SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
WITH ANGOLA, 1975 - 1988:
A STRUCTURAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE

by L.J.D. Devraun

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Relations
in the Department of Political Studies
at the University of Cape Town
Cape Town
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SOUTH AFRICA IN ANGOLA

1975 - 1988
D.D.D.

to my Russian forbearers
ABSTRACT:

There are an enormous number of competing interpretations of South Africa's apartheid era policies both in the region and towards Angola. With South Africa's role in the Angolan civil war as its case study, this paper evaluates the relative utility of certain selected approaches to international relations theory.

This paper evaluates the relative utility of system level versus unit level theories to explain the nature of South African involvement in the Angolan conflict. These two categories are represented by neo-realist structural theory and, secondly, by a variety of unit level theories typically concerned with South Africa's domestic environment. This dissertation demonstrates, through the actual events, the utility of these two distinct theoretical approaches.

Given the above approach and objectives, the methodology consists firstly of a critical conceptual review and analysis of each paradigm as a useful explanation of South African foreign relations. It consists secondly, of a more "empirical" assessment of their value in accounting for or illuminating significant aspects of the internal and external sources of motivation for South Africa's military intervention.

The empirical evidence is examined according to four stages: firstly; a review of the related literature, secondly; South Africa's initial intervention and the presence of US aid in 1975, thirdly; the widening of the conflict post 1978 under P.W. Botha, and fourthly; the departure of all the major foreign influences and final resolution of the Angolan conflict. This exercise extends until 1988 which, in December of that year, witnessed the cessation of all external intervention. The conclusion recommends further research in the form of empirical case studies which consider both the application of international relations theory as well as the military dimension of the conflict.
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ACRONYMS:

AG  Administrator-General
ANC  African National Congress
ANGOP  Angolan Press Agency
APC  Armoured Personnel Carrier
ARV  Armoured Recovery Vehicle
BOSS  Bureau of State Security
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CIO  Central Intelligence Organisation
CMEA  Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CONCP  Conferencia Organizações Nationalistas das Colonias Portuguesas
CP  Conservative Party
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DFA  Department of Foreign Affairs
DISA  Direção de Informação e Segurança de Angola
DMZ  Demilitarized Zone
DPRA  Democratic Popular Republic of Angola (FNLA and UNITA)
DTA  Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
EC  European Community
ELNA  Angolan National Liberation Army (FNLA Armed Forces)
FALA  Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (UNITA Armed Forces)
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>FAPLA</td>
<td>Forcas Armadas Libertacao de Angola (MPLA Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICO</td>
<td>Front for Independence and Continuity with the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td>Frente para a Liberatacao do Enclave de Cabinda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAE</td>
<td>Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICV</td>
<td>Infantry Combat Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Commission (to oversee cease-fire agreements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMLPA</td>
<td>MPLA Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Multi Party Conference</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola</td>
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<td>MPLA-PT</td>
<td>MPLA-Partido do Trabalho</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRL</td>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launcher</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSMS</td>
<td>National Security Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Organisation for Angolan Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partido Communista de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIDE</td>
<td>Policia International e de Defesa do Estado</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLUA</td>
<td>Partido da Luta does Africanos de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>People's Republic of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacional Mocambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAAF</td>
<td>South African Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
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<td>SAI</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>State Security Council</td>
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<td>SWANU</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People's Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWATF</td>
<td>South West African Territory Forces</td>
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<td>TAZARA</td>
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<td>TNS</td>
<td>Total National Strategy</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTA</td>
<td>National Union of Angolan Workers</td>
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<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPA</td>
<td>Uniao des Populacoes de Angola</td>
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<td>UPNA</td>
<td>Uniao des Populacoes do Norte de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
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CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY:

1.1 General Comments:

This dissertation seeks to evaluate the relative utility of certain selected approaches to international relations theory with, as a specific case study, the Republic of South Africa’s role in the Angolan civil war throughout the period 1975-1988.

The research strategy employed is inductive logic rather than hypothetical deductive due to the large amount of historical and factual detail involved in this work. Therefore, the data is analysed according to the “research-then-theory” strategy. Since the framework of enquiry in inductive logic, hypothesis are stated later in the thesis at the end of each chapter, after having evaluated the paradigms chosen against the quite considerable historical and factual detail.

Delineating a time period for such an analysis is always to some extent arbitrary. Nonetheless, there are valid reasons for choosing 1975 as a commencement point as it represents a watershed of sorts in South African foreign policy. The year 1975 witnessed the departure of Portugal’s colonial presence from Angola and Mozambique. The latter nation acquired independence under Samora Machel, a self-declared Marxist who immediately allowed Rhodesian guerillas sanctuary from which they could carry on their attacks against the Smith regime.

In Angola, Portugal’s armed forces which had seized power in Lisbon finally had their morale broken after fourteen years of anti-colonial warfare. Eighteen months later, in November 1975, Portuguese officials hastily departed from Angola leaving in their wake a chaotic civil war between three rival liberation movements which each had the
backing of one or more outside states. Angolan independence was achieved and the majority of the local Portuguese population, numbering 340 000, fled. By mid 1975 ripples from the chaos and civil war in Angola had spread to the border of SWA/Namibia which had implications for South African interests in the region (1).

Angola was representative of the death throes of colonialism but possessed even greater symbolic significance as an integral aspect of Portugal's African empire and, as such, was the last bastion of colonialism remaining on the continent. It was also representative of the escalating struggle for indigenous control of Southern Africa and constituted the first decisive battle charting the evolution of political developments across the region.

For South Africa's Vorster Government, Angola represented an ominous step forward in the communist drive seeking to dominate Southern Africa and, for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), it served as a sad testament to African ineffectiveness and disunity in either preventing the conflict or reconciling the warring parties as well as the OAU's subordination to the interventionist designs of external powers. The nature of foreign intervention in what had become a "tempestuous teapot," and the constellation of forces in the region, ensured that before independence was achieved the South African Defence Force (SADF) had penetrated Angola in a campaign to prevent victory by the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA (Klinghoffer, 1980:2).

The reasons for choosing 1988 as the end period for this study are perhaps more apparent than the reasons for having chosen 1975 as its point of commencement. The year 1988 marked a certain decisive shift both internationally and in the Southern African region. The first round of American-sponsored peace negotiations, in London
at the beginning of May, was the beginning of an eight month marathon of intense negotiations between the external powers involved in Angola. The twelve Angolan/South African/Cuban meetings subsequent to the initial meeting in London culminated in the historic signing of The Bilateral Agreement between Angola and Cuba and the Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa at the end of 1988. With these diplomatic triumphs, South African and Cuban intervention in Angola came to a dramatic end.

1.2 Identification of Problem and Methodology:

In terms of methodology, the problem to evaluate is the relative utility of system level versus unit level theories to cogently and convincingly explain the nature of South African involvement in the Angolan conflict over the period 1975-1988. These two categories, which adhere to a different level-of-analysis, are represented by neo-realist structural theory and, secondly, by a variety of unit level theories typically concerned with South Africa's domestic environment. This dissertation demonstrates, through the actual events, the utility of these two distinct theoretical approaches.

Given the above approach and objectives, the methodology consists firstly of a critical conceptual review and analysis of each paradigm as a useful explanation of South African foreign policy formulation. The methodology consists secondly, of a more "empirical" assessment, in Chapters Three to Five, of their value in accounting for or illuminating significant aspects of the internal and external sources of motivation for South African actions in Angola.

Through a careful and detailed empirical assessment of the actual political/diplomatic (both domestic and international) and strategic/tactical events, this dissertation presents the totality of the Angolan conflict, and South African
intervention, in all its dimensions (2). In this manner, the first paradigm considered moves beyond Waltz's sole emphasis on the political and beyond Buzan by considering, in addition to his strategic sector, a tactical military dimension as well. The latter dimension becomes especially evident in the military developments of 1987-1988 considered in Chapter Five.

A considerable body of literature exists that may be used to inform the discussion of the theoretical strengths and weaknesses or ambiguities of either of the two chosen paradigms (or bodies of literature). The research methodology for this part of the thesis therefore consists of a careful critical evaluation of the main theoretical texts or arguments, in addition to a thorough appraisal of the comments made in the associated secondary literature.

1.3 Levels-of-Analysis:

In any area of scholarly inquiry there are always several ways in which the components of a study may be sorted and arranged for the purpose of understanding and predicting the phenomenon under consideration. Indeed, the level-of-analysis upon which any theory of international relations is based is a matter of methodological importance (3). David Singer asserted that the level-of-analysis at which a theorist views the world was important both conceptually and methodologically. More specifically, he argued that there are both advantages and disadvantages regardless of which level-of-analysis is selected by the theorist (4). The problem also involved the question of whether the theorist should focus upon the parts or upon the whole (upon the components or upon the system) (5). In Singer's essay scholars were conveyed as concentrating on either the whole - the international system - or as specialising in

The utilisation of theory derived from more than one level-of-analysis should provide a deeper understanding of international events than that which can be obtained where only one level has been employed. According to Yalem, the prevailing tendency of international relations theorists is to confine themselves to one level-of-analysis (7). However, greater insights and a more complete picture of events can be derived from the application of another level-of-analysis. This dissertation therefore evaluates two bodies of literature each of which is primarily based on a different level-of-analysis (Singer, 1961:77-92, Yalem, 1977:322-326).

Singer recommended that, while the case for one or another level-of-analysis cannot be made with any certainty, one must nonetheless maintain a constant awareness of their usage (8). Indeed, this awareness of levels-of-analysis is necessary within the context of this dissertation in discerning between the two main bodies of literature. However, it is necessary to move beyond mere awareness and make some attempt at theoretical integration of the various levels-of-analysis or at least to interrelate them (9).

1.4 Sectors:

Barry Buzan's notion of sectors assists in filling this methodological gap which has not been filled by Singer's discussion of levels-of-analysis. The idea of levels-of-analysis, like sectors, is an abstract construct. However, the use of sectors has the advantage of highlighting certain qualities of whatever it is which is under consideration. According to Buzan, "Sectors are a way of unpacking the confusion of
the whole." They furthermore confine the scope of inquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables at play (Buzan, 1993:30-34).

Buzan poses the question, *whether a viable theory can be constructed within a sector or whether to do so inevitably confuses the sector with the whole* (10). He argues it is difficult to disentangle the economic, political, societal and strategic threads that make up the whole. Buzan's sectors necessarily overlap as each sector is a partial view of the whole. Sectors are not separated by clear boundaries like those between levels-of-analysis. Indeed, the whole metaphor of separation and boundaries is simply inappropriate. This is because the distinction between sectoral boundaries is to be found as much in the observer as the thing that is being observed. In contrast, boundaries between levels-of-analysis are more wholly within the thing being observed and serve to identify distinct elements of causality (11) (Buzan, 1993:32).

According to Buzan, following the sectoral path to theory means assuming that sectors can be made distinct. Generally the definition of system in terms of units, structures and interactions illustrate the validity of levels of analysis extending across all sectors. However, while the categories of levels may extend across all the sectors their contents may differ. Buzan therefore suggests constructing the relationship between sectoral subdivisions and levels-of-analysis on the assumption that levels-of-analysis refer to horizontal subdivisions of the "field" of the international system while sectors refer to vertical "subdivisions" of the same field (see Exhibit 1.A.). This scheme enables the viewer to consider levels-of-analysis either in terms of the international system as a whole (by collapsing the sectoral divisions) or in terms of specific sectoral subdivisions (by defining the levels in terms that are bounded by one or more sectoral subdivisions) (12) (Buzan, 1993:32-33).
Buzan's sectoral approach, coupled with levels-of-analysis, is especially valuable as it enables this dissertation to expand the neo-realist perspective by transcending the limitations of Waltz's Theory of International Politics. This hybrid approach renders the neo-realist perspective more appropriate for the study of internal and external motivations for South African actions in Angola. In contrast, an exclusive reliance on the Waltzian version of the neo-realist paradigm would have been both limited and less useful in applying this paradigm to the study under consideration.

Exhibit 1.A.
Conceptual Subdivisions of the International System
(adapted from Buzan, et al., The Logic of Anarchy, 1993)
1.5 Overview of the Chapter by Chapter Outline:

The empirical evidence of the Angolan conflict is examined according to four stages: firstly, a review of the related literature, secondly, South Africa's initial intervention and the presence of US aid in 1975, thirdly, the widening of the conflict post 1978 under P.W. Botha, and fourthly, the departure of all the major foreign influences and final resolution of the Angolan conflict. This exercise extends until 1988 which, in December of that year, witnessed the passing of the Brazzaville Accord, The Bilateral Agreement between Angola and Cuba for the Termination of the Cuban Military Contingent, and the Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa (see Appendices Three, Four, and Five for text of agreements). The final chapter consists of the conclusion as well as recommendations for future research.

In terms of Section 1.2 - Identification of Problem and Methodology - one recalls that this dissertation seeks to evaluate the relative utility of system level and unit level theories to cogently and convincingly explain the nature of South African involvement in the Angolan conflict. The following methodological considerations therefore become evident in Sections 1.5.2, 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 below:

In Chapter Three (1975-1977); system level neo-realist structural theory is most useful due to the overwhelming degree of international involvement of the major powers and their proxy states during this unique period in twentieth century cold war history.

In Chapter Four (1978-1986); sub-national or unit level theory focusing on South Africa’s domestic environmental variables offers by far the best explanation in light of the nature of South Africa’s leadership, their personalities, the rise of the security state and the militarization of South African society.

In Chapter Five (1987-1988); in this end period, which is more complex and less readily definable than the previous time periods of Chapters Three and Four, the two theoretical paradigms (or bodies of literature) are deemed to be of equal usefulness in explaining the end of South African involvement and the departure of all the major external actors from Angola.
1.5.1 Chapter Two: Review of the Related Literature:

This chapter traces the historical development, and engages in a modest survey, of the various schools of thought of international relations theory (13). Critical comparative analysis differentiates the various theoretical approaches.

1.5.1.1 The First Body of Literature:

The first body of literature, concerned with system level neo-realist structural theory, considers the work and/or secondary comments of the following authors: Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Barry Buzan et al., Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, John Lewis Gaddis, and Henry Kissinger.

1.5.1.2 The Second Body of Literature:

The second body of literature, concerned with predominantly unit or sub-national level theory (14) and specifically with South Africa's domestic environment, considers the work of the following authors in detail: Rob Davies, Joseph Hanlon, Kenneth Grundy, Deon Geldenhuyys and Hennie Kotzé and Philip Frankel (15).

1.5.2 Chapter Three: The Republic of South Africa's Initial Intervention in the Angolan Conflict (1975 - 1977):

This chapter may have more appropriately been called the "Multiplicity of Intervention by External Actors" as South Africa's intervention was only one part of the larger whole in the 1975-1976 period. It is however crucial to portray the totality of international intervention in this chapter so as to more fully understand South Africa's specific role.

Angola, a seemingly insignificant nation without strategic value prior to 1974, essentially became a microcosm of Cold War conflict lending credence to Rosenau's observation that major powers "test each other's strength and contest each other's influence through involvement in the internal wars of small neutral nations" because the destructiveness of nuclear weapons has minimised the likelihood of total war. Indeed, Angola became an arena for determining the parameters of the Soviet-American
detente relationship and was accompanied by polemics reminiscent of the height of the Cold War (Klinghoffer, 1980:2).

It would appear to a state such as South Africa, trying to ensure the survival of white minority rule in a hostile and increasingly threatening environment at home and abroad, that intervention in Angola was essential to South Africa's national security interests and continued survival. Furthermore, South African perceptions and actions in this period must be seen in light of the Clark Amendment which ensured that South Africa and UNITA were facing the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA without crucial American support (16). The end of American aid rendered the threat of Soviet and Cuban influence all the more ominous and influenced South Africa's behaviour accordingly.

This chapter seeks to identify and address the causes and motivations which compelled the Vorster Government to militarily intervene in Angola as an opportunity to influence political developments there. At his time in history the causes and motivations at play in the region and the broader international system lend themselves well to a system level analysis.

Kenneth Waltz, a neo-realist, adhering to a purely structural systemic theory of international relations draws a clear distinction between analytic (reductionist) as opposed to systemic theory. The former, which he dismisses as inadequate, accounts for causation at the individual or national level (17). By contrast Waltz's systemic theory, in which the internal characteristics of states are deemed irrelevant, is a macro level theory but is nonetheless of some utility in assisting to explain South African involvement in Angola at the height of the various internationalist interventions in 1975-1976 if not later in the conflict.

The neo-realist concern that systemic wars between the great powers are the only threat to structural stability, although limited in an important number of respects, nonetheless lends itself to the task of accounting for South African actions in light of the cold war scenario confronting that nation in the mid 1970s: the balance of regional
forces apparently tipped in the Soviet's favour coupled with the USA's inability to continue crucial support due to a Congressionally imposed ban.

1.5.3 Chapter Four: The Widening South African Involvement in the Angolan Conflict Under the Leadership of P.W. Botha (1978-1986):

In the 1980s the regional balance of power as it had existed, prior to the massive superpower intervention of 1975-1976, gradually began to reassert itself. This evolution usefully illustrates the discontinuities between global versus regional orders. South Africa, as a regional giant, could anticipate having a great deal of manoeuvrability and autonomy within the region under regular circumstances (18). During the period of greatest superpower penetration in the region, however, South Africa was unable to capitalize on its hegemonic dominance due to the overwhelming international constraints operating at the international system level.

South Africa, in global terms, is a small and insignificant nation (19). As the presence of the superpowers receded, and the trend toward superpower retrenchment became clear, the normal regional power balance gradually began to reassert itself. This was accompanied by renewed pressure on the states to the north to resume normal relations with South Africa through, for example, the Nkomati Accord of March 1984 which confirmed the regional subsystems autonomy in South Africa’s favour. While the internationalisation of the region put South Africa on the defensive, the regionalisation of the region reaffirmed South Africa’s status as hegemon.

The second body of literature, predominantly unit level or sub-national in nature and concerned with South Africa’s domestic environment, is as useful in Chapter Four as the first body of system level literature was in Chapter Three (20). Throughout this time period the policy of destabilization became the defining feature of regional policy. As argued by Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotzé, the concept of Total National Strategy (TNS), and by implication South Africa’s militaristic policies towards its neighbours, were the product of P.W. Botha’s assumption of power in September 1978. The policy of destabilization was logical result of P.W. Botha’s inclinations

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brought about by his personality type and past professional background as Minister of Defence for the previous twelve years.

As Joseph Hanlon and Robert Davies demonstrate, there were two primary aspects of South Africa's regional policy of destabilization. They were firstly; the commitment to strike against the ANC and SWAPO which was done without regard for national borders, and secondly; the implementation of coercive economic measures so as to deepen the dependency of the front line states on South Africa.

According to Philip Frankel, the policy of regional destabilization, in Angola and other front line nations, was the direct and natural result of military penetration into the foreign policy arena of the South African state. In Frankel's view, the appearance of military chiefs at top decision-making structures lent a distinct strategic colouration to the South African decision-making process. To the extent that military personnel succeeded in imposing their narrow and strategic world view on their civilian counterparts, public policy very much became a matter of direct security calculations.

Kenneth Grundy likewise concentrates on the role of the SADF in domestic politics attributing the influence of the military, as a force in South African politics, largely due to their close personal relationship with the head of state. The security establishment positioned itself at the centre of power and became an active participant in decision-making. Accordingly, those associated with a military perspective "have gained the ascendant" not only in military matters but in wider security issues, both domestic and external. Grundy and Frankel's notions furthermore reinforce the importance attached to P.W. Botha's assumption of power in September 1978.
1.5.4 Chapter Five: The Final Period: The Process and Departure of All Major Foreign Influences from the Angolan Conflict and South African Withdrawal (1987-1988):

This final end period (1987-1988) is both more complex and less clearly definable than the previous time periods addressed in Chapters Three and Four. Ultimately, the two theoretical paradigms (or bodies of literature) are deemed to be of equal usefulness in explaining the end of South African involvement and the departure of all the major external actors from Angola.

As stated by Rob Davies, in the first quarter of 1988 there was a sudden de-escalation by South Africa accompanied by their cooperation in the American sponsored negotiations based upon the principle of linkage. The beginning of the second quarter of 1988 marked a decisive turning point and watershed in the regional struggle. Suddenly, at this time, South Africa appeared to be placing greater emphasis on diplomacy and economic action through which to advance regional policy objectives. According to Davies this decisive shift was attributable to a variety of domestic and regional considerations factors including the SADF's (presumed) defeat at Cuito Cuanavale.

By contrast, Chester Crocker (a realist) regards South Africa's departure from Angola as the logical result of the end of Soviet aid and the departure of Cuba's military presence. Therefore, once the vital strategic interests for which South Africa intervened were removed, South Africa likewise responded. This axiomatic responsiveness is in keeping with the neo-realist view that the foreign policy of a relatively small state is of little significance on the international stage and is therefore defensive and responsive in nature. There is certainly some truth in the argument of vital security interests as is evidenced in comments made by P.W. Botha, Magnus Malan and General Jannie Geldenhuys. And, indeed, the convergence of Soviet and American interests for the first time since the Second World War undoubtedly had a role to play in the resolution of regional conflicts around the world (as is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five).
This neo-realist point of view does not, however, reflect the full story. Why, for example, is South Africa not involved in Angola now? In one sense at least, that question is not answerable unless one considers the sub-national level-of-analysis by taking into account internal government considerations. The new government of Nelson Mandela, the product of a lengthy liberation struggle, would not engage in a militaristic campaign against their former allies which sheltered the ANC during the apartheid era at great risk to themselves. Regardless of whether this somewhat whimsical notion is valid or not, there are certainly other non system level causes which are of importance in explaining South Africa’s participation in American sponsored negotiations and eventual departure from Angola.

Therefore, one must not entirely accept Chester Crocker’s bias because he wrote the definitive book on the subject. In light of the empirical evidence, this dissertation also considers the theoretical possibilities put forth by the second paradigm (or body of literature). This involves not only taking account of important domestic influences in South Africa but also those of the Soviet Union, Cuba and, to a lesser extent, the United States. The Soviet Union’s unbundling of its ideologically-aligned empire, for example, cannot be fully explained without considering Gorbachev’s unique personality, that country’s dramatic internal decline, and its state of economic crisis. Their failure to consider sub-national factors is one of perhaps many reasons why neo-realist American theorists failed to predict the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, many foreign policy observers appeared to be caught by surprise by the momentous events of 1989 and 1990.
1.5.5 Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations for Future Research:

This chapter consists of a very brief and concise conclusion highlighting the major theoretical conclusions of the dissertation. Chapter Six also introduces recommendations for future research along two lines of argument: firstly; neo-realist structural theory, and secondly; Angolan military events. The second paradigm, concerned with South Africa's domestic political environment and other forms of internal causation, is not addressed to any extent as the theories discussed are deemed adequately insightful and appropriate for understanding the internal structure of the South African state (21).
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE:

(1) According to Robert Jaster and Robin Hallett, by mid 1975 there were strategic developments within Angola which were perceived to portend an adverse influence in terms of South African interests in the region. Firstly, under the terms of the Alvor Agreement of 15 January 1975, the Marxist oriented MPLA established an office less than 50 kilometres north of the border. This created the fear that radical sentiments would spread among the Ovambo population which, in turn, would swell SWAPO's base of support. Secondly, in July the commander of South African forces in SWA/Namibia warned that SWAPO was taking advantage of the increasing chaos resulting from the collapse of Portuguese authority to consolidate its position in Cunene Province, bordering SWA/Namibia. Indeed, emboldened SWAPO guerrillas had already attacked SADF convoys inside SWA/Namibia throughout the month of July.

All the while, a serious refugee problem developed due to the southward movement of fighting between rival factions. Alarmed at the destabilizing effect of the sudden arrival of 11 000 refugees in bordering SWA/Namibia, South Africa established two refugee camps on the Angolan side of their common border. Fourthly, Vorster was concerned about a joint South African-Portuguese project, consisting of two major dams on the Cunene River just inside the Angolan border, that were to provide an important source of hydro electricity and water in northern SWA/Namibia.

(2) Of Buzan's four sectors (economic, political, societal and strategic) the economic sector is considered to be of the least relevance to this study. The societal sector, as Grundy, Frankel, and Geldenhuys and Kotze amply demonstrate, is closely interlinked with domestic politics in South Africa which, prior to the 1994 election, reflected the Afrikaner ethnic and cultural identity.

(3) Many theorists, and especially those concerned with global change, argue that the notion of levels-of-analysis is an archaic and outdated approach which should be abandoned. Levels-of-analysis are, however, deemed applicable in the context of this dissertation as the two bodies of literature under consideration operate at notably different levels of analysis. Neo-realist theory operates at the level of the international system and the literature concerned with South Africa's internal decision-making milieus operates at the level of the national sub-system (the unit level). In this particular dissertation both bodies of literature are considered to be of some utility in explaining Angolan events throughout the period under study.

David Singer, in an article published in 1961, first analysed the problem of levels-of-analysis.

(4) Singer did not advocate either of his approaches stating: "For a staggering variety of reasons the scholar may be more interested in one level than another at any given time and will undoubtedly shift his orientation according to his research needs" (Singer, 1961:90).
(5) While the selection of either level-of-analysis is ostensibly a mere matter of methodological or conceptual convenience the choice, however, often turns out to be quite difficult and may become a central issue within the discipline concerned.

(6) P.A. Reynolds’ terminology regarding levels-of-analysis is slightly different. What he labels as the macro level of international relations is distinct from the micro level-of-analysis. The micro level-of-analysis is typically concerned with the domestic decision-making environment. It focuses on the behaviour of relevant individuals, groups and organisations as the means by which to explain international relations. In contrast, the macro level-of-analysis focuses on nation-states within the system of states, the nature of their interactions and inter-relationships, and how and why and in what sense they change or remain stable (Reynolds, 1990:7 and 185).

In the micro level-of-analysis, he considers a variety of mechanisms within the internal or domestic environment which influence foreign policy decision-making. According to P.A. Reynolds, foreign policy actions are constrained by the perceived circumstances of the state on behalf of which individual decision-makers are acting. The domestic environment of decision-makers encompass a variety of factors, including: a nation's geography, economy, demography, political structure, culture and traditions, as well as the military-strategic situation of that nation. The domestic political context is further constrained by various groups which may claim to represent the national interest. However, in all nations the domestic political context, to some degree, constrains foreign policy decision-makers. This constraint may derive from the actual events, or from the aspirations of politically significant individuals/groups or from social convention or other traditions (Reynolds, 1990:80).

(7) Ronald Yalem nonetheless acknowledges the cogency of Singer’s argument that propositions drawn from different levels-of-analysis which may be theoretically valid may not be combinable because they are deduced from different frameworks (Yalem, 1977:324).

(8) On this subject Singer states: “We may utilize one level here and another there, but we cannot afford to shift our orientation in the midst of a study. And when we do in fact make an original selection or replace one with another at appropriate times, we must do so with a full awareness of the descriptive, explanatory, and predictive implications of such a choice” (Singer, 1961:90-91).

(9) Singer’s contribution on this point is disappointing. He argues that the different levels of analysis “defy theoretical integration” and that “they are not immediately combinable” (Singer, 1961:91).

(10) Buzan warns, the obvious danger in this method, is that the observer may begin to confuse the partial reality of the sector with the total reality of the whole (Buzan, 1993:31). Waltz, for example, confines his theory to the political sector only.

(11) This will later become more evident and will be illustrated in greater detail in Chapter Two.
Buzan believes the four sectors listed - economic, political, societal and strategic - cover the main preoccupations of international relations theorists. Waltz's theory, as the title of his 1979 publication suggests, is an attempt to define levels-of-analysis exclusively within the political sector. Buzan considers this confinement to be both a source of strength and a limitation of neo-realism (Buzan, 1993:33).

The author of this dissertation does not consider the entire spectrum of international relations theory in historical perspective as some have suggested. It is neither the purpose of this dissertation nor would it significantly inform the events under consideration.

The author of this dissertation has no intention of making the same error as Kenneth Waltz does in labelling everything which is not explicitly systemic as "units." As discussed in Section 2.4.4 of Chapter Two, by defining a system simply in terms of a structure and interacting units Waltz could not avoid pushing a vast array of causes and effects down to the unit level. As Barry Buzan (1993) states: "Many acknowledge the analytical centrality of his ideas on structure, but few are comfortable with his conclusion that all else is thereby relegated to the unit level." Therefore, a more appropriate term to describe the level-of-analysis of the second body of literature may perhaps be "sub-national" or, alternatively, "units" but certainly not in the same rigid manner as that which Waltz employs.

This survey is by no means comprehensive. In addition to those whose theories are discussed in detail in Chapter Two, the following are considered within the context of this work. They are (in no particular order): Robert Jaster, Willem Steenkamp, James Barber and John Barratt, Colin Legum, John Marcum, Tony Hodges, David Birmingham, Willem Steenkamp, Fred Bridgland, Jannie Geldenhuys, Rajan Menon, Hasu Patel, Thomas Ohlson, Chester Crocker, Bruce Porter, Neil MacFarlane, A.J. Klinghoffer, Helmoed-Römer Heitman as well as others. As is evident from this list not all are of a theoretical orientation but are nonetheless deemed to be in some way informative.

The Clark Amendment, officially recorded as the Tunney Amendment, was a ban on U.S. military aid to any Angolan party. Originally adopted for one year in December 1975, the ban was extended in 1976 and efforts to repeal it failed in 1977-1978.

With an analytic (reductionist) approach the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and interactions of its parts. Waltz's choice of the adjective "reductionist" to sweepingly describe anything other than the systemic level-of-analysis is unfortunate. According to Buzan, Waltz's "concern to develop a structural theory led him into a terminologically unfortunate distinction between reductionist theories (those at unit level), and systemic ones (those about structure). By this route, his usage of terms such as "systems theory" and "systems level" makes the term system effectively a synonym for structure. In confusing system and structure in this way, Waltz made his theory unnecessarily provocative, helping the case of those who wish to dismiss him as a structural determinist" (Buzan, 1993:28).
South Africa was the unrivalled superpower in the region both in economic and military terms. Transportation facilities, the principal lines of which had been established by the 1930s, constituted the umbilical cord determining the conduct of inter-state trade. The land-locked nature of Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland virtually dictated their continued dependence upon railroads and ports under South African control. The vital necessity of access to ports and railroads compounded the economic dependency of neighbouring nations upon South Africa. Hence, the economic patterns that emerge cannot help but be asymmetrical and the political ramifications equally distorted.

South Africa, with the greatest level of industrialization and infra structural development, was the undisputed economic powerhouse in the region. The most imposing structural characteristic of Southern African affairs was the virtually unchallenged economic domination of South Africa. In 1976 the GDP per capita was (in US dollars) $170 in Lesotho, $170 in Mozambique, $330 in Angola and a comparatively enormous $1 340 in South Africa (World Development Report, 1978). The GDP figures for 1983 reflect little change in the disparity of income between South Africa and her neighbours.

(19) While it is not the intention of this dissertation to argue that the Republic of South Africa, the dominant hegemon in the region, is a small and less significant nation in the global balance this theme would nonetheless constitute an interesting area of future research. The following literature pursues the subject of foreign policy formulation by small states to varying degrees:

Aron, Raymond, Peace and War
Baker Fox, Annette, The Power of Small States
Handel, Michael, Weak States in the International System
Spence, J.E., Republic Under Pressure; A Study of South African Foreign Policy
Vital, David, The Inequality of States
Vital, David, The Survival of States

(20) Please refer to Endnote Fourteen regarding the question of terminology.

(21) This is a humble personal value judgement given that the author of this dissertation is an outsider of sorts.
CHAPTER II:
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE:

2.1 General Comments:

Chapter Two, Review of the Related Literature, is informed by the previous discussion, in Chapter One, of methodology, levels-of-analysis and sectors. The inadequacy of Kenneth Waltz's purely structural systemic theory of international relations results in the necessity of having had to consider Barry Buzan's sectors in Chapter One. The critical weaknesses of Waltz's theory are dealt with in greater detail in this chapter in Section 2.4.4. This chapter essentially engages in a review of the related literature according to two general categories. As stated, the first body of literature is concerned with causation at the system level and the second with causation predominantly at the unit level.

2.2 Review of Classical Realism:

Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War was written in an attempt to explain the causes of the great war of the Fifth Century B.C. between the coalition led by Athens and its adversaries, led by Sparta. In this ancient work, the three most fundamental realist assumptions are evident: firstly; that the most important actors in world politics are territorially organised entities (city states or modern states - realism is state-centric), secondly; that state behaviour can be explained rationally, and thirdly; that states seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power relative to the nature of the international system in which they operate (1) (Keohane, 1986:7).

In post-medieval Western Europe, it is not difficult to understand the appeal of realism in a competitive state system and why it came to be regarded as plausible (2). Critics of power politics, such as Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace (1795), did not exercise decisive influence over those in power. By contrast, in the UK and even more so in the USA, there was a greater tendency to envisage alternatives to power politics and to question the premises of political realism. The arbitration movement.
Woodrow’s Wilson’s stance throughout the First World War (3), and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1927 to “outlaw war,” all are representative of the legalistic and moralistic approach to international relations (4) (Keohane, 1986:8).

However, by the late 1930s, these idealistic theories were in decline in the nations where, historically, they had been well regarded (5). On the eve of the Second World War, E.H. Carr published The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-39 “at a time when war was already casting its shadow on the world, but when all hope of averting it was not yet lost.” Carr’s publication represents a classic attack on the concepts of harmony of interest and of morality unrelated to power in world politics. Carr states, in no uncertain terms, that “the exposure, by realist criticism, of the hollowness of the utopian edifice is the most urgent task of the moment in international thought” (Carr, 1939:113).

The Second World War elevated political realism to prominent status in Anglo-American thinking on international affairs. Hence, it is not surprising that the period surrounding the Second World War witnessed the revival of power politics in the USA with John Herz, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann and Hans J. Morgenthau articulating political realism in contrast to the utopianism, moralism, and legalism associated with the liberal writers of an earlier era (Newnham and Evans, 1992:339-341).

Hans J. Morgenthau has been called the pope of foreign policy realism (6). Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, originally published in 1948 and like Carr’s 1939 publication, represents a declaration of war on the legalistic and moralistic tradition that had previously prevailed in American foreign policy. What Morgenthau offered as an alternative was called “political realism.” The most integral principle of realism is its understanding of politics as interest defined in terms of power (7). This concept delineates politics as an autonomous sphere of action apart from other spheres. Morgenthau maintains that leaders, both past and present, think and act in terms of interest defined as power. Morgenthau regards this feature as the enduring essence of politics (8) (The Atlantic Monthly, November 1985:131, Morgenthau, 1948:8).
2.3 The Central Importance of Waltz:

According to Barry Buzan, since the 1979 publication of Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*, neo-realism has become the dominant school of thought in international relations theory (9). Accordingly, *Theory of International Politics* (TIP) shaped much of the theoretical debate in the 1980s and reactions to it still reverberate in the literature of the 1990s. By developing the idea of a structural explanation of power politics Waltz revived the previously flagging fortunes of political realism. Since its publication TIP has inspired a critical literature and has also given rise to a number of attempts at application (10) (Buzan, 1993:1, Evans and Newnham, 1992:339-341, Keohane, 1986:4).

Buzan’s 1993 publication, *The Logic of Anarchy*, pays Waltz’s TIP the highest compliment by taking it as its starting point. Perhaps most important reason involves Waltz’s insight into structure and TIP’s provision of an intellectual framework which has become part of the standard equipment of the profession. According to Buzan, for more than a decade “TIP has been shot at, embellished, misunderstood, and caricatured but never quite displaced” (11). Furthermore, since a disproportionate amount of the contemporary debate revolves around the assertions of Waltz there is good reason to take his brand of neo-realism as the basis for the first of two bodies of literature considered in the context of this dissertation (Buzan, 1993:5-6, Evans and Newnham, 1992:339-341, Keohane, 1986:4).

2.4 Review of the Modern Neo-Realist Literature:

In his 1959 publication, *Man, the State and War*, Kenneth Waltz deals explicitly with three distinct levels or "images" of international relations. Waltz, engaging in a survey of the three levels, identifies the international system in which nation states operate as the level-of-analysis to be pursued in international relations. He cites Rousseau who finds the major causes of war "neither in men nor in states" but in the state system itself (12). The study of politics is distinguished from other aspects of the
social sciences by its concentration on the institutions and processes of government (Waltz, 1959:1-16).

The study of international politics, on the other hand, is characterised by the absence of truly governmental institutions (13). Possible answers to the more complicated task of international relations may fall into three categories: within man, within the structure of separate states or within the state system. These images of international relations, numbered in the order given, are defined according to where one locates the nexus of important causes. In other words, the first image identifies the locus of causation in human behaviour, the second in the internal structure of states and the third in the international system (14). In his 1959 publication Waltz dismisses the first two levels-of-analysis in favour of the latter. Two decades later, in his 1979 publication, Waltz builds upon his assumption that causation occurs at the international system level (15) (Waltz, 1959:1-16).

2.4.1 Kenneth Waltz - Theory of International Politics (1979)

In *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz draws a very clear distinction between analytic (reductionist) as opposed to systemic theory. The former, which he dismisses as inadequate, accounts for causation at the individual or national level. With a reductionist approach, the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and interactions of its parts. For example, the effort to explain international politics by studying national bureaucrats and bureaucracies, is reductionist. In contrast, the latter theory, which Waltz adopts, conceives of causes operating at the international level. Waltz maintains that reductionist theory will only be sufficient where systems-level effects are absent or are weak enough to be ignored. Under these circumstances Waltz would regard reductionist theory as inadequate (Waltz, 1979:80).

2.4.2 Systems Level, or Structure, Versus the Level of Interacting Units:

A system is composed of a structure and a set of interacting units. On one level, a system consists of a structure and the structure is the systems-level component that makes it possible to think of the units as forming a set distinct from a mere collection.
At the other level, the system consists of interacting units. The aim of systems theory is to show how the two levels operate and interact and that requires delineating one from the other. According to Waltz any approach or theory termed "systemic" must show how the systems level, or structure, is distinct from the level of interacting units. Definitions of structure must omit the attributes and the relations of units. Only by doing so can one distinguish changes of structure from changes that take place within it. According to Waltz, the level of interacting units or process level is irrelevant and must be separated from the systems level in seeking to explain systemic change. Hence, in Waltz's view, the distinction between the two levels must not be confused (16).

2.4.3 Three Features of Waltzian Structure:

Three propositions follow. Firstly; structures may endure while, personalities and interactions may vary widely. Structure is sharply distinguished from the level of actions and interactions. Secondly; a structural definition applies to widely divergent realms so long as the arrangement of parts is similar and, thirdly; because this is the case theories developed for one realm may, with some modification, be applicable to other realms as well. Waltz states, "Since structure is an abstraction, it cannot be defined by enumerating material characteristics of the system. It must instead be defined by the arrangement of the system's parts and by the principle of that arrangement" (Waltz, 1979:80).

Waltz first seeks to define domestic political structures which are centralised and hierarchically ordered. A domestic political structure is defined according to, firstly; the principle by which it is ordered, secondly; by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units and, thirdly; by the distribution of capabilities across units. Waltz's three-part definition of structure includes only what is required to show how the units of the system are positioned or arranged. Everything else is omitted in order to analyse the expected effects of structure on process and of process on structure. This can only
be accomplished if structure and process are distinctly defined. Waltz then applies his three-tiered definition to international politics. (Waltz, 1979:88-92)

2.4.3.1 Ordering Principles:

Firstly, in terms of the ordering principles, each part of the international political system is the equal of the others. None is entitled to command and none is required to obey. Whereas domestic systems are centralised and hierarchically ordered, international systems are decentralised and anarchic. Domestic political structures have a concreteness in government institutions and offices. International politics, in contrast, has been called "politics in the absence of government" (17). International political structures are defined in terms of the primary political units be they city-states, in ancient Greece, or nation-states in modern times. Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it will be constrained. International political systems, like economic markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended. In both systems, structures are formed by their units. Whether those units prosper or die depends on their own efforts. Both systems are formed and maintained according to the principle of self-help (18). Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states can be endlessly varied. However, survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities (Waltz, 1979:91-92).

2.4.3.2 Character of the Units:

In terms of the second aspect of Waltz's definition of structure, the character of the units, hierarchy in domestic political structures entails relations of super- and subordination among a system's parts and that implies their differentiation. In defining domestic political structures the first aspect of the definition, like the second and third, is needed because each term points to a possible source of structural variation. In contrast, states which are the units of international political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform. Anarchy entails relations of coordination.
and that implies sameness. Hence, the second aspect is unnecessary in defining international political structures because, so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units. International structures vary only through a change of organising principle or, alternatively, through variations in the capabilities of units. While Waltz concedes that states have never been the only international actors, he maintains that structures are not defined by all the actors that flourish within them but only by the major ones. So long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined by them (Waltz, 1979:93-94).

2.4.3.3 Distribution of Capabilities - A System Wide Concept:

In terms of the third and final aspect of Waltz's definition of structure, the distribution of capabilities, the parts of a hierarchic system are related to one another in ways which are determined both by their functional differentiation and by the extent of their capabilities. The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks. However, Waltz identifies two problems. Firstly, capability does tell us something about units. Defining structure partly in terms of the distribution of capabilities seems to violate Waltz's argument to keep unit attributes out of structural definitions. States are differently placed by their power. Waltz states "yet one may wonder why only capability is included in the third part of the definition, and not such characteristics as ideology, form of government, peacefulness, bellicosity, or whatever." Waltz's answer is that power is estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units. Although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities across units is not. The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but a system wide concept. Hence, a variation in structure is realised, not through the differences in the character and function of units, but only through distinctions made among them according to their capabilities (19) (Waltz, 1979:98).
2.4.4 Critical Weaknesses of Waltz's Theory of International Politics:

Common criticisms of Waltz, among others, are that his theory is narrow, static, deterministic, suffers from an exclusively political perspective and cannot deal with change. On one count, that he is narrow and static, it seems readily apparent that Waltz is ahistorical and ignores both history and human subjectivity (20). On the next count, the charge of structural determinism, Waltz's critics may not be entirely fair. As noted in Chapter One, Waltz's terminology may be unnecessarily provocative (21).

Nonetheless, according to Buzan, there is little reason to criticise Waltz's decision to focus on system structure. The relative simplicity of structure in comparison with the unit level made the clear identification of structure the means by which to define the boundary between the two levels. Furthermore, Waltz was fully aware that a structural theory would by definition focus mainly on the continuities in the international system. Waltz was also fully aware structural causes could never offer more than a partial explanation of international outcomes: "one must ask how and to what extent the units account for outcomes." Waltz further states "structure operates as a cause but it is not the only cause in play" (Waltz 1979:78,87, Buzan, 1993:22-23).

Nonetheless, to Waltz's discredit, he seemed insensitive to the difficulties created by his very tight definition of system structure for other systems analysis approaches to international relations. He defined a system simply as composed of a structure and interacting units and therein created difficulty. Using this method Waltz could not avoid pushing a vast array of causes and effects down to the unit level. Since his primary purpose in establishing the unit-system boundary was to elaborate theory at the system level, Waltz naturally paid little attention to unit factors once they had been banished beyond the realm of his structural definition (22) (Buzan, 1993:24).

The result is that Waltz's definition effectively appropriated the whole content of the system level for his own narrow definition of structure. In the process, he forced down to the unit level all other attempts to conceptualise the international system in general terms. According to Buzan, "Many acknowledge the analytical centrality of his
ideas on structure, but few are comfortable with his conclusion that all else is thereby relegated to the unit level" (Buzan, 1993:25).

Similarly, Keohane and Nye maintain "making the unit level the dumping ground for all unexplained variance is an impediment to the development of theory." They argue even if one understands both states preferences and system structure, one will nonetheless often still be unable to account adequately for state behaviour unless other attributes of the system are understood such as the character of international and transnational interactions as well as the nature of international institutions. Examining these systemic processes leads one to look more carefully at the interactions between system and unit characteristics or, in other words, how the preferences of actors are affected by the constraints and opportunities in their environments and vice versa (Keohane and Nye, 1987:745-746).

In terms of the criticism that Waltz suffers from an exclusively political perspective this is indeed true. His exclusive focus on the political sector is implied by the title of his 1979 publication. His purports to be a theory of international politics only. Buzan substantially improves upon this limitation by introducing the notion of sectors. The four sectors identified by Buzan are economic, political, societal and strategic. As earlier stated, Buzan's sectoral approach coupled with levels-of-analysis is especially valuable as it enables this dissertation to expand the neo-realist perspective by transcending the limitations of Waltz's TIP. This is discussed in greater detail in Section 1.4 of Chapter One and, for further elaboration of Buzan's research agenda, refer to Sections 2.4.6 and 2.4.6.1 of this chapter.

Waltz, in pursuing a purely structural systemic explanation of international relations, does not adequately account for change (23). A Waltzian systemic analysis would see significant change as having occurred once (in 1945) and would be unlikely to identify important changes since that time. Waltz's systems theory does not investigate how the order it analyses came about in the first place nor does it consider the relations of production or a whole host of other factors upon which that order
depends. As John Lewis Gaddis states, international systems are not immortal. They exist in time as well as in space which suggests the need to be sensitive to their evolution and prospects as to their structure (Gaddis, 1992:179).

2.4.4.1 Waltz's Evolution Towards the Less Deterministic:

In the final chapter of Neorealism and its Critics (1986), entitled "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," Waltz states: "I, like Durkheim, think of unit-level processes as a source both of changes in systems and of possible changes of systems, hard though it is to imagine the latter. Neither structure nor units determine outcomes. Each affects the other" (Keohane, 1986:328).

In this same chapter, of Neorealism and its Critics, Waltz further states: "Structures never tell us all we want to know. Instead they tell us a small number of big and important things. They focus our attention on those components and forces that usually continue for long periods (24). Clean and simple definitions of structure save us from the pernicious practice of summoning new systems into being in response to every salient change within a system. They direct our attention to the units and to unit-level forces when the particularity of outcomes leads us to search for more idiosyncratic causes than are found in structures" (Keohane, 1986:329).

Finally, Waltz himself in a 1990 article in the Journal of International Affairs admits how the unit level, or domestic politics, affects international structure and vice versa. Waltz states: "Neorealism reconceives the causal link between interacting units and international outcomes. Neorealist theory shows that causes run not in one direction, from interacting units to outcomes produced, but rather in two directions. One must believe that some causes of international outcomes are located at the level of the interacting units. Since variations in unit-level causes do not correspond to variations in observed outcomes, one has to believe that some causes are located at the structural level of international politics as well" (Waltz, 1990:34). In this final comment in particular it appears that Waltz, since his 1979 publication, has evolved and become less deterministic over time.
2.4.5 A Modified Theory of Waltz's Structural Realism:

Robert Gilpin, whose work is an effort to address change from a structural realist perspective, has a modified theory of Waltz's structural realism. In War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin does not seek to provide a theory of international relations but to provide a framework for explaining war and change. He wants to explain how middle powers can rise and challenge hegemonic powers at their apex. Gilpin does not focus on "static" entities such as balance of power or alliances but wishes to study change in a broader and more general framework.

However, a difficulty with using structural theories, such as bipolarity and hegemonic stability, to account for the post World War II peace is their static quality. Change within systems (in technology, weaponry, alliances) explains the outcomes of international relations. A "hegemonic stability" theorist, by definition, would be more concerned with what holds a system together than with how it came into being or how it might come apart. They shed little light on the forces that made stability in the first place and even less on those that may sooner or later undermine it (Gaddis, 1992:179).

Nonetheless, of some utility to the task as hand, are the five assumptions in Gilpin's analysis: the international system is stable, states will attempt to change the system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs; states will seek to change the system through expansion until the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits; once an equilibrium for change has been achieved by a hegemonic/dominant power, the political costs rise faster than the ability of the state to pay these costs, and finally; if the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established. On the basis of these assumptions, Gilpin's conceptualisation of international political change seeks to comprehend a continuing historical process in contrast to Waltz whose theory is regarded as ahistorical (Gilpin, 1981:10-11).
2.4.5.1 Gilpin's Notion of Hegemonic War:

Gilpin defines hegemonic war as that which determines which states will govern the system. From Gilpin's point of view hegemonic war is the dynamic of change. Power is defined according to the military, economic and technical ability of states. Calling upon Rader's definition that "a power equilibrium represents a stable political configuration provided there are no changes in returns to conquest," Gilpin views equilibrium as a dynamic concept which is in flux due to incremental and revolutionary change. This encompasses environmental, domestic and economic change as well as the three primary types of change (systems change, systemic change, and interactive change). Gilpin explains rather than predicts and therefore does not present a theory per se. Gilpin does not make predictions in the way Waltz does. There are patterns which are evident but the outcomes of these patterns depend upon a wide range of factors.

2.4.6 A New Theory of International Relations:

In The Logic of Anarchy, published in 1993, Barry Buzan et al., seek to construct a theory of international relations which they call Structural Realism (25). With Waltz's TIP as their foundation they identify the useful core of neo-realist theory on which to construct a more solid and wider-ranging structural realism. There are a number of characteristics which mark their theory of structural realism as a continuation of the realist tradition and a similar number of elements which constitute a departure from the realist tradition.

The three elements which mark Buzan's structural realism as a continuation of the realist tradition are firstly; that the anarchic political structure of the international system is still regarded as necessary. Secondly; the state remains the most important defining unit of the international system. Buzan, however, emphasises that this focus on the state neither closes the theory to other units nor constitutes a privileging of the political. Thirdly, the reformulated structural realism accepts Waltz's basic definition...
framework for international structure albeit with significant alterations (Buzan, 1993:10-12).

The three most important elements which constitute structural realism's departure from the realist tradition are firstly; that structural realism employs a much more open definition of structure which can be applied well beyond the confines of the political sector. Secondly; structure is not regarded as the only systemic level factor in play. Important aspects of interaction also have a systemic quality which radically affects the development and consequence of structure. Thirdly; structural realism does not rely on the positivist analogy with microeconomics that informs Waltz's theory (Buzan, 1993:10-12).

2.4.6.1 New Theoretical Horizons:

The combined impact of these similarities and differences give Buzan's structural realism a unique character. Four possibilities are consequently realised. They are firstly; that structure becomes a way of addressing history and not something detached from it. Secondly; there is an explicit linkage of units and structure through the logic of structure. This redefinition of deep structure leads to the third possibility. This consists of breaking away from the narrow logic of political interaction that dominates neo-realism and to look at a whole range of interactions (economic, societal, environmental as well as military and political) that shape both the units and the structures of the international system. The fourth possibility involves the facilitation of a clearer understanding of the relationship between the study and practice of international relations (Buzan, 1993:10-12).
2.5 Review of the Foreign Relations Literature Considering South Africa's Internal Milieux: Decision-Making Structures, Personalities and Organisations:

2.5.1 A View from the Left:

Rob Davies and Joseph Hanlon make an important contribution to the foreign affairs literature of South Africa during the apartheid era. Both are concerned with the enormously destructive role played by the apartheid regime among neighbouring nations which became known as the policy of destabilization. Joseph Hanlon is particularly interested in the economic destruction wrought by destabilization and the question of dependency. He sympathetically outlines the reasons for the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as a means by which the front line states sought to lessen their dependence on South Africa. Although largely non-systemic in orientation, both conduct their analysis from a regionalist perspective. The point of view of the region and the region as level-of-analysis (a theoretically undeveloped notion) is especially applicable in Chapter Four during which time destabilization became the defining feature of South Africa's regional relations under P.W. Botha (26).

2.5.1.1 Robert Davies:

Robert Davies' work of greatest relevance to the project at hand is firstly; the 1987 article, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978" (1985), written in association with Dan O'Meara and, secondly; Davies' 1989 article, "South African Regional Policy Before and After Cuito Cuanavale" (27).

Davies and O'Meara chronicle what they call the accord phase of regional relations which extends from 1984 until mid 1985. The Nkomati Accord, signed with Mozambique in March 1984, was more far reaching than the previous Lusaka Accord which was a limited cease-fire agreement only. The former was a comprehensive non-aggression pact which sought to re-negotiate aspects of economic relations between...
the two states. According to Davies, Mozambique saw Nkomati as defining a new pattern of regional relations based upon principles of international law.

According to Davies and O'Meara South Africa, by contrast, saw Nkomati in a wholly different light. P.W. Botha regarded Nkomati as a tactic and a device by which to remould regional relations in accordance with Pretoria's stalled "constellation of states" initiative. This involved generating a common approach on the economic and security fronts. With Nkomati as the vehicle they envisaged that South Africa would re-emerge as the dominant regional power whose internal status quo all interested parties would be compelled to accept.

Regionally, South Africa envisaged Nkomati leading other nations to enter into similar security arrangements which would immediately reduce support for the liberation struggle in the region. Over the longer term, Pretoria imagined Nkomati would promote acceptance of South Africa's hegemony by the nations to the north who would increasingly join South Africa in presenting a united front to the outside world.

Internationally, South Africa envisaged Nkomati as the means by which to end international isolation and be recognised on the world stage as the de facto regional power in Southern Africa. Pretoria believed foreign investors would regard the country as the regional power through which to channel investment to neighbouring nations. Foreign investment, it was thought, would substantially boost South Africa's crisis ridden economy as well as guarantee local firms a profitable stake in ventures elsewhere in the region (Davies, 1987:343-346).

2.5.1.1.1 South Africa's Escalating Destabilization of Its Neighbours:

By mid-1985 neither Mozambique nor South Africa had achieved the objectives they had sought from the Nkomati Accord. The accord phase of regional relations (1984 to mid 1985) was followed by a phase of escalating aggression and destabilization against neighbouring states. Pretoria seems to have concluded it could not hope to break out of international isolation by presenting a facade of good neighbourliness. Therefore, Pretoria judged it had little to lose by being seen to act
more aggressively in the region. Destabilization, never abandoned despite the signing of formal non-aggression treaties, escalated and became the main feature of South African regional policy (Davies, 1989:169).

At this point in time, South African defined two priorities of regional policy. The first regarded the commitment to strike decisively at the ANC and SWAPO presence in the region. SADF raids were launched against Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia. After the May 1986 raids against Gaborone, Harare and Lusaka, P.W. Botha stated:

> We will continue to strike against ANC base facilities in foreign countries in accordance with our legal right. We have only delivered the first instalment. We will certainly not be deterred by fanciful arguments that are being advanced here and abroad. South Africa has the capacity and the will to break the ANC. I give fair warning that we fully intend doing it (Davies, 1987:351).

By mid-1986, death and kidnap squads were being deployed against alleged ANC members in Swaziland and Lesotho. South Africa's second priority of regional policy, at this time, concerned the ability to respond to sanctions with coercive economic measures of its own against the nations to the north. South African counter-sanctions were intended to pressure regional states into withdrawing their support for sanctions as well as giving their tacit support for Pretoria's campaign. This strategy was intended to sustain South Africa's assertion that sanctions against it would only serve to victimise black South Africans and neighbouring states (Davies, 1987:351-353).

The militaristic aggression and destabilization which characterised 1987 and the first quarter of 1988 was a continuation of the cycle which had begun in mid-1985 (Davies, 1989:169). In 1987 General Geldenhuys reiterated the reason why South Africa desired to prevent UNITA's defeat by asserting that if the "Russian and Cuban supported Angolan forces" were to gain control over the area now "dominated by UNITA," then SWAPO would be able to "activate" Namibia's Caprivi and Kavango
areas and the ANC would have greater freedom to infiltrate South Africa (Jaster, 1988:101).

2.5.1.1.2 *South Africa's Sudden De-escalation, 1988:*

Throughout February 1988 senior South African officials appeared to be signalling their intention to escalate their assault on the region even further. Speaking at the scene of a rocket attack near Messina, Pik Botha told the press "We will no longer urge or encourage [neighbouring states] to attend regional peace conferences. They can go their own way ... the South African government has had enough. We reserve the right to act as we see fit." Speaking at the same time and place as Pik Botha, Defence Minister Magnus Malan ominously stated "Wherever the ANC is, we will eliminate it. If the Zimbabweans find themselves in between, I feel very sorry for them" (Davies, 1989:167).

However, within a few short months of these ominous statements promising South African escalation, there was notable de-escalation and sudden cooperation in the American sponsored negotiations (28). The beginning of the second quarter of 1988 marked a decisive turning point and watershed in the regional struggle (29). At this time, South Africa appeared to be placing greater emphasis on diplomacy and economic action through which to advance regional policy objectives. According to Davies, this decisive shift in South Africa's regional policy was not the product of the subjective intentions of decision-makers but the product of the objective conditions under which decisions are made. In other words, Pretoria retreated from escalating regional aggression because setbacks were suffered in the region, at Cuito Cuanavale for instance, making this militaristic course too costly an option to pursue (30) (Davies, 1989:172-179).

2.5.1.2 *Joseph Hanlon: (31)*

Prior to 1975, South African attempts at maintaining regional hegemony involved economic dominance and a political and military cordon sanitaire of white-ruled states. However, with the end of Portuguese colonisation and the increasing indigenisation of
Southern Africa, South Africa's security "arrangement" in the region was steadfastly unravelling. Majority rule in Zimbabwe came with the victory of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) in 1980 and directly affected Pretoria's dominance. With the ZANU victory there were nine newly created majority-ruled African nations which formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). South Africa's net profit on all dealings with the SADCC nations totalled approximately R1 500 million per year. SADCC, established in 1981, was an effort to reduce the economic dependence of its member nations on South Africa (Hanlon, 1987:332-333).

Indeed, wherever possible, South Africa sought to maintain economic dominance in the region. This economic power often translated into military and political power with quite considerable overlap between the three. Militarily, South Africa sought to ensure the nations to the north were not sheltering the ANC and SWAPO. In general, however, South African military power was used to enforce political and economic goals. The more dependent the nations to the north were on South Africa, the more vulnerable they were to South African pressure. Transport was one of the most vital aspects of dependency. South African destabilization or the threat of it deepened this dependency. For example, goods were transported through South Africa because alternative routes in neighbouring nations were disrupted or destroyed (32) (Hanlon, 1987:335).

2.5.2 The Militarization of South African Politics:

Kenneth W. Grundy's, The Militarization of South African Politics (1986) was the first comprehensive study of its kind. It examines the various institutional organs of security intelligence, both historical and contemporary, and argues that personalities have a great deal to do with the relative importance of these bureaucracies over time. Of cardinal importance to the process of decision-making, domestically and in the region, is the influence of personalities and the impact of competing bureaucracies (Selfe, 1986:14).
2.5.2.1 Close Relationship Between the SADF and the Political Leadership:

In this study, he illustrates the militarization of white South African society and cites specific examples of how this has facilitated the growth of the SADF as a power in domestic politics. He discusses the role the SADF has assumed in regional politics and in the campaign of destabilization among the frontline states. Grundy concentrates on the role of the SADF in domestic politics attributing the influence of the SADF generals, as a force in South African politics, largely to their close personal relationship with the head of state (33). Their influence, domestically and in foreign policy decision-making across the region, will grow or wane in accordance with the nature of their relationship with those personalities in positions of leadership.

The security establishment positioned itself at the centre of power and became an active participant in policy-making. Those associated with a military perspective "have gained the ascendant" not only in military matters but in wider security issues, both domestic and external, and even in matters concerning economic and foreign policy. The rise of the security establishment was evidenced by the growth in size and importance of public and private institutions and agencies concerned with security and defence. Security institutions increasingly demanded a greater voice and role in policy issues not normally associated with defence and security (Grundy, 1986:1-2).

2.5.2.2 Cultural Notions of Security and Survival:

According to Grundy, of preeminent importance in explaining their virtually unrestrained assertion of control are the ideologically laden Afrikaner cultural notions of security and survival (34). The Afrikaner ranks, largely represented by the National Party, had its locus of power in the cabinet. Cabinet power rested on the support of the caucus and information provided by the bureaucracy. Although each leader had variations in his leadership style, "by and large, each has had to conform to the demands of party structure and Afrikaner expectations." As challenges to Afrikaner power became more threatening, throughout the 1970s and 80s, professional experts in security and coercion joined traditional elements of Afrikaner power. According to
Grundy, "because of their expertise and substantive role in defence of the status quo, and because of the relatively clear consensus in the National Party on the efficacy of a coercive maintenance of order, the centrality of the security establishment is made palpably evident" (Grundy, 1986:5).

2.5.2.3 Security Establishment:

Grundy defines the security establishment thus: "The security establishment includes all those individuals and institutions, whether a formal part of the governmental and administrative apparatus of the state or attached to private and parastatal organisations, that are chiefly concerned with the maintenance of the South African state primarily by developing and employing the coercive instruments of the state or by weakening by various means the coercive arms of hostile states and movements" (Grundy, 1986:5-6).

The security establishment consisted of the SADF, the Department of Defence, and the South African Police (SAP). Various branches of the intelligence community, encompassing private and quasi-official think tanks, were also recruited into the ranks of the security establishment. Some governmental parastatal corporations, such as Armscor, were heavily defence oriented and were brought into the fold as were dozens of private firms which did Armscor work on subcontract. The State Security Council (SSC) and its secretariat, in the form of the Joint Management Centres (JMC), coordinated the participation of the various components of the security establishment (Grundy, 1986:5-6).

2.5.2.3 Bureaucratic Rivalry:

With direct implications in terms of SADF intervention in Angola, Grundy identifies the eclipsing of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) by other governmental departments and agencies even on decisions directly related to foreign policy. This displacement began under the leadership of B.J. Vorster with the rise of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the Department of Information with the associated personalities of General van den Bergh and Connie Mulder, respectively.
The DFA, in terms of bureaucratic manipulation, was outmanoeuvred and later outflanked even further by elements of the defence establishment. According to Grundy, it came as no surprise as the Angolan civil war unfolded that Hilgard Muller, then Foreign Minister, would take a back seat while more forceful personalities would contest the wheel.

Grundy characterises South African decision-making on Angola as essentially bureaucratic in nature: South Africa's original decision to intervene involved a battle between the Department of Defence in opposition to BOSS and DFA with the Department of Information assuming a supporting role. Likewise, the military hierarchy wanted to continue to aid the FNLA and UNITA while BOSS and DFA argued that the SADF's intervention was being used against South Africa as well as alienating many African and Western Governments that were not previously sympathetic to the MPLA or a Cuban presence in Africa (Grundy, 1986:90).

The South African leadership did, however, appreciate that little could be gained by committing more South African troops without more tangible Western support. When the South African leadership realised that Western assistance would not be forthcoming (presumably in reference to the Clark Amendment passed in the US Senate banning aid to any Angolan party) SADF leaders were willing, perhaps reluctantly, to pull back to more defensive positions. Also cited as contributing to this decision is the realisation that what had been a bush war had become more like a conventional war requiring a similarly costly commitment (Grundy, 1986:88-90).

2.5.2.5 Personalities and Bureaucracies:

Grundy paints a portrait of personalities and bureaucracies, and their competition, as being of central significance in the course of South African foreign policy decision-making. For example, it was BOSS which argued for SADF withdrawal and ultimately prevailed early in 1976. The climate of competition and distrust at the pinnacle of South African decision-making structures was further illustrated by major
confrontations between P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, and General van den Bergh, of BOSS.

For example, after the FRELIMO Government seized power in Mozambique, B.J. Vorster, in notable contrast to his posture in the Angolan conflict, took a conciliatory line. P.W. Botha took an opposing position and sought to support counterrevolutionary guerrillas in their attempt to unseat Samora Machel. While Vorster agreed to assist with the repair of Mozambique’s railways and harbours, simultaneously, Botha had secretly ordered the supply of extensive quantities of arms and ammunition to guerrillas operating from a base near Komatipoort. Adding to the intrigue, upon learning of Botha’s orders, van den Bergh sent military personnel to Nelspruit and Komatipoort to immobilize the equipment being transported to Mozambique (Grundy, 1986:91).

Grundy, characteristic of the theorists included in this second body of literature, predominantly adheres to a sub-national or unit level analysis. According to Grundy, South African foreign policy decision-making is overwhelmingly presumed to be the result of causation occurring at the level of interactions or units (such as the Afrikaner power structure, rise of the security establishment, militarization of white society).

2.5.3 Internal Decision-Making of the South African State:

Perhaps the piece most relevant to the analysis at hand is "Aspects of Political Decision-Making in South Africa" (1983) written by Deon Geldenhuys in association with Hennie Kotze (35). They maintain the analysis of decision-making should "begin with an understanding of the structures of the decision-makers involved." The decision-makers consist of an individual or group. Accordingly, they maintain the best way to identify the locus of power in a decision-making system is by "institutional or structural analysis" which highlights the role of the different actors allowing one to establish which individuals, groups and agencies within the government machinery feature in the power configuration (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983:33).

They embark on such an analysis of the central decision-making structures with specific reference to the place of the State Security Council (SSC), and the other
components of the Security Management System (NSMS), within these structures. Together, these factors are judged to be responsible for the configuration of "government structures for top-level decision-making" which, in turn, are portended to be the primary source of causation in South African decision-making and foreign policy formulation. According to Geldenhuys and Kotzé, instrumental to the genesis of the National Security Management System (NSMS) are three factors.

2.5.3.1 Three Factors of Strategic Policy Formulation:

Firstly, they cite South African involvement in the Angolan civil war (1975-76) in terms of the internal response required by the South African state apparatus so as to improve the channels for decision-making. Magnus Malan, described South African involvement in Angola as a venture which "focused the attention on the urgent necessity for the State Security Council to play a much fuller role in the national security of the Republic than hitherto." Malan's observation underlined the need at top government levels for a more regularised and formalised process of decision-making. Although established in 1972, the SSC had met only sporadically when an interdepartmental committee was appointed to urgently consider "the formulation of strategy at the national level" and the organisational structures required for that purpose. The end product of this investigation was the establishment of the central components of the NSMS (Geldenhuys and Kotzé, 1983:35).

2.5.3.2 Internal and External Security Concerns:

The second factor cited as instrumental to the genesis of the NSMS, and not unrelated to the first, was a concern with the internal and external security of the Republic. Commencing in the 1970s, this found expression in the reciprocal concepts of the total communist onslaught threatening South Africa's survival and the total national strategy as the requisite remedy. According to Defence Minister Magnus Malan, "The total onslaught is an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state." Magnus Malan maintains the aim of the communist inspired onslaught is "the overthrow
of the present constitutional order and its replacement by a communist-oriented black government." Necessary for combatting this threat was a total national strategy as defined in the 1977 White Paper on Defence and "specific policies" described in P.W. Botha's Twelve Point Plan (Geldenhuys and Kotzé, 1983:35).

The planned utilisation of the state's resources in this manner involved "the management of South Africa's four power bases (the political, economic, social/psychological and security bases) as an integrated whole." This was to be achieved by means of the overhauled decision-making structures of the NSMS with the SSC as its core. In this formulation, a combination of both internal and external factors produce particular policies and bureaucratic structures within the state (Geldenhuys and Kotzé, 1983:35).

2.5.3.3 Leadership Personalities:

The third factor cited by Geldenhuys and Kotzé, as responsible for shaping decision-making structures, is the influence of a leader's personality with specific reference to P.W. Botha's assumption of power in September 1978. His profession background and personal inclinations, during his previous twelve years as Minister of Defence, are used as relevant explanations of his proclivity for the concept of total national strategy. While Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha acquired a reputation as a competent administrator and, once elected, one of his first tasks was the overhaul of the official machinery for making and implementing decisions. The first phase of a comprehensive "rationalisation" programme was launched in March 1980 and aimed at the pinnacle of the power structure. The Office of the Prime Minister was, for example, greatly strengthened. The second phase of rationalisation commenced, in April 1980, when 39 existing government departments were consolidated into 22. The final phase, concerning finance, was implemented more gradually. This reorganisation of government structures, integral to the total national strategy, was presented as an outgrowth of Botha's new style of leadership, in keeping with his past professional experience (Geldenhuys and Kotzé, 1983:35-36).
2.5.4 **South Africa's Civil-Military Relations:**

Philip H. Frankel, in *Pretoria's Praetorians* (1984) explores civil-military relations so as to understand the nature of the modern South African state and its approach to decision-making. Frankel traces the development of the Union Defence Force (UDF), later the SADF, and analyses its place within the South African body politic. He argues that the SADF had been subjected to two important traditions, firstly; the British tradition emphasising the liberal view that a clear distinction needs to be maintained between the "professional" soldiers who are nominally neutral and the "amateur" political controllers of such soldiers.

### 2.5.4.1 Boer Tradition of A Citizen Army:

The second is the Boer tradition which emphasises the ethos of a citizen army whose role is essentially synonymous with, and a microcosm of, the state. Over time South African society has become increasingly militarized which has served to tip the scales in favour of the Boer tradition which, in turn, has led to an absorption of military chiefs into top decision-making structures. According to Frankel, "this dynamic, described as a dialectic between 'liberal' and 'kommando' conceptions of civil-military authority, sets the tone for ... the current militarization of South African society, the growth of the garrison state with its accompanying siege culture and the emergence of so-called total strategy representing a basic reinvigoration of the kommando ethic in the traditional heartland of Afrikaner political culture" (36) (Frankel, 1984:xxii).

Saliently, according to Frankel, the appearance of soldiers at the pinnacle of the policy-making hierarchy lends a distinctive strategic colouration to the decision-making process. Soldiers operating in this context relegate the non-military, political and economic, variables to the side-lines. To the extent that military personnel succeed in imposing their narrow and strategic world view on their civilian counterparts, public policy becomes very much a matter of direct security calculations. Frankel states: "in South Africa this is particularly the case in the foreign policy-making realm where the appearance of soldiers in the highest institutions of state has contributed to the down-
grading of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the network of key institutions developed to formulate policy under the Botha Government." Frankel cites Grundy in noting that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information (DFAI) has "fallen on hard times" (Frankel, 1984:149).

2.5.4.2 Bureaucratic Rivalry:

Militarization has had the effect of creating bureaucratic competition on foreign policy issues. Frankel characterises South African foreign policy decision-making in the region as essentially the product of a bureaucratic rivalry: the military, armed with their strategic military perspective on regional and international issues, vies with the bureaucrats of the DFA as each strive to set the foreign policy agenda. In Frankel's view South Africa's policy of regional destabilization, in Angola and other front-line nations, is a direct and natural result of military penetration into the foreign policy arena of the South African state.

This bureaucratic dialectic between the military approach, versus the DFA's political approach, to foreign policy decisions has proved critical in shaping South Africa's responses and policy towards Angola and Namibia. Frankel argues, in both cases, military leaders with access to central decision-making institutions have gained the ascendant in contrast to the DFA and its greater appreciation of inherent political considerations. The notable exception to the military's dominance of the South Africa state's decision-making apparatus was the decision to withdraw from the Angolan conflict in January 1976. In this specific instance, BOSS and DFA were able to impose the view on B.J. Vorster that a continued South African presence north of the Cunene would do incalculable harm to the Republic's image and interests in the West (Frankel, 1984:150).
2.5.4.3 Leadership Personalities:

The ability of the SADF to project its particular interpretation of regional developments onto the foreign policy-making realm is also derived from certain inclinations brought about by P.W. Botha's personality-type. These include P.W. Botha's inherent receptiveness to military views, his impatience with the civilian-oriented DFA as an inefficient and uncoordinated institution, and finally, his preference for relying upon military intelligence as the basis for his policy-decisions.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO:

(1) The three most fundamental assumptions of realism as identified by Robert Gilpin are slightly distinct from those identified by Robert Keohane. They are firstly; the nature of international affairs is essentially conflictual, secondly; the essence of social reality is the group rather than the individual, and particularly the conflict group, whether tribe, city-state, kingdom, empire or nation-state, and thirdly; the prime human motivation in all political life is power and security (Keohane, 1986:304-305).

(2) Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham point out that the nation-state is a comparatively recent phenomenon. It developed in Europe between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire with the emergence of the centralised state claiming exclusive authority within a defined territorial area. Keohane further argues that after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, with its legitimisation of the state system, political realism became generally accepted and especially so in continental Europe (Keohane, 1986:8, Evans and Newnham, 1992:258).

(3) For Americans of this era the dichotomy between their philosophy and that of the Europeans underscored the merit of American beliefs which disdained the concept of the balance of power and considered the practice of Realpolitik immoral. Proclaiming a fundamental departure from the precepts and experiences of the Old World, Woodrow Wilson's idea of world order derived from the faith of Americans in the essentially peaceful nature of humankind and an underlying harmony of the world. It followed that democratic nations were, by definition, peaceful. Therefore, once people were granted self-determination they would no longer have reason to go to war or to oppress others.

European diplomacy, in contrast, was predicated not on the peace loving nature of states but on their propensity for war. Wilson entirely rejected this approach as it was not self-determination which caused wars but the lack of it; not the absence of a balance of power that produced instability but the pursuit of it. Wilson proposed to found peace on the principle of collective security. In his view the security of the world called for, not the defence of the national interest, but of peace as a legal concept. The judgement on whether a breach of peace had in fact been committed required an international organization which Wilson defined as the League of Nations (Kissinger, 1994:221-222).

(4) Henry Kissinger argues the Kellogg-Briand Pact became another example of America's tendency to treat principles as self-implementing as the Pact was not combined with mechanisms, on the part of the international community, by which to identify and punish aggressors. Although the American leadership had enthusiastically proclaimed the historic nature of the treaty as sixty-two nations had renounced war as an instrument of national policy, they adamantly refused to endorse any machinery for applying it much less for enforcing it (Kissinger, 1994:374-375).
The idealists maintain that if humans have moral obligations to one another then so too must states. This view is premised on absolute moral values such as universal justice, human rights and self-determination which are considered to transcend parochial concerns such as national self-interest. Underlying idealism in international relations, is the belief in a common humanity consisting of a collective set of rights, duties and obligations. There is a corresponding belief in the necessity of global unity and cooperation so as to resolve moral issues of peace, security, harmony and environmental well-being.

Realism, on the other hand, considers states to create their own morality with the highest morality of all being the national interest. International anarchy dictates that self-help and self-interest are of preeminent importance in decision-making. Realism regards it as irrational not to recognise the centrality of national survival and international order. The pursuit of order and the balance of power take priority over the pursuit of justice, equality, human rights or freedom (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 189-190).

So fundamental a basis was laid by Hans J. Morgenthau's original 1948 publication that Robert O. Keohane maintains "neither Kenneth N. Waltz's Theory of International Politics ... nor the responses of Waltz's critics can be fully understood without some comprehension of Morgenthau's attempt to construct a theory of international politics" (Keohane, 1986: 10).

For Morgenthau the notion of national interest defined in terms of power is a central feature of state behaviour. Morgenthau's conception of national interest is rooted in the principles of national security and survival. According to Evans and Newnham, it is presumed that all other policy preferences are subordinate to the defence of the homeland and the preservation of territorial integrity. The issues at stake are viewed of such fundamental importance that the term "vital interest" is often used in this regard (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 258-259).

Due to Morgenthau's almost exclusive emphasis on military and economic factors, to the exclusion of others, the concept of interest defined in terms of power is regarded as outdated and has been largely superseded. According to David Singer, "... all such gross models suffer from the same fatal weakness as the utilitarian's "pleasure-pain" principle. Just as individuals differ widely in what they deem to be pleasure and pain, or gain and loss, nations may differ widely in what they consider to be the national interest, and we end up having to break down and refine the larger category" (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 258-259, Singer, 1961: 81).

According to Robert Keohane, "Whatever one's conclusion about the value of contemporary neorealism for the analysis of world politics in our time, it is important to understand realism and neorealism because of their widespread acceptance in contemporary scholarship and in policy circles. Political realism is deeply imbedded in Western thought" (Keohane, 1986: 4).
In *The Logic of Anarchy*, Buzan et al. list the following:

**Critical Literature:**
2. Spegele, "Three Forms of Political Realism" (1987)
3. R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change and International Political Theory" (1987)

**Attempts at Application:**
5. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multi Polarity" (1990)

The critical weaknesses of Waltz's theory are discussed in greater depth in Section 2.4.4 of this chapter.

Realism, taking its cue from the Machiavellian and Hobbesian models, argues international politics is essentially amoral and that notions such as justice, equality and freedom can only have application within the state (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 189). Waltz expounds: "implicit in Thucydides and Alexander Hamilton, made explicit by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, is at once a generalised explanation of states behaviour and a critical point d'appui against those who look to the internal structure of states to explain their external behaviour" (Waltz, 1959:7).

According to Evans and Newnham the crucial concept of anarchy literally means *the absence of government* but is often incorrectly used as a synonym for disorder and chaos. Hedley Bull believes an account of the history of Western thinking about international relations can be given in terms of anarchy. For further elaboration on this point please refer to Hedley Bull's 1977 publication, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Evans and Newnham, 1992:14-15).

These three levels roughly coincide with the two levels-of-analysis described by David Singer in his seminal article of 1961.

The differences between classical realism and its modern counterpart, neo-realism, are quite significant. Therefore, the student of international affairs must not equate Waltz's structural neo-realism with the classical realist tradition from which it is derived.

On this subject, Barry Buzan states: "Although Waltz undoubtedly rekindled interest in realism, he intended in TIP [Theory of International Politics] to distance himself from the older traditions of classical realism. For this reason he was happy to identify himself as a neo-realist" (Buzan, 1993:2).
(16) As stated, Waltz considers it essential to contrive a definition of structure free of the attributes and interactions of units. Definitions of structure must abstract from the characteristics of units, their behaviour, and interactions. These must be excluded in order to distinguish between variables at the level of units and variables at the level of the system. Abstracting from the attributes of units means leaving aside questions of political leaders, national institutions, and the ideological inclinations of states. Furthermore, this involves leaving aside questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states. According to Waltz what is left is “relation” after omitting attributes and interactions.

"Relations" is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they occupy vis-a-vis each other. Defining a structure requires ignoring how units interact and instead concentrating on how they are arranged or positioned and how they stand in relation to one another. Interactions, according to Waltz, take place at the level of units. How units stand in relation to one another, how they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. Rather, the arrangement of units is a property of the system. Hence, by leaving aside the personality of actors and their behaviour, one arrives at a purely positional picture (Waltz, 1979:80).

(17) Please refer to earlier Endnote Thirteen regarding Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham’s brief definition of anarchy and what it is not.

(18) On this subject, Evans and Newnham state: “For the realist the notion of self-help is a logical consequence of the anarchical structure of the international states-system. For the idealist it is the cause of it. Either way, self-help is endemic in international politics. Given that states are independent political units that are primarily concerned with their own survival and advancement but are not subordinate to a central authority, the idea of self-reliance is a compelling one. The search for security in a system of politics without government means that self-help is a necessary function of self-preservation” (Evans and Newnham, 1992:365).

(19) The final problem, regarding the distribution of capabilities in Waltz’s definition of structure, concerns relations defined in terms of interactions being excluded from structural definitions, although relations defined in terms of groupings of states do seem to tell us something about how states are placed in the system. Hence, why not specify how states stand in relation to one another by considering the alliances they form? Nationally or internationally, structural definitions deal with the relation of agents and agencies in terms of the organization of realms and not in terms of the accommodations and conflicts that may occur within them or the groupings that may be formed. By the same logic, an international political system in which three or more great powers have split into two alliances remains a multipolar system, a system in which no third power is able to challenge the top two. While market structure is defined by counting firms, international political structure is defined by counting states. In the counting, distinctions are made only according to capabilities (Waltz, 1979:97-99).
Waltz illustrates this point by stating "We do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities" (Waltz, 1979:99). What is asked is what range of expectations arises merely from looking at the type of order that prevails among them and at the distribution of capabilities within that order. There is an abstraction from the particular qualities of states and from all their concrete connections. What emerges from this abstraction is a positional picture. This positional picture is a general description of the ordered overall arrangement of a society in terms of the placement of units rather than in terms of their actual qualities (Waltz, 1979:99).

(20) According to Suzan, the complaint of narrowness arises from Waltz’s restriction of his inquiry to the international political system and from his sparse definition of structure. According to Suzan, “In combination these two restrictions exclude or marginalize a range of factors others see as being (1) structural, (2) important to outcomes, and/or (3) lying both beyond a strictly political domain and above a strictly unit level of analysis” (Suzan, 1993:25).

(21) As previously quoted in Endnote 15 of Chapter One, Buzan et al., state that Waltz’s “concern to develop a structural theory led him into a terminologically unfortunate distinction between reductionist theories (those at unit level), and systemic ones (those about structure). By this route, his usage of terms such as “systems theory” and “systems level” makes the term system effectively a synonym for structure. In confusing system and structure in this way, Waltz made his theory unnecessarily provocative, helping the case of those who wish to dismiss him as a structural determinist” (Buzan, 1993:28).

(22) While Waltz was always well aware that the unit causes played an important role in outcomes, and that “any theory of international politics requires also a theory of domestic politics,” Buzan maintains that since Waltz’s emphasis was on system structure, he was simply not interested in investigating what went on beyond his definitional boundary (Buzan, 1993:24).

(23) Robert Keohane, John Gerard Ruggie and others have also criticised Waltz for his inability to explain change.

(24) Indeed, Waltz provides a means of understanding, in more general terms, the larger systemic forces at play in Angola during the period of greatest superpower intervention.

(25) They envisage it as one theory among many and make no claim that it is the only valid way of conceptualising the international system (Buzan, 1993:20).

(26) The subject of a Southern African regional sub-system is an area of research interest to Professor Peter Vale of the University of the Western Cape and Professor Timothy Shaw of Dalhousie University, Canada. Further research into the regional sub-
systems level of analysis within the Southern African region could be a potentially productive area of future research.


(28) Evans and Newnham have this to say about the American sponsored negotiations: "Constructive Engagement - Term used to describe US policy towards Southern Africa from 1980 onward. The term was coined by Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and refers to US attempts to reform the South African system by working within it and honoring its rules. A form of "quiet" diplomacy which seeks to encourage White-led change in the region, focusing especially on Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola" (Evans and Newnham, 1992:65).

(29) According to Chester Crocker, when the London round of negotiations convened in the first week of May 1988 there was no way of knowing this would be the beginning on an ongoing process which would continue for the next eight months. The London meeting was to be the first of twelve Angolan-Cuban-South African meetings under American mediation.

(30) According to Rob Davies, "Pretoria's changed stance in the region was the product, fundamentally, of reverses on all the main fronts of regional destabilization ... But the most decisive of these was that suffered by the SADF at Cuito Cuanavale. A Cuban publication has aptly described Cuito Cuanavale as "South Africa's Waterloo:" it smashed the myth of SADF invincibility and revealed important windows of vulnerability" (Davies, 1989:172).

The enormously controversial subject of the "Battle for Cuito Cuanavale" is dealt with in some detail in Sections 5.7 and 5.7.1 of Chapter Five.


(32) Between 1980 and 1987 South Africa's war on its neighbours cost approximately 750 000 lives and more than R50 000 million in destruction and lost production (Hanlon, 1987:333).

(33) Grundy, however, was sceptical of the ability of the SADF to convert itself into a political junta.
Grundy states: "Policy still is predicated on a belief that South Africa is a besieged state, subject to the full panoply of hostile policies touching virtually every aspect of public life. Indeed, the very concepts of total onslaught and total national strategy are products of the military mind. That the agenda of government can be dictated by such a perspective itself attests to the extent of insecurity in [apartheid-era South Africa] (Grundy, 1988:1).


Frankel identifies the undoubted influence the concept of total strategy has had on the SADF and P.W. Botha. He points to the many consequences of the infusion of this concept in central decision-making structures and in the SADF itself. Like Grundy, Frankel wishes to illustrate the necessity of examining the military seriously in any analysis of the South African state.
CHAPTER III:

THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA'S INITIAL INTERVENTION IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1975-1977)

3.1 The Global Context:

It is imperative to place the period of prolonged anti-colonial warfare into its proper historical context. The years of the anti-colonial struggle, 1961-1975, coincided with the height of Cold War rivalry in what was a bipolar world. After 1945, the Truman Administration regarded the Soviet Union's expansion into Europe as yet another threat to international stability and responded by projecting American power onto the Continent but, unlike World War II, without an actual war. That same concern with potentially hostile aggregations of power shifted to the world at large as the Cold War intensified. By the 1950s any disturbance in the global status quo, however insignificant, may have appeared to threaten what was perceived to be the USA's global security interests (Gaddis, 1992:9).

The nature of the ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers was essentially characterised by competition over nuclear weapons. However, strategic interests in Europe and the emergence of a perceived power vacuum in the decolonising nations of the developing world also became the focus of American-Soviet competition. The traditional European colonial powers were eclipsed by the two dominant superpowers which jostled for influence and position in what would come to be regarded as their respective spheres of influence. In the era of decolonisation the formulation of superpower policies in the Third World was dominated by objectives related to their rivalry as opposed to the interests of new nations. In addition, John Lewis Gaddis reminds us that no one had ever envisaged an end to the Cold War. Hence, the developments which occurred throughout that period of Angola's history should be viewed in the context of the prevailing Cold War conflict which defined the nature of the international order at the time (1).
3.2 Prelude to Civil War and External Intervention, 1961-1975:

Commencing in 1961, three nationalist liberation movements began an anti-colonial struggle in Angola but were unable to either unify their forces or achieve any degree of military success against the Portuguese army. The tides turned in Lisbon, 25 April 1974, when a group of junior officers disillusioned by Portugal's colonial wars launched an armed coup against the Caetano regime (2). This action resulted in a ruling military council which was more amenable to decolonization in Angola (Somerville, 1986:40, Menon, 1986:132).

The process of Portuguese disengagement produced the Alvor Agreement which was signed 15 January 1975 by the Portuguese Government and three liberation movements, the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola), the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola) and UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola). The Alvor Agreement established a Transitional Government for the ten month interim period leading to independence set for 11 November 1975 (see Map, Appendix 1). The agreement represented an attempt, by the Portuguese, to create an independent Angolan government and, in so doing, promote a working relationship between the three factions in the period preceding independence (Somerville, 1986:41-42, Menon, 1986:132).

The Transitional Government, established 31 January 1975, was headed by a Prime Ministerial Council consisting of a member from each of the three movements. Government decisions would require a two-thirds majority. Under the agreement the armed forces of the liberation movements were to be integrated into a single, united, national army. A National Defence Commission, representing all involved parties, was appointed with the task of overseeing the integration of all troops into a mixed military force. Once this was achieved, Portuguese troops would gradually withdraw between 1 October 1975 and 29 February 1976. Democratic elections would be held prior to the end of October 1975 in anticipation of national independence (Hodges, 1976:47, Menon, 1986:132).
Although the nationalist leaders were formally committed to implementing the agreement, their historic rivalries did not diminish as the imminent arrival of independence drew nearer. Indeed, the struggle for power continued in a running battle of insults, slander, and physical attacks on one another. Unfortunately, Portugal lacked the authority to enforce its political will and, despite the consensus achieved on paper, the factions remained deeply divided along ethnic lines (3). As with all previous agreements between the MPLA and FNLA, none survived their signature. After the Alvor Agreement, factional fighting broke out and within weeks hundreds had died. Any hope of a peaceful transition to independence receded as the signatories of the Alvor Agreement became embroiled in a fratricidal struggle for supremacy and each competed for foreign support (Hodges, 1976:48, Somerville, 1986:41, Menon, 1986:132-133).

On the day of independence the Portuguese High Commissioner and all remaining Portuguese military personnel simply left. In the wake of their departure, Angola instead of peacefully becoming an independent nation was in the midst of civil war and witnessed the proclamation of two rival republics. While the MPLA proclaimed the People's Republic of Angola (PRA), based in Luanda, the FNLA and UNITA proclaimed the existence of the Democratic Popular Republic of Angola (DPRA), based in Huambo (4). With heavy Soviet and Cuban backing, it took the MPLA another three months of fighting to finally prevail over its rivals and establish control over the majority of the country (Hodges, 1976:47, Bridgland, 1986:151, Jaster, 1988:72).

3.3 The Nationalist Factions:

In terms of characterising the Angolan conflict, according to some typology of war, it may be viewed primarily as a liberation struggle. According to Klinghoffer, labelling the Angolan war as purely "civil" or "external" is an exercise in futility as it obviously incorporates ingredients of both (5). Most civil wars or wars of national liberation have some external linkages. Nonetheless, too often, the external aspects are overemphasised as the war is perceived in a global context. Therefore, one must

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be wary of obscuring the indigenous roots of conflicts which have become externalized (Klinghoffer, 1980:6). With this observation, and given that the Angolan war included a civil dimension in which three nationalist movements contested for power, it is useful to provide a survey of these competing movements.

3.3.1 The Nationalist Factions - MPLA:

MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola) was the most bourgeois, urban, and intellectual of the three movements. Its membership consisted of those most exposed to Portuguese education and culture and included many mulattoes (mesticos), assimilated blacks (assimilados), as well as some affiliated whites. Its core was composed of intellectuals with Portuguese university degrees and leftward leaning civil servants. While MPLA members generally had closer ties to the colonial administration than either the FNLA or UNITA and shared a common bond arising from their Portuguese heritage the MPLA was, nonetheless, adamantly opposed to colonial rule. It, therefore, shared ideological ground with Portuguese socialism and close ties developed. Uniquely, and in accordance with their Marxist orientation, the MPLA took the class structure of Angolan society as their basic unit of analysis as opposed to ethnicity. John Marcum comments that the MPLA's lack of ethnocentrism was facilitated by the integrationist effect of Portuguese language and culture. Along with the MPLA's Marxist ideology, their multi-ethnic inclination proved helpful in attracting Soviet and Cuban aid (6) (Klinghoffer, 1980:8-9, Somerville, 1986:36).

The MPLA received its greatest support from the mulattoes (mesticos), assimilated blacks (assimilados), and Kimbundu. The mesticos constituted roughly 1.5 percent of the population but had influence which far exceeded their numbers. They were heavily urbanized and were favoured by the Portuguese in education and employment opportunities. The assimilados constituted an even smaller percentage of the population but included the MPLA's first president as well as former president, Agostinho Neto (7). Both men were Mbundu coming from the Kimbundu people who reside in the region around the capital city of Luanda. They are Angola's second
largest ethnic group, constituting 18 percent of the population, and experienced the
greatest exposure to Portuguese colonial influence. The Portuguese Communist Party,
after World War II, organised an affiliate in Angola and was assisted by white
communist residents. The Partido Communista de Angola (PCA) was founded in
October 1955 and quickly broadened its base of support, merging with other leftists to
eventually create the MPLA in December 1956. The MPLA thus included communist
members from its inception (8) (Klinghoffer, 1980:9-10, Somerville, 1986:30-33).

3.3.2 The Nationalist Factions - UNITA:

UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) drew its base of
support from the Ovimbundu, Angola's largest ethnic group, which constituted 31
percent of the population. Although lacking educated cadres and arms, UNITA had the
benefit of a unified command structure under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi. After
leaving the FNLA in July 1964, Savimbi was invited to join the MPLA but instead
decided to establish a new nationalist movement under his control. He founded UNITA
in Angola in March 1966. Soon afterwards, in August 1967, UNITA witnessed the
severe curtailment of its operations when it was expelled from Zambia. Zambia, reliant
on Angola's Benguela Railroad for the transport of its copper exports, retaliated against
UNITA when some of its members inadvertently blew up a section of railway

UNITA drew most of its support from rural areas and, in addition to a lack of
educated cadres, had fewer arms and foreign contacts than the other two movements.
As a result, UNITA stressed self-sufficiency and guerrilla warfare (9). After Portugal's
military coup UNITA astutely tried to take advantage of its electoral popularity. In
addition, UNITA sought to minimize its military weakness by advocating a political
solution in Angola. Having acquired a reputation over time for being pragmatic and
resilient, UNITA tried to appeal to Angolan whites by adopting moderate positions
regarding racial issues and property ownership (Klinghoffer, 1980:13-14).
3.3.3 The Nationalist Factions - FNLA:

FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola) was both less intellectual and less urban than the MPLA while being more conscious of race and traditionalist in orientation. Other than its espousal of an anti-Marxist bias, the FNLA lacked any consistent or coherent ideology and regarded the MPLA as a collection of bourgeois, Marxist mesticos. The FNLA was based in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Zaire where it had military training facilities. It enjoyed the support of successive Zairian governments and, as a result, had land access to northern Angola which allowed it to prevent MPLA cadres from crossing through its zone of influence. The FNLA, infused with Bakongo cultural values, was the outgrowth of Bakongo political movements originating in the northwest region of Angola and among Bakongo emigres across the border in Zaire (10). Naturally, the majority of the FNLA's support base was derived from the Bakongo people, comprising 12 percent of Angola's population, and in Zaire. Many of the Bakongo emigres were French-speaking which served to further isolate them from their Portuguese-speaking counterparts in the MPLA and UNITA (Klinghoffer, 1980:12-13).

The FNLA was established as a result of the merger between the UPA (Uniao des Populacoes de Angola) and another party. In March 1961 the UPA organised a massive uprising in northern Angola. Their leader, Roberto Holden, achieved recognition and became the FNLA's secretary general. In April 1962, the FNLA established a government in exile, GRAE (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio). In 1961, Jonas Savimbi, an Ochimbundu, had joined the UPA and soon afterwards became foreign minister but left the FNLA three years later, in July 1964, denouncing the Bakongo's ethnic dominance of the movement. Militarily, the FNLA was better equipped than both the MPLA and UNITA combined and had the most conveniently located base in adjoining Zaire. However, it lacked experienced administrators, support in the capital and a sufficient level of OAU sympathy. It was also strongly identified with Bakongo interests (11) (Klinghoffer, 1980:12-13, Somerville, 1986:32).
3.4 Factional Fighting, Early to Mid 1975:

John A. Marcum provides an insightful explanation of the intense factional rivalry in terms of the legacy of clandestine activity inherited by each of the liberation movements. The reasons for each of Angola's three major ethno-linguistic communities producing a major liberation movement, each with a separate army and separate sources of external aid, merits examination of their shared history in a common struggle. The deep schisms dividing Angola's three insurgency groups were both ethnic and the result of Portugal's colonial policies (Marcum, 1976:409).

3.4.1 Portuguese Colonial Policies:

In terms of the latter, the Salazar government conducted a search and destroy policy in the 1950s towards individuals and groups in the colonies suspected of harbouring nationalist sympathies. The nationalist groups drew their members from a very small segment of the population and their leadership ranks were further limited by police harassment and lack of funds. Their membership remained parochial and never fully transcended the ties that bind in terms of ethnic and regional affiliations. Infiltrations and years in exile only reinforced mutual suspicions and extreme distrust. Their history of struggle in the face of repression, the insecurity of clandestine activity and, most importantly, the attitudes their history engendered did not immediately dissipate under new and changing circumstances. Hence, even with their long-fought-for goal of independence within range, the nationalist liberation movements nonetheless wasted much of their effort fighting one another (Somerville, 1986:26, Marcum, 1976:409-10).

3.4.2 Factional Character of the Civil Conflict:

According to Tony Hodges (12), indicative of the factional character of the Angolan conflict was the nature of the first major physical clash after the establishment of the Transitional Government. Less than two weeks after the Transitional Government came into being the MPLA launched an assault against their own expelled Eastern Revolt faction led by Daniel Chipenda. The MPLA attack succeeded in driving
Chipenda's group out of the capital. It was justified on the grounds that the MPLA's Eastern Revolt faction had not been recognised as a liberation movement by the Alvor Agreement and was, therefore, illegal. In reality, the MPLA's assault was motivated by their determination to avoid having a rival present in the capital. Chipenda was driven to seek the legal status that membership in a recognised liberation movement brought and, therefore, announced that his troops would join the FNLA. In April 1975 he was formally admitted to the Front and elected assistant secretary-general.

3.4.3 The Fight for Control of Luanda:

Fighting erupted in February 1975 between the MPLA and FNLA in Luanda (13). Fighting between the MPLA and Daniel Chipenda's followers also erupted in February 1975 and was soon followed by a virtual invasion of northern Angola by FNLA forces supported by the Zairian army. Holden Roberto sought to gain control of the north and to expel the MPLA from its traditional stronghold in the capital before independence was formalised (14). To complement its military strategy, and to overcome its political weakness, the FNLA set up a well-financed political apparatus. With funds supplied by Zaire and the US the FNLA was able to purchase newspapers and other important media outlets in Luanda (Hodges, 1976:50, Somerville, 1986:39-40).

The fighting in Luanda affected UNITA seriously for the first time in early June 1975. By this time, fighting was widespread in both the north and the south of the country with particularly heavy clashes in the northern, eastern and Cabinda districts. UNITA was, by far, the weakest faction militarily and had little to gain from a military power struggle. Hence, it concentrated on winning political and electoral support. However, despite UNITA's best efforts to avoid the fighting in Luanda, its offices were attacked and several of its members killed by the MPLA (Hodges, 1976:51, Somerville, 1986:43).
3.4.4 Alvor Agreement in Disarray:

At this stage, the Alvor Agreement was in a state of disarray and the Transitional Government barely functioning. For example, the provisional constitution which was supposed to have been ready months earlier, had still not been published and the Electoral Law had not even been approved. The mixed military units were still not organised and, instead, all the rival movements were competitively recruiting troops as fast as they could. There was not even agreement on the number of refugees living in Zaire and, therefore, how many would be allowed to vote in the election. Further complicating matters, each liberation movement had taken dozens of prisoners during the fighting and refused to release them despite prior agreements to do so (Hodges, 1976:51).

3.4.5 Nakuru Agreement:

It had become necessary once again for the Portuguese regime to intervene by summoning the three rival faction leaders for a virtual re-run of the Summit in Alvor. In signing the Nakuru Agreement, 21 June, the three signatories pledged their adherence to the transitional government and agreed to stop fighting. However, the ink was not dry before shooting broke out again among the movements. So low were expectations for the success of the peace-seeking agreement that, in the first week of July, a letter was released to the three factional leaders from the Minister of Economic Affairs warning that the country was on the brink of economic and political collapse. The first week of July did see a modest attempt made to implement the provisions of the agreement. However, 9 July, the fourth major wave of fighting erupted pushing the nation to the precipice of civil war and, for the first time, dividing the country into military spheres of influence. (Hodges, 1976:52, Somerville, 1986:43).

By mid-July the MPLA had driven the FNLA out of Luanda with the exception of three small pockets of resistance. Everywhere else in the capital FNLA installations had been gutted or seized. The MPLA offensive, however, was not limited to the capital. It was part of a well-prepared, coordinated drive to eject the FNLA from all its
traditional strongholds. By the end of July 1975, the MPLA had driven back the FNLA and acquired unchallenged control over the entire centre of the country. The MPLA was able to launch such a calculated offensive in defiance of the Nakuru Agreement because it had received foreign military aid, since March 1975, which undercut the military advantage held by the FNLA in the early months of the year. For instance, in March, several Soviet planes delivered arms to the MPLA in Congo-Brazzaville which were then smuggled into Angola. In the period, April - June 1975, armaments arrived by sea from Yugoslav, Soviet and East German vessels (Hodges, 1976:52).

3.4.6 Transitional Government Evacuated From Luanda:

The three factions ruled out compromise and the situation eroded further as they became more deeply embroiled in conflict. By the first week of August, UNITA forces were also coming under repeated attack by the MPLA. A major battle between the MPLA and FNLA, in Luanda in early August, compelled Portuguese authorities to accede to MPLA demands that the FNLA's Transitional Government Ministers be evacuated from the capital. At the same time, UNITA also withdrew its Ministers and soldiers from Luanda, effectively rendering the capital a military sphere of influence under the exclusive domain of the MPLA (Hodges, 1976:53).

In the first week of August, clashes were occurring between the MPLA and UNITA in the Cunene valley area and, in mid-August, major clashes broke out between them in Lobito and Benguela. The MPLA and UNITA were fighting in Luso. Finally, 21 August, UNITA formally declared war on the MPLA. In the following days battles raged between the two movements and, as the fighting spread, UNITA's forces were evicted from a string of southern cities. The MPLA's military successes reflect the fact that UNITA, in strictly military terms, was by far the weakest of the three factions at this point and that the MPLA had by then received sufficient armaments to challenge both its southern rival as well as the FNLA in the north (Hodges, 1976:53). At the end of August 1975, attempted negotiations in Lisbon failed to produce any agreement and Angola's downward spiral into civil war acquired even greater momentum.
3.5 The Period Immediately Preceding Independence, 11 November 1975:

By the beginning of September, the MPLA appeared to have the upper hand in the struggle. In control of the capital, it had access to the government apparatus and communications facilities. It controlled 11 of the country’s 16 district capitals and occupied more territory than its rivals. Virtually the entire seaboard was in MPLA hands including all the major ports. UNITA, in contrast, had been pushed back into the Ovimbundu heartland of Huambo and Bie although clashes continued around Luso in September and October. In the north, the FNLA, despite receiving large shipments of U.S. aid via Zaire, was unable to break through the MPLA’s defence into Luanda. The MPLA, although having considerable success, was unable to inflict a decisive defeat on UNITA and FNLA as both, by this time, were receiving large arms shipments from the United States as well as other sources (Hodges, 1976:55, Somerville, 1986:44-45).

3.5.1 Withdrawal of the Portuguese Government:

By mid-September, given the intense factional rivalry of the past months, Lisbon resolved they had little option other than to get out of Angola. This decision was preceded by massive public demonstrations in opposition to Portugal’s continued colonisation of Angola. Protests by both soldiers and civilians intensified in Lisbon after 200 military police and 5,000 supporters marched through the city, in early September, demanding the withdrawal of troops. Leonel Cardoso made the declaration, 18 September, that Portugal would start to withdraw its troops and, 28 October, the Portuguese Government announced that all its troops would be withdrawn prior to independence. The most politically expedient policy, especially in view of the military dangers facing the MPLA at the time, would be to leave the doors open to cooperation with whatever nationalist faction ultimately came to power (15). To this end, Lisbon decided against extending recognition to any of the factions. Other actions, however, provided the MPLA with valuable support. For instance, the departing Portuguese army left behind large quantities of arms in MPLA controlled areas (Hodges, 1976:55).
3.5.2 The FNLA's March on Luanda:

Having had its troops driven out of Luanda, the FNLA announced that all its military units had been placed in "a permanent state of military alert."

At this advanced stage, in the move towards independence, any hope for a cessation of hostilities appeared increasingly remote. Accusing the Portuguese of siding with the MPLA, the FNLA declared that their troops would march on Luanda. The next day the FNLA announced that Holden Roberto had returned to Angola, after a 14 year absence, in order to lead his troops in the march on Luanda (16).

The FNLA assault began two hours after first light on 10 November 1975. Roughly 1 500 soldiers began advancing in a single column across the broad and marshy valley of the Bengo River 30 kilometres north of Luanda. The FNLA force was supported by two regular battalions of the Zairian Army and 100 Portuguese-Angolan soldiers. As the FNLA advanced across the swamp along a narrow road, on top of a dyke, a devastating barrage was launched by the Cubans and MPLA forces. Heavy mortar shells and salvos of 122-mm rockets, fired from Stalin organs, rained down on the FNLA column (Bridgland, 1986:146-147).

The South African artillery was no match for the state-of-the-art Soviet hardware being used by the Cubans. Most of Roberto's armoured cars and jeeps mounted with anti-tank rockets were knocked out within an hour. The CIA operatives watching the unfolding debacle, from a nearby ridge, estimated that 2 000 rockets had landed among the FNLA forces. Three SAAF warplanes, which attacked Cuban and MPLA positions, were of no real assistance to the FNLA. Due to the need for secrecy they flew so high that two missed their targets while the third failed to release its bombs. Roberto's troops panicked and became bogged down in the swamp. Hundreds of FNLA and Zairian soldiers died along with a number of the Portuguese. The disaster became known as "Death Road." It broke the FNLA which was never to recover (Bridgland, 1986:147).
3.5.3 South African Direct Military Intervention:

Of paramount importance at this stage, only weeks prior to independence, was the military operation mounted by the South Africans. South Africa's earlier, relatively small-scale interventions across the border consisted of their military occupation of the hydro-electric dam installations at the Ruacana Falls on the Cunene River as well as conducting pre-emptive, hot-pursuit missions across the border to seek out and destroy SWAPO (17). These earlier interventions stand in contrast to South Africa's direct military intervention on the side of the anti-MPLA forces, UNITA, and the FNLA, on Angola's southern front commencing 23 October (18). Similar in purpose to American covert aid, the South African direct intervention was designed to engineer a military stalemate between the factions and, in so doing, increase Pretoria's leverage. With the benefit of greatly advanced leverage in the situation, Pretoria intended to force concessions from the factions vis-a-vis future Angolan policy towards the region and Namibia, in particular (Hodges, 1976:56, Somerville, 1976:37).

3.6 American Involvement (1975-1976):

The U.S. responded to the evolving situation in Angola by resuming a covert channel to Holden Roberto's FNLA and, in the period July-December 1974, the CIA channelled small amounts of aid to the FNLA. January 22, 1975, the "Forty Committee" of the National Security Council (NSC) approved the modest sum of $300,000 in order to strengthen the FNLA's position in the Transitional Government. No funds were approved for UNITA and the $300,000 was for political purposes only with no portion used to finance arms. This modest parcel of US aid did not reach the FNLA until March by which time the Soviet Union had already escalated its arms deliveries significantly, and, therefore could not have "triggered" the massive Soviet arms deliveries that month. Obviously, as logistical operations were already in operation by March, the Soviet decision had to have been made months earlier.

Regardless, the American versus the Soviet response to the Angolan situation was vastly disparate at this time: while the United States only provided a small amount
of money the Soviet Union introduced a large quantity of arms. American aid to the FNLA was a more accurate reflection of Kissinger's statements, before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, that the immediate U.S. objective was to provide leverage for diplomatic efforts in order to bring about a just and peaceful solution (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1976:20, William Schaufele and Nathaniel Davis in Klinghoffer, 1980:88).

3.6.1 President Ford Approves $14 Million in Cover Aid:

In the summer of 1975, President Ford's approval of a further $14 million ($6 million in July and $8 million in August) in covert aid and arms shipments marked the beginning of serious American involvement in Angola. This decision was taken largely in response to Soviet intervention, the MPLA military offensive, and appeals from nations such as Zambia and Zaire concerned about the security threat posed by the Soviet presence in neighbouring Angola. The U.S. resorted to covert aid because overt support would have embarrassed its allies in the region. Furthermore, it was felt reversing overt commitments would prove more difficult once initiated. As a result, covert aid was adopted as the best alternative for reaching a negotiated solution with the Soviet Union in order to terminate external involvement.

It was perhaps surprising that the U.S. became involved at all given the climate of opinion in Washington following U.S. troop withdrawal from Saigon and the Watergate Scandal. The July disbursement was followed by President Ford's authorisation of further aid which was dwarfed when compared to the magnitude and scale of Soviet and Cuban involvement. Nonetheless, Kissinger was adamant that Soviet actions so far afield had to be contained. Kissinger's position was not, however, unopposed. He was vigorously countered in the State Department and even more so in Congress.
3.6.2 Congressional Opposition to American Covert Aid:

Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the spring and summer of 1975, actually resigned over the Ford Administration's position on covert aid to Angola. A memorandum, 1 May, sent to Secretary of State Kissinger on the subject of covert aid to Jonas Savimbi expressed concern about a possible linkage between Savimbi and Pretoria, warning that "the South Africans have expressed interest in providing financial assistance." Davis concluded:

If the major actors [in Angola] settle on Savimbi, that might be the best solution. However, signs are multiplying that Angola is moving toward a violent denouement. If we launch a program of covert support for Savimbi, I think we must reckon with probable disclosure. At most we would be in a position to commit limited resources, and buy marginal influence ... We might find ourselves drawn in deeper very fast, as the fighting produces more intense pressures for arms and ammunition - as well as money. The political price we might pay - as reports of bloodshed and alleged atrocities multiply - would, I believe, exceed the possibility of accomplishment (Davis, 1978:111).

Soon afterwards, Davis took the Chair of an inter-agency National Security Council (NSC) Task Force on Angola. The Task Force Report, submitted 13 June, was strongly opposed to military intervention and advocated diplomacy aimed at encouraging a political settlement among the rival factions. The "diplomatic option" would have encouraged Portugal to play a stronger, impartial role and urged the Soviet Union to reduce its support of the MPLA. This option favoured the U.S. working in concert with Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire in order to reduce the flow of arms to Angola. Davis viewed the major advantages of a diplomatic effort to be the opportunity to shift the factional competition back into the political arena thereby improving FNLA and UNITA prospects as well as reducing the likelihood of an outcome determined by Soviet arms. Davis explained the major advantages, thus:

We believed that such an effort might reduce the danger of big-power confrontation and might further our policy of supporting peaceful solutions on that continent. We felt it would reflect our recognition that Angola was basically an African problem, and that Africans could and should play a
major role in an Angolan solution. The Task Force also made the point that such a diplomatic-political initiative would probably elicit congressional and public support in the United States (Davis, 1978:112).

Furthermore, the Task Force firmly rejected the option of covert military intervention pointing out that such intervention would commit U.S. resources in a situation the outcome of which was in doubt and over which the U.S. could only hope to exercise limited influence at best. Saliently, the Task Force Report also observed that U.S. military intervention carried with it the possibility of increased involvement by the Soviet Union and other foreign powers (Davis, 1978:112-113).

The Forty Committee, met 14 July, on the Angolan issue and was inconclusive (19). A small ad-hoc working group was then formed to refine their covert action proposal. Davis sent Under Secretary Sisco a third memo, 16 July, with a copy to Secretary Kissinger. The memo outlined salient developments which further undercut the viability of covert aid:

In the four days since my memorandum to you of July 12, the situation in Angola has importantly changed:

-We have evidence the Soviets are introducing more, heavier and more sophisticated weapons ...
-The MPLA appears to have accomplished the expulsion of the FNLA from Luanda; substantial numbers of FNLA troops have surrendered their arms and sought Portuguese protection or fled ...
-South Africa is reported to be giving Roberto some support.

If it were not true before, it seems clear now that is unrealistic to think in terms of a program that could be both effective and covert (Davis, 1978:116).

3.6.2.1 Resignation of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs:

On the following day, 17 July, Davis sent Under Secretary Sisco a fifth memo with a copy to Secretary Kissinger. It continued to argue firmly against intervention: "So far as the CIA Draft Action Plan is concerned, my view - which I have expressed - is that the measures proposed are inadequate to accomplish the purposes outlined" (Davis, 1978:116). Following the Forty Committee's consideration of the CIA Action Plan, nearing the end of July, it was given to President Ford and approved. Upon learning of the President's decision to pursue the covert action program in Angola,
Nathaniel Davis submitted his resignation as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

3.6.3 Clark Amendment to the Defence Appropriations Bill:

In the Senate, opposition to U.S. covert aid to Angola took the form of the Clark Amendment to the FY76 Defence Appropriations Bill. Approved in the Senate, 19 December, it essentially prohibited the use of any money appropriated under the defence appropriations bill for the purpose of financing CIA operations in Angola. The reasons behind the resignation of Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary were not immediately made public. His opposition, and the reasons which compelled him to resign, only became public in an article by Seymour Hersh, in The New York Times, five days before the introduction and Senate passage of the Clark Amendment. Davis himself questions whether the 14 December Hersh story triggered the introduction and Senate passage of the Clark Amendment as Senator Dick Clark and a number of other members of Congress had previously expressed strong opposition to U.S. involvement. By that time it was also apparent that a large and rapidly expanding commitment would be necessary if there was to be any realistic chance of diverting an MPLA victory (Davis, 1978:119).

Commenting briefly on the Senate floor, 17 December, Tunney argued that Kissinger and his policy staff appeared to be suffering from some form of reverse myopia viewing events as part of a grand scheme for global influence in which every new Soviet venture contained the seeds of an eventual Communist check-mate of the free world. According to Tunney, the Angolan war was no opening gambit in some colossal scheme for Soviet hegemony but a conflict among three warring factions whose tribal origins and animosities went back decades if not centuries and who possessed little or no ideological commitment. Tunney believed that conflict between rival factions was based more upon ethnic considerations than political or philosophical inclinations and, moreover, viewed MPLA courtship of the Soviet Union as largely a matter of convenience rather than conviction (U.S. Congress, Congressional Record.

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3.6.3.1 Congress Prefers Diplomacy to Aid:

Tunney viewed the issue not in terms of countering the Soviet Union but in terms of the U.S. siding with factions on the same side as the South African apartheid regime. He maintained that this could damage U.S. relations with moderate black African countries. Although concerned over Soviet and Cuban willingness to intervene in Angola, Tunney felt the U.S. could exert pressure on the Soviet Union by emphasising the incompatibility of their African strategy with the policy of detente. Tunney envisaged the potential damage the Soviet Union's actions in Angola would have (20), not only in jeopardizing the relationship of detente, but also in disrupting the export of American products (U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 1975:41208-41209).

3.6.3.2 Two Competing Lines of Argument in the US Senate:

In the debate which followed, the Senate split along two competing lines of argument. Those opposed to the Clark Amendment, in large part agreed with the administration, viewing Soviet activity in Angola from a global perspective. They focused on the geo-strategic importance of Angola in terms of access to ports and critical sea-lines. On the other hand, those in favour of the Clark Amendment focused on the region itself and argued that an MPLA victory would be no different from the coming to power of Samora Machel, a self-declared Marxist in Mozambique, or the presence of the leftist government in Guinea-Bissau. Senator McGovern succinctly encapsulated their attitude on the importance of American involvement in Angola: "I do not think it makes 60 cents worth of difference to the interests of the United States which of these three groups ultimately prevails" (U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 1975:41201).
3.6.3.3 Timing of the Clark Amendment:

Senator Domencini's contention that the timing of the proposed amendment might be of critical importance in terms of the degree of leverage the U.S. could hope to exert on Soviet activity was not debated. Nor did the Senate engage in any serious discussion over the insertion of Cuban forces and the probable implications this would presage in the course of American-Soviet relations. The Senate voted (54 to 22) to attach the Clark Amendment to the Defence Appropriations Bill, 19 December 1975. The House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly (323 to 99) in favour of the Amendment, 27 January 1976, and President Ford signed the Defence Appropriations Act into law, 9 February 1976. All additional covert funds destined for Angola were therefore blocked. Kissinger tried to broker a compromise with the Clark Amendment supporters to receive $9 million rather than the $28 million he had originally requested but was unsuccessful. (Klinghoffer, 1980:85, Bridgland, 1986:155).

3.6.3.4 Clark Amendment Gives Soviets and Cubans the Green Light.

The 19 December Senate vote in favour of the Clark Amendment proved a disaster as the timing of its passage was so inopportune. Although it is easily argued that additional U.S. aid would have had little impact in countering the formidable Cuban presence the situation in Angola was nonetheless still fluid at the time of the vote and not immune to developments in Washington. Indeed, the Senate passage of the Clark Amendment acted as the equivalent of a green light to Soviet intervention and that of their proxy state. Kissinger later testified, in Senate Hearings on Civil War in Angola, that he first raised the Angolan issue with the Soviet Union in late October 1975 after public warnings failed to bring about an adequate response. The issue of Angola was then raised by Kissinger, twice in November, and again by President Ford in December. Kissinger stated: "There was some indication the public and private warnings had the effect of giving the Soviets pause for, between December 9 and 24, no Soviet planes delivered arms to the MPLA. It was only after the Senate vote ... cutting off funds that the arms flow recommenced" (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1976:52). All Cuban troop
movement had ceased as well during this period.

3.6.4 American Military Option: Direct Naval and Aerial Involvement:

However, this account of the diplomatic initiatives undertaken is not representative of all the options which were considered at the time. Kissinger did not state that, in addition to arming the FNLA and UNITA and abetting the Zairian and South African invasions, the United States also considered direct naval and aerial involvement in the war. In the period, 15-23 November, a U.S. task force was organised and given contingency orders relating to the Angolan conflict. The aircraft carrier Independence, capable of providing significant tactical air support, sailed from Portsmouth, England the evening of 27 November. It joined forces with the cruiser Boston and three destroyer escorts in the Azores. The task force was placed on full alert (Klinghoffer, 1980:84).

With public and political sentiment rising against U.S. involvement in Angola, both Kissinger’s military as well diplomatic efforts were severely curtailed and the task force never sent. At the very least, Kissinger’s advocacy of covert action was designed to increase the cost of intervention to the Cubans and, thereby, improve the prospects for negotiation. However, that option was effectively aborted with the passage of the Clark Amendment, 19 December 1975.

3.7 South Africa’s Initial Involvement:

The SADF was not unfamiliar with the Angolan terrain. In the early 1970s, South Africa and Portugal enjoyed a cooperative relationship sharing intelligence on guerrilla activity. While Vorster provided clandestine support to the Portuguese in the form of helicopters and arms, the Portuguese reciprocated by allowing the SADF to penetrate Angola up to a depth of over 300 kilometres for the purpose of rooting out SWAPO guerrillas. These incursions were justified as being pre-emptive raids of a defensive nature. By 1975, however, the perceived security threat to Namibia was growing with SWAPO taking advantage of the chaos arising from the collapse of Portuguese authority with an attendant increase in guerrilla activity. Tension along the
Angolan border with Ovamboland was further heightened by incidents throughout July and August 1975 including the assassination of an Ovambo Chief Minister (Barber and Barratt, 1990:190, Jaster, 1988:69).

3.7.1 Which Faction Would South Africa Support:

It was of strategic interest for South Africa to assess each of the rival factions and the role each would be likely to play in the course of Angola's development. Therefore, the Vorster regime initiated contact with representatives of the Angolan movements. In March 1975 an intelligence official met in Europe with Jonas Savimbi who soon afterward appealed, albeit unsuccessfully, for South African aid. In May and July 1975 the FNLA's Daniel Chipenda made visits to Windhoek for secret talks with Van den Bergh of BOSS and, two months later, met with P.W. Botha in Pretoria.

If Pretoria was to support any one of the factions, the FNLA would have been the obvious choice in view of the FNLA's anti-Soviet bias, American funding, and Zairian support. However, UNITA, although militarily weak, derived its majority support from the Ovambos in the south. Therefore, UNITA could potentially form a buffer between northern Namibia and a hostile Angolan government or, alternatively, create further problems for South Africa by continuing to support SWAPO. UNITA's military weakness placed Pretoria in an advantageous bargaining position (21). Indeed, Savimbi was not slow in approaching South Africa for assistance upon realizing how decisively the MPLA was being strengthened by Soviet aid (Barber and Barratt, 1990:190-191).

3.7.2 When Did South Africa Actually Intervene:

South Africa's first reported entry into Angola was at the end of August 1975 for the stated purpose of defending the joint Cunene River hydro-electric project. The SADF entered Angola to occupy and defend the dam site following clashes between the MPLA and UNITA and the alleged harassment of workers. As stated in Endnote 17, from an admission made in Parliament it is evident that South Africa must have actually moved its forces across the border prior to August. Minister of Defence, P.W.
Botha, stated in Parliament that "from 14 July 1975 to 23 January 1976" South Africa's total casualties in Angola consisted of 29 killed in action and 14 killed in accidents. This account was collaborated by Jonas Savimbi: "South Africa, for some reasons of its own, invaded southern Angola in July 1975" (Legum, 1976:36).

3.7.3 Protection of Ruacana Falls Hydro Electric Facility From SWAPO:

Regardless, Pretoria claimed it informed the Portuguese Government in mid-August, that in accordance with the SA-Portuguese agreement guaranteeing water supplies, a patrol numbering 30 would be moved to the Calueque pumping station. Botha maintained the troops were sent to protect South African workers at the Ruacana Falls hydro-electric scheme "who feared they would become involved in fighting between rival Angolan nationalist groups" adding that this action was taken only after the Portuguese had failed to provide the requested protection.

In September, between 800 and 1000 SADF troops with armed helicopters moved approximately 40 kilometres across the border and occupied Ongiva and Rocadas. This action was justified as retaliation for an earlier SWAPO attack of an SADF camp on the SWA/Namibian side of the border with "Russian made rockets." Botha claimed at this time that "our troops are at strategic points along our borders but we do not interfere in the affairs of others." This statement, however, was soon qualified with the explanation that South Africa's policy of non-interference did not extend to "terrorist attacks." This qualification soon served as the prelude to a number of SADF attacks inflicting heavy casualties on SWAPO. Neto, at that time, criticised Portugal for its failure to protest against South Africa's entry, a remark which Portugal's President called "slanderous." Also in September 1975, an MPLA spokesperson expressed fears, which in the next month would prove prophetic, that South Africa was not simply planning to defend the Cunene River installations (Legum, 1976:36).

The intervention of close to 2000 SADF troops with armoured cars dramatically shifted the military balance on the southern front. The South Africans mounted an operation from a staging base at Runiu, SWA/Namibia. A motorised force of Bushmen,
some of whom had previously fought for the Portuguese, with a group of Portuguese officers and approximately 1 000 followers of Chipenda, crossed into Angola at Cuangar. Led by a South African commander, with a handful of South African officers and technicians, the column swiftly dislodged MPLA forces from Pereira de Eca. Moving on to Rocadas it was joined by South African units, including twenty armoured cars and a platoon of 81-mm mortars, as well as by a small band of Portuguese recruits (Marcum, 1978:269, Bridgland, 1986:145).

Air supplied, and accompanied by helicopter gun ships, the column had forced the MPLA out of Sa da Bandeira by 26 October. By the end of the month, the port of Mocamedes had fallen and, in the first week of November, the SADF column drove the MPLA out of Benguela and Lobito 640 kilometres north of the Namibian border and, 12 November, South Africa captured Novo Redondo a port 275 kilometres south of Luanda. These major military setbacks for the MPLA were only to be reversed some weeks after independence following the arrival of massive Soviet arms shipments and thousands more Cuban troops (Hodges, 1976:56, Bridgland, 1986:145).

3.7.4 Strategic Reasons for Direct Intervention, 23 October 1975:

South Africa's reasons for risking a large-scale intervention commencing 23 October are of a different nature from their earlier relatively small scale interventions in pursuit of SWAPO. P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, explained South African motivations thus: "South Africa is playing a limited role in Angola because Russia is involved in a campaign of militaristic imperialism in that country ... We were prepared to leave it to the people of Angola to solve their own problems, but the Russians interfered because they want to control the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope and because they want to exploit the wealth of Angola." Relying on a similar line of argument, Vorster said the Soviet Union intended to have "a string of Marxist States across Africa from Angola to Tanzania. This would have serious consequences not only for South Africa but for States such as Zaire and Zambia, and the Western world" (Legum, 1976:37).
Further, Vorster warned that "if the Soviet Union through "the left-wing MPLA established a permanent presence in Angola, it would stand astride the Cape sea route." In a subsequent interview, after having described the variety of Russian weaponry introduced into Angola, Vorster remarked "Only big powers can offset this arsenal, above all the 122-mm rockets. It is certainly beyond our limits" (Legum, 1976:37).

The dominant theme of politicians and the pro-government press was that South Africa was fighting "the battle for the West" and the West was letting South Africa down as well as ignoring their own best interests. Vorster appealed publicly for greater Western involvement "to save the war-torn country [Angola] from communism. Apart from protecting the substantial interests of the Ovambo people in the Cunene River scheme, our only involvement is that of the free world." The South African press compared the magnitude of the security threat in Angola to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Accordingly, South African leaders called upon the West not to "leave South Africa in the lurch in the struggle against the advancing forces of international communism" (Legum, 1976:37).

3.7.5 OAU Indecision And Eventual Recognition of the MPLA Government:

As previously stated in Section 3.2, Independence Day witnessed the proclamation of two rival Governments. The OAU refused to admit either government to its ranks, instead calling for a cease-fire between the factions and the establishment of a Government of National Unity. On the eve of independence, official OAU policy had come under increasing fire as African member states learned, after weeks of denials, that South African troops had entered the war on the side of UNITA and the FNLA. The Nigerian Government announced its recognition of the MPLA regime, 27 November, citing South Africa’s role as its reason (22). Tanzania followed in extending recognition to the MPLA regime, 5 December, also citing the SADF intervention. Early in the new year several other African nations followed suit. An emergency Summit of the OAU called to debate the Angolan crisis, 10-13 January, was evenly split: 22.

Nonetheless, in the wake of the MPLA’s territorial gains early in 1976, official recognition quickly followed. By the beginning of February 1976, twenty five African states recognised the People’s Republic of Angola (PRA). The OAU Council of Ministers accepted the MPLA’s military supremacy and decided, 11 February 1976, to recognise the PRA as the legal government. Only Zaire protested openly, calling the decision "illegai." Zambia did not extend formal recognition but stated "In our view, the MPLA victory is not really theirs. It is a Soviet-Cuban victory." The EC nations extended recognition, mid February, and Portugal followed suit, 22 February. By that time over seventy nations had recognised the MPLA regime (Hodges, 1976:58, Legum, 1976:32).

3.7.6 SADF Intervention Legitimated Soviet and Cuban Involvement:

The entry of South African forces into the war, 23 October, and the resultant turn-about in the military fortunes of the MPLA prompted the Soviet Union to escalate arms supplies and Cuba to send thousands of troops. As a result, by mid-January 1976, the MPLA was reported to be supported by 9 000 Cuban troops, 6 500 Katangese gendarmes and 400 Russian advisers. The South African intervention had clearly backfired prompting many OAU members to recognise MPLA and legitimizing, in the eyes of many, the MPLA’s use of Cuban troops and Soviet arms (Hodges, 1976:57-58).

These developments allowed the MPLA to reverse the military situation that had existed at the end of November 1975. Despite South Africa’s string of earlier military successes, the SADF was overwhelmed by their new and changed circumstances. By 20 November the SADF advance from the south had been effectively halted on the Queue River. As the SADF and UNITA columns moved north in November and

This shift in the military balance was demonstrated when the MPLA began a major offensive in December against the FNLA's positions in the north. By 5 December the MPLA claimed it had driven the FNLA out of Caxito and was moving towards Ambriz. Advancing into the Bakongo heartland, the MPLA announced 5 January 1976 that its forces had captured the strategic FNLA air-base at Negage and the city of Uige. Then, 12 January, the MPLA went on to seize Ambriz and the FNLA's defence collapsed. An ill-prepared, last-ditch effort to defend these cities by British and other mercenaries ended in disaster (Hodges, 1976:58, Bridgland, 1996:148-150).

3.7.7 Military Gains by MPLA Early 1976:

Following the MPLA's gains in the north in January 1976 the MPLA turned its attentions to UNITA in the south. South Africa, deciding to cut its political losses and avoid confrontation with the MPLA, pulled its troops out of the front line, and let UNITA fend for itself. P.W. Botha announced, 4 February, that SADF troops had been withdrawn to a 50 kilometres deep "cordon sanitaire" on the Angolan side of the border. The MPLA's southern offensive began at the end of January and by mid February the battle was effectively over (Hodges, 1976:58).

3.7.8 Political Repercussions of SADF Intervention:

Colin Legum postulates that "for South Africa, the Angolan affair was possibly the most traumatic in its history since the Anglo-Boer war at the turn of the century." Regardless of whether such an assertion is accurate, a number of negative repercussions followed South Africa's ill-fated intervention in the Angolan civil war. Perhaps the worst result, from Pretoria's point of view, was that the Vorster regime failed to achieve precisely the goal for which it had committed its army: creating the necessary leverage to force the withdrawal of the combined Russian and Cuban presence. If anything, South African involvement legitimized the intervention of the...
Soviet Union and Cuba as well as increasing the MPLA's level of popular support in the rest of Africa (23). The Angolan enterprise left the apartheid regime with little consolation and, instead, served to boost the morale of South Africa's internal opponents (Legum, 1976:38, Menon, 1986:135).

3.7.8.1 Political Liability of Having South Africa as an Ally:

The Vorster regime had miscalculated by underestimating the political liability of having Pretoria as an ally, if seriously expecting the West to support openly South African actions in Angola. While the precise nature of South Africa's relationship with the United States is unclear, and the subject of great controversy, there is no evidence of any Western nations openly responding to South Africa's invitation. The two states exchanged intelligence and coordinated some of their actions in the field but South Africa made its own decision to become involved in Angola and did not do so explicitly in response to pressure from the United States (24). There is, however, evidence to support South Africa's claims that they were encouraged to intervene by a number of African states to prevent a "Soviet-Cuban victory" (Legum, 1976:37, Bridgland, 1986:19).

What seems probable is that some Angolan leaders and some African leaders encouraged South Africa to intervene. South Africa responded and Vorster may have envisaged one of two scenarios: that the SADF would win a rapid "blitzkrieg" victory enabling them to withdraw their forces immediately after the capture of Luanda or, alternatively, that South Africa would receive U.S. aid if the Cuban-led attacks could be halted long enough for the Ford Administration to obtain Congressional support for intervention (25). However, these probable scenarios envisaged by Pretoria never materialized (26).

South Africa's decision to intervene demonstrated that the expectation of having any Western nation identify openly with the Republic would be unrealistic and would defy the reality of an isolated and internationally ostracized regime. Marcum argues American policy, above all, failed completely to realize the negative implications of
dealing with South Africa in terms of African politics. The greater the dependence of
the United States on tacit cooperation with South Africa to stem Soviet involvement, the
more the United States opened the way to Soviet intervention by removing any risk of
138).

3.8 Soviet Involvement:

The Soviet decision to become involved in Angola emanated from a number of
policies which have been applied to Sub-Saharan Africa with some consistency. Soviet
aims generally fall into categories that endeavour to, firstly; enhance the USSR's
strategic position specifically by gaining access to African port and air facilities,
secondly; seek political influence by supporting "progressive" movements, particularly
those that fight wars of liberation, and thirdly; undermine American, Western
European, and Chinese influence in the region while in the long term hoping to acquire
access to strategic minerals and other resources. While the Soviet decision to
intervene appeared to be consistent with these goals Angola nonetheless represented
a significant departure from traditional Soviet policies. Instead of the usual deliberate
cautiousness that characterised previous efforts abroad, Soviet actions in Angola were
representative of a far more assertive and aggressive policy (28).

3.8.1 An Improbable Locus for Superpower Collision:

According to John Marcum, Angola was an improbable locus for superpower
collision. Indeed, the Angolan civil war marked the Soviet Union's debut as a major
power in Africa (29). Although the Soviet Union had previously been involved as a
supplier of arms in African conflicts, never had Soviet arms shipments to any African
nation reached the massive levels that were attained in Angola. Nor had this number
of Cuban combat troops ever directly intervened in a third world conflict as Soviet proxy

From the Soviet point of view, it seems likely that the Angolan conflict was seen
as an opportunity to maintain the strategic and diplomatic momentum that had been
acquired with the Communist victory in Vietnam. A massive Soviet-Cuban force in Sub-Saharan African would have been inconceivable only a few years earlier and highly unlikely even a year earlier prior to the fall of Saigon. However, Hanoi’s conquest of the south, by stirring isolationist sentiment in the USA, created the very conditions which made Soviet involvement in the Angolan conflict both feasible and ultimately successful (30). Furthermore, the victories of Vietnam and Angola allowed Brezhnev to enjoy the twenty-fifth party congress in February 1976 accompanied with accolades for foreign policy successes (Porter, 1984: 147).

3.8.2 Soviet Arms Shipments:

Bruce Porter divides Soviet arms deliveries into three distinct stages. The first arms shipments took place in August 1974 and began reaching the MPLA, via Dar es Salaam and Brazzaville, in October (31). The second delivery stage began in March 1975 when Moscow substantially increased the value of weaponry destined for Angola. Porter contends that these deliveries were initiated most likely in response to signs the Alvor Agreement was disintegrating as opposed to Colin Legum’s assertion that Soviet escalation was a competitive response to the PRC’s modest effort to aid the FNLA. It is important to note Soviet arms were already en route before the FNLA attacks on the MPLA in Luanda and Caxito in March 1975 and were, therefore, probably unrelated to the FNLA’s receipt of Chinese support. The impact of Soviet arms deliveries, in March and April 1975, gave the MPLA a decisive military advantage and, by late August, resulted in their control over the majority of Angola.

The third major acceleration of Soviet arms shipments commenced, in October 1975, after the launch of South Africa’s “Operation Zulu” and the resultant decline in MPLA fortunes. At this stage the Soviet Union initiated an extensive airlift of sophisticated weapons systems. What had previously been a flow became a flood with the bulk of heavy weapons, such as tanks, arriving in this third period (32). Between November 1975 and March 1976 seventy flights by An-22 cargo planes and 19 ships discharged weapons including T-34 and T-54 tanks, MiG-21 fighters, and large
quantities of 122-mm rockets which devastated the unsophisticated opposing forces of the FNLA and UNITA. By February 1976 it was estimated by the CIA that the value of the weaponry sent by Moscow to its MPLA clients and Cuban allies had reached $US 400 million (Porter, 1984:159-64, Bridgland, 1986:149).

3.8.3 Soviet Contribution Turns the Tide in Favour of the MPLA:

Immediately prior to independence the MPLA was in a beleaguered military position with the SADF advancing towards the capital and the FNLA only just held off in the north. The arrival of Cuban troops, combined with Soviet arms shipments, was sufficient to turn the tide which had flowed against the MPLA after South Africa’s intervention. The South Africans found themselves greatly outgunned and outnumbered in both tanks and soldiers and were unwilling to commit the forces necessary to match the Cuban presence with their abundant stocks of Soviet weapons. Moscow provided everything necessary for the MPLA victory and, for good measure, added weapons little used and not even needed such as the MiG-21 fighters (Porter, 1984:162, Somerville, 1986:45, Garcia Marquez, 1977:128, Stockwell, 1978:231-232).

The Soviets proudly admit their contribution was decisive in averting a South African blitzkrieg from succeeding against the MPLA. In addition, the airlift was coordinated with the transfer of thousands of Cuban combat troops possessing sufficient expertise to use the sophisticated weapons effectively. In the period, 9-24 December, the Soviet airlift halted entirely, evidently, in response to an American diplomatic initiative. The Cubans followed suit. However, this brief hiatus did not last long and was, at any rate, of little military importance as the MPLA-Cuban forces were already amply equipped for waging an offensive which they continued throughout that period unhampered. By January 1976 the FNLA had been defeated in northern Angola and by February the SADF had withdrawn across the border into SWA/Namibia (Legum, 1976:20, Somerville, 1986:45, Garcia Marquez, 1977:128, Stockwell, 1978:231-232).

Having blunted the South African advance the Soviets were then able to use
South Africa’s intervention to their advantage. Although the Soviet Union’s justification for Soviet involvement in Angola was patently self-serving, after recognition was extended to the fledgling MPLA government 11 November, the Soviet Union could claim it was not in any way intervening (Marcum, 1976:417, Bridgland, 1976:149). Rather, the Soviet Union was aiding a legitimate government in its defence against foreign intervention by imperialist powers. An Izvestia article laid out this position in accordance with other Soviet press articles at the time:

The Western Press is trying to present matters as though a civil war were underway or continuing in Angola. In fact, there can be no question of any civil war in Angola. Foreign military intervention is being undertaken against the young republic’s legal government employing, as a cover-up, misled Angolans under the influence of factional groups. The unquestionable aim of this intervention is to overthrow the legal government of ... Angola (Porter, 1984:154).

3.9 The Cuban Role:

According to Jorge Dominguez, Cuba’s foreign policy can be seen as reflecting a relatively clear hierarchy of objectives, as follows, in descending order: firstly; survival of the revolutionary government, secondly; economic development, thirdly; influence over governments, fourthly; influence over the Left, and finally; support of revolution. Despite variations throughout the 1960s and 1970s in individual policies this pattern has remained consistent. A persistent characteristic of Cuban foreign policy was that it operated under Soviet hegemony. Essentially, so long as the Soviet Union acted at the guarantor and primary supporter of Cuba’s internal development, it was in the position to set the permissible boundaries for Cuban behaviour in the foreign policy arena (Dominguez, 1978:88).

3.9.1 Cuba’s Ideological Motivations:

The global thrust of Castro’s foreign policy was ideological in nature. The collective experience of the Cuban leadership as guerrillas in the 1950s demonstrated the importance of support from abroad. After 1959 substantial assistance was received not only from the Soviet Union but from other eastern bloc nations as well as China.
This history strengthened the ideology of the Cuban leadership which carries an obligation, in the name of "internationalist solidarity," to support their allies as others had supported the Cuban revolutionaries in their time of need. The target of Cuban ideology was to oppose the American led forces of "imperialism" wherever those forces are weak. Jorge Dominguez succinctly encapsulates the utility portended by Cuban intervention in the Angolan episode:

The Angolan war, then, was well related to Cuba's long-standing policy goals. Without threatening the survival of the Cuban government, it increased Cuban international influence over governments and over the Left. It promoted the spread of revolutionary regimes while it consolidated the alliance with the Soviet Union. This was the first time in two decades of revolutionary rule when all of these goals could be achieved simultaneously (Dominguez, 1978:98).

As part of its ideological portfolio, Cuba had a long-standing African policy which included an effort to diversify political and diplomatic relations, promote trade, and provide elements of military assistance whenever appropriate. As early as 1959, Ernesto "Che" Guevara established links with the Front for the National Liberation of Algeria then based in Cairo. In 1963, a few Cuban troops performed in logistical support roles in Algeria's fight with Morocco. Close ties were also established with the anti-Portuguese liberation movements and, in particular, between Guevara and Amilcar Cabral who led the revolution in Guinea-Bissau. By the mid 1960s, Cuba's long association with Congo (Brazzaville) was underway. Cuban interest in anti-colonial guerrilla fighting against the Portuguese developed partially for ideological reasons and partially for the purpose of acquiring greater political influence (33) (Dominguez, 1978:94).
3.9.2 Cuban Military Support:

Cuban support for the MPLA was not a novel development but the latest instalment of an ongoing continuum, the military component of which can generally be broken down into five stages. The Cubans firstly; trained and armed the MPLA in the Congo and Cuba, secondly; provided advisors for the MPLA within Angola, thirdly; established military training centres in four Angolan locations, and fifthly; dispatched intact military units for combat alongside the MPLA. Cuba's combat role in the war was much greater than originally anticipated and Edward Gonzalez, a specialist in Cuban foreign policy, states that "after Havana's initial decision to commit troops, the increase in Cuba's involvement was essentially incremental and reactive." Indeed, Cuba's initial involvement was similar in scope to previous revolutionary roles in Africa, such as in Guinea-Bissau, for example. However, the South African intervention led Cuba to substantially escalate its support for the MPLA as of 5 November 1975 with the official advent of Operation Carlota (34) (Klinghoffer, 1990:111, Jaster, 1988:73).

The earliest account of Cuban relations with the MPLA followed a May 1975 meeting between Cuban Commandant Flagio Bravo and Agostinho Neto in Brazzaville. According to Gabriel Garcia Marquez, a Colombian novelist with close ties to Castro, "Neto requested help with shipment of arms and asked about the possibility of further more specific aid." Neto was particularly interested in the prospect of having Cuban military instructors sent. The MPLA made a formal request for aid, 16 July 1975 after which Cuba escalated its assistance. Garcia Marquez states that the first delegation of civilian instructors, led by Raul Diaz Arguelles, arrived in Luanda three months later in August. This is in accordance with Castro's later claim that there was not a single Cuban instructor in Angola until August (Porter, 1984:5, Garcia Marquez, 1977:124).

In September, troop-carrying merchant-ships embarked for Angola and, according to Jorge Dominguez, "sometime between 20 August and 5 September 1975 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of the three armies and of the air force, and other vice ministers of the Armed Forces Ministry were temporarily relieved.
of their posts." They soon appeared in Angola and were only returned to their posts close to full year later. Then, 4 October, the first Cuban troop ship El Vietnam Heroico arrived at Peurto Amboim. The El Coral Island docked, 7 October, and La Plata discharged at Peurta Negra, 11 October. Troops were also airlifted to the Congo and transported to Angola by sea. Roughly 1 000 Cuban troops were present in Angola by mid-October 1975. The Cubans immediately established four training centres at Delatando, Benguela, Henrique de Carvalho, and Cabinda (Porter, 1984:6, Klinghoffer, 1980:111, Jaster, 1988:73, Garcia Marquez, 1977:124-125).

3.9.2.1 SADF Attack on Cuban Training Camp at Benguela:

On 3 November, a South African column attacked the Cuban training camp at Benguela. According to Castro, it was this attack at which Cubans first perished in Angola that led to the decision to send combat troops to assist the MPLA. Castro states that "on November 5 the Revolutionary Government of Cuba decided to send the first military units to Angola, to support the MPLA" (35). The effort was given the symbolic name of "Operation Carlota" after a black slave who led a Cuban uprising in 1843.

It began with the arrival of a reinforced battalion of special forces, 650 elite fighters from the Ministry of the Interior. The first contingent of 82 men, dressed in civilian clothes and carrying luggage full of small arms, left Havana 7 November. The next day three ships departed, carrying an artillery regiment, and arrived in Angola 27 November. Separate Cuban units began operating for the first time. Between 7 November and 9 December, a total of 70 air trips from Havana to Luanda were made with stops in Barbados, Guinea-Bissau and Congo. In the period 9 - 24 December all flights were discontinued as were Soviet arms shipments, in response to American overtures, and appears to indicate close coordination between Havana and Moscow (Klinghoffer, 1980:112, Porter, 1984:166, Bridgland, 1986:148).
3.9.2.2 Cuban Air Conveys Re-Commence Post Clark Amendment:

After this brief hiatus came to an end Cuban flights resumed with some difficulty because Barbados had, in the meantime, denied landing rights to the Cubans. Due to such difficulties, in obtaining landing rights to refuel, a number of transport planes were modified with supplementary gasoline tanks which allowed non-stop flights from Holguin to Brazzaville but with a reduced number of passengers. Most of the transport planes used by the Cubans were Air Cubana planes of Soviet manufacture. In early January 1976 the Soviet Union dispatched two Il-62 transport planes to Havana to assist the ailing aircraft. Castro later acknowledged that the USSR "collaborated with our efforts when imperialism had cut off practically all our air routes in Africa" (Porter, 1984:167, Garcia Marquez, 1977:131).

Converted cargo ships also carried soldiers to Angola. Indeed, Garcia Marquez wrote that they usually were crowded well beyond their intended capacity and that at one time as many as 15 Cuban vessels were en route to Angola. The Cuban expeditionary force expanded rapidly and, by late April 1976, there were an estimated 15 000 - 20 000 thousand Cubans in Angola (36). If anything, this estimation is low as a result of the consistent under-estimation of Cuban military strengths by Western intelligence agencies prior to 1976. Furthermore, more individual Cubans served in Angola than even the highest approximations reveal due to a policy of rotating troops between Angola and Cuba during the war (Porter, 1984:168, Garcia Marquez, 1977:131-132).
3.10 The Importance of South Africa's Internal Milieux: South African Politics, Decision-Making Structures, Personalities and Organisations:

3.10.1 Introduction:

As stated in Section 1.5.2, this chapter may have more appropriately been called the "Multiplicity of Intervention by External Actors." Indeed, due to the overwhelming degree of superpower intervention in the 1975-1976 period, the second paradigm or body of literature is of less relevance in explaining South African actions in Angola. Hence, causation in terms of the militarization of South African society, leadership personalities, the internal decision-making structures, and other domestic influences are of less importance. This conclusion is supported by the overwhelming evidence to the contrary presented in the preceding discussion of Chapter Two. There is, however, a notable exception to this assessment of the 1975-1976 time period.

3.10.2 The Importance of Bureaucratic Rivalry:

With direct implications in terms of SADF intervention in Angola, Kenneth Grundy identifies the eclipsing of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) by other governmental departments and agencies even on decisions directly related to foreign policy. This displacement began under the leadership of B.J. Vorster with the rise of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the Department of Information with the associated personalities of General van den Bergh and Connie Mulder, respectively. The DFA, in terms of bureaucratic manipulation, was outmanoeuvred and later outflanked even further by elements of the defence establishment. According to Grundy, as well as Barber and Barratt, it came as no surprise as the Angolan civil war unfolded that Hilgard Muller, then Foreign Minister, would take a back seat while more forceful personalities would take control (Barber and Barratt, 1990:192).

Philip Frankel likewise maintains that the bureaucratic dialectic between the military approach, versus the DFA's political approach to foreign policy decisions, proved critical in shaping South Africa's responses and policy towards Angola and SWA/Namibia. Frankel argues, in both cases, military leaders with access to central
decision-making institutions had gained the ascendant in contrast to the DFA and its greater appreciation of inherent political considerations.

The notable exception to the military's dominance of the South Africa state's decision-making apparatus was the decision to withdraw from the Angolan conflict in January 1976. In this specific instance, BOSS and DFA were able to impose the view on B.J. Vorster that a continued South African presence north of the Cunene would do incalculable harm to South Africa's image and interests in the West. The military hierarchy, in contrast, had wanted to continue to aid the FNLA and UNITA (Grundy, 1986:90, Frankel, 1984:150).

The South African military leadership did, however, appreciate that little could be gained by committing more South African troops without more tangible Western support. When the South African leadership realised that Western assistance would not be forthcoming (in reference to the Clark Amendment) SADF leaders were willing, perhaps reluctantly, to pull back to more defensive positions. Also cited as contributing to this decision is the realisation that what had been a bush war had become more like a conventional war requiring a similarly costly commitment (Grundy, 1986:88-90).

3.11 The Importance of the Global Order:

As previously stated, the overwhelming extent of super power intervention would appear to vindicate the utility of neo-realist system level theory in the 1975-1976 period (37). At the height of the Cold War era during which time the world order was defined by allegiance to one or the other super powers, Soviet and Cuban involvement in a regional conflict would have attracted American competition for influence. Under normal circumstances, UNITA, in all likelihood, would have received greater American backing and military support in an effort to counteract Soviet and Cuban influence in the region.

This, however, was not to be the case as discussed in Sections 3.6.3, 3.6.3.1, 3.6.3.2 and 3.6.3.3. The increasingly isolationist climate of opinion in Washington, following U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam and the Watergate Scandal, culminated
in the Senate passage of the Clark Amendment banning U.S. aid to any Angolan party. Originally adopted for one year in December 1975, the ban was extended in 1976 and efforts to repeal it failed in 1977-1978. The 19 December 1975 Senate vote in favour of the Clark Amendment proved a disaster because its timing was so inopportune. As stated in Section 3.6.3.4, the situation in Angola was still fluid at the time of the vote whose passage acted as the equivalent of a green light to Soviet intervention and that of their proxy state.

General Geldenhuys, for example, clearly identified the Clark Amendment as the major turning point. According to Geldenhuys, "The turning point of the war that led to the withdrawal of the South African troops was the new law passed by the American Congress forbidding military support to any Angolan Party ... The South African position was that it was not prepared to protect Western interests alone." He further states: "By 27 March 1976 the last troops of Operation Savannah had already withdrawn from Angola via Ruacana ... had the Americans kept up their pressure against Russian intervention, the result might easily have been some form of neutral government in Angola" (Geldenhuys, 1995:54,58).

Rajan Menon asserts that the Soviets and Cubans escalated their involvement because it was obvious American influence in the region was waning. Once this became apparent, with the passage of the Clark Amendment, the Soviet and Cuban presence could increase without serious risk of provoking a major super power confrontation (Menon, 1986: 136).

Furthermore, the entry of South African forces into the war and the resultant turn-about in the military fortunes of the MPLA prompted the Soviet Union to escalate arms supplies and Cuba to send thousands of troops. As stated in Endnote 23 of this chapter, "For the USSR, Cuba, and the MPLA, South Africa's intervention was a godsend. In the eyes of most black African leaders, the FNLA and UNITA had committed an unpardonable sin by joining forces with South Africa. While a number of them had criticised Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war, their
unhappiness about this was now displaced by their anger over South African intervention. This boosted the political fortunes of the MPLA" (Menon, 1986: 135).

Without doubt, the MPLA's victory by the end of February 1976 had been largely brought about by the increased availability of Soviet arms and Cuban soldiers. As stated in Section 3.7.4, South Africa, independently, and without crucial American support did not constitute an effective deterrent to Soviet and Cuba escalation. In accordance with a neo-realist perspective, in the face of an overwhelming Soviet military commitment and Cuban troop presence, and without crucial American support, South Africa consequently withdrew from Angola.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE:

(1) General Jannie Geldenhuys took over from General Constand Viljoen as the Chief of the Army in November 1980 and became Chief of the Defence Force in November 1985. He recognised regional conflicts such as Angola's had to be seen against the backdrop of the cold war conditions which prevailed internationally (Geldenhuys, 1995:51).

(2) The Portuguese coup was carried out by disillusioned army officers many of whom had fought in Portugal's colonial wars. The high casualties among the armed forces in Portugal's colonial conflicts (10 000 dead and 30 000 wounded) had created disenchantment within army ranks. The public was also disenchanted as the economy was suffering due to the government's enormous expenditure on far-flung military campaigns (Somerville, 1986:40, Marcum, 1978:241).

(3) General Geldenhuys asserts that Portugal, due to internal problems, either "could not or would not really exert its influence during the transitional period" (Geldenhuys, 1995:51).

According to the editor of the Angola Report "There is no excuse for the manner in which decolonisation took place, namely a complete abdication by the Portuguese ... The already very difficult situation in Angola was damned from the very moment when the provisional [transitional] government under Rosa Coutinho allowed the movements into Luanda without giving up their arms. People who had no political experience were allowed to play politics with their fingers on the triggers of Kalashnikovs" (Bridgland, 1986:132).

(4) According to Fred Bridgland, this alliance was urged upon reluctant partners by the CIA and other covert partners. It was an unnatural alliance and, indeed, Savimbi quickly expressed reservations about it. The DPRA was to comprise nine ministers from each of the movements with two nominated prime ministers holding office in alternate months. However, within a month of forming their coalition government, the FNLA and UNITA were fighting each other with as much vigour as they had the MPLA.

Bridgland states "The DPRA failed to gain recognition from anywhere, whereas the South African intervention had the effect of legitimising Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA" (Bridgland, 1986:151). The subject of the SADF intervention legitimating greater Soviet and Cuban involvement is discussed in greater detail in Section 3.7.6.

(5) George Modelski likewise maintains the semantics of labelling are based on expediency and advises the following: "As a general rule, those who wish to bring about the internationalisation of a violent conflict find it desirable to call it an external war; their opponents, on the other hand, may wish to isolate the conflict and for that reason may prefer to describe it as internal war" (Klinghoffer, 1989:6).
(6) In 1969 the MPLA attended a Soviet sponsored meeting in Khartoum the name of which was the "International Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa." The MPLA's attendance confirmed its status as the favoured faction of the Soviet Union in Angola. It also enabled the MPLA to join an alliance with other liberation movements which was instrumental in allowing the ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU to set up training camps in Angola and in allowing SWAPO to use southern Angola as a base from which to infiltrate SWA/Namibia (Somerville, 1986:36).

(7) Agostinho Neto was president of the MPLA from 1962 to 1979. In response to his election as MPLA president in December 1962 three factions developed within MPLA ranks. Firstly, Viriato da Cruz was, due to differences with Neto, removed as secretary general of the MPLA. After his split became final he led a breakaway faction attempting to join the FNLA. Secondly, Mario de Andrade was the driving force behind the creation of the Revolta Activa (Active Revolt) faction, which was mesticos dominated, in opposition to Neto's personalised methods of leadership. He was soon joined by his brother, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, who had been the MPLA's honourary president while in detention. Thirdly, the commander of the eastern front had become a potent threat to Neto's leadership. Daniel Chipenda had military autonomy, operating out of Lusaka rather than Brazzaville, and had the support of most Lunda, Chokwe and Ovimbundu party members. The three MPLA factions were temporarily reconciled in Lusaka, Zambia in June 1974 but disunity was soon evident. In the end, unity continued to prove elusive and Chipenda opened an office in Kinshasa, Zaire in October 1974. Two months later he was formally expelled from the MPLA although the Active Revolt faction remained within the movement (Klinghoffer, 1980:11-12, Marcum, 1976:411-12).

(8) The MPLA took part in the anti-colonial uprising, in Luanda, in February 1961. Although abortive, it essentially marked the beginning of the national liberation struggle. After their expulsion from Leopoldville, Zaire in November 1963, MPLA headquarters were transferred to Brazzaville, Congo. While centred in Brazzaville the MPLA maintained an additional office in Dar es Salaam from 1964. The MPLA's military prospects were boosted in May 1966 when an eastern front was opened in Zambia. As a result, the MPLA finally had direct land access to Angola. Daniel Chipenda, an Ochimbundu, commanded the eastern front where he enjoyed some success. When the Congo placed restrictions on MPLA activity in Brazzaville, in 1968, they then established another headquarters in Lusaka. Hence, by the late 1960s, the MPLA had major offices in three centres: Brazzaville, Congo, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Lusaka, Zambia (Klinghoffer, 1980:11, Somerville, 1986:30-33).

(9) Savimbi, having visited Peking and been received by Mao Tse-tung in 1964, adopted a highly self reliant strategy which emulated the Chinese. Once the colonial regime collapsed, however, UNITA promptly dropped its Maoist affiliation and adopted a more conciliatory posture which was deemed appropriate for the changed circumstances (Marcum, 1976:411).
(10) After the outbreak of fighting in 1961 up to 400,000 Bakongo war refugees poured across the border and joined other ethnic Bakongos in Zaire. Added to the already sizeable population of these transplanted Angolans, long attracted northward by the favourable economic and social conditions of the former Belgian Congo, these refugees effectively constituted a transplanted political constituency (Marcum, 1976:410).

(11) With regard to the FNLA's dominant ethnic affiliation, Immanuel Wallerstein states "the problem of the MPLA was to enlarge its base vertically in terms of popular support. The problem of the FNLA was to widen its base horizontally in terms of ethnic support" (Klinghoffer, 1980:12-13).

(12) The English (and French) speaking author of this dissertation regrets not being able to consider two books very relevant to the task at hand. They are firstly; Operasie Savannah, Angola 1975-1976 by Professor F.J. du Toit Spies, and secondly; Avontuur in Angola: Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-76 by Sophia du Preez. As is evident from their titles both are written in the Afrikaans language. As a result of their absence, this part of the dissertation, concentrating on the 1975-1976 period, relies heavily on Tony Hodges, Arthur Klinghoffer, Colin Legum, John Marcum, Keith Somerville, Fred Bridgland, Robert Jaster and Rajan Menon.

(13) The first substantial conflict occurred, 23 March, when FNLA units attacked MPLA installations at Cazenga and Vila Alice in Luanda. Three days later, 30 miles north-east of Luanda, 51 MPLA recruits were reportedly massacred after being seized by the FNLA. Fighting raged in Luanda for days despite the cease-fire agreement of 28 March and a further truce signed 8 April. A second wave of battles began at the end of April. In Luanda, in the early hours of 28 April, the FNLA launched a coordinated series of assaults against MPLA headquarters and against the headquarters of the pro-MPLA trade union UNTA (National Union of Angolan Workers). The assaults, which led to the cancellation of UNTA's May Day March, left 700 dead and 1,000 wounded. Meanwhile, fighting had erupted in the north according to Agostinho Neto and, in the south, fighting between the MPLA and FNLA was reported at Nova Lisboa (Huambo) as well as further east.

The Luanda fighting came to another temporary halt with an emergency visit by the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Melo Antunes, after the liberation movements had agreed to a new cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire agreement, signed 12 May, came to an abrupt end sixteen days later with the onset of a third more serious wave of clashes. The National Defence Commission, appointed under the Transitional Government, made the charge that the MPLA had launched coordinated assaults against the FNLA east of Luanda. The MPLA claimed it was only retaliating after months of aggression by the FNLA. The FNLA responded by mounting attacks against the MPLA in its northern strongholds. Heavy fighting also broke out between the two movements in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. In two days of fighting, during which the FNLA was driven out of Cabinda's capital, a total of eleven MPLA and FNLA members were killed and the fighting spread to Luanda. The fighting eventually subsided when another cease-fire agreement was signed, 7 June, although further battles were reported at Santo Antonio do Zaire, 8 June, and at Henrique de Carvalho a few days later (Hodges, 1980:12-13).
In early 1975, strictly in military terms, the FNLA enjoyed a distinct advantage over its rivals. In comparison, the MPLA had built a relatively small guerilla army with approximately 6,000 soldiers, while UNITA had a guerilla force of only 1,000 troops. In contrast, the FNLA in its Zairian military camps had trained an army of approximately 15,000 soldiers. Furthermore, it was well supplied with arms having received 450 tons of Chinese weaponry in 1974 and the assistance of 125 Chinese military instructors. The FNLA's Chinese and Romanian aid was, in addition to being complemented by extensive assistance from President Mobutu of Zaire, also assisted by growing amounts of American funding according to a CIA operative (Stockwell, 1978:67, Hodges, 1976:50, Somerville, 1986:42, Menon, 1986:133-134).

Bridgland describes the Portuguese departure thus: “The High Commissioner, Leonel Cardoso, appeared before the press at midday in the High Commissioner's Palace and read a short statement in which he handed sovereignty to “the Angolan people.” No Angolans were at the ceremony. The departing High Commissioner rejected any Portuguese responsibility for the situation in the country, but expressed regret that the three liberation movements had been allowed to arm themselves in the run-up to independence ... Cardoso immediately left the palace with his entourage, and under heavy guard went down to the port quarter of San Miguel to fold the red and green Portuguese flag ... The Portuguese then boarded a waiting convoy of frigates and transports which left the harbour in daylight and stayed just off Luanda until a little before midnight when they weighed anchor and passed out of Angolan territorial waters” (Bridgland, 1986:132).

According to General Geldenhuys, Holden Roberto’s ambition to conquer Luanda before 11 November 1975 made no sense as his soldiers were inexperienced and unskilled. "In the end his stubbornness sabotaged not only his own future but, to a large degree, that of Operation Savannah as well" (Geldenhuys, 1995:54).

It is alleged South African troops started operating in Angola as early as July and that by mid-August there were 1,000 SADF troops stationed at the Ruacana Falls and at Caleque in southern Angola (Somerville, 1986:44, Hallet, 1978:347-386).

Adding weight to this account is an admission made in parliament, perhaps inadvertently, by P.W. Botha. He stated that “from 14 July 1975 to 23 January 1976” South Africa’s total casualties in Angola consisted of 29 killed in action and 14 killed in accidents. This account was further collaborated by Jonas Savimbi: "South Africa, for some reasons of its own, invaded southern Angola in July 1975" (Legum, 1976:36).

South Africa’s direct military intervention, officially dated 23 October, will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.7 of this chapter.
Two days before this meeting, 12 July, Davis submitted a memorandum to the Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, State Department representative on the Forty Committee, with a copy to Secretary Kissinger. Essentially, the memo argued the following: that covert intervention would not serve larger U.S. interests, that an attempted intervention could not be kept secret, and that covert intervention would have to be so circumscribed so as not to meet its objectives while the other side could escalate at will.

Davis sent a second memo to Under Secretary Sisco and Secretary Kissinger, 14 July, the day the Forty Committee was to meet on the Angola issue. While it was largely a synthesis of the memo of two days earlier, in the final paragraph it referred explicitly to the 13 June Report of the Task Force stating the diplomatic-political alternative "was favoured by most of the agencies participating." The essence of such a diplomatic-political alternative "would be to reduce the infusion of arms and enlist African, Portuguese and multilateral influences toward a political solution" (Davis, 1978:113-116).

According to John Marcum, Washington was sensitive about the $800 million in American foreign investment in Zaire. This investment was threatened by internal instability brought about by a drastic fall in world copper prices, the failure to advance agricultural production beyond pre-independence levels, and the conspicuous affluence of the ruling elite. While none of these factors was directly attributable to the Soviets, the resultant instability, nonetheless enhanced the capacity of the Soviets for "mischief" in the region (Marcum, 1976:416).

While Barber and Barratt's reasoning appears sound, Bridgland nonetheless asserts that it was not UNITA but the FNLA which South Africa initially chose to support. Bridgland alleges that in a trip to Pretoria, 10 November 1975, Savimbi was told by John Vorster that "a concerted effort by the West and South Africa was being made to put the FNLA into Luanda by Independence Day." Bridgland also alleges that Savimbi, years later, learned from Western intelligence of the plan to offer UNITA three or four minor portfolios in the new government if the FNLA were successful in taking power. According to Savimbi, "The main part of the 2000-man South African force was in our area and yet they [the South Africans and the West] had planned to take over Luanda and give it to the FNLA without telling us. What sort of friendship is that?" (Bridgland, 1986:145-146).

General Geldenhuys' comment in Endnote 16 may well refer to Bridgland's contention that South Africa had initially supported the FNLA before they partook on their catastrophic pre-independence assault on Luanda.

Nigerian motivation for recognition of the MPLA Government is discussed in greater detail in Endnote 27.

According to Rajan Menon, "For the USSR, Cuba, and the MPLA, South Africa's intervention was a godsend. In the eyes of most black African leaders, the FNLA and UNITA had committed an unpardonable sin by joining forces with South Africa. While
a number of them had criticised Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war, their unhappiness about this was now displaced by their anger over South African intervention. This boosted the political fortunes of the MPLA" (Menon, 1986:135).

(24) While South Africa believed that the U.S. condoned and even approved, of its action, Arthur Klinghoffer asserts it does not necessarily follow that any American instigation was present (Klinghoffer, 1980:53).

John Marcum takes a contrary view and states the following: "Although Mr. Kissinger has asserted it was untrue that there had been any U.S. collusion with South Africa, high officials in Pretoria have announced that South Africa's entry into Angola was made on the basis of an understanding with American officials that the United States would rush sufficient supplies to counterbalance the weapons superiority of the MPLA/Cuban forces, and have expressed particular disappointment at Secretary Kissinger's inability to make good on his promises. At the very least the United States connived at the South African intervention and sought to cooperate with it (Marcum, 1976:422).

(25) On this subject Bridgland goes much farther than Marcum in citing American complicity. Bridgland argues: "South Africa, waiting for the Cubans to roll southwards into the vacuum that its withdrawal had left, was bitter about the failure of the West and the secret black African allies to give open support. P.W. Botha, John Vorster and "high officials" in Cape Town began to tell senior South African journalists that South Africa had intervened in Angola at the urging of the United States and certain black African countries, particularly Zambia and Zaire. Bernard Nossiter, of the Washington Post, met Botha who spoke of several black African states and at least one "free world" power giving their blessing to Pretoria's Angolan adventure. The nearest Botha came to identifying directly that "free world" power was when he told Nossiter enigmatically "I would be the last man to destroy our diplomatic relations with the United States" (Bridgland, 1986:168-169).

This debate is enormously controversial, will not be resolved in the context of this dissertation and will, without doubt, continue.

(26) According to Colin Legum, South Africa's intervention achieved four undesirable results. Firstly, it led to an escalation in Soviet arms shipments and greater numbers of Cuban combat troops creating a substantial force which could only be countered by a similarly major commitment. Secondly, in the eyes of the rest of the Continent and the OAU it provided more credible justification for the Soviet/Cuban role in Angola. Thirdly, it marked the beginning of the collapse in OAU consensus by compelling a number of African nations, led by Nigeria and Ghana, to abandon their earlier support for UNITA. Fourthly, and not unrelated to the previous point, South Africa's involvement and the SADF presence was helpful in discrediting any Angolan party harbouring anti-MPLA sentiments. Those groups were immediately suspected of colluding with "Africa's arch enemy." In other words, South Africa's decision to intervene led precisely to the results they sought to prevent (Legum, 1976:38).
(27) Nigeria reversed its stand, opposing Soviet and Cuban involvement, and recognised the legitimacy of the MPLA Government. Nigeria gave South Africa's intervention as the reason for its sudden change of policy. According to Bridgland, this marked the beginning of UNITA's diplomatic downfall. Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA Government was followed by Tanzania, whose government owned newspaper, carried Bridgland's report of South Africa's invasion of Angola under the headline "Savimbi Admits Betrayal" (Bridgland, 1976:150).

Savimbi was particularly upset about Nigeria's change of heart and said: "I thing they show ignorance or they trust very much the lies of the MPLA. Be recognising the MPLA they are only encouraging the continuation of our civil war. Instead of encouraging the civil war, they should do all they can to bring this war to an end through political negotiation (Bridgland, 1986:153).


(29) Marcum may be over zealous in claiming Angola represented the Soviet Union's debut as a major power in Africa. In this regard one could reasonably cite Egypt and Somalia as examples of Soviet influence on the continent.

(30) On this subject, Marcum states: "One would have thought that the President and Secretary of State would have perceived, as the Soviet leadership must have, that an American public chastened and disillusioned by a lost war in Vietnam would not tolerate even a very modest involvement in another distant, unfathomable, civil conflict" (Marcum, 1976:416)

(31) By late November, 600 tonnes of Soviet military equipment were in Dar-es-Salaam awaiting shipment to Luanda for the MPLA. Also in Dar-es-Salaam harbour was a Soviet ship which, according to the ship's manifest, was carrying 785 tonnes of arms for SWAPO. Western intelligence believed these arms were in fact intended for the MPLA. The Tanzanians were also holding 100 tonnes of arms sent by China via Dar-es-Salaam for UNITA. President Nyerere, however, diverted these weapons to the MPLA which caused immense bitterness on the part of UNITA (Bridgland, 1986:149).

(32) The U.S. State Department estimated that by as early as January 1975 sufficient arms had been delivered to equip five to seven thousand MPLA troops (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1975:184).

(33) Two internal changes within Cuba made possible the shift in scale that characterised Cuba's African policy from the 1960s to the 1970s. Firstly, after a dismal performance throughout the 1960s the Cuban economy recovered in the first half of the following decade, aided by the soaring world price of sugar, and also by internal changes in economic management and organisation. Secondly, the Cuban armed forces went through an important process of professionalisation in the early 1970s transforming them into the effective troops which were later deployed in African wars.
Furthermore, Cuba developed a large and competent military reserve. For example, fully 70 percent of Cuban forces deployed in Angola in 1975-76 were reservists (Dominguez, 1978:94).

(34) In addition, Marcum states that due to "the powerful racial symbolism of South Africa, its intervention had [sic] a convulsive effect among Africans, overriding anxieties related to Soviet and Cuban intervention" (Marcum, 1976:420).

(35) Castro's description of 5 November as the date a Cuban decision was taken on Angola was politically self-serving and probably inaccurate. The arrival of three Cuban ships, with supplies for the MPLA in early October, indicates that the Cubans must actually have decided, perhaps by late September, on substantial military involvement (Jaster, 1988:73).

The activities of the South Africans in Angola did, however, provide an extremely politically expedient cover for expanding Cuban involvement.

(36) Klinghoffer estimates there were approximately 14,000 Cubans in Angola by February 1976 and 17,000 by late March (Klinghoffer, 1984:114).

(37) The author of this dissertation wishes to avoid tedious repetition of the events previously described throughout the bulk of Chapter Three. Therefore, this concluding section is very brief.
CHAPTER IV:


4.1 Conditions Post-Independence:

On independence day, 11 November, the rest of the newly established nation outside the capital had little to celebrate under the weight of Zairian and South African occupation (1). Gradually, in the months that followed, the MPLA forces in Luanda regained authority throughout the provinces. It was therefore a surprise for the victorious MPLA to discover that the first challenge to its rule came from its own urban constituency (2).

4.1.1 Agricultural Production and Food Distribution:

During the first year of independence Angola experienced all the stresses of a newly independent African nation in the most acute form possible. However, probably the greatest problem facing Angola after independence was that of agricultural production and food distribution. The entire Angolan food distribution network failed at three levels; production, transport and retail. Agricultural produce in colonial Angola had grown on both white owned plantations and on black owned plots. The former sector relied heavily on the transfer of labour from south to north but, when the 1975 war split the country in two, this integration of northern land and southern labour was destroyed. Expatriate management withdrew to Europe and Ovimbundu labour retreated to the shelter of the highlands. Independence and war disrupted the system to such an extent severe shortages ensued (Birmingham, 1992:77, Somerville, 1986:47).

4.1.2 Disruption of the Transport System:

According to David Birmingham, the failure of production was not the only reason why food shortages became so severe as to almost unseat the government. The transport system was severely disrupted. Firstly; the Benguela railway was
operating only on limited sections as a large number of rail bridges had been<br>demolished. Secondly, all civilian transport planes were flown out of the country never<br>to return, and thirdly, Portuguese lorries and other vehicles were driven to South Africa<br>by refugees or destroyed in "scorched earth" actions. Due to the lack of transport even<br>where crops were grown there was little opportunity for delivering them to market due<br>to the reasons discussed.

4.1.3 Retail Distribution:

In addition to the collapse of production and transport, there were great <br>difficulties in retail distribution. Angolan colonial society was built on a nation-wide <br>network of small white shop owners and inn-keepers. Even in the capital, retailing was <br>still largely a white preserve. The rebuilding of an African class of petty traders to <br>replace those who fled was not part of the new government's social strategy. The <br>MPLA's ideal was a state-run system of "people's shops." However, experienced <br>entrepreneurs were in short supply and the city sorely lacked a responsive capitalist <br>retail network to match the needs of a newly liberated people. The food crisis was a <br>fundamental cause of political fission. Foreign exchange, needed for producer goods, <br>was instead redirected for the purchase of emergency imports. Six months after the <br>1977 coup Angola was forced to airlift 30 000 bags of maize from Zambia, for <br>emergency feeding, which marked the beginning of a long-term policy of feeding the <br>city while neglecting the farmers (Birmingham, 1992:78).

4.1.4 Shortage of Experienced Administrators:

Exacerbating such post-independence difficulties, was the shortage of <br>experienced administrators (Birmingham, 1992:77-78). By African standards, Angola <br>was a highly bureaucratised country in the 1970s. However, the withdrawal of 90 per <br>cent of its expatriates, between July and November 1975, left essential services such <br>as transport, harbours, currency, customs, police, revenue, local government and <br>health all chronically short-staffed.
4.1.5 The MPLA’s Ambitious Ideological Programme:

Furthermore, the MPLA’s ambitious ideological programme may possibly have taken priority over the immediate developmental needs of the new nation. The MPLA desired to launch a programme of socialist transformation despite all the immediate problems facing it. One of the principal decisions of the new government was the official adoption of Marxism-Leninism. The MPLA’s political bureau declared “to defend and advance the Revolution, we must analyse and characterise the different phases and stages of our struggles, and clearly define socialism as the highest aim of our Revolution.” This included plans to nationalise vital industries and implement state control of foreign trade. However, in order to implement this socialist programme, economic reconstruction was necessary. Toward this end the Neto government introduced a strict austerity programme. The austerity measures coupled with the MPLA’s increasingly Marxist stance led to conflicts between the government and its traditional constituency in Luanda (Somerville, 1998:47-49).

4.2 The Coup d’etat:

Considering the circumstances and based on the available evidence, the attempted coup d’etat of 27 May 1977 should not have been a surprise (3). After the war of 1975, frustration rose rapidly among the urban poor reaching a crescendo, two years later, in 1977 (4). Confrontation had also been building within the MPLA Central Committee itself. Gradually, the debate became polarised into two main tendencies; the official one of President Agostinho Neto and the dissenting one of Nito Alves. This divide was recognised in October 1976 when the third plenary session of the MPLA Central Committee set up a committee to investigate factionalism within the Movement. Its report, presented 20-21 May 1977, condemned the factionalism as aiming to "deflect the People from the true objectives of the current stage of struggle which is national reconstruction and the defence of national integrity against imperialism" and stated that its leaders, Nito Alves and Jose van Dunem, be expelled from the Central Committee (Birmingham, 1992:73-75, Somerville, 1986:50-53, Bridgland, 1986:263-264).
The stage was thereby set for a coup d'état which, over the following six days, unrolled in a poorly planned and incompetent manner. The coup of 27 May 1977 was seen as an uprising of the Luanda slums. The first coup attempt failed. A second coup was then planned in which the army was to kill half a dozen leaders hostile to the Nito Alves faction. This too failed. Therefore, a third coup was planned without the assistance of the armed forces sympathetic to the Nito Alves faction. However, before these plans could be executed independent insurgents from the ninth military brigade blew open the prison and captured the radio station. The planned coup d'état was revealed and the MPLA Government was able to retake the radio station with Cuban assistance (5). Nito Alves's attempted coup d'état was foiled and he and his closest associates were captured. The six dissident MPLA leaders were taken to a house in the slum area of Sambizanbga and shot (Birmingham, 1992:75-76, Somerville, 1986:52-53, Bridgland, 1986:264-265).

4.3 The Continuing Downward Spiral and External Involvement:

The year 1977 provided Angola with the worst possible start in its quest for peaceful and independent development. At the time of the attempted coup, the MPLA made little mention of the significant fighting occurring in five separate zones across the country. All five war zones involved foreign interests. Similarly, the coup engendered a variety of different foreign responses (6).

4.3.1 Rural Rebellion:

While the first challenge to the MPLA came from their own tradition constituency in Luanda the second originated over a much broader front in the provinces. The short-lived urban rebellion was followed by a long term rebellion of the countryside. Three factors rendered the rural rebellion particularly tenacious: firstly; it suited Pretoria to follow the civil war soon afterwards with a war of destabilization comparable to the one it was conducting in Mozambique. Secondly; it suited the USA not to recognise the MPLA Government in light of the crucial support it had received from America's arch enemy, Cuba. Thirdly; the provincial rebellion had a political focus which began with
the highland mobilizations of UNITA and continued with UNITA's increasing militarization in the south east where protection was offered by South African air-cover (Birmingham, 1992:81-82). The combined result was an intensifying civil war with new international involvement.

4.3.2 The Destruction of the Ovimbundu Highlands:

The war acquired greater intensity throughout the 1980s and in the process tore the Ovimbundu highlands apart. The Ovimbundu found themselves attacked by both UNITA forces and the people's army of the MPLA Government. UNITA's objective was to impoverish zones under government control through indiscriminate killing, burning and pillaging (7). The atrocities, however, were not limited to anti-government actions but were mirrored by the MPLA. The MPLA strategy of confining UNITA to the south east to prevent its return to the highlands was equally hostile. To prevent UNITA insurgents from developing a social base, the government removed the people they thought vulnerable to guerrilla penetration. The war came to resemble colonial wars in which authorities herded people into barbed wire villages in order to deny them any possibility of contact with the enemy (8). The MPLA Government adopted the same arbitrary and inhumane strategy assuming that all peasants were potential UNITA sympathizers (Birmingham, 1992:82-83).

4.3.3 American and South African Points of View:

The first international change to affect Angola directly was the defeat of President Carter and his replacement by Ronald Reagan in 1980 (9). Carter had restricted American intervention in local wars involving the other superpower. Reagan, in contrast, came to power with a policy of stopping all wars of national liberation. This was accomplished by arming and financing client groups in so-called low intensity conflicts. In Angola the chosen vehicle for a low intensity campaign to inhibit nationalist aspirations was UNITA which had failed to acquire power in 1975 (10). UNITA was rebuilt in the 1980s and given a military base in the remote south east section of the country far outside the old constituency where it was founded. In this new base UNITA
benefitted from a powerful South African air shield which protected it from recapture (Birmingham, 1992:84).

The South African invasions of the 1980s received a different reception than those of the previous decade. Birmingham describes how, in the 1970s, the moral revulsion at the armies of apartheid marching into a newly independent African nation brought international sympathy to Angola. However, by the 1980s South Africa had learnt to better manage its public relations. The Angolan Government was supported by a Cuban force of 30 000 troops which South Africa presented to the world as Soviet puppets. The joint campaign on the part of UNITA with SADF support, to overthrow the government of a Soviet satellite in Africa, attracted political support in Europe and financial support from other regions of the world.

4.4 South Africa’s War of Destabilization:

Meanwhile the times were changing with South Africa, as well, being the target of increased sabotage including the destruction of three oil installations in June 1980 by ANC operatives. The South African security situation continued to worsen and, throughout 1980, South Africa experienced the worst resurgence of black unrest in several years. These challenges created insecurity against which Pretoria reacted. It was viewed as crucial, in terms of the nation’s vital interests, to prevent the internal opponents of apartheid from believing that sabotage and armed resistance could be effective against white minority rule. Hence, Pretoria struck hard against the ANC and SWAPO guerrilla bases with little regard for national borders.

South Africa’s war of destabilization had been devastating in Mozambique and, although not less so in Angola, it was very distinct in kind and effect. The presence of a hostile marxist-oriented government in Mozambique, whose capital lay only a few miles from the South African border, posed a greater military threat than such a government would in Angola. Ideologically, however, Angola was the greater security threat due to the ability of radical Angolan nationalism to inflame black opposition within South African territory (11). Therefore, according to Pretoria’s thinking, such influences
needed to be curbed for security reasons and a campaign of destabilization was undertaken in Angola as well (Birmingham, 1992:84).

According to Birmingham, in the 1980s the balance between "local" and "international" forces was altered in the Angolan conflict. In the 1970s the various nationalist movements had been strong enough to compete with one another for central authority but, in the 1980s, the domestic forces of opposition largely withered away and were confined to the UNITA enclave and its highland sympathizers. Meanwhile, opposition in the form of the regional strategy of destabilization, orchestrated by South Africa, dominated the situation (Birmingham, 1992:84). Adding to an already explosive quagmire was the presence of a Cuban expeditionary force of 30 000 troops for the purpose of supporting the MPLA Government bitterly opposed by the USA and South Africa.

4.4.1 Operation Reindeer, The First Raid Against SWAPO in Angola, May 1978:

South Africa's first deep penetration raid against a SWAPO camp in Angola occurred under Vorster's leadership and was launched on Ascension Day, 4 May 1978 (12). Operation Reindeer consisted, firstly, of an air and parachute attack on SWAPO's most important training and supply base, "Moscow," which was 250 kilometres north of the Namibia - Angola border (13). The second part of Operation Reindeer consisted of a simultaneous ground attack by a mechanized force on various forward transit camps around the Angolan border area. This included a SWAPO complex, "Vietnam," which was 28 kilometres north of the border (Geldenhuys, 1995:92-93).

SADF intelligence reports had identified Cassinga as SWAPO's main operational headquarters for southern Angola consisting of a training complex large enough to house between 700 and 1 200 troops. The base also consisted of a vehicle park, various headquarters buildings, a large engineer training complex, parade ground and an extensive trench system. It was further equipped with anti-aircraft defences. In the wake of the SADF raid, in the form of Operation Reindeer, SWAPO flatly denied Cassinga was a military base (14). They claimed that the town, at the time of the

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attack, was populated by refugees, largely women and children, and that the only fighting force present had been a "camp defence unit" of only 300 men. Cassinga's military and strategic importance was, however, clearly evidenced by the large quantities of equipment and supplies destroyed and documents seized. The quality of military intelligence gathered by the SADF was high and had a significant impact in future operations (15) (Geldenhuys, 1995:93, Steenkamp, 1983:18).)

May 1978 was a delicate period in the SWA/Namibian settlement talks and Operation Reindeer effectively suspended them for several months. Likewise, in March 1979, prospects for a negotiated settlement on Namibia once again suffered when P.W. Botha unleashed a blistering condemnation of the UN and Contact Group (16). Claiming that South Africa had been "left in the lurch" by the West, Botha rejected Waldheim's proposals which would have allowed SWAPO to establish bases in SWA/Namibia and only nominal monitoring of its bases in Angola (17) (Jaster, 1988:80).

4.5 P.W. Botha and the Total National Strategy (TNS):

In the early months of 1980 P.W. Botha began to more heavily promote the concept of total national strategy (TNS) to the white electorate. In March he argued in Parliament: "The main objective ... under the guidance of the planners in the Kremlin, is to overthrow this State and to create chaos in its stead, so that the Kremlin can establish hegemony here" (18). The present Soviet strategy is to avoid a direct, conventional onslaught because "the threshold is too high." But, he added, "an indirect strategy is being pursued by every possible means." The military onslaught is being waged by proxy, by the Cubans, "who are a crowd of slaves of the rulers in Moscow" (Jaster, 1988:91).

In a statement which anticipated his government's imminent shift to a far more aggressive response to the so-called onslaught, he also warned of a conventional threat. Botha stated: "there is the conventional military onslaught we have to bear in mind. There is a gradual build-up of more sophisticated arms in neighbouring states, especially in Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia. Such equipment can be converted
almost overnight into a credible instrument of Soviet aggression" (Jaster, 1988:91). Hence, acting with the intent to preserve the nation's vital security interests and long-term survival, the stage was set for South Africa's more militant policy towards neighbouring nations and defiance towards the West.

4.6 South Africa's War Against SWAPO: 1979 Onward:

South Africa's war against SWAPO began seriously and consistently in 1979 (19). In an effort to obtain intelligence, via cross border operations, South Africa launched both Operation Rekstok and Operation Safraan in early March 1979. They were actually only a single operation conducted over an extended area. The part which took place in Angola was called Operation Rekstok and that which took place in Zambia was called Operation Safraan. SWAPO bases were simultaneously attacked in Angola during Rekstok and in Zambia during Safraan. During an air attack in Angola a Canberra light bomber crashed, presumably after being hit by ground fire, killing the crew. Neither the Angolan nor Zambian aspect of the operation achieved great material success (20) (Geldenhuys, 1995:108-109).

4.6.1 The 32 Battalion:

A few months later, in June, 8000 South African reservists were put into service to track down roving SWAPO units which had infiltrated Ovamboland. South Africa also reactivated a covert SADF unit, the 32 battalion, composed of black Angolans who had previously been FNLA guerrillas until Roberto Holden's defeat in 1975 (21). Led by white officers, units of the 32 battalion operated in Angola on a full-time basis (22). Their task, reminiscent of American involvement in Vietnam, was to carry out sweeps through villages searching for SWAPO guerrillas as well as seeking to destroy essential local infrastructure such as bridges and roads (23). By late 1980, the 32 battalion had been highly effective in creating a buffer zone up to 50 kilometres deep in which abandoned villages and scorched countryside allowed little opportunity for life as it had existed and scant cover for the SWAPO contingents hoping to move southward toward Namibia (Jaster, 1988:93).
4.6.2 Operation Sceptic/Smokeshell, June 1980:

In June 1980 the SADF launched Operation Smokeshell against SWAPO (24). Operation Smokeshell came about as the result of two realities one of which was political and the other military. Firstly; by early 1980 progress in the negotiations over SWA/Namibian independence "had slowed down to a snail-like crawl for the umpteenth time" and, secondly; SWAPO was once again showing signs of life (Steenkamp, 1983: 167). In addition to disrupting insurgent activities and inflicting maximum casualties, Operation Smokeshell also sought to damage Soviet confidence in SWAPO, restore confidence in the SADF, and place South Africa in a position of strength in the SWA/Namibian negotiations (Steenkamp, 1983:169).

There were a number of reasons for SWAPO's apparent revival. Probably the most important impetus was derived from SWAPO's loss of credibility, not only among the local population in Ovamboland, but in the eyes of its Soviet sponsor. In fact, as SADF intelligence duly reported to the general staff, the Soviets had demanded that SWAPO produce some definite results by the middle of the year. As a result of this ultimatum there was a abrupt resurgence in SWAPO activity. Suddenly, diligent attempts were made to relieve the scarcity of food, captured deserters were harshly punished and personal motivation programmes implemented for SWAPO personnel in their various camps across Angola (25) (Steenkamp, 1983:167-168).

More ominous was the transfer of 800 insurgents from south western Zambia to the Cunene Province in south western Angola. This served as an obvious and immediate threat to the power lines emanating from the Ruacana Falls hydro electric generating station in that area. SWAPO's mine laying operations intensified and an intense recruitment effort was reported (26). Attempts were made to infiltrate south of this area into white owned farming areas and there was a noticeable increase in mine laying and recruiting in Koakoland as well. SADF intelligence became aware that increased planning for military mobilization was taking place at all levels of the organisation. By early May 1980 SWAPO's planning activity appeared to be complete.
and it was obvious that some sort of action would have to be taken. Permission for the SADF to mount a sizeable pre-emptive attack on SWAPO targets in southern Angola was soon granted (27) (Steenkamp, 1983:168).

Operation Sceptic, better known as Smokeshell, was launched in June 1980. It was the largest South African mechanized infantry operation since World War II. It began with a blitz attack on a SWAPO base in southern Angola but developed into an extended operation as more SWAPO caches were found in the vicinity. The objective was to destroy SWAPO's command and control centre at Chifufua 180 kilometres north of the border. On June 10, after an air strike and artillery bombardment, battle groups 10 and 61 struck Chifufua (codenamed Smokeshell) (28). The operation was to have ended 17 June but, due to information found on the scene, was extended to bases west of Smokeshell and eventually came to an end 13 June (29). It brought about the first serious clashes between the SADF and FAPLA and South Africa's first contact with SWAPO's mechanized elements. SWAPO lost its forward base facilities and the SADF seized several hundred tonnes of equipment and supplies as well as numerous vehicles. (Geldenhuys, 1983:120-121).

4.7 SWAPO, Soviet and Cuban Integration:

South African security concerns were not exclusively devoted to the threat posed by SWAPO alone. By mid 1981 the security situation in northern SWA/Namibia took a sinister turn not only due to SWAPO. The ongoing delivery of Soviet arms, continuing Cuban presence, and the stock-piling of vast quantities of advanced weaponry in Angola all contributed to the escalating security threat. Likewise, the increasing concentration of FAPLA and SWAPO forces in southern Angola posed a real and significant threat to South African security interests in northern SWA/Namibia. Taking place throughout July 1981 various skirmishes between the SADF and SWAPO attained a higher and more feverish pitch (Geldenhuys, 1995:144, Jaster, 1988:94).

General Lloyd, SADF commander in Namibia, warned the introduction of Soviet early-warning radar and ground-to-air missiles rendered it more difficult to provide air

Operation Protea resulted in the second serious confrontation between the SADF and FAPLA (34) and, at the time, represented the largest South African mechanized operation since World War II. It was also the SADF's first deep penetration attack since South Africa's initial intervention in 1975. Unlike previous engagements, the eight day campaign saw heavy direct fighting between Angolans and South Africans. Among the approximately 4,000 tonnes of captured arms were several T-34 and PT-76 Soviet tanks and armoured cars, heavy trucks, 100 SAM-7 missile launchers, a large number of 122-mm rockets and almost 200 logistical vehicles (35) (Geldenhuys, 1995:145, Jaster, 1988:94-95).

The repercussions of Operation Protea were of significant benefit to UNITA. The SADF military success provided UNITA with a safe rear base inside Angola as well as shorter communication and supply lines. The South African presence in southern Angola also drew large numbers of FAPLA troops to the south and away from areas into which UNITA wished to spread its campaign. UNITA's level of military activity increased and the war eventually spread northwards. As UNITA activity spread so did the tactic of seizing foreign hostages and using them to publicise UNITA's fight against the government. In March 1983 eighty-four Czech and Portuguese construction workers were seized and taken to Savimbi's base at Jamba. Western press coverage gave UNITA a higher military profile than it deserved and gave the world the mistaken impression that the MPLA government was on the brink of defeat (Somerville, 1986:64-65).

4.7.3 Operation Daisy, November 1981:

Just as Operation Protea was a result of information collected during the preceding operation, Operation Protea provided the information which gave rise to Operation Daisy. In November 1981 Gen Charles Lloyd launched Operation Daisy, a three-week incursion, aimed at destroying a bunker complex near Cassinga 160 miles inside Angola. Military objectives were attacked at Bambi and Chetaquera. Although
no clashes took place between South African and Angolan ground forces, the SAAF had encounters with a number of MiG-21 fighter aircraft. Operation Daisy, a success for South Africa, ended 20 November (Geldenhuys, 1995:146, Jaster, 1988:95).

4.7.4 Operations Super, Meebos and Phoenix, 1982-1983:

Operations Super, Meebos and Phoenix were representative of South Africa's continued military aggression in the region and the success of P.W. Botha's policies of destabilization (36). Firstly; the SADF launched Operation Super in January 1982 as a countermeasure to SWAPO's bid to open a new front in Koakoland. Reconnaissance elements of the 32 Battalion were sent to locate SWAPO cadres preparing to infiltrate the area. Once located, near the town of Iona, the 32 Battalion were flown there to launch a blitz attack. SWAPO's casualties were great and the SADF were able to seize a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. Secondly; Operation Meebos, executed during July and August 1982, consisted of a number of air and ground attacks on SWAPO's command and control structure. SWAPO lost 345 troops and their headquarters at Mupa was destroyed. Thirdly; Operation Phoenix, a defensive counteraction, was launched against SWAPO's new deliberate wave of infiltration into Ovamboland in February 1983. Phoenix commenced 15 February, and when it finished two months later, SWAPO and SADF casualties had occurred at a rate of roughly 11 to 1 (Geldenhuys, 1995:146).

The risk to South Africa, that their war of destabilization might provoke a direct intervention by Cuban forces in the conflict, diminished with the SADF's Operation Protea in August 1981. At this time, and in response to the SADF intervention, Cuba issued an official statement warning that Cuban troops would go into action "with all forces available" if the SADF columns approached the defensive positions of the Cubans (Jaster, 1988:5). Castro stated publicly, close to a year later in July 1982, if the South Africans "strike deeply into Angolan and reach our lines, we will fight with all our might against these parasitic, racist mercenaries" (Jaster, 1988:95). Hollow rhetoric aside, the Cubans were evidently reluctant to take a more active combat role.
at the time. Hence, Pretoria intensified military pressure on the MPLA Government based on a successful gamble that greater Soviet-Cuban involvement in the fighting would not take place.

4.8 The Era of the Lusaka Peace Accord, 1983 - 1985:

However, there was nonetheless reason for concern over continuing SADF involvement in an escalating war. Militarily, the Angolans had been increasingly offering the SADF more serious resistance. By 1983 heavier and more sophisticated weapons were being used and the rate of casualties was accelerating. In December of that year, a Soviet UN representative privately warned his South African counterpart against further attacks on Angola and, in January, the Soviet Union announced it had reached agreement with Angola to bolster Angolan defense capabilities (Jaster, 1988:96). Nor, significantly, could South Africa rely upon continuing support and understanding from the Reagan Administration. When the United Nation's Security Council (UNSC) voted to condemn South Africa for its continuing occupation of Namibia, October 1983, the U.S.A. chose to abstain rather than exercise their veto.

Therefore, both South Africa and Angola were ready to consider a cease-fire and mutual force disengagement when first proposed by the USA in late 1983 (37). South Africa informed the U.N. Secretary General, December 1983, of the decision to commence withdrawal of SADF troops from Angola, 31 January 1984, provided the Angolans agreed to prevent SWAPO from taking advantage of the situation to infiltrate its forces into Namibia. Angolan, South African and American representatives met in Lusaka in early February 1984 to finalize the details (Jaster, 1988:96).

4.8.1 Operation Askari, December 1983 - January 1984:

Nonetheless, South Africa's next cross-border operation, Operation Askari, took place in December 1983 despite the U.N. brokered cease-fire having been initiated (38). General Meiring launched Operation Askari, 6 December 1983, when it became apparent that SWAPO was planning a large scale infiltration for early in 1984 (39). Operation Askari was launched with a number of ground and air attacks aimed primarily

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at disrupting SWAPO's logistical infrastructure. Although the SADF claimed the attacks were concentrated on SWAPO, Angolan forces nonetheless also became involved. The largest clash between the SADF and FAPLA took place 3 January 1984 when FAPLA's eleventh brigade and two Cuban battalions came to SWAPO's assistance as the SADF were attacking SWAPO's headquarters five kilometres from Cuvelai (40). Operation Askari was the last operation of its kind and ended 3 January 1984 (41) (Geldenhuys, 1995:154-155).

4.8.2 Provisions of the Lusaka Accord, February 1984:

The Lusaka Accord, signed 16 February 1984, limited the cease-fire to a triangular area which was bounded by the Cunene River on the west, the Cubango River in the east and a 480 kilometre strip of the Namibia-Angola border to the south. The area was systematically cleared by zones (42). In the resulting demilitarized zone (DMZ) Angola agreed to notify South Africa of any movements taking place in this area. The Lusaka Accord also prohibited SWAPO members, Cuban forces and any SWAPO supplies, such as tanks and guns, from passing through the DMZ area once the SADF had fulfilled their part of the agreement and withdrawn (43). The Americans assured South Africa that, in the event of Angolan violation of the accord, the U.S.A. would give diplomatic support to South Africa. A joint monitoring commission (JMC), comprised of both Angolan and South African representatives, was established to monitor the execution of the agreement. The JMC would patrol the border and prevent violations by any of the groups, including SWAPO, whose forces resident in Angola had conditionally agreed to accept the terms of the cease-fire (Geldenhuys, 1995:157, Jaster, 1988:96-97).

4.8.2.1 South African Withdrawal Falls Behind Schedule:

The February 1984 Lusaka cease-fire witnessed South African withdrawal fall far behind schedule as SADF commanders charged SWAPO with continuing to infiltrate its operatives through the cease-fire zone (44). The SADF withdrawal was finally completed, only in April 1985, a year later than agreed. Throughout this period few
clashes occurred between South African and Angolan forces. Two months after withdrawing, however, in June 1985, South African troops recrossed the border and attacked SWAPO units 45 kilometres inside Angola (Jaster, 1988:97, Paratus, 1985:10-11).

4.8.3 Operation Boswilger, June 1985:

From the South African point of view their reason for the launch of Operation Boswilger, of June 1985, was clear: the terms of the Lusaka Accord were not adhered to (45). Therefore, the SADF was compelled to continue with their operations against SWAPO (46). Some of the practical problems with the implementation of the accord are described by General Geldenhuys in detail. For example, the SADF sometimes had intelligence of SWAPO activities in the DMZ in contravention of the Lusaka Accord. SWAPO, technically, could not violate the Lusaka Agreement as it was not a signatory. Therefore, the SADF had to address such information to the Angolan government for action as it was they who undertook to prevent SWAPO from entering the DMZ. This involved presenting the information to the Angolan component of the JMC which always, inevitably, found one argument or other for simply ignoring SWAPO's transgressions (Geldenhuys, 1995:158-159).

In the June 1985 incursion, Operation Boswilger, and a similar operation in September 1985 SADF officials asserted that the Angolans were told of the raid on SWAPO bases "in its early" stages and did not interfere. SADF spokespersons also said that their forces were under strict instructions to avoid contact with FAPLA, the Angolan regular army, as well as to stay outside any town garrisoned by the Angolans. The cease-fire brought about by the Lusaka Accord, of February 1984, that led to a period of relative peace for roughly 18 months when there was virtually no fighting between Angolan forces and South African forces (47) (Jaster, 1988:97, Paratus, 1985:10-11).
4.9 FAPLA's Assault on UNITA's Main Base, September 1985:

This oasis of peace brought about by the Lusaka Accord came to an abrupt end in late September 1985 when Angolan troops, newly equipped with Soviet helicopters and other weapons, launched a major ground and air offensive against the UNITA stronghold in the south-east corner of Angola. The surprise assault, the largest in a decade, raised the stakes of the Angolan conflict and presented South Africa with an immediate dilemma: UNITA was of utility to South Africa militarily in defending a sizeable area of the border just inside Angola and extending east of the Cubango river. Politically, as well, UNITA's lengthy claim to legitimacy as a nationalist movement entitling it to a share of power placed added pressure on the MPLA leadership. Hence, UNITA's continued survival was of strategic interest to South Africa (Jaster, 1988:98).

4.9.1 South Africa's Commitment to UNITA:

The South African commitment to ensuring UNITA's continued survival was frequently reiterated. For example, according to a confidential US State Department Memo later leaked to the press, Pik Botha told US officials in April 1981 that his government "sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia, [and] believes Savimbi wants southern Angola. Having supported him this far, it would damage [the South African government's] honour if Savimbi is harmed." Senior South African military personnel also suggested privately that they would like a federal solution in Angola leaving Savimbi in control of the southern region. With UNITA serving as a trip-wire security would be provided to deal with the threat of a cross-border invasion of SWA/Namibia (Jaster, 1988:99).

4.9.2 SADF Intervention on UNITA's Behalf:

As stated, this commitment to UNITA was put to the test in September 1985 when the Angolan Government's first major offensive against Savimbi's forces came close to overwhelming the main UNITA base at Jamba. As the situation deteriorated Savimbi's requests for South African military assistance became increasingly urgent. By the time the decision was taken in Pretoria to intervene on UNITA's behalf the
Angolan offensive was well under way. UNITA was preparing to abandon their base as FAPLA forces had progressed to within only 40 kilometres of Mavinga (48). P.W. Botha indirectly acknowledged the SADF's intervention by telling a National Party meeting that his government could "hardly sit still" while Soviet tanks, jets and helicopters were being deployed in a drive to destroy UNITA. If the Soviet-supported forces succeeded in Angola, then surely they would do so in SWA/Namibia, reasoned Botha (Jaster, 1988:99, Heitman, 1990:13-14).

4.9.2.1 Operations Magneto and Wallpaper:

Pretoria feared, with the massive FAPLA offensive it was facing, UNITA could lose all their past gains and, thereby, allow SWAPO to gain access to Kavango and West Caprivi. Pretoria therefore authorised limited assistance which took the form of two operations each in support of one of the two fronts. Firstly; Operation Magneto provided for the attachment of some artillery advisors and medical personnel to the UNITA force on the Cazombo front along with some additional logistical support. The SAAF undertook trooping flights from Mavinga and flew supply sorties from Grootfontein to airfields near the front. Secondly; Operation Wallpaper, the more ambitious of the two, provided for the deployment of a troop of multiple rocket launchers in support of UNITA on the Mavinga front. Operation Wallpaper extended from 27 September to 3 October over which time the SAAF provided limited air support (Heitman, 1990:14).

In the case of Operation Magneto the situation on the Cazombo front was irretrievable by the time South Africa intervened (49). On the Mavinga front to the south, Operation Wallpaper and the UNITA forces re-deployed from the failed Cazombo front, combined to oppose the FAPLA offensive. The direct fighting was done by UNITA. South Africa's contribution, in the form of a troop of multiple rocket launchers and the air strikes by SAAF Mirages and Impalas on FAPLA forces along the Lomba River, inflicted heavy casualties and were an important factor in stopping the offensive. The FAPLA offensive had, however, been stopped just in time as it had
penetrated to within 28 kilometres of Mavinga. By early October, at which time the offensive had been halted, FAPLA began to withdraw its force so as to avoid harassment at the end of a long insecure supply line during the rainy season (Heitman, 1990:14-15).

4.9.2.2 South Africa's Increasing Costs:

The scale of the fighting in this offensive, resulting in heavy casualties, held sobering lessons for both South Africa and Angola (50). Months later, SADF officials expressed concerns over the Soviet Union's willingness and ability to replace major Angolan equipment losses "within a matter of weeks." Indeed, the chief of Angola's air force, in November 1985, made it clear that his country's recent acquisition of aircraft and radar installations was part of a plan to wrest control of the air over southern Angola from the South Africans, stating: "We have to go over to the offensive and liberate the territory occupied by UNITA and cut off its supply lines from South Africa" (Jaster, 1988:99).

4.10 Escalation of the Soviet Commitment, 1986:

Throughout 1986, large quantities of modern Soviet weapons systems were being delivered to Angola including aircraft which formed part of the Soviet Union's strategic reserve for conflict in Europe (51). There were 1 000 Soviet troops sent to take up training and command posts and 2 000 East Germans sent to boost FAPLA's intelligence and telecommunications services. By this stage, in 1986, Angola had close to 100 Soviet fighter aircraft including advanced MiG-23 fighter interceptors as well as 125 helicopters from France and the Soviet Union. Angolan pilots were already flying MiG-21s in ground attacks against the SADF in southern Angola. Angolan military bases in the south, designed for future offensives against UNITA, were supported by surface-to-air missile sites and advanced radar for monitoring SAAF flights in Namibia (Jaster, 1988:99-100, Geldenhuys, 1995:190).
4.11 **Enhanced Angolan Military Capacity:**

Hence, by 1987 the Angolans had something which they lacked in their 1985 offensive at which time the SAAF were able to attack Angolan vehicles and helicopters virtually without opposition. This could no longer be the case as it had been in their failed offensive against Savimbi's main base at Jamba because Angola now had the capability to provide air cover for assaults by its airborne and ground forces. South Africa responded to the growing Angolan encroachment of its previously unchallenged air superiority by upgrading the aging Mirage III ground-attack aircraft with new weapons and Israeli avionics. The renamed "Cheetahs" were apparently superior to the Soviet MiG-23s as well as less vulnerable to Angolan radar and missiles (Jaster, 1988:99-100). The SAAF also achieved an improved air refuelling capability and unveiled two new locally-assembled helicopters in 1986 and 1987.

In 1986 and 1987, the Angolans consolidated their gains in several areas and reinforced their southern bases from which they would attack UNITA in future (52). The external powers supporting the opposition deepened their commitment with the press reporting, in March-April 1986, that the USA had begun "covertly" supplying several hundred Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to UNITA. Meanwhile, the Soviets and Cubans still had no intention of departing and, in February 1986, issued a joint communique declaring their solidarity with the Angolan Government. Fidel Castro pledged to match every increase in American involvement and to keep Cuban combat troops in Angola until either the end of white minority rule in South Africa or as long as the Angolans wanted (Jaster, 1988:100). Each escalation by one side was seemingly matched by spiralling escalation on the other thereby raising the stakes further and increasing the likelihood of continued fighting.
4.12 The Importance of South Africa's Internal Milieux: South African Politics, Decision-Making Structures, Personalities and Organisations:

4.12.1 Introduction:

The period under discussion in Chapter Four (1978 - 1986) witnessed the resurgence of militaristic South African activity throughout the region. At this time the regional power balance, as it had existed prior to the massive superpower intervention of 1975 - 1976, gradually began to reassert itself. Therefore, the second paradigm or body of literature concerned with sub-national or domestic causation, at the unit level-of-analysis, is of greatest utility in explaining South Africa's role in Angola throughout the 1978-1986 period.

South Africa, as the dominant hegemon in Southern Africa, had the potential to act against any activity in the region perceived to threaten its internal order. South Africa, exclusively, possessed the requisite economic and military capabilities to enforce national aspirations and to defend its national security (53). Under the leadership of the anti-communist former Minister of Defence, it could not have been expected to sit idly by as external influences appeared to disrupt the regional power balance in favour of communism. Nor could it be expected that the region's dominant hegemon would have permitted smaller nations with far lessor capabilities to harbour South Africa's internal opposition, in the form of the ANC and SWAPO, without retaliating.

The instability and perceived threat to South Africa's vital interests brought about by developments within the region, such as the end of Portuguese colonialism and the higher profile being assumed by liberation movements, raised the profile of the Defence Ministry. Public concern, on the part of the white electorate, over growing security threats at home and abroad undoubtedly contributed to the election of a "hawkish" candidate with a reputation for toughness and deemed capable of allaying white fears.
4.12.2 P.W. Botha's Leadership and the Militarization of the South African State:

Like Barber and Barratt, and similar to Grundy and Frankel, Geldenhuys and Kotze regard the personality of the Prime Minister, and later State President, of critical importance to foreign policy decision-making. Of instrumental importance for the course of events in the region throughout the period covered by Chapter Four, was the election of Minister of Defence P.W. Botha as Prime Minister, 28 September 1978, after an internal party struggle.

Until the time of his election as Prime Minister in 1978 Botha had been Minister of Defence, a portfolio he had held since 1966. According to Barber and Barratt and Geldenhuys and Kotze, it was his formative experiences in that portfolio which were to have the greatest influence on his leadership and particularly in the conduct of South Africa's foreign policy. P.W. Botha's professional experience as Minister of Defence and life-long involvement in party politics are thought to explain his dogmatic view of security and inclination towards bureaucratic rationalisation which are, in turn, held responsible for South Africa's militaristic policy toward the region throughout the 1980s.

In keeping with the notion of personalities exerting an important influence on policy-choices, Barber and Barratt observe that P.W. Botha's election as leader represented a significant break with the Vorster years. Botha was very different from his predecessor in personality and style and quickly put his own distinctive stamp on both domestic and economic policy. Botha's background was exclusively political. He was involved in party politics from a young age and rose through the ranks (Barber and Barratt, 1990:247-249).

As stated, P.W. Botha developed more than any previous leader an almost dogmatic view of the world in military-strategic and geo-political terms. According to this perspective, the contest between "the free world" and communism was dominant with South Africa a target of communist expansionism. Botha had a reputation for strident anti-communism and complete intolerance of militant black nationalism. Botha's practical concerns, furthermore, revolved around the security and survival of
whites as a group (Barber and Barratt, 1990:248).

Barber and Barratt regard South African policy toward neighbouring nations as an extension of South Africa's domestic conflict and overriding security concerns. Pretoria's attitude toward the ANC and SWAPO was of particular importance. The deterioration of the domestic security situation strengthened the "hawks" on regional policy who were determined not to relax against the border threat. The exertion of military might therefore became an increasingly prominent aspect of South Africa's regional policy. Indeed, the concept of Total National Strategy (TNS) was, for example, the product of a military mind-set.

As stated in Section 4.4 it was crucial, in terms of the continued survival of the apartheid order in South Africa, to prevent the internal opponents of apartheid from believing that sabotage and armed resistance could be effective against white minority rule. Hence, Pretoria struck hard against the ANC and SWAPO bases with little regard for national borders. After the SADF's reluctant withdrawal from Angola early in 1976, largely due to the U.S. Senate passage of the Clark Amendment, South African military activity once again began to escalate. For example, the SADF's first deep penetration raid against SWAPO began in earnest under B.J. Vorster in 1978 (see Section 4.4.1). Soon afterwards, in 1979 under the leadership of P.W. Botha, South Africa's war against SWAPO began seriously and consistently (see Section 4.6). Angola, due to its ability to inflame radical black opposition, was regarded by South Africa as a threat more potent than Mozambique.

The application of this sub-national domestic level approach to P.W. Botha's assumption to power, as an explanation of South Africa's militaristic actions in the region, has been a theoretically fruitful exercise in the context of the 1978-1986 period. This analysis is in accordance with Geldenhuys and Kotzé's argument in "Aspects of Political Decision-Making in South Africa" published in 1983. They perceive decision-makers at the level of an individual or group and concern themselves with who makes decisions and where in order to explain South African actions. Geldenhuys and Kotzé
ascertain the best way to identify the locus of power in a decision-making system is by "institutional or structural analysis" which establishes exactly which individuals, groups and agencies within the government machinery are most influential (54).

4.13 The Importance of the Global Order:

The first paradigm or body of literature, concerned with the international system level, is of less relevance than the second paradigm considered above in Sections 4.12.1 and 4.12.2. South Africa's vital security interests did, however, most definitely provide continuous justification for the SADF to maintain involvement in Angola, and southern Angola, in particular.

Perhaps the first international development to affect South Africa's involvement in Angola, after the ascension of P.W. Botha to power, was the defeat of President Carter and his replacement by Ronald Reagan in 1980. While Carter had restricted American involvement in local wars of superpower competition - Reagan came to power with a policy of ending all wars of national liberation. This was accomplished by arming and financing client groups in so-called "low intensity conflicts." In Angola the chosen vehicle for a "low intensity" campaign was UNITA. As a result, P.W. Botha and those on whom he closely relied - General Magnus Malan and other Generals - were able to pursue their militaristic agenda in the region without being hindered by American opposition.

The South Africa state's military leadership under P.W. Botha clearly felt that the SADF intervention in Angola was orchestrated in the defence of South Africa's vital security interests due to the combined Soviet and Cuban military presence. For further justification on this matter, please refer to Sections 4.5, 4.7, 4.9.1, 4.9.2, and 4.10 of this chapter.

Barber and Barratt cite General Malan's observation that the "flood" of Soviet military equipment and its sophisticated nature were much more than necessary to cope with South African actions against SWAPO and UNITA's guerilla campaign. Malan therefore asked:
whether this was not a prepositioning of military equipment to be used, ultimately, against South Africa [and claimed] that the Russians want to develop a firm stabilized base in Angola and then use the equipment and the personnel positioned there wherever necessary in the sub-continent. If you look at [South Africa's] massive reserves of strategic minerals, don’t you ask yourself whether this mineral treasure house is not the cherry on top of the African cake? ... The Communists want a black-white polarization in South Africa so that they can attack our country with conventional military forces, knowing that not a single country in the world will lift a finger to help South Africa, because they [the Communists] would be acting against those white racists" (Barber and Barratt, 1990:314).

Malan further referred to UNITA as a "potent anti-communist force" which would be lost to the West if the Marxist forces were allowed to wipe it out. Barber and Barratt cite P.W. Botha calling on the US and other African nations to join in trying to rid the region of foreign troops. "Say to the Cubans 'go home,' and say to the Russians 'go home,' and the minute this happens, I will be prepared to settle all our military forces inside South Africa." If the Russians and Cubans were allowed to succeed in Angola, he said, the next target would be South West Africa (Namibia), followed by Botswana and then South Africa (Barber and Barratt, 1990:314).
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR:

(1) Keith Somerville argues the economic problems facing the newly independent nation were compounded by the continuing guerrilla wars in Cabinda (FLEC), Zaire Province (FNLA), as well as Mexico and parts of southern and central Angola (UNITA) (Somerville, 1986:47).

(2) In order to resist the intrusions of FNLA soldiers into the slums of Luanda, the MPLA developed the "popular power" structures. Throughout the period of South Africa's initial intervention these committees had remained loyal to the MPLA. However, disillusion soon set in once the costs of reconstruction were realized and the MPLA came to exchange increasingly virulent accusations with its dissident faction. These developments caused the MPLA to think again about the rural peasantry as the heroes of their struggle. After the suppression of the coup much was made of the fact the urban workers had never been adequately politicised and had not borne their share of the struggle (Birmingham, 1992:77).

(3) Keith Somerville's account of Angolan conditions post independence, November 1975, is much the same as David Birmingham's account. Somerville states: "The country's economy was in tatters, as a result of the liberation and civil wars, and there was a desperate shortage of skilled and managerial manpower resulting from the mass exodus of Portuguese settlers who has monopolised all such skills during the colonial period. The destruction of bridges, roads and transport vehicles meant that many areas were cut off from food and other essential supplies while the departure of the Portuguese had wrecked the distribution system, the wholesale and retail sectors" (Somerville, 1986:47).

(4) Over this period, political cells mushroomed in Luanda's shanty-towns for which there were a number of contributing factors. The withdrawal of industrial capital led to the closure of manufacturing plants and the creation of serious unemployment while, in the countryside, insecurity about an uncertain future resulted in an uncontrolled influx from the rural areas into urban centres (Birmingham, 1992:73, Bridgland, 1986:263). The events surrounding the attempted coup took place against a background of food shortages, the collapse of the distribution system, and resentment among poor blacks toward the privileged mesticos in government. Six days prior to the rebellion Agostinho Neto articulated the grievances of Luanda's urban population: "the problem of food supplies is serious. There is no cassava, no potatoes, no groundnuts, no palm oil. There is nothing on the market ... this situation pleases no one." Hence, under these circumstances, it was not surprising the urban poor came to resent the MPLA's stringent austerity programme (Somerville, 1986:51-52, Bridgland, 1986:263).

(5) The plot was ill prepared and easily put down as is evidenced by the radio station and other building being recaptured by loyalist troops on the same day as they were seized by the rebels (Somerville, 1986:53).
The Cubans were embarrassed by the whole affair but chose to support the MPLA Government while the interests of Zaire and South Africa were still influenced by their "defeat" two years previously and they were therefore prepared to welcome any change of government. The USA was looking for signs of division and would have been willing to act as broker between Nito Alves and the respective leadership of both the FNLA and UNITA. Singled out for particular condemnation was France which was described by the MPLA as an interfering foreign power with an oil-thirsty and expansive Africa policy (Birmingham, 1992:80-81).

The MPLA Government was chagrined the dissidents had such close ties to the Soviet Union to the extent that they may have expected Soviet diplomatic personnel to come to their rescue if the coup failed. However, Somerville argues "it is unlikely that given Alves' views on race and his criticism of the MPLA programme of reconstruction, which the Soviet Union was assisting, the Soviet Union would have risked its good relations with Angola by supporting a poorly planned coup attempt" (Somerville, 1986:53-54).

Survivors who failed to flee were marched to "liberated zones" beyond the reach of government forces. By 1990, Africa Watch estimated thousands had been captured by UNITA guerrillas and transported to the south for the creation of an internal colony. Children were especially prized as future guerrilla recruits. Plough oxen were stolen and seed-corn, likewise, stolen or destroyed. Farm roads were strewn with hidden landmines with the intent to kill or maim peasants attempting to return to their fields. UNITA's policy of bringing the government to its knees by starving the rural population resulted in the death of half a million children during the 1980s. Malnutrition in the towns, where peasants sought to escape, was exacerbated by UNITA's attacks on supply convoys. Even medical convoys were unrelentingly ambushed. By the end of the decade, nearly two million already vulnerable people were further weakened by drought (Birmingham, 1992:82).

The forced relocation of thousands of farmers, due to the fighting, intensified the shortfall in food production in the 1980s. Many highlands people suspected that a change in government would bring an end to their hardship and UNITA remained surprisingly popular. Although the MPLA regained command of the city in the 1980s, it was eventually compelled to change its stance on the ongoing war in the provinces. With encouragement from Cuba, attempts were made to seek a policy of harmonization and economic reform. Unfortunately, the scale of corruption and inefficiency was so great that even the huge oil revenues were unable to compensate for Angola's decline (Birmingham, 1992:83).

General Jannie Geldenhuys, in referring to fellow South Africans, stated: "We were all small fry. During 1981 big fish Ronald Reagan took over from Jimmy Carter as President of the United States. During the decade of the 1980s he was to play a major role in the new directions that Southern Africa would follow" (Geldenhuys, 1995:144).
The situation had parallels with the Nicaraguan situation in which the USA created and armed an artificial opposition in an attempt to overthrow a government whose policies were disliked by Washington. In Angola, however, the US Administration ran into difficulties having acquired an ostracised bedfellow and ally which promised to be an embarrassment. One of the reasons why the alliance between the United States and South Africa survived throughout the 1980s involved the demand for Namibian uranium which was needed in the nuclear energy industry. Nonetheless, South Africa was still intent on destabilizing Angola for geo-political reasons (Birmingham, 1992:84-85).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, UNITA derived its majority support from the Ovambos in southern Angola. UNITA could potentially form a buffer between northern Namibia and a hostile Angolan government or, alternatively, create further problems for South Africa by continuing to support SWAPO. Pretoria therefore selected UNITA as its ally for strategic reasons (Barber and Barratt, 1990:190-191).

Ian Gleeson, the last commander of the 101 Task Force, and his fellow commanders, Colonel Blackie de Swardt of the Air Force and Colonel Giep Booysen of Medical Services, were in command of Operation Reindeer. The fighting forces were under the command of Colonel Jan Breytenbach, Commandant Deon Ferreira, and Major Frank Bestbier (Geldenhuys, 1995:92).

"Moscow" was SWAPO's code name for Cassinga and "Vietnam" was their code name for Chetaquera (Geldenhuys, 1995:93).

Although SWAPO's denial was widely believed in both South Africa and abroad Steenkamp persuasively argues the overall evidence would indicate otherwise. Even if one were to ignore the SADF's claim to have found ample documentary proof of a significant military presence, there is little doubt that large amounts of war material were found and destroyed at Cassinga. Aerial photographs prove the town had a network of deep, well-planned trenches far too extensive for the needs of any refugee camp (Steenkamp, 1983:18).

General Geldenhuys boasts that a foreign military officer said the following about the SADF's execution of Operation Reindeer: "Not even the Israelis would in one day have used more than 250 paratroopers and a mobile air reserve of 120 men in an airborne operation on a target 250 kilometres across an international border, and then fly them back in helicopters" (Geldenhuys, 1995:93).

General Geldenhuys sheds some light on the subject of battle events derailing political and diplomatic initiatives and seeks to shatter the myth that battles were launched with the specific aim of derailing negotiations. He states: "Should one look carefully at a political chronology ... a continuous record of conferences, meetings and discussions ... and it would have been almost impossible to have executed a [military] operation which would not have taken place just before or after some political event or other" (Geldenhuys, 1995:200-201).
(17) The notion of "being left in the lurch" is a recurrent theme and may refer to promises, implicit or otherwise, made by Henry Kissinger regarding an American commitment to assist the South African intervention in 1975. It may also refer to the Senate vote in favour of the Clark Amendment. According to Barber and Barratt the Clark Amendment "caused deep resentment and a sense of betrayal in Pretoria and it led to Vorster's subsequent statement that the Americans would never be trusted again" (Barber and Barratt, 1990:195).

(18) To some extent the suspicions and fears of the apartheid regime regarding Soviet influence have been vindicated by the recent visit of a high ranking Soviet-era official to South Africa. Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin claimed the ultimate aim of the SACP was to use the ANC as a means by which to acquire power. According to Kalugin "They [the SACP] would have tried gradually to capture the leadership [of the ANC]. This subjugation would have been achieved through deception as well as financial means ... The ANC was just another liberation movement exploited by the Soviets" (The Argus, September 22, 1995:19).


(20) Jaster maintains the joint land and air attack by the SADF destroyed more than a dozen SWAPO camps inside Angola and Zambia (Jaster, 1988:93). This, however, does not take cognisance of the SADF's inadequate combat intelligence at the time. Since Operation Reindeer, the time at which the intelligence was gathered, some of SWAPO's bases had subsequently relocated. As a result, during Operation Rekstok/Safraan, the SADF attacked bases some of which were empty (Geldenhuys, 1995:109).

Nonetheless, Geldenhuys identified these operations as one of the most important turning points in the war. In addition, the first prior of Rekstok/Safraan was to gather operational information and everything else associated with combat intelligence. Information is usually collected in order to plan operations but, in this case, an operation was executed in order to gather information (Geldenhuys, 1995:110).

(21) Daniel Chipenda's FNLA troops, under the leadership of Commandant Jan Breytenbach, became known as Bravo Group and then were later to become known as 32 Battalion (Geldenhuys, 1995:57-58).

(22) Private Conversation, February 1995, Cape Town, Republic of South Africa.

(23) Western press reports revealed that the 32 Battalion had been engaged in military operations in southern Angola since 1979. Citing a British mercenary, formerly a member of the 32 Battalion, the reports claimed that areas captured by this force were turned over to UNITA (Somerville, 1986:63).
Although Operation Sceptic was one of the most extensive trans-border incursions launched by the SADF, few people, including serving South African soldiers are familiar with the name of Operation Sceptic of June 1980. This is because it became known by the almost universal misnomer, "Operation Smokeshell," after its opening engagement (Steenkamp, 1983:167).

Due to raids by South African forces on both sides of the Namibian-Angolan border and in southwestern Zambia, during 1979 and early 1980, SWAPO had lost a high number of troops. SWAPO's operational and logistical infrastructure were also seriously disrupted. Morale among the rank-and-file was extremely low and there were consequently a large number of desertions. In addition, SADF intelligence received several reports of insurgents actually dying of hunger in outlying camps due to food shortages (Steenkamp, 1983:167).

There were numerous incidents of young students being abducted by SWAPO and carried off to Angola for training (Steenkamp, 1983:168).

When General Magnus Malan, Chief of the SADF, granted permission for the operation he made it clear no MPLA targets were to be attacked and that Angolans would be attacked only if they tried to intervene. In early May 1980 it was still possible for this policy to be applied as SWAPO/FAPLA integration had not yet proceeded to the stage where the two constituted a combined fighting force as was to happen very shortly (Steenkamp, 1983:169).

Commandant Chris Serfontein was in charge of battle group 10, Commandant J.M. Dippenaar in charge of battle group 61 and Commandant Jorrie Jordaan was in charge of battle group 53. The task force consisting of these three mechanised battle groups crossed the border 9 June. An area across the border was first secured by Commandant Anton van Graan. Brigadier Witkop Badenhorst, commander of Sector 10 (Koakoland and Ovamboland) was in command of the operation (Geldenhuys, 1995:120).

Smokeshell was an "ants nest" with most of the SWAPO insurgents scattering to find safety at other bases. A combination of follow-up operations and search-and-destroy missions were launched to locate and destroy them (Geldenhuys, 1995:121).

In 1980 General Charles Lloyd took over from General Jannie Geldenhuys as GOC, SWA Command until the end of 1983. General Georg Meiring then took over the post from General Lloyd until the beginning of 1987 (Geldenhuys, 1995:144).


During Operation Protea, in August 1981, the SADF seized a Soviet operational map of the Xangongo base and surrounding area. The map annotated in detail the integrated Cuban, FAPLA and SWAPO artillery fire plan. This demonstrated beyond
doubt that SWAPO occupied bases jointly with the Cubans and FAPLA. SWAPO soldiers also wore FAPLA uniforms (Geldenhuys, 1995:137).

(32) Following the South African success the SADF provided UNITA with increased logistical, military, and political support. A radio station was established on South African territory which purported to be a UNITA radio station broadcasting from UNITA controlled territory. The station, called the Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, carried UNITA battle claims and speeches by Savimbi. The South Africans also later established a news agency for Savimbi (Somerville, 1986:64).

(33) During Operation Protea two Soviets officers were killed and one taken prisoner. Maj Yvgenii Victorovich Kireev, chief artillery advisor, and Col Joseph Lamonovich, advisor to the political commissar, were killed. Warrant Officer Nilolai Pestretof was captured (Geldenhuys, 1995:136).

(34) The first confrontation between the SADF and FAPLA occurred during Operation Sceptic (Smokeshell) June 1980.

(35) Robert Jaster claims the SADF’s display of weapons seizures left no doubt that the operation had been directed against Angolan forces as opposed to SWAPO (Jaster, 1988:94). Somerville likewise asserts that SADF attacks were not, as Pretoria claimed, pre-emptive or hot-pursuit strikes against SWAPO but represented a calculated attempt to weaken the Angolan economy, aid UNITA and undermine the MPLA Government (Somerville, 1986:65). However, these observations do not take account of the cooperative relationship, and the degree of integration which had occurred, between Soviet, Cuban, MPLA and SWAPO forces as of 1980.

(36) Captain Jan Haugaard was in command of Operation Super (January 1982), Operation Meebos (July and August 1982) and Operation Phoenix (February 1983) (Geldenhuys, 1995:146).

These operations - and their predecessors - placed intense pressure, militarily and politically, on the dos Santos government. Already denied access to the southern third of the nation, where operations by SADF units and UNITA amounted to a virtual occupation of the territory, the MPLA Government by 1982 faced repeated air and ground assaults which Luanda was impotent to halt (Jaster, 1980:95).

(37) According to Somerville, as a result of the fighting and of American pressure on both Angola and South Africa, talks began between Luanda and Pretoria with American officials acting as intermediaries (Somerville, 1996:67).

(38) Robert Jaster argues Operation Askari was launched, in December 1983, in anticipation of the cease-fire and certainly in response to SADF reservations about withdrawing their troops from Angola. He also argues Operation Askari was officially undertaken for the purpose of preempting SWAPO’s annual rainy season offensive implying that it was actually undertaken for the more sinister reasons mentioned (Jaster, 1988:97).
Operation Askari occurred soon after General George Meiring had taken over from General Charles Lloyd as GOC, SWA Command.

General Geldenhuys maintains this force retreated after suffering 324 casualties in comparison with the SADF's relatively meagre 24 losses (Geldenhuys, 1995: 155).

Robert Jaster tells a slightly different story from that of General Geldenhuys vis-a-vis the success of Operation Askari. According to Jaster, Operation Askari met unexpectedly heavy opposition from regular Angolan forces. Committing their Soviet T-43 tanks to battle for the first time, the Angolans were able to counter-attack a SADF armoured column and inflict heavy casualties. The SADF acknowledged the loss of 24 troops which was the largest number of South Africans killed in any single engagement up until that time. He points out, additionally, that Western diplomatic sources believed SADF casualties to be much higher (Jaster, 1988: 97).

General Geldenhuys believes, although it was not their intention, Operation Askari convinced the Angolans to engage in discussions with South Africa over a cessation of hostilities in southern Angola (Geldenhuys, 1995: 157).

However, if Jaster's less sanguine assessment of Operation Askari is the more accurate one, then Operation Askari may well have also given the South Africans the impetus to investigate a cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, Somerville describes the exertion of American pressure on both Angola and South Africa to seek a resolution to the fighting which was also undoubtedly a factor (see note 37).

Firstly; the northernmost part of the area was cleared, then the zone immediately south of it and then the zone still further south, and so on, until the SWA/Namibia-Angola border was reached (Geldenhuys, 1995: 157).

It is not commonly known that South African troops had already been south of the border for quite some time before the Lusaka Accord was signed. However, as they were not believed, the SADF actually had to send troops back into Angola so that they could be visibly withdrawn in terms of the agreement (Geldenhuys, 1995: 157-158).

This discussion, on the subject of Angolan and SWAPO violations of the Lusaka Accord, is covered in Geldenhuys, A General's Story from pages 158 to 164.

Helmoed-Römer Heitman's assessment of Angolan and SWAPO behaviour toward the Lusaka Accord is even bleaker than that described by General Geldenhuys. Heitman argues Luanda hoped the combined impact of the Lusaka Accord and American political pressure would remove the South African presence leaving FAPLA free to concentrate on crushing UNITA. To this end the Angolans delayed the work of the JMC in supervising the SADF withdrawal, giving FAPLA time to deal with UNITA, before reneging on the agreement and resuming their support for SWAPO. The Angolans reasoned that, while the South Africans were busy with the JMC, they would not be in a position to pose a military threat or to assist UNITA (Heitman, 1990: 12).
After the withdrawal of the SADF from Angola, in April 1985, SWAPO exploited the situation and began once again to operate across the border from their bases in Angola. By the end of August the Angolan side were responsible for as many as 63 violations of the Lusaka Accord while only three breaches were recorded against South Africa in the same manner. It was therefore not surprising the SADF felt they were left with no option but to resume their operations against SWAPO despite the signing of the Lusaka Accord (Geldenhuys, 1995:161-162).

Operation Boswilger, which commenced 29 June 1985 and ended 48 hours later, saw the SADF follow the tracks of SWAPO soldiers from Namibia back to their bases in three different parts of Angola. After the attack the SADF once again withdrew across the border (Geldenhuys, 1995:163).

Somerville's view is completely different from the account provided by Geldenhuys and Heitman. Somerville states "It soon became clear that Pretoria had no real intention of withdrawing its troops and every intention of gaining its benefits from the accord without fulfilling its side of the bargain" (Somerville, 1986:67).

There was indeed virtually no fighting between the SADF and FAPLA with SWAPO being the notable exception to this arrangement. The SADF's operations against SWAPO continued as before due to SWAPO's apparent refusal to abide by the provisions of the Lusaka Accord.

The FAPLA offensive was known as Operation Second Congress (Heitman, 1990:14)

The Cazombo front was too far away from the border to receive direct South African support. As well, the size of the FAPLA force vastly overwhelmed the forces available to UNITA on that front. Under the circumstances, South Africa advised UNITA not to contest the issue there, under impossible odds, but to re-deploy their forces so as to reinforce the Mavinga front. The SAAF assisted UNITA in its withdrawal and re-deployment (Heitman, 1990:14).

The number of casualties was high. UNITA estimated FAPLA losses at 1 043 killed and roughly 1 300 wounded. Among those killed were 10 Soviets and 56 Cubans. The SADF estimated UNITA losses at 1 500 killed (Heitman, 1990:15).

At a later stage Cuba, like the Soviet Union, would also send to Angola part of their strategic reserve for conflict in their own region (Geldenhuys, 1995:190).

Jaster's assertion, which appears probable, is not substantiated by General Geldenhuys in his account of the events.

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In terms of the importance of the regional power balance it is important to remember that, throughout the 1980s, South Africa was the unrivalled superpower in the region both in economic and military terms. In 1984 the GDP per capita was (in US dollars) $530 in Lesotho, $760 in Zimbabwe, $960 in Botswana, and a comparatively enormous $2,340 in South Africa. The fact that no World Bank figures are available for Angola and Mozambique bears sad testimony of the devastation of their economies.

The GDP figures for 1986 are $210 in Mozambique, $370 in Lesotho, $620 in Zimbabwe, $840 in Botswana and $1,850 in South Africa with no figure available for Angola. Throughout the mid to late 1980s, the most imposing structural characteristic of Southern African affairs remained the virtually unchallenged economic domination of South Africa (World Development Report, 1986, 1988).

The notion of structure as used by Deon Geldenhuyys and Hennie Kotzé is distinct from the notion of structure as used by Kenneth Waltz.
CHAPTER V:


According to Chester Crocker, in July 1987 the end of the conflicts which characterised Southern Africa still seemed like a distant dream. Nonetheless, what were the final eighteen months of the Reagan era were also among the most eventful in the modern history of the region. By January 1988, the Cubans had joined the peace process as acknowledged participants and agreement had been achieved on the basic linkage principle - Namibian independence and total Cuban troop withdrawal. By May 1988, the Angolans, Cubans and South Africans were enticed to the bargaining table for direct talks under U.S. mediation in London. This meeting was a watershed of sorts and the preceding nine months leading up to the London meeting represented a period of decisive flux.

This final period of external intervention illustrated a certain interplay, a relationship of sorts, between international political developments and the events occurring on Angolan battlefields. This final end-period of marathon negotiations was also witness to some of the heaviest fighting of the entire Angolan engagement. Hence, Chapter Five is initially divided according to two historical dimensions. They are firstly; the strategic and tactical dimension, and secondly; the international political and diplomatic dimension. This chapter commences with the military dimension and specifically with the Battle of Lomba River of 1987.

5.1 Strategic and Tactical Dimension:

The Battle of Lomba River, September 1987:

In early 1987, SADF intelligence sources perceived a very large build-up of MPLA forces in south eastern Angola believed to be aimed at capturing the town of Mavinga and then moving toward Jamba, UNITA's heartland (1). In the final months of 1987, the war in Angola escalated when Angolan forces launched a major offensive
against UNITA's forward position at Mavinga in the south east. As had been the case in the 1985 campaign against UNITA, the SADF intervened directly on UNITA's behalf against the 1987 offensive. This resulted in a series of actions culminating in the Battle of Lomba River in which the south eastern thrust was repulsed by a combined SADF and UNITA force. Combined SADF and UNITA forces then thrust north west and eventually halted on the Eastern Bank of the Cuito River (2). Limited to a front of only ten kilometres the conflict of Lomba River took place over a period of five days in mid September. A number of limited battles were fought in the area and were later to become known as part of "The Battle for Cuito Cuanavale" (Embleton, 1994:2, Heitman, 1990:53-64).

South Africa was the victor in the 1987 campaign which represented a stunning humiliation for the Soviet Union and Soviet strategy. The Soviet orchestrated FAPLA offensive was smashed at the Lomba River near Mavinga resulting in a headlong retreat of close to 200 kilometres back to their launching point at Cuito Cuanavale (see Maps, Appendices Seven and Eight). A combined force of 8 000 UNITA fighters and 4 000 SADF troops destroyed an entire FAPLA brigade and "mauled" several others out of a total FAPLA force of 18 000 (3). Estimated FAPLA losses ranged upwards of 4 000 killed and wounded. From start to finish, the whole endeavour was Soviet orchestrated with senior Soviet officers playing a central role in its execution. Roughly $1.5 billion in Soviet military hardware had arrived that year with huge quantities destroyed or seized by UNITA and the SADF when FAPLA broke into a disorganised retreat. As a result, paradoxically, the Soviet Union became the largest external source of arms to UNITA and South Africa (Crocker, 1993:360).

The South African force could not immediately leave the battle area in the wake of their success as it was important to ensure the new situation would not soon be reversed (4). In order to secure the most advantageous security situation it was necessary to reinforce the Cuito River as an obstacle on which UNITA could base its future defence of the area (5). In terms of military doctrine, the line of exploitation was
the Cuito River and the forces earmarked to take over from the SADF for the defence of the area was UNITA. For this to be successful the SADF viewed it as imperative to form a tank force for UNITA. This was to be done by using tanks which had been captured from FAPLA. While they were securing the area the SADF also bombarded the Cuito Cuanavale Airfield with G-5s rendering it unusable by mid October (6). In addition to destroying the airfield the SADF and UNITA pinned down thousands of FAPLA's remaining units clinging onto the town's defensive parameters. The situation was so severe, there was the risk of a complete FAPLA collapse in the south of Angola (Crocker, 1993:360-361, Geldenhuys, 1995:217-218).

5.1.1 Further SADF-UNITA Mopping Up Operations:

In November the SADF and UNITA launched further attacks. Battles fought 9, 11, 13 and 17 November resulted in all elements, which had taken part in the offensive against Jamba and which still found themselves east of the Cuito River, now being driven back to within 24 kilometres east of the river. Although it was to prove too late to make a difference Castro nonetheless decided to strengthen the Cuban force. The 50th Division, which was to form the bulk of additional ground forces, began arriving in Angola in mid November. In mid December FAPLA was still receiving Cuban reinforcements including Cuban soldiers, T-62 tanks, MiG-23s and "some of our best pilots." These reinforcements were placed in the general Cuito Cuanavale area and, therefore, came under the fire of the SADF's G-5 guns (7) (Geldenhuys, 1995:218-219, Heitman, 1990:295).

General Geldenhuys announced, 5 December 1987, the SADF would commence with a tactical withdrawal executed under operational conditions and that fighting could still take place. The troops scheduled to withdraw first were those not required to safeguard the area or to assist in the formation of UNITA's tank force. Toward the end of the month UNITA was able to take Munhango, Savimbi's birthplace, with the use of four T-55 tanks which had earlier been seized from FAPLA. The campaign entered its final phase with successful SADF-UNITA attacks on 13 January and 14 and 25
February 1988. As a result, all FAPLA and Cuban forces which had participated in the Jamba offensive were driven west of the Cuito River. However, there remained one small FAPLA presence in the Tumpo area immediately east of the river (Geldenhuys, 1995:219).

5.2 Political and Diplomatic Dimension:

The Cuban Offering, July - August 1987:

The first major diplomatic development of this era was a five-day visit to Cuba by dos Santos commencing 30 July 1987. Upon its conclusion, 3 August, Castro and dos Santos issued a communique confirming their willingness "jointly to pursue the negotiations resumed in Luanda in mid-July." The next day a new Angolan-Cuban proposal was sent to Washington offering a reduction from three to two years in the timetable for the withdrawal of the 20,000 or more Cuban troops in the southern sector. The new bid was linked to a date for implementation of Resolution 435, an end to support for UNITA, and the end of all foreign interference in Angolan affairs. The Angolan Government representative, Mbinda, proposed US-mediated talks among military experts and proximity talks in order to bring SWAPO into the fold. Although dos Santos ran no risk that both Pretoria or Washington might agree the proposal of August 4, in itself, represented a modest step forward (Crocker, 1993:354).

The American Administration, 27 July, received a message from Castro. Saliently, his unofficial emissary proposed that Cuba join the US-MPLA talks. In essence, Cuba was prepared to work with the United States and the Angolans in order to achieve a solution. If a negotiated settlement did not occur then it was made clear Cuba was fully prepared to stay and fight another ten years if necessary. If, on the other hand, Cuba were to participate in a negotiating process, which clearly and directly affected Cuban interests, then it could assist in bringing about a solution. Castro wanted an urgent reply to his proposals, within forty-eight hours, prior to the arrival of dos Santos in Havana.
From this overture it could be inferred that a deal entailing Cuban troop withdrawal was of vital importance to Castro. Although Castro's message was guarded, it was apparent Cuba was interested in scaling down its Angolan entanglement. Castro seemed to be implying that it would be beneficial if the twelve-year engagement of Cuban forces in Angola were concluded on honourable terms. The massive burden of Cuban involvement, more onerous in percentage terms than the American engagement in Vietnam at its peak, was not popular within Cuba. Furthermore, Angola was no longer keeping up with its hard-currency payments to Cuba. As well, there were additional factors which assist in explaining the sudden bid by Castro for a role in the negotiating process in summer 1987 (8) (Crocker, 1993:355-356, Bridgland, 1990:337).

5.2.1 Cuban Dissatisfaction with its Allies:

The Cuban military did not agree with their Soviet partner regarding military strategy. A debate broke out over probable SADF ground and air responses to another FAPLA thrust toward Mavinga and Jamba and as a result, arguing against the 1987 Soviet-Angolan battle, Cuba played only a minimal role in it. Soviet military and Communist Party hardliners wanted the 1987 offensive and, because they paid the bills and supplied the hardware, the Soviet Union prevailed in allied decision-making. Castro felt he was hostage to, on the one hand, a poorly led strategic alliance and, on the other, to an inept local regime. Therefore, it was conceivable that Castro's bid to join the negotiating process could be viewed as an opportunity to acquire influence over decisions which affected Cuban interests (Crocker, 1993:356, Bridgland, 1990:341).

Secondly; Castro, in keeping with his grandiose sense of destiny, was committed to Cuba playing a distinct role in the world. In Chester Crocker's characterisation, Cuban policy "contained a blend of old-fashioned military adventurism and a sort of Robin Hood Marxism based on solidarity among the underdogs." According to Crocker, the new global fluidity represented both an opportunity and a potential threat to Castro. He had never forgotten how the superpowers had settled the
1962 Cuban missile crisis over his head without regard for Cuban interests and, therefore, was intent that never happen again. Hence, he was deemed likely by the Americans to seek a visible role in the negotiating process over the future of what was the flagship of Cuban internationalist policy.

5.3 Political and Diplomatic Dimension:

**Engaging the South Africans, August 1987 - January 1988:**

The period between August 1987 and January 1988 represented one of momentous change. Within weeks of their bid, discussed in Section 5.2, the US informed the Angolans that further improvement to their proposal would be necessary prior to it being taken to Pretoria in an attempt to reengage the South Africans. Pretoria would categorically reject any formula for partial Cuban withdrawal. Nonetheless, there was adequate material to justify two informal meetings between the Americans and Angolans, in September 1987, in Luanda and then Brussels. The South Africans expressed interest in the American-MPLA meetings and complained they were not being kept fully informed. The South Africans were expressing a flicker of interest in the diplomatic process which, unbeknown to the participants, was soon to be overshadowed by some of the most ferocious fighting of the entire conflict (Crocker, 1993:358-359).

5.4 Political and Diplomatic Dimension:

**Engaging the Soviet Union and Cuba, November - December 1987:**

American officials began to perceive mounting disgust with the Angolan fighting, on the part of Soviet diplomats and academics, once the scale of the disaster at the Battle of Lomba River became known. Soviet strategy lay in ruins. Mid-November, US representatives Mike Armacost and Peter Rodman met with Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov and Vladellen Vasev in Geneva. Reportedly, the Soviets were defensive and edgy. When Vasev pursued the idea of including the Cubans in the talks, Armacost agreed to consider it if the MPLA put forward interesting new ideas. Responding to the question of whether the Cubans were ready to leave, Vasev replied
affirmatively, but added that the Soviet Union was not prepared to "throw Angola to the wolves." The Soviets were humiliated and their strategy in tatters but neither were they willing to suddenly reverse course in Southern Africa or hand the Americans what would be perceived as a diplomatic victory (Crocker, 1993:361).

Meanwhile, in an exchange with Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon, 4 November, he complained to an American official that the USA had "changed its mind" about Cuban participation since August. A few days later, at a lunch with an American diplomat, Alarcon communicated that a settlement would enable Cuba to terminate honourably a very heavy commitment. However, in an exchange 20 November in Mexico City, the tone had changed and Alarcon said he no longer felt "the same optimism" as he had previously. He now argued that an early American meeting with the MPLA, even with Cuban participation, would not necessarily be fruitful. The reason cited for this sudden change was P.W. Botha's mid-November visit to Savimbi's Angolan headquarters with members of the South African cabinet. Alarcon further cited statements by Botha, Malan, and Geldenhuys which laid out the rationale for SADF intervention. Essentially, provided with a choice between seeing UNITA defeated or halting "Russian aggression," South Africa had chosen the latter. Further cited as reason for Cuba's sudden disinterest, was General Geldenhuys' argument that the survival of UNITA served essential South African national interests by blocking access by SWAPO and the ANC to much of Southern Angola for the purpose of infiltrating Namibia (9) (Crocker, 1993:362).

Likewise, by mid-December 1987, the Angolan representative was maintaining a similarly gloomy line and abandoned an earlier proposal for a December meeting requesting, instead, a one month delay. He argued the present climate did not favour talks and that, since Brussels, the Americans had failed to provide him with satisfactory answers to his demands concerning American aid to UNITA as well as Cuban participation. Luanda was displeased with Reagan's public reference to UNITA's "heros" at the Battle of Lomba River as well as with Savimbi's statements testifying to
the effectiveness of American military support. The Angolans did not believe negotiations should take place while there were still thousands of SADF troops in Angola in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 602 (Crocker, 1993:362, Jaster, 1988:101).

Resolution 602, adopted unanimously on 25 November, condemned the intervention and called for South African withdrawal by 10 December. Pik Botha rejected the Security Council Resolution and declared South Africa would remain in Angola as long as the Cubans and Soviets did and as long as Pretoria's security required it. However, as stated in Section 5.1.1, General Geldenhuys announced 5 December that his forces had achieved their military objectives. The SADF had therefore begun a "tactical disengagement under operational conditions" or, in other words, a gradual retreat that could be interrupted by combat (Crocker, 1993:363, Geldenhuys, 1995:219).

In the second half of 1987, the Cubans played a distinctly secondary role in the fighting. As stated in Section 5.2.1, Havana disagreed with the Soviet battle plan and had done little to advance it. According to Crocker, by November, it was fair to say the Cubans had a lead role in neither the diplomacy nor the war. Nonetheless, events compelled one of the failed alliance to act. Castro, untainted by association with a failed strategy, was free to seize upon the void in leadership. In early November, the three Communist allies met during the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Castro later described how he had worked out a plan with dos Santos, 7 November, and then had informed the Soviets. His military game plan, in which Cuba would assume the strategic lead, was met with initial Soviet scepticism (Crocker, 1993:363-365, Bridgland, 1990:341).
5.5 Strategic and Tactical Dimension:

Dramatic Cuban Escalation:

The military game plan arising from the meeting between Castro and dos Santos, in early November 1987, called for a dramatic escalation of the Cuban military commitment. Cuba would dispatch up to 15,000 additional troops to Angola, replace some conscript units, and deploy the vaulted 50th Division and other front-line combat units as well as the top air force pilots. Placed in charge of the Cuban escalation were four of the most experienced commanders from earlier African wars. Cuban ground forces were immediately authorized to move south of the 15th parallel, their traditional southern perimeter, and to move their primary defence lines to within some 320 kilometres north of the Namibian border. After dos Santos endorsed Castro's plan in mid November, additional Cuban forces began arriving in Angola. The priority was the deployment of ground and air forces to assist FAPLA to hold Cuito Cuanavale although, as previously stated, it was too late to make any difference (Crocker, 1993:365-366, Heitman, 1990:295-296, Bridgland, 1990:341-342).

By taking up positions around the periphery of Cuito and pinning down its defenders, it appeared the SADF and UNITA aimed to seize it (10). With the view to help FAPLA defend the besieged town, the first three hundred Cuban reinforcements began arriving in Cuito Cuanavale in early December 1987 so as to prevent "the military and political catastrophe" that was expected to result if the FAPLA force at Cuito Cuanavale were "annihilated." A Cuban infantry regiment and a tank company later arrived from Menongue so as to strengthen the FAPLA defences (11). Bypassing FAPLA's chain of command the much decorated Cuban General, Cintra Frias, was placed in charge in Angola (12) (Crocker, 1993:366, Geldenhuys, 1995:237-238, Heitman, 1990:295).

Castro began filling south western Angola with a major deployment of conventional combat power. Their first deployments in the south were all west of the Cunene River which the Cubans used to protect their eastern flank against any South
African response. Once it became evident that the South Africans were not going to respond, Cuban forces then began deploying their forces in the area opposite Ovambo. In a reassertion of Angolan sovereignty the Cubans planned to reoccupy Cunene Province right up to the SWA/Namibian border. This would have the effect of permitting SWAPO to regain access to its most desirable sanctuary by which to infiltrate Ovamboland (Crocker, 1993:366, Heitman, 1990:296, Bridgland, 1990:342).

The Cuban deployment continued to expand. By February 1988, an advance force of 3,500 had moved south into Cunene Province and established bases near the SWA/Namibian border. By late May, Cuba had established a new southern front roughly parallel with the border. It extended from Namibe through Chibemba, Cahama, Humbe, Xangongo, Cuvelai and Cassinga. The front was manned by between 11,000 to 12,000 of Cuba's best units organised into three task forces. It was protected by MiG-23s and helicopter gun ships located, only 60 kilometres from the border, at the newly upgraded air bases at Cahama and Xangongo. The Cubans were exceedingly well-equipped with two hundred tanks, air defence radars and five different types of surface-to-air missile systems (Crocker, 1993:366-367, Heitman, 1990:296, Geldenhuys, 1995:237-238, Bridgland, 1990:342).

5.6 Political and Diplomatic Dimension:
Cuba's Pivotal Role; Castro's Gamble, February 1988:

By this time, the tripartite peace talks had already commenced in London and interpreting Cuban intentions was not a simple matter. Castro was adding significantly to the Cuban military commitment stripping some of his best units and equipment for deployment to Angola. According to Crocker, Castro's unilateral escalation risked being misperceived and could trigger a major confrontation. Castro hoped to turn the tables on Pretoria forcing the South Africans to chose between a settlement acceptable to Cuba or else risk a conventional military confrontation. Castro's gamble would have to pay off quickly or he could face the undesirable choice of deescalating having achieved nothing or becoming more deeply involved in an even deeper quagmire.
According to Crocker, Cuban forces were capable of confronting the South Africans with visible displays of prowess and, by moving southward into Angola's contested areas, the Cubans could raise the stakes of South African involvement (13). In contrast to this evaluation of the Cuban gamble, which Crocker has portrayed as full of risk, Heitman offers a somewhat more cynical account. By carefully deploying the 50th Division in south western Angola the Cubans were thought to be safe from any actual contact with the South African forces. "Having rattled his sabre convincingly enough to save face, but not so alarmingly that the South Africans would feel compelled to attack, he [Castro] could then negotiate his way out of Angola." Indeed, while the generals were deploying the 50th Division, and other elements into south western Angola, Cuban diplomats devoted themselves to seeking a negotiated settlement (14) (Crocker, 1993:367-368, Heitman, 1990:296).

Castro had decided in late 1987 to design an honourable exit from Angola but, to get out of Angola with honour intact, he had to espouse the much-reviled linkage doctrine. Linkage became the one formula by which the Cubans could go home having accomplished a satisfactory state of affairs with the end of SADF intervention in Angola and the implementation of Resolution 435 for Namibian independence. In order to succeed on this course it was necessary, firstly, to hood-wink a number of audiences into believing that Cuba was compelling Pretoria to the table. Secondly, Castro would need to persuade Washington that, while he was ready for a wider war, he preferred a balanced settlement based on linkage. These two conditions had no hope of succeeding if the South Africans refused to engage in peace negotiations. Finally, Castro had to succeed in convincing the Angolan Government they were not being abandoned by their internationalist ally (Crocker, 1993:368-369, Heitman, 1990:296).
5.7 Strategic and Tactical Dimension:

Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, February - March, 1988:

The turning point in the southern war was what came to be known as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale fought in south eastern Angola (see Map, Appendix Nine). The battle can be viewed as having three phases: Operation Modular, Operation Hooper and finally Operation Packer. According to General Geldenhuys the names are misleading as they in no way signified strategic or tactical phases of the campaign. The names were allocated merely to indicate the three main periods in which units and personnel performed operational duty and, beyond this, had no significance (15).

The main South African forces were the 61 mechanized battalion with 4 SAI (Fourth South African Infantry Battalion) in reserve and the 32 battalion (16) (Embleton, 1994:14, Geldenhuys, 1995:209-210).

A press statement of 20 February 1988 reiterated that the SADF were engaged in a tactical withdrawal but explained once again that it was being done under operational conditions and proceeding slowly (17). Meanwhile, the international diplomatic negotiations had begun to acquire momentum. As of March a negotiated settlement was in sight with an agreement achieved for the first round of tripartite talks to take place between Angola, Cuba and South Africa. Nonetheless, the SADF deemed it advisable to maintain a small military presence east of the Cuito River due to the possibility that FAPLA would try one last time to improve their position before the onset of negotiations. The South Africans suspected Castro of harbouring an immense desire for something that could be presented as a Cuban victory so as to restore his wounded pride (Geldenhuys, 1995:221, Heitman, 1990:303, Bridgland, 1990:345).

The SADF’s Citizen Force, 82 Brigade, established a presence east of the Cuito (18). The remaining FAPLA forces were concentrated at Cuito Cuanavale and Tumpo. The last battle was launched by the SADF’s Citizen Force at Tumpo, 23 March, in an attempt to deliver a final blow in the battles east of the Cuito River (19). The SADF force, however, encountered a Cuban mine field of a very sophisticated nature (20).
According to Commandant Gerhard Louw "the enemy had us pinned down in the mine field ... and they had the chance of shooting out the Oliphants one by one. Fortunately the mine field was just inside the tree line. If it had been on the open ground, [the result would have been different]." The SADF broke off the attack and the result was inconclusive (21) (Geldenhuys, 1995:221-222, Bridgland, 1990:328-329).

In the attack FAPLA suffered considerable losses but the SADF none apart from three tanks mired in the Cuban mine field. According to General Geldenhuys, this was FAPLA's "success" of the war but argues "one cannot score a try in you own half of the field!" (22). While Geldenhuys jests about FAPLA believing to have scored a success it is nonetheless apparent the SADF also did not emerge victorious either (Geldenhuys, 1995:222).

Commandant Gerhard Louw's mission had been to drive the FAPLA-Cuban presence out of the Tumpo area, hold the captured terrain until last light on 23 March, and finally, allow field engineers to move in and blow up, once and for all, the bridge across the Cuito River. However, all attempts to displace the FAPLA-Cuban presence from the last postage stamp of land of the east bank of the Cuito River had failed. By the end of March, with 800 Cuban troops now dug in around Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF was finally convinced that it was impossible to destroy the Angolan bridgehead from the east without a massive increase in South African forces and the loss of hundreds of South African lives (23). According to Fred Bridgland "Tumpo ... was the only clear defeat the SADF suffered in the War for Africa" (Geldenhuys, 1995:221-222, Bridgland, 1990:324-334).

In terms of the "war" as interpreted by the international press, South Africa was defeated and the Cubans victorious. However, the "Battle of Cuito Cuanavale" only really became a battle when referred to in a speech by Castro in July 1988 and was, in retrospect, a political creation (24). General Geldenhuys is adamant the SADF did not attack Cuito Cuanavale and stated: "How the Angolans, at such a late stage as April 1988, could still think or claim that we wanted to attack Cuito Cuanavale is
puzzling. It was practically impossible." The SADF would have had to cross the Cuito River which would have been futile as they lacked the wading capability of the Soviet tanks. According to Geldenhuys, "If we had wanted to reach Cuito Cuanavale during those last few weeks, we would have had to have positioned a sufficiently strong force west of the river before the time" (Geldenhuys, 1995:224-227, Embleton, 1994:3).

5.7.1 Who Won the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale: (25)

From the point of view of the South African military the war over Jamba represented, beyond any doubt, a combined SADF and UNITA victory (26). The SADF and UNITA sought to destroy the offensive against Jamba which they maintain they accomplished even before FAPLA could cross the Lomba River. The FAPLA offensive had been entirely driven west of the Cuito River with the exception of one isolated spot, Tumpo, east of the river. The offensive against Jamba had failed and, as far as SADF were concerned, the war in south eastern Angola had been decided (27) (Geldenhuys, 1995:227).

While it is patently clear to General Geldenhuys that his forces never even contemplated attacking Cuito Cuanavale, a conviction supported by Heitman, there nonetheless exist notable views to the contrary (28). Those holding the view that South Africa was defeated at Cuito Cuanavale include, among others, Hasu Patel, Rob Davies, Horace Campbell, David Birmingham, and Thomas Ohlson (29). According to Patel, "South Africa's defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in mid-1988 illuminated the fact that there were limits to its regional hegemonic ambitions." According to Campbell, the SADF failed to take Cuito Cuanavale in "major ground battles" in January, February and March. Campbell further asserts that "by the end of March [1988] the South African siege was over and the South Africans themselves were trapped and under siege" (Geldenhuys, 1995:227-229, Heitman, 1990:295-298, Patel, 1992:268, Campbell, 1989:12-13).

A less severe and more balanced account of the South African defeat is provided by Thomas Ohlson. Ohlson argues, due to the likelihood of incurring heavy...
casualties in a conventional attack on Cuito, Pretoria opted for a lengthy artillery battle instead. Cuito defences held resulting in a military deadlock which increasingly turned into a strategic disadvantage for Pretoria. In a move to regain the initiative UNITA, supported by the SADF, launched an attack on the north of Cuano Cubango and Bie and Mexico provinces in March 1988. Two important South African tactical objectives were not achieved: firstly; Cuito Cuanavale did not fall and secondly; SADF-UNITA forces did not take the towns of Cuemba and Luena further to the north. The SADF's reputation for invincibility was left in tatters and UNITA was not strengthened as had been hoped but, on the contrary, were inflicted with heavy losses due to an ill-advised switch of tactics. Ohlson also comments that South African vulnerabilities were revealed throughout its lengthy intervention in Angola (30). David Birmingham likewise argues a number of points similar to those argued by Thomas Ohlson (31) (Ohlson, 1989:183-185).
Exhibit 5.A:
Overview of Losses in Fighting, September 1987 - April 1988:
(Adapted from Jannie Geldenhuys, A General’s Story, 1995)

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<td>23-mm anti-aircraft guns</td>
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<td>Mirage F1 fighter aircraft</td>
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5.8 Political and Diplomatic Dimension:

International Negotiations, January - March 1988:

In early January the Angolans proposed firm dates for negotiations with Cuban participation. Angola was, furthermore, willing to discuss total Cuban withdrawal. Mbinda and General Ndalu notified Castro's adviser, Jorge Risquet, at which point the nature of the negotiations was to change forever (32). This agreement in principle to total Cuban withdrawal, which came months before the height in fighting at Cuito Cuanavale and Techipa-Calqueque, signalled that the Angolans and Cubans accepted the parameters of a settlement based on linkage. The USA negotiating team travelled
from Luanda to Zaire, at the end of January, to meet with Savimbi in what proved to be their most productive meeting in years. Pik Botha was invited to meet with Crocker in Europe and South African Ambassador Piet Koornhof was put on notice of the possibility of "proximity talks," if the MPLA were to provide a concrete proposal, in what was the first move to reengage the South Africans (Crocker, 1993:373-375).

Next, at the beginning of February, Gorbachev announced a much-improved schedule for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. The decision to deal with the "bleeding wound" next door, Gorbachev said, could lead to an early Afghanistan accord that would have "the most profound impact on other regional conflicts" (Crocker, 1993:375). He posed the question, "Which conflict will be settled next? It is certain that more is to follow." Saluting Gorbachev's speech, Schultz urged his counterpart to help persuade the Angolans to move on both Cuban withdrawal and political reconciliation with UNITA. This would effectively put pressure on Pretoria to disengage from the Namibia-Angola conflicts. Shevardnadze expressed pleasure that the Cubans were now at the table (33).

Pik Botha agreed to a meeting in Geneva, 14 March 1988, and in view of this a preceding meeting was organised, 9-11 March, in Luanda with the MPLA and Cubans. In the conference room of the South African mission in Geneva Pik Botha was handed a bluntly worded letter from Schultz conveying that the cost of failing to resolve the Angolan and Namibian conflicts could be very high for South Africa. Moscow and Havana had large investments in Angola. Botha was told, in the absence of a settlement, the Soviets and Cubans were not "desperate" for a deal but did appear open to discussing a deal. The Americans would be seeing the Soviets again in one week to further test their position. He was told that proximity talks would seem to be the logical next step. Pik Botha recognised the Soviets as critical and volunteered that the USA would necessarily play the leading role in testing them. Furthermore, if Gorbachev was serious about seeking political solutions then Botha was of the view that maybe something could be worked out. It is worth noting that these diplomatic
developments were occurring before all Cuban reinforcements had arrived, before the fighting peaked, and before Castro announced to the world that he had altered the correlation of forces (Crocker, 1993:381-384).

In the Angolan negotiations South Africa and Cuba were emerging as the central players. The Cubans appeared to have a coherent game plan whereas the South Africans clearly did not. The impetus for cooperation on the part of the Angolans and Cubans seemed to come about in early March 1988. Cuban officials displayed an intensity and sense of mission which implied that someone important was watching every move at home. Indeed, it gradually became clear that it was Castro, rather than Gorbachev, driving the Communist train in Angola. Castro clearly wanted to get to the negotiating table as soon as possible (Crocker, 1993:379). The Soviet position was, however, less apparent.

There was a meeting with Anatoliy Adamishin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, at the US State Department, 21 March, which fell short of American expectations. He offered no specific ideas for advancing the process and no concrete support in terms of the negotiations. He did, however, reveal his intention to visit Havana and Luanda and, as well, spoke of the need to maintain "regular" contact with the Americans. Adamishin seemed pleased with this modest step forward.

Shortly thereafter, 28 March, Neil van Heerden and Derek Auret arrived in Washington for three days of consultations expressing appreciation to be in Washington immediately after the departure of the Soviets. The van Heerden mission became a turning point in South African foreign policy. In discussing Soviet motives and reviewing the prospect for USA-Soviet cooperation it became apparent there were some emerging areas of agreement. It was explained that Cuba and the Soviet Union would consider supporting Cuban withdrawal only in the context of Resolution 435. Moscow and Havana had become linkage advocates because, from their perspective, having Resolution 435 implemented by Pretoria could be presented as their "accomplishment" (Crocker, 1993:386-387).
It was further explained to the South African delegation that Moscow was unwilling to sell out the MPLA and would prefer that it survive. However, it had also grasped the reality of South Africa's staying power. While there was little direct pressure on Moscow there were growing incentives. A settlement would ease the USSR's financial burden as well as the political burden in terms of East-West relations. Gorbachev wanted to achieve deals with Reagan as insurance with any future administration. Obviously, UNITA's continued survival was of central importance to Pretoria and, since there would be no internal cease-fire, UNITA would not be restricted in any way by Resolution 435 or an agreement for Cuban withdrawal.

A negotiated settlement was sold to the South African visitors as a win-win situation for the SADF as Cuban withdrawal would come as the direct result of South African foreign policies since 1975. Essentially, Pretoria would be decolonising Angola and ridding the region of its only serious adversary. South Africa then made the momentous decision to meet the Cubans and Angolans. A bilateral USA-USSR meeting was promptly organised on the eve of the first round of tripartite talks to take place between Angola, Cuba and South Africa (Crocker, 1993:388-391). It now appeared the Soviets as well as the South Africans were interested in seeking a regional settlement.

5.9 Strategic and Tactical Dimension:

The Last Battles, April - June 1988:

Operation Packer officially ended 30 April 1988 with the departure of Colonel Paul Fouche and the demobilisation of the Citizen Force units which had served in the 82 Brigade. The new phase, appropriately named Operation Displace (see Map, Appendix Ten), consisted of approximately 1,000 troops compared with the 3,000 SADF personnel which were in south eastern Angola at the height of the fighting (34). Their task was to support the sappers still laying mine fields along the eastern banks of the Cuito and Cuanavale Rivers where it was thought FAPLA might attempt to cross (35). The South African sappers laid mainly Armscor R2M1 anti-personnel and No.8...
anti-tank mines but also used Soviet mines either captured during battles or dug out from FAPLA mine fields (Bridgland, 1990:333, Geldenhuys, 1995:222).

5.9.1 The Final Battle, 26 June 1988:

As previously stated, in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.5, Castro's gamble involved a major deployment of conventional combat power commencing in mid November 1987. With the current negotiations likely to result in troop withdrawals it was thought the Cubans would logically desire to try to change the impression created by the FAPLA defeat at the Battle of Lomba River. A success or victory of some sort would allow the FAPLA alliance to negotiate from a position of strength. According to General Geldenhuys "a threatening posture in the south west would support this strategy and, as a bonus, draw the limelight away from the south east." Hence, as the Cuban deployment continued to escalate the South Africans became increasingly concerned (Geldenhuys, 1995:237-240, Heitman, 1990:297).

As the situation deteriorated throughout April and May 1988 South African concerns proved valid. Over this time both FAPLA and Cuban elements began to interfere with the SADF's operations against SWAPO. While pursuing a SWAPO group, 18 April, the SADF clashed with the Cubans south of Xangongo. A major was killed in the fighting and the body of a medical orderly was later found in a shallow grave. The final day of the London Meeting, 4 May, another clash took place with the Cubans attacking elements of 101 Battalion as they conducted operations against SWAPO south of Humbe. The SADF lost six soldiers and four Casspirs. One man was taken prisoner and was to later resurface in a Cuban hospital. A few days later there was another clash between the Cubans and elements of 101 Battalion. Meanwhile the international peace negotiations advanced unabated despite the growing tension on the battlefield (36) (Heitman, 1990:298, Geldenhuys, 1995:242, Bridgland, 1990:342).

The South Africans decided they would now have to respond to the escalating Cuban activity in addition to the presence of 200 to 300 SWAPO insurgents at Techipa. Prior to launching an attack, Commandant Jan Hougaard, headquartered at Ruacana,
commenced two reconnaissance operations with troops from 32 Battalion (37). Team One confirmed there was a strong military force at Techipa which consisted not only of SWAPO. A conventional attack was soon ruled out due to the nature of the Cuban force found at Techipa. Team Two likewise confirmed the presence of Cuban conventional forces with tanks. Any remaining thoughts of using 32 Battalion or even 61 Mechanized Battalion to attack Techipa were now dismissed. The South Africans were, at any rate, not enthusiastic to start something which might derail the negotiations and, furthermore, were still unclear about the intentions of the Cuban force. Hence, it was decided to harass them to draw a reaction so as to improve the SADF's intelligence before deciding to act (Geldenhuys, 1995:243, Heitman, 1990:298-301, Bridgland, 1990:343-347).

The available intelligence soon suggested the Cubans intended to advance southward. Given the vast disparity in strength between the South African and Cuban forces, Colonel Delport decided on an artillery strike to disrupt the Cuban force before it could move out to attack (38). Just before last light, Sunday 26 June, a number of meteorological balloons carrying tin foil were sent up into the air from north of Calueque. The reflections of the tin foil on the Cuban radar made it appear as if an air attack was under way (39). In winter it becomes dark so quickly that flying sorties are no longer possible after 18:00. The SADF thus had one hour in which to identify targets which they did extremely well. The Cubans launched six SA-6 ground to air missiles at the balloons. This enabled the SADF's radar operators, artillery observation officers and reconnaissance regiment to observe the launchings from Techipa and to plot their positions. The SADF attacked these targets for four hours after darkness fell. As their first strike destroyed the Cuban artillery command post the South Africans were able to continue shooting without fear of counter-bombardment. General Geldenhuys describes this as "one of the most brilliant operations of our military history" (40) (Heitman, 1990:302-305, Geldenhuys, 1995:245-248, Bridgland, 1990:355-361).
5.9.2 The Air Attack on Calueque, 27 June 1988:

Despite their heavy losses of the previous day the Cubans nonetheless commenced their advance on Calueque, 27 June. They were confronted by the 61 Mechanized Battalion and withdrew (41). The same day four MiG-23s dropped three bombs each on Calueque. Five minutes after the first attack three more MiGs bombed Calueque. Most of the MiGs aimed for the dam wall and scored several hits which seriously damaged the bridge running over it. Another MiG veered off from the rest and attacked the water pipeline to Ovambo. One of its bombs damaged the line and another, which missed the target, exploded between a Buffel and an Eland-90 armoured car. The stray bomb killed eleven troops on a supply mission to Calueque from 8 SAI (Eighth South African Infantry Battalion). According to Bridgland, it was the SADF’s worst single loss in the entire war and, according to Heitman, it raised many questions as to its purpose. Nevertheless, the successful air attack enabled the Cubans to claim a victory although it was not as impressive a victory as they had planned. The fighting of 26 and 27 June effectively marked the end of South African involvement in the Angolan conflict (Heitman, 1990:306-307, Geldenhuys, 1995:248-249, Bridgland, 1990:361-364).

5.10 Political and Diplomatic Dimension:

International Negotiations: May - December 1988:

The commencement of the first round of tripartite negotiations, 2 May in London, was the beginning of an eight month marathon. The twelve Angolan/South African/Cuban meetings would culminate in the historic signing, 22 December, of The Bilateral Agreement between Angola and Cuba for the Termination of the Cuban Military Contingent and The Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa (see Text, Appendices Four and Five). As portrayed by Chester Crocker, since the motivation in 1975 for initial SADF intervention was removed, so ended South African involvement in the Angolan conflict. There were, however, a variety of other internal and domestic factors which need to be taken into account so as to explain
South Africa's departure from Angola as are discussed in the next section (Section 5.12).

**Exhibit 5.B:**
**Overview of the Negotiations, 1988:**
(Adapted from Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, 1993)

| Round One: | early May | London |
| Round Two: | mid June | Cairo |
| Round Three: | mid July | New York City |
| **The New York Principles** | | |
| Round Four: | late July | Cape Verde |
| Round Five: | early August | Geneva |
| **The Geneva Protocol** | | |
| Round Six: | late August | Brazzaville |
| Round Seven: | early September | Brazzaville |
| Round Eight: | late September | Brazzaville |
| Round Nine: | October | New York City |
| Round Ten: | November | Geneva |
| Round Eleven: | early December | Brazzaville |
| Round Twelve: | December | Brazzaville |
| **The Brazzaville Protocol** | | |
| (Mini) Round Thirteen: | late December | U.N. Headquarters New York City |
| **Bilateral Agreement** | | |
| **Tripartite Agreement** | | |
5.11 The Importance of South Africa's Internal Milieux: Decision-Making Structures, Personalities and Organisations:

5.11.1 Introduction:

As stated in Section 1.5.4 of Chapter One, the events surrounding the final end period (1987-1988) are both more complex and less clearly definable than those of the previous time periods addressed in Chapter Three (1975-1977) and Chapter Four (1978-1986). In conclusion to this Chapter the two paradigms (or bodies of literature) are considered to be of equal utility in explaining the departure of all major external actors and the end of South African involvement in Angola.

5.11.2 Arguments in Favour of Sub-National/Unit Level Causation:

5.11.2.1 Internal Causation Within South Africa:

According to Rob Davies (1989), the accord phase of regional relations was followed by a phase of escalating aggression and destabilization against neighbouring states. Then suddenly, at the beginning of the second quarter of 1988, there was a notable de-escalation which Davies judges to have been the result of South Africa's increasing military costs. Indeed, the 1988 resolution of the conflict cannot be fully understood without considering South Africa's domestic concerns. The impact of the following pressures, in all likelihood, influenced the South African leadership to scale back their involvement in Angola: the rising costs of the conflict; a declining security situation within South Africa's borders; the increasing influence of the ANC and other banned liberation movements; the declaration of a state of emergency in the mid 1980s, and finally; the resultant economic crisis exacerbated by the sanctions campaign which was gaining momentum internationally.

An increasing burden was placed on the South African state - economically, militarily and also in terms of eroding support among the National Party's white electorate due to the growing number of white casualties. There was the impact of growing polarization in white South African society on the NP leadership, as the Conservative Party (CP) gained electoral support and the political spectrum shifted to...
the right. The white electorate was sensitive to and began to question the increasing number of casualties, the cost of the Angolan war effort as well as the burden wrought by Namibian occupation on a weak recessionary economy feeling the pressure of international sanctions (42).

Militarily, South African vulnerabilities were being revealed (43). For example, as earlier stated, by 1987 the Angolans had something which they lacked in their 1985 offensive. In 1985 the SAAF was able to attack Angolan vehicles and helicopters virtually without opposition. This could no longer be the case as it had been in their failed offensive against Savimbi's main base at Jamba because Angola now had the capability to provide air cover for assaults by its airborne and ground forces. South Africa responded to the growing Angolan encroachment of its previously unchallenged air superiority by upgrading the aging Mirage III ground-attack aircraft with new weapons and Israeli avionics (Jaster, 1988:99-100).

5.11.2.2 Internal Causation Within Cuba and the Soviet Union:

The Soviet Union, commencing in the late 1980s, began unburdening itself of the commitments of imperial overreach and other third world obligations acquired under Brezhnev. However, one must ask why the Soviet Union's reassessment came about. In Cuba, for example, the Angolan intervention was more onerous in percentage terms than the US engagement in Vietnam ever was. Furthermore, Cuba was no longer receiving its hard currency payments from Angola and the Angolan entanglement was increasingly unpopular among the Cuban people (see Section 5.2). The Soviet Union's changing priorities, likewise, did not arise out of a vacuum but were, at least partially, the product of internal dynamics not considered by theorists such as Waltz.

Due to internal social and economic pressures the Soviet Union's global priorities were shifting. The backdrop to Soviet reform and "glasnost" on the international stage was a situation of worsening domestic economic deterioration. The African empire accumulated under Brezhnev was an increasingly costly burden for a regime suffering internal decline. The Soviet Union could neither afford to underwrite
socialist economies within the Eastern Bloc nor support liberation movements across the globe. In effect, the reorganisation of priorities was a product of necessity. The heavy financial cost of supporting socialist regimes in the third world was increasingly occurring at the expense of critically needed domestic economic restructuring. Such support was diverting scarce resources from other more important priorities (MacFarlane, 1990:20).

In addition, there were also power struggles occurring with the Soviet state which inevitably affected Soviet decision-making structures. By late 1987 and early 1988, Soviet diplomatic, academic and media elites were increasingly candid in distancing themselves from policy commitments driven by Communist Party hardliners and the armed forces. Soviet "realists" came to view Angola as an unmitigated military disaster in which no amount of Soviet military hardware or advisers would ever bring about an MPLA victory. Previously, the military and intelligence bureaucracy, and especially the Communist Party, had long played a role in formulating African policy. However, with the accelerating changes, the Soviet foreign policy machinery came to be taken over by Shevardnadze and his "new thinkers" who gradually accommodated themselves to the American sponsored settlement (44).
5.12 The Importance of the Global Order:

5.12.1 Introduction:

On could argue, as Harry Stephan does, that South Africa was peripheral and, as such, was the national equivalent of a puppet controlled by the decisions and actions of the major global powers (45). According to this point of view, South African foreign policy was defensive and reactive in nature. Therefore, upon the departure of all major foreign influences, Pretoria perceived it to be safe for the SADF to entirely withdraw as well since the threat to South Africa’s vital security interests no longer existed. However, as demonstrated above; in Section 5.11, this view although valid is uni-dimensional and does not consider other important forms of causation.

Crocker, like Stephan, regards South Africa’s departure as a logical result of the end of Soviet and Cuban involvement. While we have demonstrated in the previous section that this does not tell the entire story, there are nonetheless system level factors which need to be taken into account as well so as to achieve a better understanding of South Africa’s participation in the American sponsored negotiations and eventual departure.

5.12.2 Arguments in Favour of International/System Level Causation:

South African intervention in and departure from Angola is undoubtedly at least partially explained by system level factors. Comments made by P.W. Botha, Magnus Malan, Pik Botha and General Geldenhuys clearly indicate that South Africa was involved in Angola due to South Africa’s perceived security interests. Pik Botha, for example, declared in November 1987 that South Africa would remain in Angola for as long as the Cubans and Soviets did and for as long as Pretoria’s security required it. There is ample evidence to support this perspective (see Section 5.4 of this chapter, for instance).

General Geldenhuys, likewise, outlined South Africa’s national interests the defence of which motivated their involvement: “There were MK camps in northern
Angola. They would probably have been transferred to the south east of Angola if Cuban-MPLA forces controlled it. That would bring them right up to the area where the borders of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana converge, which had been used as an infiltration route to South Africa. South Africa had interests in common with UNITA. It was no secret. The Minister of Defence stated this in parliament on more than one occasion. South Africa thus became involved. We undertook to supply armaments and troops which would put UNITA in a more equable [sic] position vis-a-vis the advancing forces of the FAPLA alliance" (Geldenhuys, 1995:210-211).

Robert Jaster further cites the same argument. He describes how General Geldenhuys reiterated the reason why South Africa desired to prevent UNITA's defeat by asserting that if the "Russian and Cuban supported Angolan forces" were to gain control over the area now "dominated by UNITA," then SWAPO would be able to "activate" Namibia's Caprivi and Kavango areas and the ANC would have greater freedom to infiltrate South Africa (46) (Jaster, 1988:101).

Furthermore, one of the most important global developments, in explaining the end of external intervention in Angola was the convergence of Soviet and American interests for the first time since the Second World War. It was, in all likelihood, fortunate for the fate of regional conflicts such as Angola that Soviet and American priorities were beginning to complement rather than contradict each other in 1988, and therefore, rendered a regional peace process feasible (47) (Crocker, 1993:409-410).

In the beginning, according to Chester Crocker, Moscow's long-standing dislike of the American sponsored negotiations was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union was engaged in a global, zero-sum game. Since the USA had organised the settlement it must therefore be bad with such patent obstructionism an axiom of Soviet policy. Moscow's continuing insecurity about its superpower status required Soviet officials to counter every American effort in the spirit of cold war politics.

However, another trend was developing. As part of an overall reassessment of Soviet global interests Moscow was gradually reappraising its African policies.
According to Crocker, two distinct processes coincided: firstly, the gradual transformation of superpower relations including an agreement in principle to explore the resolution of other regional conflicts (those conflicts beyond Europe in which both the USA and USSR had acquired a stake) and secondly; the ripening of the Southern African regional peace process itself. In May 1988 when the path finally seemed clear, and the disparate parties prepared to cooperate, the priorities of the two superpower nations were no longer mutually incompatible (48). Furthermore, there was great incentive, on both sides, to achieve a peace settlement before time ran out with the upcoming US presidential election.

As well, according to David Birmingham, by 1988 there was a divergence between American and South African interests. In an election year the Republicans wanted to be viewed as the peace-makers in Africa. Under pressure from the black American lobby, the Reagan Administration wanted to publicly distance itself from South Africa. The USA also wanted to see the war end because Cuba would then be obliged to withdraw from its high profile internationalist role. Cuba's liberation ideology would then assume a lower profile in the world (Birmingham, 1992:105-106).

The first visible indication of this reassessment, of the Soviet Union's power and position in the global community, occurred under Gorbachev commencing in early 1986. It accelerated in 1987 due to a variety of factors: the cycle of war in Afghanistan; the priorities of the American-Soviet bilateral relationship, and; the feverish pace of summit diplomacy in the final eighteen months of Reagan's Presidency. In his speech of 8 February 1988, referred to in Section 5.8, Gorbachev heralded a major shift in policy by signalling explicitly that an Afghan settlement could open the way to a more constructive approach in other regional conflicts. One must, however, also seek to know what internal sub-national factors were involved in bringing about these outward manifestations as discussed in Section 5.11.2.2.
(1) More specifically what SADF intelligence perceived was that FAPLA was preparing for a major two-pronged offensive aimed at Tempue, Cangamba and Gago-Coutino from the north, and at Mavinga and Lupire from the west (Heitman, 1990:20).

(2) The MPLA's failure to capture Mavinga caused jubilation in the Reagan Administration but received a comparatively muted response in South Africa (Crocker, 1993:360).

This comparatively muted response was perhaps due to the playing field having been substantially levelled since 1985. This resulted in a record number of SADF casualties. Equally serious was the loss of some of South Africa's irreplaceable Mirage aircraft. Although Pretoria had overcome to some extent the western arms embargo, via the development of a local industry, the SAAF's French fighter planes could not be replicated. Angola, on the other hand, was better able to replace aircraft destroyed in battle (Birmingham, 1992:106-107, Jaster, 1988:101).

(3) There are different accounts regarding the number of South African troops involved in this engagement. A more accurate figure may be 3 000.

(4) General Jannie Geldenhuys explains the military rationale thus: "In the longer term we had to leave the situation arranged in such a manner that UNITA itself could take care of its defence in the event of another "annual offensive." That is what we wanted to do. No more, no less. This is classic doctrine. After a successful battle, one consolidates; you secure the captured area and clear it up to a determined "line of exploitation;" you take the necessary precautions to deal with a possible counteroffensive, and if you leave the area, other forces take over from you to take care of its defence" (Geldenhuys, 1995:217).

(5) With wry humour General Geldenhuys states: "The offensives against Savimbi followed a pattern. There was an annual attempt to drive him out of his base area at Jamba with the ultimate aim of destroying him completely. It failed every year" (Geldenhuys, 1995:204-205).

With regard to the annual attempt to destroy UNITA militarily, General Geldenhuys states: "It is general knowledge that Crocker became frustrated from time to time. Every time he thought the MPLA would be prepared seriously to talk peace concerning South West and the Cubans the Soviet-supported hardliners in the MPLA wanted just one more chance to destroy Savimbi militarily. Only then, they said, would they be prepared to talk. And the next year, after another unsuccessful effort, they came with the same story. And so it went on" (Geldenhuys, 1995:205).
(6) The destruction of the Cuito Cuanavale Airfield was a significant loss for Soviet, Cuban and Angolan pilots. It meant they henceforth had to operate from Menongue and consequently could not cause much damage in the Cuito area (Geldenhuys, 1995:218).

(7) South Africa’s G-5s, and later G-6s, were a decisive factor throughout the campaign.

(8) Castro and the Cuban military were utterly disdainful of Soviet strategic planning. The Cubans believed the Angolan Government and their Soviet ally had no strategy. Soviet-led FAPLA offensives bore little relation to local conditions in Angola. While Angolan military planners treated every hill and village as a significant target, Soviet planners favoured tactically complex ground advances which took FAPLA units hundreds of kilometres beyond their rear support bases. The nature of the Angolan war was that of a low-intensity bush war spread over areas in which high-value targets were scarce. The key military resources were reliable people and the capacity for rapid manoeuvre but the art of surprise and mobility was as alien to Soviet planners as the concept of logistics was to the Angolans (Crocker, 1993:356).

(9) General Geldenhuys outlines South Africa’s national interests the defence of which motivated their involvement: "There were MK camps in northern Angola. They would probably have been transferred to the south east of Angola if Cuban-MPLA forces controlled it. That would bring them right up to the area where the borders of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana converge, which had been used as an infiltration route to South Africa. South Africa had interests in common with UNITA. It was no secret. The Minister of Defence stated this in parliament on more than one occasion. South Africa thus became involved. We undertook to supply armaments and troops which would put UNITA in a more equable [sic] position vis-a-vis the advancing forces of the FAPLA alliance" (Geldenhuys, 1995:210-211).

Robert Jaster cites the same argument. He describes how General Geldenhuys reiterated the reason why South Africa desired to prevent UNITA’s defeat by asserting that if the "Russian and Cuban supported Angolan forces" were to gain control over the area now "dominated by UNITA," then SWAPO would be able to "activate" Namibia’s Caprivi and Kavango areas and the ANC would have greater freedom to infiltrate South Africa (Jaster, 1988:101).

(10) The controversial and much debated subject regarding whether the SADF aimed to attack Cuito Cuanavale will be discussed in greater detail.

(11) It was, as previously stated in Section 5.1.1, far too late for Cuban reinforcements to have any opportunity of reversing FAPLA’s failed military situation. According to Heitman "By the time sufficient elements of the 50th Division were ashore and ready to deploy, the South Africans and UNITA had driven FAPLA across the Cuito River. Even deploying a Cuban tank company to the east bank had not helped to prevent the collapse; it had been quickly chewed up by the South Africans when it counter-attacked them to give FAPLA a breathing space" (Heitman, 1990:295).
(12) General Ochoa Sanchez was appalled by the military situation that he was presented with in Angola. He complained he had been sent to a lost war and that he would be given the blame for it (Heitman, 1990:295).

(13) Cuba could equalize, at least temporarily, the military scales in Angola. Due to its limited strategic role Cuba was not, however, capable of dominating the Southern African military balance (Crocker, 1993:367-368).

(14) General Geldenhuys caustically states, "In the south east [referring to Cuito Cuanavale] they [the Cubans] had used propaganda to instill fear and to threaten us out of the war. For public consumption they depicted their manoeuvres as a brilliant strategic move which ended the war and forced negotiations" (Geldenhuys, 1995:250).

(15) Embleton, perhaps inaccurately, maintains the first attack in what became known as "The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale" took place 25 February 1988, the second on 29 February, and the third 23 March 1988. Specifically with regard to this sort of categorisation, Geldenhuys states: "Commentators analysing the campaign in these three "duty roster shifts" could come to false conclusions" (Geldenhuys, 1995:210).

(16) Very detailed and thorough accounts of the campaign of 1987-88 are provided by Helmoed-Römer Heitman's War in Angola: The Final South African Phase and by Fred Bridgland's The War for Africa. Both works were published in 1990.


(18) The Citizen Force, 82 Brigade, was to be replaced 30 April 1988 with a small combat force (Geldenhuys, 1995:222).

(19) The aim of the SADF’s attack was to destroy the bridge across the Cuito River.

(20) While the SADF force was on a slight slope coming up from the Dala River their Oliphant tanks encountered a "warning" minefield of a very sophisticated defence system organised by Cuban General Ochoa Sanchez's top field commander, General Cintra Frias, in the Tumpo Triangle and Cuito Cuanavale area (Bridgland, 1990:327).

(21) According to Commandant Louw, "The artillery barrage had not let up at all and with the unexpected exertions the tanks had been guzzling fuel faster than expected. I asked for permission to break off the attack and Colonel Fouché granted it" (Bridgland, 1990:329).

(22) According to Geldenhuys, "In the south east it was the Cuban-FAPLA forces who were on the offensive. But they turned this around. The UNITA-RSA forces crushed the offensive and cleared the area up to the Cuito River. But the Cubans propagandistically presented the mopping-up operation as if it were a pucka [sic] offensive per se which they had gloriously repelled. They pretended that this facet was
what the whole war had been all about. In this way they camouflaged their total failure in not accomplishing their mission" (Geldenhuys, 1995:249).

Geldenhuys further cites Crocker describing the same situation as follows: "The Soviets and Angolans had laboured strenuously to smash UNITA, and had instead been thoroughly defeated. How, then, did the fighting at Cuito become a heroic Cuban legend? By proclaiming to a credulous world that the town of Cuito Cuanavale - a town under MPLA control since 1976 - was the "prize" over which the entire campaign was fought, and then by crowing when you have managed not to lose it" (Geldenhuys, 1995:250).

(23) As is well known Pretoria was extremely sensitive about South African casualties. As long as strategic gains could be made at a very low cost of life the SADF could continue to fight for UNITA. Any military effort which would entail a high death toll was regarded as prohibitive (Bridgland, 1990:331, Embleton, 1994:8-9).

(24) What became known as "The Battle for Cuito Cuanavale" is a subject of ongoing controversy. The debate over the military events of this time will not be resolved in the context of the current discussion nor is it the intent of this dissertation to do so. In fact, the "real" version of events surrounding Cuito Cuanavale could constitute an interesting subject for another dissertation or some such research endeavour.

(25) According to Bridgland the problem with asking who won the war, which is inevitably asked by anyone interested in the region, is that it may be altogether the wrong question. Bridgland suggests a more appropriate question might be: "What new opportunities did the war, and the consequent New York Accords, create for all the different belligerents?" (Bridgland, 1990:373).

(26) As earlier stated, the Soviet orchestrated FAPLA offensive had been forced to retreat close to 200 kilometres back to their launching point at Cuito Cuanavale. General Geldenhuys maintains that anyone claiming to speak with authority but gives a different judgement does so with ulterior motives (Geldenhuys, 1995:227).

(27) According to Jannie Geldenhuys the Cubans protested about their "victory" both too much and for too long: "I had a talk once with overseas generals and one of them remarked that it was very clear that the Marxist alliance had lost because the Cubans were nagging too long and too loud that they had won. "To quote Shakespeare," he said, it is a matter of "methinks the lady doth protest too much!"" (Geldenhuys, 1995:229).

(28) The author of this dissertation could continue with other similar accounts but, due to limitations of time and space, suffice it to say there are many committed to the view that South Africa suffered failure at Cuito Cuanavale.

(29) The argument of General Geldenhuys, that it was never the aim of South Africa to capture Cuito Cuanavale and that they merely wanted to clear the eastern bank, is
described by Embleton as "limited" (Embleton, 1994:17). This subject could also constitute the focus of another dissertation or some such research endeavour.

Ohlson cites military realities in Southern Angola as the single most important factor compelling the South Africans to the negotiating table in May 1988. Throughout the course of South Africa's lengthy intervention in Angola, facing an immense Soviet and Cuban military commitment, South African vulnerabilities were revealed. The threshold of increasing costs in terms of their sensitivity to white casualties, inability to effectively recruit from other racial groups and inability to replace aging weapons and equipment lost in battle as well as the loss of air superiority constituted too heavy a burden to bear for the South African state independently and without crucial American support (Ohlson, 1989:183-185).

Rob Davies makes a similar argument on this point. As cited in Endnote 23 of Chapter Two, Davies states: "Pretoria's changed stance in the region was the product, fundamentally, of reverses on all the main fronts of regional destabilization ... But the most decisive of these was that suffered by the SADF at Cuito Cuanavale. A Cuban publication has aptly described Cuito Cuanavale as "South Africa's Waterloo:" It smashed the myth of SADF invincibility and revealed important windows of vulnerability" (Davies, 1989:172).

While there are some inconsistencies in David Birmingham's account his conclusion is nonetheless clear: South Africa attacked Cuito Cuanavale and failed in this endeavour.

David Birmingham argues, just as the Angolan attack on Mavinga failed in 1987, the South African attack on Cuito Cuanavale failed to achieve its objectives in 1988. UNITA was not strengthened as had been hoped but suffered heavy casualties due to an ill-advised switch of tactics. Furthermore, the SADF assault on Cuito Cuanavale led to closer cooperation between the MPLA Government and both SWAPO and the ANC which tracked down and attacked UNITA positions. The invasion demonstrated that FAPLA could match the almost legendary power of South Africa. Within South Africa the SADF was considered to have failed and to have incurred serious losses in both life and equipment. Birmingham also argues that part of the SADF's expeditionary force was cut off inside Angola while retreating from the southern perimeter of Cuito Cuanavale (Birmingham, 1992:107).

Chester Crocker's book, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood, is the most extensive account of the diplomatic talks which culminated in the final negotiated settlement for all parties to depart from Angola. As a result, this chapter is heavily reliant on and indebted to the narrative provided by Crocker. Given the subject matter involved this reliance on Crocker was unavoidable.
(33) However, basic differences still existed between Washington and Moscow on Southern Africa. While the Soviets were aware of the extent of the quagmire in Angola, they faced no pressure or pain comparable to that wrought by their Afghanistan crisis which is referred to as the Soviet Vietnam. Furthermore, by early 1988 a more efficient procedure was needed to produce political decisions. The Cubans, Angolans, and Soviets were suspicious of the American shuttle procedure surmising that the American negotiators were filtering the parties' views and sharing them selectively as it suited them. They wanted to know Pretoria's "real" views (Crocker, 1993:375-376).

(34) General Geldenhuys describes how, at this stage, SADF levels were reduced to 1 500 and less so as to keep the occupied area safe with UNITA (Geldenhuys, 1995:222).

(35) An even heavier programme of laying mines by the SADF and UNITA was begun in mid April. The pattern of the mine field was roughly horseshoe in shape: beginning south of the Tumpo River, stretching eastward north of the Chambinga; turning northward along the eastern edge of the Chambinga High Ground, and; turning westward once again between the Dala and Cuatir Rivers. The intent of this mine field was to prevent FAPLA from pushing eastward again as the SADF reduced its presence in 1988 and trained UNITA in the use of captured Soviet weaponry (Bridgland, 1990:332-333).

(36) Meanwhile, according to Geldenhuys, "the negotiations of 3-4 May 1988 were not the end of the international political wrestling. It was the beginning of increased propaganda and diplomatic activity behind the scenes, in addition to military posturing" (Geldenhuys, 1995:242).

(37) Worried that the Cuban force might move on either Calueque or Ruacana the decision was soon made to deploy additional troops for their protection. Task Force Zulu was formed and put under the command of Colonel Mieg Delport. It consisted of a 32 Battalion Battle Group, three companies of 101 Battalion, 61 Mechanized Battle Group, a battery of Valkyrie 127-mm MRLs, a battery of 155-mm G-5s, a troop of G-2s and a troop of 120-mm mortars.

Then 8 June General Geldenhuys announced that elements of the Citizen Force were being called up for service in SWA/Namibia. The call-up was being done to provide sufficient force levels in the event of an attack into SWA/Namibia but was also meant to send a message to the Cubans (Geldenhuys, 1995:244-245, Heitman, 1990:302, Bridgland, 1990:348-349).

(38) Once permission for the operation was granted 26 June was chosen as D-Day. At this time the South African delegation had just departed from Cairo (Geldenhuys, 1995:247).

(39) At the time the balloons were sent up the SAAF Impalas executed mock manoeuvres so as to make the "air attack" appear more realistic.

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After half an hour of fighting the Cubans withdrew and the SADF also then disengaged. The Cubans retreated to Techipa and never resumed their advance (Geldenhuys, 1995:248, Bridgland, 1990:360-361).

With regard to the sensitivity of the white South African electorate to casualties, Embleton states: "One can see a distinctive pattern emerging, one in which the cost of military gain was limited most severely by the political and other costs of casualties. So long as the strategic gains could be made at a very low cost of life, the SADF could continue to fight for UNITA" (Embleton, 1994:9).

This is argued by Rob Davies, Thomas Ohlson and others as highlighted in Section 5.7.1 and in Endnotes 30 and 31 of this chapter.

Although the "new thinkers" gradually acquired greater control over the foreign policy machinery affecting African issues, on Gorbachev and Shevardnadze's scale of priorities, improved American-Soviet relations came first. This goal, to some extent, was reliant upon the removal of tensions provoked by ideological confrontation and military rivalry in the developing world. Regional conflicts in the third world or proxy wars acted as a microcosm for superpower rivalry. The Soviets sought to replace this strategy, based on military competition, with one which did not result in a loss of superpower status. According to Chester Crocker, "a strategy based on unilateral ideological goals and military means would need to be replaced by one stressing universal goals and political-diplomatic means." Accordingly, the role of a responsible permanent member of the Security Council represented a more modern and acceptable form of superpowerdom. Essentially, Moscow was preparing to exchange its role as a declining military dinosaur for one more in keeping with its actual resources and domestic situation (Crocker, 1993:409-411).

Dr. Harry Stephen was recently awarded his Doctorate at U.C.L.A. in the United States and is currently resident in Somerset West, Republic of South Africa. He may be contacted via the Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town. (Various Meetings, August - October 1994, Cape Town, Republic of South Africa).

For further discussion on this subject refer to Geldenhuys, 1995:210-211.

Barber and Barratt argue that no doubt due to lessening superpower rivalry and enhanced cooperation, the President of Congo and other African leaders were willing to play a supporting role in the American sponsored negotiations.
However, according to David Birmingham, the priorities of the US and South Africa were becoming increasingly incompatible. Birmingham believes that South Africa still desired to maintain instability in Angola because this would serve to distract the world's attention from the increasingly repressive tactics being exercised by the apartheid regime to control the black majority within its own borders. South Africa also remained steadfast in its desire to undermine the military bases operated by SWAPO and the ANC (Birmingham, 1992:105-107).
CHAPTER VI:

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

6.1 Concluding Remarks:

As stated in Section 1.1, the research strategy employed is inductive logic rather than hypothetical deductive due to the large amount of historical and factual detail which is involved. Therefore, the conclusions were not provided at the beginning along with the introduction and methodology but at the end of the pertinent chapters after having evaluated the chosen paradigms against the quite considerable historical detail. The data was analysed according to the "research-then-theory" strategy. Given the extensive historical detail and broad subject matter, this decision was in all likelihood the most appropriate choice to have made.

Nonetheless, the preparation of this dissertation, revolving around a quite broad and long ranging subject as it does, was not easily executed. Indeed, the author envies those Masters students with the good judgement to select a more readily definable and specific subject matter. Furthermore, writing on the topic chosen was fraught with danger. This is due to the inherent "politicalisation" of apartheid-era South African policies toward the region and the myriad responses they have generated in South Africa itself, the region and among interested foreign observers. Therefore, the author of this work had to walk a fine line, certainly giving credit where credit was due, but also seeking as far as possible, given constraints of time and space, to provide due consideration to competing perspectives.
No theory of international relations is omnipotent or in all ways perfect. Each and every theory has both strengths and weaknesses and none are beyond reproach. In the case of the study at hand, this was demonstrated in the finding that the two paradigms (or bodies of literature) chosen were of equal but distinct utility. In Chapter Three, system level neo-realist theory was most useful; in Chapter Four, unit level theories focusing on South Africa’s domestic variable offered the best explanation, and finally; in Chapter Five, both paradigms were deemed to be of equal usefulness in explaining the end of South African involvement and the departure of all the major external actors from Angola. As stated, each has both strengths and weaknesses.

6.2 Recommendations for Future Research:

6.2.1 Neo-realist Structural Theory Research Agenda:

(A) Greater research into the combination of and inter-relationship between different levels-of-analysis especially as applied by theorists concerned with sub-national, domestic phenomena.

(B) Greater examination of the critical weaknesses of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics which were modestly investigated in Section 2.4.4 of Chapter Two.

(C) Exploration of the fuller implications of the tactical dimension of Barry Buzan’s strategic sector vis-a-vis South African military intervention in Angola.

(D) In addition, a more thorough and comprehensive critical review of the history of international relations theory focusing on more recent “post modernist” theoretical developments.
6.2.2 South African-Angolan Military Research Agenda:

(A) Above all, a thorough and systematic investigation of the 'real' events surrounding the "phenomenon" of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987-1988.

(B) An attempt to achieve the full story regarding promises made, implicit or otherwise, to South Africa by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This would include the extent of CIA activity in Angola prior to the passage of the Clark Amendment and, by implication, the role played by external powers in the FNLA's ill-fated march on Luanda immediately prior to Angolan independence.

(C) In the interest of the new South African nation, post 1994 election, an economic analysis of the total cost to the state of South Africa's lengthy Angolan entanglement in "real" terms and in today's monetary value.

(D) From the point of view of the United Nations, International Red Cross, and perhaps other humanitarian organisations, detailed tactical knowledge of the location of landmines should be sought from the former external actors in Angola. This, to some extent, is being accomplished with the United Nations' controversial decision to grant the lucrative contract, for clearing mines in Mozambique and Angola, to a South African firm.
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APPENDIX 1

The Alvor Agreement
From Ministry of Mass Communication 1975

Angola - The Independence Agreement

The Portuguese State and the Angolan National Liberation Movements - The National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.) - having met at Alvor, in the Algarve, from 10 to 15 January 1975, to negotiate the procedure and the calendar of the access of Angola to independence, having agreed to the following:

Chapter I
On the Independence of Angola

Article 1. The Portuguese State recognizes the Liberation Movements - National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A) as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Angola.

Article 2. The Portuguese State solemnly restates its recognition of the right of the people of Angola to independence.

Article 3. Angola forms one indivisible unit, within its present geographical and political boundaries, and in this context Cabinda is an unalienable component of the Angolan territory.

Article 4. The independence and full sovereignty of Angola shall be solemnly proclaimed on 11 November 1975 in Angola by the President of the Portuguese Republic or by a specially appointed representative of the President.

Article 5. Until independence is proclaimed, the power shall be wielded by the High Commissioner and by a Transitional Government, which shall take office on 31 January 1975.

Article 6. The Portuguese State and the three Liberation Movements formally affirm, under this agreement, a general cease fire, already being observed de facto by their armed forces throughout Angolan territory.

After this date, any use of force other than as decided by the rightful authorities to prevent internal acts of violence or acts of aggression from outside the country shall be considered to be illicit.

Article 7. After the cease fire the armed forces of the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. shall take up positions in the regions and places where they are at present stationed until such time as the provisions laid down in chapter IV of this agreement shall be put into practice.
Article 8  The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer progressively, no later than the term of the transitional period, all the powers it enjoys and wields in Angola to the Angolan organs of sovereignty.

Article 9  With the conclusion of the Agreement, an amnesty is held to be granted to cover all the effects of the patriotic acts performed in the course of the national liberation struggle in Angola which would have been considered to be liable to punishment under legislation in force at the time of their performance.

Article 10  The independent State of Angola shall exert its sovereignty fully and freely, both internally and on the international plane.

Chapter II

On the High Commissioner

Article 11. During the transitional period the President of the Republic and the Portuguese Government shall be represented in Angola by the High Commissioner, who shall defend the interests of the Portuguese Republic.

Article 12. The High Commissioner in Angola shall be appointed and released from office by the President of the Portuguese Republic by whom he shall be sworn in and to whom he is politically responsible.

Article 13. It is for the High Commissioner to:

(a) Represent the President of the Republic, ensuring and guaranteeing, in full agreement with the Transitional Government, the observance of the law;

(b) Safeguard and guarantee the physical security of Angolan territory, in close co-operation with the Transitional Government;

(c) Ensure the fulfillment of this Agreement and of such others as may come to be made between the Liberation Movements and the Portuguese State;

(d) Guarantee and promote the process of decolonization of Angola;

(e) Ratify all acts which concern, or refer to, the Portuguese State;

(f) Attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers, when he thinks fit, where he may participate in their discussions but without the right to vote;

(g) Sign, approve and have published the decree-laws and the decrees drafted by the Transitional Government;

(h) Ensure, together with the Presidential Committee, the direction of the National Defence Committee, and to direct the foreign policy of Angola during the transitional period, aided in this by the Presidential Committee.
Chapter III

On the Transitional Government

Article 14. The Transitional Government is chaired and directed by the Presidential Committee.

Article 15. The Presidential Committee comprises three members, one from each liberation movement, and its main task is to direct and co-ordinate the Transitional Government.

Article 16. Whenever it thinks fit, the Presidential Committee may consult the High Commissioner on matters concerning the work of the Government.

Article 17. The decisions of the Transitional Government shall be taken by a majority of two-thirds; the members of the Presidential Committee shall chair it in turn.


Article 19. The following Offices of Secretaries of State are hereby instituted:

(a) Two in the Ministry of the Interior,
(b) Two in the Ministry of Information,
(c) Two in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security,
(d) Three in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to be known respectively as the Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism, the Secretary of State for Industry and Power and the Secretary of State for Fisheries.

Article 20. The Ministers of the Transitional Government shall be appointed in the same proportion by the National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.), and by the President of the Republic and shall be sworn in by the High Commissioner.

Article 21. Bearing in mind the transitional nature of the Government, the distribution of the Ministries shall be as follows:

(a) The President of the Portuguese Republic shall appoint the Ministers of Economic Affairs, of Public Works, Housing and Town-Planning and of Transports and Communications;

(b) The F.N.L.A. shall appoint the Ministers of his Interior, of Health and Social Affairs and of Agriculture;

(c) The M.P.L.A. shall appoint the Ministers of Information, of Planning and Finance and of Justice;
(d) The U.N.I.T.A. shall appoint the Ministers of Labour and Social Security, of Education and Culture and of Natural Resources.

Article 22. The Offices of the Secretaries of State provided for in this Agreement shall be distributed as follows:

(a) The F.N.L.A. shall appoint one Secretary of State for information, one Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism;

(b) The M.P.L.A. shall appoint a Secretary of State for the Interior, a Secretary of State for Labour and Social Security and a Secretary of Industry and Power,

(c) The U.N.I.T.A. shall appoint one Secretary of State for the Interior, one Secretary of State for information and the Secretary of State for Fisheries.

Article 23. The Transitional Government can create new posts for Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State as long as it respects the rule of political heterogeneity in their distribution.

Article 24. Duties of the Transitional Government:

(a) Oversee and cooperate in the leading of the decolonizing process until total independence.

(b) Supervise the whole public administration; ensure its normal functioning and promote the accession of Angolan citizens to responsible positions.

(c) Conduct internal politics;

(d) Prepare and guarantee the holding of general elections for the Constituent Assembly of Angola;

(e) Perform through decree-laws the legislative function and draft decrees, regulatory decrees and instructions for the proper implementation of the laws;

(f) Guarantee, in co-operation with the High Commissioner, the safety of persons and property;

(g) Carry out the judicial reorganization of Angola:

(h) Define economic, financial and monetary policy and create the structures needed to ensure the rapid development of the economy of Angola;

(i) Guarantee and safeguard individual or collective rights and freedoms.

Article 25. The Presidential Committee and the Ministers are jointly responsible for the acts of the Government.

Article 26. The Transitional Government may not be dismissed on the initiative of the High Commissioner; any change in its composition shall be effected by agreement between the High Commissioner and the liberation movements.
Article 27. The High Commissioner and the Presidential Committee shall seek to solve all the difficulties arising from the work of the Government in a spirit of friendship and through reciprocal consultations.

Chapter IV

On the National Defence Committee

Article 28. A National Defence Committee is hereby set up, composed as follows:

1. The Higher Commissioner,
2. The Presidential Committee,
3. A Unified General Staff.

Article 29. The High Commissioner shall inform the National Defence Committee of all matters concerning national defence, both internally and abroad, so as to:

(a) Define and carry out the military policy arising from this Agreement;
(b) Ensure and safeguard the present frontiers of Angola;
(c) Guarantee peace and security and public law and order;
(d) Promote the safety of persons and property.

Article 30. The decisions of the National Defence Committee shall be taken by a simple majority; the High Commissioner, who will chair the Committee, shall have a vote.

Article 31. A unified General Staff is hereby set up, which shall comprise the commanders of the three branches of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola and three commanding officers of the Liberation movements.

The unified General Staff shall be placed under the direct authority of the High Commissioner.

Article 32. Armed forces belonging to the three liberation movements shall be integrated to the same total number with the Portuguese forces in the mixed military forces, on the following numerical basis:

- 8000 men belonging to the F.N.L.A.
- 8000 men belonging to the M.P.L.A.
- 8000 men belonging to the U.N.I.T.A.
- 24,000 men belonging to the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Article 33. The national Defence Committee shall effect the progressive integration of the armed forces in the mixed military forces specified in the previous article; in principle the following calendar should be respected:

Between February and May, inclusive, and per month a total of 500 men from each of the liberation movements will be integrated and 1500 men of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Between June and September, inclusive, and per month, a total of 1500 men from each of the liberation movements will be integrated and 4500 men of the Portuguese Armed Forces.
Article 34. Such Portuguese Armed Forces contingents as exceed the quotas laid down in art. 32 shall be evacuated from Angola by 30 April 1975.

Article 35. The evacuation of the contingent of the Portuguese Armed Forces integrated in the mixed military forces shall begin after 1 October 1975 and shall be completed by 29 February 1976.

Article 36. The National Defence Committee shall organize mixed police forces to maintain public law and order.

Article 37. The unified police command shall have three members, one from each of the liberation movements, and leadership shall be put in commission, the chair being taken by each member in turn. The force shall be placed under the authority and supervision of the National Defence Committee.

Chapter V

On Refugees and Displaced Persons

Article 38. Immediately after the swearing-in of the Transitional Government, mixed equal-representation committees shall be set up, on nominations by the High Commissioner and by the Transitional Government, to plan and prepare the structures, means and procedure necessary to deal with the Angolan refugees.

The work of these committees will be supervised by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.

Article 39. Those persons housed in the Peace Villages may return to their own villages and homes.

The mixed equal-representation committees shall propose to the High Commissioner and to the Transitional Government social, economic and other measures to assure a speedy return to normal ways of life of displaced persons and the reintegration of the various forms of activity in the economic life of the country.

Chapter VI

On General Elections for the Constituent Assembly of Angola

Article 40. The transitional Government shall organize general elections for a Constituent Assembly within not more than 9 months from the date of its installation, that is 31 January 175.


Article 42. Once the Transitional Government is installed, a Central Committee shall be instituted, with equal representation of the liberation movements, to draft the Basic Law and to prepare the elections to the Constituent Assembly.
Article 43. When the Basic Law has been approved by the Presidential Committee, the Central Committee shall:

(a) Draft the Electoral Law;
(b) Organize lists of voters;
(c) Register the lists of candidates for election to the Constituent Assembly put forward by the liberation movements.

Article 44. The Basic Law shall remain in force until the Constitution of Angola comes into force, but it may not run counter to the term of this Agreement.

Chapter VII

On Angolan Nationality

Article 45. The Portuguese State and the three liberation movements - F.N.L.A., M.P.L.A. and U.N.I.T.A. undertake to co-operate to eliminate all the consequences of colonialism. On this topic, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. stress their policy of non-discrimination, according to which the quality of Angolan citizenship is definable by birth in Angola or by domicile therein, always provided that those domiciled in Angola identify themselves with the aspirations of the Angolan Nation through a conscious choice.

Article 46. The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. hereby undertake to consider as Angolan citizens all individuals born in Angola, provided that they do not declare, on the terms and within the time-limits to be laid down, that they wish to maintain their present nationality or to choose another one.

Article 47. Individuals not born in Angola but settled there may seek Angolan nationality in accordance with such rules governing Angolan nationality as come to be laid down in the Basic Law.

Article 48. A mixed committee with equal representation will study special agreements to regulate the forms of concession of Angolan citizenship to Portuguese citizens domiciled in Angola, and the status of Portuguese citizens resident in Angola and of Angolan citizens resident in Portugal.

Chapter VIII

On Economic and Financial Topics

Article 49. The Portuguese State undertakes to regularize with the State of Angola the situation arising from the existence of property belonging to the latter outside Angolan territory, so as to facilitate the transfer of such property or the equivalent value, to the territory and ownership of Angola.

Article 50. The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. declare themselves ready to accept the responsibility arising from the financial undertakings assumed by the Portuguese State on behalf of, and relating to, Angola, always provided that they have been assumed in the real interest of the people of Angola.
Article 51. A special mixed equal-representation committee, composed of experts appointed by the Provisional Government of the Portuguese Republic and by the Transitional Government of the State of Angola, shall list the property mentioned in art. 49 and the credits referred to in art. 50, shall effect such acts of valuation as it thinks fit and shall put before the two Governments such solutions as it holds to be just.

Article 52. The Portuguese State undertakes to provide the Committee specified in the previous article with all the information and data at its disposition and which the Committee may need in order to reach well-thought-out conclusions and to propose equitable solutions within the principles of truth, respect of the legitimate rights of each party and the cost loyal co-operation.

Article 53. The Portuguese State will aid the State of Angola in setting up a Central Issue Bank. The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer to the State of Angola the powers, the assets and the debits of the Angolan Department of the Bank of Angola, on conditions to be agreed in the mixed committee for financial topics. This committee will also consider all questions related to the Portugal Department of the same bank, proposing just solutions to the extent that they concern and affect Angola.


Chapter IX

On Co-Operation Between Angola and Portugal

Article 55. The Portuguese Government on the one hand, and the liberation movements on the other, agree to set up between Portugal and Angola links of constructive, lasting co-operation in all fields, specifically in the cultural, technical, scientific, economic, commercial, monetary, financial and military spheres, on the basis of independence, equality, freedom, mutual respect and reciprocity of interests.

Chapter X

On Mixed Committees

Article 56. Technical mixed equal-representation committees will be set up by the High Commissioner, in agreement with the Presidential Committee, to research and propose solutions for problems arising from decolonization and to lay down the foundations of active co-operation between Portugal and Angola, especially in the following spheres:

(a) Cultural, technical and scientific;
(b) Economic and commercial;
(c) Monetary and financial;
(d) Military;
(e) The acquisition of Angolan nationality by Portuguese citizens.

Article 57. The committee mentioned in the previous article shall carry out their work and negotiations in a climate of constructive co-operation and loyal spirit of compromise. Their conclusions shall be put as quickly as possible before the High Commissioner and the Presidential Committee for their consideration and for the drafting of agreements between Portugal and Angola.
Article 58. Any questions arising as to the interpretation and application of this Agreement which cannot be solved on the items of art. 27 above shall be settled by negotiations between the Portuguese Government and the liberation movements.

Article 59. The Portuguese State, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A., true to the social and political ideals repeatedly stated by their leaders, reaffirm their respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also actively repudiate all forms of social discrimination, especially apartheid.

Article 60. The present agreement shall come into force immediately after it has been approved by the President of the Portuguese Republic.

The delegations of the Portuguese Government, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A., and the U.N.I.T.A. stress the climate of perfect co-operation and cordiality in which the negotiations took place and feel great satisfaction at reaching this Agreement, which will meet the just aspirations of the Angolan people and of which the Portuguese people are rightly proud; henceforth they will be linked by ties of profound friendship and common desire for constructive co-operation for the progress of Angola, of Portugal, of Africa and of the world as a whole.

Signed at Alvor, on 15 January 1975, in four copies in Portuguese.
APPENDIX 2

The Geneva Protocol, 5 August 1988

Delegations representing the Governments of the people’s Republic of Angola / Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, 2 - 5 August 1988, with the mediation of Dr. Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, United States of America, have agreed as follows:

1. Each side agrees to recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that 1 November 1988 be established as the date for implementation of UNSCR 435/78.

2. Each side agrees to the establishment of a target date for signature of the tripartite agreement among Angola, South Africa, and Cuba not later than 10 September 1988.

3. Each side agrees that a schedule acceptable to all parties for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola must be established by Angola and Cuba, who will request on-site verification by the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties accept 1 September 1988 as the target date for reaching agreement on that schedule and all related matters.

4. The complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola shall begin not later than 10 August 1988 and be completed not later than 1 September 1988.

5. The parties undertake to adopt the necessary measures of restraint in order to maintain the existing de facto cessation of hostilities. South Africa stated its willingness to convey this commitment in writing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Angola and Cuba shall urge SWAPO to proceed likewise as a step prior to the ceasefire contemplated in resolution 435/78 which will be established prior to 1 November 1988. Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, once the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola is completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO's forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th parallel. The Parties deemed it appropriate that, during the period before 1 November 1988, a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General be present in Luanda to take cognizance of any disputes relative to the cessation of hostilities and agreed that the combined military committee contemplated in paragraph 9 can be an appropriate venue for reviewing complaints of this nature that may arise.

6. As of 10 August 1988, no Cuban troops will deploy or be south of the line Chitado - Ruacana - Caluque - Naullia - Cuamato - N'Giva. Cuba furthermore stated that upon completion of the withdrawal of the South African troops from Angola not later than 1 September 1988 and the restoration by the People’s Republic of Angola of its sovereignty over its international boundaries, the Cuban troops will not take part in offensive operations in the territory that lies east of meridian 17 and south of parallel 15 degrees, 30 minutes, provided that they are not subject to harassment.
7. Following the complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, the Government of Angola shall guarantee measures for the provision of water and power supply to Namibia.

8. With a view toward minimizing the risk of battlefield incidents and facilitating exchange of technical information related to implementation of the agreements reached, direct communications shall be established not later than 20 August 1988 between the respective military commanders at appropriate headquarters along the Angola/Namibia border.

9. Each side recognizes that the period from 1 September 1988, by which time South African forces will have completed their withdrawal from Angola, and the date established for implementation of UNSCR 435, is a period of particular sensitivity, for which specific guidelines for military activities are presently lacking. In the interest of maintaining the ceasefire and maximizing the conditions for the orderly introduction of UNTAG, the sides agree to establish a combined military committee to develop additional practical measures to build confidence and reduce the risk of unintended incidents. They invite United States membership on the committee.

10. Each side will act in accordance with the Governors Island principles, including paragraph E (non-interference in the internal affairs of states) and paragraph G (the acceptance of the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states).

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Geneva, 5 August 1988

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, hereinafter designated as the Parties,

Considering,
That the implementation of Resolution 435 of the Security Council of the United Nations for the independence of Namibia shall commence on the 1st of April,
That the question of the independence of Namibia and the safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola are closely interrelated with each other and with peace and security in the region of southwestern Africa,
That on the date of signature of this agreement a tripartite agreement among the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa shall be signed, containing the essential elements for the achievement of peace in the region of southwestern Africa,
That acceptance of and strict compliance with the foregoing will bring to an end the reasons which compelled the Government of the People's Republic of Angola to request, in the legitimate exercise of its rights under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the deployment to Angolan territory of a Cuban internationalist military contingent to guarantee, in cooperation with the FAPLA (the Angolan Government army), its territorial integrity and sovereignty in view of the invasion and occupation of part of its territory,

Noting,
The agreements signed by the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on 4 February 1982 and 19 March 1984, the platform of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola approved in November 1984, and the Protocol of Brazzaville signed by the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa on December 13, 1988,

Taking into account,

That conditions now exist which make possible the repatriation of the Cuban military contingent currently in Angolan territory and the successful accomplishment of their internationalist mission,

The parties agree as follows:

**Article 1**

To commence the redeployment by stages to the 15th and 13th parallels and the total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50,000 men who constitute the Cuban troops contingent stationed in the People's Republic of Angola, in accordance with the pace and timeframe established in the attached calendar, which is an integral part of this agreement. The total withdrawal shall be completed by the 1st of July, 1991.

**Article 2**

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba reserve the right to modify or alter their obligations deriving from Article 1 of this Agreement in the event that flagrant violations of the Tripartite Agreement are verified.

**Article 3**

The Parties, through the Secretary General of the United Nations Organisation, hereby request that the Security Council verify the redeployment and phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and to this end shall agree on a matching protocol.
Article 4

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the tripartite agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa.

Signed on 22 December 1988, at the Headquarters of the United Nations Organisation, in two copies, in the Portuguese and Spanish languages, each being equally authentic.

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

AFONSO VAN DUNEM

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

ISIDORO MALMIERCA

OCTAVIO MALMIERCA

Annex on Troop Withdrawal Schedule

Calendar

In compliance with Article 1 of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola for the termination of the mission of the Cuban internationalist military contingent stationed in Angolan territory, the parties establish the following calendar for the withdrawal:

Time Frames

Prior to the first of April, 1989 (date of the beginning of implementation of Resolution 435) 3,000 men

Total duration of the calendar Starting from the 1st of April, 1989 27 months

Redeployment to the north:

- to the 15th parallel by 1 August 1989
- to the 13th parallel by 31 October 1989

Total men to be withdrawn:

- by 1 November 1989 25,000 men (50%)
- by 1 April 1990 38,000 (76%); 12,000 men remaining
- by July 1991 50,000 (100%)

Taking as its base a Cuban force of 50,000 men.

The governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter designated as "the Parties",
Taking into account the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa," approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these Principles, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement,
Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 1978, hereinafter designated as "UNSCR 435/78",
Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola,
Recognising the role of the United Nations Security Council in implementing UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implementation of the present agreement,
Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of all states of southwestern Africa,
Affirming the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states,
Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states,
Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of states of southwestern Africa to peace, development, and social progress,
Urging African and international cooperation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa,
Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America,
Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in southwestern Africa,
Agree to the provisions set forth below.
1. The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989.

2. All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78.

3. Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South Africa and People's Republic for Angola shall cooperate with the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organisation, or person in connection with acts of war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78.

4. The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that withdrawal.

5. Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organisation, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression, or violence, against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of southwestern Africa.

6. The Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa.

7. The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in this agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of cooperation any disputes with respect to the interpretation or implementation thereof.
8. This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish and English languages, each language being equally authentic, this 22nd day of December 1988.

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
AFONSO VAN DUNEM

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA
ISIDORO OCTAVIO MALMIERCA

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
ROELOF F BOTHA
Map 6.2 Military situation, mid-November 1975 (Economist, November 22, 1975)
South-Eastern Angola: The Two FAPLA Offensives

Appendix 7 Map. FAPLA Offensive, Lomba
The Fapla Offensive to the Lomba

Map 6.1  South African operational sector
Moduler: The South African Counter-Offensive
Hooper: The Fighting East of Cuito Cuanavale

SCALE 0 km 2 4 6 8

1st Echelon

2nd Echelon

3rd Echelon

Cuito Cuanavale

13 Brigade

16 Brigade

21 Brigade

59 Brigade

25 Brigade

R Battery (120 mm)

Q Battery (155 mm)

B Company 61 Mech.

C Company 61 Mech.

HQ

66 Brigade

TG 1 6in
Operation Packer: 22 March
Appendix 13 Map, Operation Displace, 1988