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FROM AFGHANI TO KHOMEINI

The State in Modern Islamic Political Thought

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INTRODUCTION

Political Islam is today perhaps the most maligned feature of how we have come to view the religion of Islam as we encounter it. From what we perceive as the ‘powerless’, ‘silenced’ and veiled women of the Middle East and Afghanistan, to the global threat of Jihadi terrorism, from Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the corrupt autocracies of the oil-wealthy Gulf states; these luminescent ciphers have highlighted to us the dangers posed by political Islam. In the public domain, media and to a slightly lesser extent, even amongst academic circles, political Islam is the most obvious symptom of Islam and the broader Muslim world’s inability to deal with modernity, secularise and advance along the continuum of the Weberian ideal-type society.

Many countries, as varied as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, claim to be Islamic states in the world today. The image of a robed, turbaned cleric, best epitomised by the solemn face of the Ayatollah Ruhullah Mousavi Khomeini conjures up the mental image of the modern Islamic state. Just as Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara – framed in that almost surreal photograph captured by Alberto Korda on the morning following the failed ‘Bay of Pigs’ invasion – the image of Khomeini is a totemic symbol to many people who feel they are oppressed. These images for others however point to the dangers of populism, violent or rhetorical struggle and most importantly, the two greatest threats to modern ‘civilisation’: Third World Communism and political Islam.
When the Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of the *Wilayat-e Faqih*, the ‘Guardianship of the Jurisconsult’, was approved by the Constitution of the newly revolutionised Islamic Republic of Iran and acknowledged with the official title of Supreme Leader or *Wali-e Faqih*; it marked the evolution of over a century of modern Islamic political thought. The history of modern Islamic political thought did not begin with the 19th century Islamic ideologue Sayyid Jamal-ad-Din Afghani, nor did it end with Khomeini. But it is generally the majority opinion that a modern political discourse emerged with Afghani’s writings (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5).

As for Khomeini, never in the modern history of political Islam had the theoretical so effectively been transformed into the empirical. For the first time, the actual theories of an ideologue became the official ruling mantra of an entire state, an entire nation, perhaps for some in the western world, an entire religion. In Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries, the thoughts of clerics and classic or modernist Islamic discourse did indeed guide some of the workings of the state such as the judiciary. But in no other country was the prime institutional mechanism of the state defined so completely by one man and his theories.

The institutionalising of the *Wilayat* not only marked the first time that this happened, it also represented the apogee of modern political Islamic thought. The history of modern Islamic political thought cannot be separated from the emergence and crystallisation of the modern nation-state. In reality, the ideologues that will be studied in this paper all reacted to the idea of the ‘state’, and their writings are primarily enunciations of how the state should work, guided by Islam.
There have been extremely thorough historical analyses of modern political Islam (Enayat 1982), while others have outlined political Islam and its relation to the broader Islamic modernist discourse (Tayob 2009). Others have tried to grapple with the failure of political Islam (Roy 1994). The Islamic state has also been historically analysed by Feldman (2008) but the basis of this analysis was legal and historical, highlighting the link and tension between rulers of the Islamic state, the clerical establishment and the mediating influence of the interpretation of the body of Islamic law (the Shariah).

But very few have attempted to use Political Science as an analytical tool in analysing this history and perhaps the most central variable in the enunciation of modern political Islamic thought: the state. The novelty then of this study lies in analysing and tracing the evolution of the idea of the state, from the works of Jamal-ad-Din Afghani, to those of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

This paper is almost entirely theoretical, and unashamedly so. The argument of this paper, that the state has transformed in the discourse would not have been thorough enough, nor analytically balanced in depth and space if the paper focused at great length on a single empirical study. Starting with the research question, ‘how has the state come to be theorised in modern political Islamic thought?’ this paper proposes that the Islamic state reacted to its external environment as well as the legacies and theories of preceding generations of Muslim political ideologues.

The state in modern Islamic political discourse can be periodised into three distinct phases. The first represented the age of revivalism where the state could be used as
an instrument to revive Islam for Afghani. The second age represented the intermediate phase and followed the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The final phase marked the period that coincided with the failure and corruption of post-colonial states.

For the earlier theorists, the state was seen as the classic Hobbesian, Weberian and Machiavellian state that focused on the state’s role to rule by maintaining order with a bureaucracy in place to run this territory. The state was an ‘instrument’ to effect change for a Muslim polity and to sustain control. A major transformation of the state then begun to emerge in the 20th century, eventually culminating in the state becoming more ‘normativised’, if such a word can be used. The basis of this is the analytical conception of the state as a ‘normative order’ as conceptualised by Geertz (1980) and Krasner (1984). Within this conception, the state was no more an intervener, instrument or a means to an end in politics. It now became the end in itself.

The state was no longer a loosely conceptualised body that should be utilised to revive Islam as it was in the works of Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, but now it became the very embodiment of Islam. Islam could not be lived in society and life without the Islamic State serving a totalising realm that incorporated and collapsed the religious, political and social. But even in the later conceptions, this paper argues that the instrumentalist role of the state did not entirely dissipate. In fact these theorists were forced to resort to instrumentalism in small ways because the history of political Islam itself could not escape from the classical view of the state.
However the instrumentalism transformed from being the instrumentalism of Afghani where the state was at the service of reviving Islam, to the instrumentalism of Rida where the state could help establish a real society of justice, and finally the qualified instrumentalism of Mawdudi and Khomeini where the state was subject to God’s ownership of its domain and thus ‘God’s sovereignty’. The Islamic state became increasingly theorised as an obligation of religion, whereas for the earlier theorists it was a means at religions disposal. Its structure or form was not conceptualised as unique at its earliest enunciations and there was very little if any compulsion to establish a certain form of government, whether this be republican, constitutional or monarchic.

The paper’s utility lay in not simply writing-off the Islamic state as a failure of Islam to deal with modernity and separating religion and state as other studies have done. But its usefulness lay in highlighting the way the state has transformed and the repercussions of this for Political Scientists in the comparative field. Simply writing something off does little in trying to gain a clearer understanding of the state in political Islam. Identifying the culmination of the Wilayat-e Faqih as the zenith of the evolution of Islamic political thought, helps to highlight and periodise the epochal shift in the course of Islamic modernism. As colonialism and corruption weighed down Muslims, the trajectory of political Islam veered into investing the state with Divinity and thus unconstrained power. This is what we can refer to as its ‘normativisation’.

In terms of structure, this essay will first conceptualise the most important themes that guide an understanding of this paper. Thereafter, it will introduce the Political
Science conception of the state as instrumentalist against the state as normative order. The third section will focus on the pioneering work on modern political Islam and its focus on revivalism. The fourth section will focus on the intermediate phase, where modern political thought had reached a crossroad. The fifth and final section will focus on fundamentalism, and the increasing focus on a totalising Islamic normative order, whilst being sensitive to the tension that lay between the normativised state and the instrumentalist state.
1. CONCEPTUALISATION

1.1 Textual Sources of Islamic Law & Jurisprudence

The textual source of codifying law or presenting a theological argument in Islam relies on four hierarchical sources of descending order which was constructed between the 7th and 12th centuries. The first and most substantial is the Qur’an which is viewed as the literal word of God. If a canon is explicitly mentioned within the Qur’an, it is viewed as an inviolable commandment (Enayat 1982, 105). The second textual source is the science of hadith which are the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. These rely on the sunnah (ways) of his daily life. His companions memorised and passed on his sayings and habits through oral history, and this was collated as written history a century or two later (Feldman, 16 March 2008).

Those who specialised in this science of collecting and writing these traditions (Muhadithun) paid careful attention to the chain of narration and characters of the transmitters and categorised these traditions accordingly, from the very strong to the very weak. Yet because we are speaking of humans who by nature are wont to exaggeration and political and other expediencies, some Muslim modernists have doubted the veracity of many of the Prophetic traditions. If something is not found in the Qur’an, the hadith is the most authoritative text in this regard (Enayat 1982, 148).

When new issues arose that were unexplained or ambiguous in both the Qur’an and hadith, the classical scholars resorted to two other methods. The third source is the
consensus (Ijma) of the most senior jurists and this corresponds somewhat to judicial precedent in western common law. Jurists would generally, though not always follow the majority view (Feldman, 16 March 2008). The final source is the application of analogical reasoning (Qiyas) which purposively applies logic to understanding and comparing how the substantive issue at stake may produce a new ruling that is still consistent with the substantive teachings of the Qur’an and hadith (Enayat 1982, 148).

1.2 The Shariah

The Shariah is a contested term that has come to imply much in the contemporary world. Although conceived by many as interchangeable with Islamic law, this is very much a modern reading (Feldman, 16 March 2008). Literally meaning ‘the path’, the Shariah at its core refers to the ‘totality’ of God’s will revealed to the Prophet, which encompasses the explicit injunctions of the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions (Mir-Hosseini 2007, 2) such as the prohibition of murder.

Islamic Law as it came to be constructed is in fact called Fiqh (jurisprudence) and is the applied textual jurisprudence of the classical jurists from the four sources of Islamic texts. With reference to its application in the articulation of the Islamic state, we shall see later that the distinction that existed between the two eventually collapsed so that Fiqh became interchangeable with the Shariah as Divine injunction. Some Muslim modernists have decried the blurring of this distinction because they view the Shariah as irreproachable and Divine to Muslims. On the other hand they view Fiqh as human interpretation, something that is a plainly
human endeavour, and thus something that is imperfect. Jurisprudence for them must be contextualised amidst the backdrop of the context of primordial power relations (Mir-Hosseini 2007, 2-4).

For Mir-Hosseini (2007, 2-11) the new system of social organisation that the state has brought has in effect politicised Fiqh. Whereas in the past the scope for applying Fiqh institutionally was curtailed, the modern state apparatus has granted wide-ranging power. This is because it has become instituted and the social and human science of Fiqh is now portrayed as the Divine law of Shariah. For the early jurists there was a distinction between ‘ritual’ rulings which they admittedly conceded were limited in scope for change and rational application, and ‘social/contractual acts’ which were contextual and thus evolutionary. Thus, rulings of Fiqh which are ‘social/contractual acts’ must necessarily be open for re-evaluation (Mir-Hosseini 2007, 3-4).

But this collapsing if not expressly approved of, is nonetheless of less importance to many Muslims today. This is because the core of the divine injunctions and the Shariah as a hope to institute a better society go beyond mere sets of laws, but represents a chance to live Islam in its entirety and regenerate the political landscape of their fledgling countries. The Shariah for many Muslims today “connotes a connection to the divine, a set of unchanging beliefs and principles that order life in accordance with God’s will (Feldman, 16 March 2008).

The Shariah is best thought of as a ‘higher law’ which although to some may incorporate the entire corpus of Islamic law, is more reliant on its guiding principles
to social life and desire for justice. For some Muslims such as the Wahabi and Salafi groupings in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, the Shariah incorporates both the Qur’an and hadith as both are connections to the Divine. This is because the Qur’an was God’s literal word, and the way of life of the Prophet was divinely guided. These groups typically criticise blind following of the classical jurists especially in regard to citing consensus or independent analogy as canon, the third and fourth source of jurisprudence. They argue rather that independent juristic ability should be granted to modern scholars and even the layman, if something is not present in the Qur’an or the hadith (Piscatori 1989, 61-2).

1.3 Sunni Islam and Shi’a Islam

Shi’ism and political Islam are almost inextricable from each other. The very establishment of the Shi’a sect occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. and was politically motivated. It had to do with the issue of succession of the Muslim empire. Upon the Prophet’s death, his best friend and father-in-law Abu Bakr was chosen as his successor by a council of the closest confidants to the deceased Prophet. Ali, the Prophet’s first cousin and son-in-law, is purported to not have been present when this council came to its decision (Rahnema and Nomani 1990, 19-20).

After Abu Bakr two more Caliphs, Umar and Usman, were chosen as successors until the reign of Ali. For Sunni’s all three successors as well as Ali, are equally respected as Khulafa Rashidun or ‘rightfully-guided successors/caliphs’, with no
claim to any divine characteristics. They are thought of as those that are mentioned in the *hadith* as successors that are *Rashidun* because of their virtue and perhaps the exaggerated belief that their reigns were unconstrained by corruption and deviation. However, Shiites believe that the three Caliphs in between effectively usurped power because the Prophet had declared Ali his successor whilst on his return journey to Medina en-route from his last pilgrimage to Mecca (Rahnema and Nomani 1990, 19). Sunni scholars dispute this claim of the Shi’a as fabrication (Abd al-Raziq 2000, 99-100).

Despite being one of the richest men in Mecca at the time of conversion, Abu Bakr for his worth was unswervingly loyal to the Prophet. Ali for his part did pledge his political fealty (*bay’a*) to Abu Bakr. It was Abu Bakr who is reported to have uttered the guidance and consolatory words to the confused Muslim community upon the Prophet’s death, which have now become immortalised (Heikal 1981, 76):

> Whosoever amongst you worshipped Muhammad, then know that Muhammad is dead. And whosoever (amongst you) worshipped God; then know that God is Alive, He shall never die.

Aside from the polemics that go with the debate, the ‘Twelver’ (*Ithna Asharia*) sect of Shiites which most Iranians are, form the majority of worldwide Shi’is. They are largely based in Iraq and Iran, and Khomeini and perhaps Afghani were also ‘Twelvers’ (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). They believe that the hereditary line of the Prophet’s family were the rightful successors to the Islamic empire, both as temporal political leaders, as well as spiritual leaders of the entire Muslim communities. Ali was the first in a line of Twelve Imams from this hereditary line which is called the ‘*Ahl-ul-Bayt*’ (Bakhash 1991, 1479).
These Imams, for Shiites, are accorded the same status as all the Prophets (including Jesus and Moses) and are infallible. The twelfth of these Imams disappeared into an underground chamber in Hilla in 873 A.D and never returned. Twelver Shiites believe that he is in occultation and will reappear to bring victory to them and moral justice to the world, hence the designation ‘Twelvers’ (Rahnema and Nomani 1990, 20). While there are myriad other Shiite sects, not to mention Sunni sects, and while differences in beliefs can range far further than this explanation presupposes, this basic cursory explanation in the context of this paper shall suffice. Although figures are disputed, Shiites today make up roughly between 8 and 15% of the total Muslim population in the world. In Iran, approximately 90% of all citizens are Shi’a (Hunter 1987, 92).
2. The State in Political Science

The state as envisaged by Political Scientists and philosophers, from Aristotle to the behavioural revolution, has undergone immense theoretical and empirical changes. Muslim scholars such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) have also contributed to the political philosophy body we have at our disposal today. Irrespective of the different methods in analysing the state, the concept of the ‘state’ is premised on theoretical similarities, despite the differing empirical methods (Barkey and Parikh 1991, 525).

But despite all of this, conventional social sciences have classically looked at the state as one of rule and control, even in the most behavioural and pluralist of explanations. As a guide to viewing the state in modern Islamic thought, this paper will make a simple distinction between two broad ways the state has been treated. To simplify our analysis, it ignores the internal divisions within the vast body of western social science and picks up on the distinction made by Geertz (1980).

2.1 The Conventional View on the State versus the State as Normative Order

The conventional view on the state is largely Machiavellian, Hobbesian and Weberian. From Machiavelli it inherited issues of rule and control. For Machiavelli a
state needed arms to defend itself and laws to run its society. Without establishing control a state could not carry out its implementation of law and order:

> The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws (Machiavelli 1992, 12).

From Weber state discourse inherited what Geertz (1980, 133) calls “Weber’s ‘iron cage’”. This cage is a teleological explanation, which culminates in states establishing dominion over its territory and instituting a bureaucratic administration to administer affairs of the state, through a legal order. This continuum was in the image of the trajectory of western states. A bureaucratic administration for Weber “is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings” while the state is a “human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force (emphasis mine) within a given territory...the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate...violence (Weber 1958, 78).”

The state’s main function is dominion and establishing largely identifiable borders; instituting a political and administrative apparatus in place to run this territory and an acknowledgement by others that it is indeed a sovereign entity (Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz 1994, 4). Even in the most pluralist explanations where the state is seen as a complex platform wherein is aggregated the competing interests of groups in society, interest groups and civil society; the state is still seen as ‘instrumentalist’ since it is the platform where these interests are reconciled.
Likewise the state is also an instrument, though in a different way, to the other end of the spectrum which sees the state as instrumentalist in ensuring that society does not descend into anarchy through its institution of government and a social contract that mediates its relationships to society; which in turn provides peace and prevents anarchy (Hobbes 1975).

The ‘state as normative order’ has been given taxonomical currency by Krasner (1984) as one way the state has been analysed in Comparative Politics. The state as normative order is based on Clifford Geertz now immortalised study *Negara: the Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (1980), although Geertz himself does not refer to his approach as such. For Geertz (1980, 121), the state in political discourse has three etymological themes compacted within it:

status in the sense of station, standing, rank, condition—*estate* (“The glories of our Blood and state”); pomp, in the sense of splendo[r], display, dignity, presence—*stailness* (“In pomp ride forth; for pomp becomes the great/And Majesty derives a grace from state”); and governance in the sense of regnancy, regime, dominion, mastery—*statecraft* (“It may pass for a maxim in state that the administration cannot be placed in too few a hands, nor the legislature in too many”).

For Geertz, reliant on rule and control, the last definition of state, statecraft; the latest and most modern, has come to dominate the analysis of the state since Machiavelli in the 16th century. This definition has all but completely obscured and extirpated the other two etymological themes and the “multiplex nature of high authority (Geertz 1980, 121).” But when it comes to the symbolic dimension of why people do what they do, western political thought has been incapable of providing any conception beside the basic command-and-obedience conception (Geertz 1980, 21).
Political symbology is simply an aspect that is dependent on the real business of politics: social domination and political monopoly of violence that is the state’s true function. These analyses although claiming to be different approaches to the state in actuality all accentuate the mechanics of society and completely ignore the poetics of that society (Geertz 1980, 122-3). But in the Negaras (states) of Bali, Geertz’s case study, status was not simply the oppression of a ruling class, but it entirely represented life. Status, caste and station were not simply feudal relations, but to every Balinese it was the very definition of life. It was the “axis around which the public life of society revolved (Geertz 1980, 123).”

The status of an individual represented that person’s relation and distance from Divinity. Theoretically this status was life’s given and not a contingency of social class. Status translated into actual emotions and compulsions that come with it and mediate all the acts that were political. The Balinese Negara “drew its force, which was real enough, from its imaginative energies, its...capacity to make inequality enchant (Geertz 1980, 123).”

The state did not rely on force or exploitation to intervene as an instrument and structure status groups and subservience, but it was the very embodiment of how a reality of political acts and life was arranged. In doing this, it was a representation of life itself and the “model-and-copy conception of order”, rather than order based on control. This model-and-copy order was that held by the king. To construct a state in Bali, you had to construct a great king of pomp beyond other kings (Geertz 1980, 123).
And this king who was indistinguishable from the state in a united realm represented what power was, and in his court ceremonies, dramatic plays, court titles and eulogies; represented the entirety of the political and social life:

The more consummate the king, the more exemplary the centre. The more exemplary the centre, the more actual the realm (Geertz 1980, 124).

The hierarchy of statehood and its kings “were not defenders of the faith, Vicars of god, or Mandatories of Heaven, they were the thing itself-incarnations of the Holy as such...The rajas, maharajas, radadirajas, devarajas, and so on were so many hierophanies, sacred objects, that...displayed the divine direct (Geertz 1980, 124).” Those that connected the sacred to the populace were the priests who were the emblematic executers of divineness. Priests were “parts of the king’s regalia...‘the foremost of the king’s jewels’...the hilt of the king’s kris...learned in religious law, adept in ritual...wondrously virtuous...not simply a royal adornment, a symbol of royal authority, but rather an embodiment of part of that authority, and extension of the king’s official person (Geertz 1980, 126).”

The priest was the guide to the populace with his relationship to the king demonstrating the ideal relationship. This relationship exemplifies the perfect relation between ruler and subject and was the example to the populace of how to serve one’s God (Geertz 1980, 127). God owned the realm and the state was the religious design reflected in the hierarchies within a ‘sacred space’. This hierarchy of exemplars reflected the nature of life and relationship to the God. The gradation of king, the priest, the landlord, the peasant all required the other
for the realm to make sense. Each lower one was a coarser version of the caste above and was not in the Marxist analysis less real, but rather just less exquisite and less potent (Geertz 1980, 128-31).

All those that resided in the realm and benefitted from its blessings and energies were collectively responsible for meeting the ritual and moral obligations that this entailed. The political community was not separate from the realm “and at base was not a social, political or economic unit, but a religious one (Geertz 1980, 129).” The king who sat at the apex had to project an enormous calm, whether in court ceremony or in perception, at the centre of the state and realm. But he was also significantly a “political actor, power among powers as well as sign among signs (Geertz 1980, 131).”

Standard political theory has come to define the political as the sphere of social action, about mastery and control. This is not erroneous, but it glosses over other factors because of its own trajectory of historical interpretation. 19th Century Bali on the other hand provides a discrete conception of what “politics is about and what power comes to. A structure of action, now bloody, now ceremonious, the Negara was also, and as such a structure of thought. To describe it is to describe a constellation of ideas (Geertz 1980, 135).”

The western social sciences argues Geertz (1980, 135), despite “its topical and practical modernity” is actually deficient in reality because it cannot explain the power of ideas, symbols and what these evoke, represent and signify, and how this can be lived in the empirical. Just as arguments and texts can be read and
analysed, so too can rituals, palaces, technologies, and social formations (Geertz 1980, 135).

The mechanical aspects such as village politics and the spiritual ones such as myth and ceremony were entirely part of the political in the realm of the state. Geertz (1980, 135-6) decries the tendency of interpretative analysis to relegate the symbolic to ‘cultural’ analyses which in turn is based on western prejudice. Cultural analyses treat their case studies as fetishes and completely miss the point. This downgrades the ‘symbolic’ to the dichotomous opposite of the ‘real’ as is the dichotomies of the “fanciful to [the] sober, figurative to literal, obscure to plain, aesthetic to practical, mystical to mundane, and decorative to substantial (Geertz 1980, 136).”

Geertz’s conception of the state as normative order are not simply relevant to Bali in the 19th century, but it directs us to the facet of the state that is present in all states, only less apparent because of ‘Weber’s iron cage’ in modern politics (Krasner 1984, 233, Geertz 1980, 133). The realm of the state was of ultimate unity and people did not obey simply because of the threat of force and monopoly of violence that the state possessed, but they obeyed because there was no alternate reality and their lives was a reflection of all contained in the ‘princely realm’ of the state.

The controlling ideal and norm is the adhesive on which the actual state rests on. In this way shared realities, symbols and beliefs, not the threat of force or the power or instrumental nature of government, prevents institutional anarchy (Migdal 1994,
The rules that bound society were not obeyed out of any rational choice but because the laws "stand for the fact that a common, thus, moral life exists, and they celebrate the common life and make it compelling (Eckstein 1982, 472)."

The symbols that were entirely internalised in the workings of the state “embodied” and represented the “basic political and ethical sentiments that permeate[d] the polity”. This was “a fundamental institutional constraint that channels the behavior of individuals even to the point of endangering or sacrificing their lives (Krasner 1984, 233).” The encompassing sphere of the state sustains the ethical and moral needs of citizens through its ‘normative order’, such that alien conquest or ascendancy implies “a loss for all citizens because it means the destruction or severe weakening of the individual's social and moral community (Krasner 1984, 233).”

This is in stark contrast to the Weberian ideal-type state which has come to dominate standard political thought and its analyses. These analyses largely equate the state with governance or statecraft, rule and control. The ceremonial role of the state has traditionally been viewed as a device or ‘instrument’ to legitimate the ruling system or foster nationalistic spirit, not as an end in itself.

For others such as Marx, ceremony and symbolism were false ideologies used to bolster the power base of the ruling class. This analysis has conversely been carried down to all political spectrums today in how they may view religious ideology and symbolism in Islamic lands. Yet as this paper will show, the ‘normativising’ of the Islamic state in modern political Islamic discourse was
far from primarily a tool to gain more power, but rather rested on the ambition
to institute a normative order in the shape of God’s design, as shall be
explicated later.
MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT

The Islamic state is not entirely a modern concept even if the modern-conception of the Westphalian state is novel in its implementation in Muslim lands. This is most obviously because the Prophet Muhammad was not only viewed as the apostle of God to the Muslims, but also the leader of the Muslim populace in the city-state of Medina, which would grow into the expanding Muslim empire. The idea of the Westphalian state in Islam emerged in a modern discourse that begun to emerge in the 19th centuries when the leading modernist Islamic ideologues begun to articulate the role of Islam and the Muslim in a state.

These discourses emerged in the colonial, pre-independence and immediate post-independence periods amidst the backdrop of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent failure of many post-independence Muslim states. Consequently these discourses reflected the concerns of the times, such as trying to revive Islam, resist colonialism, emulate the success of the west; or the reinstitution of the state-less Empire of the Caliphate. This new discourse was essentially modern in both its outlook and aim. Modern in aim because it dealt with the issue of a nation-state and modern in outlook because it naturally reflected the impact of western advancement in the most important fields that underpinned this, including the social sciences.

Yet at the same time, these discourses did not purport to be new paradigms even if they were in most cases entirely novel forms of analyses. As its very name would suggest, the Islamic state theorised the search for a modern state or nation-state with reference to Islam, mainly guided by its principles, largely justified by its texts and enunciated for the most part within its confines, even if it attempted to completely
reverse some (at times major) dogmatic beliefs. Thus, to its main protagonists, the discourse was more a revisionist look at the role of Islam in the state, even if its application to the modern nation-state was entirely a novel form of analysis.

One of the earliest of theorists of a modern political Islam was a Persian most famously known as Jamal ad-din ‘al-Afghani’. 82 years after Afghani’s passing, an Islamic Republic was established after a popular revolution in the ancient land of Persia which was most likely Afghani’s homeland, changing the future of the young nation-state of Iran forever. Sunni pre-modern reformers and thinkers were indeed present in many parts of the Muslim world and their major impetus was naturally sensitive to the new ascendancy of the west. Thus their works could be termed ‘revivalist’ and were premised on the need for reform-oriented reflective thought and possible action. Amongst them were the Istanbul thinkers of the Ottoman Empire such as Ahmet Cevdet Pasa (1822-1895) (Chambers 1973) and the North African Khair-ud-din Al-Tunisi who as his suffixed last name would suggest, was Tunisian (Tayob 2009, 27, Brown 1974, Kramer 1997, 76).

However, there is a general consensus that while there may have been other and earlier influences, the true pioneering works on a Sunni political Islam begun with the works of the Persian journeyman Sayyid Jamal-ud-din ‘Al-Afghani’ (1839-1897) and the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). Both were based in Cairo, and the fact that of the most significant modern Muslim political thinkers, only the final two analysed in this paper, Khomeini and Mawdudi were neither Egyptian nationals nor at least lived there at any period, is quite illuminating. Rashid Rida was a Syrian émigré to Cairo while Ali Abd Raziq
and the two most pivotal thinkers and figures in the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb were also Egyptian.

Hanson (2006, 104-5) asserts that there is agreement among scholars, from Marsden to Hourani, Huband to Lawrence, that the modern Islamist thought that emerged in the 19th and early 20th century Egypt, was the most pivotal “to the global development of political Islam.” The most important catalyst for this that swayed Arab and Muslim opinion in general and Egyptian opinion in particular, began when Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. It was in the face of having to deal with such flagrant western imperialism which ran concurrently with Islam’s own fall, that the earliest political thinkers emerged (Hanson 2006, 104). Naturally, theirs was a discourse of revivalism.

Because this paper enjoys the luxury of being a comparative study, with due respect to the legacies of Abduh and his fellow Egyptians Al-Banna (1906-1949) and Qutb (1906-1966) their works have been omitted. This is because this dissertation wanted to highlight major paradigmatic shifts in viewing the state in Islam. Afghani was chosen over Abduh because he was more of the mentor, and many of their theories treat aspects in a similar way. For example, while Afghani argued that power is the marker of a religion’s truth (Al-Makhzumi and Al-Afghani 2003, 134-6), Abduh similarly viewed Islam’s main duty as acquiring more power (Tayob 2009, 59).

The broader approach to the Islamic state for both Abduh and Afghani were similar in conception. Tayob (2009, 17) asserts that for both Abduh and Afghani, “[r]eligion was a means for achieving progress, development and happiness in society” and had
less to do with placing any normative underpinnings of an Islamic state. Thus they were both concerned with the instrumentalist capability of the state. As for Qutb and Al-Banna, their contributions were highly contextual within the landscape of Egyptian politics, the founding of the *Ikhwaanal-Muslimoun* (Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928 and the battle against Arab nationalism and the different Egyptian authorities (Tamadonfar 2002, 146-50). Their works highlighted the increasing rise of fundamentalism and the state as an Islamic normative order. This shift in the Islamic state literature was more articulately elaborated by Mawdudi and Khomeini.

3. Revivalism and the Instrumental State

3.1 Afghani

Afghani’s origins, up to this day remain shrouded in controversy and obscurity. He was known as Sayyid Jamal-ud-din ‘Al-Afghani’ in the Sunni Muslim and larger world, but according to Shiite and Iranian history, Afghani was actually from Asadabad in Persia proper and is thus known as Sayyid Muhammad Husayni Asadabad in the Shiite world (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). The birthplace suffixed title of ‘Al-Afghani’ suggests that he was Afghan, and it is very likely that this was a clever ruse to make him more acceptable to his large Sunni fan-base, since Afghans were majority Sunni (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). In fact Afghani was most likely a Persian, and Persians since pre-modernity have largely been Shiite.
Afghani was first and foremost a political revivalist who was radical in his approach at the time. In India he was exposed to modern ideas and he soon began calling for complete freedom from colonialism. His creative approach attracted large followings in the Muslim world where he highlighted the “dynamic and progressive nature of Islam (Tayob 2009, 50).” Well travelled and liked, he was exiled to Paris from Egypt by the British in 1882 with his protégé and contemporary Muhammad Abduh. Here the two published a Pan-Islamic journal entitled *Al-Urwa al Wuthqa* (The Firmest Link) (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5).

He also very much moved around in high circles, debating the French public intellectual Ernest Renan (1823-1892), whilst often meeting the rulers of Egypt, Iran and the Ottoman Empire. He would advise the latter group to remain autonomous from British colonial interference and also to be more accountable to their populace (Tayob 2009, 50-4). Tayob (2009, 50) places Afghani’s works as those more befitting of a public intellectual with scattered ideas in leaflets and orations, rather than a scholar with a coherent body of religious thought. Much like his fellow Persian Khomeini years later, Afghani interlaced his discourse with religious symbolism and validations.

He was quite aware of the power of rhetoric and its capacity for mobilisation: “his main role was...to use Islam as an ideology” which could “strengthen its position as a focus of identity and solidarity against the attacks of the Christian west”, which was a useful “rallying point for the repulsion of western conquerors (Keddie 1983, 96).” For Afghani, religion is mostly relevant in its political dimension, thereby foreshadowing the later thrust of political Islam. Somewhat Hobbesian in his
outlook, Afghani felt that religion was “supplied” to man to ameliorate their “treacherous, greedy, bloodthirsty” nature (Keddie 1983, 140)."

The foremost utility of these inherited beliefs were almost entirely political. Religion provided the bases of stabilising society and holding it together to ensure that men did not degenerate into bestiality. Man, says Afghani, has acquired from religion:

- a firm pillar for the existence of nations and the permanence of social order; a stable foundation for the civilisation and progress of peoples and tribes; and an active agent for the repulsion of the evil and corruption that are the cause of the dissipation of people (Keddie 1983, 141).

Thus as his very starting-point in describing the utility of the state, Afghani highlights its relation to religion as a basis for civilisation and development; and the checks this provides against repelling evil and corruption. For Afghani, “unity of language of which nationality and national unity consist” and religion are the two most extensive bonds in the human world (Keddie 1983, 17). However, the ‘nation’ and national unity which was the product of the unity of language was much more important than religion as it is more “durable” and thus has “more influence than religious ties in most affairs of the world (Keddie 1983, 17).”

Thus the fundamental basis of the state and the nation for Afghani was more important than religion. Religion provided the basis for civilisation through providing norms but the nation was the ‘instrument’ for civilisation to be achieved. This overweighting of religion’s utility as a political function is taken even further. Government for him was like the typical Political Science amalgamated view on the state as the Machiavellian ideal of rule and control and the Weberian model of bureaucratic administration. The state for him should protect sovereignty and
borders, dispense justice by applying a moral and legal code, collect tax and dispense social works (Keddie 1983, 146).

While religion is placed at the centre of his analysis, Afghani places religion’s primary goal as building a stable polity and therefore not related to spirituality or duty. For him, “the truth of religion was less important than its value (Tayob 2009, 56).” The social and political challenges that modernity posed to Islam, was more significant than the value system of Islam.

Unlike his successors, Afghani thought that there is a fundamental truth underscoring all religions. A particular spiritual set of beliefs was not the marker of truth, but rather the society that possessed the most power was the truest:

> [R]eligions in their collectivity are the whole...Whosoever from these religions is on the truth then such will attain dominance and triumph, because the promised authority belongs to the faith of truth as we said, and not the faith of the Jews, the Christians and Islam, if they remain simply names (Al-Makhzumi and Al-Afghani 2003, 134-6).

The thrust in contemporary times for political hegemony and power as a marker of achieving the will of God, whether this is the quest for nuclear weapons or the arming of Jihadi militias, may very well have been an inadvertent consequence of Afghani’s equating power with truth. His linking of political emasculation with straying from the truth is somewhat similar to how Islamists like bin Laden point to Islam’s impotence as indicative of the erosion of Islamic values and the corruption entailed in the ‘western’ fashioned lives of its rulers and societies. Unlike modern Islamists, Afghani does not claim a monopoly on the truth for Islam, Afghani highlights that each religion has a ‘function’ and that they all retain both their utility
as well as their ‘claim’ to truth. Thus, what Afghani is suggesting is that “even if it be false’, religion was still useful (Tayob 2009, 56).

A prime difference between Afghani and the ideologues who took up the mantle in the 20th century such as Khomeini is that the form of government was not a religious necessity. The state for Afghani was indeed essential, but as an instrument, so that man does not degenerate into bestiality. However, he did not limit the possibility of governance to any one form or theocracy as Mawdoodi and Khomeini would do later. No doubt reflecting his natural elitist tendencies, Afghani emphasised however, that this government could only be realised, whether constitutional or monarchic, only through a group naturally “endowed with qualities of guardianship (Keddie 1983, 146).” Government should protect sovereignty and borders, dispense justice by applying a moral and legal code, collect tax and dispense social works.

From this, we are exposed to the fact that for Afghani there is no one form of prescribed Islamic government, whilst he also simultaneously suggests that some people are naturally endowed with qualities of guardianship. Afghani continues:

Government also (emphasis mine) requires a group that knows the revealed law and the civil laws and arrangements of governments and peoples, and sits on the chair of decision and judgment in order to decide legal and criminal disputes and settle enmities (Keddie 1983, 146).

Khomeini’s theory of the rule of the jurist is also perhaps premised on a similar argument as Afghani’s. But a more careful perusal of this excerpt actually shows that what Afghani means in this statement is that the religiously learned such as jurists, are primarily needed for the civil and administrative functions of government. It is perhaps for this reason that after extolling the need for a group of natural leaders, he
follows this up by saying that government also requires the religiously learned, more as judges and arbiters over legal cases than as leaders. Thus the clerics in the state are necessarily separated and distinct from the political leaders of the state.

Tayob (2009) has termed Afghani’s approach to religion ‘functionalist’. And it is this point that lends more credence to the objective of this study to place the state as the centre of analysis and utilise general Political Science theory in analysing modern political Islamic discourse. While Afghani’s approach is indeed functionalist from a Religious Studies or Sociological perspective, insofar as it corresponds to the basic premise of Sociological Durkheimian functionalism by highlighting functional imperatives in order to maintain stability within a populace; in terms of Political Science, this would be a misnomer.

This is because functionalism in Political Science is part of the broad church of behaviouralism and pluralism which sees everything as atomistic and state power as constantly eroding at the expense of regional integration, International Non-governmental organisations (INGOs), unregulated cross border informal trade and consensus based civil society-government interaction (Rosamond 2000, 50-5). Within this conceptualisation, the state is more a benign variable of ‘low politics’ than an instrumentalist one of ‘high politics’ such as order, control and power.

So what exactly is the conception of the state for Afghani? In analysing these thoughts, it is clear that the state was needed to ameliorate man’s “treacherous, greedy, bloodthirsty” nature. The intervention of religion was left to the state which was the ‘instrument’ to establish order. The state as instrumentalist is highlighted by
Afghani equating the “existence of nations” with a “permanence of social order” which in turn would be a “stable foundation...for civilisation and progress (Keddie 1983, 141).” The state was the instrument whose active agent was religion, but the state’s own duty was not religious. It was rather entirely political because it had to establish order (Machiavelli/Hobbes) and provide somewhat of a rational leadership that resembles a bureaucracy (Weber). This would prevent anarchy and be a platform to seek advancement.

For Afghani the symbolism of Islam as a legal code which could bring about a true basis of justice was less important than the institutional basis this could bring about in solidifying a state. The foremost utility of the inherited beliefs of religion were almost entirely political. The state had no metaphysical value, just a rational one: to institute order and promote advancement. Religion’s primary goal was to build a stable polity and therefore not related to spirituality or duty. The social and political challenges that modernity posed to Islam, was more significant than the value system of Islam and the state must be used as an instrument to revive Islam as a polity, rather than as a religion.

Religion’s utility could be instituted by the state because religion was “a firm pillar for the existence of nations and the permanence of social order; a stable foundation for the civilisation and progress of peoples and tribes; and an active agent for the repulsion of the evil and corruption that are the cause of the dissipation of people (Keddie 1983, 141).” Religion provided the basis for civilisation through providing norms but the nation was the ‘instrument’ for civilisation to be achieved. Religion was at the service of the state to assist its advancement, not the other way around.
This is because he felt that the nation and the state were more “durable” than religion as a unifying element of a people (Keddie 1983, 17).

His idea of the state was entirely premised on the typical amalgamated Political Science view wherein the Machiavellian state had to ensure rule and control through monopolising violence within its domain, and the Weberian model of a bureaucratic administration to administer the affairs of the land. That is why the state for him should protect sovereignty and borders, dispense justice by applying a moral and legal code, collect tax and dispense social works (Keddie 1983, 146).

Yet, as part of the broader picture, the emphasis on building a state capable of maintaining order and more especially some sort of modern polity that could culminate into establishing a resurgent Islamic ‘civilisation’ was also influenced by the need to deal with modernity in a similar way as western Europe. The emphasis on power as a marker of truth was no doubt influenced by a realist view on politics and a natural reaction to the decline of Islamic power. The inherent argument that could be made is that Afghani viewed the truth of religion as contingent on the Machiavellian and proto-realist view of power as the most definitive interest in contemporary times.

The emphasis on providing an instrumentalist approach reflected the revivalist ambitions for Islam as well as the potential of religion and its norms to provide some form of order, rather than as any existential value or truth. This is reflected somewhat in the implied focus on probity and rationalisation of the political process where the pre-eminence of political hegemony in Afghani’s analyses also naturally
reflected the age of colonialism and the new ascendancy of the west and the simultaneous political and material decline of Islam.

Unlike the Islamists that would follow him, Afghani does not claim a monopoly on the truth for Islam, nor even prescribes any particular form of government as obligatory or ‘Islamic’. The state’s functionality, in his words, could be realised under any “form of government, whether republican, constitutional or absolute (Keddie 1983, 145-6).” All that was required was the correct people who are “naturally endowed with qualities of guardianship (Keddie 1983, 146)”.

This corresponds to a rational bureaucracy that Weber articulated in the running of a state (Weber 1958, Chilcote 1981).

On the other hand Afghani also does not discount a king or monarchy from achieving the stability and advancement that a state can afford. This is also similar to Weber’s definition of a traditional authority whose legitimacy rests on rules handed down and authority resting with a chief (Chilcote 1981, 112-3). The role of Islamic Law and clerical interpretation is not all-encompassing but merely administrative. They do not impact on the executive or legislative function of government because for Afghani their role was limited to arbitration within the judicial function of the state through “decision[s] and judgment[s] in order to decide legal and criminal disputes and settle enmities (Keddie 1983, 146).”

This early period of an instrumentalist Islamic state in discourse was reliant on religion insofar as it provided laws and bases for establishing society. While religion was not separated in these works from the running of the state, the state was also not
a religious imperative with a particular form sanctioned as part of the obligatory code of life for a Muslim. Religion provided rational choices and institutional constraints such as a belief system that ensured that men did not resort to anarchy through its provision of a civil and judicial legal-code. The state was not a Divine requirement so much as a facilitator for achieving ‘civilisation’ and advancement; and the possible harbinger for an Islamic revival.

While these instrumentalist emphases did not entirely dissipate in the later theories of the Islamic state, its significance was overtaken in later years by the complete re-conceptualisation of what a Muslim or Islamic state should be. Indeed as this paper will later reveal when analysing Khomeini and Mawdudi, institutional roles and justifications were part of the broad need to establish the Islamic State. The major difference however was that the state would become the embodiment of Islam in much the same way as ritual obligations such as refraining from carrion or praying the five prayers.

Perhaps to simplify what this paper is arguing it may be more useful to view the political writings of Afghani as that of the administration of a Muslim state. On the other hand, the later works such as Khomeini’s and Mawdudi’s are not simply speaking of a Muslim state, but rather the quintessential Islamic State.
3.2 *The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*

One of the watershed moments in the history of Islamic political discourse was the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Tayob (2009: 103) highlights this episode as one of the most significant in the theory of the Islamic State. When the Ottomans were defeated in World War I, its end was nigh and the imminent political vacuum was naturally a ripe forum for religious thought to weigh in on the debate. The establishment of the Ottoman Empire in 1299, until its disbandment in 1924 in Turkey, marked the final phase before the arrival of the nation-state in Islamic lands. Straddling multiple landmasses across three continents, the Ottoman Empire was at its peak the most powerful empire on earth. Within its territories, the Ottomans would rule over Muslim Turks, Kurds and Arabs, Christian Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks and Armenians, as well as significant populations of Jews, gypsies and other peoples (Shaw 1997, vii).

The Ottoman territories served as a conduit for the routes and flow of trade and ideas between the Orient and the Occident both literally and figuratively. This affirmation is no better summed up by the fact that the viaduct city of Constantinople, later renamed Istanbul, bridges the Bosporus, the narrowest shipping strait on earth that so symbolically connects the European part of Turkey, Thrace, with the Asian side, Anatolia. Thus, Istanbul remains the only metropolis that spans two continents (Shaw 1997).

The Ottoman Empire comprised over 30 provinces, vassal territories and mini-states, some fully incorporated into the super state and others holding loose confederacy
whilst maintain large degrees of autonomy. Discontent and unhappiness with being ruled by Turks and Turanians began to emerge in the 19th century with the emergence of Arab nationalism, and was reflected in the works of Abduh and other Arab nationalists. Even Christian Arabs envisaged a future quasi-Caliphate, presided over by Arabs to regain pan-Arab sway at the expense of the Turks (Enayat 1982, 56-7).

The Ottoman sultans were seldom referred to as Khalifas (Caliphs) when they assumed political hegemony of the majority of Islamic lands upon the death of the Abbasid caliph Muttawakil in the 16th century. The reasons for this were two. Firstly, Hanafi jurists who were the preferred and protected Sunni school of thought of the Ottomans regarded the Caliphate as holding currency and existing only under the first four caliphs, the Khulafa-e-Rashidun (the rightly guided Caliphs) (Enayat 1982, 52).

The second reason was the juristic majority Sunni view that descent from the Prophet’s own tribe of Quraysh was de rigueur for acknowledgement of the title of Caliph. The leaders of the Ottomans were initially called Sultans until the 18th century when the title Caliph was used as an additional provision in an agreement with the Russians. The politicking uses of the term ‘sovereign Caliph of the Mohametan (sic) religion” gave the sultan more power over other Muslims in the steppes and Transcaucasia (Enayat 1982, 52-3).

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1 The Hanafi School of law is the earliest one of the four major schools of thought in Sunni Islam, the other being the Shafi, Maaliki and Hanbali Schools. It gets its name from its primary super jurist Numan ibn Thabit Abu Hanifa, a Persian who lived in Kufa, Iraq. These schools of thought are schools of jurisprudence which codify laws and cover most aspects of the law including rituals, transactions and punishments. The Hanafi School is followed in majority in the Indian subcontinent and Turkey, hence the protection afforded it by the Ottomans.
It may have been more appropriate to refer to the Ottoman administrative apparatus as a Sultanate, but once the title Caliph was conferred, some traditionalists supported its legitimation and this gathered momentum with the necessity of maintaining unity later in the face of European expansion, discontent in the provinces and Arab nationalism (Enayat 1982, 52-53). When the Caliphate was abolished by the Grand National Assembly of the Turkish Republic in 1924, the history of Sunni Muslim political thought and more broadly greater Islamic political thought, reached its most defining moment. The current of Islamic modernist political thought that had emerged in the 19th century had lost much of its thrust by this time, but its zeitgeist had reached its zenith and Enayat (1982, 52) contends that the debate between modernists and traditionalists for a while promised some sort of uneasy truce or even a synthesis in discourse.

But with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Caliphate which followed it a few years later the response to Turkey’s decision to secularise resulted in a more acute polemic-laden schism within the debate. From this scenario and confrontation “the Muslim mind” inexorably meandered “in the direction of an alternative to the Caliphate” becoming “one of the factors stimulating the call for an Islamic state (Enayat 1982, 52).”
4. The Intermediate Phase- Political Islam at a Crossroad

Whereas, the articulations of the Islamic state in its primacy were led mostly by members of the educated elite and politically conservative middle classes with some affinity for the west, the tide began to change at two distinct periods. The first was the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the second was the period after World War II. The latter reached its zenith in the 1970s as most post-colonial Islamic states either suffered from terminal instability or were mired in monarchical corruption.

This paper argues that this first phase immediately following the fall of the Ottomans can be termed the intermediate phase between the instrumentalist Islamic state of Afghani and Abduh, and the state as an Islamic normative order, which shall be elaborated on in the next chapter, of Mawdudi and Khomeini. This intermediate phase reflected both the revivalist ambitions of its pioneers, as well as laid the groundwork for the normative Islamic state discourse that would follow.

4.1 Raziq

The fall of the Ottoman Empire brought with it not only a novelty for modern Islamic thinkers in that they were no longer under a quasi-Muslim empire, but also the boundless possibilities of instituting a new kind of polity. The earliest statements naturally emanated from Turkey because internationally the Khilafat Movement,
especially in the Indian subcontinent, were still pressing for some form of maintaining it (Enayat 1982, 56-7).

The Turkish parliament in a report outlined in religious and rational terms, the logistical difficulties in fortifying and maintaining a bulwark supra-state formation that would make it difficult to implement any meaningful form of uniform civil administration. Muslims would and could not be expected to pledge political fealty to an alien central state and political efficiency may best be achieved in novel political forms (Enayat 1982, 56-7).

Of greater significance however is an event in 1925. Ali Abd Al-Raziq (1888-1966), in a small book entitled *Al-Islam wa Usul-ul-Hukm* (Islam and the Principles of Governance) argued for a similar principle, albeit coming from the pen of an Al-Azhar graduate, renowned religious scholar and *Shariah* judge. Al-Azhar is the second oldest university not only in Islam, but in the world at large today. Based in Cairo and founded in the 970s A.D., Al-Azhar remains the most important site of classical training in the Arabic Sciences and Sunni Islamic theology (Crecelius 1966, 40).

Considered the father of Islamic laicism or secularisation, Raziq’s controversial call for the secularisation of the state earned him the infamy of being stripped of his status as an Al-Azhar graduate when his degree was rescinded (Tayob 2009, 104-5). Raziq’s laicism argued that there was no need for Islamic government and separated the private practise of religion from the public function of government, much like
laicism’s origins in the French revolution. However, it was not based on secularising society so much as it advocated the separation of church and state.

The main thrust of Raziq’s argument is that there must be a clear separation between the spheres of the political and the religious because the nature of the Prophet’s mission was entirely religious. The argument rested on three premises which were all historical and the argument was thus grounded in traditional religious forms of argumentation and justification. The first, in complete contrast to modern political Islam theorists, points out that the Qur’an, Prophetic traditions and general early consensus of the classic scholars are all conspicuously absent in advocating the utility, legal framework, necessity or obligation of an Islamic state (Abd al-Raziq 2000, 98-100).

Raziq’s second premise argued that the Prophet left no explicit instruction on the form of government of the extant Islamic Empire. The most telling proof of this lay in the fact that he did not even choose a successor nor lay any guidelines for its process, which ultimately culminated in the schism between Sunni and Shia:

> The truth is that he (the Prophet Muhammad)...did not mention anything that had to do with a government after himself. Nor did he bring to the Muslims laws to which they could turn concerning this. He only joined God after the religion was completed (emphasis mine)...The day he...died, his prophecy ended, and the special link that was between heaven and his honourable character...was cut (Abd al-Raziq 2000).

It is clear from Raziq’s words that the fact that not only was there no discernible guidelines on succession or its implementation, but that this fact points incontrovertibly to the veracity that the political was not part of the Prophetic...
mandate. Since all Muslims believe that the Prophetic mission was completed during the Prophet’s lifetime, a fact vouchsafed for by the Qur’an, attaching religious significance to the politics that followed the Prophet’s life would not only be absurd, but also sacrilegiously contravene the Qur’an. The Qur’an explicitly states that “[t]oday I (God) have perfected for you your religion and completed My grace upon you, and approved Islam as your religion.”2 The Qur’an also states that “We have neglected nothing in the Book.”3 Thus, Raziq rightfully points out the Qur’an’s lack of any compulsion of a form of statehood and Caliphate (Enayat 1982, 62).

Raziq’s third premise rested on the notion that the Prophet was first and foremost a religious leader, and while he was also a political leader, there was a clear distinction between the two. In making this point, Raziq promised the hope of relegating power and hegemony (which was central for Afghani) to an inconsequential facet of Islam and its social life. A king or political leader for Raziq was essentially concerned with establishing dominion over people for hegemonic and material purposes, but a messenger/Prophet had the unique mandate to “make contact with souls...in order...to open the hearts of his followers, to come to the roots of love and hate; and the origins of good and evil (Raziq, quoted in Tayob 2009: 106).

The Caliphate of the first four Caliphs, who are generally recognised as the “Rightfully-guided Caliphs”, was for Raziq in fact a purely historical and contextual process. Since the Prophet Muhammad was the final messenger of God and the ‘Seal of Prophet-hood’, we could not expect the Caliphs, no matter how virtuous they may or may not have been, to inherit his spiritual station (Tayob 2009, 106-8). The

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2 The Qur’an, Chapter 5: Verse 3.  
3 The Qur’an, Chapter 6: Verse 38.
Caliphs were thus political leaders who relied on the age old traditional basis of statecraft: power, military strength and the fear of it. Regarding them as anything more than political successors would contradict the most fundamental belief in Islam after God’s Oneness: Muhammad being the final Prophet. “The Caliphate in Islam” says Raziq (quoted in Tayob 2009, 108) “was solely based on the principle of feared power, and that power in the main was armed material power.” The vocation of a political leader was necessarily sullied and materialist, but the Prophet was a political leader only insofar as it furthered the interests of spreading God’s message.

The religious duty of the Prophet permitted him to utilise and subjugate the political for the more urgent cause of attaining spiritual and religious goals. Jihad was one such means, but it was limited only to the Prophet’s prerogative and while he was still sentient (Tayob 2009, 106-7). Civil administration such as taxation was not part of worship. Only that part of it that was related to good social values such as the prohibition on interest could be included. As an example, the Arabs were a heterogeneous community and there was amongst them “great variance...as regards types of government, administrative methods and as regards manners, customs, and many of the faculties of material and economic life (Abd al-Raziq 2000, 96).”

Arab unity that was achieved by the Prophet was that of a common spiritual religion and not a political unity. This is because the Arabs kept their localised forms of civil and state administration. The unity of the Arab Muslims during the Prophet’s lifetime was:

in no respect a political unity. It had none of the aspects of a state or a government...What proves this is the conduct of the Prophet. We have no knowledge indicating that he sought to
interfere in the political direction of the various nations, or that he changed anything in their mode of government or in the administrative or judicial regime of their tribes.

Nor did he try to change the social and economic relations existing among the peoples or between them and other nations. We never hear that [the Prophet] deprived a governor of office, named a judge, organised a police force for these peoples, or regulated their commerce, agriculture or industry.

On the contrary, the Prophet left to them concern for all these interests, saying: ‘You know better than anyone.’ Thus, all these nations with the civil and political unity which they respectively enjoyed, with the anarchy and order found among them were joined together only by the tie to which we referred, namely the unity of Islam, its precepts and its morals (Abd al-Raziq 1982, 33-4).

Their unity was “not related to the concepts of government and state. However, that does not mean that it was a religious unity devoid of political aspects (emphasis mine); that is, it was a unity in religion and faith, not a unity of state and types of rule (Abd al-Raziq 2000, 96).”

Raziq’s approach to political Islam is both frighteningly simple and perhaps a tad simplistic as well. In his quest to separate a pristine blameless religious sphere from an aggressive and imperfect political sphere, his argument is simplistic insofar as it glosses over the naturally militaristic means through which the Prophet was able to subjugate the Arabs that surrounded him, even if the intent may well have been religious. Yet it is also simple but hard to counter because of its grounding in religious argumentation. It is no wonder that his work elicited such strong sentiments so as to have his degree rescinded.

But more tellingly it is the scope for achieving any form of government and keeping religion out of its function that possessed the capacity for promoting a modern polity
unconstrained by dogma. How is the concept of the state conjured up in the work of Raziq? It is clear from Raziq’s thoughts that his ideas on the state were very much encumbered by the classical view on politics and the state. Raziq concurs with the dominant view of the state as the monopoliser of violence and that ‘statecraft’ is the natural role of the state.

Raziq’s distinction between the religious and the political attempted to enforce a patent cleavage between the metaphysical (spirituality and religion) and the mundane (politics), similar in some ways to Geertz’s critique against western social sciences. This cleavage while positive from a secular perspective is actually dichotomous in its view of state and religion as binary opposites. Whereas for Geertz the ‘symbolic’ is the dichotomous opposite of the ‘real’ in traditional views on the state, as is the dichotomies of the “fanciful to [the] sober, figurative to literal, obscure to plain, aesthetic to practical, mystical to mundane, and decorative to substantial (Geertz 1980, 136), for Raziq the ‘more’ real and substantial is the issue of virtue and salvation.

The reality of politics and the state necessarily pushes it to drive its own interest, and this is temporal and of no benefit. Thus he actually opposes Geertz because for him the state can still only work in its mechanical and practical, not its symbolic dimension. The role of politics and the state was to establish dominion over people for hegemonic and material purposes. Thus the state possessed no other utility besides its classically viewed role as an extractor of resources, monopoliser of violence and subjugator of the populace through the laws set down by the dominant groups. Religion then for Raziq was necessarily
The role as an apostle necessarily meant that his duty was proscribed by the message he came with. And this message could not degenerate into the dirty, murky business of politics. Rather, it was the Prophet’s duty to “direct the affairs of the body and of the soul, our temporal and spiritual relations: his is the governance of the world and all that is concerned with the next world (‘Abd al-Raziq 1982, 31).” Statehood only held temporal utility during the Prophet’s life, since only he could use it, and that too, only to further his prime duty to “make contact with souls...in order...to open the hearts of his followers” so that they could achieve closeness to God and their ultimate goal, Paradise.

Raziq says that “if we want to call this religious unit” that the Prophet’s society, and more broadly Islam formed; “a state’...we are free to do so. [But] the authority of Muhammad over the believers was the authority of apostleship; it had nothing in common with temporal power...there was neither government, nor state, nor any type of political aspiration, nor any of these ambitions proper to kings and princes (‘Abd al-Raziq 1982, 32-3).” The basic conception of the state in Raziq’s work did not vary too greatly from that which was conceived by Afghani, even if their broader political theories were vastly dissimilar. The state was still the classical organ of rule and control. The difference between the two was that, while for Afghani the state’s
capacity to establish and maintain control could be used in the service of religion, for Raziq this was sacrilegious.

Whether the state could be used as an instrument of change or foundation of society was inconsequential to Raziq, because the political was simply irreligious. The name of Islam and its message could not be equated and sullied with an organ such as the state. As with Afghani, there was not yet any attachment of a spiritual value or symbolic dimension to the state. While for Afghani the state could be used as an instrument for advancement, for Raziq advancement was a material issue and had nothing to do religion and man’s prime duty in life, his spirituality.

He did not weigh advancement with progress or stability, even if he highlighted control as the duty of the state. Thus he says that the early Muslims were tied together by religion, irrespective of whether their societies were characterised by “anarchy” or “order” (‘Abd al-Raziq 1982, 34). The other major difference was in the substantiation. Raziq introduced classical and textual justifications for why the state and the political were distinct from the religious. Of course because the texts of Islam are such a large body and somewhat ambiguous, what this did was open up the methodology of using textual justifications in support or opposition to the Islamic state.

These justifications that have continued until today and whose protagonists have failed to realise that the ambiguities of the Qur’an and man’s capacity for substantiating their goals by selective readings and piece-meal quotations, as we shall see later with Mawdudi and Khomeini, simply make their interpretations
exercises in searching for the outcome of interest. Raziq in his work promised the hope of relegating power and hegemony (which was central for Afghani) to an inconsequential facet of Islam and its social life. Yet this promise of relegation actually led to a new direction in the history of the Islamic state simply because Raziq reiterated the classical view of the state.

Thus, the unintended consequence of Raziq’s thesis was primarily negative in that it forced the traditionalists and, more importantly, other modernists to counter the argument by arguing for a quintessentially Islamic State justified by texts. The basis of this would have to be to remove the stigma of the political and attach to it a religious justification. Without Raziq’s work, the history of modern Islamic political thought may not have veered so purposefully toward a coherent discourse of finding an ultimate Islamic state that would not only form an instrumentalist basis for Muslim society, but more pertinently also be glazed by the notion that its very establishment was an act of faith, as much as prayer!

4.2 Rida

Another reformist and contemporary of Raziq was the Syrian/Lebanese Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Like Raziq, Rida was greatly influenced by Abduh and the Journal Al-Urwa al Wuthqa that was written in conjunction with Afghani in Paris. Rida immigrated to Egypt before the turn of the turn of the 20th century. From there he began the journal Al-Manar (The Lighthouse) in collaboration with his mentor, Abduh (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5). Like Raziq and the Turks, he did not
want the continuance of the Ottoman Empire, but for him it was more because he thought it was not a true Islamic state (Enayat 1982, 70-1). Thus the idea of a state that was fundamentally ‘Islamic’ can be traced to Rida.

Unlike Raziq however, Rida’s vision of a state was intrinsically linked to Islam and its potential and capacity to deliver justice. Rida’s envisioning of a state was a state that was expressly Islamic, and was somewhat akin to the theory behind, if not the actual practise, of what we may refer to as a participatory albeit non-secular democracy. The pivot around which Rida’s theory of the Islamic state was formulated was, like the popular discourse that was brewing in Russia and elsewhere, based on the people. But Rida’s envisaging of the people was quite far apart from the Marxist wave that was ebbing and flowing around the world.

Rida wanted the will of the people to be realised in government, to protect from autocracy and capricious rule. Much like Trotsky’s worldwide revolution, using the people as a starting point, Rida brought into focus one of the most enduring themes of modern political Islam, the *Ummah* (the collective “community” of worldwide believers). Islamic government for Rida translated into government for the *Ummah* as a whole. “The authority of the *Ummah*” Rida says, was vested in “the necessity of consultation with its members” and that this was a government compelled by Islam (Rida 1922, 5).

Thus, the first real conception of the state as an Islamic compulsion and duty can be traced to Rida as well. But, unlike his successors, for Rida this idea of an Islamic state derived from its constituency, the people and their views and preferences; not
an unqualified subservience to religious law. For achieving the will of the people he favoured a republic, wherein the leader would be accountable to the law as every other citizen. The leader, Rida says “is not distinguishable in relation to [the state’s] laws from the weakest of its subjects. He simply executes the rule of law and the view (emphasis mine) of the Ummah (Rida 1922, 5).”

Pledging allegiance to a leader, as it was in the case for the first Caliph Abu Bakr, must be done “after obtaining opinion of the majority of Muslims (Rida 1922, 13).” It is quite clear from this that Rida was making a bold case for a future Islamic state based on the argument that popular will was the basis for the Prophet and the first Caliph’s rule. Because Rida’s was the first attempt at an articulate justification of an Islamic state, he needed some corroborative basis for his argument.

This was accomplished by his drawing of a distinction between Deen (faith) as exemplified by worship, and shar’ (legislation or practicability), as exemplified by social relations. For Rida matters of faith and worship such as the praying five times a day were incontrovertible and required no new re-evaluation. On the other hand, matters of practicability and social relations possessed the capacity for Ijtihad (independent new judgment from re-evaluation of the texts). The organisation of social relations such as “administration, judiciary, politics, taxes, the preparation for war which has nothing to do with worship or closeness to God in its details, was made by the Prophet because he was a legislator (emphasis mine) in his time with his Ijtihad (Rida 1922, 92).”
For Rida then, acts of worship loosely corresponded to the *Shariah* as mentioned in the conceptualisation of this essay, because it was non-negotiable, perennial and divine. However the practicable corresponded more to *Fiqh* (jurisprudence) and possessed malleability to it because it was ephemeral. However, the practicable was still under the domain of religion because it had to be guided by the substantive parts of Islamic law. Rida felt that the Islamic *Shariah* was the most magnanimous and that the state had to be Islamic because the *Shariah*’s magnanimity was based on its recognition of, and susceptibility to, change (Tayob 2009, 111-2).

Furthermore, below the leader or Caliph, a body of respected elite comprised of scholars referred to as the *ahl al-Hall wa’l-aqd* (“the people who loosen and bind”) should be in place to make important decisions (Rida 1922, 13). These scholars who were also to be chosen by the people would be responsible and act as a link between the *Ummah* and Caliph. The Sunni scholars he felt had lost much of their say over affairs of the state and society. The weakness of their position in relation to their Shi’ā counterparts was a matter of concern to Rida (Rida 1922, 60).

Ultimately, it was this theory of the need for custodianship of the scholars that would return with renewed vigour in the works of Khomeini (Enayat 1989, 165). But whereas in Khomeini, the custodians were to be defined by clerical review and scholarly hierarchy, the scholars envisaged in Rida’s work would derive their legitimacy from the people themselves. Rida found a greater audience for his view on the Islamic state than Raziq because, naturally, Muslims wanted to feel that politics could effect change while simultaneously being governed by their faith. This
was all the more acute because by this time, the stereotype of the Oriental despot, based as it was largely on some truth, was in vogue.

How then was the state conceived for Rida? For Rida, the state was indeed a duty, but not entirely as a normative order. Its utility was again based somewhat on the instrumentalist role that Afghani pointed out. The state through its use of the *Shariah* could guide society. But in turn the state’s mandate was entirely reliant on the people. It derived its legitimacy from the people. The state possessed its own power in the sense that it was the duty of the state and the scholars that oversee it to ensure that the substantive elements of the *Shariah* guided it.

The distinction between the perennial elements of faith such as the five prayers and malleable social relations indeed highlighted Rida’s most significant idea of an Islamic state: like broader *Fiqh* (jurisprudence), its susceptibility to change. For him, the more significant functions of the state such as “administration, judiciary, politics, taxes [and] the preparation for war” had “nothing to do with worship or closeness to God (Rida 1922, 22).”

Thus, the state in its legislative capacity could define its own policies since these held no metaphysical truth nor measured one’s closeness to God. The Prophet after all was a “legislator in his [own] time” and applied and employed his own ‘*Ijtihad*’ to administer the affairs of the state (Rida 1922, 22). The requirement for the *Shariah* as not an all-encompassing credo, but rather a guide to the affairs of the state, for Rida, rested on its ability to deal with change (Tayob 2009, 111-2). In fact this argument of Rida’s contradicts both the fundamentalists’ claims that the *Shariah*
is inviolable as well as almost the entire conventional thinking of western social science’s view on Islam and especially the Shariah, as incapable of dealing with modernity and change.

Rida’s theory is also based somewhat on those of Raziq’s. The former’s distinction between faith/worship and the practicable/social relations are somewhat similar to Raziq’s distinction between the religious as existential and the political as the mundane. But whereas Raziq completely downplays the role of the religious in the affairs of the political, for Rida it is essential. This is because the capacity of Islam to deliver justice makes the state that is Islamic the most capable of doing so. The right of popular sovereignty provides the other half of the construction of the state. It is not entirely clear however, from Rida’s theory whether the right of absolute sovereignty lies with the people to the extent that they can even challenge laws that are argued by some to be those of worship.

For example there is no clear idea of, when aspects of the Shariah such as polygamy come into opposition with popular will, whether popular will trumps the textual evidence on the issue. Perhaps what is being suggested is that the two provide an equal claim to defining the state, but of course this is purely conjecture. In reality, what Rida was trying to suggest is that within Islam and the confines of the Shariah lay the most egalitarian and for him the truest form of democracy. We must remember that like Afghani and his successors, Islam promised a real capacity; however misinformed our natural prejudices may suggest this is, for developing a just polity in opposition to colonialism, monarchy and oriental despotism.
Amidst the proliferation of global insecurity that terrorism has brought, a common thing we ignore is that for the ideologues of a modern political Islam, their theories of Islam in the political sphere were entirely regenerative. Based as it was on upliftment of their society in the face of European ascendancy and Islamic ebb, they attempted to deal with modernity as the realities of their own dictated. By arguing that Rida opened the way for the Islamic state to become the global threat it has become is correct insofar as some of those who followed through with his ideas have resorted to violent means to achieve it, or that others have continued the rapacious control of Muslim lands by arguing that what they suppose as the laws of the religion, such as women’s veiling, are non-negotiable aspects of worship.

But it would also miss the point to completely write off Rida’s theory on the Islamic State as the non-secular Pandora’s Box that has resulted in the continued attempt to force religion on the state and maintain anti-democratic strictures such as polygamy. Rida’s work opened up the possibility for seeing politics as a means to achieve a better society while still being grounded in religion. It was the modernity of a scholar who himself was against the traditional establishment and its impotence when dealing with social issues (Tayob 2009, 109-11).

Yet by placing the state as a religious duty, Rida opened up the paving of the ‘normativisation’ of the state through its symbolisation and the investment of the religious within it. For him the state was still instrumentalist: to achieve a better society and reflect and constitute popular will. But for those that followed, this investment of Islamic duty in establishing a state provided a new angle to look at the political and the state. Raziq’s argument that the political was simply rule and
control and therefore irreligious could now be met head-on in argumentative opposition.

This is because Rida saw the political and legislative potential of the state as constitutive of the religious, even if these were not as significant as matters of worship. The idea that legislation in the form of social relations was susceptible to change and contextualisation would be lost in the works of those that took up the mantle in the articulation of the Islamic state. While Rida’s work was a preliminary impression that identified a need for a state based on the malleable aspect of the Shariah in a period of social upheaval and change; the next group of scholars, more articulate in their elaborations of how the state should work, would arise. And that, unfortunately, may be the ultimate legacy Rida is remembered for.
5. The ‘Normativisation’ of the Islamic State and Fundamentalism

The new discourse of the Islamic State after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, beginning with Rida’s treatise became more radical; more opposed to the west, and in some cases even promoted or utilized mass mobilization. Sayyid Qutb began to promote a broad based Islamist vanguard movement, and in his homeland Egypt, this gained some momentum with his movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. The force of mobilisation that they enjoyed at times of non-state repression was gargantuan. Although after the deaths of its illustrious leaders Al-Banna and Qutb, in the 1970s Friday prayer gatherings consisted of more than 250,000 people, completely bringing central Cairo to a standstill and “reminding the Sadat government of the organisational strength of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hanson 2006, 78-9).”

While the earlier scholars this paper has analysed can be termed modernists insofar as they were willing to accommodate change in their writings of the Islamic state, the writings of Qutb and Mawdudi marked the turn to what we have now come to call fundamentalism. This turn toward fundamentalism was perhaps an unintended consequence of the earlier theorists such as Afghani, Abduh and Rida. While the early emphasis mainly promoted a syncretism between a Muslim and western polity, in effect if not explicitly said, the new literature on the Islamic state now assumed a more explicit separation between the two.

But yet as Tayob (2009, 44) has pointed out, the works of these modernists such as Afghani, Abduh and Rida are not vastly dissimilar to other religious presentations, including those of the fundamentalists. This is because they have also posited
“religion and Islam as stable centres in a bewildering and fast-changing world.” The fundamentalists for their part have earned their designation because they see the fundamentals of religion as non-negotiable and for the most, see no separation between life, religion and politics. Their “unwillingness to compromise on Islam (Tayob 2009, 44)” and pre-occupation with religious authenticity has come to be much feared in the western world.

For the fundamentalists, the idea of a uniquely Islamic system of government, in contra-distinction to a decadent western system began to gain currency during the last years of colonialism and then subsequently after the 1970s when the institutional weaknesses and corruption of the newly independent states wreaked havoc on their populaces. Where Rida opened up the possibility of the state and political being part of the religious/spiritual and not based on material power (as Raziq conceptualised it), the fundamentalists would take this further. After Rida the Islamic state begun to be conceived of as a separate analytical category and a totalised whole that was part of God’s design.

No more was the articulation of the Islamic state an attempt to make sense of the role Islam can play in the polity or state. With Qutb, Mawdudi and later Khomeini the state assumed a life and obligation on its own. The Islamic state begun to be theorised less as a facilitator of new circumstances for Muslims, but increasingly more as an Islamic obligation that a Muslim had to fulfil. The political nature of the Prophet’s achievements in establishing the Islamic Empire began to be weighted equally with, if not more than his spiritual station and moral exhortations. This was
in opposition to the clear distinction Raziq tried to postulate and Rida had taken
cognisance of.

Islam alone singles out God for worship when it singles Him out for sovereignty and the right to
create a method for the life of humanity (Qutb 1983).

The above quote from Qutb highlights the turn in the literature. Now the emphasis
was on the polity as a whole acting out God’s law. And the only way to achieve this
would be to establish an Islamic State to enforce these laws so that society reflected
and was invested with God’s design.

5.1 Mawdudi

Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979) was an Indian (later Pakistani) ideologue who was
a self-trained Islamic scholar and also a prominent journalist. Initially opposed to
partition because he felt that a universal religion like Islam could not be used to form
a nationalist state (Pakistan), he eventually supported the call for an independent
Pakistan seeing in its establishment “a promise for the rebirth of Islam (Enayat 1982,
102).” Unlike the radical sway that was fomenting in Egypt, Mawdudi used
constitutional means to try to affect the political process and helped to establish his
own party, the Jamat-e Islami, the oldest party in Pakistan today. Despite having
acrimonious relations with liberal politicians and secularists, he submitted proposals
on the Draft Constitution and his party disciples acknowledged the legitimacy of the
parliamentary and constitutional process (Enayat 1982, 102).
His political writings however, were vastly dissimilar to this rather benign participation in Pakistani politics. Mawdudi is well recognised as one of the fathers of fundamentalism, though the more peaceful as compared to the Muslim Brotherhood. He was also the most prominent, articulate and consistent ideologue of modern Islamist thought (Tayob 2009, 85). As testimony to the admiration he garnered, he was also the only modern non-Arab whose works have been translated into Arabic by the early 80s (Enayat 1982, 101).

The astuteness of Mawdudi’s approach to political Islam lay in its treating of the state as a theological argument. His theory is the closest to a relatively coherent enunciation of the Islamic state, incorporating the economic, social and political; whilst being informed and vigilant, if not convinced, by secular ideologies and social science theories (Enayat 1989, 102-3). This paper shall only focus on his political writings with regard to what the state is.

For Mawdudi, the Prophet’s mission was to bring the final message to the believers. This message that was carried out was the “final code (emphases mine) of human guidance in all its completeness (Mawdudi 1976, 149)” For him the final code that the Prophet brought contained all aspects of the social world. For Mawdudi, those who argue that the Islam does not possess an “Islamic political theory, Islamic social order and Islamic culture” and those that claimed “that Islam contains within itself the elements of all types of contemporary social and political thought and action” suffer from an inferiority complex owing to the dominant position of the west (Mawdudi 1976, 147-8).
Just as the normative order constructs a realm of the unity of forces, Mawdudi (1976, 148) argues that Islam is “a well-ordered system, a consistent whole”. Mawdudi ascribes to the concept of Tawhid (Unity of the God-Head or God’s Oneness), the most fundamental in Islam, the basis and ‘seed’ for all social and political life. Tawhid is so significant in Islam because it was the major novelty of the Prophet’s message to the polytheist Arabs to believe in One God as opposed to the idols that were popular in the Mecca and the rest of Arabia. Even murder is pardonable but Shirk (polytheism or associating partners with God) remains the most serious offence in Islam and the only one that is unpardonable in the eyes of God (Kramer 1997, 76).

The linking of Tawhid with a pre-ordained political system is both fantastically conjured up, as well as frighteningly simple. Pointing to the Qur’an, Mawdudi highlights that the dispute of Muhammad and the many Prophets before him with their enemies was not one of the existence or denial of God (Mawdudi 1976, 150). The Qur’anic verse clearly states that “if you asked them (the unbelievers) who created them, they will surely say God. How then are they turned away?”4 From here Mawdudi separates the Arabic terms of Rabb (Lord) from Ilah (Master and Law-Giver) (Mawdudi 1976, 150).

He deduces that the “uncompromising demand of the Prophets” was that the non-believers should not only accept God as their Lord, since they already recognised this, but also that they should acknowledge him as the only rightful Law-Giver (Mawdudi 1976, 150). Ilah translates into ‘Him who is the Object of Worship’. This

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4 The Qur’an, Chapter 43: Verse 87.
does not only place emphasis on ritual prayer, but also a complete and perennial obedience as a slave to his Lord in whatever that Lord’s instruction (Mawdudi 1976, 151).

*Rabb* on the other hand literally means ‘one who nourishes and sustains’. It could also mean Master or owner and someone who we generally owe our allegiance to: a patron for example (Mawdudi 1976, 151-2). Anyone can be this in some limited form such as the Lord of the Manor or a mother to a child. The biggest problem that flows from this distinction is man’s relation to it. Mawdudi goes on to say that for no other creature is the idea of Lordship as enticing as it is to humans. Man’s inherent desire is to first gain the title of *Rabb* and then ultimately to define one’s very life as a Law-giver or *Ilah* does.

This preponderance of power—whether in the name of ideology or even the vast sway of the papacy—for him is the roots of all man’s problems. Mawdudi shows how abreast he is of international affairs, considering this treatise was written in 1939, when he rightly points to the power of ideology in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and even America and Britain, no doubt referring to the roots of the future Cold War. He terms all these ideologies as ‘false gods’ and the sole cause of all miseries and conflicts (Mawdudi 1976, 151-6).

After explaining this desire of man’s desire for overlordship over others, Mawdudi attempts to get back to his thesis. The first point he stresses is what he calls ‘First Principle of Islamic Political Theory’ and this is “[t]he belief in the unity and the sovereignty of Allah is the foundation of the social and moral system propounded by
the Prophets (Mawdudi 1976, 158).” This for Mawdudi (1976, 158) “is the starting-point of the Islamic political philosophy...that human-beings must, individually and collectively, surrender all (emphases mine) rights of overlordship, legislation and the exercising of authority over others.” No single individual can pass orders “in his own right” but they must obligingly accept the sovereignty of God.

To prove that the right to legislation vests in God alone, he quotes the following piece-meal verses of the Qur’an:

The authority rests with none but God. He commands you not to surrender to anyone save Him. This is the right way (of life). 5

They ask ‘have we also got some authority?’ Say: ‘all authority belongs to God alone’. 6

Do not say wrongly with your tongues that this is lawful and that is unlawful. 7

Whoso does not establish and decide by that which God has revealed, such are disbelievers. 8

These verses for Mawdudi point incontrovertibly to the ‘fact’ that in legislation, only God’s laws could be followed. Accepting other men as law-makers would equate to denying God’s Oneness and exclusive right as the only Law-Maker. Not following God’s laws would thus be tantamount to Shirk (polytheism), which as explained is the most cardinal sin in Islam. He does not consider that the third of the above verses which warns against wrongly declaring some things lawful and others not, could refer to himself as well. But that is a debate best left to other platforms.

In summarising the basis for the Islamic state and the Qur’anic injunctions that flow from his cited verses, Mawdudi (1976, 159) points out these three conclusions:

5 The Qur’an, Chapter 12: Verse 40.
6 The Qur’an, Chapter 3: Verse 154.
7 The Qur’an, Chapter 16: Verse 116.
8 The Qur’an, Chapter 5: Verse 44.
(1) No person, class or group, not even the entire population of the state as a whole, can lay claim to sovereignty. God alone is the real sovereign; all others are merely His subjects;

(2) God is the real law-giver and the authority of absolute legislation vests in Him. The believers cannot resort to totally independent legislation nor can they modify any law which God has laid down, even if the desire to effect such legislation or change in Divine laws is unanimous⁹; and

(3) An Islamic state must, in all respects, be founded upon the law laid down by God, through His Prophet. The government which runs such a state will be entitled to obedience in its capacity as a political agency set up to enforce the laws of God and only in so far as it acts in that capacity. If it disregards the law revealed by God, its commands will not be binding on the believers.

Mawdudi asserts that perhaps the most accurate description of the Islamic state is to term it a ‘theo-democracy’. This is because it still allows for a form of democracy since all men are equal before the divine law. But these laws are subject to the sovereignty of God (Mawdudi 1976, 160). On the other hand the Islamic state is a theocracy insofar as it follows God’s laws, but is at a variance with the European conception of such a state where a priestly class “exercises unchecked domination and enforces laws of its own making in the name of God (Mawdudi 1976, 160).”

For him the state is ruled not by a priestly class, but by the whole community of believers, including the ‘rank and file’. It is this last point that deserves our attention. The pointing to a ‘rank and file’ denotes some form of hierarchy within this conception which Mawdudi denies. For one Mawdudi (1976, 160) acknowledges that the foundations of Islamic political philosophy are based on “the sovereignty of God and (emphasis mine) the vicegerency (Khilafah) of man.”

⁹ NB. What Mawdudi is referring to here is the right of ‘absolute legislation’ which encompass laws which he feels are explicitly ‘laid down’ by God. With regard to the practicable laws that Raziq and Rida referred to, Mawdudi does indeed allow for human scope in legislation as shall be elaborated on later. In fact he allows for independent juristic interpretation of the texts in contrast to traditionalist scholars who say the early consensus of the classical scholars have to take precedence over independent interpretation.
Mawdudi (1976, 168) then goes on to state that since the God is the only sovereign in the Islamic state, naturally “the persons who set out to enforce God’s law…should be regarded as representatives of the Supreme Ruler (God).” But then he goes on to state that within this Islamic state, “everyone is a caliph of God and an equal participant in this caliphate (Mawdudi 1976, 168)”. The role of all citizens is to ensure God’s sovereignty is respected. This emphasis on each man being an equal vicegerent is both romanticised and simplistic. Perhaps realising that acknowledging any form of hierarchy would naturally disprove his own thesis that no man can be an overlord over another, he resorts to this fanciful explanation.

Yet only two pages earlier, Mawdudi (1976, 166) says that the state could only be run:

by those who believe in the ideology on which it is based and the Divine Law which it is assigned to administer. The administration of the Islamic state must be those whose whole life is devoted to the observance and enforcement of this Law, who not only agree with its reformatory program and fully believe in it but thoroughly comprehend its spirit and are acquainted with its details.

The implicit reference to a hierarchy is in fact surreptitiously introduced here. Only those who have devoted their whole life to observing and enforcing God’s law could qualify as leaders of the Islamic state. Whether this qualification was limited to the pious, the cleric or the ideologue is not clear.

How is the state conceptualised in Mawdudi’s theoretical premises? Just like in the Balinese Negaras where the state was a total realm that incorporated the political as part of the religious and social, Mawdudi equates the state as representative of Islam as a whole. Islam for him is not only a religion, but is “a well-ordered system, a
consistent whole (Mawdudi 1976, 148).” The wholeness of Islam’s system could not be limited to private ritualism, but had to be as in Geertz’s description of the Negara the “axis around which the public life of society revolved (Geertz 1980, 123).”

Theoretically, the state was neither the Machiavellian controller of society nor the Weberian mediated bureaucracy, but was the actual domain of God and his laws. The political became collapsed within all that is social. And all that is social is religious, for Islam is a “well-ordered system” and “consistent whole”. By pointing to Tawhid, Mawdudi constructed the totality of the state as one unending realm. If you denied God’s Oneness then not only are you not a believer, but you do not accept the totalised realm.

The state became invested with being the totalising whole since God’s sovereignty was acted out through it. In fact, what Mawdudi may actually be saying was quite heretical in that for God’s sovereignty to be acted out, it could only be done through the institution of an Islamic state; this despite Muslims believing in God’s omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence. Life in this concept could only be political in its acceptance of God’s sovereignty as the only Law-Maker, since there was no place for other ideologies or preferences that contradicted the Divine Law much like the political in the Balinese Negara was acted through the emotions and court ceremonies of its people.

The major difference of Mawdudi’s approach to the Balinese case is his equating of social class and rank as just one form of man’s desire of overlordship over other men. This can in no way be similar to caste and status in the Balinese case which
represented and signified an individual’s closeness to the core of the state: the divine. Yet a more careful consideration of the substantive argument of Mawdudi may point out that in fact what Mawdudi is saying is that people should only have one Lord, and that is God. In relation to that God, that divine, all actions that were political should be regulated by the law of that God.

Moreover, Mawdudi (1976, 166) asserts that the Islamic state can only be run “by those who believe in the ideology on which it is based and the Divine Law which it is assigned to administer [and] whose whole life is devoted to the observance and enforcement of this Law.” This of course opens up a hierarchy. This hierarchy itself is not divinely ordained or a religious duty as it would become in Khomeini, but it nonetheless introduces a hierarchy of exemplars as in the Balinese Negara. This hierarchy was not of caste but rather of knowledge or piety.

This ‘normativisation’ of the state was not entirely free of the conventional instrumentalist view of the state in Political Science however. In fact in Mawdudi’s own words he terms the state “an instrument of reform (Mawdudi 1976, 166).” Moreover, he identifies the need for the Islamic state as necessary because “the great mass[es] of common people are incapable of perceiving their own true (emphasis mine) interests (Mawdudi 1976, 162).”

Because of this the Divine Limits (Hudud-Allah) provides restrictions on freedoms such as the veiling of women which recognise man’s guardianship over them to ensure that society does not descend into moral decadence (Mawdudi 1976, 163). These limits provide “a permanent and immutable code of behaviour for man, and...
does not deprive him of any essential liberty (Mawdudi 1976, 164).” This anti-democratic instrumentalism of the state for Mawdudi however, is neither like the instrumentalism of Afghani where the state was at the service of reviving Islam, nor the instrumentalism of Rida where the state could help establish a real society of justice. For him the state as instrument was subject to God’s ownership of its domain and thus God’s sovereignty, no matter what personal ideas of justice the individual may have on certain issues.

Thus, the state was established as Islamic normative order in the works of Mawdudi, without doing away with some of the connotations of the conventional instrumental role of the state. This tension would continue unabated in the works of Khomeini and for every Muslim thereafter who has accepted such a ‘normativised’ conception of an Islamic state. But whereas for Geertz, the representation of the Negara was positive or neutral, in analysing Mawdudi it is clear that this normativised state is negative, and would have to rely on the quelling of dissent and debate.

It is well and good to invest the Islamic state with such Divine symbolism, but can the entire populace ever agree to its limitations or live out the political mediated by their relation to the divinity in a totalised stately realm such as the Balinese Negara. This more so when strictures such as women’s veiling and capital punishment are sometimes so flagrantly unpalatable to many and go against their common sense of justice. Ultimately, investing symbolism in a state can never truly break free from the shackles of how modern politics has come to be defined both in the west and Islam.
Ayatollah Ruhullah Mousavi Khomeini is unlike the other theorists of political Islam. This is because he was actually the most important figure in a real revolution and would go on to become the most important political leader in Iran. Also unlike the other scholars in this paper aside from Afghani who were Sunni, Khomeini was a Shiite. A highly qualified cleric, Khomeini’s writings must be divided into two periods. The first, before 1963, was aimed more at the Shah and urged him to respect the Constitution and desist from inequity and oppression. He may have been suspicious of the Constitution, but acquiesced to its place in society. Within this, the place of the cleric was merely that of the jurist or teacher (Martin 2000, 108-114).

By 1963 however, the political landscape of the country changed forever. The catalyst for the “events of 1963 was the granting of capitulatory [oil] rights to U.S. nationals and advisors in Iran in the ensuing year (Dorraj, 1990: 156).” This was seen as the continuation of western imperialism and neo-colonialism, and protests ensued when people took to the streets. The slaying of unarmed Iranians in the 1963 rebellion “sounded the death knell for the Pahlavi monarchy (Dorraj 1990, 158).” Not only did it forever change the political landscape of Iran, it opened up the radicalisation of many, prime of who was Khomeini. As an example, Khomeini (quoted in Dhorraj 1990, 159) remarking on these events says:

> The monarchy in Iran, from its inception to this day –God be my witness– has inflicted miseries and perpetrated enormous crimes. The crimes of the Persian shahs have blackened the pages of history. Who but these very shahs of Iran
ordered massacres of people and piled their severed heads into pyramids? The very best of these shahs were ruthless ruffians.

After 1963, Khomeini’s ideas became highly politicised, and we see the burgeoning conception of the Islamic state, the struggle for which was equated with Ali’s son Husayn’s martyrdom at Karbala against the tyranny of the Sunni caliph Yazid (Enayat, 1982: 194). Khomeini was exiled to France and then Iraq for his vehement opposition to the Shah, from where he continued his critique of the Shah. The Shah’s reign ended in 1979 when he abdicated the Peacock Throne (Ehteshami 1995, 1).

Khomeini’s ideas of an Islamic state were developed in a series of lectures in the 1970s and these were later collected in a book. The English translation of this book by Hamid Algar (Khomeini 1981) will primarily be utilised by this paper. The basis of the Islamic state in Khomeini’s writing centred on a theory which, pronounced in its correct Arabic form is Wilayat-e Faqih, and in its Persian form is Velayat-e Faqih. Literally translating into the ‘Guardianship of the Jurisconsult’, the Wilayat is premised on the notion that in the absence of the twelfth Imam of the Ithna Asharia (Twelver) Shi’a, temporal authority must devolve to the righteous and most knowledgeable of the clerics, the Fuqaha (jurists) of the time (Jahanbakhsh 2001, 130-5).

Because Shia doctrine traditionally opposes the rulership of Sunnis or anyone beside the infallible Imams, it has been the duty of the clerics (Ulema) to check against all forms of leadership. Since the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the Twelvers have been waiting for the Imam to return for over a millennium. Because he will return
and is thus not mortally dead, all authority during the period of this occultation is thought to be illegitimate. The Wilayat is not entirely a novelty in Shiite theology. It had exponents of such a theory from as early as classical and medieval times in Shi’ism. However, its novel implementation in the Iranian concept went even further by legally instituting the position of a single Wali-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurisconsult), who is the Supreme leader able to exercise any power, or veto any decision in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Enayat, 1989, 160-2).

For Khomeini Islamic government is unlike any “existing forms of government (Khomeini 1981, 55). Like Mawdudi, Khomeini defines the Islamic state as the “rule of divine law over men [wherein] the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty (Khomeini 1981, 55).” Like Mawdudi he also places the state as the domain of God’s sovereignty:

Islamic government is a government of law. In this form of government, sovereignty belongs to God alone and law is His decree and command (Khomeini 1981, 56).

The necessity to establish an Islamic state is linked to the Shi’i belief that the Prophet chose Ali as his successor before he died. He states that after the Prophet’s death, everyone recognised the need for government, but there “was disagreement [between Sunni and Shi’a] only as to which person should assume responsibility for government and head of state (Khomeini 1981, 43).” Since in the occultation period of the 12th Imam, all temporal authority is seen by the Shi’i as illegitimate, Khomeini contends that the only people who could rule during this time are the fuqaha (jurists). Since there is no real way of knowing when the 12th Imam will return, the fuqaha should rule over society to ensure that God’s law is implemented and God’s sovereignty realised:
Since Islamic government is a government of law, those acquainted with the law, or precisely with religion – i.e. the *fuqaha* – must supervise its functioning. It is they who supervise all executive and administrative affairs of the country, together with all planning (Khomeini 1981, 79).

The jurists for Khomeini “are the fortresses of Islam...They must do whatever is necessary to fulfil that duty. It is one of their most important duties and moreover, an absolute duty, not a conditional one (Khomeini 1981, 74).” The jurists inherit the political station of the Prophet and the Imams because of their knowledge of God’s law, even though they can never inherit their blameless spiritual station:

> When we say that after the Occultation, the just *faqih* has the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger and the Imams had, do not imagine that the status of the *faqih* is identical to that of the Imams and the Prophet. For here we are not speaking about status, but function (Khomeini 1981, 62).

The prime reason why the jurists should rule in the absence of the hidden Imam is because they are the most knowledgeable. Here Khomeini cites the belief of the Shi’a in Ali’s claim to be the immediate successor to the Prophet. The Shiites believe that not only was Ali superior to Abu Bakr and the other caliphs in virtue, but that he was also the most knowledgeable on the laws and ordinances of Islam:

> The view of the Shi’a concerning government and the nature of the persons who should assume rule was clear from the time of the Prophet (upon whom be peace and blessings) down to the beginning of the Occultation. It specified that the ruler **should be foremost in knowledge of the laws and ordinances of Islam** (emphasis mine) and just in their implementation. Now that we are in the time of the Occultation of the Imam...the establishment of government is still a necessity (Khomeini, 1981: 61).”
When Khomeini and Mawdudi came forth with their theories, they did not desire to institute a state wherein Islamic law would provide the basis of stability, command and obedience. In reality, they were introducing a symbolic dimension to why Muslims should live in the archetypal state of their writings and why that state was connected to God’s divine design. The adherence to Islamic law was not simply a corollary of an instrumental state, the institution of which would be something better than the Shah’s Iran or post-colonial Pakistan. It was in fact the very way God intended society to be lived. Islam could not be lived only in the private; its obligation was to be lived in a united sphere, where all distinctions are collapsed with no differentiation between the social, the political and the reality that encompassed all of this.

Just as the king was indistinguishable from the realm in the Negara, the 12th Imam who was in occultation and ultimately Ali before him, constituted the very essence of why the state was needed for Khomeini. Ali and the 12th Imam needed to act out the political to realise God’s will. For if Ali’s role was only spiritual, then why would the Shia feel he was done an injustice when Abu Bakr succeeded the Prophet. Just as Ali’s life represented all the greatest aspects of morality, character and intelligence, it also represented the entirety of the political and social life, like the court ceremonies dramatic plays, court titles and eulogies represented in Bali.

When Khomeini asserts that the fiqhaha are the inheritors of the Prophet’s station and forwarded the idea of the rule of the cleric, he argued that the clerics
are the representatives of the 12th Imam during his occultation. It was through the clerics whose knowledge of the sacred texts connected society to the divine that unjust and immoral politics do not have to be the dominant mode of life in the Imam’s absence. This was like how the Balinese priests connected the sacred to the populace and were the emblematic executers of divineness. The Wali-e Faqih and more broadly all the jurists were similar to the Balinese priests who were “parts of the king’s regalia...learned in religious law, adept in ritual...virtuous...an embodiment of part of that (divine) authority, and extension of the king’s (the 12th Imam?) official person (Geertz 1980, 126).”

The jurist, like in Bali, was to be a guide to the populace with his knowledge and actions, demonstrating the ideal relationship to the king (12th Imam?) and the divine. This relationship would exemplify the perfect relation between ruler and subject and was the example to the populace of how to serve one’s God. The realm of the state now became part of one realm connected to the Divine via the cleric and the Imams. Just like in Bali, God owned the realm and the state was the religious design reflected in the hierarchies within a ‘sacred space’.

When Khomeini presented his argument for the rule of the jurists, his argument naturally rested on the existence of a natural hierarchy where the cleric was the most authoritative in deciding about important issues or interpreting the Islamic texts with regard to the state. This was not the same as the how caste and status was ordered in the Bali of Geertz, but it implied that such a hierarchy was natural and necessarily political. While in Bali there were numerous castes,
wherein every person was accounted for, in Khomeini’s theory there was the cleric and the populace.

Yet to accept the seniority of the *Wali-e Faqih*, as in Geertz (1980: 123) is to accept the naturalness of “the axis around which the public life of society revolve[s].” The gradation that distinguishes the hidden Imam as spiritual leader, the cleric as temporal overseer of the polity and the general populace, implies not that those who are non-clerics are less human, just less able to oversee society and the running of the state within God’s design. This corresponds somewhat to the hierarchy of exemplars in the caste system in Bali where lower castes were a coarser version of the caste above and was not in the Marxist analysis less real, but rather just less exquisite and less potent (Geertz 1980, 128-31).

Within this conception, the citizenry who live in this realm benefit from its blessings and energies and are thus collectively responsible for meeting the ritual and moral obligations that this entailed, such as living by the laws of Islam. Like in Bali, the political community cannot be separated from the realm which “at base [is] not a social, political or economic unit, but a religious one (Geertz 1980, 129)”, just as all social life should be.

As with Mawdudi, the instrumentalist role of the state still featured in Khomeini’s theory. For example Khomeini contends that legal cases “that a *Shari’a* judge in earlier times settled in one or two days cannot be settled now in twenty years (Khomeini 1981, 32).” At the crux of his critique against the Shah and
westernisation, he highlights the potential for the *Shariah* to make administration easier. He says that a lawyer once told him that because of the protracted back-and-forth nature of the Shah’s judicial machinery, litigations can drag on so long that his son will even inherit the cases (Khomeini 1981, 32).

He expands on this idea of bureaucratic red-tape to explain that all western law has done is complicate Iranian’s lives and do more to curtail their legal rights. Khomeini (1981, 32) also says that the result is not the only important thing, but procedure is too. He places great emphasis on “people’s time” and implies that not being expeditious is also a procedural failure. Of course, he does not consider that fact that the long process may also be procedural constraints to ensure that the case is resolved judiciously. He somewhat overstates this, but there can be no doubt that this criticism was very applicable to Iranians of the time, especially youngsters and the lower to middle classes. Not only in the judicial ministry but other public offices too, dealing with cold and aloof Persian bureaucrats, whether a western educated Muslim, detached Baha’i or a simple white collar official, was certainly tedious and incoherent as they tend to be in dictatorships.

Moreover, Khomeini (1981, 32) extends this notion further. He contends that the tedious process of legal and other public functions results in ‘cunning’, ‘bribery’ and corruption being the major way of ensuring cases are “settled expeditiously, but at the cost of justice (Khomeini 1981, 32-3).” He concludes this idea of corruption with a grand estimation however. He deduces that the implementation of Islamic penal codes is the only way to prevent society from being destroyed by corruption (Khomeini 1981, 33).
Thus, here what Khomeini is saying is by adopting the *Shariah*, the administrative function of the state would be simplified, rather than tedious bureaucratic red-tape. The idea that the state could be an instrument that benefits the populace then remains part of the discourse. Yet Khomeini’s conception of the rule of the jurist places the state firmly as an Islamic normative order. Whether the practice of this was borne out in reality is not under the purview of this essay. The *Wilayat-e Faqih* and Khomeini’s broader conception of the Islamic state represented the culmination of over a century of modern Islamic political thought. From its early instrumentalist role and its capacity to revive Islam the state has become an object and extension of divinity itself. Its realm has become the realm of God and His sovereignty. One might venture to say that the Islamic state has become God itself!
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has analysed the transformation of the state in modern Islamic political discourse. By not focusing on critiquing the direction that the Islamic state took in the literature, but rather tracing its substantive modification, this paper has attempted to provide a new theoretical lens to how we can view the conception of the modern Islamic state in the writings of its most prominent ideologues. The findings of this paper propose that the Islamic state reacted to its external environment as well as the legacies and theories of preceding generations of Muslim political ideologues. The state in modern Islamic political discourse can be periodised into three distinct phases.

The first represented the age of revivalism where the state could be used as an instrument to revive Islam for Afghani. The state was still very much reliant on the dominant conception of the state as monopoliser of violence and administrative device. The state’s function was to establish order and promote advancement to compete with the west.

The second age represented the intermediate phase and followed the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Here, for Raziq, the state had nothing to do with Islam as politics had no spiritual value. For Rida on the other hand, the state could be instrumental in providing justice, as justice was the natural corollary of the magnanimous Shariah. The Shariah’s strength lay in its ability to deal with change. In Rida’s view the people’s will was the basis of sovereignty.
The final phase marked the period that coincided with the failure and corruption of post-colonial states. In this period and in the writings of Mawdudi and Khomeini, the state became an extension of the divine because it represented God’s sovereignty. The state possessed a spiritual value and had to ensure that God’s law governed man’s behaviour. The political became an act of religion and the state represented an Islamic normative order.

In terms of structure, this paper firstly conceptualised the most important themes that guided our understanding of political Islam. Thereafter, it introduced the western conception of the state as instrumentalist against the state as normative order. The third section analysed the pioneering work on modern political Islam, the instrumentalist state and its focus on revivalism. The fourth section focused on the intermediate phase where modern political thought had reached a crossroad and from where the state was redirected toward a ‘normativising’ state. The fifth and final section evaluated the turn toward fundamentalism and the increasing focus on a totalising Islamic normative order, whilst the analysis was still sensitive to the tension that lay between the ‘normativised’ state and the instrumentalist state.
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