NATIONAL IDENTITY IN A CHANGING SOUTH AFRICA

A STUDY OF 'NEW' RIGHT DISCOURSE

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This study considers the process of constructing a new South African national identity in the political discourse of the ‘new’ right-wing during the transitional period between 1990 and 1994. It is concerned with how speakers for the “new” Nationalist Party who were implicated in the production of national identity within the framework of an apartheid ideology discursively construct and reconstruct national identity during this period of transition. The focus is on key political speeches and interviews given by party leader F.W. De Klerk. National identity is approached from a social psychological perspective and the study argues for a theory of identity as discursively produced within a specific historical context and relations of power. Texts are analysed using a discourse analytic approach. The analysis considers the interpretative resources and discursive practices deployed in the constructive process. Particular attention is given to the rhetorical construction of the discourse and the argumentative context within which versions of identity are produced. An interpretative link is made between the results of this analysis and the positioning of speakers within ideology and relations of power. The analysis shows how the ‘new’ social category produced in this right-wing discourse is rooted in earlier representations of identity and is constructed to maintain earlier divisions and relations. Old and entrenched constructions of national identity, based in ethnicity, remain present in attempts to redefine an inclusive South African identity. A function of this construction is to speak to the right-wing as part of a strategy to manage negotiations.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

We have triumphed in the effort to implant hope in the breasts of the millions of our people. We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity - a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world. Mandela (1994)

Background to the Study

The early 1990s marked a period of social and political change for South African society. Talk of an emerging "new South Africa", however such an entity may have been construed, was ubiquitous. The National Party government of the time called for the unification of the people of South Africa and the elimination of divisions between them; divisions which had been enforced and entrenched during 45 years of apartheid and centuries of earlier discrimination. In 1993 the then State President, F.W. De Klerk, argued that of all the challenges facing South Africa the greatest task was the building of a nation (De Klerk, December 31, 1993; FW: Main task, November 11, 1993).

The call to build a South African nation came during an epoch marked by divergent sentiments and movements around the world (Billig, 1996;1993; Smith, 1992; Sullivan, June 22, 1992; Mack 1983; Isaacs 1975). On the one hand there were claims that the world community had entered a period of internationalism or globalisation transcending older national boundaries; an era in which the nation as a dominant group form had lost its status. On the other hand, there was evidence of a growing tendency towards the fragmentation of
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this phenomenon) and the emergence of smaller “ethnic” or “national” groups heralded by cries of “self-determination”.

South African society of the period was a microcosm of these broader tendencies. The Nationalist government, as well as the African National Congress (Mandela, 1990a; Mandela, 1990b; Mandela, 1991; Constitutional Guidelines, 1991; Harare Declaration, 1991), repeatedly articulated the need to set about the task of constructing a “new” South African identity, of building “one nation” out of the ruins of the failed “multinational” apartheid project. This attempt at unification was met by, for example, Conservative Party counter-calls to “Keep Your Identity”, for “self-determination” in a “confederal” system of states, and the creation of a separate “Afrikaner Volkstaat”. Counter-calls of this kind were backed by the threat of “civil war” if they were not recognised and entrenched in the constitution then under debate. Similarly, secessionist threats were voiced by Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi in an attempt at establishing a separate state for the “Zulu nation” and former homeland president Lucas Mangope vociferously resisted the possibility of the reincorporation of the nominally independent state of Bophuthatswana into the “new” South Africa.

The blame for such conflicting perspectives may be laid largely at the door of apartheid ideology and its attempts to forge a particular set of identities and power relations within the territorial boundaries of South Africa. That nation-building presented itself as a necessary project at this point in the history of the country bore strong testimony to the consequences of such an ideology.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the nature of a South African national identity, and the meaning attributed to the concept by members of the various historically constructed groups, was confused. In a survey conducted in 1993 by Integrated Marketing Research (cited in
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Laufer, S., December 17, 1993) the potential difficulties in forging a new South African national identity were underscored by the finding that only 44.3 percent of participants described themselves as South Africans. More than 23 percent viewed themselves primarily as Africans, 13.4 percent as black, coloured, white or Indian, and 17 percent viewed themselves ethnically, for example as Afrikaners, Zulus or Xhosas. Another survey conducted amongst white South Africans during 1992 (Van Nieuwkerk and Du Pisani, 1992) found that whites, and in particular Afrikaans-speaking whites, exhibited a strong distrust of black motives. The researchers concluded that this high level of distrust (69 percent of the survey sample) "reflects the degree of alienation and polarisation in the country" (p. 12). They noted further that white South Africans had apparently not come to terms with the fact that the future of Southern Africa lay in more co-operation and not less.

The project of building a South African nation would seem a formidable, if not impossible enterprise under such circumstances. Indeed, it was proposed that the "myth of nation-building" (Degenaar, 1992 p. 15) be abandoned and that energy be concentrated instead on the creation of a democratic constitution and culture. Degenaar (1992) suggested this process would be aided by the development of common projects to tackle universally agreed upon problems related to political, social and economic injustices. But whilst pragmatic issues of this sort featured prominently in contemporary political rhetoric, the objective of nation-building, especially in Nationalist government circles, was overtly rated as a priority (see, for example, De Klerk, December 31, 1993; FW: Main task, November 11, 1993; Ramaphosa, May 16, 1993; Mandela, 1991; Harare Declaration, 1991).

1 Terms such as black, white and coloured remain in common usage in talk of group identities in South Africa. Their use in this thesis does not imply acceptance of the reality of such categories except as constructions within a particular socio-political context.
It is evident then that this transitional period was one of active national construction in political circles and, as such, this arena provides an opportunity for research into the dynamics and process of the construction of national identity. More specifically it provides the opportunity for research into how the self-proclaimed "new Nationalists" (De Klerk, February 3, 1994) proceed to construct a "new" South African identity out of their earlier multinational project. In addition, while for political leaders, whether they represented the forces of unification or conservative separatism, the concept was (and indeed still is) an important one in the future development of South Africa, it is evident that, as social scientists, our understanding of the concept is underdeveloped (McAllister cited in Ethnicity and nationalism, January, 1993).  

**Research question and aims of the project**

For a number of reasons, the political rhetoric, argument and debate around the building of a new South African nation provide an important data source for research into this process:

- It will be argued that identity is constructed in and through language or discourse (Davies and Harré, 1990; Sherrard, 1991; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Martin, 1993).

- Political discourse, specifically, provides a primary context within which the construction of national-identity occurs. In this view it becomes crucial to consider the discourse of the governing body whose position in power permits control or influence over the public media and the content of educational syllabi and the promotion of specific versions of

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2 For example, a conference on "Ethnicity, Identity and Nationalism in South Africa: Comparative Perspectives" was held in Grahamstown in April, 1993.
identity (the former National government’s domination of the South African Broadcasting Corporation and its project of “Christian National Education” provide examples of the exercise of such influence).

- In a broader sense, the analysis of language (or discourse) provides an important method of studying social change (Fairclough, 1992). It follows then that an analysis of the ways in which contemporary political language usage shifts and changes in the “building” of a nation may provide useful insights into the process of individual and group identity formation.

Research Question

In seeking to explore and understand how national identity is constructed in contemporary South Africa, this thesis will aim to address the question:

- How was the new South African national identity constructed in right-wing political discourse?

This question will be investigated through an analysis of speeches and interviews given by F.W. De Klerk in his capacity as National Party leader and (for the period under analysis) State President. De Klerk’s landmark presidential address to parliament of 1990 as well as his subsequent addresses of 1991, 1992 and 1993 will provide the core texts for analysis. The rationale for selecting these speeches is that they provide important signposts in the

3 The report of the European Community’s Broadcast Monitoring Project released in January, 1994 (SABC backs NP, January 3, 1994, p.4) found that despite changes and claimed attempts at impartiality, the SABC “continued to show a bias in favour of the National Party and the government and still perpetuated[d] old-style myths and prejudices”.

Nationalist government's progress towards the construction of a new identity. Other key speeches, interviews and party documents will also be drawn on in the process of analysis.

As part of this process, and in keeping with the argument introduced above that identity is a discursively constructed entity, this study will examine a number of factors. It will provide an analysis of the discursive practices and interpretative resources implicated in the construction of national identity. It will also consider what functions particular constructions fulfil as well as their social and political consequences. These factors will be interpreted within their historical context and relations of power.

The research question and analytical aims introduce a number of terms (discourse, resources, national identity, new and right-wing) the meanings of which will be discussed in the pertinent sections to follow. It is appropriate, however, to explain my use of new and right-wing at this point.

For essentially practical purposes it is useful to place a time limit around the concept of a new national identity. Since national identity is a dynamic entity and the process of construction a continuing one, any such limit is fixed arbitrarily. For the purposes of this study, I shall take former State President F. W. De Klerk's February 2, 1990 historic parliamentary address to mark the beginning of a "new" era. It was during this speech that De Klerk announced the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and a number of other organisations. He also announced the release of certain political prisoners notable among whom was Nelson

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4 A year later, in his parliamentary address of February 1, 1991, De Klerk himself claimed: "The initiatives of the past year have prepared the way for a new South Africa" (Hansard, 1991, Vol. 23, p. 3). Also, in the "white referendum" held on March 17, 1992, voters were asked to answer yes or no to the question: Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State President began on 2 February 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?"
Mandela, now President of South Africa. Moreover, he committed his government to the negotiation of a democratic dispensation, a “new South Africa” (Hansard, 1990, vol. 16, p. 3). The period of analysis ends in April, 1994 when the first full democratic elections were held and a new government took office.

*Right-wing* here refers primarily to the National Party. The focus of this project is essentially on the “new Nationalists” (De Klerk, February 3, 1994) that is those members of the National Party, in particular F.W. De Klerk, who argue for reform and the creation of a new South Africa. But, for comparative purposes, it will also draw on the rhetoric of earlier Nationalist speakers and conservative speakers of the far-right.

The rationale for selecting the discourse of this group for analysis is that the right-wing, and in particular the National Party, dominated the political sphere for 45 years. The National Party qua government and authors of the apartheid ideology, during this period, attempted to forge a particular version of South African national identity based in that ideology. The party's attempts at reconstructing a national identity seen in relation to their own historical constructions, and in relation to conservative resistance at the time, thus provide an ideal investigative arena within the frame of the research question above.

The focus on right-wing rhetoric should not be seen as a dismissal of the role in the construction of a new South Africa played by more liberally oriented parties such as the Democratic Party (DP) or the organisations which broadly make up the liberation movement. Without the struggle waged by the latter groups in particular it is unlikely that the construction of a new South Africa would be taking place at all. It is simply that the right-wing discourse provides ideal data and it is necessary, for purely practical reasons, in a study of this nature, to limit the volume of material for analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).
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However, given that right-wing argument or rhetoric may well be constructed to counter actual or anticipated arguments from oppositional bodies (Billig, 1987) it will be necessary to refer, for example, to ANC discourse in certain instances.

Aims and Objectives

It is appropriate at this point to make a number general observations with regard to the aims and objectives of this thesis. Henri Tajfel (1969; 1978) pointed out that a complete study of national identity must necessarily embrace a number of disciplines and cannot be covered in a single research project. Hence, this study cannot, and does not, claim to provide an exhaustive treatment of national identity. As a study of discourse the approach adopted in this thesis is social psychological: it is concerned with contributing to an understanding of how an important part of individual identity is constructed in the social domain. It is hoped, as a broad objective, that this analysis of the nation-building discourse of political leaders will provide an adjunct to research in other disciplines and contribute to the overall understanding of the phenomenon.

It is also important to note two aspects of what this thesis does not aim to do or suggest. Firstly, it is not the aim of this thesis to expose some deception or illogicality in political discourse. Political manipulations or doublespeak are in any event apparent to many people and are not the sole province of the discourse analyst (see, for example a newspaper article by Uys (1992, September 18) which reports on De Klerk’s tactics of weaving, contortions, and apparent contradictions). Further, I do not wish to suggest that the interpretations presented

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5 The universality of national identity is generally assumed in the literature (see Billig 1996; Hogg, 1992; Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). It is conceivable, however, that for some individuals or groups the concept has little or no meaning and is not significant in the construction of their identity. In poststructuralist terms, individuals differ in terms of their power, capacity or willingness to position themselves (or be positioned) in a discursive practice (Harré and Van Langenhove, 1991).
here are the only possible interpretations of contemporary political discourse. Others views are possible depending on the data analysed and the position adopted by the analyst. (As an aside, see, for example, Craig's (1992, p. 62) identification of several “De Klerks” in the discourse of political actors whom she interviewed).

Secondly, I do not wish to suggest that this study will uncover some static entity. National identity is a fluid, flexible phenomenon in a continuous state of construction and the findings of this thesis should be read within the social-historical context of the period under analysis. In this respect, I do not aim to discover South African “national characteristics” (see, for example Peabody, 1985) in the sense of relatively enduring personality and cultural traits supposedly typical of a nation. Such a concept may well be viewed as “antiquated” (Brewer, 1991, p. 243).

The perspective and arguments suggested above will be developed in the following sections and chapters. As a starting point, the discourses of some prominent meanings and definitions of the concept nation itself will be reviewed in the next chapter. In Chapters Three and Four psychological approaches to national identity will be examined, the latter chapter focusing on social cognitive theories and the work of Social Identity theorists in particular. Chapter Five reviews the limited psychological research into national identity, both locally and internationally. Chapter Six considers identity in the postmodern perspective leading, in Chapter Seven to an argument for a discourse analysis approach to national identity. Chapter Eight develops a discourse analysis “method” with which to approach the process of national identity construction in political discourse. Chapter Nine, begins the analytic process by providing an historical overview of the discourses of national identity in South Africa.

* This analysis is itself open to the sorts of interpretations which may be made of the data presented here.
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Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve provide a discursive analysis of identity construction in political discourse. The work concludes in Chapter Thirteen with a discussion of the analytical process and conclusions which may be reached.
CHAPTER TWO

DISCOURSES OF DEFINITIONS OF NATION

We know what [a nation] is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly explain or define it. Walter Bagehot (cited in Connor, 1978)

The first step toward understanding the concept of national identity is to provide some content to the idea of ‘nation’ itself. In this section I shall consider some of the more prominent discourses of meanings and definitions of the term contributed by writers in the fields of history, political science and sociology in their attempts to answer the question: What is a nation? Much of this work focuses on the European formulation of nation. Yet it remains relevant to the purposes of this thesis in that it is the European model which developed in Africa during and following the colonialist period and which endures here to the present day (Davidson, 1992).

The definitions of nation to be found in the literature are both numerous and varied, an indication of the difficulties involved in determining a priori what constitutes the entity. Many argue that, despite the unquestioned acceptance of its widespread, though not universal, presence in modern times, the (or a) nation is not satisfactorily definable in either an objective or subjective sense (Dunn, 1987; Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Moodie, 1975; Isaacs, 1975; No Sizwe, 1979). Indeed, there appears to be no satisfactory criterion for distinguishing a nation from other forms of large human groupings a priori (Hobsbawm, 1990). Where there is unanimity among researchers, whatever their particular discipline, it is in describing the concept as complex, unstable and elusive (Tajfel, 1969; Smith, 1988; 1991), if not plainly “absurd and contradictory” (Smith, 1991, p. 17). It is fruitful, nevertheless, in gleaning the
meanings attributed to the concept, to consider the discourses which emerge in some of the many proposed definitions.

**Essentialist and constructionist discourses**

For the purposes of this thesis, I shall group definitions broadly into two approaches, the objective and the subjective; and, within this framework, emphasise two emergent discourses which I have loosely labelled essentialism and constructionism. To reduce the number of definitions to a manageable but representative sample, I shall, to a large extent, follow the selective criteria adopted by Degenaar (1992) and No Sizwe (1979).

A perusal of the literature suggests two, sometimes intertwined, temporal approaches to understanding the nation. In one view the nation is seen as 'ancient', and in the other as 'modern'. The former understanding informs the essentialist discourse, the roots of which are to be found in the earliest meanings of the word nation.

The *Oxford English Dictionary, (2nd ed.)* (OED) shows that the word is derived from the past participle of the Latin verb *nasci* meaning "to be born". From *nasci* stems the noun *nationem* meaning "breed, stock or race". The OED notes that it is in this sense that the word was first taken up in the English language around the year 1300. In this, its pristine sense, then, nation refers to a group of people united by common descent or ancestry, that is, by blood. It is a sense promoted by proponents of the 'primordialist' approach to nation, an approach that takes as 'natural' or "inherent" (Tajfel, 1969, p. 146) certain fundamental divisions and characteristics of humanity, such as race, religion, language and territory (Smith, 1988; 1992). The primordialist approach does not enjoy prominence in contemporary literature (Smith, 1988) though it is prevalent in the work of sociobiologists (see for example Van den Berghe,
1978; 1987). Nonetheless it is an approach which enjoys wide, popular appeal and is
frequently mobilised in nationalist rhetoric (Smith, 1988). In discussing the definitions which
follow, I shall use the label essentialist to cover both the primordialist approach as well as
approaches which posit as necessary to national development some preexistent 'ethnic' entity.

In contrast to the essentialist view, most contemporary writers (see for example Hobsbawm,
1990; Anderson, 1983) see the nation as a peculiarly modern and political entity. The
"modernisation paradigm" (Smith, 1988, p. 3) suggests that the nation is neither a natural nor
an ancient concept. Adherents, often described in the literature as “instrumentalists”¹, posit
that the entity is a construct emerging specifically in the modern historic context of the late
18th century appearance of nationalism. In this view, it is nationalism which invents nations
conceptually and substantially (Smith, 1988).

Nationalism² itself, it is argued, arises in response to the demands of modernity and a number
of different explanations have been raised in support of this thesis. Smith (1988, p. 4) notes
that with the advent of science and modernity the nation comes to replace, as he puts it, “old
faiths with their assurance of other-worldly immortality”. Political theorists suggest
nationalism comes into being as a new ideology of liberation of the masses (Ajayi, 1993)
establishing peoples rather than kings as sovereign (see also Anderson, 1983). Nationalism in
this sense becomes an instrument for mobilising the masses to assume control of the state
(Smith, 1988). From a Marxist perspective (for example, Anderson, 1983), nationalism
emerges in the specific context of the demands and needs of the capitalist mode of

¹ The instrumentalist approach, according to Smith (1988, p. 2) regards “cultural attributes and cleavages as
infinitely malleable and subject to manipulation by elites and vested interests”. Cultural groups are thus seen
as 'instruments' of particular economic and political interests.

² It should be noted that where the term nationalism is used, it is intended in the sense of the "creative" process of
nation formation and not of the political ideology of Nationalism although the latter is, of course, related to the
development of national identity (Anderson, 1983).
production. Gellner (1983), on the other hand, proposes that nationalism emerges with the industrialisation of earlier agrarian types of society and the resultant need for large, educated and appropriately skilled populations. The modernisation paradigm is thus marked both by a divergence of opinions as to the origins of the nation and by unanimity as to its modern and constructed nature.

Objective approaches

The discourses of essentialism and constructionism I have sketched above represent opposite theoretical poles in the attempt to define nation and emerge in various forms in the definitions which follow. A useful starting point is the well-known attempt by Josef Stalin (cited in No Sizwe, 1979, p. 181) to provide an objective, a priori definition:

A nation is a historically evolved stable community of people based on community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.

The essentialist discourse in Stalin’s approach is clear. In his view a nation has its genesis in a pre-existing ethnic group marked by a common language and territory and an homogeneous culture. These elements of the nation are taken as given. Their antiquity is suggested in the notion of historical evolution and their immutability implied in the assumption of stability.

The advantage of this stipulative approach, as Degenaar (1992) points out, is that it provides abstract clarity of the meaning of the term and permits the fixing of specific criteria for inclusion or exclusion. But, No Sizwe (1979) argues, such an approach invites the tendency to search for groups which fit the arbitrary framework of the definition. It is here that Stalin’s approach fails, in that by no means all of the groups which fit the definition may be termed
'nations' at a given time. Hobsbawm (1990, p. 6) points out that groups fitting the definition may have no national aspirations. Alternatively groups who define themselves as 'nations' may not meet the criteria. The problem here, Hobsbawm argues, is that an attempt is being made to fit a new and shifting entity into a framework of "permanence and universality". This issue is also highlighted by Connor (1990, p. 92) who argues that since nation-formation is a process rather than a singular event, there is no precise formula for determining when a 'nation' comes into being. Furthermore, as will be suggested below, criteria such as ethnicity and culture upon which the definition is premised are themselves complex and elusive.

An alternate approach is based in empiricism. This view eschews the notion of a general definition and suggests instead that "differentiated definitions" are necessary. Mnacakanjan (cited in No Sizwe, 1979, p. 166) argues that

the limited scientific value of a general definition is evident not only in the fact that it is incapable of revealing the essence of nations and the laws of their development, but also in the fact that it cannot characterise fully and in a rigorous scientific manner the multiplicity of forms and the peculiarities of the origins and evolution of nations in all their phases of development, and finally, it cannot include all types of nations with their peculiarities under a general concept. In order to achieve this, differentiated definitions of the concept 'nation' are necessary.

The advantage of this objective approach is that it avoids the kinds of limitations and consequences of the abstracted a priori stipulative approach. It admits the possibility of either (or both) the essentialist or constructionist perspectives though Mnacakanjan's wording suggests a tendency toward the former view. However, Degenaar (1992) argues, this view renders general discussion of the topic impossible. Moreover, he points out that the empirical
approach also raises the question of how a nation can be identified scientifically when the nature of what is being sought is unknown at the outset.

A third approach combines the stipulative and empirical approaches and attempts to draw together clusters of recurrent features (No Sizwe, 1979). Sociologist Smith (1988; 1989; 1991), who has written extensively on national identity adopts this approach. Smith (1991, p. 14) suggests that a nation may be defined as

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\text{a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.}
\]

Developing this view Smith (1991) argues that national identity is composed of several interrelated components drawn from other types of collective identity: ethnic, religious, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political. These components signify bonds of solidarity between members of communities united by shared memories, myths and traditions and which may coincide with a state but are different from the purely legal and bureaucratic state form. The concept nation then is seen as a combination, in varying degrees, of two sets of dimensions: civic and territorial, and ethnic and genealogical. Smith (1989, p. 342) emphasises that “the nation is not a once-for-all, all-for-nothing, concept ... nations are ongoing processes”. National identity, he argues, is multidimensional and cannot be reduced to a single element (Smith, 1991). Hence, in Smith’s view, the nation and, by extension, national identity, should be regarded as a process but with certain objectively identifiable components.
Definitions

Smith’s approach draws on an admixture of the essentialist and constructionist discourses. He concedes that nationalism and nation-states[^3] are modern phenomenon as are certain elements of the nation such as citizenship and fixed, often impermeable, territorial boundaries (Smith, 1988). He introduces the more fluid conception of a nation as a “set of processes over time rather than ... fixed ‘essences’” (1991, p. 43). But he also concludes that “[i]f the nation seems in many ways modern, it is also deep-rooted” (1991, p. 69). National identity may be constructed in the context of modernity, but the building blocks and cementing bonds of solidarity are taken from a preexistent ethnic identity.

Although Smith’s approach presents advantages over the two previous perspectives it raises a number of contentious points which warrant further consideration. Notably, the nature and meaning of the recurrent features or components he identifies are controversial. While maintaining that it is fruitful to seek the origins of nations in their prenational ethnic ties, he concedes that the relationship between a modern nation and an ethnic core is “problematic and uncertain” (1991, p. 41). This point is taken up by Zubaida (1989) who challenges the contention that common ethnicity and ethnic solidarity constitute preconditions for national formations. Citing the development of Middle Eastern nations as an example, he shows that cultural and ethnic groups, and “impressions of such solidarity” (p. 337), are themselves the products of particular social, economic and political processes. Further, he points out, they may be a product of the process of national development. Nations, he stresses, are “not determined by their pre-modern history” (p. 337) (emphasis in original).

[^3]: Nation-state is a term which is often used indiscriminately to describe all states (Connor, 1978 p. 382). It is a term which is intended to describe the nationalist objective of a territorial-political unit whose borders coincide or nearly coincide with the territorial distribution of a national group. As such the nation-state is a rare entity (Smith, 1988). The nation-states of present-day Africa provide clear examples of the absence of such coterminality (Davidson, 1992).
The process of national construction suggested by Zubaida is apparent in Davidson’s (1992) study of nation-statism in Africa showing how nations may be constructed across or with disregard for earlier ethnic divisions. He argues that African nation-states each developed, along European lines, from earlier arbitrary colonial divisions, “as though their peoples possessed no history of their own” (p. 10). African nationalists adopted nation-statism as an escape from colonialism and in their quest to develop colonial territories into national territories, they discarded earlier ethnic divisions labelling them as “tribalism” and thus “retrogressive” (p. 99). In addition Davidson (pp 100-101) provides evidence that new and larger “tribes” were created (both to suit the administrative purposes of the colonialists and later the liberation and political purposes of the nationalists) and formed the bases for the developing nations. He notes (p. 100):

Segments or even substantial communities in more or less closely related communities, though historically separate and distinct from one another, now declared themselves a single people; and new tribes ... rose fully formed from the mysterious workings of “tradition”.

Similarly, in the South African context, Maré (1992) has shown how, for political reasons, the Inkatha Freedom Party and its leader Mangosotho Buthelezi have manipulated the notion of Zulu ethnicity in promoting the idea of a ‘Zulu nation’. Buthelezi, it is argued, has manipulated history to foster Zulu ethnicity and present the Zulu nation as having existed in continuity “since time immemorial” (p. 64). Yet a study by Hamilton and Wright (1993) suggests that a specific Zulu ethnic identity may not of taken hold until after 1920 and that its establishment around that time may be explained, in part, as being the result of “ideological manipulations by elites and intellectuals” (p. 16)
Definitions

The notion of ethnic bases for nations is further problematised by writers who have considered other components put forward by Smith such as culture, tradition, common memories and a shared past or history. Gellner (1983, p. 7) has approached the complex issue of the role of culture in the development of national identity. He proposes that

two men (sic) are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.

Culture here refers not to prenational “low” or “folk” cultures (p. 57) but rather an homogeneous culture which comes into being as a result of modern industrialisation and which transcends earlier cultural forms. Nations are brought into being when “general social conditions make for standardised, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures” (p. 55) and attain political legitimacy. For Gellner, a nation is defined in terms of the convergence of culture and political power in the context of industrialisation. The homogeneous “high” culture to which he refers is “imposed” (p. 57) on society with the objective of building a nation. The culture which is mobilised by nationalist movements in this process may well draw on prenational cultural resources but, Gellner emphasises, in a selective, transformative and creative way. In this view, culture is more appropriately seen as a resource which may be drawn on in the construction of a nation rather than the property of a particular group or a self-contained whole (Thornton, 1988).

In a later publication, Gellner (1987, p. 6) also raises the question of common memories and shared past which Smith highlights. He notes that while collective remembering may play a role in the formation of a nation so too does collective forgetting. He argues that “a shared amnesia, a collective forgetfulness is at least as essential for the emergence of ... a nation”. He
supports nineteenth century nationalist Ernest Renan's\(^4\) view that "perhaps \textit{the} crucial trait of a nation \[is\] the anonymity of membership" (p. 6) (emphasis in original). In this view members of a nation may identify with the collectivity without knowing its other members (see also Anderson, 1983 below) or identifying to any great extent with its sub-groups. Further any connections with groups which preceded the emergence of the nation are “rare, tenuous, suspect, irrelevant” (p. 6).

A further challenge to the notion of continuity with the past comes from Hobsbawm (1983). Smith (1989, pp. 355 & 361) speaks of the “rediscovery” or “reconstruction” of an ethnic past in the building of a nation. Hobsbawm (1983, p. 14), takes this constructive process a step further and argues in terms of the “invention” or “construction” of the components which go to make up the entity. He posits that “traditions”, or for that matter “historic continuity”, which appear or which purport to have ancient roots are often of relatively recent origin and may be “invented” (pp. 1-7).

In this view “traditional” practices and history attributed to a nation may be the consequence of purposeful selection, manipulation, creation (as in the invention of new symbols) and sometimes “forgery” (p. 7). Anderson (1983, p. 15) has pointed out that this formulation tends to overemphasise the falsity of the nationalist enterprise implying that there are other, “‘true’ communities” which might be more favourably compared with nations. For Anderson, nations are to be distinguished not so much by their falsity or genuineness, but by the “style in which they are imagined” (see below). Nonetheless, the important point here is that nationalist movements may “invent” history (in either a positive or a negative sense) in the

\(4\) Ernest Renan defined a nation as: “a community united by common error with regard to its origins, and by common aversion with regard to its neighbours” (cited in Dunn, 1987).
Definitions

development of a particular ideology within which certain group identifications, structures and actions are legitimated.

A final challenge to Smith's approach is found in the work of No Sizwe (1979, p. 167). No Sizwe adopts a specifically class-oriented position and treats the concept of nation as an ideological or political construct. He specifically dismisses Smith's stipulative/empirical proposal as providing no improvement on the other attempts at definition, and argues that the reason for such failure is that "the problem is not one of definitions" (emphasis in original). He proposes instead that

the concept 'nation' refers to a category of phenomena that encompass both delimitable quantitative elements as well as elements of consciousness. Since both sets of elements can vary without any apparent symmetry, definition - setting limits to the content (meaning) of such a category - becomes an insoluble theoretical problem. The decision as to whether or not one is confronted with a nation cannot be made merely on general grounds. It is eminently a historical question, a question that requires an examination of the specific set of circumstances (emphases in original).

No Sizwe (1979, p. 167) argues that "since historical interpretation proceeds from the historian's class standpoint", such an analysis is conditional upon asking the prior question of what the class position is of the person who poses and answers the question: "What is the nation?" An analysis of class relations is thus central to this perspective. Indeed, No Sizwe makes the general statement that "all that one can say about nations in the modern world is that they will consist of antagonistic or potentially antagonistic classes" (p. 167). How and where the territorial boundaries of a nation are set is a historical question which is decided in
the course of class struggle within or between social formations (Alexander 1986). During such struggle each class attempts to become the dominant class in the social formation and so defines the nation in terms of its own interests. Hence definitions of nation will vary according to class ideology. Further, the leading class of a nation “necessarily and ‘naturally’” premises its definition on the particular historical development of the peoples involved lending a unique character to each national movement (Alexander, 1986, p. 68).

In the South African context the dominant class has, historically, developed two theories of nationality: the separatist, multinational version of the National Party and the “pluralist doctrine” (No Sizwe, 1979, p. 168) of the liberals. In the view of No Sizwe (1979) / Alexander (1986), in contemporary South Africa the task of redefining and building the nation, of abolishing earlier formulations falls upon the shoulders of the black working class and the “radical sectors” of the middle class. The nation, he argues (1979, p. 178) “consists of all the people who are prepared to throw off the yoke of capitalist exploitation and racist oppression”. What their alternative version of the South African nation will be, becomes a matter of practical politics. But, Alexander (1986, p. 72) argues, “the choice is always materially determined”.

In sum this approach suggests that the form which the development of a nation takes is determined by particular class forces or interests under developing relations, and material conditions, of production (No Sizwe, 1979). Generally, in this view, nations are seen as developing during the establishment of capitalistic relations of production (Alexander, 1986).

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5 No Sizwe is a pseudonym adopted by Alexander in earlier work
Subjective approaches

Alexander (1986) like many other authors (see for example Miles, 1987 & 1989; Hobsbawm, 1990; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) draws on Anderson’s (1983) approach to the nation as an ideological and political construct. It is useful therefore to consider Anderson’s widely cited definition. He (1983, p. 15-16) suggests that a nation is:

an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.

It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.

The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them ... has finite, if elastic, boundaries beyond which lie other nations.

It is imagined as *sovereign* because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.

Finally, it is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship (emphases in original).

At first glance this definition may be taken to construe nation reductively as a primarily subjective psychological experience. However, here and later in Anderson’s (1983) volume, it becomes clear that nation is not simply an imaginary entity, but it has a practical existence. It
is a social reality embedded in material relations of production and usually physically located within territorial boundaries. Further, Anderson, like Degenaar (1992), introduces the central role of language\(^6\) in the constitution of national identity and thereby asserts the socially constructed nature of the nation. He points out that “from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood, and that one could be ‘invited into’ the imagined community” (p. 133).

Other subjective definitions have been formulated offering the possibility of an alternative to the plainly problematic objective definitions. Consider, for example, what Henri Tajfel (1981, p. 229) suggested was the “definition to end all definitions”, namely Emerson’s view that

The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the final statement as well.

Or Moodie’s (1975, p. 40) contention that

Nations are those bodies of people whose members believe them to be nations.

Or Gellner’s (1983, p. 53) proposition that nations are

groups which \textit{will} themselves to persist as communities” (emphasis added).

A general observation which may be made about this type of definition is that, whilst it avoids the pitfalls of the objective approach, it provides only an \textit{a posteriori} indication of what a nation is. This position raises other potential difficulties. Anderson’s definition, for

\(^{6}\) Anderson argues that the spread of nationalism is linked to the development of the printing press in Europe and the consequent possibility of widespread dissemination of ideas.
example, begs the question: Whose "imagination"? Do all individuals or groups within the "boundaries" of a nation imagine the entity in the same way, if at all, or are there differing and conflicting versions in the "minds of each"? Sharp (1988 p. 80) suggests that the image or "idea" of a nation may be held by only some people, or it may be shared by many. The answers to these questions, then, will vary from context to context. There is an added proviso for the researcher in this respect: it cannot be assumed that a nation exists when only some of its members (for example political leaders or writers) imagine, believe or assert its existence (Sharp, 1988; Hobsbawm, 1990).

Hobsbawm (1990, p. 8) warns of the potential danger implicit in the subjective approach of "extremes of voluntarism" which suggests that all that is necessary to create a nation is the will, on the part of a sufficient number of people, to be one. Nation-building in this perspective is simply consciousness-raising disregarding the materiality of nations.

Indeed, expressions of the cognitive and emotional experiences of national identification say little of how or why people come to feel or believe that they are a nation. Harré (1989, p. 22), in a different context, bluntly puts forward the proposal that: "what [people] believe they are is what the best authorities tell them they are". Dunn (1987, p.13) in his definition of a nation more subtly suggests a similar process. He claims that

nation is the social group whose members, being persuaded correctly or incorrectly of their common ancestry and destiny, hold to that common idea of identity.

While these two statements say little of the psychological process of national identification, they raise the issue of top-down "persuasion" by groups in "authority". The implication that the subjective experience of national belonging cannot be seen as occurring in a social or
ideological vacuum is an important one. In this regard, Wetherell and Potter (1992) note that the strength of Anderson’s “imagined community” lies in its challenge to the view that “acts of categorisation” are straightforward descriptions of an objective reality (p. 147). Further, they observe, his perspective raises important questions for social psychology around the construction of subjectivity and the “manipulation of identity”.

**Conclusion**

It is evident from the aforementioned that defining the concept nation is no straightforward task. The topic is informed by different discourses and approaches to the meaning and origin of the entity. Theorists from different disciplinary backgrounds adopt different positions. There does, however, appear to be general agreement amongst contemporary writers around two points:

- Nations are not “natural” or given entities, but social constructions (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996).

- Nations are a comparatively modern phenomenon.

Whilst there is little dispute around these points, there remains, as I have shown above, considerable controversy around the components or factors which go to make up the modern nation. All that might generally be said is that the nation has a political, psychological and ideological form (Billig, 1996).

These conclusions have ramifications for research into national identity. Following Anderson’s (1983) widely accepted view that nations are “imagined communities”, a nation cannot be analysed independently of those who “imagine”, “believe” or “feel” that they are a
nation. It follows that national identity cannot be analysed outside the conditions of its
collection, the social practices through which it is produced and reproduced (Hopkins &
Reicher, 1996). As noted in the previous chapter, this thesis aims to consider the ways in
which South African national identity is produced or reproduced in the political discourse of
the “new” right. To this end it is necessary to consider a theoretical and methodological
approach which takes into account the situated constructive process of building a national
identity, providing for its political, psychological and ideological form. The next chapter
begins the discussion of psychological theories and their application to national identity.
CHAPTER THREE

NATIONAL IDENTITY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

There is no such thing as a psychological 'theory of nationalism', and perhaps there cannot be. Henri Tajfel (1969, p. 156)

However its origin, age and form may be construed, the nation is a psychological reality, a component of identity, for most human beings today (Scheibe, 1983). In this chapter and the next I shall consider some of the main contributions of psychological theory to understanding the psychology of national identity. Chapter three outlines the broad metatheories informing approaches to national identity and discusses individualist and some central early social theoretical approaches. Chapter four considers the more recent social cognitive theories.

An important observation to be made at the outset is that there is no psychological theory of national identity (Tajfel 1969). Perhaps, as Tajfel (1969) suggested, there can be no single theory and that all theories may contribute to an understanding of the concept to some extent. A thorough coverage of the topic then invites a review of all appropriate literature. But psychological theories and definitions of identity are so numerous and diverse that an exhaustive coverage is not only a problematic but also a potentially wasteful exercise (Breakwell, 1986). To provide a manageable framework, this section will approach the topic from the perspective of social psychology and will locate the issue of national identity in the context of a more general consideration of social identity. Further, since the sub-discipline of social psychology is itself an expansive and widely diverse field (Foster, 1991a) a complete coverage will not be attempted. Rather, I shall aim to present an historical overview of
approaches to social identity. To this end, I have drawn on the extensive review framework contained in a number of recent social psychological texts concerned with the development of theories of social identity (Hogg, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Foster & Louw-Potgieter, 1991; Abrams & Hogg, 1990b; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Billig, 1976).

Psychological Metatheory

In broad terms there are two, apparently oppositional metatheoretical discourses which provide the framework within which the various social psychological explanations of social identity and social group processes have developed, each construing the psychological nature of the national identity in a fundamentally different manner. These discourses may be labelled the “individualist” and the “social” and, as such, they reflect the apparent problem of individual-social duality which has dogged social psychological metatheory (Parker, 1989; Hogg 1992) and which confronts the national identity theorist.

Doise (1986; Lorenczi-Cioldi & Doise, 1990) has suggested that within social psychology this duality may be further divided into four “levels of explanation”: the intra and the inter-individual explanations and the positional and ideological explanations. For purposes of this general review, I shall discuss the former pair under the heading of “individual” discourse and the latter under “social” discourse.

Individual Discourse

The individualist discourse is dominant in psychology. This position reflects the dominance, in most Western nations, of an ideology of self-contained individualism that
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serves particular interests and social arrangements and practices (Hogg, 1992; Sampson, 1981). It is a discourse which is thus likely to exert a powerful influence in the construction of versions of national identity within psychological as well as socio-political discourses.

The discourse asserts that the individual, a pre-given, rational and unitary entity, is the sole psychological reality (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984). Taking its narrowest level of explanation, this approach is limited to the study of intra-individual processes which, it is argued, account for the development of social groups and identity. At this level, attempts may be made to account for the social phenomenon of national identity in terms of pre-social, universal processes assumed to be inherent in all individuals (Billig, 1976; see also primordialist accounts in Chapter 2) without regard for the fact that individuals are “embedded in normative, socio-cultural contexts” (Foster, 1991a, p. 13). At the wider, inter-individual or interpersonal level, the approach seeks to account for the origins of such social phenomena in the relations between individuals rather than purely within them. Some explanations, in particular those of psychoanalytic orientation, are derived from interactions between the intra- and inter-individual levels (Billig, 1976). It should be emphasised, however, that the individualist discourse does not exclude the social domain. Rather, it views it simply as the context within which individual psychological development occurs. In effect, the social domain is seen as the product of intra- and inter-individual dynamics.

Within social psychology the individualist discourse has given rise to a number of theoretical perspectives on the development and nature of social groups and identity which I shall discuss briefly. There are numerous individualist definitions of what constitutes a social group (see for example Johnson and Johnson (1987) who provide a list of seven different emphases), but
the frequently cited definition of Allport (1924) and the lesser known view of Carl Jung, provide an adequate illustration of the approach.

Allport (1924, p. 4) approaches the issue of group psychology from the position of a classic behaviourist and experimentalist¹ (Turner et al, 1987). He dismisses the concept of a group as a “fallacy” arguing that

There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals. Social psychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology of the individual; it is a part of the psychology of the individual, whose behaviour it studies in relation to that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows. His biological needs are the ends toward which his social behaviour is a developed means. Within his organism are provided all the mechanisms by which social behaviour is explained. There is likewise no consciousness except that belonging to individuals. Psychology in all its branches is a science of the individual. To extend its principles to larger units is to destroy their meaning (italics in original).

From this position Allport (1924, p. 388) argues that a nation should not be considered a “psychological entity” or as possessing a ‘collective’ or a ‘group’ mind (see LeBon and McDougall below). National consciousness, in his view, is the consciousness which the individual has of his or her nation as a whole and consists of his or her image of its population, common traditions, shared interests and ideals. This learned “impression of universality” in combination with the early socialisation of patriotic attitudes as well as the

¹ The earlier works covered in the next section adopted observational or ethnographic methods
process of social influence Allport termed ‘social facilitation’ provides nationalism with a “supreme power over the behaviour of the individual”.

A similarly reductionistic discourse is to be found in a wholly different theoretical framework: the analytical psychology of Carl Jung. In a recent study Samuels (1992) finds that Jung regarded the nation as a solely psychological phenomenon and was concerned with what he termed the “psychology of the nation”. In his various considerations of the concept Jung asserted that “nations are made up of individuals”, that the “psychology of the individual is reflected in the psychology of the nation” and that the nation “is nothing but inborn character” (Jung cited in Samuels, 1992, pp. 21-25).

Of more general concern to the present study is the powerful influence of the individualistic discourse on social psychology which emerges in the latter’s bias towards cognitivism: an emphasis on the study of individual cognitive processes (Hogg, 1992; Foster, 1991a). A dominant perspective within social psychology has been “social cognition” (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This perspective is premised in cognitive psychology and approaches social issues in terms of intra-individual structures and processes such as schema, prototypes, stereotypes, judgmental heuristics, perception, and categorisation (Hogg, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Social cognitivists argue that such structures and processes necessarily serve the function of organising and ordering an otherwise overwhelmingly diverse social environment (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Their model is one which “pits the self-contained individual against the complexities of the real environment” (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 41). This isolated individual, it is argued, simplifies the world by categorising (a fundamentally important process in this theory) and labelling perceptual information (Billig, 1985; 1987; 1989a).
One way in which the individual is seen to make sense of the social world is in the cognitive categorisation of individuals into groups. Social cognitivist Hamilton (cited in Billig, 1985, p. 81) claims that "it seems almost inherent in us to lump others we encounter into social groups". It is difficult, however, to see how this "perceptual model" can account for categorisation in terms of a nation, most of the members of which the individual will never "encounter" or experience perceptually (Billig, 1985, pp. 84 & 85; Anderson, 1983). The central reason for this failing lies in the fact that the social cognition model of human beings and its major concerns are asocial (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). The model neglects the embeddedness of individuals and cognitive processes in the broad social domain and the effects of the latter on the nature and content of cognitive processes (Van Dijk, 1988). Indeed, it forms part of a social psychology only insofar as it is concerned with the "perception and judgement of social objects - people" (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 87). There is, Hogg (1992, p. 52) notes, "little about 'feelings' or groups". Nonetheless, social cognition has strongly influenced the development of European social psychologists such as Henri Tajfel and John Turner whose theories of social identity will be considered in the next chapter.

Given these approaches the question arises as to how the individualist discourse accounts for the ways in which nations provide individuals with identity and how it explains national cohesiveness. By the latter question I mean: how does this discourse explain the sense of belonging, the bond which holds members of a large group together and which is deemed so vital to developing a national identity (see chapter two)? The short answer is that it does not. The approach largely fails to consider how groups are implicated in the development of individual identity. More importantly, the approach has difficulty in dealing with social entities on the scale of nations and, traditionally, has not even considered such phenomena to constitute groups (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). In this discourse, a group is reduced to a small
collection of individuals in face-to-face interaction (Hogg and McGarty, 1990). Social cohesiveness, in this view, is understood at an interpersonal level as an affective process in terms of mutual attraction, trust and involvement between individuals (Hogg 1992; Hogg and McGarty, 1990; Turner, Sachdev and Hogg, 1983). The "Social Cohesion Model" as this approach to group cohesiveness is labelled (Hogg, 1992; Turner, 1982) explains this process in terms of a physical, molecular metaphor. The group is viewed as a molecule in which atoms are individuals and "interatomic forces" are interpersonal attraction (Hogg, 1992, p. 25). These "interatomic forces" emerge as a result of a number of factors including: the cooperative interdependence of the members of a group for the mutual satisfaction of their needs and goals, attitude similarity, physical proximity, shared threat, being liked by other members, attractive personality traits and success on group tasks (Hogg, 1992, p. 25; Turner et al, 1983; Hogg and McGarty, 1990). In sum the model suggests that individuals form a group to the extent that they have needs which may be mutually satisfied and in this respect they are dependent on each other (Hogg, 1992). A product of this form of interpersonal interaction is a sense of identity as group members (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).

This concept of group cohesiveness has been criticised for a number of reasons (see Hogg, 1992; Hogg and Abrams, 1988). Two are of importance here. Firstly, while interpersonal attraction may have explanatory relevance at the level of a small-group it is difficult to see how it may be applied to a nation in which interaction between all its members is impossible. Secondly, the approach gives no account of how shared goals and other similarities between individuals, which, it is claimed, form the basis for group cohesiveness, originate. No consideration is given to the argument that such inter-individual similarities and consequent bonds may be the product of group memberships and not simply the effect of individual needs (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).
Psychological theory

It is evident that the reductionism of the individualist approach, at both the intra and inter-individual levels, renders it an inappropriate basis for understanding large-scale group processes such as national identification. It evidently does not take into account the political and ideological forms of a nation within which the psychological process of national identification tasks place. Nor does it consider the constructed nature of the “category” nation.

The individualist approach has been attacked by social psychologists concerned with developing a socially relevant psychology, a psychology which confronts social issues and thus recognises the social and political context of human development and behaviour. Turner and Oakes (1986, p. 238), for example, adopt a strong anti-individualist stance claiming, bluntly, that “individualism is not a plausible doctrine and, in our judgement, has long since been refuted”. Their main theoretical objections to the approach are summarised by Turner and Giles (1981, pp. 31-32) as follows:

1. it denies the psychological reality of the group.

2. it misconstrues group processes as in opposition to individual reality.

3. it disconnects the individual from social reality and produces theories difficult to contextualize in society.

However, since Allport’s initiative, a great many social psychologists, particularly in the United States, have adopted his reductionist perspective. Indeed, as already mentioned, the individualistic discourse is probably, whether explicit or implicit, the dominant paradigm in social psychology (Turner & Oakes, 1986). An important counter-approach has, nonetheless, emerged largely within European circles, and will be discussed in the next section.
The "social" discourse attempts to avoid reducing explanations for social phenomena to the level of the individual and instead adopts a metatheory implicating social, political, economical and historical processes and structures in the development of national identity. In contrast with the voluntarism apparent in the individualist discourse, this approach is primarily concerned with the ways in which human subjectivity is determined by such processes and structures. It is more sociological in orientation (Hogg, 1992) taking into account positional (class or gender, for example) as well as ideological levels of explanation (Doise, 1986). I do not aim to consider here sociological approaches to understanding national identity or to put forward a critique of the reductionism implicated in social determinism. Rather, having considered the reductionism of individualist psychology, I wish to consider under the heading of "social" those social psychological approaches which aim to move away from reductionism of any form towards what Hogg (1992, p. 61) describes as "a non-reductionistic social psychology ... a truly social dimension to explanations of human behaviour." In short, those social psychological approaches more appropriate to explaining the psychological-political-ideological process of national identification.

There have been a number of developments in this direction which I shall consider in this section and in the following chapters. In European social psychology social interactionist approaches such as Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981) and Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner 1982, Turner et al, 1987) attempt to integrate both individual and social levels of explanation. Social Constructionist (see Gergen, 1985), cultural (Sampson, 1988; 1985) and postmodern and post-structuralist writers (for example Davies & Harré, 1990; Henriques et al, 1984) seek to transcend the 'problem' by revealing how the individual-social duality is
constructed: a product of historically specific practices of social regulation. Within the latter approach, the centrality of language in the construction of versions of reality and the generation of human subjectivity is emphasised and developed in discourse analytic approaches to social psychology (Parker, 1990a;1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). These critiques have important ramifications for understanding the nature and development of national identity.

In the rest of this chapter and in chapter four I shall consider a number of significant attempts to develop a "social" approach to identity and the ramifications of these attempts for developing an understanding of national identity. In the following section I shall review 'group mind' theories and Freud's group psychology. These early theories have influenced contemporary approaches to national identity. In chapter four, I shall consider the more recent development of cognitive social psychology and contemporary European cognitive-motivational accounts.

Towards a "social" theory

Group Mind Theories

Amongst the earliest attempts at developing a distinct psychological theory of the group are the "group mind" theories. Although rejected by Allport (1924) and other adherents to the individualist discourse, they have, in varying degrees, influenced contemporary thinking in social psychology. I shall consider the basic components of the work of Le Bon and McDougall as well as their understanding of the concept of the nation as a group.
An early and frequently cited analysis of the social group is Le Bon’s (1895) treatment of crowd behaviour which he labels the “psychological law of the mental unity of crowds” (p. 5). Crowd activity, in Le Bon’s view, is characterised by the emergence of a form of group or “collective mind” (p. 2) qualitatively different from the minds of the individuals who compose it. The conscious individual personality is lost, dominated by the emergent primitive irrationality of the unconscious (p. ix). Crowds are driven by emotional and instinctual urges seemingly free of the restraints of civilisation and reason.

Le Bon’s work was strongly influenced by contemporary socio-political unrest, a period of collective protest which he believed would lead to the disintegration of French society (Hogg, 1992) and should be read in that context. It also deals essentially with small group crowd phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is relevant to the study of national identity insofar as he attempts to formulate a psychological theory of the group as distinct from the psychology of the individual and postulates a form of social influence to explain the dynamics of group formation and cohesion (Turner, 1991). Perhaps more importantly, his work has not been without influence in the political arena and in the development of theories of group psychology in the 20th century. His influence is apparent in the work of McDougall (below), in Zimbardo’s study (1969) on the process of ‘deindividuation’ and, significantly, in Freud’s 1921 formulation of a “group psychology” (Freud, 1955a).

Although the term “group mind” is attributed to Le Bon’s work, it was first applied to the idea of a collective mind by McDougall (1939) in his later work on group psychology...
entitled The Group Mind. However, his notion of a collective mind departs radically from that proposed by Le Bon.

McDougal believes that, “only by participation in group life does man become fully man, only so does he rise above the level of the savage” (p. 20). The latter state is only attainable with the development of a collective or group mind characteristic of what he termed “the highly organised group” (p. 48) and exemplified in church, army and “well-developed nations” (p. 49). McDougall proposes that the more organised the group becomes the more complex its psychology and the more developed its collective mind. At a minimum, the preconditions for a collective mental life, he suggests, are: “a common object of mental activity, a common mode of feeling in regard to it, and some degree of reciprocal influence between the members of the group” (p. 23). More specifically at the level of the national mind, he asserts that the “essential condition” is “such mental organisation as will render the group capable of effective group life, of collective deliberation and collective volition” (p. 100) (emphasis added).

But what is the “group mind” McDougall proposes and what are the conditions for its emergence as the “national mind”? McDougall (pp. 49-50) posits five preconditions for its emergence and development:

1. Continuity of existence of the individuals comprising the group and/or specific roles

2. An adequate idea of the group in the minds of its members of its structure, functions, limits and inter-individual relationships: “the self-consciousness of the group mind”.

3. Interaction with other groups thereby promoting a sense of group identity.

4. A body of traditions, customs and habits.
5. Organisation of the group with regard to the differentiation and specialisation of functions.

McDougall proposes “group self-consciousness” as the principal condition in the development of a group’s collective mental life (p. 62), but he insists that the “essential condition of all developed collective life” is what he termed the “group spirit” (p. 66). The latter involves not merely knowledge or awareness of the group but “some sentiment of devotion or attachment” to it (p. 66). Group self-consciousness is necessary but not sufficient for the development of national solidarity. McDougall (1939, p. 164-5) argues that national consciousness cannot develop except in the form of “an idea of strong affective tone, that is to say a sentiment”. National consciousness, he believes, develops as “an extension of the self-regarding sentiment of the individual to the group”. Sentiment, in McDougall’s view, comprises liking, trust, pride, and/or respect (Hogg, 1992).

Informed by Gestalt theory, McDougall argues that “the life of the whole requires for its interpretation laws or principles that cannot be arrived at by the study of the parts alone” (p. xiv). From this premise he attempts to formulate a psychology of groups incorporating a collective level of analysis and to avoid the reductionism of purely individualist approaches. Herein lies the importance of his work. Though labelled a group mind theory, McDougall’s work should be differentiated from the metaphysical notions of Le Bon and, in many respects, placed closer to present day cognitive social psychology (Tajfel, 1969; Turner & Oakes 1986).

Hogg (1992), while recognising his achievement, points out a number of weaknesses in McDougall’s work. Despite his adherence to Gestalt theory he continues to depend on the notion of instinctive emotions in explaining group formation and solidarity. Further, his idea
of a group mind is vague while his principle of social influence termed “primitive sympathy” is not fully developed. Equally, the mechanism whereby group self-consciousness develops is unclear. Lastly, in addition to the points raised by Hogg, McDougall’s theory of national character (defined as “the character of the nation as a collective whole or mind (p. 106)) draws heavily evolutionary theory and the essentialist conception of relatively stable “innate racial difference” (p. 111). Nevertheless, his work grapples with a number of issues, particularly that of the individual-social relationship, which remain of central importance in contemporary theories of social identity and group formation.

**Freud’s Group Psychology**

Freud’s (1955a) “group psychology” is not easily categorised. His theory is therefore introduced at this stage somewhat arbitrarily and largely because his understanding of the nature of groups is taken from the theories of Le Bon and McDougall (Turner et al, 1987). For the purposes of this section, I shall outline the section of his theory concerned with in-group dynamics and which is important for its contribution to the understanding of national identity.

Freud limits his analysis to the smaller group phenomena of the church and the army and does not deal with the issue of national identity per se, though it is clear (see 1955a, p. 70) that his group psychology is also concerned with such large groups. He attempts to explain group dynamics in terms of his psychoanalytic theory. Specifically, he relates the formation of groups to his concept of the Oedipus complex thereby extending an interpersonal level of explanation to the broad social level (Billig, 1976).

In drawing on the Oedipus complex as an explanatory model, he proposes a parallel between the relationship of the child and his (sic) father and the individual and group leader. Hence the
group leader is of critical importance to Freud in developing his model, and he draws a clear
distinction between groups with and without leaders. It is the former group type on which
Freud concentrates arguing that leaderless groups are of minimal psychological significance
(Billig, 1976) and leaving their dynamics unexplained.

Following the Oedipus complex pattern Freud theorises that the individual group member
identifies with, and introjects the group leader who ‘becomes’ part of the individual’s ego-
ideal or superego. This process, which Freud termed primary identification (Billig, 1976),
explains the ties between leader and individual as well as psychic similarities within groups
(Hogg, 1992; Billig, 1976) but does not account for the inter-individual bonds his definition
indicates. In this regard Freud suggests a process of secondary identification whereby bonds
develop between individuals on the basis of mutual identification as a result of “a common
quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct” (Freud,
1955a, p. 107). The common quality here refers to the individuals’ common ego-ideal. The
individual members then are psychically similar to the extent they all possess within their
psyches the same “loved-object” - the leader - and thus develop the psychological bonds
characteristic of the “esprit de corps of an in-group” (Billig, 1976, p. 20). Freud does not
explicitly explain here why identification might be channelled in the “direction” of a national
group rather than other possible groups (that is, why the membership of one group may be
more salient than that of another) though Tajfel’s (1969) reading of the theory suggests that
Freud would allow for the processes of social influence in this respect.

Freud notes that “a group is clearly held together by a power of some kind” (p. 92), that
members are bound to each other and the group leader by “an intense emotional tie” (p. 95)
and it is important to record the nature of this bond since it is fundamental to his theory. The
principle underlying group formation, he proposes, is Eros, the "love-force" which "holds together everything in the world" (Freud, 1955a, pp. 91-92). It is these libidinal ties, the "love" between leader and members that, for Freud, forms the "essence of a group" (p. 96).

It is interesting to note, however, that despite his theory, Freud remained uncertain as to the emotional forces underlying national identity, particularly with regard to his own emotional ties to the Jewish nation. In a later paper (Freud, 1955b, p. 274) he suggests that such forces defied verbal expression:

But plenty of other things remained over to make the attraction of Jewry and Jews irresistible - many obscure emotional forces, which were the more powerful the less they could be expressed in words, as well as a clear consciousness of inner identity, the safe privacy of a common mental construction.

The factors and dynamics mentioned in the above paragraphs are the primary phenomena in Freud's theory of group formation and existence. But he also proposes a secondary phenomenon which is dependent on the development of these primary in-group bonds and which is necessary for harmony and cohesiveness within a group (Billig, 1976). This second factor arises in terms of Freud's theory of emotional ambivalence (Freud, 1955a, p. 102) and manifests in the development of out-group hostility.

Freud's theoretical contribution to the understanding of national identity is an important one. His theory offers a psychological explanation of the process (identification) whereby national identity becomes part of the individual's self-concept, and he attempts to include social factors in his analysis. Further he provides an explanation of the emotional ties involved in the development and maintenance of group solidarity, though his explanation of the process
Psychological theory of bonding between group members (secondary identification) is not fully developed (Hogg, 1992).

Freud’s approach has been widely influential but his work has also drawn criticism. A common criticism is Freud’s disregard for leaderless or non-authoritarian groups. In effect he accounts only for groups with leaders (authoritarian groups) and others (America, for example) are dismissed as psychologically impoverished (Billig, 1976). Equally neglected is the position of women in group formation. Since his account is premised primarily on the Oedipus complex Freud’s theory is apparently concerned only with male identification and male leaders and he appears to assume a patriarchal society (Billig, 1976; Hogg, 1992). Lastly, the question arises as to whether Freud’s theory adequately explains the large-scale process of national identification. Briefly put, in Freud’s approach, explanations of the complexities of social groups are reduced to an interaction between intra-individual, instinctive impulses and interpersonal processes premised in his theory of the Oedipus complex. In essence, the (nuclear) family becomes the explanatory model for the social group (Billig, 1976). As a theory of national identity, his work is therefore of limited application but it does provide a basis for understanding why human beings are motivated to identify with groups which is distinct from the cognitive approach discussed in the next chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided an overview of the central metatheories informing social identity and have briefly considered individualist and early social approaches to understanding national identity. I have pointed to the limitations of the reductionist individualist approach in accounting for the complexities of national identity and to some of the problems inherent in early social theories of the “group mind”. I have argued that whilst
Freud’s work is important with respect to its intraindividual theorising of national identity it
deals inadequately with the social influences in national identification. This issue of the
social, political and ideological context of identification has been taken up more recently by
neo-Freudian writers such as Elliot (1992) and Frosh (1989a;1987) an analysis of whose work
is beyond the scope of this thesis. In the next chapter I shall discuss the recent approaches to
social identity developed within European social psychology.
CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORIES

It is one-sided to suggest that as humans all we can do in our thoughts is to categorise information (Billig, 1987).

In this chapter I shall consider those theories within the cognitive paradigm which have attempted to incorporate the social dimension in their accounts of identity and group processes and, for this reason, offer a more appropriate theoretical framework for the understanding of national identity. In this respect they may be distinguished from the individualistic “social cognition” approach considered in the previous chapter. This chapter looks briefly at early forms of social psychological interactionism and then considers, in more detail, the later developments of Social Identity Theory and the theory of Social Representations which, within the cognitive framework, represent the most progressive attempts at a non-reductionist social psychology. The latter works are prefaced by an early paper by social identity theorist Henri Tajfel (1969) which represents a rare, specific attempt to grapple with issues around national identity.

Interactionism

Amongst the earliest challenges to the individualistic approach are those of cognitive social psychologists Sherif (1936, 1967), Asch (1952) and Lewin (1948) working within a social psychological interactionist paradigm (Turner et al, 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1986).
Sherif, Asch and Lewin, like Allport, reject the notion of a group mind (in the metaphysical sense) and support his contention that psychological processes reside only in individuals. However, unlike Allport, they insist on the reality and psychological distinctiveness of social groups (Brown and Turner, 1981) and, arguing from the Gestalt premise that the whole is different from the sum of its parts, propose a continuous, reciprocal, interactive and interdependent relationship between intra-individual psychological processes and the social domain (Turner & Oakes, 1986). They propose that groups have properties and dynamics which are related to, and based on individual functioning, but are not wholly determined by, or reducible to, that functioning (Brown and Turner, 1981). Individuals are changed psychologically in group (social) interactions through a dialectical process in which they create social products such as group norms, values, and stereotypes which, in turn, are internalised (Turner et al, 1987). From the perspective of national identity, this approach makes the important contribution that individual cognitions are socially mediated.

The interactionist approach also marks a move away from the individualist interpersonal understanding of group cohesiveness. Cohesiveness is seen as a fundamental quality of groups and is based in needs satisfaction, but attraction develops within a context of inter-individual interdependence rather than inter-individual similarity stressed by the former approach (Hogg, 1987). Individuals are seen to “act in an intersubjective world of shared social meanings” (Turner & Oakes, 1986, p. 240). To take one example, Lewin (1948, p. 84) proposes that

the essence of a group is not the similarity or dissimilarity of its members, but their interdependence. A group can be characterised as a ‘dynamic whole’; this means that a change in the state of any subpart changes the state of any other subpart.
The interactionist approach marks an attempt to theorise the construction of social identity and the development of group cohesiveness taking into account the broad social context and group dynamics. Herein lies its importance for theorising national identity. However, despite its advances in moving beyond an individualistic version of social identity, the interactionist perspective has not escaped criticism. I shall incorporate these criticisms in the following discussions of theories which are premised in the interactionist perspective.

**Tajfel's General Motivational and Cognitive Factors**

As a preface to a discussion of the recent developments of Social Identity Theory Social Representations I shall briefly set out the "general motivational and cognitive factors" which Tajfel (1969, p. 156ff) raised in an earlier paper as "selected requisites" for the development of national identity. As a part of rare attempt in social psychological theorising to deal specifically with national identification these points provide a useful framework within which to consider the appropriateness for national identity of the later theoretical developments.

Tajfel argues that all motivational and cognitive processes related to social behaviour are relevant to the study of national identification to some extent. He proposes (p. 157) that three factors of central importance be isolated as "requisites" for national identity to come into being. He argues that

it is necessary (emphasis added) that a large proportion of the individuals who are members of a nation:

1. perceive that nation as some form of entity, however various individuals may define that entity to themselves;
2. feel to some extent emotionally identified with that entity; and

3. consequently share involvement in the events effecting it.

The difficulties inherent in attempting to delimit the concepts of nation or national identity are implicit in Tajfel’s use of loose, open phrases such as “a large portion”, “some form of”, and “to some extent”. He stresses therefore that these three factors are not uniformly distributed across a national population. Perceptions of the nation as well as emotional involvement with the entity will vary between individuals and between groups. Equally involvement in the events affecting the nation may take many forms.

Tajfel further stipulates a condition for the existence of these three factors: effective “channels of social communication concerning the common national identity of the population”. To be effective, he suggests, such social communication should take the form of “social influence”, a process through which and attitudes and ideas about the nation are widely diffused. Influence, in turn, will only occur if the “messages” being communicated are accepted by the population. This acceptance is dependent on two factors (p. 158):

1. the capacity of the messages to build up a cognitive structure which will be capable of coexisting with, or of dominating, the competing views of the world in which classifications of human groups in terms other than national are not seen as more salient and more important; and

2. the capacity of the messages to be congruent with the individual’s motives.

Tajfel notes that the relationship between the content of social communication and these two factors is complex and points out that national identity may be of extremely variable emotional and cognitive salience for the individual. Salience may vary from a “nonsalient” or
latent awareness of membership of a nation, to little more than an unemotional means of differentiating between individuals, to a level at which national identity pervades most aspects of an individual’s life and may be charged with high emotional intensity.

Tajfel argues that traditional psychology has focused largely on the last level, on issues involving high emotional intensity (for example: extremes of nationalism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and hostility) without due consideration of the cognitive aspects of social influence. Nationalist emotions, he suggests, do not arise from nowhere but are based in existing cognitive structures and preferences. It is important, he suggests, that the “sharing” of cognitive and emotional content of national identification be related to the processes of social influence and their effects on the ways in which the individual comes to conceptualise his / her world.

The conditions which determine national identity, Tajfel argues, are to be found in the effectiveness of the “channels of communication” in the process of social influence. Here effectiveness is related to two conditions: that, other channels of communication concerned with social identity do not compete with the formation of a national identity and that the “national system is dominant over other possible systems” (p. 167). It is possible, he points out, in a “multinational state” for groups to hold to different “ethnic” identities and yet identify with a superordinate national identity provided that the different affiliations are congruent. Where a particular ethnic group attempts to develop its own national identity through a competing system of communication, disintegration of an existing nation or the obstruction of the development of a new nation is probable. Hence the development and maintenance of a national identity is dependent upon that version of identity dominating and monopolising the channels of communication to the exclusion of others and establishing a
“relatively closed system”. An important process identified by Tajfel in an individual’s acquisition of a national identity in the context of different and possibly competing social identities is that of social comparison. This process is detailed below under the heading of Social Identity Theory.

In dealing with the content of national identity, that is the cognitive structures and value systems which form the substance of national identity, Tajfel posits “two psychological mechanisms which transform the variety and multiplicity of social messages into a coherent cognitive and affective structure” (p. 128): “simplifying”, that is the categorisation of one’s own nation and others on the basis of perceived (stereotypical) intragroup similarities and outgroup differences, and “ideologizing”. The cognitive process of categorisation is covered in more detail in the following section. Here it is important to note Tajfel’s assertion that the process of simplification or “cognitive economy” is not sufficient to account for the complex features of national identification. The former process proceeds concurrently with a process of “ideologizing”. Here Tajfel is referring to the “social, political, economic and historical factors” which provide the informational and ideological framework within which the distinct features of different nations are produced. He argues that the “unifying and cohesive characteristics” of national identification occur at this “abstract ‘ideological’” level. In this context the individual learns about the peculiar qualities of his/her own nation and the ways in which it differs from others in terms of various characteristics some of which may be “genuine”, such as language, and others which may be “manufactured” or “eliminated” when appropriate. At this level what was “localised and particularised” is reproduced as “common history, common values, common missions, longings, goals, etc.” (p. 170). Such a process of ideologizing confronts the “multiethnic state” concerned with developing a common national
identity. Tajfel concludes by noting that the process of ideologizing is only successful to the extent that it is "psychologically feasible and acceptable to the population at large" (p. 171).

In the following section I shall consider the variables raised by Tajfel with specific reference to his later Social Identity Theory and the derivative Self-Categorisation Theory.

**Social Identity Theory**

Tajfel's cognitive motivational theory of social identity is concerned largely with intergroup behaviour, specifically with explaining intergroup discrimination and motivations for intergroup differentiation. But it is equally concerned with the development of a psychological theory of the social group (Turner and Giles, 1981); a theory which is non-reductionistic and which sees social factors as central to psychological development (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). To this end, Social Identity Theory draws both on the work of structuralists, in particular that of the conflict theorists Marx and Weber, and cognitive psychologists (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The model provides broadly that "society is an heterogeneous collection of social categories". These "discrete" categories, such as nationality, class or religion, "stand in power and status relations to one another" and their "dynamics are subject to the forces of economics and history" (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, pp. 18-19). Through the cognitive psychological processes of social categorisation and comparison, these categories provide the individual with a "repertoire" of category memberships or social identities of variable and context-related importance in the self-concept. Different category memberships will become salient in different contexts (Hogg, 1992, p. 90). Category memberships position the individual in the network of social relationships within society and psychologically describe and prescribe his or her characteristics and behaviour as a group member (ibid.). In this view the object of study for
the social identity theorist is no longer the individual within the social group, but “the group in the individual” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 19). Group membership is seen as a psychological state distinct from that of being a separate individual; group membership confers a social identity or a “shared/collective representation” of who the individual is (ibid., p. 3.).

Given this position, Social Identity Theory suggests itself as an appropriate model for the understanding of large-scale group processes such as national identification (Hogg, 1992; Louw-Potgieter, 1988). In the remainder of this section, I shall outline and discuss the central tenets of Social Identity Theory (social identity, social categorisation and social comparison) as well as a later derivative of Social Identity Theory, namely Turner’s Self-categorisation Theory (SCT) (Turner et al, 1987).

Social identity

Tajfel defines social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (emphasis in original) (1981 p. 255). There are several elements of this definition to be considered. An important aspect of Social Identity Theory implicit in Tajfel’s use of the word “part” is that the self-concept is seen as structured in two relatively separate subsystems: personal identity and social identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Social Identity Theory theorists propose that there is a continuum of self-conception or self-identification which ranges from purely personal at one extreme to exclusively social identity at the other (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Which level of identity (and

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1 In a later paper Tajfel (1982, p. 24) replaces the pronoun “his” with “their”.
related behaviour) is salient at any given time is dependent upon the particular situation or context in which the individual finds him or herself (Turner et al., 1987). At the social end of the continuum, Hogg and Abrams (1988) propose that in any given social context the salient social identification will be that which best "fits", in terms of a simple cognitive process of sifting of intracategory similarities and intercategory differences, the pertinent information available to the individual.

Tajfel suggests that social identity "derives" from an individual's membership of a social group or groups² where a group is defined as

a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and their membership of it (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40).

Applying this perspective specifically to nations, he suggests that "members of a national group are considered as such when they categorise themselves with a high degree of consensus in the appropriate manner, and are consensually categorised in the same manner by others"³ (Tajfel, 1981, p. 229). There are three central components included in Tajfel's definition of social identity and this definition of social groups. There is a cognitive component in the form of the individual's knowledge or perception that he or she belongs to a group; an evaluative component in the sense that the group or the individual's membership

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² Social or human groups should be differentiated from social categories. The latter is a statistical entity and the former a psychological entity. Social identity theory aims to examine the psychological processes whereby social categories are translated into human groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

³ Tajfel comments here that this statement is "essentially a social psychological one" (1981, p. 229) insofar as it is not concerned with the crucial historical, political, social and economic events underlying the development of, and maintaining, consensus.
thereof may be positively or negatively valued; and an emotional component in that the
cognitive and evaluative components may be accompanied by feelings such as love or hatred
for the in-group or outgroups (Tajfel, 1981). In the context of social groups, Tajfel (1981, p.
232) refers to the first component as “social-cognitive” thus connecting it to the “necessary”
process of social consensus he posits with respect to group membership and evaluation. His
use of the vague phrases “some degree” or, in the case of a nation, “high degree” of consensus
attests to the difficulty of establishing when sufficient consensus has been reached.
Consensus appears as a necessary but relative aspect of national group formation. The last
important point, emerging from Tajfel’s definition of a national group, is the role attributed to
consensual categorisation of the group as such by other or out groups. Whether consensual
categorisation by other groups is a necessary component in group formation and definition is
not explicit here, but it is clearly an important one. Indeed Tajfel (1981, p. 232) argues that
ingroup consensus “may often originate from other groups” (emphasis in original) and hence
determine the development of membership criteria.

Social categorisation

It is evident that the process of social categorisation is central to the development of
national identity in this model. It is seen as a universal and adaptive cognitive process,
psychologically dividing the social world into manageable and comprehensible parts. Social
categorisations are the “cognitive tools that segment, classify and order the social
environment” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40). They function not only to systematise this
environment, but to provide the individual with a “system of orientation” which helps to
create and define his or her position and those of others in society (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel &
In the process of social categorisation intracategory similarities and intercategory differences are "accentuated" on those dimensions subjectively believed to be correlated with the categorisation (Abrams & Hogg, 1990b; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Such beliefs are the product of the particular socio-cultural context within which the individual is positioned. The "accentuation effect" (Tajfel in Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 19) accounts for the contextually related production of stereotypic perceptions of self, members of ingroups and outgroups as well normative ingroup behaviour and intergroup differentiation (Hogg, 1992). Accentuation is variable to the extent that the more important or relevant a categorisation is to an individual, the more pronounced the effect becomes (Abrams & Hogg, 1990b; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Social categorisation thus occurs in varying degrees along emotional as well as cognitive and behavioural dimensions and is "overwhelmingly with reference to the self" (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 21) (emphasis in original). Hence, it is argued, that an individual's knowledge of sharing a social category membership with others (even though they are not personally known) gives rise to a sense of involvement or pride (Abrams, 1992). How the relationship between self and social categories is implicated in such variation is accounted for in terms of the related process of social comparison.

Social comparison

Tajfel (1978, 1981, 1982; see also Turner, 1981) theorises that social categorisation is connected with social identity through the complementary process of social comparison, an evaluative and motivational process whereby relative group status is perceived along psychologically salient categories. Social identity theorists propose that "all knowledge is socially derived through social comparisons" (emphasis in original) and that an individual's "confidence" in the validity and veracity of his or her knowledge, attitudes or behaviour is
achieved through establishing “consensus” with other people, in particular with members of the ingroup whose perceptions are positively evaluated as representing “true understanding” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 22; Hogg, 1992). Social comparison thus provides the means through which social identity is clarified (Abrams, 1992).

Drawing on Festinger’s theory of social comparison (cited in Tajfel 1981, p. 256) which claims, inter alia, that “there exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and his abilities”, social identity theory proposes that individuals seek positive self-evaluation; that they are fundamentally motivated to maintain or improve their self-esteem and strive to attain a positive social identity or self-concept (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Abrams & Hogg, 1990b; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This need or drive provides the motivation for intergroup differentiation along dimensions which are socially valued in general or along which the ingroup is positively (and stereotypically) valued (Abrams & Hogg, 1990b). There is a desire to seek a “positive distinctiveness” (Turner, 1981, p. 80) for the ingroup in relation to relevant outgroups and thereby achieve or maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus individual self-esteem is attached to the fortunes of the ingroup as a whole (Wetherell and Potter 1992). Insofar as the ingroup does not provide a positive social identity, individuals will either attempt, through appropriate social action, to create positive group distinctiveness or leave the group for another more highly valued group (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

In sum social identity theory proposes that while categorisation produces stereotypical perceptions of in and outgroups, social comparison and the “need” for positive social identity account for the selectivity and degree of the accentuation effect.
Social cognitive theories

Self-categorisation theory

Turner’s (Turner et al 1987, Turner & Oakes, 1986; see also Hogg & McGarty, 1990) Self-Categorisation Theory is an extension and development of Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory to which Turner had earlier contributed (see for example Turner, 1982). Self-Categorisation Theory arose out of Turner’s concern that Social Identity Theory did not adequately deal with the process of social psychological interaction in group formation (Turner & Oakes, 1986). It’s central aim, therefore, is to identify and explain the mechanisms by which individuals come to conceptualise themselves as a social group or social category (Turner & Oakes, 1986; Hogg & McGarty 1990). Self-Categorisation Theory differs from Social Identity Theory in that it focuses more sharply on the individual cognitive process of (self) categorisation as the basic mechanism of group behaviour (Abrams & Hogg, 1990a; Hogg, 1992). The theory is thus more concerned with intragroup processes than intergroup relations and, unlike Social Identity Theory, pays little attention to large-scale social issues or the central motivational concept of self-esteem (Hogg, 1992). Nonetheless, the theory suggests itself as an appropriate means to conceptualising large group processes such as national identification (Hogg, 1992).

Turner (1982, p. 15) proposes a “cognitive redefinition” of the social group. He proposes that a social group is “two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or, which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be members of the same social category”. What is notable here is that “perception” of common category membership is considered necessary and sufficient for group formation (Turner, 1982). Turner eschews the Social Cohesion Model’s premise that group formation has an affective basis. Social cohesion is not necessary for group formation, though it may be a consequence
process of (self) categorisation then accentuates similarities between the individual and this prototype at a depersonalised level where neither the self nor others are perceived as "unique persons" but as representations of the prototype (Hogg, 1992, p. 94).

In sum, self-categorisation may be seen as the process which transforms individuals into groups. It results in the individual perceiving him/herself as having the same social identity as other group members. As Hogg and Abrams (1988, p. 21) conclude: "it places oneself in the relevant social category, or places the group in one's head."

Social representations

Another recent development in European social psychology is Social Representations theory (Moscovici, 1984; 1988), which is also premised in a cognitive, interactionist perspective (Turner and Oakes, 1986). It is variously portrayed as a vague, imprecise theory which is difficult to describe and which has been interpreted in a number of different ways (Hogg, 1992; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Nonetheless Moscovici's theory is potentially useful in the study of national identity in its emphasis on the ways in which the social realm is implicated in the construction of subjective processes and, in particular, its introduction of the central role played by language in that construction. A full discussion of this theory is beyond the scope of this thesis and for the purposes of this brief section I shall draw on a number of summaries presented in recent assessments of the approach (see Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Hogg, 1992; Potter & Litton, 1985; McKinlay & Potter, 1987; Parker, 1987).

The theory aims to move away from individualist conceptions of human behaviour towards an understanding of the ways in which the social world is implicated in subjective processes, towards "the rediscovery of the social mind" (Moscovici cited in Parker, 1987, p. 448).
Social representations are mental entities (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Indeed, for Moscovici, all thought and understanding is based on the working of social representations (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). People will draw on different social representations in different contexts to achieve and exhibit identifications with different groups (Parker, 1987).

Social representations are consensual representations shared between group members providing mutual understanding in conversation and, through agreement, a stable, external version of the world (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Hogg 1992). And they provide a clear way of distinguishing between groups. A social representation, to the extent that it produces consensus around versions of the group provides an important group unifying and homogenising force (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

In Moscovici's approach it is the sharing of social representations among members which provides the essence of a group, even though the representations may not have been produced by the group (Moscovici, 1988; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). It is important to note here that representations do not simply mediate between beliefs about the group and the group qua object but, it is argued, "construct" the group. As Potter and Wetherell (1987, p. 141) explain: "When a group makes sense of its world, that world will be constructed by, and in terms of, social representations". In this regard Moscovici's proposal resonates with constructivist work such as discourse analysis.

Moscovici proposes two mechanisms by which the "innate desire" to organise or make sense of the world occurs: anchoring and objectification (McKinlay & Potter, 1987, p. 474). Anchoring is the process whereby an unfamiliar object is drawn into, or assimilated with a category of thought in an existing social representation. The unfamiliar object is related to typical (hence more familiar) cases. In this respect social representations seem similar to the
prototypes involved in the categorisation process described above (McKinlay & Potter, 1987). Anchoring is accompanied by the process of objectification through which the unfamiliar object is transformed into a concrete, pictorial part of the representation to which it was anchored, amalgamating with other prototypical images and forming a new version of that representation. The new version becomes a concrete reality for the group as it is diffused between members of the group through ordinary conversation (McKinlay & Potter, 1987; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). In this way words may become objects; the ‘imagined community’ of a nation becomes an object with a specific content (Foster & Nel, 1991).

Social representations are not static entities for they are under continuous modification. But the process of objectification suggests that they are prescriptive. Social representations are historical entities in that they are partly the product of earlier objectifications. They are prescriptive to the extent that, as a result of this objectification process, they exert an historical constraining force which cannot be escaped (McKinlay & Potter, 1987). That is, the past influences the present and, in the form of social representations, is implicated in the constitution of reality. In Moscovici’s (1984, p. 9) words:

“representations are prescriptive, that is they impose themselves on us with an irresistible force. This force is a combination of a structure which is present before we have even begun to think, and of a tradition which decrees what we should think” (emphases in original).

Moscovici’s theory has interesting potential for the study of national identity particularly in its strongly non-reductionist exposition of the ways in which social processes are implicated in the construction of subjective processes and its stress on the role of language in that construction. The notion that group identity is established through the consensual adoption of
social representations (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) fits with the conditions of social communication (the source of "most knowledge", in Moscovici's (1988, p. 215) view) and "ideologizing" Tajfel (1969) deemed necessary to the development of national identity. Indeed, for Moscovici, social representations function similarly to ideology (Hogg, 1992). However, a number of problems have been identified in the approach which diminish its potential as an appropriate explanatory framework for national identification. The literature around social representations is extensive and I shall briefly note in the next section only the major points which have been raised.

Social cognitive theories: Critique

Social identity and Self-Categorisation Theories

Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorisation Theory (jointly labelled as social identity theory for the remainder of this section) provide an impressive attempt at producing a truly 'social' psychological account of social identity and group formation. They attempt to move away from inadequate intra-individual and interpersonal explanations in which the social, political and historical context is merely incidental, towards a theory which suggests that the forms and characteristics of groups are historically and socially constructed (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Hence, it is argued that, unlike the former explanations, the approach is applicable to the study of large scale social categories such as nations (Hogg, 1992) and has been applied in a number of real, large group studies in, for example, Ireland (Waddell & Cairns, 1986; Cairns, 1982) and South Africa (Louw-Potgieter, 1988). However, a number of criticisms have been raised which indicate that, despite its advances, it may be of limited application to the complexities of national identity.
Although Social Identity Theory (and Tajfel’s (1969) earlier work on national identity) stresses the social and historical context of identity development it does not seem to have overcome the problem of individual-social dualism tending, in its reliance on an intraindividual cognitive and motivational explanation of identity, towards an individualistic position. An inadequate account is given of the ways in which these cognitive and motivational processes interact with the social context or, further, are themselves socially structured (Campbell, 1995a; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). In addition the theory has been developed largely in the context of experimental research designs and using laboratory and artificial, small group studies. While it may be able to account for identity processes in this context its applicability to the non-experimental ‘real world’ has not been established (Campbell, 1995a).

Social Identity Theory’s conceptualisation of the social category and “relatively nebulous or fuzzy” prototype in which it is anchored (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) has also been criticised for its emphasis on cognition and disregard for the socially constructed nature of such entities. In this regard it may be argued that the categories with which individuals identify are the products of social activity in particular historical contexts and not simply the function of individual perceptual needs (Billig, 1976, p. 325). Processes are thus bound up with different contents which should be viewed within the appropriate social and historical context (Michael, 1990). In addition, Billig (1976) emphasises that an individual’s identification with a group is not merely a matter of the individual passively internalising the object of his or her identification. There is a dialectical relationship between the subject and the object of identification. The group in certain contexts assumes an active role in ensuring that identification takes place and the individual is transformed (p. 323). Billig (1985;1987) argues further that consideration be given to the relations between the processes of
categorisation and particularisation ("the process by which a particular stimulus is distinguished from a general category" (1985 p. 82)). He proposes that a "rhetorical perspective" be adopted which takes into account the "argumentative nature" of identification processes (see Chapters Seven and Eight).

The inadequacy of Social Identity Theory in accounting for the production of social categories (and therefore their emotional adherents) is also reflected, in the theory's lack of attention to the role of ideology in the production of individual perceptions of social reality (Deschamps, 1982; Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade and Williams, 1986; Billig 1976). Billig (1976, p. 351) argues that the achievement and maintenance of ingroup identity "must be seen as primarily an ideological process, if there is to be no backsliding into individualistic reductionism". Foster (1991b) points out that Social Identity Theory has tended to ignore issues of power and ideology in the construction of subjectivity. He proposes that ideology become a necessary addition to Social Identity Theory if it is to provide a more adequate theory of social identity. From Tajfel's perspective an understanding of the process of "ideologizing" in the construction of national identity is necessary.

Social Identity Theory's notion that individuals are motivated to join groups by a fundamental need for self-esteem has also been criticised as too limited an explanation to deal with the variability of group processes (Abrams, 1992). Other motivational factors such as the need for material wealth, power and control warrant consideration (Abrams, 1992). Similarly Breakwell (1978) suggests that Social Identity Theory's notion of positive social identity as a motive force is too vague. Other research (Zavalloni, 1975; Brewer & Kramer, 1985) has found that social identification is a more complex process than Social Identity Theory formulations suggest involving selective, subjective perceptual and transformative processes.
of categorisation. Lastly, the role of emotion which Tajfel stresses as important to national identification is inadequately treated.

In conclusion Social Identity Theory, despite its advances and potential, is clearly limited as an appropriate approach to the study of national identity. Some writers have argued that it may be extended to overcome its weaknesses (see Campbell, 1995a; 1995b for example). Others have argued for the abandonment of the approach in favour of a discourse analytic approach (Wetherell and Potter, 1992).

**Social representations**

The theory of social representations, I have noted, is criticised for its vagueness (though Moscovici (1985;1988) sees this lack of clarity as a positive quality). Hogg and Abrams (1988) view this vagueness as a limitation insofar as the theory fails to provide a definition of the group and, further, does not identify a process which relates consensuality to the group. Others (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; McKinlay & Potter, 1987; Potter & Litton, 1985) have pointed out the practical difficulties which arise in attempting to operationalise the theory. There does not appear to be an empirical test for the identification of social representations and discriminating one from another. Researchers may, for example, be caught in the vicious circle of identifying representations through groups premised on the notion that groups define representations (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Equally the related mechanisms of anchoring and objectification cannot be empirically demonstrated and are dismissed as an “exercise in speculative cognitive psychology” along with the proposition that people come to understand large-scale socio-political processes in terms of visual (pictorial) images (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 145).
Social cognitive theories

The emphasis which Moscovici places on the (historical) prescriptive power of social representations seems to lend a deterministic quality to representations. Despite Moscovici’s insistence on the dynamic nature of the entities, it is difficult to find space for human agency or to see how change is possible (McKinlay & Potter, 1987). Besides, if “all” cognitions are circumscribed by social representations how are “unfamiliar” objects to be recognised (Potter and Wetherell, 1987)?

Lastly, Parker (1987) suggests that despite its allusions to being a social theory, social representation theory has not resolved the problem of reductionism and has avoided tackling the issue of individualism which arises in its social cognitive aspects. To overcome the problems inherent in social representations McKinlay and Potter (1987) also propose the alternative approach of discourse analysis which embodies many of the insights of social representations but attempts to avoid its pitfalls. This approach will be considered in later chapters.

Conclusions

The European approaches to social identity discussed here represent the most progressive of theoretical approaches to the complexities of national identification insofar as they aim to take account of the historical, social, political and ideological context of national identity formation. As such, their contribution to understanding national identity is significant. However, I have given above a number of criticisms which have been levelled at the three theories and which limit their applicability to the present project. Thus, without dismissing the advances made in these approaches I aim to follow Wetherell & Potter (1992) and McKinlay and Potter (1987) above, who propose an alternative approach which, it is
argued, overcomes the limitations I have described. This alternative will be considered in Chapters Six and Seven.
CHAPTER FIVE

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN NATIONAL IDENTITY

To investigate the nature of national mind and character and to examine the conditions that render possible the formation of the national mind and tend to consolidate national character, these are the crowning tasks of psychology. (McDougall, 1939)

Despite the view amongst social scientists referred to in chapter one (see also Doob, 1964 and repeated emphasis in Connor, 1978, 1984, 1990) that psychological phenomena are central to understanding the concept, the study of national identity is a neglected area in social psychology and is aptly described as a "long dormant area" (Larsen, Killifer, Csepeli et al, 1992, p. 321; see also Morse, 1980).

During World War 2 and the periods immediately preceding and following that war there was a considerable volume of research in the study of nationalistic attitudes (Feshbach 1991), no doubt prompted by the excesses German nationalism. But in the ensuing decades there has been scant attention paid to national identity and large group processes in social psychology. The reasons for this neglect are unclear. The dominance of (social) cognitive psychology and an attendant shift away from the study of groups towards individuals is one possible explanation (Hogg, 1992). There have been pragmatic consequences to this shift. An empirical focus on the individual produces research results more easily and quickly, requires fewer resources and facilitates a higher volume of academic publications, a measure of academic performance (Hogg, 1992). At an ideological level, a shift away from group studies might also been seen as a consequence of the discipline of social psychology attempting to isolate itself from work associated with sociology (Hogg, 1992). Where group oriented work
has been conducted, for example within the framework of Social Identity Theory, the emphasis has been on empirical research restricted to small group studies mostly confined to laboratory conditions. There have been a few exceptions to this trend, for example Waddel and Cairns (1986) work within a Social Identity Theory framework in Northern Ireland. These author's used questionnaires to evaluate Tajfel's idea of the situational specificity of social identity with regard to ethnopolitical social identities in Northern Ireland. While not directly related to national identity their partial validation of Tajfel's theory has implications for the study of national identity in South Africa (see Edwards, 1987, below).

International research

In consequence of the above, a search of the literature of the past twenty years reveals that there have been very few social psychological research studies of national identity. Where research has been conducted it is often more concerned with identifying national characteristics (see Peabody (1985) for a full discussion of the approach) than with an analysis of the process of identification (or, more fully, the content/process relationship).

The most recent study of this kind is that of Larsen et al (1992). Larsen et al attempted to discern the “components” (values, traits etc.) and patterns of components of national identity in samples of United States, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Greek students. The United States sample comprised both local and foreign students as well as members of other social groups. The students were asked to list three words which they thought best described being an American or Hungarian. The results were subjected to content analysis. Larsen et al, describing their project as a “first step” found evidence for a common national identity across the US samples and unique dimensions of national identity across the international samples. They suggest that the representations of national identity which they found, reflected, for the
most part, institutionalised nationalism and cultural identity and stress the need for further research into the process of national identification, in particular how it changes over time.

An earlier project carried out by Feather (1981) in Papua New Guinea, is worth mentioning since it applies and supports Tajfel's (1969) national identification model and is pertinent to contemporary South Africa. Using questionnaires and a rating scale technique, Feather studied emergent national sentiment among adolescents in the, then, newly independent nation of Papua New Guinea. He found a heightened positive national sentiment and a relative merging of personal and national concerns for the Papua New Guinea group compared with foreign nationals living in the country at the time of independence. He attributed the strengthened national identification to several factors:

• a concentration of social influence processes surrounding the event;

• the creation of a new social category (the nation) resulting in an enhancement of perceived ingroup similarities and an accentuation of outgroup differences;

• a way of "justifying" the decision to assume independence;

• and an increase in group cohesiveness as a result of uncertainties facing the new nation and related demands for group effort.

Feather's study is useful in providing broad insight into national formative processes from a (cognitive) social psychological perspective and points to a number of areas which warrant further consideration. For example the social influence process itself and the ways in which the new social category was developed in the public arena. Feather notes the need for further,
multidisciplinary, research into the variety or processes implicated in national identification in different contexts.

At an interpersonal level Feshback (1991), in his exploratory study of 81 American undergraduate students tested the hypothesis that there is a relationship between early childhood affective attachment to caregivers and later affective attachment to a nation. He argues that national images function in many respects as parental images (apparent, for example, in the metaphor of a “fatherland”) and goes so far as to suggest that “issues in early attachment are the primary antecedent of national feelings” for certain individuals (p. 211) (emphasis in original). He explains (p. 213) this relationship as follows:

The nation-terrain, government, customs, with its connotation of father as protector and mother as source of nurturance, offers a socially acceptable context in which early attachment needs can be expressed and analogous reinforcements obtained. In many ways, the nation provides the adult individual with feelings of security and vicarious feelings of approval and related rewards through identification that were directly experienced in the childhood situation.

Feshback’s findings support his hypothesis to a limited extent. He found a significant correlation between the measure of early father attachment and the patriotism-nationalism scales he employed. However, there was no correlation between early attachment to the mother and patriotism or nationalism. Further, while there was a strong correlation between early father attachment and patriotism (construed as love for or pride in the country) the correlation with nationalism (connoting national superiority or dominance) was insignificant. In brief, he concluded that early attachment relations were linked to later feelings an individual might hold for his or her nation but that further research was warranted.
The type of research conducted by Feshbach here is useful to the extent that it attempts to provide an explanation of the emotional forces involved in nation identification, an area which has been neglected in social psychology. However, in failing to take account of the broader socio-political and ideological context in which the process he hypothesises occurs, his work remains subject to the sorts of criticisms I have already discussed in previous chapters.

Two other studies carried out in Brazil and Canada (Morse, 1976; 1980) were replications of South African studies (Morse, Mann & Nel, 1977; see also Morse & Nel, 1977) and will be considered below in the context of other South African research.

South African research

The small number of psychological studies conducted in the South African context has focused on nationalist attitudes rather than the process of national identification and even within this framework, none has sought to compare national attitudes across the broad population. Studies have either concentrated on the attitudes of one section of the population (Moodie, 1980; Morse & Nel, 1977; Edwards, 1987) or compared the attitudes of divisions of one section (Morse, Mann & Nel, 1977). Some authors have touched tangentially on the issue of national identity in the course of studies of other aspects of sub-groups (for example Louw-Potgieter, 1988). A number of findings are nevertheless of general interest to the present study and will be described briefly.

Moodie's (1980) study is concerned with the development of national identity in schoolchildren. He used projective techniques and a Piagetian theoretical framework to assess development in English and Afrikaans-speaking white children aged between six and
twelve. In brief he found substantial differences in national loyalties between the two groups, loyalty being more strongly developed in Afrikaans-speaking children. This finding is consistent with studies involving adult white South Africans.

Adult studies by Morse et al (1977) and Morse and Nel (1977), both using a questionnaire/rating scale instrument, suggest that national identity for both English-speakers and Afrikaners revolves essentially around political considerations. Afrikaners tend to associate nationality with specific sub-group characteristics such as 'race' and 'ethnicity'. The studies report that for most Afrikaans subjects, to be a South African means, if not actually to be an Afrikaner, at least to be white and to support the National Party. Being a South African has little meaning for the English.

Morse (1976, 1980; see also Morse et al, 1977) extracts three aspects of national identity from his research which warrant mention (it will be noted that there is a correlation between these aspects and those theorised by Tajfel (1969)). Firstly he distinguishes an affective component. National identity may be more strongly felt by some groups than by others. In addition, the 'meaning' of nationality may differ from group to group. Secondly, he highlights a cognitive or perceptual aspect. The "nation-state" may be perceived quite differently by different groups. Thirdly, the affective and cognitive differences manifest themselves in behavioural terms, for example, political activism or "non-involved" patriotism.

Given the complex nature of national identity Morse advocates a broad-based approach to research. He argues that historical and 'cultural' forces, social interaction patterns, and personality needs and dispositions must be considered. These factors, he suggests (1976, p.
Psychological research

72) “interact to affect both how strongly individuals identify with the nation-state and the precise meaning which national identity has for the individual”.

Edwards (1987), using an open-ended questionnaire technique followed by a form of rating scale, found that Ciskeians, with the exception of a rural group, valued South African identity more strongly than Ciskeian identity. South African identity was as valued as the “tribal” identity “Xhosa” but was not seen to conflict with the latter identity. Hence, Edwards comments “the new identity (South African) can emerge without competing with the old” (p. 51). Edwards’ findings in some respects concur with an earlier study conducted in several north African states (Klineberg & Zavalloni, 1969) which revealed high levels of patriotic commitment to the nation relative to tribal identities. Tribal loyalties were nevertheless significant especially in areas of intertribal power struggles.

A more recent study by Dawes and Finchilescu (1994) considered adolescents’ perspectives of the new South African identity. The study investigated social orientations and views of national identity of two cohorts of adolescents aged 14 to 17 on average, drawn from a range of ethnolinguistic communities. Among various tasks they were asked to indicate their preferences for various group identities, including South African and various sub-national identities such as Afrikaner, White etc. They were also asked to write an essay entitled “My nation and its people”.

Regarding South African identity, sixty percent of all groups described themselves as “South African”. However, sub-identities reflecting previous apartheid categories were prevalent when adolescents were asked to rank-order their identities. For example, Indians chose Indian more frequently than South African, while Afrikaners chose South African followed
by White and then Afrikaans. In brief, a South African identity was not necessarily a first choice, sub-identities were prevalent.

These studies, though considerable change may have occurred since the earlier papers were written, reflect the variability in content and intensity between different groups of perceptions of national identity in South Africa. The study by Edwards provides useful information in the area of identity salience and the relationship between national identity and sub-group identities, while that of Dawes and Finchilescu provides insight into the prevailing patterns of identification amongst adolescents to which those concerned with building a new national identity must speak.

**Conclusion**

Much of the work described above, lacks a coherent theoretical underpinning. Consequently it does not account for the processes involved in the development and maintenance of a South African national identity and the meaning it holds for the South African population. It is evident that there remains a need for research into the process or processes of national identification in South Africa within the framework of an appropriate theory.
CHAPTER SIX

IDENTITY IN POSTMODERN DISCOURSE

All that is solid melts into air
(Frosh, 1989b)

In this chapter and the next I shall consider a recent, alternative approach to understanding national identity drawing on what is broadly termed a discursive framework (Sampson, 1993). This chapter sets out the broad arguments for such an approach and considers the “post” movement within which it arises. Chapter seven looks specifically at a discourse analytic approach to national identity. My aim in these chapters is not to develop an alternative theory of national identity in general or to supplant other analyses of the entity but to suggest a theory for the analysis of (right-wing political) discourse in the construction of national identity. In elucidating this theory and, in Chapter Eight, a method¹, I shall draw largely on the work of discourse analysts² (Burman, 1991; Burman and Parker, 1993; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Parker, 1990; Parker, 1992; Potter, Wetherell, Gill and Edwards, 1990; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) but also on other work within the discursive framework, such as the rhetorical studies of Billig (1987, 1991; see also the earlier work of Billig, Condor et al, 1988) and the social constructionist approach of Shotter (1993; see also Shotter and Gergen, 1989).

¹The division between theory and method is problematised in discourse analysis since the concepts are, arguably, inseparable. They are divided here for the sake of descriptive and structural convenience.

²For reasons which will be discussed below, this and subsequent chapters draw predominantly on the approach developed in Wetherell and Potter’s (1992) Mapping the language of racism. New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf
There are two broad reasons for adopting this approach. First, language suggests itself as a site for investigation since it plays a vital role as both a medium and an element in the construction of national identity. Anderson (1983, p. 49 & 50) shows how historically the propagation of the “imagined community” of the nation to the “masses” only becomes possible in the context of developments permitting the rapid and widespread distribution of the written text. He argues that

the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation.

Language, thus was, and is, central to the formation of national groups (indeed, as Anderson suggests, language difference is *used* in the creation of a sense of nationhood) and in the definition of boundaries between such groups. But language is not only important at a basic level as an element of national identity. Researchers into the field of national identity (Degenaar, 1992; Alexander, 1986; see also Miles, 1989) point to the importance of language use in the legitimation and construction or reconstruction (in the South African case) of particular versions of national identity. In this sense language is implicated in the construction of the national subject, in the ways in which he or she understands and experiences the reality of nationhood. It is the latter discursive practices, including the discourses about language itself as an element of identity and as the site of struggle in the building of a new national identity (Seidel, 1986), and the ways in which they are constitutive of national identity which are a central concern of discourse analysis.

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3 I use the word “important” here following Edward’s (1992, p. 143) argument that while language is certainly “important” to group identity, it is not an “essential” element.
Secondly, discourse analysis as a theory attempts to avoid the major theoretical problems around social identity raised in the previous chapter. Discourse analysis eschews the forms of cognitive reductionism evident in the dominant cognitive approaches I have described, though the approach has been criticised for adopting an extremist position in its rejection of cognitive explanations of human behaviour (see Abrams & Hogg, 1990c). It is concerned exclusively with discourse itself, its constructed and constructive nature, its different functions, and the consequences which arise may from different discursive organisations (Wetherell and Potter, 1989; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). It assumes that psychological and social processes are constituted through discourse (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). Hence, discourse analysis offers a “radically non-cognitive form of social psychology” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987 p. 178) and in adopting the position that psychological entities and processes are constituted in the social domain of discourse (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) it transcends the issue of individual-social duality.

Discourse analysis has become increasingly important in social psychology and is indicative of the widespread “turn to language” in recent years (Parker, 1990a; Potter & Edwards, 1990). This “turn” arises in the broader context of cultural and political debate about modernity, “postmodernity” and “the crisis of representation” (Burman, 1991, p. 326). Postmodernism and the related movements of post-structuralism and social constructionism mark an epistemological and ontological shift away from the empiricism and positivism of “modernity” within which traditional psychology is premised. The debates around the postmodern movement are complex and extensive and a thorough discussion of them is beyond the scope of this chapter. I wish here only to consider the salient features informing

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4 Also referred to as constructivism in some texts but unrelated to Piagetian theory.
discourse analysis and a discursive approach to identity construction. The relationship between postmodern movements and recent developments in psychology is discussed in depth in a number of articles and texts, for example: social constructionism (Gergen, 1973; 1985; 1994; Gergen and Davis, 1985; Shotter and Gergen, 1989; Hare-Mustin and Marecek, 1988); post-structuralism (Henriques et al, 1984; Parker, 1989; 1992; Parker and Shotter, 1990; Hollway, 1989); postmodernism (Kvale, 1992a; Gergen, 1991).

Postmodern discourse

The 'postmodern' discourse is heterogeneous\(^5\), stressing difference, relativity and continually shifting perspectives (Kvale, 1992b). It is thus difficult to define or conceptualise. A central feature, however, is the contention that reality is socially constructed, that the meanings we attribute to reality are historical products and constructed through the medium of language (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988). This position indicates a shift from the modernist claims to discovering objective reality and truth or the notion that language is a 'true' representation or reflection of reality. Postmodernism is not, however, an anti-modern or anti-science development (Larsen, 1990; Levett, 1990). Rather, it takes up elements of modernity and places them in new discursive contexts (Kvale, 1992b; Larsen 1990). It is thus an attempt to "rethink" modern notions of experience, truth, meaning and the individual (Eagleton 1992, November 6, p. 27).

Postmodern psychology poses a challenge to the individualism of modern psychology. It rejects the concept of a unitary and essentialised subject, and the notion of the self at the centre of the world (Kvale, 1992b). Postmodernism argues instead for a decentred, relational

\(^5\) The term itself is controversial. Jameson (1984), for example, sees current trends in terms of the culture of late (consumer) capitalism.
view of subjectivity. The subject of modernity is replaced by one which is “provisional, contingent and constructed ... a subject whose self-identity is constituted and reconstituted relationally” (Kvale, 1992b, p. 14). The postmodern view undermines essentialist approaches to national identity, as well as any notion of the nation as a ‘real’, ‘natural’ and transhistorical entity. Identity, it is argued, is developed and shaped within the social context of language which provides meaning and understanding of what is real. In postmodernity, it is argued, this context is characterised by the “forces of saturation ... a multiplicity of incoherent and unrelated languages of the self” (Gergen, 1991, p. 6) ever expanding in the presence of globilisation, transnational corporations and emerging new technologies. In this “multispectival” reality where identity is in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction the idea of a stable national identity becomes problematic. The prospect of uncovering the ‘reality’ of the or a nation is undermined when what is presented as “national reality” in media representations of the political arena, a primary site of identification, “is not a picture of ‘what is the case’” but a “massive linguistic construction” (Gergen, 1991, p. 121). In this view the focus of interest is no longer upon attempting to discern a ‘true’ national identity or national characteristics but upon the shifting perspectives within which they are constructed (Gergen, 1991). There is no likelihood of moving beyond these constructions to what is ‘real’. Thus, in contrast with the earlier psychoanalytic or Marxist pursuance of the deeper meanings of sexual or economic forces, postmodern approaches are concerned primarily with surface phenomenon (Kvale, 1992c).

Social constructionist work in the field of psychology (see Gergen 1973; 1985; see also the earlier work of Berger and Luckmann, 1971) is related to, and draws heavily on, the terminology of postmodernism (Kitzinger, 1992). Constructionism’s central concern is with understanding the ways in which language and social categories, commonly taken for granted
as real or natural (Levett, 1990), construct individual subjectivity. Simultaneously it is concerned with the ways in which these categories are themselves socially constructed in discourse (Kitzinger, 1992).

Social constructionists argue that identity is a social and historical construct produced within historically specific discourses or texts: ideologies, systems of language, explanations and social practices (Levett, 1989; Kitzinger, 1992). The introduction to a recent social constructionist text (Shotter & Gergen, 1989, p. ix) provides a succinct passage describing this view:

The primary medium within which identities are created and have their currency is not just linguistic but textual: persons are largely ascribed identities according to the manner of their embedding within a discourse - in their own or in the discourses of others. In this way cultural texts furnish their 'inhabitants' with the resources for the formation of selves; they lay out an array of enabling potentials, while simultaneously establishing a set of constraining boundaries beyond which selves cannot be easily made.

For social constructionists, it is evident, language is not a neutral medium. It is involved in the very construction of social categories and the "ascription" of identities. This approach questions the view that what are taken to be 'facts' or objective knowledge of the world are neutral. It is argued that knowledge is linked with power and always involves interpretation (Levett, 1989).

This relationship between power and knowledge is emphasised in post-structuralism, a perspective which falls within the postmodern movement but, as its name implies, retains
some of the positivistic undertones of structuralism. In contrast with the social constructionist view cited above, it is little concerned with the role of active agency in identity construction (Burman & Parker, 1993; Fairclough, 1992). Post-structuralism, in particular the work of Michel Foucault, is concerned with the historical production of subject forms within power/knowledge relations: that is, the ways in which peoples' subjectivities are produced within discourses, history and relations of power (Hollway, 1984; 1989).

Discourses (“systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements but not others to occur at particular times, places and institutional locations”) constitute, transform and reproduce both subjects and social objects, such as ‘the nation’ (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 40 & 41). In this sense discourses have a reality and organisation beyond the individual (Parker, 1989): they ‘position’ individuals within or ‘subject’ them to “regimes of meaning” (Lather, 1992, p. 88). In this way discourses are reproductive of power relations.

The social category of national identity may thus be seen as an “effect of discursive processes involving power” and the central problem for investigation then becomes understanding how and with what consequences such categories are constituted. (Sampson, 1993, p. 1223). Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge suggests that power is implicated in the control of the very terms by which discourses about identity are maintained. Power is implicated in the positioning or subjection of people within discourse and, it is argued, social categories such as ‘the nation’ are constituted within discourse in such a way as to maintain particular power differentials within and between groups (Sampson, 1993). The research questions raised within this perspective revolve around investigating why social identities are constituted in certain ways, for what purposes, and for whom (Sampson, 1993).
The postmodern movement raises a number of controversial issues for psychology, which cannot be dealt with here. One major criticism of concern to studies of national identity is that of rampant relativism (Gergen, 1985) highlighted in the following extracts from a feminist critique (Burman, 1990, pp 217 & 214):

postmodernism is characterised by a political apathy and disengagement that itself mocks politics as post ... the subject is depicted as alienated from a collective politics as able to sustain only a momentary criticality and as ultimately stranded in a timeless present that maintains and constitutes itself only by carnivalesque allusion to past genres.

The difficulty which arises here is that ‘real’ material interests and relations of power which may underlie the development of a national identity are sidelined. This point is particularly salient in the South African context where the emergence of a ‘new’ nation is inextricably bound up with historical and changing relations of power. The emerging new nation is a ‘site of struggle’ for power and conflicting material interests. Parker (1989, p. 140) has argued that the strengths of post-structuralism should not be allowed to disappear under the “postmodern illusion” that language is free from ideology and power. A discursive analysis of national identity in South Africa then should be ‘anchored’ in an analysis of ideology and power relations and if Jameson’s (1984) contention that postmodernism is no more than late capitalism is accepted, an understanding of the material realities within which South African is being constituted.
Discourse Analysis in Psychology

The complex cultural and political movement within which the recent 'turn to language' and, more specifically, discourse analysis arise provides a context for an alternative approach to understanding national identity. The 'turn' is itself complex and multidirectional and, within psychology, the strands of discourse analysis which have developed are numerous and varied (Potter, Edwards, & Wetherell, 1993). Indeed, considerable confusion surrounds the meaning of 'discourse' largely as a result of its concurrent and proliferate development within a number of different disciplines and philosophical and theoretical frameworks (Levett, 1988; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). The term can, therefore, assume very different meanings and it is difficult to speak of 'discourse' or 'discourse analysis' in a unitary sense.

In a paper evaluating the role of discourse analysis Burman (1991, p. 326) suggests that insofar as there is any cohesiveness between the various approaches it is in their common concern with the "significance and structuring effects of language" and their "interpretative and reflexive styles of analysis".

The history and development of the different strands is detailed in several texts and articles (see for example Burman, 1991; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Parker, 1990; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter et al, 1993; Potter et al, 1990). Within psychology four major strands of discourse analysis have emerged. (Potter et al, 1990; Potter et al, 1993).

First, there is the strand concerned with discourse processes and cognition (see for example, Van Dijk, 1988). A second strand draws on Austin's (1962) speech act theory and is concerned with providing a systematic account of the organisation of verbal interaction in different social contexts (for example Coulthard & Montgomery, 1981). Third there is a position which works within the framework of semiology and post-structuralism attributable
to European ("Continental") philosophers such as Foucault and Derrida (see for example Parker, 1990; 1992). This group, I have noted above, views discourse as a social practice, constructing frameworks of meaning within which knowledge and subjectivity are constituted. This third approach is sometimes augmented with psychoanalytic theory such as that of Lacan (Burman, 1991; see for example Hollway, 1984; 1989; Frosh, 1989a). Lastly, there is a strand developing within the sociology of science partly as a consequence of methodological issues around the role of discourse in research methods (see Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984).

As Edwards and Potter (1992) point out, discourse analysis is not simply the sum of these strands since there are differences between them to the extent that they are sometimes in conflict. To narrow this field, I shall mention here only two perspectives which have been overtly concerned with issues in social psychology and which have focused on topics of clear relevance to the study of national identity. The perspectives concerned are those of Potter and Wetherell (1987) (see also Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter et al, 1993; Potter et al, 1990; Wetherell & Potter, 1988; 1992) and Parker (1992; 1990; 1989; see also Burman & Parker, 1993; Burman, 1990). The former perspective draws on ethnomethodology and the sociology of science as well as features of "Continental" work. It is influenced by conversation analysis (see Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) and emphasises the importance of the social constructionist processes (see Gergen, 1985) I have referred to above. In addition, the perspective makes use of developments in the related field of rhetorical studies (Billig, 1987). Parker's perspective is informed by post-structuralism and emphasises the need to ground discourse analysis in considerations of issues of ideology and power.
Whilst there are areas of agreement between these two social psychological approaches there are areas of conflict particularly with regard to Potter and Wetherell's (1987) earlier work. These differences were aired in an issue of Philosophical Psychology (1990, 3 (2), 189-217). Debate occurred about different understandings of the meaning of 'discourse' and approaches to analytical method. A central issue which arises is around the constructed and constructive nature of discourse. Potter and Wetherell's approach is criticised for laying too much emphasis on the rhetorical strategies of speakers and positing an overly voluntaristic formulation of agency. Their perspective, it is argued, neglects (despite their allusions to semiotics and post-structuralism) to account for the systematic and coercive nature of discourse, the role of ideology and unequal power relations (Bower, 1988; Bhavnani, 1991).

Parker's approach, on the other hand, is criticised for its reification of discourse ignoring the variable ways in which discourse is actively organised and deployed in particular contexts (Potter et al, 1990).

An analysis of the ways in which political speakers construct or reconstruct versions of the 'new' South African national identity, I would argue, should necessarily draw on the strengths of both these perspectives. On the one hand discursive practice occurs within the framework of institutionalised discourses, social and political divisions, ideology and particular relations of power. The ways in which the speaker is subjected or positioned by discourse should not, therefore, be neglected. On the other hand, it may be argued that a focus on the constitutive properties of discourse obscures the agentic capabilities of subjects and their actual discursive practices (Fairclough, 1992). It is important, then, to consider the rhetorical strategies or 'wicraft' (Billig, 1987) of the speakers, the linguistic resources upon which they draw and the variable, contextually specific ways in which they use such resources.
In a later work on racism Wetherell and Potter (1992) are concerned with developing a theory and method for the analysis of discourse which brings together elements of both perspectives. Their approach thus suggests itself as an appropriate one for the analysis of constructions of national identity and I shall focus primarily on this work in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN

A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS APPROACH TO NATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

To know anything is to know in terms of one or more discourses
Davies and Harré (1990)

The fundamental assumption of a discourse approach to national identity is that discourse actively constitutes social and psychological processes\(^1\). Here discourse is taken to include “meanings, conversations, narratives, explanations, accounts and anecdotes” (Wetherell and Potter 1992, pp 2-3 & 59). It is stressed that, “discourse is not partially constitutive or only constitutive under some conditions but is thoroughly constitutive’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 62). To cite Martin’s (1993, p. 26) narrative account:

...identities by themselves do not exist, they are constructed by identity narratives which attempt at imagining communities to lock up human groups within fantasmatic boundaries in order to mobilise them ...

In this way discourse analysis departs radically from those perspectives discussed in the previous chapter(s). The social field is not seen as a pregiven structure of social groups and other divisions. The “meaning and definition” of social categories is variable, changing in different discursive contexts (Wetherell and Potter 1992, p 77). Categories are thus primarily social entities which are actively constructed in discourse for rhetorical purposes. The idea of

\(^1\)It should be stressed here that this division between ‘social’ and ‘psychological’ is regarded as a discursive construction (Sampson, 1993).
variability, flexibility and fluidity proposed in this perspective challenges the mechanistic notion of consistency between category descriptions implied in (cognitive) prototype theory (Ullah, 1990). Indeed, the way in which cognitive processes such as categorisation are constituted through language (Billig 1991; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) is not considered in, for example, Social Identity Theory where language is viewed as just another variable in the process of identification.

For discourse analysis discourse is not simply a medium which reflects or expresses pre-existing psychological or social realities. In a very real sense, words are deeds (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) actively constructive of those realities. Discursive practice is not easily separated from action, subjectivity and social processes (Wetherell & Potter 1992).

A discourse analysis theory of national identity suggests, then, that identity is a discursive, situated product (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Davies & Harré, 1990). It is constituted within historically specific cultural and ideological practices of language and communication, within the narratives and counter-narratives which construct the ‘imagined community’ of the nation. (Sampson, 1993; Martin, 1993; Bhabha, 1990). “Identity narratives” are implicated in the production of national identity through a number of possible processes: political emotions (pride or fear) are channelled in support of attempts to shift a balance of power through the selection of events which make up the broad experience of a group; perceptions of past and present are altered; social groups are created or reformed; cultures are changed emphasising certain elements and shifting their meanings (Martin, 1993, p. 17).

Discourse, then, is implicated in the construction of particular ‘versions’ of nations and, in the context of power relations, in the establishment of certain versions and the simultaneous undermining of others. (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). The discourse of nation establishes an
understanding of a collective and distinctive “we” sharing a common fate within a shared space (Anderson, 1983; Achard, 1993) defined dialectically against the ‘Other’ (Martin, 1993; Miles, 1989). It constructs a version of “national characteristics” (Peabody, 1985), a set of national personality traits and attitudes as well as an array of rituals, icons and symbols distinct from those of the Other (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). It takes the personal, the local, the familiar, the small-scale and “writes them large as a global ‘corporate’ identity” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 141).

The argument, in the foregoing, that discourse is “thoroughly constitutive” of versions of our social and psychological reality may be construed as implying that nations “do not ‘exist’”, that they are nothing but discourse (Hogg, 1992, p. 76). It should be stressed that a discourse approach does not deny reality nor does it suggest that the objects of discourse analysis are reducible to words alone (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). The primary focus in this study on discourse and the discursive practices through which a national identity is formed, is not intended to infer that these are the only practices involved in the building of a nation. Clearly, a nation is also constructed within other practices: political, economic, material (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). In South Africa the human suffering and frequently fatal violent clashes which followed upon the National Party government’s policy of forced removals and “influx control” in the construction of “homelands” and “independent nations”, provide but one example of the material reality of nationalism. Similarly O’Meara (1983) has documented the relationship between the development of Afrikaner nationalism and the forces of economic or class interests. It is important, however, to emphasise the crucial role that discourse plays in such practices. It is the construction of separate and discrete “nations” or “races” in discourse which provides a basis for their legitimation (Posel, 1984; 1987). It is through discourse that particular events, people, symbols and icons, the basic categories with
which we identify, are imbued with meanings and which form the building blocks of a nation. In this way discourse becomes inextricably involved in the construction of material reality, that is, in how we understand and experience that reality. Ultimately, there is "no meaning to reality behind discourses which discourse represents" (Sampson, 1993, p. 1222).

The theory that discourse is "thoroughly constitutive" of identity also carries with it the implication that there is a simple determinism between discourse and the "ascription" (Shotter & Gergen, 1989, p. ix) of identity. In other words, what space is there for agency or individual choice in the face of the constitutive or 'subjective' force of discourse? A discursive approach to this complex issue suggests that choice occurs within certain constraints. Shotter and Gergen's (1989, p. ix) statement from a social constructionist position (cited above) argues that while discourse or "texts" provide the potential resources from which identity may be constructed, it simultaneously establishes "a set of constraining boundaries beyond which selves cannot be easily made". Discursive practices, in post-structuralist terms, "position" people within multiple and sometimes competing discourses.

Nonetheless, it is argued that people remain capable of "exercising choice in relation to [discursive] practices" (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 46) though it is important in this respect to retain the psychoanalytic perspective that the individual exercise of "choice" may be unconsciously mediated (see Frosh, 1987; Elliot, 1992). Individuals may be unwilling or unable to position themselves (or be positioned) in a discursive practice (Harré and Van Langenhove, 1991). For whatever reason, they may choose not to "invest" (Hollway, 1984) in a discourse. This point is of particular salience in the South African context where, historically, the discourse of the 'South African nation' was constructed to exclude those who
were not of European descent or where, in the period under study, certain Afrikaner groups choose not to align themselves with a ‘new’ South African identity.

In brief a discursive theory of national identity suggests that identity is constructed, achieved, or accomplished through discursive acts. The identity constructed in discourse at any given point is seen as “a sedimentation of past discursive practices” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 78). That is, identity is constructed from the array of “interpretative resources”, the narratives of national identity, which are available or accessible within a particular socio-cultural framework (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 78). This process of construction is constrained by other practices: social, political, economic, material. There are three points to be stressed here.

• The construction of identity takes place only within the framework of available narratives thus delimiting the range of choice.

• Identity construction is interwoven with, and constrained by, other social practices such that different identities will be constructed dependent on the “set of social relations” within which the individual is positioned. Hence the possibility of ‘individual differences’ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, pp. 78 & 79).

• The argument for theorising identity as the “sedimentation of discursive practice over time” provides for some sense of continuity to identity. In other words, identity is not necessarily constructed anew in each discursive situation. However, a discursive approach stresses “fluidity, flexibility and variability” in identity construction (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 79). Individuals are continually “dislocated / disembodied” in a
process of social changes which presents the possibility of new versions of identity (Campbell, Maré & Walker, 1993, p. 4).

It remains to provide an account of how and why certain narratives become available while others do not, and with what consequences, and to account for the different choices which individuals make within this narrative frame. In order to do this, it is necessary to 'ground' a discursive approach to identity construction in an understanding of ideology and power.

The role of ideology

Ideology is one of the most elusive, complex and controversial concepts in the social sciences (Billig, 1990a; Billig et al, 1988) and may be understood in a number of different ways. In post-structuralist arguments it is rejected and elsewhere declared irrelevant in "post-industrial society" (Parker, 1989, p. 24). The debates around this concept will not be entered into here (see for example Thompson, 1984; 1987; Billig, 1991; Foster, 1991b or Parker, 1989 for summaries and discussions of different approaches). Following Parker (1989, p. 24) I would suggest that it is an important concept which, despite post-structuralist arguments to the contrary, should be retained for "political purposes" (Parker, 1989, p. 24). It is implicated in the development of nations in general (see NoSizwe, 1979; Alexander, 1986) and, in particular, in the group divisions and forms of domination and oppression in South Africa (Foster, 1991b). I shall here briefly discuss the role of the concept in a discursive approach to identity construction.

Discourse analysts are critical of two common approaches to understanding ideology. The first is a "positive" or "neutral" approach which regards the concept simply as "systems of beliefs", "systems of thought" or "symbolic practices" which are the "normative glue" of a
Discursive identity

given society. This approach draws upon the theory of social representations. It is a view criticised for its lack of a "critical edge" or conception of the coercive nature of ideology.

The other position regards ideology as an "illusion" or "system of lies" and draws on an early Marxist notion of ideology as an inverted or distorted image of what is 'real'. This view is rejected since it fails to account for the constitutive role played by ideology and discourse in what is 'real' (Parker, 1989, p. 60; Thompson, 1984, pp. 4-5; Wetherell & Potter 1992).

Discourse analysts (Parker, 1989; 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) tend rather to draw upon a "critical" or "negative" approach to the concept (Thompson, 1987). This approach seeks to retain a strongly critical perspective and a concern with the restrictive and coercive effects of ideology (Parker, 1989). It focuses on the ways in which ideology is implicated in the operations of power and how it serves to maintain asymmetrical relations of power or domination. Ideology is taken to be more than a 'set of beliefs'. It is understood as "the effects of power relations in discourses and texts" and these historically specific power relations are indicated through conflicts over meaning (Parker 1989, p. 25). An analysis of ideology, in this view, is concerned with the ways in which meaning is mobilised to serve the interests of powerful groups (Thompson, 1987) rather than with the evaluation of content. Ideology is not construed here as a "thing" but as "a description of relationships and effects" (Parker, 1992, p. 20) (emphases in original).

Wetherell and Potter (1992 p. 33) conclude that the primary advantage conveyed in the concept of ideology is "the basic premise that knowledge, talk and texts are bound up with social and material processes and the emphasis on historical analysis." Ideological discourse, along with other social practices, has powerful constitutive effects and visible, material consequences (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Ideology works through various institutions, the
media and educational systems to reproduce society and legitimate and maintain particular social and economic relations. It actively constitutes subject positions and new social identities including national identity, in accordance with particular relations of power (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Coetzee, 1990). It should be stressed that, in this view, not all discourses are ideological (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Parker 1992). Though discourse is seen as 'thoroughly constitutive' it does not follow that every account of social relations is ideological. Ideological discourse is distinguished by its relations with other social practices and its involvement in relations of power (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 61) further theorise ideology as a form of "practical action" instantiated in a variety of discursive and textual forms. Ideology in this approach, they argue, is a pervasive discursive practice inseparable from other social practices, permeating every aspect of the social, economic and political structures. Moreover, ideology is no longer seen in terms of a coherent system but, as fragmented, dilemmatic or contradictory (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Billig 1991; Billig et al, 1988). In adopting this approach, Wetherell and Potter (1992), while accepting the argument that ideological discourse 'positions' its subjects, propose that due consideration be given to the ways in which such discourse is used by speakers in discursive action. Hence the focus of study shifts from ideology to "ideological practice". But this view is qualified with the warning "not to overdo difference, flexibility and variability" and to "acknowledge areas of fixity and hegemony" in ideological discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 173).

**Discursive Power**

It is appropriate at this point to discuss briefly the concept of discursive power. The construction of national identity is inextricably bound up with issues of power and the
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legitimation of particular relations of power and a consideration of the meaning of the concept is therefore important to this analysis. An exhaustive treatment of the topic cannot be undertaken here, for it is a wide and complex one (for some examples of different approaches to understanding power see Thompson, 1984; Parker 1989; 1992, Henriques et al, 1984; Fairclough, 1989; Foucault, 1982; Therborn, 1980). I aim only to consider an issue raised by Wetherell and Potter (1992). This issue is important in understanding power in the analysis of discourse and concerns the tension between Marxist and Foucaultian power analyses.

The discursive conceptualisation of national identity outlined above draws on post-structuralist (and specifically Foucaultian) formulations of the relationship between power and identity or subjectivity. Post-structuralism implicates power in the 'subjectification' of people to the forms of identity instantiated in discourse. The focus of study within this perspective is on “the “how” of power”, that is, the “means” by which it is exercised, and its effects (Foucault, 1982, p. 786). The perspective contrasts with Marxist ideological approaches which are primarily concerned with uncovering causal relationships between social groups and with locating power with particular agents and structures (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

Foucault approaches ideological accounts with some circumspection. He argues that the concept wrongly implies that it is somehow possible to take up a privileged position outside ideology and reveal the ‘true’ history of society or the direction of power relations (Foucault, 1980; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). An ideological account suggests that some group stands outside ideological discourse. In Foucault’s view all knowledge is constituted through discursive formations (where such formations are not the property of a particular group) and there is thus no position outside discourse or what he conceptualises as ‘power/knowledge’ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Power in this view works through knowledge, through the
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“identification of new categories of people and new methods of assessment and surveillance of populations” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 83). Power produces ‘subjects’ (Foucalt, 1982). It forms categories of people and defines what is normal or deviant. Power is thus no longer seen as simply repressive but also as a potentially positive and productive network which runs through the whole social body” (Foucalt, 1980 p. 119). It is thus not possessed by particular groups, it is “never localised here or there” but “circulates” throughout society, its structures and practices (Foucalt, 1980, p. 98). Power is thus not necessarily unilateral or monolithic and may also become implicated in acts of resistance (Henriques et al 1984; Foucalt, 1982).

Foucault’s perspective is unquestionably useful in the analysis of discourse but it has been pointed out that the approach looses its potential critical power in proposing a version of power that seems to have neither agent nor object. It does not seem to “exist” in any substantive sense and that cannot be located anywhere (Paternek, 1987, p. 99 & ff). His version has been described as an entity that is “dislocated to become a type of Hegelian Spirit wandering through time” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 86). Marxist approaches by contrast ‘anchor’ the concept by retaining the notion of power as possessed by certain groups and exerted by such groups over those who are relatively powerless. In this view, it is argued, there is an identifiable direction of domination and the object of study becomes “who did what to whom and why” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 80). For example, Marxist accounts of the development of national identity in South Africa (NoSizwe, 1979; Alexander, 1986) show how the discourse of nation legitimates the exploitation and oppression of broad sections of the population while furthering the interests of another. In this way particular strategies and a direction of domination becomes apparent. The power of ideology (Therborn, 1980) also remains important in this formulation viewed as a means through which domination can be
maintained, legitimated or justified (of course, in the South African context the means of domination also included violence and other forms of coercion).

In theorising the role of power in the constitution of national identity I wish to follow Wetherell and Potter’s (1992, p. 86) argument that there is a need, if a satisfactory account is to be provided, to cover both the “established” and “constitutive” aspects of discourse, in other words to consider “both the constitution of groups and groups as constitutive”. Such an account, following Foucault’s approach, should show how the social group or category of nation is formed in discourse and consider how power is generated in that process. At the same time the account should be ‘anchored’ in terms of history, existing social relations, material interests and ideological practice. In the view of Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 86):

In analyzing establishment it is possible to talk of directions of domination, of past campaigns, of interests which are served, of power which is located and possessed, and to invoke some of the functional apparatus and articulations of practices, so well described in Marxist theory.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have outlined a discursive approach to the topic of national identity which will inform the method and analysis work to follow. While the emphasis in this perspective is on discursive construction it is not suggested that that is all there is to national identity. The discursive construction of national identity is inextricably bound up with other social practices and real material interests. The analysis of national identity in this perspective is therefore rooted in a consideration of ideological effects and relations of power.
The approach is based primarily in the work of Wetherell and Potter (1992) which suggests itself as most applicable to studying the ways in which national identity is constructed in political discourse. Drawing on post-structuralism it argues for the role of historically evolved discourses in the constitution of identity and the 'subjectification' of speakers. But along side the notion of discourse as systematised and coercive Wetherell and Potter seek to address the “social psychological” issue (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 89) of discourse actively constructed for specific purposes by speakers in different contexts. Thus while endorsing, to a large extent, the post-structuralist view of discourses in an abstract sense, as “causal agents in their own right”, considerable emphasis is placed on the social practice of discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 90). The analytical consequences of this view for considering political discourse would be a shift away from attempting to discern ‘discourses’, and the relations between them, in texts to a concern with how these discourses are used in actual situations, that is, how they are organised rhetorically (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This methodological approach will be taken up in the next chapter.
CHAPTER EIGHT

ANALYZING DISCOURSE: ‘METHOD’

Much of the work of discourse analysis is a craft skill, something like bicycle riding or chicken sexing that is not easy to render or describe in an explicit or codified manner. Wetherell and Potter (1992)

This chapter is concerned with setting out the ‘method’ employed in this study in the analysis of right-wing political discourses of national identity. It is important to assert at the outset, however, that there is no definitive analytic ‘method’ or set of procedures for discourse analysis in the sense that there is in more traditional quantitative, positivist methodologies (Parker, 1992; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Indeed discourse analysis “explicitly resists generalised description or easy ‘how-to-do-it rules’” (Parker & Burman, 1993, p. 161). Potter and Wetherell’s (1987, p. 168) seminal text, for example, balks at the task of providing an abstract description of the discourse analysis process (“words fail us at this point”) and resort to the suggestion that discourse analysis is “like riding a bicycle”. Discourse analysis has, in consequence occasionally attracted such adjectives as “bewildering” (Parker, 1990b) and “incomprehensible” (Parker & Burman, 1993). Several discourse analysts, from differing perspectives, have cautiously offered aids to minimise the difficulties around discourse analysis, including: Potter & Wetherell’s (1987, p. 160 ff.) “ten stages”, Parker’s (1992, 1990b) “seven criteria” and Fairclough’s (1992) “guidelines”.

The ‘method’ set out in this chapter should be understood in this context. The steps followed should not be regarded as discrete or sequential, but as interwoven parts of an analytical process (Potter Wetherell, 1987) informed by the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter and driven by the specific nature and needs of this study. The approach is

**Resources**

Following the aims and objectives detailed in Chapter One, the primary resources drawn upon in this analysis are the representations, meanings, rhetoric, arguments, explanations, justifications, accounts and attempts at “making sense” presented by political speakers in parliamentary and other public domains. The main sites of study are parliamentary and other political speeches, debates, and interviews publicised through the media of radio and television, newspapers and magazines, books and Hansard. The focus will be on the discourse of “new Nationalists” (De Klerk, February 3, 1994), particularly that of former President and Nationalist Party leader F.W. De Klerk. But the analysis will also draw on rhetoric of far-right and liberal elements for comparative and historical purposes. The period covered begins on February 2, 1990 when former President F. W. De Klerk, in his parliamentary address, committed his government to the negotiation of a democratic dispensation and a “new South Africa” (Hansard, 1990, vol. 16, p. 3). It ends in 1994 with the coming to power of South Africa’s first democratically elected government.

An archive of material was gathered drawing primarily on the following sources:

- Presidential addresses on the opening of parliament (Hansard and television broadcasts)
- Other relevant parliamentary debates (Hansard)
Method

- Political speeches marking particular occasions such as the 'national' referendum and other politically significant moments (Newspaper reports and radio and television broadcasts).

- First and Second Plenary sessions of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Official transcription record).

- Interviews and debates televised on the South African Broadcasting Corporation TV1 programme "Agenda".

- Collections and selections of interviews and speeches published by various researchers in social science.

- Political pamphlets and newspaper advertisements issued by the National Party

- Party manifestos and draft constitutional proposals

- Government publications (for example, Official Yearbook)

The 'data' in this study were therefore collected from a variety of natural records. The search was aimed at records and documents around specific historical events but also tracked television broadcasts and news reports on a day-to-day basis selecting material concerned with issues of group identity.

There are a number of advantages to analysing natural records of this kind. They provide an extensive, varied and convenient source. Material collected from such a variety of different sources allows for a much wider variation in accounts. Debates and discussions, in particular,

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1 National identity is a pervasive topic, arising in many, sometimes obscure, forms and in a wide variety of contexts of discussion. To reduce the 'data' to a manageable size, sources which were overtly concerned with issues of group identity or which suggested that they might potentially deal with such issues were selected.
Method

admit the possibility of different political speakers attempting to undermine each other's accounts, a source of variation which may, in itself, go some way to revealing how a version of national identity is constructed. Further, in contrast, say, to conducting interviews, the researcher has no influence on the data itself (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

There are also possible limitations. It cannot, for example, be assumed that an individual speaker has “sovereign control” over his or her talk (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 171). Journalists mediate and transform what politicians actually say (Wilson, 1990), a point to bear in mind when analysing newspaper reports. Television interviews may be scripted and preplanned and may therefore be the result of collaborative and collective efforts (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Heritage, 1985) as may be political speeches. Further, some loss of meaning may occur where Afrikaans speeches have been translated into English, for example in parliamentary debates recorded in Hansard. However, since this study is concerned with constructed versions of national identity as they are presented in the public domain the issue of individual control is unimportant. I have, in any event, proceeded on the assumption that where a reported version is seriously at odds with that which a speaker ‘actually’ gave, he, she or the political group represented would demand a retraction or correction. Press reports have been monitored accordingly. Equally, since this study is primarily concerned with the broad interpretative resources used by speakers rather than the finer linguistic aspects of their speech, the loss or distortion of the latter through crude reportage or translation will not significantly effect the analysis.

With regard to the selection of a ‘sample’, the focus has been largely on the constructions of national identity by “new” Nationalists. However, for analytical purposes comparison may also be made with the rhetoric of far-right as well as liberal or left-wing groups. The sample thus includes, the following bodies:
• African National Congress (ANC)
• Afrikanerweerstandsbeweging (AWB)
• Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU)
• Conservative Party (CP)
• Democratic Party (DP)
• Freedom Front (FF)
• Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)
• Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
• National Party (NP)

Lastly, an important observation should be made here with regard to 'data' and 'sample' size in discourse oriented research. Discourse analysis is an extremely labour intensive exercise involving the reading and rereading large volumes of material. An overly large sample may lead to the researcher being overwhelmed by too much data, failing to attend to the details of the text and therefore losing the quality of data. A balance is therefore required between the needs specified by the research question and the exigencies of a thorough analysis. Potter and Wetherell (1987, p. 161) point out that, for discourse analysts, the success of a study "is not in the least dependent on sample size" (emphasis in original). An increase in the volume of data, it is argued, may add to the workload but nothing to the analysis. In some research of this kind, a single piece of text has been used as the sole 'data' source (see for example Potter, Stringer, & Wetherell, 1984). The approach differs from more traditional quantitative methods where sample type and size are closely linked to validity reliability and the
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generalisation of results. In discourse analysis generalisability is more dependent on the reader's assessment of the value and potential consequences of the analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Coding and transcription

All of the collected material was transcribed on to a personal computer using a standard word-processing package (Microsoft Word 6). The first stage in this process involved crudely containing and focusing the 'data' by creating a list of words and short phrases which frequently signalled the topic of national identity. There were two sources for this word list: reading of the social science literature on national identity and some of the earlier transcripts themselves. In the latter case, a computer programme specifically designed to compile wordlists (Oxford Concordance Programme) was used. The wordlist served as a guide in locating relevant sections of text within the bulk of the transcripts. The word-processing package was used to search for listed words. Where a word was found, the surrounding text was read and if appropriate, marked for the next stage. The wordlist was also useful in selecting which interviews, speeches or reports to work with in the first place. The process here is cyclical (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) with searches through the transcripts providing new insights into what types of new sources warranted consideration. New sources in turn added terms to the wordlist.

The next stage (an integral part of a process rather than a discrete step) involved coding the broad 'themes' which emerged during the search. The process of 'identification' of these themes developed out of prior reading in the field of national identity as well as the reading and rereading of transcripts. Using a simple macro and the windows facility of the word-processor relevant chunks of text were copied into separate computer files. Each section was
allocated a code indicating source, date, political party affiliation (where applicable) and theme. Where more than one theme was apparent codes were appended accordingly. Hence some sections of text were allocated several thematic codes. In this way, a number of files was set up by theme. In addition, a main file was maintained containing all transcripts and reflecting the allocated codes. The object of this procedure was to sort the ‘data’ into a manageable form without severing the relevant sections from their original context. It remained possible at all times to locate a specific piece of text within the body of its original speech or interview and to keep track of the other ‘themes’ to which it had been linked. Again, it is important to see this stage as part of a cyclical process. As the analysis of the text proceeds, different perspectives and understandings emerge as to what relates to the topic of national identity, requiring repeated amendments to the coding.

A general point about discourse analysis and coding should be made. The coding of a text is not an analytic procedure in the sense that it is for standard content analytic methods. In the latter, coding, categorisation and the quantification of frequency occurrence is equivalent to the analysis itself (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). In discourse analysis, the process has the purely practical objective of collecting and marking data for later analysis. The aim here is to gather a body of instances for analysis as “inclusively” as possible (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 167) without attempting to delimit the data. In this approach, elements of the text which seem only vaguely related to the research question will be coded and included.

Analytical scheme

In keeping with the need to provide an analysis of discursive practices within their social, historical and ideological context I have adopted a scheme which will give form to the
analytic process itself. To this end, I shall follow the three broad phases for ideological analysis set out by Thompson (1984; 1987).

The first phase Thompson (1987, p. 525) describes as *social-historical analysis*. At this stage the analyst should contextualise the discourse within the specific social-historical conditions which position the speaker or speakers. Attention should be given to institutional arrangements as well as the relations of power and domination which the discourse serves to maintain. This phase will begin in the next chapter which will provide a brief historical context of the development of the 'South African nation'.

The second phase is described as a *formal or discursive analysis* (Thompson, 1987, p. 526). This step involves a systematic analysis of discourse from various sources and considering both content and form. This analysis will be carried out in Chapters ten, eleven and twelve.

The analytical procedure to be followed in this study is that set out in the remainder of this chapter.

The final phase is concerned with *interpretation or the creative construction of meaning* (Thompson, 1987, p. 528). Here Thompson proposes the important step of connecting the analytic process of phase two with that of phase one. The process involves revealing the connection between meaning mobilised in discourse and the power relations it serves to sustain, cementing the discursive analysis and the social-historic analysis of the conditions within which the discourse is produced. Part of the process of analysing the ways in which meaning may serve to maintain relations of domination, Thompson (1987, p. 521) suggests, is to identify the "modalities" through which ideology operates. These modalities are: legitimisation, dissimulation, fragmentation and reification.
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Thompson (1987, p. 528) also stresses the need at this stage to analyse the "effect" of the meanings mobilised in the discourse of political speakers by showing how political rhetoric is understood and interpreted by the individuals who receive it. This point is an important one but goes beyond the aims of the present study. It could well be taken up in a subsequent study.

Lastly, it is important to note that these phases are not discrete or sequential but interwoven parts of an interpretative process (Thompson, 1987). In this respect, the short 'history' which will be provided in the next chapter cannot simply be regarded as an objective framework for the ensuing analysis, but is itself an interpretation or construction (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

Discursive Analysis

Following phase two of Thompson's scheme this section will consider the process of the analysis itself. I shall discuss the analytic 'tool' which will be applied, provide an outline of the discourse analytic 'procedure', and consider the related practical issues of 'intuition' and reflexivity.

The analytic 'tools':
Discourses and interpretative repertoires

A significant issue that arises in discourse analytic practice is the choice of an analytical "unit" or "tool" (Wetherell & Potter, 1988, pp. 169 & 172). Two such "tools" are: 'interpretative repertoires' (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and 'discourses' (Parker 1992; 1989; Henriques et al, 1984). There are similarities between these concepts (Parker, 1992), and frequently they are used interchangeably (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), but they do reflect different analytical emphases
Method

and concerns. The discourse analyst is advised, therefore, to "be consistent in [the] choice of
and uses of" the terms (Parker, 1992, p.126).

Discourse

Parker (1990b;1992) uses the term 'discourse' drawing closely on post-structuralist,
and particularly Foucaultian work. He defines discourse as "a system of statements which
constructs an object" (p. 5)\(^2\). Notwithstanding the value of the theory underlying this
definition, Parker's approach has certain problematical implications for analytic practice. It
has been criticised for "reifying discourse" (Parker & Burman, 1993, p. 162; Potter et al,
1990) and promoting a form of discourse analysis equivalent to

the geology of plate tectonics - a patchwork of plates/discourses ... understood to be
grinding violently together, causing earthquakes and volcanoes, or sometimes sliding
silently one underneath the other (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 90).

Discourses in this formulation are depicted as abstracted and autonomous systems of meaning
which appear detached from the social practice of discourse use (Parker & Burman, 1993).
The task of the analyst is to identify 'discourses' within a given text and to consider how
those 'discourses' work with or against each other in the abstract. Further, the analyst may be
concerned with the processes by which the "statements" of a discourse produce objects and
subjects (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In this approach, little emphasis is placed on how
discourses are used in real contexts.

\(^2\)Discourse is defined by Potter & Wetherell (1987, p. 7) as "all forms of spoken interaction, formal and
informal, and written texts of all kinds". This definition differs from Parker's in that it omits any sense of
system, structure and organisation in discourse (Parker, 1989). These attributes are raised in the context of
interpretative repertoires discussed below.
Method

Interpretative repertoires

Proponents of 'interpretative repertoires' (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) as an analytical concept do not reject the term ‘discourse’ but are nonetheless cautious of its usage in this abstracted sense. This is particularly so among researchers concerned with using discourse analysis in (social) psychological contexts (Parker, 1989; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In contrast, they place emphasis on the functional and situated use of discourse. The focus of analysis in this perspective is then on how discourses are implemented in actual settings (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Since the present study is concerned with analysing the ways in which political speakers actively construct versions of national identity, the concept of interpretative repertoires suggests itself as an appropriate analytic ‘tool’.

In a recent definition 3, interpretative repertoires are defined as “broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images”. They are “systems of signification” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 90). Interpretative repertoires are the resources or “building blocks” used in the construction of versions of actions, or phenomena such as social categories and identity in discourse. In this respect, they may be seen in two possible ways. In the post-structuralist sense repertoires, like discourses, may be seen as historically evolved entities which, in a relatively automatic manner, construct versions of reality which become accepted as ‘common sense’ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). They may also be seen as the resources which people use in actively constructing versions of reality.

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3 Potter and Wetherell’s (1987, p. 149) original frequently cited original definition states: interpretative repertoires are recurrently used systems of terms used for characterising and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena. A repertoire ... is constituted through a limited range of terms used in particular stylistic and grammatical constructions. Often a repertoire will be organised around specific metaphors and figures of speech (tropes). The more recent definition “recurrent” use is more implied than stipulated, does not suggest a limitation on the range of terms and lays less emphasis on grammatical construction. The latter two points in this definition were criticised by Parker (1992).
The implication this view holds for the study of national identity, is that, in constructing versions of national identity, speakers may draw from a range of ‘identity repertoires’ in a variable and context-specific manner. It is important to retain this notion of flexibility in the construction of versions of identity. However, it should be stressed again that the range of available resources is limited by broader institutional constraints (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This may be particularly so in the case of national identity.

Interpretative repertoires primarily provide a way of analysing the content of discourse and the organisation of that content. The focus in this approach to discourse analysis is therefore not on linguistic form but the nature of the interpretative resources which enable discursive action (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). However, form and content are not always easily separated (Potter & Wetherell, 1994) and some analytical attention to the former may reveal much about the latter. In a study of the rhetorical construction of national identity it would seem useful, for example, to pay attention to pronominal usage. Particular attention could be given to the ways in the words ‘we’ and ‘us’ are deployed (Billig, 1993; Achard, 1993; Wilson, 1990).

Interpretative repertoires, and, for that matter, discourses, are viewed in theory as relatively coherent units or systems (Potter & Wetherell, 1989; Parker, 1992). But it does not follow that they are discrete in practice (Parker, 1992) and analytically it is difficult to determine whether they are present in a text as discrete entities (Parker & Burman, 1993). This difficulty is implied in the phrase “broadly discernible clusters” in the definition given above. Repertoires may, for example, overlap each other in discursive practice. Elements may be drawn from different, even contradictory, repertoires in different contexts to serve particular purposes. The process of analysis therefore involves repeated readings of the text in search of recurrent terms and patterns (Wetherell and Potter, 1988). At the same time, the process also
depends on the cultural, political and theoretical position which the analyst, reflexively, brings to the text.

It is important to add that the 'identification' of interpretative repertoires is only one part of a systematic analysis of discourse (Potter & Wetherell 1987) which will be outlined in the 'features' discussed in the next section. In the practice-oriented approach to discourse analysis I have been following, the focus is on the contextual use of repertoires; on how the concept 'nation' is constructed and deployed and how it is organised rhetorically (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).

**Features of discourse analysis**

At the beginning of the chapter I quoted Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 101) as saying that discourse analysis is something like “riding a bicycle”. This simple metaphor is a fitting one since it is only through repeated attempts at making sense of texts that an analyst develops the appropriate analytic skills. There is no set formula applicable to all texts. It is a tedious and time-consuming process of reading and rereading the detail of texts until patterns 'emerge' clearly. In the search for these patterns and recurring organisations, the analyst pursues “hunches”, and develops, abandons, and revises hypotheses (Wetherell & Potter, 1988, p. 177). It is a process which is guided, to some extent, by the analyst’s theoretical knowledge and influenced by his or her cultural background (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Parker & Burman, 1993). But, whilst there is no definitive method, there are, within the theoretical framework set out in the previous chapter, a number of broad distinguishing features which are important in the research practice of the approach adopted in this study.
Method

Analytical focus

Discourse analysis is concerned with talk and texts as social practices (Potter & Wetherell, 1994; Edwards & Potter, 1992). It is concerned with the content of such practices, their subject matter and social organisation, though it may also attend to linguistic form such as grammar and cohesion where appropriate (Potter & Wetherell, 1994). Further, the text under analysis is approached in its own right and not as a route to discerning a “true” underlying attitude or cognitive process (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Hence, this study will not aim to show what National Party leader F. W. De Klerk, for example, “really” believes or who he “really” is. Rather, it will provide an analysis of the ways in which he discursively constructs a new national identity.

Action, construction, variability, function and consequence

Discourse analysis is concerned with action, construction and variability as well as function and consequence (Potter & Wetherell, 1994). In speech or in writing, people perform social actions of different kinds. The specific features of these actions are partly produced through the construction of discourse from an existing range of styles, linguistic resources and rhetorical devices (Potter & Wetherell, 1994; Edwards & Potter, 1992). A central aim of discourse analysis then is to study this constructive process.

A further consequence of conceptualising discourse as action-oriented is the expectation of variability between versions or accounts of events or phenomena (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984). This view contrasts with the more traditional psychological concern with consistency (Potter & Wetherell, 1994; Edwards & Potter, 1992). Discourse analysis does not suggest that there is no regularity in discourse. Variability in speakers’ discourse is constrained by the available discourses or interpretative resources (Wetherell and Potter, 1988; 1992). But, whilst there
may be regularity in such resources, speakers will construct versions from these resources in a variable, flexible and sometimes even contradictory manner for particular purposes.

The search for variability is probably the most important element in analysing discourse with the aim of identifying interpretative repertoires (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1994). Variability is an index of both the functional orientation of discourse and the nature of its construction (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). It indicates that different ways of constructing versions or accounts are being used to achieve different functions (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) within a particular context. The same speaker may describe an event, person or group in different ways according to his or her purpose and circumstances. Differences in accounts may also develop over time (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984). Accounts or versions are thus characterised by contextually related changeability, inconsistency and contradiction (see also Billig, 1991; 1987 below).

For the analyst then, variability, may serve as a means to discovering, or developing hypothesis about, what function a discourse is serving. The analyst’s task is to search the data for patterns of variation in the content or form of an account and ‘map out’ the interpretative repertoires on which the speaker is drawing (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). It is important to note here that whilst the search for variability is emphasised, there is also the simultaneous need to search for consistency, that is, to identify the features shared by accounts (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

The delineation of function mentioned here is no straight forward matter. Functions are often not directly accessible particularly in discourse where the speaker does not intend the function to be explicit. For example, obfuscation of function may be a regular feature of political discourse. Similarly, the consequences of discourse which discourse analysis aims to reveal
are not always readily discernible. Indeed, a particular instance of discourse may have consequences which the speaker neither intends nor understands (Potter et al., 1990, p. 212). Thus, this phase of discourse analysis should be described as involving the development of hypotheses about language functions and effects rather than being concerned with the direct analysis of function (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Functions, then, are not regarded as the data but as the findings of discourse analysis (Wetherell and Potter, 1988).

Rhetorical construction

Discourse analysis is concerned with the rhetorical or argumentative organisation of discourse. Here discourse analysis draws on the complementary work of, for example, Billig (1987, 1988a, 1989b, 1991) whose rhetorical studies show how versions constructed in discourse are designed to counter real or potential alternative versions. The objective of discourse analysis here is to understand how a particular version is designed and functions to compete with an alternative (Potter & Wetherell, 1994).

From a rhetorical perspective discourse is organised in specific ways and draws on a variety of devices (see Edwards and Potter, 1992⁴), to “make a particular reality appear solid, factual and stable.” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 95). The “imaginary” nation is ‘realised’ in such a “rhetoric of reality” (Shotter, 1993, p.95). Rhetorical theory proposes that versions of reality are constructed and warranted in an argumentative form (a “contest between criticism and justification”) (Billig, 1987, p. 91). However, a piece of argumentative discourse cannot be understood without an analysis of the argumentative context in which it is used (Billig, 1988b). Its meaning does not simply derive from its own text or “logos” but also from the alternative discourse or discourses (its “anti-logos”) which it opposes (Billig, 1987, pp. 45-

⁴I shall return to specific devices and techniques where appropriate in the analysis sections.
Such alternatives may be explicit or implicit in the discursive context. From the perspective of national identity, the important point which the rhetorical approach makes is that versions of such identity will be constructed against some absent Other (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This notion has implications for analytic practice.

In essence, the objective of analysis within the rhetorical approach is to understand how a particular version is designed to oppose an alternative (Potter & Wetherell, 1994). The analyst's task is to establish the "argumentative meaning" (Billig, 1988a, p. 209) of a piece of discourse by locating it within its context of controversy, that is by relating it to its counter-discourses (Billig, 1990a). Where the analyst is also concerned with establishing the ideological significance of a text it is necessary to locate that text within the broader discursive and ideological patterns (Billig 1988a). Billig (1988a) argues that "ideologies are intrinsically rhetorical", insofar as they provide the resources for argumentation.

The analytical objective is not easily achieved since the argumentative meaning lies, in part, beyond the text under analysis. The problem is simplified in what Billig (1988b, p. 199) labels as "targeted discourse" where the speaker identifies the "target" of the discourse, its anti-logos. However, "untargeted discourse" is "inherently ambiguous" (p. 206) and the anti-logos may be implicit and difficult to uncover. Billig (1988b) advises the analyst firstly to establish whether there is an argumentative sense and, therefore, an implied "target". If so, the next step involves the analyst going beyond the immediate text and "interpreting" it in relation to broader arguments. The difficulty with which the analyst is presented lies in demonstrating the presence of an argumentative sense and then in showing the existence of an implied, unspecified target (Billig, 1988b). The process is dependent on "traditional scholarship" (Billig 1988a) involving wide reading around the topic and an interpretation of a text within its discursive or ideological context. It further requires reporting the analytical
procedure in a manner which is transparent and which is thus open to criticism by others. Billig (1988a, p. 215) makes the important point here that “scholarship” is itself “located firmly within the domain of argumentative rhetoric”. Hence in discourse analysis the writing of a research report moves beyond the mere presentation of research findings; it forms part of the validation process itself (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Billig’s approach is an important one for the analysis of political discourse but it has attracted certain criticisms. I shall mention the two most pertinent of these. The rhetorical approach has been criticised for its lack of an adequate analysis of power and the relationship of power to the process of argumentation (Reicher, 1988). Further, it has been pointed out that the view of ideology presented in this formulation emphasises agency at the expense of structural constraints. In consequence it is seen to abandon the ‘negative’ aspects of the concept, in particular the idea of ‘domination’ (Spears, 1989).

Social and ideological context

It is important, therefore, that this rhetorical feature, along with the other features of discourse analysis I have outlined above, be supplemented with an ideological analysis located within the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter. Discourse analysts stress that discursive practices, versions or accounts should always be seen in their broader social and ideological context. This stipulation requires that an analysis of the “situated and functional character” of discursive practices should recognise their embeddedness in that context as well as their ideological effects insofar as they may legitimate particular relations of power (Wetherell and Potter, 1988; 1992).
Method

Intuition and reflexivity.

There is an implication in the foregoing discussion that the discourse analytic process is, at least in part, dependent on the researcher’s ‘intuition’. Indeed, Parker (1990b, p. 191; 1992, p. 5), in preparing the ground for his own ‘method’ of analysis, suggests Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) “ten stages” rest on a “bedrock of ‘intuition’ and ‘presentation’” and sometimes “bewilders” new researchers. Elsewhere, however, he accepts that for certain forms of analysis 5 “a degree of intuition must be deployed” (Parker, 1992, p. 126) (emphasis in original). Some mention of the role of the researcher’s ‘intuition’ in analysis is therefore appropriate.

Clearly, if intuition is to be “deployed”, is vital that the researchers categorisations be recognised (Potter et al, 1990) and this should form an integral part of the process of discourse analysis (or, for that matter, any other interpretative - analytical exercise). In other words it is incumbent upon the researcher as he or she progresses to reflexively and critically question his or her ideas, expectations, presuppositions and methods of making sense of the text. This process involves the analyst’s continually asking the questions: “Why am I reading this passage in this way?” and “What features produce this reading?” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 168). It involves the analyst’s recognition of, and active separation of the ‘baggage’ that he or she brings to and into the reading of a text. The point is particularly salient if the analyst is to avoid imposing meanings on a text or inferring that his or her interpretation is the only possible reading (Parker & Burman, 1993).

The reflexive process involves other readers in two possible ways. First, the analyst may present the analysis to other researchers to determine what sense they may make of the work

5 See for example the rhetorical approach described above
(Parker, 1992). Parker (1992, p. 126) points out, however, that without an analysis of the others’ positions in relation to the “dominant culture and dependent subcultures” this procedure may restrict discourse analysis to the description and confirmation of common sense. Second, as part of the ‘method’ of discourse analysis, this reflexive process, is presented to the reader in the actual reporting of the analysis. Along with the researcher’s analysis and conclusions, as much of the text (or representative extracts of text) on which the interpretation is based is displayed as possible. Thus, the whole process is laid open to the reader who then has the opportunity to consider alternative readings or constructions (Potter, 1988). In this way the analyst’s ‘intuitions’ become part of an interpretative exercise, the constructed nature of which is open to further scrutiny and interpretation. It follows that discourse analysis does not, or should not, claim to present a final interpretative version of a text. Alternative readings are always possible.

Reflexivity is an essential ingredient in the discourse analytic process, but it may introduce problems of its own. These problems are perhaps less pronounced where the analytical focus is more concretely on the contextual study of discourse in action rather than on discourse as an abstract system, but they remain of concern in the present study (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Potter et al 1990). First, the process may result in undue attention being given to the researcher’s interpretations at the expense of the topic itself. Further, the researcher may become so concerned with reflexive issues of power and subjectivity that he or she is effectively paralysed, unable to move towards a level of intervention (Parker & Burman, 1993). One consequence of this predicament is that discourse analysis adopts a morally and politically relativist position. Parker (1992, p. 4), as I indicated in the previous chapter, argues that if discourse analysis is to have “progressive effects” and avoid this type of problem, then reflexivity should be grounded in the post-structuralist position.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have outlined an approach to discourse analysis, proposed by Wetherell and Potter (1992), which aims to account for discourse in both its constructed and its constructive forms. It is concerned with the concrete, practical aspects of discourse usage as well its more abstracted form. It is concerned with how political speakers actively construct and reconstruct versions of national identity in discursive practice and also how speakers are historically positioned as national subjects. It is therefore a 'method' which suggests itself as most suitable to the task of “charting” or “mapping the language” of national identity in political discourse (Wetherell & Potter 1992, p.1).

A final point to be considered is the observation that discourse analysts’ findings are not ‘generalisable’ (Kitzinger, 1992). Discourse analysis, I have already mentioned, eschews the notion that a text is closed to only one possible reading. Different interpretations are possible by different people in different contexts or the same people at different moments. The meanings distilled from a text by an analyst are dependent on the interpretative resources available as well as his or her political position (Burman, 1991).

The extent to which the findings of an analysis are ‘valid’ and ‘generalisable’ depends largely on two points. First, the process is dependent on the analytic skill of the researcher in warranting particular analytic claims. The success of this practice depends on how well the content of the material is accounted for, how well alternatives are discounted and on the overall plausibility and persuasiveness of the account (Potter & Wetherell, 1994). Second, it follows that the extent to which an analysis is deemed ‘valid’ or ‘generalisable’ rests, as I have noted above, on a transparent presentation of the process in the report. In this respect the writing of a report is part of the analysis. The reader, is thus called upon to make his or
her own evaluation of the findings presented (Potter & Wetherell, 1994). The analysis presented in the following chapters is therefore open to further discourse analysis and other interpretations.
CHAPTER NINE

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

You will agree, I am sure, that my development - most of it without aid, for that went mainly to the developers - from Native to Bantu to Plural to Co-operative to New South African was quite spectacular. Qwelane, J. (May 16, 1992)

Following the analytical scheme and Thompson’s (1987) first analytical phase set out in Chapter Eight this chapter will provide a brief overview of the historical context within which South African national identity developed prior to 1990. This account will not attempt a full coverage of events in the history of South African national identity. Rather, as a preliminary step in the analysis which begins in Chapter Ten, it will highlight significant shifts in the way this identity has been constructed in right-wing political discourse.

During the parliamentary debate on the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill in 1983, the then (Nationalist) Minister for Constitutional Development, C.J. Heunis, asserted “the founding of this nation in 1652” (Hansard, Vol. 106, 6363]. The claim is indicative of a particular version of the South African nation, which, in various forms, has been propounded by the governments of the state for most of the twentieth century.

The year 1652, to which Heunis refers, marks the beginning of an era of European colonialism in the Southern African region, and with its use here the contribution of the prior history of the peoples of the region is effectively excluded. In effect, the origins of the
“nation” are shown to coincide with the arrival of the first European settlers\(^1\). This phrase then contains the seeds of a version of South African national identity based in the separate origins and development of the peoples of the region. It highlights the need to consider the construction of South African national identity within the historical context of ‘racial’ segregation, the apartheid ideology which prevailed for 46 years and the interrelated phenomenon of Afrikaner nationalism.\(^2\)

**Origins of the ‘nation’**

The short account of the origins of the people of South Africa which follows is taken from Nationalist government publications (Buro vir Inligting, 1987; South African Communication Service, 1992; 1993). I have selected this particular account because, until 1994, it represented part of the “official” version of South African history. It underlies right-wing discourses of the ‘nation’ and, in particular, serves a rationalisation and justification of the versions of national identity which developed within the ideology of apartheid.

Official (Nationalist) publications portray the population of South Africa along racial lines - White, Coloured, Asian and Black - though a racist label is routinely rejected\(^3\). The “white community” of South Africa has its origins in the Dutch settlement established at the Cape of Good Hope under the auspices of the Dutch East India Company in 1652 (Buro vir Inligting,

\(^1\)An alternative version is presented in 1996 on the South African government’s Internet site (URL: http://www.southafrica.net). The document *Beginnings* describes the presence of the San people for more than 100000 years and the Khoikhoi for 2000 years. “Bantu” peoples are claimed to have arrived here 1500 years ago, more than 1100 years before the arrival of European settlers.

\(^2\)Some analysts have added (O’Meara, 1983; Johnstone, 1976) that Afrikaner nationalism should be considered in relation to, and as based in, the development of a capitalist system of production in South Africa.

\(^3\)For example in his address at the opening of parliament in 1980 the then State President P.W. Botha proclaimed: “This is not a racial parliament. Parliament is granting freedom to other nations ...” (Hansard, 1, 1980, 253.)
1987, p. 12; South African Communication Service, 1992). From this date there was a steady flow of Dutch immigrants to the Cape. Their numbers were augmented by the arrival of French Huguenots in 1688. In 1820 around 5000 British settlers arrived (Britain eventually gained control of the Cape in 1795) and between 1848 and 1858 several groups of Germans. More recent immigrants from Europe include Portuguese, Italians and Scandinavians.

A result of the early settlement was the growth of the so-called "Coloured" population. This group was the product of blood-mixing ("bloedvermenging") between the existing "Hottentot" (Khoi) groups of the Cape and white settlers, slaves imported from the East and "later also Blacks" (Buro vir Inligting, 1987, p.12). It is claimed that the majority of present day "Coloureds" are Christians and that their lifestyle is "unmistakably" ("onmiskenbaar") Western.

The relatively small "Asian" population is largely of Indian origin augmented by a group of Chinese. The first Indians were brought to South Africa by the British in 1860 to work as labourers on the sugar plantations in the Natal area (Buro vir Inligting, 1987). The majority of Indians still reside in this part of South Africa. The Asian lifestyle is seen as a mixture of East and West, but the latter has "gradually begun to get the upper hand" (begin geleidelik die oorhand kry) (Buro vir Inligting, 1987, p. 13).

The black "peoples" (volkere) of South Africa are described as the descendants of four groups (Nguni, Sotho-Tswana, Tsonga and Venda) who migrated southwards from central Africa "centuries ago" (Buro vir Inligting, 1987, p.14). Following a period of intergroup war and wars with both "Boer and Brit" these groups were divided into "at least nine large separate ethnic groups" (minstens nege groot afsonderlike etniese groepe) such as the Zulus and Xhosas (Buro vir Inligting, 1987, p.14). In consequence, it is stated, the blacks of South
Africa do not form a single, homogeneous group. The Bantu Self-Government Act (no.46, 1959) proclaims, for example, that “the Bantu peoples of the Union of South Africa do not constitute a homogeneous people, but form separate national units on the basis of language and culture” (emphasis added). Each group then has its own “cultural identity”, its own language, social system and occupies its own traditional territory (the Xhosas, for example, occupy the Transkei and the Ciskei regions).

This version of the history of the population portrays the ‘nation’ in terms of difference and diversity. Groups are divided along lines of “physical type, language, culture and history” (South African Communication Service, 1992, p. 21). It is noteworthy that all groups (with the exception of the so-called “Hottentots” (Khoi) whose presence was apparently insignificant) are shown as having migrated to the region at some point in the past centuries and having then occupied specific territories. In this version then, no one group can claim to have an inherited right to the South African region. Also whilst whites, despite their diverse origins, are represented as a “community”, blacks form clearly heterogeneous groups. The “Coloured” population, although of “mixed blood”, as well as the Asian group are viewed as having a similar religion (in the former case) and culture as the white group. This claim may be seen as warranting the inclusion of these two groups with whites in the political arena within the framework of the new tricameral constitution promulgated in 1984.

\[4\] In 1962, for example, H. F. Verwoed told the House of Assembly that South Africa was “A territory which generally speaking was unpopulated became the area of settlement of two population groups at a certain stage. White who came from Europe and Bantu who came from central and East Africa. [105: 660]
Views of South African nation

Four basic views of the South African nation have emerged during the course of this century, developed within different ideological perspectives. These are commonly referred to as the multi-nations, four-nations, two-nations and one-nation theses (Alexander, 1986; Degenaar 1992).

**Multi-nations thesis**

In this view, put forward by Afrikaner nationalists, South Africa is construed as a multinational state composed of between ten and twelve ‘nations’ each which its own culture and entitled to ‘self-determination’ (Alexander, 1986; Degenaar 1992). It is a view which asserts the ethnic origin of nations and fits within the primordialist approach discussed in Chapter One. Degenaar (1992, p. 3) argues that this form of “ethnic nationalism” inevitably leads to the development of an apartheid ideology.

The multinational vision of a South African population divided into discrete ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘nations’ (Sharp, 1988), was clearly constructed around earlier ‘race’ categories (NoSizwe, 1979). Alexander (1985) shows that, in this apartheid view, ‘African’ people were comprised of eight to ten primordial ‘ethnic’ groups all of whom apparently sought ‘nation’ status in separate ‘nation-states’. ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Indians’, however, whilst forming distinct ‘ethnic’ groups were not ‘nations’. White people (mainly the Afrikaans and English ‘ethnic’ groups) were regarded as a single ‘nation’: “the white nation of South Africa” (p. 47). In this construction, South African national identity became synonymous with white identity (Heaven, Rajab & Ray, 1985) and it was not until 1984 that ‘coloureds’ and ‘Indians’ came to
be regarded as sharing to some extent in this identity. Blacks, however, would take their national identity from their ‘nation-states’ (Edwards, 1987).

One-nation thesis

A corollary to the multi-nations thesis is the one-nation thesis. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was formed. Degenaar (1992, p. 5) notes that at this point South Africa was “a state without a nation and that this nation still had to be invented”. Because the political arena at that time was dominated by whites, the construction of the nation reflected white interests. The dominant political parties of the day, the South African Party and the Nationalist party, though differing in their perspectives, saw the South African nation as a white entity. The object of the Union according to South African Party leader J.C. Smuts was to “create a nation ... including Dutch, German, English and Jew, and whatever white nationality seeks refuge in this land” (cited in Degenaar, 1992, p. 6). The so-called non-white population was completely excluded from this formulation.

However, the objective of a unitary white identity was a controversial one. Certain Afrikaner nationalists argued that, whilst Afrikaners formed a distinct nation, English-speakers were “no nation in the true sense of the word, but a section of a nation overseas” (N. Diedrichs cited in Moodie, 1975, p. 42). The Afrikaner Broederbond saw the English-speaking population as “the fifth column of an overseas nation” (Conroy, 1948, p. 314). The pervasiveness of a consequent perspective which equates South African national identity with white Afrikaner identity has been illustrated elsewhere (see Morse, Mann & Nel 1977). It should be added here that in recent years the nature of an Afrikaner national identity has itself been debated between reformist Afrikaners and more extreme right-wing elements. Robert
van Tonder (August 18, 1993), leader of the Boerestaat Party, proclaimed during a television debate:


The ideal of a single white nation has thus not been without its detractors.

**Four-nations thesis**

The four-nations thesis represents the classic liberal position (Alexander, 1986). In this view, the “four population registration groups” (Degenaar, 1992, p. 4), black, white, Coloured and Indian are ‘races’ which ought to coexist in “multi-racial harmony” within a single nation (Alexander, 1986, p. 77). Unlike the multinational approach, this perspective did not regard the different ‘races’ as extant or potential nations in themselves. However, Alexander (1986) points out, this thesis eventually blended into the less overtly racist ethnic ideology of the latter perspective.

**Two-nations thesis**

The remaining thesis to emerge is referred to as the two-nations thesis and reflects the position of the Black Consciousness Movement and black nationalism (Alexander, 1986). The two ‘nations’ here are described as “black” and “white” or an “oppressed nation” and an

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5 "Any people in the world has certain qualities. One, he must have his own territory. He must have his own unique history. His own traditions. His own festivals. His own flags. His own anthems. The Boere people comply with all those qualifications. The Afrikaner people not, because he does not have it ...."
“oppressing nation” respectively. With the eventual dissipation of the “oppressing” nation, proponents of the thesis foresaw the ultimate emergence of a single (probably socialist) “Azanian” as distinct from South African nation (Degenaar, 1992).

This thesis also resonates with more recent calls by conservative white Afrikaner elements for the establishment of a separate and independent ‘volkstaat’ or ‘homeland’ where Afrikaners will protect their cultural identity (Degenaar, 1992).

**Discourses of South African National Identity**

I have noted above that national identity in South Africa has historically been divided and defined along racial lines though not always overtly. The concept of nation has been utilised in political discourse as a “mask of race” (Goldberg, 1993, p. 78ff). As such it has served as part of the “language of domination” (Posel, 1987), legitimating and rationalising the unequal relations of power between black and white. The reasons for the development and maintenance of such divisions and which underlie the ideology of apartheid have been explained in terms of capitalism, (Afrikaner) nationalism, self-preservation and self-determination and cultural and religious hegemony. These issues have been debated in numerous publications (see for example Ashforth, 1990; O’Meara, 1983; Adam & Giliomee, 1979; Moodie, 1975b; De Klerk, 1975). Here, I shall briefly trace the several forms which the “language of domination” took up to 1990.

In 1905, five years before the inception of the Union of South Africa, the Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission formalised the division of the peoples of the South
African colony into two groups: Natives and Europeans (Ashforth, 1990). The ascription of identities in this manner achieved two objectives. First it constructed the two entities as homogeneous. The notion of an homogeneous African society warranted a uniform political status and administration for all Africans. The notion of an homogeneous European block, warranted the call for 'white' national unity (Ashforth, 1993). Second, it established the basis for differentiation. Europeans and Natives could be differentiated in three possible ways: in terms of “kind” (that is “one human, the other not”), developmental stage and, lastly, places of origin (Ashforth, 1993, p. 17). These possible views provided the basis for the development of a political ideology and the assumption of an hegemonic position on the part of the “Europeans”. By May, 1917 the term ‘apartheid’ had been coined by General J.C. Smuts (McClintock & Nixon, 1986).

By the mid 1940s a different basis for the categorisation of the population had arisen out of “the principles of Afrikaner nationalism and its brand of cultural anthropology” (Ashforth, 1993, p. 249). The homogenous Native category gave way to the heterogeneous ‘Bantu’ identity comprised of the different African groups I have described above. Each group was claimed to have a separate culture and a right to develop its own national identity in its own territory. The existence of these different ‘cultural groups’ and their ‘traditional’ territories was posited as a given ‘fact’ in government discourse ignoring the point, as Ashforth (1993, p. 249) argues, that “socio-spatial formations of the South African state had been constructed through decades of political struggle”.

Goldberg (1993, p 79) points out the difference between a native and a Native. The former is regarded as a proper “born and bred” member of a nation. The latter is “natural in racial kind to foreign, hostile, dominated lands” and viewed as “simple, lacking art, culture and the capacity for rational self-determination.”
The overtly racial tone of apartheid was sounded by the National Party when it came to power in 1948 and remained its rallying cry until around 1958 (McClintock & Nixon, 1986). With the almost universal condemnation of racism however the ruling Nationalist Party began to rephrase its ideology. The term “separate development” replaced “apartheid” and later the concept of multinationalism mentioned earlier was introduced. From the late 1950’s then (during the ‘Verwoed era’ and the development of ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’) there was a shift from the construction of the South African state as a single, multiracial political entity to a multinational one (McClintock & Nixon, 1986). From this point the Nationalist government attempted to couch its policies in the discourse of nationalities rather than race.

By the early 1980’s South Africa had implemented the bantustan policy to the extent that a majority of black people had been declared citizens of either the four nominally ‘independent’ national states or the six ‘self-governing’ territories defined by the Nationalist government. The ideological repertoire of the time extended to a concept of ‘democratic federalism’.

The ideal of a white South African nation proposed at the beginning of the century was not realised during the period of Union. This was largely the result of the rise of strong Afrikaner nationalism aimed at assuming the reigns of power (Degenaar, 1992). Following the Nationalists’ election victory in 1948, British symbolism (the anthem and flag, for example) was steadily dismantled culminating in the adoption of a republican form of government in 1961. Degenaar (1992) suggests that in this way Afrikaners presented themselves as the group which would form the basis for the development of a white nation. This view, he notes, gradually developed into a broader ‘white South Africanism’.

The (tricameral) Constitution established in 1984 went some way to including ‘Coloureds’ and Indians in this formulation. In this respect it marked the National Party’s first shift
towards a single nation state (Van Zyl Slabbert cited in Nasiestaat, August 12, 1989). This change was also mooted in president P.W. Botha’s 1985 “Manifesto for a new South Africa” (popularly referred to as his “Rubicon” speech). But it was only with the political changes of 1990 that this view of the South African nation came to manifest itself in more concrete ways which included the black population at large.
CHAPTER TEN

BUILDING CONSENSUS

Unity in diversity ... falls far short of what unity ought to be. Taiwo (1991)

This chapter begins phase two of Thompson’s (1987) analytic scheme, the discursive analysis. It will also encompass his third, interpretative phase since the interpretative process is interwoven with the discursive analysis.

The years 1990 to 1994 marked a period of transition from an apartheid dispensation to the ‘new’ democratic South Africa and are vital to understanding the beginnings of the building of a new South African national identity. F.W. De Klerk’s landmark presidential address to parliament of 1990 as well as his opening addresses of the following years provide important signposts in the Nationalist government’s progress towards this ‘new’ identity. These speeches will therefore provide the framework for the analysis that follows. In addition to these and other key ‘new’ Nationalist speeches the analysis will also select extracts speeches from other parties in order to illustrate the counter-discourses against which these speeches are constructed.

Reuniting the nation: constructing inclusivity and consensus

The year 1990 was a pivotal one in South African history marking the beginning of the ‘new’ era in South African nation-building. In his opening address to parliament on February 2 of that year, State President F.W. De Klerk moved beyond the limited reform initiatives of the 1984 tricameral constitution and P.W. Botha’s 1985 claimed crossing of the
"Rubicon". Whereas the 1984 and 1985 versions of a 'new' South Africa retained an apartheid framework perpetuating the exclusive nature of an identity based in that ideology, De Klerk's 1990 speech emphasised a "new South Africa", inclusive of "every inhabitant" and aimed at building a "broad consensus" across the entire population. The speech included the announcement of a number of concrete actions to this end. De Klerk announced the unbanning of previously banned organisations and the release of political prisoners, notably Nelson Mandela. The "re-incorporation into our country" of "constitutionally independent TBVC\(^1\) countries" was also presented as a "possibility"\(^2\) [036:5]\(^3\).

As a starting point for this analysis I shall consider how De Klerk proceeds in the rhetorical task of reunification and consensus-building. The opening minutes of his speech are pertinent to gaining insight into this process:

De Klerk:

[1] The general election on 6 September 1989 placed our country irrevocably on the road of drastic change. Underlying this is the growing realisation by an increasing number of South Africans that only a negotiated understanding among the representative leaders of the entire population is able to ensure lasting peace.

[2] The alternative is growing violence, tension and conflict. That is unacceptable and in nobody's interest. The well-being of all in this country is linked inextricably to the ability of the leaders to come to terms with one another on a new dispensation. No-one can escape this simple truth.

[3] On its part the Government will accord the process of

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\(^1\) TBVC is an acronym for the nominally independent states of Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei.

\(^2\) Arguably the earlier, frequently cited "Rubicon" speech (Address by State President, 1991) delivered by State President P.W. Botha on August 15, 1985 to the National Party Congress contained similar sentiments. However, Botha asserted that only those "Black National States" who chose not to accept independence would "remain part of the South African nation" (p. 153). He reaffirmed his belief in "independent states" existing in a form of "confederation" and explicitly rejected the idea of a "unitary system".

\(^3\) Numbers in square brackets refer to quotations and extracts from 'data' rather than reference material. Please see Appendix for full details of the source of each extract.
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The aim is a totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavour - constitutional, social and economic.

[4] I wish to ask all who identify yourselves (sic) with the broad aim of a new South Africa, and that is the overwhelming majority:- Let us put petty politics aside when we discuss the future during this session.- Help us build a broad consensus about the fundamentals of a new, realistic and democratic dispensation.- Let us work together on a plan that will rid our country of suspicion and steer it away from domination and radicalism of any kind.

De Klerk’s opening reference to the last general, tricameral election lays the foundation for consensus-building work. The fact of the election, emphasised by citing the specific date of the event, serves as a warrant for his proposed new dispensation. He attributes the drive for negotiation, democracy and the inclusion of the “entire population” to the electorate whom the parliamentarians he is addressing represent. In this way, De Klerk brings the process of change into the political and constitutional context which the parliamentarians value and with which they will identify. The step of drawing, in this case, on a political process and structure familiar to the audience and which is highly valued by them is an important one in oratory, particularly if the speaker is intent on changing existing opinions (Billig, 1987).

Simultaneously, in referring to the fact of the general election, De Klerk rhetorically externalises (Edwards & Potter, 1992) the process of change placing accountability for it in the hands of the electorate. It is presented objectively as the outcome of a democratic election (within the limits of the tricameral system) rather than his own or his party’s product. He thus avoids the possible implications of personal or party interest or stake in the process (Edwards & Potter, 1992).

The parliamentary audience, however, is broadly comprised of both reformist and conservative elements and alternative arguments and resistance may be expected from the
latter. In attempting to build consensus De Klerk avoids laying stress on the differing opinions which separate these groups and designs a counter argument which appeals to values of common sense and reason. First, in choosing the words “irrevocably” and “only” he delimits the viability of alternate versions (by this time aspects of apartheid have actually been dismantled). Second, he underscores this idea by constructing a sense of positive value and continuity in the reform process set in motion by the election. This he achieves by ascribing change to a “growing” and “increasing number of South Africans”. The use of these adjectives constitutes a form non-numerical quantification (Potter, Wetherell & Chitty, 1991) which functions rhetorically both as a warrant for De Klerk’s argument and to compete with potential counter-arguments. His use of the term “South Africans”, though its meaning is undefined here, invokes the inclusivity of a national group identity and appeals to a concomitant sense of patriotism.

The third way in which De Klerk heads off potential competing arguments is through the use of the rhetorical devices of contrast and extreme case formulation (Edwards & Potter, 1992). De Klerk’s opening paragraph develops the argument that “lasting peace” can “only” be attained through a democratic process embracing the “entire population”. De Klerk then undermines the “alternative” by describing a contrasting outcome of “growing violence, tension and conflict”. Such conditions serve the interests of “nobody” while, by contrast, the path of negotiation will promote the “well-being of all”. An appeal to reason and common sense is made in claiming his proposal as an inescapable “simple truth”. It is noteworthy that De Klerk presents “peace” here in such a way as to seem a universal aim and value.

A sense of accommodation and inclusivity in the new dispensation is promoted in the third paragraph with its all-embracing stress on equality for “every inhabitant” in “every sphere”.

This sense is continued in the fourth paragraph where De Klerk calls for identification with the “broad aim” of the new South Africa. Here, in the use of the adjective “broad”, a form of systematic vagueness (Edwards & Potter, 1992) is employed. This rhetorical device is aimed at accommodating a diversity of views and also makes rejection or rebuttal of the “aim” difficult. Again, the phrase “overwhelming majority” may be seen as a form of non-numerical quantification the rhetorical effect of which is to stall or undermine potential opposition. De Klerk closes his consensus-building rhetoric using a three-part list, a rhetorical device which has been shown to be effective in constructing descriptions which are viewed as complete or representative (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The list is augmented by a pronominal “block” (Wilson, 1990): the repetitive use of the pronoun “us” to underscore the rhetoric of inclusiveness.

There is, however, a variation and possible “slippage” in De Klerk’s pronominal usage in this passage which bears further examination. At first glance the “us” to whom he speaks is those reasonable, “realistic” parliamentarians, the “overwhelming majority” of the moderate centre who identify with the general aim of a new South Africa. This sense is apparent in the first and third parts of the three-part list. But there is a subtle shift in the second part introduced by the verb “help”. The “us” here is integrated with, yet differentiated from, the “us” of the other sections of the list. This unelaborated “us” simultaneously calls for consensus and an end to domination and insinuates itself in a directive role as the leading agent of the constructive process. This pronominal usage may be seen as a crude form of what Billig (1993, p.77) has described as the “syntax of hegemony”.

Similarly De Klerk’s use of the phrase “our country” warrants further consideration. In the context of references to “the entire population”, “the well-being of all” and “every inhabitant”
the phrase conveys a sense of all-embracing inclusivity. Yet, a few moments later, speaking on the topic of foreign relations, De Klerk states:

De Klerk [036] In recent times there has been an interesting debate about the future relationship of the TBVC countries with South Africa, and specifically about whether they should be re-incorporated into our country.

Here “our country” clearly refers to a “South Africa” which excludes the nominally independent countries and thus the (black) majority of the population. At the same time, it is unclear here, and, for that matter, in De Klerk’s earlier uses of the pronoun, who “our” includes. As research elsewhere has revealed (see for example Billig, 1991) words such as “we”, “us” and “our” are often used ambiguously in political discourse.

In sum, the opening section of this speech begins a discursive process of reunification, consensus-building and identification with the idea of a new nation. Specific rhetorical devices function to persuasive effect in De Klerk’s construction of his version of a “new” dispensation and to undermine possible alternatives. In particular they are used to promote a version which seems reasonable (commonsensical), practically necessary and removed from the interests of a particular political party. At the same time, De Klerk’s pronominal usage indicates a degree of slippage between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ versions of South Africa. It is apparent that the new discourse of reunification retains some of the “baggage” of the old discourse of diversity and Nationalist government hegemony. This point will be developed further in the following sections.
De Klerk's rhetoric of reunification is balanced, later in his speech, with a warning to take into account the "reality" of the "problems of a heterogeneous population". He argues:

De Klerk: South Africa has its own national composition, and our constitutional dispensation has to take this into account. The formal recognition of individual rights does not mean that the problems of a heterogeneous population will simply disappear. Any new constitution which disregards this reality will be inappropriate and even harmful.

The first point to be noted here is that De Klerk heads off possible alternative versions by suggesting a peculiar South African "national composition" warranting a peculiar dispensation. In particular he uses this construal to counter arguments for the straightforward adoption of a dispensation premised in Western democratic models which assert the primacy of fundamental individual rights, although such rights are "accepted in principle" (De Klerk, 1990, p. 6). I shall return to this issue of rights in the next section. Here I wish to note that proposals of a unique South African "composition" have historically formed part of a Nationalist repertoire of national identity warranting what De Klerk elsewhere describes as the "differentiation" (De Klerk, 1987, p. 489) of the population. His predecessor, P.W. Botha argued, for example, in his "Rubicon" speech:

P.W. Botha: We know that it is the hard fact of South Africa life, that it will not be possible to accommodate the political aspirations of our various population groups and communities in a known defined political system, because our problems are unique.

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4 In an earlier interview De Klerk claimed: "I have been in parliament for 13 years and I have never used the word apartheid in a constructive manner. I have never defended the word as a good concept in 13 years! What do they mean by apartheid? We say: "There must be in South Africa a form of differentiation." The three chamber parliament is based on differentiation. That sort of differentiation is a prerequisite for peaceful solution in South Africa" [De Klerk, 1987 p489]
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He amplified this view in an 1986 interview:

P.W. Botha: My point of view or approach is quite different to the ordinary liberal thinker in South Africa who wishes that we think in terms of existing structures and constitutions which exist in the rest of the world. I believe South Africa is a unique country, there is no other country in the world who has the same problems as South Africa; and that is why we must start a unique system

Both De Klerk and his predecessor buttress this description by constructing as factual the heterogeneity of the population. De Klerk achieves this construction with the word “reality”, a term which here ascribes a disinterested objectivity to heterogeneity rather than presenting it as one version of “reality” constructed within a particular political framework. In this way De Klerk rehearses the rhetorical process, evident some years earlier in the speeches of P.W. Botha, of distancing himself from the “reality” of a population artificially divided under the Nationalist government. Heterogeneity becomes a practical issue, “problems” to be accommodated within the legal framework of a new constitution. While the construal of the “problems” of heterogeneity as “real” establishes them, in an objective sense, as warranting some form of solution, the added dimension of uniqueness, as P.W. Botha’s statement makes plain, warrants a unique approach distinct from the constitutions of any other country.

It is important to note that De Klerk’s discourse retains the word “problems” also common in the “national composition” repertoires of his predecessors (see for example P.W. Botha above and footnote 4 below). De Klerk’s argument that the “reality” of the “problems of a heterogeneous population” will not “disappear” suggests an essentialist view of the “national

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5 An earlier example of this form of accountability management (Edwards & Potter, 1992) is manifest in P.W. Botha’s 1985 reification of history: “Our strength is the courage to face and accommodate the problems bequeathed to us by history. The reality of our diversity is a hard reality. We face it, because it is there. How do we accommodate it? How do we build a better future for our cultures, values, languages which are demonstrably real in our heterogeneous society?”[084:157]
composition” with its connotations of fundamental immutability. The construal of heterogeneity as a “real” and “unique” problem in this way, though the nature of the problem remains unelaborated, serves as a warrant for a ‘new’ South Africa which must necessarily recognise divisions constructed within an apartheid ideology or face “harmful” consequences. In turn, it becomes important that the rights of the different groupings so retained be protected legally in the new constitution.

This argument may be seen as part of an exercise in consensus-building, accommodating conservative elements in the construction of the ‘new’ South Africa. It is however De Klerk’s retention of the language of the earlier apartheid discourse which is noteworthy. Nelson Mandela (Mandela, 1996), dealing similarly with the issue of “diversity”, puts forward a contrasting version six years later on the occasion of the adoption of the new South African constitution.

Mandela While in the past, diversity was seen by the powers-that-be as a basis for division and domination; while in earlier negotiations, reference to such diversity was looked at with suspicion; today we affirm in no uncertain terms that we are mature enough to derive strength, trust and unity from the tapestry of language, religious and cultural attributes that make up our nation.

A further point which merits consideration is De Klerk’s unqualified use of the word ‘heterogeneous’. Heterogeneity is presented as a fact, but its nature is unexplained. Similarly, De Klerk does not provide a clear explanation of the term “national composition”. However, it is possible to glean some insight into the nature of the “national composition” from the following extracts taken from a short section of his 1990 speech dealing with the issue of rights:
De Klerk: The whole question of protecting individual and minority rights, which includes collective rights and the rights of national groups, is still under consideration ... The government accepts the principle of the recognition and protection of the fundamental individual rights which form the constitutional basis of most Western democracies.

However it is clear that a system for the protection of the rights of individuals, minorities and national entities has to form a well-rounded and balanced whole.

Naturally the protection of collective, minority and national rights may not bring about an imbalance in respect of individual rights. It is neither the government's policy nor its intention that any group - in whichever way it may be defined - shall be favoured over or in relation to any of the others.

This task [proposed Law Commission investigation into human rights issues] is directed at the balanced protection in a future constitution of the human rights of all our citizens, as well as of collective units, associations, minorities and peoples.

A salient feature of these extracts is the wide variety of terms used in ascribing group membership categories to the population. De Klerk refers to associations, minorities, collective units, national groups, national entities, and peoples. This list of groups rhetorically underscores the "reality" of a "heterogeneous" and "unique" South Africa and provides a framework for a discourse of diversity and division. The consequences and functions of this discourse will be considered in more detail below. As a general observation, it is noteworthy that the terms and descriptions in De Klerk's repertoire are consistent with those discernible in earlier interpretative repertoires of the "national composition" and versions of a "new" South Africa.

Thus, former State President P.W. Botha in his "Rubicon" speech of 1985 and later parliamentary address of 1987 also asserts the "reality" of "minorities":
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P.W. Botha: We are not prepared to accept the antiquated, simplistic and racist approach that South Africa consists of a White minority and a Black majority. We cannot ignore the fact that this country is a multicultural society - a country of minorities - White minorities as well as black minorities.

Consequently there was wide acceptance of the reality that South Africa is a country of minorities and of the approach that any future dispensation for South Africa and its diverse population will have to meet the demands, on every level of government, for: the protection of minority rights and the self-determination of groups; the prevention of domination by any group of the others

Similarly, the concept of "national entities" or "national groups" is consistent with the earlier Nationalist framework put forward by De Klerk himself in an interview in 1986:

De Klerk: but we must stop talking about ‘the blacks’ because we have black nations, such as the Zulus, Xhosas and Tswanas, in South Africa. You don’t talk about Europeans, you talk about Frenchmen, Dutchmen and Germans. They aren’t just one faceless white face in Europe, and neither are the blacks in South Africa ... but just like you find there are some Germans who don’t find it important that they are Germans, you will also find blacks who don’t find it important that they are Zulus or Xhosas. But the overwhelming majority do find it important, and because we have nations in South Africa with their own languages and with different histories, the solution for the blacks must, out of necessity, be that of minority groups who find themselves in a totally different situation.

This view, its terms and descriptions, is, in turn, consistent with much earlier constructions of the “national composition” dating to the dawn of the apartheid era. In 1948, for example, former prime minister D.F. Malan argued:

D.F. Malan: There is no such thing as a unified native nation in this country. We have native groups in this country, and those native groups differ from one another as far as their traditions are concerned, as far as their tribal relations are concerned, as far as their language affinities are concerned, and there is every reason to take that into account in your legislation, and there is every reason, when such a
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large unified native nation does not exist, not to call one into being by means of legislation.

In the later era of prime minister H.F. Verwoed The Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 proclaimed, as I have already noted, that the “Bantu peoples” of South Africa could not be regarded as an homogeneous “people”, but formed “national units on the basis of language and culture.” Speaking in parliament in favour of the promulgation of that act Verwoed argued:

H.F. Verwoed: ...if through the capabilities of the Bantu it happens that here in South Africa there will be a White state, a big strong White nation, along with various Bantu national units and areas (or states, if you like) how is that different from what we have in Europe?

And during the no-confidence debate in parliament in 1962 he protested:

H.F. Verwoed: They [European national groups] could not be held together and yet the most diverse national entities as far as colour and degree of civilisation are concerned now have to be thrown together, according to the policy of the Opposition, into one multiracial state.

Apparent in the proclamation of The Bantu Self-Government Act is a relationship between the concept of “national entities” and that of “peoples”, a division to which De Klerk also refers. The proposition that South Africa consists of heterogeneous “peoples” as opposed to an homogeneous “people” has since been put forward consistently in different versions of a “new” South Africa. The tricameral Constitution of 1983 undertakes to:

To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples [111]
while P.W. Botha in his 1985 “Manifesto” asserts:

P.W. Botha [084:153] I firmly believe that the granting and acceptance of independence by the various Black peoples within the context of their own statehood, represent a material part of the solution.

Examples of the usage of terms such as minorities, national entities and peoples are numerous, appearing in the rhetoric of Nationalist politicians throughout the past half century. The few representative samples shown here have been selected to illustrate a pattern in the repertoires of Nationalist leaders at different points in South Africa’s history. In particular there is a consistency in the repertoires apparent in different versions of a “new” South Africa extolled by Nationalist leaders in 1948, 1983, 1985 and in the 1990 version under consideration here. These repertoires are mobilised as a warrant for a political order which maintains divisions between the apparently different ‘black’ groups. At the same time, there is a notable silence in this argument around the heterogeneity, different languages and histories of the ‘white’ population (see Chapter Nine). This silence serves to submerge difference within this group and maintains a representation of a unified “white nation”.

I have already suggested above that, historically, the repertoire upon which De Klerk draws, with slight variations, has served to warrant the construction of an exclusive national identity premised in an apartheid ideology. However, language is not inherently ideological (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and it cannot simply be inferred from his use of these terms that De Klerk is perpetuating an oppressive ideology. Elements of this repertoire have also been used by leaders of the liberation movement. For example, in 1948, the Manifesto of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress Youth League, mobilises the idea of national entities and minorities in a version of the four-nations thesis:
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The above summary on racial groups supports our contention that South Africa is a country of four chief nationalities, three of which (the Europeans, Indians and Coloureds) are minorities, and three of which (the Africans, Coloureds, and Indians) suffer national oppression.

Language or discourse becomes ideological only in argument or in its application (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Hence, the ideological nature of the repertoire on which De Klerk draws can only be assessed through a close analysis of how he uses it in the construction of a new national identity. At this stage it may only be said that De Klerk’s speech contains elements of an argument for a heterogeneous national composition which earlier formed a basis for the legitimisation of a race-based form of national identity constructed during the apartheid era.

The problems inherent in moving from the language of apartheid to that of reunification and consensus-building are reflected in De Klerk’s discursive movement between the idea of a nation seen as a heterogeneous collection of “peoples” and as an homogeneous “people” in the following extracts (emphases added):

De Klerk [036:6]  This task [proposed Law Commission investigation into human rights issues] is directed at the balanced protection in a future constitution of the human rights of all our citizens, as well as of collective units, associations, minorities and peoples.

De Klerk [036:9]  Our country and all its people have been embroiled in conflict, tension and violent struggle for decades.

The context of the first extract is the protection of rights of various groupings. The context of the second extract is De Klerk’s call for an end to violence and a beginning to negotiation and reconciliation. His movement between the plural and singular nouns may be seen as ‘slippage’. It may also be seen as a rhetorical device wherein the simple shift from one form
of a word to another constructs or evokes a different sense of identity to serve a particular discursive purpose.

As a final point with regard to De Klerk's "national composition" is that despite using numerous category descriptions there is a relative absence from his speech of references to race. This rhetorical move may be seen as an attempt to counter arguments that he is perpetuating the racist divisions which historically marked his party and government. One explanation then for his omitting to clarify the meaning of terms such as heterogeneous, "own national composition" or minority, may be his intention to avoid such implications. This contention is implied in De Klerk's reference to "any group - in whichever way it may be defined ..." quoted above. Here he avoids the restrictive act of definition and possible connotations of race, leaving his meaning open to the varied interpretations of his audience.

It is not until his May 1992 address to the Second Plenary Session of Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) that De Klerk makes this intention explicit:

De Klerk [047:380]

We in government are not defining the concept of minorities in any way in terms of race, or colour, or any other discriminatory norms. The government, the National Party and the many other delegations, Mr. Chairman, who insist upon proper checks and balances do so, not to subject any majority to minority whims. They do so in the spirit in which the American Founding Fathers have instituted their checks and balances. That spirit was the spirit that no majority should ever be able to misuse its power to undermine the constitution or to dominate or to damage the interests of minorities, however that may be defined.

6 De Klerk's 1990 speech contains one reference to "Black leaders"

7 ANC leader Oliver Tambo, for example argued the following: Whatever new words the Pretoria regime might seek to invent to describe its aims, it will not succeed in camouflaging the reality of continued white minority rule. Notions such as power-sharing without domination, group rights, minority rights, self-determination for the various groups, a nation of minorities, the extension of democracy and so on all mean one thing and one thing only - apartheid by another name.[112]
However, all De Klerk presents here is a negative definition: what minorities are “not”. Again, positive definition is left open. Instead, emphatically dismissing any “discriminatory norms”, De Klerk warrants the continued protection of the “interests” of undefined “minorities” by referring to an external authority, the constitution of the dominant world power. This rhetorical move not only underscores the validity of the version he is promoting but effectively manages the problem of his stake in the formulation. The issue of protecting the rights of minorities (as well as individuals in line with “most Western democracies”) is central to the consensus-building process of De Klerk’s 1990 speech and is considered further in the following section.

The rights of minorities

In De Klerk’s 1990 speech considerable stress is laid on the nature of the relationship between the various groups which he describes in the context of the “new democratic constitution”. Again, there is some consistency between the terms and phrases he uses and those of P.W. Botha in, for example, the latter’s 1985 “Rubicon” speech. De Klerk emphasises the need for the protection of the rights of individuals (in line with “Western democracies”) as well as those of the “minorities and national entities” which make up the “national composition”. Having divided the population into minority groups he draws on terms such as “well-rounded”, “balanced”, “equality” to describe a “system” for the protection of group rights which establishes a horizontal and equal relationship between those groups. Such a system would aim to ensure that no group “shall be favoured over or in relation to any of the others”. In short, there should be “no domination”.

The emphasis by De Klerk as well as P.W. Botha before him (see 035:3 above) on a relationship between groups in which there is “no domination” as well as on the entrenchment
of rights may be seen as part of a discourse of reform marking the end of "white rule". De Klerk’s rhetoric in this respect may be seen as part of the process of consensus-building. His stress on equality as well as on the incorporation of both individual and group rights in the new dispensation serves to co-opt both left and right-wing elements in the political spectrum.

But, a question remains as to the nature of the domination which De Klerk aims to prevent. Following Billig (1987) it is pertinent, as a starting point, to indicate what alternative argument De Klerk’s version may be designed to counter. An explicit answer is found in an extract from an interview with liberation theologian Archbishop Desmond Tutu:

Tutu: [011: It is just another one of the contradictions of apartheid. What they are running away from, is the fact that they (the whites) are the minority. So he keeps saying ‘we are a nation of minorities’, but that is nonsense because there is only one minority - the whites- and a vast black majority. That is the reality of our situation.

and also in a 1991 ANC document, *Advance to national democracy*:

The main content of the national democratic revolution is the liberation of the black people in general and Africans in particular. The oppressed black masses objectively stand to gain from the victory of this struggle. Among this coalition of national and social forces, the African people are the most adversely affected by the policies of apartheid.[113]

In a version of “reality” which may be linked to the two-nations thesis Tutu retains the notion of minorities but only to the extent that he posits a single (“white”) minority group. The broad heterogeneity of groups proposed in De Klerk’s version is undermined as “nonsense”. In Tutu’s version the remainder of the population is presented in the contrasting language of a “vast majority” ascribed a single, homogeneous, “black” identity. This view is also apparent
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in the ANC document which suggests in its use of the definite article "the", a singular "black people" and further a singular "African people".

This opposing version of the "reality" of the "national composition" is clearly intended to serve different rhetorical functions in terms of identity and power relations to that of De Klerk. De Klerk's fragmentation of the population and concomitant stress on minority rights is aimed at undermining the notion of a "majority" and the possibility of political domination by such an entity. A concern with domination at an economic level is connoted in De Klerk's use of the word "enforce" in opposing, consistent with the position of successive Nationalist governments, a communist ideology and the socialist rhetoric of the ANC:

De Klerk

[036:4] The collapse, particularly of the Marxist economic system in Eastern Europe, also serves as a warning to those who insist on persisting with it in Africa. Those who seek to enforce this failure of a system on South Africa should engage in a total revision of their point of view

De Klerk further undermines this economic system by describing it as a "failure" and contrasting it with his version of a "sound economy based on proven economic principles and private enterprise" (emphases added).

De Klerk:

[036:15] Among other things, those aims include a new democratic constitution; universal franchise, no domination; equality before an independent judiciary; the protection of minorities as well as of individual rights; freedom of religion; a sound economy based on proven economic principles and private enterprise; and dynamic programmes directed at better education, health services, housing and social conditions for all

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8 In an interview in 1992 De Klerk confirms: [But] we must have a constitution which will prevent the misuse of power by any majority [040]

9 See, for example, Mandela, 1989.
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The overall "aims" which De Klerk lists above summarise the central components of the framework for his version of a 'new' South Africa. The careful balancing of the content of the list illustrates further the rhetorical process of consensus-building necessary to the reunification of the population. The aims attempt to conserve a right wing position but also to accommodate the left-wing discourse: universal franchise but no majority domination, individual rights but also the protection of minorities, private enterprise but also appropriate social welfare policies. As such his version appears as a reasonable and balanced option.

The difficulty which remains, as I have indicated above, is De Klerk's evading the definition of such entities as minorities and the agents of domination. In tracing the history of De Klerk's repertoire of the "national composition" and in considering briefly the nature of possible counter arguments, a link may be demonstrated between these entities and group categories historically based in race. De Klerk's call for the protection of the rights of minorities may then be seen as a device which perpetuates and protects some of such groups. It is a device which attempts to keep silent that which, particularly in the context of the new South Africa, is unspeakable. It is a device which attempts to silence a potential source of conflict and division in a period of reunification. Yet it is a device which remains rooted in past forms of group definition and which therefore presents De Klerk with difficulties in constructing a new version of South Africa. The difficulty is perhaps most apparent in his 1992 address to CODESA:

De Klerk

Ons wil op geen wyse 'n voortsetting van diskriminasië hé nie en ons wil op geen wyse spesiale voorkeure en spesiale voorregte vir enige minderheidsgroep, nie die blankes of enige ander minderheidsgroep, inbou in die nuwe grondwet of in die nuwe Suid-Afrika nie.
De Klerk's use of the phrase "die blankes" (the whites) here clearly defines minorities in terms of race.

**Conclusion**

De Klerk's 1990 speech is clearly aimed at bridging past divisions and uniting the population for the task of building a 'new' nation. It is rhetorically designed for this purpose and its content should be seen in the context of renewal, negotiation and consensus-building; of the beginnings of a non-racial, non-sexist new South Africa. The content should also be seen in the context of potential counter-discourses to the political left and right of De Klerk's position.

De Klerk constructs a version of the social-political context which provides support for one form of social categorisation over others (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996). The alternatives in this context are the category of the old South African national identity maintained by conservatives and the new category proposed by the political left. The category which De Klerk constructs is therefore open to contestation and De Klerk's rhetoric and his production of the 'new' social category are appropriately viewed in a argumentative context (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Billig, 1987). In this view, De Klerk's rhetoric may be seen as serving two related functions. It attempts to undermine counter-versions of national identity and it begins the production of a version or social representation of a new national identity with which a sufficiently broad section of the population will identify. The argumentative process is thus aimed at building a cognitive structure which will either coexist with or dominate the competing social categorisations (Tajfel, 1969; 1981).
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Within the theoretical and methodological framework set out earlier, this chapter has considered this representational process in terms of its interwoven aspects of content and form. Close attention to De Klerk's argument shows how a number of rhetorical devices may be deployed in the promotion of one version and in the undermining of others. It is evident in this analysis that such devices, pronominal usage in particular, are indexes of broader social and ideological discursive work. Analysis of rhetoric at this level then provides a useful contribution to understanding how a particular argument may serve to maintain certain relations of power.

At the same time, consideration of the patterns in the interpretative resources on which De Klerk draws provides insight into the constructive process. Attention to variability between the usage of certain terms in De Klerk's argument and in the counter-arguments of speakers from other political organisations provides an indication how such terms are mobilised to construct versions which may serve different ideological functions. Attention to the content of De Klerk's repertoire and his deployment of that content also reveals consistency between the building blocks of his new version and those used by earlier Nationalist leaders. Analysis at this level shows how a speaker actively draws on these resources in the construction of versions but it also shows the extent to which that speaker is constrained by the availability of resources. Such constraints become evident in the apparent difficulties which De Klerk encounters in his discursive attempt at constructing a new and non-racial representation of the nation while positioned in the discourse of the old, apartheid dispensation.

In sum, in this speech, De Klerk retains and deploys, perhaps necessarily in the context of building consensus, the repertoires of previous Nationalist governments with attendant connotations of racism. In drawing on a discourse of rights, and in maintaining a silence
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around the nature of the various group divisions, he attempts to avoid drawing on the historical discourse of race which hitherto has defined the population. However, the absence of a new definition of the “national composition” presents a discursive problem and results in the occasional reversion to the old discourse. The question which arises, is how, in maintaining this position, does De Klerk manage the project of constructing a new national identity. This question is considered in an analysis of his 1991 address to parliament.
Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realise their horizons in the mind's eye. Bhabha (1990)

De Klerk’s address on the opening of parliament in 1991 was delivered in the context of reconciliation and reform initiatives of the previous year, initiatives, De Klerk claimed, which had set the scene for a new South Africa. The year saw the unbanning of the various liberation groups and the release of Nelson Mandela. The State of Emergency declared in 1985 was lifted and negotiations between the Nationalist government and the ANC were begun and formalised with the signing of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes. In terms of the latter the ANC agreed to suspend its armed struggle and exiles were permitted to return. At this point, De Klerk announced, “the time has arrived for nation-building” [037:3]. In furthering this aim, he announced in this speech, amid vociferous protests from far-right political party members, the repeal of the discriminatory Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the commencement of multiparty talks, and the framework of his formula for building a new nation: the Manifesto for the new South Africa (1991). It is his introduction of this manifesto in his 1991 speech which provides an important starting point for understanding his version of the new South African nation.
In South Africa the task of nation-building is formidable because of the diversity of our population. We lack the natural cohesion of a single culture and language that frequently forms the cornerstone of nationhood. Consequently, we shall have to rely heavily on the other cornerstone - that of common values and ideals. I have taken the liberty, on the basis of an analysis of the views of a wide spectrum of leaders, of formulating a set of these common values and ideals. Without laying claim to its being complete or the last word on the subject, I believe that it may serve as a point of departure in the search for a national consensus. The full text will be released today under the title "Manifesto for a new South Africa".

In this paragraph De Klerk constructs the basis of a "new" national identity by asserting areas of commonality within South Africa but also by setting the limits to such identification in terms of differences or "diversity". The act of construction is suggested in his use of the metaphor of a "cornerstone". His need or intention to shift or manipulate the meanings of certain terms in this process is apparent in his introduction of the idea of the dual cornerstones on which nations, he states, are built (the repeated use of the definite article preceding the word cornerstone may indicate the unresolved problematic nature of introducing this concept). Indeed it is the meaning of the "culture" cornerstone which De Klerk appears to fragment and shift to suit his rhetorical needs.

Clearly, the paragraph extends the consensus-building rhetoric of De Klerk’s 1990 speech necessary to the nation-building project. De Klerk supports his proposal and rhetorically manages the problem of his stake in it by attributing it to "a wide spectrum of leaders". A sense of inclusiveness is retained in this vague phrase which avoids mention of specific leaders. Similarly he avoids "laying claim" to having presented a final comprehensive list and positions himself simply as a catalyst in the "search for national consensus". His
proposal thus assumes a degree of objectivity, removed from particular political interests.

Indeed he later asserts:

De Klerk [037:4] On these broad basic values and ideals we can found a new South African nation. They do not belong exclusively to any single political party. They are universal

However, a tension remains in De Klerk’s argument between his retention of the “problem” of “diversity” and the need for developing “cohesion” based in areas of commonality.

At the outset De Klerk asserts that the South African population lacks “the natural cohesion of a single culture and language”. In other words, he suggests that it is a common culture and language which “naturally” provides the common bond and sense of belonging discussed in previous chapters. De Klerk’s use of the adjective “natural” is pivotal here. It cements his argument providing a sense of objectivity to his assertion, presenting it as a simple fact requiring no further explanation. This word, with its essentialist connotations, functions to freeze culture or cultures, implying that they are primordial and static entities and places them beyond political processes and interests. De Klerk does not explain what he means by “culture” but the “natural” adjective subverts the alternate argument that such categories are indeed constructions, the product of historically specific political and cultural processes (see for example, Thornton, 1988).

It should be added at this point, that De Klerk’s language usage here is consistent with that of earlier Nationalist repertoires, resonating clearly with the earlier discourse of multinationalism which construed a South African population divided into discrete ethnic

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1 The attempt, on the part of the Nationalist and earlier governments, to suppress certain cultures is noted in the ANC’s undated Draft National Cultural Policy. It states that “colonialism and apartheid neglected, distorted and suppressed the culture of the majority of South Africans” [115]
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groups each possessing its own distinctive culture and which would eventually develop into a
culture (Sharp, 1988). “Diversity” is once more reified as a problem, and the content of the
phrase “the natural cohesion of a single culture and language” is consistent with repertoires of
the “national composition” used, for example, in the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and
in P.W. Botha’s “Rubicon” speech of 1985². The emphasis on language difference, though
frequently mobilised in nationalist rhetoric as a distinct group-defining factor, has served to
construct further subdivisions within the South African population undermining the possible
counter argument for a single, majority African culture. To this extent De Klerk’s rhetoric of
a new national identity reflects the discourse of the old and perpetuates the “national
composition” and identities developed within the apartheid framework. It contrasts with
ANC discourse, in which, as I have already shown in the previous chapter, diversity is
construed positively within the context of a building a single nation.

However, De Klerk is concerned here with the construction of a new nation which, he argues,
will be built “on the other cornerstone” of “common values and ideals”. These he believes “
could provide the cohesiveness of a new South African nation” [037:3]. This constructive act
has apparent consequences and functions. Firstly, it may be argued that “culture” ordinarily
embraces such products and elements as “values and ideals” (again see Thornton, 1988 for a
discussion of this topic). Yet De Klerk’s rhetoric posits these entities as somehow separate
from culture. This fragmentation may serve the rhetorical purpose of consensus building but
it has the consequence of attributing a particular meaning to the terms “diversity” and
“culture” in this speech. It becomes apparent that “culture” construed here as “naturally”
occurring difference and stripped of the constructed elements of “values and ideals” as well as

² The Bantu Self-Government Act proclaimed that “Bantu’s form separate groups on the basis of language and
culture” while P.W. Botha’s speech refers to “cultures, values, languages which are demonstrably real in our
heterogeneous society”
language, does much of the work of the earlier, now silenced, race categories (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In effect, De Klerk’s rhetoric subtly reconstitutes the old categories in a new guise.

Secondly, it is important to note that whilst earlier Nationalist repertoires contained the term “values” and deployed it in argument for the differentiation of groups, De Klerk here uses the word to argue for the possibility of finding “common” ground on which to build a “national consensus”. His predecessor, by contrast, argued in 1985:

P.W. Botha [084:157] The reality of our diversity is a hard reality. We face it, because it is there. How do we accommodate it? How do we build a better future for our cultures, values, languages which are demonstrably real in our heterogeneous society?

This movement illustrates how repertoires, or parts of repertoires, may be mobilised for different if not contrasting discursive purposes (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Further, while the separation of “values and ideals” from “culture” indicates a race-based understanding of culture, it also serves the rhetorical function of distancing them from particular cultural interests providing an apparently neutral basis for building consensus. De Klerk, as I have noted above, underscores this process by claiming that the “common values and ideals” are universal.

Values and ideals cornerstone

A brief analysis of these “values and ideals” is useful in further unravelling De Klerk’s rhetorical purpose. He lists the following:

De Klerk [037:4] In a nutshell, the basic values and ideals, as formulated in the manifesto, and as they have crystallised out of the national
debate, could be summarised thus:

The basis of the new South Africa should be justice. The great majority of South Africans desire a just state which will guarantee basic liberties and rule out arbitrary actions and domination, and which will require and assure responsible citizenship. Everyone desires a just dispensation in which fairness will be the point of departure.

On this basis, South Africans ask that the new South Africa should epitomise the following objectives:

They want peace. They wish to be assured that they and their families and their property will be safe.

They want prosperity. They wish to share in a sound and growing economy that will make employment opportunities and better living conditions possible for everybody and allow everybody to reap the fruits of their labours.

They want progress. They wish to have effective educational, health and welfare services, as well as adequate housing and recreational facilities.

They want participation in democratic institutions. They wish to feel that they are part of government on every level, that they are not dominated and that they may be proud together of our country, South Africa.

He adds:

De Klerk: [037:4] [these broad basic values and ideals] find expression in the hearts and dreams of all successful, prosperous and stable nations.

De Klerk proposes here that in the absence of the "natural cohesion of a single culture" a new nation may be built on the values and ideals of justice, peace, prosperity, progress and participation. He argues later that on the basis of these values and ideals "we shall be able to
unite the rich diversity of our population behind common goals”, “settle our differences through co-operation and negotiation” and promote a nation which will “include all our people with allegiance and loyalty to our common fatherland” [037:5]. These values are clearly aimed at transcending what De Klerk construes as unchanging “cultural” differences.

A reading of the Manifesto for a new South Africa to which he refers in this speech indicates that, in the absence of the “natural cohesion” of culture, national cohesiveness will be provided through the entrenchment of these values in a negotiated constitution, a “constitution [which] should be based on the rule of law” [039]. De Klerk’s focus, like that proposed in Degenaar’s (1992, p.15) argument given in Chapter One, is on the “creation of a democratic constitution and culture”. In this respect his version of nation stresses what Smith (1991) determined as the civic or economic and legal-political aspects of national identity and discounts the ethnic and cultural component.

Nonetheless De Klerk puts forward his “values and ideals” in a manner that is sufficiently “broad basic” to make counter argument difficult and to facilitate a broad sense of inclusiveness. Indeed there is some concurrence in broad principle between what he proposes and the rhetoric of, for example, the ANC whose Draft National Cultural Policy stresses that

there is a need to ensure the balanced introduction of values that will assist in the establishment of a new society, such as democracy, human rights, peace, justice, and also second-generation rights, and in general, a systematic shift from values of repression, racism, exploitation and so forth [115].

At the same time De Klerk’s “values” must be seen in the light of far-right counter arguments and concerns. Although delivered two years later, the following extracts from speeches and

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3 It is noteworthy that De Klerk retains the term “fatherland” with its patriarchal connotations.
interviews provide an illustration of some of the issues which De Klerk’s “values”
encompass. Pieter Mulder of the Conservative Party claimed in a televised debate:

**Mulder**

> Ek dink ek praat namens meeste Afrikaners daar buite as ek sê hulle is
tans bekommerd. Dit gaan oor sekuriteit, dit gaan oor hulle veiligheid
vorentoe. En hulle wil graag weet, sal sy kind in die toekoms
Afrikaans-Christlik kan skool gaan soos hy nou gewoont is. Is sy
eiendom veilig, is sy pensioen veilig, sal Afrikaans ’n amptelike taal
nog kan bly en so kan ek voort gaan met ’n lys

Malcolm Lupton, leader of the National Liberation Front expressed the fear in a newspaper
interview that

**Lupton:**

> [Coloureds will be] dragged along toward economic ruination, political
marginalisation and cultural despair under a black majority regime

Wilhelm Verwoed, grandson of the late H.F. Verwoed and member of the ANC put forward
the following summary cited in a newspaper article:

**Verwoed:**

> If there is one thing which stands out in the reactions of people to
current events and changes in our country, it is feelings of fear and
uncertainty. This is accompanied by a "we-them" manner of thinking
and living. It is "black-on-black" violence in the townships far away,
it is black, faceless masses marching to threaten "us", it is "our"
language, culture and high standards that must be protected against
"them" - the "communists" and "radicals".

De Klerk contends that if the values he sets out are adopted “we will be able to enter the new
century as one of the successful and dynamic nations of the world” [037:5]. The prediction of
a “successful” nation based in the values of justice and the rule of law, of peace and security
of person and property, of prosperity and material wealth and the promise of meaningful
involvement and power in government, construct a powerful incentive for ‘investment’ in the
idea of the new nation. In many respects De Klerk’s “values and ideals” conform with the
cognitive-motivational prerequisites for national development set out by Tajfel (1969) and later Social Identity Theorists.

De Klerk attempts to construct new national identity in the form of what Tajfel (1969, p. 167) termed a "superordinate identity". He provides for the possibility of successful "social influence" and resultant identification by raising to a superordinate level those "particularised issues" which I have listed above broadly important to all members of the population (Tajfel, 1969, p. 157). In this way his rhetoric contains "messages [which are] congruent with the individual's motives" (Tajfel, 1969, p. 158). Further, in arguing that the values he proposes "find expression in the hearts and dreams of all successful, prosperous and stable nations [037:4] he provides the context for positive comparison and identification with such nations. His rhetoric also contains what Tajfel (1969, p. 158) described as "messages to build up a cognitive structure which will be capable of coexisting with, or of dominating, the competing views of the world". In this respect De Klerk's version of a new nation recognises and indeed entrenches the discourse of "cultural diversity" but simultaneously constructs and builds upon "the other cornerstone" of values and ideals unity this "rich diversity" behind "common goals". This national formulation then attempts to provide non-conflicting space for both left and right-wing elements of the political spectrum. What remains is the extent to which a significant portion of the population will "emotionally identify" with the new nation (Tajfel, 1969, p.157). De Klerk suggests that investment in these values, in particular participation in democratic institutions, will lead to a sense of belonging and togetherness and feelings of pride in the country. Emotive connotations are apparent in his warranting that these values "find expression in the hearts and dreams" of other nations.
In arguing for these “values and ideals” De Klerk puts in considerable rhetorical work to minimise his interest or stake in them. In additional to the devices I have already mentioned in discussing the previous extract, De Klerk here emphasises that the values “have crystallised out of the national debate” and prefaces his list with the phrase “South Africans ask that...”.

In addition, he stresses the pronoun “they”, alternatively opening each sentence with the phrase “they want” or “they wish” in each paragraph. Of course, this attribution and repetition serves as a powerful and persuasive rhetorical device in the act of consensus-building. However, it is fruitful to consider what else might be achieved in this discourse.

It is apparent, though not specifically claimed, that in setting forth his “values and ideals” De Klerk is building a new national identity in relation to an Other. I have already noted that De Klerk links his values to “all successful, prosperous and stable nations”. Later he asserts that he is opposed to a dispensation that is “out of step with the basic values and ideals of the world’s successful democracies and economies” [037:5]. At the same time, he defines this value based identity against an Other. He warns that “South Africa dare not make the mistakes that have led to impoverishment and dictatorship in so many countries of the world” and for that reason will adhere to the values and ideals he puts forward [037:5]. Later in his speech he states:

De Klerk [037:20]

With Communism a discredited and defunct ideology, and the Cold War virtually something of the past, we have witnessed the removal of major obstacles in the way of achieving values and objectives which will benefit mankind as a whole.

Read in conjunction with his warning in his 1990 speech that:

De Klerk [036:4]

The collapse, particularly of the Marxist economic system in Eastern Europe, also serves as a warning to those who insist on persisting with it in Africa. Those who seek to enforce this failure of a system...
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on South Africa should engage in a total revision of their point of view

it seems reasonable to argue that De Klerk is constructing an identity related to Western countries (the USA and Europe in particular) and against former Socialist countries as well those African countries which have made the “mistakes that have led to impoverishment and dictatorship”.

This assumption is supported in a brief consideration of the details of the values and ideals De Klerk proposes set out in the Manifesto for a new South Africa. Here, in the introduction, it is advocated that “Christian values ... be maintained”. Under the heading of “prosperity” are listed the following points associated with Western free market or Capitalist economic values:

* all people shall be free to sell their labour and market their products;

* the ownership of property shall be open to all;

* economic growth with the emphasis on the creation of employment shall be vigorously promoted;

These examples, as well as references to the constitutions of Western societies I have quoted in considering his 1990 speech, indicate that De Klerk is promoting the values of Western countries and by implication those of predominantly “white” racial societies. I shall return to this point in the concluding section below but it is also important to indicate here that De Klerk pitches his version in the context of counter-arguments emanating from left-wing political parties. An illustration of this alternate view is found in the ANC’s booklet Ready to Govern (1992). The ANC policy set out here, aims at a mixed economy including an
extension of the public sector and the nationalisation of industries. The document provides for a corrective policy of affirmative action in employment practices and the entrenchment of the rights of workers. It also argues for a fundamental change in the existing pattern of land ownership and proposes the redistribution or agricultural land to redress imbalances. In this context, the "values" promoted by the Nationalist Party may also be seen as an attempt to retain the socio-economic status of the dominant group.

The life of communities

Before concluding the analysis of this 1991 speech it is important to consider one further, later section of the speech where De Klerk introduces the concept of community rights. He states:

De Klerk [037]

The ending of apartheid and the repeal of these last remaining discriminatory laws will bring us to the end of an era - an era in which it was sought to deal with the reality of a diversity of peoples and communities within the same national boundaries, by means of discriminatory coercion.

However, the removal of discrimination and coercion, which is now being completed, does not alter the reality of the existence of a variety of peoples and communities.

This is not unique to South Africa either.

Throughout the world, there are certain communities within countries and states that have maintained a specific identity. Individuals, who feel attracted to certain communities and feel happy and secure in them, are also allowed to do so.

In South Africa, too, a deeply-rooted desire exists among some communities for a system in which certain human needs may continue to be met in a community context - without coercion, without discrimination and without apartheid.
The government is convinced that recognition has to be given to this reality in any new dispensation. Therefore, it remained committed to ensuring community rights for those who desire them and believes that they will have to be accommodated in the new South Africa.

The government’s points of departure in this respect are that:

People cannot be coerced into communities;

the authorities may not discriminate against certain communities in favour of others;

a community life of one’s own has to sustained by one’s own inherent will and abilities and not by statutory coercion;

community recognition has to be based on freedom of association, as it is recognised constitutionally and otherwise by various countries in the world.

De Klerk here deploys elements of an interpretative repertoire consistent with that used in former Nationalist rhetoric and in his own 1990 speech. In a variation from the latter speech there is an apparent shift from the term “minorities” with its racial connotations to “communities”. The use of this collective noun merits brief consideration.

The use of the term community has a long history in South African politics. In particular, it has been deployed in right-wing rhetoric as a euphemistic label for apartheid group categories. Such usage is clearly illustrated by the late leader of the Conservative Party, Andries Treurnicht who complained in a radio interview in 1992:

Treurnicht [009] But everybody knows there is a white community distinct from coloured community, Zulu community et cetera.
But it is a term which has also been mobilised by left-wing political groups to suit particular purposes. It is a term of such undefined vagueness and flexibility that it may be applied as appropriately to very small groups as to such large intangible entities as "the black community" or "the international community". As has been pointed out elsewhere it is "the political term [but] it is also one of the most stereotyped and obscure (Thornton & Mamphele, 1988, p. 29) (emphasis in original). For these reasons "community" presents itself as a widely accepted and relatively neutral term and is deployed as such in political rhetoric. Yet, for analytical purposes, it is important to record that it is a term which has frequently been used interchangeably with others such as 'race', ethnic group', 'nation' and 'peoples' (Thornton & Mamphele, 1988; for an example see Botha, 1991) and has been mobilised in legitimisation of the existence of such groups. In the present speech (as well as that of 1990) the use of the term should be seen in the context of De Klerk's emphasis on the "cultural diversity" of South Africa. In this perspective, it may be argued, "community" does much of the work of the racial categories around which De Klerk attempts to maintain a silence.

A further point in support of this view emerges in considering the content of De Klerk's repertoire in this passage. He speaks of communities occurring with the spatially or territorially defined confines of "national boundaries" or "countries" and within the politico-legal limits of "states". Here "community" seems to assume the form of "nation" itself, rather than that of an integral part of the larger entity. What is absent from this rhetoric is the expression of "communities" as parts of a nation or national identity.  

4 In a contrasting version Mandela, (1990a, p. 224) argues for the inclusion of the various subgroups within a single nation. He states: "We are committed to building a single nation in our country. Our new nation will include Blacks and Whites, Zulus and Afrikaners, and speakers of every other language".
The issue of "community rights" may be seen as a form of ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) with which De Klerk must contend. He is concerned with presenting a "new" South Africa reflecting "Western constitutions" and emphasising individual rights. He is also concerned with securing the rights of groups with an historical basis in an apartheid ideology. As a result of the latter history, references to group rights by Nationalist speakers were regarded with suspicion by members of the African National Congress (Tambo, 1991). De Klerk's argument for the recognition of these group rights is therefore clearly designed to persuade left-wing political parties of a break with the apartheid ideology by stressing that the retention of such rights should be "without" "apartheid", "discrimination" or "coercion" (for rhetorical effect, the word "coercion" is repeated five times in this short passage while the preposition "without" introduces the rhetorical device of a three part list). But, De Klerk's argument also reflects the concerns of right-wing politicians who fear coercive integration policies under a majority government and seek the "statutory" proclamation of a "white homeland" or "volkstaat" (see Terre'Blanche, 1987). This fear is voiced in a 1992 radio interview by right-winger Andries Treurnicht when he suggests:

Treurnicht: But at this moment people realise that if you force together different disparate communities you're in for trouble

De Klerk's proposed alternative to "community" development may thus be seen as a consensus-building device. His claim that this categorisation is "not unique" and is supported in "various countries" if not "throughout the world" serves as warrant for his proposal. In contrast to the "statutory coercion" option he proposes a process of "community" identification or "recognition" based on "freedom of association". The motivation to form such "communities", he suggests, is a "deeply-rooted desire" to have certain "human needs"
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met. Individuals identify emotionally with communities where they “feel happy and secure”. They are “sustained” through individual “inherent will and abilities”. There are echoes of an essentialist discourse in the terms “deeply-rooted”, “human needs” and “inherent will and abilities”, suggesting a “natural” need to for the existence of such group. More important, however, is De Klerk’s deployment of an individualist discourse, reducing community development to individual needs and “desires”. This approach, discussed in earlier chapters, ignores structural factors, the ideological and historical context in which community identities develop and are developed. Arguably, the deployment of this discourse here serves the rhetorical function of detracting from the socially and politically constructed nature of the “specific identity” which the proposed “communities” will “maintain”. In effect it is an argument for the acceptance or tolerance of certain, here unspecified, group identity categories which developed within the context of an apartheid ideology.

Conclusion

In this section I have attempted to show how De Klerk, in his 1991 speech, discursively constructs the basis for building a “new” South African national identity. It is a speech which continues the 1990 process of consensus-building, apparently accommodating both left and right-wing political elements. To this extent it has retained notions of national diversity and difference but has also sought to construct areas of commonality in terms of “values and ideals”. It is apparent from this attempt at balancing different views that the constructive process of producing a new South African nation occurs within a context of argument and contestation (Billig, 1987). The category nation and its component elements are produced in the context of a number of possible alternatives from either left-wing or far-right political groups. The constructive process and the categories it produces may be seen as
an argument against these alternative ways of constructing the new nation (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996).

In this process, I have suggested, De Klerk fragments and shifts the meaning of terms such as “culture” to suit his rhetorical context and needs. He selects elements of “culture” to warrant the continued existence of certain divisions and entrench them as “natural” and others which he argues will provide the basis for a new, superordinate identity.

In this discourse, De Klerk attempts to maintain a silence around race, drawing on such terms as culture and community to describe group categories. However, there are patterns of consistency in the repertoires on which he draws which indicate a relationship between such categories and earlier race groupings. Further, the “universal values and ideals” which this speech proffers as a basis for a new South Africa are clearly those of Western nations. The adoption of these values amounts then to a re-assertion of the ideology of the “culture” which dominated South Africa for three centuries. Their adoption as the fundamental values on which to build a new South Africa would thus aim to maintain, in a reformulated version, the relations of power which have held sway here for so long.
CHAPTER TWELVE

SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

There can be many "peoples" or "population groups" within a nation, but there cannot be many nations within one nation


The framework for this chapter is provided by De Klerk's addresses to parliament in 1992 and 1993. These were the last addresses made by De Klerk in his capacity of State President and mark the culmination of the reform process initiated in 1990. The chapter will also consider aspects of the referendum "Victory" speech delivered in March 1992 and which De Klerk proclaimed marked "the real birthday of the real new South African nation" [001]. A brief analysis of the content of the Nationalist Draft Bill of Fundamental Rights introduced during the 1993 parliamentary address is also undertaken for the purpose of highlighting the place of women's rights within the 'new' national formulation.

The principle of self-determination

Introducing his 1992 address to parliament, De Klerk declared that the prelude to negotiations had passed and that South Africa had fully entered a period of negotiations. Indeed, by time of this speech a great deal had been achieved. Discriminatory legislation (1913 and 1936 Land Acts, Group Areas Act, Development Trust and Land Act and Population Registration Act ) which had impeded the path of negotiation had been repealed. A Declaration of Intent had been adopted by the parties making up CODESA and preliminary work had begun setting the scene for the development of a new constitution. Debate had begun on the nature of a possible "transitional government" and the National Peace Accord
had been signed. But there were also rumblings of discontent and disagreement which would manifest themselves during 1992. CODESA would be deadlocked for several months around constitutional issues. Right-wing Afrikaners were divided over the issue of a “Volkstaat” and later in the year a number of right-wing parties, including the governing bodies of former “homelands” formed the “Concerned South Africans Group” in response to the National Party/ANC Record of Understanding reached in September. Nonetheless, 1992 saw the “white” referendum unite a large majority of white voters behind De Klerk’s reform initiatives and the announcement of the first fully democratic elections to be held in 1994.

The section of De Klerk’s 1992 speech which relates most directly to the issue of developing a new national identity is that dealing with the issue of “self-determination”. In the context of negotiation it is probable that De Klerk introduces this topic in an attempt to co-opt into the negotiation process those conservative groups which have hitherto resisted taking part. Nonetheless, the content of his argument provides a useful basis for analysing De Klerk’s construction of the nation.

De Klerk stresses that there is place in the negotiation process for discussion of “self-determination” warranting its inclusion by referring to an external authority.

De Klerk: The principle of self-determination of peoples is recognised internationally. Eminent examples of this are to be found in the Charter and several other formal documents of the United Nations.

But it is his explanation of “the government’s” position with regard to “self-determination” which is of central importance:
De Klerk:

The government has never expressed itself opposed to the principle of the self-determination of nations. From experience however it did arrive at the conviction that its application on the pattern of every people having its own sovereign state with its own territory, is not practically achievable in South Africa.

In addition, many of the steps taken over the years by successive governments to apply this principle to the maximum extent, led increasingly to racial separation, racial discrimination and domination. This led to an untenable and morally indefensible situation.

For that reason, the government undertook a whole series of fundamental policy changes. These included the removal of all forms of statutory discrimination and the suspension of all action towards the further division of South Africa's territory on the basis of peoples, that is to say, on an ethnic basis. We are convinced that partition and secession cannot work in South Africa, and for this reason a point of view in favour of an undivided state was adopted by us as long ago as 1985.

With that, the government has not abandoned the principle of self-determination.

It is firstly noteworthy that the terms of De Klerk's repertoire are used interchangeably. He speaks first of the "self-determination of peoples" and then of the "self-determination of nations". Later he explains that division "on the basis of peoples, ... is to say, on an ethnic basis". In this discourse then a discursive link is apparent between peoples, nations and ethnicity, but it remains an open question whether this link serves a deliberate rhetorical purpose or whether it simply signifies the linguistic difficulties De Klerk faces in the transition from old to new discourses. I shall return to this point in considering an aspect of De Klerk's Referendum Victory speech below.
De Klerk's "target" argument in the above passages is that presented by right-wing groups in support of the apartheid principles which saw a South Africa statutorily and territorially divided along the lines of peoples/nations/ethnic groups. This argument is adequately represented in the following extracts. Dr. Connie Mulder of the Conservative Party put the argument from a "confederalist" perspective in a television interview in 1993:

Mulder: What we are saying, what we are saying basically Mr., er, Bishop is that we believe in self-determination for the Afrikaner people, and we say we want self-determination for that people as an ethnic group, namely the Afrikaner people as such, the Afrikaner nation, and we say also those patriots speaking other languages that share the same destiny on the basis of mutual acceptance and a collective quest for freedom. And because of that we say we do not want to be prescriptive at all as to what other peoples and groups should decide, they should decide for themselves but as far as we are concerned, to create a peaceful solution in this very complex situation, we honestly believe that self-determination through a confederal structure would be the only solution.

A far-right secessionist point of view is that proposed by Afrikanerweerstandsbeweging leader Eugene Terre'Blanche interviewed in 1986:

Terre'Blanche: The resistance movement is not a party political movement but rather a cultural political movement. We are what you call a 'volks' movement. We will see to it that our country will stay in the hands of the Afrikaner people. We believe that this is our land, and we did not steal it from anyone. It was a vast open and empty country when our forefathers, the Voortrekkers, came to this land. We paid for the country with the blood of our people and with millions of tears. We were attacked by the blacks and later murdered in British concentration camps. Nearly 26000 of our people died when the British arrived in the nineteenth century. We have no other place to go. This is our land and we will keep our land. The Zulus have Zululand, and the Tswanas have Botswana. The Afrikaner resistance movement believes in separate development and that any people has the right to own their own land with the right to rule themselves and to elect their own people. We only wish for ourselves what most other European countries and peoples have for themselves.
De Klerk counters this argument from two positions. Firstly, he dismisses "self-determination" along apartheid lines as impractical. He argues that such division is "not practically achievable in South Africa" and later that partition and secession "cannot work". This argument serves the rhetorical function of undermining counter arguments premised in ideology or "principle". The principle simply does not work, a conclusion, De Klerk points out, which is based in "experience". But the argument also obscures an issue central to the process of building a new South African nation. In focusing on the "application" of "self-determination" De Klerk avoids addressing the "principle". In effect the argument from practicality leaves unchallenged and intact the "principle of the self-determination of nations" with its apartheid ideology connotations and its version of a divided South African nation. De Klerk adds that for reasons of impracticality, it was decided in 1985 to adopt "a point of view in favour of an undivided state". His use of the word "state" is noteworthy, for, as I have discussed in Chapter Two, the politico-legal and territorial entity is not necessarily coterminous with "nation". The point here, is that De Klerk does not present an argument for an undivided nation.

The principle/practice issue is also apparent in the second position De Klerk takes up, that of "moral defensibility". He argues that the application of the apartheid principle of separate national development "led to an untenable and morally indefensible situation" of "racial separation, racial discrimination and domination". In this argument, it is not the principle which is morally indefensible but the consequences of its application "to the maximum extent", that is racism. It may also be observed here that De Klerk's use of the rhetorical device of a three part list is flawed. The omission of the third adjective "racial" qualifying "domination" creates a silence around the issue of racial domination.
De Klerk claims that the “government has not abandoned the principle of self-determination”, but if the principle is retained the question remains as to how it will be applied without repeating the earlier, undesirable consequences. De Klerk proposes:

We believe that self-determination is able to find expression in many ways in South Africa, as it does in other countries. Thus, for example, there are several points of departure in the government's approach to a future constitution in which the principle of self-determination clearly asserts itself. These are to be found, among others, in the protection of language and cultural rights, community rights with strong community control and mother-tongue education for those who desire it, the entrenching of the autonomy of interest organisations, strong devolution of authority to regional and local levels of government, a voice for local communities on all manner of community affairs, a variety of checks and balances at the executive and legislative levels and power-sharing linked to proportional representation.

Again, he warrants and normalises his argument by opening with the claim that “self-determination” is accepted in “other countries”. He proposes that there are various ways in which the “principle of self-determination” can “clearly assert itself”: language protection, cultural rights and community rights and a variety of others which speak to the particular concerns of right-wing groups. I have already dealt at length with the terms language and culture and community and have attempted to illustrate how, in Nationalist political discourse, they are used interchangeably, with and are deployed to do much of the work of, unacceptable racial categories. There is a strong historical connection between these terms and those of peoples, nations and ethnic groups used by De Klerk in this speech.

The consequence of De Klerk’s argument here is the legitimisation, in the guise of “culture” and “community”, of those divisions which could not “practically” be established as “sovereign states with [their] own territory” within the race-based, multinational apartheid framework. In the context of an “undivided state” the division of “territory”, and attendant
implications for group identity and security, along group lines is no longer achievable. Instead, De Klerk marshals the legal concept of "rights" to do the work of the apartheid formulation arguing that the "cultural" and "community" rights, among others, will be secured within the framework of a new constitution. In addition, the phrases "community control", "devolution of authority" and "power-sharing linked to proportional representation" carry with them the promise of power with which such group identities may be protected and politically represented.

The white referendum: "the real birthday of the real new South African nation".

I have noted in the preceding section that De Klerk appears to use certain terms interchangeably and that this may signify the discursive difficulties he faces in the transition from old to new discourses. In this section I would like to illustrate this point further by highlighting briefly incidences of contradiction and variation in De Klerk's use of the term nation. The extract below is taken from a speech delivered by De Klerk after his "victory" in the "white" referendum of March 18, 1992. The speech is lent importance by De Klerk himself when he claims that the date marks "the real birthday of the real new South African nation".

De Klerk: What started out with idealism in a quest for justice, because that was the starting point of the policy of separate development, could not attain justice for all South Africans and therefore it had to be abandoned and replaced by the only viable policy which can work in this country, and that is power-sharing, co-operation, the building of one nation in one undivided South Africa.

It doesn't often happen that in one generation a nation gets the opportunity to rise above itself. The white electorate has risen above itself in this referendum. The white electorate has reached out through this landslide win for the "yes" vote, has reached out to all our compatriots, to all other South Africans and the message of this
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Referendum is: today is in a certain sense of the word the real birthday of the real new South African nation.

Here De Klerk asserts that given the failure in practice of the policy of separate development the only option “which can work” is “power-sharing, co-operation, the building of one nation in one undivided South Africa”. In support of the point raised in the previous section, it is noteworthy that De Klerk describes favourably the principle of “separate development” and its “quest for justice” attributing its abandonment to a failure in practice. It should be noted also that the new policy he is advocating is promoted in terms of its practical value rather than its principle. Indeed, De Klerk’s description of the new principle is interesting in that it contains potentially contradictory elements for the concept of power-sharing implies a division of some kind. The question which arises is, who, in the context of “one nation in one undivided South Africa” and of a white electorate which “has reached out to all our compatriots, to all other South Africans, shares with whom? An apparent contradiction arises in De Klerk’s rhetoric in attempting to construct a new version of the nation drawing simultaneously on repertoires of the old and the new nation. “Power-sharing”, the inclusion of which here may reflect De Klerk’s concern with right-wing arguments, has been part of the Nationalist repertoire since the 1980’s.

There is a variation in De Klerk’s use of the word nation which occurs in the next paragraph. Here De Klerk speaks of the birth of a “new South African nation” and connects the racially defined “white electorate” to “all other South Africans” (emphasis added). Yet, in the first two lines of his speech “nation” would appear coterminous with “white electorate”. It may, of course, be argued that this slippage is simply a consequence of De Klerk speaking in his second language or an over-reading of the text. However, it may also be considered in the
The extract which De Klerk claims provides the “only foundation on which we can build the future”, suggests the unity of the “many peoples” within one “home” and one “fatherland” (it does, nonetheless, reflect the cultural and racial divisions of the Nationalist repertoire). Yet, it has been argued, what appears to be the rhetoric of inclusion has been constructed in such a way that it “still excludes people outside the Afrikaner camp” (Lategan, June/July, 1992, p. 12). Firstly De Klerk limits himself to the work of Afrikaans poets (elsewhere in the speech he also cites the Afrikaans poet N.P. Van Wyk Louw). Secondly, Lategan (June/July, 1992, p. 12) points out, De Klerk’s quotation apparently misses or avoids the opportunity to bridge the “emotional rift between Afrikaner and African” by excluding two lines of immense symbolic importance. The lines, which immediately precede and succeed the quoted text, are: “Nkosi sikilel’ iAfrika - ons vra u seën, o Heer, vir Afrika” and “Nkosi sikilel’ iAfrika - seën, Heer, die land wat vele volkere dra” respectively. “Nkosi sikilel’ iAfrika” was written by an African priest and was adopted as one of South Africa’s national anthems in 1994. Lastly, the extract refers to “one fatherland” rather than one nation. Giliomee (April 3, 1997) has pointed to a distinction which may be drawn between patriotism (loyalty to the state) and nationalism (loyalty to a nation as a community defined in a primordialist sense). He argues:
"One can be loyal to the state (and even proud of it) but still not be a member of the nation (or the community) that dominates that state”.

1993: “Bill of Fundamental Rights”

The 1993 parliamentary address was delivered in the context of meaningful progress in the negotiations for a new dispensation. The first full general election had been announced and the ANC had agreed to a power-sharing arrangement with the National Party during the phase of transition to a democratic government. In April of 1993 the “new” reformed National Party would announce its new colours to fit its new image and multiparty negotiations resumed early in May. In the same month 21 right-wing groups together formed the Afrikaner Volksfront under the leadership of General Constand Viljoen. In July, agreement was reached on April 27, 1994 as the date for a full general election. In effect this 1993 speech would be the last parliamentary address which De Klerk would deliver as State President.

From the perspective of national identity construction De Klerk’s 1993 speech adds little to the repertoire he has mobilised or the constructive work he has been doing. Rather it serves to consolidate the position he has been developing within the framework of a negotiated constitution. De Klerk he maintains that “a broad consensus” has begun to develop between the various parties involved in negotiations.

De Klerk [114:3] The basis of that consensus is the growing realisation that domination in a winner-takes-all dispensation cannot work in South Africa; that dynamic economic growth, based on private initiative and free-market principles, is a precondition for a better quality of life for all South Africans; that a regional dispensation, based on federal principles and recognition of our cultural and linguistic diversity, is a necessity; and that the only road to peace is reconciliation and co-operation
This repertoire is repeated later in this speech in the context of “constitutional affairs” with added references to “power-sharing” and “the assurance of economic security for owners and investors; protection of the security of tenure of officials and teachers” [114:17]. It is apparent that the “basis of consensus” summarised here encapsulates the central issues of the earlier speeches and in particular gives form to the two “cornerstones” of the South African nation construed by De Klerk. Legal and territorial (federal) form is given to “cultural and linguistic diversity” and the broad “values and ideals” are specifically listed. Elements of this repertoire are developed further in the Bill of Fundamental Rights announced by De Klerk in this speech. I shall return to this Bill below.

But consensus is not complete with continued rumblings of dissent from right-wing groups. An attempt to persuade at least some of this group to “invest” in the new dispensation is evident in De Klerk’s “assurance of economic security of owners” and the protection of security of tenure of officials. This offer is underscored with the warning:

De Klerk  
[114:16]  
Every South African is facing a choice

Either to support the constitutional change and everything which is reasonably required for its success; or to retire to the laager and prepare for an armed and bloody struggle.

The simple truth is that a devastating war will ensue if negotiation does not succeed.

Here De Klerk uses the rhetorically persuasive device of extreme case formulation to offset the “reasonable” negotiated approach he is promoting. His deployment of the Afrikaans word “laager” is particularly meaningful here. The “laager” has served as a powerful psychological symbol of Afrikaner conservatism, Afrikaner identity, sense of security and
survivalism in the face of perceived threats from other groups. The argument here that to “retire into the laager” will lead ultimately to devastation serves as a clear signifier to right-wing Afrikaner groups that their survival is dependent on adaptation to the new dispensation.

The Draft Bill of Fundamental Rights

The Draft Bill of Fundamental Rights [065] announced by De Klerk was published within a few days of his 1993 speech. The Bill develops and extends the rights already mentioned with the purpose, De Klerk claims, of covering “the widest possible spectrum of basic rights in an effective and enforceable manner”. In brief it has “to bring about a full-fledged Rechtstaat [114:17-18]. The Bill is extensive and a detailed analysis of its contents is beyond the scope of this thesis. I wish only to mention an important component which is also raised in De Klerk’s 1993 speech and has not been mentioned in his earlier speeches discussed so far. The issue falls under the heading of Women’s Rights and its consideration is important in the context of the stress laid on non-sexism in the ‘new’ South Africa. For example, the 1991 CODESA Declaration of Intent [044] states that:

that South Africa will be a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist state in which sovereign authority is exercised over the whole of its territory

In his 1993 speech De Klerk announces the publication of draft legislation which will abolish statutory discrimination against women, prohibit further discrimination and, promote the “equality of the sexes” [114:18]. The Draft Bill of Rights also establishes these points and details women’s’ rights. There is however a note added to the draft which states the following:

It must be pointed out, however, that some of these rights, for example, an
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unqualified right to contract and to deal with property will be in conflict of aspects of the law, culture and customs of indigenous minorities and tribes, and that it is not the intention to force alien values on them.

The inclusion of these provisions regarding woman’s rights must be seen against the background of the conventions relating to women to which the government subscribes. [065:15]

An examination of the pronominal usage in throughout this Bill shows that for the most part clauses and sub-clauses use both the masculine and feminine pronouns (that is “his or her” or “himself or herself”). However there are three clauses where only the masculine pronoun is used. They are: Freedom of Worship (the right to “profess and practise the religion of his choosing); Legal Competence (note with respect to legal capacity to perform legal acts and to enter into contracts refers to “his rights” and “his interests” only); Private Ownership (no person shall be deprived of his property rights...).

Two points emerge here. Firstly, the clause cited above suggests the possibility of tensions arising between the demands of particular cultural identities which De Klerk aims to protect and those of a constitution framework based on “universal values and ideals” and on which, he has argued, the new national identity can be built. Secondly, there are the ramifications of the pronominal slippage I have noted here. Again such slippage may be explained in terms of clerical error or problems of translation. However it is evident that two of the three slippages occur in clauses which the Bill of Rights footnote suggests may be problematic in the light of cultural differences. It may therefore also be argued that the slippage constructs a meaning in the text other than which is overtly intend in the context of asserting women’s rights. From the perspective of national identity the slippage suggests a version of identity based in the patriarchal system which for so long was a defining feature of the South African nation and which is here perpetuated.
Conclusion

In his 1992 speech De Klerk's rhetoric is aimed at co-opting the right-wing and drawing them into the process of negotiating a new nation. His rhetoric aims at providing the appropriate context of security, power and integrity of group identity in which this group will "invest" and so become part of the new dispensation. The argument makes cognitively available an alternative construction (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996) of the category nation which has meaning and legitimacy for members of this group. To this end De Klerk's rhetoric functions to diminish the relative salience of competing social categorisations providing an arena for positive social comparison and identification with the new category. In the process he constructs a version of a nation in which existing group identities may remain intact and will gain the constitutional right and attendant power to persist within the framework of the new category. To some extent the territorial space which the previous dispensation sought to secure for the "self-determination" of such groups is provided in De Klerk's promise of "strong devolution of authority to regional and local levels of government". It has been pointed out that devolution is the most extensive form of a decentralised state promoting the view that "local authorities should be constitutionally separate". Devolution may also be seen as a means of diluting the political power of a majority. From an economic perspective political devolution may be viewed as an extension of the free market system (Cameron, 1990, p. 57ff).

An important general observation about this 1992 speech is the absence from De Klerk's rhetoric of arguments for nation-building so powerfully presented in the previous two speeches. The focus in this speech is rather on the "protection" of the rights of groups and cementing relations of power within the legalistic framework of a constitution. Here De
Klerk is concerned with developing the framework for what he earlier in this speech referred to as a “Rechtstaat or constitutional state in which the rule of law prevails” (italics in original). To the extent that nation-building is implied here its emphasis is strictly on the economic and legal-political or civic aspect of nationhood (Ignatieff, 1994; Smith, 1991) and as such the process may be seen as a consolidation of the “values and ideals” platform promoted in his 1991 speech. Yet it is noteworthy that references to the idea of a single nation are absent from a speech which deals, in part, with “the self-determination of nations”. De Klerk’s rhetoric here underscores the argument discussed in previous chapters that, in the broad context of developing a new nation, political speakers will emphasise certain elements and shift their meanings to fit the demands of a particular context.

In the analysis of his “Victory Speech” I have attempted to illustrate briefly the possible difficulty De Klerk experiences in such shifts, particularly in the discursive transition from the old to the new. It cannot be concluded here whether the excision of the lines from the poem De Klerk cited was deliberate. However, given the response it evoked in the newspaper article I have quoted it had rhetorical consequences particularly for Afrikaners (presumably the article itself extended this consequence) with subsequent ramifications for national identification. I have also briefly pointed to instances of contradiction and variation in De Klerk’s “Victory” rhetoric as well as the content of the Draft Bill of Rights. Here too, the possibility should be considered that meanings emerge other than those which the speaker is overtly attempting to construct. However, it is apparent that in the argumentative process of producing a new category of nation different and sometimes contradictory interpretative repertoires are drawn on, be they of the left-wing or of either the ‘new’ or ‘old’ right-wing discourses. The problem arises in attempting to forge this new category within the discursive constraints of old discourses which position the speaker. What is required is a ‘new’
language in which the South African nation may be reproduced or, as Norval (1993, p. 9) puts it: "rethinking the very imaginary which would frame the horizon of possible identifications".
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

CONCLUSION

If the nation does not become the primary identity of the people the people of South Africa, they will imbibe willy-nilly all manner of ethnic and racial allegiances or sub-identities as their ideological life-blood. (Alexander, 1996)

In this concluding chapter I shall consider the findings generated in this project from two perspectives. In the first section I shall review the application of discourse analytic theory and method and the implications of this approach for the study of national identity. In the second part of the chapter I shall consider extracts from speeches and interviews given by F. W. De Klerk in 1994. These extracts will provide the basis for drawing conclusions with respect to ‘new’ right-wing constructions of South African national identity during the period under study.

Discourse analysis and national identity

Discourse analytic theory

In the review of discourses in Chapter Two there emerged a broad consensus around the argument that ‘the nation’ is not a natural or given entity. Rather, the entity is theorised as a modern construction, though there are differing views as to the building blocks used in the constructive process. Nations are flexible and fluid entities arising in a complex web of social, political and ideological forces, material interests and relations of power. In a particularly prominent definition they are seen as “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983), a view which highlights the importance of the social-psychological nature of nations.
The notion that nations are imagined communities raises a number of social-psychological questions. It may be asked how the collective imagination Anderson theorises operates and what social categories or representations will be imagined (Billig, 1996). Further, it follows from this view that national identity cannot be understood outside the conditions of its ‘imagining’, the social representations and practices within which and through which it is produced and reproduced (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996).

This view has implications for the ways in which the process of national identification is theorised. Social cognitive theories such as Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory set out in Chapter Four provide dynamic theories of the processes by which individual social identity is developed within the framework of categorisations available in a given social context. But these theories do not adequately explain how social categories are produced in the social context or why particular categories are adopted. The discursive approach to national identity set out in Chapter Seven avoids the limitations of these theories and focuses on the ways in which social and psychological processes are constituted in the social domain of discourse. In this approach social categories are actively constructed in discourse for rhetorical purposes. National identity, it is argued, is a discursive, situated product. It is situated to the extent that it is constituted within historically specific cultural and ideological discursive practices, within the relations of power and discourses and counter-discourses which construct the imagined community. As such discourse analysis provides an appropriate theoretical perspective within which to understand the process of producing or reproducing social categories such as national identity. It provides an appropriate theoretical framework for answering the kind of question raised in this project.
The discourse analytic theory adopted in this thesis has followed the broad approach suggested by Wetherell & Potter (1992). This approach is appropriate given the complex nature of the topic under consideration. It has necessarily attempted to consider discourse in both its constructive and constructed forms, ideological positioning and practice, and the relationship between instances of discourse and the maintenance of particular relations of power. An important aspect of the approach is the consideration of the rhetorical construction of discourse both at the level of the rhetorical devices deployed and their functions and at the broader level of the argumentative context. The latter level has important implications for theorising national identity.

Billig (1987) has argued, and the present analysis of right-wing rhetoric illustrates this argument, that national categories are always selected, defined and mobilised in the context of controversy and against alternatives. In this perspective, constructions of national identity are based on the adoption of particular categories and the choice and definition of those categories become “key sites of struggle” (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996, p. 90). This view presents a challenge to mechanistic theories of social identification in which social categories may be seen simply as given in the social context. It also has implications for methodology. As I have noted above, national identity cannot be analysed outside the context of its production. In addition, given that the context of production is argumentative, analysis of the constructions of one group only is inadequate (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996). I shall return to this last point below.

The notion of choice in the adoption and definition of categories suggested in the rhetorical approach, or, more broadly, the discourse analytic contention that the meaning and definition of categories may change from context to context raises a further important point in this
theoretical approach to national identity. The impression may be created that the process is unbounded and discontinuous. Whilst the construction of a 'new' imaginary community may indeed contain elements of discontinuity produced in the process of social change, it should be stressed that the discursive construction of national identity is constrained by the available resources (interpretative repertoires) and the framework work of possible practices (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Hopkins & Reicher, 1996). The 'new' national identity is not produced tabula rasa. It may well contain elements which are new and thus present the possibility of a new version of national identity, but it will also retain a form of continuity with past versions (Norval, 1993).

This last point is illustrated in the present project which shows clearly the continuity between the interpretative resources mobilised in constructing De Klerk's 'new' South Africa and those of earlier versions. Of course, 'old' repertoires may be drawn on for specific rhetorical purposes including the rejection of earlier versions of national identity. But in analysing De Klerk's rhetoric, it is evident that his construction of a 'new' South Africa is constrained by the meaning and definition of the 'old' categories. In this respect he is positioned by the discourses produced within an apartheid ideology. Equally, it is evident that the counter-discourse of the left-wing is constrained by the availability of interpretative resources. Whilst they may be mobilised in different ways and may serve different rhetorical functions, the resources drawn on are frequently the same as those used by De Klerk. In this respect the left-wing too is positioned by the discourses produced within an apartheid ideology.

The construction of national identity is constrained not only by discursive practices but by other practices: social, political, economic, material. This constraint is suggested by De Klerk in his 1991 address to parliament:
De Klerk: Economic growth and constitutional reform have to be mutually reinforcing. Unless the pressing problems of poverty and unemployment are alleviated, constitutional models will be of little avail to us.

The point here is that national identity is not simply discourse. The discursive theory propounded here must be seen in the context of other practices. Nonetheless, as De Klerk’s statement implies, the discursive construction of national identity is inextricably bound up with these other practices and real material interests in particular.

Lastly, the theories of nation and national identity discussed in earlier chapters stressed the central importance of emotion in the development of national identification. The discursive theory adopted in this thesis is limited to the extent that it pays little attention to this aspect. It may be beneficial in future psychological studies of national identity to draw on theories which consider emotional issues and unconscious processes in the social context of discourse and ideology within which national identity is produced. Useful work in this respect has been published by, for example, Frosh (1987, 1989a) and Elliot (1992).

**Discourse analytic ‘method’**

Within the theoretical framework set out in Chapter Seven, the ‘method’ adopted in this thesis is broad, providing an analysis of both the constructed and constructive elements of discourse. Following Thompson’s (1987) suggested three phases an attempt has been made to connect the detailed discourse analysis with its historical context. In this way the approach has attempted to reveal the connection between meaning mobilised in discourse and the power relations it may serve to sustain. I have described in the concluding sections of each chapter of the analysis the results and implications of adopting this methodological approach.
As a general observation, the 'method' provides a powerful approach to the analysis of the complex processes of national identity construction. It provides the means by which it is possible to research not only what national identity is in terms of content but how, within a specific historical context, it is constructed and what the effects of that construction might be. As such it offers the potential to gain insights into this constructive process which are not accessible to more traditional methods. But the 'method' also presented difficulties in this study.

Discourse analysis is a fine-grained and intensive approach. As such, it is more appropriately applied to smaller volumes of text. In a project such as this where texts from various sources are tracked across a period of several years it becomes necessary for purely practical reasons to reduce the 'data' to a manageable amount. This study has focused on important speeches and interviews given at historically significant moments, but the pool of potential 'data' is enormous. Arguably, the accumulation and analysis of additional 'data' would not have yielded significantly different results (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Indeed, there is considerable repetition in the texts analysed here. Yet, it seems likely that an analysis of the discourse of other speakers, at different times and in different contexts may well contribute further to understanding the complexities of this constructive process. Ideally then, it would be appropriate to supplement the discourse analytic process with a coarser qualitative procedure aimed at identifying broader discursive shifts across speakers and across time.

This point leads to a related limitation of the present study. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the rhetorical perspective that versions are always constructed within the context of controversy and are organised against alternatives. An analysis which concentrates on the constructions of one group and neglects those of other groups is inadequate insofar as it
cannot fully explain why particular constructions are produced above others (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996). This study has gone some way towards meeting this criterion by providing brief summaries of the argumentative context and by citing examples of counter-arguments. However, what is required is a full discourse analysis of the construction against which a particular construction is launched. Ideally then, this study would benefit from a close contextual analysis of the constructions of national identity put forward by both the far-right and the left-wing.

Lastly, Thompson’s (1987, p. 528) approach to ideological analysis emphasises the need to analyse the “effect” of the meanings mobilised in the discourse of political speakers. This addition would require the further methodological step of showing how political rhetoric is understood and interpreted by the individuals who are exposed to it. This important observation could form the basis of a further study.

**South African national identity**

When De Klerk addressed parliament on 25 May, 1994 he did so in the context of a ‘new’ South Africa. He spoke as the Deputy President in a new dispensation, as part of the first democratically elected government in South African history: the Government of National Unity. He opened his speech by saying that what he had envisaged when he first addressed parliament as State President on 2 February, 1990 was “now a reality” [117:14]. He went on:

*De Klerk: [117:14]*

I look ahead and I am full of confidence about the future. We are on the right course. Some good foundations have been laid. We have made a reasonable start. Some great challenges lie ahead. There is work to be done. The NP is ready to do its share. We want to be of service to South Africa and all its people in the spirit of our motto: South Africa first.
Tracking De Klerk’s pronominal usage in this extract provides an index of his positioning in this moment. He is part of the parliamentary body he is addressing but he is also overtly a member of the National Party. It is from this position that he speaks here, and elsewhere in this speech, in pledging his support for “South Africa and all its people”. It is also from this position that he raises two “important matters”. The first relates to the issue of “minority rights”.

De Klerk: During the apartheid era this concept was suspect. It was associated with apartheid, racism and discrimination. In the post-apartheid era, we South Africans will have to address this issue fairly and squarely. The realities of our country demand it. The multicultural and multilingual nature of our great nation demands that we focus on the question of the effective protection of minority rights.

I do not aim to offer an analysis of this extract at this stage. The detail of its content and form are familiar and have been dealt with at length in the analysis sections. It is cited here as it neatly encapsulates the constructive process which this study has followed. De Klerk’s juxtaposing of two perspectives on the South African nation reflects the discursive movement from the repertoire of the early Nationalist formulation of the national composition to the ‘new’ repertoire mobilised in the discourse of Nationalist speakers for the past decade. It reflects the movement from the definition of the category “minority” in the racial terms of the “apartheid era” to its redefinition in the cultural and linguistic terms of the “post-apartheid era”. It reflects how discourses may be mobilised to construct and reconstruct in different contexts and for specific purposes the social categories which form the array of possible categorisations within which social identification occurs. In this process, the ‘new’ discourse legitimises and perpetuates the earlier divisions between people and thereby attempts to maintain certain relations of power.
This last point is highlighted in the second matter De Klerk raises and which is related to the question of “self-determination”.

De Klerk: I am of the conviction that the establishment of a volkstaat as advocated by the Freedom Front and the CP, is not viable and would lead to a new form of discrimination. The NP is by no means amenable to that. I am convinced, however, that by way of negotiation solutions could be found which could give far more content to the concept of self-determination - a concept which is now entrenched in our country’s constitution. We believe that thorough consideration will have to be given in this regard to renewal at the local government level. Devolution of power to the lowest possible level ought to enjoy serious consideration.

He later qualifies this proposal with an example:

De Klerk: Without making it a specific proposal, let me give one example. I believe we need to look - on a geographical basis, not on a group definition basis - at the concept of neighbourhood councils within cities and larger towns, to which can be devolved certain functions with regard to the interests of the communities living there - anyone can live there - with regard to the schools and old-aged homes serving those communities and with regard to the social services and cultural activities within those communities.

In these extracts the relationship between the definition of social groups and power relations is clear. It is the phrase “on a geographical basis” which requires further consideration. Though De Klerk’s argument contains a rebuttal of an anticipated alternative, there is a strong connection between group definition and geography in South African history manifested, for example, in the Group Areas Act of 1950. In this respect the “geography” to which De Klerk refers must be seen as a constructed political entity. Further, De Klerk’s proposal should be seen in this historic context and the geographic-group divisions which have already been produced. This point is implicit in De Klerk’s argument when he speaks of communities (and
his deployment of this political term should be noted here) already “living there”. Again the rhetoric anticipates a counter argument by inserting the possibility that “anyone can live there.

Dixon (1997, pp 18 & 19) has considered the relationship between geography, racist ideology and identity. He points out that “geographic discourse” provides a medium for the reproduction of racial inequality. In this respect “physical terrain is also ideological location” (italics in original). This discourse, then, has implications for the construction of identity for “the texts of identity and the texts of space are mutually constitutive” (p. 20).

These extracts from De Klerk’s 1994 speech lend support to the argument which has developed in the course of this analysis. In essence, the ‘new’ right-wing version of the new South Africa reproduces the repertoires of former Nationalist constructions and functions to maintain the divisions and relations promoted within an apartheid ideology. In the context of non-racialism and the “post-apartheid era”, however, De Klerk’s rhetoric is organised to deflect possible arguments that his proposals are racist or reflect such an ideology.

Perhaps the final statement which may be made about this version of the new nation arises in the following extract from a newspaper interview which De Klerk gave in April 1994, a few days before the general election.

De Klerk: [095]

I believe the Afrikaner nation and the Zulu nation, and all other nations which form part of the greater whole of the South African nation, need not fear for their futures as entities. Already in terms of the transitional constitution there is a sufficient constitutional and legal base [to protect them]. I believe that as long as there is a commitment among Afrikaners to cherish their language and their culture and traditions, the Afrikaner nation will continue to exist. And it can only exist in interaction with all other South Africans.
Conclusion

In this last extract, De Klerk's rhetoric appears to rehearse the earlier Nationalist multinational thesis. A clear difference in this version, however, is that the apparently separate entities of the Afrikaner and Zulu nations are subordinate to the "greater whole" of a South African nation. The version appears problematic, for the question arises as to how a nation may contain nations.

One response to the question is that the term 'nation' is variably deployed in political rhetoric and its meaning is related to context, audience and rhetorical purpose. For example, the phrase "our great nation" in the second extract quoted above, was constructed in the context of a speech delivered to parliament and hence to the general South African population. The last extract was taken from an interview shortly before the general election and De Klerk's argument is clearly aimed at coopting conservative political groupings. The rhetoric thus aims at producing different forms of identification in different contexts.

I would argue, however, that the nations-within-a-nation concept is indicative of a more substantive issue: a dilemma in "new" right-wing constructions of national identity. It is a dilemma of the kind which produced two different "cornerstones" of culture in order to provide the basis of the new nation (see Chapter Eleven). The concept of nation is constructed in two ways in "new" right-wing rhetoric. It is a natural, given entity with an enduring culture, traditions and marked by a common language and history. This is the primordialist version of the nation and it is one which persists throughout De Klerk's discourse emerging variably as "nation", "people" or "ethnic group". Nation is also a constructed entity which, De Klerk argues, may be produced out of "common values and ideals". This is the politico-legal or civic version of a nation born out of a democratic society based in constitutional law. It forms the "greater whole" or super-ordinate national
framework to which De Klerk alludes in the last extract. The problem arises in naming the
“new” political entity without undermining the integrity of the ‘old’, “natural” entity in which
the right-wing in particular remains heavily invested.

The use of the word ‘nation’ to describe both entities thus signifies the “new” right-wing
dilemma of retaining the old divisions, historically based in a racist ideology, and, at the same
time, pragmatically responding to the need to produce a new version of the nation: of
providing the context for the production of a new national identity and yet retaining what may
be described as “sub-national identities” (Giliomee, April 3, 1997). Positioned in a discourse
which constructs nations along primordialist lines De Klerk is unable to articulate a new
version.

In explaining his position before the Truth and Reconciliation Committee two years later De
Klerk himself notes:

We are all the children of our times, and the product of the cultural and political
circumstances into which we are born and with which we grew up. (More reconciliation
than truth, August 23 to 29, 1996).

In this view, the production of a new South African national identity in right-wing discourse
must await new ways of narrating the nation.
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## APPENDIX

### SOURCE CODES: TRANSCRIPT EXTRACTS

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