THE QUEST FOR IKHAYA: THE USE OF THE AFRICAN CONCEPT OF HOME IN PUBLIC LIFE.

BY: VUYANI S VELLEM.

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE [IN RELIGION] AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN.

SUPERVISOR: PROF. J COCHRANE.

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THE QUEST FOR *IKHAYA*: THE USE OF THE AFRICAN CONCEPT OF HOME IN PUBLIC LIFE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES FOR THE PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE

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BY

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At this stage of a work of this nature, the feeling of joy and heartfelt gratitude is so overwhelming that the best words to eloquently express this feeling would escape the writer. The study is first and foremost a commentary on my own experiences and struggles to come to terms with what is going on in our country as a black person. I often describe myself as a child of the diaspora because of my birth and upbringing in an urban context. In my home, we children studied in any African language that was available and accessible to us. Some children at home studied in isiXhosa others in Sesotho (this includes me) and Setswana.

As people who are AmaXhosa, originally from Transkei in Qumbu, we have had both experiences of happiness and bitterness as children of the diaspora. Sometimes our isiXhosa would be “suspect” among AmaXhosa while at other times we would be “confused” as Sesotho or Setswana speaking. This experience has been made worse by the situation of a black person who has no space in his/her country of birth. Yet thanks, to my parents who were not rigid about isiXhosa as we enjoyed and continue to enjoy a cosmopolitan view of life. I know who I am. I have been poised to continuously redefine myself so as to find inward harmony and good relationships with other groups. This is an ongoing path in my life. Again, thanks to my father Umsimango and my mother UmaDlamini.

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My wife Pumeza and our two daughters Pilisa and Nomvuyo have been special. Their support has been amazing and my little daughter Nomvuyo helped me press the “correct” keys on my computer.

God must be thanked. *Amasimanga ayabonga.*
DECLARATION

I, ...........................................do hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is entirely my own work with the exception of such quotations or references which have been attributed to their authors or sources.

At...........................................this date..............................................2002
ABSTRACT

This study purposes to develop an African religio-political symbol of *ikhaya* in the context of a newly found democracy in South Africa. Drawn from the insights of the *oikos* model by Everett, the study assumes that a governing symbol taken from the heritage of the African black masses in South Africa is essential for a sound public life and the emancipation of the black people.

The modern democratic *Rechtsstaat* is examined to seek ways in which an endogenous response to modernity could be attained. Envisaged to be in continuity with the tradition of Black theology, the study fundamentally argues that the gains of modernity were not conspicuously intended for blacks. The study ventures into the limbo of the location to establish the grammar, and *ipso facto*, the vernacularization of publicity and its transmutations into the African horizon despite the violent historico-political experience of the blacks. *Ubuhlanti* emerges as a vital symbol for the resilience of *ikhaya* and thus for the profession, confirmation and participation of the black people in public life.

The scope of the study is the new world order and the democratic dispensation in South Africa. While the miracle of democracy in South Africa is renowned globally, the vestiges of the legacy of the past do not just haunt our present public life but also signify its fragility. As demonstrated in the case study of the township of Kayamandi in Stellenbosch, perennial problems of squalour, disease and unemployment in which the majority of the black people of South Africa are entangled define the frontiers of our public life. Democracy is a crucial bridge for this enterprise. Nonetheless, the connections that are made between democracy and the neo-liberal market systems do not seem poised to offer results that would enhance maximum participation of all people in our public life.

A concept of *kraalonization* is mooted to signify that the gates of *ubuhlanti*, as demanded by the precepts of democracy need to be open. The kraal, as a common
denominator of many African homes at least in South Africa, can no longer be a closely guarded shrine or, “holy of holies” if its values are to be professed in public. In this regard, the study attempts to demonstrate that within the heritage of the African kraal are many precedents to open the kraal to modernity and progress lest Africans sleep in its shades ad infinitum. Democracy must then be reciprocally linked to kraalonization.

Lastly, Ubuntu as a way, is viewed as a philosophical and ethical basis of the religio-political symbol of ikhaya. The personhood of all creation and thus public life, becomes the vision for a publicity whose tenets are life-giving and unitive as opposed to a fragmented public life. The study thus calls for a struggle against Ge-stell in favour of a Gestalt life of publicity with personally efficacious performers!
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PROLOGUE

1. The Purpose of the Work

The purpose of this work is to make a case for the African concept of home [household], ikhaya, in the public sphere and therefore in public theology. In this quest, due to parallels between oikos and ikhaya, I found the use of the oikos model by Everett (1988b:1994) to be a well from which my insights are drawn. Dialogue between ikhaya and oikos is undertaken to develop an African religio-political symbol that could be employed in public life.

Writing as a black South African male, I need to declare that my inquiry is mostly influenced by the tradition of Black Theology. The advent of democracy inevitably brought about a new challenge to Black Theology. It calls for new ways of reflecting on the situation of the poor masses within the framework of the new situation that has dawned with democracy in South Africa. I believe that there is a lot that can be drawn from the tradition of Black Theology of liberation for use in public life. My convictions are expanded by the case study that I have selected, namely, the township of Kayamandi in Stellenbosch. Even though this work is written in the post apartheid era, there continues to be a general manifestation of problems along racial lines in South Africa. Black theology’s reflection on race is still vital. Blacks in great numbers are marginal voices on the peripheries of public life.

We cannot however, uncritically engage this tradition in the present context. For example, we cannot carry on as if the government of the day were illegitimate as it was before. The whole question of the relation between church and a legitimate state for example, poses new challenges. The constitution of South Africa presents a position on this matter. It could be understood as presenting a scenario of, “a secular state with interaction between the state and the religious organisations where religion is encouraged to play an important role in influencing public policy” (Omar 1999:26). Getting involved in influencing public policy in the environment of a legitimate state
is a new situation for Black theology. This new situation presents us with new starting points hence new solidarities and commitments.

To illustrate the point above, at the dawn of democracy in South Africa there came into being a notion of "critical solidarity." The notion entailed that the church could render government or extra governmental services by being positioned in critical solidarity with the state (Bam 1995:45-46). De Gruchy (1994:16-17) explained the notion in the following manner:

Being in critical solidarity means giving support to those initiatives which may lead to the establishment not only of a new but just social order. It means that the church remains prophetic in its stance towards the emergent nation, but now on the basis of a shared commitment to the realisation of that new nation... The touchstone for determining what critical solidarity means is twofold. First, it means taking sides with all who remain oppressed in one form or another in a new democratic society, participating with them in their never ending struggle for justice, human dignity, and liberation... The second touchstone of critical solidarity is the defence of human rights of all people, especially minority cultural and religious groups.

A careful reading of the sentiments above guides us to the point that a legitimate state in South Africa, which is a new thing, presents new forms of solidarity and commitment such as suggested by the notion of critical solidarity. In addition, as we could observe in the statement cited above, a lot that was gained in the liberation tradition is not jettisoned, e.g. prophetic stance, taking sides with the oppressed and participating with them in their struggle for justice. What seems to be a problem is the fact that solidarity with the poor as a key interlocution is replaced by solidarity with the state in the notion of "critical solidarity." From the point of view of Black theology of liberation solidarity can only be with the poor. However, solidarity with the poor within a legitimate state, the terrain within which this work is purposed to reflect, is a brand new situation for Black theology.

Tinyiko Maluleke (1998:60) contends that by its own intent and character Black theology has been public. He explains that Black Theology has always had intentions beyond "the four walls" of the Christian Church. This position needs to be expanded
and clarified by allowing Black theology to directly respond and reflect on the distinctive topographical terrain of public policy and *ipso facto*, public theology. A quest for the search of black performance on the public *topos* is crucial. This is inevitable if Black Theology "is essentially an apologia for Christian religion and for Christian theology" (Maluleke 1998:60).

2. **Hypothesis**

That *ikhaya*, the African concept of home, constitutes a central locus for Black Theology to participate in the public sphere.

3. **Motivation**

Having grown up in a township, I have witnessed and experienced a two-sided life of urban and rural values. This bifurcation stems out of my roots in the Transkei, and my upbringing in cosmopolitan urban context. Blacks who were migrant labourers used to be called *Amagoduka*, for mostly, they would go home after serving contracts on the mines, farms or factories. This notion was suggestive to me. In a way a township is not my home as well! I was often reminded that I should not be too proud about my township upbringing because it was a *mlungu*'s place (a white man's place). One township feature that has made an indelible mark in my mind is the whole notion of *O siceli' ndawo*, [the ones pleading for a place, lit. space]. Indeed, women and children would perambulate the township streets looking for a place while those who offered to host them would be hunted by the police and be harassed in the early hours of the morning. Having been told that the township was never my home, my search for *ikhaya*, could not be more unquenchable. Could it be that township life is somehow a constant bastardisation of African culture in the limbo between the city and the kraal? Where is *ikhaya*? We are told that it is where the roots for the African heritage are found. This symbol of African indigenous heritage is essential for black publicity.

1 *Amagoduka* is a term from *isiXhosa* from the verb *goduka* meaning to go home, to leave for home. It is a home-directed action word.

2 It became a common feature in the township for blacks living in hostels or compounds who had their wives visiting them, often for short periods, to go about asking for a place from other blacks who at least had houses in the township.
4. The Topography of Public Theology

4.1. The Greek Context

The Aristotelian *politike koinonia* is renowned as the central thrust of the tradition of political philosophy and ethics. Aristotle understood human beings as the *zoon politikon*, i.e. as political beings. In his *de Anima*, Aristotle identified intelligence and freedom as the distinctive attributes of human life (McLean 1994:8-13). In other words, intelligence and freedom constitute the foundation of human dignity and imply a civic union of human communication and co-operation. In the *polis*, i.e. the city, *politike koinonia* constituted a unique collectivity, a unified organisation with a single set of values derivable from a common ethos. To be political meant to govern and to be governed as a member of a community. The *politike koinonia* was an all-encompassing social system in which all spheres of life were interconnected. *Oikos* i.e. household was the smallest unit of the political community, which was the habitus of the goals of community. In other words the form of governance in the political community was reflected in the household, the *oikos*. I need to further state that according to Aristotle, the state is prior to the individual or family. So *oikos* serves the goals of the *politike koinonia*

If intelligence and freedom were however, foundational tenets of human dignity, the orientation of human beings to the same *telos* together as a community had to be actualised in freedom; persons rightly guiding or governing themselves toward that end as free persons. Freedom implies choice. Choice implies a plurality of goals. A plurality of goals inevitably yields to plural spheres of governance. The paradox of plurality was nonetheless easily resolved in this setting, as there was an absence of a sharp distinction between community and society. The *politike koinonia* fused the different publics by blending the politics of community and society together.

When we further gaze into the tension between solidarity and subsidiarity, unity and diversity of the *politike koinonia*, i.e. the synergetic ordering of groups [publics], then the question of participation in governance becomes a problem. If human beings are political animals, then all human beings naturally, must participate in governance. In
other words human beings are public animals. Thus understood the trick of distinction between private and public spheres of life becomes crystal clear. This becomes trickier when we consider that Aristotlear's anthropology rejected the Platonic idealistic view of reality. The Platonic view of ideal forms anthropologically implies that there is an ideal human being. The rest are just mere representations of this ideal, perfect human. The Platonic view according to him overlooked that members of a community were endowed with their own proper form, finality and operation. This is what freedom means. Human beings are not simply mirrors or inert members of an ideal form of species without their own uniqueness. Simply stated, a human being is unique. By implication, every human being has a unique place in public life. This has immense implications for participation in governance. So the question of publicity here is how all political beings could participate in governance.

In the politike koinonia, while freedom of all was guaranteed, wealth became a condition of participation in the governance of the polis. Only a few participated in the ordering and governing of the polis. Women were also excluded thus "private" actually denoted a state of being deprived, i.e. deprivation from participation in the public of governance. The concern to maximise participation in governance or the exercise of freedom of the members of the community, thereby enabling them to live more fully as persons and groups, is an apparent preoccupation of public theology or religion.

This quest to maximise participation in governance is surely a complex matter. The degree to which reality is seen, forms and structures that ensue from a particular view all hinge around the overall appreciation of reality and give governance its character and content. For example, as already alluded to, if the Platonic overall comprehension of reality regards form as being eternal, it will shape the structure and content of publicity. It will not give the same structure and content of publicity as the overall comprehension of reality that regards existence as the central point of departure. The mapping of publicity is thus significantly influenced by different worldviews.

4.2. Public and Private religion

5
Sociologists argue that there is a common moral order or system of values, which binds people together into a community. This they call social integration. Social integration is a product of normative systems, rituals and communal practices comprehended as the central fabric of social relations. Religion has been universally regarded as central a component of these value systems- "a social cement of a common moral order" (Turner 1998).

In accomplishing this task of enhancing social integration, (*religere* means to bind), religion is simultaneously expressive of the societal thought patterns and value systems even though by its intent and purposes, we may say religion derives its mandate from the transcendent ultimate(s). In other words religion mirrors the thought patterns of a given society. We must then be alert to the fact that with religion, "we may be dealing, in fact, with many different things-philosophical systems, cosmologies, systems of morality, even forms of drama, literature and other symbolic representations of religion" (Hamilton 1995:19). In certain instances religion can be an intricate whole of these elements while in other instances it may only assume some of them.

A unitary understanding of religion fuses all these elements mentioned above together. This is what we find in theocracies. The line of demarcation between what is private and what is public is thus difficult to make. When religion is however broken into dimensions or aspects that may vary independently of one another, the notion of public and private religion becomes lucid. Some of the symbolic representations of religion may assume publicity, as they would be differentiated. For example, by breaking religion, faith and morality as separate entities, public religion assumes a particular content and structure. But some religions are at the same time religions, faiths and moral systems e.g. Christianity and Islam while on the other hand there may be moral systems, which embody no element of religion, e.g., humanism according to (Hamilton 1995:20). We need to bear this in mind when we think about public and private religion.
The social meaning of collective life entails that social action, forms of knowledge and understanding feature in all social relations. The preponderant feature of human action is that it is meaningful to the participants. In other words participation has social meaning for the participants, according to Turner. Human action is thus purposeful and embodies knowledge reflexivity or consciousness. Human action involves the choice of alternative means for achieving alternative ends. Hence human action and interaction are a contingent, open-ended exercise which is not predictable. This makes all social actions to urgently require a hermeneutic of situations. Disruptions, change and threats to social order irrevocably question the meaningful character of social action and religion plays, usually a role of repairing, managing or coping with these perturbed circumstances.

In our new social order, which is pluralistic, there are many truth references to reality. Religion thus looses its monopoly as the custodian of truth. It does not only loose this “privilege” but also it is opened up in fierce contest by other claims of truth. So the manner in which religion is placed in public life is complex. What should be public religion and private religion is a contest of metaphysics also. The place of religion in any political theory will be informed by its metaphysical understanding of reality. On this note, let us move into our modern debate of the place of religion in public life.

4.3. The Tripartite Scheme of Public Theology.

This work is placed in the context of the so called New World Order. Without spending much time on this, the end of the “cold war,” new democracies that are emerging, and globalisation are some of the elements that constitute the New World Order. This means that society is changing thus there is change in the value systems which, were generally dominant before. Reflection on emerging social actions and interactions thus becomes necessary.

There is therefore a need to rethink systematically the relationship of religion and modernity and the possible role religion might play in public life. Casanova (1989:216) sees a solution in the Habermasian discursive model, which operates with a tripartite analytical division of the polity (state), economy (market) and lifeworld of
which civil societies are part. According to this, the state and economy are systems that have their own steering media. They are different from the lifeworld which is the terrain of symbolic and normative actions. Thus civil society is viewed as part of the lifeworld. In this scheme, public religions operate at the level of civil society and are thus consistent with the modern principles and modern differentiated structures of political, economic and civil society spheres.

The tripartite scheme is not devoid of problems as the spheres of politics and equally so, the economic, exert pressure on the lifeworld. To use Habermas’s term, the political and economic spheres have their own language and constantly seek to colonize the lifeworld. In this manner, religion, as a constituent part of civil society is threatened to be consumed by the steering media of power and money. Nonetheless, the current view is that religion should fit into this tripartite scheme. It should function at the level of civil society as part of the lifeworld.

5. Everett and the oikos Model

Everett uses the religio-political symbol of covenant to construct his theory of publicity. He uses a covenantal conception as a critical tool to advance a theory of public appropriate for our time. At the same time, he uses contemporary publicity as a corrective measure to the concept of covenant itself. As we shall see, Everett comprehends republicanism as the principle of mutual consensus among equals. He asserts therefore, that publicity has to be generalized to every sphere of human life. In this manner, on the basis of publicity, the closeness of the covenant is critiqued, while at the same time he repudiates the recent concentration on institutional means for balancing power against power. He argues against an emphasis on personal liberty and legal procedures that do not forge bonds nor substantive commitments to human needs. Covenant as an alternative, rather, appeals to bonds forged in voluntary associations, structured in law, and extended to many spheres of life.

This theory is based on Everett’s use of the Greek oikos concept. He nurtures his oikos model by tracing its Biblical conceptions, the Hebraic tradition of bayith becoming the equivalent of oikos, meaning household. In the biblical conception, all
components of the beyith or oikos, - politics, land, economy and religion - are taken up as covenant as this was its original meaning. What we really need to grasp for now is that Everett does not suggest that it is necessary for us to recover the primordial fused structure of the oikos. If he does, his interest is rather in the integration of public spheres, -which it fostered.

At this point I need to introduce Robert Bellah to clarify my understanding of what Everett seeks to attain in his use of the oikos model and its concomitant covenantal conceptualisation. Everett envisions his work as a response to Robert Bellah's challenge to reconstruct the biblical and republican heritage mainly to overcome the individualism that has eroded American public life. I also find a germane connection between the two in Hamilton's (1995:8) assertion that Bellah treats religion as a reality sui generis. Bellah sees religion as dealing with symbols which are non-objective and which express feelings, values and hopes. Hamilton designates this "symbolic realism."

The bone of contention here is that Everett's use of covenant is symbolic. It is metaphorical. He contrasts covenant with kingship terms to articulate the forging of relationships and the motivational role that is played by covenant as a heuristic device. For example he looks at the role of the symbol of monarch-how it cohered the Hebrew society albeit with limitations. His contention among others is that this symbol has been translated into the New Testament notion of the Kingdom of God. In the development of Christianity it was also retained with those who became engrafted into this faith becoming monarchs. Surely with his preoccupation with the covenant ideal, he seeks to harness symbols that can nurture inter-subjectivity in social action and the role of religion thereof. Modern constitutions or relations based on legal frameworks are short of this cohesive force potentially offered by covenant. While legal frameworks are of great importance, they are not sufficient if they are devoid of bonds characteristic of the integrated primitive oikos. He says,

As an independent strand of thought and practice, however, republicanism has often become a constricted emphasis on personal liberty apart from the public bonds which make participation and publicity possible. It has oscillated between theories of direct and representative
democracy apart from the actual bonds of association that sustain us over the long haul. It has emphasised legal procedure rather than substantive commitments to human needs. It has been corrupted in simple nationalisms that overwhelm the constituent polities of a people. Its legal constitutions have not been able to evoke the kind of public-spiritedness that saves professionalism from commercial self-interest and patriotism from jingoistic excess (Everett 1988b: 105).

The thrust of the sentiments above is that as opposed to bonds, which make participation and publicity possible, the package of personal liberty; legal frames; direct or representative democracy; nationalisms and patriotisms have pejoratively affected the heart of republicanism.

6. Ikhaya

It is interesting to observe as Everett has clearly demonstrated that the European Enlightenment, particularly where it was influenced by Renaissance humanism crowned all human beings with a status of a monarch. During Enlightenment this was advocated against the external guarantors of authority such as the Pope or state and so on. This impulse lies deeply behind the anthropology of modernity-the monarchical crown of every person- and the concomitant rights of a person against the state, religion and market forces to mention but a few. As we delve into iikaya there are notable affinities.

There is an expression in isiXhosa that says umuntu uyinkosl ukuzazi, which could be translated as “one is one’s own king (monarch) to know oneself.” To be able to know oneself one must be his/her own monarch or king. The implications of the expression are twofold namely, the symbolic use of the monarchical category inkosi i.e. king and the implied polity of the category itself.

First, the importance of the expression is idiomatic. It means that everyone knows himself/herself better than anyone else does. It often means that one’s thoughts and intentions are in ones’ sphere of control or management and should be left in the space of personal domain. One can say that it implies an anthropological understanding in so far as it acknowledges that literally, no one can claim to fully understand or know
another person. By implication, this is recognition of individuality *ala* Aristotle. Thus a conferment of a status of a monarch to every individual is anthropological.

In *isiXhosa*, there are also negative connotations expressed by this idiom. It is sometimes uttered to connote a futile exercise of trying knowing everything about a person. It connotes the limitations of trust that can be put on an individual as this falls within that individual’s reign and duty to be trustworthy. It may mean - “you are not trusted or loved, prove yourself” In the face of doubt and negative feelings, an individual is a monarch to give full expression of his/her rule to avert the negative.

The symbolic use of *inkosi*, cannot be overstated. Both Everett’s symbolic use of the term monarch and its figurative use among *Amakhosa* are important more so if we recall the well known African dictum, “*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,*” i.e. “I am because were are.” Following Everett, we can stretch this and say, I am a king (monarch) because we are kings (monarchs). The saying namely, “*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,*” (I am because we are,) suggests that crowning *umuntu*, i.e. a human being, with kingship is ethical. To this, there is no conceptual difference between the western European view and the African one regarding the place of a person and the status of a monarchy.

The difference comes firstly when we look at the worldviews. There is almost unanimity that the universe in the African worldview is understood in unitive terms i.e. there is no compartmentalisation of reality. Reality is understood materialistically, and the overall view of life in its totality is religiously appreciated. Life is viewed positively and the centre of African ethics is the human being. However if *umuntu*, human, is the centre of the universe it follows then that where the people are there is the public in Africa. There is no public without *umuntu*, (people or human beings), the boundaries of public and private are made of people themselves. Humanity itself plays an integrative role of differentiated spheres of life. The South African Coat of Arms probably seeks to express this in the saying, “*Batho pele,*” meaning people first. Practically this means that in public, in politics, economics, ecology, religion and culture what is of paramount importance are the people. Humanity is understood in terms of the configuration of the whole of existence, that is a *gestalt* public life.
This African worldview outlined above contrasts the abstract views of publicity that are predominant in the west-associated with Enlightenment—where reason took the place of a person in publicity. It also addresses Everett’s concern about the need to hold the spheres of publicity as integral parts due to its unitive or gestalt predisposition to reality. This can be demonstrated through the concept of *Ubuntu*, (meaning in accordance with humanity). *Ubuntu* is ubiquitous and knows no boundaries. *Ubuntu* in contrast with the covenant as Everett postulates is therefore a necessarily constant corrective of polity forms and abuses of power. Differentiated spheres of life should reflect this and not eclipse *Ubuntu*. In other words the compartmentalisation of reality, which might maliciously under-gird differentiation and thereby causing fragmentation, can fragment a person. This will mean lack of *Ubuntu*. In clearest terms, a fragmented publicity is a fragmented person from the purview of *ikhaya*. Again I must state that there is no dispute between Everett’s postulation and the precepts of *ikhaya*. This contrast is made to clarify subtleties in the geographies of *oikos* as crafted by the western “Everittian” perspective and *oikos* from the perspective of *ikhaya*.

*ikhaya*, the African concept of home is explored albeit critically to see how Africans “preside” over matters public. If the tripartite topographical scheme of public theology is assumed as a result of the inexorable path of modernity, are Africans modernised and if so to what extent? Do Africans have to be modernised in order to define public religion or theology? This work is an attempt to respond to these questions. This therefore means that it is important to look at the survival of African religion and the frontal attacks that were waged against this worldview to answer them. Moreover, the affinity and almost symmetrical position of the status of a monarch that the two worlds give to a person needs careful examination. We cannot just stop at acknowledging the affinities. Was the deep impulse of a monarchical status acquired through the influence of Enlightenment that anchored the anthropology of modernity with its concomitant rights or gains meant for blacks and Africans?

Dialogue between modernity and the African traditional worldviews is unavoidable. This is where the quest for the *ikhaya* is centred— in the experience of the black
masses. The work is perceived as a contribution to Black theology of liberation in the post apartheid era. An attempt to harness African symbols in a legitimate climate of a democratically elected government is made.

The thesis of the quest for ikhaya is that urban blacks, broadly speaking, linger in a limbo (locations or townships) between a religious cosmos [the kraal, ubuhlanti] and a white city. While the coercive forces of the migrant labour system displaced an African man and woman from their land- estranged child from parent-and obfuscated tribal authority and decorum- seemingly, the kraal, ubuhlanti, remained intact. The significance of ubuhlanti is its sacred place as a shrine of a home, ikhaya. In this space, a space between house and home, a chaotic limbo and dross of the location, how Africans carved out home, heimat, is both significant and central to this work. As Bollnow (1963:181) magnificently puts it, “To build a house is to find a cosmos in a chaos.” The cosmos that has been founded in the township limbo and the manner in which it has been negotiated and struggled for, is a significant terrain for Black theology of liberation and public life in South Africa.

7. Methodology

The basic methodology that will be used to dialogue with the concept of ikhaya lies in the case study of Kayamandi, a township in the Western Cape, using the approach of Participatory Action Research. Participatory Action Research developed as a new paradigm and alternative to the qualitative and quantitative approaches which have been dominantly used in social sciences. The claim in this new paradigm is that the latter two dominant approaches do not provide an adequate understanding of reality given that they tend to regard individuals as passive objects to be studied rather than as active creative beings. For example, McNiff (1988:2) sees action research as a loose set of activities that are designed to improve the quality of life of a particular community. The need for a formulation of a methodology that could serve as a basis for the promotion of social justice was felt long ago hence the legendary work of

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3 In South Africa, townships used to be called locations, meaning that they were intended to be places where blacks were located in between their homes and the white “man’s” world. Blacks in the townships were not given citizenship in the white cities of South Africa.
Paulo Freire (1972)) which explain this alternative methodology in a broader context of development and liberation.

The epistemological premise of this methodology is that there is no research that is value free (Rahman 1993:88-91). It is indisputable that the choice of a logical frame of analysis- the “subject-object” or “subject-subject” relationship is of value to any research methodology. Accordingly, one of the most fundamental challenges presented by Participatory Action Research is the methodological premise that knowledge produced by detached observation creates and perpetuates class and power struggle between experts and masses who are often viewed as non-experts. This inevitably challenges any claim to “objectivity” if it means freedom from subjective bias. In Argyris et al (1985:x), usable knowledge is singled out as one of the features of what they designate “action science.” From this, we can say that the spontaneous knowledge and wisdom of ordinary people, which are often disqualified as unscientific, qualify as a science that can generate valid knowledge under certain conditions.

For the reasons stated above, the Participatory Action Research methodology that is adopted for the case of Kayamandi is endogenous, an example being the work done by Margoch Maruyama (1981). The rationale of this approach is that the project is conceptualised-and designed by researchers who are insiders or initiates of a specific culture. In this particularly case, that culture is African culture. One work of which I am aware that has accomplished something of this kind, deals with a shack community near Durban, called Amawoti. In this work by Phlpott (1995 :22) some of the characteristics of action research are out-lined as follows:

* The problem under investigation originates from the community
* The ultimate goal is structural transformation
* Focuses on the oppressed groups
* Equality and accountability between the researcher and the researched.

My first encounter with the community of Kayamandi came about in 1998 when I was placed there as a minister in the G.G. Ndzyotyana Memorial Congregation. In the same year, I enrolled with the University of Cape Town where I was inspired by the course
work-studies in theology and public life. I was fascinated by the idea of oikos and its link to the African notion of iKhaya.

My shortcomings about the depth of the concept of iKhaya, necessitated my choice of Action Research. I established a group with the help of a tenacious person called Thumakele Gosa. In this group that included Yoliswa Mbombo, Jongile Gwele, Mveleli Somlatha, Veliswa Nyentsane, Nomonde Sapula, Vuyiswa Nango, Mzwabantu Bixa and later Malibongwe Gwele, we discussed many topics. I declared my academic interest to the group. But we went beyond that and felt that in fact a group of this nature was needed for the Church and the community at large.

The first workshop that was organised by the Group focused on the discussion of the topic iKhaya. It is providential that Kayamandi itself is a name derivative of iKhaya. Kayamandi means “home sweet home.” Participation in this workshop held on the 24 August 1998 was overwhelming. There was no formal paper save a brief introduction of the topic of the day, iKhaya, by myself. This was the beginning of a long but interesting road.

This group participated in the Multi Event’99 as Kayamandi Group. The ME’99 was an international conference held in Cape Town under the auspices of the University of Cape Towns’ department of Religion. This conference was organised to create space in which participants in public life could come together to discuss the role of religion in public life and the making of public policy. A wide range of different voices participated in the Event. Among these voices were community groups. Our crucial gain as a group in the ME’99 was that one member, Thumakele Gosa was trained as a facilitator hence our available skills to probe into the problems of Kayamandi were enhanced. In this way we received guidance about the questions and the processes that we followed in involving the community of Kayamandi to identify its burning issues. The case study of Kayamandi arises out of this process. It was enriched by the ever growing momentum propagated by Simanyisizwe Christian Community Project, itself a direct product of this group. There is a section in the body of the dissertation on this project. As we began to engage in the public arena, with a string of workshops
being organized and various programs being set into motion, I used the concept of *ikhaya* to interpret most of our activities.

In the Bible studies that we had in our Congregation where most of the Group members were involved and are still involved, the theme of the kraal or *ikhaya* permeated our discussions. Through this Action Research in Kayamandi, I was able to get more practical knowledge and insight into the concept of *ikhaya*. Born *umXhosa* myself, nevertheless, I gained a lot in this community in my understanding of things that I thought I understood and many that I took for granted about *isiXhosa*. There is very little that has been written on the subject of *ikhaya* and almost all the knowledge that I gained on the subject is the oral text of the “migrant” community of Kayamandi. I lived with them. My academic curiosity is my daily experience with them.

What did the members gain from this enterprise? Their ability to generate knowledge was unleashed and continues to be refined. Many of them have interacted with all levels of our immediate society in presenting, defending and explaining who and what they stood for. For some programs members would have to meet councillors, for others the Mayor of Stellenbosch, or political organisations for yet other activities. This they did on their own as I often maintained a low profile. *Simanyisizwe*’s involvement in the HIV/AIDS awareness campaign is the largest “own initiated” program ever in Kayamandi.

Most of the group members are now employed. Some have directly benefited from this work for their studies. Resulting from the involvement of the Group in the ME’99, links between the Group, G.G. Ndzotyana and the St Johns Lutheran Church in Denmark have been forged. This has added a modicum of strength to the developmental projects of the Group. Locally *Simanyisizwe* is influential in public life. It has triggered agency in Kayamandi and this community is now known beyond the borders of our country. International students at the University of Stellenbosch have also worked with *Simanyisizwe*.
Like any other human endeavour, Action Research in Kayamandi was not without limitations. In many instances institutions or organisations that we approached simply implemented our ideas as they had funds to do so. There were no funds and still no funds to shoulder and sustain interventions that were identified by the processes of the Group and Simanyisizwe.

In a situation where the community in sordid conditions and squalor is ravaged by unemployment, the enormity of the implications for what I term own-initiated programs are immense. Gallant acts of volition and sacrifice are undermined by lack of incentive that should make a difference in disparate situations of need. Yet on the other hand these places like Kayamandi become sites for battles of avarice. It is also difficult to understand the dynamics of any new community that a person joins. This seems obvious but in Kayamandi it is much more pronounced. In this community, there is a term that is used for those who are regarded as outsiders, *inkommers*, meaning “incomers.”

The term is used as a barrier against people who, amazingly, speak the same language, share the same culture and history. This is very deep in Kayamandi, and one’s interventions stand or fall on this question. How deep this barrier is for those who do not speak isiXhosa or know anything about blacks is unthinkable. One must always remember that whether black, worse if a complete outsider, invading a strange world is fraught with many difficulties.

The notion of *inkommers* is also a comment about our history. Those who resided “first” in Kayamandi are those who were allocated houses in controlled measures of influx in apartheid times. The system ‘taught’ them not to welcome but to exclude (see the whole notion of *O sicel'indawo*). It is also about power relations. Those who regard themselves as *bona fide* residents of Kayamandi by virtue of arriving first there, and staying in houses that were allocated by the municipality, wield a lot of power and influence almost every public discourse in this community. “Migrancy” almost becomes anathema even among your own in this community. In Kayamandi there was literally an eruption of violence between those who claim to be rightful
residents and the *inkommers*, mostly the shack dwellers (those who dwell in *amatyotyombe*).

Maybe the Marxist category of false consciousness, to conclude, sums it all up. The notion of *inkommers* is a statement about false consciousness. Not every grassroots work that is done among black people is representative of the black course for public liberation. "Black people" is a massive symbol. It is like a sea. We can sail through it, but we cannot dwell in it.

Black consciousness is needed for the link between Action Research and Black theology. Hence the need for the use of African religio-political symbols in public life. Notwithstanding the above, my combination of Action Research with Black theology stems form the fact that:

The wisdom of all religions can be traced to the wisdom of ordinary people, revealed at some point or other in some contexts: but systematised religion descending from above and preached as faith, rather than (scientifically) rationalised through processes of people’s own (collective) self-reflection, is alienating rather than liberating. It can also be replaced by another religion if the faith does not work, or if the “prophet” dies (Rahman 1993:84).

So, through Participatory Action Research broadly speaking, sensitivity and acknowledgement of the people’s praxis, of which one becomes a part, is the object of this work while on the other hand the frameworks of Black theology constitute its theoretical basis. An attempts is made to find “rootage” with the local people and enable Black theology to be owned by the masses in the public sphere in South Africa. The democratic and emancipation motives of Participatory Action Research are linked with the liberation motive of Black theology.

8. Schema

I offer the summary of the chapters at this point. Chapters One and Two are mainly theoretical. They are intended to climax in a characterisation of the symbol of *ikhaya*. Chapter One looks at the *oikos* model while Chapter Two builds on the first chapter.
and focuses on the debate on modernity. Chapter Three develops the religio-political symbol of *ikhaya* while Chapter Four searches for an “amorphous” *ikhaya* in the torrents of the colonial *oikos*, apartheid and the limbo of the township. The fifth chapter looks at the boundaries of publicity in the light of human agency as demonstrated by the case of Kayamandi. These are followed by an Epilogue that gives a summary of what we have achieved and how our future could be cast in the light of our findings.
CHAPTER 1
PUBLIC LIFE AND THE OIKOS MODEL

1.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to critically look at William Everett’s use of the oikos model in public life. The chapter looks at how Everett builds this theory of public. In addition to this, we look at the manner in which democracy changes the boundaries of religion. Democracy can only be compatible with certain types of oikos and thus implies a reorientation of the boundaries of religion and its place in public life. The crucial aspect of the oikos model as a heuristic design is underlined to forecast a clue for use of the African concept of ikhaya in public life, the focus of this work in toto.

1.2. Everett’s Theory of Public and the Oikos Model

1.2.1. The rationale of his theory

In the Oikos Project papers produced by Everett (1984) he explores different themes such as faith, work, economy, family and so forth in relation to the concept oikos. He (1984a:3) defines oikos as the Greek word for household or habitat. Oikos “was a sphere where people were raised, worked, worshipped, lived, loved and died. The ancient Greek oikos nurtured its own religion; a religion of hearth where ancestral claims to the land, house, and loyalties were pervasive in the lives of the people.” In this manner, in the ancient oikos God, family, faith, land, work and life were integrated.

Everett develops the oikos model due to his concern about a compartmentalised pattern of public life in modern society. Correctly so, modern society is differentiated such that the link between spheres such as religion, politics and economics is hard to establish. Our modern world is fragmented, to use his term, and as we look back to the basic tenets of the primitive oikos, our “nostalgia” for the cohesion of family life, work and worship,
intensifies. Even though we may wish to recast our public life today after the cohesive, integrated manner of the primitive *oikos*, the only thing we can long for in all probability is the force field that held up these spheres of life together. Everett (1984a:3) puts it succinctly:

We are not talking here merely of the traditional religious formulations of that concept [*oikos*]. We are talking of the basic structure of emotional loyalties and ways of getting at the world which govern our lives as individuals, as families, as associations and corporations. We are speaking of the force field that holds us up in life. Unless we lift up these often competing and obscure faiths we cannot get to the task of knitting together our work and family life in a way that respects our environment and advances our public activity.

The structure of emotional loyalties is nothing more than faith and trust in relationships. Stated otherwise, the quotation above implies that faith and trust constitute the force field of the social meaning of collective life; an agglutination of social action, forms of knowledge and understanding, “and ways of getting at the world which govern our lives.” This means that *oikos* in public life- is about the manner in which emotional structures cement relationships of publicity. It is about the emotional value that is attached to relationships without which relationships remain “dry.” The ancient *oikos* thus serves as an instructive symbol for the search of a faithful life of integrity in the modern world. It is used to revamp the magnetic field that is needed to concatenate our work and family life in a way that respects our environment and advances our public activity.

On a more theoretical note, Everett’s *oikos* model assumes the positive value of the federal-republican orders with the sole intent of seeking to search for better ways of improving this religio-political tradition. He also searches for possible religious resources that might shape and support this federal-republican symbol and those that may strongly oppose it. In other words, his theory of publicity is a combination of religious and political motifs in a reciprocally corrective manner in order to forge a symbol for contemporary use in public life.
Everett says that the contemporary notion of publicity is mediated through the Anglo-American thought of people like Lipmann, Dewey and European reflections of Arendt and Habermas. What comes out of these strands which mediate the contemporary notion of public is a definition of the concept of publicity as “a kind of discourse to which everyone has potentially equal access, whose content is people’s common concerns, and whose out-comes are governed by reason and persuasion rather than by force or deception” (1988b:129).

For purposes of elucidating this understanding of publicity above, let us tease out at least four of the factors that characterize relations in publicity as posited by Everett. These are participation, commonality, persuasion and worldliness. First, according to Everett a theory of the public needs to emphasize actual participation in the acts of publicity. Participation (as defined above) implies that all and sundry must take part in the activities of public life. For this reason the preservation of relations characterized by persuasion needs to be affirmed as no one should impose his or her views on the other one. All participants in public life are equal. Participation thus assumes what Everett renders as “rough equality of power.” But this is rough equality because it is practically impossible for all people to participate in decision-making, for example. Some kind of representation becomes necessary. This equality could be expressed for example in accessing information on a matter of common concern equally. Nonetheless this becomes tricky too, because some common way of discerning this information will be necessary. Hence “the requirements of science are the same as for public,” Everett reckons. In other words, a development of a system of accessing and discerning information that must be shared by all in public life is subject to the requirements of science. Such requirements would among others entail reason, meaning an intelligible use of such information in public life.

Participation is also about equality in power. Power cannot exist apart from relationships, therefore power should be seen as a dimension of participation. By this I understand Everett to imply that the extent to which people are empowered to participate in public life should be our calibration of power relations. He further explains that
participation is a basic human right. As such, this basic right should be afforded clarity in the place of other rights. For this reason it cannot be seen as some individualistic attribute but also a divine demand flowing from God’s covenant with us. In this manner we shall be able to harmonize our formulation of the right to participate with other rights in spheres of public life.

Second is the issue of commonality. A focus on commonalities excludes matters that pertain to individual necessities or interests but what we have in common so as to live together and to meet the demands of our life together. This focus on commonalities marks the difference between publicity and community. Publicity means that any given public sphere is focused on issues that are relevant to it. So a public sphere differs from another due to this specialty in exposition and focus. Publics are differentiated. By virtue of excluding other concerns, publicity differs from community, which is a sphere in which everything is exposed and shared.

This means that there is a way in which what is public is restricted. Certain requirements need to be fulfilled so as to acquire this concentration and focus on each public’s concerns. Everett argues that the manner in which we determine the commonality of concerns that characterize publicity should be objective and visible. “Feelings and thought cannot directly enter the public realm” (1988b:132). On the other hand publicity entails activities of exposing some claims or certain things to public inspection for debate, refinement, approval and confirmation at least. Flowing from what we said about participation above, public issues of common concern demand participation. Without much ado, the processes of refinement, inspection, debate and so forth by the public are not without limitation or worse contamination. Canons of truth, sincerity and integrity can be and are often violated. Moreover, while there could be agreement on objectivity (if there has ever been one), the difficulty lies with the invisible concerns that must be visualized in the public sphere for our common life together. Be that as it may, Everett predicates that we cannot abandon publicity because of these limitations that are at worst infused with chicanery, distortions and violence. We cannot do so because, as Everett sees it, the solution
Is to have more publicity, a greater sense of public responsibility among professions, and more imaginative ways of revealing the inevitable duplicity in our midst. From the standpoint of the general theory I am advancing, publicity is the heart of human existence as it strives toward a more perfect public. Without it we stumble in the darkness of the wild imaginings of our own hearts, the sheol of amnesia and insanity (1988b:133).

Third, the "rough equality," the commonality of concerns included, actions and responses must come out of persuasion, Everett asserts. Participants in public life resort to argument in order to forge a common course of action. Everett thus sees persuasion as being intrinsic to public life. The persuasive feature of public is however dependable. It is a product of culture. "It is a kind of communication pattern in which the behavior of others is affected by appeals to the implications of commonly held convictions about their history, their life together, their hopes, the facts at hand, and the nature of reality in general," (1988b:133). Everett acknowledges Habermas as having detailed the logic of discourse to provide a common frame of reference under-girding the persuasion process. Habermas has refined the way in which language and "speech acts" construct the basis of public life. Furthermore, "he has filled in the intellectual side of this publicity," Everett reckons. He says:

With Habermas we see a fulsome theory of the way language functions to enable us to come to a consensual kind of truth through public discourse. It is a philosophical development of the theory of reason ... theologically it is a theory of covenantal reason, in which truth emerges out of the public argumentation within a covenantal framework. It arises not merely as a consensus among participants, but also stands in continual judgement and revision through God's insistence on leading us to ever larger covenants with the whole creation (1988b:134).

According to this, Everett theologically defines persuasion through Habermas's theory of communicative action. Because of the reciprocity of covenant and public he sees communicative action theory as a philosophical explication for covenantal reason. He sees the persuasive search for the truth by which people can live together out of which springs the public as a combination of the logic of discourse and covenant.
The fourth tenet is what Everett sees as the “worldliness” of public life. By this he refers to a world of common reference, which may comprise stories, laws, history, etc. Publicity becomes a constellation of things known to all and open to everyone. This world is however physical and geographical and involves our architecture and land use. Everett therefore uses the Greek word oikos to designate this constellation of public "things" and the physical, geographical dimensions they are rooted in. The way we live on our land shapes publicity. “Our oikos can be a cradle of our publicity or a tomb of isolation.” This means that publicity has a material dimension and a symbolic one.

To sum up, what we have thus far discussed reveals that Everett uses the concept of oikos to develop his theory of publicity. He is influenced by the American and European frames of public and employs them to construct his theological view of public particularly Habermas’s communicative theory. I have used only four of the tenets that anchor his theory as the basis for further dialogue and interpretation. Let us now look at how this theory is further built up by Everett.

1.2.2. Publicity and ecclesiology

The role of ecclesiology in Everett’s theory of publicity is crucial. Looking at ecclesiology, which he roughly defines as the study of “the systematic and institutionalized practices with reference to the sacred and the transcendent,” he manages to relate publicity and religion quite simply and clearly. Everett distinguishes three main typologies of ecclesiology namely, communal, associational and institutional (1999). He explains that in the communal ecclesiology, there is a “fusion of bio-and geo piety.” This means an amalgam of family, economy, land, governance, and education. In an institutional ecclesiology there is a discernment of structural differentiation i.e. the different spheres of the oikos are differentiated. An associational ecclesiology will characteristically yield a denomination, where individuals associate or join voluntarily to achieve together such goals that might have brought them together. The latter typology is conducive to egalitarian values and is thus relevant for a democratic dispensation.
Everett further makes the point of "ecclesiological autonomy" and compares this with what he calls Federal Autonomy (1997:158ff). He explains that the question of the autonomy of religion is not merely one of the separation of church and state though this is indeed critical. For communal ecclesiologies for example, it is the autonomy of the whole community from outside interference that is in question. For institutional religions it is a question of the capacity to participate in the inter-institutional sphere, which demands special provisions in constitutional law. He explains further that, for "associationalists", it is as much autonomy over against communalism, on the one hand, and the state on the other, as it is autonomy in the face of the forces of market and finance. We can explain this by recalling what we have said by the distinction between publicity and community. Ecclesiological autonomy is needed within a community and is made possible through association.

This autonomy of association is sought over and against communalistic forces, which may subsume publicity. At the same time, the same autonomy is sought against the state and the market forces, which equally and tendentiously seek to subsume autonomy of religion or other spheres of public life. This therefore means that the type of ecclesiology that fits well in this tripartite scheme of public life - lifeworld, power and economy - is an associational one. An associational ecclesiology accords with the norm of publicity namely freedom to chose.

Following the above, the private-public distinctions also depend much on the type of ecclesiology in question. Communal ecclesiologies, for example, do not have a clear private-public distinction. It is lacking. In institutional ecclesiologies however, there is a noticeable differentiation even though the tension of power between spheres such as politics and religion for example remains problematic. When we consider an associational ecclesiology, liberty will be the norm. Consequently the associations form the basis of publics by choice, without cohesion making the private-public distinctions clearer.
The connection between religion (ecclesiology) and federalism is the most evincing points and pivots about Everett's theory to me. He (1997:5) asserts that free public assembly and conciliar decision making borne out of Christianity were crucial for the development of modern policies (polities), particularly the traditions of republicanism and federalism. Those are concepts and practices that have reinforced federalism according to him. Everett sees one of his major theses namely that "European and American thinkers generated the belief that public life requires a basic constitution that articulates the relationship between independently legitimate polities," (1997:5) as being rooted in the Bible. In his frame of inquiry (1997:7), which views ecclesiology as the study of any form of religious assembly, whether it be a synagogue, mosque, temple or kraal in the case of Africa, a germane connection between ecclesiology, ipso facto, religion and polity (politics) is attained. In these various ecclesiologies one discerns a practical expression of religious beliefs, values and orientations.

The connection between religion and politics is apparent in the semantic affinity of the terms that we examine below. The terms ecclesia means assembly itself synonymous with kehal or edah in ancient Israel that later became synagogue. The term ecclesia has now come to designate church in our time. Semantically it vivifies the political roots of ecclesia, kehal or edah. These “open assemblies” were not necessarily religious but political. Furthermore, the Latin word republica meaning public affairs is closely tied to ecclesia (Everett 1997:12 ). It constitutes the root of our modern conception of a republic which means governance conducted in an open assembly by citizens. Republic means the “re-making” of assemblies for open governance by the citizens of a polis i.e. a city. As we go further into these semantic connections, we discover that the word covenant equally has an import of “treaty relationships.” Covenant often referred to a set of mutual obligations forming people’s common life. Then the word federal, connected to foederal, fidelity, trust, in itself has deep affinities with covenant. These semantic affinities are so telling that we can immediately grasp the link that Everett makes between republicanism and federalism. Let us try in one sentence: covenants - “federals”-foederais –trusts of common good are forged and re-made in assemblies –“ecclesias”- “publicas” in open space!
The rationale here is that covenants are processes based on agreements rather than status or command. They are flexible bonds of trust adequate to create and accommodate change while simultaneously binding. On the other hand publicity directs our attention to the need for patterns of expression and negotiation that are devoid of terminality-rigidity-closeness. They are open and freed from the limits of appeals to biology in ordering human relationships e.g. monarchy by consanguinity. This is what federal republicanism entails. In our modern times, federal republicanism finds expression in constitutional democracy, the role of the constitution being to balance "power with power and authority with authority." These connections thus made between ecclesia with publicity and covenant with federal, Everett rightly concludes that both covenant and publicity have a normative and descriptive import. In addition they are theologically and sociologically analytical. They normatively evoke deep symbolic ways i.e. values commitments and ultimate orientations. The rationale of his theory is embedded in Hebrew and Christian traditions to which we now turn. Let us briefly look at how Everett harnesses the Judeo-Christian tradition to develop his theory.

1.2.3. The Biblical conceptions of the Covenant

As the Old Testament shows, covenant described a relationship between God and people, between people and people, nation and nation, person and person, and even person and earth. What seems to be of interest to Everett though is the application of the concept of covenant in the formation of bonds of mutual obligation that excluded guarantee by kinship ties. One of the best examples he cites to explain this is the relationship between David and Jonathan in the Old Testament. According to 1 Samuel 18:3, Jonathan entered into a bond (covenant) with David because he loved him. The importance of the example is that consanguinal relations seem to be transcended by love that becomes the basis of the bond between the two. Such a use of the concept of covenant in the Old Testament itself is a pointer according to Everett to a possibility of forging covenantal relationships on equal, egalitarian basis. Another example is found in Gen 21: 31 where Abraham makes a covenant with Abimelech concerning a well of water that was seized by Abimelech's servants. We discern in this example a covenant between equals.
In the same manner, Jacob and Laban entered into a covenant (Gen 31:50-53) to seal a marriage between Jacob and Laban’s daughters. In Ruth 4:7-11 we learn that in order to confirm a transaction, one drew off one’s sandal and gave it to the other to seal a covenant. An indication of the fact that a covenant was written down is found in the book of Nehemiah 9:38. We can go on and on citing these examples, but the important thing is to understand that these covenantal relationships went beyond familial relations. They became social expressions of mutual agreements in relationships of equal partners. To recapitulate what we have said about the relationship between ecclesiology and publicity, the Hebraic ecclesiology provided a window to polity and social relations based on equality free from consanguinal ties.

Making reference to the Hebraic ecclesiology, we should remember that the concept of covenant shaped the Hebrew understanding and appropriation of their relationship with God. It became central in their interpretation of the exodus from Egypt. The exodus experience became so crucial to the Israelites that in their understanding they became a unique people in a unique covenant with God. The entire history of the Israelites was immersed in the covenant to the extent that their relationship with God was described in terms of a covenant of marriage. It was also translated into the monarchical relationships of the Israelites where monarchs assumed a symbolic embodiment of God’s covenant with the people. In all, covenant included the components of land, people, faith and God.

The covenantal relationship between God and Israel persisted throughout, into the New Testament. In the New Testament, Jesus became a central figure of the new covenant. He became a monarch, a royal figure of the covenant. Everett (1988b) observes that a shift in the understanding of covenant is discernible in the New Testament where, “a deepened personalization of the covenant sets in.” Elements of the covenant such as the land, the material conditions of the covenant are eclipsed, God’s oikos becoming an ecclesia of pilgrims on this earth. Everett makes a poignant point here. The elements that are resonant with the type of ecclesiology that he traces from the Old Testament are used to measure the completeness of covenantal relationships in the New Testament.
The accompanying metaphor of the monarch persisted into the New Testament and invariably crowned everyone who followed Jesus a “monarch.” The notion of “the priesthood of all believers” is an expression of equal status of all those who believe in Jesus Christ and were initiated into this faith. We could say it is an attestation of a royalty of all believers in Jesus Christ. This monarchical status should however not relegate other components of the covenant to oblivion and this is Everett’s main contention. God, religion or faith, the land and the people dwelt in a fused oikos. This means that in the Old Testament habitat and the New Testament there was an integration of relations between God, faith, land and the people. My recollection of the root of the word “dwell” [oikodomeo] in the well-known expression “Jesus came down to dwell among us,” is that it is the same one for oikos [household]. Jesus Christ thus found a dwelling place in this world, among us and actualized the integration of covenant components in history. We can safely surmise that Biblically, covenant held the relations of different spheres of life together. These different spheres are rooted in God’s bayith physically rooted in the world. In the mystery of incarnation, the politics of God’s bayith are performed, confirmed, professed and actualized through Jesus Christ.

We cannot leave this section without illustrating this point by looking at some of the distortions that have gone along with the idea of the covenant. We have already alluded to the temptation to eclipse other components of the covenant signified in the Judeo-Christian ecclesiology that is presented to us by Everett.

In relation to publicity, Everett sees openness as a quid pro quo for a good covenant or at best an egalitarian covenant. Participation in a covenantal relationship demands equality, freedom and access to all common concerns of the participants. The need for the confirmation of a covenant opens it up to scrutiny by the covenantal or oikos participants. So it is with the commonality and worldliness of a covenant, they tear any covenant open if it is to be good. This is an indictment against closed covenants. You will realize that I have used Everett’s key words in trying to explain a simple motif about publicity.
The worst form of such a distortion of the covenant is Apartheid. Apartheid actually displayed both the anomalies of eclipsing other components of the covenant and also being a closed covenant. The paradox was that while the pro-apartheid theology understood the land that was taken away from the indigenous people of South Africa as part of God’s covenant with the Afrikaner, those who were opposed to it were often pointed to the “other-world,” which was yet to come. In other words, the covenant of the oppressed people of South Africa from that perspective had no land. At the same time, because of their colour, they were excluded from a full covenant, which became the sole monopoly of the Afrikaner or white races of South Africa. This has rendered Calvinism and its Covenantal theology to be stigmatized.¹ This is true also of other forms of exclusion. Often covenant can be used to justify relationships of inequality as in the case of women. We shall dwell more on this particular issue later as we relate it to Africa. Suffice it to say that from this example we have considered an ecclesiology that is associated with a particular religious heritage. From that we can now generically say something about covenant and publicity a point to which I now turn below.

1.2.4. Covenant and Publicity

We should by now be able to see that the concept of covenant as articulated by Everett points to the theological roots of federalism just as the symbol of ecclesia, [assembly] points to the roots of publicity. Covenant and publicity are thus intertwined concepts, hence “covenantal publicity” is a bridge term. Technically, it bridges between republicanism and federalism. Clearly stemming out of the biblical model of covenant which anchors Everett’s oikos model is the claim that, theologically, God maintains the covenant. A covenant is not full without God, land and the people. On the other hand, publicity implies the proclamation of convictions or claims in public. Our claims and convictions are brought before the public.

¹ Mostly exponents of Liberation Theology and Black Theology have vehemently challenged an interpretation of the New Testament, which is “other-worldly” and not “this-worldly”, in the history of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Beside, there are examples of materialistic readings of the New
The bridge term—"covenantal publicity"—is also about participation, which in turn evokes procedures and thus issues of polity. A constitutional democracy would be a good example of such procedures. This is about procedures and polities that enable all citizens to participate in public life. As indicated earlier in this work, from the Greek context to our modern times the problem of maximization of participation in public life has been the bone of contention. There is hardly a polity that is able to allow all citizens to participate in every decision. Representation becomes a crucial aspect for legitimate decision making or participation in publicity. This means that theories of representation are important in so far as they enhance or undermine maximum participation in public life.

It is also about plurality as an intrinsic characteristic of public life. Plurality inevitably begets choice whose value is freedom. An ecclesiology that is associational is compatible with the intrinsic pluralistic nature of publicity as it engenders volition meaning, the absence of coercion or force. Everett says that to foster freedom is to choose among associations (1988b:14). It logically follows from this understanding that persuasion which "emerges from argument" and "leads to promise" should be freed from force. Then the operation of reason becomes important faith being its nurturing dimension.

We have also said that commonality resides in culture and natural circumstances. The dynamic of publicity however pushes beyond such bonds, albeit without totally rejecting them. If I understand Everett well then, maximum participation should be experimented through going beyond the necessities of "biologist" appeals informed by ethnicity, religion, kinship and race without necessarily rejecting them as the basis of such a move. The relationship between covenant and publicity evokes the reciprocity between its theological and political domains and, ipso facto, ethical values. "Political longing finally expresses itself in religious hope, just as religious aspiration requires political content or form" (1997:21). This is what Everett seeks to achieve and actually does in relating covenant and publicity together.

Testament cf. Mosala (1989) that would concur with Everett and throw more light on this "ideological eclipse and closedness" of covenant.
The application of covenant in sociological notions of legitimation, differentiation and mediation can also demonstrate the role of religion in public life. Political frames or polities need to be accepted. They need to be legitimized. They need to bond with those who participate in them. Religious symbols play this important role of cementing the procedures or polities that are employed to attain maximum participation in public life. I have already said that it is impossible to acquire a polity that can offer all citizens the opportunity to participate in every decision. Faith or fide in the modes of representation is essential for the legitimation of the outcomes of any chosen procedures or modes of representation.

Legitimation is also about the processes of socialization and character formation. In other words the manner in which people are nurtured creates space for the legitimation of procedures and polities that govern their participation in public life. Certainly religion may play this role. It is here that the pivotal role of ecclesiology in the Everretian theory of publicity becomes important, namely, that ecclesiologies are political experiments and therefore models for wider social life. Of course, religions might legitimate or de-legitimate federal republics, but they are not necessarily obnoxious. This does not however dispute their bonding role in public life.

Differentiation is another important sociological notion. For us it implies the distinction between the church and kingdom or the distinction between prophet and king for example. The intrinsic nature of plurality in publicity, as we have already made the point yields to differentiated publics or oikoi that must be mediated (co-ordinated and legitimized). The choice of media of co-ordination and legitimation is important and sociologically, religion can play this functional role.

I have also said that publicity excludes in order to include in public life. A sum of all publics in the end must constitute a coherent public life or one oikos. Tracy's (1981:5) "three publics" for example is inter alia based on the understanding that "each theologian addresses three distinct and related social realities: the wider society, the academy and the church." The social location of an individual theologian provides what he calls "elective
affinities” for a particular emphasis in theology. All theology nonetheless, he posits, is public discourse. Publics are not unrelated. The role of religion in maintaining the relationship between publics is crucial. How we exclude or include, expose or impose in publicity is obviously an ethical matter. Covenant in his oikos model is key to understanding this role of religion and its intricate relation to public life. The exposition in this section make one point, namely, that in the oikos model by Everett, the link between federalism and republicanism is explicable through the bridge term of covenantal-publicity.

1.2.5. Religion and Democracy.

Democracy changes religion in decisive ways that shape how religious groups affect public policy. Religion changes from a dyadic focus on religion and state. It becomes part of a complex relation of other religions, independent institutions and governments. To explain the role that religion has to play in a democratic environment, Everett coins what he calls a “pre-state public consensus.” Continual argument among competing and co-operating groups builds pre-state consensus. This means that democracy is about reorientation of power relations. It shapes the boundaries of power relations between publics of which religion is one.

Pre-state public consensus exists prior to government. It is from this pre-state public consensus that differentiation takes place to give birth to the public sphere and the government per se. In other words, the fact that the public pre-exists government means that the public creates conditions of governmental legitimation and critique. The institutions of governance differentiate into public life and government, and thus “religion relates primarily to public life and to government only secondarily” (1999:30). Religion becomes a participant in the pre-state public consensus building. Therefore it contributes in the dynamic of consensus building together with a variety of other publics. All these publics form platforms for public debate. This differentiation of the pre-state public replaces the dialectic of resistance and control between the church and the state. One can use another metaphor to sum up Everett's thoughts in this manner; the
metamorphosis of a pre-state public into government and public life alters the boundaries of interest between church and state and contains their traditional conflict of interest. Everett says:

To make religious structures and other public institutions pre-state is to free them from government control. However, it also raises the question of how such institutions and organisations are to be constrained toward their proper end. For instance, how can education be held accountable to the claims of truth, the arts to the values of beauty, medical institutions to the care of health, and economy to the production of sustainable wealth? This can no longer come primarily from government and statutes. It must come from the convictions of the people. These in turn are fed by deep religious traditions and orientations, which provide a holistic framework for them (1999:31).

Religion provides a holistic framework for a differentiated public life. At the same time religion itself is altered by the dictates of publicity both in its organizational form and language. Our discussion on typologies of ecclesiology has shown this.

In a democratic dispensation therefore, religions have to become “little publics” or proto-publics. This means that they need to generate vital discussion and debate for their members. The key to Everett’s argument is found in what he says, “The transition to associational forms in religion means embracing new, covenantal models of authority structure, decision making, and participation” (1999:33). He says that associational forms of religion are covenantal in the sense that they rest on solemn mutual promises about the relations of people toward each other and the divine source of life. Their internal life rests in the promises they make with people and God. He says:

On what basis can people form relationships of trust beyond the bonds of real and fictive kinship? The biblical answer was to make covenants. Relationships of promise are the alternatives to kinship and coercion. They are the bonds of consent and hope... Constitutions are but precipitates of promises that cultivate trust and manage mistrust (1988b:79).

Everett goes on to say that in this democratic dispensation therefore, religion shares the responsibility to ensure that people cultivate cultural tools, the economic base and public...
platforms needed to participate in the forming of public life. Liberation he asserts, becomes the capacity to go public and share in the work of governance. Thus associational religion cultivates civil persuasion. By giving ontological precedence to publicity through the concept of pre-state public consensus, democracy shapes the boundaries of religion. Religion becomes an open oikos, its boundaries attaining covenantal porosity.

1.2.6. Homo publicans -Homo foedans

Everett, having developed a concept of covenantal publicity argues that the personality that has been influenced by a "monarchical status" associated with the kingdom metaphor in the New Testament has often cast self as either dethroned by "Christ, reason, or the devil." Whichever way the dethronement might have come this presented the public self as a repressed self according to Everett. This must be abandoned in favour of the performative expression of self, "a "presidential" self, in which a center of identity within us responds to various feelings, memories, perceptions in an effort to organize them for the activity of expression to others. It is a self constantly reconstructing its identity in the process of self-expression and confirmation" (1988b:145). Covenantal publicity calls for an understanding of self that is commensurate with the governing symbol of the Federal republic. This is a self that seeks publication and a self that is covenant making hence homo publicans and homo foedans.

Without belabouring the point, clearly all those characteristics of publicity summed up in the motif of openness will be incarnated in the presidential self. Personality would be seen as driving toward open, public disclosure and simultaneously becoming covenantal. The dynamic of publicity as moving toward disclosure yields to an interesting understanding of emancipation. Publicity becomes understood as emancipation in so far as it is a transition from domestic privacy to civil publicity demands. Homo publicans becomes a symbol of the acquisition of powers necessary to publicize ourselves in the world. As we publicize ourselves we profess our convictions which will in turn need to be confirmed in public. This means that emancipation begins with profession as we
profess in search for resonance and confirmation. Resonance offers the generation of power. These terms: profession, resonance and confirmation in simple terms connote public speech, public hearing, and acceptance of course in an atmosphere that is characterized by the absence of force.

We can now establish the affinity between the notion of a “performer self” or “presidential self” and Habermas’ discourse ethics especially his communicative action theory. In fact Everett resorts to Habermas to explain some of his categories of covenantal speech in publicity. He reckons that (1988b:136) Habermas seems to be getting at the same motif through his concept of communicative competence necessary for the “presidential self” to perform in the public theatre. According to Habermas (Everett 1988b:136) “communicative competence is the capacity to participate in rational discourse that advances in the direction of an ideal speech situation characterized by equality of participation and, freedom from coercion, sincerity of participants and the exercise of critical dialogue.”

To revert to Everett’s notion of a “repressed monarchical self” we can only attain the features of “a presidential self,” i.e. the homo publicans and the homo foedans through the development of a public conversation. This public conversation installs a “repressed self” into a “performer self.” Practically, this means that the weak and the oppressed are emancipated through registering their reasonable claims ascertained to be honoured in public discourse. According to this, the emancipation of the poor and the weak does not lie merely in the exercise of coercion but in the augmentation of a public in which they can participate. So profession makes the properties of the self and of the groups a basis for communication for “property is that which is proper to us” Everett declares.

Communicative competence assumes the anthropological basis for communication. Thus the Habermasian theory of communication finds expression in the self that dialogues, i.e. Homo Dialogicus (Norma 1988:161). Dialogue in this case is the ability to come to terms with opposition as opposed to rigidification in the face of opposition (Norma 1988:162). Communicative competence, which finds expression in the Habermasian
Homo Dialogicus, is the philosophical basis for the Everretian homo publicans and homo foedans.

1.3. Oikos: A Heuristic design

We need to recognise that the oikos model is an aid to help us identify certain aspects or dimensions of public life. The oikos model is not a replica but merely an approximation of an entity under our scrutiny namely, the aspects of public life. By employing this model, Everett explains and synthesises what we may already know or are at least inclined to believe. One important criterion of a model is that it becomes easily acceptable if it accords with history and experience. In this manner, the function of a model, in this case, of the oikos, is explanatory or heuristic, enabling us to discover new (theological) insights, which are pertinent to the subject of our discussion, in this case public life.

Everett makes a distinction between two types of oikos: the spatial and relational dimensions of oikos images. The spatial oikos could be placed along a spectrum of a fusion of household components (God, land, people, work and faith) to the fragmentation of such components. On the other hand, the relational dimension of the concept of oikos connotes the way the participants arrange their relationship.

Within the spatial dimension of the oikos Everett presents a few variants. First, in a fused oikos the spatial location of the spheres is on the same land, faith comprising a set of ancestral loyalties. Second, in a tight oikos all the spheres are on the same land but faith is independent. It is not necessarily located in the same spatial location. In an open oikos work and family are separated, which is what he calls a split oikos. Lastly, there is a fragmented oikos. This is the oikos of intense differentiation where the cohesion of the spheres is difficult to establish.
Similarly, with regards to the relational dimension of the *oikos*, there are different types of relationships and authority patterns, which can be hierarchical, organic and egalitarian. In a *hierarchical oikos*, one person is the final authority. An *organic oikos* divides relations by function, work controls a person with autonomy in fulfilling a function. In what he calls an *egalitarian oikos*, members stand on a roughly equal footing, and the group is controlled by the outcomes of communication, persuasion and negotiation. Everett maintains that this is dominant in the *open oikos*. (1995:326) hence an egalitarian *oikos* would be suitable for democracy.

Accordingly, faith becomes more like an image of fundamental relationships in an *oikos*. It is our pattern of deepest fidelity in harmony with the type of *oikos* we espouse. Thus spirituality is the root orientation behind peoples images and values of their *oikos*. In an *open oikos* for example, images of a direct relationship with God will be rife with egalitarian spiritual images. The *oikos* image is used to designate an ensemble of work and faith and relationships, *oikos* is used to talk about them as a system. Everett uses *oikos* to talk about space, relationships and the resultant faith in systemic terms.

*Oikos* helps recover the memory that in all traditional cultures all spheres were integrated, the family being a productive, usually agricultural unit. Its basic religiosity or faith was bound up in the honouring of ancestral customs. As we seek to discover new insights appropriate to our circumstances, through *oikos* we are able to image that:

Economics, family and religion are tied together in an integrated bundle. In the Greek this was called the *oikos*, that is habitat, or household. The *oikos* embraced not only a house, but also the lineage, a hearth, ancestral claims, and the land of the fathers (Everett 1995:18)

*Oikos* therefore, resonating with the archaic memory is about an ensemble of relationships rather than their compartmentalization. We are able heuristically to appreciate the *oikos* spectra which, range from fused to fragmented *oikoi*. Within that spectrum of spatial *oikoi* there will be a rough correspondence of relational types of *oikoi*, viz. hierarchical, organic individualistic etc.
To grasp the heuristic nature of the concept of *oikos*, Everett’s (1988b) own discussion of the meaning of the notions of symbol and model is crucial. The phrase he employs in yet another work (1997:11) namely, “infra red glasses to interpret our political life,” is enchanting. It captures his use of the symbol *oikos* to “describe our world of heuristics that press us to certain kinds of questions about social and political life.” A symbol refers to the connection of thought and action. He thus employs *oikos* as an “infra red glass” to gaze through our thoughts and actions in public life.

The word model (1997:13) describes the pattern or frame of symbolic actions, for “enduring symbols take on certain models,” Everett maintains. A frame or pattern of symbolic actions, i.e. a connection of thoughts and actions is a paradigm. A model is thus a layout of the symbolic actions—it is window through which an arrangement of—or pattern of actions could be viewed. Social life can take vivid patterns i.e. symbolic models for common action, which enable people to grasp what is going on and participate in public life. While symbols guide action as they evoke emotions, models on the other hand help bridge the gap between the familiar and the strange.

Given that models are a layout—a paradigm—a frame of thought patterns and emotions connected to symbolic actions, a governing symbol is a root metaphor, a master metaphor. It points to the location where thoughts, emotions and actions are entrenched. In this manner, a key symbol enables people to move easily from one arena into another. It is a device of navigation. For example we could use *ikhaya* as a master symbol or master metaphor governing black people to transit from one arena into another in their quest for publicity. *Oikos* to Everett is a root paradigm, a master symbol for use in public life in our modern times. Significantly, it enables Everett to traverse into yet another master symbol God’s Federal Republic for contemporary use in public life.

A symbol offers a vision. As a vision governing symbols give rise to norms and principles—“we not only live by their light, we live under it” (1988b:15). Importantly, “once the critical distance and our present actions disappears then we are on the ground of ideology,” he cautions (1988b:15).
Ideology once confused with a governing symbol blurs or obfuscates our distance from our present actions. Therefore while ideology is necessary, it can also be harmful. It logically follows from the above that the choice of symbols and the criteria used to make such a choice are crucial points of contention. Everett himself offers some criteria with the qualification that "symbols must be human enough to arise from our own actions and history, inclusive enough to embrace our plurality and complex enough to provide us with adequate models for social life" (1988b:21). We could thus enlist these criteria as humanness, inclusiveness, complexity and modeling.

1.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have attempted to describe the model postulated by Everett and made the theoretical links between religion and publicity at least from the point of view of the Judeo-Christian heritage. We have established those tenets that are foundational to the theoretical rationale of Everett's theory of public and the meaning of a governing symbol with its concomitant criteria of humanness, inclusiveness, complexity and their capacity to be modeled or framed. Covenant and federalism are needed to help us attain the unity of a group of publics and this unity must turn to some system of adherence. Everett's clearer explanation of covenantal publicity in (1988b:122-3;1997:20-1;176-9) points to the theological foundations and roots of federalism just as the ecclesial symbol is indicative of the roots of publicity. The point is that:

Covenantal publicity involves not only the reciprocity between these two component elements but also reciprocity between its theological and political domains. The ethical values embedded in the theological roots of these concepts have penetrated the political ethics connected with federal republicanism. Moreover, over centuries the values developed within the political tradition have also deeply affected the ecclesiology and ethics of the churches (Everett 1997: 20-1).

From the sentiments above, it goes without saying that the struggle for publicity is a theological as well as a political question. Yet symbols do not answer questions of policy strategy and institutional arrangements.
CHAPTER 2
THE MODERN PARTIAL OIKOS

2.1. Introduction

This chapter explores one of the assertions that Everett makes namely that, the modern oikos is partial. The historical review of the concept of oikos shows that some components of the covenant were lost e.g. in the Early Church. The manifestations of a fuller covenant leapfrogged into the period of feudalism. We shall see that heuristically, as the desirable integration of public life was sometimes attained, problems of relations would be unresolved as in the feudal system. The feudal oikos was not egalitarian. This is true of the Reformation which brought about egalitarian relations by conferring all individuals a monarchical status and therefore equality. The Reformation also eclipsed other components of the oikos. The same is true of the Enlightenment oikos. Enlightenment made the value of reason central. However, reason dethroned the individual person. Public life became a dichotomized scene of fragmented publics and a self-centric individual.

In our context, democracy is potentially a solution to the problems of the partiality of the modern oikos. In this exercise, consciousness to different forms of democracy is not compromised. We however examine the role of democracy by summoning Habermas’s communicative theory and the democratic Rechtsstaat. Everett accepts the analysis and philosophical basis offered by Habermas but according to him the solution for the partiality of the modern oikos should be found in covenantal publicity. In our examination of the partiality of the modern oikos and the role of democracy, we critically analyse the manner in which Everett and Habermas handle the Enlightenment project. We generally welcome their efforts of panel beating the Enlightenment project. This is valuable as it inculcates a sense of criticality to one’s own heritage. Such an internal criticism of the Enlightenment project helps to open lines of dialogue with other external milieus.

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The framework of this examination is however based on the view that there is a core structure for black Africans that should constitute the basis for response to the intricacies of the modern partial oikos. The chapter thus seeks to demonstrate the inadequacy of - and almost futile exercise of intending the expansion and reconstruction of the Enlightenment project as a starting point for the African experience of publicity. This chapter thus seeks to portray the road that leads to the choice of the African religio-political symbol ofikhaya.

2.2. Everett’s View of the Modern Partial Oikos

In contrast to the full ancient covenant, which included relations between God, the people and the land, Everett demonstrates either the resurgence or loss of some of these elements throughout the historical development of the concept. He is doing this to come to one of his fundamental conclusions namely, that our modern public life is a “trimmed” one (1988b). He says that with the American constitution, the individual was stripped of his Christian garment and emerged as the individual citizen, and as male citizen for that matter. In the American covenant, women had to wait for two centuries to emerge into full publicity, and one may add that this is still an ongoing struggle today. Furthermore, the role of God and the component of the land receded to make way for the expression of the individual. God played a vestigial role mainly in the sphere of the hearts of the people. The land became a space in which an individual came to exercise dominion. Because of the focus of the covenant on the individual, covenant was reduced to contract.

According to Everett, we should not just understand the difference between covenant and contract merely on the lines of intimate commitment and detached legalism. That is only a part of the problem. By reducing covenant to contract the implication is that some of the components of the covenant are missing. A full covenant recognises God’s claims, the land and the people vis a vis a fragmented covenant, which comprises a series of isolated contracts among individuals.
Everett explains that the election, which originated in God’s covenant with the Hebrew people, was understood as a divine election of a king. Election in a modern partial *oikos* however, developed into a concept of election in which “God no longer elected either a people or a candidate” (1998b:115). He asserts that in an election, decisive questions emerge about our very person on the stage of history and a person who can best personify our aspirations. This is clearly demonstrated in election campaigns where appeal to the emotions of the people is rampant. Election is therefore not just a contractual matter but a “vestige” of reaffirming a full covenant. We should also concede that in a democracy, a constitution is a contract that seeks to clear the ground for accommodating elements of the ancient full covenant. It is intended to overcome the deprivation of participation in public life and professes the ideals and symbols that are shared by all.

The problem with a fragmented *oikos* which Everett decries following on Robert Bellah’s lament over the American covenant is that while freedom of the individual was achieved, it was at a cost. In a fragmented *oikos* differentiation is over-pronounced to the harm of the integration of public spheres. Relationships are detrimentally individualistic and dissolve into privacy, which often means personal isolation. Furthermore, there is a loss of the little publics because they are not integrated. These little publics contribute to the sum total of public life. When there is a fragmentation of public life, some of them will get lost and yield to a partial *oikos*.

Publicity challenges the closedness of covenant as we have seen. Publicity challenges covenant from becoming an idol in the service of group aggrandizement. Hence the expansion of publicity is a challenge to the introversion of rigid covenants. It is Everett’s thesis that both the republican and covenantal traditions can correct each other to enhance a fuller expression of god’s purposes for human life. We can put this in this manner, a modern partial *oikos* needs an open- a porous covenant. Everett says (1988b:121), “Both of them need a God that leads them to more universal covenants with other people and creation. Both of them need to sense their place within their history of the promises.”
2.2.1 The rehearsal of the historical development of Covenant

Everett as we have seen employed the Bible in tracing the origins of the concept of covenant. Its full conception enables us to perceive partial forms that underlie constitution making in modern public life. He further demonstrates this point by looking into the Western development of public life. What emerges out of that picture is that the fragmentation of the full covenant albeit with considerable vestiges from its origins can be discerned. He then makes the assertion that “covenant leapfrogged over the heads of the Early Church carrying the ancient covenantal view into the Middle Ages” (1988b:107).

Among the Church Fathers, he selects Augustine as one example that “typified and crystallized” the reduction of covenantal thinking in the West. He explains that Augustine in his work, *The City of God*, ignored the political and structural implications of the covenant. Augustine emphasised personal salvation and the most he could retain of the covenant was its promissory notion to an historic and even future worldly hope rather than a living polity (1988b:107).

Besides Augustines’s influence, the pre-occupation of the Early Church in the West was with the appropriation of the Roman heritage into the Christian faith. The Church in the West adopted the stoic conception of natural law, which led the Western church to focus on analyses of individual human desires, thereby distancing Christians in the West from the materialistic components of the covenant. The point is that the Augustinian scheme portrayed vestiges of the covenant while leaving some elements out. Augustine’s influence signals a trend that became dominant in polity development in the Western Church.

Everett then crosses over to the period of the Middle Ages. In this era, he appreciates the system of feudalism and looks at the etymology of the word *foedus*, which connotes league or treaty. With the theme of covenant in mind, we need to be alert to the fact that the notions of the kingdom tradition yield to patterns of governance embodied in the
symbol of republic. Kingship had a social symbolic value as it responded to questions of group and personal survival, stability and cohesion.

The feudal system arose at a time when the Roman polity was crumbling. The disintegration of the Roman establishment brought back the recovery of the *oikos*, life becoming more integrated and “even fused around the household, land, kin and a domestic faith,” (1988b:108). Personal loyalties between serfs and lords, vassals and princes characterized the European society of the fourteenth century. It was a scenario reminiscent of the patterns of reciprocal loyalties characteristic of earlier covenants. Everett argues that the Middle Ages could be described as a society of a “veritable forest of covenants.” Feudalism symbolically responded to questions of group and personal survival, bringing stability and cohesion in the society of the Middle Ages.

This by no means suggests that the Middle Ages had no problems particularly in creating a public life of full participation by all. As Everett describes this era in terms of a fused *oikos* above, it stands to reason that relations were hierarchical; feudalism was not an egalitarian *oikos*. There was little volition in public life for those who did not rule. For example, Church membership was compulsory and so was baptism. These words by Southern (1970:18) give us a clearer picture:

Baptism was not only the involuntary tie which bound a medieval man: secular serfdom, if he was so unfortunate to be born into this condition, was another. Serfdom however, could be revoked by purchase, or flight, or free gift; and the higher forms of secular obligation were all in some degree voluntary - a man could take them up and in certain conditions, renounce them. But the obligations assumed in baptism were there for ever, and they brought secular obligations and penalties in their train no less than spiritual ones.

On the one hand, the Middle Ages brought about a resurgence of covenant and a fused *oikos*. On the other, private interests were subordinated to common good. The Church was a “State.” In Everretian terms it was communal, and the private-public boundaries were opaque. Beside, there were competitions and wars among the lords and later, there
were peasant uprisings in this era. In spite of all this what we are teasing out here is a clue to an integrated *oikos* or habitat of public life.

We can say in the words of Southern (1970:22):

> One of the greatest achievements of the Middle Ages was the detailed development of this idea of a universal human society as an integral part of a divinely ordered universe in time and in eternity, in nature and super nature, in practical policies and in the world of spiritual essences. Nearly everything of importance that was written in the Middle Ages until the system began to break up in the fourteenth century, was written with some consciousness of this cosmic background.

Reference to the coronation of Charlemagne in the era is significant as the monarchy is a pointer to the processes of integration fostered by *oikos*. We see the reopening of the door to covenantal understanding of political life at the time of the coronation of Charlemagne. It is said that Charlemagne saw himself mirrored in the face of Constantine. Indeed, as one recognized by the Pope at that time, he became the elect one with special covenantal relationship with God. We need to recall that in the history of the Israelites existed a covenant of servanthood between God and a king. According to Israelite tradition, a king was sacrosanct meaning that he was God’s representative on earth. The king’s election into office was interpreted to be equivalent to God’s election of the monarch. This thinking was translated to Charlemagne.

The biblical concept of election therefore, offers us the spectacles through which we can appreciate the heritage of the covenant. There were notable deficiencies in the application of the covenant conception in this era. There were no regular elections. To be more precise, it was a hierarchical *oikos*. However, the republican tradition of leagues was not abandoned due to the fusion of the monarchical and hierarchical forms of governance with covenant. In fact, a shift in paradigm occurred as a result of these leagues:

> Within the emerging towns and cities the covenant of kingship began to merge with the leagues of republican liberty. One way to understand the Reformation is to see it as the
extension of Christ’s kingship to every Christian. While this intensified the anti-Jewish bigotry of Christians it also laid the basis for a new understanding of covenantal political order. It was a covenant among Christian citizens as equals, rather than a hierarchical covenant within the feudal ladder of being (Everett 1998b:111).

According to the organic notions of the medieval times the rule of the head, i.e. the Emperor or the Pope, over members of society was legitimated through covenant. But, it was this sacrosanct kingship that pivotally merged with the leagues of the republican liberty. The forest of covenants referred to above was a forest of leagues that permeated the kingship tradition of medieval times. The combination of the governing symbol of kingship and the ideals of republicanism became a springboard for the later transmutation of a hierarchical oikos into an egalitarian one. This became clear in the times of the Reformation. In the logic of the Reformation, the voluntaristic perspectives arose, and dissolved the hierarchical notions of covenant. The royal covenant became a personal covenant of citizenship. The Reformation devolved the status of the monarch to every individual who became a Christian.

Proceeding to the Puritan principles, they laid the foundation for modern federalism, particularly their weaving together of covenantal theories of citizenship, political structure and history. According to Puritan practice, baptism became a badge of citizenship in the Church and polity. Adult baptism was tied to people’s mature entry into public life and by this very fact, covenant gained a structural and political form.¹ In addition to this, the Puritans developed a notion of covenantal association. This actually meant that people were governing themselves through covenant, and they extended this pattern to the relations among nations. Technically speaking, the Puritan ecclesiology was manifested in the structural and political form of publicity.

But there were some limitations as well with regard to the Puritan achievement. Their covenantal projection even though it bestowed every individual with kingship or monarchical status, was strung out of history. For example the question of land was

¹ In South Africa, particularly during the colonial era, baptism was a condition of admission into the white man’s city.
reduced to a stage where the coming of Jesus would be its fulfillment. Nonetheless, the Puritans played a successful role in bringing together central elements of biblical covenant and republican order. Within the social matrix created by covenantal thinking, modern rights found their original germination.

The foregoing argument depends heavily on Everett (1988b). From this argument, the amalgam of Greek political thought, the Pax Romana and the "forest" of covenants of feudalism; all became ingredients which percolated through into the Reformation where an individual became a monarch, a priest and a citizen and subsequently into our modern time. And throughout, a thread of covenant, oikos albeit mutated is discernible though not in its fullest Biblical countenance.

2.3. Oikos and the democratic Rechtsstaat

We have nonetheless not employed any theoretical framework to analyse modern society except the views that Everett advances with regard to modern society. We do not only need to broaden our understanding of the oikos model but also to test its validity on the basis of modern contemporary theory.

Habermas is among the leading social theorists in the world today. Most of his writings are widely acclaimed among major contributions to the theoretical understanding of contemporary society. In addition to the scale, range and quality of his writings, Habermas attempts to reconstruct historical materialism and he defends capitalist modernization (Callinicos 1990:95). Through the theory of communicative action, Habermas propounds a philosophy of language as the basis of his theory of modernity. As I indicated earlier, this is the philosophy that constitutes the basis for Everett’s religio-political model of oikos. Habermas becomes more indispensable for his understanding of

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2 Taken from Habermas and used here to describe the juridification and thus densification of law in modern democracy. The basic structure of the Rechtsstaat constitutes the mode of co-ordination by reasoned agreement or alternatively by fair compromise as a normative ideal of collective autonomy or self-determination in the modern world.
democracy as a bridge between the social structures and human actions that are fragmented in modern society.

Fundamentally, Habermas’s theory is anchored on a distinction he makes between two concepts of rationality which shape knowledge to guide action. First, cognitive instrumental rationality conducts actions that aim at successfully realizing goals that have been privately defined (Deflem 1996:3). Within the ambit of instrumental rationality are action types that are either instrumental or strategic. Action types are instrumental when they are directed at efficient interventions in a state of affairs in the world or, strategic when they guide attempts to influence the decisions of other actors.

Second, communicative action rests on communicative rationality, which is aimed at mutual understanding conceived as a process of reaching agreement on the basis of arguments resting on claims subject to validity tests between speaking subjects. Now according to Habermas, it is only through language, under conditions of rational argumentation that those social actors can co-ordinate their actions in terms of an orientation to mutual understanding (Deflem 1996:3).

The conditions of rational argumentation are based on validity claims, which are distinguished as a normative claim to rightness, and expressive and evaluative claims to rightness. To address these claims there are different types of discourse: theoretical discourse on truth; moral-practical discourse on normative rightness; and aesthetic and therapeutic critique on authenticity and sincerity. It is on the basis of this theory of argumentation that Habermas develops “a two level approach of lifeworld and system.” Communicative actions in daily social life are often not questioned as they arise within the parameters of an undisputed and shared lifeworld. To explain this Cochrane (1997:6) says:

For Habermas (1983) a “system” (objective economic and political structures of power) always coincides with “lifeworld” (the taken for granted substratum of worldviews and actions which “stands behind the back” of each participant in communication and which provides coherence and
direction to life). A lifeworld becomes socially effective through processes and institutions which embody the values and the storehouse of knowledge passed from one generation to the next.

The commonly accepted background knowledge within which action is co-ordinated is offered by the lifeworld. Pusey says in explanation, “Habermas has transposed the theory of society into the paradigm of communication” (1987:105). The lifeworld however is differentiated along the lines of the validity claims of the speech actions:

Thus, a differentiation into three performative attitudes in communicative action has been brought about: an objectivating attitude towards the outer world of events and circumstances, a normative attitude towards the social world of a community of a people, and an expressive attitude towards the inner world of the subjectivity of the individual (Deflem 1996:3).

By an objectivating attitude toward the outer world of events and circumstances in my understanding, Habermas refers to the cosmological view of a people while the normative attitude would be the value system of a people. The third performative action I find self-explanatory, the subjective views of an individual. The concept of the lifeworld thus understood is not limited to the cultural and traditional but also secures that social actors abide by the normative standards of their society, and enables social actors to act as competent personalities in harmony with their social environment. The components of the lifeworld correspond to the functions of culture, society and personality.

Habermas argues however that the action-oriented approach of the lifeworld is not adequate to account for all the intricacies of modern society. The process of rationalization should also be understood in terms of the “material substratum” of society. To supplement the lifeworld perspective, he introduces the systems theory, which specifically pays attention to the economic and the political systems. He posits that under modern conditions, these systems “uncoupled” from the lifeworld. They function independently no longer on the basis of communication action but in terms of the functionality of the steering media of money and power. According to Habermas, the uncoupling of the system is not problematic in itself.
Actions co-ordinated through these media are relieved from a constant threat of dissent that is rife in communicative action as a result of imbued difficulties in reaching consensus. Systems circumvent dissent with a high level of productivity and efficiency. The problem according to Habermas is that systems have the capacity to penetrate back into the lifeworld. This is what Habermas refers to as the colonization of the lifeworld, where "the communicative potentials aimed at understanding in the lifeworld are eroded in terms of the systemic imperatives of monetary and bureaucratic systems."

These systems are formally organized domains of action... that – in the final analysis – are no longer integrated through the mechanism of mutual understanding, that sheer off from lifeworld contexts and congeal into a kind of norm-free sociality (Deflem 1996:6)

To further clarify the sheering off of systems imperatives from the lifeworld and the resultant tendency to colonise the lifeworld, Habermas postulates a process of what he calls juridification in European history. Juridification refers to an increase in formal law through the expansion of positive law, i.e. more social relations becoming legally regulated; and the densification of law, i.e. legal regulations becoming more detailed (Deflem 1996:7). According to Habermas there are four identifiable waves of juridification in the European history, which demonstrate the resistance of the lifeworld to the colonizing workings of state and the economy. The outcome of this resistance in the first "wave" was achieved firstly by claiming individual rights against the sovereign, and then the democratisation of the political order which was followed by the guaranteeing of freedoms and rights against the economic system. In plain language, Habermas says that liberal democracy is the product of the resistance of the lifeworld against the colonizing systems imperatives. On a much generic tone, democratisation is indispensable for publicity to balance power against power. Democracy becomes a tool or negotiating medium to maintain harmony between systems imperatives and the lifeworld. The point here is to indicate that Habermas tries to

Show how phylogenetic developments in the areas of ethics, law and legitimate political orders followed a developmental logic, where successive stages of increasingly universal and rational symbolic structures provided necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for institutional innovations,
like the development of legitimate political orders and finally of modern constitutional regimes (Peters 1996:110).

Habermas then locates the present wave of the process of juridification i.e. the developmental logic of the resistance of the lifeworld, in welfare state. Out of this logic of modernization evolve forms of social integration that develop and formalise the inculcation of uncoerced agreement. The welfare state is markedly that locus of this wave of developmental logic:

... thanks to the Keynesian welfare-state compromise between labour and capital, on the cultural sphere, producing, through the resulting politicization of the market, an increased demand for legitimation which the progressive monetarization and bureaucratization of everyday life prevent from being met (Callinicos 1990:103).

Out of this, the picture is that democracy, or the democratization of the welfare state is indicative of the contemporary wave of resistance by the lifeworld against colonization. This is so because the welfare state is markedly ambivalent in that each freedom guaranteed at once means a freedom taken away. We thus need to further elicit the connection between democracy and juridification.

In his analysis of democracy and modern law, Habermas’s starting point is an analysis of the process of social co-ordination, collective will-formation and conflict resolution. His theory of communicative action develops a model of social co-ordination through speech acts as we have said. This is a mode in which actors develop shared understandings and agreements in different dimensions of symbolic validity. To elucidate this Habermas offers a typology of practical discourses by which joint action could be achieved on the basis of reasoned consent, that is, without force or manipulation. He gives the typology of practical discourse as: pragmatic discourse, which seeks the most efficient relations between a multiplicity of means and ends; ethical-political discourse, where definitions of collective identity and conceptions of the good life are at stake; and moral discourse about the impartial consideration of competing claims (Peters 1996:110-111).
In this whole taxonomy of practical discourses that is given above, one of the most important things that Habermas postulates is that not all conflicts are resolved through discourse and reasoned agreement. There are cases where the criterion for a solution would be a bargain for a compromise, which is legitimate and dependent on the fairness of the conditions under which it would have been reached. The mode of co-ordination by reasoned agreement or alternatively by fair compromise is a normative ideal of collective autonomy or self-determination in the modern world. For Habermas this is the basic structure of the modern democratic Rechtsstaat.

To restate the sentiments above, as a product of juridification and the resistance of the lifeworld, democracy offers the basic procedural structure and logic of uncoerced argument without which there will be violence. Habermas thus welcomes liberal democracy as a product of juridification and densification of law.

His distinction between the moral and ethical elements of politics, between principles of justice and evaluative conceptions of a collective life-form with common aspirations and projects, lets him keep a healthy distance from the more problematic elements of communitarian or republican understandings of modern society and politics (Peters1996: 112).

Key to this proposition is that Habermas insists that the modern development of social and cultural diversity cannot be replaced by a new unitary conception of the collective good life. Unity for him is located in the pluralism of ethical life forms and consensus in basic constitutional procedures and principles. But how do we find rooting or legitimacy in a pluralistic, diverse political community? Habermas responds to this by saying that given the conditions that I have outlined above, the outcomes should be understood by the participants as compatible with the results of these procedures which guarantee collective deliberations. In other words, the conditions of public deliberation and the making and implementation of the collective decisions must produce both freedom and legitimacy. In addition, rationality becomes reality in public deliberation.

Legitimacy is directly found in the same set of conditions or normative principles of a modern democratic dispensation, Rechtsstaat. In other words, legitimacy is in discourse.
itself. The procedures by means of which we come to hold our views are in themselves our Gewahr\textsuperscript{3} i.e. our warranty and legitimization for our convictions. The Rechtsstaat is thus a procedure for a communicative rationality, a discourse of coming to grips with incoherence, contradictions and dissension. Democracy becomes a barrier between system and lifeworld meaning that it bars the penetration of systems imperatives into the lifeworld. At the same time democracy is a sensor for exchanges between system and lifeworld.

2.3.1 The Shortcomings of the Modern democratic Rechtsstaat

Everett's oikos model clamours for an integrative covenantal measure in the wake of colonising, "norm-free" systems imperatives in modernity. He views Habermas's communicative theory as contractual.\textsuperscript{4} Indeed, the Rechtsstaat discussed above illustrates the point that communicative theory seems to be purely "procedural." In my inquiry, which is not without limit, I have been profoundly influenced by the view of communicative action theory as contractual. While I analytically have no qualms with the Habermasian scheme, I have serious concerns with the apparent implications of putting human actions within the context of system imperatives. Who or what is responsible for the system imperatives before we appreciate the gains of working within the system?

To start with Peters (1996) critiques Habermas for his ambivalent treatment of the substantive normative elements of the modern constitutional orders while he rightly insists on the importance of certain procedural principles or process values. To state this in clear terms, Habermas is ambivalent in his treatment of the values that couch modern constitutional orders. While he sees the sheering off of systems from the life world as not

\textsuperscript{3}I take my cue from Callimico\textsuperscript{(1990)} who explains Gewahr as the motivation of a speaker to rationally persuade a hearer to accept the former's speech act because he can assume the warranty for convincing reasons.

\textsuperscript{4}Let me indicate that I was fortunate to be part of the class that was given lectures by Prof. Everett in 1998 at the University of Cape Town. When Prof. Cochrane in the class asked a question about Habermas, I recall that Everett quickly discounted Habermas's scheme as contractual. I have indicated in the previous section of this chapter the subtle difference Everett makes between contract and covenant.
necessarily bad, he overlooks the human actions involved in the process. The systems
imperatives are so thin as if they were not in themselves undergirded by certain values.
This is not to underestimate the mammoth power of the systems once set in motion as
they tendentiously drive people along ways that undermine other values they might have.
While system imperatives admittedly propel the lifeworld and thus people into ways of
thinking and acting which they subsequently rationalize, it is the emancipatory
possibilities against system imperatives that should be sought in my view. One doe not
hear how system imperatives liberate the oppressed. Moreover if there is something to be
benefited from the perfect grammar of system imperatives, it will be against the view of
those who do not benefit from them that we evaluate them.

For this reason, while we need to welcome the dialogic aspect in Habermas’s scheme it is
it is difficult to overlook asymmetrical power relations, unequal distribution of wealth
and income. Employing Everett’s category of property namely, “that which is proper to
us,” laws that govern what is proper to us are not a product of a conflict of opinions but a
struggle of interests. In other words the social conflict created by the irreversible
propulsions of the steering media of power and money retrieves the Marxist notion of the
class struggle to which I find Habermas’s theory response rather inadequate. Habermas’s
communicative rationality is too thin to resist the critique of reason and to wide an
account of modernity. On the whole Habermas’s tendency to treat the analytical
distinction between two forms of social structure i.e. symbolic and non-symbolic namely
what he refers to as social integration and system integration as an empirical distinction
between the two is problematic.

Bearing in mind that Habermas sees democracy as a bridge between lifeworld and system
imperatives, his version of Rechtsstaat celebrates the densification and rigidification of
law i.e. procedures. My contention is that democracy itself, as a system, is not devoid of
normative values. This is why there are many forms of democracy. To illustrate the
point, in modern constitutional, legal and political orders there are normative principles
that are valuable or justifiable quite independently from their role for democratic
processes. Among the examples given by Peters (1996) are
• The protection of personal integrity against interference by others
• Equal rights and liberties that give people protected social spaces to develop and realize their individual and collective life plans
• Protections of the weak or needy
• Forms of equality of resources or life chances.

Peters posits that these normative principles might be justified in various ways certainly not on their role as preconditions for democratic participation if democratic participation is devoid of such norms. Similarly, system imperatives especially viewed as being “norm free” do not guarantee these normative principles mentioned above. But are these not principles that validate or justify any system from human actions? De Gruchy (1995) differentiates between a system and a vision of democracy. Habermas’s theory seems to suggest that specific rights become legitimate only as products of deliberative political processes. Indeed the modern Rechtsstaat in itself and of itself does not guarantee equality to resources or life chance; or even protections of the weak or needy at least as millions of blacks experience it in South Africa. Certainly, liberal democracy is no guarantor of these normative principles. While this charge cannot be sustained against Habermas, he clearly does not offer the type of democracy or Rechtsstaat that can yield to those principles mentioned above. What he suggests though is that through democracy, -a Rechtsstaat, essentially a gain of modernity, we should cope or manage the system imperatives in advanced modern capitalism.

So, “Habermas has been mostly content with this general characterization and has generally left the “system” to the “systems theorists” (Peters 1996). In so far as this dual aspect of lifeworld and system serves to elucidate the analytical quiddity of these spheres his is an excellent scheme. For example I would find the use of Habermas in Cochrane’s writings (1997,1998) in clarifying this distinction between systems and lifeworld a balanced application of the theory of communicative action as I have understood it. Cochrane’s proposal of policy making from below is an indication of his awareness of the limitations of law or procedure as a pivot between lifeworld and system.
2.3.2. The Complementarity and Divergences of *Oikos* and Communicative Action Theory

The *oikos* model and the theory of communicative action broadly speaking, are Enlightenment projects. They place, albeit from different directions, open argument as a *quid pro quo* for publicity. To recognise and deal with different validity claims, open argument and compromise should characterise the modern democratic *Rechtsstaat* according to Habermas. On the other hand, while a meticulous densification and juridification of the modern state will enhance open argument and debate, legitimacy of the outcomes of such processes needs faith and trust according to Everett. There is a sense in which Everett complements Habermas.

Both Habermas’s discourse ethics and Everett’s *oikos* model welcome plurality. They both suggest ways in which a plurality of publics can be held together. Habermas sees democracy playing this role. On the other hand, while Everett appreciates democracy as an indispensable component of modern publicity, he nonetheless highlights its partiality by arguing that it is contractual as long as it is linked to the logics of market and of bureaucracies.

But the Habermasian scheme is also different from the *oikos* model. Habermas makes analytical distinctions of modern society as a critical theorist. Everett on the other hand is informed by his Christian background. While they agree analytically on the question of the uncoupling of systems from the lifeworld and the role of democracy in bridging the system imperatives and the lifeworld, Everett sees democracy without covenant as inadequate. Habermas welcomes the uncoupling of the systems from lifeworld as a developmental logic of modernity. Everett perceives this uncoupling as a problem as well, which cannot be dealt with according to procedures only as implied by the modern democratic *Rechtsstaat*. 

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2.3.3. Implications for Public Theology

A contemporary governing symbol is needed. Having defined "public" as a kind of discourse characterised by equal participation, common concerns, persuasion rather than force, covenants are crucial to a legitimate public for without them there would be no persuasion. Everett has a vision of the self that inhabits this public world as that of the performer self, *Homo publicans*, and the self as covenant maker, *Homo foedans*. The basic thrust of these sentiments is that federal theory needs to recover the fullness of the ancient covenant in which the claims of God, the land and the people are recovered albeit not as replications of the ancient *oikos*. In doing so, we cannot ignore the impact of modernity.

The contemporary understanding of the public helps to counter, if not contradict, the propensity to foster closed communities on the basis of covenants. In other words, the republican ideal exposes weaknesses or contradictions of biological, consanguinal, patriarchal principles of covenanting, even religious ones. Everett’s axiom therefore is that covenant, as appealing to bonds that are forged in voluntary association and legal structures can be extended to many spheres of life, particularly public life. Therefore in the advent of democracy and the modern challenge to maximise participation in public life, he uses the notions of *oikos* or *bayith* interchangeably as an expression of the whole to concatenate the space between representation and indirect involvement. We have earlier on touched on the impossibility of all people at once and in the same place being directly involved in governance. While biological attributes determined participation in issues of governance, modern polities are characterised by elected representatives directly participating in governance and constituencies that are represented being indirectly involved. Trust and faith between the representatives and the represented needs to be legitimated—there needs to be rootage. Covenant in the *Oikos* is thus a "galvanising" mechanism of the republican idea, seeking to maintain rootage in a modern polity which has been stripped of essential components of covenant.
Covenant as pointing to relationships challenges theories of reason. Reason should also be covenantal. Reason is thus historic and social; it is a mental activity oriented towards some kind of conformity to patterns that transcend the actor and the actor's biological attributes. By saying that reason is covenantal and ipso facto relational, Everett actually repudiates monological trends of reason. The proposal for covenantal reason, is a proposal for a paradigm shift.

*Oikos* is also a call for a change in our understanding of humanity. In this a new species of *Homo sapiens* is assumed, a species of self that can relate covenantally, thus transcending the biological or contractual relationships at most individualistic, associated with the Cartesian Ego. *Oikos* is also about time. Everett says:

It is not possible to develop a philosophy of time here, but, as with the other components of a covenantal culture, to point out a direction for us to take as we seek to orient our lives toward each other and our common public world. This notion of time as the working out of a promise and hope is a political conception of time. It is also covenantal because it binds us to the generations past and present who struggle toward the light of full recognition (1998b:127).

If time is relational as he proposes, then it ceases to be a mechanistic dry calibration of chronicles. These chronicles are covenanted. In other words, historical events have a symbolic value. Our predisposition to the past, present and the future events, evokes not only our rational grasp of these events but also our emotional attachment to them. Covenantal conception of time therefore galvanizes past and present events with our future political promises.

*Oikos* is about nature as a covenant being. The land is a component of the *oikos*. The performances of public actions need a stage. The earth offers this stage and thus the rooted-ness of our publicity. However, we need to covenant with the world as a partner and not as an object to be exploited by human beings. With the conception of nature as a covenant being we can direct all our thoughts, ethics, and faith to a world which is historical and a history which is bound to nature.
The full covenant asks about reciprocities among the partners about the impact of economic activity on people’s capacity for publicity, about the welfare of the land, the memories and hopes present in this chapter of history, and governmental openness to wider publics. The second aspect of finding a fuller covenant demands that we evaluate our attention to legal procedures from their standpoint of their effects...human rights cannot be simply a matter of due process but of meeting the real need of the neighbour. Publicity is one of these essential needs and purposes of human life (1998b:122).

In addition, the principles of publicity need to be extended into the economic sphere as well. As the right to privacy has been recognized as a constitutional right, we now need to see that the right to public participation not only as a constitutional right but a constitutional principle as well. The web of mediating structures, voluntary associations, corporations, unions etc. have a role in preserving publics and constructing covenants. Federalism is not only a matter of law and constitution but of the vital activity of this web of associations.

We need to conclude this section by evoking insights from Bollnow (1961:178-186) and perceive oikos from his perspective of a “lived space.” According to Bollnow, there is a middle point of life-filled space, which is no longer the space of the individual man, [sic] but of the group and ultimately of the nation to which he belongs. This middle point of life-filled space, the “navel of the world,” could be Rome in Italy, the temple in Jerusalem, Mecca for the Muslim, Peking for the Chinese, Pretoria for South Africans, Moria for the Zion Christian Church, etc. The space lived by humans arranges itself around a determined centre. But, the spatial centre of the life of an individual is a house, the dwelling place, an oikos. Humans, who are fugitives on earth must root themselves tight to the ground. “To dwell is not an activity like any other but a determination of man in which he realizes his true essence” (180). Oikos is about a human determination to realise human true essence. To do so human beings need a firm dwelling, lest they be dragged along helplessly by the stream of time. The dwelling place, the house, separates an inner space from an outer space. Outer space is of openness, of danger and abandonment. Inner space, the house, is protected and offers a space where humanity can return to itself, the highest function of the house, Bollnow says.
We cannot omit to mention the sacred character of a dwelling place, house and temple are essentially one. *Templum*, meaning something cut out, is an apt expression of the very first step humanity takes to carve out of chaotic space a definite area set apart from the rest of the world. A house “is a picture of the world as a whole, and therefore every house construction is the repetition of the creation of the world, the complement of the work once performed by the gods” (Bollnow 1961:181).

Beyond the threshold of the dwelling place, the house, out there, human beings must go to transact business and fulfil their lives. Outer space is not immediately hostile for there is a protective neighbourhood, a space -*Heimat* [home] of trusted relationships, of vocation, friendships etc. As we have repeatedly stated, *oikos* is about this space, *Heimat*, relations, vocations, neighbourhood in the outer space. *Oikos* as a heuristic design is explanatory and exploratory. It is both the prism through which our dwelling in the entire creation is beckoned and yet an instrument with which we navigate our present sea of life and endless plains so as to find our rootage. It is a “sacramental” device.

It is this theology of public captured through the symbol of *oikos* that forms the basis of my quest for *ikhaya*. *Ikhaya* is a dwelling, *Heimat*, *oikos* for blacks in South Africa. An African religio-political symbol is necessary for the praxis of public theology in South Africa. My cue derives from *oikos* but my prism for blacks in South Africa is *ikhaya*. I now proceed to argue that case. I contend that the modern partial *oikos* itself fragmented *ikhaya*. I show that mainly, the Enlightenment view of modernity and the attempts to amend its shortcomings were not intended to benefit black people in general and in South Africa in particular.

2.4. *Oikos* and the African Horizon of *Ikhaya*

There are conceptual affinities between *oikos* and *ikhaya*. *Oikos* which we have simply designated as household, or *bayith*, can be translated into *isiXhosa* by the word *ikhaya* or in *Sesotho*, by the word *lehae*. *Ikhaya* also connotes *heimat* or home, a protected space from the dangers of outer space; indeed a zone of relationships, webs of trust, vocation
and friendships. "Ukwakha umzi," which can be translated as "to build a home," is another expression that symbolises the centrality of this notion, *ikhaya*. The verb *ukwakha* shares the same root as *ikhaya* and this saying bears both the physical rigours of building a dwelling place and the actual participation in procreation, (*Ukwakha umzi* means to beget children.). So *ikhaya* is equally about a complement of the creative work of the "gods," *Creatio continua*.

By African horizon of *ikhaya* therefore, (Serequeberhan 1998:18-19), I connote an existential space out of which specific discourses are articulated. Serequeberhan says (1998:18):

> Horizon designates the historico-hermeneutical and politico-cultural milieu within and out of which specific discourses (philosophic, artistic, scientific etc.) are articulated. Discourse, on the other hand, refers to these articulated concerns interior to the concrete conditions-of-existence made possible by and internal to a specific horizon.

Our locus for the quest of *ikhaya* is thus in the encounter between Africa and the "Age of Europe" within the existential or lived space interior to the African horizon. The "Age of Europe," 1494-1945 (West 1993) was marked by numerous breakthroughs of the European cosmos such as oceanic transportation, state consolidation, industrialization and in addition, imperial domination. For Africans, this was an Age of Misery.

2.4.1. African Experience of Modernity

a. *A self centric meta-narrative*

Cheong (2000) advances one of the most recent critiques against modern and postmodern philosophy, through a concept which he coins "self centrism." He argues that according to the system inherited from Descartes, everything had to be explained in terms of a

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2 I give a detailed exploration of the concepts: *ikhaya*, *umzi* and *indle* in Chapter Three. *Indle* [house], is the walls, the structure, *umzi* is home, an *indle* which graduates to this status by attaining its own *ubuhlanzi* [kraal] *Ikhaya* is an aggregate of the two adding the webs of relationship beyond the physical boundaries of *indle* and *umzi*. 

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dualism of mind and matter. This firstly came as a result of a long dispute between the clergy and science in the West, which was settled by Rene Descartes by splitting the universe into mind and matter (Fitzgerald 1996:15) thus coining the new humanity as *Ergo sum cogitato*, (I am because I think).

Accordingly, the mind in the West got to be understood as having power to access the truth and this paradigm influenced all areas of human life. Physics, political theory, ethics, economics, and the philosophy of religion were influenced by these modern, emancipatory teachings of reason. “The most prominent names associated with this view are Grotius, Hobbes, Descartes, Newton, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, Kant, Hegel, Coleridge and Emerson. In their ways, Darwin, Marx, and Freud would develop the possibilities latent within this framework” (Cheong 2000:24). The cosmos was understood in dualist terms such as matter/spiritual, private/public, sacred/secular.

Modernism produced a new myth of the self, stripping humanity of all particularities and advancing an “all human” core of the independent, “reasoning” autonomous self. The modern invention of autonomy of self has a connection with human self-centredness and its differentiation from the other. Cheong thus concludes that modernism was the absolute expression of the self-centrism of humanity. The human self accessed the truth via the instrument of reason and this reason made universal rules. Modernity was a paradigm of singularity and totalization as all other dimensions of life were subordinated and subservient to the individual reason. We need to be cautious about the fact that there were variants in the currents of modernity. The picture given above about modernity is however, in my contention, a dominant sentiment experienced by the Africans.

For instance, Everett, to recapitulate, deconstructs the Cartesian Ego in whose place he proposes *Homo Foedans* and *Homo Publicans*, a covenanted self and a performer self. In the same manner, he deconstructs linear time for a materialistic, concrete concept of time while advocating for nature as well as a covenantal being. The Everettian covenanted self, is antithetical to the monologue of the autonomous modernist self and performs in a plethora of publics, or oikoi which, are devoid of dyadic structures (rigid
boundaries. Similarly, Habermas' *Homo Dialogicus* is a deconstruction of the modernist, monologue of the autonomous self. In fact Habermas charges that Enlightenment rationality of reason *tout court* is a jagged one. Both Habermas and Everett attempt to augment the deficit in Enlightenment rationality and its resultant version of self.

The primary dissonance about the effort to panel beat and augment the Enlightenment rationality by including "covenental rationality" or "intersubjectivity" is that self remains *self centric*. The individual person remains the motif or artifact of an augmented Enlightenment paradigm. Self remains the subculture and focus of the Enlightenment addendum. This does not mean that there were no gains for a better understanding of self. The crucial point is that the developments of this subculture of self with its gains, did not originally have blacks in mind. If it did, blacks could only be framed by the superiority of the self of the white race. The augmentation of the self and *ipso facto*, the reconstruction of the Enlightenment project potentially remains subterfuge for a *Gestell* of the gigantic western self and midget Africa self.

The discourse of postmodernism in deconstructing self can also illustrate my point. Though a digression, it is an important one for my argument. Broadly speaking, postmodernism is about the deconstruction of universalised modern rationalism. It rejects the totalizing metanarratives that define and legitimate realities as oppressive. The human mind and intellect as the arbiter of truth is dethroned. It posits that there are other valid paths to knowledge beside reason, which include emotions and intuition. It seeks to dismantle the technological, scientific *Gestell* [en-framing] of modernity with a *Gestalt* [configuration of the whole] ethos.

Dualistic, linear views are losing credibility in postmodern scientific discoveries. Quantum theorists state that no object is real before it is perceived in the subject's perspective (Talbot 1987: 29,40; Brink 1985:16; Fitzgerald 1996:16,19). Fitzgerald advances a theory of chaos. She argues that the Newtonian canon of parts and pieces is the primary source of the growing sense of alienation and estrangement that looms in the
modern world. She argues that we occupy the universe in which all things are connected to all things. "The universe is one, an unbroken and unbreakable wholeness, a unity in which nothing can exist or occur independently of its relationship to the whole. There are no things, only connections" she contends (1996:28).

Quantum physics, not only challenges the world of the modernist scientific paradigm of singularity and dualism but also gives scientific credence to paradigms that support holistic frameworks and thus the connectivity of the cosmos. Some postmodernism currents thus deconstruct the modernist value system through holism which is influenced also by this new scientific paradigm of "disciplined inquiry, cybernetics and system science, the science of complexity, synthesis, expansionism, emergence, recursive causation" (Cheong 200:40). Where modernism became unified with the rational human being, postmodern currents of holism deconstructed any objective entity or boundary for a plurality of selves.

To come back to our point, while postmodernism rejects modernism the two are linked. They operate within the same subculture of individual self. Still in postmodernism, individuals encourage themselves to be perfect selves for their well being. Therefore 'the other' is the fully liberated self that has been ignored in modernity. The aim is to attain a cosmological community of fully self-contained individuals for well being thus postmodernism well being is also related to personal control. The universalization of reason became localized in individual authority (Cheong 200:71). Therefore, postmodernism never reconstructs a real 'other' even in its denial of universalized rational self. On the contrary, it produces a multiplicity of "selves." Even though modern ethics and postmodern ethics are established on different concepts, they have a common self-centric ethical paradigm. It is this self-centric paradigm which I use to demonstrate that both the reconstruction and deconstruction of the Enlightenment project so far discussed, is about the West itself. While there could be common ground in rejecting the modernist paradigm our authentic response to-and relationship with Enlightenment needs to come out of the lived space of the African horizon.
b. The Lived Space of Africa in the Modern Oikos.

The struggle for liberation is about a public life that was violently destroyed and the effects of which continue to shape a lived experience of the Africans up to this point in our history.

The Eurocentric Gestell experienced as occlusion and exclusion, is explicable in an “identitary logic” (Derrida) of the West which ultimately reduced Africans to a subhuman level. To begin with, Derrida (in Norval 1994:133) posits that the essence of racism is that it is Western in its provenance and final form, apartheid being the most racist of the racisms. It is common knowledge that Kant produced the most profound racial thoughts of the 18th century in spite of the place accorded him in the sanctum sanctorum of the traditions of Western philosophy. The spectre of Kant in the philosophy of Habermas, a basis for Everett’s theology of public is evident (Callinicos 1990:104-110). This is how Kant (Eze 1997:118) classified humans:

[ sic ] STEM GENUS: white brunette
First race, very blond (northern Europe), of damp and cold
Second race, Copper-Red (America), of dry cold.
Third race, Black (Senegambia), of dry heat.
Fourth race, Olive-Yellow (Indians) of dry heat.

The Western discourse of self, autonomous self, is rooted on this Kantian taxonomy of the human race. According to Kant, Africans, Chinese, or Eskimos lacked the capacity to develop character and were thus incapable of moral maturity because they lacked talent. The absence of this natural germ, Keim, in African people is indicative of the abysmal lack of talent, Anlage, in Africa. In training Africans, Kant said that corporal punishment was necessary and instructors had to use “a split bamboo cane instead of a whip” (Eze:116). This type of thinking—Kant’s influence in Euro-Christian ethics must have played a crucial role in the missionary conceptualization of Africans and blacks evident in the intricate trinity of colonialism, conquest and Christianity. Black Theology’s reflection on racism is thus about this very encounter between the white and black races.
Indeed, the encounter between the West and Africa is a tale of a "whipping with a split bamboo cane", aptly stated by Setiloane (1989:79):

That the African struggle [in South Africa] all the way from Nxele, Makana through Nongqawuze, the formation of the ANC which follows very close on the rise of the Ethiopianism in the Churches, Bullhoek, etc, is essentially a religious inspired struggle against the violent history of the encounter between Africa and the West.  

The encounter between black and white in South Africa was violent. This violence was rooted in racism as the indigenous people of South Africa were treated as savages and thus as lesser human beings. This is not a commentary on Habermas's or Everett's racial stance. The point is the implication for the inclusion of blacks as potential beneficiaries of the gains in a scheme that originally framed blacks as subhuman. In other words, it is not what the descendants and analysts of this Kantian racist scheme think and have come to know about blacks. Surely what positively comes out of our perusal of the scheme should encourage vistas of hope and dialogue. The point is the expression that blacks assigned this experience. It is the black profession of this experience that is at stake.

A summation of the sentiments above is that, in South Africa, black reflection focused on this violence albeit in different ways. Without maintaining an attitude of res ipsa loquitur (the facts speak for themselves), Black Theology of liberation as an apologia of Christian theology is aptly summed up by what Vuyani Ntintili (1996) suggests. He identifies three strands of development in South African Black Theology of liberation.

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6 The italics are mine.
7 Cf. The development of Black theology has been delineated in various ways. Cf. Mekoa, I. S. (1995: 40). He traces the First phase from the 1970's, the initiation of the Black Theological Project and personalities such as Basil Moore, Sabelo Ntwasa. The Second Phase he associates with the Institute for Contextual Theology and the publication by Mosala, I.J. & Thlagale, B (1986). The use of Marxist tools, economic violence and women's liberation come to the surface. Cf. Also Khabela, M.G. (1992:282ff.). He sees the divergence along, racial oppression as a tool and class or ideology. In terms of the use of or development of social analysis cf. also Cochran (1990:71). There is an important element in this whole question of delineating variants in this school of thought namely the convergence between Black Theology and African Theology. For this there are important works to which we can refer, Cf. Kretzschmar, L. (1986). She discusses Black Theology within broad themes of African Traditional religion, Black Consciousness and the gospel as the Gospel of liberation. Cf. also Cone, J.H & Wilmore, G.S. (eds.) 1979. There are dissertations that have been written which poignantly demonstrate the "soul mate" relationship between African Theology and Black Theology, cf. Maluleke, T.S. (1995); Njeza, M.M. (2000). Maluleke later
First, he identifies the Black Solidarity Strand; secondly the Black Solidarity-Materialist Strand and thirdly the non-Racialist Strand. According to this, the Black Solidarity Strand focused its conceptualisation of oppression on racism. It posited that racism has subjective and objective dimensions. The focus was on the socio-psychological dimension of racism.

The Black Solidarity-Materialist Strand accentuated class, race and gender analysis. The non-Racist Strand focused on apartheid. Niintili maintains that of all these strands, the non-Racial was the most popular. It focused on the legal dimension of apartheid (policy-making). Particularly through the Black Solidarity-Materialist Strand, the organic relatedness of oppression was demonstrated. From this then an integration and holistic approach of liberation was emphasised with an essential element of taking a preferential option for the poor. Molefe Tsele affirms this broadness and organic relatedness of this violent oppression in his *Theology of Mzabalazo* (1997:47). He says:

> The church of struggle which seeks the correlation of salvation and liberation in its life and teachings, will be characterised by an integration and uniting of multi-life dimensions, differentiations, and a permanent moment of the negative principle, i.e. the negatitivity of the cross.

This is the basis for my proposal of an African religio-political symbol of *ikhaya*. *Ikhaya* is intended as an integrative device for black publicity amidst the stream of violence that flowed from the first encounter between black and white in South Africa. Insights from Black theology of liberation constitute the basis for us to “deconstruct,” the *self-centric* self with its alleged gains for publicity.

We also need to recall that Christianity (Cochrane 1987; Mosala 1989; Villa Vicencio 1989) supported colonialism and the conquest of *ikhaya*. Colonialism was a racist expansion of the European market. Hegel recommended the generation of more wealth commented that these “siblings,” “distant cousins” “soul mates or antagonists,” need to redefine their conventional distinctions in the light of the emerging African Theologies, (1997). All of them reflect on the experience of the black masses in South Africa in their encounter with the whites.
from outside of Europe through the expansion of the European market as well as thorough colonialist expansion (Eze1997:9). Hegel, in addition to Hume and Kant, had declared the African as subhuman implying, that Africans lacked reason and by that very fact lacked moral ethical content. Marx was a conscious inheritor of the views propounded by Kant and Hegel with respect to the African people.

The Communist Manifesto, triumphantly celebrates the globalization of Europe and confirmed that what mattered was that European modernity was the real in contrast to the unreality of human existence in the non-European world (Serequeberhan 1997:143). The total exclusion of Africans in western development of the subculture of self and thus modernity should be seen in this light. It was a total negation of black Africans as human beings, which led to a view of Africa as a tabula rasa, non-historical, “virgin territory,” that could be salvaged only through the frame of the West.

The question that comes to mind therefore, is whether the African struggle is about the total rejection of the modernist “gains.” From the times of Nxele, Ethiopianism, nationalism, pan Africanism, Black Consciousness, United Democratic Front, the Mass Democratic movement, the Kairos Document and democracy, the interior negotiations of the Africans with modernity can be discerned. While there could be common ground for all of us (i.e. those who reconstruct modernity or deconstruct modernity [postmoderns] for example) in rejecting the major tenets of Enlightenment such as reason and the Cartesian Ego, our precedent for harnessing the gains of modernity is located in the interior struggles of ikhaya. In this struggle of ikhaya attempts to sift and save, accept and reject can be seen, (see the next chapter).

Such an intercourse can only be true if ikhaya, albeit dismembered, remains the playground without which Africans will have ground for expression and negotiation, not to mention their participation in public life. I therefore contend that the modern forms of life which are now viewed by some a fait accompli, in spite of the violent encounter between the two worlds of Africa and the West will misguide our quest for ikhaya. The massive production of goods, meteoric rise of technology, media culture etc. are viewed
mostly as accomplishments of modernity, often presented as demonstrating the resilience of modernity. This view is based on false assumptions.

Cochrane in his *Circles of Dignity* (1998) makes a plea for what he calls the "disenfranchised wisdom" of ordinary people. He argues that there are distinctions in techniques that are used to control the world. Some techniques of course will be better of than others. A machine gun, technically, is better than a spear. A better technique however, does not necessarily imply and should not be equated to the absence of technology where there are less developed techniques. A technical manipulation and control of the world does not constitute the sum total of wisdom, Cochrane insists. I think, however there is more than this to the problem.

Besides the fact that better techniques acquired by the West have been falsely presented as a "gift" to the technologically empty, continent of Africa at times, technological advancement is fallaciously equated to the West. The technological eminence of, *inter alia*, China, Japan, Korea, Denmark, Russia, Cuba, to mention but a few, is selectively overlooked. My point though is that these countries do not participate in the modern *oikos* with a false identity. They have not lost their unique cultural traits.

Our inspiration for public expression and profession of *ikhaya* is luminous in views such as the "subservient subversive" (Njeza) Black Theology of liberation as a refusal to become a carbon copy of the "gigantic" world of the West. Tiyo Soga, Mpambani Mzimba, Seth Mokitimi "The Brown Bomber,"8 and many others, were not "midget" imitators of the West.9 The use of Western tools in Black Theology even by the sharp critics of the West such as Mosala cannot be viewed as a continuation of the discourse of the Western paradigms of modernity. On the contrary, they signify the ability by the colonized to "colonise the colonizer".

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8 All are used symbolically here as they have albeit in different ways been "connected" to the West yet they symbolise equally a struggle that is waged against the West itself.

9 We could also use Scott's concept of "Public and Hidden transcripts" to argue the point, namely that the public transcript of an acceptance of western tools for example, does not tell all as there are hidden transcripts which must be unmasked. Often these hidden transcripts are subversive as they are rooted in a paradigm that undermines the West.
They harvest weapons that can be used for the liberation of the black masses as they operate at the frontier zones of intercourse between cultures. To the extent that this pervasive fallacy has been plunged into the centre stage of Western scholarship, it is so deep and old as seen in Plato's *Republic* "embezzled" by the West even though it was borrowed from Egyptian culture (Torkington 1996:98):

Plato's contemporaries mocked him, saying that he was not the inventor of his Republic, but that he had copied Egyptian institutions. He attached so much importance to the mockers that he attributed to the Egyptians the story of Athenians and the Atlantines to make them say that the Athenians had really lived under this regime at a certain moment in the past.

Aristotle's teacher, Eudoxus, studied in Egypt before he proceeded to Greece and so did Pythagoras and more others. The symbiosis of African philosophy and Greek philosophy discounts modernity (in terms of development and technological skill) as a Western Enlightenment or more precisely, a creation of one culture. In addition, the foregoing thoughts seal the connection between the *oikos* and thus the *politike koinonia* and *ikhaya*. While these claims are well known and accepted in scholarship, it is the celebration of the African heritage as part the global public life equal and less to none that is being professed here.

The struggle for liberation was and is a demand of technology (modernity) to move along under the aegis of basic African symbols and human values. Technology is of instrumental value and not intrinsic value, thus, it cannot be pursued for its own sake. This struggle is about the African ethos to impact on the distributive patterns in respect of economy resulting from the application of modern technology as a non-western monopoly. In other words it is not correct to assume that modern development implies cultural eradication and worse still, the eradication of African culture only.

There is no denying that in the development of the human being and society, the cultural factor cannot be ignored or denigrated. The reason is that any meaningful human development takes place in a cultural milieu and is in fact conditioned and influenced by it. The cultural milieu though it cannot be said to be a windowless monad and would have received or adopted a good
many elements from other cultures, must nevertheless stay self-identical or internally cohesive in its essentials for a reasonably long time for a meaningful and recognizable development to take place. This is in fact a necessary condition for the development of a human society in all its complexities. In the absence of this condition, development becomes distorted, uneven, and without sure foundations (Gyekye 1997:296)

In all, the point is that the search for the internal cohesion of the African cultural milieu should not be allowed invasion by foreign bodies. Inebriation with modernity should not be allowed to lead to the subversion or fragmentation of the African oikos. The costs of modernization should be negotiated always to the advantage of Africans and basic human needs. The most convincing manner of looking at this would be to come to terms with the manner in which Africans colonize their colonization, how they live as “modern beings under modernity.” Therefore, how the disfigured, violated African body survived and continues to survive, the African corpus delicti, itself (Praeg 1999)\(^\text{10}\) constitutes the emancipatory possibilities within the horizons of the disfigured body of Africa.

2.5. Conclusion

We have explored the use of the oikos model by Everett in public life. Everett combines covenant and republicanism to construct this model of federal republicanism. Publicity is present only through persuasion without which there is violence and, this is the essence of democracy. The pre-state concept of public implies this. To enhance publicity covenant should be a corrective of a contractual, partial oikos of modernity to retrieve the integral web of spheres summoned by the archaic memory of the oikos. So, in lucid terms, covenant symbolically represents the dimension of religious publicity which could not be solved by the modern West while at the same time religion is challenged to become commensurate with the tenets of publicity, i.e. open up, and be porous and abandon dyadic structures.

\(^{10}\) Cf Praeg, L.1999. He explains Delict as a branch of law that deals with the violation of right-defamation, unlawful competition. One of the points he makes is that the violated body of Africa, which has been left in a very bad place and itself so disfigured that it becomes undecidable to use as evidence, ["where the body is always out of reach"](258), remains "there even though the ripples of history will always disfigure its appearance."
The modernist paradigm produced a dualist view of reality or a binary perspective, which couched the delineation between public and private. *Oikos* challenges this duality and calls for a comprehensive, interconnected view of the cosmos. However, *oikos* must be denuded of its western garb. The *self* of the west which permeates internal attempts to remedy the Enlightenment project signified in communicative theory by Habermas and post modernism need appreciation as long as they give space for the lived horizon of the black masses to ascend the public stage.

The connection of *oikos* with the west as advanced by Everett is insightful with its challenge to the modern *Rechtsstaat*. The connection of the *oikos* to the African horizon is engulfed by a violent experience of Africans in their encounter with the West. Most importantly, this experience cannot be bridged by a modern democratic *Rechtsstaat* which in itself does not guarantee the liberation of black publicity. The quest for *ikhaya* is thus more than coping with system imperatives in advanced modern capitalization. It is more about the violence of such system imperatives to which the liberation of black expression and profession should be democratically confirmed.
CHAPTER 3

Imizi ayifani kufana iintango [iintlanti]¹

("Homes are not identical but with kraals")

3.1. Introduction

The core of this chapter is anchored on the arguments advanced in the previous chapter. The oikos model has shown us the affinity between the Greek politike koinonia, an archaic memory and symbol of nurturing an integral public life. While the oikos model is arguably a useful tool for publicity, ikhaya is chosen because it is much more compatible a tool with the African experience. In short, the idea is not to adapt the oikos model on the African context. We cannot though, relinquish formidable insights about this concept as discussed.

This chapter purports to present ikhaya as an African religio-political symbol in public life and takes into account the modern challenges of our society. It is a modest recasting of our public life in symbols that are endogenic to the experience of Africa and their struggle for a decent life and participation in public life. While my interest is focused less on the description than the conceptualisation of ikhaya, we shall nonetheless attempt to do both.

3.2. Ikhaya

Covenants and testaments are signatures to various agreements of our life in community (Oduyoye 1986:109). The signature is a symbol of acceptance of the terms of participation in a particular community. Prior to Westernization, Africans had several ways of ratifying covenants. In the case of the Akan for instance, when land was pledged the parties broke a rod in two to the transaction and each kept half of it. Lobola in South Africa is a well-known symbol of ratifying marriage between families.

¹ In Sesotho one can render this as Matlo ha a tshwane ho tshwana marako (dikgoro)
Social agreements could not take place without libations to the witness of the Supreme Being. Social agreements therefore have a religious perspective in the African worldview. It is not the variety of covenants that is particularly of interest here but, the cohesive role that they play:

Because we Africans have our roots in the same soil, drink from the same river or recognise the same divinity, a bond is created that one does not dream of breaking; it imposes a responsibility to each other that all endeavour to fulfil. Unity of life therefore is the cohesive principle in the African community. We human beings, with all created things, participate in life whose source is the one God (Oduyoye 1986:110).

In almost all ceremonies that are performed (marriage, initiation, funerals) the blood of an animal that is slaughtered is a covenantal symbol of this unity of a shared life and underscores the sacredness of covenants. These ceremonies are performed in ikhaya. For this reason I use ikhaya as an integrative symbol, of the unity of public. Through the concept of ikhaya, we can be able to establish the connection between African religion and polity. We are able, through ikhaya, to visualise the practical expression or religious beliefs, values and orientations of the African people that are pertinent for public life today.

### 3.2.1. Biblical Affinities of ikhaya

There is a conceptual link between ikhaya and bayith. From this perspective, ikhaya, as an idea, is essentially cosmological. It is a notion that looks at the nature and magnitude of forces of entropy that militate against the ever desired harmony of the cosmos in carving out home. Ikhaya like oikos, seeks to attain the harmony of the cosmos.

One of the most important aspects about covenant in the Old Testament is the tension between the Ten Commandments and the Covenant Code often described through the Hebrew words debarim [word] and mishpatim [code of law found in Exodus 21:1 – 22:17]. The tension much more clearly is about the difference between unconditional and conditional laws in the covenant between God and the people. The Decalogue is one of those laws which are
apodictic i.e. they cannot be broken. They cannot be disobeyed and this must be manifested and actualised in social agreements.

The Covenant Code on the other hand brings together a body of cultic, casuistic laws [mishpatim] and ethical precepts into a unity and is conditional. The social agreements of the Hebrews, expressed in the Covenant Code stood or fell on the basis of the Decalogue, debarim. The Decalogue could therefore be likened to the Constitution on which basis the precepts of codified law, casuistic and social agreements were adjudicated. The Decalogue was understood as God’s law.

In the New Testament, Jesus Christ brings about a new understanding of God’s law and the application. To love God and the neighbour as taught by Jesus becomes an epitome of the connection between God’s law and social relations. In Liberation theology circles this is expressed as the vertical and horizontal dimensions of God’s relationship with people. So, in this expression the “Word dwelt among us” in the New Testament, the word for dwelling is oikodomeo, and implies that the debarim is actualised in humanity, among the people to bring light in darkness (John 1). “The Word dwelt among us” refers to God’s incarnation in Jesus Christ thus God’s law does no longer descend from up there on Mount Sinai but becomes embodied in Jesus Christ.

The unconditional order (injunction or instruction)\(^2\) which derives from the debarim lucidly reaches its apex in the New Testament. The order is no longer directed from above, from the “mountain above.” Firstly, the monarchical control or sovereignty of the Word (Directive) is given all, Jews, Greek, women, slaves, through God’s incarnation in Jesus. This point we have sufficiently made as it is articulated well in Everett’s oikos. What I suggest we delineate as our second fundamental point is the presentation of the order [debarim] in the story of Creation.

\(^2\) One can read Decalogue for the word order, otherwise my use of “order” is meant to signify the intention of the Decalogue, namely, to bring order, while order itself could also connote instruction or injunction.
In the story of Creation, by his Word, God brings order and form to creation. Chaos is associated with the warfare god Marduk. Chaos, as it is implied in the Creation story is undermined through a good design of creation by God. Flowing from this covenant is about order in the cosmos i.e. in creation. It is about form or design vis-à-vis chaos.

The conditionality of social agreements or covenants, i.e. the social expression of the debarim is an exercise of orderliness and the harmony of the cosmos. If we take the image of the warfare god of chaos Marduk, God then subdues gods of disorder into orderliness and claims design and beauty (aesthetics) into his domain. Covenant in this respect is therefore indeed about order, harmony and beauty.

Up to this juncture it would be plausible to infer that Biblically, covenant is reminiscent of a theory of chaos.\(^3\) Incarnation implies the human agency conferred by God to harmonise, beautify and bring order to the cosmos. Hence humanity has been bestowed with dominion over creation, so we understand from our biblical (public) theology. The sentiments expressed by Everett regarding closed and rigid covenants explain in a different way the default in the harmony of the covenant design. Indeed, the extent to which the porosity of a covenant is defect, is the beacon of how much chaotic that covenant could be. While open covenants enhance open discourse and dialogue, closed covenants engender tyrannies and disharmony. Rites associated with covenanting signify openness of covenants, e.g. slitting open throats of animals, incisions made on human bodies.

Looking at the incarnation, Jesus being openly sacrificed on the cross, i.e. publically, the notion of Kenosis (God’s self-emptying in Jesus) is an antithesis to closedness of covenants. It is statement about chaos that is fraught with closed covenants. So if kenosis means self emptying, or pouring out of self, chaos is about self aggrandizement or pulling to self. Kenotic covenants are open covenants and chaotic covenants are closed ones from this perspective. A closed covenant is bad (kakos the Greek root for chaos), lacks beauty and harmony.

\(^3\) I have discussed the features of this theory in the previous chapter, as it is postulated in quantum physics and its articulation in social theory.
If the story of Creation is so linked with oikos and covenant in so far as it underlines harmony and open relations (a *kenotic* self) then, its implications for publicity are far reaching. For our purpose, we need to appreciate first and foremost that the unitive universe of the Old Testament and its African counterpart are about connectivity and harmony thereof. To demonstrate this point, the story of Cain and Abel in Mosala (1989) is a good illustration.

In the judgement pronounced against the bloody slaughter of a brother by another in the story of Abel and Cain, footage in the world is taken away. Worldliness is an important component of publicity in the *oikos* model. It is the stage, the ground on which the acts of publicity are performed. Human beings we should remember, are fugitives on earth who gain themselves a stay on this planet through building and thereby rooting themselves tightly to the ground. The judgement pronounced against Cain was that he would be a vagabond i.e. there would be no ground to root himself tightly, he would not be rooted tightly to the ground.4 By implication of this judgement, if one goes further, there was no ground for killing or violence, which featured in many instances where there was a collision of cultural values or world-views.

The paradox is that Canaanites were defending their land in this story. The indictment, if Mosala’s point is taken seriously, is against the Israelites, who, as representing a powerful culture or dominant group assumed that because they were a chosen nation they had to invade, and conquer. Whether the Israelites actually inhabited Canaan through conquest or assimilation, religious legitimation of exclusion in this part of their history is evident. Their covenant was closed! Furthermore, it is the outcome of the nature of the conflict between Cain and Abel upon which the judgement is made. This is what Nurnberger rightly castigates when he says that, whether in the bible or outside the bible, religious legitimation of interest and genocidal ambitions cannot be acceptable. It is the porosity of the boundaries of the Israelite covenant that is in question and not Canaan as most would assume in the story of Abel and Canaan.

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4 I am aware of Mosala’s (1989) account of the Story namely that Abel was an invader on Canaanite ground. The point here is not to dispute the fact of invasion by any means. What we need to underline is the fact that much as Canaanites were not entitled to violence in the clash of two distinct cultures of tilling the land and herding stock, Israelites who were liberated in Egypt were themselves equally not entitled to any forms of violence, there was no ground for that. It is the result of a lack of porosity (openness) in a covenant that is being explained. This is
It is not the intrinsically bad nature of Cain and intrinsically good nature of Abel but the genocidal, religious legitimation of exclusion that is in question. If oppression was bad for Abel, it could not be good for Cain.

A closed covenant ultimately loses its ground to galvanise trust and cohesion. To be legitimate, as the story above implies, only force and violence are resorted to. There is no common ground or common world thus there is no basis for legitimacy. Yet, itself legitimation is nurtured by the norms of freedom and responsibility, equality and dignity, justice and compassion, which are clearly absent in the story of Cain and Abel. Most importantly, the eradication of rootage or absence of legitimation means chaos. A chaotic self engenders violence.

This overall holistic view of covenant invokes an important trajectory in the Hebraic roots of *bayith* therefore, i.e. the dignity of the human being. It is within the very womb of chaos, the atrocious, ferocious excruciating forces of entropy that God declares that all human beings are created in his image. Exclusion and occlusion of the less powerful other, or imposition of solutions from a particular history other than dialogue, is a recipe for chaos. Tanner (1992:182) puts it succinctly:

> By definition, however, oppressive social relations do take away from such classes of persons their rights to free self-development (classes with little power). In varying manners and degrees, oppressive structures hem in the underclasses of society restricting their activities and choices for fulfilling employment and forcing them to stay in their place. Persons with little power in such societies may be actually coerced (as slaves). Or they may voluntarily submit to the curtailment of their activities under the simple threats of force (as colonised peoples). Without any such threat, they may simply find that they have no real option to do otherwise: they are workers too poor to own any means of production, immigrant labourers with no recourse, white women or men and women of colour who, though citizens, are thought unfit to hold any responsible positions of power. Such people may even consent themselves to a narrowing of avenues of their possible pursuits by internalising the prejudices against them or the fixed understandings of others about the roles for which they are fit. In the more extreme cases of oppression, the oppressed may lose any sense of themselves as responsible agents, becoming the mere

true about the South Africans if we follow this logic. While it is just to defend the loss of land due to invasion, closed covenants are violent and this can be on either sides of the conflict. Cf. Nurnberger (1999).
instruments of other’s purposes. But, in even the best cases, the oppressed lose their autonomy that is their right as creatures of God: what they are to be is ultimately determined for them without them.

The basis of the argument stated above is that Tanner believes that all human beings are created in the image of God. The creaturehood of humanity is the basis of respect regardless of physical, social or economic status. No particular qualities form the basis of respect other than the fact that all are created in God’s image. What is proper to all is that all are created in the image of God. Perceived within the framework of the Hebraic scheme of chaos as spelled out in the creation story, respect brings about harmony and concordant concatenation of the spheres of bayith. Indeed as we have said in the previous chapter about the oikos typologies, bayith is both spatial and relational. Respect is thus a human requirement for harmony in the created cosmos.

If I am correct so far, the story of Cain and Abel is about different cultures or ethnoi. Cain and Abel represent each a particular ethnos and ethos. Our comprehensive understanding of the story of creation upheld, Abel’s ethnocentric type is invasive and oppressive. It does not have respect for the ethos of the Cain type more than it is akin to closing it down. Cultures and worldviews must be viewed in their totality therefore. No single culture can count as the totality of the entire existence of the human race. The totality of culture points to an important phenomenon, that those who are in power influence the writing of history [historiography] which accords with their worldview, while the historical consciousness of the powerless is trampled underfoot (Wyman 1991:91-112). The method of writing history and the worldview cannot be separated. We should always bear this in mind for covenant in the Bible, creation and the harmony of the cosmos are rooted in history through the agency of humanity. Hence a widely accepted view namely that God is the Lord of history (the debarim lords over the mishpatim). The stage for God’s Lordship is the world.

Through the story of creation, we have deciphered important motifs of biblical covenant in addition to the fact that we employed the story to imply the commonality of the unitive universe between the African and Hebraic worldviews. From this common ground that we have established, we need to proceed to the nature of ikhaya.
3.3. Cosmology of Ikhaya

3.3.1. Omenala and Ikhaya

At biological death, all initiated Sotho-Tswana become "badimo." Babies are the gift of "badimo." Through childhood they grow until they are initiated as adults. At death they again change their state... As the immediate agents of Modimo [God], the function of Badimo is to ensure the good ordering of social relationships among the biologically living, and the fertility and well-being of men, their crops and stocks. In return they expect tirelo [service]. Their attitude to the living is basically, parental-protective, corrective and aimed at the welfare of the whole group, (Setiloane 1976:64).

It has long been disputed and convincingly so that, there is no such thing as secular and sacred compartments in the African worldview. The African position posits all aspects of life as spheres of divine activity in all its intensity. Of itself and in itself this unitive universe is most prized and can only be guarded by the ancestors. Ancestor veneration signifies a belief that the harmony that exists in a given community is not created by the community itself but, is given by God and the ancestors. This harmony, is designated omenala (Dyrness 1990:43). The pervasive character of the ancestors in every crucial event of the household, ikhaya, is prevalent up to this day. The ancestors, badimo or izinyanya, are the guardians and custodians of ikhaya. Hence Setiloane poignantly describes the notion of salvation as the maintenance of peace, order and happiness in the community. The disturber of such equanimity is an angel of darkness, a "witch".

Progress towards ancestorhood is a celebrated advancement to maturity. Factors, such as childlessness, celibacy and fearful diseases are cause for deep anxiety as they may distract one from attaining this status. Indeed the greatest fear of an African is to face the possibility of being cast away from the community of the living and the living-dead. Africans aspire to be ancestors. Through being ancestors they achieve personal "immortality," and self-perpetuation. As the human being wanders about the cosmos, the fear of death, darkness elicits this existential anxiety.
Different peoples, religions and cultures offer different solutions to this existential anxiety. The Western Christian Reformed tradition for instance offers the solution through the notion of faith alone, *Sola fide.* We will remember that one of the pioneers of the Reformed tradition, Martin Luther, became a sharp exponent of the doctrine *Sola Fide,* emerging out of an ethos which struck terror and despair in his soul. This is because of the fact that attempts to satisfy God in the era, prayers, fasting, vigils, good works, often left people with a disquieted conscience. This notion, existential anxiety, and how various traditions respond to this, reflects a constant worry about entropy and chaos which threaten the existence of the human race.

The Western emphasis of “faith alone” literally evolved into faith in the lonely solitary existence of an individual. Casanova (1989: 50) says that this inward turn of the religion toward the private individual for the sake of salvation is full of public paradoxes. He says that the temple of ancient polytheism was the Pantheon, a place where all known and even unknown gods were worshipped. On the contrary, the temple of modern polytheism is the mind of the individual: “my mind is my church.” To employ our *oikos* terminology, this has been decried as a beguiling cause of our fragmented modern society.

In the African worldview this is not tenable. No single individual human being can have faith or salvation alone. Life in the African setting is about the manageability and viability of existence amidst perturbing forces that affect the boundaries of the household of life. Kwenda (1999:11) puts it this way:

> The key is connectedness. The symbol is family. No one is allowed to be without either of these, not in life, not in death. Death marks the point where matters are decided. The management of death, as the management of life, therefore, becomes a critical function in African religion.⁵

⁵ In this article, Kwenda deals with the notion of redemption in African Traditional religion. He argues in this work that there are two types of ancestors/"ancestresses," the normances and the protances. Cults of affliction create ancestors out of otherwise disqualified candidates and are thus not normative (normances) but, are ancestors by protest/(protances). The quotation is however aimed at predicating the fact that such a struggle even
Connectedness with *ikhaya* is crucial for both the living and the living dead and manifests itself normatively and in protest. Ancestors wield a socio-jural authority in the maintenance of the decorum of the cosmos. The ancestors guard African morality and no “court” on earth can alter the situation.

Emerging out of this *omenala*, which is about the equanimity and harmony of the cosmos, there is a specific kind of spirituality. Kalilombe (1995:115) says that, Spirituality has been described as an expression of those attitudes and beliefs and practices, which animate people’s lives and help them to reach out toward the supersensible realities. Du Toit (1998:46) says that African spirituality has been expressed by black theologians as the experience of the Holy Spirit moving around to be life giving and life affirming. This spirituality is sung and danced, it is in rhythm and not in writing (Utuk 1995:121). The African worldview is negotiated and renegotiated with this type of spirituality with an emphasis of what it means to be human.

The communalistic character of the guardians of harmony, *omenala*, the fact that they want to belong, is nurtured by a spirituality that is life giving and life affirming. It is not self-centric. *Omenala* is collectively managed, each and every human being, living and the living dead, in the struggle against entropy and existential anxiety contributes primarily to this unitive cosmos of the African world view. Harmony is negotiated through *Ubuntu* to which we must now turn.

3.3.2. Ubuntu and *Ikhaya*

Botman (1998:99) says:

I want to suggest that the west might consider a small gift we in Africa could offer. It is the gift of *Ubuntu*. A term difficult to translate into occidental languages. But it is the essence of being human; it declares that my humanity is caught up and inextricably bound up in yours…I am because I belong.

in the abode of the living dead epitomises the importance of connectedness of *ikhaya* and thus belonging to *ikhaya*. The protances seek to belong; they protests against being without *ikhaya*. 

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The profound statement made by Botman is that humanity in the African worldview cannot be reduced to an "idea." The centre of the universe among Africans is the human being that cannot be defined outside the ambit of the community. The basis of being or existence is sustained *omenala*. One could say this sense of being is communal "anthropology" however, Mbiti’s designation is much more glamorous: "anthropocentric ontology," (Dyrenn 1990:49). It is a unity centred on humanity in such a manner that the destruction of humanity would in effect be tantamount to destroying the whole coherence of being, even the creator! Kwenda (1999:10) says this:

In spatial terms this could mean simply that the world of the living occupies the space that lies between the abode of the ancestors, those down below (abaphansi) [sic] according to (amaXhosa) and the Sky, the abode of the Deity. Or it could, metaphysically speaking, mean that the human beings are the centre of cosmic attention, thereby entitling them to differential consideration in the distribution of material as well as other resources.

This should be not understood in the pejorative sense of "dominating." African wisdom understands the centrality of the human being not as a master of the universes, but only the centre, the friend or beneficiary. A human being is not above nature in the sense of nature being sub-human; hence the totemic relationship of humans and nature. What this implies is that a human being can die but not the society.

The veneration of the ancestors, attitude to death, sin, sickness, forgiveness and health all converge at the centre of the community. Each and every creature is thus an agent either of life or death. The whole life or structure of the phenomenal world is characterised by this conflict. I am because we are, communalism and *Ubuntu* become two sides of the same coin. A unitive universe where the world is not viewed in dichotomic terms but rather as a harmony with visible and invisible dimensions of life renders human life as the supreme good, the *summum bonum* toward which morality is aimed. The person is highest and of intrinsic value in this scheme.
There are strong family ties in black African societies. Human dignity is communal dignity. A recent interpretation of the concept of *Ubuntu* will be of help. According to Mnyandu (1992), *Ubuntu* and *Ubulwane* could be contrasted as follows:6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>be hospitable</th>
<th>inhospitable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>feed the hungry,</td>
<td>not to feed the hungry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clothe the naked</td>
<td>not to clothe the naked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be obedient to those in authority</td>
<td>to be disobedient to destroy the property of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be Good</td>
<td>bad person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be Clean</td>
<td>to bewitch others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fear God</td>
<td>not fear God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share resources</td>
<td>to be self-centred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>care for the poor,</td>
<td>not caring for other’s needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comfort the bereaved</td>
<td>not to comfort the bereaved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What Mnyandu suggests around the question of *Ubuntu* is the whole notion of respect; *ukuhlonipha, hlompho, inhlonipho* which, according to him forms the basis of human existence. These values of *Ubuntu* which have been mentioned above, are vehicles of attaining a sound spirituality, which is inaccessible without *ukuhlonipha*, Myandu argues. *Isimilo* (character), is in essence an expression of moral conduct motivated from within *ukuhlonipha*. The concept of *ukuhlonipha* (respect and human dignity) generates a spirituality that recognises the personhood of all things in creation and a deep respect for nature and human beings.

To sum up, *ikhaya* houses a spirituality which in Setswana is captured in the saying: *Modidi ke moloi* (a poor person is a witch!). This type of spirituality is linked to the existential need of a people struggling to overcome oppression, poverty, exploitation and dehumanisation. It is a spirituality that resists anthropological pauperisation and fulfils the quest to live fully as human beings. The performance of public acts in a world that is unitive finds expression in relations that bound one in an extricable manner to another in the discourse of *Ubuntu*.

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6 This has been adapted from the work cited with some modifications.
3.3.3. The Nuances of Indlu, Umzi and Ikhaya

African families like those in other parts of the world, embody two contrasting bases for membership: consanguinity, which refers to kinship that is commonly assumed or presumed to be biologically based and rooted in the blood ties, and affinity which refers to kinship created by law and rooted in law. Conjugalism refers specifically to the affinal kinship created between the spouses (Mnayandu 1992:171)

This difference in the setting of the African home and the emphases on consanguinity is very important to grasp given the anthropocentric nature of African ontology. Fundamentally in the African setting ikhaya is a place of worship. It is the whole of the space that is occupied by the humans (physical and metaphysical) between the ancestors and the Supreme one called uQamata in isiXhosa. Ikhaya is holy, it is Heimat.

**Indlu** is specifically the physical space or structure. For example one can say a special hut in the homestead usually used for cooking or sleeping, is an indlu. It is thus a physical structure of ikhaya. The word indlu can also connote pedigree. It is often used to delineate members of the same ikhaya. We could say the house [ikhaya] of Abraham constituted: indlu enkulukulike the great house with Sarah and indlu encinci the small house with Haggar. To trace the lineage of the children Amakhosa would say one is the child of the great (first) house, indlu enkulululike the first house. This is essentially important, as traditionally there would be more than one wife in one ikhaya.

Especially in the royal family this is how children are often described mostly for purposes of heritage or succession to the throne. Of course this is not exclusive to the royal house only. One could with some measure of constraint say indlu is much more conjugal, is a physical kind of boundary that even separates family members, i.e. (abantu bekhaya).7

Usually, the fireplace called iziko divides indlu into two sections. To the right hand side of indlu is where women sit while males sit on the left. On the Women’s side of indlu is where labour, religious and other social rites needed for childbirth are performed.

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7 For some concise description of indlu, see Mdende, N. 1999. I am however indebted to the workshop materials and discussions that we had in Kayamandi.
The great hut, the *indlu enkulule*, becomes the seat of major religious rites where the clan assembles sometimes for days. In major ritual rites abstention from sex, arguments, noise or any altercations are forbidden. In the great hut we see a specific kind of decorum, a liturgy in reverence of the ancestors and God.

*Umzi*, on the other hand is in an *indlu* with a kraal, *ubuhlanti*. There is no umzi without the kraal, *ubuhlanti*. An *indlu* must graduate into umzi by establishing a kraal, *ubuhlanti*. The expression *Ukwakha umzi*, [to build a home] is firstly a graduation of *indlu* into a shrine. It evokes the process of physically building the structures and ultimately an abode for the “living dead” within the perimeters of these structures. The ancestors know, protect and hold it together. As I have indicated previously, *Ukwakha umzi* is about building *ikhaya* through participation in procreation as well. We can also add that it is to nurture and irrigate the faith of *ikhaya*, and surely the welfare, economics, politics, religion and survival of *ikhaya*. Because *umzi* involves all these processes, sometimes it is where *ikhaya* can also be used. *Ikhaya* however is an all encompassing term in my view, the navel of the world of *indlu* and *umzi*.

*Ikhaya* is sentimental; it is a sacramental construct. It is “an umbilical cord” of *umzi* and *indlu*. *Ubulhanti, Ithango* [the kraal] being the shrine of *ikhaya* is where members of *umzi* and the invited community congregate in cases of liturgical services such as marriage, initiation, etc. as alluded above. The term that is generally used to designate such liturgies is *umsebenzi*, which literally means service or work. The significance is that to work is a service to *ikhaya* and thus to the ancestors much as traditional rituals are performed in honour of the ancestors. It is in the kraal where the sacrificial animal is slaughtered, so the kraal is the altar. When there is such *umsebenzi* therefore, the family performs what they call *Isiko*.

The question of the relationship between *amasiko* [traditions] and *izithethe* [customs] is very complex. One Mr Majola came closer to clarifying the relationship between the two when he

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8 Incidentally, in the townships people use the term –work, a bastardisation of the English word work, to mean *umsebenzi*. *Tirelo* is the word for work in Setswana. And in Sesotho the word is *Mosebetsi*. When a person invites people they are called to *umsebenzi*, the service be it marriage, or any other form of liturgy. Any type of *umsebenzi* invokes the veneration of ancestors.
said that, "isiko liyaphilisa, isithethe senzwa ngabantu," i.e. tradition is life-giving and custom is human-made. When there is marriage, prayer for rain, harvest, initiation or imbeleko [a rite performed for a newly born child], the congregation asks for the blessings of life. Hence isiko, even though there might be some variants because of distinct family customs [izithethe] is essentially life-giving. Isiko emancipates, dispels darkness and brings blessings, protects, gives prosperity indeed, it is the source of life. Such services are accompanied with deep reverence, dignity and respect because the living beings are a congregation of living dead who are now present. It is in the kraal that they talk, contemplate or meditate in the presence of the ancestors.

The socio-economic importance of the kraal can be seen from this. The kraal being the main shrine of a family or social group, it is also a place of an "association between a social group and the dead ancestors group" (Kuckertz 1981:5). Cases and disputes and thus the politics of a clan have as their rendezvous the kraal. It is a place of social intercourse. The ancestors and the living exist as a group of kinsmen, the living constituting a congregation in honour of the living dead. Izinyanya (the ancestors) in isiXhosa signify the harmony which the society, community and umzi cannot create but a harmony that is conferred by God and through them (Izinyanya). Virtually, there is no ikhaya without Izinyanya. There is no ikhaya without a kraal; there is no community without umthonyama, umgquba [the dung carpet on the floor of the kraal].

This brings me to the economic significance of the kraal. We should remember that in the kraal are animals, the cattle. They are a source of material life and wealth. Where they stay, where they rest after long days of grazing in the pastures, they stay with the ancestors; they stay in the shrine and are looked after by the living dead. Virtually no aspect of life is excluded from the kraal; the economic, the political, nature and relationships are all nurtured if not held together in the kraal [ubuhlanti]. Religion, nature, politics, health, economy, the

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9 Majola (listener) 1999-06-01 in "Umahluko phakathi kwesiko nesithethe," (The Difference between Tradition and Custom) the debate hosted by Radio Mhlobo Wemene in a talk-show programme called "Twelve Down" which starts at 00H00-04H30. This view has also been advanced in a number of discussions that we had in our Kayamandi Group discussions. This view is much more acceptable to me.

10 These two words are often used figuratively in isiXhosa to denote Africans as children of umthonyama, children of umgquba (children of the dung carpet on the floor of the kraal.)
jury all are in a circular kraal. The architecture of amaXhosa does not have straight lines but circles. The huts are round, the kraal itself is round, their time is equally “round.” The circle always means sharing, equality and participation.

Hence the title of this chapter, houses are not the same but with their kraals. The kraal is an indispensable locus of a web of life giving activities in ikhaya. It is a prism of the ecclesiology of the African people mirrored in the African politike koinonia. The kraal is thus a seat of the politics of ikhaya and a window through which we can appreciate the polity of the African people. Most importantly, as intimated in the expression that I have used for this chapter, it is the material bond of all homes and by this very fact, an integrative symbol of the religio-political and social biosphere of African people. Umzi can mean town i.e. polis. Umzi can also mean country like in the musical piece, Mzi Wase Africa (The African Polis) composed by B.B. Myataza. Umzi is the African polis and ikhaya, the habitus of the African politike koinonia. The kraal, which is a seat of the harmony of ikhaya is a crucial symbol for the African web of economic, religious, political and personal relations.

3.4. The Topography of Ikhaya in Public life.

There was no time when ikhaya was not there in spite of the harsh, violent inflictions imposed upon it. This exuberant spirit in times of frontal attacks and attempts to extinguish ikhaya, is an experience from which we can discern a life giving spirit in public life.

3.4.1. Under the Shades of the Kraal

There is a word isithunzi[isiXhosa] or serithi [Sesotho] for a shade and these words have deep connotations. We may say a person has isithunzi or serithi to imply that he/she is dignified, respectable, bright or presentable. A person whose sethunzi is defect is said to have isinyama, meaning to be darkened, to be clouded with darkness. The word mnyama of which isinyama is derivative, means black. My choice of the word shade has these deeper meanings in mind. I use the word shade to connote the dignity, brightness that emanates from the kraal. The dark condition of African people in South Africa; the condition of a dignity that has come to
be defect, I call *isinyama*. From the point of view of my use of the symbol of the kraal, Black theology is about this condition namely, *isinyama* of black people. Black theology has always stated that blackness is also a condition, a psycho-social condition according to Black Consciousness which is more than skin colour (Maluleke 2000:47). *Isinyama* is an African term for this condition. Indeed the kraal is the place where the healing for *isinyama* takes place. *Isinyama* means an eclipse from the radiation of good life offered by the ancestors.

In *isiXhosa* a black person is called *umuntu omnyama* as a white person is called *umuntu omhluphe*. There is nothing pejorative about this. *Isinyama* is a power of darkness that befalls a person and that may include any colour of a person. *Isinyama* is about powers that instigate misfortunes, bad-luck or adversity in life. It is about bad conditions in the lives of people. This is an essence of Black theology; a reflection on the condition of *isinyama* on blacks thereby affecting all social relationships in South Africa. If there is anything pejorative about the colour of the black people, the word *isinyama* would be appropriate in expressing that condition of a defect dignity of the black people.

As a starting point I adopt and adapt the statement by Henry Okullu (Maluleke 1997:8) in the following manner:

...when we are looking for the *lived space of ikhaya* we should go first to the fields, to the village church, to Christian homes to listen to those spontaneously uttered prayers before people go to bed. We should go to the schools, to the frontiers where traditional religions meet with Christianity. We must listen to the throbbing drumbeats and the clapping of hands accompanying the impromptu singing in the independent churches...Everywhere in Africa things are happening. Christians are talking, singing, preaching, writing, arguing, praying, and discussing. Can it be that all this is an empty show? It is impossible. This then is the *lived space of ikhaya*.

In the previous section, I have underlined the importance of the kraal and what it symbolises. As an important component of *ikhaya*, the obstruction and destruction of *imizi* [homes] in the turbulent history of the African people did not penetrate into the kraal, at least not directly.

\[11\] Italics are mine.
At home in *ikhaya*, blacks behaved their natural ways. To grasp this point we need to recognize that this work views the missionary enterprise in South Africa as a public liturgy of the western world as encountered by blacks. In the dichotomy of private-public, brought about by the missionary enterprise, some elements of religion were relegated into the private sphere. Reason as a central motif of religion, pushed other aspects of faith to the “private.” Publicity, viewed from the point of view of this encounter between black and white worlds thus reduced human beings into abstraction because only what was viewed to be rational entered the public realm. The jagged rationality of public life excluded fundamental religious beliefs, elevating reason only as the medium and arbiter of public profession. Blacks were viewed as pagans with no religious roots, who deserved no land. The profession of their fundamental beliefs suffered a double decimation.

First they experienced deprivation on the generic grounds of a presumed irrationality of their religious beliefs in public life. What was deemed irrational could only be enjoyed in the realm of the private home. This prevented religious intercourse between the colonial *oikos* and *ikhaya*. Second blacks suffered from the rigidity of a closed public along colour lines open to them only if they were to cease to be black and accept what the master *oikos* could offer them. The master *oikos* “closed down” their world, their stage of public performance, i.e. the land was taken away from them. Their participation in public life that knew only one language, colour, reason, was summarily effaced.

The frontal attacks waged on African values assumed a public space defined and dominated by the West. The violence inflicted upon the Africans “strategically” missed out the terrain of home, *ikhaya*, and presumptuously focused on publicity, which excluded the “private” home. The praxis of *ikhaya* thus went underground and became clandestine. Scott’s (1985, 1990) concept of hidden and public transcripts is testimony to this. According to Maluleke (2000:55)

Scott casts doubt over the suggestion that subordinates can be thoroughly incorporated into the hegemonic scheme of things through the cultivation and acceptance of false consciousness. For Scott, there is a different, creative, empirical and more reliable way of understanding the relationship between domination and resistance. A careful study of the arts of resistance among subordinate groups will
ensure that we are not reduced to waiting for open social protest to lift a veil of consent and quiescence. A view of politics focused either on what may be command performances of consent or open rebellion represents a far too narrow concept of political life—especially under conditions of tyranny or near-tyranny in which much of the world lives.

This is what I have in mind when I say that the West did not touch the root paradigm of *ikhaya*. When Africans were finally defeated, they only had the kraal left for their shade, yet the kraal is a governing symbol of their lives. Hence I locate that root paradigm of black Africans in *ikhaya*, home under the shades of the kraal.

African experience has been lived and continues to be lived in the shades of the kraal, *ubuhlanti*. In this work then the kraal is perceived as reality *sui generis*. I see the kraal, *ubuhlanti* as a symbol which does not only express the feelings, values and hopes of the African people but, the locus of such values even today. I see the symbol of *ubuhlanti* [kraal] as a seat of organising and regulating the flow of interaction and social activity in all spheres of the history of the African people in South Africa.

For instance, people who stay in urban centres still refuse to call them *ikhaya*. The reason for this, among others, is that in the absence of *ubuhlanti*, [the kraal], there is no qualifying factor for their residences at most “squatters camps” or townships and hostels to be called *ikhaya*. Nelson Mandela retreated to *ikhaya* after his release from prison and his retirement from office. Thabo Mbeki, just before elections, went to *ekhaya* after many years of exile and estrangement from *ikhaya*. The present President of the South African Council of Churches and the Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church in Southern Africa, Mvume Dandala is no exception. After he was elected into the office of Presiding Bishop, he went home to Mount Ayliff to “celebrate” the success and honour bestowed on him. While these important figures in our political religious landscape in South Africa are mentioned to demonstrate that they are not exceptions to the rule, there is a deeper symbolic meaning for this.

We need to tackle the obvious one first, namely, the religious symbolism involved in the practice of going to *ikhaya*. The blessings and wisdom, strength and life can only be received *ekhaya* (in *ikhaya*) where there is a kraal, *ubuhlanti*. 
In the kraal, there we find the abode of the guardians of harmony and life-giving spirit of *ubuntu*. The practice of retreating to home, *ikhaya* is a religious pilgrimage to the seat of omenala and, ipso facto, the blessings of life. This is a lived reality, a religious praxis of *ikhaya*. I cannot but echo these sentiments, “The African struggle all the way from Nxele, Makanda, through Nongqwuzu, the formation of the ANC which follows very closely on the rise of Ethiopianism in the Churches, Bullhoek, etc, is essentially a religiously inspired struggle” (Setiloane 1988:79).

This struggle is correctly fashioned as the struggle of the gods by Khabela (1997) in his analysis of Tiyo Soga’s life, the first black minister to be ordained in South Africa. De Wet (1994:147) says that *ukwakha umzi* [to build home] among *aMabomvana* [the red blanketed] who are also designated as *Amaqaba*, [those who smear ochre], succeeded in weaving into a single coherent system of ideas two distinctly different sets of imperatives. He says this rightly so because *ukwakha umzi* is a religious practice of building up *umzi* and reproducing the homestead relations of production.

Males, he contends, had to endure the erosive hardships of the migrant labour system for the sake of *ikhaya*. The city experience, he goes on, was symbolically interpreted as a rite of passage. Only “men” were meant for the limbo of city life. It is only when they were initiated into manhood that they ventured into the rigour and sordid life of the city to build *amakhaya* [homes]. They had to be commissioned from *ubuhlanti*, so *ubuhlanti* remained, hence *Imizi ayifani ifana ngenitanti!* [homes are not identical save with their kraals].

*ikhaya* is therefore not abstract, it is a public religious symbol entertained in the media as well. Radio *Umhlobo Wenene* hosts a programme which is religiously “intoned” called “*Khumbula ikhaya,*” meaning “remember your home.”12 Those who break the umbilical cord between town and rural home are sick, they are called *amatshipa*.13 It should by now be acceptable that the trademark of a black African traditional home is stability amidst torrents of

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12 In this programme, people call and shout, implore, beseech those who left home and usually it is in the rural areas. The tenor of the programme is that cities are not home, people must go home, *emakhaya* not necessarily to stay there but to receive blessings.
tempestuous attacks. Such a trademark is discernible in the religious struggle and symbol of
ikhaya, ubuhlanti. The "homeward" excursions by such figures as Dandala, Mandela and
Mbeki mentioned above symbolically represents this trademark.

What is Mandela and Mbeki’s trademark? It is certainly political. Talking about Mandela,
we often hear phrases such as “the symbol of unity,” “the symbol of reconciliation,” “the
world renowned political figure” and so on. Surely Mandela is a legend, a magnanimous
figure. Mandela and Mbeki are cited however as examples of political symbols that are
"shaded" by the kraal, ubuhlanti. Both of these men would not ascend to the highest office of
the country without being commissioned from the kraal, ubuhlanti. What they symbolised
without question was that the values of the kraal cannot be divorced from public life. Their
public role is shaded by the values of ubuhlanti. Indeed this is where all homes or publics
come to converge, in ubuhlanti.

Ubuhlanti is a platform of political discourses. The shape of the kraal is round. Its
significance is that power must be shared. Equality and power sharing is therefore
symbolised by the kraal itself as participants of umzi or ikhaya engage in political discourse.
The maximisation of participation is demonstrated by the shape of the kraal, a reminder to the
participants about the values that should flow out of this platform.

The ancestors guard these political discourses. They “hear” and “see” what is going on and
ascertain harmony, which cannot be achieved without them. At the same place where issues
of publicity are attended to, the dung of the cattle reminds the participants about the economic
and ecological matters that affect the community. Prayers and supplications are also offered
here. Let me say, in ubuhlanti at the seat of ubuntu, a life giving spirit of humanity and thus
the politike koinonia is found.

The symbolic significance of Mandela’s, Mbeki’s and Dandala’s commission from the kraal
into publicity is a “traffic” in which all homes, and ipso facto persons in Africa travel daily.

13 Pronounced “amachipa” this is one word that I find difficult to translate. The connotation is of a person who
casts himself/herself out of ikhaya. Vagabond could be employed as it signifies a person who has lost rootage.
By this I mean that the inspiration and power to face the challenges of publicity derives from the kraal for every ordinary African citizen as it is symbolised in the great figures cited above. The traffic from the kraal into public life is a daily experience. The values associated with *ubuhlanti* are a driving force in the lives of ordinary people who go to work, struggle for their housing and health and the upbringing of their children.

If publicity is at the heart of human existence then I venture to say that publicity is "kraalonized" and the kraal is publicised at the same time. There is a traffic between the kraal and the public. The challenges of publicity permeate into the kraal much as the values of the kraal are shaded in public life itself. For example, when we glance at the responses of the ancestors of the African struggle as individuals or collectively, the Ethiopian movement, African Nationalism, Pan Africanism and Black Consciousness we can discern the orbit path from the kraal to publicity, outside and into the kraal again. At certain instances the kraal is eclipsed while in some it is luminous. Let me explain this metaphor.

In the old debate between African and Black Theologies we can grasp this problem. African Theology saw Black Theology as being centred on Western paradigms. Black Theology on the other hand charged that African Theology without reflecting on issues of liberation and racism was not adequately dealing with the experience of the African. The modern challenges of the problem had to be tackled as well. The permeation of the public political agenda into the kraal could not be evaded. There could be no pretence that the values of the kraal were not tainted. Focus on the political agenda seemed to eclipse the kraal (African traditional values). The kraal was invaded! This however happened for strategic reasons. The review of the countenance of "half a century of African theologies" by Maluleke (1997:16) aptly paints this picture:

As with the Bible and African Culture, socio-economic and political issues have been on the agenda of African theology, especially what have been termed the African theology of liberation and South African Black theology. The conventional distinctions of 'Black' from 'African' theologies as "siblings," "distant cousins," "old guard," or "new guard," "soul mates or antagonists," theologies of "inculturation and liberation" are no longer adequate. They do not sufficiently account for either the supposed similarities or difference between the various dynamic and emerging strands of African
theologies. With the changing ideological map of the world and the sweeping changes on the African continent itself, the agendas of what has been termed “African theologies of inculturation” as opposed to “African theologies of liberation” plus South African Black theology are moving closer together. Having been cautious to speak about ‘African’ culture due probably to the apartheid state’s manipulation of African culture into the Bantustan system-South African black theologians are now beginning to speak more freely about culture. This is illustrated by the increasing references being made to the concept of ubuntu (African personhood) in numerous South African intellectual debates.

The consensus is that these theologies are like clans with izithethe [“customary practices”] that are different connected together by one an only one thing, Isiko [tradition], which is life giving.14 The life of black people was at stake and this was the measuring rod of the contributions that needed to be made after all the value of the kraal is about life albeit eclipsed in the charge against Black theology.

Equally important is that the eclipse of African values from the public stage does not mean that African Christians totally repudiated African values.15 The proliferation of African forms and styles of worship in settler churches indicates this. The root paradigm of the kraal could only be eclipsed but not eradicated. Scott’s notion of “public” and “hidden” transcripts is an indication of this fact. Yet Africans did not reject for example Christianity but the missionary nor have they rejected better techniques associated with colonisation but the coloniser himself. Counter assimilation is a complex process. To revert to my metaphor, not everything that goes into kraal is necessarily rejected. However when that which is not rejected goes out i.e. (ejected) projected from the kraal it will be toned with the values of the kraal. This is what I mean by “kraalonization.”

14 Remember that I have said the distinction (albeit not rigid) between izithethe and Amasiko is that the latter is life giving. The variants of Amasiko are called izithethe expressing the location, clan or tribal differences. Without Amasiko, there is no life. I use this image therefore to club together differences in African theologies as izithethe of the Isiko (tradition) of African struggle which has been about life namely living under the omnipresence of death caused by oppression, colonization apartheid etc. The kraal is a symbol of this struggle for life.

15 In a different way I have argued this point in the previous chapter in the section that deals with modernity. The use of tools from other cultures to liberate blacks cannot be viewed as being contradictory to their liberation for as long as the inspiration to harness such tools is from within, the point that I am making. Hence the use of the term “eclipse” to signify that at face value the values of the kraal seem not to be there.
I mean the negotiations of publicity and the kraal as viewed from the internal perspective of the kraal (the shades of *ubuhlanti*). Such public negotiations are "cooked" in the kraal, *ubuhlanti*.\(^{16}\)

The kraal is a governing symbol of this lived permanence of the struggle. This struggle is experienced in many ways and resisted in many ways aggregated in the symbol of the kraal. In South Africa, black African people are squatters in the land of their birth. The notion of *ikhaya* is thus a lived reality and is experienced politically too. It is out of this reality of the lived space of *ikhaya* that we should look for a high degree of decision and collective conscience which could not be destroyed by wars of colonization and conquest, Christianity, and the repressive regimes of Apartheid, whatever their immeasurable damage. *Ubuhlanti*, (*kgoro in Sesotho*) or the kraal, is the symbol and the heart of the collective spirit for black people to undermine systems, machines and weapons to decide about their own lives. The struggle is ever *kraalized*, the social actions of the African people orbit around the kraal. This will have implications for appreciating the intercourse between African polity and western polity, African Christianity and Western Christianity, etc.

The "burning fires" and "boiling pots" in the kraal sift and filter "harmful" ingredients. In the practices of kraal, there is a signal for the acceptable comportment of the ritual and offering to the ancestors. If it is a goat, which is mostly used in many rituals, it must scream before it is slaughtered, so must a bull bellow if it is sacrificed.\(^{17}\) Mosala's advice for us to be concerned about the "silences that are eloquently speaking" in our public life today could imply that the offering is not welcome. Entry into the kraal is mostly not prohibited with hostility, strangers are welcome, however, impropriety, imprecision and ambiguity are guarded. There are ideological and ethical terms, which are acceptable to *ikhaya*.

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\(^{16}\) The image that I have in mind is that of a boiling pot in *ubuhlanti*. The ingredients of the pot that is put on fire inside the kraal usually follow the requirements of the type of ritual that is being performed. For example, if it is a goat that has been slaughtered for a specific ritual, it is prepared i.e. cooked according to specific guidelines.

\(^{17}\) In every occasion when there is a ritual offering, an animal mostly, a goat must scream. This is followed by shouts of joy, ululation and praises with the expression *Icamagcv livumile* meaning the acceptance of the occasion to the ancestors. Should the animal not scream or below if it is a bull that ritual is discontinued. This still happens even today. The expression in *isiXhosa Xa ingakhali tsekelele* meaning when it does not scream or bellow it is given up comes from this. For ordinary use this expression means "giving up." Not everything that comes to the kraal is acceptable so, not every ideology is acceptable, the test is in the kraal.
The kraal is a symbol of ideological contestations and the black African struggle in South Africa. It is the space or terrain that I deem to have survived under the shade of ubuhlanti. The shade of the kraal is a condition, a material, spiritual, socio-political and culturally lived space.

This condition finds expression in one of the important values that go along with the symbol of the kraal, the notion of poverty. In Setswana they say, *modidi ke moloi*, a saying which I literally translate as “a poor person is a witch.” The common interpretation though is that bad treatment of the poor calls upon bad luck and misfortunes such as caused by witchcraft. This means that poverty demands sound ethical responses. The presence of poverty is as haunting and intimidating a fact as witchcraft is to the community. Poverty disturbs the equanimity and harmony of the existence of a community.

When one looks at the lives of black people in townships, there *isinyama* of the black experience becomes a shocking reality. Black life is bewitched and so is our country. Terms such as *ityotyombe, mukhukhu, amabobosi,* (used for squatter camps) are hard to translate. They however carry deep connotations of an antithesis to *ikhaya,* “home sweet home.” Usually trapped in sordid conditions of squalor, these names in themselves are a refusal, resistance and rejection of an imposed condition of poverty and landlessness. They signify a deprivation to dwell on, (oikodomeo) and thus to be rooted tightly to the ground. It is this pronounced condition of wanderers in their own land that is shaded by the symbol of the kraal. Our public square is bound in our public squatter camps. *Amatyotyombe, amabobosi, mekhukhu,* are the rituals and offerings of colonisation, apartheid.

This is what I gather from the religio-political symbol of *ikhaya,* a struggle from the kraal to resist a sordid squalor of public life. It is about space, ecological relationships, time and the material conditions of the African people. It shapes their struggle, it is the seat of their struggle. The ritual offerings of colonisation and apartheid namely, their ideological temples and shrines are rejected in the kraal.
3.4.2 The Shades of *Ubuhlanti* in Modernity\(^\text{18}\)

Credo Mutwa (Boon: 1996) argues that a blend of cross cultural attitudes, philosophies and behaviour unique to Africa is necessary. According to him, today’s Southern Africa needs many lamps to be lighted to prevent the night from once more reclaiming our land. These lights must take many forms- actions done, structures built, books written and so forth. Significantly and much more telling is an initiative by the World Council of Churches called *Oikoscredit*. This project states in its mission statement, “In today’s world, the chances for a dignified and sustainable existence are unfairly distributed. *Oikoscredit* was created to build bridges between the rich and the poor, by making credit accessible to the disadvantaged of this world” (Challenge, November 2000:6). *Oikos* is significant here and applied to deal with a particular context as one of the many lights needed to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich. My discussion of *ubuhlanti* and modernity recognises this vital point lest the “shade” of the kraal becomes “night.” Africa cannot afford to “slumber” in the shades of the kraal. Kraalonization is an activity, traffic and not a sleep under the shades of *ubuhlanti*.

Martin Prozesky in the *Sunday Times* of 11 July 1999, in a short article called *Morality of the people, by the people, for the people*, is certainly suspicious about the ethic of common good that is informed by religion. He argues that future does not hold for such a framework of morality in a democratic context as "it treats adult people as moral adolescents." While Prozesky understandably takes issue with religiously legitimated notions of the common good, for Africans in their unitive view of the world, the dichotomy of the sacred and secular is foreign. In addition, the apparent individualistic purview of common good in his argument should attract our concern. Let us examine the notion of common good and its implications for *ikhaya* in a democratic environment. The statement above raises questions about our understanding of personhood or at least an African anthropology that is communitarian. Prozesky is suspicious of the community “owned” morality, which impinges or infringes on the autonomy of an individual hence, “moral adolescents.”

\(^{18}\) This section must be read as a continuation of the debate that I raised in the previous chapter. While I dismissed internal amendments of the Enlightenment project as the basis for a construction of an African religio-political symbol, in this section I attempt to demonstrate that *ikhaya* is challenged by publicity and needs to realign to avoid “sleeping” or “slumbering” *ad infinitum.*

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We have previously commended interior attempts to deconstruct the understanding of self in modernity. We have also seen that there are limits to those attempts in so far as they can give content for the expression of a black African in public life given the history of the encounter between black and white. Similarly, there are varying currents about notions such as democracy, common good, justice, etc. in the west. In varying degrees, discourses on these notions have been about the west. Furthermore, South Africa has been mostly influenced by the Reformed Tradition in the bitter history of the encounter between the west and black Africa amidst varying traditions and discourses of religion in the West. In this section, a philosophical rather than a historical argument on the polysemic notions of common good, democracy and justice at least is attempted.

Going along with the concept of *Ubuntu* is an expression found in most of the African languages I know: *Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*[isiZulu]; *Motho ke motho ka batho*, [Sesotho]; meaning I am because we are. Stemming from the unitive universe of *ikhaya*, communitarian social structures among black Africans is a known experience to this day in South Africa. Often, and correctly so, individualism is discounted on the basis that Western anthropology concedes ontological primacy to an individual self, which is not the case in the African worldview. On the contrary, ontological primacy is given to the community.

In this respect, we cannot view community as an association of some kind where people make a choice to belong. For example this is one of the fundamental tenets of *oikos* as supported by Everett. He opts for a religion that is associational as a form that is compatible with the demands and challenges of democracy. As I have tried to show in the previous chapter, this is a weakness (from the point of view of Africa) of republicanism as advanced by Everett at least. While it is communitarian in orientation, it grants ontological primacy to the individual self hence it fails to adequately address the problem of the Cartesian Ego. Our concern is thus not the Cartesian Ego *per se*, (whose denunciation I fully accept and applaud). It is rather the self centric ontological basis of that ego we belabour in the section.
For example, while Everett uses a notion such as pre-state public which inevitably grants public ontological primacy to differentiation, his anthropology is based on an ontological primacy of an individual self in my view.\(^19\)

The word, which I have employed above namely *ukutshipa*, is an antithesis to the perversities of individualism and as I have indicated, it scorns any inclination to disowning oneself from communal belonging and by implication from *ikhaya*. In essence individualism is anti-rootage, it is a negation for grounded-ness. Expressed in other terms, it is all reason for fragmentation, an adversary of political legitimation.

Prozesky’s statement above evokes the notion of a common good. The common good however is not a sifting of individual choices and a selection of the best out of that process. It is not the dividend of choices as made by individuals or a product of bargaining from a host of goods. Certainly, if ontological precedence is accorded an individual, the choice of an individual will at most be viewed as sacred hence putting all individual choices on an equal pedestal. However my understanding is that common good is what is good for all preceding and over above the choices made by those who inhabit the temples of the individual self. Common good is a way, a *hodos*. Granted, a person’s wellbeing may be tied up with the existence of social relationships at many different levels, some of which extend beyond his/her proximate community.

Nonetheless a good that is common to all is not the lowest common denominator of our relationships or a substitute of commonly shared views. This good that is common is about life, about a person, (*umuntu [isiXhosa], motto [Sesotho] onipa [Akan]*) not an individual self or self riddled in abstractions. *Umbuntu* means this, namely, a way of being human of becoming a person, is our common good. It is the personhood of all things in creation. I will return to this shortly.

\(^{19}\) This is the argument that we have already noted in the previous chapter. While self is not conflated with ego, self is preceded by community in my view.
Africans do not choose to belong. One does not belong to an “association” of clans or tribes and so on. The birth rite called *imbeleko* essentially roots the child into a clan *ipso facto* into the hands of the ancestors, the guardians of the harmony and equanimity of life. Belonging deeply means belonging to the living and the living dead. Up to this day this practice is common and the most important among the African people of this country without which it is believed that one’s life becomes literally, chaotic. When *imbeleko* is not performed, the manifestations of this chaos take the form of a host of illnesses such as nervous breakdown, lack of success in work, misfortunes, barrenness or infertility, the list is endless.

There is a close connection between the verdict passed in the story of Cain and Abel and the concept *ukutshipa*. The most feared punishment in the communities of *AmaXhosa* is what is known as *ukuhlanywa*. It is when a clan severs a person’s roots, almost the same as being declared a vagabond. Members of the clan assemble in the kraal and the perpetrator is ritualistically declared washed out of the clan. This is more than capital punishment and is extremely rare. It is only when an individual has been washed out that we can understand him or her as *self*, at least in African terms. This is unthinkable; it is unbelievable [ke kgakgamatso (Mosala)]. Associated with *imbeleko* is the falling off of the umbilical cord (*inkaba*). When the *inkaba* of a baby falls, it is not thrown away, rather, it is dug into the ground. When you ask a person “where is your *inkaba*,” you actually ask where they are verily rooted, and that, is *ikhaya*, home. To be uprooted, to be declared a vagabond, is like digging *inkaba* out of the ground and throwing it away to be blown by the wind helplessly. So a human being cannot be a solitary self. Such a view does not make ontological sense in Africa.

We can examine this by further looking at the notion of association, key for our understanding of democracy. First is the ontological precedence that is accorded an individual self. This implies an ontological primacy of choice to associate by an individual. In addition, this becomes the basis for the assumption that there should be a choice between association and community. Obviously this stems out of an Enlightenment ethos of singularity and dualism. While I fully agree that an associational ecclesiology is most compatible with an egalitarian
oikos, therefore democracy, I cannot nonetheless, subscribe to an exaggerated view of association. The hazards of that view are manifested in the Cartesian Ego. I have stated previously that umuntu uyiNkosi ukuzazi ("One is one’s own monarch to know oneself") meaning that self-understanding is attained when a person is accorded a monarchical status.” This statement is an acknowledgement of the freedom of an individual person to make choices and thus to associate. This sentiment qualifies relationship and thus responses made by an individual person. While an individual person cannot be without a community, the choice to relate is an individual’s way of life, the manner of his or her association. Association thus becomes a means to an end. That space for an individual is available in the values of ikhaya. Initiation has this symbolic value. It is meant to prepare, confirm and affirm individual participation in publicity.

Surely the value of association in democracy cannot be the reason for a fragmented egalitarian oikos as we have seen in the previous chapter. In other words it is not correct to equate individual liberty with an egalitarian oikos. Of course an egalitarian oikos dictates a type of personality that will give expression to equality, freedom and liberty. Such a personality is not an individual self. In vivid terms it is a misconception to assume that the value of association important as it is, is equal to democracy and equality. I have indicated that there are certain normative values that do not depend on democracy in order to be fulfilled. Similarly such normative values will not depend on association or choice thereof even though this is important. Democracy is not egalitarian because it is proper to that which is proper to an individual self. It is egalitarian if it is proper to the common good of all and the personhood of all things in creation. Hence the ethic of Ubuntu in ikhaya is undisputedly egalitarian.

It is equally false to view ikhaya as bereft of association. There are associations in the values of ikhaya called imibutho, in Sesotho mekhatlo (associations or guilds). We see a lot of them in townships and rural areas today. I therefore believe that ikhaya is the springboard of association. One can only choose if there is a home and basis for choice. After all, association itself is not an antithesis to belonging (rootage) but a means to it. All proto publics belong to one oikos, that is the point I am making. Community is the basis of
publicity. A person is born naked into a home (ikhaya) and there acquires nurturing to perform in public so as to be confirmed by the public. Be that as it may, I do not for one moment suggest that there have not been any internal problems with regards to the tension between community and publicity in ikhaya. While I have disputed the over-exaggeration of individualistic association as a criterion for an egalitarian ikhaya, equally, an over-exaggeration of communality is an aberration. To illustrate the point, the agonic African womanist discourses point to the ramified patriarchal tyrannies associated with African communal culture. Over emphasis of rigid communitarian views have made an African black woman to appear to be an object owned by the community. Often this has made Africans to turn a blind eye to the agony of the “daughters of Anowa” (Oduyoye 1995).

Yet the oppression of women in ikhaya cannot be necessarily justified on the basis of the values of ikhaya. The venerable name inkosikazi (woman) is a paradox. The word inkosikazi is taken from inkosi (monarch). Inkosikazi is a feminine gender for a monarch. This has been actualised in history where African matrilineal communities exist, such as the one from which Oduyoye herself originates. In South Africa such a symbol is found in the Balobedu tribe which has a female monarch to this day, Queen Modjadji. We cannot even stop there in exposing these paradoxes. Women are also allowed in the kraals of their homes while they are excluded as wives in the kraals of their spouses’ homes. This paradox serves as a strong point in favour of the kraal as an all-embracing symbol and gender sensitive heuristic design in contemporary Africa. Traditional healers who are mostly trusted in African contemporary society are mostly women. This is by no means a denial of the prevalent chauvinistic tendencies, which have fashioned African women’s plight as a double experience of oppression.

The solution however is not the solitary wilderness of individualism, which came to Africa as a male dominated tyranny. While we need to concede the fact that community precedes an individual and that the creation of social values is a function of the community which frames relationships nonetheless, not all relationships are essential for personal development. Some relationships are positively harmful to the development of a person. Such relationships are
closed, i.e. they lack porosity and are manifested in domination, humiliation, discrimination and marginalization. The oppression of women is such an example.

Gyekye (1997:39-49) challenges African scholars or philosophers who have radicalised the communitarian values to the exclusion or occlusion of individual personal development. He advocates for what he calls a moderate communitarianism. I take my cue from his argument and prefer to use the word “unrestricted” to “moderate” communitarianism\(^\text{20}\). I am saying this because I do not see communitarianism as restricting personal efficacy. I thus attempt to describe the idea of unrestricted communitarianism. Viewed from within, the eclipse (inhibiting factors) of what I would like to call personal efficacy could be accounted for in many ways. However this is not intrinsic to the African view of the person not even by the symbolic ideals of the kraal.

In Sesotho there is a saying, moketa ho tsoswa o itekang\(^\text{21}\) which means one is helped when one takes an initiative in helping oneself. Charisma is recognised, ancestor beatification is truly an African value as well. Individual effort to strive for this crown of being “a monarch” is an important sine qua non for ancestral graduation. To come back to the meaning of Ubuntu, an individual can be a human being without being a person. The promotion of human welfare, which is the ultimate goal of African morality, places human life as the sumnum bonum (supreme good) toward which morality is aimed. Hence Ubuntu is “hodogenic.” It is a way, a pursuit or practice of moral virtue, to uncover an innate personhood.

Culture in its totality is about this way. The commonly used word in isiXhosa for culture is incubeko. The word means “to cultivate.”

\(^{20}\) While I accept what Gyekye is saying, I don’t agree with the argument he builds for example against the notion “I am because we are” which he believes is inherently encouraging radical communitarianism. In that expression I find a dialectic of singularity and plurality. I do agree with the fact that it has been often interpreted to exclude individual personal efficacy.

\(^{21}\) This idiomatic expression is based on the idea of a cow that is lean, (moketa means lean). If it does not attempt to rise on its feet it is left to die. If there is no initiative even if the illness has been diagnosed, the prognosis is that the patient will die if there is no effort no matter how much help could be given. Applying it to my argument, without any effort by a person no amount of collective effort can replace personal efficacy, or agency. This expression gives evidence to the fact that personal agency is recognised in Africa.
Literally translated though it means a way of being “peeled off.” As a person is being cultivated or peeled if not milled, what comes out is isimilo i.e. character. The understanding is that human moral conduct cannot be conceived without character, which motivates it from within. As if this were not the end, this expression, umntu uyatyeka, a person is eatable or maybe edible is used to express one who is endeared to many people. This is an honour, it means all palatable relationships that one forges and is spoken of as “eatable.” Mostly in funerals one hears such statements about people. Someone will say this one was umntu, (a person), this one was eatable, wayetyeka. To be described in these terms is earned through toils of cultivation, milling and peeling off. A human being may die without having been a person, umntu, and indeed this is what is said normally about self-centred, selfish people.

They say a person does not have ubuntu and it is very sad if one is said to be not an umntu at all. Personal efficacy is this hodos to ubuntu!

My point is twofold. As a way, values that do not peel off and therefore lead to ubuntu are harmful. The creation of social structures and values is a function of the community for personal efficacious development. Such efficacious development of a person is for ubuntu in itself not for an individual self. There is ipso facto no moral justification for communitarian values within the kraal of Africa which thwart and abort the envisaged product of umntu.

Change, or to be precise progress, (tswelopele in Sesotho or inkubela in isiXhosa) is an intrinsic value of the kraal. One such notable change is the discontinuance of “arranged marriages.” The latest example I give is that of King Letsie of Lesotho who vowed to remain married to his only wife against the common polygamous practices of African monarchs. Such indications of the progressive use of the symbol of ikhaya can also be seen in the present democracy in South Africa. That the African National Congress calls its National executive meetings Lekgotla is not just and indication of progress and openness to tswelopele.

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22 In my interaction with the Kayamandi Community on this subject I was impressed by the image of peeling off maize. This is not foreign a concept in English as putting someone or letting him go through a mill means causing someone to pass through hard training. To mill is the productivity of character.

23 King Letsie has clearly stated his conviction that he is married only to his wife and no tribal marriages will be negotiated for him. The royal house has accepted this.
*Lekgotla* or *inkundla* is a space between the kraal and huts in the homestead. *Inkundla* is a term that shares the same root with *ikhaya*. It is an *assembly*, a *kendal*, a space where marriages are negotiated, cases are reviewed, and courts and councils are held. It is a public space. More importantly however, it is in that space that the marriage and thus the symbiosis between modernity and Africa must be sealed. The use of the term *lekgotla* for the National Executive of the African National Congress is not a mere synonym of *res publica*, but an indication of the need for the application of the values of the kraal in public life. It is already happening!

Indeed if modernity is about *tswelopele*, [progress], then it is not alien to the kraal, nor is democracy and publicity which cannot be understood and accepted on the terms dictated to the guardians of the kraal. Morality of the people by the people for the people is human life of the people by the people for the people, hence *Batho Pele!* It is the maximisation of values, structures, and functions for a *personal* efficacious and life giving public. The symbol of *ubuhlanti* is common to all homes, and certainly offers us *lekgotla, inkundla* (space) for an authentic African *politike koinonia*.

### 3.5. Conclusion

*Ukwakha umzi* is finding *ikhaya* of the people by the people for the people. The connecting thread and maximising symbol for democracy to find rootage in South Africa is the kraal, *ubuhlanti*. Having drawn affinities between *ikhaya* and the bible, creation and the harmony of *ikhaya*, I find the topography of black African publicity in *ubuhlanti*. *Ubuhlanti* is the seat of inspiration and motivation for black agency in the way for a public that is poised in *Ubuntu*. The boiling pots of the marriage between *ikhaya* and modernity are in the kraal, in *Ubuhlanti*. 
CHAPTER 4

Umsebenzi and *Ikhaya*: The Resilience of *Ikhaya*

4.1. Introduction

This chapter attempts to demonstrate the resistance and resilience of *Ikhaya* against colonization as it manifested itself in the migrant labour system. Because colonialism, conquest and Christianity were a “trinity,” I deal with them collectively to discern the patterns of boundary change that they inflicted upon *Ikhaya*. To achieve the objectives of this chapter, the logic of the colonial *oikos* is presented. It is a graphic presentation of colonialism and apartheid rather than a sequence of the chronicles of this history that is envisaged.

Change in the boundaries of *Ikhaya* is about the movement of the people. Such a movement could be accounted for in various ways, for example through urbanization which is the concentration of people in cities and towns. In our South African situation urbanization and the migrant labour system are not easy to distinguish. Roughly, the migrant labour system was an intense system of recruiting cheap black labour from the rural areas during the discovery of minerals. Such traffic of populations into city centers, in cases where it takes place without meeting basic needs, has generally caused a deterioration of the quality of life of the majority. Where there has been a systemic exclusion of the people from the city, the situation is at its worst, as it is in South Africa. The urban habitat in the midst of precarious economic conditions becomes a scene of congestion, jobless populations, growing poverty; an epitome of deteriorated normative values of human neighbourliness and co-existence.

*Umsebenzi/tirelo*, i.e. work is not without values and not without God or gods. Beside the fact that work is integrated to *Ikhaya* spatially, we need not overlook the fact that in the values of *Ikhaya*, work is rendered to God through the ancestors thus evoking the values of *Ikhaya* summed up in *Ubuntu*. *Umsebenzi* is liturgical.
A liturgy is a public profession of beliefs, values and *fide*. A people’s predisposition to work is a statement of their faith. The organization of work and the attitude of a people towards work is a public profession of- and commensurate with the gods/Gods associated with this work. For this reason, in the displaced location of *umsebenzi* from *ikhaya* the liturgies associated with the kraal i.e. *ubuhlanti* would be symbolic of the resilience of *ikhaya*.

To use the term which I used previously, the mutation of *ikhaya* in the locations is a *kraalonisation* (an assimilation of city life under the shade of the kraal) of city life. I take my cue from the insights of translatability (Kwame Bediako) or “vermacularisation” (Lamin Sanneh) for this designation of the struggle of city life. I demonstrate that black liturgies that emerged in the face of “migrancy”(*ubutyotyombe*) of colonisation, and apartheid were shaded by *ikhaya*.

4.2. The Logic of the Colonial Oikos

4.2.1. Slavery

Five years after Van Riebeeck’s arrival in the Cape, the construction of the halfway station to India was complete. A decision was then made which allowed some of Van Riebeeck’s contingent to settle at the Cape as Free Burgers. With this decision went the experimentation of farming in what is now called Liesbeek (Boeseken 1977:5). From the very onset, however, Van Riebeeck had put out an urgent request for slaves and pleaded that they would be used for the dirtiest work, “in addition to which they could be made to carry stones and dig the soil”(ibid). This marked the beginning of slave trade, which was linked to labour. Strong African men had to serve as slaves at the Cape. In the 1690’s Malays and Bengalese people were brought as salves to the Cape. Slaves were often not called by their names rather, they were given names chosen from the Bible, classical mythology and European names, Boeseken explains. The first slave for

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example was called Abraham and the first slave from Malagasy was called Anthony. The first woman slave from Malagasy was called Eva.

The treatment of the slaves is a matter that is of great significance. Words such as “loss of valuable labour,” “desertion,” “fugitives” “abscondment,” “lazy,” were often used to describe the freedom of these human beings. The earliest “mishpatim” of the slave-treatment is found in the Placcaaten, the laws, which were written by Van Riebeeck at the Cape. Slaves were not to be beaten up at the risk of a fine. The slave owners were not to scold their slaves “often.” Chains had to be dispensed with. In times of war, slaves were used. For example, when war was declared against the indigenous Khoi, the slaves were used to chase the latter.

There was also a category of people called Free Blacks, “vrijgelaten swart” who were “mardijkers,” a name derived from merdeka, which means free (Boeseken 1977:77). In the Cape this meant a person who came as a slave into the Colony and subsequently won freedom. Slaves who had white fathers automatically became free upon reaching the age of discretion, which for men was fixed at 25 and women at 22. That they were able to speak and understand Dutch, confirmed in the Christian Religion and became church members, were conditions for their freedom. Those who were 40 and were born in the Cape were allowed to pay installments for their freedom while others who were brought from elsewhere would attain such a privilege after 30 years of faithful service.

The point that is being asserted above is that slavery was at the heart of the colonial oikos. Slavery was racial. The work relations in the colonial oikos were determined through race. While there is little evidence with regards to black indigenous Africans being used as slaves in the colony because the slaves were imported, we can safely argue that at the encounter of the black and white, from the very early beginning the relationship was that of “master and slave.” For example, de Gruchy (1989) interprets the differences between the English and Afrikaner Churches on the basis of the question

1 I have earlier on given an explanation that the name used by isiXhosa speaking people for squatters is ityotyombe or mokhukhu in Sesotho. The bottom line is that it is not ikhaya so migrant labour is work in ityotyombe not ikhaya.
of slavery in the colony. When slavery was abolished by the colony, Afrikaners continued with the practice.

Racism, understanding and speaking Dutch and confirmation in Christianity were from the beginning, among the conditions that characterised slavery. The “Gospel of Work” propounded by the missionaries had these master-slave transcripts in the black and white relations around umsebenzi.

We want to see natives become workers. And we believe Christianity will be a chief cause of their becoming working people. How this must come to be is twofold. Christianity creates needs. Generally speaking, every man will work just as much as he requires to do more. There will be a constant relation between the time a man works and his necessities...If you want men to work, then, you must get them to need. Create need and you supply stimulus to work, you enlist the workers own will on the side of labour. Few men anywhere, and certainly no heathen men, ever work for the mere pleasure of working. Now, the speediest way of creating needs among these peoples is to Christianize them (The Christian Express vol. VIII (95) (1 August 1878), 1-2.

This notion of the Gospel of work as cited above was enunciated in the editorial of the newsletter that was the mouthpiece of Lovedale, a key missionary enterprise in South Africa. Selope Thema maintained that the attitude of both Boer and Brit toward the indigenous people was the same in their condemnation of traditional society as a life of laziness and indolence (Villa-Vicencio 1989:43). James Stewart of Lovedale argued that lazy races die or decay whereas races that work prosper on earth. Christian civilization according to Stewart had to be linked to work and commerce hence “The Gospel of work.” Cochrane (1987;1989) offers insights, which are crucial for understanding the church’s link to work or labour in South Africa and the “monopolistic and monopsonistic” tendencies of missionary enterprise.

Two points at least flow from the sentiments expressed thus far. First, the fusion of work and the colonial oikos is underlined. Missionaries who represented the religion of the colonialists were not exempt from the social fabric of their respective communities. The
churches they represented were an integral part of the socio-economic and political structures of the time. So colonial faith, work and God were the same.

Second and most importantly, while work was an integral part of the colonial oikos, it was coercively disintegrated from ikhaya. Ikhaya, its God, -land, -faith and -people were not wanted but only cheap work from ikhaya. Thus African slaves built the colonial oikos. Within the womb of the “Mother City,” as Cape Town is affectionately called, rest the seeds of African slavery by white Europeans. Slavery is work without land, God and faith and other components of ikhaya. The colonial oikos established itself by violently negating indigenous cultures and created a racial terra firma of white cities through black godless work and labour.

4.2.2. The construction Africa

Colonization meant that things fell apart for ikhaya. Discourses about Africa used images such as “dark continent,” “a backward continent,” “a continent of the savage,” “an uncivilised continent” and so on. Africa means many things to many people and different things to different people. No matter how different or many things could be said about Africa, what Africans say about Africa is profound for the liberation of African people. All of those images that are cited above are not constructed by Africans themselves. In a sense therefore, Africa is one of the constructs of Western colonialism. Africans had little say in the way Africa was constructed by interventions of discovery, civilization, colonization, industrialization and Christianization. This construction of Africa has often influenced historiography by way of interpreting Africa in foreign categories.

When we however consider that there is a view that Africa, south of the Sahara is the cradle of humanity (Gugler 1999: 211) our urge to look at Africa through the pristine pre-colonial window becomes intensified. If “Africa” as the cradle of humanity fell apart, where and what is the human habitat of existence then? My question begs the African perspective of the place of humanity at the center of the universe.
Often, civilization is connected with the arrival of whites as if there was no civilization before their arrival in Africa. There is evidence that in the fourteenth century or slightly later, nomadic tribes began to settle in the green valleys and pastures of the eastern and northern parts of present South Africa (Kritzinger 1995:204-5). In addition to this, Africa has traded with among others, Arabs for more than a thousand years before the arrival of white colonialists. There was a civilization before the eruption of ikhaya. Actually there were several civilizations across Africa.

To demonstrate this point above, there was also an urban culture long before colonial interference in other parts of Africa. Earliest cities of Africa have been situated along the Nile. Cities such as Menroee, the capital of the kingdom of Cush or Nubia, Askum in the highlands of northern Ethiopia, and Timbuktu could be cited as examples of African urban history. For example, according to Yoruba tradition, Ife, situated in the present day southwest Nigeria, is cited as a city where the whole world was created. While Africa is not a homogeneous entity this illustration is made to highlight the commonality of woundedness of Africa through colonialism-the construction of Africa as a dark continent.

Christian missionaries arrived with traders and with colonial rule as they spread throughout the sub-Saharan continent. Significantly, how the colonial powers succeeded in dividing the continent is appalling:

Luanda had been founded by the Portuguese in 1575 and become the administrative centre of Angola in 1627. Cape Town, had been established by the Dutch in 1652 as a supply station on the Dutch East India Company's sea-route to the East. To settle freed slaves the British founded Freetown in 1792, the Americans Monrovia in 1822, and the French Libreville in 1848. Dakar grew up around a French port built in 1861. In 1881, Kinshasa was renamed Leopoldville after the king of the Belgians (Gugler 1999:219).

These beach -heads of European expansion changed the boundaries of Africa even though they remained small until the mining discoveries in Kimberley, Johannesburg, Lubumbashi, Kitwe, Askum and Dakar to mention but a few.
Railway constructions from Cape Town and Port Elizabeth to Kimberley; from Beira to the Zambian Copperbelt and across the border to Lumumbashi dramatically changed the face of the continent towards the close of the 19th century. Obviously, these cities, constructed by the colonial regimes and settlers presented a distinct contrast to the long established cities of Africa.

With the boundaries of the African cities which obviously had values that were commensurate with the beliefs of African people reorganized by the colonial powers, the reasons for the movement of the people from *ikhaya* and thus urbanization becomes an involved hermeneutical exercise. It is so involved because there are many divergences in African experience, culture and belief systems apart from the notions imposed by the experience of colonialism and apartheid. What is being envisaged above is that among commonalities regarding Africa is the wound of colonialism, which should constitute the locus of our hermeneutic of *ikhaya*. The word urban or urbanization could simply refer to the transition of individuals and families from the rural into the urban dwellers. But the word may also connote the processes involved in the transition; the patterns of distribution of the migrants and the causes of such patterns.

4.2.3. Urbanization: The Dislocation of *Umsebenzi*

Let us firstly have a glance at some of the theories of urbanization in South Africa. Of these theories a broad distinction is often made between the neo-classical and radical approaches. The neo-classical school of thought (*Dewar et al* 1984: 3-16) sees the rural-urban movement as a rational process of response to prevailing socio-economic conditions. The assumption is that a “reasonable” acknowledgement and assessment of a need to migrate to the alternative, reasonable socio-economic conditions is made by those in transit. The process of socio-economic development is thus viewed as a logical progression which follows from an inevitable change from traditional to modern patterns of *ikhaya*
Viewed in this manner, the traditional home is underdeveloped; needs to be driven to maturity so as to reach the stage of high-mass consumption. This approach is dualistic, and assumes the position that the rural *ikhaya* should be assimilated into a modern *oikos*. Thus migration becomes an auto-correcting or auto-balancing process towards equilibrium in the inevitable modern path of development.

The radical paradigm of urbanization challenges the assumptions of this school of thought discussed above. It refutes what is termed the Rostovian path (a linear, inevitable path of development) with its concomitant dualistic economic approach. The assumption that the migrant labourers make a “rational” choice to relocate, i.e. that they reason out and perceive or understand that there are alternatives, is refuted as not plausible both empirically and theoretically. This is so because such a rational explanation of migrancy is abstract. Urbanization is also linked to the material conditions of a people. An abstract view of urbanization reduces the migrant people into abstractions thus denuding if not fragmenting them from their lived rootage in *ikhaya* and its values. I am here concerned about ways of expressing the experience of urbanization which is not the same everywhere. The radical paradigm serves better in arguing that the form and causes of migration are not independent of the spatial and historical struggles of homemaking in South Africa. As we shall see in the next section, the indigenous people of this country were coerced into the city only as cheap labourers with utter disregard and violence against their home, *ikhaya*.

4.2.4. **On Labour Power Without Labourers.**

One classic way of describing the colonial *oikos* is captured in Anthony Lemons phrase, namely, that it was meant to “secure labour power without labourers” (1:1991). The struggles of *ikhaya* to be precise, begin with the invasion of the land of the indigenous African people of South Africa. There were distinct phases, the first being the settler colonial era at the Cape in 1652 until the a few years after the 1910 Union. The next phase could be demarcated by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, which was characterized by a conscious pursuit of urban segregation, later to be superseded by the
Apartheid era. These legislative landmarks are merely convenient boundaries to examine the adversities of the frontiers of ikhaya. It should however be stated that the extent to which these landmarks possess germane threads of continuity exerts a profound influence on the post-Apartheid ikhaya that is emerging at the advent of democracy in South Africa. Moreover, one thing is conspicuous:

The cities which developed in South Africa were regarded as creations of the white community. From early on-long before the National Party took control in 1948-the "natives" were not regarded as part of these cities. They had functions to fulfill in the city but they had to "be temporary sojourners," [squatters on the land of their forebears (Kritzinger 1995: 206).]

This is the actual feature about the present day ikhaya. The housing backlog is so enormous that in the road between the city and ikhaya, millions of African people are left lingering and wandering. For now we should just reckon that:

Certain key features are common in the social formation of all colonial and settler colonial cities and in South Africa to the post-colonial cities of the segregation and apartheid phases. Forces of control, imposed to maintain relations of dominance, depended crucially on control of access to political power, but also included control of access to means of production and levels of employment, and to the means (education, training and opportunity) of socio-economic mobility; control over land resources, their ownership, use and distribution, and over access to services and amenities; and control over spatial relations through segregation and urban containment, (Dewar et al. 2)

We should discern that the key feature in the migrant traffic from ikhaya into the city was the containment of African people as labourers with no access to political, economic, land and educational and religious power. They were workers without gods or God.

We are able to observe the same pattern when we look at the missionary method of the "Mission-Station." The land of ikhaya was bifurcated. While these mission stations were located on African land, they solicited their protection from internecine conflict through the military might of the colony. Blacks who were converted, were

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2 Words in italics are mine.
accommodated in mission stations while the "red-blanketed," i.e. unconverted people, remained in the traditional *ikhaya* and were often hostile to the culture and values that developed in the mission stations. In the mission stations, Western-Christian values were adhered to, and frontal attacks on African culture were waged from there.

Similarly, natives were not regarded as matured Christians who were fully part of this Christian fold. The Ethiopian\(^3\) movement is an indication of this point. The white city and the white church created African squatters (*amatshipa/vagabonds*) in socio-political and religious spheres. They needed a god of the missionaries to perform in this newly created "Christian" public.

From the point of view of the Africans, the *topos* of *ikhaya* was a division between *Amakholwa* [the believing ones] and *Amabomvana* [the red-blanketed-ones] (Khabela 1996). Sometimes the words used to designate the social dichotomy of the African world are *Amaqaba* [taken from the word *ukuqaba*, to smear; so those who smear ochre on the faces or bodies] and *Amaqghoboka*, [taken from the word *ukugqoboka* meaning to make a hole. Thus, *Amaqghoboka* are those in whom holes have been created]. What this actually implies is that those who accepted or were made Christian were hollow, viewed from the perspective of *Amaqaba*.\(^4\) We could explain this notion by summoning the Greek word *idios* (empty) to see this as being about "the emptied ones." See this example:

> How could Tiyo Soga and his missionaries not see the contradiction between what they preached and what the white people did to the black people? Why did Tiyo, in particular, being a black man

\(^{3}\) The Ethiopian Movement entails an exodus of black leaders, mostly clergy from the mission or settler churches. Rev. Pambani Mzimba who was the first black minister from Lovedale, went out of the Free Church of Scotland to found the Presbyterian Church of Africa. Revs Mokone and Dwane are associated with the formation of the Order of Ethiopia. Ethiopianism was an indigenous response to issues of race, indigeneity, identity and liberation against the trinity of Colonialism, Conquest and Trinity. Cf. Dwane S (1989), Gerdener (1958). Kierman (1990) maintains that the emergence of an African Christianity as expressed in Ethiopianism was a dialectical process, an interaction between missionary and African consciousness in (Prozesky:1990). From this we could view the phenomenon of African Initiated Churches as a commentary on the trinity of Colonialism, Conquest and Christianity alluded to above.

\(^{4}\) It is this perspective that is going to be privileged in this work. The term *Amaqaba* has been used derogatively for many years. In a seminar that was recently held at the SABC on 18 January 2000,
not understand the contradiction? As one Xhosa man put it, “there is something terribly wrong in the head of an educated black man” (Khabela 1996:71).

In social actions and symbolic values this dichotomy finds expression in the designations *Isintu* and *Isilungu*, meaning according to *Ubuntu* values and White values respectively. Tiyo Soga’s life, the first black ordained minister in South Africa, is paradigmatic in demonstrating the intricacies of the conflict between *Isilungu* and *Isintu*. His mother had to depart from *ikhaya* and repudiate the polygamous marital relationship that was viewed as sinful. He grew up in the “Mission” world and had to abandon his world of *Amajwara* (his clan). So the missions left holes in African people. While blacks were Christianized, they had no religious power of expression. While they worked, they had no labour power.

Furthermore, when we glance at the Frontier Wars in the Eastern Cape, they signify far reaching power relationships between blacks and whites as distinct from those of cattle barter, miscegenation and eventual extinction as with the *Khoi* and *San*. The forays, forts, forgotten treaties, and violence shaped the city and its mind-set, which is still prevalent today. Colonists having emerged triumphant continued their course of expansion and created congestion among the tribes by containing them in specific glebes of land to suck up their labour. Tribesmen regarded by the colony as hostile and who were numerically superior were viewed as deserving to be kept outside the frontiers of the colonized society by force. When cheap, black labor became indispensable this attitude was modified. All but those who were needed for labour were debarred from entry and the sole economic benefit of the conquerors. So the sophistication of exclusion and the holes inflicted on Africans was a progenitor to the system of locations.

By looking at the so-called buffer zone in this era of our history we can illuminate the frame of locating blacks and therefore the system of locations in South Africa. The ceded territory between the Fish and the Keiskamma rivers after clashes between the colonial

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representatives of the African Traditional Religion used and interpreted this term positively. “Traditional healers smear ochre, initiates even today smear ochre” they retorted.
power and AmaXhosa was called the buffer zone. This zone indeed, epitomizes the filtering of African people into the service of the white city.

It was in this zone that Amamfengu were later accommodated when it was annexed to the Colony. Amamfengu were used as a buffer between whites and AmaXhosa. In essence blacks were used against blacks. Black chiefs were used against black chiefs, traditional healers against traditional healers etc. From this we can discern the policy that veered in the direction of protected subjecthood. To these subjects, law, industry and civilization were brought through resident agents who were appointed as advisers among the African tribes. The word location, whose connotation as an area for an exclusive black settlement bears parallels to this earliest scenario of the buffer zone. Cathcart’s words sum it all:

I have guarded against any premature interference with or disparagement of the authority and influence of Chiefs in respect of the government of their clans, because I am convinced that to remove one means of governing before you can possibly supply its place by another can only be productive of anarchy; whereas, if the Chief be supported in the government of his clan, it is easy to govern the chief and his people through him (Reader 1961:6).

As chiefs were held responsible for the good behavior of their people, government commissioners were gradually being introduced into African areas without any mandate to interfere with tribal matters. Grey notably made a lasting impact in the history of this country. Coming as an ex-governor from Australia and New Zealand, his approach aimed at taming the “savage” tribes and he argued in contrast to Cathcart (Reader 1961:7) that:

...we should feel that if we leave the Native beyond our border ignorant barbarians, shut out from all community of interest with us, they must always remain a race of troublesome marauders; and that, feeling this, we should try to make them a part of ourselves with a common faith and

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3 Amamfengu were tribes that were dispersed in the Eastern Cape during the times of Umfecane (Shaka’s Wars). They were vulnerable and became usable in the white-black conflict as they were readily receptive of western-Christian forms of life. They include clan names such as Dlamini, Radebe, Mbele and so forth. For many years, AmaXhosa could not even accept marriages with Amamfengu. Even though this is no longer the case today, it is still “documented” in the oral tradition of AmaXhosa.
common interests, useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue; in short a source of strength and wealth for this colony, such as Providence designed them to be.

This proposition meant that blacks had to be trained in manual skills and be civilized essentially meaning to be westernized. The black territory from this time was nothing other than the reservoir of labour than any menace to the colony. Following our discussion up to this juncture, it is clear that not only force was sufficient to contain the Africans. Infiltration into their worldview and its invasion was also a strategy or weapon used to nail them down for exploitation and abuse in the colonial oikos. Locations thus meant to be ruthless machinery to bore economic, political, social and religious holes in black people.

4.2.5 Land, Minerals and Migrancy

According to (Worden 1998), before the discovery of the minerals the Cape colony was dominated by settler commercial agriculture. In the Western Cape, a wealthy grain and wine producing class of farmers had emerged in the colony. By the middle of the eighteenth century, these farmers were increasingly marginalized into frontier farming. Their labour force depended heavily on Khoi and San. At this time however, Africans enjoyed independent cultivation mostly unimpeded.

The discovery of the minerals in 1870 in South Africa altered the form and content of public space. The boundaries of ikhaya were stretched. There is a school of thought that entails that Africans were initially not attracted to urban centers as they were in their own right successful farmers, cultivating their land assiduously (Bundy:1988; Worden1988). South Africa acquired a capitalist, industrial economy and society at the advent of the mineral revolution. While the reasons for the tardiness of the black people against moving into the cities are contested, the stability of ikhaya and its equilibrium was nonetheless maintained.
As time went on it soon became clear that the supply of black labour both for farm and mine work was insufficient for the colony. To achieve these ends, the colonial government passed legislation that would satisfy their needs. Among these were Tax Laws, Pass Laws, Location Laws and Vagrancy Laws. This was a direct attack on *ikhaya*. There were also indirect measures which undermined peasant agriculture and thus formed the basis for the future spatial dislocations of *ikhaya*.

The railway infrastructure and social infrastructure were deliberately and strategically constructed to conform to the needs of the colonial establishment. I have already indicated that railway constructions from Cape Town and Port Elizabeth to Kimberley changed the countenance of the population movement in South Africa during the mining discoveries in Kimberley. The mining revolution was and is not intrinsically bad. What it meant for blacks is the bone of our contention. Blacks were now coerced into the mining industry to supply cheap labour through the Laws that were passed. This resulted in the dislocation of Africans from their homes. The violent frontier clash between whites and blacks shifted to another boundary, the mining towns, where more labour was needed. Charles Villa-Vicencio aptly sums it up:

> If issues of land and tax determined the socio-economic place of blacks in pre-industrial colonialism, it was the intensified emphasis on these factors in the period following the discovery of gold that deepened the gulf between whites and blacks. The focus of the confrontation between the races had shifted from the frontier to the mining towns, where the major requirement of the newly-founded deep-level mines was labor, plenty of it, as cheaply supplied as possible. This concisely stated, became the issues around which pass laws, job reservation and other laws anticipating the modern panoply of apartheid laws emerged (1989:67).

The horrors of migrancy marked a change in the frontiers of battle between white and black. The horrible “compound system,” introduced in Kimberley in the 1880’s epitomizes this shift in the boundaries of the conflict. This became the model that was adopted for African workers in municipalities, factories, warehouses and farms. The compound system basically meant a creation of hostels specifically for labour recruits mainly men and later women.
It meant that men would leave their families in the rural homes to be accommodated in the hostels in numbers. These labourers, staying in the compounds would remain there for as long as the contract dictated. Some would stay for more than five years. Family life was broken, ikhaya was dismembered. Mothers who toiled in the rural home to make ends meet raised children whose fathers were caged in the compounds.

These hostels were like cages out of which cheap labour force was taken. In one room of the hostels eight men would be accommodated or even more in some instances. Compounds had a wall fence around them to control workers. Initially the residents were allocated rooms according to their ethnicity and thus specific blocks of the hostels would identify with a specific ethnic group. This changed after the eruption of tragic tribal wars in the compounds in about 1974 and early in the 1980's. Otherwise, the compound system before this literally entrenched segregation on tribal, ethnic lines. The compounds were "stations" or "buffer zones" for the mission of cheap labour in the city.

The diamonds fields in Kimberley prefigured the emergence of monopoly company control over production and a racially divided labour force (Worden 1998:37). Measures to strip search workers who left the mine were introduced but applied only to African workers as whites went on strike to resist the regulation. The compounding of the black labour force followed even though it is argued that it was meant for the whites also. So by the 1880's the labour force in South Africa was racially divided following on the influence of the powerful mining industry. The outline I give below follows on the account given by Worden (1998:16-37)

A systemic allocation of labour between the white city and the white farm on the other hand was now in place. Periods of economic depression also increased the pressure on black people to move into the cities and measures to deal with this influx were put in place as I indicated. However these structural changes also created a poor white population, particularly among the Afrikaner. This was caused by the restriction on land

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6 A series called Emzini weintintsiza broadcast by the SABC is an attempt to capture the life experiences of the hostel dwellers in one of our major cities, Egoli. I myself had a personal experience of living in a compound at President Brand Gold Mine in Welkom.
availability, which resulted from the process of fixing national boundaries, the
commercialization of agriculture, the rinderpest epidemic and the Anglo-Boer War now
generally called "The South African War."

Cheap black labour was preferred on the mines than expensive white or coloured labour.
A series of measures had to be introduced to foster and protect the economic position of
the whites who gradually lived in the urban centers. Thus the process of assimilating
whites into the city was evidently different from that of the blacks. In fact whites
established their cities as they moved to the urban centers.

These changes meant that white farmers were then sitting with a recurring problem of the
shortage of labour. Control measures of the movement of blacks into the cities were
indirectly channeling blacks into farm employment. This was strategically done at the
level of wages that had to be on par or even below what the urban black brought home.
Pass laws were therefore a means of channeling and distributing labour between the Boer
and the Brit, [the farm and the city]. The political threat of the urban proletariat was thus
forestalled while at the same time the pressure on the agricultural wages was diminished.

Inevitably, the capacity of the reserves to serve as a buffer in the rapidly increasing
urbanization was declining at an alarming rate. These reserves purposed to absorb the
surplus population and to subsidize the urban wage. Their situation reached a crisis point
in the 1930's. Competition for work between the farm and the city intensified. Black
women were subjected to removal from the urban centers and the efflux of surplus
population to the reserves was fortified by the introduction of the 1945 Native
Consolidation Act. This Act meant that only blacks who could provide proof of
employment were allowed to remain in the reserves. For example, there was a 72 hours
restriction on black migrant labourers newly arrived in the urban centers. That meant that
within 72 hours they had to produce proof of employment. Thus, the prohibition of urban
"squatting" and the provision of housing became cornerstone measures of control.
At the advent of Apartheid from 1948, policy focussed on determining the direction of the flow of the rural people by pointing them "homeward\(^7\)," displacing ikhaya to what became known as the Homelands. While the homeland population increased notably in the 1960s to the 1980s, the urban metropolitan centers also grew. The economic boom that was experienced in the 1960's depended on this particular restructuring of capital towards monopolization, as the surplus population and unemployed blacks in the urban centers were forcibly absorbed by the Homeland. As the terminology that was used to describe this system was confusing, so was the process of urbanization confused. Certain towns within the homelands remained under the control of the central government. There were boundary towns and dormitory towns. Land, minerals and migracy eroded ikhaya from the colonial oikos right into the Apartheid era.

4.3. Apartheid and the Dichotomization of the Space of Ikhaya

The ideological essence of apartheid needs to be seen for what it is. Derrida deconstructs apartheid in the following manner:

By itself the word occupies a terrain like a concentration camp. Systems of partition, barbed wire, crowds of mapped out solitudes. Within the limit of the mark, the glaring harshness of the abstract essence (heid) seems to speculate in another realm of abstraction, that of confined separation. The word concentrates on separation...It institutes, declares, writes, inscribes...A system of marks, it outlines a space in order to assign residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it discriminates (Norval 1994:131).

Two important aspects emerge out of the quotation above: the abstract essence of apartheid, and the marks or the spaces that it created. According to this, such spaces were marked politically. Derrida perceives a semantic resonance between apartheid and

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\(^7\) It is interesting to note that the system used the nomenclature or terminology of home in the creation of the bantustans. Again we can discern that always attempts to bastardize African concepts in the process of containment and control have been a dominant feature. The words such as Emakhaya, Amagoduka, O S'celi'ndawo, became dominant and it is against this system that we shall look at them in the next pages of this work. However, ikhaya and its understanding could never be determined, defined and demarcated by the homeland system rather, it became a point of departure of the struggle for land. In this period we should remember that the PAC was formed when there was an introduction of repressing laws culminating in the Sharpville massacre.
certain European discourses on race classifications. The essence of racism is that it is Western in its provenance and final form (1994:133). As the most racist of racisms, apartheid takes extreme identitary logic as it has succeeded in creating ethnic identities and allegiances. Apartheid could thus be linked to a certain European discourse on racism. Apartheid is a system of marks which outlines space in order to assign forced residence or closed off borders (1994:133).

The political frontiers of apartheid in Norval’s thesis do not necessarily correspond with the racial nor class divisions. Rather, the division of the social, which has taken a form of dichotomization of political space, cuts across these political boundaries. Norval thus argues that we should go beyond any objective notions of division because the political boundaries do not exist as internal and closed moments of a particular discourse. Changes in political frontiers rather, result from complex processes of interaction of opposing discourses.

The implications of this view are far reaching. The frontiers of apartheid do not simplistically correspond with racial class divisions. In other words, it is not a question of being on this and that side of the political frontiers of apartheid because the division of the social, which has taken the form of dichotomization of political spaces, cuts across these boundaries. The spaces of opposition to apartheid could not necessarily be demarcated along racial division even though the political space was racially dichotomized.

Norval cites the introduction of the Tri-Cameral Parliament in the 1980s in South Africa as an example. Instead of resulting in a lessening of antagonisms of the formerly excluded races, the project rather opened up new vistas and spaces of opposition. Rather than inhibit the development of antagonisms, it led to a proliferation of and deepening of antagonistic relations and ultimately to a series of changes in the construction of political frontiers against the desired results. The rise of the United Democratic Front [UDF] in this era that drew from formerly antagonizing persuasions, the black consciousness and
progressive poles, illustrates my point. In stead of these polarities being fortified they became much more porous quite against the wishes of the apartheid engineers. Apartheid could not simply acquire alliances from other races by expanding its racial groups of governance at the exclusion of black people.

It was in this era that issues of ontological blackness and the black interlocutor became prominent. Not every black person was necessarily “black” and similarly not every white was necessarily an “enemy.” The politically drawn frontiers could not be coterminous with friends and foes in racial lines according to which they were intended to be marked by the system. There were changes in the construction of the political boundaries. So Apartheid was ambiguous, it was a demon, according to Ngcokovane (1989). The very fact that there were labyrinths of black strands against apartheid is indicative of this fact.

We have simply explained Norval’s thesis that is equally explicable in what Mamdani designates as the bifurcation of the African subject and citizen. The crucial point though is the link between apartheid and the western discourses of modernity, classification, and racism. First, if apartheid is the worst form of western racism and therefore the worst variant of modernism, Mamdani goes on to say that it is the worst, generic form of colonialism:

My second objective is to establish that apartheid, usually considered unique to South Africa, is actually the generic form of the colonial state in Africa. As a form of rule, apartheid is what Smuts called institutional segregation, the British termed indirect rule, and the French association. It is this common state form that I call decentralised despotism, (1996:8).

This connection is crucial for this chapter. Derrida pitches apartheid as western discourse, modern and racist. Mamdani sees apartheid as the generic form of colonialism. The package of western discourse to which ikhaya is perpetually responding has the ingredients of modernity, racism, colonialism and apartheid. The dichotomization

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8 Most of the people who were in the leadership of the UDF were acclaimed and self proclaimed Black Conscious exponents such as Allan Boesak, Cyril Ramaphosa, Frank Chikane, Saths Cooper, to mention but a few.

9 Cf Chapter One.
or bifurcation of the political spaces marks the battle zone between this discourse and *ikhaya*. In other words, the dichotomized political experience of blacks is about marks, abstractions, racism, colonization and apartheid. This is the essence of the ideology of apartheid.

4.4. The Mutation of *Ikhaya*

As I have already indicated, Ethiopianism marked an enunciation of the principle of religious authority into which Africans entrusted their hopes and fears. A number of songs composed in the era of this racist-migrant-cheap-slavery-type of labour depict this religious hope. For example the well-known *Shosholoza, Ekhaya* 10, *Sidiniwe Sesiya Emakahya* are "hymns" that depict the spirituality of this era. I have argued that despite the containment of the Africans by the colonial *oikos*, the root paradigm of African traditional religion was not directly reached to be precise. As the city became more invasive and provocative, with a strong military might, the mask around the kraal became thicker. The religion of *ikhaya* became "nocturnal" as it became exposed to a powerful frontal attack by the religion of the whites. The practice of this religion was not effaced from the public sphere but became "clandestine."

Men were commissioned from the kraal *ubuhlanti*, to face up the rigours of city life. In most instances, only after initiation would a man proceed to seek employment anywhere. Today the practice is that before one goes into tertiary education one should be initiated into manhood or adulthood. While a man is called a "boy" in the city by his white employer, he knows deep down that he is not one. Similarly, while a woman is called a "girl" in the city, deep down she knows that she is a woman. Yes, because there is a difference between a man and a boy or a girl and a woman. Manhood and womanhood are generally attained through initiation rites. The white man does not know!

10 The latter two are choral songs which when rendered invoke an indescribable impulse like Handel's Coronation Mass. *Ekahaya* is composed by J Foley and *Sidiniwe* [We are weary and tired, probably of city life] by the legendary composer, P.J.Simelane.
The migrant labour system in so far as it has hitherto shaped these patterns of distribution and space among the black Africans in South Africa is distinctly a violent process. The knowledge that one is proclaimed man or woman from ubuhlangi keeps them going. They are warriors for their homes in the vicious city life that is not meant for “boys” or “girls.” It was from the kraal that Africans began to negotiate with the consequences of atrocious wars of the colonial oikos and apartheid. African religion was neither conquered nor silenced in the public space. It became a clandestine force. It remained boiling in the fires of ubuhlangi.

4.5.1 Township Limbo

The perennial problems of congestion, squalor, hygiene and sanitation are features common to every township in South Africa to be faced by African men and women, not boys or girls. One of the best expressions of this scenario is in Ezekiel Mphahlele’s lyrical strains which portray the location as,

...an organised rubble of tin cans. The streets were straight; but the houses stood cheek by jowl, rusty as ever on the outside, as if they thought they might as well crumble in the straight rows if that was to be their fate. Each house as far as I remember, had a fence of sorts. A few somewhat pretentious houses could be found here and there (Maluleke 1995b:162)

"Although," Maluleke argues, "semantically, even in terms of government nomenclature, the word township" is not exclusive to urban areas of black residence, in South Africa the word has come to refer almost automatically to black residential areas, (1995:162). Let us briefly explore this.

In 1887, as far as we can trace, there came to the fore the idea that locations be built at a convenient distance from the town. This proposition was followed by the major cities of South Africa such as Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Among the reasons cited for this proposition was the fear of the white people of the spread of contagious disease. These locations had to be segregated from the whites. At the instance of the Lagden Commission of 1903-5, locations became a policy followed in the Reef mines where they
were first called "location." Both the framework and the detail of the migrant labour policy go back to the Lagden Commission, including identity plates and the subsequent demarcation of "Native Reserves" in the 1913 Land Act.

Within no time, due to congestion, in 1914 the Tuberculosis (TB) Commission reported that locations were poised in conditions that enhanced the spread of TB throughout the country. This was confirmed in 1918 by a bad influenza epidemic that the distressing conditions in which Africans were living in locations were a health threat. This resulted in the African Housing schemes for the first time in South Africa.

The birth of Stallardism was soon to come. According to Stallard "the native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas which are essentially the White man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of a White man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister." This became doctrinal in establishing locations in South African. The migrant labour system was anchored on this doctrine thus every law that was passed inevitably fell within the frame of Stallardism. In one letter written by the town clerk of East London it is said:

The benefits accruing to the town from the establishment of the location are that we compel Natives to leave the town and be in the location at a certain hour, thereby preventing a lot of undesirable characters being about the streets. The chief point, however, is that it is undesirable to have natives living in the town, their presence leads to the accumulation of filth and generation of disease, besides being in other respects a great nuisance to the white population, (Reader 1961:13).

The building of "match boxes", was a response not to the housing needs of the black people in the cities but, a response to the health threat that the locations were imposing on the white city. The locations were seen as "breeding-grounds" for diseases in the white

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11 (This is taken from Dewar et al.) Stallard headed the Commission that was established in 1922 in the then Transvaal Local Government and the resolutions contained in that Commission were followed everywhere in South Africa.

12 That is how the traditional rectangular houses in the black townships used to be called. They all looked the same and Serote alludes to this in his poem about the Township of Alexandra.
city. There was not much that was done to improve the condition of the townships or to provide the amenities even for the housing units that were already built. At the out-break of the First World War, location improvements came to a standstill (1961:14). Locations were over crowded!

The worst, mendacious nightmare about the locations was the so-called "Durban model". This was a system which entailed the building of beer-halls in the townships allegedly for revenue and their improvement. Yet the progressive worsening of conditions, want of water, road maintenance, electricity and increasing plot densities speak louder than words. What could be said without any doubt is that the revenue accrued in the township subsidized the low rates for the white residents in the city. This is what township life entailed. The essence of the doctrine of Stallard is that human social relations are both space creating and space contingent. The limbo of the township thus signified a struggle for space as a struggle for survival. Spacing in relations and social actions in South Africa was racially zoned.

4.5.2. The Land Act and *ikhaya*

The infamous Land Act of 1913, prevented all blacks from owning land in the so-called white areas. It is common knowledge that only 13% of the remaining land area of South Africa was set aside for Blacks. With regards to the economic consequences of this Act, Africans who had been involved in the agricultural free market were disadvantaged forever. Huge glebes of land even in rural areas were ceded as reserves and people had to be removed from them. It was a scenario tantamount to closing down free market in land, which lessened black competition, which, whites feared in agricultural circles. Politically, kings were left without power. One of the main responsibilities of *Amakhosi* was to allocate land. Land tenure was communal and *Amakhosi* acted as guardians and custodians of communally owned land. This Act usurped all of this power.

Dense rural areas were an inevitable consequence as this Act was freezing the distribution of land on racial lines consequentially creating territorial racist segregation.
Blacks were reduced to labour tenants, dependent on a wage from a white master as the Act ensured a reliable flow of black labour in the city. Because there were no permanent rights afforded to blacks to live in the city so a large number of blacks consequently became migrant labourers as their options were severely limited. When they became redundant they were dumped back into the rural "migrant" reservoir. We can thus conclude by saying that the containment of a large number of people on a limited amount of land and an absence of investment resulted in the creation of an impoverished and landless mass. Their only chance of survival lies in the security of wage employment in white urban areas. This is what townships were meant for. They transmuted ichaya into located masses of landless blacks that were left without any option save to struggle for survival and to provide cheap labour security for the white city.

4.5.3. The Resilience of Ikhaya

At the social level Ilokishi, a bastardization of the English word "location", is "unwanted." Ubulokishi and Ubuntu are contrasted everyday in the township. To say that someone has ubuloskishi is almost tantamount to saying that he/she has no Ubuntu. Ubulokishi could be a term of stigma.

Ilokishi is something with which blacks do not associate themselves, and it can’t be called home. People either do things isintu [according to the way of ubuntu] or isilokishi, [according to the way of Ubulokishi (location)]. Ubulokishi is a debased form of Ubuntu. Each and every time when there is a funeral, an initiation ceremony or a wedding in a township, township talk [umgozo], [ukugoboza], will always critique such events on the basis of their proximity in character and practice from what is supposed to be according to isintu. It is in such umgozo that people say the wedding was too "white," it was handled isilokishi or the initiates in December celebrated if not gone through the

13 Umgozo is a township term with the verb ukugoboza or ukugoboza which, was coined from a character on Television called Umamgobozi. This was a woman character in a drama who liked "gossiping", to tell the neighbours about events or stories that might have taken place in the township. Today this term is widely used even in the magazines (e.g. Pace) and has attained an import that somehow connotes "whispering" or telling hidden or secret transcripts. Today in the township if someone wishes to tell something he/she would draw attention by saying, "have you heard umgozo this week."
process of initiation itself isilokishi contrary to isintu. These issues are highly sensitive, they are usually “soft-spoken-transcripts” which flow in the transcript of umgozo. The major point though is that life in day-to-day talk and experience in the township is a contrast between ubulokishi and isintu.

By briefly looking at the language of the people in the township another point can be made. Deeper in the metamorphosed township life is the language that has become almost universal to the townships called “Fly-taal,” or “Tsotsi-taal.” The lexicon of this language seems to proliferate every day. See the Madiba Jive which is the form of dance that mimics Nelson Mandela’s famous jovial dance. In the African value system, dance by an old person has a deeper meaning. An old person’s dance affixes the ultimate signature to the mood for which dance is performed. The Madiba Jive seals the joy and blissful moment of South Africans as they celebrated their first democratic elections.

Recently, I have heard a new phrase, “things are Ringo,” meaning “things are fine.” It is taken from Ringo Madlingozi who composed a musical sensation called “Sondela.” Old people who grew up in townships will often be conversant with this language. A father is a “timer” a mother “old-lady,” pronounced “oleidi.” This language has developed and continues to develop. A Mecedes-Benz is now a “TY” after Toni Yengeni and the list is endless. Surely this creativity has symbolic value. An analogous language that could be cited is that one called “Fanakalo,” used on the mines. Both these languages are concoctions of languages. Township language is the vernacularization of the city. Lamin Sanneh, who examines the translation of the Gospel into Africa, employs the notion of vernacularization to argue his point. I am fascinated by his insights as I look at the vernacular or linguistic translation of the city value system in the township.

Terms such as toyi-toyi, umzabalazo and most catching, “I-system” are part of the rich Fly-taal lexicon. The limbo of the location does not only produce a language but, this language also provides a terrain, a corpus of the translatability of two worldviews as the

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14 Different moods have different types of dance. When there is war Africans will dance, when there is sickness they also dance. The point though is that the climax of that mood finds its expression in the dance of an old person. Nothing can speak better than that.
city value system is constantly vernacularized. In township language location is called kassie from the Afrikaans lokasie. Many youth that grew up in the townships would “pontificate” even old “timers” too that they are from ekassie and not emakhaya. They “see the light,” they are “omalaita” as opposed to Amagoduka. There is this sense of pride about the township that has developed, a spirit that is poles apart from the actual intention and squalour of the township. Serote’s words (Maluleke 1995:162-163) epitomize all that could be said about the contradictions and paradoxes of eKassie:

My beginning was knotted to you,
Just like you knot my destiny
You throb in my inside silences
You are silent in my heart-beat that’s loud to me.
Alexandra often I’ve cried.
When I was thirsty my tongue tasted dust,
Dust burdening your nipples.
I cry Alexandra when I am thirsty.
Your breasts ooze the dirty waters of your dongas,
Waters diluted with the blood of my brothers, your children
Who once chose dongas for death beds
Do you love Alexandra, or what are you doing to me

I was gone from you, many times
I come back
Alexandra, I love you;
I know
When all these worlds became funny to me
I silently waded back to you
And amid the rubble I lay,
Simple and black

It would have been a mistake to exclude this poem or sonnet so that, even if I do not succeed in painting the best picture of the location, it may through repeated repetition present the grammar of township life. This sentimentality or spirituality with regards to the township is found in the names that are given to the townships or locations. Katlehong (a place of success) in Springs, Thabong (a place of happiness) in Welkom,
Meloding (Melody, a place of singing) in Virginia and of course Kayamandi (a pleasant home) in Stellenbosch. When one looks at these townships and the actual conditions in which their respective residents live, no better explanation than hope can make any sense. It is hope that knows that there is *ikhaya* and that *ikassie* is not *ikhaya*. The township lexicon is about the grammar of social actions at the frontier zones between the white city and the dehumanized black areas. It is a communicative rationality that emerges out of a struggle to survive and live. The root of this grammar though, is the kraal.

We can also see this in the music and spirituality of *ekassie*. The *marabi* culture, *Barorisi* style, the well-known movement of *Amadodana* which was for years strongest on the reef are mutations of *ikhaya* in a changed social scenario. When one listens to the *Ladysmith Black Mambazo* and Paul Simon’s resounding *Homeless*, an *isiZulu* rhythmic piece rendered in what is called *Isicathamiya*, the levels of this creativity can be well appreciated. It is a combination of refined albeit discordant western style of music with African music. *Isicathamiya* itself is an allotrope of traditional dance. Thus, in the residual space and the limbo of the location are pangs of a metamorphosed habitat of *ikhaya*. “We are homeless, *Si lala emaweni,*” (we sleep on the rocks) in the nefarious rupture of *ikhaya*, the location.

The question is whether this mutation is obnoxious or not. By calling upon the translation argument as it is predicated by Bediako (1995)\(^\text{15}\), we can both clarify this mutation and problematise it. Let me attempt to summarize his thoughts even though he specifically deals with African religion and Christianity in particular. The thrust of Bediako is that Christianity is a non-Western religion. We should note that Bediako uses Lamin Sanneh’s thoughts to develop his point of the translatability of the Christian Gospel viz. the vernacularization of the Gospel. With this I fully agree. As I have already indicated, there is a sense in which the location is a site of the vernacularisation of the city into *ikhaya*. It is the site where the translatability of the city into *ikhaya* takes place. Publicity is not a Western concept. The integrated nexus of spheres that formed or

\(^\text{15}\) I am not discussing Bediako in this section, but drawing parallels from his scheme in so far as the whole question of the mutation of *ikhaya* in the location takes place. Cf. Tinyiko Maluleke 1997. (Review Article) In Search of “The True Character of African Christian Identity,” in *Missionalia* 25:2, 210-219.
shaped the oikos; religion, land, people, God-are certainly not western phenomena. The mutation of ikhaya cannot be and will not be a mutation into a western oikos without the psycho-social pathologies that we have witnessed in this country. Umsebenzi is not a white man’s creation.

4.6. Conclusion.

We have explored the resilience of ikhaya in this chapter. Importantly, the frontiers of the bloody wars that subjugated blacks shifted into a fierce scene of piercing holes into ikhaya. Labour power was sucked from the veins of landless, godless, homeless and faithless blacks. Africans became squatters in the country of their birth. This is what comes out of the logic of the colonial oikos. It was a ferocious, coercive disintegration of umsebenzi from ikhaya.

Yet when we look at the precarious conditions of ilokishi, ekassie, and the struggle between ubulokishi and ubuntu, the grammar of ubuhlanti provides a communicative rationality that conveyed dialogue between the white city and ikhaya. The construction of the language and the lexicon of the limbo of township life emerged out of a real struggle for survival. It was not a grammar constructed for dialogue and debate to bridge differences in opinion. Africa was violently constructed. The language and rationality of the colonial oikos was nothing else but violence. How this violence was absorbed in the kraal constitutes the basis for the grammar of publicity in South Africa. On the basis of this grammar, let us punctuate the scenario of Kayamandi in Stellenbosch.
CHAPTER 5

Kayamandi and Domocracy

5.1. Introduction

Public life is about the maximum participation by all members of the public. This is not necessarily as standard definition but a description shaped already by certain philosophical commitments. The advent of democracy in South Africa brought about this hope and in itself democracy is intended to maximize participation in our public life today. This chapter presents a text on publicity from the perspective of the ordinary black masses. It is a text that is not refined and has its own vocabulary operating on the underside of mainstream discourses of public life.

Kayamandi Township is selected as a case to demonstrate the public text of ordinary black masses. We limit our view of this text as we focus on the era of the democratic dispensation since 1994-2000. Within the advent of our democratic dispensation, our horrible history obviously implies that there are problems. This chapter presents the problems of Kayamandi as given and identified through the participation of this community. It is out of this picture that we begin to engage the text of Kayamandi.

The focus of this chapter is not on Kayamandi per se but on issues in Kayamandi that provide us a pertinent agenda to define the frontiers of publicity in South Africa. Most importantly, as we gaze into this text in Kayamandi and engage with the generic godless, faithless, jobless, landless limbo of the location we attempt to apply the African religio-public symbol of *ikhaya*.

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1 One old lady in a Talkshow emphasized that what we have in our country today is not democracy but *domocracy*. The word *domo* in Sesotho is taken from Afrikaans *doom*, meaning stupid. This was a fascinating idea to me because, initially, I thought the old lady was making a mistake and needed to be forgiven. As I listened to the lady, I was taken aback as I noticed that I was the one who committed a
5.2. Context

DRAMA: An old man tied or chained to a hump of filth, is approached by a politician who patiently offers the old man some exercise on voter education while campaigning for his own party in the ensuing elections in 1994. The election is over, two women argue between themselves as they pass by, one saying these people such as the old man have brought squalor to their township with the result that the value of their property has depreciated, the other one being sympathetic to the old man. A minister also passes by proclaiming: "repent the kingdom of God is at hand," while simply ignoring the old man’s situation. Suddenly the same politician comes by and again avoids the old man. When the old man recognizes him, asking about the promises he made initially, the politician has no time for him and walks away. When the old man tries to follow the politician, the bunch of filth follows him! Lastly, another minister comes and is broken at the sight of the entanglement of a human being in squalor. He "drops" the Bible and embraces the old man.

This drama, acted by The Kayamandi Community Group presents one of the vestiges of the legacy of the past, the squalor and sordid conditions of township life. It attempts to help fathom life in a community throttled by congested shacks, drowned in heavy rains and doused in flames that ravage in cold winters. The contradiction is that the word Kayamandi which is the name of this township, means pleasant home, home sweet home.

When the Kayamandi Group participated in the Multi Event' 99 (hereafter ME'99) they were tasked to identify a burning, pressing issue which, when attended to, might simultaneously deal with other problems which are not necessarily unique to the township of Kayamandi. As we might be aware, crime, abuse of women and children, housing, unemployment and so on are perennial problems in every township. The Kayamandi Group's contention was that if "we clean the dirt" the unutterable sights of congestion- and create space for a dignified life in the township, there would be space for the alleviation of other problems such as have been alluded to above.

mistake she knew what she was saying. "This democracy is dom," she insisted. The word then is not my invention, it is available in the lexicon of "common spontaneous wisdom."
5.2.1. A brief background of Kayamandi

Kayamandi is a "location" situated approximately 6km from the inner city of Stellenbosch, one of the most beautiful cities in the Western Cape Province. Around 1679, Simon van der Stel, who had been newly appointed Governor of Cape Town by the Dutch East India Company, came across a river and a green fertile valley in his expedition into the interior. This being the first river that he crossed from Cape Town, it became known as Eerste Rivier\(^2\)-meaning "the first river." The area he arrived at was named Stellenbosch after the governor.

Having originated in the late 1940's, around 1947, the Kayamandi community has its origins in the hostels that were created for workers who were in the employ of the wine industry and farms in Stellenbosch. Like many other townships or locations it grew from the influx of blacks into the city. In fact it never grew beyond its original boundaries. Townships that were created in those years are twice the size of Kayamandi today, comparatively speaking. Kayelitsha, created in the Eighties just a few kilometers away from Kayamandi, is a good example. One can safely conjecture at a glance that the flow of blacks into Kayamandi was rigidly controlled.

The Kayamandi community is housed in hostels [which have been converted into houses] accommodating families, and shacks which, are so overwhelmingly congested that one could say the place is lock, stock and barrel a shack community. Many of the dwellers come from either Ciskei or Transkei and the township is preponderantly IsiXhosa speaking. There are however Sesotho speaking people and few so-called Coloureds.

What aroused my curiosity about this place are blocks of flats, which were unoccupied in the face of such congestion. This has been the case since I joined this community in January 1998. Up to this day when there is much need for space and houses in

\(^2\) The drama was presented in the Multi Event '99 at the workshop table on Eco-justice.

\(^3\) Eerste Rivier is now predominantly a so-called Coloured area. This is where I stayed since April 1998 before I relocated to Kayamandi at the beginning of 1999 where the Group members and the Congregation I served are located.
Kayamandi, the community has not occupied those flats. They did not only arouse curiosity in so far as they were unoccupied but also the contrast of beauty and squalor is conspicuous. It was not sheer coincidence that in my field work studies I clung to this sense of curiosity and continued through the ME'99 mainly to identify issues that underlie the squalour of this location.

The sight of these flats is reminiscent of the biblical story of the *Tower of Babel*. Many explanations have been given as to why they are not occupied. There are security guards employed to watch them and the community simply “ignores” them. One should not for one moment misinterpret this state of affairs for inertia on the part of the community. This might be a silent albeit eloquent statement of being aloof, a silent resistance against a “fortified language” of those who govern or otherwise rule Kayamandi. Furthermore, it has proved to be expensive to have unoccupied flats because it means a continuous loss for the local Council for as long as they remain unoccupied.

This apparent inertia of the community, which is indispensable for a healthy public discourse in Kayamandi and Stellenbosch begs the question of participation in public life. We should view this “Tower” of flats to epitomize deeply hidden currents, which impede public intercourse in a democratic situation. Where do the members of this community express themselves? Where do they confirm their public profession and which land constitutes the theatre of their public performance? All these questions are the measures of publicity in Kayamandi specifically, as well as more generally in our public life in South Africa.

5.2.3. The Ambit of the Case Study

The context of this case study is the new dispensation of democracy in South Africa. It purports to be an exemplification of a reflection on the situation of the disadvantaged communities that prevailed within the first term of the first ever democratically elected government in South Africa. The crux of the reflection is basically on how the masses endeavour to carve out home (*ukwakha ikhaya*) in the newly found national home of the
democratic *Rechtsstaat*. The drama that was used by the Kayamandi Group in many of its public presentations offers us a purview of this community. Behind this text, lies a deep checkered history of the eruption of *ikhaya* now confronted with the mood of maximizing participation in our public life.

Zola Skweyiya, Minister for Welfare, Population and Development, says that South Africa is facing a deep social crisis with the potential of reversing the democratic gains accrued since 1994 (*Sunday Times*, January 16, 2000). According to Skweyiya, the assumption in social policy making is that families and communities have the ability to respond to this social crisis. Policy-making (Welfare), he asserts, has proceeded as if these social institutions were fully functional with the ability to provide the full range of social support that is required to restore the well-being of the people. He identifies the nature of the problem as a complex of persistent and increasing levels of poverty and social inequality. In addition to this, violence against children, women and the elderly, HIV/AIDS, and low economic growth, are perennial he suggests. From this then, the eruption of the decorum of *ikhaya* which has rendered *ikhaya* dysfunctional certainly militates against the assumption that *ikhaya* is capable of anchoring policy-making and the restoration of *Ubuntu*, the well-being of the people.

What Odendaal (1995) says about this era in general is perceptive:

...the constitution of the Republic of South Africa suggested a change in the structure of local government to the creation of non-racial local government structures based on considerations such as demography, economy, physical and environmental conditions. A direct result was the promulgation of the Local Government Transition Act, [1993] which plunged the restructuring of local government structures on an irreversible track. It is thought that the success of this new policy will depend on how legitimate and democratic the new local government structures will be.

While the legitimacy and therefore, the democratic nature, of local government is the crux of the matter according to Odendaal, the crux of the case study is whether the legitimacy and thus the democratic dispensation in the new South African Constitution with its local government prongs is not being negatively impacted upon by the burning
issues which the communities themselves have identified. Within the framework of this new order we need to argue the case of Kayamandi.

5.3. The Problem

In August the 24th 1998, an ecumenical workshop was convened at the instance of the Kayamandi Group. The Kayamandi Group was a nucleus of youth members of the G.G. Ndzotyana Memorial Congregation of the Uniting Presbyterian Church which I served. We reflected as this small group on the situation in South Africa and Kayamandi from a Christian point of view. On participating in the ME’99 we registered as the Kayamandi Group which henceforth I shall designate “the Group.”

“The Group” agreed to explore the theme, coined “The impact of the migrant labour system on the African concept of home [ikhaya], in relation to the role of the Church in the public sphere,” in the workshop. The workshop basically took the format of Small Groups and Brainstorming and no formal paper was presented, but a dialogical approach was followed where a lot of interaction from the plenary was allowed. Those who were present were broken into groups to identify problems which impeded the community from building or finding “home” in Kayamandi. Then they presented their findings in the plenary, and common problems in all the groups were identified. The workshop identified the following problems:

- Unemployment -[Umsebenzi]
- Crime -[Ubundlobongela]
- Education -[Infundo]
- Squalor,Congestion -[Ubundaka,Ubugxwayiba]4

In the same workshop there was an agreement that a “follow up workshop” be held. It was notable also, as the workshop confirmed, that interactions of this kind were indispensable in Kayamandi. These problems were identified collectively. In the same
workshop a collective endeavor to moot possible solutions was made. The major solution that emerged was that a project be initiated, and different kinds of projects were mentioned, such as building, sewing, and computer/typing. Mention was made of focusing on projects that would enhance self-employment.

The Group continued to reflect on the information and agenda that emerged out of the workshop. Out of these reflections several related themes emerged. Such themes included *Creative Imagination and Poverty, Silence, Beauty and Power*. The highlight of these discussions came out in Bible Study (Discussion 1998: 24 October).

5.3.1. A Voice from periphery

Reflecting on the parable of talents, Veliswa likened this to the practice in the townships called *Imigalelwano*. Money collected in these groups is sometimes given out as loans with interest. A “heated” debate followed. Others felt that there was some exploitation in the text because the multiplication of the talents was meant for the lender. The feeling was that those who had power like the lender was exploiting those who were "employed" to multiply the talents. Veliswa cited as an example the practices of the taxi industry in black circles. Mostly the owner does not insure the driver of the taxi while the vehicle itself is insured. The owner pays the driver a certain percentage of what the driver is able to bring per day. All that concerns the owner is how much the driver "checks" in per day.

The question “what is to think” was discussed. Jongile feels that those who multiplied the talents had thought better than the one who did not multiply the talents. A hot debate erupts again. Jongile’s subtle way of seeing this is that possibly those who have been multiplying did not necessarily bring everything that was accumulated to the owner. Otherwise that is what most Taxi Drivers do!

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4 The English designation is my own, otherwise the problems were stated in IsiXhosa
5 The word *Umgalelwano* comes from the root *ukugalela*, to pour or to contribute. *Imigalelwano* are associations which are formed by people in the townships to "pour" in money and share it either at the end of the year or any period that might be designated by the group. There are variants e.g. "stokvels," burial societies etc. What is intended here it to give a general practice of association common in black townships to beat the “system.”
They seldom take all the daily proceeds to the owner. Even so, the lender gains at their expense, the group argues. Then, Jongile says all have thought but differently in their resistance against this exploitation.

What then is meant when a person thinks? If these people who have multiplied the talents have been exploited and the other one who did not multiply thought differently then those who multiplied the talents thought about strategies of undermining within the prescribed *modus operandi* by the lender. The one who says that he was afraid, is probably mystified by the *modus operandi* of the lender and his system. This is a "cool" way of shrinking power. It is like cold water that is poured on a hot container; the group appreciates the image. It is a radical abstention a radical silence mostly met with wrath as the text indicates.

The Group also focused on the notion of the word *imbutho* [a crowd, a throng, a meeting]. *Imbutho* is contrasted with another term *umbutho* [an association]. *Imbutho* in *IsiXhosa* is not a neutral term. It appears in some of the parables and we particularly looked at the parable of the workers in the vineyard as we read the parable of the talents. It is not a good thing to be associated with *imbutho* members of the group emphasize. The connotation of this word is summed up in Psalm 1:1b [New American Bible] “the counsel of the wicked,” or the company or association of the insolent.

In Mt 20:3, we read that the owner of the vineyard employed from *imbutho*, "meaning from a place of [imbutho] a meeting of a throng, “wicked, insolent” that was unemployed. What does this say about such associations in Kayamandi?

5.3.2. A dialogue with the text from the periphery

From the perspective of the *vox victumarum*, *vox Dei* one should recall that Jesus always looked at the crowds, the *ochlos*, and the riff-raff of society with compassion. *Imbutho* accordingly is a meeting where there is no direction, a place where people with no direction, who are "mystified," come together. It is these crowds whose option we take in
understanding the Gospel. The notion of *imbutho* goes a long way in describing the helplessness of the community of Kayamandi. It explains the depression and inability of the community to appreciate and act together without being triggered into action.

When one looks at the flats that have not been occupied in such conditions of congestion, in the direst need for space, one remains amazed if not tempted to believe that the community accepts to be trapped in this situation. Kayamandi is a crowded community, an *imbutho* or conspiracy of colonialism and apartheid. It is made up of mystified crowds who remain stunned at their entanglement in marginalization. One may ask, are they "afraid?" Are they “afraid” to clean the squalor they live in?

In the meeting that was held in one of the dirtiest sections of Kayamandi, Zone O, on the 24th July 1999, facilitated by members of “the Group” under the auspices of *Simanyisizwe Christian Community Project*, a glaring scenario emerged. When reasons or causes for the situation were sought, the report entails that people themselves cited what they called " the spirit of I don’t care," "lack of thinking or creative or constructive imagination among them"; and simple lack of basic hygiene standards. This comment in the report is telling:

There are many people who are disturbed by those who exhibit traits that have been mentioned above who, have complained strongly and painfully as they were disheartened by the stench, dirty water, urine and filth deposited next to their dwelling places, -by people who know themselves only, maybe who do not know what they are doing and who they are in the first place; -people who think about themselves and their places only if they do care any way. People who are filthy in action and thought, shortsighted people. This disappointing state of affairs shows little understanding and insufficient knowledge if not extreme narrowness. They pass water into the garments that cover their own bodies. (Simanyisizwe 1999,24-07: 2)

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6 *Simanyisizwe Christian Community Project* is a direct offspring of the Kayamandi Group which was formed by an ecumenical workshop and the name itself was suggested in the workshop. There is a section that deals with this in the following pages.

7 The original text was written in *IsiXhosa*. The translation from *IsiXhosa* is mine. People who attended the meeting made this comment, and it is not at all a judgement passed by “the Group.”
Mosala's reading of Jesus in the parables (1994: 142-147) is telling in this respect. The hermeneutical insights he proposes germaneally illuminate the text of Kayamandi:

In my country in the past four years we have seen a move from an old status quo to a new settlement. The key players in that settlement have been De Klerk and Mandela. Like the texts of the bible in which we hear certain things and do not hear others, see certain things and miss to notice others, the political texts of De Klerk and Mandela have made present certain realities and have absented others; they voice to certain formerly unheard things and rendered yet others silent...It seems to me that in seeking to develop a hermeneutic of the poor in the Third World, the question is no longer on which side God is. That was a good question for its time. Now, however, the relevant question is how to interpret the eloquence with which the poor are silent and the absence through which they are present in the pages of the bible. It is in struggling with these silences and absences that a new and creative appropriation of the liberation of the gospel takes place.

When facing the text of Kayamandi, squalor and congestion conspicuously “absent” the community’s performance in public life. The boundaries of publicity become amorphous in imbutho where a street is a playing ground for the children; a sporting ground a place to squat on; a drain an abattoir for weekend “meat markets” a corner of a building be it a church-building or another, a convenient toilet; a shack, a salon; a washing basin, a dish basin; a tavern, a chapel; a shack, a shelter, a maternity ward and a body wrapped in garments that hold water that is passed in them! Where they find expression there is our boundary of publicity. It is in the conditions of sordid squalor.

At face value, as I have argued, the people of this community seem to have accepted their condition. It looks as if they have got tired of talking about this matter and so, life must go on. It is a community that has at face value lost its sense of appreciating beauty. Exacerbated by the epidemics that underlie squalor, there is no doubt this is a depressed community. Commenting on a similar scenario on the out skirts of Cairo, “a settlement which looks like a garbage dump,” Cochrane (1998:7) expresses sentiments that could be applied to Kayamandi:
Similar sentiments were expressed in the workshop, *Women and Squalor in Kayamandi*, facilitated by Simanyisizwe on 28 October 1999. Squalor is in the mind, squalor is to think like your oppressor, it is the tavern or the shebeen, it is the stench in Kayamandi. Squalor, in the most capturing line cited above, makes those who live in it to pass water into the garments that cover their own bodies!

I have been using the word “mystified” above in line with what Motlhabi (1999) suggests about it. Motlhabi argues that Marx steers between a somewhat rejection of morality while at the same time using morality to repudiate and criticize capitalism. While morality is not explicit as it were in the Marxist scheme, it is paradoxically implicit in the critique leveled by Marx against capitalism. Following this line of thought, morality could be ideological. In other words the morality of capitalism is ideological. It is ideology viewed as being characteristically prejudicial. In that sense ideology is partial; it mystifies because it presents itself as serving the interest of all. It is false and misleading because in instances where it offers the facts, it places them in an inconspicuous manner. For this reason, the painfully legitimizing tendency of ideology could be read in people in Kayamandi "passing water onto the garments that they have put on.” The personal image is distorted and thus the deterioration of very basic principles of human relations characterizes *imbutho* of squalor in Kayamandi. There is no direction, there is no unity, no harmony of existence all but a mystified community.

If *Ubuntu* is the *sumum bonum* of African morality according Motlhabi, then there is no morality at all in this situation because,

> As far as morality is concerned, it is considered to be ideological when historically specific values and practices are claimed to be eternal, unchanging and universal, private interests masquerade as expressions of public interest, their values oppress and inhibit rather than fulfill and enhance human potentialities (1999:226)

*Imbutho* signifies a presence of ideological values that oppress and inhibit the enhancement and fulfillment of human potentialities. They inhibit public profession *ipso facto* expression in public life.

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This story could be told in order to glorify poverty. That would be wrong, for those who are poor know, as well as we should, that there is nothing romantic about poverty, nothing desirable and nothing acceptable about it. The significance of the story lies in its pointing to the importance of human imagination in the midst of despair: to possibility in the face of actuality. It indicates that ecology of spirit is a vital force, with practical implications.

The text above refers to the kinds of positive, celebrative efforts by poor people. The Kayamandi story is a scandal! The absence of positive, celebrative efforts by the community of Kayamandi in a democratic dispensation leaves much to be desired. The story of Kayamandi is one of a vicious entanglement of our democracy in the legacy of the past.

The text of Kayamandi is a human face. It is a face, as in Levinas, "that is present in its refusal to be contained" (1979: 194). This text heuristically presents an "epiphany" of what is presumably absented or silenced in the advent of democracy; it is a revelation of an absent speech of imbutho. The text of Kayamandi, to further employ Levinas's transcendental aesthetics, is an "aesthetica" that cuts beyond face only as a moral summons. What then should be done, Mveleli uses the English word "persuasion" in our Group's Bible Study (1998), “all these people should be persuaded to understand what is going on.” What is it that is absently eloquent and eloquently silent in this epiphany revealed by the text of Kayamandi? We need to magnify our spectacles to face the Kayamandi text.

5.4.Domocracy

5.4.1. The new situation: the language of the interregnum

The Multi-Event 1999 (ME'99) was a gathering of intellectuals, communities and high-powered policy-makers held in Cape Town, February 1999. Its main focus was to attempt to provide a framework within which religion in public life could be rethought in the new situation that prevailed after the first five years of democracy in South Africa.
The object of this Event was to identify key questions with possible responses rather than formulate key answers to a new situation that has arisen in the context of the new democracy in South Africa (Cochrane 1999:55). This new situation is, preeminently, the emergence of the new constitutional democracy and thus the formal end of apartheid.

Paradoxically, there is a rapid and an increasing awareness that such an end of the racially defined world of apartheid does not mean the end of racism and its effects. Emerging together with this new democracy is the question of pluralism and not merely as a social fact but, as Cochrane explains, as a constitutionally and legally binding framework of a new South African society in South Africa (1999:54). Coupled with these are issues of globalization and its economic frameworks; as well as HIV/AIDS and other perennial diseases such as TB. The new constitutional framework, pluralism and these global challenges put Christianity in a position of lost privilege as it used to enjoy with a certain hegemonic place in South Africa before.

According to Cochrane then:

What the ME'99 demonstrated is that there is an important, even vital, realization among key religious leaders that statements about the kind of society they envision, from their various faith perspectives and traditions, must be met with direct engagement in addressing the major issues of our society at this time-including crime and corruption, abuse of women and children, false economic values, new virtues of citizenship, poverty and impoverishment, and many other matters debated in the ME'99. Leaving it to the government whether at local, regional or national level- is insufficient. (1999b:55)

The sentiments above are telling. One can say they both confirm and affirm that while there could be "gains" in South Africa, derived from the new era of democracy, there is still a daunting task that is waiting. Dealing with the monstrosities and perversities of the past legacy leaves no option for religion but a clear call to participate in public life. It is a call to exert energy and interest according to Cochrane, "in defining the place of religion in public life in ways that are continuous with the best heritage of critical and conscientious witness and struggle, yet capable of meeting the changed conditions." The realization by ME'99 is a confirmation and affirmation of what has already been contested, bitterly so, that the church or religion has a place in public life.
The religio-political symbol of *ikhaya* seeks to bridge this past and the promising future of democracy. It was in the preparatory academic workshop leading to the ME'99 that Maluleke poignantly argued:

Although Christian in methodology and focus, Black Theology has always had intentions beyond the four walls of the Christian Church, on the one hand, and the realm of the merely religious on the other. Therefore, if Black Theology was not public in its effect, it was definitely public and political in its intent. Besides, it is most likely that Black theology became private discourse more by default than by design. It became private because it was and still is not hegemonic. As a subversive theology Black Theology appears to be private discourse but has it ever been anything but public discourse in reality? How do marginal and subversive theologies become public discourse? Do, should and can they be? (1998:60)

From this then, the tradition of Black Theology's involvement in public life is affirmed. Furthermore, to expand on what Maluleke says, we should not turn a blind eye to the fact that even in discourses of theology, inequalities resulting out of the hegemony of other forms of theology were not automatically eradicated by the formal removal of the racist world of apartheid. *Ipso facto*, inequalities and hegemonic propensities themselves might have attained new forms. This irony is captured well by Walters *et al* (1999:71-73) that while the term "public" is implicitly inclusive, in reality, the power dynamics promote the exclusion of both women and blacks.

Significantly though, black theology and feminist/womanist theology problematise power and space. When public space is defined through "absent" discourses, the understanding of power as located in the center also changes. According to Walters *et al* then, "what is projected in this process (when power and space are problematised), is a public space which is polyglot, requiring honesty, an openness to diversity, an ethic of listening for the other"(1999:72). Denise Ackermann (1999:92) taking her cue from Maluleke says:

Most importantly, he finds that the [f]ailure to recognize the absence-silence of black voices with respect to the TRC...[is an] eloquent presence...that 'speaks,' illustrating not only the marginalized

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*The words in brackets are mine.*
position of blacks, but especially the grinding and continued marginalization of women." These lines merit a heartfelt amen.

A polyglot projection of public space which includes the language of "absence and silence," in agreement with Ackermann, (1999:89) does not need concepts such as compassion, forgiveness, listening to the other and so on to be trivialized. What I mean is that compassion, forgiveness, and listening to the other can have a significant meaning when our public life is filled with the presence and thus expression of those voices that are absent.

Indeed, in the ME'99 it did emerge that the notion of public had the potential of covering a number of overlapping areas or itself the notion of public being an area of un-clarified overlaps, (Walters et al 1999:80). The statement by the analysts of the ME'99 suggests that, perhaps, "public discourse simply refers to everyday discourse-a synonym for the lowest common denominator where particularities do not interfere." What a kgakgamato! The idea of public discourse as simply referring to everyday discourse where particularities do not interfere is tantalizing. But the question is if public becomes a sphere where particularities do not interfere, what is it that checks particularities from interference? Everett's model proposes a bund, or covenant. But what do blacks offer as a mechanism of checking particularities from interfering in publicity? My answer is that the lowest common denominator for publicity is ubuntu for the struggling black masses. The position of this work is that the bridge between particularities in a plural public life is ubuntu. Ubuntu is the ethic of the harmony, the omenala of ikhaya in public life.

From the point of view of ikhaya as developed in this work, unemployment cannot be dealt with if the God of the African people does not become part of umsebenzi. If the God of Africans is not among the Gods that create space for employment in our new world and democracy. Similarly with education, land and space. Democracy should be constituted in such a way that it is integral to the normative values of ikhaya so as to be meaningful for the masses that are absented by the powerful.
Democracy is about this absence of marginal and subversive symbols in public discourse. As the text of Kayamandi shows, without the mind of ikhaya, our democracy is narrow and thus our public life will be deficient. "Squalor is to think like your oppressor, the text asserts."

Deborah Williams argues that in the "New World Order" what was Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) has now changed into Low Intensity Democracy (LID) (1993:1-4). LIC constituted a political, economic and psychological warfare waged at the grassroots level against popular revolution. This strategy was used among others in Nicaragua, El Salvador, South Africa and the Philippines. On the basis of this strategy, in the light of emerging democracies, "low intensity democracy was conceived as a compromise between "unstable" representative democratic systems in the Third World and the US established and supported military dictatorships" (Williams 1993:2).

Williams says that the New World Order, "the language of the interregnum," replaces state-sponsored socialism with capitalism as a dominant paradigm for allocating resources. Importantly, liberal democracy is proclaimed as the best constitutional framework in which a capitalist market economy can flourish. A crusade for democracy according to Williams has become the ideological agenda of global capitalism. I have already argued my point in the previous chapters about the connection between a free market system and democracy. Democracy cannot only be constituted to connect with an economic system that does not benefit the black masses. At present we need to see that such a connection is ideological. It is an ideological strategy of democracy used to provide legitimacy while concealing human atrocities, loss of sovereignty, the undemocratic nature of the new economies and a diminished popular participation.

This ideology of democracy mystifies. First it connects umsebenzi and imbutho. The rate of unemployment lamented in the text of Kayamandi indicates this. Those who work are selected from a community that is directionless, landless and faithless. At best this is slavery. The economy of the city and the country is anchored on a "spirit of I don't care," a narrow spirituality.
It is a democracy that courts with an economic system which is based on the rationality of the oppressor, bereft of popular associations of *imibutho*. By this very fact, the association of blacks with this form of democracy is inhibited. It is eloquently absent. We can further say democracy with work that is godless is godless too. There is no work without God, land, faith and *umuntu in ikhaya*, a reality that is clearly depicted in the text of Kayamandi.

The ideological use of democracy notwithstanding, we need to recall that certain normative values about what is common to all of us, our common good, do not depend on democracy. This is the least common denominator of a public discourse that is freed from interferences of particularities. It is about what is proper to all of us. What is proper to us at least is life, the worldliness of or publicity, and thus shelter and our heritage, the confirmation and affirmation of our professions (our mind), and maximum participation. These attributes are eloquently absent in the limbo of Kayamandi. *Domocracy* is the rule of narrowness, exclusion and occlusion, landlessness, faithlessness and godlessness.

### 5.5. Public performance in Kayamandi

In the absent stage of public performance for the black masses in Kayamandi and our new national home of democracy, we need to search for spaces that could offer them this stage.

#### 5.5.1. “The Group” in the ME’99

What comes out clearly from our participation in the ME’99 is that there is the possibility of tackling a problem, i.e. one burning problem and *ipso facto* simultaneously deal with the rest. Second, the participation of the Group in the ME 99 affirms guidance in its methodology of Participatory Action Research in Kayamandi. It affirms the need to appreciate the wisdom and knowledge of the people in seeing and identifying their problems as a *sine qua non* for participation.
Thus the problem in Kayamandi is known in wider circles, putting Kayamandi on a public map in public life. Max-Neef’s (1991) theory of Human Scale Development identifies nine fundamental human needs: subsistence, understanding, creation, protection, participation, identity, affection, idleness and freedom. These needs form an interrelated and interactive system with no hierarchies of degree of importance. How these needs are satisfied could be either singular or synergic (where more than one need is satisfied with a single action). The problems presented by the Group in Kayamandi are therefore not a hierarchy of problems, they are all equal in degree of importance.

5.5.2. Simanyisizwe Christian Community Project

In many of the workshops that were held in Kayamandi and facilitated by the Group, people suggested the need for a project. The problems in Kayamandi are so chaotic. Problems that go along with poverty which hinder sound public discourse are true of this community. Coupled with these problems the role of the church in Kayamandi has been questioned even though in all our workshops participants felt that the church had a place in changing the situation in Kayamandi. While the church is understood to be part of the problem, her role and her particular engagement in the processes of the development of Kayamandi was deemed important on countless occasions.

The term project is fluid at a glance. Insights from Ndou (1998:3) doing research in the Northern Province among the community members of Mukomawabani conceptually define this term. Project according to Ndou is an intervention that addresses a particular problem. If this is the case (and I fully accept Ndou’s definition generically), then I use the word project interchangeably with intervention and thus view a project as a purposive intervention in addressing a particular problem in a particular context.

What follows then is a description of community intervention where the community itself expresses its awareness of their social-economic reality and their problem and the measures they seek to undertake in order to change the situation around them. This intervention took place in an important workshop which was held in Kayamandi where
delegates from various Churches were invited to think, propose and guide the workshop on identifying the project. This project was then called Simanyisizwe Christian Community Project, (SCCP).

Today the SCCP has garnered numerous achievements. There have been interventions on issues of women, cleaning campaigns, HIV/AIDS, and a host of public awareness activities in Kayamandi. Most of these programs are still going on. The impact of the SCCP at local level is something to be documented. The SCCP has also established international connections. A number of students from overseas have worked in this Project and advanced its vision of “restoring the dignity of the community of Kayamandi.” Already there has been a visit to Denmark in July 2001 where new partnerships and friendships were forged.

This is not a report about the SCCP. Certainly it is about the agency of the Community of Kayamandi and the potential that has been unleashed at the instance of this Project. Yet as in many communities, the weakest point of SCCP is lack of funds. Lack of funds in a “starving” community has a bearing on representation and voluntary action. These problems range from suspicions about leaders making money out of the poor, self-interest that becomes rife in the projects of this nature and lack of sustained commitment to changing the situation as there is no immediate gain.

Yet the fact that people wanted a project is significant. With this project they say “we are tired of being patients of history as we were meant to be by the colonial oikos and apartheid.” They reclaim their agency in history. In the words of Oliver Blanchete, (Serequeberhan 1994:5) “Man (sic) enters into society [history] as he begins to form his own projects in consort with others or put another way, society [history] in the concrete is constituted by a community of projects.”
5.6. Conclusion.

The text of Kayamandi is a brief exposition on the quest for *ikhaya*. The main point underlined in the exposition of this text is that of participation, and that means both materialistically and in own rationality. Another point is that our democracy is ideologically contested. It remains as such for as long as the creative imagination of the black masses, their symbols of rationality, and their deserved normative values of life, justice, protection and so on are silently absent in this new dispensation. Yet, in the shadows of the kraal, blacks permanently struggle to reclaim their expression in public life. They initiate associations for burials, groceries, recreation, weddings and project in the face of omnipresent death in *ikhaya*. 
EPILOGUE

The black Struggle Against Gestell

In this study a critical and eclectic view of western categories in publicity has been attempted. In other words positive appropriations and critical rejections of western views of publicity characterize the approach of this work. The work realistically acknowledges sediments deposited on the banks of Africa, indeed heavy flows into the kraal, ubuhlanti, from the “Age of Europe” right into the apartheid and through into the newly found democratic dispensation. At best, intercourse between modernity and Africa continues with all its hazards.

In crafting the oikos model, ecclesiology constitutes the cornerstone for Everett’s theory of public. The relationship between a political system and its ensuing institutional practices with the sacred and transcendent places the role of religion in public at a high pedestal. The fundamental lesson in this regard was that democracy changes the boundaries of religion and thus presents a new topography for religion in public life. This necessitated an examination of the modern democratic state.

Our examination of the modern democratic state followed on Everett’s assertion that it is fragmented. Inevitably, the patterns of thought and values of the modernist paradigm needed some involved scrutiny. From this what comes out is that the Enlightenment gains shifted the boundaries of publicity to rationality and dualist categories. While the place of an individual, his/her freedom was finally attained, the relationship of the individual person with another one and equally so with the components of public life is not easy to resolve. The ongoing attempts to deal with this problem as shown by the razor sharp sociological and philosophical analysis of Habermas yield helpful insights for the contemporary discourse.

The main point of our response to the modern problems of publicity is that the connection of oikos with modernity, albeit important and real, cannot avoid to plunge the African horizon into its violent experience. This was the case at the encounter between the west and black in South Africa.
So the gains of modernity do not automatically include the joy of the black people in public life as they still struggle for this up to this day. The adoption and use of the gains accrued in the struggle for the emancipation of an individual person as the Enlightenment project indicates by blacks thus becomes problematic if their emancipation in publicity is not vivid. This problem becomes much more pronounced when publicity is viewed as a “profession,” “participation,” “confirmation” and “property” to a “world” of a given public. The need to give this profession, ipso facto, full expression, demands confirmations and properties rooted in the history of the black African masses. What is proper for black masses is their emancipation in public life.

The philosophical basis of self which permeates internal discourses of western publicity is shown to be different from that of the African world. While the reality of advanced modern capitalization is not disputed, what it does to black masses is argued to be the most crucial point of departure. For this reason liberating possibilities are sought in the African relio-political symbol of ikhaya rather than options to manage or cope in the fragmented modern public life. Oikos is denuded of its western garb.

We are thus challenged to kraalonize our public discourse. The inspiration of the black masses is in the kraal for them to root democracy in South Africa. Ubuhlanti is the seat of that inspiration. The ecclesiology of ikhaya does not only offer possibilities in the face of challenges for tswelepele but intrinsically possesses these attributes through Ubuntu. Furthermore, kraalonization is about the resilience of ikhaya that stood the test of time. Shown in the limbo of township life, the transmutations of ikhaya evidently witness to the negotiation of ikhaya with external influences. Openness of ikhaya to the challenges of democracy is evident in this history and beckons us for serious public engagement.

True to Aristotle’s view that humanity is the zoon politikon, black historico-cultural experience with the west is lock stock and barrel political. It is out of this horizon of a politically lived background that we can engage modern democracy and this means our historico-cultural milieu. According to Fanon, the concrete political process of anti-colonial confrontation is a metaphysical experience. While the lived psychosocial pathologies of the encounters between the colonizers and the colonized is
important, it is the emancipatory possibilities that we looked for in the quest for *ikhaya*.

As "political beings" publicity is about all of us being included in public life. In the government that is legitimate, Black Theology is challenged to be in solidarity with the black masses in a struggle against the en-framing mind of the dominant in the democratic order of our contemporary society. It is the association of Black Theology with absent symbols and values of the black masses in public life that will present better possibilities for black expression in public life.

Such religio-political symbols we search for in the amorphous bastardized situations such as the limbo of the township. We discover the vitality of association in *imibutho* and *imigalelwano*. We discover the lost joy and hilarity of the black person in the *M adiba Jive*. We find a new consciousness emerging in the *domocracy* of township life. Yes, in our quest for *ikhaya* the African initiated programs find footage and we take our place on the global stage and mimic no one.

There is no publicity and public life in South Africa without black expression. Publicity is about a full expression of the democratic dispensation through the black "mind," the frame, the rationality of the marginal voices. This is the only condition for persuasion without which there is violence. Against *Gestell* and forward with a *Gestalt* public of life.
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THESES


## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abantu bekhaya</td>
<td>Members of a home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amabobosi</td>
<td>A term usually used to refer to shacks in isiXhosa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amabomvana</td>
<td>This term originally refers to a tribe. It later came to connote those who are not educated-the red-blanketed. The word bomvu means red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amagoduka</td>
<td>Those who are going home. In urban centres the term refers to people (migrants) who hold their original homes in the rural areas as their home de facto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amagqoboka</td>
<td><em>Those with holes or the hollow ones.</em> This term was coined to refer to a class of people who welcomed western civilisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amajwara</td>
<td>The name of the clan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amakhosi</td>
<td>Kings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amamfengu</td>
<td>A clan made up mostly of tribes that came form Amazulu and got dispersed during the Wars of Shaka usuallu called Umfecane or Dofaqane is Sesotho.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaqaba</td>
<td>This usually refers to a group of people who rejected western ways of living. These would smear ochre on their faces and the verb for smearing is gaba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amatshipa</td>
<td>Those who do no longer go home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AmaXhosa</td>
<td>A tribe indgenous in the Eastern Cape grouped among the Nguni people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batho pele</td>
<td>People first.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badimo</td>
<td>Ancestors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enkulu</td>
<td>Great one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Isithunzi</em></td>
<td>Shade, dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lilikishi</em></td>
<td>Township</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Imfundu</em></td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Khumbula</em></td>
<td>Remember</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lehele</em></td>
<td>Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lobola</em></td>
<td>A token given to the bride's family for the union of marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mokhukhu</em></td>
<td>A shack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mekgatio</em></td>
<td>Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Moketa ho tsoswa o itekang</em></td>
<td>An expression meaning that those who take the initiative to help themselves will be helped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Modidi ke moloi</em></td>
<td>An expression meaning that a poor person is an adversary when not treated well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ominyama</em></td>
<td>The black one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Omhlophe</em></td>
<td>The white one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>O sicel'indawo</em></td>
<td>Phrase in the township to refer to those who ask for a place to sleep or accommodated. It became rife when migrant labourers were visited by their wives/families. They would go around asking for a place from those who were allocated houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Omenala</em></td>
<td>Decorum/harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sesotho</em></td>
<td>The language of the Basotho people, a nation that was formed by Moshweshwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tswelophele</em></td>
<td>Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tirelo</em></td>
<td>Work. Usually associated with ancestor veneration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ityotyombe</em></td>
<td>A shack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Inkaba</em></td>
<td>An umbilical cord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Imibutho</em></td>
<td>Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Imbutho</em></td>
<td>A throng. The word is mostly used negatively i.e. to designate a group or a meeting of people whose purposes are not good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Inkosikazi</em></td>
<td>Woman or queen. A married woman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Incubeko</em></td>
<td>Civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Inkqubela</em></td>
<td>Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Isintu</em></td>
<td>The African way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Isilungu</em></td>
<td>The western way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ikhaya</em></td>
<td>Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Inkosi</em></td>
<td>King or monarch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>IsiXhosa</em></td>
<td>The way of AmaXhosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Isimilo</em></td>
<td>Character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Imizi ayifani kufan iintanda</em></td>
<td>Idiomastic expression meaning homes are the same even though they are different. &quot;homes identical save with kraals&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Indlu</em></td>
<td>House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Iziko</em></td>
<td>Fire place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Isiko</em></td>
<td>Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Izithethe</em></td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Imbeleko</em></td>
<td>A ceremony for childbirth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ubutyotyombe</strong></td>
<td>The shack life. Patterns of behaviour associated with squalour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukuqaba</strong></td>
<td>To smear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umlungu</strong></td>
<td>A white person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umntu uyinkosi ukuzazi</strong></td>
<td>An expression meaning one knows oneself better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ubuntu</strong></td>
<td>The way of a person. A term or concept meaning the morality, philosophical view of the Africa people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umntu ngumntu ngabantu</strong></td>
<td>I am because we are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukutshipa</strong></td>
<td>To abandon home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukwakha umzi</strong></td>
<td>To build a home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukuhlanjwa</strong></td>
<td>A ceremonial cleansing of a person from his/her home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ubulwane</strong></td>
<td>The way of animals. To behave like an animal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uqamata</strong></td>
<td>The name of the deity of AmaXhosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umzi</strong></td>
<td>Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ubuhlanti</strong></td>
<td>Kraal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umsebenzi</strong></td>
<td>Work. Veneration for the ancestors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umthonyama</strong></td>
<td>Dung carpet in the kraal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umgquba</strong></td>
<td>Dung or manure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Umgobozo</strong></td>
<td>Gossip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ubundlobongela</strong></td>
<td>Crime or acts prone to ruthless behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ubugxhwayiba</strong></td>
<td>Squalour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>