THE ADMINISTRATION OF CECIL JOHN RHODES

AS

PRIME MINISTER OF THE CAPE COLONY

(1890 - 1896)

Thesis presented for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

by

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In his monograph, Sir Thomas Fuller divides Rhodes's public policy under three heads - the expansion of the Cape Colony; the federation, or, as it was frequently called, the union of South African States; and the Government of the Cape Colony itself when he became its Premier. Any such divisions are of course merely arbitrary, and merely made for the sake of convenience, for it is obvious that these aspects of his policy were closely inter-related, and, in fact, inter-dependent.

For this reason, it is all the more to be regretted that in the Imperialistic fervour which hallows the memory of Rhodes the Empire-builder, or at the other extreme, in the severe condemnation of the Rhodes of the Jameson Raid, the significance of his work as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony is under-estimated or overlooked altogether. The Colony provided the base for his operations in the wider field of South African politics. Without its support, there could have been no Northern development, and in his scheme of South African unity, he believed it the Colony's destiny to play the leading rôle. Thus during his Premiership, the Franchise changes were introduced as a step towards a common South African Native policy; the Glen Grey Bill was a "Native Bill for Africa"; in regard to railways and customs, the ultimate aim was amalgamation and free trade in South African products as a prelude to political unity.

Above all, it was a period of close co-operation between the two sections of the European population in the Colony itself, and it is this aspect of Rhodes's administration with which this thesis is primarily concerned. It has also been necessary to deal at some length with his earlier activities to show how this co-operation became possible, and to trace its effect upon the general trend of his policy after 1890. One chapter has been devoted to a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the break-up of the first ministry which paved the way for the disastrous event with which Rhodes's Premiership terminated.
The sources from which the material for this thesis were obtained are tabulated in the Bibliography, and in this connection I should like to express my thanks to -

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CHAPTER I

RHODES BECOMES PRIME MINISTER

a. Introductory

b. Politics and Finance

Rhodes, Hofmeyr and the Africander Bond - Basutoland - Bechuanaland - Ideas need money - Diamonds - Gold - the Charter

c. The First Rhodes Ministry

Fall of the Sprigg ministry - Rhodes as Prime Minister - Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance - Dual position

a. Introductory

The year 1872 was a significant one in Rhodes's life. Following a serious illness in Kimberley, he was taken by his brother Herbert on a long trek into the north - a journey that was to count for far more than its immediate object of investigating the Transvaal gold discoveries. The previous year, while travelling across the Drakensberg from Natal to the Diamond Fields, Rhodes had discovered Africa. On this second journey he began to know and love it. Something in him responded to the vastness of the country, perhaps to the implications of other spacious lands to the north waiting for a white population. The vague ideas which had passed through his head as he sat sifting diamonds in Kimberley began to fall into a pattern. Oxford was necessary to these plans, and it was Oxford which gave form and direction to his philosophy. (1) It only needed John Ruskin, with his creed of service, to translate that philosophy into a purpose. "This is what England must either do or perish: she must found colonies as fast and as far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthiest men; .... If we can get men, for little pay, to cast themselves against cannon-mouths for love of England, we may find men who will also plough and sow for her ... All that I ask of you is to have

(1) Basil Williams, Cecil Rhodes, pp. 25-26; pp. 35-36
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(1) Basil Williams, Cecil Rhodes, pp. 25-26; pp. 35-36
a fixed purpose of some kind for your country and for yourselves."(2)

The sentiments of that Inaugural Lecture were to echo through Rhodes's life and work. In the years that followed, he became convinced of the divinely-appointed mission of the British race - a belief that found expression in his first Will of 1877. Briefly, Rhodes bequeathed the wealth, which he had yet to win, to a society having for its object "the extension of British rule throughout the world ... the foundation of so great a Power as to hereafter render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity."(3)

In his later Wills he was to alter the details and the methods; but he retained the central idea, an idea which became more practical as its immediate objects became more limited. The will of 1877, therefore, despite its extraordinary naivete, may be regarded as a confession of faith from which Rhodes never substantially departed.

While Rhodes was still an unknown digger at Kimberley, he was deciding the form of his own contribution to the Divine plan - a definite policy in South Africa. To paint the map of Africa red from the Cape to the equatorial lakes; this was the dream from which his political creed gradually evolved. Rhodes foresaw the land scramble which was to take place in a few years, but he was not primarily interested in the coastal tracts, which were unsuitable for colonisation on a large scale. Rather, he was obsessed by the thought of the tableland of the interior, with its mild climate and its vast resources, where a new dominion, settled by men of Anglo-Saxon stock, might replace the lost American colonies.(4) In terms of practical politics, two conditions were necessary to the realisation of these schemes. The first was the federation of the South African states under the British flag; the second was the organised settlement of the north.

(2) Ibid., pp. 41-42
(3) Ibid., p. 51
(4) W. T. Stead, Last Will and Testament, pp. 58-77; Basil Williams, op.cit., Chap. VI
b. Politics and Finance

Rhodes's entry into Cape politics was not due, therefore, as is so often the case, to any vague notion of securing local interests, but it was, in fact, as essential to his purpose as was the amalgamation of the diamond mines eight years later. The political federation of the South African states should, he believed, come from within, and not be imposed from outside. He had to use, therefore, not the "Imperial factor", but the Dutch themselves; to use the Cape Colony as the base for his operations, and to consolidate the unofficial leadership it already enjoyed. Rhodes had long held that the Dutch were the "coming race in South Africa", and that they should play their part in running the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that he should choose as his constituency the rural district of Barkly West—a choice which enabled him to speak, not only for the Kimberley miners with whom he was so closely connected, but also for the Dutch farmers whose support he now hoped to gain.

Rhodes took his seat in the House in 1881, and came into contact for the first time with Jan Hofmeyr, leader of the Dutch party in Parliament. Although conservative and nationalist in his views, he had much in common with Rhodes. He favoured South African union provided Dutch interests were duly regarded, and had, in 1878, founded the Boeren Beschermings Vereniging, later to be merged with the Rev. S. J. du Toit's then anti-British Africander Bond, to awaken his fellow-countrymen to a sense of their own importance. Yet, in 1881, Rhodes and Hofmeyr approached each other with mutual suspicions. Majuba had just been fought, and what Gladstone intended as an act of magnanimity had been construed by every Englishman and Dutchman as a surrender. Racial bitterness had flared up, and Rhodes was represented to Hofmeyr as a "John Bull Englishman", while Rhodes regarded the Africander leader as a "dangerous man ... devising machinations

(5) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.57
against his country". (7) These suspicions did not survive their first meeting when each found much to like and respect in the other.

During the next two years, Hofmeyr devoted his energies to securing the amalgamation of the Boeren Beschermings Vereniging and the Bond, and joined the latter organisation to ensure the success of the negotiations, which were finally concluded at Richmond in May 1893. It was mainly due to Hofmeyr's activities that the new party was purged of its extremist anti-British views, and he was able to assure Rhodes in the House two months later that he too believed in South African union under the British flag, as opposed to the Bond concept of a United South Africa under its own flag. This assurance did much to allay Rhodes's fears, and he was later to refer to "the high aim of the honourable member for Stellenbosch". (8)

Rhodes had been returned to the House to support the government of Sir Gordon Sprigg, whose bungling attempts to disarm the Basutos, and the resultant war and defeat of Colonial troops, had reduced his majority to two. Rhodes's sympathies, however, lay with the Basutos. (9) During the session of 1881, as a result of the general dissatisfaction with Sprigg's policy, and more especially as a result of his refusal to build a railway to Kimberley, Rhodes and his colleague withdrew their support, and the ministry, thus placed in the minority, was forced to resign. Rhodes's action was not welcomed in Kimberley, but it is interesting to note that he was able, in a single speech, to justify his conduct and to carry his constituents with him. (10)

Scanlen succeeded Sprigg as Prime Minister, and Rhodes, who had meanwhile been appointed to a Commission to investigate the claims for compensation by loyal Basutos, advised him to hand the country over to the Imperial Government, as the Cape had shown

(7) Hofmeyr, op. cit., p.376
(8) Ibid., p.377; also pp. 203-207
(9) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.63
(10) Lewis Michell, The Life and Times of C. J. Rhodes, p.59
clearly its inability to handle the situation. This was not done until 1883, as Scanlen feared to adopt this solution in view of the unpopularity of the Imperial Government. In the light of Rhodes's later attack on the "Imperial factor" his plea for intervention by the Home Government is significant. The reason is not hard to find. Rhodes wanted to dispose of the Basutoland problem, as he realised that there was no possibility of advance in that direction. On the contrary, Basutoland was likely to be a continual source of embarrassment to the Cape Government; a continual drain on the Colony's resources, which, he believed, would soon be called upon to deal with a far more vital problem. (11)

More important to Rhodes's plans than Basutoland was Bechuanaland, the great territory lying to the north of the Cape Colony, between the Transvaal and what afterwards became German South West Africa. While the Kalahari Desert filled its greater part, a fertile strip of land along the Transvaal border contained what was known as the English or Missionaries' Road. This track, used by missionaries, explorers and hunters, was the only route from the Cape Colony to the interior. (12) The Boers sometimes raided it, but their claim that it lay within their borders had never been conceded. In 1871, the British Government had secured the Southern approaches by annexing Griqualand West, but by 1882 the anarchy in the territory called for further action. The Bechuana chiefs were perpetually at war with each other, Natives on their way to and from the diamond fields were molested, while two small Boer republics, composed largely of adventurers, had sprung up in Stellaland and Goshen. The road to the north which had to be kept open if Rhodes's dream was ever to become a reality was almost closed.

The Imperial Government, unmoved by this prospect, pursued its old policy, refusing either to take on any fresh obligations itself, or to allow the Transvaal to extend its frontiers. The

Transvaal Government, however, embarrassed by the anarchy on its borders, began to agitate for permission to annex the republics. This Rhodes was determined to prevent. He too wanted annexation, but by the Cape Colony as the dominant state in South Africa, not by the Imperial Government, nor by the Transvaal, which had recently threatened to impose a tariff of 33 per cent on Cape imports. (13) 

In 1882, therefore, Rhodes secured his appointment to a Griqualand West boundary commission. As a result of his activities, largely beyond the scope of his instructions, he returned with an offer from the Bechuana chief Mankoroane to place his territory under the protection of the Colony, and a petition from the Stellaland settlers asking for annexation. Rhodes urged Scanlen to take prompt action, but the latter was too afraid of the Dutch vote to propose annexation. Hofmeyr was also hard to convince. He too realised the importance of Northern development, but, unlike Rhodes, he did not believe that this development should only be carried out under the British flag. The proper policy, rather, was one of co-operation between the Colony and the Transvaal. For this reason, he did not wish to intervene in a situation which he regarded as concerning the latter more than the Colony. (14) In vain did Rhodes warn Scanlen of the consequences of parting with the interior road. His appeal served no purpose, as the majority in the House were either indifferent or hostile to his plans. The situation was only saved by an event which drew attention to the gravity of the issues in South Africa.

On May 1st, 1883, the German flag was hoisted at Angra Pequena, an act which was followed by the declaration of a German protectorate over Damaraland and Namaqualand. Rhodes had disquieting visions of a German dominion stretching from Angra Pequena to Delagoa Bay, and his fears were shared by others. (15) The

(13) Van der Poel, railway and Customs Policies, p.17
(14) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.253
(15) James Rose-innes, Autobiography, pp. 62-64
British Government now began to take ponderous action. Commissioners were sent to Bechuanaland, among them a well-known missionary, the Rev. John Mackenzie, whose prejudices and want of tact immediately brought him into conflict with the Dutch. Meanwhile, the introduction of a bill by the new Prime Minister, Upington, for the annexation of Southern Bechuanaland gave Rhodes another opportunity of defining his policy. "I look upon this Bechuanaland territory," he told the Cape House in August 1883, "as the Suez Canal of the trade of this country, the key of its road to the interior. . The question before us really is this, whether this Colony is to be confined to its present borders, or whether it is to become the dominant state in South Africa - whether, in fact, it is to spread its civilisation over the interior." (16)

His attack, in the same speech, on the "Imperial factor" and on Mackenzie delighted the Cape Dutch, even though at the same time it aroused doubts in England of his loyalty to the British connection. There was, however, considerable opposition to Mackenzie, and he was finally recalled by the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, who sent Rhodes to Bechuanaland as Deputy Commissioner in his place. (17)

Thanks to Mackenzie, the Bechuanaland Boers were by this time on the verge of war with the imported police. Rhodes, therefore, visited Stellaland, and within a week induced the settlers to accept a British protectorate. Goshen, with the open support of the Transvaal, was less tractable, and the "Imperial factor", in the shape of Sir Charles Warren and four thousand troops, finally had to intervene. Warren re-appointed Mackenzie against the advice of the High Commissioner, repudiated Rhodes's agreement with the Stellalanders and arrested their leader, Van Niekerk, on a charge of murder. Influenced by Mackenzie, Warren wanted to establish Imperial authority throughout Bechuanaland, whereas Rhodes had hoped to secure a settlement by gaining the

(16) Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, His Political Life and Speeches, p.62
(17) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.81
co-operation of the Stellaland burghers, thus avoiding all racial friction. In the light of Warren's actions, which offended all the Dutch in South Africa, Rhodes had no alternative but to resign. Warren was recalled in August 1885, but by then the Cape Parliament had washed its hands of the business, and Bechuanaland became a Crown Colony. Rhodes had failed in his immediate purpose, but his main object had been secured. The road to the north was again open. (18)

By 1885, Rhodes was recognised as an important factor in Colonial politics. He held office as Treasurer in Scanlen's ministry for a few months in 1884, and when Upington succeeded as Prime Minister, became one of the opposition leaders. (19) His work in Basutoland had given him a new insight into the Native mind; his work in Bechuanaland was of greater importance, for it showed him that the Cape Colony could not be relied upon to support a forward policy in South Africa. As we have seen, Hofmeyr and Rhodes shared the common ideal of Union under the British flag - the Bond leader regarding any other form of union as impractical for at least the next fifty years (20) but they differed in regard to the method to be adopted. Rhodes's first attempt to unite English and Dutch in common policy had failed, but his work during this period is none the less significant, because it laid the foundation for the later alliance with the Africander party.

Rhodes now came to believe that wealth was essential if any of his schemes were to be realised. "It is of no use to have big ideas if you have not the cash to carry them out", he once told General Gordon. (21) In time, he was to over-estimate and become tainted by the material power his wealth gave him, but, for the present, it is sufficient to record that by the enterprises he set going in Kimberley, and later in Johannesburg,

(18) Basil Williams, op.cit., Chap. 8; Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.249 ff.; Lewis Michell, op.cit., p.84 ff. and Chap. 9; Rose-Innes, op.cit., Chap. 6
(19) Lewis Michell, op.cit., p.97
(20) Hofmeyr, op.cit., pp. 203-204
(21) Stead, op.cit., p.142
he became master of the financial resources he thought necessary for his political aims. In Kimberley, the financial duel between Rhodes's De Beers Mining Company and Barnato's Kimberley Mine resulted in the formation in 1888 of the De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited. That Rhodes was thinking of more than merely the control of 90 per cent of the world's output of diamonds was evident from the Trust Deed of the Corporation, by which it was empowered to annex territory, to maintain an army, and to carry on almost any sort of business anywhere in Africa. Some of the shareholders objected, and secured a Supreme Court decision in their favour to prevent the amalgamation. The check was merely temporary, however, as Rhodes and Barnato outmanoeuvred the recalcitrant shareholders by a voluntary liquidation. (22)

Rhodes was still amalgamating the diamond mines when gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand, and the dispossessed diggers of Kimberley began to flock to the mining camp that was to be Johannesburg. The wealthier men followed, among them Rhodes and Beit, and in the scramble for claims won rich prizes. In 1887, Rhodes formed the Gold Fields of South Africa Limited, afterwards to become the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa, one of the richest and most powerful companies on the Rand. Politically, the discovery of gold was even more important than the discovery of diamonds. It planted a large and turbulent Uitlander population within the Transvaal; it brought "the racehorse" and "the ox" (23) into a fatal opposition. (24)

With the financial means thus obtained, Rhodes was able to devote his attention to the organised settlement of the North; an activity that was to result in 1889 in the granting by Queen Victoria of a Royal Charter of Incorporation to the British South Africa Company. With certain qualifications, the Company was armed with most of the powers of a modern state over a territory for which no northern frontier was named. (25)

(22) Basil Williams, op. cit., pp. 92-105; Lewis Michell, op. cit., pp. 89-96; Walker, De Villiers, p.196
(23) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.87
(24) Ibid., pp. 107-113; Lewis Michell, pp. 96-97
c. The First Rhodes Ministry

Rhodes did not play an active part in Cape politics during the years 1886-1890. Although he had never joined the Bond himself, he had grown increasingly sympathetic to its policy and frequently voted with Bondsmen during his comparatively rare visits to the House during this period. This was in keeping with his earlier declaration of the need for co-operation between English and Dutch as an essential to the attainment of South African unity. Thus, in 1886, he had spoken and voted in favour of Hofmeyr's education motion, and following his support of the Bill for the abolition of the Excise, publicly expressed his belief in the need for Protection to encourage the agricultural development of the Colony. (26) The agricultural legislation and attempts to obtain preferential treatment for Cape wines in England during his period of office as Premier are proofs of Rhodes's sincerity, while his continued interest in their welfare did much to lessen the Bondsmen's initial suspicion of a ministry which included men with the pronounced opinions on Native policy of Sauer and Innes. A full discussion of the latter will be attempted in the later chapters, but Rhodes's remarks on this subject during the 1887 Registration Bill debates showed that his policy was not greatly at variance with that of the Africander Party.

But, while Rhodes and Hofmeyr found a basis of common agreement in regard to internal policy, they had not, as we have seen, been in complete agreement in regard to Northern development. It even seemed likely at one stage that their differences of opinion in this matter would bring their co-operation to an end. (27) The Charter granted to the British South Africa Company in October, 1889, meant that Rhodes had the official backing of the Imperial Government in his schemes, but it was equally important that he should have the support of the Colony, without which

(26) Vindex, op.cit., p.139
(27) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.381
the development of the Northern territory would have been virtually impossible. Hofmeyr welcomed the granting of the Charter as an alternative to the acquisition of the north by either the Imperial or Colonial governments. Yet Hofmeyr's conversion to Rhodes's schemes was finally due to the isolationist policy adopted by President Kruger which caused him to lose the sympathy of the Cape Dutch. (28) In gaining Hofmeyr's support of the Charter, and the Chartered Company's railway agreement with the Colony (October 1889), Rhodes had a valuable ally in James Sivewright. These railway negotiations, which are considered to be the first practical results of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance, (29) paved the way for the closer co-operation which began with the acceptance of Rhodes as Premier.

Having gained Colonial support, Rhodes adopted his own methods to ensure that interest in Northern development was maintained. He attempted to set up a local board of the Chartered Company in South Africa to assist him as Managing Director, (30) but after the failure of his attempt to persuade Chief Justice de Villiers (31) and Hofmeyr (32) to become Directors, he abandoned the idea. He did, however, distribute Chartered Shares to Colonists, particularly Bondsmen, at a price considerably below their market value, ostensibly to interest them in his ventures. (33) The acceptance of what were in effect valuable gifts by men such as Hofmeyr (34) is not without significance in view of Rhodes's belief in the power of the material sources at his command.

Rhodes was re-elected for Barkly West in the General Election of 1888, but his Northern interests prevented him from taking his seat during the following session, and his increased responsibi-

(28) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.141
(29) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.385
(30) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.141
(31) Walker, de Villiers, p.208
(32) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.388: Hofmeyr had, in fact, been empowered to become a director in terms of a Bond resolution.
(33) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.142; Rose-Innes, op.cit., p.87
(34) Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. 20
lities, in fact, led him to consider the possibility of again asking for leave of absence during the session of 1890.\(^{35}\) The announcement of Sir Gordon Sprigg's railway proposals, however, compelled him to reconsider this decision.

The Sprigg Cabinet had been in a precarious position for some time. Sprigg feared the growing Hofmeyr-Rhodes friendship, and when Tudhope resigned in 1889, had tried to counter it by inviting firstly Hofmeyr and then Sivewright to join his ministry.\(^{36}\) The weakening of the Cabinet as the result of the eventual appointment of Pearson, and the failure of his 1889 railway construction programme, led Sprigg to adopt desperate measures to recover his popularity. This was the background to the extensive scheme of railway construction announced by the Governor at the opening of the Second Session of the Eighth Colonial Parliament on May 29, 1890.

Hitherto, the main railway development had been concentrated on the trunk lines from Cape Town and Port Elizabeth to the North where the best markets for Cape produce and overseas goods were to be found. Sprigg now proposed to remedy the resultant neglect of the more recent port of East London, and the western and central districts of the Colony, by linking the existing lines. This scheme was proposed in Committee of Ways and Means at an estimated cost of £7,693,726.\(^{37}\) The personification of the localism Rhodes had always hated, its financial implications frightened even the Bond farmers who had long been pressing for railway development and whose support Sprigg had no longer hoped to gain. Many of the lines would not be able to pay the interest on their construction for many years, and Rhodes realised that they would impose a severe strain on the Colony's resources at a time when her financial position was not too flourishing. He maintained that East London should be looked upon as a market for the grain trade of the Free State and Eastern Province and

\(^{35}\) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.183  
\(^{36}\) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.386  
\(^{37}\) Cape Hansard, 1890, p.21
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\(^{35}\) Basil Williams, \textit{op.cit.}, p.183

\(^{36}\) Hofmeyr, \textit{op.cit.}, p.386

\(^{37}\) Cape Hansard, 1890, p.21
not as a potential rival of Port Elizabeth for long-distance traffic.

In the absence of the Prime Minister, due to illness, the proposals were introduced by the Railway Commissioner, Col. Schermbrucker, on 16th June. Sauer condemned the whole scheme as a fiasco which would undermine the finances of the country, and suggested that its aims were "more to consolidate a party than to meet the interests and demands of the country".\(^{(33)}\) In the face of a vigorous opposition attack, the government suffered a series of defeats in Committee, and when Sprigg returned to the Assembly on the 8th July, it was to move the adjournment of the House.\(^{(39)}\) He then placed himself in the hands of the Governor, but agreed to remain in office until a new ministry had been appointed.\(^{(40)}\)

Sauer had meanwhile been invited to form a government, and although he was prepared to do so, he considered that it would be in the interests of the country if the formation of a ministry were entrusted to someone "who might be able to combine in his government a wider representation of the several parties in the country".\(^{(41)}\) In other words, Sauer realised the difficulty of attempting to form a ministry that did not have the confidence of Hofmeyr and the Bond party. He, therefore, advised the Governor to send for Rhodes, who subsequently announced the formation of his Cabinet on 17th July.

Before accepting the Governor's commission, however, Rhodes took steps to ensure that he would have the support of the Bond. Accordingly, a meeting was held on 16th July at which Rhodes explained his policy, and asked for their co-operation. As a result, it was unanimously agreed "that Mr. Rhodes and his government should be given 'fair play' in the administration of the country and its interests". At the same time, Rhodes offered to serve

\(^{(33)}\) Ibid., p.39  
\(^{(39)}\) Ibid., p.143; Cape Times, 9/7/90  
\(^{(40)}\) Cape Hansard, 1890, p.144  
\(^{(41)}\) Cape Times, 16/7/90
under Hofmeyr or to give him a seat in the Cabinet.\(^{(42)}\) In refusing Rhodes's offer, the Bond leader laid himself open to the charge of political dishonesty, as it was felt that as his party was mainly responsible for Sprigg's defeat, it should have been prepared to form a ministry itself.\(^{(43)}\)

The agreement thus arrived at was reflected in the composition of the new ministry. Under Rhodes as Prime Minister and Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works were Merriman, Treasurer General; P. H. Faure, Secretary for Native Affairs; and Sivewright, Minister without Portfolio.\(^{(44)}\) The Premier had hoped to hold office without portfolio, and had in fact been sworn in as such, but as his position was held to be unconstitutional, Sivewright resigned to enable Rhodes to become Commissioner. The arrangement was only temporary, however, as Sivewright resumed office as Commissioner two months later, while Rhodes continued the administration as Prime Minister only. The confusion caused by the objection to what was, at most, a technical constitutional fault was due to the unnecessary interference of the Speaker,\(^{(45)}\) and the position was not legalised until the passing of the Minister of Agriculture Bill in 1893.\(^{(46)}\)

The new ministry was one of undoubted administrative ability, but from its inception it was feared that it would not be strong and lasting, as differences were bound to occur between the two Bondsmen, Sivewright and Faure, and the three opposition members, Merriman, Sauer and Innes. Merriman certainly did not feel happy in his new position. He had long disliked Rhodes's Northern policy, and, in a letter written only three months before assuming office, denounced the Chartered Company's projects as an "open filibustering expedition".\(^{(47)}\) In a letter written to Charlotte

\(^{(42)}\) Hofmeyr, \textit{op. cit.}, p.388
\(^{(43)}\) Cape Times, 17/7/90
\(^{(44)}\) Hofmeyr, \textit{op. cit.}, p.389
\(^{(45)}\) Cape Hansard, 1890, p.170; \textit{Ibid.} 1891, p.108
\(^{(46)}\) Innes, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 81-82
\(^{(47)}\) Sir P. Laurence, \textit{Life of John X. Merriman}, p.128
Barry at the close of the session, he refers to the difficult position occupied by Sauer, Innes and himself. He felt that Rhodes would have been able to carry on the administration just as well with Sprigg and Upington, but as he had helped to bring about their downfall, he could hardly have refused Rhodes's offer to join the ministry. Further comment on the new ministry is found in a "Cape Times" editorial of 18th July, 1890. While expressing its disapproval of Rhodes's dual position as representative of the Chartered Company and Prime Minister, the article expresses confidence in his ability to carry out a truly South African policy, and to retain the necessary control over his ministers. Rhodes was to exercise this "necessary control" for nearly three years, but, in the face of increasing internal tensions, was unable to prevent the disruption caused by the Logan Contract.

In his decision to form a ministry, Rhodes had been influenced largely by the knowledge that he would have the support of Hofmeyr and the Africander Bond. He had received a promise of "fair play" from them, and a similar assurance was given by the newly-formed Progressive Party. As the Bond did not have an absolute majority in the House, Hofmeyr had always refused to undertake the responsibility of forming a ministry. Nevertheless, the votes he commanded had enabled him to control the destinies of the governments of Scanlen, Upington and Sprigg. Like Rhodes, he preferred, wherever possible, to negotiate with his opponents than to fight openly, and was quite satisfied to remain the "power behind the throne", the secret counsellor of those ministries he supported. He, no doubt, also realised that while the majority of his supporters were unfitted for administrative duties, acceptance of office would force him, in turn, to rely on the votes of others. An inevitable result of this policy was the development of the caucus

(48) Merriman Papers, No. 121, J.X.M. to Charlotte Barry, 1.10.90
(49) See Cape Hansard, 1890, p.149
(50) Fuller: Cecil Rhodes, A Monograph and a Reminiscence, p.165
system in the Cape parliament only a few years after its invention by the Irish party in the House of Commons.\(^{51}\) The caucus, first introduced by Hofmeyr into the Bond party, soon became an important factor in Cape politics, and Rhodes and Hofmeyr were frequently attacked for their use of a device which was regarded by their opponents as a threat to free constitutional government.\(^{52}\)

Rhodes did not attempt to deny the close co-operation that existed between himself and Hofmeyr, and defined their relationship in the course of the 1892 Franchise debate. "He would take the House into his secrets. He did consult the hon. member for Stellenbosch. He consulted him in the first place, because he represented a large section of the people of this country; in the second place, because he found his sound judgement was of enormous assistance to him. On a purely trivial little question they had a couple of hours' discussion."\(^{53}\) This was the policy adopted by Rhodes throughout his period of office. Hofmeyr was usually consulted before a proposal was submitted to the House, and the preliminary discussions with the Bond caucus enabled Rhodes to judge to what extent he would have their support. As a result of this, there were times when he laid himself open, with some justification, to the charge of merely following the dictates of that party. But it is equally true that there were certain topics on which he was not prepared to brook any interference. Thus, in the face of vigorous Bond opposition, he appointed Dr. Muir to the position of Superintendent-General of Education in succession to Sir Langham Dale - an appointment which was fully justified in the light of the subsequent progress of elementary education in the Colony between 1892 and 1895.\(^{54}\) Similarly, in 1894, he introduced the Scab Act, and put it into effect the following year despite the very real threat that a breakdown of the alliance would result.

\(^{51}\) Innes, op.cit., p.72
\(^{52}\) Cape Hansard, 1894, pp. 385 and 464. See Chapter V, Glen Grey
\(^{53}\) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.439
\(^{54}\) The statistics show that 726 additional schools were set up in this period, providing facilities for an additional 28,087 pupils. Cape Times, 19/11/95
In the course of a conversation with the leader of the Progressive Party shortly after Dr. Muir's appointment had been decided upon, Rhodes expressed his views on education in particular and on his alliance with the Bond in general. "...I would throw up my position to-morrow, rather than hand over the youth of the Cape Colony to any person not in my judgement fully qualified for such a responsible position, however ardently he might be supported by local authorities. You know ... the legislation which pleases the Dutch farmers. Well, I have great sympathy with them; they have needs and experiences which we are all, I sincerely think, apt to overlook. I help them as far as I can, instead of opposing them. Is not that the better way? It pleases them and it pleases me. As for other minor measures, which I have supported, if men like to put blue ribbon on their cattle when they send them to market, why shouldn't they?"(55) In other words, he was prepared to compromise when questions of serious policy were not involved. The extent to which Rhodes succeeded in remaining true to this principle during his five and a half years of Premiership will be discussed in the following chapters.

As the Rhodes ministry had taken office in the middle of the session, it was unable to introduce any important legislation. The session did, however, present a severe test to the new administration in the form of an attack on Rhodes's "dual position". On the 21st July Mr. Laing moved "That in the interests of this country it is impolitic and undesirable that the official representative of the British South Africa Company should be Prime Minister of this Colony". (56) The Company, he considered, was in all ways the representative of the Imperial Government, having Imperial backing and Imperial objects and ideals. In contrast, the objects and ideals of the Colony were South African. Where these interests clashed, Rhodes would be placed in a very difficult position. "Is he going to stick to the Chartered Company,

(55) Fuller, op.cit., p.168
(56) Cape Hansard, 189C, p.162
or will he throw in his lot with the Cape Colony as a patriot of this Colony?" Laing, himself, thought that in the event of any difficulty Rhodes's choice would lie with the former.

The debate which followed is of special significance. Hofmeyr was in Pretoria at the time as, indeed, he had been when Rhodes received the unanimous promise of "fair play" from the Bond. The support Rhodes received from the Africander party during this period proves, therefore, that the alliance was not merely based on the friendship existing between the two leaders. Thus we find Mr. le Roex, who represented the extreme left wing of the party, strongly supporting Rhodes as the best man to promote South African union. (57)

In reply to Laing's speech, Rhodes denied that there was any possibility of a clash between the Chartered Company and the Colonial Government. The interior movement, he said, had been designed to save the Northern territories from Germany or Portugal, or "from transference to a neighbouring state" - events which would have weakened the Colony in the ultimate negotiations for a united South Africa. While all responsibility rested on the Company, all the benefits resulting from the opening up of the new territories would be enjoyed by the Colony. It could not be said, therefore, that his policy was Imperialistic.

Reverting once more to the "dual position" question, Rhodes pointed out that there had not been the slightest chance of his becoming Premier when he had entered into his agreement with the Colony. Nor had he wanted to take over this position, but he had felt it was his duty to do so. He, therefore, assured the House that "if such a contingency should arrive - which I cannot foresee - that the interests of the Chartered Company and this colony may clash, I will at once place myself in the hands of His Excellency the Governor." (58) Following this assurance, the motion was negatived by a large majority.

(57) Ibid., p.164
(58) Ibid., pp. 164-165
While it was true that in matters such as the Bechuanaland railway agreement, Rhodes would be concerned as Commissioner and as Director of the Chartered Company, in assuming in such cases that his interests would lie with the Company, Laing overstated his case. As the "Cape Times" pointed out, Rhodes had the right to ask the House to trust him and not to presume his "failure under temptation".(59) Nevertheless, despite the auspicious beginnings, history shows us that as a result of the change of policy adopted by Rhodes four years later, he was, in his position as the controlling influence of the Chartered Company, and as Prime Minister of the Colony, to compromise both the Imperial and Cape Governments as well as himself, and those who had complained of the incompatibility of his dual position were to be vindicated.

(59) Cape Times, 27/7/90
CHAPTER II

THE FRANCHISE AND BALLOT ACT

The Constitution Ordinance - Native Franchise - Hofmeyr's 1891 Resolution - the Dual Vote - Negotiation and Compromise - Government's Proposals - Vote by Ballot - Franchise and Ballot Bill - Redistribution of Seats - Comments and Conclusion

Much of the major legislation introduced by Rhodes during his period of office was directly or indirectly concerned with the Native question, and it was, therefore, necessary for him to attempt to reconcile the conflicting viewpoints of his supporters. This was especially true of the period before 1893, when the presence in the Cabinet of Kerriman, Sauer and Innes, representing the so-called "negrophilist" as opposed to the "repressive" school of thought, made it essential for him to find a modus vivendi with regard to Native legislation if the solidarity of the Cabinet were to be maintained.

Representative government had been established at the Cape by the Constitution Ordinance of 1853. The Colonial Secretary, Newcastle, had refused to impose any restrictions on non-Europeans, and the right to vote and to stand for election to the House of Assembly was based on occupation of premises worth £25 per annum, or a salary of £50, or £25 with board and lodging. (1) At that time, the few Natives eligible rarely voted, but by 1891 their great increase in numbers enabled them to have a decisive influence in 7 out of the Colony's 37 constituencies, that is 12 of the 76 members of the Colonial Assembly. (2)

In an attempt to meet the potential danger of the growing Native vote, Sir Gordon Sprigg had, in 1887, introduced the Parliamentary Registration Bill, which removed from the rolls large numbers of Natives living under communal tenure. The check had not, however, been permanent, and Hofmeyr feared that unless more

(2) Imvo, 6/8/91
effective legislation was introduced a struggle for political control would result, not merely between black and white, but between what he termed "barbarism and civilisation".\(^3\) Rhodes had supported the 1887 Bill, and agreed that it was necessary to reduce the Native vote. At the same time, he realised that it was a delicate subject which would have to be carefully dealt with. In 1853, the equal franchise had been opposed by the colonists, but since then many people, led by Saul Solomon, Innes, Merriman and Sauer, had come to regard the equal franchise as the best means of educating the Natives and avoiding oppression. Rhodes opposed this, believing that the Natives should only enjoy the franchise after years of political education. But perhaps his main reason for supporting Hofmeyr's proposals was the realisation that any attempt at South African unity would break down over the franchise question. His remarks on this subject during the 1887 Registration Bill debate show clearly that he realised that some alteration of the liberal Cape franchise would be necessary if this were to be obtained.\(^4\) In Natal, the high property qualification virtually excluded the large Native population; in the Free State the franchise was limited to Europeans; in the Transvaal the Grondwet expressly excluded Natives from equal rights in "church and state".\(^5\)

Early in the session of 1891, a special committee of the Bond was appointed to undertake the difficult task of drawing up a resolution that would have the support of all members of the Cabinet. Innes, especially, was in a very difficult position, as he had pledged himself to oppose any restriction of the existing Native vote, but under pressure from Merriman and Sauer he agreed to accept moderate changes.\(^6\) On 22nd July, Rhodes wrote to Hofmeyr indicating the form of resolution which the Cabinet would support in the House. While admitting that the terms were vague, he stated

\(^3\) Hofmeyr, op. cit., p.430  
\(^4\) Vindex, op. cit., p.163  
\(^5\) Cambridge History, Vol. 8, pp. 388-390  
\(^6\) Laurence, op. cit., p.134
that it was clearly understood that the Assembly's acceptance of
the resolution would bind them to introduce legislation the fol-
lowing session. (7)

Thus on the 8th August, 1891, Hofmeyr moved "that the atten-
tion of the Government be directed to the question of the Parlia-
mentary Franchise, with a view to such legislation during the
next session of Parliament as to secure due weight in the future
for the material and educational interests of the Colony". (8) In
support of his motion, Hofmeyr quoted statistics to show that the
ratio of black and white had more than doubled in the past twenty-
six years. (9) This was largely due to the annexation of the
Transkei, but there, too, there had been a great increase in popu-
lation. (10) Turning to the registration figures, he pointed out
that the Act of 1887 had merely been a temporary check, and he
feared, therefore, that if the register in the Transkei and Fron-
tier districts reached the same ratio as in other parts of the
Colony, the white population would be utterly swamped. Their
low franchise was unique in South Africa, and he believed that
it would ultimately prove to be the major cause of separation
between the Colony and the other states. While not proposing
to "undo the past by direct interference with those who already
possessed the franchise", he suggested that a man with a higher
property qualification and a higher income should have an addi-
tional vote. A second vote should also be given on the basis
of education. In conclusion, Hofmeyr expressed his willingness
to support any better plan that might be devised. (11)

While Rhodes welcomed the resolution as one which gave
them the opportunity of carefully considering the matter, (12) it
was strongly opposed by those who regarded it merely as a Bond
device to increase its power at the expense of the Native vote.
The opposition was led by Sir Gordon Sprigg, who claimed that

(7) Hofmeyr, op. cit., p.430
(8) Cape Hansard, 1891, p.327
(9) Census, 1865: 180,000 whites - 314,000 blacks
  1891: 376,000 " - 1,148,000 "
(10) Transkei, 1879, 260,000; 1891, 477,000
(11) Cape Hansard, 1891, pp. 327-330
(12) Ibid., pp. 331-333
the franchise question had split the ministry, and that Rhodes and Hofmeyr had, therefore, been forced to come to an arrangement not to press the matter this session.\(^{(13)}\)

Throughout the debate great interest was shown in the attitude that would be taken up by Sauer, Merriman and Innes - the "three extinct volcanoes" as Upington called them.\(^{(14)}\) When Sauer rose, it was to propose an amendment. He felt that he could not accept the motion because it was a direct instruction to the ministry, and he accordingly moved "that the attention of the Government be directed to the question of the Parliamentary Franchise with a view to a consideration of the question whether any legislation is required to secure due weight in the future for the material and educational interests of the Colony".\(^{(15)}\) He admitted that he would rather have left the matter alone, but was prepared to deal with the question seriously, and consider what was best suited to the requirements of the country.\(^{(16)}\) Sauer opposed the idea of a differential franchise, and in this was supported by Merriman, who feared that if the franchise question was shirked altogether, the Europeans might be driven into two hostile camps.\(^{(17)}\) Finally, Innes, in reply to the attacks made on him, assured the House that his principles remained unchanged, and would not be sacrificed by him. There would be time next year when the government's plans were made known to see if their accusations were justified.\(^{(18)}\) At the conclusion of the debate, Sauer's amendment was accepted by Hofmeyr, and carried by 45 votes to 22.\(^{(19)}\)

Hofmeyr's motion was widely commented upon in the Colonial press. There is no doubt, however, that Sauer's amendment which placed the initiative for future action in the hands of the ministry

(13) Ibid., pp. 344-347
(14) Ibid., p. 337
(15) Ibid., p. 336
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid., p. 339-341
(18) Ibid., p. 343
(19) Ibid., p. 347
did much to moderate criticism. **Imvo**, which considered that Hofmeyr was motivated solely by a desire to add to the political power of the Bond, welcomed it as "the first victory against the reactionary party".\(^{(20)}\)

During the months that followed, Hofmeyr addressed meetings in defence of his dual vote proposals. He emphatically denied that such legislation would reduce the power of the English vote. Speaking at Stellenbosch, he pointed out that the towns, where property was more expensive, would gain, and in Cape Town 4,962 voters would be entitled to a second vote through the £100 property qualifications.\(^{(21)}\)

Meanwhile, apart from a vague reference to the franchise question by Sauer at a Civic Banquet in Cape Town on 13th November\(^{(22)}\), there had been no indication of the course of procedure the government proposed to follow, although there was widespread belief at this time that there was a possibility of a Cabinet split.\(^{(23)}\)

Four months were to pass before the Government's policy was announced. During this period attempts were being made in the Cabinet to reach agreement on the nature of the franchise changes. Innes, especially, was in a very difficult position, and his indecision is apparent in his letters to Merriman at this time. He felt that the correct thing for him to do was to refuse to agree to any changes. "Unless we make a stand soon we shall not know where consistently and loyally to stop".\(^{(24)}\)

On the 3rd of February Sauer expressed the fear that Innes was on the point of resigning, as he was not prepared to agree to Hofmeyr's £75 occupation proposals,\(^{(25)}\) but in a letter of the same date Innes told Merriman that he would consent to a moderate raising of the franchise if he were allowed to explain his attitude towards the Bill in the House.\(^{(26)}\)

Sauer was thus able on the 11th of February to cable the news that agreement had been

\(^{(20)}\) **Imvo**, 16/8/91
\(^{(21)}\) **Cape Times**, 15/1/92
\(^{(22)}\) *Ibid.*, 14/11/91
\(^{(24)}\) *Merriman Papers*, No. 20, Innes to J.X.M. 27/1/92
\(^{(26)}\) *Ibid.*, No. 48, Innes to J.X.M. 3/2/92
Innes, however, was not yet satisfied with the state of affairs, and in a letter to Merriman written shortly afterwards remarked that although he had agreed to a "sloppy sort of a compromise" with regard to the Franchise Bill, he would be glad to be out of office again.\(^{(28)}\)

This was the background to Sauer's "franchise speech" at Aliwal North on 12th March. In stressing the need for unity among the white sections of the population, Sauer expressed his confidence that the Government bill would help to remove suspicion between the two classes. While realising the danger of a low franchise where there were people bordering on barbarism, neither he nor Innes would support a measure which differentiated between blacks and whites. The government intended that all those on the voting register should remain, and while it was admitted that there were many exercising the franchise who were not competent to do so, they would not agree to a raising of the franchise to make it beyond the reach of the Natives. They opposed the dual vote suggestion as they believed that it was not only impracticable but also contrary to the precept that "a man should arrive at a certain stage of civilisation before being given the privileges of the franchise". They proposed instead an increase in the property qualification. In addition, it was felt that a man who could not read or write was not entitled to the franchise, and a simple but effective education test had been devised by the Government. The question of redistribution of seats and vote by ballot would be dealt with at another time.\(^{(29)}\)

In an accompanying leading article the "Cape Times" expressed its regret that these matters were not also being considered. It maintained that the Government's proposals did not go far enough, and condemned them as a "piecemeal operation" merely postponing the general overhaul. \(\text{Imvo, on the other hand, welcomed the}\)

\(^{(27)}\) Ibid., No. 64, Sauer to J.X.M. and \(\text{\&}\) (London, 11/2/92, Have arrived at modus vivendi franchise)

\(^{(28)}\) Ibid., No. 92, Innes to J.X.M., 24/2/92

\(^{(29)}\) Cape Times, 14/3/92

\(^{(30)}\) Ibid.
Government's scheme as one - in contrast to Hofmeyr's - devised to attract moderate men of all parties, and gave credit to the Government for following a course of procedure in this matter quite apart from considerations of class, such as in the principle of a plural vote for the more privileged members of the community, and colour. (31) This comment is of some significance. Imvo, it will be remembered, was the leading organ of Native opinion in the Colony and its praise of the "statesmanship of the government plan" is in direct contrast to its bitter attacks made previously on Hofmeyr's original proposals. The "compromise negotiations" were, however, not yet completed, and Sauer was able to announce in Port Elizabeth that the Government's bill would also make provision for vote by ballot. (32)

There had long been agitation for the introduction of voting by ballot in the Cape Colony, and during the past two sessions bills to implement this had been introduced by Mr. Orpen. (33) His efforts were unsuccessful, however, as his proposals were not only opposed by Rhodes, Hofmeyr and the Bond members, but also by men such as Kerriman and Upington. Others again felt that a general ballot was impracticable, and that it should only be applied in the larger areas. The "Cape Times" was one of Orpen's supporters. Commenting on the 1891 debate it stated: "That the protection of the ballot is especially needed in the country districts for coloured people is shown by the confession of its enemies ... if the coloured people are capable of exercising the franchise, they are entitled to protection." (34) Nevertheless, Sauer's Port Elizabeth announcement was not generally welcomed, as it was feared that the ballot provisions would wreck the Franchise Bill in the Committee stage. (35)

The motion for the first reading of the "Bill to amend the

(31) Imvo, 17/9/92
(32) Cape Times, 9/4/92
(33) See Cape Hansard, 1890 pp. 154-160: 1891, pp.35-39
(34) Cape Times, 6/6/91
(35) Ibid., 9/7/92
law with regard to the qualifications of voters for Members of Parliament, and to make provision for taking votes by ballot at Parliamentary elections" was introduced by Rhodes on 24th June,(36) three weeks after the commencement of the 1892 session. In moving the second reading of the Bill on the 11th of July, Rhodes, while admitting that it proposed a great change in the constitution, stated that in the absence of public opposition he felt assured that the bill was the expressed desire of the country. Quoting examples of European countries, Rhodes showed that the Cape franchise was comparatively lower than almost any of these, while in countries where there was a mixed population, events had shown that extreme caution was necessary in granting the franchise to coloured people. Thus, in Jamaica, the granting of freedom of constitutional rights to negroes in 1834 had brought about the revolt of 1865. In their own country the Imperial Government had set a precedent in Griqualand West by raising the wage qualification from £50 to £100 to exclude particularly the Native vote. As far as the Colony was concerned, he did not believe it right to give two votes to a man of intelligence and property and one to a barbarian, but was of the opinion, rather, that they should look upon a voter as a citizen of some education, and one who was either possessed of some slight means or who had recognised "the dignity of labour".

Rhodes then turned to a consideration of the provisions of the Bill. Under clause 3, those who were already on the voters' list were not to be deprived of the franchise. The occupation qualification was to be raised from £25 to £75 (Clause 4). The occupation qualification, he pointed out, should not be confused with the ownership qualification, which was about £6 per annum. In addition, provision was made for an education test (Clause 6), whereby a voter had to prove his ability to write his name, address and occupation. Provision had also been made for voting by ballot because of the continued application for it by a large section of the population. Nevertheless the Premier did not

(36) Cape Hansard, 1892, p.66
attempt to hide the fact that he objected to the ballot in toto "because he liked to know how a man voted". (37) On the question, however, of whether the ballot should be introduced immediately or not, it had been necessary to compromise and its operation was delayed until after the General Election of 1894. Rhodes concluded by discounting the belief that the Bill had been designed by the Bond to further its own ends, and assured the House that had that been the case he would not have introduced it. (38)

Sir Gordon Sprigg's speech opposing Rhodes's proposals was more in the nature of an attack on the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance than on the Bill itself, which he denounced as unprincipled and dishonest, being aimed at a small section of the electorate. It is difficult, however, to reconcile the general trend of Sprigg's remarks with his introduction of the Parliamentary Registration Bill in 1887. (39) He regarded the education qualification as the only redeeming feature of the Bill, but the provision that those already on the register were not to be affected meant that ignorance was to be a predominant factor in the representation of the people for the next twenty years. Turning to the clauses providing for voting by ballot, Sprigg condemned the proposal to delay their effective operation until 1898, and suggested that in the event of a change of government these clauses might be removed by amendment. The fact that the three ministers who objected to the ballot were not the same three who objected to the raising of the franchise showed the "changeable nature of the happy family".

This was undoubtedly true. Sauer, Sivewright and Innes favoured the ballot; Rhodes, Merriman and Faure did not, but as it was realised that the ballot provision would greatly strengthen the Bill in the eyes of the House a compromise was arrived at. Nor was this compromise confined to the Cabinet, for Hof-

(37) Ibid., p.152
(38) Ibid., pp. 149-152
(39) See Vindex, op.cit., pp. 150-151
meyr obtained the promise of Progressive party support for the higher franchise in return for the inclusion of the ballot clauses. (40) Sprigg had little justification, therefore, for his concluding accusation that the Bill was merely a political scheme to enable certain Ministers to remain in office; a measure introduced by the Government to satisfy the desires of the Bond. (41)

In reply to Sprigg's allegations, Sauer denied that the ministry was not agreed upon the Bill. At the time when Hofmeyr introduced his resolution he feared that extreme views would be put forward, and would have preferred not to touch the franchise. He had since realised that his fears were groundless, and considered that the moderation shown by the Dutch people reflected the highest credit upon them. He admitted that there had been great changes in the Colony since the passing of the Constitution Ordinance as the result of annexation, and that there would be further annexation in the future. Consequently, there were many Natives exercising the franchise under the £25 qualification who were not competent to do so. Although he had many reasons for wishing that the franchise could remain unaltered, his views were not shared by the bulk of the people, and by many of the Natives themselves. As far as the provisions of the Bill were concerned, he felt that the liberal parliamentary aid to schools gave all sections of the population the opportunity of fulfilling the educational qualifications, while the £75 qualification was not a high standard. He had always favoured the ballot principle, and felt that it was better to accept a deferred ballot than to have no ballot at all. Above all, the Bill recognised the principle of political equality, and for this reason he was prepared to accept it. (42)

The most significant speech, however, was that of the Attorney General, Innes, in which he explained why he had thought it right

(40) Fuller, op.cit., p.180
(41) Cape Hansard, 1892, pp. 152-157
(42) Ibid., pp. 157-159
and proper for him to join in the responsibility of bringing the Bill forward, although there were some provisions to which he objected. While he considered that the low franchise had worked very well and that the Natives had not abused their privileges in the past, he had long favoured the introduction of an education test. When he voted for the resolution last session, he had hoped that the Premier and his colleagues would find no need for change. During the recess, however, they had decided to move in this matter, and he admitted that his first impulse was to have nothing to do with it. Realizing, however, that the agitation was likely to develop on racial lines and result in a far more drastic and sweeping measure, he had decided that it would be better for him, and those thinking similarly, "to put those opinions for the time in their pockets, and moderate that which they could not prevent". (43)

Developing this theme, Innes maintained that those opposing the Bill were doing so, not for love of the Natives, but because of their distrust of the Bond. Racial agitation would be fatal for the Natives, and he believed he was speaking up for them by supporting the Bill. He had consulted their leaders and had been advised to make a compromise. In doing so, he knew the risk he was taking of misrepresentation by his opponents and of being misunderstood by his friends. After discussing the moderate changes to be introduced by the Bill, with special reference to the provision protecting existing rights, Innes expressed the belief that the compromise would be final and permanent. If the measure turned out as he expected, he would ignore criticism "because he should have done something to draw together all sections of Her Majesty's subjects in this Colony". (44)

Merriman, too, joined the debate in defence of the Bill. He denied that the Government had given any pledges to the Bond. The Prime Minister had merely asked them for "fair play", and they were justified in working with them for the good of the

(43) Ibid., p.166
(44) Ibid., pp. 165-169
country as long as they secured a fair representation for their views and the views of those who had hitherto acted with them. He claimed that the country favoured the Bill, and even Imvo was not opposed to it. In the absence of opposition, he deplored the suggestion that the Bill should be laid before the country, as they should avoid the danger of making the Native vote an election platform. He, therefore, appealed to moderate members to support the Government and to stop agitation which would only result in a more drastic measure. (45)

After a protracted debate, the second reading was passed by a majority of 25. (46) The Committee stage resulted in no major changes, but on the 28th July Mr. Douglass, the member for Grahamstown, gave notice to move on the order for the third reading "that a measure dealing with the Parliamentary franchise, so as to give increased weight to education and material wealth, that does not readjust Parliamentary representation is incomplete and unsatisfactory, and that therefore the Bill will not be further proceeded with". (47) Mr. Douglass claimed that the parliamentary franchise and parliamentary representation were synonymous, and that it was "unequal in the extreme" to alter one without the other. (48) Innes, in reply, maintained that only when anomalies prevent the voice of the people being properly heard ought redistribution to be connected with the franchise. This had applied in England in 1832 and 1867 where there were new centres of population that were not represented. (49)

Nevertheless, an analysis of the average number of voters per representative in the various constituencies shows clearly that there were several glaring inequalities. There were 90,717 voters in the Colony, giving an average of 1194 voters to each member. At the one extreme the Port Elizabeth average was 2,550, while, at the other, that of Victoria East was 371. (50) On the other hand, it could be argued that many of the divisions, while

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(45) Ibid., pp. 193-195
(47) Ibid., p.275
(48) Ibid., p.296
(49) Ibid., p.299
(50) Appendix A
not possessing 2,400 voters, which was the numerical requirement for a two-member constituency, were entitled to this privilege by virtue of their wealth and importance. Similarly, it was suggested that a small population occupying a large area required a higher standard of representation than compact masses of population among whom there could be little diversity of interests. (51)

Even when these factors are considered, however, there is no doubt that some redistribution was necessary. This was not denied by members of the Government, but they did not consider that it was essential, and, in any case, it is doubtful whether Rhodes could have carried a measure of this nature. Innes, himself, pointed out in the debate that redistribution could only be dealt with by the strongest of governments. (52) Earlier in the session Rhodes, in reply to a question raised by Dr. Smuts, said that the Government had promised to deal with the franchise, and had a sufficiently difficult question to handle without adding a Redistribution of Seats Bill. (53) The debate following Mr. Douglass's motion provides a good example of the difficulties involved. The figures quoted by the mover to show the pressing need for redistribution were equally effectively used by Hofmeyr and Innes to counter his proposal. Hofmeyr, in fact, quoted voluminous figures to show that in any redistribution scheme Mr. Douglass's own constituency, Grahamstown, would be one of the first to lose a representative. (54)

Apart from these difficulties an important factor in the matter of redistribution was undoubtedly the attitude of the Bond party. This attitude was clarified at the Bond Conference in Queenstown in March 1893, when a motion was introduced urging the Government to give its immediate attention to this subject. The debate on this resolution showed that while the need for reform was recognised, and while legislation was, in fact, favoured by many of the delegates, they were not prepared to support any

(51) Cape Hansard, 1892, p.299
(52) Ibid., p.300
(53) Ibid., p.23
(54) Ibid., p.299
measure which would not result in redistribution to their advantage. The Rev. S. J. du Toit questioned the competence of a ministry of two wings to undertake the work, and warned the Congress of the risk of attempting it until they had strengthened their party in the constituencies and in the House. At present, the Bond might lose twenty seats or gain twenty, depending upon "who handled the scissors". These statements, together with those of other leading Bondsmen, show clearly that they were motivated solely by political considerations and were only prepared to consider redistribution favourably if the aggrandisement of their party were assured. (55)

However, to return to the 1892 debate. The amendment was subsequently negatived and the Franchise and Ballot Bill was read a third time and passed. (56) The voting figures show that a large majority in parliament considered that some change in the franchise law was necessary, and there was, in addition, a remarkable absence of opposition to the Bill outside the House. In contrast, Hofmeyr's dual vote proposals were severely condemned, of distrust of the Bond's motives and partly because/ partly because they were considered contrary to the Cape tradition of not differentiating on grounds of colour. While some considered the Bill incomplete because of its failure to deal with redistribution, (57) it was realised that there were many who were in favour of a far more drastic measure. For this reason, the belated petition against the Bill by the Coloured Agitation Committee in Kimberley, (58) and their cable to Gladstone asking for Royal Assent to be withheld until the petition had been received, was strongly condemned in the colonial press. (59) While the Ministers themselves attached no importance to the petition signed by some 10,341 people, mainly Asiatics, (60) it was not without effect in England. In a dispatch, the Secretary of State, Lord Ripon, while informing the Governor that the Queen would not be advised to inter-

fere with the operation of the Act, condemned the measure as "... legislation contrary to the spirit and tendency of public opinion in the present day". (61)

The practical effect of the measure can be seen in the registration figures for 1893. (62) These show an increase of 4,566 European voters as against a decrease of 3,348 non-European. This could hardly be called a sweeping change in an electorate of 90,717, and does not lend colour to the frequent accusation that Hofmeyr had merely sought to introduce the measure for the sake of strengthening his party, although, judging from the Bondsmen's attitude towards redistribution, there were, no doubt, some of them who hoped that the Bill would have this result as it became increasingly effective. In fairness to Hofmeyr it must be said that he, at any rate, honestly regarded the growing Native vote as a danger to the Colony, and he seized the opportunity presented by Rhodes's accession to power of averting this danger. As had been pointed out in the debates, the policy of annexation adopted by the Colony would, if continued, lead to a great increase in the number of Natives under their control. And further, if the ratio of voters in the Frontier districts was to reach that of the other parts of the Colony, the result would be a swamping of the register by "blanket Kaffirs", as Sauer called them. (63)

With this viewpoint Rhodes was in full agreement, and the course followed by him was the natural development of his policy as expressed in the Parliamentary Registration debate five years previously. "Does this House think it right that men in a state of pure barbarism should have the franchise and the vote? ... I will lay down my own policy on this Native question. Either you have to receive them on an equal footing as citizens, or call them a subject race. ... Treat the Natives as a subject people as long as they continue in a state of barbarism and communal tenure; ..." (64) In agreeing to introduce legislation on the

(61) Ibid., C. of G.H. No. 8, 27/1/93
(62) Appendix B
(63) Cape Hansard, 1891, pp. 327-330; 1892, p.157-159
(64) Vindex, op. cit., pp. 158-159
basis of Hofmeyr’s 1891 resolution, therefore, Rhodes cannot be accused of inconsistency or of having sacrificed his principles. These charges were made against Merriman, Sauer and Innes, especially the latter, but they were able to justify their conduct in the light of the circumstances in which they found themselves. In a final analysis, therefore, the Franchise and Ballot Bill is perhaps the supreme example of Rhodes’s ability, by compromise and negotiation, to formulate a policy which was acceptable to his heterogeneous supporters.

But while the franchise policy adopted by Rhodes was acceptable to the Bond, he did not regard the Native merely as a hewer of wood and a drawer of water. As his views on the Native question matured, and as his policy developed, he came to believe that the Europeans had a definite responsibility towards the primitive peoples with whom they came into contact. The Native he regarded as a child, to be treated neither as a full-fledged citizen nor as though he were incapable of growth. Where restriction of the franchise, he realised, was not enough, and his desire to implement a more constructive policy resulted in the introduction of the Glen Grey Bill in the Cape House two years later.
CHAPTER III

THE LOGAN CONTRACT

Weakness of the Ministry - Logan Contract - Correspondence - Resignation - Rhodes and De Villiers - Second Rhodes Ministry - Session of 1893 - Select Committee - Report - Conclusions - General Election of 1894

The term "a Ministry of all the Talents" had been used by Disraeli to describe Gladstone's Cabinet, and when Parliament adjourned in 1892, it seemed that this description could well be applied to the Rhodes Administration. With the undoubted prestige he had brought to the Premiership, and his ability to reconcile conflicting interests, Rhodes was able to hold the Ministry together, and the attempts to drive a wedge between what Sprigg called its "left and right wings" had thus far been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, there was an ever-present threat of dissension within the Ministry itself. Merriman had not willingly accepted office, and the strain imposed upon the Ministry in the attempt to reach unanimity on the franchise legislation had almost caused Innes to tender his resignation. At the same time, their distrust of the Bond resulted in a lack of sympathy between them and Sivewright, the leading Bondsman in the Cabinet. On questions of Native policy they were diametrically opposed to each other, and the enmity was further aggravated by their jealousy of the special confidence Rhodes placed in Sivewright. The latter, it will be remembered, was largely instrumental in gaining Hofmeyr's approval of the 1899 railway agreement between the Colony and the Chartered Company, and, since then, Rhodes had frequently

(1) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.441
(2) Vide supra p. 14
(3) Vide supra p. 24
(4) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.187
used Sivewright's undoubted ability in the furtherance of his schemes.(5)

Unfortunately, Sivewright's methods were not always above reproach, and his actions did not help to lessen the ill-feeling between himself and his three "left-wing" colleagues. On one occasion, Rhodes's tactful intervention was necessary in a situation which might have had serious repercussions in the Cabinet and in Parliament. This was the "Bamberger case", which, had Sivewright's view prevailed, would have meant the negation of the important principle of complete impartiality in making judicial appointments. To this Innes, as Attorney-General, was not prepared to agree, and it was on his insistence that the matter was re-considered.(6) It can thus readily be appreciated that the Cabinet was in no condition to meet the crisis precipitated by the Logan Contract.

At this time, the needs of railway passengers were met by refreshment rooms at the various stations. These were managed by private individuals, chief of whom was a personal friend of Sivewright's, Mr. J. D. Logan, who controlled many of the main refreshment rooms on the Cape Railways. This system had several practical defects, as for example the difficulty of altering the time-table,(7) and Sivewright's departmental advisers believed that it would be advantageous to concentrate the system of railway refreshment rooms under one head. In September, 1892, Logan wrote to Elliott, the General Manager of Railways, and in the course of his letter made certain proposals for putting this scheme into effect.(8) In a letter of the same date, Sivewright authorised that a meeting should be held between Logan, Elliott and himself, at which some such arrangement could be sketched out.(9)

In terms of the agreement which was drawn up the following

(5) See Van der Poel, op.cit., p.59 ff.
(6) Innes, op.cit., p.94
(7) A.4-'93: Minutes of Evidence, p.23
(8) Logan to Elliott, 13/9/92, Papers of Correspondence, p.1
(9) Sivewright to Elliott, 13/9/92, Ibid. p.2
day, Logan was to enjoy "the sole and exclusive right to supply refreshments at the different rooms now in existence, or which may hereafter be established ... in this Colony, or elsewhere, belonging to and under the control of the Colonial Government, ... for a period of ten years to commence from the date on which all the refreshment rooms now in existence shall have been handed over..."(10) While the present holders of contracts were not to be disturbed until these had expired, occupiers with no fixed leases were to be given twelve months' notice. In return, Logan was to pay a sum equal to the rents paid for existing contracts plus the rents of the other refreshment rooms as they came into his possession. When they had all been handed over to him, he was to pay an additional rental of £250 per annum for the first five years, and £500 per annum for the second five years. (11) As a period of eight years was to elapse before all the existing contracts expired, Logan was, in effect, to have a virtual monopoly for a period of eighteen years.

Rhodes and Sivewright left for England during the first week in October, but it was not until some weeks had passed that the Ministers received their first intimation of the Contract's existence from the local press. On the 8th November, Innes wrote to Rhodes giving him details of the Contract, and warned him that unless a satisfactory explanation was given by Sivewright he would refuse to share any responsibility for a "job" of that description. (12) Sauer was away from Cape Town at this time, but on his return a Cabinet Council was held, as a result of which a cable was sent to Rhodes telling him of the Contract and advising, "Cabinet thinks steps should be taken cancel contract ... Immediate action necessary". (13) In their reply of the same date, Rhodes and Sivewright, while pointing out that the Contract had been drawn up on the strong recommendation of all the departmental heads, placed themselves in the hands of their colleagues. "We confirm what

(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Cape Hansard, 1893, P.5
(13) Sauer to Rhodes, 18/11/92, Papers of Correspondence, p.22
you on spot consider best."(14) Perhaps the most significant of these cables, however, is that sent the following day to Sivewright: "Hofmeyr Graaff say Logan Contract causes grave dissatisfaction. Weakens Ministry. Places friends false position. Retreat in time. Show Rhodes."(15) This cable shows clearly the attitude of the Bond leader to Sivewright's action, and this view seems to have been shared by most of his supporters. (16) In any event, it is significant that Sivewright did not show the cable to the Premier as requested, as a result of which, Innes pointed out later, he was able to say that he agreed to, or ordered, cancellation without advice from outside the Ministry. (17) The Cabinet's decision to cancel the Contract had, meanwhile, been endorsed by Rhodes; but after this step had been taken, Logan made a formal demand for £50,000 damages. (18)

The correspondence indicates clearly the ill-feeling aroused by Sivewright's actions, and was an accurate indicator of the stormy months that lay ahead. Thus we find Sauer telling Rhodes that he considered that the Contract had just been cancelled in time, and that he had never known feeling to run so high. "I trust Sivewright will recognise that it was not open to us to do otherwise than we have."(19) In similar vein Merriman wrote "... we are a good deal bespattered, and I am afraid have a reputation as a jobbing Ministry". (20) Sivewright, on the other hand, considered the action of his colleagues quite unnecessary, and in a letter to the Premier remarked that it was more evident than ever that the Cape Government could not go on much longer. He suggested, further, that his colleagues were causing trouble as Innes, for example, might have waited until he had asked him to share responsibility. However, he concurs to cancellation ... bows to the will of the majority. (21)

(14) Rhodes and Sivewright to Sauer, 18/11/92, Ibid.
(15) Innes to Sivewright, 19/11/92, Ibid. p.24
(16) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.68.
(17) Cape Hansard, 1893, p.5
(18) He was eventually awarded £5,000. Logan vs. Colonial Government, Cape Times, 1/6/93
(19) Sauer to Rhodes, 30/11/92, Papers of Correspondence, p.30
(20) Merriman to Rhodes, 30/11/92, Ibid.
(21) Sivewright to Rhodes, 28/11/92, Ibid. p.28
As we have seen, Logan had stated his intention of instituting legal proceedings, and as Attorney-General it was Innes's duty to draw up the Defendant's plea, Article 4 of which stated "... Her Majesty's Colonial Government refuses to perform the said contract for the reason that it is undesirable in the public interest ..." (22) On being informed of this, Sivewright cabled that he, personally, was unable to concur - "... being more than ever convinced contract authorised desirable in public interest" (23) In the course of the correspondence which followed, Innes reminded him that the Contract had not only been repudiated without protest from him, but that he and Rhodes had agreed to abide by the decision of the Cabinet. In addition, as it was necessary for them to justify their action in court there could be no other plea. (24) Sivewright then suggested that if Faure as Acting Commissioner approved of the plea, he should defend, but Innes pointed out that as he only did his work by private arrangement, he could not intervene. There could not be two Commissioners. (25) Sivewright eventually withdrew his objection on condition that it was made clear that he personally considered the Contract desirable and in the public interest.

There can be no doubt that the attitude adopted by Sivewright in this matter widened further the breach between himself and his fellow ministers, and virtually precluded any possibility of an amicable agreement being arrived at in the Cabinet. Thus on the 18th February we find Merriman writing "This Logan business of course renders it quite impossible for me to sit in the same Cabinet with a man who could do such a thing as well as others which have come to my notice - and as soon as Rhodes returns an explanation must take place which will probably end in my resignation." (26)

Sivewright returned to the Colony on the 24th of April, but as Rhodes did not call the Cabinet together, the ministers

(22) Ibid., p.37
(23) Sivewright to Innes, 10/2/93, Ibid., p.42
(24) Innes to Sivewright, 16/2/93, Ibid., p.43
(25) Sivewright to Innes, and reply, 17/2/93, 18/2/93, Ibid.
(26) Merriman Papers, No. 30, 1893, J.I.M. to Julia, 18/7/93
were not given an opportunity of discussing the matter with him. At the Prime Minister's request, Innes set out in writing their grievances against Sivewright. No reply was received to this letter, but the Ministers withheld their resignations; firstly, because they did not wish to take any decisive step until they had heard from Sivewright, and secondly, because they did not wish to increase Rhodes's difficulties by forcing his hand prematurely. (27) As the session approached, however, the ministers decided to bring matters to a head, and on the 2nd May informed Rhodes that in the absence of any explanation from Sivewright, they found it impossible to remain in a Cabinet of which he was a member. (28) The ministers were, in effect, asking Rhodes to support the action they had taken, but the Prime Minister, acting on Hofmeyr's advice, tendered his resignation, and in this way avoided taking sides in the controversy. (29) 

The Cabinet crisis was not only a threat to Rhodes's political power in the Colony, but it came at a time when "the superstructure of the north threatened to come crashing about his ears". (30) Kruger had been re-elected President in the South African Republic; the construction of the Delagoa Bay railway was proceeding steadily; but above all, the failure to find a new Rand in Mashonaland and the resultant economies threatened the very existence of the Chartered Company itself. In addition, the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon, was showing an unexpected interest in northern development, and the long-deferred increased capitalisation was due to take place at the end of 1893. (31) Finally, there were differences of opinion between Rhodes and the High Commissioner, especially over the amount of control to be exercised by the latter over the Chartered Company, and in regard to the future of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

In the face of all these difficulties, Rhodes saw in the

(27) Cape Hansard, 1893, p.7
(28) Ibid., pp. 6-7; Innes, op.cit., p.97
(30) Walker, De Villiers, p.223
(31) Walker, History, pp. 431-432
Ministerial crisis an opportunity of freeing himself from his official duties in the Colony. His dual position had been frequently attacked in the past, and he realised that his absences from the Colony might become more frequent in the future. Hofmeyr being unwilling to form a Cabinet, he approached Chief Justice de Villiers - the only other man under whom he was prepared to serve - and invited him to form a ministry with himself as Minister without portfolio. Several meetings followed, but negotiations finally broke down over the question of Sauer's inclusion in the Cabinet. There were many objections to such an appointment from Rhodes's point of view, and these are set out in a memorandum to De Villiers.

"If Sauer is in -

1st. Sivewright will fling mud, Colony discredited credit will suffer. Sivewright will utilize his influence with bond members against Ministry.

(b) Sprigg will not go in, and will join Sivewright and malcontent Afrikanders against Ministry.

(c) Schreiner will not go in.

(d) Rhodes cannot go in. Would be better simply to discharge Sivewright fill up vacancy and go on, which he cannot do on account of mud-flinging in House.

Sauer has told Hofmeyr that it is advisable that none of the malcontents himself included shall be in the new Ministry at present.

After a new election and redistribution which may result in extension of Houses, it would be advisable to create new portfolio grass would have grown over squabble, when it would

(32) This account of the Rhodes - De Villiers negotiations is based on that contained in Walker's De Villiers, pp. 225-231, and appendix. The contemporary press had no knowledge of these events, which took place a few days before the ministry resigned. De Villiers's judicial position, naturally, made publicity undesirable, while Rhodes had his own reasons for pledging the Chief Justice to secrecy.
be possible to appoint one or other of the malcontents possibly Sauer.

With Innes on the bench and Sprigg in the cabinet the opposition will not have a possible Prime Minister, but if Sprigg does not go into cabinet he will become an out and out leader of opposition with Sivewright?"\(33\)

It must be remembered that in Sivewright, Sauer, Innes and Merriman, Rhodes was dealing with men of outstanding ability, and he realised that a combination of any of these with Sprigg could form the nucleus of an extremely strong opposition. \(34\) Imvo, in fact, in a leading article on the Ministerial crisis, commented that a combination of Sprigg and the three ex-ministers would be strong enough to rule without any coalition with the Bond. Alternatively, if Rhodes were to adopt the obviously correct course of dismissing Sivewright, a powerful Sprigg-Sivewright alliance might result, and for this reason it was essential that Sprigg should be in the Cabinet. As far as the three "malcontents" were concerned, it was thought that Sauer would support De Villiers, while Merriman was to be offered the Agent-Generalship, and it was intended to elevate Innes to the Bench. In this way Rhodes hoped to eliminate all potential opposition leaders.

Under these circumstances, De Villiers's intimation that he could not form a Ministry without Sauer came as a great disappointment to Rhodes. The Chief Justice, however, promised to reconsider his decision, and influenced by many factors decided to take office. Chief of these was the realisation that he was being presented with a golden opportunity of working for federation. He therefore prepared his address to the electors and a list of proposed ministers in anticipation of his meeting with Rhodes and Hofmeyr the next day (Monday, 1st May). \(35\) That meeting, postponed by Rhodes on account of Hofmeyr's absence from Cape Town, did not materialise, and on Wednesday (3rd May) the "Cape Times" announced that Rhodes was forming a new Ministry.

\(33\) Rhodes to De Villiers, Walker, \(\text{De Villiers}\), pp. 226-227
\(34\) Imvo, 3/5/93
\(35\) Walker, \(\text{De Villiers}\), p.228
Any analysis of these events, and of the Rhodes - De Villiers correspondence of the next few days, reflects little credit on the Premier, and in seeking an explanation for Rhodes's behaviour several factors must be taken into account. The cabinet crisis came at a very awkward time for him; at a time when he was anxious to be relieved of his administrative duties and yet retain his influence in the Colony. In addition, Rhodes wanted to eliminate, if possible, all potential opposition. He and Hofmeyr regarded De Villiers, with the undoubted respect he enjoyed in the Colony, in the Republics and in Britain, as the best man for the Premiership. At the same time, they had hoped that he would be prepared to leave decisions on matters of policy to him. In this, however, they found that they had under-estimated him. At one of their earlier meetings, for example, while discussing a possible Cabinet, De Villiers pointed out that while he would take Hofmeyr's recommendations into account, the final responsibility of choosing Ministers would rest with him. Similarly, after deciding to take office, De Villiers drew up his address to the electors before consulting Rhodes and Hofmeyr. Nevertheless, Rhodes was still prepared to serve under De Villiers when, on the Monday morning, Hofmeyr's absence and Sprigg's offer of assistance presented him with an alternative solution.

Rhodes had resigned on 2nd May, and when the new Ministry was announced, it was seen that only Faure, the former Secretary for Native Affairs, had survived the storm. Under Rhodes as Prime Minister were Sir Gordon Sprigg, Treasurer General and Minister for Agriculture; W. P. Schreiner, Attorney General; J. Laing (Sprigg's lieutenant), Commissioner; P. H. Faure, Colonial Secretary; and J. Frost, Secretary for Native Affairs. Rhodes had always maintained that there were no clear lines of political divisions in the country, but in his appointment

(36) Ibid., p.225
(37) As Schreiner was not a member of Parliament, a vacancy was created for him at Kimberley.
(38) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.138
of Sprigg, the former Leader of the Opposition, he laid himself open to the charge of violating the spirit of Responsible government. The memory of Sprigg's frequent attacks on the Premier's dual position remained, and only three months previously, speaking at East London, he had condemned the "Ministry of discord" which had "demoralised Parliament and dishonoured the country". (39) *Imvo* was especially outspoken in its criticism of what it described as the "scandalous prostitution of Responsible Government". (40) In a previous article before the composition of the Cabinet was known, the same paper suggested that Sprigg would swallow his principles for the sake of office (41) - a suggestion that was dismissed by the "Cape Times" as not being consistent "with the dignity that should belong to public life". (42)

In the absence of evidence to suggest any such ulterior motive in Sprigg's action, the most likely explanation is that given by one who was directly concerned in these events. "Both men were in trouble, companions in misfortune. Rhodes ... because ... he had already struck an inconvenient strain of independence in the Chief Justice; .... Sprigg ... because he was out of office; he loved the work of administration, and he genuinely believed that his presence in the Treasury was a public interest of the first order ... By burying the hatchet, and ignoring the past, Rhodes would retain the control of policy, with an amenable subordinate to do the chores; and Sprigg would have the satisfaction of superintending from the Treasury the minor details of domestic administration. So the bargain was struck, and the Chief Justice was left in his chambers, like Mariana in the moated grange." (43)

In contrast to the criticism of the new administration, the newspaper editorials of this period and the letters of the Merriman and Rose-Innes papers give us some idea of the popula-

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(39) *Cape Times*, 2/2/93
(40) *Imvo*, 10/5/93
(42) *Cape Times*, 6/5/93
(43) *Innes, op.cit.*, pp. 98-99
rity of the three "malcontent" Ministers, and the high esteem in which they were held. One of Innes's correspondents, however, while expressing confidence that he had acted as he thought right and best, felt that after the "Left wing"'s acceptance of the Franchise and Ballot Bill the previous year, their present action was rather like "swallowing the camel and straining at the gnat". This is not, however, a fair criticism, as it will be remembered that their support of that Bill was, in the words of Innes, motivated by a desire to "moderate that which they could not prevent". That the moderating influence of Innes and his colleagues was appreciated is shown by a letter he received from the Editor of Invo in which the latter states that he is aware that Innes has parried many a blow in the Cabinet aimed at the Natives, while many another was not attempted simply because his attitude was known.

This was the background to the 5th Session of the 8th Colonial Parliament which opened on the 16th of June - a session which, apart from the Minister of Agriculture Bill, was singularly barren of practical legislation, and which reflects little credit on Cape Parliamentary institutions. The inevitable attack of Rhodes's dual position was introduced by Mr. O'Reilly, but it was, in reality, an attack on the inclusion of Sprigg and Laing in the Cabinet. Rhodes, in reply, reaffirmed his contention that there were no clear lines of political division in the country, and that the choice of Ministers for any Cabinet was mainly a personal and social matter. Laing referred the House to a letter published by him a year after the introduction of the first motion on Rhodes's dual position, in which he expressed the opinion that the Prime Minister had kept faith with the country according to his promises, and that as long as he kept faith he would support him. While there was much criticism of Rhodes's action from members like Sauer, Merriman, Solomon and Brabant, the actual terms of the motion only referred

(44) Rose-Innes Papers, No. 12, Douglas to J.R.I., 12/5/93
(45) Cape Hansard, 1892, p.166
(46) Rose-Innes Papers, No. 8, J. Tengo Jabavu to J.R.I., 6/5/93
(47) Cape Hansard, 1893, p.44
(48) Ibid., p.46
(49) Ibid., p.45; see Cape Times, 22/6/91
to the dual position, and it was almost unanimously rejected, only O'Reilly and his seconder supporting it.\(^{(50)}\)

As was to be expected, a large part of the session was taken up by the debates on the Logan Contract. On the first day of the session, Sivewright moved that all papers and correspondence concerning the Logan Contract be laid on the table of the House. Rhodes then made a formal statement on his resignation, thus enabling Innes to speak "as a matter of privilege".\(^{(51)}\) After giving an account of the events leading to their resignation, Innes said that the sole cause of dissolution was the question of principle; the conviction that the confidence which ought to exist between them and Sivewright was no longer possible.\(^{(52)}\) Sauer and Merriman spoke on similar lines; the former stressing the fact that their main grievances were Sivewright's failure to consult any of his colleagues, and his action in granting the contract without tenders being called for;\(^{(53)}\) the latter condemning the Contract and Logan in particular, whom he denounced as a "political agitator".\(^{(54)}\)

As Sivewright had not anticipated that any discussion would have been allowed on the Prime Minister's statement, his main speech in defence of his actions was made on the 20th June when the motion for the "papers and correspondence" came before the House.\(^{(55)}\) After pointing to the need for improvements in the present Railway catering arrangements, Sivewright proceeded to defend the Contract and his choice of Logan as the best man to carry it out. It will be remembered, however, that his former colleagues were not objecting so much to the Contract itself, but to the manner in which it had been granted. Sivewright claimed that there were times when one was justified in departing from the rule of calling for public tender. In this case, it would have meant higher rentals and higher prices as the existing

\(^{(50)}\) Ibid., p.48
\(^{(51)}\) Ibid., p.4
\(^{(52)}\) Ibid., p.7
\(^{(53)}\) Ibid., pp. 11-12
\(^{(54)}\) Ibid., p.13
\(^{(55)}\) Ibid., p.20 ff.
contracts would have had to be respected. The contract held by Logan at De Aar, for example, only expired in December 1900.

While admitting that the period of the Contract was too long, he reminded them that there were provisions whereby the General Manager of Railways had the right to fix the tariffs, and give one month's notice of cancellation if Logan failed to give satisfaction or keep the terms.

Sivewright then turned to the "political aspect" of the Logan question, and here the tone of his speech became more personal, being directed against Merriman in particular. Although it was Merriman who had persuaded him to join the Ministry - "the greatest political blunder of my life" - there was no political sympathy between them, and he was warned while in England that his three colleagues were hatching a conspiracy against him. Defending his actions with regard to the pleas in the Logan Case, he claimed that he was delayed overseas by a matter of great importance to the Colony. He could not tell what the work was, but it was different from anything that any Cape Minister had ever undertaken and brought to a successful conclusion. In his earlier statement on the opening day of the session, Sivewright had also referred to "another matter", and "another charge" that had been made against him, and he now claimed that the Logan Contract was not the cause of the Cabinet disruption. They could have got over the Logan Contract, but not the "Canavan incident".

Merriman, in reply to these veiled accusations, challenged Sivewright to draw his other matter "from its obscurity ... if he dared" - a challenge which was, unfortunately, not accepted.

In the absence of any further information, therefore, the 1893 Cabinet crisis can only be considered in the light of the Logan Contract itself.

After further discussion, it was agreed "That the papers and correspondence connected with the Logan Contract ... be referred

(56) Ibid., p.26 ff.
(57) Ibid., p.28
(58) Ibid., pp. 9-10
(59) Ibid., p.28
(60) Ibid., p.31
to a Select Committee, consisting of five members ... for inquiry and report into the questions involved ..." (61) The Committee, as nominated by the Speaker, was to be under the chairmanship of Hofmeyr, and it was ruled that they were to consider and decide on the wisdom or advisability of executing the Contract and the consequences involved. It was pointed out that the personal integrity, honour or character of an individual member could only be considered by a Committee specially chosen for that purpose. (62) The significance of this ruling can readily be appreciated. Sivewright, by his cryptic references to "another event", had successfully diverted attention from the Contract itself, and the Select Committee was now unable to pass judgement on the actions of the Ministers concerned. In addition, the appointment of the Committee had been preceded by a long and bitter debate, with the result that when it eventually reported at the end of the session, interest in the matter had waned, and Parliament devoted little time to its consideration.

The evidence taken before the Committee showed that there were several defects in the Contract itself. It was, for example, open to doubt whether the Contract gave Logan the right to any refreshment rooms opened on new lines. This was the view taken by the Chairman of the Committee and by Logan himself. Sivewright disagreed, and admitted that if this were the case, the amounts to be paid by Logan were insufficient. (63) These defects were referred to in the Chairman's Report which was laid before the House on the 14th August. While not being as explicit as had been hoped in some quarters, (64) it provided as complete a vindication of the three "left-wing" Ministers as could be expected under the circumstances.

After setting out the events leading to the drawing up of the Contract, the Report states, "the Committee, while acknowledging the undoubted advantages connected with the concentration

(61) Ibid., p.110
(62) Ibid., p.128
(63) Al. '93 pp. 12-13; p.68
(64) Imvo, for example, made a plea for a definite resolution to test the feeling of Parliament: Imvo, 23/8/93
of Cabinet solidarity. The ill-feeling aroused by his actions, added to the latent enmity between him and the Triumvirate, was sufficient to split the Ministry, quite apart from the consideration of the "other matter" which was referred to.

But, although there was undoubtedly a lack of sympathy between them and Sivewright, the evidence does not suggest that they used the Logan contract as a means of bringing about his political downfall. On the contrary, it seems that during their difficult period of office the Triumvirate did attempt to bridge the political gap between themselves and the Bondsman whenever possible. It was Merriman who persuaded Sivewright to join the Cabinet and it was due to Sauer and Merriman that Innes was persuaded to accept moderate changes in the franchise. The Logan Contract involved a matter of principle, and on this they were not prepared to compromise, whatever the cost to themselves. This viewpoint is supported by the evidence of a personal letter written by Merriman shortly after the formation of the second Ministry:

"Of course the sacrifice is very great in every way - the loss of position ... the interruption of one's work ... but I cannot but feel that the loss of self-respect in the continuance of the Sivewright-Hofmeyr-Rhodes-Alliance would have been much worse. The new combination is an odd one - Elsewhere one would say that it was impossible but here we are easy-going and people easily forget." (72)

Similarly, Sauer in a letter to Rhodes expressed his regret at the separation, and added "I shall, however, look back to my association with you as one of the honours and pleasures of my life." (73)

In the settlement of these difficulties it is once again possible to trace the close co-operation existing between Rhodes and Hofmeyr. It was at Rhodes's request that the Bond leader drew up a list of possible Ministers for a De Villiers Ministry. (74)

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(69) cf. Hofmeyr, op. cit., p. 443 ff.
(70) Cape Hansard, 1893, p. 26
(71) Laurence, op. cit., p. 134
(72) Merriman Papers, No. 79, 1893, J.X.M. to Julia, 7/5/93
(73) Millin, Rhodes, p. 178
(74) Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. 20, Rhodes to Hofmeyr, April 1893
and he was frequently consulted during the negotiations. Motivated purely by political considerations, however, neither of them took sides in the issue. Admittedly they had agreed to the cancellation of the Contract, and it had been condemned in the Hofmeyr-Graaff cable, but they were not prepared to pass judgement on Sivewright himself, as they realised the danger of having him in opposition. Rhodes in particular was determined to prevent the formation of a strong opposition in the House. For this reason, he failed to take the obvious step of bringing the Cabinet together on his return to the Colony in April, 1893, and later pledged De Villiers to secrecy to prevent his consulting any of the "malcontents", and Sauer in particular, until the success of the negotiations had been assured.(75)

Thus, with the assistance of Hofmeyr, Rhodes successfully withstood a serious challenge to his power in the Colony. His fears of a strong opposition proved groundless, and the General Election of 1894, fought mainly on personal or local issues, had little effect on his position in Parliament. The Programme of the Progressive Party gained little support, and its position was further weakened by the disunity among its leaders, and the resultant mismanagement, which caused it to lose at least two safe seats in Aliwal North and Somerset East. (76) In some of the other constituencies, however, the attempts to organise on an anti-Bond basis were more successful. In Cape Town, a "ticket of four" were elected,(77) while the activities of the Queenstown Political Association were not without effect in that constituency. (78) The final results showed that while the number of Bond members remained unaltered, there had been a slight increase in the number of Rhodes's supporters. Nevertheless, he was unable to make good the loss of his four most outstanding Ministers. The new Administration was to introduce

(75) Walker, De Villiers, p. 226
(76) Cape Times, 18/9/93; 11/10/93; 8/2/94
(77) Ibid., 5/1/94; 6/2/94; 9/2/94
(78) Ibid., 8/11/93; 7/2/94
much constructive legislation, but its members were unable to curb Rhodes's growing impatience. Hofmeyr's retirement from public life in April, 1895 removed the last effective check on his actions, and paved the way for the Jameson Raid with its disastrous consequences for the Colony, and for South Africa, eight months later.
CHAPTER IV

AGRICULTURE

a. The Minister of Agriculture Bill

Rhodes and Agriculture - Departmental Reform - The Minister of Agriculture Bill

b. The Scab Act of 1894

Need for legislation - The Scab Commission - Recommendations - Scab Act of 1894 - Opposition - 1895 Debate - Into Operation - Conclusion

a. The Minister of Agriculture Bill

During the early years of his life in England, Rhodes, as was perhaps only to be expected of one coming from farming stock, showed a keen interest in agricultural matters, and on arriving in South Africa in 1870, gained valuable knowledge of the conditions of farming in this country. The thirteen months spent on the cotton plantation in Natal, despite the failure of the venture, are significant, because they gave him a practical interest in agriculture - an interest which later enabled him to win the confidence of the Dutch farmers by his sympathetic understanding of their needs. (1) South African manufacturers, he believed, could not and should not compete with those of England, but they should rather devote their attention to the improvement of agriculture in the Colony, which was essential if its future was to be assured. The creation of a Minister of Agriculture in 1893 was a logical development of the policy adopted by him in an attempt to bring this about.

During the session of 1891 a motion was introduced in the Assembly for reform in the Department of Agriculture, as it was felt that the Secretary for Agriculture was unable to exercise any effective supervision in such matters as phylloxera, scab, and cattle diseases. (2) The motion was subsequently withdrawn.

(1) Basil Williams, op. cit., pp. 7-13
(2) Cape Hansard, 1891, pp. 118-119
but the matter was again raised the following year, when the Government was asked whether it was "prepared to introduce a Bill during the present session for the appointment of a Minister of Agriculture with a seat in the Cabinet". (3) Rhodes replied in the affirmative, but during the debate on the Estimates, Sprigg pointed out that no provision had been made for such an appointment. In reply to his plea for a definite statement from the Government, Rhodes gave an assurance that it was their intention to introduce a Bill providing for the creation of a new minister or for the rearrangement of the Departments. (4) The latter course was adopted to avoid expense. Announcing the decision to place Land, Mines and Agriculture under the control of the Treasurer-General, Rhodes said that it was felt that he alone of all the Ministers had time to deal with all the questions connected with these subjects. (5) It is obvious, however, that this could not be regarded as a permanent solution to the problem, and in the debates many members expressed their dissatisfaction at the arrangement. (6)

Before the next session of Parliament opened, the Logan Contract had split the Cabinet, and Sprigg had succeeded Merriman as Treasurer-General and Minister for Agriculture. During this period the demand for a separate Minister continued, and accordingly, on the 19th June, 1893, Rhodes gave notice to "move for leave to introduce a Bill to create the office of a Minister of Agriculture, and to amend the designation of, and provide for the assignment of duties to certain Ministerial Officers". (7) Introducing the second reading, the Premier said that they would have to consider whether the country desired that they should have a special Minister to deal with agricultural matters. He claimed that the country was in favour of an additional Minister being appointed, and that the Bond and Farmers' Congress supported

(3) Cape Hansard, 1892, p.60  
(4) Ibid., pp. 109-110  
(5) Ibid., p.329  
(6) Ibid.: also pp. 345-346  
(7) Cape Hansard, 1893, p.16
the proposals. Statistics showed that the products of the soil amounted to £3,500,000 p.a. of the revenue out of the present total of £8,500,000. Further, if the mines were to cease, they would only have these products to rely upon to meet their commitments, including the interest on their £26,000,000 debt. During the past ten years wheat and flour to the value of £500,000 p.a. had been imported, and they would have to consider whether their corn production could not be increased. Similarly, butter and cheese to the value of £80,000 p.a. was imported. These problems together with many others would provide ample work for a Minister of Agriculture. Merriman, on the other hand, did not consider that an additional minister was necessary, and suggested that a Council for Agriculture should be established — "not a politically-fluctuating minister". The agriculturalists, he claimed, would gain nothing from the proposals, which would merely lead to an enormous increase in expenditure.

The second reading had been introduced on the 10th July, but the Bill was withdrawn due to a technical error on the 24th July. The debate was subsequently re-opened by Rhodes four days later. The postponement, he said, had given him an opportunity to consider the opinions of the House in connection with this subject. While most members agreed that a Minister of Agriculture should be appointed, there seemed to be four schools of thought on the subject. Firstly, there were those who believed that there should be someone responsible to the agriculturalists and representing their interests. Secondly, there were those who agreed in this, but who felt that it was unnecessary to create a new Minister. This section, led by Merriman, believed that the agricultural interests could be catered for by some rearrangement of the Cabinet. They objected mainly to the additional expenditure, and had suggested that the office should be amalgamated with that of Secretary for Native Affairs. This was an incongruous proposal.

(8) Ibid., pp. 114-115
(9) Ibid., p. 116
(10) Ibid., p. 182
as "it would be like a minister of the Church who also carried on a large wholesale business". Thirdly, there were those who were totally opposed to any such combination. This group was keenly interested in the Native question and considered that the millions of Natives under their charge should be represented in the House. In addition, there was a fourth section who believed that the Prime Minister should have the responsibility. After careful consideration of these viewpoints, he had devised a scheme which he believed would satisfy all parties. He, therefore, proposed to move in Committee the following clause in place of Clause 6: "The office of Secretary for Native Affairs constituted under Act 1 of 1872 shall be and is hereby abolished, and the duties and functions heretofore assigned to and exercised by the Secretary for Native Affairs shall, from and after the taking effect of this Act, be discharged and performed by the Prime Minister of this Colony for the time being."

This amendment, he said, should satisfy those who wanted a minister solely responsible for Agriculture as well as those who maintained that the problem could be met by redistributing the ministers' work. Finally there were those who considered that the millions of Natives should not be ignored. They too should be satisfied, for, he pointed out, he was going to increase the position of the minister who had to deal with Native affairs. Instead of being a subordinate minister, it would be the Prime Minister who would carry the responsibility for all Native legislation - a responsibility shared by all members of the Government. In his opinion, the Prime Minister would have plenty of time to consider the problems that arose as he would be concerned, not in working out details, but in direction of policy. In conclusion Rhodes pointed out that he had had exceptional training for this office. At De Beers, he had 10,000 Natives in his employ, and he was personally responsible for 200,000 in Mashonaland. He was not, therefore, afraid to accept the responsibility for a further 1,000,000 in the Colony. (11)

(11) Cape Hansard, 1893, pp. 217-218
Generally speaking, the new proposal was welcomed in the House. Merriman, in contrast to his earlier opposition, welcomed the clear and explicit manner in which it had been announced.\(^{(12)}\) Sivewright and Innes, on the other hand, felt that the growing work of administration justified the creation of a new portfolio. The former felt that the Premier already had sufficient duties, while the latter anticipated difficulties if he ever left the Colony or suffered a defeat in the House, in which case there would be no one in the Cabinet to take over.\(^{(13)}\) The most valid criticism, however, was that of Capt. Brabant, who pointed out that they might easily at some later date have a Prime Minister who was not fitted to be Secretary for Native Affairs.\(^{(14)}\) While it was undoubtedly true that no one was better qualified than Rhodes to occupy this position, the same might not necessarily be true of his successor. Nevertheless, the amendment was agreed to on the 1st July and the third reading was passed with a large majority the following day. This debate provides yet another example of Rhodes's ability to devise a compromise to suit all sections of the House, while at the same time retaining his own policy.

b. The Scab Act of 1894

In the course of his second reading speech, Rhodes referred to several matters in regard to agriculture that needed attention.\(^{(15)}\) Of these the most important was undoubtedly the high incidence of scab disease in sheep. During this period, the decline of the wool industry was referred to with growing alarm in the Budget speeches of Merriman and later Sprigg.\(^{(16)}\) Whereas in 1874 the wool exports of the Colony had amounted to £2,948,000, this figure had dropped to £2,196,000 in 1890. Within two years, the quantity of wool exported had decreased by 10 million pounds.\(^{(17)}\) The Commission appointed in 1892 to inquire into the working of the laws and regulations dealing with the suppression of scab disease published its report in 1893.\(^{(18)}\)

\(^{(12)}\) Ibid., p.218
\(^{(13)}\) Ibid., p.219
\(^{(14)}\) Ibid., p.218
\(^{(15)}\) Ibid., p.115
\(^{(16)}\) See Cape Hansard, 1890, p.171; 1891, pp. 48-55; 1893, p.120; 1894, p.108
\(^{(17)}\) Cape Hansard, 1891, pp. 48-55
sion of scab disease in sheep, and as to the necessity for amend-
ment of the same”, estimated that the average annual monetary
loss as a result of the disease was £500,000, rising to £1,000,000
during bad seasons. These losses were not only due to the
deterioration in the quality of the clips alone. It seems that
because of the bad name acquired by Cape wool on the London market,
buyers avoided it in favour of Australian and American wool, with
the result that much of it was declared unsaleable. The evidence
also showed that farmers who had not dipped their sheep suffered
ever losses in times of drought.

The serious incidence of scab was no new problem in the
Colony. In 1693 and 1740 the Dutch government had taken string-
gent measures against the disease. In the course of time these
plaats had, however, fallen into disuse. A permissive Act had
been passed in 1874, replaced in 1886 by a measure which provided
for a compulsory scab act in the Eastern and Midland Districts.
Five years later, Act 37 of 1891 permitted the scab acts to be
enforced in any part of the Colony, subject to the right of the
Divisional Council to suspend its operation if so requested by
two-thirds of those on the voters' roll. This provision was
severely criticised by the Commission. It maintained that the
constant agitation for repeal was impairing the effectiveness of
the Act, and condemned the practice of "hawking petitions". Many
people who signed them under political pressure afterwards regretted
their action and signed counter-petitions. Graaff-Reinet was
cited as one example of this. In the Eastern and Midland
Districts, on the other hand, where the laws had been enforced,
there had been great improvement in the conditions of the flocks,
and in the Komgha district, 50,000 sheep had been examined and
found to be entirely free from the disease.

(18) G.1-94: Report of Scab Commission, pp. 5-6
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid., pp. 7-8; p.20
(21) Ibid., p.20
(22) Ibid., pp. 8-9
admitted that the improvement in some parts was not as great as might have been expected, the Report shows clearly that this was due mainly to the bad administration and inherent weaknesses of the Act. (23)

The Commission found that the chief cause of the failure of previous legislation was undoubtedly the absence of any provision for simultaneous dipping on the part of stockowners in any district. Every owner treated his flock or portion of it at his own convenience, and the result was "an endless round of dipping, cleaning, re-infection and dipping year after year, without any possibility of stamping out the disease". (24) This substantiated the claim of those opposing legislation that it was impossible to do so, and caused many who at first favoured such legislation to doubt its efficacy. In addition, there was the constant danger of infection from stock travelling within a proclaimed area, or entering it from outside, as it was possible for scabby sheep to be moved through such an area without detection. The regulations which provided that these sheep, if detected, were to be either impounded or sent back merely increased the danger of infection. (25) It was suggested, therefore, that the removal of any small stock into a proclaimed area should be prohibited under any partial Act.

Many of the abuses under the existing Acts were undoubtedly due to the inadequate number of inspectors. Their inability to perform their duties caused great inconvenience to farmers in such matters as the issue of quarantine licences to those who wished to move their flocks, while their general inefficiency and want of tact in dealing with farmers who did not understand the provisions of the act increased their antagonism towards it. (26)

The question of overcoming the opposition to any general application of the scab laws was one of the most serious that had to be faced by the Rhodes administration, and its attempted solution imposed a very severe strain on the Rhodes-Bond alliance.

These difficulties were foreshadowed in the Report of the Commission.

(23) Ibid., p.11
(24) Ibid.
(25) Ibid., p.12
(26) Ibid., pp. 16-17: see also Kerriman papers No.315, 1892, Frost to J.X.2. 26/12/92 and Journal No.315a - a general criticism of inspectors, who must play a part in educating the farmers.
which found that there was a great diversity of opinion among farmers as to the prevalence of scab; the suitability of scab legislation; the causes of the disease and the resultant losses; and the efficiency of the different types of treatment. Some farmers believed that two dippings in a recognised solution would provide a cure, while others regarded this treatment as useless or even harmful. These wide differences of opinion are all the more remarkable, as they were often found to exist among farmers living in the same district and under absolutely similar conditions.

It was widely believed, firstly, that it was useless to attempt to cure a disease which, they maintained, was caused by drought, poverty, blood impurities and bad shepherding, and secondly, that any legislation would simply mean ruination to the farmers - a belief that was strengthened by the vague rumours of the hardships caused by scab legislation. Thirdly, it was claimed that the disease was not contagious, and the common practice of mixing clean and scabby sheep was another difficulty which had to be overcome by those working for its eradication. (27)

In an attempt to meet these difficulties, detailed recommendations were made by the Commission. (28) They suggested that the present scab legislation should be repealed, and should be replaced by a compulsory scab act applying to the whole Colony. At the same time, provision should be made for the suspension of the Act or any portion of it in times of severe drought. To ensure the effectiveness of such legislation, careful attention should be paid to matters such as the appointment of inspectors, annual compulsory simultaneous dipping, the removal and importation of stock, disinfection of kraal buildings and vehicles, and the baling of skins and wool in transit to prevent the possibility of infection.

This Report, submitted to the Government in March, 1894, was the result of a long period of careful investigation, and formed the basis of the Bill "to amend the laws relating to scab in sheep", the second reading of which was introduced by Frost, the Secretary for

(27) G.4 - '94, pp.2-3
(28) Appendix C
Agriculture, on the 11th June. (29) The evidence of the Commission showed that some alteration in the law was absolutely necessary, and he believed that it would be possible to stamp out the disease if a stringent Act was applied. Turning to the provisions of the Bill, Frost said that in deference to the plea that the scarcity of water in the Northern districts prevented farmers from dipping their sheep, provision had been made for the suspension of the Act by proclamation in times of severe drought. It was proposed to appoint one Chief Inspector of scab in full control of the working of the Act, and seven inspectors in charge of certain areas. They in turn would control sub-inspectors. All these appointments would be made by the Government, but sheep farmers would be given the right to appoint dipping inspectors to assist farmers who were experiencing difficulty in stamping out the disease. In reply to those who felt that it was not right that stock owners should have the control of their stock taken out of their hands, Frost pointed out that the eradication of scab depended almost entirely on effective dipping. While not proposing to supply free dip the Government was prepared to provide for its conveyance free of charge on the railways. The suggestions of the Commission in regard to the setting up of dipping tanks had been embodied in the Bill, and above all, dipping was to be compulsory and simultaneous, taking place during the three months commencing 1st December. All sheep were to be dipped at least twice, and this was to be done by the dipping inspector if the farmer concerned did not do so himself.

Regulations were made to prevent the indiscriminate removal of infected sheep (Clause 27); for the disinfection and destruction of premises and compensation if the latter course were adopted. (Clauses 28 and 29.) Frost pointed out that the object of this was to secure the abolition of the little bush kraals which, unlike those which were more substantially built and properly constructed, could never be disinfected effectively and remained a continual source of infection. (30) Parts 4, 5 and 6 of the Bill dealt with

(29) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.92
(30) See G.1-94, pp. 18-19
the removal of sheep. In conclusion, Frost quoted the example of the Australian colonies to show that it was possible to stamp out scab, and expressed his confidence that it would be possible to meet all objections to the Bill, which, if strictly applied, could have the same effect in the Colony. (31)

The divergence of opinion that existed in regard to scab legislation soon showed itself in the ensuing debate, and it was obvious that the Committee stage, if reached, would result in drastic changes. Several members, in fact, supported the second reading with the object of bringing this about. (32) Three different viewpoints in regard to scab legislation emerged. Firstly, there were those who considered that stringent legislation was essential; secondly, there were those who, while recognising the need for legislation, regarded the Government's proposals as being far too drastic; thirdly, there were those who were totally opposed to any legislation on the subject.

In the first group, the most significant speech was that of Dr. Smartt, Chairman of the Scab Commission. In defending its work, he pointed out that its members were all sheep farmers who had a practical knowledge of the object of the inquiry. Despite the fact that some of them were originally prejudiced against scab legislation, their conclusions had been unanimously arrived at, and their investigations had shown the absolute necessity for immediate and drastic action. He reminded those who maintained that it was unjust to force legislation on people who did not want it that there were just as many in favour of legislation as there were who opposed it. Although there had been petitions from thousands of farmers against legislation, he believed that a plebiscite would show that the owners of three-quarters of the stock in the country were in favour of a compulsory measure which was essential to their self-preservation. Nevertheless, he was willing to accept any reasonable compromise provided that the Act did not become a dead letter. If this were to occur, it would be better

(31) Cape Hansard, 1896, pp. 92-94
(32) Ibid., p. 95
to have no legislation at all, as it would be most unfair to those districts where serious attempts had been made to stamp out the disease. Similarly Fuller, who spoke as one connected with the export of wool, claimed that all the objections of the North-western districts fell away "before the overwhelming force of the necessity for legislation of this kind". He warned the House that a critical period in the wool industry had been reached, and feared that the industry was doomed unless the quality of the wool was improved.

In contrast to these speakers, many members, while approving of the Bill and its principle, felt that it was "overweighted by needless provisions", more suitable to Australia than to the Colony. The provisions for the disinfection and destruction of kraals was cited as one example which would cause unnecessary expense, and which would be impracticable to put into effect. This view was supported by Mr. du Toit, a member of the Commission. The majority in the country, he said, favoured a moderate general Act, but he felt that the present Bill had gone beyond the spirit of their report. He would, however, support the second reading in the hope of its becoming more acceptable in Committee.

Merriman, Sivewright and Innes spoke on similar lines, and each in turn criticised the Government's handling of the Bill. Merriman deplored the fact that they had not shown their policy in regard to the Bill, as a result of which the debate had been unnecessarily prolonged. He did not consider the proposals "tyrannical", but feared that they were too ambitious, and foredoomed to failure if they did pass into law. Sivewright referred to the Franchise Act of 1892, "the great measure of the session", which would, however, have failed had a compromise not been arrived at by the Government of which he was then a member. The failure to adopt a similar policy in regard to the present Bill had resulted in a great deal

(33) Ibid., pp. 153-156
(34) Ibid., pp. 122-123
(35) Ibid., p.120
(36) These clauses were in fact withdrawn later, although the Commission had made a definite recommendation on this point.
(37) Cape Hansard, 1893, p.160
(38) Ibid., pp. 165-166
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(37) Cape Hansard, 1893, p. 160
(38) Ibid., pp. 165-166
of opposition and irritation where none was necessary, as the Government might have brought in a measure to which all were agreed. Had this course been adopted, it would have been possible to strengthen the Bill in Committee if the House so desired.

In an attempt to meet these difficulties, Sivewright suggested that the Bill should be withdrawn and another measure introduced next session; failing that, they should attempt to make the measure more workable in Committee by confining the application of the compulsory clauses to the Eastern Province. (39) Innes, too, regretted that at a time when circumstances favoured the advance of scab legislation, the Government should have introduced the Bill in such a way as to arouse those who opposed it "into a state of frenzy". The Opposition, he said, were supporting a Government measure, and had the right to ask them to explain their attitude towards it. (40) His plea was not without effect, for shortly before the close of the debate, Sprigg rose to speak on behalf of the Government. Their decision on the necessity for a stringent Scab Bill had, he said, been made several months ago, and while they would be prepared to accept any reasonable amendments which would not interfere with the principle of the measure, they relied upon the majority to assist them in bringing forward a practical law in the face of the attempts by a minority in the House to emasculate the measure. (41)

The minority to whom Sprigg referred were those who were totally opposed to any legislation. This section regarded it as a "cruel and tyrannical law" forced upon the farmers, and held that it was impossible to exterminate scab, which had existed in the time of Moses. (42) Another speaker warned the Government that the passing of the Bill would "lead to a rising of the people", while yet another opposed it as a measure "calculated to ruin the farmer". (43) The numerical strength of this section of the House,

(39) Ibid., p.167
(40) Ibid., p.168
(41) Ibid., p.170
(42) Ibid., pp. 121-122
(43) Ibid., p.158; p.161
the "hardshell Bondsmen" as Merriman later called them, is shown by the voting figures for the second reading, which was carried by 47 votes to 20.\(^{(44)}\)

At this stage, the Bill followed closely on the lines indicated by the Commission, but it was obvious that several drastic changes were to result in Committee. The operation of the Act was postponed until November, 1895, except in those districts where the existing Scab Acts were in force, or where its operation was requested by a majority of sheep farmers who were also Divisional Council voters. In which case, it was to take effect on or after the 1st March, 1895.\(^{(45)}\) It was also agreed that the whole or any portion of the Act, with the exception of Clause 6 (dealing with the removal of sheep from a district) might be suspended by proclamation throughout the Colony in times of drought.\(^{(46)}\)

The Government's acceptance of these amendments gave rise to much ill-feeling in the House. Rhodes defined the first of these as a compromise which had been arranged by the Government; a compromise which, while giving them time to prepare the machinery for the working of the Act, did not affect its principle.\(^{(47)}\) To this the Opposition were not disposed to agree, as they considered that any delay would cause irreparable harm. Above all, they feared that the next session of Parliament, which now intervened before the Act came into effect, might result in its repeal. There is no doubt that the decision to postpone its operation was a grave error of judgement. Not only were the "anti-Scabbists" given an opportunity of stirring up opposition, but they were also able to present a false picture of the hardships the Act would cause. In those districts where it was applied it worked well, and had the other districts been given a similar chance, they would have found it beneficial, and many of the misconceptions in regard to its operation would not have arisen.

\(^{(44)}\) Ibid., p.171  
\(^{(45)}\) Ibid., p.202  
\(^{(46)}\) Ibid., p.244  
\(^{(47)}\) Ibid., p.197
The second of these amendments led to further heated discussion, and the frequent accusation that the Government were emasculating the Bill. It was felt that the Act would be little more than a permissive measure, and that its weakness would only serve to increase the agitation against it. (48) On the other hand, the Scab Commission had recommended that the drought-stricken North-western areas should be exempted from the Act if necessary, and it seemed only fair and logical that the same concession should be made to other parts of the Colony where it was also possible that severe droughts might occur. In addition, the Attorney-General's addendum in regard to Clause 6 ensured that at no time would the absolute suspension of the Act be possible. As this power of suspension rested with the Governor, and not with the farmers themselves, it could hardly be called a permissive measure, and the Government consistently opposed all amendments in this direction.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Commission, it was, as we have seen, originally proposed that the Chief Inspector and his assistants were to be appointed by the Government, while the stock farmers were to have the right to nominate dipping inspectors. As a result of a series of amendments, while rejecting an attempt to leave the latter choice entirely in the hands of the farmers, the measure of control which the assistant inspectors were to have over them was considerably reduced. Against this, the Chief Inspector was given the right to enter upon any land or premises for the purpose of supervising and directing the carrying out of the duties of the elected inspectors. An attempt to give similar powers to his assistants was rejected, as it was felt that the farmers would submit more readily to the control of men elected by themselves. (49)

It is obvious that the Opposition feared that the elected

(48) Ibid., pp. 238-240
(49) Ibid., pp. 246-250; pp. 322-325
inspectors would not be capable of efficiently carrying out the Act, but the proviso whereby the Minister was able to refuse to appoint any person considered unsuitable proved to be a valuable safeguard against possible abuses. (50)

One further amendment must be referred to. On Clause 15, dealing with simultaneous dipping, Schreiner moved to extend the period of dipping from three to four months commencing 1st November, 1895, and 1st November, 1896. In addition provision was to be made for the exemption from the second dipping of sheep that had been declared free from disease. In other words, whereas the dipping of 1895 was to be simultaneous and complete, that of 1896 would not be so if the owner of sheep was able to produce the necessary certificate. The Scab Commission had regarded simultaneous dipping as an essential to the success of any legislation, and had in fact recommended that all sheep should be dipped at least twice after shearing at intervals of 10-14 days. (51) In the light of the importance that had been placed on this aspect of legislation, it is not surprising that Schreiner's amendment should cause much discussion, and be referred to by one member "as the most serious blow that had been aimed at the Bill". It was felt that two dippings were essential to ensure the eradication of the disease, and Rhodes, while voting for Schreiner's proposal, said that he was "substantially in accord with hon. members on the point". When a division was called for the proviso was negatived by 29 votes to 28, (52) but it was subsequently re-introduced and passed by a majority of 4 votes. Rhodes again supported it, and the fact that he did so despite the plea of the Secretary for Agriculture, Frost, that the matter should not be pressed to a division led to much justifiable criticism in the House. (53)

When the provisions of the 1894 Bill had first been announced, it was generally welcomed as a great improvement on any previous legislation, but the Government's vacillatory attitude during the

(50) See Cape Hansard, 1896, p.219
(51) 3.4-194, p.11; p.24
(52) Cape Hansard, 1893, pp.251-253
(53) Ibid., pp. 333-334
second reading debates led to criticism of the slovenly way in which its measures were introduced, and doubt was expressed whether the Bill would survive in sound and practical form in Committee. (54) The mounting criticism of the Government's acceptance of numerous amendments found expression when the motion for the third reading was introduced on the 26th July.

The Bill as amended was condemned as "a thing of shreds and patches" which would not only fail to eradicate scab, but also bar the way to effective legislation in the future. Innes considered that the Government had muddled away its opportunity, and while admitting that the Bill still contained provisions which might be effective if honestly administered, expressed doubt whether this would be done, as the Government had already shown its weakness in the face of political pressure. Nevertheless he was prepared to give them an opportunity of carrying out the Act. (55) To this Merriman was not disposed to agree. He denounced the Bill as a "sham and a delusion from beginning to end", and was supported by Sauer, who prophesied that it would be a costly failure. He believed that it would be impossible to carry a measure which was opposed by the majority of the people in the country, and maintained that the Prime Minister had merely secured his position by lobbying (56) at the expense of his own views and those of his colleagues. (57)

Rhodes, replying to these allegations, while admitting that the form of the Bill had been changed, denied that it had been emasculated. Seven weeks had been spent in an earnest attempt to pass a compulsory Act, and in their desire to produce a measure which would be acceptable to the mass of the people, every reasonable amendment had been made. At the same time, he assured the House that no concession had been or would be made on a matter

(54) Cape Times, 27/6/94
(55) Cape Hansard, 1893, p.357
(56) Vide supra pp. 15-16
(57) Cape Hansard, 1894, pp. 357-359
of principle. In the subsequent division, the third reading was carried by 42 votes to 23, Merriman and Sauer being among those who opposed it.

The passing of the Act was the signal for a renewed outburst of opposition. Throughout the session of 1894, and indeed during those preceding it, there had been numerous petitions presented on the subject, but the opposition now began to assume serious proportions. During September, 1894, a resolution was passed by the Brandvlei (Calvinia) Branch of the Bond calling upon all the district "besturen" of those branches opposed to the Act to communicate with them with a view to drawing up petitions against it. It was further suggested that each branch should send a representative to Cape Town to present the petitions personally to the Ministers on a specified day. In an open letter published in "Ons Land", the Hon. R. P. Botha, M.L.C., a leading Bondsman, advised them to test the Act before condemning it, but his appeal, endorsed by others, went unheeded and the organised agitation continued. Delegates from 37 Bond centres met in conference at Victoria West in December, and once again renewed their plea for a permissive Act. Their main objection seems to have been the inspection clauses, which they regarded as an attempt to enslave Africanders, as they considered that they endangered their right to be free from control on their own land.

Parliament re-assembled in May, 1895, and on one day during the first month of the Session no fewer than 127 petitions against the Act, carrying 10,043 signatures, were presented. In addition, a monster deputation of 200 delegates arrived in Cape Town to interview the Government. In his Budget speech the following month, Sprigg referred to the vital necessity of maintaining and carrying out the Act, and announced that it was their intention to do so. At the same time, his tactless reference to the depu-

(58) Ibid., pp. 359-361
(59) See Votes & Proceedings, 1890-1892, No. 24 of 1890, Nos. 71 and 90 of 1891, No. 54 of 1892
(60) Cape Times, 17/9/94
(61) Ibid., 28/9/94
(62) Ibid., 27/12/94
(63) Cape Hansard, 1895, p.123; Votes & Proceedings, 1895: No.46
tation, which he represented as having been "stirred up in the North-Western and South-Western districts by the Demon of Ignorance and Prejudice", was keenly resented, and undoubtedly did much harm to the conciliatory policy Rhodes was attempting to follow.

A little over a week later a Bill was introduced by a private member to make the law permissive. Frost, the Secretary for Agriculture, in moving its rejection defended the working of the Act which had been in force in some districts since March 1895. Merriman and Sauer again expressed their belief that the Act would be useless without the co-operation of the people, and it was suggested that a Select Committee should be appointed to consider the advisability of creating a dividing line west of which the Act should not be enforced unless a majority of the farmers petitioned for it. To this suggestion Rhodes was not prepared to agree, as it would merely have meant going back to the old Act. He reminded the House that the stringent regulations of the 1894 legislation had been "moderated to an enormous extent", and it was essential that they should test the effectiveness of their proposals. If they were not prepared to do this, he personally would be inclined to ask the Governor to give them an opportunity of consulting their constituents.

At this stage the debate was adjourned for several days, and when it was re-opened on 16th July, the following amendment was introduced by a private member: that "... no further steps should be taken this session in regard to the Scab Amendment Bill, but ... that a searching inquiry be made by the Government during the recess into the working of the Scab Act of 1894 with a view to: (1) a judicious application of the second section ... in districts where such application may be calculated to meet reasonable objections to the Act; and if found necessary (2) such fresh legislation next year as experience may prove expedient".

(64) Cape Hansard, 1895, p.221
(65) Cape Times, 14/6/95
(66) Ibid., 1895, p.349
(67) Ibid., pp. 401-402; pp. 423-424
(68) Ibid., pp. 425-426
(69) Ibid., p.471
Government's acceptance, Rhodes pointed out that it gave the Act the "fair trial" they demanded, and merely asked for a judicious application of the powers of suspension contained in the second section of the Act. It was his intention to visit the North-western districts in December and January to meet the people and see if they had any grounds for their objections. If so, he would be the first to tell the House that the Act could not be applied in certain areas. He did not, however, think that this would be the case, and for this reason the words "if found necessary" had been included in the motion at his request.\(^{(70)}\)

The sudden compromise accepted by the Premier was, generally speaking, well received, although, as he had anticipated, there were some who held that he had abandoned his principles, and did not intend to carry out the Act. Innes, in particular, condemned an arrangement which had been "prepared in the lobbies and ratified before he (Rhodes) came into the House". In the light of the Premier's previous declaration that he was prepared to stand or fall by the administration of the Act, it would appear that Innes had every justification in referring to Rhodes's action as an extraordinary feat of political agility, and he feared that it would mean that they were giving the Government tacit authority not to carry out the Act where people did not want it.\(^{(71)}\)

As the Premier's proposed tour of the dissatisfied districts did not materialise, the question as to whether he would have made any further concessions or not remains a matter for conjecture. It is likely, however, that Rhodes, realising the extent of the opposition, hoped by his personal intervention to be able to win round to the Government's point of view those who were opposing the Act mainly because of their ignorance of its provisions. In this it is very likely that he would have been successful, for the later reports show that when representatives were sent out for this purpose their efforts met with an amazing degree of success. In December, 1895, for example, Scab Inspector Verran at two meetings

\(^{(70)}\) Ibid., pp. 471-472
\(^{(71)}\) Ibid., pp. 472-474
at Ventersdorp and Burghersdorp secured the unanimous promise of support for the law from the local farmers, many of whom had at first been antagonistic. (72)

This, however, is to anticipate. Rhodes's promise to investigate served to pacify the "anti-Scabbists" in the House, and the amendment was accepted by 57 votes to 12. (73) At the same time, the agitation in the Colony itself seemed to be increasing as the date of the general application of the Act approached. There were reports of active and passive resistance through the agency of the local Bond branches, and one of these actually resolved not only to refuse to elect inspectors, but also to impose fines on all who obeyed the law. (74) The Government were, however, not prepared to make any further concessions, and a petition signed by 9,435 persons asking for the dissolution of Parliament was rejected as being neither necessary nor desirable. (75)

The Act came into force on the 1st December, 1895, and despite the fact that the Colony was passing through a period of exceptional drought as a result of which it was not pressed in certain districts, the results of the measure were considered satisfactory by those who had put it into operation. In the course of a debate during the session of 1896 arising from a renewed attempt to make the law permissive, (76) Faure, Secretary for Agriculture in the Sprott Cabinet, pointed out that in the four months during which the Act had generally applied all the sheep and goats in 40 districts had been dipped, and a second dipping had been possible in 24 districts. Whereas in November, 1895, 521,608 animals were found to be infected, over 13 million animals were free from scab by March, 1896, leaving 2½ million still to be cleaned, of which only 153,340 were infected. (77) In the Somerset East district, for example, the number of infected sheep had fallen from 2,376 to 758, and in the Bedford district there

(72) Cape Times, 10/12/95
(73) Cape Hansard, 1895, p.476
(74) Cape Times, 10/9/95
(75) Ibid., 18/9/95
(76) Cape Hansard, 1896, p.228 ff.
(77) Ibid., p.230
had been a similar decrease from 527 to 5. \(^{(78)}\) In addition, Sprigg in his Budget speech was able to announce that the wool export had increased by £145,000, representing an increase in quantity of eleven million pounds. \(^{(79)}\)

It would appear, therefore, that the measure met with a considerable degree of success, and for this credit must be given to the Rhodes Administration. For the same reason, however, it is all the more regrettable that greater care was not taken in its introduction. The weakness shown by the Government during the 1894 debates, when the Ministers voted against each other in Committee, and when Rhodes on more than one occasion supported an amendment introduced by a private member contrary to the advice of his Secretary for Agriculture, antagonised many who would otherwise have supported the Act, and encouraged those agitating for its repeal. Had the Government rather introduced a less stringent measure which could possibly have been strengthened later, and from the beginning sent out representatives to explain the working of the Act, many of the subsequent difficulties would have been avoided.

\(^{(78)}\) Ibid., p.440
\(^{(79)}\) Ibid., p.234
CHAPTER V
RHODES AS SECRETARY FOR NATIVE AFFAIRS

a. The Annexation of Pondoland

Condition of Pondoland - Necessity for
Action - Natal and Pondoland - Settlement -
Annexation - Conclusions

b. The Glen Grey Act

Origins - 1892 Commission - Report -
Individual Title - 1893 Debate - Alienation -
Glen Grey Bill - Land Settlement - Location
Boards - District Council - Labour Tax -
Liquor - Franchise - "Lobbying and Caucuses" -
"A Native Bill for Africa"

a. The Annexation of Pondoland

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the passing of the
Minister of Agriculture Bill in 1893 was the fact that it marks
the beginning of a period when Rhodes himself was responsible
for Native administration; a period which saw the successful
annexation of Pondoland, and the passing of his great legislative
measure, the Glen Grey Act.

The necessity for definite action in Pondoland on the part
of the Colonial Government arose from the events in the territory
itself, and from Natal's suggestion that joint action should be
taken. Pondoland, the only Native territory in the Eastern Pro-
vince which still remained nominally independent, had long been
a source of trouble to the Cape and Natal governments. All those
who had dealings with the Pondos seem agreed that they were excep-
tionally unfitted to govern themselves, and were, generally, of
an inferior stock as compared with the surrounding tribes. Thus
in 1891, in his Report on the state of affairs in Pondoland, Colonel
Griffiths describes the territory as being in a state of anarchy
and confusion with no security for life and property. (1)

There was no improvement in the position during the next few
years, and the internal anarchy resulted in constant friction
with the Colonial Natives, and caused annoyance to the people of

(1) A.2-'91, pp. 6-7
Natal. Matters came to a head when a minor chief, Umhlangaso, rebelled. He had long been a source of trouble to Sigcau, who now decided to take drastic action against him. The Natal Government saw a chance of intervention which might lead to annexation, but its tentative efforts in this direction met with a stern rebuke from the High Commissioner. Meanwhile, however, Umhlangaso and six other minor chiefs had petitioned to be taken over by Natal.(2)

Early in February, 1894, the High Commissioner in a Minute to Ministers pointed out the implications of such a transfer being endorsed by Sigcau.(3) Rhodes's reply shows that he had already anticipated the danger of Natal obtaining a foothold in Pondoland. He stated that the Government was prepared to undertake at once the responsibility of establishing law and order in the country, and to annex it to the Colony in terms of the agreement arrived at with H.K.'s Government, whereby the latter was relieved of all military and financial responsibilities. The Colony in return was given a free hand in the territory subject to consultation with the High Commissioner.(4) When, therefore, on the 13th February, the Governor of Natal suggested that the two governments should co-operate in Pondoland, the High Commissioner was able to reply that his Government were already taking the necessary steps for the establishment of order.(5)

It is thus obvious that it was the fear of Natal's intervention that finally stung Rhodes into action, although he, naturally, denied this in Parliament.(6) Natal had been granted self-government the previous year against the wishes and opinions of Rhodes, who regarded the step as premature and dangerous. It was an essential feature of his ideal of a united South Africa that the Cape Colony should be the predominant state, and it is understandable that he should be reluctant to see a rival state strengthened in any way.

Speaking at Kokstad shortly before his visit to Pondoland, he

(2) G.59-'94, Pondoland Correspondence, p.11
(3) Ibid., p.12
(4) Ibid., p.12
(5) Ibid., pp. 14-15
(6) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.8
launched into a violent tirade against Natal, speaking of its parliament as a parochial assembly, and sneering at its poor financial state and small white population.\(^7\) To him her attempted intervention suggested that "the neighbouring Colony, with its new-fledged responsibility of Responsible Government, was prepared to deal with the whole continent".\(^8\) Rhodes later attempted to justify this attack on the grounds that it was necessary to make their neighbours realise their position, but there is no doubt that his speech caused much ill-feeling, and antagonised many from whom he was hoping for support in his proposals of union.

Once a definite course of action in Pondoland had been decided upon, Rhodes summoned Major Elliot, Chief Magistrate of Tembuland and the Transkei, to Cape Town for consultation. In a Memorandum, Elliot expressed the belief that both East and West Pondoland could be incorporated without bloodshed and at comparatively little expense. He suggested that the Governor should call on the chiefs Sigcau and 'Nquiliso to submit to Colonial authority. If they refused, European troops should be sent to occupy the country. When this had been affected, the petty chiefs should be invited to submit, being given the assurance that their people and property would be protected. He felt sure that so many would avail themselves of this offer that opposition on the part of Sigcau and 'Nquiliso would be impossible. Eastern and Western Pondoland could then be divided into magistracies.\(^9\)

On the strength of this Memorandum, Major Elliot was appointed Resident Commissioner for Pondoland, and entrusted with the work of annexation. Consequently, accompanied by Mr. Stanford, Chief Magistrate of Griqualand East, he left the Colony on 1st March armed with letters to the chiefs drawn up on the lines suggested by him. 'Nquiliso, Paramount Chief of Western Pondoland, formally ceded his country to the Colony on 19th March, while a similar treaty was entered into with Sigcau the following day. In terms of these treaties, each chief was to be paid £500 p.a. subject to

\(^7\) Basil Williams, \textit{op. cit.}, p.208

\(^8\) Innes, \textit{op. cit.}, p.103

\(^9\) G.59-194, pp. 16-18
launched into a violent tirade against Natal, speaking of its parliament as a parochial assembly, and sneering at its poor financial state and small white population.\(^7\) To him her attempted intervention suggested that "the neighbouring Colony, with its new-fledged responsibility of Responsible Government, was prepared to deal with the whole continent".\(^8\) Rhodes later attempted to justify this attack on the grounds that it was necessary to make their neighbours realise their position, but there is no doubt that his speech caused much ill-feeling, and antagonised many from whom he was hoping for support in his proposals of union.

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\(^7\) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.208  
\(^8\) Innes, op. cit., p.103  
\(^9\) G.59-94, pp. 16-18
good behaviour. In addition, the Government promised protection and security to them and their people. Similar arrangements were made with the lesser chiefs. Meanwhile, Rhodes announced his intention of visiting Pondoland, and at meetings with 'Nquiliso and Sigcau completed the negotiations that had been commenced by his magistrates.

On the opening day of the Parliamentary session, 17th May, 1894, Rhodes gave notice to move "that in the opinion of this House, it is expedient that the country known as Pondoland, comprising the territories of East and West Pondoland which have been ceded by the Chiefs Sigcau and 'Nquiliso, should be annexed to this Colony, and that the Government take such steps as may be necessary to effect such annexation". In defending the Government's actions during the recess, Rhodes said that experience had proved that it was almost impossible to have a barbarian power between two civilized powers. This had also been the view of his late colleagues, and a definite policy had been formulated by the late Government. They had been prepared to undertake annexation when the right time occurred. During the recess, hostilities had broken out between Sigcau and Umhlangaso, and the new Responsible Government of Natal had declared that it was quite prepared to deal with the Pondoland question if the Colony did not act. The Government had not, however, been pushed into action by Natal, but felt that the time was ripe.

Turning to the way in which annexation had been carried out, Rhodes dismissed as impossible the Natal Government's proposition that the territory should be divided between them and the Colony. He made it clear that the incorporation was to be absolute and unconditional. The chiefs had shown themselves unfit to govern, and would, therefore, be replaced by magistrates. This change of government was, he claimed, welcomed by the common people because they knew they would enjoy greater security of life and property. The Premier emphasised the determination of the Govern-

\( ^{10} \) Ibid., pp. 24-26
\( ^{11} \) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.2
ment to recognise no concessions, and referred to the damage caused by the system in Swaziland. (12) All this had been achieved at very little cost to the Colony, (13) and while he hoped that the hut tax for 1895 would be sufficient to pay for the magistrates, he anticipated that in time it would be sufficient to meet all expenses. (14)

Rhodes then went on to discuss the Government's decision not to disarm the Pondos. The wisdom of this decision cannot be overestimated. As he pointed out, they had submitted without a shot being fired, and disarming might have been resented. In addition, it would have meant compensation for useless weapons. (15) He believed too that if the Government treated them with justice and consideration they would not break out, and in this he was justified by subsequent events in the territory. It is true that in June, 1895, Sigcau was arrested and imprisoned on a charge of obstruction, under a proclamation specially issued for that purpose, but he was afterwards released following a successful appeal to the courts. (16) De Villiers in his judgement rightly expressed his severe condemnation of the way in which the chief had been arrested, and there seems to have been little justification for the drastic action taken by Rhodes on this occasion. (17)

However, to return to the 1894 debates. There was little real opposition to the resolution, acceptance of which paved the way for the introduction of the Pondoland Annexation Bill later in the session. (18) In contrast to the Colony's disastrous attempt at intervention in Basutoland in 1880, (19) the annexation of Pondoland was accomplished with an amazing degree of success,

(12) In a telegram to Stanford (17/3/94) Rhodes stated that Sigcau was to receive no future payments for concessions, as this would imply that they were recognised by the Government.
(13) Rhodes estimated a total cost of £30,000; £15,000 for additional Cape police to replace those allotted to each of the 5 magistrates in Pondoland; £8,000 salaries for the magistrates for the first year; £7,000 for the actual annexation itself.
(14) Cape Hansard, 1894, pp.7-9
(15) Ibid., p.10
(16) Walker, De Villiers, pp. 259-260
(17) Ibid.: Millin, Rhodes, p.230
(18) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.63 ff.
(19) Vide supra, p.4
and for this much of the credit must be given to Rhodes. While it is true that the actual cession of the country was carried out by the two chief magistrates, Rhodes's subsequent visit to the territory against advice did much to pacify those chiefs who resented their loss of independence. The wisdom of his decision not to disarm the Pondos has already been referred to, and the refusal to recognise any concessions, while undoubtedly causing great loss to some was fully merited in the light of the chaos caused by the system in Swaziland. It was with no little justification, therefore, that Rhodes was able to refer to the unselfishness of the Government in freeing 200,000 people from "the seething cauldron of barbarian atrocities".

b. The Glen Grey Act

The session of 1894, which began with the annexation of Pondoland, ended with the passing of the Glen Grey Bill. This is regarded as Rhodes's greatest legislative achievement, and marked an important stage in his Native policy. While it was undoubtedly true that the Bill was not an original measure, a fact admitted by Rhodes himself, to him must be given the credit of giving it effect, and of shaping it into a living instrument of policy.

There had been previous attempts at granting individual tenure to Natives in the Colony. The experiment had been tried on the mission stations, but as the Natives were separated from their tribes and all tribal authority, and as the land remained the property of the mission, they can only be regarded as artificial measures, adopted more for strategic than for social and economic purposes. Before 1836 military settlements had been set up on the Colonial border where individual tenure was given to the Fingoes over farms of 200-300 morgen, and under the Kama-stone scheme (1877-1879), plots were surveyed and allocated to

(20) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.209
(21) See Walker, De Villiers, p.250; Cook Proc. vs. Colonial Government
(22) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.10
(23) Ibid., p.47
Natives who applied for them. These Natives were required to pay rent and to pay the surveying costs, and the fact that a "tax" was involved caused them to lose sight of the advantages to be gained. These earlier experiments failed partly because of clumsy administration, and partly because of the opposition of the chiefs, who were unwilling to allow the members of their tribes to pass from their jurisdiction. The Government's policy of replacing chiefs by salaried headmen facilitated the success of the Glen Grey Act. Above all, the latter measure differed from the previous experiments in that, unlike them, it was incorporated within the framework of the tribal system.\(^{(24)}\)

In 1892 a Commission had been appointed to inquire into the tenure of land in the Glen Grey district, and had been asked to report on the following points:-

1. The nature and condition of the tenure under which the Glen Grey lands were in Native occupation.
2. The extent and natural features of the ground so occupied, and its suitability for pastoral or agricultural purposes.
3. The number of male residents and the number of huts occupied by them.
4. The practicability of reducing the number and extent of existing locations by combining two or more locations into one.
5. The best way of disposing of vacant land.
6. The desirability or otherwise of giving individual title to those Natives who wish for it, and the best course to adopt regarding those who do not desire it.

The Commission found that the district had been handed over to the Tambookie tribe for their use and occupation by Sir George Cathcart in 1852. From that date the country was held by them on tribal tenure. Following the failure of the Government's attempt to induce the tribe to vacate the district in 1864, security of occupation was granted to those remaining in Glen Grey. It was merely stipulated that those kraals that had been vacated

were not to be filled up without permission. Some of the vacant land was granted for mission purposes. After the 1881 Tambookie rebellion, only those Natives who had remained loyal were left in the Reserve. The rebels, however, gradually returned, and the Commission found that by 1892 it would have been impossible to pick out the rebels from the rest. In any event, the fact that they had been admitted meant that their offence had been condoned.\(^{(25)}\)

The action of the Commission in stressing the fact that the land belonged to the Native inhabitants was welcomed by Merriman in the debate on its report.\(^{(26)}\) This statement is not without significance in view of the action of those who were always looking for a means whereby the European might be able to gain a foothold in the reserves.\(^{(27)}\)

In its Report on the following questions, the Commission stated that the locations in the Glen Grey district covered 248,476 morgen. While the soil in the valleys was generally suitable for agriculture, there was good grazing throughout. The census returns showed that there were 7,500 occupied huts and a male population of 18,926, of whom half were assumed to be children. In addition, however, the Resident Magistrate believed that there were large numbers of Natives at work in the Colony who had claims to land. For this reason they regarded it as impracticable under existing circumstances to attempt to reduce the number of locations. The fifth point of reference therefore fell away, as there was no land to dispose of.\(^{(28)}\)

The land tenure provisions were the keystone of the Glen Grey Bill, and this section of the Report is, therefore, of special significance. As a result of its inquiry, the Commission estimated that 2,356 Native landowners were in favour of, and 1,312 opposed to the granting of individual title. In addition, it believed that

\(^{(25)}\) A.3-'92, Report, Sec. I
\(^{(26)}\) Cape Hansard, 1893, p.173
\(^{(27)}\) See petitions, Votes & Proceedings, 1890-1893: No.145 of 1890, That the Glen Grey lands may be put up and sold at public auction; No.374 of 1892; No.128 of 1893; Prime Minister's Office, Minutes from the Governor and High Commissioner: Address from the Natives of Glen Grey to the Governor, 23/9/91
\(^{(28)}\) A.3-'92, Report
the bulk of those at work in the Colony would favour the idea. The Commission strongly recommended that title should be granted, as it felt that land matters in Glen Grey would never be on a satisfactory basis until this was done. Such action would prevent additional Natives from coming into the district, and as the land would be insufficient to support more than one family, a man's children would be forced to seek work when they grew up. In this way, the granting of individual title would help to solve the labour difficulty. The Commission felt assured that those opposing the granting of title would join the others once the survey had been commenced, but in the event of a large number objecting, thought that they could be located together in a suitable part of the district. Although the Commission itself considered that the titles should be issued without any restrictions, many of the Natives had requested that the alienation of lands without the consent of the Governor should be prevented. In deference to their wishes, it was thought advisable that a clause should be inserted to prevent the transfer of property without the consent of the Governor for three or four years. (29)

During the session of 1893, Frost, the then Secretary for Native Affairs, moved "that in accordance with the recommendations of the report of the Glen Grey Commission ... steps be taken for granting individual title to land in the Glen Grey district to all who prove themselves entitled thereto". Special provision was to be made limiting the transfer of land for three years. (30) Herriman, in reply, while commending the Commission's report as one of great moderation and fairness, attacked the proposal. He pointed out that it was not clear whether it was desired or understood by the Natives, who would be subject to all the disadvantages of holders of alienable titles. For example, their land would be seizable for debt. (31) Innes moved the adjournment of the debate, (32) and later tabled as an amendment "That

(29) Ibid., Sec. 6
(30) Hansard, 1893, 1.n.173
(31) Ibid.
(32) Ibid., p.255
in the opinion of this house it is desirable that legislation should be introduced with regard to Glen Grey and other Crown lands, to secure to individual Natives the right of separate occupation of defined portions of lands thereon, to regulate the disposal during life, and the devolution after death, of such defined portions, to prevent over-crowding by squatters, to define commonage rights, and to provide for the regulation and good government of the location." The debate was, however, never resumed.

The question of the alienation of the Glen Grey lands was to prove prove one of the major difficulties in drawing up the Bill. The overcrowding in the district and its resultant evils made it urgently necessary for action to be taken. It was generally admitted that the only possible remedy was the issue of individual titles, but there were differences of opinion on the method of its application. On the one hand the great majority of the Bond members were in favour of full individual title with all its privileges and responsibilities. Admittedly this would mean that the Native would gain the franchise, which was debarred to him by the Act of 1877, but it would also mean that his land would be liable for debt, and available for purchase by Europeans. In this way they hoped that the highly-prized Native lands would be thrown open for development. (33) On the other hand, there were many who believed that while the Natives should have the right to dispose of their land among themselves and enjoy the franchise, they should not be allowed to sell it to Europeans. Nor should it be made executable for debt.

Rhodes himself was strongly opposed to the inter-mixing of whites and blacks in the reserves, and devised a compromise whereby this might be prevented. It seems that Hofmeyr too recognised the necessity of keeping the reserves intact, but shrank from publicising a viewpoint somewhat in advance of that of his followers. (34) It

(33) Hofmeyr, op.cit., p.469
(34) Ibid., p.471
has been suggested that Hofmeyr was the real author of the Glen Grey Bill, but the facts suggest rather that there was close co-operation between him and Rhodes in its preparation. It must be remembered that the Bond leader was absent from the Colony during the 1894 session. Hofmeyr had somewhat unwillingly agreed to represent the Colony at the Ottawa Conference, a duty which he realised would involve his absence from one of the most important sessions of the Cape Parliament, and it is likely, therefore, that the normal consultations between him and the Premier were intensified before his departure. His reason for not publicising his views on the Glen Grey settlement have already been referred to, but he did apparently pass on these views in writing to Rhodes. In the absence of the relevant documents the extent to which these views were followed remains a matter of conjecture, but it cannot be denied that Rhodes was able, in Hofmeyr's absence, to impose his policy in this matter upon his Bond supporters and upon his own colleagues. As Hofmeyr's policy was not known at the time, it is to Rhodes that the full credit for this must be assigned.

During the debate on the second reading of the Bill, Kerriman accused Rhodes of making a "scamper through the Transkei" and devising a Bill from the few ideas thus gained. This was hardly a fair criticism, for quite apart from his wide experience after years of dealings with the Natives, it is evident that the principles of the measure were being formulated by him long before the drafting of the Bill itself began. Nearly two months of the session had passed before Rhodes gave notice to ask for leave to introduce a Bill "to provide for the disposal of lands and for the administration of affairs in the district of Glen Grey and other proclaimed districts".

(35) Ibid., p.469
(36) Ibid.
(37) Sprigg and Frost were in favour of granting full individual title.
(38) This expression was first used by Imvo in an editorial criticising the haste with which Rhodes was travelling through the territories on his tour of inspection (April, 1894). This criticism was subsequently modified, however, for the same paper in a later editorial welcomed the "straight talks" between him and the Natives, and more especially the assurances given in regard to land and liquor. - Imvo, 11/4/94; 2/5/94
(39) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.385
(40) Ibid., p.253
Introducing the second reading, the Premier, in a broad survey of the conditions of the Natives under his control, pointed out that the enormous increase of population would soon make it impossible for the locations to support them. In their idleness the men turned to the canteens, and "they left them in those great preserves, and did not teach them the dignity of labour". From this survey Rhodes developed as his premises four points: "to give the Native interest in the land, allow the more superior minds amongst them to attend to their local wants, remove the canteens and give them a stimulus to labour". On these four points the main provisions of the Bill were based - the land settlement, the establishment of Location Boards and a District Council, the labour tax and the liquor provisions.

In terms of the land settlement of the Glen Grey Act, the district was divided into eighteen locations. Each location was then surveyed and divided into allotments of approximately 4 morgen. It had estimated that the cost of these surveys would be £2.10s. for each allotment, but it was found that the actual cost would be £5. As 8,000 titles had to be issued this would result in a loss to the Colony of £20,000. It was, therefore, proposed that £2.10s. should be paid immediately, and the remaining amount spread over four annual instalments. There were two objections to this proposal. In the first place, it was felt that the expense involved in a formal survey of allotments was too great, and as one member pointed out, if, as was intended, the Bill was applied to other parts of the country, the cost would run into millions of pounds. Secondly, attention was drawn to the Labour Commission report which stated that "the Natives are not prepared generally to go to the expense of having titles to surveyed lands". Merriman proposed an amendment whereby the survey of the location should be carried out and registered in the Deeds Registry Office in Cape Town; allotments should then be

(41) Ibid., p.362
(42) Ibid., p.263
(43) No. 25 of 1894, Part I
(44) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.364
(45) Ibid., p.433
(46) Ibid., p.434
marked out on the ground and registered in the office of the Resident Magistrate. The adoption of this local registry would thus provide a cheap and ready means of registration.\(^{(47)}\) Rhodes's refusal to accept this amendment was justified by the success of this section of the Bill. Apparently little difficulty was encountered in inducing the Natives to pay these survey fees, and within three years after the passing of the Act, 6,576 of the 7,088 plots surveyed had been taken up, and £15,000 in fees collected.\(^{(48)}\)

But while the prohibitive cost of surveys was the most serious objection, there was another difficulty which had to be overcome. Native agriculture was based on the idea that people could move from one part of the land to the other, with the result that the pasture land was not definitely separated from the arable. It was now necessary to make this distinction to enable permanent allotments to be marked off. The Native land did not lend itself readily to surveying, and the fact that freedom of movement was to be curtailed caused some dissatisfaction. On the other hand, as a result of the density of population in Glen Grey, Natives were far advanced to the stage where each man had his own farm, and much of the success of the surveys is due to the fact that, wherever possible, these holdings were confirmed with as little change as possible.\(^{(49)}\)

When these surveys had been carried out, title deeds were to be issued to those in occupation of land in each location. The opinions of the two schools of thought on the issue of individual title have already been referred to. As we have seen, the main differences were in regard to the alienation of land, and the question of its being seizable for debt. Rhodes, steering a middle course, made provision for the alienation or transfer of land subject to the approval of the Governor.\(^{(50)}\) As he was of

\(^{(47)}\) Ibid., p.432
\(^{(48)}\) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.213
\(^{(49)}\) See A.19-'95, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 2-3; Wiggins, Thesis, p.31 ff.
\(^{(50)}\) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.367
the opinion that the Natives should be in their own reserves and not "mixed up" with Europeans, he objected to any period being fixed during which land could not be sold to them, as was suggested the previous session. \(51\) Sauer and Innes felt, however, that this safeguard was not sufficient, and suggested that the consent of some local body representing the Natives, such as the District Council, should also be required. \(52\) This suggestion was accepted by Rhodes during the second reading, but not supported by him during the Committee stage. \(53\) The fears of those who believed that these provisions would not prevent Europeans from gaining a foothold in the Glen Grey area - fears increased by Sivewright's subsequent declaration that he "did not want to give perpetual tenure to those Kafirs" \(54\) - have not been realised. In the words of Innes, "... European intrusion has ceased to be a menace; the anti-Native forces have adopted a new alignment; the slogan now is not dispersion but segregation. Natives are now not to be driven out, but to be driven into their reserves. The problem now is how to provide the necessary land." \(55\)

In regard to the titles being seizable for debt, it was felt that some protection was necessary to prevent people from inducing the Natives to run into debt. \(56\) Consequently, an amendment was introduced by Innes and accepted in Committee to the effect that "It shall not be competent for the registered holder of such land or mortgage such land/in any way to pledge his interest therein". \(57\) Subject to this condition, all property of the registered holder both movable and immovable was liable to execution for debt. The recognition of this principle was undoubtedly a grave error, and in time the Natives became greatly indebted to traders. By 1903, the average landowner was in debt to the sum of £20-£60. In such cases, the title deeds were given as security, but they were of

\(51\) Ibid.
\(52\) Ibid., p.382, p.411
\(53\) Ibid., p.424
\(54\) Ibid., p.467
\(55\) Innes, op.cit., p.106
\(56\) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.383, pp. 383-389, p.411
\(57\) Ibid., pp. 436-438; Act 25 of 1894, Section 5
no real value, as the allotments could not be mortgaged. The provision was withdrawn when the Glen Grey Act was amended in 1905. A similar modification was made when the Act was extended to the Transkei.

The title deeds issued to the Natives in Glen Grey were subject to a perpetual quitrent of 15s. per annum payable by each registered holder. This quitrent was 5s. more than the hut-tax which it replaced, but Rhodes pointed out that the Natives would benefit, as there would be no extra charge for any additional huts that were built. The allotments thus granted could not be sub-divided, or sub-let, as this would defeat the very aims Rhodes had in view. For this reason, too, the Native law of primogeniture had been adopted to ensure that the land would remain intact under one owner. The Schedule to the Act made provision for the forfeiture of the title if the holder rebelled, or if, having been previously convicted of theft, he was sentenced to imprisonment of not less than twelve months. In addition, in the event of the failure of the title-holder to cultivate his allotment for a period of twelve months, the Resident Magistrate was empowered, in consultation with the District Council, to report to the Governor. The latter would then give three months' notice of his intention to cancel the title if the holder still failed to make proper use of his allotment in that period. Finally, the title could be cancelled in cases of continued default (i.e. one year) in payment of quitrent or survey fee. This provision was criticised by Sauer as being unduly harsh, but his amendment in Committee to stay its application for two years was negated.

The provision in the Glen Grey Bill for the establishment of Native Councils was the practical expression of an important

(58) Wiggins, Thesis, p.54
(59) Innes, op.cit., p.107
(60) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.364
(61) Ibid.
(62) Ibid., p.383
(63) Ibid., p.443
aspect of Rhodes's Native policy. In this way, building upon the traditional Native custom of government by chief and councillors, he hoped to train them in the art of self-government, to "allow the more superior minds amongst them to attend to their local wants". Two types of Councils were provided for. Firstly, there were to be Location Boards of three members, appointed by the Governor for one year. These Boards were to have such powers under the Village Management Act as the Governor deemed advisable. All revenue collected by the Board in its location was to be handed over to the District Council, which would then use the money within that location. The Boards were thus little more than appendages of the central body, and had very limited powers. Rhodes realised that the policy he was introducing was very much in the nature of a social experiment, and his reluctance to increase the powers of the Boards can thus be appreciated. When, therefore, Innes moved as an amendment to Clause 6 that the land in the locations be placed in trust with these bodies, he pointed out that there were some locations where there would not be a single Native sufficiently civilized to understand what the trust proposed to be vested in them was. It should also be remembered that the Bill was not intended for application to Glen Grey only.

In addition to the Location Boards, a District Council of twelve members was established to administer local affairs within the district of Glen Grey. Six of its members were to be nominated by the Governor in consultation with the Resident Magistrate, and three additional members each were to be chosen by the Location Boards of Lady Frere and Glen Grey. These nominees were then to be submitted to the Governor for approval. The Governor had the right of refusing to accept any such nomination. These councillors held office for three years, and, as in the case of the Location Boards, were

(64) Ibid., p.383
(65) An amendment was introduced by Kerriman which reduced their term of office from the three years originally proposed to one year. Cape Hansard, 1894, p.441
(66) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.44C
(67) Act 25 of 1894, Section 5, Clause 31 ff.
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(66) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.444
(67) Act 25 of 1894, Section 5, Clause 31 ff.
eligible for re-election. Rhodes defended the adoption of the nominee principle on the grounds that the white farmers in the Glen Grey area should be protected. It was feared that if the entire Council was elective there might not be a single European represented.\(^{(68)}\) In an additional statement a few days later, however, the Premier announced that it had been decided to exclude the North-western portion of Glen Grey, the portion occupied by Europeans, from the operation of the District Council to avoid the difficulty of having a Council of both "blacks and whites".\(^{(69)}\) In the light of this statement, the principle of nomination used in regard to both the Location Boards and District Council was attacked. It was feared that the Natives, having no right to assist in the election of members, particularly of the latter, in view of its powers of taxation, would not be able to take any living interest in its proceedings - the very object the Premier had in view.\(^{(70)}\) Rhodes, in reply, maintained that the people did not understand the question of election, and held that nomination was safer in the hands of the magistrates.

As with the Location Boards, Rhodes regarded the setting up of the District Council as but the first tentative step towards eventual self-government, and there were many restrictions on its powers. The magistrate was *ex officio* the Chairman of the Council, having a deliberative and casting vote in all questions. All administrative appointments made by the Council were subject to the approval of the Secretary for Native Affairs, and the appropriation of revenue was subject to the approval of the Governor.\(^{(71)}\)

At the same time, however, the Council was empowered to levy an annual rate of 5s. on every registered title-holder and every other able-bodied adult male Native in the district. The revenue thus gained was to be expended on local works, roads, bridges, education and agricultural improvement. In this Rhodes had two objects in view. Firstly, he wished to give them an interest in local matters,

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\(^{(68)}\) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.367
\(^{(69)}\) Ibid., p.379
\(^{(70)}\) Ibid., p.383, p.389, p.341
\(^{(71)}\) Act 25 of 1894, Cl. 52-53
and secondly, he maintained that the Colony should be relieved of the local expenditure of the Transkei. The right of taxation would, he believed, be an important step towards the attainment of the first object. The District Council worked well, and during the first year in which the rate was payable £1,612 was collected. The Report on the working of the Act expressed its confidence that the Council would prove a very important factor in raising the Native, and making him a more useful member of society. (72)

Section 33 of the Act provided that every adult male in the district of Glen Grey was to be subject to a tax of 10s. per annum, unless he could show, to the satisfaction of the Resident Magistrate, that he had been at work beyond the borders of the district for three months during the preceding year, or that he had been employed outside the district for a total period of three years. In which case, he was to receive exemption from further payment of the tax. This clause was regarded by many as a mere sop to the Bond, and, as such, a blot on the measure. Rhodes, however, attempted to justify its inclusion on the grounds that "it was the duty of the Government to remove these poor children out of their state of sloth and laziness, and give them some gentle stimulants to go forth and find out something of the dignity of labour". (73) The Report of the 1892 Glen Grey Commission had shewn that the land seemed barely sufficient to support those already upon it, and the Premier pointed out that it was impossible to give a small piece of land to each head of a family and allow it to be subdivided in view of the enormous increase in the Native population. (74) It would have to be realised that in future nine-tenths of the Natives in the country would have to spend their lives in manual labour. The labour tax was not slavery therefore, but was intended as a stimulant

(72) G.47 - '96, p.2
(73) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.363
(74) Ibid.
to the large number of young men in the locations who relied on their families for food, and were able to remain in these areas without doing a stroke of work. He thought he might compare their present position "to that of the young man about town, who loafed about in the club all day, dressed himself up for parties and afternoon tea, and in the evening, ate and drank too much and probably finished up with immorality." (75) The debates show that the labour tax would have been accepted without much opposition had Rhodes limited its application to the "young men" he so picturesquely described. But the tax was to be applicable to all. He claimed that the owner of a four-morgen allotment who planted only mealies could complete his farming within three weeks, and he thought it would be advisable for such a man to go out and work for a certain period. (76)

In a leading article Imvo condemned the provision as one affecting freedom of contract. In addition, the Bill was inconsistent with itself. On the one hand, people were to leave the locations on compulsory service, and on the other hand, they were liable to be dispossessed if they failed to occupy their allotments beneficially for twelve months. (77)

The proposal met with equally strong condemnation in Parliament. Sauer, while agreeing that some action should be taken against those who had no visible means of support, denied that they had the right to compel landed proprietors to work. (78) Merriman, too, agreed with the idea of a labour tax, but thought that it should first be applied in the towns, and not in Glen Grey, where they had an industrious body of people. The statistics for these locations showed that they ranked fifth in the production of corn, had as many sheep and ten times the number of cattle as the Caledon district, produced half the quantity of wool produced in the whole Fraserburg district and a hundred times the quantity of mealies. In addition, of the 7,000 adult males in Glen Grey,

(75) Ibid., p.365
(76) Ibid.
(77) Imvo, 18/7/94
(78) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.382
5,000 were out at work at the same time. On these grounds he challenged the Premier's statement and expressed the conviction that it was equally important that steps should be taken to deal with Europeans who refused to work. (79)

Innes voiced his objection on similar lines, and claimed that the general application of the tax would defeat the main objects of giving individual tenure, which were to encourage these people to produce more than one crop a year and to devote their whole time to their land. (80) Despite these valid arguments, Rhodes refused to accept an amendment in Committee to exclude the Natives holding land under the Act from the payment of the labour tax. He reaffirmed his belief that three weeks was sufficient for the cultivation of four morgen of mealies. Natives who went in for gardening and spent a fair part of the year working in their allotments would be able to claim exemption from the magistrate. (81)

In practice, however, the labour tax soon became a dead letter, and it was repealed eleven years later. (82) It is obvious that it would have been very difficult for the magistrate, in the absence of the necessary administrative machinery, to prove the veracity of many of the claims for exemption made to him. The Select Committee appointed to deal with Glen Grey petitions found that exemption had been freely granted, and that the tax had been mainly applied to young unmarried men. (83) The report of the Select Committee on the working of the Act showed that of the 5,400 Natives originally liable for the tax, 3,400 had been granted total exemption and a further 600 exempted for that year. (84) The reason for the ineffectiveness of the labour tax, apart from the difficulties of administration - difficulties which were increased by the Natives' intense dislike of the measure - is best summed up in the words of Merriman when he said that it would be impossible "to compel men to work by Act of Parliament". (85)

(79) Ibid., pp.387-388, 390 (85) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.390
(80) Ibid., p.412
(81) Ibid., p.460. This power given to magistrates to exempt from or impose taxes was also subjected to severe criticism: see Ibid., p.382, p.412
(82) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.213; Innes, op.cit., p.107
(83) A.19-'95, Report, p.5 (84) 0.47-'96, p.3
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\(^{(82)}\) Basil Williams, op.cit., p. 213; Innes, op.cit., p. 107
\(^{(83)}\) A.19-'95, Report, p. 5 \(^{(84)}\) G.47-'96, p. 3
It has been suggested that Rhodes's refusal to accept any amendment to this provision was not entirely due to "sordid reasons". His capacity for hard work, and his sincere horror of "loafing" led him to expect a high standard in his fellow-men, and it could be argued that it was to encourage this that the labour tax was included in toto in the Act. At the same time, it is equally true that the Bond would not have readily agreed to the removal of a provision that greatly improved the measure in their eyes.

But, if it is possible to justify Rhodes's action in regard to the labour tax, no such justification is possible for his handling of the liquor provisions of the Bill. It was proposed that the Natives should exercise a kind of local option through the agency of the District Council, who were to be nominated members of the Licensing Court. Under the special regulations regarding the grant and renewal of licences, no new licence was to be granted by the Resident Magistrate unless its issue was approved by the majority of the Council, while the renewal of any licence might be refused if a two-thirds majority of the Council objected. In addition, cancellation was to be subject to the payment of compensation.

In the course of his second reading speech, Rhodes, referring to the "curse of liquor" at the Diamond Fields, pointed out that "he had assisted in making 12,000 of these poor children hard-working and sober. They were now in compounds, healthy and happy. In their former condition the place was a hell on earth. Therefore, his heart was thoroughly with the idea of removing liquor from the Natives." In the light of this declaration, the obvious step would appear to have been the introduction of total prohibition, but, somewhat illogically, Rhodes proceeded to argue that prohibition without compensation would be unfair to the licence-holder.

There were eight canteens in Glen Grey which were most respectably...

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(86) Milne, op. cit., p.235
(87) See Stead, op.cit., p.42
(88) Act 25 of 1894, Secs. 61 and 63
(89) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.367
conducted, and he felt that if any of these were to be closed, it was only fair that compensation on the basis of three years' profits should be granted. The funds for this could be met from local taxes.\(90\)

The opposition to these proposals exceeded even the opposition to the labour tax, as they were so obviously inconsistent with the principles expressed by Rhodes. It was argued that local option as exercised by a nominated District Council was quite different from that exercised by voters in the Colony. It was not only feared that public opinion might be ignored,\(91\) but also that the nominated majority might use their influence to retain the canteens. Commenting on this, the "Cape Times" remarked, "Mr. Rhodes's confidence in his fellow men is touching, but it is not the quality of a law-maker."\(92\) The main objection, however, was to the recognition of the principle of compensation, which was condemned by Sauer as class legislation in the wrong direction.\(93\) Innes referred to the 1891 Liquor Bill debates when he had contended that a man had no vested interest in his licence, and was not, therefore, entitled to compensation.\(94\) They had successfully resisted the attacks then made on local option, and had come to the conclusion that if compensation had to be directed before a public house could be suppressed, it would "knock the bottom" out of the local option clauses altogether. It was now proposed to introduce this very principle where it was most necessary that the canteens should be suppressed, and he feared that the precedent thus created would affect the whole Colony.\(95\)

In Committee, efforts were made to remove the objectionable features of this proposed liquor legislation. Following an unsuccessful attempt to expunge sub-section 18 of clause 53, which provided for compensation for the loss of liquor licences,\(96\) it was moved that the amount of compensation be reduced to six months'
profits. (97) This was withdrawn in favour of an amendment whereby the District Council, by giving a licence-holder two years' notice of non-renewal, might avoid paying any compensation. This amendment was subsequently agreed to, as well as one reducing the amount of compensation to be paid under ordinary circumstances to two years' profits. (98)

The question was re-opened during the debate on the Bill as amended in Committee, when Sauer again moved to omit the sub-section. He pointed out that one of the Premier's objects in introducing the Bill was to "drive out the liquor pest from among the Natives", but he feared that they would be placed in a worse position than before. Firstly because they had to give compensation in the Glen Grey district, whereas this was not the case in the Colony itself, and secondly, because the right of local option which they had hitherto been able to exercise was to be taken away. (99) He was supported by Merriman, who said that Rhodes proposed to put the Natives under disabilities which he dared not put on white people. (100) Sauer's amendment was eventually carried by a majority of 33 votes to 25, and the compensation clause was thus omitted from the Bill. It can be said, therefore, that the system of liquor control as enforced in Glen Grey was considerably different from that which Rhodes himself originally intended.

Finally, the franchise provisions of the Glen Grey Bill must be referred to, as they mark the continuation of the policy adopted by Rhodes on this subject. (101) He had always maintained that the Native should only enjoy the franchise after a certain stage of civilization had been arrived at, and he once again expressed his belief that "if certain hon. members would leave off talking about the Native vote, and consider more about the future of the Native, the Native would thank them more deeply... 'Leave them alone as to their vote, and attend to their real interest'." (102)

(97) Ibid.
(98) Ibid., p. 444
(99) Ibid., pp. 460-461
(100) Ibid., p. 461
(101) Vide supra, pp. 34-35
(102) Cape Hansard, 1894, p. 365; cf. 1887 Registration Bill speech. Vindex, op. cit., pp. 158-160
Section 26 stated that the land allotted should be considered as being held under communal tenure. In other words, the Glen Grey lands were to fall within the scope of the 1887 Registration Act, and the value of these lands could not, therefore, be included in the qualifications of a voter. The object of this was obviously to prevent a great increase of voters in the districts where the new tenure was introduced. Rhodes defended his action on the grounds that they were dealing with "citizens" who were children, and as their land was protected the Natives had no right to claim the vote. As the £75 building qualification and the education test remained unaltered, he claimed that he had not broken his pledge by interfering with the franchise. In addition, nine-tenths of those at present enjoying the vote were not entitled to do so, and it was intended to appoint a Government officer to revise the Registration Act.\(^{(103)}\)

While admitting that these proposals did not alter the position of the Glen Grey Natives who already held their land under a communal tenancy, Sauer condemned them as making an "invidious distinction", and suggested that the misconception might arise that they wished to take away the votes of those people because they were Coloured.\(^{(104)}\) Innes's opposition was mainly directed at the creation of special machinery for striking people off the roll when machinery already existed for that purpose. The danger lay in the fact that the Act could be enforced in any district of the Colony where there was a large Native population, and these clauses might well be applied in any such district.\(^{(105)}\) The matter was again raised by him during the debate on the Bill as amended in Committee, when he moved to omit these clauses. His motion was, however, negatived, and the franchise provisions, regarded by the Opposition as being quite unnecessary and totally unconnected with the objects of the Bill in any way, passed into law.\(^{(106)}\)

\(^{(103)}\) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.365
\(^{(104)}\) Ibid., pp. 381-382
\(^{(105)}\) Ibid., p.413
\(^{(106)}\) Ibid., pp. 459-460
The voting figures show that whereas the second reading was carried by an overwhelming majority of 59 votes (Ayes 62; Noes 3), this figure was reduced to 35 when the House divided on the third reading (Ayes 51; Noes 16). The reason for this is to be found in the attitude adopted by Rhodes himself, which is a very interesting feature of the debates. Throughout the second reading the Opposition leaders expressed their regret that so important a measure had not been introduced earlier in the session — more especially as Rhodes had announced his intention of applying portions of it by proclamation if he was unable to proceed further than the second reading. This was condemned by Innes as "a new departure in Native policy" which made it all the more desirable that the principles and details of the measure should be "thrashed out" in Parliament. It was also pointed out that Rhodes's speech was at variance with the Bill itself. This was especially true of the liquor clauses, and the hope was expressed that amendments would be accepted in Committee to give effect to Rhodes's views on this and other matters. Finally, Herriman and Innes in turn deplored the apparent lack of interest in the Bill, and the fact that it was only being debated on one side of the House. The former condemned the practice of underhand agreement, lobbying and caucuses which destroyed all sense of parliamentary government. "He preferred to stand up and take his fighting in the House; the Premier preferred to take it in the lobby. He did not believe in any measure until it had been thrashed out on the floor of the House." The extent to which the caucus system had developed can be judged from subsequent events.

In his speech at the conclusion of the second reading debate, Rhodes expressed his agreement with some of the Opposition suggestions, and indicated that he would be prepared to abide by the decision of the House on certain points. The following day, however, before going into Committee, Rhodes asked the Opposition
not to press their view that the alienation of land should require the consent of the District Council as well as that of the Governor. He himself had no objection to the additional safeguard, but he had found that his acceptance of this would lead to considerable discussion and opposition which would hinder the passage of the Bill. In return, he would be prepared to "meet them" on the question of election to the District Council and on the question of liquor. (114)

Rhodes's "extraordinary statement" was not merely due to his desire to avoid prolonged discussion, but was the result of a caucus meeting which had been held in the interval. (115) Sauer immediately rose to express his condemnation. Rhodes, he said, had received his marching orders and accepted them, giving as his reason the fact that he wanted no discussion. "If they were to come there and simply register what had been done in a caucus or in the lobby; then for God's sake let them go home ... It was an insult to that House ..." (116) The heated remarks of the succeeding speakers were an accurate indication of the committee stage which commenced shortly afterwards. In the face of the Opposition's decision to withdraw their support from the Bill and the obstructionist tactics adopted by them later, Rhodes, showing for the first time the impatience that was to lead to such disastrous results the next year, lost his temper, and "made up his mind for a night of it". (117) During this, the first all-night sitting in the history of Cape parliamentary institutions, which ended at 7.15 a.m. on 7th August, the majority of the Opposition amendments were rejected, and they, accordingly, decided to register their votes against the third reading.

In the course of the debate, Rhodes referred to the measure as a "Native Bill for Africa". In the light of this statement, the circumstances under which it was introduced are doubly unfortunate. Rhodes attempted to justify his demand that the Bill

(114) Ibid., p.424
(115) See Innes's speech ref. the Glen Grey Act, Cape Times 29/1/95
(116) Cape Herald, 1894, p.424
(117) Ibid., p.439
should be passed that session on the grounds that any delay would result in serious Native agitation throughout the country, (118) but there is no doubt that the haste with which the legislation was introduced caused the very people who were directly affected by it to doubt its efficacy. (119) In any event, it is significant that the provisions which were later withdrawn by legislation - the labour tax and the execution of the land for debt - were two of those which were most consistently attacked during the debates.

Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, it can be said that Rhodes's experiment has proved a success. It is the only plan that has been generally applied, and where it has failed it is because the Native himself has been unable to adjust himself to his new environment. Whatever the original source of Rhodes's measure, "To him belongs the credit of giving it effect, of shaping it into a living instrument of policy. By so doing, he has written his name in the statute book of South Africa, where it will remain, a witness to his statesmanship, long after some of his more popular exploits have been forgotten." (120)

(118) Ibid., p.467; Imvo assumed this a tacit admittance that there was matter in the Bill which would rouse agitation - Imvo, 15/8/94
CHAPTER VI

THE JAMESON RAID

a. Rhodes and Kruger

Union - Kruger and the Uitlanders - Kruger and the Cape Colony - Railways and Customs - Closing of the Drifts

b. The Raid

Reform Movement - Loch - Robinson - Hofmeyr - Bechuanaland Annexation - Protectorate - Preparation - Raid

c. The Aftermath

News received - The Proclamation - Collapse of the Reform Movement - Session of 1896 - Committee of Inquiry - Report - Rhodes and Cape Politics - Conclusion

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a. Rhodes and Kruger

The unification of the South African states was the primary object of Rhodes's colonial policy, and in working for this ideal he had always stressed the need for patience. Speaking at the 1891 Congress of the Africander Bond he said, "The mistake has been made in the past to think that a union can be made in half an hour ... It took me twenty years to amalgamate the Diamond Mines. That amalgamation was done by detail, step by step, attending to every little matter in connection with the people interested; and so your union must be done by detail, never opposing any single measure that can bring that union closer, giving up even some practical advantage for a proper union ... In connection with this question I may meet with opposition; but if I do, I shall not abandon it."(1) Similarly, three years

(1) Vindex, op.cit., pp. 274-275
later he assured a Cape Town audience "... I find if you stick to a point which is a right point, a proper point, a point in the interests of the country, you gradually win the people to it". (2) As a result, it can be said that by 1895 Rhodes had reached a pinnacle of success. Gazetted as a Privy Councillor, he was recognised in England as a great Colonial statesman, in his own country as the one man able to bring about federation. In the Cape Colony he had, as we have seen, gained the support of Hofmeyr and secured the removal of the Republican ideal from the Bond programme, while Natal, despite the damaging Kokstad speech, was ready to play her part in his schemes. (3) The real obstacle to union was the Transvaal, where the opposition was concentrated in the person of President Kruger.

Since their first meeting in 1885, Rhodes and Kruger were in almost continual conflict. The establishment of the Chartered Company in the North and the later annexation of Kosi Bay, which barred the road to the sea, had closed the Transvaal frontiers against future expansion and strengthened Kruger's conviction that Rhodes's aim was to destroy his isolation. Of more immediate importance, however, was the Uitlander question. Following the discovery of gold on the Rand, a horde of prospectors, diggers and speculators - mainly British - had swarmed into the Transvaal. As their numbers increased, Kruger became alarmed, and his treatment of them was in keeping with his idea of maintaining an independent republic free from British interference. Thus, while the Uitlanders provided nineteen-twentieths of the revenue, they had no control over the city for whose existence they were responsible, and had no share in the government of the country. (4)

There was undoubtedly much to be said for this attitude, since to have conceded anything approaching an equal franchise to the Uitlanders, who already outnumbered the burghers four to one, would have transferred control to Johannesburg. In any event, the majority of them, who originally had no intention of staying in

(2) Ibid., p.412
(3) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.243
(4) Ibid., p.247
the country, were probably not interested in politics. As late as 1895 when 35,000 Uitlanders signed a petition for citizenship within five years, it is doubtful whether it would have been taken up by many of the signatories. (5) But all were agreed in condemning the inefficiency of the Kruger régime. Not only were they expected to bear the greater proportion of the taxation, but they were hampered by laws and monopolies. They were refused local government; they were liable to be called out on commando; their children were taught in Dutch. In addition, concession-hunters, mostly German or Dutch, preyed on the mining community. There were coal and water concessions which forced up prices, a liquor concession which debauched the mine Natives, and, most prohibitive of all, a dynamite concession which cost the industry £600,000 a year. (6) The Uitlanders' protests and petitions were ignored by Kruger, who was convinced that the slightest weakening would be fatal.

Nor did he attempt to cultivate the friendship of his neighbours in the Cape Colony with its large Dutch population. In July 1885, and again in the following year, Kruger invited the Cape to discuss the question of a customs union between them. (7) The Prime Minister, Upington, however, more concerned at the temporary difficulties of balancing his budgets, failed to utilise this golden opportunity, despite Rhodes's appeal to the Cape House to take a long view of the subject and embrace the offer. (8) The offer was never to be renewed. The change in Kruger's financial position as the result of the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in July, 1886 enabled him to adopt the separatist policy he had always favoured, (9) and the Bond warning that "the Africander cause is far from being strong enough to be able to face division between Transvaal and Colonial sons of the soil" went unheeded. (10)

In the face of these difficulties, the Cape Colony and the Free State were, economically speaking, drawn closer together. The succeeding years witnessed the ratification of the extension

(6) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.247
(7) See Van der Poel, op. cit., p.539 ff.
(8) Vindex, op.cit., p.132
(9) Walker, History, p.413
(10) Hofmeyr, op. cit., p.331. The effect of this policy on the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance has already been referred to. Vide
of the Port Elizabeth line to Bloemfontein, leading in turn to the consummation of a customs union between them. (11) Kruger's reply to their invitation to join it was the imposition of heavy duties on Colonial produce, and he finally only consented to the extension of the Cape railway across the Vaal when he was obliged to accept a subsidy from the Cape Government to save the Netherlands Railway Company from financial collapse. (12) The Sivewright Agreement of 1891 was regarded as a "veritable coup d'état" for the Cape railway policy. (13) The line to Johannesburg was opened by September, 1892, and during the next twelve months the Cape laid claim to 85 per cent of the Transvaal trade. (14)

But the Colony's difficulties were not yet over. In February, 1894, a convention was signed by the Transvaal and Natal Governments which provided for the extension of the line from Charlestown to Pretoria, the regulation of rates to the mutual advantage of the Natal and Delagoa Bay railways, and the re-adjustment of rates should the traffic carried by either railway fall below one-third of the gross goods traffic of the Transvaal. (15) The Cape immediately recognised the threat to her prosperity presented by this arbitrary division of trade. The expiry of the Sivewright Agreement at the end of 1894 would enable the Netherlands Company to assume full control over the fifty-mile section from the Vaal to the Rand, and her fears for the future were increased by the Transvaal's denial that any "solemn promise" had been given to Sive-wright that no South African state would obtain a railway connection with the Transvaal on terms better than those granted to the Cape Colony. (16) By the end of 1894 the Delagoa Bay line was completed, and to counteract the reduction of rates on the Cape railway the Netherlands Company tripled those on the fifty miles linking Viljoen's Drift with Johannesburg. (17) An attempt to settle these difficulties at a conference in Cape Town (April,

(13) Cape Times, 21/12/91 (14) Van der Poel, op.cit., p.73/ff.
(17) Walker, History, p.451
1895) failed, but meanwhile, the Cape merchants had found their own solution to the problem in the use of ox-waggons to transport goods from the Free State frontier to Johannesburg. So successful was this retaliatory move to Kruger's attempt to stifle Cape competition, that on the 28th August he gave notice of his intention to close Viljoensdrift and Zanddrift to overseas traffic as from the 1st October.\(^{(18)}\)

Kruger's action aroused a chorus of condemnation in the Colony and in the Free State.\(^{(19)}\) The Attorney-General regarded it as an infraction of the London Convention of 1884, and the High Commissioner protested to Kruger accordingly on behalf of the Cape Government.\(^{(20)}\) No reply was received until 21st October, three weeks after the proclamation had been enforced. Kruger denied that his action constituted a breach of the Convention, and blandly offered to apply the closing to Colonial goods as well.\(^{(21)}\) The Cape view was subsequently upheld by the British Government, and their further intervention was requested, despite Kruger's invitation that the Colony should attend a conference to discuss the question of a division of traffic, and despite the report of Elliot, the General Manager of Railways, that the delay caused by the closing of the Drifts was far less than he had expected.\(^{(22)}\) Rhodes favoured no such peaceful settlement of the crisis. The Secretary of State, Chamberlain, however, who had only taken office a few months before, was more cautious. On the 1st November he agreed to the sending of an ultimatum to the Transvaal Government, provided that the Governor obtained from his ministers an explicit undertaking that the Cape would be prepared to carry half the expenses in the event of an expedition becoming necessary.\(^{(23)}\) Rhodes had no difficulty in obtaining this assurance, and the ultimatum was dispatched on the 3rd November. Kruger, however, realising the danger of his position, re-opened the drifts.

Had he not capitulated, Rhodes would have been able to oppose him supported by the majority of South Africans outside the Transvaal. Rhodes had, in fact, welcomed the crisis, and "the prospect of conflict was a welcome respite from the routine of administration.\(^{(24)}\)"

\(^{(18)}\) Cape Times, 29/8/95  \(\text{ibid.}, 6/9/95\)  \(\text{ibid.}, G.76-97, p.5 ff.\)  \(\text{ibid.}, p.16\)  \(\text{ibid.}, p.15 ff.\)  \(\text{ibid.}, p.24\)
of war, the overthrow of the Pretoria Government and, if all went well, the speedy inclusion of Rhodesia in a South African federation". (24) When these prospects did not materialise, he was forced to rely once more on his own schemes for bringing them about. The closing of the drifts was, therefore, a fitting prelude to the Jameson Raid and marks the climax of the growing antagonism between Rhodes and Kruger. The latter's one aim was "to keep his Transvaal a sanctuary for his chosen people"; (25) Rhodes was attempting to hasten the inevitable union. In this he was not prompted by any racial hostility towards the Dutch. His aversion was for Krugerism, an anachronism which had to be swept away at any cost. He had tried negotiation and failed; only one alternative remained.

b. The Raid

Rhodes was by nature an impatient man, but he had hitherto curbed himself rigorously in the arduous negotiations of business and politics. By 1894, however, there were occasional signs of deterioration. (26) This was partly due to ill-health, for there were already symptoms of the later heart trouble. He used to say that he would not live beyond forty-five, and that his work would have to be completed in the few years remaining for him. This obsession was partly responsible for the definite change of policy determined by Rhodes that year. Once, when opposed, he would have tried to conciliate; now he was often overbearing, even arrogant. As a result, many of his old friends were estranged, and their place was taken by a horde of flatterers and secretaries, men who were mere agents, prepared to carry out his plans without question. (27)

At the close of the 1894 session, Rhodes, accompanied by John Hays Hammond, made a prospecting tour through Mashonaland. The latter spoke frequently of the Uitlander grievances. He

(24) Walker, History, p.452
(25) Basil Williams, op.cit., p.249
(26) Vide supra, p.100
(27) Basil Williams, op.cit., pp. 249-252; Innes, op.cit., p.108; Millin, op.cit., p.244
Governor of attempting to curtail his freedom of action in the North. The speedy appointment of Sir Hercules Robinson, Loch's successor, lent support to the suggestion that the Governor had been recalled, although this had been denied by the Secretary of State, Lord Ripon. Not only was Robinson a shareholder in the Chartered Company, and a director of De Beers and the Standard Bank, but his previous relations with Rhodes had also to be considered. In the light of these activities, it was felt that his re-appointment was undesirable, and a resolution to this effect was passed at a public meeting in Cape Town on the 26th March.

Robinson was regarded by many as Rhodes's nominee. Under normal conditions it would have been natural for him to have been consulted in the appointment of a High Commissioner who was also the Governor of the Colony of which he was Prime Minister. But, Rhodes's activities in securing Robinson's appointment at a time when it was essential that he should have a Governor who was well-disposed towards his projects assume greater significance in the light of subsequent events. In addition, Robinson's age and ill-health cannot be overlooked, as they prevented him from exercising the vigilance of a younger and stronger man.

The second political event, unlike the first, was one in which Rhodes played no part, but it was equally important. On the 4th April, 1895, Hofmeyr tendered his resignation as a member of the Cape Parliament. At a time when his health was deteriorating, there were grave dissensions in the Bond itself. The alliance with the Ministry, as we have seen, was strained by the opposition to the Scab Act, and in this and other matters Hofmeyr found himself in advance of his party. In addition, the rejection of his offer to mediate in a political feud at Stellenbosch following the 1894 elections had strengthened his resolve to

(35) Ibid., 28/2/95
(36) Ibid., 27/3/95; see also editorials 25/3/95, 28/3/95
(37) Walker, De Villiers, p.255
(38) Cape Times, 5/4/95
On the opening day of the 1895 session, Rhodes introduced a motion expressing regret at Hofmeyr's retirement. There is no doubt, however, that it came at an opportune time. The sole remaining check upon him was removed, and he was free to implement the new policy he had adopted.

To ensure the success of the Johannesburg revolt, two objects had to be achieved; a supply of arms, and the provision of a force on the border ready to enter the Transvaal and support the rebels at the first sign of rising. Rhodes proposed to achieve the first by buying and smuggling arms into the Transvaal; the second, by utilising his position as managing Director of the Chartered Company. Before any such force could be assembled, however, it was necessary for a suitable "jumping-off place" to be found. The obvious site was in the neighbourhood of Maefeking, but as that region was still under the direct control of the Crown, it was necessary that Rhodes should obtain its transfer from Imperial control as a preliminary to the Chartered Company's securing a foothold on the South-eastern border of the Protectorate directly opposite Johannesburg.

The territory known as Bechuanaland had, in 1884, been divided into two administrative units, a Crown Colony in the South, and a British Protectorate in the North. The Protectorate fell within the territorial limits of the Charter of 1889, but although the Company had within the next six years taken up extensive mineral and land rights, the administration of the territory had remained under the supervision of the High Commissioner. While in England in 1894, Rhodes obtained an assurance from the Colonial Office that they would consider favourably his request for administrative powers in the Protectorate, ostensibly to protect the construction of his new railway to the north, actually to enable the police of the Chartered Company to be moved south to the Transvaal frontier. At the same time, he had realized that his obtaining the Protectorate would depend on the Cape taking over Crown Colony.

(39) Hofmeyr, op. cit., p.473; Walker, Le Villiers, p.256
(40) Cape Hansard, 1895, p.6
and he was given a definite promise that such annexation would be sanctioned. (41)

Accordingly, on the 5th June, 1895, Rhodes gave notice to move "That in the opinion of this House it is expedient that the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland should be annexed to this Colony, and that the Government take such steps as may be necessary to procure the consent of Her Majesty's Government to such annexation, upon suitable terms and conditions to be submitted for approval to this House". (42) There was little opposition to the proposal, but Sauer moved as an amendment the additional words "and is of further opinion that the status of the territory known as the British Protectorate should not be altered without the previous consent of the House". This amendment was not introduced out of any suspicion of Rhodes's motives, but because it was felt that the Colony should have a voice in the future of the territory which gave access to the North. (43) Despite the appeals of Rhodes, who realised the potential danger to his plans, and Schreiner, who regarded the amendment as one "which verged upon the unconstitutional", (44) Sauer refused to withdraw his proviso, which was subsequently rejected. The original motion was then carried by 45 votes to 23. (45)

Before the Bill annexing the Crown Colony was introduced, Lord Rosebery's Liberal Ministry in England resigned. Joseph Chamberlain succeeded Lord Ripon as Secretary of State, (46) and Rhodes now had to deal with the representative of a Tory Government. The Bill was read a second time on 31st July. (47) While there was little opposition to annexation itself, the condition stipulated by the Secretary of State that no future legislation should be introduced on certain specified subjects without first ascertaining the views of the British Government was greatly resented. (48) Rhodes himself, while considering the conditions unnecessary, thought that

(42) Cape Hansard, 1895, p.169; pp. 203-206
(43) Ibid., p.208
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid., p.214
(46) Cape Times, 4/7/95
(47) Cape Hansard, 1894, p.557
(48) Imperial Blue Book, Vol. 42, Correspondence relating to annexation of British Bechuanaland, Nos.11-16. The correspondence shows that the conditions eventually agreed to by the Colonial Government were much less binding than those originally proposed.
they ought to be accepted in view of the generous action of the Imperial Government in granting them the territory without asking them to repay any part of the large sum spent on its development. (49) Kerriman, on the other hand, condemned the proposals as "striking at the very root of their liberty". (50) Despite these criticisms, the third reading was passed without a division.

The incorporation of the Crown Colony did not, however, give Rhodes his "jumping-off" ground. It was merely the first step towards acquiring the Protectorate for the Chartered Company. It was to this task that he now turned his attention. We have seen that Lord Rosebery's Government had promised to consider his request favourably, but they hesitated to take any steps which might arouse opposition. With the Government's defeat in June, the decision was left to Chamberlain, who soon showed that, while he had no objections to the transfer of the Crown Colony, he did not intend to bind himself by any of his predecessor's promises in regard to the Protectorate. As a result of negotiations between Dr. Rutherford Harris, Rhodes's agent in London, and the Colonial Office, the Chartered Company was granted a corridor of land on the Eastern Border, ostensibly for the purpose of railway construction. Rhodes had to obtain the necessary grant from the various chiefs. In return, the Company agreed, firstly, to the creation of large Native reserves under the High Commissioner; secondly, to abandon their claim to a railway subsidy of £10,000 per annum promised by Lord Ripon; and, thirdly, to undertake responsibility for the security of the strip and the border. It was also agreed that the Chartered Company might enlist in its force members of the Bechuanaland Border Police, disbanded because of the new arrangements. Rhodes maintained that it was essential to protect the construction parties, and was given permission to collect an adequate force at Pitsani, a few miles north of Mafeking. While these negotiations were in progress, Rhodes obtained a grant of land from two chiefs in the southern Protectorate, which was duly confirmed by

(49) Cape Hansard, 1895, pp. 557-559
(50) Ibid., p. 565
the High Commissioner by Proclamation on 18th October. The "jumping-off" ground was thus secured, and the first detachment of police left Bulawayo the following day. (51)

Meanwhile, the rising in Johannesburg was being organised. Jameson paid several visits to the Rand, and following discussions with the leading members of the National Union, the Uitlander reform organisation, it was agreed that 5,000 rifles and one million rounds of ammunition should be smuggled into the country. On December 23rd, the date provisionally fixed for the rising, Jameson was to cross the frontier with 1,500 men. In October, Lionel Phillips and Charles Leonard obtained Rhodes's personal assurance of his support in the rising, and the promise of financial aid from himself and Beit. At the same time, he allayed their fears that he and Jameson intended to annex the country to England. He pointed out that his objects in joining the reform movement were, firstly, to secure the improvement in conditions which he was entitled to claim in view of his enormous capital interests in the Transvaal, and, secondly, free trade in South African products - one of the points in Leonard's "declaration of rights". If these objects were achieved a customs union, railway amalgamation and eventually federation would be bound to follow. "It was, in fact, his old idea of independence for local affairs with the British flag for union." (52)

Preparations now began in earnest. In England, Dr. Harris, in the intervals of his diplomatic activities, bought rifles and ammunition, and these were smuggled into the Transvaal concealed in oil drums or under truckloads of coal. The officials of the Chartered Company and De Beers played a large part in these transactions. (53)

(51) Basil Williams, op.cit., pp. 256-263; Michell, op.cit., pp. 270-271; Walker, De Villiers, p.263. The question of the complicity of the Colonial Office in the Jameson Raid is, obviously, beyond the scope of this thesis, but one cannot fail to be amazed that Chamberlain should have willingly relinquished control of this important frontier at so critical a time in South African affairs. See Le Roux, Thesis; Cambridge History, Vol. VIII, pp. 561-562


(53) A.O. 196, Report, pp.11-12; Minutes of Evidence, p.95 f' Appendices J-0
placed at suitable points on the road to Johannesburg. The plot
developed into a "kind of schoolboys' game" with the leaders sending
cryptic messages that sometimes deceived even the recipients. Thus,
the rising became the "polo tournament" or the "flotation", the
High Commissioner "the chairman", Jameson "the contractor" and
the conspirators "the subscribers". Perhaps the most sensa-
tional device of all, however, was the undated letter of invitation
signed by five of the Johannesburg leaders which was to be produced
by Jameson on the day of the rising, and which was actually received
by him about a month before it was dated.

But the Reformers were growing more uncomfortable as the
appointed day approached. As early as 7th December, a week's
postponement was suggested. Only a portion of the rifles pro-
mised had reached them, and they had not yet begun to prepare their
people for revolt. Johannesburg was, in fact, less ready for a
rising than it had been in 1890 or 1893, when discontent had been
accentuated by the depression of the gold-mining industry. Due
mainly to the activities of Dr. Harris, the flag question once
again became acute. As late as Christmas day, Leonard,
accompanied by the Editor of the Johannesburg "Star", hurried down
to Cape Town to settle the matter with Rhodes, who calmed them
with the assurance that he did not intend to force the Union Jack
on the Transvaal. By now, however, it was clear that the rising
would have to be postponed, and telegrams of increasing urgency
to this effect were sent to Jameson on the 26th, 27th and 28th
December.

All this time Jameson had been curbing his impatience on the
frontier. His self-confidence remained unshaken, but he feared,
firstly, that he might lose some of his policemen who were due for
 disbanded, and secondly, that if the Reformers delayed any longer

(54) Ibid., Appendix A
(55) Ibid., Report p.13
(56) Ibid., Appendix A.36
(57) Robey, Thesis, p.12
(58) Basil Williams, op. cit., p.267
(59) A.6-96, appendices A71-A73; A76; A79; A80; A82; "... all our
foreign friends are dead against it (flotation), and say
public will not subscribe one penny towards it even with
you as director"- Harris to Jameson, 28/12/95
the plot would be discovered. On the 26th December two messengers were sent to stop him, but Jameson, who was not prepared to accept the numerous excuses for postponement, decided to force Johannesburg into action. Otherwise he feared it would never rise at all. Jameson set out on the afternoon of Sunday, 29th December, having sent a telegram to announce his departure which arrived in Cape Town on Sunday morning. By the time an answer ordering Jameson not to move was ready for dispatch, his advance party had cut the wire to Mafeking. The line was re-opened at noon on Monday, 30th, but no further attempt was made by Rhodes to send this message or any other disapproving of Jameson's action.

c. The Aftermath

The misadventures of the raid belong to Jameson's story rather than to that of Rhodes. As far as the latter was concerned, it was not until he heard that evening that the wire to Mafeking had been cut that he realised to the full what was going to happen. He then sent for Bower, the Imperial Secretary, who had known about the plot since October, 1895. Bower, in turn, informed the High Commissioner, who had already received an anxious cable from Chamberlain, instructing him to warn Rhodes that he would receive no support in any attempt to force matters in Johannesburg. Rhodes's colleagues in the Ministry were, meanwhile, completely in the dark, and Schreiner, the Attorney-General, was disinclined to believe an official telegram from the Mafeking magistrate (30th December) reporting Jameson's departure. His interview with Rhodes late that evening, which has been typified as representing the great struggle between Africander sympathies with the Transvaal him and Africander devotion to Rhodes, soon showed that the information he had received was correct. Both men realized that the

(60) Ibid., Appendices, A.74, A.75, A.84; JJ, No.1602
(61) Ibid., Appendix CC No.26771
(62) Ibid., Report, p.21
(63) H.C. 311, Minutes of Evidence, No. 2507 ff.
(64) Imperial Blue Book, Vol. 42, Jameson Raid Correspondence No.2
(65) Unfortunately the same cannot be said of Robinson. Recent research has shown that Bower accepted the rôle of scapegoat to protect the High Commissioner from any suspicion of complicity, for had there been any evidence of this, Kruger backed by Germany would have denounced the London Convention. Dr. v.d. Poel is my informant. See also Innes, op. cit., p.150ff.
Ministry was doomed, but nevertheless, Rhodes would not take further action to recall Jameson. Next morning the news of the Raid was in the newspapers.

The Rand political situation had been the subject of frequent editorials since Lionel Phillips's speech in Johannesburg on 21st November, when he had severely attacked the Transvaal Government. The "Cape Times" had, in fact, welcomed this, the first public departure from the Chamber of Mines's principle of non-interference in politics, as a sign that Rand labour and Rand capital were joining forces. Throughout December there had been reports of growing tension, secret arming of the mines, and, following the publication of the Transvaal National Union manifesto, of the mass exodus of women and children. It was, therefore, known that there was every possibility of a rising on the Rand, but a development of this nature had never been expected.

However, to return to the events of the 31st December. Hofmeyr, on receiving confirmation of the news, sent a telegram to Kruger wishing him success against "Jameson's filibusters", and called on the High Commissioner to repudiate the raiders by proclamation. After some hesitation Robinson agreed, and despite the efforts of Rhodes and Bower to delay its dispatch and publication, a proclamation was sent to the British Agent in Pretoria during the afternoon. The publication of the proclamation in the Johannesburg press the following day ensured that even a belated Uitlander attempt to support Jameson would not occur, as they now found that they were forbidden to take part in the plot which they hitherto believed had the support of the Imperial Government. In the course of these negotiations Hofmeyr met Rhodes, and demanded from him a manifesto repudiating Jameson.

The Premier's refusal to take such action virtually meant the

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(66) a.6-96, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 52-54
(67) F. L. Garrett: The Story of a South African Crisis, p.156
(68) Walker, Schreiner, p.71
(69) Cape Times, 31/12/95
(70) Ibid., 22/11/95
(71) Ibid., 27/12/95
(72) Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. 11
(73) H.C. 311, No. 3126 ff.
end of the fifteen-year-old friendship.

Rhodes had always justified his refusal to denounce Jameson on the grounds of friendship, but it is more likely that he was still hoping that Jameson's inroad would meet with success and he did, in fact, give him every assistance at this stage. Unable to delay the proclamation, the letter of invitation, now dated 28th December by Dr. Harris, (75) was cabled to the "Times" in an attempt to gain support in England. The appeal for "helpless women and children" had the desired effect, and the "new Poet Laureate, unable to control his feelings, burst into song". (76)

But the news of Jameson's surrender at Doornkop on 2nd January brought men's minds back to reality. It was in keeping with the irony of events that relief should come at this moment from a quarter where help might least be expected. On the day following Jameson's surrender, the Emperor of Germany sent Krüger a telegram of congratulation, which not only turned public opinion in England, but also drew an angry protest from Hofmeyr at the Kaiser's "blundering utterance". (77)

The relief was only temporary, however, and the magnitude of the disaster of the Raid became apparent as the facts became known. Jameson and his men were at Krüger's mercy, and with the arrest of the Reform leaders Johannesburg was also in his power. The result could hardly have been otherwise in the light of the haphazard way in which the conspiracy had been organised. In addition there was the continual "flag question" and the fear of the Rand financial interests that Rhodes, backed by his enormous resources, would use the Johannesburg rising as an occasion for a financial coup d'état. But more important than the reasons for the failure of the Raid are its effects on South African politics. By their impatience, the Uitlanders destroyed all hopes of reform and lost the sympathy of many who had previously supported them.

(75) Jameson had originally dated it 20th December
(76) Innes, op. cit., p.126
(77) Basil Williams, op. cit., pp. 273-274; Hofmeyr, op. cit., pp. 495-496; Cape Times, 14/1/96
Kruger, on the other hand, was rehabilitated, and occupied a leading position in South Africa. His suspicion of Britain was justified, as was his refusal to grant the Uitlanders political rights and privileges. The attack on Transvaal independence led Kruger to undertake the systematic arming of the state, while the election of Steyn to the Presidency in the Free State was a portent of the growing solidarity of feeling between the two republics. (73)

For Rhodes, the Raid was unmixed tragedy. As a result of his own efforts to hasten union in South Africa he had caused its breakdown. In addition, the breakdown caused more bitterness than the failure of previous attempts because it had been motivated from within the Colony by the Prime Minister, not from Downing Street by the High Commissioner. (79) The racial strife which Rhodes had attempted to overcome since his entry into politics fifteen years previously broke out again with renewed vigour, and he lost for ever the confidence of most of the South African Dutch, and many of his English-speaking fellow-colonists. They felt with Schreiner that "you cannot trust a man altogether and be absolutely mistaken in your trust and remain with regard to the rest of the world just as full of trust and confidence as ever". (80) The loss of Dutch support, so essential to the success of his plans, and more especially the loss of Hofmeyer's friendship was keenly felt by Rhodes, but in his anxiety for the safety of his Charter he tended to become arrogant, and refused to admit his error. As a result, a second meeting between himself and Hofmeyer merely served to widen the breach between the two men. In rejecting Hofmeyer's advice to absent himself from the Colony for some time, and issue a manifesto in the interests of "peace and reconciliation", Rhodes lost his chance of ever regaining Africander support. There was much work for him to do in the few years remaining to him, but in the Colony he never regained his old position. (81)

(73) Merriman Papers, No. 8 of 1896, Notes on the Political Situation; Walker, History, pp. 459-461; Basil Williams, op. cit., pp. 274-275
(79) Robey, Thesis, p. 124
(80) Walker, Schreiner, p. 76
(81) Hofmeyer, op. cit., pp. 500-501; Basil Williams, op. cit., pp. 274-275
Robinson had accepted Rhodes's resignation on the 5th January, 1896, and invited Sir Gordon Sprigg to form a Ministry. Rhodes, himself, did not return to political life until 1897, being engaged, firstly, in England, where he ensured the safety of his Charter, and then in Rhodesia. The 1896 session of the Colonial Parliament opened on the 1st May. The absence of the two men who had dominated its proceedings for the past six years resulted in an inevitable readjustment of party leadership. Sauer and Merriman both disapproved strongly of Rhodes's action and were drawn towards the Bond. Sauer resigned as Leader of the Opposition, and Innes was appointed in his place. The Bond, too, needed a parliamentary leader, and within the first two weeks of the 1896 session it was clear that Schreiner was to occupy this position - an event which was to lead him to the Premiership two years later at the head of a Bond ministry. For as the Cape parties began to re-form, it was not on the old basis of racial co-operation which was the outstanding feature of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance. The re-organisation was on racial lines, and had the effect of uniting Cape Africanders.

As was to be expected, the Jameson Raid debates were the outstanding feature of the session. It was soon apparent that Sprigg's so-called "stop-gap administration" had no definite policy to offer the House, and this fact, together with the "lukewarm milk-and-water" condemnation of the Raid in the Governor's speech, was criticised in the later debates by Merriman in particular. (82) In a letter to Innes a short while previously he had already deplored the Ministry's failure to call Parliament and give the Colony a lead in this matter. He felt especially that they had a duty to discharge in regard to the Charter, and reminded Innes that he had predicted in 1889 that the Charter "would bring ruin and disgrace upon South Africa". (83) It was not surprising, therefore, that in the face of the Government's inepti-

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(82) Cape Hansard, 1896, pp. 79-80
(83) Rose-Innes Papers, No. 52: Merriman to Innes, 20/4/96
Merriman should table a motion for the "revocation or alteration" of the terms of the Charter. (84) It was realised, however, that this would mean the setting-up of Crown Colony Government in the North, and even if England were prepared to undertake this great responsibility, such action was considered undesirable.

Following a meeting presided over by Hofmeyr, (85) Schreiner moved an amendment to Merriman's motion. The amendment

1. condemned the Raid,
2. called upon H.A.'s Government to institute an investigation,
3. asked for steps to be taken to prevent the recurrence of such an event,
4. demanded the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances as affecting the Cape Colony. (86)

Finally, an additional amendment was moved by Innes which differed mainly from the other two in that it included an additional subsection expressing the hope that steps would be taken in the South African Republic "towards the favourable consideration of legitimate Uitlander grievances". (87)

The ensuing debate showed that most members favoured a thorough inquiry into the circumstances of the Raid. Merriman's motion was disliked for the reasons already referred to, while Innes's amendment was regarded as constituting unwarranted interference in the internal politics of another state. The motion and amendment were, therefore, negatived, and Schreiner's amendment carried without a division. (88)

The Committee appointed by the Speaker was under the Chairmanship of Sir Thomas Upton, Attorney General, and consisted of Messrs. Innes, Du Toit, Merriman, Schreiner, Jones and Fuller. (89) The investigations of this Committee, facilitated by a special Act of Parliament which enabled it to demand the production of all relevant cables and telegrams, (90) was the forerunner of the House of Commons Inquiry the following year. The main findings

(86) Cape Hansard, 1896, p.52; p.86 ff.
(87) Ibid., p.72; p.93 ff.
(88) Ibid., p.196
(89) Ibid., p.260
(90) Act No. 4 of 1896
of its Report of 17th July, 1896, were as follows:—

1. No member of the Colonial Government with the exception of the Prime Minister had any knowledge of the plot.

2. Similarly, with the exception of one minor official, no member of the Cape Civil Service could be charged with a breach of duty.

3. The evidence showed that the stores and workshops of De Beers were used for the storage and unlawful exportation of arms to the South African Republic.

4. While the local directors of De Beers were acquitted of complicity in the plot, the same could not be said of the principal officials of the Chartered Company in Cape Town. Of the directors, at least Rhodes and Beit, together with the Administrator, Dr. Jameson, and the Secretary, Dr. Harris, were active promoters.

In regard to Rhodes in particular the Committee found:—

1. That in his capacity as controller of the three companies, the British South Africa Company, De Beers, and Gold Fields of South Africa, he was thoroughly acquainted with the preparations, and had directed and controlled the combination which made the Raid possible.

2. Although he did not direct or approve Jameson's entry at the precise time when it occurred, he could not escape the responsibility for a movement in whose arrangement he had concurred.

3. His absence from the Committee's proceedings was regretted, especially "as they are reluctantly forced to the conclusion upon the evidence before them, that the part taken by him in the organisation which led to the inroad headed by Dr. Jameson was not consistent with his duty as Prime Minister of the Colony". (91)

With this verdict, Rhodes himself was in substantial agreement. (92)

The adoption of the Report was moved by Schreiner, who showed that it was impossible to justify Rhodes's conduct in regard to

(91) A.6-1996, Report, pp. 22-25
(92) cf. Fuller, op. cit., pp. 208-209
the Raid. At the same time, he was not prepared to attribute his actions to any but the highest motives. "Mr. Rhodes sought to gain his ends by a short method which was a wrong method, and he believed a day would come when Mr. Rhodes would say that his methods in this connection were wrong. But he would never be led into the suggestion that Mr. Rhodes's motives were at any time low or grovelling or sordid; and he believed that a vast majority of the people not only in this Colony but throughout South Africa, including the Transvaal, would say of the man - there was nothing mean, nor grovelling, nor sordid in the actions of Mr. Rhodes. The aim of Mr. Rhodes was a high one. He wished it had been a right one."(93)
To illustrate the position in the Colony in regard to the question of REDISTRIBUTION of SEATS

Compiled from the Statistical Register of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 1896 (p.36) and from the Hofmeyr Papers, Vol. 9

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**NOTE:** In his figures for 1891 Hofmeyr gives a total of 90,717 voters as opposed to the Statistical Register's total of 90,679. This comparatively small numerical difference is due to variations in the number of voters in the following constituencies: Cape Town, Colesberg, Cradock, Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Victoria West. The Statistical Register of the period does not unfortunately distinguish between European and Non-European voters, and it has, therefore, been necessary to rely on Hofmeyr's figures.
APPENDIX C

REPORT OF THE SCAB DISEASE COMMISSION (Gt. '94)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1)

1. Repeal of present scab legislation.
2. A general scab act (para. 97).
3. Suspensory clause for certain north-western districts (para. 94).
4. Notice of termination of appointment to all scab inspectors, who, however, shall be eligible for re-appointment (para. 47).
5. (i) Appointment of at least one inspector of dipping in each field cornetcy, on recommendation of resident farmers (para. 46).
   (ii) Appointment of inspectors of areas by Government, to supervise class (i) (para. 47).
   (iii) Appointment of chief inspector to be responsible for administration of act (Ibid.).
6. Prohibition of entry of all small stock into Colony by land, and quarantine stations at ports for importations by sea (para. 36).
7. Efficient dipping of all small stock at least twice a year after shearing, under inspection if necessary (para. 68).
8. Annual compulsory, simultaneous dipping of all stock for two years, in a sulphur dip, under inspection if necessary (para. 82 and 85).
10. Immediate notification of all outbreaks of the disease (para. 68).
11. Notification of intention to dip, and of results (Ibid.).
12. Dipping of scabby stock before impounding (para. 38).
13. All stock in Native locations to be dipped at the same time, under supervision (para. 69).
14. Stock farmers to be responsible for cleansing of employés' stock (para. 70).
15. Regulations for cleansing stock belonging to servants or others before removal from any run (para. 62).

(1) Annexures to the Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1894, Vol. 1
16. Inspectors, police officers, or landowners may impound scabby stock travelling on public roads, with or without a permit (para. 64).

17. A suitable dipping tank to be provided on every run (para. 62).

18. The same in Native locations (para. 65).


22. Facilities for removal of stock in times of drought, or for change of pasturage (para. 61).


24. Disinfection of kraals, buildings and vehicles, including railway trucks (para. 51 and 55).


T. W. SMARTT, Chairman
R. P. BOTHA
P. J. du TOIT
W. H. HOCKLY
A. FRANCIS

Cape Town,
24th March, 1894
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(ii) Statistical Register of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 1890-1896

(iii) Votes and Proceedings of the Cape House of Assembly

Acts of Parliament and Petitions where necessary

(iv) Annexures to the Votes and Proceedings of the Cape House of Assembly

A. - papers commanded to be printed by the House of Assembly of the Cape of Good Hope

G. - papers commanded to be printed by the Government of the Cape of Good Hope

Report on Pondoland ... ... ... ... A.2 -'91

Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the Tenure of land in the Glen Grey District ... ... ... ... ... A.3 -'92

Report of the Select Committee on the Logan Contract Papers ... ... ... ... ... A.4 -'93

Report of the Labour Commission ... ... ... ... G.39-'93

Report of the Scab Disease Commission ... ... ... ... G.1 -'94

Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Pondoland ... ... ... ... ... G.59-'94

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Report of the Select Committee on the Jameson Raid ... ... ... ... ... ... A.6 -'96

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Papers relating to the Closing of the Drifts on the Vaal River in 1895 ... ... ... ... G.79-'97

(v) Papers commanded to be printed by the House of Commons

Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa (1897) H.C. 311

(vi) Blue Books issued by order of the Imperial Government on affairs relating to South Africa, 1890-1896
b. Unpublished Primary Sources

(i) **The Merriman Papers** (In the South African Public Library)

Letters written and received by Merriman during the period 1890-1896. Of special value for the years 1890-1893, when Merriman was a member of the Rhodes Ministry.

(ii) **The Rose Innes Papers** (South African Public Library)

There are unfortunately comparatively few letters in the collection for this period.

(iii) **The Hofmeyr Papers** (South African Public Library)

Useful for statistical information regarding the franchise. The bulk of these papers, however, deal with matters of Bond administration.

(iv) **Prime Minister's Office** (Cape Archives)

Minutes, dispatches, reports, petitions, correspondence etc. received by the Prime Minister during the period 1890-1896

c. The Press

(i) **The Cape Times** (Jagger Library)

The volumes for the months July 1890 - March 1896 were consulted. This newspaper does not hesitate to criticise Rhodes, and is at all times suspicious of and antagonistic towards the Bond.

(ii) **Imvo Zabantsundu** (Native Opinion) (South African Public Library)

A weekly newspaper published in King William's Town. Edited by J. Tengo Jabavu, it is written mainly in Xhosa with English editorials, and is of special interest as it expresses the Native point of view.
The following biographies were also consulted:-

Baker, Sir Herbert: Rhodes by his Architect
Jourdan, Philip: Cecil Rhodes
Le Sueur, Gordon: Cecil Rhodes
McDonald, James G.: Rhodes: a life

b. Autobiography
Innes, James Rose- Autobiography

Innes was a member of the First Rhodes Ministry, and his scholarly autobiography is indispensable in any attempt to evaluate Rhodes's work.

Wilson, G. H.: Gone Down the Years

c. General
Kleinhans, Ralph : The Old Cape House.
Walker, Eric A.: History of South Africa
van der Poel, Jean: Railway and Customs Policies

d. Special Periods - The Jameson Raid
Fitzpatrick, J. P.: The Transvaal from Within
Garrett, F. B.: The Story of an African Crisis
Hole, H. Marshall: The Jameson Raid

e. Bibliography
Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. VIII
Thomson, Daphne Walker: Cecil John Rhodes: a Bibliography
University of Cape Town, School of Librarianship

f. Unprinted Theses
Boltman, J. C.: The Franchise Question
le Roux, P. D.: The Jameson Raid
Robey, E. M.: Rhodes's Federation Policy, 1881-1896
Wiggins, Ella: The Glen Grey Act and its effects upon the Native System of Land Tenure in the Cape Colony