"The baby will grow": A post-structuralist and psychodynamic analysis of a community psychology intervention

By

CAROL LONG

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Master's Degree in Clinical Psychology

Supervised by Assoc. Prof. Sally Swartz

University of Cape Town

1999
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
ABSTRACT

Progressive South African psychologists have recognised the need for community approaches in South Africa which maximise access to psychological intervention and which value politically aware psychological practice. Few extended analyses of such interventions exist in the literature, and community psychology has been critiqued for its lack of theory. This study aims to provide an extended analysis of a community intervention conducted with a group of Primary Health Care Workers. The intervention was motivated by their request for psychological skills in order to enable them to work more effectively with their clients. Interactive workshop sessions were thus conducted by two facilitators (including the author) under supervision over a period of one year. The aim of such workshops was to instil a psychological way of thinking. This consequently implied an emphasis on the emotional world of Primary Health Care Workers.

This study provides a post-structuralist and psychoanalytic analysis of the process of intervention in order to offer potential suggestions for future community work and to explore how the interface between psychoanalysis and post-structuralism may offer possibilities for more theoretically grounded community work. Particular emphasis is placed on power relations, discourse and language, and psychoanalytic understandings of relationship in order to explore the intervention as well as the implications of articulation of post-structuralism and psychoanalysis in community work. It is suggested that psychoanalysis is best utilised in community settings when it explicitly recognises socio-political influences and includes these in the object-worlds of ourselves and our clients, and when recognition of power and difference are foregrounded. A further aim involved subjecting a Foucaultian discourse analytic method (e.g. Hollway, 1989) to a practical intervention in which there are multiple texts and in which the clinician becomes the discourse analyst. Whilst this method is no doubt controversial, it offers the potential to extend the use of post-structuralist methodology to the analysis of practical therapeutic encounters beyond the typical methods of analysing written or transcribed texts. Implications of this analysis thus hold bearing on future intervention as well as on future methods of researching psychological practice.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to the following people:

The Primary Health Care Workers who participated in this intervention, for their enthusiasm about the workshop process, for the valuable work they are doing, and for their integral role in my learning process.

My co-facilitator, Pumza Sakasa and clinical supervisor, Anastasia Maw for their support and sharing of my practical experience.

To my dissertation supervisor, Sally Swartz, for her belief in me and ability to help me gain perspective.

To the staff and students of the UCT Child Guidance Clinic.

To my parents, for their unfailing support.

To Pierre van Staden and Rucksana Christian for their help in allowing me to use their ears, and for their support and understanding.

To the Centre for Science Development for the granting of an academic bursary. The views expressed in this dissertation are not necessarily the views of the Centre for Science Development.

-ii-
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION
A note on ethics

## CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

## COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA
The development of community psychology in South Africa
The Primary Health Care Movement
Empowerment models of community psychology
The need for new directions

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POST-STRUCTURALISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
Post-structuralism
Psychoanalysis
  - Basic assumptions of psychoanalysis
  - Central tensions in psychoanalysis
  - The psychoanalysis of groups
  - Relational psychoanalysis
Articulations between post-structuralism and psychoanalysis
  - Employment of psychoanalysis in post-structuralism
Summary: Points of articulation between post-structuralism and psychoanalysis

## METHOD
Data
Sampling
Method of analysis
Subjectivity and method: A reflection on the position of the analyst
ANALYSIS: HOW CAN THE INTERVENTION BE INTERPRETED USING POST-STRUCTURALIST AND PSYCHOANALYTIC IDEAS?

Sexual abuse
Discursive closure and emergent relationship
An interlude: Exclusion enacted
The following session: opening up of discursive space
Opening up of emotional space: discursive and emotional shifts
Discursive and emotional-splitting: A continuation of the process
Practising politico-psychoanalysis

ANALYSIS: HOW CAN POST-STRUCTURALIST AND PSYCHOANALYTIC IDEAS OFFER A DEEPER CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTERVENTION?

Sites of power and resistance
Language
Culture and geography
Expert knowledges and the institutional imperative
Power
Triangular negotiations: the role of the interpreter
The decision to include interpreters
"Errors" of interpretation
The interpreter as part of relationship
Interpreters' emotional responses
Back to the beginning: A reivisitation of our first session

GROWING PAINS: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INTERVENTIONS

A CONCLUDING REFLECTION

REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION

"Now that you have come, the baby will grow"

Armed with idealistic notions of empowerment, uneasily combined with understandings of the unconscious, we set off to "do" community psychology with a group of primary health care workers (PHCWs) in an impoverished shack community in Cape Town. We arrived with a skit about psychology which we performed in Xhosa (a language I do not understand). In return, we were given a play performed by the PHCWs about how they make a woman breast feed when she does not want to (what more could a psychoanalyst ask for?) as well as a deep suspicion on their part that I could actually understand Xhosa and was secretly listening to their every word. At the end of the session, the co-ordinator thanked us for coming (they had been on a waiting list at the University of Cape Town's Child Guidance Clinic) and definitively stated: "now that you have come, the baby will grow". So began our community intervention, saturated with power relations and negotiations of relationship within the context of multiple points of difference and multiple opportunities for misunderstanding.

Reflecting back on this intervention, which was conducted over the course of a year, a number of curiosities emerged which motivated the focus of this dissertation. First, in the context of the paucity of literature available describing community psychology case studies in South Africa, the richness of our interaction and our struggles in finding ways to work together offers potential ideas for ways of working in the future. Second, our approach to working was psychoanalytic, an approach which is relatively unexplored in South Africa, while the epistemological background through which I entered the arena was post-structuralist. Making sense of this mishmash of influences (community psychology, post-structuralism and psychoanalysis) presents a challenge regarding how one can theorise community intervention. The aim in this regard is to explore how this community psychology intervention can be interpreted using the interplay of psychoanalytic and post-structuralist ideas and, consequently, what this may imply for practice. A third question arose from my curiosity to explore the role that I played in this intervention, along with the various institutional discourses I carried with me. Thus a further aim of this analysis is to interrogate the intervention using post-structuralist tools regarding the ways in which language, knowledge and power relations are implicit in the construction of discursive nets which may simultaneously enable and constrain. A fourth curiosity involves subjecting a Foucaultian discourse analytic method (e.g. Hollway,
1989) to a practical intervention in which there are multiple texts and in which the clinician becomes the discourse analyst. Whilst this method is no doubt controversial, it offers the potential to extend the use of post-structuralist methodology in analysing practical therapeutic encounters beyond the typical methods of analysing written or transcribed texts.

This study thus aims to enter the relatively unexplored territory of combining psychoanalytic approaches (in particular those which theorise relational as opposed to intrapsychic dynamics) with community psychology’s emphasis on critical and politically aware intervention. The theoretical basis for the analysis presented relies on an intersection between post-structuralist and psychodynamic concepts as they may be used in practice. It will be argued that both psychoanalysis and post-structuralism offer tools for exploring power relations between practitioner and client in a more complex, contradictory and productive manner than the tools offered by critiqued notions of empowerment. Further, both theoretical paradigms place emphasis on reflexivity for the practitioner regarding the intervention as well as the interactive process (Parker, 1992) and offer complex insights into subjectivity and understanding the subject as non-unitary and contradictory (Hollway, 1984; 1989). This analysis will attempt to illustrate how such conceptualisations introduce multiple layers of meaning into the understanding of an intervention and offer possibility for change and progressive praxis. In particular, it will be argued that psychoanalysis is best utilised in community settings when it explicitly recognizes socio-political influences and includes these in the object-worlds of ourselves and our clients. Further, it will be suggested that a psychoanalytic approach without recognition of the interplay of power on a variety of dimensions, and without recognition of issues of difference (cf. Kottler, 1990; 1996) between client and practitioner, puts the intervention at risk for misinterpretation and patronization.

The process of this intervention forms the basis of analysis. Due to its complexity and size, the course of intervention will not be discussed in detail. Rather, critical moments of interaction will be explored in relation to the psychoanalytic and discursive formations at play as well as to the political and psychoanalytic relational dynamics between client and practitioner. This analysis will be preceded with a brief contextualization of the intervention and its participants. Echoing broader blurring of boundaries between description and analysis, this contextualization will also provide a flavour of the kinds of psychoanalytic and political interpretations and processes that became inherent in our
interaction over time. A brief discussion of keys issues in South African community psychology will then be followed by an explication of the theoretical frameworks of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism. A discussion of method will lead into the analysis and to theoretical, methodological and practical implications that may be drawn.

A note on ethics
Perhaps one of the reasons for the paucity of South African community psychology case studies relates to the ethical difficulties involved in such an exploration. Names and details have been changed in order to disguise the identities of those involved. The sharing of an intimate process of relationship nonetheless raises ethical concerns. Maw (1996), similarly describing her interactions with people in a community psychology setting, raises concern that she would not necessarily want the people she was writing about to read her document, since some of the statements made may be offensive to them or indicate betrayal in some way. It could be argued that in this way the power dynamics that are inevitably played out between client and practitioner (McNamee & Gergen, 1992) are duplicated between subject and researcher, thus setting up hierarchical relationships of access to knowledge and truth that have been criticized by researchers who aim to promote more egalitarian research (Jayratne & Stewart, 1991). While I share Maw's (1996) concerns, I hope to employ a method which problematises notions of truth and scrutinises the power relations at play in the intervention, thus at least ameliorating some of the ethical difficulties inherent in such research. It becomes necessary, then, to contextualise the analysis presented below within a number of caveats or disclaimers:

1. The focus of analysis is not on actions of participants but rather on moments of interaction. Interest is thus focused on the psychoanalytic and discursive meanings produced in interaction and in context.
2. When actions of participants are analysed, this is understood in the context of interaction and in the context of a recognition that certain discursive imperatives apply.
3. Exploration of the intervention is secondary to the primary aim of raising methodological, theoretical and practical implications.

Further, I concur with Maw (1996) that this kind of research may contribute towards the growth of community psychology in South Africa. Ethical problems of writing about my
interaction with people I came to know and respect are outweighed by the ethical problem of not writing about issues which are central to progressive psychology in South Africa at this time. While writing opens opportunity for uncomfortable betrayal, not writing contributes to complicit and paralysing silence within the profession.
CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The organization to which PHCW’s in this case study belong is situated in an impoverished shack community in Cape Town. This area has historically received little structural provision of basic health needs, including mental health needs. This community was initially constructed under the apartheid regime to be close enough to Cape Town’s central business district to provide labour but far enough away for strict geographical boundaries to be created between ‘white’ and ‘black’. Dixon (1997) explores how such rigid creation of boundaries reinforces identities marked by difference and reinforces racist ideology. For him, “the racial boundary is the geographical emblem of apartheid” (Dixon, 1997:24). Most of the people in this area are Xhosa speaking and originate from the Transkei. Mirroring the transience of the shack dwellings in which most residents live, the community is predominantly transient, with people moving in and out fairly frequently.

It has been documented that people in these communities, classed by apartheid as ‘second class citizens’, have regarded the provision of emotional needs as a luxury in comparison to more urgent basic needs such as housing, nutrition, safety and health. This PHC organization, situated in the community, was initially created to address some of these primary health needs. It is thus predominantly a community health organization, reliant on external funding and aligned with organizations connected to a local university. The 18 community health workers employed by the organization provide primary health care by means of regular home visits and clinic facilities as well as health and social education to the approximately 280 homes in the area. In order to meet this need in terms of available funding, staff regularly work unpaid overtime and take home a very small salary. Because all staff (except the co-ordinator) live in the area, they are also regularly approached for help at their homes. PHCWs presented as particularly stressed and burdened by the load of their work, the environment in which they work as well as personal adversity. The organization is under-resourced and, at the time of the intervention, was experiencing a funding crisis and the threat that they would be forced to close down.

This organization approached the University of Cape Town’s Child Guidance Clinic, a training institution for Clinical Psychologists, requesting intervention. The co-ordinator of the organization (who requested the intervention) felt PHCWs were in need of psychological skills in their daily work. They were also encountering increasing numbers
of cases involving trauma, schizophrenia, depression, somatic presentation of psychological complaints and family difficulties. Two Intern Clinical Psychologists (myself included) were requested to offer workshops on psychological skills under the supervision of the Child Guidance Clinic.

This referral was understood by us as possibly operating on a realistic as well as a phantasy level. This is in line with group and organizational psychoanalytic theories that any communication of other may also be a communication about self. (e.g. Bion, 1961; Obholzer & Zagier Roberts, 1994). While the need in the community is clearly great, we wanted to approach this intervention without artificial divides between PHCWs and the community, hypothesising alternatively that staff needs are not separate from those of the community. After our first few sessions of getting to know more about the organization and the people involved, we started to relate the emotional needs for nurturance in the community to those of the organization as well. The following extract from our psychodynamic formulation (adapted from formulation skills suggested by Hinshelwood (1991) & Perry, Cooper &Michels (1987)) provides a flavour of how we started to think:

It is suggested that since the need in the community is great; the pressure on the organization to provide a transformative service is considerable. It is noteworthy that staff are overworked and provide a very broad service. It is hypothesised that staff have responded to their perception, and personal experience, of deprivation with a strong desire to compensate in a context in which compensation would have to be extensive. This may have led the organization to place large amounts of pressure on themselves in order to fulfil a nurturant role in the community. Because their work is likely to be emotionally draining, it is conjectured that staff have needed to distance themselves from these emotional demands in order to cope with their intensity. This may have resulted in the present situation in which there are few opportunities within the organization to express feelings and in which the group norm is to respond to emotion with shaming and ridicule. The fact that the organization is under-resourced and over-worked may compound staff's awareness of their own deprivation. It is possible that, while there are clear needs in the community for psychological skills, the present request is also in part a request by workers for emotional support for themselves, the nurturers and providers who sublimate
their own emotional needs.

It is hypothesised that the organization has managed its own needs by creating a number of structural protections. For example, there is a strong norm towards bottom-up and democratic decision-making. This is clearly an appropriate reaction to historical exclusion by apartheid's non-democratic structure. This structure also seems to offer a context in which everything is spoken about and there are no secrets. However, because this structure is designed predominantly around business matters in a context where personal secrets seem to be present and feared, it is hypothesised that this structure also effectively curtails expression of their own needs, uncertainties and vulnerabilities. This may create an illusion of unity in an organisation fraught with tension. In addition, it is hypothesised that PHCWs have a greater sense of power in comparison to their client population because of their greater knowledge and status. This may further limit their ability to express feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. Historical and structural constraints may make it difficult for staff to feel entitled to support for themselves since they may feel this is selfish in light of the greater needs of the community. It is suggested that a consequence of reluctance to take support is that it becomes difficult to draw on internal resources to give support to each other and to their clients.

In consultation with PHCWs, it was decided that we would meet and interact in workshop format once a week for the duration of the year. Due to PHCW's time pressures, this was later changed to once every fortnight, resulting in a total of 12 workshop sessions. Workshops were planned from week to week in line with the process. All workshops were conducted in Xhosa through interpretation, initially by the Xhosa speaking practitioner and then, since this process proved disruptive, through trained interpreters who were all undergraduate university students. A range of issues were discussed, extending from fairly circumscribed skills such as drawing a genogram to more general issues such as listening skills and engaging a child. PHCWs also brought workshop material. For example a case of sexual abuse which had been brought to their attention was discussed.

While this process may sound neat, a sense of ambivalence predominated workshops and we interpreted a central element of connection and disconnection which
characterised the development of relationship. Language and power issues as well as other issues of difference seemed central, and much time was spent in supervision reflecting on these. In line with our psychodynamic formulation and our commitment to maintaining a critical and socio-political stance, central goals in workshops included the fostering of a psychological way of thinking, mutual learning through relationship and placing more emphasis on process than on content. Thus we positioned the process of learning as one which happens through experience and reflection (Senge, 1990) and in relationship (Salzberger-Wittenberg, 1987; Watt, 1994). Whatever could be learnt through negotiating a new relationship in unexpected ways, we felt, could help participants deal with clients and with their own emotional cargo in more flexible ways. Negotiation of a new relationship would further our own learning as well. It was felt that a strict focus on impartation of concrete skills would have trivialised the dynamics of the developing relationship, provided little space for negotiation of power and fostered a unidirectional exchange of knowledge. We felt this would have reduced the benefit both participants and ourselves were able to gain from our interaction (see Freire (1972) for an explication of the benefits of a mutually interacting pedagogical stance). In our continuing formulation of the process of intervention, we aimed to maintain a binocular focus on socio-political considerations as well as maintaining "a listening position on the boundary between conscious and unconscious meanings" (Halton, 1994, p.12). We aimed to include reflection on our own positions of power and those of participants as well as our own contradictory positioning as both experts and trainees, a positioning which conversely reflected their own expert/trainee status.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Community psychology represents an international movement which explicitly aims to challenge the individualist bias of psychological practice (Orford, 1992). Primarily practice based rather than theoretically oriented, it aims to reconceptualise psychological intervention on social and community levels (Orford, 1992). Community psychology in both First and Third world countries has often arisen in response to political and social change (Maw, 1996). The aim, on the whole, is for more politically aware and progressive approaches to psychological work. Politics, power and egalitarianism thus seem to characterise many approaches to community psychology.

The discipline has been characterised by a number of debates. Much discussion, for example, has related to how to define 'community' in the first place. Debate exists, for example, regarding whether to define a community as an area or as a group of people with something in common, such as shared culture, values or purpose (Butchart & Seedat, 1990). A similar long-standing debate concerns whether communities are defined around formal structures or groups, or around an informal sense of belonging (Panzetta, 1973). In addition, communities are often heterogeneous with different interest groups and power relations within them. This raises the question of who to work with when working with 'the community'. Community psychology, then, potentially presents an object of interest which is homogenized such that there is danger of failure to take issues of difference and power into account. Bozzoli (1987) notes that, in addition to internal divisions within communities, their reason for existence is often overlooked. Communities may have a negative reason for existence; idealisation of the power of communities is thus a risk. In South Africa, the concept of community is particularly fraught given the historical effects of apartheid and the Group Areas Act. Butchart & Seedat (1990) note that many geographically designated 'communities' are township areas artificially constructed by apartheid government. It is these communities which have been of predominant interest to South African community practitioners. Non-critical acceptance of such 'communities', argue Butchart & Seedat (1990), holds potential for reinforcement of the racial divides these communities were based upon in the first place. Thornton & Ramphele (1988) add that the concept 'community' is a politically charged term which has been used insidiously in many policy initiatives in the past in South Africa. They imply that the term 'community' takes on meaning only if there is a sense of identity attached to it. Further, this meaning needs to be shared by people identifying with a particular community. However, the existence of shared
meaning and identity does not lead to the implication that a 'community' is a fixed entity. Thornton & Ramphale's (1988) concept of 'community' thus necessarily defies definition. Isemonger (1990) suggests that we should not be working with existing communities, but rather actively promoting the construction of new communities in order to cut across existing power dimensions. The location and definition of practice is thus a shifting and contested one.

A second debate which pervades definitional issues in community psychology pertains to principles of and approaches to practice. Newbrough (1992) argues that the discipline of community psychology is split according to two predominant ideological approaches to practice. The first focuses on social problems and holds ideological ideals of addressing social dysfunction. The second, more radical, position concerns itself with social injustice. Critical of constructions of 'dysfunction', this second position aims to address systemic issues in order to promote improvement on a social and political level. Newbrough (1992) suggests an ideological intolerance between proponents of the two positions in the United States. These two positions seem to characterise what Seedat, Cloete & Shochet (1988) and Butchart & Seedat (1990) term the mental health model and social action model in community psychology. These authors suggest this ideological divide is as applicable in South Africa as in America, representing polarities on a continuum of practice (Seedat et al., 1988).

The mental health model is primarily based on the assumption that individual pathology and social dysfunction are related to environmental as well as individual factors. This assumes that in a given area, it is possible to delineate the environmental factors at play (Butchart & Seedat, 1990). Once these are outlined, the most logical level of intervention is at the level of prevention (Seedat et al., 1988) with the aim of "alleviating harmful environmental conditions in the catchment area" (Butchart & Seedat, 1990, p.1097). Focus remains on mental health, which is often characterised as an absence of mental illness (Butchart & Seedat, 1990). This approach thus locates dysfunction within the community and often neglects a political analysis of aetiology. In practice, the mental health model often takes the form of setting up clinics in a particular community which aim towards prevention and treatment. Although psychoeducation is often part of the initiative, focus remains predominantly on the individual and responsibility for maintenance of health resides in the practitioner and the client without reference to broader social structures. Seedat et al. (1988) note that one of the main advantages of
this system is the provision of scarce psychological resources to a greater number of people, and generally in communities which have had historically limited access to such services. The approach remains service based and individualistic, however. In comparison with the more politically aware social action model, Seedat et al. (1988) believe the mental health model to be limited in this respect. Rappaport (1981) adds that the popularity of preventative models is not necessarily based on confirmation that preventative approaches are any better than no approach at all. This approach has been most associated with Primary Health Care initiatives in South Africa.

The social action model locates social and psychological problems in relation to "inequalities resulting from economic exploitation and political powerlessness" (Butchart & Seedat, 1990, p.1097). This more radical approach has been particularly focused upon the 'poor' (Seedat et al., 1988) with the aim of promoting equality through attention to social structures rather than individual problems. Approaches lean heavily on concepts of empowerment (Butchart & Seedat, 1990) in which a community is mobilised into collective action and equality of relationships is stressed. Power relations are a central focus, with emphasis on mobilising the community's resources rather than offering expert power (Seedat et al., 1988). This approach is closest to Orford's (1992) ideal of 'giving psychology away'. It has been very influential both locally and abroad but has come under criticism due to the abundance of levels of intervention and debates regarding psychological versus social empowerment. The approach has also been criticised as naive (Child & Family Wellbeing, 1996). Its approach to power in terms of oppression and powerlessness (Seedat et al., 1988) could also be critiqued as oversimplistic and paradoxically disempowering through its failure to recognize the power of resistance.

These two models provide a useful framework for informing and understanding community work in South Africa and abroad. While providing ideological underpinnings for practice, they do not provide a theoretical framework for practice or for development of the field. In fact Newbrough (1992) calls for inclusion of theory as crucial in the development of the discipline of community psychology. Not only is a more sustained theory of praxis needed, he argues, but a broader theoretical base for community. While some have applied existing theories (e.g. systems theory or social constructionism) to community psychology, no sustained theoretical development has occurred. Therefore possibilities for new directions will be discussed below after an appraisal of practical and
ideological trends in the discipline is explored.

The development of community psychology in South Africa

The development of community psychology in South Africa is a recent trend, and arose largely in response to ethical questions raised by psychological practice in apartheid South Africa. Maw (1996) provides a thorough history of the development of community psychology in South Africa, tracing the responses of progressive psychology to the political climate of apartheid. She argues that progressive psychologists responded to apartheid’s unacceptable practices with a rejection of much Western-based psychological practice. Arguing that such practice is ‘reactionary’ (Hayes, 1986 in Maw, 1996), politically unaware and elitist, international developments in community psychology were drawn upon in order to formulate a more appropriate practice in a country which traditionally neglected and even exacerbated the mental health of the vast majority.

Maw (1996) suggests that calls for a more liberatory psychology intensified particularly in the 1980’s when the apartheid struggle was at its height. With a changing political climate, South African psychologists have increasingly called for more relevant practice (e.g. Berger & Lazarus, 1987; Dawes, 1986; Kelly & van Vlaenderen, 1997). Concerns here included a move away from eurocentric models of practice (Maw, 1996) and an emphasis on accountability and transparency on behalf of the institution of psychology and within the minutiae of psychological intervention. This implies a radical reformulation of ways of practice. Dawes (1986) stresses that relevant practice cannot be achieved without critical awareness on the part of the profession. Accessibility has become another major concern. Kriegler (1993) notes that the shortage of professional mental health care workers such as psychologists has contributed to the lack of accessible mental health care in South Africa. Increasing calls have suggested a sharing of skills (Berger & Lazarus, 1987) and devolution of training onto community workers.

The professional association of psychologists has recently attempted to increase the accessibility of mental health care by accrediting third year students of psychology as a mental health workers in addition to the existing accreditation of psychologists after 6 years of study. Accessibility has also meant relocation of the site of psychological intervention from the hospital or consulting room into the community in order to redress past imbalances where many communities had limited access to psychological
interventions (Tollman, 1991). There has also been much discussion about incorporating indigenous healers into the health care system and possibly forming partnerships between indigenous healers and Western professionals (Swartz, 1986; 1987). It has been argued that indigenous healers have existing ties with communities and share similar world views (Seedat, 1997) as well as being more accessible to many than psychologists are. Questions have been raised, however, regarding the effectiveness of indigenous healing (Swartz, 1996a) as well as the extent to which people choose to use these systems (Lund & Swartz, 1998). It has also been argued that the rationale for attention to indigenous healers is based on assumptions regarding the staticity and homogeneity of culture, both problematic assumptions in our diverse population (Long & Zietkiewicz, 1998). The debate remains central, however, and its conspicuous absence from a recent discussion on mental health policy in South Africa (Pillay & Freeman, 1996) implies the disjuncture between current debates and current policy.

Requests for more relevant psychological practice have been accompanied by injunctions in the literature for the institution of psychology to put its house in order (Butchart & Seedat, 1990). It has been stressed that psychologists need to develop greater political consciousness (Berger & Lazarus, 1987). Appeals to psychologists have encouraged a more self-reflexive stance and the need for psychology to "emancipate itself from its own ... complicity with oppressive establishments" (Seedat & Nell, 1992, p. 191). As clients have been portrayed as disempowered, so too have psychologists (Seedat, 1997). Psychologists have been enjoined to empower themselves towards critical practice (Butchart & Seedat, 1990; Kriegler, 1993; Seedat & Nell, 1992).

One of the implications for the profession has been increased recognition of the need for more appropriate training of psychologists (Berger & Lazarus, 1987; Swartz, 1996a; 1996b). This is an issue which has been hotly debated amongst universities (Child & Family Wellbeing, 1996). The demographics of candidates accepted for professional training has come under spotlight. This is in line with the argument that the profession does not represent the demographics of the country and is culturally similar in a culturally diverse country (Kriegler, 1993). Encouragement of culturally sensitive therapists has been identified as an important issue (Gobodo, 1990). It has also been suggested that white candidates be required to speak an indigenous language (Kriegler,
1993; Swartz, 1996a). Discussion of the content of training has stressed a move away from individual therapy to more sustainable and community-based forms of intervention as well as a more critically focused and politically aware emphasis in training (Child & Family Wellbeing, 1996). This emphasis, it could be suggested, has meant that interest in community psychology is a fruitful strategy for potential candidates. The chaos of community work thus requires trainers to think about how to engage and motivate students, who despite what they may say, may well be more interested in individual therapy in private practice than less clearly defined roles in the community (Lazarus, 1990 in Maw, 1996, p.17).

Community psychology has thus become an increasing focus in training of professional psychologists. This has led to many university based initiatives, including the first university programme which leads to professional registration as a counselling psychologist at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1999. While universities may be encouraging the growth of community psychology, there is concern that they are not addressing issues of sustainability after a student qualifies, since there is a paucity of jobs available for professionals wanting to work in the field of community psychology (Child & Family Wellbeing, 1996).

Interest in community psychology in South Africa is thus apparent. Change away from the traditional therapy room, however, continues to happen in the margins. Significantly, the demise of apartheid does not seem to have led to an increase in interest in community psychology or to a change in the issues of concern. In fact a perusal of local South African psychological journals (South African Journal of Psychology and Psychology in Society) demonstrates a decrease in published articles on community psychology in South Africa in recent years. One of the most recent articles by Seedat (1997), entitled "The quest for liberatory psychology", raises issues similar to those raised more than a decade previously and clearly implies that the practice of liberatory psychology in South Africa is still a quest. Seedat's (1997) call for psychologists to play a more active role in progressive and political praxis, call for recognition of indigenous healing systems and for attempts to make psychological practice more appropriate to the majority are all issues which predominate in the literature of the last two decades. Seedat (1997) suggests that difficulties in reaching a liberatory psychology are connected to disillusionment which disempowers and immobilizes progressive
psychologists. He cites authors who have interacted with this disillusionment as far back as 1984 (Nzimande, 1984). The question, of course, is when psychologists are going to stop calling for liberatory practice and start practising it. It could be argued that, despite political transformations, social transformation in South Africa continues to be slow and itself characterised by disillusionment. It is possible, however, that progressive psychologists have become caught up in a recursive rhetoric of struggle which limits the development of new and creative ways forward.

The Primary Mental Health Care movement
The move from specialist tertiary health care to primary health care with increased accessibility and increased community involvement is an international trend supported by the World Health Organization (e.g. 1991). The movement is based on objectives of primary prevention of illness and has come to incorporate mental health care (Blair, 1992; Rappaport, 1992).Primarily based on the mental health model of prevention, the aim is to set up clinics in catchment areas easily accessible to the residents of that area, affordable to the majority and integrated with community involvement (Tollman, 1991). Emphasis is on service provision (Seedat et al., 1988), although a comprehensive approach which addresses wellbeing rather than just illness is encouraged (Tollman, 1991).

The international move towards primary health care is mirrored in South Africa by policy initiatives towards a move away from tertiary provision, and the setting up of community-based clinics (Freeman, 1991; Pillay & Freeman, 1996). A gap exists, however, between the reality of current community based initiatives and proposed policy. Currently, several organizations exist in which Primary Health Care Workers, usually members of the community who have been trained by professionals, offer primary care services and psychoeducation in a particular catchment area. Funding is often provided from nongovernmental sources which entrench the autonomy of such initiatives but restrict a national planning and vision initiative. There is currently little professional recognition of the role these health workers play and little formalised planning around future training needs.

Primary health care policy does not address the existence of these initiatives at all. Instead, policy implies that all primary health care provision will be conducted by professionals at community clinics (Pillay & Freeman, 1996). Pillay & Freeman (1996)
raise concerns regarding the cost of setting this up as well as the funding implications of subsuming mental health care under the broader umbrella of primary health care. A further implication of this regards the priority that mental health care training will be assigned. In terms of community psychology's principles of involving and empowering non-experts as part of the initiative (Orford, 1992), this situation presents an entrenchment of professional elitism and undermines the work that Primary Health Care Workers are already doing. Further, the policy's almost exclusive focus on prevention and service provision does not address issues of broader empowerment of the community, thus subjecting it to the limitations of the mental health model. Thus while this policy represents a response to the community needs of South Africans in terms of accessibility and affordability (Pillay & Freeman, 1996), it does not address the more radical challenges presented by progressive practitioners in South Africa.

Empowerment models of community psychology
Perhaps the most available method for progressive practice in South Africa has been through drawing on international literature on community psychology, most notably on notions of empowerment and participation (e.g. Orford, 1992; Rappaport, 1987; Serrano-Garcia, 1984; 1990). Such notions advocate unilateral power relations which encourage clients to "gain mastery over their own affairs" (Rappaport, 1987, p.122) through interventions driven by participants at all stages of the process. Much has been written about the complexities of achieving meaningful empowerment and participation (e.g. Edwards, 1990; Riger, 1993; Serrano-Garcia, 1984). Due to this complexity, definitional issues will be briefly addressed below.

Empowerment implies a process in which people gain control over their own lives in the context of participating with others to change their social and political realities (Serrano-Garcia, 1990). Political and social change are seen as ideals of empowerment, since the notion of empowerment is based on assumptions that certain sections of society are powerless (Seedat et al., 1988). Any empowerment programme which aims to give power to a particular group is inherently disempowering because it does not allow people to take up power themselves. True empowerment, then, must be taken rather than given (Rappaport, 1996). An approach to empowerment therefore values the existing resources and skills of a particular group, arguing that the existence or at least potential of these is present and can be valuably harnessed (Rappaport, 1981).
A dialectic exists in the literature between psychological or experienced empowerment and objective, resource-based empowerment. The former involves a personal sense of self-determination (Kromberg, 1992; Seedat et al., 1988) while the latter implies better access to resources including access to power and ability to change the material reality of one’s life (Riger, 1993). Riger (1993) argues that if one is psychologically or subjectively empowered, but has no access to the resources and wider recognition that constitute material power, one’s ability to act on psychological empowerment is limited—an ultimately disempowering situation.

While many models of empowerment describe power in simple terms of presence or absence (Seedat et al., 1988), attention has been paid to incorporating different kinds of power into the exposition of empowerment theory. Hollander & Offermann (1990), for example, emphasise the different functions of power by distinguishing ‘power over’ from ‘power to’ (the ability to act) and ‘power from’ (the ability to resist). Cruikshank (1994) outlines different routes to power; through skill and expertise, through information and through relationship or connection. Such contributions help to embellish the concept of empowerment in more complex ways.

An empowerment strategy, argues Serrano-Garcia (1984) has implications on the individual and collective levels. Empowerment should result in development of a strong sense of self in relation to the world, of more functional strategies regarding the personal and social level and of opportunity for development of resources. In addition, empowerment should foster a more critical awareness of the social and political forces impacting on one’s life (Serrano-Garcia, 1984). Empowerment thus implies a process of internalisation and self-growth, and it is to this end that the concept of participation was developed.

Serrano-Garcia (1984) advocates that any intervention should imply active participation from all involved at every stage of the process. This process of dialogue implies no domination by groups of participants, by world view perspectives or through inequality of discursive opportunity (Kelly & van Vlaenderen, 1997). Sustained levels of participation and active participation in knowledge generation (Chesler, 1991), it is argued, will facilitate empowerment of participants. There is recognition that the process of minimizing power dynamics is idealistic. However, it is suggested that sustained reflection on the process, ideals of transparency by all concerned and focus on the
influence of socio-political factors on interaction can militate against this (Kelly & van Vlaenderen, 1997). Focus is on creative facilitation such that one avoids "situations [where] resistance is such that requiring their participation may become another form of oppression" (Serrano-Garcia, 1990, p. 180).

Kelly & van Vlaenderen (1997, p.160) argue that participation has become a "buzzword" used to legitimize any and all community projects" in South Africa and that this diverse usage has undermined its explanatory value. Referring to Habermas (1984), who suggests that dialogue can only take place when power relations are minimised, Kelly & van Vlaenderen (1997) imply that power dynamics are so salient and pervasive in South Africa that minimizing asymmetrical power relations is an idealistic goal. Swartz (1996b) adds that the common strategy used by psychologists of disavowing their own expertise in an attempt to value the expertise of the other (e.g. Orford, 1992) is equally idealistic since it denies the reality that psychologists are experts and have power. In a recent South African conference (Child & Family Wellbeing, 1996), discussion often reflected disillusionment with the concept of empowerment and of “giving psychology away”. Thus while ideals of empowerment and participation are politically aware and egalitarian in approach, implementation at the level of practice is fraught with contradiction.

**The need for new directions**

In the absence of sustained theory in the discipline (Newbrough, 1992), community psychology has come to rely largely on either prevention approaches or empowerment approaches. Disillusionment with the first is based on scepticism regarding its effectiveness (Rappaport, 1981) and its lack of social critique (Seedat et al., 1988). Disillusionment with empowerment is based on increasing critique of its idealism and naiveté (Child & Family Wellbeing, 1996) and of the danger of raising unrealistic expectations that cannot be met (Cruikshank, 1994). Seedat & Nell (1992) add that many interventions need to deal with society’s perception of the magical power of psychologists. Simply stepping down from power will not eliminate these perceptions. They trace a psychological intervention with Primary Health Care Workers with particular reference to subversion and resistance.

It could further be argued that a psychodynamic understanding of intervention raises questions about an empowerment model which postulates that participation is possible
if only facilitators promote this. Such an approach takes little account of psychodynamic issues and resistances. In addition to issues of approach and practice, theoretical issues of the nature of subjectivity or personhood have not been addressed adequately by empowerment theory. Empowerment theory seems to be based on individualism and ideals of self determination (cf. Seedat et al., 1988) which construct the subject in terms of free will and rationality. This ironically seems to contradict the social and political awareness they are trying to foster. This is because ideologies of free will do not allow politically sophisticated analyses of how the individual interacts with social and political discourses and structures. It will become apparent in the following section that the tenets of community psychology are in this respect contradictory to those of post-structuralism and psychoanalysis, the other two major epistemological strands drawn upon in this thesis. These difficulties arguably leave community psychology at an impasse. One possible approach is to imbue community psychological interventions with more sustained theory as well as a more self-reflexive approach. It is to these ends that theories of post-structuralism and psychoanalysis are presented in order to ground the analysis of community intervention presented here.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POST-STRUCTURALISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Post-structuralism and psychoanalysis represent two major epistemological influences on late twentieth century thought which have had profound effects not only on academic discourse but on broader social and political processes. Both post-structuralism and psychoanalysis represent burgeoning and heterogenous disciplines. In addition to within-paradigm differences, the differences between the epistemologies of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism are considerable and, it is often argued, irreconcilable. Psychoanalysis and post-structuralism have, on the whole, developed as separate fields with the exception of Jacques Lacan who proclaims allegiance to both psychoanalysis and post-structuralism (Parker, 1997). Recent theorists (e.g. Flax, 1993; Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1997), however, are beginning to break down this divide by examining the articulations between these two major fields.

Due to the complexity and sheer volume of work in these two fields, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive review of both. Rather, each will be briefly explicated in terms of its basic tenets as well as concepts which have particular application to the analysis which follows. Focus then turns to an examination of the intersections between post-structuralism and psychoanalysis.

Post-structuralism

Post-structuralism has emerged as one of the primary debates to characterise the last decade and to have important ramifications for current social practice (Becvar & Becvar, 1996; Fraser & Nicholson, 1994). In fact, the tensions and disputes between advocates of a modernist understanding of self and those who support a post-modern understanding pervade much current debate (Lowe, 1991 in Basilli, 1991).

Post-structuralist theory falls under the gambit of social constructionism. Burr (1995) identifies several basic underlying assumptions of social constructionism. First, social constructionism is anti-essentialist in its rejection of core or pre-given attributes. It is also considered anti-realist because of its stress on the constructed nature of social life. Language is seen as pre-dating rather than merely representing thought and is understood to be the mechanism through which everything is constructed. Language is also understood as performative of meaning rather than as an opaque vehicle for description of meaning. Focus of social constructionist thought is on interaction and social practices rather than on intrapsychic processes. This is particularly clear in
Foucault's post-structuralist theory which places emphasis on the role institutions and institutional discourse plays in the construction of reality. Finally, social constructionism rejects examination of static entities, arguing instead that it is social processes rather than structures which need to be considered. Post-structuralist theory represents an extreme form of social constructionism because of its general commitment to social determinism and to the constitutive function of language in forming reality and in constructing knowledge (Burr, 1995).

The status of knowledge is a central concern of post-structuralism. A critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge is generally adopted. Knowledge is understood as constructed and sustained by social processes rather than as representation of fact. The function of knowledge in perpetuating certain kinds of (often hegemonic) social practices is stressed (Burr, 1995). Further, post-structuralism stresses that the production of knowledge can never reach universal truth, but is rather constituted by the specific historical and cultural context for which it is produced (Henriques et al., 1984). Post-structuralism represents an extreme form of the problematisation of notions of truth, arguing that a multiplicity of truths, and thus meanings, can be produced through discourse (Gavey, 1989). Discursive analysis based on the work of post-structuralist Michel Foucault (e.g. 1971), then, offers analytical versions of discursive truths, never claiming absolute authority for the analysis presented (Burman & Parker, 1993). Parker (1992, p.195) suggests that a discursive analysis which presents itself as absolute truth participates in "the tyranny of the finished text". An acceptance of multiple truths allows recognition of contradictions within and between discourses (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Discourse is understood as a way of understanding language as well as understanding social processes. It is thus not merely about what is said, but about the links between language, power and subjectivity. Weedon (1987 in Davies, 1990, p. 505) defines discourse in terms of a Foucaultian approach:

Discourses ... are ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and the relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern. Neither the body nor thoughts and feelings have meaning outside their discursive articulation, but the ways in which discourse constitutes the minds and bodies of individuals is always part of a wider network of power relations, often with institutional bases.
It is clear from this definition that discourse is intimately linked to power and to subjectivity. Both of these terms have particular meaning in post-structuralist discourse. The mechanisms of power represent one of the primary preoccupations of our time with politically motivated theory burgeoning. Foucault (e.g. 1975; 1976; 1980) provides a useful explication of power which escapes monolithic and unidirectional conceptions of power. Traditionally conceptualised oppressive power does not explain the interaction between power and people. It is suggested that Foucault's explication allows this possibility. Foucault argues that power does not reside in people or even in hierarchies, but resides instead in discourse. Power is therefore everywhere. It is anonymous and power relations are constantly shifting: Because power is understood as a diffuse concept, this understanding allows analysis of resistance. The power to resist thus becomes an important unit of analysis. Power is no longer conceptualised purely in terms of oppression, but is rather bidirectional. Power does not only weigh upon us as a force that says no but traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse (Foucault, 1980, p.119).

Emphasis on institutional power remains, but this is understood in terms of the power of institutional discourse rather than on that of individual members of an institution. This broadening of the concept of 'institution' opens space for the nuclear family, for example, to be understood in terms of institutional power.

The link Foucault makes to subjectivity involves his concept of productive power. He suggests that power constrains, silences, regulates and polices but simultaneously also produces subjectivity, knowledge and truth. Because discourse is the vehicle for the workings of power, people who take up a particular discourse are enjoined to internalise the matrices of power that discourse upholds. Rose (1989) provides a discussion of how discourse and power offer the subject an injunction towards self regulation rather than external regulation. Drawing on Foucault's concept of surveillance, he provides an example of how discourses of success or failure are internalised into the self and become the objects of subjectivity:

The self becomes the target of a reflexive objectifying gaze, committed not only to its own technical perfection but also to the belief that 'success' and 'failure' should be construed in the vocabulary of happiness, wealth, style, and fulfilment and interpreted as consequent upon the self-managing capacities of the self (Rose, 1989, p.239).
Focus on subjectivity, then, allows for understandings of how discourses become influential on the level of subjective experience. Davies and Harre (1990) and Hollway (1984) theorise the concept of 'subject positions'. Subjects do not just exist or float randomly in discourse. They take up particular subject positions in relation to discourse. This is not merely an act of choice; only certain positions are available to people depending on their broader position in the discursive matrix. Subjectivity thus has a double meaning. It refers to the subjective experience of being who one is, "the condition of being a subject" (Henриques et al., 1984, p.3) as well as to a discursive injunction to form oneself in a particular way:

... subjects are dynamic and multiple, always positioned in relation to discourses and practices and produced by these - the condition of being subject (Henриques et al., 1984, p.3).

Hollway (1989) suggests that individuals become invested in their particular subject positions because these offer ways of constructing identity as well as offering certain rewards and privileges. This must necessarily be understood in relation to post-structuralist understandings of identity as multiple, contradictory and fragmented rather than as stable, unitary and linear (Burr, 1995).

Post-structuralism thus offers a challenge to modernist understandings of rationality and free will. Psychoanalysis, while vastly different in its conceptualisation, offers a similar problematisation of rationality and free will in understanding personhood.

Psychoanalysis
Basic assumptions of psychoanalysis
Despite being a heterogenous discipline, all psychoanalytic theories have origins in Freud's initial work (Frosh, 1987) and all share basic assumptions about persons, the state of the mind and implications for therapy (Stolorow, Brandchaft & Atwood, 1987). Many of these assumptions have infiltrated common culture and have offered language for people to understand themselves and their experience regardless of their level of exposure to psychotherapy (Parker, 1997). The most well known of these, of course, relates to the existence of an unconscious structure which motivates people to action or affect in ways which are not always accessible to them (Brown & Peider, 1991). This concept is considered to be Freud's greatest contribution to psychology. It offers ways for psychology to understand people and their interactions in more complex detail and
to explain people's actions outside of constraining presumptions of free will or agency (Henriques et al., 1984). Morgan & Thomas (1996) note that the supposition of the existence of an unconscious implies an assumption about the nature of people. Rather than understanding people as rational and singular beings which has been the dominant historical assumption, the notion of the unconscious portrays people as fundamentally irrational in their motivations. Psychodynamic theory, Morgan & Thomas (1996) imply, further undercuts notions of individualism and separation by positing that the boundaries between people are permeable, and that the spaces between people are as imbued with unconscious process as the spaces within their minds. Nonetheless, Atwood & Stolorow (1984) warn that psychoanalysis is often in danger of propagating the "myth of the isolated mind" through its emphasis on intrapsychic processes.

The link between anxiety and defence constitutes a second basic assumption underlying psychoanalytic theories. Anxiety and internal conflict are understood to be basic ingredients of the human psyche (Brown & Pedder, 1991) and to be basic preoccupations of the unconscious realm. We unconsciously manage these anxieties through defence mechanisms which rechannel, distort or remove anxiety such that it becomes more manageable. Much time has been spent outlining these defences by psychoanalytic theorists (Kaplan & Sadock, 1991). It is widely accepted that defence mechanisms operate, although Stolorow et al. (1987) note that controversy exists regarding whether the employment of such defences in therapy constitutes a resistance to the therapeutic process or a communication to the therapist of central dynamic issues. Anxiety is generally, however, understood to be linked to psychic pain and to be ameliorated through the employment of defences (Brown & Pedder, 1991).

A third central assumption of psychoanalysis involves the recognition of the persisting influence of the past, particularly infancy and early childhood, on the present (Morgan & Thomas, 1996). This is central to the understanding of human motivation regardless of whether it is constructed through notions of primitive drives or through understanding of developmental arrest (Mitchell, 1988). This understanding, linked to the concept on the unconscious, stresses that the past is always simultaneously present. Past experiences of relationship and of trauma as well as past conflicts and unconscious experiences inevitably impact on actions, choices and emotions in the present. The traditional slant on understanding the relation between past on present emphasises the repetition of failure in line with Freud's concept of repetition compulsion (Jacobs, 1990).
Other theorists such as Melanie Klein have highlighted mechanisms in which past primitive processes are inevitably returned to and repeated throughout life, such that, for example, one can never break out of cycling between the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions (Hinshelwood, 1989). Some theories place emphasis on the necessity of regression towards earlier developmental phases so that the predominant issues experienced there can be re-experienced in new ways (J. Klein, 1987). The omnipresence of the infant in the adult (e.g. Britton, 1986) becomes a primary assumption through which meaning is constructed and action understood.

A central psychodynamic concept which arises directly from this assumption, and upon which much psychoanalytic practice is based, is that of the transference (Morgan & Thomas, 1996). Within a therapeutic relationship, it is assumed that the patient transfers experiences, conflict and emotions connected to past figures, notably parents, onto the figure of the analyst such that the patient experiences the analyst in crucial ways as repeating past relationships. Stolorow et al. (1987) note that the concept of the transference is pivotal in psychoanalysis, but is also understood in vastly different ways. Conceptualisations include understanding the transference as a false connection, as a distortion of reality, as a re-enactment of the past or as a displacement of emotion, or a projection of internal conflict onto the figure of the analyst. Stolorow et al. (1987) stress that, in their formulation, the transference serves multiple functions, and should be used as an active and dynamic concept through which to understand the patient’s organising activity. Through this formulation, it becomes possible to articulate the relation between the present and the past in less static ways than has often occurred in psychoanalysis. In this sense, the transference is defined as “an expression of the continuing influence of organizing principles and imagery that crystallized out of the patient’s early formative experiences” (Stolorow et al., 1987, p.36). Representations of the past are thus fluid and continually changing but based in early experience.

These underlying psychoanalytic assumptions hold implications for conceptions of treatment. While debates exist regarding what makes psychoanalytic treatment useful, there is generally consensus regarding a particular psychoanalytic approach to treatment (Frosh, 1987). Freud’s notion of the ‘talking cure’ is generally accepted. The talking cure implies that in-depth discussion and verbal exploration of the self can lead to the uncovering of underlying dynamics, and that this in turn will lead to changes in quality of life and symptomatology (Frosh, 1987). While debate exists regarding the
extent to which therapists adhere to Freud’s neutral analytic stance (Stolorow et al., 1987), there is general agreement that the focus of therapy should remain on the patient and that the therapist’s interactions be guided by this. Continua of the rule of abstinence exist, but the therapist’s actions are always understood in relation to Freud’s ‘fundamental rule’ (Freud, 1949 in Jacobs, 1990). The ‘fundamental rule’ demands that the patient should say anything in therapy and there should be no restrictions on this. Because of the link between the process of therapy and the unconscious, another shared assumption regarding treatment is that whatever occurs in the therapy holds potential for unconscious meaning (Halton, 1994). Malan (1979) thus advocates developing an understanding of how any communication can be an unconscious communication. It must be noted that such communication is more often than not understood within the context of pathology, a theme which appears to be another shared assumption of much psychoanalytic work. Because psychoanalytic theory has largely been developed in relation to work with patients, it is usually assumed that there is an underlying pathology or at least something "wrong". While some have extended psychoanalytic theorising, e.g. in relation to feminism and cultural theory (Elliott & Frosh, 1995), implications for intervention have usually been confined to constructing the person in terms of a model of disease or dysfunction. This study attempts to depart from this major assumption by examining intervention without necessarily implying primitive pathology or early failure.

Central tensions in psychoanalysis
The heterogeneity of psychoanalysis has given rise to a number of central tensions which not only have theoretical implications, but implications for practice as well. The burgeoning of different psychoanalytic schools and the competitiveness which this elicits has no doubt contributed to these tensions. Frosh (1987) believes such tensions can be potentially productive as sites of debate. Some of these tensions will be examined here with particular reference to their implications for intervention.

One of the first debates to emerge with Freud himself regards whether dynamic and unconscious issues are related to trauma itself or to the phantasised experience of trauma (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992). This debate continues in current theory and relates to a parallel debate regarding the reality component of experience. It holds important implications for therapy, since therapy can be framed in terms of uncovering previous trauma or in terms of uncovering psychic processes. The analyst’s task, then, is
correspondingly concerned with uncovering objective reality, a process which Stolorow et al. (1987) critique. They argue that this understanding places the analyst in a hierarchical position as the only one capable of access to true understanding. They suggest instead that value should be placed on the patient's subjective reality, regardless of whether this constitutes a material reality or an experienced but symbolic reality. To some extent this begs the question of the genesis of unconscious concerns but does offer the patient a measure of ambiguity regarding the factual status of experience.

This is related to one of the major splits between psychoanalytic schools which coheres around the extent to which they believe early experience and subsequent conflict is intrapsychically based or linked to early relationship experiences (Mitchell, 1988). Much of Freud's theory was based on the concept of drives, a concept which has been criticized for its biological essentialism and its failure to take into account experiences of relationship and the impact of the social realm (Frosh, 1987). Present psychoanalytic theories range from incorporating drive theory as central to rejecting the notion of drives altogether (Mitchell, 1988). Mitchell (1988) suggests that this central preoccupation results in two unhelpful assumptions about humanity. The first portrays humanity as "beast" at the whims of primitive instincts, and the second portrays humanity as "baby" and therefore helpless victims vulnerable to developmental arrest, usually caused by parents. Mitchell (1988) believes that such divisions are unhelpful in that they result in limited understandings of psychological life. Kohut (1977 in Stolorow et al., 1987) similarly points to the apparent antithesis between explanations of developmental deficit and psychic conflict, arguing that in fact these are closely intertwined. Stolorow et al. (1987) suggest that both of these concepts can be usefully utilised if the concept of conflict is removed from a biologically based framework and understood instead in terms of the person's subjective experience. Nonetheless this remains a controversial debate within psychoanalysis.

The therapist's theoretical orientation and assumptions about the nature of personhood do, of course, hold profound implications for how therapy is conducted and change conceptualised (White & Epston, 1990). Debates exist concerning what kind of therapeutic interventions prompt change. This is related to understandings of the genesis of the problem. Genesis is usually either understood as intrapsychic and based in the unconscious or is understood as interrelational and based in experiences rooted
in past relationships (Mitchell, 1988). The debate that arises, then, is whether cure is
brought about through interpretations during therapy which generate insight or whether
it is the experience of a therapeutic (as opposed to pathogenic) relationship which heals
or repairs past experiences (Stolorow et al., 1987).

Both of these assumptions to some extent imply an unequal power relationship in
therapy such that the healing forces are controlled by the therapist, whether in the form
of what the therapist says or what kind of relationship the therapist fosters with the
client. Psychoanalysis has been frequently criticised for its unequal power relations and
its assumption that the therapist has privileged access to the truth (Frosh, 1987). The
issue of the therapist's power seems mainly to have congealed around theorising the
status of the countertransference. Freud's initial discussions of countertransference
referred to undesirable responses on the part of the clinician which represented an
interruption of the therapeutic process (Stolorow et al., 1987). Countertransference has
since been broadened to encompass the therapist's experience in relationship, to be
incorporated into therapy and used in a productive way (Thomson, 1995). Proponents
of intersubjectivity, for example, go as far as to dismiss the term 'countertransference'
in favour of the 'analyst's transference' or the 'analysand's transference' (Stolorow &
Atwood, 1992). This renaming removes pejorative connotations and stresses that the
analyst's transference is as much a part of the therapeutic process as the analysand's
(Brandchaft, 1995). This represents a radical challenge to psychoanalytic thought, but
one which is difficult to value positively. Wolf (1988), for example, encourages an
intersubjective understanding of countertransference rather than a demonizing of the
concept. However, an examination of his paper reveals a plethora of headings implying
otherwise. These include "the analyst's fears" (p.137), "the analyst's vulnerabilities"
(p.138), "countertransferences Proper" (p.144) in which "Proper" refers to the therapist's
own unanalysed issues and needs and is "a sign that all is not well with the therapist"
(p.144), and "reactive countertransferences". This entrenches original understandings
of countertransference which favour the rule of abstinence by implying that any
response on the part of the therapist more than likely represents something "ubiquitous"
(p.142) and worrying.

Another tension which exists in psychoanalysis regards the relationship between the
individual and the social (Parker, 1997). Psychoanalysis is often concerned primarily
with the individual and not only underplays social influences but also underplays the
extent to which psychodynamic issues may be understood as inherently social. The next section examines some of the ways in which psychoanalysis has directly addressed the issue of the interaction between the individual and the social, by focusing theory of the psychodynamics of people in groups.

The psychoanalysis of groups

Psychoanalysis has primarily been an individual enterprise, both in terms of developing theory about the individual and in terms of interacting with individuals in the therapeutic context. While Freud did address issues of group behaviour, this was mainly theoretically based and concerned with mass crowds rather than with the kinds of interactions people have in groups on a day to day basis (Parker, 1997). The work of Wilfred Bion (e.g. 1961) of the Tavistock Institute, however, was central in changing psychoanalysis' exclusive focus on the individual and bringing day-to-day groups into the spotlight of psychoanalysis. Basing his work on that of Melanie Klein, Bion was a central player in the Tavistock's extension of psychoanalytic theory into their work with organizations (Parker, 1997). Morgan & Thomas (1996), for example, understand the influence of Klein and Bion to be central to an understanding of psychodynamic group processes. A consideration of the contributions of Klein and Bion is offered below, followed by exploration of more recent work on psychoanalytic consultancy in organizations (Obholzer & Zagier-Roberts, 1994; Menzies Lyth, 1988; 1990).

At first glance, it appears contradictory to include Klein as a central proponent of group psychoanalysis, since many understand her theory to lean strongly towards the intrapsychic, drive-oriented end of the individual-social continuum (Frosh, 1987). Klein herself stressed that her theory is concerned with the representation of objects in the internal world and not with real people or with interactional dynamics. Her term "object" reflects her concern with internal representation rather than relationship. Hollway (1989), however, has suggested that Klein's theory can be understood as interrelational since it posits interactions between people rather than within individuals. Projection necessarily implies projection onto an other. Projective identification can be understood as a process in which the internal realities of two people operate in communication (Morgan & Thomas, 1996). Possibilities thus exist for appropriation of Klein's theory to understand interactional dynamics. These concepts have thus become useful in understanding social processes such as racism (e.g. Kovel, 1995), scapegoating in organizations (e.g. Obholzer & Roberts, 1994b) and war (e.g. Parker, 1997).
Klein’s central concepts of splitting, projection and projective identification are closely interrelated (Morgan & Thomas, 1996) and connected by Klein to the infant’s earliest experiences of terror and psychotic anxiety. Klein argued that these defences are first employed in relation to the first object, the mother’s breast, but remain with us throughout life in order to manage unbearable anxiety (Parker, 1997). Splitting involves the separation of good and bad; loved and hated object. This is necessary to reduce anxiety by keeping good parts from contaminating bad parts. This may happen in relation to one person who is understood alternately as all-good or all-bad, or parts of a group may be split such that some members become idealised (Hinshelwood, 1989) while others become all bad (Parker, 1997). Splitting can, however, simultaneously mollify the anxiety of contagion and increase guilt-related anxiety. Related to splitting is the defence of projection, in which the infant (and later adult) cannot tolerate an internal sense of badness or pain and thus projects these feelings onto another such that the person’s internal conflicts are recognized as those of another. "Projection ... originates from the defection of the death instinct outwards and in my view helps the ego to overcome anxiety by ridding it of danger and badness" (Klein, 1946 in Hinshelwood, 1989, p.126). Introjection refers to an internalisation of the good object (Hinshelwood, 1989; Parker, 1997). Projective identification, a controversial and much written about concept, implies an identification by the other with a particular projection such that the other feels and experiences the projection. Morgan & Thomas (1996, p.84) graphically describe this elusive concept as “the unconscious mechanism through which mix ups occur between individuals and through which boundaries between identities begin to break down”. There is some disagreement on the sequence of these processes. Morgan & Thomas (1996), for example, maintain that projection is a subsequent process to splitting while Frosh (1987) argues that projection of internal destructive and good impulses onto the object occurs first, followed by splitting of that object into good and bad and finally introjection of these objects. 

Klein did not intend to portray these as clean processes or as painless excisions of anxiety. While there is a necessity for such defences to ward off anxiety, she argues, these defences produce different kinds of anxiety.

*Splitting*, the ‘severance of love and hate’, and of the ‘frustrating breast’ from the ‘gratifying breast’, is a process which tears at the ego as well as the object; *Projection* throws the death instinct out onto the object but rebounds to persecute the infant; *Introjection*, the taking in of the good object, is a
'precondition for normal development', but provokes anxieties of dependence in which the ego is only a 'shell' for the object; and Projective Identification, 'the forceful entry into the object', connects ego to object through terrifying 'phantasies' of retribution and of imprisonment and persecution within the object (Parker, 1997, p.90 with quotations from Klein, 1946).

This has implications for another of Klein's central concepts, envy. Envy is conceptualised as a destructive attack on good objects, a spoiling in which the good object is attacked precisely because of its goodness (Hinshelwood, 1989). Frosh (1987) notes that envy is unavoidable and is a consequence regardless of whether the breast (object) is fulfilling or not. This process is central to the vacillation that occurs between the paranoid-schizoid position, where primitive defences predominate, and the depressive position in which acknowledgement of ambivalence and the taking back of projections leads to attempts at reparation, restoration and preservation (Frosh, 1987). This process is inevitably repeated; however, Klein suggests that in normal development, the good comes to predominate against the bad, bringing a measure of balance and relief (Frosh, 1987). Thus, argues Frosh (1987), while Klein's theory is often criticised for its negativity, its value is precisely in its recognition of the contradictions in human experience and the tracing of processes of negotiating those contradictions.

Bion was strongly influenced by Klein, and developed his theory specifically in relation to work groups (Parker, 1997). His point of departure from existing psychoanalytic theory was his assertion that the group has an unconscious life of its own which is greater than the sum of the unconscious lives of the individuals within the group (Morgan & Thomas, 1996). This notion of groupishness or the group mind prompted Bion to listen to group process in the same manner that a therapist listens to a client's individual process (Halton, 1994). His central argument was that unconscious processes in a group are shared by group members. Group members share anxiety related to membership of that group as well as to the group's task. It therefore becomes possible to postulate group defences. Individuals contribute to group mentality. Bion suggests, however, that group mentality has a profound effect on the mentality of the individual. He defined group mentality as

the unanimous expression of the will of the group, contributed to by the individual in ways of which he is unaware, influencing him disagreeably whenever he thinks or behaves in a manner at variance with the basic assumptions. It is thus a machinery of intercommunications that is designed
to ensure that group life is in accordance with the basic assumptions [of the group] (Bion, 1961, p.65).

Bion's understanding of unconscious group processes offered dynamic possibilities for understanding interactions within groups as well as between groups (Stokes, 1994). Through a reconceptualisation of the group as having a psychodynamic life of its own, new interventions could be contemplated using psychoanalytic techniques in group settings (Halton, 1994).

A second concept of use to group work is Bion's understanding of knowledge. He removes knowledge from the realm of cognition and the realm of individuality, placing it firmly in relation to others and to emotion, and defining it in terms of the process of gaining knowledge rather than the possession or absence of knowledge (Parker, 1997). Knowledge is thus produced through a relationship between the container and the contained, and the type of knowledge produced depends on the nature of this relationship (Hinshelwood, 1989). This of course has pedagogical implications, particularly regarding the acquisition of psychological 'knowledge', since it implies that relationship is central. The development of knowledge within relationship, further, is not a simple process of acquisition of more or better knowledge. In an unbounded or otherwise unsafe relationship, the type of knowledge that is produced is termed by Bion 'minus K' (Parker, 1997). Minus K can represent a lack of knowledge or, more accurately, a refusal to know. "To avoid knowing is also to avoid responsibility" (Parker, 1997, p. 43). Minus K also consists of pseudo-knowledge which forms a substitute for knowledge and, in the institutional context, often represents all the superfluous and irrational activity which substitutes for the primary task. Bion explicated these kinds of activities which are motivated by unconscious forces in his discussion of basic assumptions (Hinshelwood, 1989).

Two tendencies were outlined in order to describe group life. The first, work-group mentality relates to what Bion calls the primary task of the group - the task for which the group has formed. The second is basic assumption mentality which is usually anti-task - works in opposition to the primary task of the group - and is usually unconscious (Stokes, 1994). Bion identified three basic assumptions, all of which relate to group alignments and which prompt a particular emotional climate and shared task (Morgan & Thomas, 1996).
The first, basic assumption dependency, illustrates processes in a group in which someone or something, usually the leader, becomes the centre of focus. The group then behaves as if its primary task was to attend to the needs and wishes of its members. Dependence on the group and/or the leader becomes the primary motivation and often leads to passivity and inhibition of development (Bion, 1961). Basic assumption fight-flight involves primary focus on a real or imagined enemy and corresponding responses of attack or avoidance. This offers the group a target onto which to project hostility or danger. The enemy may be within the group or external to it, and contributes towards a deceptive sense of togetherness as well as a focus on activities directed towards this enemy instead of primary task activities (Bion, 1961). Basic assumption pairing involves the hope that something or someone in the future will solve the group’s problems and bring about salvation. This occurs whether actual members in the group are paired together or the group fantasises about some future event or person. The group thus focuses on the future to the exclusion of present necessities (Stokes, 1994). The usefulness of this conceptualisation for work with groups is that it offers a framework for understanding apparently irrational processes and provides possibilities for bringing these unconscious activities into consciousness in order to challenge the underlying assumptions (Stokes, 1994).

The work of Klein and Bion has been extended through the Tavistock Clinic (e.g. Menzies Lyth, 1988; 1990; Obholzer & Zagier-Roberts, 1994) through incorporation of systems theory into understanding of organizational life, and the unconscious processes operating in an organization. This has led to the development of psychoanalytically informed consultancy work with organizations (Obholzer & Zagier-Roberts, 1994). Menzies Lyth, for example, examined patient-nurse relationships within the hospital setting and, similar to Bion, described several institutional defences that were operating, including splitting of the nurse-patient relationship in order to avoid the anxiety produced through intimacy, depersonalisation, categorization and denial of the significance of individual patients as well as detachment and denial of feelings (Morgan & Thomas, 1996). These mechanisms, Menzies Lyth argued, protected nurses from intimacy with their patients and thus from anxiety about or reaction to loss. The corollary, however, was the maintenance of less than optimal nurse-patient relationships. Menzies Lyth also examined the work structures of nurses in a similar way to some Tavistock-allied writers who have drawn upon systems theory in order to relate structural and organizational issues to predominant psychodynamic concerns (e.g. Obholzer, 1994; Zagier-Roberts,
1994). She traced, for example, how ritual task performance became a common institutional practice which allowed staff to avoid making decisions about individuals. She was also interested in ways in which work structures aided the diffusion of responsibility such that anxieties regarding responsibilities over the life of a patient were diluted. Both these processes might be considered by Bion as anti-task since they interfered with the growth of the organization and the effectiveness of the primary task.

The approaches outlined above imply that a skilled external consultant could work with a particular group, focusing on its anxieties and defences in order to facilitate increase in the functioning of the group. Mosse (1994), however, warns that such an approach runs two major risks. First, it may lead to an increase in introspection, sensitivity and insight but may not address systemic difficulties, which may simply lead to further frustration. Second, institutional problems may be attributed to individuals such that group members and/or consultants end up pathologizing people inappropriately. This process, instead of aiding, merely perpetuates scapegoating in the organization. Rose (1992) provides a more radical social critique of the Tavistock approach, suggesting that the extension of psychoanalysis into new areas represents an extension of realms of power and influence which is more useful to the Tavistock and the institution of psychoanalysis than to the participants themselves.

A third consideration in the South African context relates to the wealth of knowledge critical social psychology has contributed to the understanding of groups, and to issues of difference and power within and between groups. The theories of Bion and Klein, like most psychoanalytic theories (Frosh, 1987), are presented as universal, but may in fact be mediated by social and historical factors as well as by the particular nature of the group under question. Nonetheless, these theorists have demonstrated applicability to the particular issue of understanding interactions between people and in groups. Focus now turns to what could be understood as a metatheory of psychoanalysis which further addresses the issue of relations between people.

**Relational psychoanalysis**

The tension highlighted above between intrapsychic or conflict based explanations and developmentally based accounts is not only central to psychoanalytic theory but also holds important political implications. These competing approaches construct the nature of the subject in particular ways and, Mitchell (1988) argues, in reductive ways. A
consideration of how this debate relates to the linked debate about interactions between individual and social augments this suggestion. The intrapsychic model reduces social life to internal, inescapable and uncontrollable urges and thus fails to provide acknowledgement of familial as well as broader social operations in explanations of motivation, causality or construction. The developmental model reduces formative experience to early familial relationships and thereby excludes implication of the individual in present adult relations. Mitchell (1988) warns that this reduces the subject to the status of victim, passively directed by early developmental failure and blameless for all subsequent experience. This model also reduces consideration of the social to early familial influences and thus excludes the influence of later relational experiences as well as broader social processes. He suggests that these two approaches offer metaphors for understanding people. As such, he implies, these metaphors weave particular constructions around the notion of personhood such that they recursively construct the subject in terms of the demands of the metaphor. The intrapsychic model he terms the ‘metaphor of the beast’ and the developmental arrest model the ‘metaphor of the baby’.

These two approaches have generally been considered to be mutually exclusive and competing. Mitchell (1988) has attempted to combine them in his integrative theory of relational psychoanalysis. He suggests that the model of the beast draws primarily on accounts of internal self organization and the metaphor of the baby on accounts of attachment to others. Both of these he understands to be integral aspects for understanding all psychodynamic phenomena and neither in isolation can provide an adequate account of psychodynamic processes. He adds that there is a third dimension which, if not taken into account, leads to inadequate explanation. This consists of the process of interpersonal transactions. Interaction is thus as constitutive as internal organization or developmental attachment. The space between people is as important as the spaces within (Mitchell, 1988).

Contrary to what many psychodynamic theories imply, Mitchell (1988) argues that psychodynamic configurations remain far from static after early childhood. Self, other and the relationship between self and other constantly mutate and develop the person’s psychodynamic world throughout life. This conception is particularly useful as it adds complexity to his psychodynamic account and avoids the trap of reducing psychodynamic configurations to early experience, either of relationship or of primitive
internal experience. Mitchell (1988, p.8) suggests that psychodynamics occurs within a "multifaceted relational matrix" in which intrapsychic and interpersonal realms "create, interpenetrate, and transform each other in a subtle and complex manner" (p.9). This metaphor implies a variety of interrelated factors which play themselves out not in isolation, but in the immediate social realm. He suggests that this meta-understanding allows psychoanalysis to integrate several existing strands of theory in useful and productive ways. He draws predominantly on self psychological and object relations theories with some incorporation of the work of Melanie Klein. The implication, however, is that an overarching understanding of the three different components of human experience allows one to incorporate aspects of any psychoanalytic theory into the broader gambit of relational psychoanalysis.

The assumption of several factors which construct and continually co-construct psychic life lends a certain relativism to Mitchell's (1988) approach to psychodynamic understanding. He reinforces this by drawing on the work of psychoanalysts working within a social constructionist framework such as Schafer (in Mitchell, 1988) and Spence (1982). They utilize narrative theory to suggest that stories are constructed by people and through psychoanalysis in order for them to make sense of their lives. This allows Mitchell (1988, p.33) to value a 'multiplicity of voices' in relation to understandings of psychodynamic processes. 'Self' and 'object' become relative and co-constructive terms:

There is no 'object' in a psychologically meaningful sense without some particular sense of oneself in relation to it. There is no 'self', in a psychologically meaningful sense, in isolation, outside a matrix of relations with others (Mitchell, 1988, p.33).

This understanding of self, he implies, allows his theory to incorporate 'a multiplicity of voices' in relation to theory as well. While self psychology, object relations theory and interpersonal psychoanalysis, for example, each value only one aspect of the relational matrix, an understanding of multiplicity allows one to draw on all of these in an integrative manner.

Mitchell's (1988) model resonates with another recent attempt to integrate different strands of psychoanalytic theory, the intersubjective approach. Championed largely by Atwood, Brandchaft and Stolorow (e.g. Atwood & Stolorow, 1984; Stolorow et al., 1987),
the intersubjective approach has gained momentum in recent years (Goldberg, 1995). Intersubjectivity is largely understood as a development of self psychology (Ornstein, 1995). Similar to Mitchell’s (1988) notion of the relational matrix, the intersubjective approach takes the intersubjective field as the most important site of inquiry. This field focus[es] on the interplay between the differently organized subjective worlds of the observer and the observed. The observational stance is always one within, rather than outside, the intersubjective field (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, p.41).

The focus on the spaces between people is thus central in both relational and intersubjective psychoanalysis. Mitchell (1988), however, appears to focus on this space throughout the life span and in different contexts. Intersubjectivists focus only on mother-infant relationships and on the therapeutic relationship as a mirror of this formative relationship - the intersubjective field between analyst and analysand. The stress is on the relationship between observer and observed rather than on any other kind of relationship. Clinical phenomena, for example,

cannot be understood apart from the intersubjective contexts in which they take form. Patient and analyst together form an indissoluble psychological system, and it is this system that constitutes the empirical domain of psychoanalytic inquiry (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, p.64).

This focus on the therapeutic relationship is politically useful through its valuing of what the therapist brings to the relationship. It is explicitly framed as "in part a response to the unfortunate tendency of classical psychoanalysis to view pathology in terms of processes and mechanisms located solely within the patient" (Stolorow et al., 1987). The approach is, however, still strongly based within a framework of developmental failure (Stolorow et al., 1987) which raises Mitchell’s (1988) critique of the ‘metaphor of the baby’. While there is an attempt to incorporate conflict into the intersubjective model (Stolorow et al., 1987), this is done through a valuing of subjective experience over objective fact. This does not, as does Mitchell’s (1988) model, allow for an incorporation of aspects of conflict based psychoanalytic theory. Further, although intersubjectivity appears implicitly based on social constructionist influence, this is largely limited to an appreciation of the construction of reality through subjective experience. Unlike Mitchell’s (1988) account, there is no sustained attempt to value multiplicity or the constructive nature of social interaction.
Both relational psychoanalysis and the intersubjective approach have been drawn upon in the analysis offered in this thesis. Because of the focus of intervention on interrelational processes, it is suggested that these approaches offer openings to psychodynamic understanding which are not straight-jacketed by individualism or reductionism. Such an approach is politically useful in its emphasis on the relational matrix or intersubjective field. Post-structuralists might reframe these concepts in terms of the discursive matrix, and such an approach facilitates analyses of power relations. Relational and intersubjective approaches thus offer opportunities for the appropriation of psychoanalysis into a broader realm than that of individual patient and individual therapist. It is suggested, however, that neither approach adequately addresses the complex relations between individual and social. Both approaches confine their appraisal of the social world to past and, to a lesser extent, immediate social relations. Neither addresses broader issues of social power or the influence of discourses on subjectivity. These issues are considered central to a politically useful analysis. These theories do, however, provide a bridge through which psychoanalytic concepts may be appropriated through post-structuralist understandings of discourse, knowledge and power. The notion of a 'relational matrix', for example, has been extended in this analysis to include relations of the individual to political, social and economic events within the intersubjective field.

Articulations between post-structuralism and psychoanalysis
Some of the ways in which psychoanalysts have incorporated post-structuralist ideas have been traced above. Similarly, there is rising interest amongst some post-structuralists in amalgamating psychoanalytic concepts into post-structuralist thought (Burr, 1995). Attention is given below to a variety of ways in which psychoanalysis is employed by post-structuralists in order to trace some of the theoretical similarities the two paradigms share and some of the implications of combining them.

Employment of psychoanalysis in post-structuralism
Post-structuralism posits that knowledge is incorporated or generated not in order to refine the truth but in order to strengthen discourse and to perform various functions (Parker, 1992). Foucault's (1980) power-knowledge formula suggests that the production of knowledge is always linked to matrices of power. It could be suggested, then, that incorporation of psychoanalytic knowledge into post-structuralism serves purposes of boosting the power of post-structuralism through the incorporation of power
that psychoanalysis holds in modern culture. It is suggested here that psychoanalysis has been incorporated in several different ways and for several purposes, four of which will be examined.

The first major strand of articulation relates to interest in post-Lacanian theory. Elliott & Frosh (1995) note not only a revival of interest in Lacanian and post-Lacanian work, but also interest in reconceptualising this work. Lacanian theory represents the only category in which post-structuralism and psychoanalysis are thoroughly incorporated. Lacan explicitly positioned himself in both schools and drew heavily on post-structuralist understanding to reconceptualise psychoanalytic concerns such as development, the constructive role of language and the unconscious (Urwin, 1984). This strand of articulation thus serves the purpose of meshing the two broader theories in ways which produce new accounts. Elliott & Frosh (1995) suggest the popularity of this approach is related to its ability to enter social and cultural domains, offering a post-structuralist psychoanalytic account which moves beyond individual pathology and the therapy room. Lacanian theory has been used, for example, in film criticism (e.g. Mast, Cohen & Braudy, 1992), to provide analyses of broader social processes (Elliott & Frosh, 1995) and in feminist and post-feminist thinking (Flax, 1993). This strand of amalgamation through Lacan represents a large body of work, beyond the scope of this thesis.

A second strand links psychoanalysis to the post-modern dilemma which is concerned with ever shifting meanings and locations such that it is not possible to know or to fix identity (Ward, 1997). It has been suggested that psychoanalysis similarly understands meaning as elusive through its focus on irrationality and its blurring of boundaries between self and other (Elliott & Frosh, 1995). Zizek (1991 in Elliott & Frosh, 1995) reconceptualises this relationship in terms of space rather than meaning. What is "terrifying about post-modernity is not so much the gaps and absences in people's lives, but the way everything is wrapped up together into a space that denies distance" (Elliott & Frosh, 1995, p.3). Incorporation of psychoanalytic understanding thus offers a contradictory purpose. Firstly it "mak[es] meanings out of what appears not to be meant" (Elliott & Frosh, 195, p.3) and thus offers a way of negotiating the post-modern dilemma without denying the shifting nature of self and meaning. Secondly, psychoanalysis offers an alternative language and reason for understanding the terrifying lack of space and distance by identifying with the inevitability of a blurring of boundaries around self. Klein's account, for example, offers a way of understanding the 'mixed-upness' of
experience (Elliott & Frosh, 1995) which, it could be argued, offers a framework for tolerating the post-modern dilemma. Incorporation of psychoanalysis thus simultaneously offers a way out of the post-modern dilemma as well as offering an understanding that there can never be a way out and consequently a framework for endurance.

A third articulation of post-structuralism and psychoanalysis consigns psychoanalysis to the status of discourse. If psychoanalysis is treated as a discourse, its truth value and therefore the more insidious elements of its power, can be disregarded. Psychoanalytic concepts removed from the status of truth can then be used more creatively and fluidly. Flax (1993), for example, understands psychoanalysis in terms of the Foucaultian concept of 'discursive formation' while Parker (1997) outlines what he calls a 'discursive complex'. Both of these authors argue that psychoanalysis can be productively and socially used if understood as discourse.

Flax (1993) understands Foucault's concept of 'discursive formation' to imply the formation of discourse around a particular configuration of truth and productive power. While discursive formations produce rules and systems, they are conflict-ridden and unstable. Boundaries around discursive formations are constantly shifting and also contested, thus requiring of the discursive formation to constantly respond to shifts and challenges, and thus to constantly mutate and reinforce. A discursive formation therefore relates to the underpinnings of post-structuralism, but represents a particular instantiation of discourse. Flax (1993) argues that psychoanalysis can be understood as a discursive formation since it makes particular truth claims, implies particular configurations of power relations and constructs boundaries around the borders of psychoanalysis. Rather than suggesting that this invalidates psychoanalysis, she motivates for a reconceptualisation of psychoanalysis outside the boundaries of 'science'. She suggests that the discursive formation of psychoanalysis itself holds means through which the power of the discursive formation can be subverted. She suggests, for example, that psychoanalysis undermines dualistic binary oppositions, foregrounds contradiction and provides a complexity which holds promise for incorporation into a post-structuralist world view. Reconceptualisation of psychoanalysis as discourse, she argues, will ensure its continued survival in a post-modern world.

Flax (1993) uses the concept of discursive formation to advocate the continuance of
psychoanalytic theory and practice in new subversive forms. Parker (1997), with his similar concept of 'discursive complex', has somewhat different aims. He presents a similar argument of psychoanalysis as discourse. The truth status of psychoanalysis is an irrelevant question for him. He argues that psychoanalytic discourse pervades subjectivity, the media and current understanding to such an extent that it has become an influential discourse for the 20th century subject regardless of his/her direct exposure to psychoanalytic treatment. Psychoanalytic discourse is so pervasive, he argues, that it has come to construct the nature of subjectivity. The discursive complex of psychoanalysis thus simultaneously positions the subjects within this discourse and "touches an already existing shape of subjectivity" (Parker, 1997, p.8). This presents a paradox, since Parker (1997) is suggesting that psychoanalysis is a discourse but is also an expression of something inherent in the 20th century subject. This paradox allows him to simultaneously analyse psychoanalytic discourse and use psychoanalytic concepts as tools for analysis in and of themselves. This relationship between the centrality of discourse and the centrality of psychodynamics in understanding subjectivity is reflected in one of the definitions he offers:

A discursive complex is a set of statements about a psychic object which is organized around psychoanalytic preoccupations such that the object simultaneously looks like an item in a psychoanalytic vocabulary and the subject is defined as a psychodynamic subject. Discourse reproduces and transforms the psychic world of the subject as addressed, recognized and transformed by texts in accordance with psychodynamic principles (Parker, 1997, p.69).

This offers a way of using psychoanalysis in a predominantly post-structuralist manner, both as constitutive of the subject and as constitutive of discourse. Perhaps what Parker (1997) does not bargain for is the power of psychoanalytic discourse as an explanatory framework in and of itself. He aims to appropriate psychoanalytic concepts as analytic tools but, it is suggested, ends up unable to appropriate the concepts from the truth value they possess.

The discursive complex is an analytic device which brings together the study of discourse as it pertains to positioning of subjects and the study of psychodynamic processes as they are constituted in language and structured as collective cultural forms. But this coupling of discourse analysis and psychoanalysis really only gives us the shell of a device to help us read a text. It is still a rather abstract notion, and to fill it out we must elaborate a specific appropriate analytic framework for the phenomenon in question (Parker, 1997, p.69).
It is suggested that these concepts are not necessarily used any more critically than if used by a psychoanalyst. Parker (1997) provides a number of insightful analyses drawing on a range of psychodynamic concepts. However, when he analyses a text, 'splitting', for example, is still meant as splitting in the Kleinian sense, and thus as a process which is not discursively constructed but which really happens. Perhaps there is no way out of this dilemma, and perhaps it is not analytically useful. It does, however, point to the explanatory power of psychoanalysis and some of the difficulties of incorporating psychoanalysis as discourse.

A fourth approach to melding psychoanalysis and post-structuralism is exemplified in the work of Hollway (1984; 1989) and Henriques et al. (1984). The purpose here is to reframe psychoanalytic theory in order to present a form of psychoanalytic discourse analysis. Similar to Parker (1997), the aim is to provide an analytical tool, but psychoanalysis itself is not necessarily treated as a discourse. Hollway (1984; 1989) drew on Kleinian and Lacanian theory; focus here remains on Klein due to its applicability to the present analysis. Hollway argues that Kleinian theory does not have to be used intrapsychically, but that her defences are inherently relational. Hollway takes as her starting point the similarities between psychoanalysis and post-structuralism in their conceptualisation of the subject as contradictory, non-unitary and irrational. Further, she suggests that anxiety is a central aspect of human experience, but that anxiety is discursively connected and not merely intrapsychically connected. Defences against anxiety thus operate within the relational realm and in interaction with discourse. Her approach is thus based on exploring contradictions in subjectivity and focusing on relations rather than on individuals. This allows her to develop a theory of subjectivity, drawing on concepts of positioning in discourse outlined above, which include an affective dimension. This affective dimension, she suggests, is related to discourse. It becomes possible to trace "how discursive relations enter into the very production of desire in the first place" (Henriques et al., 1984, p.222). Thus she can reconceptualise the unconscious through arguing that what is repressed has discursive as well as emotional signification. This helps to address what Collins & Mulder (1997) imply is one of the difficulties with post-structuralist analysis, i.e. that it leaves little space for affective dimensions of the post-modern subject.

Henriques et al. (1984) note that two implications of Hollway's work stand out. First her account renders it possible for us to understand our actions through alternative
discourses. Second, notions of contradiction and positioning highlight that we are neither totally powerful nor totally powerless but multiply positioned and, to some extent at least, able to shift positions in relation to discourse. Further, Henriques et al. (1984, p.204) suggest that the inclusion of psychoanalysis broadens the scope of understanding of discourse:

work at the level of discursive constitution of subjects elides the specificity of the construction of actual subjectivities in the domain of discursive practices.

A link is thus made between discursive configurations and subjects. Hollway's method of relating psychodynamic issues to discursive processes makes a further link between the language of the unconscious and the language of the social world in productive ways.

These four approaches, despite their different purposes, illustrate a variety of ways in which psychoanalysis and post-structuralism are potentially complementary. An explication of some of these points of complementarity offer further possibilities for articulation.

Summary: Points of articulation between post-structuralism and psychoanalysis
Henriques et al. (1984) note four major points of similarity between psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, some of which have been alluded to above. Both debunk the myth of the rational subject and subvert notions of free will and agency. Emphasis on unconscious processes in psychoanalysis preclude notions of a unitary subject and highlight instead contradiction and multiplicity. Psychoanalysis problematises divisions between cognition and affect in a similar way to post-structuralism's problematisation of divisions between social processes and subjectivity. Finally, psychoanalysis provides an account of the continuity of the subject through its emphasis on past relations which is similar to post-structuralism's notion that the subject is constructed through discursive history rather than uninfluenced by external forces.

The foregoing discussion suggests a number of other possibilities where psychodynamic and post-structuralist concepts could be recalibrated to incorporate the insights of both. Language, a preoccupation of both schools, forms one such point. Some work has been done towards understanding psychoanalytic accounts of construction of self and world through stories (e.g. Spence, 1980). Hollway's (1989)
suggestion that the language of the unconscious is discursively constructed provides another useful way of incorporating the status of language.

A second module of potential overlap involves the different accounts offered by each theory of concepts of conflict, power and resistance. While these terms mean somewhat different things within the two paradigms, both pay attention to conflict and power. One of the tasks of this thesis is to articulate conflict and power through these two paradigms.

A third point of articulation becomes possible through Mitchell's (1988) concept of the relational matrix. If this conception were broadened to include social, economic and discursive relations, it would be possible to understand self in relation to other in more complex and politically useful ways.

A fourth preoccupation which also holds political implications regards locations of difference. Construction through difference is central to many psychoanalytic accounts, and it is this which feminist psychoanalysts have appropriated in order to offer feminist understandings of gender difference (Flax, 1993). Post-structuralism is similarly interested in the construction of difference through binaries. Difference (be it racial, gender or other) is a central political preoccupation and is inextricably linked to power. Theory which is able to draw on post-structuralist and psychoanalytic understandings of difference may offer new insights into this political preoccupation.

Henriques et al. (1984) warn that frequently levelled critiques against psychoanalysis should not be disregarded. Psychoanalysis does have bourgeois bases and has been criticised for the exclusivity of its practice. Its historical and cultural specificity also needs to be highlighted as well as its potential for biological essentialism and anti-feminism. Henriques et al. (1984) do add, however, that a critical approach to psychoanalysis can have potentially politically progressive sequela. They advocate subversive use of the theory, an acknowledgement of links to socio-cultural realms and removal of psychoanalysis away from the privilege of psychoanalysts into new and more relevant realms. It could be added that psychoanalysis needs to be depathologised if it is to enter more relevant realms, and needs sustained attention to points of overlap between psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, as well as consideration of the implications such overlap may hold.
METHOD

The method employed in this research is based on Foucauldian post-structuralism and discourse analysis. Hollway's (1989) innovative approach to research has been the predominant source of influence in the development of my methodology, as will become apparent. As Hollway (1989) points out, the distinction between method and theory is an artificial divide within this epistemology. Thus many of the ideas outlined in the section above overlap with issues of method. Similarly, while a division has been made between data, sampling and analysis, overlaps exist between each as is reflected below in descriptions of how each was approached. Methodology was thus largely a continuous process in which the relationship between data, analysis, the position of the researcher and issues of validity inevitably dialogue in interrogation of each of these aspects. Pilgrim (1990) argues that the struggles involved in research are seldom reflected in research reports. He implies that the consequence of presenting the research process as neat and defined elides the role of the researcher in the construction of research and prevents the researcher from articulating its inherent complexities. In reflecting on methodological issues here, an attempt is made to reflect the process of struggle since this is felt to be a central and valuable part of the research process.

Data

Theoretically, the 'data' that constitutes this analysis consists of the process of interaction between myself, my colleagues and PHCWs during the course of intervention. Data thus relies heavily on my own memory and my own subjective experience. While such methods of data collection contradict aspirations of 'objectivity' advocated by positivist paradigms of research, there is a growing body of literature which critiques such notions, arguing that 'objectivity' is an unattainable myth at best (Giddens, 1976). By embracing subjectivity, the researcher positions herself such that awareness of what she brings to the analysis is required rather than mystified (Mama, 1995). Recognizing inherent positions of the researcher and accepting these in order to undertake innovative methods is in line with post-structuralist discourse analytic research (e.g. Parker, 1992; Hollway, 1984; 1989). Parker and Burman (1993) argue that the boundaries between researcher and analysis are artificial since analysis is inevitably imbued with the researcher’s subjectivity. In the present context, the researcher is also the practitioner. Within a positivist paradigm, this would imply double lack of objectivity. It must be recognized that this situation slants the analysis in the
direction of the researcher's frame of reference; the status of my subjectivity in this research is revisited below. It is suggested, however, that my double role as practitioner and researcher has offered more opportunities for dialogical interaction and modification between myself and a number of other people involved in the process of development of this analysis. Analysis, in agreement with Hollway (1989), began forming from the beginning, and did not constitute a separate process to data collection.

In order to ameliorate selective and self-fulfilling understandings of the data (i.e. the process of intervention), data was collected in a reflexive manner such that the intervention was subjected to reflection from multiple parties at multiple points. This allowed me to analyse and modify my interpretation of events, when appropriate, through use of the perceptions of others. Formal sources of data used to dialogue with my own memories include:

1. Comprehensive case notes written by myself and my colleague
2. Case conference preparations and summary notes as well as case conference discussions in which a number of colleagues not directly involved contributed their understanding and questions to the process
3. Letters and written material used during the course of workshops (including handouts designed by ourselves and newsprint recordings of workshop discussion)
4. Case formulations
5. Notes on the supervision process in which the process of intervention was reviewed and discussed.

After initially planning to subject this written data to analysis, I realised that, unconventional though such research may be, the richness of the data was precisely in my memories. Having discovered that Hollway (1989) went through a similar process of "opportunistic data collection", I decided to use written data as locations of modification and mediation of my memories. Thus the focus of data is still on the text, in its pure form or as a locus of negotiation of my subjectivity. In order to further this negotiation, I engaged in a process of dialogue with colleagues in order to subject my memories and my emerging analysis of the data to external checks. One of the people most involved was a colleague, a Clinical Psychologist who studied with me during the time of the intervention, thus having indirect knowledge of the process. In this way, peer
debriefing was used in order to provide external checks on the process of data recall and analysis (Guba & Lincoln, 1985).

These attempts at verification, however, need to be located within the epistemological paradigm of this research. These are attempts to maximise the ‘truth’ of my memories within a post-structuralist framework which problematises notions of truth and suggests instead that multiple truths exist (Burr, 1995). While I have a responsibility to interrogate the power matrices and institutional imperatives existent in my own discursive formations (Burman, 1991), adherence to a Foucaultian form of analysis must also emphasise the co-constituting and bi-directional nature of power (Foucault, 1975). While this has complex implications for this research, it highlights a pertinent issue concerning data gathering:

Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction (Bakhtin, 1984:110 in Shotter, 1995:160).

I was not a passive observer of the process of intervention and neither were other participants. Analysis began before the intervention was complete and was ameliorated and negotiated together with participants throughout the process such that interpretations or assumptions I made were often able to be subjected to endorsement or rejection by participants themselves. We were thus subject to mutually producing discursive influences. Whatever data I draw upon for analysis consists of a complex network of dialogical interactions which, while it may never be accurate, can also never be exclusively my superimposition onto the process of intervention. Nonetheless, with the plethora of data available to me, some choices needed to be made regarding which data to choose for analysis.

**Sampling**

Sampling of the data required immersion into the texts available as well as the theoretical frameworks employed, and thus overlaps with data analysis (Hollway, 1989). Since two broad categories of data are available - formal texts and my informal experience of the intervention - an attempt was made to combine these when sampling data for analysis. I thus decided to sample moments of interaction in line with the research interest in issues of relationship and with instantiations of discursive practice. Such moments were highlighted through memory and interrogated through the available data.
case notes and other formal texts.

Sampling was therefore not based on statistical methods but followed Hollway's construct of "theoretical sampling" in which subjects or data are sampled in such a way as to gather rich data in order to maximise the quality analysis. Hollway (1989) devised criteria for sampling research participants which cannot be used here since moments of interaction, rather than subjects, are being sampled and for different purposes. In order to sample interactions capable of yielding rich data, the following criteria were employed:

1. Interaction or content sampled was characterised by contradiction in discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) or struggles around notions of truth.
2. Interaction elicited complex illustration of psychodynamic and/or discursive processes at play.
3. Interaction was imbued with meaning in terms of content and context.
4. Interaction was of emotional significance to the group (evaluated on the basis of their reactions) and/or to the practitioners involved.
5. Interaction took up time and thought in workshop sessions and/or in the supervision process.
6. If interaction took up neither significant time nor emotional energy, such silences or lack of analysis at the time may contribute to an understanding of the discursive and psychodynamic processes at play.

Although it could be argued that selection of data according to non-statistical sampling produces data which 'fits' preconceived researcher biases, discourse analysis rejects the notion that researcher bias can be controlled or eliminated (Burman & Parker, 1993; Woolgar & Ashmore, 1988). Hollway (1989) further argues that statistical sampling is not a necessary condition for generalizability, but that

a social theory of the subject implies that the information derived from any participant is valid because that account is a product (albeit complex) of the social domain. If this domain is analysed in its specificity, the resultant interpretation will be valid without the support of statistical samples; that is, without evidence that whole groups do the same thing (Hollway, 1982:183 in Hollway, 1989:15).

In this context, it is suggested that the kinds of struggles and experiences which
emerged during the course of this intervention may be related to similar struggles and experiences in other interventions precisely because of their relationship to the social domain and to shared political, emotional and discursive experiences of being South African.

**Method of Analysis**

As stated, the process of analysis began concurrent with the intervention and continued through a process of data immersion. The process of analysis, in line with research objectives, conforms to four interlinking goals. First, given the paucity of case studies available in the literature, a goal was to offer a descriptive analysis through tracking the process. This was done, secondly, in order to highlight psychoanalytic concepts and ways of working and thirdly to offer a critical post-structuralist analysis of the interaction. Fourth, in line with the goal of offering a critical reading with the benefits of theory and hindsight, attention was paid to the intersubjective field (cf Stolorow, Brandchaft & Atwood, 1987) - to the ways in which relationship was discursively and psychodynamically negotiated through the course of intervention. This fourth requirement implies as much emphasis on the actions and contexts of the practitioner as of participants. An ethic of reflexivity (Banister, 1995) was thus central to the analysis. In retrospect, given my investments (cf Hollway, 1983; 1984) in my own institutional and positional discourses, this was more difficult to do than I had imagined. While I have not de-centred myself from my beliefs and investments, I have endeavoured to avoid foreclosure of analysis by following techniques of offering enough description of the intervention so that my reading can be accepted or modified by the reader (Opie, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and by locating my analysis within the bounds of explanation rather than truth (Parker, 1992).

Data analysis was guided by the use of theoretical concepts. Thus, for example, Kleinian notions of splitting and projection were used as analytic tools (Hollway, 1989) or ‘discursive complexes’ (Parker, 1997) through which to interrogate the material. Similarly, Foucaultian notions of productive power and the link between language, knowledge, power and institutions (Foucault, 1975) provided a lens of focus through which to discuss the intervention. An initial attempt was made to divide the data into categories concordant with the theoretical concepts utilised, but it was felt that something of the flavour of the interaction was lost in this manner. Drawing on ideas from narrative analysis (e.g. Howard, 1991) it was decided to present the analysis of
each area of interest in chronological story format. The reason for this was twofold: firstly, this expresses issues of process which are central to the research and second, it maintains the integrity of how the story was initially constructed. Narrative analysts argue that people construct meaning of and in their lives through the construction of stories (Giddens, 1991; Sarbin, 1986).

Stories are habitations. We live in and through stories. They conjure worlds. We do not know the world other than as story world. Stories inform life. They hold us together and keep us apart. We inhabit the great stories of our culture. We live through stories. We are lived by the stories of our race and place. It is this enveloping and constituting function of stories that is especially important to sense more fully. We are, each of us, locations where the stories of our race and time become partially tellable (Mair, 1988:127 in Howard, 1991:192).

In presenting the analysis as storied process, interpretation is more able to demonstrate the dynamic processes as well as the discursive issues and shifts at play.

Stories are located within a number of different discourses, and thus vary dramatically in terms of the language used, the concepts, issues and moral judgements made relevant and the subject positions made available within them. In this way post-structuralism shades into narratology (Davies & Harre, 1990:46).

Focus does not remain, however, on the storied construction of intervention or on the process. A crucial goal of the analysis was to illustrate the relation between context and content (Hollway (1989). Thus analysis was conducted on several levels following Foucault’s (1971) understanding of discourse and discursive practices. This suggests that discourse does not only reside in language but also in a multiplicity of practices which feed into institutional and power relations. Fairclough (1989; 1995) provides a useful model for analysing discourse on a number of levels which appears based on Foucault’s (1971) explication of method. For Fairclough, discourse is not only text, but also context and the interaction between the two. Discourse can therefore be analysed on the level of *text* (in this case clinical notes and texts produced during the course of intervention) and on the level of *interaction* (which includes processes of production of discourse such as one party performing a play for another) as well as on the level of *interpretation* (which would involve how the actions, context and content of that play were interpreted by the various subjects involved). Finally, discourse needs to be interrogated on the level of *context*, which requires scrutiny of the social conditions of
production and interpretation. This approach will allow the intervention to be contextualised as a mutually constructed interaction situated within broader social, political and economic dynamics.

The link between analysis and theory is another central focus of my method. While a strict grounded theory approach, in which data informs the development of theory (e.g Berg, 1995; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) was not followed, analysis was informed by a constant interplay between data, existing theory and theory development. This was felt to be necessary for the research to go beyond description and to enter the possibility of being useful in other circumstances. Mama (1995) argues that the general processes through which subjectivities are constituted need to be theorised, if research is to be relevant for anyone other than the actual participants. This research pays more attention to relationship and intersubjectivity than to subjectivity, but the link between theorising general processes and developing theory remains. Weedon (1987:8) makes a similar point which has proven useful in orienting this research:

It is not enough to refer unproblematically to experience ... we need a theory of the relationship between experience, social power and resistance ...
Theory must be able to address experience by showing where it comes from and how it relates to material social practices and the power relations which structure them.

**Subjectivity and method: A reflection on the position of the analyst**

Discourse analysis can never merely report on discourses used by participants; there is concurrent production of discourse on the part of the researcher (Parker & Burman, 1993). The process of analysis is shot through with my subjectivity and with my agenda to present a way of working in community which is both psychodynamic and politically aware. Further, much of what constitutes my data consists of my own participation in the intervention. Hollway's struggle in this regard is useful (1982:235 in Hollway, 1989:22):

My commitment to participating in the research thus derives not only from the recognition that I am as appropriate a participant as any, but also that it is consistent with my analysis of the relations of research. By taking the same kinds of risks of disclosure and exploration as other people my position as researcher is more likely to be demystified.

51
Hollway (1989) further adds that the researcher's experience needs to be imbued with theory in order to separate analysis from opinion. Thus my subjectivity is understood as a part of the research and, furthermore, a part of the research process. While the task of attempting to delineate the method followed in this analysis is useful in explicating my major methodological concerns, it has been easier to set out such a method than to unerringly follow it. The process of post-structuralist analysis does not conform to a series of steps, but has required of me to embark on a recursive and reflexive analysis (Bannister, 1994) through "engaging in an interpretive relationship" with the data (Smith, 1995:18). The result is a suffusion of theory, method and experience which cannot be artificially separated.
ANALYSIS: HOW CAN THE INTERVENTION BE INTERPRETED USING POST-STRUCTURALIST AND PSYCHOANALYTIC IDEAS?
Psychoanalytic ideas were drawn upon throughout the intervention and through supervision in order to interpret, formulate and guide the direction of the process of intervention. Whilst post-structuralist ideas were not explicitly drawn upon during the process of intervention, these may have been implicitly present through a general focus on socio-political interplay as well as through the author's epistemological roots in post-structuralism. This section of the analysis thus aims to explicate how the interplay of these two epistemological strands guided the process of intervention and how these can be used post-hoc to deepen understanding of the process. Since the data available is extensive, one extended thematic process (running over 5 sessions but also arising later in the intervention) will be discussed in detail. Aspects of the rest of the process will be used to illustrate Kleinian concepts of splitting, issues of relationship and an extension of Bion's conception of group activities unconsciously reflecting broader organizational anxieties and preoccupations.

Sexual abuse
The first five sessions after our introductory session were focused, to varying degrees, on a case study of sexual abuse which one of the PHCWs was currently dealing with. These sessions can be read on at least two levels. Firstly the details of the case are important and the "reality" component exists that this was a series of events existing in the real world and of concern to the case worker in terms of her primary task (Bion, 1961). The following analysis, while not denying the importance of this level of meaning, focuses primarily on a second level of meaning. This relates to how this material might communicate something about the group itself and its antitask concerns (Bion, 1961). The sessions are described in sequence and interpreted in terms of psychoanalytic and post-structuralist methodological frameworks.

Discursive closure and emergent relationship
In the first session, PHCW's had named issues they wanted facilitators to deal with during the course of workshops. These were generally discrete issues related directly to their work, none of which involved abuse of any kind. Our second session with PHCWs was therefore directed at discussing the use of genograms. Unlike a therapy session in which the client is expected to bring the material, and there is an understanding that the selection of such material holds unconscious significance
(Casement, 1985), we determined the structure of the session.

In supervision afterwards, tracing interactions during the session, predominant themes of shaming, silencing and policing emerged. For example, members publicly shamed one another for having children out of wedlock. More subtle examples of shaming occurred through non-verbal communication. When discussing what motivated participants to become PHCW’s, for example, some participants who expressed altruistic rather than financial motivations were treated with silence, aversion of gaze, and a general feeling of disdain. This was in contrast to more powerful members who received admiration for expressing altruistic reasons. One participant offered her reasons in English rather than Xhosa. This act was followed by disapproving looks and murmured remarks from other members which positioned her as an outsider to the group, and which she appeared to experience as shameful. Such examples of explicit and implicit shaming pervaded group interaction. In addition, one clinician was silenced by being turned into an interpreter. One member, who tried to offer a sexual abuse case she was dealing with as material for genogram discussion, was silenced in Xhosa by other members such that only the Xhosa speaking clinician noticed the interaction. Discussion of this case was therefore policed out of workshop discussion. Towards the end of the session, she brought the case up again, but since many of the members were starting to leave, it was decided to postpone further discussion to the following session.

Employing a group psychoanalytic ear to this session, it can be postulated that the group was communicating something to us about the need to silence and police terrible secrets in order to conceal their own shame. Configurations of shame became performative communications. The act of members shaming each other could be interpreted as a display of their own feelings of humiliation under the surveillance of facilitators. Interestingly, this theme is linked to the case which was silenced, since this case is related to the shame of sexual abuse.

The case was about a mother who self-referred, describing herself as unhappy. The story unfolded as follows: Mother had questioned her husband because he had given their 18 year old daughter money to buy paraffin. This money was usually given to mother. Because she had questioned him, husband had beaten her up. Mother then revealed suspicions that daughter and father were "having an affair". A confrontation
of some sort developed and daughter attempted suicide. Mother therefore approached the case worker (B) because of her own unhappiness and distress.

A psychoanalytic listening would pay particular attention to this material that surfaced at the end of the session, when there was no longer time to pursue it. Following the notion that a communication may always be in part a communication about the self - a projection outwards of phantasised bad parts of the self - we may hypothesise at this point that the abuse, distress, secrecy and confusion evident in the case presented may also have been a communication, at these early stages of the relationship, of their fear of revealing and confronting these preoccupations in themselves and their organization. This is supported by the reactions of the group to the person attempting to discuss this case, through their active efforts to police her by foreclosing further discussion of the case. An advantage of such a psychoanalytic interpretation is that it provides clues regarding the nature of the emergent relationship, which at this stage, understandably, may have been characterised by the kind of suspicion and mistrust communicated in their interactions and in the silencing of issues of shame and emotional hurt.

A discursive reading of this material may deepen this understanding. Post-structuralists understand silence in terms of a policing of discourses. Foucault (1976), talking specifically about sexuality, implies that that which is most constructed as an object of silence, that which is most tightly policed, is often that which is of most preoccupation.

The production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role it is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous formidable materiality (Foucault, 1971, p.52).

The performance of silence in this interaction, however, was not akin to discursive silence which usually involves an elision of discourse from public speech. Rather, participants took part in a noticeable act of silencing, thereby highlighting discursive preoccupations to be avoided. The effect of these actions was to underline the subject matter which was deemed inappropriate to be explored. This act of silencing in the public realm (e.g. attempting to exclude further discussion of the sexual abuse case) corresponded with a focus on representation in a more intimate realm, such that most of the discussion of the case occurred between facilitators and two or three participants after the formal session had ended. When one considers the links made previously
between silencing and shame, the discursive imperatives of where and how shameful material may enter discourse appear to reinforce the shamefulness of talking about this case.

This offers hypotheses akin to those offered by psychoanalysis regarding the need to silence and police relational interaction, but extends ideas about preoccupation of abuse beyond the group to the level of the social and political. Central to post-structuralist method is a concern with matrices of power relations. Sexual abuse has been understood in itself as primarily an act of power (Vogelman, 1990). Discourses of abuse, therefore, may speak about power of one to hurt another (as father hurt mother and daughter and participants shamed one another). Overlaying psychodynamic principles of transference, in which material offered speaks also about the therapeutic relationship and other past relationships, the way in which this case was presented may also represent an unconscious message regarding our powerful position and its potential for abuse in a socio-political context in which power has, historically, been abusive.

The relational discursive communication may therefore speak to fear of the power of facilitators to be abusive. Foucaultian conceptualisations of the bidirectionality of power (Foucault, 1975) offer another possible level of analysis through a recognition that no subject and no discourse is completely powerless. Post-structuralism emphasises the bidirectionality of power (Foucault, 1975) and psychoanalysis the lack of distinction between subject and object (Klein, 1987). We may therefore postulate that this communication in the early stages of relationship was also about the power of what the group may do to us: the power of exclusion (analogous with the exclusion and silencing happening in the group), the power to abuse and, mirroring the group dismissing B and the Xhosa speaking clinician, the power to ignore.

Discursive analysis and psychoanalysis similarly share attention to the detail of how a narrative is presented. The way in which the PHCW presented the case to us (regardless of how it was presented to her, since she was offering us her construction) holds potential for access to psychodynamic and discursive meaning. It is significant to note that the injured party was presented as the mother and not the daughter, and that the main discursive concern was with the sanctity of the family. Of concern was, firstly that the father had contravened acceptable discursive practices by offering daughter the power of money and responsibility (to buy paraffin) rather than mother. This may be
interpreted as a contravention of implicit power relations. Secondly, father and daughter were engaging in a relationship, significantly not labelled as abusive but rather as mutual, which further contravened the matrix of power and which excluded mother. The layers of meanings resident in this description were elaborated on in further sessions and will be discussed in more detail. Of interest at this point of the emergent relationship is the possible interpretations available regarding the overlap of meaning between the narrative and the development of our relationship. It could be suggested that we were intervening in an existing system with existing rules about who does what and to whom, and that this system was in some way threatened by our entry. Perhaps there was a fear that we would stop PHCW's doing things traditionally within their realm (parallel to the act of buying paraffin) and possibly even take over and that our entry into the relational net would alter things such that relationships would change in insidious ways. Discourses of family sanctity were thus highlighted at this early stage, and were to subsequently return.

Such an analysis in the early stages of intervention may easily foreclose the dynamic and discursive issues involved, and thus should be entertained as a set of working hypotheses to be treated with flexibility. The detail of hypotheses presented here holds the advantage of hindsight, and it is debatable whether we would have been able to enter into such detail at the time, given our newness to the process and our lack of distance from it. Such an analysis, however, offers some indication of how discursive and psychodynamic formulations may be usefully analysed at the emergent phases, and may offer ideas about how the interaction may proceed.

An interlude: exclusion enacted
We arrived for our next planned workshop meeting to find the building locked up and abandoned. After waiting a while, we decided to leave. We wondered if this signalled a lack of interest, resistance to the process or disengagement. It later emerged that participants had prepared for us to arrive an hour earlier than the scheduled time, had waited almost an hour and then given up, concluding that we were not going to arrive. It was not clear why they thought we had changed the time from that agreed upon. Psychodynamically, an understanding of this interchange may signal anxiety on the part of participants prompting avoidance of the process (Hollway, 1989), and this was a possibility discussed in supervision. In order to understand this, we needed to review the psychodynamic themes regarding relationship and trust which had emerged in the
previous session. A more complex psychodynamic understanding of the particularities of this missed session may relate to psychoanalytic theorising of the infant’s interaction with the mother (J. Klein, 1987). By arriving early, it may be suggested that participants were wishing us into existence, setting us up for a phantasyed magical appearance and satisfaction of needs, which, due to the constraints of reality, were inevitably not fulfilled. In this way, their actions constructed us as capable of providing nurturance, but doomed to failure and doomed to become the withholding parent.

A frequently levelled criticism against psychoanalysis is that such an interpretation propagates a one-person view of the process (Stolorow et al., 1987) which does not take account of the role of the therapist/practitioner, but places meaning solely within the psyche and actions of participants. Overlaying a post-structuralist interpretation of events brings us into the discursive realm, if one understands action as communication and therefore as laden with discourse. A contradiction is inherent in the turn of events: we were waiting for them, hypothesising them to be avoidant while they were waiting for us, presuming us to have abandoned them. While we constructed them as resistant, they were communicating to us that they were eager for us to arrive, eager enough to wait a considerable period of time. We found ourselves in a catch 22 situation where communication was rendered impossible and where different discursive assumptions regarding causality became potentially irreconcilable. Drawing on the hypotheses of power relations raised in the previous session, this interlude could be seen as a discursive enactment of our power to withhold and their power to exclude. One may also wonder about a communication of an inability of the two parties to co-exist in the same space and place. This raises issues of the multiple points of difference between us and them, an issue which will be returned to below.

A binocular understanding of possible psychodynamic and discursive interpretations allows for a recognition of the emotional as well as social implications of this interaction. We may be cued to issues in the development of our relationship, to emotional fears which may have been involved as well as to social and political meanings. For example, the absence of the psychologists in this session may be connected to comments in a later session regarding the historical absence of psychologists in this community. This may imply that psychologists have typically been withholding and absent. Thus on a social, interpersonal and emotional level, communication could be understood as involving their own experience of parents, both political and personal, letting them down.
The following session: opening up of discursive space

We planned to use this session to open up space for B to discuss her case and to simultaneously introduce the genogram as a technique for understanding the stories of clients. We therefore asked B to describe the case as we constructed a genogram and opened this up for group discussion. In retrospect this offers opportunities for a discursive way of working. By focusing on a previously noted act of silencing or exclusion, we were opening discursive opportunities to interactively engage with it. B described the story in a similar way to her previous description, adding that the daughter had recently joined the family from the Transkei, that both parents drank a lot of alcohol and that father was receiving treatment for epilepsy. All these pieces of information became material for discussion in the group.

Participants engaged with this story in an emotionally invested, and blaming and rejecting manner. Discussion centred around who was to blame for the events. Much discussion centred around mother's drinking. There was a feeling that she was irresponsible to drink - a 'no good person'. The story was reconstructed around this information, with suggestions that father perhaps could not trust mother because she drinks, and thus was forced by her actions to turn to the daughter instead, relying on her to take care of the household duties and leaving the family system no choice but to incorporate daughter as a 'wife'. This also offered one possible explanation from the group as to why father and daughter were having sexual relations. Questions were raised about why daughter had recently been brought from the Transkei. It was suggested that this must have been mother's decision since mother wanted to hand over responsibility to the daughter. There was a suggestion that mother was lazy. Again, reasons for the current situation were constructed around her immoral actions which had directly precipitated father and daughter's sexual relationship.

At this point in discussion, the predominant emotional mood in the group was indignation and shock. One PHCW located this shock in mother, expressing outrage that mother could be thinking that her own daughter was sleeping with her husband. This raised questions about the composition of the family. Perhaps this was an attempt to assimilate the events in this family in a way that would not contradict the discourse of family sanctity. It was first questioned whether this daughter could be the real daughter of the parents. The unspoken implication of this seemed to be that father would never engage in sexual activity with his real daughter. Perhaps because this
explanation interacted with the powerful discourse of patriarchy, the next suggestion relocated blame back squarely within the realm of the bad mother. It was suggested that this mother was not the daughter’s real mother, since if she were, she would never say such terrible things about her daughter. Such reframing momentarily removed discussion from the sexual act, which no doubt was the site of much anxiety, and repositioned discursive energy onto a less threatening wrong-doing by implying that the transgression in this family could be defined around mother’s lies.

Aiming to open up possibilities within the discussion for more empathic responses, one of the facilitators asked the group who they were most worried about. The immediate initial response was that they were concerned about mother’s behaviour and they felt she was absolving responsibility. “Worry” was therefore constructed in terms of blame rather than care. Perhaps in order to support discourses of the breakdown of family sanctity while remaining positioned as caring health workers, attention then turned to father. Some participants were worried about father because he is epileptic (another indication of relocating the problem of concern away from the family and the sexual act). Others worried that he would not be fed because of mother’s alcohol use (his patriarchal rights would be unfairly contravened because mother has contravened the discursive imperative of appropriate behaviour for her position). It was felt that this would force him to trust the daughter more and would force the daughter to take on more household responsibilities. A tracing of the micro shifts in these explanations indicates that, after an initial focus on father, energy returned again to mother as the source of worry. At no point did daughter become the focus of discussion; no-one identified her as a source of worry and her suicide attempt was conspicuously absent from the entire discussion.

The agreed upon time for a break had arrived, and before adjourning, one of the facilitators said that she was most worried about the daughter because she must be very unhappy to want to commit suicide. This comment may be understood as a second attempt to open up discursive space for shift by introducing an alternative possibility into the hegemonic story. At this point, however, no discussion ensued.

We had previously decided, in response to our sense that the group wanted something more concrete from us, to undertake small group discussion after the break on the psychological development of children. Perhaps reluctant to change our structure, and perhaps also unconsciously feeling that the world needed to get back on track and thus
possibly colluding with the discursive demands of the group, we continued with this structure. The mood in these small groups was sombre, but no member returned to the previous anxiety-provoking discussion. Of interest to this discussion is that gender/power relations became a sub-theme in both of the small groups. For example, one of the four male participants related a story about beating his wife because she had not wanted to breast feed, while another male shamed a female participant by questioning the accuracy of what she was saying. Discussion in one group also arose around why children’s first words are generally ‘mama’ and not ‘tata’ (father).

Employing a group psychoanalytic ear to these utterances suggests that the previous discussion may have been concerned not only with the sanctity of the family, but also with acceptable gender relations and acceptable directions of violence. It is permissible to beat one’s wife with good reason, but it is not for the wife to reneg on her duties. This may add another level of understanding of the anxiety present in the previous discussion. The father’s sexual act may be simultaneously positioned within two contradictory discourses. Firstly, his actions evoke the (as yet unspoken) discourse of harm and contravention within the family in which the appropriate and expected place for PHCWs to position themselves involves their shock and disapproval. Contradictorily, however, is the discourse of the male prerogative in which the woman is seen as the man’s property and may be appropriately punished if she transgresses. Such patriarchally sanctioned ideas have been documented by Vogelman (1990) and Wolf (1997) amongst others. These authors trace historical practices in various cultures in which the woman who transgresses sexually is punished. Vogelman (1990), for example, notes that a man who rapes another man’s wife may be punished by the offended party (the wronged husband) raping the perpetrator’s wife in turn. This implies that patriarchal discourse entitles the man to take up a position of authority and power over the woman. Sexual and violent ownership within patriarchal discourse (such as the participant’s pride over beating his wife who refused to breast feed) may hold complex application in this case. This may explain the recursive return of discussion to the mother’s blame, since if this can be established, then the father’s act may be interpreted as punishment against her and thus justifiable in terms of the rules of patriarchal discourse. The transgression becomes one of disobedience rather than sex, a transgression which is familiar in common discourse and evokes less anxiety than the taboo around father-daughter sexual relations, much less sexual abuse. Further, unlike the alternative discourses of contravention and harm, this discourse does not require
moral outrage or empathy for the harmed party, and is thus more able to be smoothly incorporated into the subjectivity and emotionality of participants. This is not to suggest that participants chose the easy way out, but rather that in the face of emotional conflict, which undoubtedly had personal meanings and echoes for participants, the discourse requiring less emotional upheaval and less display of shame was chosen. The investment of participants in discussion and our assessment of their emotional reactions, however, leave little doubt that this contradiction was felt and struggled with on an unconscious level.

Psychodynamic and post-structuralist interpretations of this session thus suggest an important interaction between available discourses and defences. It is suggested that the discourses employed in this session acted as defences to ward off anxiety. It becomes clear that psychodynamic concerns are not divorced from the dominant discursive formations of a particular context, and that these are shared and supported in groups in order to manage both the discursive imperatives and the psychodynamic emotional invocations of a particular situation.

An additional level of analysis of this session involves how the subject matter relates to existing and past relationships in interaction with psychodynamic meaning. On an intergroup level, the group's blaming reflected the previously noted intergroup process of shaming and blaming; the blameworthy mother may have become a displaced object onto which they could act out and illustrate processes of blame and shame in the group. It is possible that the group were communicating to us their own feelings of shame, possibly related to their personal lives and to feelings about being abused as a community. On an organizational level, it is interesting that the group colluded in projecting blame onto the mother, particularly since most of them are mothers, as are most of their clients. Perhaps this buying in to patriarchal discourses represents a defensive response to a situation of perceived helplessness made available by political gender relations where mothers have little power and much responsibility. The splitting of good father and bad mother may have kept authority good while blaming the nurturant figure for what was going wrong. This evokes a possible interpretation of the politico-psychodynamic transference. South Africa's authority figures have historically been abusive in this community, and consequently nurturance levels low. Similarly fathers are imbued with authority and mothers with the role of nurturance. Keeping fathers good may have been the safest way of dealing with the issues around authority

62
they evoked, and blaming the mother for lack of nurturance may have provided an outlet for participants to project their own lack of nurturance. On another level, participants may have been acting out for us what they feared we would not understand, regarding what it feels like to be persecuted. Their blaming approach together with the horror of the story may, in terms of the therapeutic relationship, have represented an attempt by the group to show us the worst they could offer in order to see whether we could survive.

On the level of relationship it is interesting how we may also have paralleled characters in the lived story. The group may have feared that, like the mother, we would not take up responsibility and would not be nurturant but, like the father, we probably represented figures of authority and thus possible threat. Simultaneously, the group may have been communicating something to us in their portrayal of the daughter. The inclusion into the narrative of the fact that she moved from the Transkei locates her as an outsider, as we were, and an outsider capable of destruction of the fibre of the family network. A psychoanalytic interpretation offers the possibility that we were viewed as the outsiders capable of such base destruction.

As facilitators at the time, we found ourselves in a moral dilemma regarding how to respond to values radically different from our own. We thought about introducing a workshop on the effects of sexual abuse in order to empower participants to take up a more empathic and less persecutory stance in relation to the case. We decided that this may have denied important feelings and may have served to contain our own anxieties rather than theirs. Following psychoanalytic techniques, we decided that "if we can tolerate the feelings long enough to reflect them, and contain the anxieties they stir up, it may be possible to bring about change" (Halton, 1994:17). This allowed us to listen to what the participants were saying as a communication of anxiety rather than as the truth of what they believed. A post-structuralist framework would aid in shifting the clinician's understanding of what is said from a description of the only truth for the client to an offering of one possible truth chosen because of the discursive and emotional constraints of the situation. It is suggested that this stance offered participants opportunities to negotiate with dominant discourses and try out discursive shifts in an environment able to tolerate this.
Opening up of emotional space: discursive and emotional shifts

In the next session, we provided little formal structure, and participants spoke more about the case. Two new pieces of information prompted them to shift from a blaming position to one connected with shock and pain. The daughter was 14, and not 18 as they had thought, and had made two suicide attempts, not one. The first time she had tried to drown herself. The second attempt was prompted when daughter came home to find mother absent. She therefore took an overdose of pills. When explaining to mother afterwards, she said she had been scared that mother was not home because father had beaten mother up because father wanted her instead of mother. She then confirmed that father had been sleeping with her. Mother then sought help from the street committee, who felt it was the PHCW's job to deal with the case. The PHCW referred the case to social workers who in turn referred the case to the police. Father was arrested but released on bail and started threatening mother and daughter. Mother and daughter were then asked to give statements to the police, who asked the PHCW to accompany them. The PHCW said this was not part of her job and referred them to the social worker.

The rest of the session was spent discussing this situation, with a high degree of emotion present in the group. The reaction was initially one of shock and disbelief. In particular, disgust and anger were directed towards the father, with some participants agitatedly advocating that father should be killed. By the time we reached time for a break, the predominant emotion was sadness, and this endured after the break when we broke up into small groups. Towards the end of the session, hopelessness, frustration and disbelief regarding both father's behaviour and that of the authorities was palpable.

In retrospect, a psychoanalytic understanding of this interaction raises a number of issues. By understanding their initial reaction as part of a process involving the necessary expression of anxiety, aggression and splitting, we avoided categorising their responses as "attitudes" and thus opened space for their later exploration of these reactions. An intrapsychic and interpersonal understanding cued us to wonder whether their previous rejection, and later anger, may be related to their own experiences of abuse. Rape Crisis Cape Town estimated in 1994 that one woman is raped in South Africa every 34 seconds. Further subjective experiences of being abused are likely to have been prominent amongst the group on a number of levels. Avoidance of naming

64
abuse in workshops may therefore have been related to similar personal avoidance, making the confrontation of abuse more emotional and more frustrating.

The discursive and emotional shift in the group was palpable. A discursive reading of this shift, paying attention to shifts in the construction of narrative, suggests that the two new pieces of information supplied by mother may have had an impact on the group's construction of the story. Perhaps the younger age of the daughter and her more frequent suicide attempts (complete with details in the narrative) made it possible to construct the daughter as more vulnerable and therefore to prompt a shift of blame to father. Further, this narrative is presented a new perspective on the mother's story. Perhaps by giving the group access to mother's subjectivity as well as daughter's, participants were able to reincorporate their projection of blame onto mother related to their own lack of nurturance. This may have allowed a negotiation of their denial of sexual abuse. In relation to discourses of family responsibility, this retelling may have stressed how mother was beginning to take daughter's plight seriously, thus prompting the group to do the same and to identify with the sadness of the case. The hopelessness and frustration which followed is akin to Klein's (1935 in Hinshelwood, 1989) "depressive position". However, this seemed to leave the group with little recourse. It could be understood that their anger towards the system and towards father, while justified, was also a displacement of their anger outwards because of their difficulty tolerating incorporation of these depressive feelings.

An additional aspect of the way in which the story was constructed seems central. In the initial telling, the PHCW traced a recursive devolution of responsibility from one institution to the next, with no-one prepared to take full responsibility. This communication may have worked on a number of levels. On a realistic level, institutional support in this community has been historically poor from a number of quarters, from police failing to intervene, to low conviction levels and little support for survivors of sexual abuse. This level is distant from participants' own responsibilities and was almost exclusively focused upon. By locating anger outwards as well as locating the workings of power within an impenetrable social network of abuse, the daughter's abuse and their own becomes related to abuse by the institution. Participants were able to become morally outraged but nonetheless positioned themselves as powerless in the face of insurmountable odds. The next level, of course, is that PHCWs were implicated through their contact with this case in the withholding and helpless network of institutions as
responsible for making some kind of difference to the story's ending. Besides the case worker's assertions in her initial telling that this case demanded more than her job required, there was a distinct absence of discussion about the role of the PHCW in such a case. A psychoanalytic understanding would suggest a projection of responsibility and displacement of anger outwards in order to defend against the anxieties elicited by entertaining a notion that they might hold direct responsibility. While this operates on the level of the task of the organization, it also possibly creates a division between abuser and abused in which they could avoid identifying themselves as possible abusers, since their lack of action may have been related to their feeling overwhelmed by the case and by personal experiences of abuse the case may have elicited in the group.

Facilitators are also implicated in the discourse of institutional failure. We represented the institution of psychology, an institution meant to help people negotiate trauma, yet all we were doing was encouraging PHCWs to engage with this case themselves. During this workshop, we as facilitators did not focus on this level of meaning. Partly, it did not occur to us since our framework was one of consultation in which the aim is to empower workers emotionally and technically to take on the work themselves. Simultaneously, it may be that the helplessness of this case elicited powerful feelings in ourselves. The fact that it did not even occur to us that the group may have thought the institution of psychology should play a more active role in this case may have represented our own denial. Our focus on their emotional reactions may have partly been a projection of our own. Our role in workshops may therefore also have been co-constitutive of the process, and had we shared our own emotional reactions to this case, further discursive and emotional space may have been opened up for the group.

This process whereby we came to be seen as complicit in the devolution of responsibility demonstrates the contradictions in the process of building relationship. While the subtext, as we were later to discover, included messages of breakdown in relationship attached to our role of power, other aspects of this session indicated on a conscious and unconscious level that the relationship between group and facilitators had begun to deepen. The degree of trust in revealing their emotions was strikingly more open than in previous sessions. It could be argued that the group were merely discursively aligning themselves to us by offering us the discourses of emotionality that we would approve of, and that this accounted for the shift from blame to empathy and
from denial to confrontation. This interpretation of 'pleasing us' nonetheless points to a development in the relationship. A psychoanalytic overlay of this discursive interpretation holds the advantage of recognizing that not only discourses, but emotions and motives are contradictory, and that it is possible that their response in the session indicated a deepening of relationship coexistent with a depth of feeling not directly related to the transference relationship.

Two micro-incidents may illustrate the flavour of the emerging relationship, and its complex interplay of acceptance and rejection of us. First, we were offered coffee for the first time. This was probably not a response to etiquette, and in the course of the process came to mark sessions in which participants felt contained. At the time we interpreted this as a reciprocation of nurturance and a communication of acceptance of us. Coffee is an expensive commodity in a cash-strapped organization and is also a symbol of comfort and of sharing. Thus meaning and interaction happens not only in conversation and in workshop material but in action as well.

The second incident involved an interaction between two group members during small group discussion. Group members, including the organization's co-ordinator, were discussing how they imagined the mother and daughter must be feeling. A group member then said she agreed with the co-ordinator, calling her by her first name. There was a shocked silence and the group member trailed off, saying she was too embarrassed to remember what she had wanted to say. The participant had violated a taboo by calling the co-ordinator by her first name rather than calling her 'sisii' [sister]. The effect of violating this taboo was a silencing of and self-conscious withdrawal from the case and the empathic response it had elicited. Psychoanalytic understandings of this interaction may trace the process as an enactment of the disastrous effects of proceeding into another person's pain, implying that such a positioning endangers the existing structure. This interaction signalled the danger of the territory they were entering. Because they were entering this in relationship with the facilitator, issues of the transference relationship arise. The implication extends that our presence was dangerous to the existing order, and that hierarchically accepted relationships were particularly at risk. This is reminiscent of an enduring theme in the previous session regarding the sanctity of the family, and the chaos of family breakdown.

Thus while this session represented an intensification of trust in our relationship from
both sides (since we were also able to commit more to their employment of a similar discourse to ourselves), this was not unequivocal. If one understands every interaction in the session as a possible unconscious reflection of the group's primary anxiety (Bion, 1961), then this interaction may have represented an anxiety about our relationship and about the consequences of proceeding. This does not invalidate the trust that has been gained or the experience of group members of being in a containing relationship. Rather, this is understood as an important part of the working through of their own emotional issues and as indication of the process of the group challenging dominant discourses about the existing order. Despite the brevity of this interaction, it appears to hold clues for the continuation of the process into the next session.

**Discursive and emotional splitting: A continuation of the process**

After these sessions, we thought little about what the group may have been communicating about our relationship in the intervention, although a retrospective analysis suggests that relationship issues were central. We expected the group to be overwhelmed by their feelings and to retreat to a point of rejection, and this is what happened. The next session dealt with issues around whether mental health work was part of their job or not, with emergent feelings of inadequacy, hopelessness, rejection and frustration about the lack of an easy answer to this kind of work. The session was framed by high absenteeism, a clear statement at the beginning of the session that people were stressed and tired because it was month end and, for the first time in the process, a request to end the session early.

This session demonstrated a number of shifts in conversation and process which illustrate how listening to the process for discursive and psychodynamic meaning can deepen understanding of the interaction. These processes will be traced through emphasis on the discursive shifts that occurred. Implications of this for psychoanalytic work will then be explored. The following table summarises the major shifts that occurred during the session. Each will be discussed in more detail.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Discursive meaning/shift</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Solution &quot;not a pill&quot;</td>
<td>Aligning with our discourse</td>
<td>Aligning and pleasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. PHCWs as outsiders to the family</td>
<td>Valorisation of family</td>
<td>Excluding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural demands &amp; intrusion</td>
<td>Marking difference and exclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of skills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Referral needs</td>
<td>Someone else's problem</td>
<td>Resisting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychologists should start a clinic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Police and social workers problematic</td>
<td>Someone else withholds solution</td>
<td>Resisting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Differences between psychologists and social workers</td>
<td>Idealisation of psychologists</td>
<td>Idealisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. PHCWs need more skills</td>
<td>Facilitators need to give more</td>
<td>Neediness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help with cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After end of session:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We're cheating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We're lying and withholding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Process of Session Five

Discussion about whether mental health work was the job of PHCWs or not began with the kinds of comments often taught in counselling skills workshops. One person, for example, said that mental health work was different to the kind of work they normally do because what was needed was not a solution, like a pill. Rather the PHCW needed to listen and resist giving advice but help the client reach their own solution. Similar themes emerged regarding psychological work, but at this point people did not engage with whether they should be doing this work.

As they spoke about what was involved, however, the argument became less and less possible as the discussion shifted to markers of difference as obstacles. The shift was marked by a discussion about how an outsider cannot know what is really going on inside a family. This positioned PHCWs as outsiders unable to access beyond the sacred boundaries of the family. Another marker of difference was then added: one person noted that within their culture, it is difficult for an older person to disclose
personal details to a younger person, particularly if that person is regarded as a stranger or outsider. Similarly it is considered rude for a younger person to be intrusive. These two arguments together produced a discursive shift from engagement to a position of unavoidable impossibility of PHCWs engaging at all. Because these arguments draw on broader social discourses, they attained a truth status difficult to negotiate. This allowed the shift from talking about what a PHCW would need to do to talking about how actually embarking on such work would represent an intrusion into the family. A participant noted that sometimes a PHCW thinks something is wrong in a family, but the family say that nothing is wrong. The implication here was that the PHCW must therefore have made an incorrect assumption. Through this series of shifts around difference and exclusion, the valorisation of the family was reinstated and the notion of PHCWs doing counselling work became a discursive minefield.

This was enforced by comments about PHCWs' lack of skills, which perhaps prompted the next discursive shift to externalise the problem onto someone else. Participants said they needed good referral sources, which were sparse in their community. When one of the facilitators explored whether participants envisaged themselves taking on this kind of work (a shift of responsibility back onto them), the suggestion came up that facilitators set up a clinic at the organization staffed by psychologists. Responsibility was shifted back onto us. This was backed up by a discussion of how the police were often corrupt and how social workers were overworked and often inefficient. Externalisation of the problem and our implicit refusal to become directly involved shifted discussion back to discussion of withholding institutions who would not provide a solution.

At this point it could be argued that this externalisation prompted a splitting between PHCWs and other institutions who were refusing to take responsibility, thus shifting emphasis from their own responsibility to the failure of others. Klein's (1946 in Hinselwood, 1987) understanding of splitting entails a separation of good and bad so as to avoid contamination from the bad object as well as retaliation from the good object. By splitting us from them, it is suggested that a fear arose that we would retaliate in some way. The next discursive shift indicates an attempt to keep us good and idealised. A discussion arose about how our workshops had taught the group the difference between social workers and psychologists. This discussion clearly positioned psychologists as superior. If one traces the progression of the session, this theme does not relate to the predominant theme of the session, which highlights the possibility that
this shift may have been a response to anxiety. One of the differences mentioned was that a social worker would not care what happened to the family while a psychologist would try to understand everyone in the family and explore the problem from different angles before taking it to the police. This idealisation, however, was accompanied by what could be understood as a veiled accusation as discussion turned to how participants had never had contact with psychologists before because psychologists had never come to Khayelitsha.

Our powerful position, both situationally and historically, perhaps prompted participants to construct us as good objects, although unconscious meanings regarding markers of difference and our abnegation of responsibility indicated that participants may have been furious with us for forcing them to confront such difficult issues. Their discussion of markers of difference referred to them as outsiders in relation to their clients. A transferential understanding would suggest a communication that we were the outsiders, incapable of communicating with our clients, themselves. We could be understood as intruders into their social order and facing a considerable cultural divide. In the session itself, this anger at us was translated into need, as the session ended with a plea for more skills and a continuation of the process in which we could help participants discuss their cases. While these comments were probably reality based and also perhaps indicated a commitment to our continuing relationship, the comments which emerged after the session closed indicates that there were coexistent emotions of anger towards us.

After the session closed, two participants approached one of the facilitators, accusing us of cheating the group by not really teaching them what we know. One of the participants said she had been under the impression from the beginning that we were to set up a clinic and deal with clients ourselves, and that she had not expected that we would be working with them in order for them to do this work. We had discussed expectations at the beginning of the process, but it is possible that a number of people had different expectations they felt unable to voice. Of psychodynamic importance is how these comments culminated the shifts through the session related to communications about relationship. Participants simultaneously aligned with and idealised us while rejecting and accusing us.

Relationship issues were thus central. One of the politico-psychoanalytic processes this
may illustrate involves what could be termed the political transference. In the face of deprivation and helplessness, we had become depriving and persecutory like the persecutory parent state which failed to provide for their nurturance needs, failed to provide services and perpetrated gross acts of abuse against the community. This broader political process has been mirrored in state services and we had come to represent those in power. Perhaps a psychoanalytic listening to displacement of anger onto an unproviding social work and police force in the previous session would have helped us to hear their anger towards us as well. Since it was impossible to accuse or retaliate against the political parent, they responded to us transfentially because the feelings being evoked were reminiscent of continuing and formative experiences of abuse in their communal experience, much like individual continuing and formative experiences are repeated in individual therapy (cf. Stolorow et al., 1987).

Besides for relating to both political and psychodynamic processes, we suggest that the notion of the ‘political transference’ must also incorporate recognition of reality and fantasy. While we may have become withholding because of projection of participants’ feelings of powerlessness and abuse, there is also a strong reality component that their current (and not only past) community needs are not being adequately met. Anger directed at us may therefore have been a projective anger at themselves as well as realistic anger which found little channel for expression elsewhere. The metaphor of ‘spitting out’ that we used to describe parts of the process may thus have been a spitting out of the bad, but also an enacting spitting out which opened a new arena for acting. Through relationship, they could reject us in ways they were powerless and inexperienced to do to the parent state. Thus enactment of resistance within the therapeutic relationship may offer new experiences towards resistance elsewhere. In this sense, psychoanalysis and post-structuralism uncomfortably merge. Psychoanalysis often sees resistance as something to be analysed away (Stolorow et al., 1987) while post-structuralism understands resistance as a necessary force in the matrix of power, and often an appropriate one. The possibilities of politico-psychoanalysis suggest a need for tolerance of resistance and exploration on a political and social as well as intrapsychic level.

Interpretation of these sessions illustrates how a politico-psychodynamic approach is able to articulate emotional, social and political issues on a number of levels in order to avoid abnegation of broader issues in a purely psychodynamic approach and
abnegation of psychodynamic issues through a purely political approach. The interplay between politics and psychodynamics needs further attention, and raises a number of implications for future work.

Practising politico-psychoanalysis
The foregoing interpretation has offered possibilities for community work which pays attention to both psychoanalytic and discursive meaning. Crossing the divide between the epistemological paradigms that have traditionally separated community psychology from psychoanalysis raises questions of both a political and psychodynamic nature. It is suggested that a binocular focus on the interaction between unconscious and conscious levels of meaning, on the one hand, and the dialectic between personal and political or discursive meanings, on the other, may prove useful in the integration of these various concerns into a framework that might adequately respond to the needs of community work.

The preceding description offers an example of how session material may offer an unconscious reflection of the organization's anxieties and preoccupations (Obholzer & Zagier Roberts, 1994). Through the process of the sessions, participants enacted the meanings of working with a particular client in relation to the personal as well as organizational meanings this client evoked. It is argued that this formulation can be extended to an understanding of how session material reflects unconscious anxieties and preoccupations on a political level as well. Psychoanalysis therefore needs to be extended to incorporate the parent state into the 'family' and history of participants. In this sense it could be understood that the recursive process of relationship in which acceptance and exclusion were simultaneously played out related to the building of a relationship with us but also a reflection of broader preoccupations. Thus transferential issues of abuse may have been related to personal abuse, abuse in the community, feelings that working in this community became at times intrusive and abusive as well as broader political abuses. An important implication for practice is that the experience of resistance in relationship may open up discursive possibilities for resistance elsewhere.

Metaphors of environment and context thus become important tools for understanding process and relationship. For example, we hypothesised during the intervention that transience appeared to be a central metaphor to describe our relationship and that this
seemed to mirror broader processes in the organization and the community. First, group members attended sessions in an unpredictable manner. On an organizational level, funding for the organization threatened to become transient, thereby threatening the existence of the organization. On a community level, the population of the area is nomadic with new people frequently arriving searching for better options and existing community members leaving. The shack dwellings in which people live are transient, temporary and vulnerable to external threat. With little to rely on, one would expect the process of relationship to reflect this impermanence. A community psychologically based intervention aimed at empowering PHCWs to work with other community members needs to take this dynamic into account.

Psychodynamic understanding, then, aids in understanding and interacting with the emotional world of participants. Understanding of discourse and discursive shift positions such understanding within the realm of the social. Participants in these sessions were not only struggling with emotional reactions to an emotionally demanding case, as well as the echoes this interaction held for broader issues of context and relationship. They were also struggling with dominant discourses of power and truth which bade them maintain existing power relations. This was also done within the context of the intervention process which was itself imbued with imperatives and power relations. The importance of paying attention to discourse and discursive shifts lies again in its possibility for finding spaces, through dialogue, for opening up pockets in discourse for resistance and shift.
ANALYSIS: HOW CAN POST-STRUCTURALIST AND PSYCHOANALYTIC IDEAS OFFER A DEEPER CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTERVENTION?

The foregoing interpretation opens new possibilities for ways of thinking about community work in South Africa which are not straight-jacketed by the imperatives of individualism and self-determination. In order to prevent such interpretation from becoming yet another powerful voice foreclosing truth, however, it is necessary for analysis to shift focus towards a deeper self-reflexive and self-critical stance. The analysis presented below critically explores aspects of the intervention. First, the intervention is contextualised within sites of power and resistance, including language, culture and institutions. Second, the role of the interpreter is explored, as the use of interpreters is regular in many kinds of psychology work in South Africa. Finally, we revisit the first session of our intervention in order to trace the discursive and relational imperatives set up here that to some extent framed the intervention.

Sites of power and resistance
Language
Post-structuralist theory concerns itself with the ways in which language constructs our experience of and interactions with the world (Burr, 1995). In the context of a multilingual South Africa, the already complex issue of language is overlaid by the fact that the majority of psychologists speak a language different from the majority of clients (Seedat, 1997). While all our participants could understand English, many were reluctant or unpractised in speaking it. The act of speaking English positioned them as inadequate and made them feel inferior. All workshops were conducted through interpretation, with a pattern emerging that PHCW's who spoke English during workshops were usually expressing some kind of knowledge which was felt to be superior to that of the group. An English speaking participant could thus align him or herself with the status of English as traditionally a language of knowledge and superiority. In contrast, a number of people approached both the Xhosa speaking and English speaking facilitator after workshops and spoke in English. These communications often seemed to be an act of connection and the use of English at these times could be understood as an act of making extra effort to communicate and thus to relate. Thus participants' relation to English was not simply a relation to another language but a dynamic engagement with power relations at play, both between and within the group.
Similarly, participants' act of speaking Xhosa was not simply used as a vehicle of communication. At times, participants spoke actively amongst themselves, and when asked what they were talking about, gave vague replies such as "we're talking about today's workshop". The use of Xhosa was thus an effective excluding mechanism which had the effect of placing the English speaking interpreter in the position of being "stupid" (cf Sinason, 1992). Sinason (1992), talking about mental handicap, notes that at times mentally handicapped individuals are more "stupid" than at other times - a process which she calls secondary handicap and which she likens to a continuum we are all familiar with. It is suggested that in this case, Xhosa became a powerful means of exclusion which projected participants feelings about feeling "stupid" when they spoke English. While these struggles clearly relate to language and power, it is suggested that they also provided a vehicle for expression of other emotional processes happening in the group. Also, the act of speaking Xhosa allowed participants to resist the power of the facilitators and the institutional hegemony they represented.

A question arises regarding whether effective community work can be done through interpretation. Many have argued that the ideal would be for same language psychologists to do this kind of work (e.g. Swartz, 1996b) since this circumvents language difficulties. While there is merit in this idea, it could be argued that this view understands language as merely a vehicle of communication rather than as an active, dynamic and constructive concept. Of striking interest in this intervention was that there was an English speaking facilitator as well as a facilitator speaking the same language as participants. This did not however obviate participants positioning the Xhosa speaking facilitator in terms of difference. Towards the beginning of the intervention, a few participants said to her that they could not understand her language as she speaks a different, and inferior, dialect to them. Her dialect was not markedly different to that of participants, implying that this communication was a marker of relationship. This communication may have been a communication of other points of difference (particularly regarding level of education). It implied a warning that she should not see herself as the same as participants. Again, language was used in the construction of power relations, with participants possibly resisting her institutional power by denigrating her language. The solution of abandoning the use of interpretation in intervention in favour of same language facilitators, as well as being unrealistic in terms of resources, implies that language is a mere instrument. It is suggested that issues of power are central to community work, and that language is merely one of the places in which sites
of struggle emerge.

Language does, of course, play a crucial role in levels of understanding. While this was more of a difficulty for the non-Xhosa speaking facilitator than for participants who could understand English, the difficulties of a multilingual context place interactive understanding in jeopardy. The interpreter is central in this relationship, as will be discussed below. There were inevitably times where communication was not optimal. It is easy for this level of misunderstanding to both interact with and be misinterpreted by psychoanalytic meanings. For example, after one workshop in which relational connection was tenuous, participants threw away a handout we had made for them. We had produced the handout with the intention of offering something concrete as requested by the group. We interpreted this action as a possible rejection of relationship. The handout was, however, in English, and it may have been that such a tool was simply of no use to them. Another incident occurred in our termination session, along with all the emotional issues termination often evokes. We had jointly decided to hold a party to signal closure. During this, one of the participants suggested a game of broken telephone, in which a message is whispered from one person to the next. By the time all have received the message, it is usually distorted beyond recognition. This was conducted in English and included facilitators' participation. While on the one level this may have been a summation of the process during the year, symbolizing stilted and inaccurate communication, it also resonated with a session that had occurred a few weeks previously in which listening skills had been the focus. This session had been one of the highlights of the process, and signalled a sense of understanding on behalf of participants. This metaphorically captures how language difference can become a site of confusion, a site of power and resistance, but also a site of sharing, even when client and practitioner do not understand one another's words.

Thus despite language differences, there were some sessions in which facilitators and participants connected and shared experiences. We also committed to reflecting with the group on the process of interpretation and attempting to communicate a willingness to overcome language barriers. It is suggested that psychological intervention in a multilingual context is not only possible but potentially productive if the practitioner occupies an active stance of reflexivity, a commitment that the process is made more difficult in a multilingual setting and a recognition regarding the complex power relations at play.
Culture and geography

Cultural difference represents another possible divide in community psychology work in which practitioner and client occupy different cultural positions. Again, understanding the flexibility of culture is important in avoidance of reifying cultural differences as insurmountable entities. It is noted above that the assumption that people from the same language background will inevitably be seen as similar does not necessarily hold. Analogously, including a psychologist of the same culture as participants in an intervention is not an easy way out of difficulties of cultural difference. It does not erase other differences that exist. It is suggested that cultural homogeneity is rare in South Africa, and that cultural differences exist even within a group (Long & Zietkiewicz, 1998). Nonetheless, the perception of all parties involved that the English speaking facilitator came from a culture different to that of participants was prevalent and shared.

In line with post-structuralist theory, it is suggested that ‘culture’ be understood not as a bounded entity, but rather as a narrative and location of the construction of identity. Within an understanding of what it means to belong to a certain culture coexists a number of discourses which serve particular functions (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and which gain people access to certain identities (Woodward, 1997). This notion will be explored in relation to the intervention by examining two interactions which relate to the notion of a ‘cultural argument’. One of the difficulties with a notion of ‘culture’ is that members of that culture excuse behaviours by arguing that these are part of their culture. The implication is that such behaviours are therefore natural, beyond criticism and such that it becomes impossible to argue against them. One of the more extreme forms this argument often takes is that female circumcision is a cultural practice and therefore cannot be challenged.

The first incident has been discussed above and presents the cultural argument that outsiders cannot invade families and younger people cannot intrude upon the affairs of older people. The effect of this was to protect participants from engaging in work which is emotionally demanding and to serve as a defence against the overwhelming emotional issues sexual abuse cases evoke. Simple acceptance of the cultural argument would ignore a number of interactive, organisational and emotional issues at play and would have circumscribed a necessary process of coming to grips with the demands of psychological work.
The second incident is remarkable in its refusal to employ the cultural argument. A number of South African clinicians have noted how Rogerian based listening skills of reflection, empathy and avoidance of giving advice are often rejected on the grounds that there is a cultural imperative in townships for counsellors to tell their clients what to do. One of the reasons we delayed workshops on counselling skills until late in the process when a stronger relationship had been formed was prompted by such a discussion with a fellow clinician. She had previously conducted a counselling course at the same organization and, amongst other things, reported a resistance to counselling skills based on the cultural argument. In contrast to her experience, our session on listening skills was well received by this group. They volunteered that many people in their culture do not listen. The notion that one has to be directive in order to fulfill cultural imperatives was not understood by them to be subjectively true. Part of the session involved experientially based exercises in which participants listened to one another badly and then listened well. This experience of being listened to was one that was frequently mentioned in evaluation as an experience which helped them to connect to being better listeners. The fact that the same organization which had previously rejected this on the basis of cultural argument was now embracing this on the basis of emotional experience, with no reference at all to the cultural argument, may indicate that their experience of being contained in this session obviated the necessity of calling upon the cultural argument. This suggests that, at least some of the time, such arguments are used discursively and as defence.

It has been suggested that 'culture' is a concept which should not be taken as a rigid definition or a factual entity. Culture does, however, influence our construction of identity (Woodward, 1997). Understanding it as a social construction does not eliminate the subjectively real meanings it holds for all parties involved. South Africa, due to its unique history of forced removals, places culture in a particular geographical location. The Group Areas Act dictated that certain areas be created for people from other 'cultures' to the dominant one; these areas or 'townships' were traditionally situated on less desirable land and often far enough away from central business districts to facilitate labour but prevent contact. While such boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred since South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, the area in which PHCW's worked remains a firmly classifiable township. Differences between facilitators, who worked and lived in a more affluent area, and participants, thus played itself out geographically. While the effects are undoubtedly numerous, focus here will be on some
of the metaphorical influences geographical location had on facilitators.

Our fortnightly travel from what felt like one world to another marked time and often came with a sense of displacement. Entering this township involved entering a location of fragile and debilitated shacks interspersed with makeshift shops and a landscape strikingly different to my realm of experience. I would prepare myself for a shift from my familiar surroundings to a space where, both contextually and psychically, I felt at sea most of the time. Interestingly, the Xhosa-speaking facilitator, who was not as foreign to these surroundings, felt a similar shift. Driving home after the session had ended, we invariably felt hungry and sought out cake or milkshakes as soon as we returned. We would sit eating our cake and discussing the session, and reflected back on this as an informal debriefing session. This illustrates most intensely for me how cultural difference was felt on a subjective level. It holds important implications for community work, which often occurs in unfamiliar contexts. Central to the process of engagement with participants involves an understanding, integration and acceptance of feelings on the part of facilitators of being out of their depth and off balance. During my first few visits, this experience of foreignness together with my frustration at understanding so little of the verbal interaction convinced me that the differences were so vast as to make community work impossible. When participants and I found ways of connecting nonetheless, I recontextualised my experiences as a necessary journey towards client and practitioner meeting on more levelled ground than would have occurred had participants travelled to us instead. Recognition and negotiation of geographical shift as well as the vulnerabilities of practitioners thus contributes to negotiation of difference.

**Expert knowledges and the institutional imperative**

Community psychology theory urges the practitioner to recognize the expert knowledges that participants possess (Orford, 1992) and to underplay one’s own expert knowledge. Recognition of participants’ expert knowledge as community members and as PHCWs with medical knowledge became an important part of building relationship. Our own expert status, however, cannot be overlooked, both in terms of the knowledge we had access to from our tertiary education as well as participants’ perceptions that we had knowledge we were not bestowing. Our status as representatives of the institution of psychology thus became an additional marker of difference which set up power relations and differential status existent no matter how much we tried to undermine them. Swartz (1996a) implies that the practice of denying one’s own expert status is a patronizing act
which merely denies the training that psychologists have had. It is suggested in relation to this analysis that a framework which valorises the knowledge of community members denies the emotional components of choices made in the name of knowledge, and that such a framework possibly misses out on the subtleties of interaction.

For example, one of our sessions was prompted by participants’ previous conflation of a “slow” child with a “sad” child. It could be argued that PHCWs had voluminous exposure to children with both emotional and intellectual difficulties, and that they would have expert knowledge in this field. One of the exercises in the session involved three participants role playing children with different difficulties. One acted “slow”, another “slow and sad” and the third “sad”. They interacted with participants who asked them particular questions and then had to guess which person was acting in which role. Participants asked many factual questions during this interaction, and it was particularly striking that very few people asked the “sad” role-player any questions. During the course of the role play, she increasingly withdrew and marginalised herself from the group. At the end of the role play, the other two players were correctly ‘diagnosed’, but there was disagreement about whether the ‘sad’ role-player was sad or merely slow. In a previous abstract discussion, participants had spoken eloquently about what is involved in identifying a child who has emotional versus intellectual problems. When it came down to interaction, even on the level of role play, the role playing participant connected strongly with her role (indicating an emotionally felt understanding of emotional difficulty in children) and the group intuitively and collectively avoided this person. Our expert knowledge as psychologists lay not as much in teaching ways of identification as in recognizing the group’s emotional difficulty in engaging with this knowledge in a therapeutic manner. We therefore reflected to the group our observation that it was particularly difficult for the group to ask questions around ‘sadness’ or to know how to interact with someone who is feeling sad. This prompted discussion about the role of the helper’s own feelings in psychological work and, in later sessions, more of an active struggle by participants with their own emotional reactions. An approach of either sharing knowledge or reinforcing the existing knowledge of the group would have missed this dynamic.

An acceptance of the knowledge of the psychologist, particularly regarding a trained ear for listening to process, must however ideally co-exist with a healthy scepticism towards the “knowledge” we do possess. Post-structuralism argues that knowledge is relative,
does not reside within absolute truth and is not without payoffs in terms of institutional legitimacy and power (Burr, 1995). One issue which arises here concerns the status of psychoanalysis in this intervention. Psychoanalytic discourse holds power not only because of its institutional legitimacy but also because its rhetorical structure allows a clinician's opinion to be seen as truth even when this contradicts the client's opinion and is actively rejected by that client. Our own psychoanalytic discourse, as will be seen in a retracing of our first session, may have set up imperatives for the intervention which were not inevitable but mutually constructed. Another example of how psychoanalytic discourse may have reached the status of truth involves our interpretation of irregular attendance by group members. In line with psychoanalytic interpretations of absence, we often interpreted a resistance to the process. It could be, however, that at times this "resistance" would be more critically interpreted within a post-structuralist framework as a resistance of the power relations at play. Sometimes, absence may have been merely related to the demands of participants' busy schedules and to burnout. Through supervision and active discussion with those involved in the project as well as uninvolved colleagues, we moved towards a more fluid understanding of such absences as well as other processes in the intervention.

The power of psychoanalytic discourse in shaping the truth of interaction is highlighted through examination of how we used psychoanalytic interpretation in this intervention. The process of assigning psychoanalytic meaning was largely conducted in supervision after sessions had taken place. Participants therefore had little access to our psychoanalytic understandings. A significant realm of discursive production was not negotiated in relationship but rather in a separate domain marked by the power of discourses of psychology. While participants could reject our actions which may have been based on psychoanalytic interpretation and thus prompt us to renegotiate meaning amongst ourselves, they could not actively participate in co-construction. This separation of discursive availability and access reinforced expert power relations. Interpretation of session material thus often involved constructing narratives from which participants were excluded, since these were seldom explicitly offered. The process followed in this analysis similarly offers interpretations which are reinforced by the power of academic psychoanalytic discourse, but which participants have no power to reject. This highlights the need for dialogue as a moderator of dominant discourses and not, as can easily happen, as further entrenchment of dominant discourses. It is suggested that, since we are at least to some extent spoken by the discourses we are positioned
in, this process can never be complete. Indeed, investment in the discourses of our institution allows us the commitment to approach community work with conviction. It is suggested that this conviction can be useful as long as it co-exists with a willingness for self-reflexivity and a sceptical stance to the kind of truths we produce.

Psychoanalysis was not the only institutional imperative at play in this intervention. As practitioners working in the field of community psychology, we adhered to a number of beliefs which related back to the institution of psychology. Community psychology in South Africa is often characterised by proponents as a fringe discipline in psychology (Child & Family Well-being, 1996). It is resistive to mainstream psychology’s tendency to be uncritical, to forge psychology as a discipline for the elite and for those who can afford it. Thus our work was motivated by a belief that empowerment of PHCWs to engage in psychological work with their communities represents at attempt to broaden the net of psychology and heighten its accessibility.

This agenda represents a resistance to the powerful discipline of mainstream psychology and, I believe, an important political resistance to the often oppressive role that psychology has played in South Africa (Louw & Foster, 1991). Such an agenda, however, is naively held if there is no recognition that this motivation is double edged. Hornstein (1988) has noted how psychology has historically gained status by the creation of markets which it can then call its own. Intelligence tests construct the need for intelligence testing, for example. The creation of these markets, argues Rose (1989) has often been in line with dominant social needs and has interacted with methods of social control. Rose suggests, in line with Foucault, that technologies of the psyche complex gain credos because of the ability of psychological discourse to invoke subjectivity and to invoke subjects to internalise certain desires. Therapy, Rose argues, constructs a discourse in which people self-regulate and self-police their subjectivity such that a therapized community emerges which, in line with Hornstein’s (1988) theory, in turn creates further markets for therapy.

Rose (1992) offers a similar critical reading of London’s Tavistock Clinic, suggesting that the Tavistock’s extension into organizational work, which is akin to our community work, was not as altruistically motivated as it may seem. Rather, this addition ensured that the Tavistock extended its web of influence, creating a new market and a new realm of dominion for the psyche complex. This is not to suggest deviance or calculation
on the part of the Tavistock, but rather an exposition of the ways in which the discipline extends its realm of influence.

UCT Child Guidance Clinic's commitment to extending training of psychologists into the area of organizational community psychology needs to be examined in a similar light. While community psychology is clearly needed in order to meet an emerging South Africa's needs, community psychology is also becoming increasingly fashionable and increasingly fundable. Applicants aspiring to enter the elite profession of psychology are often aware that certain institutions value community psychology, and that voicing such a commitment in an application interview increases their likelihood of being accepted. Community psychology thus becomes a profitable enterprise in a number of ways. This does in no way make community psychology inherently wrong, but it does suggest a need to maintain a critical stance to the kinds of things community psychologists do and to the kinds of benefits clients obtain. PHCWs in this instance, for example, had no choice but to accept our presence for a year and no longer, as this was the requirement of our course. UCT Child Guidance Clinic was not insensitive to the needs of the organization and did ensure continuity after this initial intervention, but in many ways the PHCW organization was not in a position to refuse the various disadvantages which were associated with an intervention staffed by trainee psychologists. The institutional imperative thus becomes a further nodule around which power is negotiated.

Power

Issues around language, culture, geography and expertise represent a few of the locations in which power was central. It is artificial to sequester issues of power under a separate section since power and resistance were central to the process of intervention and a central concern of the entire analysis. The foregoing discussion has attempted to trace some of these complex interplays through a Foucaultian perspective which understands power as bidirectional (Parker, 1989). Such an understanding has important implications for the purpose and application of the preceding analysis, since it understands power as an inevitable component of discourse and as something to be deconstructed. Thus it is felt that such an analysis deepens possibilities around future intervention and is not intended to annihilate community intervention. Particularly in settings where power is differentially held and in which differences are salient, it becomes important to negotiate issues of power head on and not try to wish them out of existence.
Triangular negotiations: the role of the interpreter

Analysis thus far has focused on relations and interactions of participants and facilitators and has excluded the interpreter as part of the relational network. At the beginning of the intervention, facilitators assumed that the role of the interpreter was to passively interpret words and nothing more. Swartz (1998:36) names this model the “invisible interpreter” and notes that clinicians often unconsciously assume this to be the best way of working. Drennan, Levett & Swartz (1991) note on the level of language that there is not an adequate Xhosa word for “depression”, and that the task of the interpreter is therefore inevitably to construct meaning in terms of their understanding of “depression”. Recent work on translation and interpretation (e.g. Gentzler, 1993; Venuti, 1992) has highlighted the post-structuralist view that language does not consist of words but meanings and constructions, and hence an act of interpretation is inevitably a reconstruction of meaning, and is necessarily guided by the discourses of the interpreter. This suggests that the notion of the “invisible interpreter” who directly reiterates words from one language to another cannot account for discursive meanings in speech acts and cannot exclude the interpreter’s own discursive positioning in relation to the content of what is being said.

In addition to this discursive level, it soon became apparent during this intervention that interpreters cannot be simply excluded from the relational level of communication. Rather than conduits for words, interpreters actively participated in the relationships that were formed and, it is suggested, in the psychodynamic level of client/practitioner relationship as well. What we initially assumed as a situation in which mutual interaction between two parties was objectively mediated by a third was actually a triangular relationship in which alliances formed and shifted between facilitators, participants and interpreters.

Given the necessity and frequency of using interpreters in a multilingual context, a closer examination of the ways in which triangular relations played out in this particular discursive context cannot be overlooked. Using psychoanalytic and discursive frameworks, we trace the process of including interpreters and some of the “errors” of interpretation which occurred (cf. Vasquez & Javier, 1991 in Swartz, 1998). The triangular relationship is then explored through discussion of how interpreters were incorporated into relationship and how interpreters responded to session material and relational dynamics in terms of their own emotional responses.
The decision to include interpreters
The decision was made to conduct sessions in Xhosa through interpretation prior to our first workshop session. This represented an attempt to meet participants on their ground and an attempt to communicate commitment to understanding them, rather than expecting them to understand us. This decision was supported by the group, who stated that they would feel more comfortable communicating in their mother tongue. We did not include interpreters in the first two sessions, partly because of lack of resources and partly because we imagined the Xhosa speaking clinician to be a wise choice in terms of forming relationship. It became clear after the first session, however, that the consequence of this was that the Xhosa speaking clinician became silenced by the group. She was positioned, much as we later positioned interpreters, as a conduit whose role was to convert words between languages rather than to actively participate. By the second session, she felt unable to interact as a clinician. This raised concerns for us about her perceived status in the group, and a decision was made to include an interpreter in the next session.

After two sessions, this interpreter felt unable to do the job on her own and requested a second interpreter. During the course of the intervention, a third interpreter filled in from time to time when one of the others could not attend. The introduction of and attendance of interpreters was therefore sporadic and this no doubt had effects on the process. At the end of the intervention, one of our future recommendations was to include an interpreter from the beginning who would attend every session and form part of the relational net from the start. We felt that this would aid continuity and would also locate the interpreter as an integral part of the team. It is debatable whether this would have eliminated the kinds of issues we discuss below, since it is argued that the interpreter’s participation in the discursive and relational arena is inevitable. The advantage of continuity may however have made the process more coherent.

Interpreters were all selected University of Cape Town undergraduate students who attended ongoing training sessions through the course of the year. It is important to stress that, in comparison to the often ad-hoc arrangements that are made regarding interpretation (Swartz, 1998), these interpreters were externally situated to clients and not family members or staff members employed to perform other functions, which is often the case. They were also well trained. These were "good" interpreters. This is important to note in relation to the ensuing analysis, since this implies that the difficulties
encountered were not the result of interpreters doing incorrect things, but were an inevitable part of the process.

"Errors" of interpretation
Vasquez & Javier (1991 in Swartz, 1998) note five common mistakes that interpreters make. These include omission, when an interpreter leaves out parts of what has been said, addition, the process of adding to what has been said, condensation or summarisation of what has been said, substitution of what has been said with something else and role exchange in which the interpreter assumes the role of the interviewer and asks his/her own questions. All of these "errors" were made by interpreters at some point during intervention. Swartz (1998) cautions that understanding these processes as errors avoids locating difficulty within the clinician or the system. It does not recognize that there is no one perfect interpretation given the options of words available. We suggest here that, in addition, such errors are not always technical but are responses to relational dynamics which occur because of the interpreter's unique position in the therapeutic relationship.

While no interpreter operated above the level of Vasquez & Javier's (1991 in Swartz, 1998) "errors", one interpreter in particular seemed to make errors more frequently. She would regularly ignore what I had said and say what she had been thinking, fail to relay a comment I had made and take over the conversation such that I had no idea what was being said. I experienced her as difficult to interrupt and often dismissive when I asked her what had transpired. She made me feel excluded from the process and I became quite angry with what I understood as her resistive behaviour. On one occasion, the Xhosa speaking clinician, aware that the interpreter often disregarded what I had said and voiced her own opinion in the name of interpretation, corrected her. She became furious with the Xhosa speaking clinician for doing this, I became furious with the interpreter and, no doubt, these dynamics were observed by the group. The psychoanalytic metaphor might be that of children observing their parents fighting. Group members later approached us saying they did not like this interpreter, preferring the new interpreter, and they would like us to replace her. In interaction, the group had seemed warm towards this interpreter and did not interact as much with the new interpreter. It is therefore possible that the group were unconsciously trying to remedy the friction by offering the possibility of evicting the least powerful player. We did not consider this possibility at the time, but felt we could not simply oust her.

87
As frustration levels rose, communication broke down further and interpretation errors became more frequent. In desperation, we asked our supervisor, who was also supervising the interpreter training programme, to approach her. What emerged was her frustrations regarding the role she was expected to play. She related strongly to the group, and felt left out unable to participate. She had been aware of transgressing the traditional interpretation role and had concerns about this, but found herself responding to her isolation nonetheless.

This illustrates how the triangular relationship implicates all parties on an emotional level. Further examination of the interpreter’s position in terms of power relations suggests that, as an undergraduate student aspiring to be trained as a psychologist from a similar community to participants, she was positionally caught between participants and facilitators. She did not have the legitimacy of facilitators, although she had some psychological knowledge, and she did not have the belonging of participants, although she came from a similar community. Her access to power was therefore restrained on either side and she could not fully take up either the discourses of psychology or the discourses of the community. It is suggested that her act of finding voice through the process of interpretation may have been one of the only ways open to her to gain the power of voice in interaction. Further, it may have been that her transgression of strict interpretation was an attempt to interact and thus form relationship with participants, the least powerful of the two parties. This hypothesis is returned to below.

Part of the negotiation of this impasse involved discussion with the interpreter and an offer to include her in post-session discussion. Another proposed solution was to utilise each interpreter differently. We decided to assign each interpreter different roles. One interpreter would sit next to the English speaking facilitator and quietly interpret what participants were saying. We felt that this would have the added benefit of improving the flow of workshops for participants. The other interpreter would then interpret whatever the facilitator said aloud to the group. While this did improve the flow of sessions for participants, it became easier for the facilitator to be excluded since it became more difficult for her to time her interventions. It also set up alliances between facilitator and interpreter vs. interpreter and group which seemed to split facilitators and participants. It remains important, however, to allow flexibility in the interpretation process and to explore different structures in order to find ways that work best for all involved.
The interpreter as part of relationship

It is thus apparent that the interpreter becomes an active participant in the intervention. Even in the case of an interpreter who attempts to remain neutral, ascriptions and preferences are made. The process of aligning one interpreter with the facilitator and one with the group, combined with personality factors in which the facilitator’s interpreter tended to be more reserved than the other interpreter, set up dynamics within the process. The facilitator’s interpreter came to be seen as outside the group, together with the English-speaking facilitator, while the other interpreter was included in the group. This process happened on either side of a holiday break and, once relationship and continuity had been re-established in sessions, seemed to dissipate. It coincided as well with a distancing by the group from the Xhosa speaking facilitator. Facilitators were thus ejected as the interpreter aligned with the group was included. It is possible that this splitting allowed the group to more actively resist the power of facilitators at a point in the process in which relationship was tenuous and in which the anticipation of or recent passing of a long break was foremost. Interpreters thus came to represent, to some extent, objects to be included in an acting out of relationship issues. It is likely that such triangular alliances would be made even if there were one interpreter present.

Interpreters also became objects onto which the group located various concerns. For example, two of the three interpreters were incorporated into the intervention structure as sexualised objects upon first meeting. The first interpreter, a woman, was identified by a powerful male in the group as a potential wife. The effect of this was to undermine her role in the group and to position her as an object for possession. This occurred in the context of a number of other gender issues in the group. There was clearly a hierarchy in which the male participants were more powerful and made similar sexualised, and sometimes degrading, remarks to other group members. Sexualization of the interpreter could also have represented a displaced response by powerful male participants to the presence of more powerfully perceived female facilitators. This comment, less risky than the sexualization of facilitators, prompted a further comment by the male participant. Framed as a joke, he noted that the addition of the interpreter widened his choice of wives. The interpreter thus became a conduit for broader gender issues at play.

Similarly, the introduction of a male interpreter prompted much attention from the female participants. At the end of his first session, they commented that they liked him, they
thought he was handsome and they wanted to introduce him to their daughters. The less confrontative and direct response of female participants may indicate the differential power held in the group. The effect, however, remained to incorporate him into the group as a sexualised object such that his function and expertise were undermined. This may represent a rejoinder to his expertise as interpreter and therefore a struggle around the status of expert knowledge, as well as an attempt to include him in the group in a more colloquial way which aligned him with the group rather than the institution of the university. Interpreters thus came, in various ways, to become part of the object world of participants.

**Interpreters' emotional responses**

When a session is emotionally loaded, participants and facilitators are emotionally affected. So too are interpreters, but their position is such that there is often little support for their emotions and little opportunity for them to engage with their emotions during the session. After our second sexual abuse session, for example, the interpreter went home with a headache. She attributed this to the size of the group and the extent of her concentration, thus requesting a second interpreter. It is possible, however, that she was responding to the feelings of the group and taking home the emotional intensity of the session.

A more striking example of interpreter emotional reactions affecting both herself and the process occurred in the first session after the holiday break. Sessions before the break had moved away from issues of sexual abuse to assessment of children. With separation issues in mind due to the break, we arrived for the session unsure of what to expect in terms of relationship dynamics. We aimed to have a review session. Half way through the session one of the participants asked us to present a case. Before facilitators could respond, the interpreter said she had a case of sexual abuse of a 3 year old by his/her father, although it was a case she had heard about and could merely be a rumour. As she began describing the case, facilitators felt uneasy about the interpreter taking over the group's process. She was raising an issue which had previously been emotionally invested and had worked best within a sense of connected relationship. We also felt the group was at a point at which it was important to follow their process rather than directing it. Facilitators felt unable to stop the discussion, however, since this kind of disagreement may have been divisive for the group and hurtful for the interpreter.
She therefore continued discussing the case with the group. Discussion centred around the kind of blaming that had been prevalent in the first case discussion of sexual abuse. The interpreter was also active in this blaming discussion, suggesting for example that perpetrators engage in sex with children because they are virgins and need experience. The facilitators were again uncomfortable about such comments since they are not the kinds of ideas we would have liked to perpetuate. The location of voice also had implications on how facilitators responded to the session. If PHCWs had expressed blaming sentiments, we could have interacted with them. Expression by the interpreter, who has associations to the university, ‘fact’ and ‘knowledge’, could give these ideas extra weight for the group. This made it difficult to challenge these ideas without undermining the interpreter. As discussion continued, our perception was that the way in which this case was discussed opened up space for anger, prompting a participant to bring up another ‘hearsay’ case of sexual abuse which reinforced the notion that there was a huge and vague external threat which could not be pinned down.

Facilitator-interpreter dynamics also came into play. For example, the interpreter at one point directed a question at one of the facilitators, demanding a ‘factual’ explanation for why perpetrators engage in sexual abuse. This facilitator felt directly challenged by the comment. It also seemed to play into dynamics of facilitators as ‘withholding’ which were so pertinent to the group. As the interpreter became more active in discussion and less thorough in translating discussion, the other facilitator felt increasingly excluded from the session, not having access to large chunks of interaction.

Interpreter-participant dynamics also came into play. For example, an incident arose when the interpreter helped herself to coffee uninvited during the break. When she asked participants where the milk was, they were dismissive and unhelpful. The interpreter ended up loudly proclaiming that she would drink her coffee without milk. At this point in the process, it had already become an unspoken rule that participants only offered coffee at points of connection and that facilitators and interpreters never helped themselves to coffee. This act could be understood as a symbolic attempt to gain membership of the group or to take nurturance, but within a context where nurturance is limited and where material resources are precious. At the end of this session, we reviewed with the group, and several people said they had wanted something different from the session. One participant, for example, said that it had been a long time since we had been there, and participants had wanted us to return. After this session, she
said, she was frustrated because it seemed like there had just been more words. The interpreter, therefore, due to her own needs, had waylaid the process for both facilitators and participants, leaving both with an unsteady sense of connection.

This interaction can be understood in terms of personal, interpersonal and projective dynamics. On a personal level, the interpreter had just come back from holiday and had alluded that her holiday had been traumatic. She may have therefore been feeling particularly vulnerable and particularly open to projections from the group for something more from us. She may therefore have been expressing her own emotional difficulties or been vulnerable enough to pick up on the uncertainty of the group. On an interpersonal level, she seemed to be actively repositioning herself as a member of the group as well as a powerful intervenor, as powerful as facilitators. She may therefore have been resisting the power dynamics of her positioning by crossing boundaries on both sides. On a projective level, she may have been voicing for the group a number of issues around their frustration with us as withholding. Her choice of topic was exactly the one where 'truth' was most needed and most elusive, and where emotions had been most evoked during the course of workshops. Further, because of the interpreter's strong identification with the group, the session may have created the space for her to take up the group's issues and challenge us from a much more powerful position than group members could take up. It is also important to note that the last session she had attended had involved sexual abuse, and that she had missed out on much of the subsequent process. She may therefore have been carrying projections from that previous session, unaware of how the group process had shifted.

Perhaps closer attention to the role of the interpreter earlier in the process could have circumvented the insecurity which may have prompted the interpreter's actions in this session. While this is difficult to establish, this session does illustrate the strains involved in maintaining a passive interpreter position. Swartz (1998) suggests three other possible positions an interpreter may take up besides that of the invisible interpreter. He suggests that interpreters may fulfill the role of culture brokers, mediating the cultural divides between client and practitioner, as junior colleagues, which requires a more active interpreter role, or alternatively as client advocates charged with the empowerment of clients and protection of client interests. In this situation, the interpreter would be redundant as culture broker, since one of the clinicians was Xhosa. Further, the foregoing discussion of culture suggests that culture is not an homogenous entity
unrelated to other power relations, and that the notion of a member of one culture brokering for another member despite their positional differences is not unproblematic. We argue that the role of client advocate, as seen in this session, holds the risk of the interpreter advocating on the basis of projection and her own emotional reaction, and is possibly simplistic. Had this interpreter been more drawn into the process as a colleague from the beginning, however, her sense of exclusion may have been lessened and her understanding of our goals and processes would have been more congruent and therefore less discontinuous.

**Back to the beginning: A revisitation of our first session**

After an analysis of the process of intervention and a flavour of the concerns of the various parties involved, it appears redundant to return to the beginning of the process in order to conclude analysis. A retrospective exploration of the first session in the process, however, provides opportunities for critical analysis of what followed and for an exploration of the themes planted here which endured through the intervention.

The first session began with an introductory ice breaker in which each person stated their name and what they had left behind that morning. We were struck by, and unprepared for, the number of people who said they had left behind family members in other places or children alone at home. This first introduction, then, positioned participants in relation to loss, family breakdown and the vulnerability of children. We then presented a play in Xhosa in order to begin the process with a commitment to sharing ourselves with the group, and in the spirit of mutuality, asked PHCW's to perform a play for us. A few participants were chosen by the group to perform this task, while the rest of the group observed. Our play was about a child who refused to go to school, and we broke it half way through to elicit the group's ideas of what might be happening with the child. The play was planned such that the child was school refusing because she was being bullied. Participants’ play demonstrated two PHCWs going on a home visit to a mother who was refusing to breast feed. In the play, they explained and demonstrated how to breast feed as well as showing the client how to clean her breasts. This was done graphically in role play, with the participant acting as the client taking her breasts out while a PHCW cleaned them. They also showed the client how to clean the baby's navel and look for signs of jaundice. They explained that they were showing us how their job involves both cure and education.
Underneath the mutuality of this exchange appears to lie a wealth of discursive meaning. Our first communication, the play, located childhood as an area of concern, and thereby obviated adults as legitimate objects of concern and intervention, an obviation which resonated with their initial communication around the vulnerability of children. The discourse and the parameters of who can be damaged had in some ways been set. While this did not set in motion an inevitable cycle of childhood valued above adulthood and consequent possible infantilization, it set a tone which participants responded to in their choice of play, and which became an enduring theme throughout.

A retrospective evaluation of the kinds of material we presented to the group in subsequent sessions reveals that many exercises, role plays and case discussions planned by facilitators were about children. This is no doubt partly a result of institutional influence, since our institutional roots were at the Child Guidance Clinic and much of our work related to children. What is striking, however, is my unawareness of how much of our material was related to childhood. This consistent theme reinforced notions of adulthood as illegitimate of care. The effect of this may have been that the adults in the group felt care was denied them, and that a dynamic was set up in the group through which group members were infantilized through an unconscious communication by facilitators that only through childhood could participants have access to facilitators' attention.

The play participants presented for us also communicates issues of relationship. By showing themselves at work, they were foregrounding their competence and their ideals from the beginning, perhaps communicating to us that they were not children. The play was also fundamentally related to resistance - to a woman who had refused to give nurturance by refusing to breast feed. In the play, the implication was that refusal of nurturance was related to ignorance, which reinforced their expert position. Further, in light of our later metaphors about the group refusing nurturance and refusing the breast, they were acting out a dynamic which was to become central and which had strong psychodynamic connotations. The graphic inclusion of one participant revealing her breast while another fondled it to demonstrate cleaning seems laden. In some ways participants were challenging boundaries by extending exposure to strangers and outsiders. This was reinforced by the sexual connotations of the act, which elicited much laughter from the rest of the group, and which placed us in a position of uncertainty regarding how to react. The shock value of such an interaction may also have presented a challenge to facilitators and an act of resistance; a communication that they would not
be passive participants. This action also entrenched a communication that they felt comfortable with their expertise, comfortable enough to reveal themselves. It is also possible that participants chose this play in response to our play about children, thus reinforcing the centrality of childhood, priorities that children in trouble take and issues of nurturance as areas of concern.

The rest of the first session was spent eliciting the needs of the group. The list that emerged was extensive and well beyond the scope of what could be accomplished in the time available. Issues raised also demanded factual 'answers' to questions. One issue, for example, requested us to tell participants if, and exactly how, an illness can become a psychological problem and how participants could identify whether a physical problem existed or was psychological. The scope of this list communicated to us the extent of the perceived need in the group and in the community.

Two incidents which occurred after the session ended, alluded to in the introduction, framed this session and the entire process. First, the programme co-ordinator approached us to communicate her excitement that we had come, adding that now we had come, "the baby will grow". This framed the session's dominant discourse about babies and raises questions about who the babies were in the intervention. Participants, though psychodynamic discourse, were often positioned by us as babies either needing or rejecting nurturance. The statement made by the co-ordinator positioned us as holding the power to initiate the process of development. Our developmental understanding of the intervention positioned them precisely as babies growing up, yet a parallel process which we did not own as fully as our own growing up as trainee psychologists and as naïve to the demands of PHCWs' environment.

While this comment raises questions about who babies are and what they are supposed to do, it also positioned the process of intervention as one of nurturance and new growth. It represented a trust in the anticipated relationship and in the endeavour we were about to jointly undertake; a shared baby which both parties could nurture and develop. This communication is in contradiction with the second incident which occurred, in which a PHCW accused the English speaking facilitator of being able to speak and understand Xhosa, but deceiving the group about her knowledge. In contrast to the acceptance and hope of the previous statement, this was a communication laden with suspicion and foretelling a relationship characterised by deception. The fact that
it was located around language and knowledge is significant, since these two areas represented possible areas of power and difference in the interaction. Perhaps there was a communication about the suspect nature of our knowledge and our integrity. This statement therefore offered a further challenge to facilitators and a further communication that participants would not be deceived.

At the beginning of the intervention, then, lay the seeds of later contradictory relationship dynamics, later discursive concerns and the subsequent emergence of power relations. The active co-construction of discourses of childhood and dynamics of nurturance were maintained, in some form or another, in every subsequent session.

Engagement in a process of critical reflection on the process of intervention thus raises a number of issues regarding power, discourse and relationship. These issues suggest that a sustained process of self-reflection through intervention helps to prevent a blindness to power relations and too heavy a reliance on one's own discursive truths. At the end of this analysis, it becomes difficult to state that a process of critical self-reflection has been undertaken, and perhaps this is because one's investment in a particular process as well as a particular understanding of that process presents a challenge out of which one cannot completely remove oneself. Description of the process as well as possible interpretations of discursive meaning and relationship raise a number of implications for community work in South Africa, as well as for research and theory development. It is to these that discussion now turns.
GROWING PAINS: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INTERVENTIONS

The approach advocated here discourages a non-critical application of psychodynamic concepts in a community intervention. Given that the area of psychoanalytic community intervention is relatively new in South Africa, it is imperative to engage in a continual process of self-reflection in order to extend the utility of such work. Recognition of the practical, social and emotional complexities of a multicultural community setting is needed, as well as recognition of the implications for its interaction with psychoanalytic theory, which is itself complex and often experience distant (Stolorow et al., 1987). Reflecting on the process of this intervention and on what we struggled to and needed to recognize, some implications are drawn which may aid self-reflection and the use of post-structuralist concepts in future psychoanalytic community work.

1. Recognition of power relations

Issues of power and difference which were salient throughout the intervention have been continuously alluded to. Active exploration and reflection of such issues is advocated, since they cannot simply be wished away. It is also suggested that a unidirectional understanding of power fails to consider that, as Foucault (e.g. 1975) argues, power is differentially held and all players have access to powerful practices. A diffuse understanding of power helps practitioners to recognize participants' assertions of power. Further, such recognition may offer a place in which the emotions attached to such issues can be worked through in new ways. For example, a participant physically kicked one of the facilitators in the second last session. A traditional psychodynamic understanding would draw on processes of aggression and rejection as part of the work of the termination phase. Another layer, however, may have involved an acting out of a reversal of power relations: the township was kicking out the educated outsiders before they had a chance to kick out the township. If such a possibility can be explored, spaces within the matrix of power may be widened for acts of resistance against coercive power.

It is also important to recognise the power interpretation of such actions holds. In the example cited above, a number of other possible interpretations may exist. Since psychoanalysis is itself a powerful discourse, it is equally important to recognize that the language of psychoanalysis may provide yet another point of division and misinterpretation between facilitators and participants. Psychoanalysis has often been criticized as "elitist, irrelevant and oppressive" (Maw, 1996, p.80) and can easily be
misused to construct the participant’s understanding as subjective and the analyst’s as fact (Schwaber, 1983), thereby imbuing the analyst with the power of knowing all. For example, the notion of resistance, which Klein (1927 in Hinshelwood, 1989) refers to as the avoidance of a relationship for transferential reasons, may be misused to label appropriately rejecting actions. Theory may then reinforce power relations as well as offering tools for analysis of power.

2. Recognition of the complexities of the transference relationship
   A broadening of the concept of “transference” is needed in order to incorporate the influence of the punitive parent state in the emotional lives of people. When, for example, participants talk about experiencing really being listened to for the first time in a counselling workshop, this concept allows the recognition of personal as well as political experiences of being silenced. Such understandings may prevent a psychoanalytic intervention from failure to interact with the realm of the political and from blindness to the need for social action.

Further, those intervening need to constantly reflect on what is traditionally called their counter-transference reactions, and that they are not exempt from relations and responses to the punitive parent state. It is thus important for us to ponder on what motivates us to do community work and what our emotional reactions are to being (often privileged) members of post-apartheid South Africa’s ‘family’. In one workshop, for example, the white facilitator wrote in newsprint sitting on the floor, when in any other situation she would have done so standing up. Reflection on transferential reasons for this were helpful in understanding her own sense of guilt and need to reparate.

3. Recognition of the absence of a therapy room
   In individual therapy, the client travels to and enters the therapist’s space, and this contributes to the boundaries of the intervention. In community work, the practice is commonly for the therapist to enter the client’s space, a space in this case vastly different and under-resourced. This has implications for the boundaries of the intervention and for power relations. In this context, strict adherence to psychoanalytic principles may obscure the purpose of the intervention as well as restricting the practitioner’s ability to engage with power relations in a productive way.
4. Recognition of the multilingual context
An additional important implication of the change from traditional therapy involves recognition of intervention conducted within a multilingual setting. Recognition of and dialogue with difference is thus central. Further, the multilingual context, in this as in other cases, was mediated by interpreters. Facilitators initially viewed the interpreter's function in a neutral technical light, paying little attention to interpretation as an interpersonal process (Drennan et al., 1991). The analysis presented here, however, suggests that interpreters are not outside of the transference relationship. On the one hand; they joined us in becoming objects for participants to use. On the other hand, interpreters may have joined participants and objectified us. Further, interpreters found it difficult to be neutral non-participants. Interpreters therefore need to be included as players in the process, and ways of working need to be negotiated and renegotiated.

5. Recognition of the need to refine theory and practice
An important question regarding future psychoanalytic work in community settings involves asking what exactly psychoanalysis is. A relational approach has been drawn upon here and would benefit from further theory refinement in line with the needs of community psychology. Psychoanalysis is a heterogeneous theoretical discipline with contradicting theoretical understandings. It would be of benefit to strive towards refining theoretical notions of politico-psychodynamic work by drawing more strictly on psychoanalytic theory and also entering into more fine-grained analyses of how the theory of psychoanalysis interacts with and articulates more broadly political issues.

A second question regards implications for intervention. The preceding discussion included illustration of politico-psychodynamic understanding and formulation. More exploration would be useful regarding what this means for how we intervene. Psychoanalytic literature itself is not in agreement on what constitutes appropriate intervention, particularly regarding whether change happens through interpretation or through experience of relationship (Stolorow et al., 1987). In this intervention, change was understood as occurring through containment and relationship. We were reluctant to interpret our psychoanalytic understandings in this intervention, although in retrospect it may be that interpretation would have been possible. The practice of engaging in psychoanalytic discourse outside of sessions may also have entrenched power relations and exclusion of PHCW's to access to psychoanalytic discourse. A process of review in order to feed back our understanding of the progression of sessions may have
opened space for productive dialogue during sessions regarding how the process of change could be understood. These issues need further exploration.

6. Can psychoanalysis meet empowerment?
While psychoanalytic literature itself is divided about what constitutes change, psychoanalytic literature and community psychology literature are equally divided. It is suggested that a psychoanalytic understanding, which gives salience to the emotional worlds of participants, can be subjectively empowering and that, further, an integrated political understanding can go some way towards empowerment at the social level as well. Our purpose was to empower participants to deal with their own emotional worlds, individually and in response to their clients, as a meaningful way to help them deal with their clients directly. It is suggested that a self-reflexive and politically aware psychoanalytic practice in community settings opens possibilities for adding complexity to existing empowerment theory. De-emphasis from ideologies of self-determination and agency undermines simple calls for people to empower themselves. This opens opportunity for recognition and dialogue with possible psychoanalytic and discursive constraints to empowerment. Such recognition allows for more complex understanding and possible negotiation on personal, social and political levels.

7. Methodological implications for research and practice
The use of a concurrent post-structuralist and psychodynamic framework allows for an analysis of discursive meanings, constructions of truth, complex issues of power as well as emotional issues and relationship dynamics. This methodology could be usefully extended in research, as could a methodology which scrutinises case material in order to dialogue with the emergence of principles of intervention in community psychology. In the case material presented, this methodology was largely employed post-intervention. An additional area of possibility involves employing an interpretive methodology through the course of intervention in order to subject the process to more sustained and theoretically guided recursive reflection. Integration of post-structuralist and psychoanalytic methodology on a practical level, despite their different methodological roots, offers possibilities for new hybrids of understanding and new approaches to intervention.

8. Post-structuralist psychoanalysis: Theoretical implications
The existence of some congruence between epistemological assumptions of post-
structuralism and psychoanalysis highlights possible points of articulation between the two paradigms. In the analysis presented, psychoanalytic understandings of relationship and the concept of psychoanalytic echoes of past in present have been appropriated into a post-structuralist framework. This framework allows a decentring of truth and a more socially sustained understanding of the workings of power. Such theoretical articulations need further exploration. In particular, it is suggested that the inclusion of psychoanalysis into post-structuralism deepens a post-structuralist understanding of subjectivity which extends possibilities for use of post-structuralism in therapeutic intervention. Conversely, the incorporation of post-structuralism into psychoanalysis addresses psychoanalysis' penchant for individualistic and politically removed practice by foregrounding the social and political.

A CONCLUDING REFLECTION
The focus of this analysis has been on the possibilities offered by post-structuralist and psychoanalytic interpretation of interaction, language and relationship rather than on evaluation of the intervention. The question arises, nonetheless, of whether the intervention presented was a success or a failure. Description and analysis of the process suggests a discontinuous experience for all parties, one which was fraught with tension and contradiction despite the development of relationship and of ways of working. Contrary to understanding the messiness of this process as a sign that the intervention was not as smooth as it should have been, it is suggested that this contradiction and tension is not only an inevitable part of the therapeutic process but also an inevitable consequence of the plethora of competing discourses and subject positions inherent in community work. It is suggested that, rather than 'mistakes' or 'problems', the processes of this community intervention, tensions included, added to the richness of the experience for all parties as well as to the necessity for critical reflection.

Endnotes:
1. Throughout this text, "we" and "our" refer to the facilitators conducting the intervention, and not to the authorial position.
2. Due to the confidential nature of case notes, these are not appendixed in this dissertation. An extract from our formulation has been provided in Chapter 2. Further, analysis endeavours to provide the reader with information about the process. Complete confidential records are filed at the Child Guidance Clinic, University of Cape Town.
REFERENCES


Swartz, L. (1996b). Crossing or creating boundaries: issues for clinical psychology in the community. Inaugural lecture, University of Cape Town.


