ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AS A TOOL FOR RESOLVING SOUTH AFRICA'S ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT WOES

By:
Robyn Elizabeth Hugo (HGXROB001)

Supervisor:
Professor Alexander Paterson
Institute of Marine and Environmental Law

Word count: 25 968 words

Research dissertation presented for approval of Senate in fulfilment of part of the requirements for the degree Magister Legum in Environmental law in approved courses and a minor dissertation. The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the completion of a programme of courses.

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the submission of Magister Legum dissertations, including those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of the University, and that this dissertation conforms to those regulations.

Signed by candidate

15 January 2014

Signature removed
ABSTRACT

South Africa’s environmental resources are in serious decline, despite the constitutional environmental right, and multiple environmental protection laws. A predominant reason for this is that the criminal sanction is the default method of environmental enforcement. Even if prosecutors succeed in proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the fines imposed are too low to deter environmental violations.

This dissertation proposes the introduction of an administrative penalty system into SA environmental law, as this system has had positive compliance impacts in numerous jurisdictions. Administrative penalties in the Netherlands and United Kingdom (the roots of SA’s civil and common law systems, respectively) are evaluated to identify best practices for administrative penalties.

In SA’s environmental regime, there is an ‘administrative fine’ contained in section 24G of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. This is not a true administrative penalty, nor does it comply with the recommended best practices. Section 24G should either be deleted or substantially improved to meet its obligation of protecting the environment. Given the significant potential of administrative penalties to improve environmental compliance and enforcement, practical suggestions are made regarding their introduction into SA environmental law as a means to halt the current widespread non-compliance with environmental legislation.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ 1

1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 3

2 CHAPTER 2: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT THEORY .................................... 10

2.1 Compliance and enforcement tools ...................................................................................................... 10

2.1.1 The criminal sanction ...................................................................................................................... 11

2.1.2 Administrative measures ................................................................................................................. 13

2.1.3 Challenges of traditional compliance and enforcement tools ......................................................... 14

2.1.3.1 Implementing body ..................................................................................................................... 14

2.1.3.2 Standard of proof ....................................................................................................................... 15

2.1.3.3 Cost and implementation time .................................................................................................. 15

2.1.3.4 Ease of implementation .............................................................................................................. 15

2.1.3.5 Deterrence impact ...................................................................................................................... 17

2.1.3.6 Proportionality ............................................................................................................................. 17

2.1.3.7 Prevention of environmental harm .............................................................................................. 17

2.2 Administrative penalties ...................................................................................................................... 19

2.2.1 Nature and form of administrative penalties .................................................................................. 19

2.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of administrative penalties ............................................................ 22

2.2.2.1 Implementing body ..................................................................................................................... 22

2.2.2.2 Standard of proof ....................................................................................................................... 22

2.2.2.3 Cost and implementation time .................................................................................................. 22

2.2.2.4 Ease of implementation .............................................................................................................. 23

2.2.2.5 Deterrence impact ...................................................................................................................... 25

2.2.2.6 Proportionality ............................................................................................................................. 27

2.2.2.7 Prevention of environmental harm .............................................................................................. 28

3 CHAPTER 3: DRAWING LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS REGARDING THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES .............................................................................. 28

3.1 Introduction to the regimes .................................................................................................................... 29

3.1.1 Netherlands ....................................................................................................................................... 29

3.1.2 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................................. 30
3.2 Lessons to be drawn from the Netherlands and United Kingdom

3.2.1 Nature of penalty

3.2.2 Trigger for penalty

3.2.3 Scope of application

3.2.4 Institutional arrangements

3.2.5 Decision-making process

3.2.6 Maximum penalty quanta

3.2.7 Allocation of penalty proceeds

3.2.8 Appeal and review procedures

3.2.9 Effect of penalty on criminal offence

3.2.10 Non-compliance implications

4 CHAPTER 4: ADMINISTRATIVE PENALIES IN SOUTH AFRICA’S ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REGIME

4.1 Overview of s24G

4.2 Critical evaluation of s24G

4.2.1 Nature of penalty

4.2.2 Trigger for penalty

4.2.3 Scope of application

4.2.4 Institutional arrangements

4.2.5 Decision-making processes

4.2.6 Maximum penalty quanta

4.2.7 Allocation of penalty proceeds

4.2.8 Appeal and review procedures

4.2.9 Effect of penalty on criminal offence

4.2.10 Non-compliance implications

5 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources

Cases

Legislation

Policies and guidelines

Secondary sources
## LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEL</td>
<td>Atmospheric emission licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQA</td>
<td>National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRE</td>
<td>Better Regulation Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;E</td>
<td>Compliance and enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Competent authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Centre for Environmental Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of Environmental Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFRA</td>
<td>Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC&amp;E</td>
<td>Environmental compliance and enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSO</td>
<td>Environmental Civil Sanctions (England) Order 2010 No.1157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Environmental Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer van 13 Juni 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI</td>
<td>Environmental Management Inspectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environment Protection Act 1990 c.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETS</td>
<td>Emission Trading System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMP</td>
<td>Fixed monetary penalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GALA</td>
<td>General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht van 4 Juni 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHG</td>
<td>Greenhouse gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>Interested and affected party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEM</td>
<td>Integrated environmental management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Listing Notice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>Netherlands Emissions Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NECER</td>
<td>National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEM</td>
<td>National Environmental Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEMA</td>
<td>National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEMBA</td>
<td>National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEMLAB 2</td>
<td>National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Bill [B13-2012]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Prosecuting Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWA</td>
<td>National Water Act 36 of 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORO</td>
<td>Offence Response Options (Environment Agency Offence Response Options Operational Instruction 1430_10 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAA</td>
<td>National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES</td>
<td>Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGE</td>
<td>Regulation, Enforcement and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAEO</td>
<td>South Africa Environment Outlook (Department of Environmental Affairs &amp; Tourism South Africa Environment Outlook A report on the state of the environment 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Supreme Court of Appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMA</td>
<td>Specific environmental management Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UT</td>
<td>Upper Tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMP</td>
<td>Variable monetary penalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WML</td>
<td>Waste management licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRA</td>
<td>Water Resources Act 1991 c.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

‘The condition of the South African environment is deteriorating. Increasing pollution and declining air quality are harming people’s health. Natural resources are being exploited in an unsustainable way, threatening the functioning of ecosystems. Water quality and the health of aquatic ecosystems are declining. Land degradation remains a serious problem. Up to 20 species of commercial and recreational marine fish are considered over-exploited and some have collapsed.’

Recent reports reveal that most of South Africa’s (SA) terrestrial ecosystems, and over 80 per cent of its river systems, are threatened. The quality and quantity of water reserves are declining. This has an adverse impact on human health, exacerbated where there is inadequate sanitation. Marine wastewater pollution is escalating. About half of SA’s wetlands have been destroyed. Alien invasive species are multiplying – aggravating impacts on biodiversity and water availability. Waste management and access to waste services are poor. Uncontrolled coastal development poses serious environmental threats. Air quality is deteriorating, and the population is increasingly being exposed to dangerous ambient pollutant concentrations, with their accompanying serious health risks. The negative impacts of climate change - for the environment, and for human health and well-being – are mounting.

This dire situation persists despite the fact that the state is constitutionally obliged to ensure environmental compliance and enforcement (EC&E). In addition to a constitutional environment right, there is a surfeit of environmental legislation compelling compliance with

---

1 South Africa Environment Outlook (SAEO) 2.
2 Outcome 10 Delivery Agreement 2,32.
5 OECD Performance 34; DEA Strategic Plan 2012-2017 15; Outcome 10 10,12,30; SAEO 34-35,38; National Waste Management Strategy (GN344 GG35306 of 2012-05-04) 15.
6 DEA Strategic Plan 2012-2017 16; OECD Performance 22-23; SAEO 38.
7 OECD Performance 23,33; Outcome 10 2,10-11,13,24,29; SAEO 4-7,10,24-25,32-39.
8 S.24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 guarantees everyone the rights to an environment not harmful to health or well-being, and to have the environment protected, through reasonable
and facilitating enforcement of section 24 - the environment right in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution). The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) is the framework legislation for environmental protection. NEMA and the various specific environmental management Acts (SEMAs), are among the ‘reasonable legislative measures’ for environmental protection envisaged by the environment right.

The combination of widespread non-compliance with legislation designed to protect the environment, and the poor enforcement of these laws mean that constitutional rights are not being realised, and environmental governance is subverted. This is so even though NEMA contains several provisions intended to make the criminal sanction more effective. Several commentators argue that this poor EC&E is partly because criminal sanctions imposed by criminal courts are the default enforcement measure of SA’s environmental authorities. This dissertation advocates the use of an administrative penalty system – with legislative and other measures that: prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promote conservation; and secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources, while promoting justifiable economic and social development.

---

9 Glazewski ‘NEMA’ in *Environmental Law* 7-6; van der Linde ‘NEMA’ in *Environmental Management* 197; Du Plessis ‘Environmental Compliance’ in *Compliance&Enforcement* 379.


13 Damage from environmental crimes and rehabilitation costs are recoverable from polluters (s.34). Offenders can be ordered to: repay the financial advantage (and investigation and prosecution costs); or remediate. Employers and company directors who fail to take reasonable preventative steps are presumed criminally liable for their employees’ or company’s environmental crimes. Courts may: withdraw authorisations; disqualify offenders (s.34C); and order forfeiture (s34D). Part of a fine can be paid to anyone whose evidence led to conviction (s.34B). S.34G provides for admission of guilt fines.

non-criminal fines generally imposed by administrative officials\textsuperscript{15} - as a tool to help resolve SA’s EC&E woes.

Compliance with laws depends on the risk of being caught and convicted, and on the severity of punishment imposed,\textsuperscript{16} all of which are currently minor in SA environmental law. Environmental crime is both under-investigated and under-prosecuted.\textsuperscript{17} If an offence is detected and a decision made to prosecute, the prosecutor must prove the violator’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt in criminal court.\textsuperscript{18} Even if this onerous burden of proof is met and a fine is imposed, it is generally far too low to deter non-compliance - particularly when the benefits of breaking the law are significant.\textsuperscript{19}

This is supported by statistics in the National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Reports (NECERs) released annually by the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA).\textsuperscript{20} NECERs contain details of C&E action taken by the Environmental Management Inspectorate (EMI) – a network of environmental enforcement officials. The EMI has wide-ranging investigative,\textsuperscript{21} inspection,\textsuperscript{22} enforcement\textsuperscript{23} and administrative powers\textsuperscript{24} to

\textsuperscript{15} Macrory&Wood\textsuperscript{e} Environmental Civil Penalties 4,6; Hampton \textsuperscript{e} Reducing Administrative Burdens 40; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 11,17-18,24-25; Macrory Report 38,41,43,45; Svatikova Criminalization 39,85,107,109,145; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24) JEL 256,259,282; Kidd 2002 (9) SAJELP 37,39; INECE Principles Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 65; fn.66.
\textsuperscript{18} Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,120,124; Svatikova Criminalization 109; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24) JEL 259,282; INECE Principles 71-72; Davis 2010 Acta Juridica 412,415.
\textsuperscript{20} 2010-11 NECER 10; 2011-12 NECER 11,13-14.
\textsuperscript{21} S.31H.
\textsuperscript{22} S.31K.
\textsuperscript{23} S.31J,s31H(5).
\textsuperscript{24} S.31L,s34G.
monitor and enforce compliance with NEMA and/or the SEMAs. Although the EMI has made some progress in improving poor EC&E, issues like: intersecting (and sometimes conflicting) mandates; difficulty ensuring coordination with other government departments; the fact that certain legislation falls outside of the inspectors’ mandate; resource constraints; and the vast extent of environmental non-compliance – including by government - undermine its effectiveness.

For instance, the NECERs indicate that, despite several arrests for environmental offences, conviction rates are low. The 2010-11 NECER reveals that the conviction rate was a dismal 9.75 per cent. In the following year, it was only 7.59 per cent, and the conviction rate reflected in the 2012-13 NECER was extremely low – 4.7 per cent. The 2011-12 NECER also contains what it calls ‘highlights of court sentences obtained’. That these are regarded as ‘highlights’ illustrates how low criminal penalties are. In 2012-13, 49 administrative fines were issued in terms of section 24G of NEMA (s24G) with a total value paid of R5 385 215. As evidence that current enforcement efforts are not an effective deterrent, the NECERs demonstrate that many violators are repeat offenders and/or remain in non-compliance, despite enforcement action against them.

27 10.
28 There were 1988 arrests and 738 criminal dockets registered with the South African Police Service. Of the 234 cases handed to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), it declined to prosecute 21. There were 72 convictions, 19 plea bargains and 22 acquittals. To calculate the conviction rate, I divided the number of convictions by the number of criminal dockets.
29 2011-12 NECER 11. There were 1339 arrests and 1080 criminal dockets registered. 201 cases were handed to the NPA, and it declined to prosecute 20 of these. 82 offenders were convicted, 13 entered into plea bargains, and there were seven acquittals.
30 9.
31 There were 1818 arrests and 1488 registered criminal dockets - of which 268 were handed to the NPA. The NPA declined to prosecute 37 of these. There were eight acquittals, 70 convictions and 14 plea bargains.
32 13-14. For instance: six months’ imprisonment (suspended for three years) was imposed for illegal hunting inside a protected area; and R3000 was imposed for the illegal dumping of medical waste.
33 10. There were 58 such fines, with R8 364870 paid in 2010-11 and 86 fines with R17 627233 paid in 2011-12.
34 Non-compliances by the following facilities have annually been recorded in the NECERs since 2009-10: Sasol’s Secunda Refinery, Mpumalanga (25,40,36,36); Engen’s Refinery, Kwa-Zulu Natal (25,41,37,37); PetroSA Refinery, Western Cape (28,39,35,36); Samancor Middelburg, Mpumalanga (25,41,38,37); Highveld...
The deficiencies of the current enforcement measures are not the only problems with SA’s C&E efforts. Another serious challenge is C&E’s fragmented nature. Environmental authorities from different government spheres have overlapping mandates and can use various environmental measures in different contexts. This is compounded by legislative fragmentation. As well as there being national, provincial and local laws all dealing with similar issues, there are also multiple cross-sectoral Acts applicable to activities. Inadequate communication and cooperation between different government spheres and departments within department means that this fragmented structure can result in duplication, conflict, inconsistencies, turf protection, bureaucracy, inaction, excessive governance costs, a lack of accountability and uncoordinated enforcement actions.

Government’s substantial resource constraints – both human and financial – have also seriously hindered C&E endeavours. Many officials lack the required capacity and skills for effective C&E. Staff turnover is also high. The dearth of skills and capacity is most dire in local government. This is of particular concern, given that municipalities have been entrusted with several important environmental functions.

Steel, Mpumalanga (26,42,39,38-39); BHP Billiton Metalloys Meyerton, Gauteng (27,43-44,42,41); Xstrata Wonderkop, North West (28,43,41,40); Mondi Richard’s Bay, Kwa-Zulu Natal (26,52-53,58,62).

National government has executive authority over ‘marine resources’, ‘mining’, and ‘fresh water resources’. ‘Environment’, ‘pollution control’, ‘air pollution’, and ‘water and sanitation services’ (potable water supply systems, domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems) are areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence (ss.44,85,104,125,Sch.4 Constitution). Municipalities have executive authority over ‘air pollution’ and ‘water and sanitation services’ (s.156(1),Sch.4,5 Constitution). ‘Cleansing’, ‘refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal’ are areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence, which municipalities have the right to administer. Local government competence is subject to the other spheres’ oversight (ss.104,125,156(1),156(6)(a),155(7),Sch.5 Constitution).

For instance, instead of a comprehensive Act addressing pollution in an integrated manner, several laws apply - administered by different authorities.


Du Plessis ‘Environmental Compliance’ in Compliance&Enforcement 379-380,384; OECD Performance 173; fn.35.
These C&E problems are not unique to SA. To try to curb the severe decline in the state of the environment, law and policy-makers across the globe have been introducing innovative C&E measures as alternatives to the criminal sanction. Several other jurisdictions have established administrative penalties, which have, in many cases, had a positive impact on legislative compliance. An administrative penalty system is also successfully used in terms of SA’s Competition Act 89 of 1998 (Competition Act).

Currently, apart from NEMA’s ‘administrative fine’ paid in terms of s24G for the consideration of an application for retrospective authorisation of an illegally-commenced activity, SA environmental law does not contain an administrative penalty system. This dissertation seeks to critically explore the merits of and possibilities for promoting the extended use of administrative penalties in SA environmental law to complement existing criminal, administrative and judicial measures; and, generally, as an alternative to the criminal sanction.

Chapter 2 considers C&E theory, and the available tools. It also addresses the challenges of traditional C&E mechanisms - specifically the criminal sanction - and the

---

40 Fn.11-12,14,17-19,37-38.
42 Including United States, Canada, Finland, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, Mexico, Peru, Equatorial Guinea, UK, Netherlands, Australia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Belarus.
43 BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 16-19; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 94-97,103-104,124-126; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 37-38; DEFRA Review 4,6,28,30; Hampton Reducing Burdens 38,40-41; Macrory Consultation 6-7,18,45-50; Svatikova Criminalization 3,20,24,39,85-86,106,110,183,185; Macrory&Woods Penalties 4-5,11,19-22,31,38; Macrory Report 22.41-42; Macrory Regulation 13,15-16; fn.156.
44 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 113-117; Kidd Environmental Law 279.
45 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 113; Kidd Environmental Law 279; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 237-238. Chap.4 explains why this is not a true administrative penalty.
46 Civil measures - like interdicts - require litigation in civil court and fall outside the scope of this dissertation (Kidd Environmental Law 279-280; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 57-58; Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-11-26-14).
increasing use of administrative penalties. The form and nature of administrative penalties, as well as their advantages and shortcomings, are addressed.

Chapter 3 evaluates the use of administrative penalties in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands - which are, respectively, the roots of SA’s common and civil law legal systems. The purpose of examining the contemporary use of administrative penalties in the two jurisdictions which form the basis of SA’s legal system, is to distil a set of best practices for the application of administrative penalties to SA’s EC&E efforts.

Chapter 4 critically assesses NEMA’s s24G ‘administrative fine’ - currently the only so-called administrative penalty in SA’s environmental law - and the recent amendments thereto47 - against the possible lessons identified in Chapter 3. Practical suggestions are made for SA’s introduction of a true environmental law administrative penalty system.

To ensure consistency in the analysis, the relevant regimes in both Chapters 3 and 4 are assessed using the following set of themes: the penalty’s nature and extent, and the circumstances which must exist before it can be applied; institutional arrangements for its use; the decision-making process - including the burden of proof and the factors for consideration in calculating the penalty; whether the penalty has an upper limit; the destination of the penalty funds; appeal and review procedures; the penalty’s impact on criminal offences; and the implications of penalty non-payment.

Chapter 5 concludes by summarising how administrative penalties can potentially improve SA’s C&E.

---

2 CHAPTER 2: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT THEORY

2.1 Compliance and enforcement tools

C&E mechanisms generally fall within two primary categories: ‘command-and-control’ and ‘alternative compliance’\(^{48}\) mechanisms.\(^{49}\) Administrative penalties are an example of the command-and-control approach, which consists of prescribing legal obligations and compelling compliance using various enforcement mechanisms. Such measures are designed to: compel legislative compliance; and punish and deter non-compliance.\(^{50}\) These state-centred measures afford the state some direct control over the regulated community.\(^{51}\) Examples are criminal, administrative and civil measures.\(^{52}\)

Both criminal and administrative measures (in their more traditional forms), are considered below, as are some of their inherent difficulties. Administrative penalties are more innovative than traditional administrative measures. Since they contain both civil and criminal elements, they are regarded as a hybrid sanction.\(^{53}\) This hybridity has the result that, when evaluating how best to formulate administrative penalties, lessons can be learned from the theory of both criminal and administrative sanctions.

---

\(^{48}\) These are often divided into incentive-based and voluntary measures. The former can be market-based (tax benefits, subsidies, deposit-refunds), regulatory or information-based incentives, and generally reward desired conduct. They can also penalise unwanted conduct – means like product taxes, user charges, emission and disposal charges impose costs on those who fail to meet required standards. Voluntary measures include self-regulatory (co-operative agreements and labelling schemes) and co-regulatory measures (environmental management co-operative agreements) for firms to improve environmental performance (Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 58-60; Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 297-306, 313-329; Lehmann ‘Voluntary’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 269, 272-294; Nel & Wessels 2010 (13)5 PER 49-53, 59-65; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 247-249).

\(^{49}\) Kidd Environmental Law 268; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 51; Du Plessis ‘Environmental Compliance’ in Compliance & Enforcement 381; Du Plessis & Nel ‘Compliance’ in Compliance & Enforcement 259.

\(^{50}\) Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 26-27; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 51-52; Du Plessis ‘Environmental Compliance’ in Compliance & Enforcement 381; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 246.

\(^{51}\) Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 297, 306; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 245-246; INECE Principles 75; OECD Compliance 76.

\(^{52}\) van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 246; Kidd Environmental Law 269, 278; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 52.

\(^{53}\) Macrory & Woods Penalties 6, 11, 19; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 862; Lynott 2010 (17)1 IPELJ 12; DEFRA Review 6.
When considering C&E measures, it is important to evaluate the justifications for punishment. The retribution theory is that society’s condemnation of an offender is reflected by means of the offender’s punishment. Punishment is regarded as being justly deserved.\textsuperscript{54} The deterrence theory provides both for individual deterrence: in which punishment discourages one person from repeating the same wrongdoing, and for general deterrence: in which the punishment of one offender serves to deter the general public.\textsuperscript{55}

2.1.1 The criminal sanction

Fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the criminal court are the default punishment for breaching environmental legislation.\textsuperscript{56} Historically, criminalising conduct has been used to express condemnation with the most socially objectionable conduct. But more recently, regulatory crimes have been created, several of which are for apparently minor and/or highly technical legislative violations.\textsuperscript{57} Generally, environmental crimes are not regarded as moral wrongs, and do not elicit the kind of indignation that would support the retributive theory’s reliance on public condemnation. This is strengthened by the fact that many environmental offences are strict liability offences – offenders are held liable in the absence of fault. Therefore, most criminal sanctions are intended as a deterrent, rather than for retributive purposes.\textsuperscript{58}

For the criminal sanction to be effective in this role, there must be a serious likelihood of an offender’s apprehension and conviction, and the imposition of a meaningful sanction.\textsuperscript{59} Another integral aspect of deterrence is that C&E action is publicised. In addition to imposing

\textsuperscript{54} Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95-96; Svatikova Criminalization 25-46; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 856,909,912-913; Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-15; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 241.

\textsuperscript{55} Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-15; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 856,860-861; Svatikova Criminalization 23-24; OECD Compliance 74; Macrory Consultation 30; van Zeven&Mulkey 1992 INECE Proceedings paras.3.2.1,3.2.2; OECD Fines 9; fn.16.

\textsuperscript{56} Fn.14.

\textsuperscript{57} For instance, a failure to provide: access to accounts (s.151(1)(b) NWA); or information for the national waste information system (s.67(1)(m) Waste Act).

\textsuperscript{58} Kidd Environmental Law 270,272-276; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 98,105,109; Svatikova Criminalization ix,1,23,37,40-41,109,175; van Zeven&Mulkey 1992 INECE Proceedings paras.3.2.1-3.3.2; OECD Fines 9,19; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 11,13,22,24,26; Macrory Report 7,14,16,18,23,38,47,54; Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,6,8,37; Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 88,93-94; Babbitt et al 2004(15) DELPF 2-3,26-29,43,48-50,54-64; DEFRA Review 4,14,22,27-28; Macrory Consultation 5,14-15,17,19,29,33-35,39,43-44,49,50,54; INECE Principles 76,79-80; Macrory Regulation 12,15,26-29.

\textsuperscript{59} Fn.16.
meaningful sanctions, an effective penalty regime must send a strong message to ensure that others comply.\textsuperscript{60} This is illustrated by the popular quote of American diplomat and politician Chester Bowles:

\begin{quote}
‘20 percent of the regulated population will automatically comply with any regulation, 5 percent will attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75 percent will comply as long as they think that the 5 percent will be caught and punished.’ \textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

It is also essential that the punishment fit the crime – if the penalty is too lenient, the utility of the criminal sanction as a deterrent is significantly diluted, and the seriousness of environmental law violations are minimised. By contrast, if a penalty seems too severe, this may result in contempt for the law. Over-zealous prosecution – especially of offenders whose non-compliance is inadvertent or the result of strict liability - also deprives criminal sanctions of their stigma.\textsuperscript{62}

Because of the stricter criminal procedure and high standard of proof (guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt),\textsuperscript{63} the public believes that the information about the offender’s guilt is reliable. This can attract negative publicity and a loss of reputation – with a likely loss of business - for corporate offenders. For individuals, stigma has social and economic consequences, as many people avoid interaction with criminal offenders, and a criminal record limits ex-offenders’ employment opportunities. This is particularly so for violations which elicit widespread public disapproval. Stigma is an extra cost to the offender, which does not draw on government resources.\textsuperscript{64} Criminal law is also the most coercive form of enforcement – the only one that provides for the offender’s incarceration. Imprisonment

\textsuperscript{60} Svatikova \textit{Criminalization} 79,109; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in \textit{Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement} 241-242; van Zeben&Mulkey 1992 \textit{INECE Proceedings} paras.3.2.1,3.3.2; OECD Fines 10,25-26,29; INECE Principles 79,85; Rechtschaffen 1998(71) \textit{SCLR} 1225-1226; Macrory \textit{Consultation} 8,15,22; Macrory Report 10,35,86,91,97,99,101; fn.412-414.

\textsuperscript{61} Bowles \textit{Promises to Keep} 25.

\textsuperscript{62} Fn.16,54-55,57-58,158-159.

\textsuperscript{63} Fn.18-19.

\textsuperscript{64} Rechtschaffen 1998(71) \textit{SCLR} 1187,1221; Sherman 2007(23) \textit{JUEL} 89-90,102; Babbitt et al 2004(15) \textit{DELPF} 1,23,26,47; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in \textit{Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement} 241-242; Svatikova \textit{Criminalization} xv-xvi, 4,26,86,88-91,96,98-100,109,140,144,179-181,186; Waite 2007(24) \textit{PELR} 353-354; INECE Principles 72,79; Pedersen 2013 76(2) MLR 323,327.
incapacitates the offender by removing them from the general population to prevent additional harm.65

2.1.2 Administrative measures

Administrative measures are implemented by relevant environmental authorities and not by the courts.66 These officials have specialist expertise and experience.67 Administrative measures usually aim to stop unlawful conduct, to ensure compliance with the law and authorisation conditions, and/or to compel persons to take corrective actions where their conduct harms the environment.68 Because polluters can be directed to remediate environmental damage at their own cost, these measures support the ‘polluter pays’ principle.69 Where administrators do not wish to seek criminal recourse through the judicial system, administrative measures provide a very attractive alternative.70

Administrative measures take many forms;71 can be used in a wide variety of circumstances; and are able to regulate activities in fairly specific ways. More than one measure may be applicable in a particular context; and often, a range must be applied simultaneously. Officials have extensive discretion regarding their use. As a result, administrative measures are potentially more efficient than criminal measures.72

---

65 Svatikova Criminalization ix,xiv-xv,2,4,24,26,86-91,98-100,185; van Zeben & Mulkey 1992 INECE Proceedings paras.3.2.1.5.1; INECE Principles 71-72, 9; Sherman 2007(23) JUEL 89,102; Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 241-242.
66 Feris 2006 (9)3 PER 54-55; Kidd Environmental Law 278; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 225,238; OECD Compliance 74; fn.15.
67 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 109,118,122,124; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 911,913; Abbot 2009 (11)1 ELR 45; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 37; INECE Principles 70, Macrory & Woods Penalties 37,39.
68 Kidd Environmental Law 278-279; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 55; OECD Compliance 74; fn.114.
69 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 238; fn.114,445.
70 Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 56; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 225-226; Kidd Environmental Law 278; Glazewski et al Compliance in Environmental Law 26-5.
71 Most prevalent are: directives, abatement notices, compliance notices, and the suspension and withdrawal of environmental authorisations.
72 Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 33,38; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 55-56; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 225-226,233,238-239; Lynott 2010 (17)1 IPELJ 13,22; OECD Compliance 76,80; Macrory Consultation 39,45,48-49; fn.139.
They require proof on the less strict civil standard: a balance of probabilities. These measures are less formal, simpler, more flexible, speedier and cheaper than criminal measures. Another advantage is that non-compliance with administrative measures is a criminal offence, and the public can compel environmental authorities to implement administrative measures.

2.1.3 Challenges of traditional compliance and enforcement tools

There are numerous problems with the criminal sanction - especially insofar as environmental law is concerned. In addition to its ‘inherent weaknesses’ (which apply worldwide), there are also ‘contingent weaknesses’, that apply particularly to SA and other developing countries.

Below, the disadvantages of criminal measures (and administrative measures, where applicable) are evaluated using a series of themes: the body that implements the measure; standard of proof; cost and implementation time; ease of implementation; deterrence impact; proportionality; and prevention of environmental harm.

2.1.3.1 Implementing body

Criminal courts impose criminal penalties after successful prosecution of offenders. Because of environmental law’s inherent complexities and technical nature, specialist prosecutors are

73 Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 33,37-39; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 120-121,124; Svatikova Criminalization 20-21,87,95; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 253,256,258-259,282; Macrory&Woods Penalties 5,9,11; Macrory Report 46-47.
74 Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 33,37-38; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 225,234; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 253,255-256,259; Faure ‘Balancing of Interests’ in Balancing of Interests 30; Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,11,31; Hampton Reducing Burdens 9,40; Macrory Consultation 39,45,49.
75 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 109,124,126; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 235,238-239; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 253,258,279,282,284; INECE Principles 75; Paddock 2011 INECE Proceedings 600; OECD Compliance 75-76; Macrory Consultation 48,50.
76 Glazewski et al Compliance in Environmental Law 26-4-26-5,26-9; Feis 2006 (9)3 PER 60-61; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 34,36; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 232-233,235.
77 Kidd ‘Criminal’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 242; Kidd Environmental Law 270.
78 Fn.14.
often required to argue cases, but there is a lack of such expertise.\textsuperscript{79} A further obstacle is that, generally, judicial officers have not had a lot of exposure to environmental law.\textsuperscript{80}

2.1.3.2 \textbf{Standard of proof}

A criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is a heavy burden to discharge.\textsuperscript{81}

2.1.3.3 \textbf{Cost and implementation time}

The time-consuming nature and expense of prosecution are among the criminal sanction’s inherent weaknesses. It is extremely resource-intensive (both in terms of financial and human resources) for enforcement agencies to prepare cases for prosecution and ensure that enforcement officials attend court. Prosecutions can take several years. Enforcement resources are limited and the costs can be significant, as extensive investigative powers, including those of experts, are required. It is also costly to imprison offenders.\textsuperscript{82} If too many limited enforcement resources are expended on criminal proceedings, these are not available for other potentially productive means to address environmental harm.\textsuperscript{83}

2.1.3.4 \textbf{Ease of implementation}

Regulatory authorities generally cannot mould these measures to suit specific circumstances, and the regulated community has no incentive to do more than is necessary to comply with

\textsuperscript{79} Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1201-1202; Kidd \textit{Environmental Law} 270,273; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 98-99,126; Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in \textit{Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement} 306; van Zeven&Mulkey 1992 \textit{INECE Proceedings} paras.3.3.5,5.1; Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 6; OECD Performance 57.

\textsuperscript{80} BRE \textit{Sanctioning post-Hampton} 14,22,26; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,101,109,118,126; Craigie et al ‘Institutions’ in \textit{Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement} 99,101; Faure\&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 259,283; Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 5; Macrory \textit{Consultation} 25,32,48; Macrory \textit{Regulation} 28.

\textsuperscript{81} Fn.18-19.

\textsuperscript{82} Glazewski et al \textit{Compliance’ in Environmental Law} 26-15,26-46; Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1213-1214,1225; Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 93,104; Babbit et al 2004(15) DLPF 42-43,45; Svatikova \textit{Criminalization} ix-xvi,2,40,87,94,98-99,105,108-109,179,181; Kidd \textit{Environmental Law} 270-272; BRE \textit{Sanctioning post-Hampton} 3,5,13,22; Macrory Report 14,16,18,23; Macrory \textit{Consultation} 14-17,29,34-35,44-45,48-49; Davis 2010 \textit{Acta Juridica} 412-413,423; INECE \textit{Principles} 71-72,79; Pedersen 2013 76(2) MLR 322,328; Macrory \textit{Regulation} 24,28,30; fn.38.

\textsuperscript{83} Macrory\&Woods \textit{Penalties} 4,19,37-38,42; Paddock 2011 \textit{INECE Proceedings} 601; Svatikova \textit{Criminalization} 41; Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 6; Macrory 2009(11) ELR 72; Macrory \textit{Consultation} 5,14.
the law. This means that such measures do not encourage industry to undertake voluntary initiatives or meet stricter environmental standards than legislated.84

Environmental crime is under-investigated and under-prosecuted.85 Many cases are dismissed – for policy or technical grounds, or because the prosecutor takes the view that it is not in the public interest to prosecute.86 Courts have a heavy workload, and SA’s criminal justice system is already significantly overburdened with serious criminal cases.87 The obstacles presented by the accused’s procedural safeguards are another inherent weakness and worsen the time and cost burden.88 Contingent weaknesses of criminal law include: ineffective policing;89 insufficient public awareness of environmental law and co-operation with the criminal process;90 and the challenges of investigation.91

Since it is difficult to obtain a criminal conviction and an appropriate penalty, authorities are discouraged from prosecuting environmental crimes. This sustains the poor prosecution rate, resulting in a compliance deficit. Officials are, as a result, also denied the opportunity to improve their practical investigative and prosecution skills.92

A possible disadvantage of the discretion given to officials to impose administrative measures is that there is no control over whether the official will do so.93 In order to be effective, implementing officials require appropriate training. Successful implementation

84 Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,37; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 52; Feris 2006 (9)3 PER 53; van Zeben 2010(22) Georgetown Intl Envtl Law Review 246-247,249.
85 Fn.17.
86 Fn.18.
87 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,118,124-126; Svatikova Criminalization 40,109; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 259,283; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 13.
89 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 99; Kidd Environmental Law 272-273.
90 Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 55,61; Paterson&Kotze ‘Compliance&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 373,375; Kidd Environmental Law 273.
92 Fn.17-19.
93 Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 56; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance&Enforcement 239; OECD Compliance 81; Lynott 2010 (17)1 IPELJ 13.
depends on administrative capacity – which is currently quite poor. The political will to make these measures successful is also essential.94

2.1.3.5 Deterrence impact

The widespread non-compliance with environmental law makes it clear that the criminal sanction and traditional administrative measures are not an effective deterrent.95 Inadequate penalties are another contingent weakness. Where sanctions are imposed for environmental offences, these are, generally, too insignificant to amount to a serious deterrent. This problem is exacerbated by the low detection probability and the large financial benefit that can result from non-compliance with environmental legislation.96 This results in perverse incentives for the regulated community to violate the law.97

2.1.3.6 Proportionality

Another weakness of criminal law is the reluctance to penalise wrongdoers for actions not regarded as moral wrongs (with priority being given to ‘real crimes’). In relation to regulatory offences, criminal prosecution may, in any event, be disproportionate.98

2.1.3.7 Prevention of environmental harm

Command-and-control measures are not aimed at preventing or repairing environmental harm. This harm has already been done by the time the prosecution is instituted: criminal law is reactive. This is contrary to the aim of environmental law: to protect the environment.99 Because criminal law is usually plant or medium-specific, it fails to regulate cross-media and cumulative effects on the environment appropriately. Crucial demand-side management

---

94 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 226,239; Paterson\&Kotze ‘Compliance\&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 376; INECE Principles 77; fn.38.
95 Fn.11-12,17-19,27-34.
96 Fn.16-19.
97 BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 5; Macrory Report 20,54; Faure\&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 284; Hampton Reducing Burdens 38-39; Macrory Consultation 29-30; OECD Fines 10; Paterson\&Kotze ‘Compliance\&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 375.
98 Fn.57-58.
99 Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 54-55; Glazewski et al Compliance’ in Environmental Law 26-28-26-29,26-46; Paterson\&Kotze ‘Compliance\&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 375-376; Waite 2007(24) PELR 354. This has been ameliorated to some extent by NEMA’s accessory sanctions (fn.13).
considerations are neglected, because criminal law focuses on controls relating to supply. Having stricter control over demand and consumption is essential, given the fast-depleting natural resources. Criminal law does not correct market failure so as to take consideration of environmental goods and services like water, soil, air, fauna and flora.\textsuperscript{100}

In his evaluation of regulatory sanctions for the UK, Richard Macrory determined six ‘Penalties Principles’ as the source of any sanctioning regime. Sanctions should aim to: change the offender’s behaviour; eliminate non-compliance benefits; be responsive, taking into account what is appropriate for the particular offender and the circumstances; be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm; include an element of restoration; and deter future non-compliance.\textsuperscript{101} For the reasons set out above, the criminal sanction largely fails to address these aims in relation to environmental law violations. Although traditional administrative measures have fewer of the deficiencies of criminal measures, a common criticism of these measures is that they lack ‘teeth’.\textsuperscript{102}

It has been argued that criminal sanctions should be reserved for serious infringements that demand significant punishment – for instance where there is intentional and/or continued wrongdoing, and/or where the conduct of the offender has resulted in serious damage to humans or the environment. Criminal prosecution for environmental offences should be used as a last resort.\textsuperscript{103}

Due to the many disadvantages of the command-and-control methods - particularly the criminal sanction - alternative compliance mechanisms\textsuperscript{104} are increasingly being used – either as an alternative, or in conjunction with criminal measures.\textsuperscript{105} Despite being a

\textsuperscript{100} Paterson ‘Incentive-based Approach’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 307; fn.1-7.
\textsuperscript{101} Macrory Consultation 8,19-20; OECD Fines 9; Macrory Report 10,27-31,35.
\textsuperscript{102} Paterson\&Kotze ‘Compliance\&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 376.
\textsuperscript{103} Kidd 2002 21-27,50; Kidd Environmental Law 269,274-277; Paterson\&Kotze ‘Compliance\&Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 375; Feris 2006 (9) PER 67-68; INECE Principles 71-72,74-75; Sherman 2007(23) JUEL 94-95,104-105; Faure\&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 254,258,282,285; Waite 2007(24) PELR 354-355; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 13,18,22-23; Macrory Report 18,38,42,47,98; OECD Compliance 74-75,84-85; DEFRA Review 4,6,28-29,53; Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 3-4,6; Hampton Reducing Burdens 9,39-40; Macrory Consultation 7,13-14,16-18,30,35,37-38,43-44,48-49.
\textsuperscript{104} Fn.48-49.
\textsuperscript{105} Fn.41-44.
command-and-control measure, administrative penalties are able to negate various disadvantages of the more traditional of these measures.

2.2 Administrative penalties

The nature and form of administrative penalties is considered below. Thereafter, the pros and cons of administrative measures are evaluated, using the same themes as in 2.1.3 above.

2.2.1 Nature and form of administrative penalties

Administrative penalties – sometimes called civil penalties\textsuperscript{106} - are another type of administrative measure and the focus of this dissertation. In general, these are monetary penalties imposed by the regulator, without the intervention of the courts.\textsuperscript{107} However, in some jurisdictions – like the United States (US) – administrative penalties are imposed by an independent tribunal. In this case, the system is still administered by environmental officials.\textsuperscript{108}

Administrative penalties have been described as a hybrid sanction, as they have both criminal and civil law elements. The resemble criminal law fines because they are financial and punitive in nature, but the process in which they are imposed is civil.\textsuperscript{109} Given the lower standard of proof required for administrative penalties – a balance of probabilities\textsuperscript{110} - and the stigma\textsuperscript{111} and coercive nature\textsuperscript{112} of criminal prosecution, administrative penalties should be used for environmental law violations that are not egregious enough to warrant criminal prosecution.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{106} Some authors use these terms interchangeably; others distinguish civil from administrative penalties, in that the former use the existing civil court structure and rules, and the latter require specialised institutions (Lynott 2010 (17)1 IPELJ 12; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 118; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 43-46). Others regard the latter as fixed penalties imposed by a regulator without discretion to assess the amount, and civil penalties as discretionary monetary sums imposed under criminal law (Macrory&Woods Penalties 11). In this dissertation, ‘administrative penalties’ refer to monetary penalties imposed under the civil law by regulators.

\textsuperscript{107} Fn.15.66.

\textsuperscript{108} Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,118.

\textsuperscript{109} Fn.53.

\textsuperscript{110} Fn.73.

\textsuperscript{111} Fn.64.

\textsuperscript{112} Fn.65.

\textsuperscript{113} Fn.57-58,103.
Administrative penalties aim to enforce administrative regulation by punishing non-compliance, deterring violations and creating incentives for the regulated community to improve its compliance. They support the ‘polluter pays’ principle as they aim to: eliminate any monetary advantage from non-compliance with legislation; secure the remediation and recover the costs of environmental damage; and be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the resulting harm. Ideally, they should also make restitution to adversely affected communities. Administrative penalties should also take into account what is appropriate for the particular issue and the offender.

These penalties can be structured to provide for both fixed and variable monetary penalties. This provides more flexibility and allows penalties to be more proportionate to the violation. Fixed monetary penalties (FMPs) are automatic, non-discretionary, relatively low monetary amounts imposed for technical regulatory or otherwise minor offences that do not result in substantial financial gain or serious environmental consequences. The penalties are ‘fixed’, because the relevant legislation sets out the circumstances in which a breach has occurred, as well as the penalty amount or the method to calculate it. There is no discretion as to the level of the penalty, but the regulator does have discretion as to the penalty’s imposition. Although they can more easily avoid the concerns attendant on a regulator’s discretion, FMPs cannot accommodate issues of mitigation and aggravation.

By contrast, a variable monetary penalty (VMP) is for larger amounts, determined at the regulator’s discretion, with reference to a published scheme. Legislation may set out a range of factors to consider in determining the penalty; alternatively, detailed guidelines may be developed. A maximum penalty may be specified in legislation, but there is not always an upper limit. Generally, VMPs would be for negligent breaches of environmental legislation; alternatively for ‘innocent’ breaches resulting in significant financial gain and/or substantial

---

114 Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,11,19,37-39; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 26; Macrory Consultation 8,39,44,50,55; DEFRA Review 21-22,29-30,40,42; Macrory Report 22,42,47; OECD Compliance 78; OECD Fines 3,18; fn.68-69.
116 DEFRA Review 29; Macrory Report 42.
118 BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 11,24; Macrory Consultation 18,51,55,59; DEFRA Review 28; Macrory Report 43-45,48,100; OECD Compliance 78-79; OECD Fines 3; Waite 2007(24) PELR 354-355.
119 Macrory&Woods Penalties 39; DEFRA Review 28; Macrory Report 38.
external consequences. Notice of the possible penalty imposition is provided, as is an opportunity to make representations. Having considered the representations, the regulator can impose a VMP.

Administrative penalties are more representative of the level of economic advantage, and the severity of the non-compliance. In determining the penalty, the regulator must consider a publicly available set of criteria, including mitigating and aggravating factors like: the circumstances of the non-compliance; the seriousness of the violation; the regulatory importance of the requirement violated; the offender's degree of fault; vicarious liability for employees' failures and whether the employee was acting within their authority; the level of the offender's cooperation with the enforcement authority; the expected or actual gain from the non-compliance; the violator's history of non-compliance; regulators' previous enforcement actions; the firm's size; the violator's ability to pay the penalty; the duration of the non-compliance; the conduct of the business after the non-compliance came to the regulator's attention; and whether the offence was voluntarily reported in a timely and accurate manner.

The recipient of an administrative penalty can appeal to an independent tribunal if the imposition and/or the amount of the penalty is disputed. This tribunal should be staffed by members with specialist environmental law expertise.

---

120 Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 41; Macrory Consultation 59; DEFRA Review 28,40; Macrory Report 38,45,52,55,100; OECD Compliance 79,87.
121 Macrory Report 55-56.
122 Macrory&Woods Penalties 4-5; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 11,24-25; Macrory Consultation 18,45,52-53,55-59; DEFRA Review 22-23; Macrory Report 38,45-49; OECD Fines 3,6,11-23,28; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,110,120; OECD Compliance 3,87-89.
123 Hampton Reducing Burdens 40-41; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 11,18-19,24; Macrory Consultation 7,18,22-23,44,53-55,59; DEFRA Review 31, 42,53; Macrory Report 38,41,52-56,93,100; Paddock 2012(42) ELRNA 10630; Macrory 2009(11) ELR 72-73; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 37-39; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 95,121-122; Svatikova Criminalization 85,282; INECE Principles 75,78.
2.2.2  Advantages and disadvantages of administrative penalties

2.2.2.1  Implementing body

A major advantage of an administrative penalty system is that environmental officials — who are familiar with environmental legislation and the effect of environmental violations — administer the system and impose the fines. They have particular expertise and understand the sanctions expected to result in compliance. These officials are also better acquainted with the technological aspects of the regulated entity, and the offender’s personal circumstances. They are therefore well-placed to consider all relevant information when deciding if an administrative penalty is appropriate; and, in the case of a VMP, its extent.¹²⁵

If someone is aggrieved by the imposition of an administrative penalty, they can challenge it in a higher tribunal which has specialised expertise in the subject matter. The appeal tribunal’s clearer understanding of the issues is likely to result in fairer outcomes.¹²⁶ Appeals also do not have to compete with other cases in the already overloaded court system.¹²⁷

2.2.2.2  Standard of proof

Another significant benefit of the system is that there is generally no need to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (the criminal standard) before imposing a penalty, but on a balance of probabilities (the civil standard).¹²⁸ As a result, monitoring regulatory requirements like those in environmental authorisations is less demanding than for a criminal case.¹²⁹

2.2.2.3  Cost and implementation time

Administrative penalties are less resource-intensive than criminal proceedings in terms of time, finances and personnel.¹³⁰ However, the enforcement costs of administrative law include the costs of inspection and evidence-collection – which are incurred irrespective of

¹²⁴ Fn.15,66.
¹²⁵ Fn.67.
¹²⁶ Fn.123.
¹²⁷ Macrory Consultation 54; Macrory Report 54-55; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 124; fn.87.
¹²⁸ Fn.73.
¹²⁹ Svatikova Criminalization 95; INECE Principles 71-72; Macrory Consultation 30; Macrory Report 20.
¹³⁰ Fn.72,74-75.
whether a violation is found. A lack of human, monetary and technical resources for inspections will impact negatively on an administrative penalty system. The flip-side is that a credible and effective enforcement system requires fewer inspections of compliant businesses.

2.2.2.4 Ease of implementation

Administrative penalties have simpler procedural requirements, are less formal, and are easier to administer and impose than criminal penalties. The administrative penalty system also makes it easier to determine the optimal punishment level.

In an administrative penalty system, more complaints are lodged for adjudication or settlement, more environmental violations are pursued, and more fines are imposed. Administrative penalties are flexible – allowing both for a more personalised approach to regulatory non-compliance, and a more proportional response to environmental breaches. Because the system provides a meaningful, transparent and consistent regulatory response to violations, the regulated community knows where it stands. As a result, administrative penalties promote fairness. They can remove the economic advantage of non-compliance – like a business’s avoided costs of operation and maintenance, as well as the profits from postponed expenditure (like the time, value or money accrued as a result of industries not installing required equipment or infrastructure). Industries that incur the costs required to

---

131 Svatikova Criminalization 94-95; Lynott 2010 (17)1 IPELJ 13; Macrory Consultation 30; Macrory Report 20, 98.
132 Hampton Reducing Burdens 38; Macrory Report 98; fn.129.
133 Fn.71-72,74-75.
134 Svatikova Criminalization 87,107,109,137,145; OECD Compliance 75; Waite 2007(24) PELR 355; Lynott 2010 (17)1 IPELJ 13; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 38.
135 Fn.117.
137 Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,38-39; Minzner 2012(53) WMLR 877; Macrory Report 15,20,22,47; Hampton Reducing Burdens 40-41; Macrory Consultation 19,48, 54-55,57,60; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 110-111,126; OECD Fines 10-17,25.
comply with environmental legislation support the penalisation of those competitors that obtain an unfair advantage from non-compliance.\textsuperscript{138}

Enforcement authorities have much greater control over administrative proceedings than criminal prosecutions.\textsuperscript{139} Because violations do not have to be sent to the public prosecutor or argued in court, the burden on state attorneys, police services, public prosecutors and criminal courts is reduced, and environmental cases do not have to compete with other crimes in the criminal justice system.\textsuperscript{140}

Since administrative penalties do not have the risk, negative publicity, loss of reputation and stigma of criminal prosecution, nor the threat of a criminal record, offenders are also less likely to dispute such penalty than a criminal fine.\textsuperscript{141} It is also so that criminal prosecution is clearly not the appropriate response for all violations of environmental legislation: certain breaches do not ‘deserve’ the stigma and adverse publicity of a criminal offence.\textsuperscript{142} In any event, because criminal prosecution of environmental law is limited, the stigmatic impacts and loss of reputation associated with a criminal sanction are often theoretical.\textsuperscript{143}

Officials’ successsful use of administrative penalties enhances their reputation, which is likely to increase compliance.\textsuperscript{144} Administrative penalties can also provide more funds towards the fiscus.\textsuperscript{145} Although administrative penalties cannot ‘incapacitate’ offenders and remove them from society in the way that imprisonment can, an ‘incapacitation’ effect is

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{138} Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1223-1224,1226-1227; Hampton Reducing Burdens 38; Macrory Consultation 8,39; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 110,126; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance\&Enforcement 61.
\textsuperscript{139} INECE Principles 75; OECD Compliance 76; fn.72.
\textsuperscript{140} Fn.15,66,87,127.
\textsuperscript{141} Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 98,126, Svatikova Criminalization 139,145,153,169; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 258-259,284; INECE Principles 75,78; OECD Compliance 75,78; OECD Fines 12-13,15, Macrory&Woods Penalties 4,19,38; Macrory Report 42, 47.
\textsuperscript{142} Fn.57-58,103.
\textsuperscript{143} Svatikova Criminalization 140; Faure&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 284; fn.17.
\textsuperscript{144} Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 125.
\textsuperscript{145} Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 124,126; Kidd Environmental Law 272; OECD Fines 7-8.
\end{footnotesize}
available by suspension or withdrawal of licences. This has been held to be the corporate counterpart of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{146}

A disadvantage of the system is that, because they have similar aims, administrative penalties sometimes have some of the same safeguards for offenders as those in the criminal system. An administrative penalty may be regarded as a ‘criminal charge’, entitling an offender to the rights in Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.\textsuperscript{147} But important procedural differences remain between the two systems.\textsuperscript{148} As long as the model applied incorporates safeguards proportional to the nature of the penalty system, the benefits of avoiding the burdensome criminal procedural requirements can be retained. The emphasis is on the true nature of the proceedings and not their form.\textsuperscript{149}

A further downside of administrative penalties is that court judgements have a greater precedent value than administrative penalty decisions. However, where the imposition of a penalty is resisted, the matter will, in any event, end up in a higher tribunal like a court.\textsuperscript{150}

In relation to those jurisdictions where there are currently no administrative penalties – such as in SA’s environmental legislation – enabling legislation and new policies and procedures would need to be introduced. The need to establish new institutions - or expand existing institutions – is the primary disadvantage to the introduction of an administrative penalty system. New staff will have to be employed and procedural rules drafted.\textsuperscript{151}

\subsection*{2.2.2.5 Deterrence impact}

Because administrative authorities usually have an ongoing relationship with offenders, authorities often follow a compliance strategy; negotiating with offenders instead of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotesize
\item Svatikova, Criminalization 86-87,139,144; Faure\&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 283-284; Watson 2005 (17)1 ELM 6.
\item Rome,4.XI.1950.
\item Svatikova, Criminalization 3-4,20-21,144,169; Faure\&Svatikova 2012 (24)2 JEL 254-255,285; Macrory\&Woods Penalties 31-35.
\item Macrory\&Woods Penalties 35,39; Lynott 2010 (17)1 IPELJ 10.
\item van Zeben\&Mulkey 1992 INECE Proceedings para.3.3.5.
\item Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 118-122; Macrory\&Woods Penalties 37.
\end{thebibliography}
prosecuting them. This is based on the assumption that authorities are more likely to achieve increased compliance if they adopt a conciliatory rather than a coercive approach. This approach is also followed because of the problems inherent in the criminal sanction, and a lack of alternative enforcement mechanisms.\textsuperscript{152}

Given the widespread non-compliance with environmental law,\textsuperscript{153} and the fact that many violators are repeat offenders,\textsuperscript{154} it appears that negotiation is not a sufficient deterrent. Compliance strategies often persist for long periods, requiring continuous interaction between authorities and offenders. A credible threat of legal sanction is essential for compliance,\textsuperscript{155} and administrative penalties provide this.\textsuperscript{156} Monetary fines have a strong impact in deterring the contravention of environmental legislation; in that potential violators are dissuaded by administrative penalties issued, and adjust their behaviour to avoid their imposition. This means that administrative penalties play an important role in increased C&E of environmental law.\textsuperscript{157}

However, if administrative penalties are not set high enough, businesses may easily budget for these fines as part of their operational costs and/or transfer the cost of the fine to their shareholders or the public.\textsuperscript{158} And if the penalty is set too high, it will be perceived as unfair, and the offender will spend resources resisting the penalty instead of complying with it. Both clearly defeat the deterrent and punitive goals of administrative penalties.\textsuperscript{159}

Another shortcoming of any monetary sanction is that it is only effective to the extent of the offender’s assets. Administrative penalties are inappropriate where offenders do not

\textsuperscript{152} Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1205-1206; Svatikova Criminalization 91-92; Babbit et al 2004(15) DELPF 45; Macrory Report 14-15,20; Pedersen 2013 76(2) MLR 340; Macrory Consultation 15-16,29-30,35,44-45,49,60; DEFRA Review 28; INECE Principles 75,82; Kidd Environmental Law 274-275; fn.14.
\textsuperscript{153} Fn.11.
\textsuperscript{154} Fn.34.
\textsuperscript{155} Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1220,1227,1230; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 7; Macrory Report 20; INECE Principles 75,82; Svatikova Criminalization 93; fn.16.
\textsuperscript{156} Svatikova Criminalization 91-93; INECE Principles 82; Macrory&Woods Penalties 9-10,38; BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 7,15; Macrory Report 16,20; Kidd 2002 (9)1 SAJELP 24; Macrory Consultation 15.
\textsuperscript{157} Fn.43.
\textsuperscript{158} BRE Sanctioning post-Hampton 22; Sherman 2007(23) JLUEL 100-101; Macrory Report 20-21; Pedersen 2013 76(2) MLR 324,343; Macrory Consultation 60; fn.62.
\textsuperscript{159} INECE Principles 80, fn.54-58,62.
have the means to pay. The deterrence impact is limited when the benefits of non-
compliance are high, substantial harm is caused by the violation, the probability of detection
and/or imposing sanctions is low, and/or the offender’s assets are negligible compared to the
harm. When insolvency is an obstacle, more severe sanctions, like imprisonment, are required
for appropriate deterrence. The more significant the harm, the more society values
deterrence, and is prepared to bear the costs of imprisonment.

It has been proposed that an option to resolve the insolvency problem is to raise the
probability of detection and thereby decrease the severity of the sanction required for optimal
deterrence. However, it might not be possible to increase the likelihood of detection cheaply
enough. Another option is to arrange for payment in instalments, or to consider alternatives
to monetary payment – such as a violator’s donation of time and effort for voluntary
improvements to environmental quality, or participation in environmental awareness media
campaigns. Where the imposition of the fine would result in an extreme financial burden -
with results like insolvency or closure of the business - and there is determined to be an
important public interest for the firm to remain in business, a decision could be made to
impose a smaller fine. This option should only be considered if no alternatives are possible.
A reduced penalty should not be imposed in circumstances where the plant is likely to close
down in any event, or will probably persist with its non-compliance.

2.2.2.6 Proportionality

Monetary fines also address circumstances where criminal prosecution is not a fitting
response to a breach of environmental legislation. In other words, the violation does not
warrant the moral condemnation and stigma of criminal prosecution - for instance, where there
is only negligible harm as a result of the violation, or non-compliance was inadvertent.
VMPs promote proportionality as they are imposed by having regard to relevant factors like the circumstances of the offence, the economic benefit of the violation, and the environmental damage.\textsuperscript{168}

2.2.2.7 Prevention of environmental harm

In addition to penalising environmental law contraventions, administrative penalties deter violations and incentivise improved compliance. They aim to eliminate the benefits of violations and remediate environmental harm. Like other administrative measures, they are in keeping with the ‘polluter pays’ principle.\textsuperscript{169}

Apart from the NEMA’s s24G administrative fine,\textsuperscript{170} there are no administrative penalties in SA’s environmental law. However, there is quite widespread use of such penalties in other jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{171} Chapter 3 critically evaluates administrative penalties in the Netherlands and the UK.

3 CHAPTER 3: DRAWING LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS REGARDING THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES

This chapter evaluates the use of environmental law administrative penalties in two foreign jurisdictions to distil a set of best practices for possible application to SA’s environmental regime. The Netherlands and the UK are the roots of SA’s civil and common-law legal systems, respectively, and have contemporary experience with administrative penalties. The Constitution provides that a forum interpreting constitutional rights may consider foreign law,\textsuperscript{172} and examining these foreign systems provides relevant general lessons for assessing SA’s legal system in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{168} Fn.117.
\textsuperscript{169} Fn.43,68-69.
\textsuperscript{170} Chap.4.
\textsuperscript{171} Fn.42-43.
\textsuperscript{172} S.39(1)(c).
To set a context for the critical evaluation, a brief introduction to the regimes is provided. Thereafter, the regimes are jointly evaluated using a series of themes, with a view to draw possible lessons for the use of administrative penalties to improve SA’s EC&E effort. These themes are: the administrative penalties’ nature, trigger and scope; institutional arrangements; decision-making processes; maximum quanta; allocation of their proceeds; appeal and review procedures; their effect on criminal offences; and non-compliance implications.

### 3.1 Introduction to the regimes

#### 3.1.1 Netherlands

The Constitution\(^{173}\) is the framework of Dutch public law (including environmental law).\(^{174}\) Government must conserve and improve the environment.\(^{175}\) The General Administrative Law Act (GALA)\(^{176}\) contains general administrative law provisions\(^{177}\) and deals with the conduct of administrative authorities,\(^{178}\) including the Netherlands Emissions Authority (NEA).\(^{179}\) There is also constitutional provision for specific administrative courts.\(^{180}\) Most environmental laws are enforced via the Economic Offences Act,\(^{181}\) which, together with the Dutch Penal Code,\(^{182}\) regulate criminal law enforcement.\(^{183}\) The Environmental Management Act (EMA)\(^{184}\) contains general environmental provisions,\(^{185}\) and makes provision for the NEA to impose administrative penalties when certain emissions trading provisions are violated.\(^{186}\)

European Union (EU) law is the primary influence of Dutch environmental law. EU directives and regulations apply directly to the Dutch regulatory framework, or are
incorporated into national law.\textsuperscript{187} Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the EU\textsuperscript{188} (Directive) establishes a scheme for Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission allowance trading within the European Community. The Netherlands is subject to GHG-reduction targets and falls within the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). Emission allowances are auctioned or allocated - with each allowance representing the emission of one carbon dioxide tonne. Allowances can be traded in the online European Registry (NEA manages the Dutch registry section), to enable companies to purchase additional allowances to meet their EU ETS obligations.\textsuperscript{189} Participating businesses and airlines that emit GHGs require an emission permit\textsuperscript{190} and must annually surrender emission allowances (or other credits) equivalent to their emissions.\textsuperscript{191}

3.1.2 United Kingdom

The legal systems of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland are based on common law principles, and Scottish law is based on civil law principles with common law elements.\textsuperscript{192} There is no written constitution - statute law takes precedence.\textsuperscript{193} The Environment Protection Act\textsuperscript{194} (EPA) (amended by the Environment Act)\textsuperscript{195} is the primary legislation\textsuperscript{196} regulating emission control and waste management.\textsuperscript{197} The Environment Agency (EA) is responsible for enforcement.\textsuperscript{198}

Following investigations and reports by Philip Hampton and Macrory into alternative regulatory and enforcement approaches,\textsuperscript{199} the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions (RES) Act\textsuperscript{200} came into force in the UK in 2008.\textsuperscript{201} It empowers EA (and others) to impose various civil sanctions - including administrative penalties in the form of both FMPs and VMPs -

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Koster, Hoge&Buiter 'Netherlands' 5.
\item 13 October 2003.
\item Koster, Hoge&Buiter 'Netherlands' 9-10.
\item S.16.5 EMA.
\item Koster, Hoge&Buiter 'Netherlands' 10.
\item Himsworth 'Scotland' in One Country 119,124.
\item Barnett \textit{Constitutional & Administrative Law} 26; Himsworth 'Scotland' in One Country 119-120.
\item 1990 c.43.
\item 1995 c.25.
\item In England, Scotland and Wales.
\item OECD \textit{Environmental Compliance} 150.
\item Svatikova \textit{Criminalization} 119. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency enforces the EPA in Scotland.
\item Fn.101.
\item 2008 c.13.
\item S.75.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
subject to the introduction of secondary legislation. These sanctions were introduced by the Environmental Civil Sanctions (England) Order (ECSO) and the Environmental Civil Sanctions (Miscellaneous Amendments) (England) Regulations. To give effect to these, EA published guidance on the use of civil sanctions and enforcement of offences by means of the 2011 Enforcement and Sanctions Statement and Enforcement and Sanctions Guidance (Guidance). Civil sanction guidance is provided to regulators by the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.

The RES Act applies to offences in relation to which EA has an enforcement function, including illegal water abstraction in terms of the EPA and a failure to furnish information in terms of the Water Resources Act (WRA).

3.2 Lessons to be drawn from the Netherlands and United Kingdom

3.2.1 Nature of penalty

The Dutch administrative fine is defined as a punitive sanction, comprising an unconditional obligation to pay a sum of money.

In the UK, FMPs are payments of prescribed monetary penalties. FMPs are most appropriate for minor offences without direct environmental impacts - where EA’s advice has not resulted in the required improvements and a low monetary penalty is more likely to change the offender’s conduct. VMPs are monetary penalties of amounts EA determines. VMP are for more serious offences or where there is evidence of negligence or mismanagement.

---

202 Part 3 RES Act; OECD Environmental Compliance 150.
203 2010 No.1157.
204 2010 No.1159. Svatikova Criminalization 120.
205 S.63(2)(a),s4(1) RES Act; s11(1)(a) ECSO.
206 The 2013 Offence Response Options (ORO) instruction contains options for offences EA regulates.
208 2008 RES Act Guidance.
209 S.38(1).
210 1991 c.57.
211 S.5.40 GALA.
212 S.39(3) RES Act.
213 Guidance 10.
214 S.42(5)(a) RES Act.
VMP imposition could change the violator’s behaviour, deter others, remove the financial gain of non-compliance, and/or result in a quicker resolution.\(^{215}\)

It is preferable for an administrative penalty regime to follow the UK system of distinguishing between FMPs and VMPs. This allows more flexibility and proportionality as mitigating and aggravating circumstances can be considered.\(^{216}\)

### 3.2.2 Trigger for penalty

The Dutch EMA sets out the offences in relation to which NEA has discretion to impose an administrative penalty,\(^{217}\) and those where such fine must be imposed.\(^{218}\) Examples of the former are: establishing a facility with GHG installations without NEA’s authorisation,\(^{219}\) and contravening an emissions trading\(^{220}\) licence.\(^{221}\) NEA must impose a fine, for example, when an airline fails to surrender annual GHG emission allowances at least equal to the total emissions in that year from aviation activities (in Annex I to the Directive) from 1 January 2012 for which that airline is responsible.\(^{222}\)

Generally, administrative penalties can only be imposed if the offender is at fault.\(^{223}\) However, for non-discretionary fine offences, fault is not required.\(^{224}\) An administrative penalty cannot be levied if one has previously been imposed on the violator for the same violation.\(^{225}\)

In the UK, several laws provide monetary penalties for offences. The WRA provides that a FMP or VMP may be imposed, *inter alia*, for abstracting water without a licence granted

\(^{215}\) Guidance 11; fn.68.

\(^{216}\) Fn.117-122,251;278,280-281.

\(^{217}\) S.18.16a(1).

\(^{218}\) S.18.16a(2).

\(^{219}\) S.16.5.

\(^{220}\) Chap.16.

\(^{221}\) S.18.18.

\(^{222}\) S.16.39t.

\(^{223}\) S.5.41 GALA.

\(^{224}\) S.18.16a(2) EMA.

\(^{225}\) S.5.43 GALA.
by EA. A VMP may be imposed for the EPA offence of failing to furnish information in compliance with a written notice from the Secretary of State or a waste regulation authority.

Before a FMP or VMP may be imposed, EA must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed. EA should follow the Penalties Principles when considering appropriate action.

It is recommended that administrative penalties be available for all environmental violations not serious enough to warrant criminal action. Strict liability offences should generally be reserved for FMPs. Contrary to the UK's position, and because a violator does not face criminal prosecution, it is appropriate for the standard of proof for administrative penalties and appeals to be a balance of probabilities.

3.2.3 Scope of application

In the Netherlands, an administrative penalty for an airline's failure to surrender the required emission licence may be levied in addition to an increase in the GHG allowances that airline must annually surrender. If an emissions trading licence is violated, an administrative order under penalty may be imposed as well as an administrative penalty.

In the UK, the EA may not serve a notice of intent to impose a FMP where a VMP (or other discretionary requirement) has been imposed on that person for that act or omission. A notice of intent to serve a VMP cannot be served where a FMP has already been imposed, or

---

226 S.24(4)(a); Sch.6 RES Act; Sch.5 ECSO; ORO 207.
227 S.71(3), Sch.6 RES Act; Sch.5 ECSO; ORO 37.
228 S.39(2), s42(2) RES Act; Sch.1,s1(2),Sch.2,s1(2) ECSO.
229 Fn.101.
230 Guidance 4.
231 Fn.113.
232 Fn.118-119.
233 Fn.73.
234 S.16.39t EMA.
235 S.18.16a(4) EMA.
236 A reparation sanction requiring reparation of the violation and monetary payment if the order is not carried out (s.5.31d GALA).
237 S.18.16a(3) EMA.
the person has discharged FMP liability by paying the prescribed sum.\textsuperscript{238} A VMP may not be imposed on a person on more than one occasion in relation to the same act or omission.\textsuperscript{239} Provision to pay a FMP, VMP or non-compliance penalty may include provision for: early payment discounts; payment of interest or other late payment penalties (which cannot exceed the penalty amount); and penalty enforcement.\textsuperscript{240}

Apart from criminal penalties,\textsuperscript{241} a possible lesson to be drawn from these two jurisdictions is that an administrative penalty should be in addition to any other environmental penalty, and should only be imposed once per violation.

\subsection*{3.2.4 Institutional arrangements}

In the Netherlands, NEA is an agency affiliated with the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment.\textsuperscript{242} It is an autonomous government organisation with independent sanctioning and enforcement powers,\textsuperscript{243} responsible for allocating emission rights, issuing emission permits, monitoring compliance and imposing sanctions.\textsuperscript{244}

The EA in the UK is an executive non-departmental body accountable to the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and aims to protect the environment and contribute to sustainable development by implementing UK government policies.\textsuperscript{245} The EA must have regard to published guidance when exercising its functions.\textsuperscript{246} This includes: the circumstances in which the penalty is likely to be imposed and when it may not be levied; rights to make representations and objections and appeal rights.\textsuperscript{247} FMP Guidance includes: the penalty amount; how to discharge liability; and the effect of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{238} S.51(1) RES Act; s.5, Sch.1, s.5(3) ECSO.
  \item \textsuperscript{239} S.42(4) RES Act; Sch.2, s.1(3) ECSO.
  \item \textsuperscript{240} S.52(1) RES Act.
  \item \textsuperscript{241} Addressed at 3.2.9.
  \item \textsuperscript{242} Koster, Hoge&Buiter ‘Netherlands’ 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{243} Dekkers & Allessie 2005 INECE Proceedings 275.
  \item \textsuperscript{244} Chap.16 EMA; Koster, Hoge&Buiter ‘Netherlands’ 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{245} http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/aboutus/149356.aspx.
  \item \textsuperscript{246} S.63(2)(e) RES Act; s.11(1)(d) ECSO.
  \item \textsuperscript{247} S.63(3)(a),(b),(e),s.63(4)(a),(b),(d) RES Act; s.11(2)(a),(b),(e),s.11(3)(a),(b),(d) ECSO.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Enforcement guidance includes: possible sanctions; action EA may take to enforce the offence; and when EA is likely to take action. In deciding on the appropriate response to environmental non-compliance, EA must consider: the outcomes sought; immediate action for environmental protection; and whether additional action is required. If advice has not resulted in the desired result, these public interest factors will be considered to determine the appropriate sanction: intent; foreseeability; environmental effect; nature of offence; financial implications; deterrent effect; and the offender’s history, attitude, and personal circumstances.

As is the case in these two jurisdictions, it is preferable for officials with specialist expertise to administer and impose administrative penalties. These officials should be adequately trained to understand when administrative penalties are appropriate, and to exercise appropriate discretion in the evaluation of VMP factors.

Transparency, fairness, consistency and accountability are crucial for effective administrative penalties. There should be publicly-available guidance which contains similar information to the UK Guidance. Ideally, the enforcement policy should be drafted in consultation with the regulated community and wider stakeholder groups. The public and regulated entities must know what action regulators will take when a violation is discovered. The policy must state the circumstances in which different types of enforcement action will be imposed, and how fines will be calculated (including the factors considered in determining the fine). It should also contain information like: relevant time limits; the scale of charges;
methods of payment; and complaints and appeals mechanisms. Enforcement policies should retain some flexibility. To boost confidence in the system, regulators must be able to justify the enforcement action chosen, and any departures from the policy. Enforcement policies should be periodically reviewed and improved.

3.2.5 **Decision-making process**

The Dutch GALA provides that NEA and the competent supervisor may draw up a report of the violation (including the legislative violation; and, if necessary, the violation date, time and place), to present to the violator by the date of fine notification. If a Code of Criminal Procedure investigating officer’s report has been prepared, the administrative report is not required. Where an administrative penalty of more than €340.00 may be imposed, one of these reports is mandatory, as is the violator’s opportunity to make submissions. In such event, the report-drafter may not impose the fine. For non-discretionary fine offences, the report includes the intention to add the offender’s name to the published list of transgressors, and the offender may also make submissions on this. The violator may inspect and copy the information on which the fine is based, which, if reasonably required for the offender’s defence, should be their language.

For those violations which require NEA to exercise discretion regarding fine imposition, the legislation gives no guidance. If a report has been drawn up of a violation, NEA decides – within 13 weeks – whether to impose the fine. If the violation is submitted to the prosecutor, this time limit is suspended until NEA regains power to impose an administrative penalty. If, after the violator has expressed their views, NEA decides: not to impose a fine; or to submit the violation for prosecution, it advises the violator in writing.

---

257 Macrory Report 89.
260 S.152 Wetboek van Strafvordering,1921.
262 S.5:53.
263 S.10:3(4).
264 S.18.16g(2),s.18.16i EMA.
265 S.5:49 GALA.
266 S.5:51.
267 S.5:50(2).
For discretionary fine offences, the violator may only receive the administrative report with the fine decision. This decision must be based on sound reasons, and, in general, all decisions must contain these reasons and the relevant legislative provisions. The decision should also contain the fine amount, and the deadline for payment (usually six weeks). For EMA non-discretionary fines, the decision also states that the offender’s name will be published, and NEA adds the name to the transgressors’ list.

In the UK, where the EA proposes to impose a FMP, it must serve a notice of intent which includes: the grounds; the penalty amount; that liability can be discharged by paying 50 per cent within 28 days; the right to make representations and objections (within 28 days); and the circumstances in which it may not impose the FMP (including any defences). If the EA possesses material undermining its case, it must disclose this. A person who made representations timeously may discharge liability as per this notice.

Before serving a VMP notice, EA may require the provision of reasonable information to establish the offence’s financial benefit. VMPs have three components: financial benefit (to remove the offence’s benefit); deterrent; and deduction (to reduce the penalty by the costs the violator incurred - like complying with a compliance notice). The deterrent component is based on: the financial benefit; the costs to comply with a restoration notice; or the maximum criminal fine a magistrate’s court could impose for the offence where there is neither significant benefit or restoration; and then adjusted according to aggravating and mitigating factors. Aggravating factors include: blameworthiness, non-compliance history, foreseeability and risk of environmental harm, and ignoring previous advice. Mitigating factors include: preventative measures, cooperation with EA, self-reporting, immediate voluntary remediation and restoration, and personal circumstances. The offender’s attitude could either aggravate or

---

268 S.3:46-3:47.
269 S.5:52.
270 S.4:86.
271 S.4:87.
272 S.18.16k.
273 S.18.16a(5),s.18.16p.
274 S.40(2)(a)-(c)(i),s.40(3) RES Act; Sch.1,s.2-5 ECSO.
275 Guidance 19.
276 Sch.1,s.7 ECSO.
277 Sch.2,s.1(6) ECSO.
mitigate. Persons who cannot pay the full penalty amount may provide submissions and evidence for EA's consideration.

The deterrent and financial benefit components are added together to: challenge the offender’s behaviour; deter others; and assure others that offenders have not secured any advantage. From this amount, the costs incurred by the violator are deducted. Regulators must exercise their reasonable judgement on the appropriate penalty on the basis of the available evidence. The VMP amount determined is included in the notice of intent. The procedure for imposing a VMP is similar to the FMP process. The offender can undertake to take action (including a monetary payment) to benefit anyone affected by the offence: EA can accept or reject an undertaking, and consider any accepted undertaking in its decision.

As soon as possible after the representations period, the EA decides whether to impose the sanction (with or without modification) or to impose a different sanction. Decisions to proceed with a civil sanction, notwithstanding contrary representations, will be made by a separate reviewing lawyer and manager. Where EA decides to impose the FMP, the notice imposing it (the final notice) includes: the penalty amount; the imposition grounds; payment methods; the period of 56 days for payment; any early payment discounts or late payment penalties; appeal rights; and non-payment consequences. Following VMP representations, the final amount is included in the final notice.

Having considered the procedure in these two jurisdictions, it is proposed that, in an administrative penalty system, an offender should receive notification of the intention to impose a monetary penalty, including relevant details of the violation (and other information similar to the UK procedure), and should have a reasonable opportunity to make submissions

---

278 Guidance 23-33.
279 DEFRA Review 20.
280 Guidance 23,33-34
281 DEFRA Review 19.
282 S.43 RES Act; Sch.2,s.1(1),s.2(3),s.4-6 ECSO.
283 S.40(2)(c)(i); s.43(2)(c) RES Act; DEFRA Review 23.
284 Guidance 19.
285 S.40(2)(d)-(e),s.40(5) RES Act; Sch.1,s.6 ECSO.
286 Guidance 24.
regarding the factors used to calculate the fine. The decision-maker must carefully consider the representations – and, for a VMP, also the relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances – to decide whether to impose a fine. In making this decision, the regulator must be guided by its policies. Generally, more junior staff could impose FMPs, but decisions regarding VMPs should be taken by more senior officials, independently from inspectors, to protect the relationship between field staff and industry and for a more consistent regulatory approach. When the offender is notified of the fine imposition, reasons should be provided, and the offender advised of details like: the payment deadline; consequences of non-payment; and the appeal right (and how and where to lodge an appeal).

3.2.6 Maximum penalty quanta

In the Netherlands, maximum administrative penalties are generally determined by statute and the administrative authority imposes a lower fine if the violator demonstrates special circumstances. If the amount is not legislatively determined, the authority sets the fine at an amount commensurate with the violation’s gravity and the offender’s blameworthiness. If necessary, the authority considers the circumstances of the violation.

The maximum administrative penalty for discretionary fine offences is €450,000 per violation; or, if the turnover in the preceding financial year exceeded €4.5 million, ten per cent of the undertaking’s turnover. In relation to non-discretionary fine offences, the fine is prescribed in the Directive for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent by which the annual emissions exceed the GHG emission allowances, emission reduction units or certified emission reductions surrendered. A lower penalty may not be imposed. The Directive requires that member states ensure that operators who do not annually surrender sufficient allowances to cover emissions during the preceding year are liable for an excess emissions penalty of €100 for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted by that installation for

---

287 Fn.118-122,251,274-278,280-282.
288 Fn.246-250,254-259.
289 Macrory Consultation 58; Macrory Report 50.
290 S.5:46 GALA, read with art.1, para.2 of the Penal Code.
291 S.18.18e(1). S.18.16e(5) deals with the calculation of the turnover.
292 S.16(3).
293 Inter alia, in terms of s.16.39t EMA.
294 S.18.16(e)(2) EMA.
which the operator has not surrendered allowances. Payment of this penalty does not release
the operator from the obligation to surrender an amount of allowances equal to those excess
emissions when surrendering allowances in relation to the following calendar year.\textsuperscript{295} This
amount is increased annually in accordance with the European consumer price index.\textsuperscript{296}

In the UK, where the relevant offence is: for a FMP, triable summarily (whether or not
it is also triable on indictment), and for a VMP, triable summarily only; and, for both,
punishable on summary conviction by a fine (whether or not it is also punishable by
imprisonment), the penalty amount may not exceed the maximum fine amount.\textsuperscript{297} The
maximum FMP is £100 for an individual or £300 for a body corporate.\textsuperscript{298} The amount of a
VMP must not exceed £250,000.\textsuperscript{299} Where the VMP would be greater than £250,000, the EA
usually prosecutes.\textsuperscript{300}

As in the UK and for EMA non-discretionary fine violations, it is recommended that
FMP amounts be determined by statute.\textsuperscript{301} Since administrative penalties are for less
egregious violations that do not warrant criminal prosecution,\textsuperscript{302} maximum VMPs should not
exceed the maximum criminal fine that could be imposed. If the fine would exceed this
amount, it is recommended that, as in the UK, the regulator prosecute.

### 3.2.7 Allocation of penalty proceeds

Because Dutch administrative penalties are paid to the authority that imposed the sanction,
unless otherwise provided by law,\textsuperscript{303} EMA fines are paid to NEA.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{295} S.16(3).
  \item \textsuperscript{296} S.18.16e(2)-(3) EMA.
  \item \textsuperscript{297} S.39(4),s.42(6) RES Act; Sch.2.s.1 (4)ECSO.
  \item \textsuperscript{298} Sch.1.s.1(3) ECSO.
  \item \textsuperscript{299} Sch.2.s.1(5) ECSO.
  \item \textsuperscript{300} DEFRA Review 19.
  \item \textsuperscript{301} Fn.118.
  \item \textsuperscript{302} Fn.113.
  \item \textsuperscript{303} S.5:10(1) GALA.
\end{itemize}
However, in the UK, where a regulator receives any monetary penalty or interest for late payment, it must be paid into the Consolidated Fund (the government’s general bank account), and is not available to regulators.\textsuperscript{304}

Best practice requires that, to prevent any incentive for regulators to increase their revenues improperly by levying inappropriate fines, funds from administrative penalties should not be available – directly or indirectly – to the regulator that imposed the fine.\textsuperscript{305} This is contrary to the Dutch position, but the same as in the UK.

3.2.8 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Appeal and review procedures}

In the Netherlands, GALA provides that, if a decision is open to objection (reconsideration by the administrative authority) or administrative appeal (review by a different administrative authority),\textsuperscript{306} this is stated in the decision, together with details as to time limits (generally six weeks),\textsuperscript{307} and where the objection or appeal may be lodged\textsuperscript{308} (objection notices are filed with NEA; administrative appeal notices are filed with appellate authorities; and administrative court appeals are instituted by filing appeal notices with that court).\textsuperscript{309} Notices describe the challenged decision and the grounds, and, if possible, include the decision.\textsuperscript{310} Generally, an objection precedes an administrative court appeal.\textsuperscript{311} In appropriate circumstances, NEA grants an applicant’s request to appeal directly to the administrative court.\textsuperscript{312} An objection or appeal does not suspend the challenged decision’s operation, unless otherwise provided by law.\textsuperscript{313}

\textsuperscript{304} S.69 RES Act. Where a regulator only has functions in relation to Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, different Funds are used.

\textsuperscript{305} Macrory Consultation 58-59; Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 124; Macrory Report 10,33,50; Macrory Regulation 15,30.

\textsuperscript{306} S.1:5.

\textsuperscript{307} S.6:7-6:8.

\textsuperscript{308} S.3:45.

\textsuperscript{309} S.6:4.

\textsuperscript{310} S.6:5.

\textsuperscript{311} S.6:13,s.7:1(1)a-c.

\textsuperscript{312} S.7:1a.

\textsuperscript{313} S.6:16.
Before deciding an objection or administrative appeal, NEA gives interested parties the opportunity to be heard. At least a week before the hearing, NEA makes all relevant documents available for inspection by interested parties - who may also file additional documents until ten days before the hearing. Parties are generally heard in each other's presence. Witnesses and experts may be heard.

Unless the objection hearing is handled wholly or partly by NEA, it is conducted by: someone not involved in preparing the challenged decision, or two or more persons of whom the majority (including the chairman) were not so involved. Unless otherwise provided by law, NEA determines whether the hearing will be public. An advisory committee – consisting of a chairman (neither a member of nor working under NEA's authority) and at least two members – may decide an objection. NEA may explain its position at the hearing. The appellate authority or an advisory committee conducts an administrative appeal. The hearing is public, unless, for compelling reasons, the authority decides otherwise, or an interested party so requests. A record of the hearing is kept. If, after the hearing, the relevant authority becomes aware of facts with considerable relevance to the decision, this is communicated to interested parties - who have the opportunity to be heard.

The authority deciding an objection generally gives its decision within six weeks from the day after the deadline for filing an objection notice, or within 12 weeks if there is an advisory committee. The administrative appeal time period is the same if the appellate authority is part of the body whose decision is being appealed. Otherwise, the authority generally decides within 16 weeks from the day after the appeal's expiry date. An advisory committee's recommendation is written and includes the hearing record. If the decision departs from the recommendation, this must be explained and the recommendation

---

314 S.7:2,s.7:16.  
315 S.7:4(1-3),s.7:18(1-3).  
316 S.7:6,s.7:20.  
317 S.7:8,s.7:22.  
318 S.7:5.  
319 S.7:13(1),(5).  
320 S.7:19.  
321 S.7:7,s.7:21.  
322 S.7:10.  
323 S.7:24.
Sound reasons for the decision must be provided and reasons stated if no hearing is held. The decision is sent to its addressees and communicated to interested parties as soon as possible. The appeal decision must also be communicated to the authority whose decision was appealed.

If the objection is admissible, the challenged decision is reconsidered. If the reconsideration gives cause to do so, the administrative authority revokes the decision and, if necessary, replaces it. The objection decision may be appealed. If the appellate authority finds the appeal well-founded, it annuls and may replace the challenged decision. If the decision on the objection or appeal is appealable, this is stated when the decision is notified, as well as who may lodge an appeal, where and by when.

Appeals of EMA administrative penalties are decided by The Hague District Court. Cases are first considered by a single-judge panel, but, if deemed unsuitable for a one-judge panel, are referred to a three-judge panel (which may also refer a case to a single judge). Generally, natural persons without legal capacity to appear in judicial proceedings are represented as per civil law rules. As far as possible, the court must decide the matter finally.

A preliminary inquiry takes place. Within four weeks of the administrative authority’s receipt of an appeal notice, it sends the case-related documents to court and files a defence. If the court affords the appellant the opportunity to reply, the authority may submit a rejoinder. Other parties may make written submissions. The court may permit the

---

325 S.7:13(6-7),s.7:24(2).
326 S.7:12,s.7:26(1),(3)-(4),s.3:27,s.3:28(2).
327 S.7:11.
328 S.7:1(2).
329 S.7:25.
330 S.6:23.
331 S.8:7,Sch1,chap.3,s.6.
332 S.8:10.
333 S.8:21(1).
334 S.8:41a.
335 S.8:42.
336 S.8:43.
authority to correct a defect in the challenged decision; and, if so, parties have four weeks for written submissions. The judge advises parties of the further conduct of the matter within four weeks of: the authority indicating it will not repair the defect; the deadline for the defect to be repaired; the representations; or the representations deadline. Until the parties are invited to appear in court, the district court may, in certain circumstances, close the inquiry, and give judgment directing the authority to deal with the appeal notice as an objection notice. This judgment may be opposed.

Parties must cooperate in an investigation, but appellants are not obliged to testify about the violation. Those summoned must appear, provide requested information, and testify when required. If persons fail to comply with these obligations, the district court may draw appropriate conclusions.

After the preliminary enquiry is closed, parties receive at least three weeks’ notice to appear in court and may file additional documents until ten days before the hearing. Generally, the hearing is public. With the parties’ consent, the district court may direct that there will be no hearing - the inquiry is then closed. The court closes the hearing following examination of the case and the parties’ final speeches. Thereafter, the judge: gives oral judgement immediately; or announces when judgment will be given (usually oral judgment can only be deferred by a week and written judgment is given within six weeks). Judgment comprises the decision, its grounds, and states who is entitled to which remedy -

337 S.8:51a.
338 S.8:51b.
339 S.8:51c.
340 S.8:54.
341 S.8:55.
342 S.8:30.
343 S.8:28a.
344 S.8:27(1),s.8:28.
345 S.8:33(1).
346 S.8:31.
347 S.8:56.
348 S.8:58(1).
349 S.8:62.
350 S.8:57.
351 S.8:67(1).
352 S.8:63,s8:77(1).
353 S.8:66,s8:67(1).
before which court and by when.\textsuperscript{354} If the district court annuls the penalty decision, it decides the fine imposition and directs the extent to which its judgment replaces the annulled decision.\textsuperscript{355} Where a judgment includes an award of damages, costs or compensation, it is enforceable in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure.\textsuperscript{356} The judgment may declare that: the district court lacks jurisdiction; the appeal is inadmissible, unfounded or well-founded.\textsuperscript{357} If the appeal is well-founded, the judgment sets out the violation.\textsuperscript{358} The court also annuls all of part of the decision, and may order the authority to take a new decision, perform another act, or replace the annulled decision. A non-compliance penalty may also be ordered.\textsuperscript{359}

A district court may reopen an inquiry it considers not to have been complete, and determine its further conduct.\textsuperscript{360} GALA makes provision for interim judgments,\textsuperscript{361} and provisional relief.\textsuperscript{362} A court may review a final judgment on the grounds of facts: which occurred before judgment; of which the applicant was not and could not reasonably have been aware prior to judgment; and which might have resulted in a different judgment had the court been aware of them.\textsuperscript{363}

There is a higher appeal available to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State.\textsuperscript{364} Generally, this appeal would not suspend the appeal decision's operation.\textsuperscript{365} The court clerk of the higher appellate court advises the district court clerk of the appeal as soon as possible. The latter provides the former with the court record and judgment within one week, and a report of the hearing (if requested).\textsuperscript{366} There is provision for a cross-appeal within six weeks of receipt of the grounds of higher appeal. Interested parties may make written submissions within four weeks of these grounds. Generally, inadmissibility or

\textsuperscript{354} S.8:67.s8:71.
\textsuperscript{355} S.8:72a.
\textsuperscript{356} Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering,2002; s.8:75-s.8:76.
\textsuperscript{357} S.8:70.
\textsuperscript{358} S.77(2).
\textsuperscript{359} S.8:72.
\textsuperscript{360} S.8:68.
\textsuperscript{361} S.8:80a-8:80b.
\textsuperscript{362} S.8:81-8:87.
\textsuperscript{363} S.8:119.
\textsuperscript{364} S.8:104-105.
\textsuperscript{365} S.8106(1).
\textsuperscript{366} S.8:107.
withdrawal of the higher appeal does not affect the cross-appeal’s admissibility. The higher appellate court can: confirm the district court’s decision (adopting or improving it); or partially or completely replace it. If the judgment requires that the authority take a new decision, it may provide that only the higher appellate court can hear an appeal of such decision. In certain circumstances, the higher appellate court may refer the case back to the district court.

In the UK, the person on whom a FMP is imposed may appeal. Appeal grounds include that the decision was: unreasonable; based on an error of fact; or wrong in law. VMP appeal grounds are the same, with an additional ground that the penalty amount is unreasonable. Appeals are to a first-tier Tribunal (Tribunal) established in terms of the Tribunals Act, consisting of judges and other members. Tribunal Rules govern this process and the Tribunal may give directions on issues like: document inspections; statements; and the evidence required. Parties may be represented. An appellant lodges an appeal notice within 28 days of the decision, including: the appeal grounds; the relief sought; a written record of the decision challenged; and any statement of reasons. The Tribunal sends these documents to respondents, who respond within 28 days, including any opposition grounds, and the written record and decision reasons (if these were not in the notice). Within 14 days, appellants may make written submissions, with supporting documents, in reply.

Appeals are considered at a hearing (unless agreed otherwise and the Tribunal is satisfied that a hearing is not required), of which at least 14 days’ notice is provided.

---

367 S.8:111-112.
368 S.8:113.
369 S.8:115.
370 S.40(2)(e) RES Act.
371 S.40(6) RES Act; Sch.1,s.8 ECSO.
372 S.43(7) RES Act; Sch.2,s.8 ECSO.
373 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 c.15.
374 Ss.3-4.
375 The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009.
376 S.22 Tribunals Act.
377 Rule 15.
378 Rule 11.
379 Rule 22.
380 Rule 23.
381 Rule 24.
382 Rule 32.
Usually, hearings are public and each party may: attend any hearing; and send written representations to the Tribunal and other parties before the hearing. In certain circumstances, the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing in a party’s absence. EA must prove the commission of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. In other cases, the Tribunal determines the standard of proof. Notices are suspended pending appeal. The Tribunal may: withdraw, confirm or vary the sanction; take such steps as EA could take; or remit the decision whether to confirm the decision (or any related matter) to EA. The Tribunal may give a decision orally at a hearing. As soon as practicable, it provides to each party: a decision notice and written reasons; and notification of any appeal right (and how to exercise it).

A party seeking permission to appeal the Tribunal’s decision makes written application to the Tribunal within 28 days of the latest of: receipt of written reasons; notification of amended reasons or the decision’s correction following a review; or notification of failure of an application to set it aside. The application sets out the alleged error of law and the result sought. The Tribunal must first decide whether to review the decision. If it does not do so (or takes no action following a review), it considers whether to grant appeal permission. A record of its decision must be sent to the parties as soon as practicable. If permission is refused, the record must be accompanied by: reasons for such refusal; and notification of the right and procedure to make an application to the Upper Tribunal (UT) (which consists of judges and other members) for permission to appeal. The Tribunal may also review a decision containing an error of law. Generally, all parties may make review representations. The Tribunal must notify the parties in writing of the review outcome, and of any appeal right.

383 Rule 34.
384 Rule 35.
385 Rule 33(1).
386 Rule 36.
387 Except stop notices.
388 S.54 RES Act; s.10 ECSO.
389 Rule 38.
390 Rule 42.
391 S.3(3),s.5.
392 Rule 43.
393 Rule 44.
The Tribunals Act provides that, with Tribunal or UT permission, a Tribunal decision may be appealed to UT on a legal point. If UT sets aside the Tribunal’s decision, it must either remit the case to the Tribunal with reconsideration directions, or re-make the decision, by making any decision the Tribunal could make and appropriate factual findings. There is also an appeal right to the relevant appellate court on any point of law arising from UT’s decision. Permission may be sought from UT (or the appellate court if UT refuses). The appellate court has the same decision-making powers as the UT. Both the Tribunal and UT may review their own decisions.

EA publishes reports specifying the cases in which: civil sanctions have been imposed; FMP liability discharged; third party undertakings accepted; and enforcement undertakings concluded. To ensure that sanctioning is in line with good practice and applied consistently, EA has centrally-coordinated arrangements to review or monitor individual decisions, and civil sanctions are monitored and overseen by a director-led national panel. Having consulted appropriate persons, the relevant Minister reviews the operation of provisions conferring power on regulators to impose civil sanctions, particularly considering whether the provision has implemented its objectives efficiently and effectively. The review results are published and provided to Parliament.

It is recommended that – as is the UK - appeal grounds be contained in legislation. The appeal tribunal should be staffed by adjudicators with environmental expertise – ideally, a legal expert, an expert in the particular area, and a member from a relevant stakeholder group. A notice of appeal, setting out the appeal grounds, should be filed with the appeal tribunal. Generally, an appeal should suspend the decision’s operation. At the appeal tribunal,

---

395 S.12.
396 Ss.13-14.
397 Ss.9-10.
398 S.65(2)(a), s.65(3).
399 S.65(2)-(3), s.14(1)-(2).
400 DEFRA Review 23.
402 S.67.
403 Macrory Report 55-56.
404 Fn.123.
the appeal can be a full re-hearing on the merits, or deal only with a particular issue. As in the UK, appeals should usually be public.

In a FMP appeal, the first step could be an internal review by the regulator to allow the presentation of information that it may not have been aware of before imposing the penalty. Thereafter, the regulator can: uphold its decision; reverse its decision; or impose a lesser sanction. If the appellant remains dissatisfied, an appeal can be brought before the appeal tribunal. Parties can agree that the FMP appeal be determined on the papers only. A VMP appeal should take the form of an oral hearing. The appeal tribunal must provide reasons for its decision, and can confirm, set aside, and where appropriate, replace the regulator’s decision. Costs can also be awarded. The appeal decision should also indicate that it can be taken on review or appeal to a higher appellate tribunal, as well as the time period for doing so.

An appeal notice containing the appeal grounds should be delivered to the higher appeal tribunal, which, as in the UK, has the same powers as the appeal tribunal. Again, the appeal could be a full re-hearing or limited to a particular disputed aspect regarding the administrative penalty. A record should be kept of all proceedings and both tribunals should have the status of a High Court so that their orders are executable.

There must be good record-keeping on the use of administrative penalties. Enforcement bodies should measure the environmental advantages of enforcement action, such as steps taken by industry in response. Regulators must follow up enforcement actions to ensure compliance, and subsequent follow-ups should determine the effect of the action on compliance.

---

405 Macrory Report 55-56.
406 Macrory Report 55.
407 Macrory Report 56.
408 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 119. The Constitution makes provision for the establishment, by an Act of Parliament, of courts with a status similar to the High Courts (s166(e)).
409 OECD Fines 26.
410 Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1269-1271.
411 Macrory Consultation 8,22; Macrory Report 10,32-33,51,100; OECD Fines 25,27; Rechtschaffen 1268-1271.
For administrative penalties to be effective deterrents, environmental agencies should regularly publicise the outcomes of enforcement action – including administrative penalties – and not only the number of actions taken. If outcomes are monitored, officials, the public and the regulated community will know the impact of enforcement action, and whether it must be changed to improve these results.\textsuperscript{412} Officials should make public: the number of fines imposed; their monetary value; the violators; the nature of the violations; whether fines have been paid; and if not, what enforcement will be (or has been) taken.\textsuperscript{413} A strong message must be sent to other potential offenders that any non-compliance will be penalised with meaningful fines.\textsuperscript{414}

### 3.2.9 Effect of penalty on criminal offence

The Dutch GALA provides that an administrative authority shall not impose an administrative penalty if criminal proceedings have been brought against the violator for the same act, and the hearing has started or a penalty imposed.\textsuperscript{415} If the conduct is also a criminal offence and the seriousness of the offence or the circumstances under which it was committed warrant this, NEA presents it for prosecution,\textsuperscript{416} together with the administrative report.\textsuperscript{417} If an act is one that must be submitted to the prosecutor, NEA may only impose an administrative penalty if the prosecutor has: informed NEA that there will be no prosecution, or failed to respond within 13 weeks.\textsuperscript{418} An administrative penalty imposed for conduct which is also a criminal offence is void if the Court\textsuperscript{419} orders that the offender be prosecuted.\textsuperscript{420}

In the UK, where a notice of intent to impose a FMP is served: no criminal proceedings for the relevant offence may be instituted for 28 days; and if that person discharges liability or an FMP is imposed, they may not be convicted of the offence.\textsuperscript{421} If a

\textsuperscript{412} Macrory Consultation 8,21; Macrory Report 10,32,35,87-91,97; Macrory 2009(11) ELR 73; OECD Fines 25,27,29; Rechtschaffen 1998(71) SCLR 1268-1271, fn.60.
\textsuperscript{413} Faure\&Svatikova 2012 (24) JEL 284; Macrory Consultation 22; DEFRA Review 4,6; Macrory Report 33,86; Macrory 2009(11) ELR 73; OECD Fines 26; fn.60.
\textsuperscript{414} Fn.16,60-61.
\textsuperscript{415} S.5.44(1).
\textsuperscript{416} S.18.16d EMA.
\textsuperscript{417} S.18.16g(3).
\textsuperscript{418} S.5.44(3) GALA.
\textsuperscript{419} Pursuant to art.12i of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
\textsuperscript{420} S.5.47 GALA.
\textsuperscript{421} S.41 RES Act; Sch.1,s.10 ECSO.
VMP is imposed or a third party undertaking is accepted, that person may generally not be convicted. However, conviction is possible if: a non-monetary discretionary requirement is imposed, or an undertaking[^422] is accepted; no VMP is imposed; or there is non-compliance with this requirement or undertaking. Criminal proceedings for such offences triable summarily may be instituted up to six months from the date EA notifies the person of their failure to comply.[^423]

To commence a prosecution, EA must be satisfied that there is a realistic prospect of conviction, as required by the Code for Crown Prosecutors.[^424] Where, for instance: the offence has caused (or may cause) serious harm to the environment or people; there is overt criminality, gross negligence or reckless behaviour; or non-compliance has been protracted and serious, EA would generally prosecute, having regard to the public interest considerations.[^425]

A possible lesson to be drawn from these jurisdictions is that, if liability for a monetary penalty has been discharged, or a FMP or VMP has been imposed, no criminal proceedings should be instituted for the violation, as criminal and administrative penalties are alternatives to one another. If the conduct is particularly egregious[^426] or also amounts to a criminal offence and there is a realistic prospect of conviction, the authority should present it for prosecution. Also, an administrative penalty cannot be imposed if criminal proceedings have been instituted or a criminal penalty imposed for the violation. For the reasons explained in Chapter 4, s24G is different – and both the ‘administrative fine’ and criminal liability apply.

3.2.10 Non-compliance implications

In the Netherlands, GALA provides that a debtor who fails to pay the fine within the prescribed period is in default and liable to statutory interest.[^427] NEA may recover the sum by compulsory

[^422]: In terms of s.43(5).
[^423]: S.44 RES Act; Sch.2.s.10 ECSO.
[^424]: Guidance 3. The Code is a public document, issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions, setting out the general decision-making principles prosecutors should follow.
[^425]: Guidance 16.
[^426]: Fn.103.
payment order.\textsuperscript{428} This is an enforceable order, served and executed at the debtor’s expense,\textsuperscript{429} which enables the creditor to proceed to execution in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure.\textsuperscript{430} The demand notice fee, statutory interest and cost of an enforcement order may also be collected.\textsuperscript{431} A right of action for payment of money prescribes five years after the payment period expires.\textsuperscript{432} If an administrative penalty is imposed on one person twice within four years for the same violation, NEA can withdraw the authorisation for a facility with GHG installations.\textsuperscript{433}

In the UK, provision to pay a penalty may include: provision for EA to recover it, and any interest or other financial penalty for late payment, as a civil debt; provision for these amounts to be recoverable, on the order of a county court or the High Court, as if payable under a court order.\textsuperscript{434} The penalty must be paid within 56 days of the final notice; and, following an unsuccessful appeal, a penalty must be paid within 28 days. Failure to pay increases the penalty by 50 per cent.\textsuperscript{435} Where a FMP or VMP is not paid, the defaulter cannot be prosecuted for the original offence – unpaid penalties are enforced in civil courts.\textsuperscript{436} The application can be decided by a court officer without a hearing. Once the order is made, EA may proceed to enforcement action – including a warrant of execution to seize money or goods to the amount’s value; a charging order on the debtor’s property; and a third party debt order (usually to prevent the debtor from withdrawing money from their bank account).\textsuperscript{437}

It is recommended that interest be levied on an unpaid administrative penalty. Decision of the relevant authorities and tribunals should be enforceable as if they were court orders.\textsuperscript{438}

\textsuperscript{428} S.4:114,5.10(2).
\textsuperscript{429} S.4:120.
\textsuperscript{430} S.4:116.
\textsuperscript{431} S.4:119.
\textsuperscript{432} S.4:104-4:107.
\textsuperscript{433} S.18.17 EMA.
\textsuperscript{434} S.52(2) RES Act; s.6 ECSO.
\textsuperscript{435} Sch.1,s.9 ECSO.
\textsuperscript{436} DEFRA Review 40.
\textsuperscript{437} RES Guidance 33-34.
\textsuperscript{438} Fn.408.
Chapter 4 assesses s24G against the lessons identified in this chapter, and makes practical suggestions for an environmental law administrative penalty system in SA.

4 CHAPTER 4: ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA’S ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REGIME

SA environmental law does not contain a true administrative penalty. The criminal sanction’s deficiencies, the many advantages of administrative penalties, and the success of administrative penalties in other jurisdictions, mean that an administrative penalty system holds enormous potential for SA’s EC&E. This chapter critically evaluates the s24G ‘administrative fine’, and the amendments made to it on 18 December 2013 by the National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Act 30 of 2013 (Amendment Act).

This evaluation is informed by the lessons drawn from the assessment of the administrative penalty schemes in operation in the Netherlands and the UK, undertaken in Chapter 3. Accordingly, it is similarly structured; with the first part providing a brief overview of the relevant regime, and the second part, a critical evaluation based on the themes used in Chapter 3.

4.1 Overview of s24G

NEMA contains National Environmental Management (NEM) principles to guide the implementation of environmental legislation. The precautionary principle requires a risk-averse approach, and the preventive principle is that negative impacts on the environment and environmental rights must be prevented; alternatively, minimised and remedied. Polluters must pay to remedy, and to prevent or minimise pollution and consequent health effects.

---

439 Chap.2.
440 Fn.42-43.
441 NEMA’s s.34G makes provision for admission of guilt fines for NEMA/SEMA offences. This is also not a true administrative penalty because, if the contravention is disputed, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in criminal court (Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 94-95).
442 S.2(1)(e).
443 S.2(4)(a)(vii).
444 S.2(4)(a)(viii).
445 S.2(4)(p).
Integrated environmental management (IEM) is central to NEMA, and includes evaluating activities' impacts on the environment, socio-economic conditions and cultural heritage, and alternative options to mitigate these. IEM dictates that environmental authorisations are required for certain activities. Detailed requirements (including, in some cases, environmental impact assessments (EIAs)) must be followed before authorisation is obtained. Activities' potential environmental consequences, and the option of not implementing the activity, must be assessed and reported on. The state organ that decides whether to grant authorisation (the competent authority (CA)) also considers feasible and reasonable alternatives to and modifications of the activity to minimise environmental harm.

All parties interested in and affected by the proposed activity (IAPs) require a reasonable opportunity to participate in public procedures regarding its potential environmental consequences.

Section 24F (s24F), read with section 49A(1)(a) of NEMA, makes it an offence to commence an activity listed or specified in the EIA Listing Notices, 2010 (LN) without prior authorisation. However, s24G permits ex post facto authorisation of activities that commenced unlawfully. S24G provides that anyone who has commenced a listed activity without authorisation can apply to the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, the provincial MEC for environmental affairs, or their delegate for a directive. Prior to its amendment, s24G provided that this directive was to compile and submit a report containing: an assessment of the nature, extent, duration and significance of the activity's environmental impacts (including cumulative effects); mitigation measures undertaken or to be undertaken; the public participation process followed (which also addressed all IAP comments); an environmental management programme; and any other information required. As set out below, the amended s24G makes provision for various other directives. The CA determines an

---

446 S.23(2)(b) & (c).
447 S.24(2). The activities are set out in EIA Regulations Listing Notices, 2010.
448 S.24(4)(b)(i).
449 S.1(1).
450 S.24O(1)(b)(iv).
451 S.24(4)(a)(v).
452 S.24(2)(a)-(b). There is a maximum fine of R10 million and/or ten years' imprisonment (s.49B(1)). As discussed below; s.24F(1)(b), read with s24(2)(d), prohibits the commencement of certain activities without compliance with applicable norms and standards.
453 Introduced in 2005, s.24G was presumably intended to address unauthorised developments, and uncertainty regarding ex post facto rectification (van der Linde 'NEMA' in Environmental Management 206; Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) PER 126-137,140; Basson 2003(10) SAJELP 133-147).
administrative fine – a maximum of R5 million – for the applicant.\textsuperscript{454} After payment of the fine, the Minister or MEC considers the documents provided, and may then: refuse to issue authorisation; issue authorisation subject to conditions; or direct the provision of further information or additional steps before deciding whether to grant authorisation.\textsuperscript{455} Failure to comply with a directive or a condition is an offence, punishable by a maximum fine of R10 million and/or ten years’ imprisonment.\textsuperscript{456}

When s24G was promulgated, the maximum R1 million fine was one of the highest fines for environmental legislation, and caused some concern among potential violators.\textsuperscript{457} However, s24G has been controversial and frustrating, and its effective application severely hampered by interpretation difficulties.\textsuperscript{458} Effectively, a person contemplating the undertaking of a listed activity can choose either: to follow the prescribed route of seeking authorisation before commencing the activity; or, if the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs, or there is some doubt as to whether authorisation will be granted, to undertake the activity and seek s24G authorisation.\textsuperscript{459}

Although s24G was not intended as an invitation to commit offences for later correction,\textsuperscript{460} this is what appears to have happened. The widespread abuse of s24G has become the most prevalent environmental offence.\textsuperscript{461} The DEA has noted that: ‘many people tend to knowingly commence with a listed activity without [authorisation] and later apply for a [s24G authorisation] to rectify the unlawful commencement’, and that this poses ‘serious dangers to the credibility of the [EIA] process’.\textsuperscript{462} This has been confirmed by research in Gauteng, which revealed that the section ‘has seriously undermined the overall compliance and enforcement effort by opening the door to abuse and providing a mechanism which effectively accommodates environmental crime’.\textsuperscript{463} Many violators simply budget for the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{tabular}{l}
454 S.24G(5).  \\
455 S.24G(2).  \\
456 S.49B(1).  \\
457 Fourie 2009 (16)\textit{2} SAJELP 113; Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in \textit{Environmental Compliance & Enforcement} 237-238.  \\
458 Van der Linde ‘NEMA’ in \textit{Environmental Management} 207.  \\
459 CER May 2011 1,6,8-9; Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) \textit{PER} 144-145; OECD Performance 51.  \\
460 \textit{Body Corporate of Dolphin Cove v KwaDukuza Municipality & another} 2012 JOL 28771 (KZD) [41].  \\
461 OECD Performance 39.  \\
463 September \textit{Critical Analysis} s24G 81.
\end{tabular}
\end{footnotesize}
administrative fine and proceed without authorisation, knowing they can apply for [s24G] ‘rectification’ if they are discovered.\(^{464}\)

When a s24G application is made, the violator often presents the CA with a fait accompli, at a stage where it is too late to consider alternatives - damage to the environment has been done, and might even be irreversible. In other words, the CA has little basis to refuse the application,\(^{465}\) and it is unlikely that an authority or a court would order the demolition of an illegal structure.\(^{466}\) This approach renders environmental assessment ineffective.\(^{467}\) This is exacerbated because the vast majority – if not all - s24G applications succeed.\(^{468}\)

The Amendment Act attempts to address some of s24G’s significant problems. However, as explained below, it fails to deal with all of the problems with the section.

4.2 Critical evaluation of s24G

S24G triggers some broad constitutional issues, and arguably amounts to an unreasonable, unjustifiable violation of the constitutional right.\(^{469}\) The idea that a lawful activity can follow from unlawful administrative action is contrary to the constitutional rule of law,\(^{470}\) read with the principle of administrative legality and administrative justice.\(^{471}\) Retrospective authorisation is inconsistent with NEMA’s purpose to promote environmental rights\(^{472}\) and with the preventive and precautionary principles; falls foul of the principles that promote IAPs’ participation in

\(^{464}\) CER May 2011 1,6,8-9,July 2012 4,August 2013 2-3, September 2013 3.
\(^{465}\) CER May 2011 2; Magaliesberg Protection Association v MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Rural Development, North West Provincial Government and others 2013 3 All SA 416 (SCA) [56].
\(^{466}\) CER August 2013 2; In Magaliesberg, the Supreme Court of Appeal commented, at para 52: ‘in considering the remedy of demolition, the image of wrecking equipment, bulldozers, earth moving machines..., with concomitant pollution and potential further harm to the environment cannot be ignored’.
\(^{467}\) Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) PER 124,134,144-145.
\(^{468}\) CER May 2011 2,July 2012 4,August 2013 2.
\(^{469}\) S.36 of the Constitution makes provision for rights to be limited if this is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
\(^{470}\) S.1.
\(^{471}\) S.33.
\(^{472}\) Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) PER 135-136.
environmental decision-making; and is incompatible with IEM - principles required by sustainable development - and international law obligations. Conducting an EIA and obtaining prior authorisation for an activity, are integral to the environmental right, and there are sufficient legislative tools to regularise unlawful activities without s24G.

However, as the section has not been subject to constitutional scrutiny, the analysis will focus on the lessons to be learned from foreign experience, with a view to improving the current formulation of s24G (although the preference is for s24G to be scrapped entirely), and introducing a true administrative penalty system into SA environmental law.

4.2.1 Nature of penalty

Although it is referred to as an ‘administrative fine’, the s24G fine is not strictly punitive – payment merely triggers the consideration of the application for ex post facto approval of an activity. The Minister or MEC may direct the provision of a report and may require additional information. Prior to its amendment, s24G provided that, after the CA determined an administrative fine, the Minister or MEC considered the reports and information submitted and decided whether to: direct the person to cease the activity and rehabilitate the environment; or issue an authorisation. The Amendment Act makes explicit provision for the refusal of the authorisation and for the provision of further information. The fact that the fine is determined before the authority evaluates the information militates against it being an administrative penalty of the nature described in Chapter 2.

---

473 Basson 2003(10) SAJELP 146.
474 Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) PER 132; van der Linde ‘NEMA’ in Environmental Management 207; CER August 2013 2-3.
475 Van der Linde ‘NEMA’ in Environmental Management 208; OECD Performance 51.
476 CER July 2012 4.August 2013 3; A mandamus can compel the removal of the illegal activity and restoration of the previous position (Silvermine Valley Coalition v Sybrand van der Spuy Boerdery and Others 2002 (1) SA 478 (C) 488D). S28 NEMA requires polluters to take reasonable measures to prevent, or minimise and rectify pollution. The Director-General or provincial department head may direct such measures, or take them herself and recover costs. S31A of ECA is similar. If there is an ECA conviction, the court may order the offender to repair environmental damage from the offence (s29(7)).
477 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 113.
478 S24G(1)(b)(vii)-(viii).
479 Except where otherwise indicated, all amendments discussed are in clause 9.
480 S.24G(2)(a).
481 S.24G(1)(b)(viii).
482 2005 NEMA-S24G Guideline; Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) PER 142.
True administrative penalties are hybrid in nature. They are more proportionate to the type of offence and harm caused, and easier to administer and impose than criminal penalties. It is recommended that a conventional administrative penalty system be introduced into SA, with FMPs for minor infringements and VMPs for more serious offences or where there is evidence of mismanagement or negligence. The s24G administrative fine triggers the consideration of an application for *ex post facto* environmental authorisation in the circumstances set out in 4.2.2 below – there is no distinction between FMPs and VMPs as in the UK.

### 4.2.2 Trigger for penalty

Prior to its amendment, s24G(1) provided that ‘a person who has committed an offence in terms of s24F(2)(a)’ – i.e. commenced a so-called listed or specified activity without authorisation - could apply for ‘rectification’ in terms of s24G. Although it was held in *Supersize Investments 11 CC v MEC of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism, Limpopo Provincial Government and another* that s24G(1) meant that there had to be criminal proceedings against an applicant, this cannot be correct. S24G applied to anyone who had commenced an activity identified in terms of section 24(2)(a) or (b) (which amounted to an offence). It did not indicate that it applied to a person who had been ‘charged and/or convicted of an offence’. The Amendment Act contains the following improved formulation: ‘on application by a person who has commenced with a listed or specified activity without [authorisation] in contravention of s24F(1)’.

However, this should read ‘s24F(1)(a)’ because s24F(1)(b) refers to activities that do not require authorisation, but instead must comply with prescribed norms or standards. Alternatively, if the intention is for s24G also to be applicable to activities that do not comply with prescribed norms and standards, a distinction should be made between s24F(1)(a) and (b) offences.

---

483 Fn.53.
484 3.2.1; fn.117.
485 Fn.212-216.
486 S.24(2)(a).
487 S.24(2)(b).
488 2013 JOL 30257 (GNP) [13].
489 S24G(1)(a).
490 CER July 2012 5.
In practice, there is a trend for companies to rely on the emergency defence to criminal liability,\textsuperscript{491} and then to make a s24G application. As the section does not provide for separate responses to different fault levels, intentional and repeat offenders are let off too easily, while ‘innocent’ offenders are prejudiced by s24G’s criminal stigma in the context of section 49A(1)(a)’s strict liability.\textsuperscript{492}

It was incorrectly held in \textit{Supersize} that the intention of the legislature was not to force innocent applicants to admit to a crime, in order to fall within the ambit of s24G. In other words, that those who \textit{bona fide} commence an activity without authorisation fall outside the purview of s24G, and can apply for authorisation, with completion of the construction regarded as the ‘proposed activity’.\textsuperscript{493} As set out above, fault is not a requirement of s24F or s24G, and the violator’s state of mind is therefore irrelevant.

If s24G remains in SA law, payment of the administrative fine should be limited to negligent violations. The Centre for Environmental Rights (CER) has proposed that anyone who falls within s24F’s ambit is required immediately to cease the activity and take reasonable measures to mitigate environmental degradation from the offence. Secondly, it proposed that a s24G applicant would have to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence was not committed intentionally. If this onus cannot be discharged, such person would have to rehabilitate all environmental degradation - to the satisfaction of the CA - and would not be permitted to apply for s24G authorisation. An applicant who can show that the offence was not intentional, but cannot show that it was not committed negligently, can apply for s24G authorisation. An ‘innocent’ violator – who can show that the offence was not committed with intent or negligence – can apply for s24G authorisation, but should not be required to pay the administrative fine.\textsuperscript{494} None of these suggestions – which would prevent the cynical use of s24G to avoid conducting an environmental assessment - was taken on board in the Amendment Act.

\textsuperscript{491} Prior to amendment, s24F(3) provided a defence to a s.24F charge if the activity was in response to an emergency so as to protect human life, property or the environment. S49A(2) is stricter, but similar.
\textsuperscript{492} CER May 2011 1-2,6-9,August 2013 2-3.
\textsuperscript{493} [13]-[14].
\textsuperscript{494} CER May 2011 1-2,6-9.
Insofar as the introduction of a true administrative penalty is concerned, and bearing in mind the lessons from the Netherlands and the UK, the trigger for an administrative fine should be the commission of certain violations of environmental legislation\(^{495}\) which are not sufficiently egregious to warrant criminal prosecution.\(^{496}\) Generally, intentional offenders should instead be prosecuted, as should those who are repeat offenders and/or who have committed infringements causing serious damage to people or the environment.\(^{497}\) It is recommended that strict liability offences generally be reserved for FMPs,\(^{498}\) with VMPs for negligent violations. VMPs may also be available for ‘innocent’ breaches if these have serious consequences, or the offence resulted in significant financial gain.\(^{499}\)

Contrary to the UK’s position, and because a violator does not face criminal position, the standard of proof for administrative penalties and appeals should be a balance of probabilities.\(^{500}\) This is the same standard required by the Competition Act.\(^{501}\)

### 4.2.3 Scope of application

Until its amendment, s24G only applied to activities identified in EIA LNs as requiring authorisation.\(^{502}\) The LNs specifically include activities that require an atmospheric emission licence (AEL) in terms of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 (AQA),\(^{503}\) and specifically exclude activities that require a waste management licence (WML) in terms of the National Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008 (Waste Act).\(^{504}\) Notwithstanding the explicit exclusion of waste management activities from the LN, it was incorrectly held in *Interwaste (Pty) Limited and others v Coetzee and others*\(^{505}\) that s24G also applied to the Waste Act.

---

\(^{495}\) Addressed at 4.2.3.
\(^{496}\) Fn.113.
\(^{497}\) 3.2.9.
\(^{498}\) Fn.232.
\(^{499}\) Fn.120.
\(^{500}\) 3.2.2; fn.233.
\(^{501}\) S.68.
\(^{502}\) S.24(2)(a)-(b).
\(^{503}\) LN.1,activities 2 & 18; LN.2,activities 5 & 26.
\(^{504}\) LN.1 activity 28; LN.2,activity 5; LN.3,activities 13(1) & 14(2).
\(^{505}\) 2013 JOL 30686 (GSJ) [31].
In addition to the apparent extension to s24F(1)(b), the Amendment Act now expands s24G to apply to the commencement of waste management activities without Waste Act WMLs. No explanation is given for the singling out of WMLs from all other authorisations – the majority of which are not covered by the LN. This expansion is unwarranted and is likely to lead to expectations and create vested interests which will be difficult to reverse in subsequent amendments.

The Air Quality Amendment Bill, 2013 proposes the introduction of a s24G equivalent into the AQA (section 22A) for circumstances where an activity listed in terms of section 21 of AQA is commenced without an AEL. However, activities requiring an AEL are already contained in the LN and therefore require NEMA authorisation. Section 22A would mean that two applications are needed: one in terms of s24G for commencing a NEMA-listed activity without authorisation; and one in terms of AQA (generally to the municipality as licensing authority) for commencing an AQA-listed activity without authorisation. This duplication creates the possibility of conflicting decisions by different authorities on related ‘rectification’ applications.

S24G should not have been extended. However, having regard to lessons drawn from C&E theory and the two foreign jurisdictions, a true administrative penalty system should be available at least for those violations of NEMA and SEMAs which are not sufficiently egregious to require criminal sanctions. As has been done in both the UK and the Netherlands, it is advisable initially to the pilot the use of administrative penalties for particular offences.

Apart from criminal penalties, an administrative penalty should be in addition to any other NEMA/SEMA penalty, and should only be imposed once per violation – as per the

---

506 S.24G(1)(b).
508 CER September 2013 2-3.
509 Fn.113.
510 Fourie (2009 (16)2 SAJELP 119) proposes that these penalties also be available for violations of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 and the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998.
511 Addressed at 4.2.9.
Netherlands and the UK. Provision for payment should include provision for: early payment discounts; interest; and penalty enforcement.  

4.2.4 Institutional arrangements

The decision-maker on s24G applications and administrative fines is the CA — the Minister or the relevant MEC. A person who has contravened s24F(1)(a) initiates the s24G process — although this is often on instruction from the EMI - by making an application. On application, the Minister or MEC ‘may’ direct, inter alia, the compilation of a report and the provision of additional information. Although s24G uses ‘may’, the Minister and MECs apparently take the view that there is no discretion regarding the acceptance of a s24G application. However, some offences are so egregious that they cannot be ‘rectified’ and should never be considered for ex post facto authorisation. In these cases, the authority should refuse to process the application.  

S24G contains no details as to how or by when a decision regarding an administrative fine is made, nor is there any publicly available guidance in this regard. There is general unease about the lack of transparency in the fine calculation, giving rise to concerns about corruption. As set out in 4.2.5 below, the CER only recently learned of the factors that are considered in determining such fines. The Amendment Act makes provision for regulations to be prepared that relate to the procedure and criteria to be followed in the determination of a s24G administrative fine, and provides that the ‘existing standard operating procedure adopted by the Minister’ for determining s24G fines applies in the interim. Whilst there is no difficulty in setting out the procedure and criteria for s24G fines in regulations, the DEA should make these regulations available for public comment as soon as possible, as it is clear from its implementation that the ‘standard operating procedure’ is wholly inadequate.

512 3.2.3.
513 CER August 2013 2-3, September 2013 3.
514 CER May 2011 1-9. Many incidents of corruption in the s24G process have been reported to the EMI (personal communication from Grant Walters (Director Enforcement: Environmental Impact and Pollution, DEA)).
515 Clause 21.
516 S.44(1)(a)(aC). This amendment was not necessary, given that NEMA already empowers the Minister to make regulations ‘generally to carry out the purposes and provision of [NEMA]’ (s.44(1)(b)).
517 S.44(18).
For the introduction of a true administrative penalty system for SA environmental law, such penalties should be imposed by a specialist environmental authority (as in the UK and the Netherlands), with officials who are properly trained in the use of administrative penalties, including the discretionary evaluation of VMP factors.\textsuperscript{518} The EMI – which has environmental expertise, understands the impact of violations, and is familiar with the technical aspects and particular circumstances of offenders – could potentially fulfil this role.\textsuperscript{519}

As in the UK, for both s24G and a conventional administrative penalty system, and in order for regulated entities and the public to know what action can be expected from a regulator,\textsuperscript{520} there must be publicly-available guidance on administrative penalties, which is updated,\textsuperscript{521} and into which IAPs have input.\textsuperscript{522} All decisions should be made with due regard to the decision-maker’s policies and this guidance.\textsuperscript{523}

4.2.5 Decision-making processes

There is no requirement in s24G that a person who has commenced a listed activity illegally must cease the activity, pending the application’s determination. Instead, the unlawful activity is apparently generally permitted to continue, while the various reports and studies are underway.\textsuperscript{524} The explanatory memorandum to the National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Bill [B13-2012] (NEMLAB 2) states that the DEA has received numerous complaints that ‘applicants proceed with illegal activities on the assumption that their 24G applications will be successful’.

The Amendment Act provides the Minister or MEC with powers to issue directives for several reasons – in addition to the existing s24G powers to direct the compilation of a report and provision of other information.\textsuperscript{525} One of these is a directive to cease the activity

\textsuperscript{518} Fn.252.
\textsuperscript{519} Fn.125.
\textsuperscript{520} Fn.255.
\textsuperscript{521} Fn.246-250,256-259.
\textsuperscript{522} Fn.254.
\textsuperscript{523} 3.2.4.
\textsuperscript{524} Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) PER 143-144.
\textsuperscript{525} S24G(1)(b).
immediately, pending a decision on the application. This is discretionary, unlike the CER’s proposal that an applicant be required immediately to stop the unlawful activity and mitigate its impacts. The decision-maker could also, for example, direct the applicant to: remedy the activity’s adverse environmental impacts; cease, modify or control any act or omission causing pollution or degradation; and/or eliminate and/or contain or prevent the movement of pollution or degradation.

S24G is, effectively, a short-cut procedure for authorisation - not only does it permit less stringent environmental assessment and public participation processes than the normal authorisation process, but the public participation process is not clear. The preparation of a report is apparently not even a prerequisite to the application’s consideration – it is just one of the directives available. An applicant so directed is only required to describe the public participation process, and how IAPs’ comments were addressed. The Amendment Act attempts to make the environmental assessment aspect more robust by indicating that the report should also: describe the activity’s need and desirability; and assess the manner in which the geographical, physical, biological, social, economic and cultural aspects of the environment may be impacted. There is still, however, no provision to consider alternatives to the activity, which is a crucial aspect required by NEMA and the EIA Regulations, 2010.

After the application is received, the report compiled and it and other required information made available (and other directives potentially issued), the applicant is required to pay an administrative fine determined by the CA (which cannot exceed R5 million) before the Minister or MEC can consider the documents submitted and decide whether or not to issue authorisation. There is no publicly available list of factors to be considered by the decision-maker, nor any specific provision for an applicant to make representations in this

526 S.24G(1)(b)(i).
527 Fn.494.
528 CER August 2013 2.
529 CER May 2011 2.
533 CER May 2011 2.
534 S.24G(4).
regard. In fact, the CA is apparently required to make the decision before the information is considered, and therefore without having regard to its contents. It is consequently not clear what information is taken into account by the decision-maker. As set out above, it is essential that the draft regulations on s24G fines are urgently made available for public comment.

In May 2013, the DEA advised the CER that environmental authorities had developed, for internal use, a calculator to guide the determination of s24G fines, based on the following indices: social benefit that may accrue from the development; socio-economic and biodiversity impact that may result from the development; the development’s impact on the sense of place/heritage significance of the environment within which it is situated; and the pollution that has occurred or which may occur if mitigation measures fail. The calculator allows for a standard application of impact scores linked to the activity’s potential environmental risk (a more severe impact means a higher impact score). The impact score is determined after a review of, inter alia, any additional information requested from the applicant, DEA inspection findings, and any other relevant information. The applicant’s compliance history is also taken into account in making a final fine determination.535

As indicated above, the vast majority of s24G applications succeed.536 Prior to its amendment, s24G did not make explicit provision for the application to be refused - it provided two options for the Minister or MEC after determination and payment of the administrative fine, and consideration of the report: direct the applicant to cease the activity and rehabilitate the environment; or issue an authorisation. The amended s24G(2) empowers the authority to: refuse to issue authorisation; issue authorisation (which only takes effect from the date of issue); or direct the applicant to provide more information or take certain steps before a decision is made. The Amendment Act also provides that, as part of this decision, the authority may direct the applicant to rehabilitate the environment; or take other necessary steps,537 and that an applicant’s failure to comply with a s24G(1) or (2) directive may be taken into account.538

---

535 DEA May 2013 3.
536 Fn.468.
537 S.24G(3).
538 S.24G(5).
As ‘administrative action’ (as defined in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA)), administrative penalties must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, and anyone whose rights are adversely affected is entitled to written reasons. To ensure fair administrative action, and in keeping with the lessons distilled from the UK and the Netherlands, decisions on s24G administrative fines and conventional administrative penalties should only be made after the offender has had an opportunity to make representations regarding the imposition of the penalty and the mitigating and aggravating factors, and these have been carefully considered.

The consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors by the decision-maker allows for the optimal administrative penalty to be determined. Insofar as s24G is concerned, the factors apparently considered in determining the fine are insufficient. Both for s24G and a conventional administrative penalty system, the factors to be evaluated should at least include those used in the UK for determining a VMP.

Having considered the procedure in the other jurisdictions, when the offender is notified of the fine imposition, it should be in writing, containing reasons and the relevant legislative provisions, and the offender advised of details like: the payment deadline; consequences of non-payment; and the appeal right (and how and where to lodge an appeal). FMPs could be imposed by more junior staff members, but senior officials – and not inspectors – should decide VMPs.

4.2.6 Maximum penalty quanta

Before its recent amendment, s24G indicated that the maximum administrative fine was R1 million per offence. It seems, however, that this maximum amount was really – if ever – imposed. S24G fines were simply too low to amount to a proper disincentive for non-

---

539 S.33 of the Constitution; Craigie et al ‘Dissecting’ in Environmental Compliance & Enforcement 56.
540 Fn.246-250,287.
541 Fn.134.
542 CER May 2011 1,8-9,August 2013 3-4,September 2013 3; fn.277-278,280-281.
543 3.2.5.
544 Fn.289.
545 Fn.33.
compliance: companies budgeted for the fine and proceeded with their contraventions. If they were discovered, they applied for rectification. Even if the maximum fine of R1 million were usually imposed, this was a very small amount compared to the benefit of not having to follow the proper authorisation route. The maximum fine was also well below the cost of following EIA process and only one-fifth of the maximum criminal penalty in s24F.

It has been suggested that the s24G fine be linked to a meaningful percentage of the activity's commercial value. The CER has proposed that, where a juristic person has unlawfully commenced an activity, it should be liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding the greater of: ten per cent of the person’s annual turnover in SA and its exports during the preceding financial year; or R10 million.

The Amendment Act increased the maximum s24G fine to R5 million. Whilst an increase is supported, R10 million is more appropriate. When the fine is determined, the CA must consider all relevant factors. The Amendment Act increased the penalty for s24F violations from a maximum fine of R5 million to a maximum fine of R10 million and/or ten years' imprisonment. The s24G administrative fine is therefore half the fine for s24F offences. The increased s24F fine is more in keeping with the fact that many offenders are corporate entities, and that substantial benefits can accrue to an offender who commences an activity without authorisation. It is also in line with penalties for similar SEMA offences.

Having considered the position in the UK and the Netherlands, it is recommended that, for a true administrative penalty system, the maximum amounts of both FMPs and VMPs should be prescribed in legislation. FMPs should be for fixed amounts, and, since administrative penalties are generally intended for offences which do not warrant criminal

---

546 Fn 459-464.
547 CER August 2013 2.
548 Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) PER 146.
549 CER May 2011 6.
550 S.24G(4).
551 CER May 2011 1,8-9, September 2011 3; OECD Performance 41.
552 Fn.122,251,277-281.
553 Clause 25.
554 S.49B(1).
555 S.68(1) Waste Act; s.102(1) NEMBA; s.52 AQA, s.89(2) PAA & s.151(2) NWA (for a second or subsequent offence).
prosecution, maximum VMPs should not exceed the maximum criminal fine. As in the UK, if, having evaluated the appropriate fine using the relevant factors, it would be higher than the maximum criminal fine, the violator should instead be prosecuted.\textsuperscript{556}

\subsection*{4.2.7 Allocation of penalty proceeds}

The fact that the s24G administrative fine is paid to the department implementing it has resulted in a system of perverse incentives, ensuring that the vast majority (if not all) s24G applications succeed.\textsuperscript{557}

Funds (from s24G and true administrative penalties) should not be available to the regulator that imposed the fine.\textsuperscript{558} As is the position with Competition Act administrative fines,\textsuperscript{559} these should be paid into the National Revenue Fund,\textsuperscript{560} controlled by National Treasury.\textsuperscript{561}

\subsection*{4.2.8 Appeal and review procedures}

NEMA provides that there is an appeal to the Minister\textsuperscript{562} or MEC\textsuperscript{563} of any decision by anyone acting under a NEMA or SEMA power delegated by the Minister or MEC, respectively. This means that appeals of both s24G fines and s24G decisions are available when the Minister or MEC delegates these decisions. If the Minister or MEC is the decision-maker, no appeal is available, but the decision can be taken on review to the High Court.

An appeal panel can be appointed to advise the decision-maker.\textsuperscript{564} Importantly, the appeal does not suspend a decision, an authorisation or any of its provisions, or any directive, unless the Minister or MEC directs otherwise.\textsuperscript{565} The EIA Regulations provide that anyone

\textsuperscript{556} 3.2.6.
\textsuperscript{557} OECD Performance 51; CER July 2012 4,August 2013 2,September 2013 3; fn.468.
\textsuperscript{558} 3.2.7; fn.305.
\textsuperscript{559} S.59(4).
\textsuperscript{560} S.213 Constitution.
\textsuperscript{561} S.11 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999.
\textsuperscript{562} S.43(1).
\textsuperscript{563} S.43(2).
\textsuperscript{564} S.43(5).
\textsuperscript{565} S.43(7).
affected by the decision may submit a notice of intention to appeal to Minister or MEC within 20 calendar days.\textsuperscript{566} If the appellant is not the s24G applicant, it must, within ten days, provide the applicant with the notice and advise where and for what period the appeal submission is available for inspection. If the appellant is the applicant, it must provide each registered IAP with this information.\textsuperscript{567} The appeal must be submitted within 50 days of the decision.\textsuperscript{568} It must be in writing and accompanied by: the appeal grounds; supporting documentation not in the decision-maker’s possession; a statement of compliance with the notice of intention to appeal requirements; and any prescribed appeal fee.\textsuperscript{569} Any responding statement must be submitted within 30 days; and delivered to the appellant ten days thereafter. If there is new information in the responding statement, the appellant may submit an answering statement within 30 days, with a copy to the respondent ten days thereafter.\textsuperscript{570} In processing the appeal, the decision-maker must: acknowledge receipt of appeal/statements within ten days; and advise all parties of a suspension directive or an appeal panel’s appointment. The decision-maker may also require additional information.\textsuperscript{571} Members of an appeal panel must be independent and the Minister or MEC must provide it with written instructions regarding the issues and the deadline for its written recommendations. If the panel introduces new information, each party may, within a period the panel determines, provide additional statements rebutting or supporting such new information.\textsuperscript{572} The decision-maker must make a final decision within 90 days of receipt of all relevant information, including a panel’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{573} The decision may confirm, set aside or vary the decision, or make any other appropriate decision.\textsuperscript{574} All parties must be notified of the decision and its reasons within ten days.\textsuperscript{575}

A party aggrieved by: a s24G decision taken or fine imposed by the Minister or MEC; or the internal appeal outcome, can, within 180 days of the decision, apply to review the

\textsuperscript{566} Time periods may be extended on good cause.
\textsuperscript{567} Reg.60.
\textsuperscript{568} Reg.62.
\textsuperscript{569} Reg.61.
\textsuperscript{570} Reg.63.
\textsuperscript{571} Reg.64.
\textsuperscript{572} Reg.65.
\textsuperscript{573} Reg.66(2).
\textsuperscript{574} S.43(6) NEMA.
\textsuperscript{575} Reg.66(3)-(4).
A review court can make any just and equitable order, including, *inter alia*: directing the administrator to — give reasons, act in a particular manner; setting aside the administrative action and: remitting the matter for reconsideration, or, in exceptional cases:

---

576 S.7(1) PAJA.
577 S.7(2).
578 S.6(2).
579 Rule 53(1)-(2).
580 Rule 53(5)(a).
581 Rule 53(1)(b).
582 Rule 53(3).
583 Rule 53(4).
584 Rule 53(5)(b).
585 Rule 6(5)(e).
586 Rule 6(5)(f).
587 For example, 9.8.2 of Practice Directive 02/2013 of the South Gauteng High Court provides that a hearing date can only be allocated if the court file has been indexed and paginated and heads of argument delivered.
substituting the decision or correcting a defect resulting from it; directing the payment of compensation; declaring the parties’ rights; granting temporary relief like an interdict; or as to costs.\textsuperscript{588}

The High Court’s decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) (the highest appeal court except in constitutional matters)\textsuperscript{589} or to the Constitutional Court (the highest court in constitutional matters).\textsuperscript{590}

Having considered C&E theory and the position in the UK and the Netherlands, an appeal tribunal should be constituted of adjudicators with expertise in environmental matters.\textsuperscript{591} There is no special tribunal to dispute a s24G administrative fine. An Environment Tribunal could be established as the appeal tribunal for appeals of decision regarding administrative penalties (and potentially other environmental disputes). It might be possible to expand the existing Water Tribunal for this purpose.\textsuperscript{592} An Environment Appeal Tribunal could be established for higher appeals and its decisions should be appealable to the SCA.\textsuperscript{593} These tribunals should have the status of High Courts and have the power to set aside, replace, or confirm the contested decision. Records must be kept of all proceedings.\textsuperscript{594}

It is recommended that, as in the UK, appeal grounds are contained in legislation.\textsuperscript{595} An appeal should, as a general rule – and unlike NEMA appeals – suspend the operation of

\textsuperscript{588} S.8.
\textsuperscript{589} S.168(3) Constitution.
\textsuperscript{590} S.167(2)(a) Constitution. There may also be an appeal from the SCA to the Constitutional Court on a constitutional issue. The latter can also be approached as a court of first instance in certain circumstances (s.167(6) Constitution).
\textsuperscript{591} Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 122. From about mid-2012, the Tribunal’s operations have been ‘held in abeyance’ pending legislative amendments – due to concerns that it was not legally constituted. As an interim solution, s.150 of the NWA (which makes provision for the Minister to direct parties to attempt to settle NWA disputes through mediation and negotiation) has been employed (Minister’s Written Reply to Parliamentary Question 2280 on 10 September 2012). In Exxaro Coal (Mpumalanga) (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Water Affairs (case 63939/2012, 7 December 2012), the Minister’s decision to suspend the Tribunal and introduce mediation was held to be invalid and ultra vires. The SCA in Makhanya NO and another v Goede Wellington Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2013 1 All SA 526 (SCA) commented that a mediation panel was not an appropriate body to consider licence applications. On 14 June 2013, the Minister called for nominations for members to reconstitute the Tribunal (GN615 GG36568 of 2013-06-14).
\textsuperscript{592} This is the position for appeals of Competition Appeal Court decisions (s.62(4) Competition Act).
\textsuperscript{593} Fn.404.
\textsuperscript{594} Fn.408.
\textsuperscript{595} Fn.403.
the decision, and should generally be public. It can be a full re-hearing or only deal with a particular issue. In a FMP appeal, the regulator could initially conduct an internal review at which information is presented that it may not have seen before imposing the fine; following which, the decision can be upheld or reversed, or a lesser sanction imposed. There should be an option to appeal this decision to an appeal tribunal and parties can agree that the appeal will be determined on the papers. It is recommended, however, that a VMP appeal generally be conducted by an oral hearing.

Detailed record-keeping on administrative penalties is essential. In relation to publicising s24G fines, the NECERs contain some enforcement action details, but not enough to draw meaningful conclusions. This is compounded by the lack of reliable baseline evidence. In relation to s24G fines, for example, only the number and value of fines are provided. The value of each individual fine is not known, nor is the violator or the nature of the violation. The NECERs also do not indicate what enforcement action has been taken where s24G fines have not been paid.

4.2.9 **Effect of penalty on criminal offence**

Until its recent amendment, the heading of s24G was ‘rectification of unlawful commencement of activity’, but the word ‘rectification’ was not repeated in s24G; nor is it in the amended s24G. There has been uncertainty regarding the consequences of ‘rectification’, especially regarding criminal liability for the period between the activity’s illegal commencement and rectification, and regarding the admissibility in other proceedings of evidence from a s24G application. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) argues that s24G creates a criminal prosecution indemnity, and that prosecuting a violator who follows the s24G process would amount to the offender being punished twice. It has been argued that, because the Legislature made provision for a criminal sanction (a fine), instead of a mere administrative fee

---

596 Fn.405.
597 Fn.406.
598 Fn.407.
599 3.2.8.
600 Fn.33.
601 CER August 2013 2,4.
602 NPA April 2013 4.
for processing the application, the payment halts s24F’s operation.603 The effect of these arguments is that, prior to s24G’s amendment, someone who illegally commenced a listed activity, and subsequently obtained ex post facto authorisation, was subject only to a maximum R1 million fine (and not imprisonment), rather than the s24F potential fine of R5 million and/or ten years’ imprisonment.604 This interpretation has the result that payment of the fine indemnifies the offender from prosecution, even if the authority refuses to grant ex post facto authorisation and issues a directive to cease the activity. Payment of a fine means that the offender will not acquire a criminal record, and others involved in the offence and directors do not face prosecution.605 The NPA’s interpretation, coupled with the fact that s24G applications are very seldom – if ever – refused, means that violators have effectively been able to buy themselves out of criminal prosecution.606

It was held in Interwaste that a s24G rectification application suspends s24F’s penal provisions, and, by implication, any unlawfulness of the illegal activity. The court held that s24G provides for a moratorium against further action being taken against the applicant, pending the finalisation of the rectification application.607 Another argument in favour of the previous s24G creating a criminal prosecution indemnity, is that, unless it was so intended, there was very little incentive to follow s24G: an offender had to admit the offence, pay an administrative fine and remained liable to prosecution.608

However, in the absence of an express contrary provision (of which there was none in s24G), it could not be implied that a successful s24G application created immunity for prosecution for past criminal conduct. There was also no indication in s24G that an authorisation operated retroactively to legitimate the activity. In fact, s24G does not deal with criminal liability – it deals with rectification of the unauthorised development, and the administrative fine is a penalty for seeking ex post facto approval; not a substitute for criminal sanctions. The idea of rectification is that something that was irregularly done can be cured. The past unlawfulness is, by the granting of s24G rectification, ‘rectified’, in that the

603 Van der Linde ‘NEMA’ in Environmental Management 206-207.
604 Paschke&Glazewski 2006 9(1) PER 145.
605 Budlender August 2013 6-7.
607 [29].
608 Cockrell & Hofmeyr June 2013 11-12.
development that was illegally commenced was no longer unlawful. A substantial advantage of a successful s24G application is that there can be no order to demolish the development. But this rectification is not retrospective: when the listed activity was commenced, that was an offence. The subsequent authorisation does not retrospectively negate this past unlawful conduct or criminal liability. It merely regularises the activity prospectively.

The NPA’s argument about an offender being punished twice for the same offence, is based on the criminal plea of _autrefois convict_. But so-called ‘double jeopardy’ only applies for criminal convictions and not administrative penalties. Every accused person has the right not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted. In any event, the s24G fine is not punitive. As a result, payment of a s24G fine did not amount to a criminal conviction which prevented the offender from being criminally charged for unlawful commencement of the activity.

As set out above, the CER has proposed that an illegal activity be ceased, the damage mitigated, and the offender punished by criminal prosecution and/or an administrative penalty. After completion of the enforcement action, the offender can apply for authorisation. In this process, mitigating factors like: the company’s level of disclosure and cooperation with authorities, steps taken in mitigation, and a s24G or criminal fine payment should be considered in determining the administrative and/or criminal penalty. To avoid self-incrimination, admissions in a s24G application should not be admissible as evidence in a prosecution.

The Amendment Act makes clear that any s24G authorisation granted only takes effect from the date of issue – it is not retrospective. NEMLAB 2’s explanatory memorandum states that CAs have experienced a reluctance from the NPA to institute prosecutions once a person has applied for or received a s24G authorisation, and the

---

609 Budlender 7-12.
610 S.35 Constitution.
611 Fn.477.
612 Glazewski et al Compliance in Environmental Law 26-17.
613 CER May 2011 1,7-9,August 2013 3-4.
614 S.24G(2)(b).
amendments ‘make it clear that criminal prosecution may still be instituted despite the fact that
a person has applied for [authorisation] in terms of [s24G]’. The Amendment Act provides that
neither the submission nor granting of a s24G application derogates from: the EMI’s or the
South African Police Service’s authority to investigate any transgression; or the NPA’s legal
authority to institute any criminal prosecution.\(^{615}\) It also provides that, if after the submission of
a s24G application, it comes to the Minister or MEC’s attention that the applicant is under
criminal investigation for the offence, it may defer a decision to issue an authorisation until the
investigation is concluded and: the NPA has decided not to prosecute; the applicant is
acquitted or found not guilty after prosecution; or the applicant has been convicted and has
exhausted all appeal or review legal proceedings.\(^{616}\)

The payment of a s24G fine should also be included as one of the instances which
will not derogate from the authority to investigate transgressions or criminal prosecution. The
issue is not whether the NPA has legal authority to institute an application after an application
is made or authorisation given – it is whether the application, fine or authorisation confers an
indemnity from criminal liability for contravening NEMA. In other words, s24G should provide
that neither the submission of the application, nor an authorisation, nor the payment of a s24G
fine indemnifies the applicant from criminal liability. To be a proper disincentive for illegal
commencement, the discretion for the Minister or MEC to ‘defer’ the decision to issue an
authorisation while a criminal investigation is underway, must be an automatic suspension of
the s24G process. Since the decisions made in the criminal prosecution and in the s24G
application affect each other, they cannot run concurrently; if the offence justifies criminal
prosecution, then this more serious enforcement process must take precedence. This will
encourage speedy prosecution by authorities, and plea and settlement agreements with
offenders who want access to rectification. In the circumstances, if a s24G applicant is under
criminal investigation, the authority must defer a decision to issue an authorisation.\(^{617}\)

Having evaluated the position in the UK and the Netherlands regarding a conventional
administrative penalty system, as well as C&E theory, it is recommended that no criminal
proceedings be instituted if liability for a monetary penalty has been discharged, or a FMP or

\(^{615}\) S.24G(6).
\(^{616}\) S.24G(7).
\(^{617}\) CER August 2013 4, September 2013 3-4.
VMP imposed. If the violation amounts to a criminal offence and there is a realistic conviction prospect, the offence should be prosecuted. If criminal proceedings have been instituted or a criminal penalty imposed for the offence, an administrative penalty should not be imposed.\textsuperscript{618} In other words, criminal and administrative penalties are alternatives to one another. However, because s24G is not a true administrative penalty, it is appropriate that payment of this ‘administrative fine’ does not indemnify the violator from criminal prosecution.

4.2.10 Non-compliance implications

Before its amendment, s24G(3) provided that the failure to comply with: a directive to cease and rehabilitate; or a s24G authorisation condition, was an offence, for which the offender was liable to a maximum fine of R5 million and/or ten years’ imprisonment.\textsuperscript{619} The Amendment Act\textsuperscript{620} provides that the penalty for failing to comply with a directive or with an authorisation condition is a maximum fine of R10 million and/or a maximum imprisonment period of ten years.\textsuperscript{621}

Bearing in mind the lessons from the Netherlands and the UK, it is suggested that, for both s24G and the recommended administrative penalty system, interest accrues on unpaid fines. All decisions of regulators, appeal and higher appellate tribunals should be enforceable as if they were High Court orders.\textsuperscript{622}

It appears from the discussion above that s24G fails to comply with any of the recommendations in Chapter 3. It should either be scrapped, or substantially amended as suggested above.

There are no insurmountable obstacles to the establishment of a true administrative penalty for SA environmental law. The numerous advantages of such system over the criminal

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{618} 3.2.9. \\
\textsuperscript{619} In terms of s.24F(4). \\
\textsuperscript{620} Clause 25. \\
\textsuperscript{621} S.49B(1). \\
\textsuperscript{622} 3.2.10. 
\end{flushright}
sanction,623 and its success in other jurisdictions,624 illustrate the potential for administrative penalties to improve SA’s EC&E significantly. The EMI, which is already familiar with environmental law and violations could, with additional training, administer the system. The legislation would have to be amended to provide for such penalties, and guidance drafted regarding their implementation. A first step could be for the DEA and Department of Water Affairs to prepare a joint policy paper on the implementation of administrative penalties for water and environmental legislation. New institutions625 would have to be established626 to form the Environment and Environment Appeal Tribunals and presiding officers employed. An administrative penalty system would, however, relieve pressure on the State Attorney.627 Another integral aspect to the success of administrative penalties is that they are supported politically and by industry.628 Given all of the advantages of these penalties - including a more proportionate response to violations629 and improved C&E630 – they are likely to receive this support.

5 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

SA’s environmental resources are in serious decline, although there is a constitutional environmental right, and multiple laws aimed at protecting the environment.631 As highlighted in Chapter 1, the reasons for this dire state of affairs include the fact that criminal punishment is the default method to enforce environmental laws.632 There would appear to be insufficient investigation and enforcement of environmental offences;633 and, even if a prosecutor succeeds in discharging the heavy burden of proof required to secure a criminal conviction, the fines imposed are simply too small to be an effective deterrent for the violation of environmental legislation. This is particularly the case when significant advantages – financial

623 Chap. 2.
624 Fn. 42-43.
625 It may be possible to expand the Water Tribunal into an Environment Tribunal to hear administrative penalty appeals (fn.592).
626 Fn. 151.
627 Fn. 140.
628 Fourie 2009 (16)2 SAJELP 119-120; Macrory Report 90; fn. 94.
629 Fn. 117.
630 Fn. 43.
631 Fn. 1-10.
632 Fn. 14.
633 Fn. 17.
The NECERs reveal that, year after year, several industries remain in non-compliance with the law, and/or commit further offences, despite enforcement action against them.\textsuperscript{635} It is clear that the current approach is failing to deter violations and to stem pollution and environmental degradation.\textsuperscript{636}

Effective EC&E is essential for environmental protection.\textsuperscript{637} As a possible means of improving the dismal state of EC&E in SA, this dissertation posits the introduction of an administrative penalty system into SA environmental law – with monetary fines imposed by administrative officials\textsuperscript{638} – on the basis that this has been successfully used in numerous other jurisdictions, with positive impacts on compliance with environmental law.\textsuperscript{639} There is currently no such system in environmental legislation – the ‘administrative fine’ in s24G of NEMA only triggers the Minister or MEC’s consideration of an application for \textit{ex post facto} environmental authorisation.\textsuperscript{640}

If one considers C&E theory - addressed in Chapter 2 - there are multiple drawbacks of traditional C&E tools, and the criminal sanction in particular. Among other things, prosecution is expensive and time-consuming and requires well-capacitated enforcement authorities,\textsuperscript{641} specialist prosecutors and judges who understand the consequences of environmental violations.\textsuperscript{642} SA lacks this capacity.\textsuperscript{643} It is difficult to prove an offender’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt,\textsuperscript{644} and criminal courts are already significantly overloaded with serious criminal cases.\textsuperscript{645} Violating environmental law is generally not regarded as a moral wrong, and priority is given to ‘real’ crimes.\textsuperscript{646} A compliance deficit results from the fact that it

\begin{footnotes}
\item[634] Fn.16-19,27-32.
\item[635] Fn.34.
\item[636] Fn.11-12.
\item[637] Fn.16.
\item[638] Fn.15,66.
\item[639] Fn.42-43.
\item[640] Fn.477.
\item[641] Fn.82-83.
\item[642] Fn.79-80.
\item[643] Fn.38,79-80.
\item[644] Fn.81.
\item[645] Fn.87,127.
\item[646] Fn.98.
\end{footnotes}
is difficult to obtain a criminal conviction and an adequate penalty: authorities are discouraged from prosecuting environmental crimes.  

In contrast, there are numerous advantages associated with the use of administrative penalties. These penalties provide a more proportionate response to violations than the criminal sanction, as they take account of the financial benefit gained by non-compliance and the seriousness of the breach. They are more proportionate and transparent than criminal fines and, for VMPs, mitigating and aggravating factors are evaluated to determine the appropriate fine.  

Officials with specialised expertise impose these penalties, and the standard of proof – a balance of probabilities – is much easier to discharge. Administrative penalties are more informal than criminal proceedings, require fewer financial and human resources, and are less time-consuming. Offenders are less likely to dispute these fines, which lack the criminal conviction’s stigma and risk (including of a criminal record). The recipient of an administrative penalty can appeal to an independent tribunal - staffed by members with specialist environmental expertise - instead of having to compete with other cases in the overburdened court system.

Building on this theoretical foundation and with a view to distilling a set of lessons for the improved formulation and application of administrative penalties to SA, Chapter 3 evaluated the use of administrative environmental law penalties in the UK and in the Netherlands (respectively the roots of SA’s common and civil law legal systems). This evaluation highlighted how these two regimes differ in several respects in relation to: the nature of the penalties; their trigger and scope; institutional arrangements; fine quanta; allocation of fine proceeds; appeal and review procedures; their effect on criminal offences; and implications of non-compliance.

---

647 Fn.92.
648 Fn.117.
649 Fn.67.
650 Fn.73.
651 Fn.74-75,130.
652 Fn.141.
653 Fn.123.
654 Fn.645.
Against this context, Chapter 4 evaluated SA’s first attempt to introduce administrative penalties within its environmental regime; namely s24G of NEMA. This evaluation highlights that s24G fails to comply with several theoretical conditions and lessons drawn from successful regimes, such as those in operation in the Netherlands and the UK. These inconsistencies include the following: s24G is not an administrative penalty of the type discussed in Chapter 2 - it is paid to trigger the consideration of an application for ex post facto environmental authorisation when a person has commenced a listed or waste management activity without authorisation; no distinction is made between ‘innocent’, negligent and intentional offenders, and all such offenders can apply for ex post facto rectification; the Minister or MEC is the decision-maker; whereas in a true administrative penalty system, environmental officials administer the system and impose the fines; there is no publicly-available guidance as to how or by when a decision regarding an administrative fine is made, nor is there specific provision for an applicant to make representations regarding the fine - the factors that the DEA apparently considers in calculating s24G fines are insufficient; the fact that the s24G fine is paid to the implementing department creates the risk of perverse incentives to approve applications; there is no specialist tribunal to challenge s24G administrative fines; lodging an appeal does not suspend the challenged decision; and record-keeping and publicising of s24G fines is insufficient.

As a result, it is proposed that s24G either be scrapped entirely or substantially revised to meet the constitutional dictate of protecting the environment for the benefit of present and future generations. If domestic policy-makers elect to retain it, several key amendments are proposed, together with the introduction of a true administrative penalty system: s24G should be limited to negligent violations and its application should not have been extended to waste management activities - intentional offenders should be

655 Fn.477,489,506.
656 Fn.492.
657 Fn.15.
658 Fn.514.
659 4.2.5.
660 Fn.542
661 Fn.557.
662 Fn.592.
663 Fn.565.
664 4.2.8; fn.600.
665 S.24 Constitution.
a true administrative penalty system should be introduced into SA environmental law, for violations of NEMA and the SEMAs that are not serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution: FMPs should be available for minor infringements and strict liability offences, and VMPs for more serious offences; because criminal and administrative penalties are generally alternatives to one another, if, having evaluated the appropriate penalty using the relevant factors, it would be higher than the maximum criminal fine, the violator should instead be prosecuted (since s24G is not a true administrative penalty, it is appropriate that a successful s24G application does not preclude possible criminal prosecution); specialist environmental authorities should impose administrative penalties if violations have been proved on a balance of probabilities; there should be publicly-available guidance regarding the imposition of s24G fines and administrative penalties – including the mitigating and aggravating factors evaluated - so that regulated entities and members of the public know what action will be taken in response to violations; the factors to be evaluated should at least include those used in the UK for determining a VMP, and regulations regarding the procedure and criteria to determine a s24G fine should be published for comment as soon as possible; decisions on s24G administrative fines and conventional administrative penalties should only be made after careful consideration of submissions made by an offender regarding the penalty and the mitigating and aggravating factors; funds from s24G and administrative penalties should be paid to the National Revenue Fund and not to the implementing department; apart from criminal penalties, an administrative penalty should be in addition to any other NEMA/SEMA penalty, and only be imposed once per violation; specialist tribunals – with the status of High Courts - should be established to hear appeals of s24G fines and administrative penalties; appeals should suspend the operation of penalty decisions; administrative penalties should be enforceable as if they were High

---

666 3.2.9; fn.494,497.
667 Fn.509.
668 Fn.485,498-499.
669 4.2.9; fn.497,556.
670 Fn.518.
671 Fn.500.
672 Fn.520-523.
673 Fn.542.
674 4.2.4; fn.515-517.
675 Fn.540.
676 Fn.558-561.
677 Fn.512.
678 Fn.591-594.
679 4.2.8.
Court orders; and detailed records must be kept of s24G fines and administrative penalties; including: the value of each fine; the violator; the violation; and what action has been or will be taken if the penalty is not paid.681

Criminal sanctions are clearly failing to realise the constitutional right to an environment not harmful to health or well-being - there is widespread non-compliance with environmental legislation, and the state of the environment is deteriorating. The successful application of administrative penalties in other jurisdictions illustrates the significant potential of administrative penalties to improve SA's EC&E. For the reasons explained in Chapter 4, s24G is not a particularly useful precedent for the introduction of such penalties. It is recommended that an administrative penalty system – structured with regard to the lessons learned from C&E theory and the use of these penalties in the UK and the Netherlands - be piloted in SA environmental law.

680  4.2.10.
681  Fn.412-413,599.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Cases

Body Corporate of Dolphin Cove v KwaDukuza Municipality & another 2012 JOL 28771 (KZD).

Exxaro Coal (Mpumalanga) (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Water Affairs (case 63939/2012, 7 December 2012).

Interwaste (Pty) Limited and others v Coetzee and others 2013 JOL 30686 (GSJ).


Makhanya NO and another v Goede Wellington Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2013 1 All SA 526 (SCA).

Silvermine Valley Coalition v Sybrand van der Spuy Boerdery and Others 2002 (1) SA 478 (C).


Legislation

Acts

South Africa


Competition Act 89 of 1998.


Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999.

*Netherlands*

Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 Augustus 1815.
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering van 1 Januari 2002.
Wet op de Economische Delicten van 22 Juni 1950.
Wet Milieubeheer van 13 Juni 1979.
Wetboek van Strafrecht van 3 Maart 1881.
Wetboek van Strafvordering van 15 Januari 1921.

*United Kingdom*

Environment Protection Act 1990 c.43.

Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 c.15.


Other


Rules and regulations

South Africa


List of activities which result in atmospheric emissions which have or may have a significant detrimental effect on the environment, including health, social conditions, economic conditions, ecological conditions or cultural heritage (GN 893 in GG 37054 of 2013-11-22).

List of waste management activities that have, or are likely to have, a detrimental effect on the environment (GN 921 in GG 38083 of 2013-11-29).

National Biodiversity Framework (GN 813 in GG 32474 of 2009-08-03).


Practice Directive 02/2013 of the South Gauteng High Court.

Rules regulating the conduct of the proceedings of the several provincial and local divisions of the High Court of South Africa (GN R48 in GG 999 of 1965-01-12).

**United Kingdom**

Environmental Civil Sanctions (England) Order 2010 No.1157.

Environmental Civil Sanctions (Miscellaneous Amendments) (England) Regulations 2010 No.1159.

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 No. 1976 (L.20).

The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (S.I.2008 No.2698 (L.15)).

**Draft legislation**

National Environmental Management: Air Quality Amendment Bill [B27-2013].

National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Bill [B13-2012].

**Memoranda on Bills**

Department of Environmental Affairs Memorandum on the Objects of the National Environmental Management Laws Second Amendment Bill, 2013.

**Policies and guidelines**

**South Africa**

United Kingdom


Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs Civil sanctions for environmental offences. The Civil Sanctions Order and Regulations 2010. Guidance to regulators in England on how the civil sanctions should be applied, and draft guidance for Wales 2010.

Environment Agency Offence Response Options Operational Instruction 1430_10 2013.


Other


SECONDARY SOURCES

Books


Chapters in books


Journal articles


Nel J & Wessels J ‘How to use voluntary, self-regulatory and alternative environmental compliance tools: some lessons learnt’ 2010 (13)5 Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 48-78.


Pedersen O ‘Environmental Enforcement Undertakings and Possible Implications: Responsive, Smarter or Rent Seeking’ 2013 (76)2 The Modern Law Review 319-345.


Reports

South Africa


Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism South Africa Environment Outlook A report on the state of the environment 2006.

Department of Environmental Affairs Delivery Agreement for Outcome 10: Environment 2010.

Department of Environmental Affairs Strategic Plan 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2017.

National Biodiversity Assessment 2011.
UK


Other


Theses

Correspondence, submissions, opinions, parliamentary questions and answers

Budlender G Section 24G of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998: 12 August 2013


Centre for Environmental Rights comments on the National Environmental Laws Amendment Bill, 2011: 26 September 2011.

Centre for Environmental Rights and Legal Resources Centre comments on the National Environmental Laws Amendment Bill, 2012: 18 July 2012.


Centre for Environmental Rights comments on the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Amendment Bill, 2013: 13 September 2013.


Department of Environmental Affairs correspondence to the Centre for Environmental Rights: 24 May 2013.

Minister’s Written Reply to Parliamentary Question 2280: 10 September 2012.

National Prosecutions Service Director of Public Prosecutions North Gauteng, Pretoria correspondence to the Centre for Environmental Rights: 10 April 2013.

Nominations for chairperson, deputy chairperson and additional members of the Water Tribunal (GN 615 in GG 36568 of 2013-06-14).

Unpublished papers

Bosman C & Boyd L ‘Compliance and enforcement in a co-operative governance structure – Challenges and some solutions for the South Africa situation’ Paper presented at 8th International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Conference, April 2008
Dekkers C & Allessie M ‘The infrastructure for permiting, inspection and enforcement of nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxide emissions trading in the Netherlands’ Paper presented at 7th International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Conferences, April 2005


Paddock L ‘Beyond Deterrence: Compliance and enforcement in the context of Sustainable Development’ Paper presented at 9th International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Conference, June 2011


Websites

Environment Agency