THE 1985 SCHOOL CRISIS IN THE WESTERN CAPE

PHULUFHUWANI HASTINGS NEKHWEHVA

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
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Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
The thesis is an exploratory and primarily empirical study with the objective to construct a detailed chronology of the events of the 1985 school crisis particularly in African schools in the Western Cape and to reflect on the relationship between the school crisis and the organic crisis in South Africa and the Western Cape in particular. The data for the thesis were derived from primary and secondary documentary sources and in-depth interview material. A total of 51 interviewees were selected principally on the basis of the specific role they played particularly within the Department of Education and Training institutions as well as in community, political, workers', parents', teachers' and student organisations during the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape. Interviews were open-ended with a semi-structured interview schedule which consisted of topical headings. The thesis's theoretical framework was informed by Gramsci's Marxism and the key concepts employed in the analysis included Gramsci's notions of hegemony and organic crisis as well as Freire's concept of conscientisation. Utilising Gramsci's Marxism, the historical transformations in economic, political and ideological spheres which affected the development of student struggles and the crisis in the Department of Education and Training schools in 1985 were examined. Chapter 1 deals with the 'Total Strategy' as a form of State "formative action" to overcome the general crisis.
It also documents in chronological order the main events of the school boycotts and both political and economic struggles on a national level from 1953 to 1984 and early 1985 in order to provide a sound background for the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape. Chapter 2 which is offered as an empirical contribution to sociology of education covers a series of complex events and processes which constituted the core of the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape in a chronological order. In the conclusion, Gramsci's concepts of 'hegemony' and 'organic crisis' supplemented by Freire's notion of conscientisation were directly utilised to analyse the slogan 'People's education for people's power'. One crucial observation explicit in the thesis and expressed through verbatim interview extracts was that the school crisis could only be resolved when the apartheid capitalist system in its entirety has been abolished.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations given below are used in the text of the dissertation.

AAC - All African Convention
AEM - African Educational Movement
ANC - African National Congress
ANC(WC) - African National Congress (Western Cape)
ARMSCOR - Armaments Corporation of South Africa
ASA - African Students' Association
ASAC - Athlone Student Action Committee
ASM - African Student Movement
ASSA - Association for Sociology in Southern Africa
ASUSA - African Students' Union of South Africa
ATASA - African Teachers' Association of South Africa
AWB - Afrikaner Weerstands beweging
AZACTU - Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions
AZANYU - Azanian Youth Unity
AZAPO - Azanian People's Organisation
AZASM - Azanian Student Movement
AZASO - Azanian Student Organisation
BC - Black Consciousness
BCM - Black Consciousness Movement
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCMA</td>
<td>Black Consciousness Movement of Azania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOP</td>
<td>Balance of Payment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Br</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSc</td>
<td>Bachelor of Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSSP</td>
<td>Black Student Study Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACE</td>
<td>Centre for Adult and Continuing Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAL</td>
<td>Cape Action League</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATA</td>
<td>Cape African Teachers' Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATU</td>
<td>Cape African Teachers' Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAYCO</td>
<td>Cape Youth Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Crisis in Education Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLPP</td>
<td>Coloured Labour Preference Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSAS</td>
<td>Congress of South African Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Cape Provincial Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRADORA</td>
<td>Cradock Residents' Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRADOYA</td>
<td>Cradock Youth Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRIC</td>
<td>Careers Research and Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTCC</td>
<td>Concerned Teachers' Co-ordinating Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTPA</td>
<td>Cape Teachers' Professional Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUSA</td>
<td>Council of Unions of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>Department of Education and Culture</td>
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<td>DET</td>
<td>Department of Education and Training</td>
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DEIU - Democratic Teachers' Union
DPSC - Detainees Parents' Support Committee
DVT's - Departmental Visiting Teachers
EDASA - Education For an Aware South Africa
ERIP - Education Resources Information Project
FOSATU - Federation of South African Trade Unions
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GNP - Gross National Product
GST - General Sales Tax
HNP - Herstigte Nationale Party
HSRC - Human Sciences Research Council
IDAMASA - Inter-Denominational African Ministers' Association of South Africa
ISCC - Inter-Schools Co-ordinating Committee
JSRC - Joint Student Representative Council
LAGUNYA - Langa-Guguletu-Nyanga
MAC - Mamelodi Action Committee
MJC - Muslim Judicial Council
NACTU - National Congress of Trade Unions
Nam - Namibia
NAMDA - National Medical and Dental Association
NCCPC - National Co-ordinating Committee of Parent Committees
NECC - National Education Crisis Committee
NEUM - Non-European Unity Movement
NEUSA  - National Education Union of South Africa  
NF  - National Forum  
NP  - National Party  
NUSAS  - National Union of South African Students  
OFS  - Orange Free State  
PAC  - Pan Africanist Congress  
PAC  - Parents’ Action Committee  
PE  - Port Elizabeth  
PEBCO  - Port Elizabeth Black Civic Association  
PENATA  - Peninsula African Teachers’ Association  
PESCO  - Port Elizabeth Students’ Council  
PEWDO  - Port Elizabeth Women’s Organisation  
PFP  - Progressive Federal Party  
PIC  - Parents’ Interim Committee  
PRC  - Pupil Representative Council  
PSIC  - Parents’ and Student Interim Committee  
PTA  - Parent-Teacher-Association  
PTLC  - Paarl Teachers’ Liaison Committee  
PTS A  - Parent-Teacher-Student-Association  
PUTCO  - Public Utility Transport Corporation  
PWW  - Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging  
RESA  - Research on Education in South Africa  
RMC  - Release Mandela Committee
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<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAAWU</td>
<td>South African Allied Workers' Union</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Students' Action Committee</td>
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<td>SACHED</td>
<td>South African Committee for Higher Education</td>
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<td>SACOS</td>
<td>South African Council of Sport</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>South African Chemical Union</td>
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<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute of Race Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALDRU</td>
<td>South African Labour and Development Research Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANNNC</td>
<td>South African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANSCO</td>
<td>South African National Student Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>South African Police</td>
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<td>SASM</td>
<td>South African Student Movement</td>
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<td>SASO</td>
<td>South African Students' Organisation</td>
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<td>SATA</td>
<td>South African Teachers' Association</td>
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<td>SATS</td>
<td>South African Transport Services</td>
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<td>SORIA</td>
<td>Soshanguve Residents' Association</td>
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<td>Students of Young Azania</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Soweto Parents' Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPCC</td>
<td>Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Student Representative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSRC</td>
<td>Soweto Student Representative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People's Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASA</td>
<td>Teachers' Association of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TATA</td>
<td>Transvaal African Teachers' Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCF</td>
<td>Township Co-ordinating Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLSA</td>
<td>Teachers' League of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUCSA</td>
<td>Trade Union Council of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCM</td>
<td>University Christian Movement</td>
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<td>UCT</td>
<td>University of Cape Town</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISCO</td>
<td>United Students' Congress</td>
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<td>UNITRA</td>
<td>University of Transkei</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USF</td>
<td>United Students' Front</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>UTASA</td>
<td>United Teachers' Association of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWC</td>
<td>University of the Western Cape</td>
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<td>UWO</td>
<td>United Women's Organisation</td>
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<td>WECOSAC</td>
<td>Western Cape Students' Action Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>WECTU</td>
<td>Western Cape Teachers' Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEPSAC</td>
<td>Western Province Students' Action Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>WESCO</td>
<td>Western Cape Student Council</td>
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<td>WPOC</td>
<td>Western Province Council of Churches</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The boycott of Black schools in 1985 not only made the school system unworkable but also transformed the struggle for reforms into the contest for control of the schools themselves. Initially the students organized around the slogan "Liberation first, education later" which treated the boycott as a strategy rather than a tactic. This culminated in several negative consequences which not only led to the collapse of the school system and the termination of school careers but temporarily threatened to weaken students' further contribution to the liberation struggle. The point is that students failed to assess the limitation of the boycott strategy prior to its implementation. An indefinite boycott minimised their chances of contending successfully for the implementation of democratic control within these institutions. It also deprived them of the organisational base for the establishment of democratic SRCs and PISAs. With the reduction of their organisational capacity caused by the indefinite boycott, students' organizations started losing coherence and their communication structures with the community started disintegrating. This meant that the invaluable support which the community could lend to the students' struggle could no longer be fully galvanized. It was only at a later stage - 18 August 1985 - that COSAS charted a new course for the student struggle. The organization's principle of fostering consultations and the development of a healthy relationship amongst
parents, students and teachers came to the rescue of the student movement. It was during a parent-student meeting on 18 August 1985 at Guguletu that African students realized that they would need the maximum support of their parents, teachers, workers and the whole oppressed community if they wanted to pose a serious challenge to the apartheid education authorities. Because for many parents the deprivation of further schooling for students overshadowed any political gains of the boycott actions this support could not be guaranteed unless the educational struggle was conducted within the schools. On the national level these issues were taken up by the National Consultative Conferences on the Crisis in Education in December 1985 and in March 1986. At these meetings parents expressed the feeling that students had not fully utilized the opportunities created by the boycott tactic to advance the educational struggle. The main emphasis was on employing the boycott as a tactic rather than as a strategy because dogmatic adherence to boycotts created problems for the contest for democratic control within schools. The two conferences were unanimous in their rejection of the slogan "Liberation first, education later" in favour of the more dialectical slogan "People's education for people's power". Their justification was that opponents of apartheid education had to begin putting forward a fundamentally different education system which could replace the existing one. In addition, they had to start addressing the question of how best could the transformation of the existing apartheid structures be effected bearing in mind that the regime had not yet been overthrown. It was in this sense that 'People's education for people's power' was viewed as a creative antithesis and, unlike the boycott strategy which was incompatible with transformation, it called for the establishment of people's power in education.
As a result, the students learnt that the education arena was but one site of the liberation struggle and that the contest for the control of this arena should be intensified (by fighting for the establishment of People's Education) both inside and outside the schools. In addition, by the end of the 1985 school crisis a generation of high school students had been politicized and the community at large had been drawn into a united response to State oppression and police brutality. Moreover, students had learnt how to organize rallies, how to consult and mobilize support, and how to articulate the demands of the oppressed masses.

In the process of recounting the 1985 school crisis experience the following arguments were advanced: One cannot treat events in education in isolation from other developments in South African society as a whole. Schools do not operate in a socio-political and economic vacuum. Any serious examination of the educational crisis should view it as part and parcel of the 'organic crisis' within which the apartheid system is encoiled. Thus the 'crisis of authority' within the schools in 1985 was a reflection of the socio-economic, political and ideological crisis which was engulfing South Africa.

This school crisis was characterized by an attempt by the students supported by parents and workers to challenge the power relations reflected in State ideological apparatuses like schools (which function to secure hegemony for the ruling class) so that liberatory values could be injected into the education system. With the advent of the concept of 'People's Education', the struggle in the educational terrain moved from mere protest to challenge. The development of this concept also signalled the death of the slogan 'Liberation now, education later'. In their quest
for freedom, adherents of the latter slogan were prepared temporarily to forfeit education. It is in this sense that 'People's Education' was a response to a political crisis. It recommended a strategy of emancipatory education to ward off unstrategic militant struggles and to pose a challenge to ruling class hegemony within schools. This strategic shift came during a period when South Africa had a complex set of economic, political and ideological structures which provided elements of hegemony for the White ruling class. Since formal control of societal institutions like schools was in the hands of the White ruling class, counter-hegemonic practices or a 'war of position' by students' and workers' movements were in part required in order to capture power within these structures.

Educational and political economic struggles were merged resulting in the breakdown of apartheid authority structures as the protest for school-based demands (lack of educational resources) was reinforced by parallel workers' and community struggles for a living wage and the removal of troops from the schools (and the lifting of the state of emergency), respectively. The links between varied domains wherein the crisis was manifest reinforced the sharpening of the conflicts in each leading towards much more radical suggested resolutions than before. This resulted in a progressive reduction of ruling class hegemony. Therefore in order to understand the 1985 school crisis an exposition of the nature of the relationship between students' and parent/workers' struggles is needed.

The school crisis is a manifestation of the contest inherent in the South African socio-economic and political processes. In this sense the crisis within schools was a microcosm of the organic crisis. The latter's causes
were linked to the crisis of capital accumulation, the crisis of apartheid rule, and the severely restricted domestic market resulting from international sanctions against South Africa which had led to massive unemployment. As a consequence of the socio-economic and political crisis, a class struggle developed placing demands on the agenda such as the right to form independent trade unions and the right to free and compulsory education. These struggles were neither sporadic nor confined to a narrow spectrum of issues. They mobilized the oppressed around a broad spectrum of socio-economic and political demands which included the abolition of apartheid education and its replacement by an alternative democratic system. The Freedom Charter provided connections between the specific demands and their common solution in the abolition of apartheid. This enabled students, parents and workers within the Charterist Camp to forge a united front against the regime at ideological, policy and organizational levels. The organizational unity which arose together with a coherent programme of action was symbolized by the establishment of the UDF in 1983. It was within the UDF that specific demands were bundled together in a joint demand for a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa at this historical conjuncture. The overt politisization of all grievances and their linkage to the apartheid system served as a response to Black people's subordination to White domination in every domain of their lives. Moreover, the increase in the application of the State repressive apparatus to quell any expression of discontent, tended to remind the oppressed people of the common basis of their subordination.

Within a historical context the thesis demonstrates that there is a connection between Black students' grievances concerning educational resources (both human and physical) and the Black community's
socio-economic deprivations and political subordination. Since the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape is a result of a capitalistic and racially-based education system which is part of the whole segregation and later the apartheid process, it seems the crisis cannot be overcome without the abolition of the whole apartheid capitalist system. Thus the abolition of the apartheid capitalist system is one of the necessary conditions for both the alleviation of the crisis and the establishment of an alternative education system in South Africa.

The resolution of the education crisis can be much easier when power has been handed over to the majority of the people. Since the ruling bloc is unlikely to hand over power voluntarily, the contest for the control of societal institutions at all levels has to be advanced in a transitional period. For instance, a programme of action to change power relations at schools and to win community control of schools ('People's Education for People's Power') is an integral part of the struggle for liberation in South Africa. There is therefore a connection between the resolution of the school crisis and that of the organic crisis. The fate of the schools is intertwined with that of other societal institutions in South Africa.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework applied in the analysis of data employs both Antonio Gramsci's twin concepts, 'organic crisis' and hegemony, and Paulo Freire's notion of conscientization. The notion of 'organic crisis' has its origins in the writings of Gramsci. According to him,
"A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves ... and that, despite this, political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making efforts to cure them within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts ... form the terrain of conjunctural and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organise" (Gramsci, 1971:179).

It is important to think about the 'crisis' phenomenon strategically, conjuncturally, and politically rather than concentrating on economic conditions and tendencies only. While economic aspects may provide a necessary level of determination, they cannot provide the sufficient conditions for determining either the politico-ideological forms which the crisis may assume or the overall tendency of their resolution. As Gramsci puts it:

"It may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of themselves produce fundamental historical events; they can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving the entire subsequent development of national life ... The specific question of economic hardship or well-being as a cause of new historical realities is a partial aspect of the question of the relations of force, at the various levels" (Gramsci, 1971:184).

For Gramsci, crises are over-determined by aspects such as the economic, political, social and ideological in principle and therefore can never be simply 'read off' from the economic element. There is therefore no 'fixed' scheme to be applied because crises are subject to a variety of possible 'determinants' and forms of resolution.

In reinforcing Gramsci's point, Stuart Hall (1988:43) stresses that what characterizes the immediate arena of contest cannot be accounted for by the existing economic contradictions alone. The continual attempts to maintain the prevailing social order have primacy in the description of the immediate site of struggle. When the 'crisis' is 'organic' the strategy of the ruling class takes both defensive and formative forms.
State response includes profound restructuring of its institutions and ideological discourses so as to construct 'a new balance of forces'. To achieve this goal policies directed at the attainment of a new settlement - but 'within certain limits' - are instituted. Political and ideological work to reformulate and adapt old ideologies to the new conditions become part of the overall reconstructive strategy which varied socio-political and ideological forces adopt to solve the crisis. Gramsci maintains that:

"The incessant and persistent efforts ... from the terrain of the 'conjunctural' and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organize. These forces seek to demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions exist to make possible, and hence imperative, the accomplishment of certain historical tasks ... The demonstration in the last analysis only succeeds and is 'true' if it becomes a new reality, if the forces of opposition triumph; in the immediate, it is developed in a series of ideological, religious, philosophical, political and juridical polemics, whose concreteness can be estimated to the extent to which they are convincing and shift the existing disposition of social forces" (Gramsci, 1971:178).

A point which needs to be clarified is that in the category 'forces of opposition' is included certain elements within the ruling class. This group is composed of the element which believes that in order to conserve the prevailing social order some form of reform is necessary. Another strategy of the ruling class which gains prominence in the context of crisis is the increasing reliance on coercion in disciplining the politico-economic struggle. In the period of 'organic crisis' and when the social conflicts have become acute, the State’s repressive and legal apparatuses are employed for both disciplinary and educative functions. Stuart Hall (1988) says this is ensured through,

"... the extension, over the period, of police power and surveillance of political groups and individuals; the use of police and legal apparatuses in a wide area of social conflicts; the role of the judicial forces in containing the economic and industrial class struggle; the employment of new judicial instruments - the Industrial Relations Act, legal constraints on picketing and strikes; the extension of the conspiracy charge and political trials; the abuse of habeas
corpus under the loose definition of 'emergency'. Just as important have been the elaboration of legal and juridical ideas and discourses around the themes of the defence of the State, the protection of the political order from subversion, and their connection with crime as a 'symptom' of moral degeneration and the collapse of the social authority" (Hall, 1988:136).

The latter factor has as its primary outcome, the generation of broad consensus for the defence of the prevailing social order. It is principally a hegemonic war for the re-imposition of 'law-and-order' along populist lines. Ideological hegemony is of vital importance in the context of an 'organic crisis' especially in the process of creating conditions conducive to the attainment of consensus and compromises.

According to Raymond Williams (1977:112):

"A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or structure. It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits. In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular. Its internal structures are highly complex, as can readily be seen in any concrete analysis. Moreover and this is crucial, reminding of the necessary thrust of the concept, it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own. We have then to add to the concept of hegemony the concept of counter hegemony and alternative hegemony, which are real and persistent elements of practice."

A crisis management strategy in a nation-state also concerns the right to monopolise the definition of the situation. The ideological hegemony which prevails in the competition between rival interpretations is also decisive in the determination of the outcome/resolution of the crisis. With divergent interests still existing and political re-alignments continuing to occur - which in fact were part of the causes of the hegemonic crisis - it is always impossible to predict the outcome of the hegemonic contest. The struggle for hegemony and legitimacy is therefore crucial in the reconstruction of a new social order. The notion of
hegemony refers to the ceaseless work required in the creation of legitimate authority structures without which the exercise of State power is made difficult.

According to Stuart Hall (1988:133),

"It also requires that 'account be taken of those interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised' so that 'a certain compromise should be formed'... In the 'war of position' though the defensive-offensive tactics in relation to each position has an overall effect, it is overwhelmingly the question of strategic position and disposition - that is, the struggle for hegemony - which counts, 'in the last instance'."

Hegemony in Gramsci's theorization means the permeation of ideas, values, attitudes, beliefs and morality supportive of the established order in the whole society in order to gain consent (or to maintain ideological control over the masses). Gramsci (1957, 1971) argues that the constant exercise of coercive force alone for gaining legitimacy by a State indicates the existence of an 'organic crisis' or crisis of authority. An organic crisis is a situation where the dominant hegemony is disintegrating and the masses' ties to the dominant and traditional ideologies are broken. This may result from the conscious mobilization into political awareness of hitherto passive and repressed social groups. The purpose of the 'war of position' strategy (which involves conscientization of repressed groups to make them aware of their oppression so that they can engage in liberatory action) is to bring about this 'crisis of authority'.

Lastly, the notion of conscientization developed by Paulo Freire (1972) stresses the importance of the oppressed understanding the cause of their oppression through critical reflection on their conditions of existence. It is through critical reflection that political action by the oppressed people can come about. The concept of conscientization can therefore be
defined as a process through which people become aware of their situation by the adoption of consciousness-raising and dialogical educational strategies by educators, reflect upon their situation, and act upon it as conscious social actors.

LITERATURE ON THE 'ORGANIC CRISIS' OF THE 1980s IN SOUTH AFRICA

Since the mid-1970s a profound economic crisis began maturing due to international, regional and domestic factors such as the slow down in growth experienced by Western economies (Cassim, 1987:535; Von Holdt, 1986:304; Stadler, 1987:161). Certain factors which included the domination and subordination of the South African economy to the world economy and political stagnation accounted for the lack of creative economic solutions to the crisis. The lack of viable solutions meant that the high growth rates of the 1960s and early 1970s could no longer be achieved and the downswing which started in the late 70s could not be reversed. For instance while during the periods 1962-72 and 1972-1981, the average annual growth rates were 5.5% and 3%, respectively, this decreased to 1.1% during the period 1981 - 1986. The sharpening of economic and political tensions due to the declining growth rate led to the start of the breakdown during the 1980s of the once relatively stable pattern of economic advance (Cassim, 1987:535).

Factors such as the stagnation of industry, insufficient markets, the fall in the value of the Rand, the decline in the annual growth rates of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the balance of payment (BOP) deficit formed part of the explanation for the economic crisis of the 1980s (Von Holdt, 1986:304, 309, 310; Cassim, 1987:540). Linked to these factors were, however, the limits imposed by the sanctions and disinvestment
campaign (Alexander, 1988:10; Innes, 1987:551). This campaign made an important contribution to bringing about the conditions under which the severe BOP deficit problem arose. The demand for, and prices of, SA exports started declining and while the demand for, and prices of, imports were increasing. This culminated in a BOP deficit since SA was importing more than what it was exporting. Thus the decrease in traditional exports, the falling gold price and increased imports were responsible for the balance of payments crisis in early 1984. At this stage the BOP current account which had reflected a R2,5-billion deficit at the end of 1983 had increased to R2,86-billion deficit. The BOP deficit had debt implications for South Africa and this weakened the value of the Rand in relation to the growing strength of the Dollar price. The steady decline in the value of the Rand from 1983 decreased export prices while increasing those of imports. The further drop in the value of the Rand at the end of 1984 led to the translation of the BOP crisis into the inflation crisis (Von Holdt, 1986:309; Innes, 1986:291).

The decrease in the GDP annual growth rates was caused by, amongst others, the monetarist policy response to the international recession of 1981 implemented in the early 1980s. This policy strengthened the effects of the international recession in South Africa. Contrary to the policy-makers' intentions to combat increasingly severe recessions, the monetarist policies were partly responsible for the debt crisis at the end of 1984. Other negative results of these policies were the falling of per capita incomes, rising inflation, outflow of capital, closing down of companies, retrenchment and increasing unemployment. In 1982 overall unemployment rose to the level of 22,5%. Together with economic and political conflicts which arose in 1984 in part as a response to the official decision to drive the economy into recession, retrenchments and
growing unemployment, the BOP deficit and the debt crisis were undermining investor confidence, inhibiting imports and rendering it difficult to pay for borrowing (Cassim, 1987:540-1; Innes, 1986:290).

The above crisis compelled the South African regime to devise a formative strategy with two faces. First, the National Party (NP) attempted to remodel political institutions and restructure economic relations as a means by which the prevailing apartheid social order could be legitimized. Part of this aspect involved the tricameral deal, and the increase in economic and educational opportunities for a section of the oppressed majority. Second, both the SADF and the SAP were strengthened so that the economic and political restructuring could occur within a stable and orderly context. The NP strategists believed that reforms 'within certain limits' could only be implemented when the State's repressive apparatus's resources and powers had been increased for the defence of the State (Stadler, 1987:161).

It is in this sense that the apartheid policy partly contributed to the development of the organic crisis in SA. The purpose of the NP strategy was to defend and perpetrate White property and supremacy. According to Johnstone,
"The actual goal of apartheid policies is the pragmatic development of an economically powerful White supremacy. The Whites want continued prosperity and continued superiority and the government is seeking to secure both these goals together. The true rationale of apartheid policies is thus to maximise economic development both for the sake of White prosperity and for the material protection of White supremacy. The function of the official ideology is to justify the increasing demand of rights to, and servile status of, non-Whites in the "White" areas in the name of future rights and opportunities for them in 'their own' area" (Johnstone, 1982: 20).

This policy was in part a response to the development of Black Nationalism and working class consciousness in the urban areas in the 1940s. When the ANC was formed in 1912, its reformist leadership could not attract the support of militant workers within the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU). According to Saul and Gelb:

"It was only in the 1940s that the national movement and the working-class struggle began to link up more effectively as in the wake of the unprecedented strikes of those years, the ANC set down firm roots among the people, and, under pressure from its Youth League, radicalised its perceptions of South African Society" (Saul and Gelb, 1986:189).

The populist politics of the ANC in the 1950s linked up the militant African nationalist and the proletarian line. However, the Africanists within the ANC viewed this as betrayal of 'pure' African Nationalism. This tension resulted into the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress by the latter faction. The establishment of the PAC marked both the opposition to 'multiracialism' and the rejection of socialism by the 'Africanists' (Saul and Gelb, 1986: 189-190). Nevertheless there was an interpenetration of class and national democratic struggle during the 1950s.

Moreover, worker and student struggles of the 1970s also placed much emphasis on the link between proletarian action and the Black liberation struggle. Unlike the ANC, the Black Consciousness (BC) movement's
'anti-White liberal' policy alienated White democrats. It also believed that the Black working class alone could end the system of 'racial capitalism'. The BC movement and its allies criticized the Freedom Charter for its being a populist and liberal document (Wolpe, 1988; Saul and Gelb, 1986:192, 195-196). Within the ANC/SACP Alliance itself are those who put much emphasis on the primacy of the national struggle and others who stress the importance of merging revolutionary nationalism and socialism in the SA struggle. The former position is criticized for its failure to guard against the betrayal of the working class by the ANC's petit bourgeois and reformist leadership which could pursue its own sectional goal - its co-option into the ruling class. The latter position is criticized by the 'left'/ 'workerist' tendency for failing to identify the fact that national liberation and class struggle stand in contradiction to one another. It is not in the interest of workers, it is argued, to fight for national liberation. For the 'left'/ 'workerist' tendency a socialist revolution is a solution to the SA dilemma. Despite the 'left'/ 'workerist' tendency's protestations, the simultaneity of racially defined and class-based oppression in SA calls for an analysis which stresses the interplay of national-democratic and socialist forms of struggle. Although the existence of a tension between the two could not be denied, the argument that the two forms of struggle could complement each other is equally convincing. The two dimensions of SA struggle cannot be compartmentalized 'phases' of revolution as they overlap. The existence of racially defined oppression requires the reinforcement of class struggle by national struggle and vice versa (Wolpe, 1988:5-23; Saul and Gelb, 1986:194-200; Bundy, 1989: 3-4). However, the contest for the right to define the situation amongst SA liberation movements was a manifestation of the crisis engulfing the country.
Alex Callinicos (1981, 1988) argued that we could better understand the 'crisis' in South Africa by employing the concept 'organic crisis' in our analysis (Callinicos, 1981:93; 1988:28). John Saul and Steven Gelb (1981, 1986) also described the crisis in South Africa as 'organic'. South Africa in the 1980s, according to them, had 'incurable structural contradictions' deeply and firmly implanted in its social structure for an extreme duration, and the military-parliamentary forces and extra-parliamentary political forces were contesting their resolution (Saul & Gelb, 1981, 1986). The argument was that the relative over-politicization of the apartheid economy had brought about political and ideological factors over a period of time which developed into stumbling blocks to capital accumulation. The 1980s crisis was therefore seen as different from depressions, cyclical economic crises, and structural crises because it was spread throughout South African economic, political, judicial, social and ideological structures and relations. This view was also advanced by Karl von Holdt who argued that the 1980s recession was not simply an ordinary slump but 'combined cyclical factors with more profound and serious structural contradictions which could only be resolved by restructuring capitalist production' (Von Holdt, 1986:304).

Ignoring the above conditions for the resolution of the South African 'organic crisis', P.W. Botha came up with a strategy to alter these 'contradictions' within limits set by the continued reproduction of capitalism in the SA social formation (Callinicos, 1981:43; 1988:28). This was done without sound consideration of SA's peripheral status in the international economic structure and the growing militancy and revolt of the Black working class - factors which were partly responsible having rendered his 'reforms' inefficient. However, the indecisiveness of the
Botha regime should be viewed with due consideration to the verkrampte/verligte divisions within the National Party. Facing a nationwide popular movement opposed to its rule, the divided NP increasingly relied on the State coercive apparatus in dealing with any opposition. However, if anything, these tactics tended to exacerbate the 'organic crisis' (Callinicos, 1981, 1988).

The crisis was so deep in the mid-80s that the country’s economic growth was going in reverse and unemployment was rife. In Port Elizabeth, for example, unemployment amongst under-25 youth was placed above 70%. The State response to the 1980s economic crisis - the monetarist policy - not only attacked the working class through retrenchments which increased unemployment but also lowered the price of labour. Other negative economic indicators which became symptoms of the crisis were: rise in bankruptcies; fall of fixed investments, domestic savings and profits, retrenchments, unemployment and inflation. However, the actual causes of this deterioration as argued here included the peripheral status of South African capital. The linkage of the domestic economy to foreign capital meant that the international structural contradictions of capital had adverse effects on national capital (Bundy, 1986:11; Alexander, 1988:10; Cassim, 1987:541). In Navarro’s words:

"The actual cause of the crisis is the decline in the profitability of the largest industrial and commercial companies of the capitalist world. In popular parlance the propelling industries of Western capitalism have not been making enough profits and they have triggered the present crisis in order to recreate the conditions for those profits to rise again. The objective of the crisis was to reorder and recreate a new international social division of labour that would allow the rate of profit to increase" (Navarro, 1982:44).

However, South Africa’s history of a consistent exclusion of the Black working class from its socio-political institutions makes it unique
amongst other capitalist countries. The antagonism which developed from the policy of exclusion became so acute in the 1980s that the State had to rely increasingly on the coercive/repressive State apparatuses to defend existing social relations. The use of the oppressive State apparatus bred more socio-economic and political conflicts which deepened the crisis. According to Colin Bundy:

"Economic malfunctions do not occur in a socio-political vacuum. On the contrary, they interlock with, they aggravate and are aggravated by, social and political conflicts" (Bundy, 1986:11).

By the same token the above elements of the organic crisis led to the intensification of an ideological crisis (Bundy, 1986:11) to the further annoyance of both monopoly and Afrikaner capital on the one hand, the perpetrators of apartheid on the other. The result was a legitimacy crisis for the apartheid regime which led to attempts at ideological renovations directed at winning the "hearts and minds" of the Blacks during Botha's 'reform' period.

According to Bundy (1986:11-12), the 'crisis in the schools' is linked to this ideological crisis of the apartheid regime because confusion in the ideological sphere creates a deep 'hegemonic crisis'. When the dominant ideology can no longer generate consensus amongst a significant section of the ruling class itself, churches, universities and schools face increasing difficulties in propagating it. The inability to propagate the ideology of the established order is nothing else but an intense ideological crisis which is a microcosm of the general crisis - the organic crisis. The crumbling of the ideological hegemony of the established order led to the transformation of educational institutions into sites of the struggle for liberation. Thus the 'crisis in education'
is related to the broader phenomenon - the wider, structural dilemmas which were confronting the SA State during the 1980s. Neville Alexander's account of this relation is instructive:

"The events in the educational arena since 1976, important as they obviously are, cannot be treated in isolation from the critical developments in the rest of the social formation and in Southern Africa as a whole. Any mono-causal approach leads to blatant distortion of reality and inevitably to disastrous intervention. In short, we have to be clear at all times that the ten years of crisis in the educational arena represent at the same time ten years of crisis in the system of racial capitalism as a whole. The crisis in education both reflects and reflects back on the larger crisis in which the system is encoiled politically, economically and ideologically" (Alexander, 1988:9).

METHODOLOGY

(i) Introduction

"Marxism does not seek to sustain the 'simple people' in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but instead to lead them to a higher view of life. If it asserts the need for contact between the intellectuals and the simple people it does not in order to limit scientific activity and maintain unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to build an intellectual moral bloc which makes politically possible the intellectual progress of the masses and not only a few groups of intellectuals. The active man of the masses works practically, but he does not have a clear theoretical consciousness of his actions, which is also a knowledge of the world in so far as he changed it" (Gramsci, 1957:66).

Employing a sociological imagination informed by Gramsci's historical materialism data was drawn from primary and secondary documentary sources which included journals, publications of organisations and newspapers. Another empirical method utilised in the data collection phase was in-depth interviews. Data elicited from the application of both methods was used to construct a chronology of events in the 1985 school crisis and the socio-economic, political and ideological crisis in South Africa.

In-depth methods approach society from the bottom. This type of approach may help the participants in the research to reflect upon their
experiences. Research Projects which are confined to the examination of objective tendencies tend to lose touch with the perceptions and experiences of research subjects. The strength of in-depth methods is therefore in its relatively high degree of naturalism. In contrast with quantitative methods such as a survey, in-depth methods are less artificial, are closer to the respondents, and are high on internal validity. While they do have disadvantages, the most common being that the researcher's subjectivity and its effects on respondents may bias the results presenting difficulties of replication (where other researchers may want to check my findings), they have more advantages especially for this kind of research project.

Employing in-depth methods gives the researcher the chance to have a two-way communication, an objective which could not be served by use of a standardised survey. Maria Mies (1983) says there exists an exploitative relationship between the research staff and the respondents in quantitative research. Respondents are often treated as "objects" of study, deceived and manipulated for the benefit of the research product. Moreover, quantitative data cannot convey an in-depth understanding of the subject under study. Through a dialogical approach similar to Freire's (1972;1984) conscientisation methodology can an in-depth understanding of the subject under study be gained. While Freire has been strongly influenced by radical humanism, he has also been influenced by Marxism. He stresses both content and process. It is in this sense that his concept of conscientisation can be easily linked to Gramsci's Marxism, particularly Gramsci's notion of hegemony. The contest for consciousness for Gramsci is the primary struggle between the ruling class and the oppressed. For the oppressed to win power, the development of organic intellectuals is necessary.
Gramsci defines organic intellectuals as the thinking and organising element of the working class. They have a directive and organisational function which is educative. Contact between these intellectuals and the "simple" needs to be the medium through which problems are studied and resolutions are identified. Organic intellectuals function to connect the oppressed's historical experience with laws of history and to a coherent and superior conception of the world. The largely uncritical and unconscious way that the masses perceive and understand the world he termed "common sense". This common sense must be challenged so that it becomes "good sense". Gramsci’s conception of historical materialism will therefore help to test the underlying assumption of this project, which is that the development of the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape was a response to certain material conditions prevailing at this particular historical conjuncture and its resolution was part and parcel of the process aimed at alleviating the general economic, social, political and ideological crisis in South Africa.

(ii) Data Collection

For data collection secondary sources, primary documentary sources such as newspapers, pamphlets and publications of organisations, and in-depth interviews were utilised.

1. Secondary Sources

In Chapter 1 the dissertation relies heavily on secondary source material to produce a broader perspective and the level of generalisation required in dealing with the development of student struggles particularly in the
Western Cape. Some of the useful secondary sources used were: Kallaway (1983); Lodge (1983); Molteno (1987); Hare (1983); Bot (1985); Rose and Turner (1975); and Hermer (1980).

2. Primary Documentary Sources

The following primary documentary sources were utilised especially in Chapters 1 and 2:

(a) Commercial and community newspapers
(b) Pamphlets
(c) Organisational publications

In the process of reconstructing chronologically the 1985 school crisis events in the Western Cape, Cape Town's two English medium daily

(a) Commercial and Community Newspapers

Commercial newspapers, The Argus and Cape Times, were combed. Another commercial newspaper, the Business Day, and a commercial magazine, The Financial Mail, were also consulted. In addition the Johannesburg based newspapers, The Weekly Mail, The Sowetan and City Press, and the Natal-based newspapers, the Sunday Tribune, The Herald and The Mercury, were consulted to capture the national development of the 1985 school crisis. Grassroots, a community-based newspaper, was very useful in cross-checking information provided by the other newspapers and in this sense newspapers were of immense value in the process of constructing the chronology of the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape with a particular focus on DET schools. Newspaper cuttings were collected at several
resource centres and libraries such as the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU), the African Studies Library, and the SANSCO-NUSAS Resource Centre at UCT, the Black Students Study Project (BSSP) in Athlone, the Education Resources Information Project (ERIP) and the Centre for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE) at UWC, the Careers Research Information Centre (CRIC) at Claremont, and the South African Committee for Higher Education (SACHED) in Observatory. The Argus Library in Cape Town was combed with a view to present a more consistent chronology of the school crisis in 1985 and the related economic and political events which were organically linked to it. Unfortunately, newspapers have too often shown how little reliance can be placed on them.

Reports are often inaccurate as in newspapers speed is valued more than polish resulting in the publication of wrong news. Besides unintentional incorrect reporting there is a problem of bias, much of which may emanate from the political stance taken by the newspapers. More often the political "angle" of a newspaper reflects the political views of its owners who are mostly members of the dominant groups in a society. This point is valid for most newspapers in South Africa. Government censorship is an additional issue in discussing the accuracy and reliability of newspapers as sources of empirical data. Due to government censorship, especially in 1985 when media curbs were imposed by the government, some of the views expressed in the newspapers were distorted making it difficult for social researchers who wished to use in scientific work. In view of this potential inaccuracy and unreliability of newspaper sources, other primary documentary sources such as publications of organisations and pamphlets as well as in-depth interviews were used to cross-check information provided by newspapers. The collection of primary documentary data took place from July 1987 until September 1989.
(b) Pamphlets

Additional primary documentary sources of supplementary information were pamphlets which had been issued during the course of the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape by community, political, parent, teacher and student organisations. Some of these pamphlets (Documents 2, 68, 71) to a certain extent helped in the reflection of the level of consciousness reached by students in 1985. Another purpose served by the use of pamphlets in this dissertation was that of cross-checking data from other sources used such as newspapers and in-depth interviews. While the collection used was not as comprehensive as initially hoped for, interviewees 5, 9, 20, 24, 38 and 45 offered the researcher private collections of pamphlets which roughly covered their organisational activities during the 1985 school crisis.

Interviewees 20 and 24 also helped the researcher to gain access to the Black Student Study Project (BSSP) office in Athlone where an additional collection of pamphlets and newspaper cuttings were obtained. As more resource centres such as the Educational Resources Information Project (ERIP) and the Centre for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE) at the University of the Western Cape, the Careers Research and Information Centre (CRIC) in Claremont, the Trade Union Library at Community House in Salt River, the South African Committee for Higher Education (SACHED) Library, and the African Studies Library at UCT were consulted, more pamphlets which covered the education struggle as far back as the late 1970's to 1988 were obtained although these collections were uneven and had gaps. The SANSCO-NUSAS Resource Centre at UCT was also useful in the collection of pamphlets.
(c) Organisational Publications

Publications of community, political, teachers and student organisations such as the Black Sash, the UDF, WECTU and COSAS during the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape and after were collected together with pamphlets and newspaper data. As these repeated factual information in newspapers, pamphlets and in-depth interviews, they were used both in the process of constructing the chronology of the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape and for cross-checking the data provided by the other sources. In addition, information offered by publications of organisations provided valuable insights into organisational developments and provided overview analyses of the 1985 crisis in South Africa as a whole (see Appendix IV; Documents 10, 20, 39, 57).

3. In-depth Interviews

The single most important method of data collection was interviewing. A total of 45 interviews were conducted mostly in Cape Town African townships, namely, Crossroads, Guguletu, Langa and Nyanga between September 1988 and February 1989. The remaining interviews were conducted in respondents' work places in Cape Town (as in the case of interviewees 11, 25, 29 and 40) and in students' residences at UCT (in the case of interviewees 2, 8, 9, 12, 20, 21, 24, 32 and 41 who were university students at the time).

Interviews 7 and 12 were conducted in Coloured designated areas where the respondents involved lived at the time. These interviews aimed at reflecting on the situation at Coloured schools during the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape. However the two interviewees were selected
for other reasons as well, for instance, interviewee 7 was a leading member of AZAPO national executive and interviewee 17, while he had been a member of the Bonteheuwel Inter-School Committee in 1985, was a member of COSATU in 1988.

From the above 45 interviews, 51 people were interviewed (there were occasions when two to three respondents were interviewed together) Of the 51 interviewees, 38 were men and the remaining 13 were women. The interviewees included two DET school inspectors, five DET school principals, six teachers, seven tertiary students, sixteen high school pupils, three primary school pupils, one priest, and four executive members of the Parents' Action Committee (PAC) in 1985. Except for the two school inspectors, two of the principals, one of the teachers, one of the tertiary students, and two of the high school pupils, the rest of the respondents were involved in community, political, civic, teachers and students organisations in 1985.

Of the remaining respondents, all except one (Interviewee 15) were prominent in civic, community or political structures not based in schools. Taking into consideration the fact that respondents were selected on the basis of their direct involvement during the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape, the smaller proportion of women interviewees in this research project reflected that sexism, consciously or not, was still deeply embedded in even those structures which claimed to be alternative. In an attempt to address this imbalance I attempted to look for additional women but after interviewing one of this category of subjects, that is interviewee 15, I decided against this strategy. The under-representation of women at the leadership level of community and student organisations during the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape
had an effect of excluding a significant section of women from the sample of this research project. This reflected on gender inequalities inherent in the SA society and which demands urgent attention. The above sample was not statistically representative because there was no possibility of probability sampling. Gaining rapport was of higher priority than gaining statistical representation. This was because I wanted interviewees to recount their experiences during the 1985 school crisis in detail. The study was not aimed at statistical associations, but rather the respondents' own experiences and perceptions. When it is essential to get an insider's view of reality, patience and time is needed to allow the respondent to make his point. Moreover, making fruitful contacts and developing trust necessitate non-random selection of respondents. In addition, the political sensitiveness of the topic had an added effect of making the development of reciprocal relationship of trust between researcher and respondent more difficult (especially because interviews were conducted when SA was under the State of Emergency).

Finding entree to the setting was not difficult because 1988 was my seventh year in Cape Town. Moreover, during 1983 I stayed at Malunga Park flats, a UCT African students' residence which was situated in Guguletu. During my stay in Cape Town I had established contacts with people in the African townships through:

(a) teaching UNISA Sociology I and II at SACHED in Mowbray from 1985 to 1986,

(b) teaching UNISA Sociology I, Geography Std.10 and History Std.8 at St. Francis centre in Langa from March 1986 to March 1989, and

(c) conducting in-depth interviews for my Honours research project entitled Experiences and Perceptions of Apartheid: Interviews with Africans in the Western Cape (Nekhwevha, March 1986).
Finally, some of my fellow students, who had played a major role in the formation of the Students' Action Committee (SAC) at UCT in 1985 and who were interviewed for this research, had contacts with community organisations which I utilised.

Thus before setting out to conduct interviews, I had already been interacting with community organisers, teachers, students and other potential interviewees. For instance, a teacher who was in my UNISA Sociology I class at SACHED and later at St. Francis in Langa (Interviewee 39) had an elder brother who was the Chairperson of the Ministers' Fraternal. Also she was teaching under a principal who was the Vice-President of PENATA. The two are interviewees 16 and 36B respectively. In another case, a clinical psychologist I interviewed for my Honours project, after being introduced to her by her son (my Sociology classmate at UCT from 1982-1984), introduced me to her husband who was a DET school inspector in Cape Town (Interviewee 1) during the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape. Where contacts were not available, for example when I interviewed a NACTU official (Interviewee 29), some difficulties were experienced. My request for an interview with the above interviewee was opened for a debate amongst the membership in an attempt to get a proper mandate for the interview. It was only through my persistence and after a long time that the interview was finally conducted in December 1988. Thus personal contacts mostly accounted for how access was gained.

Interviews were in-depth and open-ended with a semi-structured interview schedule. Question pointers were constructed on the basis of data gathered from such primary documentary, and secondary, sources as had been available prior to the commencement of the interview phase.
Furthermore, my own experience and limited involvement in the 1985 school crisis was useful in the construction of a sub-set of question pointers. Informal and formal discussions which I had on the general socio-economic, political and ideological crisis in South Africa, and the educational crisis in South Africa in general, such as the discussions in the 1987 (June-July) ASSA Conference at the University of the Western Cape where I delivered a paper entitled Transformatory Education: The SA Education Crisis and Suggested Solutions (Nekhwevha, 1987), contributed crucially to the construction of question pointers for the in-depth interviews. Such discussions served effectively the functions of a pilot study. The interview schedule used, covered the following topics:

(a) the chronology of the 1985 school crisis events particularly in DET schools in the Western Cape;

(b) how the interviewee perceives/views the educational crisis in SA in general and the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape in particular;

(c) whether there exist any links between the school crisis and the organic crisis, and

(d) whether the school crisis was overcome (If yes, how was it resolved? and if not, how could it be resolved)?

Although questions were semi-structured, they also depended upon the spontaneous flow of the interviewees' account of their experiences, which was not hindered. Having started a heading, I allowed the respondent to dictate the subsequent situation. Question pointers were used simply to ensure that at each interview the four points given above were covered. During most of the interviews the social situation was very natural and respondents were given room to develop their ideas, for example, Interviewee 9 insisted that the 'cultural' aspect had to be added to what I initially characterised as an economic, political and ideological crisis in South Africa. The use of in-depth methods can be extremely useful in getting to the bottom of a complex social situation and set of events and
can introduce the researcher to relevant factors which had not been previously considered. For instance, before conducting the interviews I had never heard of the Township Co-ordinating Forum (TCF) and when Interviewees 5 introduced the structure, I simply used a prompt "Tell me more about the TCF", and the whole idea of the Township Co-ordinating Forum was explained to me. Undoubtedly, then, an interviewer can gain real depth of insight into what may be a very complex social situation like the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape. A tape recorder was used to record all the in-depth interviews and it was only on one occasion (Interview 45), when a tape was full and an additional one was not available, that brief notes were taken. The use of a tape recorder made it possible for a complete verbatim record of the interviews to be kept. A tape recorder, while helpful in some ways, might be inhibiting to interviewees. However when brief notes are used in the absence of a tape recorder the exercise might be demanding. In my Honours dissertation entitled Experiences and Perceptions of Apartheid: Interviews with Africans in the Western Cape (Nkhwevha, 1986), I used brief notes when conducting in-depth interviews. Brief notes taken at the time of the interview need to be expanded more fully immediately after the interview while the memory is still fresh. Moreover the researcher is always in danger of forgetting to put a point forward or not being able to understand her own notes afterwards. By having used a tape recorder all these problems were avoided and the in-depth interviews were subsequently transcribed. However, verbal slips constantly appear in the tape and the speech is much more unstructured, hesitant and ungrammatical than one might expect. Moreover, a full grasp of what was conveyed in words demands the incorporation of what was communicated by facial expressions and body gestures as these are used to expand or supplement what is conveyed verbally. Non-verbal communication also helps the researcher to
check the sincerity of the respondents. Only the use of a video recorder would have provided an even more complete register of the unfolding conversational exchange but practical and financial constraints left use of a tape recorder as the only feasible alternative. While my qualitative ethnographic methods gave me the advantage of getting more 'in-depth' information than quantitative methods such as a survey would have, and provided me with the flexibility to alter strategies and follow up new leads which arose, one of the limitations of this type of study is the lack of generalisation of my findings. Perhaps if two or more interviewers had been used to cover the same topics more valuable information than was documented here could have been obtained. This point relates to the theoretical framework and politics of the researcher which might have biased the results. However, in view of the fact that the research project was exploratory, and dealing with the 1985 school crisis in the DET schools in the Western Cape which was a relatively unexplored area, a sample survey would have been quite inappropriate because I was going for depth and wanted to let the interviewees develop the themes themselves.

Another practical problem which arose during the interviews was the failure of some respondents to remember the development of the school crisis events. Others were confused about the location and dating of different occurrences. This made interviews alone inadequate for the construction of the chronology of the events in the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape particularly in DET schools. To deal with this problem primary sources such as newspapers, publications of organisations and pamphlets were used to complement the information obtained through in-depth interviews and for cross-checking data.
4. Triangulation

The combination of documentary research methods and in-depth interviews in this study aimed at producing more reliable empirical data than would have been obtainable through any single method used in isolation. In the process of using multiple research methods or what is termed triangulation, data obtained from different sources could be cross-checked.

(iii) Ethical Considerations

No deception of any kind was used when interviewees were approached to contribute to this study. The researcher explained that the objective of the research project was to reconstruct the 1985 school crisis particularly in the DET schools in the Western Cape and to reflect on the relationship between the school crisis and the organic crisis in South Africa. Furthermore it was explained that the real life experience during that period would be of vital importance as this was an exercise in contemporary history. Despite the political sensitivity of the research project and possible persecution of those who participated by the South African security forces, the interviewees who mostly had never appropriated their history as subjects felt honoured by the idea of contributing towards the reconstruction of the 1985 school crisis events. As a result they offered that their real names could be used when the thesis was presented or published. However, the researcher treated the interviewees' identity confidentially and except for a few places where the names of the politically prominent interviewees appear in the dissertation, the respondents have been assigned numbers which range from 1 to 45. A complete list of these interviewees was submitted to the
thesis supervisor for reference. In relation to the possibility of there being an exploitative relationship between the researcher and the respondents especially when quantitative methods are employed, the use of in-depth interviews benefit both the researcher and research subjects in that while in-depth understanding of the matters under study is gained, the interviewees also get an opportunity to reflect on their past experiences. The benefit for the interviewees, however, would be increased if the results of this work were made public and accessible to them.

(iv) Terminological Note

In an attempt to reflect as closely as possible the historical reality of South Africa and the views of the main social actors in the educational arena, use of some racist and offensive labels was unavoidable. In the dissertation the terms "Black", "White", "African", "Coloured" and "Indian" are used to refer to the social categories commonly characterised as such in South Africa. However, in contrast to how it is commonly used by the perpetrators of apartheid, the term "Black" is employed in this study to describe all the oppressed groups in South Africa. Thus the terms "Black" and "African" are not synonymous here. The other terms, namely, "White", "African", "Coloured" and "Indian" whose continued use somehow might be exploited to give further justification to the existence of distinct groups in South Africa, are employed to distinguish social categories which decades of apartheid created. These ideologically conceived terms together with others such as "Kaffir", "Native" and "Bantu", which constantly came up in quotations and which presupposes the existence of more than 15 "races" in South Africa, are rejected on the grounds of the scientific argument that only one human race exists.
Related to this is the fact that most South African literature and more so most texts written in English are saturated with sexist conventions. Attempts have been made to change "spokesman" to "spokesperson" and "chairman" to "chairperson". This exercise, however, could not effectively address sexism in our language structure because the deeply embedded and largely unconscious form of discrimination in most sources the dissertation draws from posed problems which could not be entirely eliminated. Terms such as "manpower" and the sole use of masculine pronouns occur so frequently that it was concluded the re-definition of racist and sexist terms would need an independent study. Furthermore, terms "respondents", "subjects" and "interviewees" are used interchangeably to refer to the people who were interviewed. When I have used the term "subject" I do not wish to imply any inequality between researcher and respondent. In addition, I have used terms "dissertation", "thesis", "research project" and "study" interchangeably.
CHAPTER ONE

THE TOTAL STRATEGY AND STUDENT STRUGGLES TILL EARLY 1985

The State's total strategy was a response to the organic crisis in South Africa and it is in this sense that the analysis of it has to take cognisance of factors which were at play during the conjuncture within which it was introduced. According to Harold Wolpe,

"The general argument is that an understanding, in any given period, of the political conjuncture requires an analysis which, on the one hand, is historically specific and, on the other hand, is not reduced solely to a descriptive account of struggles and events. To achieve this, it is necessary to analyse not only the prevailing struggles but also the structural conditions which mark the character of a period and provide the specific context against which the content and direction of political conflicts can be understood" (Wolpe, 1988:3).

The key factor lies in the concept of 'organic crisis' which is applicable to the analysis of the South African State of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Apartheid State and its attendant modes for regulating the South African social formation could no longer be reproduced by means of apartheid policies, practices and objectives. The crisis was general and as reflected by the growing militancy of the Black working class in the mid-70s and the 1976 student uprising in Soweto, the State could no longer reproduce, amongst others, labour and educational relations on the basis of the apartheid system in its old form.

According to Callinicos (1981:93) South Africa's peripheral status within the international economic system, the rising organic composition of
capital in industry, the increase in the role of the State and the challenge presented by the Black workers were constituent parts of the 'incurable structural contradictions' deeply embedded in South African society. These structural contradictions came to constitute a barrier to capital accumulation. In a relatively over-politicised political economy, political and ideological factors can work against economic strategies (South African Review 4 1987: XIV-XV). It will be argued here that this was the case for the South African social formation in the late 1970's and the early 1980s.

Since the mid-1970s the Apartheid State had been faced with an economy sliding into recession (Davies, 1984:342; Chisholm, 1984:387). South Africa was having difficulties with its balance of payment, inflation rate was increasing and unemployment was increasing. All these factors not only threatened the continued capital accumulation process in South Africa but led the State to search for other solutions rather than relying on suppression alone. As from the mid-70s the discussion around these issues took a new turn as the international, regional, and domestic crisis deepened (Stadler, 1987:161). However, instead of restructuring capitalist production, when Prime Minister P. W. Botha came to power in 1976, he sought to resolve the developing organic crisis within the limits "set by the continued reproduction of capitalism in South Africa" (Callinicos, 1981:93).

After the 1976 students uprising big capital represented by institutions such as the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Chamber of Mines, and the Association of Chambers of Commerce effectively steered the government into a strategy of promoting and co-opting a Black petit bourgeois class into the capitalist structure to serve as a buffer against the mass
of exploited and oppressed Blacks (Davies, 1984:342).

"In order to guarantee the conditions for continued capital accumulation in South Africa, the interests of capital in general require the State to embark upon a somewhat altered course designed to bring about some limited incorporation of the Black proletariat within the institutions which legitimise bourgeois society" (Hartwig & Sharp, 1984:329).

However this could not be done without eliminating certain aspects of the apartheid system. Some concessions had to be made to lure Blacks into the 'free enterprise' system. Meanwhile major conflicts developed around the political strategy to be adopted with the conservative 'verkrampte' camp insisting on continuing with the Verwoerdian apartheid. The verkramptes represented the interests of the White working class, the old White petit bourgeoisie and the White rural sector. Their view was that the government should continue to maintain the job colour bar, segregation of facilities and amenities, the prohibition of 'mixed marriages', and the ban on Black political organisations and trade unions. The 'verligtes' or 'enlightened' Nationalists represented the interests of national and international progressive capital and the new petit bourgeoisie. The verligte group's position was that if White voters opposed their new political strategy, the stability of South Africa would demand rule by a 'civilian-military junta' (Hartwig and Sharp, 198:333-4). These developments resulted in the shifting of allegiances within the National Party and its metamorphosis from a populist movement to a bourgeois party. The transformed party launched a new political strategy, the so-called 'total strategy' in 1979. This strategy involved a combination of military measures or repression and certain 'cosmetic changes' to win over a small section of Blacks to the capitalist structure while at the same time tightening the control on the majority of oppressed and exploited Blacks (Chisholm, 1984:388; Davies, 1984:346).
According to Saul and Gelb (1981), Botha's political crisis management strategy had its origins in Afrikaner capital, the military and monopoly capital. This strategy required a policy of limited economic and political concessions to Black workers and the separation of the Black petit bourgeoisie from the majority of the oppressed and exploited through their co-option into the capitalist structure. However this strategy demanded the reconstitution of the State ideology and the restructuring of the form of political, economic, and ideological conditions for a relatively stable capital accumulation process in South Africa. The main aspect of the total strategy was to divert workers' demands into economistic and reformist ones through the recognition of trade unions and the granting of limited rights to the urban proletariat. As part of the 'crisis management' strategy the State was also to consolidate the independence strategy for homelands and to win over Asian and Coloured communities into the State structure through the new Tricameral dispensation (Hartwig and Sharp, 1984:330). Saul and Gelb (1981) went further to say, the military position, was that only by curing certain of the country's structural contradictions within 'certain limits' will defence, let alone growth, of the system be possible. For the military, 'the challenge to 'survival' is 'total': economic, political and ideological' (Saul and Gelb, 1986:90). It is therefore clear that central to the struggle between the contending forces, the South African regime and the oppressed Black majority, is the battle for the hearts and minds of the oppressed Black majority. This is why some of the crucial integral components of the government strategy were labour and educational reforms meant to defuse workers and students struggles (Davies, 1984:341; Chisholm, 1984:388).
As part of the 'total strategy' the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions of Inquiry were set up by the State to investigate labour relations and influx control respectively. The aim of the State was to promote a partially settled and stable urban workforce instead of a purely migratory labour-force (Chisholm, 1984:388). The two Commissions were also to tackle the urban crisis in its entirety. The Riekert Commission recommended that "a stratum of Africans should be accorded permanent residence rights in the cities" while at the same time the government should tighten the control of "outsiders", that is, those in homelands, to make it more difficult for them to come to the urban areas (RESA, 1987:12). The Wiehahn Commission recommended the registration of Black trade unions and the repeal of the job colour bar in many categories of work except in mining and the public sector (RESA, 1987:13). As a result of the recommendations of these two Commissions, the pass laws were repealed culminating in the introduction of a new form of influx control based on access to housing and guaranteed employment in the cities, and there was a tremendous development of the independent Black trade union movement in South Africa (RESA, 1987:12-13).

One of the crucial components of the total strategy was educational reform aimed at defusing the students' struggles which reached their peak during 1976 and 1980 (Davies, 1984: 341; Chisholm, 1984:333). The government responded to the 1976 uprising by dropping the name 'Department of Bantu Education' and changed it to the 'Department of Education and Training' in 1978. Following this development, an Education and Training Bill was passed in 1979 to replace the Bantu Education Act of 1953 (Davies, 1984:351). Item No. 7 of the Bill made provision for the Minister to establish and close down schools, and to hire and fire teachers. Moreover, the Minister had ultimate control over the functioning of these schools.
(Davies, 1984: 351-2). Davies also indicated that Black organisations rejected the Bill because it categorised people according to "race" and did not reflect any move towards the abolition of separate departments for African, Coloured and Indian education. The Bill’s emphasis on control and its lack of commitment towards equal distribution of educational resources was seen as an instrument further to entrench 'separate development' (Davies, 1984:352).

The 1979 Education and Training Bill gave the authorities tougher new regulations to deal with unrest and boycotts. The new regulations, gazetted in December 1980, extended the authorities’ power to expel pupils and to refuse re-admission. These regulations also transferred certain powers from school principals to the Secretary for Education and Training and his fellow officials. According to these new regulations pupils could be expelled for conduct at or outside of the school without the principal’s recommendation. Pupils could be expelled for taking part in a boycott, protest marches and sit-ins. A new section, titled 'Treatment of Pupils Under Extraordinary Circumstances', was designed to deal particularly with boycotts. It concerned suspending pupils, closing and re-opening schools and deleting pupils' names from school registers in the event of boycotts. Permission to re-enter schools might only be obtained through the Secretary. Maximum ages for pupils were also laid down. No one over 16 was allowed at primary school, no one over 18 in Stds. 6, 7, 8, and no one over 20 in Stds. 9 or 10 - unless the Secretary gave permission (Financial Mail 9/01/81; Hendler, 1982:4). According to Hendler, 'New Regulations for African Schools were also gazetted in May 1981, and were almost identical in content to the December 1980 Regulations' (Hendler, 1982:4).
The Education and Training Bill was followed by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Commission of Inquiry set up by the State at the height of nationwide school boycotts in 1980. At a meeting between the delegation sent by the Cape Teachers' Professional Association (CTPA) with the support of the United Teachers' Association of South Africa (UTASA) to present students' grievances to the government, and the Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, held on 5 May 1980, the latter informed the delegation that an independent Commission of Inquiry would be set up to investigate how a new structure for education could be established. Following this, the HSRC de Lange Commission of inquiry was formed. This Commission reported on its findings in June 1981 (Chisholm, 1984:388; Molteno, 1987:78-79; Davies, 1984:355).

The following extracts were part of the guiding principles in the formulation of the HSRC de Lange Report's recommendations:

(a) "Equal opportunities for education, including equal standards in education, for every inhabitant, irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex, shall be the purposeful endeavour of the State."

(b) "Education shall afford positive recognition of what is common as well as of what is diverse in the religious and cultural way of life and the languages of the inhabitants."

(c) "Education shall give positive recognition to the freedom of choice of the individual, parents and organisation in society."

(d) "The provision of education shall be directed in an educationally responsible manner to meet the needs of the individual as well as those of society and economic development, and shall, inter alia, take into consideration the manpower needs of the country ..." (NEUSA, 1982)

The first major limitation of the HSRC de Lange Report was that it did not propose the total de-racialisation of education but only higher education (RESA, 1987:14). In line with the new move to modernise apartheid through
the 'total strategy', the Commission's main objectives were:

(i) the creation of an African middle-class and

(ii) the satisfaction of 'manpower' shortages (RESA, 1987: 13).

The 'manpower shortages' arguments can be linked to the introduction of capital-intensive technology in the early 1970's to combat rising wage demands by Black workers. A significant number of jobs were de-skilled and a demand for semi-skilled jobs arose in a move by capital to deal with a crisis of profitability (Muller, 1984:11). However the de Lange Report's recommendations related to 'manpower shortages' were meant to 'modulise' and fragment the scope of skilled activity, of craft knowledge and hence of worker control. Far from creating a new middle class on any scale that might be politically effective as a buffer, de Lange seems to be designed to create something that looks more like a new proletariat" (Muller, 1984:12). The government strategy of incorporating Black workers within the capitalist structure, Muller argues, was directed at defusing conflicts between labour and capital and thus diverting the working class from socialism in South Africa.

The de Lange Report recognises that an educational crisis exists in South Africa and formulates a crisis resolution strategy. However the report does not reflect at all on the historical origin of the crisis. The challenges to Bantu Education in 1976 and the link this had with the organic crisis is left untouched. The organic crisis is only reflected on in the form of the manpower needs of capital - that the school system should be compatible with the "free enterprise" system (Kallaway, 1982:32). Buckland argues that the technicism in the recommendations of the de Lange Report functions as an ideology to maintain the status quo.

"For this reason technological rationality has been incorporated into the ideology of those elements of the ruling
elite which, in the face of the realities of 'politics of survival', have chosen to seek to modernise and streamline apartheid. This is not meant to suggest a conscious conspiracy to adopt technicism as a new instrument of oppression; rather it is argued that technicist features of the Western mind-set which underlie the technological revolution and the ethos of modernisation so serve the power interests of significant sectors of the dominant groups that they are accepted uncritically as 'rational' or logical. Crucial to an appreciation of this is an understanding of the way technological rationality has become the prevailing hegemony" (Buckland, 1984:383).

Muller maintains that arguments for policy changes in times of socioeconomic and political crisis are always coined in terms of economic necessity. He argues that the 1976-1980 unrest in Black education and the rejection of the apartheid education system was the cause of the setting up of the HSRC de Lange Commission of Inquiry (Muller, 1984:1). According to Chisholm this Commission was appointed at the midst of the 1980 school boycott and therefore the reconstitution of education was not simply a response to technological changes or shifts and re-alignments within the working class, but also a reaction to the mass struggles in South Africa. The HSRC was partly responding to workers' strikes and stayaways in the 1970's which were led by strong trade unions and the students' uprisings of 1976 and 1980 (Chisholm, 1982:7). To a certain extent the de Lange Report was responding to students' demands, such as, the demand for one national education system, although the Commission coined its report such that ultimate control would be maintained in the interests of capital (Chisholm, 1982:18).

The reformist nature of the Report is reflected by its failure to recognise that schooling in capitalist society entrenches class domination and perpetuates exploitation. The acceptance by the report of apartheid structures reflects its being an integral part of the strategy to defend the status quo (Kallaway, 1982:35).
In October 1981 the government indicated that it had reservations about certain aspects of the HSRC Report. Due to this it decided to lay down the following guiding principles as points of departure in the consideration of the HSRC Report:

That it reaffirms its stand for 'own' schools and education departments, and mother tongue instruction for each population group within the framework of self-determination (Hartshorne, 1984).

The Government's White Paper on the provision of education in the Republic of South Africa released on the 2nd November 1983 rejected the HSRC de Lange Report's recommendations that a single education department be established (Bot, 1984), although the de Lange Report wanted de-racialisation only for higher education. Instead of a single education ministry the de Lange Commission Report had recommended to take over all control for education in South Africa, the 1983 government White Paper recommended that education departments be maintained along 'racial' and 'ethnic' lines (Financial Mail 15/06/84). This reveals that there was no move away from 'group rights' or apartheid. Rather the new alliance - the verligte Nationalists, the military and monopoly capital - was just creating stable conditions for the further accumulation of capital while streamlining and modernising apartheid. However, while the apartheid regime reflected its rejection of the HSRC recommendations, Chisholm says that some of these recommendations were being implemented in education policy (Chisholm, 1982:7). But the crisis events of 1984-5 in the Black community and the oppressed majority's continued demand for a genuine socioeconomic and political transformation of the South African society reflected the failure of the government's 'total strategy'.
RESISTANCE TO BANTU EDUCATION

Within the education arena, the major struggles which in fact contributed towards the development of the State's economic crisis of the 1980s included the following acts of resistance:

(i) The 1953 protest against the Bantu Education Act of 1953 organised by the African National Congress (ANC);

(ii) The 1976 student uprisings which started as a protest against Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in Soweto;

(iii) The 1980 school boycotts which centred in the Wester Cape; and

(iv) The 1984-85 struggles against both the tricameral elections and the apartheid education system as a whole.

(i) Resistance Against the 1953 Bantu Education Act

The contest for ideological hegemony in the educational arena and control of the schools themselves started with resistance against the implementation of the Bantu Education Act of 1953. In 1953 opposition to Bantu Education was initially from teachers' organisations. In the Cape, the Cape African Teachers' Association (CATA), the first teachers' organisation to be politicised, took the lead (Lodge, 1984:270). Together with the Teachers' League of South Africa (TLSA), CATA opposed the Bantu Education Act of 1953. While CATA was composed predominantly of African teachers, TLSA was predominantly "Coloured" (Makhubela, 1978:14).

However, unity was lacking in teachers' struggle against the Bantu Education Act of 1953. The division of teachers made the severe response of the authorities both in the Transvaal and in the Cape possible. In the Cape, a newly formed rival teachers' organisation, the Cape African Teachers' Union (CATU), was immediately recognised by the government after
breaking away from the militant CATA. The recognition of CATU resulted in the withdrawal of the recognition of CATA by the government because CATA consistently opposed Bantu Education. After having identified those teachers who were opposed to the system of Bantu Education, the government dismissed some of them (Lodge, 1984:271; Cameron, 1986:169). However, opposition to the Bantu Education Act was less widespread in other areas of the country. The Transvaal teachers, led by the Transvaal African Teachers' Association (TATA), unlike their Cape counterparts, "were subjected from 1950 to strict provincial prohibition on political activity" (Lodge,1984:273). Despite this prohibition, TATA members formed part of the general communal boycott of schools (Lodge, 1984:273).

The official policy of CATU on the introduction of the Bantu Education Act was that politics should be excluded from education matters and that teachers should rather concern themselves with educational issues for which they were well-equipped and trained. CATU argued that to drag politics into the educational field would be detrimental to the African child for whom the teachers were employed. Teachers should rather leave the political aspects of education to the political organisations such as the AAC and the ANC (Torch, 16/02/54).

In contrast, CATA believed it was the South African political situation and the National Party's apartheid policy which had led to the Bantu Education Act of 1953 and therefore to separate politics from education matters was not acceptable. To CATA the Bantu Education Act deprived Africans of education by offering them an inferior, distorted and racially segregated education system. CATA resolved to fight the differentiated type of education system and to replace it with liberal, free and compulsory education for all children. It believed, however, that the
struggle against Bantu Education would have to be merged with the struggle for equal rights and the extension of democratic rights to all the people of South Africa. CATA also condemned CATU for having deserted the liberation struggle (Torch, 21/07/53).

The first Black political organisations to respond against the introduction of the Bantu Education Act in support of the teachers were the All Africa Convention (AAC) and the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM). In 1948 CATA affiliated to the AAC. NEUM, composed mainly of "coloured" teachers and founded in 1943 and the TLSA were both affiliates of the AAC (Lodge, 1984:270).

The African National Congress also played a part in the struggle against the 1953 Bantu Education Act. Cameron argues that Tom Lodge gives a 'mistaken impression' when he writes "that there was no significant response from the ANC (W.C.) in regard to Bantu Education". He further argues that while the ANC (W.C.) was still recovering from the 1952 Defiance Campaign and preoccupied with the resistance against forced removals, parents linked to the Congress Movement in Elsies River withdrew their children from Eureka School in protest against the Bantu Education Act "a year before the ANC's national Bantu Education Campaign". The ANC (W.C.) also played a part in the campaign against school committees and school boards (Cameron, 1986:177). In other parts of the country, especially in the Transvaal, branches of the ANC did take an active part in opposing the introduction of the Bantu Education Act of 1953. However, the ANC became more prominent only when the Act was to be implemented in 1955 (Cameron, 1986:77, 169; Makubela, 1978:23). 1955 was a test of strength between the National Party government and the Black opposition forces, from which no one emerged as an ultimate winner. The ANC later
realised that the boycott of Bantu Education as part of the ongoing process of struggle should be integrated within a war strategy against the whole apartheid system (Cameron, 1986:78). There were certain weaknesses in the strategy of those who opposed Bantu Education during this historical period. They were divided. Firstly, teachers in the Cape were divided into camps, the conservative and reactionary CATU, and the militant CATA. Secondly, while the ANC and the Unity Movement affiliate CATA were united (although they organised separately) in the boycott of school committees and school boards, they were divided on the withdrawal of African children from schools. The ANC was for the withdrawal whereas CATA campaigned against the withdrawal of African children from schools (New Age 2/06/55; Torch 12/04/55). However, even within some circles of the ANC old leadership, represented by Dr. A.B. Xuma, the decision pushed by the militant Youth League to withdraw children from school was not popular (Cameron, 1986:78). One consequence of the constant emphasis on not involving children by the ANC 'old guard' and the Unity Movement was that pupils' and students' revolutionary potential was not utilised during the struggle against the introduction and implementation of the 1953 Bantu Education Act. There is no indication that parents, teachers and political organisations consulted pupils and students when decisions to withdraw children from government schools, boycott government schools and their school committees and school boards, and to create 'alternative education', were made. This trend was to change during the 1976 student uprisings against Bantu Education when the youth took the lead.

(ii) The 1976 Uprisings

"The student revolt that flared up in Soweto in June 1976 was a clear indication of the extent of mass resistance to oppression under apartheid. Yet the result posed a number of important questions for revolutionary strategy in South Africa, especially in terms of its implications for an alliance of
workers and students and for its relation with the liberation movements" (Mafeje, 1978:18).

While 16 June, 1976, was the outcome of a sustained battle in opposition to the enforcement of Afrikaans as a compulsory medium of instruction, the slogan 'Afrikaans is the oppressor's language' clearly challenged the whole system of apartheid (Mafeje, 1978:18). In a few days the student struggle had spread across the country 'and eventually affecting nearly every town and village throughout South Africa' (Hirson, 1981:234). About 140 people and well over 1000 were injured in the first few days of the protest (Bot, 1985:16). The Minister of Bantu Education responded by closing schools in Soweto and other affected areas on 18 June, 1976 (Lodge, 1983:328).

Although the unrest spread widely within the Transvaal itself within a week and to the Orange Free State and Natal later in June, the SSRC based in Soweto continued to give a measure of organised direction to the students' struggle nationally. The University of Zululand was marginally affected and at the end of June a substantial number of schools were burnt down in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal. Students also attacked Urban Bantu Councils, Bantu School Boards, beer halls and government offices (Mafeje, 1978:18; Lodge, 1983:328). The Cape Peninsula joined the protest only on the 11th August, 1976, about two month after the 16 June demonstration in Soweto (Herner, 1980:ix; Mafeje, 1978:18).

In 1976 the three Cape Town African townships (Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu) had a total of 31 schools and 32 875 pupils. Of these, four were high schools, ten higher primary, fourteen lower primary and three combined primary schools. There was a total of 367 teachers for these schools of
whom 307 were teaching 30,936 pupils in primary schools and 60 were teaching 1,939 high school pupils. There was a marked disparity in government expenditure amongst White, Coloured, Asian and African pupils. In the Cape the government spent R496 and R199 per annum on each White and Coloured child’s education, respectively. Asian children received R141 per year each from government expenditure. Government expenditure on an African child’s education, R28,56 per year, was by far the lowest compared to other groups in the Cape.

"In August, after a relative lull, serious unrest broke out among schoolchildren in the Cape Peninsula. The struggle with the police raged for three weeks (11 August - 3 September) resulting in at least 92 deaths according to the police" (Mafeje, 1978:18).

However, prior to the demonstrations on 11 August, 1976, in Guguletu, the University of the Western Cape (UWC) was already having class boycotts in solidarity with the students of Soweto. The UWC week-long solidarity boycott which started on 2 August, culminated in a demonstration along Modderdam Road on 8 August. In the African townships also there were sporadic actions such as the burning down of the Langa Post Office on 26 June, which coincided with the closure of Fort Hare after a boycott in solidarity with the Soweto students’ uprising had been held there (Herner, 1980:7-8). The trigger of the events in Cape Town was the Guguletu march in solidarity with Soweto students. Although police managed to block some of the students from Nyanga and Langa on their way to the central point for the march in Guguletu, 6000 African pupils marched towards the Guguletu police station and the arrest of 19 demonstrators resulted in more action by angry pupils. On the same day, Langa pupils clashed with the police when they marched to the shopping centre. 3000 Guguletu pupils re-grouped resulting in further confrontation with the police. Nyanga students gathered in the police station where they forced the police to
release their 19 colleagues arrested in an earlier demonstration. During the night administration buildings, beer halls, bottle stores, shops leased out by Bantu Boards, and many other buildings seen as symbols of the apartheid system were attacked and burnt down (Hermer, 1980:7-8, 16, 18-19).

The momentum of the boycott in Cape Town increased considerably when Coloured students, especially in Bonthuwal joined the students' struggle. As a sign of solidarity Coloured youths went to Guguletu on 31 August. When African students went to meet them near the Guguletu police station, the police fired tear-gas and a running battle between the police and pupils resulted. On 1 September, students from the townships held a protest march in the city centre of Cape Town. They were tear-gassed by the police. Meanwhile, African students started holding daily meetings at Langa High. As the struggle continued Langa High became a gathering point for all pupils from Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu. On 3 September, the riot police squads invaded Langa High and after throwing tear-gas canisters they started beating up pupils. But this action did not deter the students from their struggle. This is evidenced by the fact that another demonstration was staged in the Cape Town city centre on 7 September, 1976 (Hermer, 1980:52-68).

While Coloured students returned to school when they re-opened in the first week of October, a meeting held at I.D. Mkeze secondary school in Guguletu resolved that African students would not return for the fourth quarter. They were determined to continue with the struggle. Included within their campaign at this period was a move to abolish shebeens. There were two marches on October 25 in Guguletu where one person was killed and fourteen wounded during confrontations with the police. In
this period students transformed their loose structure by forming a committee, the LAGUNYA Action Committee. It was this committee, together with the Ministers' Fraternal (an organisation of township Ministers acting as mediators between students and the police) which channelled complaints about police brutality to the government authorities. However, the government, through a Brigadier Bischoff, denied knowledge of alleged police brutality resulting in the further deterioration of the government relationship with the African townships. It was therefore not a surprise when students in Cape Town African Townships boycotted their end-of-year exams which were scheduled to start on November 1, 1976. Even under heavy police protection, only 6 out of 103 senior certificate candidates turned up. Soweto students also deserted examination centres. Like their Cape Town counterparts, Soweto students also took up the campaign against liquor and shebeens (Herner, 1980:93-4, 118-119).

However the organisational strategy of students in 1976 had its own limitations. The students failed to consult properly and mobilise workers. As a result workers only became aware of the situation when demonstrations and mass rallies were held by students and also through indiscriminate police action. For instance, on one occasion police confronted workers at Inhlazane station on 16 June, 1976, and started baton-charging them (Mafeje, 1978:19). Moreover police arrested 50 prominent Black leaders including Steve Biko and Winnie Mandela (Herner, 1980:30). The detention of leaders of the Soweto Parents Association resulted in many workers and parents supporting the struggle. Thus during the first two weeks of the 1976 uprising students concentrated mainly on preventing workers from going to work. This culminated in a very ugly incident when there was a confrontation between Mzimhlophe hostel dwellers and the students in August (Mafeje, 1978:20). However, as the struggle
unfolded students realised the strategic importance of winning the support of workers. The three-day general strike called by both the students and the ANC for 23 to 25 August, 1976, reflected the realisation by students that in order to resolve the crisis in education they had to strike at the economic structure of the country and that this implied that workers had to be brought into the struggle as equal partners (Mafeje, 1978:19).

Despite the heavy presence of the police about 80% of the workers in Johannesburg responded to the strike call and in some areas absentee rates of 90-98% were recorded. Bus and train services to and from the townships were either suspended or cancelled. As a consequence, the "inflow of foreign capital had virtually ceased, the price of gold had plunged to US$106 per ounce, foreign reserves had fallen by more than 25 per cent in the four months ending in June and balance of payments had worsened" (Mafeje, 1978:1920).

The police, however, found and exploited the weakest link in the strike, the student-worker solidarity which was shaky. They armed Mzimhlope migrants who killed about 21 and injured 107 urban dwellers. But after a serious drive to conscientise and mobilise workers by students the police could no longer bribe migrant workers into killing students and destroying their parents' houses. The 13 to 15 September, 1976, national stayaway was successful because most workers including Mzimhlope Hostel dwellers responded positively to the call. The stayaway's success was also shown by the fact that places such as Cape Town - where both the Coloured and African communities stayed at home - effectively participated. Students in Cape Town also made a tactical blunder similar to that which students in Soweto had made at an earlier stage by not in involving migrant workers within their struggle (Mafeje, 1978:21). However, the fact that Cape Town
African students managed to solve their differences with the hostel dwellers at a later stage, and that together with Coloured and Indian students they launched the United Students’ Front (USF) representing 13 Cape Town schools. This represents an important achievement of the 1976 student struggles in Cape Town (Hermer, 1980:118). Nationally, the participation of more than 300,000 students in the campaign against Bantu Education, the disbanding of Urban Bantu Councils, and the resignation of hundreds of teachers, show that the 1976 students’ strategy was relatively successful in mobilising a significant section of the Black community against apartheid (Mafeje, 1978:19-21).

Amongst the social scientists who made a critical analysis of the Soweto 1976 uprisings are Kane-Berman (1978), Brickhill and Brooks (1980) and Hirson (1979). Kane-Berman (1978:48) viewed the influence of BC ideology as "the single most important factor" which explained the 1976 student protests. In contrast, Brickhill and Brooks (1980) argue that the general decline of the economy with the resultant rise in prices during 1976 and the rising unemployment contributed to the 1976 uprisings. On the political level they gave the ANC a central role claiming that some of SASM or SSRC students were members of ANC cells. By implication Brickhill and Brooks (1980) were denying the organic link between the BC ideology and the majority of the 1976 generation of students. Baruch Hirson (1979) also denies the Black Consciousness influence on the events of 1976. He places the militancy of the African working class at the centre of this historical period. Like Brickhill and Brooks, he also explored links between some of the SASM leadership and ANC. He argues that SASM was organisationally autonomous from SASO and BPC. The threat of unemployment and the reorganisation of African secondary schools emerge as central
On the political level the anti-imperialist struggle's success in Angola and Mozambique, the continued bush war in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the sporadic guerrilla activities of exiled political organisations (the ANC and PAC) inside South Africa did have an influence on the 1976 uprisings. Inside the country, however, the BC ideology was dominant during the 1970's and it was undoubtedly 'a significant factor in the 1976 student troubles in Soweto' (Hartwig and Sharp, 1984:328). The 1976 student demonstrations provided a trigger for the widespread labour and political struggles throughout the country (including the homelands) which challenged the whole apartheid structure (Hartwig and Sharp, 1984:328).

"1976 saw an uprising of the oppressed and exploited Black people of South Africa that was unparalleled in the history of their struggle for equal rights and equal share in a free, democratic and united land. From a localised protest by school students there developed an uprising which drew in the whole nation and challenged the entire system of exploitation and oppression of which Black South Africans find themselves the victims" (Molteno, 1982:623).

(iii) The 1980 School Boycotts in African Schools

The struggle against Bantu Education continued despite the banning of 19 Black Consciousness organisations including SASM in October 1977, following the 1976 uprisings. New organisations such as the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) sprang up to fill the vacuum created by the banned ones. However, the dominant ideology during this period was still the Black Consciousness idea (Document 10).

COSAS was founded in Pietermaritzburg in 1979 as a national student body and at its inauguration in Welgespruit near Johannesburg in May 1979, students from Transvaal, Pretoria, Eastern Cape, Orange Free State and
Western Cape were represented. From its formation COSAS' objective was to advance the struggle against Bantu Education. Despite constant detention of its members and other forms of harassment, COSAS branches were established in most areas in SA including Cape Town, Worcester and Paarl in the Western Cape. However, the majority of schools in the Western Cape were not part of COSAS. Like SASM before it, COSAS aimed at mobilising students around conditions at Black schools, such as lack of representation for students and victimisation and harassment of students by the security police. However, in 1980 COSAS was still preoccupied with building its structures nationally and while it in principle supported the boycotts throughout South Africa, it could not play a leading role (Africa Perspective 24 (1984): 77-80; Document IO; Millar and Philcox, 1981: 2-3).

The year 1980 was marked by a continuing crisis in African education. The struggle for the control of the education arena continued between the State (through further application of repressive regulations) and the students (through their opposition to the racially differentiated education system and demands for democratically elected SRCs) (Hendler, 1982: 1). Students also demanded a 'democratic, non-racial, equal education for all youth of a united liberated land' (Molteno, 1987: 1). Before the beginning of the 1980 academic year COSAS had already taken up the issue of the employment of servicemen in Soweto schools with the DET. They demanded that soldiers be removed as teachers in Soweto schools since soldiers were the people who upheld the apartheid system thus perpetuating oppression and exploitation in South Africa. In a meeting called jointly by COSAS and AZASO on 26 January, 1980, parents and students expressed their rejection of Bantu Education. They resolved that students should refuse to pay school fees and to wear school uniforms. Students were to stay away from schools which employed servicemen until they had been
removed from their schools. AZASO and COSAS called another meeting with parents in Soweto on 2 February, 1980, which resolved that students should boycott the schools until the soldiers were removed. They also demanded the removal of age restrictions, the establishment of democratic SRCs and an equal and free education system. However the boycott was not successful because only four out of 51 secondary schools responded. During the same period pupils at Fezeka in Guguletu, Cape Town, drew up their demands which they presented to their principal on 6 February 1980. From 14 February, 1980, 800 Fezeka High School pupils boycotted classes protesting against the lack of student representation, shortage of textbooks, compulsory uniforms and the increased school fees (Millar and Philcox, 1981:3; Molteno, 1987:25-6, 28; Howe, 1983: 81-86).

The boycott of classes escalated mainly in the Coloured schools throughout the first part of 1980 in Cape Town. Amongst the African Schools only Fezeka High was involved at this stage. Despite the fact the Fezeka High pupils returned to class on the 21 February, 1980, after a meeting with teachers and parents the previous day, when the Coloured schools' boycott began on Monday, 14 April, they also decided to boycott classes until the demands which they had presented two months earlier were addressed. They also demanded that intimidation and expulsion threats to students be stopped. The demands made during the formation of the Committee of 81, representing students from Coloured and African schools as well as tertiary students in the Western Cape, were: the demand for autonomous SRCs, the abolition of the permit system for admission to institutions like UCT, an end to compulsory uniforms, an end to corporal punishment, and an end to unfair dismissal of teachers. They also demanded that damaged schools be repaired, sufficient textbooks be supplied to schools,

There were many marches and mass rallies in solidarity with the Western Cape students throughout the country. 2 000 Coloured high school pupils marched in Johannesburg immediately after 25 000 students in the Cape boycotted classes on the 14 April, 1980. Their solidarity march was stopped by the police. From 21 April the boycott spread to rural Cape areas, Transvaal and Natal with an estimated 100 000 pupils participating. Throughout the country students met and resolved to continue the boycott until their demands had been met. The class boycott broadened to Pretoria’s Mamelodi township where 1 500 African pupils went out on a solidarity boycott. 900 African pupils in Grahamstown also joined the boycott. This crisis resulted in the constant use of State coercion to repress student rebellion. On the last four days of April, nine pupils were arrested in Mamelodi and 714 Coloured pupils were also arrested outside Westbury High in Johannesburg under the Riotous Assemblies Act. 1 300 African pupils from five high schools in Kwanashu were tear-gassed by the police during a demonstration (Molteno, 1987:72; Howe, 1983:83-84).

The beginning of May 1980 was marked by the downing of tools by 1 000 teachers and lecturers in Coloured and Indian institutions in Cape Town. These teachers and lecturers were to a certain extent involved in awareness programmes. Coloured and Indian primary schools in the Peninsula also observed a one-day stayaway from classes as a sign of solidarity during this period. At this time 5 000 Durban pupils and students from more than 37 educational institutions decided to end their boycott at a mass rally at the University of Natal. But in Turfloop and
Fort Hare protests started on 6 May, 1980, when police tear-gassed and baton charged protesting students. Except Fezeka High School whose class boycott had started on the first day of the academic year, African pupils from Langa High, I.D. Mkize and Sizamile only joined the class boycott through a stayaway on 13 May, 1980 (Howe, 1983:84).

By the time African pupils in Cape Town decided to join the boycott, Coloured schools were already contemplating going back to classes on 14 May. This became a reality on 19 May when the Committee of 81 decided to return to classes although they emphasised that further action would be taken if their short-term demands had not been met within three weeks (Howe, 1983:81). During this period boycotting African pupils elected their own body, the Regional Committee which would represent them in the Western Cape independently of the Committee of 81 (Molteno, 1987:81,91). However, Coloured pupils did not at this stage totally desert the struggle as the Committee of 81 decided on 10 May that even if they returned to school on the 14th, they would boycott the June examinations in solidarity with students still in detention and those released but who had not had enough time to prepare for the examinations (Molteno, 1987:81,91).

Meanwhile the University of Fort Hare was closed down indefinitely resulting in 2800 students being sent home. This factor together with others such as the mass arrest of 153 African students in Grahamstown, the sacking of meat workers on strike in Cape Town and the heavy-handed police action in Kwamashu, led Cape Town Coloured schools to resume their class boycott on 22 May. The resumption of the boycott call was made by the Committee of 81, the steering committee monitoring and regulating the boycott at that time. One of the single most important actions by boycotting students was taken on 24 May when students staged a
demonstration through commercial and financial disruption at the Golden Acre in Cape Town. Parallel demonstrations were staged in at least three centres in suburbs of Cape Town as well as one in Paarl. Since then the boycott gathered momentum in the Western Cape and throughout the country, resulting in many clashes between the police and students. Some of these confrontations resulted in the death of students, for example, two youths were killed when police opened fire on marchers in Elsies River on 28 May. However, the large funeral of the two, attended by about 12 000 people was used for the mobilisation of the broader community (Howe, 1983:85-86; Molteno, 1987:93-95).

On 29 May, 1 000 African pupils from Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu held a mass rally at Fezeka High School, Guguletu. After this mass rally there was a total boycott in African secondary schools. In African primary schools children continued to attend although they were not given normal classes (Molteno, 1987:105). Black communities also started to boycott City Tramways in protest against increased fares which took effect on 2 June. While the bus boycott was still continuing the Committee of 81 again decided to call off the boycott. However, 60 educational institutions in the Western Cape disregarded the Committee's call and continued with their class boycotts (Howe, 1983:85-86).

African students in Cape Town held a total boycott when they reopened for the third term on 7 July. However on Wednesday, 16 July, the Committee of 81 announced that an overwhelming majority of students had voted in favour of returning to normal classes although the campaign for students' demands would still continue. Students were to return to classes the following day, that is, on 17 July. In African schools, students felt returning to classes was not an acceptable option because the Department of Education
and Training (DET) had not showed any commitment to meeting students' demands. Moreover they had not been consulted when the Committee of 81 made the decision to call off the boycott. However, even if they had been consulted, it would seem that the fact that at this stage only Sub-A to Standard 2 were attending schools, which were now teaching general knowledge and alternative syllabuses, would have made it impossible to return to normal classes. The Committee of 81 tried to save face by calling a week's boycott starting on Monday, 28 July. The main reasons for calling this boycott were:

(i) African students' claim that they had not been consulted and hence their continuation of the boycott, and

(ii) The failure of the government to respond quickly to their short-term demands.

Most Coloured schools did not respond to this call and instead returned to normal classes. The class boycott in African secondary and higher primary schools continued however, from 4 August in the Western Cape and parts of the Eastern Cape as well as in Soweto where students were organising a rent boycott. The Port Elizabeth Students' Council (PESCO) also called off their boycott on the 21 August (Molteno, 1987:134-141).

The continued class boycott in Cape Town African schools culminated in the formation of a parent body, the Parents' Action Committee (PAC). The students were represented throughout by both their Regional Committee and the Committee of 81. Several meetings were held early in September between the two bodies and a common position that students would only go back to school when the DET had met their short-term demands was adopted. The DET responded by ordering African pupils in Secondary and higher primary schools to re-register on 8 September accompanied by their parents. About 4 704 students, less than half the total number of those
affected, re-registered. The PAC and the Students' Regional Committee had decided to continue with the boycott a day before the schools were scheduled to re-open. On 9 September, the police clashed with students in a Guguletu church hall where students had been discussing the boycott. At the end of the week classrooms were empty and the class boycott was total. Meanwhile in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage almost all higher primary and Secondary schools were closed indefinitely. Towards the end of September the Minister, Dr. F. Hartzenberg, announced that 74 Cape schools were to be closed for the rest of the year. This closure affected 14 schools in Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga, two in Paarl and another two in Worcester. Other areas affected by the closure of schools during this period were Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Soweto, Bloemfontein and Lebowa (Molteno, 1987:144-147).

The boycott of African schools continued into the beginning of 1981. It was only at the end of the first term in 1981 that the African community together with students decided to end the boycott. The meeting called jointly by PESCO and COSAS on 21 January, 1981, decided to call off the boycott conditionally. The conditions were: the extension of the date for re-registration; that the government should bring about changes in the education system, and that all students must be re-admitted to their previous schools unconditionally. The meeting reserved the right for students to engage in further action if these conditions were not met. The Cape Town African schools also ended their boycott on 11 March 1981, the date students had previously laid down for their short-term demands to be met. The meeting which decided to suspend the boycott was held at Fezeka High School. Despite having called off the boycott, students emphasised that the government should release detained students, recognise democratic SRCs and the PAC, provide free stationery and textbooks, and
review the increased school and examination fees (Molteno, 1987:150-151; Millar and Philcox, 1981:3).

There are lessons to be learned from the 1980 school crisis. The 1980 student generation realised that the struggle against the 'unequal' and inferior education system was organically linked with the economic and political struggle of the majority of the oppressed and exploited community (Millar and Philcox, 1981:3-4). Throughout 1980 students developed new tactics aimed at avoiding more confrontations with the police. This was a result of lessons learnt in 1976 when these confrontations had resulted in many deaths and casualties. The 1980 students stressed the importance of building and strengthening their organisations on the ground. This was why instead of having deserted their schools they transformed them into meeting places (Langa High was used as a central meeting place in Cape Town) and bases for the organisation of the student movement. While in the Transvaal and Natal this strategy was not well established in 1980, it was most extensively used in the Western Cape. This factor explains why both the Western Cape and the Eastern Cape managed to sustain the class boycott in 1980 (Hendler, 1982:2). However, on other levels Western Cape pupils in particular did not have a common strategy. Whereas Fezeka Secondary was involved from the beginning of the Coloured schools' class boycott, the majority of African schools only joined the boycott in May. Moreover when the Committee of 81 decided to call off the boycott on 16 July, African students continued with the boycott until early 1981. This had very bad repercussions for the organisational strategy adopted and the nature and form of the unity between Coloured and African pupils in 1980. Specifically the decision of the Committee of 81 created divisions
between Coloured and African students and also caused a strain on the relationship between the Regional Committee and the Committee of 81.

Another important limitation of the 1980 class boycott reflected in Molteno’s (1987) work was that in Cape Town, African parents and teachers were not properly consulted in the initial stages of the school boycott although at a later stage the formation of the Parents’ Action Committee (PAC) facilitated communication between parents and students. The decision to continue the class boycott by African schools in Cape Town in early August 1980 was made jointly by the Students’ Regional Committee and the Parents’ Action Committee. Lastly, by participating in economic and political struggles such as the bus boycott and rent boycott in Cape Town’s townships, students also lend some weight on the Black working class struggle.

(iv) Revival of Political Struggles and the 1984 School Boycotts

According to Harold Wolpe (1988:205) the contest for hegemony within Black schools played a major role in the reconstitution of the political domain during the crisis of the 1980s. The COSAS conception of connections between socio-economic, political and educational transformation rendered apartheid ideology ineffective within the schools. As a consequence a crisis of ruling class hegemony ensued and community organisations and politics were reactivated. The revival of political struggles translated into the formation of new political formations such as the National Forum (NF) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983. Parallel to this development was the rise of the independent Black trade union movement which identified itself with the national liberation struggle. Under the leadership of the UDF, extra-parliamentary opposition began effectively to
challenge the National Party's crisis management strategy (Adam, 1983:18). In this sense students' organisations were progressively replaced as a dominant factor in the political domain (Wolpe, 1988:205).

The latter developments did not lead into the detachment of student struggles from the overall national liberation struggle. From 1980 to 1983 COSAS consistently consulted community organisations during students actions. However the resumption of a leading role by political organisations meant that student efforts become largely though not exclusively centred around educational matters. It was at this point that the boycott as a strategy resumed its importance within the student movement. It was around radical reformist demands such as the recognition of democratic SRCs, the demand for qualified teachers and free textbooks and the abolition of corporal punishment that the boycott strategy was employed in the Pretoria area in 1983. As the boycott strategy was more and more adopted throughout South Africa, the demand for democratic SRCs become central to student struggles. This meant that students were no longer struggling exclusively for radical reform within the educational arena but were challenging the State's ideological hegemony and control over the schools. In 1984 the boycott strategy which was pursued by COSAS gained widespread support (Wolpe, 1988:206).

According to the Race Relations Survey:

"During 1984 South Africa experienced the most widespread civil unrest since the Soweto disturbances in 1976. Increasing discontent and protest over a variety of issues throughout the year culminated in a major stayaway by workers in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) area on 5 and 6 November. The underlying causes of the unrest were continuing dissatisfaction with African education, anger at the exclusion of Africans from the new tricameral parliament, and the persistence of high inflation and deepening unemployment" (S.A.I.R.R., 1985:65).
The centre of the school boycott at the beginning of 1984 was the Eastern Cape where the boycott was triggered by the demand for the reinstatement of a teacher, Matthew Goniwe, who was dismissed after refusing to be transferred. This boycott spread rapidly from one school to seven others around 3 February, 1984, within Cradock (SASPU National 5 (1), March 1984; Varsity 03/05/1984; Cape Times 10/07/1984).

The 1984 national protests embodied grievances which included factors such as the introduction of the new tricameral constitution and the elections, high inflation and resultant unemployment, and the 1983 government White Paper recommendation for the retention of separate education departments for each population group. Under the leadership of COSAS students boycotted classes against:

- A racially divided and unequal education system;
- The age limit regulations;
- Overcrowded classrooms;
- The bar on democratic SRCs;
- Authoritarian headmasters;
- Corporal punishment;
- Unfair dismissal of teachers;
- The high matric failure rate; and
- Sexual harassment of female teachers.


It was around these demands that students in Atteridgeville and Saulsville (near Pretoria) waged their struggle against the DET authorities from the beginning of the 1984 academic year. More prominent amongst these demands for the Atteridgeville and Saulsville students were the demand for the abolition of the age limit restrictions and the demand for democratic
The student action around these issues led to the closure of six secondary schools in Atteridgeville and Saulsville by the DET in May 1984. Struggles around similar issues also took place in Soweto and Alexandra at the beginning of 1984 (City Press 17/2/85; Bot, 1985:1; SAIRR, 1985: 65; Cape Times 14, 15, 16, 18, 25/5/1984). The boycott of May 1984 was not limited to DET schools. Amongst an estimated 27 000 of those who participated were university students. Although this section of the student population were reacting to their specific circumstances, they also identified with the grievances of the DET pupils (Cape Times 18, 25, 28, 30/5/84). The students' struggles were also complemented by community struggles over high rents. The rent boycotts in townships coupled with a worker strike in the Transvaal reinforced student struggles. About 6 000 workers were on strike as a result of a wage dispute on 16 June, 1984, in the Transvaal (Bot, 1985; SAIRR, 1985).

After the June-July vacation the struggle for control of African schools in the Eastern Cape and Atteridgeville was resumed. These struggles spread to Wattville (near Benoni), Duduza, Thabong (near Welkom in the O.F.S.) and Thembisa. In most cases pupils were responding to the government's refusal to grant them the right to constitute democratic SRCs (Natal Mercury 7/8/84; Star 7/8/84; Sowetan 1, 2, 6, 7/8/84; Rand Daily Mail 1, 2, 3, 4, 6/8/84; Sunday Tribute 5/8/84).

In a reformist statement on 5 August, 1984, the Education and Training Minister, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, announced that arrangements would be made for pupils' councils to be incorporated into the new school liaison committees (Sowetan 6/8/84; Rand Daily Mail 6/8/84; Natal Mercury 7/8/84). Viljoen was repeating a call made earlier by his colleague, Barend du Plessis, that Atteridgeville pupils could have Pupil
Representative Councils (PRCs) elected by students but which would not be allowed to take-over the schools. However this structure fell short of genuine student representation as its powers were similar to those of the prefect system which had long been discredited. In addition, Viljoen believed that there were outside forces which were manipulating students in their own political interests. The PRCs would not be permitted to advance any political interests and student organisations with political programmes were not going to be tolerated. According to Viljoen, the duties of PRC members were:

(a) "To act as representatives of their fellow students;"

(b) "To serve as a channel for communication between students themselves, between student and staff, and between students and principal;"

(c) "To assist in maintaining order in the school in accordance with the appropriate school rules;"

(d) "To set a positive example of discipline, loyalty, respect, punctuality, academic thoroughness, morality, co-operation and participation in school activities" (Rand Daily Mail 15/10/84).

In contrast the objectives of democratically elected SRCs spelt out in the COSAS constitution were:

(a) "To assist the staff to instill responsibility, determination, far-sightedness and dignity into the students;"

(b) "To activate students in all matters affecting them concerning the school, education and development;"

(c) "To represent the student body whenever necessary;"

(d) "To promote student development from the grassroots level" (Rand Daily Mail 15/10/84).

The failure by the DET authorities to recognise student organisations such as COSAS contributed to about 20 000 students in Queenstown, Cradock, Graaf-Reinet, Tembisa, Welkom, Warmbaths, Nigel, Parys, Pietersburg, Soshangwe, Mamelodi, Paarl, Alexandra and Atteridgeville
having continued their school boycott (Star 7/8/84). Pupils resisted attempts to lure them back to school while their demands had not been met. Student struggles during this period spilled over into the country-wide resistance to the implementation of the tricameral parliament (Cape Times 15, 18/8/84; Sowetan 23/8/84; Rand Daily Mail 24/8/84).

The August, 1984, tricameral elections created much tension in the Black community and students participated in the protests directed against them.

"During the elections for the tricameral parliament in August 84, student organisations called for a two-week student boycott. Nearly one million students stayed away and joined the nation-wide community protests against the new constitution. The proposed tricameral parliament was seen as a further entrenchment of racially segregated education and contradictory to the student demand for a unitary, democratic system" (Document 54).

Western Cape students geared themselves for the boycott of the tricameral elections from 17 August. About 3 000 University of the Western Cape (UWC) students and 500 University of Cape Town (UCT) students voted for participation in the protests against the elections. Following calls by the Azanian Students' Organisation (AZASO) and COSAS, 15 Peninsula schools planned to start a two-week boycott from the same date as UWC and UCT. Other schools planned to have stay-aways on the election days. UWC began a one-week boycott in anticipation of the House of Representatives (Coloured) elections on 27 and 28 August. At UCT, Black students held a four-day boycott of classes with alternative programmes and a further two-day stayaway coinciding with the House of Delegates elections. In Johannesburg, Eldorado Park and Soweto, students who were protesting against the House of Representatives elections were tear-gassed and baton-charged on 22 August. The following day about 700 000 mostly
Coloured pupils stayed away from school in protest. Demonstrations against the elections spread to the Reef where many schoolchildren were arrested and others injured during the process. In Tongaat, Natal, houses of both the House of Delegates and the House of Representatives candidates were attacked. The Indian Directorate of Education responded by suspending hundreds of Indian students who boycotted the elections. The extent to which the boycott was successful was reflected by the low turn-out in the elections, for instance, a mere 18% poll for the House of Representatives was reported. Moreover, protests around the tricameral elections triggered other student struggles in some educational institutions in SA. For example, UWC students merged the boycott against the tricameral parliament with the demand for the cancellation of Botany exams and the dismissal of the Registrar of Finance, J. Strassen. Strassen was accused of co-operating with the police during confrontations between students and police (Interviewees 5, 6, 9, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 33, 35; Cape Times 15, 16, 18/8/84; Sowetan 23/8/84; Rand Daily Mail 24/8/84). Coinciding with the tricameral elections was the intensification and broadening of the battle for school-related demands of which the right to democratic SRCs was the primary one. A total of 19 000 students from Tembisa, Daveyton, Alexandra, Cradock and Atteridgeville were out in the streets during this period after the DET closed their schools. From 15 August, to the end of the month there were numerous confrontations between the police and pupils resulting in, amongst other things, the killing of a Mabopane East Technikon student by the police; the critical injury to a Daveyton student who was shot by the police; the occupation of Minerva High School grounds in Alexandra by the police; the arrest of 29 Cradock youths; the charging of six pupils at Etwata High School in Watville with public violence, and the arrest of 11 people who allegedly participated in the burning down of property, such as homes and
cars. Pupils at Teto Secondary in Thabong near Welkom demonstrated and boycotted against Bantu Education as a whole and about 3 000 Medunsa students joined the boycott. At this stage an estimated 30 000 pupils were not receiving tuition. The government's response was that pupils who failed and were over-age would face exclusion. The DET threatened Tembisa students in particular that they would be taken off the registers if they did not return to school on 20 August. Tembisa students from the four affected schools responded by calling a mass meeting at the Maphole Cinema where they decided to continue the school boycott until their demands had been met. When a handful of parents brought their children back to Tembisa schools on 20 August, they were chased away by angry pupils. Police intervention made the situation worse and consequently unrest developed in the township and the township mayor's house was gutted. Tembisa pupils were on the march and even the heavy-handed police action could not deter them. A police order against marches was defied during the funeral of their colleague who was killed by the police during previous pupil-police confrontation. A deadlock situation existed also in Soshanguve where pupils were still boycotting classes demanding democratic SRCs, the release of four arrested colleagues, and the resignation of a principal. Mr. Rautekane, whom students believed was a member of the security police. Solidarity marches and boycotts were staged at Mohlakaneng Senior Secondary in Randfontein, Musi High, Thabo Jabula Senior Secondary and Fonte High in Dobsonville, and Katlehong on 28 August. There were also running battles between the police and students in Pimville and in the East Rand where police killed a youth and injured two others. These confrontations which spread around the country also affected universities such as UWC and UNITRA. In UNITRA, for example, an estimated number of nearly 500 pupils were arrested after police baton-charged them. This was the background against which the tricameral
elections were conducted. According to the DET figures, more than 90,000 Black schoolchildren in the Vaal Triangle alone continued a complete stayaway on 27 August, the day of the House of Delegates elections. The DET used this factor as a justification for their closure of African primary and secondary schools there a week earlier (on 28 August) than the September recess had been scheduled to begin (Sowetan 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31/09/1984; Rand Daily Mail 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 27, 28/09/1984; Cape Times 18, 28/08/1984; Star 20, 21, 23/08/1984; Bot, 1985; Interviewee 35).

Students' response to State repression took a more radical and political form. When schools were to be re-opened on September 26, 1984, except those closed indefinitely in Tembisa and Atteridgeville, pupils in the Vaal Triangle and the East Rand decided to continue with their boycott. The Vaal Triangle pupils in particular started to link their educational demands with political ones. In the list of grievances presented to the Lekoa Town Council as a precondition for a return to school they demanded:

(i) That rent should be reduced by R30 a month;
(ii) That all political detainees be released; and
(iii) That the police be removed from the township. (Rand Daily Mail 26, 27/09/1984).

The index of the deepening crisis within the education arena was provided by the decision by students in the East Rand, Pretoria, Soweto and Vaal Triangle to begin a three-day stayaway on Monday 8 October, 1984. The decision was initiated by Soweto students at a meeting in Seanaoane on 5 October. Students from the Vaal Triangle, the East Rand and Pretoria resolved to join the three-day stayaway (Star 6/10/84). COSAS also called for a two-day school boycott at the Pace Commercial College during this period. It also planned a parents-students meeting to be held at the
Regina Mundi Catholic Church to resolve the problem of pupils who had been arrested (Sunday Mirror 07/10/84). As an attempt to justify the stayaway, AZASM maintained that the:

"Current atmosphere is not conducive to normal learning, police were keeping a high profile at schools, the establishment of student representative councils, the abolition of age restrictions and corporal punishment and the provision of free textbooks had not been met" (Star 6/10/84).

The position adopted by students was supported by a significant section of the Black community including Black business people. At Sebokeng for instance, the Orange-Vaal Ministers' Solidarity Group, and the Evaton businessmen came out in support of the continued boycott of classes by students. The State's coercive apparatus which was used to repress student struggles antagonised these moderate groups in the Black community. This could be easily inferred from the reasons given for their identification with the student movement. These were:

(i) The continued presence of police in the townships;
(ii) The intimidation and "reign of terror" perpetuated by the security police against students;
(iii) The refusal of community councillors to resign; and
(iv) The failure of the government to reduce rentals to R30.00 in the area (Sowetan 8,9/10/84).

In October, 1984, the struggle for the postponement of the final exams became central to the student struggle. At a meeting on 5 October, COSAS and AZASM extended the boycott of classes to Wednesday, 10 October. At the meeting it was felt that the academic year should be extended and the exams should be postponed to early 1985. Moreover, pupils boycotting classes at 42 Eastern Cape schools decided not to write exams. A COSAS spokesperson stated that this decision had been taken as a sign of solidarity with Transvaal and OFS students who could not write
examinations because the DET had closed their schools. The COSAS leadership was mandated to ask the DET to postpone the final examinations until February, 1985. On 8 October the organisations' leadership reiterated students' demands which included:

(i) The establishment of democratic SRCs;
(ii) The abolition of the age limit regulations;
(iii) End to corporal punishment;
(iv) The release of all detainees;
(v) The reduction of rent; and
(vi) The resignation of town councillors.

However, the conflict between the DET and students centred around the postponement of exams (Rand Daily Mail 6, 9/10/84; Sowetan 08/10/84; Argus 9/10/84; Cape Times 9/10/84).

In response, the government announced that African matric students who did not sit for the scheduled November 1984 exams would have the option of writing matric as private individuals in May/June 1985. This was a last-ditch attempt by the government to have about 220 000 boycotting students country-wide return to school before the end-of-year examinations commenced (Cape Times 9/10/84; Rand Daily Mail 10/10/84).

In addition the government stated that all Black secondary schools would be allowed to establish "democratically elected" SRCs from the beginning of 1985. However, the DET emphasised that the SRCs would be restricted to educational matters only and could not be used to advance political interests. The Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr. G Viljoen, asserted that the DET's intention was not to allow a take-over of schools by pupils but to give them a chance to contribute towards the running of
these schools. He also announced that the six secondary schools closed since May 1984 in Atteridgeville and Saulsville were to be re-opened despite the parents' decision against the re-opening of the schools because of the growing conflicts between boycotting students and those students who were attending normal classes (Argus 9/10/84; Sowetan 9/10/84). The Publicity Secretary of AZASM, Kabelo Lengane, confirmed that there were growing conflicts between boycotting students and those who had gone back to school. He gave, as the major reason for the conflict, "slight differences of approach" to the school boycott amongst students. Kabelo Lengane, nevertheless, condemned the victimisation of principals and students who went back to school. One of the schools where students were intimidated was Realogile Senior Secondary in Alexandra, where pupils were forced out of classes by those students who were boycotting classes. Ilinge Secondary School pupils also marched to disrupt classes at Fortune Kunene Primary School in a Vosloorus township. In addition, pupils of three Vaal Triangle schools, namelySelelekela, Lofense, and Emadwaleni were also chased out of their schools by boycotting students on 8 October. The same happened in Soweto where Meadowlands High, Orlando High, George Khoza Secondary, Madibane High and Daliwonga Secondary were affected. Another Soweto secondary school, J.J. Kekana, was burnt down (Rand Daily Mail 9/10/84).

As a response, numerous meetings were held amongst parents, teachers, pupils and community organisations to discuss the school crisis. One of these meetings was held at Regina Mundi Church in Rockville, Soweto, on 10 October. The meeting was called by AZASM with the aim of resolving the conflict between boycotting students and those who chose to return to school. In the meeting, AZASM accused COSAS of having contributed to the chaotic situation in Black schools. However, AZASM's Kabelo Lengane felt
that the Press, by exaggerating the conflict, was fuelling divisions within student ranks. In addition, the Alexandra Schools' Joint Governing Council invited parents to a meeting where they discussed whether to continue the boycott or to call it off. Another meeting of this nature was held in Daveyton on the East Rand, where parents showed their solidarity with pupils by calling on the DET to scrap the age limit regulation and abolish corporal punishment. Moreover, at a meeting of church leaders in Johannesburg on 8 October they pledged their support to the Black community by calling for the withdrawal of troops from Black townships, the resignation of community councillors, the reduction of rents, and the reduction of housing costs. However, the decision everyone shied away from was whether the boycott should go on or not (Rand Daily Mail 9, 11, 12/20/84; Star 9/10/84; Sowetan 9, 11, 12/10/84; Document 6)

Contrary to the expectations of many, and in line with the move to broaden democracy, COSAS and AZASM refused to play a role in deciding whether the boycotts should continue or be called off. AZASM maintained that the decision had to be taken by the community at joint meetings of pupils and parents because the country-wide stayaways were caused by both pupils and community demands. However, COSAS's Thlabane Mogashoa felt the decision to continue with the stayaway or to call it off should be left to students to decide upon by themselves. He further argued that despite the fact that COSAS members were boycotting schools in Soweto, the COSAS position depended on what pupils as a whole decided upon. Both COSAS and AZASM reiterated their support for 'legitimate' students' demands. AZASM's Kabelo Lengane added that if students returned to school the object could be to reassess their position and to adopt an equally effective alternative strategy inside the classrooms. But pupils in the Vaal Triangle, for example, chose not to return to school until rents in the
area had been reduced, all town councillors had resigned, and all detainees had been released (Rand Daily Mail 9/10/84). As a response to students' demands, Viljoen argued that the age limit regulations had been applied to only 319 over-age pupils in 1984 and that it would not adversely affect over-age pupils in 1985 as due consideration would be given to those who were affected by the school unrest. In essence the government was retaining the age limit restrictions. On the students' demand for democratic SRCs Viljoen said that the SRC constitution had already been drawn although there was still room for discussions. In response AZASM's Kabelo Lenganre reiterated the boycotting students' position that they would return to school only when their detained colleagues had been released and the end-of-year examinations postponed until 1 March, 1985. Kabelo Lenganre welcomed Viljoen's announcement, which granted pupils the right to establish democratic SRCs, but he emphasised that the struggle for the abolition of the age limit restrictions and the immediate withdrawal of troops from the townships would be intensified. In contrast, the president of COSAS, Lulu Johnson, rejected the SRC constitution outright on the grounds that students would not be allowed to draw up their own SRC constitution (Rand Daily Mail 9,10/10/84; Star 9/10/84, 11/11/84; Natal Mercury 10/10/84; Cape Times 9/10/84; Argus 9/10/84). The two conflicting positions adopted by the two student leaders reflected deeper ideological and strategic differences between the two student organisations which they represented. At the end of September, a meeting was proposed of delegates from the Azanian Student Organisation (AZASO), the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and the National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA) for the purpose of planning the Education Charter Campaign. The idea of an the Education Charter Campaign was first raised by AZASO in 1981. Educational demands were to be
collected from the community and the students through door-to-door visits, rallies and workshops (City Press 30/9/84; Rand Daily Mail 13/10/84; Cape Times 13/10/84). At the launching conference a core group consisting of representatives of the four organisations was established. Its tasks were:

(i) To formulate the collected demands of students and parents into a cohesive document;

(ii) To reach education establishments throughout the country in order to make the Charter more democratic and acceptable, and

(iii) To involve parents, workers and the whole community in education (City Press 14/10/84; Bot, 1985).

The declaration of the Education Charter Campaign which was drawn up at the meeting read:-

Noting:

* "that the separate and inferior system of education for the majority of the people of South Africa entrenches inferior and undemocratic ideas;"

* "that the unequal education which students continue to reject further deepens the present crisis;"

* "that the so-called reforms including de Lange proposals and the White paper are measures to ensure the continued survival of apartheid education;"

* "that under this New Constitution apartheid education will still be felt in our classrooms and the cultural life of our people will still be harmed."

Believing:

* "that education must be based on the needs and serve the interests of the people;"

* "that education should be accessible to all regardless of colour, creed, sex or age;"

* "that reforms will not bring about a lasting solution to our problems in education;"

* "that our students' struggles arise out of real grievances;"

* "that education is not an issue affecting students alone but all sectors of our society;"

* "that there can never be meaningful change in education until there is meaningful change in society."
Therefore pledge:

* "to unite as workers, women, youth, students, professionals, sports people, and others to fight side by side;"

* "to inter-link the struggles in education with the broader struggle for a united, free, democratic and non-racial South Africa;"

* "to engage ourselves in the campaign for an Education Charter that will embody the short-term, medium-term and long-term demands for a non-racial, free and compulsory education for all in a united and democratic South Africa based on the will of the people" (SASPU focus 3 (2), November 1984).

Efforts to mobilise support from youth and parents in the drawing up of a national education charter embodying both short-term and long-term demands for a democratic education system in South Africa was marked by a meeting at the University of the Witwatersrand on 4 February, 1985. The Education Charter Campaign Committee with members drawn mainly from COSAS and AZASO received support throughout the campaign from NUSAS, NEUSA, trade unions and other community organisations (Rand Daily Mail 7/2/85; Interviewees 4, 10, 12, 29, 35).

The ideological split between COSAS and AZASM was rooted in philosophical differences relating to the non-racialism of the Freedom Charter on the one hand and a mixture of proletarian action and Black nationalism on the other, respectively. The two liberatory theories were explicit in campaigns carried out by the student organisations. As a member of the charterist movement COSAS played an active role in the drawing up of the Education Charter whereas AZASM adhered to the socialist education policy of AZAPO (Document 20).

On the 18 November, 1984, AZAPO unveiled its socialist education policy as a counter to the Education Charter Campaign. This policy had been first hinted at in 1980. In its 1980 preamble to the Critique of
Education in South Africa, AZAPO mentioned that one of its aims and objectives was:

"To work towards the establishment of an education system that will respond creatively towards the needs of AZANIA. In this pursuit the Committee notes that the unjust, oppressive and exploitative practices and beliefs in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres are also primarily shown in the existence of manifold educational systems catering for different races in the country. We also contend that no equitable and just system of education can thrive and function in an unjust and exploitative society. We also note that the means of communication and education are controlled and owned by the dominant ruling classes in order to promote, perpetuate, sustain and maintain their own interests... In the endeavour to establish an educational system for the future, we shall take into cognisance both the evolutionary and revolutionary implications of education" (Document 20).

The policy for a socialist-orientated education was adopted by the organisation at its National Congress in Pietersburg in 1981. Since then the organisation has been working on its new socialist education principles which were revised by the central committee before being presented by the Transvaal region Vice-President, Hlaku Rachidi, at the Soweto branch meeting on Sunday, 18 November, 1984. The policy criticised the apartheid education system which was capitalist-oriented and promoted individualism. The alternative model, Hlaku Rachidi maintained, was socialist in content to suit the needs of a future socialist republic (Sowetan 20/11/84). At this period, AZASM, a student wing of AZAPO, warned the DET to ensure that students' grievances were met before schools re-opened for the 1985 academic year (Sowetan 13/12/84). The new socialist education policy was adopted by AZASM. Formed at Witbank in the Transvaal in 1983 by those who still felt strong about the Black Consciousness philosophy when the Azanian Student Organisation (AZASO) adopted the Freedom Charter, AZASM's destiny has always been tightly enmeshed with that of AZAPO (Interviewees 13 and 20).
The last aspect of the 1984 students' struggle was the disruption of final examinations. As a result of the government's insistence that internal secondary exams had to be written, Stds. 6, 7 and 9 exams were disrupted at Sekanontsane Secondary and Prudence High in Alexandra. About 15 youths were arrested during these incidents (Cape Times 20/10/84). The continuation of the exam disruption in Soweto and other areas together with the intensification of the stayaway in the Vaal Triangle, the East Rand and the Eastern Cape led to the announcement by the regional inspector for the Johannesburg region, Mr. B. Chambers, that the police and SADF members would be used to protect those matric pupils writing exams (Cape Times 23/10/84). The government also sent about 7 000 police and SADF personnel on a house-to-house raid in Sebokeng in an attempt to force pupils back to school. Despite this heavy-handed police and army action the disruption of exams continued and the stayaway action was accelerated in the Vaal Triangle, the East Rand, the Eastern Cape and in some Soweto schools (Rand Daily Mail 26/10/84; Mercury 26/10/84; Cape Times 26/10/84).

The State employed the repressive apparatus throughout the course of the 1984 student and community struggles. This is a typical reaction of the ruling class in a crisis situation where its ideological hegemony is crumbling and it can no longer generate consent amongst the subordinated classes (Saul and Gelb, 1986: 188, 211-2). There are numerous examples of this heavy-handed action by the police force. For instance, on 1 September, 1984, the police killed three people in the East Rand where boycotting students were confronted by armed officers (Rand Daily Mail 1/09/84). Armed action by the police often resulted in community support for the boycott strategy as reflected in the Sebokeng case where solidarity with the students was primarily because of the continued
presence of police in the townships and the intimidation campaign by security police against students (Sowetan 8,9/10/84). Despite the 9 October, 1984, announcement by the Minister of Law and order, Louis le Grange, that the troops would temporarily withdraw from Soweto, indications were that a substantial number of troops had remained in the township (Star 9/10/84).

The harassment of students often drew sympathy for their cause from workers, parents and teachers. The two-day PWV work stayaway on 5 and 6 November, 1984, was testimony to the kind of support students had gained during their 1984 struggles. According to the SAIRR,

"Demonstrations of dissatisfaction during the year converged in the November stay-away, when school children, local groups, and trade unions in the PWV area united to express their discontent in the largest political stayaway on record" (SAIRR, 1985:65).

About 300 schools in the PWV area remained empty during the second day of a two-day work stayaway which started on 5 November. The work stayaway was called by various Black organisations to put pressure on the government to meet community and students' demands country-wide. According to Monica Bot,

"... the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) called a meeting of community organisations and trade unions. This resulted in the call for a stayaway on 5 and 6 November in support of several demands, including those of pupils, as well as in protest against the government's handling of township grievances" (Bot, 1985:1).

Most hit by the stayaway were Atteridgeville, near Pretoria, a number of East Rand townships and the Vaal Triangle, where there was a total stayaway from all schools. A substantial number of pupils in Soweto, Alexandra and Landverwacht, near Standerton, also stayed away from school. The stayaway call coincided also with the prolonged education
crisis in the Vaal Triangle, the East Rand the Eastern Cape. This stayaway saw the absence of an estimated 400 000 pupils from schools in different townships country-wide (Rand Daily Mail 7/11/84). In addition more than 30 000 employees stayed away from work on 5 and 6 November (SAIRR 1985:65). As a consequence, more than 100 teachers, some of whom were members of the African Teachers' Association of South Africa (ATASA), suffered substantial salary deductions in January and February, 1985, for absenteeism during this stayaway (Sowetan 5/3/85). The massive support for the stayaway call demonstrated 'a much closer alliance between pupils and parents/workers' in 1984 (Bot, 1985; Rand Daily Mail 26/10/84).

In conclusion, the 1984 generation of students became aware of the organic link between student and community struggles. According to Dr. David Webster of Wits university, boycotting students in South Africa successfully linked up their school stayaway to community struggles during 1984. The two-day work stayaway from 5 to 6 November emanated from the alliance forged between students, trade unions, community and youth organisations in the process of struggle. While the 1976 student generation issued directives to workers to stay away from work in solidarity, the 1984 generation worked democratically with community organisations and thus achieved an unprecedented ability to link up their school-related demands with community issues. Another factor which revealed that 1984 pupils worked far more democratically with progressive trade unions was that the three-month long stayaway which affected 93 000 Vaal Triangle students was triggered by the community's protest against rent increases (Rand Daily Mail 15/11/84; Interviewee 35). While Webster's view presents a clear picture of what the gains were in relation to the development of consciousness among students, it does not address at all the setbacks during 1984. There was a section of the student body in
the area affected by the stayaways who wanted to attend classes and write end-of-year examinations. Moreover, while Coloured and Indian students protested against the 1984 tricameral elections, their participation was minimal in the school stayaways throughout the year. In addition there were disagreements at times between the Black Consciousness AZASM students and the Charterist COSAS students. These disagreements which arose in the process of the struggle should be reflected in any evaluation of what occurred.

The following is an illuminating summary of trends developed in the student movement during the 1984 stayaways:

* "the acceptance of boycotts as one strategy within a wider struggle for democracy;"
* "Growing emphasis on Black unity and united action, as illustrated by the narrowing of the gap between students, parents and workers;"
* "A split between BC and Freedom Charter adherents (or racial vs non-racial);"
* "Localised to widespread mobilisation on a national level;"
* "Limited (educational) objectives to increasing involvement in community and political issues" (Bot, 1985:18).

(v) The Early 1985 School Boycotts

Whereas some of those areas which were affected by the 1984 school boycotts such as Atteridgeville, near Pretoria, and the Vaal Triangle, returned to relative normality at the start of the 1985 academic year, a total school boycott was reported in 17 schools at Fort Beaufort, Uitenhage and Cradock in the Eastern Cape. In addition, school stayaways were also reported in Pretoria, the East Rand and Pietermaritzburg when the schools re-opened. About 70 000 pupils were still staying away from their schools throughout South Africa at the beginning of March. The
Government, instead of meeting students' demands which included the establishment of democratic SRCs, closed some of the affected schools. For instance, seven schools were suspended indefinitely in Cradock and another six were also closed at Imbali, near Pietermaritzburg. Police battles with students during the first half of the year culminated in the massacre of about 43 people by police at the Langa township in Uitenhage on 21 March and the death in police custody of the Odendaalsrus branch COSAS organiser on 4 May (Cape Times 13/02/85, 10/3/85; Evening Post 11/2/85; Eastern Province Herald 22/3/1985; Sowetan 10/5/85; Star 9,10/5/85; Natal Mercury 18, 20/5/85; Document 63). At the end of June, a total of 215 people were reported to have been detained throughout the first half of the year with 21 of the detentions having occurred in June alone. However the number of those still in detention dropped to 100 at the end of June as some of them had been released in the meantime. During this period all outdoor meetings and a wide range of indoor meetings were prohibited as they were covered in the government ban on political gatherings. In addition about 107 political trials had already been recorded for the year and 1 000 more persons in 102 trials were scheduled to appear in the courts for political trials (Document 42).

THE POSITION IN WESTERN CAPE DET SCHOOLS IN EARLY 1985

At the end of 1984 there were seven secondary schools and 47 primary schools under the DET in the Cape area. There were about 2 486 pupils in Std. 6, 1 928 in Std. 7 and 675 in Std. 10 in those schools. On a national level, of 75 271 African candidates who sat for the National Senior Certificate examination throughout the country in 1984, only 37 737 (50.3%) passed. Of those who passed only 8 620 (11.45%) got a university entrance pass. However, about 3 086 matric results were withdrawn by the
DET because of the alleged irregularities and the late submission of over 1,000 scripts by examiners. In addition, about 130 schools which had 113,990 African pupils could not write the 1984 final exams because of the 1984 school boycotts. All these students had to be accommodated in schools for the 1985 academic year in addition to those who followed a normal progression from lower standards. However, at the beginning of 1985 the DET announced that it was not going to repair schools damaged during the 1984 school boycotts. The DET circuit inspector for the Western Cape, P. Scheepers, also instructed secondary school principals in Cape Town on 11 January not to admit pupils from outside the area served by the schools up to Std. 7. This announcement coincided with the announcement by the government that the DET would stop building schools and that there would be a blanket building freeze at Langa and Guguletu in an attempt to force African students of those areas to move to Khayelitsha, a dormitory township 50km beyond Cape Town's city limits. As a consequence Western Cape African schools were so overcrowded that some pupils were forced to wait until the 1986 academic year to continue their schooling. Students on waiting lists exceeded 1,500 and many of those who attempted to enrol in secondary schools were turned away because of the shortage of accommodation. Worst hit was Paarl township, Mbekweni, where pupils on waiting lists exceeded 1,000. In response students at the Simon Hebe High School in Mbekweni location boycotted classes citing amongst their demands the lack of accommodation in the secondary schools. Other demands concerned:

(i) Shortage of books;
(ii) Lack of parents' involvement in school matters;
(iii) The high failure rate in 1984; and
(iv) The absence of democratic SRCs.
The students boycotted registration and called on the DET to address their demands. The Simon Hebe High School's boycott continued until the end of January but the DET insisted that pupils who had not attended primary school in the area had no right to enrol. This policy was enforced despite the DET's failure to build secondary schools in the new dormitory, Khayelitsha. There were already four classrooms for a pre-primary school which was catering for 106 children, and 44 classrooms in a primary school catering for 1,390 pupils in Khayelitsha. But the DET was only hoping to complete building secondary schools in Khayelitsha in January 1986 and secondary pupils in the area were to be accommodated at the existing schools in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu. Since students who had passed their primary school in Khayelitsha and those in the secondary category who were already in Khayelitsha also flocked to seek accommodation in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu secondary schools, there was no way that overcrowding could be avoided (Cape Times 9, 10, 12, 15, 16/1/85; Sowetan 15/1/85; City Press 20/1/85; Selfe, 1985:13-14). The Minister of Co-operation, Development and Education, Viljoen, admitted in parliament that there was a serious shortage of 5,799 classrooms in African schools outside the homelands. This figure was more or less the same as that estimated by Selfe, which was 3,327 primary and 2,448 secondary classrooms shortage nationally. Ironically at the same parliamentary sitting the government refused to explain the rise in its spending on secret accounts by R11 million to R95 million during the 1985 financial year (Rand Daily Mail 17/4/85; Selfe, 1985:14).

(i) Problems related to the Physical Conditions And other Factors in Western Cape DET Schools in Early 1985

Most of the Cape Town African pupils and teachers interviewed for this
research project indicated that the following problems existed at their schools early in 1985:

Classrooms in a bad shape

Most school classrooms were generally in a bad shape. This was more evident in the old schools which had wooden floors. Holes developed in the floors and walls. Cupboards did not have locks and window panes were broken. In addition doors were broken and without handles.

Overcrowded classrooms

Classrooms were overcrowded.

Leaking roofs

Roofs of some old schools such as Langa High and Zinasa Public Primary at Langa leaked badly during rainy days.

No electricity

Although electricity was being installed at most schools, some schools were still without electricity.

No ceilings

Most of the schools did not have ceilings although new blocks of classrooms which were being added in some schools were built with tiles and ceilings as in the case of Walter Teka Higher Primary in Nyanga.
No Hall

The general tendency was to hire church halls. However, most schools used two classrooms separated by a partition for a hall. But these halls were too small and could only accommodate 100 pupils. So for a meeting involving all the students church halls were utilised.

Shortage of furniture

There was a general shortage of furniture and desks in Cape Town African schools in 1985.

The bucket toilet system

Some schools, although very few, were still using the bucket toilet system e.g. Walter Teka Higher Primary School in Nyanga.

Shortage of teachers

The shortage of teachers compelled teachers to teach eight to ten periods a day. This problem also led to the imposition of a class teaching system (that is, each teacher was compelled to teach one class for the whole year and about eight to ten subject a day) in Cape Town African Primary schools by the DET. Moreover at Langa High School there was only one Geography teacher and his Head of Department was not a Geography teacher.

Insufficient textbooks

About 2 to 5 pupils shared a textbook. Some of the textbooks sent by the
DET to the schools were outdated and irrelevant. Children were compelled to buy their own textbooks as a result and because the majority of them could not afford to buy these textbooks, teachers were forced to prepare notes for students.

Non-existent school libraries

The majority of the schools did not have libraries. Staff members tried to convert some of the classrooms into libraries. In addition READ sent them library boxes. However the DET's supply of library books to African schools was limited and even these library boxes remained nearly empty.

Ill-equipped laboratories

In some cases there were ill-equipped laboratories in Cape Town African schools in 1985, whereas in other there were no laboratories at all. This made Chemistry and others science subjects such as Geography which required the use of a laboratory more theoretically oriented.

No supply of stationery

No stationery was supplied at all to African Schools in Cape Town before and during 1985.

Corporal punishment

Corporal punishment was administered to pupils by teachers and especially by the Principal for various offences such as failing to wear a school uniform. Offenders were brought to his attention by prefects. Prefects
were appointed by the principal with the assistance of his teachers and they functioned to see that everything was in order at school. They were not democratically elected and were accountable only to the Principal and his staff; they were seen as the Principal’s ‘puppets’ by most students.

Lack of sports facilities

In the few cases where sport facilities were provided for a school, it was only facilities for netball, basketball and football. Moreover, the state of these facilities was very poor.

No sports fields

In most schools there were no sports fields. Principals had to hire stadiums from the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) for sports occasions instead. There were also not a lot of these stadiums in the township either and the Principal had to plan very much in advance for anticipated sports tournaments. In schools where there were sports fields, the fields themselves were in a bad shape. In most of these few cases, only a soccer field was provided.

Lack of sports kits

Most pupils bought their own soccer kits although in exceptional cases soccer and netball kits were provided by the school. Other sports equipment such as javelins, shotput, discus and running shoes were not provided at all. In fact there was a general lack of both educational, sports and recreational facilities in Cape Town African schools before and
during 1985 (Interviewees 2, 3, 8, 10, 14, 15, 19, 22, 33, 34, 36A, 36B, 39).

The concern about the lack of educational facilities raised by the interviewees were reinforced by James Sefle (1985) who maintained that no stationery was supplied at all to African schools in Cape Town before and during 1985. In fact children were forced to buy their own textbooks, exercise books, pens and pencils despite the fact that stationery was being freely supplied by the government to White pupils (Sefle, 1985:14). The Peninsula African Teachers' Association (PENATA) claimed to have sent a memorandum to the DET complaining about stationery during 1985. The DET responded by referring the teachers to the Administration Board in this regard. As in a hide-and-seek game, the Administration Board would refer the teachers back to the DET offices for stationery requests (Interviewee 36A).

In early 1985 the Minister of Co-operation, Development and Education, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, made the following statement on the supply of books and stationery at DET schools:

"Stationery and books are provided to schools on the following basis: Stationery. Schools with compulsory education receive stationery free of charge. Exercise books. Exercise books are provided on the same basis as the stationery. Textbooks and class readers. All public and State-aided schools receive textbooks and class readers free of charge. Set books. Set books, which are only being used in secondary schools are not supplied free of charge" (in Sefle, 1985:14).

In addition the DET claimed that it had only established compulsory education for Africans in 269 schools involving 140 816 pupils. The department claimed further that it was unable to establish compulsory education in the other 1 150 schools under its control but did not give specific reasons for this failure (Sefle, 1985:13-14). The consequence
was that the majority of African parents in South Africa were expected to pay for their children's expensive stationery and books as well as high school-fees.

(ii) The Boycott of Classes in Simon Hebe School, Paarl

In the middle of January, Paarl's Simon Hebe School in the Western Cape went out on boycott against:

(i) The failure of the government to introduce democratic SRCs;
(ii) The shortage of textbooks;
(iii) Insufficient involvement of parents in school matters;
(iv) The high failure rate in 1984; and
(v) Lack of accommodation at the school.

The high failure rate at Simon Hebe High School reflected the situation in DET schools throughout South Africa. The Financial Mail reported that of the 15,995 pupils who wrote the 1984 DET examinations, only 1,928 or 12.55% gained university entrance passes. Another 6,103 or 39.72% gained ordinary Senior Certificate passes. The 1984 total percentage pass was 52.27%, an increase of 2.23% over that achieved in 1983 when only 11% of those who had written matric exams had gained university entrance passes (Financial Mail 11/01/85).

The DET had also announced that it was not going to repair many of the schools damaged during the 1984 school crisis because of the alleged lack of funds. As a result there was a lack of accommodation in schools throughout the country and about 1000 pupils were on waiting lists hoping to be placed in schools in Paarl. Owing to the Simon Hebe school boycott, the DET appealed to the community to step in and help with funds to create
accommodation for students (Cape Times 15, 16/01/85; Sowetan 15/01/85; Argus 15/01/85; Rand Daily Mail 16/01/85). In February 1984 Simon Hebe High again became a centre of activity when its students participated in community resistance against forced removals. The confusion around forced removals to Khayelitsha spilled into the school boycott at Mbekweni location at Paarl where residents and youths who attended a residents' meeting to discuss this issue burnt a Western Cape Development Board vehicle. Police responded by invading the Simon Hebe High School but did not make any arrests (Cape Times 22/2/85).

(iii) Cape Town African Students Demand a Democratic SRC

At a meeting held at Fezeka High School in Guguletu on Tuesday, 12 February, 1985, African secondary pupils from Fezeka, Sizamile, Langa and I.D. Mkize High Schools rejected the DET SRC constitution (Cape Times 13/2/85). In a pamphlet calling the meeting they said:

"Traditionally most schools have inherited the prefect system as a form of representation because teachers nominate the prefects and it has given them the right to dictate to students. It has also given few privileges to a few students. It is clear that there is a need for democratically elected SRCs. The SRC is a body which represents the students' aspirations" (Document 38).

The four Cape Town African high schools resolved to hold their own SRC elections, and not to allow the DET to control voting procedures. In this way, they believed, they could ensure the establishment of democratic SRCs (Cape Times 13/2/85). The students perceived the aim of democratic SRCs as:

1. To voice aspirations and grievances around their particular school;

2. To act as a link to create a working relationship between teachers, students and parents;
To set up educational programmes within the school and help students to expand their knowledge of current events;

To make students aware about laws made by the DET regarding uniform, corporal punishment, expulsion, etc.

To act as a link with other schools and workers' organisations by joining national students’ bodies like COSAS" (Document 38).

(iv) The Role of COSAS in Early 1985

"COSAS was formed in 1979 to unite all the oppressed and exploited students of South Africa. For the past year COSAS has been involved in taking up educational struggle campaigning for democratic Students’ Representative Council. COSAS also strive to form students’ and worker alliance because students on their own cannot bring about change without a dynamic leading role of workers. So then COSAS have strong relationship with the Trade Unions and community organisations" (Document 72).

In early 1985 COSAS was operating in Western Cape schools, but taking different forms depending on the setting. It had branches in all the four African high schools in the area, that is, Langa, Sizamile, I.D. Mkize and Fezeka. Local branches constituted a structure referred to as a regional branch with its own regional executive committee. However, major decisions of the organisation were taken at a national congress. The national congress was composed of both local and regional structures. The national congress met at the end of each year (Document 65).

In addition there was a national council which was meant to review the gains and losses of the organisation. The national council met at the middle of each year.

In line with its non-collaboration policy, COSAS intensified the struggle against the DET-created prefect system in favour of their replacement by democratic SRCs in early 1985. As one of COSAS' 1985 secretaries and a Std.10 pupil at Sizamile High in Nyanga East put it:
"As we were opposed to government structures, we took up the struggle for SRCs. We believed the education we got was meant to perpetuate racist ideas and to reproduce cheap labour. We never said people should boycott education as a principle but as a tactic because we also defined the schools as arenas for the struggle and hence we should pre-suppose that the students will be at the schools in order to carry on with the struggle ... The present education crisis has its root in 1983 bus boycotts in East London.

By then COSAS was still weak to carry that struggle to a national level. It was only in 1984 with the uprisings especially in the Transvaal that COSAS started to respond. What one saw was an initiative on the part of COSAS to call trade unions and community organisations to discuss the crisis that was taking place in the schools and the townships as well. Out of that attempt one saw a bigger stayaway in the Transvaal. Organisations became stronger and by 1985 COSAS made a resolution to campaign for the SRCs on a national scale. The SRC was now going to be a national issue. The spark of the 1985 school crisis began to develop in areas such as Natal which the Western Cape joined at a later stage. COSAS' role was providing uniformity in the struggles that were developing and taking up the campaign for democratic SRCs ... As a tactic it was necessary to build the SRCs and to begin to draw these SRCs into the struggle. In a sense COSAS acted as an organisation which will provide the political programmes for the SRCs" (Interviewee 4).

COSAS as an organisation of students had to do more with school-related demands such as lack of textbooks, sports and educational facilities, and student aspirations in the educational sector. Another problem faced by students was their ill-treatment by staff members in the form of corporal punishment and COSAS had to show teachers that the common enemy was the apartheid regime. Moreover, COSAS students viewed themselves as members of the community before they were students and to maintain their link with the community they encouraged parents to be involved in school matters. The effectiveness of COSAS in organising and educating students around problems at school as well as in encouraging co-operation among them was the main reason behind its banning in mid-1985. Moreover the DET was threatened by COSAS' attempt to build unity amongst teachers, students and parents in the struggle for a free, compulsory, non-racial and non-sexist
democratic education system (Interviewees 32, 44, and 45). Another member of COSAS in 1985 said:

"In COSAS we believe in non-racialism. The main objective was to unite the students, our schools, and develop a concrete relationship between students, teachers and parents.

We also wanted to involve our parents and community on issues that were taken up in our schools and ensure that parents see themselves as part of our education. So the main objective was to link these sectors together and to show that the problems at our schools were national ... SRCs were to unite students in the African townships around the above ... we fought for the formation of P TSA's ... we started with basic issues which united everyone, such as the question of fighting problems experienced by students at school, that is, lack of facilities, books, laboratories and qualified teachers. Our other main aim was to ensure that we had strong structures that would lead to the participation of all students in decision-making in a different way from how the DET handled its matters through the Regional Director, Scheepers, Inspectors such as Mtoba and Mshumpela, Principals and Teachers. In the DET structure students who were at the bottom of the structure had no say and were expected to accept everything ... We also ensured that our parents took part in our schools as they were the ones who brought us to school and bought our books" (Interviewee 30).

The creation of SRCs, central to COSAS' struggle in school since it was formed, was a means through which students could effectively contest the control of the schools and thus transforming the education arena into a site where the struggle for a free, non-sexist, non-racial democratic South Africa could be effectively advanced. COSAS' position was that through the establishment of SRCs students could be effectively brought under the control of COSAS. In this way most students could be actively involved in the struggle. The SRCs were, therefore, initially created as a platform to launch the position of COSAS. COSAS was to involve its members in all the SRC structures so that these members could advance the interests of COSAS within these bodies. The point here was that COSAS on its own could not control students who were not its members but a democratically elected SRC could rightfully claim maximum support for its programmes in a particular school (Interviewee 4 and 44).
It is therefore not surprising that the SRC constitution looked like a duplicate of that of COSAS. The 'Proposed Constitution for the S.R.C.' drawn up by the Cape Town African students in 1985 read:

"PREAMBLE"

"Believing that independent SRC are necessary to schools, realising that there is a need of good relationship between student, teacher and parents and noting that such relationship have never existed before. We resolve to establish a structure that will ensure such relationship"

NAME

STUDENT REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL: herein after reffered as the S.R.C.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

(1) To represent students in all matters affecting them.

(2) To normalise relationships between students, teachers and parents.

(3) To create a spirit of trust, co-operation and creative companionship amongst students.

(4) To build critical analyses of life in our society" (Document 73).

The congress of South African Students (COSAS) constituition, in turn, reads:

"PREAMBLE"

"We, the students in South Africa regarding ourselves first as members of society before we are students and BELIEVING that students are morally and spiritually obliged to contribute constructively toward the welfare of society and that the unity of students is the vital key to the realisation of our objectives.

THEREFORE RESOLVE to establish an organisation as set out below.

1. NAME:

The Congress of South African Students, hereinafter referred to as COSAS.

2. OBJECTIVES:

2.1 To normalise the relationship between students, teachers and parents."
2.2 To create a spirit of trust and co-operation between students and parents.

2.3 To create a spirit of trust, responsibility, understanding and creative companionship between students.

2.4 To impress on the student the essence of his being even after completion of his studies.

2.5 To strive towards an education which is dynamic, free and compulsory for the betterment of society.

2.6 To become practically involved in projects contributing to the improvement of COSAS in pursuance of the above objectives" (Document 11).

The structuring of COSAS' and the SRCs constitution is similar as they both structure their preamble, name, objectives and other aspects in a similar fashion. Furthermore, central to both preambles is the need to create a 'good relationship between students, teachers and parents' or to make students responsible for their society as they are 'members of society before we are students'. According to one of the COSAS members and a Std.10 pupil at Langa High in 1985:

"There was no vast difference between the SRC and COSAS constitution. The SRC also believed in non-racialism although there were small problems here and there given the fact that the Joint SRCs represented all students in different schools and not all these students believed in what COSAS believed in. So we had to accommodate all these pupils although when it came to drafting the constitution the aim became to develop critical students as opposed to pupils who accept anything. Mainly the SRCs were to unite students in the African townships around the above. The objective of uniting students, parents and teachers was also reflected in the SRC constitution.

That is why we fought for the formation of the Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSA's) which were no problem to anyone even those from the Black Consciousness persuasion" (Interviewee 30).

COSAS' national campaign for, amongst other things, the establishment of democratic SRCs and the demand for non-racial democratic education was consistently disrupted by the security police who victimised, intimidated,
arrested or detained COSAS leaders. For instance, a COSAS organiser and the Joint Student Representative Council (JSRC) President in 1985, was detained during the second half of 1985 (Interviewee 30). Moreover, COSAS itself was banned on 28 August, 1985 (Star 29/8/85). A pamphlet issued by the Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO) had this to say to the government’s response to COSAS-led struggles:

"The government response is to ban COSAS. But repression is nothing new to COSAS. Since COSAS has been formed its leaders have been banned, imprisoned or forced into exile. The first president E. Mogale is presently in prison. His successor Wanto Zenzile and others have been forced into exile. The present COSAS president is in hiding" (Document 64).

But COSAS was not alone in organising African students in the Cape Town townships during the first half of 1985. Other organisations, such as AZASM, participated in the struggle for the establishment of democratic SRCs. The Vice-Chairperson of the Cape Town branch of AZASM in the townships described the role of his organisation during 1985 as follows:

"During the 1985 school crisis AZASM went out to organise more students and successfully got more new members. We used T-shirts and stickers for publicity and became a force to be reckoned with. We also held workshops and since there were ideological conflicts between AZASM and Freedom Charterists, AZASM politicised people as to the dangers of ideological differences. We therefore managed to gain support in the townships" (Interviewee 13).

THE MAY-DAY STAYAWAY IN PENINSULA COLOURED SCHOOLS

The Inter-School Co-ordinating Committee (ISCC) representing at least 30 Coloured schools in the Cape Peninsula planned a Mayday stayaway for 1 May, 1985 (Argus 1/5/85). A pamphlet released by the Belgravia High School’s SRC described the ISCC as follows:

"The ISCC is a representative body which questions why we as the oppressed students have to suffer the indignity of an education system designed only to create people who will accept domination
and their status as inferior people. The SRC says NO; we must never accept our status as inferior people. We shall all be equal. We must strive for a proper education system which gives every child, irrespective of colour or creed, the opportunity to develop to his/her fullest potential" (Document 67).

About 67 Coloured schools in the Cape Peninsula responded to the Mayday stayaway call. The ISCC spokesperson said:

"In the Eastern Cape, Transvaal and other areas, oppressed students have been brutally killed and the ISCC realises that it is because of a system where workers are exploited that our fellow students are suffering" (Argus 1/5/85).

It was due to this realisation that the organisation called on 'all oppressed students in the Western Cape' to stay away on May Day (Argus 1/5/85). However, it was not the first time in 1985 that Cape Peninsula Coloured students stayed away from school to "salute our comrades and pledge support for the cause of workers and oppressed people" including those killed and arrested (Cape Times 20/4/85). On 19 April, 1985, Coloured pupils in the Cape Peninsula, especially the Bonteheuwel and Oaklands Senior Secondary Schools, staged a one-day stayaway gesture of protest at the Uitenhage shootings which claimed an estimated 43 lives on 21 March, 1985 (Cape Times 20/4/85). However, the 1 May stayaway was more successful in that some of the 67 Coloured school affected had 100% absenteeism (Cape Times 2/5/85). Surprisingly there was no report of any participation of African schools in Cape Town in the Mayday stayaways. This posed a lot of problems in relation to unity between Coloured and African pupils in the Cape Peninsula. Cape Peninsula African pupils had much to protest about at this period, for example, lack of accommodation in schools had resulted in more than 500 African children having been out of the school in the area for the rest of the 1985 academic year (Cape Times 1/5/85). It is in this sense that the non-participation of Cape Peninsula African pupils in the Mayday stayaway should be viewed as
reflecting the lack of unity between Coloured and African Students in the first half of 1985.

CONCLUSION

When the HSRC De Lange Commission of Inquiry was set up in 1980 Black students and parents thought the government was going to make some concessions in the educational arena (Interviewee 35). However, the government did not make any fundamental changes.

Disappointments about the HSRC De Lange Report and the 1983 Government White Paper as well as the failure of the government to establish a free, non-racial, dynamic and democratic education system lead to the protest against the 1983 Government White Paper and the campaign for the establishment of democratic SRCs in early 1984 (Sowetan 13,14/2/85; Interviewee 35). After raising educational grievances and organising around the Education Charter Campaign, students realised that they had to link-up with community and workers' organisations. In August 1984, students organisations called for a two-week boycott of the elections for the tricameral parliament. In response, nearly one million students stayed away from schools and participated in the country-wide community protest against the new constitution. The tricameral parliament was viewed as a body which would further entrench the apartheid education system whereas students were yearning for a free, non-racial, dynamic and democratic education system (Rand Daily Mail 15/11/84; Document 54; Interviewees 9,35).
The continuing dissatisfaction with apartheid education, the exclusion of the majority of South Africans from the tricameral parliament, and the deepening economic crisis caused by disinvestment and sanctions which brought high inflation and deepening unemployment, resulted in the 5 - 6 November, 1984, stayaway by workers in the PWV area. The overwhelming workers' response in the Vaal Triangle during this stayaway laid a solid foundation for the development of a student-worker alliance in 1985 (SAIRR, 1985:65; Bot, 1985; City Press 17/2/85; Interviewees 12, 24, 35). The development of students' political consciousness was reflected in the demands embodied in the Education Charter Campaign at the beginning of 1985 which included community and worker demands such as the removal of the army and the police from Black townships, the establishment of a non-exploitative economic system, and the abolition of the apartheid system (Interviewees 9, 35). Moreover, the practical application of the COSAS constitution, especially those parts which stressed consultation and co-operation between students on the one hand and teachers, workers and parents on the other, demanded that COSAS members forge alliances with teachers, workers and parents during the first half of 1985 (Document 11; Interviewees 4, 30, 32, 35, 44, 45).

However, the development of students' political consciousness was uneven. Students who were members of student organisations such as AZASM and COSAS were more advanced politically as compared to those not affiliated to any student organisation. The most important distinction between the two groups of students was that the former group was accountable to its organisations and therefore observed organisational discipline whereas the latter group lacked such a responsibility and was susceptible to spontaneous action because of a lack of political education (Rand Daily Mail 15/11/84; Interviewees 4, 9, 30). It was for the above reasons that
COSAS engaged in a politicisation and mobilisation programme inside DET schools in the Western Cape at the beginning of 1985. Through the Education Charter Campaign COSAS organised students in African schools in the Western Cape around visible school-based grievances, such as the demand for democratic SRCs, the abolition of corporal punishment, the removal of sexual harassment, the demand for free stationery, and the abolition of high school-fees and costly uniforms. However, because membership of COSAS was not compulsory, the organisation did not represent all school pupils and in order to advance effectively the student grievances, a students structure which represented all the pre-tertiary students was needed. Only a democratic SRC could serve this purpose. Since democratic SRCs were non-existent at DET schools in the Western Cape in early 1985, COSAS was compelled to organise students to fight for the establishment of SRCs. It also encouraged its members to participate in those democratic SRCs to ensure that the struggle for the establishment of a free, democratic, non-racial, and dynamic education system was advanced within those structures (Document 72; Interviewees 4, 30, 32, 35, 45, 44). The unevenness of African students political consciousness was also reflected in their failure to heed the ISCC call for a solidarity stay-away from schools on Mayday, 1985. The non-participation of DET schools in the Western Cape also reflected that the unity between Coloured and African students, despite efforts by COSAS to mobilise Black students against the apartheid education system, was not yet fully developed (Argus 1/5/85; Cape Times 20/4/85, 1, 2/5/85; Interviewee 44).
A THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE 1985 SCHOOL CRISIS EVENTS

INTRODUCTION

The 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape has to be analysed within the context of the organic crisis which confronted South Africa from the late 1970s and deepened during the mid-1980s. The crisis had as components economic, political, and ideological factors (Saul & Gelb, 1986:188). The international crisis of capital accumulation and the hegemonic crisis of White rule - the backbone of the organic crisis - translated into a 'crisis of legitimacy' for the SA State (Alexander, 1987:10; Stadler, 1987:161; Bundy, 1987:314). At this period the ruling class became progressively less hegemonic although it remained dominant (Alexander, 1988:13). Divided internally, ruling class defensive strategy - a mixture of reform and continued repression reached its limits in acquiring consent for its rule. It is in this sense that the mid-80s period was the conjuncture of 'unstable equilibrium' (Wolpe, 1988:209). The Apartheid State's capacity to bully down opposition to its rule was near exhaustion and at the same time the opposition forces lacked the resources and power to abolish the system. This shift in the balance of forces posed the question whether the path for SA's survival would follow a direction of reform or one of revolution (Callinicos, 1981:142; 1988:50; Saul & Gelb,
1986:211-212). For the national liberation movement the time had come for the process of progressively eroding apartheid structures. In contrast with the 1970s the transformed politics of the 1980s involved more radical community based organisational structures such as the National Forum and the United Democratic Front. Formed in 1983 these umbrella structures gave greater degree of political focus and organisational capacity to the mass movement which was expressed during the 1983 tricameral elections. The result was the progressive extension of the national liberation struggle into the schools and this development was consolidated in October 1984 (Bundy, 1987:313-4; Wolpe, 1988:209). While the resistance movement was convinced that the setting was ripe for revolution, the main question it faced, was the form this revolution would take. Did the situation call for an all-out assault (Freedom now, Education Later) or did it need the progressive assertion of people's power within apartheid structures (People's Education for People's Power)?

On the regime's side, the continued use of the mix of reform and repression to defend the status quo was re-assessed. The Apartheid State had to do something to allay the fears of capital that the National Party had lost the strategic initiative in resolving the organic crisis. At this period it was clear that the so-called 'reforms' of the Botha regime were failing to control and maintain the existing social relations in SA. Moreover, the State was increasingly relying on coercion to suppress the growing mass struggles which 'reforms' had failed to diffuse. As a result, from mid-1984, SA entered a period of 'mass strike' which needed the abolition of the apartheid system in its entirety as a resolution for the organic crisis (Saul & Gelb, 1986:211-212).
Fundamental contradictions within the ruling class bloc limited its capacity to come up with new, deep-meaning changes to diffuse the 'mass strike'. The regime’s inability to formulate a consistent strategy to deal with the resistance movement coupled with the prominence of coercion, further reflected that the period of organic crisis had indeed been reached. This presented the resistance movement with unique opportunities to advance the interests of the national liberation struggle. Although the ruling classes were aware of the possibility for the national liberation movement effectively to utilise the space created by the 'unstable equilibrium' to challenge for political power, with its back against the wall it intensified repression as a desperate "last resort" measure to defend the status quo (Saul & Gelb, 1986: 188, 211-2). The adoption of a repressive strategy instead of seeking consensus further reflected that the efforts to elicit spontaneous consent through so-called reforms had totally collapsed.

Indeed the imposition of "rule" as opposed to "social hegemony" revealed that the "formative action" which began in the late 1970s had by the mid-1980s failed to galvanise spontaneous consent for the regime. According to Raymond Williams,

"Rule is expressed in directly political forms and in times of crisis by direct or effective coercion. But the more normal situation is a complex inter-locking of political, social and cultural forces, and ‘hegemony’ according to different interpretations, is either this or the creative social and cultural forces which are its necessary elements" (Williams, 1977: 108).

In the period of hegemony ruling class ideological domination is exercised without the application of direct repression. The process of "legitimation" achieved through spontaneous consent ensures that the ruling class ideology is embraced and counter ideologies deemed
illegitimate (Kavanagh, 1985:16). The twists and turns of the apartheid regime at the ideological level during the 'reform' period decreased the NP's ability to lead. Consequently the ideological forms' effectiveness in stabilizing the system was fundamentally reduced. Ideological apparatuses such as educational institutions, could as a result no longer function easily as media through which ruling class ideology was propagated. The pre-eminence of schools as a domain of the struggle in 1985 was, therefore, caused by the regime's hegemonic crisis (Bundy, 1987:314). It was not surprising therefore that the students accurately expressed both the dilemmas of that moment and the interests of the oppressed majority in South Africa (Lenin, 1970:89).

The adoption of the undialectical slogan "freedom now, education later" indicated the attempt by students to utilise the unique opportunities created by the organic crisis to advance the interests of the national liberation struggle. The slogan came out of a search for a strategy to break the deadlock and dramatic challenges presented by the state of 'unstable equilibrium' which was reached in 1985 (Wolpe, 1988:209). Its antithesis, 'People's Education for People's Power' reflected deeper strategic considerations concerning how best the transformation of the existing apartheid structures could be effected bearing in mind that the regime had not yet been overthrown. Due to the fact that in terms of sheer power the ruling class was scarcely a spent force, the progressive assertion of people's power in education and the establishment of people's organs of power such as street committees were seen as a viable long-term strategy that could eventually lead to the downfall of the regime.

The school crisis was characterised by an attempt by the students supported by parents and workers to challenge the power relations
reflected in State ideological apparatuses like schools so that liberatory normative values could be injected. In the process, students' grievances became more overtly political such that their voice became the articulation of the demands of the oppressed masses as a whole. Educational, political and economic struggles were merged. The links between varied domains wherein the crisis was manifest reinforced the sharpening of conflicts in each leading towards much more radical suggested resolutions than before. This reduced ruling class hegemony tremendously although it remained dominant.

A central argument advanced here is that one cannot treat events in education in isolation from other developments in South African society of which they are part. Schools do not operate in a socio-economic vacuum. Practices in these institutions are informed by socioeconomic and political processes and in turn events in the educational arena contribute to shaping society. In this sense any mono-causal approach would distort the fact that education struggles aggravate and are aggravated by socio-political and economic conflicts. Any serious examination of the educational crisis, therefore, should view it as reflecting back on the organic crisis within which the apartheid system is encoiled. Thus the crisis of authority within the schools in 1985 was a reflection of the socio-economic, political and ideological crisis engulfing South Africa. The historical/empirical account which follows below is, where possible, chronological.

MAIN TRIGGERS

Despite the continued efforts in early 1985 by COSAS to mobilise support for the establishment of democratic SRCs and the existence of grievances
relating to, amongst others, lack of educational facilities and poor maintenance of school buildings, "the Cape Peninsula was relatively unaffected by political and educational struggles being waged elsewhere in the country" (Bundy, 1987:314). In a period of hegemonic crisis, one or two political incidents could bring major impetus to organised political, economic and educational resistance. The death of Matthew Goniwe and his colleagues whose charred bodies were found on July 1, 1985, near Port Elizabeth after they went missing on 27 June, 1985 was one of the triggers (Cape Times, 10/7/85; Sowetan 8, 9/7/85; Star 8/7/85; Interviewees 5, 17, 19, 20, 27, 30, 42, 44, 45). The declaration of the State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts on 20 July, 1985, and taking effect on 21 July, 1985, was another main trigger of the school crisis in the Western Cape (Sunday Times 21/7/85).

The death of Matthew Goniwe and his colleagues was commemorated throughout the country and in Cape Town African townships this service was held on 19 July, 1985. Clashes with the police after the commemoration service in Guguletu led to tension in the township and students started discussing appropriate action to show their solidarity with their counterparts who were already boycotting classes in the Eastern Cape (Argus 20/7/85, 2/9/1985; Cape Times 20/7/85; Interviewees 5, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 42, 44, 45). As a result Western Cape Black students called for a mass meeting at the University of the Western Cape on 26 July, 1985, the main objective of which was to respond to the government's declaration of the State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts and discuss the school-related grievances of students.
At this meeting the students resolved to start a class boycott on the same day in the Western Cape until the government lifted the State of Emergency and students' demands had been met (Weekly Mail 12/9/85).

FREEDOM NOW, EDUCATION LATER: THE BOYCOTT AS A STRATEGY

The adoption of the boycott as a strategy by the Western Cape students in the second half of 1985 should be viewed within the context of the organic crisis. On a period of organic crisis, the failure of the ruling class hegemony and "formative action" to generate spontaneous consent lead to the prominence of coercion in suppressing opposition forces (Hall, 1988:136). There is however a conflicting argument which states that in South Africa the application of the repressive State apparatus is proportionally greater than what we have in democratic countries of the West. In this sense the situation "in which the State relies on naked coercion, is virtually the 'normal' situation" (Kavanagh, 1985:16-17).

On this point Saul & Gelb (1986) argued that although elements of State coercion have always been prominent in South Africa, the intensification of mass struggles in 1984 and 1985 saw a marked increase in the scope of its application. Repressive State action was evident in early 1984 principally against education struggles and in August 1984 against community forces which were against the implementation of the tricameral parliament. Saul and Gelb went further to say,

"It was however the dramatic scale of police and military response to the developments in the Transvaal beginning in September that really set the tone for what was to follow. When the State of emergency was declared in many parts of the country in July 1985, it was primarily a formalisation of the prevailing situation even if it did give the forces of repression a somewhat free hand" (Saul & Gelb, 1986:221).
However ruthless repression had its costs, and one of these was the creation of new impetus for further resistance. The tactic of relying on the State coercive apparatus in dealing with opposition exacerbated the 'organic crisis' and put the question of a revolutionary situation on the agenda (Callinicos, 1981,1988). It was not only in the 'economic' and 'political' spheres that the national liberation struggle was waged but the educational arena became an important site of this struggle (Alexander, 1985:82). This point was summarized by Colin Bundy who argued,

"While mobilising and organisational efforts of student activists ... played a part, beyond any doubt the major factor in ratcheting the student/youth militancy in Cape Town between July and December was the State's heavy-handed coercive measures" (Bundy, 1987:315).

The first African students' action in the Western Cape was primarily a response to State repression. The death of four Cradock leaders, Matthew Goniwe and his colleagues was linked to the application of the State repressive apparatus (Argus 19,20/7/85, 2/9/87; Repression Bulletin, October 1985; National Education Crisis WIP Nov/Dec 1986). On 19 July, 1985, the Cape Peninsula African primary and secondary school pupils and those in Worcester and Paarl stayed away from their schools to commemorate the death of the four - Goniwe, Mkonto, Calata and Mhlawuli (Argus 20/7/85, 2/9/87; Cape Times 20/7/85).

The Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu students held their commemoration service at the St. Gabriel Church in Guguletu. According to the SRC organising committee which represented township pupils, the one-day stayaway was not only meant as protest against the killing of the four but also as an expression of solidarity with boycotting pupils in the Eastern Cape (Argus 20/7/85; Cape Times 20/7/85). By using this commemoration service as a
visible defiance of the apartheid system, African students were clearly undermining the legitimacy of the regime. To counter this challenge to its hegemony, the apartheid regime required daily police presence and psychological and physical intimidation. On this occasion the government responded by sending police and traffic officials to Guguletu and Crossroads where all entrances were manned and buses and cars entering the township were turned away. The Press was also barred from the area (Repression Bulletin October 1985; Argus 20/7/85; Cape Times 20/7/85). In this period an unrest situation developed in some parts of Crossroads and Guguletu leaving more than 11 people injured and three vehicles gutted. The confrontation between mourners and the police started soon after 2.00 pm when vehicles with officers armed with sjamboks, shotguns and tear gas attempted forcefully to disperse people coming from the memorial service. As the battle between residents and the police spread within the township, bus services in the townships were suspended. Police also drove a petrol tanker to safety after its driver abandoned it in the face of the township residents' attack. This became the starting point of the cycle of resistance and repression in the Cape Town townships in 1985 after a period of relative calm in early 1985 (Repression Bulletin October 1985; Argus 20/7/85; Cape Times 20/7/85).

However, the adoption of an 'indefinite boycott' as a strategy took place at a mass meeting on 26 July, 1988 at UWC stadium (Cape Times 27/7/85; Argus 26/7/85; Repression Bulletin,October 1985). The burning issue at this meeting was the extensive wave of State repression experienced throughout the country. About 910 people had already been detained under the Emergency regulations. It was therefore as a response to the declaration of the State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts that
Cape Town Black students began an indefinite class boycott on 26 July, 1985 (Cape Times 27/7/85). However, the period towards the adoption of the boycott strategy in the Western Cape was characterised by varied and diffuse spontaneous activities by students. The collective decision by most Western Cape student organisations to begin the boycott on 26 July, 1985, was made after some students in the area had already begun boycotting classes. The purpose and duration of the boycott was continually contested with periodic reassessment. Differences and hesitations about its effectiveness did occur occasionally and the pattern of its implementation in the Western Cape in 1985 reflected these tensions.

For instance, the class boycott started on 22 July, 1985, in the Cape Town African townships and about 4,000 UWC students decided to boycott classes from Wednesday 23 to Friday 26 July, 1985 (Repression Bulletin October 1985; National Education Crisis WIP Nov/Dec 1986). In addition pupils from 29 Coloured secondary schools who were part of the Inter-School Co-ordinating Committee (ISCC) decided to boycott classes from 25 July, 1985 (Weekly Mail 12/9/85). The ISCC decided upon this action after a teacher and Secretary of the Kraaifontein Civic Association, D. Galant, was threatened with a transfer because of her involvement with community issues (Weekly Mail 12/9/85). The decision to boycott classes was also a response to the broader political and socio-economic crisis in South Africa. A member of the ISCC revealed,

"We felt we had to take some action and decided to boycott normal classes we felt we had to show solidarity with and support for our fellow students in the Vaal Triangle and the Eastern Cape. We also felt we had to respond to the declaration of a State of Emergency elsewhere in the country" (Weekly Mail 12/9/85).
UWC students only started an indefinite class boycott on Monday 29 July, 1985. On the same date all the five high schools in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu who were on boycott were confronted by the police, leading to the killing of an 18 years old student, Sthembele Matiso, by the police. That was after the police in Caspirs threw tear gas, beat up people with sjamboks and shot at youths who were marching in the streets of Guguletu (Student Bulletin 1 (2), May 1986; Repression Bulletin October 1985; Cape Times 30/7/85). As a result about 45 Black institutions in the Western Cape were on a stayaway by July 30, 1985, and at the other schools where students attended, instead of normal classes, awareness programs were held (Repression Bulletin October 1985; Cape Times 31/7/85, 1/8/85; Star 1/8/85). The DET regional inspector in the Cape, J.J. Jansen, said that the boycott at African Secondary Schools in the Peninsula and Boland was total and at about four African primary schools the stayaway was in full force on 30 July, 1985 (Argus 31/7/85).

In a pamphlet released by the Azanian Revolutionary Movement of Students (an underground students activist group which infiltrated and/or recruited its members from Black Consciousness and Pan Africanist Student movements in 1985), the demands of boycotting students were give as follows:

1. Freedom of Expression;
2. Free education;
3. Scrap the emergency and withdraw all security forces from the townships;
4. Freedom to change their syllabi to reflect the objective realities of the Azanian people’s history, their history of oppression and resistance;
5. Freedom to fully democratise all educational institutions;
6. Freedom for all political prisoners;
7. Freedom for all exiles to return without let or hindrance;
(8) Freedom to bring the working class into the universities, colleges and schools to discuss politics;

(9) Freedom to discuss politics with the rank and file of the police, the army and the navy, and their role in society in relation to the situation of the masses of the oppressed peoples;

(10) Freedom to organise and mobilize the rural proletariat and peasantry" (Document 51).

One observation made by a significant section of the interviewees was that students' demands covered both educational and political matters. They challenged the whole economic and political fabric of South Africa and their achievement demanded nothing less than the destruction of the whole apartheid system (Interviewees 5, 8, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 30, 31, 37, 38, 42, 44, 45).

At the end of July, students started to canvass seriously for the community's support for their grievances. On 31 July, 1985, the Western Province Student Action Committee (WEPSC), an ad hoc organisation co-ordinating the boycott, endorsed eight short-term demands drawn up by the Inter-School Co-ordinating Committee (ISCC). These demands included the reinstatement of dismissed teachers, the right to a democratic SRC, freedom of speech for students and teachers, the immediate resignation of "dummy" MP's and community councillors, and the removal of the SADF from the township (Cape Times 1/8/85; Interviewees 17, 20, 44). Community councillors became the target of student attack because they were seen as part of the control of the African community. In addition the government was promoting community councils or Black local authorities for its own benefit. By implementing "upgrading" schemes under these bodies' control, the NP hoped to gain greater credibility and legitimacy (Callinicos, 1988:60;128).
Towards the middle of August 1985, education had ground to a halt in the Western Cape African townships (City Press 11/8/85). This development coincided with the mobilisation of community support for student struggles by the more conscious element in the student leadership e.g. COSAS student leaders. In response progressive organisations under the leadership of the UDF called for a consumer boycott of White shops and those belonging to community councillors to begin officially on 14 August, 1985 (Repression Bulletin October 1985; City Press 11/8/85; Cape Times 12/8/85). This prompted further harsh repression from the State. Soldiers and police went as far as beating, arresting and detaining students inside their schools (Argus 12, 13/8/85; Cape Times 12,13/8/85; Varsity 44 (9) 21/8/85).

The intensification of the use of coercion against the community and students forced teachers in the Western Cape to take a stand. The result was a mass meeting of Western Cape teachers from 79 schools and colleges which was held on 15 August, 1985, to discuss teachers' position on the school boycott and police attacks on their students. At this meeting the teachers resolved to co-ordinate a two-day teachers' strike to demonstrate their support for the class boycott. Teachers also resolved to help in the co-ordination of alternative education programmes at this meeting (National Education Crisis WIP Nov/Dec 1986; Interviewees 19,44). Gramsci argues that the constant exercise of coercive force alone for gaining legitimacy by a State indicates the existence of an organic crisis or crisis of authority. Within the context of an organic crisis the conscious mobilisation into political awareness of hitherto passive and repressed social groups can lead into a hegemonic crisis for the State. The politicizing of previously conformist teachers and quiescent parents
brought about strong support for student grievances and rather politicised students demands (Interviewee 7).

On Sunday, 18 August, 1985, Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga parents and students held a meeting in Guguletu where a body of parents called the Parents' Action Committee (PAC) was elected to liaise between students/parents and the DET on the educational crisis. The meeting also initiated the drawing up of a list of students' grievances to be handed in to the local education authorities by the PAC (Document 5; Interviewees 5, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 36A, 36B, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44).

The core of the demands were related to those already raised by COSAS of which the fight for democratically elected SRC's was the main issue. However the fight for the new list of demands was led by the PAC and SRCs from the four secondary schools in the Guguletu, Langa, Crossroads and Nyanga area although primary school SRCs were later included. The Cape Town African school SRCs through the initiative of COSAS later joined together to form a structure called the Joint SRCs (JSRCs) (Documents 14, 24). After visiting schools and consulting principals, teacher, parents and student the PAC finally produced a list of demands which included:

(i) The lifting of the State of Emergency in the 36 magisterial districts;
(ii) The unconditional release of all detained students and an end to their victimisation after release;
(iii) Full recognition of democratically elected SRCs;
(iv) The abolition of age limitation regulations;
(v) The abolishment of St. Francis school, as the existence of this school was a result of the application of the age limit restrictions;
(vi) The subsidising of transport fares;
(vii) The reduction of exam fees from R36.50 to R20.00 per year;
(viii) The abolition of the quota system in relation to the pass rate in DET schools;

(ix) The building of more schools and technikons;

(x) The freedom of choosing academic subjects; and

(xi) The introduction of an equal, dynamic, free and democratic education system (Document 35).

In addition some interviewees included grievances such as the recognition of the PAC and PTSAs and an end to sexual harassment of female students.

An SRC member in Langa High in 1985 said in this regard:

"Demands were the supply of stationery, the abolition of the prefect system, the abolition of school committees, the recognition of the Parents Action Committee (PAC), the demand for school facilities such as laboratories and renovation of school buildings, the recognition of democratically elected SRCs, the lifting of the State of Emergency, and the parents and community organisations be involved in the running of schools. The State did not respond immediately to the demands.

When our schools were to be closed, members of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) came to inspect the school conditions and told us that they would expose the government in the media. It was only after the SACC's visit that the DET started responding positively" (Interviewee 31).

A UWC student and member of AZASO in 1985 added:

"The 1985 students' demands were basically for a free and fair compulsory education, the recognition of SRCs and PTSAs, the upgrading of existing schools, the building of new schools, and end to the usage of unqualified teachers, and the stopping of sexual harassment of female students. The State did meet the demand that they should stop using unqualified teachers at some schools. Sexual harassment stopped with the student upsurge" (Interviewee 12).

It would seem that the demand for the stopping of sexual harassment was twofold. Besides harassment of women by male teachers inside the schools, women students were also ill-treated when they were detained or arrested. One female student responded to the question on what the 1985 school crisis-related demands were in the following manner:
"Yes, there were feminist demands because women who were arrested or detained were not well treated. The police raped women and killed them. Women were beaten up terribly by the police. They have no respect at all. Once when we came back from an unrest victim's funeral, the army and the police turned the tables upside-down without even respecting the dead. In 1985 we fought for the unbanning of women organisation" (Interviewee 2).

A DET local school inspector believed that students had genuine grievances in 1985 and that the practice of apartheid in education was not justifiable. On the question of the nature of the 1985 school crisis-related demands, he responded:

"It has been a cry for years, for a long time before 1985 students called for the establishment of equal education. They demanded qualified teachers and dedication to teaching from the, free textbooks, the control of schools by parents, and the building of more schools. Apartheid cannot be justified at all. If it is not good for us, it can’t be good for education" (Interviewee 28).

Another DET local school inspector argued that while the main school-related demands were legitimate, other demands should have been directed to the government rather than the DET. According to him:

"The main demands of students were legitimate but others - like the demand for the immediate release of pupils from detention - were not because the DET did not arrest or detain the students. That demand should be channelled to the Minister of Police because DET was not responsible for the arrest" (Interviewee 1).

In contrast, a Langa high school principal in 1985 argued that it was politics which shaped what happened inside and outside the school. By introducing Bantu Education the government had already politicised the educational arena. The school crisis, to him, was the outcome of the contest between the community and the government over the control of
societal institutions including the schools. As the school was but one site of this struggle, the challenge to the DET authority structure was therefore a threat to the whole apartheid policy. The Langa High School principal concluded in the following way:

"The root cause of the school crisis is the fact that we don’t have a vote which can carry somebody to parliament with direct representation. There is only one cause for 1976, 1984 and 1985 school boycotts, that is, political inequality. We need a one-man-one-vote, that’s all. Under no circumstances is apartheid acceptable. There is no moral justification for whatever is done through the government’s apartheid policy. In fact long ago when I was still interested in politics, I came to one conclusion that in South Africa whenever the government proposes a particular line of action, we have got to do the opposite. That’s what I have learnt" (Interviewee 3).

A student who was a member of COSAS and the JSRC executive in 1985 advanced a similar argument although he went beyond a pure anti-apartheid struggle to identify the capital-labour conflict in South Africa. At the centre of this struggle is the attempt by capital to reproduce cheap labour on the basis of colour in schools and the resistance against this by the students. As he puts it,

"The government’s policy had something to do with the 1985 school crisis in SA and the Western Cape in particular in the sense that the bread and butter issues which students identified stemmed directly from the way in which society is structured and inevitably the policy which the government followed or adopted. This was a historical period when SA provided certain demands required by the movement of capital, that is, the need for cheap labour. The education crisis is therefore an inevitable attempt by the student section of the working class to resist, they had to redirect their offence to the representatives of capital, the State. The government is the component of the State and it was its apartheid policy which caused the educational crisis" (Interviewee 4).

Other interviewees felt that although there were school-based grievances in 1985, Western Cape students started their class boycott partly as a response to incidents of apolitical nature in other regions such as the
school boycott in the Eastern Cape, the Uitenhage (Langa township) shootings, the disappearance and later death of Matthew Goniwe and his colleagues near Port Elizabeth, and the slaying of civil rights lawyer, Victoria Nonyamezelo Mxenge, in Durban. One such interviewee was the Secretary of the Parents' Action Committee, Vuyiselwa Galawe, who said:

"The demands in the list of grievances, which I read to you, were actually the initial cause of the school crisis although I think there were some contributory factors such as the death of Goniwe who was seen as a teacher and a progressive member of the community" (Interviewee 5).

The Cape Times summary of the final copy of the list of demands presented in writing to the DET office in Cape Town read:

"* The release of all detained students and guarantees that these students will not be victimised when they go back to school;

* Full recognition of democratically elected SRCs;

* The abolition of the age limit for pupils;

* The ending of the shortage of textbooks;

* Laboratories are not well-equipped;

* Libraries are poorly equipped and as a result cannot be used properly;

* Examination fees should not be increased every year and should be reduced from R36.60 a year to R20.00;

* School transport should be subsidised, particularly for those students who have to travel long distances to and from school;

* The quota system should be abolished ... only a certain number of students are passed every year and this should be ended;

* There should be a free choice of subjects;

* Plans for a new school at St. Francis should be abolished;

* School properties were not adequately maintained and schools were badly managed;

* The sexual harassment of students should be stopped;
More schools and technikons should be built in our area;
* We also demand equal and democratic education that will benefit our people" (Cape Times 22/8/85).

On 21 August, 1985, the PAC called another meeting attended by Langa, Nyanga, Crossroads and Guguletu parents and students where they presented the copy of this list of demands for discussion (Repression Bulletin, October 1985). In approving the demands the meeting condemned the harassment of students by the police, called for the lifting of the State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts and demanded that the SAP/SADF forces be removed from the townships. The PAC was given a mandate to present the final copy of the list of demands to the DET Circuit Inspector in Cape Town. According to the Secretary of the PAC, Vuyselwa Galawe,

"Our first task was to write a letter to the regional director, Piet J. Scheepers. We actually asked for a meeting and we received a reply after two weeks that he was prepared to meet us. We went to his office in town. On our arrival there he wanted to know who we were. Every one of us introduced herself/himself. He looked at the demands that we presented to him and said that unfortunately he did not have time. He left us like that. He was actually rude" (Interviewee 5, 'Substance confirmed by Interviewee 18').

However, in a letter dated 2 September 1985, the Circuit Inspector acknowledged receipt of the list of grievances from the PAC on 23 August, 1985, emphasising that the channel of communication for the Circuit Office was through government-recognised (and DET-created) school committees. The conclusion which could be drawn here was that the government did not, and was not prepared to, recognise the parents' structures such as the PAC but wanted to continue to exercise control of African schools in the Western Cape through its parents' school committees (Document 32; Interviewees 5, 11, 18, 24, 30, 32, 36A, 36B, 37, 39, 40,41, 43, 44).
On 22 August, 1985, African pupils from Guguletu, Nyanga and Langa schools met at Fezeka High School where they were confronted by the army and the police. During violent clashes in which the security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets, 50 pupils were arrested. Under the leadership of the PAC, parents waited outside the Guguletu police station until the police released the students at midnight. On Friday 23 August, 1985, all roads to Guguletu, Langa and Crossroads were sealed off and students were boycotting classes. The following day violence spread to Khayelitsha where people were arrested in connection with petrol-bombings and to the Paarl townships where violent incidents involving police armed with tear gas, rubber bullets and birdshot were reported. Access to Crossroads, Guguletu and Langa remained scaled off until Monday 26 August, 1985. During the weekend of 24-25 August 1985 unrest continued in Guguletu where about ten commercial vehicles were stoned. In addition, an unidentified driver was injured and a paraffin-bearing truck was set alight with only 15 paraffin drums escaping ignition. Security forces in Caspils and vans responded by sealing off an area around the smouldering truck at the corner of NY. 1 and Uluntu Drive. They also fired tear gas at the youths who were near the vicinity (Repression Bulletin, October 1985; Cape Times 22, 23, 24/8/85).

However, despite the heavy-handed police action and the DET's refusal to recognise these structures, students were already forming SRCs in their schools. Moreover pupils were now saying that "their boycott was in support of putting an end to apartheid and a bid to achieve equal education for all in a non-racial democratic State" (Cape Times 24/8/85). Furthermore, students felt that the boycott had succeeded in making their parents aware of school-related grievances. They were "prepared to
sacrifice to keep up the struggle and to gain freedom" (Cape Times 24/8/85).

To avoid bloodshed the Parents' Action Committee (PAC) was attempting to meet the DET officials in Cape Town but the local Circuit Inspector was not prepared to recognise them. Following the PAC's failure to get the discussion with the DET officials in Cape Town going, the Ministers' Fraternal, representing priests/ministers in the Cape Town African townships criticised the PAC for not carrying out the task which they had been mandated to do. The Ministers' Fraternal urged the PAC to go straight to the Minister concerned in Pretoria. In fact the position of the Ministers' Fraternal was that it was the PAC who had instigated the class boycott. In response, the PAC agreed that there was a need for them to go to Pretoria but that this would only be possible when their base had been consolidated and when a strong mandate from parents, teachers and students had been obtained for that purpose (Repression Bulletin, October 1985; Cape Times 24, 26, 27/8/85; Star 26/8/85; Interviewees 5, 10, 25, 30, 36A, 36B, 37, 44).

Another community action in solidarity with student struggles was the Pollsmoor march which was led by the UDF (Natal Mercury 26/8/85; Cape Times 26/8/85). On the day of the Pollsmoor Prison march to demand the release of ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, that is, on 28 August, 1985, the government announced the banning of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). On the eve of the Pollsmoor march, COSAS was declared an unlawful organisation in terms of Section 4 (1) of the Internal Security Act of 1982 (Natal Mercury 29/8/85; Sowetan 29/8/85). At the time of its banning, COSAS was the organisation most affected by detentions under the
State of Emergency regulations in some parts of South Africa. According to the Detainees Parents' Support Committee, more than 510 COSAS members had already been detained under the State of Emergency before the organisation itself was banned (Grassroots 5 (8) October 1985; Weekly Mail 30/8/85; Repression Bulletin October 1985; Natal Mercury 29/8/85).

It could therefore be inferred that COSAS's banning was an attempt by the apartheid regime to subdue the students and to disrupt attempts by community, political and student organisations led by Dr. Allan Boesak to march to Pollsmoor to demand the release of Nelson Mandela on August 28, 1985. Although it was under these circumstances that COSAS was declared an "illegal" organisation, it was primarily the organisation's role before and during the initial phase of the 1985 school crisis, and particularly its attempts to develop the student-worker alliance that led to its banning. Moreover the demands made at the beginning of 1985 through COSAS's Education Charter Campaign not only included school-based matters such as the demand for democratic SRCs and a free, non-racial education system but also community and workers demands such as the removal of the police from Black townships and the establishment of a non-exploitive and non-racial SA. As a result, the isolated struggles of students and workers quickly converged as reflected in the collective community action adopted in the consumer boycott. Similarly the utilisation of the COSAS constitution which stressed consultation and co-operation between students on the one hand and parents, workers and teachers on the other hand, and the usefulness of this aspect of COSAS' constitution in the mobilisation of a broad section of the population against the apartheid education system were a threat to the NP government (Interviewees 4, 30; Document 11).
On 18 August, 1985, COSAS succeeded in winning the support of Cape Town African parents when the PAC was formed (Document 5; Interviewees 5, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 36A, 36B, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44). After COSAS was banned the slogan "Liberation now, education later" established itself within the field of the educational struggle during the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape (Document 54). The slogan presumes that the apartheid regime was weak, about to fall, and that more student-worker pressure would force the government to negotiate a settlement resulting in the transfer of power to the oppressed Black majority. It was believed that the time was ripe. This showed that even if students had learnt the lesson that parents' and workers' support should be mobilised, the strategic understanding of how workers' struggle could bring about fundamental changes was lacking (Interviewee 35).

The period from October, 1985, was characterised by the quest for maximum unity amongst parents, students, workers and teachers, which culminated in the formation of a broad structure composed of trade unions, teachers' organisations, civic, political, and student organisations in Cape Town African townships, which was called the Township Co-ordinating Front (TCF). The TCF played an important role in mobilising community support for students' demands in which the campaign for the army and police's removal from the townships and schools was central. One of the factors which characterised this period was the overt presence of the army in the townships. Army camps were being erected in the townships and inside Black schools. The army was becoming an integral force in the direct subjugation of the community and in quelling any resistance the community generated against the government. It was therefore under these
difficult conditions that the TCF operated. Deprived of COSAS's organisational structure, the TCF was unable effectively to discipline and give direction to the school students (Interviewees 4, 5, 18, 30, 38, 43).

The government ban on COSAS, the single largest affiliate of the UDF and the largest umbrella student organisation, left students without 'organisation and direction' (Muller, 1987:20). With the prominence of the slogan "Freedom now, Education later" after the organisation's banning, student frustration resulted in major student-student and student-parent conflicts (Muller, 1987:20; Interviewee 7). These conflicts produced new forms of violence such as the 'necklace' phenomenon (Argus 12, 13, 14/11/85; Sowetan 13/11/85). The 'necklace' phenomenon, that is, killing a person by placing a burning tyre containing petrol in/on it around his/her neck, was used in South African townships during the 1985 school crisis. At the beginning of November 1985 a person was killed in Cape Town African townships through the use of the 'necklace' technique. On Monday, 11 November, 1985, an attempt was made to set fire to a tyre which was placed around the neck of a 22 years old Fezeka High School matric pupil from Guguletu. This happened shortly after he was forcefully taken from his home to the I.D. Mkize High School grounds in NY.50. The youth, however, escaped his assailants by kicking one of them in the groin before the petrol could be set alight. His attackers, who singled him out for 'necklacing' because he had been writing exams, then fled. But on 13 November, 1985, they were back again. This time they petrol bombed his parents' house in Guguletu. Meanwhile another Guguletu man was hospitalised with six stab wounds on his back after he had tried to rescue a school girl who was being molested for attending classes. The school girl was being forcefully pulled by a crowd from her home in NY.57 when
the man, who was subsequently hospitalised, went to her aid. The man was
attacked and stabbed in the process. A substantial number of shebeens
were attacked and a bus was set alight on the same date in Guguletu (Argus
12, 13, 14/11/85; Sowetan 13/11/85). However, 'necklacing' was at times
used indiscriminately - even for personal differences (Interviewees 24,
44). 'Necklacing' was not the only method used to enforce the class and
exam boycott. During the class boycott students were expected to attend
awareness programmes which involved watching videos and holding workshops
where discussions about the South African liberation struggle, its
relationship to the education struggle, and how it compared with struggles
in China, USSR, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, for instance, took place. Since
some of the students failed to turn up, it was decided that a school
register be used to identify absentees. The aim was to ensure maximum
participation of students in these programs. Absentees were followed from
their homes and persuaded to attend the programmes. However, some
students had decided to quit school and amongst them were those who just
stayed at their homes and others who decided to join the labour market.
Some youths then started to force the latter groups to these programmes
and those who resisted were beaten up with sticks in the process
(Interviewees 6, 13, 14, 22, 4, 45). In addition, those who were
suspected of writing exams secretly were hunted down, beaten up, and
brought back to school by force to attend awareness programmes
(Interviewee 22). However, there were some social benefits derived from
the awareness programmes. For instance, the involvement of the unemployed
youths in the workshops helped them cope with the frustration of
unemployment (Interviewee 36A). Moreover, the involvement of teachers
especially members of DETU provided room for the development of a healthy
relationship between teachers and pupils (Interviewees 41, 44).
There were, however, a lot of tensions around the question of strategy. While the boycott strategy found expression around slogans "Freedom now, Education later" and "Education for liberation", there were no systematic assignments organised around these mottos (Interviewees 7, 12). For the township school students in Cape Town, in particular, there seemed to be no fixed strategy (especially since the formation of the PAC on 18 August, 1985). The Joint SRCs' activities reflected that a combination of strategies and tactics was at play. The COSAS leadership, for instance, felt that parents' support was crucial to the student struggle (Interviewees 4, 30). However, for the achievement of parent-student unity around student grievances, some sacrifices had to be made by students. One of these compromises was the need to put less emphasis on the slogan "Liberation First, Education later" in joint student-parents meetings (Interviewees 7, 9). The point was that, for many parents the deprivation of further schooling to students "overshadowed any political gains of the boycott actions" (Wolpe, 1988:207). Thus parents' and some students' support could not be won through the slogan "Freedom now, Education later". As a result the two slogans operated alongside each other although the failure of the DET to respond promptly to the PAC call for the authorities to attend to student demands led to the predominance of the boycott strategy (Weekly Mail 24/10/85; Interviewees 4, 30). In addition the banning of COSAS had as an outcome the further dominance of the slogan "Freedom now, Education later" (Congress Review No. 4, Anonymous, 1986; Interviewee 30). However, the existence of awareness programmes within Cape Town African Schools during the 1985 school crisis indicated that the "Education for liberation" strategy was not completely abandoned (Interviewees 41, 44).
It was the issue of relating the boycott strategy to the overall strategy of the resistance movement which led to the realisation by the Black community towards the end of 1985 that the interests of the national liberation struggle in SA could be better served when students continued their educational struggle inside the schools (Johnson, 1985; Mkhatshwa, 1985; Sisulu, 1986). The emergence of the slogan "People's education for Peoples Power" in the National Consultative Conference convened by the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC) on 28-29 December, 1985, in Johannesburg, and its consolidation at the NECC Conference in March, 1986 in Durban, marked the realisation of this idea (Document 57). The original call, 'liberation before education', became subdued. A call for students to return to school was made, and organisational structures at the school level, which would advance the interests of the liberation struggle were proposed (Interviewee 7).

POLICE ACTION AND THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

In a situation of crisis 'rule' is expressed by direct repression (Williams, 1977:108). This however is an indication that the process of legitimation can no longer be achieved through the operation of hegemony (Williams, 1977:108). The failure of social hegemony to mobilise spontaneous consent in the context of crisis leads to the expansion of police power, surveillance of political organisations and the constant use of police in dealing with social conflicts (Hall, 1988:136). The declaration of the State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts in terms of the Public Safety Act of 1953 on 20 July, 1985 (Sunday Times 21/7/85) was therefore a response to a situation of organic crisis. The death of Matthew Goniwe and his colleagues in Cradock, the killing of Sthembele
Matiso in Guguletu, the house-to-house police search at Zwelihemba near Worcester, and the deployment of SADF/SAP forces in the townships were all desperate action by the State to quell resistance to its rule in the context of crisis (Cape Times 1, 10, 30, 31/7/85, 1/8/85; Star 18/7/85, 1/8/85; Sowetan 8, 9/7/85; Repression Bulletin, October 1985).

According to the Sunday Times, the 'tough new powers' given to the police and the army from 21 July, 1985 involved the following:

"* The emergency measures, effective from midnight, fall into categories some which come into effect immediately and others that will be announced from time to time. The following come into force immediately:

* Any commissioned, warrant, or non-commissioned officer of the various law enforcement agencies may - when he considers someone to be endangering life, property or public order - order the person to move and warn that force may be used if the order is disobeyed.

Arrest

* Any member of the security forces may, without a warrant, arrest any person when he deems it necessary for the maintenance of order.

Such a person can be detained for up to 14 Days (or longer, if the Minister of Justice so decrees) under a written order signed by any member of the force ..." (Sunday Times 21/7/85).

Although the Western Cape was not included in these emergency regulations, an extensive wave of State repression was being experienced by the Peninsula Black majority. The cycle of resistance and repression started on 19 July, 1985, in Cape Town after students had called for a one-day stayaway to commemorate the death in late July of the four Eastern Cape community leaders. On that date police sealed off entrances to Guguletu and Crossroads and banned the press from the area. The confrontation between mourners and the police left about 10 Guguletu residents seriously
injured (Argus 2/9/87). Numerous incidents of the police’s violent reaction to challenges to the State authority were witnessed throughout the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape. For instance, in response to struggles at UWC, on 31 July, 1985, police sealed off Modderdam Road before throwing tear gas canisters at students who were picketing near the University gates (Cape Times 1/8/85). In addition about eight people were arrested in Mitchells Plain on 16 August, 1985, in connection with the distribution of class and consumer boycott pamphlets (Varsity 44 (9), 21 August 1985; Repression Bulletin, October 1985).

The direct coercion employed by the State repressive apparatus during the Pollsmoor Prison march was further testimony to the fact that the State hegemony was no longer effective in bringing about consensus in South Africa.

About 23 UDF national leaders who were planning to participate in the 28 August, 1985, march meant to serve as a symbol of the demand for the release of all political prisoners including Nelson Mandela were detained on 22 August, 1985 (Argus 22/8/85; Cape Times 22, 23, 24/8/85; Star 24/8/85; Repression Bulletin October 1985; Daily Dispatch 24/8/85). A day before the March, Dr. Allan Boesak, who was instrumental in organising the "peaceful" march to Pollsmoor was also detained. In addition, the government banned access to Athlone Stadium where the march was scheduled to start. Further arrests took place and about eight UDF members were arrested (Argus 27, 28/8/85; Cape Times 27, 28/8/85; Repression Bulletin October 1985; Interviewees 31).
These actions and the prominence of coercion throughout the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape were an open admission by the SA regime that it had lost the battle for the 'hearts and minds' of the subordinated classes. The funeral of Ebrahim Carelse who was shot during police action in Salt River, held on 12 September, 1985, was used as a symbol by Muslims for their re-dedication to the national liberation struggle (Grassroots 6 (8) October 1985). This meant that the State's influence within what Deborah Posel (1988:2) termed a "battlefield of perceptions" was declining.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT/SOLIDARITY: THE MERGING OF POLITICAL AND EDUCATION STRUGGLES

(i) Organised Parent's Role

On 29 September, 1985, African parents, teachers and students met in the township and called on the Minister of Education and Development Aid, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, to meet the PAC on Wednesday, 2 October, 1985, to discuss the students' demands which included the release of detained pupils, the recognition of democratic SRCs and PTSAs, the scrapping of apartheid education and the reduction of exam fees (Cape Times 30/9/85; Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32, 36A, 36B, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 45). The refusal by the government to recognise the PAC and its failure to address students grievances partly contributed towards the decision by about 36 000 Black students in the Peninsula to continue with their school boycott in early October 1985 (Cape Times 3/10/85; Business Day 3/10/85; Daily Dispatch 2/10/85).

The decision to continue with the school boycott coincided with new attempts by the Parents' Action Committee (PAC) to arrange a meeting
between themselves and the DET Circuit Inspector, Piet, J. Scheepers, on 2 October, 1985, at St. Francis Hall in Langa to discuss the students grievances. Scheepers once again turned down their invitation arguing that he would prefer to meet the PAC at his Cape Town office. In protest against Scheepers' refusal to meet the PAC with a view to resolve their grievances, African pupils in Cape Town held a mass rally at New Crossroads No.3 school in Guguletu on 2 October, 1985. Police and army personnel in about ten police vehicles and three Caspirs were sent to stop the rally and although the rally was over when they arrived, they pursued and beat up students who were on their way home in the streets of Guguletu. On the same day Viljoen announced from Pretoria that SRCs could be established democratically at DET schools but that they could not be allowed to govern or take over the running of the schools and could only operate in educational areas. The view that democratic SRCs could not become involved in wider politics was rejected by student organisations throughout the country (Star 3/10/85; Interviewees 1, 5, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 32, 36A, 36B, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44).

In an attempt to 'defuse the situation, the Director-General of the DET, Dr. A.B. Fourie, proposed that the PAC submit a memorandum of demands to the Cape Town local DET office (Document 33). Following this request, the Peninsula students represented by the Pupils' Action Committees drew up a list of ten demands in addition to the demand for the postponement of exams to March 1986. This list included demands for the lifting of the State of Emergency, the removal of troops from the townships, the unconditional release of detainees, the recognition of democratic SRCs and PTSAs, the unbanning of COSAS, the postponement of end-of-year exams to
March 1986, an end to victimisation and intimidation of students and teachers, and the unconditional reinstatement of dismissed, suspended or expelled students and teachers (Sowetan 2/12/85).

While African students formed part of the Pupil's Action Committees, the Parents' Action Committee (PAC) started co-ordinating a broad research project on the grievances of DET-based students. Volunteers from the PAC, DETU and the Joint Student Representative Councils (JSRCs) - a body representing all SRCs in African secondary schools in Cape Town - formed the core of the research team. Before a memorandum of demands which emanated from this research was presented to the local DET Circuit Inspector, Piet Scheepers, as requested by Fourie, the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC) called for a National Education Crisis Conference at Wits University in Johannesburg on 28-29 December, 1985, where the national school crisis was discussed. The conference made a decision that students should return to school on 28 January, 1986, to continue the struggle inside the school and to implement People's Education. Almost all community, political and student organisations in the Western Cape supported the call to return to school on 28 January, 1986. On 31 January, 1986, the PAC presented the memorandum of demands to the Cape Town regional director. Whereas the government made some concessions on for instance, the building of some comprehensive schools in the African townships and supplying some stationery (even this supply was inadequate), the rest of the demands were not met (Document 45; Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 34, 36A, 36B, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45).
Since the NECC December Conference resolutions provided for the calling of another national conference on the school crisis if students' grievances were not attended to, the second NECC meetings was called (Molobi, 1987; Documents 21, 57). It was held in Durban on 29-30 March, 1986. Resolution 13 of the NECC Durban meeting indicates that students would return to their respective schools to demand the re-opening of those schools and the right to education, to use the presence of students at schools to assist in building and re-grouping of student organisations, and to implement alternative People's Education immediately (Document 47). Following this call, Cape Town African pupils returned to their schools and at this stage the JSRCs had already decided against promotions. Instead they opted for repeating their respective standards and to write end-of-year exams only in November 1986 (Document 26; Interviewees 5, 6, 10, 14, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 36A, 38, 41, 43, 44).

While there was a link between the emergence of student demands and the establishment of organised parent support for student action, another primary factor in the development of the PAC was the police campaign of intimidation against DET students in the Western Cape in 1985.

The State's harassment campaign against boycotting students started on 6 July, 1985. During and after this period DET students were constantly dispersed with tear gas, rubber bullets, and batons. On numerous occasions the SAP/SADF forces sealed off Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu and conducted house-to-house searches. Police action of this nature continued on 2 August and in the process about 49 members of the Joint SRCs were detained at Fezeka High School in Guguletu. The consequence was the mobilisation of parents' and teachers'
support culminating in strong protests from both the PAC and PENATA against the arbitrary arrest of student leaders (Cape Times 6/8/85; Repression Bulletin, October 1985; Interviewees 5, 13, 19, 26, 30, 32, 41, 43, 44).

(ii) Organised Teacher’s Role

The emergence of progressive teachers’ organisations such as the Western Cape Teachers Union (WECTU) and the Democratic Teachers’ Union (DETU) lent much weight and support to the student struggle for democratic control of the education arena in 1985. WECTU and DETU were formed as teachers realised that their destiny was bound up with that of their community. Traditional teachers’ associations such as the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association (CTPA) and the Peninsula African Teachers’ Association (PENATA) were not preferred by progressive teachers because of their long history of insensitivity to the students’ grievances and their preoccupation with salary and housing subsidy negotiations. An interim body, the Concerned Teachers’ Co-ordinating Committee (CTCC) was formed on 20 August, 1985, by mostly Department of Education and Culture (House of Representative) based teachers who felt the CTPA was not responding positively to the school crisis. On 29 September, 1985, the CTCC officially launched the Western Cape Teachers’ Union (WECTU) at Kismet Cinema in Athlone. This was followed by the launching of the Democratic Teachers’ Union (DETU) in the Cape Town African township schools at NY 117 Presbyterian Church in Guguletu on 17 October, 1985 (Interviewees 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 19, 26, 30, 32, 36A, 41, 43, 44). The involvement of those teachers organisations in the 1985 resistance movement provided room for the development of a healthy relationship between teachers and pupils (Interviewees 41, 44).
The contest for control of the Coloured schools, and for the establishment of democratic SRCs, and the struggle around examinations provided the context within which WECTU was established. However, it was the school boycott at the end of July 1985 which triggered moves towards the formation of a progressive teachers organisation within the DEC schools. About 2 000 progressive teachers in mostly DEC schools were pioneers in the establishment of the (CTCC). The majority of CTCC’s 1 500 signed-up members were based under the DEC (House of Representatives) throughout its existence. The CTCC established 10 regions which were Cape Town, Athlone East, Athlone Central, Elsies River, Wynberg, Southern Suburbs, Northern Suburbs, Paarl and Worcester, and Mitchells Plain (Argus 2/9/85). After the Minister of Education and Culture in the House of Representatives, Carter Ebrahim, closed the 465 educational institutions, the CTCC became instrumental in the community action by parents, teachers and students to re-open the closed schools (Cape Times 28, 29, 30/9/85; Herald 5/10/85; Interviewee 9).

The constitution of the 2 000 member teachers’ union - a direct product of the school crisis specifically in the Western Cape - was ratified at the launch meeting. The membership of WECTU was open to all teaching staff, retired teachers and staff members of any education institution (Document 16; National Education Crisis WIP Nov/Dec 1986). The aims and objectives of WECTU were:

"To struggle for unitary, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and free education system on all levels, and compulsory education at primary and secondary levels as part of our struggle for a non-racial South Africa, free of oppression and exploitation; To refuse to collaborate with any State department or person who seeks to preserve the status quo; To work towards democratic control over the education system and to initiate against the propagation of oppressive education;"
* To promote and safeguard the rights and interests of all members and to protect our members from victimisation; To work towards the abolition of all racist and sexist salary scales and employment conditions; To bring together and work jointly with parents, teachers and students in democratically elected PTSAs and PTA's; etc." (Document 16).

Parallel to this development amongst Coloured teachers, moves towards the establishment of a progressive teachers organisation within Cape Town DET schools were gathering momentum.

The idea of the formation of DETU came during the period from July to September 1985 when some Cape Town DET teachers were forced to attend crash courses in typing and other teaching skills at St. Francis in Langa so as to divert their attention away from the school crisis events. In order to make sure that teachers did not discuss the class boycott amongst themselves, they were scattered in different venues around the Cape Peninsula African townships for these crash courses. Some of these small groups were given the task of planning syllabuses and schemes for the 1986 academic year. During this process some teachers started asking themselves whether it was sincere to plan syllabuses for 1986 whereas the 1985 academic year was not yet completed. Out of this soul-searching came the idea of a meeting amongst those teachers who were placed at St. Francis in Langa. Discussions in this meeting culminated in the idea of forming a progressive teachers organisation for Cape Town African teachers which was later called the Democratic Teachers' Union (DETU). DETU was officially launched at the NY 117 Presbyterian Church in Guguletu on 17 October, 1985, as part of African Teachers' response to the deepening school crisis in DET schools. Members of DETU believed that the organisation was formed to address students' grievances and was a response
to the call by students for the active involvement of parents, teachers and the Ministers' Fraternal (representing Cape Town African townships' priests/Church ministers) in educational matters. According to them the Peninsula African Teachers' Association (PENATA) could not provide a link between parents, teachers, and student structures in the townships because PENATA believed in using "official" DET structures to address students' problems. The constitution of the government-recognised PENATA was limited as it emphasised that official channels should always be used whenever there were grievances. DETU, in contrast, wanted to see teachers establishing working relations with the Joint SRC, PAC, the Ministers' Fraternal and other community organisations. In this sense an initial step towards the formation of PISAs was forged during the process of struggle (Interviewees 5, 10, 14, 19, 26, 30, 32, 41, 43, 44, 45).

DETU did not want to involve itself only with salary issues but with the whole liberation struggle in South Africa and intended to make efforts to ensure that teachers who involved themselves with political matters would be protected from dismissal. In fact new teachers who were fresh from teachers' colleges and mostly teaching in secondary schools did not see why teachers had to take a back seat in the struggle (Interviewees 5, 10, 14, 19, 26, 30, 32, 41, 43, 44, 45). An executive member of PENATA, who insisted that his organisation played an important role during the 1985 school crisis, argued in contrast, that DETU was formed by secondary school teachers who wanted to exclude themselves from primary school teachers. According to him these teachers initially identified themselves with NEUSA but later called themselves the Democratic Teachers' Union (DETU) (Interviewee 36A). However, an executive member of the PAC confirmed that PENATA showed itself to be out of touch with the school
crisis events especially when parents demanded reports about the situation at schools from principals at a meeting during August 1985. While school principals, most of them PENATA members, remembered that students had last been in normal classes during Matthew Goniwe’s commemoration service on 19 July, 1985, they said they did not know why students were boycotting classes. Under pressure from the PAC, one of the school principals conceded that students did inform them about their grievances (Interviewee 5). In order to understand the conduct of these school principals one has to acknowledge that PENATA was an affiliate of the African Teachers’ Association of South Africa (ATASA), and that all affiliates of ATASA were recognised by the government at the expense of not involving themselves in political matters. In fact, ATASA’s reaction to the formation of DETU and other new teachers’ organisations was not positive at all. In a letter to the General Secretary of the Cape African Teachers’ Union (CATU), F.M. Madlokazi, dated 4/11/85, the Secretary General of ATASA, H.H. Dlamlenze wrote:

"In some of your regions, there seems to be some new Teacher’s Associations springing up. There is one suggestion which I want your executive to go into with the greatest care:

That the pending registration of all teachers in this country should take the following into account: That when teachers are registered in terms of the proposed registration act, such act should include compulsory membership of ATASA in the same way as the Nursing Council and the Nursing Association in respect to nurses. Such registration of the association might be interpreted to be part of the system. Therefore give the matter a serious thought at the next meeting of the Council, the matter might be considered. If the matter receives your favourable response, it might be necessary for us to approach the government to have membership compulsory in terms of the law" (Document 31).

Despite these attempts to stop the development of progressive teachers’ organisations, DETU and WECTU were formed in the Western Cape during
1985. At a meeting of parents and students in Cape Town African townships on 31 October, 1985, DETU was invited to explain its policies and after committing itself to work alongside the community organisations, it was integrated within a broad front comprising parents, teachers, students and workers in the Township Co-ordinating Forum (TCF) (Interviewees 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 14, 18, 24, 25, 26, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45). However, in one way or another the existence of PENATA did benefit the educational struggle in that members of this teachers’ organisation, with their access to the apartheid rulers, could at times divulge some of the secret plans of the government to the community (Interviewee 5). For example, at one meeting held towards the end of 1985, a PENATA member told the PAC that in a meeting with them, the DET regional director:

"was trying to find out from them (PENATA) what is actually happening. He wanted to know whether the PAC is a front or not. After the discussion the DET regional director, Piet Scheepers, felt the only solution would be to instruct the security police to detain the PAC executive members immediately. In response, PENATA members told the regional director that if the PAC executive is picked up the school crisis won’t be resolved" (Interviewee 5).

However, organised teachers’ support to student struggle did face difficulties in that the militant section of the students remained suspicious of teachers’ motives. This was evident on most occasions where DETU, the PAC and the JSRCs engaged in joint planning. Whereas the credibility of PAC leaders was never an issue, DETU teachers were time and again called upon to elaborate further on their policies (Interviewees 4, 5, 30, 32). Moreover, the activist role of DETU and WECTU leaders made them targets of State repression (e.g. detention, dismissal and suspension) (Daily Dispatch 23/11/85; Cape Times 18, 21, 29/11/85). The common experience of the two teachers organisations does not, however, imply that they managed to establish a joint policy during the school
crisis of 1985 in the Western Cape. While they both embraced non-racialism as a principle, they would not establish meaningful links with each other perhaps partly because of the differences in the nature and form of struggles waged within the DET and the DEC. Despite this, the role of collectively organised progressive teachers was pivotal in conscientising the Black community and mobilising opposition against apartheid within the context of the school crisis (Cape Times 23, 25, 28, 29, 30/11/85; Daily Dispatch 23/11/85; City Press 24, 25/10/85; Argus 25, 26, 28, 30/11/85; Document 4; Interviewees 5, 6, 10, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 36A, 40, 41, 42, 44). An authoritative exposition of organised teachers' role during the 1985 school crisis has been provided by Peter Jones:

"Teachers were hesitant to come up with a positive identification of solidarity with students and the oppressed community as a whole. The teacher structures that had been existent such as PENATA and CTPA were pre-occupied with salary negotiations and/or an increase on their natural benefits. In South Africa it would seem the biggest teachers' organisations have always been those who were conformist. These were teachers organisations that had been less inclined into exposing themselves to direct conflict with their departments. In addition these teachers organisations have also been more opportunistic when they was a school crisis as in 1985 they hastened to negotiate with the government on behalf of the students without a mandate. The CTPA also, following their "legal methods" challenged Carter Ebrahim to reopen schools or face community action. There also energized in 1985 organisations such as WECTU and DETU which have been much more blatant in their rejection of the system. That is not to say the former organisations do not reject the status quo but that they have been less inclined to take a harsher role to engage their departments. The ones that have been inclined to do that have been much smaller such as DETU and WECTU and much less successful. Moreover they have always stood up much more visible and therefore available for being neutralised" (Interviewee 7).
During the 1985 student struggle, the use of the State coercive apparatus resulted in the alienation of township residents. As a consequence, the Black townships became centres of popular rebellions directed at the State itself and those aligned to it (Callinicos, 1988:130). Although the UDF was the leading organisation within the townships, the most important social force in sustaining the resistance were the students (Callinicos, 1988:130). Another main social force in the resistance in 1985 was the labour movement which had started to involve itself in the national liberation struggle. A significant element within the Black working class was openly identifying itself with the UDF's political struggle and increasingly advocating the use of industrial power for political ends (Callinicos, 1988:130). It was along these lines that many trade unions played a significant part during the consumer boycott, the Pollsmoor March and the political general strikes (Saul and Gelb, 1986:235; Callinicos, 1988:132).

(i) The Consumer Boycott

The consumer boycott of 1985 was meant to pressurise the White business community and thus bring pressure to bear on the political system (Saul & Gelb, 1986:235). This mass action which was started on 15 July, 1985, by Port Elizabeth township residents had as its targeted results the resolution of issues which were overtly political. Amongst these were:

(i) The withdrawal of the SADF/SAP from Black townships;
(ii) An end to mysterious disappearances of Black political leaders;
(iii) A government price freeze on basic commodities;
(iv) The lifting of the ban on meetings of certain organisations;
(v) The scrapping of the Black Local Authorities Act; and
(vi) Consideration by the DET of pupils' demands.

Because these demands were common for most areas in SA the consumer boycott became a strategy which was generalised on a national level (Daily Dispatch 2/8/85; Weekend Post 3/8/85; City Press 11/8/85). Following the precedent set in the rest of the country, Cape Town progressive organisations also called for a consumer boycott of White shops and those shops belonging to Black "collaborators" to begin officially on 14 August, 1985. Amongst the reasons given for the consumer boycott action in the Western Cape were the demands for the lifting of the State of Emergency, the release of all political prisoners and detainees, and the withdrawal of the army and police from the townships. About 14 organisations in the Western Cape, namely the UDF, SACOS, WPCC, MJC, the Western Province Council of Sport, the AME Ministers' Alliance, the Western Cape Youth League, the Thornhill Residents Association, the Call of Islam, the Al-Jihaad, the Plastic and Allied Workers Union, the Thornhill Youth, the District Six Interim Youth Movement, the Sarepta Youth and other civic, community, religious and student organisations supported the call. Central to the call for the consumer boycott in Cape Town was the aim to persuade White voters to force the government into lifting the State of Emergency. According to an executive member of the Western Cape Civic Association, Christmas Tinto, the consumer boycott was called because "White people have got the right to vote and they voted this government into power ... We want them to approach their government and tell it to lift this State of Emergency, release all detainees and get the troops out of the townships". He added that long-term demands
included the release of political prisoners and the unbanning of "people's organisations". Another leading spokesperson of the Consumer Boycott Action Committee was Boesak, who believed the vast military and political power of the Botha administration could be brought down economically by a consumer boycott action (City Press 11/8/85; Cape Times 12/8/85; Repression Bulletin, October 1985; Varsity 44 (9) 21/8/85; Documents 7, 9, 27, 56, 58; Interviewees 5, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 38, 44). As an initial step towards publicising the consumer boycott over 70 000 pamphlets were distributed and regional committees were set up to co-ordinate it. On 14 August, 1985, hundreds of Mitchells Plain pupils staged a march from the Woodlands Senior Secondary School after a rally, one of several at the Peninsula schools to mobilise support for the consumer boycott, involving seven schools in the area. On this day confrontation between the students and the police was prevented by teachers who appealed to the police to leave. Another rally meant to popularise the consumer boycott was attended by about 2 000 pupils from central Cape Town schools such as the Trafalgar High School. In addition more than 2 000 Hanover Park students and teachers voted to down tools in support of class and consumer boycotts. On Friday, 16 August, 1985, eight people were arrested in Mitchells Plain in connection with the distribution of class and consumer boycott pamphlets bringing the national emergency detentions to a total of 1 700 (Varsity 44 (9) 21 August, 1985; Argus 15/8/85; Repression Bulletin, October 1985; Documents 7, 58; Interviewees 5, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 38, 44).
(ii) The Pollsmoor March

The dramatic escalation of popular struggle and State repression during the last week of August 1985 brought the question of the transfer of political power to the fore. Under the popular leadership of the UDF the question of the political leadership which could resolve the unstable equilibrium in the favour of the masses was raised. Organisations within the UDF umbrella felt that the experience of the incarcerated political leaders such as Nelson Mandela would be required during the crucial period of transition toward a democracy.

At a mass rally at the Samaj Centre in Rylands convened by COSAS, AZASO and NUSAS for all schools in the Peninsula on 22 August, 1985, Dr. Allan Boesak announced plans to march to Pollsmoor Prison to demand the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. The UDF executive member, Trevor Manuel, Grassroots editor, Saleem Badat, and trade unionist Johan Erentzen also addressed the rally. At a Press Conference at the Lutheran Youth Centre in Athlone on the following day, Boesak put forward Wednesday, 28 August, 1985, as the date for the "peaceful, non-violent and disciplined" march to Pollsmoor Prison. The Press Conference coincided with the detention of 23 UDF leaders throughout the country. Amongst these detained UDF leaders, 13 were from Cape Town, eight from Durban and two from Worcester. The UDF leadership was detained under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act. The detention of these leaders robbed the Pollsmoor March of the organisational skills it so much needed. Moreover, the UDF leaders were expected to participate in the march together with trade unions, student organisations, civic and religious organisations, the Muslim Judicial Council, the Civil Rights League, and other community
organisations (Argus 22/8/85; Cape Times 22, 23, 24/8/85; Star 24/8/85; Repression Bulletin, October 1985; Daily Dispatch 24/8/85). On 24 August, 1985, the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, banned the proposed march, saying that the police would act to end "what would constitute an illegal gathering" (Weekend Argus 24/8/85). Le Grange telephoned Boesak informing him that the march was illegal and the government would take whatever action was necessary to stop it. In fact the police had by that time started detaining people and from Friday, 23 August, to Monday, 26 August, 1985, about 27 anti-apartheid activists (including the 23 UDF leaders) were detained under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act. Boesak responded by saying that he saw no reason why the planned march on Pollsmoor Prison should be called off. He also informed the international community on 25 August, 1985, that the march was still on. On the night of 26 August, 1985, Boesak appealed to about 2,500 people in Belhar Community Centre both to join the march and to intensify the consumer boycott of white-owned shops and businesses (Natal Mercury 26/8/85; Cape Times 26, 27/8/85). The government then decided to detain Boesak under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act on Tuesday 27 August, 1985, a day before the march. During this period community, political and student organisations were gearing themselves for the march.

Despite the arrest of a further six political activists on 26 August, 1985, in the Western Cape, mass rallies were held throughout the region to galvanise support for the Pollsmoor march. One of these mass rallies was held at Lentegeur High School on 26 August, 1985. Moreover, school principals (for example, the Spes Bona Secondary School principal) cancelled formal September examinations "due to the alarming escalation of the boycotts at schools" (Documents 28). Another two activists were
arrested during the Lentegeur rally when police using tear gas and rubber bullets attacked about 2 000 pupils who were on their way to the venue. Incidents of violence also occurred in the African townships of Guguletu, Langa and Khayelitsha. Guguletu was sealed off to traffic. Two buses and a private vehicle were damaged. Stone-throwing was also reported in Washington Avenue in Langa. At Site C in Khayelitsha another two vehicles were set alight (Repression Bulletin, October 1985; Argus 27/8/85; Interviewee 31). Despite the detention of Boesak and the other UDF leaders, the accelerating police violence in the townships, and Le Grange's announcement that the Pollsmoor march was illegal, on the morning of Wednesday, 28 August, 1985, thousands of people were prepared to march to Pollsmoor to demand the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. In turn, the SAP/SADF forces planned the biggest military operation ever seen in Cape Town before and as part of their strategy to disrupt the march announced the banning of COSAS. Police broke up marches in Athlone and at the University of Cape Town (UCT). At UCT a large group of students and a number of staff members assembled in the Jameson Hall to prepare for the march. However, when it was learnt that the march was cancelled, students decided on an alternative march off the campus. Marchers went down Woolsack Drive where they were stopped by the police. A member of the staff who was mandated to read out a message to the police was arrested by the police but was released immediately afterwards. Earlier in the day three UCT members of staff and two students were arrested near the Pollsmoor Prison. Moreover a large military-type vehicle with a video camera manned by the police was sent to UCT to stop a picket by students and some staff members on the slopes in front of the Sports Centre between 3.30 pm and 4.00 pm. The Police later tear-gassed and sjambokked students to stop the peaceful picket. In addition police
sealed off Guguletu and Nyanga and killed eight people when they opened fire on those who were preparing for the Pollsmoor march. The deployment of the SADF/SAP forces in Black townships on the Pollsmoor march day resulted in more than 80 people wounded and at least 29 arrested in various places in the Peninsula. The violent repression by the use of tear gas, sjamboks, rubber bullets and birdshot also affected the Press. In an open attack on the Press, more than nine journalists were arrested throughout the Peninsula during the march. It would seem that the demand for the release of Nelson Mandela was worth sacrificing life for during that period. While adherents of the Congress Movement were demanding his release, Mandela re-emphasised his commitment to the liberation of Black people by rejecting the idea of a national convention. The rejection of the national convention was hailed by the Azanian Youth Unity (AZANYU) and the Cape Action League (CAL). AZANYU, an Africanist Youth organisation in Cape Town, which had supported the consumer boycott, the demand for democratic SRCs and the removal of troops from the townships, hoped Mandela's statement would "bring the ANC and PAC closer in an operational co-operation in the struggle for liberation" (Sowetan 26/8/85). CAL's statement expressed "complete support for the progressive position taken by one of the great leaders in the liberation struggle, Nelson Mandela, in rejecting the idea of any form of national convention. We agree that the convention would betray all working people and would bring about a negotiated settlement for the benefit of the middle-class of South Africa" (Cape Times 17/8/85, 27/8/85; Repression Bulletin, October 1985; Grassroots 6 (8) October 1985; Document 40; Sowetan 26/8/85; Interviewees 8, 9, 10, 17, 19, 20, 22, 44).
(iii) Organised workers in solidarity action:

The Stayaway of 10-12 September, 1985

While the UDF emerged as a leading organisation during the consumer boycott, this should not lead to the downgrading of the labour movement's contribution to the mass resistance of 1985. Indeed student and political organisations' resistance in 1985 was relatively more political and involved more direct collision with the State than that of the trade unions. However this fact should be related to the economistic nature of the demands which had lead to the emergence of the Black workers movement as a social force. The struggle for wages and working conditions, reformist by its nature, limited the capacity of the Black working class to challenge directly the White ruling bloc (Callinicos, 1988:131). It would also, however, be generally valid, to state that during the 1985 school crisis the organised Black working class "have been drawn ever more firmly into the political arena" (Saul and Gelb, 1986:234). The independent trade unions' political activity was via stayaways or political general strikes.

In 1985 there were about 22 'stayaways' in which the Black working class participated effectively (Callinicos, 1988:132). One of these stayaways in which the independent trade unions played a central role was carried out in September 1985 to complement student resistance against authoritarian control of the educational arena.

As a solidarity action with the boycotting pupils and a sign of its condemnation of Carter Ebrahim's closure of 625 schools country-wide, the UDF and about nine trade unions in the Western Cape called for a worker
stayaway on Wednesday and Thursday, 11 and 12 September, 1985. However, there was confusion as other trade unions circulated separate stayaway pamphlets targeting Tuesday, and Wednesday 10 and 11, September, 1985, as the days of the workers' action. Despite this confusion, thousands of workers throughout the Western Cape participated in the three-day stayaway which started on 10 September, 1985, and ended on 12 September, 1985. The stayaway call was supported by the Mitchells Plain Centre Merchant Association and the Western Cape Traders' Association which had previously supported the consumer boycott against white-owned shops. Both associations closed their shops in response to the stayaway call. A number of Cape Town factories operated with less than 30% of their staff during the stayaway and the UDF announced on Wednesday, 11 September, 1985, that the stayaway had been 75% successful. The Western Cape Hostel Dwellers' Association Chairperson, Johnson Mpumkumpa, also reported that only about 50% migrant workers had gone to work on Wednesday. However, on 12 September, 1985, the last day of the stay-at-home, police in Casspers patrolled the Black townships. In Heideveld, for instance, a Casspir with about seven policemen kept guard at the railway station at peak hours. At 5.30 pm when workers who went to work alighted from the train at the station, they were stoned by youths from Guguletu for having ignored the stayaway call. The presence of a Casspir aggravated the situation and in the ensuing clashes police fired about five shots at the youths. Youths in Langa and Guguletu also clashed with migrant workers who were on their way home from work on Wednesday and Thursday, 11 and 12, September, 1985. In addition, bread milk and newspaper deliveries were disrupted in many parts of Cape Town during the stayaway. Moreover, as the taxi drivers had taken a decision not to transport workers during the stayaway days,
transport to the townships was scarce (City Press 15/9/85; Grassroots 6 October 1985; Business Day 12/9/85; Cape Times 10/9/85; Interviewees 10, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26, 32, 36A, 38, 43, 44).

Nonetheless Acts of resistance such as work stayaways remained demonstrative protests rather than direct challenges to the power of the State (Callinicos, 1988:132). The positive element was that these acts reflected on the acute economic contradictions which meshed with intensified political mobilisation against the Apartheid State. It was protests of this nature together with sanctions by the international community which brought pressure to bear on capital. As a result there developed an argument that capitalism could not easily defend itself if it continued to be linked to apartheid. However, the 1985 crisis was 'organic' in that it not only affected the social reproduction of the apartheid structure but also "the very continuation of the capitalist system is cast in doubt" (Saul & Gelb, 1986:12). Although these conditions provided ample opportunities for the resistance movement, it was not in a position to match the military power of the Apartheid State. Due to the fact that State power ultimately depends on the control of the means of institutional violence, the central aspect on the 1985 mass upsurge's agenda – the transfer of political power to the Black majority – could not be delivered. The popular resistance lacked the military power to overthrow the Apartheid State (Callinicos, 1988:132, 136). In addition the full strength of the workers' movement was not fully mobilised and utilized against the White ruling class during the 1985 resistance. Moreover the Black working class lacked both the collective strength and political leadership which could offer an alternative strategy to the Black masses (Callinicos, 1988:132).
THE CONTEST FOR CONTROL OF COLOURED SCHOOLS

The state of affairs in Coloured Schools during September 1985 could be characterised as what Gramsci (1971) called the crisis of authority. The State strategy to recapture authority was direct physical coercion. But this had grave consequences - the massive alienation of broader sections of the community, i.e. parents, teachers and workers (Webster, 1987:172).

The situation in Coloured Schools worsened following the week-long boycott of class in protest against the banning of COSAS and the declaration of the State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts. (Grassroots 6 (8) October 1985; Cape Times 2, 3, 5/9/85). On 6 September, 1985, Ebrahim announced an indefinite closure of 465 Coloured educational institutions in the Western Cape attended by over 500 000 students (Grassroots 6 (8) October 1985; Cape Times 7/9/85; Star 7/9/85; Daily Dispatch 7/9/85).

From 10 September, 1985, there were repeated calls for Ebrahim to reopen the 465 closed Coloured schools and colleges. The struggle for the control of Coloured educational institutions reached its peak on 14 September, 1985, when meetings of parents, teachers and students throughout the Peninsula resolved to co-ordinate community action to reopen Coloured schools on September 17, 1985 (Documents 45, 68; Grassroots 6 (8) October 1985; E. Post 10/9/85; Cape Times 10, 14/9/85).

Despite Ebrahim’s statement that ‘unauthorised’ people would be prevented from entering premises of ‘officially’ closed schools, this community action went ahead (Grassroots, 6 (8) October 1985; Argus 16/9/85; Cape Times 16, 18/9/85; E. Post 17/9/85; Daily Dispatch 17, 18/9/85; Document 2). However, during the course of the action, violence erupted when
police clashed with parents and students who wanted to reopen their schools. In Athlone alone about 173 people were arrested in the grounds of Alexander Sinton Secondary School. The police also detained four teachers under Section 29 and 50 of the Internal Security Act in the area (Cape Times 18/9/85; Daily Dispatch 17, 18/9/85; Interviewees 7,9,17). This show of strength by the community contributed towards Ebrahim's decision to declare the schools 'officially' reopened on September 21, 1985 - a day after the official week-long September school recess had begun (Grassroots 6 (8) October 1985; Herald 21/9/85; Cape Times 21/9/85; Sunday Times 22/9/85). However, the government banned all meetings inside Black Schools after the September recess. To enforce the new ban, police and SADF personnel in armoured troop carriers started patrolling Coloured schools on 1 October, 1985 (Cape Times 1, 2/10/85; Argus 2/10/85; Star 2/10/85 ; Daily Dispatch 2/10/85). Direct physical coercion is only exercised when structures of State hegemony have collapsed (Callinicos, 1977:108). Under 'normal' circumstances, hegemony ideological control requires consent from those dominated (Kavanagh, 1985:16). In SA where ideological hegemony had been vigorously contested since the 1950s, the development of the organic crisis led to the shift of strategy amongst DEC students from mere school boycott to effective challenge for control of the education arena during September 1985. In this sense, the student upsurge, which started in July 1985 formed part of the resistance movements' counter-hegemonic activities.

This led to questioning by parents and students of the legitimacy of the tricameral system which Ebrahim represented. This crisis in ideological hegemony had as one of its consequences the undermining of authority relations within DEC schools and hence the attempt by parents, teacher and
students to constitute alternative authority structures namely democratic PTSAs and SRCs. Efforts by the State to regain control of the schools evoked a directly opposite response - the decision to resume the class boycott in October 1985 by about 36,000 Black Students in the Peninsula.

THE EXTENSION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY CAPE TOWN

The State of emergency was declared in the Western Cape Town as a security action to maintain public order at the time when the rejection of apartheid domination had grown into mass resistance. The South African crisis had created a situation where the State hegemony was crumbling and almost all its legitimacy was lost (Moss, 1987:173; 186). The government had no clear vision of the future with which to invite wider allegiance after its reforms had been discredited by the student and community related political activities (school boycott, consumer boycott, Pollsmoor March, and worker stayaways) in the second half of 1985 in Cape Town and elsewhere in the country. At this point its power appeared to be based increasingly upon force. It was therefore not surprising when the Emergency powers were extended to the Western Cape on 26 October 1985 (Document 55).

The extension of Emergency powers to Cape Town was primarily the formalisation of the prevailing situation even if it gave the forces of repression a somewhat freer hand because the cycle of resistance and repression started as early as 19 July, 1985, in the area (Argus 2/9/85). However, by this extension of the Emergency the government was admitting that student mass resistance was causing panic or that the State had lost control (Moss, 1987:173).
However, the specific struggles within the context of which the State of emergency was extended to the Western Cape were focused on the call for the postponement of the year-end exams to March 1986. Under the State of Emergency regulations the police and the army were allowed to search houses, stop any meeting, and arrest and detain people. The security forces were also provided with the right to control the movement of people and the right to control all information about the people and about events happening in the areas under a "State of Emergency". One of the main intentions of the Botha government, however, was to deny people the right to hold peaceful protests in South Africa. According to the Relief Centre's pamphlet entitled The Legal Position in a State of Emergency, in terms of these regulations (Document 55),

"The Division Commissioner of Police for the Western Cape will be able to:

(0) Prescribe curfews to any areas;

(1) Close businesses where he has reason to suspect that such businesses are likely to promote an existing boycott campaign against other businesses;

(2) Make it an offence for any child of school-going age not to be at school during school hours except where a child has an excuse acceptable to the police;

(4) Order the detention of any person whom he suspects of endangering the safety of the State;

(5) Censor press reporting of events in the emergency areas . . . ."

In terms of the above stipulations more than 80 people in Cape Town were held during dawn on 27 October, 1985, immediately after the extension of the State of Emergency to the area. Amongst those detained were local UDF officials, lecturers, teachers, students and community workers. A government spokesperson in Pretoria confirmed that these people were held under section 50 of the Internal Security Act which allowed police to keep
them for 14 days; The UDF, SACOS, the Muslim Judicial Council, the End Conscription Campaign, the Civil Rights League, the Women Movement for Peace, the Norwood and Bellville South Circuit of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA) and WECTU, amongst others, condemned both the extension of the State of Emergency and the arrest of more than 80 people in the area. The organisations demanded the lifting of the State of Emergency in South Africa and the release of all political prisoners and detainees. As a consequence of the government move, a group of White teachers concerned at the increasing militarisation at schools and at the declaration of the State of Emergency, formed an organisation called Education for an Aware South African (EDASA) whose aim was inter alia to fight the cadet system and militarisation at schools. EDASA also condemned the declaration of the State of Emergency, demanded its removal, and pledged its solidarity with those detained in the Western Cape dawn raids (Argus 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 28/10/85; Star 16/10/85; Cape Times 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30/10/85; Sowetan 24/10/85; Evening Post 26, 28/10/85; Times (Br) 26/10/85; Guardian (Br) 28/10/85; National Education Crisis, WIP Nov/Dec 1986; Documents 1, 55, 59, 66; Interviewees 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 27, 36A, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45).

However, despite the government’s assurance that it would provide police protection for pupils who sat the end-of-year exams, over 188 DET schools country-wide were deserted and another 119 had very low attendance. Of those schools which had no attendance at all, about 117 were in the Eastern Cape, 47 in the Johannesburg region, 12 in Pretoria, three in Natal and six in the Orange Free State (Star 18/10/85). In addition, almost all DET
secondary schools and some primary schools in the Western Cape were out on boycott (Interviewees 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 19, 26, 30, 31, 32, 36A, 41, 43, 44, 45).

In the Western Cape the campaign for the postponement of end-of-year exams in the DET schools was reinforced by parallel action around the same issues within DEC schools and the universities in the area. The Western Cape Student Congress (an umbrella structure representing the majority of secondary schools), the Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO), the Interim Regional Forum (a body co-ordinating and spearheading the boycott in the Western Cape and representing 80 schools in the Cape Peninsula, Worcester, Paarl and the outlying areas), the Athlone Student Action Committee (ASAC), and students at South Africa’s Coloured colleges refused to write matric exams under police guard at the Cape Showgrounds in Goodwood and at the Cape Corps base at Faure. In solidarity about 1 000 UWC students and more than 500 UCT students boycotts their end-of-year exams (Cape Times 11, 12, 22, 26, 28, 29/10/85; Argus 22, 28/10/85; E. Post 28/10/85).

Almost every progressive community, political, civic, parents’ and teachers’ organisation including the government-recognised Peninsula African Teachers’ Association (PENATA), representing teachers in the African townships, in the Western Cape supported the students’ and pupils’ decision not to write end-of-year exams (Cape Times 29/10/85). PENATA felt that pupils and students had not been able to prepare for the exams. In addition, PENATA supported students’ grievances and stressed that the demands put forward by the students should be attended to (Cape Times 28/10/85; Argus 28/10/85).
By extending Emergency powers to this area the State hoped to destroy the developing unity and to crush political resistance so as to regain the control it had lost (Moss, 1987:173,186). With the resistance movement scattered by the repressive State apparatus the State could start to re-entrench its control over the schools and townships as well as attempt to re-define the political domain to suit its overall strategy of co-option.

This strategy backfired as it massively alienated township residents (Webster, 1987 : 140). The 25 October, 1985, state of emergency in the Western Cape had failed to "stem the tide of mass rebellion in Black townships" (Callinicos, 1988:127).

THE STRUGGLE FOR POSTPONEMENT OF FINAL EXAMS

On 5 October, 1985, some students under the Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives) resolved not to write their end-of-year examinations and called for their postponement to March 1986 (Cape Times 7/10/85). In this period the slogan "Liberation now, education later" was becoming popular amongst boycotting students and teachers were refusing to administer exams which were to be written under police guard at several venues including the Cape Corps base at Faure (Weekly Mail 24/10/85; Cape Times 28/10/85). The government reacted to the campaign for the postponement of exams in the Western Cape by extending the declaration of the State of Emergency to Cape Town, Worcester and Paarl on 26 October, 1985 (Guardian (Br) 28/10/85). Despite this, almost all African secondary and primary schools in the Western Cape were out on boycott demanding the
postponement of exams to the beginning of 1986 (Cape Times 28/10/85, 19/12/85; Sowetan 19/12/85).

Though the resistance within the education arena was formidable, it had its limitations. The 1985 mass upsurge posed the issue of the transfer of political power to the Black majority (Argus 21/10/85). But while the oppressed community posed the question of power through their counter-hegemonic activities, they lacked the military means to overthrow the Apartheid State (Callinicos, 1988:131).

THE DECEMBER 1985 NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE ON THE CRISIS IN BLACK EDUCATION

According to Joe Miller,

"The state of emergency, the SADF occupation of the townships, the banning of COSAS and the struggle for 'proper' education were indisputably national issues" (Miller, 1987:21).

It was the above factors which formed the basis of the idea for a national conference. However, the conference was partly an admission that there existed no military means within the resistance movement at that stage to match the military power of the Apartheid State (Callinicos, 1988:132). The inability of the resistance movement to remove the SADF/SAP forces from the townships reflected this weakness. In Gramsci's own words:

"The violent conquest of power necessitates the creation by the party of the working class of an organisation of a military type, pervasively implanted in every branch of the bourgeois State apparatus, and capable of wounding and inflicting grave blows on it at the decisive moment of struggle" (quoted in Anderson, 1976:72).

On the 28 and 29 December, 1985, the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC) convened a Consultative Conference at the University of
Witwatersrand to discuss the crisis in Black education (Sowetan 13/12/85; Business Day 24/12/85; Star 28/12/85). The Consultative Conference was also meant to formulate a national strategy to deal with the Black education crisis in 1986 - the 10th anniversary of Soweto students' uprising of 1976 - and to decide whether or not students should go back to school in 1986. In addition the Consultative Conference was to work out conditions under which students would go back to school if a decision was reached in this regard. The SPCC - an organisation representing parents and seeking a solution to the education crisis - had already been to Zimbabwe to consult with the African National Congress (ANC) on the issue before the Consultative Conference took place. A member of the SPCC delegation that met four executive members of the ANC in Harare on Christmas Day, 1985, Vusi Khanyile, said the ANC would abide by the decisions of the conference (Sowetan 30/12/85; Business Day 30/12/85). About 312 delegates from more than 161 organisations from across South Africa attended the Consultative Conference. There were also delegates of parents, students and teachers from the Cape, Natal, Free State and parts of the Transvaal at the meeting (Campbell, 1987; Upfront, No. 3 March 1986). About 200 Azanian Student Movement (AZASM) members also attended the first day of the conference (Argus 30/12/85).

Speeches made in the conference corroborated the argument that the liberation movement, while it had made significant advances in the contest for ideological hegemony, lacked military preparedness. The secretary of the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference, Smangaliso Mchathawa, said in this regard, "current schools must be taken over and transformed (from) within" (Mchathwa, 1985:13). Another speaker, COSAS's former president Lulu Johnson, supported Mchathwa when he argued that "At the
moment, making use of the apartheid structure to our favour becomes a burning question" (Johnson, 1985:19). It is along these lines that the strategic shift from "Liberation first, Education later" to "People's Education for People's Power" should be understood. The important realisation was that the apartheid system was not about to collapse and that People's Education had to be seen as a 'process' (Muller, 1987:31).

However, disagreements developed on the status of organisations represented in the conference and on the selection of speakers: Black Consciousness - and Africanist - oriented organisations like AZAPO, AZASM, the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU), the Durban-based Institute for Black Research, and the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU) - which had its biggest following in the Western Cape - were given observer status and the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC) did not give them a platform to address the conference. In addition, the SPCC only consulted the ANC in Harare, leaving out the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC¹) and the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA). As a result the Africanist - and the Black Consciousness-orientated internal organisations did not turn up on the second day of the conference (that is, on 29 December, 1985) protesting that the conference was ideologically bent towards the Charterist or Congress position. These organisations therefore did not participate in the decision-making process on the second day of the conference (Star 30/12/85; Argus 30/12/85; Sowetan 30/12/85; Cape Times 31/12/85).

The conference decided that if the communities agreed, students should return to classes nationally on 28 January, 1986, and gave the government three months to meet six short-term demands (Document 26). The demands were for:
(i) The release of all detained students, pupils, parents and teachers;
(ii) The withdrawal of the SADF/SAP from the townships;
(iii) The unbanning of COSAS;
(iv) The reinstatement of dismissed and transferred teachers;
(v) The lifting of the State of Emergency;
(vi) The recognition of democratically elected SRCs;
(vii) The rescheduling of exams to a date agreed upon by the community; and
(viii) The repairing of school buildings damaged during the unrest (Argus 30/12/85; Sowetan 30/12/85; Star 30/12/85; Cape Times 31/12/85).

The Consultative Conference delegates warned that if these demands were not met, the situation would be reviewed at another national consultative meeting resulting in the mobilisation of the whole community against the government (Document 43; Molobi, 1987). The SPCC conference also called for an immediate end to corporal punishment and sexual harassment of students, demanded free textbooks, school facilities and other educational material because Whites received a free supply of these educational resources. The conference also decided that parents should refuse to pay school fees for 1986 (Upfront, No. 3 March 1986; Campbell, 1987; Document 57).

Other resolutions made at the December 1985 Consultative Conference were that:

(i) Teachers' associations should meet in a month's time to establish a single national teachers' body, and
(ii) Parents should pull out of statutory parents' committees at schools and establish their own PTSAs which would link up regionally and nationally (Star 30/12/85; Sowetan 30/12/85; Cape Times 31/12/85).
It was revealed at the conference that in the Western Cape about 26 PTSA's were in the process of forming a federation to be launched on 26 January, 1986, and that the PAC had already established links with trade unions and community organisations. This experiment of consulting and drawing more parents' bodies into the struggle was to be extended to other regions (Interviewees 1, 5, 10, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36A, 37, 38, 40, 43, 4, 45).

Lastly, the conference recommended that a National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) be formed to call for a second National Consultative Conference to review the situation in March 1986. This national committee was set up on 6-7 March, 1986, with one representative from each of the eight regions (Transvaal, for example, was divided into North and South), three representatives from the SPCC and with the power to co-opt relevant people. Most of parents and pupils from Soweto and the Western Cape accepted the recommendations of the Wits Consultative Conference to return to school on 28 January, 1986, and to continue the education struggle inside and outside the school (Sowetan 31/12/85; Documents 26, 47, 71).

THE BACK TO SCHOOL CALL

According to Callinicos (1986:130-136) while the resistance movement effectively challenged the apartheid regime in 1985, it lacked the military means to overthrow the regime. After digesting this point the school student - the major social force in the mass upsurge of that period - became demoralised and started to stage a strategic retreat. It was, therefore, this fact which largely contributed to the decision by school students to accept the recommendations of the December 1985 National
Consultative conference that students return to school when the 1986 academic year began (Document 26). According to Gramsci (1972), counter hegemonic activities ('the war of position') had to be complemented by military strategies ('war of manoeuvre') to combat the State so as to overthrow it. This means that the military strategy or 'war of movement' is crucial in the final stage of the attainment of power: the overthrow of the State. It was these frontal assaults ('war of manoeuvre') which the December Conference felt were not yet developed. Under these circumstances the early 1986 organisational strategy had to focus on the call for students to return to school.

Although pupils in the Western Cape agreed to go back to classes, the situation was not normal in Cape Town African townships. At the KTC squatter area, a group of vigilantes called "Fathers" led by government-backed community councillors such as Johnson Ngxobongwana and Sam Ndima were attacking members of progressive organisations such as the UDF, CAYCO and UWO, the majority of them youth. The war between these groups in Guguletu, KTC and Nyanga resulted in much loss of life. Harassment of members of the UDF and other progressive organisations in those areas by the police followed the events. The police arrested about 60 people, the majority of whom were members of UDF affiliated structures, at Nyanga in early January, 1986, on the pretext of creating peace between the youth (or so-called comrades) and the vigilantes. However, evidence showed that the police often helped the vigilantes to attack houses, students and other members of progressive organisations such as the UDF. Moreover, in this period the government was banning meetings organised to discuss the decision by the NECC that pupils return to school on January 1986. However, the Cape Peninsula African pupils heeded the NECC call
and deserted their schools until 28 January, 1986. Moreover, some Coloured pupils staged a walkout and decided to return on 28 January, 1986. In addition, on 14 January, 1986, WECTU teachers marched en masse to the DEC (House of Representatives) offices in Roeland Street, Cape Town, demanding the immediate and unconditional reinstatement of all victimised teachers. At the same time, 14 scab teachers were forced to leave Rylands High School by more than 300 parents, teachers and pupils despite efforts by police and soldiers to force pupils into classes by surrounding the school on 16 January, 1986. The police also detained a Rylands High School pupil under the Emergency regulations in order to quell the protest against scab teachers on 20 January, 1986. Furthermore, 24 policemen entered Groenvlei High and ordered teachers to teach. Police and military patrols were also used at Guguletu and Nyanga. Because the City Tramways buses were becoming targets of attack, the police ordered them to drop passengers outside the townships. On 24 January, 1986, policemen conducted a house-to-house search in Langa, where they arrested 195 workers who were part of the South African Allied Workers’ Union in a hostel. These workers were amongst the union’s members who had been on strike for better working conditions and a living wage since August 1985. Despite this provocative action by the army and the police, the UDF together with the Consumer Action Committee and parents’, teachers’ and student’s organisations took crucial steps to create favourable conditions for a return to school. Firstly, the organisations agreed to suspend the consumer boycott in the Western Cape from 24 January 1986. Secondly, more than 2,000 parents, students and teachers decided at a meeting in Guguletu which coincided with the launching of the Western Cape regions’s COSATU branch, that pupils should return to school on 28 January, 1986, as agreed in the NECC conference on 28-29 December 1985. In addition, about 155
organisations in the Western Cape, including the UDF and the Western Cape branch of AZAPO, urged students to return to school and continue their education struggles inside and outside the schools. As a result most students throughout the country and thousands in the Western Cape returned on 28 January, 1986, despite the anger and frustration about conditions at school, lack of textbooks, heavy-handed police actions at their schools and the refusal of the educational authorities to meet their demands. However, many schools remained unsettled and some pupils walked out for reasons such as the lack of textbooks. Police brutality also continued at Rylands High and Groenvlei High on 21 March, 1986, where teachers were being forced to teach at gunpoint. Moreover, a number of students from Bellville were still in detention. In addition, attendance remained low for some time at most secondary schools in Guguletu, Langa, Nyanga, Crossroads, Zwelethemba, and Mbekweni (Documents 19, 21, 26, 47, 48, 57, 62, 65; Grassroots 7 (1) February 1986; Grassroots March-April, 1986; National Education Crisis, WIP Nov/Dec 1986; Interviewees 1, 5, 7, 19, 20, 2, 26, 30, 35, 36A, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44). The statement by the Western Cape Students' Council (WESCO) on the back-to-school call which was supported by the Athlone Student Action Committee (ASAC), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Call of Islam read:

"We need to stress, however, that our returning to class does not mean that our schools will be 'normal' as they were before the boycott started... Our schools can never be normal again. Too many of our people were killed, injured and detained in our struggle for decent education and our memories are filled with the sacrifices our parents and students went through. While back to school we will continue our struggle. We will form and participate in democratic SRCs, organise awareness programs as part of the school day and we will intensify the campaign for the authorities to submit to our demands by March 1986 as decided by the SPCC conference... We have gained wide support for our demands. To our parents who support us we are especially grateful. We want to emphasise that we will continue to organise ourselves in a democratic manner and will
take all future decisions regarding the education struggle on this basis. We further need to stress that the boycott is merely suspended. It will be restarted if and when circumstances requires such a step. Should the authorities not listen to our demands by March then, as decided by the SPCC conference, we in consultation with parents, teachers and workers will nationally decide what further action to take" (Grassroots 7 (1) February 1986).

NO PROMOTIONS, NO TRANSFERS

At a meeting of DETU, JSRCs and PAC on 14 January, 1986, it was decided that pupils and students would return to school on 28 January, 1986, as agreed in the NECC conference. The DET directive that Std. 10 pupils should write final exams between May and June as private candidates was rejected in favour of writing final exams in November 1986. Moreover, the meeting resolved that no promotions be effected at all and especially from Std. 3 to 10. As there was uncertainty on the policy regarding registration and transfers (Langa High School, Sizamele and Fezeka High School's pupils who asked for transfers and reports were experiencing difficulties), it was suggested that a meeting with all township school principals on 20 January, 1985, be called so that a uniform decision could be made concerning transfers and registrations. Another reason for meeting with school principals was to urge them to discourage those pupils who asked for transfers to areas outside the Western Cape from doing so. In addition, the meeting with school principals was to find a way in which the victimisation and replacement of progressive teachers by scab teachers or those teachers who dissented could be stopped. At the meeting between the African townships' school principals on the one hand and representatives of the PAC, JSRCs and DETU on the other, all Cape Town African secondary schools such as Fezeka,
Langa, Sizamile, New Crossroads, I.D. Mkize, Khayelitsha Public school and St. Francis Adult Centre and some primary schools such as St. Mary's, Khayelitsha Higher Primary, Xolani, Tembeni and Andile Primary reported that they still adhered to the conference decision on the return to school and that registration of pupils would only begin on 28 January 1986. The principals agreed that because the 1985 syllabus had not been covered, exams would only be held in November 1986 and registration for the Std 10 exams would be on 14 February 1986. Principals, however, pointed out that they were experiencing problems with promotions as some parents had approached them for transfer letters for their children. It was reported that some schools including the Khayelitsha Higher Primary School were promoting pupils from Std. 2 to Std. 3 under the instruction of the Circuit Inspector. The meeting reached an agreement that the directive from the Circuit Inspector giving orders to some school principals to promote pupils was sowing confusion within the communities. It was resolved that a uniform strategy on promotions had to be adopted. Another meeting to discuss the promotions issue further was called on 26 January 1986. This meeting decided that pupils should not be promoted at all and that any request for transfers should be refused (Interviewees 5, 6, 10, 14, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 36A, 38, 41, 43, 44).

MEMORANDUM OF STUDENT'S GRIEVANCES DRAWN UP AND DISSatisfaction WITH THE DET'S RESPONSE TO THEM

In response to a proposal by the Director General of the DET, Dr. A.B. Fourie, which he had made in a letter dated 28 November 1985, that the PAC submit a memorandum of student grievances in Cape Town DET schools, a team of volunteers who included teachers, parents and students, was set up on 18 December, 1985, to research and draw up a memorandum of these
grievances, which was to be handed to the local DET officials on 31 January, 1986 (Document 33; Interviewee 5). Towards the end of January 1986 the PAC rallied support around the completed memorandum of student's grievances. As the State of Emergency was in full force, the PAC was the only organisation which could call for meetings in the townships. As a result of this government ban on meetings other structures such as civic organisations were very weak. In fact the PAC was also affected by the application of the Emergency powers in Cape Town. For instance, four members of the PAC executive had also been detained for their participation in UDF and other civic activities. The PAC, operating with only 6 of its 10 elected members, called all township organisations together including the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the Azanian Youth Unity (AZANYU), the United Women's Organisation (UWO), the Release Mandela Committee (RMC), the Hostel Dweller's Association, the Azanian Student Movement (AZASM), the South African Chemical Union (SACU), the Azanian Students's Organisation (AZASO), and Rastafarian groups in the townships and urged them to strengthen the Township Co-ordinating Forum (TCF) which was becoming confused by ideological splits. It was re-emphasised that the TCF was not a vehicle for ideological battles but an instrument to unite the Cape Town African community against the apartheid regime. The new programme of the TCF spelt out by the PAC was:

(i) To build unity amongst the community organisations;

(ii) To co-ordinate the rent struggle, and

(iii) To work with trade unions towards a broader participation in May Day activities.
In order to ensure that the TCF fulfilled this task it was proposed that each organisation involved in it would elect and provide one representative to sit on the TCF executive. The PAC also suggested that the TCF form two committees, namely, the street committee and the rent committee, to assist in organising the rent campaign. Street Committees' representatives would form a zone and each zone would have two delegates in the TCF. The establishment of PTSAs was to be the task of the PAC. In a major show of rejection of the government-created school committees, PTSAs were to be democratically elected. PTSAs were charged with the tasks of:

(i) Controlling programmes at schools;
(ii) Running the schools on a day-to-day basis; and
(iii) Providing a healthy link amongst parents, teachers and students.

The SRC of each school was to be affiliated to the TCF and primary schools were to elect a committee which would have joint programmes with the JSRCs in order to strengthen the relationship between primary and secondary school pupils. The SRC was to be elected democratically at each school. In the initial stage each class would elect 2 representatives to sit on the SRC of any school. The SRC would then elect its executive committee. The activities of the TCF, PAC and SRCs were publicised through T-shirts, pamphlets, newsletters, stickers, videos and workshops. Progressive teachers in structures such as DETU assisted in running the workshops and "People's Education" programmes (Interviewees 4, 5, 20, 30, 32, 44, 45).

Religious organisations such as the Ministers' Fraternal assisted in providing church halls which were used as venues for these programmes and
mass meetings which could not be accommodated in school halls. They also provided printing and other facilities for the TCF, PAC and JSRCs (Interviewees 4, 5, 16, 30). In addition, during January 1986, the consumer and rent boycotts were assessed. At the recommendation of the UDF, the consumer boycott was suspended on 24 January, 1986, to show the authorities that the community was prepared to create favourable conditions for the return to school on 28 January, 1986. It was felt, however, that the rent boycott, started on 1 December, 1985, to pressurise the DET to respond to students' demands, should be maintained and that a bus boycott campaign should be investigated in case the DET did not meet pupils's grievances (Interviewees 5, 30, 32, 44, 45). In this way, the PAC was given a strong mandate to present the memorandum of students' grievances to the authorities and to meet with the authorities in this regard. On 31 January, 1986, a delegation of the Parents' Action Committee (PAC), met with DET officials in Cape Town to discuss student grievances which included the demand for democratic SRCs, the introduction of an equal, dynamic, free and democratic education system, the removal of age limit restrictions, the building of more schools and technikons, the unconditional release of all detained students, the lifting of the State of Emergency, and the subsidising of transport fares.

According to an official of the National Congress of Trade Unions (NACTU),

"Certain demands linked directly to education, for example, the question of the right to democratically elected SRCs, the question of PTSAAs, the question of dismissed teachers, expelled students and detained people. The campaign for the troops out of the townships and schools provided the link between struggles inside school and outside. To me those were the broad issues around which the struggle was fought. Teachers and students were victimised. The issue of exams was a major demand at the end of the year. Most students wanted the exams to be scrapped. They didn't believe that exams could be written under the present situation. Moreover, other students were still in detention. So, it seems most teachers and
students together with the community were affected by the question of the troops and the general detention of people. The crisis was ignited by transfers and dismissals of teachers as well as detentions" (Interviewee 29).

The demands therefore challenged the whole apartheid education structure and in questioning the presence of the army and the police in both their schools and townships, they provided the link between community and student struggles. In a sense, the State's move to send troops into the schools and African townships strengthened the unity of parents, teachers, students and workers, and brought about an atmosphere favourable for more joint action by these sectors. The demand for the removal of troops from the townships was also reflected in an interview with an executive member of the Parents' Action committee (PAC) who said:

"The root cause of the 1985 school crisis was that children want proper education. They divided their demands into short-term and long-term demands. One of the short-term demands was that troops should move out of the townships. However the troops are still stationed in the townships. Students also demanded that more schools be built. In those new schools White principals were introduced to replace Black ones. I support the children, they were right, to boycott classes as this action resulted in some demands being met even if they were not met in a proper way. There are still very few schools in our townships - very few new schools were built. There are books which children get freely although they are not adequate" (Interviewee 18).

A student who was a member of COSAS and JSRCs executive committees added,

"Some of the 1985 school crisis demands were, the overcrowding of classrooms and the need to build more schools, provision of free books, provision of adequate laboratories, the general upliftment of apparatus and facilities. Some of the bread and butter issues were addressed by the State and at this moment there are about two or three schools which have been built, free books are now offered by the State. There was also a time when school fees were scrapped. Those are the bread and butter issues which were addressed in an attempt by the State to quell the militancy of the youth" (Interviewee 4).
However, the DET refused to concede to most of the students' demands (See Appendix III). It was clear from this response that the government was not prepared to scrap its apartheid education system. This was confirmed on 6 February, 1986, when a statement released by the Cabinet Ministers after a session of Parliament maintained that "the National Party stands by its policy of separate schools for different race groups" (Star 6/2/86). In response, the Democratic Teachers's Union (DE'TU), called on the local DET to take grievances of Peninsual African students, teachers and parents seriously. DE'TU criticised African inspectors in particular for showing no concern for their community. It also reiterated the decision made by organisations in the Cape Town African community on 26 January, 1986, that no promotions should be effected at junior primary schools and that exams would only be written in November 1986. DE'TU stressed that the community decision was not in conflict with the SPCC conference recommendations as the December 1985 SPCC conference had resolved that exams would be written on a date agreed upon by the PAC, SRCs and DE'TU. The Teachers' Union maintained that forcing students to write exams when they were not ready would lead to bitter conflict (Cape Times 12/2/86). DE'TU was responding to the DET attempts, with the support of a government-recognised teachers' union, the Cape African Teachers Union (CATU), to impose promotions of Sub A to Standard 2 pupils and to force Standard 10 pupils to write the May/June 1986 final exams as private candidates. To achieve this end, CATU went as far as accusing the PAC, DETU and JSRCs of allegedly having deviated from the NECC's December 1985 decision (Document 37). In response, DETU warned the DET deputy regional director in Cape Town, P.J. Scheepers, and CATU not to undermine the community which they were employed to serve. It urged the DET to come up with practical responses to the memorandum tabled by the PAC on 31
January, 1985, before the March deadline set by the NECC in the December 1985 conference. Another demand which the Teachers' Union felt had not been satisfied, was the supply of stationery which the DET had promised to the schools (Cape Times 3/3/86; Grassroots March-April 1986). Within days the DET hastened to deliver free stationery of inferior quality to ID Mkize High School in Guguletu and Sizamile High School in Nyanga so as to diffuse the situation. The DET also started preparing for the building of the Good Hope College in Khayelitsha. It also assured matric students that they would not be charged another exam fee for the 1986 final exams. However, on 21 March 1986, Guguletu, Nyanga and Crossroads students demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the free stationery and books provided by the DET at a mass rally in Guguletu despite the heavy presence of the army and the police in the townships. The climax of the mass rally was the burning of piles of "free stationery" and books. Teachers also felt the "free stationery" and books were of low quality and that the stationery could not cover all the students (Cape Times 24/3/86). One teacher said in this regard:

"The delivery of the books took place without discussions with principals and teachers. We were not consulted about the number and quality of books we need. Furthermore these books are thin, they are simply not adequate. We will use them for one week and they'll be filled. What happens then?" (Cape Times 24/3/86).

The government also failed to concede to the demand that the 1985 prescribed books be retained for 1986 to avoid unnecessary expenses. This demand, together with the lifting of the State of Emergency, the lack of facilities and teachers; the reduction of school and exam fees; the abolition of school committees and their replacement with PTSA's; the establishment of a dynamic form of education; the building of more high
schools and technikons, and the subsidisation of transport costs by the State, were among the grievances discussed by the PAC with the Deputy Minister of Education and Development Aid, Sam de Beer, at meeting in Cape Town on 11 April 1986. In a letter to the Chairperson of the Parents' Action Committee, M.A. Ralawe, dated 14 April, 1986, Sam de Beer wrote:

"At our meeting on Friday 11 April, I undertook at your request to investigate the possibility of getting the prescribed books for 1985 prescribed also for 1986 so that it should not be necessary for those candidates who had already bought the 1985 books to again buy those books prescribed for 1986. For your information I need to point out that the Xhosa set books are prescribed by the Joint Matriculation Board and this body also sets the examination papers. The English set books are prescribed and the papers set by the Department of Education and Culture (House of Assembly). The Department liaised with both bodies on your behalf but although both were most accommodating, it was not possible to accede to your request.

I sincerely regret that there seem no alternative but those candidates wanting to do the 1986 examination have to obtain the required prescribed books" (Document 29).

THE 29-30 MARCH, 1986, SECOND NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE ON THE EDUCATION CRISIS IN DURBAN

Since it had become apparent that the government’s response to the demands put forward at the SPCC Conference had fallen short of resolving the school crisis, the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) - a body which developed nationally out of the December 1985 conference and representing parents, teachers, civic and students’ organisations called for the Second National Consultative Conference for 29-30 March, 1986 (Cape Times 24/3/86; Document 57). Over 1 500 delegates from all over South Africa responded to the call and converged in Durban on 29 March, 1986. The conference proceedings were however disturbed by an Inkatha
attack on arriving delegates. The Inkatha members arrived in bus-loads and killed two people amongst the delegates during the attack. They also burnt a car belonging to an NECC executive member. Fearing another Inkatha attack, the organisers, changed the conference's venue to the Rajput Centre in Chatsworth. Instead of the two planned days, the conference got under way on Saturday night at 10.00 pm and went on until 5.00 am the following morning. The exhausted delegates, especially students, fearing another Inkatha attack, armed themselves with sticks and others planned escape routes (Document 57; Grassroots, 1986). The meeting reiterated the demands which had certainly not been met by the authorities. The most pressing demand in the Eastern Cape, for instance, was the universal lack of stationery and school books which were hampering progress (Document 57; Interviewee 44). After Zwelakhe Sisulu put forward the idea of "People's Education for people's power" (Sisulu, 1986), the conference resolved:

(i) To work towards the implementation of this alternative education system;
(ii) To call for the unbanning of COSAS;
(iii) To condemn the repressive action taken against teachers', and
(iv) To urge students to return to school after the Easter 1986 recess.

Resolution 13 of the NECC Durban Conference indicated that students would return to school to demand the re-opening of closed schools and the right to education, to use the presence of students at schools to assist in building and re-grouping of student organisations, and to implement alternative People's Education immediately (Document 57). In addition the NECC executive was mandated to seek a meeting with the DET to discuss the
education crisis on condition that the government released all detained students and teachers, that it allowed the NECC to consult fully with parents, students and teachers throughout the country before the meeting took place, and that the government make an undertaking not to detain NECC members during the talks. After the March 1986 NECC conference in Durban, Black pupils and students stayed at school but when the government refused to give an undertaking on any of the NECC conditions, attendance gradually decreased (Document 57). For instance, while Western Cape students supported the NECC call that they should go back to school and start building People's Education, the continued detention of students, inadequate educational facilities, and the denial of the right to democratic SRCs led them to resume their protest (Documents 26, 71; Interviewees 1, 5, 10, 19, 21, 24, 26, 31, 35, 36A, 37, 38, 40, 44). The government's refusal to make concessions to student grievances also led to the collapse of a meeting between the NECC executive and DET officials which had been proposed at the March 1986 Consultative conference held in Durban. As a consequence students resumed their class boycott in some parts of the country in May 1986 (Document 57).

However, in their struggle against inferior and repressive education in 1984-5, Black students realised that in order to transform their education system they had to join all forces which sought to transform the oppressive and exploitative apartheid system of which the education system was an integral part. That is to say, students' struggle had to link up with that of workers' organisations, political organisations, civic, youth, parents' and teachers' organisations. Students discovered during the process of struggle that strong grassroots organisations and PTSA's had to be built and strengthened if they were to play an important role
not only in changing the educational system but also in effectively challenging and transforming the whole society. They also realised that resistance had to be carefully planned, although planning should not compromise the democratic form which the liberation struggle should take. An understanding was reached during 1985 that student organisations should work democratically through consultation and that imposing particular ideas/views and actions on the oppressed could only create divisions in the community (Document 4). Students also learnt to view the liberation struggle as a process and recognised the fact that rather than abandoning their schools, the education arena could be used as a site of struggle and a place where the aims and goals of the liberation struggle could be advanced. In this sense the slogan "Liberation now, education later", which arose during the 1985 education struggle from a militant youth who were frustrated by the inflexible nature of the apartheid regime and its violent response to legitimate student grievances, was rejected for its undialectical nature. Central to this realisation was the issue of how to use the boycott strategy as one of the weapons of both the educational and the liberation struggle. Towards the end of 1985 and especially in the December 1985 SFCC organised National Consultative Conference at Wits University in Johannesburg, students reached an understanding that an indefinite boycott could be destructive to the general organisation of students. The more dynamic slogan, "education for liberation", was now fully endorsed and just like in the factories where the class struggle was about workers' control of both their work tools and the work process itself, students were saying they would have to contest the control of their schools and the determination of what they were taught inside the schools. It was felt that schools should be used as a base for the organisation of students and that the boycott strategy could only be
employed when the situation demanded its use (Sisulu, 1986; Documents 4,13,54).

The depth of this strategic shift in the contest for hegemony within the educational arena was captured by Johann Muller who said:

"... the 'back to school' motion was carried again. It was buttressed by a further strategic shift. The student slogan 'Liberation first, education later' assumed that national liberation was imminent. This assumption was not shared by the ANC, and certainly not by the unions. The fact that the unions were much in evidence in Durban was therefore not insignificant. Keynote speaker Zwelakhe Sisulu spelt it out: 'We are not poised for the immediate transfer of power to the people. The belief that this is so could lead to serious errors and defeats'. The education struggle was therefore likely to be a protracted one 'from within' as Mkhathwana had suggested at the first conference. While duly complimentary about the achievements of the 'young lions', Sisulu suggested that the time had come for the students to pull back from the forefront of the struggle and lend their support to the larger community effort: 'The struggle for people's education is no longer a struggle of the students alone'" (Muller, 1987:23).

CONCLUSION: THE LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE 1985 SCHOOL CRISIS

The 1985 school crisis registered a very high detention, maiming and death rate of the Black people in the hands of the South African security establishment. In the Western Cape violent confrontations between the police and African students started during the commemoration services for the death of Matthew Goniwe on 19 July, 1985, at the St. Gabriel’s Church in Guguletu. However, it was the 26 July, 1985, students' meeting at the University of the Western Cape (UWc) which resolved to start a boycott of classes in all Black schools and colleges. Violence engulfed the Western Cape for the following 12 Weeks in succession in Athlone, Mitchells Plain, Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu amongst other areas. According to Harold Wolpe (1988: 207) the emergence of the slogan "Liberation first, Education
later" coincided with the ANC's call to concrete evidence that school-students' actions were a direct response to this call. However, some connections can be made between the ANC call to South Africans to 'make apartheid unworkable and' the country ungovernable' (Document 74) and the adoption of the boycott as a strategy rather than as a mere tactic. According to Peter Jones, the misinterpretation of the call to make the country ungovernable led to the use of force, subverting the orderly process of building organisations from bottom to top and ignoring the necessity to consult or having to find consensus (Interviewee 7). The danger of organising through force was reflected in the conflict between the youth and Witdoek vigilantes in KTC where the police exploited minor divisions in the community to set in motion a process which led to the destruction of homes, the death of many people and the diversion of the struggle against apartheid (Interviewee 7). Moreover, during the first three weeks (that is, from 26 July to 18 August, 1985, when the parents' Action Committee (PAC) was formed), students tended to tackle their grievances in isolation forgetting that with parents', teachers' and workers' support, they could strike a telling blow on the government. On a national level, a lack of co-ordination revealed itself in, for example, the consumer boycott which started in March in the Eastern Cape and only in September 1985 in the Western Cape. This point was put forward in an interview with a member of both the regional executive committee of COSAS and the JSRCs executive committee in 1985, who said:

"In 1985 students managed to gain student unity. They also began to pose assertive power against the DET in the form of SRCs. They also managed to bridge the gap between themselves and the parents and they realised that students on their own cannot take the struggle anywhere because they are not structurally located in the capitalist economy. Hence the working class sphere. May I highlight the fact that they realised that they need to draw in their parents and workers - an important achievement and a reflection of the development of
class consciousness. It was not there in 1976 and even in 1980 for that matter. It also took time before the students could forge unity on a national scale. Here in the Western Cape our response to the crisis was more of a solidarity with the students in other areas. This had quite a positive aspects, the realisation of the need for national unity. These were the gains. Let's now turn to the losses.

The losses are just the gains the State made. Seemingly our gains were not that much consolidated in the sense that the revolutionary element which had grown up during the 1985 struggle failed to develop a theoretical framework and did not see the importance of philosophy and the understanding of society and hence the militants of 1985 are now militant in a bit of gangsters because they were not free from the bourgeois ideology. Despite the desire of the students to forge unity with the community, that was not taken to its logical conclusion to be provided uniformity in their struggle through their organisation. What we found, for example, was the consumer boycott taking place in the Eastern Cape in March 1985 while in the Western Cape it only started in September 1985 when other areas were busy with the rent boycott. So we had different components of the struggle being waged at the same time but there was no uniform expression on a national scale or any form of uniformity. I am saying that flew directly from the contradiction between the reformist leadership and the militancy of the working class. This therefore reflected a crisis in the leadership of the working class meaning that one of the tasks the liberation movement is facing is to resolve that problem before the talk of our own October " (Interviewee 4).

When the consumer boycott of White shops and those shops belonging to Black councillors was launched in Cape Town on 14 August, 1985, force was still an integral part of the youths' strategy to gain support and this led to divisions within the community. A UCT student who was a member of AZASM in 1985 had the following to say in this regard:

"The losses were due to the methods used by students. The students had to realise that they can't champion the struggle. They could merely show solidarity with the working class and not tell them what to do. A thing with the consumer boycott, good as it may be, a lot of bad methods were used. Students would actually wait at the station and search people's belongings in a rude and impolite manner. Parents were made to drink fish-oil etc., and instead of winning the working class on your side, it made them hostile towards students and the term comrades' became applicable only to students as parents resisted being called comrades because they saw comrades as kids who harassed old people. It is important to note that
culture goes with the struggle. We would not transcend certain levels within a culture because if we want to get rid of certain conservative tendencies within the culture of say, the African people, we must realise that it will take time for them to be convinced that things must be looked at in a different way. Also a lot of people died. The use of the 'necklace' was done indiscriminately, even for personal differences. So we did not have a strong student leadership which was always subject to recall, and the masses were not under strong control by the leadership" (Interviewee 24).

The lack of consultation led to the demoralisation of teachers, the straining of relationships between workers and students, and some students dropping out and seeking employment. The division of the student constituency between those who were boycotting classes and those who wanted to attend normal classes led to an exodus by the latter to seek enrolment in Transkei and Ciskei. It also led to the use of an oiled burning tyre ('necklace') to eliminate or threaten those suspected of betraying the liberation struggle and those suspected of working for the security police. COSAS with its principle of encouraging the development of a healthy relationship amongst parents, students and teachers was critical of, the new developments. Together with the Cape Town African secondary schools SCR's they initiated a meeting between parents and students on Sunday, 18 August, 1985, at Guguletu. Thus during the first three weeks of the 1985 class boycott in Cape Town townships, students realised that they would need the maximum support of their parents, teachers, workers and the whole oppressed community if they wanted to pose a serious challenge to the apartheid education authority. This development of political consciousness was reflected in a pamphlet issued by the Student Revolutionary Front which stated:

"But in our anger and frustration, we must not make the cardinal error of turning our struggle inwards, thus antagonising our parents, older brothers and sisters. The barricades and pickets must not be directed at our allies but against the instruments and protectors of capitalism - the police and army. Those amongst us who break revolutionary
commands must be disciplined. A revolutionary never indulges in indiscriminate violence, merely for the sake of violence. We cannot build the new socialist society on the ashes of those structures which we need to utilise in the revolutionary process. We must be seen as LIBERATORS and not as thugs bent on creating chaos!" (Document 2).

Students had been able to arrive at this position because of the experiences of the 1976 uprisings which started in Soweto and the 1980 school boycott especially in the Western Cape where conflicts developed between the youth and migrant workers in Mzimhlope and Langa hostels in Soweto and Cape Town, respectively, which as a result reduced the possibility of students maintaining the intensity of the educational struggle during that historical period. The divisions in the community enabled the government to exploit the situation by ruthlessly suppressing student opposition and re-establishing the status quo in Black schools. The Student Revolutionary Front confirms this observation in the following manner:

"Many a battle-scarred student with experience from 1976 to 1980 realised that the tactic of turning students against their parents and teachers had to be countered. The growth of a Co-ordinating Teachers Committee has been a vital step forward, and the recent drive towards the formation of PTSA's is indeed a giant leap forward. Students, parents and teachers need one another to SMASH capitalist education and to deepen our understanding of what we are sacrificing for in our day to day struggles. Our greatest battle, however, is to guard against falling into the trap that we the students can LEAD the struggle. The involvement of our parents, by and large the workers who carry on their backs the whole rotten capitalist system, is our biggest challenge. Without our parents, brothers and sisters forming part of the People's Army, the armed struggle will fail. It is they who must fill the organisations of the people as well as LEAD our struggle for a socialist society. This means that we do not allow the capitalist oppressors to turn our parents against us. The question is how do we achieve this? We must continue to build unity in struggle with our parents and teachers. We have to consolidate our gains and in the process assist in taking the struggle into another phase" (Document 2).
Through the tireless work of student organisations such as COSAS, AZASO, NUSAS, AZASM and CAYCO, amongst others, the political consciousness of students developed to a level where they realised that before they are students, they are members of the community. This understanding propelled the students to a position where they saw consultation with the community as an integral part of their struggle against the educational authorities. The formation of the Parents' Action Committee (PAC), representing Langa, Guguletu, Nyanga and Crossroads parents on Sunday, 18 August 1985, at Guguletu at students' request was part of this new development in student politics. Later in the year, the founding of the Township Co-ordinating Forum (TCF) representing all community, civic, political and student organisations in the Cape Town African townships was a reflection of students' seriousness in involving themselves in community matters and to mobilise wider support for their school-related grievances. The 1985 youth involved their parents, teachers, workers and the unemployed, rather than antagonise them as they learned from 1976 and 1980 student struggles that without the full participation of the community, they will be weakened, and therefore cannot win the battle against the educational authorities. However, for a healthy alliance to be forged between students and the community, students were expected also to participate in community and political organisations' and trade unions' activities.

"While in our youthful enthusiasm we may believe that the revolution is around the bend, that 'freedom now' is going to be realised in the near future, we must also be aware that the boycott as a weapon of struggle cannot in itself bring change and has serious limitations. The South African State, although vulnerable, is a very strong one. They have enforced their control through the use of the police, security and defence forces. Therefore we have to find many means and methods to fight and DEFEAT the system. Each one of our brothers and sisters is a potential fighter in the cause of liberation. We need to join the people's organisations in our thousands to
provide the ENERGY and SPARK for their organisations to become future democratic organs to run the country. We must build and revolutionise the organisations, transform them into tools which will be able to resist the power of the police and army. These organisations must be able to provide defence of the gains of our revolutionary struggle. But more important they should also be instruments of OFFENCE under favourable conditions" (Document 60).

STUDENT/WORKER ALLIANCE

"Our struggle is organically linked to the struggle of all the working people, on whose backs the capitalist system rests. It is when this class in society stirs and begins to assert its demands and interests that the capitalist system is threatened. It is our task to convince our fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters that their struggle in the factories, farms, etc., and our struggle in education is ONE. Student militancy alone, is not enough; our energy has to be equipped in democratic PRACTICES whilst carrying out these task. Every student must be involved in our decision making. Our student leaders must reflect the views and practices of the student masses at all times. It is our task as revolutionary students to continually direct our struggle at advancing the workers' interests for both NATIONAL LIBERATION and freedom from EXPLOITATION" (Document 60).

During the process of struggle in 1985 Western Cape students were compelled to develop a broad perspective which encompassed an understanding of industrial relations and labour laws. The students' struggle was also expected to give impetus in the direction of moving towards the achievement of political objectives within the arena of mass struggle. This led to the establishment of strong and democratic student structures which took the form of SRCs and Joint SRCs in the Cape Town African townships before taking their rightful place within (or as affiliates of) the TCF, UDF, and the NECC. As a result, students were able to mobilise support for their grievances within the TCF, UDF and the NECC. Joint community actions such as the rent boycott and the consumer boycott were possible as a result and these campaigns served both to put pressure on the government to attend to both students' grievances and the Black community's demand for economic and political rights. Through joint
awareness programmes and workshops with the community, students learnt of the causes of hunger, poverty, unemployment, homelessness and land hunger. They realised that unemployment and low wages given to Black workers by apartheid capitalism were linked to their parents’ inability to pay their school fees, and to buy them books, stationery and uniforms. Students also came to link the denial of economic and political rights to Blacks in South Africa to their denial of educational resources and a critical and creative education system. The exposure of the evil of the apartheid system led to the discovery that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to resolve the problems within the education system before the apartheid structure had been totally dismantled. With this understanding the 1985 generation of students started involving everybody in the oppressed community including the unemployed in awareness programmes. University students from UCT and UWC assisted in setting up these programmes and other community projects. Resource Centres at institutions such as the South African Institute of Race Relations and SACRED, to mention a few, were consulted to get relevant literature for those awareness programmes. The involvement of the unemployed was to prove one of the most successful elements of these programmes as hooliganism and crime were substantially reduced towards the end of 1985.

The flexibility and tolerance which developed during the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape also led to government-recognised teachers’ organisations such as the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association (CTPA) and the Peninsula African Teachers’ Association (PENATA) to seek alliances within the democratic movement against the apartheid regime although efforts by the CTPA president, Franklin Sonn, UCT principal Dr. Stuart Saunders and UWC rector Professor Richard Van Der Ross on 11 November,
1985, to negotiate the resolution of the school crisis with the State
President, P W Botha, without a mandate from the boycotting students, was
strongly condemned by community, civic, political, workers', teachers' and
student organisations in the Western Cape. At this stage joint structures
between Coloured and African students such as WESCO and Pupils Action
Committees formulated collective lists of demands after having survived
the government clampdown on their structures which came with the extension
of the declaration of the State of Emergency in Cape Town, Worcester and
Paarl on 26 October, 1985. According to a Student Revolutionary Front
pamphlet:

"The attempts to divide our different schools and students have
been buried in struggle. Unity in action in the head of battle
had struck a death blow against division. The blood of our
brothers and sisters has washed away the slave labels imprinted
on our minds by the ruling capitalist class. We are "Xhosa",
"Zulus", "Coloureds", "Indians" and "Malays" no more. We are
nothing else but young soldiers fighting a CLASS WAR. Students
from Manenberg, Rylands, Langa, Nyanga and Steenberg have
become ONE fighting force against the LOCAL AND FOREIGN
BOSSES. Our battles have been fought with heavy losses yet
lifelong bridges have been built and enemy plans often
destroyed" (Document 2).

At this stage some militant students such as Ashley Kriel went underground
joining the ANC and PAC military wings. The latter students
participated in the intensification of the guerilla war against the
apartheid regime resulting in the increase in bomb blasts directed at the
security establishment in South Africa. In the final analysis the
community managed to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with both the
apartheid system and its racial education system. In an interview a
member of COSAS and the first President of the JSRCs who was a matric
student at Langa High confirmed that:

"There were strong gains as because of the problems people were
experiencing, they came together ... So, unity was their first
gain. Although structures like the Joint SRC broke down at a
later stage, I think people were united during the 1985
crisis. Secondly, parents also got involved and their unity with teachers and students during the crisis was a gain. People proved that they can make things happen. We were involved with a lot of activities of our own, e.g. fund-raising. There was room for suggestions, room to think and to have an idea. For me this was a gain because in the present school structures you do not have chance to have an idea and to suggest as well as discussing. People also learnt that we can’t just do things, we must think and strategise to avoid being victims. In a situation where people discuss, people assess their past action and mistakes to make sure that they do not commit the same mistakes in future. In this way we encourage the unity between students and the community. Development comes about when students and community stand together. I do not see losses as losses but as an experience, a learning experience for everyone. Our main aim is to better the country” (Interviewee 32).

The two NECC Consultative Conferences held on 28-29 December, 1985, and 29-30 March, 1986, in Johannesburg and Durban, respectively, and which resolved that the community should work towards controlling schools and implementing People’s Education also showed that students’ grievances had national support. Due to this pressure by the community and sanctions and disinvestment by the international community as well as the escalation of the armed struggle, the government was conceded to some of the students’ short-term demands. The government started building comprehensive schools and upgrading facilities in existing schools. For example, the DET provided existing schools with proper toilet facilities, electricity, ceilings, and old schools were painted and renovated. (See Appendix III; Cape Times 24/3/86). It also promised to look into the demand for abolishing the prefect system and school committees with a view to finding ways in which democratic SRCs and PTSA’s could be integrated within the existing authority structures in schools. However, the stationery provided by the government was of a low quality and also not adequate. While students returned to their schools, the bulk of their demands had not been met. But the political consciousness which they had developed
during the 1985 school crisis and the new methods of mobilising the community through proper consultation were tremendous gains for the liberation struggle in South Africa. These methods exposed the vulnerability of the apartheid regime - that as long as the community was united, the exercise by the regime of naked force alone could not solve the problem. The students also learnt that the educational arena was but one site of the liberation struggle and that the contest for the control of this arena should be intensified (by fighting for the establishment of People's Education) both inside and outside the schools. In short, at the end of the 1985 school crisis a generation of high school students had been politicised and the community at large had been drawn into a united response to State oppression and police brutality. Moreover, students had learnt how to organise rallies, how to mobilise support and how to articulate the demands of the oppressed masses. Lastly, students, teachers and parents had learnt to organise themselves effectively in democratic SRCs and PTSA's in order to fight the autocratically imposed rules governing their schools. Thus at the end parents, teachers and students were better placed to turn schools from instruments of indoctrination to areas where the interests of the liberation struggle could be advanced.

(Argus 1, 20, 26/7/85, 15/8/85, 2/9/87, 12, 13, 14/11/85; Cape Times 20, 27/7/85, 11, 14/11/85; Evening Post 11/11/85; Repression Bulletin October 1985; Sisulu, 1986; Documents 2, 4, 5, 60; Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 31, 32, 33, 36A, 36B, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45).
CONCLUSION

The constant exercise of coercive force alone for gaining legitimacy as was the case during 1985 was a major indicator that there existed an organic crisis or crisis of authority in South Africa. The dominant hegemony was collapsing under persistent assaults by the student-led resistance movement. However, it seems a common element of most student uprisings in South Africa that in the initial stages parents, teachers and workers are not properly consulted. This fact is valid for the 1976 and 1980 upsurges in Soweto and Cape Town respectively, as well as in the initial stages of the 1985 school crisis in the Western Cape. Thus although each generation of students learn from past experiences it seems that there is an uneven development of political consciousness amongst students. For instance, it was the advanced section of the students, especially the organised students in COSAS who intervened in the Cape Town African townships and called in parents, leading to the formation of the Parents' Action Committee (PAC) on 18 August, 1985.

The attempt by the 1985 student organisations to consciously mobilise support of passive and repressed social groups, parents and teachers was based on an accumulation of experience closely related to the 1984 mass upsurges and the immediate concern of which was the tricameral elections and labour related issues.

After raising their own educational grievances such as the demand for the establishment of democratic SRCs and organising around the Education Charter Campaign, students realised that they had to link up with workers. It was as a result of the developing working relations between student organisations on the one hand and community and workers'
organisations on the other hand that the 5 and 6 November, 1984, stayaway in the PWV area was relatively effective. Central to this development was the idea of building a student-worker alliance through collective action and of mobilising support for students' grievances. The overwhelming workers' response in the Vaal Triangle during this stayaway laid a solid foundation for the development of a student-worker alliance in 1985.

This was reflected in the fact that in spite of there having been very real school-based grievances, political factors such as the declaration of the State of Emergency were among the main triggers of the school crisis in the Western Cape in 1985. However, the fact that the intense student struggle in the Western Cape began later than in other areas such as the Eastern Cape did not mean that the Peninsula effort was a mere reaction or gesture of solidarity with national formations. Of course the existence of student networks as symbolised by national students' organisations such as AZASM, COSAS and AZASO, which were so well established might give credence to the view that Peninsula students merely reacted to national events during 1985. But because the 1985 school crisis was part of an entire general crisis at all levels - economic, political, ideological and cultural - the education crisis of 1985 in the Western Cape cannot be understood as having been a simple reaction to events in other areas.

One of the factors which stood out during the 1985 school crisis was that this period heralded the start of a more overt presence of the army in the townships. Army camps were being erected in the townships. The army was becoming an integrated force in the direct subjugation of the community and in quelling any resistance which the community generated against the government. Calls for the removal of these troops from the African
townships fell on deaf ears. This fact gives weight to the argument that the 1985 school crisis was not resolved but repressed through the use of State coercive apparatus. Moreover, it was precisely because the education crisis was part and parcel of the general crisis that it could not be resolved in isolation. The implication which could be drawn from this is that it would be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to establish an alternative education system while apartheid structures were still intact.

Although the student-led 1985 mass upsurge posed the question of the transfer of power from the apartheid State to the 'people' (Argus 21/10/85), it had numerous limitations. To begin with, the conceptualisation of the liberation struggle as a process with steps and stages was lacking. Students relied much on the big bang view of liberation - "Freedom now, Education later".

The validity of the view that at precise moments in history, objective conditions weaken the political hegemony of the ruling class and compel the dominated classes to engage in the struggle for State power is not in question here. But an understanding that the crisis of the State needed to be deepened in active struggle was missing amongst adherents of the 'liberation before education' slogan. The central issue here is the conception of power. Power is not centralised in political institutions alone but diffused in diverse institutions and practices in civil society. Schools as part of the ideological State apparatus is one of the arenas within which the contest for power takes place. And although the political arena symbolise the decisive concentration of State power, liberation trenches need to be established in other domains, that is, economic, ideological and cultural levels. The boycott strategy, however,
hampered the exercise of counter-hegemony by oppositional forces within the schools. According to Gramsci,

"A Social group can, indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power (this is indeed one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well" (Gramsci quoted in Simon, 1980:22).

Although the 1985 generation of students might have grasped the fact that the inability of the apartheid ruling class to continue to 'lead' created possibilities for change, its notion of change had its limitations. No consideration was given to the complex combination of social processes and forces which would bring about change (Bundy, 1988:1). According to Callinicos (1988:130-1), while from 1984 the independent trade unions began to use Black workers' industrial power for political ends, their economism limited their ability to challenge directly the apartheid State. The student-led upsurges of 1985, therefore, did not utilise the full strength of the working class against the State. Although the UDF, which represented a combination of social forces opposed to apartheid, including the independent trade unions, was active, the full strength of the working class had yet to be mobilized and directed against the Apartheid State (Callinicos, 1988:32). Moreover, although the mass upsurge brought the question of the transfer of political power to the fore, the resistance movement as a whole lacked the military means to overthrow the State (Bundy, 1988:1; Callinicos, 1988:136).

In addition, the working class also lacked the collective strength and political leadership to construct an alternative strategy for the subordinated masses (Callinicos 1988:136).
The 1985 resistance movement also failed to heed Gramsci's warning that "internal relations of a country must be understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one wishes to dominate them and direct them" (Gramsci quoted in Simon, 1980:34). There is a position adopted by Kavanagh (1985:16-17) which states that elements of South African domination are different from those in Western democracies. In the first instance the "rule" element, which implies direct repression, is proportionately greater under apartheid rule. What Gramsci defines as a 'crisis' moment by virtue of the predominance of direct coercion is a 'normal' situation in South Africa.

Moreover, although the apartheid rulers do make complex and intensive use of cultural and ideological forms of domination, the dominant group does not attempt to legitimise its own culture in the way Gramsci described. Although the latter position is an antithesis of the core argument of the thesis, it reflects however the complexities involved in understanding the South African situation. It is the correct understanding of the unique "internal relations" within a social setting which are necessary to the development of a suitable strategy for the transformation of the social formation.

In addition a situation of organic crisis does not necessarily produce either the preservation of the status quo or the overthrow of the regime (Hall, 1988:127-8). There are other possible outcomes (Gramsci, 1971:210). Harold Wolpe (1988:102) believes that the apartheid regime's 'reformist strategy' failed 'to divide and displace the major thrust of the opposition' as was the 1985-1986 emergency in curbing the development of political bodies of opposition. Furthermore he argues:-
"If the regime was unable to destroy the terrain of extra-parliamentary mass politics in the 1980s as it had done with such rapidity in the 1960s, nor was the mass democratic movement yet in a position to dislodge the regime. In short, there existed an unstable equilibrium in which the White bloc, while holding State power and having at its disposal the armed and security forces, was unable to suppress the mass opposition which, in turn, did not have the immediate capacity to overthrow the regime and the system. In this situation a space was opened up for initiatives for a reformist solution to the country’s crisis on the basis of a ‘negotiated settlement’" (Wolpe 1988:103).

Gramsci’s strategic conception of the ‘war of position’ was therefore not grasped and developed within the South African setting amongst the 1985 generation of students.

"This war of position does not exclude the possibility of very sharp struggles, even violent ones, against the coercive organs of the State. What it means is that the decisive struggle for State power can only be won on the basis of a decisive shift in the balance of forces and the transformation of the State are likely to take place in stages, so that the achievement of each stage creates the conditions for further advances" (Simon, 1980:75).

Gramsci’s war of position is not reformist but an advice that the correct strategy depends on concrete analysis of the given situation and of the overall balance of forces. This spirit was captured in the first National Consultative Conference in December 1985 at Wits. The President of COSAS, Lulu Johnson, recognising the limitations of the ‘Liberation before education’ slogan concluded, "At the moment, making use of the apartheid structure to our favour becomes a burning question" (Johnson, 1985:19). In support, the Secretary of the South African Catholic Bishops’ Conference, Smangaliso Mkhathwana, said: "Current Schools must be taken over and transformed (from) within" (Mkhathwana, 1985:13). The emergence of the concept "People’s education for people’s power" can be traced back to this effort to transform apartheid education structures from within.
PEOPLE'S EDUCATION FOR PEOPLE'S POWER

One of the social spheres identified as an arena for the advancement of the liberation struggle in South Africa was the educational arena. As the education system which progressive South African educators and students wanted to abolish was part and parcel (or a product) of the oppressive and exploitative social order which the majority of the oppressed people were fighting to overthrow, it became essential that those who were seeking to establish a fundamentally new education system in South Africa link-up their struggle with the broader liberation struggle. It was felt that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish an alternative education system until apartheid had been completely abolished. However, an understanding was reached that students should go back to school on January 28, 1986, in order to regroup and attempt to implement a transitionary and transformatory education, People's Education. In the Consultative Conference on education which took place on the 28th and 29th December, 1985, and was convened by the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC) where this idea originated, the delegates declared that:

"People's Education is education that:

(1) Enables the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system and prepares them for participation in a non-racial, democratic system;

(2) Eliminates capitalist norms of competition, individualism, and stunted intellectual development and one that encourages collective input and active participation by all, as well as stimulating critical thinking and analysis;

(3) Eliminates illiteracy, ignorance, and exploitation of any person by another;

(4) Equips and trains all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to attain people's power in order to establish a non-racial democratic South Africa;
(5) Allows students, parents, teachers and workers to be mobilised into appropriate organisational structures which enable them to enhance the struggle for people's power and to participate actively in the initiation and management of People's Education in all its forms;

(6) Enables workers to resist exploitation and oppression at work-place" (SAIRR Topic Briefing, Reg. No. 05/10068/08 (PD/3/86/3/3/86 pp. 5-6).

The concept of 'People's Education for people's power' is related to Freire's notion of conscientisation and Gramsci's concept of ideological hegemony. The notion of conscientisation developed by Paulo Freire (1972) can be defined as a process through which people become aware of their situation, reflect on it, and act upon it as conscious social actors.

Freire's consciousness-raising educational strategies emphasise dialogue and equal participation by all concerned. He believes that in education for liberation, no-one conscientises anyone else. Whether we are students, educators, political leaders, workers, etc., we must all take part in the conscientisation process. Freire (1984) argues that there is no conscientisation if the result is not the conscious action of the oppressed as an exploited social class struggling for liberation. Moreover, he says critical reflection on past action should be related to the continuing struggle of the oppressed. There is an emphasis on the importance of the oppressed understanding the cause of their oppression. The more accurately they understand this causality, the more critical their understanding will become.

The process of action and reflection is crucial to his educational theory. Underlying Freire's theory is the assumption that critical
understanding will lead to political action. This is barely elaborated. The possible implications of his emphasis on consciousness-raising rather than political action may lead to an individualist rather than a collectivist view of social change. While Fréire aligns himself very firmly with 'the oppressed', he does not place class struggle and political action at the centre of his theory. He does not start from the analysis of the State, nor does he articulate a theory of transition (Walters, 1986:5).

However, the concept of conscientisation links well with Gramsci's notion of hegemony (as exercised by organic intellectuals to permeate ideas, values, attitudes, beliefs and morality within trade unions, schools, churches, and other societal institutions which challenges the established social order so as to detach the greater masses from the traditional ideologies) and a process through which an organic crisis (or crisis of authority) can be brought about. An organic crisis presents an opportunity for the masses to challenge for State power through revolutionary action and to reconstitute society along the lines Marx envisaged - the abolition of classes. In this sense Gramsci's notion of ideological hegemony can be traced back to Marx. In an authoritative argument for his Marxist position and the function of hegemony, Gramsci said,

"Marxism does not seek to sustain the 'simple people' in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but instead to lead them to a higher view of life. If it asserts the need for contact between the intellectuals and the simple it does so, not in order to limit scientific activity and maintain unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to build an intellectual moral block which makes politically possible the intellectual progress of the masses and not only a few groups of intellectuals. The active man of the masses works practically, but he does not have a clear theoretical consciousness of his actions, which is also a knowledge of the world in so far as he changes it" (Gramsci, 1957:66).
Gramsci believes that what makes the oppressed masses endorse the essential ideological and structural features of the bourgeois State is found in the superstructure. Through its subtle control of the mass media, the schools, the trade unions, etc., the ruling class is able to persuade, with a considerable degree of success, the oppressed masses to accept the legitimacy of their own subordination. It is only through counter-hegemonic practises that the oppressed can be made aware of their situation resulting in the 'revolution of spirit' whose function is to bring about a 'crisis of authority'. The point which is being advanced here is that it is precisely because of its similarities with Freire's concepts of education for liberation and conscientisation as well as Gramsci's notion of hegemony that 'People's Education for people's power' was a revolutionary strategy. According to Freire,

"Education for liberation is concerned, as a social praxis, with helping to free human beings from the oppression that strangles them in their objective reality. It is therefore political education, just as political as the education that claims to be neutral, although actually serving the power elite. It is thus a form of education that can only be put into practise systematically when society is radically transformed. Only the 'innocent' could possibly think that the power elite would encourage a type of education that denounces them even more clearly than do all the contradictions of their power structures. Such naivete also reveals a dangerous underestimation of the capacity and audacity of the elite. Truly, liberating education can only be put into practice outside the ordinary system, and even then with great consciousness by those who overcome their naivete and commit themselves to authentic liberation" (Freire, 1984:125).

However there was a problem in linking 'People's Education for people's power' to education for liberation. The question was who these 'people' were. Thus at the centre of the controversy was the definition of the term 'people' which seemed to be loosely used. A UCT student and member of AZASM in 1987 commented that:

"Education for liberation, a kind of education that prepares one for taking over power during the liberation process is
different from 'People's Education for People's Power' because
the latter slogan is vague. What is meant by 'People's
Education for People's Power'? When you say liberation you are
not talking about the emancipation of the labour force from the
chains of exploitation? I say this because my understanding is
that the struggle in this country is basically against
exploitation. And if 'People's Education' is for all people,
that could be for both the exploiting and exploited classes.
The same question goes for 'people's power', what is it? This
is why I think the slogan is vague" (Interviewee 20).

A similar question has been raised by Peter Kallaway (1986) who also felt
that the nature of 'People's Education for people's power' depended much
upon what was meant by terms such as 'people', 'national' and
'community'. Kallaway says there is no clear distinction in the 'People's
Education for people's power' rhetoric between the populist national
liberation struggle after whose completion in most former colonised
countries of Africa liberal values and private ownership was taken for
granted and a struggle whose aim is to reconstitute South African society
along socialist lines.

This rhetoric, he argues, amounts to an appeal for classical liberal
values of equality, an end to racism in education and individual rights.
Kallaway suggests that the debate should pose a socialist alternative to
the present apartheid education system, that is, an alternative which
links education and politics to the power of workers or producers in the
work-place. To implement 'People's Education' would imply gaining control
of schools which is impossible because the ideas formalised in school are
always those of a class in power. This, however, does not mean that
students and progressive teachers cease to contest for the control of the
educational arena. This contest has to continue to enhance the liberation
struggle in South Africa. The usage of the word "people" in 'People's
Education' should not be confused with the bourgeois democratic abuse of
the word 'people'. Since item 6 on People's Education states that this is
a form of education which "enables workers to resist exploitation and
oppression at their work-place" (SAIRR Topic Briefing Reg. No.
05/10068/08 (PD 3/86 3/3/86) PP. 5-6) there is no attempt in the document
to cover-up the class antagonisms which exist in South African society.

Of course, this criticism of the suspected populist nature of the
'People's Education for people's power' strategy also affects Freire's
notion of conscientisation and Gramsci's concept of hegemony which both
see liberation as a process of political mobilisation which has its end
result the freeing of both oppressor/oppressed, coloniser/colonised,
master/slaves, exploiter/exploited. Freire's lack of emphasis on
political action raises the question as to whether critical understanding
necessarily leads to collective action or not. Gramsci has also been
criticised for downgrading the 'war of movement' or the military element
of the political struggle in his Prison Notebooks (1971) thus encouraging
a 'gradualist' and 'revisionist' interpretation of his work in prison
(See also Femia, 1987; Boggs, 1976). Femia (1987) argues that the 'war of
position' or ideological hegemony strategy occupied a prominent position
because Gramsci 'realised that no regime in a modern industrial society
could long endure without popular support and a unified cultural base.

Gramsci's strategy thus included such objectives as striving for class
alliances and adjusting the revolutionary process to specific national
practices. In South Africa such attempts to strive for class alliances
manifested itself in, for example, the involvement of both Christian and
Islamic religious groupings in the political activity of the UDF and the
prominence of religious leaders such as Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, and
Moulana Faried Esack. While the character of these activities might be populist in the transitionary period, this created space for the filtering in of socialist ideas. The point is that any social movement causes a counter-reaction on the part of the system as an expression of the intervention of the political apparatus the goal of which is the maintenance of 'law and order'. This intervention might take the form of repression or co-option. But whatever form it takes, State intervention has the effect of politicising the sphere in question which in turn promotes the development of working class consciousness.

In order to evaluate correctly the slogan 'People's Education for people's power' one needs to understand its emergence in the field of struggle. Whereas alternative programmes called awareness programmes were held in Cape Town in DEC and DET schools from when the class boycott began on 23 July, 1985, it was the emergence of the slogan "Freedom now, education later" which can throw light on for the origin of the slogan "People's Education for people's power". In Cape Town the slogan "Freedom now, education later" started to be chanted in mass rallies at the beginning of October, 1985. For example chants of "Freedom now, education later" were heard at a mass rally held at the Groenvlei High in Lansdowne on 8 October, 1985 (Cape Times 9/10/85). From then this slogan started appearing on posters at student demonstrations and was spray-painted on walls throughout the Peninsula. The meaning of the slogan was clearly conveyed by a publication called Congress Review No.4 which stated that:

"The slogan advanced by the students in their heroic struggle: Freedom now, Education later, demonstrates a correct assessment of the revolutionary situation which had matured inside our country. An acknowledgement of the unprecedented crisis engulfing the whole of racist South Africa. Despite the persistent attempts of the liberal-bourgeoisie to make us believe that 'revolution is not around the corner', the students, united as never before, answered the battle call to
rid our people finally of the scourge of gutter education. Through their 'active' boycott they transformed thousands of young people into fearless combatants who made the streets of the Flats 'no go zones' for the enemy.

How was it possible for the students to make such a short space of time to heighten the political commitment and awareness of the Coloured masses and win such outstanding support from so many groups with the Coloured middle class. The students, right at the onset, realised the correctness of their slogan. Freedom now, Education later, did not depend on the approval of the hesitating and vacillating sectors of the community.

Political rights for them are not won by stringing together scores of names of sponsors on a list of demands. They were not busy demonstrating an exercise in political opportunism where messages of support become a substitute for genuine political struggle. No, they were too serious about the task which was facing them. With outstanding creativeness, they moved their forces over the lengths and breadths of the Peninsula and in the process dispersed and exhausted the enemy forces. From Bonteheuwel to Mitchells Plain, from Lansdowne to Wynberg to Bo-Kaap, they gained control of the streets. Their base became the entire Cape Flats and at certain times extended right into the centre of the racist Cape Town. The flames they lit burn till this day on Park Road, on Belgravia Road and in many other townships.

No matter how busy some teachers are in concocting 'intelligent schemes' to assist Goebbels in 'normalising' the schools at the start of 1986, they must remember that the flame of freedom continues to burn inside the thousands of our young in Bonteheuwel, in Mitchells Plain and in Manenburg. In Guguletu, in Mamelodi and in Graaf. In Worcester and in Mbekweni. In the breasts of our young all over the country who under the banner "Freedom Now" are demonstrating such outstanding courage, heroism and selfless contempt for death" (Document 8).

This slogan was part of the politicisation or mobilisation process in 1985 which arose in the field of struggle. Militant youth who were pessimistic about change in the education system while the apartheid regime still existed, concluded that constructive sacrifices should be made to advance the interests of the liberation struggle over and above personal gains such as certificates and degrees. A former AZASO UCT branch chairperson and UWC student in 1985 pointed out that,

"The slogan 'Freedom Now, Education Later', has been misinterpreted. It does not mean forget education completely
now and only fight for liberation - and only after liberation we will then see to the question of education. Rather it should be looked at in terms of education and liberation priorities. You can continue with both of them even if the priority of one is above the other. What the slogan means is that it should not be a mad rush to finish a degree. The slogan is relevant and needs to be looked at within the context of what is happening" (Interviewee 12).

In addition a NACTU official said:

"If the slogan 'Freedom Now, Education Later' means that the enemy is collapsing and that we must sacrifice all education now to push the enemy over for fundamental changes then I can support it. But this line of argument was based on a false premise that young people were going to give up education even if we were not in a period of fundamental changes.

So, some people interpreted Freedom Now to mean that we must make certain sacrifices in education to develop our struggle for freedom and other interpreted it as sacrificing education now for we were in the point of seizing power, where freedom becomes our first priority. I think the latter idea was based on the false assessment of the situation and the slogan in that sense had to be opposed. But if Freedom Now implies clarity that in this phase of our struggle we must be able to make the necessary sacrifices in education, constructive sacrifices as against our own personal gains by becoming lawyers, teachers and intellectuals, then it is understandable" (Interviewee 29).

There was a marked identification, amongst Black Students, with the armed struggle with militant students consciously projecting an armed insurrection in 1985. Many students left the country as had happened in 1976 and 1980 to join mostly the ANC because the Congress tendency was dominant in 1985. According to the Principal of Langa High in 1985:

"Freedom Now, Education Later or 'education after liberation' was part of the politicisation process. At the beginning of the present school crisis which specifically started in 1976, the students' slogan was "Away with the language of the oppressor" meaning Afrikaans. And even then the fact is that behind that slogan was animosity toward the Afrikaner. But now 'Education Later, Freedom Now', that is active politicisation. In 1976 a large number of our students left the country and many of them joined the ANC. Many of them got scholarships overseas, for instance, in Germany and some of them still write to us. Others became delinquent. But now the slogan, "Freedom Now, Education Later" obviously is an active enticement to carry out the liberation struggle, that is to say, leave the country and come back as a guerilla fighter and a gun in hand which many students had done. There are students who left the country in
1976 and later died in Guguletu and elsewhere, for instance in Soweto. They did come back to fight" (Interviewee 3).

However, the undialectical interpretation of the slogan 'Freedom Now, Education Later' by some militant students which lead to the belief that the apartheid regime was collapsing and the oppressed about to seize power, resulted in a fresh search for an unambiguous slogan around which students could rally support for their grievances. Central to their search for a new slogan was a review of how effectively to use the boycott strategy to the benefit of both the educational and broader liberation struggle in South Africa. The more advanced students were discovering that the liberation struggle was a process and recognising that their schools could be used to further the goals of this struggle. The boycott strategy was now seen as just one of the weapons of the liberation struggle in South Africa and its over-use viewed as destructive to the organisation of students. According to a prominent student leader and executive member of both SOYA and SAC at UCT in 1985,

"The question for arguing for liberation before education as it were was never corrected but it collapsed with the collapse of the 1985 school crisis. It came to an abrupt end largely because of State repression but I think critically so because of the dynamic around which students had planned their activities. In that way they over-extended or prolonged the boycott beyond viable limits resulting into the dilution of not only grassroots demands but also led to the distraction of events within broadly based community organisations. This, unfortunately, is a lesson that the boycott as a weapon has its limitations. Those limitations are imposed by the context in which that boycott as a strategy is used. But because students are a mobile constituency, it will take generations to learn a lesson that we can only use the boycott as a tactic to a certain extent. Students do not want to hear about retreat or/ and retreat in good order as opposed to retreat after having been routed by security forces. Retreat in good order would have preserved the physical resources that the 1985 school crisis had brought out. We would also have made a lower statistics in terms of physical injuries within the student community. We would also have avoided disillusionment within the student community in as far as the attendance to their demands by the government was concerned. So, all the students disillusionment and the higher physical injuries was a direct
result of the overextension of the boycott. This result was, however, not only determined within the development of the student community but also outside the student community as well. I think more so outside the student community. The broader political struggles in the country, we must note, will always exercise a decisive influence in all levels of activities both inside and outside the resistance movement. It should be accepted as such. It should be expected that given the kind of slogan which was advanced within the broad community struggle, that is the whole question of governability, this will be interpreted in various ways within the students community and one of the interpretations brought about the slogan "Liberation before education". So, there is that unevenness within the student community. But the collapse of the 1985 boycott was a demonstration that the whole question of education struggle in whichever level - secondary, primary and tertiary is very much an integral part of the broader struggle for liberation in South Africa" (Interviewee 9).

The idea that the slogan 'Freedom Now, Education Later' had prolonged the boycott weapon beyond its viable limits and that the call for 'ungovernability' had lead to divisions amongst students and a chaotic situation was explicit in Dr. Neville Alexander’s statement which argued that:

"The slogan of liberation before education showed a lack of real deep analysis. It was only from October, 1985, onwards that things began to change. Then, of course, things were beginning to ebb and people realising that it (the revolution or seizure of power) is not going to happen quickly. Secondly, there was parent - worker pressure on students to go back to school because the whole thing has become so chaotic. Ungovernability was now having a boomerang effect. The community was feeling the boomerang effect of the ungovernability call because children were no longer going to school - they were now into drugs, alcohol, sex, and getting into all sorts of trouble. All these things were taking their toll. Many of the students, of course, left the country and went into exile and so on. But there was a lot of parental pressure. Parents were once again trying to gain control of the situation. So there was a conservative backlash amongst the Blacks. But also those voices that had originally opposed "ungovernability" and "Freedom Now, Education Later" began to have more reason and effect amongst the people. As a result between October and March, 1986, there was a complete turn around of the situation" (Interviewee 35).
The disorganisation arising from the fact that some students misinterpreted the slogan "Freedom Now, Education Later" to mean abandoning their schooling until the liberation struggle had been completed and parents' pressure for students to go back to school, contributed towards the formulation of the more dynamic slogan, "People's Education for people's power". As 'People's Education' centred students' activities inside schools, it enjoyed greater acceptability amongst parents. In addition, its emergence through the ruthless criticism of the "Freedom Now, Education Later" slogan during process of struggle, its development within awareness programmes, and its ability to unite parents, workers, teachers and students against the apartheid system as well as its primary objective of turning schools into sites for the liberation struggle made it a viable alternative to the apartheid education system. Moreover, People's Education's avowed aims to mobilise "workers to resist exploitation and oppression at the work-place" (SAIRR Topic Briefing, Reg. No. 05/10068/08 (PD 3/86 3/3/86) Pp. 5-6) gave it a socialist content. The idea of a "People's Education for People's power" programme in South Africa was consolidated at an SPCC Conference. It was during this conference that students reached an understanding that an indefinite boycott could be destructive to the general organisation of students. The boycott weapon was henceforth to be used as a tactic and there was a realisation that the organisation of students and re-grouping of student organisations is easier when students were inside their schools - that schools could serve as a base for the advancement of the contest for the control of the educational arena and for the struggle for liberation in South Africa. As an executive member of DETU put it,

"The slogan "Freedom Now, Education Later" has been misrepresented. It does not mean what it seems to be saying. What it meant during the 1985 school crisis was that students
and everybody involved in the educational process must involve themselves very much in the struggle for liberation in South Africa. It does not mean books must be eliminated altogether but that the liberation struggle must be number one in the process.

This only means that the primary objective of the oppressed community is to liberate themselves and other aspects of social life should be secondary to that goal. But nevertheless in the context of what it looks like, that is, liberation first, education later, I would reject it. My feeling is that the liberation struggle must go hand in hand with books. While struggling one should have time for books. In the NECC conference there was a strong feeling that students must go back to classes. The classes or schools can be used as centres for the liberation struggle in South Africa. So we should use those centres for re-education and for implementing an alternative education system, "People's Education for people's power". This slogan, which is similar to "education for liberation" is very positive. When the Afrikaners took over the country they institutionalised the informal separation and segregation in our education into a formal weapon to subjugate and oppress our people. They wanted to make our people perpetual slaves mentally and in any other way. So they used education as a political weapon. They thought by now there will be multitudes of domicile and subordinated slaves. We reject apartheid based Bantu Education. We also reject Christian National Education because it is also not liberatory. Through the theory and practice of "People's Education for people's power", we are laying the foundation for our future education system which will be decided upon by all people in a post-apartheid South Africa" (Interviewee 19).
APPENDIX 1:
List of Interviewees

1. Anonymous (school inspector)
2. Anonymous (student)
3. Anonymous (school inspector)
4. Anonymous (student)
5. Vuyiselwa Galawe (social worker and executive member of the Parents' Action Committee (PAC))
6. Anonymous (student and associated member of DETU)
7. Peter Jones (member of AZAPO's national executive)
8. Anonymous (student)
9. Anonymous (student)
10. Anonymous (teacher)
11. Craig Mkhaliphi (ex-Robben island political prisoner and member of the Pan African Congress (PAC))
12. Anonymous (student)
13. Anonymous (journalist and Vice-chairperson of the Western Cape branch of AZASM)
14. Anonymous (teacher)
15. Anonymous (worker)
16. Anonymous (Chairperson of the Minister's Fraternal)
17. Anonymous (3 students)
18. Anonymous (executive member of the Parents' Action Committee)
19. Anonymous (teacher)
20. Anonymous (student)
21. Anonymous (student)
22. Anonymous (student)
23. Anonymous (school principal)
24. Anonymous (student)
25. Anonymous (school principal)
26. Anonymous (school principal)
27. Anonymous (student)
28. Anonymous (school inspector)
29. Anonymous (NACTU education organiser at the Western Cape branch)
30. Anonymous (student)
31. Anonymous (student)
32. Anonymous (student)
33. Anonymous (student)
34. Anonymous (student)
35. Dr. Neville Edward Alexander
36A. Anonymous (teacher)
36B. Anonymous (school principal)
37. Anonymous (student)
38. Anonymous (Executive member of the parents’ Action Committee)
39. Anonymous (teacher)
40. Anonymous (student)
41. Anonymous (teacher)
42. Anonymous (3 students)
43. Anonymous (Executive member of the Parents’ Action Committee)
44. Anonymous (2 students)
45. Anonymous (student)
Memorandum of Demands Submitted to the Cape Town DET office by the Parents' Action Committee (PAC) on 31 January, 1986

MEET OUR DEMANDS NOW? MEET OUR DEMANDS NOW?? THE DEMANDS???

THE STATE OF EMERGENCY MUST BE LIFTED IN 36 MAGISTERIAL DISTRICTS

The state of emergency has been declared for the third time in South Africa. The first one was declared in 1960, the 2nd one in Soweto 1976 and we now Witness the third state of emergency in the 36 magisterial districts. During these periods, the State gives wide powers to the security forces - the SAP, the Army, the Prison authorities. These security forces are empowered to detain any person without a warrant and to search any house without a search warrant.

In places like Graaf-Reinet and Cradock, old women have been beaten up by the police and soldiers while students have been forced at "gunpoint" to attend classes. In the Western Cape although the state of emergency has not been declared officially, the actions of the police and soldiers gives it an official stamp. Detentions of Community leaders, harassment of students and the beating up of ordinary people is the order of the day. The Capitalists and the government cannot govern us without using force. We the students, the sons and daughters of the oppressed and exploited, together with our parents demand that the state of emergency be lifted in 36 magisterial districts and those areas where it is not officially declared. The complete withdrawal of the SADF from the townships.

To enforce the state of emergency, the security forces are allowed to patrol the townships. They do not patrol but have beaten up and killed hundreds of working class children. The Owning class "Capitalists" cannot rule on their own, they always look for people to rule on their behalf, that is why there are Political parties like the Ruling Nationalist Party and the PFP. The parliament talk-shop of Botha and Slabbert is used to win sections of the working masses by promising
them a better life under the present system. During times of unrest, when the working people demand more than Parliament can offer, the army and police are used to crush the uprisings. Some people argue that the SADF should play a neutral role, to that we say, with the absence of the "band of armed gangs", Botha and even his masters, Capital would not be able to rule for a day.

We say loud and clear, SADF leave our townships, leave us alone. Don’t play with our kids in the streets during the day while you slaughter them at night.

THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL DETAINED STUDENTS AND NO VICTIMISATION AFTER SUCH RELEASE

From the time the school boycotts started, a large number of students have been detained. These students have been detained because they voiced their opposition to Bantu Education and organised other students to stand up and fight for a better education. Lately, the State has also banned the democratic student movement COSAS.

In some cases those students who are to be released from detention are not re-admitted to their schools.

WE STUDENTS CANNOT CONTINUE WITH CLASSES WHILE OUR FELLOW STUDENTS ARE LEFT TO ROT IN THE APARTHEID JAILS. WE DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL DETAINED STUDENTS WITH NO VICTIMISATION.

FULL RECOGNITION OF THE SRC’S WHICH ARE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED BY STUDENTS.

Student Representative Councils are elected at each school by the students. SRCs act as a link between the teachers and the students. We want the students to form part of whatever decisions that are taken at the schools. In our society (country) decisions are made for the masses by the Authorities. The lives of the masses are controlled. We want to stop that, at least in our school. The Department of Education and Training agreed to this and drew a constitution for the SRCs. We rejected this constitution because we did not agree with the Authorities on the principles of this constitution but also because the authorities drew up
the constitution in our presence. We don't want anyone to think for us. We know what we want and only we know.

OUR VISION OF THE SCHOOL IS A PLACE OF LEARNING WHERE DECISIONS ARE TAKEN BY THE TEACHERS, OUR PARENTS AND BY US STUDENTS THROUGH THE SRC'S. WE BELIEVE IN JOINT PARENT-TEACHER-STUDENT CONTROL IN EDUCATION

AGE LIMITATION REGULATIONS MUST BE ABOLISHED

In 1981, a year after the 1980 school boycotts, the government introduced the age limitation regulations. This means that a child who is over 16 years must not be admitted to do Std. 5, no student who is over 18 years must be admitted to Std. 8, and a student who is over 20 years must not be admitted to do Std. 10. When these students fail, they are not re-admitted and have to attend Adult Education Centre, like the New St. Francis "LAGUNYA".

ABOLISHMENT OF ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL (LAGUNYA)

This school will not have functioned if there were no age limitation regulations and no quota system.

The existence of this school creates division amongst the students. The other high schools are poorly equipped with facilities like laboratories, libraries, and teaching aids, whilst Lagunya has these facilities. We know that it is the big firms which have sponsored these equipment and not the government. But WE DEMAND THAT EITHER ALL STUDENTS ATTEND SCHOOLS WHICH ARE WELL EQUIPPED OR ALL ATTEND THE OTHER THAT ARE ILL-EQUIPPED SO THAT WE CAN FIGHT TOGETHER FOR A BETTER EDUCATION SYSTEM; ABOLISH THAT SCHOOL! TREAT ALL STUDENTS AS EQUALS!

EXAMINATION FEES MUST BE DECREASED FROM R36.00 TO R20.00 PER YEAR

The examination fee is raised every year by R3.00. Our parents have to pay for this too while their wages are not raised. Moreover, we do not only pay for writing examinations that a few students will pass (Quota system) but we also have to pay to reproduce the rotten education we are given.

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WE DEMAND THAT NO MORE INCREASE BE MADE ON EXAMINATION FEES AND THAT THE FEES BE REDUCED TO R20,00

TRANSPORT FEES MUST BE SUBSIDISED

There are only four High Schools in Cape Town for Africans one school in each township except for Gugulethu where 2 exist. A large number of students attend these schools and not all of students can attend a school in the area where he/she lives. To enable us to get to schools we have to use buses and trains. We students pay the same fare that our parents pay. In fact our parents pay double because they have to pay our fares also. WE DEMAND THAT TRANSPORT FARE - BE IT BUSES OR TRAINS - BE SUBSIDISED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT TRAMWAYS reduce the high bus fares. Transport is subsidised for State "officials" like Botha and his functionaries.

MORE SCHOOLS AND TECHNIKONS BE BUILT

"Deliberate attempts will be made to keep institutions for advanced education for Africans away from the urban environment" - these are the words of Verwoerd! It has been the policy of the government to build high school or teacher training schools in the homelands. Examples are L.L. Sebe Training School in Zwelitsha, Cape College in Fort Beaufort etc. Verwoerd and company believed that the home of the Africans are in the homelands and those that live in the urban areas should return to the homelands when they want to further their education.

Job Schoeman, the Public Relation Officer of the Department of Education and Training said in 1982 that the aims of his age limitation regulation is two-fold. "Firstly to have pupils of the same age in the same class and secondly to bring the DET INTO LINE WITH OTHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS". We would like to look at these aims. Schoeman cannot have pupils of the same age in the same class in this gutter education. By law, we students have to start school at age 7. Not all of us start school at this age and moreover some of us have to leave school for a year or so because our parents, who produce the wealth of this country, cannot afford to keep us.

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at school. Why? Because they have to pay for our school fees, books, uniforms and other things out of the starving wages they get.

Secondly, why does Job Schoeman want to bring DET in line with other education departments through this regulation only? We say to Schoeman and company that we know why they introduced this regulation, they introduced it so as to get rid of those students who experienced the student struggles of 1976 and 1980. Secondly, the capitalists are in need of semi-skilled black labourers. Those of the students who are not re-admitted at their schools and at St. Francis either swell the ranks of the unemployed or end up being paid starving wages. Education has nothing to do with age! Education knows no age!

Quota system must be abolished

In 1981, 14,420 matric students wrote examinations and 2,056 passed. This number qualified to further their studies at university. The remaining 12,364 had to either look for work or do something else.

Job Schoeman's reasons for the high failure rate was under-qualified teachers. He further said that he expected a similar pass (failure) rate for the next 4 to 5 years until sufficient qualified teachers were trained. But it is not the teachers that want to be under-qualified, the education which we received was and is rotten!

Again in 1983 the same Job Schoeman had this to say about the poor results. "The results are poor because of the fact that Africans come from culturally deprived background and a single ministry of education is not the answer. "We students demand and our parents know that before we write examinations the DET knows how many students will pass. Schoeman we don't talk about one ministry of education for different races but one non-racial and free education system for all for the benefit of every person.

The ideas of Verwoerd were dead long before he followed to the grave.
We see the sudden rush by the Department sponsored Argus teach fund to build additional classrooms at the existing schools. The government entrenched separate schools for separate races. Either open up all schools/technikons, university for all or build more schools, not classrooms and technikons in our townships.

FREE CHOICE OF ACADEMIC SUBJECTS FOR ALL STUDENTS

In our schools the students have no choice of academic subjects. No school offer commercial subjects like accountancy, bookkeeping etc. We are forced to do subjects that have no relevance to the present situation. WE DEMAND FREE CHOICE OF SUBJECTS WITH RELEVANCE TO THE NEEDS OF NOT ONLY A FEW IN OUR SOCIETY BUT TO THE WORKING CLASS.

THE INTRODUCTION OF AN EQUAL, DYNAMIC, FREE AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION SYSTEM

The governments approach to education is subject to 4 principles. These are:

(i) CHRISTIANITY,  
(ii) GROUP IDENTITY,  
(iii) MOTHER TONGUE INSTRUCTION and (iv) PARENTAL DECISION MAKING.

We the Parents' Action Committee and the Joint SRCs believe in a DYNAMIC AND FREE, NON-RACIAL AND EQUAL, UNIVERSAL AND COMPULSORY WITH JOINT PARENT-TEACHER-STUDENT CONTROL OVER EDUCATION.
APPENDIX III:

"Initial responses by the Regional Director to recommendation made in the memorandum submitted by the Parents Action Committee on 31 January, 1986."

1. **Shortage of school text books**
   1.1 The principal in consultation with subject teachers selects textbooks from the catalogue, principals are free to contact the publishers for specimen copies.
   1.2 Allocation for text books is based on the anticipated enrolment of school based on principals estimation of enrolment in the following year.
   1.3 Requisitions for books are routinely submitted in good time.
   1.4 Covering the schedule (addendum to the memorandum) the position will be investigated.

2. **Lack of laboratory equipment etc.**
   2.1 Biology, Physical Science and General Science laboratories are provided for all new secondary schools built by the Department of Education and Training.
   2.2 Specialist rooms including geography rooms are also provided for all new secondary schools built by the Department of Education and Training.
   2.3 In primary schools, science equipment and science kits are provided.
   2.4 Laboratory equipment is provided on the basis of requisition.
   2.5 The recommendation relating to the provision of similar accommodation in primary schools and of language laboratories is noted.

2.6 **Libraries**
   2.6.1 Sums of money are budgeted each year by the Department of Education and Training for the purchase of library books.
2.6.2 Primary schools have class libraries as opposed to the centralised libraries in secondary schools.
2.6.3 The Department of Education and Training runs one year full time courses with full salary and fees paid for teacher-libraries.
2.6.4 Recommendation covering the equipment of libraries with TV sets, video machines and Video Tapes is noted.

3. School Premises: Maintenance
3.1 All Departmental schools in the Cape Town Circuit were properly fenced.
3.2 Painting and the upkeep of buildings is done according to the programme of works.
3.3 Garden tools are available on requisition.
3.4 The provision of toilet rolls and cleaning materials is receiving attention.
3.5 The standards of wages and salaries are determined by the Commission of Administration.

4. Misappropriation of school funds
4.1 The case of Sizamile will be investigated on request from the School Committee.
4.2 According to the present Act and regulations made thereunder the school committees are in charge of school funds. The reference to "PTSA's" is not understood.
4.3 Each school determines its own form of finance control.

5. Shortage of qualified teachers
5.1 Better qualified teachers are given preference when appointments are made.
5.2 The Department of Education and Training is continuously engaged in programmes of upgrading of teacher qualifications. Participants receive bursaries to defray costs and are granted study leave.
6. Sexual Harassment of Students
The Department of Education and Training will investigate all cases of alleged sexual harassment, provided that a formal complaint is made by the parent of the student concerned and will take action against any teacher who is found guilty of such behaviour.

7. The State of Emergency
The recommendation that the SADF the SAP be withdrawn from the townships should be directed to the appropriate Departments.

8. Recognition of SRCs
The Minister of Education and Development Aid, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, has authorised the constitution of SRCs by individual school communities. He has given three requirements: i.e. that they be democratically elected, that they concern themselves with educational issues and that they do not subsume the Authority of the school. The initiative now lies with individual school communities to establish such bodies in terms of a written constitution that should receive the prior approval of the Regional Director.

9. Accommodation and equipment of SRCs: This appears to be an innovation in the school context.

10. Age Limitations
Age limitations have ceased to be of application except in the case of first admission to school in Sub A.

11. Examination Fees
This matter concerns examination policy which is determined in the Head Office of the Department.

12. Subsidisation of Transport Fares
Covered in the Director General's letter of 28 November 1985, para 8.5.
13. **Quota System Should be Abolished**
   There is no quota system - merely pass requirements.

14. **Free choice of academic subjects**
   It is incorrect to say there is no choice of academic subjects in schools. Positive steps have been taken to introduce technical and commercial subjects.

15. **Abolition of St. Francis School**
   The school serves a useful function in that it provides a second chance for students who have failed the matriculation examination.

16. **More Schools and Technikons be Built**
   16.1 Teacher training colleges are being provided in the large urban centres e.g. Port Elizabeth and Cape Town.
APPENDIX IV:

List of documents

1. 1985 - Year of Resistance (pamphlet) Printed by Zakhe, 1986

2. A Revolution Retreat to Advance our Struggle (pamphlet) Issued by the Student Revolutionary Front, September 1985

3. A Tribute to our Comrades who were killed on Monday 3/3/1986 (pamphlet) Issued by CAYCO, March 1986


5. Black Education Deadlock 1985/6 (document) Issued by the Ministers' Fraternal, 1986

6. Black student-worker solidarity (pamphlet) Issued by AZASM, 10 October 1984

7. Botha declares his weakness (pamphlet) Issued by the Claremont and Observatory UDF Area Committee, August 1985


9. Consumer boycott continues (pamphlet) Issued by the UCT Consumer Action Group, 1985

10. COSAS = A History (document) published by COSAS, Undated

11. COSAS Constitution (document) Published by COSAS, Undated

12. Crisis at Crossroads!! (pamphlet) Published by UCT SRC News, February 1985
13. Defend Our Gains (pamphlet) Issued by the UWC SRC News, 28 April 1986

14. Do you have an SRC? If not, who represents you? (pamphlet) Issued by COSAS N.E.C, 1985

15. Draft Statement on the Return to Classes (pamphlet) Issued by the Wynberg region of WECTU, 1985

16. Education and Liberation, Western Cape Teachers Union, Number 1, November 1985

17. Education Charter Week (pamphlet) Issued by CAYCO LOGRA Branch, Tuesday 24 to Friday 27 September 1986

18. SRC call (pamphlet) Issued by the UWC SRC, Friday 18 October 1985

19. Education Crisis Documents Leaflet No 2 in Azania Worker Vol 2(3) 1986

20. Education in South Africa (document) Published by AZAPO, December 1980


22. Funeral service of the late Stembele Matiso (pamphlet) Issued by COSAS, August 1985

23. Initial responses by the Regional Director to recommendations made in the memorandum submitted by the Parents’ Action Committee on 31 January 1986 (document) Issued by the Cape Town Circuit Inspector of Education and Training, 31 January 1986

24. Joint Student Representative Council (hand-written pamphlet draft) Produced by COSAS, 1985

26. Let us Return to Formal Academic Classes (pamphlet) Issued by 155 organisations in the Western Cape, 28 January 1986

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