

# **An analysis of the political rhetoric of South African President Jacob Zuma's speeches on climate change**

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## **Abstract**

Climate change has a global impact on all sectors of life including politics and the economy; health and food security, social justice and media. There are stark contrasts in the political and scientific debates on climate change. The economic impacts have already gripped the attention of both the political elite and science community, who also recognise the threats on the survival of the human population. Recent global climate change meetings such as the COPs are an indication that politics, and not necessarily science, is at the centre of this environmental challenge. In politics, policy debates are arguments over actions. It is therefore important to understand how the SA government communicates climate change given its status as a leading force in Africa and its insurmountable socio-economic challenges. With a theoretical understanding of Moral Foundation Theory, Steve Vanderheiden's political theory that addresses climate change justice and framing theory and textual analysis, the researcher analyses President Jacob Zuma's climate change speeches during COP to identify master narratives, given the president's visibility and political direction at these high level meetings. This dissertation contributes to the lack of scholarship on how the president communicates climate change within the communication field and general shortage of presidential rhetoric in Africa. Zuma's rhetoric on climate change indicates that SA's priority is economic development and this will not be compromised by climate change policy that halts growth in developing nations. Zuma is clear that common but differentiated responsibilities must remain the cornerstone of climate change policy, if fairness, balance and equity are to be realised. He stands by this argument despite growing GHG emissions from some of the developing nations, including South Africa.

**Key words:** climate change, presidential rhetoric, Jacob Zuma, South Africa

## **Abbreviations and acronyms**

**ANC** – African National Congress

**BASIC** – Brazil, South Africa, India and China

**BRICS** – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

**COP** – Conference of the Parties

**CBDR** – Common but Differentiated Responsibilities

**DIRCO** – The Department of International Relations and Co-operation

**GHG** – Greenhouse gas emissions

**IPCC** – International Panel on Climate Change

**LDC** – Least Developed Countries

**OPEC** – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

**TAC** – Treatment Action Campaign

**SA** – South Africa

**UNFCCC** – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

**UN** – United Nations

**US** – United States

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## Chapter one: Introduction

The scientific evidence is compelling – for almost a century CO<sub>2</sub> and other GHGs have accumulated in the earth's atmosphere. The evidence indicates that human-induced behaviour is the reason for the accumulation. The planet has experienced extreme weather conditions from droughts to melting arctic ice, wildfires to severe flooding. With an estimated 150 000 climate change related deaths annually, according to the World Health Organization, this environmental challenge poses a serious problem now and for future generations.

But the global scientific community believes that technologies are available to address climate change. How can we come together to address this challenge that has become a political issue in SA as one of the key players at least in representing the global South rhetoric? Climate change is a complex issue and is no longer a “technical problem requiring technical solutions”.

Climate change has a global impact on all sectors of life including politics and the economy; health and food security, social justice and media (Cortés, 2014; Saleh, 2012; Dankelman, 2010). There are stark contrasts in the political and scientific debates on climate change. Recent global climate change meetings such as the COPs are an indication that politics, and not necessarily science, is at the centre of this environmental challenge. In politics, policy debates are arguments over actions (Dessler & Parson, 2006).

The ramifications of climate change are immense and affect peoples' security around the world. The economic impacts have already gripped the attention of both the political elite and science community, who also recognise the threats on the survival of the human population (Stern, 2007).

Several expected consequences of climate change include, water scarcity, sea levels rising, food security challenges and an increase in natural disasters. It is expected that violent conflicts over sacred resources will occur and that climate-related migration will continue (Dimitrov, 2010).

The complexity of presidential rhetoric of climate change can be found in institutional contexts and power positions. Presidents across the globe face the challenge of balancing their climate change rhetoric with their respective countries' policies. Building on studies on US rhetorical presidency, the researcher strives to offer an understanding of how the SA presidency navigates the climate change spectrum while considering its moral and practical positions (Widmaier & Grube, 2014).

SA, although developed compared to most African countries, are faced with the similar vulnerabilities, amplified by climate change. However, the country is also known for being the largest contributor of GHGs emissions, mainly because of it the source of its powers continues to be coal-based (Chagutah, 2009). The SA government has conceded that the climate change is a global problem that requires committed action from all nations. Through proposed policy, government aims to reduce its GHG emissions while simultaneously addressing pressing needs such as poverty, unemployment and rural development (The Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2011).

With its decisive climate change policy action evolving on the home front, the SA government also enjoyed prominence in the international arena by hosting the COP17 in Durban in 2011. The State's roles in different coalitions of developing nations, such as Brazil BRICS and the G77 + China, means it negotiates on different platforms.



It's only in the past 20 years that the political and economic dimensions of climate change have been accentuated because for a long time, climate change was communicated as a scientific problem (Taderera, 2010 & Moser, 2007). There is a body of literature which allows for one to understand the public's attitude towards climate change and trends in public opinion. Important to note, Hart (2011) demonstrated that a thematic framing of climate change issues made people support policies to address it as opposed to those exposed to episodic frames.

This growing knowledge also present challenges and opportunities for approaching communication on climate change (Moser, 2007). It thus becomes vital to understand how government communicates climate change, given South Africa's status as a leading force in Africa. And as well as its insurmountable challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment described by President Jacob Zuma has the triple threat (Zuma, 2012).

The analysis of how the presidency and high-level political figures communicate climate change contributes to the broader understanding of climate change rhetoric (Vint, 2012).

## **1.1 Background**

### **The Presidency and communication**

Rhetoric and persuasion go hand in hand because a leader's ability to persuade an audience lies in his or her ability to employ appropriate rhetorical tactics. If the speaker can persuade then he has used rhetoric successfully. Persuasion is described as an interactive communicative process. If a president is to influence the constituents or other stakeholders' beliefs, attitudes and behaviour, then his or her messages must comply with the wants and their needs. In democracies it is then incumbent that for a leader to attract people through his or her policies and the role of rhetoric should not be understated (Alo, 2010).

Before delving into the scholarship on presidential rhetoric from the US, it is worth noting that there is a growing interest in moving towards a clear-cut definition and consolidation of African rhetoric. In Nigeria the interest in rhetoric studies is evident and in other parts of Africa research is published on rhetoric related themes. There is an absence of studies to identify which rhetorical strategies were employed by African leaders that have brought about political change on the continent. In fact, it is urged that we think about how African rhetoric is conceived (Alo, 2010).

For decades scholars of the presidency, many of whom find their academics homes in the departments of political science or government focused their research on two out of the three general areas of power available to presidents. The first of the two powers referred to the constitutional and statutory power courtesy of a Constitution. The second power was conferred by law and the political power as head of party (Windt, 1986).

The third power with public opinion occasionally received attention until Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* was published. Here, he addressed the "person as one among many in a set of institutions" rather than the office. His contributions moved away from the number of books written on all aspects of the presidency. There was a quick and wide response to Neustadt's work because it went beyond descriptions of the presidential office and institutional studies. Scholars started to integrate the "president-as-persuader", moving away from the formal legal powers or the political powers of the office as the main focus (Windt, 1986).

It is argued that even scholars of International Relations and comparative politics saw rhetoric as a secondary consideration until it was returned to the centre of political analysis mainly through persuasion. The role of rhetoric in processes and outcomes is therefore of great significance (Krebs & Jackson, 2007).

Medhurst (1996) stated both scholars of the presidency and rhetoric have intellectual traditions that date back to Aristotle. Scholars of rhetoric, often residing in their academic homes in departments of speech or communication, speak to Aristotle's rhetoric while the scholars of the presidency speak and endear themselves to his politics. For rhetoricians, Neustadt's work meant that presidential rhetoric could now find shelter within the discipline of presidential studies (Windt, 1986).

With the advent of technological advances in media, presidents could speak to the people instantaneously and directly. Presidential speeches have been increasingly accessible as people read the presidents' words or read about them.

Presidents could be heard on radio or seen on television and nowadays presidents make the daily news on television stations, all which make it seem as if people have constant access to presidents (Ceaser et al., 1981 & Stuckey, 2010). People are no longer just an audience for presidential rhetoric and the “presidential words are no longer something apart from us” (Stuckey, 2010).

The relationship between media and the presidency is an interesting and sometimes mutual one. The presidency uses the media to speak to the public while the media use the presidency to interpret events or issues. Essentially, the media and the presidency feed off each other. This mutual exchange is of significance, because it changes how the presidents operate, in that the focus is now on how they attempt to govern, previously it was on the amount of power they had (Ceaser et al., 1981).

Social media, another technological advancement, adds to peoples’ access of a president’s speech. According to Rhodes University’s Jude Mathurine, co-ordinator of new media at the School of Journalism and Media Studies, there is no data yet that indicated definite influence on voter patterns in SA compared to Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaigning which has been the subject of several studies. However, Mathurine noted that South Africans did use social media platforms to promote their political beliefs, or canvass for their political affiliations. The parties also use social media to communicate messages from their political leaders (Nevill, 2014).

These days, presidents across the globe face the challenging task of having to deliver speeches that are powerful enough to provide direction on events as he or she relies on rhetoric to govern (Ceaser et al., 1981 & Stuckey, 2010).

However, Cohen (1995) argued that the public generally is inattentive to politics. Therefore, when the president wants to attract attention to an issue, he has to signal that a policy problem is important by speaking about it in fundamental terms.

Cohen (1995) demonstrated that when a president referred to a policy, people were more likely to be either aware or concerned. Thus, it would be in the best interest of the president to explain his reasons for adopting a position and provide information which supports the importance of the policy area.

However, in some cases, the presidency does not have to have to make solid arguments about a policy problem but can merely mention it and the public will take notice of such issues. In the case of the South African government's reluctant position on providing anti-retroviral drugs for persons infected with HIV, a civil society group, TAC, used all the tools at its disposal such as protest, petition and litigation to successfully challenge government's controversial HIV and AIDs policy (Ranchod, 2007).

### **Climate change and communication**

The South African government while providing political leadership on climate change also holds the responsibility to protect people susceptible to climate change effects (Madzwamuse, 2011). But Hulme (2009) argued that climate change threatens both national and global security. With that threat, comes the rhetoric associated similar to that of international terrorism. This means that there is a new form of geo-diplomacy required at the highest levels of government.

The geo-politics of climate change is a difficult path to navigate. It is estimated that 30 percent of the world's poor live in countries where the economy is dominated by a resource of wealth.

Countries that have been in conflict over resources have their challenges exacerbated whilst trying to reduce emissions. States or groups of states could use climate change to their favour and that arm conflicts could occur as governments attempt to access limited resources as demands increase (Giddens, 2009).

Giddens (2009) also referred to IPCC reports which indicated that resourced-base wars could still occur in this century. While changes are expected in mass migration in cities in poorer countries, the wealthier ones are not exempt from the effects. For example, the US has already experienced extreme weather patterns.

For a long time, climate change was communicated as a scientific problem, and it's only in the last two decades that it has been placed on the global political and economic agenda and this has been no different in SA (Taderera, 2010).

Communication on climate change and related policies are vital because understanding of the subject means that people will be able to prepare for the future by taking necessary precautions, especially if they live in areas that are vulnerable to climate change. They can also make behavioural changes that can contribute to the mitigating climate change. One study found that South Africans do not see climate change as having any special relevance to the country or continent (Neville, 2010). Another study stated that "the levels of awareness in SA of climate change as a global phenomenon are concerning". An empowered citizen could also hold his or her government accountable to ensure the issue is being dealt with (Taderera, 2010).

However, a critique of the National Climate Change Response White Paper (from here on referred to as the White Paper) emphasised the elite nature of some aspects. For example, the response envisages a communication plan that adopts a strict top-down approach which is both “elitist and vertical” (Srampickal, 2006), stating that “government departments will start communicating with citizens about climate change to inform and educate them and to influence their behavioural choices”.

The argument here is that the White Paper does little to inspire active participation which is significant to affecting behavioural changes needed to help limit carbon emissions. The White Paper also fails to acknowledge communication in the 11 official South African languages. This is important as research indicated that if real behaviour change is to happen, then community participation is a must, especially in marginalised communities (Smith, 2013).

Global climate change policy started to receive attention in the 1960s while only a little consideration was given to energy policy debates of the 1970s. By the early 1980s as it became increasingly clear that warming from greenhouse gases, was a serious concern. The scientific community then started to try to persuade governments to pay attention to the growing environment challenge (Dessler & Parson, 2006). In recent times, the SA government has been using rhetoric which indicated a move towards cleaner energy, civil society, however, still feels there is much focus on fossil fuels (Masters, 2009).

A report by two leading non-governmental organisations argued that the SA government has taken more positive steps on pushing for strong outcomes in the international area.

However, the report pointed out that the State has not done enough at home to hold large industries accountable (Earthlife Africa & Oxfam International, 2009).

Masters (2009) argued that country's industrial sector has indicated movement towards sustainable development policies; however this has not actually translated into reduction of GHG emissions. In fact, a 2013 report by the National Business Initiative said, "despite the encouraging disclosure improvement and voluntary commitments, company actions are not resulting in significant emissions reductions – and there remains great variation in performance between and within sectors" (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013).

Government's position on climate change has experienced opposition from the business sector. For example, the business and industry sectors have continued to express concern for government's negotiating position on climate change because the prospect of a future carbon tax could present additional challenges (Masters, 2009).

In 2009, at the South African National Climate Change Summit, the Energy Reality Group, were against the idea of the country taking steps to reduce emissions. The group made up of scientists, engineers and economists noted in a statement that "mitigation costs are high and the threats that climate change pose are too uncertain to justify diverting significant resources from development" (Masters, 2009).

Getting the balance right as far as meeting developing needs and dealing with climate change is confusing and SA is not alone in this confusion (Earthlife Africa & Oxfam International, 2009).



Therefore, the idea behind this dissertation is not to merely identify the strengths or the shortcomings in the President's speeches but more importantly to understand how he communicates the complexities of climate change and identify if any policy is reflected in his rhetoric.

For example, the Zuma administration has relentlessly pushed job creation as a priority (Zuma, 2009). In relation to climate change, green jobs are a concept that has been mentioned in Zuma's speeches. The jury, however, is still out on the number of green jobs created and exactly what constitutes a green job (Masters, 2011). Nhamo (2013) stated that for green growth to permeate the continent, Africa will need to enhance her political will and manifest shared visions and focus on economic development.

Nhamo (2013) supported the need to better understand the green economy and advocates for the role of education and media along with human capital, good governance and a good investment climate, operational information technology as "parameters not necessarily directly linked to green economy" but that are vital.

Neville (2010) stated that South Africans get their information on climate change through media and schools. There are numerous studies into the media representation of climate change that have highlighted common challenges. Due to the complexities of the subject, journalists struggle to properly cover climate change and also there is a lack of editorial interest (Finlay, 2010). Media coverage on government climate change and related policies are also lacking (Cramer, 2008).

There is a tendency for local media to use reports from international news agencies in times of environmental disasters and climate change related conferences. While, this makes financial sense and keeps the subject on the agenda, this practice excluded the African voice, especially at grass root levels (Finlay, 2012 & Tagbo 2012). Ultimately, the government has a responsibility to keep its citizens informed and at the same time ensure that climate change climbs up both national and international agendas (Madzwamuse, 2011).

This dissertation will argue the importance of addressing climate change, the president's rhetoric on the subject because of his visibility and how he discursively constructs this issue both in the South African and African context. It will ask and seek to answer questions on the post South Africa's democratic government's political climate change rhetoric. The analysis of Zuma's speeches can contribute to the environmental communication field.

Zuma's speeches and those of his two key ministers on climate change dating from October 2011 (the build up to) COP17 until December 2011 (when the conference ended) will be analysed. The researcher will also consider the president's speeches at COP15 and COP16. The speeches of Minister of COP17, also South Africa's Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane and Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, Edna Molewa, will be analysed to establish if there is any cohesion in thought and rhetoric between the ministers and president. The researcher will also briefly examine the speeches of former Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki.

During the high level meeting in 2011, Molewa led the South African delegation to the COP, to ensure that the country's interests were properly represented during the negotiations. On the other hand, Nkoana-Mashabane was made the COP 17 President. Her department, DIRCO, was required to perform logistical duties at the COP 17 and play a significant role in facilitating a positive outcome. Nkoana-Mashabane and her department had to see to it that the conference functioned within the requirements of the UNFCCC. The decision for the two appointments was deemed strategic. The South African government had recognised its role in managing the international diplomacy of climate change, however, were also cognisant of its duty to ensure that South Africa's interests were protected during the negotiations (Parramon-Gurney & Gilde 2012).

## **1.2 Thesis statement**

To study political rhetoric is to study political language and the dynamics between the speaker and the audience and how the language is used or abused. Students of presidential rhetoric must prioritise language, especially in the media politics era (Windt, 1986).

This study is thus pertinent to the rhetorical presidency when it comes to climate change as a political and politicised issue. Given the politicisation and complexities of climate change, this dissertation on rhetorical studies seeks to go beyond the analysis and criticism of presidential speeches and campaigns. Medhurst (1996) stated that in the early 1970s that presidential rhetoric emerged as a specialised subfield and became a new area of study within the rhetoric and presidential scholarship fields.

The impact of public language and arguments and how it relates to presidential power are subjects that interest scholars in this discipline (Windt, 1986). Meanwhile, observations have indicated a rise of the rhetorical presidency, in that the number of speeches has been increasing and purpose of presidential rhetoric changing (Tienken, 2013).

The president's primary task is to provide the people with solutions for public problems (Hargrove, 1998). Climate change, described as the most serious challenge that cropped up in the past few decades, is one such problem and is difficult to manage. Dessler & Parson (2006) argued that knowledge about climate change, like all scientific knowledge is subject to uncertainty; however, this should not prevent action from being taken immediately.

There are several reasons presidents deliver speeches, one of the most significant, being to communicate policy preferences to legislators. For presidents, speeches are a key tool to communicate their positions on current political situations and are also used to help them govern their people (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010). Based on this purpose mentioned above, it's therefore a reasonable argument that the shaping of climate change rhetoric within politics is driven largely by presidents and major political figures (Vint, 2012).

High-level politicians contribute to the understanding of climate change by making use of different rhetorical frames (Vint, 2012). Therefore, this dissertation analyses how Zuma employs different frames that address climate change with the political and economic spheres. It also seeks to understand how these frames contribute to understanding South Africa's position on climate change both as a country and a leader in Africa.

Over the past few years, SA's role in the international climate change negotiations has been one of importance. Pouris & Naidoo (2011) stated that SA has contributed scientific input as part of the IPCC and has also been a leading voice in forming a global binding deal to address the challenges, resulting from climate change. SA finds itself in more than one coalition. The development of coalitions has become a critical part in the structure of multilateral negotiations. The reason is that countries belonging to coalitions are in a position to wield more bargaining power than if they had to act as an entity (Auer & Racine, 2001).

African countries negotiate through the Group of 77 + China and through the Africa Group. There are also other powerful coalitions such as BASIC, LDC, Alliance of Small Island States, and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Manika, 2013). Thus, SA has both represented interests of other Africa countries as well as other developing states, depending in which group it negotiated in (Parramon-Gurney & Gilde 2012).

SA alongside their BRICS partners has become a force during negotiations. These countries' increasing global emissions are also a factor in negotiations. African countries' needs and vulnerabilities differ vastly from that of the developing BRICS and make it difficult for them to negotiate at COPs. Also the size of the delegations and the resources of the different nations impact the extent to which participation is possible. It is suggested that the developed world focuses on emerging developing countries that has relevance to them (Mumma, 2001).

However, the country's innovative and pro-active efforts to deal with climate change have been commended. With the introduction of its White Paper, SA has also positioned itself as a leading force for developing countries (Parramon-Gurney & Gilde 2012).

The White Paper sets out the country's proposed response to climate change with two key objectives. The first aim is to address climate change impacts by employing sustainable measures in relation to the country's social, economic and environmental resilience and emergency response capacity. The second aim is about stabilising SA's contribution to the global GHG emissions in the atmosphere, bearing in mind; its commitments to its development goals (The Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2011).

These aims will be addressed by strategies within a short, medium and long term time frame. The second aim, in accordance with the UNFCCC, articulates that the ultimate objective of the Convention is to "stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system". (UNFCCC, n.d).

The White Paper is said to contain elements that are "developmental; transformational, empowering and participatory; dynamic and evidence-based; balanced and cost effective; and integrated and aligned" (The Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2011). However, SA has been criticised by some African countries, particularly the LDC and the Small Island States in Africa, not paying heed to their best interests but rather aligning itself more to developed countries (Parramon-Gurney & Gilde 2012).

Further to the White Paper, the South African government in its first year in the new dispensation signed the UNFCCC and ratified it four years later (Neville, 2010). Government subsequently introduced or amended different pieces of legislation, around energy and the environment. Chagutah (2009) stated that according to University of Cape Town Associate Professor at the Energy Research Centre, Harald Winkler, climate change was a priority for the ANC and other political parties in 2009, which happen to be an election year. This, according to Winkler, was the first time that the global challenge was considered an election issue (Chagutah, 2009).

Zuma came in to power in 2009, a year that was touted as a crucial one for climate change, as the decisive Copenhagen talks or COP15 loomed. Following his inauguration, Zuma, spilt departments each, with their own ministers. Related more to the environment and energy, the Zuma has created two new departments by separating the Department of Minerals and Energy into the Departments of Mining and the Department of Energy. So was the case of the Department of Water affairs and Forestry (Chagutah, 2009). At the time the decision of the spilt was attributed to the president wanting to address “developmental challenges that need to receive immediate attention” and “achieve visible and tangible socio-economic development within five years” (Zuma, 2009).

When Zuma addressed delegates at the COP15, he said developed countries are “historically responsible for around 80 percent of the current emissions in the atmosphere”. At the Copenhagen talks described as the “largest summit in the history of international diplomacy”, Zuma also highlighted the position of developing countries, which he said are “most affected by climate change and are least capable to adapt to the impacts”.

Zuma said “agreements that recognise the common responsibility of all nations to reduce emissions, while not retarding the development the developing countries” are imperative (Zuma, 2009).

Zuma added that while developing countries would do their bit to reduce global emissions, it is up to the wealthier nations to lead the fight. SA is not alone in adopting this position, as the North-South side dynamic will be explored further on. Already some of the developing nations are at a disadvantage when having to deal with climate change because its limited resources as compared to the developed countries that have access to financial and technological resources to address climate change (Gupta, 2000).

While, Zuma did not talk about the security threats that climate change could spur on, other African leaders at different occasions brought this issue to the fore. The North-South side dynamic is an important one because of the way climate change is viewed by countries belonging to this divide. When it comes to climate change negotiations the South sees climate change as a development issue while the North views climate change as an environmental issue (Manika, 2013).

Common but differentiated responsibilities – has become the other important consideration is the South’s arguments. This speaks to Article 3 of the Convention which advocates “that taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.



There is agreement from the developed nations that there should be common responsibilities to address climate change. However, developing nations place emphasis on differentiated responsibilities in climate change policy (Kasa et al., 2008).

One of the main reasons that make addressing climate change incredibly challenging is that global economies depend on burning fossil fuel energy. The challenge is also that these countries do not favour simple technological avenues to correct the problem. There are no quick or cheap alternative forms of energy sources available to cater for almost 80 percent of the world's energy needs which is currently being serviced by fossil fuels (Dessler & Parson, 2006).

During the COP17 in 2011, SA persisted with its call for a “legally binding instrument for measurable, reportable, and verifiable finance, technology and capacity support from developed to developing countries” (Masters, 2011). During his speeches, Zuma emphasised the debate on contribution to climate change made by the developed and developing worlds and the question of funding for mitigation and adaptation endeavours by the latter.

The South has been adamant that its developmental needs cannot be compromised when solutions are being sought out in the global efforts to address climate change, an important point because institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program are working to halt and even reverse poverty. Climate change is an issue that cannot solely be addressed at country levels. Even if one country decreases emissions significantly, it still remains irrelevant if other countries continue emitting high levels of GHGs (Manika, 2013).

Climate change effects that go unchecked, in addition to costs for implementing climate policy are issues which have become a reality for most nations. Each country's emissions are closely related to their economic activities and thus geopolitical future. This means that climate change policy is and will not be just about the environment but more to do with economic policy and it is power politics (Wiener, 2008).

SA, considered to be a "laboratory for democracy" in an era of global politics, is a good example to provide a "test case for the relevance of rhetorical studies in a postmodern democracy" (Salazaar, 2002).

### **1.3 Significance of the topic**

Understanding how the South African government (here represented by Zuma and his Ministers of International Relations and Environmental Affairs) communicate climate change is important to establish its position on the domestic, continental and international fronts. The need to understand how the SA government communicates climate change is further compounded by the fact that the country, while itself affected by climate change, also seeks a balance between managing its greenhouse gas emissions and meeting its developmental goals and expanding economy.

SA's history of racial oppression has resulted in a severely unequal country. Coupled with poverty and unemployment, South Africa like other nations, seeks to address these social developmental goals by improving the global standard of living. For many countries success in these goals meant that there was growth in the national domestic gross product and in personal income (Hulme, 2009).

Peterson (2004) argued that the president's voice is the "most visible and important signifier of political thought around climate change". The president also plays a significant role in agenda setting when it comes to important issues.

There is a lack of scholarship on how the president communicates climate change within the communication field. How the president communicates climate change has an impact on the way environmental concerns are articulated. In Africa, the few studies that examine presidential rhetoric mainly relate to single speeches, such as inaugural addresses. There is little literature on both environmental and presidential rhetoric because these two areas are studied independently (Vint, 2012).

Despite, SA's best efforts thus far, the country also finds itself in a precarious situation in that it suffers the effects of climate change but at the same time is a leading contributor to the problem. Cloete, Ramgowlan & Taylor (2011) noted that SA's CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are higher than those of European countries, largely due to the dependence on fossil fuels for energy production. The country has been able to attract international investment because of its cheap energy. SA's dependence on fossil fuels continues because of its development needs. This raises the question if SA can actually meet international climate change mitigation goals (Masters, 2011).

The detrimental nature of climate change is indicated by the severe harm it can cause and the costs and difficulties associated with reducing the changes. Policy issues with higher stakes generally translate into more litigious debates. The risks of climate change and dependence of fossil fuels to the world economy mean that vigorous opposing views are expected over what needs to do be done over climate change and what actually is being done (Dessler & Parson, 2006).

#### **1.4 Research Objective**

This dissertation provides a rhetorical criticism analysing how high-level politicians in SA, especially Zuma and two of his ministers position the State and Africa in intense climate change discussions both at home and abroad.

The study also seeks to examine government's (Zuma and his two ministers mentioned above) own rhetorical understanding of climate change. Another goal of this analysis is to ascertain, by identifying frames, if the government communicates how action must be taken, who must take the action and to what end.

Therefore, the proposed study recognises the potential of adding knowledge in the area of communicating climate change by understanding how government communicates. The analysis of Zuma's speeches aims to also provide insight to two important questions. Firstly, how does SA prioritise climate change alongside daunting its national priorities which include job creation and the eradication of, poverty and social inequality? Secondly, what is SA's position on climate change in relation to the continent given that it is the largest contributor to GHG emissions and its attempts to establish itself as a leader in Africa.

## 1.5 Brief summaries of sub-themes

### Climate change and Africa

The African continent's climate change challenges have received global attention. But Makina (2013) argued that the continent remains the face of a helpless victim. Nobel Peace Prize winner, the late Wangari Maathai, in her book *The Challenge for Africa*, discussed how for centuries "the world has been telling Africa who they are". Makina (2013) also suggested that Africa's position more as a recipient and victim as opposed to a participant stand to impact negatively on its future generations.

Africa, despite their numerous and unique challenges, often fall under one group and that is the developing countries. As previously highlighted the discourse on climate change between the developed and developing countries is that the former is responsible for most of the GHG emissions while the latter are left to suffer the consequences. African politicians have used powerful rhetoric when talking about the impact on climate change on the continent. In 2007 at an African Union Summit, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni called climate change an "act of aggression" by the developed world against the developing world and demanding compensation for the damage (Brown, Hammill & Mcleman, 2007). Namibia's representative to the UN, Kaire Mbuende, called the developed countries' emissions of greenhouses "low intensity biological or chemical warfare" (Njeru, 2008).

On face value these views may seem harsh but the reality is that climate change negotiations continue to be driven by countries' economic growth trajectories rather than the environment. The planet is being reshaped by climate politics and this is evident during climate change talks where negotiations have been about how the global economy can be transformed to move towards low-carbon development (Dimitrov, 2010).

A number of challenges experienced by African countries in negotiations have been qualified in studies (Makina, 2013; Mumma, 2013 & Gupta, 2000). The G77 + China contains the majority of poor countries. Many of these countries have at some point experienced civil war.

A large number of countries make up the G77 + China. The diversity of these countries and different governance systems result in them expressing interests that are both similar and different. Many of these countries are challenged by a lack of resources. Their diversity, individual challenges at a country level and varying levels of vulnerability make it difficult to agree on a common position on climate change. It is imperative that policies that support solutions are appropriate for the specific needs of those countries in this group (Gupta, 2000 & Makina, 2013).

Additionally, G77 + China countries find themselves with ideological challenges in climate change negotiations. For example, some of the nations face extreme poverty and inequality, which leaves them in difficult positions when they have decided on whether to focus on growth in the short term or use their last resources in a way that will not be able to sustain them (Gupta, 2000). It is unlikely that these problems will not become simpler anytime soon, with the latest IPCC report providing evidence that the continent is getting warmer and that already affected ecosystems will be subjected to further considerable changes.

Water availability is expected to come under more stress because of changes to the climate. African national governments are addressing climate change and are initiating governance systems for adaptation.

However, the report stated that an effective co-ordination of the various adaptation initiatives implemented are lacking. For Africa to address risks posed by climate change and execute meaningful adaptation strategies, it would require substantial support in resources such as finance, technology and institutional and capacity development (IPCC, 2013).

## **Climate change and women & children**

### **Women**

Studies from the 1980's indicate that women, especially those in rural areas in developing countries, interact more with the environment and experience the impacts of environmental degradation more as compared to men (Dankelman, 2010). A study in rural KwaZulu-Natal more recently, indicated that due to socially constructed roles and responsibility, climate change exacerbated the already heavy work load of the women in this area (Babugura, 2010).

Women in rural or poor parts of the world are often tasked with activities that are dependent on resources which are affected by climate changes. Women need access to water, vegetation and wood (Adger et al., 2007). Women had to work physically harder but were also emotionally exhausted from worrying about how they and their families would survive. For example, women still have to walk long distances to collect water (Babugura, 2010).

Women experience climate change differently due to a number of inequalities already prevalent. The factors include women's position in society, access to resources and their power relations they encounter in solving climate change challenges (Babugura, 2010).

It is therefore concerning that women are excluded from decision making processes for the usage and management of natural resources, energy policies and programmes, which lie with male-dominated organisations (Dankelman, 2010; UNECA, 2009).

Despite these challenges, the role women play in protecting the environment does not go unnoticed (Dankelman, 2010). Women are not merely victims in the process and gender issues must be factored into climate change responses. Activists advocate that attention must be paid to “gender differentiated perspectives” around climate change and that women’s input must be included in national policies, action plans and sustainable development proposals (Babugura, 2010).

### **Children**

In a UNICEF report, the United Nations affiliated organisation acknowledged the South African government’s effort to address climate change. The organisation recognised the proposals in the White Paper but observed that children’s needs and plans to address it were lacking (UNICEF, 2011).

Children in rural areas in South Africa are disadvantaged. Just in three of the nine provinces in SA - KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape – at least 76% of children are live in rural areas. These children are subjects to poverty, inequality and the consequences of climate change. They lack proper housing, primary health care, access to clean water and proper sanitation. These factors impact on their physical and mental development. However, attention too must be paid to children in urban areas. They too are subjected to different developmental challenges which include over populated urban areas and urban planning. The issue of inadequate infrastructure in urban areas also impact on children (UNICEF, 2011).



The report described children as invisible persons. The argument is that with any level of government children's needs are not recognised nor is there acknowledgement for their role as change agents, particularly at grassroots levels. One of the recommendations was that focus on children becomes an important part in laws and policies, especially in the time of disasters, where children face the risk of neglect or abuse (UNICEF, 2011).

### **Climate change and poverty**

The implications of climate change on poverty reduction are serious enough to threaten years of development efforts. In fact, the latest IPCC report supports this with its latest finding that climate change is expected to create a new poor between now and 2100 with further negative impacts on sustainable development. There are expectations that some regions including urban areas and some rural regions in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia to suffer further impacts of climate change (Niang & Ruppel, 2013).

A report, compiled by a host of international organisations including developing banks, the World Bank and at least two UN programmes, stated that climate change will exacerbate current vulnerabilities faced by poor communities, even though the impacts may vary. The report highlight the common challenges as a result of climate change but also warn that for some families in affected areas, migration could be their only option (Abeygunawardena et al., 2003).

The emphasis on adaptation comes on the basis that “the higher the concentrations of GHGs, the higher the likelihood of irreversible and grave damage to human and biological systems” (Abeygunawardena et al., 2003).

### **1.5 Brief summaries of the chapters**

Chapter one will introduce the dissertation topic, followed by the background and dissertation statement. It will also contain a short explanation of the significance of the topic and the research objectives. There are also sub-themes identified that relate to climate change. Chapter two will consist of the theoretical framework that will be employed in this dissertation. Chapter three reviews the literature that relate to climate change and the presidential rhetoric separately. Chapter four will focus on the methodology used in the dissertation while chapter five will present the findings. Chapter six will provide a brief discussion and include the limitations of the study. The dissertation will be concluded in chapter seven.

## **Chapter Two: Theoretical framework**

The Moral Foundation Theory (MTF), Steve Vanderheiden's political theory that addresses climate change justice in terms of justice, equality and responsibility together with framing theory will provide the theoretical framework for this dissertation.

### **2.1 Moral Foundation Theory**

Presidential rhetoric is concerned with how a president can use different rhetorical strategies to persuade the public. Windt (1986) argued that a President has few powers available to him or her but in a democracy, presidential rhetoric may well be the "fundamental power upon which all others rest". South Africa has a constitutional democracy. There is a proportional representation voting system based on political party lists at the national and provincial levels. In short, the leader of the party with majority votes becomes the President of the country, in this case Zuma, the leader of the ANC, is thus the President of the country (SA info, 2014).

As such, the president of a democratic nation will rely on effective rhetoric that persuades to bridge differently situated actors (Dryzek, 2010). People would need substantial knowledge to understand the complicated nature of politics, therefore the role that political rhetoric play in shaping different viewpoints is a crucial one (Saleh, 2014).

Climate change presents a morally ambiguous problem as far as developing global strategies to combat the phenomenon, thus challenging political systems (Jameison, 2007).

While it has been established that an effective international response to climate change is needed, governments also have to pay attention to their own national economic systems and political processes, hence complicating climate change negotiations (Dawson & Tyson, 2012).

People's attitudes towards politicised issues (such as abortion, homosexuality and xenophobia and climate change) are influenced by moral considerations (Dawson & Tyson, Mucciaroni, 2011; Kovala et al., 2012). However, there are not many studies that provide an understanding of how moral rhetoric is used strategically, especially by political elites, to appeal to the public's morals. Building on MFT, this dissertation will also seek to understand if Zuma uses moral rhetoric in relation to climate change.

According to MFT, five innate psychological systems facilitate the constructions of moral virtues, meanings and institutions among human groups but to a varying degree. These systems create quick gut-reactions either of like or dislike to different situations. These reactions are what lead to people making judgments of right and wrong (Kovala et al., 2012).

The five foundations of MFT refers to how people react "emotionally to harm, reciprocity (including justice, fairness, and rights), ingroup, hierarchy, and purity", according to Graham et al (2009). Initially, MFT was developed for cultural psychology research and not political psychology.

However, scholars' thinking of the link between morality and how political attitudes have been formed has been influenced by MFT (Weber & Federico, 2013; Graham et al., 2009). Scholars in the US used MTF to understand differences in the political systems. When making moral judgements, the conservatives identified with all five foundations almost equally as compared to the liberals who resonated with mainly the harm and fairness foundations (Graham et al., 2009; McAdams & et al, 2008; Haidt & Graham 2007).

South Africa's political system does not divide people into liberals and conservatives, therefore an understanding of how people employ the five foundations to sensitive issues might not be clear. However, morality as an issue was a serious enough concern for South Africa's new democratic government. The state introduced the Moral Regeneration Movement, an initiative close to former President Nelson Mandela's heart. Government also held a Moral summit in 1998 with a strong emphasis on the relation between morality and crime (Rauch, 2005).

In 2010, Zuma commented that "South Africans inherently have high moral values and standards" while calling for moral renewal. He said "moral communities are important to sustain and consolidate democracy, peace and prosperity in South Africa."

Politicians can use MFT to garner support for their various policies (Koleva et al., 2012). The link between morality and attitude formation means that "moral appeals can be a powerful tool for persuasion" (Feinberg & Willer, 2013).

Moral rhetoric is language that one uses when one wants to take a moral position on an issue (Sagi & Dehghani, 2013). The persuasiveness nature of moral language makes it most likely to be used during pivotal moments such as presidential speeches or passing of a bill (Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005). There is a tendency for people's worldview to be affected when moral rhetoric is used in political debates and discourse which can result in higher levels of political intensity (Clifford, & Jerit, 2013; Koleva, et al, 2012).

Clifford & Jerit (2013) showed that moral rhetoric increases to counter an opposing side's use of moral language. For example, with stem cell research a politically sensitive subject, elites on opposing sides used moral words in an effort to influence the public. Koleva et al. (2012) noted that moral foundation can predict a person's opinion on controversial political issues more than political ideology. Therefore, it would be strategically beneficial for politicians to use moral rhetoric in their public arguments (Chong & Druckman 2007).

By understanding what moral language political elites use; when they use this rhetoric in policy debates and the effect it has on the public, one can get greater insight on how politicians attempt to use moral reasoning for support. The first two questions are relevant in this dissertation because South Africa has been playing a prominent role in climate change negotiations.

Also, its status in developing nations in coalitions draws criticism from other African nations who believe that the country put its needs ahead of theirs (Mumma, 2001).

It has been observed that words may do “the work of politics” (Graham & et al., 2009). However, while studying the choice of words, the researcher aims to understand how Zuma places emphasis on certain features to make his strongest arguments. This dissertation uses an original qualitative content analysis on the debate over climate change.

## **2.2 Climate change justice**

Vanderheiden (2008) stated that anthropogenic climate change is an issue of justice and fairness in global politics. A collective effort guided by a moral imperative is needed to limit the total GHGs emitted. Essentially, for human life to be sustained, the right to distribute GHGs must be fair (Caney, 2009).

Science and economics have been central to climate change debates without giving nearly as much attention to the issue of justice. While governments have been drawing attention to the “other priorities”, a significant part of its population has failed to see the magnitude of environmental issues.

“Equity is basic to the justice process” and mitigation policies to redistribute climate change requires the justice component. However, concepts such as justice which is related to concepts such as equality, distribution, desert and responsibility, are complex ones and more especially in the case of climate change (Vanderheiden, 2008). The nature of this scientific phenomenon is complex largely because of its long-terms effects that occurs globally, spatially and temporally.

This dissertation concerns itself with climate change justice because of South Africa’s position as a developing nation and its struggle against poverty and inequality.

South Africa has been leading the charge on efforts to address climate change but places much emphasis on differentiated responsibility, given Africa's developmental needs at present.

Mitigating emissions is imperative and a matter of urgency. But it is argued that mitigation responsibilities – emissions reduction of GHGs, carbon sinks need to be created and maintained, and increasing alternative energy sources and also creating technology – along with adaptation measures are not sufficient to deal with climate change. It is proposed that compensation responsibilities must also be considered. The third responsibility should be to help people whose rights have been violated because of the impacts of climate change (Caney, 2009 & Shukla, 1999).

The utopian view is that climate justice requires global solidarity to effectively deal with climate change. And that cohesive approach to climate change will mean that all people in all countries are equal with equal voices, which will translate into an urgent collective responsibility and moral duty (Robinson, 2013). But this has not been the case for a few reasons.

The problems posed by climate change are intergenerational largely because the sources and impacts occur over space, time and species. However, it is important for justice to be administered to address both intragenerational and intergenerational inequalities.

The emissions remain in the atmosphere for centuries. Governments of industrialised nations committed voluntarily to stabilise their emissions. However, the converse has occurred, when emissions continue to rise, despite the scientific evidence indicating the urgency to reduce emissions.



Political inertia has been and remains a challenge to climate change as governments drag their feet using delaying and obstruction tactics. Climate change negotiations are an indication of just how difficult it has been to reach agreements on fairness and equality in not only taking responsibility but future consensus on GHG emissions. As was the case with the Copenhagen talks which was dubbed a “geopolitical disaster” (Gardiner, 2006). The division of emission rights is distributed among the developed and developing worlds, hence this becomes a question of global justice which Shukla (1999) argued is the primary justice issue in climate negotiations currently.

There are three important inequities in the political arena that still plague the globe starting with the relative casual responsibility of nations. Some nations have contributed more to GHG emissions due to their industrialised nature but getting these nations to take responsibility for it has been politically challenging. More affluent nations that depend on carbon intensive activities and have high consumption levels stand to make the poor even more poor as the latter will have to bear the economic costs of climate change (Vanderheiden, 2008).

Secondly, those nations that bear the relative casual responsibility for anthropogenic climate change are more likely to have resources to reduce GHG emissions on a larger scale. And finally, the developing nations are expected to suffer the predicted harmful effects of climate change without having the economic capabilities for mitigating endeavours.

To this end, these inequities mean that the designing and implementation of solutions to climate change is a complicated process because achieving fairness and effectiveness is that more challenging (Vanderheiden, 2008).

However, Robinson (2013) argued that for a long time the challenges associated with the principles of equity and CBDR and respective capabilities have been used as a reason for inaction or to avoid taking responsibility.

One point of contestation in developing climate change policy has been the question of responsibility and in a way a question of fairness. There is a rift between the industrialised nations in the North and the developing nations in the South. In the climate change negotiating spectrum the North has been the driving force in climate policy development while the South have been reduced to the role of ratifying policies (Vanderheiden, 2008).

Despite the unfairness in the North-South dynamic the IPCC recognised that developing countries too will have play a significant role to meet the main objective of the UNFCCC which is the stabilisation of GHG concentrations (Shukla, 1999).

Vanderheiden (2008) argued that democratic norms are not normally adhered to in international negotiations and in this case of climate change. Also there is little political equality when the G8 countries dominate climate change negotiations at the expense of the remaining issues, many of whom suffer or are likely to suffer the adverse effects of climate change.

Shukla (1999) agreed with this view, stating that developed nations enjoy greater power and are in a position to influence bargaining rules. This can be attributed to industrialised nations having access to global capital, military power and knowledge resources. For developing nations this imbalance of power is an issue of justice.

With the shift in the world economy, China has overtaken the world's leading emitter the US (Olivier et al., 2013, Weber et al., 2008).

Both China and the US, now contribute to 40% of the world's emissions. However, neither of these countries have committed to binding limitations on emissions. One of reasons is that these countries feel that it would cost them more than they are to benefit from limiting their emissions.

These large volumes of emissions have the potential to cause losses to Europe and other developing states such as India and those in Africa (Posner & Sunstein, 2008). On this basis, some argued that developing nations can no longer be excluded from binding commitments because this leads to another set of inequities (Weber et al., 2008).

In the developing world, there is more pressure placed on China compared to South Africa or India to lower emissions, but China argues that its must be exempt from emissions caps because of its developmental goals, its investment in renewable energy and low per capita emissions (Weber et al., 2008). To this end, there is no straightforward path to achieving climate change justice.

Vanderheiden (2008) examined the liberal egalitarian understandings of distributive justice. He noted that equity-based and responsibility-based models of fairness both part of the UNFCCC is important if a global climate change policy is to be fair and just. He also conceded that the language used in international treaties relating to climate change contains elements of justice.

Distributive justice concerns itself with fairness in the distribution of not only the burden but the benefits too. What is considered a fair distribution is relative; however this theory has been widely associated with climate change (Mowat, 2012).

There is consensus among international lawyers that both distributive and corrective justice ideas best relate to the CBDR principle, whereby industrialised nations who historically have made significant contributions to GHGs should “contribute disproportionately to the creation of international public goods” Posner & Sunstein (2008).

Article 3 of the Convention (UNFCCC) stipulates that all countries are obliged to protect the climate system for people that are living on the planet now and for all those to come. This obligation must occur on the basis of equity and in accordance with their CBDR and respective capabilities. Vanderheiden (2008) stated that international justice is defined in terms of “equity”, “CBDR” and respective capabilities and relates equity to distributive justice. “Responsibilities” and “capabilities” are an indication of past GHG emissions and the abilities of nation to reduce present level of emissions. Equity is thus a criterion for assigning remedial responsibility among nations for climate change, according to (Vanderheiden, 2008).

On the another hand, Mowat (2012) argued that the formation of new global climate change regime has been impeded because of the CBDR principle and that “equal responsibility” between countries is in fact not an egalitarian approach. It is also argued that while climate change is an issue of science, science cannot dictate how they share the atmosphere. There is no “clear and precise rules of international positive law” and the global community is subjected to the UNFCCC which commits to stop global warming “on the basis of equity”.

In relation to the principle of CBDR, Mowat (2012) stated that developed nations “fatally” challenged this principle during COP17. The industrialised nations felt that their developing nation counterparts were emitting as much GHG as they do.

Hannah Mowat, an environment advisor raised valid questions which, if anything, demonstrated the intricacies at climate change negotiations. Her thinking places more emphasis on creating equal situations for countries and as such questioned why there is still a need for CBDR to reduce GHGs emissions. Mowat argued that if thus far CBDR has prevented a binding legal agreement why is there still so much focus on the contentious principle and why has it not yet been “gutted” (Mowat, 2012).

Parties to the UNFCCC, such as the US, advocate for fair distribution but on a utilitarian or libertarian basis. “Redistribution” to them is unfair as it goes against the natural order. The argument is that those able to use distribution in their favour should be entitled to a higher distributive portion with higher overall value. A position strongly opposed by developing nations because they need equal opportunities to grow. They therefore stand their ground that distribution must be based on historical emissions and a per capita allocation if justice is to be served.

### **2.3 Framing theory**

Framing theory refers to selecting some aspects of an event or issue to get people to develop a particular understanding, therefore re-aligning their thinking about an issue. Communication frames are relative to a specific issues, events or political actors. (Myers et al., 2012; Jong & Druckman, 2007; Entman, 2010 & Nelson, Clawson & Oxley 1997).

The basis of framing theory is that there are multiple perspectives to any issue and that important consequences emerge as a result of the framing of issues (Gamson & Modigliani 1989). The choice of language in policies influences the debates of the respective policy issue. In the case of foreign policies, which are complex and ambiguous, framing plays a vital role.

Framing is a tool often utilised by presidents when they want support for their policies. Strategic issue framing thus plays an important role in presidential speeches (Garrison, 2001). Issue framing is a pivotal tool, available to presidents to define their ideas. In doing so, presidents can avoid the risk of allowing the opposition to supply its own definition of their causes (Medhurst, 2006).

Elite framing requires presidents or leaders to both shape the understanding of the public on complex issues and also offer alternative solutions and as such framing in this context can also be seen as a rhetorical tool for elites (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Framing is necessary especially in cases where the events or issues are complex and the various elements demand the public's attention. Framing is not only an essential component of communication but a normal part that allows people to negotiate the huge volume of information accessed on a daily basis.

Therefore, framing can both define problems and also allow for suggestions to combat them. Kuypers et al. (2008) noted that the "rhetorical power of a frame comes from its function to heighten the saliency of some aspects of reality over others." It is difficult to avoid framing in policy and public issues, therefore framing helps to direct public discourse (Nisbet, 2009).

While framing and media seem to go hand in hand, anyone wanting to emphasise specific viewpoints can use this tool (Parton & Morrisonel, 2011). With framing being unavoidable, the questions then remain, which frames are activated and who are activating them. In the same breath, systems of frames typify political ideologies. Framing, therefore, becomes important to successful political communication due to its nature to underscore desired views over the rest (Lakoff, 2010).

### **Framing in politics**

Entman (2010) stated that understanding framing, in the case of politics, will enable one to tell the difference between governments' preferred versions of issues and what actually gets reported on. People use frames as well as their own experiences and communication with each other to understand political issues (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009).

There is a careful consideration in selecting words and images when making up a frame that is used to oppose or support a view in political conflicts. Messages are crafted using "emotionally charged, understandable and memorable" words or images. For example, the US government after the 9/11 attacks repeatedly used terms such as "axis of evil and war against terrorism" as part of the framing strategy to "unite" the country behind its plan to wage war in Afghanistan (Entman, 2010).

It has been noted that presidents use framing in strategic ways to pursue longevity in their terms at office. Whether presidents are concerned with re-election or leaving a legacy, much consideration is given to framing. This is largely because their images are quite visible and there are constraints on their framing choices. These constraints allows for the prediction of frames used by presidents for the two priorities of re-election or legacy.

Generally, presidents select frames that have a positive tone and that mainly focus on aspects of an issue that are most favourable to him or her. In terms of issues around policy, presidents are likely to reinforce the same messages over a period of time, using favourable frames, to garner support for his or her policy choices or goals (Glazier & Boydston, 2010).

In order for frames to be effective or influential, despite who is using them, it needs to resonate with the audience's existing ideas, beliefs or perceptions (Nisbet & Scheufele 2009). Lakoff (2010) argued the possibility for changing frames is limited. For frames to be effective the right language must be used and introducing new language to existing frames is not always possible. Communication systems will need to be adjusted to allow for new frames to reach all parts of the population. The new frames must also be able to be trusted and for that to happen there must be continuous repetition. If these new frames do not make sense they will be ignored. Therein lays the importance of frames. When something as complex as climate change is being communicated, people must already have "systems of frame" that can help them make sense.

### **Framing and climate change**

Nisbet & Scheufele (2009) provided an example of how framing of climate change reached a different audience. American biologist Edward Wilson and other scientists placed emphasis on the religious and moral aspects related to climate change to convince religious leaders of the importance of the global challenge. Civic organisations with an interest in climate change can participate in "bottom-up" framing issues through formal gatherings such as town meetings, conferences and forums.



These frames that are born here are important because they provide weight to stakeholder-sponsored frames which is needed in regulatory and political decisions in science (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009).

There are advantages to using framing beyond “selling the public on science”. When framing is included in communication strategies, there is potential for the promotion of dialogue, learning and also provision for understanding points of agreement or dissent about an issue (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009).

Recently climate change has been framed as a political issue, prior to that it has been communicated as an environmental problem (Myers et al., 2012). Global warming for example was a difficult concept to grasp because people did not possess a system of frames and these frames require time in order for these frame systems to be built. The importance of language and visual imaginary (tools used to communicate frames) cannot be emphasised enough. Merely using slogans and a few key words also doesn't guarantee that people understand frames around the environment (Lakoff, 2010).

It is further argued that while practical steps can be taken to improve the environment (recycling, growing vegetables, using less energy and so forth) what is actually missing is political action. The action needed to deal effectively with the changes to climate should come from government because individual actions alone cannot mitigate the consequences. Therefore, people should be thinking about their government's contribution in the political turf at home and the international arena. However, politics is not in the environment frame (Lakoff, 2010).

It is important that policies are formed to address keys elements of an issue and not because of frames that are known to resonate with the public (Jong & Druckman, 2007).

It was important that this dissertation use framing theory, because understanding how climate change is framed is crucial to the way it's received by the policy makers and the public. Framing could provide a lens to see the multi-facets of climate change and the extent to which they drive policy.

In one study, communication researchers and practitioners tested the hypothesis that by framing climate change on a personal level, people who were not interested or dismissed information on climate change may show interest. The researchers used the public health and/or national security as a way to make climate change more tangible to people. When the health frame was used, evidence suggested that people reacted on emotional level in support of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. People's emotional reactions to climate change can inform communicators about the strengths and weaknesses in the communication strategies. But this factor is often overlooked (Myers & et al, 2012).

Different stakeholders in climate change have to compete with each other to make their case in salient issues, which results in frames serving ideological and governance purposes (Nisbett, 2009). One of the keys to success in any democracy is mobilising support within the majority of its people; therefore governments need to be able to continuously persuade its constituencies.

Issue framing is central to political persuasion campaigns (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 2009). In the US, climate change frames oscillated between “unfair economic burden” courtesy of Republican pollster Frank Luntz to Al Gore’s “climate crises”. Another key frame focused on public accountability.

Scientists and democrats were said to use the public accountability frame against George W. Bush administration. This frame, called the “war on science” was cemented when *The Republican War on Science* (2005) was published. President Barack Obama’s framing of climate change came in the form of the public accountability frame when he promised “to restore science to its rightful place” (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009).

According to Nordhaus & Schellenberger (2007) the “unfair economic burden” frame was turned into the “economic development” frame, with major emphasis on “creating green jobs” used by the Obama administration and recently in South Africa (The Government of SA, 2011).

When using the framing theory to identify the master narrative in Zuma’s speeches, consideration will also be given if frames are of a general and specific nature. Jacoby (2000) clearly demonstrated the difference between a general and specific frame. In a general issue, attention is paid to the disputed governmental activity itself rather than its causes or consequences. An example of a general issue frame is a statement like “The federal government should take steps to protect the environment.”

Meanwhile, a specific issue frame explicitly links governmental activities with targets in society. Statements of this type not only promote certain policy initiatives; they also identify the reasons that such steps are necessary, along with the beneficiaries (or victims) of governmental action. An example of a specific issue frame might be "The federal government should protect the environment, in order to reduce air/water pollution and to protect people whose lives and property are threatened by toxic waste dumps" (Jacoby, 2000).

The understanding and arguments made in the three sections under the theoretical framework chapter, allows the researcher to then examine the speeches to understand how South Africa positions itself on the global scale on climate change with specific reference morality, justice and framing.

## **Chapter three: Literature Review**

In this chapter, research on presidential rhetoric and its history will be discussed. A brief discussion of literature on African presidential rhetoric, framing of climate change and climate change in Africa, will also follow.

### **3.1 Presidential rhetoric**

The study of presidential rhetoric does not have a specific academic home and is studied from the perspectives of both the social sciences and the humanities (Zarefsky, 2002). The initial scholarship on the presidency focused on the institution itself and examined the presidential power as conferred by the constitution and political party (Rossitter, 1956). It was only much later that the rhetoric of the president found its place in the discipline of presidential studies, when attention was given to the president's power as a persuader (Windt, 1986; Smith & Smith, 1994).

Scholars asserted that any study of presidential rhetoric must discuss contributions by Tulis (1988). His main thesis was that before the twentieth century, it was rare to hear popular leadership speak directly to their people. They preferred to communicate between the different levels of government. Beginning his work with James Ceaser, Glen Thurow, Jeffrey and Joseph Bessette in 1981, Tulis was more concerned with the presidency than the rhetoric as he is a scholar of government and political theory (Medhurst, 1996).

Tulis raised three key issues; firstly a president's performance was measured by their words and not actions. Secondly, presidents used popular rhetoric excessively. Finally, people did not understand how the political system actually worked, due to sometimes being misled, resulting in a possible credibility issue when performance and expectations did not match.

Medhurst (1996) argued that rhetoric had more to do with how leaders chose what to say, when to say to it while considering the conditions and outcome and not so much with their ability to persuade. He offered five principle concerns of the rhetorical presidency beginning with the assumption that a non-rhetorical presidency existed. Secondly, Medhurst posited that the term “rhetoric” as used by Tulis and his colleagues refers to “emotional appeals to ignorant audiences”.

His third criticism is that political action fell short with rhetoric taking precedence and should be considered symbolic action. The fourth is the assumption only policy-related rhetoric is meaningful to governance. Finally, he stated, “Aristotle may have written the first systematic treatise on rhetoric, but he did not write the last” (Medhurst, 1996).

However, at a later stage, Tulis (1996) explained that the term “rhetorical presidency” to mean both the “rhetoric of any president and the newer popular form of rhetoric devised by modern presidents,” however “readers have tended to confine the term to the modern practice”. Tulis conceded that the term, although designed with several meanings, were confined to one. He felt that he was partly responsible for this happening.

In the article with Ceasar et al. (1981) he stressed the advantages of the traditional presidency over the modern rhetorical presidency and that he did not abandon this thesis in his book but rather modified it where he attempted to describe and assess the ambivalence of rhetoric leadership. He argued that popular rhetoric was necessary in some circumstances to contend with depression and war but became problematic in normal times where it traded on images of war and strife (Tulis, 1996).

Friedman (2007) argued that Tulis's work is most helpful in explaining the "pathological aspects of modern politics" in all social democracies. On the other hand, Windt (1986) noted that the rhetorical presidency contributed to rhetorical studies. And that rhetorical presidency offered more than a mere analysis and criticism of presidential speeches and campaigns. He asserted that it is a study of "how presidents gain, maintain, or lose public support", effectively concerning itself with the study of presidential public persuasion.

Neustadt's work came under criticism for a few reasons, mainly its timing. His contribution to presidential rhetoric was written prior to presidents using televisions to mobilise coverage and when presidential bargaining most likely among the elite behind closed doors. It is argued that he mistakenly equated persuasion with bargaining. Several political scientists are said to have since revised, repaired and redirected Neustadt's work including Theodore Lowi, James Barber, Bruce Buchanan, Lester Seligman, George Edwards Samuel Kernell and Tulis (Smith & Smith, 1994).

In other studies, Gronbeck (1996) and Benson (2003) were concerned with how presidents use rhetoric to their advantage as political leaders. Zarefsky (2002) combined political communication and political science elements, arguing that rhetoric was that viable option when presidents were faced with limitations of power or resources afforded to them by the constitution.

Meanwhile, Edwards (1996) questioned the point of the studies on presidential rhetoric if scholars are not researching the impact on audiences. He pointed out those leading scholars of presidential rhetoric are unable to provide evidence that rhetoric has an impact on audiences and states that those in the field of presidential rhetoric should not be exempt from the same standards in which other disciplines are held.

Similarly, Lim (2008) stated that “anti-intellectual presidency” is an issue because the quality of presidential rhetoric is problematic, with presidents saying a lot but very little at the same time.

Dorsey (2002) contributed to the literature by focusing on the relationship between presidential rhetoric and leadership. He stated that it is difficult to define leadership given that the concept is “grounded in the nature and practice of rhetoric”. He noted the close connection between leadership and the president as a rhetorical leader. But he pointed out that scholars see this connection as not being ideal when leaders use rhetoric to influence the public which is perceived as a dangerous act.

In the book *The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership* which Dorsey edited, he noted that academics in this field detect presidents’ over reliance on rhetoric to govern. This could lead to attention take away from policy issues, replaced by a superficial relationship between the president and his or her constituents.

However, Zarefsky (2004) countered these assertions. He argued that presidential rhetorical studies allow for new knowledge on that depicts historical and current events. Placing a moratorium on traditional case studies was one suggestion for future studies on presidential rhetoric.



Other suggestions included examining topics that such as the invariant features of presidential discourse or how can political emotion be systematised (Hart, 2002).

More recently, Beasley (2010) offered another model, the unitary executive, which provides institutional reasons why presidents rely on powers of the executive branch as opposed to public discourse to promote their policies. Beasley (2010) argued that it would be beneficial to consider both models simultaneously to keep up with the changes as the executive office's ability to for create and enforce public policy changes.

There is a shortage of longitudinal studies of presidential rhetoric because research has largely been confined to individual presidents, speeches or issues. A considerable amount of these speeches are either inaugural or state of the nation addresses. By studying these speeches, the opportunity to gain insight into presidents' daily rhetoric is lost. Also, presidents need to be studied in conjunction with each other to understand the evolution of the presidential office. The reason for this is when policy or political situations change; the president's rhetoric can be determined by constraints and incentives (Teinken, 2013).

Given that messages (in this case the messages are located in the speeches) are key places to extract rhetoric (Medhurst, 1996), this dissertation aims to understand the Zuma's climate change rhetoric. In doing so, the researcher aims to narrow the literature gap on environmental communication and presidential rhetoric, especially in Africa.

Environmental issues have become a prominent feature in public discourse; however, the study of presidential rhetoric has not attended to this discourse. President or high-level political figures' voices contribute to the understanding of climate change rhetoric because of their visibility. How presidents discuss climate change is also important because of the lacking scholarship in this area (Carcasson, 2004).

By studying presidential rhetoric on climate change, one can understand how a president prioritises his or her country's needs ahead or alongside climate change. One can also unravel policies or emphasis placed on areas such as geo politics or the economic considerations of climate change (Vint, 2012).

### **3.2 African Presidential Rhetoric**

As noted above, focus on presidential rhetoric of American presidents is comprehensive as compared to the scholarship on the rhetoric of African leaders which is few in number. Rhetoric has played and continues to play a significant role in African politics in the form of negotiations for independence, inaugural addresses, declarations and presidential releases.

Ige (2012) asserted that Africans are now beginning to look at the issue of the presidency. "African scholarship has not embarked on rigorous study of rhetoric and the gap is still very apparent."

It is further argued that in Africa, exists a vast amount of undocumented material on presidential rhetoric from the days of Kwame Nkrumah, one of the founding fathers of independent Africa to a series of military dictators and current leadership in the continent. In African presidencies lie an abundance of speeches, mostly ceremonial (Ige, 2012).

While it was a challenge to find studies on presidential rhetoric of climate change by African leaders, there were some that examine rhetorical strategies employed by a few. Randy (2013) examined Nigeria's political response climate change without specifically looking at presidential rhetoric on the subject.

Adegoju (2012) used critical discourse analysis to examine how President Johnson-Sirleaf used certain rhetorical strategies in her first inaugural speech in 2006 to manipulate the Liberian people's mindset to embrace her vision.

Alo (2012) examined speeches of leaders from the five major regions (Robert Mugabe, Thabo Mbeki, Mwai Kibaki, John Evans Atta Mills, Olusegun Obasanjo, Hosni Mubarak, Joseph Kabila and Paul Biya) to see if these presidents were able to persuade Africans on various political and socio-economic policies and plans.

The two studies undertaken by an international scholar assessed the rhetorical success of South Africa's first two democratic leaders, former Presidents Mandela and Mbeki. Sheckels (2009) identified three rhetorical strategies for the "success" of Thabo Mbeki 1996 "I am an African" speech. In another study, he demonstrated Mandela's transition from a freedom fighter to a statesman and also asserted that the world icon's rhetoric was "not entirely effective". Sheckels (2001) argued that when South Africa's challenges became more prominent, Mandela's "language of suggestive certainty" declined, thus leaving Mbeki in a weaker position.

It is not unusual that Mandela's rhetoric was the focus of other studies, given his global reputation. Williams (2008) analysed four speeches of the popular statesman made during and just after South Africa's transition from an apartheid state to a democratic one.

Brockett (2005) examined F.W de Klerk and Mandela's rhetoric over a four year period to understand the pair's respective rhetorical visions of a new South Africa and how these strategies were used to identify with their audiences.

Ige (2012) noted that studies, while not strictly focused on rhetorical analysis and rhetorical theory, offered primary data which are rhetorical in nature. He stated that there is an opportunity for scholars not just those in the field of rhetoric or linguistics but others in political science, sociology, public management and peace and conflict studies, to readily incorporate rhetoric into their research.

The review of literature indicates the wide gap in rhetorical studies both in climate change and presidential rhetoric as it relates to Africa.

### **3.3 The framing of climate change**

Nisbet (2009) stated that although frames provide lenses through which journalists write stories or policy makers define their policies or people discuss an issue, framing is not the same thing as spinning an issue, even though some do exploit this concept to their benefit. He therefore notes that framing is an "attempt to remain true to what is conventionally known about an issue" while placing more emphasis on some parts of an issue than others.

Recent studies of the construction of global climate change in the US media, French media, and German media () demonstrated interesting discrepancies concerning the degree of scientific uncertainty displayed in the European and US media respectively.

There have been a great number of studies on the media coverage of climate change and recent ones in France and Germany continued to show that the uncertainty around the science is still prevalent. These studies also highlighted the discrepancies in the European and US media coverage of climate change (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff, 2008; Brossard et al., 2004 & Weingart et al., 2000).

Media coverage has been increasing in some countries (Fioravanti, 2007). However, dependence on content from international sources, lack of resources or understanding of the complex subject, unsupportive editors and a lack of training are some of the challenges still faced by media, particularly in Africa (Tagbo, 2010 & Cramer 2008).

Studies showed that in South Africa media reported on climate change as an environmental, economic or political story mainly in the print media, but did not link it to broader development issues, such as poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Reports on the effects of climate change on South Africans and policies related to climate change are also lacking. Media reports stemmed from international news agencies and results in the absence of an African voice (Bosch, 2012; Cramer, 2008 & Tagbo; 2012).

In addition to media grappling with climate change, studies in some countries show that some sections of the public lack basic understanding of climate change or global warming. This can be detrimental to people's safety, even in SA where extreme weather conditions have resulted in deaths, if they remain unaware of what actions to take (Neville, 2010; Brechin, 2003 & Bulkeley, 2000). Moser & Dilling (2007) argued that science alone cannot get people to change their behaviour; it has done its part in showing that people's actions have mostly contributed to the problem.

Therefore, the distribution of information is important because it can lead to behavioural change but it can also garner public support for government policies (Bulkeley, 2000). There needs to be communication among key stakeholders - scientists, politicians, and the public – on climate change if the public are able to engage on this complex challenge (Solomon et al. 2007).

Thus framing is also important because the public needs to be able to understand if politicians are using climate risk for their own purposes. This understanding would mean that the public could make appropriate demands from their government leaders (Agwu & Amu, 2013).

Thematic framing focuses on how an issue is presented generally while episodic framing, according to Iyengar (1991) has more to do with the provision of a case study on a particular issue. Hart (2011) demonstrated that people who were exposed to thematic framing of scientific information were more likely to support climate change policies as compared to those people who received information that employed episodic framing.

### **3.4 Climate change in Africa**

There is consensus both politically and scientifically that climate change poses a threat to Africa. If attention is not paid to adaptation, mitigation and compensation, efforts to reduce poverty for example, will be derailed (Taderera, 2010).

There are two important arguments to consider when it comes to climate change literature in relation to Africa. The first is that most countries on the continent contribution to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are insignificant yet these countries are more vulnerable to the impacts of the phenomenon more than many other regions in the world.

The fifth IPPC report contends that Africa will experience further stresses to the water availability and substantial impact on its ecosystems. The continent must also prepare for a rise in climate-relevant health issues. This alone could exacerbate Africa's challenges of poverty and health issues. Literature that suggests that there has been a growing interest in climate change as a driver of conflict since the late 1990s and it posing a security issue and increasing the risk of violent conflict on the continent (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Ki Moon, 2007).

According to Brown, Hammill & McClellan (2007) there has been a shift in climate change language, conjuring threats to international peace and security and where Africa is most likely to bear the brunt of the conflicts. But Norda & Gleditsch (2007) cautions that more scientific research is needed to confirm the link between climate change and conflict

Thus it is imperative for African leaders to use science to determine their national positions on climate change policy, which should also consider all the impacts (both negative and positive) and national key vulnerabilities.

In the developing world, African countries in particular fall short when it comes to promote identifying to arguing for their national key vulnerabilities (Ramos & Khala, 2009).

The arguments made for clear national positions are significant as the second point of contention is found in studies which address how Africa fits into the global negotiating community.

African countries are referred to as developing nations and grouped with heavyweights such as India, China, Brazil and even South Africa, whose economic needs and goals differ vastly. Mumma (2010) argued that Africa's marginalisation in climate talks stems from the continent being unable to articulate a position that shows its unique challenges or circumstances. The inability for African countries to inarticulate and highlight their positions stems from their limited financial, technical and human. In addition, larger developing countries such as India and China are drawing more attention to their vulnerabilities.

South Africa has been criticised for letting down their African counterparts at international climate talks, especially Copenhagen and Cancún. South Africa signed the first stage of the Kyoto Protocol, without resistance, but was not an Annexure 1 country and therefore was not legally bound to cap emissions. For poorer countries, mitigating climate change is a justice issue that needs equitable distribution. It's not even about if or when they should employ mitigation initiatives. But these countries have experienced unfavourable bargaining positions (Shukla, 1999).

According to Bond (2011), SA now a part of larger emerging economies during the second stage, was keen to retain the North-South differentiation of responsibility to cut emissions. In addition, government was also eager to get rid of the Kyoto's binding targets or establish complicated offsets and carbon trades. This proposal would have the same effect (Bond, 2011).



## Chapter four: Methodology

Language is a key component in a rhetorical strategy especially in a political domain but so are “premises of agreement”. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) maintained the value of the idea of an audience in traditional rhetoric. They argued that while speech is addressed to an audience, written text too is produced for an audience in the form of readers. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) the starting point of any argument has a “premises of agreement” between rhetoric and his or her construction of the audience. The establishment of such premises is considered as “a preparation for argument which not only establishes the elements but constitutes the first step in the utilisation of these elements for persuasive purposes”.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) acknowledged that while a complete list of everything capable of constituting an object or belief cannot be drawn, there are five premises of agreement that can be established: “facts and truths, presumptions, values, hierarchies, and loci”. These five premises are split into two categories, real and preferable. The real category comprises facts, truth and presumptions while the preferable relates to values, hierarchies and lines of argument.

Facts and truths are grouped into one category, but represent two variations of ideas that are based on “data, objective reality, and thoughts common to all” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Facts and truths are said to be “binding on everybody” but when challenged by audiences can lose its status as a fact. Presumptions enjoy “universal agreement” and is connected to what is “normal and likely” until there is proof to the contrary.

Values are an agreement which requires that an ideal, being or object must be able to influence action and that one can make use of this influence in an argument. Values enter some stage of an argument more so in political arguments. Values are divided into concrete (normally these values are attached to something living or a specific group or particular object) and abstract values such as justice and truth. Hierarchies, too, are considered either concrete or abstract and are closely associated with values while loci refer to headings which arguments can be classified (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).

Drawing on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's work, this MA thesis uses the rhetorical criticism approach, which seeks to understand how language is used to impact an audience when a wide range of topics are analysed. This chapter will elaborate on the selected sample and expand on the methodology.

It is important to mention here that rhetoric criticism is a qualitative research that is certainly very challenging because of rich and complex history. According to Snape & Spencer (2003) qualitative methods assist researchers to answer questions that seek to explain or understand social phenomena that often have complex natures.

Politicians are sometimes accused of making empty promises or simply using "rhetoric" which is synonymous with negativity. However, in this context, this connotation of rhetoric is not applicable. Here, rhetorical criticism refers to a "qualitative research method designed for systematic investigation and explanation of symbolic acts and artifacts" (in this case Zuma's speeches) for the "purpose of understanding rhetorical processes" (Foss, 2004).

For the purposes of this study, this analysis is meant to achieve “subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Snape & Spencer, 2003).

Rhetorical scholars’ interest in studying political speeches goes beyond a summary of the content but seeks to understand the rhetorical appeal and the ethical and political implications of the speech (Williams, Young & Launer, 2012). Modern day presidents are expected to make several speeches pertaining to key national events, conditions, and conflicts that arise under their administration. Their decision to make speeches will depend on whether they choose to confront or avoid issues (Ragsdale, 1984).

The researcher chose to examine Zuma’s speeches over other African leaders and two other SA presidents because COP17 happened in the year Zuma was president of the country. Zuma made several speeches and was present for several sessions of the COP in Durban in different settings. Studying his speeches is vital because within a global text the president would also have to act on national interests just like his counterparts.

Medhurst (2011) stated that any presidents’ rhetoric is subjected to more attention than most people whether it’s deserved or not. A president’s rhetoric found in inaugural or state of the nation addresses, campaign discourse (including social media and other internet presence) and impromptu reactions has become subject to scrutiny. Modern presidencies produce more rhetoric, largely due to the availability of media that is in operation 24 hours a day, and to audiences at home and across a country’s border. Tienken (2013) noted the increase too in the number of presidential speeches and argued that the purpose of presidential rhetoric has changed.

In this thesis, rhetorical criticism is thus used to analyse 18 speeches (inclusive of the ministers press statements that were read out to the media) - a combination of Zuma's and two of his ministers. This dissertation is undertaken with two intentions. The first is to use rhetoric analysis to contribute to the development of the SA rhetorical presidency while the second is to contribute to knowledge of how the modern presidency uses the personal mode of persuasion.

#### **4.1 Method**

For purposes of rhetorical criticism, the researcher will seek to understand how often Zuma makes value statements regarding his political agenda and whether he adheres to ANC norms and this will be considered a measure of success.

Rhetorical criticism, is one of four approaches to textual analysis, and is a qualitative method that will be used in this thesis. Researchers in the communication field use textual analysis as a method to "describe and interpret the characteristics of a recorded or visual message". When researchers conduct textual analysis, they are interested in describing texts in relation to its content, structure and functions (Frey, Botan & Kreps, 1999).

Rhetorical criticism offers important contributions to improving communicators' abilities to perform their jobs, more than it contributes to theory. Knowledge derived from rhetorical criticism empowers communicators and gives them options to construct messages (Foss, 2004).

Scholars are implored to ask critical questions that relate to effects that are answerable by reasoned argument. Such questions include how are Zuma's speeches constructed to invite or discourage certain reactions? What role might his speeches play in a more comprehensive campaign to modify attitudes or behaviour? Who are the various possible audiences for the speech? (Brockriede, 1974)

A brief introduction by Foss (2004) to rhetorical criticism method offers four basic steps when conducting rhetorical criticism studies: "selecting an artifact; analysing the artifact; formulating a research question; and finally writing the essay with focus on its contribution to rhetorical theory". She argued that this method allows scholars to think about communication in new or different ways. These basic tools, she said, helps scholars to learn how to balance "between letting the data speak and categorizing the data, how to be patient, and how to create a theory."

Rhetorical critics have the most to offer because they look for new ways to frame existing knowledge, new insights that produce new knowledge, and new possibilities for communicating (Foss & Foss, 2013).

This approach seemed appropriate for this study although the researcher did consider work of other rhetorical critics. For example, Burke's work in *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950) would have been used if the purpose of this study was to understand how Zuma used aligning symbols in his speeches. Alternatively, Lakoff's thoughts in *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* (1987) and *Moral Politics* (1996) could have informed the researcher should she wished to study how Zuma used "familiar metaphorical networks" to persuade his audiences.

In analysing Mandela's rhetoric, Sheckels (2010) employed Hart's verbal content analysis because words have "become crucial tools in the rhetorical presidency, with tonal nuances that suggest the attitudes that the president wants his audience to share."

Methodologically, the researcher followed these procedures: conducted a close textual reading of all speeches, noted the critical and theoretical observations of the text, analysed the texts according to the code sheet.

#### **4.2 Sample**

For the sake of this specific subject matter, the researcher has focused on speeches within a specific timeframe that relates to climate change rhetoric by the president. It is thus a purposive (also called judgement sampling) non probability sample that was used. This sampling type is advantageous when a scholar wants to "construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon or develop something about which only a little is known" (Kumar, 2010).

The advantage to this sampling meant that the researcher had control over the selection process and was able to include key political actors such as the ministers. The researcher is aware that the findings of this thesis cannot be generalised even within the South African context; however it enables the research to go in-depth about this issue that is highly controversial matter in a society that is vulnerable and is overwhelmed with historical baggage and many inequalities at different socio-political and economic fronts.

Scholars asserted that purposive sampling is a favourable choice in qualitative studies to increase the range of data exposed and to unearth multiple perspectives (Kumar, 2010).

Ten speeches delivered by President Jacob Zuma from October 2011 (the build up to) COP17 until December 2011 (in which the conference ended) will be analysed. Of the ten speeches, two speeches were geared towards the business community; two towards civil society and the remaining were directed to different segments of COP 17, including opening and closing sessions and those at high level political audiences.

A further eight speeches from Ministers Nkoana-Mashabane and Molewa, also sourced from the Government Communications website were analysed. These speeches were sourced from the Presidential website. Some of these speeches were made to the press during the COP. The speeches were limited to COP17 as this was a global event hosted by South Africa in Durban, which resulted in the President having to address different audiences including the business, civic and political sectors

The aim of the study is to understand how government communicates climate change therefore with this clear purpose in mind, nonprobability sampling would be advantageous. Generalisations are not the aim of the study; therefore this is an appropriate sample.

### **4.3 Presidential rhetoric**

Presidential rhetoric studies in recent times have fallen into four categories, “criticism of single speeches, criticism of rhetorical movements, development of genres of presidential speeches, and miscellaneous articles on various ancillary topics dealing with presidential rhetoric” (Windt, 1986).

With single speeches scholars largely pay attention to inaugural addresses, which tends to be ceremonial or crisis speeches which normally follows a declaration of one by a president. It is argued that the intrinsic value of critically analysing the single speech is that it deepens the understanding of what worked or did not based on a particular speech.

When criticism is extrinsic, raw material could be provided to increase knowledge on how a president uses his persuasive powers to meet his goals or to develop theories about presidential rhetoric and this is an area which is lacking (Windt, 1986). Zarefsky (2012) also argued that single speeches need to be examined in tandem within broader cultural and social frames to have discernible effects.

There are a series of questions that a scholar could ask about the plausibility, consistency, rhetorical strategies, consequences of speeches on target constituencies, among others about presidents' speeches to contribute to an improved understanding of "how public arguments and presidential speeches affect the President, his policies, and the continuous political debates about our national agenda and the direction of public policy" (Windt, 1986).

The focus of rhetorical movements places individual speeches in proper political contexts as scholars get to experience how a president uses rhetoric to build constituencies, defend his policies and get legislation passed. The focus on genre studies seeks to understand how presidents employed rhetorical strategies on similar occasions and topics.



It is argued that scholars who used this method rely on their knowledge of past rhetorical activities to examine contemporary rhetorical efforts. Finally, miscellaneous research exists in the forms of “textual accuracy, speech preparation, quantitative research, arguments over the ethics of using speech-writers”. These analyses contribute to knowledge on how presidents use rhetoric to exercise power (Windt, 1986).

Windt (1986) stated that over the course of history, there has been a shift in inaugural address. Initially in the US, inaugural speeches were about how the incoming presidency could uphold republican and Constitutional principles. Nowadays, the point of inaugural addresses centre around an attempt "to articulate the unspoken desires of the people by holding out a vision for their fulfilment."

Campbell & Jamieson (2008) argued that State of the Union addresses has three functions. These are values transmission, discussion of key issues of national concern, and recommendations on policy. Combining specific ceremonial and deliberative functions, this address therefore presents challenges to presidents. The difficulty lies in the delicate balance between expressing lofty ideals and demarcating specific programs and policies, while labouring under the time constraints posed by the genre as a modern mediated event.

One of the main reasons that states of the union addresses or inaugural speeches have been subjected to several studies is that there is a foundation for comparisons to be drawn. However, these types of speeches are of a ceremonial nature. South Africans, like their American counterparts, have more access or interactions with speeches. Thus other speeches aside from the ceremonial ones must now become the focus of presidential studies (Teinken, 2013).

#### **4.4 Research Question**

A president's rhetoric reaches different audiences, oscillating between a general audience and party specific audience. A reasonable assumption suggests that the success of presidential rhetoric vary in the way concrete values and abstract values are used on different occasions and based on these thought, the following research question was proposed.

RQ1: How successfully did President Jacob Zuma adhere to the kinds of values that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) asserted are typical for audience members predisposed to ANC ideology?

Accordingly, a number of sub questions will be addressed here:

RQ2: What is the master narrative of Zuma's speeches on climate change?

RQ3: How does Zuma frame climate change in relation to South Africa's priorities such as poverty, rural development, education and job creation?

RQ4: How does Zuma represent Africa as a leader of a major developing country?

RQ5: Does Zuma focus on justice as a concern as it relates to climate change and the continent?

RQ6: To what extent was there alignment in communication among Zuma and his two key ministers during COP17?

RQ7: Did the climate change rhetoric of former SA presidents and Zuma's ministers differ?

A coding sheet ([Appendix 1](#)) was created to note the frequency of certain concrete values (for instance climate impact, drought and floods and so forth) and abstract values (such as justice, responsibility etc.). In order to limit bias the researcher did not include a category that identified other parties or party leaders in SA as this study pertained specifically to the SA presidency which is led by an ANC leader.

The coding consisted of assigning a tally mark next to the variables in each category, which the researcher then used to calculate the total frequency of each type of value.

This MA dissertation could be used by media members as reference points as the president continue to address the issue of climate change publically. SA's civic societies deal with environmental and climate change issues could also benefit from a theoretical understanding of the president's rhetoric on climate change.

By using the master narratives, speechwriters could either build on these themes or include issues that were identified as lacking. These rhetorical choices could influence the initial bond of agreement with their audiences. Critics can also ascertain to what extent Zuma followed the rhetorical theories of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969).

## **Chapter five: Findings**

This chapter contains the research findings. It provides an understanding of Zuma's climate change rhetoric by primarily identifying the values and master narratives in his speeches. The focus on what his predecessors communicated as well as two members of his cabinet active at the time of COP17 illustrates similarities and/or differences in climate change rhetoric.

After completing a close reading of the selected speeches, the researcher coded for key words and phrases. The parameters of these key words and phrases were informed by the extensive theoretical framework and literature review which focused mainly on climate change justice and presidential rhetoric. The researcher also briefly examined speeches outside COP17 such as Zuma's State of the Nation Addresses from the start of his presidency in 2009 until the conclusion of the Durban talks.

The data was then grouped into sub sections: Zuma's master narratives, SA and climate change, Africa and climate change, justice and climate change, Climate change and SA leaders which answered the research questions under broader headings.

## **5.1 Zuma's master narratives**

There has been very little rhetoric on climate change since the start of Zuma's presidency. In his 2009 SONA, Zuma briefly spoke about implementing the "Water for Growth and Development strategy", to strengthen the country's water management system. He acknowledged that this development as a mitigation measure. Without directly addressing climate change, the president mentioned that government will "continue to improve our energy efficiency and reliance on renewable energy" (Zuma, 2009).

In his 2010 SONA, Zuma spoke about "SA's Industrial Policy Action Plan" and the country's new focus on green jobs. This is the only SONA in which Zuma mentioned global policy on climate change. He referred to the BASIC countries and the US making a "significant contribution to the accord adopted in Copenhagen". Zuma also committed to working with the global community on a legally binding treaty. In 2011, the year of COP17 there was no mention of climate change in his SONA (Zuma, 2010).

The brief summary of climate change content in the SONAs demonstrated that Zuma gives priority to other socio-economic challenges over the global environmental challenge. Even in its 2009 election manifesto, the ANC mentioned climate change in direct relation to developing green jobs and that these "jobs should exist in industries and facilities that are designed to mitigate the effects of climate change".

Three key frames have been identified: the blame, balance and responsibility frames.

### **Blame frame: developing versus developed worlds**

The results indicated that Zuma clearly distinguished between the developing and developed countries in all his speeches, delivered to mainly high level country delegations during COP17. This divide was used when Zuma spoke about the history and negotiations of climate change. This distinction is central to his arguments made from COP15 throughout COP17, more so if the speech was delivered to audiences at the high level political sessions.

By drawing the distinction, Zuma's rhetoric employed the blame frame in the most explicit terms. He emphatically used the phrases such as "some facts are already well known" or "it is common knowledge" to qualify his statements that the "developed countries are historically responsible for 80 percent of the emissions in the atmosphere" or that "developed countries benefitted from a high level of emissions for their own development".

This frame is supported by research that has shown that developing nations have contributed minimally to GHGs emissions but have suffered the effects of climate change due to their vulnerable nature. These countries' exposure to poverty and related challenges, such as lack of proper infrastructure and access to healthcare and education also make them susceptible to climate change (Stern, 2007).

Zuma did not single out his administration or any particular sector as culprits of climate change in SA or Africa. He briefly acknowledged SA's contribution to climate change but places more emphasis on SA's current challenges rather than who is responsible for climate change. He did use the country's history to support his arguments for economic development.

He takes his audience on a historical tour that shows the current disparities between the developed and under developed areas in South Africa. He also emphasises that SA's reputation for being "one of the most energy intensive economies in the world" started a long time before SA moved into a democratic dispensation.

While Zuma acknowledged that SA is more developed compared to other developing nations, he reminded his audience that there are still several villages and townships that need development. He supported his argument by reminding his listeners that South Africans still suffer the effects of economic and political exclusion.

### **Balance frame**

Zuma uses the balance frame which according to Carcasson (2004) is a combination of the economic and environmental frame. He repeatedly uses this frame, structuring his arguments around the belief that "sustainable development and economics should be at the heart of the climate change discussions".

Vint (2012) demonstrated that former American Presidents George W Bush and Bill Clinton also strategically employed the balance frame. Similarly, Zuma advocated for "faster economic growth" which he firmly believes must be achieved alongside "the sustainable management of SA's natural resources" ([Appendix 2](#)).

Acknowledging that climate change is a daunting problem especially in developing countries, Zuma, also stated that policies for adapting and mitigating these challenges cannot come at the expense of “economic growth and poverty eradication in developing countries” ([Appendix 3](#)).

Zuma also strategically employed this frame when he stressed the need for funding for clean development mechanisms, innovation, new technologies and models for investment. However, he repeatedly also argued that sustainable development and innovation measures must be a conceivable option for developing countries.

He contextualised this frame predominantly by talking about a green economy, which he saw as “reducing rather than increasing resource consumption” and will give rise to green growth and green jobs. This is in line with government policies for a wider economic regime in the country in which job creation is a major aspiration.

This strategy then paves way for Zuma’s closely related narrative which states that developed nations must lead the way in climate change adaptation and mitigation and must provide financial support and technological mechanisms to developing countries. Zuma acknowledged that climate change affected the whole world and that every country must take responsibility in contributing to the solution. However, he often places the responsibility to drive the process on the developed world.

Developing countries are ready to play their part in reducing global emissions, but obviously rich countries have to take the lead ([Appendix 10](#)).

Zuma’s rhetoric appeared to have served two purposes; to show the intention to address climate change but to also indicate that creating equity is SA’s priority too.



Growth would also need to be inclusive of all people, because according to Zuma “experience shows that growth does not in itself necessarily overcome exclusion and marginalisation”. The president emphasises that growth ties in with “education and healthcare, infrastructure, access to land and finance” ([Appendix 4](#)).

Zuma stated that global solutions from state parties are needed to address climate change. But when he addressed local audiences he was persistent that a collective effort is needed to tackle climate change as noted in the White Paper. He used practical examples to make his point. For example, Zuma said in order to introduce new sources of electricity, government would need to regulate the national grid:

It needs business to invest and bring its technological and managerial expertise to the table. Labour will be required to support the necessary training and to help fund projects through investment from members’ retirement savings for instance. That kind of collaboration is the only way we can make a greener economy possible in economic, social and political terms. Beyond the narrow economic needs of transformation, we must also ensure that everyone gets something out of the process. ([Appendix 5](#))

By situating the developing world’s position as the disadvantaged, the results showed that Zuma’s master narrative is then that developing countries should be subjected to CBDR. The researcher analysed the speeches for master narrative in relation to both SA and Africa and found that this predominant argument had prevailed for both categories.

It was common for Zuma to argue that CBDR is a necessity because the developing countries would have to increase their emissions due to their development paths. He argued that CDBR has been a consistent principle in the international convention on climate change.

The main emphasis was not on South Africa's high emission rates but rather it's "right" to develop to address its economic challenges. Therefore by focusing on CBDR, Zuma intertwined South Africa's need for development with that of his African counterparts or other developing nations.

### **Responsibility frame**

CBDR, now a highly politicised concept and a massive stumbling block, was crucial to climate change negotiations in the 1990s. Under the earlier Conventions, countries were divided in Annex 1 (Industrialised nations) and non-Annex 1 parties (Developing nations). Pauw & et al (2014) argued that CBDR is no longer indicative of scientific knowledge or political realities currently resulting in a dysfunctional system of international climate policy.

South Africa's position on CBDR has always been consistent – government acknowledges that while it should reduce its GHG emissions, it should not be at the expense of its development goals. The country's focus has always been on economic growth and development to get the majority of its people out of poverty, therefore in their rhetoric the SA government place great emphasis on their need to build capacity and technology to address climate change (Koketso, 2011).

Zuma also reminded his ministers that climate change policy requires “principles of multilateralism, environmental integrity, CBDR and respective capabilities, equity, and honouring of all international commitments and undertakings made in the climate change process” (Zuma, 2011).

Following Zuma’s extensive focus on CBDR another popular narrative during climate change negotiations was to push for a legally binding commitment to the Kyoto protocol.

There is a general understanding that parties should positively and decisively resolve the question of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which commits developed countries to cut their emissions of greenhouse gases ([Appendix 3](#)).

The results showed that Zuma considered climate change to be a “practical issue” and repeatedly argued that funding mechanisms from the developed world to developing nations are needed to address the issue. Closely linked to funding, the results indicated that Zuma drew a close link between poverty and climate change.

Africa’s vulnerability does not only stem from climate change impacts such as the rise in the sea level, severe droughts and floods. Africa is more vulnerable because of poverty which limits the ability of most African nations to cope with the impact of climate change. Agricultural output in many African countries is expected to decrease by as much as 50% by the year 2050, which will cause serious food shortages ([Appendix 8](#)).

Zuma used the same argument during COP16 and COP17 stressing that developing countries needed to provide political direction by “encouraging developed countries to provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity building for adaptation action in developing countries” ([Appendix 11](#)).

During the Durban talks, Zuma specifically spoke about the Green Climate Fund, demanding that it becomes operational. The merit in this rhetoric is supported in the Stern Review. The reality for developing countries, already hit hard by climate change, is that millions of people will be forced into deeper poverty if adaptation measures are not implemented. There is difficulty in estimating adaptation costs but it is expected to run into billions and therefore developed nations should be compelled to honour their existing commitments to increase aid to the world’s poorest countries (Stern, 2007).

Giddens (2009) is also of the view that “financial assistance from the rich to the poorer nation must focus much more on adaptation than has been the case up until now”. He argued that underdeveloped countries would need finance to begin to assess their vulnerabilities even before the finance can be utilised to address adaptation measures. There has been little progress in linking adaptation to existing poverty-alleviation programmes.

Zuma argued that finance remains a key issue in climate change because it will allow for resilient societies to be built. An idea that Giddens (2007) supported because he believes government adaptation policies should focus on strengthening that resilience as even poor people are not normally without resources.

There is little emphasis placed on the science of climate change in Zuma’s rhetoric. In fact, he has argued that enough research has been conducted and that more is

not necessarily needed. He stated that action should be a priority, given that political inertia on this subject has been there for a long time ([Appendix 6](#)).

## **5.2 Climate change and SA's socio-economic challenges**

Specific to SA, the results showed that Zuma mainly focussed on green job creation and economic development as the main path in dealing with climate change. Much of the rhetoric centres on policy, especially the New Growth Plan (NGP) and the green economy and not necessarily the White Paper.

Zuma's audiences were subjected to explanations of the NGP South Africa's "vision to place jobs and decent work at the centre of economic policy" ([Appendix 5](#)). The plan envisions creating five million new jobs to be created by 2020. In this policy, focus is on the emissions intensity of growth. Three of the most important areas for achieving that goal are renewable and nuclear energy, green transport and the built environment.

Zuma also focused on the Green Economy Accord, in which government, business and labour signed in 2011, with the goal creating 300 000 jobs within the next 10 years. Zuma explained that the accord will result in the creation of opportunities around "renewable energy; biofuels; cleaner coal; more energy efficient technologies for production and greening buildings" ([Appendix 5](#)).

Zuma addressed poverty as an issue affecting the developing world but on a few occasions mentioned that one of "South Africa's major challenges for poverty eradication particularly in the rural communities, is access to electricity. People have to burn wood and coal to get some sort of energy which causes health-related problems such as pneumonia and asthma" ([Appendix 9](#)).

In terms of policy, the White Paper did not receive as much attention as compared to the NGP and Green Economy Accord. When Zuma did speak about the White Paper he once again referred to how government was implementing strategies towards cleaner technology and transition towards a low carbon future.

Zuma did situate South Africa as a “responsible global citizen... contributing its fair share to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”. But at the same time Zuma told his audiences that South Africa acknowledges that it is the “largest producer of electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa, generating 90% of our electricity from coal”. ([Appendix 4](#)). He also clarified that until South Africa operates in a low carbon economy, the country will continue to use coal to meet its developmental challenges. It is statements like these that indicate the economic growth remains a main priority for the SA government, often at the expense of the environment.

Zuma’s rhetoric generally pertained to the country as a whole rather than communities or specific reference to a group of people. Therefore highlighting how climate change impacts directly on women or the youth for example was communicated through the broader South African population.

But during one of his addresses Zuma spoke about the “economic empowerment of the black majority” and how he understood that growth is needed to address gender inequalities, so that women can find real opportunities in the economy. When he spoke about youth, he also considered their access to economic opportunities rather than what younger South African are doing or thinking about when it comes to climate change.

There was no focus on how climate change impacts on women and children on a personal level. At the same time, Zuma does not generally refer to success stories of ordinary South Africans who are making great strides to alleviate the impact of climate change on their lives.

Considering Zuma's emphasis on the green economy conceptualised in the White Paper as a vehicle to "promote investment in human and productive resources", a quick search of COP17 articles in the daily newspapers shows that there will were no real debate on what constituted green jobs or if the green economy was something more than rhetoric. In a critique of the media coverage of the White Paper Smith (2013) found there was limited coverage on this important policy, let alone raging debates relating to climate change.

For example, Zuma established that poverty is an issue in Africa and that climate change stands in the way of development that would address the challenge which affected people in all regions of the continent.

We need to link climate change, food security and poverty; we need to engage on emerging issues including finance and technological support and approaches such as Climate-Smart Agriculture that are geared towards addressing food security, adaptation and mitigation ([Appendix 8](#))

On a more general note, Zuma predominantly used specific frames. Politicians use these frames to overtly link governmental activities with targets in society. Even though the policies Zuma mentioned did not mainly focus on the environment, it focused on government's policy for economic development and job creation ([Appendix 6](#)).

### **5.3 Climate change and Africa**

In his divide between the developing and developed world, the researcher found that Zuma referred to Africa more generally in his speeches. That means Zuma occasionally singled out countries such as Sudan and Kenya, mentioning extreme weather patterns in those nations. He did not speak about policies of these countries or regions. In fact, to bring back the focus on the continent's struggle with climate change, Zuma used phrases such as "Africa and the developing world" or the "developing world, especially Africa". Zuma also did not talk about SA's role in driving negotiations with other African countries beyond mentioning that Africa is part of the G77.

In one instance when Zuma was addressing the Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability, he used the opportunity to demonstrate the African struggle more than he did during any other speech. Zuma even referred to recurrent resource-induced conflicts, which is an argument lacking in his other addresses ([Appendix 7](#)).

The findings also indicated that Zuma used his addresses to highlight Africa's need to receive funding and other resources to respond to climate change. There were two occasions when it appeared that Zuma took a more leadership approach, with more commanding rhetoric. In the Nobel Laureate Symposium, Zuma spoke about how climate change despite all its challenges could also provide the continent with an opportunity. He argued that Africa can no longer simply be the producer of raw materials but should "build dynamic and competitive manufacturing sectors". This kind of rhetoric is generally absent in his other speeches.



In a speech to the audience at World Climate Business Summit on Green Business Generation ([Appendix 4](#)) Zuma noted that Africa and many developing countries because of their “abundant natural resources” have plenty opportunities for green growth. He elaborated by proposing that alternative energy be developed and investment in areas such as “marine aquaculture development, wildlife management, waste services and ecosystem rehabilitation programmes” be considered.

This is a shift from his general rhetoric as Zuma does not make these arguments when his audiences are high level politicians or negotiating delegates because his position is clear in those cases, that Africa and the developing world need agreements with CBDR and funding mechanisms.

The researcher detected some emotive language in the official opening address for COP17, which is not something he uses often. His choice of words was more concrete when he said “for most people in the developing world and Africa, climate change is a matter of life and death”. Even when he spoke about how solutions for climate change cannot be independent from resolutions for poverty eradication Zuma goes back to taking a more clinical or formal approach to language ([Appendix 3](#)).

While there is a sense of solidarity with Africa as the continent is included in one side of the divide, the developing world, very little rhetoric is focused on opportunities for partnerships between regions or countries. He did mention an agreement between SA and the Democratic Republic of Congo with respect to the “Grand Inga Hydro Electricity Project for the construction of a dam that will provide electricity to more than half of Africa’s population” ([Appendix 3](#)). More than that, there is little in Zuma’s rhetoric that makes Africa come across as a unified continent that is able to negotiate policies on the own terms.

#### **5.4 Justice and climate change**

One of the key questions this thesis looked at was how successfully Zuma adheres to the kinds of values that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) asserted are typical for audience members predisposed to ANC ideology. The researcher found that Zuma uses most of the values (facts and truths, presumptions, values, hierarchies, and loci) noted by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) in his addressees.

He especially used truths and facts. As the president of the host country of COP17 Zuma utilised the opportunity to use rhetoric that is commonly accepted as fact. For example, when he addressed the local government and cities convention, he drew the audience to the fact that it is this sphere of government that is most close to the people when it comes to implementing climate change response programmes.

He drew correlations between how local government should see the relevance to climate change because of the link to poverty in the developing world. He did this by reminding delegates that local government is closest to the people and that this sphere of the State is also “directly responsible for the implementation of climate change response programmes” ([Appendix 2](#)).

Zuma’s messages were tailored on how climate change exacerbates poverty. He gently reminded his audience that if climate change goes unchecked at the lowest level of government, that they will be subjected to more vulnerability. To emphasise his point about the importance of municipalities’ role in addressing climate change challenges, Zuma referred to the situation in his own country in which disaster management mechanisms have been set up to deal with unprecedented weather patterns.

Zuma acknowledged that climate change policy in the developing nations must consider poverty because it is a condition that these nations are already challenged with. Zuma's climate justice strategy is closely linked to funding from developed nations and CBDR because it is on these two points that he speaks about justice, equity and fairness.

Fact – either accepted (observe) or agreed (facts that are probable or possible) are often used in Zuma's rhetoric because he raised issues that are common to several developing countries, even though countries in these brackets are not always in complete agreement. Such issues include the idea that developing nations should be allowed to advance their economies without severe restrictions to their global emissions.

The use of abstract values in Zuma's speeches, concepts such as fairness, balance and justice, are "essentially connected to change" according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). Zuma's usage of such values is in a way calling for change but mainly for action. He demanded change in the speed at which financial aid becomes more accessible to developing nations to address climate change.

Zuma did not use the word justice in his addresses but often spoke about the concepts related to it such as distribution, responsibility, fairness, balance and equity (Vanderheiden, 2008). The president spoke about these concepts in relation to mainly policy, when he urges all parties to "strive for a balanced, fair and credible outcome that can pass any test of environmental integrity".

His arguments of these values are predominantly found in his approach to climate change policy, that there must be differentiated responsibility because of the divide between the developed and developing world.

The focus of justice and fairness as it directly relates to people is not a prominent feature in Zuma's arguments. Zuma on one occasion spoke about South Africa's history and the impact of apartheid in creating imbalances in development, where rural areas continue to suffer the impacts of extreme weather conditions because of their vulnerability. For example, Zuma did not make any specific reference about communities in South Africa that experience health issues because their homes are close to factories that release toxins into the air or water. His emphasis focused on policy.

Zuma placed great emphasis to ensuring that the developing world are on the receiving end of fair and balance outcomes by often telling his audiences that a legally binding agreement is needed. This tactic underscores that South Africa is willing to commit to GHG target reductions but on the condition that all other parties are on board.

This dissertation discussed CBDR at length when unpacking Zuma's master narrative, however, it must be pointed out that his idea of justice is correlated to the concept. Zuma's rhetoric is clear that justice can be served if countries that were previously responsible for higher GHG emissions take responsibility for their actions by "taking the lead" as he often puts to address climate change. He re-iterates the point by arguing that for many years that these concepts were central to negotiations.

These are multilateralism, environmental integrity, common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities, equity and honouring of all international commitments and undertakings made in the climate change process. I, therefore, encourage the parties to apply these principles in the

discussions and ensure that the final outcome remains faithful to these principles. ([Appendix 6](#))

Zuma also related to fairness and balance by asking countries to put their national agendas aside when negotiating climate change agreements. He urged countries to do this “no matter how difficult this may be” despite the fact this has been one of the major factors that cause blockages in these types of talks.

The difficulty with putting national agendas aside has been that countries have different understanding of fairness or equity to global climate change as seen during many of the COPs. The debate has been around the increasing emissions by the developing countries. On the other hand, developing countries feel that developed countries generally have done little to implement their previous voluntary reduction commitments. There is no global police to monitor policies nor can one country be prevented from reaping the benefits of another country’s effort to limit climate change effects (Cazorla & Toman, 2000).

Zuma also related to fairness by arguing that developing countries must be allowed a developmental space. The president linked that with the concept of distribution by asking that “funding, technology transfers, mechanisms and networks and capacity building for real and tangible adaptation actions must be established. This will give effect to the agreement that equal priority must be given to adaptation and mitigation”.

## **5.5 Climate change and SA leaders:**

Former South African Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Kgalema Motlanthe did not attend any COPs, making Zuma the first president to do so in 2009 when he attended the Copenhagen talks, COP15, according to DIRCO. Zuma subsequently attended COP16 in Mexico, a year before South Africa played host. Zuma has since not attended a COP.

The Copenhagen talks were set up to be a decisive one, in that many hoped for a binding international agreement. Hopes were raised by renewed US engagements under the Obama administration. Several other countries make national statements of increased commitments. However, the talks were marred by failure to agree on the burden of action. There were several procedural road blocks but outright failure was avoided. Twenty eight countries conducted last minute negotiations which lead to a political deal at the final hours (Dessler & Parson, 2010).

Best to the researcher's knowledge there were no dedicated speeches by Mandela on climate change. Mbeki, in 2007, was very clear in his speech to the 62nd United Nations General Assembly that action on climate change would depend on countries' circumstances. Mbeki spoke mainly on how the consequences of climate change, mainly extreme weather patterns severely hindering the common efforts to reach the MDGs.

The speech made the country's position clear: There must be climate equity and the SA's right to develop must stay a priority. Similarly to the current leadership, Mbeki in his speech also called for opportunities for technology transfer and capacity building.

Mbeki's strong statements, although more general, were also noted when he said in Parliament that "The South African Government understands the urgency of action, and that the costs of doing nothing about climate change far outweigh those of taking concrete measures" (Mbeki, 2007).

South Africa hosted the World Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002 ten years after the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. The Rio Summit resulted in a number of landmark agreements that sought to address stopping and where possible reversing damage done to the environment and addressing poverty and inequality. According to Mbeki (2007) Agenda 21 was central for developing a framework for sustainable development. In his address at the Summit, Mbeki used terms such as "ecological degradation" and "social and economic development with environmental protection", the rhetoric at the time did not use the term climate change as prominently as it's being used in recent times.

Mbeki also referred to South Africa's history and the impact that apartheid had on economic development for the majority of the country:

Having emerged from more than three centuries of colonialism and apartheid, we inherited two inter-linked economies that we characterise as the First and Second economies. The two economies - one developed and globally connected and another localised and informal, display many features of a global system of apartheid. As South Africans, we sought to strengthen the First economy and use it as a base to transfer resources to strengthen and modernise the Second economy and thus embark on the process to change the lives of those who subsist in this Second economy (Mbeki, 2007).

Mbeki too spoke on behalf of developing nations when he highlighted that developing countries, especially those in Africa, “do not have the material base from which to address and attain the MDGs on their own”. He called for assistance with financial aid as well as “investment, trade, technology transfers and human resource development to these poor countries if we are to achieve the development goals and successfully adapt to the devastating impacts of climate change” (Mbeki, 2007).

Mbeki also stressed that climate change policies must be “fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol”. On the point of CBDR Mbeki also saw the need for countries’ individual circumstances to be considered. In his 2007 address at the UN he said, “Though we have different responsibilities, and developed countries clearly have to take the lead, we all have a common duty to do more and act within our respective capabilities and in accordance with our national circumstances” (Mbeki, 2007).

While there were other ministers present at COP17, the researcher focuses on two key ministers because of the positions they occupied. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane was the President of the COP and her rhetoric oscillated between specifics of how the negotiation process needed to evolve with major emphasis on the importance of renewing the Kyoto protocol.

The balance between being a minister in an African country and the COP president was evident in her rhetoric, when Nkoana-Mashabane spoke about how the “climate change negotiation process is still recovering from the serious setbacks it has suffered over the years and a trust deficit needs to be overcome” (Nkoana-Mashabane , 2011).



Nkoana-Mashabane had the challenging task of striking a balance between the talks itself and her being a key member of the South African government. South Africa's climate change policy or key challenges faced as a result of climate change was, therefore, limited in her speeches.

However, whether she was addressing the media or high level sessions, she too spoke fervently on the CBDR that should be accorded to developing and developed nations. Similarly to Zuma, she also called for funding for mitigation and adaptation for developing countries, especially African states.

Nkoana-Mashabane also viewed climate change as a "practical manner" that required a "balanced, fair and credible outcome" that "must be directed by the principles that form the basis of UNFCCC climate change negotiation" (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2011).

She also acknowledged that Green Climate Fund in the Durban talks would be a crucial issue "especially since the developing countries clearly demand a prompt start for funding as it would unlock many other pressing issues and would allow them to reach their objectives in this regard" (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2011).

In one of her speeches (Nkoana-Mashabane a, 2011) singled out her engagement with women making this the second time that special attention was given to any vulnerable group that suffers that effects of climate change, the first was a reference by the president.

Minister Molewa's rhetoric had more flexibility to draw attention to the South Africa, while acknowledging that climate change negotiation are "extremely complex, highly political and sometimes conflicting set of social, economic and environmental development issues" (Molewa, 2011).

While she focused on the concepts of funding and CBDR, she was vocal about SA climate change policy in relation to the country's recognition that "in the medium-term, some of the options with the biggest mitigation potential include the shifting to lower-carbon electricity generation options" (Molewa A, 2011).

However, similarly to the president Molewa placed more emphasis on the New Growth Path. She spoke about "Government recently signed a Green Economy Accord which commits signatories to a partnership to build and grow the green economy. The Accord notes that up to 300 000 jobs are possible within a decade if South" (Molewa, 2011).

Molewa's rhetoric kept the dialogue closer to home when she argued that if climate change was left unattended addressed, it could compromise that impact on "developmental gains and the progress made by South Africa, the Southern African Development Community and the African continent to achieve the MDGs" (Molewa, 2011).

## Chapter six: Discussion

The examination of the White Paper explains SA's roadmap to address climate change but a study of Zuma's rhetoric gives us an understanding of how the leadership of this country views climate change in relation to the realities facing their people.

It is evident that SA's history of inequality informed Zuma's rhetoric. He positioned SA on the side of the divide that is disadvantaged. While he acknowledged the country's political and economic standing as compared to his African counterparts, Zuma's rhetorical approach to climate change negotiations appear to be conditional. The findings show that his rhetoric was mainly informed by the country's economic development and that even global policies need to factor this in for the entire developing world.

For example, during the Copenhagen talks, the president went to the extent of committing that "South Africa for example will be able to reduce emissions by 34% below 'business as usual' levels by 2020 and by 42% by 2025" with the condition that the country receives "financial and technological support from developed countries".

Given that it is challenging to balance rhetorical idealism and policy practicalities, civil society responded to this goal with scepticism and considered Zuma's target to be quite unrealistic (Death, 2011). South Africa was also on the receiving end of criticism from other African civil society organisations for breaking the "collective responsibility". Another research paper indicated that SA's unilateral decision to commit to this target was also met with apprehension and contributed, in a way, to the existing disunity in Africa and as well as with the G77 + China (PANA, 2008).

Despite Zuma referring to “we” when he spoke about Africa, as a means to be inclusive, his rhetoric on justice is not compelling when it comes to climate change negotiations and Africa. With the developed world and now the top echelon of the developing world having more bargaining power during climate talks, it would be expected that the leader of Africa’s powerhouse to be more inclined to speak with a unified voice.

He positioned Africa within the developing world so as to not alienate the rest of the nations belonging to this group. In this way he seemingly strengthen his arguments that poorer countries across the world should be able to negotiate climate agreements that work for them.

An interesting point of contention is that Zuma spoke about the developing world with emphasis largely placed on Africa. He hardly refers to China, India, Brazil and Russia, also all developing nations and members of the BRICS coalition. The BRICS is considered to be the new “building blocks of the global economy” and have all played a significant role in the G20 shaping the economic policy and financial stability of the globe (Prasad, 2013).

The challenge Zuma possibly faced in referring to China and India could be that these two developing nations’ growth has sprouted tremendously. China has overtaken the US as largest emitter of climate change (Giddens, 2007) which is an indication of both the country’s economic growth and heavy dependence on coal for energy. China without making any commitment to the Kyoto protocol has called for fairness and equality by making developed countries responsible for mitigation (Stalley, 2013). This of course is a thorny issue that made developed nations such as the US and Canada not commit to legally binding agreements.

Zuma's rhetorical approach to China would require a level of caution as the Asian powerhouse assumes a leadership role in developing countries and in the G77 (Kasa, Gullberg & Heggelund, 2008). Researchers describe China as "the most vocal advocates" of CBDR who urge other developing countries, such as South Africa, to rally on issues of fairness and equity (Stalley, 2013).

China, despite its growing emissions levels also advocates for the principle of CBDR. And like SA, China uses this principle to frame climate change as a "North-South issue" (Stalley 2013).

This CBDR principle which SA, China and other developing nations have emphasised constantly resulted in stalemate in climate change negotiations. One of the main reasons is that the different nations have conflicting interpretations of the CBDR principle (Harris & Symons 2013).

Pauw & et al (2014) have questioned that if some of the developing nations are now the largest emitters, should a "critical reconsideration of the conceptualisation and implementation of CBDR" not be considered and note the lack of progress made in this area.

Like the Chinese economy, South Africa's economy is energy-intensive due to their dependence on coal as indicated by Zuma. However, Koketso (2012) noted that in the past SA's contributions were minimal compared to emissions from industrialised nations. He argued that in order for South Africa to tend to its socio-economic challenges, the country would need a steady economy without restrictions.

Koketso (2012) concurred with Zuma's argument that it would be "grossly unfair to expect South Africa to abandon its current economic drive while other countries have benefited from decades of development based on fossil fuels" (Appendix ).

Despite the US and other developed nations vehemently arguing against CBDR (Vint, 2012) Zuma' argument is supported by research which indicated the merit in using CBDR to differentiate between the developing and developed world. The report showed that "65 nations emissions paths currently seem to be within the climate-friendly range are poor developing countries" (German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2009).

Zuma used rhetoric that places more emphasis on how climate change impacts South Africa rather than the country's contribution to global emissions. For example, Zuma implied that South Africa's priority to achieve "economic transformation is therefore an integral part of our quest for a sustainable economy that responds to the impact of climate change". On the occasion he did mention South Africa's emissions while simultaneously talking about the country's vulnerability.

Stern (2007) advocated that development policy and process must make room for the inclusion of adaptation measures. Considering this a first step, Stern (2007) argued that this can be achieved by first pivotal step towards effective adaptation. While Zuma has paid little attention to budgets in his speeches he has focused on overarching economic policies.

Mbeki and Zuma's rhetoric on this subject is consistent with the ruling party who says that environmental issues have been considered in various policies and programmes since 1994. The ANC, acknowledging the country's history promote "transformative environmentalism" based on "sustainable development" to bring

about social and economic justice. Nkoana-Mashabane and Molewa despite playing different roles during COP17 used rhetoric that was aligned to the current and past president, indicating the consistency in South Africa's messages about climate change.

Zuma's rhetoric on climate change, like his predecessor, mainly focused on the economy. He bolstered his arguments by positioning SA as a developing country with urgent needs for economic growth. Given that climate change is a global challenge, South Africans would need a president to state his position. When leaders are silent on key issues it does not go unnoticed. Zuma's stance on climate change allows for possible engagement with civil society or business and labour who he sees as necessary allies in this dilemma.

Sheckels (2010) asserted that Mandela, especially towards the end of his term, did not come across as too confident when he spoke about policies. It would appear that Zuma in his climate change speeches exuded confidence to an extent by repeatedly referring to his economic growth path policy.

### **6.1 Limitations of the study**

Zuma's speeches were sourced from the COPs which in its nature is highly political. This selection means that one's understanding of how Zuma talks about climate change to civil societies or ordinary South Africans were limited. The time period for this study occurs before and during South Africa's hosting of the Durban talks. Therefore the researcher is unable to ascertain if there was a shift in Zuma's ideology post the Durban platform.

The purposive sampling means that generalisations on Zuma's rhetoric on other topics cannot be made. This is unfortunate because South African presidential rhetoric studies are slim. This dissertation did not focus on other ministers speaking at COP17, such as the Ministers of Energy and Economic Development. Their rhetoric could have also contributed to a broader understanding of the subject at a national government level.

The word constraints of this dissertation did not allow for a secondary analysis on media coverage's of the speeches. Analysing some of the media content could help contextualize and explain how media and the public respond or react to Zuma's and government's communication.

Understanding the reactions would help communicators to revise messages to include not only important values but practical information embedded in policy to help citizens become empowered in responding to climate change on a personal and community level. It can also identify the public's concerns and areas which they require more information or engagement with government.



## **Chapter seven: Conclusion**

The aim of this dissertation was to examine presidential rhetoric on climate change in South Africa by analysing Zuma's speeches during COP17. The world spotlight was on South Africa as this was the first time the country hosted a COP. Zuma was also the first South African president to attend a COP. It was on this basis that the researcher felt compelled to analyse his climate change rhetoric as opposed to speeches made by his predecessors.

South African presidents have spoken extensively about subjects such as HIV/AIDs, poverty and unemployment, unlike climate change. Therefore, this thesis has aided in making a contribution to the understanding of government climate change rhetoric in SA. In doing so it has also contributed to the limited but growing African presidential rhetoric studies.

It is well established that Africa with its minimal contributions to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is most susceptible to the effects of climate change. It is also common knowledge that South Africa finds itself in a dubious position in that it is the largest contributor of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions but it also faces developmental challenges including inequality and poverty which remain a massive challenge for the majority of its people.

By identifying Zuma's master narratives on climate change, we are now in a position to understand how SA views the challenge; who it considers responsible, how it views itself as contributing to the problem and what can be done.

Zuma's rhetoric on climate change indicated that SA's priority is economic development and this will not be compromised by climate change policy which halts growth in developing nations.

Zuma was clear that CBDR must remain the cornerstone of climate change policy, if fairness, balance and equity are to be realised. He stood by this argument despite growing GHG emissions from some of the developing nations.

One of the aims of the study was to assist communicators in the rhetorical strategy on climate change. This thesis identified that SA needs to be more clear on how exactly it contributes to climate change, it would help without dwelling too much in the past to explain what has been done and how the current dispensation has contributed to the problem. Zuma only touches on this point very briefly.

SA has been criticised for not always prioritising the interest of other African nations in climate change negotiations and to an extent this argument in terms of rhetoric is an important one. When Zuma spoke about Africa, he specifically mentioned examples of extreme weather conditions on the continent or how Africa's developmental needs should not be compromised in climate change policy. That Africa faces injustice because it does not necessarily have the resources to enjoy commanding positions at these talks, is not an issue he raises. Zuma's rhetoric is similar to that of other leaders in that climate change now remains more an economic issue rather than an environmental one.

Future research into this topic is important because it can contribute to presidential rhetoric in Africa.

Analysis of climate change rhetoric in other areas such as business and labour and NGOs could also contribute to a further understanding of how climate change is communicated and what improvements can be made to reach wider audiences.

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## Appendices:

### Appendix 1

<b><u>CODE BOOK</u></b>	
<b>1. Date</b>	With six digits: day, month, year (ex. 011111)
<b>2. Word count</b>  The word count is to understand if Zuma' speeches are similar in length or specific audiences	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Small (Less than 300 words)</li> <li>2. Medium (300-600 words)</li> <li>3. Major (more than 600 words)</li> </ol>
<b>3. Audience</b>  These categories refer to which occasion Zuma address	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Business</li> <li>5. Civil society</li> <li>6. High-level political session</li> <li>7. General open sessions</li> </ol>
<b>4. Master narrative</b>  These categories refer to how many times Zuma refers to key issues related to the climate change (themes that are found in the UNFCCC articles and White Paper)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Natural disasters</li> <li>9. Common but differentiated responsibilities</li> <li>10. Africa and its development goals</li> <li>11. Socio-economic issues such as poverty and inequality</li> <li>12. Development of clean or alternative energy</li> <li>13. Adaptation and mitigation measures</li> </ol>
<b>5. Narratives related to South Africa</b>  These categories refer to how many times Zuma refers to key challenges in South Africa that could be exacerbated by climate change	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>14. Unemployment</li> <li>15. Job creation</li> <li>16. Poverty</li> <li>17. Economic development</li> <li>18. Green jobs</li> </ol>
<b>6. African regions mentioned in speeches</b>  These categories seek to show if there are any specific regions Zuma emphasises	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>19. SADC region</li> <li>20. Countries in North Africa</li> <li>21. Countries in East Africa</li> <li>22. Countries in West Africa</li> </ol>

	23. Small Islands
<p><b>7. Narratives related to Africa</b></p> <p>These categories refer to how many times Zuma refers to key challenges in Africa that could be exacerbated by climate change</p>	<p>24. Unemployment, job creation, poverty</p> <p>25. Economic development and Green jobs</p> <p>26. Historical disadvantage</p> <p>27. Common but differentiated responsibilities</p>
<p><b>8. Climate justice narrative</b></p> <p>These categories refer to the phrases in which Zuma refers to the concepts of justice, equality and fairness</p>	<p>28. Phrases with the word justice</p> <p>29. Phrases with the word equality</p> <p>30. Phrases with the word fairness</p> <p>31. Phrases with a combination of the words</p>
<p><b>9. Comparison with Zuma's ministers' speeches</b></p> <p><b>9a Edna Molewa</b></p> <p><b>9b Maite Nkoana-Mashabane</b></p> <p>These categories test the similarities between Zuma and his ministers' speeches</p>	<p>32. Women and climate change</p> <p>33. Poverty and unemployment and climate change</p> <p>34. Job creation and climate change</p> <p>35. SA's effort to deal with climate change</p> <p>36. Africa and climate change</p>

## Appendix 2

**Date: 28 November 2011**

Address by His Excellency President Jacob Zuma at the Cities and Local Government Convention on the margins of the UNFCCC Climate Change Conference, Durban

*02 December 2011*

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Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC: Ms Christiana Figueres;  
The Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Minister Richard Baloyi;  
KZN Premier, Dr Zweli Mkhize,  
Chairperson of SALGA,  
Councillor Thabo Manyoni;  
Mayor of eThekweni Municipality, Councillor James Nxumalo;  
The President of Local Governments for Sustainability and Deputy Mayor of Vancouver,  
Canada, Councillor David Cadman;  
Governors, Mayors and Councillors,  
Distinguished guests;

Good morning to you all!

Thank you for inviting us to this Local Government and Cities Convention.

This is an important gathering as it focuses primarily on the agenda of the Local Governments from the Global South, who have a lot to contribute to the UN climate change response process.

Local Government is the sphere of government that is the closest to the people. It is directly responsible for the implementation of climate change response programmes.

We are therefore pleased that this convention is taking place, as this dialogue among municipalities is very important.

Ladies and gentlemen,

As you are aware we are meeting in the middle of the United Nations climate change talks, known popularly as COP 17.

Negotiators are discussing how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to secure a relatively safe future for all of humanity.

In the African context, they must help us strike a balance between ensuring that climate change does not reach dangerous levels on the one hand, and the need to grow our economies to eradicate poverty on the other hand.

The convention is proceeding well. The discussions are continuing as planned in an environment that is conducive to constructive engagement.

Parties still have divergent views on the shape of the final outcome.

However, there is a general understanding that parties should positively and decisively resolve the question of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which commits developed countries to cut their emissions of greenhouse gases.

The first Kyoto commitment period expires at the end of 2012.

Parties must also reach agreement on the legal nature of a future climate change system.

Generally, Parties agree that Durban should operationalise the Cancun agreements. This includes the establishment of the Adaptation Committee, the Technology Mechanism, the transparency rules on mitigation and support.

For Durban to be regarded as a resounding success, especially for developing countries, the Green Climate Fund that was agreed to in Cancun must be operationalised.

This must be done by adopting the report of the Transitional Committee and through an early launch of the fund.

The Co-chair of the Transitional Committee, South African Minister in the Presidency, Mr Trevor Manuel, presented the report of the Committee to the Parties on Wednesday, 30 November.

It is worth noting that regardless of the good work done by the Transitional Committee, the sources of long-term finance are not yet clearly defined.

For the initial capitalisation of the fund to be realised in Durban, the high level segment that is due to start next week will have to provide the political will, which should translate into financial pledges.

Many developing countries are hopeful that the early launch of the fund will allow for both their adaptation and mitigation needs to be met.

I must point out that the mood of the negotiations thus far indicates that we should remain optimistic of achieving a successful outcome.

There is a general consensus that the effects of climate change are affecting all of us, although differently, and that action on mitigating these effects can no longer be delayed.

We trust that this realisation will help us reach the compromises we need to take this process forward and help us live up to the responsibility we have towards our people.

Ladies and gentlemen,

As an African country, South Africa wants the Durban outcome to be pro-poor, pragmatic and in line with the African development agenda.

We feel strongly the climate change regime must not jeopardise the economic growth and poverty eradication priorities of developing countries.

We are keen to challenge the notion that there is a trade-off to be made between faster economic growth and the preservation of our environment.

We must prove that faster economic growth can be achieved alongside the sustainable management of our natural resources.

That is the route we are following in South Africa, through investing in green economy interventions that will help us save the future while creating decent work.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We look to local government to contribute to shaping the outcome of Durban as the sphere that has to respond immediately to the impact of climate change.

Given the pivotal role of local government, it is of concern that some local authorities in Africa and the developing South believe that the dominant features of the current climate change response debate are not relevant to their context.

This means that the climate change regime must be visibly in touch with the general conditions of poverty that most local authorities in the developing world operate under, for it to be relevant to the people of the South.

The high levels of poverty increases the vulnerability of most municipalities, and makes it impossible for them to respond adequately to the impact of climate change.

Due to limited resources they often have to choose between adaptation - responding to the impacts of climate change and mitigation, reducing the emission of greenhouse gases that cause climate change.

In this regard, we urge the developed world to take the constraints of Africa and other developing countries seriously when considering Climate Change response measures, and in particular adaptation measures.

We reiterate the position that efforts by developing countries to contribute to the mitigation of green house gas emissions should be supported by richer nations through the provision of technology, financing and capacity building.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Given that local government is the first port of call for people in distress during periods of disasters, disaster management mechanisms must be drastically enhanced in all municipalities as a matter of urgency.

In our country we have had our fair share of extreme weather which has caused destruction and mayhem. Science tells us that we are bound to experience more of these severe occurrences.

We experienced unprecedented heavy rains and flooding during December 2010 and January 2011.

Thirty four municipalities that are located in eight of the nine country's provinces were the worst affected. We also suffered massive damage to 27 461 settlements.

The impact on education, transport, agriculture, and health infrastructure was estimated at almost R4 billion.

This led to the affected areas being declared national disaster areas.

As a result, currently all the 278 municipalities in the country are mainstreaming climate change responses in all their local planning processes and Integrated Development Plans.

This local government convention will hopefully enable municipalities to compare best practices with these response mechanisms.

Municipalities in the developing world must not wait for surprise flooding, extreme drought or fires.

We need to start investing today in a safer tomorrow, by prioritizing the establishment of disaster management structures across all spheres of government.

In our country, 30 municipalities already have disaster management centres and work is ongoing to create others given the challenge we face.

This Cities and Local Government Convention should indeed help in fostering such cooperation and the sharing of expertise.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me reiterate how humbled we are by the confidence shown in our country by the United Nations through entrusting us with the responsibility of hosting the COP 17/CMP7 conference.

Africa, the G77 plus China and the BASIC countries – Brazil, South Africa, India and China – will continue working with other regions to ensure a successful outcome.

We must strive for a balanced, fair and credible outcome that can pass any test of environmental integrity.

We must work towards an inclusive, fair and effective climate change deal which is favourable to both the developed and developing countries.

So far, success is in sight.

We trust that you will have fruitful deliberations as you work to make local government more responsive and resilient to climate change.

I thank you

### **Appendix 3**

**Date: 2 December 2011**

Address by His Excellency President Jacob Zuma at the official opening of COP17/CMP7, Inkosi Albert Luthuli International Convention Centre, Durban

Your Excellency the President of the Republic of Chad and Chairperson of the Economic Community of Central African States,



Excellencies Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa and Vice-President of the Republic of Angola,  
Honourable Ministers,  
Executive Secretary of SADC,  
Honourable Premier of KwaZulu-Natal province,  
Distinguished delegates of states parties,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to welcome you all to South Africa and to the city of Durban in the beautiful province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN).

You are meeting in a part of South Africa known for its rich history of bravery and military conquest, displayed in the early years of our history, under the reign of the legendary King Shaka, after whom the airport you landed at, is named.

The KZN province is also known for its scenic beauty, warm and friendly people, diverse and colourful culture as well as a stretch of golden beaches.

We are welcoming you to a province which was home to some of the greatest leaders, our country's first Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Chief Albert Luthuli and also at some point, the legendary Mahatma Gandhi.

Both were distinguished fighters for freedom, justice and human rights for all.

This is also the city and province in which the founding President of a free and democratic South Africa, our icon, President Nelson Mandela, cast his vote for the first time on 27 April 1994, launching a new era of freedom and democracy in our country.

We are therefore truly honoured to host in this province and country, the 17th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, known commonly as COP 17, and the 7th Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, known as CMP7.

We thank the United Nations for showing confidence in Africa's ability to host this meeting again, after COP 12 which was successfully hosted in Nairobi, Kenya in 2006.

Excellencies,  
Distinguished delegates,

I have mentioned some of the outstanding leaders who taught us the power of reaching out to people who think differently from ourselves, in order to find solutions to complex political problems.

That is the spirit that should prevail in COP17/CMP7.

With sound leadership, nothing is impossible here in Durban over the next two weeks.

Excellencies,  
Esteemed delegates,

This meeting is taking place because climate change poses serious risks for humanity, especially in the developing world. Climate change can no longer be treated as just an environmental challenge. It is a holistic sustainable development challenge.

Various regions of the world have different views on the issue, simply because they are affected differently by climate change. However, for most people in the developing world and Africa, climate change is a matter of life and death. We are always reminded by the leaders of small island states that climate change threatens their very existence.

As the sea level rises, it threatens to wipe them off the face of the earth.

Recently the island nation of Kiribati became the first country to declare that global warming is rendering its territory uninhabitable. They have asked for help to evacuate the population.

Africa's vulnerability does not only stem from climate change impacts such as the rise in the sea level, severe droughts and floods. Africa is more vulnerable because of poverty which limits the ability of most African nations to cope with the impact of climate change.

Agricultural output in many African countries is expected to decrease by as much as 50% by the year 2050, which will cause serious food shortages.

In some practical examples of impact, scarce grazing land is causing conflict in the Sudan, amongst peoples that have previously lived in peace for centuries.

Severe drought in Somalia is exacerbating an already volatile region causing displacement of populations and increasing refugee communities in Kenya.

In the Americas, we have also witnessed the frequency of intense hurricanes on the Gulf Coast from which the communities of New Orleans have yet to fully recover, five years after Hurricane Katrina.

In our own country, we have experienced unusual and severe flooding in coastal areas in recent times, impacting on people directly as they lose their homes, jobs and livelihoods.

Given the urgency, states parties should strive to find solutions here in Durban.

Negotiators will be building on the good work done in Cancun, Mexico at COP16/CMP6. The message we wish to emphasise to negotiators is simple.

The expectation is that you must work towards an outcome that is balanced, fair and credible.

You have before you the responsibility to re-affirm the multilateral rules-based system anchored by the Kyoto Protocol and to provide the funding needed to address impacts of climate change through activating the Green Climate Fund.

Another key issue on the table is the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and reaching agreement on the legal nature of a future climate change system.

As this Conference of the Parties is taking place in Africa, adaptation is a key priority, particularly for small island states, least developed countries and Africa.

We also feel strongly that as an African Conference of the Parties, the COP 17 outcome must recognise that solving the climate problem cannot be separated from the struggle to eradicate poverty.

Informed by this view, as a responsible global citizen, South Africa is contributing its fair share to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

At COP 15 in Copenhagen, we announced our commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and by 42% in 2025, with support from developed countries with regards to finance, technology and capacity-building.

We have gone some way towards implementing this undertaking.

Our New Growth Path framework includes comprehensive green economy interventions including an ambitious focus on renewable energy and the promotion of green industries.

Early this month we concluded a landmark Green Economy Social Accord, signed by government, the trade union movement and the business community, committing all of us to achieve 300 000 green jobs by 2020.

The Accord showcases one of the greatest South African strengths, which is social dialogue and partnerships.

The green economy will create new opportunities for enterprise development, job creation and the renewal of commercial and residential environments the world over.

There are also significant opportunities for the development of a green economy in Southern Africa and which could also be extended to other parts of the Continent.

In this regard, the Republic of South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo recently signed an Agreement with respect to the Grand Inga Hydro Electricity Project for the construction of a dam that will provide electricity to more than half of Africa's population.

The plant is estimated to generate about 40 000 megawatts, which is over one third of the total electricity produced in Africa today.

We are also working to generate hydro and wind energy sources from cooperation with the Kingdom of Lesotho through Phase 2 of the Lesotho Highland Water Project, and are working on other renewable energy projects with Mozambique. Change and solutions are always possible.

In these talks, States parties will need to look beyond their national interests to find a global solution for the common good and benefit of all humanity.

Excellencies,  
Distinguished participants,

We have come a long way since Copenhagen and Cancun. Durban must take us many steps forward towards a solution that saves tomorrow today.

Let me once again extend a warm welcome on behalf of the government and people of the Republic of South Africa.

It is my honour and privilege to declare COP17 and the seventh meeting of parties to the Kyoto Protocol open.

I look forward to meeting with you again on the 6th of December, when we open the high level segment.

I wish you well with your deliberations.

I thank you.

## **Appendix 4**

**Date: 3 December 2011**

### **Address by His Excellency President Jacob Zuma during the World Climate Business Summit on Green Business Generation, Elangeni Hotel, Durban**

03 December 2011

Ministers and Deputy Ministers;  
CEOs of various organizations, local and international;  
Members of the Business fraternity;  
Esteemed guests;  
Ladies and gentlemen:

Good morning,

We appreciate this opportunity to meet with the business sector during this 17th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP17) serving as the seventh meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

The theme of COP 17, Working Together: Saving Tomorrow Today reminds us that it is not only governments that have a responsibility to build a sustainable future. The business sector has a key role to play too, alongside other key sectors of society.

Your interest in these climate change talks as business indicates your understanding that climate change is more than just an environmental issue. It is about the continued existence of the human species in harmony with its environment in a sustainable manner.

Climate change is already having a serious impact on Africa and many parts of the world.

Changing weather patterns are affecting the environment, health, natural resources, shelter, infrastructure such as roads, bridges or dams, and even food production.

The negotiations are a party-driven process. South Africa, as COP President represented by our Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, is playing an enabling role for parties to find agreement on the salient issues of climate change.

As South Africa, we seek a global regime that ensures that climate change does not reach dangerous levels, while recognising that the priority for developing countries is to address poverty and socio-economic development.

The talks have to produce a multilateral climate change regime that is fair, credible, balanced, inclusive and effective.

Thus far, talks are going well. Parties still differ on a number of issues. We think this is normal especially during the first week of the conference, ahead of the start of the high level segment next week.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The climate change talks are taking place against the background of yet another economic crisis in the developed world, which is likely to impact on most parts of the globe.

The situation in some parts of Europe is serious and the rest of the globe will feel the impact, more so the developing world.

The economic crisis occurs during a period when the world is already facing rising food and fuel prices, extreme and unusual weather conditions due to climate change, energy insecurity, poverty, youth unemployment, and continued economic volatility.

The situation calls for us to find economic solutions that attend to the needs of our planet.

New sources of growth and innovation, and new technologies and models for driving investment are urgently needed to deliver long-term prosperity in a stable, sustainable and inclusive way.

It is in this context that we promote a green economy and green growth.

A Green Economy is one in which business processes are configured or reconfigured to deliver better returns on natural, human and economic capital investments, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas emissions, extracting and using fewer natural resources, creating less waste and reducing social disparities.

Thus, a Green Economy grows by reducing rather than increasing resource consumption.

We have committed ourselves to our people as a government to work towards an inclusive, green, and sustainable growth.

The inclusive nature of the growth is a key focus in our country as we come from a history of political and economic exclusion of the majority of the population during the pre-1994 period of apartheid and colonial oppression.

New ways of doing things, like promoting sustainable development and green growth provide an opportunity for South Africa to expand its push towards an inclusive growth and an economy that includes and caters for the needs of all of our people.

Meaningful economic transformation is therefore an integral part of our quest for a sustainable economy that responds to the impact of climate change.

We emphasise this because developing green economies is not just about eco-efficiency but also about equity.

Experience shows that growth does not in itself necessarily overcome exclusion and marginalization.

For as long as people lack adequate education and healthcare, infrastructure, access to land, capital, finance and market institutions, they simply cannot take advantage of growth, green or not.

They are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. Instead of broad development, the benefits of growth end up captured by a relatively small number of people.

The inclusive and sustainable growth that we seek has a number of dimensions.

We define it as growth that ensures adequate incomes to workers to address the needs of their families. This puts decent work at the centre of our efforts to build a more inclusive green economy.

We refer to growth that promotes rural development and connects the rural population to the mainstream economy.

We refer to growth that promotes strong local economic empowerment, so that our people see tangible benefits in the expansion of goods and services. In the case of South Africa, it means ensuring the economic empowerment of the black majority.

We refer to growth that addresses gender inequalities, so that women can find real opportunities in the economy.

Inclusive and sustainable growth also refers to growth that draws in young people so that we do not have a young generation without hope and opportunity.

It also refers to growth that is combined with respect for basic rights, such as health, safety and trade union rights in the workplace.

Sustainable green growth must also include improved access to quality education and skills. It must also bridge the digital divide so that the children of the poor can also gain access to the information and communication technology skills that are so crucial in the modern economy.

We are addressing the need for balanced, green and inclusive growth through our government's New Growth Path framework which places employment at the centre of our efforts.

For the African continent, this opportunity of driving green and inclusive growth requires that we leapfrog from being just a producer of raw materials. Africa has to build dynamic and competitive manufacturing sectors that do not just export raw materials but which process the minerals and agricultural products into consumer goods.

Today we invite you to partner with South Africa and Africa on the road towards inclusive, shared, sustainable and greener growth.

The South African Government is already implementing strategies towards cleaner technology and transition towards a low carbon future, guided by our recently adopted National Climate Change Response Policy.

Having said this, we are very mindful of the fact that South Africa finds itself in a situation in which it is both a high emitter of greenhouse gases, as well as a country extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

We are the largest producer of electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa, generating 90% of our electricity from coal.

As a responsible global citizen, we remain fully committed to contribute our fair share to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

However, given our developmental challenges, we will continue the use of fossil fuels in the short to medium term while transitioning to a low-carbon economy, over the long term.

It was with that visionary approach in mind that on the eve of the Climate Change Summit held in Copenhagen, we announced our commitment to reduce our carbon emissions by 34% by 2020 and by 42% by 2025.

This was to be done in the context of a comprehensive, fair and effective legal binding multilateral agreement that delivers financial and technology support for our action.

However we are not waiting for an agreement in Durban before achieving green, sustainable and inclusive growth.

We are forging ahead with our programme of greening the economy to improve the economic, social and environmental resilience of the country in the face of climate change.

Africa and many developing countries boast most exciting opportunities for green growth, by virtue of their largely abundant natural resources. There are many initiatives that we can pursue together to protect the future, while not destroying industries and jobs.

With the development of wind, solar and other renewable energy technologies, energy efficiency and even electric vehicles, we are now witnessing the growth of new green industries.

There are vast opportunities for investments in the fields of renewable energy, marine aquaculture development, wildlife management, waste services as well as ecosystem rehabilitation programmes to name just a few.

We are promoting investments in all these sectors.

We have an ambitious renewable energy plan. We will soon announce the results of the bidding process for the first 3.725 megawatts of green energy to be procured under our Renewable Energy Flagship Programme over the next few years.

Over the next twenty years we plan to scale this up to at least 18 Gigawatts, to account for 42% of new capacity being commissioned.

Last month, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed an Agreement for the construction of the Grand Inga Dam that will provide electricity to more than half of Africa's population.

Ladies and gentlemen,

As we noted, the biggest barriers to developing renewable energy in Africa to date are not technological, but financial.

In that regard, South Africa has been hard at work in the development and design of financial instruments aligned to our national plans for green growth. During the course of COP 17 we will be launching a key initiative that could kick-start major development for renewable energy generation and industrial development.

The South African Renewable Initiative (SARi) funding mechanism will help us unlock South Africa's green growth potential through the funding of large-scale renewable developments. This will be achieved with the assistance of global partners – donors and Governments, who will provide innovative funding solutions to facilitate it.

Renewable energy still costs more than non-renewable energy, which in South Africa is largely supplied by cheap, abundant coal supplies.

It is estimated that the renewables' targets indicated in our Integrated Resource Plan 2010 would add an average incremental cost of around 660 million US dollars to South Africa's annual electricity bill up to the year 2044.

The SARi model will enable us to deal with the high cost through low cost loans and other financial instruments combined with time limited pay-for-performance grants.  
Ladies and gentlemen,

In promoting this new green, sustainable and inclusive growth focus, we are putting together some policy proposals that will impact on the business sector. These may include putting a price on carbon and other pollution or on the over-exploitation of a scarce resource through mechanisms such as taxes, natural resource charges or tradable permit systems. We would also have enablers or incentives such as recognition for eco-labeling systems.

These are some of the issues we will continue discussing with business in our social dialogue forums. Already we have an innovative Green Economy Accord that we signed with business and labour, indicating the seriousness with which we all regard the need to move towards a green economy.

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is vitally important for nations to come to an agreement at COP17 to ensure that emerging nations are not burdened by penalties that make them uncompetitive.

We thank you for supporting the COP 17/CMP7 process.

Let me reiterate that we see in the threat of climate change, an opportunity to develop our green, inclusive, sustainable and shared growth.

This would be growth that provides jobs and which improves infrastructure, health, education and all basic services that our communities need to have an improved quality of life. We also see in the response to the threat of climate change, an opportunity for meaningful economic transformation that will create an inclusive economy to contribute to the building of a better life for all.

We will be partnering with the business community as we move forward to this new trajectory.

I thank you.

## **Appendix 5**

**Date: 4 December 2011**

**Speech delivered by President Jacob Zuma on the occasion of the World Economic Forum Green Partnership Dialogue, High Level Roundtable Meeting, Inkosi Albert Luthuli International Convention Centre, Durban**

The Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, and COP 17 President,  
Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane;  
Minister of Environmental Affairs, Ms Edna Molewa;  
Business Leaders;



Your Excellencies;  
Distinguished guests;

Colleagues and friends,

Let me start by welcoming you to the UNFCCC climate change conference, COP17, a gathering to decide the future of the planet as a whole.

Our central challenges here are to balance the development needs of our people today against the imperatives for our common future.

I am happy to have this opportunity to share with you our plans and actions towards a low-carbon economy.

Colleagues and friends,

Historically, the South African economy was built on our mineral riches, starting with diamonds and gold and expanding into platinum, steel and a host of other metals.

That economic foundation was in turn largely founded on low-cost energy from our abundant coal. As a result, today we have one of the most energy intensive economies in the world.

The wealth beneath our soil shaped South Africa for both the good and the bad. It shaped the buildings and infrastructure around you, the lovely cities and the resorts.

At the same time, it was not used to shape and improve the villages and townships on the outskirts of our towns and cities.

Indeed, the apartheid system was largely designed to support mining by providing cheap labour and cheap electricity, as well as the logistics systems needed to get our mineral riches to foreign markets.

Today, we know that our old growth path, with its premise of plentiful but high carbon-emitting energy, comes at a big cost to the environment.

We will now have to establish new kinds of production and find new ways to produce goods which will reduce both our economy's use of energy and emissions from energy production.

This will require a profound and far-reaching change in our economy, one that will affect us all.

This transformation will provide openings for new investment, production and employment. The challenge is to find opportunities amidst the costs and risks.

It is not a job just for government or business or labour alone. It is something we must work on together.

For instance, bringing in new sources of electricity requires government to regulate the national grid. It needs business to invest and bring its technological and managerial expertise to the table.

Labour will be required to support the necessary training and to help fund projects through investment from members' retirement savings for instance.

That kind of collaboration is the only way we can make a greener economy possible in economic, social and political terms.

Beyond the narrow economic needs of transformation, we must also ensure that everyone gets something out of the process.

Above all, we must make sure that poor communities do not end up footing the bill, whether through job losses or high prices.

That would indeed make the whole process not only inhumane but ultimately unsustainable. Dear friends and colleagues,

Just over a year ago, South Africa adopted a new policy framework that pointed to the need for changes in our economy. Our New Growth Path focuses on achieving more inclusive as well as greener growth.

To start with, it targets employment creation as the most important step toward shared growth in South Africa.

We are encouraging more labour-intensive activities that can create employment opportunities on a mass scale.

But our New Growth Path also addresses the emissions intensity of growth. Three of the most important areas for achieving that aim are renewable and nuclear energy, green transport and the built environment.

They offer opportunities for investment and employment creation in an array of activities in the short and long run.

In the very short run, we will get jobs from services associated with cleaning up the environment, especially recycling, cleaning public spaces, and controlling invasive species.

Already we have public employment schemes creating tens of thousands of jobs in these areas.

We are also rolling out the installation of solar water heating units that are creating jobs and bringing clean energy into the homes of people.

A critical step in realising these opportunities for growth while reducing emissions was the adoption of our Integrated Resource Plan for electricity. It foresees that in the coming decades, at least a third of new electricity generation will come from renewable sources.

We are developing regulatory frameworks and support systems to encourage the production of electricity as well as the new technologies required to meet this ambitious target.

We have also created an important platform, the Presidential Infrastructure Co-ordinating Commission, which must ensure that the necessary investments in new electricity generation are aligned with our broader development strategy.

This Commission is drawing on expertise from across our society to ensure adequate, efficient and productive investment in infrastructure.

It provides a central instrument to achieve our aims around transforming the energy sector in particular by supporting new kinds of generation, including renewable energy.

In short, as these examples show, we as government have begun to implement the New Growth Path's commitments, including around the green economy.

But again, this is not just an issue for the state.

For this reason, we have captured our commitments in an accord with organised business, labour and other representatives of civil society who come together under the auspices of the country's National Economic Development and Labour Council or NEDLAC.

The Accord is one of the most comprehensive social partnerships on the green economy anywhere in the world.

It covers not only green investments but also our shared commitment to ensuring that the benefits of those investments are more broadly spread.

Let me highlight some of the specific elements of the accord.

First, government is committed to procuring almost 4 000 megawatts of renewable energy for the national grid by 2016.

That is more than this beautiful coastal city of Durban uses in a year. It is equal to around a tenth of national generation today.

Our electricity utility, Eskom, and business will also continue to work on technologies to further reduce emissions from coal-fired plants.

The solar and wind energy industries have targeted the creation of at least 50 000 green jobs by 2020. Government will also support the installation of one million solar water heating systems by 2014 to 2015.

That will provide the basis for expanding local production of components and heating systems.

Organised labour will work with us to help establish cooperatives to undertake installation and maintenance.

More importantly, all the parties will promote the manufacturing and distribution of clean cooking stoves and heaters for the local and continental market.

This is an often overlooked area of emissions, but it has enormous implications for the health of poor communities – which in South Africa are often shrouded in smoke in the winter.

Moreover, it should help reduce the burdens of collecting wood and cooking that are usually borne mostly by women.

Second, as the discussions at COP 17 underscore, financing is a critical component of any strategy to green our economies. We obviously need to tap into international sources.

This will be achieved partially through our Industrial Development Corporation, which will provide up to R25 billion for investments in green economy activities over the next five years.

In addition, business has committed to strengthening existing efforts by financial institutions to fund investments in the green economy. It will also actively pursue investment opportunities in manufacturing linked to renewable energy initiatives.

Organised labour will promote retirement fund investment in green investment vehicles that will create jobs and support our broader goals of greening the economy.

Third, business has committed to improving the environmental performance of existing production facilities.

It will develop benchmarks for energy efficiency by industry as well as company energy-management plans. These plans will implement the National Energy Efficiency Strategy, which targets a reduction in energy intensity of at least 10% by 2015.

Organised labour will establish joint workplace committees to discuss and implement energy efficiency plans.

It will undertake a “lights-off after hours” campaign in buildings and workplaces and educate members on the importance of energy efficiency.

Government will introduce regulations to phase out the bright light bulbs and replace them with energy efficient ones.

Fourth, government will provide a supportive regulatory environment for the biofuels industry, including the finalisation of mandatory blending regulations and incentives.

Finally, government will invest in mass-transport systems to reduce reliance on private cars. Initial steps have been taken on bus rapid transport and commuter rail.

By 2014, the state-owned commuter rail company, PRASA, will invest R20 billion in new trains, most of which will be manufactured locally.

Government will also review its rail investment programme in order to accelerate the shift of freight transport to rail from road.

The state-owned transport enterprise, Transnet, will invest about R63 billion in the freight rail system over the next five years. For its part, organised business will continue to promote greater use of rail freight by companies.

Our Green Economy Accord also includes a strong commitment to ensuring that the benefits of the activities reach young people and those historically excluded from our formal economy.

In particular, government and business have set a target of 80% youth amongst new employees in the manufacturing and installation of solar-water heating systems as well as government’s public works programmes to green the economy. Moreover, all the parties have agreed to a variety of measures and programmes to bring smaller and social enterprises into the green economy.

As you can tell from the accord, the main opportunities will arise around renewable energy; biofuels; cleaner coal; more energy efficient technologies for production; and greening our buildings.

We will, during COP 17, share our experiences while also learning from other nations who are going through similar economic transformation.

Together as governments, business, labour and other sectors, we must form strong partnerships and cooperate to achieve the objectives of COP 17, to save tomorrow, today.

This World Economic Forum roundtable offers an opportunity to forge and strengthen such partnerships.

I wish you well with the deliberations.

I thank you.

## **Appendix 6**

**Date: 6 December 2011**

### **ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JACOB ZUMA AT THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE COP17/CMP7 HIGH-LEVEL SEGMENT DURBAN**

Excellencies Heads of State and Government and leaders of delegations,

Honourable UN Secretary General Mr Ban Ki-moon,

Ministers and Deputy Ministers,

Distinguished negotiators,

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great honour and pleasure for me to welcome you to the High Level Segment of COP 17/CMP 7 in Durban, one of the holiday capitals of our country.

The past week has seen extensive preparations, formal and informal meetings, planning, negotiations and manoeuvring, to ensure that the success of the High-Level Segment.

I can safely assure my colleagues the Heads of State and Government as well as the UN Secretary General that your delegations were definitely not on holiday. They worked extremely hard to bring us to this level.

As Parties, as we meet in Durban, we are agreed on the facts and impacts of climate change which are already evident all around us.

We are agreed that this global challenge requires a global solution. However, different positions still prevail on some critical points.

However, it is important that there is common ground on the elements that will remain critical in reaching any agreement.

These are multilateralism, environmental integrity, common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities, equity, and honouring of all international commitments and undertakings made in the climate change process.

These principles have formed the basis of climate change negotiations over the years.

Only by remaining true to them, through the Party-driven process, will we be able to achieve a credible response to this challenge. I therefore encourage the parties to continue to apply these principles in the discussions and ensure that

the final outcome remains faithful to these principles. We need to show the world that Parties are ready to address the problems in a practical manner, and that they are willing to forgo the national interest at times, for the interest of humanity, no matter how difficult this may be.

As we begin the high level segment, we need to re-build trust and to re-assure one another of honest intent and commitment to find solutions for the problems caused by climate change.

By now all of us understand that Durban is a decisive moment for the future of the multilateral rules-based regime, which has evolved over many years under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol.

The 1st Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol is about to come to an end. The question that has been left unanswered from Bali is the 2nd Commitment period.

This has now become dependent on the decision on the legal nature of the outcome of the negotiations under the Convention. It is also clear that if this question is not resolved, the outcome on other matters will become extremely difficult.

In order to find a solution, Parties need to be re-assured that should some of them commit to a 2nd Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol in a legally binding manner, others would be ready to commit to a legally binding regime in the near future.

Underlying this request for re-assurance is the insistence that all Parties will implement the obligations and commitments previously undertaken, and that all will share the load to address the problem.

Parties also need assurances that adequate and sustainable long term funding will be

delivered, and that the implementation of all agreements will continue without an implementation gap occurring.

Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

We need to make a decision here in Durban that includes both the now and future

aspects of these re-assurances that are needed. On the now and immediate, we need to agree on the adoption of a 2nd Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the possibility of enhanced mechanisms and to decide on the eligibility for participation in these enhanced mechanisms.

Such an agreement should entail the adoption of an amendment of Annexure B of the Kyoto Protocol with re-assurances that Parties will implement the amendment domestically by the end of 2012. We must also agree on the formalization and implementation of the mitigation pledges of developed countries and the rules of comparability between the pledges of those Parties of the Kyoto Protocol and those Parties outside the Kyoto Protocol.

Therefore, the rules to assure comparability need to be finalized as soon as possible. An Agreement on adaptation, the establishment of the Green Climate Fund, finance,

technology transfer and capacity building must also be part of the agreement in Durban.

For the future, Parties need to pronounce on the legal nature of the outcome of the future multilateral rules based system.

This should be done in a manner that would be equal in nature to those decided on the 2nd Commitment Period.

In this future multilateral rules' based system, the level of ambition and the fact that all Parties will collectively have to do more, will have to be addressed.

We wish to underscore the point that developed countries have the responsibility to take the lead in addressing the climate change challenge.

They must lead the global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. And they must also lead through providing support to developing countries in their mitigation actions and efforts to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change.

This is consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility enshrined in the international convention on climate change.

It is common knowledge that developed countries benefitted from a high level of emissions for their own development.

It is therefore fair that developing countries be provided developmental space in a sustainable way so that they too may develop and eradicate the poverty that continues to afflict their people.

We must agree that all Parties, will have to do more to reach the agreed long-term global goal of limiting average temperature increase to below 2 degrees Celsius. We must agree as well, that the international community must honour the international commitments and undertakings made under the climate change process and not to shy away from these decisions.

Parties must secure an enhanced multilateral rules-based response to climate change that is equally binding on all. Therefore, a process needs to be established for which the 2013-2015 review could provide valuable input.

This process should also take into account what science prescribes, as well as the outcome of the 5th Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report and other work that would have been done, under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention and the Subsidiary Bodies. Parties have to consider the type of process that will be required and a specific timeframe to conclude the work.

The objective would be for the multilateral rules based system, binding on all Parties, to be implemented by no later than 2020.

Colleagues Heads of States and Government and representatives,

Esteemed participants,

Let me briefly name two other crucial elements, namely; adaptation and finance. Real action on adaptation is an essential element of the outcome. It is also a key priority for many devel

oping countries, particularly Small Island Developing States, Least Developed Countries and the African continent. The time has come for the world to move away from analysis, study and research, to identifying practical adaptation actions that can be implemented on the ground.

There can be no dispute that research and analysis are important aspects of adaptation actions. However, we now need more practical action. In this regard, the Adaptation Committee must be constituted. Its functions must be decided upon so that it can begin its work.

The Adaptation Committee should play an important role in bringing into focus, in a coherent and holistic manner, what needs to be done as far as adaptation is concerned. The committee must bring an end to the current fragmented approach to adaptation in the Convention.

The link with the funding, technology transfer, mechanisms and networks and capacity building for real and tangible adaptation actions must be established. This will give effect to the agreement that equal priority must be given to adaptation and mitigation.

And ladies and gentlemen,

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) represents a centre piece for a broader set of outcomes for Durban. Developing countries demand a prompt start for the Fund through its early and initial capitalization.

The early capitalization of the Fund and the issue of long term funding present a significant political challenge, given the current economic situation in many developed countries which, of course, is fully appreciated.

Another challenge to overcome is the lack of confidence from developing countries in the delivery and transparency of the pledged Fast Start Finance.

I am confident that all Parties will make a special effort and show the required leadership to creatively provide these assurances that can lead to consensus on all the outstanding issues. There is a lot of work to be done this week, to bring the work of Durban to a fruitful and successful conclusion.

I wish the parties well during this final push towards a meaningful outcome in Durban.

It is only by working together that we will be able to save tomorrow today.

I Thank you

## **Appendix 7**

**Date: 6 December 2011**

Opening remarks by President Jacob Zuma to the 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability – Transforming the world in an era of global change, Inkosi Albert Luthuli ICC, African Pavilion, Durban



06 December 2011

Excellencies Heads of State and Government,

Prof Johan Rockström, Chair of the 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability,

Ministers,

Ambassadors,

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is indeed an honor for me to welcome you to this august gathering of Laureates, state leaders, ministers and other distinguished participants, to discuss global sustainability and related solutions to climate change.

This UN climate change conference in Durban, COP 17/CMP7 is all the richer because of your attendance and participation.

Many of you have made an invaluable contribution to the upliftment of humanity and in the protection and sustainable use of our environment.

As COP17/CMP7 President, South Africa fully supports the Nobel Laureate Symposium in its dialogue with the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Global Sustainability.

This symposium is very important to members of the UN SG's panel as obtaining the views of a distinguished gathering like this one will certainly add value to our work.

Esteemed members;

Humanity has never been so profoundly aware of climate change, its impact and the necessity to radically reduce the emissions to save the next generations.

The developing world and Africa in particular are hardest-hit by climate change.

Apart from the climate change impact such as sea-level rise, severe droughts and floods, Africa's vulnerability also arises from the prevailing dismal levels of poverty, which limit the continent's ability to cope with the adverse effects.

The effects, as we know, are always manifold and unfortunately, also include the recurrent resource-induced conflicts such as we have seen in the Sudan over grazing land.

As we have always emphasized, a global multilateral response grounded in the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities will be the only effective and sustainable answer to this pressing global challenge.

In this regard this COP17 conference presents us with an opportunity to shape the future global response to climate change, by providing leadership and political direction for this critical process.

None is better placed than you therefore, leaders in the field of humanity, with your proven and tested credentials, to provide visionary direction.

Given the difficult global economic climate, we are fully aware that countries are concerned that decisions taken at the climate change negotiations could hamper their economic development.

We feel strongly therefore, that sustainable development and economics should be at the heart of the climate change discussions.

We have also always maintained that without multilateral rules-based system there can be no guarantee that countries will honour their commitments.

Colleagues and friends,

There are a number of issues currently on the table for discussion as you would have been briefed by respective delegations.

Finance remains one of the key issues, not only for a comprehensive climate deal, but also to place the global community on a path that will allow us to build resilient societies.

With reference to future actions, it remains of critical importance that the level of ambition should correspond to the demands of science.

Any agreement on a future response should also take into account what science prescribes, as well as the outcome of the 5th report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

It is here where Parties have to consider a definite timeframe for concluding the work that forms part of the agreement on future actions within the multilateral rules-based system which should be implemented by no later than 2020.

More importantly, as you are aware, action on adaptation is an essential element and a key priority for many developing countries, particularly Small Island Developing States, Least Developed Countries and the African continent.

Therefore, the operationalisation of the Adaptation Committee is urgent, considering its role in enhancing coherence and agreeing on activities for the next phase of the Nairobi Work Programme.

The need for dedicated financing to be made available for adaptation programmes and assistance will continue to be of critical importance in all future climate change negotiations.

We therefore urgently require a formula that will reflect these elements in a manner that can provide the required re-assurances of the commitment and full participation of all Parties, developed and developing, in the current and evolving climate change system.

Such a formula is achievable, but it will require leadership and pragmatism from all sides.

I am personally of the view that with the necessary political will, there is a window of opportunity to find this delicate formula that would safeguard the many gains.

This opportunity should not be missed.

It is also important to think beyond our national interests in these negotiations, no matter how difficult that may be. That is always the area where sound leadership is needed so that we can harmonise engagements beyond existing entrenched positions.

Developing countries fear that their economic and social development could be hampered by countries which have the greatest historical responsibility for current concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

At the same time, the share of global emissions of greenhouse gases originating in developing countries is growing rapidly, as they expand their industries to improve social and economic conditions for their citizens.

As climate change is a global problem, every country must assume responsibility to play its part in contributing to the solution.

That way we will be able to find solutions.

The developed world must continue to take the lead. On the other hand, the developing countries must show a willingness to take their fair share of responsibilities, keeping in mind the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, to deal with the challenge of climate change.

The outcome of this balance must address the urgent need of humanity as it is already suffering the effects of climate change.

The outcome must also address natural resource management, and advocate for institutions that will integrate these issues of development and natural environment.

Also important is food security, and other concerns as articulated in the Millennium Development Goals.

Esteemed colleagues and friends,

Ladies and gentlemen;

Many people have referred to this Conference as an "African COP". It is no coincidence that this event of Nobel Laureates is taking place in the Africa Pavilion.

We are happy indeed that you have decided to contribute your collective wisdom to one of the most defining issues of our time on African soil.

At the same time, I need to remind you that this is not the first COP on the African Continent. However, there is a particular way in which the African continent looks at this event.

We want you to feel the spirit of Africa and the warmth, and use it to develop strong partnerships to take forward the mammoth task of dealing with climate change and ensuring global sustainability.

This event is not like the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup tournament that we proudly hosted, where only a few soccer teams qualified, with one ultimate winner.

All countries have qualified to participate and all should be able to emerge here as winners.

According to your programme, you will continue with extensive deliberations on possible solutions for what we need to do NOW and what we agree to do in the FUTURE. I wish you all the best with those discussions.

As our message at this COP states, it is only by working together that we can truly save tomorrow today!

I thank you.

## **Appendix 8**

**Date: 7 December 2011**

### **Address by President Jacob Zuma on the occasion of the COP 17 High Level Side Event on Climate-smart Agriculture, Durban**

07 December 2011

Honourable Ministers,

Your Excellencies,

Distinguished Delegates,

Senior Officials,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is generally accepted that by 2050, there will be more than nine billion people in the world.

If this is true, agricultural production must increase by 70 percent in order to feed our growing population. Agriculture is more vulnerable to climate change than any other sector. Climate changes create risks and uncertainty with potentially serious downsides. Without strong adaptation measures, climate change could reduce food crop production by 10 to 20 percent by the 2050s, with more severe losses in Africa.

Climate-smart agriculture seeks to enhance agricultural productivity by improving on resilience. Farmers should be at the centre of this transformation of the agriculture sector. Improved agricultural practices have the potential to increase crop yields, diversify income sources and reduce the vulnerability of small farmers to climate change.

Climate-smart agriculture includes proven practical techniques – such as mulching, intercropping, conservation agriculture, crop rotation, integrated crop-livestock management, agro-forestry, improved grazing, and improved water management – and innovative practices such as better weather forecasting, more resilient food crops, and risk insurance.

No one knows exactly how the future global climate will develop and what the resultant consequences will be to all of us particularly the developing and poor countries, but impacts could be considerable.

Food security, especially in Africa, is linked to the prevailing climate.

Any long or short term changes thereof are paramount to our ability to feed our nations with high quality, affordable and accessible staple foods. Food security is important to Africa's

economy as it impacts heavily on the countries' poverty alleviation and sustainable development plans, including Millennium Development Goals.

Agriculture has a huge potential to cost-effectively reduce greenhouse gases through changes in agricultural technologies and management practices, in particular in developed countries. Improvements in water conservation and demand management and its spatial distribution, will intensify the need for safer water purification, storage, and management.

Equally important is supporting innovative institutional mechanisms that give agricultural water users incentives to conserve. Investments in rural infrastructure, both physical (such as roads, market buildings, and storage facilities) and institutional (such as extension programs, credit and input markets, and reduced barriers to internal trade) are needed to enhance the resilience of agriculture in the face of the doubts of climate change.

We need to link climate change, food security and poverty; we need to engage on emerging issues including finance and technological support and approaches such as Climate-Smart Agriculture that are geared towards addressing food security, adaptation and mitigation.

Research must help us to identify early actions and best practices to build capacity and increase resilience and carbon sequestration, while enhancing and ensuring food security. Current and on-going awareness programmes should assist the farming communities to put into place best farming practices which will promote sustainable agriculture and thereby contributing towards the green economy.

The ruin of natural resources (land, water, and biological diversity) threatens the livelihoods of the poor, particularly in rural areas, where they rely heavily on them. Increasing poverty, in turn, limits the range of available options with regard to the sustainable management of these finite resources. The exhaustion of natural resources contributes directly to the scourge of climate change.

The African continent is one of those continents which will be badly affected by climate change. In spite of recent economic growth in many countries of the region, poverty continues to be Africa's overwhelming development challenge.

This is associated in most cases with insufficient access to modern energy and other basic infrastructure like safe drinking water and sanitation, irrigation for crops and well-maintained rural roads. In the coming decades, in an effort to meet the Millennium Development Goals on poverty and hunger, the agriculture need to develop and grow at an exceptional absolute rate involving intensification of crop and animal production.

While this growth must target the needs of increasing population, it will certainly put an extra pressure on agricultural lands and will have to be achieved against reduced water availability, in particular in the agriculture-based economies. Good farming practices follow ecosystem-based approaches designed to improve sustainability of crop-livestock production systems, aiming to meet consumer needs for high quality, safe products produced in an environmentally and socially responsible way.

Evidence suggests that market incentives and the right mix of policy instruments can improve sustainable farming practices and farmers' incomes. Governments should consider promoting organic farming systems. Organic agriculture has a smaller footprint on the natural resource base and the health of agricultural workers than conventional agriculture.

In short, Food security, poverty and climate change are closely linked and should not be considered separately. Climate-smart agriculture offers a “triple win” for food security, adaptation, and mitigation.

Climate-smart farming techniques such as mulching, crop remainder management, and soil and water conservation measures, can increase farm productivity and incomes, and make agriculture more resilient to climate change, while also contributing to mitigation.

Adaptation enhances food security and can potentially contribute to reducing agriculture’s greenhouse gas emissions. Strong adaptation measures, as well as the financing required to support them, are essential if we are to reach our poverty alleviation and food security goals. We should not separate agricultural productivity, strengthening farmers’ resilience to climate change and take away carbon. Many programs across the globe as well as here in Africa have applied this integrated approach.

This COP 17 meeting represents a unique opportunity for Africa to shape the global climate agenda and strengthen the focus on climate change and agriculture through a work program on adaptation, and a separate work program on mitigation, both of which must be informed by science.

Climate-smart agriculture provides for an environmentally sound and affordable way for smallholders to intensify production in marginal areas and offers promising export opportunities for developing countries which have in many cases an inherent comparative advantage due to relatively abundant labour supply and relatively low use of agro-chemicals.

Several studies show that the use of organic methods of farming by small producers in developing countries can lead to an increase in crop yields and thus enhance food security among the poor. Sustainable crop and livestock systems provide ecosystem services that restore productivity, conserve soil, water and biodiversity, take away carbon, regulate climate and provide landscape and cultural values.

Policies that address the drivers of land ruin and build capacities at all levels for sustainable land use and wide adoption of sustainable land management practices need to be developed and adapted to local circumstances. It is equally important to provide incentives for producers to encourage sustainable farming practices and investments in soil conservation and water use efficiency.

These are some of the reasons why countries of the world should consider adopting climate-smart agriculture or sustainable agriculture as some of us call it. Climate-smart agriculture seeks to increase sustainable productivity, strengthen farmers’ resilience, reduce agriculture’s greenhouse gas emissions and increase carbon sequestration. It strengthens food security and delivers environmental benefits.

Governments can direct public investments, institutional reforms, and development programs towards smallholders in ways that encourage further public and private agricultural and rural development investments.

Investments in agriculture development and incentives provided to local farmers must be complemented by macro-economic policies to ensure sustainability. Investments in core public goods, science, infrastructure, and human capital, combined with better policies and institutions, are major drivers of agricultural productivity growth.

It is clear that climate change poses a serious threat not only to agricultural production but the economy as a whole. By tackling climate change in a coordinated effort we will increase the positive spin-offs and benefits to the agricultural communities and economy.

Thank you once again for the opportunity to address you on this important topic, during these critical discussions on saving humanity and the future.

I thank you.

## **Appendix 9**

**Date: 8 December 2011**

Address by President Jacob Zuma at the launch of COP 17 Legacy Projects in Groutville, KwaZulu-Natal

08 December 2011

Honourable Premier,

Ministers and Deputy Ministers,

Mayors and councilors,

Representatives of United Nations agencies,

Representatives of the private sector,

Good afternoon to you all.

We meet in Groutville, a town that is home to one of the most outstanding leaders of our country and continent, Chief Albert Luthuli.

This visionary, who was a president general of the African National Congress, was the first South African to receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

He left behind a rich political legacy and a collection of wisdom that we continue to draw from each day, as we work to build a better Africa and a better world.

The 17th conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP 17 is meeting at the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Convention Centre, named after this great South African hero.

It is befitting therefore, that we come to Groutville to pay our respects to his memory and legacy.

Last week, the family buried his son, Mr Sulenkosi Luthuli. We extend our deepest condolences to the family during this sad time.

Ladies and gentlemen,

One of South Africa's major challenges for poverty eradication particularly in the rural communities is access to electricity.

People have to burn wood and coal to get some sort of energy which causes health-related problems such as pneumonia and asthma.

Further economic consequences include productive time consumed by collecting wood, and the costs of achieving energy security can be expensive.

Environmental consequences are equally concerning, with deforestation and local air pollution being the typical outcomes of reliance on natural and fossil fuels for energy.

We are working on solutions already.

Today we launch the pilot project to tackle energy access in rural areas which has been made possible through a partnership between the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), its implementing agency, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO).

They have been working with additional support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and their South African partners, the Departments of Energy and Environmental Affairs.

This approach complements the country's move towards improving the energy efficiency of existing applications and ensuring that a greater proportion of the energy mix is comprised of renewable sources, as a sustainable and climate-friendly approach to energy security for all.

Nineteen (19) clinics in KwaZulu-Natal are being retrofitted with solar water heaters, which include the clinic here in Groutville, KwaDukuza Local Municipality, which is part of the iLembe District Municipality. In addition to the installation of the solar water heaters at the clinic, solar water heaters have also been installed at the two primary schools, Dr Vilakazi Primary and Aldinville Primary as well as boundary lighting at Dr Vilakazi Primary.

A select number of households in close proximity to the clinic are also recipients of renewable energy and energy efficient technologies.

Thanks to one of the project sponsors, these households have now received energy efficient cooking stoves together with solar powered torches, lanterns and energy efficient indoor lighting.

The impact of this intervention will be the reduced use of carbon-intensive electricity from the grid as well as reduced timber and coal for heating and cooking.

This will contribute to the scale up of greater use of solar-powered sources of energy.

This intervention will also address the health implications associated with the burning of timber and coal; the costs associated with buying electricity and coal; and the productivity losses in collecting timber for energy purposes.

We congratulate all partners in this important project.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We have a second announcement to make here in Groutville.

At the COP17 talks last week, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Economic Development Department opened a pledge challenge to companies, trade unions and individuals to make a financial pledge to install solar water heaters on the rooftops of a number of houses in Groutville, home of Chief Albert Luthuli.

This is a tribute to his contribution to the country and the world, and also as a legacy of COP17 to the people of this province.



The response has been excellent. Companies, workers and even school children have made contributions. We have in 10 days raised money and matching grants for installing solar water heaters in 500 homes, which will bring hot water to more than 3 000 residents.

We thank all who contributed to this wonderful and innovative project.

More details will be made available tomorrow morning by the Minister of Economic Development at the COP17 venue in Durban.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today has been an important occasion.

We have launched a multi-lateral commitment to advancing integrated energy solutions to rural communities.

The interventions announced today will ease energy poverty while addressing the country's development goals without compromising the environment.

The people of Groutville and surroundings will always remember COP 17 as the UN climate change conference that brought a difference to their lives in practical terms.

We will continue building on this path towards a sustainable, environmentally friendly future.

I thank you.

## **Appendix 10**

### **2009 – COP 15**

#### **Address by President Jacob Zuma at UN Climate Change Conference, Copenhagen, 18 December 2009**

<http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009/jzum1221.html>

Excellencies, Your Majesties,

We have all gathered here because we understand the enormous challenge we face as a result of climate change.

A lot of work has been done over a period of time by our negotiators as well as the United Nations to assist the world to reach agreement.

Climate change is a practical matter for the developing world, especially Africa.

For countries such as South Africa, weather patterns in coastal provinces are already wreaking havoc on the lives of our people, which makes this challenge a reality that we are already confronting.

We came here knowing that reaching an agreement would be critical for future generations to avoid fundamental and irreversible changes in climate.

We knew that the outcome of this Conference would have to give effect to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility enshrined in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Some facts are already well known. Developed countries are historically responsible for 80 percent of the current emissions in the atmosphere.

Developing countries are most affected by climate change.

As they justifiably pursue their own development paths, it is expected that developing countries' emissions will increase.

In the long-term, we need an agreement that recognises the common responsibility of all nations to reduce emissions, while not retarding the development of developing countries.

Our view remains that all developed countries must commit to ambitious, legally binding emission reduction targets, in with historical responsibility and in line with needs of science.

Developing countries should commit to nationally appropriate mitigation action, to achieve a decline in emissions relative to business as usual.

This would be conditional on finance, technology and capacity building support from developed countries.

Developing countries are ready to play their part in reducing global emissions, but obviously rich countries have to take the lead.

With financial and technological support from developed countries, South Africa for example will be able to reduce emissions by 34% below 'business as usual' levels by 2020 and by 42% by 2025.

We wanted a complete, legally binding agreement, but accept the progress that has been made in COP 15.

We support the fact that parties will continue negotiating two complementary binding instruments: one under the UN Convention and one under the Kyoto Protocol.

We have made progress in that we have been able to isolate the areas of agreement and disagreement.

We need to move with speed to finalise the areas of disagreement, in order to conclude a legally binding agreement for the sake of future generations.

We, the leaders of the world, need to seize our historical responsibility to act now to safeguard the future of humanity and the planet it inhabits.

We owe it to current and future generations.

I thank you.

## Appendix 11

### 2010 – COP 16

**Closing remarks by President Jacob Zuma to the Heads of State and Government Dialogue at the UNFCCC climate change conference, Cancun, Mexico, 9 DECEMBER 2010.**

#### **"THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT SHOULD OUR LEGACY BE"**

Excellency President Felipe Calderon,  
Excellencies Heads of State and Government,  
Honourable Ministers,

We congratulate our colleague and friend, President Calderon for the successful organization of this important conference, and also the outstanding hospitality extended to our delegations.

As the hosts of the next round of talks, the 17th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in Durban next year, we have learned a lot from Mexico.

Our participation here is valuable indeed and we appreciate the offers of support from the Mexicans and other nations.

The theme of this Leader's Dialogue places a heavy responsibility on us as leaders to look to the future. It enjoins us to think now about how future generations will judge us, based on our response to the challenge of climate change.

The world is waiting for good news and progress to emerge from these negotiations. They look up to us to come up with meaningful solutions.

The Bali Roadmap set the two track framework for negotiations under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, in accordance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibility and respective capability.

We dare not delay.

The climate is changing and regions such as Africa and small island states are becoming more vulnerable as we spend hours, months and years deliberating.

Drought in Africa, flooding in the Phillipines, Pakistan and China, wild fires in Russia and other parts of the world are warnings of what lies ahead if we do not act sooner.

It is estimated that in some African countries yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50% in the next 20 years.

In addition, between seventy five and two hundred and fifty million people are projected to be exposed to increased water stress by 2020.

Health impacts will also magnify the challenges of food and water insecurity. Increasing strain on the resilience of many ecosystems will affect the livelihoods of people living in rural areas.

Considering that the effect of climate change is already felt by most developing countries, it is important that urgent steps be taken to help them adapt to as well as mitigate the impact of climate change.

The Copenhagen Accord provides political direction in this respect by encouraging developed countries to provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity building for adaptation action in developing countries. The Cancun negotiations must help us move forward.

The talks have to produce a multilateral climate change regime that is fair, inclusive and effective, keeping temperature to well below two degrees celsius above pre-industrial levels.

In fact more recent science indicates that one point five degrees celsius is the safe limit.

We also urge that the multilateral climate change regime must strike a balance between climate and development imperatives. It must also not jeopardize economic growth and poverty eradication priorities of developing countries.

Through our actions, we also need to respond to the notion that there is a trade-off to be made between faster economic growth and the preservation of our environment.

We must prove that faster economic growth can be achieved alongside the sustainable management of our natural resources.

That is the route we are following in South Africa. We are exploring further the concept of 'green jobs', including scaling up labour-intensive natural resource management practices which contribute to decent work and livelihood opportunities.

We are in particular, amongst others, pursuing investments in projects and industries in the fields of renewable energy, marine aquaculture development, wildlife management, waste services as well as ecosystems rehabilitation programmes.

There are many other initiatives that industrialized nations can pursue and which some are pursuing already to protect the future, while not destroying industries and jobs. We emphasise the view that the multilateral climate change regime must proactively support sustainable development by enabling a transition to a low carbon economy, and an equal balance of emphasis on adaptation and mitigation.

This can be achieved by ensuring that adaptation is recognized as an international responsibility requiring an international legal framework, to enable and support the implementation of large scale adaption programmes at international, regional and national levels.

As agreed in Bali, the most effective and politically acceptable way to urgently deliver on these requirements is through an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to establish a second commitment period, with a comparable legally binding outcome under the Convention.

Colleagues,

We strongly believe that we must leave Cancun having agreed on the over-arching decisions on the legal form of the eventual outcome of negotiations under the Convention and the continued negotiation of a 2nd Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol.

There must also be decisions on a roadmap and timelines for further negotiations as well as decisions to support implementation in the short term.

This will enable Durban to build on what has been achieved in Cancun, and to ensure that future generations inherit a world that is sustainable and climate resilient.

Working together we can do more.  
Acting now costs far less than acting later