance. Moltmann
had done this by interpreting the cross as God's self-identification with oppressed and destitute man and also as his call to men to identify themselves with him in his identification with Godforsaken man.

Although Moltmann's five "demonic circles of death" - namely poverty, violence, racial and cultural deprivation, pollution and meaninglessness - involve responses of identification which are political in nature, Miguez Bonino contends that he finishes with a "political theology of the cross" whose only role is the critical function of de-sacralization. Miguez Bonino feels that this is insufficient. Theology must not sit on the fence, ideologically speaking, or take refuge in a mere "critical function". He allows that there is a danger of sacralizing a socio-political ideology, but he nevertheless claims that by opting for historical, analytical and ideological mediations a secularization of politics is possible and the danger of sacralization can thus be avoided. In fact, he concludes, the European political theologians have succumbed to the temptation to sacralize the "critical freedom" of their theology and have thus failed to recognize their own captivity to the Western liberal ideology.

He claims, furthermore, that the liberation theologians have recognized these dangers in their open choice of the Marxist analysis and socialist system for Latin America. The Christian faith which kindles imagination can therefore be said to have a "utopian function" in that the eschatological vision provides a stimulus and challenge to seek to establish historically the provisional and temporary signposts of the Kingdom. Because of the eschatological significance of historical action a Christian can engage in the drive to bring in a socio-political order that is more consistent with the Kingdom. The background against which these issues must be set is the dialectical use which Miguez Bonino makes of Marxism. Indeed, behind the whole liberation theology enterprise is the encounter
between Marxist doctrine and Christian theology that has taken place in the post-Stalin era. (39)

4. **MIGUEZ BONINO ON CHRISTIANITY AND MARXISM**

In the context of the Latin American situation the Christian alliance with Marxism has arisen from the painful fact of the prevalence of poverty and the awareness that this has aroused the need for purposeful remedial action. The situation was summed up aptly by Kirk when he said, "Marxism seemed to speak most cogently to the stark economic contrasts and deplorable social conditions encountered by young priests and laymen in their contact with the poor areas of the continent". (40) It also "offered a complete interpretation of the Latin American scene." (41) In addition because of its colonial history, Christianity, in Latin America has become almost the only religion to claim any widespread allegiance with the three hundred million people who constitute its population. In this respect it is unique in the third world. With 90 per cent of Latin America being at least nominally Catholic and with the existence of a small Protestant following in addition, the continent can be described as "Christian". But Christians find it difficult to reconcile their religion with the tragically miserable circumstances in which so many of them live. Hence there is the quest for an alternative to the capitalist economic system.

Similarly it is this same combination of factors which can lead Lawrence Bright to declare that in Latin America "to be a Christian and a Marxist is normal enough". (42) People have turned to revolution in response to the intolerable situation of oppression, and they have done so "without waiting for justification from the Christian gospel or Marxist philosophy". (43) This means that what Miguez Bonino has called the "Christian pilgrim-
age to Marxism" (44) does not begin in an intellectual debate about the structural similarities of Marxism and Christianity or about the philosophical points of contact. It begins in the commitment to a revolutionary project. Whilst the Christian-Marxist dialogue in Europe may have begun "over the coffee-cups" and issued in joint action from there, in Latin America that order is reversed; co-operation in action has come first and dialogue has ensued. This has happened because "the circumstances that condition the situation of individuals, not communist ideology, constitute the true challenge for the church." (45)

(a) The Christian Involvement in a Revolutionary Project.

Miguez Bonino begins his rationale for his espousal of a limited form of Marxism from the fact of this engagement by a significant number of Christians in a revolutionary project. He states with emphasis:

"It is my thesis that, as Christians, confronted by the inhuman conditions of existence prevailing in the continent, they have tried to make their Christian faith historically relevant, they have been increasingly compelled to seek an analysis and historical programme for their Christian obedience. At this point, the dynamics of the historical process, both in its objective conditions and its theoretical development, have led them, through the failure of several remedial and reformist alternatives, to discover the unsubstitutable relevance of Marxism." (46)

The commitment to a revolutionary project in league with Marxists has been brought about by the petit bourgeoisie not as a result of their own experience of poverty and destitution but out of a sense of solidarity with the poor combined with a theoretical understanding of the socio-economic dynamics at work in Latin America. These people had tried to use conventional methods of offering charity and had campaigned for reform. Both of these efforts had proved irrelevant in the fact of the powerful economic structures ranged against them. They concluded that only a structural and political approach would be effective. Furthermore they witnessed the failure of Christian Democratic parties to provide a
"third way" between capitalism and Marxism. Their decision to align themselves with Marxist movements "is therefore an option for structural over against purely individual change, for revolution over against reformism, for social over against capitalist development or 'third' solutions, for 'scientific' over against idealistic or utopian socialism." (47)

The choice for Marxism comes from the desire by these people to make their action historically effective. It stems from their belief that in order to put into effect the command to love they have to base their effort on the best available analysis of suffering and oppression. This they believe is provided in Marxism. Miguez Bonino is at pains to emphasize that "they were not looking primarily for a theoretical answer to philosophical or existential problems" (48) and hence they are free to pick and choose those components of Marxism which are helpful to them in their enterprise.

(b) Marxism as a Hermeneutical Tool

Miguez Bonino however, is clear in his assertion that Marxism can be of assistance to the Christian in more than just his revolutionary stance. "It seems to me", he writes, "that translated to the area of Biblical study, the Marxist insights are a powerful instrument to free interpretation from its idealist presuppositions and captivity." (49) He goes on to show that the Marxist claim that religion serves an ideological function can be applied in the sphere of interpretation. Marx taught that Christianity provides religious sanction to the capitalist bourgeois system, and Miguez Bonino is convinced that the principle of "ideological suspicion" inherent in this teaching is justified. Indeed he sees it as providing a "fundamental critical tool for interpretation." (50) Because all interpretation is carried out within a tradition "We modify, correct, qualify, even reverse 'meanings' which have already been given, traditioned,
almost incorporated into the texts." (51) This is seen in our understanding of what Jesus taught about "riches" and "the rich". In the Protestant tradition we interpret the hard sayings of Jesus about these things in "inner" or "spiritual" ways. We imply that

"riches (in themselves) are good - therefore Jesus could not have condemned them as such - consequently the text must mean something else. This something else must be found in the 'subjective' sphere (i.e. of intention, attitudes, motivations). Once this framework of interpretation is in operation, all texts gather around it in one coherent whole." (52)

An example of this is the way in which many have traditionally spiritualized the Lucan beatitude about the poor.

"The ideological function of such interpretation is evident (however different the intention of the interpreter may have been): you can rest assured in your capitalist accumulation of wealth (or your attempt to reach it); religion (reverence for God) legitimizes and blesses your effort!" (53)

This process can further be seen in the habit of treating historical events such as the crucifixion, Parousia, or mission of Jesus - as if they were individualistic and inward 'existential' moments, experiences or appropriations.

Another way in which Marxist criticism of religion is useful is in the determination of the influence on the biblical texts of the socio-economic matrix in which the writings were born. Marxism has understood religion as the projection of man's misery and protest against it. Man finds a "(substitutionary) satisfaction in the hope of an apocalyptic (and later otherworldly) vindication". (54) Ernst Bloch has perceived the dynamism in that hope and has asserted that the religious and mythical garb in which it is clothed needs to be stripped off. If it is to be realized in history then it must be incorporated into a historic - scientific project. Allowing that there are deficiencies in this Marxist presentation Miguez Bonino is nevertheless convinced that in the field of biblical interpretation it poses "the question as to whether and in which form a
religious outlook which finds expression in texts expresses the socio-economic relations and circumstances of a given society." (55)

This question can be seen to relate in particular to the Old Testament social prophets. Instead of trying to progress to a new order of society they are usually looking back, seeking for a return to some pre-agricultural or even nomadic way of life. The Marxist analysis enables Miguez Bonino to see that their message is precipitated by the crisis of social change. From the simple nomadic order their society progresses to a more differentiated system in which class relationships replace interpersonal and inter-familial ones. "Their prophecy" he writes with insight, "is indeed 'the sigh of the oppressed creatures' alienated in this change and 'the protest' of that creature." (56)

However the significance and importance of the prophets' protest is that it takes the form of a utopian hope for a previous real or imagined harmony. The prophetic message should therefore be interpreted not as a call to a voluntaristic transposition of its demands. No moralizing of the message to make it into an appeal to those in power to repent is sufficient. What is needed in the contemporary historical situation is rather to make heard the prophetic protest against the disruption of human life which is caused by the capitalist system. In addition we need to give expression to the prophetic hope that human life and society will be reintegrated in justice and solidarity.

This type of analysis should be applied, Miguez Bonino believes, to "the 'eschatological reversal' of rich and poor....the thaumaturgic (healing) expectations and performances, (and) the forms of communal solidarity which we find both in the Old and New Testaments." (57) However, the problem then arises as to whether, in the Christian interpretation the power and activity of God have not been eliminated since the
biblical writers locate God in this "mythical" or "utopic" space. On the contrary, claims Miguez Bonino, the biblical witness tends to "histori
imize the space of God's intervention" (58) because "God judges and liberates 'in, with and under' historical, worldly events." (59) Thus, by bringing to light the socio-economic matrix Miguez Bonino believes we can deepen the insights of biblical interpretation.

"Using the terms of the Marxist analysis the Bible is not satisfied with expressing human misery, nor with protesting against it, nor with projecting its overcoming into the otherworldly or subjective realm, it announces, narrates and demands historical events which, at least in principle and initially, overcome in reality this misery." (60)

A further critical tool is provided by the Marxist understanding of the relationship between theory and praxis. Marxism claims that the praxis out of which any theoretical position is evolved and into which it is read has a determinative influence on that theory. Miguez Bonino believes that this holds good in the interpretation of the biblical message. If the word of God is understood as a statement of what God is or does then the subjectivistic inversion of liberal hermeneutics is valid. But he conceives the biblical message itself to be a call which is made in order to elicit certain actions and to create situations. This then means that God is not so much the content of the message but the originator and the motivator of the actions and situations - "the wherefrom and the where
to". (61) It follows that hearing the message means in some way becoming involved in the action and in creating the events and situations.

"By defining the event as 'God's action', the Bible is not withdrawing it from history - even if the ideological framework used is mythical - but in pointing to the divinely wrought and revealed background and power of the human action demanded. This is even so in the New Testament reference to Christ's resurrection: mission, the new life, community active love, are the human historical content of which Christ's resurrection is the ground and power." (62)

This means that in the Christian scheme, hearing the message involves
one in creating the situation called for which is the equivalent of praxis in the Marxist understanding. And this praxis will influence our interpretation of the text (or, in Marxist terms, our theory).

Miguez Bonino goes on to explain that:

"The relation between theory and praxis - to which Marxist thinking has called our attention - is by no means simple. It does not deny that any source of action already incorporates (conscious or unconscious) theoretical presuppositions. It underlines the importance of theoretical thinking which examines the practical course of action in terms of its relevance to the goals of the process and criticizes the theoretical presuppositions in terms of the development of the process. There is, in this respect, a constant relation between theory and praxis." (63)

In Miguez Bonino's understanding this becomes fundamental for the very nature of theology itself. Accepting this view of the relation between interpretation and praxis will demand the utilization of whatever analytical tools are available in order to understand the present praxis, to interpret the texts, and to work out the conditions for a new praxis.

"This is precisely the 'theoretical' work. And this is the only justification of theology...when it fulfils its task!" (64)

Miguez Bonino readily faces the fact that Marxism also has limitations in the field of biblical interpretation. It is limited by its rejection of theism and therefore by its insistence on human action as the ultimate causative power of history. Human creativity - highlighted in Marx by his predilection for Prometheus - is the sole locus and origin of historical engagement. What the Christian perceives as the dynamic and source of his praxis is, for the Marxist, an ultimate alienation. Miguez Bonino claims that the rejection of the idealist interpretation of the scriptures results in a wholesome correction of the distortions arising from the modern liberal subjectivistic interpretation which had reversed the direction of the incarnation. This is because "while God's Word becomes history, idealist interpretation replaces history by words". (65) By utilizing
Marxist critical tools in the interpretation of the Bible, one can furthermore understand God's Word as a dynamic reality and not merely as a static formula. The Bible is a normative witness to the dynamic purpose of God and "has a 'reserve of meaning' which becomes concrete as men read it in obedience within the conditions of their own history." (66) Because the interpreter must also be involved in a process which is the locus of knowledge we can agree with Miguez Bonino when he concludes "Not the mere 'hearer' but only the 'doer' can understand God's Word." (67)

(c) The Concept of Liberation

A further insight used by Miguez Bonino and illuminated by its development in Marxism is the notion of liberation. The Latin American theologians regard this as a basic key for interpreting the message of the Bible today. Marx set out his vision of liberated man in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844.

"Communism as the positive transcendence of private property, as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being - a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man - the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution". (68)

When Marx later evolved his theory to postulate the proletariat as the bearer of liberation he still envisaged that the working class would bring this about for and on behalf of all mankind. Kolakowski claims that "Marx continued throughout his life to regard communism as the liberation of the whole of mankind; the proletariat was to be the conscious instrument of that liberation, as being the class which had suffered the extreme degree of dehumanization." (64)
Miguez Bonino and the liberation theology school have, by their use of this category asserted that it is one of the central themes of the biblical witness and a crucial one for interpretation. In summarizing Gutierrez' treatment of this aspect he notes that although the notion of liberation is not a new one in theological tradition it has, by way of its application in the socio-political field, acquired a new dimension.

"The value of a term such as this is that it makes it possible to understand the aspiration of peoples and social classes, to conceive history as a process and to speak of man's relation to God as one and the same reality, although differentiated in three levels of meaning: socio-political liberation, humanization as a historical process of man's self-realization, and deliverance from sin (fellowship between man and man and man and God). The originality of this theology is not to have discovered these three levels of meaning but to have started from their unity as the fundamental point of departure." (70)

The use of the concept of liberation as a fundamental category for the interpretation of the Bible is seen most especially in the significance which the liberation theologians accord the event of the exodus. This is seen as a paradigm of socio-political liberation and also as a pointer to the unity between the socio-political and the redemptive dimensions of liberation. (71) The weakness of this motif has been demonstrated by Yoder who points out that

"The Exodus is not a revolution. The model of revolution called 'liberation' most currently in our time is for the subject peoples (or more accurately for a minority group acting in their name) to seize sovereignty within the land within which they are oppressed, taking that sovereignty away from a foreign power or from a feudal minority in their own society. This is very strikingly not what the Exodus did." (72)

Miguez Bonino has chosen the Kingdom of God as his central biblical theme and this has several advantages over the Exodus theme. As the main keynote of the teaching of Jesus it is a central New Testament category. It brings
into sharp focus the Christian need to emphasize the priority and initia-
tive of God in the establishment of liberation, and thus harmonizes with the
biblical and Reformed emphasis on the sovereignty of God. It therefore
singles out a motif which highlights the Christian belief in transcendence
as an indispensable component of faith and action and does this without
in any way compromising the need to stress the cruciality of human action
in historical initiative. The category of the Kingdom used by Miguez
Bonino enjoys the further advantage that it is thoroughly eschatological
in its perspective, as we shall see later in chapter three.

As additional models of liberation Miguez Bonino uses the New Testament
images of "body" and "resurrection". In a typical sentence he states
"since Christ has risen and inaugurated a new realm of life, man's exis-
tence in love bears the marks of this new age and will find lasting ful-
filment when this new age will become an unresisted and total realization".
(73) He further makes use of the apocalyptic imagery of eons or ages
in which to work out the historicization of God's liberating activity.

(d) Class Struggle

Yet another feature which Miguez Bonino finds ready to hand in Marxism
is the concept of the class struggle. He claims that this category
of Marxist thought is decisive for the task of theology. Its use by
Christians does not imply a complete and unquestioning acceptance of
Marxism as a world view. Nevertheless it does represent a clear break
from humanist inspiration for social concern and a decisive shift in
favour of a stance involving political engagement "mediated through a
scientific (Marxist) analysis." (74)

The "Christians for Socialism" movement has accepted an orthodox Marxist
analysis which has seen class struggle as a fact to be recognized for
what it is, an instrument of liberation, for the final elimination of oppression and also as an evil that must be overcome. The concept of class as such can therefore be accepted by Christians since it is purely a result of scientific analysis. Miguez Bonino believes that Marx's anthropology which describes man as a worker has its counterpart in the true Biblical understanding of man. The traditional Christian view has been distorted by idealist presuppositions and has thus concentrated on man in philosophical, cultural and religious terms. The true picture should be otherwise. As Miguez Bonino has put it:

"Whether one deals with the creation stories, with the law, or with the prophetic message, there seems to be in the Bible no relation of man to himself, to his neighbour or even to God which is not mediated in terms of man's work. His dignity is located in his mission to subdue and cultivate the world. His worship is related to the fulfilment of a law in which the whole realm of his economic and political activity is taken up...." (75)

However, Marxism sees man in his working role as alienated man. The Christian view agrees but goes beyond this assessment, discerning a deeper and more total alienation than that which arises from the economic conditions pertaining in capitalist society. This is the state the Christian calls sin.

Class, however, is a sociological category and finds its nearest parallel in the Bible with the designation of "the poor". When this refers to those who are weak, destitute and oppressed it constitutes a condition against which the prophetic witness is raised. Miguez Bonino says

"Poverty is not a hazard of fortune or a fact of nature but the result of certain people's greed and injustice. It is intolerable because it contradicts the very purpose of God's mighty act of deliverance - to rescue his people from the slavery of Egypt. It robs man of his humanity as a steward and transformer of the world and therefore it contradicts the mandate of creation. Finally, it breaks solidarity, and consequently it destroys fellowship among men and with God. Poverty in this sense, is a scandalous fact which must be eliminated. God himself is engaged in
Miguel Bonino concurs with Gutierrez in his opinion that Christian poverty involves a stance which, out of love, expresses solidarity with the poor in order to protest against it. However he cautions that it is too simplistic to equate the Marxist proletariat with the Biblical category of the poor. The former is part of the more rigorously scientific analysis which, as part of revolutionary theory, goes much further. In particular it seeks to offer an in-depth analysis of the dynamics, causes, and nature of the proletariat and its role, besides offering a highly organized and well-planned strategy for changing the present conditions. Class struggle as such is viewed by Miguel Bonino as a much deeper and more realistic way of describing the inevitability of conflict in the overcoming of evil and the establishment of a better order. For him class struggle is a fact, and as such it was not discovered by Marx. "Even Calvin", he says, "with keen realism describes the economic and social realms, under the sway of sin, as a battlefield in which greed and self-seeking have destroyed an original community of justice and introduced exploitation, injustice, and disorder..." (77)

Marxist analysis is of value in codifying and systematizing this economic conflict. It teaches that class struggle is to be regarded as a bitter contest motivated by greed and power. It especially describes the present capitalist system as an effort on the part of the rich and powerful to maintain the status quo for their own advantage. Class struggle is, moreover, the determination of the poor to break up the present economic system and to replace it with one in which work will be creative of a more humane condition both for the individual and society. In short it is part of the struggle to achieve liberation by the oppressed. Miguel Bonino, in accepting this description claims that it confronts the Chris-
time with a choice because "a love which intends to be effective in terms of God's Kingdom cannot avoid taking sides." (78) In defending the need for a revolution which might involve force and violence Miguez Bonino points out that since man is involved in the ongoing struggle of creation - and creation always involves some exertion of violence on things as they are - then the introduction of anything new will inevitably involve the disruption to some degree of the existing order. Indeed "it is possible to conceive history as a dialectic in which the negation through which the new can emerge implies always a certain measure of violence." (79)

It is a false assumption, furthermore to claim that the Christian ethic calls for "reconciliation at any price." The Biblical teaching points to the new age overcoming the old age through struggle. In addition Christ's love for all men as depicted in the Gospels did not mean an easy-going tolerance, nor an acceptance of evil with equanimity. Indeed "love must be interpreted in such a way that it may include condemnation, criticism, resistance and rejection." (80)

This is not to say that Miguez Bonino is an advocate of violence. He does discern, however, that the Marxist category of class struggle provides an insight that penetrates far deeper into the reality of the human situation than a superficial neutrality advocated in the cause of Christian peace conceived in the sense of the absence of conflict.

(e) Man as the subject of his own history.

A final plank in the Marxist platform which Miguez Bonino feels he can stand on is the emphasis on the need of man to become the subject of his own history. In Marx, this was expressed in his preference for Prometheus, the god who stole fire from heaven and gave it to man. Marx's Prometheanism enshrines his confidence in man's unlimited powers to
create his own history by means of his self-realization and his contempt for the fetters imposed by tradition and the past.

Liberation theologians, accepting the ineffectiveness of developmentalism and reformism to bring about any significant social change in Latin America went on to side with those who saw in the striving for liberation by the oppressed peoples of the continent the legitimate aspirations of those people to shape their own political history. Together with the groups amongst whom there arose the revolutionary consciousness we have previously alluded to, the liberation theologians perceived that there was a genuine need for the liberation of people as individuals and as groups in order for them to become the subjects of their own history. Developmentalism had only perpetuated the situation where the poor of Latin America had been the object of other people's history. Liberation was therefore proposed as the antithesis to development, (81) and it is to take the form of a "historical project" which Miguez Bonino defines as

"an expression frequently used in our discussions as a midway term between an utopia, a vision which makes no attempt to connect itself historically to the present and a programme, a technically developed model for the organization of society. A historical project is defined enough to force options in terms of the basic structures of society. It points in a given direction. But frequently its contents are expressed in symbolical and elusive forms rather than in terms of precise technical language."  (82)

This historical project envisages (i) the casting off of the relationship of dependence on the Western economic empires, (ii) a revolution to eliminate elitism in the social structure by the mobilization of those people with a revolutionary awareness, (iii) the establishment of a strong centralized state, (iv) the conscientization or politicization of the people so that they become true "protagonists of their own history", (5) emphasizing the primacy of the political dimension in the struggle, (vi) a determination to evolve a genuine and indigenous
Latin American socialism with which is combined the rejection of "Marxist" dogmatism, (vii) the emergence of a humane order which will allow for a genuine liberation which is seen as "the process through which and in which a 'new man' must emerge, a man shaped by solidarity and creativity over against the individualistic, distorted humanity of the present system." (84) This project is to be undertaken by man come-of-age as he takes responsibility for the fashioning and direction of his own history.

By adopting this aspect of the Marxist position Miguez Bonino has to walk something of a theological tightrope. Before him, Gutierrez had fallen into the trap of claiming on the one hand that liberation is a gift of God to be received and on the other that it is man who liberates himself. (85) Miguez Bonino is able to avoid this dilemma by using the biblical notion of the Kingdom as his key category, and by carefully choosing his words. He says

"God calls his Kingdom from and within human history in its entirety; his action is a constant call and challenge to man. Man's response is realized in the concrete arena of history with its economic, political, ideological options." (86)

For Miguez Bonino, therefore the action of God and the creative co-operation of man correspond in the call-challenge and respond-obey sequence. Man's historical project therefore coincides with God's initiative in history.

Miguez Bonino is also able to link up this understanding of historical action with a correction of Marx's Prometheanism. He declares:

"...in Christian terms God himself is the Prometheus - he himself undertakes on the side of man and in the utter solidarity of love the restoration of man's right and power to be free in the world: he himself fights for man's lordship and, 'although we do not yet see that all things have been subjected to him (man), we see him (Jesus Christ) crowned with honour and glory (Heb. 2:86-9), the promise and assurance of man's final liberation and glory." (87)
(f) **Limitations on the use of Marxism**

The alliance between Christianity and Marxism is set within limits. Miguez Bonino's acceptance of Marxist insights to illuminate Christian theological pathways is a selective exercise. For Miguez Bonino and the other theologians of liberation the use of Marxism is really a means to an end and the motivation is that of trying to make their Christian commitment effective in the complex tangle of economic, social and political circumstances which constitute the Latin American reality. The appeal of Marxism is that it purports to give a systematic and plausible account of the nature and origin of the woes the people suffer. At the same time it offers a radical new order to replace the old. The attraction of the Marxist analytical tools consists in the objective and ideologically disinterested way in which Marxism accounts for the causes of the basic injustice inherent in the economic order throughout Latin America. Unlike capitalist and liberalist descriptions, Marxism can show that it is not influenced in its analysis by its own vested economic interests. By appealing to the notion of objective laws at work in historical change Marxism is able to point to the feasibility of its claims. These laws will lead to the establishment of justice not as an expression of a beautiful ideal but because it will be the inevitable result of the revolutionary activity in which the oppressed people will engage in order to steer the course of history in a direction which will promote their own interests. The Marxist account is both all-embracing and sufficiently radical to offer a plausible alternative in distinct conflict with the previously accepted norms. It appeals because it adjudges the present system to be "rotten from top to bottom, impossible to justify on any grounds, and impervious to any reforms which do not set out to change the entire economic, political, and legal structures involved." (88)

The relationship, therefore, between Christianity and Marxism is, for
Miguez Bonino, a pragmatic and dialectical one, and Christian theology has to retain a critical distance.

For one thing, the question of the identity of the Church qua Church of Jesus Christ is important. This is the problem which Moltmann highlights in the first chapter of *The Crucified God*. (89) He spells out there the tension between relevance and identity. If the Church is deeply involved in historical action it is inclined to lose its identity, whilst if it concentrates on maintaining its identity within the specifically Christian tradition it tends to lose out in becoming isolated from the contemporary issues of mankind’s ongoing struggle. Miguez Bonino is well aware that by allying itself with Marxist revolutionary activity as well as utilizing its analytical and ideological insights the Church is in danger of losing its vocation. He says

"When the cause of Jesus Christ (and consequently The Church in any missionary understanding of it) is totally and without rest equated with the cause of social and political revolution, either the Church and Jesus Christ are made redundant or the political and social revolution is clothed in a sacred or semi-sacred gown." (90)

He affirms the necessity for a clearer definition of the identity of the Church both in the interests of the Church itself and also for the sake of the autonomy of the human struggle for liberation. In this way the danger of paternalistic imperialism on the Church’s side will be solved. To do this he believes a restatement of the Christian understanding of creation is necessary. When creation is thought of as the invitation to man to create his own history and culture and creatively to transform the world then the traditional understanding of soteriology can be seen as Christ’s coming in order to "reopen for man the will and the power to fulfil his historical vocation" (91) - which is to become really and truly man. The Church can proclaim this salvation and witness to this saving activity in Jesus Christ. This proclamation is always a praxis in
the historical situation and not merely a verbal affirmation. The Church therefore can maintain its identity by celebrating, reflecting and proclaiming the freedom which the saving activity of Jesus Christ effects in human history. Eschatologically there will be full humanity and no distinction. "But we live before the millennium. In Marxist terms we would say: we live in the pre-history of mankind". (92)

A second area where Miguez Bonino sees the relation between Christianity and Marxism inevitably involving tension and a critical distance on the part of theology is in relation to materialism and theism. Most Marxists claim a determinative role for material forces which is supreme. They thereby deny the reality and possibility of any transcendent power.

Christians have to take issue with Marxists here, claims Miguez Bonino

"Not because they speculatively pose the existence of a realm of the 'spirit' but because they have been grasped by the reality of the living God who is beyond history and the universe as well as active in history and the universe, the living God who in faith they know to be true, nay, to be the true and ultimate reality in which everything has meaning and existence." (93)

In the third place Marxism and Christianity differ on their understanding of the source and power of solidary love. Despite their common ethos in terms of human solidarity and their commitment to making their love historically efficacious they see this love as emanating from distinctly different sources. The Marxist locates this love in man's love for himself and in his self-affirmation. In his revolutionary activity man puts into practice his love for his fellow-man, but he does this in his basic self-love and assertiveness. (94) For the Christian this love originates in God. Man's solidarity with man derives from the very nature of his inherent relationship to God and his neighbour. He loves, because he has first been loved by God and this action sets him within the eschatological
community of love.

Then fourthly, the end attained by empirical Marxist socialist movements, Miguel Bonino admits, does not provide a promising record. Most liberation theologians, and this includes Miguel Bonino in much of his writings, concentrate on pointing out the inequities and injustices that are brought about in the Latin America of capitalist development. Poverty, unemployment, poor housing and inadequate education are the features of this condition. But Miguel Bonino is too careful and painstaking a thinker to overlook the discrepancies between Marxist promises and Communist fulfilments. The regimes these have ushered in have shown scant regard for "personal freedom, popular participation, the control of power or the ability to overcome discrimination" (95). For this reason the Christian must remain critical and uneasy since, in allying himself with such a movement, he must be aware that he is helping to bring in a social order which is far from satisfactory. Nevertheless he believes that this attaches to all ethical action in life "this side of the Parousia" (96). In other words the Christian has to recognize the ethical relativity and compromise in the goals likely to be achieved in the historical project he embarks on. Indeed, Miguel Bonino declares that the Christians who are "committed to revolution must openly reject these fascist trends in socialism". (97)

In the fifth place whilst the Christian will have to be aware of his involvement in action which is likely to include the use of violence, Miguel Bonino does not believe that this is the most serious problem confronting the Christian embarking on revolutionary activity with Marxists. He points out that the statement by Marx that "violence is the midwife of history" is not a glorification of violence but an empirical observation - that where revolutions have taken place and violence has occurred then history has been made. He goes on to claim that in Scripture the word violence is used almost exclusively for the actions of the unjust rulers in their
oppression of the people. (98) He believes nevertheless that a Christian may participate in a struggle which may require violent methods for its resolution provided he does so in the full awareness of his responsibility to keep that violence to the minimum. Miguez Bonino also points out that a Christian will be wise to the ideological justification of violence on the part of those Christian ethicists who wish to retain the status quo.

Finally the relationship between Marxism and Christianity will consist of dialectical interaction in the field of reflection on ethical considerations. Miguez Bonino believes there is a "peculiar insight which is born of faith" (99) and that the Christian point of view has something to contribute to the revolutionary movement. One of these considerations is the question of means and ends. Whilst Marx was deeply interested in this problem Miguez Bonino believes it has not been sufficiently explored in Marxist thinking. It is from the perspective of the insight of faith that he can support Rubel's claim that "neither Marx nor Lenin carried far or deeply enough the consideration of the quality of action which corresponds to the nature of the society which they discern for the future." (100)

Then again, the relationship between solidarity and hatred in revolutionary activity needs to be understood. Christians will avoid self-righteousness in this issue, but because of biblical insights as to the nature of love they will enter the alliance with "something to give". Miguez Bonino does not offer any solution to this question but his point is that the engagement in the praxis together provides a stimulus and a challenge to Christians to prove in the revolutionary situation that evil can be overcome with good and that rejection and opposition can become instruments of love and redemption. Recognizing that hatred has a dehumanizing effect
on the revolutionary combatant Miguez Bonino believes that the Christian will have an understanding of the dynamics at work and this will open up opportunities for bringing to bear the active power of the gospel, especially in the post-revolutionary era.

One aspect of this, Miguez Bonino believes, is the Marxist intention of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. He emphasizes that all revolutionaries should recognize the transitoriness of this phase and obviously the Christian partners of the Marxist revolutionaries will take their part in minimising what he calls the "objective inequality which a revolutionary process creates." (101)

Miguez Bonino is further convinced that Marxist thinking and political theory have not yet developed adequate safeguards with regard to the control of power. These inadequacies have been shown up by the appearance in socialist states of "arbitrariness, the 'cult personality', the appropriation by a clique or a bureaucracy of a total control of society, the exclusion of the very proletariat from the shaping of the process and the determination of its direction." (102) It is the Christian's duty, affirms Miguez Bonino, to raise this whole problem and to struggle for a more adequate solution. Again an answer is not offered - but the significant point is that, because of its critical distance and the "insight of faith" the Christian can and should pose the question to the Marxist.

We can now see that, whilst Miguez Bonino is prepared to accept and make use of important parts of Marxist doctrine in order to enable the Christian to reflect creatively on any proposed revolutionary involvement with Marxists to establish a more just society, he by no means "sells out" to Marxism. Rather, by dialogue and mutual cross-examination and self-exami-
nation he is advocating a deepening of theory and a more humane and better-motivated revolutionary praxis for both Christians and Marxists. Because of the wide divergence on some crucial points and the mutual agreement on others the relationship between them will be "a tense and mutually challenging one." (103) We are also in a position now to underline the conclusion to which de Gruchy comes when he says that Miguez Bonino

"is not trying to do a 'deal' with Marxism through reducing the Biblical message to fit Marxist analysis or theory; but he finds that at certain points, Biblical faith and obedience relates positively to certain Marxist insights in his situation." (104)

One of the major aspects of Marxist teaching which Miguez Bonino finds challenging to Christian theology is its insistence that the "otherworldliness" implied or expressed in much Christian teaching leads to withdrawal from political engagement. Marxism is categorically and uncompromisingly an affirmation of man's responsibility for shaping history. Roger Garaudy has even described it as a "methodology for historic initiative". (105) Accepting the validity of the Marxist claim that historic Christianity has frequently been an "opiate" of the people the political theologians in Europe and Latin American liberation theologians are trying to explore ways of ascribing significance to human action whilst at the same time upholding the sovereignty of God and his initiative. Christians have come to face the painful truth in Garaudy's criticism:

"Religion is an 'opiate' whenever, in affirming that an eternal life beyond history and beyond this life is what is essential, it devalues the problems of this life and the struggles of history. It is an opiate whenever it conceives of the relation between man and God as man encountering God only to make up for his own weaknesses or the failures of his thought and action, 'at the limits' rather than 'at the centre', as Bonhoeffer wrote. It is an opiate when it assumes the form of an ideology, a metaphysic rather than an act, a decision, a creative way of living. In sum, it is an opiate whenever it consecrates political and social..."
dualisms by conceiving the world in a dualist fashion, acting, in Nietzsche's expression as 'a Platonism for the people'". (106)

Miguez Bonino believes that the philosophical presupposition underlying this dualistic approach to reality derives from Platonic idealism and that a theology of historical engagement must meet the Marxist criticism at this point. We now turn our attention to his treatment of this theme.
In "Historical Praxis" Miguez Bonino says, "The unity of God's work and human history constitutes the inescapable starting point for any theological reflection." (1) In making this statement he is re-affirming the belief, widely held amongst theologians of liberation, that "History is one". (2) This slogan is used to correct the widespread assumption in theology that "secular" history is in some way different from "religious" or "salvation history". (3)

Liberation theologians emphasize that the everyday real of human existence, conceived in such categories as political activity, economic forces and social configurations, is the true and proper sphere of God's saving action. They vigorously reject any presuppositions which would so distinguish between the sacred and the profane that the latter is denied as a valid area in which God's rule and therefore his redeeming presence and liberating power apply. For them, the term "salvation history" would not be used validly if it denoted a particular strand of religious events within general history. It might apply rather to the salvation of history, "seen as the subverting by the power of the gospel of all those structures which are obstacles to the full human and spiritual development of the human community." (4) For these theologians then, God's activity in history is thus not to be confined to the history of the Israelites, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, the ongoing history of the church and the inner spiritual life of the believer. In short, the realm of human life commonly designated as political, or public in the sense that it embraces the totality of the life of mankind, is where we are to look for the signs of the ongoing work of God in Christ.
One of the reasons for this assertion is that these theologians have discerned the deep radicality of sin in the "public" structures. This understanding of sin perceives it as a social and historical fact which is revealed in the absence of brotherhood and love in human relationships, in the alienation between God and man and hence also as an interior, personal disorganization. Liberation theology, in short focusses primarily on the collective and corporate dimensions of sin. (5)

By the same token the universality, the totality and the radicality of the salvific process affirm the oneness of history and the need to transcend the way of thinking which regards reality as divided into two separate orders. The redeeming activity of God in the whole of human history is all-embracing. The action of Christ and the gift of the Spirit extend to the whole human activity and history and it is this action which gives history its unity. Salvation is a universal process which may not be reduced by being limited to the strictly religious sphere. Any notion that the work of Christ applies to the social life of man only in an indirect way, or by "implication", is foreign to this conception of the gospel. (6)

The belief that history is divisible into two strands, one sacred and the other profane, is derived from Platonic idealism where it is assumed that reality consists of two aspects - the spiritual or invisible, and the material or visible. These two supposed levels, when transposed into theological and biblical interpretation constitute a distinction between what is thought of as "God's realm" on the one side and man's on the other. The "spiritual" is thus regarded as superior to its "material" or "earthly" counterpart.

When idealism is applied to biblical history the Old Testament texts are seen as recording events and promises which, in the New Testament, have
to be interpreted in a spiritual sense. Because of their "carnal" point of view the Jewish people were prevented from understanding the special figurative sense of these promises. In the New Testament the inner meaning was clearly revealed. (7) It is to this dualistic way of approaching reality that Miguez Bonino addresses himself in the first section of his chapter on "Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engagement". In this section his purpose is to show that Christianity must accept the Marxist criticism of religion when religion is interpreted in idealist categories. He affirms that a historical dualism is not only not of the essence of the Christian understanding of history, but is in fact the root cause of the withdrawal by Christians from historical engagement. If such idealist presuppositions and hermeneutical approaches can be disposed of, then the way will be open to establish the validity of Christian participation in historical action.

In order to study Miguez Bonino’s interpretations of history, we will begin then by examining the dualistic interpretation which developed in the Augustinian tradition. This tradition, which has so profoundly influenced Christian thought and practice through the centuries had its roots in Platonism as well as in Scripture and is severely criticized by Miguez Bonino and other liberation theologians. We will trace its development beginning with Plato, proceeding through Augustine himself. We will also consider how Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms is shaped by it, and conclude by looking at how the doctrines of Providence and Predestination emerged within this tradition and have in turn influenced it. This is followed by a study of the Old Testament prophetic view of history and New Testament eschatology. We also take a brief look at the existentialist interpretation of eschatology as taught by Rudolf Bultmann. By examining the rediscovery of Apocalypticism we are provided with an entrée to the development of the Marxist interpretation of history. All of this has singular significance
for understanding both contemporary political and liberation theologies. Finally, we consider Miguez Bonino's own contribution to the debate, and, with some recourse to Bonhoeffer and Pannenberg, we attempt to evaluate that contribution.

1. **THE DUALISM OF THE AUGUSTINIAN TRADITION**

The dualism which Miguez Bonino attributes to Augustine is really a manifestation of a long tradition which has its origins in the classical philosophy of ancient Greece, and especially in the thought of Plato.

(a) **The Idealism of Plato**

Previously, Ionian thinkers had endeavoured to determine the original cause or source of reality (the arche). Thales had postulated water, Anaximenes claimed that it was air, Heraclitus that it was fire, whilst Anaximander plumped for a basic element underlying all matter, the 'boundless', (apeiron). But more was necessary if the mind of man was to penetrate beyond surface appearances. None of these postulated principles accounted for the element of purpose or underlying unity in the universe. Accordingly Greek thought evolved a theory in which reality was conceived in a two-fold way, that of matter which was itself formless, and form which organized and gave existence to matter. Form was the constitutive principle of the universe. Plato used this pattern in formulating the principles of the ideal State in his *Republic*. The perfect or ideal state existed or so he contended, only in the eternal world of ideas which men were to contemplate if they sought to achieve true statesmanship. One of these eternal ideas was that of justice. A man must study the ideal or archetype of justice in order to know the meaning of justice and to practise it.

The ultimate reality, lies, for Plato, in this eternal world of ideas. (8) These are ideal standards of perfection, and the sense-data perceived by
the individual which correspond to the idea are only approximate. The ideas are, moreover real, as opposed to the shadows or imperfect likenesses which go to make up the world of sense. The highest of these ideas is the Good. Eros is the desire for the Good, or the urge for knowledge. (9)

In Platonic idealism, then, the focus is not on this world of time and events, but on that other world of eternity. It follows that if reality is conceived of dualistically, and more significance is ascribed to the one world than to the other, then the first of those two entities will be the one to receive emphasis and attention whilst the other will be neglected. Platonism elevates eternity at the expense of time and history, and Plato reveals the indifference of the Greek mind towards time and history as well as the low regard in which he held historical action and event. In his thought there is no philosophy of history as we know it today. Such a notion of history as it had stressed the endlessly repetitive cyclical process of birth, growth, decay and death. Man and the events of his life are seen as part of, and patterned upon, the recurring processes of nature, and meaning was found, not in any sort of transcendence but in each event, incident, or story itself. (10) Rudolf Bultmann summed up the Greek understanding of history aptly when he wrote, "For Platonic idealism empirical history is a story of decline and fall, not an occasion for the exercise of responsibility, in which new situations present man with new duties". (11)

From this brief outline we can see the pattern of dualism emerging which was to influence philosophical and theological thinking for centuries. The identification of the ideal world with God and heaven was easy to make when early Christian theologians were seeking for a hermeneutical key with which to interpret the faith to the classical world. Indeed it became the standard approach accepted universally once Augustine's
masterly treatment had synthesized the biblical and classical traditions in the fourth and fifth centuries.

The elements which Miguez Bonino is at pains to counteract are clearly visible in Plato's thought. Time is of no significance as compared with eternity. Time indeed is cyclical and this only serves to underscore the relative insignificance of the material, temporal, earthly world. Consequently the irruption of the new and the challenge which this affords to man is to be seen merely as the repetition of something already experienced. Historical responsibility is of no consequence as compared with the attainment of true being which is to be achieved by spiritual contemplation of the eternal and unchanging ideas. It was left to Augustine to transpose these fundamental philosophical presuppositions into theological and biblical categories.

(b) St. Augustine and the "Two Cities".

St. Augustine's dualistic thought can be traced to the three systems which had most influence on his early development. These were Donatism, Manichaeism and Neoplatonism. (12) The Donatists had maintained the primitive Christian emphasis on apocalyptic expectations which embodies a cosmic dualism between the personified forces of good and evil. Manichaeism had similarly propounded a radical cosmic dualism between good and evil. (13) Whilst he claims not to have read many of Plato's writings (14) the influence of Plato upon his thought is manifest. Portalie's explanation is that "a closer examination will show that the imprint left on Augustine's soul derives from the fundamental Platonic doctrine rather than from Neoplatonic variations". (15)

Augustine's use of Plato's idealism can be seen in a statement made early in his literary career:

"It is quite enough for my purpose that Plato felt that there are two worlds, the one intelligible in which truth dwells, the other sensible and evident to our visual and tactile sense perceptions". (16)
As we shall see later, Augustine broke through some aspects of the classical approach to history and in his theology of Providence established the principles that were to be the foundation of the Christian understanding of history for centuries.

In *De Civitate Dei* (17) Augustine seeks to answer the criticism of opponents of the faith, such as Porphyry and the Manichee Faustus. In trying to set down the essence of Christianity he sought to delineate this in terms of the disordered relationship between created beings and their creator. This implied a disorder too, between the created beings themselves. Augustine sought to show that two fields of force, which he designated as the "earthly" and "heavenly" cities respectively, represented this deranged relationship and that the limits of this division could be seen throughout the history of the human race. (18) This division he discerned in the fratricidal struggle of Cain and Abel in Genesis (19) whom he characterizes as the fathers of the two cities.

These two cities, or societies, are universal - as is the tension existing between them. Furthermore, it extends throughout history. The dualism from the various traditions we have outlined above is revealed in the description Augustine gives of the two cities.

"We see then that the two cities were created by two kinds of love: the earthly city was created by self-love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly City by the love of God carried as far as any contempt of self. In fact the earthly city glories in itself, the Heavenly City glories in the Lord. The former looks for glory from men, the witness of a good conscience". (20)

The Platonic idea that human life is lived on two planes, emerges from his further description of the two cities:

"Scripture tells us that Cain founded a city whereas Abel, as a pilgrim, did not found one. For the City of the saints is up above, although it produces citizens here below, and in their persons the City is on pilgrimage until the time of its kingdom"
comes. At that time it will assemble all those citizens as they rise again in their bodies; and then they will be given the promised kingdom, where with their Prince, 'the king of ages', they will reign, world without end". (21)

Thus the final separation between the two is conceived of as taking place beyond history. On the historical level they remain merged together with frontiers which cut across the sociological boundaries of church and state.

In this formulation Augustine can be said to have established theologically a valid realm of the secular, political sphere (for him the Roman Empire). Its task was to achieve and maintain political and economic well-being, ends which could be regarded as good and legitimate, provided they were not absolutized and thus idolized, thereby becoming evil. In doing so he recognized and distinguished three different dualisms which had become confused in early Christian thinking. These were (a) the dualism between Israel or the church and the empire as sociological entities, (b) that between obedience and apostasy and (c) the dualism between time and eternity.

The ultimate destiny of the obedience - apostasy dualism was on the transcendent plane in eternal life and damnation. But there is a distinction between this dualism and that of the finite and the eternal. In its own terms the finite can be good and reflect the purpose of God. On the other hand, when wrongly absolutized, it can become a vehicle of damnation. Augustine makes both a distinction and a connection between the apocalyptic dualism of good and evil on the one hand and the Platonic dualism of spiritual and material on the other. The empire is legitimate in its own proper secular realm but only serves the lower needs of man. The destiny of those who know only this realm is death on earth (the temporal realm) and hell on the eternal plane. Its virtues are only "noble vices" and
Augustine, however, so accepted the Platonic dualistic categories of time - eternity and matter - spirit to the degree that he failed to see the connection between earthly, political, secular activity and the realm of the divine, eternal and spiritual. The *civitas terrena* therefore had no eschatological significance and 'secular' history had no meaning beyond itself. It served as an infrastructure for the 'real' history - sacred history, or the City of God. The question of the ultimate meaning of the human historical project was left unanswered. Rosemary Ruether has summed up the Augustinian position:

"For Augustine, man sojourns within history, but it is not his true home. What he does here to serve strictly temporal ends has no eternal significance in a positive sense. Eternal life is the ultimate destiny of the human spirit. It in no way develops in and through material history but must seek only to keep itself pure from the world. And against those distractions which might seduce the soul to turn to love of self and concern for the material universe in place of God, it must cultivate that pure knowledge of God". (23)

The unintentional effect of this separation of the two spheres has been to remove the state from moral responsibility and significance, and to divorce political action and programmes from theological criticism. Messianic hope is separated from social and historical creativity, the latter being placed beyond the scope of divine activity and judgment and the former becoming privatized and otherworldly. The State's role is seen to be the maintenance of law and order and the promotion of prosperity, whilst the church is assigned a spiritual task confined to the realm of the individual and private morality. The kingdom of God is not seen as having any correlation with the political arena.

In the West, the effect has been that the established churches have adopted a "kind of residual Constantinianism" (Ruether). They honour the Pauline injunction to obey the constituted authorities, regarding them as ordained of God, by blessing the existing political order. This has the effect of
sanctifying the status quo, a practice which is apparent both in Latin America (where the existing order is regarded as virtually co-terminous with Christendom) and also in South Africa where the Afrikaner's civil religion decrees that he is called of God to implant and maintain Christian civilization on the southern tip of the continent. In both regions Rosemary Ruether's description of the consequences is applicable when she says: "To oppose this Christian society is to oppose God, be an 'atheistic secularist' or 'communist'." (24)

(c) Luther and the "Two Kingdoms".

The long term effects of the Augustinian position which have been manifest down to the present time, received further impetus from the doctrine of the "two kingdoms" enunciated by Luther. Luther's theory can be seen as a direct descendent from Augustine's idea of the two cities. He says "There are two kingdoms, one the kingdom of God, the other the kingdom of the world...God's kingdom is a kingdom of grace and mercy, not of wrath and punishment. In it there is only forgiveness, consideration for one another, love, service, the doing of good, peace, joy etc. But the kingdom of the world is a kingdom of wrath and severity. In it there is only punishment repression, judgment and condemnation, for the suppressing of the wicked and the protection of the good. For this reason it has the sword, and a prince or lord, is called in Scripture God's wrath or God's rod (Isaiah XIV)....Now he who would confuse these two kingdoms - as our false fanatics do - would put wrath into God's kingdom and mercy into the world's kingdom; and that is the same as putting the devil in heaven and God in hell". (25)

Luther emphasizes the need for the autonomy of the secular kingdom. It is an order of God that comes as a consequence of the Fall. Because man is sinful God ordains this structure of restraints in order to preserve life and impose a measure of discipline in human relationships. (26)

In addition to restraining evil the political power exercised a parental role in providing sustenance and care. Here Luther is able to include in the secular kingdom the structures of community life such as marriage,
family, property and the relationship between masters and servants. All of these participate in the positive aspects of the secular government ordered by God. (27) There is thus a discernible affinity between Luther's thought and the biblical dualism between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan. It is also related to Augustine's doctrine of the two cities. For Luther the kingdom of the world is primarily the state with the "sword" as the power and duty of exacting punishment and therefore of preventing evil. Summing up Luther's position Paul Althaus can say, "If secular government is basically represented by the state and particularly by its punitive power, it is obviously easy to approach the whole problem on a dualistic basis.....the unconditional opposition between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the sinful world...." (28)

It is also true however that there is in Luther's thought a unity between the two kingdoms, since the secular government is "God's own work, institution and creation". (29) Nevertheless there is a difference in rank, for "temporal power is but a very small matter in the sight of God, and too slightly regarded by him for us to resist, disobey, or become quarrelsome on its account, no matter whether the state does right or wrong". (30)

There is an independence and an interdependence. The secular kingdom can exist independently of the spiritual and vice versa. But the latter needs the former since it can only carry out its spiritual duties when there is peace, and for this it needs the secular arm. Likewise the worldly kingdom needs the spiritual dimension since it can only continue to maintain law and order if it has the knowledge of God and his truth which its spiritual counterpart provides. One of the consequences of this is that a Christian may find himself acting in a dual capacity, since he lives in two areas at the same time. He is both a private person and a public person. (31)
The doctrine is open to two major criticisms. The first is that the rigidity of the separation between the two kingdoms tends to limit the lordship of Christ to the area of the spiritual and thereby assigns an autonomy to the area of the human political realm, removing it from the scrutiny of moral demand and critical surveillance. This is the same criticism we noted with regard to the Augustinian formula. The second is that Luther disregards the eschatological significance of the kingdom of the world, and weakens the polemical tension between the two spheres. They consequently appear to stand side by side in static coexistence.

Thielicke insists that it is the New Testament concept of the two aeons which provides the corrective to the simultaneity of the two governments put forward by Luther. Instead of existing side by side the two aeons follow one another temporally. He adds, in a passage which we feel Miguez Bonino would approve of,

"Only when we abide by the New Testament's definition of the true relationship can we avoid reconciling the two governments in terms of a static and timeless coexistence. Only then is our aeon constantly called in question by the coming aeon. Only then does the challenge to all its orders and to its fallen nature remain. Only then can we be dissatisfied with the view that because power reigns in politics and retribution dominates law, these are supposedly the will of God. Only then are these things seen to be provisional and open to question. Only then does the coming world constantly break in upon the present world, to disturb it, to keep it from absolutizing itself and fashioning for itself a 'good conscience', a conscience which no longer lives in expectation". (32)

Of greater consequence, however, is the danger that the "two kingdoms" concept will encourage a religious quietism which will abdicate responsibility for the political realm and withdraw into an irrelevant and disengaged escapism, as the liberation theologians, amongst others,
have asserted. Thielicke in fact admits as much when, contrasting Reformed and Lutheran views of Church and state and their respective images of "activism" and "passivity", he draws attention to the different responses to the German Christian movement under Hitler. Reformed theologians took the lead in the Confessing Church to oppose this movement, whilst their Lutheran counterparts were usually defensive in their strategy. (33)

The mainly passive reaction by churches influenced by the two kingdoms theology does not mean that they do not protest against the state when it commits crimes against humanity. It may well offer admonitions and warnings but it will not offer radical resistance. The result, says Thielicke, is that there develops a wide rift between ecclesiastical and political or spiritual and secular, responsibility and "the church is guilty, not only in respect of its own nature and task, but also in respect of the state. By abandoning the state to its own devices, the Church delivers it up to demonism and error". (34) It is precisely this "demonism and error" against which Miguez Bonino and Gutierrez and their fellow liberation theologians are seeking to guard. By using the Marxist analysis of their society they perceive the state as being little more than a tool in the hands of capitalist entrepreneurs and the multi-national companies. Their "historical project", validated by their claim that history is one, seeks to assert the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man before him in the creation of a just society.

(d) Providence and Predestination

The doctrine of providence was first formulated by Augustine, who, notwithstanding his use of the classical idealist philosophy, was able to break away from it in working out his concept of time. (35) In contrast to the naturalistic cyclical idea of time Augustine saw that the Christian interpretation involved the idea of linear sequence, laying stress on the significant uniqueness and cruciality of each moment. Augustine perceived the inherent failings of Greek theories:
(i) They tried to account for the world by phenomena that are intrinsic to it;  

(ii) in making a circle of the infinite they omitted to recognise the incomprehensibility of the concept;  

(iii) by focussing on the typical, they lost the sense of uniqueness of the individual person and event;  

(iv) and in regarding history as having already done all that its own limitations would allow it do do they could not see it as a process reaching forward to a new and continuous creation with the possibility of novelty through human freedom. (36)

The events which gripped Augustine himself and about which he was subsequently able to generalize were the sacrifice of Christ on the cross and his resurrection, together with his own experience of salvation based on that sacrifice and resurrection. These he affirmed as being unrepeatable and in doing so drew attention to the biblical emphasis on "once-for-all-ness". (37)

From this inner conviction and certainty Augustine was able, by extension and reflection, to see the importance of every moment. If one of two moments can be full of unique and unrepeatable content, charged with eternal significance then any other - and therefore every other - historical point of time can be similarly filled. They are equally unrepeatable because they too can mediate salvation. Since these moments all together constitute history they impart significance and therefore meaning to history. This also means that historical time is moving towards a significant future from a beginning in the mystery of creation. Furthermore, because every moment is able to bear ultimate significance it means that there is the possibility of novelty and the emergence of the new.

When Christian thought thus triumphed over the thought forms of the ancient world it pressed the claim that the world is a creation of God over against belief in the resisting power of eternal matter. This
implied the belief that history had a beginning and came to be by the act of God. The New Testament (following the Septuagint) had used the word *ktizein* which emphasized, not the shaping of something that had been eternally co-existent with God, as in Platonic thought, but an entirely new foundation, something created out of nothing, *ex nihilo*. Since God himself had created this world, it was essentially good. He was the source of the creative activity and, in Augustinian thought, the principle of order and the course of motion in the creation thus initiated. (38)

In this continuing creative activity lies the understanding of providence. The temporal process is not self-explanatory. Its origins and its continuance come from outside itself, a need inherent in the concept of a transcendent God over against his creation. In creation and providence therefore God acts in the same way. He grants the power of existence to all things both as an initial act and as an ongoing process. Providence is not a repetition of creation, but is distinct from it, presupposes it, guarantees and confirms it. The natural creation (as distinct from the act of creating) becomes the scene in which God enacts his providential ruling, and hence Barth can say that the goodness and perfection of the creation

"consists in the fact that God has made it serviceable for the rule of His free and omnipotent grace, for the exercise of the lordship of Jesus Christ....That he uses it in the service of this kingdom; that He co-ordinates and integrates it with His work in this kingdom; that He causes it to co-operate in the history of this kingdom, this is the rule of His providence". (39)

Basic to the idea of providence is the belief in the nature of God as sovereign Lord of history. Augustine saw the divine sovereignty at work in the rise of the Roman Empire. Because God is the sovereign Lord who wills the rise and fall of nations, claimed Augustine, he had brought into being this outstanding instance of earthly glory. (40)
A problem to all accounts that have discerned the divine providential ordering of historical events has been the role of human action in relation to the providential will of God. These have usually resolved the dilemma by subsuming human intention within the larger purpose of God. Indeed, Butterfield has drawn attention to the strange way in which the outcome of historical processes has frequently been completely different to the one intended by the people making the decisions. This phenomenon he calls "that kind of history-making which goes on so to speak over our heads, now deflecting the results of our actions, now taking our purposes out of our hands, and now turning our endeavours to ends not realised". (41) Not only is God thought to be in control, but the idea that he knows beforehand the outcome of events he has designed has been present to a greater or lesser degree in most classical theological writings. It assumes a divine "plan" because it perceives the broad outline of God working his will in, with, through and despite the actions of men in history. It results from a sense of the absolute-ness of God's controlling power. Stemming from the model of the choosing of the Israelites by God in the Old Testament covenant this idea appears also in the New Testament. Augustine takes up the claim asserting both that believers, the members of the City of God, are destined for the end of knowing God in blessedness and also that the events of history, both sacred and secular, happen in fulfilment of the preordained scheme of God. (42) History therefore becomes an unfolding of this predetermined plan, and man's role is reduced to that of a spectator and responder. The biblical view of God and man "polemically engaged" (Miguez Bonino) together in creating history has given way to a one-sided emphasis on the power of God. Calvin taught that the object of history was to enable God to fulfil his eschatological purpose, the salvation of the elect, and that
this end was beyond history, outside of time and space. (43)
The sovereign will of God, for Calvin, operated in the sphere of providence which he saw as the outer working of God—the forces that play upon a person from outside—and election was the rule of God over the inner "spiritual" life. It will be seen that Calvin's main concern was with the life of piety of the individual believer. Unlike Augustine, Calvin was not unduly interested in constructing a speculative philosophy of history but rather in God's working providentially and redemptively in the lives of individuals and through them transforming history. Barth has distinguished between providence and predestination by saying that God's predestinating rule over a person relates to his claim over that person as an object of saving grace whilst God's providential rule relates to his ongoing governing of a person in the sense that the person is a product of God's creating activity. (44)

The elaboration of the doctrine of providence into predestination with the accompanying implication of determinism, leads us again to the heart of the question being posed by Miguez Bonino in his treatment of "Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engagement". It seems to us that the core of what he is getting at in his indictment of Christian passivity arises at this point. For not only had Christian eschatology been dualistic but where it has attributed to God a providential sovereign role in secular events it has been inclined to advocate by implication, an attitude of withdrawal and renunciation of responsibility on man's part. By over-emphasizing God's sovereignty, theology has tended to underplay man's role and significance in the creation of history. However, the gradual abandoning of this stance since the Enlightenment has led to the enhancement of man's awareness of his role and in Marxism to his assumption of control to the exclusion of any participation by God. Miguez Bonino and his fellow theologians of liberation have latched on to the validity of the truth in the Marxist position and are seeking to
reconcile this insight with the traditional (and Biblical) understanding of God's kingly rule in history. He is concerned, no less than Augustine, Calvin and Barth, with the need to stress the part God takes in history, and his use of the category of the kingdom shows this. But he is concerned also to expose the attitude of resignation and other-worldly escapism which has so often cloaked the legitimation by the Church of political oppression and conservatism.

The presupposition on which Augustine's doctrine of providence was based, and which has been at the root of the problem was the idealistic type of eschatology he expounded. In trying to combat the chiliastic teachings which were prevalent he adopted the view that the Book of Revelation was to be understood as a spiritual allegory. (45)

The kingly rule of God, according to Augustine, is now taking place in two ways - first as the present mission of the church and secondly as the blessedness of heaven for the redeemed, which he saw in Platonist fashion as beholding God: "Similarly, in the future life, wherever we turn the spiritual eye of our bodies we shall discern, by means of our bodies, the incorporeal God directing the whole universe". (46) In working out his theology of history Augustine pointed out that the City of God, though present in this world lives by supernatural regeneration and is eternal and immortal. As such it is ahistorical, and secular history, the Civitas Terrena, is incidental. In eliminating chiliasm Augustine replaced the expectation of the end of history with the expectation of personal death and individual glory. Paul Tillich has spelt out the consequences by saying "A nonhistorical element has penetrated into the Christian interpretation through the elimination of chiliasm. This element was strong enough to devaluate historical activity and the struggle for social justice and to separate the individual destiny from that of the whole". (47) For Augustine the main interest and concern was not therefore in the dominion of empires, their rise and fall. It was rather in the suprahistorical, eschatological goal of participating "in God's
eternity beyond death, space, historical time, the physical body and the physical earth". (48)

When the crisis in western Christianity, precipitated by the sack of Rome by Aleric in 410, challenged the Christian claim that conditions would improve when the Empire recognised the church, the reply Augustine made was, in effect, to sideline the importance and significance of secular history by asserting the ultimate supremacy of the Civitas Dei in "the world beyond". In so counteracting the "this-worldly" hopes of the chiliasts and defending the faith against pagan recriminations, Augustine had shifted the locus of eschatological hope from earth to heaven. This non-historical eschatology became the predominant thought in western faith and has survived down to the present day. (49) It does not rule out the possibility of the Parousia, but it has the effect of focusing attention away from any such future intervention by God in history. (50). It follows that for Augustine there was no possibility that the redeeming activity of God might apply in the realm of secular history. As with the writers of the New Testament he displays an indifference to the fate of the Civitas Terrena since for him it is of no eschatological significance. Its purpose was simply to provide sustenance for the upbuilding of the church.

When Calvin restated the doctrine of providence in his Institutes over a thousand years after Augustine he used scriptural categories rather than those of classical philosophy. In doing so he made certain departures from the Augustinian precedents. One of these was his belief that providence performed a much more creative work in history than it had with Augustine. For Calvin, God's will is both active and sovereign to regenerate men and women. As with the other reformers the concept of justification was strong and he taught that it was based on Christ's saving work and God's electing grace, and that
sanctification flows from this. This work of sanctification, however, did not seek to take men and women out of this world. Rather it effected a transformation of character in them within the world and therefore indirectly of the world itself. (50)

This is a radically different emphasis, and it represents a new departure in the Christian attitude to history. For the first time, Calvin enunciated a biblically grounded notion of a history transformable by the providential rule of God operating through Christian believers. He injected into the understanding of history a more dynamic sense of the liberating power and presence of God. In this view change can be brought about by God, and can be seen to derive from his hand in events.

Calvin envisaged three ways in which Christians were to participate in political life. The first of these was by involvement in the establishment of the Christian community which would be faithful to the gospel. The second was by personal participation in political action which would improve social life by lawful and constitutional methods. The third was by refusing to obey unjust laws if they were incompatible with the gospel. (51) Here we note the correspondence between Calvin's view and the assertion by Miguel Bonino that "Faith is not a different history but a dynamic, a motivation, and in its eschatological horizon, a transforming invitation". (52) This is a far truer reflection of the essential Biblical prophetic view than the dualistic notions we have looked at, or the Augustinian idea of a providential ordering of history from active participation in which man was largely excluded. Calvin sees man as the agent of God in the process of introducing historical change. Augustine's doctrine of providence had been rooted in the classical concepts of static orders for which change was anathema. As such the very concept of God had become static too. Calvin opens the way for a rediscovery of the dynamic concept of God in the Bible and in contemporary history - a God who calls men to dynamic participation in the process
of shaping the world. Gilkey has encapsulated this belief in the following quotation:

"Historical change is, therefore, for us as for previous cultures, a religious phenomenon, one of the most deeply religious factors in ordinary experience. From the point of view of faith, it is the strange face of the hidden God constituting, upsetting, destroying, challenging, judging, re-creating and calling". (53)

2. PROPHECY AND ESCHATOLOGY

There is no one view of history in the Bible. The approach of Isaiah is clearly different to that of the book of Ecclesiastes, whilst the New Testament focusses mainly on the fulfilment of promises made in the Old Testament. Then again the apocalyptic literature provides an interpretation which is so significant that it demands a section of this study for itself.

The view of the prophetic writers is based, like that of Calvin, on the central concept of the sovereignty of God. So important is the prophetic literature itself, and so pervasive is its influence on the more historical sections of the Old Testament that we can consider it as representing the main central nexus of ideas concerning history in the Old Testament. Indeed, when Miguez Bonino rejects the dualistic approach to history by recourse to the Old Testament it is to the prophetic outlook he is referring. He describes his approach to history in the Old Testament as follows:

"There is scarcely a question of "two histories" in relation to the Old Testament. There, God's action takes place in history and as history. It inextricably involves human action and, conversely, there is no human action reported outside the relation with God's purpose and word. This interconnection does not mean an equation between God's sovereignty and history, as if the former would justify or sacralize everything that happens... But the distinction is conceived polemically:
the Lordship of Yahweh is an efficacious word which becomes history and creates history by convoking and rejecting men and peoples in relation to God's purpose. Thus, Yahweh's sovereignty does not appear in history as an abstract act or an interpretation but an announcement and commandment, as announcement which convokes, as promise and judgment demanding and inviting a response. History is, precisely, this conflict between God and his people in the midst and in relation to all peoples". (54)

This is an excellent description of the prophetic view of history. It can be well illustrated in the call of the prophets. Amos was taken from his work as a shepherd and ordered to go and speak the word of the Lord to Israel and apparently never demurred. (55)

The response of Jeremiah was by contrast, a far more hesitant reply and his description indicates how Jahweh had to persuade him. (56) Again by contrast Isaiah was able to overhear the divine speech and volunteered to respond. (59) In each of these three instances the degree of human reaction to and involvement with the prior divine initiative varied, but in each there was divine - human interaction.

As we shall presently see, the prophets were themselves directly involved in the historical process, but we cite these three instances to serve as models of human responses to God's call and command. Similar patterns of responding can be seen in kings and military generals, priests, and government officials. God spoke and men either heard or refused to hear, obeyed or disobeyed, accepted or rejected his command. Whilst the prophets themselves furnish reactions to the divine sovereignty in ways which might be regarded as more compliant, we can see in other places similar varying responses; in the incident with Naaman (58) an initial refusal to obey is followed by submission; in the description by Deutro-Isaiah of Jahweh's deliverance of the exiled people, Cyrus the Persian is depicted as the Lord's anointed one. (59) But men are free to disobey the commandment too, and the repeated calls of the prophets
to the people to change their ways usually go unheeded. (60) What happens in the events of everyday history therefore is a curious, if fascinating, interweaving of divine initiative and human response which, as warp and weft together form the fabric of events. God and men interact with one another in a dialectical pattern which the liberation theologians, amongst others, have rightly perceived to be one history.

Miguez Bonino goes on to make two further claims with regard to the Old Testament. In the first he refutes the validity of the frequently made dichotomy between what he calls the "brute facts" of history and and interpretation of them in the prophetic witness. These belong together because of the prophet's message comes itself as one of the constituent parts of the historical process and is hence "an act and a factor in itself". (61) Its object is not detached explanation but engagement, calling, inviting and condemning.

His second comment on the nature of Old Testament history emphasizes its political character since as action and word it embraces both the totality of the life of the people as a people and also the intergroup relations of different peoples and nations in the structures of power. The dualism that separates political life from religious life is foreign to the Old Testament. Even the personal epiphanies are woven into the history of the people of God. In all the commerce of the day to day legal, political, economic and domestic relations of the nation "Yahweh conflictively asserts his sovereignty by calling and rejecting, forgiving and punishing and thus erecting the signs and the road of his coming final victory, his Kingdom. (62)

We can see from both of these assertions a correcting of the dualistic division of history we have previously outlined. In the first Miguez
Bonino emphasizes the historical nature of the prophetic word itself. The prophet is not merely a commentator on historical events but a participant in the process. His call to repentance, his invitation to the nation to redirect its course of action and his appeal for social change, come into line with Marx's fundamental principle of praxis and the role of philosophy - to change the world rather than to interpret it (a theme to which we will return later). This points to the prophetic function as historical engagement and underlines the involvement of prophecy with history. It is also the role Miguez Bonino assigns to theology.

This engagement in historical action has been described by Von Rad (63). In a study of the role of the divine word in prophetic activity he points out how from early times even the word of man was conceived as having a creative power in itself and as an objective reality in its own right. The divine word was, however, immeasurably more powerful and hence the theology characteristic of Deutro-Isaiah developed emphasizing the activity of the word of God in creation.

From its presence in creation to its force in history there was really only a small transition. The phrase "the word of Jahweh came to so and so" occurs 123 times in the prophetic literature and "represents the apperception of the divine word as event, a unique happening in history which a man is looking for or which takes him by surprise, and which therefore sets the person in a new historical situation". (64) Furthermore, although there may be a similarity between the oracles of a particular prophet each one is still unique - it is the word of the Lord and not a word - and therefore each one is to some extent a new event.

The prophetic activity was involved in a dialectical relationship therefore with the events of history. The day to day happenings prompted the prophets to speak, but when they uttered "the word of the Lord" that word in turn affected the course of these events. So when Isaiah talks of the Lord sending "a word against Jacob" it has such objective reality
that he can add that "it has lit upon Israel". (65) Jeremiah was called to prophesy and his ministry was to involve him in plucking up and breaking down, as well as the building and planting of nations (65). This was not only historical activity, it was historical action of the most effective and radical nature, and there is little wonder that the established authorities were fearful of the prophets. (67)

Whether Miguez Bonino was consciously using these insights of Von Rad is not clear, but the correspondence between his succinct paragraph and the exposition by Von Rad is striking. In any event Miguez Bonino is correct in pointing out the involvement of the prophetic message with the course of historical events.

With regard to the second point - the nature of Old Testament history as political - we can here note the concept of the unitary nature of reality which underlies Miguez Bonino's attempt to guard against the dualistic interpretation of history. The reality of the sovereign God and the reality of the political events in Israel's history are indissolubly linked for neither makes sense without the other in the prophetic way of looking at them in the Old Testament.

Clearly the prophets speak the word of God in relation to the political events happening around them and it is both in relation to and even sometimes through these happenings themselves that God speaks to them. Nowhere is this "political" and "secular" nature of the history seen more clearly than in the attitude of Deutero-Isaiah to the rise of Cyrus of Persia, to which we have previously referred. The prophet links the action of God with the imperial ambition and statecraft of the foreign king in a union that is at once both political and theological.

There is, however, more to the prophetic interpretation of history than Miguez Bonino brings out, and a fuller understanding of its dynamics can be gleaned from the insights both of Von Rad and Heschel. Von Rad
traces the prophetic awareness of history to the Hebrew sense of time and contrasts this with the contemporary western concept. Western man thinks of time as a linear sequence beginning in a vague distant past and moving into recorded history with the present as the centre and with the future stretching onward. Israel had a somewhat different attitude. For her, time was not separated from specific events. It was in fact "event-full" and it was the occurrence taking place in the point of time or period that invested any particular time with significance. Thus there is no such thing as an abstract or philosophical idea of time, but rather of a "time" when something happens. "The tree yields its fruit in its time" (Ps1:3) and God gives his creatures food 'in due time' (Ps. 104:27); that is to say, every event has its definite place in the time-order; the event is inconceivable without its time, and vice-versa". (68) There thus evolved in Israelite thought and practice the ordering of the year in relation to the great agricultural festivals. The peculiarity of the Hebrew use of these celebrations was that she eventually "historicized" them by linking them with events in her past - the Exodus, the sojourn in the wilderness and the dwelling in booths. In making this transition she demonstrated her unique awareness that she was not bound to the cyclical events of nature but to historical acts in which Jahweh had both saved and accompanied her. By re-enacting these historical events the Israelites felt themselves to be participating in them in a real and vivid way which meant that the saving acts held a certain contemporaneousness about them.

Israel did not stop there. She went on to add a whole series of such happenings to her calendar and consequently there evolved from the aggregate of these special times "a span of historical time" (Von Rad), the beginning of the concept of a linear historical span. Fundamental then to the sense of history for Israel was the conviction that it existed only as the times in which God guided, saved, and spoke to her.
With the prophets there is a sharpening of this idea. By relating their message to the historical movements of their own day,

"they placed the new historical acts of God which they saw around them in exactly the same category as the old basic events of the canonical history - indeed, they gradually came to realise that this new historical action was to surpass and therefore, to a certain extent, to supercede the old. They were in fact called forth by their conviction that Jahweh was bringing about a new era for his people". (69)

Their theological interpretation of current events distinguished their work from mere political calculation because they perceived precisely that interrelationship between human actions and the sovereign freedom of the will of Jahweh to which we have previously referred. In this looking for the novum which God was to inaugurate they switched the perspective of time from a concentration on and celebration of the past events to an expectation of the future working of God. So the characteristic feature of the prophetic message is "its expectation of something soon to happen" (70).

This sense of the imminence of the future marks the beginning of the biblical eschatological awareness. The prophets heighten the sense of drama by depicting a break between the present and the future. This division, separating the present age and the future age is what constitutes the true dualism of the biblical interpretation of history. It is marked by the intervention of "Jahweh's great act of demolition" (Von Rad) in which he brings to an end the previous age and ushers in a new state which is so different from what went before it that it cannot be regarded as a mere continuation of the past. This sense of urgency prompted the prophets to preach their message of judgment. By doing so they sought to dislodge the people's faith in past events which had given them a false sense of security. A new thing was about to happen, a vitally crucial new thing for "the prophets saw Jahweh approaching Israel with a new action which made the old saving institu-
tions increasingly invalid since from then on life or death for Israel was determined by this future event". (71)

The experience of suffering also served as a component factor in the Israelite historical awareness. Her geographical position resulted in her constantly becoming embroiled in the imperial power struggles of the ancient near east. Her smallness and relative weakness led to frequent defeats in battle and to her regular subjection to foreign powers. Her story has been well described by Butterfield as being full of "the thuds and thunders of disaster". (72)

In Abraham Heschel's reckoning this suffering meant that history was a "nightmare". "There are more scandals", he says, "more acts of corruption, than are dreamed of in philosophy. It would be blasphemous to believe that what we witness is the end of God's creation". (73) The prophets believed that such a state of evil cannot be accepted as final or as inevitable. Improvement even, was not enough. They looked for redemption. In so doing the prophetic message contained not only the threat of condemnation but also promise. Ezekiel speaks of a heart of flesh replacing the heart of stone (74) and Isaiah looks for a time when nature herself will change to match the glory of the age. (75) The new age will see the end of fear and of war, the disappearance of idolatry and the flowering of the knowledge of God. (76)

This hope of a new age then, stems from the Hebrew belief in justice which demanded that the suffering be requited. The very same sense of outraged justice had led Plato to formulate his doctrine of the two worlds. If this one allowed injustice there had to be another one where things were everywhere perfect. (77) But the Hebrew mind had no such ideal world elsewhere. It was earthed in the reality of this world, and it needed a terrestrial fulfilment of the promises. With barely a trace of hope in a life hereafter where all could be put right it
was on the horizontal level of history that justice must be done. If a blessed future had been promised in the past and only suffering was known in the present then that promise could only be fulfilled in the future. This same passion for the replacement of wrongs by justice reappears in the theology of Miguez Bonino and his fellow liberationists.

With the prophetic hope for a new age there is emphasized the concept of Jahweh as the God who comes. If he is transcendent, and wholly other, he is, nevertheless, the one who intervenes in the course of events, and because he has come in the past so he will come again in the future. "The coming of Jahweh is the central idea of Old Testament eschatology". (78) He is the God who comes because he is the God of promise. Indeed, his very nature revealed in the mystery of his name points to the coming fulfilment of his promise and thus to the future. In the Sinai revelation he names himself as "I am who I am" or "I will be what I will be" (79). Israel's understanding of Jahweh relates therefore to a dynamic nature, to a God who is still to reveal himself to her in his future acts and comings. "When his name is demanded of him, he simply interprets the intention which tore him from his local soil and put him on the move in the form of a cloud and a column of fire toward the future, the futurum Canaan, as if he were moving to his distant home". (80) Always there was some promise still to come to fulfilment. From the covenant with Abraham promising "the land that I will show you", through the Exodus promise "that I will bring you up out of the affliction of Egypt", and the dreams for the "Day of the Lord" so scathingly denounced by Amos, to the hope of a glorious future of shalom articulated in the prophetic vision of the return to primordial paradise, the new covenant of Jeremiah, the restored Israel of Ezekiel and finally to the Apocalyptic goal of the kingdom of the son of man - always He is the God
of the future beckoning them towards the fulfilment of a still-hoped-for promise.

In all this the great prophets fulfilled the role of catalysts. It was their perceptive insight which pierced to the cutting edge of time and discerned amidst the tramp of armies, the moral demands of God, and the pain of a people, the interrelationship of forces and the decisiveness of the conditional nature of the covenant. For them the future was not pre-programmed. It was dependent upon what the people would do in the present and constituted a call to change their ways—or else Jahweh would bring this or that to pass. Heschel declares:

"What saved the prophets from despair was their messianic vision and the idea of man's capacity for repentance. That vision and that idea affected their understanding of history.

History is not a blind alley, and guilt is not an abyss. There is always a way that leads out of guilt; repentance or turning to God. The prophet is a person who, living in dismay, has the power to transcend his dismay. Over all the darkness of experience hovers the vision of a different day." (81)

It is this vision with its accompanying power to rise above despair which has captivated the theologians of liberation as well as contemporary political theologians. As they have sought to interpret their hope for the poor and dispossessed in the light of the Biblical revelation they have rediscovered this Old Testament model of a theology of history.

One such theologian has been Jurgen Moltmann who has utilized Von Rad's outline of the prophetic categories of novum and futurum in expounding his theology of hope. (82) Moltmann sees in this complex of ideas "the first signs of a universal eschatology of mankind" (83) He also perceives that the content of the hope—a new age of blessing, fulness of life and protection—emerged from a hope for reversal of
the experience of deprivation and suffering. He detects in this reversal, furthermore, the dialectical pattern which Hegel and Marx were to analyse in the movement of history. "The positive content of the ideas", he says, "is all supplied by negation of the negative". (84)

The essence of the biblical response to suffering is, according to Moltmann, not resignation or despair, but hope. This hope is not an escapist or quietist flight to some heavenly bliss (85) but a protest against suffering. The resurrection of Christ points to the future of the earth and is consequently "the enemy of death and of a world that puts up with death". (86)

Miguez Bonino, in line with other theologians of liberation, shares this conviction that history provides mankind with an opportunity to engage in historical action which will constitute a response to the divine invitation to set up signposts of the kingdom of God on earth. This belief, as we have seen, emerged in the Old Testament prophets.

However, when we move into the New Testament we find a somewhat different attitude to history. The New Testament resounds with the confident claim that the manifestation of God's kingly rule promised in the Old Testament has come in the person of Jesus Christ. The Messianic Age has arrived; the promises are fulfilled; the things hoped for have materialized. Indeed, the relationship between the two testaments should be thought of not so much in terms of upward development nor of contrast but rather in terms of beginning and completion. The link that binds them to each other is the concept of the kingly rule of God. (87) This sense of continuity is to be carefully noted. Miguez Bonino makes the claim that, "Nobody can fail to see that we move into a somewhat different climate as we enter the New Testament, particularly the Pauline and Johannine literature. The question is to determine what is the difference". (88)
He suggests that this difference is due to the difficulty which Gentiles have in identifying with the events of the Biblical narratives. Whilst they see the continuity between their own national histories and their present situation Miguez Bonino feels they therefore have to try to combine the biblical history and their own. Most fail to do this and finish with a sense that the biblical events are distant and remote as history.

However, there appears to be a much more theologically significant fact which Miguez Bonino seems to overlook. This is the shift in the understanding of time and history which the Christ-event brought. As we have seen, the predominant sense of history in the Old Testament was very largely the result of the development from the awareness that God had acted in a series of past events into the future orientation which the prophetic hope engendered. The focus of time had therefore come to be fixed largely on the future. In the New Testament the emphasis is on the "now" of the saving events. This results in an awareness of Christ and the events surrounding his incarnation, ministry, death and exaltation as constituting the centre of history. Because Christ is the fulfilment of the promises the eschaton has arrived. But it is not the end of time and history. Rather it is the mid-point. (89)

Despite the strong emphasis on the fulfilment in the present nevertheless the sense of the future still to come, so strongly evident in the prophetic witness, by no means diminishes in the New Testament. Although the awareness that the kingdom has already arrived is strong, the hope for a future consummation still remains. Whilst in one sense the coming of Jesus represents the end to which history has moved, in another it signals the beginning. For now the end time - inaugurated by the incarnation, ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus - has ushered in the last phase of history. This also has a goal - the return of Christ - as well as a centre which was his coming. "The believer",
declares Bakhoff, "looks forward and backward, and knows himself to be involved in the unrestrainable movement towards the completion of God's Kingdom". (90)

There are two aspects of this forward reference in the New Testament hope. The first is the sense of the imminence of the Parousia. Whilst the intensity of the first expectations gave way in the face of pragmatic needs to a more realistic perspective, the hope of orientation to the future itself never diminished. A consummation of the Kingdom is everywhere predicted. The manner of this consummation may vary but the hope remains strong. (91)

The second aspect of this future hope, however, is the conviction that the Kingdom, so vividly manifest in the Christ-event and to be consummated at the close of the age, is nevertheless an ongoing reality in the world. The mission of the church to the Gentiles is a witness to this continuing awareness. In his parables, Jesus had spoken repeatedly of an imminent coming of the Kingdom as well as referring to its presence in his person. But he also told of a link between the present and the parousia in the "growth" parables - those referring to the mustard seed, the wheat and tares, the seed growing secretly and the leaven. These point to the conviction that not only has something happened, and not only is something going to happen but it is also taking place, albeit silently and unnoticed, now. There is a continuity between the past and the future, and the apostolic church witnessed to that present and continuing activity of the Kingdom in its proclamation and its service.

There is thus a complex set of factors which leads to the change in climate between the Old and New Testament to which Miguez Bonino refers. When he accounts for the transition by claiming that Gentile converts have a difficulty in identifying with their own national
history, as well as the events of the biblical drama (92) this is really beside the point. It may to some extent explain the duality of histories which we have to hold together, but Miguez Bonino seems to make something of a red herring of this fact. The change is the shift of focus from the future reference of prophetic eschatology to the realization that the new age has begun.

At this point, however, we must go a little more deeply into the question Miguez Bonino asks with regard to the difference in climate between the unitary concept of history in the Old Testament and the much less discernible interest of the New Testament in the political events of the day. This is the real problem with which Miguez Bonino is trying to come to grips.

Here we have to face the fact that the New Testament writers have by and large omitted to "eschatologize" the truth they sought to witness to. In an important passage which spells out the significance of this fact Van Ruler says:

"The word 'eschatologize' is meant to convey the fact that originally and finally, and hence continually, our concern is with God himself and the world in the naked subsistence of things. This may be glimpsed at times in the New Testament where it speaks of the end of faith, of the Son's giving of the kingdom to the Father, of the dwelling of God among men, of the new earth in which righteousness dwells, of the new birth of the world of authority and the good as such (1 Pet. 1:9; 1 Cor. 15: 26, 28; Rev. 21:2; II Pet. 3:13; Matt. 19:28; Rom. 13: 1-7). But generally speaking, this is all concealed in the particularity of revelation. The Messiah and the Spirit, the incarnation and the indwelling cover it over, keeping and preserving but also hiding it...

In the Old Testament this original and final element, this faithfulness to the earth and time, is plainly more visible". (93)

It is possible to account for this lack on the part of the New Testament writers. For one thing they lived for the most part with the vivid expectation of an imminent parousia. This meant that since a further irruption of divine power was expected any day there was no awareness of any need to involve themselves with such vast concerns since God
himself was soon to make all things new. Since he had acted independently of human initiative in the mighty acts of the incarnation, resurrection and Pentecost it must have seemed perfectly normal to think that any action needed on the stage of what Van Ruler calls "the earth and time" could also be expected to come directly from the intervention of God.

Secondly, the tumultuous political events that did take place, such as the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and the Neronic persecutions must only have served to stimulate the apocalyptic expectations which we find so strongly emphasized in the New Testament. These in their turn attributed the predicted sensational happenings to divine intervention rather than calling for human action.

Thirdly the position of the Christian community itself was a factor. In the earlier years of the period during which the New Testament was written the focus was on the activity of God in and through the mission of the Church to the Gentiles. The whole attention was directed to creating and maintaining the tiny communities in an increasingly hostile environment. In the later years the church was itself a persecuted minority and the extant writings reveal a concern with urgent defensive reactions against the twin dangers of heretical teaching and physical persecution.

Because of the widespread and intermittent persecutions any writings that may have been circulating which could have portrayed the church as a politically dangerous element would have been suppressed either by the church itself or by the authorities. This constitutes a fourth possible cause for the lack of any overt "eschatologization" of the Christian testimony in the sense we have referred to above.

The Church has followed this tendency, and the gap which Miguez Bonino seeks to explain is precisely this failure to ground the message in the
context of their "earth and time" reality by the New Testament writers whatever the cause may have been.

Van Ruler also voices this concern of Miguez Bonino. He believes,

"... that in this respect we have to speak most emphatically of the greater value of the Old Testament as compared with the New. The Old Testament has a more positive concern with creation and the kingdom, with the first things and the last, with the image and the law, with sanctification and humanity, with ethos and culture, with society and marriage, with history and the state. These are precisely the matters at issue in the Old Testament. For this reason the Old Testament neither can nor should be expounded christologically, but only eschatologically, in other words theocratically. There is in it a profound confidence in the goodness of the world, the serviceability of man, and the possibility of sanctifying the earth.

This the church needs for its own life, to keep it from hopeless entanglement in the problems of sin and atonement, as though only dark shadows lay on the earth and life. For God's sake it needs to be more human and secular than it has hitherto let itself be in its tradition". (94)

The New Testament then, with the exception of the Apocalypse and the occasional references to historical characters such as Herod, Pilate, and the silversmiths at Ephesus has little to say about the secular events of the day. But the sense of history is not missing. It is perhaps better to say that the Old Testament concept of history is the framework within which the New Testament picture of God's acts is set.

Before we leave the teaching of the New Testament we must pause to take note of some trends in eschatological thinking which have emerged in modern times. Following the nineteenth century liberal understanding of the Kingdom which focussed on human experience and ethical activity the emphasis began to change with the appearance in 1892 of Johannes Weiss' work Jesus' Proclamation of the Kingdom of God, (95). Weiss claimed that the teaching of Jesus depicted the Kingdom of God as an irruption into history, a crisis which was solely the work of God.

This view was developed by Schweitzer who claimed that the whole life,
work and teaching of Jesus was dominated by the apocalyptic thought
forms of our Lord's day centring on the imminence of the coming
Kingdom. (96) Schweitzer's work had the value of pointing out that
eschatology was central to Jesus' own thinking and not merely periphe-
ral. This school of "consistent" or "future" eschatology was followed by
the work of C.H.Dodd who claimed that the eschaton was realized in the
person and work of Jesus. (97) Dodd made great use of the statement
by Jesus, "The Kingdom of God is in the midst of you". (98)

One of the most important expositions of New Testament eschatology, however,
has been the existentialist interpretation of Rudolf Bultmann. He is
important in our present context because he represents a point of view which
the contemporary political theologians have sought to repudiate. In addi-
tion his ideas lead to a position where history is de-valued as a sphere
for eschatologically significant concrete human action. Bultmann set out
to expound eschatology in terms of Heidegger's existentialist categories.
In doing so he fastened on to the New Testament eschatological emphasis
on the present to the exclusion of its Biblical components in the past
and the future. His eschatology is thus all centre, with neither beginning
nor end in the historical continuum.

Acknowledging that Heidegger's existentialism was an atheistic version,
Bultmann claimed that since it analysed human existence, and this was one
of the concerns of theology, it was useful as a vehicle of interpreta-
tion for theological understanding. The result is that Bultmann eschews
the historical and eschatological significance of the objective world and
the making of history, concentrating on the interior, subjective life of
the individual as the focus of the word of God in its address to and
dealings with man.

In Bultmann's view, man finds himself, his authentic being, in decisions
that he makes. Man is his own possibility and he realizes this possi-
bility only in historical encounters and the decisions he makes regarding them and the responses he offers to them. His historicity does not consist in the sort of historical engagement Miguez Bonino is calling for, but rather in his own history which is when he realizes himself. (99)

Here then, the dualism is seen in the dichotomy between the outside objective world of historical structures and the interior, subjective world of the self where authenticity becomes realized in the actualizing of man's possibility. Transcendence is localized in subjectivity and God is removed from the world of historical activity. Bultmann says:

"God, who stands aloof from the history of nations, meets man in his own little history, his everyday life with its daily gift and demand; de-historized man (i.e. naked of his supposed security within his historical group) is guided into his concrete encounter with his neighbour in which he finds his true history". (100)

Faith for Bultmann is not responding in commitment to God with an outgoing love, but with a new interior disposition. Renewal is effective at the personal level only. Bultmann's concept of eschatological significance is grounded in the present moment. Any moment in which God confronts me is invested with eschatological importance because in it I am called to make a decision in response. The eschaton is the present moment in which God gives me the opportunity to opt for authentic existence. Bultmann affirms that the eschatological event of Jesus Christ becomes new repeatedly in the proclamation of the church and the response of faith. Preaching encounters and addresses man, and demands an answer, a decision. He claims "It is the paradox of Christian being that the believer is taken out of the world and exists so to speak, as unworlly and that at the same time he remains within the world, within his historicity". (101)

In such an understanding, history - secular, creative and political - has been divested of meaning. This can be found in the inward world of "authentic existence". In such a downgrading of history there is the tendency to relativize and spiritualize man's
relationship with and responsibility before God. The inevitable consequence is the privatization of man's relations with God and the repudiation of responsibility for the concrete issues of political and social existence.

Jurgen Moltmann has articulated the criticism which contemporary political theology makes of existentialist theology by saying,

"A theology which settled faith in the existence of the individual, in the sphere of his personal, immediate encounters and decisions, is a theology which from the viewpoint of sociological science stands at the very place to which society has banished the cultus privatus in order to emancipate itself from it. This faith is in the literal sense socially irrelevant, because it stands in the social no-man's-land of the unburdening of the individual - that is, in a realm which materialist society has already left free to human individuality in any case". (102)

Whilst the existentialist interpretation of New Testament eschatology succeeded in avoiding some of the problems facing New Testament scholarship at the time it was formulated (103) it nevertheless finished up with an understanding of the historical foci of the Christian faith which was a denial of the very significance of history which the prophets had sought to emphasize. Bultmann's theology, no less than the traditional theologies, has lent significance to a realm of reality removed from actual history. In so doing it has created a new dualism which is as clearly otherworldly as was the dualism stemming from the Augustinian tradition. It was equally as disengaged from concrete political activity as they were.

In an attempt to re-establish the eschatological significance of historical action, and to avoid the dualism which we have seen to be inherent in traditional theology contemporary political theology turned again to the biblical sources. It was attempting to discover categories of interpretation which would offer hope for a better future in the face of the suffering prevalent in so much of the world today. This quest
led them to look afresh at the apocalyptic understanding of history.

3. **APOCALYPticalism**

One of the fruits of the Marxist-Christian dialogue has been that theologians have turned their attention to the theology of history and in doing so have rediscovered the insights in apocalypticism. This has led to a remarkable reversal of interest, since both the modern mind and the Church had been uncomfortable with the apocalyptic mythological framework. The attention it now receives would have been impossible prior to the sixties of the present century. (104)

Although in one sense apocalyptic arose because of the failure of the prophetic model it nevertheless has certain affinities with prophecy. Both seek an answer to the riddle of theodicy. They look also to the action of God in the political events of history in the future and therefore have a predictive element. Differences in style abound which it is not necessary to elaborate on here. Despite these distinctions both prophets and apocalyptists spoke what for them was the work of God in their respective styles and situations. (105) The most important feature of the apocalyptic framework for understanding history is the combination of a cosmic dualism (which involves a struggle between the personified forces of good and evil) with the idea of the two ages. This present age is the sphere of human history, and it is under the power of evil. The apocalyptists see no hope for improving it, so totally evil has it become. The righteous find themselves suffering and persecuted because of the evil powers at work. It is because of this sense of helplessness that apocalypticism has sometimes been described as pessimistic. Moreover there is the prediction of increased suffering before the present age ends - a "things will get worse before they get better" attitude.
But it finds its hope in the idea of the new age, the age to come. Soon, claim these writers, God will intervene with power. and, in a mighty conflict which will include the whole cosmos, he will overthrow the evil power and inaugurate a new age under his dominion. The faithful followers will share with him in the bliss of this new age which will be their reward for loyalty and endurance in the face of their present suffering and oppression. In some apocalyptists this earth as well as this age is to be replaced by a new one, or, as in Revelation, by the descent of a heavenly city. In this way, the apocalyptic view of history sought to explain the present prevalence of evil in the form of suffering, and to assert faith in a God who was ultimately in control of the universe at the same time. The cry for justice we have previously noted is inherent in this explanation also, with the new age predicted as the time when the wrongs will be put right, and true justice established.

The essence of the apocalyptic faith, however, was its insistence on and confidence in, the power of God to intervene in the course of history. The present age was thoroughly evil and incapable of redeeming itself. Its redemption had to come from outside. Its hope, its only hope, lay in the intervention by the transcendent God. This intervention, moreover, would come - of this there was no doubt in the apocalyptists' faith - and the new age would be brought about therefore by miraculous means.

In this divine intervention we observe a distinction between the prophetic view of the future and that of apocalyptic. The prophets, as we noted earlier, saw future history as under the control of God but contingent also upon the human response to God. Men in their freedom had the power to influence the course of events. The apocalyptists, on the other hand, having despised of the possibility of any favourable human co-operation with and submission to God, concentrate on God's
mighty intervention at the end of the age. God would dispense with human freedom because to use Rowley's phrase, "He would Himself act in a way as solely His own as His act in creation had been". (106)

The age to come will, in the apocalyptic view of history, see the establishment of the reign of God. Those who have remained faithful to God in the suffering and persecution will be saved and will share in this glorious future. Some who have suffered death will be raised to share in it. (107)

The belief in hope for a resurrection had arisen in the first of the apocalyptic works, Daniel (108) and whilst not unique to Jewish apocalyptic was taken up in the New Testament. It became one of the legacies from apocalyptic thought to achieve a permanent place in Christian belief.

Judgment is to take place as a part of the establishment of the theocracy. It is a forensic type of judgment and usually has God as the judge. (109) It is dispensed on the basis of faithfulness and obedience (or apostasy) during the suffering and oppression.

All initiative it seems, is removed from human hands, and in the dialectic between despair of the evil present and hope for the divinely-ordained future there is little place for the exercise of that human freedom so greatly prized and so sacrificially gained in the modern era. Truly, if apocalyptic is to provide any meaningful contribution to a theological perspective it will have to be reinterpreted in order to designate a real role for men's participation in and creative contribution to the shaping of the historical process. This may be the meaning behind Miguel Bonino's statement that "we must deepen our understanding of the apocalyptic literature" (110) - a statement which he appears not to elaborate, but to which we will return later.
The apocalyptic view of history, because it holds out a utopian hope of God's intervention, the end of suffering, and the rule of righteousness and peace, has captivated the imagination and aspiration of various groups down the centuries. Despite its association with, and appropriation by, fanatical groups it may not be casually dismissed. Indeed Russell, in assessing its significance concluded that this "promised kingdom is one of shalom and as such is not altogether divorced from earth or history or from the kingdoms of men. Its sign is that of justice and peace, not just in some far-off time or place, but in the struggles of contemporary life". (111)

Apocalyptic teaching has given rise to two diverse reactions. The first is quietism (112), and the other is militant, political and even revolutionary millenarianism. (113) One of the most influential of the latter forms of teaching came from Joachim of Fiore who lived in the latter half of the twelfth century. (114) Using typological and allegorical style of interpretation from the scriptures he worked out a scheme of history based on the doctrine of the trinity, involving three epochs of history each of which manifests a person of the trinity. The final period would be one of love, joy and freedom and the knowledge of God would be directly perceived in the hearts of all men. Joachim deduced that this third phase was to begin in a short while and that the final age would commence about A.D. 1260. Before this there would be a three and a half year reign of the Antichrist who would be a secular ruler. In the interim period Joachim declared that there must be a new order of monks to prepare for the final age and their rule would endure until the Last Judgment. There was then to be a two-stage eschaton. The age of the Spirit was the first stage and the parousia and final judgment the ultimate conclusion. In this scheme we can see the provision both for an historical continuity and a final consummation.
The revolutionary tendencies latent in this type of Apocalyptic interpretation came to prominence in the use Joachim's followers made of his ideas. The Franciscan Spirituals proclaimed him as a new John the Baptist and St. Francis as the novus dux, even a "new Christ". They formed a minority order within the larger Order and later seceded from it. They interpreted Joachim's ideas in order to claim that they themselves were the unworldly monastic order which was to replace the hierarchical institutions of the Roman Church, Pope, clergy, sacraments, scripture and teaching. They used the life of St. Francis as the criterion by which to condemn the contemporary corruption of the Church and identified the Emperor as the Antichrist who would chastise the Church.

The teaching of Joachim inspired other revolutionary movements in subsequent periods. His importance however lies in the three-stage type of historical interpretation he inaugurated. This three-stage model was to be copied in the idealist philosophies of Lessing, Schelling, Fichte and to a lesser extent Hegel. Similarly Auguste Comte's division of history into phases ascending from theological, through metaphysical, and culminating in a scientific era, illustrates the hold Joachim's schema exercised on subsequent minds. It can similarly be seen to reappear in Marx's theory of history as consisting of three main epochs - primitive communism, class society and final communism. Cohn can also hear an echo from the Joachite past in the Nazi phrase "Third Reich" and the belief that it was going to last for a thousand years. (115)

The conclusion we are drawn to is that the promise of a future golden age to replace present wrongs holds a great appeal for the minds of men in different periods. It can also exert enormous emotional and political influence when used by those seeking to gain power. The liberation being promised in contemporary political and theological movements bears a
strong resemblance to Joachim's projected third epoch of love, joy and freedom. When in addition to the offer of such sought-after gains the prediction is made that the new age is about to break in then the mixture can prove to be a potent brew. As Moltmann has observed, "When freedom is near, the chains begin to gall" (116)

This comment is well illustrated by the events which followed the teachings of Thomas Müntzer. A learned man, Müntzer was a contemporary of Luther in the early sixteenth century. At first he supported Luther but soon broke away and became a bitter opponent of the great reformer.

The apocalyptic element that Müntzer adopted in particular was the theme that the last days were at hand and God was speaking directly to his elect. The Turks were soon to conquer the world and the Antichrist would rule over it, but the elect were then to rise up and annihilate the ungodly. The elect were those who had received the Holy Spirit, "the living Christ" who was distinct from the historical Christ.

Müntzer counselled intense ascetic self-mortification in preparation for direct communication with God. When the Holy Spirit comes to a person thus prepared he becomes a vessel of the Holy Spirit, and such a person is thus given complete knowledge of God's will, lives in perfect harmony with it and is consequently able to fulfil the divinely ordained eschatological mission. Müntzer claimed that he himself was in this condition. His teachings appealed particularly to the poor, who were ever eager to hear and follow one who promised better things to come. At Allstedt people flocked from the surrounding countryside to hear him. These he formed into a revolutionary movement which he called the "League of the Elect" in opposition to Luther's university influence. A new Reformation in which Allstedt was to replace Wittenberg, was foretold, and this reformation, claimed Müntzer, would be total and final. It would usher in the Millennium. (117)
The revolutionary nature of his eschatological beliefs was clearly stated
in the sermon he preached before Duke John in July 1524. Basing it on the
Book of Daniel he declared that the last of the world empires was now
approaching its end and that the world was the empire of the devil. Priests,
monks and ungodly rulers all needed to die, claimed Müntzer. "The sword is
necessary to exterminate them. And so that it shall be done honestly and
properly... our dear fathers the princes must do it... If they resist let
them be slaughtered without mercy... At the harvest time one must pluck the
weeds out of God's vineyard". (118) However Müntzer had little to say
about the nature of the future society and apparently did little to improve
the material lot of the peasants amongst whom he lived. What is clear is
that he foresaw a state in which property and goods would be held in common
and each would receive according to his needs.

In 1525 Müntzer was able to stir an army of peasants 5000 strong into
revolt against the princes. They were massacred and Müntzer was beheaded
after battles at Frankenhausen and Muhlhausen.

Müntzer is perhaps the classic example of premillenial revolutionary
chiliasm. He has been accused, in his insistence on precipitating the
millenium by coercive human action of a "Promethean snatching of the
stuff of divinity out of heaven" and of holding a Gnostic Christology
and soteriology. (119) Despite these heretical tendencies Müntzer
enjoys favour amongst the modern advocates of liberation by violence.

In assessing his importance Matheson declares: "For the Marxist his impor-
tance lies in his awareness of social injustice and above all in his
analysis of the use and abuse of power-political, economic and cultural.
For all its unconscious romanticism there is much to be said for this view".
(120)

Assessment and evaluation of Müntzer however is
usually made on the basis of the ideological bias of the commentator. He has been acclaimed by Marxists as "the Theologian of Revolution", and Bloch begins his biography of Müntzer with the statement: "Müntzer is, first of all, history in a productive sense; he, his life and work, and all the past that merits recording, has the function of obligating us, inspiring us, to support ever more broadly what we were meant to be". (121)

From an Anabaptist standpoint Goertz has concluded that Müntzer was basically a mystic who believed that when a believer received salvation or the Spirit this was a paradigm of what happened in the political spectrum. A transformation in the inner life, for Müntzer, necessitated a corresponding change in power relationships. Mysticism could be fused with apocalypticism. (122)

The significance of Müntzer for this study is that he represents one possible response to the apocalyptic interpretation of history. This response affirms the eschatological nature of human history, declaring that man has a place and a role to play in the creation of history under God. As against the passive role of the Church castigated by Miguez Bonino, Müntzer was prepared to take hold of human affairs. Believing in the future inbreaking of God into terrestrial events, he sought to bring in the promised age of socialistic egalitarianism and righteousness looked forward to for so long by the poor and the oppressed. Müntzer was prepared to write history "from underneath" and, in doing so so to see himself as an agent and co-worker with God.

The apocalyptic interpretation of history, despite its inherent weaknesses in being devoid of any ethical emphasis and of denying man a role in the creation of the promised future, can nevertheless become a powerfully motivating element for political activity. It insists on a dramatic
and imminent irruption of the eschatological kingdom. Left in its pristine biblical form it can lead to a renunciation of political and social responsibility every bit as quietist as the dualism of traditional theology. It substitutes a temporal dualism for the idealistic one and this switch leads to an important change in the psychological effect it has on those who accept it. When, to the insistence on the imminent inbreaking of the future there is added, by way of amendment to the biblical schema the claim that men must act to prepare for or to establish that kingdom, then the possibilities of upheaval in a revolutionary situation are greatly increased. Such a revolutionary situation, where millions suffer exists in the third world today and to a greater or lesser degree these conditions apply in most, if not all Latin American countries. Liberation theology can be seen as a theological reflection in such a situation which makes use amongst other themes of the apocalyptic emphasis on universal history.

Apocalyptic has been restored to prominence in the main stream of contemporary theology mainly as a result of the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg whose aim was to re-establish history as the fundamental theme of theology. In order to do this Pannenberg first seeks to understand the nature of history as revelatory event and concludes that it only becomes comprehensible from the viewpoint of its end, which is apocalyptically conceived. He therefore draws attention to the universality of history in the apocalyptic scheme. This universality of history emerged from the gradually developing concept of the universal sovereignty of God which became explicit in the post-exilic writers. The succession of world empires and the theological reflection on this phenomenon gave rise to this understanding. Pannenberg discerns an underlying unity in the various apocalyptic writings which consists of the theme that the meaning of history will only be completely known at its end when all will be revealed. Finally God's universal sovereignty will be indicated and his divinity
will be disclosed. In Pannenberg's view, the intervening events of history reveal God only indirectly. (123)

For Pannenberg, this final consummation of the Kingdom of God, when understood in characteristically apocalyptic style as imminent, is what gives significance to the here and now. By interpreting the teaching of Jesus in this way Pannenberg is able to unite the ethical with the apocalyptic, an exercise which Miguez Bonino follows in the second section of his chapter on "Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engagement" and to which we will return later. By doing this Pannenberg overcomes the ethical weakness in apocalypticism which we have previously noted.

The significance of Pannenberg's treatment of apocalyptic for this study is that he enables the contemporary mind to treat apocalyptic seriously. His bold affirmation of the value of its vision of universal history as the arena of faith and action points the way for political and liberation theologians to relate the insights he uncovers to their particular frame of reference. Whilst Pannenberg himself stops short of relating his theology to specific political issues his combination of apocalyptic with an ethical content serves to focus on the possibilities available to others with a more contextual interest. We shall have occasion to refer to Pannenberg's theology again. In the meantime we must consider other contributory factors which bear upon Miguez Bonino's theological enterprise.

The rise of contemporary political and liberation theology movements can be seen in part as a result of the rediscovery of the Biblical understanding of eschatology and apocalyptic. This renewed awareness of the importance and significance of history to Christian theology was prompted by the challenge presented by the Marxist interpretation of history. Indeed any appraisal of contemporary theology must of necessity take
cognizance of Marx's thought and philosophy, and to that system we
turn our attention.

4. THE MARXIST INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

As we have seen the "unworldliness" of the church's traditional under-
standing of history can be attributed to its captivity to idealistic
categories. The rise of Marxism, and its appeal to proletarian man derives
from its rejection of this interpretation of Christianity. Gollwitzer
has summed up the situation by asking:

"Did not the urgency of material need and the object
lessons taught by material work compel the proletarian
to a materialistic understanding of the world, in
contrast with which the idealism cherished by the Church
necessarily appeared as a pale, unrealistic, misleading
and deliberate confusion of the real issues? Did not
theology interpret Christian faith in idealist categories,
Platonic instead of Hebrew, so that it was easy to take
Christianity for a special kind of idealist world-view?" (126)

It is this idealist world-view of Christianity as it relates to history
and its effects in the renunciation of historical responsibility which
Miguez Bonino is seeking to correct.

At the same time the Marxist view of history evolved out of the philosophical
speculations of idealist thought in the mid-nineteenth century. This line
of reasoning had been developed via Descartes (125), Kant (126), Fichte
(127), and Schelling (128). Idealism is dualistic and in dividing reality
into two separate entities it gives rise to the dichotomy of reality which
appears in Descartes who postulated a self-contained mechanistic world of
matter completely divorced from the world of mind or spirit. The problem
becomes acute when the separation of 'spirit' from 'nature' leads philosophers
or theologians to clothe Christianity with idealistic and therefore dualistic
garments. Whether idealism leads to theism or not the effect has been the
same. The British Marxist, John Lewis has described the result:

"It turns us away from our real responsibilities and from any effective
grappling with the problems of the actual world, whether social or scientific. (129) Furthermore it creates an attitude which discourages any attempt to improve or reform the social milieu. This plays into the hands of those who benefit materially from the status quo and is exactly what we have seen to be the situation in Latin America.

In Marxist circles idealism is seen as the "ally of clericalism and superstition" (130). This, however, is a superficial assessment. When the German idealist movement was a new and developing school of thought it was calling into question the philosophy it was replacing in the same way as the teaching of Marx criticized and replaced idealism itself. But it has to be admitted, with Gollwitzer, that in so far as Christinity was expounded in idealist categories an inaccurate picture was drawn and a weakened form of faith was communicated. The force of Miguez Bonino's contention that history is one, and his assertion that man must be involved in a historical project can be gauged from these criticisms of the traditional Christian approach to history. If we are to follow the Marxist rejection of idealism and idealistic versions of faith we need to see first how idealism developed in the thought of Hegel. The reason for this is that in Hegel idealism reached its full flowering before turning into the historical materialism of Karl Marx.

Fundamental to Hegelianism is the principle of the dialectic. He tried to show how the identity between Nature and Spirit which Schelling had spoken of was achieved through the resolution of the contradiction of opposites in a gradually ascending scale. (131)

Hegel evolved the notion that pure concepts give rise to each other by means of three stages of formulation: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The first stage, the thesis, is the original idea, but it contains
within itself inadequacies which lead to the assertion of its antithesis. These polarities then inevitably produce a tension which is resolved by the development of a third concept, or synthesis of the preceding elements. The synthesis is necessarily of a higher order than the previous thesis. The process then begins again, for the first synthesis now becomes the thesis of a new and higher triad. (132)

The succession of polarities is the basis for Hegel's dialectic of history. Each stage of history, he believed, contained within itself the contradictions which brought about its own destruction or dissolution which in turn led to its transformation into a new and superior stage. History, for Hegel, was the sphere where the eternal ideas of divine reason appear in dialectical succession within time and finitude.

In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History he outlined four such stages of world history. (133) These he called the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman and finally the Germanic which for Hegel was the age in which human spirit reached full maturity. Each of these periods, Hegel contended, had some essential principle which characterized it but which also led to its breakdown and ensured that it was succeeded by some better principle in the next phase. These principles have a successive order like the stages in rational reflection, proceeding dialectically from a simple and inadequate understanding to an increasingly complex view with a number of different aspects to its truth. In attributing the events of the historical process to a dialectical sequence or rhythm Hegel was of course, postulating a determinism. This was in line with the Enlightenment tendency to discover the natural laws at work in the universe. It was also, however, a restatement of the pre-Enlightenment theology of providence.

For God, Hegel substituted the term "World Spirit", and in place of the hand of providence, he used the phrase "cunning of reason". (134)
This was for Hegel, a transcending purpose that functioned in, over and behind the conscious actions of historical figures, and this sense of a transcending purpose was to all intents and purposes an idealist rational version of the theological concept of providence. Carr has summed up this aspect of Hegel's position well with the statement "Hegel's World Spirit grasps providence firmly with one hand and reason with the other". (135)

In his dialectical progression of epochs and his concept of the "World Spirit" Hegel utilized and developed Schelling's ideas of development in the Absolute. The idea, which came to the fore in Fichte, of subject and object seeking a synthesis in infinite progress has been transcribed on to the stage of world history by Hegel. Fichte's creative subjectivity emerges here as well, for to present Hegel's view of history as a simple, thoroughgoing determinism, is a very one-sided perspective of a complex and dialectical formulation of the interlocking forces at work in history. For alongside the "cunning of reason" at work in the historical processes Hegel also lays stress on the development of human creativity.

In The Phenomenology of Spirit with its complicated thought patterns and its confusing juxtaposition of the developmental phases of mind as mere schemata with the corresponding actual phases in the history of culture, Hegel develops the notion of the importance and role of human labour.

His reasoning may be summarized as follows. He began from the awareness of experiencing a desire to appropriate objects. This was linked with the awareness of inhabiting a world of work and artefacts. This world around was a world of people in society, and the relations between these people were expressed in work. He came to the conclusion that man is an economic being, and in appropriating the objects he desires he humanizes the
environment in which he lives. In so doing he negates the world as it is, by changing it into a world of objects. In this action he transforms the world by means of his labour.

For Hegel, it was through the application of human labour that man developed the human spirit and achieved the freedom he sought. Looked at from this perspective man's labour and struggle can be regarded as the means by which he raised himself. Here we can see the source from which Marx was later to derive his theory of the proletariat and the idea of labour as the demiurge of history. (136)

In Hegel's complex teaching we find certain other themes which were to be taken up by Marx and developed into his historical materialism. The first of these is the use of the dialectic which affirms that it is through contradiction, negation and struggle that man arrives at a new stage in the achievement of freedom. The second derives from the context in which Hegel worked out his philosophy. He did this by reflecting on the French Revolution which proclaimed the right of every person to take part in the creation and control of the society of which he was a part. Henceforth the common people were to assert themselves in the events of history and the role of the proletariat was to achieve increasing significance. (137) A third theme was the importance of man's work as a transforming and creative activity in human existence. Through his labour man transforms his world and educates himself. The fourth aspect is his stress on the importance of man's passage from the awareness of freedom to its achievement. In doing so man seeks to be free from alienation and subservience.

We find these themes being taken up by Karl Marx who developed his interpretation of history from the Hegelian scheme. Marx, however, rejected the idealism with which Hegel's thought had been impregnated and instead evolved a materialistic dialectical system. "My dialectical method", he
"is not only different from the Hegelian but is its direct opposite. To Hegel the life process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which under the name of 'the Idea' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought... The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell". (138)

Marx took the materialism of Feuerbach and married it to the dialectic of Hegel. His stages of world history were economic stages and it was part of the unfolding dialectical evolutionary task of history to expose and refute the idealistic expositions which had gone before. In a well-known passage he declares:

"The task of history, therefore, once the world beyond the truth has disappeared, is to establish the Truth of this world. The immediate task of philosophy which is at the service of history once the saintly form of human self-alienation has been unmasked, is to unmask self-alienation in its unholy forms. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of right, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics". (139)

In the place of the dualism inherent in idealistic philosophy Marx's historical materialism is essentially monistic. For him the fundamental determinative reality, which is sufficient to account for the origin of all other aspects of human existence, is the production of the necessities of life by means of human labour. His anthropology therefore is based on the presuppositions that man is first a working being, and secondly that his distinguishing mark is to make tools with which to do that work. (140) The changes that take place in society are consequent upon the improvements man makes to his tools and the effects these have on the pattern of social relationships. In Capital,
Marx affirms: "Man himself, viewed as the impersonation of labour-power, is a natural object, a thing, although a living conscious thing, and labour is the manifestation of this power residing in him." (141) He claims therefore that labour, or as he would prefer to designate it, labour-power, is the ultimate reality.

The key to history, according to Marx, is the dialectical pattern of the changes in the economic base. In Marx's way of thinking all things are in a state of flux, change and movement. This applies alike to natural, social and conceptual phenomena. Nothing is a finished entity in itself. Moreover there are intricate inter-relationships between phenomena, and these, too, are part of the pattern of restlessness, agitation and becoming. "There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations and of formation in ideas; there is nothing immutable but the abstraction of the movement - mors immortalis" (142).

Following Hegel's thought, Marx also saw the struggle of opposites and contradictions and the consequent emergence of the new and superior in the synthesis. Marx however "exteriorized" the principle and combined it with the materialism previously noted. For him the true reality is in the actual phenomena themselves as they are apprehended in sense-perception, and the ideas of them are but reflections of the physical world. Because reality is external to the human mind it is therefore scientific, and the dialectical method is a scientific approach to historical phenomena.

In particular Marx utilized this concept of the dialectical nature of historical change in his analysis of the social processes as these have been fashioned and shaped by economic influences. He expended much time and energy applying this theory to the forces at work in the capitalist society of his day. From this he looked into the past to feudal, slave...
and primitive societies and then into the future projecting in advance
the arrival through the dialectical process of what he conceived would be
communist society. This would come about because the capitalist system,
true to his dialectical theory, embodies within itself the contradiction
which would ensure its own decay and overthrow. This contradiction was
the alienation of the working class. The antithesis or negation of
capitalism would come in the consciousness of the workers, which conscious-
ness would lead them to revolutionary activity and subsequently give rise
to socialism, which would then be the negation of the negation.

In Marx's understanding it was essential for the economic conditions to
have ripened in order for the revolution to take place. There had to
be a convergence of material circumstances which precipitated the end of
capitalism and the present world-order. Man himself could not produce
this convergence by seeking to take the initiative in speeding up change.
Even the proletariat could not do that. The economic forces had to
develop to a pitch of intensity for authentic revolution to have any
possibility of succeeding.

Marx was convinced that in this dialectic he had discovered the laws of
historical change. History was not shaped by divine powers, nor by
great persons, and it did not happen by sheer chance. Men created it,
mostly unconsciously, within the dialectical movements which were conse-
quently the laws of the historical process.

If the forces of history are moving inexorably towards the dissolution
of capitalist society and the establishment of communism it follows that
Marx is seeking to hold out the promise of a glorious future to mankind.
His thesis is that capitalism has, in true dialectical fashion, the in-
herent contradiction within itself that will bring about its own disso-
lution. This consists in the alienation of the proletariat it has
engendered. Whilst throughout the previous stages of history the accumulation of wealth has always resulted in poverty for the workers and wealth, prosperity and culture for their oppressors only capitalism has created the material preconditions which will lead to the removal of this oppression by the workers themselves. Marx describes the process as follows:

"Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation, but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of the negation". (143)

Herein, then, lies Marx's view of the future of capitalism. On the one hand the dialectical forces within the system would ensure its collapse. On the other, the class struggle would come to its climax and the proletariat would rise in revolution. Again it is to be noted that Marx nowhere laid down the actual economic conditions that would presage the downfall of capitalism, a fact first pointed out by Rosa Luxemburg, (144) who tried to make good this deficiency with her theory of accumulation.

For Marx, the proletarian revolution, to which he urged the workers, would lead to the establishment of communist society. Thus capitalism
represented for him the end of pre-history. History proper was about
to begin. Garaudy explains, "For us, Communism is not the end of his-
tory, but the end of prehistory, man's prehistory which is made up of
jungle-like encounters common to all class societies". (145)

It was Marx's firm conviction therefore that communism was coming. More-
over it was coming not just as an ideal to be hoped for - it was a real
movement which was even then in its birth-pangs and would finally destroy
the present order. What he envisaged was not merely a restructuring
of the present system but the establishment of a new one. Ushered in by
an unprecedented revolution "Socialism is novissimus, the end of history as
it has hitherto been known, and the beginning of the adventure of
mankind." (146)

The first step is for the proletariat to gain power and this it will do
by revolution. The dream goes on: "The proletariat will use its politi-
cal supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie,
to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state,
i.e. of the proletariat organized as the ruling class, and to increase
the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible". (147) The hope
is that the system of inequality and oppression, greed and poverty will
be supplanted by a redistribution of the world's wealth and goods on a
more equitable basis.

The socialist cause, though initiated by the working class is for and
on behalf of all mankind. Since the proletariat had suffered the most
inhuman degradations and privations it was to be conscious of its mission
on behalf of all humanity. But Marx held firmly to the belief that the
capitalist was every bit as alienated as the labourer and that communism
was therefore to embody the liberation of all people. Communist society
was to see the end of class conflict since in Marx's expectation the
proletariat does not merely substitute itself for the bourgeoisie but eliminates both itself and its opposition. Communist society was to be the "classless society". One of the features of the new society would be the abolition of private property. Individual property would replace capitalist private property. (148)

Other consequences following on the establishment of communist society would be the elimination of the state, (149) and the demise of conflict between individuals (150). Furthermore there will be the maximum development of the full potential in each person (151) the abolition of the division of labour (152) the regaining by man of his true nature which had been impaired by the alienation inherent under a capitalist system (153) and the full humanization of man (154). In Marx's utopian vision man, thus liberated from his subjugation to the tyranny of the productive forces and the enslaving relations they create, will become not only fully individual man, restored man, and social man, but also universal man. In the Grundrisse, Marx describes this dimension by saying:

"The basis as the possibility of the universal development of individuals; the real development of individuals from this basis as the constant abolition of each limitation conceived of as a limitation and not as a sacred boundary. The universality of the individual not as thought or imagined, but as the universality of his real and ideal relationships. Man therefore becomes able to understand his own history as a process and to conceive of nature (involving also practical control over it) and his own real body". (155)

In Marx's scheme we can now delineate certain significant features. The first of these is the rejection of the idealist interpretation of history in favour of a thoroughgoing materialism. Ideas develop from the relationships created by the economic modes of production as do ideologies, culture and religion.

Then secondly, he affirms that man in his capacity as a working and tool-
making being is the creator of history. Responsibility for change is entirely in man's hands. When he changes his mode of production man changes his whole social, cultural and political configuration. Therefore he has it within his power to initiate change. Where he finds himself in a situation of oppression and exploitation - as do the proletariat in a capitalist system - he can bring about change by means of revolution.

A third element Marx emphasizes in the historical process is the dialectical nature of historical change. This means that there is a certain determinism at work and that change comes about under certain patterns or laws. This aspect underlines the dynamic nature of history.

The fourth feature we need to single out is Marx's eschatology. The promise of a future liberated society is in fact a secularized eschatology. This fulfils a utopian role in Marx's scheme in the sense that it motivates men to seek change and creates the desire to achieve their liberation. It provides the momentum therefore, for historical innovation. This is the same aspect which we have found in the apocalyptic interpretation.

Then fifthly, Marx designates the proletariat as the saviour of the human race, and in so doing gives to them a sense of destiny and importance when they perceive their role as a messianic calling.

A further aspect of Marxist teaching is that it provides a description of the forces at work in industrial society. In doing so he exposes the enormous power (generated under capitalism) of economic forces to exercise control over cultural, religious, social and political dispositions.

In Marxism then, we find a system which offers a secular alternative to much that Christianity had hitherto claimed to provide. Marx expounded a world view which embraced an analysis of the present circumstances of
millions of people toiling in industrial society with little hope of ever improving their material lot, a worldview moreover which offered an anthropology, a soteriology, and an eschatology, combined with a messianism and an overriding humanism. In short Marx gave a description of present circumstances which was recognizably accurate, a vision for the future which lifted men's minds to the possibility of improving themselves and a hope which could motivate them to do so.

The widespread influence of Marxism and what Kirk calls its "perennial fascination" (156) are factors that do not need elaboration here. What we do need to note however is the effect which Marxism has had on the development of theological reflection and its role in the formulation of liberation theology in particular. The Christian-Marxist dialogue which took place in Europe in the nineteen-fifties and sixties posed certain challenges to theologians. In particular it was the thought of Ernst Bloch which helped theologians to come to grips with the challenge of the Marxist interpretation of history.

With the possible exception of Roger Garaudy, Bloch more than any other philosopher from the Marxist side of the debate was able to discern a correspondence between Christian concepts and the Marxist approach to history. (157) Like Marx, Bloch explored Hegel's dialectical method and saw that its value lay not, as Hegel himself conceived, in the dialectical evolution of Spirit as reality but rather in the creation of concrete historical determinism of the orthodox Marxist teaching. With telling simplicity allied to almost mystical insight he combined idealist and materialist strains, juxtaposing the idealist contemplative role with the materialist revolutionary, and perceiving the relation between biblical and Marxist insights into the nature of history. Bloch perceived also the value in the monistic perception of reality which Marx had championed.
Before Marx there was either selfish materialism or an ineffective idealism in the guise of "a misunderstood Jesus". (158)

Bloch believes that the genius of Marx was that he "at last created separate sensitivities; to externality which so easily hardens the heart, and to the goodness of a man who would bring freedom by himself alone. Only afterwards does he unite the two; he is guided simultaneously, so to speak, by Jesus with a whip and the Jesus of brotherly love". (159)

In contrast therefore to Marx, Bloch can see the validity of a religion stripped of its usual idealistic interpretation. His futurism, to which we shall return later, readily re-theologizes into eschatology, without losing the Marxist emphasis on praxis. Bloch's aim is to ontologize human hope and by so doing, he is able to pave the way for theologians to historicize God, so to speak in the future. God thus becomes not a static being in the realm of eternity but the power of the future.

Bloch stresses the idea \textit{incipit vita nova}, a new life begins. It is not the return to, or renewal of a previous life. It is essentially novum - that which has never been before. This he finds symbolized cultically both in the mystery religions and in Christian baptism. However, the really new derives solely from the Biblical revelation and in particular from the resurrection. In contrast to the cyclical renewal of the mystery religions the resurrection is located in linear time, and was completely without analogy in previous history. Bloch says:

"Instead it emerged in its own right, as a novum in time; as if before Jesus there had been nothing in any way really new, but only longing for, and suggestions and expectations of this one new thing... and so, for the Christian consciousness, \textit{incipit vita nova} had its unique starting-point in history, which was chronically identifiable as 'under Pontius Pilate'. So that when the divine helper (the Paraclete) appeared at the end of history (John 16:7) the same new beginning would start the process of complete renewal in which not one stone would be left upon another". (160)

Meeks explains "Christianity remains the single religion which has united
the ultimum with the novum and not exclusively a primum". (161) Bloch however does not leave the incipit vita nova on the purely personal, subjective level. His vision is utopian and in a later passage more in keeping with his Marxist presuppositions he declares: "The form of incipit vita nova which is attached to the present respects immediate ends enclosed within the possible range of a human life, they must at the same time set their sights on the distant goal of a society without alienation". (162) It is possible to see in this line of thinking how Bloch overcomes the idealist problem of historical dualism. In so doing he also enables Moltmann and Pannenberg to discard the traditional concepts of a God conceived in the conventional metaphysical categories of being and to rediscover the biblical concept of a universal and unitary history. Bloch's thought has therefore served as a catalyst for much present-day theological reflection, including that of Miguez Bonino.

5. THE THEOLOGICAL ANTECEDENTS OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY

The bridge between Marxism of Bloch and the liberation theology of Miguez Bonino is provided by the political theology of Moltmann and Metz. Like Bloch, Moltmann stresses the future as the factor which determines the present and by utilizing the insights of Von Rad, is able to break away from Greek philosophical categories in fashioning a Christian interpretation of history.

He affirms that the prophetic view of history as proclaimed in the Old Testament is the starting point for a Christian understanding of the historical process. He goes on to develop his theology in the categories of promise, hope and the new creation. (163)

Moltmann accepted the Marxist criticism that the church had neglected the future as the sphere of God's renewing activity. His theological formulation
seeks therefore to re-theologize the future hope emphasized by Bloch. What in Marxism had become secularized must according to Moltmann be re-introduced into theology in such a way that Christians can commit themselves not only to a future life hereafter but to a future before the hereafter. We will return to this theme later.

Moltmann similarly took the Marxist point that it is both necessary and possible to overcome the sufferings and contradictions of the present social order. This is a presupposition which as we have seen, Miguez Bonino and the liberation theologians of Latin America have also adopted as their starting point.

For Moltmann hope is a call to pierce beyond present viewpoints in order to change the existing social reality. Like Bloch and other Marxists, he believes that hope is "a basis for constructing a new image of society which will challenge the claim that present society has reached a harmonious state". (164) This change, however, cannot be brought about as a result of a purely factual technological study of existing conditions. Together with Marxism, Moltmann perceives that an ideological viewpoint is necessary.

Moltmann furthermore goes along with the Marxist claim that the economic forces which dominate contemporary man are the root cause of his alienation and oppression.

Like Miguez Bonino, Moltmann's use of Marxism is a dialectical one. He criticizes the inadequate humanistic basis to which he believes Marxism is tied. This was derived from its sources in Feuerbach and the Enlightenment and has led to the divinization of man and the concept of the authentic society.

Moltmann also criticizes Marxism on the score that its account of human alienation does not penetrate deeply enough to the roots of the human
condition. Moltmann recognizes that to substitute one set of working conditions for another will not get to the cause of Man's internal tensions. We will see, in chapter four, that Miguez Bonino reiterates this criticism of Marxism.

Moltmann's third main criticism of Marxism is that the priority of praxis over theory is impossible. He believes that "we must also ask whether the critical analysis of man's misery, and practical attempts to alter it could ever be completed without such conceptual patterns, which extend beyond experience and beyond the success of the practical attempts." (165) Here there is some degree of divergence between Moltmann and Miguez Bonino (166), for liberation theology generally places a firm emphasis on praxis as the locus of truth.

The significance of Moltmann's theology for this study, then, lies primarily in his willingness to accept much of the Marxist criticism of the idealistic understanding of reality that has permeated much Christian thought and practice. Picking up the category of hope from Bloch, Moltmann has begun to fashion a theology which represents a radical departure from the existentialist offerings of Bultmann. By wedding Bloch and Von Rad, so to speak, Moltmann has been able to reconcile God, man and history in a creative and dialectical way. By dispensing with the dualism with which Christian theology had become involved, Moltmann has set the stage for the "History is One" plea which is strongly advocated by Miguez Bonino and his fellow-liberationists.

Metz focusses on the fact of secularization, claiming that the church should accept it since the characteristics of pluralism, openness to the future, pragmatism and post-atheism are all aspects which correspond to a Christian understanding of the world. For Metz the Christian view of creation implies a perspective on history in which God is seen as its ini-
tiator and dynamic principle. He says:

"We must bring together that which has been so long disastrously separated: Namely Transcendence (God), and the Future, because this orientation toward the future is demanded by the biblical faith and message itself." (167)

Metz therefore postulates a unified view of reality in which God and the world are nevertheless distinct and separate. As in Moltmann, God is not conceived of in metaphysical and atemporal categories. Commenting on Metz's position, Kirk says: "Transcendence has been converted into event. History is real, for God has accepted the world in his Son". (168)

Thus Metz arrives at a similar conclusion to that of Moltmann, though by a different process of reasoning. What in Hegel had been the dialectic of Spirit and in Marx the dialectic of historical and economic forces has become the dialectic of God and history. The dualism of Augustinianism has been overcome by the monism of Marxism and the groundwork of what Miguez Bonino was to assert about the unity of history was being laid. (169)

Another potent influence on the development of Miguez Bonino's thought on this issue is that of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Like Miguez Bonino, Bonhoeffer was concerned to repudiate the dualistic theology so prevalent in the Augustinian tradition, and cited three instances of this trend. (170) The first was the scholastic scheme of nature and grace in which the realm of the natural becomes subordinate to the realm of grace. The second was the Lutheran division of reality into two kingdoms which resulted (as we have seen) in the autonomy of the orders of this world being set in opposition to the law of Christ. The third example was the congregation of the elect (under Thomas Müntzer) who struggled against a hostile world to establish God's Kingdom on earth. Bonhoeffer's description of the effects of this dualism underlines the results we have previously noted:
"In all these schemes the cause of Christ becomes a partial and provincial matter within the limits of reality. It is assumed that there are realities which lie outside the reality that is in Christ. It follows that these realities are accessible by some way of their own, and otherwise than through Christ. However great the importance which is attached to the reality in Christ, it still always remains a partial reality amid other realities". (171)

Such an idea runs counter to Bonhoeffer's concept of reality. He is thoroughly convinced that such a dualism is against both the Biblical and Reformation principles. The result of such dualism is that man abandons reality as a whole and sets himself in one or the other of the two spheres. This means that he either has Christ without the world or the world without Christ. If he tries to bridge the gap by standing in both spheres at once he becomes "the man of eternal conflict". (172)

Bonhoeffer grounds his notion of reality in Christology, which is regarded by most commentators as the key to his whole theology. (173) For him the point of departure for ethics is not the reality of the world or of the self but of "God as He reveals himself in Jesus Christ". (174) This is a word of revelation which God has already spoken. In this revelational reality alone lies the good, because this alone is the real, and it is a concrete not an abstract reality. In this way Bonhoeffer sees the unity of the reality of the world with the reality of God. The former possesses its reality only through the reality of God which is the ultimate reality. Christ reconciles what in idealism are the irreconcilable — the ideal (or standard) and things as they actually are — what ought to be and what is. For Bonhoeffer the inner meaning of God's revelation in Christ is that here the two realities are reconciled. "The reality of God" he says, discloses itself only by setting me entirely in the reality of the world, and when I encounter the reality of the world it is always
sustained, accepted and reconciled in the reality of God". (175)

Such a notion supercedes and abolishes all idealism and cancels out the dualistic concepts of reality. Such dualism is a false representation which regards the separate spheres as "ultimate static antitheses" (176) and such a static way of approaching things leads inevitably to thinking in terms of laws. Luther's "two kingdoms" have to be seen and held together in a polemical unity which Bonhoeffer believes is how Luther originally intended the idea. (177) Bonhoeffer thus conceives of the world, the profane or secular as taken up into the ultimate reality which is Christ since they have no separate reality outside of His reality.

This unity of reality is realized concretely afresh in the life of men. The result is that the life of the Christian, and therefore of the Christian community is not one of withdrawal from the world for the sake of the pursuit of an otherworldly spirituality, but rather of immersion in the world where the reality of God and the world are reconciled. In this sense Christians are worldly, participating fully in the history-making process of worldly engagement.

The Christian does not have to be the man of eternal conflict but, "just as the reality in Christ is one, so he too, since he shares in this reality in Christ, is himself an undivided whole. His worldliness does not divide him from the world. Belonging wholly to Christ, he stands at the same time wholly in the world". (178)

In the world of political action then, which the liberation theologians have chosen as the focus of their theological reflection, there is (according to Bonhoeffer) no question of shunning responsibility on the part of individual Christians or the Christian community. If in the past, a dualistic theology of history has encouraged political passivity, this has been a theology out of harmony with the underlying truth of the
incarnation which is the locus of the unity of the reality of the world and God. The Kingdom of God can only be the rule of God when it is his rule within the reality of the world which he has taken up into the ultimacy of his own reality.

Whilst Bonhoeffer was writing in order to formulate an outline of ethics, the principle on which he grounds his system applies equally well to the realm of history. In fact so well does his statement of the matter accord with Miguez Bonino's attempt to establish a Christian idea of history that we have to keep reminding ourselves that it was indeed ethics that Bonhoeffer was reflecting on rather than history.

6. MIGUEZ BONINO AND THE UNITY OF HISTORY

Our consideration of various interpretations of history has brought us to the stage where we need to recapitulate some of our main findings before we try to evaluate Miguez Bonino's own handling of the theme of the unity of history. Our examination of the thought of Plato, Augustine and Luther revealed that there was an inherent dualism in their teachings which has influenced much traditional Christian theology and the attitude of the church to "temporal" affairs. In each of them we find a transcendence posited outside of history. In Bultmann on the other hand the transcendence is interiorized but is no less removed from the arena of historical engagement. For all of these theologians, however, the sphere of the real, the meaningful, the eschatologically significant is not in history itself but in eternity, the spiritual, or the subjective. Well then may Miguez Bonino assert that in Christianity as opposed to Marxism there has been an inclination to passivity with regard to the shaping of history. This has come about through the continued emphasis on the conception of two worlds: "this present, temporal, earthly one, which had a preparatory, contingent, and even at points negligible value, and the eternal one which is the true realm of life, fulfilment and happiness"
the goal for the Christian". (179)

The doctrine of Providence, begun in Augustine, was an attempt to attribute historical happenings to divine sovereignty, as was the development of the idea of predestination. Calvin, however, was able to evolve a theology of providence which also stressed the significance and role of human responsibility in political action. From the prophetic understanding of history we have seen illustrations of the claim by Miguez Bonino that history is a conflictual interaction between God and men and that the prophetic witness was itself a participation in history. In addition the Hebrew sense of time and of the sovereignty of God combined to create a sense of the imminence of the future about to break in. The New Testament rings with a greater emphasis on the "now" of the saving events, together with a continued appeal to a future consummation. In apocalypticism we have seen how the emphasis on the universality of history has been combined with an ethical emphasis in Pannenberg's theology to produce a convincing account of the unity of history and the importance of historical action.

In Marxism our study has shown that the dualism of idealism has to be rejected and that the dialectical interaction of economic forces propels man into the position of the sole creator of history. Marx eschews any notion of transcendence either within or outside of history whilst Bloch puts a biblical face on Marxism. By accepting the validity of the Marxist rejection of idealism Moitmann and Metz are both able to formulate a theology of political action which is grounded on a more biblical understanding of history than idealism had portrayed. Bonhoeffer's theological grounding of reality in Christology represents a courageous attempt, to use Meeks' words, "to overcome the dualism between act and being, the idealistic norms of natural law and the positivistic apotheosis of reality, and the ethics of transcendent norms and the ethics of immanent situational decision". (180)
When Miguez Bonino refutes the dualism in much traditional theology he does so not only by referring to the polemical nature of history in the Old Testament and the problem which Gentile converts have in reconciling two histories in Christianity. In addition he draws attention to a number of "pointers".

For one thing there is the problem of the failures of the Church. These failings contradict any alleged continuity between the Church and the Kingdom of God (which often arise from the Augustinian or Lutheran concepts). The "history of faith" has itself been characterized by many of the marks and features of the secular history which is so despised in the dualistic pattern of thinking. An empirical consideration leads to the conclusion that ecclesiastical and secular history are "pretty much of a muchness". This known and acknowledged difficulty has given rise to the awkward theories about "the invisible church, the coetus electorum, and sectarian views". (181) The upshot has been, however, that any attempt to identify the presence of the Kingdom of God with the history of the empirical church has been fraught with difficulties and embarrassments.

Then secondly, Miguez Bonino speaks of "our own experience of God's presence in the world and "the witness of scripture" (182) as being further evidence of some continuity between the Kingdom and history as such. Very soon in the church's history there arose the question as to the eschatological future of people who had not heard the gospel but who nevertheless had the right attitude. St. Paul made reference to this problem in 1 Cor. 15:29 when he replied to the Corinthians' query about being baptized on behalf of the dead. Clearly this primitive custom of vicarious baptism related to the Corinthian Christians' fears that unbelieving relatives who died might be excluded from the Kingdom. The fact that the Church permitted such a practise and the positive response
Paul made to their query in expounding his doctrine of the resurrection clearly show that primitive Christianity was prepared to recognize the possibility of God’s presence and power being active outside the community of faith.

In addition, Miguez Bonino points to the reference in 1 Peter 3:18 – 19 on which the article of the creed relating to Christ’s descent into hell is largely based. One of the traditional interpretations of the crucial phrase "he went and preached to the spirits in prison, who formerly did not obey" is that these were people other than Christians. If this is accepted, then it is an indication again that the early Church believed that God's sovereignty extended beyond the boundaries of the Church itself.

A further point Miguez Bonino makes is that the surprises at the last judgment to which Jesus refers also indicate that any human action in love has eschatological significance. Here he is no doubt thinking of what he calls the "eschatological inversion" in such biblical passages as the parable of the great assize in Matt. 25: 31-46, the promise by Jesus that "tax collectors and harlots go into the kingdom of God before you" (Matt.21:31) and his declaration that in the kingdom of God "the last will be first, and the first last" (Matt. 20:16) Miguez Bonino is prepared to admit that although these "remarks applied first and foremost to Israel, they do forcefully suggest some continuity between general human history and the kingdom". (183).

In addition, in "Historical Praxis" he further points to the fact that the dualistic solution tends to use what he calls "a whole slew of biblical texts" (184) and depends on a hermeneutical approach contrary to that of the Bible. "In my opinion" he says:
"its conception of redemption is borrowed from that of gnostic and mystery religions. The God of the prophets and of Jesus Christ can hardly be equated with the soter ("saviour") of such sects, for the latter is busy trying to populate his Olympus with a few select souls who have been rescued from the tumultuous sea of matter and human history. The Gospel of Luke and the Acts of the Apostles depict a divine mission that takes on Israel's hope (Luke 1-2) and launches it out toward the limits of this earth and history through the power of the Spirit. The seer of Patmos envisions all the peoples of the world bringing their offerings to the heavenly Zion. Paul describes all creation waiting in expectation for the manifestation of God's children; he proclaims the collapse of all barriers, the creation of a new humanity, and the recapitulation of all things in Christ. All of these notes in the New Testament would seem to be incompatible with the straightening religious view that would make the history of human beings and nations irrelevant. Thus the 'dualistic' situation would seem to involve us in grave difficulties from the standpoint of biblical theology and its ethical and ideological functionalism". (185)

It seems to us that whilst what Miguez Bonino says in support of these pointers to the continuity between God's work and human history may be true in itself the unity is not proved or disproved by these references. Indeed, this seems to us to be the weakest part of his whole argument in the chapter under scrutiny, and its elaboration in "Historical Praxis".

The idealistic notion that reality is divided into a dualism of the ideal and the actual has to be rejected because the overriding ontology of reality in the Bible is one which involves a reconciliation between the reality of a transcendent God and the events of man's historical pilgrimage. This unity was well brought out by Miguez Bonino in his account of the prophetic understanding of history.

The unity of history therefore is guaranteed, not by the occasional references to God's working in events that are external to church affairs in the New Testament. It is guaranteed by the sovereignty of God and the outworking of that sovereignty in the world of men and their history. In a telling passage Eichrodt states this conviction with clarity. He declares:
"For in the encounter with the Christ of the Gospels there is the assertion of a mighty living reality as inseparably bound up with the O.T. past as pointing forward into the future. That which binds together indivisibly the two realms of the Old and New Testament - different in externals though they may be - is the irruption of the Kingship of God into this world and its establishment here. This is the unitive fact because it rests on the action of one and the same God in each case; that God who is promise and performance, in Gospel and Law, pursues one and the selfsame purpose, the building of his Kingdom". (197)

This link between the Old and New Testament in their proclamation of divine sovereignty in history is well illustrated in the universality of history depicted in the apocalyptic interpretation. The apocalyptists affirmed the unity of history in three ways. In the first of these ways, their view encompassed a continuity between past, present and future which were ultimately embraced within the divine purpose whatever temporary setbacks had to be encountered. In the second place the apocalyptists affirmed the unity of history because it is a simple goal towards which both the universe itself as well as the history of men are moving. That goal is the consummation of the kingly rule of God. In the third place, the apocalyptists follow the prophetic emphasis on monotheism and envisage the unity of history as "a corollary of the unity of God". (187)

As we have seen Pannenberg makes use of the essential message of apocalyptic in his theology. He does, moreover, by starting from a departure-point in anthropology. Amongst other characteristics, man is open to that which transcends the world and this feature affects his relation to his own future. (188) This gives rise to the phenomenon of hope in man. Following Von Rad's expounding of the prophetic hope Pannenberg draws attention to man as the historical animal. Israel could experience the continuity of the chain of events because she knew herself "to be in on the goal of God's work". (189) This goal gives Pannenberg his key to the
whole understanding of the apocalyptic notion of history. Notwithstanding the efforts of post-Enlightenment man to centre the meaning of history in himself this is something he can never achieve because he is always trapped in his particularity. (190) The unity of history cannot be guaranteed by technology or the media of communication either. This, claims Pannenberg, "is still only accessible from the God of Israel

...The unity of history is established by the appearance of the end of all events through God's revelation in Jesus". (191)

The end of history has a universal significance because it is the final event in which God is vindicated as the God of all peoples and of all creation. By drawing out this aspect of the apocalyptic message Pannenberg offers a view of the unity of history which is not only accessible for contemporary man. It is also useful for liberation theology. Miguez Bonino, we feel, would establish a better basis for his theology of the unity of history were he to follow Pannenberg at this point. Miguez Bonino's usual hermeneutical key is the belief that God and man are polemically involved in the creation of history. For some reason he seems to depart from this method in his effort to renounce dualism in the New Testament and resorts instead to the method of finding proof texts. The result of this is that he arrives at the right conclusion but for the wrong reasons.

Miguez Bonino, however, is correct in seeking to establish a more significant role for human action than apocalyptic normally allows. He avows:

"God builds his Kingdom from and within human history in its entirety; his action is a constant call and challenge to man. Man's response is realized in the concrete arena of history with its economic, political, ideological options. Faith is not a different history but a dynamic, a motivation, and, in its eschatological horizon, a transforming invitation". (192)
Pannenberg's use of apocalyptic, however, is also rooted in the resurrection which he sees as a "prophetic revelation" of the apocalyptic vision of the end. He therefore focusses his concept of the unity of history both on the nature of God (193) and in Jesus Christ. In the final analysis, then, his focal point is in christology.

Bonhoeffer also locates his theology of the reconciliation of the reality of God and the world in the christological reality. Again it seems to us that the references Miguez Bonino makes to the New Testament pointers we have mentioned would have been unnecessary if he had more faithfully followed Bonhoeffer. The latter's formulation is a more soundly and solidly based foundation on which to build the sort of ethical superstructure which Miguez Bonino has in mind. Dualism has to be overcome in incarnation. Only here can transcendence and worldly realities be truly combined. Well then may the Jesuit, Scannone, say: "As Christian faith sees it, history has an incarnational structure, thanks to grace. It thus is in the nature of a sign, a mystery and a sacrament". (194)

This is a conviction which we feel sure Miguez Bonino would be happy with. Indeed Miguez Bonino may have formulated his theory of history on the foundation laid by Bonhoeffer. J. De Santa Ana and G. Clarke Chapman have both drawn attention to the influence of Bonhoeffer on the development of the theology of liberation (195). It was precisely in the area of overcoming dualism that Bonhoeffer was most helpful, claims De Santa Ana, who proceeds to show that it was through the influence of Bonhoeffer's thinking in Letters and Papers from Prison (196) that the Protestant liberation theologians in Latin America were prompted to work out a theology which declared that "in our time God cannot be used as a working hypothesis by which to understand reality". (197) Miguez Bonino, moreover, seems to be making an unmistakable allusion to the "Thinking in two Spheres" section of the Ethics when he says:
"At the centre of our faith there is an unavoidable physical and historical reality: cross, resurrection, the sacraments, the resurrection of the body, a new heaven and a new earth. Idealism - the attempt to dissolve these realities into subjective feelings, ideas or symbols - is in Christian terms a heresy, whether it comes in the guise of neoplatonic gnosticism, spiritualistic mysticism, subjective pietism or liberal Hegelian, Kantian or existentialist philosophy! Our discussion with Marxist materialism cannot be engaged at this point. We must take for granted the reality and uppermost significance of the material world and the material basis of human relationships and social processes". (198)

Miguez Bonino wrote this, in Christians and Marxists some time after his earlier work, Doing Theology and it may well be a deliberate correction. In any event it represents a more decisively christological basis for his rejection of idealism than the arguments he had previously adduced.

The recognition that dualism is overcome in the reconciliation of the world and God in Christ also leads to the affirmation of the autonomy of the secular as a valid sphere of activity in which God and man engage together in the creation of history. The clarity with which Bonhoeffer expounded this message was welcomed by Latin American Liberation theologians both Catholic and Protestant, enabling them to criticize the dualism inherent in the "'split level' supernaturalist worldview" and the "clericalization that withdraws the church into a spiritual ghetto". (199)

Certain important consequences follow from this view of history. The first of these concerns the identity of God. In an idealist schema God is robbed of his specific identity. He becomes an object in our thought who is described in terms of his attributes. In this way he is thought of apart from the actions in which he comes to us, calls us, redeems us, judges us and liberates us. He is the idealist way of thinking about being - spiritual, eternal, perfect, ideal, the Good, and so forth.
When the reality of God and the reality of the world are seen as a unity then God is the "I am" who "himself defines his own identity, he who is what he wants to be for us and the world" (200). He reveals himself in his actions in his world. He is encountered therefore only where he is active, which is in history.

The Christian view of history therefore locates transcendence within history. Idealism portrays a transcendence beyond history "in eternity" and to which, by contemplation and devotional practices we are to relate. The focus of attention is therefore outside the reality of this world. Similarly in the existentialist way of theologizing transcendence is located in the personal, interior subjectivity of the individual. Again the focus of this interpretation of religion is in the authenticity of the person, which renders the reality of the world irrelevant. This in turn renders God irrelevant. Marxism lacks any sense of transcendence, deliberately seeking to avoid any such notion since it might smack of compromise with idealism or religion. For Marx, man alone controls history even though he is subject to the dialectical "laws" or "processes".

The second consequence is that in this biblical view God is working in history when he engages with man in an action or announcement that involves man in an active relationship with his neighbour and the world. Miguez Bonino explains:

"There is no manifestation of God in Scripture in which a specific form of action is not included. God does not speak merely to inform or to notify; he speaks in order to invite, to command, to forbid a certain course of action. And this action is always related to a particular historical content - to men, nations, things, events". (201)

In the biblical perspective therefore this is precisely what history is - God and man in the polemical relationship we saw described in the Old Testament and present, though partially concealed in the New.
This formulation constitutes Miguez Bonino's restatement of the doctrine of Providence which had largely excluded man and in so doing had denied him any possibility of participating actively and creatively in any historical project. Here history is seen as a dynamic process of action and interaction, in which God and man conflictively and dialectically create the new. Upon this foundation it will be possible for Miguez Bonino to erect his theology of the kingdom of God as an eschatological reality which is being built in, by and out of this interaction between God and man.

The third consequence relates to Miguez Bonino's theological method and epistemology. If history is where God is acting in concert with man this action must be the source of our knowledge of God. In the idealist scheme man derived his knowledge of God from revelation and from that worked out deductively what his action, obedience, discipleship, ethics had to be. From the "other world" he obtained an idea or principle which he had to work out in "this world". Miguez Bonino states,

"Obedience is not a consequence of our knowledge of God, just as it is not a pre-condition for it; obedience is included in our knowledge of God. Or, to put it more bluntly: obedience is our knowledge of God. There is not a separate poetic moment in our relationship to God. There is an imperfect faith, a faltering faith, but there cannot be, in the nature of the case, a believing disobedience...." (202)

Therefore the unity of the reality of God and of history locates the primacy of our theological datum in action which, in the language of liberation theology means our praxis. Praxis is, of course, more than action as such. It is the "two-way traffic that is always going on between action and theory". (203) This means that knowledge and therefore also theology is derived from the reality of God and man in action in history. Another way of saying this would be to say that our theological reflection follows from our historical engagement and brings to bear the
mediations of scripture and tradition on that reflection. To use Brown's words,

"This...is an ongoing task, involving our constant check of action at the hand of theory, theory at the hand of action" and it means "not to have a passive intellectual acceptance of something, but an ongoing dialectical relationship with something, in interchange with which both it and we are transformed". (204)

This ties in with Miguez Bonino's description of the prophetic task as involving participation in the process of history itself. It also relates to Marx's avowal that the task of philosophy is to change the world rather than to interpret it.

Praxis then provides Miguez Bonino with the clue to interpret the biblical category around which he has chosen to build his liberation theology, viz. the Kingdom of God. This hermeneutic is one of historically engaged praxis which enables him to see the Kingdom in terms of "a call, a convocation, a pressure that impels". (205) This demands an active engagement which is what history is and where our knowledge of God begins. By contrast the idealist hermeneutic begins with a search of the Bible for truths about God and principles for ethical conduct which have to be deduced and then put into operation. Bultmann's existentialist hermeneutic reduces all historical action to interior experiences which have no connection with the unitary reality of God and history. In idealism theology begins "in eternity", in Bultmann it begins "in me", whereas in Miguez Bonino it begins in the engagement men make with God in historical action.
CHAPTER THREE

MAN'S HISTORICAL PROJECT UNDER GOD

The key factor in all theological interpretations of history is the significance attributed to the roles of God and man respectively. The idealistic schemes concentrate on subjectivity and otherworldliness and generally consider historical action to be relatively worthless. A similar lack of emphasis on political activity is to be found in the existentialist understanding. The prophetic account does give prominence to concrete political engagement but this is lost sight of to a certain degree in the New Testament, whilst Apocalyptic has to be re-interpreted if ethical action on the part of man is to play any meaningful role in its scheme. We have seen how the doctrine of providence elevates the role of divine initiative to the neglect of the human side. Calvin, however, has shown a more dynamic role can be assigned to man within the framework of a central theological emphasis on the sovereignty of God.

By contrast, in the Marxist interpretation man becomes the prime mover and sole creator of history. The liberation theologians have taken their cue from the Marxists and are seeking to re-assert the significance of human action in history and at the same time to retain the theological stress on the divine initiative and sovereignty.

Whilst he nowhere acknowledges any indebtedness to Calvin, Miguez Bonino follows the reformer in underlining the priority of the divine initiative in human history. He does so, however, by using the category of the Kingdom of God which provides an eschatological dimension within which significance can be claimed for human action without losing the indispensable emphasis on God's prior activity. In the second section of the
chapter on "Kingdom of God, Utopia, and Historical Engagement" therefore
Miguez Bonino deals with the fundamental issue that is crucial to his
whole theological enterprise. This can be put in the form of a question:
"How far can human historical action be regarded as having eschatological
significance? Does it belong to the coming Kingdom of God?"

"Or again, how do we return to the eschatological
Christian faith the historical dynamism which it
seems to have lost?
Do historical happenings, i.e. human historical
action in its diverse dimensions - political,
cultural, economic - have any value in terms of
the kingdom which God prepares and will gloriously
establish in the Parousia of the Lord? If there
is such a relation how shall we understand it?
And what is its significance for our action?" (1)

In this chapter we begin by looking at the traditional theological
position, and in particular the "distinction of planes" model. Contemporary
European political theology has attempted a response and has called
into question the traditional stance. However its answer is inadequate
since it stops short of using any language that would imply a causative
connection between historical praxis and the Kingdom. We go on to see
how Miguez Bonino tries to remedy this deficiency in his use of the cate-
gory of the Kingdom of God and how he utilizes the apocalyptic idea of
the two aeons.

We then examine his use of the Pauline concept of the "body" and "Resur-
rection" on the one hand and "works" on the other as analogies for the
continuity and discontinuity between history and the Kingdom of God. We
take note of additional material he has utilized from New Testament sources
in expounding this theme in a later work.

We follow this with a study of the Marxist understanding of the role of
human action in history with its stress on the creation by men of their
own history and the driving forces in that history. We take note of what
Marx said about the role of the proletariat and productive forces, as well as the secularized eschatological goal of Communist society.

We also examine some of the futurism of Ernst Bloch and see how this is paralleled in biblical thought.

We then trace the correspondence and divergences between Miguez Bonino's thought and Marxism before referring to four contemporary theologians who provide comparative approaches to the question of the relationship between the present and the future. These studies - of Pannenberg, Moltmann, Rahner and Bonhoeffer - afford us an insight into the value and strength of Miguez Bonino's eschatological thought.

1. SOME TRADITIONAL THEOLOGICAL POSITIONS

The classical theological formulations of the relationship between faith and temporal realities have followed idealistic lines.

Augustinianism gave rise to the concept of Christendom. This denied any authentic existence to "the world", and saw salvation as confined exclusively to the religious dimension of man's experience. The church became the sole dispenser of salvation ('extra ecclesiam nulla salus') and secular history became largely irrelevant. The church assumed for itself a position of power in relation to the world and sought to exploit whatever advantage it could gain to further its mission of evangelization. This political activity was pursued by clergy and bishops with laymen giving support and assistance where necessary and possible. (2)

This attitude, described by Gutierrez as "the longest historical experience the church has had" (3) is by no means extinct in some Catholic-dominated
areas. Indeed, it forms the backdrop to the liberation theology movement of Latin America. It was to some degree, however, superceded by the "distinction of planes" idea. This posited a sharp distinction between the church and the world, the latter being regarded as having an autonomous existence of its own. The Church's role vis a vis the world was to respect that autonomy. Its influence upon the world was via the moral teaching it gave to individuals who then exercised their consciences in the temporal sphere. This is similar to Calvin's position.

The Church was seen as having a dual mission to evangelize individuals and through them to influence society. By converting men to faith and baptizing them the Church adopted the stance of an "order apart" promoting salvation and holiness in the world. When these people then influenced the society and civilization of which they were members she fulfilled her mission to be "the soul of human society". (4) The unity between the 'two planes' was provided by the Kingdom of God since both Church and world in their separate ways contributed to its edification.

Similar tendencies have appeared in Protestant theology. One such was Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms which we have outlined and evaluated above. (5) Another is the doctrine of the sovereignty of spheres worked out by the nineteenth century Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper. In seeking to counteract the growth of atheism as a development of Enlightenment thinking in Dutch education, Kuyper taught that there were two types of grace. Special grace was that which operates in the individual believer's inner life to root out sin. There was a distinction between this and common grace however, which was the restraint God placed on the effect of sin in society. It served to maintain the sovereignty and independent characteristics of the God-given spheres of community life such as Church, family, education and the State. Each
sphere was organic and natural in Kuyper's scheme. It was formulated in order to protect the family's and the individual's rights against the abuse of power by the state. As in the later Catholic "distinction of planes" system the individual's role is to go out and permeate the life of society with Christian principles and ideas. In this way the members of the Church are the invisible church in society, the visible institution having no right to interfere in the sphere of the state, which has its own God-ordained sovereignty. (6)

One of the ironies of the history of theological thought in Southern Africa is that Kuyper's formulation was later used to justify the apartheid policy of the post-World-War II South African government. Despite its origin as a theological attempt to defend the individual's rights against an authoritarian state, Afrikaner theologians have elaborated it to claim that the policy of apartheid defends the authority of the divinely ordained inner law of each ethnic group. (7) This has been used to provide divine sanction for a system which, by severely limiting human rights, achieves the exact opposite of what Kuyper intended.

In each of these developments we note the more or less rigid distinction between church and world and the dualism implied. The inner "spiritual" life of the believer is seen as the prime locus of God's saving activity, which only indirectly affects the historical, or worldly life of mankind. This privatization of faith probably came to its fullest expression in the existentialist theology of Bultmann.

One of the objects of contemporary political theology was precisely to combat the implied dualism and dehistorization of the faith which followed from the positions we have now sketched. In order to counter this distortion contemporary theologians such as Noltmann and Metz sought to emphasize the public and political character of the faith by pointing to the prophetic interpretation of history. Now it is chanc-
teristic of philosophers and theologians that when they try to reverse a trend in this way they sometimes go too far in the opposite direction and overstate their case. C.H. Dodd's espousal of 'realized eschatology' is typical of this type of pendulum effect. The question to be posed in relation to the political theologians however, is not whether they go too far but whether they go far enough. Liberation theologians are convinced that they do not.

2. THE RESPONSE OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY

Miguez Bonino contends that the contemporary political theology emanating from Europe has in fact failed to grasp the nettle on the issue of the connection between historical action and the kingdom of God. In this assertion he follows Segundo who stresses the caution with which German political theology expresses this link. Segundo contends that this caution can be traced back to the influence of Luther on Protestant theology. He makes the point that for Catholic orthodoxy the link between the planes of human activity and God's eternal kingdom was the concept of merit. Merit was the eternal worth of human action and great value was attached to right intention.

Luther, however, claimed in his doctrine of justification by faith that salvation was guaranteed by Christ's merits alone. Segundo believes that this severed the connection with human action and Luther thereby "seems to have undermined the possibility of any theology of history". (8) Our previous chapter has shown how the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms similarly narrowed the gospel in terms of its relationship to history. Segundo maintains that since contemporary political theology is very dependent on Luther's doctrine of justification it has declined to attribute any causal connection between mankind's historical action and the
construction of the eschatological kingdom. This is because the emphasis in the doctrine of justification by faith is placed on God's activity, and faith becomes the "confident but essentially passive acceptance of God's fixed plan for human destiny and the construction of his eschatological kingdom". (9)

He then shows that there is a marked semantic timidity on the part of the European political theologians to commit themselves to any language that would imply causality in the relationship. He quotes Weth who says: "God himself brings about the revolutionary action that is decisive for the coming of his kingdom. His action cannot be effected or replaced by any human action". (10) Weth uses the word "analogy" to describe the relationship, whilst Moltmann uses "anticipation" and Metz the term "rough draft". In doing so they are seeking to maintain the distinction between the relative and the absolute. The European theologians are seeking to safeguard the eschatological kingdom of God as the absolute and to affirm any political order as relative.

Segundo quotes from both Metz and Moltmann to prove the point he is trying to make. Metz says that 'Christian eschatology' knows less about the future than either Western or Eastern ideologies and claims that the Church "should institutionalize this eschatological reserve by setting itself up as a court or instance of critical liberty vis-a-vis social development". (11) In this way it would be able to combat the inherent tendency of the latter towards absolutization.

Moltmann is quoted as saying: "Only through the dialectics of taking sides is the universalism of the crucified one realized in the world. By contrast the false universalism of the church.....is a premature and untimely anticipation of the kingdom of God". (12) Segundo concludes that European political theology will try to guard against any absolutization whether
it be from the past or the future, from East or West, including both the existing and projected orders. The burden of his contention is that political theology opts for revolutionary change in theory only. He claims that the political theologians believe it is wrong to "encumber the absolute (here the Kingdom of God) with the weight of the relative (here perishable political systems)". (13) The reason for this belief is that relative values are completely unrelated to absolute values.

Segundo is correct in his reading of the Europeans' position, for the influence of Luther is patently evident in their writings.

Since Miguez Bonino himself follows Segundo here, this excursus into the latter's argument has enabled us to get a more amplified version of the point Miguez Bonino is making. He concludes that, for the European theologians, action in history and eschatological transformation are of different orders.

"One can never say there is a direct link between the two because the eschatological kingdom is 'totally other'. The relevance and relatedness of historical effort is situated on another plan and is, at best, indirect. All historical activity is relativized, and eschatology stands as a caveat against all political commitment. As a result we seem to get some 'religious' or at least 'suprahistorical' sphere that takes primacy. The real eschatological kingdom of God and his message stands over and above the contingent, secondary, and perhaps partially inauthentic realm of historical liberation. While we may use such terms as 'liberation' and 'salvation' for the latter, our use is at best analogical and at worst equivocal. Salvation in the real and strict sense applies to a spiritual, eternal kingdom; only in an emasculated sense does salvation apply to the temporal realm of history". (14)

He ends with the scathing observation "The ideological functionalism of such a scheme is readily apparent". (15)

3. THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND HISTORY : CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY

Over against these tentative links, Miguez Bonino boldly asserts a causal
connection by using the Pauline theology of resurrection as a model. This posits a tension of continuity and discontinuity. There is a continuity in the sense that there is a recognizable identity between the body of the present life and the resurrection body. But there is also a transformation, a change (or discontinuity) which marks the beginning of the resurrected life. This is the newness or difference which Paul emphasizes as a hallmark of the future.

"Such transformation is not a disfiguration or denaturalization of our bodily life but its fulfilment, its perfecting, the elimination of corruptibility and weakness. As a matter of fact, bodily life reaches its true shape, its full meaning - communication, love, praise - in the resurrection. Resurrection, far from being the rescue of a spiritual element in human life, cleansing it from the bodily experience and identity obtained throughout life, is the total redemption of man, the true and unhindered realization of a bodily life cleansed from self-deception and self-seeking (flesh) and made perfect in transparent (glorious) singleness of purpose and experience (spiritual) and full community with God". (16)

It is necessary here to note also that this image is more instructive even than Miguez Bonino himself draws out. For the resurrection body is part of the age to come of apocalyptic thought. It belongs, in Paul's thinking, to the coming age, the eschatological kingdom - and the same tension of continuity and discontinuity is manifest in the relationship between "this age" and "that which is to come". (17)

Miguez Bonino then uses the concept of 'works' in Paul to underline the eschatological significance of human action. He claims that works performed in this life belong to the new order in so far as they are done in love, since that new order "becomes explicit in love". (18)

The weight of this claim is best examined by referring to the biblical passages Miguez Bonino has in mind. (19) The first four verses of Colossians chapter three all have an eschatological flavour - e.g. "Your life is hid with Christ in God". The fourth verse in particular gives the context of Paul's thought and underlines the present-future
continuity which Miguez Bonino is seeking to emphasize - "When Christ who is our life appears, then you also will appear with him in glory". Then again there is the allusion in verse 6 - "On account of these the wrath of God is coming" - and further in vv. 24 25 he says, "knowing that from the Lord you will receive the inheritance as your reward; you are serving the Lord Christ. For the wrongdoer will be paid back for the wrong he has done and there is no partiality". In this same passage Paul repeatedly emphasizes love as the hallmark of the new life or "age":

"Put on then, as God's chosen ones, holy and beloved, compassion, kindness....forbearing one another..... forgiving each other....And above all these put on love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony. Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all, and in all". (20)

But Paul is no apocalyptist, for the strict dualism of the two ages is transformed in his thinking by an inherent continuity. According to Jenni, Paul "believes that he and his readers 'stand in the isthmus of time between the ages', or better, he believes that the age to come can be entered from within history". (21) This is precisely the line of argument Miguez Bonino is pursuing, viz. that the works, or good conduct of which the hallmark is love, represent the ethical outworking of the new age which is now appearing in the present age. He says, "Since Christ has risen and inaugurated a new realm of life, man's existence in love bears the marks of this new age and will find lasting fulfilment when this new age will become an unresisted and total realization". (22)

In his later work, "Room to be People" (23) Miguez Bonino deals at greater length with this connection between the present historical actions and the eschatological kingdom in biblical writings, and since this is the whole thrust of his argument in this section of the chapter we are studying we will reproduce in summary form this later elaboration.
After referring to the Colossians 3 passage he draws attention to the parable of Dives and Lazarus in Luke 16:19-31. The point of the story, as told by Jesus, was that the rich man's options were open only in this life. Therefore, for him,

"the decisive moment has already passed. Eternity was already at work while he had been enjoying his life without caring about his fellow men. The character and destiny of his life was sealed then and there....

The real question is whether or not here, in this life, we participate in the 'society' which God has established with human beings for the creation and transformation of the world....

This life here is the decisive factor". (24)

The message is clear - that historical actions here and now are determinative of the eschatological destiny. The future is being created now.

The continuity is again brought out in the emphasis Miguel Bonino lays on the dictum by Segundo to the effect that "There is no love lost in this world". (25) This he uses as a summing up of the biblical assurance that "love endures" from I Corinthians 13.

"The most heroic actions, the most philanthropic or resounding deeds, can be nothing more than short-lived manifestations of an action with no value or permanence. They can be the isolated sound of an instrument played thoughtlessly. Only love gives permanence and meaning to these actions. Because only in love is there the permanence, the tenacity, the total commitment, the prudence, and the sensitivity which can achieve a permanent result. There is one life if there is love and in the extent to which there is love". (26)

This can be further illustrated in two passages from the gospels. In the first, recorded in Mark 14: 3-9 there is related the incident of the anointing of Jesus at Bethany. When the disciples complained, Jesus defended the woman by declaring that she had performed an act of love which would be recounted wherever the gospel is preached. The act of love is not lost. It is permanent, "as eternal as the gospel itself". (27) He concludes that "love, like God's word itself, is
eternal, and with his word an act of love will never be without a future" (28)

The second is the familiar parable of the great assize in Matthew 25. The criterion for judgment was declared to be the human, historical actions of mercy and compassion (or the omission thereof). In his comment and explanation Miguez Bonino reiterates his assertion that love is the nature of the future kingdom:

"We deceive ourselves if we see this as a simple commercial transaction, for a service offered to a poor person here, you receive a reward later there. It is concerned with the very nature of the future which Jesus Christ offers. His kingdom is the triumph of single-minded and active love". (29)

The nature of life after death is not given much attention in the New Testament. The determinative principle is the permanent and undying character of Christ's love which gives an eternal dimension to human love. When human love is identified with Christ it participates in that death-transcending character.

The same principle applies in the gospel account of the raising of the widow of Nain's son in Luke 7: 11-17. This shows not only Jesus' power to raise the young man back to life (he would die again) but his death-denying compassion. The incident proves that "love does not have to cry over what seems lost. Whoever lives in love here in this life has a future both here and in eternity". (30)

The conclusion Miguez Bonino comes to is that love gives meaning to the isolated acts that make up this human life, and that life after death participates in this same reality. Its foundation and impetus is the very being of God which means that love has an eschatological dimension. If participating in the love of God manifest in Christ imparts meaning to the isolated and disjointed incidents of the present life "such a
meaningful life must have a future in the afterworld. In love and only
in love does our life have a future". (31)

It is important to note that in Room to be People Miguez Bonino is expounding
his theme in a homiletical rather than an academic context and consequently
avoids relating what he says to the apocalyptic framework he has used in
his other studies. But the burden of the exposition is the same - the
new age which is to be consummated in the future is characterized by love
and that love has to be explicated in the here and now. Actions of this
nature participate in that coming kingdom and so the continuity between
present history and the eschatological kingdom is a thread running through
the biblical record. In fact the "new age", with love as its hallmark,
has broken into "this present age" and this overlapping of the ages provides
the link between historical action and the eschatological kingdom.

Miguez Bonino also underlines the corporate nature of this kingdom. Since
love is of the essence of the kingdom it necessarily implies a breaking
down of the barriers of separateness and a community of persons. This is
also a part of the biblical witness. Indeed, he says, the kingdom

"refers to a humanity that has been transformed on a
renewed earth. It is a vision of a world in which
the creative plan of God is finally fulfilled, where
hunger, poverty, injustice, oppression, pain, even
disease and death have been definitely overcome; it
is a world from which evil has been rooted out for-
ever. Where the love of God is "all in all", where the
human love manifested in Jesus Christ has penetrated
all humankind and therefore fulfills God's plan for
creating a humanity which manifests his love in a
harmonious world which they themselves work, culti-
vate, and make fruitful". (32)

This is an outworking of the biblical concepts of justice and peace both
of which are expressions of relationships between and amongst people
within the context of love.
Miguez Bonino also makes use of the Pauline concept of God's ultimate purpose being the uniting together of all things in Jesus Christ which the apostle sets out in the Ephesian letter. The biblical concern, therefore, is for a future of humanity in a "collective and organized existence...a community which is created and recreated in love, in a world destined to be 'the home' of that community". (33) Thus the concept of love can never be reduced to individual and isolated acts of kindness and mercy. It is necessarily a community concept. This means that if the Christian message is reduced to dimensions that are only private and personal it is distorted. If further, such a privatized life is lived only in and for itself and is thought of as prolonged eternally then it is "in truth, hell, condemnation, damnation because love cannot conform to living a private life". (34)

The corollary of all this for Miguez Bonino is that love translated into such corporate terms has an eternal future in the same way as does an individual action. If healing a sick person is an act of love with an eschatological future so also is a national health programme. It follows also that political action, undertaken in love for those suffering from oppression and injustice is "part of the gospel" (35) Indeed he says,

"all opposition to oppression and injustice must have a future. And for that reason, it is part of our human service to Jesus Christ's opposition to capitalistic greed and bureaucratic dehumanization and the substitution of monopolies and multinationals for an economy which serves all mankind. It is the struggle to politically organize the human community with a real, not false quality, so that people will have equal value, not just in theory but in actual opportunities for them to develop their abilities and manage their jobs and their lives". (36)

The kingdom of God is established in such acts. So too, we are to see the eschatological significance of the many acts of sacrifice which ensure only small amounts of freedom, justice and human dignity. Some
are only partially successful. But all participate in the kingdom.

In a significant passage Miguez Bonino sums up his eschatology thus:

"But God has invited us to begin to create the future and has promised to guarantee and certify for eternity what we create through personal and collective love. There is one human history in this world before death because God is love. And therefore there is also one human history after death and after this world. This is the nature and foundation of Christian hope". (37)

We can see therefore that in Room to be People Miguez Bonino expounds passages from the New Testament which enable him to emphasize the elements of continuity and causality. The Kingdom life here is determinative of the life of the kingdom to come and the hallmark of that kingdom is love.

It is possible here to discern a development in Miguez Bonino’s thinking. InDoing Theology his contention that there is a continuity between present action and the future kingdom was based on a relatively limited range of New Testament ideas. These were the nature of the Resurrection "body" and "works" in Pauline thought and some general remarks about the kingdom. In Room to be People he has used a more widely-based biblical foundation which includes both Pauline and synoptic sources. In developing his thoughts about the importance of continuity however he has to some extent neglected his previous emphasis on discontinuity. This element in his teaching had been derived from the apocalyptic stress on the future kingdom which irrupts into the present. We now move to a consideration of Miguez Bonino’s use of apocalyptic.

4. THE KINGDOM AND APOCALYPTIC THOUGHT

Miguez Bonino’s idea of the Kingdom of God is grounded in the New Testament affirmation that in Jesus Christ God’s rule has both arrived and is yet to be consummated. This, as we have shown in the previous chapter is related to the apocalyptic framework in which much of the New Testa-
ment message is expressed.

It is important here to note that the New Testament message of the kingdom involves the very same polarity of continuity and discontinuity which Miguez Bonino has underlined in his use of the resurrection theme and the concept of works in Paul. It is in this connection also that his reference to deepening our understanding of the apocalyptic literature can best be understood. (38) The kingdom, he declares

"is not the natural outcome of history. Conflict and judgment intervene. Yet the kingdom does salvage, transform and fulfill the 'corporeality' of history and the dynamism of love and fellowship at work in it. This means that the eschatological reality, in turn, is fashioned, nurtured, and raised in history". (39)

The continuity and discontinuity between history and the coming kingdom in apocalyptic thought is brought out in a helpful insight provided by C.B. Caird who draws attention to the distinction between the German words Das Ende and Die Endzeit. The Jewish people, he points out, expected the latter rather than the former. However, it is easy to become confused between the one and the other. Caird says, "But to expect an End is not the same as to expect an End-time. The one is an event beyond which nothing can conceivably happen. The other is a period of indefinite duration in which much is expected to happen". (40)

In discussing this observation, D.S.Russell contends that das Ende is better defined as the transcendental finale and die Endzeit as a temporal continuation of history in the sense of the kingdom as the earthly reign envisaged by certain of the apocalyptists (including Daniel). In this way some continuity can be affirmed - both between history and the end-time and between the end-time and the end. In fact in some apocalyptic writing there is a fluctuation between them and even a mingling and merging of the two. (41)
It has to be admitted however, that in typical apocalyptic thinking the element of discontinuity is paramount. The sharp antithesis is drawn between "this present age" and "the age to come". The awaited kingdom is transcendental and other-worldly, and this is the kingdom that really matters, and on which the future hope is set.

Russell does point out, however, that though contemporary history is not clearly in focus in apocalyptic thought, it is nevertheless a significant factor in the scenario. Frequently hidden behind obscure imagery and by the phenomenon of pseudonymity there is an air of unreality about the whole picture. "Nevertheless continuity remains and history as well as eternity has a firm place within the revelation of God's purposes made known to them. The contemporary scene is the stage on which the divine purpose is even now being worked out and it is in contemporary terms that the kingdom is to be understood". (42)

Furthermore, despite the prominence which apocalyptic gives to the salvation of the individual there is also reference to the community in the age to come. This is an aspect to which Miguez Bonino has drawn attention in his teaching. The goal of salvation is envisaged as a new society, which will manifest justice and peace. With shalom as its distinguishing characteristic this kingdom is rooted in this world of time and history.

This is all in line with the New Testament's eschatological emphasis that the kingdom powers are at work now as well as in the future. If the early Christians could cry "Come, Lord Jesus" (43) it was because he had already come and his reign had begun. The vision of the seer of Patmos could include, therefore, the praise of the elders in heaven who worshipped God and said

"We give thanks to thee Lord God Almighty, who art and who wast, that thou hast taken thy great power and begun to reign". (44)
The stuff of history therefore - the daily action of social life, institutions, individuals, politics, science and commerce, is the very activity of the kingdom itself and not merely a setting against which some other 'real' or 'spiritual' life of the kingdom takes place. The concerns of secular history, therefore are meaningful in terms of the kingdom and can and do contribute towards the establishment of a society based on peace and justice. "They are, or can become, a means whereby the kingdom can become visible on earth." (45)

Nevertheless, the other side of the polarity has to be given due consideration. As Miguez Bonino himself emphasizes "The Kingdom is not... the natural denouement of history". (46) Human beings may be agents of its coming and stewards of its mysteries. But it is also supramundane and transcendent. It is something 'given' - the work and gift of God himself. Whilst the prayer of the disciples was to be "Thy kingdom come... on earth" its coming is a consummation, and that implies a break, or discontinuity. (47) This sense of "otherness" is brought out in the affirmation contained in a World Council of Churches publication:

"We believe that time is not infinite, that history will end, that the present heaven and earth will pass away, that the new heaven and the new earth will come, that the kingdom of God is not something that happens in linear continuity with history. In this sense Christians are not naïve utopians or simple optimists who identify the just and sustainable society with the Kingdom of God". (48)

The discontinuity is also emphasized in contemporary theological discussion. Wolfhart Pannenbring for example, expresses his belief that the Kingdom is not the present reality. The latter is all too recognizably characterized by injustice, brutality and war, and this fact indicates the gap between the present and the kingdom. The biblical literature in its realism proclaimed the kingdom as the coming reality. Even when things were going well, and there was a sense of God's rule being evident still the kingdom was announced as the future coming
kingdom. "In the light of the futurity of God's Kingdom, it is obvious that no present form of life and society is ultimate". (49)

However, Pannenberg's use of the resurrection as the prolepesis of the apocalyptic end also leads him to see a continuity between "now" and "then" and since he also emphasizes history as the sphere of God's self-revelation the foci of his theology are fixed both in the "here" and the "hereafter". This is brought out when in discussing the radical transformation of the body described by Paul in I Cor. 15 he makes a distinction between a structural continuity and a historical continuity. The transformation effected will be so radical that nothing will be unaffected; the replacement of the old perishable body by the new spiritual body in the resurrection of the dead will represent a break between the old existence and the new. This break is a substantial or structural break. But Pannenberg affirms on the other hand a historical continuity. The transformation of resurrection will bring change to the same earthly body, for "there is a historical continuity in the sense of continuous transition in the consummation of the transformation itself" and hence there is a "connection between the beginning and the end point which resides in the process of transformation itself, regardless of how radically this process may be conceived". (50) From this definition Pannenberg is able to argue for a "historical continuity" between the "last days" and the "new age" in the apocalyptic scheme.

For Jürgen Moltmann, the emphasis is placed rather on the future as the fulfilment of promise. For him, promise declares the "coming of a not yet existing reality from the future of the truth... future is that reality which fulfils and satisfies the promise because it completely corresponds to it and accords with it". (51) In the 'not yet existing reality' we find the discontinuity, but continuity is affirmed in the correspondence and accordance between the promise and future. Thus the
present and the future are linked by hope, which, for the Christian is
directed towards the irruption of the new creation of all things by
the God who raised Jesus Christ from the dead. This again stresses the
discontinuity in the eschatological views of Moltmann, as he calls the
new creation a "novum ultimum". (52) For Moltmann, the Christian
response to promise is in hope which involves historical action. This
latter brings the longed-for future into the present and so transforms
the suffering of the present. Herein lies the continuity. The discon­
tinuity in the theology of hope consists in its doctrine of the future
of God. (53)

In his understanding of apocalyptic eschatology, Moltmann again brings
out the element of discontinuity. He declares the theological signifi­
cance of apocalyptic to lie in the "historifying of the cosmos," (54)
and sees it as an eschatological and historic interpretation of the
cosmos. (55) By this he means that the apocalyptic dualism of the two
aeons applies not merely to man and his history - but to the universe as
well. Thus the natural sphere is "historified" in the apocalyptic
sense that it splits into "a world that is coming and one that is passing
away". (56) Thus the change in man, in this view, involves the conver­
sion of the whole cosmos, since the whole creation is included in the
suffering of the last days. The suffering becomes universal and destroys
the all-sufficiency of the cosmos, just as the eschatological joy will
then resound in a 'new heaven and a new earth'. (57) Moltmann is at
pains also to point out that when apocalyptic is viewed from this cosmo­
logical perspective the "existing bounds of reality" could themselves be
transformed. (58) The end therefore would not be a return to the begin­
ning, not a repristination of creation nor a reversion to a pre-fall
condition of purity, but a bringing to be of something wider than the
beginning ever was. The cosmos would thus become involved in the process
of the eschaton.

If we allow the validity of this insight - and the imagery of the book of Revelation, speaking as it does of a "new heaven and a new earth", would seem to require us to do so - then we can see that when Jesus spoke in his ministry of men seeing "the Son of man seated at the right hand of power, and coming on the clouds of heaven" (59) he was declaring the arrival of the future as a present reality. Apocalyptic sees the end in the beginning, and especially the beginning of the end time can be seen in the life and ministry of Jesus which demonstrated the breaking in of the kingdom. The first advent is a foreshadowing of the second and his death and resurrection can be seen as a demonstration of his coming glory. The witness of the New Testament according to Russell is that "the Kingdom will be ushered in at 'the end' but through Christ its life and citizenship are a present possession". (60)

Miguez Bonino uses two brief phrases to delineate the relationship between history and the consummation. On the one hand, he says, "the kingdom redeems, transforms, and perfects the 'corporeality' of history and the dynamics of love that has (sic) operated in it". (61) Nevertheless it is also true that "history arrives at the Kingdom through suffering, conflict and judgment". (62) Here he is affirming, in the first place the continuity aspect. However, "suffering, conflict and judgment" speak of the discontinuity so forcefully brought out in apocalyptic thought. In order to yield a balanced understanding of the twin emphases in both the prophetic and apocalyptic interpretations these two poles have to be held in tension, and this Miguez Bonino was careful to do in Doing Theology. Both are necessary for a full picture of the relationship between history and the kingdom. As Russell has succinctly expressed it: "The kingdom is 'on earth'; the kingdom is 'from heaven'; and these two are one". (63)
Part of the appeal and fascination of the apocalyptic view of the kingdom is its belief that this present age is to be replaced by a new one, that out of the destruction and death of things as they are there is to arise a new reality. The intervention of what Miguez Bonino calls "suffering, conflict and judgment" is to be the prelude to new and better things. A similar vision inspires Marxism. There is to be no easy optimistic gradual development, as in the nineteenth century liberal view of "progress". In fact Marxism understands, says Niebuhr, "as the purely progressive view of history does not, that civilizations and cultures do not merely grow but that they must die and be reborn if they are to have a new life". (64)

5. THE SECULARIZED ESCHATOLOGY OF MARXISM

For Karl Marx the coming age will see the arrival of communist society. And he was quite definite as to who was to be responsible for inaugurating this future bliss. This was the task of the proletariat. He was firmly convinced that the dialectical processes at work in the historical events of his day were bringing about the dissolution of the capitalist system. The constant phases of prosperity followed by crises, with intermittent periods of dullness were some of the fluctuating influences which all adversely affected the working man. He therefore encouraged them to strike and to participate in any action which would rouse them from the torpid state of disinterest into which they were cast by the dehumanizing forces that were exploiting and oppressing them. He considered that the object of such activity was not just to gain some slight and temporary economic advantage, but to awaken their political awareness for the role they were destined to play in history. (65) Marx believed that the working class should organize itself as a movement to initiate and carry through the revolution needed to inaugurate the socialist era,
and the forces of capitalism itself were, by their ever growing concentration into larger and larger (but ever fewer) units, turning the proletariat into "a class always increasing in numbers and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself". (66)

Marx had perceived that the only way in which his projected communist society could be brought into being was by the proletariat becoming aware of its revolutionary potential. Thus the task for him was to arouse in the working class their incipient revolutionary consciousness. He has discovered also that "it is not the consciousness of human beings which determines their existence, but social existence which determines their consciousness". (67) To participate in the economic struggle would, therefore, prepare and train them for the political conflict that was looming.

There is here a tension in Marx's thinking. For whilst on the one hand he believed that it was the proletariat's historical mission to initiate the revolution, he also knew that the very conditions in which they worked had the effect of simultaneously numbing them into resignation to their lot

"The advance of capitalist production develops a working-class, which by education, tradition, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of Nature. The organisation of the capitalist process of production, once fully developed, breaks down all resistance....The dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to the capitalist". (68)

In Marx's opinion it is the task of Marxism itself to act as the catalyst in such a situation. He declared: "We must force these petrified relationships to dance by playing their own tune to them". (69) The revolutionary consciousness was there latent in the proletariat. It has to be aroused. Marx saw himself and his teaching as the spark to light
the fuse which would ignite the revolutionary explosion. In the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" written when he was only twenty-six, the seed of this idea is already germinating in Marx's thought.

"As philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapon in philosophy. And once the lightning of thought has squarely struck this ingenuous soil of the people, the emancipation of the Germans into men will be accomplished...The head of this emancipation is philosophy. Its heart is the proletariat". (70)

Thus for Marx the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat was the indispensable requisite for social change. In and through this reformed consciousness the implicit and unconscious historical tendency became explicit and recognizable. Later Marx referred to this as scientific socialism, a term he used in order to distinguish it from utopian socialism "which confined itself to propounding an arbitrarily constructed ideal". (71)

One of Marxism's celebrated statements is the affirmation that "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles". (72)

Once the unity of primitive communist existence had been destroyed by the acquisitive avarice which led to the system of private property, class division began and relations between classes emerged. These took the form of friction, struggle and antagonism. Marx applied his insight of the dialectic to this phenomenon and hence evolved his theory of the class struggle. This he believed was the outcome of the developing relations of production (master-slave, lord-serf, and capitalist-worker) through the historic stages. The class struggle was therefore built into the successive economic structures that were erected in these different phases.

When Marx subsequently postulates the revolution as the culmination of "pre-history" it is not then a new innovation in his scheme. It represents the development and fulfilment of a historical trend that has been gathering momentum through the ages. (73)
In Marx's understanding of things, the contradictions in the capitalist system merely served to polarize the existing antagonism still further until the inevitable revolution would signify that the breaking point had been reached.

By terminating pre-history in this way, the proletariat would, in Marx's view, eliminate class differences by restoring the humanity of all men as social beings. History was under man's control and Marx eschewed any idea that there was any power outside of the historical process itself that could affect it. Man "is not doomed to run behind history trying to catch it up". (74) He can himself take charge.

"The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men that change circumstances, and that the educator himself needs educating". (75)

This highlights the crucial role of the proletarian revolution in Marx's scheme. Man's freedom to create history happens when that revolution is ready to break in upon the course of events and interrupt the normal flow of historical events. This point is reached when the proletarian consciousness ripens and the working class becomes aware of its historical destiny and opportunity. Even whilst capitalism casts its alienating spell on mankind it is bringing about its own self-destruction by means of its internal contradictions. One of these contradictions is the alienation of the proletariat to the point of historical self-consciousness and its consequent assumption of the role of saviour of mankind. Van Leeuwen has therefore described the similarity between the Marxist plan of salvation and that of the biblical revelation aptly by saying: "This is a secularised biblical eschatology in which the proletariat has assumed the broad features of the Servant of the Lord, whose vicarious suffering for the whole creation inaugurates the new age". (76)
There are two aspects of Marxism that need to be noted at this point.

The first is that in Marx's soteriology, salvation is something achieved as a result of self-effort by one section of mankind - the proletariat. (77) Marx, seeking to deny the Christian belief in creation, could declare:

"A being only considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he only stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the grace of another regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he has, moreover, created my life - if he is the source of my life". (78)

Marx believed, mutatis mutandis, that man had to save himself. Instead of his state of bondage and alienation the final revolution will usher in man's total regeneration. It will not merely bring about material plenty and a fairer distribution of goods but a spiritual awakening and liberation. Thus man, by his own efforts will re-create himself as a totally new being. In the German Ideology Marx and Engels spoke of this regenerative activity when they said: "The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice". (79)

Then secondly this leads us to Marx's Prometheanism. In the foreword to his doctoral dissertation Marx had declared, "Prometheus is the most eminent saint and martyr in the philosophical calendar" (80) and he is said to have read the works of Aeschylus in Greek every year. (81) No doubt deriving his inspiration from this annual devotion Marx weaves the Promethean thread into the tapestry of his thought throughout. Marx's Prometheus is a collective one, in fact the proletariat that steals fire from Zeus (for Marx, capitalism).

J.M. Lochman has described Marx's interest in Prometheus in three ways. (82) Firstly he welcomed the rebellious nature of the Greek mythological figure. He does this on behalf of and for the benefit of mankind. When he brings the fire back to earth he teaches men to build houses and establish
settlements. Then secondly he admires Prometheus' martyrdom. Prometheus is condemned (by vengeance of the gods) to suffer in chains and this symbolizes for Marx the lot of the proletariat. Thirdly, he appreciates the stubborn refusal by Prometheus to be cowed and submissive. Marxists generally see him as "a human genius moving beyond all the set boundaries, questioning all the traditional prerogatives of the gods, and installing man as the responsible agent and final hope of the universe". (83)

Miguez Bonino sees Prometheanism as the key to Marxism. He says 'Prometheus, human affirmation - rebellion and solidarity - at the centre of history: this seems to me the pulsing heart of Marxism as a historical movement". (84) It is here that we find one of Miguez Bonino's important learnings from Marx, and, utilizing this insight from Marx he emphasizes the true biblical understanding of the role of man. For him the God of the Bible is not a Zeus, and does not impose limits on man's creativity. Rather he creates man in his own image, makes him a steward in his creation and a partner in his ongoing task. As such, he invites him to share in the eschatologically significant historical project of establishing his kingdom. The biblical God "is not a cosmological policeman jealously watching the frontiers of his untouchable realm" (85) as was the Greek god. Instead of keeping the fire of creation for himself he shares it with man. He also shares himself. "In Jesus Christ he goes the way of man so that man might go his way: to have life and to have it in abundance, to participate in the life everlasting, the world without end". (86) As the partner of God, man is called to use the 'fire' in his ordering of the creation and his life in history. "Man is a free, creative, transcending being, an 'eschatological existence', challenging the 'status quo', changing the world, seeking the 'greater justice' of the coming Kingdom". (87) These are all statements Miguez Bonino would echo and endorse.
That Christian theology has not always thus seen man is undeniable. All too often, as we have previously pointed out, this dynamic, active and positive aspect of man's nature has been obscured in a religion that has encouraged otherworldliness and inwardness.

In his insistence that the workers could not "sit back and await final success as a gift from History" (88) Marx was throwing down a challenge to the church which the political theologians of Europe and the theologians of liberation have finally taken up. In this sense, then, the Marxian theory stresses the continuity between the now and the then, the "present age" (of capitalistic exploitation, oppression and misery) and the "coming age" (of freedom and uninhibited growth in the communist society) by the eschatologically significant action of the proletariat in assuming responsibility for the future of mankind. Marx's abandonment of transcendence and theism has forced him to spotlight man as the principal actor on the stage of world history. This Promethean "human affirmation" (to use his own terminology) is what Miguez Bonino is seeking to re-establish by including it in the biblical picture of the kingdom. If the "Kingdom is not merely adumbrated, reflected, foreshadowed, or analogically hinted at in the individual and collective realizations of love in history, but actually present, operative, authentically - however imperfectly and partially realized," (89) it is because man's present actions in history are of abiding significance.

This human responsibility is further brought out by Miguez Bonino in a quotation which he uses approvingly from the Dutch theologian Lambert Schuurman, who says:

"...we cannot delegate this responsibility (planning for the world) to someone else since we take seriously man as partner and co-operator with God. I am convinced of the need for man to work, to make history and not to lose time in creating partial or total secularizations of reality.... On this point there can be no controversy with Marxists. The world and its future are our business and we cannot delegate it to anyone else". (90)
It is interesting in this connection to find Machovec also drawing out a similar interpretation from his study of the gospels. Not unexpectedly he drives home the continuity aspect of the kingdom. Because Jesus and his disciples were not propagating idealism or otherworldliness, his reflections about the Kingdom of God relate to this-worldly realities such as history, politics, social situations and the concerns of men for their terrestrial future. (91) It is significant that Machovec has here minimized the "otherness" or discontinuity of the kingdom. This is a temptation into which Miguez Bonino has not fallen, having maintained with strict discipline the essential polarity and tension between both of these two aspects of the biblical understanding of the Kingdom.

Nevertheless, Miguez Bonino has delved more deeply than this in his interpretation of the kingdom by means of the Marxist analogy. In the latter scheme there is also a marked discontinuity between the present age of proletarian suffering and the coming age of communist society with its projected future bliss. In fact, the aim and purpose of the proposed classless society is to destroy the evils and vexations imposed by the capitalist system. The very notion of revolution implies this discontinuity. It calls for the destruction of the old and its replacement by the new. The importance of revolution in Marx's thought is brought out in his claim that it was the "driving force of history". (92) In addition his descriptions of the June Revolution of 1848 in Paris and the Paris Commune of 1870-1 and its suppression (93) indicate the significance he placed on the cruciality of revolutionary activity.

It is important to understand just what Marx meant by the revolution. In this regard, the revolution he believed to be necessary was more than merely a seizure of power by the overthrow of the ruling authorities. This had
happened in the French Revolution, and Marx regarded it as a failure because it did not produce the new type of society, with freedom as its cornerstone and hallmark which the revolutionaries had hoped for, and which Marx himself believed to be the *raison d'etre* of all revolutions. The reason for its failure, Marx contended, was that the economic foundations of social life were not understood by those mounting the revolution. (94) Marx's classic statement explaining his concept of total revolution is contained in his *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*:

"At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work before, from forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformation the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic and philosophic - in short ideological - forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out". (95)

By his use of his holistic idea of revolution Marx emphasized the discontinuity between the present and what he envisaged for the future. Speaking of the apocalyptic understanding of history and the Kingdom Miguez Bonino refers to "the intervening fact of judgment which divides, excludes and cleanses ('burns') that which does not belong in the new age". (96)

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that he has seen the continuity-discontinuity tension in both Marx and the biblical understanding of the Kingdom and that he has perceived the necessity to preserve it in his own theological exposition. In doing so he has been more faithful and perceptive to both Marx and the Bible than has Machovec.
There is, however, a further level to which this study must proceed as we examine the parallels between Miguez Bonino and Marx. In the previous chapter we referred to Marx's concept and use of the dialectic as an interpretation and explanation of historical change. (97) In fact Marxist dialectic is to be understood in three ways:

1. In the sense that the forces at work bringing about social change in the events of history operate in a dialectical way or rhythm it is the objective fact of those processes;

2. As a description of those laws;

3. As a revolutionary force itself since it is the theoretical consciousness - or revolutionary awareness - of the proletariat, by whom the transformation of social history is to be brought about. (98)

In accordance with this dialectical movement of history the disintegration of capitalism was assured by means of the contradictions inherent in that system itself. Here again in the dialectical movement of history itself, we have, in Marx's thought, another instance of the strong sense of continuity he detected in the historical process. Capitalism would cause alienation. Alienation would engender a revolutionary consciousness. The revolution would sweep away the capitalistic system and inaugurate communist society. In Marx's view these would all follow as night follows day - it was in effect a law of history.

The question of historical necessity arose later when Rosa Luxemburg emphasized this aspect of Marx's doctrine to the exclusion of any possibility that human will would in any way deflect the course of events. This clashed sharply with the views of the revisionists, led by Bernstein. (99) In the Afterword to the second edition of Capital Marx quoted with approval the account of his theory by a Russian reviewer who had said "Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history governed by laws independent of human will, consciousness and intentions". (100) The continuity therefore is strong.
in the sequence of historical events.

Alongside this, there appears also an element in Marx's thought which brings out the discontinuity and thus sets up the tension again. This is the belief that the coming communist society was not a far-off event to be expected eventually, but an imminent, indeed a present reality. In *The German Ideology* he and Engels declared their belief:

"Communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence". (101)

The new society was even then in the process of gestation. In *The Civil War in France* Marx declared that the working class "have no ideals to realize but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant". (102)

Later Marxists have drawn out with greater emphasis and clarity this effect of the future on and in the present. Lukacs, in castigating revisionists who separate the movement from the final goal says that the latter is not a condition at which the proletariat arrive as the culmination of a process. It cannot be forgotten during the course of the struggle. "The final goal", says Lukacs "is precisely the relation to the totality (to the totality of society considered as a historic process) through which, and only through which, each moment of struggle acquires its revolutionary content. It takes the daily struggle from a level of facticity, of simpleness, to that of reality". (103) Here Lukacs is saying that the final goal is present, giving meaning to the everyday struggle to achieve it. In relation to the present context he seems to be confirming that the discontinuity of the future has arrived in the present.
Here again then we detect an element of the continuity-discontinuity tension in the secularized eschatology of Marxism, which Miguez Bonino points to in the Christian sphere. On the one hand there is evolutionary progression by dialectical contradiction and conflict to the future, and on the other hand the future eschatological goal gives meaning to the present endeavour. In the latter the evil and suffering of the present is partly overcome in the transforming newness imparted into it by the presence of the future. In the former there is the growth through conflict and suffering to the new society and humanity. And this, as we have seen, is the essence of Miguez Bonino's exposition of the relation between history and the final kingdom. In Christians and Marxists he says:

"In other words, history - and ethical action is participation in history - must be seen by the Christian both in its discontinuity with God's Kingdom (and therefore as the sphere where evil can only be partially checked) and in its continuity (and therefore as the sphere in which the good of the Kingdom can be partially anticipated)". (104)

6. ERNST BLOCH AND THE FUTURE

Bloch is the Marxist philosopher who perhaps more than any other has ventured into the field of transposing Christian categories and Marxist ideas. In doing so he has concentrated mainly on the eschatological aspect of Marxism and has thereby helped Christian theologians to understand some of the implications of Christian eschatology. (105) Bloch's basic philosophical premise is contained in his celebrated statement, "S is not yet P". "Hence the universal formula that applies at the beginning of philosophy. S is not yet P, no subject already has its adequate predicate". (106) For Bloch, the incipit vita nova, the new life begins, means that the future of things - of being itself - will
bring forth their true nature and uncover their full potential. The realization of this potential will come about through hope.

Bloch's underlying presupposition is that man has unlimited potential for self-creativity and in the looking towards and striving for some as yet unrealized goal man awaits his own fulfilment. Man's essence lies therefore not in a return to a golden age of the past, but in an ascent to the future. This future, which has still to come into existence has an ontological status of its own since it is a possibility, a potential waiting for fulfilment, both in things and human attitudes. Philosophy's role is to awaken this dormant utopian possibility in humanity.

Bloch believes that in the historical record of man's mental and emotional images and dream-world fantasies lies the key to understanding this utopian urge. Men have expressed, albeit sometimes crudely, their ideas and hopes of a better world, a brighter future, and a release from suffering and pain in the poems, fairy-tales, popular legends and religious yearnings for paradise. Some of these longings are found in the revolutionary utopias constructed by historical figures - such as Thomas Muntzer - where a paradisal state is expected, which will eradicate evil, poverty and suffering. He claims that, "Where the negative emotions of expectation and their utopian images are oriented towards hell as their ultimate end..., the positive emotions of expectation (i.e. hope) - are oriented no less absolutely towards paradise". (107)

In common with other Marxist thinkers Bloch exhibits an appreciation of chiliastic movements. The key to their motivation, he believes, lies in their use of the eschatological element inherent in the biblical notion of the kingdom which "has posited, acknowledged and required the paths of utopianism as preparing for the final leap; in the Gospels the idea appears, not as a heavenly beyond, but as a new heaven and a new earth". (108)
Bloch however believes that Marxism has provided the only picture of the future that is both concrete and consistent. It offers both a theory about it and a praxis which ushers it in. In opposition to the inadequacy of the previous fantasies Marxism offers "an actively conscious participation in the immanent historical process of the revolutionary transformation of society....The point of a concrete Utopia is to understand precisely the dream concerning it, a dream rooted in the historical process itself". (109)

Bloch, however, is opposed to the Marxian concept of historical necessity, in the sense of laws of 'necessity of events'. In Man on His own he declares: "People, not things and not the mighty course of events outside ourselves (which Marx falsely places above us) write history". (110)

For Bloch, therefore, the determinative element in history is man's own creativity. Part of that creativity is his capacity for hope and his reaching towards that for which he hopes. This hope is actualized therefore in human activity. Just as in the classical Marxist scheme theory and praxis coincide in the coalescence of the proletarian consciousness and the socialist revolution so in Bloch hope for the Utopia and action to initiate it coincide. This hope is not something man receives from nature. He himself activates the latent hope within himself, and like Marx's man, cannot sit back and await the envisaged future as a gift to be received. "It is precisely hope (to the extent that it is joined to a world that does not surrender) that neither falls into despair nor sinks into quietist confidence". (111)

The similarity between this interpretation and Miguel Bonino's exposition is apparent. Whilst Marx rejects Utopianism, Bloch seeks to concretize Utopia and sees the key in the category of hope. Miguel Bonino, in line
with contemporary political theologians (112) has utilized this part of Bloch's teaching.

Bloch, unlike Moltmann, Metz and Weth, does not see the connection between present action and the future eschatological reality (for him Utopia, for the theologians the Kingdom) in terms of "analogy", "anticipation", etc. He places the emphasis in true Marxist fashion on human causality, since he sees human hope as the dynamic force behind history. But whilst Bloch is able to do this from Marxist premises, Miguez Bonino has to reconcile his emphasis on human responsibility with his theistic and biblical sources, and this is a much more difficult task. Nevertheless it is Bloch who perceived the significance and parallel between his own ideas and the importance of the category of the kingdom for biblical faith. "The Kingdom remains the central religious concept". (113) However, Bloch is careful to delete all traces of theism from his eschatology. He believes that, "the Kingdom remains a messianic frontal space without any theism; indeed, as increasingly demonstrated by every anthropologization of heaven from Prometheus down to the belief in a Messiah, it is only without theism that the kingdom remains at all". (114)

But Miguez Bonino has "re-theologized" Bloch's categories without diminishing in any way the positive and full insistence Bloch makes on human creativity. If the kingdom is both "from above" and "on earth" and they are one then there is no threat to the importance and significance of human ethical action. Indeed, as Miguez Bonino says, even its weaknesses and imperfections are gathered up and perfected in the kingdom of God that is yet to come. "The kingdom is not the denial of history, but the elimination of its corruptibility, its frustrations, weakness, ambiguity - more deeply, its sin - in order to bring to full realization the true meaning of the communal life of man". (115) Indeed, so effectively has Miguez Bonino welded the insights of Block into his interpretation of
the relationship between the kingdom in its present and future aspects that he finishes with a picture that is far richer than any "messianic frontal space".

To take the matter a stage further, we note that Bloch also emphasized the openness of history. Because man is at the helm of history and because he dares to hope for the new and to strive to actualize it, it follows that history must be open. Furthermore, the activity of man in this open, future-oriented, hope-actualizing history, includes in its scope matter itself. Man is to shape the world, as well as to write his own history in it.

The concept of an open history poses a challenge to any theology of history. If God, as our understanding of providence suggests, is in control, how can the future be open? If God is guiding history to its consummation in the Parousia what place is there for human creativity? Again Miguez Bonino has responded to the challenge. He suggests that God charts the course, whilst men pilot the ship. This is what we understand him to mean when he says:

"Once we see divine initiative as that action of God within history and in historical terms which opens history toward the promise, we seem not only entitled but required to use the strong language of growth, realization, creation which, furthermore, is that of the prophets and apostles". (116)

Bloch has even allowed a notion of transcendence which he interprets as the pressure of the future on the present. This is possible where there is someone who can orient himself to the future which means someone who can hope. Here again we have a secularized counterpart to the New Testament concept of the New Age which has broken into the present and which we saw earlier was approximated in the thought of Marx and Lukacs. Whilst these latter would not admit to any suggestion of transcendence Bloch, moving uninhibitedly amongst Biblical ideas can see the power
in the concept, suitably stripped of its theistic and christological connotations. After accusing Christian mysticism of "hiding the Christian God under a bushel" he affirms a humanistic eschatology.

"It lies in a downward reversal of the motion, not of love but of transcendence itself; downward to mankind, so that in the utmost novum of this New Testament its heavenly Jerusalem will 'come down out of heaven', and will do so 'prepared as a bride', not as a sacrificial altar, nor a throne of mercy". (117)

Thus Bloch holds a belief that something - a Utopia - comes from the future into the present. In this sense Miguel Bonino perceives the 'utopian function' of Christian eschatology. It serves to fire the imagination for concrete historical action. It is important, however to guard against thinking of the kingdom as a utopia which has (literally) "no place". The concept of the kingdom enables Miguel Bonino to do precisely what Bloch endeavours to do i.e. to concretize utopia. The kingdom has a place "both in history and in God's eschatological time" (118). For Miguel Bonino it is not a dream of what the future might be but a mobilizing vision which defines "projectively.....the possibility for which we work in the present". (119) It embraces an interpretation of a past historical event, a present reality i.e. mobilizing vision etc. and a commitment to work towards the longed-for communal life in a future which will embody the great symbols of love, peace and justice. Thus Miguel Bonino's concept of the kingdom is more all-embracing than the Marxist hope.

Another point of correspondence between Miguel Bonino and Marxism is in the resolution of the problem of historical necessity and freedom. The outline we have previously given has served to indicate the duality in Marx's ideas of the motive forces at work in the historical process. On the one hand we have drawn attention to the Marxian analysis of the
dialectical nature of history in the successive economic formations which Marx sees as the epochs of mankind's march. These periods have each been seen to embody the tendencies which have developed into the antitheses or negations of their own positive characteristics and dynamics. In their turn these movements have dialectically superseded their antecedent theses and become syntheses on a more advanced level. These successive eras have been seen to be processes dependent upon and deriving from the economic base in the modes of production. On the other hand we have observed Marx's designation of human initiative and creative drive as the artisan of history, culminating in the proletarian revolutionary consciousness which performs the act of human self-affirmation in the establishment of scientific socialism. We thus find ourselves faced with an apparent tension, if not contradiction, within the interpretation of history which Marx enunciated.

Marx resolved this problem by positing a correspondence between them rather than a dichotomy. "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past". (120) Furthermore, Marx did not hover between determinism and voluntarism. For him, the dialectical process of the breakdown of capitalism involved the rising consciousness of the proletariat which was to break out in the revolution. He does not perceive a dilemma between historical necessity and conscious action. Proletarian class-consciousness is both a condition of the revolution and the historical process in which the revolution takes place. (121) Whilst it is giving birth to its own revolutionary consciousness the proletariat therefore "passes decisively from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom". (122)
Miguez Bonino's solution to the problem of how to emphasize human historical responsibility in an exposition of the doctrine of the kingdom of God follows similar lines. The "quite unbiblical concept of God as a kind of machine programmed to produce certain facts (the incarnation, the Parousia) irrespective of the movement of history" (123) though intended to protect the primacy of the divine initiative, has to be rejected. That initiative should be seen rather as "the action of God within history and in historical terms which opens history towards the promise". (124) If this action is "within history and in historical terms" then it is also human action, and the divine initiative coincides with the initiative of men in terms of the continuity-discontinuity paradox Miguez Bonino has outlined.

The most obvious difference between the Christian idea of the New Age and Marxism on this point is the appreciation of the present activity and its significance for the future. In Marxism the present is to be swept away. So evil and corrupt is the exploitative capitalist system that the only good purpose it can serve is to conscientize the proletariat for revolutionary activity. In true Old Testament apocalyptic style it regards the present age as wholly evil. The new age will be the realm of righteousness. But for Miguez Bonino the new age has begun already. The works of the new age belong to the new order of the resurrection. Because of this they have a future - the new age will preserve, fulfill and complete them.

It is, furthermore, the kingdom that gives meaning to the whole content of the present and that gathers up the isolated fragments of human effort in a bringing together of past, present, and future in a glorious unity of love. In a moving passage on this theme Miguez Bonino declares:
"In this respect, we should also ask ourselves if the thousands of human battles waged to secure small amounts of freedom, justice, or dignity which are often bathed in human blood, often only partially triumphant, and where often the victory itself is deceiving, really constitute history or merely reflect incidents with no permanent significance. And the answer is always the same. Christians should not be cynical in regard to human history for the same reason that they should not be cynical in regard to their personal life. They have learned to see the power of love manifested in Jesus Christ to ransom, to perfect, and to give eternal future to every instant of their personal life and to every movement in the communal life of human beings. They have come to see the love of God preserve and give meaning to all life". (125)

In contrast with this, the Marxist future goal of classless society is so all-dominant that it relativizes both past and present. Actions in the "now" or the "before" are divested of their value unless they are related to the revolutionary cataclysm to be brought about when the dialectical movement has ripened the processes of history. Marxism sacrifices the partial in the present for the sake of the whole in the future. It discounts the past in order to deify the future. In a guardedly cautious but very revealing admission at the empirical level, Milan Machovec admits that Marxists today have discovered how undue concentration on the paradise to come "can lead to a fanaticism which abuses and ill-treats the present-day members of society". (126) In Míguez Bonino's understanding of the kingdom such a callous travesty is avoided. The present is not only caught up in the kingdom, which has already arrived and is still to be consummated in the future. It contributes to it and is a part of it. In a sentence which is absent from Doing Theology but which he has inserted in the text of "Historical Praxis" he states "This means that the eschatological reality, in turn, is fashioned, nurtured and raised in history". (127) Unlike Marxism where every new synthesis becomes negated in its antithesis we have here the possibility of the ultimate future of love being shared by the
present partial manifestations when they are salvaged, transformed and fulfilled. (128)

We have now seen that in Marxism the future relativizes the past and the present. We have also examined Miguez Bonino's thought and seen how in his hands Christian theology can assign significance to present action which is gathered up in the expected kingdom. We have now arrived at the point where we need to compare Miguez Bonino's interpretation of eschatology with the work of other contemporary theologians.

7. "DOES THE PRESENT DETERMINE THE FUTURE, OR DOES THE FUTURE DETERMINE THE PRESENT?" (129)

The developments in eschatological theology which began with the work of Weiss and Schweitzer in the early years of the present century served to set in motion a continuing debate. The responses by Dodd and Bultmann have similarly had their contemporary counterparts. (130) In the field of systematic theology, however, the discussion in recent years has focused on whether the methodological starting-point should be "the future of the present Christ" or "the presence of the coming Christ" (131). The question posed by Moltmann which we have used as the title for this section of our study encapsulates this problem. It has been restated by Moltmann, in the sentence, "Is the future theologically the 'revelation' of the present (apocalypse) or is the present the realized anticipation of the future (fulfilment) ?". (132)

Wolfhart Pannenberg grappled with this question in "Theology and the Kingdom of God." Pannenberg believes that the notion of the future as enshrined in the teaching of Jesus on the kingdom of God is the key to understanding the very nature of God. Jesus taught that God's claim on the world was to be thought of in terms of his coming rule. "Thus it is necessary to
say that, in a restricted but important sense, God does not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God's being is still in the process of coming to be". (133) This statement is reminiscent of Bloch's futurism, and also implies a development in God similar to that envisaged in the process theology of Hartshorne and the philosophy of Whitehead. Pannenberg guards against this danger by claiming that "what turns out to be true in the future will then be evident as having been true all along". (134)

For Pannenberg, therefore, God is "the power of the future", (135) and because God's Kingdom is not to be thought of simply as a far-away event but as imminent, it means that "God's rule is present and we can even now glimpse his future glory. In this way we see the present as an effect of the future, in contrast to the conventional assumption that past and present are the cause of the future". (136) He sees this future as an unpredictable and ambiguous, though nevertheless personal, category. God is ultimate future beyond whom there is no future. God's ultimate act of sovereignty, the final coming of his kingdom, will be revealed in the eschaton. That end has been revealed already proleptically in the resurrection of Jesus. The resurrection, however, is a unique event and therefore history is open because man is free. Pannenberg says: "In relation to the God of the power of the future, man is free: free for a truly personal life, free to accept the provisionality of everything, free with regard to nature and society, free for that creative love that changes the world without destroying it". (137)

We can now see that Pannenberg's response to the question posed in our heading is clearly one which affirms the second of the two options - the future determines the present. Like Miguez Bonino, Pannenberg has chosen the kingdom category as the framework within which to expound and
develop a theology of the relationship between the present and the future. His interpretation brings out strongly the relativity of the present vis a vis the future. This means that the present is constantly under the judgment of the future and this fact, to use Villa-Vicencio's phrase, "prevents all moral and socio-political complacency and other-worldliness". (138)

Pannenberg's emphasis on the priority of the future, however, has led him, in contrast to Miguez Bonino, to lay insufficient stress on the significance of present human action. Whilst Villa-Vicencio can claim that Pannenberg's thought is "significantly political" (139) we would reply that it is insufficiently so because of this very failure. It may be that Miguez Bonino's dialogue with Marxism has led him to lay a greater emphasis on the ethical imperative inherent in the biblical teaching on the kingdom. If so, we see in this emphasis a healthy corrective to the "abstract ethical systems" (140) with which Pannenberg is left.

Jürgen Moltmann has found a fruitful way to harmonize the two emphases. He does so by a semantic study of various words for "future". In the German word Zukunft there is perhaps some confusion until the equivalents in Latin and Greek are considered. The Latin equivalent is adventus which carries the connotation of expectation of something that is to come. "It means" he says "the arrival or 'coming' of something other, something new and transforming, which had not yet been present in that form and is still not present as yet". (141) The Greek word which corresponds here is parousia which, in addition to the sense of arrival, was used in Greek philosophy to denote "the present". In the New Testament this is used to signify the coming of God and of Christ. As in the Old Testament it speaks of the unique and then final coming of God and of a world which is in complete harmony with him. In this understanding the future
does not arise as a consequence of the present, but rather "the present springs from a future which one must be expectant of in transience". (142)

However, the Latin word *futurum* carries the sense of that which is yet to be and is roughly equivalent of the Greek word *physis* which indicates something that will bring forth or produce. Again the German word *Zukunft* does duty for this meaning in common parlance. The English equivalents, as Moltmann's translator points out, would be "Coming" (as in "the coming year") and future in the sense of what is "ahead". (143) The German word *Futur* should be used to indicate potentiality or "the temporal prolongation of being". (144) Moltmann goes on to draw out the theological significance of this distinction. The passion and resurrection of Jesus are the prolepsis or sending ahead of God's future, the *Zukunft*. Because this is so, then the present is determined by him and becomes the seed of that which is to come. It therefore produces a *Futur* corresponding to the *Zukunft*. The latter, however has a soteriological role of justification and reconciliation "in an unrighteous and unreconciled existence". (144) The ultimate overcoming of this enmity becomes the *Futur* of this present. However, Moltmann finishes with a priority assigned to the eschatological. He says:

"The soteriological "descent" from the presence of salvation to the consummating future, however, is comprehended and enclosed by the converse theological 'descent' from the eschatological sole lordship of God to the provisional lordship of Christ. It is only out of historical descent from the future to the present that the converse soteriological descent from the present to the future acquires its quickening power". (145)

Moltmann therefore recognizes the necessity for human activity directed to the future, but the formula he finishes with means that God's kingdom is entirely his own. Whilst he allows that history must move, through human endeavour, towards its destiny this is not the same as the arrival
of the kingdom in the parousia. For Moltmann, this human creating of
the future is participation in the mission which looks for the possi-
bilities of changing history. (146) But in Moltmann's scheme the
work which men do finishes with a lesser eschatological significance
than that which Miguez Bonino assigns to it in "Room to be People".
Whilst Moltmann therefore, represents an advance on Pannenberg in this
respect, the balance in his thinking still lies more with the future
which determines the present than vice versa. Moltmann is in dialogue
with Marxism to a far greater degree than Pannenberg and his awareness
of the sufferings and Godforsakenness of the oppressed in the third
world comes out clearly in The Crucified God. Here Moltmann confesses
the need for "political hermeneutics of faith" and "political disciple-
ship" (147) and says "the identifications of the presence of God with
the matter involved in liberation from vicious circles are real symbols,
real ciphers and material anticipations of the physical presence of God".
(148)

Miguez Bonino takes issue with Moltmann at this point and we shall explore
this disagreement in our next chapter. At this stage it is sufficient
to note that in Moltmann the political involvement called for is seen in
these sacramental terms. It is a sacrament of the future but only in
the secondary and derivative way described above is it causative of the
future.

A third theologian to deal with this issue in eschatology is Karl Rahner
whose solution is to draw a clear distinction between an intramundane
future and the absolute future. The latter phrase is a term which Rahner
coins as a circumlocution for the word God. The absolute future is
approaching both the individual and the human race. The present is
described in terms of an absolute becoming whilst the absolute future is at work it "and supports it as an inner constitutive element of this becoming". (149) Rahner thus combines both poles of Moltmann's dilemma - the absolute future determines the present and the present determines the relative or intramundane future.

Rahner's formulation is worked out specifically in response to Marxism whose future goal he sees as solely an intramundane future. An intramundane future is one which is planned by man. Christianity regards such objectives as "the greatest possible liberation of man from the domination of nature", and "the progressive socialization of man for the attainment of the greatest possible scope for freedom" (150) as genuinely human and God-given tasks. This task is understood by Rahner as implicit in the ethical imperative of love for God and neighbour which comprise the one commandment and accomplishment of authentic Christianity. Rahner believes that Marxism is an ideological utopian view of the future which confuses the intramundane and categorisable future with the absolute future.

By contrast Christianity, by making a clear distinction between the worthwhile goals of an intramundane future and the mystery of the absolute future protects man from the temptation to absolutize his relative goals. Such a temptation occurs when he invests in these relative goals "such energy that every generation is always sacrificed in favour of the next, so that the future becomes a Moloch before whom the man existing at present is butchered for the sake of some man who is never real and always still to come". (151) Rahner believes that "ultimate radical significance" is assigned by the ethical imperative of Christianity to the work for the intramundane future.
Rahner's scheme has considerable merit. A clear distinction is kept between the secular, intramundane future which always stands under the judgment of the absolute future. Furthermore the relative nature of this future is ably maintained, and the tension between the two is fully emphasized. It is doubtful, though, whether the philosophical categories he uses and the ethical imperative he refers to can ever engender sufficient motivation for worthwhile action. As the study of radical apocalyptic movements showed it is the imminence of the future inbreaking of God which provides the "utopian" motivation for significant action. Man needs powerful and stimulating symbols to evoke the effort needed to overcome the oppressive forces of conservatism and reaction. Whilst Rahner's answer therefore is philosophically tidy it is lacking in the essential ingredient which Miguez Bonino's category of the kingdom of God includes - namely human hope. (152) As a contribution to the Christian-Marxist dialogue in Europe Rahner's thought represents a valuable clarifying of concepts. In the context of the humanly stultifying conditions of the third world it is short of dynamism.

The need for a powerful dynamic combined with clear-cut ethical concepts is provided in the thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer who begins with the paradigm of justification by faith. Justification is the last word. It is final in a qualitative sense: as God's own free word it is sovereign and independent. As such it is the irreversible and final word and ultimate reality" (153) and cannot be achieved by a way of one's own. Consequently it is a judgment on the things before the last. It is also final in a temporal sense, being preceded by something that is penultimate but which occupies a span of time. This penultimate remains even though the ultimate annuls and invalidates it.
Bonhoeffer goes on to speak of the two extreme solutions which are sometimes put forward in response to the problem of the relation between the penultimate and the ultimate. The one is the radical answer which emphasizes what in considering Miguez Bonino's ideas we have come to distinguish as discontinuity. There is a complete break between the ultimate and penultimate and that break is the judgment of Christ. The second response is compromise which distances the ultimate to such an extent that it has no effect on the penultimate which therefore "retains its right on its own account and is not threatened or imperilled by the ultimate". (154) In eschatological terms the radical response is equivalent to thoroughgoing apocalypticism, and compromise to extreme conservatism. Both are opposed to Christ in whose incarnation, cross and resurrection is to be found the solution to the problem of the relationship between ultimate and penultimate.

In the incarnation the human reality is affirmed as that which is before the last. It is neither independent (as in compromise) nor destroyed (as in radicalism). "He allows it to remain as that which is before the last, as a penultimate which requires to be taken seriously, a penultimate which has become the outer covering of the ultimate". (155)

In the Crucifixion the ultimate judges the penultimate but also shows it mercy as the penultimate "bows before the judgment of the ultimate". (156) In the resurrection new life is imparted to man but he still remains man, in the realm of the penultimate. The penultimate is not annulled by the resurrection "but the eternal life, the new life, breaks in with ever greater power into the earthly life and wins its space for itself within it". (157) Thus Bonhoeffer establishes a relationship between the ultimate and the penultimate which is christological all the way through. In a way that is reminiscent of his fusion of the reality
of the world and the reality of Christ which we looked at in the
previous chapter here Bonhoeffer sets the penultimate and the ultimate
in a horizontal polarity. His biographer, Bethge explains that "the
ultimate and the penultimate are correlatives, each conditioning, qualifi-
ying, and validating the other". (158)

Bonhoeffer sees ethics as the preparation of the way from the ultimate to
the penultimate. And yet the penultimate precedes the ultimate.

"It is everything that precedes the ultimate... It
is at the same time everything which follows the
ultimate and yet again precedes it. There is, therefore,
no penultimate in itself; as though a thing could
justify itself in itself as being a thing before the
last thing; a thing becomes penultimate only through the
ultimate, that is to say at the moment when it has
already lost its own validity. The penultimate, then,
does not determine the ultimate; it is the ultimate
which determines the penultimate". (159)

The ultimate then is Christ's coming in grace. And man's task is to
prepare for his coming since there is in the historical situation a depth
of human suffering impeding the coming of Christ. To feed the hungry is
to prepare the way for the coming of grace because it is a thing before
the last and when done for the sake of and in the knowledge of Christ
"this penultimate does bear a relation to the ultimate. It is a penulti-
mate. The coming of grace is the ultimate". (160)

However, more is needed than the amelioration of social conditions. The
activity of preparing the way must be a spiritual reality. Only repen-
tance is an adequate preparation, and repentance requires action. These
actions must be directed to two objectives - to be men and to be good.

In the final analysis, however, only the Lord Himself can prepare the
way for his coming. "The end of all preparation of the way for Christ
must lie precisely in perceiving that we ourselves can never prepare the
way". (161) This explains the emphasis on repentance since "it is
not our way to Him but His way to us that has to be prepared and it can be prepared through my knowledge that He Himself must prepare it....... 'Preparation of the way is a way from the ultimate to the penultimate'. (162)

Bonhoeffer's dialectic of the ultimate and the penultimate has the advantage that it maintains the ultimacy of the ultimate whilst giving due significance to the importance of the penultimate. Indeed, it is this formulation by Bonhoeffer which enabled liberation theologians with Protestant views to participate critically in dialogue with Marxism. It clarified for them the distinction and relationship between what is ultimate and what is penultimate. By relying on God's pardoning grace (in the ultimate) they were able to see that the goals of human justice were penultimate, and therefore concretizations of repentance. They were attempts to "prepare the way". (163) As such the alliance with radical groups was a valid Christian ethical response to an inhuman situation.

Bonhoeffer's formulation holds a healthy balance between the present and the future. The ultimate, in Bonhoeffer's scheme, both judges and pardons the inadequacies and failings of the penultimate and hence guards against the danger of absolutizing the penultimate. At the same time the concept of "preparing the way" allows greater significance to present historical action than does the sacramental model used by Moltmann. Bonhoeffer embraces the priority of the future brought out so well by Pannenberg, maintains the clear distinction between the penultimacy of the intramundane future and the absolute future we have seen in Rahner, and still assigns a greater degree of causative significance to present human action than does Moltmann.

Our criticism of Bonhoeffer arises when we compare Miguez Bonino's
teaching on the kingdom of God with Bonhoeffer's treatment of the ultimate and the penultimate. Miguez Bonino, it seems to us, takes the essential elements of Bonhoeffer's thought at this point and uses them as the basic structure for his exposition of the kingdom of God. By so doing he is able to clothe the more spatially structured account of Bonhoeffer with symbols that are at once both more biblical and more dynamic. In this respect Miguez Bonino has overcome the lack of an adequate eschatology in Bonhoeffer's scheme. (164)

By utilizing the category of the kingdom of God Miguez Bonino has been able to develop an eschatology which maintains a healthy balance between the present and the future. He emphasizes both the judgment and the redemptive grace of the promised future kingdom whilst at the same time underlining the way in which these liberate us to participate in the historical enterprise of the present. Consequently he can claim "eschatological permanence" (165) for the "concrete historical options" (166) which the gospel impels us to make here and now. Because these undertakings are penultimate God "will rescue what is significant and destroy what is negative" (167) The relation between the present and the future therefore is positive, dynamic, and dialectical and herein lies the strength of Miguez Bonino's theological work.

Miguez Bonino then sees the future, the ultimate, (the "absolute future" of Rahner) as a call to and therefore determinative of the present. At the same time it is a judgment on the present. The result is of crucial importance. He says:

"There is, therefore, also a critical and polemical dimension in the Christian witness which consists in bringing to judgment the human situation and assuming its conflicts and contradictions in terms of the realization of God's announced purpose". (169)
The question then arises as to how the Christian is to determine where his engagement in the historical situation will begin. He must of necessity choose between available political alternatives. This involves him in relating his understanding of God's redemptive purposes to his assessment of the contemporary socio-political situation. It also raises the issue of political and ideological mediations and we now turn our attention to this aspect of Miguez Bonino's theology.
Inherent in the liberation theology enterprise is the unquenchable conviction that Christians must act in order to bring about a more human condition of life for all men and women. There is the further recognition that if this action is to be in any way effective it must be actualized in the arena of political endeavour. Anything which stops short of commitment to a political programme is destined to peter out in the quicksands of comfortable neutrality, ideological self-deception or well-meaning but ineffective intentionality.

The need for engagement in the process of history-making is taken a step further as the theologians of liberation recognize also that in order to concretize this commitment Christians must use whatever resources are available to them. Hence they have turned to the social sciences in order to utilize the research knowledge and insights about human society garnered in those disciplines.

Alongside this utilization of the social sciences has come the awareness that these sciences are not value-free. Despite the rigorously scientific methodological code which the human sciences strive to maintain they are influenced consciously or unconsciously by ideological factors. Liberation theology therefore acknowledges the need for a critical discernment of ideological influences and goes on to assert the necessity for theological self-awareness on the part of both the social scientist and the theologian.

In addition to discernment and self-awareness, however, the liberation theologians firmly believe that the Christian has to choose between the
ideological and political options that are open to him. Whilst he may be aware of factors in any ideological option which are not in harmony with his basic Christian convictions, he may - indeed must - throw his weight in with some ideology and its corresponding political concretization. To remain neutral, or to distance oneself from the ideological conflict is, the liberation theologians believe, to avoid engagement and involvement. Also it is not possible.

The myth of ideological neutrality is particularly abhorrent to these theologians. They contend that an individual who purports to remain uncommitted ideologically is merely deceiving himself and his failure to engage in political action renders void any claim to profess Christian love. The effect of neutrality and non-commitment is that the person ends up unwittingly supporting the ideology of the status quo and the politics of conservatism.

The problem then arises for the Christian as to how he is going to decide between the majority of Christian theologians in claiming that our understanding of the Bible and the gospel message and the "theologico-hermeneutic reasoning or instrument" (1) used in this interpretation enable us to ascertain criteria for judging between choices.

Social sciences, ideology and biblical and theological interpretation then, constitute the human mediations which it is necessary to identify and use in the process of transposing Christian love into meaningful historical action. In the present chapter we shall first examine Miguez Bonino's own reasoning about the need for and use of these mediations and follow this with a comparative study of four other models by theologians who have sought to set out a social ethical system. In this section we look at the social ethics of John Howard Yoder's radical reformed model, Karl Barth's neo-orthodox formulation, Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theology.
In our third section we examine the debate between Miguez Bonino and Jürgen Moltmann which spotlights some of the basic differences between European political theology and liberation theology. This leads into a consideration of the relationship between ideology and Christianity and here we refer briefly to the position of Peter Berger.

In the final section we will see how Miguez Bonino delineates points of agreement and disagreement between Christian theology and Marxism over this question.

1. MIGUEZ BONINO'S TREATMENT

Miguez Bonino deals with the question of historical mediations by again utilizing his key category of the Kingdom of God. If God's initiative is understood as his action in opening history towards the promise then the crucial issue for Christians becomes not "Where is the Kingdom to be discovered?" (which would be little more than an intellectual exercise) but "How am I to participate in the Kingdom?" From this standpoint the Kingdom is seen not as an object to be observed, discovered and interpreted with rational tools, but an empirical movement.

"a call, a convocation, a pressure that impels. History, in relation to the Kingdom, is not a riddle to be solved but a mission to be fulfilled. That mission, one must hasten to add, is not a mere accumulation of unrelated actions, but a new reality, a new life which is communicated in Christ, in the power of the Spirit." (2)

This commitment to action, or historical engagement, involves working out the sort of individual and communal quality of life which possesses eschatological significance. This poses, for Miguez Bonino, the question of historical mediations. In examining this aspect of his thought we find it necessary to refer to his writings both in "Historical Praxis" and Christians and Marxists in greater detail than was necessary for the
previous two sections. We do so because in Doing Theology he introduces his argument with Moltmann at this stage. We prefer to consider this aspect of his thought later in our study and to trace here the development of the theme of mediations in his later works. The argument with Moltmann is left out of "Historical Praxis" altogether in favour of an approach to the issue of historical mediations in the contemporary Latin American context, whilst in Christians and Marxists he explores the concept of mediations still further.

Miguez Bonino is unequivocally in favour of articulating Christian obedience through the use of mediations. In the final chapter of Doing Theology he sets out briefly his ideas on ecclesiology and claims that the church has to opt for a concrete historical praxis on either the right or the left. This involves it in making a decision of faith in which a church becomes a community of faith and which "places it for or against Christ". (3) In clarifying this statement he gives a definition of what he means by mediations. He affirms the need to reject all fanaticism by

"recognising that a Christian option cannot take place except through mediations; a theological and ethical reflection which incorporates a certain analytical and ideological understanding of history into a careful and intelligent listening to the word of Scripture and the tradition of the church." (4)

In this sentence Miguez Bonino makes three important declarations which constitute the core of his thinking on this subject. The first is his conviction that mediations are absolutely necessary both for historical engagement and in order to avoid fanaticism. Secondly, he believes one of the necessary mediations to be a scientific and ideological analysis of contemporary society. In the third place, the interpretation of the biblical witness concerning the general nature of the kind of life appropriate to the Kingdom is a further mediation which he considers to be
indispensable. In "Historical Praxis" he clarifies the latter two points by asserting that the mediating factors are: theological interpretation, scientific analysis and ideological synthesis. (5)

The use of theological interpretation as one mediation and scientific analysis as another corresponds with Miguez Bonino's constant allusion to "the double historical reference" of the faith. (6) By these he means the "Christ-reference" on the one hand which is needed to maintain the identity of the present reality of the kingdom in general history, and on the other hand the "present" historical reference which alone is the soil in which our faith is rooted if it is to be relevant. (7)

The similarity between Miguez Bonino's formulation of this tension and the christological theology of Bonhoeffer is plain to see.

Miguez Bonino believes that the theological mediation can be further elucidated as

"the reading of the direction of the biblical text, particularly of the witness of the basic, germinal events of the faith. They seem, in fact, to point, in their integrity and coherence, to certain directions which such concepts as liberation, righteousness, shalom, the poor, love, help us to define". (8)

He contends that it is not possible to derive from the Bible a set of laws for contemporary society. But it constitutes the crucial referent for a contemporary faith and

"It is indeed possible and necessary to underline a continuum, a direction and a purpose in God's historical action as portrayed and interpreted in the Scriptures, which is conveyed through such expressions and symbols as 'justice', 'peace', 'redemption' in their concrete biblical illustrations". (9)

Miguez Bonino is careful, however, to stress the equal importance of the mediation of scientific analysis. This has come about as a result of the growth of sociological thought in Latin America and it has provided a new direction for theological reflection. The particular insights provided through sociological analysis have been: (a) its assumption of the
problem of dependence and liberation as a basic structure of analysis
and (b) its substitution of the revolutionary nature of liberation
in place of the liberal concept of liberty. This perspective has led
sociology itself, according to Miguez Bonino, to rearrange its own cate-
gories and tools. (10) These new categories were fundamental in providing
theology with a scientific structure to enable it to understand, analyze,
and develop the revolutionary praxis of an increasing number of Christians.
Previously the theologians had no tools with which to approach this phenomenon
which is the starting-point for the theology of liberation. (11)

It is to be noted here that when Miguez Bonino speaks of scientific analysis
he is referring to radical sociological theory. This is to be distinguished
from the traditional academic sociology which sought to be rigorously objec-
tive in its studies of society. It is held by radical sociologists that
academic sociology functions and makes its analyses from the presuppositions
and viewpoints of capitalism and therefore accepts a bourgeois ideological
starting point. It presupposes respect for the given order and stresses the
objective external character of social realities.

Radical sociology on the other hand holds that capitalist society is in
the grip of social problems which have an economic basis and can never
be solved until they are recognized as symptoms of the malaise which a
capitalistic economic system spawns. The ideological nature of conservative
sociology is indicated by Shaw when he says:

"Sociology arises and assumes the economic problems are
solved, when economic problems have become transparently
social problems which cannot be solved within the framework
of bourgeois economics. That is to say, when the social
character of capitalist production, veiled by bourgeois
economics, has become apparent in the revolt of the chief
force of production, the working class, sociology arises
as a theory of how to respond to this revolt without
abolishing the capitalist mode of production. Sociology
recognizes the social character of production - but by
denying that it is to do with production which is a
matter for economics!" (12)

The determinative criterion for sociologists is their stance on
Marxism. Shaw again says "The litmus test is still the attitude
of sociologists to Marx". (13) This means that radical sociologists have an avowedly ideological starting point but their claim is that conservative sociology, though less aware of it, is no less ideological.

Radical sociologists, then, operate from Marxist premises and therefore begin with a theory that is critical of capitalist society. It simultaneously offers an alternative. These people see the social problems as originating from the class conflict they believe to be inherent in the capitalist system and they believe that only a Marxist-type revolution can resolve the underlying tensions. They still seek to pursue research with honesty and integrity but they "add Marxism to the tradition they share with the conservatives". (14)

Hence the relationship between ideology and the social sciences is itself an ideological issue and when Miguez Bonino calls for a mediation which is scientific it is this self-confessed, radical, Marxist-orientated analysis that he has in mind.

In "Historical Praxis" Miguez Bonino describes the analysis of the historical context as "Ideological". He says: "Both our personal and our collective actions - be they political, economic, or simple face-to-face interpersonal relations - express some understanding of humanity, reality and the future. In short, they constitute an ideology." (15) In this article he goes further than he did in Doing Theology be relating the mediations he speaks of to the actual present situation in Latin America. He finds the praxis of Christians there falling into two camps. One of these opts for a conservative stance with regard to political and economic structures - a preservation of the status quo. The other is more radical and is calling for a switch to a socialist system with the concomitant socio-political changes that would be necessary. He then affirms his belief that the mediation of theological interpretation justifies the
use of the concept of liberation which is derived from the direction of the prophetic message, the ministry of Jesus, and the "new life in Christ" as described by St. Paul. These together point to liberation, which mode of life can be spelt out in terms such as "justice, solidarity, the real possibility of accepting responsibility for oneself and others, access to the creation that God has given us, freedom to establish one's own community through one's own effort and love, and space for worshipping God". (16)

Such a quality of life he believes is not manifest in Latin America. The capitalist system with its internationnal monopolistic tentacles "is not a viable structure for historicizing the kind and quality of human life that has a future in God's kingdom". (17) On the contrary they are potent contradictions. Instead of liberation the Latin American scene portrays rather oppression and slavery. Thus those Christians who have become engaged in the struggle for a socialist order are seeking to alter the status quo. Hence Miguez Bonino can say:

"...for us Latin Americans today socialism, as a socio-economic structure and a historical project, is viewed as our active correlation with the presence of the kingdom insofar as the structure of society is concerned. On that level it represents our obedience in faith and it is the matrix of theological reflection". (18)

He goes on to stress that there is no intention to absolutize a socialist order. The project to create such an order is a human, historical effort, and as such, is to be transcended both historically and eschatologically. Here again we see the influence of Bonhoeffer's category of the ultimate and the penultimate. Miguez Bonino brings out clearly the relative nature of the proposed order - it is "more in accord with the kingdom than the existing system", but it is not coterminous with the Kingdom. Nevertheless Christians will be motivated to evaluate and criticize it in order to move beyond it even in history.
The mediations involved are, Miguez Bonino admits, human and fallible, and therefore they cannot be absolutized. But an option has to be taken since one cannot evade the issue merely because of the relative nature of the human enterprise. To pursue the erroneous option would be disobedience. Returning to Bonhoeffer's discernment of justification as the ultimate Miguez Bonino concludes, "Here again the last word is 'salvation by grace' through faith. Working in and from a concrete historical commitment, we cannot hope for the kingdom and our activity to coincide in any way except through the gratuitous mercy of God". (20)

In Christians and Marxists (21) he delves somewhat more deeply into the question of mediations. Mediation is, he affirms, of the very nature of any historical movement, and he cites the role of the party of the proletariat in Marxism-Leninism as an instance of the human, concrete level. But he also stresses the uniqueness of Christ's mediation in the Christian scheme. Because the Christian perspective sees alienation as a radical and fundamental estrangement it calls for a mediation that is practical. It differs from the Marxist scheme in that it claims the alienation is so fundamental that man cannot save himself. This dilemma is solved christologically. Here Miguez Bonino draws from the insight of Dorothee Sölle who distinguishes between a substitute and a representative. The former takes the place of the person for whom he substitutes, replacing and displacing him. The representative acts on behalf of those he represents who are usually "a minor, an incapacitated, a powerless person or group". (22) As an interim expedient he does for them something which they are unable to do themselves. The purpose is to empower them so that they can eventually do it for themselves. Miguez Bonino believes that this sort of representation describes the mediation of Christ which aims to recreate man as "God's free and active agent in God's humanizing purpose". (23)
He goes on to consider Christian ethics which he describes as "the search for ways of realising concretely in the world the power and efficacy of solidarity love". (24) This search involves restoring the Christian understanding of love from its bourgeois captivity in idealistic, sentimental and subjective forms to its Biblical setting. The Biblical understanding of love should be seen in terms of the establishment of God's Kingdom — "the sovereignty of his covenantal, humanizing love". (25)

The breaking in of the Kingdom is seen in Christ's ministry as it fulfils the prophetic promise of Isa. 61:1-2 which was used by Jesus in the programmatic definition of his work in Luke 4:18 ff. When the Apostles carry on the ministry of Jesus they are taking over where the mediating representative (as previously defined) handed it to them.

"A Christian ethics has as its ultimate horizon the shalom of the Kingdom and as its immediate criterion and power the redemptive mediation of Jesus Christ.

The indissoluble unity of this horizon and the mediation are at the heart of Christian witness". (26)

Here we note the similarity again with the formulation by Bonhoeffer, The eschatological ultimate is, in Miguez Bonino, the shalom of the Kingdom and the penultimate is here the redemptive mediation of Christ. Their unity is a christological unity, the touchstone for Bonhoeffer's formulation.

For Miguez Bonino, the crux of the problem is the task of getting from the biblical cluster of concepts — love, peace, justice, liberation, — to the concrete historical situation. He states his position well when he says:

"Christian ethics, nevertheless, faces still a crucial problem. How do we do justice effectively in the world? The hungry, thirsty, naked, foreigners and prisoners of the world are always historical beings, caught in the web of human economic, political, social relationships. Our obligation to them cannot escape the complexity of such relationships. In other words, Christian ethics
has to do with the problem of historical mediation. We cannot at this point simply reproduce biblical models because we live in a different world". (27)

Hence there is the indispensable need for a contemporary sociology, politics and economic theory.

Miguez Bonino then mentions some of the classic instances where the lack of a consciously formulated mediation has led to the unwitting smuggling in of interests of those constructing or using the system. One such instance was Calvin's attempt at Geneva to apply Old Testament legal injunctions literally. Another was the Anabaptist use of the New Testament guidelines. Similar tendencies have been apparent in the scholastic concept of "natural law" and the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms. All of these schemes have suffered from the weakness that their creators were unconsciously manipulating them for their own political or economic purposes.

In the case of Calvin and the Anabaptists the result was fanaticism, whilst the "natural law" system led to confusion. The "two kingdoms" formulation by Luther led to the ideological servitude of the German Christian movement under the Nazi regime as well as the "thinking in two spheres" (to use Bonhoeffer's phrase) apparent in the capitalist interpretation.

The danger of fanaticism crops up again in Miguez Bonino's exposition in "Historical Praxis". Here he points out that some theologians have started their ethical systems by asking "What is God doing in history today?" They then attempt to identify God's actions with human programmes. He admits that there may be some value in such an endeavour but it is prone to the fanaticism of the crusader. "Once people think they have discovered 'what God is doing' they quite logically tend to absolutize it and their own actions; they are led to sacralize their own ideology". (28)
Miguez Bonino believes that Christianity has lacked an adequate mediation for analyzing the dynamics of society and its own role in it. This, he claims is provided in Marxism which he describes as "a scientific, verifiable and efficacious way to articulate love historically". (29) He derives this belief from his premise that the ethos of the Marxist enterprise can be summed up in the affirmation "solidarity (love ?) is better than egoism" (30) Following Rubel he sees the focus of Marx's theoretical formulation as stemming from the humanist tradition. (31) The rejection of capitalist self-seeking and individualism is at the core of Marx's ethics and the positive expression of this is solidarity. In support of this claim he quotes approvingly from Lenin:

"The old society was based on the following principle: either you loot your neighbour or he loots you; either you work for somebody else or somebody works for you: you are either a slave or a slave-owner. And it is understandable that men, educated in such a society, will assimilate, together with their Mother's milk, as it were, the psychology, the habits, the idea that there is nothing but master and slave, or small owner or small employee, officer or intellectual, in one word, men who are exclusively engaged in caring for themselves and what is theirs, without thinking of others. (Revolution) is a victory over our own routine and weakness, over petit bourgeois egoism, over all those habits which an accursed capitalism has left as a heritage to the worker and peasant". (32)

In elucidating this claim Miguez Bonino uses as a starting point, the assertion by Che Guevara that "a revolutionary is a person possessed by deep feelings of love". (33)

Marx however, by retaining the philosophy of identity and of self-containment, failed to provide a sufficient dynamic for openness to "the other" at every level of thought and action. This is where the Christian
understanding of God enters in, for in the biblical notion love is ontologically ultimate and is grounded in a trinitarian base. (34) This love is also historically concrete and engaged, being derived from the covenant-God. (35) It is in addition a love which "encompasses and gives unity to the totality of man's relationship with God and with his neighbour". (36) This is the foundation for his development of a love-ethic which, in order to be efficacious needs the mediation of the Marxist ideology, and requires Marxism and Christianity to meet in engagement. If Marxism can in fact provide a historically scientific way of making love efficacious then, he claims:

"the use of the Marxist analysis is not something foreign for the Christian. Our real discrepancy has to do with the ultimate nature and foundation of that love. And this is not without practical consequences. But the intention to make this love historically operative for the total human society is essential for both Christian and Marxist". (37)

Miguez Bonino claims that at this point Marxism and Christianity need each other. Christianity has the motivating power, source and dynamic of solidary love but lacks an adequate theoretical and scientific structure. Marxism has the latter, but lacks the former. Thus historically, Christianity has been allied with a capitalism whose basic ethos is anti-Christian. In fact, "in terms of their basic ethos, Christianity must criticise capitalism radically in its fundamental intention, while it must criticise socialism functionally, in its failure to fulfil its purpose". (38) It must be underlined that Miguez Bonino sees Marxism as a tool to be used for the attainment of Christian ends in a thoroughly secular way. Because of this he can be adamant that,

"there is therefore no sacralization of an ideology, no desire to 'theologize' sociological, economic, or political categories. We move totally and solely in the area of human rationality - in the realm where God has invited man to be on his own. The only legitimate question is therefore whether this analysis and this projection do in fact correspond to the facts of human history. If they do, or to the extent that they do, they
Starting from the premise that the Kingdom demands historical engagement, then, Miguez Bonino has argued his way to the position where he feels he can make a commitment to a specific secular political movement without thereby secularizing that ideology. In this respect the theologians of liberation go further than previous theology has dared to venture. The route from the command of God to its concretization in the socio-political context has been a particularly difficult one, but it is instructive to see how the map has been charted by others.

2. **A CRITIQUE OF OTHER THEOLOGICAL MODELS**

In order to gain a better perspective on Miguez Bonino's ethical approach we now propose to review four other theological models. From this we hope to establish a comparative basis by which to understand and evaluate Miguez Bonino's own position. The first of these models comes from the radical reformed tradition and is worked out in the theology of John Howard Yoder. The neo-orthodox theology of Karl Barth provides us with a second model. The differences between these two are not great, but there is a wide gulf between Barth and "Christian Realism" which is our third example and comes from the mind of Reinhold Niebuhr. We conclude this section with a look at Dietrich Bonhoeffer's ethical system which derives from his "Christological Realism".

These models represent a fair cross-section of theological reflection on the question of Christian social involvement in the twentieth century.

(a) **The 'Radical Reformed' Model**

In this approach the church is seen as discontinuous with society and therefore is called to fulfil ethical principles which are not intended for society at large. The church therefore should seek to be a
radical alternative to that society and will only weaken its own ethical position be becoming involved in the sort of historical engagement advocated by Miguez Bonino. As the principal exponent of this view Yoder eschews the mediation of any human wisdom except the interpretation given by the gathered assembly of Christian believers. Yoder bases his social ethic on the premise that the humanity of Jesus is normative and constitutes what he calls "the primary substantial criterion". Thus the obedience Jesus himself offered to God the Father is definitive for Christian disciples. In addition the moral teaching Jesus himself gave provides a basis for guidance and decision-making. However, he adds: "This excludes any single-issue system whereby one holds out the promise that once one key theme is struck (law and gospel, or nature and grace, or love and justice, or providence or vocation) the rest of ethics will enfold (sic) simply, almost deductively". (40)

Arising from this stance Yoder singles out Jesus’ role as servant as the key category for Christian obedience. Based on this model the disciples will follow a pattern of "revolutionary subordination" in imitation of Jesus. This life-style will be focussed around such characteristics as forgiving, loving indiscriminately, dying with Christ and sharing his risen life, serving others, mutual subordination, suffering (both in innocence and under persecution), sacrifice and seeing death as both liberation from sin and as victory. (41) The example of the teaching and life of Jesus is, claims Yoder, quite adequate to provide a basis for a Christian social ethic.

Unlike Míguez Bonino's understanding of the Kingdom, in which human action in historical engagement utilizes political, sociological and ideological mediations in order to shape history the radical reformed model sees a discontinuity between church and society. This comes out in Yoder's rejection of Niebuhr's concept of the need for a balancing of powers in the political process in order to safeguard society from the worst effects of the abuse
of power by sinful men. Yoder sees the new birth as marking a qualitatively distinct way of living for the Christian believer which requires a completely different ethical starting point from that for unredeemed society. He says: "the doctrine of redemption means that ethics for Christians and ethics for unregenerate society are two distinct disciplines". (42) In such a stark contrast the rigid dichotomy between church and society is accentuated.

Central to Yoder's reasoning is the conviction that the early church saw itself as a unitary community over against society at large. This changed when the rise of Constantinianism led to the idea that the believing community was co-terminous with the empire. Civil government was now seen as the bearer of historical movement and ethics became the standard of conduct of which the ruler was capable. "Social ethics' means not what everyone should think and do about social questions, but what people in power should be told to do with their power". (43)

Yoder holds that the New Testament demands of Christians an ethical pattern which is valid for the Christian whether it enables him to "manage society" or not. Much effort is expended, he claims, in trying to find what he calls the "right handle by which one can 'get a hold on' the course of history and move it in the right direction" (44). For Yoder, the criterion for ethical conduct should not be the question as to whether a particular course of action will achieve the desired effect in society or history but rather whether it conforms to the pattern of Jesus who was prepared to accept the powerlessness of the cross. The method of arriving at ethical decisions is the one used by the New Testament church. In a key passage Yoder states:

"The knowledge of the meaning for today of participation in the work of Christ is mediated ecclesiastically...The promise of the presence of Christ to actualize a definition of his will in a given..."
circumstance...was given not to professional exegetes but to the community which was gathered in his name...") (45)

This process

"recognises the inadequacies of the text of Scripture standing alone uninterpreted and appropriates the promise of the guidance of the Spirit throughout the ages, but locates the fulfillment of that promise in the assembly of those who gather around Scripture in the face of a given real moral challenge" (46)

It is therefore the hermeneutic community that forms the bridge between the New Testament text and the present day. The tools of the technical exegete are regarded as holding less significance than the gathering of disciples. Likewise there is no recourse to a few broad general principles condensed by a skilled ethicist. This apparently 'ad hoc' type of mediation is justified on the grounds that "the Christ around whom we gather is the same yesterday and today and forever" (46) and because "the ground-floor of the canonical witness is a body of relatively clear texts". (47) This approach discounts the value of utilizing any other repository of human wisdom, and, since it does not believe in working through political action groups these are likewise regarded as unnecessary mediations for any Christian action because (as we have seen) the political order operates in accordance with patterns that are incompatible with Christian discipleship.

In this model the church does agree with government per se even though it does not necessarily agree with a particular policy at any given time. Even when the effects of government policy are manifestly evil "The call is to a nonresistant attitude toward a tyrannical government". (49) This does not absolve the Christian community from all political action, however, for Christians have a duty to speak to the authorities in prophetic witness.
One response to Yoder has been made by Richard J. Mouw (50). Amongst other criticisms of Yoder's position Mouw points to the biblical precedent in that although the Old Testament approach operates in a basically theocratic context there is plenty of evidence that some prophets did seek to address pagan political situations. In addition prayers are commanded in the New Testament "for all men, for kings, and all who hold high positions". (51) Mouw adds that should the opportunity arise some Christians might see themselves as promoting justice by serving in pagan courts (52).

Then in answer to Yoder's claim that it is not the Christian's responsibility to manage society Mouw points out that this seems to be precisely the role that is assigned to man in the Genesis account of creation. Indeed Miguez Bonino's claim that the Kingdom is a call inviting man to respond in concrete action is in direct continuity with this role of co-creator.

Thirdly, the virtual abdication of responsibility for exercising power in the political realm could well lead to the increase of injustice.

From Miguez Bonino's point of view it could be observed that in a situation such as pertains in Latin America it is little use pleading the mistakes of Constantinianism (and numerous neo-Constantinianisms) as Yoder does. (53) Ninety percent of the population there is nominally Catholic and the boundaries between church and society are blurred. Whether indeed it is possible to put the clock back anywhere is questionable for that matter. In such a situation the ethic for a radical minority is hardly meaningful, especially considering that the majority of Christian 'thinkers have abandoned that idea of mission which seeks to rescue people out of society in order to put them into the church.

The christological approach which we have found in Bonhoeffer seems to us more tenable. If God takes up the reality of the world in the reality of Christ
then the whole of the reality is God's sphere. His presence and activity is not limited to a small enclave within the totality of that reality. His Kingdom is not coterminous with the church. The radical reformed model seems to suffer from failing to hold in tension the two referents of faith which we have seen to be so essential. Yoder eres on the side of maintaining the identity of a Christian ethical position at the expense of relevance. In this respect he stands in sharp contrast to the concretization advocated by Miguel Bonino. Yoder admits that "Christian ethics must respect fully the concrete situation in which man hears the call to obedience; valid ethical discourse is inseparable from accurate knowledge of historical realities and of the available alternatives". (54) Despite this claim, he seems to give little or no place to the reality of the this-worldly locus of Christian obedience.

Furthermore it is doubtful if many will accept the omission of mediation in the form of scholarly interpretation which even Barth admits. We could point out also that the Holy Spirit is able to lead and inspire a dedicated scholar every bit as much as the gathered community. Indeed the latter, especially if it had no expert resources available could easily become a pooling of mutual ignorance.

A further weakness of this model is that it seems to be unaware of the problem of the ideological captivity which the liberation theology of Miguel Bonino exposes. So acute is this criticism, and so manifest is the captivity to which it points that any social ethical system which ignores the challenge it poses runs the risk of being charged with naive oversimplification.

(b) The Neo-Orthodox Model

The neo-orthodox model of Karl Barth seeks to avoid at all costs any possibility of sacralizing a political or ideological system. It makes a distinction between "general" and "special" ethics. The former
is the command of God, or the claim made by God in demanding that man approve the gracious action of God. This action is God's free decision, a decision which is eternal and sovereign, and even as it claims man it is also God's judgment on him. Barth describes it as "the judgment of His grace by which man is at once condemned and acquitted and thus becomes free for eternal life". (55)

In special ethics the attention focusses on the man who is thus addressed by God. Barth calls the encounter in which God meets and commands man the ethical event and believes that there are spheres and relationships in which this meeting takes place. The determination and demarcation of these spheres from each other results from the historical articulation of the figures involved, viz. the God who commands and the man who acts. Although God's will for man is one will it has different forms and elements and man similarly exists and relates to God in historically differentiated aspects and elements.

For his concept of the spheres of special ethics Barth begins from the structure of real man which he had outlined in his treatment of the humanity of Jesus Christ. He had designated this in terms of the man for God, the man for others, the whole man, and the Lord of time. Since special ethics is the discernment of the ways in which the command of God comes to man it becomes "a matter of learning to what extent this command of God in this particular sphere has in view the sanctification of man, or in other words aims in this particular sphere at his freedom". (56) This leads Barth to delineate the spheres in terms of man's fourfold freedom. First there is his freedom before God or his relationship with God. Then there is his freedom in fellowship which is his relationship with his fellow man. Thirdly Barth describes man's freedom for 'life which is "the freedom which man is to realise.............in the act of his life as soul of his body". (57) Finally there is man's freedom in his existence as a finite being with regard to "the limit of time, vocation and honour". (58) Within these broad general spheres there is
scope for including a wide variety of human problems and issues.

The spheres which Barth designates therefore are not divine forces in history. They are rather the place where God confronts man to claim man's obedience to his commands. They are to use Meeks' words, "particular spheres on earth which are claimed, taken possession of, and molded by the divine command". (59)

The idea of spheres no doubt prompted Barth's description of the relationship between the "civil community" and the "Christian community" in terms of two concentric circles. (60) The outer one is the state and the inner one is the church. They exist side by side but are never coterminous. For this reason the church is to maintain a critical stance vis-à-vis the state, because there is a radical discontinuity between the Kingdom of God and all human political structures. (61)

Barth therefore rejects the value and need for political mediations. His position has to be seen against the backdrop of the context in which he thought and wrote. His bitter opposition to the Nazi regime and the German Christian movement had shown him the dangers of sacralizing a political ideology and this fear no doubt prompted his call for a radical break from any identification of salvation with political liberation. Barth was not without his political commitment and in his earlier days had championed the socialist cause (62), but he saw no possibility of partial realization of the Kingdom, no continuity between the penultimate and the ultimate in the political realm.

Although in this model Barth avoids any overt attempt to steer the course of historical events as envisaged by Miguez Bonino he does nevertheless admit that Christians will enter the political arena anonymously and will thereby witness to the Christian gospel. In this way they will be constantly "giving the State an impulse in the Christian direction and freedom to develop on the Christian line". (63)
Furthermore Barth believes that the Church as such will encourage the state along the lines of social justice. He says "And in choosing between the various socialistic possibilities...it will always choose the movement from which it can expect the greatest measure of social justice."

(64) This prophetic role however will be a critical stance taken from a distance and because the church will remain outside of historical engagement she will abstain from fighting with political weapons. Because theology for Barth chooses its own interpretation of reality it does not get involved with secular interpretations. Hence whilst the church opposes tyranny it does not see itself as free to engage in the best human politics available in the secular world in the way that Miguez Bonino advocates.

If we accept the need for what Moltmann and Miguez Bonino call the two-fold reference of Christ on the one hand and present reality of the world on the other, it is clear that Barth has sacrificed relevance for the sake of identity. If Christology is the starting point for ethics then for Barth it is a Christology which is dominated supremely by the historical reference of the Biblical revelation. Since our knowledge of the present reality of the world is so partial and incomplete it has, for Barth, a relatively minor significance. This one-sided concentration on the ultimate causes him to gloss over the importance of the penultimate and leads to a failure on his part to give sufficient recognition to the penultimate. This in turn means that he ignores the need for the range of historical mediations which Miguez Bonino claims is essential. There is no doubt, however, that Barth does recognize the importance of the mediation of theological interpretation and in this sense also his position is an advance on that of Yoder. Barth's own personal pilgrimage away from active political involvement and polemics is no doubt reflected in his theological reluctance to acknowledge the necessity for the ideological and political articulation of faith, and the scientific analysis of present
reality, since his own life-work became more and more wrapped up in his later years with the task of theological writing and teaching.

Despite his inclination towards a socialist viewpoint his weakness lies in his failure to perceive the need to self-consciously choose a political mediation, and his consequent omission to be rigorously self-critical in the field of ideological preference.

(c) The Christian Realism Model

As we indicated in the introduction to this section this model marks a distinct departure from the previous two positions and takes political realities seriously. Like Miguez Bonino Niebuhr believes in historical engagement. However, he starts from a different ideological position and consequently finishes some distance away from the liberation theologian's standpoint.

Emphasizing that "We are men and not God" (65) he set out to show that American Protestantism was "meeting complex ethical problems of a technical civilization with an almost completely irrelevant individualistic pietism and moralism" (66). Just as Miguez Bonino's starting-point is the suffering of the masses in Latin America so Niebuhr developed his ethical views in response to the exploitation of industrial workers in the Detroit motor industry.

His anthropology has been labelled "pessimistic" as a result of his firm belief that "the Christian doctrine of original sin is the best attested of the Christian doctrines". (67)

In contrast to Miguez Bonino, this model fears that an undue emphasis on eschatology might lead to an "otherworldly" indifference to political issues. Here we note a fundamental difference between Niebuhr and Barth. Niebuhr criticized Barth's silence on Hungary, attributing it to complacency. This was caused, Niebuhr maintained, by Barth's "too consistent eschatology". Barth had said, in the light of the second
coming of Christ the changes on the political front were to be accepted with equanimity. (68) Niebuhr's scathing reply was,

"The certain smaller changes which are to be accepted with calm are, for instance, the change from comparative political freedom to despotism. Not being a theologian, I can only observe that if one reaches a very high altitude, in either an eschatological or a real airplane, all the distinctions which seem momentous on the 'earthly' level are dwarfed into insignificance". (69)

Niebuhr was keenly conscious of the responsibility of the church to fulfil its prophetic function in society. Like Miguez Bonino he believed that the church could not remain aloof from the struggles and anguish of the human situation. He had a clear sense of the providence of God manifesting itself particularly in judgment. Whilst the purpose of judgment was to turn men to repentance it was not within the church's competence to change their all too frequent despair into repentance. Only divine grace could work such a miracle. "But it does belong to the 'care' of the church for the world that it so interpret the judgments under which nations stand, and so disclose their divine origin, that there is a possibility of repentance". (70)

Niebuhr held a deep conviction that the Church had to be involved in the penultimate concerns of the world and that the church's social ethic had been inadequate historically to enable it to relate meaningfully in political engagement. It had either sanctioned government as an ordinance of God to prevent anarchy (71) and to support the ruling power, or had encouraged fatalism through teaching that an evil ruler is a punishment from God. It had further used a perfectionist ethic to reinforce counsels of submission to injustice. (72)

He believed that the church should help in defining and applying principles derived from the ethic of love in terms of justice in the political sphere.
This could not be left to "pagans" (73)

The biblical basis of his position is the ethic of love propounded by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. This involves a deep insight into the true situation of others and a willingness to affirm their life at the same time as, or even at the cost of, one's own. But in the social dimension this involves the weighing of the political realities and the achievement of justice through the balancing of the competing powers at work in the structure of society. So great is the passion for pursuing selfish ends that only a counterbalancing of harmonizing powers can keep in check the worst effects of its destructive drives. (74)

Niebuhr's approach therefore, was pragmatic rather than dogmatic. He held an eschatological perspective only as a distant horizon. Such an end he described as "the final pinnacle of the Christian faith and hope" (75) and stated quite categorically his preference for an ethic of "the foothills where human life must be lived" (76). "Realism", "Pragmatic Democracy", "Approximations of Justice", "Ethical Relativism", "Balance of Power", these then were the watchwords and principles which Niebuhr enunciated as he wrestled with the task of preparing the way of the Lord in the penultimate.

In this model there is a deliberate and self-conscious choice in favour of utilizing political mediations. Niebuhr's ethical formulation is therefore firmly grounded in the secular realm, in the reality of this world. Furthermore, he has not lost sight of the ultimate, for his awareness of the prevalence of human sin does not lead to despair, but to hope. This he acknowledges is guaranteed by the fact of divine judgment. Niebuhr has therefore managed to maintain in tension and balance the dual reference necessary for faith.
The major weakness in Niebuhr's model is the failure to acknowledge his own ideological bias. This arises because he is not sufficiently self-critical with regard to unconscious ideological presuppositions. Whilst his pragmatism led him to reject ideologically conceived political systems his choice of human means to achieve limited ends is itself an example of his own ideological commitment. In fact, the mediations Niebuhr uses - "Christian Realism", "Pragmatic Democracy", "Approximations of Justice", "Ethical Relativism", and "Balances of Power" are all part and parcel of the ideology of Western liberal democracy.

It is instructive in this regard to note Niebuhr's response to the early formulation of liberation theology in the work of Shaufl. (77) This he characterized as soft utopianism. Earlier Niebuhr had spoken critically of utopianism (78). "Soft" Utopianism, he claimed, could be distinguished from "hard" utopianism. The former were the western liberals and the latter included such "hard-liners" as Marxists and Fascists. "The soft utopians do not set themselves in array against an evil world, or claim that their cause is the perfect embodiment of the divine will" (79), The hard utopians by contrast had been prepared to create a fighting community because they were motivated by "the fanatic fury which makes the pretension of perfection so dangerous". (80) The soft utopians sought to meet the radical evil with non-resistance, "hoping that kindness would convert the hearts of tyrants". (81)

The Christian Realism school have severely criticized liberation theology (82) but, in line with the assessment we have just offered, Rubem Alves has seen through the ideological captivity of the Christian Realism critique. It begins from the assumption, he says, that the present system is worth preserving by means of balances and checks whilst liberation theologians regard this as a fatalistic attitude and contend that it is not necessary to put up indefinitely with a system that is imperfect. The
ideological self-justification of Christian Realism is manifest, contends Alves. He says: "When a system despises certain ideas as being utopian or incapable of realization, it says very little about the real possibility or impossibility of these ideas, but it definitely makes a confession of its own limitations". (83)

(d) Christological Realism

This model is important in understanding Miguez Bonino's theology because ethics is another area where he has been deeply influenced by Bonhoeffer. From his world-affirming base Bonhoeffer was able to go on and proclaim a God who is to be found, not at the periphery of the world but at its centre. (84) It follows that for Bonhoeffer ethics is faith realized in the midst of the reality of the world. To be a Christian is to be a man and this means being one with Christ in his suffering which is in the middle of the world of reality. It means to immerse oneself in the secular concerns without necessarily trying to "Christianize" them. Bonhoeffer says:

"To be a Christian does not mean to be religious in a particular way, to cultivate some particular form of asceticism (as a sinner, a penitent, or a saint) but to be a man. It is not some religious act which makes a Christian what he is, but participation in the suffering of God in the life of the world". (85)

This involves being a man because Christ is incarnate. But it also means being a man sentenced by God because it involves being conformed to the Crucified one. By the same token to be a Christian means being conformed to Christ as the Risen one and this points to a new man. "In the midst of death he is in life. In the midst of sin he is righteous. In the midst of the old he is new". (86)

This whole conception is set with the framework of Bonhoeffer's polarity of the ultimate and penultimate. Penultimate matters must be seen for
what they are, but ultimate answers must not be given to penultimate questions. To do so is irresponsibility and the ultimate answers are in fact no longer ultimate. This highlights his awareness of the need for mediations. These are necessary because ...."One cannot and must not speak the ultimate word before one has spoken the penultimate. We live in the penultimate and believe in the ultimate". (87)

In an earlier treatment of the meaning of discipleship Bonhoeffer had shown his understanding of the need for mediation. The Word is the mediation between God and man and between one Christian and another. (88)

Immediacy so easily leads to capriciousness and loss of perspective. Only the Word gives us access to reality. Bonhoeffer therefore insists that only he who believes is truly obedient, "for one can obey, with sanity and sanctity, only when one is at a distance. There must be mediation". (89) Without mediation there is fanaticism and, like desire, when fulfilled it is no longer strong and compelling.

Bonhoeffer's ethic, following his christology, is a contextualist ethic. It seeks the answer to the question "Who is Christ for us today? " The two poles of its reference are emphasized even in this brief statement. On the one hand there is the Christ who is taking form in this world and on the other there is the "today" and the reality of the immediate here-and-now world where life is being lived, and where Christ is taking form. This latter is a dynamic, ever-changing reality. So that who Christ is for us today may not be identical with who he was for us yesterday. "What can and must be said is not what is good once and for all, but the ways in which Christ takes form among us here and now". (90)

These two references in Bonhoeffer's ethic correspond with the mediations referred to by Miguez Bonino when he writes about "Hermeneutics, Truth and Praxis", in *Doing Theology*. (91) He says these are "not certainly
a foolproof key to Christian obedience, but a significant framework for it". (92) The dependence of Miguez Bonino on Bonhoeffer is apparent.

This ethic, grounded as it is in the formation of Christ in the world, is a "filled" rather than an atomistic ethic. Its base in the christological reality safeguards it from the danger of atomism. Since Christ is the ongoing reality - the same yesterday, today and tomorrow - continuity is assured through its being his form that is in the world. Every individual act is therefore vague, but the "structured ontological unity of the form of the world and the form of Christ" (93) ensures a universality missing in purely atomistic ethics.

The methodology of Bonhoeffer's ethical system arises from the ontological coherence of the reality of the world and of God in Christ. Thus he derives two descriptions of moral action from this christological foundation which amount to the same thing. The one is "conformation to Christ" and the other is "correspondence with reality". In being conformed to Christ man takes on the form of Christ, and since Christ became man he therefore takes on his own true form: "The form of Jesus Christ takes form in man. Man does not take on an independent form of his own, but what gives him form and what maintains him in the new form is always solely the form of Jesus Christ himself". (94) If the reality of Christ and the reality of the world cohere it follows that "action which is in accordance with Christ is action which is in accordance with reality". (95) Bonhoeffer goes on to say:

"Action which is accordance with Christ is in accordance with reality because it allows the world to be the world; it reckons with the world as the world; and yet it never forgets that in Jesus Christ the world is loved, condemned and reconciled by God". (96)

Here we find a possible basis for Miguez Bonino's affirmation of the need for Christians to recognize the validity of secular politics. By reckoning
with the world "as the world" the Christian can engage in historical action and can participate in political activity with those who are not Christians. This presupposition underlies Miguez Bonino's stance and attitude on this question.

A further theme developed by Bonhoeffer is that of responsibility and deputyship. "Responsibility is the total and realistic response of man to the claim of God and of our neighbour" (97). It is a basic response to life itself, an all-embracing orientation that includes attitudes, actions, responses and choices. In line with Bonhoeffer's other ethical ideas it is worked out from a christological basis. Jesus Christ is responsible for men. To be conformed to Christ is to be open to and responsible for others.

Deputyship is the hallmark of responsibility. Vicarious living, even to the length of being prepared to die for another is the meaning of deputyship. The example of Christ's sacrifice provides the criterion for being fully a man. This type of vicarious living for others is the hallmark of community as well as individual fulfilment (98). Bonhoeffer developed his concept of the range of deputyship throughout his working life. In his doctoral dissertation the general idea of deputyship was suggested as being in force in Christ and his church only. He later broadened its range with a universality of scope commensurate with his expanded christology which exalted Christ as the pantocrator in the Ethics. Here deputyship is found in the behaviour of all responsible men, whether Christian or not, for it may be found or exercised in the whole of life.

In his Ethics, Bonhoeffer also outlines another mediation in his ethical system, the mandates, a concept closely akin to Barth's special ethics. These are the areas where God orders life through concrete commandment. In and through them we see the applicability of deputyship.
"By the term 'mandate' we understand the concrete divine commission which has its foundation in the revelation of Christ and which is evidenced by Scripture; it is the legitimation and warrant for the execution of a definite divine commandment, the conferment of divine authority on an earthly agent. The term 'mandate' must also be taken to imply the claiming, the seizure and the formation of a definite earthly domain by the divine commandment. The bearer of the mandate acts as a deputy in the place of Him who assigns him his commission". (99)

Bonhoeffer's mandates are the Church, marriage and the family, culture and government. Each can be thought of as a constant in the middle of life which conveys the command of God by showing the creature what the creator requires of it. Instead of a multiplicity of separate and disconnected ethical events man is born into a world where the mandates guide and direct him in his corporate life with its obligations and demands, relationships and responsibilities. In and through them man is able to realize his being-for-others, or deputyship, which is derivative from Christ's deputyship.

Supremely it is in Bonhoeffer's concept of Christian faith as productive of human maturity that his thought is suggestive for Miguez Bonino's liberation theology. Bonhoeffer was able to move from the belief in power as dominance to power as capacity and could decry human weakness. "Is not the weakness of men often more dangerous than deliberate malice?" he says, and answers his own question with the affirmation, "Christ does not only make men good: he makes them strong too". (100)

Bonhoeffer developed his concept of Christian maturity in the section of the Ethics headed "The structure of the Responsible Life". (101) Here we find deputyship, correspondence with reality, acceptance of guilt and free action forming the four qualities of adulthood. This state of adulthood is the opposite of the state of dependence which Miguez Bonino is trying to cast off. Whilst he had not yet recognized the need for
a social analysis in the way Miguez Bonino had, Bonhoeffer had provided him with a description of "a particular mind-set, that of the mature Christian". (102) When people like Miguez Bonino take up Bonhoeffer's basic thoughts and develop them in conjunction with the systematic description of society provided by the analytical tools of Marxism, the distinctive teaching of liberation theology emerges.

In the structures of Bonhoeffer's thought then, we can see the outline being formed from which Miguez Bonino was later to develop his concept of mediations. There is the crucial and all-determining criterion of the dual reality of Christ and the world. Any system must do full justice to both of these referents. Then there is the eschatological reference point of the ultimate which determines the penultimate. In Miguez Bonino this is the Kingdom of God: the present structure of human social and political life must be brought into conformity with this. In Bonhoeffer there is the use of mediations to avoid fanaticism and over-simplistic action and to provide concretion for ethical action Miguez Bonino develops this into socio-political analysis and ideological commitment. In fact, in Bonhoeffer's own involvement in the Hitler assassination plot there is the blueprint for Miguez Bonino's call for the articulation of Christian obedience in secular political activity.

Although Bonhoeffer had not come to the point of dealing with the realities which contemporary theologians of the Third World grapple with in the form of economic exploitation, social deprivation, and political injustice, he was however deeply concerned about the lot of the poor of his day.

The task of "preparing the way of the Lord" entailed making a caring response to their needs. He declared:

"The hungry man needs bread and the homeless man needs a roof; the dispossessed need justice and the lonely need fellowship; the undisciplined need order and the slave needs freedom.....It is
for the love of Christ.....that I share my bread.....
and that I share my dwelling with the homeless". (103)

Nevertheless these were not conceived in structural terms because the
importance of Marxist analysis (with its emphasis on the significance
of ideological factors and political engagement) had not yet become an
issue for theological reflection.

The key to understanding Miguez Bonino's ethical model with its
emphasis on the need for socio-political mediations is in his sentence
"We move totally and solely in the area of human rationality - in the
realm where God had invited man to be on his own" (104). In this state-
ment he clearly indicates his affirmation and acceptance of the need
for secular political involvement. It also underlines, however, his aware-
ness of the dangers which the radical reformed and neo-orthodox models
sought to avoid, viz, the sacralization of an ideology.

By his use of the category of the Kingdom of God with its all-embracing
stresses on the sovereignty of the divine command, the unitary nature
of history (implying the affirmation of the secular) and the possibility
of judgment, he has been able to assert the necessity for Christian engage-
ment in historical activity without losing Christian identity or
sacralizing any ideology.

Miguez Bonino has therefore, we believe, improved on the radical reformed
model which finishes with a radical minority group of Christians
effectively disengaged from secular political activity. This group
remains faithful to the pristine New Testament community's pattern but
has little possibility of ever influencing human affairs to the extent that
it might bring relief to the sufferings of the mass of humanity.

Much the same can be said for the neo-orthodox model of Barth. The radical
discontinuity this requires between the Kingdom of God and the secular
structures implies a dualistic ontology, and its effect is to allow too
great an autonomy to the secular realm. Miguez Bonino counters this weakness with his concept of the Kingdom which impels Christians to effective action in all spheres where love is needed to overcome evil.

Whilst Miguez Bonino's model allows for a greater degree of agreement with Niebuhr on the score of historical engagement he differs at two important points. The first of these is the question of ideological self-awareness and the second is the radical degree to which he is prepared to utilize the Marxist social analysis as a mediation. It is interesting to note that Niebuhr had a clear concept of the judgment of God operating on the historical level, but apparently failed to see this extending to the mediation he himself was using, a feature which enables Miguez Bonino to commit to God the weaknesses of his mediations.

Miguez Bonino's stance is self-consciously modelled on that of Bonhoeffer but again the ideological option he chooses signifies something of the distance he travels from Bonhoeffer before arriving at his destination. This study of the different models all points to a conclusion which is crucial for the understanding of the liberation theologians' position. This is the conviction that ideology, and the way a particular ideology influences and even determines the method of theological reflection is at the heart of the liberation theology enterprise. Nowhere is this insight more clearly demonstrated than in the public debate Miguez Bonino has had with Jurgen Moltmann.

3. THE DEBATE WITH MOLTMANN

Miguez Bonino's differences with Moltmann arise in part from his consideration of the need to maintain the tension of the two-fold reference of the Christian faith. Any action which purports to have eschatological significance, or a permanent future has to "name" this future and "correspond to its quality". This involves proclamation on the one hand and effective
love in action on the other. Neither may be subsumed under the other. Both are eschatologically significant but their unity is "not in our hands. The tension cannot therefore be overcome this side of the full realization of God's Kingdom" (105). This tension has to be lived with and in the ethical understanding of this "double historical reference" there comes the problem of relativizing the one or the other. Miguez Bonino believes that the North American and European theologians fall into this trap because for them "the specific 'Christ-reference' relativizes the 'present' historical reference of our faith and action". (106) He uses Moltmann as an example to prove his point.

After briefly summarizing the main thrust of Moltmann's Theology of Hope, and noting certain criticisms that had been made of it Miguez Bonino offers the opinion that Moltmann has corrected and deepened his earlier thought in his later work The Crucified God. He has done this by concentrating on the cross, which he sees as the meeting point of the tension between identity and relevance (which Miguez Bonino has described as the "Christ-reference" and "present historical reference"). Moltmann singles out five vicious circles of death (107) by which he describes the concrete identification of God with suffering, God-forsaken man. These are poverty, violence, racial and cultural deprivation, pollution and meaninglessness and they are met by the concrete contents of historical hope which he lists as justice, democracy, cultural identity, peace with nature and meaningfulness. These are political issues and call for a "political theology of the cross", which "must liberate the state from the political service of idols and must liberate men from political alienation and loss of rights". (108) The political task of the church is therefore seen by Moltmann as the critical function of de-sacralization and de-ideologization.

At this point Miguez Bonino makes his first criticism of Moltmann. He claims that Moltmann's five vicious circles of death are merely a
general and impressionistic description of the social forces at work. Something much deeper is needed. "Can we remain satisfied", he asks, "with a general description of the 'demonic circles of death', without trying to understand them in their unity, their roots, their dynamics, i.e. without giving a coherent socio-analytical account of this manifold oppression?" (109)

Miguez Bonino believes that Moltmann has failed to employ a sufficiently penetrating analysis and in so doing has failed to take seriously enough the hard facts of history, especially as these relate to the ideological captivity of the Church. Referring to the political role of Christianity in the post-Constantinian era he asks:

"Are we not forced to indicate how was the Christian faith co-opted into a political project, what were the relations to the dominant ideologies, what is the historical dynamics of the process, how is the critical awareness concerning the inadequacy of this synthesis related to historical - socio-economic, political, ideological-changes?" (110)

Miguez Bonino has here put his finger on a soft spot in European theology. He has shown how liberation theology, by using the more rigorously scientific categories of sociology and Marxism exposes the hidden ideological agenda of much traditional theology. In addition, he is correct when he asserts that Moltmann has sacrificed the "present historical reference" to the overarching "Christ-reference", and therefore, despite his efforts to avoid it, has made relevance subservient to identity, and has reverted to an idealistic methodology.

Miguez Bonino's second criticism of Moltmann is on the score of identification with the oppressed. He acknowledges that Moltmann recognizes that God is "not an unpolitical God, he is the God of the poor, of the oppressed, of the humiliated", (111) - all in harmony with the thrust and emphasis
of liberation theology. But he draws attention to the failure to go the whole way in Moltmann's statement that "The crucified God is in fact a stateless and classless God". (112) Miguez Bonino, in reply to this, argues "are we really for the poor and oppressed if we fail to see them as a class, as members of oppressed societies?" (113) He takes up Moltmann's claim that a theology of liberation needs to affirm historical "materializations of God's presence" and points out that a theology which remains ideologically neutral "above right and left... independent of a structural analysis of reality" (114) cannot provide them. Moltmann fears that ideological commitment will result in the sacralization of that ideology. Miguez Bonino recognizes this danger but adds that a recognition of the secular nature of such a political option will ensure that the danger is avoided. This leads him to place his emphasis on mediations. So, he says

"it is important to stress that such a secularization of politics is to be attained not through a new idealism of Christian theology, but through a clear and coherent recognition of historical, analytical and ideological mediations. There is no divine politics or economics. But this means that we must resolutely use the best human politics and economics at our disposal". (115)

His third criticism, which again brings out the relativism of Moltmann's position with regard to historical relevance, constitutes a call to European theologians to de-sacralize their concept of "critical freedom". This would enable a true secularization of politics to take place. It is necessary, he claims, to recognize the human, ideological contents in the idea.

"When they conceive critical freedom as the form in which God's eschatological kingdom impinges on the political realm, they are simply opting for one particular ideology, that of liberalism". (116)

European theologians may be justified in their choice of the liberal social-democratic project but they should present it analytically and
ideologically in terms of its human political nature and not disguise it as "the critical freedom of the gospel". (117)

Moltmann's reply came in his Open Letter to Jose Miguez Bonino (118)

His first response is to claim that Latin American liberation theologians have not produced a distinctively new theology. In fact they have made less of a genuinely indigenous contribution to theology than have those who have generated African, Japanese and North American Black theologies. Furthermore some of the Latin American theologians criticize the European theologians fiercely, and then finish up saying the very things they have criticized the Europeans for saying. This is true, says Moltmann, of Alves, Segundo, Gutierrez, and of Miguez Bonino himself.

Moltmann goes on to point out that the summary points at the end of Miguez Bonino's chapter on "Kingdom of God, Utopia and Historical Engagement" are all found, to greater or lesser degree, in one European theologian or another.

Moltmann's second rejoinder is on the score of the use by the Latin Americans of Marxism. Here again, Moltmann believes that the liberation theologians have failed to generate "a peculiarly Latin American way to socialism". (119) Whilst they do utilize Marxist ideas - advocating Marx's class analysis - they do not apply this to the history of their own people. Moltmann claims that they merely rehash a few basic doctrines without producing a truly indigenous theology or sociology. The upshot of the Latin Americans' claims seems to be that "one is called upon to opt, in a moral alternative for the oppressed against the oppressors and to accept Marxism as the right prophecy of the situation" (120)

Moltmann further castigates Miguez Bonino and his fellow liberation theologians for failing to make a radical turn to the people. This is
not achieved, he points out, by adopting Marxism which only brings a theologian "into the company of Marxists and sociologists" (121).

He also claims that European theologians are not politically neutral as Miguez Bonino had asserted, and quotes both from Metz and his own Theology of Hope to substantiate this claim.

In his third criticism, Moltmann accuses the Latin American theologians of failing to make an accurate analysis and assessment of the historical situation. These differ, he claims, as between Latin America and Europe. In the former there is the necessity for revolution but not the possibility since those who are to carry out the revolution (the poor and exploited) are not yet ready. The consequence is that the intellectuals and students (and presumably Moltmann means to imply the liberation theologians) are theoreticians of revolution rather than practitioners.

On the other hand the European theologians perceive that they themselves are living in a revolutionary situation - despite the noises of the 1960's - and so they cannot be expected to produce a revolutionary theology. Moltmann believes that his theology stays with the people whilst that of the liberationists is more a theory about a utopian future.

Moltmann rounds off his articles with a statement of his belief in "Democratic Socialism" as the most realistic concept for Europe. He acknowledges that others in different situations might prefer to "overcome class rule and dictatorship of the right by a temporary leftist dictatorship, a protective and transitional dictatorship for the building up of socialism and democracy". (122)

In seeking to evaluate the dialogue the following points arise:

(1) Miguez Bonino has correctly pointed out the inadequacy of Moltmann's "five vicious circles of death" to provide a sufficiently analytical and scientific account of the dynamics, roots and unity of
the social forces at work in the situation of oppression. Moltmann has not sought to defend his position against Miguez Bonino's criticism which is thus a very penetrating observation. In failing to deepen his perception of his need, Moltmann has indeed succumbed to the temptation to relativize the present historical reference of the faith so cogently stressed by Miguez Bonino.

(2) In Moltmann's statement of his belief in favour of democratic socialism we perceive a response to Miguez Bonino's requirement of ideological commitment. It would, however, have been preferable if Moltmann had elaborated on the mediating role of such a concept - in the same way that Miguez Bonino has related his more radical socialist understanding with the biblical concepts of justice, peace, and solidary love. In this respect Miguez Bonino's criticism of Moltmann's failure to identify fully with the poor is valid.

(3) In his reply Moltmann seems more intent on criticizing weaknesses in the Latin Americans' theological formulations than in developing an answer to Miguez Bonino's criticism of his own position. In one place he asserts

"The true radical change that is necessary is still ahead of both the 'political theologians' in the European context and the 'liberation theologians' in the Latin American context. In my opinion they can enter in a thoroughly mutual way into this change, namely a radical turn toward the people". (123)

Here it is necessary to point out that the Latin American theologians evolved their liberation theology by a turn to the people, and the result is evidenced by such events as the death of Camilo Torres and others, as well as the witness of Helder Camara. The fact that Miguez Bonino may not publish in Spanish in his Argentinian homeland, and that Assmann's writings have been restricted in Bolivia is testimony to the revolutionary effect which the authorities in those countries perceive
the liberation theologians to have achieved. (124)

(4) It has to be said, however, that there is some value in Moltmann's reminder that the Latin Americans have borrowed extensively from European political theology, and that there is therefore nothing specifically indigenous in their liberation theology enterprise. Insofar as they have used Marxist tools this has constituted a copying of their European counterparts. The distinctiveness of their contribution lies in the radical degree to which they have utilized these tools, the rigour with which they have applied the class analysis of Marxism and the critical distance they have set between themselves and the European thinkers.

(5) Brown summarizes the responses of Latin American theologians to Moltmann's attack. (125) Gutierrez has shown that there are two different theologies involved - one in "the modern spirit" and the other from within a situation of oppression, with a gulf between them. Others see Moltmann as entrenched in the western liberal tradition and fear that he is seeking to impose this as a world theology. This presupposes a movement of "reformism from within" and endeavours to move only gradually to a more just social order. There is a feeling amongst these theologians that Moltmann is still intellectualizing.

(6) Finally, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the Latin American theologians are guilty of projecting their own context into other situations. By so doing they are calling for a liberation theology in every situation or at least setting theirs up as the standard and norm for theology. Miguez Bonino's book is aptly entitled Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation. Moltmann is quite right to retort that he is not in a revolutionary situation and so is justified in starting from a different departure point.
Subsequent to this verbal debate Moltmann visited Latin America and, in reporting on his impressions, revised some of his harsher opinions of the liberation theologians. He expressed the view that the process of self-awareness in liberation theology was to be regarded as brave and honest, and in some ways served as a corrective to the unrealistic radicalism of their European critics. He was convinced that the oppression of the poor was so chronic that liberation theology was the only theological response available to Miguez Bonino and his fellow theologians. However, he claims that liberation theology still needs to move from the realm of ideas to the realm of people, and to move from the exodus to the cross. (126)

4. IDEOLOGY AND CHRISTIANITY

In a study of Miguez Bonino's use of Marxist critical tools de Gruchy asserts "The problem of ideology remains central to the discussion". (127) Our study in this chapter so far has underlined the validity of this contention. In our first section we set out Miguez Bonino's own position which emphasized how integral to his thought is the conviction that an ideology is an indispensable mediation in giving effect to Christian love in political terms. By contrast we saw how the models evolved by Yoder and Barth led to a concept of the Kingdom of God where effective historical engagement was virtually ruled out. The Christian realism model faced up to political realities without going far enough to ensure total political and ideological involvement, whilst Bonhoeffer's concepts of responsibility and maturity were only tentative pointers in the direction to which Miguez Bonino has now committed himself so fully.

It is important now to examine the concept of ideology and to attempt an understanding of the relationship between faith and ideology.

Whilst there were rudimentary concepts of ideology prior to Marx (128) it is in his work that the idea first becomes a crucial issue. The contradictions which emerge in capitalist society are impossible for men to solve in con-
sciousness and hence they are given distorted solutions in the mind.

Summarizing Marx's position, Larraíñ states "Ideology is, therefore, a solution in the mind to contradictions which cannot be solved in practice; it is the necessary projection in consciousness of man's practical inabilities". (129) For this reason, in Marx's understanding, the contradictions cannot be solved by mental criticism, but only by revolutionary practice which goes to the problem of ideology at its roots by removing the contradictions which lead to it. (130)

Furthermore, there was a class interest in ideology for Marx, since it was used by the dominant class in order to maintain the system. It was therefore an instrument of oppression. As such the concept of ideology had a definitely negative connotation.

Later Marxist thinkers modified the concept somewhat, and a full outline of these developments has been given by Larraíñ. (131) The most important is undoubtedly the way in which Lenin changes the idea. By emphasizing the base-superstructure polarity Lenin expands the concept to include the notion that since economic factors determine all other modes of thought ideology becomes a set of cognitions and theories which express the interests of a class and hence it is not confined to the use by the dominant class only. It has now therefore acquired a positive connotation. (132) In effect it comes to designate a class Weltanschauung. With minor modifications, Lenin's adaptation was followed by Lukács and Gramsci.

It is worth noting at this point that Míguez Bonino uses the notion in both of these senses. In his argument with Moltmann he accuses the latter of being captive to the western liberal democratic ideology (133) which is a use of the ideology in the false consciousness sense of Marx's own understanding. When he advocates the use of Marxism as a mediation because it offers a coherent ideological world view then it is clearly the second connotation he has in mind. (134)
Larrain has detected sociological and psychological interpretations of the origin of ideology in Durkheim (135) and Freud (136) respectively, but the next major contribution to the theory of ideology came from Mannheim. Mannheim drew a distinction between ideology and utopia. The former denoted "the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it". (137) Ideology therefore has a reactionary connotation for Mannheim. By contrast, utopian thinking is the insights into a situation by oppressed people whose interest in changing the society is so strongly motivated that they perceive only the elements in that situation which tend to negate it. However Mannheim proceeds to develop what he calls a total conception of ideology which entails a radical analysis and criticism of all points of view including the analyst's own. (138) Thus the concept of ideology merges into Mannheim's theory of the sociology of knowledge. Here we note that Mannheim is moving towards the position which Miguel Bonino and his fellow liberation theologians call for in respect of theology, viz. that all theological reflection is affected by the ideological sympathies of the theologian and these need to be unmasked and acknowledged in any valid theological discourse.

Subsequent developments in the concept of ideology evolved via the theory of genetic structuralism of Goldmann (139), the structural analysis in linguistics of Barthes and Greimas (140) and the structural analysis of myth by Levi-Strauss (141) as well as the adaption of this theme in a Marxist way by Godelier (142).

The structuralist interpretation of ideology in Marxism is most commonly associated with Louis Althusser who believes that ideology "has a material existence which determines the subject" (143). Therefore according to Althusser the source of ideology is in material reality itself, and not the subject. Men cannot live without some representation of their world and of their relations to it. He says:
"In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation between them and their conditions of existence, but the way they live the relation between them and their conditions of existence. This presupposes both a real relation and an 'imaginary', 'lived' relation" (144)

Althusse believes that in order for the working class to arrive at a true knowledge of the social structure they need the theoretical practice of science, a view which closely resembles Lenin's.

The debate amongst contemporary social theorists on the relationship between science and ideology need not be elaborated at this point. Sufficient has been said to demonstrate the complex nature of the subject and to indicate that the debate on the concept of ideology itself is very far from concluded (145). The word ideology as currently used in theological discourse can thus serve to designate a communal or group world-view or, in a more specific sense, a political doctrine which usually sets out to implement the goals of the group whose interests are purportedly served by that political party. In addition ideology can be used with a negative connotation or in a positive sense as we have outlined above in contrasting the meanings assigned to it by Marx on the one hand and on the other by Lenin and most subsequent writers. Theologians frequently indicate in which sense they intend their use of it to be understood (146)

The problem for Miguez Bonino lies in determining the extent to which he can legitimately go in using an ideology as a mediation without surrendering the essential Christian identity of his theology. He also has to remain within the parameters of his overall objective which is to work out a theology of historical engagement within the category of the Kingdom of God. In addition he has to retain the status of his theology qua theology for "when theology is used to support, justify, or becomes a function of the system, then it has surrendered its prophetic and critical function and that is fundamental to its nature" (147).
Villa-Vicencio asserts that gospel and ideology are inherently related to each other and depend on each other. He said: "The one cannot authentically exist without the other. Yet if one dominates the other the milk turns sour. Gospel devoid of ideology is abstract theory and esoterical nonsense, while ideology without gospel is political tyranny" (148). After defining Gospel as "the wide-ranging call or lure of God in history to ultimate freedom in Christ both in one's person and at a communal level" (149) he goes on to describe ideology as "a systematic articulation of ideas to enable people to live together in a given situation in a peaceful and orderly manner". (150) This latter definition is altogether too loose to do duty for all the variations in meaning which the word ideology has (as we have seen) to carry. Villa-Vicencio is not unaware of the other meanings, as his earlier survey shows (151).

However, the value of his insight is in the light he throws on the nature of the gospel as an incarnational gospel which is always contextually relevant. A positive ideology enables the gospel to be relevant to the context in which it is being proclaimed. The gospel of the Kingdom was relevant to the needs of first century Palestine when Jesus preached and declared it. He spoke "with a Jewish social and political 'accent'" and his gospel was applicable to the socio-political and spiritual needs of the day". (152) But what Jesus offered was more than a programme of political absolutes or totalitarian dogmas. "It was an eschatological gospel critique of the contemporary political situation". (153) Because
it called men to absolute freedom in the name of God, it was sharply distinguished from the Jewish nationalist ideologies of the day.

Thus the Christian tradition has always maintained a stance, which, despite temporary ideological captivities, has had within itself both a contextually relevant component but also an element which has enabled it to break free from and transcend any tendency to complete identification with any specific party-political ideology. Because of its eschatological roots in the coming Kingdom the gospel has a position from which it can exercise criticism of itself and therefore of any ideological system with which it may become involved. This means that the gospel serves as critique vis-a-vis ideology and is thus engaged in a relationship with ideology which is dialectical. Villa-Vicencio is here using ideology in the sense of open or positive ideology. It is, he says "an open, dynamic, relational, contextual doctrine of ideas", "it is politically realistic and potentially redemptive". (154) The gospel is therefore both incarnational and independent, being in dialogue with various options but never "identical without remainder" (155) to any particular one.

Going on to pose the question "Does not the milk always turn sour?" (156) Villa-Vicencio points out the danger of the gospel becoming ideologically captive within a closed, demonic ideology. Various historical instances are cited of this actually happening and he comes to the conclusion that the gospel is an invigorating and dynamic power whilst people are en route to liberation. When success is achieved it tends to capitulate to doctrinaire ideology. This, he postulates, is because the lust for power becomes uncontrollable.

Villa-Vicencio ends with a lucid exposition of the possible alternative relationships between gospel and ideology. The first of these is the abdication option. This happens where, in order to avoid the many pit-
falls involved in the possible captivity of the gospel or theology to a political ideology a choice is made for political non-involvement. It is seen in the sort of other-worldly pietism common in extreme evangelical circles and which comes in for particular scorn from the political theologians.

Secondly there is what Villa-Vicencio designates the "no-escape option". He explains "No-escape simply suggests that it is a fallacy to equate inactivity or political non-participation with an absence of influence". (157) In fact this usually involves an unwitting support for the status quo. He concludes that it is impossible to be completely uninvolved in the ideological struggles of the day. Whilst this is not clearly spelt out by Villa-Vicencio the person choosing this option recognizes that he is involved willy-nilly in the ideological conflict and decides (usually on the basis of pragmatic considerations) which of the competing ideological formulations on offer will serve his own cause the best. The likelihood of self-delusion is high. Villa-Vicencio asserts "Gospel, try as it may, never quite succeeds in isolating itself from ideology". (158)

The third option is described as the level of principle option. The advocates of this option claim that since the bible presents no carefully worked-out political programme, the responsibility of the Church is to enumerate certain general principles, such as love, justice, and peace. From these the politicians should work out specific political policies and programmes. (159) Villa-Vicencio rules out this option as an evasion of Christian responsibility and an avoidance of commitment. Because the gospel is an incarnational reality it speaks to a specific need with a specific word. The church therefore should participate in the process of spelling out the ideological proposals in concrete terms. This will involve her in making choices and some will transpire to be mistakes.
Because of her political fallibility therefore the church will speak as a human participant and not as if she is declaring the word of the Lord. As a contributor she will "agonise as part of mankind in the creation of a viable political programme for a just and peaceful society". (160)

The fourth option is the role of the gospel as critique. The Church needs to adopt a political perspective that is in conformity with the gospel, critical of any ideologies and supremely self-critical. To do this there has to be political commitment, though it is commitment from an independent position. Herbert Richardson suggests that "the beginning of political thinking is criticism. It is criticism that shows the limitation of all totalistic accounts of human life..." (161). The act of criticism locates man in the finitude of his world and regards his political activity not as the creation of the Kingdom of God but as an attempt to establish "a tenuous finite good: a house to live in, a state that is at peace". (162) Theology is the handmaiden of this tenuous, finite project.

Villa-Vicencio is aware of the difficulty of this task for an institutionalized church. It is possible, however, he claims, for small groups and individuals.

This delineation of the relationship between gospel and ideology is closely akin to that of Miguez Bonino. In a discussion of the role played by ideological presuppositions in biblical interpretation he reveals his understanding of ideology as "a (more or less coherent, or partially modified) unified conception of the world" (163) This indicates that he uses ideology in the neutral sense of world-view. However, he goes on to make clear his awareness of the negative sense (that of class interest) when he says:
"Hermeneutics in this new context means also an identification of the ideological framework of interpretation implicit in a given religious praxis. It is important to point out, in this respect, that such discernment of an ideology implicit in a theological or religious praxis does not necessarily imply the intention of the person or group in question to uphold or promote such ideology. One could even venture to say that, in most cases, people are themselves unaware of it. Their words and actions may intend something else. But in the context of a given situation they may in fact be supporting and buttressing a certain political and/or economic line, and, therefore, functioning, in the wider context of the total society, as ideological justification of such lines". (164)

Here Miguez Bonino clearly reveals agreement with the views of Villa-Vicencio on the closeness of the relationship between theology and ideology. It is an admission of the ideological captivity of theology. It should however be remembered that, as Fierro has pointed out, (165) this is an advantage which contemporary political theologians have over previous theologians - they are aware that they are influenced by the ideological framework from which they operate. This enables Miguez Bonino - and for that matter those theologians who share this view - to be self-critical. It is this awareness that allows Miguez Bonino the theological freedom and independence to examine critically and opt for the ideology of socialism. He declares:

"Any course of action which keeps a certain coherence implies a unified perspective on reality, an explicit or implicit project. Ideology, in this sense, has also a positive meaning; it is the instrument through which our Christian obedience gains coherence and unity. It is so, though, provided that it be always brought to consciousness and critically examined both in terms of the gospel and of the scientific analysis of reality". (166)

Here we see Miguez Bonino clearly emphasizing the dialectical relationship between theology and ideology and underlining what Villa-Vicencio calls the role of gospel as critique vis-a-vis ideology.
A useful comparative study to Miguez Bonino's ethical position is provided by Peter Berger who sets out from a sociological perspective to explore the relationship between political ethics and social change in the third world. (167) Berger maintains that one needs to utilize the best insights of different ideologies. He arrives at this conclusion through an ethical evaluation of both capitalist and socialist models. Using Brazil and China as examples of capitalist and socialist development respectively he subjects them both to the ethical criteria of what he calls the "calculus of pain". These countries have both been prepared to sacrifice a generation of people in order to achieve their goals.

Berger shows that capitalist development in Brazil has led to a wide disproportion in the economic levels between the very few who are rich and the vast majority of poor. Large areas of the country remain unaffected by industrial growth and millions of people are severely undernourished and in fact starving to death. Life expectancy is low (in the thirties) and disease is common. His conclusion is "Millions of people have died because Brazilian society is what it is". (168)

In China the situation is somewhat different. Millions have died there also, but this has occurred as a result of the campaign of terror pursued by the Maoist regime. Up to 1955 the figure had been put at between five and ten million victims, with a decline in the ruthlessness since that date. Overall, however, there had been a small but significant rise in the economic level of the Chinese population.

Both China and Brazil therefore have witnessed widespread suffering in the implementation of development programmes derived from their different ideologies. In Brazil, the number of victims from political brutality could be counted in thousands, but the economic victims in millions.
In China the reverse is the picture. In both countries the respective regimes excuse the present suffering on the grounds that it is the necessary price to pay for the future happiness. In Brazil this promised future is depicted as the wealth and prosperity of a fully developed society, in China as communist society. The calculus of pain which Berger uses as the ethical criterion for the evaluation of these two models of development involves certain value presuppositions. He says

"They are very simple: It is presupposed that policy should seek to avoid the infliction of pain. It is further presupposed that, in those cases where policy does involve either the active infliction or the passive acceptance of pain, this fact requires a justification in terms of pain rather than technical necessity". (169)

When the promised results of capitalist and socialist development in the two selected instances are measured against this criterion they are then seen to be nothing more than articles of faith. The empirical evidence which is available, Berger claims, does not lead to the conclusion that these postulated results will necessarily follow.

Furthermore since they are articles of faith there is the possibility of doubting them. There is also the possibility that they may be wrong. Berger is at pains to prove that most political decisions have to be taken before there is adequate knowledge available by which all possible options can be studied - a phenomenon he calls "the postulate of ignorance" (170). Since this is so the legitimations for both the colossal human sacrifices involved in both the Brazilian and Chinese models falls down. Then the result is seen to be an enormous amount of human misery and pain which has been deliberately caused and which has no justification.

Berger's second ethical criterion is the calculus of meaning and again he states his underlying belief, which is: "Human beings have the right to live in a meaningful world. Respect for this right is a moral impera-
One of the characteristics of mankind is the propensity to attach meaning to the various experiences and phenomena of life. Man utilizes both cognitive and normative meanings - "what is" and "what ought to be". The first could be described as the "definition of reality". When groups or individuals are deprived of such frameworks of meaning they are said to be in a state of what Durkheim called Anomie.

The onset of modernization in the form of functional rationality and pluralism has not only threatened the frameworks of meaning in traditional society but has also offered the benefits of technological advancement. Berger's point of entry into the debate concerns the limits that may be set to modernization in a third-world situation. It centres on the question "What components of modernity may be tinkered with, and which must be taken (or left) as a package deal?" (172)

In reacting against the threatened loss of meaning posed by adopting modern practices the counter-modern values held by many third-world peoples are termed "Resistances to development" (173). Berger questions the presupposition behind this term. He holds that, since men have the right to live within a framework of meaning the cost of implementing policies which seek to modernize the way of life of people in a traditional culture is frequently in the realm of meaning. In fact the so-called "resistances to development" need to be taken seriously. There is a high probability of failure for policies which ignore the indigenous definitions of a situation. The phenomenon of resistance to development arises because there exist counter-definitions of any given situation. Where these operate on the normative level it means that the traditional values are being threatened by the onset of modernization. Where the counter-definitions are on the cognitive level the traditional world view is being challenged by and defended against the interpretation of reality pertaining in the
modern world.

Berger makes the plea that political planning and policy-making be conducted in a humanistic way which gives due regard for the significance of values and meanings in human affairs.

In this exercise Berger is making an evaluation of ideologies and policies from an ethical standpoint. He has chosen his criteria, and recognized the value-judgments implicit in them. He has thus followed a similar procedure to the one pursued by Miguez Bonino. By contrast, the latter has chosen as his criteria the theologically-mediated and biblically derived concepts of "liberation, righteousness, shalom, the poor, love". (174). Both however, have used their criteria in the sense of critique as outlined in our discussion of Villa-Vicencio's ideas. Miguez Bonino, using theological and biblical criteria, or mediations, is able, through a dialectical grappling with Marxism to opt for a socialist ideology in order to articulate Christian obedience in a situation of oppression. Berger is outside that situation and his ethical criteria lead him to make more rigorously critical analyses of both capitalism and socialism from empirical examinations of their achievements.

It is perhaps not surprising that they come to adopt different stances with regard to socialism. Berger, from a North American background is far more critical of socialism than is Miguez Bonino, and his analysis, it must be admitted, is far more rigorously scientific. By applying the criterion of the "calculus of pain" he is able to outline the extensive cost in human suffering to be paid in a situation like China. This price is largely ignored by Miguez Bonino. Both agree, however, that there is economic suffering on a large scale in the capitalistic development model.
There is further agreement on the need for commitment. Whilst acknowledging the value and place of detachment for scientific observation, Derger admits that the moral urgency in historical situations frequently jerks him out of "an attitude of permanent disengagement". (175)

Berger agrees with the analysis which claims that Third World states have little hope of emerging from poverty unless they can disentangle themselves from dependency on the more affluent countries (176). He goes on to concede that "there are situations in the Third World in which, with however much reluctance, one must conclude that the revolutionary option is the only plausible one". (177)

Berger, however, is by no means an ideologue. He believes that pragmatism rather than ideology is a better guideline for economic policy and that Third World governments would be well advised to adopt such a pragmatic stance in order to build up their countries. An approach like this would cut across the capitalist-socialist dichotomy. He points out (with a realism lacking in the liberation theologians) that the situations in Third World countries are so varied, that no hard and fast doctrinaire decisions can be made as to which ideological pattern would ensure the best development in any given place. In one country capitalist development would be better whilst socialism might suit another. It is important to Berger that all development should allow for the enhancement of "the meanings by which human beings live". (178)

Berger's recipe for a method of political ethics requires a mixture of utopian imagination and motivation on the one hand and "hard-nosed analysis" on the other. He concludes that the intellectual self-discipline involved in scientific analysis as well as the visionary imagination of the utopian are both indispensable. Furthermore they are needed in the same individual despite the inevitable tension such a combination would engender.
Berger provides an interesting comparison with Miguez Bonino. Like the latter he introduces self-confessed value judgments and uses these to provide a rigorous critique of ideological standpoints. Berger manages however to be more detached from his own admitted position in the Western liberal tradition and consequently is able to be more critical of the ideology of capitalism (and the "development" this offers) than is Miguez Bonino of the socialism which he espouses. Whilst the latter chooses the Marxist analysis as a critical tool and evaluates an existing socio-economic situation from that perspective he fails to be as objectively critical of his own chosen stance as Berger. In effect Berger finishes up by evaluating his own critique and offering as a solution a mixture of the pragmatic realism of capitalism together with the powerful dynamic of the utopianism of socialism. Thus the difference between them is that Miguez Bonino opts for an "either-or" choice, whilst Berger prefers a "both-and" answer.

Berger does provide an example, though, of the sort of mediation which Miguez Bonino speaks of. His ethical criteria for the evaluation of ideologically-based political action represent an attempt to construct a framework of reference from which analysis and criticism can begin. This is similar to the way in which Miguez Bonino considers that the Marxist analysis relates to the Latin American situation. Whilst Berger is able to approach the problems of the third world from a more detached scientific perspective Miguez Bonino is seeking to engage Christian commitment with the need for historical action in order to precipitate radical social change. He perceives a sense of what Berger calls "moral urgency" in his own situation and it is because of this that he is prepared to utilize those components in Marxism which he considers can provide him with a mediation by means of which he can achieve his goal.
In his willingness to adopt elements of Marxism in order to express Christian obedience, Miguez Bonino indicates areas of agreement between Christianity and Marxism:

"Christians can agree with Marxists on the need for a historical mediation of our humanist intention, i.e. for a set of analytic tools, a concrete political and social programme and a coherent ideological view which permits men to embrace and carry forward the struggle for human liberation". (179)

The first component of this historical mediation is "the set of analytic tools". By this we take Miguez Bonino to mean the Marxist belief in historical materialism as an analysis of the economic forces at work in history and as a rejection of idealist interpretations of reality.

In a succinct summary of Marx's later thought, based on the latter's claim that social changes are brought about by the changes in the forces and modes of production, Miguez Bonino gives a six-point digest of historical materialism. These are:

"(1) man is not seen any more as an essence to be realised, nor strictly as a moral individual; rather, we are faced with total entities called 'social formations' (feudal, capitalist, socialist, communist);

(2) such social formations are not the embodiment of ideas or the result of man's planning but are determined by the 'mode of production' dominant at a given time;

(3) this 'mode of production' is the basis on which the 'edifice' of a socio-economic formation rests and, in its turn, it determines (at least in principle) the character of this formation;

(4) the emergence of a new mode of production is mainly dependent on the appearance of new technologies which are in turn related to new forms of ownership;

(5) the basic force behind the whole process is 'need', the way in which man solves the problem of 'earning his living';
the social relations that result from this situation determine in turn all superstructural elements: ideology, family, religion, culture". (180)

Miguez Bonino, whilst not accepting all that is stated or implied in this outline sees it as the way in which Marx gives "a scientific foundation and content" (181) to his revolutionary project.

Nevertheless Miguez Bonino believes that Marxism is not to be embraced in a set of tenets devised once and for all by Marx and Engels and handed down for faithful interpretation and implementation by their followers. Rather he sees the onward flow of interpretation and reformulation through successive generations and in response to new situations as inherent in the ethos of Marxism. In an outline of the development of Marxism through Leninism and Stalinism, the Frankfurt School and Althusser, he finally declares his belief that

"one should set Marxism in the context of the long heritage of man's aspirations and struggles for a more human and just organisation of individual and social life. These struggles, always partly successful and partly frustrated, combine moral aspirations, the possibilities and conditionings afforded by scientific and technological progress and man's intellectual effort to penetrate and take control of the dynamics of human history and social relationships. The movement teaches a new qualitative level with the extraordinary and rapid technological and scientific developments of the modern age". (182)

Marxism is itself dialectical, and from within the struggle of its own thesis and antithesis comes its ever-evolving development. Marx himself turned Hegelianism "upside down". He engaged in the struggles of the proletariat and rescued it from its own weakness - that of a "voluntaristic world of imperatives" (183). He further embraced the economic principles of the theorists but reversed them by inserting into them the latent revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. Miguez Bonino concludes: "Thus he possesses the heritage in the only possible way: by transforming it" which means that "while challenging and overcoming his heritage, Marx
also offers a future to it". (184) Marx did this by providing it with a set of analytic tools and a revolutionary theory. Hence Miguez Bonino believes that Marx's contribution "must be judged by his mature scientific thought". (185)

Miguez Bonino further declares his conviction that the Marxist movement has at the moment lost its impetus and cannot provide sufficient motivation for a global socialist revolutionary struggle. The remedy he believes lies in the Christian motivation for solidary love. But any Christian involvement in revolutionary activity needs to utilize the elements of Marxism which is "the permanent core of any struggle for liberation" (186)

These are:

1. Historical materialism in the sense that "history is not primarily the unfolding of man's consciousness or of his ideas but the dynamics of his concrete activity, the main form of which is the work through which he transforms nature in order to respond to the totality of his needs" (187)

2. The communal nature of man as a "concrete social formation with its structures, relationships and self-understanding (ideology)" (188)

3. The fact of class struggle and the revolutionary part to be played by the proletariat. Since they are the ones in a position to become "an indispensable and certain force for change". (189)

4. The notion of praxis as the source of knowledge. "Truth is not found in the contemplation of a Platonic world of ideas or in the exploration of subjective consciousness but in the scientific analysis of the activity of human beings within the conditions of their social situation". (190)

Whilst affirmation of Marxist materialism might at first arouse suspicion it has to be remembered that this is being put forward in opposition to the idealist interpretation of reality which we examined earlier. As we have seen God calls men into a moral and spiritual relationship with himself and their neighbours. But this has to be mediated through historical events and material realities.
The second part of the historical mediation Miguez Bonino calls for is a concrete political and social programme. In Marxism this is seen as embodied in the communist party as the institutional organisation of Marxism. Marx himself had little to say about the party or its formation. Instead he held firmly to the belief that man was able to save himself, and, as we have seen, he assigned to the proletariat the role of heilbringer. His failure to spell out the exact economic circumstances that would trigger off the great proletarian revolution led to embarrassment and argument amongst his followers, and it was left to Lenin to become the architect of the first great Marxist revolution.

Lenin's unique contribution to the development of Marxism was not in the theoretical field. His peculiar genius was to see the need for a historical mediation in the form of an organized political party. It was to be an elite of professionals. The reason why the general mass of the proletariat could not articulate their revolutionary consciousness was simple: "they have had to slave in factories and have had neither the time nor the opportunity to become Socialists". (191)

Therefore, for the revolution to come about it had to have a well disciplined leadership. Lenin saw that homogeneity and continuity of leadership were necessary to success. In 1902 he affirmed the need for a small group of tried and talented leaders with professional training. They had to be trained by long experience and by good teamwork. Without such a leadership eschelon no class could conduct the necessary struggle. (192) Thirteen years later he still maintained this view when he said: "If a small group (at present our Central Committee is a small group) could act in every given crisis, directing the masses towards a revolution, that would be very good". (193)
Shortly after coming to power he admitted the elitist nature of the small cadre of leaders, since, as he said "the stratum of workers who are governing is an inordinately, incredibly thin one". (194) But the daunting task which devolves upon this small elite is one which the group is equal to. Lenin's visionary hope emerges when he describes the party's challenge: "This grain of sand has undertaken the task of transforming everything, and it will perform it". (195)

Thus whilst Marx eschewed the need for a concrete historical mediation this was corrected by the pragmatism of Lenin. Marx, of course, was in this respect at least, the captive to his own love for philosophy. (196) Philosopher he may well have been, but organiser he was not. (197)

Miguez Bonino feels that there need not be any essential discrepancy between Christian and Marxist claims on the question of historical mediation. Both assert the need for some concrete mediation to be the embodiment of their respective historical movements. The historical project which constitutes the historical mediation Miguez Bonino envisages is to include the rejection of developmentalism because of its involvement with international capitalism, a social revolution, a strong centralized state, popular participation involving conscientisation, a concentration of a "prolonged political struggle" (Miguez Bonino), the creation of an indigenous Latin American socialism which rejects Marxist dogmatism and the development of a "new man" in place of the "non-man" (Gutierrez). (198)

The third aspect of the historical mediation envisaged by Miguez Bonino is what he calls "a coherent ideological view" which allows people to be involved with and to promote the struggle for human liberation by which he means the adoption of a Marxist type of socialism as a world view.

Since capitalism is grounded in a basically selfish ethos it must be
rejected as conflicting with the direction of the gospel. By the same
token socialism must be preferred. Indeed,

"the basic ethos of capitalism is definitely anti-Christian: it is the maximising of
economic gain, the raising of man's grasping impulse, the idolising of the strong,
the subordination of man to the economic production. Humanisation is for capitalism an
unintended by-product, while it is for socialism an explicit goal. Solidarity is for capitalism accidental; for socialism it is essential". (199)

The features of Marxism which are important for a coherent ideological view
are precisely this commitment to solidary love, the analysis of reality
which involves the rejection of idealism and the adoption of praxis
as the fundamental locus of knowledge, and the availability for the
cause of the oppressed. In addition the revolutionary thrust of Marxism
as the means for liberating the oppressed is part of the necessary world-
view. Marxists see their theory as more than an analytic tool. It
is a revolutionary theory and movement for transforming the world, invol-
vimg the working class as the revolutionary instrument.

Miguez Bonino is careful to state that there are however, limits to
the extent to which a Christian can go in adopting the Marxist ideology.
One of these is in the understanding of historical materialism. Insofar
as this means the correction of the distorted understanding of reality
which arises from idealism this is acceptable. But of course the Marxist
understanding of historical materialism as we have outlined in chapter two
means more. Miguez Bonino points out that this is where one of the funda-
mental differences between Christian faith and Marxist ideology occurs.
This is because

"most Marxists - at least the most conspicuous - have claimed for materialism a totality and exclusiveness which negates in principle all
reality which is not reduced to immanent terms. Such a claim Christians must reject, not
because they speculatively pose the existence of a realm of the 'spirit' but because they
have been grasped by the reality of the living God who is beyond history and the universe, the living God who in faith they know to be true, may to be the true and ultimate reality in which everything has meaning and existence. At this point, no compromise is possible. Actually, such a compromise would voice the engagement of the Christian as such of all authenticity and meaning". (200)

The other ideological limitation of deficiency is in the understanding of the nature of love. Quoting Fromm, Miguez Bonino shows how the Marxist concept of love envisages it as originating in and emanating from man himself.

"Man constitutes himself by determining, without any external authority, although certainly in the context of society, the goals and meaning of his existence. Hence, he rejects all 'love of God' which would not be, in the last resort, man's return to himself as a human being - 'all gods who will not recognise man's self-consciousness as the highest divinity' as Marx has said. This is, according to Fromm, the only possible humanistic ethic. Anything else is alienation, because 'man owes to himself his existence, not only materially but also emotionally and intellectually'" (201)

This, as Miguez Bonino points out, is an inadequate understanding for the Christian who claims that he is a product of love rather love being a product of man. The origin and motivation for a Christian's love is the love of God himself.

Miguez Bonino then, believes that in order to concretize the eschatologically significant actions which man's participation in the Kingdom of God requires there is an indispensable need for mediations. Without these there is either the absolutizing of an ideology, ideological captivity, fanaticism, or no effective historical engagement. He contends that three mediations are essential. These are, first, a radical scientific analysis of society which alone can furnish a sufficient understanding of the social reality in relation to which Christian love has to be articulated. Secondly there is needed a biblical and theological hermeneutic
so that the ethical requirements of the Kingdom of God may be spelt out in relation to the social analysis and political reality of the contemporary situation. The third mediation is an ideological world view and political programme which is able to provide a vehicle by which Christians can give effect in a secular way to their commitment to articulate their love.

This position, as we have seen, represents an advance on other ethical models which either fail to put their Christian commitment into effective political engagement or do so without sufficiently rigorous scientific analysis. The comparison with Berger's similar study has shown that there are other ethical approaches to the question of ideological options in a third world situation and we propose to return to this consideration in our final chapter.

Miguez Bonino is fully aware, however, of the need for Christian theology to distance itself from any ideology it chooses so that it can maintain its prophetic and critical role and therefore its identity. His choice of Marxism is fraught with problems, even though he uses it in a dialectical way. He is convinced, nevertheless, that this is the only one possible for a Christian in the Latin American situation if the cycle of oppression, misery, suffering and exploitation is to be broken. He believes that the situation is so chronic that only a radical approach can have any chance of effecting change in a meaningful way.

Furthermore, he claims that by allying itself with Marxism in the revolutionary situation in Latin America Christianity can make a significant contribution to Marxist theory and praxis. In this way he hopes to liberate theology from its merely critical and reflective role to one in which it participates in the changing of the social order.

The question arises as to whether he has been sufficiently rigorous
in applying the ethical criteria he has chosen to the ideology to which he has committed himself. Is Marxism any more likely than capitalism to usher in conditions more appropriate to the coming Kingdom of God? Furthermore, is Miguez Bonino's interpretation of the Kingdom in terms of historical engagement a valid one? To a consideration of this question we must now address ourselves.
CHAPTER FIVE

CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE SEARCH FOR A THEOLOGY OF HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT.

The search for a theology of historical engagement which Miguez Bonino has undertaken is well summed up in a question he asks about the nature of the relationship between God and man. He says,

"Is God a substitute subject for men in historical action, or is he the wherefrom and the where-to, the pro-vocation, the power, and the guarantee of an action that remains fully human and responsible? If he is a substitute subject - however much we may try to explain it away - history is a meaningless game and man's humanity a curious detour" (1)

It is Miguez Bonino's claim that much traditional theology has indeed regarded God as a substitute subject for man in historical action with the consequences outlined. He has set himself the task of re-instating man as the subject of his own history whilst maintaining the biblical emphasis on the sovereignty of God. In his re-examination of the theme of the Kingdom of God he has sought to emphasize that God does not take over from man the handling and ordering of the world's business. Rather God's role is to prompt and provoke man into historical engagement.

Miguez Bonino has chosen the Kingdom of God as the biblical motif around which to work out his theology. In this final chapter we look at the suitability of this category for this undertaking and we underline this suitability in terms of the centrality of the Kingdom in the bible, and its ability to enable Miguez Bonino to maintain a Christian identity and a contemporary relevance in his liberation theology.

We go on to examine the criticism that liberation theology, like Marxism, only treats man in his corporate dimension and consequently fails to offer salvation to the individual. We see how Miguez Bonino avoids this pitfall by incorporating two aspects of personal salvation in his exposition of the
Kingdom. The first is in terms of meaning and significance in this life and the second relates to a personal life after death. Both of these, however, are conceived of in ways that emphasize political engagement.

We then turn to a brief survey of leading expositions of the Kingdom of God in the twentieth century and see how they each emphasize the Kingdom as gift and man's role as merely reflexive or passive. By contrast Míguez Bonino draws out the active, dynamic role of human action within the Kingdom. The liberation theology of Sobrino, however, offers a positive and biblical corrective to Míguez Bonino's vagueness on the crucial category of repentance.

In looking at Míguez Bonino's use of Marxism as a mediation we note the alternative approach suggested by Berger and point out the need for a more rigorously critical appraisal by Míguez Bonino according to the criteria he himself has offered. In further evaluation we refer to the stress which Niebuhr puts on the depth and magnitude of human sinfulness and point out that history has a record of turning the tables on those who would steer it along a particular pre-determined course. This unpredictability is referred to by Niebuhr as irony.

Finally we set out seven theses which we consider this study of Míguez Bonino's theology has suggested as steps in the direction of a theology of historical engagement.

1. **THE KINGDOM OF GOD AS THE KEY CATEGORY**

The key to Míguez Bonino's exposition of liberation theology is in his understanding and interpretation of the Kingdom of God. The significance and importance of this choice is not that it is a useful, handy and convenient article chosen from the wide range available, but
that it is a category which is at the very core and centre of the biblical message. Indeed, in trying to evaluate other Latin American liberation theologians, Kirk has selected this theme as his criterion because of its centrality in the Bible. He can talk of "Scripture's testimony to the kingdom of God as the central hermeneutical key.... for its own understanding". (2)

In selecting any biblical theme as a hermeneutical key there is always a danger. Barr has drawn attention to the problem in his discussion of the habit which theologians have manifested of attributing greater prominence to some themes within the Bible than others. In this way "election" in traditional Calvinism, "justification by faith" in Lutheranism, and the synoptic gospels in liberalism have all constituted "thematic priorities" at different times. (3) Barr prefers to use the term "material centre" to describe such a choice and admits that, within limits, it has its value. The difficulty arises, however when theologians elevate a material centre to a higher status than others and succumb to the temptation to absolutize this theme and to regard it as beyond criticism. Some of the criticisms currently being levelled at liberation theology are along these lines. For example Kirk regards the category of the Exodus as a "privileged text" in the hands of some Latin Americans who have seemingly absolutized it. (4)

There are two main reasons why, in Miguez Bonino's use of the Kingdom of God, the dangers in choosing a key theme and regarding it as the supreme touchstone of theological evaluation are reduced. The first of these is because of its centrality. The witness of the Bible is that God rules over history and achieves his redemptive purpose within it in a new and determinative way. In the life and ministry of Jesus it was the major focus both of his teaching and his mighty works. The overriding meaning
of his resurrection is that God's rule is vindicated over the powers of evil and death and that his ultimate victory is assured despite the intervening possibility of suffering and struggle.

Nevertheless, even such a choice is not without its problems, and a major difficulty in selecting it is the apparent absence of the Kingdom theme in the teaching of St. Paul. (5) However this should be seen as an apparent problem rather than a real one. There is in the teaching of Jesus a close connection between the proclamation of the Kingdom and his own person and work. The concern of the early Christian preachers and apostles was not to repeat the message of Jesus but rather to declare the significance of Jesus himself as the crucified and risen Messiah. (6) Paul emphasizes the fact that the rule of God had broken in by his constant references to the events of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. He further stresses the imminence of the Parousia which corresponds with the synoptic teaching on the consummation of the Kingdom and also refers to the cosmic scope of salvation in passages such as Romans 8:21.

Then secondly the danger of absolutizing this theme is minimized because the Kingdom of God is so wide-ranging in the area of its biblical concerns. The concept of sovereignty is basic in any doctrine of creation; the cosmic lordship of Christ over the powers is an obvious instance of the inbreaking of the Kingdom; the new creation and the new man are both related to the Kingdom of God; so too are providence, resurrection, and exaltation; and redemption (in the sense of release from alienation for love and service) is likewise part and parcel of the Kingdom story. (7)

The centrality and wide-ranging nature of its concerns also enables the category of the Kingdom of God to serve as an anchor by which Miguez Bonino is able to hold to the specifically Christian identity of his liberation
theology. By its alliance with Marxism liberation theology runs the risk of sacrificing this identity and some critics are convinced that this has in fact happened. Hebblethwaite believes that there is no satisfactory synthesis between Christian theology and Marxist theory. Despite the many efforts to achieve the right mix he questions whether it is possible at all. He contends that it is "an attempt to square the circle". (8) The verbal gymnastics used by the synthesizers involve attempts to redefine Christianity in order to prove its revolutionary essence and at the same time to show the peacable intentions of Marxism. Hebblethwaite concludes that the end result is a sell-out for Christianity whilst Marxism "gets the benefit of the doubt". (9)

A similar conclusion is arrived at by Vree, except that in his opinion both Marxism and Christianity lose out. (10) Admittedly most of Vree's thinking relates to the European and North American dialogue, but the liberation theology enterprise is an even more radical attempt to find what he calls a synthesis. Vree claims that in dialogue with Marxism Christianity veers towards gnosticism whilst in the same enterprise Marxism sinks into revisionism. (11)

It is our contention that Miguez Bonino is fully aware of the dangers inherent in the attempt by liberation theology to utilize aspects of Marxism and that he successfully avoids the pitfalls involved. Moltmann has emphasized the importance of maintaining Christian identity in any political theology and attempts to do so by anchoring his theology in the crucifixion. He claims that "Christian theology finds its identity as such in the cross of Christ". (12) Miguez Bonino by contrast has successfully maintained the specifically Christian character of his liberation theology by shaping it within the moulds of the Kingdom of
God. Using this central biblical affirmation as his criterion he has been able to define the unity of history as the locus of the sovereignty of God, to embrace the tension between the present and future action of both God and man in history, and to relativize the necessary mediations in the process of articulating Christian obedience in political struggle. At the same time he has been able to take seriously the Marxist emphasis on human initiative in historical engagement as well as its analysis of socio-economic dynamics.

The Kingdom of God is also an apposite material centre for theological reflection because it adequately fulfills the requirement of contemporary relevance. Miguez Bonino, following Moltmann, accepts that faith and theology always have to live in a tension between what he calls the "Two-fold historical reference" which consists of the distinction between human history and the sovereignty of God, between action and proclamation, and between the "present" and "Christ" references. Relevance concerns the degree to which theology takes account of and meets the realities of the contemporary life of mankind. Summarizing Moltmann's exposition, Miguez Bonino says:

"The relation of the two appears in contemporary Christianity as almost inversely proportional: the greater the involvement in present historical action for the sake of the neighbour, the greater the risk of losing the specific identity; the stronger the consciousness of attachment to the specifically Christian heritage the stronger the risk of isolation from the present struggles of mankind and therefore of irrelevance." (13)

There can be little question that Miguez Bonino's liberation theology maintains the demand for relevance, and it is our submission that it is his choice of the Kingdom theme that enables him to do this. The biblical concept of the Kingdom includes within its scope the concern for radical social change which is so all-important in the Latin American situation, as well as the movement towards a new political order, the
stewardship of power, and the interrelatedness of the different levels of liberation as well as a hermeneutic which takes account of the conflictual nature of society. (14)

Whilst Miguez Bonino undoubtedly derives his concern for these issues from the Marxist analysis of the Latin American situation his choice of the Kingdom motif enables him to integrate this historical reference with the "Christ reference". The reason why such a thoroughly biblical concept is able to withstand the test of relevance lies in its thoroughly this-worldly character. In our study of the prophetic interpretation of history we saw how idealism was excluded by the biblical focus on the rule of God in the present events of human experience and the expectation of the future. The predominant emphasis even in the Genesis accounts of creation sets the world in the dimension of time and history. As Van Leeuwen has put it: "Right from the start the primary reference of the Hebrew expression אֹלָם is to time and history - within which the Lord moves with his people toward his Kingdom". (15) Consequently, when Miguez Bonino wishes to reflect theologically on a praxis which includes a scientific analysis of the dynamics in contemporary society the Kingdom motif is particularly suitable.

Furthermore it is christologically defined and is therefore fully in line with Bonhoeffer's formulation of the unity of the reality of God and the reality of the world in Christ, who is the ultimate reality. The New Testament proclamation that in Christ the rule of God broke into the world in a new way means that the theme of the Kingdom of God has a christological basis and definition. It is precisely this christological framework of the Kingdom which determined that its use in the liberation theology of Miguez Bonino will be grounded both in contemporary history and in the biblical tradition. It is interesting in this connection to note the parallel
between Miguez Bonino and the thought of Sobrino. "I think that liberation theology as 'theology' is profoundly christological", says Sobrino, "and insofar as it is concerned with 'liberation', its most all-embracing theological concept is 'the Kingdom of God'". (16)

Miguez Bonino has also been able to accommodate within this concept the eschatological dimension of the biblical orientation of the future. By drawing out the tension between the present and the future in his continuity-discontinuity formula he has combined together the positive elements in prophetic eschatology, apocalyptic theology and the New Testament dual emphasis on so-called "realized" and "future" eschatology. Alongside this harmonizing of biblical themes he has simultaneously blended in the melody of the ultimate significance of present human historical action undertaken in love. In this skilful way, Miguez Bonino has been able to take the insight enshrined within the Marxist belief in the inexorability of the coming revolution and reinterpret the Christian message of the finality of Christ and the coming consummation of his Kingdom from that vantage point. In the process of achieving this goal he has also managed to synthesize into a unified whole the hope contained in the prophetic understanding of time, the apocalyptic stress on the inversion of the order pertaining in the present status quo, and the ethical requirement of a love which is the criterion of human historical action.

This combination of diverse elements has also enabled Miguez Bonino to overcome the major weakness in apocalyptic expectation. By emphasizing the eschatological significance of love he has avoided the failure in much apocalyptic theology to work out any meaningful ethic. At the same time, by underlining the ultimate significance of actions done in the present he has ruled out the probability of pessimism and despair which result from the apocalyptic conviction that the present age is so totally evil that it is fit only for destruction.
One of the most serious criticisms to have been levelled at liberation theology concerns an integral dimension of biblical eschatology. This may at first seem somewhat surprising since the liberation theologians lay considerable stress on eschatology. The criticism, however, is directed at their apparent lack of interest in the life to come. Fierro alleges that liberation theology follows Moltmann in not stating what its position is in this regard. There is left the suspicion that "it does not believe much in that life, if at all". (17) Fierro believes that one of the reasons for this ambiguity is that liberation theology has not really come to grips with the traditional theology of salvation nor has it set out its own attitude to it. In singular terms the problem could be posed in the question: "Is it possible to believe both in heaven and in the theological meaning of decolonization?" (18). A similar stance is adopted by Newbegin. He deals with the problem of salvation understood as human meaningfulness. (19) Accepting the critique by liberation theology of the traditional idealistically conceived theology of salvation Newbegin sees the question of meaning as a dilemma. On the one hand meaning can be found in the future of the community. Traditionally Christianity offered the former option, whilst Marxism has proclaimed the second. They have usually been understood as mutually exclusive and Newbegin asks whether the dilemma is inevitable. Does meaning for the individual have to exclude a meaning for history or does one have to choose meaning for history at the cost of personal hope?

Cutting right across the search for meaning is the intervening fact of death which, from a human point of view is the negation of all meaning. "It shears through the threads on the loom before the weaving is finished". (20)
The gospel of the resurrection meets the need for a meaningful future and embraces both the private and public life of the human person. The Christian hope is one: it offers a personal possibility of life after death but it also proclaims the destruction of whatever opposes God's kingly rule and the final subjection of the universe to God. Newbigin contends that Romans 8 enshrines the essence of the Christian gospel of liberation. "By giving his Son to die the death of sinful man", he asserts, "God delivered us from the grip of sin and death and placed us under a new jurisdiction - that of the Spirit...This is an accomplished liberation. Like all liberations it is a change of regime". (21) But it involves those who are thus liberated in becoming agents of liberation through both suffering and service. Newbigin goes on to point out that God the Father and creator is likewise ordering all things in the cosmos towards the fulfilment of the end to which he has called them.

In this way Paul's teaching presents a picture which portrays history itself as a struggle for liberation and the church as a participant in that struggle. But the significance of the individual is not sacrificed. The individual Christian has a role as both a fighter for liberation and as one who has himself been liberated. The church cannot bring in "the city which is the perfection of all that God purposes both for our personal and for our public life" (22) because there is no evolutionary road from here to there. The ascent is not simple. As in the New Testament Apocalypse the New Jerusalem is to "come down" rather than being "built up", and the church's role is that of witnessing to the grace and justice which both judges and redeems those structures in which are embodied our hopes for justice.

Newbigin's exposition represents a useful and helpful response to Míguez Bonino. Together with the comments by Fierro it draws attention to the failure of liberation theologians in general to take sufficient account of
the exceeding sinfulness of sin in the individual. It seems to the present writer that in the quest for structural liberation some theologians—notably Assmann and Boff—have omitted to deal with total human liberation. Gutierrez has described this as threefold. (23) It would appear that by concentrating on political liberation they have finished with an imbalance which neglects the spiritual liberation of persons. The impression is almost given that the liberation theologians have gone along with the Marxist contention that only the future society to be inaugurated by the revolution can provide the necessary conditions for personal fulfilment and what the older theology has usually called salvation. On this score Newbigin's criticism is to be welcomed. In any endeavour to interpret the message of the New Testament the individual must necessarily be given due significance.

On the other hand Miguez Bonino, unlike the majority of liberation theologians, has attempted the task of incorporating a "beyond-death" dimension into his exposition. This emphasis on the after-life comes out in two places.

The first of these is in Room to be People where he deals at length with the theme "Love will never cease to be", (24) and meets the problem of meaning on a personal level which Newbigin has highlighted. His answer is that it is the eternal future after death which gives meaning to the otherwise disconnected and incoherent experiences of learning, working, struggling and loving of this life. Whilst he is careful to emphasize that in the New Testament there is very little information or speculation about the nature of the hereafter he is adamant that the nature of the Kingdom life is love.

"What is constantly repeated is that the love of Jesus Christ is permanent and that death cannot end it. Therefore, Jesus Christ gives an eternal dimension to the love in our lives. Whoever has identified himself with it has already conquered death". (25)

Miguez Bonino even goes on to deal with "Images of the Future Life" and points out that music and song figure prominently amongst these, symbolizing
joy and harmony. "The future life is present in this image" he says, "like the kind of life in which effort, work, and service become joy and repose, while happiness is creation, service and duty". (26) The consequence is that here and now we should be trying to transform work which means involvement with the economic and political fields. The future is not just an end to be arrived at, though. The images of the future life carry hidden within them a call for the transformation of the present.

A further image of the future life which he refers to is that of reward. Considered as the accumulation of credit this is absurd but it makes sense when seen as "a kind of parable which teaches that actions that belong to this new life are never incomplete or unfinished, but rather are projected into the future, then the idea seems coherent and positive". (27)

We would maintain therefore that Miguez Bonino has foreseen the criticism by Newbigin and Pierro and has met it in this exposition. It may well be that Room to be People was not available to Newbigin when he wrote his evaluation of liberation theology since it was only published in English in 1979 and Newbigin wrote a year earlier. It is clear that Miguez Bonino is fully aware of the danger of ignoring the issue of personal salvation. On the evidence in Doing Theology Miguez Bonino could be charged, along with liberation theologians in general, of this imbalance. His later book, however, without sacrificing any of the insights of Doing Theology, has effectively restored the balance and has provided an insight which is a valuable contribution to the liberation theology exercise.

A second reference to the significance of death comes in the last chapter of Christians and Marxists where Miguez Bonino reckons with the heroism of communists who have died for their cause. This poses a call to a spirituality of commitment for Christians whose gospel demands complete dedication. Here he quotes an illuminating passage from Bloch who points out that the
"His Good Friday, is not sweetened - much less absorbed - by any Easter Sunday, a Sunday in which he will personally return to life. The Heaven to which the martyrs raised their arms amidst flames and smoke, does not exist for the red materialist. And nevertheless he dies confessing a cause, and his superiority can only be compared with that of the very early Christians or of John the Baptist". (28)

Whilst Miguez Bonino is at pains to stress that he is not trying to set up Christian spirituality in any competitive sense over against Marxist commitment he nevertheless delineates what for him is the more excellent way of Christian devotion. Grounded in the spirituality of faith, hope and love as set out by St. Paul in I Corinthians 13, Miguez Bonino expounds the relevance of Christian spirituality amidst the revolutionary struggle along three directions.

In the first of these there is the requirement of utter availability for service as conceived in the words of Wesley's covenant prayer: "I am no longer my own but Thine. Put me to what Thou wilt, rank me with whom Thou wilt;......I freely and heartily yield all things to Thy pleasure and disposal". (29) Miguez Bonino interprets the evangelical emphasis on salvation by grace through faith as indicating that an individual finds his true identity and reality not in himself but in Christ. The simple trust of faith involves the total surrender of the person and his subjectivity to his Lord.

In this passage Miguez Bonino locates himself firmly in the evangelical tradition and shows that a theology of liberation does not have to abandon or discard the theology of personal salvation. Whilst Miguez Bonino does not spell out the relevance of this teaching for a theology of the Kingdom of God it is transparently clear nevertheless that the theme of personal surrender and utter availability for service are prime requisites for any
subject of the one who is the King.

The second direction of Christian spirituality is a commitment unto death. Here the hope of resurrection enables a Christian to risk his life because he is "conscious of the freedom for self-giving available to those who know that 'death....cannot separate us from the love of Christ' " (30) Miguez Bonino sets death in the context of the struggle for liberation and at the same time recognizes the costliness and suffering involved in any social transformation. "It seems to us that only a faith that transcends death can responsibly undertake the awful decision of indispensable but costly transformations", he says. (31) Suffering and even death therefore are envisaged as "participation in the lot of solidarity love, the only thing that can really create a possibility of new life for man". (32) The end result is that the Christians shares in the triumphal procession with the Lord which is the consummation of the Kingdom.

In this way Miguez Bonino has built into his eschatology the element of personal significance and has shown how a liberation theology of the Kingdom of God allows for and includes the hope of the hereafter. For him it is this very hope which gives ultimate significance to the ethical struggle in the present. Always, however, the hope of the future consummation is to be related, not to pious escapism, but to historical engagement. "To be a disciple" says Miguez Bonino, "is, in Christian terms, to enlist in a conflict which is still raging, however much its outcome may be evident to faith" (33).

In the third place, faith, hope and love issue in joy and gladness. We can rest, in the true meaning of the Sabbath, because, "We do not carry the burden of the whole world on our back, we carry only the burden of the day". (34) Here is an aspect of Christian discipleship which, in Miguez Bonino's opinion, shows up a fundamental lack in Marxist philosophy.
Marxism at this point fails to take account of the depth of human "joy, personal fulfilment, hope and love" (35) despite the fact that these are illustrated in the lives of some of the militants.

As with other aspects of Christian spirituality, joy too has to be related to historical commitment. Miguez Bonino says:

"It is necessary, particularly, where we have been dealing with the most 'spiritual' dimensions of Christian life to remind ourselves that we are still speaking about political and social engagement - we are still in the world of social struggle, economic considerations, political programme, revolutionary theory, perhaps jail and torture, in any case conflict. It is here that the Christian lives his witness". (36)

We have now dealt at some length with Miguez Bonino's teaching on personal salvation, death and resurrection in order to show that within his attempt to develop a liberation theology using the category of the Kingdom of God there is ample room for a theology of meaning in personal terms. The criticism by both Fierro and Newbigin (whilst directed at liberation theology in general) is, in our opinion, amply met by Miguez Bonino's exposition in the way we have outlined above.

Newbigin has stressed the nature of personal sin, salvation, and the afterlife. He has shown how, in the Christian understanding personal meaning finds its full flowering in the life of the Christian community. It seems to us, however, that in making his evaluation of liberation theology he has failed to take sufficient account of the depth, complexity and massive ness of structural and social evil. In line with a number of the critiques summarized by Brown in *Theology in a New Key* it seems to us that Newbigin has missed the main point in liberation theology's attempt to co-opt the Marxist analysis. Whilst he claims to accept the Marxist critique of capitalism (37) he seems unable to see its usefulness in the Christian enterprise of liberation. In other words he fails to grasp Miguez Bonino's all-important concept of mediations and is content merely to outline the
Christian alternative to Marxism. This is no answer to the endemic political and economic nexus of oppression and exploitation that pertains in Latin America and one might have expected that Newbigin (with his personal experience of the third world) would have had a more comprehensive insight into the nature and intractability of the problems there, as well as the inadequacy of simplistic solutions.

2. THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT

The contemporary study of New Testament eschatology has been characterized by a pronounced emphasis on the divine prerogative in the establishing of the Kingdom of God. Beginning with Johannes Weiss' rediscovery of the significance of the apocalyptic element in our Lord's teaching, the tendency has been to emphasize the radical transcendence of the Kingdom. Weiss believed that Jesus was referring to a future rather than a present Kingdom, and it was to arrive apocalyptically rather than develop gradually. The recent translators and editors of Weiss' epoch-making work sum up his teaching with the following statement:

"For every man, and that includes Jesus, the only viable attitude to take vis-a-vis the advent of the Kingdom was one of passivity. Men could pray that the Kingdom might come, but they could do nothing to bring it into existence. That remained forever solely the prerogative of God. The Kingdom was a gift, not an assignment." (38)

C.H. Dodd in reacting against the apocalyptic emphasis of Weiss and Schweitzer interpreted the Kingdom in categories reminiscent of Platonism. There is a tension between on the one hand the eternal order, which is the kingdom lying beyond history and which is represented by the prayer "Thy Kingdom come" and, on the other hand the "this-worldliness" of the declaration "The Kingdom
of God has come upon you". (39) History becomes a series of events deriving from a timeless reality beyond it. "It is instrumental, or more properly sacramental, to the eternal order". (40) This eternal order impinges upon present human experience and confronts individuals with the Kingdom of God "that is, with the ultimate good and the final power in the universe". (41)

The role of men, in this interpretation of the Kingdom is to accept it, respond to it and enter into it.

"Out of their response, one way or the other, further events proceed. Thus history is moulded by the spirit. The whole series of events remains plastic to the will of God, and serves to bring men again and again face to face with the eternal issues". (42)

To accept, to respond and to enter are all considerably less passive roles for man than the one Weiss gives him. Nevertheless they fall far short of the active, positive part which Miguez Bonino envisages. The reason is not hard to find since Dodd's scheme is set within a framework of idealism. Having argued away any meaningful future consummation for history or the Kingdom, Dodd is left with a dualistic situation in which historical events are merely the interaction of timeless spirit with the temporal order". (43) Dodd's work is a brave attempt to reconcile two philosophies of history which are poles apart - the Greek idealistic system which is essentially cyclical and the Hebrew eschatological and apocalyptic view in which time is fundamentally linear. The result is that man is robbed of any possibility of becoming the subject of his own history and finishes with the prospect of a Kingdom of God which in the final analysis offers "blessedness" in eternity. Political action and economic forces do not even come within the orbit of concern in this interpretation.

Whilst Weiss and Dodd represent the two contrasting positions which have
emerged as the extremes in twentieth century studies of the Kingdom of God it was inevitable that other scholars would seek to synthesize "consistent" (or future) and "realized" eschatology.

One such attempt was made by W.G. Kümmel who accepted that the Kingdom of God is the future eschatological age. He stressed, however, that in Jesus the Kingdom came into being. His eschatological teaching assured men that they are now living in the last days and that the consummation was imminent. (44) Jesus' own ministry was the guarantee and demonstration of the eschatological character of the present time. The importance of the teaching which Jesus offered, claims Kümmel, does not consist of the imminence of the apocalyptic end of the world. It lies in the arrival of the consummation which will allow the Kingdom of the God who has already shown and actualized his redemptive purpose and power in Jesus to become an unfettered reality. It is because Jesus has already fulfilled the promise of God that it will be fulfilled.

For Kümmel man's role in the Kingdom consists of "adherence to the man Jesus" (45) and of acceptance of his preaching. Again we note that in Kümmel's exposition the action is all on God's side whilst man is assigned to a reflexive and responding part only. Although Kümmel comes nearer to Miguez Bonino's concept of the relationship of the present Kingdom to the future one than either Weiss or Dodd, man is still not the subject of his own history. Indeed, history itself, as secular political activity, hardly comes into the picture. The Kingdom is a religious activity centred on the preaching of Jesus and the loving help he desires to give, as well as his death and the certainty of his resurrection. As such it points to the eschatological fulfilment still to come. The concept of any penultimate ethical requirement of social or political action to erect signposts is absent.
A further study of the Kingdom of God by a contemporary scholar is supplied by G. Eldon Ladd in his book *The Presence of the Future*. (46) Ladd distinguishes between four different uses of the term Kingdom of God in the gospels. In the first it is used to denote the reign or rule of God; in the second it means the future apocalyptic order at the end of the age; in the third use it signifies the presence of God among men now, and in the fourth meaning it indicates a present realm into which men are entering. (47)

Like Kümmel, Ladd sees the key to the meaning of the Kingdom in the fact that it has become dynamically active in the person and mission of Jesus himself. The Kingdom is basically to be thought of as God's supernatural breaking into history in the person of Jesus Christ. It is supremely an act of God, a gift with which he blesses his people. In a sentence which is in some ways typical of his thought Ladd says: "The Kingdom is not only an eschatological gift belonging to the age to come; it is also a gift to be received in the old aeon". (48)

In an otherwise extensive examination of the meaning of the Kingdom, Ladd allocates a mere two pages to "The Kingdom and Social Ethics". (49) Here he acknowledges the absoluteness of the Kingdom to come, the need for the church to "make an impact on the world" (50) and the concern of Jesus for man's physical and social well-being in addition to their spiritual welfare. The individual ethics are absolute ethics and only attainable in the age to come. As in the previous critics, again we find little or no conception of any dynamic and active part for man to play. The action is almost entirely one-way—from God to man. Human initiative is limited to the receiving of blessings, or salvation as a gift. The Kingdom relates almost exclusively to the inner life of individuals. Secular history is abandoned to the politicians, and man passively awaits the final apocalyptic end.
If these four interpretations of the Kingdom of God are typical of New Testament scholarship in the twentieth century it is not difficult to see how Miguez Bonino and the other theologians of liberation have found themselves impelled to seek a new hermeneutic of the Kingdom. With Marxism calling men to create their own history and carve their destiny for themselves, the plea to accept, receive, and respond to the Kingdom as a gift or as something imposed from without appears as a tame alternative. In this regard it is interesting to note the observation by Martin that Marxism along with Islam appeals to the masculinity of mankind. It does so because it sees "no ambiguity in power itself, and proletarian power acquires unqualified legitimacy". (51) By contrast the responding, reflexive role assigned to men in the Kingdom of God by these interpreters of the New Testament appears as feminine rather than masculine. Clearly some new hermeneutic key had to be employed if the levers of power were not to be abandoned to the sole control of those who eschew any allegiance to the God and Father of Jesus Christ.

It is our belief that Miguez Bonino has shaped a new form for the interpretation of the Kingdom of God in categories which, whilst remaining faithful to the biblical foundation are yet able to bear a superstructure in conformity with the power-conscious demands of contemporary man as articulated in Marxist revolutionary consciousness. When we analyze Miguez Bonino's references to the Kingdom in the chapter we have selected for the focus of our present study we find he uses the phrase in five different senses.

In the first place by the Kingdom of God he refers to the active sovereignty or Lordship of God in history. Out of some fifty-three references to the Kingdom in the chapter, twenty seven or approximately half, fall into this group. Clearly uppermost in Miguez Bonino's interpretation is the Old Testament conception of God's rule in history. In this sense it represents
God's present action in the totality of the affairs of men and his guidance and influence in those affairs. There are, for example, frequent references to "history and the Kingdom", but the key sentence for clarifying our understanding of this concept is the one where he says, "Once we see divine initiative as that action of God within history and in historical terms which opens history toward the promise, we seem ... required to use the strong language of growth, realization (and) creation" (52). This accords with scripture and the doctrine of providence. It is similar to the first use of the term noted by Ladd.

In the second of Miguez Bonino's uses he means the Kingdom as the future eschatological goal of history to be realized at the Parousia of our Lord and this meaning appears in about a quarter of the references. Clearly again he is in full harmony with one of the central biblical aspects of the kingdom, and one which has been uppermost in the contemporary studies of the Kingdom. With the exception of Dodd, who later acknowledged the need to modify his view, most modern scholars have recognized the fundamental soundness of the point being made by Weiss and Schweitzer—that the future aspect of the fulfilment and consummation of the Kingdom was intrinsic to the biblical picture. Any arguing away of this dimension can only represent a serious omission on the part of the interpreter, and leads to a thoroughly non-eschatological or ahistorical view of the Kingdom.

Like Marx, Miguez Bonino prefers not to use the term "utopian" to describe this future Kingdom. Such language he believes, removes the Kingdom out of the context of history and puts it into the category of wishful thinking. "The Kingdom" he says "is not utopian: it has a place both in history and in God's eschatological time". (53) Thus, in line with both Kümmel and Ladd and the majority of later commentators Miguez Bonino accepts that the twin emphases of the Kingdom, present and future are not mutually exclusive but have to be held in tension.
Here it is possible to see the significance of Bloch's insights for contemporary theology, and the use made of his futurism by Miguez Bonino. The future eschatological goal of the Kingdom is the motivation for ethical and political endeavour as well as the guarantee of its fulfilment and significance. The attempt to come to terms with Bloch's emphasis on human creativity in its future-directedness has compelled Miguez Bonino to examine the significance and role of human action in a theology of the Kingdom. This attempt has led Miguez Bonino to re-establish the positive, active role of man in becoming the subject of his own history and in the liberating of man from the oppression which besets him.

Thirdly, by the Kingdom, Miguez Bonino wishes to indicate the redeeming activity or presence of Jesus Christ in history. This usage only occurs in three places in the chapter under review but they serve to underline the essentially evangelical emphasis which Miguez Bonino wishes to retain. The category of the Kingdom thus enables him to bring out the truth inherent in Marx's application of Hegel's dialectic to the economic forces at work in history. In Marx the dialectically related forces lead to a new age - communism. In Miguez Bonino the new age is the salvation which the redeeming presence of Christ effects. It may be useful to look a little more closely at this idea. On the first occasion Miguez Bonino says that it is necessary to "name the Kingdom" in terms that relate to secular history. In this way phrases like "love", "liberation", and "the new man" can be used "as signs which allow us to identify the active sovereignty of God in history, the redeeming presence of Jesus Christ, and, consequently the call and obedience of faith". (54) Here the redeeming presence of Jesus Christ is used synonymously alongside the sovereignty of God and the call of faith. All are included in the understanding of the Kingdom of God. In the other two places Miguez Bonino refers to the fact that "the Kingdom redeems, transforms, and perfects" (55) history.
The significance of this emphasis must not be lost. If, as other critics have pointed out, the Kingdom brings blessing and salvation to individual believers it is also true that it brings a redeeming presence into the historical process. According to Miguez Bonino it is precisely this redemptive activity which we are called upon to identify and align ourselves with in the political activity to which the Kingdom points us.

This leads us to the fourth sense in which Miguez Bonino employs the term Kingdom of God. Here it is the mission to be fulfilled and it is at this point that he has incorporated the active, positive, or "masculine" element so predominant in Marxism into his teaching. He emphasizes that God comes not merely as gift but as demand and the following sentences convey this meaning:

(a) In the Old Testament Yahweh's sovereignty appears "as an announcement which convokes, as promise and judgment demanding and inviting a response". (56)

(b) "God builds his Kingdom from and within human history in its entirety; his action is a constant call and challenge to man". (57)

(c) "The Kingdom is not an object to be known through adumbrations and signs that must be discovered and interpreted but a call, a convocation, a pressure that impels". (58)

(d) "History, in relation to the Kingdom is not a riddle to be solved but a mission to be fulfilled". (59)

In these statements Miguez Bonino has skilfully maintained the biblical stress on the priority of God and at the same time has brought out the need for human initiative, decision, and action. The Kingdom is no longer merely a gift to be received passively. It is a mission of human engagement in the positive, active, and dynamic - even conflictual - work of creating history. It is not merely an inner disposition to be engendered nor a religious blessing to be received, accepted and responded to. It is an enterprise to be embarked on and a business to be administered. Whilst the Kingdom is God's reign of shalom, justice and righteousness, it
is to be established in human history which is plastic in men's hands.

This emphasis stands in contrast to the views of the critics we have examined and constitutes a contribution to the theology of history in general as well as to liberation theology in particular. It represents a shift away from the passivity required in consistent eschatology and also from the religious blessing offered by the Kingdom in realized eschatology and the subsequent syntheses. It also marks a distinct advance over the old "social gospel" of Walter Rauschenbusch where the Kingdom of God was conceived as the ideal human society. (60)

The fifth meaning which Miguez Bonino attaches to the Kingdom follows from the last and consists of references to human participation in the Kingdom. In this way he can speak of "historical mediations for our participation in the building of the Kingdom" (61) and "action which corresponds to the Kingdom". (62) Without labouring the point it is necessary merely to note that here Miguez Bonino underlines the human enterprise involved in the Kingdom as human history and the secular nature of that history as opposed to traditional interpretations which have stressed the religious character of the Kingdom.

By contrast with Miguez Bonino, Gutierrez gives little place to the concept of the Kingdom in his liberation theology. His main biblical theme centres around the Exodus, as we have previously mentioned. Where he does mention the Kingdom he tries to show how it is to be thought of and worked for in political ways. Previously Catholic theology had thought of "the growth of the Kingdom" in terms of temporal progress by which it referred to man's dominion over nature.

The Kingdom is both gift and the struggle for liberation, claims Gutierrez. "The growth of the Kingdom" he says is a process which occurs historically
in liberation, insofar as liberation means a greater fulfilment of man" (63). What Gutierrez seems to be saying is that historical liberation leads to the growth of the Kingdom. Miguez Bonino says that because the Kingdom has come we must use the human mediations available to actualize the Kingdom in history and erect signs of the coming Kingdom.

However, the recurring feature we have seen in the New Testament critics, appears again in Gutierrez, where the fact of the givenness of the Kingdom is emphasized again. Gutierrez makes no attempt to reconcile the Kingdom as gift and the Kingdom as human initiative. (64) and his concept of the Kingdom falls far short of the one portrayed by Miguez Bonino.

Sobrino has offered a much more thorough study of the Kingdom of God. He draws attention to the fact that not only is the Kingdom due to God's initiative, but it is also redemptive of evil situations. Indeed, in the teaching of Jesus God's action and presence is only conceived of as the overcoming of a negative situation. (65) Here is the basic liberation in the teaching and action of Jesus. Two aspects of Christ's ministry are distinctive signs of the Kingdom - his miracles of healing and his pardoning of sins - and these are part and parcel of the liberation he offers in the Kingdom. Sobrino stresses the point that the relationship of Jesus to the Kingdom means that we can only know him in the service of God's Kingdom. The Kingdom puts Jesus at one remove, so to speak, from direct personal contact. His activity and life function in the service of the Kingdom and this is the point at which we are called to relate to him.

Sobrino sees sin as the abuse of power, which leads to oppression of various kinds. Jesus condemned in particular the collective sins where the abuse of religious, intellectual, economic or political power was evident.
The proclamation of the Kingdom by Jesus included the call to repentance. In an important passage which is crucial to his interpretation, Sobrino says: "Jesus himself shares the apocalyptic conviction that the breaking-in of the Kingdom is God's work alone....Corresponding to this work of God, however, is a human attitude that is usually designated with the Greek word Metanoia". (66)

This human attitude is, on the part of the poor and lowly, to be one of faith and confidence in God. On the part of those called to discipleship, however, there must not only be faith: there must also be active co-operation in the proclamation of the Kingdom and the action of turning it into a full reality. Their discipleship called them to place themselves at the disposal of the Kingdom. This means that "Following the praxis of Jesus gives expression to the concrete obligation to fight for love and justice among human beings". (67)

In Sobrino's exposition then, we find a parallel to Miguez Bonino's main interpretative points about the Kingdom. It is God's active reign; it has broken into history in a new and dynamic way in the person and ministry of Jesus; it is still to be consummated; it manifests itself in redemptive activity in history; and it involves a command or call on disciples to engage in active participation.

We find the particular value of Sobrino's account to be that he spells out far more clearly and exegetically the concept of metanoia, which is not mentioned as such by Miguez Bonino. As we have seen, (68) this was the very point which Bonhoeffer had drawn out so clearly in his exposition of the relationship between the ultimate and the penultimate.

It is important for us also to note that this response to the grace aspect of the Kingdom can be clearly seen in the Bible even when a critic is not
utilizing a political hermeneutic. K.L. Schmidt, without any of the presuppositions of liberation or contemporary political theology, underlines this human side to the coming of the Kingdom. Beginning with the need to accept the Kingdom as gift, he goes on to outline the gospel call to service in the Kingdom, and by using Paul's phrase about "fellow-workers in the Kingdom of God" (69) is able to assert, "Since, however, faith is obedience to the command of God, our concern and effort are demanded. Through faith we should fight for the kingdom of God like the elect under the old covenant". (70) Furthermore, because the decision to be for the Kingdom is so crucial it follows that the "invitation to the Kingdom of God must be accepted in metanoia". (71) It seems to us that this is a weak point in Miguez Bonino's treatment, for whilst he emphasizes the "pressure" that the Kingdom puts on men to participate in political action he fails to spell out just how this call or commission is worked out in the New Testament. Sobrino has perceived very clearly the call to repentance and, following Bonhoeffer, has interpreted this as the basis in the gospels for the requirement of active and creative struggle in the service of the Kingdom.

Sobrino also provides a further useful corrective to Miguez Bonino's concept of the Kingdom in his careful exposition of the liberative effect which the Kingdom exerts on human affairs. Miguez Bonino has been content to refer rather vaguely to "a direction and a purpose in God's historical action...which is conveyed in such expressions and symbols as 'justice', 'peace', 'redemption' in their concrete biblical 'illustrations'" (72). Sobrino, by contrast, has spelt out how sin as the abuse of power opposes the Kingdom and creates oppression. The latter is the direct result in history of collective sin. In this way Sobrino is able to depict how the Kingdom redeems in terms of liberating men from oppression, and by so doing makes the leap from New Testament times to today that much easier. He has thus brought out the soteriological aspect of the Kingdom far more
explicitly than has Miguez Bonino, and in the process has exposed the need for a closer and clearer link between the presence of the Kingdom and political liberation in Miguez Bonino's liberation theology.

3. **MEDIATIONS AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD**

A theology of historical engagement must, it seems to us, utilize some ideological and political mediations. Here Miguez Bonino is quite right and his decision to opt for an alliance with Marxism is at least to be admired for the courage it reveals.

As we have seen, Miguez Bonino feels the urgency of the contemporary situation in Latin America is so strong, and the economic and political condition so extreme that he perceives only two possibilities. Either one chooses to support the present capitalistic system or one sides with Marxism in discerning capitalism as the root of the evil and throws in one's lot with the revolutionary movements. The ethical criteria Miguez Bonino perceives as inherent in the Kingdom lead him to evaluate the present politico-economic system as basically sinful, and concomitantly he finds Marxism to be motivated by love.

Built into the biblical concept of the Kingdom is the dialectical tension between the relativity of the penultimate and the absoluteness of the ultimate. This allows Miguez Bonino to provide for the moral ambiguity involved in a Christian commitment to work with Marxists for a better society, even though what is established is only likely to be a temporary and partial improvement on the status quo.

It is clear that the Kingdom formula thus enables Miguez Bonino to avoid falling into the temptation of absolutizing the relative as Marxists tend to do.
Yet it is here that we feel further thought needs to be given to the choice of mediations. It seems to us that the availability of grace and the comforting assurance that the imperfections of the human mediations will be purified in judgement and forgiveness have probably led Miguez Bonino into a too-easy acceptance of the Marxist analysis of the social situation.

We have referred in Chapter Four to the way in which Berger carefully and analytically evaluates the two major ideological systems available to third world countries. We saw there how he established ethical criteria by which to measure the results of these ideological systems and how he sought to synthesize the benefits of "hard-nosed analysis" and utopian motivation.

By contrast it seems to us that Miguez Bonino has not evaluated empirical Marxism with a sufficiently rigorous analysis. Having critically and negatively evaluated the results of capitalism in the form of human misery and suffering he does not proceed to subject existing Marxist systems to any such examination. Our problem therefore would be that before opting for the Marxist analysis of society and offering it as an alternative to capitalism we would expect the same criteria of the Kingdom to be applied as were used in the case of capitalism.

Our study of Berger's use of ethical criteria involved an examination of what he termed the "calculus of pain" and the "calculus of meaning". We would have preferred Miguez Bonino to have developed similar criteria in the form of a "calculus of love". This could then be applied to situations where Marxism is the chosen ideology. Similarly we feel that a more analytical
and dispassionate evaluation of Marxist praxis would result from the formulation by Miguez Bonino of a "calculus of justice" and a "calculus of peace" (or "shalom") as tools for the further evaluation of empirical Marxism.

Admittedly the assessment which would ensue would still be framed from a perspective which would have subjective and individualistic elements. Any significant degree of scientific or objective detachment would be difficult to achieve. It seems therefore that the selection of the Marxist analysis because of its "scientific" character is a somewhat arbitrary judgement. For this reason the justice implied in the Kingdom requires that a certain amount of caution and reserve need to be exercised in the choosing of an analytical tool which is to be regarded as suitable for discerning and calculating any pattern of social and economic formation which is to be more appropriate to the Kingdom than any present system.

It is for these reasons that we find the "both-and" approach of Berger to be more acceptable as a mature and scientific approach to the question of ideological mediations. He acknowledges the worth and significance of the powerful motivating factor in the utopianism of Marxism, and is able to hold to this without jettisoning the value of tough-nosed analysis inherent in the business acumen and skills which are generated in capitalism.

It is our belief therefore that Miguez Bonino needs to be more rigorously critical in his acceptance of Marxism. Undoubtedly
the Marxist analysis highlights a critically important factor in the dynamics of the Latin American situation. But, if it is to be used in conjunction with ethical criteria of the Kingdom it needs to be accepted with reservations, or at least with greater reservation than Miguez Bonino uses.

Empirical observation leads the present writer to wonder whether a "mixed" economy might not prove to be an option which would lead to social conditions more in keeping with the ethical criteria appropriate to the Kingdom. Marx expressed his conviction that the more advanced industrialized countries of the west were ripe for a proletarian revolution. Such a conflagration did not take place. What did happen, however, was that the more severe conditions of cruelty and exploitation were ameliorated as a result of the rise of the trade union movements and by the exercise and extension of the democratic process. Nevertheless, over against this consideration, it has to be remembered that the liberation theologians in Latin America have categorically rejected any such third way. They do not see this as a possible alternative in their cultural and economic context since it lacks a sufficiently strong theoretical and ideological basis. In addition the failure of the Chilean experiment has emphasized the inadequacy of this type of approach in Latin America.
We have already had occasion to refer to the inevitability of personal preference and even bias as well as the intrusion of subjective factors in any assessment of ideological options. From a theological viewpoint this is to be expected and the reason is not hard to find. Reinhold Niebuhr's "pessimism" is a sober guide here. Holding tenaciously to his biblically-grounded affirmation that all men are equally sinful he points out that the strong, the rich and the powerful have greater opportunity to sin against God out of pride than do those who lack position or prestige. But this is not the total picture. Niebuhr points out that there is a dimension of truth in the biblical assessment which becomes obscured in the Marxist analysis. He describes it as follows:

"A too simple social radicalism does not recognize how quickly the poor, the weak, the despised of yesterday, may, on gaining a social victory over their detractors, exhibit the same arrogance and the same will-to-power which they abhorred in their opponents and which they were inclined to regard as a congenital sin of their enemies. Every victim of injustice makes the mistake of supposing that the sin from which he suffers is a peculiar vice of his oppressor". (73)

Furthermore Niebuhr penetrates the depths of some of the problems which arise in opting for Marxism as a political
mediation. He points out that whilst the justified resentments of the poor do provide a powerful motivating dynamic in history this bitterness can be a two-edged sword. Together with their utopian hopes of redress the anger experienced by the poor can frequently become as distorting an influence on their judgment and hence a source of confusion as is the social arrogance and greed of the powerful. In addition to many other errors about the virtues of the poor Marxism, in Niebuhr's opinion, gives no thought "to the fact that if they become historically successful they will cease to be poor". (74)

This warning by Niebuhr serves to caution us against any over-easy acceptance of Marxism. Whilst we contend that Miguel Bonino is right to posit the need for a Christian theology of historical engagement to adopt secular political and ideological mediations, we believe Niebuhr's point needs to be considered in assessing the suitability of the Marxist analysis.

The work of Reinhold Niebuhr serves to highlight a further aspect which needs to be taken into account in any theology of liberation. This is the occurrence of what Niebuhr calls the irony of history. By irony he means those "apparently fortuitous incongruities in life which are discovered upon closer examination to be not merely fortuitous". (75) This happens when a hidden relation is discovered in the incongruity, as for example when "strength becomes weakness because of the vanity to which strength may prompt the mighty man or nation". (76)
In the context of a theology which seeks to reflect upon man's effort to become the subject of his own history it seems right to point out that human design frequently fails to achieve its objectives in the field of historical action. Successive regimes, particularly on the continent of Europe for example have set out in the past two centuries to dominate the world. They have finished in failure, and have become subject to other powers. Examples could be multiplied. The ancient prophets of Israel perceived this element in history and warned the powerful nations against the dangers of pretension. They affirmed that "every human achievement avails itself of, but also obscures, forces of destiny beyond human contrivance". (77)

There are two intervening factors. One is the capriciousness of the human nature which seeks unaided to control history, frequently in defiance of God's sovereign rule. The other is the fact of divine judgment. Together these operate to bring about such unexpected results that the enterprise of deliberately setting out to create history may seem to be a somewhat fatuous exercise. Speaking of this unpredictability of history, Butterfield has referred to "what a live thing history is, and how wilfully it may break away from the railway lines which the prophets and pedants may have set for it". (78) It seems to us that this sounds a much-needed note of warning which should be an integral part of any theology of historical engagement.

Miguez Bonino, we believe, is aware of the danger of overweening pretentiousness because his references to judgment seem to indicate an awareness that any state of affairs which might arise from the liberation enterprise will only be provisional. Nevertheless his willingness (which is particularly marked in Christians and Marxists) to co-operate with Marxism at the level of a revolutionary praxis needs to be tempered with this caution.
The allowance which he makes for moral ambiguity in history needs to be matched by a reserve with regard to the actual achievement of ends. Finally the Kingdom is God's and only our efforts to create a more just society are, as Bonhoeffer has reminded us, merely the preparation of the way. But that way is the way of the Lord and it is not our way to him but his way to us.

4. **TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT**

We have now come to the stage where we are able to summarize the significant points which our study of Miguez Bonino's theology has produced.

1. The essential biblical foundation for a theology of historical engagement is the theme of the Kingdom of God. As a central biblical affirmation this ensures the specifically Christian identity of such a theology. At the same time the rule of God which the message of the Kingdom proclaims is a reality only when it is understood as united with the reality of the world. This unity constitutes a christologically-based understanding of the locus of God's action and assures the relevance of theological reflection to the contemporary issues in the life of mankind. Conventional interpretations of the meaning of the Kingdom of God need to be re-examined and reformulated in order to assign due significance to the importance of human activity in history.

2. Because God's rule is exercised in the life and affairs of men, universal world history is the arena of his activity. Whilst the
process of history is extremely complex it is nevertheless a unity in which the Kingdom of God can be both discerned and acted upon by men. The separation of history into sacred and profane sections constitutes a false dichotomy and excludes God's action from a large part of human affairs. Consequently the Kingdom has to be recognized and responded to in the totality of man's political, social, economic, cultural, religious and intellectual activity.

3. The response which the Kingdom requires on the part of man is repentance in the sense of active involvement and obedient participation in the process of change. The proper perspective for theological reflection is only attained by engagement in the issues and struggles of the historical process. The Kingdom therefore constitutes a mission for men to fulfil rather than a substitute for their concrete action.

4. The Kingdom not only requires present historical engagement, it affords the assurance that, however temporary or provisional the work of man might prove to be it is nevertheless guaranteed permanent significance in the fulfilment and consummation of the Kingdom which is yet to come. This eschatological hope is not merely a concession to compensate for present suffering. It is an affirmation of and witness to the presence in man's human struggles of God's Kingdom which has already begun in Christ and is at work in his followers and his world. It points to the ultimate victory of God's rule in the affairs of men and of his love for them.
5. The Kingdom of God is able to serve as a theological reference-point which includes within its range of concerns the need for personal fulfilment as well as corporate salvation. The infinite worth of the individual in the New Testament witness is largely negated in Marxist praxis and neglected in much of the liberation theology so far published. Whilst a theology of historical engagement will seek to avoid the excessive individualism and subjectivism so characteristic of evangelical pietism it will nevertheless strive to give due significance to the hopes, aspirations and worth of the individual.

6. Whilst historical action is to be assigned a greater role than hitherto, a full understanding of the Kingdom will also keep in view the relativity of all human endeavour. Overemphasis on divine initiative in some past interpretations may have led to political passivity but a true perspective will maintain the distinction between the absoluteness of the ultimate and the relativity of the penultimate. Here again the Christian emphasis will be seen as a ready corrective to Marxist distortions.

7. For Christian commitment to be articulated amidst political realities a choice must be made between the available options and mediations. If the fanaticism of Thomas Müntzer and his followers is to be avoided the autonomy of secular political movements has to be recognized and allowed for. One of these mediations will be the determination of the ethical criteria which an interpretation of the Kingdom of God in the biblical record will provide. A further mediation will involve the careful scrutiny of the available analytical tools. Yet another
will be the rigorous application of the ethical criteria to all the available ideological options. The alignment of a Christian commitment to historical action with the possible political alternatives is a risky and hazardous task but there can be no escape from the responsibility to engage in the affairs of the world of men if the Kingdom of God is to be the supreme reality in that world.
Liberation Theology and Southern Africa

The relevance of Latin American liberation theology to the situation in Southern Africa is easy to understand, given the striking similarities between the two areas. Both have economies that are directly related to and are dependent on the two North Atlantic foci of industrial activity and wealth, viz. the United States and Western Europe. (1)

Southern Africa furthermore has, like Latin America, a capitalistic economic system, usually referred to as "free enterprise" by its advocates. There is a concomitant disparity in income with the average for whites being several times that for blacks, and the economic differences are almost universally coterminous with ethnic and colour distinctions.

For blacks poverty is accompanied by inferior education, unemployment, lack of job opportunities, inadequate professional and technical training, poor housing, migrant labour, health deficiencies caused by malnutrition, and the disruption of family life.

The attendant inequality in the distribution of power evidenced in Latin America is repeated here. The conclusion to which the Economics Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society came reads like an extract from an introduction to Latin American liberation theology:

"During its deliberations, the Commission saw increasingly clearly that distribution of wealth within a society becomes synonymous with distribution of power. It is the powerlessness of the poor that perpetuates their poverty and alienates them from the hopes and drives of that society. On the other hand, the economically secure are suspicious of the aspirations of the insecure, and so become repressive and resistant to change. This link between power and wealth is at the very heart of the matter. It also makes it imperative that Christian thinking should concern itself with economics. For although Christian thinking cannot be said to have any specific economic insights, it must and does concern itself with how a man is treated. If there is material inequality
within the economic sphere, there will also be inequality in the power of the poor to put things right. There are many such inequalities within the Republic, reflecting the great gulf which exists between the rich and powerful and the poor and impotent, between white and black." (2)

Thus the black man in Southern Africa has experienced the oppression which the poor worker in Latin America has known. Added to it, however, has been the cultural and ethnic factor of having been despised because of the pigmentation of his skin. The consequent state of oppression and exploitation is presupposed in the thinking of all black theologians. Speaking of the origins of black theology one has said "it was not until the turn of the century and after the complete conquest of the blacks by the whites that black consciousness began to loom as a recovery from the frustrations of the said conquest which had deprived him of personality, possessions and status." (3) So the writing of the exponents of black consciousness and black theology are interlaced with the words which denote the same type of experience as their Latin American counterparts - oppression, conquest, slavery, humiliation, hurt and "forced self-denial". (4)

The presence of these conditions in Southern Africa gives rise to the classic Marxist situation in a capitalist society with a small, privileged, affluent minority who have political and economic power, wealth and privilege and a large, relatively powerless, underprivileged and poor majority with all the features of the traditional class struggle depicted by Marx in the Manifesto. (5) However, added to this is the nationalistic and ethnic component which, except in a few rare instances, exacerbates and reinforces the socio-economic and political cleavages, and which is used as a further excuse for the oppression, exploitation and dehumanization which we have described.

The religion brought to the black community by missionaries has largely been
characterized by otherworldliness, pietism, and escapism. In this situation says Boesak, "people went to church and thoroughly enjoyed being beaten to pulp for their sins; or they went there waiting to be swooned right into heaven away from the horrendous reality of our way of life which we cannot face". (6)

Religion in this society fulfils the worst features of the Marxist jibe that it is an 'opiate' of the people. It is clear that the call by liberation theology for historical action is likely to find ready ears amongst a people who become ever more aware of their oppression with each passing day, and who are beginning to question the intentions of those who have proffered them a faith which was inclined to inure them to their unhappy lot. Indeed some are now claiming that the Christian church is one of the main instruments of oppression. (7) Such an attitude is born of a religious faith which has failed to relate its central thrust to the historical situation. A people who have thus imbibed part of the Christian faith are becoming aware of the inadequacy of the springs from which they have drunk. This awareness is giving way to a rising black consciousness which promises to awaken its devotees to the possibilities of historical and in some instances even, revolutionary consciousness. The indications of this come from the black consciousness movements which have grown rapidly during the nineteen-seventies; the student uprisings in 1976 and the subsequent spasmodic school, university and college boycotts; the mounting incidence of what the authorities refer to as "urban terrorism"; the escalating border conflict; the growth of black theology and other academic "support-systems" for the black consciousness movements; the willingness on the part of many to participate in Marxist-related political and military activity (witness the student refugees who have linked up with black nationalist armies of
liberation in the countries adjacent to the Republic of South Africa); as well as the accession to power in some territories of pro-Marxist governments. In addition the continuing incidence of labour unrest in the form of strike action points to a developing consciousness on the part of the South African "proletariat" of its need to assume responsibility for its historical destiny. There is thus developing a revolutionary praxis for which black theology is seeking to provide a theological reflecting process in its emphasis both on ethnicity and liberation.

The theme of liberation was espoused in Latin America for two reasons: "it formed a direct contrast to the concept of dependence, and it had a long historical usage in biblical and Church tradition as a synonym for salvation". 

Whilst the economic phase designated as "development" in Latin America has not applied to Southern African blacks, the need for self-assertion and self-affirmation has been paramount, and this connotation is inherent in the concept of liberation. The overriding awareness has been, and is, not so much the economic factor, as in Latin America, but the ethnic distinctions. These have been particularly emphasized in the post World War II era since the policies of "apartheid" and "separate development" have been adopted by the ruling White governments, particularly in the Republic of South Africa, but also in Zimbabwe and Namibia. What has applied in terms of oppression and subjugation to the Latin American working classes has applied to the black masses of Southern Africa, with the additional highly emotional factor of race to increase and reinforce those distinctions and control mechanisms. Not only has the white man been economically better off, he has considered himself superior because of his skin colour and has accordingly treated his black fellow-countryman with contempt.

It is thus understandable that in "doing theology" in his situation the
black theologian of Southern Africa should have opted for a black theology related solely to socio-economic realities such as his Latin American counterpart has chosen. For the black theologian, it is his situation of suffering that is determinative of his experience, and which is therefore the formative influence in his theological reflection. This is because, as Gqubule has said, "... 'black' in South Africa means far more than mere appearance. It speaks of the whole history of domination, oppression, privation, disenfranchisement and discrimination by the Whites." (9)

Religious sentiment amongst the whites has been largely influenced by the traditions from which the two main language groups originated. The English-speaking churches brought with them a religion that was "individualistic and characterized by either the lukewarm apathy or enthusiastic piety so well described or caricatured in the novels of George Elliot." (10) This has developed all the dualistic features of the idealism so strongly condemned by Miguez Bonino.

The Afrikaans-speaking tradition was, on the other hand, very strongly influenced by the Reformed teachings of Calvinism. In dialogue with the historical events in South Africa it led to the growth of an Afrikaner "civil religion" with a strong sense of historical commission and destiny which has continued and grown down to the present day. This has taken place also under the impact of the teachings of Abraham Kuyper with its emphasis on the sovereignty of spheres which we referred to in chapter three. The effect of this concept was to give theological validation to the social and political segregation of the races that was developing as a result of the historical events in the Southern African sub-continent.

Clearly Miguez Bonino's theology of historical engagement has pertinent things to say within the Southern African context. His emphasis on the unity of history is a necessary corrective to the dualism which is prevalent in much Christian thinking in South Africa. If the majority
of Christians are to become the subjects of their own history then a theology which stresses the indissoluble unity of political and spiritual issues is vital.

Miguez Bonino's concept of the Kingdom of God is helpful in this regard. It tells us that history, which in this part of the globe means the history of Afrikaner, English, Asiatic, black and brown alike, is one complex process in which there is interaction between the sovereign Lord of that history and all the people of this sub-continent. It underlines furthermore that in this history God meets us, calls us, judges, redeems and liberates us, whether that liberation be from oppression for black or from fear, prejudice, and self-interested domination in the white.

Miguez Bonino, furthermore, reminds us that any theology that is to be relevant must teach that our participation in historical events is to be understood as shot through with eschatological hope. The future reference of the Kingdom in Southern Africa implies a commitment to meaningful change so that political structures, economic forces and social relations will approximate more closely to the biblical shalom. In this regard de Gruchy's claim is pertinent when he says, "A 'sacred history of liberation' with paradigmatic characters and events is developing and it is enabling Blacks to respond to present events and live in anticipation of a better future." (11) It is our contention, however, that all Christians need to be engaged in the process of repentance and re-creation so that the correlation between the ultimate and the penultimate is actualized and concretized in this context.

Miguez Bonino also sets out some useful guidelines in his reflections on ideology and mediations. Clearly the ideological conflict in Southern Africa is more complex than it is in Latin America. But equally clearly our study has shown the cruciality of ideological
issues. It has also shown the relevance of economic factors and the need to utilise informed and in-depth social analysis if theological reflection is to become an effective component in historical engagement. This means for one thing that the pre-occupation with the ideology of nationalism and ethnicity will need to be harmonized with and related to an analysis of the economic realities and dynamics present in the region. It seems to us therefore that more reflection in the vein of Linden's study on Zimbabwe to which we referred in our introduction is necessary and will valuable contributions to the theological debate. (12)

Miguez Bonino's work, and the relevance to it of Berger's suggestions also point to the need for the application of ethical criteria to ideologies. If the capitalist and Marxist options available in Latin America need to be carefully scrutinized in the way we have indicated then so do the ethnic and nationalist ideologies of Southern Africa. A critique of these, utilizing Berger's "calculus of pain" and "calculus of meaning", for example, would yield useful and suggestive insights for theological reflection.

Above all, Miguez Bonino's insistence that Christian love, to be effective, has to utilize some ideological and political programme, is salutary and apposite. The tensions experienced in those South African churches which have large memberships in both black and white communities have highlighted the problems involved in ideological commitment. They have also revealed the impossibility of ideological neutrality, and Miguez Bonino's concept of mediations provides a rationale for the articulation of the Kingdom love so essential in the crisis of Southern Africa's turmoil and tribulation.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION.


(3) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), p.132 ff. (Subsequently referred to in these notes as "Doing Theology").

(4) R. Gibellini (Ed.), Frontiers of Theology in Latin America (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1979), p.260 ff. (Subsequently referred to in these notes as "Historical Praxis").

CHAPTER ONE.


(4) For a fuller description of these circumstances see J. Eagleson (Ed.) Christians and Socialism: Documentation of Christians for Socialism Movement in Latin America (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1978), p.63. See also the description by H. Camara of the conditions in North-East Brazil in Church and Colonialism (London: Sheed & Ward, 1969), p.138. In addition to these impressionistic descriptions Miguel Bonino has set out a useful summary of statistics drawn from a United Nations report compiled in 1952. See Doing Theology, p.22-23. Despite these generalized pictures, note should be taken of the fact that conditions vary greatly between different countries. The per capita income of Argentinians is eight times that of Bolivians. In Argentina the illiteracy rate is eight per cent whilst in Bolivia it is eight five per cent. See P. Hebblethwaite: The Christian-Marxist Dialogue and Beyond, p.39.

(5) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p.5.


(7) Ibid., p.15.

(9) Ibid. Miguez Bonino cites a compelling statistic to substantiate the claim that "the north" is exploiting Latin America. "Most of the extractive industries in Latin America are owned or controlled by foreign corporate investment, a considerable portion of the profits being taken out of the various countries... (American investment in L.A. between 1950 - 65 adds up to 3.8 billion dollars; benefits transferred to U.S.A. in that period 11.3 billion; deducting foreign aid in that period there is a net 5 billion dollars favourable to U.S.A....") (Doing Theology, p23)


(11) J. Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, p29


(13) Ibid.


(15) J. Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, p31

(16) Ibid.


(18) G. Gutierrez "Evangalio y Praxis de Liberacion" in Mission Abierta (Madrid, 1972) pp 455-456. Quoted in J. Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, p42. Miguez Bonino cites a number of features, people and events that have been highlights of the movement. These include: the life and work of the revolutionary priest Carmilo Torres, the work and prophetic witness of Bishop Helder Camara, the "Priests for the Third World" movement in Argentina, the ONIS organisation in Peru, ISAL ("Church and Society in Latin America") as a Protestant group, the Medellin Conference of Catholic Bishops in 1968 which opted for a decidedly socialist analysis of the Latin American situation and gave a certain respectability to the liberation theology
in Catholicism, and the "Christians for Socialism" convention at Santiago in 1972.


(20) Ibid. (21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid., p262 (23) Ibid.


(27) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p91.

(28) See below p 213.


(30) A balanced perspective of the concept of liberation as an all-embracing category, and not merely a socio-political project is provided by Leonardo Boff when he says "Today the main scene of liberation is the socio-political realm because it is there that we most keenly feel the stings of alienation and sin, of oppression and the lack of freedom. It is certainly true that the liberation of Christ and God is something more than just socio-political liberation. Any authentic theology therefore, will be marked by two aspects. On the one hand it will be very concrete because it will see just economic and political measures as the contemporary mediations of Jesus Christ's salvation for our own day. On the other hand it will ever remain open for something more because liberation embraces more than the political and economic dimensions. Liberation goes further. It is all-inclusive and universal. Its main components are liberation from everything that vitiates human effort (i.e. sin) and the conquest of death". ("Christ's Liberation Via Oppression", Frontiers of Theology in Latin America, p128.)


(33) "Historical Praxis" p263. For an example of such historical study
cf. E. Dussel, History and the Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1976) See "Five Theses" p199 where Miguez Bonino gives a brief description of the way this theological project is taking shape. He refers to the biblical work of Miranda and also Vidales who "is working in the synoptic gospels, trying to overcome an idealistic interpretation of the message of Jesus by relating this message to the economic and social conditions of his time" (Ibid.), and to Assmann, Gutiérrez, Segundo, Alves and De Santa Ana in the area of systematic interpretation.

(34) "Historical Praxis", p266.

(35) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p133.


(38) Ibid., p136.

(39) From entrenched positions where both sides hurled verbal abuse and anthems at each other a "thaw" took place around the mid-fifties which led first to discussion and then to dialogue. The outcome was a recognition by both sides of the validity of some positions held by their respective opponents and the acceptance of certain criticisms. Works appeared under the names of some Marxist thinkers indicating an appreciation of positive elements in Christianity. These included Ernest Bloch, Roger Garaudy and Milan Machovce who all made significant contributions from the Marxist side. (See especially E. Bloch, Man on His Own (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), R. Garaudy, From Anathema to Dialogue; The Alternative Future; M. Machovec, A Marxist Looks at Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976). The responses from the Christian perspective come from Moltmann, Metz, Rahner, Lochmann and the liberation theology movement. The most significant features of the Christian response for the usefulness of this present study are: the significance of human initiative, the correlation between praxis and theory (both of which we have already noted), the importance of economic factors in the context of the total dynamics of society, the passion for social justice, and the underlining of the complexity of structural evil.

(40) J.A. Kirk, Liberation Theology, p160.

(41) Ibid.


(43) Ibid.
(44) Christians and Marxists, p17.


(47) Ibid.

(48) Ibid.

(49) J. Miguez Bonino, "Marxist Critical Tools: Are They Helpful?" Unpublished paper, p1. (This paper was not revised for publication and the present writer has therefore made occasional grammatical and linguistic amendments in citing from the original).

(50) Ibid., p2.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Ibid.

(53) Ibid., p3. Miguez Bonino goes on to give another example in which J. Jeremias, in commenting on the parable of the rich man and Lazarus concludes "Jesus does not intend to take a position in the question of rich and poor". (Idem)

(54) Ibid., p4

(55) Ibid.

(56) Ibid., p5.

(57) Ibid.

(58) Ibid., p6

(59) Ibid.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Ibid., p7.

(62) Ibid.

(63) Ibid., p8. Marx set out his understanding of knowledge as praxis in his Theses on Feuerbach. The second of these serves as a useful summary of his ideas. "2. The question whether human thinking can reach objective truth - is not a question of theory but a practical actuality or non-actuality of thinking - thinking isolated from practice - is purely scholastic question." Writings of the Young Marx, pp400-402. Cf. also the following appraisal by Gutierrez: "Knowledge of reality that does not lead to a modification of it is really an unverified interpretation, an interpretation that is not transformed into truth...Marx starts from that perspective to lay the epistemological bases of his own contribution to a scientific understanding of history. Historical reality, thus ceases to be the field for the application of abstract truths and idealistic interpretations: instead it becomes the privileged locale from which it eventually returns." "Liberation Praxis and Christian Faith", Frontiers of Theology, p19.
(64) Ibid., p9. (65) Ibid., p10.

(66) Ibid., p11.

(67) Ibid. See also the chapter on "Hermeneutics, Truth and Praxis", Doing Theology, p86 ff.

(68) K. Marx, Economic and Philosopher Manuscripts of 1844 (Moscow Progress Publishers, 1977), p96-7. (Marx's emphasis)

(69) L. Eoakowski, I p173. Karl Popper's description of Marx would no doubt find an echo in contemporary Latin American thinking. After describing the inhuman working conditions in 19th Century Britain outlined by Marx in Capital he concludes that "his burning protest against these crimes, which were then tolerated, and sometimes even defended, not only by professional economists but also by churchmen, will secure him forever a place among the liberators of mankind". The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p122.

(70) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p70. Cf. also Miguez Bonino's summary of Lucio Gera's exposition of the project of liberation in Latin America. "The Latin American people 'become today intimately aware of their domination and intimately decides their LIBERATION'. Dependence and liberation are not abstract evocations, they mean cultural liberation (breaking away from the liberal-Enlightenment-magisterial culture in order to cultivate a culture of the people), political liberation (from the power of 'the empire' which is at present represented by the U.S.A. and its local oligarchic clientele), and structural liberation (the end of the bourgeois state and the creation of a different shape of society, a socialist one)". Ibid., p67-8.

(71) Cf. G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p159. J. J. Segundo has criticised Gutierrez's use of the Exodus in the sense that he considers it naive to make a direct parallel between the situation of the Israelites in Egypt and that of the oppressed people in present-day Latin America. He claims that a mediating ideology is necessary which "we might regard as the one which would be constructed by a gospel message contemporary with us". (The Liberation of Theology, p117). See the analysis of these positions by S. Mackie in "Praxis as the Context for Interpretation", in Journal of Theology for Southern Africa (No. 24 September 1978), p38-9. Cf. also R. Alves' use of the Exodus as a historical expression of the language of "Messianic humanism". (A Theology of Human Hope, p39)

(72) J. H. Yoder, "Goshen, The Red Sea and Sinai: Does Liberation Come First?" (Unpublished paper), p4. Yoder also alludes to the criticism made by Miguez Bonino who "has asked why it should be so obvious that out of the total Biblical
heritage it should be dominantly or even exclusively the picture of Exodus which becomes illuminating and motivating without equal reference to exile, captivity, cross, the giving of the law, the taking of the land, the scattering of the faithful or other major themes of the Biblical witness." (Ibid. p1).

(73) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p141. Cf. also the description of liberation in a Christian context given by Monika Hellwig. The reference point for the Christian reflection on liberation is the person of Jesus, she claims. "Crucial criteria drawn from this reference point are: first, that true liberation (salvation) is possible for all, not only a few; secondly, that true liberation encompasses the totality of the person; thirdly, that true liberation has an external and an internal dimension (sometimes called the political and mystical dimension among the liberation theologians); and finally, that true liberation is such as to transcend death and all other possible disasters." "Liberation Theology: an Emerging School", p149.

(74) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p71
(75) Ibid., p109. (76) Ibid., p112
(77) Ibid., p119 (78) Ibid., p120.
(83) Ibid., (84) Ibid., p40.
(85) G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p207. Here Gutierrez refers to Christ as "the Lord of history, the liberator of the oppressed". On p68 he says, "The Latin American by participating in his own liberation, gradually is taking hold of the reins of his historical initiative and perceiving himself as master of his own destiny". The inconsistency has been pointed out by A. Fierro, The Militant Gospel (London: S.C.M. Press, 1977), p326.

(86) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p138.
(87) J. Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p108.
(88) J. Andrew Kirk, "Marxism and the Church in Latin America", Missionalia (Vol. 6, No. 2, August 1978), p33
(90) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p163
(91) Ibid., p166.
(92) Ibid., p169. Here we see Miguez Bonino's use of Bonhoeffer's distinction between the ultimate and the penultimate, to which we shall refer later.

(93) J. Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p125.

(94) This theme is developed in R. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), passim.

(95) J. Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p123.

(96) Ibid. 

(97) Ibid., p124.

(98) Ibid.

(99) Ibid., p130.

(100) Ibid.

(101) Ibid., p131.

(102) Ibid., p132.

(103) Ibid., p119.


CHAPTER TWO.

(1) J. Míguez Bonino, "Historical Praxis, p271. (Míguez Bonino's own emphasis)

(2) G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p153.

(3) One of the best-known expositions of this theme is contemporary times has been that of O. Cullmann, Christ and Time (London: S.C.M. Press, 1951, 1962), and Salvation in History (London: S.C.M. Press, 1967). Cf. the statement by Cullman in Salvation in History, p309 "The Bible shows us how even in pre-Christian times lines lead from secular history to salvation history. Christian faith sees Christ's lordship over the world as already having begun, and from this faith much closer relationships between general history and salvation history may be drawn".

(4) M. Hellwig, "Liberation Theology: An Emerging School", p 141.

(5) G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p175. Cf. also the claim by J.P. Miranda that "the decisive step in human liberation was taken by the biblical authors when they intuited that evil consisted in an organic and cohesive totality, that sin had a unity, that it was structured into civilization and therefore had gained control of the very essence of the law". Marx and the Bible (London: S.C.N. Press, 1977), p250. See the description by R.H.Brown, Theology in a New Key, p69, of "systemic evil".

(6) G. Gutierrez, ibid., pp177-3.

(7) Ibid., pp165-6. Note should be taken, however, of A. Fierro's criticism that Gutierrez "shadowboxes" with a "phantom" by taking to task the dualistic theology of the 1920's, and virtually ignores the more contemporary theologies of Bultmann and Robinson (The Militant Gospel, (London; S.C.M. Press, 1977, p343).

(8) R.C.Cross and A.D.Woolley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (London: MacMillan, 1964), pp178-9, where the authors point out that the misleading translation "idea" is a direct transliteration from the Greek eidos or idea (which Plato uses interchangeably). They prefer to use the word "forms", since Plato conceives of them, not in a subjective way (as "ideas in the head") but as objective realities, the perfect ideal type, visible shape or nature of what is being symbolized in any particular word or term. Nevertheless, in common with general usage, we retain the use of the word "idea" in our text.

(9) A further example of Plato's dualism can be seen in the following passage where he says "a man whose thoughts are fixed on true reality has no leisure to look downwards on the affairs of men, to take part in their quarrels, and to catch the infection of their jealousies and hates. He contemplates a world of unchanging and harmonious order, where reason governs and nothing can do or suffer wrong; and, like one who imitates an admired companion, he cannot fail to fashion himself in its likeness. So the philosopher, in constant companionship with the divine order of the world, will reproduce that order in his soul and, so far as man may, become Godlike;
though here, as everywhere, there will be scope for detraction$. Republic VI, Trans. F.C. Cornford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941), p. 204.

(10) K. Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 7 refers to Herodotus' approach to history: "The temporal scheme of Herodotus' narrative...like all Greek conception of time, is periodic, moving within a cycle. In the view of Herodotus, history shows a repetitive pattern, regulated by a cosmic law of compensation mainly through nemesis, which time and again restores the equilibrium of the historical-natural forces".


(12) Born and brought up in North Africa, Augustine was in contact with the Donatist movement which flourished there in the early decades of the fourth century. Donatism rejected the concept of Christendom which had arisen following the decrees of Constantine in 312. Donatists further rejected the claims of the Catholic Church and declared that they themselves were the true church and heirs of the martyrs. Augustine wrote twelve volumes to refute the Donatist heresy.


(15) Ibid., p. 96. Cf. C.N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), where Augustine's thought is seen as a correction of Plato: "For Augustine the failure of Platonism was the failure of what he generously acknowledged to be by far the most vital and tenacious of the philosophic heresies. In his eyes, therefore, that failure was catastrophic, as making the utter bankruptcy of classical reason".


(20) Ibid., p. 593. (21) Ibid., p. 596.


(26) "Temporal authority was not instituted by God to break the peace and to initiate war, but to keep the peace and repress the fighters. As Paul says in Romans 13, the office of the sword is to protect and to punish, to protect the good in peace and to punish the wicked with war". Luther, Works of Martin Luther, Philadelphia Edition. Quoted in H. Thielicke, Theological Ethics I (London: A and C. Black, 1968), p361. Cf. P. Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972) p48 where the point is made that Luther "says that secular government was already present in paradise and that it was instituted from the beginning of creation". Althaus is able to conclude in a footnote, "Luther thus recognizes that at least some elements of secular government were present before the fall". (n.31)

(27) Cf. P. Althaus, Ibid., p49 for an analysis of Luther's usage of the phrases "the world" and "the secular" and where the point is made that Luther developed a clever distinction between the terms "government" and "Kingdom" in the course of time.


(29) Luther's Works, 45: 91, 99. (Althaus, ibid., p54 n.53)

(30) Ibid., 44: 93.

(31) P. Althaus (ibid., p67) lists a number of further ways in which Luther describes this duality of roles.

(32) H. Thielicke, ibid., pp373-3. Miguez Bonino's treatment of the Pauline themes of "resurrection" and "works" (Doing Theology, p141) as we will see in our next chapter, is an attempt to explain both the continuity and discontinuity, between the "present age" and the "new age". He concludes that "history arrives at the Kingdom through suffering, conflict, and judgment. But the Kingdom redeems, transforms, and perfects the 'corporeality' of history...." (ibid., p142).


(34) Ibid., p565. It is worth noting at this point that Karl Barth attributes the "fatal ethical dualism" to Luther's definition of the relationship between law and gospel, and sees a direct connection between Luther's dualism and the rise of National Socialism and "German paganism" Eine Schweizer Stimme, 1938-1945 (Zollikon-Zurich, 1945), p113. Quoted in H. Thielicke, Ibid., Vol. 1 p368.

(35) It is instructive to trace the origins of the word providence in its Latin antecedent providentia, for here ready to hand was a concept with a honourable lineage. "Providentia begins by being the power of the Gods which takes thought for the state and it acts either directly or through agents; Cicero, for example, saved the state at the time of the Catilinarian conspiracy through his Providentia (among other things), but that Providentia was due partly to his own cleverness and partly
to the inspiration of the gods. In the same way Providence was responsible for the emergence of Augustus, bringing back peace and government. From this time onwards Providentia appears in 'private' and imperial inscriptions, on coins and in all the literature relating to the Empire. But it gathers to itself certain main connotations. It includes, most obviously, the care of the ruler, as for example, Trojan, for his subjects, as expressed in works-roads, buildings, corn-supply, security of frontiers, provision for orphans; children, the prosperity of agriculture and so on; but it includes also the capacity for warding off conspiracy and insurrection and for planning the 'succession'. This last foresight at first meant planning the dynastic succession; but when the elective principle, by which one Emperor chose or nominated his successor, replaced the dynastic principle, Providentia, signified the wise choice of successor. Into this wise choice there entered also Providentia of the gods who inspired the selection; and so the ruler owed his rule to the divine planning and was therefore the agent of the gods'. R.H. Barrow, Introduction to St. Augustine, The City of God (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1950), p234.

The object of this Providentia was to secure the welfare and therefore the perpetuity of the Roman state. It carried with it the notion that there was a providence governing the affairs of the Romans and that the Emperor derived his authority and mission from a divine source. It required little imagination for Augustine to marry these ideas to the needs of a Christian philosophy of history and to see the similarities between the classical concept and the Biblical theme.

(36) R.H. Barrow, Ibid., p164.

(37) "If on the other hand, they suppose that the soul has always alternated between felicity and misery throughout the infinity of past ages, but from now onwards, after its liberation, it will not return to a state of misery, they still lose the argument. They are saying that the soul was never truly happy in the past, but then begins to enjoy a kind of novel and genuine felicity, which is to admit that the soul has a new experience, something which had never before happened to it in all its eternity; and this new experience is something of remarkable importance" (Augustine, D.C.D. p453.) In referring to the cruciality of the saving events he asserts: "For Christ died once for all for our sins; and in rising from the dead he is never to die again; he is no longer under the sway of death. And after the resurrection we shall be with the Lord for ever". (Ibid., pp488-9).

(38) R.H. Barrow, Ibid., p162.


(40) "Let us go on to examine for what moral qualities and for what reason the true God deigned to help the Romans in the extension of their empire; for in his control are all the kingdoms of the earth". (Augustine, D.C.D. p196) "The kingdoms of the East had enjoyed renown for a long time, when God decided that a Western empire should arise, later in time, but more renowned for the extent and grandeur of its dominions" (Ibid., p201)
H. Butterfield, Christianity and History (London: Collins, Fontana Series, 1957), p124. In his treatment of this theme Karl Barth has disclaimed the possibility of any absolute account or description being given to the relationship between divine sovereignty and creaturely activity. He uses four metaphors to indicate it—those of the servant, the instrument, the theatre and the mirror. (K. Barth, ibid., p40-51). Of these it is perhaps significant that only the first involves a human, conscious agent. The others fail to give due weight to the freedom and humanity of the creature, whom Barth is trying to designate.

Augustine, D.C.D. Book XVIII. 47. "It was foretold to the saints of old that He would come in the flesh in just such manner as it was told to us that he had come in order that through one and the same faith granted to us through Christ all who are destined for the city of God, for God's house and God's temple, may be led towards God". (Quoted in R.H. Barrow, Introduction, p42). Cf. K. Lowith, Meaning in History, p170. "If seen with the eyes of faith, however, the whole historical process of sacred and secular history appears as a preordained ordinatio Dei".


"Predestination is more than a special example of the general divine government of the world. (It) is rather the presupposition, and its fulfilment in history the constitutive centre, of God's overruling, and the basic and goal of its realisation. In predestination we certainly have to do with the creature under God's lordship, but with the creature i.e. man, as the object of the original, central, and personal intention of God, with man as the partner in the covenant of grace made by God in and with creation. In providence, on the contrary we have to do with the creature as such and in general; with God's active relation to the reality created by and therefore distinct from Himself". (K. Barth, ibid., p4).

"Now some people have assumed...that the first resurrection will be a bodily resurrection. They have been particularly excited, among other reasons, by the actual number of a thousand years.... I also entertained this notion at one time. But in fact those people assert that those who have risen again will spend their rest in the most unrestrained material feasts, in which there will be so much to eat and drink that not only will those supplies keep within no bounds of moderation but will also exceed the limits of incredibility. But this can only be believed by materialists; and those with spiritual interest give the name 'Chiliasts' to the believers in this picture, a term which we can translate by a word derived from the equivalent Latin, 'millenarians'". (Augustine, D.C.D., pp906-7). For Augustine the millennium is to be understood as the church fulfilling its mission here on earth and it has thus begun already. (Ibid., p914-5).

Ibid., pp1086-7.


(49) For Calvin, the eschatological emphasis also lay in the bliss of heavenly joys: "When it comes to a comparison with the life to come, the present life cannot only be safely neglected but, compared to the former, must be utterly despised and loathed. For if heaven is our homeland, what else is the earth but our place of exile? If departure from the world is entry into life what else is the world but a sepulcher? And what else is it for us to remain in life but to be immersed into perfect freedom what else is the body but a prison? If to enjoy the presence of God is the summit of happiness, is not to be without this, misery? But until we leave the world 'we are away from the Lord'". (Institutes, Book III, IX:4). The idea that the body was a prison, from which the soul was released at death, of course, a feature of Platonic thought. Calvin held that, by looking to heaven, believers could endure the sight of "wicked men flourishing in wealth and honours" even when these exploit them for their own selfish ends, "For before their eyes will be that day when the Lord will receive his faithful people into the peace of his Kingdom, 'will wipe away every tear from their eyes' (Rev. 7:17) (Isa. 25:8), will clothe them with a robe of glory...and rejoicing (Eccles. 6:31 EV) will feed them with the unspeakable sweetness of his delights, will elevate them to his sublime fellowship - in fine will deign to make them sharers in his happiness". (Institutes, Bk. III, IX-6).

(50) L. Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind, p184.


(52) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p138.

(53) L. Gilkey, ibid., pp33-4.

(54) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p134.

(55) Amos: 7:15.

(56) Jer. 1:4 ff.

(57) Isa. 6:8.

(58) II Kings 5: 1 ff.

(59) Isa. 45:1.

(60) e.g. Jer. 5: 27-28.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Ibid., p135. Cf. A.A. Van Ruler, The Christian Church and the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), p91. "the quintessence is to be found in politics in the broadest sense of the term: the state, social and economic life, culture - in a word, the sanctification of the earth".

(64) Ibid., p87

(65) Isa. 9:7

(66) Jer. 1:10.

(67) Amos, 7:10, Jer. 20: 1 ff.


(69) Ibid., p113.

(70) Ibid., p115.

(71) Ibid., p118.

(72) H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p104.

(73) A. J. Heschel, ibid., p181.

(74) Ez. 11:19.

(75) Isa. 11:6.

(76) Isa. 11:9.

(77) "The death of Socrates compelled Plato to repudiate a world in which so just a man could be so undeservedly condemned, and it made him seek another world of goodness and beauty, in which the unjust condemnation of the holy man was impossible. This motif recurs everywhere in the ancient world, the pagan as well as the Hebrew". (N. Berdyaev, The Meaning of History (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1936), p102.


(79) Ex. 3:14 (Including R.S.V. footnote).


(81) A. J. Heschel, Ibid., p181, Cf. A. A. Van Ruler, ibid., p38. "This movement towards fulfilment is not controlled by an unalterable plan. God allows free course to the history. Even before his words are fulfilled, and irrespective of whether they can later be fulfilled, they create a sphere of freedom in which there is room for repentance and conversion for faith and obedience".


(83) J. Moltmann, ibid., p130.
(86) Ibid.
(88) Doing Theology, p135.
(89) A.A.Van Ruler, ibid., p42.
(91) In Ephesians for example, it is seen as the "uniting of all things in Christ" (Eph. 1:10), and as late as the pastorals the Parousia is still expected (Titus 2:13).
(92) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p136.
(93) A.A.Van Ruler, ibid., p88.
(94) Ibid.
(97) C.H.Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (Glasgow: Collins Fount, 1961)
(101) R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1957), p152. Bultmann goes on to quote approvingly Erich Frank when he says: "to the Christians the advent of Christ was not an event in that temporal process we mean by history today. It was an event in the history of salvation, in which the realm of eternity, an eschatological moment in which rather this profane history of the world came to its end. And in an analogous way, history comes to its end in the religious experience of any Christian 'who is in Christ'. In his faith he is already above time and history". (The Role of History in Christian Thought, pp74-75. Quoted in R. Bultmann, ibid., p120.)
(102) J. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p316.
(103) The major problem Bultmann sought to contend with was the difficulty arising from the application of the historical method to the biblical Kerygma. Cf. M.D.Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, p66.

Rowley thought that the major difference between prophecy and apocalyptic was that the prophets still hoped for a future that would arise from the present whilst the apocalyptists despaired of such a development. "That the prophets were not merely preachers of righteousness, but foretellers of the future, is plain to every leader....Similarly the apocalyptists sought to sketch the future, and were confident of their power to do so. The pattern of the prophecies of the prophets and of the apocalyptists differed, however. Speaking generally the prophets foretold the future that should arise out of the present, while the apocalyptists foretold the future that should break into the present. The prophets saw the events and policies of their day with penetrating eye, and perceived their inevitable outcome ... They looked....through the darkness to a brighter dawn in the more distant future and had glimpses of the glory the righteous remnant should inherit, when evil had run its course and consumed itself.

The Apocalyptists had little faith in the present to beget the future. They saw...innocent men suffering direst agonies for their faith, the righteous Remnant in the crucible of affliction, and they looked for a great divine intervention in history in the immediate future". H.H. Rowley, *The Relevance of Apocalyptic* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), pp35-8.

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Rev. 2:4.

Dan. 12:2.

Dan. 7: 9-10.


N. Cohn, ibid., p108.


(117) N. Chm, ibid., p238.

(118) Ibid., p239.


(122) H.J. Goertz, ibid., p110.


(125) The idealism of Descartes was thoroughly dualistic. The world of thought, of mind, was, for him, completely distinct from the world of physical matter. This enabled him to posit a self-contained mechanistic world of matter subject to naturalistic laws which functioned quite independently of the ideas and principles that had always been supposed to affect and govern it. This divorce led to two diverse developments. Science was able to pursue its own course autonomously whilst those who accepted Descartes' proofs of the existence of pure spirit stressed the primacy of thought alone.

(126) Kant emphasized the sovereignty of human reason, pointing out the activity of the mind itself in the acquisition of knowledge. The human mind has a priori conceptions of reality and these fashion what the mind receives from the objective world. For Kant it is the a priori concept that is superior to the object and it is our task to ensure that the latter conforms to the former rather than vice-versa. This means that we have to summon a great effort on the part of the mind to achieve cognitive knowledge. But it is wrong to suppose that any such absolute knowledge is attainable. Kant's is a subjective idealism. It splits the mind of man into two components, one active, the other passive, and likewise divides the world into what is perceived and what
is thought. Kant believes the great purpose of human existence is to master the world by the reason and the will and so achieve a God-like state. In this way essential humanity will be realized. "Kant opens a new chapter in the history of philosophy's attempt to overcome the contingency of human existence, setting up freedom as man's realization and establishing the independence of the autonomous reason and will as the ultimate goal of man's unending pilgrimage towards himself, a self that will then be divine". (L. Kolakowski, I, p50). Here we see emerging the emphasis on human creativity and the need for man's assertion of himself to achieve freedom which Marx was going to develop with such fervour, albeit in a style undreamt of by Kant. The same commitment to praxis reappears in the commitment to historical social change on the part of the liberation theologians. But in Kant it is still idealism - the effort is mental and reality is subjective. We also find a departure from the Augustinian emphasis on divine providence which removed historical initiative from man.

(127) In Fichte's philosophy we find a type of pure idealism. He believed that "Philosophy teaches us to discover everything in the ego; only through the ego can order and harmony be instilled into the inert, formless mass; man by virtue of his existence, is utterly independent of everything outside him and exists absolutely in and through himself, he is eternal, existing by himself and by his own strength". (J.C.Fichte, On the Dignity of Man, 1964, Quoted in L. Kolakowski, I. p50). Man achieves this autonomy by continuous moral effort at self-transcendence. Thus the self becomes absolute and self-consciousness becomes the primary state of Being. For Fichte consciousness itself is action and the world of objects has no independent existence. Thus subjectivity is the point of departure and subject and object become the result of a duality which seeks to find a synthesis in infinite progress. "Since Fichte regarded humanity as unconditional existence, he could...regard it as practical existence, defined basically by an active attitude towards its own world, which possessed a conditional existence in relation to creative subjectivity. In this way he laid the foundation of the interpretation of human history as the self-creation of a species, the meaningful, unidirectional ascent of freedom to self-knowledge". (L. Kolakowski, I.p55). In Fichte's thought we can discern the elements of Marxist pr-ometheanism beginning to emerge - there is the stress on human effort, self-transcendence, and practical creativity. The sense of dependence on God which we find in the Augustinian doctrine of providence is rejected in favour of what to Augustine would have amounted to Pelagianism. With Fichte's transcendental ego reigning sovereign with relation to human life man is at the helm of history.

(128) Schelling occupies a lesser place in the idealist movement but is important because he introduces the idea that in God there is development. God transverses a pathway from the less to the more, from what is partially defective to what is complete and perfect. Schelling submerges both the ego and things in an Absolute which is neither and yet both at once.

The main significance of Schelling's thought is that it provides a stepping stone from Fichte to Hegel. From Fichte's emphasis on human moral exertion and Schelling's identity of Spirit and Nature Hegel moved to the great idea of the contradiction of opposites.
in the evolution to the higher, or the dialectical mode of thinking.


(130) Ibid., p14.

(131) Hegel based his formulation of the dialectical nature of the rational process on the ideas of the classical philosophers and saw his own understanding to be a development from theirs. "In short there are three elements which, according to Hegel, may be said to be essential to dialectic. First, thinking is thinking of something in itself taken by itself. Second, as such it necessarily thinks contradictory determinations simultaneously. Third, the unity of contradictory determinations has, in that these are sublimated in that unity, the proper nature of the self. Hegel is of the opinion that all three of these elements are to be found in the dialectic of the Ancients". H.G. Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p20. The first two of these elements stem from Eleatic philosophy and the third is found in Plato's speculative dialectic. This postulated the contradiction and antithesis of being and non-being, and, in Hegel's view carried the implication that they belong together and entail a higher unity.

(132) Hegel elaborates this concept of dialectic in various applications. He sees it, for example, in the dialectical structure of self-consciousness which he posits in terms of a master-slave relationship. The thesis is self-consciousness and the antithesis is another's self-consciousness. "Self-consciousness is to begin with, simple being-for-itself, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else...What is 'other' for it is an unessential, negatively characterized object. But the 'other' is also a self-consciousness, one individual is confronted by another individual". G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Ed, Miller and Findley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p13. These two individuals, to prove themselves, engage in a life-and-death struggle. The self-consciousness that emerges dominant is the master and the subservient one is the slave. But to be satisfied, the master seeks to be recognised by another man and the slave, because he is a slave he is not truly man. Therefore the master self-consciousness has contradiction inherent within itself. Only the slave consciousness can achieve satisfaction by ceasing to be a slave - but it must have been a slave first "and since there are slaves only where there is a Master, mastery, while itself an impasse, is justified as a necessary stage of historical existence that leads to the absolute science of Hegel. The Master appears only for the sake of engendering the Slave who 'overcomes' (aufhebt) him as Master, while thereby 'overcoming' himself as slave. And this slave who has been 'overcome' is the one who will be satisfied by what he is and will understand that he is satisfied in and by Hegel's philosophy, in and by the Phenomenology. The Master is only the 'catalyst' of History that will be realized, completed and 'revealed' by the slave or the ex-slave who has become a Citizen". (A.Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p47. The synthesis arrived at is thus the citizenship of the slave which, for Hegel means freedom.

(134) Ibid., p34.

(135) E.H. Carr, What is History? (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964) p135. See also S.J. Case, The Christian Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), p67, where she sums up Hegel's view of history, "Reason in its most concrete form is God. God governs the world; the actual working of his government - the carrying out of his plan - is the history of the world".

(136) It was this element in Hegel's dialectic that appealed to Marx. If man experiences alienation through his objectification of the products of his labour in capitalism, he will, Marx claimed, transcend that alienation in bringing communist society into being. Indeed Garaudy has asserted that Marx regarded this as Hegel's outstanding achievement in "that he conceives objective man (true, because real man) as the results of his own labour". (R. Garaudy, From Anathema to Dialogue, p6?).

(137) Cf. A. Prior. Revolution and Philosophy (Cape Town: David Philip, 1972) p31, where the author traces the significance of revolution and alienation in Hegel's thought. In Hegel's earlier thought he welcomes the revolution as the event which would totally replace alienation. He modified this attitude later, but "even in this later position, historical events, be they revolutions, or not, are in constant interplay with the negative and alienating aspects of the age, whence arise development and change. Nowhere in this position is there any clear indication that Hegel opposes revolution and accepts alienation. Rather, from a belief in the power of revolution to remove alienation emerges his ambivalent attitude towards revolution and alienation as necessary historical phenomena because history is the arena where absolute Spirit is dialectically realised as reason and freedom".


(139) K. Marx. Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Basic Writings, p263. See Kolakowski II pp447-458 for an outline of Lenin's debate with the Empiriocritics. Most of Lenin's criticism was derived from Akselrod (Philosophical Essays, 1906). See also the assessment by J.J. Kirk "It would seem that what Marx, perhaps unconsciously for later he dissociated himself from Hegel's dialectical method (cf. Capital Vol. I) took over principally from Hegel was the idea that history would only find the right key. In point of fact Marx comes very close to Hegel's method, substituting the reality of material forces for the irreality of the idea and the reality of the class struggle for the irreality of the conflict of ideas". "The Inherent Failures of Marxism", Missionalia (Pretoria, Vol. 6 No. 3 November 1978), p72.


(143) Ibid., p788-9.

(144) L. Kolakowski, I, p371.

(145) R. Garaudy, From Anathema to Dialogue, p79.

(146) L. Kolakowski, I, p309.

(147) K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto, Basic Writings, p28.

(148) The first five measures proposed in the Manifesto all relate directly or indirectly to this aspect: "1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes. 2. Heavy progressive or graduated income tax. 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. 4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels. 5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly". Basic Writings, p28.

(149) Marx considered that since under capitalism the apparatus of state government was the legalized means whereby the bourgeoisie held the proletariat in subjection this would be no longer necessary. Since class conflict would cease one class could not oppress another and would not need the machinery to do so. Indeed one of the first steps in the revolution would be for the proletariat to destroy the state machine.

(150) With the abolition of private property, Marx held that the source of conflict between individuals would be obliterated. He assumed that there could be an identity between what society willed and what an individual wanted. He further reckoned that the private person could therefore submerge his own interests in those of the collective whole. Marx contended that the new life in communist society would create a new social dimension. Competitiveness would cease and peace would flourish. In terms reminiscent of the Old Testament picture of shalom (Micah Chapter 2) he says: "In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' " K. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme. Basic Writings, p119.

(151) Far from the individuality of a person being lost in the mass and shrinking to a colourless uniformity indistinguishable from his social environment, Marx believed that men would now rise to the level where they can maximize the use of the latent powers within them and achieve true personhood. The great ideal is the utmost actualization of each person, with the expansion and growth both of intellectual and social capacities and thus the larger enrichment of personality. In this way the object of the communal ownership of the productive forces will be a general minimizing of the unnecessarily long working hours. "The surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the condition for the development of general wealth, just as the non-labour
of the new has ceased to be the condition for the development of the general powers of the human brain. With that, production based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct material production process is stripped of the form of penury and antithesis. (it is) the free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them". Grundrisse III, 2 Notebook VII. Quoted in L. Kolakowski I p349.

(152) Marx found the division of labour, with each man assigned to work exclusively on his own speciality a particularly irksome aspect of capitalism. Under communism he would be liberated from this type of bondage, because "in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for one to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic". K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, Basic Writings, p254.

(153) For Marx the goal of history was for man to regain the essential, true humanity he had lost by virtue of his alienation - which alienation had become intolerably severe under the inhuman oppression of capitalism. The object was therefore for man to achieve "the reconciliation of his species - essence with his empirical existence" (Kolakowski). Marx himself articulated this when he said, "Communism as positive overcoming of private property as human self-alienation, and thus as the actual appropriation of the human essence through and for man; therefore as the complete and conscious restoration of man to himself within the total wealth of previous development, the restoration of man as a social, that is, human being. This communism as completed naturalism is humanism, as completed humanism it is naturalism. It is the genuine resolution of the antagonism between man and nature and between man and man; it is the true resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, objectification and self-affirmation, freedom and necessity, individual and species. It is the riddle of history solved and knows itself as this solution". Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 1844 Writings of the Young Marx, p304. In this state liberated man, will still labour - the hunting and fishing notwithstanding - but this labour will no longer be alienated labour, nor will it dehumanize the individual. Rather it will affirm him since it is an object of his own self-creation. In effect, Marx's communism will make the labourer a "shareholder in his own firm" and he will thus see something of himself projected in the product made. This process will therefore be a self-enriching experience. Conducted on a communal basis, the product of the work entailed will become an expression of their joint skills and combined efforts.

(154) The underlying of the future society in Marx's scheme is the humanization of humanity. For this to happen man must regain control of his creative powers and express his self-creativity in and through his personal labour energy. When this happens, man will no longer be estranged from the object of his labour. When as a pro-
laritarian he sees himself as part of the decision-making and history-creating process he will no longer be distanced from the world around him. He will be part of the co-operative of free workers who together possess and utilize the earth's resources, and thus he will no longer be alienated from his fellow men but become a truly social being. Prior expresses the ideal succinctly when he says "Marx envisions men ceasing to utilize each other as objects. Men will relate to each other immediately and not via the objects they produce, the worker will see his product as an extension of himself and his freedom will be reinstated". A. Prior, ibid., p111.

(155) K. Marx, Grundrisse, quoted in D. McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction, p76. It is to be noted further that Marx envisaged a two-stage action by which the communist society was to be established. The first step was the wresting of political power by the proletariat in its revolutionary stage. But then there was the intermediate stage, a period of social transformation. This stage is known as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" a phrase which Marx first employed in 1850 when he said, "This socialism is the declaration of the permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the necessary transit point to the abolition of class differences generally, to the abolition of all the production relations on which they rest, to the abolition of all social relations that correspond to these production relations, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social relations..." K. Marx. The Class Struggles in France. Basic Writings. p317. Marx envisaged man achieving his full self-realization only in the final and ultimate stage of communism, cf. R.C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth, Karl Marx (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p15′, where he clarifies Marx's teaching on this point. "On the basis of this reasoning, Marx defines the communist world revolution as the 'negation of the negation'. Unlike Hegel, however, he holds that the negation of the negation does not immediately spell affirmation. For Hegel the cognitive act by which Spirit negates itself as a finite being yields it the affirmative consciousness of itself as infinite being. For Marx on the other hand, the communist action of world appropriation does not in itself bring man the affirmative consciousness of himself as man. He credits Feuerbach with showing that the destructive process of negation of the negation is not per se an affirmation. And he says that the affirmative stage of human self-negation lies beyond the immediate revolutionary action against private property. Far from being fully human already on the morrow of the great world revolution, man, according to Marx will exist in a temporary state of terrible degradation. The human negation of the negation produces only 'unthinking' or 'raw communism' (der rote Kommunismus) in which man remains, for the moment, more than ever a negation of himself. This is the immediate post-revolutionary transitional stage that Marx later designated as the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat".

A. Fierro considers that "It is Bloch who has perhaps shown most earnestness and sympathy in trying to work out a historical - materialist theory of Christianity that would salvage its legitimate heritage. Bloch pictures Marxism, and Marxist hope in particular, as 'religion in its heritage'. The Militant Gospel, p119.


Ibid. (Bloch's own emphasis)

M.D. Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, p82.

E. Bloch, ibid., p86.

J. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, pp95ff.


See Miguez Bonino's chapter on "Hermeneutics, Truth and Praxis" in Doing Theology, pp86 ff. It is to be noted, nevertheless, that in his model of the Kingdom, Miguez Bonino is in fact using the sort of conceptual pattern to which Moltmann is referring in this passage.


See Miguez Bonino's reference to Moltmann and Metz in this regard in Doing Theology, p137.


Ibid. (171) Ibid., p197.


Cf. J.D. Godsey, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: S.C.M. Press, The Preacher's Library, 1960), p214, "this mutual polemical attitude witnesses to their shared reality and to their unity in the reality that is in Christ".

D. Bonhoeffer, ibid., p201.
J. Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, p133. It is interesting to note the assessment made by Kuyper of nineteenth century European Christianity when he said that "believers have carried on throughout our whole century in a dualism over against the world and have been all too one-sidedly spiritual....They have dared not grasp any higher than to rescue spiritual life within their private circles". (Gemeene Gratie, III, p10). Quoted in M.C. Berkouwer, *A Half Century of Theology*, p186.


J. Miguez Bonino, "Historical Praxis", p269.


"Historical Praxis", p270.

Ibid. (185) Ibid., p271.


Ibid., p144. (190) Ibid., p147.

Ibid., p148.


J.C. Scannone, "Theology, Popular Culture and Discernment", *Frontiers of Theology in Latin America*, p228.


J. De Santa Ana, ibid., p190.


G. Clarke Chapman, ibid., p15.

Ibid., p40. (201) Ibid.


CHAPTER THREE.

(1) J.Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p139.

(2) A more humanistic development of this thinking was the "New Christendom" approach evolved later by Jacques Maritain, True Humanism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938). It allowed a greater autonomy to the political sphere and sought to build a society motivated by Christian principles, including justice, respect for the rights of others and brotherhood. For a brief outline see G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p54-56.

(3) Ibid., p53.


(5) See above p 55.


(9) Ibid., p143.


(15) Ibid., p265. Similar criticism of European political theology comes from Hugo Assmann who describes it as the "theology of affluence". "The theology of affluence has created a sea of calm around itself, in which it can sit back and flirt at a distance with the idea of revolution, but without getting its own hands dirty in the process". Practical Theology of Liberation (London: Search Press, 1975), p120. Cf. P. Hebblethwaite The Christian-Marxist Dialogue and Beyond, p40 where the above quotation from Assmann is
described as a "metaphor of considerable confusion".

Hebblethwaite interprets the Latin American criticism of European theology as a dismissal of those "who simply write endless prolegomena to an action that never takes place". (Ibid.)

The problem which the political theologians of Europe face is to try to safeguard on one hand the notion of transcendence whilst emphasizing the responsibility of human action on the other. Hence we can find Moltmann saying "Thus Christianity is to be understood as the community of those who on the ground of the resurrection of Christ wait for the kingdom of God and whose life is determined by this expectation". (Theology of Hope, p326.) A few pages further on Moltmann says "not to be conformed to this world does not mean merely to be transformed in oneself, but to transform in opposition and creative expectation the face of the world in the midst of which one believes, hopes and loves". (Ibid. p330.)

Metz lays stress on the transcendental nature of future action when he says: "Man's experience is that in the precariousness of the hominized world - which is ultimately the precariousness of his freedom in this world - someone comes towards him from the future, the God who ordains and foresees everything, who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ as the inescapable and uncontrollable free future of man and of the world". (Theology of the World, p73.) Metz however lays greater emphasis than does Moltmann on the human initiative in eschatological action, as e.g. in the following: "Therefore the hope which the Church sets in itself and in the world should be creative and militant. In other words, Christian hope should realize itself in a creative and militant eschatology. Our eschatological expectation does not look for the heavenly-earthly Jerusalem as that ready-made and existing, promised city of God. This heavenly city does not lie ahead of us as a distant and hidden goal, which only needs to be revealed. The eschatological City of God is now coming into existence, for our hopeful approach builds this city". (Ibid., p94.)

The tension which the European theologians try to hold by these apparently equivocal formulations has been described by J.H.Lochman as "the hybris of the Babylonian activists and...the indolence of the pious passivists". (Encountering Marx (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), p115.) In view of the emphasis laid by both Moltmann and Metz on human initiative in the passages quoted above - and many others could be cited in further evidence - the harsh criticism of both Miguez Bonino and Assmann seems unjustified.

(16) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p140-1. See J.A.T.Robinson, The Body (London: S.C.M.Press, Studies in Biblical Theology, 1962), p80, where the author draws attention to the link between baptism and the resurrection. The body's "ultimate destination, by incorporation into the Body of Christ, is transformation from being a natural body to become a σώμα πνευματικόν (1 Cor. 15,44) from a body that is merely 'a living soul', 'earthy' and 'mortal', to one quickened by the life-giving Spirit of the last, or heavenly, Adam (Rom. 8:11: 1 Cor. 15, 45-9) from a body of 'humiliation' and 'dishonour' to one wholly refashioned to 'the body of his glory, according to the working whereby he is
able even to subject all things unto himself' (Phil. 3.21; I Cor. 15.43; cf. Col. 3.4). Consequently the process of redemption, which is repeatedly described as being 'unto the praise of God's glory' (Eph. 1.6, 12, 14, Phil. 2.11) is equally 'unto our glory' (I Cor. 2,7) for Christians are 'the glory of Christ' (II Cor. 8.23; cf. I Thess. 2.12; II Thess. 1.10, 12; 2.14; Eph. 1.18; Col. 1.27)" See also H.A.Williams Jesus and the Resurrection (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951), p50; H.Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament (London: S.C.M.Press, 1969), p190; J.A.T.Robinson, I.D.B. Vol. 4 article on "Resurrection in the New Testament", p52; O. Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Body? (London: Epworth Press, 1958), p28 ff; W.G.Kummel, The Theology of the New Testament (London: S.C.M.Press, 1974), p237-243: and D.S.Russell, Apocalyptic Ancient and Modern, p72 where the continuity and discontinuity is seen as originating in the Apocalyptic literature.

(17) II Cor. 4.18. However, cf. the footnote by Miguez Bonino in "Historical Praxis" p283, n.10 where he expounds more fully the notion of the two 'eons'.

(18) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p141.

(19) "Historical Praxis", p283, n.9.

(20) Col. 3: 12, 13, 14, 11.


(22) Doing Theology, p141. See also W.G.Kummel, ibid., p228 where the author deals at length with Paul's affirmation that 'God will reward every man according to his works" (Rom.2:6)


(26) Ibid. (27) Ibid., p52.

(28) Ibid. (29) Ibid.

(30) Ibid., p53. (31) Ibid.

(32) Ibid., p54.

(33) Ibid., p55. Cf. J.A. MacKay, God's Order (London: Nisbet, 1953), p83, where, commenting on the same passage from Ephesians 1.9 referred to by Miguez Bonino, the author says, "This means that God has constituted Jesus Christ the unifying centre of a vast scheme of unity whereby the celestial and terrestrial orders, separated as they are now by the great gulf between the supernatural and the natural, and the greater gulf between the holy and the sinful, shall be joined together in a united Commonwealth. In this transcendent unity in which all God's
creation shall be summed up in Christ, God's will shall be done perfectly. His kingdom will have come in the fullest sense."

(34) J. Míguez Bonino, *Room to be People*, p55.

(35) Ibid., p56.  

(36) Ibid.  

(37) Ibid., p57.  


(41) D.S. Russell, *Apocalyptic Ancient and Modern*, p24. This of course, is against H.H. Rowley (cf. ibid. p105) who sees one of the differences between the prophets and the apocalyptists as being that the former look for a future kingdom that will arise out of history i.e. continuity, whilst the latter will call for a future that will break into (i.e. discontinuity) the present.

(42) D.S. Russell, ibid., p25. Russell illustrates this sense of continuity further by reference to (a) the use made of apocalyptic by the Zealots, (b) the portrayal of the kingdom as the final phase of history in Daniel, I Enoch and the Psalms of Solomon, and (c) the use in later apocalyptic thought of the idea that the kingdom still belongs to this present age and marks the climax of history after which there is to be a timeless eternity in heaven.


(44) Rev. 11:17.

(45) D.S. Russell, ibid., p68. Cf. also the following observation by the Czechoslovakian Marxist, Milan Machovec. "In spite of their diversity the classical parables are nearly always about a certain process: ripening (Mk. 4:28) growth (Mk:30-2) the working of yeast (Mt. 13:33 and parallels) spring buds (Mk.13:28-9 and parallels) a search (Mt.18:12,13 and parallels). The common factor is that something dramatic is going to happen in the future but that its seeds have already been sown". (*A Marxist Looks at Jesus*, p93).

(46) *Doing Theology*, p142.

(47) H. Berkhof, ibid., p180.


(50) W. Pannenberg, *Jesus-God and Man* (London: S.C.M.Press, 1968), p76. See also the comments by C. Villa-Vicencio, "The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg", J.T.S.A. (September, 1976, No.16) p32. The same theme is pursued by Pannenberg in *Revelation as History*, p141 where, speaking of the end being seen ahead of time in Jesus' resurrection but as being still in the future for others, he says: "The witness of the New Testament is that in the fate of Jesus Christ the end is not only seen ahead of time, but is experienced by means of a foretaste. For, in him, the resurrection of the dead has already taken place, though to all other men this is still something yet to be experienced".


(52) Ibid., p33.

(53) See M.D.Meeks, *Origins of the Theology of Hope*, p43. Moltmann himself uses the terminology of continuity and discontinuity cf. *Theology of Hope* p148-150. Speaking on the need for a novum G. Vahanian states "In the light of ideology, from classless society to valueless ethics, everything afflicts man with visions of another world. By contrast, utopia, like the kingdom is moved by the vision of a new world, radically other than the "other world" itself. The heart of the matter is this: what can trigger such a vision is not an event which would be either primal or final: it can only be a novum namely that which nature could not engender nor history give birth to". *God and Utopia* (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), p38. The discontinuity is again emphasized by Vahanian when he says "Apart from the fact that the novum encourages what is alien to man, it is what happens when the human is the event of God. Accordingly, the novum is to the eschaton as man is to God; and likewise signifies that which, being radically other, is God in relation to man, a relation which it alludes only by converting it to the greatness of man". Ibid., p54.


(56) Ibid., p137.  (57) Ibid.

(58) Ibid., p136.

(59) Matt. 26:64.

(60) D.S.Russell, Ibid., p70.

(61) *Doing Theology*, p142.

(62) Ibid.


(64) R.Niebuhr, *Faith and History*, p241.

(66) K. Marx, Capital I, p786.

(67) K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in Basic Writings, p43.

(68) K. Marx, Capital I, p737.

(69) Quoted in L. Kolakowski II, p397.

(70) K. Marx, Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in Basic Writings, p265-6. Cf. A. Prior, ibid., p108 "for Marx it is revolutionary philosophy that proclaims the possibility of a better future and thereby heightens the alienation of the present".

(71) L. Kolakowski I, p128. Cf. G. Lukacs, Marxism and Human Liberation (New York: Delta Publishing Company, 1973), Ed. E. San Juan, p44 "It is only with the appearance of the proletariat that the consciousness of the social reality finds its achievement. And this is because the point of view of the proletariat is one from which the totality of the society becomes visible. Consequently as the doctrine of historical materialism emerged it was both the 'condition for the liberation of the proletariat' and the doctrine of the reality of the total process of historic development. This was true precisely, because it was a matter of vital need, a question of life or death, for the proletariat to attain a perfectly clear vision of its situation as a class. This knowledge of the totality of society, and the resultant consciousness was the inevitable precondition of proletarian action. The unity of theory and 'praxis' is, then, only the other face of the historic social situation of the proletariat, a situation which makes self-knowledge and knowledge of the totality coincide. Thus the proletariat is both the subject and object of its proper knowledge". Cf. L. Kolakowski III, p269-270.

(72) K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto, Basic Writings, p7.

(73) W.H. Shaw, Marx's Theory of History (London: Hutchinson, 1978), p110. In fact the conflict between the classes was deliberately fostered and promoted by the syndicalist movement which advocated proletarian 'purity'. The ideology for this was provided by the Frenchman George Sorel, who believed that "syndicalism offered the only hope of a genuine victory of the proletariat. He did not join the movement, believing that middle-class intellectuals could only do harm as members of workers organizations, but he provided it with an ideology from outside. The business of the syndicalist movement, then, was to imbue the workers with a sense of alienation from bourgeois society, to break with bourgeois morality and modes of thought, to have nothing to do with party and parliamentary intrigue and to defend proletarian
purity against ideologists and rhetoricians". (L.Kolakowski II, p163).


(75) K. Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, Basic Writings, p244.

(76) A.T. Van Leeuwen, Christianity in World History (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1964), p336. See J.M.Lochman, Encountering Marx, p92. "In the critical operations of dismantling religion the redemption elements of the biblical heritage become secularized. This secularization is a very doubtful operation: the secular questions become 'theologized', 'mythologized' and 'absolute'. Political ideology as the avant garde of an absolute future; the field of political action becomes an eschatological battlefield and finally the political opponent can and does become the apocalyptic power of evil and is understood and treated as such". See also A. Prior, Revolution and Philosophy, p114, "The proletariat...becomes the final bearer of total liberation. (It) is thus endowed with an historical significance and meaning, it is the possibility of salvation for all mankind". See R.C.Tucker (Philosophy & Myth in Karl Marx, p12) where he quotes Martin Buber's phrase "a socialist secularization of eschatology"

(77) Supra, p 30 , where attention is drawn to the early Marx's teaching that in communist society man would revert to his true essential nature.

(78) K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p106.


(83) J.M.Lochman, Ibid., p243. See R.C.Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, pp 75-77 for the claim that Marx derived his Prometheanism from his Hegelianism.

(84) J. Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p103.

(85) J.M.Lochman, ibid., p244. (86) Ibid.

(87) Ibid., p245.

(88) L. Kolakowski I, p304.
(89) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p142.

(90) Ibid., p125. (from Lambert Schuurman, El cristiano, la iglesia y la revolucion (Buenos Aires: La Aurora, 1970) pp 118-119). See also the affirmation by L. Boff "The Kingdom of God is a process in which people are meant to participate". "Christ's Liberation via Oppression", Frontiers of Theology in Latin America, p120.

(91) M. Machovec, A. Marxist Looks at Jesus, p85.

(92) K. Marx, The German Ideology, in Basic Writings, p258.

(93) In The Class Struggle in France, Basic Writings, pp281-317, and The Civil War in France, Basic Writings, pp349-391.

(94) A. Prior, ibid., p118. However, it is a misrepresentation of much of what Marx has to say to claim, as does Prior, that Marx regarded the use of force and violence as indications of the failure of a revolution (ibid. p117). In the Manifesto Marx and Engels declare: "If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of revolution, it makes itself the ruling class and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonism and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class". (Basic Writings, p92) Marx interpreted violence as being inherent in the dialectical movement of history. In the context of the transition from feudalism to capitalism he avows: "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power". (Capital I, p824). Marx is concerned not so much about the weapons of the revolution, but its economic foundation and conditions. But Marx was not dogmatic about the method to be employed. As late as 1872 he could say to a Congress of the International at the Hague: "We know that the institutions, the manners and customs of the various countries must be considered, and we do not deny that there are countries like England and America, and Holland, where the worker may attain his object (that is "capture political power") by peaceful means. But not in all countries is this the case". (Quoted in M.M. Boer Karl Marx's Interpretation of History (New York: Norton 1965), p264.

(95) Basic Writings, pp43-44.

(96) Doing Theology, p142.

(97) See above p 101 ff.

(98) Kolakowski I. p323. For Lenin, who was no mean exponent of the teachings of Marx, the whole of the dialectic could be summed up as the science of the unity of the opposites (Kolakowski, IIIm p463). Gyorgy Lukacs on the other hand emphasized the revolutionary element in his dialectic which Kolakowski has included in his
comprehensive definition. Cf. Kolakowski, III, p264. "The Marxian dialectic is not merely a way of perceiving or describing social reality, or even indicating how it should be described: it is the mainspring of social revolution and does not exist outside the revolutionary process, of which, as method, it forms an integral part".

(99) See Kolakowski II, p76 for a review of the progress of these discussions. Amongst others who adhered to a strictly deterministic line was Karl Kautsky the German Marxist (Kolakowski II, p36). Expounding Lukacs' teaching which was substantially faithful to Marx's own understanding Kolakowski describes the resolution of the dilemma thus: "Once the proletariat comes on the scene, conscious of its role in production and in the dynamic unity of history, 'historical laws' are identified with human will and freedom becomes identical with historical necessity". (Kolakowski III, p278). K. Popper has used the term "historicism" for this type of determinism. He says, "We now find that the historicist method implies...the theory that society will necessarily change but along a predetermined path that cannot change, through stages predetermined by inexorable necessity". The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p51.


(101) K. Marx and F. Engels, Basic Writings, p257.

(102) K. Marx, Basic Writings, p370.

(103) G. Lukacs, Marxism and Human Liberation, p46.

(104) J. Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p123.

(105) It is worthwhile here to note the claim by Fierro that "Marxist theory is not a thing of the future at all nor, except in Ernst Bloch and a few other Marxists who are semiteologians does it focus its main attention on the future. It is first and foremost a theory about present social reality, an analysis of its material and economic causes, and a methodology for action that will truly be able to change that society". (The Militant Gospel, p277).

(106) E. Bloch, Man on His Own, p90.

(107) E. Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, quoted in L. Kolakowski, III, p428.

(108) E. Bloch, Man on His Own, p159.

(109) E. Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, in L. Kolakowski III, p432.

(110) E. Bloch, Man On His Own, p37.

(111) Ibid., p90.
Notably Moltmann, cf. M.D. Meeks, op. cit., pp 80 ff; J. Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*, p243; and J.B. Metz, who speaks of "Christian hope at which, as Ernst Bloch once very neatly observed, we have not only something to drink but something to cook. Eschatological faith and earthly commitment do not exclude, but imply one another". ("Christian Promise and Revolution" in R. Garaudy, *From Anathema to Dialogue*, p115.)

E. Bloch, ibid., p160.

Ibid., p161.


Ibid.

E. Bloch, ibid., p110. P. Teilhard De Chardin has a similar notion in his Omega Point. This he describes as "The Future-Universal" and the "Hyper Personal" *The Phenomenon of Man* (London: Collins, Fontana Religious Books, 1977), p286. He goes on to say, "Expressed in terms of internal energy, the cosmic function of Omega consists in initiating and maintaining within its radius the unanimity of the world's 'reflective' particles. But how could it exercise this action were it not in some sort loving and lovable at this very moment? .....To be supremely attractive, Omega must be supremely present (ibid., pp295-296) "Autonomy, actuality, irreversibility and thus finally transcendence are the four attributes of Omega" (ibid., p297) It is "already in existence and operative at the very core of the thinking mass" (ibid., p319).


Ibid.


L. Kolakowski, I, p148.

K. Marx, *Capital* Vol. III, p941. Critical theory, as held by the Frankfurt school similarly resolves the freedom-or-necessity dilemma. Expounding Horkheimer's thought Kolakowski explains, "Critical theory looks forward to another society in which men and women will decide their own fate and not be subject to external necessity; in so doing it increases the likelihood of such a society coming about and it is aware of this fact. In the future society there will be no difference between necessity and freedom". (L. Kolakowski, III p354).


Ibid.

J. Miguez Bonino, *Room to be People*, pp56-57.
(126) M. Machovec, ibid., p36. Cf. a similar evaluation of the goal of progress by Berdyaev which could justifiably be applied here as well. He refers to it as "A Deity refusing itself to all past generations, admitting to its intimacy only the last and perfect product of history....(it) could only be thought of as a vampire, unjust and pitiless to the vast bulk of mankind". (N. Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, p193).

(127) J. Miguez Bonino, "Historical Praxis", p274.

(128) Ibid., p273.


(130) See C.L. Mitton, Your Kingdom Come (Oxford: Mowbrays, 1978), for a recent re-statement of Dodd's position.

(131) See J. Moltmann, ibid., p20 ff. for a summary of this debate.

(132) Ibid.

(133) W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p56.


(139) Ibid. (140) Ibid.


(142) Ibid.

(143) Ibid., in footnote. The translator is Margaret Kohl.

(144) Ibid., p30. (145) Ibid.


(148) Ibid., p337.


(150) Ibid., p64. (151) Ibid., p66.

(152) Against this evaluation cf. the appreciative reception of Rahner's ideas by J.M. Lochman in Encountering Marx, p125.

(154) Ibid., p127.

(155) Ibid., p131.

(156) Ibid., p132.

(157) Ibid.


(159) D. Bonhoeffer, ibid., p133.

(160) Ibid., p137.

(161) Ibid., p144.

(162) Ibid., p145.


(166) Ibid.

(167) Ibid.

(168) Ibid.

(169) Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR


(2) J. Miguéz Bonino, Doing Theology, p143.

(3) Doing Theology, p171.

(4) Ibid.

(5) "Historical Praxis", p280. Cf. J.C. Scannone, "Theology, Popular Culture and Discernment", p231: "This means that among the mediations to be confronted by theology are: the pre-reflective or scientific interpretations through which the faith of the people or of different groups reads the signs of the times; the projects and utopias that articulate the hope in the eschatological kingdom before it arrives; and the political mediations through which charity works".

(6) Doing Theology, p144.


(8) Doing Theology, p103.

(9) Ibid., p151. (10) Ibid., p93.

(11) See G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, pp11-15


(13) Ibid., p43

(14) Ibid.

(15) "Historical Praxis", p276.

(16) Ibid., p278 (17) Ibid.

(18) Ibid., p279 (19) Ibid.

(20) Ibid., p280


(22) Ibid. (23) Ibid., p110.

(24) Ibid. Cf. the same point made lucidly by Fierro: "The Gospel commandment of love, for example contains no indication of the concrete way one is to comport oneself in a given situation. If Latin American Christians want to find out how they should conduct themselves in the face of a generalized state of oppression, injustice and elitist privilege, they will not make any such progress by engaging
in long exegetical or theological discussions over the nature of gospel charity. What they must do is make a rational and scientific analysis of their milieu, using the concepts furnished by social theory. At that level they have nothing to do or to contribute as Christians. There is no Christian social theory, no Christian praxis, no Christian politics.

The inspiration of the Gospel message operates in a different order, in the realm of regulatory ideas. Evangelical love is not directly a practical method; rather it constitutes a guiding idea and a general, comprehensive horizon for all practical methods. It takes in all those methods and, at the same time it is sought as the definitive and attainable goal of all actions". (The Militant Gospel, p254).

(25) Ibid.  (26) Ibid., p111.
(27) Ibid., p113.
(28) "Historical Praxis, p275.
(29) Christians and Marxists, p115.
(34) Christians and Marxists, p105.
(37) Ibid., p115.  (38) Ibid.
(39) Doing Theology, p98. Cf. also the claim by M. Machovec that in "Jewish mythology Yahweh has a totally different role from that of Zeus in Greek or Shiva in Indian Mythology; Yahweh speaks, forbids, gets angry, but he does not act, at least not in human form - it is man who acts". (A Marxist Looks at Jesus, p58).


(45) J.H.Yoder, "Radical Reformation Ethics", p657.


(47) Ibid., p658. (48) Ibid.

(49) J.H.Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, p204.


(51) I Tim. 2: 1-2.


(53) J.H.Yoder, "The Constantinian Sources of Western Social Ethics", p105.


(56) Ibid., p45. (57) Ibid., p46.

(58) Ibid., p565.


(60) K. Barth, *Community, State and Church* (Garden City, New York; Doubleday, 1960), p169.

(61) Ibid.


(63) K. Barth, *Community, State and Church*, p188.

(64) Ibid., p173. See also the claim by West that "Barth remains, in a deeper sense, a contemporary of Karl Marx; a cousin who did not know him, so to speak, but who shared the same spiritual ancestors, and the same revolutionary drive against the pretensions and the complacency of a bourgeois society. Both men grappled with the challenge to German idealism of revolutionary figures such as Feuerbach. Both were oppressed by the moral self-justification, the ideology involved in this idealism, whether its exemplar was Hegel or Schleiermacher, and both wrestled with the problem of truth and knowledge until they had established what they believed to be no longer a merely subjective starting point, but one which responded to a reality outside themselves -- in Marx's case the dialectical movement of material forces of
production, in Barth's the Word of God which calls man in question. In each case this reality was known as an acting reality which claims the allegiance of the total man, cutting off the possibility of meaningful thought or life outside the circle of its action. In each case this action constituted a new community, for Marx the proletariat, for Barth the Church, to which time and history are relative, in the sense that these are the dimensions of the purpose and fulfilment of this community. In each case the history of the world beyond them is incidental, and the believer retains a sovereign independence of this world and the problems it raises on its own presuppositions. C.C. West, *Communism and the Theologians* (London: S.C.M. Press, 1958), pp188-9.


(68) See R. Niebuhr, *Essays in Applied Christianity*, p186 where Barth is quoted as saying "the goal toward which we are moving is the second coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Message of the church is a message of hope for everyone. Alternations in political systems must stand in the light of this great change, which is called Jesus Christ. It would be curious if the Church, which knows of this one great change, could not accept with a certain calm certain smaller changes".

(69) Ibid.

(70) Ibid., p171.


(72) Ibid., p146.

(73) Again in response to Barth Niebuhr declared: "We ought indeed to have a greater degree of freedom from all traditions, even the most hallowed, as we seek to establish and re-establish community in our torn world. But freedom over law cannot mean emancipation from the tortuous and difficult task of achieving a tolerable justice. It is certainly not right for Christians to leave it to the 'pagans' of our day to walk the tightrope of our age, which is strung over the abyss of war and tyranny, seeking by patience and courage to prevent war on the one hand and the spread of tyranny on the other, while the Christians rejoice in a 'revolutionary hope' in which all these anxieties of human existence, and the peculiar anxieties of our age, are overcome proleptically. It is particularly wrong if we suggest to these pagans that we have no immediate counsel in the present perplexity but that we will furnish a 'sign' of the 'coming kingdom' by some heroic defiance of malignant power, if the situation becomes desperate enough. We will not counsel any community that this or that course might lead
to tyranny. We will merely prepare ourselves to defy tyranny when it is full blown". (Essays in Applied Christianity, p172.)

(74) "The problem of politics and economics is the problem of justice. The question of politics is how to coerce the anarchy of conflicting human interests into some kind or order, offering human beings the greatest possible opportunity for mutual support. In the field of collective behaviour the force of egistic passion is so strong that the only harmonies possible are those which manage to neutralize this force through balances of power, through mutual defences against its inordinate expression, and through techniques for harnessing its energy to social ends. All these possibilities represent something less than the ideal of love. Yet the law of love is involved in all approximates of justice, not only as the source of the norms of justice, but as an ultimate perspective by which their limitations are discovered". (An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p128)

(75) Essays in Applied Christianity, p174.

(76) Ibid., p175.


(79) Ibid.

(80) Ibid.

(81) Ibid., p237.

(82) See e.g. T.C.Sanders "The Theology of Liberation: Christian Utopianism" Christianity and Crisis (Vol. 33 No. 15 Sept. 17, 1973) p167.


(84) See the explanation by A.Dumas of Bonhoeffer's position when he says: "In this way the responsible restructuring of the actual world is fulfilled - which is a better way to describe the work accomplished by Jesus Christ, and the work Christians are to carry on in following him, than such terms as 'redemption', which can lead to escapism, or 'justification', which can justify letting things remain as they are". (Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality, p139)

(85) D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p122.

(86) D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p82.

(87) D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p50.


(89) A. Dumas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality, p120.

(90) D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p85. L. Rasmussen draws out the implications of this double reference when he says: "On the one hand the Christian should make his decisions in a particular theological context, namely within a Christo-universal understanding of the world, a word reconciled in Christ, the ontological center
of existence. On the other hand, the Christian's decisions are also made in a particular historical context, the knowledge of which is indispensable for discerning Christ's peculiar Gestalt in this time and place, for uncovering the concrete command of God that will bring reality to expression here and now". (Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Reality and Resistance, (Nashville: Abingdon, 1972), p25).

(91) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p103.
(92) Ibid.
(94) D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p82.
(95) Ibid., p229
(96) Ibid., p230.
(97) Ibid., p245. However, note needs to be taken of Rasmussen's warning that Bonhoeffer uses the word "responsibility" with several secondary connotations which appear throughout the Ethics (Ibid., p38)

(99) D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p287.
(100) D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p131.
(101) D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp224 ff.
(103) D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p137.
(104) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p115.
(105) Ibid., p143.
(106) Ibid., p144.
(108) Ibid., p327.
(109) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p147.
(110) Ibid., pp147-8.
(112) Ibid.
(113) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p148.
(114) Ibid., p149.
(115) Ibid.
(116) Ibid.
(117) Ibid., p150.

(119) Ibid., p63

(120) Ibid.

(121) Ibid. p64.

(122) Ibid., p68.

(123) Ibid., p64.

(124) See the observation by R.M.Brown who points out that this comment by Moltmann "has something of an ad hominem flavour since the Latin American theologians discovered liberation theology by making 'a radical turn towards the people'. It was just such a turn that led to encounters with socialism as a serious option for Latin American Christians". (Theology in a New Key, p129).

(125) Ibid., p130.


(129) Ibid., p46.


(131) J. Larrain, The Concept of Ideology, p68 passim.

(132) Ibid., p76.

(133) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p116.

(134) J. Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p119.

(135) J. Larrain, The Concept of Ideology, p91ff. Larrain claims that Durkheim's theory of ideas as outlined in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), p422ff represents an understanding of ideology which "seems to be explained in terms of a natural bent i- the mind of society considered as a subject". Durkheim, however, does not use the term ideology as such.


(138) Ibid., p66.

(140) The theories of Barthes and Greimas are summarised in J. Larrain, *ibid.*, pp132-140.


(142) Godelier's views are presented in summary form in J. Larrain, *ibid.*, pp151-153.


(146) See e.g. J.W.De Gruchy, "The Protestant Usage of Marx in Latin American Theology", p381. Cf. also the description of C. Geertz "...ideologies...are most distinctively maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience". (The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p220.

(147) J.W.De Gruchy, *ibid*.


(153) *Ibid*.

(154) *Ibid*.


(156) *Ibid*.


(158) *Ibid*.

(159) W. Temple, *Christianity and Social Order* (London: S.C.M. Press, 1980), p47: "The Church must announce Christian principles and point out where the existing social order at any time is in conflict with them. It must then pass on to Christian citizens, acting in their civic capacity, the task of reshaping the existing order in closer conformity to the principles".


(162) *Ibid*.

(164) Ibid. Cf. R.M. Brown Theology in a New Key, p.81: "What we bring to Scripture, in other words, conditions what we draw from Scripture: our ideology is transplanted into our hermeneutic, so that there is a double distortion, and therefore double cause for suspicion."

(165) A. Fierro, The Militant Gospel, p. 244.

(166) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p.95.


(168) Ibid., p.173. (169) Ibid., p.165 Author's own emphasis


(174) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p.103.

(175) P. Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, p.246.

(176) Ibid., p.248. (177) Ibid., p.249.

(178) Ibid., p.251.

(179) J. Miguez Bonino, Christians and Marxists, p.119.

(180) Ibid., p.78. (181) Ibid.

(182) Ibid., p.84. (183) Ibid., p.85.

(184) Ibid. (185) Ibid.

(186) Ibid., p.92. (187) Ibid.

(188) Ibid. (189) Ibid., p.93.

(190) Ibid.


(192) See V. Lenin, What is to be Done? (Quoted in N. Leites, ibid., p.285)

(193) V. Lenin, Letter to the Socialist Propaganda League in America November 1915. (Quoted in N. Leites, ibid., p.287)

(194) V. Lenin, Speech at the 8th Party Congress, March 19, 1919. (Quoted in N. Leites, ibid., p.287)

(195) V. Lenin, Speech in the plenum of the Moscow Soviet, Nov. 20, 1922. (Quoted in N. Leites, ibid.)

(196) See D. McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx, p.167, where the comment is made that "It was only during Marx's lifetime that the idea of the political party in the modern sense developed".
(197) It is noteworthy that L. Kolakowski begins the Introduction to Volume I of his trilogy, *The Main Currents of Marxism* with the bald statement "Karl Marx was a German philosopher" L. Kolakowski, Vol. I, p1.

(198) See J. Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, pp54-55. It should also be noted that Miguez Bonino does later expand on his own position when he says that a Christian "will quite likely join - certainly with different degrees of attachment - some movement, party or group in which Marxism will play a prominent if not leading role" (Christians and Marxists, p122.)


(200) Ibid., p125.

(201) Ibid., p117.
CHAPTER FIVE.


(2) J.A.Kirk, Liberation Theology, p187.


(4) J.A.Kirk, Liberation Theology, p95.

(5) The phrase "Kingdom of God" only occurs nine times in the Pauline epistles, and three of these instances are repetitions of the list of evil practices which prevent inclusion in the Kingdom (I.Cor.6:10, Gal. 5:21 and Eph. 5:5).


(7) J.A.Kirk, Liberation Theology, p177.


(9) Ibid.

(10) D. Vree, On Synthesizing Marxism and Christianity, p 89.

(11) Ibid., p 90. See also R.M.Brown, Theology in a New Key, ppi01ff where a fairly comprehensive review of critiques of liberation theology is undertaken.


(13) J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p145.

(14) J.A.Kirk, Liberation Theology, p177.

(15) A.T. Van Leeuwen, Christianity in World History, p331. See also Machovec's claim that "because Jesus and his first disciples did not draw a line between this world and the 'other' world, the consequences of his reflections about the Kingdom of God concern this world with its history, politics, social situations and the real longings of real men for their earthly future". (A Marxist Looks at Jesus, p85).

(16) J. Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, p37.


(18) Ibid., p237.


(20) Ibid., p17
(21) Ibid., p119.  
(22) Ibid., p123.  
(24) J. Miguez Bonino, *Room to be People*, p51.  
(25) Ibid., pp52-3.  
(26) Ibid., p58.  
(27) Ibid., p59.  
(31) Ibid.  
(32) Ibid., p139.  
(33) Ibid., p140.  
(34) Ibid.  
(35) Ibid.  
(36) Ibid., p142.  
(37) See *The Open Secret*, p125.  
(40) Ibid., p155.  
(41) Ibid.  
(42) Ibid.  
(43) Ibid.  
(45) Ibid., p154.  
(47) Ibid., p123.  
(48) Ibid., p206.  
(49) Ibid., pp302-4.  
(50) Ibid., p303.  
(53) Ibid., p151.  
(54) Ibid., p138.  
(55) Ibid., p142.  
(56) Ibid., p134.  
(57) Ibid., p138.  
(58) Ibid., p143.  
(59) Ibid.
See e.g. W. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York: MacMillan, 1918).

J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p143.

Ibid.

G. Gutierrez: A Theology of Liberation, p177.

This appears again in his treatment of poverty. He says "In other words, the elimination of the exploitation and poverty that prevent the poor from being fully human has begun; a Kingdom of justice which goes even beyond what they could have hoped for has begun. They are blessed because the coming of the Kingdom will put an end to their poverty by creating a world of brotherhood". (A Theology of Liberation, p298).

J. Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, p47

Ibid., pp56-57 (67) Ibid., p59

See above Ch. 3 p50.

Colossians, 4:11.


Ibid.

J. Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology, p151.


R. Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952) p142. See also Niebuhr's further claim that "the Communist alternative to the injustices of our civilization has universally created greater injustices and hatched more terrible tyrannies than previously known in history" (Ibid).

Ibid., pX. (76) Ibid.,

Ibid., p137.

H. Butterfield, Christianity and History, p143.

POSTSCRIPT.

(1) Both supply raw materials and food to their northern counterparts and both receive manufactured goods from them. Both therefore have to adjust their economies to meet the needs and demands of their trading partners in the north, and both consequently
reflect, to some extent, the economic patterns of upswing and downturn in the countries they do business with. Furthermore, Southern Africa resembles Latin America in that it depends for its economic development on large amounts of foreign investment capital with the accompanying relationship of dominance and dependence that such a pattern tends to generate. The degree of this dependence is much less accentuated in Southern Africa, but it is, nevertheless, a factor to be reckoned with.


(5) K. Marx and P. Engels, Manifesto, Basic Writings, p7.


(7) See A. Mafeje, "Religion, Class and Ideology in South Africa", M.G. Whisson and M West, Eds, Religion and Social Change in Southern Africa (Cape Town and London: David Philip and Rex Collings, 1975) p176; where the writer says: "The Whites are the very people who have brought hell for us. We cannot be deceived any more. We have seen through the fraud of the Christian religion. For years the Christians have been preaching equality and mutual love amongst all people. But who are the first to practise inequality? It is none other than the Christian himself!"


(11) Ibid., p51.

(12) See Introduction n(1).
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