SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE REFORM IN THE 1990s:
INTERNAL PROCESSES AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

ELRENA VAN DER SPUY

Thesis Presented for the Degree of
DOCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY
In the Department of Criminal Justice
University of Cape Town
October 2005
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ABSTRACT

In the contemporary era policy-making is increasingly being shaped by non-domestic influences and actors. The mobility of policy ideas and mechanisms across time and space provides a challenge: How best to conceptualise the routes and modes of travelling whereby ideas and instruments are transported from one location to another? Conceptual tools originally designed in public policy circles - such as lesson-drawing, modelling, policy diffusion, policy transfer and convergence - have more recently been introduced into criminological enquiries regarding the convergence of criminal justice policies.

This thesis applies the conceptual framework of policy transfer (referring to conscious efforts on the part of social agencies to export-import lessons from one locale to another) to the field of policing with a specific emphasis on South African police reform after 1990. The central focus of this enquiry is the interplay between novel, often externally derived, ideas and practices with a national police force at a time of immense political transition. Selective aspects of South African police reform are explored with specific emphasis on how, in what way, and to what extent, local reform efforts have been influenced by global notions and practices of 'good policing.' Three institutional conduits for reformist policing ideas are considered. In the first instance, the contribution of policing scholars, a knowledge-based community of some importance, to debates on the pathways for police reform are discussed with an emphasis on the theoretical and normative assumptions that have guided their analyses of a policing ethos and system beyond Apartheid. Secondly, the role of an interim policy mechanism, the National Police Board (created in terms of a peace agreement signed in 1991) in setting an agenda for police reform is considered. Thirdly, the discussion profiles the international development community as a constituency of importance in recent police reform efforts. The latter exploration proceeds through a case study method. Three distinct examples of donor aid in support of institutional reform are described with particular reference to the paradigms invoked, the cultural entrepreneurs and policy networks involved, and the contextual factors that facilitated and/or constrained reformist efforts.

A wide range of data collection methods were utilised during the course of the research. A literature review of contemporary debates on policy transfer, police and security sector reform in both mature and emerging democracies was undertaken. Furthermore, a wide range of primary documentary sources and various official policy documents were consulted. Face to face interviews with members of various policy constituencies also provided source material. Lastly, participant observation of policy structures and field notes compiled during evaluative research of a number of donor assisted projects provided contextual observations of importance to the analysis.

This enquiry supports the conclusion that there is growing convergence in the language and practices associated with democratic police reform. Yet the dilemmas of policy transfer from North to South - particularly (although not exclusively) in the context of aid packages - are often underestimated. Local experiments suggest that whilst policy transfers can facilitate policy change, policies transferred too easily become victims of domestic contingencies. Empirical enquiries into the context, processes and outcomes associated with reformist interventions are necessary to sharpen our understanding of how exactly policy travels and to what local effect. Recent reform activity aimed at the South African Police illustrates the extent to which policy communities situated at the local, national and transnational level do not exist in isolation but rather stand in a complex and interactive relationship to one another.
ABBREVIATIONS

AFIS Automated Finger-printing Identification System
ANC African National Congress
APEC Assistance to Policing in the Eastern Cape
APLA Azanian People's Liberation Army
AWB Afrikaner Weerstandsbeveging
AZAPO Azanian People's Organisation
BAC Business Against Crime
BDD British Development Division, UK
BDDSA British Development Division in Southern Africa
BLTPPP Basic Level Training Pilot Programme
CAWC Crimes Against Women and Children
CBO Community-based Organisation
CONTRALES Council of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
COSATU Council of South African Trade Unions
COP Community Orientated Policing
CPF Community Police Forum
CPP Community Peace Programme
CPPP Community Policing Pilot Project
CPTT Community Policing Task Team
CODESA Council for a Democratic South Africa
CSVR Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
DCAF Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
DCIS Development Co-operation Information System
DCS Department of Correctional Services
DFID Department of Foreign International Development
DP Democratic Party
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU European Union
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU Government of National Unity
IAC Interim Advisory Committee
IAT Interim Advisors Team
IDASA Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa
ICD Independent Complaints Directorate
ICJ International Commission of Jurists
IEC Independent Electoral Commission
IDC International Development Co-operation
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
IMSSA Independent Mediation Service of South Africa
ISD Internal Stability Division
ISU Internal Stability Unit
IT Information Technology
ITC International Training Committee
ITEC Independent Teacher and Enrichment Centre
JCPSC Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster
LHR Lawyers for Human Rights
MIT Multi-National Implementation Team
NCCS National Crime Combating Strategy
NCPS National Crime Prevention Strategy
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
NP National Party
NPA National Peace Accord
NPM New Public Management
OECD Organisation for Economic Development Cooperation
ODA Overseas Development Agency, UK
PAC Pan Africanist Congress
PiP Partner in Policing: Community Reduction Programme
PMoSS Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security, Eastern Cape
POP Public Order Policing
POPCRU Police and Prison Officers' Civil Rights Union
PPG Police Policy Group
RSA Republic of South Africa
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary
SA South Africa
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADF South African Defence Force
SANCO South African National Civics Organisation
SANDF South African National Defence Force
SAP South African Police
SAPS South African Police Service
SARPCCO Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation
SDIP Service Delivery Improvement Programme
SDU Self Defence Units
SPU Self Protection Units
SSR Security Sector Reform
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TBVC Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TCO Transnational Criminal Organisations
TEC Transitional Executive Council
TEG Training Evaluation Group
UCT University of Cape Town
UMAC Urban Monitoring Action Committee
UN United Nations
UK United Kingdom
USA  United States of America
UNCIVPOL  United Nations Civilian Police
UNISA  University of South Africa
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
WOLA  Washington Office of Latin America
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to my supervisors, Prof. Nico Steytler (UWC) and Prof. Dirk van Zyl Smit (UCT), who managed to maintain a rather delicate balance between intellectual guidance, social therapy and a measure of coercion in helping me see this project through. Thanks too to all those others who participated, either through choice or because of fate, in the broader process of writing this thesis.
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Chapter 1

The Reform of Policing in South Africa after 1990:
Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer

1.1 Introduction

At the time of Union in 1910, the four territories that comprised the future South Africa had all developed institutionalised public policing in a variety of forms. With the passage of the South African Police Act of 1912, the shape of a unified police organisation was laid down, and formally created in 1913. The new force conceded little to provincial autonomy, and from the beginning formed a militaristic and centralised organisation that future leaders of the South African state would often call upon to maintain the racial order. Its destiny was tied to the Ministers of Justice (and later, from the 1960s onwards, to a Minister of Police) responsive to a mainly white electorate. The political exigencies forced upon policing by the dictates of white domination moulded the institutional character of the police in a direction that almost consistently tended towards a deepening of police power and the erosion of civil liberties, especially for the subordinate majority. From 1976 to 1989, the state faced an almost continuous state of virtual civil war. At the end of the 1980s the public police was a highly politicised institution geared toward the protection of state security and pitifully under-developed for the task that lay ahead. It would confront a new political dispensation and an increasingly demanding crime environment with a long entrenched (and deserved) reputation of 'brutality, corruption and ineptitude' (Rauch, 2000:1).

A decisive break in the twentieth century history of the public police as an appendix of the racial state occurred in 1990, as South Africa entered an era of political liberalisation. This phase was guided by a multi-party peace agreement (the National Peace Accord [NPA] of 1991) which put in place various interim mechanisms of oversight over the police. Democratic elections were held in April 1994 and a constitutional order came into existence shortly thereafter under the guardianship of a
Government of National Unity (GNU). From then onwards reform of the police institution was to form one critical part of a much broader programme of radical transformation of the state machinery as a whole.

The transformation of the police was guided by a number of policy frameworks. Critical in this regard were the Interim Constitution of 1993, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, and various administrative guidelines for transforming the public civil service. These measures amounted to a radical shift in political mission, service standards and operational practices of the public police. The rationalisation and amalgamation of eleven officially separate police administrations resulted in the formation of one central structure, the South African Police Service (SAPS).

The Interim and Final Constitutions of the Republic of South Africa created a legal order under which the police were to be restrained by the norms of accountability and legality in line with liberal constitutionalism. These basic laws laid down the objectives of the SAPS: to prevent crime; combat crime; investigate crime; maintain public order; protect and secure the inhabitants of South Africa and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law. The South African Police Services Act of 1995 specified that the SAPS had to be impartial, effective, responsible, an equal opportunity employer, and co-operative with the public and other state organs. Reform measures since 1994 embraced an extremely wide agenda, and objectives at times shifted in response to conditions on the ground. Just how much the reforms contributed to a more effective police force remains a highly contentious matter. The 1995 Act was notable for its confirmation of the centralised and national character of the South African Police (SAP).

Two contentious issues regarding the police arrangement for the future related to the national versus the regional divide, as well as the degree of political control to be exerted in a constitutional democracy. Political expediency and compromises dictated the decisions on this front (Rauch, 2001). The SAPS retained a centralised police organisation controlled from headquarters in Pretoria. The SAPS thus remained a very hierarchical organisation, bearing the imprint of decades of organisational sedimentation.
In every significant respect the highest-ranking police official, the National Commissioner, retained overriding powers. The provincial arms of the SAPS, as before 1994, operated largely as administrative agents of the national headquarters. It was within this context that reform of the police – a generally accepted goal in most political circles – was undertaken.

1.2 Reform from within and without

Reform of the SAP in the post-1990 period has by no means been a purely indigenous development. Local police reform has drawn much of its inspiration from the outside. Not only have ideas current in the international policing fraternity and scholarly circles been imported, foreign policing experts and practitioners too have participated extensively in the reform process itself. The importation of foreign policing ideas into the South African context is not, of course, a recent development. After all, the politics of colonialism and the development of a settler economy created the very conditions within which generic ideas and practices associated with the model of colonial policing were imported (Brogden, 1987) and adapted to the local exigencies of modern South Africa.

In the context of South Africa’s own post-colonial transition a new dynamic for modelling police reform on international practices emerged. Like many other transitional societies at the time, South Africa came to look North for ideas, principles, practices and instruments associated with democratic policing. In the post-Cold War environment the democratic model was widely diffused. As Bayley (2001) has noted, by the mid-1990s the principles associated with the democratic policing regime had become globalised. Whether this diffusion extends much beyond the level of discourse and rhetoric remains an open question, in South Africa as elsewhere. On the face of it, it seems likely that international ideas interact with the local context and undergo mutation in the process. More often than not, the result may be a hybridisation of the original ideas. It is against this background that this thesis proceeds to explore the trajectory of South African police reform with a specific emphasis on how, in what way, and to what extent local reform efforts were influenced by the ‘international factor.’
In order to examine the international contribution to the reform of the SAP, this discussion focuses on three examples in which international influence and participation played an important if not decisive role in reforming aspects of South African policing. Each comprised critical conduits for international ideas in the post-1990 phase of South African police reform. In focusing on these case studies, this discussion aims to add both historical detail and analytical insight to our understanding of recent South African policing reform as a variation on the theme of policy transfer and policy diffusion. Furthermore, by applying the conceptual framework for understanding policy transfers - developed in the context of western industrial societies - to a transitional society, this exploration intends to engage with the cross-cultural applicability of mainstream conceptualisation(s) of the phenomenon of policy transfer.

The contention of this thesis is that all three case studies yield insights into the way in which the 'cultural and conceptual resources' (Sparks & Newburn, 2002:108) relevant to local police reform have been borrowed, adapted, consolidated and/or sabotaged from one locale to another. The case studies also provide considerable information regarding the political sponsors, cultural entrepreneurs and policy networks involved in the process of borrowing. In this examination of the conduits of foreign ideas and practices, reference will be made to the kind of situational factors and contextual exigencies that may support or undermine the increasing approximation of local policing policies to some international norm.

Description and analysis of the processes involved in the reform of local policing take us squarely into contemporary debates on policy diffusion, policy transfer and policy convergence. The concept of, and literature on, policy transfer provides a useful analytical framework for putting recent developments in South African police reform into broader perspective. In order to argue the case for an analysis of the international influences on local police reform through the analytical prism of policy transfer, some discussion of the relevant literature and its heuristic value is warranted.
Experiencing South African Police reform through the lens of policy transfer and policy convergence

Practices associated with the exchange of ideas or the modelling (Karstedt, 2002) of policies and systems of one jurisdiction on another are not new. Political and scholarly interest in the processes underlying policy convergence and policy transfer is, however, more recent. The academic debate on policy convergence and policy transfer only took off in the 1990s. Initially, the most important contributions came from the disciplines of International Relations and Political Studies. In a seminal article published in 1991, the political scientist, Colin Bennett, attempted to instil some analytical rigor into the then-fuzzy debates on policy convergence. Convergence was meant to refer to the trend towards increasing similarity in social policies (in areas such as welfare, health and security) across different political jurisdictions. Setting out to ‘identify the most common structural and procedural variables associated with findings of (public) policy convergence’ (217), Bennett was of the opinion that the nature and causes of convergence were more complicated than most assumed. To do justice to that complexity, substantive empirical investigations were required to map ‘the transnational sources of domestic policy and politics...’ (Bennett, 1991:218).

Policy convergence, as he pointed out, could take different forms. For example, it might involve a standardisation (conversion) of policy goals, policy content, policy instruments or policy outcomes, or a convergence of policy styles. Furthermore, convergence itself could be a function of different processes. On this score, the author identified four qualitatively different avenues through which convergence could be achieved. Emulation, or imitation, involved the ‘utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes from overseas and a drawing of lessons from that experience’ (Ibid:221). Elite networking again referred to the sharing of ideas within policy communities. Thirdly, convergence could also be achieved through the harmonisation of policy. In this regard the deliberate and co-operative attempts of authoritative intergovernmental agencies were particularly critical. Lastly, and in contrast to the spirit of co-operation and voluntarism implied in the previous three processes, convergence
might also be the result of imposition or penetration of policy frameworks by one regime upon a less powerful one.

Since Bennett's earlier engagement, the debate has taken off in a variety of directions (Rose, 1991; Haas, 1992; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000; Stone, 1999; 2000a; 2000b). Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), for example, came to argue in favour of the concept of policy transfer rather than policy convergence. The former concept, they thought, was analytically more robust than the rather descriptive concepts of policy diffusion and convergence. Policy transfer was defined as a 'process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting...is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting' (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000:5).

Whilst policy transfer can hardly be described as only a contemporary phenomenon, it has experienced a rapid growth in recent decades. The reasons for the growth in policy transfer have been diverse: global economic forces, the expansion of communication technology, and the formative influences of international and transnational organisations in the contemporary area, to name but three factors.

In developing a conceptual framework for analysing actual processes of policy transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identified a whole range of issues that would require systematic analysis in empirical investigations. Included in these are the following questions:

1. What causes policy transfer, and what kinds of motivations may drive the process?

2. What is being transferred – is it policy content, instruments, ideologies, ideas, attitudes or positive/negative lessons?

3. Who are the key actors involved in the process? A diverse number of role players could potentially be involved. Actors, for example, may range from governmental officials, bureaucrats, consultants, research
institutions, think tanks\textsuperscript{1}, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), transnational corporations and/or supranational institutions.

(4) What kinds of contextual factors facilitate or inhibit the transfer of policies? Stated differently, under what kinds of conditions do policy transfers lead to policy success and/or failure?

More recently, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) have woven a wide range of variables into a 'Policy Transfer Framework' with a view to assisting empirical research. This framework elucidates many factors of importance in a more grounded discussion of policy transfer. In particular, it notes that policy transfer may take place voluntarily or may be subject to coercion (to various degrees). Policy may be adopted more or less freely or be imposed from the outside by some external agency. The policy process is comprised of different phases, ranging from agenda setting to actual policymaking and policy implementation. Each of these discrete processes is subject to a range of influences that collectively make for either successful policy transfer or policy failure.

1.4 Policy convergence in recent criminological debate

Issues of policy convergence, diffusion and transfer have also been invoked, either implicitly or explicitly, in recent criminological debate. For example, criminological discussions on growing similarities in crime control discourse and penal practices in western societies, as found in the work of David Garland (1996; 2000; 2001) implicitly appeal to notions of policy convergence and diffusion. The authoritative nature of Garland's contribution and the impact of his ideas on the community of criminological scholars warrant a more detailed discussion of his work.

In a seminal article published in 1996, Garland focused attention on the growing similarities in penal policies pursued in the United States of America (USA) and the

\textsuperscript{1} See in this regard the analysis of Stone (2000b) regarding the role of think-tanks in policy transfers. Here think-tanks are defined as 'independent, or private, policy research organizations.' The 'supply and demand' forces that shape the role of these institutions are also discussed (p.153).
United Kingdom (UK). Three specific aspects were highlighted in his discussion. In both societies, he argued, crime had increased substantially. Rates of property crime, in particular, escalated dramatically. As a consequence, crime is increasingly viewed as an inescapable fact of modern co-existence, a 'normal feature of everyday life' and an everyday 'risk.' Secondly, there was growing recognition of the constraints on the state to really 'do' something about crime. The erosion of the myth of the state's monopoly over crime control, and its limited capacity to contain or resolve the crime dilemma, had given rise to a third similarity in outlook and practice: the appeal to market mechanisms and for 'popular involvement' in crime prevention. With the market expanding into the crime complex, at the same time 'responsible citizens' were being called upon to participate in the governance of their own security. Notions of community safety and community policing reflected the salience of active citizenship in the new crime environment. Criminal justice policy, noted Garland (1996), increasingly exhibited a contradictory character – on the 'soft' end of the crime equation there was an attempt to define deviance out of the system with restorative justice principles and diversion practices in mind. On the 'hard' end of the crime equation however, the state periodically reasserted its authority over penal policy in a strong-armed, punitive fashion. As politicians talk of a war on crime, harsher sentences had become the order of the day:

We thus have an official criminology which is increasingly dualistic, increasingly polarized, and increasingly ambivalent. There is a criminology of the self, that characterizes offenders as rational consumers, just like us; and there is a criminology of the other, of the threatening outcast, the fearsome stranger, the excluded and the embittered. (p.461) State sovereignty over crime has thus been simultaneously denied and symbolically reasserted (p.462).

In terms of Garland's argument, the causes underlying growing similarities in crime policy and criminal justice discourse and practice between the USA and the UK are located in structural dynamics. At the core of such convergence lies the social and cultural conditions associated with the rise of late modern societies. In subsequent work Garland (2001) further elaborated on the growing similarities in penal policy as a function of comparable economic, social and cultural changes associated with 'late modernity.'
Garland's core ideas have found considerable resonance in the work of others. His ideas are mirrored in Jock Young's (1999) exposition of the changes induced by the rise of what he calls the *exclusive society*, as well as Ian Taylor's (1999) description of the *market society*. Both offer structural accounts of the malaise besetting late modern societies and its impact on the nature of sociality, patterns of social regulation and on policy responses to crime. Both emphasise how similarities, *inter alia*, in contemporary labour markets, in the associated political rule (neo-liberalism) and in cultural values (through the rise of moral individualism) have driven crime control and penal policies in increasingly analogous and punitive directions.\(^2\)

The relevance of the arguments briefly referred to above lies not so much in the detail as in the conclusion that growing policy convergence in the field of crime control is a consequence of broad structural forces. The latter collectively shape the punitive disposition in crime policy that characterises the exclusive/market society of the new millennium. In this view policy convergence is the outcome of broad and sweeping social trends in economic and political organisation, *rather* than a consequence of conscious policy transfers by particular institutional actors.

More recently, the issue of policy convergence has become articulated in much more explicit terms in criminological discussions. In an issue of the prestigious journal *Criminal Justice*, two leading British criminologists, Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn (2002a), put the issue squarely on the table by posing a (deceptively) simple question: ‘How does crime policy travel’ from one location to another? For them, policy transfer is analytically distinct from convergence and diffusion. Policy transfer in the area of crime control, they argue, has been much neglected. They too reiterate that the movement of ideas across time and space is not new. Under conditions of globalisation however, policy transfer is more readily evident. In their view, a substantive answer to the question of how ‘crime policy travels’ would require empirically grounded investigations into

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\(^2\) A third example from the quarters of sociological scholarship, of a more conservative leaning, is to be found in the work of the American sociologist, Francis Fukuyama (1999) who emphasises the disintegration of the nuclear family and its impact on the decline in social solidarity, community cohesion and trust.
processes underlying transfer as well as the political actors and policy entrepreneurs involved. The challenge for such investigations was to supplement structural explanations with agency-led perspectives. This view concurs with that of Evans and Davies' (1999:361) who suggest that ‘policy transfer should be examined through a structure and agency approach’ at three levels, namely the global/transnational level, the macro-level and the inter-organisational level.

The literature on policy transfer has largely been concerned with the consensual transfer of ideas between western democracies. Policy transfer, however, does not happen in one direction only. The unidirectional depiction of transfer from centre to periphery or from North to South has been problematised in recent years (Karstedt 2002). As Nedley (2000) puts it: ‘(B)y failing to acknowledge that policy entrepreneurs in the North may have something to learn from successful programmes already underway in the South, policy transfer analysis is fundamentally flawed’ (p.1). For Mareen Cain (2000) the notion of ‘interactive globalisation’ captures the ‘possibility of mutual and reciprocal learning’ (p.250). Furthermore the concept of ‘path dependency’ (Karstedt, 2002) has been invoked to emphasise the importance of local political culture as an intervening variable that shape the outcome of policy transfer from one locale to another (Melossi, 2004). Policy transfer does not necessarily lead to policy convergence. On the contrary, the persistence of ‘national and local divergences’ combined with the ‘contradictions of contemporary reform’ (as in the field of youth justice) may ‘preclude any aspiration for the delivery of a universal and consensual product’ (Muncie, 2005:35).

Detailed empirical engagements with aspects of criminal justice policy transfer, such as those provided by Jones and Newburn (2002b; 2005), have furthermore alerted us to the need for distinguishing between levels of policy. Here the distinction between substantive elements of policy (content, instruments and practices) and the more symbolic elements of policy involving style and rhetoric are particularly useful for purposes of analysing ‘concrete outputs of the policy process’ (Jones & Newburn, 2005:70). Furthermore, the distinction between voluntary and coercive transfers\(^3\) is an

\(^3\) See in this regard the discussion by Nedley (2000).
important one for understanding the political circumstances within which transfer and/or lesson-drawing is situated. This distinction is all the more relevant in the case of policy transfers involving developing societies and/or new democracies where 'conditionalities' so routinely accompany developmental assistance from North to South.

The agencies involved in transfer, as Stone (1999; 2000a; 2000b) has noted, may comprise of individuals, networks, organisations or transnational policy communities. In recent years, the influence of transnational think tanks and collaborative policy networks have grown steadily. Think tanks in particular ‘are a key set of agents for exporting lessons’ (Stone, 2001:356) given their ‘propensity for lesson-drawing that aids cross-national policy transfers of ideas, practices and policy programmes’ (p.339).

It is against this background of an appreciation of the complexities involved in policy transfer that the challenges for research are being formulated. In short, the challenge for research is to track the actors involved in exchanges, the policy networks implicated, the interests served, and the outcomes achieved in the conscious transfer of policies from one locale to another. Detailed investigations of the motivations and influences underpinning transfer will contribute to a much more nuanced understanding of the mobility of policy ideas across time and space.

1.5 Transferring criminological ideas into the South African context

The formative influences of western ideas on South African crime policy and debates have been recognised in a small number of scholarly commentaries on the development of South African criminology. Van Zyl Smit has produced pioneering, historically informed contextualisations of these influences (Van Zyl Smit, 1989; 1990; 1999). More recently Van Zyl Smit and Van der Spuy (2004:184) put the practice of borrowing of ideas from abroad in a broader time frame as follows:

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4 The distinction between policy communities, knowledge or epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) and policy transfer networks (Evans & Davies, 1999) is useful.
Criminological ideas have long been imported into South Africa. Both Afrikaner Nationalists in the 1930s and aspiring radical supporters of majority rule in the 1970s and 1980s turned to the grand criminological theories of their time. Thus the overtly racist criminological ideas that were widely available internationally in the 1930s were used to underpin the Afrikaner Nationalist school of criminology... Similarly, an affinity with the ideas of what one may loosely call critical or radical criminology flourished among a small group of intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s. In the climate of political change in the early 1990s this criminology, supplemented by communitarian idealism and feminism, was given considerable publicity and appeared to be growing in influence.

Recent explorations of the relationship between South African criminology and the radical tradition of European criminology - from late Apartheid to the period of political transition - is to be found in the work of Dixon (2001; 2004a; 2004b). In his work the challenges confronting critical criminology for a democratic South Africa are considered in some detail through the lens of Jock Young’s *Exclusive Societies* (Dixon, 2001). In subsequent work, Dixon takes his cue from Cain (2000) in arguing that one needs to conceive of the process whereby criminological ideas are exchanged as characterised by ‘interactive globalisation’ rather than a simple one-way transfer of ideas from North to South. One example of such interactive globalisation, ie of the adoption and adaptation to local exigencies of the model of community policing, is to be found in Dixon’s (2004b) critical commentary on the development of community policing through different political phases and its ‘indigenisation’ in South Africa.

South African experiences of criminal justice reform after the advent of democratic constitutionalism demonstrate the extent to which reform has been shaped by a combination of international policy regimes and local influences and exigencies. Substantive developments attest to the mixture of international and local influences in areas such as youth justice and child rights (Sloth-Nielsen, 2003); organised crime (Standing, 2004); crime prevention (Dixon, 2004d); victims’ rights (Davis & Snyman (eds), 2005); restorative justice (Skelton, 2002); sector policing (Dixon & Rauch, 2004) and prison privatisation (Berg, 2003). For each of these areas one can trace the interplay between transnational, regional and local influences and interest groups.
Having recognised that issues relating to policy transfer and convergence arise across many substantive areas in criminal justice, it needs to be noted that this thesis is exclusively concerned with select aspects of policy transfer and convergence in the area of policing. Given this particular institutional focus, of what relevance is the broader criminological discussion on policy transfer for understanding contemporary shifts in policing? It is with this question in mind that the discussion now turns to a consideration of the ways in which issues of policy convergence and transfer have been introduced into policing debates.

1.6 Converging toward a common policing future?

In the field of policing studies, interest in policy convergence amongst police institutions and policing experts worldwide has emanated from two rather distinct quarters. Mainstream analyses of contemporary shifts in policing in post-industrial societies have a fair amount to say about the march toward a common policing future. Secondly, issues of policy convergence are also very much implicated in the more practically orientated discussions on how best to affect police reform in transitional societies and post-conflict settings. A more detailed consideration of these two sources is provided below.

1.6.1 Late modernity and the fragmentation of policing

One leading example of mainstream commentaries on qualitative shifts in the organisation of policing is to be found in Bayley and Shearing’s (1996) review of the changes in policing that confront Western industrial societies. In this article it is argued that the restructuring of policing is itself driven by the confluence of broader social factors, such as the rise of mass private property, the rampant commodification of security, the contraction of the role of government vis-à-vis the provision of security, growing public fear of crime, and the rise of cultural individualism. To capture the

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5 Which has approximated nothing short of a 'quiet' revolution according to Shearing and Stenning (1980).
dramatic changes in security, Bayley and Shearing invoke the concept of the 'pluralisation' of policing. Building on earlier work by Shearing relating to the impact of privatisation - through the market and through communities - on the state's (shrinking) share in the governance of security, this review takes a more composite view of future developments. For Bayley and Shearing (1996) the pluralisation of policing beyond the state constitutes a watershed in the evolution of law enforcement. 7

Within the 'plural, networked' world (Loader, 2000: 324) of contemporary policing, the division of policing labour between state, market and civil society is complex. In response to this reality of 'nodal networks,' recent research has come to focus on the nature of the inter-relationships between different providers (Shearing & Wood, 2003). These relationships may vary from co-operative alliances, to more or less peaceful co-existence, to competitive and even hostile contestations over turf. A further feature of the current debate is the focus on normative concerns. Here the impact of diversification and the commodification of security on the actual delivery of accessible, appropriate and effective security to citizens is critical (Loader, 1999; Kempa & Shearing, 2002). Such concerns are particularly pertinent in emerging democracies where the state's capacity to deliver security is much more limited than in established democracies.

Other discussions of the challenges confronting the governance of security 8 in the 'postmodern era' (Sheptycki, 1997) and in 'risk-based societies' (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; De Lint, 1999) continue to emphasise the homogenising effects of structural

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6 In subsequent work they have opted for the concept of 'multilateralisation' to refer to the multiplicity of auspices under which security is governed. In exploring further the impact of such multilateralisation, Bayley and Shearing (2001) note that in the new age, there is a crucial distinction to be made between the auspices under which security is organised and the actual providers of such security.

7 Others have taken issue with the depiction of a 'watershed' or 'a qualitative break' in the history of policing. Jones and Newburn (2002c) for example have warned of the dangers of overdramatising current trends (p.130).

8 The challenges confronting the governance of security more specifically need to be understood against the background of shifts in governance more generally. See Mbabazi, MacLean and Shaw (2002) for a discussion of the need for moving beyond a state-centric approach to governance.
conditions characteristic of post-industrial societies. So too the effects of transnational crime, particularly of an organised nature, on policing systems and methodologies have been explored. Sheptycki (1998:493), for example, regards the 'transnationalization of clandestine markets' as a crucial factor in new age policing. In a world where crime knows no borders and where illegal enterprises pursue business interests across frontiers, the challenges confronting law enforcement agencies are increasingly similar. Faced with criminal predation of an organised nature, the argument goes, law enforcement agencies need to consolidate their resources, build co-operative alliances, standardise policy frameworks and harmonise operational procedures in the 'war' on organised crime. Such a view suggests that the transnationalisation of lucrative illicit enterprises (such as drugs, illegal weapons, and the sex trade in human beings) creates fertile conditions for cross-societal police exchanges in best practices and cross-national lesson drawing. At both the international and supra-national level a variety of organisations, situated beyond, below and above the state, are coming to play a larger role.9

1.6.2 Policing in transitional societies

The second source for discussions on policy transfer and policy convergence is that of transitional policing. In the post-Cold War environment the challenges confronting the democratization of former authoritarian police institutions in emerging democracies have acquired great importance (Neild, 1999; Call & William, 2001). A new wave of global assistance efforts has contributed to growing interest in the politics and technical practicalities involved in reforming police agencies in difficult social settings (Bayley, 1995). The concern with practical lessons is evident in David Bayley’s (2001) reflections on Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It? In this publication the author extracts general lessons from the trials and errors of recent developmental interventions aimed at the reform of police organisations in new democracies.

9 For a discussion of the social propellers of, and the salient features associated with, transnational policing in its Eurostate mould, see Walker (2003).
In other policy circles the institutional net has been cast wider than the police by focusing on the challenges confronting security sector reform. Key participants in this debate include developmental agencies that have come to see security sector reform as crucial for the prospects of democratic consolidation in transitional states (Winkler, 2002). Viewed from a security sector angle, the reform of the public police agency is part and parcel of wider systemic efforts to democratise the security sector. The historical dominance of military institutions and the underdevelopment of civilian police agencies in many parts of the world constitute part of the cultural background. The potential for, and difficulties confronting, developmental efforts aimed at aligning security sectors to democratic principles have been a feature of such debates. Comparative analysis of the chequered history of police reform initiatives in new democracies - such as those provided by Ziegler and Neild (2002) and Caparini and Marenin (2004) - have contributed in no small measure to the spirit of pragmatism that now prevails. Underlying this pragmatism is the realisation that policies are not transferred in the abstract, nor are they transported into social vacuums. The shuttling of ideas, recipes, mechanisms and cultural habits of mind invariably takes place under particular social conditions upon which a wide range of social agencies exert their respective influences.

Finally, a further source of ideas on transitional policing is also emerging from the field of peace-building and peacekeeping operations in post-conflict settings. In contexts such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), organisations like the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) agency are intimately involved in restructuring policing organisations in 'collapsed states' (Holm & Eide, 2000). From such field engagements, a series of lessons have also been forthcoming on which future efforts aimed at policy transfer and implementation can be built with the view to maximising the effects for institution building.

The literature on political transitions and transitional policing is beginning to generate the kind of empirical data from which insight into the nature, process and consequences of policy transfer and policy convergence can be gleaned. The climate of political transition itself, as Brocklehurst et al. (2000) conclude in their review of
comparisons between Northern Ireland and South Africa, ‘shapes and facilitates lesson
drawing’ in public policy. As they put it:

Lesson drawing in transition may thus be part of a broader strategy of attempting
to remove uncertainty in a complex and fast moving environment,...One reason
why lesson drawing is particularly useful in times of transition is that it often
enables policy makers to remove themselves from their own scene...Secondly
where issues are particularly sensitive, for example, policing a divided society, it
enables players to discuss reforms by alluding to the exporter environment and its
parallels without using the highly charged identities and issues of the potential
importer country. This has certainly been the case in recent exchanges between
the SAPS and the RUC\textsuperscript{10} on the subject of Change Management (Ibid:15).

One of the most explicit engagements with the diffusion of policing policies
across national borders is to be found in a recent paper on the topic of ‘transnational
policy regimes’ (Marenin, 2005). Not much has been written about the actual processes
whereby such regimes are created and sustained in particular locales. On this score
Marenin (2005) argues that various players, actors and regime communities participate in
the moulding of international policing regimes. These actors may be local or foreign and
can be drawn from a variety of institutional orbits: governmental structures, the market,
civil society (NGO’s) or police institutions. To explore the social composition of regime
communities more empirically, the author identifies five different communities that are
actively involved in the shaping of policing regimes. These communities include scholars
and research institutions, policy outfits and think-tanks, transnational policy-makers,
NGOs and private consultancy firms, and finally, professional police agencies.
Collectively each of these communities participates in the ‘shuttling of ideas’ from one
region to another, across borders, at training locations and conference venues. As he puts
it in an earlier paper:

The dissemination of democratic policing norms and practices has occurred in
numerous ways, and has been done by all regime communities. Methods range
from appeals to professional states, quid pro quo negotiations, salesmanship,
semi-coercive persuasion, and straightforward imposition (Marenin, 2003a:20).

\textsuperscript{10} RUC refers to the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
Marenin's (2005) analysis helps to set the pace for more substantive engagements with processes and agencies involved in the dissemination of ideas and practices relevant to an understanding of policy transfer in the field of security in the contemporary era.

In conclusion, recent engagements with the concept of policy transfer in political science, public administration, criminology and policing studies hold considerable potential for addressing the following question: How does police policy travel and to what effect? It is with this question in mind that we turn to a consideration of South African police reform for the period 1990 onwards as one case study of a broader process of ‘interactive globalisation’ (Cain, 2000; Dixon, 2004b) through which ‘transnational policing regimes’ (Marenin, 2003a; 2005) emerge, ‘policy transfers’ (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Jones & Newburn, 2002a; 2002b; 2005) are mediated, reciprocal ‘lesson-drawing’ (Hamber, 2003) is facilitated and ‘policy convergence’ (Bennett, 1991) may or may not be effected. In its substantive exploration of certain aspects of policy transfers in the field of policing, this thesis hopes to build and expand on other recent contributions in this area. But before doing so, some broader contextualisation is called for.

1.7 South African police reform in retrospect: local pressures and international influences

The history of the public police in South Africa is testimony to the intimate connection between local pressures and international influences. The tradition of repressive policing was moulded by the consecutive influences of colonial conquest, the peculiarly racial dynamics that shaped industrialisation, and the emergence of a virulent form of ethnic politics. From the 1960s onwards, international condemnation bestowed a pariah status on South Africa. During the height of state repression the international community more generally, and the anti-Apartheid movement more particularly, continued to exert influence through a moral condemnation and political isolation of the Apartheid state. During this period NGOs active in the monitoring of state abuse and support to the disenfranchised could rely on international support.
With open political rapprochement underway from February 1990 onwards, the history of internationalisation changed direction from political exclusion to constructive engagement. Local efforts toward political liberalisation were met with generous international support. In a short space of time a dramatic re-insertion of South Africa into the international community was effected. One institutional recipient that stood to benefit from international support and assistance was the public police institution.

Much has been written over the past fifteen years about South African police reform in the context of post-Apartheid reconstruction. More recently, South Africa has also emerged as a pivotal case study in comparative assessments of security sector reform in post-conflict situations. In such circles South African experiments are projected as a source of inspiration to others grappling with the strategic frameworks for democratising the armed formations of former authoritarian regimes. To illustrate the point, one example will suffice. In a publication edited by two leading international scholars in the security sector field, South Africa is singled out as 'providing especially comprehensive blueprints for security sector transformation' to its African neighbours (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003:xi) It is with this observation in mind that the question as to the formative role of international influences vis-à-vis local pressures comes to the fore.

The contribution of the international community to the project of local police reform is generally acknowledged. The role of international exchange and assistance in the reform of the public police, however, has not been the subject of much substantive empirical enquiry. A few exceptions are worth noting. The first is Brogden and Shearing’s (1993) earlier normative injunction against what they described as a tendency toward a neo-colonial importation of international models for local police reform. At the time they insisted that local knowledge and indigenous practices of social ordering had to guide the process of reconstituting the field of policing. A second engagement with the internationalisation of local police reform focused more explicitly on the role of the foreign developmental community. On this score, Van der Spuy (2000) described core features of developmental assistance in aid of police reform for the period 1994 to 1998.
and identified shifts in the objectives of such assistance over a period of time. Shifts in the priorities for, and objectives of, developmental assistance, she noted, were the result of a rather complex interaction between locally driven policy agendas and international pressures. However, the details of the processes underlying transfer and convergence remained unexplored in her paper.

1.8 Political context, police reform and international-local exchanges

This thesis attempts to fill a gap in the local policing literature by exploring (selectively) through the utilisation of three case studies, the interchange between local initiatives and international influences in the process of the reform of the South African police. The analysis of these case studies requires at least some reference to the broader context in which foreign and local personnel pursued their reform goals.

In the early years of political liberalisation a lively interchange arose among local elites and foreign counterparts on a wide range of matters pertaining to state reconstruction. Such exchanges became more formalised in the run up to the democratic elections of 1994. Various international fact finding missions were undertaken from 1990 onwards. Reports produced by such missions were transmitted to the international community. For example, in 1990, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) brought out a report on violence in Natal and police complicity in it. At the invitation of a local network - Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) - the ICJ undertook another visit to South Africa in March 1992 and expanded its enquiry into violence and its impact on a peaceful settlement. In 1991, Africa Watch of Human Rights Watch published a report titled The Killings in South Africa: The Role of the Security Forces and the Response of the State (Africa Watch, 1991). It found that there was abundant evidence that the state is implicated in the past six years of so-called "black on black" violence and favoured Inkatha supporters (p.2). The Dutch Violence Observation Mission (1993) to the Vaal

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III Three shifts were identified: In the first phase assistance was geared toward the legitimation of the public police; the second phase refocused attention on capacity-building of the law enforcement machinery in response to a crime epidemic. In the third phase assistance had more focused concern with making effective "war" on organised crime in specialist divisions of the security establishment.
Triangle in South Africa, which again worked in close collaboration with a local network (Peace Action), published its report *Violence in the Vaal* in early 1993. The focus of the inquiry was the role of the police in violence in the urban area to the south of Johannesburg. The delegation comprised of three Dutch police unions and had as part of its objective to provide support to the Police and Prison Officers’ Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), the then illegal trade union formation active amongst black police officers and prison warders. In its recommendations it focused on the need for non-partisan and neutral policing, and recommended the creation of effective internal disciplinary procedures. Such reports, combined with Amnesty International’s annual focus on human rights abuses, brought concerted political pressure to bear on the conduct of security forces in the early phase of political liberalisation.

The utilisation of foreign expertise with direct relevance to reform of the policing mandate became a feature of the time. Its most explicit utilisation was in the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry’s investigation into the future regulation of public demonstrations (See Heymann, 1992). With regards to this contentious matter, both academic and police expertise were deployed to formulate recommendations relevant to a future democratic dispensation. The importance of such policy developments in the terrain of public order policing can hardly be underestimated. The International Panel provided new terms of reference for public order policing based on a triangulated vision of shared responsibility between the central state, local authorities and the organisers of protest. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. The guidelines developed by the International Panel formed the basis for new legislation in the field of public order policing. Following on from this development was the subsequent creation of a training programme for ‘marshals’ aimed at building community capacity to regulate public demonstrations. The utilisation of foreign policing expertise was again a feature of this training initiative. Lastly, there was the Waddington (1992) investigation, under the auspices of the Goldstone Commission, into the events surrounding the Boipatong massacre in July 1992 in which forty-two people were killed. There were persistent rumours that the police had

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12 This was a joint initiative undertaken by Dutch police unions, the Association of senior police, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the Netherlands.
had a hand in the lethal conflict between Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC) supporters. The utilisation of British policing expertise to investigate such allegations of police complicity was itself necessitated by widespread public distrust in the local police. As such the Waddington Inquiry constituted a confidence-building strategy of some significance in the divided context of the time.\footnote{Waddington’s (1992) report found no convincing evidence of police complicity but he painted a dismal picture of a police organisation ill equipped to investigate crime according to basic professional standards. In this regard he came to a damning conclusion about the state of police accountability: ‘If these obvious failures (of the investigation process) are in any way representative, then they suggest that the SAP is an \textit{unaccountable} police force…’[and] that ‘systems do not exist for either internal or external accountability’ (p.43-44).}

The opening up of political space under the National Peace Accord (NPA), the key agreement in the transitional process, provided further opportunities for direct field engagement in policing on which others also capitalised. In the run up to the first democratic elections, international involvement in security extended to international monitoring as a direct response to the adoption of Resolution 772 by the United Nations Security Council (17 August 1992). Various observer missions were deployed under the auspices of the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth, and the United Nations (UN). In some of the missions, police experts played a pivotal role. To varying degrees such international monitors interacted with local police contingents as they went on their daily business of regulating ‘order’ in the fractious environment of the time. The police observers became important conduits of democratic policing principles in the day-to-day practical engagement with local police on the ground.

United Nations observers were to be deployed in South Africa in support of the work of NPA structures. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa (1993a), \textit{Violence in South Africa}, raised general impressions around the debilitating impact of violence on the prospects for successful negotiations, considered the role of Peace Accord Structures, and noted the need for reform of the criminal justice system and the police institution. Lastly, there was the initiative to build a peacekeeping force that also relied on international policing expertise. This experiment, however, failed and the peacekeeping force was disbanded shortly after its inception (Anglin, 1995).
After 1994, developmental assistance in aid of institutional reform of the police expanded significantly, creating many opportunities for close interaction and an exchange of policing ideas, operational methods and institutional systems. Developmental aid was brought to bear on a wide front. It targeted many layers of the police organisation. And to varying degrees it brought political credibility, financial assistance, modern technology and technical expertise to the police agency. Aid had a wide range of objectives in mind: bestowing credibility on reformist efforts; changing mind-sets and cultural habits; modernising systems; professionalising conduct; and providing institutional hardware.

By the late 1990s a more regional approach to policing reform emerged, with South Africa in a position to play a key role in reform of police agencies in the Southern African region. The creation of transnational institutions within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region - of which the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) and the Interpol Sub-Bureau are two important examples - also facilitated a more regional approach to the development of policing policy. In the latter structures police elites themselves emerged as important channels for the diffusion of ideas and systems responsive to the crime demands of the region.

This brief discussion provides a background against which institutional conduits of democratic policing ideas and modern policing practices could be identified. International policing experts and observers, local policy elites, NGOs (both local and international), academics, development agencies, consultants, private industry and others were all active in the debate. An exhaustive analysis of all these influences is hardly feasible in a work of this nature. For the purpose of this thesis, the following three case studies were selected, for a variety of reasons to be later elucidated.

1.9 Three case studies: scholars, policy entrepreneurs, and the international development community

Chapter 2 first turns to a consideration of the role of the community of policing scholars - both local and international - in the conceptualisation of police reform and on
the application of competing models for the practical project of police restructuring. In
the discussion it is noted that, in the space of a decade and a half, policing studies in
South Africa have grown quite spectacularly. The field now generates a steady stream of
commentaries, policy proposals, conference papers, research reports and peer-reviewed
scholarly publications on a wide range of issues. The situation prevailing at present - both
in terms of the depth and breadth of policing studies - stands in sharp contrast to the past.
In this review of the policing literature, four models of policing reform are identified as
relevant to a consideration of the competing ways in which the agenda for police reform,
both conceptually and normatively, were constructed. Through a consideration of a
number of core texts that appeared since the late 1980s, the interplay between foreign and
local scholars in setting a framework for post-Apartheid police reform is illustrated.
Furthermore, South African experiences attest to the policy relevance of intellectual ideas
as a function of the collaborative networks that have long existed between academics and
political elites.

The second structure of importance for this discussion is an interim policy
mechanism, the National Police Board, which was created in terms of the NPA in 1992,
finally dissolving in December 1994. Cast in the mould of a national policy advisory
structure consisting of civilian and police representatives, the Board focused its
deliberations on a number of strategic priorities relevant to the quest for policy reform.
Such priorities included: the restructuring of police training; the creation of mechanisms
of oversight and revising the police complaints systems; adopting the doctrine of, and
creating practices associated with, community policing. In the early period of political
reform, the Board constituted a forum through which new policing concepts from both
international and local sources flowed, receiving at least a polite audience from the senior
police officials present, and sometimes leading to significant innovations in practice. In
doing so the Board assisted in setting the agenda for police reform in specific ways. Over
a short space of time it forged for itself an institutional identity and relied for political
credibility on the access it enjoyed both to inner-ANC political circles, NPA structures,
and established civil society organisations, as well as reformist fragments of the police
elite. During its short existence the Board contributed towards the institutionalisation of
the principle of international assistance in the reform of the police organisation. It
exploited the opportunities for exchanging ideas in the international market place,
emulated foreign models, and utilised foreign expertise.

Chapter 3 of the thesis undertakes a critical review of the activities and broader
role of the Police Board (a hitherto neglected institution within the police reform
literature). The review attempts to demonstrate the intimate reliance on international
policing ideas and practices by local policy elites as a way of mobilising support for, and
directing energies toward, the reform of the former authoritarian police institution.
Innovative strategies based on elite networking also proved successful for setting the
agenda of police reform. This chapter describes the context in which it operated and the
constraints, both infrastructural and social, with which it had to contend. It considers in
some detail the various ways in which the Board capitalised on whatever opportunities
for debating policy priorities in the area of police reform. Part of the success of the Board
can be ascribed to it being an institutional cog in much larger social machinery that had
the radical reform of the repressive police institution at heart. In a way the Board acted
as a location within which diverse views - drawn from different interest communities
such as the scholarly, political, civil society and practitioners - could be considered.
Specifically, the Board was instrumental in formulating the policy terms of reference for
police accountability, police training and strategic planning. Such police frameworks
facilitated to a greater or lesser degree the agenda for actual reform that the new policing
elite came to pursue after April 1994.

A third conduit for internationally acclaimed models and ideas regarding crime
and its control involves the international development community. In the post-Cold War
environment in particular, developmental agencies have come to constitute an important
channel for liberal ideas about the governance of security, and the democratisation of
policing in post-conflict environments. Chapters 4 to 7 of the thesis deal with this aspect.
In chapter 4 the discussion takes stock of the contemporary debates on good governance
and security sector reform, and the role of developmental agencies in transferring ideas,
mechanisms and operational know-how to police agencies in developing contexts and in
post-conflict settings. The concepts of good governance and security sector reform are probed and the conceptual and political controversies outlined. The discussion then moves on to take a look at developmental efforts in the area of police reform in South Africa.

Against this broad background the discussion then focuses on a consideration of select examples of donor involvement in South African police reform. Three case studies of donor aid to the SAP are discussed in some detail: donor assistance in aid of the reform of basic training of police recruits as a point of leverage for affecting cultural change within a former paramilitary police organisation (Chapter 5); donor assistance aimed at improving safety and security (Chapter 6) and law enforcement capacity through a multi-levelled intervention in the Eastern Cape; and donor assistance for improvement of ‘service delivery’ within the police organisation informed by the paradigm of managerialism and the spirit of public sector reform (Chapter 7). This sample of donor-assisted policing projects is analysed so as to arrive at a number of observations regarding the role of the foreign development sector in the processes of policy transfer and policy diffusion. In each of the case studies, the discussion identifies the conceptual terms of reference which guided each project, the actors involved, the networks mobilised, the respective motivations and interests at play, and the obstacles negotiated along the way of organisational reform.

1.10 Conclusion

Western scholars have noted growing similarities in criminal justice discourse, policy, and practices in the era of late modernity. Such similarities, it has been argued, have been forged through structural processes associated with post-industrialism and/or late modernity. More recently there has been recognition of the need to complement such structural analyses of policy convergence with empirical investigations into the actual politics and logistics of transfer, emulation, modelling and lesson drawing. This recognition has contributed to an exploration of the role of social agencies in the ‘shuttling’ of ideas (Marenin, 2005) from one locale to another. It is this conceptual
framework that will be overlaid on the recent history of South African police reform. Through this superimposition, the interaction between local and international ideas will be explored in an attempt to respond to a challenge raised by Jones and Newburn (2002a), that what is required is much more nuanced policy histories aimed at examining institutional conduits for reformist policing ideas, the conceptual paradigms utilised, the strategies invoked, and the social alliances created in pursuit of policy reform. Such explorations are necessary in order to arrive at an understanding of the relationship between agency and structure in policy making (Jones & Newburn, 2002a). Consideration will be given to a wide range of situational factors that shape the outcomes of any particular set of reformist endeavours. Whether local policing policies and operational practices will approximate ‘global best practices’ thus remains an open question rather than a foregone conclusion.

1.11 A note on the methodology employed in this study

The data collection methods on which this thesis relies were diverse and, in some regards, eclectic. The eclecticism was a function of the fact that research was conducted over a period of ten years and involved a variety of projects in which I participated in different capacities. For example: In some instances my primary role was that of detached researcher interested in gathering factual knowledge about practices of ‘monitoring’ police in action and the role of external agencies in this regard. As a consultant I was paid to undertake evaluations of donor-funded projects such as the Basic Level Training Pilot Programme (BLTPP). As a participating member of an interim policy mechanism, the National Police Board, which was designed to provide advice on policing matters in the early period of political transition, I kept a diary of my observations during the monthly meetings of the Board in the hope that I could utilise those observations for research purposes at some later point.

In compiling this thesis I thus put old research to new use, drawing rather freely on the research findings that I had accumulated during the course of a decade and that formed the basis of a number of project evaluation reports to funding agencies. This may
records included minutes of monthly meetings, submissions of the various sub-
groups of the Police Board, security briefings by the SAP to members of the
Board, as well as letters of correspondence between the Board and various other
structures (Minister of Police, National Peace Structures and NGOs). Such
documentary material provided the factual data from which detailed observations
about the activities of the Board, as interim policy mechanism involved in debates
on police reform, could be formulated.

The minutes and submissions of other structures such as the Police Policy Group
(PPG) also proved useful for purposes of reconstructing the role of networks
which develop in the space where academic debates begin to inform advocacy on
future police arrangement. The PPG comprised a small think tank with a political
allegiance to the ANC, and it utilised its research expertise to inform policy
debates in ANC circles. It helped to create a forum for debate in ANC circles,
disseminated information on critical areas of reform, and helped frame strategic
questions for policy. As such it played an agenda-setting and networking role in
an admittedly small but influential circle of the ANC.

Other documentary sources utilised during the course of this research included
policy documents that emanated from the SAP, the SAPS, the Ministry of Safety
and Security, a number of crime policies, as well as parliamentary debates on the
challenges confronting the public police agency.

For the three examples (Chapter 5, 6 and 7) of donor assisted projects profiled in
this thesis, project-specific documents constituted a further critical source of
information. The negotiation of access to such primary documents often proved to
be time-consuming and frustrating. In some instances access to documentation
was secured as part of a contractual involvement in the evaluation of donor-
funded projects. Unlimited access to all documentation of the support structures
involved in the restructuring of basic police training, for example, was secured by
the Training Evaluation Group (of which I was a member) with the backing of the
British Development Division South Africa. Access to documentary material relevant to Chapters 6 and 7 was negotiated directly with the research division of the SAPS. In the latter instance however, the permission granted for access was more restricted, and excluded some interim-reports, for example. Again, each chapter contains reference to the documentary material utilised, the constraints on access and issues relating to confidentiality.

Interviews: Face to face interviews were conducted with members of policy constituencies involved in policy reform during the course of different research projects. So, for example, the transcriptions of interviews conducted with international monitors and police advisors attached to a number of monitoring structures in the run-up to the first democratic elections in 1994, were re-examined during the course of writing up this thesis. In addition, transcriptions of interviews with aid agencies and recipients of aid in the criminal justice system compiled during 1998-9 and again in 2002-3, again served as background material for understanding the context within which lesson drawing, elite networking, and policy transfer may take place.

The observations recorded during a focus-group interview in 1995 with a group of eighteen international advisors involved in the BLTPP of 1995, too served as background material for analysing, from both structural and agency-led perspectives, aspects of transfer, emulation, and copying in the process of restructuring basic police training.

During the process of writing up the thesis I conducted a number of further interviews with key actors in policy formation and implementation. These meetings included face to face interviews with five ex-members of the Police Board; two members of the civilian policy elite who occupied central positions in the newly established Ministry of Safety and Security shortly after its formation in 1994; and five project managers who had intimate knowledge of the
implementation of the sample of three donor assisted projects discussed in this thesis.

Participant observation and field notes: The description of the role of the National Police Board also relied on participant observations conducted during my stint as a civilian member of the Board between 1993 and 1994. At the time, I kept some field notes on the nature of social interaction between members and groupings within the Board, the contentious issues which arose during the course of the Board's existence, the unfolding of administrative relations, and the impact of political processes on the tone and substance of the Board's proceedings. Almost ten years after their compilation, the notes helped to put the formalised record of proceedings found in the institutional minutes and submissions into a more interactive context. Regular attendance of meetings of the Multi-Implementation Team (MIT), and strategic planning sessions of structures such as the Field Training Advisors involved in the implementation of a new curriculum for Basic Level Training, also served as a social laboratory for reflecting on the micropolitics of police-to-police developmental assistance.
Chapter 2

Conceptual Paradigms for Police Reform in South Africa: Scholarly Debates, 1980-2005

2.1 Introduction

During South Africa’s recent political transition, local opinion benefited from an unprecedented exposure to international policing debates. There were many sources contributing to a lively exchange of policing ideas. So, for example, the deployment of international monitors (amongst who were police advisors) provided one avenue for the diffusion of concepts and practical know-how to the project of police reform. Following hard on the heels of these personnel were a number of international policing scholars who participated - often in collaborative fashion - with local researchers in a wide range of conferences, workshops, policy forums, and/or community-based projects. All of these activities contributed in one way or the other to the setting of the agenda for police reform in South Africa.

Of particular relevance to this chapter is the way in which one particular ‘regime community,’ ie the community of scholars, brought various theoretical models and policy ideas to bear on the debate, and the actual business of police reform in the 1990s. The conscious diffusion of intellectual ideas on police reform took on an interactive format involving both local-to-international and international-to-local borrowing and exchange. This chapter identifies the different paradigms in terms of which policing reform became conceptualised. Four paradigms or models of police reform are identified: the colonial model, the liberal-democratic model, the governance model, and the transitional model. In the discussion below, the defining features of each paradigm and its main proponents will be outlined, and the policy implications for the reform of the Apartheid police highlighted. But before doing so, some brief discussion of the field of police studies prior to the 1990s is necessary, as it set the scene for oppositional ideas to emerge once political transition provided new spaces for intellectual exchanges about the future of policing.
2.2 Background to the new South African policing studies: From police science to critical policing studies

2.2.1 Police science: conservative police studies and international isolation

Fifteen years ago, one could count the number of serious academic writings on the SAP on the fingers of one and a half hands. This dearth of critical analysis and empirical engagement was a function of a number of factors. First, the conceptual parameters within which 'police science' (as it became labelled) developed at tertiary institutions, such as the University of South Africa (UNISA), were extremely narrow. With a captive audience of police practitioners readily at hand, police science occupied itself either with abstract concepts divorced from the reality of the South African context (for instance, 'the police role in society'), or with issues of narrow technical relevance to the police institution. Altogether absent from its concerns was a socio-political contextualisation of policing under apartheid.

Until the mid-1980s, academic engagement with the police institution and its role in South African society was confined to a group of mostly Afrikaner academics, located at the Universities of Pretoria and South Africa. There was a very concrete reason for this situation. Ambitious police officials gained promotion in large part by passing accredited examinations. For officers, a university degree was particularly desirable. Long accustomed to servicing the needs of the upper, largely white, ranks of the civil service, the Universities of South Africa (UNISA) and Pretoria respectively offered tailor-made correspondence and extra-mural courses in criminology and 'police science' for police officials unable to enrol as full-time students. Particularly prominent in this were academics at UNISA’s Department of Police Science, where Professor T J van Heerden was a leading figure in the institutionalisation of police science as an academic discipline. His *Inleiding tot die Polisiekunde* (1976) was, in the author's own words in the preface to the English version (Van Heerden, 1986), 'the first scientific publication on police science to appear in South Africa.' Influenced on the one hand by the American tradition of police science, the work also embodied the apolitical, positivistic style of exposition so characteristic of criminology offered at Afrikaans-medium universities at the time. Little contact with South African reality was made in chapters that ranged from the evolution of policing in
general to traffic control. Tailored to the concerns of police practitioners, this version of police science existed largely in a social vacuum. In the highly politicised context of the time, it was a travesty of science (Schärf, 1990). Nor did a voluminous 'history' of the police compiled by Dippenaar (1988) as a commemorative album in celebration of the 75\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the SAP, satisfy the demands for a balanced historical analysis of the evolution of policing in twentieth century South Africa. Written from the vantage point of an insider socialised in the discourse of state security, Dippenaar's history amounted to no more than an ethnocentric and self-congratulatory account of the evolution of the SAP (Van der Spuy, 1990).

Another factor of importance in the underdevelopment of policing studies was the issue of limited research access. Under apartheid, access to the institutions of coercive rule - such as the police and prisons - was curtailed by various exclusionary rules (Slabbert, 1985). The scope for academic inquiry was thus severely restricted. But for those with ties to the regime, it was possible to negotiate access on the basis of ethnic solidarity - a situation that encouraged the growth of a neutered and one-sided research enterprise, and the proliferation of service courses aimed at police professionals. In combination, political restrictions on conducting research, and sharp ideological polarisation within the academic community, as well as the international isolation of academia before the mid-1980s, inhibited the development of an indigenous tradition of policing studies true to the criteria of balanced academic enquiry.

With the regime crisis of the mid-1980s, matters began to change. And from the early 1990s onwards, the growth of policing studies has been fuelled by the imperatives of political transition. The opportunity to set the agenda for police reform has acted as a stimulus for a wider debate on the future of policing more generally.

2.2.2 Borrowing from abroad: The rise of critical policing studies in the 1980s

A direct engagement with the political relationships between police, state and society in the settler colony eventually emerged from writers opposed to the racial status quo so readily accepted by the police scientists. During the 1980s a group of academics, legal activists and paralegal service providers, adhering more or less to a tradition of critical scholarship, began to
turn their attention to the police of the apartheid state. Drawing on the broad framework for a critical criminology, first explicated in Davis and Slabbert’s (1985) *Crime and Power in South Africa*, the core ideas revolved around the political economy of crime generally, and the coercive instrumentality of the police as the guardians of white interests in the racial oligarchy more specifically.

These early critical commentators entered the debate under conditions of heated political contestation, as successive states of emergency were declared from 1985 onwards, and additional powers bestowed on the security forces to quell growing resistance from opponents of apartheid. On the country’s borders and inside the townships, the police were deployed as the first line of defence of state security as never before. In this period of the country’s history they became, very visibly, the storm troopers of the racial state. It was within this context then that the politics and logistics of policing an embattled state became a subject of local academic debate. Two examples of a new critical literature on the police stand out: the special edition of the law journal, *Acta Juridica*, published in 1989, and the collection of essays edited by Hansson and Van Zyl Smit entitled *Towards Justice? Crime and State Control in South Africa* that appeared in 1990. Both the legal and criminological analyses contained in these volumes sought to expose state lawlessness and the abuse of power through police action. Together these works marked an important phase in the diversification of local policing studies, borrowing ideas in particular from the influential British school of critical criminology and the emerging branch of critical police studies (Hall et al., 1978).

A number of themes were central in the critical police studies of this period. First was the emphasis in both publications on the politicisation of policing from the late 1970s onwards. Though a full account of the slide to highly repressive policing beyond the rule of law dating back to the 1950s has still to be written, this trend was not new. But the pace of change certainly increased after the Soweto uprisings of 1976. From that date onwards, the SAP came to operate more and more on the model of ‘high’ political policing, so prominent a feature of police behaviour in other authoritarian contexts (Brodeur, 1983). Explorations of the habits of mind operative within the police subculture in the context of grand Apartheid captured the ethnocentric worldview of the uniformed men (Van der Spuy, 1990). This emphasis on the
inherently political role and repressive dynamics of policing was a distinctive feature of local debates at the time. As such, the critical perspective stood in sharp contrast to the apolitical approach characteristic of Afrikaner police science.

A second feature of policing captured in several detailed descriptive studies was the paramilitary style of public order policing. Examination of the operational strategies underlying public order policing yielded crucial insights into the coercive methods of crowd control used by the SAP in the late 1980s (Haysom, 1989). The routine use of lethal force (Haysom, 1987; Hansson, 1989), encouraged by a legally permissive regime, also underlined the degeneration of an institution supposedly committed to the protection of the community at large. Despite limitations on direct access to the police organisation, journalists and academics also began to breach the curtain of official denial with examinations of the subcultural dynamics of police violence. On this score, Steytler’s (1990) exploration of the militarist ethos that shaped cop culture (and its side effects) deserves particular mention. Other valiant attempts (Haysom, 1990; Laurence, 1990) were also made to bring to light the activities of state-sanctioned hit squads, whose existence was widely rumoured throughout the late 1980s, although conclusive proof of their involvement in maintaining minority rule had to await the political breakthroughs of the 1990s (see Coleman, 1998). But state terror had other faces too, and the torture of political detainees became the subject of a detailed investigation by a team of researchers based at the University of Cape Town (UCT) (Foster, Davis & Sandler, 1987). The publication of their findings provoked harsh governmental criticism.

A third characteristic of policing highlighted in this early phase of research was the increasing reliance by the state on agencies other than the public police for the purposes of 'order maintenance.' A number of publications focused on growth in the subcontracting of state repression through the use of shadow forces. So, for example, inquiries into state-sponsored vigilantism (Haysom, 1986; 1990; Fine, 1989; Black Sash, 1988; Catholic Institute of International Relations, 1988) examined the role of a variety of surrogate forces in fomenting violence amongst political opponents of the apartheid regime. These accounts captured the extent to which the dirty work of the white state was increasingly being carried out by black quasi-mercenary formations. These case studies also provided telling examples of the extent to which
the apartheid state was prepared to forfeit its monopoly over the deployment of coercive force in order to protect state security.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus, in that last convulsive phase of ethnic rule, the emerging discipline of policing studies engaged in rich descriptive terms with the crisis of social control in a dying political order and the repressive mechanisms (both within and outside state) spawned in the process. From this account it should be clear that the substantive concerns of critical policing studies on the left (repressive policing, state-sponsored terror and the systemic use of torture) had little in common with the topics pursued in police science on the right. The ideological fault line ran wide and deep, marking out those sympathetic to the police from their often outspoken critics. Much like the wider field of criminology, the study of police and policing bore the imprint of political division and ideological cleavage.

2.3 Apartheid policing: Colonialism of a (special) type?

Necessary corrective to the apolitical certainties of police science though it was, critical opposition to developments in policing under grand apartheid often lacked both historical depth and a proper appreciation of comparative context. To take the second of these points first, the SAP were not alone in their penchant for the truncheon (or, in the case of riot police in the later years of apartheid, the indigenous sjambok\textsuperscript{15}), and it was not only in South Africa that the political leadership of an embattled or unpopular minority regime were using and abusing their police to cling to power and enforce a fragile civil peace. Appropriately enough, one of the first writers to argue this was John Brewer (1990) of Queen’s University in Belfast, who drew attention to common patterns in the policing of ethnically ‘divided societies’ such as Israel, Northern Ireland and South Africa. In this seminal piece, Brewer succeeded in extrapolating generic features of policing and of the police institution in divided societies. As we shall see in a moment, Brewer’s work was only the first of many comparative studies of policing in

\textsuperscript{14} In later years, this reliance by the state on a range of coercive formations to buttress Apartheid rule, was taken as long-standing local proof of the international trend (from the 1990s onwards) toward diversification in the policing field.

\textsuperscript{15} A horsewhip.
communally divided societies. The upshot of Brewer’s political analysis was to make reform of the police institution dependent on a political dissolution of ethnic sectarianism and social strife. Brewer’s identification of structural features of policing under conditions of an ethnic autocracy provided an obvious agenda for reform of the police organisation to suit the imperatives of a non-racial constitutional order.

To those with a longer historical view of policing, apartheid police practice was but one, albeit distinctive, example of a broader phenomenon referred to in one influential body of analysis as ‘colonial policing’ (Brogden, 1987). This colonial model was seen as a direct outcome of the need for imperial powers to impose order on recalcitrant subject populations across the colonised world in the first half of the twentieth century. The salient feature of this model was centralised paramilitary police formations, for which ‘normal’ policing was subsidiary to the task of controlling the subordinate masses beyond the magic circle of the colonisers. With internal security and the maintenance of public order as their core functions, crime control was relegated to the margins of the police mandate. Perceived by the ‘natives’ as an alien force representing the political authority of the colonial power, police-community relations were distinctly adversarial. In terms of both structure and function, the colonial model was considered the antithesis of the kind of democratic policing prevalent in the mature metropolitan democracies, with its normative emphasis on the rule of law and policing by social consent.

By the early 1990s, many observers saw the coming democratic transition in South Africa as a natural opportunity to abolish colonial rule and the militarism inherent in neo-colonial apartheid policing by refashioning the SAP into a community-friendly organisation enjoying popular legitimacy. For this endeavour, the philosophy of community policing based on a partnership agreement between the police and the people appeared especially attractive. To embrace a constitutional future, nothing short of a switch from a para-military, repressive police force to a civilian and community-orientated police service was required.¹⁶

¹⁶ Some of the brighter hopes however, rested on rather facile assumptions about the ease with which a repressive bureaucracy like the SAP could be reformed. Local scholars were not alone in underestimating the complexities of the process for, even in international circles, the colonial dimension of policing was ill understood. The difficulties of crafting consensual policing principles on the institutional and cultural relics of a paramilitary model of policing
The straightforward depiction of Apartheid policing as *colonial* proved politically popular. That is despite some warnings from intellectual quarters that, as the South African experience amounted to ‘colonialism of a special type,’ a historical appraisal of policing in this colony should reveal that its history ‘is unique’ (Brogden, 1989:2). The warnings of Mike Brogden, the British policing scholar were, however, not heeded. In much the same vein, Annette Seegers’ (1991) depiction of twentieth century South African policing history as the (uneasy) co-existence and articulation of three models of policing (authoritarian, totalitarian and liberal) in one state failed to inform the discussion on the challenges confronting police reform in the post-colony.

With regards to the emergence of a historically substantive narrative on policing, two publications that appeared in the early 1990s attempted to put policing in South Africa in a more respectable historical perspective than was hitherto the case. John Brewer’s *Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa* (1994) contained a thick historical account of the making of twentieth century South African policing. In this work he took issue, with the conventional critical depiction of it as a more or less undiluted form of colonial policing. According to Brewer, both the dynamics of settler colonialism, and the particular brand of racial rule pursued under apartheid, rendered police-state relations more varied than has been recognised by most commentators. By adopting an historical perspective, Brewer was also able to capture the contradictory pressures of repression and reform to which the police institution had been subject long before the 1990s. In addition, Brewer (1994:344) also directly engaged with the ‘relative autonomy’ of the SAP vis-à-vis the state and considered the implications for police reform. The subtleties of his argument were again lost in the optimism of the political moment.\(^{17}\)

Compared to the breadth of Brewer’s historical analysis, Gavin Cawthra’s *Policing South
Africa: The SAP and the Transition from Apartheid (1993) offered a more focused account of the post-1976 period of regime politics. Here the impact of the counter-insurgency war (both on the borders and inside the townships) on the security establishment is considered, and the slide from legalised repression to extra-legal suppression documented in some detail. Cawthra’s description of the ‘nexus of forces’ on which the maintenance of ‘law and order’ came to depend in the late 1970s and 1980s emphasised both the diversity and the fragmented nature of the machinery of social control. Looking forward to a new democratic era, he anticipated that the fortunes of police reform would be shaped by broader societal changes and concluded that:

[I]t the end the successful transformation of policing in South Africa will entail not merely changes to the police force and to the way it interacts with society, but to the political, social and economic conditions which are the poisonous legacy of apartheid (Cawthra, 1993:204).

In touching in this way on the challenges facing reform of South African policing, Cawthra followed the lead provided by Brewer (1993:197), who had also insisted on an appreciation of what he called the ‘structural cap(s)’ on police reform. Unfortunately, however, such caveats - realistic as they were - failed to gain much of an audience amidst the euphoria surrounding the impending introduction of majority rule. As the stream of policy statements intended to direct the restructuring of the apartheid state grew into a flood, arguments about the structural constraints on police reform and the formative impact of broader social conditions on its trajectory were all too easily ignored. As a consequence, far too little attention was paid to the financial, political and social obstacles to sweeping reform of the police organisation. Only later were the challenges that the South African situation posed to police reform properly appreciated.

The depiction of South African policing under Apartheid as essentially approximating the model of colonial policing proved politically attractive. On the one hand it resonated with the visible features of policing as partisan and essentially paramilitary, the overt reliance on force, its systemic inclination toward abuse of police power, and the mentality of siege so characteristic of its cop culture. In the context of political transition, the sharp juxtaposition of the colonial past

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18 This ‘nexus of forces’ included the SAP, specialist police divisions such as the security branch and riot squads, homeland police forces, a number of black and white auxiliary formations, the private security industry, and a wide range of self-help agencies and vigilante groupings operating under the command of local strongmen.
and the liberal future of the armed formations under a constitutional democracy suited the demands for an altogether new approach.

2.4 Liberal democracy and the model of community policing

The unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990 marked a turning point in South African politics and its system of policing. In a remarkable speech by the then South African President F W de Klerk to an audience of its highest ranking officials, the SAP were instructed to take on a totally new role (Cawthra, 1993: 131). No longer the ring of steel surrounding a beleaguered state, the force was to break free of its past, embrace new democratic principles of accountability, impartiality and respect for human rights, and reorient its institutional objectives to prioritise the fight against crime and the protection of citizen security. Academic observers were quick to elaborate on the implications of this change in direction. Scholarly works published in this period heralded the new phase in policing studies that was to accompany the transition to constitutional rule. Characteristic of this new phase became its almost unquestioning reliance on the liberal democratic model of policing - with particular reference to British traditions.

The first example of this new genre was a volume entitled *Policing the Conflict in South Africa* edited by Mathews, Heymann and Mathews, published in 1993. It consisted of an eclectic mix of papers delivered at a groundbreaking conference held the previous year and attended by both international and local representatives, to address the 'contentious, if not explosive' issue of policing in South Africa (Ibid: 1). A newfound receptivity in local debates to international influences and ideas was very much in evidence throughout the volume. For comparative insight, the conference drew on recent developments in police reform in the UK, the USA and (closer to home) in Namibia. During the two days of deliberations recorded by Mathews, Heymann and Mathews (1993), the emphasis was on key principles. Appropriate policies to guide police reform in the future and general issues relating to the role, structure, control, accountability and composition of the police organisation were all carefully considered. From such discussions it became apparent that the model of liberal-democratic policing was destined to exert a persuasive influence over police reform. Two principles of the liberal-democratic model were emphasised:
policing in terms of the 'rule of law', and 'policing by consent'. As a consequence, discussions on police reform focused on the principles and structures of oversight and accountability on the one hand, and the desirability of institutionalising a community-orientated form of policing on the other.

A retrospective assessment of these discussions on police reform in the period 1990-95 reveals a comfortable consensus on the critical features of the post-apartheid police. One typical example of the conventional template for police reform, put forward during these years, is the American scholar, Ron Weitzer's (1993) commentary on Transforming the South African Police. Like much of the literature of the time Weitzer insisted on the necessity for change in the role, orientation and structure of the police to be achieved by revamping the organisation's mission and subcultural ethos, redesigning its mechanisms of accountability, and attending to police-community relations.

Across the international-national divide, a broader social consensus was emerging around the agenda for police reform in South Africa: instilling the principles of human rights, oversight and community-responsive policing. Proof of the salience of these principles is to be found in their legal institutionalisation in the Interim Constitution of 1993 and thereafter in the Police Services Act of 1995.

A specific feature of policing debates on either side of the 1994 elections was the extent to which the notion of community policing enjoyed widespread support. Its distinctive features and political virtues were discussed from the podiums of academic conferences, various policy bosberade and regional workshops alike. One of the most substantive of academic explorations of the model of community policing and its suitability to local context was to be found in an appraisal by Marais (1992a). Beyond the surface appearance of consensus, different constituencies of course understood community policing in very different ways. These differences ranged from state- to civil-centred notions of community policing (Dixon, 2004c). But an essential part of the attractiveness of the concept lay in its elasticity of meaning - allowing different parties to congregate under its banner. At the time of South African experiments in

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19 See in this regard the recent review of Bowling et al. (2004) on policing reform and human rights.
constructing the future model of policing, the doctrine of community policing enjoyed near
hegemonic status in Anglo-Saxon policing circles. The latter was the very reference group to
which reform-minded South Africans were looking for both intellectual and political inspiration
in crafting policing arrangements in a new political order. By the mid-1990s the model of
community policing, with its emphasis on social partnerships and organisational decentralisation,
had become a commodity for import with detailed instructions for implementation.

In the transitional context of South Africa, the symbolic appeal of community-based
policing was obvious enough. Here at least was an approach that recognised the virtues of
policing rooted in the ‘organic community’ of ‘the people.’ Its normative desirability and
institutional effectiveness seemed unquestionable (Wood & Font, forthcoming). Clearly it was
the diametrical opposite of the colonial legacy of policing imposed and controlled by a sectarian
minority from above. A more critical disposition towards community policing, and the
philosophy of communitarianism on which it relies, only developed towards the end of the 1990s
(Pelser, 1999; Pelser, Schnetler & Louw, 2002). A more recent analysis has argued that
community policing as a doctrine and as a practice in South Africa has been a matter of
contestation, involving successive distinct phases (Dixon, 2004c). With the benefit of hindsight,
it is clear that the symbolic appeal of community policing often obscured the fractious nature of
communities, as well as the lack of institutional capacity within the police at the time to embrace
the spirit of community policing. In practice the issue of the locus of control (state or
community) in experiments regarding community policing has been shaped, as Dixon (2004c)
recently demonstrated, by the ebb and flow of political circumstances and competing interests.

2.5 The governance of security model

Amidst growing consensus about the central features of the post-colonial policing system
and the transfer to South Africa of Western policing models and arrangements, two critical
voices stood out. The text of relevance here, Policing for a New South Africa (1993), was co-
written by two international policing scholars, Mike Brogden and Clifford Shearing, and echoed
many of the concerns of other writings on the legacy of South Africa’s system of policing. Here
too the emphasis fell on the permissiveness of the legal regime under which the Apartheid police
operated; the limitations embedded within its system of political accountability; the systemic predisposition to use of violence; the impact of Christian fundamentalism and nationalist ideology on police culture, and the resort to surrogate policing agencies to buttress racial rule. In its depiction of the future of policing, however, Policing for a New South Africa broke quite decisively with the prevailing consensus. And it did so in very explicit terms by raising concerns about the centrality of the liberal democratic model of policing and the conventional cloning approach to police reform being advocated by various salesmen. ‘The West’, they retorted, did not necessarily know best (Brogden & Shearing, 1993:9). On the contrary, the project of police reform had to be conceived in dramatically different terms.

There were two aspects to this argument. In this first instance, Shearing in particular had long argued that international shifts in governance necessitated that the role of the police itself had to be reconceptualised. A ‘problem-solving’ approach had to replace the outdated conception of policing as primarily concerned with ‘bandit catching.’ This particular point was developed further in various popular publications distributed under the auspices of the Community Peace Foundation of which Shearing was at the time the Director. Furthermore, these two authors argued that mere modernisation of the public police was altogether inadequate, indeed passé. After all, the structural shifts in policing internationally demanded a dramatic re-conceptualisation of the terrain policing, its form, content and objectives. The drift toward privatisation in the provision of security services, and the resulting pluralisation of policing on the ground, had ramifications for the role and responsibilities of the public police.20 In the light of such changes, the authors argued, a much broader agenda for the reform of policing as opposed to the mere reform of the public police was required (Brogden & Shearing, 1993). The broader agenda had to aim at the joint articulation of different sources (public, private and

20A further source of the diversification of policing emanated from market forces (Bayley & Shearing, 2001). Like elsewhere in the developed world, the state’s role vis-à-vis the provision of security has been augmented by other than public agencies. So for example, the private sector had since the 1970s emerged as a key provider of a wide range of security services. A consideration of the role of the private sector in the provision of security in South Africa introduced a fourth theme into the literature of this first period in the development of policing studies, namely the commodification of security. Here one contribution in particular is worth noting. In a pioneering investigation into private contract policing in South Africa, Grant (1989) captured the extent to which the provision of security was becoming commercialised by the late 1980s. As a consequence, an increasingly complex division of policing labour between the state and private companies was well underway even as state repression reached its height in the late 1980s. However, the implications of such diversification for the project of police reform only came to be considered much later in the debate.
community-based). This was all the more imperative in the South African context where, in the face of a hostile and uncaring state, a tradition of self-reliance in the provision of security has long taken root amongst the communities of the disenfranchised.

Against this historical background, Brogden and Shearing (1993) were particularly critical of the unreflective reliance in South African debates on the importation of western police models to local problems on the one hand, and the missionary impulse on the part of developmental agencies to export ready made solutions - hatched in the streets of London and Amsterdam - to the policing frontier of the post-colonial periphery.

In setting the agenda for reform of the field of 'governance of security' more broadly, as opposed to the reform of the public police institution more narrowly, Brogden and Shearing (1993) favoured a 'dual system of policing'(p.166). This dual system was to be based on a creative mix of state provision and home grown indigenous practices of self-policing. The dual system of policing contained a much more radical interpretation of community-based policing as policing by, and on behalf of, communities. In putting flesh on the skeleton of this proposal, the authors drew on some novel suggestions first put forward in 1992 by an International Panel of Experts, convened on the request of Justice Goldstone, to draft recommendations for the policing of mass demonstrations. These suggestions later became enshrined in the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. The regulatory framework put in place under the terms of this piece of legislation gave administrative content to three broad principles. First, the regulation of public demonstrations required a collective responsibility to be shared through 'triangles of safety' comprised of a demonstration's organisers, the appropriate local authority, and the public police. This principle in turn was rooted in a notion of policing as 'everyone's business', as opposed to the exclusive prerogative of the public state. Second, ordinary citizens exercising their right of protest should be recruited and trained as marshals so as to help fulfil a regulatory function. Through this second principle the desirability of 'bottom-up,' lay participation in the regulation of order was thus accentuated. A third and last principle on which the recommendations of the International Panel relied was that, for the purposes of maintaining public order in the future, the police should attempt to play a specialist and minimalist role, specifically with regards to the deployment of coercive force. All three of these principles guided the conceptual vision of
policing for a new South Africa.

By challenging the idea of a separate professional police force as an adequate guardian of social order, Brogden and Shearing (1993) introduced to South Africa conceptions of policing and society that were beginning to catch on in Western criminological circles. Here, the critical analysis of the relationship between the 'police' and broader notions of 'policing' problematised the narrow institutional focus on the public police to the exclusion of other agencies. Rejecting a 'back-to-basics' reform of a dysfunctional public police, the work of these two writers has remained a focus for debates on alternative policing and social control mechanisms in the new South Africa. In the period of reconstruction, however, various factors conspired to dilute the broader orientation so carefully theorised in the work of Shearing and his colleagues in favour of a much narrower state-centred approach to police reform in South Africa (Shaw & Shearing, 1998). It is in the fervour of state and police reconstruction that the demand for policy relevance would push policing debates into very practical and applied directions. In the process, the more conceptual dimensions of the debate were forfeited - at least in the policy circles of criminal justice practitioners.

The ideas developed in the 1993 publication laid the foundations for much of Shearing's (2001a; 2001b) subsequent development of the governance paradigm in policing. In conclusion, South African debates around the governance model of policing have evolved from cautious beginnings to a sweeping analytical tool that also engages with the practicalities of future policing in very particular ways. Some aspects of the model have guided the reform of South African policing, particularly in the contested terrain of public order policing. For the rest, the governance model remains to exist on the fringe of the actual business of state-centred police reform as pursued over the past decade.

2.6 State and police reconstruction: the application of conceptual models

From 1992 onwards, new political space opened up in civil society after the signing of the Peace Accord and the creation of structures such as Local Dispute Resolution Committees and the Police Board. Within the state too, new bodies were created to devise and recommend
reforms, including the Interim Advisory Committee (IAC) to the newly renamed Ministry of Safety and Security, and then, after 1994, the Civilian Secretariat and various departmental task teams. Over time a small cadre of researchers-cum-advisors came to wield considerable influence over the policy frameworks being devised for constitutional policing. Practical issues of critical relevance to the project of police reform dominated the research and policy agenda of local commentators. By the late 1990s, spiralling official crime rates, growing public anxiety about safety and security issues, and a good deal of party-political posturing on crime control all added to the pressure for feasible police reform. Insufficient attention to the budgetary implications of the policy changes envisaged as part of the reform process also contributed to a sharp disjuncture between the theory of reform and its implementation. The consequence of all these factors was a growing divergence between the visionary hopes of the immediate post-election period, and the reality of the new policing order that took shape in the second half of the 1990s.

The reform agenda itself was also subject to change. For example, by the time South Africa's second administration came to office in 1999, the earlier emphasis on legitimacy and accountability had given way to a more focused campaign for police effectiveness in the 'battle against crime' (Rauch, 2002a). Meanwhile, inside the police bureaucracy, there was a new managerialist emphasis on economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The marginalisation of civilian oversight structures, such as the civilian secretariat in the Department of Safety and Security, and the dilution of early commitments to community participation in policing at local level that became evident after 1998, were striking evidence of this trend. Thus, toward the latter part of the 1990s, the agenda for institutional reform increasingly tipped in favour of a technically orientated modernisation of bureaucratic systems and procedures. It was within this situation of complicated and messy institutional realignments that policing research at the turn of the century was obliged to operate.

At the local level policing researchers soon became embroiled in the reality of police

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21 Such concerns ranged from the integration of homeland police forces (Marais, 1992b) to the restructuring of basic police training (Rauch, 1992c), the integration of paramilitary formations into state structures (Marks, 1995), the creation of mechanisms of police oversight and accountability (Haysom, 1993a), and the institutionalisation of new styles of community policing (Jagwanth, 1994; Marais, 1993; Rakgoadi, 1995).
reform. A review of the prominent research concerns of the period suggests a number of distinctive features. The first is the explosion of research interest in policing after 1994, and the enormous diversity of the issues that were to receive attention. A second characteristic of this period is the overwhelming emphasis on policy-orientated or applied research in the post-1995 years. This research was driven by an ameliorative desire to boost institutional capacity for crime control and crime prevention. For researchers, the demand for ‘cutting edge’ work with a clear practical application meant engaging with the organisational priorities and operational needs of criminal justice agencies struggling to contain, let alone resolve, the effects of criminal predation. The third distinctive feature of this phase is that police-related research came to draw on a burgeoning body of crime data. Both the quality and quantity of crime information improved, as the systems and procedures for generating official crime statistics were revamped, and alternative methods of data collection (such as victim crime surveys) were employed. The wider availability of such crime data led to a much greater appreciation of the complicated crime realities facing both the new South African police and its public. As a consequence, the socially decontextualised work on police reform, characteristic of earlier periods, gave way to more situationally grounded analyses. This weaving together of crime and policing is poignantly illustrated in the title of a book by Mark Shaw (2002a), *Crime and Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa*.

2.7 Policing in transitional contexts

Even before 1994, appeals for ‘relevance’ had pushed some policing research in an increasingly administrative direction. Close partnerships with government and implementing agencies made for research that could be utilised in support of the development and implementation of policy. But by 2000 there were signs that both the social conditions and the framework of professional relations within which research is undertaken were changing. ‘Policy fatigue’ tempered the fervour with which some researchers first approached hands-on involvement in the work of state reconstruction. A cooling of relations between the police and some of the major research institutions also occurred, and there were signs of a growing disillusionment with the whole project of policing reform. An early but telling example of this
disillusionment is to be found in a commentary on the trajectory of policing reform dating back to 1998:

The central feature of the policing reform process in South Africa is that it has abandoned the framework established to guide it and in so doing has lost sight of the fact that a fundamental premise of reform was to reduce the insecurity of poor communities through creating local policing networks in which the police were not the centre. Policing reform designed to improve the security of the whole community has become a police reform process that has business and the middle classes as its principal focus (Shaw & Shearing, 1998:11).

It was at this juncture that South African debates on policing began to draw more heavily on the burgeoning literature that concerns itself with the wider dilemmas associated with what has become known as 'transitional' policing. In the process, a more explicitly normative engagement with issues of access, equity and accountability seems to be in the offing. This development brings us to a fourth model of policing which, for the sake of convenience, can be referred to as the transitional model.

In the early years of the new century, the mood of debates on police reform has changed from creative optimism tinged with a more cautious pragmatism, to a brooding pessimism about the challenges ahead. Evidence emerging from other post-authoritarian settings suggests that South African experiences concerning the intractability of policing reform (both in its state and non-state modalities) are not unique. Comparative analysis of experiments in police reform from Latin America to Eastern Europe points to a remarkable number of structural commonalities associated with 'transitional' policing, though the concept itself continues to be used in a rather loose kind of way. Increasingly, references to the dilemmas confronting 'transitional' policing all over the globe are part and parcel of local policing studies. Here scholars and practitioners can draw on at least two significant sources. In recent years, international development agencies have come to accept first, that 'good governance' is integral to social reform in the 'developing' world, and second, that 'good policing' is an important aspect of 'good governance.' These perceptions have led them to look for examples of best practice in policing to inform the assistance given to police in 'developing,' 'transitional' and 'post-conflict' societies. One example of this kind of work is a recent publication by Ziegler and Neild (2002), which reflects a
serious and penetrating comparative analysis of the chequered history of police reform initiatives in new democracies. Entitled *From Peace to Governance*, this report captures the contradictory nature of the process thus:

The paradox of post-conflict police reforms is that these settings offer both unparalleled opportunities to re-conceptualize and to reshape policing institutions and doctrines, and deeply hostile environments for the implementation of ambitious reform plans (Ziegler & Neild, 2002:3).

A second source of ideas on ‘transitional’ policing is also currently emerging from the field of peace building and peacekeeping in the aftermath of civil war. In the course of their work in contexts such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, organisations like the UNCIVPOL agency are gaining invaluable experience in restructuring policing organisations in ‘collapsed states’ (Holm & Eide, 2000). For students of ‘transitional’ policing, work in such difficult settings also provides important insights into the micro-politics of police reconstruction in societies like South Africa, where the state remains relatively powerful but clearly incapable of fully meeting the security needs of all its citizens.

Local observers have begun to note that the path of police reform in other ‘transitional’ contexts sketched above resonates with South African experiences. In recent years, South African policing scholars have been quick to draw both insight and consolation from other transitional experiments. Recent work by Mark Shaw (2001b; 2001c; 2001d; 2002a; 2002b), which extrapolates from experiences in Northern Ireland, Latin America and Eastern Europe, exemplifies the new comparative sensitivities that (some) local commentators currently exhibit in their assessments of policing reform in South Africa. This has resulted in a re-emphasis on the constraints and competing ‘policy dilemmas’ confronting police reform. Five policy dilemmas are outlined by Shaw (2002b), including the need for balancing institutional transformation with actual crime-fighting capacity; balancing the need for centralised control versus the devolution of policing; long-term crime-preventive and short-term crime-control responses; and institutionalising a human rights culture versus crime fighting effectiveness. These policy dilemmas seem to do no more than reiterate - with the benefit of hindsight - John Brewer’s (1993) earlier prognosis regarding the ‘structural caps’ on change in post-authoritarian contexts.
The current reality, as Shaw (2002a:110, my emphasis) soberly observes, is that South Africa has 'developed a parallel system of policing.' And one cannot help but note that this parallel system (one for the rich, the other for the poor) stands in sharp contrast to the grand vision of a 'dual system of policing' based on a delicate intermeshing of state and civil capacity originally advocated by Brogden and Shearing (1993).

In contrast to the optimism of the mid-1990s regarding a radical break between past and future, the trajectory of policing reform is now sketched in less dramatic terms. Far from breaking free of the past, South African policing staggers into the future carrying the corpse of the old order on its shoulders. The new rhetoric of transformation emanating from the upper echelons of the SAPS does not altogether hide the disconcerting continuities with the past. Brutality, corruption, and incompetence continue to characterise the new force. Confusing the picture still further are numerous self-help social control initiatives. For the most part vigorously repressed by the Nationalist Party prior to the 1980s, and then co-opted when politically opportune, these non-police agents have once again undergone a revival, competing to offer deprived communities a range of policing functions. There is a partial difference: some do it with state blessing, as in the case of Community Police Forums (CPF’s), and others with benign NGO mentorship, as with the Peace Committees of the Community Peace Programme (CPP). But that is by no means always the case, and bottom-up 'community policing' has returned with a vengeance in the new South Africa (Harris, 2001). In addition, the rampant commodification of security continues apace, rendering policing a private good rather than a public right (Loader & Walker, 2001).

In the current wave of policing research, the bland descriptive accounts of the mixed economy of security characteristic of earlier periods have given way to much more detailed investigations of relational issues to do with the competition between state, market and civil society (Tshehla, 2002). The contraction of public police activity on the one hand, and the growth of the commercial security industry and the unregulated expansion of non-state self-help activities on the other, raise ethical and legal issues that are only now beginning to receive proper attention. As Shearing and Kempa (2001) lament, the governance of security in the socially stratified world of the new South Africa continues to reproduce the injustices of the past. Issues
of equity and democratic accountability remain far from settled, just as much as those of capacity and competence. As one recent commentator has observed:

In 1994 South Africa officially abandoned apartheid and embraced democratic constitutionalism. Seven years later the prevalence of non-state policing permits the continuance of authoritarian values and practices; divides communities on the basis of their ability to secure alternative policing for a failing state provision; and nurtures the view that the rule of law is more of an obstacle to maintaining social order than as an effective guarantee of it. With a state monopoly of policing being a non-viable option for a country with limited public resources like South Africa, some other way must be sought to ensure that a public good like policing becomes accountable, consistent and humane (Baker, 2002:51).

These remarks raise several points. The first relates to the role of the state in the maintenance of social order. In a world of 'networked nodal governance' (Shearing & Kempa, 2001:206) advocates of bottom-up lay participation often end up marginalising the state. Whether intentional or not, this is something that neither 'weak' nor 'collapsed' states can afford (Goldsmith, 2002). Bringing the state squarely back into our discussions on social regulation requires, as Goldsmith (2002) suggests, that issues of institutional capacity are properly addressed rather than glossed over. Thus, in a post-colonial context where institutional underdevelopment is the norm, issues of capacity need to be brought into the foreground of thinking on the institutional transformation of the police. There are encouraging signs that some have taken up the challenge to factor into our policing mantras for the future the character and capacity of the state itself (Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing, 2003). The third issue raised by Baker confronts our assumptions about the democratic instincts located within 'communities.' Authoritarian tendencies and coercive inclinations are not the prerogative of states alone. As recent anthropological research on non-state mechanisms of ordering illustrates (Buur, 2002), self-help groups flex their muscles in oppressive ways too. Nor is the rough justice of the mob and other more organised social formations always entirely distinct from state action for, as Huggins (2000) suggests in the Brazilian context, it often masks official complicity in anti-crime repression. The dangers of too idealised a depiction of 'community' are all too obvious.

But what is to be done to resolve the dilemmas that continue to confront the delivery of citizen security in emerging democracies? In a number of recent articles, Shearing and associates
(Shearing & Kempa, 2001; Kempa & Shearing, 2002; Shearing with McCarthy, 2002) have reiterated the need to bring both state and non-state mechanisms of policing under a common regulatory framework that protects the liberal principles of due process. Overcoming the current 'security deficit' will require innovative strategies involving both top-down and bottom-up experiments in social ordering (Kempa & Shearing, 2002:45). The problem with such prescriptions is that they require at least a modicum of competence at the centre and an abundance of resources (preferably mobilised by some benign NGO) at the grass roots. Unfortunately, neither can be taken for granted.

2.8 Conclusion

Over the past fifteen years South African policing studies have grown dramatically. One feature of the debate has been the lively interchange between local and international scholars and researchers, prompted by the insertion after 1990 of South Africa into the international political community. Scholarly networks of exchange and collaboration also benefited from this process. For those interested in crafting policy frameworks for police reform, the South African case study holds considerable appeal. It is in this context that the debate on models and principles of policing developed in various ways: by looking back into the past (the colonial model) so as to construct an alternative vision of the future; by looking to particular quarters of the developed world for models to import (through 'cloning' of the consensual model); or by putting transitional experiments to comparative use in identifying the complex challenges facing institutional reform of formerly authoritarian police forces in high crime contexts. This discussion has highlighted four models of relevance. The neat juxtaposition of earlier years, between the colonial and liberal model of policing, seems to have given way to an understanding that the complexity of the actual process of reform is better served by the identification of broad principles underlying democratic policing, rather than neat modular prescriptions to be imported into local contexts. The wisdom of this approach is evident in David Bayley's (1999:5) comment that there are two features - responsiveness both downward and upward, and 'accountability to multiple external audiences' - that are essential to democratic policing. How these principles are to be institutionalised will depend on local history and context. Lessons learnt during South African experiments over the past decade and a half seem to provide support for the wisdom of
Bayley's cautious realism.

The discussion has outlined the ways in which local and international scholars interested in the fortunes of South African policing came to engage - consciously and reflectively - with democratic policing ideas. Political liberalisation provided new opportunities for engagement to scholars long accustomed to the restrictive research conditions which prevailed under Apartheid. A strong local tradition of policy-relevant research ensured that intellectual debates engaged with pressing political concerns confronting the reconstruction of the public police agency on the one hand, and the governance of security on the other. As state reconstruction got underway, the opportunities for intellectual debate and policy engagement multiplied. The diffusion of intellectual ideas and research findings into practitioner circles was given additional momentum as researchers and academics became part-time consultants or full-time advisors to the new policing elite. The growth in stature and credibility of research organisations and think tanks with a particular interest and expertise in safety and security also provided opportunities for socially responsive engagements with policing. Aspects of the evolving interchange between the academic community of policing scholars, policy elites, and police practitioners is examined in greater detail in the following Chapter.
Chapter 3

The National Police Board, 1992-1994:
Setting the Agenda for Police Reform

3.1 Introduction

Following agreement in terms of the National Peace Accord\textsuperscript{22} (NPA), the Police Board was created in July 1992. It was constituted as one small cog in a larger system for the civilian oversight of policing that evolved in the early phase of the political transition. During its short existence the Board considered some major issues of policy, relevant to the reform of the authoritarian police institution. Although devoid of any real power, the Police Board accrued a measure of symbolic authority and political clout. In this regard its organisational linkage to the NPA institutions, and the access it enjoyed to anti-Apartheid NGOs, proved critical. It seems fair to say that the Police Board acted as one of the channels to senior police management and the political leadership for the dissemination of reformist ideas and strategies that at the time were emanating from a wide range of constituencies.\textsuperscript{23} The Board provided a forum in which discussions between senior police officials and civilians on a future police dispensation could take place. An analysis of the tone and substance of these conversations about the restructuring of authoritarian policing provide some insight into the politics of reform as played out in this institutional mechanism. Through its deliberations, the Board helped shape some of the terms of reference and operational practices for a public police agency suited to the demands of a constitutional democracy. As such, the Police Board can be viewed as one transitional mechanism that participated in a process whereby ideas and practices associated with democratic

\textsuperscript{22} The National Peace Accord was signed on 14 September 1991. It constituted a key agreement which created terms of reference for signatories in the run up to the democratic elections of 1994. The National Peace Secretariat was established on 8 November 1991. Its main function was to establish and co-ordinate regional and local peace committees. On 4 November 1992 the \textit{Internal Peace Institutions Act, No. 135 of 1992}, came into operation.

\textsuperscript{23} Such as Peace Accord structures, NGOs, the scholarly community (both local and international), international police practitioners, and developmental agencies.
policing were brought to bear on the South African context. An analysis of the deliberations of the Police Board yields insight into the social actors involved in a process of policy diffusion, emulation, and modelling.

This chapter provides an account of the Police Board, from its formation in June 1992 to its dissolution in November 1994. In the ensuing discussion the social context within which the Police Board was created is described, and the imperatives for institutional change within the police organisation considered. Thereafter the discussion shifts to its social composition and the institutional terms of reference that guided the Board’s work. A description of the primary policy concerns and working methodologies is followed by a discussion of the impact of the Board on the reform of a formerly authoritarian police institution.

For purposes of developing a social history of the Board, this discussion relies on documentary material such as Minutes of Police Board meetings and various submissions tabled by each of the Subcommittees during the course of the Board’s existence. In addition, I draw on personal recollections of my role as participant in, and observer of, the inner workings of the Board. A series of field notes compiled during 1992 and 1993, and relating to the Board’s activities, also provided impressionistic details on the contexts within which the Board conducted its work, the moods that prevailed, and the kinds of issues around which the Board’s activities centred. Finally, for purposes of a retrospective assessment of the contribution of the Police Board, a small number of interviews were conducted with ex-members of the Board during the last quarter of 2003.

3.2 Social context

In February 1990, President de Klerk set in motion a political process that would result in a negotiated transition toward democratic, constitutional rule. In his speech of 2 February, he lifted the ban on the liberation movements and pledged to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners (Cawthra, 1993). Formal bilateral talks between the Government and the ANC
commenced shortly thereafter. The Groote Schuur Minute on the freedom of political prisoners and the return of exiles was signed in May 1990. In August 1990, the Pretoria Minute followed. In terms of the latter, the ANC suspended the armed struggle. Signatories to the Minute agreed, in principle, to joint monitoring and control of the SAP and other security forces.

Despite the forging of key political agreements, however, political violence continued to escalate. A number of interest groups involving church, business, and political leaders, attempted to convene national peace meetings. In April 1991, President de Klerk agreed to a peace summit. The plan was rejected by both the ANC and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), who argued in favour of an independently convened peace conference that ‘needs to ...reach multi-lateral binding agreements with obligations on all parties to act in accordance with these agreements’ (Gastrow, 1995:23). Despite opposition, the de Klerk peace meeting took place. A facilitating committee, consisting of church and business representatives, was appointed to organise a second peace summit that would involve all parties. This summit took place in June and was attended by about 120 individuals representing 20 organisations. Key recommendations emerged from the discussions. They included the necessity for developing ‘a code of conduct for political organizations, a code of conduct for security forces, socio-economic development and reconstruction, as well as enforcement mechanisms that would include a commission and peace secretariats’ (Gastrow, 1995:31). An organising committee was tasked with the responsibility of convening an inclusive forum that would aim at reaching binding agreements. Five working groups were established to draft consensual documents on a core number of issues. The working groups convened behind closed doors. Their deliberations were collated into the NPA and tabled at the National Peace Convention of September 14, 1991.26

24 Interviews included the following former Generals: Johan van der Merwe, Pretoria, 3 September 2003; Louwtjie Malan, Pretoria, 3 September 2003; General Johan le Roux, Pretoria. 4 September 2003.

25 The five working groups were: Group 1: Code of conduct for political parties; Group 2: Code of conduct for security forces; Group 3: Socio-economic development; Group 4: Implementation and Monitoring; Group 5: Process, secretariat and media. Each working group had representation from the three major political groups (the National Party (NP), ANC and Inkatha,) as well as a church and business leader from the initial preparatory committee.

26 Only the three white right-wing parties were absent from the proceedings.
The NPA, which has been described as 'one of the few truly consensual documents to have emerged in South Africa' (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993a:24), was signed by 27 political, government, and trade union leaders. Designed as a conflict resolution mechanism, the NPA had three objectives: the elimination of political violence, the promotion of democracy, and the facilitation of reconstruction and development (Gastrow, 1995). On paper at least, agreement now existed with regards to the basic principles that would guide the process of political negotiation toward a multi-party democracy. The Peace Accord itself set out a vision for a democratic and peaceful South Africa, and articulated a code of conduct for political parties as well as for the armed forces.

Shortly after the signing of the NPA, the focus shifted to multi-party negotiations. In the process, political energies were diverted away from the implementation of the Accord (Ibid:47). Formal negotiations started in December 1991 with an all party Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). It produced agreement on the principles to guide the political process, and an endorsement of an electoral system based on proportional representation and a bill of rights (Sommer, 1996). In July 1992 a massacre of residents at Boipatong, south of Johannesburg, which left 29 dead, led to the withdrawal of the ANC from the negotiating forum. The ANC launched a campaign of rolling mass action. (These events are also discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2) By mid-1992 CODESA had collapsed. Behind the scenes, however, secret bilateral talks continued between the government and the ANC and resulted in an agreement for power sharing. By March 1993 CODESA II was on track. This time around participants were well aware of 'the costs of another failure' (Atkinson, 1994:13). A resolution for a two-phase transition was reached. Broad agreement also existed on the creation of a multi-party Transitional Executive Council (TEC). This council and its various substructures were to include representatives from different political parties. Once established, the TEC and its sub-councils assumed 'executive powers in the areas of finance, policing, defence, intelligence, and local government' (Gastrow, 1995:97). In December 1993 a democratic interim constitution was enacted. Four months later, in April 1994, general elections were held. With the election of a Government of National Unity (GNU), 84 years of minority racial rule in South Africa came to an end.
3.3 Political negotiations and police reform

The challenge of reforming highly militarised police agencies, with low levels of legitimacy and ineffective systems of accountability were manifest in both societies [South Africa and Northern Ireland] as events pushed them towards political compromise (Shaw, 2001c:25).

The transition to democracy, through a 'pacted agreement' between political elites, provides the context for a consideration of the impact of negotiation on police reform in South Africa (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). More particularly, it also provides a political background to a consideration of the role of a transitional policy mechanism, the Police Board, created in terms of a provision contained in the NPA in the restructuring of the SAP between 1992 and 1994. Before proceeding both to describe and to evaluate the role of the Board on police policy reform, some comments on the impact of political negotiations on the reorganisation of the security forces seem warranted.

Issues related to the governance of the armed forces featured in the political negotiations of the post-1990 period. At CODESA various sub-councils were created to deal with a range of political issues. Negotiations around policing took place within the Law and Order, Stability and Security Sub-Council. According to Shaw (1994), these negotiations were characterised by neither depth nor breadth. In his view, three factors in particular militated against more substantive engagements on a future police dispensation. In ANC circles, policy discussions on security sector reform focused on the military rather than the police. The ANC's interest in integrating the armed wings of the liberation movements into the South African Defence Force (SADF) decisively tipped the scale in favour of policy investment in the military rather than the police. Secondly, at the time of the initial negotiations, the ANC also lacked a clear police policy framework. As a consequence, it came to rely predominantly on policy inputs from academics sympathetic to the mass democratic struggle. Lastly, at the time political negotiations were underway, the SAP had already secured some reformist momentum from within. As a

\[27\] In late 1991 for example, a Police Policy Group (PPG) was established under the chair of Prof. Nicholas (Fink) Haysom. This forum sought ways of engaging the ANC elite in discussions with the view to developing an agenda for the reform of the public police.
consequence, political agreement about the future role and shape of the police organisation was more readily forthcoming than initially anticipated. Different emphases, however, were evident in the discussions about a future police dispensation. While the ANC stressed the necessity for security force accountability to civilians, the South African Government and its security forces emphasised the need for 'professionalism' and non-interference by politicians (Steytler, 1992). Good interpersonal relations between key negotiators were instrumental in arriving at sufficient consensus over police issues across the party divide. The relationship between the key SAP negotiator, General Andre Pruis, a lateral entry from academia, and Advocate Nicholas Haysom, representing the ANC, proved particularly important (Shaw, 1994). This relationship took root within the institutional context of the Police Board and became consolidated around the TEC deliberations.

In police circles in the late 1980s, the imperatives for institutional change came from two quarters. First, the *De Witt Commission of Inquiry* into the organisational structure of the police was a response to the exigencies confronting the police under successive states of emergency. It had been appointed in 1988 (South Africa, 1990). Secondly, the SAP's *Strategic Plan* of 1991 was a direct response to the political changes induced by the de Klerk government (Cawthra, 1993). The impact of such internal reviews on subsequent organisational adjustments of the police institution requires some attention.

The *De Witt Commission of Inquiry* reported its findings on the Structure and Function of the SAP in 1990. It proposed various organisational changes. Its most visible result was the restructuring of the SAP into 11 regional commands, and the devolution of management

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28 Andre Pruis, an ex-intelligence operative who opted for a short career in academia, became one of the first lateral entries into the police in the late 1980s. On the strength of a recommendation of Neil Barnard to the Minister of Law and Order (Hermus Kriel), Pruis then headed the Police-Community Relations Division. He became a pivotal figure in subsequent negotiations over the future of the police organisation. Close working relationships between him and Fink Haysom, forged in the context of Police Board deliberations, proved instrumental for arriving at agreements over the future of policing. In the end, as Shaw (1994) notes, there was more common ground between Pruis and Haysom on critical issues than between Pruis and his Minister, Hermus Kriel. In later years Pruis became Deputy-National Commissioner of the SAPS.

29 According to Commissioner De Witt, George Fivaz was the principal author of the document. After the elections, Fivaz became the first Commissioner of the newly renamed South African Police Service (Interview, ex-Commissioner de Witt, Pretoria, August 2003).
decisions to the regional commissioner level. Furthermore, the Security Branch was 'closed' and incorporated into the Crime Combating Division, and the 'riot squads' were regrouped into the Internal Stability Division. A new component of Crime Prevention was also established within the Division of Visible Policing. Henceforth the SAP was to consist of five divisions: Crime Combating and Investigation (following a merger between the Detective and Security Branch), Visible Policing (which entailed a merger of the Uniformed and Operational branches), Internal Stability, Human Resource Management, and Support Services.

The second inspiration for organisational change came from more explicit political quarters. After de Klerk's February speech, a working group consisting of high-ranking police officers embarked on a strategic assessment of the mission, policy and strategy of the SAP in late 1990. Dramatic changes in the external environment, as the argument went, necessitated such an assessment. In response to its identification of the main problems besetting the police force, management advocated the following strategies for change: a depoliticisation of the police force, increased community accountability, more visible policing, improved management practices, reform of the training system, and restructuring of the organisation (SAP Strategic Plan, 1991). Furthermore, suggestions for the creation of a Police Board, police-community liaison forums, and a restructured public complaints mechanism were also mooted. In line with the ideas contained in the Strategic Plan, a range of organisational adjustments took place from 1991 onwards.

The reformist ideas contained in the Strategic Plan of 1991 were particularly influential in shaping the relevant sections on policing in the Police Accord. As Marais and Rauch (1992:4) noted, such influence provided proof of the extent to which 'Nationalist/SAP negotiators had the experience and expertise in policing which other parties lacked.' In an act of anticipatory socialisation toward a democratic political order, the SAP had begun to emphasise the

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31 The problems identified included: inadequate service delivery, a poor public image, insufficient deployment of manpower, inadequate training and inefficient utilisation of resources.

32 For a more detailed description, see Steytler (1992)
desirability of 'apolitical professionalism,' 'police independence,' and non-partisanship in any future dispensation. As Steytler (1992) observed, this newfound commitment to notions of 'police independence' was itself driven by political opportunism aimed at insulating the police as much as possible from an ANC-dominat government in future.

3.4 The National Peace Accord: Implications for the police

The Multilateral National Peace Accord, signed in September 1991 (first by de Klerk, Buthelezi, and Mandela and then endorsed by most political parties), set the pace for far-reaching changes in the political and legal rules within which public police were to operate. As Cawthra puts it (1993:184) the "general provisions" relating to security force actions amounted to a manifesto for fundamental change. So, for example, a permanent Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence (the Goldstone Commission) was established in October 1991 (Shaw, 1993). Furthermore, the Peace Accord introduced a range of new structures and operational methods that the police had to observe. These innovations included a Police Code of Conduct, with an emphasis on professionalism and the utilisation of minimum force; a new complaints mechanism, called the Police Reporting Officer, that was to be staffed by legally-trained ombudsmen; special units for investigating allegations of police misconduct; and Local and Regional Dispute Resolution Committees responsible for monitoring the Peace Accord at the local level. These committees had a peacemaking role and consisted of regional representatives from a wide range of structures: political organisations, churches, business, trade unions, and the armed forces. Lastly, the Accord also made provision for the creation of a Police Board as a civilian-police advisory structure to the Minister of Law and Order. Given the historical legacy of Apartheid policing, the NPA broke new ground in creating a number of mechanisms through which it hoped to institutionalise notions of civilian accountability and multi-party oversight.


34 The agreement was not signed by the Conservative Party, other right-wing groups, nor the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) or Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO).
3.5 The National Police Board

The Police Board was launched at a carefully orchestrated press meeting, held at the Officer’s Club at Police Head Quarters on 2 June, 1992. The meeting was presided over by the Minister of Law and Order (Hernus Kriel), the Commissioner of Police (Johan van der Merwe), and the newly appointed Secretary of the Board (Advocate Brunette, a former Deputy Attorney-General of Natal). The public addresses by both the Minister and the Commissioner noted the importance of political changes for the future of the police organisation. Then followed briefings by the five divisional heads on the structure and functions of the SAP. The presentations were characterised by bureaucratic formality. A closer reading of the Briefing documents to the South African Police Board, however, revealed the extent to which modern notions associated with partnership and co-operation between police and communities, crime prevention, and service delivery, had already caught on inside the police bureaucracy by 1992. In the context of the time, the police elite was now advocating that ‘(e)veryone must behave in a professional and responsible manner.’ Progressive as the discourse on professional policing may have sounded on paper, the Board’s deliberations quickly confirmed the tension between modern, democratic policing concepts and old-style, authoritarian attitudes and practices.

The 22 members of the Board consisted of an equal number of civilian and police representatives. The chair, a civilian, was appointed by the Minister. The 11 police

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36 For example, the briefing on Visible Policing boasted of a new component, Crime Prevention, and emphasised ‘the value of a scientific approach to crime’ and the value of ‘obtaining the involvement of the larger community’ in policing. Furthermore, the Internal Stability Unit, established in January 1992, now had as its mission ‘to establish stability in the community by combating and preventing riots, unrest and crime in a professional and accountable manner.’ In pursuit of this goal, retraining of ‘all existing members of the ISD... with an emphasis on prevention, negotiation, mediation and communication’ was envisaged. There was also reference in the document to a ‘process of purging the ISD of members who are considered to be unsuitable and members who have continually been exposed to violence for a number of years’ (South African Police Board, Briefing Document, 2 June 1992).

37 The Minister of Law and Order appointed 11 civilians from a list of names put forward by the National Peace Committee, which was in turn based on political party nominations received from signatories of the Peace Accord. This included the ANC, Democratic Party (DP), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and NP but not the PAC or Inkatha.

38 In August 1992, the chair resigned to take up the position of Attorney-General of Transkei. Advocate Brunette was replaced by Mr. Van Vuuren, an ex-Director of Armscor.
representatives were made up of five generals of the SAP, and six from each of the six ‘self-governing homeland’ police forces (Lebowa, KwaNdebele, Kangwane, Gazankulu, Qwa-Qwa, KwaZulu). Excluded from the ambit of the NPA were the police institutions of the TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei), in view of their nominal independence.

Three of the civilian appointees were drawn from the ranks of academic research institutions. Clifford Shearing was a well-known international criminologist, and Eirena van der Spuy (University of Stellenbosch) and Janine Rauch (University of the Witwatersrand) had an explicit interest in policing research. The other nine male representatives all came from legal quarters, a number of whom were senior ANC cadres. The particular composition of the civilian members facilitated interaction between the Board, the local and international research community, a range of non-governmental institutions active in the field of human rights and police monitoring, as well as key political organisations such as the ANC. The nomination of so many lawyers onto the Board may have had a reassuring effect on the police, with expectations that the Board’s approach to the issue of policy reform would be shaped by a socio-legal approach to policy reform rather than by any ‘bottom-up’ programme of social reform.

39 Clifford Shearing, a South African by birth, has spent the best part of two decades abroad, carving out a career as a criminologist in the Northern hemisphere. At the time of the creation of the Board, he was emerging as a critical voice on South African policing reform through first the Community Law Centre and later, the Community Peace Foundation at the University of the Western Cape. Shearing provided an important link to the international community. He became a persuasive advocate of international policing ideas. Even before the dissolution of the Board, Rauch became advisor to the Minister of Safety and Security and later, Chief Director of Policy of the newly established Secretariat, the civilian policy structure of the Ministry of Safety and Security.

40 Nicholas Haysom, a Professor of Human Rights and Labour Law at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, soon established himself as one of the key ANC negotiators at Kempton Park. His influence over ANC policing policy was substantial. After 1994 he became legal advisor to Nelson Mandela, the newly elected president of the Government of National Unity. Pius Langa, a Durban-based Human Rights advocate, in later years became Chief President of the Constitutional Court. Mathews Phosa, a lawyer who worked in the ANC legal department, also emerged as a key figure in the political negotiations. After 1994 he was elected as Premier of Mpumalanga. Advocate Peter Gastrow, the Deputy Chair of the Board, was a long-standing opposition spokesperson (first for the Progressive Federal Party and then later in the Democratic Party) on Law and Order issues and a member of the Peace Accord structures in Natal. In the constitutional era he became advisor to the newly elected Minister of Law and Order and then moved on to become a researcher within the Institute of Security Studies, an independent research institution. Sakkie Steyn, a practicing lawyer, was at the time the Inkatha nominee. After 1994, he joined the police as a lateral entry and became Director of Labour Relations and the Police Legal Service within SAPS.
3.5.1 Terms of reference

A sub-committee of the NPA drafted terms of reference for the Police Board.\(^{41}\) The broad aim of the Board was to provide a forum for consultation between elected civilian and senior police with a view to improving policing. In terms of paragraph 3.3 of the NPA, the Police Board was charged with the responsibility 'to consider and to make recommendations to the Minister of Law and Order in regard of policy relating to the training and efficient functioning of the police, with the view to reconcile the interests of the community with that of the police' (National Peace Accord, 1991: Par 3.3). Designed as a policy advisory structure, the Police Board had no statutory powers. It also had no role with regard to the day-to-day functioning of the police. Included in the ambit of its authority was the right to undertake research and call for representations from the public. Budgetary constraints, however, limited its capacity for subcontracting research. Recommendations of the Board were to be made public 'insofar as it is essential in reconciling the interests of the community with that of the public.'

These terms of reference for the Police Board were rather vague. Before long it became apparent that such generality was susceptible to different interpretations of the mandate of the Board and its relationship to both the Minister and the Peace Accord structures. The issues at stake were threefold. First there was the issue relating to the relative autonomy of the Board vis-à-vis the Minister of Law and Order. Broadly speaking, civilian members of the Board emphasised the political importance of independence from the police given the latter's tainted public image. The second issue of contestation concerned the accountability of the Board to Peace Accord structures. Most of the civilians argued that the Board, as a creature of the Peace Accord, had a political obligation to work closely with Peace structures. The generals, in contrast, took a different view. In the early period of the Board's existence, for example, the police generals voiced strong opposition to the proposal that Police Board minutes be circulated to the Peace Secretariat. In their view, the Police Board had to function independently of the Peace Secretariat. Thirdly, there were narrow versus broad interpretations of the mandate of the Board.

\(^{41}\) The three members were the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Jay Naidoo from the ANC Alliance, and Walter
In the face of conflicting interpretations of its mandate, the Board instructed Peter Gastrow, the deputy-chair and member with close working relationships with the National Peace Secretariat, to draft a Strategic Plan to guide its work. This Plan was tabled, discussed, and finally accepted by members of the Board in the first quarter of 1993. The Strategic Plan opted for a broad interpretation of the mandate of the Board as set out in paragraph 3.3 of the Peace Accord. A wide range of issues was listed as potential policy concerns for the Board. The Board was urged to prioritise policy issues of its choice with due regard to capacity constraints. It furthermore argued that in its deliberations the Board should, within the existing constraints, both protect its independence and enhance its capacity for autonomous decision-making. Regular communication between the Board and structures of the Peace Accord was agreed to. Finally, the plan also reiterated that recommendations of the Board had to be made public, albeit after prior notice to, and discussions with, the Minister.

The adoption of the Strategic Plan by members of the Board signalled a victory for a broad and liberal, as opposed to a narrow and conservative interpretation of the Board’s mandate – features to be explained later in the discussion. A closer working relationship between the Board and various Peace Accord structures followed. As a consequence the Board received updates on enquiries of the Goldstone Commission. A regular exchange of progress reports between the Board and Peace structures also became institutionalised. In addition the Board also invited reports from regional Peace structures on violence and policing. The latter provided a

Felgate from the IFP.

42 These considerations included: setting overall priorities for policing; improving the relationship between police and local communities; police expenditure; criteria for recruitment, training, equipment modes of operation of police; appointment of senior police; and strategies for prevention of crime amongst others. The Board was urged however to determine priority areas.

43 For most of its existence the Board, for example, remained financially dependent on the Ministry.

44 Only in September 1993 did the Board receive a more substantial budget and with it an administrative infrastructure. Repeated calls for a more flexible financial approach in support of the work of the Board only began to pay off once an amount of R51 000 was given to the Board. This amount was paid out of the South African Police’s budget to finance a series of regional workshops on police-community relations.

45 In a diplomatic concession it was decided to discuss such recommendations privately with the Minister so as to ‘allow for an opportunity of dialogue between the Minister and the Board.’ Police Board, Strategic Plan, 24 March 1993.
counterpoint to the Board’s exclusive reliance on monthly security briefings prepared by the police. Jointly, the Board and the National Peace Secretariat also organised a national workshop on Police-Community Relations in June 1993. Attended by a large contingent of senior police and members of civil society, the workshop yielded many insights into relational issues, helped to set the agenda for future interventions in this terrain, and cemented relations between the Board and the Peace Accord structures.

3.5.2 Ideological tensions and social alliances

There were significant political and ideological differences among members of the Board. The most visible political division, particularly in the early stage of the existence of the Board, involved the police on the one side and vocal civilian critics of the Apartheid regime on the other. As the majority of critics had political sympathies on the ANC-side, this division often presented itself as police-versus-the-ANC. Beyond the level of appearance, however, the politics of race ensured a less-than-united police contingent. Throughout the Board’s existence, the homelands were silent partners, noted for their physical presence but social absence. The dominance of the SAP generals in the proceedings of the Board provided tacit proof of the social inequality that had long characterised the interaction between the SAP and homelands police forces. Relations between the SAP generals and their ‘underlings’ in the Bantustans appeared at best cool, and at worst non-existent. On the eve of the discussions on the re-integration of the 11 police institutions into a unitary South African police institution, the political power was evidently in the hands of the SAP. As the reform process gained momentum the simple division of police-versus-critics gave way to a division between hawks and doves that straddled the police-civilian divide. This re-alliance was influenced by two factors in particular: first, the departure in early 1993 of the first batch of old guard SAP generals, and their replacement by a new contingent of more forward-looking officers. Their departure formed part of a first wave of early retirements of 15 members of the general staff to make way for a more reformist-orientated and representative leadership. The second factor of importance relates to the momentum

46 In the process, the places occupied by Lt-Generals H.P.M. de Villiers, A.B. Conradie, Louwtjie Malan, Basie Smit and J. Swart were filled by a new batch of SAP officers. Each of the new incumbents represented a police division: Lt-General J.H. le Roux (Crime Prevention and Investigation); Andre Pruis (Community Relations); Mike Bester
created by political reform, and the extent to which the working groups established within the Board provided a forum within which both professional and social alliances became forged between police and civilians. Such alliances effectively diluted the sharp division between police and civilians so characteristic of the early phase of the Board’s existence.

3.5.3 Micro-politics of interaction

A brief look at the micro-politics of interaction within the Board provides a view into the ideological fault lines that existed at the time. For purposes of illustration, a few examples will suffice:

Public order policing: At the first meeting of the Board, in response to the presentation of the Divisional Heads on the structural framework and functional responsibilities of the public police agency, most of the questions from the civilian side focused on aspects of public order policing. This ‘bias’ toward one of the most contentious and political aspects of Apartheid policing did not, at the time, go unnoticed in police circles. In all probability it confirmed their suspicions about the political partisanship that critics of the regime would pursue through the work of the Board. As one general pointed out in no uncertain terms: ‘It is clear that some people on the Board have political agendas and if we don’t beware their political agenda will split the Board apart.’

Public order policing remained on the agenda of the Board as controversy continued to stalk the routine operation of the Internal Stability Unit (ISU). The Head of the ISU, in particular, did not respond well to criticism. Lt-General de la Rosa was of the opinion that ‘normal policing’ was not possible in the unstable and violent context of transitional South Africa. Critical comments on the part of the Wits-Vaal Secretariat in their presentation to the Board about the operational conduct of the ISU in that region were dismissed as ‘unfair’ and

(Physical Services Rendering); M. Cronjé (Basic Training) and Lt-General A. de la Rosa (Internal Stability Unit).

17 Field notes, Board Meeting, 5 November 1992.
That there were other fractures of importance within the police organisation became clear from time to time. The most aggressive of interactions took place between Lt-General de la Rosa and a fellow police official, Gregory Rockman. The latter was a member of the police who, in the late 1980s, achieved celebrity status in anti-governmental circles for having publicly criticised the heavy-handed tactics of the riot police in Mitchell’s Plain (Rockman, 1989). Rockman appeared before the Board to present the views of the Police and Prison Officers’ Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) on trade union affiliation. In senior police circles, he appeared persona non grata. A delay of 30 minutes to the start of the meeting clearly angered Rockman. By the time he and his colleagues were invited into the Boardroom, Rockman was in a combative mood. He wasted no time in questioning the Board’s legitimacy. The hostility was tangible as Rockman and Lt-General de la Rosa tried to outstare one another. This little melodrama exposed some of the cracks within a police organisation long dependent on subordinates to defend the racial state. It also signalled that transitional politics and institutional change were likely to expose pro- and anti-reformist schisms within the police organisation.

Security briefings: Competing interpretations of political violence, and the role of the security forces in fanning or mitigating such violence, also constituted a source of division within the Board. Briefings on the security situation in the country were a regular item on the monthly agenda. Compiled by the Crime Information and Interpretation Centre of the SAP, and presented by General le Roux, the content of the briefings reflected the security sector’s interpretation of the prevailing political situation. The briefings included a short discussion of the causes of political violence, followed by descriptive details on incidences of violence, an identification of regional hotspots, and tallies of attacks on police. The presentation of the briefings created scope for debates that reflected ideological divisions between supporters and critics of the regime and its coercive instruments.

48 Field notes, Board Meeting, 5 November 1993.

49 Political violence more generally, taxi violence, train attacks, farm attacks etc.
A review of the security briefings between 1992 and 1994 points to the evolving character of political violence, as well as to the changes in perceptions and constructions of the political enemy. For example, in the early phase of the Board’s existence, crude depictions of political violence as a function of a brutal power struggle between the ANC and Inkatha dominated. Any allegations of police complicity in the cycle of violence were at the time considered part and parcel of a ‘sensationalist campaign’ against the forces of law and order. Such depictions, of course, did not go unchallenged.

In an attempt to redress the exclusive reliance on police data and interpretations, civilian members of the Board proposed that the Board invite presentations from the Regional structures of the NPA. Shortly thereafter, presentations from the Wits-Vaal and Natal Peace Secretariats were made at meetings of the Board. The presentations provided a different angle on community conflict and the role of the police. These meetings allowed the SAP to air their complaints of

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50 As the deals struck around the negotiation table turned former adversaries into allies, the political challenges to social order no longer emanated from the ANC alliance but rather from the far right or the ‘leftist reactionary terrain’ (APLA in particular). After April 1994 again, the threat to the democratic order were identified as coming from criminal quarters, bent on perpetuating a ‘reign of terror in order to make the country ungovernable.’ Police Board Minutes, September 1994:2.

51 Police Board Minutes and Field Notes Board Meeting, August 1993.

52 Field Notes, Meeting of the Police Board, 6 August 1993.

53 The presentation by Peter Harris on Police trends on the Wits Vaal (November 1993) sketched a complex context characterised by political intolerance, poverty, endemic conflict, rumour mongering, the mobilisation of criminal networks and security force misconduct. The conduct, modus operandi and operational accountability of the Internal Stability Unit were discussed at some length. De la Rosa responded by saying that his analysis was one-sided, and that ‘normal policing’ was no longer possible under the prevailing conditions. (Field Notes, Meeting of the Police Board, November 1993).

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one-sidedness and the over-emphasis on police misconduct in the complex situations on the
ground.\textsuperscript{54} Such exchanges illustrated the politicised character of policing generally, and public
order policing more particularly. They served as reminders of the divergent experiences and
views to which insiders and outsiders of the ethnic state adhered in their approach to the police.

Broader political events, however, came to emphasise the many fires that were fanning
political instability in the early phase of transition. On 25 June, 1993, some 300 Afrikaner
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) members occupied the World Trade Centre, the venue of
CODESA. Police handling of the events provoked much public criticism. From then onwards,
the right wing threat became a regular item in the security briefings to the Board.

Over a period of time the substance of the deliberations of the Board and its engagement
with the ‘security situation’ became more even-handed. By early 1994, members of the Board
expressed their appreciation for the greater amount of detail and more ‘balanced reporting’ in the
security briefings.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Murder of police officers:} The killing of police officials constituted a further source of
controversy within the Board. The security briefing of November 1993 boldly stated that
‘(a)lmost all the attacks on members of the SAP are either carried out by members of the ANC or
by members of their affiliates such as the SDU’s.’ To the Generals the ‘ongoing murder of police
officials’ constituted a ‘prolonged massacre.’\textsuperscript{56} They demanded that the Board ‘come out in
support against the aimless killings of policemen.’\textsuperscript{57} Beyond the total onslaught rhetoric,
General Pruis argued in more reasoned terms that attacks on the police were a source of
demoralisation within the institution. Such attacks also placed a damper on reformist attempts
aimed at demilitarising the police. By late 1993, ANC spokespersons started to denounce the
random attacks on the security forces. Such denunciations formed part of a confidence-building

\textsuperscript{54} Field Notes, Meeting of the Police Board, 5 November 1993.
\textsuperscript{55} Minutes of the Meeting of the Police Board, 4 February 1994.
\textsuperscript{56} Briefing to the Police Board, 1994. Security Situation in the RSA, 2 September (p.1).
\textsuperscript{57} Minutes of the Police Board Meeting, 6 May 1993.
strategy on the part of ANC officials. By September 1994, the ongoing murder of members of the SAP again featured prominently in the security briefing. This time round, however, the culprits were no longer considered to be members of the ANC. Ordinary 'criminal elements' were now identified as the wrongdoers.58

3.5.4 Forging an institutional identity

At the first meeting of the Board, there was some discussion regarding the issues of substance on which the Board should focus. Three issues were identified: mechanisms of police accountability, police-community relations, and an agenda for transformation. All three of these focus areas were natural extensions of the kind of thinking that informed the Peace Accord framework. Behind the scenes, Board members of the Police Policy Group, (PPG) initially constituted as an informal grouping with an interest in developing policing policy within ANC political circles, regularly caucused both before and outside of Police Board meetings. These discussions were aimed at setting an agenda for Police Board deliberations in line with the strategic assessments of the PPG about a future police dispensation. Between January 1992 and April 1994, the PPG evolved from an unofficial think-tank existing on the margins of police policy with a somewhat fluid composition and some core policy entrepreneurs59 to a think-tank of considerable importance to the deliberations of Working Group 3 of CODESA. Under the auspices of the PPG, various policy papers were drafted on a wide range of issues. These ranged from the democratic principles of policing; structures of police accountability; interim mechanisms of political control; community policing; modalities of incorporation of homeland police agencies; decentralisation and representivity; priority issues for transformation; and the role of the international community in police reform.60


59 The driving force of the PPG was Fink Haysom. Both Etienne Marais and Janine Rauch, at the time researchers attached to the Policing Project at Wits funded by Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA), were key participants. Various ANC politicians attended PPG discussion forums. PPG also invited inputs on various issues from NGOs active in the security field with the view to formulating policy guidelines to a cadre of senior ANC leaders.
At the very first few meetings of the Police Board, various requests were made for policy details to be made available to members of the Board. Such requests were part of a more strategic approach on the part of the civilian section to gain access to particular policy frameworks. From the outset, opposition-aligned civilians were keen to utilise the opportunity that the Board provided for accessing information that had long been curtailed by various administrative and legal rules. On this score they were testing the extent to which the Police Board could be used as a convenient platform for wrenching open, at least for the privileged few, the culture of secrecy within the institution. In doing so, policy reform could be informed by more substantive knowledge of existing policy frameworks.

3.6 Key policy initiatives of the Police Board

During the course of its short existence, the Police Board was quite directly concerned in a variety of policy issues relevant to police reform. Included in the ambit of the Board’s deliberation were matters relating to: police training; a public police complaints system; internal disciplinary procedures and suspension; strategic planning, institutional restructuring and police effectiveness; police-liaison forums and community policing; deaths in detention and lay visiting schemes; public order policing policy and operations; and trade unionism. The policy agenda was shaped by three sets of factors. First, there were the general terms of reference for the Police Board as set out in the Peace Accord, with specific reference to the restructuring of police training and the improvement of community-police relations. Secondly, the strategic framework that the Board adopted gave rise to five working groups that pursued the designated areas of concern. The deliberations of the working groups coalesced around the following contentious points: training; strategic planning; community policing; human resources and personnel; and the organisation and ‘culture’ of the SAP. A third activity was ad hoc in nature. The Board also attempted to respond to policing issues as these cropped up in the early transitional period. Two in particular deserve attention here: the Boipatong massacre (1992) together with the Waddington report on police handling of the events, and renewed concern about the torture of

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60 This discussion draws on various Minutes of the PPC dating from late 1992 to early 1994.
detainees in the aftermath of the publication of a report on the topic by the state pathologist, Dr. Gluckman. 61 Both issues provided the Board with opportunities to profile policy concerns of relevance to the project of police reform.

The Board conducted its affairs through a number of sub-committees. The composition of the sub-committees included both civilian and police representatives. Police divisional heads were appointed onto sub-committees that had a direct link to their areas of professional expertise. In civilian circles, there was some behind-the-scenes caucusing to arrive at a sensible division of labour based on interest, expertise, and political decorum. Each of the sub-committees served as a liaison mechanism for engaging with the police organisation itself, as well as other public bodies and NGOs on critical policy issues.

In its bid to make its presence known within the police organisation, the Board conducted a number of high profile visits to police institutions. First on the list was a visit to Maleoskop, the controversial public order training centre, in June 1992. Thereafter followed a visit to Rooiberg (January 1993), where the Koevoet unit used to be stationed, and a visit to the Verdrag Internal Stability Unit (February 1993). In April of the same year the Police Board was hosted by the SAP Johannesburg Witwatersrand so as to introduce Board members to aspects of routine policing of inner city Johannesburg. Members were escorted in military style, one Casspir upfront, the other behind, to various nightspots that included a visit to a striptease bar, observations of street sex workers, a gay bar, and a so-called Satanist club. 62 On a more sober note, with a visit to the Forensic Laboratory in August 1993 the Board concluded its public relations efforts on this front.

In the section below, the substantive concerns of each of the subcommittees and their respective achievements will be discussed in greater detail.


62 The staging of this particular visit drew criticism from some members of the Board who saw the exercise as a compromising one.
3.6.1 Strategic planning

Shortly after its inception, the Police Board broached the issue of strategic planning within the police with a view to defining a role for itself in a process aimed at managing change. At the time, restructuring initiatives underway in the police institution were considered the responsibility of the SAP. By introducing policy issues relating to both the process and outcome of strategic planning and involving public input and scrutiny, the Board ventured into a challenging area of civilian-police interaction. It took as a point of its departure the Strategic Plan of 1991 that was hatched in the inner corridors of the police. The document was circulated to members of the Board and, indicative of the culture of secrecy that prevailed at the time, it had 'confidential' stamped on its cover. From such secretive beginnings, a debate evolved about the form, content, and process of strategic planning in a context of rapid political change. Strategic planning, it was argued, had to be informed by the philosophy of 'community policing' based on the principles of transparency, and a joint articulation of community and police resources in pursuit of public safety.

It was within this framework that the Board approached the issue of strategic planning in various contexts. Slowly but surely both the politics and logistics of strategic planning in democratic police institutions were being flagged. So, for example, the issue appeared on the agenda of a meeting between the Board and the Commonwealth Observers.63 This was a consequence of caucusing between a delegation of the Observers, and Board members of the PPG. Furthermore it was a focus area of discussion in the Police Board visit to police institutions in the UK, which was undertaken by five members in mid-1993. In her report back to the Board, Janine Rauch related the dividends that accrued from public transparency of strategic assessments, and the institutionalisation of modern management techniques involving performance evaluation.64

The sub-committee on Strategic Planning, consisting of the chair, Clifford Shearing, with

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Mathews Phosa as the other member, liaised regularly with Efficiency Services, the department responsible for Strategic Planning in the SAP. The Chair, too, participated in the discussions of the SAP General Management’s discussions on the topic. In its progress report of September 1993, the Board reported that consensus was reached that the Strategic Plan had to ‘involve the community.’ Details of how that was to be achieved, and to what end, were very much left open. Furthermore, there was also agreement that the Police Board should give its support to the Strategic Plan, once finalised.

In August 1993, an external consultant was appointed to facilitate Strategic Planning within the Police. The Strategic Plan of the SAP (South African Police, 1993) was promulgated on October 19, 1993. For the first time ever it was made public, a not insignificant concession to the demand for ‘transparency’ embodied within the philosophy of community policing. The Plan itself was couched in the fashionable language of environmental analysis. It included a scan of both the external macro- and internal micro-environments within which the police organisation operated. The driving forces impacting on the role of the police agency included cryptic references (in a schematic format) to the needs of the community; technology; globalisation; the rule of law and a Bill of Human Rights; trends in crime; trends of violence; and cost-efficiency. As such, the Strategic Plan signalled the introduction of some elements of managerialism that became a key feature of organisational reform after 1994. From 1995 onwards the publication of the strategic plan of the SAPS became mandatory in terms of provisions contained in the South African Police Services Act of 1995 (Act 68 of 1995).

3.6.2 Police-community consultation/policing

From the early 1990s, the concept of community policing was being promoted by a wide range of constituencies as a suitable paradigm for the delivery of policing services in a post-Apartheid political order. The utilisation of the concept, however, masked deep-seated differences in understanding of what exactly community policing entailed (policing by the

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65 National Police Board, Progress Report to the Minister, dated September 1993.
community; policing in the community; policing on behalf of the community).\textsuperscript{66} The notion of community policing also developed a currency in police circles 'to describe recent developments in “police reform”' (Marais, 1992a:8) with a particular emphasis on the desirability of police-community consultation. The creation of police-community consultative forums as a mechanism for liaising and consulting with members of the community flowed directly from this point. In the community at large, debates on community policing proliferated in a wide variety of organisational contexts. Those who took part in the discussions ranged from NGOs active in the field of monitoring police operations and research institutions, to policy-orientated practitioners. Among the fruits of these deliberations were a realisation that clarity was needed in defining features of community policing, critically assessing its suitability to the post-colonial policing context, and an appreciation of the obstacles likely to be encountered in its institutionalisation. After 1993, key elements of community policing became entrenched in law (the Interim Constitution, the Police Services Act) and in-house police policy frameworks. A key mechanism through which this approach to policing was to be institutionalised was the Community Police Forum, a liaison structure legally enshrined within the Interim Constitution and the South African Police Service Act of 1995 (Pelser, 1999).

The deliberations of the Police Board underline the popularity of the doctrine of community policing during the transitional phase. The sub-committee on Police-Community Consultation of the Police Board developed as its brief ‘monitoring, facilitating and assessing the community relations initiatives of the SAP.’ In pursuing its objectives, the Police Board latched on to initiatives undertaken by other constituencies - particularly those of prominent NGOs and research institutions. One example here involved Police Board support and participation in a conference, organised by IDASA in October 1992, that explored various aspects of community-police relations. The conference brought together representatives from political parties, community organisations, the police, and international experts. Discussions focused on a wide range of issues concerning the reform of a police organisation long maimed by its lack of legitimacy and credibility.\textsuperscript{67} The enhancement of police-community/community-police relations was a dominant theme at the conference.

\textsuperscript{66} See in this regard the excellent discussion by Marais, E. (1992a).
A second workshop, of particular importance to the Board’s role in facilitating policy discussions among the police, community organisations, and others on the challenges confronting the implementation of community policing took place in June 1993. This time around the workshop was co-hosted by the Police Board and the National Peace Secretariat.\textsuperscript{68} The involvement of the Police Board ensured a large representation of senior police personnel. The workshop took place a week after the right-wing attack on the World Trade Centre (where political negotiations were underway) that gave rise to public criticism of police handling of the events. The contentious and divided nature of the debate on policing was borne out by the party-political perspectives on the state of policing. For the remaining part of the conference, constructive engagement with both the obstacles confronting community-based policing, and pragmatic strategies for intervention took place. This workshop helped set the agenda for the Board’s own work in the area of community-police relations. It also succeeded in challenging head-on the conservative agenda of the police as reflected in their semantic use of the term ‘police-community’ (as opposed to community-police) relations. The Board undertook to organise a series of regional and local workshops so as to facilitate discussions between the police and particular communities. Both kinds of workshops provided proof of the extent to which the Police Board could slipstream in the momentum created by the initiatives of others. Both workshops confirmed the centrality accorded to community policing in the discourse on police reform.

With regard to the development of a mechanism to address allegations of police conduct vis-à-vis detainees, the Police Board played a particularly active role. On this score the force of political circumstances proved instrumental. Prompted by a fresh round of allegations concerning deaths in detention by Dr. Gluckman, a Port Elizabeth District Surgeon, the Minister of Law and Order in a letter to the Police Board\textsuperscript{69} expressed concern about the ‘perceptions which have been created and which are worsened by every death which occurs.’ Gluckman’s allegations once

\textsuperscript{67} For a summary see Valentine, S. (1992).


\textsuperscript{69} Minister of Law and Order: Letter to the Police Board, 9 December 1992.
again propelled the issue of police abuse of power vis-a-vis detainees to the centre of attention. The Commonwealth Secretariat also raised its concerns about the well-being of detainees. In a bid to defuse public concern, the Minister appointed 12 magistrates to visit cells countrywide. Permission was also granted to the International Red Cross Committee to visit police cells.

It was against this background that the Minister requested that the Board advise him regarding the possibility of introducing a mechanism for monitoring detention facilities (along the lines of the British system of ‘lay visiting’), so as to ‘convince the public that the South African Police has nothing to hide.’\(^{70}\) The sub-committee on Police Community Consultation took the issue forward. An information note on Lay Visiting was circulated to Members of the Board in early 1993. Members of the sub-committee carefully examined a body of evaluative research on lay visiting schemes in Britain. Bar a few alterations, the British guidelines were adopted. Other agencies helped to create a climate conducive to the idea of lay visiting. During a visit by the Commonwealth Observer Group in November 1992, issues relating to community police liaison and lay visiting were discussed.\(^{71}\) Chief Superintendent Peter Stevens, a delegate from Scotland Yard, held several meetings with police chiefs to discuss the principles and procedures involved. A British video on lay visiting was utilised as a marketing exercise with police in the various regions.

In late 1993, a pilot lay visitor scheme was introduced at a number of SAP stations. Opportunities were created for purposes of drawing lessons from the pilot phase.\(^{72}\) Upon finalisation of the national guidelines, community visiting schemes (as the programme then became known) were then open to nation-wide implementation. In terms of the operational guidelines for community visiting schemes, lay visiting functioned as a sub-community of Community Consultative Committees. By January 1995, according to official figures presented to the Police Board, the community visitor scheme was operative at 237 police stations. By then

\(^{70}\) In its British form, lay visiting was concerned with the ‘making of unannounced visits…by independent persons on the detention and custody of suspects in police stations’ (Kemp and Morgan, 1990:13).

\(^{71}\) Peter Stevens (Scotland Yard) and Henry Jensen (Canada).

\(^{72}\) See correspondence between Janine Rauch and Rob Midgley of the Grahamstown Community-Police Forum, 26 October 1993.
832 visitors had been appointed. Interest in expanding the operation of visitor schemes into regional structures was forthcoming from organisations with a long-standing interest in police monitoring. In the Western Cape, proposals advocated by the Regional Peace Committee to develop a regional lay visiting structure modelled on similar programmes in Grahamstown and the Wits-Vaal peace committees were met with resistance. The police in the Western Cape favoured local schemes operating under the auspices of police community liaison forums.

Evaluative research into the functioning of a small sample of community visiting schemes in the Western Cape conducted at two stages (Van der Spuy, 1995; Gopane, 2000) suggested that the initial flurry of enthusiasm and activity was not sustainable in the longer term. The petering out of the initiative had as much to do with infrastructural constraints as with a change in the political mood concerning detainees in police custody. By late 1999, community visiting schemes had become a concept more alive on paper than in practice.

3.6.3 Sub-committee on complaints procedures, suspension, and departmental investigations

For obvious political reasons, the issue of police accountability was central to all the discussions on police reform. Concerns about human rights abuses by the police, and the structural weaknesses besetting both internal disciplinary procedures and external accountability measures, had long fuelled debates on police accountability in South Africa. It was thus almost inevitable that the Board came to focus its attention on the issue of oversight more broadly, and internal complaints procedures more specifically. The Board’s deliberations benefited from a momentum for change created on two fronts: provisions contained within the NPA regarding proposals to establish a Police Complaints Investigation Unit, and discussions on the issue that also emerged within police circles. What the Accord had in mind was the investigation of selected criminal offences allegedly committed by members of the Force in an impartial and

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73 Correspondence from Head: Physical Service Delivery to the Police Board, dated 2 March 1995.

74 See Western Cape Regional Peace Committee Correspondence regarding the Task force on lay visitors programme. Report on Meeting with General Du Toit, 23 March 1994.
A sub-committee on Suspension and Departmental Investigations of the Board was given the responsibility of examining the current structures in operation, exploring cross-cultural models operative in other societies, and developing recommendations for an appropriate public complaints procedure. The sub-committee was headed by Nicholas Haysom, who was widely regarded as one of the leading local experts on the topic.

Given the contentious nature of the topic, the sub-committee's deliberations required close working relations with the relevant police divisions. The sub-committee invited a Prosecuting Officer of the SAP to brief members of the Board on disciplinary procedures and suspension. He concluded his presentation by saying 'that the policy relating to suspension seems to be fair and reasonable and if exercised responsibly it should normally satisfy everyone who has an interest in the matter.' To this presentation Haysom responded in writing. In a damning comment on existing police disciplinary procedures, Haysom described the SAP's procedure and practice in regard to suspension of policemen and women as 'unfair and unjust; arbitrary and selectively used...out of line with practices in police forces elsewhere, and in conflict with current industrial relations practices.' Here the appeal to international best practices was obvious enough.

A proposal for a new complaints procedure to an impartial body was accepted by the Board and then discussed with the Minister of Law and Order. The Board’s recommendations were forwarded to the SAP Legal Services and submitted to the Sub-council on Law and Order, Stability and Security of the Transitional Executive Council. Such proposals formed the

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76 See Briefing by Col Mulder van Eyck to members of the Police Board regarding the disciplinary procedure in the South African Police, 3 September 1993.


backbone of the proposed Independent Police Complaints Council as set out in section 15 (1)(c) of the Transitional Executive Council.

3.6.4 Restructuring police training

The sub-committee on Police Training of the Police Board became one of the most active and strategically successful of the Board's various sub-committees (See Chapter 5). In its focus on police training, the Police Board could count on support and expertise from various quarters. The Strategic Plan of 1991 had already identified training as an area requiring revamping and investment. The desirability of international exchange and input into training so as to offset the damage caused by international isolation was acknowledged within the police organisation. The Board could thus count on the support of the police bureaucracy. Reform of training was simply considered less contentious than many other aspects, such as reform of disciplinary procedures, for example. In ANC policy circles, too, the strategic importance of an overhaul of police training was well appreciated.\(^79\) It too had been identified in a confidential briefing document as one of the critical areas of reform. Furthermore, as an area suited to technical transfer, reform efforts could count on donor support that was said to be readily forthcoming.

The three members of the Board responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Training Committee were Janine Rauch,\(^80\) Professor Clifford Shearing, and General Cronjé (the Divisional Head of Physical Services). At the second meeting of the Board, Rauch tabled a research report on police training, which she had completed a few months earlier. Entitled "'Drill is the Means, Discipline is the End': Basic Training in the SAP,' the paper provided an assessment of the basic training programme at police colleges. Rauch argued that the basic training of police recruits exhibited a number of problematic features: a preoccupation with drills and parades; hierarchical interaction between students and trainers; a tendency toward repetition, rote learning and front-loading in the classroom; and a focus on knowledge-based assessment. As for the paramilitary habit of mind at work in the field of police training Rauch (1992a:13)

\(^79\) See submission of the Police Project on Police Accountability to the ANC aligned PPG - dated late 1991.

\(^80\) At the time, Rauch was a researcher attached to the Policing Project at the University of the Witwatersrand.
commented as follows: 'The social life and culture of the colleges are characterised by regimentation and uniformity, reflecting the philosophies of discipline and drill which underpin the training as a whole. The colleges merely reflect the features of the prevailing police culture.' In the conclusion to the report, it was recommended that 'training must remain a focus of reform energies... because the training sphere is a microcosm of the Police Service at large, reflecting its convictions, its discontents, its relationships, maybe even its future.' (See Chapter 5 for further discussion).

Rauch's excursion into the content and dynamics of police training made an important contribution to the sparse South African police literature on this issue. Within the context of the Police Board, this research report was used to galvanise support for the reform of training. The subcommittee was required to advise on the way forward. The restructuring of training, it argued, must be informed by a new vision for the SAP. In a short policy paper on the police role in a rapidly changing context, there was reference to the need for adhering to 'international norms of professional policing'81 as a way of addressing the legacy of adversarial police-community relations. The hand of Clifford Shearing was evident in the argument that, internationally, policing had become focused on a problem-solving approach. Such an approach, he argued, relied on an integration of police and community resources. In the South African case, nothing short of a 'thorough review and revamping of basic training' was required. The policy paper helped frame the debate on the utilisation of expertise situated outside the police institution. Before long, the Minister announced that an independent expert committee would be appointed to investigate training within the SAP.

The sub-committee on police training was instrumental in the creation of two structures of importance to the restructuring of police training: the International Training Committee (ITC) and the Multi-National Implementation Team (MIT).82 With international backing from both developmental agencies and foreign police institutions, the deliberations of the sub-committee on Police Training were quickly transformed into an effective pressure group. With such backing it

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81 Subcommittee on Police Training, Report 1 to the Police Board, 6 August 1992 (p.2).
commanded a considerable measure of persuasive power within the police organisation. A later chapter (Chapter 5) will take forward the developments regarding basic training up to and including the implementation of a new basic training course for police recruits.

3.7 Closing down

In November 1994 the work of the Board was brought to a conclusion. Its closure was commemorated by a farewell dinner held at the Training College in Pretoria. Earlier in the year, there had been clear indications that the role of the Police Board was being overtaken by events. In a context of dramatic political changes, alternative policy centres were being created. First came the Transitional Executive Council's (TEC's) Sub-committee on Law and Order that took responsibility for drafting interim legislation. Initially the Board played a supportive role vis-à-vis the TEC. But before long there was concern about the way in which the Board was being marginalised in the Sub-council's deliberations. After the general elections a number of civilian members of the Board were appointed to political/policy positions.83

After the general elections of April 1994, a newly styled Ministry of Safety and Security took charge of the police bureaucracy. By then already it was clear that the momentum of political change had overtaken the Board. Devised as a policy mechanism to help facilitate a process whereby police-community relations could be normalised and aspects of police reform could be developed, by mid-1994 it had become a spent force. From then onwards policing policy became the prerogative of interim advisory structures, a wide variety of Technical Teams, and later, the newly established policy centre of the Ministry, the National Secretariat.

3.8 Conclusion

The Board's influence vis-à-vis the development of policing policy in support of

82 The Sub-Committee on Police Training set out the Tasks for the International Training Committee and the Multinational Implementation Team in a document titled Proposals on Training tabled at the Meeting of the Police Board, October 1993.

83 See footnote 19 for details on the career moves of key civilians on the Board after the elections in April 1994.
democratic constitutionalism was constrained by a variety of factors. Issues of structural design played an important part in the scheme of things. In the absence of statutory powers the Board had little official clout to radically redefine the terms of reference for transitional policing. For purposes of influencing aspects of policing policy - particularly in the early phase - it remained ever dependent on the power of brokerage that the police generals could wield within the larger police organisation. In some respects the Board remained a structure of peripheral importance to many of the policy manoeuvrings that interest groups within the police organisation were pursuing. Planning around organisational restructuring, for example, proceeded without any recourse to the Police Board. As a lever of influence, the Police Board was always dependent on the goodwill and support of the police bureaucracy. Some would argue that the Board was never intended to play more than a symbolic role. 'It was toothless. The Board was never meant to be more than an exercise in window dressing,' as one General put it.84 Other factors also impacted on its role. In the first phase of its existence, the Board operated in an environment where political control over the police remained firmly embedded in National Party hands. By late 1993, however, a shift in political power-relations created a certain momentum for change on which the Board could capitalise. By the time that political control moved toward the Transitional Executive Council, the Board became displaced as other policy centres of importance to the future of policing emerged. Before long, the reason for the initial existence of the Board became obsolete. In this way, the Board became a casualty of a political process that delivered the outlines of a new political order as well as broad agreements for a security sector subject to democratic control.

Despite its short lifespan and the absence of any statutory powers, the Police Board deserves recognition for its role as a conduit of reformist ideas and practices associated with democratic policing. As an interim policy mechanism, the Board helped set the agenda for police reform in very particular ways. The Board focused its deliberations on a number of strategic priorities: police training; the police complaints system; and mechanisms of civilian oversight and community policing. The Board provided a convenient platform for a number of strategically-minded players to frame a reformist agenda.

84 Interview, former Police General and Member of the Board, L.M. Pretoria, 3 September 2003.
Various sub-committees of the Board succeeded in setting in motion processes of reform on which other subsequent structures (TEC; the National Secretariat of the newly established Ministry of Safety and Security) capitalised. Key to the success of the Board was the way in which it utilised both international and local expertise in mobilising support for reform of the former authoritarian police institution. During the course of its short existence it deployed innovative strategies based on elite networking across a number of interlocking institutions. Such institutions ranged from research units, to political structures (ANC, National Peace Accord, the Goldstone Commission), and civil society structures (NGOs such as IDASA, Lawyers for Human Rights [LHR] and others played prominent roles). In addition, networking also succeeded in identifying and involving reformist-orientated members of the police organisation in the discussions on the future of the police in a constitutional democracy. Lastly, the Police Board provided a social laboratory within which strategically placed individuals could both conceptualise and refine an agenda for police reform, which later provided a blueprint of sorts for the new Ministry of Safety and Security.
Chapter 4

International Aid and National Police Reform: Issues and Trends

4.1 Introduction

In the post-Cold War environment, there has been a substantial rise in foreign assistance to the police in emerging democracies. Increasingly this aid forms part of sectoral interventions by developmental agencies in the reconstruction of criminal justice systems specifically, or the security sectors more broadly. As a consequence, developmental agencies constitute an important conduit for (largely) western ideas and institutional practices associated with ‘good governance’ and the ‘effective delivery’ of security services. Academic interest in the shape and impact of this kind of assistance has grown concomitantly, as illustrated in the contemporary debates on security sector reform (Ball, 2002; Ball et al., 2003; Brzoska, 2003; Cawthra & Luckham (eds) 2003; Winkler, 2002).

From the early 1990s onwards, in South Africa too, the international development community became a significant player in the field of criminal justice and police reform. By way of introduction, this chapter briefly outlines the nature of the debate on good governance and security sector reform, as well as the role of developmental agencies in assisting police abroad. Thereafter the focus shifts to foreign aid in support of South Africa’s transition toward a constitutional democracy, with a specific emphasis on foreign developmental assistance to the public police. In doing so, thematic shifts in developmental assistance for the period 1994-2002 are briefly identified. Such shifts are interpreted as dynamic responses to both local and international changes in the crime environment on the part of policy elites. This discussion aims at setting the scene for a more detailed presentation of three case studies of foreign assistance in support of police reform in South Africa for the period 1994 to 2003.
4.2 Good governance and security sector reform

Development agencies of the leading economic powers have long constituted one of the most influential channels for transporting policy ideas and associated practices across borders and continents. In recent years the notion of good governance has come to occupy a central place in developmental agencies' debates on how best to facilitate processes of democratisation in states in transition. Practices commonly associated with good governance include respect for the rule of law, accountability and transparency in government, and efficient public administration. More recently, the challenges associated with the institutionalisation of good governance in the security sector have also begun to receive more substantive recognition.

The concept of security sector reform (first introduced by Clare Short, British Minister of International Development, in a speech delivered in 199885) has become popularised in developmental circles, as new opportunities for international peacekeeping opened up at the end of the 1980s. International peacekeeping efforts raised the profile of issues relating to the police, the military, as well as the justice system in post-conflict reconstruction. By the late 1990s the growing concern with public sector reform, to enhance service delivery more generally, also infiltrated discussions on security sector reform with an attendant emphasis on government's role in the provision of security to its citizens (Brzoska, 2003).

Currently security sector reform is regarded as crucial for the prospects for democratic consolidation in transitional states. As Winkler (2002:4) argues: 'It is indeed increasingly recognised that the reform and control of the security sector is an indispensable precondition for human and economic development.' On closer scrutiny, however, the concept of security sector reform harbours conceptual and political controversies. The question as to which institutions constitute part of the security sector has elicited different responses ranging from broad to narrow definitions.86 Apart from the definitional issue, Brzoska (2003) notes that the concept

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85 According to Brzoska (2003) the concept was used in a public speech by Clare Short, Minister for International Development in the newly created Department for International Development (DFID).

86 Williams (2000) distinguishes between three approaches: the minimalist approach defines the security sector as
also masks important ideological differences. Some commentators, for example, see the primary objective of security sector reform as entrenching good governance, with a particular emphasis on accountability and effective oversight. Others see the provision of basic security in itself (with a resulting emphasis on capacity building and skills transfer) as of critical importance. It is in the context of transitional societies, characterised by high rates of violent crime, that these various approaches play themselves out. In emphasising that security sector reform is a process, Edmunds (2002) explains that, in the post-authoritarian context, security sector reforms fall into two interrelated phases.

First generation SSR concerns the establishment of new institutions, structures and chains of responsibility for the security sector. Second generation SSR concerns the consolidation of previous reforms, and the effective and efficient operation of institutions and procedures at a sustainable cost for the state and society (Edmunds, 2002: 16).

To reiterate: in the post-Cold War era, interest in the capacity of donors to help shape institutional restructuring of the security sector has grown steadily (Ball, 2002; Ball et al., 2003; Cawthra, 2003; Hutchful, 2003; Hills, 2002). On the practical side of the debate, donor agencies are particularly concerned with developing strategic guidelines for assisting reform of security sector institutions. Critical reviews of developmental assistance are beginning to generate various lessons both for policy development and for implementation in the field. Some broad principles have emerged from the comparative debate on good practices for justice and security sector reform. These principles include the need for:

- setting clear parameters for assistance (Ball, 2002);

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being composed of statutory forces concerned with the maintenance of state security. The maximalist approach includes all institutions both statutory and non-statutory concerned with physical security. The author goes on to advocate a pragmatic approach that combines both statutory mechanisms of state-centered security as well as non-statutory (including paramilitary formations) mechanisms that routinely took part in the maintenance of physical security (Also see Edmunds, 2002; Ball, 2000; Ball et al., 2003).

87 In the post-9/11 environment, developmental assistance may well be tipped in favour of support for building institutional capacity (ie effectiveness) of security regimes confronted with the threat of global terrorism (Brzoska, 2003).

88 One example of the strategic terms of reference is Ball's (2000) specification of the priorities for security sector reform articulated from a governance perspective.
- clarity about the objectives of aid;  
- balancing short-term and long-term interests in aid packages (Isaacson & Ball 2003); 
- developing a sectoral approach toward police reform, for example, as part and parcel of a much broader investment in criminal justice reform (Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999); 
- advancing a participative model of assistance based on close consultation between recipient and donor, so as to tune aid to local needs and through that to advance local ownership of projects (Ball, 2000; Ziegler & Neild, 2002; DFID, 2003); 
- co-ordinating developmental assistance so as to align efforts of various agencies; 
- utilising confidence-building measures (Ball, 2000); and lastly, 
- conducting impact assessments to generate critical lessons for future assistance (Ball, 2002; Ball et al., 2003).

In the case of Africa, restructuring of the security sector is a truly complex enterprise, given the historical legacy of civil-military relations, the overall weaknesses besetting state institutions, and the resulting governance deficits (Hills, 2000). Such is the scale of the undertaking that Ball et al. (2003) have argued that it is much more appropriate to talk about security sector transformation as opposed to mere reform. They explain that:

transformation processes need to address four institutional aspects of each of the security bodies: its organizational character, its cultural make-up, its human resource practices and, critically, its political relationships with both the elected authorities and with the civil power. Failure to address all four of these areas will, invariably, result in a failure to address the fundamental character and purpose of the institution in question and thus reduce the likelihood that the transformation process will succeed (Ball et al., 2003:267).

Given the Western origin of the concept of security sector reform, its operationalisation in the developing world presents various challenges. The importance of developing a distinctly African tradition of security sector reform is a point made succinctly by Williams (2000:3):

A rigorous and strategic indigenisation of the concept will be required on the African

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As Isaacson and Ball (2003) argue, this requires clarity on the centrality of core objectives, such as democratic accountability, civilian oversight, and professional capacity.
content, however, if any semblance of local ownership is to be effected, and if any potential discrediting of the concept, from opportunistic and predictable political quarters, is to be avoided.

4.3 Police reform and development assistance

Police reform constitutes one component of security sector reform. Over the past decade the role of foreign agencies in domestic projects aimed specifically at police reform has increased dramatically. However, what distinguishes the current phase of foreign aid to police reform is that the pursuit of the latter is embedded in a larger strategic framework for advancing 'democratic governance.' In the decade of the 1990s, as Bayley (2001:76) recently (and somewhat optimistically) concluded, the principles of democratic policing were 'no longer problematic.'

A body of literature evaluating this trend has developed and can be illustrated with examples from the case of US foreign assistance to police reform. In 1995, the American policing scholar, David Bayley (1995), reviewed the scope for US foreign policy initiatives in democratic policing abroad, and formulated eleven guiding principles for foreign assistance to police. Six years later, In Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do it, Bayley (2001) again engaged with this complex terrain, and suggested guidelines for developmental agencies involved in institutional transformation. In this latter analysis he notes the existence of a tension between support for the police driven by the agenda of democracy and 'protection against international criminal activity' (p.5). A similar point (as discussed in Chapter 2 [section 2.7]) regarding inherent tensions in the reform process is contained in a recent publication from the prestigious Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) (Ziegler & Neild, 2002), entitled From Peace to Governance.

A further source of pragmatic ideas on how best to support the rebuilding of police

90 As Bayley (2001:5) puts it: 'During the 1990s, the US government gradually learned a major policy lesson: that security is important to the development of democracy and police are important to the character of that security. Assisting in the democratic reform of foreign police systems has become a front-burner issue in American foreign policy.'
institutions is emerging from international peacekeeping efforts in post-conflict contexts. Assessments of the work undertaken by agencies such as the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) to restructure security agencies in 'collapsed states' (Holm & Eide, 2000) have added insights into the politics and logistics of police reconstruction, the role of transnational agencies in such endeavours, and the institutional prerequisites for optimal results.

While much of the debate on foreign assistance to police abroad is practitioner-orientated, there are also more conceptual explorations of the scope and objectives of such reform. The leading voices on this front are undoubtedly those of Bayley and Shearing (1996; 2001). In short, these authors have argued that the field of policing has been subject to dramatic shifts. The structural processes which have fed into pluralisation of policing at the global level have been discussed earlier in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. At the national level, the consequences of such developments have been an increasingly complex division of policing labour between the state, market, and civil society. New pressures are also forthcoming from the transnational and international arena. As they argue:

Policing today is being restructured away from nation-states by two forces: multilateralization within countries and supranationalization among countries. In both cases, policing is no longer being constructed and provided exclusively by nation-states. It is quite unclear how these forces will play out in the next few years. The possibilities are worthy of a millennium (Bayley & Shearing, 2001:40).

The structural shifts in policing demand a reconceptualisation of policing, its form, content, and objectives. Such a reconceptualisation has ramifications for the reform of police and policing. In the early phase of South African debates on police reform (and the role of the international community), Brogden and Shearing (1993) challenged the conventional, state-centred approach to the reform of the public police (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) and argued in favour of a 'dual system' of policing.91

With this brief sketch of the contemporary debate on developmental assistance to police

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91 These ideas were woven into a 'nodal conception of governance' consisting of a regulated network of 'participatory nodes' (Shearing, 2001:259).
agencies abroad, the discussion now turns to the South African case.

4.4 Developmental assistance in the South African transition

Any review of developmental assistance to post-1994 South Africa demands at least some reference to the broader context. There are two aspects of note in this regard. First, post-1994 developments need to be situated against the role of international support for the anti-Apartheid movement and its subsidiary organisations up until the early 1990s. Second, developmental assistance to post-1990 South Africa needs to be assessed against developmental assistance in the rest of the African continent. To take the last point first: compared to the rest of Africa, the relative importance of donor assistance to South Africa is small. This stands in sharp contrast to the increase in donors’ sphere of influence regarding domestic policy in Africa from the 1980s onwards. In terms of the logic associated with structural adjustment and ‘donor conditionality’, the granting of aid has become increasingly subject to the implementation of domestic policies that will advance both liberalisation of the market and democratisation of the state. Through such conditionality agreements, external actors become key players in the domestic policy arena by defining agendas for policy. As Lise Rakner (2003:35), in her incisive review of the role of donor aid in economic liberalisation and political reform in large parts of Africa, remarks: 'More than in any other area of the world, political and economic developments in Africa have been heavily influenced and shaped by the changing trends of the international development aid debates and policies.'

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92 This part of the discussion relies on detailed empirical research of the content of donor assistance in the criminal justice field that was conducted in two phases, 1998 and 2002. The initial research was conducted at the request of the United Nations Office in South Africa with the view to enhancing the transformative impact of developmental assistance on criminal justice reform. For purposes of this thesis I extrapolate from that body of research both empirical findings and social observations relevant to the topic of this inquiry, ie the role of the international development community in the process of local police reform.

93 As pursued by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in particular.

94 Yet, as the Zambian case study illustrates, the relationship between government, internal opposition and external actors is always complex. Many factors impact on the capacity of any one of the key players to shape domestic policy agendas. The influence wielded by the international donor community in reform efforts may well be far less than the standard conspiratorial depictions of donor aid as a form of new age imperialism.
As already stated, international aid in support of democratising the South African state and society from 1990 onwards constitutes a new phase in foreign support for the struggle against Apartheid. The South African 'problem' has long been internationalised. Moral condemnation of white minority rule went hand in hand with financial support in the struggle for economic and political rights amongst the disenfranchised. After 1990, the efforts of major powers regarding South Africa switched from pressure on Pretoria for a change in its ways, to what might be termed 'Project South Africa': an anxious, helping, and of course self-interested concern to facilitate the democratic transition. The election of a government of national unity in 1994, as Bratton and Landsberg (1999:1) point out, 'signalled the onset of large-scale, longer-term bilateral programmes of official development co-operation with the South African government.'

However, in stark contrast to the dependency on aid of other developing countries in Africa, official donor assistance to South Africa in the late 1990s constituted less than 2 per cent of its annual budget (Department of Finance, 2000b:1). Unlike its continental neighbours, South Africa has not been subject to either economic or political conditionality. On the contrary, the main authors of structural adjustment have been indigenous rather than foreign. So, for example, it can be argued that the macro-economic policy of the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), represents a locally driven structural adjustment initiative. In this context, one would expect the external policy relationship between the post-Apartheid government and the developmental community to be of a different order to that encountered elsewhere in Africa. As argued in an official report on developmental assistance for the period 1994-1999:

SA is a paradoxical recipient of ODA. This is a confident, resource rich, middle-income country, straddling many worlds. It is pivotally and influentially located at the strategic heart of a range of international relationships of symbolic and structural importance. … ODA commitments now constitute fractionally over 1% of the SA Government’s Budget and less than 0.3 % of the country’s GDP. …The financial value of ODA to the country is thus of marginal significance, leaving the country free to take an open and objective look at the qualitative strategic value of ODA (Department of Finance, 2000a:1).

The nature and destination of developmental aid in South Africa since 1994 is fairly well
documented. With regards to the sectoral distribution of aid, the following five sectors have dominated: education, agriculture, business development, health and housing, and democracy and governance (Bratton & Landsberg, 1999). It is the last-named category that is of interest for this analysis. A sizeable proportion of overall Official Development Assistance (ODA), particularly in the form of grants and technical assistance, has been earmarked for good governance and democracy. According to the tallies from official sources, donor support in this area constitutes approximately 8 per cent of overall overseas developmental assistance (Department of Finance, 1999). Between 1994 and 1998, the justice cluster received about R256 million in ODA, of which, as calculated, 65 per cent went to justice and 35 per cent to safety and security (Ibid.). Such figures, however, need to be treated with caution. The difficulties associated with translating donor assistance - particularly of a technical kind - into monetary terms make this exercise a daunting one. Despite such difficulties, the above figures do provide a rough numerical baseline for the ensuing discussion.

Compared to other developing countries, Bratton and Landsberg (1999) note, the South African Government has so far succeeded in setting its own developmental priorities for donor assistance. In doing so, the South African government has been much more successful than any other African country in determining the terms and content of international assistance. Strategic frameworks designed within core departments of the criminal justice system have been useful mechanisms for steering developmental assistance to this sector in locally defined directions. As such, the South African case study differs substantially from the situation prevailing in most other African societies, where donor conditionality dominates. A critical ingredient in the South African capacity to shape developmental assistance to local priorities has been the state’s efforts to manage developmental assistance in a more proactive manner. It is to local efforts aimed at co-ordinating assistance that the discussion now briefly turns.

Local efforts towards the co-ordination of official donor assistance in South Africa have evolved over a period of eight years. An important milestone along the way was the publication

95 As the Development Co-operation Report (Department of Finance, 1999:24) states: 'It is evident that the major portion of ODA in the form of grants and technical assistance is to the democracy and governance cluster.'
of the Development Co-operation Report (Report I), commissioned jointly by the United Nations Developmental Programme and the Department of Finance in August 1998 (Department of Finance, 1999). This report reviewed ODA for the period 1994-1998. It included an attempt to capture in quantitative terms the extent of Overseas Developmental Assistance (ODA) across sub-sectors of government, and assessed the effectiveness of foreign funding expenditure. It put forward several recommendations regarding future management of developmental assistance, based on lessons learnt since 1994. The report made it clear that '[t]he essential point of departure for the government was that it would attempt to exercise a greater degree of control over development assistance than was customary among recipient countries' (Department of Finance, 1999:30).

A second landmark in the process toward co-ordination of developmental assistance was the publication of the Development Co-operation Report II in October 1999 (Department of Finance, 2000a). This report provides a critical review of the evolution of aid during the 1990s, its substantive preoccupations, and the blockages experienced within the aid management system for the period 1994-8. As a conclusion, it also crafted a strategic framework within which future donor assistance should be procured. In line with notions of local ownership of international development assistance, it advocated the local management of the development assistance programme. This model was to be explicitly South African-led. The point was argued in the Report as follows:

...SA needs to authoritatively lead the process of managing ODA, consciously and discerningly dictating the nature, source, form and content of ODA in order to ensure that ODA makes a significant contribution to the country’s development, does not divert the development process and, at the very least, does not wastefully and ironically consume SA’s own resources in the process of managing ODA (Ibid:12).

In pursuit of a South African-led programme of development assistance, the absence of information management tools to capture ODA flows was seen as a particular shortcoming. The urgency of addressing this particular weakness that characterised donor co-ordination was emphasised at the time. It is against this background that efforts emerged to develop a Development Co-operation Information System (DCIS) under the auspices of the Chief
Directorate of International Development Co-operation (IDC), located in the Department of the Treasury.\textsuperscript{96} The achievements to date and the obstacles encountered are discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Van der Spuy, 2003).

4.5 International aid and South African police reform

Before sketching the main concerns of aid for police reform since 1994, a brief review of aid to the criminal justice sector as a whole provides some essential context. In an audit of developmental aid undertaken in 1998, (Van der Spuy \textit{et al.}, 1998) three broad categories of assistance to the criminal justice field were identified: Human Resource Management and Development; Institutional and Administrative Development; and Logistical Development. For the period 1994-1998 the bulk of such assistance, of either a technical or financial nature, was channelled towards the Department of Justice and the Department of Safety and Security. In contrast at the time, the Department of Correctional Services hardly featured as a recipient of aid.

These categories of assistance translated into the police organisation as follows: Human Resource Development stretched across a wide terrain, with educational courses in human rights, gender sensitivity, race equity, and victim-rights, particularly in the area of domestic violence and violence against children. Investment in training at both the basic and specialised levels consumed a major portion of developmental assistance. And lastly, in the early phase, the importation of ideas, principles, and practices associated with community policing proved a popular theme of assistance packages. The content and direction of institutional change was defined by various management structures operative within the Department of Safety and Security in pursuit of the three key areas of institutional restructuring: amalgamation, rationalisation, and democratisation of the police organisation. With regard to Institutional Development, aid was deployed in support of civilian oversight on the one hand, and complex change management processes on the other. Both technical and financial assistance has been channelled toward the development of Information Technology and the provision of basic

\textsuperscript{96} See \textit{Van der Spuy} (2003) for an account of the development of the DCIS, the difficulties negotiated and the achievements thus far.
equipment with the view to creating a modern infrastructural base within the police organisation.

Regarding the obstacles confronting the system of official donor assistance in its early phase, the South African experience confirms many of the procedural ailments besetting foreign-funded projects elsewhere. To name some of the most central: unduly complex managerial systems; poor strategic assessment of both the sustainability and suitability of aid packages imported from abroad; limited managerial capacity within local institutions to absorb best practices extracted from elsewhere; vague programme objectives; insufficient mechanisms of co-ordination and oversight of foreign funded projects; and weak communication linkages between key players partaking in aid programmes. Having said that, it is also important to highlight that, in a relatively short period of time, many lessons have been learnt. Since 1996 in particular the system of management pertaining to externally-funded programme objectives has become much more streamlined. Individual line-departments within the justice cluster have made concerted efforts to clarify the administrative rules regarding the management of aid. Furthermore, the search for suitable mechanisms of co-ordination has yielded positive effects - in some departments, such as Safety and Security, much more than in others (Van der Spuy et al., 1998).

4.6 Shifts in developmental assistance to the South African police institution: From 'good governance' to the 'war on crime'

A more longitudinal view of developmental assistance for policing reform stretching over a period of ten years, suggests interesting shifts in emphases. Elsewhere I have argued that, for the period 1990-2000, three phases can be identified with regard to donor assistance for policing reform. For purposes of this discussion, a condensed version of the original argument is presented (See Van der Spuy, 2000).

In the first phase (1992-1996), Western assistance to the police was driven by the need to transform an apartheid institution into an accepted and legitimate organ of social control. To this end, the doctrine of community policing provided a very useful prism through which policing
reform, both within and beyond the state, could be viewed. The model of community policing also contributed to an increasing oscillation of local policing ideas towards the Western norm. Material and symbolic incentives to encourage state reform were readily forthcoming. On the recipient side of the equation there was, at the time, a laissez faire attitude toward developmental assistance. It was a case, as someone put it, 'of taking whatever was on offer' without too much anxiety about its applicability or sustainability. This attitude was in itself indicative of a lack of strategic capacity within recipient institutions in this early phase to proactively solicit and manage donor assistance (skills rarely practised during the period of international isolation under Apartheid). As a consequence, donor assistance for this period often appeared ad hoc and fragmented.

The following examples illustrate the space that the community police model opened up for international intervention into local policing. Between 1994 and 1996, three major foreign developmental projects in the policing terrain were operationalised as community policing initiatives.

- The Commonwealth involvement in the Basic Level Training Pilot Programme had, as a key objective, the creation of 'community police officers.'
- The Western Cape Community Policing Project (a United Kingdom initiative) became a collaborative project between the provincial police ministry and NGOs, aimed at the formation of community policing forums at station levels in the province of the Western Cape.97
- The Community Policing Pilot Project locked the Belgian Gendarmerie and the SAPS into a five-year bilateral agreement with the aim of embedding community policing principles at 43 stations nation-wide.

All three projects had a common objective: to entrench the philosophy of community policing in police operational practice. Beyond the commonality of that broad objective, however,

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97 Entrenched by statute in the South Africa Police Services Act of 1995, community police forums came to be viewed as the key institutional mechanisms for democratising the police at the local, station level.
there were a number of important differences: the objective characteristic of the donor institution involved, the depth and breadth of donor involvement, the strategies deployed in pursuit of the objective, the working methodologies utilised, the exact point of entry, the extent of the involvement of civil society structures, and the degree of control that the foreign donor exerted over the process.

An analysis of these three examples of donor-assisted projects provides a useful glimpse into an intricate process, whereby the international policing machine was slowly extending its reach into the coercive centre of the post-Apartheid state. These examples also illustrate the extent to which the (nebulous) doctrine of community policing provided a vehicle for transporting policing ideas and operational strategies from the North to the South. The preoccupation with community policing as a framework for donor assistance served several useful purposes. In many instances it locked civil society into projects for policing reform. A number of such foreign aided projects relied on the expertise of non-governmental structures. This was especially the case when it was a matter of consulting or involving 'the community' in the projected reform. The legitimisation of the public police was considered contingent on the involvement of local communities - a fairly radical idea for the previously authoritarian and centralised South African police structures.

The importation of community policing notions in this phase was embedded within a sweeping policy framework for police reform. Initially the political frameworks for re-building society and restructuring the Apartheid state were idealistic. In the immediate aftermath of the elections of April 1994, policy documents emanating from the criminal justice quarters, as elsewhere, promoted the notion that radical reform of old structures was the main agenda. The Green Paper on Policing exemplified the grand terms of reference for institutional transformation of the police that the newly elected policing elite of the Government of National Unity (GNU) embraced. Apart from the daunting task of amalgamating and rationalising the disparate police and justice systems that existed under Apartheid into unitary state structures, the

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98 For instance, transnational organisation to SAPS, foreign government to police, Police to police, foreign donor to local NGO to police.
cultural habits of mind within the state had to be altered to embrace constitutionalism. Policy documents stressed the need for inculcating new attitudes and creating new mechanisms of accountability. A key theme was the need to respect human rights and due process.

In practice the community involvement agenda did not translate smoothly into reality, and in many ways was sidelined. Whilst a range of factors contributed to this marginalisation of the doctrine of community policing, one factor in particular deserves attention. Amidst increasing lawlessness on the streets and growing public perceptions of 'impending anarchy' and a 'crime epidemic,' the demands for making effective 'war on criminals'99 rose to new heights. In order to do just that, the issue of institutional capacity of the public police agency moved to centre-stage.

In the second phase, from 1996 onwards, Western efforts were directed towards aiding the South African government in confronting 'crime' as one of the most central challenges facing stabilisation of the emerging industrial democracy. In this context, the lack of institutional capacity within the police machinery to counteract crime became starkly evident. Donor assistance came to target the public police institution as the major beneficiary of assistance. Aid was aimed increasingly at improving the capacity within the public police agency to deliver basic services to its constituencies. As a consequence, institutional development and capacity building towards effective and efficient service delivery became the prominent preoccupations of international assistance. The logic of such assistance seemed to echo the political pragmatism in local governing circles in response to what Landsberg and Kabemba (1997) have called a perceived 'capacity deficit.'

It was against this background that a shift in rhetorical appeals to accountability took place. While in the early period the project of state reform was aimed at a broad-based political legitimisation of the new state, by 1996/7 the emphasis had shifted to managerialist notions of accountability. Organisational restructuring had as its objective greater effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery by the police, rather than mere democratic accountability.

This shift led some observers to argue that the radical agenda of policing reform was being whittled down (Shaw & Shearing, 1998). The anticipated incorporation of informal or 'popular justice' structures did not materialise, and policing assumed, on this view, its accustomed face. In this debate, the international donor community in particular was singled out - as was local corporate capital - as the culprits in sabotaging the project of policing reform in favour of mere police institutional reform. By and large, however, such critics were lonely voices at a time when the practicalities of fighting crime seemed the paramount and obvious necessity. The argument made little impact on those donors who were increasingly working closely with government rather than civil society, as in the pre-1994 period.

Between 1996 and 1998, donor assistance in support of policing reform increasingly targeted the state at the expense of the non-governmental sector as its major beneficiary. The reasons behind this prioritisation of the public police were threefold. First, in the space of two years the state had made some progress in streamlining the mechanisms for managing donor assistance, and became an increasingly attractive site for foreign funds. By 1997, the rather ad hoc approach to tendering for and administering donor-assisted projects in the criminal justice system had given way to much more administrative formalism. Secondly, the decline in the fortunes of the non-governmental sector in this period, partly as a result of a post-1994 brain drain to the public service, also tipped the scale in favour of the state. Decisions to sub-contract portions of criminal justice reform to civil society structures were also increasingly left to the discretion of the state itself. Locked into a corporatist embrace with the state, NGOs came to enjoy less independence, while the hand of the state itself was strengthened vis-à-vis the international aid community (Bratton & Landsberg, 1999). Thirdly, on the negative side of the equation, this targeting of the public sector was based on a growing international understanding of the structural weaknesses besetting the criminal justice system within the post-Apartheid state, and the importance of addressing such capacity deficits through developmental aid. If crime posed a formidable challenge to the consolidation of democracy, then the expansion of basic police

100 Many donors exhibited this tendency. The Nordic countries, however, remained more committed to funneling funds directly through NGO networks.
capacity to deliver a measure of law and order was imperative.¹⁰¹

The pragmatic spirit of this period became exemplified in the *White Paper on Safety and Security*, published in 1998. This policy document insisted on the need for rendering the police 'accountable' in ways that emphasised police effectiveness and efficiency. In contrast to 1994, the earlier rather soft notions of accountability to the community were replaced by statements about an accountability that 'empowers the front liners to deliver' at the 'local level.' Here service delivery became championed as the key to police accountability. This led to an acute appreciation of the need for reforming investigative capacity - ie a woefully run-down detective force - within the police organisation and for targeting resources to that purpose. In response to the *White Paper*, the SAPS formulated its goals for 1999/2000 as follows: to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of criminal investigations; to target visible policing to address specific crimes; and to improve the quality of service to victims of crime (See SAPS, 1999). Again, such strategic assessments of the pressing concerns for institutional development had a formative effect on the programmatic objectives of the international aid community. It is at this time that a shift away from supporting policy-making toward policy implementation became evident. Middle-level police managers in particular were identified as a worthy target for foreign investment. In the period under review, capacity-building of this managerial layer of the organisation was central. Furthermore, investment in information management systems and technology was embraced as a prerequisite for improved service delivery.

In the third period, from 1998 onwards, donor assistance was also strongly influenced by the very specific political concern with organised crime as a threat to global security. With the demise of the Cold War, debates on global security began to make strident references to organised crime as the cancerous growth of the next millennium. Transitional states in particular

¹⁰¹ The drift towards co-operative governance within the criminal justice system and around 'priority crimes,' which was advocated in the *National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996*, provided the administrative parameters within which donor contracts became designed. Thus the kinds of projects that attracted favourable attention for funding were precisely those which claimed to bolster the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to wage, as the military metaphor would have it, effective 'war' on 'high-profile crimes.' In particular it singled out the need for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system without delay. In the end the re-engineering of the criminal justice system came to consume the lion's share of donor resources between 1996 and 1998.
were seen (by the developed world) to exhibit a great vulnerability to the predatory practices of trans-national criminal organisations (TCOs). In such societies, TCOs add further 'turbulence to domestic politics and challenge the normal functioning of government and law' (Williams, 1998:39). As a threat to global security, organised crime required counter-strategies at the intergovernmental level. It is in line with this kind of thinking that we have seen a lively export - from North to South - of 'best practices' for making war on organised crime.

In this period the substantive preoccupations of the donor regime came to exhibit a more focused character, with donor investments targeting law enforcement capacity in specific specialist quarters of the state. They homed in on the legal, administrative, and operational level, with the explicit intention of counteracting organised crime. It is in this latter period that an approach to developmental assistance that focused on the region rather than individual states became evident. Diplomatic pressure and technical assistance from abroad increasingly sought to expand operational capacity within police institutions of the twelve-nation Southern African Development Community (SADC). In this regional approach, the international aid community viewed South African law enforcement agencies as pivotal players through which law enforcement capacity within the region could be developed.

4.7 Conclusion

South African developments suggest that international aid has been an evolving enterprise, influenced by shifts in the local agenda for policing reform and by Western assessments of the challenges to global security, both from organised crime and more recently from global terrorism. In its description of the evolution of donor assistance, this discussion has outlined three modalities through which foreign governmental aid engaged with police reform in South Africa: community policing; professional policing to wage war on crime more generally; and specialist policing to wage war on organised crime more particularly. Each modality offered opportunities for extending policing ideas and operational philosophies in vogue in the North into the policing agency of a post-conflict society.
International assistance to South Africa has been driven both by efforts to bring about a more rational, even humane, world order, and by the geo-political and material interests of the major donor countries in securing a stable free market economy on a continent desperately in need of economic progress. And, as shall be seen in following chapters, development agencies themselves exert their own dynamic on the form and content of foreign project assistance, as agency personnel pursue the next best idea in a career context. For South Africa itself, the influx of developmental assistance was a significant instrument by which the government as a whole, and the police in particular, came to participate in an increasingly joined-up world. After decades of isolation and only covert relationships with the world policing and security community, the SAPS was now firmly linked with global policing theories and practices, all in part paid for by the major foreign donors. It is a trend that has continued ever since.

With this broad overview of the form and content of development aid in support of South African police reform, as well as thematic shifts overtime, the discussion now turns to a more detailed engagement with three selected case studies of aid.
Chapter 5

International Assistance and Reform of Basic Police Training in South Africa, 1994-5

5.1 Introduction

The discussion now turns to an account of one important police reform project that depended heavily on foreign assistance: the Basic Level Training Pilot Programme (BLTPP). Funded by the Office of Development Administration of the UK, and supported by a Commonwealth Advisory Team, the BLTPP constituted a sizeable intervention in a critical area of policing. In this discussion emphasis is on the actors, processes, and principles involved in the solicitation of aid and the implementation of the project. Opportunities utilised or discarded for aspects of policy diffusion, transference, and convergence in the field of basic training are outlined.

5.2 Foreign assistance and police training: In search of international policing standards

The area of police training has long been a popular target of development assistance, suited to the objectives of both professionalisation and democratisation. As articulated in the work of one critical structure which participated in the restructuring of basic police training in South Africa:

Review of the basic level training programme is seen as one of the key elements in re-orientation of the SAPS towards the concepts of service and accountability to the community. It will also be an integral part of the Human Resource strategy for improving the competency and representativeness of the SAPS.\textsuperscript{102}

The difficulties associated with engendering such changes, and the appropriate strategies to be followed in pursuit thereof, are much better acknowledged at present than in the past (Chan, 1997; Marks, 2004; Brogden & Shearing, 1993).

By the early 1990s, the necessity for the reform of police training in South Africa was well acknowledged in many circles. For example, the Police's own Strategic Plan of 1991 identified training as an area requiring revamping and investment (SAP, 1991). The desirability of international exchange and input into training so as to offset the damage caused by international isolation was conceded within the police organisation. Reform of training was simply considered less contentious than many other aspects, such as reform of disciplinary procedures, for example. In ANC policy circles, an overhaul of police training was identified in a confidential briefing document as one of the critical areas requiring reform as outlined in chapter 3.103 In the South African case, enhancing respect and protection for human rights constituted critical components of a political project that aimed at the institutional reform of the public police agency (Brown & Van der Spuy, 1999).

The strategic importance of international assistance in the restructuring of police training was an issue of debate. A briefing paper on the role of the international community in policing reform, developed for the Police Policy Group (PPG), set the tone for some of the discussions (Nathan, 1992). Drawing on Zimbabwean and Namibian experiences, the author identified police training as an area particularly suitable for foreign assistance and an exchange of personnel. Subsequently, Nathan (1993:121) argued that Namibian experiments in police reform provided a 'useful case study of a project to fundamentally alter the nature of apartheid policing.' Furthermore, as a sphere in which technical transfer was very feasible, reform efforts could count on donor support that was said at the time to be readily forthcoming.

In opposition circles, before 1994 there was broad agreement that training had to be modernised to equip police officers with professional skills. On this score, international developments in 'new style training' were considered particularly

103 See submission of the Police Project on Police Accountability to the ANC aligned Police Policy Group – dated late 1991. This assessment was influenced by pioneering research undertaken by Janine Rauch (1992c) in the early 1990s.
critical for purposes of both human resource and infrastructural development. New strategies for recruitment and selection were an integral component of such restructuring. The latter, of course, were critical components of a larger endeavour to change the social composition of the public police institution in South Africa so as to become more representative of the population. 104 Lastly, but by no means less important, the reform of basic training was interpreted as a critical access point to engender a cultural change within the organisation by advocating new values and aligning institutional habits to international best practices.

The recruitment and deployment of 1 760 community police officers in 1995 provided an unprecedented opportunity to institutionalise modern democratic values and new professional skills within a police organisation which had long grown accustomed to serving regime interests in a repressive manner. Closer scrutiny of the arguments in support of restructuring of police training also suggested that police training was viewed as a pivotal medium through which the institutionalising of community policing as an organisational paradigm could be effected. Consider in this regard the argument set out in supportive material distributed amongst field training officers by the Multi-National Implementation Team (MIT, circa 1995):

the philosophy and mission of Community Policing can drive all aspects of training, so that training becomes the key to promoting and institutionalizing the shift to Community Policing. This requires analyzing all aspects of training to ensure that they promote the mission of Community Policing which is to provide decentralized and personalized police service that empowers the community to participate as partners in the process of making their neighbourhoods better and safer places in which to live and work (p.1).

5.3 The role of the Police Board in the restructuring of police training: Mobilising resources and setting the agenda

As discussed in chapter 3, the Police Board became a critical player in promoting the reform of training police recruits. The sub-committee on Police training
of the Police Board became one of the most active and strategically successful of the Board's various sub-committees. The three members of the Board responsible for coordinating the work of the Training Committee were Janine Rauch, Clifford Shearing, and General Cronjé (the Divisional Head of Physical Services).

At the second meeting of the Board, Rauch tabled the research report on police training to which reference has already been made above, as well as in chapter 3. She had completed this Report a few months earlier, under the auspices of the Policing Project of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). The paper provided an assessment of the basic training programme at police colleges. Rauch concluded the report by arguing that the paramilitary habit of mind at work in the field of police training was quite pervasive.

The social life and culture of the colleges are characterised by regimentation and uniformity, reflecting the philosophies of discipline and drill which underpin the training as a whole. The colleges merely reflect the features of the prevailing police culture (Rauch, 1992a:13).

It was against this background that she recommended that training must constitute a focus of reform efforts.

Rauch's excursion into the content and dynamics of police training made an important contribution to the sparse South African police literature. Within the context of the Police Board, this research report was used to galvanise support for the reform of training. The sub-committee was asked to advise on the way forward. In response, the sub-committee argued that the restructuring of training had to be informed by a new vision for the SAP. A short policy paper on the police role in a rapidly changing context argued that there was a need for adhering to international norms of professional policing as a way of addressing the legacy of adversarial police-community relations. The hand of Clifford Shearing was evident in the argument that, internationally, policing had shifted towards a problem-solving methodology which emphasised a proactive and preventative approach rather than a

105 At the time a researcher attached to the Policing Project at University of the Witwatersrand.

reactive one. A problem-solving methodology was reliant on an integration of police and community resources. In the South African case, nothing short of a thorough review and restructuring of basic training was required. The policy paper helped frame the debate on the utilisation of expertise situated outside the police institution. Before long, the Minister announced that an independent expert committee would be appointed to investigate training within the SAP.

The sub-committee on police training was instrumental in the creation of two structures of importance to the restructuring of police training: the International Training Committee (ITC), and the Multi-National Implementation Team (MIT). With international backing from both developmental agencies and foreign police institutions, the sub-committee, through its deliberations, was quickly transformed into an effective pressure group. With such backing, it commanded a considerable measure of persuasive power within the police organisation as an ally of some institutional importance to the political elite.

5.4 The International Training Committee: Combining external and local expertise in re-conceptualising police training

In October 1992 an International Training Committee was appointed to review and oversee all reform in the field of police training. To whom the ITC should report became an issue of contestation between the Board and the Minister. Diplomacy guided the decision around the composition of the ITC. It was to consist of a mix of educational expertise drawn from institutions with a long-standing history of involvement in police education, such as UNISA, and more critical-orientated institutions, as well as foreign experts. The utilisation of foreign expertise was of...
both symbolic and strategic importance. It was symbolic in so far as it signalled the re-entry of the SAP into the international policing community after decades of international isolation. It was strategic in so far as the international experts brought the local training debate in line with international developments. The mandate of the ITC was ‘to evaluate all aspects of training in the South African Police and determine standards and requirements for training which will comply with present-day demands and the needs of the community - compared to international standards’ (ITC Report, 22 June 1993).

As a way of furthering contact between the Board and the police-training establishment, members of the Board were urged to visit police training colleges close to them. Access to training institutions was organised through a central directive from the Minister’s office. Visits, limited as they were, provided an opportunity for advertising the work of the Police Board and engaging with the concerns of trainers at such institutions. In the Western Cape, a pilot project was conducted under the auspices of the Board. By involving Bishop Lavis and Paarl Training Colleges, it succeeded in opening up the debate about training concerns as perceived by trainers themselves, and yielded recommendations regarding reform of training establishments (Schwella, 1993). From this investigation followed some provisional recommendations for pursuing institutional reform at Paarl College, in particular. Despite the fact that such interventions were piecemeal, it succeeded in making more visible the political rifts - between hawks and doves - within the police organisation.

In the ensuing months the ITC proceeded to rewrite the script of basic policing training. The conceptual parameters were defined by the philosophy of community policing on the one hand, and the principle of probationary training on the other. In both respects the ITC could draw on the international expertise in its midst. In November 1993, at a formal ceremony held at Silvertown College, the ITC presented its

Olivier (SAP Training); Maj-Gen M.W. Cronje (SAP).

109 See in this regard, for example, the Report on Visits to training centres in the Western Cape conducted during February/March 1993 and discussed at a Meeting of the Police Board, 4 February 1994.

various reports to the Police Board (ITC Report, 1993). Broad agreement on the curriculum seemed to have been readily forthcoming. Overall the new curriculum was to emphasise interpersonal skills training. A more controversial aspect of restructuring, however, concerned the issue of 'demilitarisation.' Whilst the ITC allocated 44 periods to drill, MIT later questioned the wisdom of this decision in the light of the importance of moving away from a military model of training. The emphasis on drill, in the view of MIT, further reduced the need for recruits to develop self-discipline (ibid).

5.5 Putting ideas into practice: The role of the Multi-National Implementation Team

Implementation of the new script for police training became the responsibility of the Multi-National Implementation Team (MIT), whose mandate was ‘to direct and achieve the implementation of the new South African Integrated Policing approach through Basic Training’ (Multi-National Implementation Team, 1995:1). Clifford Shearing had first mooted the idea of a MIT in a report to the Police Board in October 1993. The idea was taken up in full by the ITC. Foreign donor interest in providing financial and technical assistance for the work of MIT was secured. With full political backing from the office of the newly appointed Ministry of Safety and Security, MIT commenced work in August 1994. Sixteen months later, in December 1995, it concluded its mission. A comprehensive overview of its work can be found in the Report on the Work of the Multi-National Implementation Team on Police Training in South Africa (Multi-National Implementation Team, 1995), spanning both a planning and implementation phase.

After April 1994 the newly established Ministry of Safety and Security took formal charge of all areas of policy formulation. An Interim Advisory Team was appointed in May 1994, with the task of advising the Minister on all aspects relating to the amalgamation, rationalisation, and transformation of the Service. A number

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112 Minutes of MIT, 28 September 1994.

of structures were created to aid transformation. In the area of training, the Technical Team on Training, with its various sub-committees, came to play an important role. In the new political environment it was destined to become the institutional vehicle through which the initiatives, spearheaded by the Police Board, co-ordinated by the ITC, and implemented by the MIT, could be further developed.

All in all, the Police Board, through its Sub-committee on Police Training, proved of critical importance as a mechanism for setting the agenda on restructuring of police training in line with international developments. The Board was also instrumental in creating institutional capacity to develop and implement a new training curriculum. After 1994, its work benefited greatly from the support it received from the new political masters and its ability to override resistance within the police bureaucracy. In addition, it was successful in mobilising both local and international expertise for developing the content of, and implementing, the proposals.

In May 1994, the newly appointed Minister of Safety and Security requested that the MIT be established. The call was heeded by the Overseas Development Agency of the UK with Commonwealth support. MIT commenced work in August 1994. The MIT was charged with the responsibility of operational planning and overseeing the implementation of the concept. It consisted of four international police officers (one each from the UK, Sweden, Holland and Zimbabwe114) and four SAPS officers working as an integrated team. Before long, local police representation was extended to include training expertise from the TBVC police agencies. Initially, MIT reported directly to the Office of the Ministry of Safety and Security. Subsequently, it also reported to the Commissioner of the SAPS. It liaised with a variety of other structures: the ITC, the Police Board, the broader constituency of police trainers, as well as NGOs and academics with an explicit interest in police training. MIT’s deliberations extended from project planning through to implementation and evaluation of the Pilot Programme.

September 1994

114 The Dutch representative withdrew from MIT not long after its inception – apparently due to differences of opinion regarding the policing model to be followed.
In December 1995, 16 months after its inception, MIT concluded its mission to implement an altogether new basic training programme under the political auspices of the new Ministry of Safety and Security. In the space of those months MIT, in collaboration with a variety of other local structures, and against considerable odds (of time, space, limited resources and cultural resistance), re-moulded basic police training in its entirety. During the course of its deliberations, MIT undertook a project ‘needs analysis’ (particularly in the area of trainer needs) and planned the course delivery in fine detail accordingly. In the implementation phase MIT, devised a style of training that was student-centred, and developed methods of assessment appropriate to ‘new style training.’ It was also responsible for devising new management structures to oversee the programme as a whole.

The following account of this whole experiment is based on an analysis of documentary sources produced in the course of MIT’s work (such as the minutes of weekly MIT meetings; various policy documents; and progress reports produced by MIT and other structures). Furthermore, evaluative research of the New Basic Training Pilot Programme for recruits to the SAPS, in which I participated as a member of a wider team of evaluation experts also informs this discussion. The evaluation research was conducted by the Training Evaluation Group (TEG) with funding provided by the British High Commission through the Office of the British Development Division in South Africa (TEG Final Evaluation Report, 1996). The evaluation study was conducted between May 1994 and October 1995. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were utilised. These included: field observations at training colleges and training stations; focus group interviews with samples of trainees, trainers and international advisors; a stratified random sample questionnaire involving trainees, as well as open-ended questionnaires circulated amongst field training managers and international advisors. For purposes of this

115 The terms of reference of the TEG were to ‘conduct an independent evaluation of the basic level training programme, so as to establish its contribution to a new SAPS human resource policy that would ensure greater representativeness on the one hand and greater competence on the other. Furthermore to assess the contribution of the BLTPP to the overall goal of institutionalising a community related model of policing and formulate policy proposals for improvement and recommendations for the improvement of future basic level training programmes’ (TEG Terms of Reference, BDDSA, 1994).
discussion I draw on the evaluative findings as reported by the Training Evaluation Group (1995; 1996).

5.6 The Basic Level Training Pilot Programme: Importing new concepts and methodologies

The BLTPP commenced in January 1995 with an intake of 1,760 students. Henceforth, basic training was to extend over 12 months, instead of six as in the past. The first phase of 26 weeks was to comprise college-based instruction in the theory of policing. The second phase of field training consisted of on-the-job learning under the tutelage of a mentor.

The explicit aim of the pilot training programme was to produce ‘community police officers’ (ITC, 1993a). The first task that MIT had to grapple with was the development of a profile of the new South African police constable that could guide both the selection of recruits and their assessment in the programme. The terms of reference for developing the profile were already set by the ITC, following its rather loose definition of community policing. In terms of ITC’s documentation, the community police officer comprised ‘... innovative police officers capable of sound judgement, discretionary decision making, problem solving abilities, officers who are provided with the knowledge, skills and tools to deal with the social causes of the crime phenomenon rather than act only in terms of its consequences - police officers who can win the respect and trust of the community.’

From this profile MIT extracted five principles, which they considered ‘inherent’ in the doctrine of community policing: transparency, accountability, democracy, communicative, and professional skills, and specified the behavioural features for each. For example, ‘transparency’ translated into someone who displays openness, integrity, impartiality, consistency and reliability; ‘democratic’ translated into someone who acts democratically, is sensitive to diversity, is approachable, is loyal, and yet able to criticise. These rather broad behavioural measures were then ostensibly utilised in the selection and assessment of trainees (ITC, 1993a).

Under the guidance of MIT, itself a multi-national advisory structure involved in what has been called 'process consultancy,' pockets of other international experts were deployed to develop local policing expertise in areas such as recruitment and selection, managing the pilot programme, training of trainers, overall management of the project, and support of field training. A brief outline of the extensive deployment of international police expertise in support of the pilot project follows.

**Recruitment and selection:** This key phase included the involvement of a UK officer in the design and implementation of a new system of recruitment. This advisor worked in close co-operation with a Special Project Team, composed of local police trainers situated at the training college. The Team took charge of the recruitment of community police officers that would meet the social profile of the New South African Police Officer. Through Superintendent R. Griffiths, British expertise was brought to bear on local methods of selection and screening, and a strategic plan for recruitment and effective management developed. In this way, international experience helped shape both managerial policy and the operational logic of the recruitment division.

**Training local trainers:** Foreign police expertise was also deployed to re-train some 400 local trainers at centres throughout the country. These workshops were held under major constraints of time and infrastructural resources. As a specialisation, training had long suffered from a lack of status within the police organisation of old. Throughout the police agency, human capacity was at worst uneven and at best underdeveloped. Over-ambitious in design, the training workshops hardly scratched the surface. Under the circumstances, they offered little more than rudimentary excursions into 'new style training.' This idea included an emphasis on role-play, critical thinking, experiential and cognitive learning, and the use of continuous assessment. All these critical elements associated with new style training, as conceptualised in the training field of the UK, posed considerable challenges to trainers schooled in a paramilitary and outdated teaching methodology.

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An evaluative workshop conducted with 33 trainers in mid-1995 solicited their assessment of the pilot training programme of which they formed such an integral part (TEG, 1995). The trainers were unanimous that the crash course did not equip them adequately to undertake training. The negative effects of rudimentary training were exacerbated by a number of other factors, such as disparities in resources across training colleges, and the unevenness in educational standards amongst trainers themselves. Responses solicited at the workshop also made it clear that trainers themselves were struggling with broader diversity and multi-cultural issues in the post-1994 work environment. One of the critical issues included the lack of proficiency in English, which became, by administrative fiat, the official medium of instruction after April 1994. More generally, feelings of job insecurity and uncertainty about their career future in training also affected trainers. Communication problems between students, trainers, and managers, and overall lack of grievance procedures further complicated matters within the training environment. Many felt that the BLTPP constituted too abrupt a move away from a military tradition, and they felt ill equipped in the new environment to maintain "discipline." The responses of trainers provided some insight into the dislocations experienced by trainers (not exactly well equipped for the demanding job of presenting a new curriculum delivered in a different style) caught in the throes of a radical restructuring of the training and broader organisational environment.

It is against this background that MIT became a useful scapegoat for the frustrations expressed by trainers. In terms of the views solicited, many of the trainers regarded the MIT as a "sinister force," consisting of foreign government representatives with direct political relations to the new Minister and his Change Management structures. In large part this perception was fuelled by the fact that management at the colleges "passed the buck to MIT" when confronted with concerns of trainers.

Supporting field training: The field training part of the restructured basic police training programme required an altogether new infrastructure. Suitable training stations had to be selected, relevant station commissioners briefed, and field training
support staff deployed.\textsuperscript{118} Eighteen International Advisors worked alongside an interlocking network of local field training operatives that included Field Training Officers, Supervisors, and Managers. Drawn from a number of Commonwealth police institutions,\textsuperscript{119} the group brought together comparative experiences from both developed and developing societies. However, the numerical dominance of UK officers in the team ensured that British models prevailed. Tasked with the responsibility of advising on matters of field training in all provinces, they were considered ‘an invaluable resource.’\textsuperscript{120} The advisors were expected to network widely, establish working relationships on a broad front, devise remedial plans to keep the programme afloat, and identify and report on problems experienced in the deployment of the field trainees. By all informed accounts, the advisors were critical players in the process whereby the field training programme was operationalised.

Deployed in mixed teams of two (one UK officer, one non-UK) to the 107 training stations scattered across all nine provinces, the working conditions of the advisors varied quite considerably in terms of geographic diversity and regional complexities.\textsuperscript{121} A focus group interview conducted with the international advisors toward the end of their deployment also suggested that differences internal to the group existed. Selection criteria for these personnel drawn from a range of societies varied, making for uneven training expertise within the contingent of advisors. Different contractual arrangements also gave a material base to the initial tensions within the group. Furthermore, differences in political background, cultural practices, and policing style also affected working relationships on the ground. Proficiency in English, too, varied within the group and impacted on their field deployment. Despite

\textsuperscript{118} This included three categories of field training staff drawn from the ranks of the police organisation: field training officers, supervisors, and field training managers, each with clearly defined responsibilities.

\textsuperscript{119} Nine were UK officers, two from India, two Malaysian and one each from Pakistan, Singapore, Zimbabwe and Botswana.

\textsuperscript{120} Interviews with members of MIT and with Field Training Managers were conducted during the course of 1995.

\textsuperscript{121} The number of stations to be supervised ranged from five (North West Province) to 88 (Northern Province). The number of field trainees in an area under their supervision ranged from 100 to 329; field training officers ranged from 37 to 110 and Field Training Supervisors from four to 33. The average number of kilometres covered per week ranged from 400 km to 2 300 km. The details were gathered by means of a survey which was circulated amongst the international advisors in 1995.
these differences, it was the TEG’s assessment that, in its external relations the international advisors managed to project a professional esprit de corps.

The advisors, thinly spread across the country and with a remit considered ‘too wide and nebulous,’ attended to an extraordinarily wide range of issues. Their interventions were critical in keeping the field training programme afloat. Whilst issues concerning training methodology were central to their deliberations, they also attended to matters relating to the implementation of community policing. This included advice with regards to the launch of community forums, structuring community involvement in policing, advising the community on policing matters, and addressing aspects of community relations. A third area of focus was interpersonal skills, including communication skills, techniques of problem solving, and conflict-mediation. Advice relating to police managers touched on the management of change, general managerial skills, and aspects of staff development. Lastly, they also attended to a range of operational and logistical matters relating to the field-training programme. As in the case of the MIT, the international advisors were often exposed to the thinness of the line separating the advisory function (so frequently stressed in their briefings) from the actual management of the field-training programme.

Through their deployment in the field, the international advisors also developed a critical understanding of the wide range of factors that impacted on the successful implementation of the programme. Part of their explicit brief was to identify obstacles so that the policy elite could devise ameliorative strategies. The contents of their monthly reports reflect the virtues of ‘deep monitoring’ of the opportunities for change and the obstacles encountered in the course of their deployment. Furthermore, the responses collated from an evaluative questionnaire.

122 Response received from the questionnaires distributed amongst international advisors as part of the evaluation assessment undertaken by the TEG for the contracting agency, British Development Division in Southern Africa (BDDSA).

123 Interviews with members of MIT as well as Field Training Managers confirmed this.

124 Out of the 18 questionnaires distributed in October 1995, 15 completed questionnaires were returned. Of the fifteen questionnaires eight were completed by UK officers and seven by Commonwealth police officers. Furthermore a focus group discussion was also held in Pretoria 7 December 1995. This focus group discussion was attended by 13 officers (seven from the Commonwealth and six UK officers) to canvass their views on a number of select themes relevant to the evaluation study. The findings of this part of the evaluation are discussed more fully in the
circulated amongst the international advisors, included reference to a wide range of factors on which the sustainability of the project hinged. Structural concerns raised by the advisors included insufficient physical resources, and inequities across training stations. In their view, overall poor working conditions within the public police also sapped professional commitment. Issues relating to organisational culture also featured in the responses. This included general resistance within the police organisation to changes induced by 'outsiders.' Such resistance was exacerbated by what was described as a siege mentality pervading the organisation, an autocratic management style, and a fire-brigade approach to practical policing. Advisors furthermore commented on the pervasive nature of both racism and sexism within the police organisation. Sexual harassment at the training colleges was described as an endemic problem. During the pilot programme sexual liaisons between trainers and trainees, for example, posed a problem of some dimension on which the advisors commented at their report back meetings. A further set of obstacles pertained to the quality and training of all field training operatives, and an insufficient grasp of key educational principles on which the pilot training programme was based. Finally, an overall lack of appreciation amongst the policy elite of the politics of language bedevilling the pilot project was again highlighted in discussions.

The monthly reports of the international advisors constitute a rich resource for those interested in the tricky politics and logistics of institutional transformation. MIT engaged with the content of those reports in an earnest fashion and drafted reports for higher authorities indicating matters that required urgent attention. One issue amongst many others that were highlighted concerned the receptivity of the larger organisation to the principles on which the basic level training programme rested. Others, too, agreed that the changes introduced into the training environment were not sufficiently marketed to the wider organisation, nor was enough done to help induce a change in the mentality of the wider canteen culture. In the event, changes within the training environment remained relatively contained. In many instances field trainees were

125 MIT, Minutes of Meeting, 6 July 1995.
126 See the findings of the questionnaire circulated to Field Training Managers. As reported by TEG, 1995.
deployed and left to fend for themselves in a rather hostile organisational environment.

5.7 Evaluating the impact of the BLTPP

What can be concluded on the basis of this particular case study regarding the value of international deployment in support of police reform? The value of international deployment, as in support of the BLTPP, seems to lie at a number of different levels. At a political level, international advisors provided legitimacy to a broader process of institutional reform, boosting the confidence of the wider South African community in the process. In the context of the basic level training programme, the international advisors also fulfilled a developing and nurturing role. As training experts drawn from the police environment, they were well placed to identify local needs in the field. Through their deployment at the ground level they provided a safety net of skills and expertise to local field training operatives. As such, they acted as catalysts of change, on the one hand imparting new values and operational principles, whilst also providing practical techniques as the need arose. Deployment of international police assistance in the BLTPP also suggested that the foreign contingent could play an intelligence role, functioning as the eyes and ears of the post-authoritarian policing elite, conducting reconnaissance into the strengths and weaknesses of the police institution inherited from the past, and setting the agenda for future reforms - albeit in an indirect kind of way.

In the focus group interview conducted with field advisors, the time-consuming nature of building trust and gaining credibility (on which the effectiveness of the advisory contingent deployed in support of process consultancy depended) featured strongly. It is with this observation in mind that the views of local managers, deployed in support of the Field Training Programme, regarding their international compatriots were solicited. Field Training Managers occupied a position of particular importance in the field-training programme. They worked in close liaison with the team of International Advisors, although the intensity of contact and quality of the relationship with field training operatives varied from team to team and from province to province. Regarding the achievements of the Field Training Programme, the following views emerged. The training programme provided a 'space for police
reform' by challenging the military habits of mind that for so long had prevailed at training colleges. It also advanced training expertise. But on the opposite side of the equation, the programme was said to have failed to spread the message of reform more widely within the police organisation. Neither could the programme address the many logistical constraints that required structural adjustments beyond the reach of the BLTPP. The integration between theory and practice of policing also left much to be desired. As for the value of international deployment, they were said to have brought their practical experiences in both new style training and community policing to bear on the South African situation. However, a certain 'lack of knowledge regarding the complexity and diversity of the South African context' was noted as a factor that constrained their influence.¹²⁷ This point of view had a certain resonance in many other conversations with local operatives involved in the BLTPP.

In an evaluation of the work of MIT, conducted by TEG (1996), it was noted that it provided a visionary construct of policing based on radically different sets of educational concepts and political values operative in the police agencies of western democracies; it translated with some success the new vision into managerial policy; it helped put in place the organisational infrastructure supportive of the new vision; it partook in the development of resources, and monitored progress and obstacles confronting the effective utilisation of the basic level training programme (Van der Spuy, 1996). Acting as a catalyst of change, MIT could not avoid becoming embroiled in turf politics. To reformists, MIT constituted an ally of considerable importance. To others it was a source of deep resentment for changes forced upon the organisation with the political backing of the Ministry of Safety and Security.

In the end, however, external factors almost completely undermined the investment in training. A moratorium on new recruits that took effect in 1996 effectively halted the momentum for change galvanised by the Police Board, the ITC, and MIT. Trainers were redeployed to train batches of low level municipal police officers who were being integrated into the SAPS. The basic training and the field training programme, as developed by the ITC and MIT, came to a halt, training

¹²⁷ Written response to questionnaire circulated amongst field advisors, October 1995
expertise was lost, and staff demoralisation was said to be rampant at training colleges (Van der Spuy, 2000).

5.8 Conclusion

The donor-supported training initiative was one of several ambitious programmes that the SAPS undertook in conjunction with foreign partners. Mention has already been made of the Belgian-supported Community Policing Project, and Western Cape Community Policing Project, and the Community Policing Pilot Project in Section 4.6. Even more ambitious than any of these has been an ongoing project on 'Reform of Policing in the Eastern Cape' (to be discussed in chapter 6). None of these initiatives has been markedly successful. While the reasons for failure in each case differ in detail, the underlying issue remains the intractability of changing a large bureaucratic institution, whose basic character was settled as a result of the political compromises of 1993 in the first place, and the massive budgetary constraints that emerged almost immediately after May 1994. The result has been a set of ad hoc measures that were not foreseen before the ANC's advent to power, particularly by the somewhat idealistic policy drafters whose goals became subordinate to the realities of day-to-day politics.

The unanticipated moratorium on the recruitment of new police personnel was only one of the set-backs to the dream of a new, democratic, and professional police service in the New South Africa. But it also illustrates the limits of donor power, and of the effectiveness of quite substantial foreign investments in security sector reform. The underlying lesson is that donors, no more than governments, do not work with a clean slate, even at a time of highly symbolic renewal and change like that signified by the democratic elections of April 1994. Nevertheless, despite setbacks in project implementation and the limited impact of the major donor-supported reform packages, the importance of a scheme as potentially (if not in the event actually) influential as the basic training programme lay in the fact that it institutionalised the principle of large-scale donor co-operation with the state police. In doing so, it also revealed that police reform in South Africa was likely to be a protracted and difficult affair.
Chapter 6

International Assistance and Local Pressures in Police Reform: The Case of the Eastern Cape

6.1 Introduction

In an attempt to expand the enquiry into the interplay between international influences and local pressures in the reform of policing, this Chapter takes up another case study of a very different kind to the Basic Level Training Pilot Programme (BLTPP). The project under consideration also involved large-scale foreign involvement in the restructuring of South African policing, but has been conducted over a much longer span of time. Initiatives regarding Assistance to Policing in the Eastern Cape (known in local parlance as APEC) date back to 1995. Project planning was conducted throughout 1996 and the project officially started in March 1997. In the original project framework, APEC was intended to have a life span of three years.

This project warrants attention for a number of reasons. First, in both quantitative and temporal terms, the scale of the assistance stands in sharp contrast to ad hoc, small interventions characteristic of many early investments in police reform. This intervention was described as ‘the largest overseas police aid programme in the African continent’ at the time of its inception, in a report of the Eastern Cape Department of Provincial Safety and Liaison (2000:25).

Second, the principal recipient of assistance, the Eastern Cape provincial police, represented one of the most underdeveloped of provincial police institutions. Since it operated in an impoverished and largely rural region of the country, this experiment in police reform was in a particularly taxing locale. As such, this engagement in police reform may throw into sharp relief the potential for, and obstacles to, foreign aid effectiveness in a difficult policy environment (Collier & Dollar, 2004).
Third, the project involved the joint mobilisation of resources of two of the most prominent of donors in South African criminal justice reform, the EU, and the Department of Foreign International Development (DFID) of the UK. APEC is thus representative of multi-donor involvement in pursuit of institutional reform of the public police agency.

Fourth, the project has spawned a number of reports - mid-term reviews, evaluation reports conducted under the auspices of donor agencies, as well as independent project reviews - to which access was negotiated. These reports lend themselves to the kind of interpretative analysis that is not possible in the absence of project assessments.

Last, a focus on developmental assistance in the Eastern Cape allows one to map both continuities and discontinuities in objectives across two programmes in consecutive periods of time. A comparative analysis of the two phases (APEC I and APEC II) of the programme yields insights into the development over time of project assistance, and the kinds of factors that may shape shifts in focus. Tracking assistance across time may also throw light on the sustainability of reform initiatives.

Any evaluative assessment of APEC almost eight years after its conceptualisation needs to be sensitive to the historical context within which it was designed. In recent years, the terms of reference that guide project design and implementation have become more sophisticated, as instructive lessons have emerged from the trials and errors of the past. In addition, as one observer notes, the ‘landscape of aid policy has changed’ considerably over the past five or so years (Mosley, Hudson & Verschoor, 2004:217). Viewed against this evolving policy background, the design flaws in APEC I may be much more obvious. But such a retrospective assessment needs to appreciate that, for its time, APEC I was innovative and bold.

128 Negotiating access to the grey literature is cumbersome and success depends in no small part on one's location, one's networks and the overall culture of both recipient and host institutions vis-à-vis access to information.
Documentary analysis and follow-up interviews with a small sample of officials who were closely involved in APEC comprised the key methodological tools utilised for reconstructing the trajectory of assistance. The evolution of assistance is charted through four phases ranging from Project Initiation and Design; Project Implementation; and Project Evaluation; to Project Closure or Project Re-engineering. This chapter provides descriptive details regarding the evolution of the project. In doing so, it also illuminates some of the themes relevant to the politics of developmental assistance. Such themes include:

- The nature of the institution targeted for reform in line with contemporary definitions of democratic policing;
- The dominant policing paradigms, in terms of which developmental assistance is couched, and how these may shift over time;
- The role-players, project mechanisms, and institutional conduits involved in the transfer of policing ideas, cultural attitudes, and operational practices associated with democratic policing;
- The contextual factors that impact on project conceptualisation, implementation, and evaluation;
- The relevance (or not) of lessons learnt for project closure, donor exit, or alternatively donor reinvestment.

Organising the discussion along the above-mentioned themes allows one to appreciate that international assistance to police institutions (situated in high-crime, transitional societies) is an endeavour fuelled by missionary intentions, shaped by conceptual frameworks (clear-cut or ambiguous), mediated by bureaucratic procedures, and almost always plagued by uncertain outcomes. In practice the links between project goal, purpose, outputs, and outcomes - so neatly specified in project

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129 Four interviews were conducted. This included the following: E-mail correspondence with a technical assistant that was deployed by one of the donor agencies in support of project implementation from 1997-2002 (Interview 1); Face to face interview with a member of the Scoping Study for Phase II of European Assistance (Interview 2); An interview with a project co-ordinator deployed in the Pretoria office of the EU with considerable experience in developmental assistance (Interview 3); Interview 4 had as a respondent a Programme Manager deployed by one of the donor agencies within SAPS Head Office.
log frameworks - are more tenuous than project proposals would suggest. Exploring the micro-politics of developmental assistance through this case study allows one to track the interaction between foreign funded projects and local realities. It is this interaction that calls into question the notion of an inevitable march toward a democratic policing future which may linger in structuralist approaches to the subject.

6.2 Overseas Development Assistance and policing in the Eastern Cape: Beginnings

The imperative for rebuilding the South African police agency into something approximating a functioning law enforcement agency was clear enough with the arrival of constitutional democracy. Homeland police forces had been an essential part of the ‘grand apartheid’ plan. Policing by the South African Police and its homeland appendages converged on a common objective, the protection of state security. During the widespread insurrections of the 1980s, the homeland police agencies, much like the SAP, had ruled ‘with the whip’ (Haysom, 1983). Within the homelands, the relationship between the governing elite and its armed men was highly politicised. As in the centre, human rights violations on the part of the armed forces in the Bantustans were widespread.

This reform imperative was all the more valid in the case of the Eastern Cape. The locale of two homelands (Ciskei and Transkei), it was also in a dire economic state, reflected in high levels of poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment. The Province enjoyed the dubious status as the second largest, and the poorest province in the country. In 1992, Bisho, the then capital of the Ciskei, was the scene of a bloody confrontation between armed forces and about 60 000 marchers, led by a number of ANC stalwarts. The Bisho massacre, as it became known, left 29 dead and hundreds injured as troops opened fire (Naki, 1999). Looking beyond the Bisho event, wider patterns of violence had further contributed to social instability and fragmentation in the region since the early 1990s. A Report by the Human Rights Committee (1997) - published at the time of APEC's inception - on the state of criminal justice in the province painted a gloomy picture of infrastructural decay, lack of resources, rampant demoralisation amongst staff, and low levels of public confidence in the system. The failure of public justice was in part related to the emergence of self-help policing
agencies in townships in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. Key examples of the ‘self-regulating organs of popular justice’ (Nina 1995:51) were the anti-crime committees that emerged under the auspices of the South African National Civic Organisations (SANCO) from 1992 onwards. On the eve of the political transition to a constitutional state, public and private forms of policing in the Eastern Cape stood in a complex and largely antagonistic relationship to one another.

After May 1994, one of the first tasks of the newly renamed Ministry in charge of the Police, the Department of Safety and Security, was the amalgamation of eleven nominally independent police forces: the SAP itself, and its homeland spawn. As a result of deals struck at the pre-1994 negotiating table, these various bodies were to be brought into one unitary service. This process of amalgamation, which has been the subject of too little in-depth research, bequeathed a number of problems which the united SAPS still struggles to overcome, most notably that of incorporating under-trained and incompetent homeland police into a white-officer-dominated hierarchy.

The Eastern Cape was required to bring together three different police agencies (the South African Police, the Ciskei, and the Transkei police). The merger, which took place 1 September 1995, was complicated by considerable discrepancies in resources, skills, and organisational styles (Marais, 1992b). The legacy of regional inequities in access to policing resources was evident enough. A study of provincial budgets undertaken in 1995 found that the Eastern Cape police were substantively under-resourced, with many of the 205 police stations geographically isolated across a rural landscape (Batchelor [n.d]).

In response, a locally driven initiative emerged in 1995 to solicit international assistance for rebuilding the police institution. In the early phase, the provincial Premier and the provincial Police Commissioner took the lead. From the start, various interest groups were involved in the deliberations, which resulted in a project proposal which was submitted to the developmental arm of the UK. The British Development Division (South Africa) in turn undertook wider research into a framework for developmental assistance. Again, a consultative approach brought many stakeholders

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128 The numerical strength of the different police agencies was as follows: SAP had 10,000 officers, the Ciskei police 3,000 and the Transkei police 5,000 (Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999:91).
in the province into the ambit of the discussions (European Union/DFID, 1999). The provincial ‘wish list’ was then presented to the British government, which apparently reacted ‘in horror’ at the sheer scale of the assistance requested (Interview i, 2004). Through a process of further bargaining and negotiation, the EU was also brought on board, and after some lengthy process a three-year project framework was agreed upon. The latter constituted a slimmed-down version of the original request. This was the inception of ‘Assistance to Policing in the Eastern Cape’ (APEC). With joint funding secured from the British government aid agency, DFID, and the EU, and a demarcation agreed upon between the areas of responsibility, the total budget for APEC compromised 13.729.000 Euro or ZAR 82.404.000.\footnote{The project budget needs to be put in perspective. At the time when the project was approved the exchange rate stood at ZAR 6 to the British Pound. At the time of conclusion of the project the exchange rate stood at ZAR 13 to the Pound which meant at the recipient end more than a doubling of the amount originally agreed upon. Even allowing for inflation this was a significant windfall.} Project implementation only commenced in April 1997 and the project was formally concluded in 2002 (European Union, 1997).

As already noted, APEC developed in a difficult policy environment (Collier & Dollar, 2004) characterised by poverty, social instability, and weak criminal justice institutions. In both quantitative and temporal terms, the project was one of the largest assistance packages to the South African criminal justice system. Its ambitious design stood in sharp contrast to the ad hoc and small-scale interventions characteristic of aid investments in the early phase of South African police reform. A further feature of APEC was its multi-donor involvement, in which two prominent players in the field of criminal justice assistance, namely the EU and DFID, pooled resources. This multi-donor role was itself to prove problematic, particularly given the EU’s cumbersome and time-consuming disbursement procedures.

The finalisation of the agreement on APEC envisaged that it would consist of five key components. Two were concerned with institutionalisation of police accountability, a novel idea in the South African context: the establishment of civilian oversight mechanisms, and support for community policing forums. A third aim was the development of human resource policy and programmes, which boiled down, in practice, to extensive training ventures. This theme has been a feature of much other international assistance to the SAP, as was the fourth, namely ‘support to management
structures and processes' both within the SAPS and the Secretariat. The fifth component comprised an unusual intervention for donors in the South African case: investment and assistance in infrastructural development, which included the provision of physical resources and the development of a building and transportation programme.

APEC conceived of police reform in classical 'good governance' terms (Brzoska 2003:30). In line with reformist efforts in other transitional contexts, the creation of mechanisms of oversight and accountability was considered critical to enforcing the principles associated with the rule of law and respect for human rights in a constitutional democracy. In its explicit resort to a good governance framework, APEC’s objectives were at the time neatly aligned with national priorities to institutionalise civilian oversight and control, and thereby separate the (civilian) policy function from the operational command function of police management (Rauch 2002b).

In the post-1994 context, the National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and Security were designed with a policy advisory role to the political executives, while injecting a measure of civilian oversight. It is against this local policy background that APEC enshrined in its project framework extensive capacity building in the Office of the Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security and the Provincial Secretariat. In an important way donor aid followed, rather than dictated, a locally-driven agenda for police reform.

Secondly, APEC also strongly embraced the philosophy of community policing. In particular it was intended to assist the statutorily defined Community Police Forums (CPFs). At the time of APEC’s inception, national policy viewed CPFs as key mechanisms for building trust between police and the community, and for advancing a community responsive mode of policing. In addition, the development of vibrant CPFs was seen as a way of advancing a partnership approach to policing involving, as the dogma would have it, the ‘joint mobilisation’ of resources in pursuit of community safety. The community policing component of the project proposal was earmarked for British assistance. Support to CPFs in the Eastern Cape was a logical extension of DFID’s (then known as the Overseas Development Agency, [ODA])
track record with regard to the institutionalisation of CPFs in various parts of the country, which included a pilot project undertaken in Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape (the Grahamstown Community Safety Project), and in three other provinces (Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999). Project experiences accumulated in each of these other locations shaped project management and project implementation of community policing in the Eastern Cape. Two features in particular deserve mention: the extensive involvement of local NGOs in project design and execution, as well as the widespread utilisation of foreign technical advisors working in close collaboration with the Office of the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) in each of the provinces.

A third feature of APEC concerned its emphasis on institutional development. The importance of expanding human resource capacity in the project framework was an attempt to plug some of the holes left by apartheid policing. This deficit was particularly evident in the case of the former homelands. Addressing basic capacity deficits in training and revamping management systems constituted two components in this regard. Both were standard features of the kind of developmental interventions which aid agencies, involved in police reform, have deployed over the past decade (Clegg, Hunt & Whetton, 2000).

Last, a particularly distinctive feature of APEC was the extent to which it prioritised financial investment in the infrastructural hardware of the police agency. In contextualising this aspect of APEC, it is worth noting that the proper mix of material and technical assistance to police abroad remains one of the areas of disagreement in developmental circles (Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999). APEC suggested that the prospects for a change in cultural disposition on the part of the police (from a repressive to a democratic style of policing) were in part dependent on an upgrading of the physical environment from which policing services were being dispensed. According to the logic of the argument, the need for improvement in basic infrastructure was a necessary facet of a larger aim at ‘police transformation.’ The APEC project document included ambitious plans for upgrading building infrastructure and revamping the transport system across the province. The need for

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132 Western Cape, Free State and North West.
such improvements has all too often been neglected in the various policy documents for local police reform of the post-1994 environment (European Union, 1999).

6.3 APEC in action: The difficulties of implementation

Project management structures were only slowly put in place. Once project implementation was underway, a number of interlocking structures were supposed to manage APEC. Management and control of the Project rested with a Project Coordinator. The Project Steering Committee, chaired by the provincial Minister of Safety and Security, was responsible for policy decisions. This Committee consisted of a wide range of representatives including the Provincial MEC, the Provincial Commissioner, the Permanent Secretary of the Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security, and the Project Co-ordinator. Observer status was granted to the two donors. Project Committee members were also co-opted from CPFs, as well as from the Council of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA). The latter body represents the hereditary leadership (in colonial parlance, the ‘chiefs’) of the country’s nine ethnic Bantu-speaking groups. With the Eastern Cape containing all the rural descendants of the Xhosa-speaking branch of the Nguni language family, the relevant members of CONTRALESA constituted a potentially significant source of rural authority. However, from the various evaluation reports, it transpires that this organisation did not participate much in APEC meetings.

A Project Management Team assumed responsibility for the day-to-day functioning of the project. Later evaluations of APEC indicate that the Project Management Team played a particularly important role with regard to project coordination. According to an evaluation report it functioned as an ‘efficient management forum’ (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002:33). Furthermore, the project design made provision for the deployment of technical assistance. Such technical assistance is mostly regarded as an increasingly important conduit for foreign interests and policy-choices (Actionaid, 2000).

The Policing Advisor to the MEC for Safety and Security played a particularly important role with a wide range of responsibilities. An employee of DFID, he was considered a critical catalyst for modern policing ideas and methodologies. His
deployment proved critical to the success of the project. APEC thus put together an elaborate project management structure backed with technical assistance and having at its disposal an international resource person, deployed as a Policing Advisor, with a professional background in policing and developmental assistance. In combination, these mechanisms played a key role in the day-to-day implementation of the project.

6.3.1 Initial implementation obstacles

The implementation of APEC first faced bureaucratic and administrative problems. A delay of a year was caused by the lack of clear-cut procedures at the National Treasury with regard to the procurement and utilisation of donor funding. This initial delay in disbursement echoed problems relating to budget management that so often plague developmental aid (Foster, 1999). Procedural and management differences in project implementation between the two developmental agencies also complicated matters. Inflexibility on the part of the EU in accommodating to the local context was one stumbling block.

Of more significance, however, was the role of politics. As observers of developmental aid have commented, political pressures are all too often a neglected feature of project assistance literature (Caparini & Marenin, 2004). One central component of APEC related to the development of effective oversight mechanisms in the Province, particularly with respect to the Provincial office of the MEC for Safety and Security and the Provincial Secretariat. Hostility between the MEC for Safety and Security and the Provincial SAPS marked the initial stages of project implementation (European Consultancy Organisation, 2003). The historical legacy of Eastern Cape policing proved hard to shake off. A major issue was the adversarial nature of political relations, both between the police and the community, and the police and the new political masters.

A conflict of interpretation concerning the oversight function further bedevilled project efforts. As one respondent put it: ‘The roles and responsibilities of the Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security were completely misunderstood’ (Interview 1, July 2004). A major casualty in the war between the political and operational arms was none other than the Provincial Commissioner, considered in
some circles to be a truly competent officer. Shortly after the commencement of the project, the Provincial Commissioner was axed — apparently after a dispute with the Office of the MEC. The post was left vacant for a period of twelve months with a consequent lack of strategic direction on the part of the SAPS.

The reasons underlying the political hostility between the SAPS and the MEC and Secretariat were complex. The Mid-Term Review painted the following picture:

> Politicisation, understaffing, poor morale, loss of staff, poor relationships with SAPS, geographical distance between SAPS and PMoSS\[133]\(^{133}\), delay in developing their strategies despite the efforts of the Policing Advisor, have all taken their toll (European Union 1999:27).

The Annual Report of the Department of Provincial Safety and Liaison for the period 1999/2000 confirms some of the internal difficulties mentioned above. Budgetary constraints meant that projects were put on hold. A high turnover of staff and a freezing of posts within the Secretariat negatively affected its role. The lack of continuity regarding staff effectively neutralised developmental efforts toward capacity building among Secretariat personnel (Eastern Cape Department of Provincial Safety and Liaison, 2000).

Apart from inter-agency conflicts, project implementation in the area of accountability also had to contend with shifts in national policy vis-a-vis the Secretariat. As Rauch (2002b:23) notes:

> For instance, institutional restructuring of the Department of Safety and Security under Minister Tshwete resulted in a significant disempowerment of the national Secretariat, rather than the strengthening envisaged in the 1998 White Paper. Not only were the oversight functions envisaged for the Secretariat retained by the SAPS, but the crime prevention role advocated for the Secretariat was also shifted to the SAPS.

Thus, by the end of the first national administration in 1999, changes in strategic thinking regarding the role of the National Secretariat were in the offing. At a time of alarmingly high crime rates, politicians at the centre were under pressure to respond to a public that was becoming ever more vocal about crime. One visible

\[133]\(^{133}\) Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security, Eastern Cape.
consequence was a shift in emphasis away from prioritising effective accountability and oversight arrangements in police reform, toward an emphasis on improving law enforcement capacity in the face of a crime epidemic. In practice, this development entailed the dilution of the oversight function of the Secretariats at both National and Provincial levels, and the reassertion of the operational autonomy of police management in conjunction with Ministerial control. These changes undermined project efforts to support provincial oversight structures (European Union/DFID, 1999).

Troubled though the relationship between the Provincial leadership and the Secretariat was in the initial phase, the experience did lead to greater understanding in the longer term between the political executive, oversight structures, and the police organisation. One of the project’s achievements, as noted in the evaluation report, has been described as a normalisation of relations and the establishment of political trust between key constituents involved in policing.

But institutional issues were the lesser of the predicaments facing APEC’s implementation. The nub of the problem was the disfunctionality of large numbers of the police themselves. APEC’s answer was perhaps predictable: a heavy emphasis on ‘skills development.’ Large numbers of police officials made obligatory pilgrimages to training workshops. At the end of APEC, it was claimed that more than 6,000 police officers had attended training courses funded by APEC (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002: Annexure 7). The list of such courses makes for impressive reading: Station Commissioners Course in Functional Skills; Labour Relations; Administrative courses; Suicide Prevention; Trauma and debriefing; Interpersonal Development; Personnel Services Training; Training of Visible Policing in Crowd Management; Detective Training; Tactical policing skills; Strategic Management; Team Leadership Programmes and so forth.

To put this international assistance in perspective, in the case of APEC foreign funding in the area of human resource development far outstripped local investment in human resources in the province. According to the evaluation in the Final Report (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria 2002:10) in 2000 and 2001, APEC covered ‘about 2/3 of the total training expenses of the police’ in the province.
On paper at least, developmental assistance stood to make a substantial difference in bringing about a corps of trained police officers in the province.

The human resource component of the project was in hindsight vastly over-ambitious. From the very start the initial design team of APEC seemed to have underestimated the extent of the skills deficit. According to the Mid-Term Evaluation Report of 1999, the sheer scale of training needs was not properly anticipated. The Final Report further underlines this point: 'During the implementation it was soon found that the level of skills was far below what had been anticipated. It was often not a question of improving skills, it was rather a question of illiteracy. The quality of the buildings was also much worse than expected... (thus) some of the objectives, ... turned out to be unrealistic' (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria 2002:20-21). Generous as the training investments were, they fell short of making a significant difference (European Consultancy Organisation, 2003). This is a conclusion one is tempted to accept in the light of an observation recorded in a Safety and Security Portfolio Committee Briefing (30 May 2001). In that briefing a member of the African National Congress (ANC) reported that 'she had recently returned from the Eastern Cape and had found the management, training of officers and condition of equipment in police stations totally appalling.' In response, Commissioner Selebi noted that SAPS had to close down a detective branch in Umtata because 'detectives were not doing their jobs.' However, as Selebi pointed out, the root of the problem was of a more systemic nature, as 'there are too many highly ranked officers and too few constables in SAPS who are willing to get their hands dirty.'

6.3.2 Project evaluation: Shortcomings in hindsight

As is common practice with donor projects of this nature, APEC was subjected to a mid-term and final evaluation. Such reports have their own inbuilt problems. Donors for instance are alleged to be averse to reports which are comprehensively negative about a project. (Interview 2, May 2004). One recurrent theme running through the evaluations, however, is that the designers involved in the conceptualisation of APEC I seemed to have underestimated the sheer scale of an undertaking aimed at bringing about competent law enforcement in such a large area. A specific shortcoming was identified as the lack of a full feasibility study prior to the
finalisation of the project framework. The evaluation reports state that a proper estimation of the depth and breadth of developmental assistance required to improve police capacity in the province was never undertaken - hence the overly optimistic targets at the inception.

It is also the case that, in the early phase of reform, few observers really appreciated the range of challenges that confronted the reform of the South African police organisation as a whole, and not just in the Eastern Cape. As Shaw (2001b:28-29) puts it: ‘Given the history of policing in the country, it was assumed that the SAP was an all-powerful instrument which could be used effectively by the new government if two conditions were satisfied, namely, that it could be made more accountable to those whom it policed and at the same time more legitimate.’ This overwhelming emphasis on the political aspects of reform simply failed to appreciate the infrastructural decay, and the dearth of conventional policing skills in the province. Only by the late 1990s did the compounded impact of many ailments such as ‘limited resources, an overly centralised and bureaucratic hierarchy, a lack of appropriate skills and training, a lack of managerial expertise, and a limited intelligence and investigative capacity’ receive proper recognition (Pelser & Masuku, 2002:116). It could be argued that APEC I was in no position to address the depth or breadth of need that prevailed in the province, as the scale of investment required far outstripped the budgets of the external players.

A further factor which constrained efforts to improve human resource management within the province had to do with national versus provincial jurisdictions and mandates. Changing the rules in areas of selection and promotion, for example, was only possible if decision-making was devolved to the local level. In some instances, APEC initiatives to streamline human resources provoked resistance from national office. It soon became clear that changes to systems and rules could not be implemented at the provincial level without national approval. In retrospect, the APEC framework did not make sufficient allowance for the involvement of the ‘dead hand in the centre’ (Interview 1, July 2004).

With regard to the upgrading of police stations, unrealistic targets were also set in the project framework. APEC envisaged the upgrading of an initial 100 stations.
Soon, however, it became apparent that the scale of need for infrastructural investment far outstripped the budget. By mid-term only 38 stations had benefited from APEC. Contributions to the Fleet Management System and Workshop Maintenance System also failed to materialise as the national centre expanded its control over transport issues. This put an abrupt stop to any provincial efforts as initially envisaged by APEC (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002).

A key component of the overall project aimed to provide support for a model of community-responsive policing. Officially known as The Partners in Policing Crime Reduction Programme (PiP), this initiative was managed by three NGOs in the area, with financial support from DFID. These NGOs were the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA), Independent Teacher and Enrichment Centre (ITEC), and the Urban Monitoring Action Committee (UMAC). Their participation focused on stimulating community-policing awareness and conducting crime prevention training at 195 police stations. Under the auspices of this component of the programme, a flurry of initiatives were undertaken. Hundreds of community members and police officers were trained in establishing and maintaining CPFs. Some 4289 members of the community and 3148 police officers were beneficiaries of this training (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002).

The Policing in Partnership programme was subject to independent external evaluation (Pelser & Masuku, 2002). The reports claimed considerable success for the establishment of CPFs. The APEC evaluation stated that PiPs had successfully trained both SAPS personnel and members of the community. Various study tours, of both police and community members, to the UK took place. According to the evaluation reports, CPFs proved instrumental in making co-operative working relationships between police and community possible. In what seemed like an overstatement, the evaluation claimed that CPFs ‘have helped to ensure cultural change within SAPS’ (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002:58).

But like elsewhere, the record of CPFs in the Eastern Cape was uneven. Many had to contend with community apathy on the one hand and politicisation on the other. The evaluation study canvassed a wide range of views about the Community
Policing programme objectives and its successes. What emerged from the report was that participants (police, civil society, NGOs) held diverse views about the programme objectives, which ranged from crime reduction more generally, to ensuring community involvement in crime reduction more specifically, enhancing the capacity of CPFs, strengthening the relationship between the community and SAPS at station level, and finally, improving service delivery on the part of the police. Different constituencies brought different expectations to the project.

The final evaluation also concluded that a key assumption on which PiP was built, namely that CPFs as representatives of the community were able to draw on voluntary participation in crime reduction projects and in doing so would improve community/police relations, was questionable. In practice the organic link between CPF representatives and the community was far more tenuous. Nevertheless, the evaluation concluded on a positive note in stating that the programme did achieve important results, including buy-in on the part of stake-holders involved (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002). This finding was supported by a respondent who stated that the whole PiP initiative contributed to a dramatic improvement in the relations between communities and the police. In his view, a much neglected spin-off of the PiP programme was the reduction in crime levels at a number of stations (Interview 1, July 2004). On the other hand, it must be noted that the promotion of CPFs in the late 1990s and thereafter was taking place at a time when the leadership at the centre had effectively lost their earlier enthusiasm for the kind of community involvement that effective CPFs seemed to promise.

6.4 Conclusion: The end of APEC I and the start of APEC II

Local institutions may display diverse competencies and cherish divergent strategies. APEC experiences attest to two sets of dynamics in this regard. The first concerned the friction between centre and province. The second came to the fore in the early adversarial relationship between the political leadership on the one hand, and the police leadership on the other. Aid may exacerbate social tensions and cleavages, as recent reports from humanitarian assistance confirm. Vigilance and strategic management is required to offset such side-effects. By all informed accounts, in the case of APEC the policing advisor played a critical role as ‘honest broker’ and ‘peace-
maker' to manage the political tensions and build trust between the different constituencies. Whilst local ownership may be one of the necessary pre-conditions for sustainable interventions, it is more likely to evolve in the process of project implementation than being a condition well-established at the outset of project implementation.

APEC I came to its appointed end in 2002. The final evaluation report was delivered in 2003. Shortly thereafter a scoping study for a possible continuation of developmental assistance was undertaken, the recommendations of which were released in late 2003. A new project agreement came into effect in June 2004 and with it the EU pledged an amount of €25m for a project titled 'Support to Policing of Crimes against Women and Children in the Eastern Cape.' In doing so the EU more than doubled its investment in enhancing security services for the province.

The second round of assistance substantially departed from the project framework that guided APEC I. In part, the lack of continuity between project objectives and the change in the key recipients of aid (in part) appears to be a function of international shifts in aid policy in Brussels and elsewhere. Relevant here is the move toward ‘pro-poor’ policies generally, and the recasting of assistance to security as a developmental objective aligned to the needs of marginalised communities in particular. In line with the emerging wisdom that currently informs aid policy, the new project document argues that high levels of crime infringing on the rights of women and children (the most vulnerable segments of the poor) pose a particular challenge to the strengthening of democracy (Clegg, Hunt & Whetton, 2000). As a consequence it earmarks both technical and financial assistance to the enhancement of service delivery to victims of violence against women and children. In line with this pro-poor and victim-centred logic, support to an oversight mechanism - the Independent Complaints Directorate - aims specifically (and some would argue narrowly) at building capacity to monitor SAPS compliance with legislation relevant to crimes against women and children. The new project articulates the need for moving away from a state-centred investment in law enforcement capacity toward crime prevention more broadly, actively nurturing civil involvement in the pursuit of community safety, and advancing cross-cutting partnerships (across the public, market and private spheres) in the process.
Shifts in the metropole over the design and content of aid packages, as noted, reflect far more than lesson drawing from an existing project. In the case of APEC, however, the sharp switch in policy objectives in the new phase may also reflect at least some learning from the local. Making only faltering progress with the official structures of law enforcement in the Eastern Cape, funders - the EU in particular - have turned to other sectors to supplement police action, while narrowing the scope for police reform in the Province to what may seem a more manageable but strategic area, namely the status of women and children. The re-introduction of crime prevention motifs also testify to a realisation that law enforcement functions may make little headway when chronic social issues remain unaddressed. But both the management of domestic violence and child abuse, and crime prevention strategies present formidable challenges of their own, as international experience has shown. APEC II may well prove to be a far more taxing exercise than expected.
Chapter 7

Managerialism and Aid: The Service Delivery Improvement Programme

7.1 Introduction

By the late 1990s in South Africa, much greater clarity existed with regards to the core principles underlying the model of democratic policing to be pursued through transformative actions. By then, three principles were jostling for space and attention: legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness. The demand for effectiveness in policing gained momentum as crime rates and public concern increased. By the time of the second democratic election in South Africa, operational effectiveness was considered a necessary precondition for sustaining the legitimacy of the post-Apartheid police. It is in this context that the concept of police accountability itself became more responsive to calls for more effective policing through an improvement in service delivery.

This chapter reconstructs part of the story of the adoption of the principle of effectiveness in the pursuit of police reform. It examines the ways in which both local and international influences combined to put managerial efficiency on the agenda of police reform. Some key features of the managerialist paradigm and the conceptual building blocks on which it is based (partnership and service delivery) are outlined. Broader factors have rendered the ideas attractive (cost effectiveness and crime control capability). Its implementation, however, has been characterised by unanticipated difficulties and institutional resistance. By way of conclusion a brief assessment of the potential democratic spin-offs, flowing from the process whereby police work is crafted onto a managerial grid, is offered. Do managerialist-orientated strategies yield benefits for purposes of both modernising and democratising systems of public policing? In particular, is this true of those police agencies long shaped by

\[142\] The democratic dividends could be considered at the level of structural, procedural and cultural change of a former colonial police institution.
the proclivities of colonial politics with their centralised forms of control and paramilitary habits of mind? Some observers think that this is in fact the case.  

This discussion focuses on the ways in which managerial reform became prioritised as a particular means to a more effective police organisation that both internally operated with greater sophistication, and externally tackled high crime rates with greater success. These reforms have been quite wide-ranging. Many of them have concerned the adoption of up-to-date administrative procedures, accounting practices, and personnel policies. This chapter restricts itself to an analysis of the attempt to introduce service delivery improvement principles and mechanisms in the SAP through a process of interactive co-operation between the Belgian Gendarmerie and the SAPS between 1995 and 2000. Before focusing on managerial reform in policing and considering the relevant case study, the broader context, both global and national, is outlined.

The analysis presented here relies on scholarly sources and on documentary material emanating from various transnational policy agencies involved in public sector reform, as well as South African policies relevant to public sector re-engineering and project-specific documents in the field of managerial police reform. In addition, interview material conducted for a project that was undertaken during 1998, and which at the time involved participants in the pilot phase of Project Lifeline and the Community Policing Pilot Programme (CPPP), was re-examined for purposes of extracting background information and insight into the current analysis. Lastly, four interviews were conducted with members of SAPS management situated at head office. These interviews explored issues relating to the implementation of foreign

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135 For example, Marks and Fleming (2004:803) maintain that more participatory forms of management are crucial in police agencies 'whose objectives are more democratic and community-oriented policing.' In terms of this argument managerialist reforms are seen as a necessary if not sufficient facet of organisational democratization. Yet experience suggests that the obstacles to the assimilation of corporatist strategies, as the authors note, are multiple. Others again are much more concerned with the damage which the efficiency imperative may inflict on police organisations (Vickers & Kouzmin, 2001).

136 The research findings were included in a report by Van der Spuy (2000).

137 All four of these officers had, or still have, an intimate involvement with the modernisation of human resource management. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with Stefan Pieterse and George Moorcroft of the SAPS in Pretoria, 16 April 2005; Pieter du Plessis (EU) in Pretoria, 16 April 2005; Eugene de Villiers from SAPS, Somerset West, 5 August 2005.
assisted project interventions, such as the Service Delivery Improvement Programme (SDIP), and its impact on the police agency.

7.2 Public sector reform and new public management

The popularity of public sector reform, based on the 'New Public Management' paradigm, is well documented (Hood, 1995; Kaul, 1997). These reforms rely on the importation of new management techniques from the private into the public sector. Underlying the New Public Management (NPM) approach is a belief that the state itself has become too large and that the market offers superior mechanisms for achieving the efficient delivery of goods and services (Polidano, 2001). In the developed world the reforms have been driven by a wide range of factors, such as the importance of the fiscal crisis of the post-welfare state, the increasing appeal of neo-liberalism, the impact of information technology, and the growing influence of management consultants.138

Over the past two decades public sector reform has brought new paradigms and mechanisms to bear on the workings of state bureaucracies. The objectives of public sector reform are wide-ranging. They include the reduction of the size of government; improving accountability; boosting efficiency and effectiveness through the introduction of principles such as 'value for money' and the 'customer as consumer'; and the development of performance management indicators. Some commentators are of the opinion that these steps hold considerable potential to affect the cultural habits, values, and outlook of public service organisations. As Kaul (1997:15) puts it: 'The concern for quality and the increasing identification with the public concerns are important aspects of the new culture. This gives rise to the possibility that a new public service value system is emerging in which quality, like probity more traditionally, is taken as moral as much as regulatory.' In this view new management techniques provide both an impetus for, and a key to, organisational change within public service organisations.

138 Consultants, Larbi (1999) notes, have been particularly instrumental in the transfer of management techniques from the private to the public sector.
In practice, 'managerialism' has had far reaching effects on management systems and procedures. Administrative structures have been overhauled; human resource management revamped with an emphasis on flexible staffing, performance contracts, outputs and incentive packages; service users have been reconceptualised as consumers; and, last but not least, systems of financial planning and management have been re-engineered (Kaul, 1997). All of these efforts stand traditional notions of accountability on their head. As Kettl (1997:456) explains:

[T]he government reform movement...radically transforms the nature of democratic accountability. It introduces an important bottom-up influence to counter traditional top-down control.

The notion of a lean and cost efficient delivery of public services holds particular appeal in developing regions where state bureaucracies have long been wasteful, inefficient, and corrupt (Klitgaard, 1997). It is against this background that the spread from North to South of the virtues of NPM, particularly by transnational institutions, donor agencies and their platoons of management consultants, needs to be appreciated. Once donor agencies began to construct a link between improved governance and poverty reduction, public sector reform became linked, conceptually and strategically, to developmental objectives. In recent years, notions of 'good governance' have become closely intertwined with the principles of 'new managerialism.' This transfer, both voluntary and coercive (as under conditions where aid conditionality applies), of NPM reforms to developing regions has contributed to a certain 'globalization of public sector management' (Flynn 1997 quoted in Larbi, 1999:1) and a 'diffusion of reforms' (Halligen, 1997 quoted in Larbi, 1999:1). In this process of diffusion various transnational agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have been playing a particularly important role (Bislev, Salskov-Iversen & Hansen, 2001).

139 As for the transfer of new paradigms from North to South the UNDP notes as follows: 'NPM seeks to roll back the role of the state by applying private sector management principles to government organisations. The enthusiastic dissemination of this model to developing countries was seen by some as a new attempt to colonize development administration with a standardised, western approach to PAR (public administration reform). Nevertheless, the language of NPM, and the principles of client focus, decentralization, the separation of policy making from implementation, and the use of private partners for service delivery continues to inform current thinking about PAR' (UNDP [circa 2003] Public Administration Reform. Practice Note, p.4).
African experiences also attest to the pivotal role of donors in state restructuring (Kiragu, 2002; Therkildsen, 2001). Outcomes, however, are far from guaranteed as change toward NPM has been ‘uneven and contested’ (Larbi, 1999:35), with cross-national studies revealing significant variations in public sector reform (Stevens & Teggemann, 2004).

A critical question for new democracies is whether the adoption of public sector management approaches will open up political spaces for democratising institutions beyond a mere modernisation of institutional structures and processes. This view is captured in the United Nations’ argument that public sector management ‘is also about fostering dynamic partnerships with civil society and the private sector, to improve the quality of service delivery, enhance social responsibilities and ensure the broad participation of citizens in decision-making and feedback on public service performance’ (UNDP, 2003:5). In this description the normative elements of NPM are explicit. If nurtured with care, NPM may advance contractual relations between public agencies and private citizens infused with elements of participatory accountability. It is the accrual of democratic spin-offs from NPM that is of particular interest in a discussion on police reform in the context of political transition. In the field of security the adoption of a new discourse of public management and its associated principles may facilitate the pressure for reforms towards a model of good policing characterised by social responsiveness (both upwards and downwards) and accountability to ‘multiple audiences’ (Bayley, 1999:5).

7.3 Managerialism in criminal justice policy

The infusion of managerialism into criminal justice policy (Dilulio et al., 1993) and research (Jefferson & Shapland, 1994) has become a subject of considerable debate over recent decades (Bottoms, 1995; Feeley & Simon, 1996; Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). The managerialist paradigm, as Muncie, McLaughlin, and Langan (1996) put it, is ‘committed to the effective management of the criminal justice system and its component parts. Cost-effectiveness, efficient forms of custody and control, the identification and classification of risk, performance indicators, quasi-competition and organizational targets are the concerns of the new managerial regime’ (p.305). Others again have warned that the instrumentalist spirit so
characteristic a feature of managerialism should not blind us to the more insidious political implications of the new paradigm (See Lacey, 1994).

### 7.3.1 Managerialism in policing

A number of critical commentaries on the impact of managerialism on public police agencies have emerged in the past decade (Cope, Leishman & Starie, 1997; Reiner & Spencer, 1993; Loveday, 1998; Loader, 1999; Fleming & Lafferty, 2000; Vickers and Kouzmin, 2001; Fleming & Rhodes, 2004). The debate has crystallised around a number of distinct themes. One is the change in discourse. For example, the adoption of new public speak in police policy circles is to be found in the demand for 'effectiveness and efficiency' in the delivery of police services; the setting of 'policing objectives' through an assessment of local crime concerns; the adoption of 'citizen charters' responsive to customer needs; and in the wide-spread insistence on public-private partnerships. Real managerial reforms have accompanied the rhetoric so as to 'set standards' for services, 'monitor' performance and 'engage' in consultative interaction with customers (Dadds & Scheide, 2000).

A second component links managerialism with police accountability. Within this strand of the debate there are clear differences of opinion, between those who accentuate the rapport between new managerial approaches to policing and the model of community policing, and others who predict that managerial modes of administrative accountability may well erode more organic forms of social accountability. With regards to the first view, Gianakis and Davis (1998) emphasise the synergy between the managerialist emphases on economy, efficiency and equity and the model of community policing. In their view 'community policing has become recognized as the law enforcement manifestation of that movement ...' (p.485). The affinity between the principles underlying NPM and community policing is also emphasised by Eck and Rosenbaum (1994). A second body of opinion is less optimistic about the actual democratic spin-offs of managerial approaches. New

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140 Where efficiency means the efficient use of police resources and equity refers to the equitable distribution of police services.

141 Although one should note that conceptual affinity and synergy at a rhetorical level provide little guarantee for a convergence of outcomes at the operational level.
accountability creates a range of accounting devices to 'measure performance and make decisions auditable' (Chan, 1999:255). But new accountability, warns Chan (1999), gives emphasis to managerial standards, as opposed to legal or public-interest standards which prevailed in traditional models of accountability. Whether the new form of accountability actually renders police more accountable to social audiences situated at the local level, is thus a moot point. Here Scott (1998) too concurs. In his view the emergence of a performance culture may simply steer police organisations in the direction of managerial accountability, which may well be at odds with more participative notions of community-based accountability.

Equally contentious in the debate is the question as to the receptivity of police bureaucracies (so long considered resistant to outside influences) to new managerial ideas. Some anticipate that managerialism may result in structural and organisational reforms. Such changes, it is argued, hold considerable potential for re-shaping the institutional culture of public police organisations in the direction of greater openness and transparency. On the opposite side are those who exhibit more scepticism. Savage (2003) traces the 'reform-resistant nature' (p.171) of the British police, highlighting the capacity for cultural resistance which the canteen culture exhibits. On a slightly different note, the paradoxical consequences associated with the imposition of new managerialist approaches within the British police are outlined by McLauglin and Murji (1997:99):

While, on the one hand, there continues to be deep resistance to managerialization, on the other hand, at many levels within the organization, the impact of various forms of managerialism have already been felt deeply. The ways in which these tensions will be played out remained to be seen.

The pitfalls associated with inserting a managerialist agenda, and buying into management tropes and their 'potentially deleterious effects on police organizational abilities' are explored in further detail by Vickers and Kouzmin (2001:7). Here they part company with those who embrace the new paradigm and its faddism so readily, warning instead against 'blind acceptance of managerialism' and the 'possibilities of disaster.'

142 Such then is the substance of the debate on managerialism in police organisations in the developed world. To date very little research exists with regards to the impact of new public management ideas on
7.4 Public sector reform in post-Apartheid South Africa: The citizen as active consumer of public services

The advent of constitutionalism had far-reaching implications for the public service, whose broader mission and routine practices have been moulded by ethnic politics. After 1994 a radically new policy framework was required for the public service to create 'a better life for all.' A string of policy papers sought to coerce and co-opt, push and shove the state bureaucracy into a new frame of action. The Interim Constitution of 1993 and The Public Service Act of 1994 set the base line for re-organisation in the civil service. Various obstacles had to be negotiated: the scarcity of management skills, institutional fragmentation, the underdevelopment of the human resource function, and the lack of management information.

The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995) stipulated eight transformation priorities. Shortly thereafter followed the Green Paper on Transformation - Public Service Delivery (December 1996). The latter, too, provided evidence of a new managerialist ethos, with an emphasis on the improvement in 'quality, quantity and equity' of service provision. In 1997, the 'Year of Service Delivery,' the Batho Pele (People First) Service Delivery initiative was launched. This campaign profiled the need for transforming service delivery with departmental-specific delivery plans. Key to the implementation of Batho Pele was management reform. The White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service (1997b) refined the policy framework with the view to facilitating the shift from 'personnel administration to human resource management' (p.9). The Public Finance Management Act of 1999 attended to financial management in the public sector with more onerous reporting responsibilities for accounting officers.

police institutions in transitional contexts. Three exceptions however are worth noting: Sepp, (2002); Marks and Fleming (2004), and Collier (2004).

143 These were: rationalisation, institution building, representivity and affirmative action, transforming service delivery, democratising the workplace, human resource development and training, employment conditions and the promotion of professional service delivery.

144 The priorities for such reform were simpler regulatory regimes; improved human resource management systems with performance targets; decentralisation and delegation of responsibilities; and the participative involvement of consumers through feedback systems.
The new framework for governance as advocated in the public sector filtered down to individual state departments. But soon the gap between expansive policy frameworks and actual governmental practice at the department level loomed large. Additional guidelines for public sector reform were provided in the wide-ranging Presidential Review Commission of 1998. Sweeping in scope, this Review captured the flawed nature of the machinery of government inherited from the past and the enormity of the challenges in striving toward ‘(t)he creation of a people centred and people driven public service which is characterised by equity, quality, timeousness and a strong code of ethics’ (Ministry for the Public Service and Administration, 1995: Paragraph 2.1).

This brief overview of post-1994 policy guidelines provides evidence of the extent to which the language, principles and mechanisms in support of public sector reform permeated discussions on state reconstruction after 1994. In developing policy frameworks, the Department of Public Service and Administration took the lead and borrowed freely from international best practices. The new legislative frameworks in support of public sector reform and financial management clearly created opportunities for change and reform (Collier, 2004).

As is to be expected, reform of the public sector also provided a space within which the international community could pledge its support and provide assistance (both technical and financial) to the new democracy. Public sector reform in the context of political transition opened up opportunities for international assistance in South Africa. For example, the export of public service ideas from the UK dates back as far as 1990, when 75 senior ANC officials benefited from an exchange agreement initiated by Nelson Mandela with the Civil Service College. After 1994, the Civil Service College continued to function as a critical conduit of British practices and training ventures and assistance.145

The social re-engineering of the civil service set the framework for intrusive departmental reviews of the state's machinery. Managerial reform within the police bureaucracy thus constituted one aspect of a state-wide effort. After April 1994 the new political elite of the renamed police administration had to manage a complex process of rationalisation and amalgamation in order to redress the effects of balkanisation. The unification of the eleven former police forces into one central structure was an expensive and time-consuming exercise. Beyond the technical processes lay the more fundamental priority of transforming the Police Service to improve its quality and accessibility. With hindsight, it is clear that from the start the complexity of institutional reform of the old SAP had been underestimated. The immensity of the task, and its unintended consequences, seemed not to have been properly appreciated. There was little anticipation that dramatic shifts in policy could have sweeping budgetary implications. Key pieces of policy such as the Green Paper on Policing of 1994, and the NCPS of 1996 were all constructed in a budgetary vacuum.

The availability of international donor aid was, however, some slight palliative. Measures that could properly be considered 'managerialist' in scope and aim received the support of a number of foreign agencies. In this regard five donors in particular deserve mention: the Swedes, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, and the EU. All of these donor constituencies became involved in human resource developments within the wider criminal justice sector and/or the police specifically. Such interventions ranged from policy development more broadly, to various forms of capacity development which targeted different layers of the organisation more specifically. Furthermore, infra-structural support, assistance with developing information management systems, and redesigning of budgetary systems were prominent features of bilateral support (Van der Spuy, 2003). The rest of this Chapter considers just one case study among this flurry of managerial initiatives, but one that more than most others was directly concerned with enhancing policing performance at the grass roots, and hence with crime reduction. This example concerns a Belgian-assisted project that targeted management reform at police station level in particular: the Service Delivery Improvement Programme.
Managerial reform and service delivery: The Service Delivery Improvement Programme

The Service Delivery Improvement Programme (or SDIP for short), as it eventually became known, had a chequered history. It evolved from disparate beginnings and diverse inputs from a number of different quarters (in-house and departmental, corporate and foreign) into a more consolidated approach to service delivery improvement. In its initial phase this project was co-driven by change management structures within the SAPS and a team of police advisors seconded from the Belgian Gendarmerie. The emphasis in the discussion below is on the Service Delivery Improvement Programme as one facet of a new managerialist ethos, its evolution over time, key formative influences and alliances created in its institutionalisation (involving the local business community, a foreign police agency and the administrative core of the SAPS), and its integration into both the semantics and actual business of policing.

In 1995, flowing from a number of tangential inter-personal, political and organisational factors, negotiations between the SAPS and the Belgian Gendarmerie began with a view to a five-year exchange agreement. Influential in this regard had been contacts built up since the early reform period after 1990. So for example, in 1992 Judge Goldstone (who headed the Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence) had involved Cyril Eijnaut, a policing expert from Belgium, in the work of the Commission. Peter Harris during his stint at the Regional Peace Accord structures in the Witwatersrand also built up contacts with technical experts from Belgium. Harris called on those experts when he moved to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). As a result, in January 1994 an identification mission was undertaken by the Belgian Gendarmerie to determine the feasibility of providing support during the first democratic elections in April 1994. This led to the deployment of two police officers involved in the monitoring endeavours of the IEC in the pre-election phase. During this deployment further consultations between the Belgian Gendarmerie and interim advisory structures within the Ministry of Safety and Security developed. In these circles Etienne Marais, a well-known civilian policing expert and later member of the Civilian Secretariat of the SAPS, played a particularly critical role. These personal networks proved important. They were to lead to the Minister of Safety and Security's
invitation to the Belgian Gendarmerie to assist the Change Management Team, a critical structure in the organisational reform of the SAPS. The outcome was a five-year exchange agreement between the two police agencies signed in 1995.

7.6.1 Competing interests: Business Against Crime, Foreign consultants and ‘low cost solutions’ to service delivery

The implementation of the 1995 agreement with the Gendarmerie proved protracted. One result was that its operations ran up against related activities that had managed an earlier start. The story is somewhat involved, but requires a brief digression if the final shape of the SDIP, and the influences brought to bear on it, are to be appreciated.

By the time the Gendarmerie moved into action on the ground, similar efforts regarding grass roots police reform had been underway for some time. In particular there was ‘Project Lifeline.’ The driving force behind this project was an American-based consultancy firm, McKinsey Incorporated. The latter claimed specialist expertise in improving operational performance of organisations through a problem-solving methodology. The company first entered South Africa in 1995. In its initial review of the South African scene it identified the perceived lack of capacity on the part of the police to address high rates of crime. After consultations with the Minister of Safety and Security and senior police officials, a pledge for support, sold at the time as of a pro bono nature, was translated into a skeleton framework - Project Lifeline. Its goal was to improve substantially the performance of 100 of the most ‘needy stations’ across the country. The aim was to work closely with station commissioners and their personnel to develop a plan for improving performance at the station level.

146 Whilst in the initial phase there was much emphasis on the pro bono nature of McKinsey’s involvement, the business community ended up footing what was described ‘as an expensive bill’ for the consultancy work whilst the SAPS budget had to pay the costs for communication and transport (Interview, EvV, 5 August 2005).

147 Needy stations were identified as those confronting high levels of crime, weak station capabilities and inadequate infrastructure.
However, McKinsey Inc. were not the sole actors involved in Project Lifeline. The McKinsey consultants moved ahead with the backing of a local coalition of economic interests, Business Against Crime (BAC). The formation of BAC, a Section 21 Company, followed in response to an appeal from President Mandela to business leaders in August 1995 to co-operate with government in fighting crime. In the initial phase there was little clarity as to the objectives or strategies to be deployed by this loose corporate alliance. Ad hoc and localised interventions characterised this first phase of assistance. ‘Adopting’ a ‘local cop’ or ‘local police station’ became a way of targeting specific police stations for business support. Much media attention accompanied the involvement of business in crime control:

The war on crime by business is steadily gaining momentum, with a national chicken fast food franchise joining The Star, Plascon and BMW, among others, in announcing plans to ruffle the feathers of criminals. Nando’s Chickenland has joined hands with Business Against Crime with the launch of its Crime Busters campaign which, along with new menus, logos and bumper stickers, will get outlets around the country to donate 50c off each purchase to a neighbouring police stations for the next eight months….BMW South Africa donated 100 vehicles to the Gauteng Highway Patrol Unit, Plascon is raising about R1 million through the sale of paint, Saambou makes awards for community police forums, and now Nando’s has a crime-buster initiative (The Star, 4 September, 1996).

By late 1996 the promulgation of a key policy framework, the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), provided business with broad terms of reference for their interventions. As discussed in Chapter 4 this framework highlighted four focus areas ranging from Re-engineering the criminal justice system (Pillar 1), Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (Pillar 2), Civic Education (Pillar 3), to Efforts focusing on Transnational Organised Crime (Pillar 4). After the unveiling of the NCPS, almost all of BAC’s support came to be directed to Pillar 1. In search of a detailed strategy for support, BAC dispatched teams of consultants (of which the largest and most expensive of efforts involved Anderson Consulting) to identify blockages within the criminal justice system and devise priorities for reform. Priority crime projects were identified and business plans developed. A team consisting of six
agencies. Furthermore, the paramilitary leanings and centralised nature of their organisational structures made for a certain organisational rapport. Both agencies had to respond to a changing crime environment in which transnational crime was presenting new operational demands. Such broad similarities, it was argued, bestowed credibility on the exchange agreement, emphasising the virtues of 'reciprocal exchanges' and 'joint learning' based on a 'comparative' engagement with 'international trends', as opposed to a mere unidirectional transfer of solutions from donor to recipient. The imperative underlying the exchange was for both public agencies to get into line 'with international developments' and develop their respective capacities for 'professional service delivery.' As stated in the Technical File (1995) the basic principles on which both police organisations 'want to build their future organisations, are very similar. Both organisations clearly perceive the need for professional service delivery'(Point 2.2). This appeal to 'internationalisation', and the need to emulate international best practices and utilise international experts, provided a powerful legitimating argument in support of the project.

A critical factor in the negotiations prior to the signing of the agreement related to the direct access that the Belgian contingent enjoyed to the Ministry of Safety and Security, the interim advisors team (IAT), and then later to change management structures within the police organisation. Such direct access to change agencies within the centre of the bureaucracy proved very useful. Within police circles at the time, some concerns were expressed about the potentially exclusionary implications resulting from signing the Belgian agreement. The concern hinged on the possibility that SAPS could be losing out on other international support (Dutch, British and Danish support in particular) that was said be forthcoming in similar areas. The newly appointed Commissioner of Police, George Fivaz, was adamant that the dangers of the Belgians 'obstructing or dictating' the long-term vision of the SAPS had to be avoided. Such concerns, however, did not derail the process, and neither did they materialise in practice. On the Belgian side there was considerable emphasis on their 'support' and 'coaching' role. The Gendarmerie's technical experts would

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150 Ethnic tensions characterised the Belgian side and racial animosity the South African side.

help to identify the levers for change, and 'signal' where problems existed. In the long run, after all, they had to become 'dispensable.'

Signed in March 1995 for a period of five years, involving close to 164 million Belgian Francs (about R20.5 million), the agreement paved the way for interactive engagements involving information missions, elaborate training sessions, study tours, workshops, audits, conferences, field research, and a large number of seminars. Project structures and agents included management sectors, station commanders, project teams and leaders, and facilitators and trainers deployed at different levels of the organisation. The paper trail that ensued resembled that of a publication industry with diagnostic packs, training documents, status plans, scouting reports, research papers, and mid-term reviews, as well as a compact final evaluation report which was completed around 2003.

As mentioned earlier, the CPPP constituted one component of the overall four-pronged intervention specified in the agreement. In this initial phase Belgian efforts focused on the operationalisation of the community policing framework as explicated in the CPPP. The efforts in this regard revolved around a project-based methodology aimed at gaining clarity as to the kinds of services to be offered to the community (Technical File, 1995). Couched in the discursive framework of a CPPP, it advocated the virtues of 'needs driven' policing relying on 'active partnerships' and 'joint problem solving.'

In the evolution of CPPP on the ground two phases can be distinguished: a pilot, and an extended second phase. In the pilot phase 20 stations in the Johannesburg Area, a hotbed of crime, were targeted. The minute details of the process, its ambitious scope, and the thick web of structures spawned in support of the programme, are contained in a large number of station-specific project documents. Programme Johannesburg provided an opportunity for piloting a model for effective policing – it was likened to a 'professional conduct' campaign which would turn police members into 'professionals' (SAPS, [circa, 2003]:42). It aimed at creating

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152 More information is also contained in the briefing notes to the Portfolio Committee for Safety and Security delivered in August 1998 (Briefing, 1998).
‘pockets of excellence’ and ‘rolling out’ such successes to other parts of the country. The project documents made reference to ‘oil staining effects’ and ‘cascading lessons down.’ Articulated in this manner, Programme Johannesburg publicly signalled the intention of overhauling the operational efficiency of the SAPS in toto.

The pilot project consisted of five phases based on a so-called SWOT methodology. In the preparatory phase, buy-in amongst station management was to be secured. Phase 2 involved a diagnosis of crime rates at the local level, and an audit of the current performance levels utilising performance charts. During Phase 3 ideas, such as how to address root causes of the problem at station level, had to be generated. In Phase 4 an integrated implementation plan was developed. In the final phase implementation and monitoring of the plan concluded the intervention. As articulated in project documents, the project’s initiative was to develop community pilot projects with the view to a ‘change in culture’ away from the ‘command and control’ model of management. Project operatives situated at the station level were expected to ‘take initiative’ and ‘solve problems’ in a ‘creative’ fashion and with a clear understanding of ‘basic standards’ of service delivery (SAPS, [circa, 2003]: 68-70).

Project documents and business plans compiled for each of the twenty police stations provide a detailed view on the wide range of initiatives involved and the complex dynamics that ensued once project implementation got underway. At this point CPPP was described as a ‘methodology,’ a ‘management tool’ geared toward an improvement of service delivery at station level through developing practical ideas; expanding skills and knowledge; boosting morale; instilling discipline; and addressing communication blockages within the organisation. The target beneficiaries were conceived in wide and inclusive terms.

In order to appreciate both the symbolic and material importance of Programme Johannesburg, some reference to the prevailing state of organisational

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153 Between 1994 and 1996 SWOT methodology which became popular in organisational auditing, focused on the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) in planning exercises.
affairs within the police organisation at the time is necessary. The SAPS resembled a beleaguered institution - under-policed, under-resourced and under siege - both internally and externally. In the budget vote delivered by the Minister of Safety and Security in May 1997 there was already reference to a ‘vicious circle of crisis management’ within the police (Hansard, 1997: Col 1462). In this speech the Minister pointed to the dire need for outside expertise and assistance in the actual management of support functions such as human resources, logistics, and finance. Such assistance, it was argued, would allow the police to focus most of its attention on operational matters. It was to this call for assistance that the chairman of South African Breweries, Meyer Kahn, responded with an offer of a two year secondment to SAPS. It was anticipated that this senior executive would lend momentum to efforts to modernise human resource practices and instil fiscal discipline within the police organisation.

Meyer Kahn’s appointment as chief executive of the SAPS took effect on August 1 1997. It was heralded as a ‘vital milestone in the drive by government and the private sector to combat crime’ (SAPA, 24 May, 1997). It was Kahn’s intention to pursue market-based principles of organisational management within the police bureaucracy and to instil fiscal discipline - particularly through the reduction of personnel expenditure. Soon after his appointment, Kahn pushed for the installation of an Automated Finger-printing Identification System (AFIS). The latter he argued was a basic prerequisite for the modernisation of the police infra-structure. Whilst lack of clarity with regards to his role and function seemed to have plagued his appointment (Shaw, 2002a), the challenges confronting Kahn were formidable. The political compromises forged at the negotiation tables of CODESA in 1992-3, combined with the harsh budgetary constraints, combined to rule out truly sweeping reform. For example, one casualty of a budget-enforced policy of attrition and downsizing was the replacement or supplementation of the old SAP and its homeland surrogates by a properly trained cadre of new recruits. The incorporation of the Botha-era special constables (‘kitskonstabels’) was to saddle the new SAPS with around 30 000 police officers who were scarcely literate, hardly trained, and generally despised. Again and

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154 It would involve the criminal justice sector (Justice, Correctional Services, Welfare/Social Services), local government, metro police, the business community, victims of crime, community police forums, police management as well as rank and file.
again the desire to professionalise policing would bump into the 'special constable' problem. Furthermore the desire to balance the costs of salaries with those of operations also ran into intractable difficulties. To add insult to injury, infrastructural capacity was weak at best. At the time of Kahn's appointment the backlog regarding police equipment amounted to R2 billion (Hansard, 1998: Col 3265). In addition, a reduction in operational expenses was also on the cards (Hansard, 1998: Col 3302). Against this harsh economic reality and amidst spiralling crime rates, the development of managerial competence and the inculcation of financial discipline became the straw onto which the police clutched in their quest for modernisation.

Meyer Kahn threw his weight behind the pilot project in metropolitan Johannesburg. As in the case of Project Lifeline, the project methodology relied on dramaturgical devices which in turn created some momentum at the station level. But the collective energy of the workforce did not provide a magic wand for neutralising systemic blockages. Before long, performance charts ran into procedural difficulties. In many instances the station plans suffered from poor implementation, or simply gathered dust. Lessons learnt (negative or positive) during the pilot phase were never formally captured, nor passed on in any systematic fashion. As a consequence the notion of 'oil-staining' and 'cascading' of best practices did not materialise to the extent originally envisaged.153

During the initial phase of the project, managerial reforms were pursued following the doctrine of community policing. In the second phase, the desirability of management reform took on its own momentum and became increasingly divorced from the semantics and logistics of community policing. In this phase, managerial principles fed more directly into traditional crime combating objectives. This development would signal a third phase in the co-operative agreement between SAPS and the Belgian Gendarmerie.

7.6.3 Phase 3: Inserting strategic planning and SDIP into policing priorities and plans

It was almost inevitable that tension would develop between the project initiatives undertaken under the auspices of Project Lifeline, Project Johannesburg, and CPPP proper. There were three aspects to this tension: the politics of turf, differences in approach and time-lines, and the degree of local ownership. Relationships between Lifeline consultants on the one hand, and the Belgian Gendarmerie and SAPS on the other, became increasingly competitive and acrimonious.\textsuperscript{156} CPPP evolved at a much slower pace than the ‘rapid appraisals’ and ‘low cost’ interventions characteristic of Project Lifeline. In police circles there was also concern about too close a dependency on costly consultants in keeping the initiatives of Project Lifeline going. The building of in-house organisational capacity to drive the project initiatives under the Belgian agreement was viewed more favourably.

Against this background, project managers working within the SAPS made a strategic decision: first, to integrate Project Lifeline into the CPPP, and later to repackage the Belgian initiative into an organisation-wide effort to improve service delivery. In the process, the connection with McKinsey Inc. was jettisoned, though not without subsequent disputes that led to McKinsey threatening to take court action against the SAPS. The project methodology, a central feature of CPPP, became relabelled as the SDIP. In this incarnation it entailed an expansion of the original set of interventions, a mainstreaming of new public management strategies within the police organisation, and a much stronger consolidation of SAPS ownership of the process as a whole.

\textsuperscript{156} Interview with ex-Project Manager, E v V Somerset-West, 5 August 2005.
7.6.4 Managerial reform and shifting emphasis in policing: from Service to Force

These latter developments need to be appreciated against shifts in political mood and operational policy about the time of the second democratic elections. As argued in Chapter 4, from 1998 onwards a shift in gear was evident as the project of police reform became redefined, from broad-based legitimacy to police effectiveness, from the technocratic idealism of the NCPS to ‘Back to Basics’ in the ‘War Against Crime.’ Public concern about the escalation of rates of violent crime served as a pressure point on the political elite. In response, police management began to place far less emphasis on broad policy frameworks, to refocus police responsibilities on law enforcement, and to invest limited resources on some indispensable policing capacity such as investigative skills and intelligence gathering. In 1998 the Minster of Safety and Security publicly acknowledged that the police agency was in a bad shape: ‘What we currently have is a generally untrained, ill-equipped and underresourced SAPS’ (Hansard, 1998: Col 3244). He proceeded to lament the overly ambitious nature of previous police plans, arguing that there is a need for a return to ‘the core business of the department namely enhanced and improved law enforcement and delivery of effective crime prevention programmes,’ with the objective of building a lean and streamlined police service (Hansard, 1999: Col 2586).

The above quotation can be seen as indicative of a new political pragmatism spawned in part by transformation fatigue. One spin-off of the latter became a much more technically orientated attempt to fix basic administrative systems and practices so as to improve law enforcement capacity in the face of spiralling crime. At this point the principles of new public management (conducting crime trend analysis, stipulating priorities, aligning resources, quantifying outputs and assessing impact), so carefully nurtured during the bottom-up pilot phase of the CPPP, became inscribed into the SDIP and inserted forcefully into the harder, crime combating edge of operational strategies.

SDIP comprised a diagnostic analysis of the internal and external environment within which a police station was situated; an assessment of the performance of the station; an identification of the factors impeding performance; the development of an
implementation plan in response to the diagnosis of situational and organisational ailments; the utilisation of performance charts which specified desired and actual outputs; and an assessment of performance by evaluation teams. Elaborate business plans were to be developed with a detailed exposition of core deliverables and sub-deliverables, required inputs, a specification of activities, desired outputs, and timelines.

In the second phase Belgian assistance moved to the centre of the police organisation and aimed at advancing effective policing vis-à-vis 'priority' crimes (as outlined in the Strategic Plan of the Police) with visible short term combating objectives. Here the ideas of SDIP begin to merge with the in-house planning of top police management. One striking indication of the application of basic managerial principles to crime combating strategies is to be found in the details of the National Crime Combating Strategy, announced by the SAPS in 2000 (SAPS, 2000a). This strategy relied on a two-phased programme – targeted crime fighting in 'hot spots', to be followed by more explicit crime prevention measures of a developmental nature. The NCCS made explicit its resolve to fight crime. Stations with high rates of recorded crime became earmarked for support and monitoring. In total 145 police stations considered 'hot spots' became recipients of additional resources with closer monitoring keeping a check on efforts. The logic involved and the operational strategies deployed resemble a more elaborate application of the very principles and ideas generated in the pilot phase of Project Johannesburg.

National instructions on service delivery were dispatched to police stations in 2000. The development of these instructions relied heavily on Belgian assistance and marked its integration into core policy frameworks of the organisation in line with the requirements set out in the Batho Pele White Paper. By now service delivery ideas became an integral part of overall strategic planning within the police organisation. At this point official descriptions of SDIP described it as a program designed to improve the 'quality of services rendered to the community' by the Police Service, and to improve the functioning of the Service, consisting of integrated plans which would align the priorities of the respective levels, setting out tasks, responsibilities, service standards, resources and time frames (SAPS, 2000b).
Managerial regimes and police reform: South African lessons

Notwithstanding its rather ad hoc beginnings and the initial turf battles between external players jostling for position, by 2000 the SDIP had evolved into a large-scale intervention in strategic planning. It left few of the old management systems within the police organisation unaffected, although its success in improving grass roots policing, and hence in reducing crime, could be held to be minimal at best.

The momentum of this process, as the discussion has tried to make clear, was shaped by a combination of local and foreign influences. Of critical importance for the police agency (as for other state departments) was the promulgation of generic regulatory frameworks for the public service of the new democracy. A successive number of policy and legal frameworks obligated all departments to comply with new sets of administrative rules. Within the criminal justice sector more broadly, important shifts towards system-wide planning and a 'clustering' approach aimed at cooperative governance in the criminal justice system had emerged. The latter was explicated in the NCPS of 1996 (discussed in Chapter 4) and provided further momentum to notions of 'cooperative management' – so dominant a feature of the systemic dimension of managerialism as outlined by Bottoms (1995).

The SAPS seemed to have embraced the new regulatory regime with more enthusiasm and with more relative success than other departments in the criminal justice sector. As Shaw (2000:14) puts it: 'The system of priorities and objectives as implemented by the SAPS since 1996 is probably the most comprehensive of any government department.' Leggett (2003) too talks in favourable terms of the Department of Safety and Security's innovative efforts to 'develop and track performance indicators' within the police organisation. In an interview with Commissioner Moorcroft, the head of Corporate Services, he too boasted about the extent to which the Department of Safety and Security, compared to other departments, was at the forefront of compliance with service delivery regulations.

157Interview, Commissioner George Moorcroft, Corporate Services, SAPS Head Office, Pretoria: April 16, 2005.
The trajectory of this programme aimed at service delivery produced many lessons about the politics and logistics of inculcating new managerial regimes. Good intentions and a flurry of activities again provided few guarantees for effective impact or long-term sustainability. Deficiencies at the management level played havoc with project objectives. Political commitment amongst key functionaries varied and diluted the momentum for change. Volatility within the work force – due to attrition, redeployment of personnel, and/or affirmative action – scattered the expertise developed through a number of projects, ranging from Project Lifeline, to Project Johannesburg and CPPP. Over-ambitious target-setting made realisation unlikely and vague indicators of success, as contained in station plans, bedevilled efforts to assess impact. Many of these lessons are also echoed in Collier's (2004) detailed enquiry into the fate of large-scale efforts to introduce local financial management, based on a replication of UK experiences, and involving an exchange agreement between the West Mercia Constabulary and the SAPS in Bloemfontein. Marks and Fleming’s (2004) analysis of managerial reform in a public order police unit in the Durban area further captures some of the obstacles encountered in inculcating participatory management techniques, aimed at changing workplace cultures and practices, in specialist sectors of the SAPS. Management deficits create unwieldy obstacles, and persistent adherence to traditional notions of discipline restricts the scope for participatory management practices.

In Project Johannesburg, the lack of support and co-ordination from the centre meant that implementation was uneven and often weak. In this regard managerial deficiencies played a role, as did the unevenness of the policing landscape within the Johannesburg area. Situated a mere 10 kilometres apart, conditions on the ground varied starkly across the twenty police stations included in the project. From the corporate splendour of Sandton to the residential leafiness of Rosebank to the grime and decay in an inner-city station such as Hillbrow, the field of policing proved diverse. Amidst such variation in local policing context, the creation of ‘pockets of excellence’ meant different things, required different inputs, and often produced different results.
7.8 Conclusion

In the space of a decade the interdependence of policy formulation and budgetary allocation had become a prominent feature of the new managerial approach. Increasingly stringent requirements emanating from National Treasury for constructing policy within tight budgetary frameworks forced police managers to apply their minds to a difficult issue. The South Africa Police Service Act of 1995 obliged the police bureaucracy to compile annual police plans with a specification of priorities, targets, and performance indicators. From 1996 onwards this has been an evolving exercise. The excessive priorities, unrealistic targets and multiple performance indicators so characteristic of the early experiments have been simplified. A more direct alignment between priorities and resource allocations has been brought about (Shaw, 2000). Through trial and error (ie through negative lessons) more pragmatism has emerged. Those in search of proof, on paper at least, of the new managerial discourse and its impact on operational delivery need look no further than the more recent Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the South African Police Service and/or Departmental specifications of Policing Priorities and Objectives. The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service for 2004-2007, compiled by the SAPS Strategic Management division, reflects the new managerial sensibilities that have come to pervade the police organisation. Its conclusion is worth quoting in full so as to capture the new managerial discourse:

The Strategic Plan 2004-2007 provides the strategic focus, within the context of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, and sets the parameters within which the SAPS intends to pursue its objectives towards contributing to a safe and secure environment. The plan sets out the Department’s programmes, priorities and strategies in terms of which funds are allocated and directed for the purpose of both, addressing crime effectively, and improving service delivery.

The successful implementation of the planning information will determine the extent to which the SAPS has achieved its objectives. This will be determined, inter alia, by the output of the various programme and subprogrammes, the level of satisfaction in the community, and the general feeling of safety which prevails in the RSA. Key to the success of the Plan will be the ability of the SAPS to prevent the rate of priority crimes from increasing, while ensuring that the detection rate does not decrease in 2004 to 2005 (SAPS, 2004b:40).
has contributed to a discussion of a more existential nature as to what policing is about, and what the police should be doing, as well as their capacity to be involved in crime prevention efforts (Leggett, 2003). In this debate the difficulties and pitfalls of utilising crime rates as indicators of police performance had been broached. The latter question is particularly critical in a high crime context such as the South African one, where reductions in violent crime rates are all too frequently offered as political promises.

This analysis of the SDIP case study cannot, of course, by itself provide definitive conclusions regarding the extent to which imported ideas regarding professionalism and new management paradigms have been disseminated in a transitional police agency, or of their overall effectiveness. But the South African case study suggests that managerialism may yield varying and divergent reformist dividends. In the first phase of experiments of service delivery, from Project Lifeline to CPPP, a social consciousness pervaded managerial experiments. That consciousness tipped the project towards ‘service delivery’ in line with ‘community safety’ concerns. Key tools utilised were safety audits and local crime surveys, consultative engagements and partnership arrangements, the introduction of station service charters, and the conducting of exit polls to gauge ‘customer’ satisfaction. Such endeavours aimed at expanding the knowledge base for a locally-orientated policing service, the improvement of police-community relations, and an expansion of horizontal alliances between business, the police and the community.

Over time, however, the managerial innovations became channelled into more technocratic domains. In the second phase, a more organisationally-specific engagement with service delivery improvement gained momentum. Modernising systems and procedures within the police bureaucracy now consumed the bulk of energy and resources. In this phase, administrative experts within the police organisation assumed a more prominent role. This managerial cadre focused its attention on developing human resource indices: performance contracts, performance charts, and performance indicators. Instead of administrative accountability being a means to an end (of consumer satisfaction), it became an end in itself. The appeal of administrative accountability in its narrow form seemed obvious enough, as it allowed for more control over the product and control over the process whereby policing was
delivered. Increasingly the business imperative and logic of managerialism became applied to force as opposed to service aspects of police business. There is ample evidence of this development in the National Crime Combating Strategy of 2000. The latter relied on basic managerial principles in devising a national policing plan informed by crime analysis; the identification of policing priorities and their operationalisation; an alignment of budgetary resources and operational activities; and a monitoring of impact and outputs of crime combating.

The challenges confronting the implementation of the paradigm of New Public Management are also evident from closer scrutiny of field experiments in this regard. Complexity and contradictions characterise the process. Although the modernising rhetoric pervades the recent policy documents, the concrete evidence for an improvement in the quality of service delivery on the part of the South African Police Service remains elusive (Lapsley, 1999). In the end we again confront, the potential for, as well as the difficulties relating to, the transferability of grand narratives such as professionalism and managerialism into locales as difficult and contested as South Africa (Mulcahy & Ellison, 2001).

\[158\] The appeal of managerial authority in an organisation which has been deeply affected by the collapse of discipline which accompanied the demilitarisation drive should not be underestimated (See in this regard the potent comments of Vickers & Kouzmin [2001]).
Chapter 8

Policy Transfer and Policy Convergence in Policing: Concluding Observations from Transitional South Africa

8.1 Introduction

The current project of police reform in South Africa is about fifteen years old. During that time dramatic changes have taken place in the ethos, structure and operation of the SAPS. Reform measures since 1994 have embraced an extremely wide agenda, and objectives have shifted in response to conditions on the ground. It remains a contentious matter just how much the reforms have contributed to a more effective police force, or may rather have exacerbated its institutional and personnel instability. Of course, both may be the case, with pockets of greater efficiency co-existing within an unsteady matrix. This study did not attempt to answer this very large and vital question. It has had a more modest goal: an examination, through selected case studies, of the interplay of novel, often externally derived, ideas and practices with a national police force at a time of immense political transition.

The course of organisational change of the public police agency in South Africa has been driven by structural dynamics, both national and global, and by the concerted efforts of a wide range of social agencies. South African police reform can be described as a variation on the theme of 'interactive globalization' (Cain, 2000:250), where local and international influences mix and combine - often in unexpected ways.

This discussion started from the South African vantage point, with a conceptual enquiry into the phenomenon of lesson drawing and policy transfer in pursuit of police reform. Here it is appropriate to return to the key questions formulated in the introductory chapter as a framework for exploring policy changes in South African policing after 1990. In attempting to answer these questions, some general conclusions are drawn from this
(selective) inquiry into post-1990 policing developments in South Africa. The following thematic concerns are thus addressed in this concluding Chapter:

- What causes policy transfer, lesson drawing and innovation, and what kinds of influences shape transfers?
- What kinds of actors and agencies participate in the process of policy transfer?
- What can we conclude regarding the contextual factors which may facilitate or inhibit the transfer of policy in new democracies?
- What observations can be made regarding the link between policy transfer and policy convergence?

8.2 Policy transfer, lesson drawing and innovation - structure and agency

South African experiments attest to the fact that the interchanges between internal and external policing ideas have been greatly facilitated firstly, by political events at the national level and secondly, by global shifts in policing. South Africa's turn towards political negotiations in 1990 facilitated its reinsertion into the international community. Considerable goodwill at the international level was combined with receptivity at the local level for policy change. As Brocklehurst et al (2000) put it, the climate of transition facilitated lesson-drawing. South Africa's aspiration to belong to a 'normative community of nations', (Bernstein & Cashore, 2000: 81) exemplified by western democracies, aided the process of exchange. The international normative discourse, associated with the rule of law and human rights, shaped the agenda for policy change within the local police organisation in definitive ways.

Opportunities for changing the structure, function and legitimacy of the police institution were exploited by a wide range of constituencies (Mawby, 1990). In the South African case, the change was conceptualised as one involving a shift from a repressive, colonial model to a consensual model of policing. The example of Anglo-American policy
and practice proved particularly persuasive. In the contested context of the time, and particularly in the early phase of reform, lesson drawing from 'international' best practices provided political leverage on sensitive policing issues. Lesson drawing from mature democracies thus served as a powerful source of legitimisation of reformist endeavours in the face of resistance from conservative political quarters and from the old police guard. Only in recent years has there been an interest to turn toward developing contexts as appropriate locations for purposes of lesson drawing.

In the post-Cold War context, the existence of what Marenin (2005: 107) describes as a 'transnational policing regime' - defined by the principles of democratic governance - has become widely acknowledged, perhaps optimistically so. The third wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991) has brought national police agencies of former authoritarian regimes into the normative orbit of democratic policing. As a consequence, national efforts towards police reform in new democracies have increasingly been influenced by the normative assumptions embedded within the democratic policing regime. A particularly prominent feature of this regime that has emerged during the 1990s is the centrality of notions relating to Community Orientated Policing (COP). In the South African case, as the discussion in previous chapters illustrated, COP too has wielded a strong influence over the debates and experiments for a new policing dispensation. Again, various agencies have invoked the principles associated with democratic policing in their quest for setting a strategic framework for South African police reform.

Although the normative 'pull' of a democratic policing model is not to be disputed, more recent developments in the field of security, such as those associated with the growth in the illicit economy and the re-insertion of terrorism onto the international security agenda, pose new challenges for the institutionalisation of democratic policing regimes. In the post 9/11 security environment, contradictory pressures may be exerted on national police agencies to prioritise their efforts toward democratic governance on the one hand, whilst pursuing police effectiveness to counteract terrorism on the other. Shifts in South African policing policy over the past decade provide evidence of changes in the reform agenda.
While the 'legitimacy deficit' dominated in the first phase for police reform, reform efforts have increasingly shifted to addressing the 'capacity deficit' in specialist enclaves of the police. Growing concern with high rates of crime of a predatory nature, as well as with organised crime, has contributed to the increasing emphasis on police effectiveness in combating crime. The rival forces associated with the quest for democratisation and for securitisation are thus likely to place competing demands on domestic policing policy in the contemporary era. Although such effects need to be examined more closely before firm conclusions can be formulated, it would seem that the institutionalisation of a democratic policing model, as discussed in the previous chapters, is already subject to challenges (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998).

The 'decentring' of policing (Marenin, 2005:100) in the international sphere has created favourable conditions within which an ever-wider range of actors and networks (state, non-state, transnational, corporate) have become involved in policy development at the domestic level. Recent South African developments confirm the range of non-domestic influences over, and agencies involved in, the reform of public policing policy. While recognising the variety of players involved in the crafting of a post-Apartheid policing policy, this dissertation focused on a small selection of such social agencies. It is with hindsight that the interconnectivity of such agencies and conduits (local and international) involved in the project of South African police reform seem much more evident than at the outset of the analysis. This is a point to which we return in the concluding paragraph.

8.3 Actors, agencies and networks involved in policy exchange and transfer

This dissertation focused on three institutional conduits for reformist policing ideas in recent years in South Africa. The three conduits constitute a small but critical part of a much wider range of social mechanisms through which policy ideas are invoked and made to travel across time and space. Such actors comprise individuals, institutions, coalitions and

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159 Marenin's (2005) use of the concept of 'decentring' captures the extent to which policing in the contemporary era has become, in the words of Bayley and Shearing (2001:vii), a matter of pluralisation and 'multilateralisation.'
networks. The actors may hail from the public sphere more generally, the police institution more specifically, the corporate sector, or from civil society. The agents may be situated at the domestic, regional, international or transnational level. In each of the three institutional conduits profiled in this dissertation, the discussion identified the social context within which the policy community functioned, the political sponsors and cultural entrepreneurs involved, the policy networks constructed, and the social alliances created in pursuit of police reform. For the purposes of this conclusion, a brief summary of the areas of focus and the major findings will suffice.

8.3.1 The role of knowledge-based networks or 'epistemic' communities in police reform

In the first instance, the discussion focused on the community of policing scholars who have helped to shape the debate on police and police reform in South Africa. Police studies as an area of critical enquiry in South Africa only developed from the mid-1980s. Despite the existence of repressive controls, local members of the academic community were able to interact with international ideas on issues relating to social control and the role of armed state formations. Furthermore, in the South African case, a tradition of intellectual activism facilitated a critical engagement with the political dynamics of Apartheid policing and the challenges confronting a post-Apartheid policing dispensation. From the late 1980s onwards, the quest for policy orientated research in support of reconstruction created new opportunities for local researchers to contribute to police debates. Exchanges between local and foreign scholars grew exponentially as the international isolation of South Africa gave way to constructive engagement. In the early phase of reform, the strategic utilisation of high profile international expertise gave political stature to local policy debates which emphasised, for example, the importance of depoliticisation, demilitarisation and democratisation (Caparini & Marenin [eds], 2004). Informal political networks, as well as professional alliances, proved useful in identifying and inviting to South Africa international
scholars\textsuperscript{160} to participate in public debate, academic conferences, and in later years, in the actual drafting of policing policy. The return to South Africa of intellectuals in exile too boosted local research and policy advocacy.\textsuperscript{161} The strategic importance of external scholarship - particularly in the early phase of political reform - should not, however, detract from the role which indigenous members of the research community came to play in policy debates. Local members of the ‘epistemic community’ had a fine grasp of the contextual dynamics with which a future policing model had to contend, as the earlier policy engagements with community policing by Etienne Marais (1992a), for example, so convincingly illustrated.

Chapter 2 outlined the various conceptual paradigms which diagnosed the South African policing ‘problem’ and the way in which each engaged - to varying degrees - with the future of policing beyond Apartheid. In the South African case, academic research has informed policy making for the SAPS, particularly so in the early phase as intellectual energies honed in on the project of state reconstruction. By the late 1990s, the growth of in-house research capacity within the police was combined with a certain cooling of relationships between independent research outfits and the police institution. This may have contributed to greater marginalisation of external research in police policy formulation. Whether this is likely to be a long-term trend remains to be seen. What is, however, beyond dispute is the role in policy deliberations which knowledge-based or ‘epistemic’ communities (Haas, 1992:2) have played over the past decade.

Academic debates of a critical persuasion have imparted a degree of reflexivity into policing debates, examining the linkages between the police and the state, the police and the broader society, and the national state and transnational community. More recently, local debates have also engaged with the dynamics confronting policing reform in the context of

\textsuperscript{160} The most notable of these were: John Brewer from Northern Ireland, Clifford Shearing from Canada, Mike Brogden and Tank Waddington from the UK, and Ron Weitzer and Philip Heymann from the USA.

\textsuperscript{161} The most important figure in this regard is Gavin Cawthra, the military/security sector expert who, during his period of political exile, held a research position with the UK-based International Defence and Aid Fund during the 1980s.
political transition (Shaw, 2001c; 2001d). Observations regarding the politics of police reform in post-conflict settings have introduced a much needed comparative angle into policing discussions. In this regard South-South exchanges between scholars situated in developing regions, for example, constitute one promising development. Such research networks provide a useful counterpoint to the almost exclusive reliance previously on North-to-South lesson-drawing so characteristic of the earlier phase of police reform. South-South networks may prove crucial for appreciating the forces which promote 'indigenization' of policing ideas and practices in developing contexts (Edwards & Hughes, 2005:348). Within the Southern African region, South African academic and research networks exert considerable influence in regional deliberations on policing and security sector reform. This influence is clearly a function of the relatively advanced nature of local scholarship on police and security sector reform and the policy expertise acquired over the past decade. There is also growing evidence of lesson-drawing from South to North in recent policing discussions in which local experiments in the governance of security drawn from South African townships are being projected into western academic forums (Kempa & Shearing, 2002).

8.3.2 Policy mechanisms in police reform

Policy units everywhere have a distinctive role to play in the conceptualisation, advocacy, and implementation of policing policy. Expertise in policy formulation, as well as capacity in policy implementation, are critical requirements, all the more so in the quest for transforming police institutions with colonial and authoritarian histories. Technical assistance provided by international aid agencies and transnational think tanks, for example, constitute resources for policy innovation in post-conflict settings.

The trajectory of South African police reform has been shaped by a wide range of policy mechanisms. Chapter 3 considered the contribution of an interim policy mechanism, the National Police Board, a product of South African’s own peace settlement, in some detail. The Board itself had no real powers, and only operated for a short period (1992-1994) in a fluid political environment. In addition, the Board had to contend with considerable
hostility from the police organisation. The Board soon outlived its purpose, as political deliberations about the future police dispensation shifted to central political structures. It was disbanded shortly after the formation of a new Ministry of Safety and Security and the consolidation of policing policy. Nevertheless, it was a locus for some major policy deliberations, the first such in which senior officials of the police force were required to debate with civilian outsiders. Viewed from a micro angle, and based on an analysis of the substantive deliberations of the Board, it is clear that the Board provided a novel interim platform from which civilians could actively engage with members of the police elite on critical (and all too often contentious) issues of police reform. This process of dialogue and exchange at the elite level was of strategic importance at the time, given the adversarial legacy of the past. Through its deliberations, the Board accrued a measure of informal power and helped to set an agenda for police reform amongst a wider network of policy instruments.

More importantly, the Board served as an instrument for establishing alliances between civilians (academics and political activists with political access to the mass democratic movement) and reform-orientated police that proved instrumental after 1994. During the Board's existence a number of civilian members of the Board sharpened their policy skills, and then went on to become influential members of the policing policy elite in the new dispensation. In a way the Board served as a launching pad for the careers of future policy makers. During the Board's existence it also functioned as a conduit for international policing ideas and strategies, though often in an ad hoc and informal manner. It provided an internal platform within which international ideas could be debated between local constituencies. Through its substantive work, as discussed in chapter 3, the Board helped to introduce a comparative angle onto a number of policing issues such as police accountability, police training, strategic planning, and partnership arrangements. The Board interacted with various other policy communities: it drew on external research expertise in exploring the terms of reference for a future police dispensation; it helped to canvass the opinions of community-based organisations on policing issues; it embarked on some study visits abroad to extract 'best practices' from elsewhere; it helped convene workshops and conferences between former political adversaries; and it acted as a sounding board for foreign police
practitioners eager to offer advice. Much of the authority of the Board was derived from its institutional connections with Peace Accord structures. The capacity of civilian members to mobilise NGO support for some of its endeavours also proved critical to the Board’s role. This ability to mobilise and involve community expertise in public debates on post-Apartheid policing was particularly critical in the search for greater inclusivity in policy deliberations, and for advancing local capacity for steering the reform agenda after 1994. Within the constraints flowing from its structural design, the Board mobilised social capital across the boundaries of state and civil society. Yet, in the wider scheme of things, this policy mechanism was no more than a small cog in an otherwise complex social machine feeding off the momentum of political change.

8.3.3 Developmental aid as conduit for policy innovation and change

Third, this discussion profiled the international development community as an influential actor in the process of local police reform. The impact of international donor aid in South Africa is a striking exception to the situation in much of the rest of Africa, where the infusion of foreign funds and expertise may make the difference between state viability and public bankruptcy. In the latter case, donors are far more able, and determined, to attach conditions to the provision of aid that may be tantamount to a clear infringement of state sovereignty. Rakner’s (2003) penetrating study of the Zambian experience with aid over the past three decades is one striking example. South Africa could have afforded to dispense with foreign development aid if it seemed too intrusive in domestic policy goals. Nevertheless, the country, and the public police specifically, have received quite generous assistance. This aid can be construed as a cause of policy changes (Stensen & Edwards, 2004), but also as a victim of domestic contingencies.

In the South African case developmental assistance in aid for criminal justice reform has been characterised by diversity, both in terms of the types of projects funded, and the range of donors involved. Recent South African experiments in this regard serve as a reminder of the opportunities for foreign assistance in support of police reform. An empirical
inquiry into the manner and scope of interchanges between local and foreign constituencies in agenda-setting and the implementation of organisational reforms reveals their complex nature. Such investigations also cast light on the role of international and transnational institutions in defining the principles of 'good' policing, and providing support for their institutionalisation in local settings. Aid agencies constitute important sources of policy innovation by bringing international rules and norms to bear on national settings. Since this influence is backed by the provision of material and technical resources, it may translate into discursive shifts in policing debates, cultural changes of police organisations, and changes in the technologies of operational policing (Vitale, 2005).

Conditionalities attached to the provision of developmental aid often result in the coercive imposition of (policing) ideas and practices from the outside. But even in the unequal context of aid relations, the interaction between external and internal role-players is more complex. Conditionality, it has been recognised, may well act as a constraint on policy transfer and change. Insofar as local ownership is critical to the sustainability of policy changes, consultative and persuasive strategies rather than coercive methodologies need to inform attempts at policy transfer and change under the auspices of international aid agencies.

In South Africa the influence of aid agencies has been tempered by the relative absence of conditionalities, as well as by the comparatively advanced nature of local policy expertise and capacity. Here external actors in policy innovation and change have had to contend with local ideas and traditions, and growing expertise about the form, content and priorities for police reform. Local capacity for an engagement with policy and practice, both outside and within the police organisation, has developed quite significantly over the past fifteen years. The evolution of such in-house capacity is likely to impact on the nature of the relationship between internal and external players in the policy innovation game.

Development assistance to the police and to the field of security has been an evolving enterprise. The paradigms which have informed aid in the sphere of police reform have
evolved from ad hoc and piecemeal approaches to more ambitious sectoral interventions. The recent growth in practical experiments in donor-assisted police reform has provided scope for conceptual analysis and practical lesson drawing on a much wider scale. Proof of greater reflexivity within key developmental networks is to be found in recent attempts to clarify the objectives of assistance to police abroad, and to define the principles that should guide such assistance. Clarification of the rules of the aid game is considered one step toward greater effectiveness in project support. These developments are clearly important. On the ground, however, the success of developmental assistance is far from guaranteed, as each of the case studies of donor-assisted police projects (discussed in chapter 5, 6 and 7) has illustrated - an issue to which the discussion will return below.

The three case studies of donor assistance to the SAPS were selected from amongst the many possible candidates by virtue of their scale, their centrality in addressing basic policing issues, and, last but not least, in one case by virtue of the writer’s own extensive involvement in its design and evaluation. These case studies capture shifts in the form and content of assistance in support of policy change over time.

Reform of basic training, as pursued through the Basic Level Training Pilot Programme (BLTPP) between 1994 and 1995, has long been a traditional focus of foreign assistance to police abroad. Support for training has seemed on the face of it to provide for a relatively straightforward transfer of skills and capacity, characteristically underdeveloped in police agencies in former authoritarian settings. In the context of the latest wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991), foreign investment in police training abroad also embraces the more ambitious objective of engendering change in the cultural disposition of public police agencies. With such goals in mind, training exchanges focus not only on basic policing education but also on human rights issues and diversity concerns. The latter were particularly prominent features of the restructuring of local police training through developmental aid in the BLTPP, as well as in a wider range of training exchanges at the levels of middle and
senior-management (Brown & Van der Spuy, 1999). The BLTPP combined both normative and more technical objectives. It embraced the philosophy of community policing and its political principles and aimed at modernising the training systems.

We noted that a range of professional organisations participated in a process whereby the agenda for a substantive reform of basic and advanced training of the police was agreed upon and then implemented. In this endeavor, the Police Board played an instrumental role by mobilising both academic and professional police expertise from domestic, regional, and international quarters. This reform initiative was the first to fall squarely under the political authority of the newly established Ministry of Safety and Security. Close political alliances between the international team of policing experts (who acted as overarching project coordinators) and the policy arm of the Ministry of Safety and Security (the Secretariat) proved pivotal in institutionalising new principles and practices for basic police training. Again, an appeal to international best practice served as a legitimating device in the face of bureaucratic intransigence and/or canteen resistance to the demilitarisation of training, for example.

Assistance to Policing in the Eastern Cape (APEC) constituted a much more ambitious intervention than the Basic Training project. It aimed at re-building policing in the Eastern Cape over a four-year period. In targeting infrastructure, basic policing skills, management capacity, and police oversight, APEC represented a multi-faceted intervention based on a consultative engagement between the Ministry of Safety and Security, the police, NGOs, businesspeople, and social communities in the province. As in the case of BLTPP, the philosophy of community policing informed the overall project framework. But compared to the Training initiative, APEC was also informed by a more expansive paradigm pre-figuring ‘problem-orientated’ policing and ‘inter-sectoral’ approaches to police reform that became more prominent features of foreign assistance in later years. Much of APEC’s success depended on the mobilisation of wider social networks involving NGOs, the research

162 The difficulties involved in engineering a change in the canteen culture of police forces is well recognised in academic literature on the topic (Chan, 1997). Recently, ethnographic enquiries into cultural and behavioural change in the South African police organisation have begun to consider the challenges of measuring the impact of reform on organisational mindsets and habits (Marks, 1999; 2000; 2002).
community, local policy elites, and foreign aid workers (Bass, 2000). As such it depended on a network approach to police reform informed by the principles of the co-production of security. Again various unanticipated factors impinged on project implementation, and thus shaped the destiny of the programme in ways unforeseen by the planners. We return to such factors later in the discussion.

In the third and final case study the focus shifted to developmental assistance aimed at the improvement of service delivery through institutionalising 'managerialist' ideas and practices. The Service Delivery Improvement Programme (SDIP) also comprised an ambitious project, if not quite at the scale of APEC. It aimed to penetrate through middle police management to the conduct of the rank-and-file at the country's very diverse police stations. In this instance policy innovation and change were driven by in-house agencies (police management in particular) in collaboration with external counterparts (police management of the Belgian Gendarmerie). In this project the police agency itself constituted a critical conduit for the diffusion of ideas and systems across time and space. SDIP illustrates the importance of bilateral (or multilateral) networks of police professionals in policy innovation from one locale to another. In the new transnational context, police networks constitute a growing source of policy entrepreneurship (Bigo, 2000; Gerspacher, 2005).

The approach adopted by SDIP exemplified the extent to which the paradigm of new public sector management has come to influence police organisations. Characterised by the use of business analogies such as 'value for money' and 'customer services,' managerialist approaches to police reform constitute one source of policy innovation. As the case study demonstrated, managerialist philosophies provide opportunities for more corporate players to become involved in policy debates within the public sector. The actual successes that could be attributed to the project's activities are hard to establish, and probably the whole Programme aimed too high. Experience derived from its activities, however, helped shape the strategic planning of top management at the turn of the century. In that sense, SDIP
enjoyed a considerable impact on the overall direction of policy at the highest level, itself an unanticipated achievement for which it deserves some credit.

8.4 Contextual factors which impact on policy transfer and policy change

At a very general level all three of the institutional conduits discussed in the preceding chapters emphasise the wide range of situational factors which may facilitate or inhibit the transfer of policy with the view to affecting changes in the structure, organisation, and legitimacy of police organisations in new democracies. In this regard two broad observations will suffice. The one touches on social receptivity and the political will to affect change. The other concerns the institutional capacity to follow through. Political transition opens up opportunities for policy exchanges and social re-engineering which are utilised by a wide range of social players, often with competing sets of interests in mind and varying levels of capacity in hand. The space for policy innovation may become curtailed by feelings of social uncertainty and dislocation in the wider society, and demoralisation within police ranks. Institutional capacity for conceptualising and implementing changes is of critical importance to the sustainability of policies. One critical lesson to be drawn from South African experiments in criminal justice and police reform is that the gap between policy innovation and policy implementation simply loomed far too large for comfort.

All three of the case studies of donor assisted reform projects underscored the importance of understanding local context in terms of both social and institutional environment. For example, when APEC was under consideration, the Eastern Cape resembled, as one observer put it, 'the Wild West.' The province in the mid-1990s constituted a politically volatile environment with shadow formations engaging in low intensity war. Pursuing project objectives in this fractious environment turned out to be much more difficult than most participants had anticipated. Likewise, SDIP was conceived at a time when the domestic reform process had hardly begun to take effect. By 1997, factors that had not been integrated into the original design were changing the character of the police
organisation - the continual restructuring of specialist units, and a bold affirmative action policy, to name but two of the most important.

Development circles now stress the indispensability of thorough, country-based assessments before projects of this scale are launched. Patterns of socio-political conflict need to be properly appraised, and institutional audits of the recipient organisation are vital to strategic interventions. Such requisites have now become common (and crucial) in the case of humanitarian assistance in post-conflict reconstructions undertaken in collapsed or weak states. In this regard, Cliffe & Luckham (2000) insist that substantive political analysis must inform policy design, for ‘(a)ll too often international agencies, donors and NGOs have plunged in on the basis of an inadequate understanding of what are, after all, profoundly political processes’ (p.291). Fulfilling this requirement would require much more collaboration between country-specific experts, policy analysts and the aid community. In this connection, the rise of global think tanks and their interaction with developmental networks is an encouraging sign (Stone, 2000b; 2001).

There is a further dimension to the issue of context that underlines the necessity for evaluating institutional capacities. APEC targeted a weak police agency in a politically volatile and economically impoverished rural province of the country. The original planners simply underestimated the deplorable state of policing affairs in the province. As a consequence, project implementation had to confront the dire state of criminal justice and the extent of skills shortages amongst its practitioners. In turn, SDIP confronted a national organisation that overall was not in a dramatically better shape than that in the Eastern Cape. The sheer scale of the investment required to upgrade professional capacity across the police organisation in the country seems to have been underestimated in the conception of both aid projects. Thus, the histories of APEC and SDIP emphasise the importance of social scans and feasibility studies for project design and project implementation – again an ingredient that is currently considered crucial in project design.

163 Interview conducted with technical assistant deployed in support of APEC, May, 2004. Further details
As the current wisdom would have it, 'local ownership' and political commitment at the recipient level are vital components for maximising the developmental spin-offs, and for ensuring the sustainability of aid interventions in policing reform (Saferworld, 2002). The experience of APEC and SDIP, however, points to a possible dilemma: is local ownership a viable option in the face of limited institutional capacity? This was a relevant question that designers and implementers of the new curriculum in basic police training in 1994 had to confront. In the case of APEC, the situation was complicated by the failure of the national SAPS office to work smoothly with the province in the execution of the project. SDIP targeted police middle management but merely shifted the burden of rank-and-file demoralisation and underperformance to the shoulders of overworked and under-resourced Station Commanders. The result was all too predictable: police stations in middle class areas benefited most from the programme, as they enjoyed the personnel and resource basis to absorb at least some of the ideas that filtered downwards.

The experience from all three projects suggests that none of these donor-funded initiatives actually came remotely near achieving their original goals. The failure of foreign aid to bring about 'development,' however conceived, is hardly a novel observation. The academic literature on the subject - as opposed to the more optimistic pronouncements of agencies such as the World Bank and donor governments - is replete with tales of failed or underperforming projects, particularly in Africa. What project designers rarely anticipate is the unintended and contingent character of projects in what is effectively social engineering. While it is perhaps asking the impossible that planners look more to unintended than intended consequences, and factor in 'contingency,' the possibility of project failure and the likelihood of underperformance need to be addressed from inception.

The findings emerging from the projects as discussed in this thesis - selective as it may be - may also be put to more radical use in contemplating the potential for, and limitations associated with, building state capacity in the face of institutional underdevelopment on the scale witnessed in the Eastern Cape in particular, but also affecting

in chapter 6.
the police nation-wide. Investment in police agencies is a costly affair, all the more so in developing contexts. One conclusion is that future pragmatic engagements with public police agencies in contexts such as the South African one may not be able to bracket out the work of other agencies involved in the provision of security. This raises a difficult question concerning the institutional parameters within which police reform is to be pursued. This issue, too, has been at the forefront of recent conceptual deliberations amongst governance and policing scholars as highlighted in chapter 2 of the dissertation.

All three case studies of donor aid suggest that sectoral and programmatic interventions need to stretch over a longer period and require more material resources. The collapse of the Basic Level Training initiative when Treasury instituted harsh budgetary constraints could hardly have been foreseen. Against the expectations of all concerned, it constituted merely a once-off intervention whose fruits were largely squandered in the following years when the moratorium on recruitment led to the dissipation of the reformed training institutions. But the fact remains that the project planners had not even considered the necessity of some follow-up support when the original training programme was completed. In recent years, the realisation that short-term interventions may do as much harm as good has become embodied in the shift from project to programme assistance, and the call for a ‘joined-up’ and ‘whole-of-government’ approaches (DFID, 2002: 10). Reform of the police, as is currently understood, needs to be embedded in a wider sectoral initiative to reform the criminal justice system. ‘Justice and Security Sector Reform’ (Lalá, 2004) has become the new label that signifies an intersectoral sensitivity, at least on paper, to the challenges at stake. A principled insistence on ‘joined-up’ approaches must also engage with the practical difficulties involved. Such interventions are both complex and costly. They also require long-term investment, often with few short-term returns to appease constituencies that demand quick returns and tangible demonstrations of remedial impact, particularly in high crime contexts.

If ‘joined-up’ approaches and partnerships are to become a reality in the domain of safety and security, then they will of necessity have to target a much wider range of agencies
(other than the public police) involved in the co-production of security (Cliffe & Luckham, 1999). Tentative arguments in support of such a broader engagement have crept into recent attempts at a demarcation of the security sector. Minimalist discussions on security sector reform take a state-centered approach to the matter. In contrast, ‘maximalist’ approaches also include non-state organs of justice and policing that routinely breed in the gap left by illegitimate and weak states in troubled zones (Ball, 2000; 2002). Whatever the desirability of a more inclusive strategy to security sector reform in developmental interventions, its feasibility has hardly been tested. It remains, however, a key theme in recent academic engagements with the challenges confronting the governance of security, both globally, and in developing contexts more particularly (Bayley & Shearing, 2001). If, under current conditions, public police agencies constitute only one resource in a wider network of safety providers, developmental aid needs to build capacity on a much wider front than conventional practices have hitherto done. This may lead to the broadening of the scope of informal justice and security mechanisms in developmental assistance (Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999). The need to involve agencies other than the police in developmental assistance constitutes one lesson that seems to have been drawn from the APEC experience. Beyond this principled stance, however, experimental interventions on a wider front have been slow in the making, and their impact on the wider quest for community safety and justice still remains to be seen.

8.5 From policy transfer to policy convergence

This excursion into aspects of South African police reform was informed and guided by recent debates on policy transfer, convergence, emulation and modelling (Karstedt, 2002). In the contemporary era, the normative and operational parameters of ‘good policing’ are no longer crafted primarily at the national level. Ideas, mechanisms and practices are manufactured in settings and contexts that are increasingly located beyond the national level. Complex structural processes provide an engine for change, as do the conscious or unconscious actions of a wide range of social agencies. The motivations driving such exchanges may vary greatly. These motivations, and the processes and consequences of exports and transfers, deserve much more examination than has so far been the case. In
addition, as policing paradigms proliferate in the minds of policing scholars, 'best practice' thinking in development agencies also undergoes shifts and reversals.

We have noted in earlier discussions that the process of transfer may exhibit qualitatively different features, ranging from deliberate and conscious efforts to more unconscious processes of absorption and osmosis. Ideas may be imposed on the public police agency in an almost coercive fashion by transnational institutions or adopted in a more consensual manner. Depending on circumstances and power inequalities, both imposition and voluntary import may yield positive effects for purposes of adopting 'good' practices. As for the outcome - good, bad or mediocre - much depends on the configuration of forces at the local level and their interaction with transnational loci of power.

Scholarly debates on the need to frame discussions on police reform in a wider governance-of-security framework, so as to avoid the pitfalls of a state-dependent approach, have achieved some prominence. Indeed, in principle, the transfer of policy ideas could become a two-way process, as lessons from developing contexts suggest reforms at the developed centre. The most important contributions in this regard emanate from scholars working under the broad rubric of 'nodal governance.' Shearing and like-minded academics have considered how a nodal network approach may be put to strategic use in the difficult policy context of 'weak' or 'failing' states where a 'security vacuum' exists (Dupont et al., 2003:340). When the state suffers from legitimacy or capacity deficits, the role of non-state agencies and non-domestic actors becomes all the more crucial.\textsuperscript{164} The notion of nodal networks can itself be put to analytical use in conceptualising the ways in which policy transfers and policy exchanges are enacted in the contemporary era.

\textsuperscript{164} Shearing has for some years been involved in directing an experiment in bottom-up 'micro-governance' in the township of Zwelethemba, Worcester, in the Western Cape. This initiative has been extended to other townships in the Western Cape. For some scholars this particular 'model' has provided a social laboratory for the conceptual ideas now being inserted into international circles. Shearing himself drew on his experience in South Africa to propose similar ideas while a member of the Patten Commission on the reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Shearing, 2001a).
Critical questions regarding the content and the transfer of policing paradigms are clearly in order. Mike Brogden's (2004) engagement with the export-import of Community Orientated Policing (COP), which he describes as the 'central thrust of a drive to export policing techniques' (p.637), raises some vital issues. COP, as he notes, is attractive to various constituencies. As he puts it (Brogden, 2004:642): ‘It is seen as both a band aid for transitional government as well as a panacea for all crime ills, and the building block of the new democratic state.’ He laments the fact that far too little empirical analysis exists of the motives underlying the exchange dynamics, the processes of installation, and the outcomes. Ellison (forthcoming) also concurs that COP has emerged as a global paradigm packaged for export to transitional societies. Both insist that a more critical appraisal of the efficacy of COP as a reformist strategy is required. Empirical enquiries, such as that provided by Ruteere & Pommerolle (2003), suggest that in certain contexts COP may be put to repressive rather than benign use. In the context of aid conditionality, transfer is shaped by power inequalities between centre and periphery. The specific contexts of weak states may render COP misplaced. Bland description of policy transfer as a voluntary exchange between equals in pursuit of the noble ideas of accountable and efficient policing simply cannot do justice to the dynamics under which community policing has become commodified and is traded in a global marketplace. Policy content, ideas and instruments may well be transferred but with little guarantee that they will be put to good effect. Policy may travel with few guarantees that it is for the better.

In the current era there is a truly wide range of actors involved in the production of knowledge and its utilisation for policy changes. On the available evidence it seems fair to suggest that policing ideas and practices are no longer simply diffused from some core centre to a distant periphery. Policy ideas seem to circulate within, and between, knowledge-based and practitioner networks populated by a variety of actors (Nigel & Winter, 2000). A neo-colonial depiction of policy transfer, as a one-way process whereby western hegemonic ideas are superimposed on local settings, fails to appreciate the diversity of policy exchanges in the contemporary era. Epistemic communities and knowledge networks situated at local, regional and transnational levels interact with policy elites and a wide range of international and local
constituencies with an interest in the reform of police agencies. Such exchanges seem to provide proof of 'interactive globalization' on a scale not sufficiently appreciated in earlier discussions on policy transfer (Cain, 2000).

Furthermore, recent reform activity aimed at the South African Police illustrates the extent to which 'policy communities' do not exist in isolation, but stand in an interactive relationship to one another. The boundaries are fluid between knowledge-based communities, domestic policy actors, corporate players and donor communities. There is considerable interchange across these communities, contributing to a cross fertilisation of ideas between researchers, policy makers, the political elite, and police professionals. As individuals move across the borders of these communities, so do their ideas. This spatial mobility of influential people and their ideas across institutions has been a particularly prominent feature of early reform developments in South Africa as the trajectory of individual careers criss-crossed the boundaries between private and public sector, state and civil society. Over time, the scope and space for interaction may have contracted as the overall reformist momentum slows down, policy fatigue sets in amongst players, systems solidify, or the democracy becomes more mature (Van Zyl Smit & Van der Spuy, 2004).

The interplay between local context and international ideas is, by all informed accounts, highly complex. It is against this background that the literature on policy transfer would do well to engage with the difficulties, discrepancies and gaps between policy design and policy implementation. The latter has been a critical shortcoming confronting the policy revolution that has been taking place in South Africa. Furthermore, it is probably wise not to conflate policy transfer and policy convergence, or to see the former as a cause of the latter. Local evidence suggests that the link between transfer and convergence of policy is more fraught with tension than optimists would like us to believe. Policy transfers may lead to policy confusion instead of policy diffusion. Here various factors may play a role: inappropriate transfer, weak political will, ineptitude on the part of those involved, cultural resistance, transformation fatigue, or sheer confusion as local actors confront the 'paradox of
the plenty' (Karstedt, 2002). In the South African case, policy overload has been one critical factor that has shaped the trajectories of policy changes in the SAPS.

Finally, at the most general of levels, this inquiry supports the conclusion that there is ample evidence of growing convergence in the rhetoric, if to a lesser extent in the practice, associated with democratic police reform. In the current decade there is a widespread desire for effective and humane policing. But there is an equally common awareness of the obstacles in the way of achieving just that. Most South Africans would agree that the police should act with professionalism and according to the ideals of due constitutional process. But few view this goal as readily attainable under current social conditions. In this sense, the debate is no longer about what, but about how. Critical engagement with the means rather than the goals of policing reforms is a necessary pre-condition for a police future that will consolidate the advances that have been made thus far.

Empirical enquiries into the contexts, processes, mechanisms and outcomes associated with reformist interventions could contribute to our appreciation of how exactly police policies travel and to what local effect. In the end it is the path dependent nature of the process whereby policing policy ideas and instruments become internationalised that we need to confront.
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