CONCEPTS OF SOUL

An Investigation into the Concepts of the Soul current at the Inception of Christianity.

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PREFACE
This thesis has been called forth by the debate about the concept soul which has been pursued in many fields: in theology by Oscar Cullmann and many others; in philosophy by Gilbert Ryle, among others. In psychology, we find that as early as 1926, at an International Psychological Conference, Pavlov declared that we must abandon the misleading term 'soul'. He stated that, in his opinion, "the proper study of psychology is physiology".

In 1972 there was a news item in the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet referring to Krister Stendahl, principal of the Harvard School of Divinity, U.S.A., and his prediction that "the long and illustrious tradition to talk about the immortality of the soul" was now approaching its end.

In this connection it is interesting to note what Dr Steiner wrote as early as 1917, "the development of the modern scientific outlook....has contributed to the abolition of the soul.... It will not be long before....those who take seriously the existence of the soul are not of sound mind, and only those will be regarded of sound mind who recognise the 'truth', namely, that thinking, feeling and willing are necessary by-products of certain physiological processes."

We are not here entering into a debate as to who is right or wrong, but we are asking what concepts were available on the idea of the soul at the beginning of our Christian era.

There is no doubt that our modern concepts are very far removed from what our forebears thought. That this is so can be shown simply by looking at the English word 'soul' and its semantic development.

The English word 'soul' derives from the Anglo-Saxon 'sawol' (or 'sauwl'). When the early Christian missionaries had to translate into Anglo-Saxon their word for that something which God at the creation blew into the nostrils of man, and
which may or may not be that same something which through the grace of God survived death, they chose the word sawol. It seems probable that sawol had developed along the same lines among the Germanic tribes as had psyche among the Greeks, i.e., the word conveyed a basic feeling of the something which is LIFE.

Onians, who has done intensive research into the origins of European thought, tries to trace the origin in primitive thought of the relationship between the beliefs about "the body and the immortal soul" on the one hand, and beliefs about a 'life-liquid' on the other. In this connection he is interested in the Greek concept αἰόν, a word associated with psyche and traceable back to the same root as the modern English word 'soul'.

According to Onians it is generally accepted that for Homer αἰόν meant "period of existence", as well as, sometimes, 'spinal marrow'. The latter meaning, however, may be the earliest as it is not "difficult to see how a word designating the life 'fluid' might come to mean the life which the fluid represents and the lifetime dependent on it". It seems that the early Greeks believed there was a fluid, αἰόν, which filled and formed the flesh and which could come out of it and be lost. "The earliest evidence implies that this liquid in the flesh was one with the cerebro-spinal fluid and the seed"; tears and sweat were manifestations of the same "liquid, or liquefiable element, in the body", which in fact appeared to be "the stock of life, vitality, and strength". We read in the Odyssey that Penelope's "fair cheeks melted as she shed tears" and, no doubt, in serious illness "wasting with sweating and loss of vitality go together".

Among the early Greeks as well as among the early Germanic peoples the young were said to "abound in liquid", whereas the aged lost liquid, "dried up". Onians remarks in a note with regard to earlier English expressions, "see e.g. the old terms 'sappy', 'saphead', etc., for the young and
foolish, (but 'sapless age', I Henry IV, iv : 5), and the belief that the marrow was the seed of life and that with age it shrank and with death it disappeared".

Thus, when Homer uses \textit{aion} meaning 'life-time', the development is natural: the amount of life, i.e. the fluid (\textit{aion}) in the body diminishes as time passes on - it can be compared with "the diminishing sand in a glass"\textsuperscript{11}. When Homer speaks of "the \textit{aion} is slain therefrom", or of the "\textit{aion} leaving" a man, it seems we may find here a transition "from the meaning 'life-fluid' to that of the 'life' which the fluid contains and represents"\textsuperscript{12}. Onians points to the similarity in the development of \textit{psyche}, which, "from its concrete meaning 'soul' comes to mean not that entity but the life which it confers...."\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
Related to \textit{aion} is & Modern English \textit{SOUL} \\
\hline
from Anglo-Saxon & \textit{SAWOL} \\
from Gothic & \textit{SAIWALA} \\
as well as Gothic & \textit{SAIWS} = 'a body of water' \\
\textit{Sanskrit} & \textit{AYUH} = 'mobile, living' \\
\textit{Sanskrit} & \textit{AYUH} = 'vital element, life, lifetime',\textsuperscript{14} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

In Onians's opinion there is in this connection another important and related word, viz. the Latin verb \textit{sapere} = to be wise. \textit{If} its original meaning was 'to have sap, native juice' it would be related to the Italian \textit{sapa}, the French \textit{sexe}, the Anglo-Saxon \textit{saep}, the Old Icelandic \textit{safi}, the German \textit{saft} (cf Afrikaans \textit{sap})\textsuperscript{15}. Onians points out that the Greeks (and the Romans) related consciousness and intelligence to the native juice in the chest (blood) and to the vapour exhaled from it (breath)\textsuperscript{16}. In old Germanic beliefs we find likewise "the conscious self... in the chest and the surviving soul... in the head,\textsuperscript{17}". The Anglo-Saxon poet of Beowulf says "in his hreder fast, in mind-bonds, a secret longing burned in his blood\textsuperscript{18}".

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item hreder = heart, breast, mind (perhaps also lungs).
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Onians points to the difficulties in establishing the original connotations of *sa'ir* without a thorough study of the Germanic evidence, but suggests that it may have begun "as the conscious self, breath in relation to blood centred in the chest, and that it was later, with a growing belief in the continuance of the conscious self, identified with the surviving ghost". He arrives at this assumption through analogy with the development among Greeks and Romans.

At an early stage in Greek thought there was a fusion of *psyche* and *thymos*: in Roman thought there appears (according to Onians) to have been confusion as to the role of *anima*, some characteristics of *animus* being attributed to *anima*. In both cases an original duality developed into the concept of a single indwelling spirit of life and consciousness. In order fully to understand this development we shall have to trace primitive thinking and the concepts of soul much further back in time.

It is now clear that, in feeling our way back, it is no good simply going back to the New Testament. We cannot know what the word 'soul' meant for the New Testament writers if we do not know what concepts were available to them. When we tackle the question we shall have to find out what was available, within that world, to the New Testament, to the Old Testament, or to the Greek writers with regard to those very basic concepts of the soul, concepts which form the sources of the chief understanding of our Western concepts of soul.
Notes to Preface.

1. **Rudolf Steiner, Building Stones**, p. 35
3. Steiner, p. 28
5. ibid., 209, 18
6. ibid., 202
7. ibid., 212
8. ibid., 201 (cf Odyssey 19: 204f)
9. ibid., 213
10. ibid., 214
11. ibid., 215
12. ibid., 208
13. ibid., 208
14. ibid., 209
15. ibid., cf 62, 74
16. ibid., 63
17. ibid., 154
18. ibid., 69, n 1
19. ibid., 209, n 3
20. ibid., 169, 171.
INTRODUCTION

SOME PREHISTORIC BACKGROUND
TO THE CONCEPT SOUL.
When tracing the origin of the concept 'soul' among prehistoric, as well as among today's primitive peoples, it is interesting to note how primitive logic arrives at very much the same conclusions all over the world.

Nyman assumes that ideas about a body-soul and/or an organ-soul are the oldest of the soul concepts. The primitive mind finds no clear distinction between body and soul. These will eventually decay together, unless the body is dried, stuffed, or embalmed in order to preserve it "for ever". Certain organs, such as the heart, kidneys, liver, as well as certain parts of the body, had preference over others as being the seat of the soul(s).

Wheeler Robinson draws slightly different conclusions though he, too, emphasises the body-soul oneness in primitive thought. As regards the religion of the ancient Egyptians, he writes: "The continuance of life beyond death is intimately connected with the preservation of the corpses". Wheeler Robinson then refers to Budge and the latter's conclusion that "all the available evidence shows that the Egyptians of dynastic times mummified the dead body because they believed that a spiritual body would 'germinate' or develop itself in it.... A mummy consists of little more than the skeleton, covered by the skin, the fat being destroyed by chemical agents, and the intestines being preserved in jars with the mummy... These details are to the point", according to Wheeler Robinson, "because it was precisely through the preservation of the body and its principal parts that the personality became immortal. All this is but an impressive example of the ideas as to the body indicated above; the body, down to its very details, has a psychical as well as a physical significance".

Onians emphasises that "in the Egyptian ritual of embalming, the dead who had been dried up, was, in the oils and aromatic exudations that were used, believed to receive life and renewal of his body" (cf p 2 above, and p25 below).
On a higher cultural level, the primitive mind draws more advanced conclusions and regards the red blood-fluid as the residence of life and soul (blood-soul). But this view also changes and instead it is the warm vapour from the blood which is regarded as the soul (vapour-soul). According to Nyman the idea of a vapour-soul seems to have been contemporary with, or earlier or later than the idea of a distinct 'breath-soul'.

A point of connection between the breath-soul and the blood-soul may have been the throat and/or the neck as being especially vulnerable parts of the body. The throbbing pulse could have given the impression of a life force (cf nephesh, p. 36 below). Another possible explanation to the view of seeing blood and breath as "the residence of life and soul", an explanation which must have seemed quite natural to primitive minds, follows from the fact that 1) life sustaining blood is pumped in and out of the embryo through the umbilical cord, and 2) as the new born child is brought into the world it has to breathe in 'life' with its first breath.

Nyman points out that "the two souls gradually fuse and give way to a new understanding of the soul. It is still substance, but of a finer, thinner, more volatile matter than that of which our body consists. It seems rather to have the same characteristic as air".

The breath-soul still lives on in our day. Nyman refers to "curious practices in the stone-age", but why not add—and curious practices today. Kissing, for instance, and nose-rubbing, and the blowing on of wounds. There is an old Mexican painting depicting a marriage ceremony between a god and a goddess, the god politely holding his bride's arm. Between them, connecting their mouths, is a red vapour-like cloud, their souls. The original, profound meaning of kissing would seem to be a "communion of souls". Nose-rubbing, which is still used as a greeting among many primitive tribes, may, according to
Nyman, have had the same origin. The Indians ascribe a vital power to prana, the life-force, which is in breath. When blowing on a wound we are unknowingly using the healing and curative power of the breath-soul.

In this connection, Jung's description of his visit to the Elgonyi tribe in East Africa and his attempts to understand their religious customs is interesting. An old man describes how in the morning when the sun rises they leave their huts, hold their hands before their mouths and spit or blow into them. Jung interprets this as an offering to the rising sun, which for these natives is mungo (mana), or divine, at the moment of rising.

Jung draws the following conclusion: "If they have spittle on their hands, this is the substance which, according to primitive belief, contains the personal mana, the force that cures, conjures and sustains life. If they breathe upon their hands, breath is wind and spirit - it is roho, in Arabic ruch, in Hebrew ruach, and in Greek pneuma. The action means: I offer my living spirit to God. It is a wordless, acted prayer, which could equally well be spoken: 'Lord, into thy hands I commend my spirit!". And Jung ends: "Does this merely happen so, or was this thought already incubated and purposed before man existed? I must leave this question unanswered."

When Malinowski, one of the pioneers in the anthropological field, discusses sacred traditions and compulsory rites among primitive peoples, he emphasises that "a society which makes its tradition sacred has gained by it an inestimable advantage of power and permanence... There is a creative element in the rites of religious nature." When pointing to "the dogma of continuity after death", he finds that "the difficulty of facing one's own annihilation or that of a near and beloved person... could become socially destructive". Religion, however, can remove it "only by its negation in ritual".
Malinowski ends with same type of question as did Jung: "Whether this is achieved by a Providence directly guiding human history, or by a process of natural selection in which a culture which evolves a belief and a ritual of immortality will survive and spread — this is a problem of theology and metaphysics. The anthropologist has done enough when he has shown the value of a certain phenomenon for social integrity and for the continuity of culture".¹²

Nathan Söderblom, former archbishop of Sweden, ascertains, "In the superstitious rites and the confused animism of the Savage you will discover the sense of the infinite".¹³

Returning to Nyman, we are told that soul conceptions among primitive peoples show the same "development whether we study the breath-soul amongst the Zulus, the ancient Aztecs, the primitive Germanics, or the Greeks: they all look upon the soul as a thin, fine breath-like substance, its presence making the body alive and movable, its absence bringing unconsciousness and death".¹⁴ According to Nyman we shall furthermore find that "the error of these views is that they confuse a condition for life with life itself, and later with the soul".¹⁵

In addition to the above views and probably running parallel with them, there arose another notion of the soul, namely, that it could and did at times exist outside the living body, to return again unharmed. Nyman traces this idea to primitive man's belief in the reality of his dream life. Dreams have always had a profound influence on the human mind. But it seems certain that primitive man is much more defenceless against his dream experiences than is modern man. He easily believes that there may be a being inside him, the sleeper, a being who can experience the world on its own, unbound by time and space.¹⁶

Herbert Spencer, the philosopher of the theory of evolution, has the merit of being the first to assume that to believe in a second life (an alter ego, a little man within the big
man, a shadow-soul or image-soul) is a characteristic trait of all primitive thinking. Research in many fields has proved Spencer's theory to be correct, and it has been found that primitive peoples in many parts of the world regard any representation of a man (picture, photograph, reflected image, shadow) as his soul, his Doppelgänger. In their original significance the Fravashi of the Persians and the Ka of the Egyptians may have been the same kind of "second selves", duplicating the visible bodily "selves".

Nyman's theory about primitive mentality seems a fitting introduction to the vast literature dealing with this subject. Many are the writers and researchers within different fields (philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, students of religion and the humanities) who have attempted to explain the life and thought patterns of primitive man, from different angles and with different aims in view. There seems to be an almost unanimous opinion about one thing, namely, that man of pre-scientific consciousness does not separate the spiritual and the material, nor the ethical and the physical, in the way we do. For him there is no clear-cut difference between the familiar and the strange, soul and body, life and death, an inner and an outer world.

"The thinking of primitive peoples is predominantly synthetic", says A R Johnston, "and it is characterised in large measure by what has been called the grasping of a totality. Phenomena are readily perceived as being in some kind of relationship; they are readily found to participate in some sort of whole". Jung describes primitive man as unpsychological: "Psychic happenings take place outside him in an objective way". We find that van Peursen thinks along the same lines: he presumes that for primitive man "the world around is thus implicated in what we would nowadays call the inner life", and that the soul is "never simply immaterial, because the world is never simply material". Frequently a soul was attributed to 'inanimate' objects which led to the worship of nature (animism).
Both Nyman and van Peursen describe primitive man as experiencing his surroundings as full of mystical powers and influences; the soul is also felt as a force of this kind. In a mystical way it is both part of man and alien to him. Not only can the soul leave man in his sleep, but it can happen to be located completely outside him, for instance, in a tree or in an animal.

Levy-Bruhl, the French sociologist and ethnographer, who studied primitive tribes in many parts of the world, has given interesting examples of their beliefs in an 'exterior' soul. He describes the world of primitive man as a world of pre-logical mysticism and calls the curious relationships between visible and invisible man "une participation mystique".

Jung objects to the word mystical which Levy-Bruhl emphasises but which Jung does not find well chosen, for in his opinion "primitive man does not see anything mystical in these matters, but considers them perfectly natural... even the things he dreams about seem to him real". Jung also relates how some native tribes firmly believe that their souls may emigrate, and that the medicine-man can catch them in cages like birds; also that other strange souls may come from far away places and cause disease in the village they visit. Jung tells a story of a white man who, having shot a crocodile, found himself surrounded by excited villagers demanding compensation. A certain old woman in the nearest village had died at the moment when the shot was fired. Therefore, the crocodile was obviously the old woman, or rather, her bush-soul: the hunter had killed both.

In "The Teachings of Dona Juan", Carlos Castaneda asks a Sonoran Indian woman whether she knew any diableros. She replies by telling him about a woman who used to turn into a dog and who was killed when stealing cheese. "The white man killed the dog with a shotgun, and at the very moment the dog died in the house of the white man, the woman died in her own hut. Her kin got together and went to the white man and demanded payment. The white man paid good money for having killed her."
We, of course, would call this way of accounting for events 'pre-logical', or simply 'illogical', but, says Jung, "it only strikes us in this way because we start from assumptions wholly different from those of primitive man. It is not that primitive man is more or less logical than we are; on the contrary, he behaves exactly as we when he does not examine his assumptions". He is just as sure about the causes of disease and other ills as we are; he would no more attribute them to natural causes than we to spirits and witchcraft. The reason why we have "the feeling of something prodigiously strange" when approaching the world of archaic man is that he does live in "a different world". Only by knowing his presuppositions can we understand him, or, says the psychologist Jung, "we might equally well say that primitive man ceases to be a riddle when we have come to know our own presuppositions".

In his encyclopaedic study of primitive myth, Frazer discusses various forms of the external soul in folk tales. In this case too the external soul is necessary to life, its destruction means death to its owner. In the Greek saga about Meleager, it is told how his life was exactly correlated with that of a piece of wood and how it came rapidly to an end when the wood was burnt.

In an essay about the Kiwai-Papuans, Landtman describes how a savage, when tricked into looking at himself in a mirror, would shrink back, showing a panicky fear of punishment for having improperly looked into the world of spirits. This tribe uses the same word for 'soul', 'shadow', and 'image' of a person in general.

Leenhardt asked an old Caledonian Islander whether it was "the notion of spirit that the West had brought to them", but was told that they already knew about that. What was new to them was the idea of the body. Their language had shown the peculiarity of not separating the first and the third persons: the 'I' was defined as something definite, but could just as well be located 'out there', in a tree, for instance.
van Peursen is interested in Leenhardt's research, as the conclusions he draws from it strengthens his own main theory, namely, that we should look on man as a unity of soul and body: "man as mind is man as body". Therefore, when discussing these peoples and how they were formerly "living in an indeterminate atmosphere in which their very bodies were activated by spirit-forces; how all this changed through confrontation with Western thinking", and how the old man now says 'I', van Peursen concludes that man discovers his own bodiliness as he discovers his individual personality and inner life.

It is interesting to compare the above with what Tyrrell says about selfhood and otherness from self: "In the personality, the midlevel centres possess in some degree both the qualities of selfhood and of otherness from self; and it looks as if the higher we go in the personal hierarchy, the more selfhood we find and the less otherness". The Islanders had to go through a development involving the process of differentiating themselves "from their mythico-social world" in order to be aware of being individuals with private souls and inalienable bodies. In van Peursen's words, "soul and body are disclosed each in the other".

From another field of experience William Reich describes his attempts, in dealing with schizophrenic patients, to establish a relationship between what is expressed as ego and what is experienced as external world. He writes, "We are all simply a complicated 'electric' machine which has a structure of its own and is in interaction with the energy of the universe. At any rate, I had to assume a harmony of outer world and ego; no other assumption seemed possible. Today I know that mental patients experience this harmony without any boundary between ego and the outer world. And that 'the Babbits' have no idea of this harmony, feeling their beloved egos, sharply circumscribed, to be the centre of the universe".

van Peursen also discusses the works of the anthropologist
A C Kruyt who, through his fieldwork, found that a distinction must be made between two main categories of souls: 1) the central life-soul, the life principle; 2) the shadowy phantom-soul, the death soul. This may be so among certain tribes and even certain civilisations, but it seems that it should not be made a general rule, for there is too much overlapping. We shall find in Homer's thinking that the life principle seems involved in both 'life-souls' and 'death-souls'.

In connection with the phantom-soul, we may note how Tyrrell explains apparitions. He suggests that ghosts in all forms are hallucinations, and that as such they are "the sensory expressions of dramatic constructs, created in the regions of the personality outside the field of normal consciousness".

Apparitions have two characteristics: 1) a life like resemblance to human beings, and 2) a somnambulistic or automatic behaviour. They therefore present an incongruity. According to Tyrrell, ghosts have been known from earliest times and have always 'shown' these two contradictory attributes. "The first characteristic... led to the apparition being identified with a human being in a naïve and literal way. Yet at the same time, the intangible, evanescent, and ethereal nature of the apparition led to its being regarded as a 'spirit'... but if an apparition is, literally, a human being, and at the same time is something immaterial, it must be the immaterial part of a human being. Thus 'spirit' came to mean the immaterial self, or essence of selfhood, as well as an apparition. The second characteristic... led to the quite incompatible view that they were mere empty simulacra or 'shades'. The two beliefs together, thus gave rise to the idea, so prevalent in antiquity, that the dead became ghosts who, in losing the body, lose their hold on real life and wander in a state of semi-consciousness through a gloomy underworld."

Malinowski's approach to the origin of the belief in spirits...
is almost the opposite of the above. He suggests that "the belief in spirits is the result of the belief in immortality. The substance of which the spirits are made is the full-blooded passion and desire for life, rather than the shadowy stuff which haunts his dreams and illusions. Religion saves man from a surrender to death and destruction, and in doing this it merely makes use of the observations of dreams, shadows and visions. The real nucleus of animism lies in the deepest emotional fact of human nature, the desire for life."³⁷.

Quite possibly Tyrrell and Malinowski are equally right. The development of primitive thinking about souls, ghosts, and spirits did undoubtedly follow different paths arriving at somewhat different conclusions. Sumerians and Babylonians believed that the death-souls led a mournful after life in the bowels of the earth. They were worried and gloomy peoples³⁸ who feared death, whereas the Egyptians were generally more cheerful and confident and their attitude towards the life after death was optimistic. They regarded it as a happy continuation of this life. Perhaps one could say that they expected their death-souls to behave as life-souls, i.e. to enjoy the same kinds of pleasures as had their living bodies.

The primitive Greeks too, had at an early stage, believed in the survival of body/soul as an entire entity and had symbolised this belief by embalming their dead. But later in their beliefs a separation takes place between body and soul, and to Homer's heroes nothing was as hateful as death. "Do not try to explain away death to me", says the shadowy death-soul of Achilles when Odysseus meets him in Hades. "I would rather be a slave on earth than a king in Hades."³⁹. Here the similarity between Hades and Sheol is very striking. No doubt, the early Israelite view of the after-life "was gloomy in the extreme."⁴⁰.

"A History of Civilisation" points to the fact that the Greeks did not deny that death was inevitable, and they suffered the
fears and anxieties common to the human lot. With regard to earthly life, however, they had no feeling of hopelessness but found it rewarding to engage in tackling its manifold problems. Kitto also describes their almost fierce joy in life, their exultation in human achievement and human personality. "The tragic note which we hear in the 'Iliad' and in most of Greek literature was produced by the tension between these two forces, passionate delight in life and clear apprehension of its unalterable framework."
Notes to Introduction.

3. ibid., 10
4. Onians, 283
5. Nyman, cf p 13
6. ibid., cf p 13
7. ibid., cf p 17
9. ibid., 174
11. ibid., 62
12. ibid., 62
14. Nyman, 14
15. ibid., 19
16. ibid., 20
17. ibid., 23
19. A R Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel*, p 1
20. Jung, 161
22. Nyman, cf p 10, van Peursen, cf pp 81,83
23. Jung, 162-3
25. Jung, 145-6
26. ibid., 149
27. Nyman, cf p 23
28. van Peursen, cf p 85
29. ibid., 192
30. ibid., 85
32. van Peursen, 85
33. William Reich, *The Function of the Orgasm*, p 62
34. van Peursen, cf p 82
Notes to Introduction/2

35. Tyrrell 155
36. ibid., 39, 40
37. Malinowski 51
38. *A History of Civilisation, Prehistory to 1300*, pp 16, 17
42. ibid., 61
PART I

GREEK THINKING.
CHAPTER I

HOMER'S CONCEPT OF THE SOUL
"To men of his own time and race, sharing his environment and his beliefs, Homer's picture was clear", but for us his world is "that strange, different world". Numerous scholars have tried to explain the concept of the soul in Homer. Some have gone so far as to say that nothing survives death; that the Homeric poems show the belief that death is the end of everything, but as Rohde says, "in any case it is 'no mere nothing' that can enter the gloomy depths".

Homer's view on this subject probably reflects centuries of Greek popular beliefs before approximately 800 BC, and what concerns the Greeks after Homer was that they were educated on the 'Iliad' and the 'Odyssey' to such a degree that they accepted, it seems almost without questioning, the Homeric interpretation of life and death which became the prevailing one in Greece for centuries to come, "satisfying their needs and governing their actions".

Even in the first period of Greek philosophical thinking, sometimes called the 'archaic period', "stretching more or less from the beginning of the sixth century BC into the first half of the fifth century", we are dealing with Homeric concepts of the soul. At this time, Homer's poems were sometimes attacked and criticised, and we find that they undergo some changes. They are still realities in the discussions of both Plato and Aristotle, who found that Homer's stories encouraged immorality and gave a false account of the soul; even so Homer remained "the educator of Hellas". Stacey points out that even though there is "of course, no direct relationship between Homer and St Paul,... Paul was influenced more by popular thought than by the great teachers, and Homer played a leading part in shaping popular thought".

Is there a specific Homeric concept of the soul?

In Homeric thinking "there is no room within man for an individual, personal soul" answers van Peursen. Böhme's opinion is that "what we have here is a number of life-souls and a death-shade", and Snell finds "a batch of organs.
composed of spirit-matter, which together comprise the area of the psychic." 7

When using the word 'psychic' we are already on shaky ground. It is derived from psyche which, in later Greek, is generally speaking the comprehensive term for soul, but in Homer it seems at first sight to be only that 'almost nothing' which flutters around in Hades. In the Homeric "area of the soul", however, the words thymos and nous are also important. Snell suggests that Homeric man splits what we usually call 'soul' into three parts and that he defines each of these "by the analogy of physical organs". But here again, when we want to grasp Homer's meaning without any doubt "we encounter terminological difficulties". The idea of soul/s is intimately connected with the "whole character and orientation" of the Homeric language. 8

The ancient Greeks did not use concepts in the way we do because they did not think as we do. "To a certain degree a man felt that he could not help his own actions. An idea, an emotion, an impulse came to him; he acted and presently rejoiced or lamented. Some god had inspired or blinded him". 9 "The gods play an intimate part in the affairs of the mortals". 10 Homeric man did not have our sharp distinction between thinking and feeling and acting, nor between our abstract and concrete. Rohde suggests that "the activities of willing, feeling or thinking were regarded as the manifestations of something which lives and wills inside the visible man. It may be concealed in one of the organs or in the body itself." 11 "The metaphoric use of words for organs, which may be interpreted as abstraction", says Snell, "has its place on the most primitive level of speech, for it is precisely on that level that the organ is regarded, not as dead and concrete, but as participating in its function". 12

Psyche and thymos leave the body at death; the former to lead a ghost-like existence in the underworld as an image, eidolon, the latter to vanish without trace. The aion, in fluid form, also leaves the dying man (cf p 2 above).
Homer writes: "The son of Tydeus deprived them of thymos and psyche and took away their glorious arms". And Achilles says after Patroklos's short appearance: "Ah! me!, then there is even in the halls of Hades a psyche and eidolon, but phrenes there are not therein at all".

When Odysseus meets the psyche of his mother in Hades, she explains why she cannot be grasped, though he tries to clasp her psyche three times: "This is the way with mortals when one dies. For no longer do the sinews hold the flesh and the bones, but the mighty energy of burning fire overcomes these (as soon as the thymos has left the white bones) and the psyche like a dream-phantom flies away hovering".

The psychai will be allowed into Hades only when the corpses which they have left behind are burnt; until this has been done, they retain consciousness and memory, and can communicate with the living in their sleep. Not to be burned, but to have to remain as a restless phantom amongst the living, would, however, be a fate worse than the shadowy existence in Hades. It seems that in this wish to see the disembodied souls safely and unreturnably settled in Hades the Greeks projected their own fear of them. Hades is the inaccessible world of the unseen.

In the "Voyages of Ohthere and Wulfstan", attributed to the English King Alfred (848-900), we read the following: "and among the Ests it is the custom that a man of whatever tribe must be cremated and if a single bone is found unburned, then they (his relatives) must pay heavily for it". (See here Onians of St Paul + seed + resurrection...)

Rohde writes about the early Greek custom of cremation, that although "intended to benefit the dead" it still more benefits the living "for they will not be troubled by ghosts that are securely confined to the depth of the earth". "Altogether the soul in Hades was a witless, joyless thing, incapable of appreciating its own misfortunes. It had no vitality, no reason, no moral sense, no other reality than that of an
apparition a man might see in a dream"\(^\text{28}\). (Cf. here what was said about apparitions earlier: p 13 above; and cf also the shades in Sheol, p 147 below).

Some prophets and heroes are exceptions, however. The prophet Teiresias retained his "consciousness and intelligence" even in Hades; his lungs were still full of blood. As regards the other psychei, Odysseus has to offer blood to them before they can remember their former lives. van Peursen remarks that it seems as though in this manner the "death-souls... appropriate in some degree the substance of a life-soul (i.e. the thymos)"\(^{19}\).

Charles, however, finds that these very books (X and XI of the Odyssey), which describe Odysseus' visit in Hades, attest to "belated survivals of Ancestor Worship" (cf p 28 below). "In these books the poet attributes the restoration of the consciousness of the shades to their enjoyment of the blood of the slaughtered animals; but this is pure misapprehension of the poet, who lived in an age that had forgotten the original significance of these rites". These books describe the shades as possessing a certain degree of "consciousness, thought and vitality" even before drinking the blood\(^\text{20}\).

We said that Snell suggested that, for what we usually call soul, there are for Homer "three parts of soul" (cf p 17 above). Snell, however, does not call thymos and nous independent souls. Rohde criticises "the belief in the existence of more than one soul in the same person" referring to the following statement by Gomperz: "Homer recognises in the thymos a word supposed to be derived from the steam rising from freshly shed and still warm blood - a second soul in addition to the psyche; a 'smoke-soul' side by side with the 'breath-soul'"\(^{21}\).

Rohde quite decisively states that the Homeric thymos should not be called a soul, or a double to the psyche, "if by soul a 'something' is meant - as it must be in popular psychology -
which is added independently to the body and its faculties, something which lives separately in the body and after the death of the body (with which it is not indissolubly united) dissociates itself and goes off independently"22. Rohde emphasises that *thymos*, like *menos*, *nous*, *metis* and *boule*, is a special faculty of the living body: "either thinking, or willing, or merely feeling is conducted by its means"23. But to acquire life, the body must be supplemented by the *psyche*. In fact, Homer "several times, quite unmistakingly, uses the word *psyche* when we should say 'life'"23.

When we translate *psyche* with 'life' we are not giving it its true meaning, according to Snell, but he admits that it is "the force which keeps the human being alive"24. Stacey finds that for Homer vitality was largely physical and wholly dependent on *psyche"25. Both Snell and Stacey point out that *psyche* has no share in the waking activities of man26.

Of course, in all these discussions we return again and again to the task of clarifying our concepts. No doubt, Rohde uses a different language from Snell, or from van Peursen, or even from Stacey, when he defines his concept of the soul. It seems, however, that Reeves is on his wave-length when she writes: "In referring to the *psyche*, as distinct from the *thymos*, we have introduced the early Greeks' immortal soul in contrast to their mortal mind or spirit"27. Onians explains *psyche* as having "served many of the purposes which the concept of the unconscious serves for us", whereas *thymos*, on the other hand, may perhaps be "closest referred to as awareness or consciousness"28.

The third part of the soul, in accordance with Snell's theory, the *nous* is, like *thymos*, also a word for the mind; whereas *thymos* is the organ of motion and emotion alike, *nous* is the "cause of ideas and images"29. All mental phenomena are in one way or other distributed in such a way as to fall within the sphere of either of the two organs. *Nous* is often referred to as the reason or intellect and seems to have been related "purely to spirit or mind"29. As such
it no doubt played an important role in later philosophy (cf. Aristotle, p 121 below).

Onians, too, discusses the narrow relationship between thymos and nous, relating both to consciousness. Whereas thymos has to do with man's uncontrolled motions and emotions, with his "fierceness, energy, and courage", nous expresses the purposing consciousness: nous (unlike thymos) does not express a permanent organ of the body (cf p 121 below); nous may rather be said to define thymos, or to be a current controlling it; nous is "dynamic and emotional". This would explain why the early Greek philosopher Anaxagoras regarded nous as the dynamic ordering factor of the universe (cf pp 67/8 below).

The early Greeks' concept of consciousness is discussed by Reeves, whose book is an approach to modern psychology. She points to the fact that "thymos, the stuff of mind or consciousness" is said to be contained in the phrenes, and that phrenes, which later came to mean diaphragm, in Homer's times meant lungs, as Onian's research very clearly shows. Reeves finds that "we are thus led to realise that in its turn thymos connoted breath. Moreover, since phrenes, with the heart, were organs of mind, the quality of the mind was related to their quality. Also, 'thought', 'breath' and 'words' were intimately associated."

As we have already seen the idea of breath as life principle has deep roots in the human mind. Onians gives us many examples of how in Homeric thinking, the water vapour condensing from the breath was identified with the vapour from the blood. "The cognates of thymos suggest that it should mean vapour. Whence? From what liquid but blood, the hot liquid which is in fact concentrated in the heart and around it in the lungs, (phrenes). The latter are filled with blood and breath that interact, giving and taking from each other."

Onian's 'discovery' that phrenes must be translated 'lungs'
is of great importance, and it seems, according to Reeves, a "crucial point" in understanding Homer, in particular his emotional expressiveness. Phrenes has been a bone of contention among scholars for more than a century, and many have written, as Nyman does, that it is very difficult to get "a feeling of what this terms stands for"^33. Perhaps Onians has this feeling?

Onians seems to base his statements on very thorough studies of his material. It is interesting to follow his line of thought with regard to 'inspiration'. "What conception could be more natural, when feeling and thought are the work of the lungs?", he asks. "Time and again... we read how a god or a goddess 'breathed' menos into a hero or heroes or into horses or mules.... At the stage of thoughts when these beliefs emerged there was difficulty in conceiving anything except material entities. Menos is apparently... conceived as itself something, fluid or gaseous, which for convenience we may translate 'energy', and which was felt inwardly much as we feel what we so name. It was thought to be more particularly with the thymos in the phrenes. Hence he, who has it, 'breaths' it, and the god, who gives it, 'inspires' or 'breathes it into' him, and alternatively is said to 'place it in his thymos' or 'in his phrenes'"^34. Thus, inspiration happens in a very literal sense.

Phrenes, with thymos, being assumed to be organs of the mind, breath and all psychic activities were felt to be related. 'Words' need 'breath' and 'thoughts' to be expressible, and there was felt to be an intimate relationship between these three concepts. "Thoughts are words and words are breath, epea, ariaz, as Sappho seems to have called them", and, says Onians, "this conception of words would be natural, inevitable among men unfamiliar with writing"^35. Homer's Greeks, as many other primitive peoples, thought that words or thoughts were kept in the lungs (see p 3 above). The reference of consciousness to breath also explains why the Athenians were thought to be intelligent and the Boeotians dull - owing to the clear air of Athens and the thick atmosphere in Boeotia respectively^36.
Onians's explanation of the original meaning of the verb phronein leads to interesting conclusions. In later Greek phronein has primarily an intellectual sense, 'to think', 'to have understanding'. In Homer's sense it carries a more comprehensive meaning, it conveys "an understanding of undifferentiated psychic activity". There is a totality of response in Homer's heroes, they give free bodily expression to all feelings: weep copiously and publicly, and refrain from nothing in their rage, even to the dashing of children to death, which to our mind is quite incongruous with their acclaimed nobility and status far above mere savages. For them, thinking and willing "form a complete unity which is the reality". "'To know' means in effect 'to have seen'.... 'to understand something' is 'to be able to do it'", and so forth. Phrases such as 'to see her is to love her' and 'I shuddered at the thought' carry the same implications (cf p 75 below).

Horse-riding seems to prove the same point: where there is a right relationship between horse and rider the latter need only to think about the next move, perhaps even without knowing that he is thinking about it, and the horse will react accordingly. An idea passing through the rider's mind will cause an invisible movement, fully understandable to the horse. "All mental states", says William James, "are followed by bodily activity of some sort. They lead to inconspicuous changes in breathing, circulation, general muscular tension, and glandular and other visceral activity, even if they do not lead to conspicuous movements of the muscles of voluntary life.... All states of mind, even mere thoughts and feelings, are motor in their consequences." Jung modifies the above statement slightly when he remarks that "the psychic feeling and the bodily change are two sides of a unity "each of which has a cumulative reciprocal effect upon the other".

In this connection, Onians concludes that "for the Homeric Greeks the thymoa is the 'spirit' (somehow living and willing inside man, see p 17 above), the breath that is consciousness, variable, dynamic, coming and going, changing as feeling
changes and, we may add, as thought changes."43.

The connection between Teiresias (see page 19 above) having his lungs still full of blood and retaining his consciousness and intelligence becomes much clearer after Onians's explanations. The vaporous thymos, rooted in the breath and blood of the phrenes, feels, thinks and wills only for as long as man is alive (Teiresias being the exception). Thymos is rightly referred to as the breath-soul, or rather the breath/blood-soul, according to Onians44.

Psychein means 'to blow', but although psyche was thought to be gaseous45, it is not originally the breath-soul. Later there is a fusion of psyche and thymos. Onians produces a variety of evidence which suggests that "Psyche was not simply the 'life' but was the living strength which sustains the body giving it vital tone and movement"45.

Onians states, somewhat shockingly, that procreation and sneezing seem to have been the two most distinctive manifestations of the psyche, though any one "movement, quivering, throbbing, itching, flushing, etc. of a part of the body without any apparent influence from the conscious self was a warning of some happening" and ascribed to the psyche46. Even today we view warily a shudder down the spine as a premonition of death. Perhaps this may be explained "by an original belief that there was the life and the life-soul"47. For Homer's Greeks "psyche was especially in 'the seed' and this 'seed' was enclosed in the skull and the spine"48.

The particular importance attached to sneezing in Homer's thinking would thus, according to Onians, have to do with the belief that psyche was situated in the head. "A sneeze was a strange happening and would naturally be traced to something inside the head; it would be regarded as a spontaneous expression of that something independent of the body and the conscious will. It was regarded as prophetic, a sign from a power with other power. Psyche was the power
with just such superior knowledge, such relations to the
body, and such independence of the conscious self. A
sneeze could also mean some serious disturbance of the soul
and it was therefore wise to say "Zeus save me" when sneezing.
It is interesting to note how long-lived and widespread this
custom has been.

A nod was a peculiarly binding and sacred form of promise in
Homer's thinking. Onians traces its importance to the
belief that "the holy life-soul and the executive power was
involved in the promise". A 'nod' was characteristic of
psyche, whereas 'speech' would be the sign of thymos (in our
terms: 'unconscious' and 'conscious' self).

We discussed earlier (pp2/3 above) Onians theories with regard
to αἰόν as the liquid or liquefiable stuff of life and strength.
The conclusions that Onians draws are thus that the Greeks
identified the liquid noticed in the brain (the cerebro-spinal
fluid) with the seminal fluid. For them it seemed to be
the same fluid, the (generative) marrow, which was found in
the head, the spine, the thigh bones and the knees, and as
tears and sweat in the flesh, and with this they identified
psyche as the life principle. They saw in psyche the
life which is transmitted in procreation. This new life,
says Onians, "was regarded as the greatest miracle, the
holiest mystery". (cf p 120 below).

Psyche had its habitat in the head and so the head was
peculiarly sacred. To sanctify the head in some way or
other has been a custom among numerous peoples and civilisations.
"Laurel wreaths, haloes, diadems, anointings,
crowning, and innumerable other signs of respect for the
head may probably be associated with the same line of thought."

Onians's conclusions seem very far reaching. He suggests
that, through his research into the beliefs about αἰόν, we
should now be better able to understand why the Nubians, for
instance, "suppose it will give them strength to apply the
sweat of their horses to their own bodies" or why "anointing,
the application to the body of oily liquids or unguents, (was) practised from the Homeric age onwards, usually after the bath". The reason for these different kinds of anointings were "that it was thought to feed, to introduce into the body through the pores, the stuff of life and strength, which appears to come out through the pores in the form of sweat" 55 (cf the use of oil etc. in the Egyptian embalming ritual, p 5 above - oil was thought to be seed).

The belief that the psyche was in the seed gave rise to the idea that it was the father who provided the soul, and, therefore, the life of the new being; the role of the mother was merely to clothe it with a body. We meet this belief in the myth about Zeus who, when he wished to have a child without the mediation of a woman, gave birth to Athena directly from his head. And in Aristotle we read that the psyche is contributed by the seed of the male and that the woman cannot provide it (cf p 119 below). Consequently, it was widely believed that a woman had no soul! 56.

The Romans, in their early poetry, had a phrase which has puzzled translators a great deal: "caput limare cum aliqua (or, aliquo)"; 'to diminish one's head with someone'. This has been taken to mean 'to kiss', but according to Onians it means to have sexual intercourse. The idea behind the phrase seems to be that the soul in the head is used up to the same degree as the seed stored in the head is used up 57.

This joins up with Onians's explanation of how 'hairy' men were believed to have the strongest sexual bent - and loss of hair, baldness, was believed to be dependent upon loss of seed" 58. The present author remembers from her young days in Sweden hearing whispers about bald-headed men and insinuations about what their baldness indicated. It is certainly amazing to notice what a short time in folklore 2 000 years are.

Now, as we have seen, the soul, the psyche, was the living strength which gave the body "vital tone and movement".
In this connection, the idea of a celibate priesthood is also discussed by Onians. At first it may seem far-fetched to relate this rule to primitive ideas about the soul. But these views "facilitated", as Reeves puts it, "a positive attitude to chastity"\(^{59}\), as a means of conserving a man's vitality and immortal soul.

Homer's psyche was thus thought of as "vitality unencumbered and unassociated with any of the usual psychological functions which at times have been attributed to the mind", says Reeves: (cf p 66); she concludes that "such elegant simplicity was not to remain". Instead, we have to face the consequences of the gradual fusion of psyche and thymos: "the attributes, functions, and locations of the original thymos and those of the immortal and creative psyche becoming confused and intermingled"\(^{60}\).

The Homeric concept of soul was in itself an attempt to embrace and unite older, primitive views with newer, more rational views, the latter having grown up among the refugees from old Greece who founded the maritime cities of New Greece on the Asiatic coast. From about 1200BC, a great wave of destruction had overcome the Greek islands. Scholars used to attribute to the Dorian invaders this great catastrophe which destroyed the Mycenaean culture and ushered in the 'Dark Age' (ca 1100BC -- 800BC), but there had probably been much destruction going on already, a fact which facilitated the Dorian conquest\(^{61}\).

During this so-called 'Dark Age', Greek refugees, Ionians, and others, had swarmed eastward across the Aegean Sea to Asia Minor. The central region of this coast was later called Ionia. It was here in Ionia that Greek culture emerged again into the daylight, and where, in about 800BC, the Homeric poems were written down. This first colonisation had been more or less involuntary, but it had scattered the Greeks from the motherland to the Aegean Islands and to Asia Minor. The transparent clarity of the Homeric creed is a fruit of the detached sophistication of the aristocrats.
in these city-states, who had left the "dark powers of the earth" behind them when departing from Greece. Homer's thinking was surprisingly free of superstition. At about 750 BC, great new organised colonising movements began in which both Greece proper and the earlier colonies took part. From this time onward the *poleis* of Ionia became very rich and highly civilised. Miletus, the most prominent among them, later became the birth-place and the cradle of a new way of thinking, of Greek science-philosophy.

It has always been a great temptation for scholars to reconstruct the Mycenaean society from Homer. But Homer was writing 500 years after the Trojan War. There are many contradictions in Homer's works, as if strata representing various stages in man's development had been arbitrarily interposed and mingled above and between each other: there are traces of many ancient conceptions which refused to die merely because something new had emerged.

The old Mycenaean religion remains a puzzle, but Rohde assures us that rudiments of a once vigorous soul-worship are not hard to find in Homer. In the *Iliad*, the funeral of Patroklos gives us a picture which "in the solemnity and ceremoniousness of its elaborate detail is in striking conflict with the normal Homeric conception of the nothingness of the soul after its separation from the body." The whole episode is full of primeval savage ideas, down to the slaughter of human beings, and the offerings are certainly sacrificial in character, sacrifices to a powerful soul.

From another source we get, what Rohde calls, "the most important information about the development of Greek belief in the soul". In Greece itself, in the land of Boeotia, we find Hesiod, the earliest of the Greek didactic poets, writing "Works and Days", and probably also a *Theogony*. Among these Boeotian peasants has "survived a religious worship paid to the souls of certain departed classes of men". This cultus preserved alive, at least as a vague
tradition, a belief which Homeric thinking had interrupted, but not quite succeeded in eliminating. Hesiod tells us about "a form of ancestor-worship based upon the once living belief in the elevation of disembodied and immaterial souls to the rank of powerful, consciously active spirits". As we have seen, according to Homeric beliefs in general, the dead in Hades possessed no consciousness. The Hesiodian 'souls', however, were consciously and independently active in their lives after death, and Charles points out that such views "were undoubtedly helps to the formation of a doctrine of immortality".

According to Hesiod there were several classes of men, among which were Men of the Golden Age, of the Silver Age, and of the Bronze Age. After death, the first mentioned became "Daimones epichthonici, watchers over mankind in a good sense, and endowed with large powers. Similarly, men of the Silver Age became daimones opochthonioi (not in Hades). Men of the Bronze Age (namely of Hesiod's own time) became phantoms, eidola, in Hades. Charles emphasises that from these views that only the earlier generations are exalted into a higher life, we see clearly "that in Hesiod's age the Homeric doctrine had become supreme".

Hesiod may have been partly under the influence of the Delphic Oracle, a mountain shrine of the sun-god Apollo, and particularly sponsored by the invading Dorians. The oracle "took under its protection everything that could promote and strengthen the cult of souls". Apollo became the patron of the cult of Heroes and a patron of the Heroes themselves. Originally the 'Hero' had been the mythological ancestor and patron of the city-state, i.e. each city-state worshipped their own particular 'Hero'. The 'Heroes' represent soul/spirits which have entered upon a higher stage of existence, but "they are no more mortals, nor yet gods". They are, however, not some kind of inferior deities or demi-gods, and they are quite distinct from the daimones.
After the Persian Wars (490-449BC), wars of freedom which had aroused the deepest and most religious feelings in the Greeks, "it did not seem too much when whole companies of those who had fallen for freedom were raised to the rank of Heroes"66. Rohde describes how, even at a later period, there were annual solemn processions to honour the Greeks who had died for their country, and also how the archon of the city would call upon the "brave men who had laid down their lives for Greece" and invite them to a meal and satisfaction of blood66.

However, to come back to the Homeric time (ca 300 years before the Persian Wars), there is an episode in the Odyssey which describes Menelaos's 'translation', which, though it may seem foreign to Homeric thought, is still not completely out of the range of its ideas. Menelaos is carried off, soul and body, by the power of the gods, to the country of the blest, the Elysian Plains. We have said that once the soul descended into Hades it could never return. The gods could however give a man immortality through translating him when still living into Elysium. To the Homeric poet 'god' and 'immortal' are interchangeable terms. When, as in the case of Menelaos, his psyche is never again to be separated from his visible self, he will be immortal and a god, immortal being identified with 'divine', but not, however, with 'immaterial' or 'spiritual'.

Stacey describes as bodily the life of the Immortals. "The joys of Elysium were bodily joys and the punishment of unfortunates bodily pains. Immortality lay in possessing a body, that unlike the human one, was free from corruption. Disembodied immortality, if that word be given its full meaning, was never envisaged by Homer"68.

It seems thus that the gods possessed a "material immortality", but perhaps we should ask whether this so-called materiality of the imperishable bodies of the gods was the same as that of what we think when we are confronted with the concept 'materiality'. We refer here to some interesting facts from
Onians's research. He compares *ichor*, *brótos* and *bro´tós*. "Homer's gods", he says, "have no 'blood' that is mortal, only a counterpart that is 'immortal', i.e. *ichor*, which is why they are known as 'immortal'". This liquid issues when any of them are wounded.

On the other hand, we have seen that the divine and immortal in man is the life-soul, the *psyche*, whereas *thymos* is mortal, "destroyed and shattered by death". "Thymos is rooted in the breath and the blood of the *phrenes*," as we said earlier (p 24 above). Onians finds that this direct relation of "thymos, the mortal factor, to blood may help us to explain *brótos*, 'gore', (blood that has run from a wound and is dry apparently), i.e. that it is in origin one with *bro´tós*, related to *mors* and meaning 'mortal' or 'dead'. Its *thymos* has been destroyed, and it is parted from the *psyche*.

The fact that the gods were thought to have had an immortal liquid in their bodies instead of blood, naturally leads to the question whether or not their bodies too were made up of a quite different immortal 'matter' compared with the 'matter' of human bodies. The gods were generally invisible, but could make themselves visible to the human eye; they moved through the air; they changed into any shape, human or animal. It seems probable that in the view of Homer's listeners the bodies of the gods were made of some immortal stuff, which we would call immaterial, and that this was the reason why they were "free from corruption" (cf p 30 above).

But we return to the phenomenon of 'translation'. Rohde finds that the verses about Menelaos's translation "allow us a glimpse into a world about which the Homeric poems are otherwise silent." The Elysian Fields are no new invention, they belong to that old tradition which was interrupted through the violent upheavals and migrations connected with the Dorian invasion. Rohde relates another instance in which this ancient belief in the 'translation' of an individual, body and soul, into immortal life was confirmed by the Oracle at Delphi as late as 486BC. This peculiar
case was that of a certain Kleomedes, who, in what seems to have been somewhat dubious circumstances, had killed his opponent in the boxing match at the 71st Olympic festival, and who then completely disappeared. The Oracle declared that he had been 'carried away' and he was then officially raised to the rank of Hero. It seems that the title of 'Hero' given to Kleomedes would witness to the fact that the original meaning of 'translation' had been confused. A 'Hero' was a psyche (soul/spirit) and was not visualised as possessing a body.

When reading about these 'translations' we are no doubt reminded of 'resurrection' in the Bible. Rohde anticipates this, finding that little would be gained by believing that these Greek 'translation legends' were borrowed from Semitic tradition instead of having an independent origin in Greece itself. Charles sees an "infinite gulf between the old Greek conception of the translation of Heroes to the Isles of the Blessed and that of the translation of Enoch and Elijah in Israel. For the translation of the Greek Heroes was due, not to their moral character or merits of any kind, but to their physical relationship to some of the gods."

Somehow the above two conclusions do not seem to reach the heart of the matter. In this connection, it is interesting to read what the authors of "A History of Civilisation" have to say when comparing the Homeric poems with the Bible. "Together with the Old Testament, some of which was being committed to writing at about the same time, these two poems form the greatest literary and cultural and spiritual legacy of ancient man. Indeed, certain modern scholars would maintain that both Homeric and Hebrew civilisation grew directly from a common eastern Mediterranean background, and they point to many parallels in action and attitude. In many respects archaeological evidence serves to suggest that this viewpoint probably deserves a wider acceptance than it has yet won."
One of these modern scholars is Cyrus H. Gordon who, when discussing the prevailing attitude, describes this as the "tacit assumption that ancient Israel and Greece are two water-tight compartments, totally different from each other. One is said to be sacred, the other profane; one, Semitic, the other Indo-European. One, Asiatic and Oriental; the other European and Occidental. But the fact is that both flourished during the same centuries, in the same east Mediterranean corner of the globe, with both ethnic groups in contact with each other from the start"76.

In a later book, Gordon states with regard to the Ugaritic epics, that these have "unmistakable and organic parallels that link the pre-prophetic Hebrews with the pre-philosophical Greeks"77.
Notes to Chapter I.

1. Onians, p2
2. Rohde, p4
3. Onians, p xi
4. van Peursen, p87
5. Stacey, p59
6. van Peursen, p91
7. ibid., p90, referring to Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind.
8. Snell, pp8, 15
9. Onians, p303
10. A History of Civilisation, p35
11. Rohde, p29
12. Snell, pp9, 15 (cf van Peursen, pp89-90, Rohde, pp5, 7)
13. Iliad, XI, 333ff, cf Onians, p94
14. Iliad, XXIII, 103f, cf Onians, p59
15. Odyssey, XI, 218ff, cf Onians, p60
16. Sweet's Anglo-Saxon Reader, p22, lines 155ff
17. Rohde, p21
18. Stacey, p60
19. van Peursen, p89; cf Onians, p60
20. R H Charles, Eschatology, p144
21. Rohde, p50 n58, referring to Gomperz, Greek Thinkers.
22. Rohde, p50
23. Rohde, pp30, 31
24. Snell p8
25. Stacey, p61
27. J Wynn Reeves, Body and Mind in Western Thought, p28
28. Onians, p103, n4; cf van Peursen, p89
29. Snell, pp8, 9
30. Onians, pp49, 50, 83
31. Reeves, p26
32. Onians, p47
33. Nyman, p25
34. Onians, pp 50-52
Notes to Chapter I/continued 2.

35. Onians, pp67-8
36. ibid., p78 n2
37. ibid., p14ff
38. Reeves, p26
39. Onians, p20
40. van Peursen, p90
41. William James, Mental Action is perhaps simply a Function of Brain Action, in Flew, ed, Body, Mind and Death, p207
42. C G Jung, Psychological Types, p822
43. Onians, p50
44. ibid., p94
45. ibid., p195
46. ibid., p196
47. ibid., p207
48. ibid., p119
49. ibid., pp103-4
50. ibid., pp138-9
51. ibid., p109
52. ibid., p100
53. Reeves, p29
54. Onians, p211
55. ibid., p210
56. ibid., p111, p111 n6
57. ibid., p123
58. ibid., p232
59. Reeves p29, cf Onians, p110
60. ibid., pp29-30
62. Rohde, pp77-79
63. Charles, p145
64. Rohde, p131; cf A History of Civilisation p 41
65. ibid., pp117-8
66. ibid., p131
67. ibid., pp55-56
68. Stacey, pp61-2
Notes to Chapter I/continued 3.

69. Onians, p507
70. ibid., p506
71. Rohde, p55
72. ibid., p129
73. ibid., p58
74. Charles, p57 n1 (Eschatology)
75. A History of Civilisation, p35
76. Cyrus H. Gordon, The Common Background of Greek and Hebrew Civilisations, p11
77. Cyrus H. Gordon, Ugarit and Minoan Crete, p14
CHAPTER II

A TIME OF TRANSITION
(ca 800 - 500 BC)

Psyche and Thymos developing into one concept; a gradual development towards BODY/SOUL duality.
In Chapter I we discussed the fusion of thoughts, feelings and sensations among Homer's Greeks. Reeves finds that "in this respect they did their best to serve us well". But it was not long before philosophers began to draw a sharp distinction between thought and feeling. This kind of theorising created problems which are closely interwoven with the "paradoxical problem" of locating the non-spatial soul.

Onians traces the "great dispute between subsequent thinkers as to whether the head or the chest is the seat of the ruling part" to the breakdown of the original duality of psyche and thymos, and their fusion into a more complex psyche. He adds in a note that "Plato favoured the head, Aristotle the heart and Epicurus the chest while the Stoics were divided". Reeves maintains that the "elegant simplicity" of the psyche as "vitality unencumbered" was not to remain. A very gradual development must have taken place over several centuries, psyche assuming more and more of the function of the thymos.

As this Homeric duality of psyche and thymos dissolves, it seems that another duality, that of body and soul, emerges. This could mean, as we have already noticed (p12 above) that man had to feel the unity of an inner life before he could be aware of having a body. We must ask whether this duality of soul and body was still unknown in Homer's time and, as van Peursen ascertains, in the time of the earliest Greek philosophers. On the thought of this latter period, van Peursen emphasises that "soul and body are still knit so completely together that not only is the soul so far unseparated from the body, but the concept 'body', as partner to that of 'soul' is unknown." It is generally accepted the the Greek word for body, soma, in Homer's time, stood for 'corpse'. There were different words used for 'body': demos meaning 'frame', or meleia and guia meaning 'members'. It seems that neither psyche nor soma was the real man, or rather, there is a contradiction in
Homer's way of talking about the person, so that we are in doubt wherein the personality consists. Sometimes the corpse left on the battlefield is referred to by the proper name of the person as 'himself', another time it is the escaping soul which is "invested with the name and value of the complete personality, the 'self' of the man".

Snell believes that the early Greeks did not "grasp the body as a unit" and that one can see proof of this in their language as well as in their visual arts. According to his theory, only gradually does the language discover the body, and he describes the process as follows: "In the early period a speaker when faced by another person, was apparently satisfied to call out his name... or to say this is a man. As a next step, the most conspicuous elements of his appearance are described, namely his limbs as existing side by side; their functional correlation is not apprehended in its full importance until somewhat later. True enough, the function is a concrete fact, but its objective existence does not manifest itself so clearly as the presence of the individual corporeal limbs, and its prior significance escapes even the owner of the limbs himself. With the discovery of this hidden unity, of course, it is at once appreciated as an immediate and self-explanatory truth. This objective truth, it must be admitted, does not exist for man until it is seen and known and designated by a word; until, thereby, it has become an object of thought".

This very elaborate explanation differs from A R Johnson's assumptions. We said earlier (p 9 above) that he finds that the thinking of primitive peoples is characterised by "the grasping of a totality". Snell maintains that the totality is grasped only at a later stage. Somehow, it seems that Snell does not draw the logical conclusions of what he himself states above. If 'the speaker' says 'this is a man', the speaker must have indeed grasped a totality, i.e., "the prior significance" of the "individual limbs". It seems that Johnson's view is the generally accepted one: primitive peoples perceive phenomena as being
part of some sort of a whole.  

We have said that Homer had no word for the living body. Then why did he have the word *soma* for the corpse? When he writes: "Quickly out of her limbs fled the *thymos*", one gets the impression of the limbs losing their moving force. Perhaps one may say that somehow primitive man, in the manner in which he sees the physical body as functioning teleologically, is not so wrong after all. If he presumes that there is a unifying principle in the form of invisible forces holding all things together, it is quite natural that he should explain everything to fit in with these preconceived ideas.

It may seem that the early Greeks did not need a separate word for 'body' because they already used the word *thymos*, the life-force, which in the process of moving each and every limb, united them into one living whole. We described the functions attributed to *thymos* earlier (pp 21/2 above). It is easy to understand that for the early Greeks when *thymos* left the dying man only a corpse remained. It may thus be assumed that as the *psyche* took over more and more of the full personality of the 'real' man, the word for 'corpse' seemed a logical one for living as well as for dead bodies, at least in thinking influenced by Orphism (cf pp 39, 54 below).

It was pointed out earlier (p 17 above) that Homeric man thought he felt an action taking place within him, an action he could not help or explain. In this connection Snell states that when "the notion of soul and body is as vague and almost incoherently formulated as it is here, the gods form a necessary complement to it." Or, in van Peursen's words, "Everything that happens suddenly to a man, such as an unlooked-for access of valour (menos), a sudden recollection, a flash of insight - these things are not to be explained in terms of man himself, but as having their ground and origin in divine intervention."

This last sentence seems to strike a familiar note, well-known from the religious point of view. In various ways the
message comes through: Sit back, relax and allow the Lord, or the Divine in you, to talk to you, to advise you, to run your life for you. Listen to the 'small voice' and all your problems will be solved or will simply dissolve. Snell sees this point and writes, "If we take this notion, that a thought 'came' to us, and give it a religious twist, we come fairly close to the Homeric attitude".

It is interesting to note the similarity between Phemius in the Odyssey (22: 347), who states, "No one has taught me but myself, and the God has put into my heart all kind of songs", and the Anglo-Saxon poet Caedmon of the second half of the 7th century AD, about whom the following is said by Bede, "therefore he was not taught by men, or learned the art of poetry through the medium of a man, but he was divinely aided and acquired the art of poetry through the gift of God. ....and they all said just as it was, that a heavenly gift had been granted him by the Lord himself".

There is a chapter in Catherine Marshall's book "Beyond Ourselves", (a sentimental and certainly not very academic personal account of "a woman's pilgrimage in faith"), about how to find God's guidance. She writes, "Christianity from the first has taught us that a better way for making decisions is available: the direct guidance of God to the individual. The promise that God can guide us is the clear teaching of Scripture, both in its total sweep and in its specific promises......Apparently the 1st century Christians, expected to receive their marching orders from God, regarded this kind of inner guidance as the rule rather than the exception".

Marshall then admits that "it might be argued that it is not unusual for a solution to be served up in toto from the subconscious mind when the mind is relaxed. People experience this constantly. Then how can I justify connecting God with it?". She answers her own question by quoting what C G Jung says about the unconscious: "In so far as anything is unconscious it is not definable. Since we cannot possibly know the limitations of something unknown
to us, it follows that we are not in a position to set any limits to the self...".

Marshall continues, "Since a scientific man like Jung admits that we cannot set limits to the self, the Christian may be permitted to wonder whether somewhere in the depths of personality - still beyond the reach of our scientific probing and measuring - there is not a place where the Spirit that is God can impress upon the spirit that is man a thought, a direction, a solution. Certainly it is neither plausible nor scientific to say that such things 'just happen'".15

Perhaps primitive man, as typified by Homer, did, somehow, know something very important. Something which we do not always want to acknowledge, but which is always there: The possibility of God communicating with man. As Schilling emphasises, "we are not in a position to assert the falsity of a proposition or opinion because the process of its growth from lowly beginnings can be traced".16 Along the same lines Carrington maintains that "anthropologists as a class refuse to acknowledge the reality of any genuine psychic phenomena believed in by 'savages', despite the absurdity of such an attitude, as pointed out by Andrew Lang and other competent critics. The general attitude seems to be that just because primitive peoples believe in certain unusual phenomena, these beliefs are erroneous, and such phenomena do not occur".17

Snell, in following his particular line of thought, states that the 'life of the soul' "was first understood as the intervention of a god", and concludes that this shows that "Homeric man has not yet awakened to the fact that he possesses in his own soul the source of his powers; ... he has not yet roused himself to an awareness of his own freedom. The Greeks were the first to break through this barrier, and thus founded our Western civilisation".18

Van Peursen points to a phrase which is often used in writings from this time of transitions, "either some divinity put the
idea into his head, or else it took rise within himself.\(^{19}\)

However, to come back to the emerging duality of body and soul, we find that the Greeks gradually singled out the two words *psyche* and *soma*, words which used to refer to the 'corpse' and also (among their different meanings) to the 'phantom' in Hades, to stand for their new concepts. van Peursen finds "the process by which the 'shade' comes to be the soul" quite logical because it is closely connected with the "sense of guilt that burdens human existence and the yearning for deliverance, for salvation, which found widespread expression in the many religious cults, - in Orphism, for example"\(^{20}\). The process by which the 'corpse' came to be the body may be seen as an equally logical one as we remarked (cf p 36 above). In Orphism (see pp 46, 53 below) the body was anyhow regarded as a corpse, whether living or dead.

As we said earlier (cf p 28 above), the old cults of the soul had been overshadowed and partly changed by the Homeric view. Gradually, however, times seem to have become more religious, at least on the Greek mainland, even if not in Ionia. In Greece proper, in the the 6th century BC, we find that cults began developing "in which more primitive but deeper religious feelings found expression". Armstrong is referring to fertility cults, mysteries, and the worship of the dead in all its forms\(^ {21}\).

As we saw earlier (p 29 above), the Oracle of Delphi was deeply involved in all manner of soul-worship, sponsored by the Dorians. These tribes were still very primitive when, from about the 11th century, they invaded Greece. They had brought their ancient cult of ancestor worship with them, they were still very much anchored within the clan, and needed the security of tradition. The Delphic Oracle was the authority in the details of purification and expiation after murder-trials. The judicial procedure seems to have aimed at pacifying and satisfying invisible powers more than the state and its living members, and was therefore principally of religious importance.
The souls of murdered men were regarded as particularly powerful. Far back in prehistoric times these souls would have helped themselves to revenge, especially in cases where murder had been committed within the family, when the murderer had "slain the very person whom he would have been called upon to revenge". Later ages 'instructed' the Curse-goddesses, the Erinyes, to take over "the rage of the dead man's soul". The judicial office in Athens, as well as in other Greek poleis, was closely bound up with the services of the Erinyes, and it is interesting to note that Plato is following the old custom of Greek cities when, in 'The Laws' (865 BC), he explains that his state shall take its regulations for purification and propitiation from Delphi.

That the cult of the dead and, above all, this belief in a powerful after-life for murdered men, greatly influenced the general belief in a life beyond the grave (see p 29 above) seems to be proved by an episode described by Xenophon and referring to the dying Cyrus. The King had strong hope in an after-life for all souls. This hope was founded on 'facts' about the souls of those "who have suffered injustice", and he found these facts to be unquestioned and admitted by all. Cyrus also argued that if the souls of the dead had no active power in their new existence, the worship of the dead would not have been preserved until his own times.

We find that the early Greeks did not really question that something invisible continued some kind of existence after the death of the visible person. What they questioned, and at different times had varied opinions on, was how, where, and with how much power over the living the souls lived on. No doubt, even at an early date we find occasional expressions of the view that nothing survives death, and later there are many unbelievers. But it seems a fact that many unbelievers did, in their last wills, provide for a serious and "perpetual cult of their souls"; nobody could be quite sure of the future. It might be wise to cling to tradition and old-established customs.
We do not know much about the development of religious thinking in Greece during the important 8th and 7th centuries BC, but it seems that a desire for a more perfect and hopeful prospect of the life to come gradually grew stronger and that a means of satisfaction was created with the Eleusinian Mysteries. They arose from an agrarian festival peculiar to certain families in Eleusis. The goddesses of the kingdom of the souls beyond the earth, Demeter and her daughter Persephone, stood in a special relationship to four princes of Eleusis, who erected a temple to them. The princes and their families were promised a privileged fate after death.

Kitto has an interesting explanation in this connection, which has to do with the assumption that Greek culture derives from a mixture of two incongruous older cultures. This is why we find cults based on the mysterious life-giving powers of nature, with mother-goddesses existing side by side with and in sharp contrast to the Olympian cults. The latter were based on social organism, the father being the head of the family. Kitto finds that the mystery cults appealed to the individual; these cults admitted anyone, bond or free, and taught doctrines of rebirth, regeneration, and immortality. The Olympian cults, on the other hand, admitted only members of the group, were not interested in any further teaching, and concerned themselves mainly with paying the honours due to the immortal and unseen members of the community, the souls of the departed. "The god-conception is European... the goddess-conception Mediterranean, the latter coming down in straight descent from Minoan Crete."

The Eleusinian Mysteries had begun as an exclusive society, but later, probably from that time onwards when Eleusis had been united with Athens (ca 7th century), welcomed within its doors "every woman, yes even θεσπόροι, and children and slaves". You could almost say that this openness to everyone became its principle and distinguishing characteristic.

No doubt, the Mysteries contributed to give the picture of Hades more colour and distinctiveness, and because of the
great numbers "the more lively conception of the state of the soul in the hereafter may have become the common property of Greek imagination"28. What must have drawn the masses was the 'assured' promise of a real, joyful life after death for the 'pure', whereas an evil fate in Hades would necessarily befall all 'the others'.

Everyman's 'Classical Dictionary' writes: "Today the initiates might be accused of hypocrisy in seeking ritual purification rather than moral perfection. But it must be remembered that the mysteries kept alive the ideal of a more perfect life hereafter and, no doubt, made their contribution to the idea of union with the godhead and thus to the specifically Christian ideal of everlasting life"29.

Rohde, who wrote much earlier, at the beginning of our century, has another point of view. He says: "Indeed we must not look to the Eleusinian Mysteries for the ecstatic exaltation of the soul to the recognition of its own godhead—though such exaltation was the motive force and the essential core of Greek mysticism, as of all mysticism and mystic religion"30. The religious beliefs advocated by the above Mysteries were held and believed in by the Greek populace, and according to Rohde, "the bare idea....that actually in the order of nature, the inner-man, the SOUL of man, belonged to the realm of gods; that as a divine being it had everlasting life—such an idea would involve further consequences about which no one can be in any doubt: it would have contradicted every single idea of Greek popular religion"31.

Rohde is thus making a sharp division between the Eleusinian Mysteries and Orphism, referring to the latter as "Greek Mysticism". More often, Orphism is classed together with the Eleusinian as another of the Mysteries. One must, however, remember that, as Rohde points out, in its origin and essence katharsis (ritual purification) had nothing to do with any feeling of personal guilt or responsibility, or with morality in general. The 'stain' which was wiped out by
these mysterious religious, but ritual, means is not "within the heart of man". It clings to man as something hostile, and from without, and it can be spread from him to others like an infectious disease\(^\text{32}\).

Up to a certain point Rohde's division may be applicable. The Greeks in general, the so-called populace, kept their customary beliefs and cults, probably often joining the Eleusinian Mysteries because these were officially recognised. "At the height of Athenian power (ca 440BC), a decree of the people was passed which required the yearly offering of first fruits of the fields to the Eleusinian temple from Athenian citizens and allies, and invited similar offerings from all Greek states"\(^\text{33}\).

On the other hand, as was pointed out above (p 42), Greek imagination was, through the Eleusinian Mysteries, again directed to the SOUL, to the possibility that to care for the soul in this life might be important to the state of the soul in the hereafter. These Mysteries also underwent gradual changes. In the Hellenistic Age they are no doubt rightly classed under "Greek Mysticism".
Notes to Chapter II.

1. Reeves, pp25,30
2. Onians, p117
3. Reeves, p29
4. van Peursen, p91
5. Iliad, i:3-5, ref by Rohde, p6
6. Iliad, xv: 251, ref by Rohde, p6
7. Snell, p8
8. A R Johnson pp1-2
9. Iliad, xxiii : 880, ref by Onians, p80
10. Snell, p20
11. van Peursen, p91
12. Snell, p31
15. ibid., p142
16. P Schilling, God in an Age of Atheism, p117
17. H Carrington and S Muldoon, The Phenomena of Astral Projection, p26
18. Snell, pp21,31,32
19. van Peursen, p91
20. ibid., p92
21. A H Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, p2
22. Rohde, p179
23. Rohde, cf p182
24. ibid., cf p174
25. ibid., cf pp218-9
26. Kitto, p20, cf p26
27. Rohde, p221
28. ibid., p228
30. Rohde, p225
31. ibid., p254
32. ibid., pp294-5
33. ibid., p220
CHAPTER III

THE DIFFERENT STRANDS IN GREEK ARCHAIC THINKING LEADING TO DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS APPROACHES.
That there were many different strands in early Greek religion is a fact. As Rohde points out, the Homeric view of the soul was in contradiction to the cult of souls. As we have said, the Iliad and the Odyssey were written down (ca 800BC) among the Ionian Greeks who, having fled from their homeland (ca 11th century BC), had created new traditions and customs. They had to break with their traditional ancestor worship and as a consequence the "surviving shades" had been safely deposed in Hades. The Dorian tribes, however, were still firmly anchored in the cult of souls.

As Homer's poems began gradually to influence the whole of the Greek world, we find beliefs in daimones, and Heroes, and 'translations', side by side with more sophisticated beliefs about the non-return of the banished psychai from Hades.

Not only the Dorians, but especially the original inhabitants of Greece (who had been subjugated by the first Greek tribes from the North, from ca 2000BC onwards), had been carrying on with their sacrifices to the chthonic powers of the Netherworld and to the dead. These ancient religious rites and conceptions refused to die and seem to have grown stronger during the 6th century BC.

We have seen already how Kitto divides his Greeks as regards religion into those who conceived of the gods in the Olympic hierarchical fashion and into those who felt the mystery of birth and death in all life, human, animal or vegetable. Or, in Ferguson's words: "In fact there are two strands in Greek religious thought, which need careful identification. One is the strand whereby it is thought possible to become one with God. The other is the strand whereby there is a fixed and rigid gulf between God and man. To seek to bridge this gulf is ἱβρίζ..."².

Boman, too, remarks that in the Olympian religion "the sharp boundary between god and man was never overstepped as in the
Mysteries". The fact that human pride was considered the greatest sin demonstrates "that we are dealing with a genuine religion which in this respect may be compared with that of the Old Testament....". **Hybris** is the attempt to put oneself in the place of the gods, and Ferguson asks whether this is "so very different from the Christian concept of sin to put self, or some aspects of self, in the place where God should be"?4. In this discussion we must, however, take note of that fact which Stumpf points out, namely, that "it is not that Homer's gods are moral and require goodness, they are merely stronger than men and exact obedience"5.

The crux of the matter seems to be in the different conceptions of psyche. We have said that the early Greeks did not question the existence of an invisible 'something'. But is this 'something' in man akin to the gods, is it forever striving to reach a union with its ground of Being? Or must man, in his humanity, completely know and hold his distance from the divine on earth as well as in Hades?

Ferguson's paper is a protest against the rift between classical and theological studies. He points to the fact that Christianity in origin must be seen in context, which is "Judea as part of the Hellenistic world under the rule of Rome", and that none of the parts of this context can be ignored. He refers also to Clement of Alexandria, who was prepared to see the pagan authors as "precursors of Christ for the Greeks in exactly the same way as the Old Testament writers were precursors of Christ for the Jews". In actual fact, "At the time of Jesus, Palestine had already been under 'Hellenistic' rule and its resultant cultural influence for some 360 years".

Ferguson's criticism of the so-called 'dehellenisers' is interesting. The latter are indeed biased and typical of one strain of thought prevailing in our contemporary society. Perhaps this type of thinking is already on the way out again; its conclusions were exaggerated to such a degree that, in some cases, they became ridiculous.
Owen sets his heart on clearing the field for a right understanding of the "Christian faith based on Biblical sources", which includes throwing out "the alien accretions of 'religion'", i.e. the doctrines of "body-soul dualism, exaltation of the soul and the immaterial in general as divine and eternal, denigration of the life and this world, and suspicion of the physical appetites". He calls this set of ideas 'Orphism' or 'religous anthropology', and finds that it seems apparent that this was of "early origin in Greek culture and was widespread throughout the fifth and fourth centuries". In Owen's opinion, most Greeks from the sixth century onwards were hopelessly influenced by other-worldly views, making this worldly existence a "miserable and unfortunate episode in the life of the soul". That there could have been another strand of Greek religious thinking seems almost completely to have escaped Owen's notice.

We can here compare the following passage from Charles. "Despite all the teachings of individual poets, philosophers and schools, the popular beliefs of the Greeks remained from century to century in the main unaffected. The immortality of the soul never became part of the national creed, but remained the peculiar property of individual theologians and philosophers. This is conclusively established by the evidence of Greek epitaphs".

Owen would certainly not agree with "A History of Civilisation", which states that "The Greeks were less other-worldly than the other peoples;.....far more interested in life on earth." Neither would he agree with Kitto, who writes: "The sharp distinction which the Christian and the Oriental world has normally drawn between the body and the soul, the physical and the spiritual, was foreign to the Greek;....to him there was simply the whole man. That the body is the tomb of the soul is indeed an idea which we meet in certain Greek mystery-religions, and Plato, with his doctrine of immortality, necessarily distinguishes sharply between body and soul; but for all that, it is not a typical Greek idea."
That the Greeks were fortunately preserved by their own genius from "the gloomy severity" of peoples like the Etruscans and the Egyptians, is pointed out by Rohde. The Etruscans depicted scenes of torment in the Underworld, and the Egyptians elaborated in picture and in writing details of the trial of the dead on the day of judgment. "The Greeks were not very susceptible during their best centuries to the infectious malady of a sick conscience,...it is (however) true that even such dark fancies of the Christian hell as Dante's are in part derived from Greek sources". Rohde refers these fancies to "particular isolated sects" which "recommended themselves to a philosophic speculation which in its worst excesses violently contradicted all the most fundamental principles of Greek culture". The quote made above about common Greek traditional views seeing "simply the whole man" seemingly contradicts what was said on pp 36, 39 above, where it was pointed out that Orphism (in which the 'body' may indeed be compared to a 'corpse') may have influenced the new meaning of the word soma. But 'common man' often uses new concepts which are abroad without being aware of their real meaning.

It has been suggested, according to Owen, that those ideas which he calls Orphism appear so early and are so prevalent in India that Greece actually derived its inspiration from that quarter. Owen, however, finds "that it is probably closer to the truth to hold that these doctrines are characteristically 'religious' and turn up spontaneously in different places". He then states that even though these ideas were common in both India and Greece as early as the 6th century BC, it was in India that they exerted their quietistic and world-denying influence on the whole of human life. The West, however, was saved through "the inspiration of Christianity". Because the Christian faith was not Orphic in its views on human life, the West has been able to add "enormously to man's material well-being". During certain periods, Christianity was "in danger of being corrupted by these Greek ideas,...(but) the this-worldly emphasis and the true naturalism of the Biblical faith have
triumphed over the world-denying spiritualism of 'religion'\(^\text{17}\).

There are, however, many "terrible misunderstandings" in Christianity, and Owen describes with horror how "religious anthropology" turns up "even more often and more objectionably in many so-called Christian hymns, prayers, and poems". As examples, he quotes the opening sentence of the prayer of committal in the "Burial Office of the Book of Common Prayer", and also John Donne (1572-1631), the Christian poet, who wrote:

"When bodies to their graves,
souls from their graves remove".

Owen remarks that "many of our hymns are nothing but thinly disguised Orphic poems\(^{18}\).

But to return to the "different strands", we shall sum up what has been said so far, this time in Stacey's words: "The first strand stems from Homer and glorifies the living man, holding out no hope for the future and showing little interest in the soul. The second is the religious view of Orphism, that the soul is a divine creation temporarily encumbered with a body as punishment. It would be difficult to imagine a greater contrast than between these two", says Stacey who points to the obvious fact that "the unity of body and soul which was life in Homer's view was death to the soul in Orphism". Stacey also gives us the third strand, which is the theory expressed by some early philosophers "that there is a permanence in the natural order of which the human being partakes, the grain of permanence that rests in man being his soul\(^{19}\), or that the psyche is the primal, impersonal force holding everything together.

Greece had no sacred caste rule as had most other ancient civilizations. Priests were citizens who had other activities in civic life. It has been said that the absence of a professional priesthood allowed mobility in personal thought\(^{20}\). On the whole, this type of religious thinking "did not set up any conflict between body and soul, appetite and reason", says Mary White\(^{21}\). In spite of Owens's assumptions to the contrary, it is also generally
acknowledged to have been a naturalistic, well-rounded interpretation of human nature and happiness.

Thus the conditions in Magna Graecia facilitated personal thought and led to a "search for truth". Armstrong points out that this search could have been undertaken for different reasons, and that actually the philosophy of the West has a "twofold beginning in different quarters of the Greek world and under the influence of different desires". We encounter a first beginning in Ionia at about 600BC, and here the motive was "to know and understand for the sake of knowing and understanding", as Aristotle explains it, "philosophy having its roots in wonder". The Ionian philosophers asked, "What is the explanation of the world? Why are things as they are? Why do they change?", and they never doubted that the universe obeys LAWS and is capable of explanation.

Kitto suggests that "behind the gods (though sometimes identified with them) is a shadowy power that Homer calls ananke, Necessity, an Order of Things which even the gods cannot infringe". This idea of the universe as a rational order was behind the attempts made by Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes to explain "the impersonal force controlling the structure of the universe and regulating its powers of changes". These philosophers can perhaps be said to show "the temperament of science".

On the other hand what Armstrong calls "the second beginning" must be described as showing "the temperament of mysticism". This second beginning took place in the Greek cities of South Italy during the second half of the 6th century BC. Here the desire was for the union of the human with the Divine Spirit. The Pythagorean philosophers asked, "How may I deliver myself from the body of this death, from the sorrowful weary wheel of mortal existence and become again a god?"

Behind Pythagoras's philosophy lies the mystical cult known as Orphism. It has been assumed that the two movements
had a more or less contemporary beginning and were based on the same origin, the pre-Hellenic cult of Dionysius Zagreus which was preserved in secret societies in Greece and more openly in Thracia. In the 6th century BC the Greek and Thracian rites were blended and this resulted in a widespread religious revival centered round a new conception of soul and immortality.

Charles describes the Dionysiac cult in Thrace as giving the first real contribution towards the doctrine of immortality because of its presuppositions of "the original kinship of God and man" and that "man could through certain ritual ceremonies and ecstasies become one with the gods." However, "a full and divine life apart from the body for men in general was still inconceivable, (and) hence the doctrine of the transmigration of souls was of necessity a factor in this belief. The soul could maintain its immortality only through successive incarnations."

In the books ascribed to Orpheus, the legendary prophet of the Orphics, we read about the myth of Dionysius. As a child the god had been torn to pieces and devoured by the Titans who, through this act, gathered something divine into their own bodies. The heart of Dionysius was saved and was used by Zeus to re-create the young god. In his rage, Zeus then destroyed the Titans through lightning and from their ashes he created the human race. This myth explains allegorically the mixture of good and evil in man in the form of a dualism between the godlike immortal soul and the soiled mortal body.

It is generally assumed that the Orphic view of the soul has grown out of the practice of religious ecstasy. In this connection Rohde devotes an interesting chapter to the Thracian worship of Dionysius, giving elaborate details. The movement seems to have appealed particularly to women. In religious 'madness' they wandered up into the mountains, waving torches, dancing themselves into a frenzy. The god himself, sometimes in the shape of a bull, would seem to
appear amongst them. At the height of the ecstasy the maenads tore asunder every living thing that crossed their path, and consumed the raw flesh as though it were the god himself or animals sacrificed to him that they were devouring. In their wild excitement they would feel themselves "bursting the physical barriers of their souls".

In early Greece, when extraordinary phenomena occurred which seemed to transcend all normal experience these would be explained "by saying that the soul of a person thus 'possessed' was no longer 'at home' but 'abroad', having left its body behind". This was "the literal and primitive meaning understood by the Greek when he spoke of the ekstasis of the soul in such 'madness', just as madness is a prolonged ekstasis". However, with regard to the Dionysiac cults "the temporary alienatio mentis" of the maenads was thought of as a "hieromania, a sacred madness in which the soul, leaving the body, winged its way to union with the god". According to Rohde, the soul was then "with and in the god, in the condition of enthouiasmos"; those who were in this condition "live and have their being in the god. While still retaining the finite Ego, they feel and enjoy to the full the infinite powers of all life".

Rohde emphasises that "the mysticism of highly cultivated and talented peoples and the emotional religion of primitive 'savages' have in common this impulse to union with a god or God, i.e. the extinction of the individual in the divine".

"This tendency towards ecstasy and its violent expressions (which) exist in many persons' souls and now and then, for reasons unknown, breaks out and spreads with wild speed.... is infectious", says Nilson, "a fact which plainly appears in myths concerning the Dionysiac orgies. It reminds us of the epidemics of dancing in the Middle Ages and similar phenomena in more recent times."

In 'Bacchae', a tragedy by Euripides, produced posthumously by his son in 405BC, we are confronted with the mystic worship by women, their contagious ecstasy and their terrible deeds of
strength. In her frenzy, Agave, together with the other women, kills her own son Pentheus without recognising him. It seems that Pentheus should be seen as an example of human reason which is limited and closed to the mysteries beyond the material world. Euripides condemned the extravagances of the Dionysiac religion, but appeared to have been attracted by its mystical side. Under the influence of Apollo the orgies were gradually toned down and Dionysus is found associated with Apollo at Delphi.

It is interesting to note, as Rohde points out, that wherever there are cults of this kind, based on "ecstatic raptures", we find also a "peculiarly vital belief in the life and power of the soul of man after its separation from the body".34

Mystical union with the divine has been sought and achieved in many different ways. Rohde suggests that the Thracians were addicted to certain intoxicating drinks and that these "may have increased the excitement; perhaps they even used the fumes derived from certain seeds, with which the Scythians and Massagetai knew how to intoxicate themselves".35 "Only when thus possessed did the Bacchae drink milk and honey out of the rivers; their power ceased when they came to themselves again", writes Plato in the dialogue "Ion".36 Söderblom too discusses the importance of intoxicating beverages for primitive man; they were regarded as sacred and, together with tobacco and dancing, were the means "whereby medicinen men and shamans got into a state of ecstasy".37

It seems that in our contemporary society, we are not far removed from the 'problems' of those times - with our misuse of tobacco, alcohol, and especially drugs. No doubt, drugs lead to "ecstatic raptures" and have been said to cause mystical experiences, even if many object to these being in any way called religious or exalted. Parrinder, when writing about mysticism, says that "the 'profane' mysticism of drugs, drinks or madness, illustrated in Aldous Huxley's 'Doors of Perception', is beyond our subject here".38 Zaehner finds that it is peculiar that even though Huxley
did in fact realise "the connection between the effects of mescaline and schizophrenia, yet he seems to have refused to face the fact that what he calls religion is simply another word for the maniac-depressive psychosis. If religion really boils down to this, then Huxley deserves much credit for having brought this important fact to the public notice." 39

We do not know to what degree the Thracian women were filled with drugs, drink or madness when they performed their ecstatic rites in their attempt to become one with the god, to participate in his divine flesh. But from these rites Orphism developed and, in the myth, Orpheus himself was torn to pieces by the Thracian maenads. This shows that the blending of Thracian and Greek elements did not take place without opposition. In the end, what had been the height of ecstasy for the maenads was transformed by the Orphics into "the original sin", i.e. in Orphism, the Titans' cruel act of tearing to pieces and consuming the body of the child Dionysius was regarded as the original sin. 40

Stacey suggests that Orphism is the origin of the following four ideas (we would add 'in Western thinking'):

1. The transmigration of souls
2. The body being the tomb, or prison, of the soul; the soma-soma doctrine.
3. The soul having moral value; ritual purity leading to moral purity.
4. Disincarnate immortality. 41

All those beliefs which Owen rejects in Christianity are no doubt found in Orphism. There is a thorough-going dualism, the soul and body being entirely different, even antagonistic to each other; the soul is struggling to be free again. To be born into this world is punishment, to die is a release. The soul is immortal and divine, two concepts which, as we have seen, belong together, and thus the soul is in fact a god. This world and this life, with its senses and physical appetites are under heave suspicion, for they clog the soul and (though this is no longer part of the Christian teaching) chain it to the wheel of reincarnation. 42
Actually, until 553AD, the doctrine of reincarnation had been a part of some of the Christian teachings. But when the Emperor Justinian issued his anathemas against Origen at the Fifth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople, this doctrine, along with other teachings of Origen, was declared anathema. It is a fact, however, that there was no representative of Rome present at this meeting, so the editors of the book 'Reincarnation' find that the Catholic Church was mistaken when it believed that Origen had been condemned by the whole Church. In the opinion of J Head and S L Cranston (the editors just referred to) "the one disastrous result of the mistake (was) that the teaching of the pre-existence of the soul and, by implication, of reincarnation was excluded from the Christian creed". It should be noted that what has been said above about the Fifth Council at Constantinople is correct, but the proceedings of this Council were subsequently ratified by the reigning Pope Vigilius on the 23rd February 554 in a Constitution "Dominus noster et Salvator" and consequently the anathemas against Origen were condemned by the whole Catholic Church.

We have seen that according to Charles the Dionysian cult preached the incarnations of the soul because it was felt that only in a living body could the soul maintain its immortality. Charles points to a new stage of development in the Orphic teaching. He writes, "the tenet of transmigration changes of necessity its character. It is no longer the means whereby the soul preserves its vitality, as the Dionysiac religion conceived it, but has become a spiritual punishment and discipline of the soul and the soul does not attain to its highest till it is freed from this cycle of necessity of rebirths...and lives eternally in God". At this stage in religious thinking Hades seems to become an intermediate abode where the soul is judged and must pay for evil deeds. The initiated and the purified live there with the gods of the lower world till the time comes for their return to the upper life.

To help the soul towards salvation, use was made of ritual
purifications and asceticism. Rohde sees in these dealings mysticism entering into the closest alliance with kathartic practices. In true human manner, the initiates 'knew' that they alone would enjoy a blessed after-life; all others would be exposed to torments beyond the grave, and to an endless round of births, deaths, rebirths, until the end of time. Orphism, with its other-worldliness and asceticism, had an effect of the greatest importance on later Greek philosophy and religion.

The Orphic religion became philosophic in the hands, or rather, minds, of the Pythagoreans. They took the vision of Orphism and worked it out along logical and scientific lines. Their philosophy also shows some influence from the Milesians, the philosophers with a temperament of science: Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes.

Bier suggests that in spite of its differences, the Orphic view did not change the basic Greek idea of the soul, i.e., the soul is an individual 'something', temporarily situated in a body which it animates during occupation, but leaves to decay at death. The differences between the two views have to do with where to lay the point of emphasis: on man's life in this world or on the soul's in the next. We must not forget, however, that in Orphism we find a kind of 'disincarnate', or perhaps it should be called 'spiritual', immortality, the soul being divine, for the first time in Greek thinking. According to Bier, the theories of the Milesian philosophers did indeed change the basic Greek idea of the soul.

The philosophers of the Milesian school, a school which seems to have flourished in what was then the Ionic capital during the entire 6th century until the Persians laid it waste in 494, believed in Laws regulating the Universe. They were practical astronomers, land surveyors and geographers. What they were searching for was the nature of the first principle out of which all things have issued. They arrived at different conclusions: this elementary living stuff (Urstoff in German) was thought to be respectively
water, the 'indeterminable boundless', or air; but, somehow, they all assumed specific forms of motion working in this primal matter, a primal force insolubly combined with it. Perhaps one should modify Bier's statement and add that even the Milesians did not alter the concepts of the 'old' psyche, but rather emphasised its one aspect, the immortal activity. The old psyche too had been unconscious, immortal, invisible activity; the conscious activity being ascribed to thymos, which, as we have said, was not able to be awakened to real life before the arrival of psyche, and it perished at death, whereas psyche somehow survived.

"Just as the Homeric Greeks appear to have believed that in the generative fluid, aion, was the gaseous psyche", says Onians, so did Thales believe "that the elemental liquid and its developments were permeated by psyche". Anaximenes too emphasises psyche. There is a fragment of his work which says: "Just as our psyche being aer holds us together (sukratei), so do breath (or 'air' pneuma) and aer encompass (surround, periechei) the whole world.

Thus the same power which our souls express, rules and sustains the world-all. As this force belongs to all substance, every smallest little part of matter is animated as well; it has life because it has 'soul'. It is interesting to note how Anaximenes 'expressly argued from microcosm to the macrocosm'. For him the whole universe is psychian.

The thinking of the Milesian philosophers, according to Armstrong, "is far too primitive to make any distinction between spirit and matter, life and body, force and mass. This Hylczoism, philosophy of the 'living stuff' is not yet very far from primitive Animism, the belief that everything that moves and changes or shows any sort of activity does so because it is alive". Because they were "attributing spiritual qualities to the primeval source of things, the physiology of the Hylczoists naturally could not assume any profound distinction between that source and the soul."
In this view, immortality, eternity, soul, and god all meant the same, all stood for the same life principle. The basic force in the basic stuff was thought of in what might be called divine terms. In Milesian thinking there is no question of an other-worldly existence for an individual soul. The soul was "conceived merely as a function of the various elements of the body or as a transient individualisation of the one primitive substance or force, and this individualisation terminated at death", says Charles. Bier explains the individual soul to be "without a personal existence, thus without self-consciousness", and it therefore automatically "returns to its source after death, as a drop of rain falls into a lake".

Diogenes, a nature philosopher in the Milesian tradition, who lived in the 5th century BC, believed in "divine, intelligent, world-arranging air". We breathe in our own human soul and our 'reason' from the great breath, or air, the world-spirit. Nyman points out that here we find an "important parallel to the relationship in the Old Testament between ruach and nephesh".

After Miletus had been destroyed by the Persians the centre of the intellectual life of Greece shifted to Southern Italy and Sicily. It was in this area, at Crotona, in about 530 BC, that Pythagoras founded the Pythagorean Brotherhood. Armstrong assumes that "early Pythagorean cosmology may have consisted in an account of how a dark indefinite vapour (possibly the Milesian primal stuff) was drawn into the universe continually by a process like breathing, and order and geometrical shape imposed on it". However, it did not 'happen' haphazardly, as Anaximenes had thought. The Pythagoreans looked for a divine reality above matter, shaping it into a harmonious whole, cosmos. Mathematics was their basis for proportion and because the musical intervals are based on numerical proportions they drew the conclusions that the universe as a whole was a musical harmony and that the
They assumed an opposition between FORM, the male principle, which was good and unchanging, and MATTER, the female principle, which was evil and for ever changing. Order stood against disorder. Corresponding to this was their belief that the soul was unchanging, good and divine, whereas the body was changing, bad, and a prison for the soul, which it polluted. A later development in Pythagoreanism would point to the belief that the soul was a harmony. However, the fact that the Pythagoreans were the first to speak unequivocally of the soul as the SELF, it being the same self-conscious subject passing from one body to the next, does not agree with the concept of the soul as nothing but a harmony holding the body together.

No doubt the Pythagoreans have greatly influenced later thinking: "their contribution, from their days to ours, has been richly productive of both good and evil consequences". One consequence which grew out of Orphism and which was helped on its way by the Pythagoreans was the beginning of Greek ethics as such. As we have already said, katharsis may originally have had "nothing to do with morality or what we should call the voice of conscience", but the ideas about the reasons for purification gradually changed.

It was the Pythagorean view that "when death separates the soul from the body, the soul must after an interval of purification in Hades return to the upper world and be reborn. Its conduct in the earlier life determines the nature of its new incarnation. Finally, after a series of transmigrations, it is raised from the earthly life and restored to a divine existence". Thus the idea of a complete immortality demanded a pure soul freed from all pollutions: from the stains cleaving to it from the outside as well as from its own inner imperfections. For the first time there emerged something like a coherence between religious and ethical practices, their common aim being to lead the initiates to feel some kind of responsibility for
their lives and morals. A sense of personal guilt and sinfulness began to develop.

Among the Pythagoreans this took the form of asceticism. Rohde calls this a purely negative system of morality, but admits that asceticism later became "an important and decisive spiritual movement in Greece". He also points out that even the seven 'Wise Men', who have been idealised in so many Greek legends, were represented as "individuals not far removed from the ideal of asceticism. Nor was it long before an attempt was made to use these ideals as the basis on which to found a society".

Besides the ascetic way for purifying the soul of its bodily contacts, Pythagoras had taught that there was also the aesthetic and intellectual way. "The latter was the highest and the best, the soul was subjected to rational form". Owen explains further that the soul thus "began to be associated with pure reason; its true end lay in escape from the body and in return to the higher heavenly realm which was similarly defined in terms of pure mathematical reality."
Notes to Chapter III.

1. Rohde, p253
2. John Ferguson, Athens and Jerusalem, p2
3. Thorlief Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, p118
4. Ferguson, pp2-3
5. S E Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre, A History of Philosophy, p4
6. Ferguson, p1
7. Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, Vols I-II, p1
8. D R G Owen, Body and Soul, p25
9. ibid., p44
10. ibid., p43-44
11. ibid., p33
12. Charles, p156 (Eschatology)
13. A History of Civilisation, p40
14. Kitto, p173
15. Rohde, p242
16. Hengel, p201
17. Owen, p49
18. ibid., p28
19. Stacey, p70
20. M P Nilsson, Greek Piety, cf p4
22. Armstrong, p1
23. Aristotle,
24. Armstrong, p1
25. Kitto, p176
26. Stumpf, p4
27. Armstrong, p1
28. Stacey, cf p62
29. Charles, p146 (Eschatology)
30. Rohde, pp253ff
31. ibid., pp259-60
32. ibid., p262
33. Nilsson, p22
34. Rohde, p261
Notes to Chapter III/continued 2.

35. Rohde, p259
36. Plato, Ion, 534 A
37. Söderblom, p3
38. Geoffrey Parrinder, Upanishads, Gita and Bible, p95
39. R C Zaehner, Mysticism, Sacred and Profane, p88
40. Nilsson, cf p22
41. Stacey, p63
42. August Bier, Die Seele, p13
43. J Head and S L Cranston, Reincarnation, p40
44. Charles, p147 (Eschatology)
45. Rohde, cf p294; Armstrong, cf p7
46. Bier, p13
47. W T Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, p22
48. Onians, p252
49. Nyman, p27, cf Onians, p252
50. Onians, p252
51. Armstrong, pp3-4
52. Rohde, p365
53. Bier, cf p14
54. Charles, p148 (Eschatology)
55. Bier, p14
56. Nyman, p27
57. Armstrong, p8
58. ibid., p8
59. Charles, p149 (Eschatology)
60. Rohde, pp302-3
61. Owen, p37
CHAPTER IV

EARLY PHILOSOPHERS: THEIR CONCEPTS OF SOUL AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON POSTERITY.
An old Orphic proverb says that Zeus, Hades, Helios, and Dicnysius were all one god. This idea may have influenced Xenophanes of Colophon (516-490BC), who was the first to state in Greek philosophic thinking that "All is One, The One is God". Stace 'accuses' him of being the originator of "the quarrel between philosophy and religion"¹. Xenophanes walked up and down Greece attacking the "traditional mythology and preaching a sort of pan-animism", i.e. he declared the universe to be sustained by an immanent all-pervading world-soul². Perhaps one could say that he applied the thinking of the Milesians to actual religious practices.

Xenophanes is the reputed founder of the Eleatic School, but it was Parmenides of Elea (ca.514-?BC) who made this school famous with his first principle doctrine. He calls this sole reality BEING and declared that BEING was wholly excluded from all Becoming or Change. "BEING IS". BEING is the same as THOUGHT, for all thought is in relation to something that IS, that which IS forming its content. "This view of the correlative nature of BEING and 'consciousness' leads so far with Parmenides that the two, THOUGHT and BEING, are declared to be fully identical"³.

To a certain degree, Parmenides shares the Orphic/Pythagorean contempt of the world, but without showing any particular interest for the care of the soul. In the Eleatic philosophy "there is no room for the future individual existence of the soul", says Charles⁴. Purely through reasoning, Parmenides wants to prove that BEING is the soul source of Truth. Everything else is illusion. In fact he does not only deny the world of senses but is carried to the conclusion that this world is logically impossible. This world is not BEING, therefore it is NON-BEING, and NON-BEING IS not. True BEING is not known to the senses, but only to reason. It is interesting to see how the fundamental position of idealism is already established in Parmenides's distinction between sense and reason⁵.
Parmenides, besides being regarded as the father of idealism, is called the father of materialism, a rather difficult position to hold, it may seem. This can of course be explained by the fact that in the thinking of the archaic period all matter was animated. Nobody ever visualised any substance as completely 'material'; the necessity of making a distinction between spirit and matter, in our sense, had not occurred to these thinkers. Some of his successors drew 'materialistic' conclusions from his theories, seeing in 'matter', which was without beginning or end, the first principle of BEING. In modern times we find the same theory in what has been called "the doctrine of the indestructibility of matter". It was Plato who developed the idealistic aspects of Parmenides's philosophy.

Through his reasoning and his use of logic, Parmenides was a great pioneer. His philosophy, says Armstrong, "Is the starting point from which Platonic dialectic, Aristotelian logic, and the whole Western tradition of philosophical reasoning have developed".

Contemporary with Parmenides, but acclaiming BECOMING instead of BEING as absolute reality, was Heraclitus of Ephesus (ca 535-475BC), known as the 'Dark', or 'Obscure'. He shows an absolute contempt both for popular ideas and for the philosophy of all other thinkers. He did not write his short, sharp prose-sentences 'for fools'; perhaps he hoped that most of his readers, being unworthy anyhow, would not understand him. Plato remarks in 'The Theaetetus', through the person of Socrates, when the latter has tried to explain the doctrine of the disciples of Heraclitus: "The maintainers of the doctrine have as yet not words in which to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that will suit them.....".

The Elysian Mysteries played a great role in the aristocratic family of which Heraclitus was a member, and may have influenced his thinking, though he decisively states his own independence of thought, having "searched himself only" to attain knowledge
of the truth. He had faith in nothing but his own intuition, laying great stress on the soul's ability to gain infinite wisdom when opening itself to the universal Logos, the unity of life and rationality.

The psyche is "unbounded and characterised by depth" is one of Heraclitus's sayings, and van Peursen, in accordance with his own assumptions, concludes that "as man makes this splendid discovery of the mystery which is his inner life, he learns to distinguish and to separate the sacral and the profane. 'The soul augments itself', says Heraclitus, and man's make-up, his very nature, is itself 'daimonic': the inner life takes over the function of divine intervention and in so doing discovers its own being".

Against Parmenides's BEING, Heraclitus had thus posited BECOMING, but also for Heraclitus his particular TRUTH is known only by thought (reason), not by the senses. The senses betray us by giving us only a show of permanence. However, in the flux of all things there is an eternal LAW and "a HARMONY that reconciles all antitheses". Logos is what never changes, the essence and proportion of the world. Bouquet remarks that, "'logos' as a distinctly technical term makes its appearance in Greek... in the works of Heraclitus of Ephesus, at a period when Greek and Indian philosophy were by no means so far apart from one another as used to be thought; and it must be remembered that Ephesus is on the Asiatic shore of the Aegean.

Logos is identical with LAW "because it is God, a living all-ruling intelligence which seems to be in-some way expressed through the Ever-Living Fire which is the stuff of the Universe". Bouquet attempts to explain what Heraclitus meant by 'fire': "...it is not 'flame' in the ordinary sense", he says, "but much more what we should describe as a molten gas such as hydrogen, and... this primordial fire transformed itself by process into fluids and solids, and then by an upward road back again - by a cyclic movement - into fire". Whether Heraclitus is
a materialist or not seems to be as questionable in his case as it is in the case of Parmenides. On the one hand, Heraclitus's primordial substance "is not yet conceived as anything like mind or spirit"; on the other hand "it is hardly ... 'gross matter', since it is said to be the source of the world's intelligence...".\(^\text{14}\)

The human soul is a spark of this eternal fire and is drawn into the body by breathing; though in actual fact at the same time it seems to be the FIRE as SOUL which creates the body by turning itself into the lower elements.\(^\text{15}\) It is generally assumed that Heraclitus did not believe in a personal survival of the soul. Rohde finds that "there can be no question of the permanent identity of the soul, of the spiritual personality, with itself..... What seems to maintain itself as a single person, is in reality a series of souls and personalities, one taking the place of another and ousting and being ousted in turn".\(^\text{15}\) The soul is imperishable but when it leaves the body at death it returns to the universal Fire.

Heraclitus seems to have chosen fire as the first principle because it is the most mutable of the elements, forever changing. One is struck by the similarity of a saying by Guatama Buddha (563-483BC - thus living at the same time as Heraclitus) that "there is only one thing that is eternal here - and that is change". Bouquet remarks on the resemblances between Heraclitus's philosophy and the thinking of "some of the Indians who have spoken of the Absolute (or Brahma) as emitting, sustaining, and reabsorbing the universe".\(^\text{16}\) And further, Heraclitus's doctrine that "all things happen according to Logos, and the Logos is universal, an all pervading cosmic principle of reason" has, according to Bouquet, such a striking resemblance to "the Chinese doctrine of the Great Tao...that some have been tempted to deduce an actual connection between the thought of Hellas and that of China, especially when it is found that Chinese moralists like Meng-ko urge people to live according to nature, which is just what the later Stoics like Epictetus did".\(^\text{17}\).
Another impressive thinker who had great belief in his own powers was Empedocles of Acrasas, Sicily, (ca 490-430BC), an ardent follower of the Orphic and Pythagorean traditions. He was not a lone thinker like Heraclitus, but rather a kind of powerful and magnetic healer, who triumphantly travelled from city to city "crowned with ribbons and garlands, adored as a god, and questioned by thousands: where is the road to healing?" a question as relevant to-day as it was then. Many legends sprang up about him; he was said to have disappeared without trace, thus gone to the next world body and all. Another legend, however, said that he jumped into the crater of Mount Etna, in order not to disappoint his followers who, because of his teachings, believed him to be a god and not subject to human death. Unluckily, one of his shoes was thrown out...

Be this as it may, these legends show that the belief in a possible 'translation' of the whole person into the next life was still alive in Greece in the 5th century BC, i.e. the idea that "immortal life can only be obtained by undissolved union of the psyche with its body" - but they are not fair to Empedocles's own teaching. When he claimed to be a god who would never die, he certainly did not mean that his psyche would remain forever bound to his body. For him the fallen, but divine, soul had been imprisoned in the body; through purifications and asceticism it would be released and live a disincarnate life in freedom and divinity.

Actually, Empedocles had many sides to his personality, being a statesman, as well as a philosopher and a mystic. He united in "his own person to an astonishing degree the most sober attempts at a study of nature that was scientific according to its lights, and quite irrational beliefs and theological speculations."

Stace explains that Empedocles was "the originator of the familiar classification of the four elements", earth, air, fire and water, which he calls the "roots of all". It is interesting to compare these four "roots of all" with
Chapter VII, verses 4-5, of the Bhagavid Gita, where Krishna says: "Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intellect and egoism - thus My Nature is divided eightfold. This is the inferior Nature, O mighty-armed Arjuna; know thou as different from it My higher Nature, the very life-element, by which this world is upheld" 23.

Empedocles's classification, which was further developed through his younger contemporary, Hippocrates, and ca 550 years later by Galen, gave the foundation for the doctrine of the four humours, which still, to some degree, influence popular thought (melancholy, choler), and which was of the greatest importance to mediaeval man, both in his thinking in general and to his art of medicine 24.

To think of the 'first principles' in terms of the four elements, again raises the question whether this must be called a materialistic doctrine. It seems quite clear, however, that Empedocles's view of the soul cannot be classified as altogether materialistic. We should, in fact, have said 'views', as Bier suggests that Empedocles entertains three different views of the soul. His first view is still in the old tradition and shares 1) the Homeric belief that the 'soul' is located in the phrenes and/or heart. But he knows also 2) the Orphic mystic soul, and 3) the Hylozoistic soul 25.

After Bier's suggestions, it is interesting to read Rohde's speculation that in Empedocles's theories one can find a development of the Homeric view that is "the conception of a 'soul' that as an independent, unique, and self-contained spiritual being dwells within the body, while the body does not receive its intellectual faculties from the soul but exercises these by its own power" 25. "The blood is actually the power of thought" 26.

Thus, "the office of the soul, which is a stranger in the world of sense, is neither perception nor thought...but the philosophic vision into the complete truth of being and
and becoming which it brings with it out of its divine existence in the past", says Charles, and he continues, "the faculty of thought, nous, and the daimonic being which we may call soul (though Empedocles never uses this term) thus exist side by side in man, the former of which perishes with the body, while the latter is not immortal indeed, but long-lived. This dualism in the inner life which appears in Homer thus reappears in Empedocles, and later in Plato and Aristotle. The doctrine of transmigration naturally formed a part of his system...."27. It seems that Empedocles had a vision of a future time when all the elements, all souls, and even the gods, would be reunited in the divine universal spirit, not, however, to rest there, but in order to come forth again in individual existence in a newly restored world (cf. Charles, 150).

We quote also Stacey's interpretation of Empedocles's "division of the metaphysical side of human nature". Stacey finds the philosopher original because "he differentiated between the soul which led a singular life above the concerns of this world and the faculties of perceiving, feeling, willing, and thinking which he associated with the blood". This distinction is important, according to Stacey, "because it foreshadowed the distinction between psyche and nous which occurs in Aristotle and all the popular thought of the Hellenic world"28. It seems that Stacey is wrong in his conclusions about Empedocles being original when he is actually only following Homer's tradition. Furthermore, Stacey does not clearly define the changes which occurred with regard to the concepts psyche and nous in Aristotle's handling of these. For Aristotle it is nous which may eventually lead its life "above the concerns of this world...", but we shall have to come back to this later.

As blood is the power of thought, nous, thinking takes place in the heart and it is here too that the elements and their psychical powers of love and hate are most intimately mixed. The two psychical moving causes, the principle of unification, love, and of division, strife, hate, are of great importance
to the health of body and soul. When perfectly mixed within themselves and with the elements, they give harmony and balance to the whole person. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Empedocles speaks of tears and sweat as being produced when the blood goes through a melting procedure, when the watery liquid separates itself from the rest of the blood (cf. Onians, 202, n2).

The foundation of the philosophy of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (500-428 BC) is the same as that of Empedocles and as that of the Atomists, whose philosophy we shall discuss presently. Anaxagoras states: "The Greeks erroneously assume origination and destruction, for nothing originates and nothing is destroyed. All is only mixed and unmixed out of pre-existent things, and it would be more correct to call the one process composition and the other process decomposition."  

The moving cause, doing the mixing and unmixing, is calledNous ('mind' or 'intelligence') by Anaxagoras. "It is intelligence which produces the movement in things which brings about the formation of the world". Nous, an immaterial, incorporeal principle is here used for the first time in philosophy, and says, Stace, "on the question of the moving cause... Anaxagoras became for the first time wholly original."  

Anaxagoras says: "AllNous is alike, both the greater and the smaller". Thus Nous manifests itself also in the individual; it is, or constitutes, that very thing which we call the 'soul' of a living being. At death, when the body returns to the elements, Nous leaves it, but not as an individual soul, rather as an indivisible principle. Charles finds that "though this mind individualised itself in certain material combinations, it retired into itself on the dissolutions of these." The living man thinks and displays knowledge to the same degree as he has himself received his part of the general world-reason, Nous. The more soul, the more he is able to think. But, as Windelband points out, "the first distinct separation of
the intellectual thinking principle from the material substance... did not lead to the recognition of the indestructibility of the individual spirit" 34

It does not seem that Anaxagoras attributed to nous a purposing intelligence, but thought of it in purely mechanical terms, and this is Plato's criticism of Anaxagoras's philosophy in 'Phaedo'. Armstrong remarks that in Anaxagoras "the common-sense attitude and religious indifference of the Milesians reappear" 35.

It has been interesting to note how in this early period of philosophising the pendulum of thought has swung between the two poles, East and West, of Magna Graecia; between the more 'scientific' and the more 'religious' attitudes; the one side providing a thesis, the other an antithesis. Empedocles may have tried to combine the two but the mystic in him dictated his conclusions. His contemporary, Anaxagoras, remained "true to science". Actually, from then onwards, the pendulum began to concentrate its swingings over Athens, where Anaxagoras became a dominant intellectual figure. He, and Democritus, who, however, remained all his life in his home city of Abdera, "were the last two independent Milesian thinkers" 35.

When looking at Democritus's system of philosophy we find "that it bears an astonishing resemblance to some 20th century scientific views" 37. As a successor of Leucippus, Democritus of Abdera (ca 460-360BC) introduced into Western thought "the notions of atomism and of mechanical principles of explanation". Reeves further points to the fact that he was the first to advocate "the billiard-ball theories of the universe... which were later to trouble European philosophers so much" 38.

Democritus, like Plato and Aristotle, was a systematic thinker, a man of "gigantic learning, comprehensive information, and great clearness of abstract thought" 39. But his own age did not show much interest in his theories of bodies in motion
as an explanation of natural phenomena. Only the Epicurean school took up his 'science', but they made certain modifications and did not understand him properly. His system was thus forced into the background for about 2000 years by teleological systems. However, this atomistic theory was so long-lived that it was "revived in the 16th century and held sway until the quantum theory and Einstein gave the 20th century a new conception of matter, denying the attribute of indestructibility to the atoms".

Democritus assumed two ultimate realities: atoms and the void; the plenum and the vacuum. 'True Reality' is the motion of the atoms in the void. Atom meant things you cannot cut any further. 'Matter' was explained by the shape, size and position of its atoms; except for solidity, and probably weight, the atoms were non-qualitative. "The sensible qualities of things, such as smell, taste, colour, do not exist in the things themselves, but merely express the manner in which they affect our senses, and are therefore relative to us".

The 'soul' was an extremely pure, refined and mobile fire and consisted of the same kind of small, smooth, round atoms which made up the 'fire' and air, these atoms being "like the motes in a sunbeam". Soul-atoms were spread throughout the body, always one soul-atom between every two ordinary ones, and they conferred movement upon all others. Armstrong explains that "there is no cause for the movement and no directing force". Everything happened by chance. The atmospheric pressure squeezed the soul-atoms out of the body and new ones were breathed in again, the air being filled with freely floating soul-parts. With the 'last breath' they were scattered, the human being died; he dissolved into atoms. The soul-atoms last eternally, always ready to form new world phenomena. Democritus expressly denied individual immortality.

From his systematic thinking about the structure of matter,
Democritus also drew conclusions with regard to the problem of knowledge and the ethical side of man's conduct. He distinguished between thought and sense perception as the two sources of knowledge, corresponding to a 'higher' and a 'lower' reality. It seems that from Pythagoras onwards these two 'realities' had been more or less taken for granted in Greek philosophic thinking. The forever changing things in the transient world were called phenomena by Democritus who assumed that they could never give true knowledge, only belief, what he called "a bastard sort of information". Only thought (reason) gave knowledge of what truly is. What 'truly is' was changeless.

Perception occurred when "infinitely small copies of the things", which Democritus called 'images', pressed from the outside onto the soul-atoms on the inside. Windeeband further explains that thought, for Democritus, happened in the same mechanistic and materialistic manner through the impressions made by the 'truly real' on the soul-atoms, thus "ideas arise through the motion of atoms". The difference between perception and thought could be expressed in quantitative terms. Thought leading to genuine knowledge was caused by the most delicate, finest and gentlest of motions, a movement which comes nearest to rest.

The same quantitative contrast was also the basis of Democritus's ethical theory. Harmony and true happiness must be sought in the gentlest and quietest motion, a motion which accompanied right insight. False happiness, on the other hand, was itself violent motion and led to over-excitement and unbalance. True happiness was rest, and rest was secured only by knowledge. In fact, as Windeeband pointed out, Democritus's systematic 'materialism' culminated in a noble and lofty theory of life.

Hippocrates of Cos (ca 460-377BC), the famous physician, was a contemporary of Democritus and lived in Athens during its 'golden days' when other 'giants' were men like Pericles, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes and Socrates, to name but a few. According to Armstrong, the 5th century doctors
of medicine in Greece showed "a genuinely scientific attitude of mind". Hippocrates can be "credited with turning the first page of the history of medical psychology," says Reeves, and points to his treatise "Sacred Disease" (epilepsy). Hippocrates states: "I do not believe that the 'Sacred Disease' is any more divine and sacred than any other disease, but on the contrary, has specific characteristics and a definite cause.... It is my opinion that those who first called this disease 'sacred' were the sort of people we now call witch-doctors, faith-healers, quacks, and charlatans." He may not sound quite as scientific to modern ears when he later concludes: "As then the brain is the first organ in the body to perceive the consciousness derived from the air, if the seasons cause any violent change in the air, the brain undergoes its greatest variations.... These things (i.e. the things we see come and go, the cold and the sun, too, the changing and inconstant winds) are divine, so that there is no need to regard this disease as more divine than any other; all are alike divine and all human.... The majority of maladies may be cured by the same things as caused them." What did Hippocrates have to say about the 'soul'? Onians finds that the Hippocratic school clearly shows how the concept psyche has changed. Life and consciousness which had formerly been divided, centred in head and chest respectively, in psyche and thymos, are now united. The pneuma (air) taken in with the breath was "intimately connected with thought and feeling" and was therefore considered as bringing into the body the intellect as well as different spiritual powers. The finest, purest and most active particles of this soul-air was taken up and stored by the brain, "the principal centre of reasoning." Hippocrates seems to have placed 'most' of the soul, as such, in the brain, the 'rest' sustaining different parts of the body.

Flew points to the "Hippocratic insistence that all mental activity and conscious experience has a physiological basis; and that the organ primarily concerned is the brain," and concludes that "materialistic ideas of this sort have a much
longer pedigree than is often realised, extending back to
the time of the Homeric poems and perhaps beyond"55. In
this connection, we must point to Reeves's observation that
Hippocrates was "more convinced that sensation and motor
activities were associated with the brain, than he was that
the brain itself thought"56. It was the soul-air concentrated
in the brain which was responsible for thought and feeling.

Next in the row of thinkers stand Socrates and Plato, both
of whom have immensely influenced our contemporary concept
of the soul. But no thinking occurs in a vacuum, and
thanks to those earlier philosophers who had already so
courageously pioneered new fields of thought, a very good
foundation had been laid for "the intellectual life of all
who have come since"57. Actually, wherever we look in
the world of today we are reminded, consciously or sub-
consciously, of our Greek past. It is certainly an
eye-opener to realise that Pythagoras was the first to use
the concept cosmos; Heraclitus, logos; Anaxagoras, nous;
Leucippus, atom; Democritus, phenomenon.

These pioneers had penetrating and analysing minds even if
they were but pseudo-scientific in their approach: "inclined
to sweeping generalisations and jumping to conclusions on
insufficient evidence"58. However, it is interesting to
remember that Empedocles "formulated the principle of the
survival of the fittest"59. Today's scientists certainly
have a different approach to their problems, but even so
we may remind ourselves, as Reeves points out, "that in
recent times, the more general recognition that scientific
method leads not to certainty but to known chance has given
its role a changed emphasis"60.
Notes to Chapter IV.

1. Stace, p41
2. Armstrong, p12
4. Charles, p149
5. Stace, cf pp48-50
6. Armstrong, p12
7. Plato, Theaetetus, p183; cf Boman, p 52
8. van Peursen, pp92-3
9. Stace, cf p113
10. Boman, p52
11. Armstrong, p10
13. Stacey, p67
14. Bouquet, p139
15. Rohde, p368
16. Bouquet, p139
17. ibid., p140
18. Stace, cf p 81
19. Rohde, p378; cf Armstrong, p15
20. Stumpf, p22
21. Rohde, p379
22. Stace, p83
23. Swami Venkatesananda, The Song of God, p161
25. Bier, cf p16; Rohde, cf p382
26. Rohde, pp383,380
27. Charles, pp149-50 (Eschatology)
28. Stacey, p68
29. Rohde, cf p380, Armstrong, cf p15
30. Stace, cf p95
31. Anaxagoras, A Fragment of his Treatise, Stace, cf p95
32. Stace, p97
33. Charles, p150 (Eschatology)
34. Windelband, p63
Notes to Chapter IV/continued 2.

35. Armstrong, p16
36. Rohde, p385
37. Stumpf, p26
38. Reeves, p34
39. Windelband, p101
40. Stumpf, pp28-9
41. Stace, p92
42. Armstrong, p18
43. Bier, cf p15
44. Stumpf, p29
45. ibid., cf p29, Armstrong, cf p19
46. Windelband, cf pp113-5
47. ibid., p116
48. Reeves, p32
49. Armstrong, p19
50. Reeves, p33
51. Hippocrates, Treatise on the Sacred Disease, ref by Reeves, p33; Flew, cf p31.
52. ibid., ref. Reeves, p33
53. Onians, p116
54. Reeves, p33
55. Flew, p31
56. Reeves, p33
57. J H Randall and Justus Buchler, Philosophy: An Introduction, p16
58. Armstrong, p5
59. Windelband, p53
60. Reeves, p15
CHAPTER V

SOCRATES (ca 470-399BC)
A N Whitehead suggested that "The whole history of Western philosophy consists of footnotes to Plato", and Flew remarks that though this must naturally be regarded as an exaggeration, "it is nowhere nearer the truth than in the area with which we are here concerned", that is with regard to "Body, Mind and Death".

In most of Plato's dialogues Socrates is the leading character, and it is generally assumed that those without Socrates are later dialogues. But otherwise scholars disagree on almost every point regarding the facts about Plato's writings. Over more than 2000 years, 'foolproof' conclusions have, time after time, changed the chronological order of the Platonic dialogues. Quite recently Gilbert Ryle in his 'Plato's Progress' has attempted a reshuffling and a deal which seems to give them an interesting, original sequence.

With regard to the 'Socrates' of the dialogues, we find assumptions about his personality and importance varying in every possible degree from the authentic Master speaking through his devoted disciple to a passive and shadowy mouth-piece used to preach a philosophy he would never have approved or even understood. Armstrong finds that, even if we assume that Plato was deliberately producing an "original metaphysics of his own" when attributing it to his master, "the literary custom of the time, and the conventions of the 'socratic Conversation' in particular, would probably have permitted him to do so".

To separate and distinguish a specific Socratic 'soul' from an equally specific Platonic one would thus be a formidable, perhaps impossible, task, a task in no way attempted here. When discussing the concept soul as found in Plato's writings, we shall take the easy approach of assuming him to give a fair account of Socrates' views in the presumably earlier dialogues, as well as of his own thinking in the later ones, being well aware that other interpretations of the relationship between the two may be better founded.
It seems that no one doubts that Socrates and Plato would have been on the same mind with regard to the answer on the important question: What matters most, body or soul? For both philosophers it is the soul which makes the man. A healthy soul knows what is right and acts accordingly to the benefit of the body. No man intentionally does wrong, says Socrates, and thus ignorance is the obstacle to be overcome. Stumpf attempts to interpret Socrates' emphasis on the role of ignorance as follows: "Wrongdoing, then, is the product of ignorance, simply because it is done with the hope that it will do what it cannot do", and that is, produce true happiness.

As it is possible, in Socrates' view, to know the TRUTH, knowledge of the 'truth' must be found and taught. Only when the soul has true knowledge is a man truly good, truly just, and truly happy. In this connection Randall and Buchler point out that "Socrates, intensely preoccupied with the problem of those human excellences that make up the good life for men and cities, taught generations that if one could only find the right way of getting the right kind of knowledge, the problem of living well would be solved". And, the above authors conclude, "for unless a man can know when he is justified in being confident that he knows, how can he be sure that he knows what is best?".

Can we, as Socrates does, relate virtue to knowledge? The first to criticise him was Aristotle who pointed to the obvious fact that Socrates had forgotten "that the majority of men's actions are governed by passions and emotions", and not by reason. Stace believes Socrates to have been "above human weakness...if he knew what was right he did it".

Reichenbach remarks that when identifying virtue and knowledge, Plato and Socrates established the ethico-cognitive parallelism, the theory that ethical insight is a form of cognition, that is, of knowledge. "If a man commits immoral actions he is ignorant in the same sense that a man who makes mistakes in
geometry is ignorant; he is unable to perform the act of vision which shows him the good, a vision of the same kind as the one that shows him geometrical truth".8

Onians also refers to Aristotle's criticism of Socrates' manner of relating virtue to knowledge. As we saw earlier when referring to Homer's heroes and their physical expression of their emotions, Onians maintains that "where cognition and thought are so bound up with feeling and tendency to act, the relation of moral character, of virtue, to knowledge, is closer than where cognition is more 'pure'.......

Greeks like Aristotle and we today have apparently attained to....a sharper discrimination and definition of the aspects and phases of the mind's activity"9.

Socrates was wholeheartedly one with his KNOWLEDGE, and this ability he wanted to share with everyone. When he said that "all men seek the good, but the many do not know what the good is"10, he meant that GOOD which would make all souls into happy souls. For Socrates, the "care of the soul" was the most important thing given to us in this life. Socrates knew that he was on a Divine mission when he tried to open his fellow men's eyes to this fact. He affirms in the "Apology": "This has been laid upon me by the god (God) through the oracle-word and dreams and in every way whereby a divine providence has ever enjoined upon a human being to do any kind of things".11.

This task led him to his famous method and irony, that is, his sidewalk talks at the market place and his professed ignorance. He had to find an objectively real Truth and an equally objectively real moral Law in order to give mankind 'knowledge' and thus save their souls. Devoting his life to this task, he made a great impact on the thinking of his own age, as well as on future thinking, up to and including our own time.12.

Armstrong emphasises that "after Socrates, the conception of the soul as personality and of the care of the soul as
the most important thing in life becomes pretty well universal among thinking Greeks. It is one of the most important and decisive changes in the whole history of human thought, and it did more than any other development in Greek philosophy to prepare the way for Christianity\(^{13}\). "Socrates gave to the word psyche those moral and religious overtones that 'soul' has for Christian minds", says John T McNeill, who points to Socrates' reply to young Hippocrates when the latter excitedly reports "the arrival of Protagoras, the Sophist, whose pupil he proposes to become". "Are you aware of the danger to which you are about to expose your soul....on which all depends?"\(^{14}\).

The Sophists had already put man, instead of cosmos, into the centre of philosophic and 'scientific' thinking, but Socrates wanted to prove the falseness of their subjectivism and relativism. When laying the emphasis on the ethical side of man, he became the founder of a scientific system of ethics, of ethics based on experience and arising out of life's problems which he tried to explain. In general, we have only confused ideas about goodness and justice, but Socrates attempted, in his dialogue with his fellow men, to find the real essence within something abstract such as 'virtue', 'justice', 'goodness', 'beauty'. He formed his concepts by comparing numerous examples of each class.

To draw parallels between the 20th century AD and the 5th century BC is quite easy and interesting. Stace points to this age as becoming one of negative, critical and destructive thought. "Democracy had undermined the old aristocratic institutions of the State, and science had undermined religious orthodoxy"\(^{15}\). As we have seen, the Greeks had "no authorised body of theologians", no Church as institution. "Religion lacked the support and restraint of dogma"\(^{16}\) as it was based on custom and tradition. It therefore did not have much defence against attacks in the form of new thoughts.

After the end of the Persian Wars, during the 'Great Fifty
Years', when Athens was the political, economic, and intellectual leader of a powerful and prosperous Greece, we encounter both in Greece in general and in Athens in particular a magnificent intellectual upheaval. It was the peak time of what has been called the Greek Aufklärung (enlightenment)\textsuperscript{17}. It is in periods such as these that new ideas break down old prejudices and established ideas, and from having been positive and constructive in the beginning they become, gradually, among the masses, destructive. We encounter scepticism, atheism, and, sometimes, complete nihilism. Humanism becomes the new religion, the emphasis being on the individual. "Man is the measure of all things", said Protagoras, one of the best known Sophists. All values become subjective and all knowledge dependent on the sensations and impressions of each individual.

With their emphasis on individual perception, the Sophists showed a new approach to the question of knowledge, leading to the denial of the possibility of real, universal knowledge. Earlier thinkers had never doubted a) that there is an objective truth, and b) that man can know it. They had all agreed on the fact that thinking, reason, is necessary for this process, and they had differed only in their belief of the role of the senses - the Orphically influenced philosophers having called all knowledge through the senses illusionary.

Bringing their subjectivism to bear upon ethics, the Sophists consequently identified morality with the feelings of the individual: 'goodness', for instance, invariably differs from individual to individual, changes from time to time. This was impossible for Socrates to accept, as his whole view of life depended on the objectivity of a truth that could be taught, a truth "which the soul must see and realise in order to be itself good"\textsuperscript{18}. The concept of 'goodness' had to be unchanging and universal, not the creation of the mind. And as Armstrong points out, in this "insistence that the definition of goodness is universally and always true, the universal concept emerges clearly for the first
time in the history of European philosophy, a development of the very greatest importance".  

Aristotle says of Socrates: "Two things ought rightly to be imputed to Socrates, viz. induction and the general determinations of concepts". In this connection, Söderblom remarks that though Aristotle gave to Socrates "his place of honour in the history of thought, there is not a word in Aristotle about what is equally remarkable, viz. his place in the history of religion". When defending Plato (and Socrates) against the accusations in Popper's book 'The Open Society and its Enemies', Levinsohn points to the same "firm religious faith". Levinsohn writes: "There is, unmistakingly, his sense of the divine guidance of his own life, first by the daimonion which would always halt him if he approached any evil, and secondly by the command of the god of Delphi; co-ordinate with this is his unshakeable faith in the cosmic grounding of human good; and it seems to me necessary to add his serene belief in the certainty, humanly speaking, of immortality.

The above sentence may be said to expose all those ingredients that made Socrates tick, those different aspects of his deep religious faith. It seems reasonable to believe that Socrates was, in Kierkegaard's words, "an immediate possessor of the divine", that he had achieved the "unity of ideal and life, of theory and practice". In an almost naïve manner he was blissfully certain that a) the divine purpose was behind everything, b) his own vocation was divinely ordained, c) the divine voice helped him, and d) that the soul was immortal. Of course it must be added that although many scholars agree with the above, all the points have been more or less completely rejected by others. It is, for instance, assumed that Plato incorrectly emphasized (b) and (c), and that as regards (a) and (d), Plato attributed his own theories to Socrates.

Beginning with (a), it is interesting to note that when piety is grounded in reason, as Socrates' piety was, the corresponding
world view is necessarily teleological. "By discovering the essential nature of everything, Socrates believed that he could also discover the intelligible order in everything," an order that had as its goal absolute perfection. The end being perfection, it was the end that caused the beginning, for mechanical causes never explain perfection. No doubt, Greek and, later, all European thought has been immensely influenced by this theory as propounded in Plato's and, later, in Aristotle's writings (cf. the mechanical view of Democritus, p 68 above).

With regard to point (b), Socrates took the answer given by the Delphic Oracle very seriously. The Oracle had declared him to be the wisest man in Greece and in attempting to find out why, he discovered that the reason was that he did, truly, know his own ignorance. The others were ignorant even of their ignorance. The beginning of wisdom is to know that you do not know, the beginning of wisdom and the beginning of the knowledge leading to 'virtue'. It seems that in this discovery of Socrates', there is a strong parallel to Jesus' words in John IX 41: "If you were blind, you would have no guilt; but now that you say 'We see', your guilt remains". For Socrates, as for Jesus, REAL KNOWLEDGE, real seeing, does indeed change a person, it is the same as being born anew. But false knowledge, pretending 'to see', is that kind of 'ignorance' which is identical to sin.

Armstrong finds that this Socratic conclusion shows his "deep and direct piety more effectively than the famous 'supernatural sign', which does not indicate any belief on Socrates' part that he was in special communication with the divine world, and amounted to no more in spite of the mystifications of later writers, than a sort of uncanny anticipation of bad luck".

This leads us to point (c), and one may wonder why Armstrong is so sure of the unimportance of Socrates' daimonion? Why is it so beyond question that Socrates believed himself to be in special communication with the divine world? Söderblom
devotes many pages to what he calls "the mystery of Socrates' soul". The daimonion signified for him intercourse with the divinity. It was the 'sign of God' says this author, and he also finds that "this secret of his soul and life was manifest in the certainty that the power experienced by him, the friendly guidance or providence, was the central power of life in which his unconditional confidence was placed.

It is interesting to study the different theories which have been proposed regarding Socrates' daimonion. Lately, however, its role has been belittled as one of utter insignificance. Is this, as Söderblom suggests, "because some people have no room for the extra-ordinary"? We discussed earlier the disbelief, so characteristic of the 'scientific' attitude of today, in the possibility of God's direct guidance of the individual. It seems worthwhile to repeat that one may wonder at this rejection of what seems a quite coherent explanation of many human experiences, including Socrates' 'inner voice'.

J.T. McNeill finds that "the daimon was distinct from conscience which for Socrates was linked with reason. In Xenophon's report of his defence it is called the 'voice of God'. It represented a direct breaking in from a supernatural realm, and was wholly personal to himself." On the other hand, some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that Socrates was 'mad', and suffered from auditory hallucinations and other weaknesses. The most general theory, however, has been that what Socrates experiences is his conscience speaking to him, or rather, in him. Stacey does not unduly stress the point but says that "Socrates certainly was aware of unwritten laws, perceived only inwardly, which must be obeyed even though the laws of the state contradict them."

Windelband assumes that Socrates had to admit that there were conditions in which knowledge is insufficient for certain decision, and where feeling entered upon its rights.
Under such conditions, Socrates believed that he heard within himself the daimonion, a counselling and, for the most part, warning voice. He thus believed that the gods warned him of evil when his own knowledge proved insufficient. And so, says Windelband, "the wise man of Athens set faith and feeling beside ethical science".

Stacey, as we saw earlier, pointed to three different strands in the early Greek view on man, and he gives in connection with these strands an elucidatory explanation of the Socratic Soul. We shall let him lead us on to point (d). As we have seen, for Socrates the individual soul was of infinite value: "All sense of moral, intellectual and spiritual worth was contained in it. It was the true self, the most noble part of man. To preserve it pure was life's highest duty. This is an advance on all the three positions we have already noticed. The ordinary consciousness of man, his normal thoughts and judgments were now included within the scope of the soul, so that any doctrine of immortality which may rest on the Socratic view would involve, not the subsistence of a shadowy ghost, nor the release of a divine prisoner, nor the re-absorption of a seed of primary reality, but the continuation of the real man". In Stacey's opinion, Socrates added to the "breadth and depth of the meaning of the word psyche without making immortality a cardinal feature".

As far as (d) is concerned, what in fact did Socrates think about immortality? Having a wholehearted trust in the divine power of the good, he could sincerely say: "For a good man there is no evil, whether he live or die, and the gods are concerned with the business of such a one".

Obviously, the true Socrates, that man of whom James Adams says: "it is primarily as the physician or healer of the soul - that he regards himself", must have believed in some kind of future eternal life for this very soul, or his whole teaching would appear nonsensical.

It does not seem probable that Socrates of the 'Apology' was in any doubt whatsoever when he suggested that "death is
one or other of two things,"37, either to be compared with dreamless sleep, or "like making a journey to another land"38, concluding, "not only are the dwellers in that world happier in general than we are, but for all the time to come they are immortal, if what we are told is true."39. To prepare our souls for this happy, immortal existence is the goal of our life on earth, therefore, this life is of the greatest importance. This is a point where it seems that the Socratic and the Platonic views differ.

When Socrates used the Delphic Oracle's words: "Know thyself", he meant, "examine yourself, gain insight into your vocation, know what you are doing"40. Socrates was concerned with life here and now, says Söderblom, "the sort of life which we find later in the Gospel"41. Kaplan compares Buddhism with the philosophy of Socrates, the post Renaissance humanists, and with the contemporary existentialists, and concludes, "the problem with which the world confronts the inquiring mind is not a cosmological one but a moral one: not, what is the world made of, but what is man to make of his life in the world - this is the question. Although the Buddhist is interested in knowledge and understanding - indeed, in this above all - what he wants to understand is man, and what he seeks knowledge of is how to live so as to achieve the supreme value that life affords."42.

We shall listen to Socrates' words of warning: "My good friend, you are a citizen of Athens, a great city and highly renowned for its power and wisdom: you are not ashamed then of seeking to acquire as much money as you can, and reputation and honour, but caring nothing and taking no thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?"43.
Notes to Chapter V.

1. Flew, p34
2. *Gilbert Ryle, Plato's Progress*
3. Armstrong, p28
4. Stumpf, p44
5. Randall and Buchler, p10
6. Stace, p147
7. ibid., p148
9. Onians, p18
10. Stace, p148
12. Stace, pp129,146
13. Armstrong, p29
15. Stace, p108
17. Stace, p119
18. Armstrong, pp31-2
20. Söderblom, p235
22. Ronald B Levinson, *In Defence of Plato*, p635
23. Söderblom, p262, ref to S Kierkegaard, *Om Begrebet Ironi*, pp124,256
24. Stumpf, p43; Armstrong, cf pp29-30
25. Armstrong, p27
26. Söderblom, p236
27. ibid., p245
28. ibid., p237
29. ibid., p237
31. Söderblom, cf p242
32. Stacey, p71
33. Windelband, p98
34. Stacey, p71
Notes to Chapter V/continued 2.

35. Plato, Apology 41 D; Woodhead, p66; cf Söderblom, p248
37. Plato, Apology, 40 C, Woodhead, p64, and Apology 40 D p 64.
38. Plato, Apology, 40 E, Woodhead, p65
40. Söderblom, p251
41. Söderblom, p252
42. Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy, p268
43. Plato, Apology, 29 E, Woodhead, pp49-50
CHAPTER VI

PLATO (ca 427-347 BC)
The central point in Socrates' teaching is generally understood to have been the identification of virtue with knowledge. Assuming, as many scholars have, that Plato regarded this Socratic doctrine as an axiom, it may well have been the starting point for his own philosophic thinking. If knowledge of the good was all important, it would have seemed necessary to be able to "determine exactly what sort of reality this goodness was".

Plato had studied, and was well acquainted with, all the earlier philosophers, and he does indeed "gather the entire harvest of Greek philosophy". Stace writes that "all that was best in the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, Heraclitus, and Socrates reappears, transfigured, in the system of Plato". All previous thought, however, is nothing but the foundation for Plato's own new and original philosophy, which was later to become the Philosophy for the Western world.

In Plato's view, Socrates had not gone far enough when searching for the concepts of goodness, justice. Heraclitus had pointed to the continual flux within the world of appearances. Knowledge of an objective, unchanging Truth cannot be found among forever changing phenomena. These latter can only be the object of 'opinion'.

Parmenides's eternal, immutable Being gave a vision of something real beyond this world of illusion, somewhere there must 'exist' or rather BE, a world of timeless and unchanging 'Forms' (Ideas), with the Form of Goodness as the most superior one. Knowledge of these Forms, of these eternal patterns of which the objects we see are only copies, would indeed be pure knowledge, knowledge of reality.

In this connection, Kaplan remarks that in the Western tradition, philosophers have been classified "into those which follow Parmenides and those which follow Heraclitus: the one localising reality in something fixed and unchanging, and the other in the ceaseless flow of events, one in substances and the other in processes, one in eternity and the other in
time - in a word, one in being and the other in becoming". It is also customary in the Western tradition to speak of Greek thinking as static and Hebrew thinking as dynamic. In all these sweeping generalisations, important details are overlooked.

H D Lewis makes us aware of the fact that we sometimes find Plato protesting "against the remoteness and aridity of his own account of true reality as the world of forms". In 'The Sophist', for example, we find him insisting that "there must be place in that which is perfectly real for 'change, life, soul'" (Sophist, 248 E). Lewis says too, that the Platonic concept dynamis, which plays a part "in the inter-relationships of being and becoming", is a concept of particular "importance both as a key to Plato's thought and as a notion of the utmost importance for thought and culture of the present day".

Boman expresses the same thought when emphasising that the antithesis is not: static-dynamic, but: rest-movement.

True reality as the World of Forms is the central and governing principle of Plato's philosophy. This principle led obviously to the conclusion that the 'other-world' is more important than 'this-world'. However, if man, in order to have true knowledge, must know the forms, and the forms are conceived of as being beyond this material world, how can any knowledge be possible at all?

On his journeys to Italy, Plato had come into close contact with Pythagoreanism and its Orphic roots. The re-incarnation doctrine of the Orphics provided a logical link between the two worlds. To the Socratic idea that the real man is the psyche, was added the Pythagorean concept of the divine soul. The soul, being immortal, and thus truly god-like, has always 'been' and always will 'be'; it goes through a cycle of re-incarnations, and in between these it dwells in the Realm of Forms where it 'knows' reality. At birth, becoming chained to the body, it apparently forgets its knowledge. Through the process of anamnesis, however,
the innate knowledge is drawn out of the incarnated soul which intellectually grasps what the physical eye is unable to see.

Charles maintains that "once pre-existence and immortality are admitted, the doctrine of recollection follows of necessity." This consequence the Orphics had already drawn but it was Plato who gave it a philosophical exposition.

Plato's conception of the Realm of Forms is criticised by Stace, who emphasises that "Plato cannot resist the temptation to think of the absolute reality as existing. Consequently, the Ideas are not merely thought as the real universal in the world, but as having a separate existence in a world of their own." In Stace's opinion, Plato rightly realises that the individual horse is not real, though it exists - only the universal horse is real. If Plato's idealism, however, were fully developed, this universal horse, which is the form of horseness, would obviously not have an existence.

Stace makes a strong point of the fact that "to distinguish between existence and reality is an essential feature of all idealism." The disincarnated soul lives among these 'forms' which have a separate place and existence of their own, for this is how Stace and many others interpret Plato, and consequently, Plato's whole doctrine of recollection and re-incarnation shows a capital defect. In fact, "Plato commits the greatest sin that can be ascribed to a philosopher. He treats thought as a thing."

Stumpf, on the contrary, stresses that the Forms must not be thought of as having any dimension, "the question of their location comes up as a consequence of our language, which implies that the Forms, being something, must be some-place in space. ....Furthermore, these Forms seem to have originally existed in the 'mind of God', or in the supreme principle of rationality - the One." Cornford, too, suggests the possibility that "the pattern for the visible world is forever
in the thoughts of Supreme Reason"13. Max Scheler proposes with regard to Plato's 'ideas' that "Augustine was the first consciously to (have imagined these) as God's thoughts"14. In fact, for Augustine, "the various forms in which the world is shaped were always in God as Exemplars. All things, therefore, are finite reflections of God's eternal thought"15.

Perhaps Augustine understood what Plato really wanted to convey? Plato's difficulties were that he could not describe his vision, his mystical insight, except in words taken from the physical world. "According to Plato, we never know for sure, as far as verbalisation can take us, that a defining formula is the correct form of speech in which to express the essence of the thing we aspire to know", says Marjorie Grene. "Only a vision beyond language can give us the knowledge of the thing"16.

Many scholars find that it is necessary to emphasise that Plato's philosophy is essentially religious. Lee affirms that "the vision of the Form of the Good is what others have called the vision of God. . . . The experience is religious; it has the characteristics that William James noted in all mystical experience, it is a state of knowledge and yet not incommunicable in ordinary language"17. Rohde too assures the Realm of Forms, "the world of pure Being, to which only the pure soul can attain", as a "world of divinity"18.

Onians points out that when discussing the meaning of the word oide, 'to see' (later, generally translated 'to know') "the doctrine of 'vision' presented by Plato implies more than mere cognition, and for him what the soul has 'seen' is all important for its condition..."19. Knowing the Realm of Forms has somehow changed the 'unborn' soul, and having seen the Form of the Good is most important for the whole essence of the souls, for it makes them what they are. For the Greeks, as we know, knowledge was from earliest times connected with seeing. Knowing is simply a superior kind of seeing.
Walsh attempts to explain Plato's usage of the concept knowledge. "Whereas knowledge and, still more, belief are to the modern mind primarily about something, Plato takes them as conditions in which, in each case, something is directly apprehended... knowing is a superior sort of seeing, one in which an utterly stable object is discerned with infallible certainty". Walsh adds that "Plato's notion of knowledge as being thus intuitive has played an immense (and, some would add, a disastrous) part in the history of philosophy...".

"In Plato's spirituality there is a great scope for contemplating, meditation, 'seeing';", according to Söderblom, "a seeing issuing in ecstasy and perfected in the separation of the soul and body". Knowing, for Plato, is without the senses, it is a purely spiritual activity. The soul, involved in the sensual world but attempting to free itself, must try to "see through the physical eyes, not with them", says Plato in the 'Theaetetus', and also: "it is the eye of the soul which sees".

Because "sensory perception is a restrictive factor for Plato's soul", says van Peursen, "the faculty of sight... can impede the life of the soul just as much as physical pain". The senses are not windows for looking out, but they are bars shutting out reality, keeping the soul out of touch with Truth. For the philosophical soul there is, however, at a later stage, a new way of looking at the world and discovering its beauty. Reichenbach explains that we have here "a theory of knowledge in which acts of insight replace sense perception". But it is important to emphasise that these acts of vision "can supply knowledge only because the ideal thing exists".

"Since physical things exist, they can be seen; since ideas exist, they can be seen through the eye of the mind". Reichenbach admits however that "once empirical observation is abandoned as a source of truth, it is but a short step to mysticism".

It is by the faculty or power of dialectic that the soul
moves towards its highest goal, which is to communicate directly with the Form of the Good. The whole variety of the world is then reduced into the intelligibility of the One. 'The manifold' is One. The soul knows it is part of the One. Somehow, we as souls become what we think. In Plato's view we are divided when we think of divided things, when we see only the manifold. When perfect intelligence is reached, the soul is completely released from the objects of sense. Ultimate reality is unity, not dualism.

"Exactly what Plato meant by dialectic has been much disputed", says Lee. "It is concerned with both mathematics and morals, in each bringing a coherence and certainty lacking at an earlier stage. "Dialectic travels through the whole range of the Ideas, graduated one above the other, till it reaches the last and most universal of the Ideas." If we say the dialectic is a purely philosophic activity and that it gives coherence to the whole of man's knowledge and leads finally to a vision of ultimate reality, ....we have perhaps said what one can say with certainty.

As regards mathematics, Plato no doubt strongly believed that a training in this science, by turning the soul from appearances to Pure Form, makes the soul fitted for philosophy and the search for the absolute Good. It seems that when attempting to "discover the metaphysical basis for the validity of moral judgments", he was struck by the obvious fact that the "situation was just the same in scientific judgments.

Plato was most probably aided by the Pythagorean concept of form as it derives from mathematics. Perfect triangles, like perfect justice, perfect beauty, and perfect goodness, do not exist in the world of the senses. The objects of mathematical knowledge are not derived from sensory perception. This kind of knowledge, in Plato's thinking, is independent of experience and shows an absolute and immutable truth. It must be part of the knowledge which the soul brings with it from the non-material world.
Reichenbach discusses the "strange blend of mysticism and mathematics, which has never died out since its origin in Pythagoras' philosophy", and finds that "what unites such a mathematical mysticism with non-mathematical forms is the reference to acts of supersensuous vision; what distinguishes it from those other forms is the use of vision for the establishment of intellectual truth".

As we have seen, on the one hand Plato clearly takes the path of a mystic. Most scholars point to this mystical trend, though they certainly value it differently. On the other hand, what he understood through mystical insight he attempted to develop into strictly formal thinking. He wanted to create a philosophy which was rational as science, the science of his own times. Perhaps we can say with Rohde that Plato "to a remarkable degree combined the cold exactitude of the logician with the enthusiastic intensity of the seer".

It is interesting to compare what Einstein has to say about the true scientist: "His religious feeling takes the form of a rapturous amazement at the harmony of natural law, which reveals an intelligence of such superiority that, compared with it, all the systematic thinking and acting of human beings is an utterly insignificant reflection. It is beyond question closely akin to that which has possessed the religious geniuses of all ages."

In dealing with what follows, consideration must be given to the assumptions prevailing in Plato's times, and this will be further discussed later. Rational Laws rule Plato's Universe. When Divine Reason created Cosmos, it formulated Laws by which it disciplined Chaos. Cosmos means Order and includes Beauty and Truth. Plato continually draws parallels between the soul of man, of society, and of the universe. The visible universe is for him a Living Being with a Soul. Man is a microcosm in a macrocosm, an image in miniature of both Heaven and the State, and, moreover, related to the ordering principle, the Laws, of the visible heaven, which is the material universe. More explains that man, in Platonic thinking, "is under
obligation, or at least has the power, to render himself like God by bringing law and order into the unruly members of his own being, as God exercises government upon the lawless elements of the material world. 'Man' here is the Soul, the soul being the real man, the rational soul being responsible for the conduct of the irrational soul as well as for the conduct of the body.

Stacey points out that "Plato's view of the number of souls in a man and the divisions of the soul gives rise to some uncertainty." We encounter the same uncertainty when trying to find an answer to the question why the eternal soul ever becomes earth bound at all. If the soul were all perfection and the body all bad, there would be no rational explanation for their unhappy union - and Reason is Plato's catchword.

No doubt almost every author has his own interpretation of what Plato really wanted to say. So often he uses symbolic language which conceal his 'Truths' in myth form, myths which belong to our Western heritage, such as: The Prisoners in the Cave; the Charioteer with the Tame and the Wild Horse, the Captain on a frail Ship having to deal with ignorant Sailors.

In the 'Phaedrus', Plato explains that souls dwelling in the divine Realm are, each one of them, "like the composite union of powers in a team of winged horses and their charioteer. Now all the gods' horses and charioteers are good and of good descent, but those of other beings are mixed. In the case of the human soul, first of all, it is a pair of horses that the charioteer dominates; one of them is noble and handsome and of good breeding, while the other is the very opposite, so that our charioteer necessarily has a difficult and troublesome task" (Phaedrus, St 246).

We shall continue to quote from the 'Phaedrus' St 246 and give Plato's explanation of SOUL as such, which is SOUL as LIFE.
and of the origin of the individual soul: "I must try to tell how it is that a living being is called both mortal and immortal. Soul, taking it collectively, has charge of all that is soulless. It traverses the entire heaven, appearing sometimes in one form, sometimes in another. When it is perfect and fully winged, it soars on high and is responsible for all order in the universe; but if it loses its wings, it is carried down until it can fasten on something solid. It settles there, taking on an earthly body, which seems to be self-moving because of the power of the soul within". Plato then explains how it is that "a living being is called both mortal and immortal". "This composite structure of body and soul joined together is called a living being and is further designated as mortal. Immortal it is not on any reasonable supposition: in fact, it is our imagination, not our vision,....that present us with the notion of a god as an immortal living being, equipped both with soul and with body, and with these, moreover, joined together for all time".

We are then told that the reason for the soul's loss of wings is that the wings can be nourished only by what is beautiful, true and good. "More than any other part of the body the soul partakes of the divine nature which is beautiful, wise and good, and all such qualities. Nothing, certainly contributes more than these to the nourishment and development of the soul's wing: while by their opposites, ugliness and evil, it is wasted away and destroyed".

Armstrong calls the myth of the charioteer and his horses "a superb picture of the tripartite soul in action....where the Driver (reason) aided by his good and tractable horse (the higher emotions) fights a mighty battle to subdue the undisciplined fury of the bad horse (carnal lust) which yet, for all its unruliness, remains a necessary member of the team and part of the whole".

In the 'Republic', Plato uses the same three parts of the soul and elaborates his symbol in great detail when depicting how the State is Man Writ Large, the Ideal State therefore
consisting of three classes of citizens: the Philosopher-Rulers, the Soldiers, and the Producer-Workers. We find the different parts of the soul in different parts of the body: the rational faculty in the head; that of will and resolution in the chest; and the faculty of the sexual and vegetative drives in the abdomen. To each of these functions of the soul there is a corresponding virtue: wisdom, courage, temperance. We take our place in society in accordance with the degree to which these virtues rule and manifest themselves in our lives. "Virtue for Plato means knowledge in the broader sense of the fulfillment of a unique function" says Stumpf, "it is therefore attained only when each part of the soul is fulfilling its own function."

In the ideal State the order is strictly hierarchical. If depicted as a pyramid, the philosopher-rulers are at the top, giving the State their wisdom; next in importance comes the class of guardians, contributing to the State their courage; the producer-workers, finally, give the State their temperance, or self-control. In the life of the ideal society all three parts have their proper functions, and this is 'Justice'. Plato was convinced that without justice life would be entirely without meaning, for 'Justice' is the precondition of 'Truth'. To function as the perfect State, the State must be just.

Just as a man's character and his well-being are the product of inner harmony, of balance, and of a proper order between the three elements in his soul, so does the dominance of the one or the other of the three classes decide how the State will be governed. We are morally, politically, but above all, spiritually, bound to society; our place among our fellow-men is our spiritual status as well. Wherever injustice creeps in we find chaos: in the soul of a man, in the community, or in the Universe.

Plato's tripartite division of the soul had an immense influence on later thinking. The hierarchical societies of the Middle Ages were founded on this principle of everyone
and everything having its proper place; the Church explained it as being the fulness of God's will.

Most scholars describe Plato as changing and developing, though perhaps not always as progressing, in his thought as he grew in years. Charles, among others, assumes that Plato gradually changed his principle of the tripartite soul and that he began to visualise the eternal, uncreated soul, in the Realm of the Forms, as "simple and indivisible, a power of pure thought"\(^{39}\), necessarily unassociated with emotions and passions. Only when incarnated in the body does the soul become soiled by the passions and has to begin on the troublesome road to freedom.

If this is what Plato means then he certainly leaves unanswered the question why the already perfect soul must 'fall'.

Many believe, however, that Plato's intention is to show the necessity of a descent into the 'cave' for the progress of the 'not yet perfect' soul. 'The Allegory of the Cave' is surely a very proper account, some would say 'satiric', of the blindness of human life in the world of the senses. But in this same book, the 'Republic', Plato also says that to understand the soul as it really is we should look: "to the soul's love of truth.... Think how its kinship with the divine and immortal and eternal makes it long for them and try to grasp them; think what it might become if it followed this impulse wholeheartedly and was lifted by it out of the sea in which it is now submerged, and if it shed all the rocks and shells which, because it feeds on the earthly things that men think bring happiness, encrust it with a strange and earthly shell. Then one could really see its true nature, composite or single or whatever it may be"\(^{40}\).

This longing for "the divine and immortal and eternal" is described by Armstrong as follows: "There is, however, besides the single control of reason in the well-ordered soul....another single and therefore in a sense unifying force which Plato recognises. This is **eros**, Desire."
Plato's conception of it is in some ways strikingly like the 'libido' of Jung... Eros in Plato is the motive force behind all human thought and action, the drive or longing after a good unattained which impels the soul on without rest until it is satisfied.\(^{41}\)

The suggestion that for the Christian agape is "The free and unmerited love that comes from God and flows towards man", whereas eros for Plato is "the love that stems from man and strives towards God" is too schematically presented, says Boman.\(^{42}\) "Just as there is a human factor at work in the Christian relationship with God, so in the Platonic there is a divine factor; Plato's God is in part represented impersonally as the Idea of the Good with the sun as a symbol - which is surely not ineffective but life-bestowing, glorious and attractive (Republic) and in part personally when God is called the good creator and father (Timaeus).\(^{42}\)

When using the Sun as the symbol of the Form of the Good, Socrates points out that: "The Sun... not only makes the things we see visible, but causes the processes of generation, growth, and nourishment, without itself being such a process... The Good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligence of the objects of knowledge, but also of their existence and reality; yet it is not itself identical with reality, but it is beyond reality, and superior to it in dignity and power.\(^{43}\)

Boman emphasises that one should thus not underestimate "the enormous activity which he (Plato) ascribes to the Ideas, especially the highest Idea, the Idea of the Good, i.e. God", neither misrepresent "the corresponding activity it requires of man.\(^{44}\) The attraction and the strength to strive upwards is given the soul from the Ideas themselves, according to Boman, who finds it misleading, "indeed false, to say that in Socratic-Platonic religion man ascends to God on his own strength and redeems himself.\(^{44}\)

Desire (love) in its purest form is, for Plato, always
concerned with beauty. In the 'Symposium' he shows the full ascent of the philosophical soul from sensuous love of one beautiful object to love of beautiful forms in general; later this love turns into spiritual love of beautiful souls, to be followed by realisation and love of the beauty of the sciences; at a spiritually advanced stage the future philosopher, being shown the way by dialectic, begins to understand and love the absolute and unchanging beauty of the world of Forms. He will gradually concentrate his love on the highest and most beautiful among them, the Form of the Good, and 'love' then passes into philosophy. This stage is reached in a moment of immediate vision, "a suddenly acquired apprehension of the world-order". At this moment the soul once more finds its divine nature and divine home.

Modern psychology, as did Buddha, has paid much attention to the force of desire, and Reeves puts her psychological finger on the 'sore spot' when describing Plato as providing "for some people...one of the most satisfying literary expressions of the individual human need to identify successfully and (here is the mystical and perhaps masochistic element) completely with something greater than himself. Thereby the individual believes he may attain both a purification and security which, rightly or wrongly, he does not feel able to achieve in any other way". Reichenbach is still more critical when he remarks that "the intellectual recognition of truth does not always endow the human mind with the strength to resist deep-rooted emotional appeals of the search for certainty".

Söderblom sees this longing with religious eyes, and visualises man "as the meeting-place of two worlds" in the spirit of Plato. Söderblom points to Orphic inscriptions on South Italian graves of the 6th century BC which read: "I am a child of the earth and the star-spangled heaven', and he concludes "however closely his (man's) mind and labour may be tied to the visible world, he has never forgotten his lofty destiny".

Owen is, no doubt, right when he emphasises that through
Platonism, much of Orphism has penetrated into the very heart of Christianity. It may perhaps also be pointed out that Plato seems indeed to have been preparing the soil for Christ's message, and in the opinion of many scholars, not only the Greek soil, but Hebrew soil as well. We shall return to this later, but now only quote these lines from Hadas:

"The principal innovation of 'The Wisdom of Solomon' which may be attributed to the kind of Greek influence of which Plato was the chief vehicle, and which in turn had a major influence upon subsequent religious developments, is the explicit doctrine of the immortality of the soul and of rewards and punishments after death." 49 Hadas also points out that "in the stress upon individual salvation which we find in Wisdom and its successors, Christian and Jewish, we may see an example of a western importation (to Israel) returned to the west with fresh emphasis and urgency." 50
Notes to Chapter VI.

1. Armstrong, p32, cf p37
2. Stace, p164
3. Armstrong, cf p20
4. Ferguson, cf p11
5. Stumpf, cf p49
6. Kaplan, p271
7. Boman, cf p27
8. H D Lewis, The Elusive Mind, p119
9. Boman, pp54-5
10. Charles, p154 (Eschatology)
11. Stace, p246, cf p247
12. Stumpf, p63
13. Cornford p44
14. Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, p135
15. Stumpf, p150
17. Plato, The Republic, tr H D P Lee, p36
18. Rohde, p470
19. Onians, p18, cf p 16
20. W.H. Walsh, Metaphysics, p21
21. Söderblom, p259
22. van Peursen, pp37-8
23. Reichenbach, p32
24. ibid., p20
25. Stumpf, p60
26. Lee, p300
27. Rohde, p470
28. Lee, p300
30. Field, p xix
31. Reichenbach, p34
32. Rohde p471
33. Albert Einstein, The World as I see it, p28
Notes to Chapter VI/Continued 2.

35. Stacey, p72
37. Armstrong, p42
38. Stumpf p71
39. Charles, p152 (Eschatology)
40. Republic, Bk IX, 611-612, p391
41. Armstrong, p42
42. Boman, p19
43. Republic, Bk VI, 509, p273
44. Boman, p72
45. Rohde p485 n61
46. Reeves, pp34-5
47. Reichenbach, p143
48. Söderblom, p8
49. Moses Hadas, *Hellenistic Culture*, p77
50. ibid., p78
CHAPTER VII

FIVE POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST FOR THE CONCEPT OF THE SOUL IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY.
As we have seen, it seems that almost any conclusion is justified when interpreting Plato. With regard to the following five points, there are no doubt the usual controversial answers. We shall begin our discussions with points 1, 2 and 3, and suggest that it may be reasonable to assume that for Plato:

1. The body is a necessary prison for the soul during its earthly life. The purified soul looks forward to a complete disembodiment beyond time and space.
2. Even the purest soul, in communication with the 'Good', still maintains some kind of individuality, either during life on earth or in its disincarnated stage.
3. The Philosopher is the link between this world and the One Beyond. Even if the emphasis is on the soul of the Philosopher and his lonely path to salvation, the salvation of all souls is implied.

The first to disagree with No 2 above would be Owen, who writes: "The purified soul will in the end return to the divine and heavenly realm from which it came. Losing its individuality, along with its body, it will be absorbed into pure universal reason". Field finds it possible that in the later dialogues "Plato had ceased to believe that the immortal part of ourselves necessarily survived in the form of separate individualities".

A totally different opinion about Plato's later teaching is expressed by Armstrong: "Plato came to think of the soul as having a true bodily home in the heavenly world, and of its ultimate destiny not as a complete disembodiment, but attachment to a pure and everlasting heavenly body". It is possible, however, that we must regard the above as a kind of wishful thinking, if we are to judge from Armstrong's own words in the 'Critical Introduction' to his book written in 1967, 20 years after the first edition. He writes there that the first edition "bears the stamp of what is now
a rather old-fashioned sort of Roman Catholic one-sidedness and complacency".

Plato has no need of a body, as we can see in the following quotation from the 'Phaedo': "If at its release the soul is pure and carries with it no contamination of the body, because it has never willingly associated with it in life... then it departs to that place which is, like itself, invisible, divine, immortal and wise; where on its arrival, happiness awaits it, and release from uncertainty and folly, from fears and uncontrolled desires, and all other human evils; and where, as they say of the initiates in the Mysteries, it really spends the rest of time with God" (Phaedo, 80B-81C).

Earlier, we quoted from the 'Phaedrus' about the unreasonable supposition that god, as an immortal living being, must have body and soul.

Keeping these two quotations of Plato in mind, we shall now listen to Charles's opinion. He seems to agree with Owen, but differs from Hadas, when stating that there is an "immeasurable gulf" dividing Plato's thinking from Jewish as well as from Christian doctrines. As a proof, he gives two points: i) it is not a human soul that Plato's final teaching deals with, but pure intelligence; ii) his doctrine, as set over against the Jewish and the Christian, is the glorification of an unbridled individualism. Its appearance in any single human community or family is of the nature of an accident. It existed before any such came into being, and will outlive them. However nobly the virtues relating to one's neighbour or the State are expounded in the Platonic system, they are related to the individual mainly as elements in its discipline and self-culture.

Rohde seems to agree with Charles when he (Rohde) points out that "we must not inquire what sort of personality and individual distinctness can yet remain with the soul when
it has cast off all effort, desire, sense-perception, and everything related to the world of change and multiplicity, to become once more a pure mirror of the eternal”. But in Rohde's opinion it is still some kind of personal immortality that Plato teaches; when the soul is set free from this earthly existence, it can "escape out of time and space and find its home in eternity, without at the same time losing its own self in the General and Universal that stands above time and space". Time, for Plato, belongs to this world of change. Not until the phenomena we know have been produced can there be the concept of time. Stumpf explains that "until then, by definition, whatever is, is eternal. The very meaning of time is change, and therefore in the absence of change there could be no time".

Plato is undoubtedly difficult to understand. Many of his sayings contradict one another. Perhaps what he is trying to get across can be expressed only in paradoxical language, or, must seem paradoxical to our understanding. Maybe, on the other hand, as Söderblom proposes "two spirits dwelt in Plato's soul. The one perceived the world as impurity and a prison, the other saw the beauty of the world and the demands of the community". Referring to the demands of the community, Field finds that the later works of Plato show that "the aim of the process...in which the soul throughout the universe is always and everywhere engaged...is not to get away from this world, but to make it as good a world as it is possible of becoming".

It is possible that Hadas in the following quotation, as well as Charles in the quotation given above (see p 98.), sees only one side of Plato's philosophy. Hadas assumes that the "doctrinal point in which the Semitic eschatologies significantly differ from Plato's is that they are concerned with the destiny of a nation whereas Plato is concerned with the destiny of individuals".

Windelband, it seems, sees only the other side when he ascertains that "true to the logical principle of the doctrine
of Ideas, that which truly is in the ethical sense, is not
the individual man, but mankind, and the form in which this
truly existent humanity appears is the organic union of the
individuals in the state". Plato considered the state
"as presenting in large the ideal of humanity, and of educating
the citizens to that particular virtue which makes him truly
happy". Stace emphasises the same point more strongly still
when asserting that for Plato "the individual is nothing,
the State everything. The individual is absolutely
sacrificed to the State. He exists only for the State...
(which) is a homogeneous unity, in which its parts truly
disappear".

In order to see both sides we should take notice of the fact
that the philosopher, having had a completely individual
education in order to make his 'soul' resistant to all worldly
influences, in the end, against his own real wishes, turns
back 'into the cave'. Lee says of these Philosopher-Rulers
that "they do not serve the State because they want to, they
are philosophers who have seen the supreme vision and would
prefer to spend their time in philosophy. But they have
a duty to their fellow-men, and that they discharge by doing
the work of government for which their training has fitted
them; they are a dedicated minority ruling in the interest
of all". Lee finds "a perennial attraction in this
conception of the highest talent put at the disposal of the
community, of the ruler whose heart is in heaven dedicating
himself to the service of society".

Rohde describes these men as having expelled "all traces
of the corruptible and the mortal", and of being "already in
this life immortal and godlike and fit to die". Only
through these truly wise rulers can the state achieve its
end and provide an ideal community of souls, a community
which has the right type of education and which will, in
Plato's own words, "bring compulsion to bear" upon the
ignorant souls.

Plato carries to its extreme consequence the thought that the
end of human life consists in moral education, and that the entire organisation of a community must be arranged for this sole end, writes Windelband. "Education", in Stumpf's opinion, "is (for Plato) a matter of conversion, a complete turning around from the world of appearance to the world of reality". It seems that if this is the right interpretation of Plato, then, contrary to Charles's statement earlier, it is of great importance to all souls that they do indeed 'appear' in a community which has the right type of education. But where and how is this achieved?

Plato himself affirms that the Philosopher-Ruler can only rule "the society where he really belongs". And it seems that we are in a vicious circle when we realise that only the 'right' individuals can create this society, individuals who have had the 'right' education. This education can be provided only by a strong State, ruled by a Philosopher-King who organises everything down to the smallest detail, according to his vision of the end for all souls: on the earthly plan, to fulfil one's own function in the Ideal State; on the eternal plan, to be worthy of one's reward in the Divine Realm.

Plato, no doubt, sees the difficulties and has to admit that his theoretically constructed 'Ideal State' of the 'Republic' may never "exist on earth". Socrates says (Republic, 592): "Perhaps...it is laid up as a pattern in heaven, where those who wish can see it and found it in their own hearts. But it does not matter whether it exists or ever will exist; it is the only state in whose politics he can take part".

Is the Philosopher-Ruler perhaps a mirage, "a product of the kind of idealism which asks too much of human nature and is then disappointed by what it finds?" asks Lee, who finds, however, that "he does stand for a set of problems which are real, and to which every society must find its answer". No doubt, in the Christian communities too, education was until recently regarded as a preparation for eternal life.

It is interesting to notice that in Hajas's opinion, the
Platonic concept of education which had incorporated much Spartan austerity influenced Talmudic teaching too. Hadam proposes that there may be "a larger sense in which Platonic doctrine is a factor. It is possible that the system which the Talmud constructs is consciously calculated to achieve a goal which Plato specifically prescribes and further, that the system was then adopted by forces which did shape European civilisation..."21. "The complete control of civic as well as religious life by the established authorities is common to the Talmudic and the Platonic programme, as is the significant prescription that all children be educated to accept that control..... The rabbis were men of faith, and their object was the service of religion, but their method for securing discipline was, like Plato's, to provide authority for men's smallest actions"22.

Hengel refers to a work by Hecataeus of Abdera, probably written before the end of the 4th century BC, where the Jewish state is described as "a true 'aristocracy' along the lines of the Platonic utopian state". Hengel suggests that Hecataeus was "already thinking of a comparison with the Sparta that Plato so treasured"23. Later, a legend sprang up according to which there was an affinity between Jews and Spartans. "Speculations of this kind were helped on by the fact that there was a certain analogy between the Jews and the Spartans with their strict laws, their lawgivers Moses and Lycurgus, and the divine authorisation on Sinai or through Delphinian Apollo"24. Hengel sees this from the Hebrew point of view as an instance of achieving "entrance tickets into European culture"24.

That the mediaeval Church was built and organised on the Platonic hierarchical pattern seems an established fact; most interesting is the assumption that this influence did, possibly, work more directly on the Christian Church through Jewish religious tradition, a tradition which had somehow, centuries earlier, accepted Platonic ideas. The following lines from Dimont seem to assess the situation: "The Jews
absorbed everything intellectual which the Greeks had to offer. To everything intellectual they borrowed they added a Jewish touch. The Greeks then took these retouched ideas back from the Jews. The result was something neither had foreseen. The Greeks emerged in a Jewish-made mantle known as Christianity; the Jews wore a Greek philosophic tunic labelled 'Talmudism'. More, when speculating about borrowings in religion in the field of ideas, finds that these are usually "in the nature of the appropriating of things in the possession of another which the borrower recognises in all good faith as belonging to himself, ideas which, when once they become known to him, are seen to be the necessary implications or complements to his own."

As we have repeatedly pointed out, the influence of Plato on the Western world is incalculable; those parts of his teaching which did not reach it directly have, somehow, returned from other sides, often incorporated into the religious, philosophical and political thinking of Eastern countries before reaching the West.

If the theory about Platonic influence on the Talmud is acceptable, it shows again how inspiring and able to endure in different forms Platonic philosophy has always been. In contemplating this, one may perhaps ask whether there is now more, or, in fact, less reason for Owen to despise the fiend Plato? Owen is quite adamant and dismisses Plato in the following words: "He remains to the end an antiphysical dualist. It is he, and his followers, who most of all are responsible for imposing the 'religious' anthropology on western thought."

This leads us to our fourth point:

4. All dualism dissolves when the soul visualises the unity of, and in, all.

We mentioned earlier that when the soul reaches its highest goal it finds that 'the manifold' is One. Plato's views
were no doubt antiphysical, but they were not dualistic in their essence: dualism would be found in the view that the world of senses is as real as the ideal world, in other words, that there are two worlds side by side, and that the body is as real as the soul. Although Plato does not use the concept, he would have described a belief in dualism as ignorance. In the Realm of the manifold which the soul has entered from the Realm of the One this confusion is natural; true knowledge alone can change this false view.

Lamont, who in his book "The Illusion of Immortality" is engaged in, as he expresses it "the intimations of mortality" (no eternal soul for him!), writes on the issue of a monistic versus a dualistic psychology. He finds the issue a most crucial one in the study of the meaning of death "for it cuts across and illuminates all other issues connected with a future life.... It is as real today as 2,400 years ago in the time of Plato and Aristotle. It cannot be circumvented, except verbally, by any out-of-the-way definitions of the body or of the personality. Both may be defined as ideas in the mind of God or both as rhythms in the realm of matter, but the exact relationship between these ideas or these rhythms remains fundamental. Likewise the ideas that make up the mental life of the personality may be defined as pure and immaterial essences or as particles of physical energy in its most refined form, but the essential point for the question of immortality is still how binding is the partnership between the personality which has ideas, however described, and its body." 28

For Plato, this partnership was certainly not binding. As we have said, the real man, the soul, has no need of the body. On the other hand, the body exists only because it is animated by the soul, or to express it in more symbolic language: the mortal body exists as the prison of the immortal soul. When the prisoner escapes, the prison breaks down. "The soul is a presence which makes the body what it is." 29.
We come now to the fifth point, which deals with the acclaimed confusion in Plato's thought about the soul. It is here proposed that:

5. For Plato himself his conclusions with regard to the concept soul are quite clear.

There are many authors who either see no confusion or who find that what seems unclear to us can be adequately explained from Plato's point of view. Grene maintains that "Platonic separate soul, Platonic immortality one must take seriously as Plato's deepest faith. Soul for Plato is the moving force in the world as in the individual; if one cannot accept literally his arguments and the kind of afterlife he deduces from them, one can at least imagine what it was like to see the world in this way".

No doubt we are doing Plato a great injustice when we forget that he was a 'religious' philosopher living ca 2,400 years ago, and when we try to make him conform to 20th century standards of what is the now acclaimed type of scientific philosopher. Plato's whole teaching, his religious philosophy, which has never ceased to give us food for thought, was centred round his KNOWLEDGE (used in his sense) of the indestructibility of the SOUL. We must certainly attempt to understand him on his own conditions and in the 'scientific' and philosophical climate of his own times, and admire that he has exerted such unbelievable influence right up to our own times. P.T. Geach says the same: "The usefulness of historical knowledge in philosophy, here as elsewhere, is that prejudices of our own period may lose their grip when we imaginatively enter into another period, when people's prejudices were different".

It seems that Bier finds it easy to accept the 'prejudices' of Plato's period. Writing in 1939 about "modern psychology", he criticises its attitude towards the 'soul'. He finds that in its penetrating studies of the soul and in its attempts to make it conform to various systems, in reducing it to crumbs, or rather crushing it to atoms, this
psychology has arrogantly forgotten the most important thing, "i.e. the old truth, which all primitive people knew and which the 'common man' still knows, and this is : that the soul is the animating principle of the organism and that life is gone as soon as the soul is not there any longer. I share this old conviction", says Bier, "a conviction which was once the Consensus Omnium. Whether we look on the soul as an independent being or only as the moving and animating power is, in this connection, not important. We must not lose this wisdom, or we cannot understand the soul". Referring to the 'soul' as "the life which moves", Bier quotes from Plato's 'Laws': "Either the soul has its seat inside the body and leads the motion, or it takes from the outside its fire and air-like bodies and so moves on body through the others, or it remains completely bodyless, but has wonderful power which leads the motion".

We shall listen to a discussion in the 'Phaedo', the dialogue which describes Socrates' last day and death in prison. About the 'Phaedo', Tredennick writes: "It is an attempt to encourage by every means a belief in the soul's immortality - not to prove it by logic, for Plato knew quite well that this is impossible, but to commend it to intuition. According to Plato, Socrates asked: "If you should ask me what exists in a body to make it hot, I will not give you that safe old foolish answer, heat, but a more clever answer suggested by our discussion, namely fire; and if you should ask me what exists in a body to make it ill, I shall not say sickness, but fever; and again, should you ask what must be in a number to make it odd, I shall not answer oddness, but the number one, and so forth. Do you clearly understand my meaning now?"

"Quite clearly", he replied.

"Then answer me", said he (Socrates): "What must there be in a body to make it alive?"

"A soul", he said.

"Is this always so?"

"Of course", he said.

"Whatever the soul occupies, then she always brings life hereto?"
The discussion goes on, but its point is that 'a soul', bringing life, cannot itself die. The soul is thus immortal. Field calls this "a very tricky argument, which would probably make a little appeal to us nowadays, as least as formulated here. But it has a certain affinity to arguments that have been more familiar to modern times, on the lines that life is not something that can be explained by purely physical or chemical processes and that therefore we must postulate a source for it outside these."  

When discussing passage 100B-105E of the 'Phaedo', of which the quotation given higher is a part, Flew postulates that "Plato's argument here seems to depend upon a fundamental confusion. What he is supposed to be trying to prove is the immortality of all individual souls, in the sense of individual personal agents; things which...he believes to be invisible and incorporated substances. But what his argument here actually treats is the soul in quite a different sense: the soul conceived as the principle of life....The soul as the Form of Life belongs to an entirely different category from souls thought of as individual human persons."  

It seems that Flew can in no way "imagine what it was like to see the world" in Plato's way. It seems that the confusion can be explained if we accept the following three points as fundamental for Plato's thinking:  

a) The body lives only when provided with LIFE.  
b) SOUL is LIFE, i.e. SOUL as such, not any particular soul. SOUL is the source of motion and change in all which is not soul (i.e. what is soulless) (cf p 91 quote from 'Phaedrus').  
c) The human soul is the stuff of SOUL and thus divine, eternal and immortal. Consisting of SOUL, the soul animates the body giving it LIFE. When SOUL is thus manifested as 'soul' it is the SELF or personality of the human being. It is manifested as an individual 'something' before 'birth' and again after 'death'. In the human being we find thus a combination of soul-self-life and body.
From the 'Phaedo' (115C,D), we quote Socrates' conversation with Crito, before Socrates drinks the poison:
(Crito asks)...."how shall we bury you?"
"Any way you like", said he, "if you can catch me, and I do not give you the slip".
And with a gentle laugh he looked at us and said: "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am Socrates, I, the man who is now conversing and ordering each detail of the discussion: but he thinks I am the corpse which he will see shortly, and actually asks how he is to bury me. But though I have already stated at considerable length that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer be with you but shall depart to enjoy the mysterious happiness of the blessed, it seems that I speak to him in vain...."

Flew emphasises that "if any route is to be made over the gigantic obstacle lying in the way of doctrines of personal survival or immortality, this route will have to be Platonic. In this broad sense, anyone who takes the mind or the soul to be, in our sense, a substance is thereby at least Platonicising; and anyone who goes on to identify this putative substantial soul or mind with the real or true person is adopting a fully Platonic position". It seems that Socrates would agree with this, especially as Flew explains substance to mean something that "could significantly be said to exist on its own independently of the body or anything else". He did after all say "If you can catch me....".

Ferguson accentuates that "the Greek psyche is as elusive as Proteus and does slide imperceptibly from life to mind and from mind to what one might call moral personality". But "for Plato it was the sovereign element". It is this elusive psyche that we have so far tried to trace, and which through Plato's works became such an integral part of Christianity. As we shall see it is the very same psyche which somehow manages to slide out of the hands even of Aristotle, who so boldly stated the inseparability of soul and body.
Notes to Chapter VII.

1. Owen, p39
2. Field, p xxviii
3. Armstrong, p43
4. ibid., Intro. p x.
6. Charles, pp155-6
7. Rohde, p472
8. Stumpf, p83
9. Soderblom, p258
10. Field, p xxviii
11. Hadas, p78
12. Windelband, p126
13. Stace, pp323-4
14. Republic (Lee), p43
15. Rohde, p471; cf van Peursen, p38
16. Windelband, p127
17. Stumpf, p55
18. Republic, 592, p369
19. Republic, 592, p369
20. Lee, Intr. p47
21. Hadas, p80
22. ibid., pp81-2
23. Hengel, p256
24. ibid., p72
25. Max I Dimont, Jews, God and History, pp77-8
26. George Foote Moore, Judaism, p394
27. Owen, p41
28. Corliss Lamont, The Illusion of Immortality, p27
29. van Peursen, p4
30. Grene, p243
31. P T Geach, An Essay in Body, Mind and Death, ed Flew, p269
32. Bier, p36
33. Plato, The Laws, 2 Bd 5 419, see Bier p36
34. Tredennick, p97
Notes to Chapter VII/Continued 2.

35. *Socratic Dialogues*, p163
36. *Field*, p xcvii
37. *Flew*, p55
38. *Plato, Phaedo*, in *Socratic Dialogues*. 115C-D, pp176-7
39. *Flew*, pp8,4
40. *Ferguson*, p4
41. *Stacey*, p72
CHAPTER VIII

ARISTOTLE: THE CONCEPT OF SOUL IN ARISTOTELIAN THINKING.
384-322BC.
Plato, it was assumed earlier, when contemplating the importance of 'knowing the Good', decided to find out what sort of reality this 'goodness' was. Aristotle would most probably have concentrated on the 'knowing'. He did after all begin his Metaphysics with the words "All men by nature desire to know".

Plato and Aristotle had different starting points. What constituted problems for Plato were not problems for Aristotle. It was a real problem for Plato to bridge the gulf between the merely apparent good and the really good: the whole of the 'Republic' seems to have been written in order to teach the 'true philosopher' how to achieve this goal, to the benefit of his own, as well as of all other souls. But Aristotle, in Grene's words, "sweeps aside the whole problem in two brief paragraphs: 'Different things appear good to different people....Perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of them'". Grene concludes, "in Aristotle's neat, circular argument the crisis of Sophism, the collapse of an unstable humanism, is as if it had never been at all".

In fact, the concept of knowledge, as understood by Plato and Aristotle respectively, may lead us to an understanding of the similarities and differences in their approach to the concept 'soul'. They were both confident that knowledge was possible, and that knowledge to be true knowledge must be certain, that its objects should be permanent and stable, that knowledge must be of a "reality that is delimited, all of one piece, the kind of reality a rational mind can truly comprehend".

Plato had stated that this changing world could never be the object of true knowledge, only of belief. Knowledge of the Forms was real knowledge. For Aristotle, too, knowledge was primarily the knowledge of forms, but as regards the Platonic Forms, it seemed to him that "these are so completely cut off from the material world that they cannot
possibly be the objects of our knowledge, immersed as we are in that world". The unchanging objects of true knowledge which we need for science and philosophy must somehow be found here, within this changeable world of individual things.

Armstrong suggests that "the questions, which Aristotle had to answer when he rejected Plato's solution, were - first - precisely what were the stable and unchanging realities which exist in this world of change, and, then, precisely how could one reality of this kind change into another, as the things revealed by our senses appear to do. It was, as far as we can tell, more by trying to answer these questions than by any other line of approach that Aristotle arrived at the great basic conceptions of his philosophical system, Substance, Form and Matter (Soul and Body), Act and Potency. All these problems are discussed in the 'Metaphysics', which Aristotle called 'True Wisdom', 'First Philosophy', or 'Theology'. True Knowledge, or Wisdom, must be found in what is most real, thus, in true reality, and since it is most real, it should be most knowable and the source through which all other things come to be known.

Plato, as we have already seen, undoubtedly tended towards mysticism. Aristotle was critical of his use of myth and poetic language, for what Aristotle wanted was distinct, concrete knowledge, and for this he found indispensable the evidence of the senses. Nevertheless, as a follower in the Greek tradition, he cherished reason even more. He was, perhaps, the first Greek philosopher who consciously tried to reconcile rationalism and empiricism, though he would not of course have used these terms.

Aristotle's great influence on mediaeval theology depended on his giving 'Reason' the highest place in his philosophical system. As Reichenbach says: "The close connection between rationalism and theology is understandable. Since religious doctrines are not based on sense perception, they demand an extra-sensory source of knowledge." The philosopher
who pretends to have found a knowledge of this type is the natural ally of the theologian. The systems of the great Greek rationalists Plato and Aristotle were utilised by Christian theologians for the construction of a philosophy of Christianity; Plato became the philosopher of more mystically minded groups, Aristotle the one of scholasticism.  

In Aristotle's system, God is Eternal Pure Reason. This Divine Reason is absolutely 'real', but is not 'existent'. (cf 'to be' and 'to exist' on pp 83, 85 above, and p 115 below). Stace interprets Aristotle's theory of evolution as follows: "The whole universal process of things is nothing but the struggle of reason to express itself, to actualise itself, to become existent in the world". Akin to the Divine Reason is man's 'agent intellect', which has been translated as active nous, 'mind' or 'active reason'. This separable, active reason in man is described by Owen as "a spark of Pure Reason, a divine element in man's nature. It can raise man completely above nature and, when cultivated by the pursuit of knowledge, can finally escape altogether from matter and become united with the Divine, Pure Reason". We shall later discuss nous in more detail.

Grene describes 'active nous' as "a power of direct confrontation with the 'being-what-they-are', i.e. with the essential nature of a thing, of things". She finds that Aristotle "did know, or believed that he did, (that the) peculiar substance of each kind of thing is there for us to grasp, vaguely in perception, step by step in induction, directly and luminously through rational, necessary intuition". In 'intuition' the seeker has found true knowledge, because he now knows true reality.

Aristotle defines true reality as the essence unfolding in the phenomena through "the process of coming to be". Referring to what Aristotle calls a substance, we find that a substance is for ever "engaged in the process of becoming actually what it has in itself to be, or again as striving to realise a certain form which it shares with others of its
There seem to be two different Aristotelian concepts of 'substance'. We said above, with Greene, that one can come to know the 'peculiar substance of a thing'. Here "substance is evidently being thought of not as the concrete thing but as its essential nature". But in other connections, Aristotle clearly shows that he is "thinking of substance as the individual thing". Everything that exists is some concrete, individual thing, a unity of matter and form.

Form is the universal, rational aspect of each substance, which it shares with all other members of the same class; Matter is the particular, physical aspect of each substance, which contributes to making it an individual thing. A thing is real because it participates in 'form', changeable because it participates in 'matter'. The degrees of reality and of changes depend on the relationship of matter and form. We may here again point out that Aristotle places the form (soul) definitely in that category of being which corresponds to the Platonic Ideas, the Realm of Pure Forms. For Aristotle, as for Plato, true knowledge is bound up with the universal, with Form or Soul.

Where did Aristotle find his forms? Looking around him in the natural world, he was struck by the fact that everywhere and in everything in the phenomenal world matter lies before us. It seemed to him that the existent universe is a scale of being lying between the two extremes of matterless form and formless matter. Aristotle himself describes substance as having "three meanings: form, matter, and a composite of both". Referring to animate bodies, he assumes that these are substances "not in the secondary sense in which matter (or potentiality) and form (or actuality), which are really elements in substance, may be called substance; they are individual independent substances concrete of matter and form".

Aristotle writes: "If the eye was an animal, its sight would be its soul", in other words, sight is to the eye what the
soul is to the body. Sight on its own does not exist 'physically' (compare the grin of the so often cited 'Cheshire Cat'), but by using the two words sight/eye; soul/body; or form/matter, a logical analysis of the two concepts is possible. Thus the analysis which distinguishes 'form' and 'matter' has, in Armstrong's words, "a purely intellectual and non-physical character....you can only separate them in your mind and not in reality". "Clay cannot simply be clay without any form whatever", says Randall, MATTER "which is what we can sense, signifies that a thing is", FORM "which is what we can know, signifies what a thing is".

In order to explain how a thing could be simultaneously both 'real' and 'capable of change', Aristotle set forth his doctrine of Act and Potency. Windelband proposes that Aristotle "solved the fundamental problem of Greek philosophy - viz. how behind the changing multiplicity of phenomena a unitary and abiding Being is to be thought - by means of a concept of relation, that of development.....In particular, the process of development presents itself to Aristotle as the relation of Form to Matter". All Becoming consists of the purposive process of matter taking on form. Armstrong suggests that it may seem to us "the merest common sense to say that a thing can be one thing actually and all sorts of other things potentially, but it took a very long development of Greek thought before Aristotle arrived at this simple-seeming doctrine.

Ross discusses the 'de Anima' and finds the question whether all the attributes of soul are common also to its "possessor, the unity of soul and body which we call a living being", one of the questions which "takes us into the heart of Aristotle's psychology". In the 'de Anima' 403 and 412, we find the view expressed that "most mental phenomena are attended by some bodily affection...(and that) mental phenomena are therefore 'formulae involving matter'"; and also that "we should not define anger either as the dialecticians do, merely as desire of retaliation, or as the physicists do, merely as the blood boiling over the heart".
According to Aristotle's general theory, Ross says it follows from the relation of soul and body that "(Aristotle) had not conceived the notion of the self as a pure spiritual being to which its body is as much part of the outside world as other physical things. Rather, for him, soul and body form a union which while it lasts is complete, and in which soul and body are merely aspects distinguishable by the philosophic eye". Aristotle does, however, indeed make a reservation with regard to 'active nous' to which we shall return later.

Flew expresses the inseparability in Aristotle's philosophy of soul from body in different terms from Armstrong, Randall and Ross. It seems that he may be drawing the wrong conclusions with regard to "not physical but of logical impossibility". This is what Flew writes: "The Aristotelian notion of form is tricky, and is especially to be distinguished from the Platonic. . . . Whatever else may be obscure here, it is, as Aristotle himself said, obvious that the soul is not separable from the body. And, furthermore, this inseparability must be a matter not of physical but of logical impossibility. It is upon this insistence that we must rest Aristotle's claim to be regarded as the patron of all monistic and materialistic views of the nature of man".

In regard to Flew's statement about Aristotle's alleged "materialistic views on the nature of man", we have a question which finds great disagreement among scholars. van Peursen suggests, and it seems the right approach, that the Aristotelian view rules out not only immaterialism but also materialism. Immaterialism puts the emphasis on the soul, but the Aristotelian 'soul' "at once implies a concrete body". Materialism takes the body as the starting point, but here it would simply mean "that we have already - albeit unawares - smuggled in the soul". When discussing the soul, Aristotle in the 'Metaphysics' (1026a, 5) immediately adds: "...insofar as it occurs not without matter". R D Hicks, who edited the 'de Anima' in 1907, had on the other hand come
to the conclusion that Aristotle "so far from favouring materialism, secures once and for all the soul's absolute immateriality".26

Walsh, in a chapter titled "Materialism and Aristotelianism", explains that Aristotle defines his metaphysics in "two apparently quite different ways".27 In his conclusion Walsh points out that: "Because he believed in 'sensible' as well as 'insensible' substances Aristotle could elaborate what is in effect a metaphysics of experience, a doctrine of how to take familiar things. A modern critic might well see this as ruling out belief in things unseen on the Platonic pattern, but there is no evidence that Aristotle, who after all continued to believe in the intuitive powers of reason, ever took that view. On the contrary, he held that things seen can be explained only if we presume the existence of things unseen. To lay exclusive stress on either of our alternatives would accordingly be a serious mistake".28

We know, without doubt, that for Plato the soul was immaterial and immortal. But as we have seen, there is much disagreement about Aristotle's stand on materialism/immaterialism, and when we turn to the concept of immortality it seems that in the past "the worst arguments raged over Aristotle's believing or not in a personal or any other kind of immortality".29 In this connection Reeves suggests that perhaps to Aristotle "the constitution and fate of an individual person were not of primary interest or importance; perhaps he was unimaginative; perhaps in his impersonality Aristotle has much to give us?.....".30

Let us go back to Stace's interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of evolution as the struggle of reason to become existent in the universe. This struggle is eternal, timeless, because absolute matterless form, that is, pure reason, can never exist. Pure form IS. This process goes on in a universe which consists of circles within circles and which is perfect and eternal, and as Aristotle himself says: "God therefore.....fulfilled the perfection
of the universe by making 'coming to be' uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because that 'coming to be' should itself come to be perpetually is the closest approximation to eternal being.\textsuperscript{31}

The process of 'coming to be', or 'reason expressing itself', is found in inorganic matter as gravitation, in plants as nutrition, in animals as sensation, and in man as reason. The higher on the scale of being an individual thing is situated, the more it partakes in reason, soul, form, reality... or whatever we want to call it. The ultimate Reality towards which the entire Universe flows, or strives, is both its beginning and its end; the end being already present in the beginning. All becoming is a purposive process as we have said before.\textsuperscript{32} Motion, in all its forms, is produced "not by a mechanical propulsive force, pushing from behind, so to speak, but by an ideal attractive force", according to Stace.\textsuperscript{33} And it is "the soul which is activating and directing this striving".\textsuperscript{34}

In the search towards perfection, towards the wholeness of being, the potentialities of the body are actualised by the soul and therefore this very SOUL is most properly what a living thing is. In a living thing the soul is its entelecheia (for the sake of which). Entelecheia also means that which 'has its end in itself', that is, "the 'what' that contains the goal towards which its development has tended".\textsuperscript{35} The way a man functions as a human being, his very nature, "resides more truly in the defining form of man than in the characteristic stuff that constitutes a human organism".\textsuperscript{35}

The concept 'entelechy' has caused not a little confusion and much controversy over the centuries. But no one denies that Aristotle's philosophy is thoroughly teleological. The purposive planned activity in Aristotle's system was put up against the mechanism of Democritus's. Aristotle emphasised this world as the place for this planned activity, criticising Plato for having removed purposefulness from the world of perception to the Realm of Forms. In Aristotle's
view, every living being carries its pre-determined end within itself; from the moment it has a beginning in time. In living creatures form is a principle of perfection, a life plan, or a design which becomes increasingly evident as it unfolds. The whole must be seen before the part; the goal before the way to it. This is not a new theory of Aristotle's, he is following in the early Greek traditional thinking which saw all things about which it could be said that they were "existing by nature" as parts of a scheme "which had the appearance of being organised in the biological sense" (Walsh : 57). It seems that Grene, when discussing the concept of necessity in Aristotle's thinking, scores a point when remarking: "Aristotle, for whom inherent teleology reigns supreme in nature, can allow an area for the non-functional, the merely necessary within his 'rational' nature. He, the prophet of the 'for-the-sake-of-which', is less obsessed with finding 'ends' than are the Darwinian evolutionists, who deny teleology while seeking it everywhere in order to reduce it to necessity".

With the concept 'entelechy' in mind, let us look at the scale of being again. The lowest item, inorganic matter, is, in Aristotle's own words, "that which has not got its end within itself". Its form remains on the outside. It is not 'besouled'. As soon as the form enters into a thing, it becomes empsuchen soma, a 'besouled body'. It has life. Moving up the biological scale we encounter the Aristotelian concepts of the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational 'souls', function being increasingly more complicated as we advance. Living man 'has' three souls, the rational one being his peculiar sign: he can think.

The following passage is from the 'de Anima', Book I, Chapter 1: "Holding as we do that knowledge is a good and honourable thing, yet that some kinds of knowledge are more so than others, either because they are more certain or because they deal with subjects more excellent and wonderful, we naturally give a primary place, for both these reasons, to an enquiry about the soul. Indeed an acquaintance with the soul
would seem to help much in acquiring all truth, especially about the natural world; for it is, as it were, the principle of living things" 39.

Referring to the above passage, Flew states that Aristotle himself "ascertains the nature or essence of the soul as the principle of life". Flew continues, "This means, or should mean, that he will be using the word soul in the sense in which to talk about something having a soul is simply a misleading substantival way of saying that it is alive.... It is perhaps not altogether surprising that even he seems sometimes to have been entangled by his terminology. He sometimes takes it that the dividing lines between the levels in this hierarchy of functions must be more absolute than they are. He even forgets that in this sense of soul, souls cannot be substances (in our sense, that is; a sense quite different from that in which Aristotle himself employs the Greek word usually translated substance). His fundamental thesis is that the life, or the soul, is 'the form of the particular living body'" 40.

It seems that, as Plato was earlier, Aristotle too is being judged from the point of view of our modern prejudices, without taking into account what the concept psyche really stood for in Greek thinking from Homer onwards. For the Greeks, psyche was more than just 'the principle of life'. In fact, Aristotle does not say 'principle of life', as Flew suggests, but 'principle of living things'. Aristotle is by no means free from the assumptions and prejudices of his fellow-men. Psyche had been 'the miracle, the mystery' of life and a 'something' (which could leave the body at death and go to Hades) long before Homer. As we have seen for Plato it was life and a 'something': for Aristotle, too, attuned as he is to traditional thinking, psyche is 'the principle of living things', as well as, paradoxically, a 'something' on its own.

Thus, when Reeves says that we must be careful "when we talk about different 'souls' in Aristotle's system, and not think
of these as entities lodged in bodies", she adds that this is something that "Aristotle seems to have tried to escape if not wholly successfully". In general, however, he is very clear in his rejection of a soul-body dualism: "Soul is the way the body works: that is all". Or, when the body moves we see the soul at work.

Armstrong explains in this connection that we have "in Aristotle's universe a special group of material substances, Aether, Pneuma and the principle of transparency and light, all hot or bright, all active, and not subject to qualitative change, whose function is to act as vehicles and intermediaries through which the immaterial communicates with and acts on all other material things". Pneuma is the "material vehicle through which sense perceptions reach the soul" and it is at the same time 'pneuma' which produces "bodily movements under the influence of the movement of desire in the soul". This important intermediary is present in the sense-organs and in the channels and veins connecting them with the heart. The heart is "the ultimate organ which originates movement...(it) is the pivot of the whole body; the point at which the body is actuated by soul". As we said earlier, Plato believed the brain to be the centre of physical life, whereas Aristotle emphasises the importance of the heart as the centre. This incorrect view of Aristotle's "set popular physiology off on the wrong track" says Stacey (Stacey : p 75). We shall later compare this Aristotelian view of the heart with the Israelite view.

Pneuma is also assumed to be an intermediary when it comes to the problem of transferring the 'soul' from generation to generation, the seed being the logical soul-carrier. We have already made mention of the Aristotelian view that the male of the species gives the newborn his soul, whereas the female provides the body. Thus "the contribution of the male parent is nothing material but is the impressing of a certain form on matter supplied by the female". The question is, as Greene points out, how the seed can be
"soul purely"; seeds are material and soul is form. We said earlier that, according to Onians, the Homeric Greeks also saw psyche as "the life which is transmitted in procreation". In this connection Onians refers to the dialogue 'Timaeus' in which Plato goes back in time to the original limitations of psyche, which is the time before thymos and psyche merged into one concept. Plato here tells us that psyche is "planted and fastened... in the marrow, the divine part in the marrow of the head called the ekephalos. In this fastening life (bios) is involved. The psyche is itself 'seed' (sperma), or rather, is in the 'seed', and this 'seed' is enclosed in the skull and spine, and explicitly identified with the marrow... and flows thence in the propagation of a new life. This appears to be original popular belief...". Onians points out that it is also very explicit in Aristotle "that the seed was itself breath (pneuma) and that procreation was such a breathing or blowing". Onians refers to Hist. Anim 586a, 15f; de Gen.Anim. 728a, 9f; 736b, 33f. 

Grene, too, assumes that Aristotle, in order to find an intermediary between seed and soul, described "semén as made up of 'cognate pneuma' in which soul has already been implanted", and that he speaks of pneuma (breath) almost "as if it were soul, or a very special sort of vehicle of soul". In the same way as "soul acts on and communicates with body, through pneuma", the Unmoved Mover, Eternal Pure Reason, "acts on everything else through setting in motion the heavens made of aether". It seems that the Milesian ideas of "specific forms of motion working in the primal matters" somehow influenced Aristotelian philosophy. The Stoics later used the same ideas for their doctrine of the pneuma.

We have said that the rational soul is man's peculiar sign; he can think. Perhaps we can assume that, on the Aristotelian view, whereas animals sense only that a thing is, human beings can come to know what a thing is. In addition to this, 'active reason' may disclose the why of things. "It is", says Aristotle, "that mind by which the soul forms
This nous is separable and impassable and unmixed, being essentially an actuality. For the active is always of higher value than the passive, and the originative principle than the matter. Actual knowledge is identical with its object; potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, but in general it is not temporally prior; but nous does not at one time function and at another not. When it has been separated it is that only which it is in essence, and this alone is immortal and eternal. We do not remember, however, because active reason is impassable, but the passive reason is perishable, and without the active reason nothing thinks" (de Anima, Bk 3, Ch 5).52.

A human being thus has 'active' and 'passive' nous, and the distinction between these two 'minds' falls within the soul. Nous poietikos comes in "from the outside" and remains "unmingled with the body and its powers and uninfluenced by them." It requires a potential principle - a tabula rasa, on which it may imprint forms", the nous pathetikos. Actually, Aristotle himself speaks of to poion (agent intellect), the phrase nous poietikos first being found ca 220 AD.54.

Ross asks how, in Aristotle's view, it happens that "we come to know things which in the ordinary sense we did not know before. Does not this transition from potential to actual knowledge imply that there is something in us that actually knows already, some element that is cut off from our ordinary consciousness so that we are not aware of this pre-existent knowledge, but which is nevertheless in some sort of communication with the ordinary consciousness or passive reason and leads this on to knowledge?"55. "It is clearly implied", says Ross, "that active reason, though it is in the soul, goes beyond the individual; we may fairly suppose Aristotle to mean that it is identical in all individuals."56.

Most scholars agree that in fact Aristotle fell into a certain dualism by introducing 'separable nous'. As van Peursen
says "there are here the rudiments, at any rate, of a new dualism - one which opposes soul-body on the one hand, to mind on the other"\textsuperscript{57}.

Greene attempts an explanation of this diversity in the make-up of the Aristotelian man: "Perhaps it springs from the biologist's sense that his own knowledge, his own elaboration of sets of prepositions and arguments about other living things, is itself a very strange addition to life itself, so strange that it must have a foreign source, an origin all of its own....Perhaps then, Aristotle's \textit{nous} is.....a concept necessary to guard the knowledge of life against the collapse into mere life?"\textsuperscript{58}.

What makes the interpretation of Aristotle's use of and distinction between \textit{psyche} and \textit{nous} so difficult is that \textit{psyche} is not quite our soul, nor \textit{nous} our mind. Reeves explains that though \textit{psyche} is usually translated 'soul' and \textit{nous} 'mind', Aristotle, when using the concept \textit{psyche} is "discussing what we would call 'mind' and his concept \textit{nous} appears to share one characteristic, i.e. immortality, which is what we should call 'soul', but seems to be impersonal"\textsuperscript{59}. Aristotle could conceive of a disembodied mind (\textit{nous}), but not of a disembodied soul (\textit{psyche}). Or in Ross's words; "Nor can soul exist disembodied - though here Aristotle makes a reservation in favour of the highest elements in the human soul, the active reason, which, as it comes in from the outside, exists too after the body's death, though whether in an individual form or merged into some wider spiritual unity, Aristotle does not say"\textsuperscript{60}. What Aristotle says is that the active element in human reason is "on the death of the individual, capable of existing apart from any body"\textsuperscript{61}.

Having passive mind and active mind, man is "in a unique way the point of contact between empirical reality and divine reality"\textsuperscript{62}. Man is both a link in the chain of living beings and an outsider to the same. The fact that it is within the soul that the distinction between active and
passive reason is found would be fatal, says Ross "to any interpretation which identifies the active reason with a divine reason falling entirely outside the individual human being. It is not fatal to the view that the active reason is a divine reason immanent in human souls"\textsuperscript{63}. 

There are moments in which active mind is in a state of complete harmony with the truth about the whole of reality - living like God. In contemplation "the partition between active and passive reason is broken down and we become aware of our oneness with the principle whose knowledge is always actual and always complete"\textsuperscript{64}. The "full unfolding of the 'active reason' in man, Aristotle calls a 'beholding' (\textit{teoria}) and", says Windelband, "this 'beholding' which exists only for its own sake and has no ends of will or deed, this wishless absorption in the perception of the highest truth, is the blessedest and best of all"\textsuperscript{65}.

Rohde emphasises that in Aristotle's description of this state of \textit{teoria} "the sober reserve of his lecture style seems uplifted and almost illuminated with the warmth and brilliance imparted by a genuine glow of personal experience,"\textsuperscript{66}. Flew, however, dryly remarks that Aristotle had "the undoubted conviction that abstract cognition is something rather grand, almost divine - just, the job for the top sort of person."\textsuperscript{67}

Greene, in this connection, directs our attention to what seems to be a paradox when comparing the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. Plato, placing man's destiny in another world where Truth and Goodness rule, finds it necessary and fitting for his philosopher, who had climbed "painfully aloft to gaze at the Sun and the Good, to return to the cave to rule among the shadows". Aristotle, on the other hand, who boldly decries Plato's other world and discovers "being in the inspection of the sensible world itself", finds it just as right and fitting for \textit{his} wise man to revel in contemplation of Pure Being which is, in fact, quite the same Being as the Form of the Good in the Platonic philosophy\textsuperscript{68}. As Windelhand points out: For Pure Form alone "Aristotle
employs all the predicates of the Platonic idea. It is eternal, unchangeable, immovable, wholly independent, separated from all else, incorporated and yet at the same time the cause of all generation and change.\(^{69}\).

The Unmoved Mover is the mover, but how did the world begin? Was it created? Ross answers "No! For Aristotle matter is ungenerated, eternal; he expressly argues against a creation of the world\(^{70}\). Stace explains that "God is not related to the world as cause to effect. It is no relation of time at all. It is a logical relation. God is rather the logical premise, of which the world is the conclusion, so that God granted, the world follows necessarily...."\(^{71}\). We said earlier that motion is produced by an ideal, attractive force directed by the soul; and that pneuma is the intermediary which, influenced by the desire in the soul, produces the bodily movements. On the universal level, aether is the intermediary which is acted on by Eternal Pure Reason; this action seems in a paradoxical way to be the longing of matter after God. In Windelband's words, "He (God) acts upon the world, not through his motion or activity, but through the longing for him which the world has\(^{72}\).

In Stace's view, time and space, being inside this globular universe, are infinite, whereas God, as real but not existent, must be beyond and outside the "outermost sphere", which is not in "space or time at all". God is thus infinite\(^{73}\). Grene, on the other hand, states equally firmly that Aristotle's God "is finite through and through, wholly determinate Being, pure thought and the purest object of thought, delimited sharply from all other bodies, but not, most emphatically not, the source of their existence as Father or Creator\(^{74}\).

Aristotle himself writes about his Unmoved Mover that since it must think the best "it thinks itself,...and its thinking is a thinking of thinking....throughout all eternity\(^{75}\). "Such an activity", says Windelband, "is thought, and thought
alone...that thought which presupposes nothing else as an object, but has itself for its constant, unchanging content."76.

That Aristotle thought of God as a self-conscious being, different from the world, was of great importance in Windelband's opinion, and made possible the passing over of monotheism "from the pantheistic form, which it had with Xenophanes, and even still with Plato, into the theistic form"76. On this view, the Unmoved Mover is transcendent. Stumpf, on the other hand, talks about the Unmoved Mover as the "immanent form of the world", but not as "the religious God becoming involved in the affairs of man"77.

Could these diversities be solved by assuming that Aristotle had given his Unmoved Mover two aspects? That God, like man, can be said to be both within and outside the world? Let us assume for a moment, and it is a mere assumption, that the Aristotelian God (Theos), being the thought of thought, can, in fact, be said to be both the subject and the object of his own thoughts: as Subject he is Pure Nous, transcendent, most real, but not existent - the predicate 'infinite' may possibly be appropriate in this case; as his own Object he is the immanent soul of the world, the Form of forms - perhaps even justifying the predicate 'existent' and 'finite'.

Stumpf understands the 'thinking', that is, the 'knowledge' of the Unmoved Mover to be the "whole system of Forms taken as the intelligible structure of all things"78. Thus, as he 'thinks', 'knows' himself, he 'thinks', 'knows' the world, of which the intelligible, rational order is due to him. God is thus, somehow, involved in making the practical aspects of the world work. In this connection, Ross quotes a passage from the 'Metaphysics' which, he says, "at first sight seems to suggest that God exists immanently in the world as well as transcendentally":79: "We should consider in which of two ways the nature of the whole possesses the good and the best - whether as something existing separately and by itself, or as the order of the whole. Perhaps we
should say that it possesses the good in both ways, as an army does. For it is true both that the good is in its order, and that its leader is its good, and the latter in a higher degree; for he does not exist by reason of the order, but the order by reason of him.

Ross points out that "when Aristotle considers the nature of God, he feels that the ascription to Him of any practical interest in the world would detract from His perfection; but when he considers the world he tends to think of God in a way which brings Him into closer relation with it". No doubt, even such an expert on Aristotle as Ross is not always sure of what Aristotle really wanted to say and so, it seems, we may well agree with Windelband that possibly Aristotle himself "had not become clear as to the relation of the unmoved mover to that which was moved", and with Reeves who suggests that "we can entertain the simple possibility that Aristotle himself was not sure what he thought....".

If in fact Aristotle was not sure what he thought, many of his interpretators have been all the more so. Aristotle's classical philosophy has proved an ideal authority throughout the centuries for proving the most varied philosophical theories, and has very often been used to solidify important Christian doctrines, even the doctrine of the immortal soul and personal immortality.
Notes to Chapter VIII.

1. Grene, p53
2. ibid., p38
3. Armstrong, p74
4. ibid., p77
5. Stumpf, cf p 95
6. Stace, cf p 257
7. Reichenbach, pp77-8
8. Stace, p307
9. Owen, p42
10. Grene, p241
11. Welsh, p58
12. Ross, pp165-6 (Aristotle)
13. Stace, p281
14. Aristotle, de Anima 414a, cf Reeves, p42.
15. Sir David Ross, Aristotle,
16. Aristotle, de Anima, 412b, cf Armstrong p92
17. Armstrong, p79
18. Randall, p195
19. Windelband, p138
20. Armstrong, p80
21. Ross, p131
22. ibid, p131
23. ibid., p132
24. Flew, pp16-17
25. van Peursen, p109
26. R D Hicks, cf Flew, p17
27. Walsh, p56
28. ibid., p62
29. Reeves, p37
30. ibid., p38
31. Aristotle, de Generatione Animalium, 336b, ref Grene pp61-2
32. Stace, cf p307
33. ibid., p280
34. Bier, p36
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<td>ibid.,</td>
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<td>ibid.,</td>
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<td>52.</td>
<td>ibid.,</td>
<td>Bk 3, Ch 5, cf Copleston p72 (430a)</td>
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<td>Grene,</td>
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69. Windelband, p145
70. Ross, p184
71. Stace, p282
72. Windelband, p146
73. Stace, pp306-7
74. Grene, p246
75. Aristotle, cf Stumpf, p101
76. Windelband, p145
77. Stumpf, p101
78. ibid., p105
79. Ross, p184
80. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1075, 11-15; cf Ross, pp184-5
81. Ross, p184
82. Windelband, p236
83. Reeves, p38
PART II

HEBREW THINKING.
CHAPTER IX

GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONCEPTS OF SOUL.
"The Bible is the book of the soul above all others", writes Archbishop Söderblom. It "draws aside the curtain from the secrets of the human soul, as no other writing in the world does. The conflicts of the inner life are manifested... The Bible represents the independence of the inner life as being due to the fact that at every moment the soul is occupied with its relation to God, which is the most urgent consideration in life. The soul is not occupied with itself but with God. It is not interested in a state of happiness and peace for its own sake, but on acquiring it by means of a right relation to the Highest. ....When discourses occur in the holy writings of Israel, it is between the Lord and the soul. Essentially it is the Lord himself who speaks. His words are irrefutable. The Lord's words are actions, as are those of the man who speaks on his behalf".

Dimont, a Jewish historical writer, begins his book as follows: "Jewish history dates back from the day, 4000 years ago, when a man named Abraham had an encounter with God, known to him as Jehovah. The dialogue between Jew and God begins then. This continuing dialogue is the history of the Jews, with the rest of the world as interested eavesdroppers".

For about 800 years following the days of Abraham, the Jews were a nomadic people wandering "in and out of the great civilisations surrounding them", as Dimont depicts it. About 1600 BC many Hebrews followed Joseph into Egypt: 400 years later, after enslavement, they were led out by Moses. The great Exodus ends with a gradually accomplished victory over the Canaanites, and a successful settlement in Palestine.

From the above we may conclude, as Rowley points out, that "at least three strains entered into the religious life of Israel": 1) Pre-Mosaic religious elements from the general Semitic background, 2) Canaanite influences, the Canaanites being far advanced in the organising of peaceful agricultural settlements, and 3) the unique, and specifically, Israelite
elements given to the Jews at Sinai through Moses.

Actually, as is generally acknowledged, "A challenging and perplexing duality" runs through the Old Testament. There are not only two peoples, the Hebrews and the Israelites, but also two Moses', the Levite Moses and the Midianite Moses. There are also two Gods, Yahweh (Lord) and Elohim (God). We read of two kingdoms, fused into one, then broken into two again. Perhaps we are right in finding two souls as well, nephesh and ruach? Dussaud calls them the spiritual and the vegetative souls.

Did Moses, as a non-Jew, weld the Israelites of Egypt and the Hebrews of Canaan into one people, as Sigmund Freud assumes in "Moses and Monotheism"? In this connection, Dimont asks, "Were the Hebrews who left Ur with Abraham in 2000BC and the Hebrews who entered Egypt under Joseph the same people as the Israelites who were led out of Egypt by Moses?" Whatever are the answers to the above questions, it seems evident that "when the tribe that Moses had thus reformed took its place in Palestine side by side with other Hebrew tribes, the religion of Yahweh and the Mosaic law offered a valuable rallying point for the larger community". Nobody will deny the importance to the Western world of Moses' appearance in 'history' and its results: the giving of the Law, the bringing forth of a Nation, the beginning of the Bible.

Undoubtedly, "ideas and practices of various origin, and at various levels of development, are to be found within the Old Testament". Also, according to Rowley, "much even in Judaism, can no longer be regarded as special supernatural revelation given directly and specifically to Israel, but had its antecedents in Canaanite religion". In fact, as Christen and Hazelton point out, "there is evidence to suggest that the early Hebrews had much more in common with their Near Eastern neighbours, and were culturally more indebted to them, than was once supposed."
Dimont suggests that "the grand design of the entire Book of Exodus resembles that of primitive tribal initiation rites, but on a high, ethical, symbolic plane. Before the young males in a primitive tribe can join adult society, they have to go through initiation rites which have these five elements in common: a symbolic death; a symbolic rebirth; a symbolic mutilation uniting them into brotherhood; a new name given to each initiated member; and, finally, revelation of the tribal Laws". Dimont then compares the following five elements from the book of Exodus with the above: in the desert the old generation dies out; a new generation is born; all males are circumcised; the Hebrews are called the People of Israel; and, finally, given the new Law.

The covenant they make is with a god called Yahweh, possibly a new god to the people led out of Egypt by Moses, a jealous god who has chosen his own people and given them his country to live in. At this early stage it seems the religion of Israel was monolatrous, and thus it was not denied that other nations had their own gods as well. Not only was it not denied, as McNeill points out, but it was a great temptation to the Israelites not to resort to the fertility divinities, the Baals, "when life came to depend on agriculture.....After all Yahweh was a god of the desert and of war....His worship stood in isolation, emphatically opposed to the religion of the fields".

This stage in the Hebrew religion prevailed, according to Charles, until about the 8th century BC. A monolatrous view of deity has several characteristics:

1. "A national God is a personification of the genius of a people, the embodiments of its virtues and its vices on a heroic scale". It has been said that each nation has the type of god it deserves; or that man's god is always just a little in advance of the man.

2. Yahweh's jurisdiction was regarded as limited to his own people in his own land; thus the individual felt himself under Yahweh's dominion only so long as he was living,
inhabiting the land and 'alive', within
the confines of Palestine. When in
another country he had to serve their
gods. The Shades in Sheol were
cut off from the fellowship of God.

"Early Yahwism could furnish no eschatology for the individual", says Charles, the Israelite being left to his hereditary
primitive beliefs of pre-Mosaic origin, and, "these beliefs relating to the soul and spirit, Sheol and the condition of
the departed were heathen to the core....Sheol was the final
abode alike of the righteous and the wicked". Charles
proposes that "before the eighth century BC no conflict between
Hebrew theology and eschatology of the individual was possible,
since their provinces were mutually exclusive". Byrney
too finds the conception of Sheol "entirely unconnected with
the religion of Yahweh".

We found earlier that primitive logic arrives at very much
the same conclusions with regard to the development of the
concepts of the soul and the life force - almost anywhere
in the world. We can hardly find a single primitive people
who does not believe in some kind of soul and some kind of
survival. Oesterley finds "that the belief in immortality,
or at least in life of some kind hereafter, seems to be
ingrained in human consciousness; it is doubtful whether any
race of men, even the most backward, are without some ideas
of an after-life, which is taken for granted".

Rowley quotes the above passage from Oesterley, adding "what
really matters, however, is the nature of the afterlife that
is expected, and many religions have not advanced very far
towards a satisfying faith. In the Old Testament we find
a variety of views and the seeds of the most satisfying faith
which can be found anywhere". Some of the views are
very old and primitive. With reference to these primitive
conceptions, Rowley points to Schofield who has related "the
Old Testament evidence to that provided by archaeology,
arguing that (the very early) funeral and mourning customs
point to a belief in survival after death".
Inge, in this connection, ascertains that "the Greeks, like the Jews, soon outgrew the barbarous notions about survival which are almost universal among savages. Both peoples, and especially the Jews, for a long period attached very little importance to the life after death; and when they came at last to make the belief in immortality a part of their religion, this belief was not even historically continuous with the ideas of primitive soul-cultus, which had their centre in the performance of pious duties to the departed spirits"21.

We can thus trace three stages in the development of Hebrew thinking in the Old Testament about survival: 1) the pre-Mosaic cult of souls; 2) the Mosaic, i.e. indifference to individual survival, and 3) the monotheistic view, i.e. individual eternal life, in some form.

We know that, though forbidden by the Law, necromancy was practised in Israel. Saul goes to consult the necromancer at En-dor, asking her to conjure up Samuel: "Then the woman saw Samuel and, giving a great cry, she said to Saul, 'Why have you deceived me? You are Saul'. The king said, 'Do not be afraid! What do you see?' The woman answered Saul: 'I see a ghost rising up from the earth'. 'What is he like?', he asked. She answered, 'It is an old man coming up; he is wrapped in a cloak'. Then Saul knew it was Samuel and he bowed down his face to the ground and did homage. Then Samuel said to Saul, 'Why have you disturbed my rest, conjuring me up?'" (I Sam: XXVIII 12-15)22.

The Jerusalem Bible commentator remarks in a note: "The narrator seems to share the popular belief in ghosts (though he regards it unlawful to consult them);.... Doubtless, as in other seances, credulity and trickery were at work; but the incident is presented as a genuine recalling of Samuel's spirit (hence the woman's fear) to foretell the future."22.

Charles assumes that in the older, pre-Mosaic, heathen view, the soul, or life-force, was called nephesh or ruach inter-
changeably. At death nephesh/ruach set off for a gloomy life in Sheol. Though their material bodies were apparently left behind, early Hebrew, as did primitive man in general, conceived of their dead as possessing some other kind of bodies, like a misty vapour or shadow, "due to the metaphysical inability of early Israel to conceive of the body without psychical functions, or the soul without a certain corporeity".

We recognise in this primitive view of an after-life in Sheol many likenesses with archaic Greek belief about Hades, and with their Ancestor Worship. According to Charles it is important to distinguish clearly between this older heathen view and later eschatological views which developed logically, but very slowly, out of a monotheistic Yahwism. Other scholars do not necessarily share this emphasis of Charles on a clear-cut distinction between older and later views; he states himself that "he was obliged to part company" with many of his predecessors in this field; however, he assumes that without this distinction you cannot understand the conflicting views in the Old Testament on the nature of the after-life which the 'shades' lead in Sheol.

According to McNeill, in early Hebrew society, in the times of Saul and David, we meet prophecy as an ecstatic group phenomenon. Trances were induced through dancing and singing, and these trances were "interpreted as signs of direct communion with God". These ecstatic holy prophets "as spokesmen for the old religion of the desert...came into conflict with all the new-fangled ways of settled society".

During the 8th century BC there was, however, a great transformation of the prophetic tradition. Amos, Hosea, first Isaiah, "in defending and exalting the power of Yahweh, ...swept aside the claim of all other divinities and cults and proclaimed monotheism in its clearest and most emphatic form". Instead of "thou shalt have no other gods before Me", Yahweh told his people, "there are no other gods but Me". Cairn explains that "up to then the notion of the covenant
would always be accompanied by a temptation to the thought of favouritism. The true harmony of the two notions, that of the special covenant and the universal image, lay in the conviction that it was God's purpose that in Abraham's seed all the peoples of the earth would be blessed. The bond between Yahweh and Israel had been believed to be inseparably twined together, to be somehow 'natural', but now the prophets bore home to the people with great persuasive power and in no uncertain terms that "Yahweh pursued His own righteous purposes independently of Israel.

McNeill emphasises that "this juxtaposition of universal power and absolute righteousness brought to a logical culmination the trends toward religious universalism and ethical individualism apparent in other religions of the Middle East during the same centuries.....Religious thinkers of Israel and Judah were here at an advantage; for the fact that Yahweh had always been a jealous God, hopelessly antagonistic to local fertility cults and demanding an exclusive worship, made the transition to radical monotheism easier.

"The conception of God never stands by itself", is pointed out by Owen, "it always has important implications for the conception of man and the world. Thus the peculiar convictions about the nature of God, embraced by Israel, were accompanied by peculiar ideas about man and the world; as the one conception changed so did the others. It was now firmly stated that the bond between God and Israel was ethically conditioned. Yahweh stood in relation to all men, but his relation to Israel involved a higher and more searching test for this nation.

Moreover, God seeks "for that intimate relation between His true worshippers and Himself the 'knowledge of God', want of faith in Him becomes itself a sin". Pedersen explains this 'knowledge' with deep understanding: "That which fills a man's soul with what he is in real contact; it becomes the operating power of his soul, and he acts upon it. There is what has been called 'a physical and mystical'
connection between them. It is this act of intimate appropriation which is called 'to know' in the Old Testament. Pedersen also explains 'thinking' for the Israelite as an occupation which did not necessarily involve the solving of a problem, but was concerned with the grasping of a totality. "For the Israelite, as for primitive people in general, the mental processes are not successive, but united in one, because the soul is always a unit, acting in one. Counsel and action are identical." It is interesting to compare here the Greek concept 'to know' and the close connection between action and the idea in Homer.

"When once it is conceded that God is the creator and God of all the world, then man's future life, as well as his present, must be subject to Divine Providence." And yet, though Israel possessed a monotheistic faith from the 8th century BC onwards, it did not, for many centuries to come, draw those very obvious conclusions which were actually inevitable from the first. "Eschatological beliefs are universally the last ones to be influenced by loftier conceptions of God", says Charles. Only as the words of Genesis II 7 became living truths for the Israelites were they moved to abandon their pre-Mosaic heathen views; though in actual fact, "with the first proclamation of Yahwism by Moses the doom of Ancestor Worship and its teachings" had already been pronounced.
Notes to Chapter IX.

1. Söderblom, pp268-9
2. Dimont, p27
3. H H Rowley, The Faith of Israel, p16
4. Dimont, p37
5. Rowley, ref. to R Dussaud, Les Origines Cananéennes du Sacrifice Israelite, p83. Rowley, p84 n4
6. Dimont, p38
7. ibid., p41
8. William H McNeill, The Theme is Setting, in Collection, ed. Christen and Hazelton, p96
9. Rowley, p17
10. ibid., p15, cf 159; cf Söderblom, p287
11. R J Christen and H E Hazelton, Monotheism and Moses, p vii in Collection
12. Dimont, pp41-2
13. W H McNeill, p97
15. R H Charles, Religious Development between the Old and the New Testaments, pp100f
18. Rowley, ref. to Oesterley and Robinson, Hebrew Religion, Rowley p157
19. Rowley, p157
22. Jerusalem Bible, p379
23. ibid., p379, note to I Sam.
24. Charles, pp47-8 (Eschatology)
25. ibid., p49 (Eschatology)
26. W H McNeill, pp97-8
27. David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, p36
28. Charles, p17 (Eschatology)
29. W H McNeill, p98
30. Owen, p164
Notes to Chapter IX/Continued 2.

32. Johannes Pedersen, Israel, pp131-2
33. ibid., p108, cf pp128-9
34. Charles, p102 (Religious Development)
35. Charles, p16 (Eschatology)
36. ibid., p50
CHAPTER X

THE CONCEPTS OF NEPHESH
AND RUACH
Nephesh is an elusive concept, no easier to catch than psyche in Greek thinking. It takes the place of honour "in any discussion of the Israelite concept of man", says A R Johnson, and it admits a "remarkably wide range of meaning". Nephesh can be found 756 times in the Old Testament, and the Authorised Version uses 42 different renderings of it: 'soul' is used 428 times, and 'life' 117 times. This shows the well known difficulty of finding a corresponding English concept for 'nephesh'. Onians too emphasises that "it has been impossible to convey more than a part of the meaning (of nephesh); in many contexts it has been necessary to use a word which implies much that is alien to the original".

In Owen's opinion, the word which should not be used when translating nephesh is 'soul': "either it means the personal pronoun, the self, the whole man, and has no reference to the inner as opposed to the outer life, or it means the principle of life, breath or breath-life and is quasi-physically conceived. In either case a falsely 'spiritual' tone is given when nephesh is translated 'soul'. Onians's research seems to indicate that the Hebrew ruach is nearer in meaning to the Greek psyche than is the Hebrew nephesh. Whether this fact indicates that the English word 'soul' is more suitable to render the meaning behind ruach than the meaning behind nephesh is, of course, another question. But the 'questions' are related to one another. In any case, as Charles points out (pp 153f), at the older pre-Mosaic stage of Hebrew development, nephesh and ruach were used interchangeably.

In Genesis II 7, after the creation of man, "vitality did not rest in the body and God's breath did not provide a soul. Body and divine breath together made the vital active nephesh. In this verse of Genesis we read: "then the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath (neshamah) of life (chayyim); and man became a living (chayyeh) soul (nephesh)". In Genesis VI 17, VII 15 ruach is used instead of neshamah. In Genesis
VI.22.(J) a conflation of both these phrases is given: "the breath (neshamah) of the spirit (ruach) of life (chayyim)". Nephesh, a living soul, (being or creature) was formed when God's breath animated matter. God's breath is the Spirit of God. Federsen sums up Genesis II.7 in the following sentence: "Such as he is, man, in his total essence, is a soul".

We have here encountered three terms which all originally had the meaning of breath: nephesh, ruach and neshamah. The last, as Ryder-Smith explains, "is something from the outside which God gives man". Neshamah is ordinary breathing, no psychical function is attached to it. Nephesh and ruach are, however, different.

As was discussed earlier, there is in primitive thought a relationship between on the one hand, beliefs about the body and a separable (immortal) soul, and on the other hand, beliefs about the life liquid: breath/blood/aion. We said that Onians pointed out how our Old English sawol (soul), related as it is to blood, can be traced back to the Sanskrit a̲yuh, meaning vital element, life, lifetime. The development of nephesh is much the same. It was originally identified with the breath and the blood, combined in the vapour from the blood. Old Testament scholars have come to the same conclusion as the one mentioned earlier, i.e. that the newly shed blood vapourises and gives the idea of a breath/blood-soul (or vapour-soul) leaving the body at death.

The original meaning of nephesh is uncertain, but it has been asserted that "in the kindred Assyrian the corresponding naplistu was applied to the throat through which one breathes"; Onians continues that it is thus clear "from its root that it was something of the nature of 'breath' or 'exhalation'". Throughout the Old Testament its primary meaning is 'that which breathes'; animals as well as men partake of it; breath is the first sign of life. When it ceases, life ceases", and, says Stacey, "to possess nephesh was to possess vital power. This led to the equation of nephesh and vital
It is clearly something in man (or any other animal) which is necessary to life and with which life is closely bound up.

There is a close link between nephesh and blood "because the departure of both at death suggested that nephesh was located in the blood", or was actually identified with it: "Only take care not to consume the blood, for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh" (Deut. XII 23). The blood contained the life or soul and this was the property of God. "Indeed it is this thought of a common life vouchsafed by Yahweh and identifiable with the blood", according to A R Johnson, "which requires that all blood shall be sacred to Yahweh and taboo for man, and so is made the basis for the grim ritual of sacrifice." It was given to God, because it was thought to be alive.

Nephesh is thus the dynamic life-soul connected with breath and permeating the body as blood, a visible life-force. It is also the seat of physical and psychical experiences. "Thus far nephesh comes very close to, or is identical with, the conception of thymos", says Onians. In nephesh as in thymos "the ordinary consciousness (is identified) with the breath in direct relation to the blood". van Peursen, too, likens nephesh to the "thymos of early Greek thought". He says, "this soul is never envisaged as purely spiritual, in the sense of 'incorporeal, non-physical'. Affective experiences typically related to man's physical conditions are ascribed to the soul. Thus we hear of a hungry soul, a thirsty soul and of a soul which seems to be empty, when a man who has been dreaming of food wakes up. This soul, then, is the seat at once of hate, of joy, or longing for God."

R H Charles, on pages 43 and 44 of his book "Eschatology" has this to say: "If the teaching of Genesis II 3 is taken as a complete account of man's composite nature, the soul must be regarded not only as the vital principle of the body, but as the seat of all the mental activities", and here he
notes "It is noteworthy that the soul, according to this view, corresponds to the Homeric conception of the mind (thymos)".

He goes on "With this the spirit, which is really the impersonal basis of life in man, stands in no direct relation. From these facts it is clear that no advance in the direction of an immortality of the soul can be made with such an anthropo-

logy; for in death the soul is extinguished and only the spirit survives. But since the spirit is only the impersonal force of life common to men and brutes, it returns to the Fount of all Life, and thus all personal existence ceases at death...."

On page 142 of the same work, Charles writes: "Only one part of man's composite nature survived death according to Homer....the psyche.....it enjoys an independent and secret existence in the body, and on the death of the body independently withdraws itself. It exercises no function of the human spirit, whether of thought, will or emotion. These belong to thymos.....The thymos is the most comprehensive expression in Homer for various mental activities.....thymos.....nous.....menos.....are all functions of the body and not of the soul and disappear with its resolution into its original elements. .....accordingly after death, or rather after entrance into Hades the soul loses its consciousness and thought.....The person fully conceived appears to be the living man, that is the combination of the visible body and the invisible soul".

Hebrew psychology is synthetic, says Stacey, and thus the Hebrew "would not have recognised that blood, flesh and bones formed one group of terms with a limited range of functions, and soul, breath and spirit another - with a different range of functions. All the terms to the Hebrew suggested the whole being, for the personality was without abstract divisions. The term used was that which suggested the aspect of life most appropriate to the context"20. So when we read that "the heart thinks, the kidneys emulate, the bowels feel sympathy, the eye sees, the ear hears"21, we get the picture of many parts which, though they are themselves conscious and active, cannot really be differentiated one from another. Together they form the one unity, the
living soul = man.

We read in 'The Theology of the New Testament': "In principle Old Testament anthropology is the same as that of other Near Eastern peoples. Terms like nephesh and leb have the same meaning in Accadian, Ugaritic and Hebrew. Outside the Bible, too, the metaphorical rise of parts of the body shows that man is regarded as a psycho-physical being, whose life can manifest itself by extension or concentration in all parts of the body"22.

Stacey emphasises that "any suggestion of a body-mind dualism ......is dispelled by the discovery that physical organs exercised psychical functions"23. It is interesting to compare this with p 17 above, where we quoted Snell in connection with "the metaphorical use of words for organs" in Homer's poems. "On the most primitive level of speech", he says, "the organ is regarded not as dead and concrete, but as participating in its function"24.

Nephesh, the 'living-soul', is thus man in almost all his aspects, from neck, breath, blood, life-force to the seat of feeling, will, desire: in fact, the whole personality. The power of nephesh is "even found to be present in such 'extensions' of the personality as the spoken, and the written word, one's name, one's property, and (most important of all) in one's offspring"25. What may seem a paradox is that nephesh sometimes came to mean a 'dead body' as well.

Johnson points to the interesting feature of semantic polarisation in the Semitic languages, "at one extreme it may denote that vital principle in man which animates the human body and reveals itself in the form of conscious life, and at the other extreme it may denote the corpse from which conscious life has departed". In fact, nephesh has travelled the full circle26. For the Hebrew, "'life' and 'death' form a unified pair of concepts"27, even though to our way of thinking they are opposed to one another.
On Pedersen's assumptions "the soul maintains its intimate relation with the body even after death.....that which is done to the body is done to the soul". When David takes the Philistine's head with him he maintains "mastery over his soul.....when the body is flung on fields or roads, there is danger that birds or other animals may defile it and thus also the soul". Orians points out several characteristics of the nephesh which can be found in the Old Testament. "Blood shed was said to cry out from the ground". Though in several passages the nephesh is spoken of as dying, it is, according to others, still present with the body after death, at any rate, when the latter has not lost its blood. It seems to have been believed to be in the grave or in Sheol.

Earlier we discussed the importance which the Greeks of Homer's time (and many other primitive peoples) attached to cremation. It was suggested that they projected their fear of the 'souls' in this wish to see them unreturnably settled in Hades. The Israelites did not have a tradition of burning corpses; they knew it only "where a soul is to be utterly destroyed". To burn a person's body or bones, for example, after his death, was a cause of great injury and ignominy (cf Lev XX 14; XXI 9; Josh VII 25; Amos II 1). But we notice among them too that same feeling of reassurance when the dead body had been laid down into the grave with their fathers; then they knew that the 'soul' was a rest. Even so, it could happen that the dead appeared in some form on the earth again, interfering with the fate of the survivors. The 'ghost' could be conjured up, as when Samuel's 'spirit' appeared before Saul.

As was mentioned earlier, according to Charles, the above facts are typical of the older heathen view. In this view the departed in Sheol are allowed a "certain degree of life, movement, knowledge and remembrance"; they are visualised as being able to return in order to counsel the living as they are well acquainted with their affairs. "The relations and customs on earth were reproduced in Sheol, each nation also preserved its individuality, and no doubt its national garb and customs...".
The later Old Testament view denies all the above activities and faculties to the 'souls of the dead', but even on that view, it was still for many centuries believed "that the soul subsisted after death, though it did not 'exist'". There is no evidence that it was ever part of the faith of Israel that a man wholly ceased to be when his body was laid in the grave", says Rowley. The 'something' which somehow survived was "invariably called shade(s) and not soul(s)". Owen emphasises that the 'something' which "continues to exist is not part of man such as his soul; existence in Sheol lacks both soul and body, and therefore has no vitality at all; (the shade) is simply a faint replica of what the personality was as a whole". And Moore asserts that "there is nowhere a suggestion that the soul survives the man whose life it was; the inhabitants of the nether world are not souls but shades".

The term 'shade' in actual use does "suggest a relative weakness on the part of the dead as compared with the state of the living". Johnson emphasises that it is important to understand that for the Israelite, life and death flow into each other and that each can be explained in terms of the other: "just as death, in the strict sense of the term, ... is the weakest form of life, so any weakness in life is a form of death". "Death is most appropriately described as an emptying out", says Pedersen, "as it is possible to be or less alive, so one is also able to be more or less dead".

As there are no sharply defined dimensions between life and death, it may happen that the vitality of a man is restored again; given nourishment, especially water, the nephesh regains life; the same is also said about the ruach. "Then God opened a hollow in the ground, the hollow there is at Lehi, and water gushed out of it. Samson drank; his vigour (ruach) returned and he revived" (Jud XV 19). As was pointed out earlier, Charles assumes that nephesh/ruach were synonymously in early pre-Mosaic times, but he emphasises that the "partial differentiation of these two naturally arose in the course of time".
Once the teaching of Genesis II 3 is understood, *nephesh* and *ruach* are two different concepts. The soul then "must be regarded not only as the vital principle of the body, but as the seat of all mental activities. With this, the spirit, which is really the impersonal basis of life in man, stands in no direct relation". The development did not stop here, of course. The meaning of *nephesh* and *ruach* have gone through several more changes (cf the 'Intertestamental' literature below).

When tracing *ruach* back to earliest times, we find that this concept "in the sense of breath was closely connected with the nostrils", and that the word for nostril had to do with anger. *Ruach* was thus probably "originally applied both to the 'blowing' of the wind and to the 'blowing' and panting of men and animals in distress or excitement", says Wheeler Robinson. In pre-exilic times *ruach* is used for a) the wind caused by God; b) for the passions of anger; c) for the stronger energies of life, and d) for the external influences (ascribed to Yahweh).

Man's *ruach* was given to him in creation; it is a gift of God, and as we said earlier, God's breath is the Spirit of God. Ryder Smith finds that it is as though God took part of His perennial fund of air and gave it to man, withdrawing it at death, when man's *ruach* returns to God's fund. But this use of the phrase 'the ruach of God' is clearly distinguishable from the use of the same phrase to denote God's gift of His Ruach, not to every man, but to particular men, such as the prophets.

Stacey, too, emphasises two uses of *ruach*: there is a) a personal use of the term, indicating an element in the personality which dwells there naturally, and b) the term is used of one or many spirits being breathed in from without. When this supernatural spirit blows through the personality, the man is thought of as possessed by the spirit, which may be of a good or of an evil nature. Psychical states like "furious anger, madness, bravery, corybantic prophecy were
explained as the possession of a spirit."47.

".....there is the peculiar contribution to ancient thought made along the Semitic line of development and culminating amongst the Hebrews", according to Wheeler Robinson, who here refers to the fact that "a dominating belief amongst the pre-Islamic Arabs, and to a considerable extent within the Assyrio-Babylonian civilisation, is that of the spirit-control of human personality from without". "But, in the Old Testament, this belief in the accessibility of man to the will of demons and spirits, good and evil, is concentrated into belief in accessibility to the Spirit of Yahweh, and is deepened by the moral consciousness and by progressive conceptions of both God and man till it becomes spiritual in the fuller sense of the word".48.

We find that the "idea of power involved in the word ruach is carried over into what we would now call psychology, to denote the dominant impulse or disposition of an individual" says Snaith, who draws the same conclusions as the above authors, that in one sense a) "ruach is regarded as being part of.....the active and determining man"; in another sense b) however, the acting ruach is "other than the man, as if controlling him and dominating him from the outside"49. When used in a personal sense ruach gradually grew to encompass "the whole range of emotional and volitional life, thus overlapping the sphere of nephesh"50. We must of course note that this is a post-exilic development, and not confuse this overlapping with Charles's theory of ruach/ nephesh being almost identical, as the life-principle, in pre-Mosaic times.

We shall now turn to Onians's theories regarding ruach. They will lead us into an interesting, but different train of thought concerning Hebrew conceptions, but we shall recognise the theme from Onians's ideas concerning Homerian psyche. He begins by pointing out several differences in the Hebrew use of ruach compared with the use of nephesh. Ruach is never, like nephesh is, "identified with the blood
or even brought into relation with it. Also, at quite an early stage, it is used to signify the 'spirit' of Yahweh entering a man to possess him to prophesy or, what may be much the same thing, to fill him with strength. Ruach might also be used of another spirit subordinate to Yahweh and sent into a man to trouble him or lead him astray, sometimes in prophecy".51

So far there seems to be nothing new, but Onians then proceeds to prove the correctness of his statement that the conception of ruach is almost "identical to what we have traced as underlying the psyche...."52. Earlier, we followed Onians's explanations about psyche, that for the Homerian Greeks it was the procreative life-soul, especially connected with the head; sneezing was an expression of the same, a nod was sacred because it was the sign of the power of the psyche. The most important task of the head was to store the seeds. Those early Greeks identified the liquid in the brain with the cerebro-spinal and the seminal fluid, tears and sweat were 'of the same fluid' as well; it was called aîn and contained psyche. Oil was thought to be a good replacement when this 'stuff of life and strength' had been lost through the pores in the form of sweat. In the Preface we referred to Onians's theory that in sickness sweating and loss of vitality went together in early Greek thought: also that the Germanic people referred to the aged as losing their liquid, as 'drying up'. Death is an 'emptying out' for the Hebrews too, as Pedersen pointed out.

Onians suggests that "there is reason to believe that among the Jews originally the head was believed to contain the life or life-soul. In the Kabbalah the supreme deity is conceived just thus, as a 'head', a head containing the liquid of life".53. If the head was thus thought to be the source "we can understand their use of the term for 'head', rosh, for the source of a river and for 'beginning!'".54. In the Kabbalah we read too that "the dead are restored to life by the 'dew' (i.e. marrow or liquid) of the head of the deity".55.
"In that skull distilletteth the dew from the White Head which is ever filled therewith; and from that dew are the dead raised unto life"56.

Onians also quotes the "Zohar of the Hebrew Kabbalah", where it is said that: "in the testes are gathered all the oil, the dignity and the strength of the male from the whole body"57.

Onians remarks that "the prime source was the head. The interpretation of the seed, the stuff of life and strength as 'oil' fits and perhaps explains the belief among the Semites and elsewhere that the fat contains the life, and more particularly why the fat about the kidneys has been singled out as the seat of life and strength by the Arabs..."58.

"In the Old Testament the king was the 'Yahweh-anointed' and by the anointing became the son of Yahweh". "I have selected my servant David and anointed him with my holy oil; my hand will be constantly with him, he will be able to rely on my arm" (Ps LXXXIX 20)59. "He will invoke me, 'My father, my God and rock of my safety'; and I shall make him my first-born, the Most High for kings on earth" (Ps LXXXIX 26)60.

Thus, according to Onians's theory: "This liquid of life and strength, the seed, was conceived of as 'oil' and... a new 'spirit', even the 'spirit' of Yahweh, was believed to be transmitted to the head by anointing it with holy oil"61. It was a bestowing of new life, of divine life. Onians suggests that we may compare the above with "the belief that the bread and wine after consecration are the body and blood of God..."62.

Onians thus emphasises the identification, in ancient Hebrew thinking, of the spirit with the life-soul (associated with the head, "of the nature of vapour, fitting the name ruach") AND the life-fluid, (or seed) in the head and spine. From this identification follows the belief in 'oil' as a manifestation of the seed, and of a 'blessing' as a more or
less symbolic outpouring of liquid, of dew, rain, water of fruitfulness. The following passages, according to Onians, "strongly suggest that to give a blessing was to give liquid, that is life, seed". "As they go through the Valley of the Weeper, they make it a place of springs, clothed in blessings by early rains" (Ps LXXXIV 6). "How good, how delightful it is for all to live together like brothers: fine as oil on the head running down the beard, running down Aaron's beard, to the collar of his robes; copious as a Hermon dew falling on the heights of Zion where Yahwen confers his blessing, everlasting life" (Ps CXXXIII 1-3). "And I will make them and the places round about my hill a blessing; and I will cause the shower to come down in its season; there shall be showers of blessing. And the tree of the field shall yield its fruit" (Ezek XXXIV 26).

Onians also quotes: "For I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and streams upon the dry ground: I will pour my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring; and they shall spring up among the grass, as willows by the watercourses" (Is XLIV 3).

Here, as Onians points out, quite clearly 'blessing' is equated with 'spirit' and both are 'poured'. "A father about to die 'blessed' his sons. He might then be thought to transmit not merely fruitfulness but soul or 'spirit'". And referring again to the anointing of a king, Onians points out the fact that the spirit was given by pouring actual liquid representing seed into one who thus becomes a 'son'. It is not the legal fiction of adoption, but a magically effective bestowal of seed = spirit.

Onians's research leads to interesting conclusions. He suggests that when during the Egyptian rule in Canaan "lamps placed between two bowls...under the corners of thresholds of houses" began to replace jar-burials of sacrificed children, "the lamp is not just a 'symbol of life' but equivalent to 'spirit', life-stuff, to serve instead".
Perhaps one may see the statement in 'The Theology of the New Testament' about ruach as "a life-giving power bringing rain-bearing clouds," as in some way pointing to the same "outpouring of fruitfulness" from which Onians draws such far-reaching conclusions. The dynamism of ruach is also emphasised in the 'Theology of the New Testament', as is the fact that this source of life is outside man, and that "one might say the ruach is the condition of nephesh and that it regulates its force. Without nephesh an individual dies but without ruach a nephesh is no longer an authentic nephesh."

It was said earlier that "body and the divine breath together made the vital active nephesh." We compare the above with the following thinking from Aristotle: i) "soul and body from a union, a living being, which, while it lasts, is complete..." (114) "the potentialities of the body are actualised by the soul and therefore this very soul is most properly what a living thing is" (116). We shall change (i) slightly: i) Ruach and Dust form a unity (nephesh), a living soul, which, while it lasts, is complete. ii) "the potentialities of the Dust are actualised by the Divine breath and therefore this very ruach is most properly what a nephesh is". It seems one could almost say that Aristotle was trying to put 'his understanding' of the Old Testament into philosophical language. (cf p. 149 about Philo).

However, to return to the concepts ruach and nephesh and their development in post-exilic times, we find that not only do these two concepts overlap but also leb(ab) (heart) is involved. In Pedersen's words "the likeness between these three expressions is greater than the difference". Leb(ab) is often used as meaning "mind, will, conscience, moral character, and even on occasion the seat of the appetites and emotions". Johnson says that it seems to have taken "the place of the brain in their (Israelite) thinking;...it is in fact as the seat or instrument of his intellectual and volitional activity that it figures most prominently in
Israelite thinking. "The direction of the heart determines the act", says Pedersen. Pedersen quotes I Sam XIV 7: "His armour-bearer said to him, 'do just as your heart tells you: as for me, my heart is with you'".

Considering the important role of the heart (used 850 times in the Old Testament), one may well understand its ethical associations: the purity and integrity of the heart, an integrity which is reached "only as one learns to respond to Yahweh with all one's heart". "As the heart is so frequently associated with intellectual and volitional activities", says Johnson, "this expression is often reinforced by adding 'and with all one's nephesh', a term which tends to be employed with...a more emotional content". "Nephesh is the soul in the sum of its totality, such as it appears; the heart is the soul in its inner value", is Pedersen's explanation. "Whereas it can be said that Jacob came to Egypt with seventy 'souls', it cannot be said that he came there with seventy 'hearts'".

"Yahweh is primarily concerned not with man's outward appearance, but with his heart; for obviously it is here that a man's real character finds its most ready expression. In this connection, lebib and ruach are truly interchangeable terms. In the last resort "the fundamental need is for a new heart and a new spirit". Man's petrified heart must be revitalised: "it is necessary for man to undergo a radical change of heart with all that this implies as to the transformation of his character", says Johnson. In 'The Theology of the New Testament' we find the same point emphasised: "The description of man as nephesh and concentration on the heart do not correspond to two different anthropologies. They are two tendencies within one and the same picture of man. The first views man from the standpoint of his vegetative life and his exterior. The second views him in terms of his inner worth. The dynamism of the anthropology demands a centre, a conscience, which allows man to find himself and to grow beyond himself."
It is interesting in this connection, and in connection with Johnson's statement that the heart takes the place of the brain in Hebrew thinking, to note what was pointed out earlier with regard to the heart in Aristotle's philosophy. Stacey assumed that it was the Aristotelian incorrect view which caused popular physiology to take the wrong direction. Perhaps there is only a superficial likeness between the Aristotelian heart as the centre of the body, as "the point at which the body is actuated by the soul", and the Old Testament 'heart' as an 'inner centre'. Nevertheless, for Aristotle, too, the heart took the place of the brain, and so it is easy to understand that a Hellenistic Jew like Philo, whose philosophy we shall discuss in detail later, believed the Greek philosophers to have been influenced and inspired by Hebrew religious thinking. It seems probable too that the Old Testament view of the 'heart' would easily lend itself to an acceptance of the heart as the centre of the psychical life in accordance with Aristotle's theories.

Perhaps we can best understand the mutual relationship between soul, spirit and heart in early Hebrew thinking by thinking of them as denoting "three aspects of one unit", as Ryder Smith expresses it, "for the whole range of experiences is ascribed alike to them all. We shall find that the two concepts heart and spirit on many occasions indicate a higher aspect of man than does the nephesh aspect, especially when the latter is used interchangeably with basar (flesh). Man's real character is expressed by the state of his heart, but, nonetheless, it is also "stamped by the flesh".

Ryder Smith points out that the precise Hebrew term for the whole body, geviyyah, is seldom used in the Old Testament. "It is found three times of a living and three times of a dead body". Hebrew used the word basar which "though it has to be translated flesh...does not denote the merely physical...there is nothing that is merely physical in Hebrew thought." We have repeatedly pointed to this typical characteristic of primitive thought.
language, too, lacked a word for the body of a living man, but had a word for the corpse—soma. We discussed different explanations for this fact. With regard to the fact that there is "no distinctive word for the 'body' in Hebrew", Robert McAfee Brown assumes that "such a word is not needed because there is no separate part of man, distinct from his 'soul', which needs to be so distinguished".

"Flesh, too, is soul" says van Peursen. But man as flesh is man in his limitations, visible and tangible, in contrast with invisible, infinite God. God does not see with the eyes of flesh and so sees the reality, the truth of things, which man cannot understand. Man in his total essence, as spirit and flesh (dust), however, belongs to the 'visible' as well as to the 'invisible'; and man as ruach is man "created in the spiritual image of God", according to Rowley.

Dimont emphasises that "making God spiritual instead of material...signified subordinating sense perception to an abstract idea - it was a triumph of spirituality over the senses". God is Spirit and therefore, in Rowley's opinion, there is never a question of God having a physical form. Other scholars do not necessarily share this view. Ryder Smith, for instance, states that "the Hebrews did not believe that God is spirit and nothing else. He had 'form'; (they) thought of God, angels and men as having the same kind of 'form'." It is possible "that the Hebrew thought of 'form' and 'shape' as separable from 'body' in a way which is not common now, though many people seem to think of a 'ghost' as 'form' without 'body'".

When discussing "whether the Hebrews thought of God as possessing physical form, though not a material body" Cairns finds that "at least we can say that God is a God who can naturally reveal himself, and even becomes incarnate in the physical world, and the physical world is one which is sacramentally fitted to reveal his spiritual nature". It is the "spiritual kinship with God, making possible a real fellowship with his Maker, which lies behind the thought
that man was created in the image of God", according to Rowley. "That man is other than God is never lost sight of in the Bible, which could never be guilty of speaking of the divinity of man; that man is wholly other than God is equally alien to Biblical thought, and could hardly be accepted by any believer in the Incarnation")

"Man in no way participates in the divine nature. He is made of the dust of the ground, and his relationship to God is not that of a spark to the fire or a drop of water to the ocean but rather that of an image to its original") Owen admits though that the fact "that man is made in the image of God...distinguishes him from the rest of nature;...there are inherent in human nature godlike possibilities. By virtue of the way in which he is created by God, man is capable of achieving a personal status that is akin to the life of God") We read in 'The Theology of the New Testament' that "in the sight of God who is believed in as a living person, man is a Thou who is fully free and responsible". Here the author draws an interesting conclusion, assuming that "for this reason, undoubtedly, the collectivist element could never restrict the significance of the individual in Israel, not even in the earliest period")

With regard to man as created in the image of God, the New Testament brings a new vision. The New Testament restores actuality to the likeness through Christ. Jesus stands between man and God participating in the nature of both.
Notes to Chapter X.

1. A R Johnson, p3
3. Onians, p481
4. Owen, p175, cf p167
5. Onians, p484
6. Stacey, p86
7. Jerusalem Bible, p16
8. Charles, cf p42 (Eschatology)
9. Pedersen, p99
10. Ryder Smith, p6
12. Onians, p481, cf Gen XII 5; Ex I 5, XII 4; Gen IX 4; Lev XVII 14.
13. Stacey, p86
14. Onians, p481
15. Stacey, p91; cf Lev XVII 11.
16. Jerusalem Bible, p235; cf Gen IX 4, 5
17. A R Johnson, pp8-9
18. Onians, p481
19. van Peursen, p95; cf Ps CVII 9; Prov XXV 25; Isa XXIX 8; I Sam XX 17; Ps XLII 2.
20. Stacey, p94
21. Owen, p176
23. Stacey, p91
24. Snell, p15, cf p9; cf van Peursen pp89-90; Cfr Rohde, pp5,7
25. A R Johnson, pp87-8
26. ibid., p22, cfr Charles, p42 (Eschatology)
27. Boman, p29 n1
28. Pedersen, p180; I Sam XVII 54
29. Onians, pp481-2; cf Gen IV 10; Judg XVI 30; Job XIV 22; Lev XXI 11; Pss XVI 10, XXX 3; Job XXXIII 18, 22, 30.
30. Pedersen, p181
32. Charles, p47 (Eschatology)
Notes to Chapter X/Continued 2.

33. Charles, p40 (Eschatology); cf Rowley, p156
34. ibid., p43; cf H H Rowley, From Moses to Qumran.
35. Rowley, From Moses to Qumran.
36. Charles, pp48-9 (Eschatology)
37. Owen, pp177-8
39. A R Johnson, pp88-9
40. ibid., p95
41. Pedersen, p180; cf Isa LIII 2
42. Jerusalem Bible, p329
43. Charles, p45 (Eschatology) cf Gen XLV 27
44. ibid., p42
45. Wheeler Robinson, pp18-19
46. Ryder Smith, p12; cf A R Johnson, p35
47. Stacey, pp89-90
48. Wheeler Robinson, p10
49. Norman H Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, p146
50. Stacey, p89
51. Onians, p483
52. ibid., p484
53. ibid., p144
54. ibid., p234 n6
55. ibid., pp287-8
57. Ha Idra Zuta Quadisha, XXII, 741, Trans van Rosenroth and Mathers, ref Onians, p188 n2
58. Onians, p188 n2
59. ibid., p189, n2
60. Jerusalem Bible, pp873-4
61. Onians, p484
62. ibid., p191
63. ibid., p492
64. Jerusalem Bible, p868
65. ibid., p917
Notes to Chapter X/Continued 3.

66. Ezek XXXIV 26; Onians, p492; Isa XLIV 3; Onians, p492; cf Gen XLIX 25; Mal III 10; Prov XI 25, V 18; Isa XXXII 15; Ezek XXXIX 29; Joel I 1; Zech XII 10.

67. Onians, p493
68. ibid., p499-500
69. Theology of New Testament, pp628-9
70. Pedersen, p102
71. Snaith, pp149,151
72. A R Johnson, pp75-6
73. Pedersen, p102
74. Jerusalem Bible, p359
75. A R Johnson, p82, cf p83 n4
76. ibid., p87
77. Pedersen, pp103-4
78. A R Johnson, pp84,86
79. Theology of New Testament, p628
80. Ryder Smith, p96
81. Pedersen, p178; cf Stacey p93
82. Ryder Smith, p24
83. Halvorsen and Cohen (eds), A Handbook of Christian Theology: Robert McAfee Brown, Soul (Body) p357
84. Rowley, 979 (Faith of Israel); cf A R Johnson, p37; Stacey, pp90,93; Snaith, p150.
85. Dimont, p45
86. Rowley, cf. pp78,83 (Faith of Israel)
87. Ryder Smith, p30
88. Cairns, p34
89. Rowley, p83 (Faith of Israel)
90. Owen, pp166-7.
91. Theology of New Testament, p631
CHAPTER XI

IDEAS OF ETERNAL LIFE DEVELOPING IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.
From the beginning there is a purpose inherent in the creation. Yahweh had promised the Jews the Kingdom, a kingdom of unbroken, national prosperity, in fulfilment of this purpose. The belief in the Kingdom is intimately bound up with the belief in Divine Justice. The relationship Kingdom-Justice is somehow, from man's point of view, regulated through the Law, the Torah. If Israel carries out her part of the covenant, in other words, obeys the Law down to its last letter; then Yahweh, who is absolute Justice, will provide: "long days in the land which the Lord gives them".

The Kingdom was to be everlasting, but there was "no such promise for the individual who was still alive at its coming and could share in its glory". At most, its members were to enjoy lives of patriarchal duration. "The emphasis was laid on the community, on its security and permanence and happiness", according to Charles. Brunner points out that "we must accept the fact that the Old Testament, even the prophetic message, is not concerned about the fate of the individual after death". Other authors stress the same point. "The eschatology of the prophets had no message of light and comfort for the individual beyond the grave".

"It is with the social conception of man that the Old Testament presents us, his religion being intimately bound up with the relationship to God of the whole group to which he belongs".

The Exile in Babylon was a new milestone in the history and development of the Jews. Without Temple, Law and Land, Israel was made to realise that you could carry these 'realities' within yourself, and so the conceptions of many religious beliefs changed. This is the time of the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel, among others. Charles affirms that "in the fact of the coming exile, when the nation would cease to exist and only the individuals remain, Jeremiah was the first to conceive religion as the communion of the individual soul with God". "A blessing on the man who puts his trust in Yahweh, with Yahweh for his hope". "I, Yahweh, search to the heart, I probe the
loins, to give each man what his conduct and his actions deserve. God must enter into relation with the individual, and make known his will to him, and hereby a personal relation of the individual with God is established. And according to Charles "the further development of these ideas led inevitably to the conception of a blessed life beyond the grave".

Ezekiel, the Prophet of the Exile, has also been called the Prophet of the Spirit. The significant contribution of Ezekiel is his doctrine of the 'new ruach', "ruach in its most effective meaning". The ethical implication of this doctrine is the idea that a bad man can be turned into a good one by being given a new ruach, and that the good man finds his present reward and the bad man his present punishment in accordance with the strictest individual equity. "I shall pour clean water over you, and you will be cleansed; I shall cleanse you of all your defilement and all your idols. I shall give you a new heart, and put a new spirit in you; I shall remove the heart of stone from your bodies and give you a heart of flesh instead. I shall put my spirit in you and make you keep my laws and sincerely respect my observances."

Divine Justice was an essential element in the Israelite religion. "The Justice of Yahweh applied to groups just as human justice did at that time", writes Dubarle. "We find men dealt with, in primitive legislation and religion, not on the basis of the single life which consciousness binds together for each of us, but as members of a tribe, a clan, or a family; hence comes the familiar practice of blood-revenge, or the idea that the sin of one...can properly be visited on the group to which he belongs, and into which his own personality, so to speak, extends". Also, according to Wheeler Robinson, Mozley was wrong when calling this "the negative sense of individuality" as it is better described, positively, as "the idea of corporate personality".
In this, the oldest of views, "Yahweh himself is seen as the jealous God who visits the iniquity of the fathers on their children". But, says Dubarle, "with the royal administration progressively replacing local or tribal initiatives, the principle of sanctions against individuals only is proclaimed in Deuteronomy XXIV 16. And the prophets in their turn proclaim that from now on divine justice, too, will take into account the merits or demerits of each individual and not those of his family. "The word of the Lord came to me again: What do you mean by repeating this proverb concerning the land of Israel: 'The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge'? As I live, says the Lord God, this proverb shall no more be used by you in Israel. Behold, all souls are mine; the soul of the father as well as the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sins shall die" (Ezek XVIII 1-4). This quotation is taken from the Revised Standard Version. The Jerusalem Bible translates the same passage as follows: "'As I live – it is the Lord Yahweh who speaks – there will no longer be any reason to repeat this proverb in Israel. See now: all life belongs to me; the father's life and the son's life, both alike belong to me. The man who has sinned, he is the one who shall die". When reading these two different renderings of nephesh we are reminded of Owen's words earlier that 'soul' gives a "falsely spiritual tone". However, somehow, it may seem that we are losing something important when using only the terms 'life' or 'man' for nephesh. On the Hebrew assumptions it appears evident that nephesh is 'life' and a 'something'. "From the emphasis on corporate personality we move forwards to the recognition of moral individuality". The sufferer, as an individual, must now ask what he himself has done; each and everyone shapes his own fate and is not only an anonymous part of the community. There is still the national solidarity to Israel, it is as strong as ever, but from now on the individual plays a more important role in the life of his nation. But as we said earlier, there
was from earliest times an understanding of the significance of the individual in Israel, perhaps, one must not put too much stress on the 'corporate personality'? Undoubtedly, however, a more spiritual conception of the human personality gradually developed, and made possible a more personal relationship of man to the Lord, "He was not only the God of Israel but also the Lord of the individual seeker." 

There was much of value in Ezekiel's message, but, on the other hand, the view that "the outward lot of the individual harmonises perfectly with his inner character" does not stand up to the facts of life. The innocent do suffer and the evildoers do prosper. Ezekiel's doctrine of visible individual retribution "was an ideal principle", says Dubarle, "and the Book of Proverbs tries to show its application in everyday life in spite of very real exceptions to it......Malachy confirms that this scandal was widely resented and was not confined to the discussions of wise men. He himself evades the difficulty only by holding out a promise for the future just like Jeremiah and Ezekiel. "You say, 'It is useless to serve God; what is the good of keeping his commands or of walking mournfully before Yahweh Sabaoth? Now we have reached the point when we call the arrogant blessed; yes they prosper, these evil-doers; they try God's patience and yet go free'. This is what those who fear Yahweh used to say to one another. But Yahweh took note and heard them: a book of remembrance was written in his presence recording those who fear him and take refuge in his name. On the day which I am preparing says Yahweh Sabaoth, they are going to be my own special possession.... Then once again you will see the difference between an upright man and a wicked one, between the one who serves God and the one who does not serve him" (Mal III 14-18).

However, Ezekiel's doctrine "dominates most of the subsequent religious thought of Israel", but proves to be nothing but a temporary solution to the vital problem of innocent suffering. To us it seems evident, of course, that, as Wheeler Robinson points out, "the simplest solution of the problem of individual retribution lies in the doctrine of a future life." To
make this solution a real cornerstone of its faith the religious consciousness of Judaism had to go through further developments. We find clear evidence, in Söderblom's words, that "the book of Job, passages in the Prophets, and several of the Psalms show how these problems tortured the thinkers of Israel". How is innocent suffering to be reconciled with Divine Justice? If the sufferer deserves his lot and knows this, then he has to accept that his sin has alienated him from God. But once the fact is acknowledged that there is such a thing as innocent suffering, then the innocent sufferer has the right to feel that he is not cut off from God's sustaining presence when he most needs it.

Charles assumes, though this is not a generally accepted opinion, that the book of Job "undoubtedly suggests the idea of a future life", an idea which was 'in the air' at the time the book was written. "This new view of the next life springs from a spiritual root (and)....a new doctrine of the soul" is involved. In this view, the disembodied soul, after death, is "capable of the highest spiritual activities". The passage to which Charles is referring reads in the version which he uses as follows: "But I know that my Avenger liveth, And that at the last he will appear above (my) grave: And after my skin hath been thus destroyed, Without my body shall I see God: Whom I shall see for myself, And mine eyes shall behold, and not another" (Job XIX 25-27).

Charles describes the line "And after my skin hath been thus destroyed" as 'hopelessly corrupt', but finds the rest of the passage clear. After his death Job "shall witness his vindication, and enjoy the vision of God.....It is not the blessed immortality of the departed soul that is referred to here, but its actual entrance into and enjoyment of the higher life, however momentary its duration. The possibility of the continuance, much less the unendingness of this higher life does not seem to have dawned upon Job, though it lay in the line of his reasonings. Nevertheless, the importance of the spiritual advance here made cannot be exaggerated."
About this same passage Rowley writes: "In one familiar passage he (Job) has been supposed to attain a faith in a more worthwhile Afterlife; it is however one of the most cryptic passages in the book, both text and interpretation are far from sure." About eleven different recent translations are quoted by Rowley, and undoubtedly, the variety amongst the versions is impressive. Some "take out all suggestion of an Afterlife, while others emend it to make the suggestions much clearer."  

Snaith assumes that the above passage "can be made to refer to life after death only by a most liberal latitude in translation, a strong attachment to the Latin version, and reminiscences to Händel's 'Messiah'. The Hebrew text is difficult, but it is unlikely that the vindicator is God, and Job almost certainly means that he will be vindicated before he is dead." In Wheeler Robinson's opinion, even though there is no assertion of immortal life, "it is fair to say that the faith behind such statements involves a transcendence of death which is of the highest significance for the future." "The solution of the problem of suffering" lies, for the author of Job, in the fact, according to Rowley, that "it achieves the spiritual miracle of the wresting of profit from the suffering through the enrichment of the fellowship of God."  

Perhaps one may here remark that the use of the word 'profit' is unsuitable, taking the clue from Satan's question: "but Job is not God-fearing for nothing, is he?" No doubt Rowley is talking about 'spiritual profit', but even so, the word 'profit' seems to lead into the wrong line of thought. The meaning implicit in the book of Job should rather be seen to lie in the fact that it does not matter that the mystery of suffering remains, but what does matter is Job's sudden insight into the mystery of God. In a flash of light, Job 'knows he shall see God' with his own eyes, physically and mystically, as Pedersen explained earlier. It seems unimportant whether the author of Job is thinking of an individual person, or of the nation of Israel as a whole,
when trying to explain the mystery of innocent suffering. What is important is that he is attempting to show the difference between knowing God by hearsay and knowing Him 'eye to eye', knowing Him in the mystery of His Presence.

What troubles the author Job, what he is wrestling with, is, it seems, not the 'problem' of suffering, but the 'mystery' of suffering. It is a mystery which cannot yet be revealed, but in the meantime it is necessary to understand that God cannot be measured on a human scale, cannot be fitted into human standards set up to decide what a just God should or should not do.

When reading the Psalms we encounter the same sense of the mystery of a personal spiritual relationship to God. Many are the attempts which have been made to explain exactly what the psalmists were saying. Among others, Psalms XVI 9f; XLIX 14f; LXXII 23f; LXXVIII; have caused much controversy and have been differently interpreted.

We look at Psalm XLIX 14-20:
"Like sheep to be penned in Sheol, death will herd them to pasture and the upright will have the better of them. Dawn will come and then the show they made will disappear. Sheol is the home for them; But God will redeem my life from the grasp of Sheol, and will receive me. Do not be afraid when a man grows rich, when the glory of his House increases; when he dies he can take nothing with him, his glory cannot follow him down. The soul he made so happy while he lived - 'look after yourself and men will praise you' - will join the company of his ancestors who will never see the light of day again. Man in his prosperity forfeits intelligence; he is one with the cattle doomed to slaughter." Rowley is of the opinion that what the Psalmist is emphasising is surely "That the inequalities of this life will be rectified in the next"; it would be meaningless to interpret the passage in the manner that the righteous is merely promised to have "some good fortune before he dies", as he
would then in fact be worse off than the wicked, seeing that "he (the righteous) too must, on this view, relinquish his good fortune at death." The wicked man has at least had an easy life all along. Another theory is that the above Psalm refers to the 'life' of the nation of Israel and therefore has nothing to do with individual immortality.

It is, however, possible, according to Russel, even on the view that Sheol is the only place for all and everyone after death, to trace among the pious in Israel "a growing conviction that the sense of fellowship which they enjoyed with God in this life could surely not come to an end with death, but that even in Sheol men might be able to praise him." This leads us to the insight expressed by Söderblom, whom we shall quote at length with regard to the following Psalm LXXIII 23-28:

"Even so, I stayed in your presence, you held my right hand; now guide me with advice and in the end receive me into glory. I look to no one else in heaven, I delight in nothing else on earth. My flesh and my heart are pining with love, my heart's Rock, my own, God for ever! So then: those who abandon you are doomed, you destroy the adulterous deserter. Whereas my joy lies in being close to God. I have taken shelter in the Lord, continually to proclaim what you have done."

Söderblom writes: "Other peoples of Iran and India had long known hells and heavens in abundance. The land beyond the grave was mapped in gaudy colours. The austerity of Jahve did not allow this......There was no room, no possibility, for any mythology or sagas, telling of the future, to grow and flourish. As yet the Psalmist has no conception of the future life beyond the traditional notion of Israel regarding a shadowy Sheol. Then....by the inexorable logic of divine communion does the miracle take place. The gates of death are pierced by trust in the Lord.....Life and death and heaven and earth and Hell and Hades coalesce....Though body and soul may languish, though he be lowered into the deep hell of shame and torture, God is still his everlasting
good....Decision and equilibrium are not to be sought in future retribution. The psalmist owns God in the present and that is enough. Here we have a foretaste of the Gospel method of finding eternity in the present moment"  

"This is a milestone on the road to formulated belief in resurrection and eternal life", says a note in the Jerusalem Bible. But many scholars restrict themselves to assumptions along the lines of what Dubarle expresses in the following: "If some of the psalmists really looked forward to immortality with God, they were the forerunners of what is to become in the Book of Wisdom a firm doctrine concerning the just".  

Wheeler Robinson suggests that what the Psalmists describe is in fact a mystical relationship with God and that we meet something of the same mystical divine fellowship in the Greek ideas of immortality. For the development of the doctrine of a blessed life beyond the grave "we ought to group together the need for a solution of the problem of individual retribution and the claims of a spiritual experience entering a realm where it knew itself to be above death". Dubarle points to the same when he proposes that "two principal lines of development can be distinguished: faith in a just retribution and the hope of an after-life, or at least a vague notion of it".  

It would thus seem that there are two lines of thought on 'what lies beyond death' which emerge alongside each other and can be followed in the development of Jewish religious thinking.  

1) The one is this 'assurance' of eternity in the presence of God communicating with the spirit of man. The soul/spirit 'lives in the now' where the right and wrong aspects are of no importance.  

2) The other is a more theologically devised belief in the resurrection of body and soul to a life in the 'Kingdom of God', based on the problem of individual retribution and a
'Just God' and limited to human understanding of Divine Justice.

The first grows out of what we may call mystical 'knowledge'; the second develops through more intellectual thinking, sometimes inspired, sometimes, more than anything, wishful. Here we can trace many different kinds of influences.

Ezekiel was of importance in directing the development of what we have referred to as the second line. We shall here take up the thread from our earlier reference to the promise about the future, which we find in Malachi, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, among others. What Ezekiel prophesied was not, however, the restoration to a life on earth for the individual dead Israelite, but "the recovery of the nation from the death of the exile and its resurrection to national life in its own land."40. We quote from Ezekiel XXXVII 7-12: "While I was prophesying, there was a noise, a sound of clattering and the bones joined together. I looked, and saw that they were covered with sinews; flesh was growing on them and skin was covering them, but there was no breath in them. He said to me, 'Prophesy to the breath; prophesy, son of man. Say to the breath, The Lord Yahweh says this: Come from the four winds, breath; breathe on these dead; let them live!' I prophesied as he had ordered me, and the breath entered them; they came to life again and stood up on their feet, a great, an immense army. Then he said, 'Son of man, these bones are the whole House of Israel. They keep saying, 'Our bones are dried up, our hope has gone; we are as good as dead'. So prophesy. Say to them, 'The Lord Yahweh says this: I am now going to open your graves; I mean to raise you from your graves, my people, and lead you back to the soil of Israel---- And I shall put my spirit in you, and you will live, and I shall resettle you on your own soil; ....'41.

Dubarle points out that "the literary image created (in Hosea) developed in Ezekiel to a vision of grandiose proportions.... (And) as the Lord himself then explains, the scene symbolises the renewal of the nation. In exile
Israel considers herself destined for annihilation. But Yahweh will bring her home and place her again in her own land. In this way a language is forged which will later be available for telling the story of the resurrection proper, that is, "real resurrection as distinct from 'metaphysical'."

The same point is stressed in a note in the Jerusalem Bible: "by the imagery chosen, he (Ezekiel) is already preparing the minds for the idea of an individual resurrection of the body, vaguely perceived in Job XIX 25 and explicitly stated in Daniel XII 2."43

What we have called the first line is, however, also developing in its own manner and here too language and imagery are used which are suitable for furthering its message. And so we find, as Wheeler Robinson expresses it, that "the higher side of human personality (expressed by ruach) is conceived to be accessible to God to a much greater degree than our present ideas of personality would usually suggest to us."44 This is because "the similarity of terminology kept open a heavenward door, so to speak, in human nature and no more striking case could be found of the influence of language on the thought it shapes even whilst it serves."45

With regard to Job and the Psalms we can then it seems say with Russell that even if they at best give "only a glimmering of hope....this hope, however, was such that it could only reach its logical conclusion in a belief in a future life, and it is to the credit of the apocalyptists that they were the first to arrive at this conclusion in the doctrine of the resurrection from the dead."46

With regard to the prophetic message, Charles proposes that if we take the typical prophetic 'Kingdom of God on earth' as our point of departure, we shall find that "every subsequent development of this conception till it is reborn in Christianity is due to apocalyptic literature", and to this literature we can attribute the change from the prophetic "materialistic heathen view" into a spiritual one. Wheeler Robinson finds
that the development which has begun in the Old Testament will be towards a larger idea of social life, both on earth and in heaven by path of a more spiritual individualism.
Notes to Chapter XI.

1. Exodus XX 12.
2. Charles, p20 (Religious Development); cf Charles, pp159-60 (Eschatology)
3. Emil Brunner, Eternal Hope, p142
4. Charles, p178 (Eschatology)
5. Wheeler Robinson, p70
6. Charles, p61 (Eschatology)
7. Jerusalem Bible, p1281 JerXVII 7; 10
8. Snaith, p151 (Distinctive Ideas)
9. Jerusalem Bible, p1406 Ezek XXXVI 25
11. Wheeler Robinson, p8
12. Dubarle, pp34-5
13. Revised Standard Bible p371
14. Jerusalem Bible, p1379
15. Wheeler Robinson, p11
16. Söderblom, p275; cf Charles pp61-2 (Eschatology)
17. Wheeler Robinson, pp33-5
18. Dubarle, p35
19. Jerusalem Bible, p1546
20. Wheeler Robinson, pp35,39
21. Söderblom, p276
22. Rowley, cf pp171,178 (Moses to Qumran)
23. Charles, p73; cf p159 (Eschatology); cf Pss LIX 15, LXXIII 24
24. ibid., pp71-2
25. Rowley, pp179-181 (Moses to Qumran)
26. Snaith, p90 (Distinctive Idea)
27. Wheeler Robinson, p41
28. Rowley, pp181-2 (Moses to Qumran)
29. Jerusalem Bible, p729 Job 19
30. Wheeler Robinson, cf p 41; Charles, cf p 61 (Eschatology)
31. Jerusalem Bible, p833
32. Rowley, p171 (Moses to Qumran)
33. D S Russell, Between the Testaments, p145
34. Jerusalem Bible, p857
Notes to Chapter XI/Continued 2.

35. Söderblom, pp282-3
36. Jerusalem Bible, p857 n(k)
37. Dubarle, p37
38. Wheeler Robinson, p41
39. Dubarle, p34
40. Rowley, p 164 (Faith of Israel)
41. Jerusalem Bible, p1407
42. Dubarle, pp39,38
43. Jerusalem Bible, p1407 n(d)
44. Wheeler Robinson, p70
45. ibid., p27
46. Russell, pp144-5 (Between the Testaments)
47. Wheeler Robinson, p70
CHAPTER XII

APOCALYPTIC LITERATURE IN GENERAL AND ITS APPEARANCE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 'LIFE AFTER DEATH'.
In the last chapter it was pointed out that the Apocalyptic literature can be said to be the medium through which the two lines of thought on what 'lies beyond death', which emerge in the Old Testament, are developed to greater spirituality and depth. Important changes in religious thinking took place in the period between the Testaments, especially with regard to many eschatological references and ideas, and these changes would, to a considerable extent, "be unexplained and inexplicable were it not for the fact that we possess this body of Jewish literature".

Martin-Achard makes an interesting summary of different events outside Palestine, and inside its borders, as well as within the people itself: events, or call them phenomena, which conspired, as he says "to lead the People of Yahweh towards adopting a belief that overturns the conceptions by which it has lived for so long". Influences moulding Judaism were: "the new ideas current in the world brought into being by Alexander's campaigns; the importance attached to the lot of the individual who is contending with sufferings incompatible with the righteousness of Yahweh; the yearning for a life lived in fellowship with God that will not sooner or later fall into the power of death; and the misfortunes of a community devoted to its traditions and led, by the enmity of the powers of the earth, to count more and more upon the coming of the Messianic Age".

It is in the Old Testament canon that we find the earliest apocalyptic writings. Ezekiel, in addition to his other epithets, has been called "the spiritual founder of Apocalyptic".

Russell explains apocalyptic as being "embedded in Prophecy". "Its roots", he says, "were widespread and drew nourishment from many sources, prophetic and mythological, native and foreign, esoteric and exotic; but there can be no doubt that the tap root, as it were, went deep down into Hebrew prophecy, and in particular the writings of the post-exilic prophets whose thought and language provided the soil from
which later apocalyptic works were to grow... the seeds from which they grew had already been sown in such passages as Ezekiel XXXVIII-XXXIX, Zechariah I-VIII and IX-XIV, Joel III and Isaiah XXIV-XXVII.4.

It seems that the apocalyptic writers, as had the Prophets earlier, claimed to be writing under divine inspiration, an inspiration which was linked with intense psychical experiences5. Daniel (X 2,3) fasts for three weeks before his seemingly most important vision, according to Russell5. Hengel, too, points to the possibility that "the apocalyptic literature is derived at least in part from visions and ecstatic experiences. There was again a strong interest in such extraordinary experiences in the Hellenistic period, indeed one must suppose that certain methods - like fasts and constant prayer - were developed in order to bring on visionary experiences.....Even the former Pharisee Paul will not have received his ecstatic gift only on becoming a Christian"6.

The book of Daniel, "the first and greatest of all the Jewish apocalyptic writings"7 was produced at a time when the historical conditions were right, Israel having arrived at "the most heroic and at the same time the most tragic periods of its history"7. "A time of trouble such as there has never been since there was a nation" (Dan XII 1)8. The book of Daniel was probably written by one of the Hasidim in the time of the savage persecutions under Antiochus Epiphanes of the Jews who were living according to the Law and who would not adopt Greek customs, shortly after the outbreak of the Maccabean Revolt (between 167-164 BC).

"A doctrine of resurrection can be seen born as a twin with a doctrine of martyrdom" writes Evans. The hero martyrs "hurl their defiance at the tyrant out of full confidence in a resurrection to eternal life"9. Another "less immediate and passionate and more metaphysical" form of the doctrine of resurrection is concerned with the divine righteousness and judgment. Here resurrection of the individual is of
secondary interest; the great hope is for the "universal judgment whereby God will bring to an end the present age (now conceived of as irretrievably evil) and the evil angels responsible for it, and will assert his righteousness over all".

It is interesting to note that W R Farmer actually sees the doctrine of resurrection being more or less calculatedly brought into the nationalist theology of the Jewish resistance movements, accounting for the "astonishing phenomenon of mass martyrdom as well as mass military heroism on the part of the Jews in the Greco-Roman period". Evans, however, maintains that "it could be argued the other way round..... that the doctrine arose later out of reflection upon the nationalist activity and enterprise". This seems to be the general opinion among scholars. There is also general agreement on the fact that "we encounter in early Hasidic apocalyptic the first references to the resurrection, judgment and human fate after death.....".

However, the view that persecutions made the Jews believe in a safe and assured asylum beyond the gates of death does not invalidate the theory of foreign influences, even if we do not have to go as far as Gunkel does. Gunkel represents a 19th century view holding that the doctrine of resurrection arose in Israel neither from previsions of faith nor from religious reflection, but was borrowed in its fully developed form from the East. This view is today outdated. Most scholars, however, agree that the Hebrews were not on an island fed only on their own ideas growing out of the past. They were very much part of that world brought into being by Alexander and his successors, surrounded as they were on all sides by Hellenism.

We have seen that Russell said earlier that Jewish apocalyptic had its taproot deep down in the soil of Hebrew prophecy, but also that its roots in general were widespread, drawing its nourishment from many sources. We find the sources in Babylon, Persia, Egypt, Greece. Post-exilic prophecy
itself shows many of those influences. Russell makes an interesting enumeration of the 'stuff' which makes up apocalyptic and which he finds is contained as seeds in those post-exilic prophetic books mentioned above. Among the elements making up this 'stuff' we find the following: "The notion of divine transcendence, the development of angelology, fantastic symbolism, cosmic imagery, the use of foreign mythology, reinterpretation of prophecy, the visionary forms of inspiration, a distinctly literary form, cataclysm and judgment, the Day of the Lord, the destruction of the Gentiles, the coming of the Golden Age, the messianic deliverer and the resurrection of the dead". It is of course the last item on this list with which we are especially concerned, with that 'something' that will 'live on'. In this connection, Hengel suggests that the "indication of the historical origin of resurrection are on the one hand in the direction of Iranian religion, where they are already attested by Theopompos (4th century BC), while on the other hand conceptions of resurrection communicated by the dying and rising of vegetation deities had certainly been known in Israel for some time". The Greek Orphic conceptions of the beyond was a strong influence when "the burning problem of a theodicy looked for an answer".

Hengel believes that "foreign conception need not primarily have been taken over in literary ways; they could also rest on the transference of popular motives". Earlier, we quoted Moore with regard to borrowings in religion; no doubt, the borrower will never feel he is 'appropriating' anything in the possession of another religion. These new ideas, "when once they become known to him, are seen to be the necessary implications or complements of his own".

It seems quite impossible for anyone ever to give a complete true-to-fact answer to the question of "who influenced who" within the syncretism of Hellenism. Hengel says that "it is necessary to be careful in describing themes specifically as 'hellenistic' or 'oriental', i.e. Babylonian or Persian or
even Indian - and this applies to the question of the historical derivation of apocalyptic themes in general". It is also suggested by Hengel that "the cultural influence of Alexandria, Antioch and the Phoenician cities probably had greater effect in Jerusalem in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC than a direct Iranian-Babylonian influence, especially as Babylonia and Iran were similarly under Hellenistic rule from the time of Alexander the Great to the middle of the 2nd century. We must therefore reckon on the possibility that even originally oriental themes were mediated by Hellenistic sources".

We shall now look at two passages from the Old Testament: the so-called Isaiah Apocalypse (Chapters XXIV-XXVII), and the Apocalyptic book of Daniel, keeping in mind that most scholars seem to agree that there is little reason to read any assured doctrine of resurrection into any of the texts of the Old Testament. We may see in Job XIX 25-27 "a momentary resurrection to visualise his vindication", or find a reference "to the contemporary situation of the author" in Daniel XII 2, but that is all. Rowley does not even mention the passage from Isaiah, as in his opinion, "there is here no thought of individual resurrection".

Isaiah XXVI 19: "Your dead will come to life, their corpses will rise; awake, exult, all you who lie in the dust, for your dew is radiant dew and the land of ghosts will give birth." This passage reminds us of Onians's quotation from the Kabbalah, "from that dew the dead raised unto life". It seems in fact that Isaiah XXVI 19, like Genesis II 7, speaks quite clearly of a new creation out of dust by the Spirit - the radiant dew.

There is no agreement among scholars about the above passage. The Jerusalem Bible has a note saying: "A prophecy: of resurrection - according to some, of Israel's national revival according to others." Rowley finds nothing that "goes beyond the thought of national resurrection". The passage is best linked with Ezekiel's vision of the valley of the dry
bones, according to others. If, however, the other point of view is true and it does in fact "refer to the actual resurrection of men's bodies, then this is the first occurrence of such a belief in the Old Testament" says Russell. Whatever its meaning really is, "this text", according to Dubarle, "contributed to maintaining Israel's faith in a God who was the supreme source of life and who never tired of coming to his people's aid in their tribulations".

It is generally agreed that Isaiah XXIV-XXVII are later additions, possibly from the time of Artaxerxes III (358-338 BC), a time of persecutions. Isaiah himself was born in about 765 BC.

The first clear reference to the resurrection of the dead is in Daniel XII 2: "Of those who lie sleeping in the dust of the earth, many will awake, some to everlasting life, some to shame and everlasting disgrace". A note in the Jerusalem Bible calls this "one of the key texts of the Old Testament on the resurrection of the body". When asking the question to what degree Daniel's view did represent the common view of the author's day, Rowley is cautious in his answer. Even if it was a new vision it "played a considerable part in the development of thought". "What is important here is that man's resurrection has become an object of firm hope instead of being merely a longing or an image of the race's perpetuity", says Dubarle.

When asking who Daniel's resurrection involves, different answers have been proposed. The more generally accepted view is that only the very good and the very wicked Israelites will be raised: the ones to eternal life, the others to eternal torment. Another explanation is, however, possible, according to Dubarle, who suggests that "the two categories describe, on the one hand, those who have risen again and, on the other hand, those who have not; the latter condemned to rot away for ever in the earth, arousing the abhorrence of all flesh. Any resurrection, therefore, would be reserved
Charles, who interprets Daniel XII 2 in accordance with the first mentioned view, compares this passage with Isaiah XXVI 19, maintaining that the latter thought of resurrection "as the necessary spiritual sequel and the true organic development of the righteous life on earth", and that it was therefore "of necessity limited to the righteous". When Daniel extended resurrection to encompass the unfaithful in Israel, "he secularised it, and gave it a meaning absolutely at variance with its original one".

Russell expresses the same feeling when remarking about the Daniel passage that "the factor of continued fellowship with God as the raison d'être of resurrection is lost sight of. The resurrection belief has ceased to be the spiritual matter which it was to the writer of Isaiah XXVI and has become what R H Charles calls a 'mechanical conception'. Thus severed from the spiritual root from which it grew, the resurrection is transformed into a sort of eschatological property, a device by means of which the members of the nation are presented before God to receive their final award.

The peculiar Jewish idea of resurrection has been too little regarded, says Söderblom. "A general resurrection is nowhere taught in the Old Testament. The resurrection is unconnected with any process of Nature or with the metaphysical make-up of man. The resurrection is demanded and called forth by the passion for righteousness and retribution. Who shall rise? Those whose lives cry out for recompense or punishment". Russell here emphasises that "until the day of resurrection, the shades of all who have died remain in Sheol, shut off from fellowship with God".

There are here, however, many different opinions and we do not have any uncomplicated answers. The question involves especially the concept of the Justice of the Lord. We find here all 'forms' of Justice, from the problem of Individual
Retribution to the great vision of the Last Day of Universal Judgment. On the one pole we find the duty to attend to the smallest detail of the Law, on the other pole the voluntary, joyful giving of one's life to expiate the sins of one's brethren.

Cadbury, when discussing the idea of an after-life in Jesus' teaching, writes: "References to the future life for Jesus as for Judaism in general are connected with the idea of retribution". We have quoted Cadbury here because his following sentence seems to apply to the passage in Daniel under discussion. Cadbury writes, "This utilitarian-sounding approach would suit the stand-point of his (Jesus') hearers". Perhaps this was the kind of message which Daniel's hearers too understood?

On the other hand it seems that there is much more involved in the command of being good and thereby preparing for oneself a place in 'Heaven' than meets the eye. This 'being good' implies, in Jesus' message, so much that if one could really follow it, there could be no question of 'doing good for reward'.
Notes to Chapter XII.

1. Ryder Smith, p65; cfr Charles, p206 (Eschatology)
2. R Martin Achard, From Death to Life, p223
3. Charles, p210 (Eschatology) ref to Duhm, Theologie der Propheten
5. ibid., p170
6. ibid., p207
7. ibid., pp15-16
8. Jerusalem Bible, p1132
10. ibid., p20 n3 ref to W R Farmer, Maccabees, Zealots and Josephus, p190
11. Hengel, p196
12. Charles, p72, n1 ref to Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos, p291
13. Russell, p91 (Jewish Apocalyptic)
14. Hengel, p196
15. ibid., p202
16. George Foote Moore, Judaism, p394
17. Hengel, p181
18. Rowley, pp167-8 (Faith of Israel)
19. Jerusalem Bible, p1183
20. ibid., p1183 n(g)
21. Rowley, p166 (Faith of Israel)
22. Russell, p146 (Between the Testaments)
23. Dubarle, p40
24. Jerusalem Bible, p1447 and n(b)
25. Dubarle, p41
26. Charles, p164 (Eschatology); cf Russell, p368 (Jewish Apocalyptic)
27. Russell, p369 (Jewish Apocalyptic)
28. Soderblom, p276
29. Russell, p368 (Jewish Apocalyptic)
30. Henry J Cadbury, Intimations of Immortality in the Thought of Jesus, (Collection, ed Stendahl) p142
PART III

HELLENISTIC THINKING
CHAPTER XIII

THE CONCEPT OF SOUL IN THE INTERTESTAMENTAL PERIOD
(LARGELY HEBREW)
It is quite amazing to look at the intellectual diversity within Judaism during the Intertestamental period. Pfeiffer describes it as "so alive, so progressive, so agitated by controversies, that under its spacious roof the most contrasting views were held - until greater conformity was reached after AD 200". Sometime after 200AD the oral tradition of Judaism became codified in the Mishnah. From then on the religion of the Jews became "definitive and homogeneous and authoritative".

When we look at the centuries prior to the fall of Jerusalem, we find that "there was no recognised 'orthodoxy', nor was there any one party whose beliefs formed the norm by which Judaism could be judged. On the contrary there was a great variety of religious parties which were not greatly concerned about the question of orthodoxy at all", according to Russell. Charles too points to the fact that "the Jewish Church prior to AD 70 could open its doors to all the spiritually-minded men of the nation,...Thus Sadducee and Pharisee, Herodian and Essene worshipped in the Temple, bound together....by unity of spirit in the worship of the same God...."

It has been assumed that a distinction must be made between Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism, and scholars have generally agreed that "there were in fact two distinctive Judaisms". Hengel, however, emphasises that when "distinctions are made between 'Jewish apocalyptic' and 'Hellenistic mysticism', between the 'Jewish, rabbinic tradition' and 'Hellenistic, oriental gnosticism', between a 'Palestinian' and a 'Hellenistic' community....this unavoidable distinction.....does pass too lightly over the fact that by the time of Jesus, Palestine had already been under 'Hellenistic' rule and its resultant cultural influence for some 360 years".

In this connection, Russell points out that it has become "increasingly clear in more recent years, that no rigid distinction can be drawn between the Judaism of Palestine and that of the Dispersion and that both were open to the
same kind of influence. Both found themselves confronted with Hellenistic ideas and culture which, consciously or unconsciously, shaped their religious outlook. "Something fundamentally new arose in 'Hellenism' - through the encounter of Greece with the Orient - which differed from the time of classical Greece, just as Judaism...underwent a gradual but deep-rooted change in the Hellenistic period through its encounter and conflict with the social, political and spiritual forces of this epoch, on the basis of which it differs in essential points from its earlier forms in the Old Testament." What Hengel has here emphasised seems to give the key to a right understanding of the importance of the intertestamental period. It is not possible to understand the New Testament through studies based only on the Old Testament. 360 years is a long time in the history of thought for any nation, and much shaping and reshaping of the religious vision is bound to take place.

Coming back to the different movements within Judaism, Russell points to the interesting fact that of the total Jewish population the Pharisees numbered only about 5%, whereas the Sadducees and the Essenes together numbered only 2%. We assume with regard to the Sadducees that they did not want to let go of the pre-exilic concepts of 'Temple, Priest and Sacrifice', whereas the Pharisees had accepted the post-exilic concepts of 'Synagogue, Rabbi and Prayer'.

These last mentioned concepts were, of course, the natural ones for the Jews of the Diaspora, and so, according to Selby, "the Diaspora Jew...in a general way...can be classified with the Pharisees." One may assume that it was this elasticity, introduced by the Pharisees, which made possible the survival of Judaism in the difficult times to come. They believed "in the principle of religious evolution" and could therefore "embrace such opposites as the Wisdom writers, on the one hand, and the Apocalyptists, on the other hand, the extreme literalists hanging on every word and letter of the Torah, and the allegorists of Alexandria."
There was, even among the Pharisees themselves, according to Charles, "no uniform intellectual belief on the great questions as to the nature of the resurrection, the Kingdom of God, the Messiah...". In fact, says Charles, "we can discern two forms of Pharisaism in addition to the two 'Judaisms'". Though the apocalyptic form of Pharisaism was mostly found within Hellenistic Judaism and the Legalistic one within Palestinian Judaism, the issue was not so simple; there was much overlapping of thought and concepts. The complexity is too great for any generalisations. Charles believes that Apocalyptic and Legalistic Pharisaisms were the forerunners of Christianity and Talmudic Judaism respectively. The two forms of Pharisaism had devotion to the Torah in common, though they gradually grew apart. However, "Talmudic Judaism, no less than Christianity, owes its spiritual concepts of the future to apocalyptic". In this connection, according to Koch, we can understand the reversal of direction taken by Paul. "It only becomes comprehensible if Paul was ruled, before his experience on the Damascus road, not by rabbinical understanding of the Law but by an apocalyptic one".

Russell does not go along with Charles's distinction between the two kinds of Pharisaism. He finds too much overlapping of ideas "within the variegated Judaism of that time" and does not find it established "that the apocalyptic movement belonged in any special way to the Pharisees or that a Pharisaic authorship can be claimed for these books". Undoubtedly, the resurrection of the dead came to be an important article of Pharisaic faith. With regard to the Jewish nation as a whole, however, "it remains reserved about it for a long time". It was not until the capture of Jerusalem that it became so important that Martin-Achard can speak of it as "one of the fundamental dogmas of Judaism".

The conceptions of the future life which we find in the intertestamental books, especially in the apocalyptic ones, "are not uniform, but various and sometimes incoherent. That
may itself argue that they were widespread and well established, and this would seem to be the conclusion drawn by most of the authorities", according to Evans who points out that the variations with regard to 'life beyond the grave' in this literature generally are concerned with 1) who, 2) where, 3) when, and 4) in what form? Thus when asking "Who will be raised from the dead?" the answers vary between: "the righteous Israelites only; the righteous and unrighteous in Israel for judgment; all men for judgment". When asking: "Where will this new life be lived?" the answers will be: "on this physical earth; on a renewed, more spiritual earth; somewhere in 'the Beyond'". To the question: "When will the Kingdom come?", the answers may be: "in this age and time; at the establishment of the Messianic time; in an 'Age' of everlasting life". When we ask: "In what form will the dead be raised?, the answers vary between: "in a reconstituted, physical body; in a transformed, spiritual body; as souls/spirits needing no body".

We find several new beliefs emerging: the departed are no longer visualised as mere shades; they are conscious souls/spirits; the realm of the dead may depicted as having rivers, mountains, trees and flowers; there are divisions in the underworld. Sheol, in some cases, becomes an intermediate abode. Punishments, sometimes in the form of the most cruel torture, are meted out to the souls/spirits of the evil-doers, whereas the righteous are rewarded.

No doubt, there is a great fluidity of thought, and apparently incongruous views are found at times within the same book. As Russell says, not all the variations are "clear to the reader, or even perhaps to the writers themselves".

Israel's old beliefs were, in fact, being moulded in new forms. When trying to understand all these variations on the theme 'life beyond death' and the place of SOUL in the thinking of the times, we seem to be confronted with at least four quite different views:

a) All personal existence ceases after death.  
b) The dead are resurrected into physical bodies.
c) The soul/spirit resurrected in a new, transformed, non-physical body.

d) Survival of a disembodied soul/spirit.

The first view: **ALL PERSONAL EXISTENCE CEASES AFTER DEATH**, is apparently completely negative. Man as *nephesh*, a living soul, a living creature, is made from the dust of the earth, animated by *ruach* given him by God. When the spirit is breathed out at death, there remains but the original 'dust'. This view "mistook the destructive intermediate stage of the Yahwistic doctrine of an after-life for the true one", says Charles, and "this defective view..... which had arisen in the 5th century BC maintained itself down to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD"21.

It seems a certain fact that the Sadducees rejected the doctrine of the resurrection22. Charles assumes that they believed that the spirit, as the breath of God, on death returned to its divine origin23. It has been suggested that they may have believed in the immortality of the soul. There is no way of knowing and so "the phenomenon of the Sadducees remains"24. Evans points out that "as they were the losing party which did not survive the fall of Jerusalem, their literature, assuming that there was any, is among that which did not survive; it would not have been of interest to later generations. Hence we are almost totally in the dark about them and their position, which may have been less of the odd man out in the general scene than it must now appear"24. Nowinckel assumes that the fact that the doctrine of the resurrection was rejected by the Sadducees "shows how new it really was, and how alien to earlier Judaism"25.

The second view: **THE DEAD ARE RESURRECTED INTO PHYSICAL BODIES**, is probably the most primitive of the views. The righteous who die in obedience to their God will "regain their strength"; God will recreate their bodies out of the dust, blow his *ruach* into them, and they will reappear as the same 'living soul' among the still living, to share with them the present
sensuous kind of life, but under the condition of continuous peace and happiness in a Messianic Kingdom in the present world."26

We shall here look at I Enoch, also called the Ethiopic Book of Enoch as until recently it was extant only in an Ethiopic text. Aramaic sections have now been found at Qumran. The book is divided into five parts written during a span of more than a century. It has been the subject of much scholarly study. "Diverse opinions have been expressed concerning the dating of the several sections and the final editing of the whole book."27 We shall follow Russell's direction with regard to the dating of the sections. The first five chapters serve as an introduction. Chapters 6-36: "the angelological book,"26 probably date from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164 BC) and were written after the book of Daniel.29

Chapters 37-71: the Similitudes or Parables of Enoch, are the latest of the sections, probably written ca 40-35 BC, but as this section shows some Christian influence, at least part of it may be of a later date.

Chapters 72-82: "the astronomical book,"29, or "The Book of The Heavenly Luminaries,"30, was probably written before 110 BC.

Chapters 83-90: "The Dream Visions" are probably only a little later than Chapters 6-36, and seems to have been influenced by the book of Daniel.

Chapters 91-104: "the book of Admonitions", in which is included the "Apocalypse of Weeks" (Chapters 93:1-10; 91:12-17). These were probably written in the time of Alexander Jannaeus, (102-76 BC).30

For the discussion of view b) we shall take our example from Chapter 22, verses 3-4, 8-13.

3. "Then Raphael answered, one of the holy angels who was with me, and said unto me: 'These hollow places have been created for this very purpose, that the spirits of the souls of the dead should assemble therein, yea, that all the souls of the children of men should assemble here. 4. And these places have been made to receive them till the day of their
judgment and till their appointed period.

8. Then I asked regarding all the hollow places: 'Why is one separated from the other?' 9. And he answered me saying: 'These three have been made that the spirits of the dead might be separated. And this division has been made for the spirits of the righteous, in which there is the bright spring of water. 10. And this has been made for sinners when they die and are buried in the earth and judgment has not been executed upon them in their lifetime. 11. Here their spirits shall be set apart in this great pain, till the great day of judgment, scourgings, and torments of the accursed for ever, so that (there may be) retribution for their spirits. There He shall bind them for ever. 12. And this division has been made for the spirits of those who make their suit, who make disclosures concerning their destruction, when they were slain in the days of the sinners. 13. And this has been made for the spirits of men who shall not be righteous but sinners, who are godless, and of the lawless they shall be companions: but their spirits shall not be punished in the day of judgment nor shall they be raised from thence. And we quote further from I Enoch Chapter 25 verse 6:

"Then shall they rejoice with joy and be glad. And into the holy place (Jerusalem) shall they enter; And its fragrance shall be in their bones, And they shall live a long life on earth, Such as thy fathers lived: And in their days shall no (sorrow or) plague Or torment or calamity touch them."

We find here several of the new developments. Hengel gives the following explanations: "Like Homer, the Old Testament knew only the concept of the underworld (sheol), in which the dead live a shadowy existence". Now there appears "for the first time in Judaism, in connection with Enoch's journeys to heaven and to the underworld, detailed portrayals of the mythical kingdom of the dead in the north-west beyond the sea, which have contacts at many points with Greek and Babylonian mythology." The Greek mythology of the realm of the dead was in popular currency in the Greek world, especially as it derived, inter alia, from the portrayal in
the 'Odyssey'. Presumably Homer was also read in Jerusalem at the time (c 175 BC) of the foundation of the gymnasium (cf. II Macc IV 9ff).

With regard to the 'hollow places', Hengel points out that this new idea of a division in Sheol is "bound up with the conception of a retribution beyond death". Here, as in Daniel, through the influence of the Hasidim, "does there penetrate to the consciousness of further circles of the Jewish people the idea that after death the 'souls' undergo different fates and can be punished or rewarded". We know that this was a familiar doctrine within Orphic and Pythagorean traditions.

Undoubtedly, Zoroastrianism too, in its earlier form, had developed an eschatology which has great affinities with the conception of the apocalyptists. "Zoroastrian influence is evident in such matters as the separation of the soul from the body at death, the lot of the departed between death and resurrection, the doctrine of the resurrection and their teaching concerning the Last Judgment", says Russell, who also points to their "greatly developed doctrine of angels and demons and.....the personalisation of evil spirits..... There is no parallel in the thought of the Old Testament" for all these new elements.

The imagination of the author of I Enoch 6-36 dwells with pleasure on the fate of a) the righteous, b) the punished, and c) the unpunished sinners: a) and c) will be raised to their different ends; b) will stay in their spirit-forms in Sheol everlastingly. With regard to the fact that the dead in Sheol are no longer called 'shades', but 'spirits' or 'souls', apparently synonymously, Charles explains that the older Semitic view of soul and spirit seems sometimes to reappear in the 2nd century BC, but now it is "the older view in a further stage of development". What has changed is that whereas "according to the old Semitic view the spirit never descended into Sheol, now it always does so, and the departed in Sheol are more frequently called 'spirits' than
Russell emphasises that what we have here "is something much more significant than simply a change of name, from 'shade' to 'soul' or 'spirit'; it is a radical change in men's beliefs concerning the nature of survival in the life after death. The change shows that the departed in Sheol are now regarded as 'conscious moral beings' - no longer to be called rep'im (the lifelless ones)". It was pointed out earlier that in post-exilic times nephesh and ruach began overlapping with regard to their meaning, and this was again affirmed by Charles (p 179 above). Both terms at this time were being used for the full personality and also for the continuity of that same personality in "that form of life in which men survive the grave". Russell, too, points to the apocalypticists' use of "the word pneumata ('spirits') as a synonym of psychai ('souls') to describe individual conscious beings after death even though this use of the word is not Greek at all.

It was thus the entire personality which descended into Sheol and there possessed life and consciousness to almost the same degree that it had in its life time. We remarked earlier that Socrates gave the world the conception of the 'soul' as 'personality' and that this brought about a great change in human thought and prepared the way for Christianity. We have here, however, in what we have called view b), something of the Socratic view but with Hebrew details. In view b), the righteous are eagerly awaiting the resurrection of their real physical bodies, and this resurrection is necessary for the "fullest expression and realisation" of their personalities. The wicked, on the other hand, seem to have eternal disembodiment added to their other punishments whether they remain in Sheol or are transferred to a still worse fate in Gehenna.

II Maccabees is also of interest because of its affirmation of a belief in resurrection and its materialistic view of it. According to Charles, we have here an interesting syncretism of the view based on Genesis II 3, which is that the spirit
returns to God at death, and of the view which assumes a conscious life for the soul/spirit in Sheol. Contrary to the expected picture of the departed - after the withdrawal of the spirit - as unconscious or sleeping in the grave, or in Sheol, until the day of Judgment, they descend into Sheol, fully conscious, to await the day when the Creator will give back to them their spirit and their life.

In II Macc VII 22, the mother of the seven martyred brothers exclaims: "I do not know how you appeared in my womb; it was not I who endowed you with breath (pneuma) and life (zoe), I had not the shaping of your every part. It is the creator of the world, ordaining the process of man's birth and presiding over the origin of all things, who in his mercy will most surely give you back both breath and life, seeing that you now despise your own existence for the sake of his laws". And the last words of the youngest brother, spoken in "perfect trust in the Lord", are the following: "Our brothers already, after enduring their brief pain, now drink of ever-flowing life, by virtue of God's covenant, while you, by God's judgment, will have to pay the just penalty for your arrogance" (II Macc. VII 36).

The souls in Sheol are even depicted as having the capacity for moral change. The living pray for their moral improvement during their stay in Sheol: "For if he had not expected the fallen to rise again it would have been superfluous and foolish to pray for the dead, whereas if he had in view the splendid recompense reserved for those who make a pious end, the thought was holy and devout. This was why he had this atonement sacrifice offered for the dead, so that they might be released from their sin". (II Macc XII 44-45).

In a dramatic episode, it is told how Razis, one of the elders of Jerusalem, surrounded by the enemy, falls on his sword: "Although he had now lost every drop of blood, he tore out his entrails and taking them in both hands flung them among the troops, calling on the Master of his life (zoe) and spirit (pneuma) to give them back to him one day" (II Macc XIV 46).
It is interesting to note in II Maccabees VII 36 the use of the words 'drinking of the ever-flowing life'. The Greek word used here for that eternal life is *zoe*, not *psyche*. Evidently it must be the souls (*psychai*) of the murdered brothers who are already now drinking of the ever-flowing life, awaiting the reunification with their bodies, their *pneuma* and *zoe*. We may here make a comparison with Onians's theories (pp 144/5 above) (p 314 below), of water or dew as a restorer of life.

The third view: **THE SOUL/SPRIT IS RESURRECTED INTO A NEW TRANSFORMED NON-PHYSICAL BODY**, shows how the hopes of the faithful were transferred from this material earth to a spiritual, invisible Kingdom, and how the material bodies were turned into spiritual ones. "The new projection of man's destiny into the unseen world is so important, both in itself and in its reaction to the general conception of human personality, that it may be called the chief contribution of later Judaism to our subject", that is to the Christian doctrine of man, according to Wheeler Robinson 40.

As examples of this view, we shall turn to two other sections of I Enoch: Chapters 83-90 and Chapters 37-71.

*I Enoch* 90, vv 24-26, 29, 33, 35, 37, 38:

"And the judgment was held first over the stars, and they were judged and found guilty, and they went to the place of condemnation, and they were cast into an abyss, full of fire, and full of pillars of fire. And those seventy shepherds were judged and found guilty, and they were cast into that fiery abyss.

And they brought those blinded sheep, and they were all judged and found guilty and cast into this fiery abyss.... And I saw till the Lord of the sheep brought a new house greater and loftier than that first, and set it up in the place of the first which had been folded up: all its pillars were new....and all the sheep were within it.

And all that had been destroyed and dispersed, and all the beasts of the field, and all the birds of the heaven, assembled in that house, and the Lord of the sheep rejoiced with great joy.
because they were all good and had returned to His house. And the eyes of them all were opened, and they saw the good, and there was not one among them that did not see. And I saw that a white bull was born, with large horns, and all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the air feared him and made petition to him all the time. And I saw that all their generations were transformed, and they all became white bulls...."41.

In these passages 'Enoch' describes how Israel's enemies, and the treacherous angels (stars)42, and the apostate Jews (the blinded sheep)42, will all be destroyed. According to Charles's interpretation, the righteous will be resurrected42, transformed into the spiritual likeness of the Messiah42, that is, into a higher form of life, and then they will live forever in a heavenly Jerusalem42. In allowing only the righteous to be resurrected, the author is following the original and spiritual view of the resurrection, which was that "it is the organic development of the present life of righteousness."43.

The conclusion that the righteous rise into eternal life, "which would make this passage the first expression of the idea in Jewish literature", is doubted by Russell. "The Messiah is not here a supernatural being, but a man (90:37), however superior he may be to his fellows"44. It may seem an impossible task to decide whether 'the white bull' is a 'supernatural being' or a man, but, on the other hand, all the righteous, who now 'see the good' and are transferred into the image of the 'white bull' (the Messiah), must certainly be spiritually different from ordinary men. 'To see the good' strikes a very Platonic note, and, no doubt, we repeatedly encounter Platonic language in apocalyptic literature. There is no agreement among scholars as to what degree and in which cases the thought behind has also been taken over.

With regard to I Enoch 90: 38, Hengel's interpretation differs from those of Charles and Russell. Hengel writes: "...the
Messiah is born and finally all the beasts - not only the sheep of Israel - are changed back into their perfect primal form of the patriarchal period; they become 'white bulls', like the pious fathers from Adam to Isaac.\(^45\)

The Parables, or Similitudes, of Enoch (Chapters 37-71) present us with many difficulties, according to Charles, who dates these books to 94-64 BC. The difficulties have to do with the fact that the author clings to the hope of an everlasting Messianic kingdom, whereas most other writers of the 1st century BC, and of the next century, show the prevalent dualism of a new heaven and a new earth. The writer of the Similitudes "for the last time in Judaism combines in one blessed future the separate hopes of the individual and the nation, and thus unites in a high spiritual synthesis the severed eschatologies.\(^46\)

The conception found in the Similitudes of the coming Messiah is also of special interest. If Charles's dating is right, these chapters may historically have been "the source of the New Testament designation" of Jesus as "the Christ", "the Righteous One", "the Elect One", and "the Son of Man".\(^47\)

There is, however, no general agreement as to the dating of the Similitudes, and the fact that they are the only parts of I Enoch which are, not found among the Qumran documents may point to a Christian-influenced author, or to Christian interpolation.

In I Enoch 53, vv 2-5, we read: "Blessed are ye, righteous and elect, for glorious shall be your lot. And the righteous shall be in the light of the sun, and the elect in the light of eternal life: The days of their life shall be unending, and the days of the holy without number. And they shall seek the light and find righteousness with the Lord of Spirits: There shall be peace to the righteous in the name of the eternal Lord. And after this it shall be said to the holy in heaven that they should seek out the secrets of righteousness, the heritage of faith; for it has become
bright as the sun upon earth, and the darkness is past."48
And again in I Enoch 62 vv 14-16 we read:
"And the Lord of Spirits will abide over them, and with
that Son of Man they shall eat and lie down and rise up
for ever and ever.
And the righteous and elect shall have risen from the earth,
and ceased to be of downcast countenance.
And they shall have been clothed with garments of glory, and
these shall be the garments of life from the Lord of Spirits;
and your garments shall not grow old, nor your glory pass
away before the Lord of Spirits."48

The Similitudes no doubt show a further development in the
description of the after-life of the 'faithful'. They will
become truly spiritual, with bodies of glory and life, living
eternally in the company of the Lord of Spirits, the Son of
Man, and the angelic hosts.

It must be admitted that with the prejudices and assumptions
of today it is decisively difficult to understand many of the
concepts these authors use. These writings are "not easy
to handle", says Evans, "nor is their evidence easy to assess".49
Their view of man after death becomes extremely complex. They
talk in symbols about dreams and visions and use words and
terms which seem inadequate if not misleading. "We are
tempted to think that....(eschatology) is a symptom of
desperation, a grasping at straws, the figment of a fevered
theological imagination", according to Hamilton.50 Russell
denies that "apocalyptic is a literature of despair....With
equal appropriateness it can be described as a literature
of hope....".51

The apocalyptists had to find a way of expressing their beliefs
that the next life is a continuity of this life, a continuity
of the personality. But, as we said earlier, the person-
ality in the old Hebrew view could only be expressed to the
full in a soul-spirit-body unit; "only thus could participation
in the coming kingdom be made possible.....and this was the
raison d'être of the resurrection".52 The evil dead do not
deserve a resurrected body. "As disembodied souls - naked, (they could not) share in the fellowship of God in the after-life...."\(^{52}\).

Stendahl writes about the works of Josephus and points out that when Josephus "describes the tenets of both Essenes and Pharisees to the outside world, he speaks within the framework of the immortal and imperishable soul. The Pharisees, he says, consider 'every soul imperishable, but only the soul of the good passes into another body, while those of the wicked suffer eternal punishment'"\(^{53}\).

Somehow, the apocalyptic concept 'body', even when consisting of 'glory and life', seems easier to handle than the invisible and elusive soul/spirit. The re-created body, whether earthly or heavenly, is regarded as being visible and real to at least some kind of senses. But what about the soul? God remakes the body anew and in the process the soul somehow slips in. Hengel, when tracing Greek influence in apocalyptic anthropological concepts, remarks: "The soul is separated from the body and in the resurrection - a conception which as yet does not have a single content - in some circumstances receives it back again......By and large one receives the impression that the internal consequences of this belief have not been thought through clearly.....Spiritualised and realistic conceptions stand side by side with relatively little connection"\(^{54}\).

Sometimes the soul/spirit seems to be 'clothed with' the new body, sometimes the soul/spirit must have joined in, unnoticed, as the new body emerges. "Many strange devices were adopted to facilitate the conception of a reunion of body and soul at the great Resurrection, without which life in its fulness was impossible"\(^{55}\). With regard to the soul/spirit being clothed in a new body, we find an interesting example in II Enoch, (ca 1-50 AD). The original Enoch (Genesis V 22-24) "walked with God". He "knew the fellowship with God in this life to such a degree that he was spared the experience of death but was lifted into enduring fellowship"\(^{56}\).
In II Enoch, Enoch finds himself in God's realm in his earthly body, which, according to the author, was not suitable for its spiritual environment. Enoch's resurrection is performed by the Angel Michael whom God orders to: "Go and take Enoch out of his earthly garments and put him into the garments of my glory" (II Enoch 22:8). We get here a vision of the 'real' Enoch, some static personality who would remain the same even after a change of bodies. Is the soul/spirit the 'real' Enoch?

In referring to the 'Apocalypse of Moses' (of the 1st century AD, before 70), Russell gives an example along these same lines: "The death of Adam is described in terms of the departure of his soul (13:6) or the giving up of his spirit (31:4); but it can also be described in these words, 'Behold Adam...has gone out of his body' (32:4), as though the essential personality were to be identified with his soul or spirit."

The term 'of my glory' is used very often in the Apocalypses; we met this term in I Enoch 62:16, and in II Enoch 22:8, and we shall discuss it later when Paul uses it about the body of Christ. According to Koch, this term 'of my glory' is a catchword and is "used wherever the final state of affairs is set apart from the present and whenever a final amalgamation of the earthly and heavenly spheres is prophesied.

Glory is the portion of those who have been raised from the dead, who will thus become as the angels or stars of heaven. Glory is then the mark not only of man, however, but also of conditions, the 'state' in which they live, the heavenly Jerusalem, or of the eschatological ruler who is above them."

Another interesting book is the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch (II Baruch, c 60-100 AD). It seems that we find here a parallel to the 'pneumatic body' in Pauline teaching, and it is suggested (by Charles) that the latter is "in some respects a developed and more spiritual expression of ideas already current in Judaism". In this book, the resurrection takes place in stages. In the first instance, the physical
bodies are restored in exactly the 'defected and deformed' conditions in which they were at the moment of death.
Charles points to the fact that "this is the earliest appearance of a doctrine which was developed to extravagant lengths in later Judaism and Christianity". The reason for this 'first resurrection' is that it will make possible the recognition of the dead, wicked and righteous alike, so that they can be judged according to their deserts and punished accordingly. Afterwards there will be a series of changes, leaving the faithful with spiritual bodies, that is, they will be "transformed into more suitable bodies for their new existence".

There are many details in the apocalyptic literature (as we saw, for instance, in I Enoch 90, 24-26 above) revealing the cruel manner in which sinners are going to be punished. "For I saw all the angels of punishment abiding (there) and preparing all the instruments of Satan" (I Enoch 53 : 3). "And there mine eyes saw how they made these instruments, iron chains of immeasurable weight. And I asked the angel of peace who went with me, saying: 'For whom are these chains being prepared?' And he said unto me: 'These are being prepared for the hosts of Azazel, so that they may take them and cast them into the abyss of complete condemnation, and they shall cover their jaws with rough stones as the Lord of Spirits commanded" (I Enoch 54:3-5).

M P Nilsson stresses that "the nearest parallels come from the portrayals of the places of punishment in the underworld in the Greek tradition, where the punishment for the fallen Titans and the wicked men are mentioned side by side". On the other hand, God's judgment and punishment should perhaps not be taken too literally, for they are rather part of the apocalyptic cosmological mysteries in general. "The whole cosmos is in the service of an eschatologically controlled salvation history. If one wants to know God in all his glory, one must also know these cosmological mysteries for the glory of God as creator is revealed through them".
For the Jew, God is the Creator and the source of all life, and this fact must never be lost sight of. Thus, even when Greek influence is the strongest and we come very near to a doctrine of the immortality of the soul, the soul is not regarded as naturally immortal but needs God's Grace for its survival after death.

Dimont describes the faith of the Pharisees: "they believed in the resurrection of the dead, in the coming of a messiah, and in the immortality of the soul"; he then goes on to say of the Sadducees that they did not "believe in immortality or resurrection, and denied the existence of the hereafter", whereas the Essenes believed "in the immortality of the soul, in resurrection and in the concept of a messiah". It must be admitted that Dimont's manner of juxtaposing 'resurrection' and 'immortality' seems at first most incongruous to the present writer. It is interesting to read Stendahl in this connection. "There is nothing new in the fact that the two concepts.....stand in a certain tension to each other"; he says, "but there is a new intensity to this tension in the minds of many modern students of religion.....which makes it reasonable to deal with immortality and resurrection under the sign of an either/or rather than both/and....". The conditions were, however, different in the times of the apocalyptic writers and Stendahl points out that among the Diaspora Jews "the stark language of resurrection was naturally related to the belief in immortality".

When discussing the 'Fathers of the Church', Wolfson, too, emphasises that the belief in immortality and the belief in resurrection "were inseparably connected with each other.....The belief that in the end of days there will be a general resurrection of the dead meant the reinvestment of surviving souls with risen bodies. To all of them, in the interval between death and resurrection the soul had a life of its own without a body".

To come back to the apocalyptic literature, however, there are some books in which no bodies, physical or spiritual,
are mentioned at all. This leads to what we have called view d) SURVIVAL OF DI-EMBOBLED SOULS/SPIRITS. According to Charles, there are three Palestinian apocalyptic books which express beliefs in the survival of the soul without the body. There is however no general agreement on this issue. The books to which Charles refers are: 1) Jubilees, (ca 150 BC); 2) I Enoch, Chapters 91-104 (ca 102-76 BC); and 2) The Assumption of Moses (ca 6-30 AD).

Hengel dates the Book of Jubilees later than Russell does. Hengel calls it "the Essene book of Jubilees" and finds it closely connected with the Enoch tradition as it "in its historical framework also incorporates the eschatological consummation, the 'new creation' in the form of prophetic visions for the patriarchs". Hengel suggests that one should date it at the end of the 2nd century BC, and as proofs for this theory, he stresses that it is "named in the Damascus document, which was probably written in the first half of the 1st century BC, and appears nine times in the Qumran fragments".

Referring to the Jubilees, Hengel assumes that it was "presumably intended for a wider circle"; it belonged to the esoteric "popular books" for the pious. On the one hand it shows an "abrupt rejection of everything non-Jewish", Charles stresses that it "contains the strongest expression of the absolute autocracy of the Law", and that it is a "glorification of legalistic Judaism and of the priesthood". On the other hand, it belongs to the "few apocalyptic books in which there is no reference at all.....to a resurrection and which, indeed, point to quite a different form of survival". This book, according to Russell, "teaches, not the resurrection of the body, but the immortality of the soul".

"And at that time the Lord will heal his servants, and they shall rise up and see great peace, and drive out their adversaries. And the righteous shall see and be thankful, and rejoice with joy for ever and ever, and shall see all
their judgments and all their curses on their enemies.
And their bones shall rest in the earth, and their spirits
shall have much joy, and they shall know that it is the Lord
who executes judgment and shows mercy...." (Jubilees 23 : 30ff).
Russell remarks of the above passage: "There is thus no place
for the righteous dead in the coming earthly kingdom; their
spirits rejoice in eternal bliss"73. According to Charles,
the book of Jubilees expresses the idea that the era of the
Messianic Kingdom had already set in73, that it was of the
nature of a progressive, spiritual development and that
therefore the final judgment "could only occur at the close
of the Kingdom...(which) is only of temporary duration"75.
During the Messianic period, also called the "greet day of
peace", the spirits of the "righteous will enter into a
blessed immortality"76 immediately at death77.

At this stage one may well ask where the 'righteous' will assemble after death? Charles points out that "it cannot be to Sheol.....for Sheol is 'the place of condemnation' (Jub.
7 : 29) to which eaters of blood and idolaters are condemned"76.
In this connection it is interesting to read Hengel's
suggestion that in the "Essene wing of the Hasidim the idea of physical resurrection retreated so far into the background that we must ask whether this concept is still apporpriate in their case, and whether for them eschatological salvation did not rather consist in the heavenly communion of the exalted spirits with the angels"78.

I Enoch, Chapters 91-108, has much in common with Jubilees.
Here, too, it seems that the Messianic kingdom "is conceived as of temporary duration". Charles remarks that "such a temporary earthly kingdom cannot be the goal of the hopes of the risen righteous. Their faith can find satisfaction only in a blessed immortality in the eternal heaven itself"79.
"I know a mystery..... That all goodness and joy and glory are prepared for them, and written down for the spirits of those who have died in righteousness, and that manifold good shall be given to you in recompense for your labours, and that your lot is abundantly beyond the lot of the living. And
the spirits of you who have died in righteousness shall live and rejoice, and their spirits shall not perish, nor their memorial from before the face of the Great One unto all generations of the world: wherefore no longer fear their contumely" (I Enoch 103:2ff)80. "Be hopeful, and cast not away your hope; for ye shall have great joy as the angels of heaven. What shall ye be obliged to do? Ye shall not have to hide on the day of the great judgment and ye shall not be found as sinners, and the eternal judgment shall be far from you for all the generations in the world. And now fear not, ye righteous, when ye see the sinners growing strong and prospering in their ways: be not companions with them, but keep afar from their violence: for ye shall become companions of the hosts of heaven" (I Enoch 104:4ff)80.

The author of I Enoch Chapter 91-108 is strongly opposed to Ezekiel's doctrine of retribution. To him, prosperity is a "source of delusion of those who possess it"81. "Woe unto you, ye sinners, for your riches make you appear like the righteous, but your hearts convict you of being sinners" (I Enoch 96:4)81. The author identifies the sinners with the Sadducees and lets one of them say of the righteous who have died: "Behold, even as we, so do they die in grief and darkness, and what have they more than we?.....And what will they receive and what will they see for ever? Behold they too have died, and henceforth for ever shall they see no light......They perished and became as though they had not been, and their spirits descended into Sheol in tribulation" (I Enoch 102:7,8,11)82.

It is evident that the author here stresses the difference in outlook between those who believe in a blessed afterlife and those who believe in a 'nothing'. This expectancy of happiness and joy in the spiritual world, in the company of angels, was a living force among 'the faithful' and gave them their inner power to stand strong in the face of persecutions and death. They knew their souls/spirits were in God's hands. It is easy to understand the impact on people completely filled with these beliefs when it was proven to
them that Jesus had in fact 'risen' as the 'First One', indicating that the eagerly awaited New Age had indeed begun.

The Assumption of Moses was written about a century later than I Enoch 91-108. Here too the faithful in Israel are to be exalted by God straight to heaven and her foes to Gehenna (10 : 9f). The three books just discussed were presumably written in Palestine. It may seem less surprising to find works expressing, what Charles called, "the transcendent view of the risen righteous,... a resurrection of the spirit only"\textsuperscript{83}, in Alexandrian Judaism than in Palestinian, although we cannot draw any rigid borderlines between them.

Among Alexandrian literature expressing survival of the soul/spirit only, we find the Book of Wisdom, the Works of Philo, the Book of II Enoch, and the Book of IV Maccabees. All these works are "more or less leavened by Greek philosophy"\textsuperscript{83}. We must note about the above works that only II Enoch is an apocalyptic book. Wisdom and IV Maccabees belong to the extra-canonical books of the intertestamental period. The Wisdom of Solomon is, of course, included in the Catholic canon of the Old Testament, and has had great influence on Christian thinking throughout the centuries.

Klausner assumes that 'pseudo-Solomon' was a Palestinian Jew who had fled to Egypt and there wrote "all parts of his book in Greek at different times, during the years 70-50 BC. This Palestinian Jew, who was permeated with the spirit of the Holy Scriptures in their original Hebrew form, as well as the teaching of the early Pharisees, was influenced in Alexandria by Greek doctrines also, particularly by Platonism and Stoicism....The whole book is an amazing compound of Judaism and Hellenism, with the preponderance on the side of Judaism"\textsuperscript{84}.

"No, Wisdom will never make its way into a crafty soul nor stay in a body that is in debt to sin, the holy spirit of instruction shuns deceit, it stays aloof from reckless purposes,
is taken aback when iniquity appears" (Wisdom I 4,5) 

"But the souls of the virtuous are in the hands of God, no torment shall ever touch them. In the eyes of the unwise, they did appear to die, their going looked like disaster, their leaving us, like annihilation; but they are in peace. If they experienced punishment as men see it, their hope was rich with immortality; slight was their affliction, great will their blessing be. They who trust in him will understand the truth, those who are faithful will live with him in love; for grace and mercy await those he has chosen" (Wisdom III 1-4, 9, 10) 

"I was a boy of happy disposition, I had received a good soul as my lot, or rather, being good, I had entered an undefiled body" (Wisdom VIII, 19, 10) 

"....for a perishable body presses down the soul, and this tent of clay weighs down the teeming mind" (Wisdom IX 15) 

"Ashes, his heart, meaner than dirt his hope, his life more ignoble than clay, since he misconceives the One who shaped him, who breathed an active soul into him and inspired a living spirit". 

"since a human being made them (the idols), a creature of borrowed breath gave them shape" (Wisdom XV 10,11, 16) 

Referring to the above passages, it seems first of all evident that 'Pseudo-Solomon' thought of man as consisting of two parts, body and soul. "In the much discussed passage, VIII, 19f, the coming together of the two dissimilar parts, body and soul, resulted in the creation of man" 

Secondly, we encounter the concept 'immortality' for the first time in the Old Testament. "This word", says a note in the Jerusalem Bible, "gives philosophical expression to the hope of the Psalmist who could not resign himself to the loss of intimacy with God through death".

The fact that there is no mention of bodily resurrection in the above book has been interpreted in different ways. Dubarle points out that according to some scholars this omission follows logically on the belief that after "a long sleep the dead rise up from their common place of rest on
the day of judgment. It is not properly speaking a
corporal resurrection but a new life for the spirit either in
felicity or in affliction. Nor is it immortality as the
Greeks conceived it, a natural consequence of the non-material
nature of the spirit. Other exegetes see the Semitic
anthropology, still evident, in Wisdom, as bringing with it
an implicit affirmation of the resurrection of the body.88

Dubarle expresses as his own opinion the possibility that
the author knew of the belief in resurrection of the body but
preferred "probably in order not to shock his Greek readers,
to emphasise the spiritual elements of the after-life and
leave in obscurity the fate of the body. There is no
positive evidence for the resurrection of the body to be
drawn from his writing, but nor is it possible to find any
denial of the concept here.88

The third point is the apparent confusion "about wherein
self-consciousness lies". Stacey points out that in XV 11
"it is not in soul or spirit, so it must be in the body"
This seems to be confirmed in VIII 19, "but the verse is at
once corrected to assert that self-consciousness is found
in spirit or soul". III 1 certainly confirms this latter
opinion.89

Fourthly, we may assume that the soul is thought of as being
more important than the body. Both VIII 20 and IX 15
indicate this. A note in the Jerusalem Bible explains
that line VIII 20 "emphasises the superiority of the soul"
and thereby "amends the phrasing of VIII 19 which seems to
give pre-eminence to the body".90 A fifth point of
interest is the possibility of seeing a belief in the pre-
existence of the soul in VIII 19 and 20. This, according
to Evans, is the evident meaning of those passages: "The
pre-existent soul enters a corruptible body on earth, and
in the case of the righteous, who is maintained in the root
of immortality by incorruptible wisdom, only seems to die,
death being the creation not of God but of the devil; in
the case of the wicked it continues for ever in the spiritual
death which ungodliness has already meant on earth"\(^91\).

In the Jerusalem Bible we read the assumption that the problem of retribution "finds its solution in this book. The author makes use of the Platonic distinction of body from soul\(^92\), and of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul to proclaim that God has made man imperishable\(^92\), and that incorruption is the reward of wisdom and the way to God\(^92\). This life is only a preparation for another in which the virtuous live with God and the wicked are punished"\(^92\). Man is created for immortality, "because he is created by God as an image of his own incorruptible being"\(^91\). "Yet God did make man imperishable, he made him in the image of his own nature, it was the devil's envy that brought death into the world, as those who are his partners will discover" (Wisdom II 23)\(^93\).

IV Maccabees was probably written in the beginning of the 1st century AD, and in any case, before 70 AD. "It constitutes an exposition of Jewish Stoicism"\(^94\). Verse 16 of Chapter 25 is of special interest, owing to the fact that it is almost identical with the passage in the gospels which recounts Jesus' conversation with the Sadducees\(^95\). "Inasmuch as they know that these, who have died on behalf of God, live unto God, as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and all the patriarchs" (IV Macc. XVI 25)\(^96\). "The patriarchs, even Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, will receive the faithful on death", says Charles. "This expression shows us that the phrase 'Abraham's bosom' was a current one, but whereas in the Gospels it is an intermediate abode, here it is heaven itself". Charles also remarks that "there can of course be no resurrection of the body......Only a blessed immortality of the soul is taught"\(^96\). IV Maccabees, like the Wisdom of Solomon and II Enoch, teaches the soul's pre-existence.

II Enoch, also called the Secrets of Enoch, or the Slavonic Book of Enoch, probably dates from the 1st century AD, although is has been suggested that its date is much later\(^97\). "It is an eclectic and syncretistic book by no means free from
Christian influence and may indeed be a Christian work representing a Christian continuation and counterpart of the previous Jewish Enoch.\(^97\)

"Sit and write all the souls of mankind, however many of them are born, and the places prepared for them to eternity; for all souls are prepared to eternity, before the formation of the world."\(^98\) (II Enoch XXIV 4,5).

The above quotation clearly indicates that the author of II Enoch believed in the pre-existence of souls. We referred to this book earlier as an example of the soul/spirit in the next life being "clothed in spiritual clothes." Being of a syncretistic nature II Enoch displays a variety of different views of Sheol and the final judgment and in this it differs from IV Maccabees, the books of Philo, and (probably) Wisdom, according to Charles. The last mentioned books advocate an individual type of religion without Sheol and "final judgment in the ordinary sense."\(^99\) The judgment in II Enoch will follow on a Messianic kingdom of 1000 years, and, says Charles, "here for the first time the Messianic kingdom is conceived as lasting for 1000 years, and it is to such an origin that we must trace the Christian view of the Millenium."\(^100\)

The author of II Enoch is particular when arranging his different categories of departed souls; future places of abode have been prepared for everyone. As Charles points out, "the rebellious angels are confined to the second heaven, the fallen lustful angels are kept in durance under the earth; Satan being hurled down from heaven, has the air as his habitation."\(^100\) An interesting point is that "even the souls of beasts are preserved until the final judgment in order to testify against the ill-usage of men."\(^100\)

The teaching of the pre-existence of souls in II Enoch as well as in the other books under discussion here is "of course, not a Hebrew belief at all, but a Platonic doctrine which found its way into Jewish thought and into certain Jewish writings of this period."\(^101\) The chief exponent
of this type of Jewish writing; and of this period, is no doubt the famous Philo of Alexandria, a contemporary of Jesus and Paul. Philo was "a leading figure in the Alexandrian community, and his writings are our best evidence for its culture and intellectual outlook" says Armstrong. We find in his works his reaction to and interpretation of all the many influences sweeping in over Alexandria, where the mingling and mixing was, as we have seen, amazingly great. Philo reacted by attempting to find a compromise between Judaism, whose great truths he never doubted, and all that which he found best in Greek thinking.

In Philo we meet, according to Bultmann, "the whole tradition of Greek philosophy pressed into the service of Jewish propaganda". In fact, Philo did find "the origin of all that was great in Greek philosophy" in Judea. He was quite convinced that Plato and Aristotle were followers of Moses, had used the Old Testament and gained their wisdom therefrom. Half jokingly, as it seems, Klausner writes that Philo "comes and says that there is truth also in the books of the pagans, that their philosophers are also saints and holy men, that Greek morality is very lofty and comparable in its basic principles to Jewish morality. A view like this necessarily weakened the opposition between Judaism and paganism...there was no more dangerous thing to ancient Judaism, surrounded by pagans, than the weakening of this opposition.

We shall discuss Philo's religion-philosophy in the next chapter: at this point of interest is his strong belief in the immortality of the soul and of matter as the foe and "utterly polluted prison" of the soul. "The space of the world" was filled with living beings or souls, according to Philo. The angels and the demons dwell near the heavens where the 'ether', the highest atmosphere, is very thin. 'Air' in the ordinary sense, the lower atmosphere, is less thin and pure and here the souls of men dwell. They "are attracted by the sensate world, go down to earth and enter into mortal bodies, although they themselves are immortal. Accordingly, the body is the bestial part of man, the source
of all evil, ... the dead corpse which drags the soul with it in life, and the coffin or tomb of the soul, which only after it is freed from the body begins to live an eternal life" 106. However, says Klausner, "Philo, unlike Plato and the Stoics, does not deem the body evil in itself, but evil only in comparison with the soul. Sense experience is not evil in itself; indeed, there is great good in it, namely, understanding of the world. It is evil only insofar as it brings about evil desires" 106. The above is not quite fair to Plato, for he too found sense experiences necessary for an understanding of "the world of the senses".

Charles assumes that for Philo "the ethical character of the soul on its entrance into the mortal body would appear to be the results of its own action in the past". There are different theories about where the souls could have 'acted' in the past with regard to Philo's teaching as well as to, for instance, the Wisdom of Solomon. Philo seems to have taught that before the creation of the earth all souls lived "in undisturbed contemplation of God" 107. Some souls continued this activity but others were pulled down and united to mortal bodies. Of the latter only "a few are saved by a spiritual philosophy ..." 107. In the De Gigantibus, 3, Philo writes: "... meditating, from beginning to end, on how to die to the life in the body in order to obtain incorporeal and immortal life in the presence of the uncreated and immortal God" 107.

The souls of the above 'philosophers' would not be interested in its race or nation, but would pursue its "own independent destiny" and thus ascend to heaven directly after death 107. Charles then concludes with regard to the Alexandrian writers which we have just been discussing that it is strange "that though they conceived the pre-existent life of the soul as essentially ethical and capable of progress upward and downward, they failed to extend this view to the after-life of the soul, and regarded it as mechanically fixed for good or evil unto all eternity" 107. However, there are indications that the idea of rebirth was among the many new views which influenced
the Jews in the intertestamental period. The chance of progress, which Charles is looking for, would thus be given to the souls when reborn into new bodies for a new period of existence in the world of senses. It seems that the following lines from Philo's De Somniis: "The air is full of souls; those who are nearest to earth descending to be tied to mortal bodies return to other bodies, desiring to live in them"\(^{108}\), as well as Wisdom VIII 19,20, quoted earlier, are evidence of a belief in reincarnation.

In any case, the various books of the intertestamental period "at least put a question mark against any idea of a normative Judaism in the 1st centuries BC and AD to be deduced from the Old Testament and rabbinic exegesis of it", says Evans\(^{109}\).
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36. Russell,  pp358-9 (Jewish Apocalyptic)
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38. Russell,  cf p153 (Between the Testaments); cf. Charles, p242 (Eschatology)
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72. ibid., Vol I, p209
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107. Charles, pp305-6 (Eschatology)
108. 'Reincarnation' p27
109. Evans, p14
CHAPTER XIV

THE SUITABILITY OF GREEK CONCEPTS TO CARRY ACROSS HEBREW AND (LATER) CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.
It has been said that "Christian philosophy filled the forms of Greek thought with the substance of the Biblical revelation"¹. This is, of course, one of those generalising expressions which cannot be accepted out of context, but, even so, let us ask to what degree Greek concepts like psyche, pneuma, logos, were suited to be filled with the meaning behind the Hebrew words nephesh, ruach, dabar/memra, and later to be the carrier of Christian thought.

It was the Greek translation of the Old Testament, the Septuagint (probably of the 3rd century BC), which most realistically had brought Hebrew and Greek concepts into direct confrontation with each other. Hengel remarks that "the holy texts were translated as literally as possible, even down to preserving the Hebrew word order, and more far-reaching influence by Greek mythology and philosophical speculation was avoided"². But even so, when using Greek terms the Greek ideas behind them slipped in more or less unnoticed. As Jaeger points out with regard to early Christianity, "With the Greek language a whole world of concepts, categories of thought, inherited metaphysics and subtle connotations enters Christian thought"³.

It seems that psyche was an appropriate translation for nephesh and could well be adapted to the different Hebrew meanings attached to it without actually changing them. Both words could stand for 'life', for a 'man', and for the personal or reflexive pronoun; also for the element in human nature that experiences. Psyche is, however, never used for the 'corpse' as nephesh had been in the Hebrew text. Gradually two new features to the Hebrew view of nephesh, now psyche in the Greek translation, may be noted⁴. Stacey maintains that the Old Testament "does not speak of souls being good or bad, though it comes near at times", as in Ezekiel XVIII 4⁴. The second feature is the idea of a pre-existence of souls, i.e. the possibility "that the soul might even be sullied before a man was born"⁴.

The word ruach became pneuma in Greek translation. Pneuma
is used when ruach stands for wind, or for supernatural powers, or for Divine possession in the Old Testament. Like psyche it is used as a representative term for the whole man and as the seat of thought and feeling. As has been pointed out, the common ground shared by the two terms, if nephesh/ruach or psyche/pneuma in late Old Testament times was still shared by them in the intertestamental period. Sometimes, however, as we have seen already, psyche may seem a better translation of ruach and be nearer to ruach in its basic meaning than as a rendering of nephesh.

In most cases soul/spirit are also synonymous in the apocalyptic books when used of the dead. With reference to I Enoch Chapters 6-36 we quoted Charles saying that here "the departed in Sheol are more frequently called 'spirits' than 'souls'". This was a new development in Hebrew as well as in Greek thought. Russell points out that "although frequent use is made by Greek writers of the word psyche (souls) to describe discarnate beings, the use of pneuma (spirits) in this connection is not typically Greek at all. In certain apocalyptic writings, however, the two terms are used indiscriminately with this meaning".

There is, however, one important difference between the use of pneuma and the use of psyche. A Jewish writer, whether Palestinian or Hellenistic, would never lose sight of the one important point, that ruach/pneuma is derived directly from God. Thus when the idea of pre-existence was brought into some of the Alexandrian intertestamental books, the Hebrew concept behind nephesh/psyche adopted to itself this non-Hebrew doctrine, but the Hebrew ideas behind ruach/pneuma did not follow suit.

We saw how in Wisdom XV 11,16 pneuma is said to be borrowed from God. "A man, like an animal, has a psyche; a man, like God, has a pneuma,... in other words at this point man is like God. He is more like God than an idol because he has borrowed his pneuma from God". Ryder Smith continues "Yet, the spirit of man is not the same as the
Spirit of God in man". We find thus that the author of Wisdom is not teaching a form of pantheism even though he teaches "both that the Spirit of God permeates all things (except sin) and that it penetrates the spirits of good men". The concept of God's Pneuma filling the world and holding all things together may be compared to the Stoic conception of a pervasive fire; but the author of Wisdom nowhere suggests that all things are made of pneuma, as the Stoics asserted of their One Fire. "The idea is not that the Spirit of God is immanent in the universe (and shut up in it), but that coming from God outside, it pervades the whole and holds it together". Ryder Smith assumes that the Hebrew view "that every man has a pneuma of his own is not found in Greek philosophy or in Philo".

When considering the assumption just made by Ryder Smith, one has to discuss whether nous might not as well be used as pneuma when translating ruach in this connection. In Aristotle's thinking, for instance, every man has a nous of his own, in fact, a passive and an active nous, as we have seen already, whereas he uses pneuma in quite a different way. We shall not take up this question now, however, but shall rather discuss the above statement with regard to Philo's use of pneuma as Philo is a good example of those who believed that Greek concepts were suitable for rendering Hebrew thought.

It is difficult to decide what Philo thought with regard to the pneuma operating in man, whether it should be regarded 1) as the property of man (allowing that it is borrowed from God) during his life span, or 2) as belonging to and being part of the Divine Spirit which pervades everything including man. Klausner explains Philo's theory of pneuma as follows: once the pre-existent souls have entered into the mortal bodies, then "God breathed His spirit into the body and He guides the body by means of intelligence, and this in turn makes possible perception and apprehension of the existing world. And the power of judgment, memory and language are the principle powers of intelligence".
Philo's Jewish-Alexandrian doctrine of the pneuma keeps "two non-Greek characteristics", says Armstrong. "The idea of a free creative act of inbreathing by God instead of a necessary participation, and the idea of the highest part of the soul, the inbreathed pneuma (a portion of the divine substance) as the image of God. It is from this tradition that the use of 'pneuma' which we find in St Paul for the human 'spirit', the highest part of man, superior to the 'psyche' (soul) derives; and the later idea of the 'image of God' was of immense importance in later Christian thought".

Philo seems to have incorporated in his concept of pneuma the Platonic psyche, the Aristotelian nous, and the Stoic pneuma, among other ideas. Klausner emphasises that "at the foundation of Philo's system lies the dualism of deity as complete and absolute spirituality, which is active cause, and matter which is an effect and a passive object. Man, too, is a mixture of matter and spirit".

We said earlier that, according to Philo, the soul, once freed from the body, would begin to enjoy its eternal life. This was Klausner's interpretation of Philo's teaching. It seems the question lies here: what happens to the pneuma together with intelligence, memory? Does the psyche continue to exist without these and does the pneuma return to its origin after the death of the body? On these questions scholars have given very different answers.

In his essay about the Church Fathers, Wolfson points out that Philo "represents the two-soul theory" with regard to the Platonic conception of the separability of the soul. According to this interpretation "in every human being, from his very birth, there are two souls, one separable and one inseparable, and it is the inseparable soul in which memory, that is memory of past sensations, originates". In the one-soul theory there is one original separable soul and it is here "that the power of memory resides, even the power of memorising the impressions and images of past sensations".
and, because memory originates and resides in that separable soul, it can be preserved in that soul even after it has become separated from the body".  

Wolfson explains further that "some Fathers, mainly unorthodox, follow him (Philo) (whereas) orthodox Fathers who are conscious of the implications of the problem, follow, as a rule, the one-soul theory". It is interesting to note that 'both sides' attempt to prove their point by interpreting Genesis II 7: "And the Lord God... breathed into his nostrils the breath of life", in accordance with their own view.  

If Wolfson's interpretation of Philo's thinking is right then it seems these "two souls" would be very much Aristotelian. The separable nous without memories is immortal, whereas the inseparable nous with consciousness does not survive the body at death. If Klausner, however, is right, Philo would seem to have fused into one concept Aristotle's nous, coming from the 'outside' and the Hebrew concept of God's Spirit of Genesis II 3; which becomes man's 'borrowed' spirit with all the faculties of consciousness.  

Charles explains the 'two sides' of man's nature in Philo's thinking as follows: "The animal soul has its seat in the blood, and, subsequently to its first creation, is due to human generation, but the rational soul comes direct from God to all men as pneuma. The rational soul (called nous, or dianoia, psyche or pneuma) possesses intellect and freedom of will, and can fulfill the law, if it will".  

Bultmann believes that in Philo "Gnostic ideas were at work." This gives us still another possible interpretation of the thinking of Philo, that in the gnostic view "man's self at death will be released from the body (and from the 'soul') and will soar in the state of 'nakedness' into the heavenly world". We can here compare the views of Plutarch, a contemporary of Philo, to whom we shall come back when discussing Middle Platonism. Plutarch maintains that man consists of nous, psyche and body. After death, psyche
is left on 'the moon', whereas *nous* goes on through the celestial spheres to the Highest Heaven. It would seem that on the latter as well as on the Gnostic view, the *nous*, travelling through the heavenly realms, must have kept some kind of consciousness and memory in order to remember the many passwords which it had specially memorised during lifetime to use on its last, important journey.

Returning to Philo, we find, no doubt, that his way of thinking and of reacting to the 'atmosphere' of the early first century AD gives us valuable information and understanding of early Christianity, especially with regard to the thoughts of Paul. To what degree Philo influenced, or was himself perhaps influenced by, early Christian thinking has been the object of endless speculation. Perhaps we can just repeat that similarity of ideas does not necessarily mean borrowing in either direction.

Philo is criticised, not for attempting "to weaken the opposition between Judaism and paganism", as was Klausner's point of view, but "for contaminating the pure clear air of Greek thought with the enervating fogs of oriental mysticism", by the philosopher W T Stace, whom we have quoted earlier in connection with Greek thinking. Stace continues, "Philo taught that God, as the absolutely infinite, must be elevated completely above all that is finite. No name, no thought, can correspond to the infinity of God...The human soul reaches up to God, not through thought, but by means of a mystical inner illumination and revelation that transcends thought".

The same state of illumination is described with approval by Klausner: "And when the human mind is evicted from us as the divine spirit enters in, when the human light sets and the divine light dawns and rises, there comes to man that intoxication of holy inspiration, an intoxication not of wine, which Philo calls by the wonderful name of 'sober intoxication'. This is rapture or ecstasy, the state in which man's knowledge of himself is fused with that heavenly light which is shed
from deity into the soul of man." Armstrong, too, points to Philo's "real mystical doctrine" and to his description of how "the human spirit or intelligence may even in this life be rapt by Divine possession beyond its normal activity or intellectual contemplation, (and how it) may attain to the mystical union and the direct vision of God in His simple unity instead of in the multiplicity of His powers." Armstrong emphasises that not only is Philo's doctrine clearly connected with the "ancient Greek conception of enthouasms, possession by a God, but its deeper roots are to be found in the tradition of the Hebrew prophets." "Only one who has achieved this state has attained the heights of pure spirituality....This 'drawing near to God' is the greatest 'good' which man can obtain in this world," says Klausner.

Philo called it 'sober intoxication'. The early Christians at Pentecost were also believed to be intoxicated though sober. It is interesting to follow Taylor's reasoning about the Spirit of God in this connection. "There is more of Dionysius than of Apollo in the Holy Spirit", says Taylor. "In later times the younger god Dionysius, travelling through all the lands of the Middle East, won back the devotion which the Great Mother had lost. He represented a resurgence of irrationality and ecstasy. An affronted puritan conscience will be quick to point out that he was merely the god of intoxication. But we would do well to remember that that was the charge levelled on the day of Pentecost. 'These men are full of new wine' (Acts II 13) were some of the truest words ever spoken in jest."

It seems Philo would have understood that 'these men' were filled with that very 'intoxication of Holy inspiration', that the Pneuma of God had taken possession of them. It is generally acknowledged that Philo's strong emphasis on God communicating with man through the Divine Spirit and his doctrine of a mystical union with God were two aspects of his teaching which greatly influenced his contemporaries,
but that his theory of 'Logos' was especially important. No doubt, it was because of his mystical experiences that the Pneuma of God and the Logos of God became such vivid realities in Philo's thinking. On the one hand, he had this "inner illumination transcending thought". On the other hand, he "could not imagine as possible any immediate relationship between the corporeal world and deity, which is absolutely spiritual, so he elaborated on the Heraclitean-Stoic Logos in the spirit of the Hebraic-Talmudic Na'amah."  

Thus, according to Klausner, "Greek Logos influenced the form and tendency of the Philonic Logos, but Philo found its general essence in original Judaism". Like Plato's Form of the Good, Logos is for Philo the Divine Pattern from which the material world is copied but it is also at the same time, 'the Word of God' in Judaism. Cullmann finds Philo's Logos lacking in unity, but "as a result partly of Platonic and partly perhaps of mythological influence" it somehow "prepares the way for the conception of a personified mediator".  

The Hebrew term for the 'Word of God' in the Old Testament is DABAR. "In the Targumim, the Aramaic renderings of the Old Testament.....the 'Word' is called MEMRA." The LXX translators had to use six different words, besides that of logos, to express the different meanings of dabar. Barr points out that "the senses of this word (dabar) are 'word' and 'matter'; the alternative of these will depend on the context". According to Barr some scholars maintain that "when it primarily means one it suggests the other; when it is the event it suggests its own inner meaning, when it is the word it suggests the manifestation of this word as dynamic event". This is not, says Barr, the true fact about the actual usage of the words even if "there are cases where the senses coincide.....'to speak words' and 'to speak matters' are not really distinguishable.....".  

When logos is used to translate dabar, this concept, says Bouquet, "if read by Gentiles who did not know Hebrew.... would have led many to the conclusions that the Jews after
all had their own belief in the same cosmic Logos... which they were beginning to personalise. They need not have read Philo in order to draw this conclusion..."24. Logos for Philo is a spiritual mediator between the spiritual part of man’s soul and God who is absolutely spiritual.

We shall here take a short look at the development of the concept logos in Greek thinking. The word logos occurs in classical Greek from Homer onwards25 and we seem to be able to attach three principal meanings to it: speak, reckon and think26. Onians points to an ancient account from Alexander Polyhistor where it is said "that the soul consists of vapour (atmos) and logos are 'winds of the soul'"27. Onians then suggests that logos, originally meant "'thought' conceived materially as breath, spirit, pneuma", i.e. when the pneuma (breath) became thought and/or speech it was called logos27. In fact, in Homer, "deep reflection is conversation of one’s self with one’s thumos or of one’s thumos with one’s self"; Onians concludes that "this view of thought as speech contributed to the later use of logos as equivalent to ratio as well as oratio"28. It was an early understanding of the fact that you cannot think rationally without forming words and sentences.

Heraclitus teaches that "we become intelligent by drawing in the divine logos through in-breathing..."27. Logos as a distinctly philosophical concept appears for the first time in Heraclitus’s philosophy, as the Ever-living Fire, or the 'Stuff of the Universe' of which the human soul was a spark. Bouquet explains the Heraclitean FIRE as meaning not 'flame', "but much more what we should describe as a molten gas such as hydrogen"29. Those early philosophers were by no means consistent in their terminology; confusion is always possible, especially between the concepts Logos, Pneuma and Nous. Nous, for instance, meaning mind or intelligence, is sometimes used with the identical meaning of logos, standing for reason, intelligence.

In the thinking of the Stoics, the Heraclitean logos became the term for the highest manifestation of the Divine, Universal,
Fiery Breath - of God. The Divine Breath itself was called **pneuma**. Aristotle had used the concept pneuma for the material vehicle through which the soul communicates with the body, as we saw earlier. **Pneuma** became for the Stoics something like the pre-Socratic 'living stuff'; they "applied the idea to the universe as a whole because they regarded the 'universe as a whole' as a living being"\(^{30}\).

"The human soul proceeds into man from God"\(^{31}\); thus, analogically, **logos** (reason) is the highest 'part' of man's soul; to live according to reason is to be virtuous and wise. Goodness, Reason and Wisdom, in their highest perfection, are identical and the marks of the Stoic Sage. Boman assumes that when comparing the idea behind Greek **logos** and Hebrew **dabar** we shall find that the two concepts show "what each people held most important in the life of the spirit.....For the Hebrew it was the dynamic, lordly, majestic, powerful creative; for the Greek it was the ordered, measured, carefully planned, and meaningful"\(^{32}\).

Boman ascertains that "in Israel the Word of God belongs to the spiritual sphere......and stands in all formal distinctions on the same high level as the word **logos** in Greek thought"\(^{33}\). "All over the ancient Orient, in Assyria and Babylonia as well as in Egypt, the word, and particularly the word of God, was a mighty and dynamic force", says Boman\(^{34}\), who also points out that in "Egypt the power of creating and of sustaining everything was traced back to the divine word.....In the region of Memphis, Ptah is the creator of the world, and the specific origin of creation is the mouth which named all things"\(^{34}\).

In "The Theology of Memphis", we read about the 'creation', to which Boman refers above: "(Thus) it happened that the heart and tongue gained control over (every other) member of the body, by teaching that he is in every body and in every mouth of all gods, all men, (all) cattle, all creeping things, and (everything) that lives, by thinking and commanding everything that he wishes......Indeed, all the divine order really
came into being through what the heart thought and the tongue commanded.\textsuperscript{35} The above quotation is taken from a collection of readings called "The Origins of Civilisations", edited by W McNeill and J W Sedlar. The editors say in notes to the above that "Ptah, as mind and speech, has transmitted his divine power to all things", and that "Mind or intelligence was believed to reside in the heart."\textsuperscript{35}

In the introduction to the "Theology of Memphis" the editors explain that it "has attracted an extraordinary amount of scholarly attention - largely because it appears to anticipate, at a very early date, probably just after 3000 BC, the Biblical \textit{Logos} doctrine ("In the beginning was the word", etc. from John \textit{1})".\textsuperscript{36} Creation of the world, thus, does not depend on physical work but "Ptah creates the world through the power of his mind or thought and through the speech which expresses his thoughts. The assumption is that thought is the source of all that exists, while speech is its agency. Thus the things of this world are merely the objective forms of thought."\textsuperscript{36}

"The effective word of Yahweh is just as dynamic as the word of other ancient oriental gods", says Boman, "and must be understood in analogy with the highest human function; it is the majestic word, of command, sublime, and meaningful, creative or destructive."\textsuperscript{37} When quoting Boman it may be wise to bear in mind that some of his conclusions have been quite sharply criticised by Barr and by other scholars. Even though \textit{dabar} or \textit{memra} may at first have been only a literary device to avoid using anthropomorphic language when talking about God, there is, according to Jones, "a startling rabbinic insistence on the Memra's mediatorship between God and man".\textsuperscript{38} "The Memra has a deep theological and mystical significance."\textsuperscript{39} It is a manner of bridging the gulf between God and man, a gulf which was strongly felt during the 1st centuries BC and AD. Philosophers and religious thinkers, in general, felt the need for intermediaries between the infinite and the finite. We now meet supernatural beings in great number, "not only angels and the just
who have been taken up into heaven, but also efficacious forces such as glory, righteousness and wrath, as well as Logos, Sophia and Pneuma. "The trend towards the transcendent and the abstract in Jewish belief in God favoured the origin of middle-beings which interposed themselves between God, who had become distant from the world, and man.

"When peaceful silence lay over all, and night had run the half of her swift course, down from the heavens, from the royal throne, leapt your all-powerful Word; into the heart of a doomed land the stern warrior leapt" (Wisdom XVIII 14,15). Especially in an Alexandrian environment we find in the Judaism of this period that Logos, the pre-existent Word of God has become associated with Sophia, the pre-existent Wisdom of God and with the pre-existent Torah in which the Word and the Wisdom of God were manifested. In the above quotation "the Word of God is personified as the executant of divine judgment". In other passages from the Wisdom of Solomon, as is pointed out in the Jerusalem Bible, it seems that 'Wisdom' is identified with the Spirit of God.

"For within her is a spirit intelligent, holy, unique manifold, subtle, penetrating all intelligent, pure and most subtle spirits; for Wisdom is quicker to move than any motion; she is so pure, she pervades and permeates all things. She is breath of the power of God, pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty; hence nothing impure can find a way into her. She is a reflection of the eternal light, untarnished mirror of God's active power, image of his goodness. Although alone, she can do all; herself unchanging, she makes all things new. In each generation she passes into holy souls, she makes them friends of God and prophets; for God loves only the man who lives with Wisdom. She is indeed more splendid than the sun, she outshines all the constellations; compared with light, she takes first place, for light must yield to night, but over Wisdom evil can never triumph" (Wisdom VII 22-30). It should be noted, according to the commentator of this passage in the Jerusalem Bible, that "this doctrine of Wisdom gives rise not only to a theology of the
Word, but to a theology of the Spirit, of the sanctifying Spirit, the inspiration of the prophets, the source of knowledge and understanding of the world". We shall come back to Sophia, as the celestial mother, when discussing Gnosticism in the next chapter.

Dabar and Ruach had already at an early stage been used almost interchangeably in Hebrew poetry as well as in many of the narrative phrases, according to Taylor, who finds these two terms "as closely related as breath is related to voice" "By the word of Yahweh the heavens were made, their whole array by the breath of his mouth;" (Psalm XXXIII 6). "The same spirit of Yahweh speaks through me, his word is on my tongue" (II Sam XXIII 2).

In Taylor's opinion "the strict trinitarianism of orthodox Christian doctrine has probably led the church to draw too sharp a distinction between the Word or Logos and the Holy Spirit. In the minds of the earliest Christian apologists the two were inextricable.....it was the near-identification of the two terms which enabled the early apologists to present the first coherent and convincing theology of creation and redemption for that Graeco-Roman world".

However, there is a difference between the two concepts: "Spirit is experienced as inspiration, Word as revelation. Ruach is the eternal lying in wait in every moment, but dabar commits itself to the uniqueness of a particular moment". Klausner, from a different point of view, emphasises that it might well be said of Paul's treatment of Jesus as the Messiah "that 'Thou has made him but a little lower than God' (cf Psalm VIII 5). Matthew and Luke supplied "this little that was lacking.....(and) soon spoke of Jesus being born of a virgin and the Holy Spirit; and before long they were followed by the Evangelist John, a writer seeing in Jesus the Logos who existed at the beginning of all creation, and was with God, and was himself - God.....What could Judaism have to do with such views as these?".
Jones expresses what Klausner has just said as follows: "Finally the notion of the Word reached a stage beyond which it could not go unless in truth it appeared in person upon earth. At this stage Israel stops, the Church goes on". Perhaps one can describe what happened as follows: When the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, after His death and rising again, pondered upon His impact upon them, they were filled with the wonder of a new meaning attached to all those concepts from the Old Testament and from the religious literature of their own time. They understood with a new insight concepts like Pneuma, Wisdom and Logos. They understood, too, that the Christ, Jesus, had been perfect MAN, the essence of the Living Soul of Genesis I 7 and still much more, as Paul, it appears (though other views are possible, which will be dealt with later) tries to express when he writes "The first man Adam became a living soul, the last Adam a life-giving Spirit" (I Cor XV 45).
Notes to Chapter XIV.

1. Owen, cf p50
2. Hengel, Vol I p102
3. Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p108
4. Stacey, p97
5. Russell, p152, n1 (Between the Testaments)
6. Ryder Smith, pp75, 74
7. Klausner, p189
8. Armstrong, p163
9. Klausner, p181
10. Wolfson, pp79-80
11. Charles, p473 (Eschatology) ref to Philo, Quod deterius 22-24
13. ibid., Vol I p169 n1
14. Stace, p371
15. Klausner, p196
16. Armstrong, p164
17. Taylor, pp50-1
18. Armstrong, cf pp163-4
19. Klausner, p186
20. Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? In Immortality and Resurrection Vol 1 p256
21. Alexander Jones, God's Living Word, p17
24. Bouquet, p158
25. ibid., cf p139
26. Boman, cf p67
27. Onians, p76 n9
28. ibid., p28
29. Bouquet, p139
30. Armstrong, p123
31. Stace, p348
32. Boman, pp52-4; cf Jones, p9 n1
33. ibid., p61
34. ibid., pp58-9
Notes to Chapter XIV/continued 2.

35. William H McNeill and J W Sedlar (eds), The Origins of Civilisation, p32.

36. ibid., pp28-9

37. Boman p66

38. Jones, p17

39. ibid., p19 n2 ref to J Abelson, The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature, pp150-3

40. Hengel, Vol I p155

41. Jerusalem Bible, p1031

42. ibid., p1015 n (i)

43. ibid., p1014

44. John V Taylor, The Go Between God, p58

45. Jerusalem Bible, p814

46. ibid., p413

47. Taylor, p59 ref to Charles Raven, Natural Religion and Christian Theology.

48. ibid., p61

49. Klausner, p485

50. Jones, p22

51. Jerusalem Bible, NT, p308
CHAPTER XV

THE CONCEPT SOUL AND THE 'SPIRITUAL'
IN ESSENISM (QUMRAN), NEO-PYTHAGOREAN-
ISM, GNOSTICISM, THE MYSTERIES,
STOICISM, MIDDLE-PLATONISM.
Judaism of the intertestamental period, as was said earlier, showed a syncretism of beliefs from many different sources; many vigorous sects had sprung up displaying a "kind of Jewish non-conformity, opposed to the official Judaism of Jerusalem". Vermes, too, referring to the books of the Qumran Community, finds that they "reveal one facet of the spiritual ferment at work among the various parties of Palestinian Judaism at that time, a ferment which culminated in a thorough examination and re-interpretation of the fundamentals of the Jewish faith."

Schmithals points out that the "various expressions of Christianity cannot possibly have sprouted from a single root... The transition from the manifold forms of Jewish orthodoxy and of Jewish Hellenism to the variety of ecclesiastical Christianity can be shown with sufficient clarity in the extant sources". With regard to Christianity as well as to Judaism there were "three different religious forms circulating under the same name", i.e. 1) Orthodoxy, 2) Gnosticism, 3) Hellenism.

It is certainly difficult to define 'orthodoxy' except in broad outline. We said earlier that prior to 70 AD, in the Jewish church, all the spiritually minded men of the nation, whether Essenes, Pharisees, Sadducees, or Herodians, were united in worship of the same God. It is in this wider meaning that Schmithals can say that orthodox Judaism at Jesus' times "embraced Pharisees and Sadducees, apocalypticists and Essenes", as well as other groups. Other scholars emphasise that "whereas the Pharisees and Sadducees were 'parties' within Judaism, the Essenes and Christianity must be distinguished as 'sects'". And, according to Dimont, there were about 24 religious sects in Palestine at this time "proclaiming the coming of a messiah", each of them preaching its own "brand of salvation".

Both Pharisees and Essenes were influenced by, as well as themselves influencing, the apocalyptic literature. Perhaps one can say that the Pharisees were more concerned with
the books showing the patterns of rewards and punishments in the afterlife, and the resurrection beliefs concerned therewith, whereas the Essenes show the more 'spiritual' approach. "It was early Essenism with its doctrine of the two spirits, developed under Iranian influence, that brought about a dualistic sharpening of Jewish apocalyptic and the speculative derivation of evil from one power, in principle anti-godly, though it was created by God".

The influences behind the changes in the apocalyptic books which we have discussed earlier are called by Bultmann and his school 'Gnostic'. Typical Gnostic thinking, which we shall presently discuss, because of its radical spirit-matter dualism, would undoubtedly reject any "universal eschatology which involves the idea of (the material) creation's renewal as a 'New Heaven', and 'New Earth'... or of bodily resurrection". van Groningen assumes that Bultmann takes up the following position: "The Prologue to the Gospel of John is on the verge of Gnosticism, and the Apostle John's semi-Gnostic language is a point of transition between the two. Furthermore, the Gospel of John is a point of transition also between Jewish Apocalyptic and Gnosticism. As for Paul, he is midway between Jewish Apocalyptic writings and the developed Gnostic thinking of the 2nd century AD.

The danger of the Bultmann school is that one is apt to speak of "Gnosticism wherever a motif of the Gnostic myth emerges, even when, as for example in Paul and John, it expresses an understanding of existence wholly different from the genuinely Gnostic". Undoubtedly the apocalyptic literature, Gnosticism and Christianity were in different ways responses to the problems of the age. Each of them must be given its due, based on a "balanced assessment of their mutual relationships", says R McL Wilson.

We shall now turn to the Essenes' "response to their age". In this connection it is interesting to read about the French liberal theologian, Ernst Renan, who, about a century ago, declared that "Christianity is an Essenism which has largely
succeeded", and whose theory caused much bitter controversy. When discussing Renan's theory, Black asks whether the new facts which the Qumran discoveries have unveiled do not now "support the theory that the Essene sect constituted, as it were, the matrix of the primitive Church? Is the Christian Church a child of Esseni:m?"12. The different answers to this question would fill books.

Dimont, when describing how "the ruins of an early Jewish Essene monastery were found in the vicinity where John the Baptist and Jesus had preached", remarks that "the resemblance of early Christianity to the Essene religion grew into a mirror image"13. "Christianity had existed at least 200 years before Jesus, its greatest and noblest spokesman, but not its originator"13. Some writers have gone so far as to state that the Teacher of Righteousness was indeed Jesus. The Catholic scholar Père Jean Danielou, "listed twenty-seven reasons for believing that the early Christians were influenced by the Essenes", according to Edmund Wilson14. On the other hand, Driver rejects any direct influence of the Covenanters, or of the Essenes, on Christianity. He even insists that "the current identification of the Essenes with the 'Covenanters' cannot be sustained"15; and that the scrolls date from between 46-66 AD till about 132-135 AD15.

"Consequently", says Driver, "the Scrolls may be regarded as a collection of documents approximately contemporary with the writings of the New Testament; their authors breathed the same atmosphere, as they spoke a common language and had in some respects similar aims"16. Driver has been much criticised for his conclusions, especially those referring to his dating of the scrolls17. It seems however evident that whatever the direct connection between the Qumran Sect (whether Essenes or not) and Christianity may in fact have been, they were undoubtedly in existence at the same time, in each other's immediate proximity, surrounded by the same conditions and ideas and, as it seems, "each cut off from the body of official Judaism"18.
We shall here adapt the position which seems to be generally agreed upon by scholars that "the Essenes and the sect responsible for the scrolls were in all probability identical". We read about the Essenes in the works of several authors of the 1st century AD: the geographer and historian Pliny the Elder, Philo of Alexandria, and the historian Flavius Josephus, as well as in the writings of the Church Father of the 3rd century AD, Hippolytus. Vermes remarks about the three first-mentioned writers that they "have all discoursed on this sect of ascetics whose common life and severe discipline they seem greatly to have admired".

Dimont ascertains that Josephus' books: 'History of the Jewish War' and 'Antiquities of the Jews' are the most valuable volumes in existence dealing with the two fateful centuries of Jewish history, 100 BC to 100 AD. The following paragraphs are from the 'Jewish War' II viii. 11:

154. "Indeed, it is a firm belief among them that although bodies are incorruptible, and their matter unstable, souls are immortal and endure for ever; that, come from subtlest ether, they are entwined with the bodies which serve them as prisons, drawn as they are by some physical spell;

155. but that when they are freed from the bonds of flesh, liberated, so to speak, from long slavery, then they rejoice and rise up to the heavenly world. Agreeing with the sons of the Greeks, they declare that an abode is reserved beyond the Ocean for the souls of the just; a place oppressed neither by rain nor snow nor torrid heat, but always refreshed by the gentle breeze blowing from the Ocean. But they relegate evil souls to a dark pit shaken by storms, full of unending chastisement.

156. The Greeks, I think, had the same idea when they assigned their valiant ones, whom they call 'heroes' and 'demigods' to the Islands of the Blessed, and the souls of the bad to Hades, the place of the wicked, where according to their mythology, certain people such as Sisyphus, Tantalus, Ixion and Tityus, undergo their torments. A belief of this kind assumes in the first place that souls are eternal; next it serves to encourage virtue and to deflect from vice."
157. Indeed, the good will become better during their lives if they hope to be rewarded, even after their end; whilst the wicked will restrain their instincts out of fear if they expect to suffer eternal punishment after their dissolution even though they escape while they live.

158. Such, then, are the religious teachings of the Essenes with regard to the soul: they offer them as a lure, and those who have once tasted their wisdom do not resist.21

We said earlier that according to Hengel the Essenes seem to have been utterly disinterested in the idea of a physical resurrection and apparently saw the eschatological salvation "in the heavenly communion of the exalted spirits with angels". No doubt, the "Hasidic-Essene eschatological anthropology"22 is a problem for scholars, and Hengel refers to P Grelot and his rejection of "the idea that the Essenes knew the concept of a resurrection by reference to the earlier parts of I Enoch and Jubilees", as well as to K Schubert. The latter believed that the Essenes "knew it, albeit in a reduced form compared to later conceptions". Here, of course, the question hinges on the definition of the concept of 'resurrection'. The 'reduced form' in which K Schubert speaks of the resurrection would, according to Hengel, be something like "a resurrection of the soul endowed with corporeal functions".22

Josephus was in fact writing "a drastically apologetic translation of their (the Essenes') belief in the resurrection", says Stendahl. "Even if the Essene library found at Qumran does not contain explicit references to the resurrection, the tenor and context of those texts are far removed from the concerns epitomised by Josephus. The Qumran texts centre around God's promised vindication of the elect, which we have seen to be the original matrix of the belief in the resurrection"23.

We find Josephus' theory about the Essenes interpreted by the Church Father Hippolytus in a manner which may also be referred to as "drastically apologetic". Hippolytus was
a successor, Irenaeus of Lyon as an anti-heretical writer, and had, according to Chadwick, a mind that was "a curious mixture of scholarship and foolishness". We shall quote from his 'Refutations' XI, 27: "The doctrine of the resurrection is firmly established among them (the Essenes). They declare, in fact, that flesh will rise again and be immortal, just as the soul is already immortal. When the soul is separated from the body it goes to rest in a pleasant, light and airy place until the judgment. This is the place which the Greeks, who had heard tell of them, called the Isles of the Blessed. But there are still more Essene doctrines which many Greeks have appropriated to make them their own. Indeed, the Essene observances with respect to the Deity are more ancient than those of all the nations; which shows that those who have dared to speak of God, or the creation, received their doctrines from no other source than the Jewish Law. Among them, Pythagoras and the Stoics of Egypt received most in following the school of the Essenes. Furthermore, they declare that there will be a judgment and a universal conflagration, and that the wicked will be punished for ever."

To the above Dupont Sommer remarks that the "relation between Jewish Essenism and pagan Pythagoreanism is presented here in an ingenuously apologetical manner, and contrary to all probability; according to it the pagan philosophers were pupils of the Jews." It seems, of course, evident that Hippolytus is turning the facts upside down and it is interesting to note, in this connection, that Josephus in his 'Jewish Antiquities' stresses Pythagorean influence on the Essenes: "The Essene sect practices the way of life taught by Pythagoras to the Greeks" (XV, 10, 4. 371).

Even if Stendahl's suggestion seems plausible that Josephus' description of the Essene beliefs about the soul may be taken as an apologetic attempt to explain resurrection in some form, in a manner intelligible to gentile minds, there is still much evidence of their beliefs in asceticism and soul/body dualism. Smart draws the conclusion from Josephus that the Essene held
that the "soul is immortal and distinct from the corruptible body. . . . As often elsewhere asceticism goes with a belief in the separation of body and soul. It may well be that the Essene doctrines were in this influenced by Greek ascetic thought as exhibited by, for instance, Orphism. 26.

The Essene doctrine of pre-existence, which they had taken over from the Greeks, and the influence from Plato, is pointed out by Stacey too. "It only requires a hint that self-consciousness rested in the soul, for the Platonic doctrine to be present in all its essentials. It is difficult to explain why a narrow-minded sect like the Essenes should have drunk so deeply at the wells of Hellas. Probably they were led to it by their un-Jewish contempt for the body. 27.

The Orphic-Pythagorean dualism of soul and body; the beliefs in the soul's pre-existence before birth, as well as beliefs in its survival after death; the banning of "blood-offerings and the consumption of flesh and wine" 28; the ritual washings and purifications of the body, possibly in order to prevent the 'stains' from the body from contaminating the soul; the great importance "attached to the belief in angels or intermediary beings"; these are the traits of Essenism to which Copleston draws our attention. 28. In Windelband too we find the suggestion that the Essenes "probably proceeded from a contact of Neo-Pythagoreanism with the Hebrew religious life." 29.

"Pythagoreanism sprang up again in a vigorous revival towards the end of the Hellenistic age." 30. What came to life in Alexandria under the name of Neo-Pythagoreanism was the old philosophy in a new shape. Many Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic ideas were incorporated within its system. And for the rest, in the general Hellenistic syncretism, with its mingling and fusing, it is not possible to disentangle the many criss-cross roads leading to and from the different strongholds representing Oriental and/or Occidental religious thinking.
"It is possible in theory that the founder of the Essene community knew Pythagorean doctrines", says Hengel, though he does not believe in a direct dependence as "the Essene community wanted only to represent the genuine intention of the Torah and the prophetic writings and to defend its own Jewish heritage against all alien influences. Thus, these alien influences were accepted only unconsciously or in a polemic apologetic situation". Hengel, however, admits that the Essenes "adopted and worked over to a considerable degree foreign influences in their Hellenistic environment from Babylonia and Iran and indeed from Ptolemaic Egypt. But they are not typical Pythagoreans. Even the doctrine of the immortality of the soul merely corresponded to a widespread religious opinion in their Hellenistic environment".

Pryke, who has done a thorough study of "the Eschatology in the Dead Sea Scrolls", points out that his main thesis is to "question the conclusion made by the scholars that the sect was thorough-going in its eschatology. A close examination of the texts does not permit us to force into one eschatological pattern the community's belief concerning the Messianic hope, the Teacher of Righteousness, and the future life. As with the New Testament, there is no one continuous pattern or uniform doctrine, for the Qumran documents which cover a similar period of over 200 years oscillate between a this-worldly Messianic hope and a near gnostic attitude to the future life".

"Altogether, the ten complete Dead Sea Scrolls and the thousands of fragments belonging originally to almost six hundred manuscripts, amount to a substantial body of literature covering the Hebrew Bible, other religious compositions, and works proper to a particular Jewish sect". Among those scrolls and fragments there are some which express a "this-worldly Messianic hope" and to these can be counted, says Pryke, the Zadukite documents (also called the Damascus Rule), and the Scroll of the War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness (also called the War Rule), and a few of
the Hymns. In these we find a pre-occupation with "this world, with the founding of the community and its struggles for survival".

The following show strong Greek, Hellenistic and even Gnostic influences, according to Pryke: the Angelic Liturgy, the Hymns (with a few exceptions), the Manual of Discipline (also called the Community Rule), and the Horoscopes of Qumran. Referring to the Angelic Liturgy (IV QS1 i. 24-26) and the Horoscopes of Qumran, Pryke suggests that "the sect was mystical and dangerously near to Gnosticism in some of its ideas; also that the language of the Angelic Liturgy is near to immortality of the soul and far from real eschatology". In fact, says Pryke, "the Manual and the Angelic Liturgy support Josephus' assertion that the sect (if Essenes) believed in the immortality of the soul". The Manual of Discipline, (the Community Rule) says: "these are the counsels of the spirit to the sons of truth in this world. And as for the visitation of all who walk in this spirit, it shall be healing, great peace in a long life, and fruitfulness, together with every everlasting blessing and eternal joy in life without end, a crown of glory and a garment of majesty in unending light".

Evans gives an interesting résumé of facts found, and opinions expressed, by various scholars in connection with the eschatology of the Qumran sect. The following passages are from Evans's book.

"J. van der Ploeg (1952) considers that 'the obvious kinship of the sect with the Essenes would lead us to expect a belief in the immortality of the soul apart from the body, and this he believes is borne out by the texts, which have little to suggest a renewed bodily existence but much to suggest a life in a world of light, angels and God'".

"H. H. Rowley (1956) also thinks that the scrolls reflect a belief in the immortality of the soul rather than in the resurrection of the whole person, body and soul together..."
"E F Sutcliffe (1960) states that 'no passage in the scrolls reveals an expectation of the resurrection'. He notes that its absence is particularly surprising in the War Rule where, when some of the sons of light are said to fall in battle, one might have expected some encouragement from the thought of future resurrection.

"H J Cadbury (1964) suggests that this may illustrate 'how attention when concentrated on apocalyptic hope may leave out as relatively unimportant the question of what happens to those who do die'".

"Matthew Black (1969) disagrees with Dupont Sommer that it (the Hymn of Deliverance) implies the immortality of the soul, and denies that there is any evidence that the Qumran Essenes believed in the immortality of the soul as distinct from the body. He sums up: 'it is virtually certain that the sect had some form of belief in the Resurrection, though, so far, no unambiguously clear evidence for such has been produced. Indeed on the contrary, a number of passages appear to imply the old Biblical doctrine of Sheol, which seems to rule out, not only every form of belief in the resurrection, but also, no less, any kind of hope in immortality'".

"G R Driver (1965)... The conclusion, then, seems to be that the Covenanters had some vague notions of a physical resurrection, and certainly believed in a future angelic existence in eternal bliss in community with God, if only as a corollary to the eternal damnation of their enemies, but perhaps not in any resurrection of the body".

"P Hoffmann (1966) fails to find any evidence for a doctrine of a future state, and accounts for it by the community's imminent expectation of the end, but he refers to Père de Vaux's study of this end and that the dead were to be raised for it".

To the above résumé by Evans, can be added Cadbury's expressed
opinion that although the texts are "heavily surcharged with vivid eschatological pictures.... the published documents have little or no clear reference either to immortality or to resurrection from the dead....(also) that it ought not to be attributed to the texts just because Josephus includes in Essene eschatology the immortality of the soul as he does in Pharisaic belief, and Hippolytus attributes to the Essenes' faith also resurrection of the body"35.

Mansoor suggests that on the one hand, "members of the sect were unconcerned with the resurrection of the body because they expected the universal judgment to occur during their own time. No resurrection was foreseen, but instead an assumption of the body, sanctified and purified through the ritual of the sect, was expected". On the other hand, Mansoor finds that there is evidence for a belief in immortality in passages as "wisdom of life, knowledge of eternity, eternal life, eternal bliss and eternal destiny"36. To come back to Pryke, we find that he concludes that "the bliss of the elect as described in the Manual....is much nearer to 'immortality of the soul' than to the resurrection of the flesh (and that) on the whole the community's belief in the future life seems to have been transmutation of matter into spirit....."37.

In his thorough-going research Hengel repeatedly stresses that the Hellenistic period created a spiritual milieu which is very noticeable from the 2nd century BC onwards 38. The Manual of Discipline, in its original composition, "may date from the latter part of the 2nd century BC 39. The extreme spirituality in the thought of the Qumran community is clearly expressed, according to Cullmann, in the Manual II 11, where we find the "doctrine that the divine thought is the origin of all that is"40. We discussed earlier "The Theology of Memphis", where it is taught that Ptah creates the world "through what the heart thought and the tongue commanded". It is interesting to notice the same doctrine in the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy, though here it may seem that it is the "immaterial substances of Platonic metaphysics, the Ideas
The Neo-Pythagoreans most probably made the Platonic dualism with its motives of ethical and religious values the centre of its system. There is strong emphasis on the distinction between body and soul, between the spiritual and the material. We find a definite concept of the soul, as a permanent principle, having individuality even after death. Their dualism led, "on the one hand", as Windelband proposes, "to the doctrine which will have God worshipped only spiritually, as a purely spiritual being, by prayer and virtuous intention, not by outward acts, - and, on the other hand, to completely ascetic morals which aim to free the soul from its ensnarement in matter, and lead it back to its spiritual prime source by washings and purifications, by avoiding certain foods, especially flesh, by sexual continence, and by mortifying all sensuous impulses. Over against the deity, which is the principle of good, matter...is regarded as the ground of all evil, propensity toward it as the peculiar sin of man.""42.

When reading Windelband's description of Neo-Pythagoreanism, one is struck by the strong likeness with the Qumran sect. Copleston comments on the mystical elements which Neo-Pythagoreanism adopted, which seem an answer to "the contemporary demand for a purer and more personal religion. Direct intuition of the Deity was claimed and revelation - so much so that the philosopher is sometimes depicted as prophet and wonder-worker, e.g. Apollonius of Tyana"43. Hengel suggests that the revival of Pythagoreanism as well as "the success of the mystery religions" were part of a development which "was prepared for by a literature of revelation" in which we find described the "miraculous experience of ecstatic wonder-workers...often combined with a journey to heaven. The reason for this was that, as the world-picture changed, people were more and more inclined to transfer the kingdom of the dead to the starry heavens"44.

We read in Windelband how the dualism which opposed the
earthly, transient world to a spiritual, immaterial realm of the divine "ultimately proved to be the right expression for that inner discord which ran through the entire life of the ageing Greek and Roman world. (There was) a deep passionate need for the salvation of the soul" which came to be increasingly felt on all levels of the population. "The soil of the ancient world of civilisation, after bearing the fruits of art and science, became the battleground of religions. (And) the form in which this contest of religions was waged prove, in spite of all, what a spiritual and intellectual power Greek science had grown to be.....Each of the religions desired to satisfy not only the feelings but also the intellect, and was therefore anxious to transform its life into a doctrine", a doctrine giving true knowledge on the subject of the salvation of the soul.\(^{45}\)

The Essenes also stressed the importance of knowledge for the salvation of the individual as well as of the community. We find here, says Hengel, that Essenism "stands in the religious stream of the Hellenistic world" which can be described by the phrase "wisdom through revelation....The apocalyptic-Essene conception of knowledge anticipates many essential features of that in gnosticism\(^{46}\). Hengel finds that "Bultmann's definition of gnostic knowledge could, with the alteration of a few terms, be applied word for word to Essenism\(^{46}\), and he quotes H Gressmann as saying: "Gnosticism is the innermost essence of apocalyptic\(^{47}\)."

Again and again we have to admit the impossibility of finding within the Hellenistic syncretism of thoughts and ideas any satisfying answer to the question: "Who influenced whom?" Hengel stresses the fact that ancient writers did indeed present "the Essenes as a community of 'philosophers', who led an ascetic life in the wilderness by the Dead Sea in the service of the knowledge of God, wisdom and the love of man.....The very features which disturb us and seem strange to us, like the dualistic doctrine of two spirits, their determinism, the hierarchical angelology, manticism and magic, aroused attention within and outside Palestine through
their speculative scientific character; and in conjunction with the ascetic life of the community occasioned the supposition that the Essenes were Jewish *Theici Andrea* on Palestinian soil.\(^48\).

Gnosticism, a term we have now come across repeatedly, is explained by Chadwick as being, on the one hand, "a generic term used primarily to refer to theosophical adaptations of Christianity propagated by a dozen or more rival sects which broke with the early church between AD 80 and 150", on the other hand, however, the term is "often used in a much wider and vaguer sense to describe an imprecise, syncretistic religiosity diffused widely in the Levantine world, and existing independently of and prior to Christianity"\(^49\). Jonas calls Gnosticism "the spirit of late antiquity"\(^50\).

When pointing out with Windelband that "the ageing Greek and Roman world" was searching for a doctrine which would give 'true knowledge', we must add that there is a difference in the Essene, as well as in the Gnostic, 'knowledge' from philosophical 'knowledge'. Perhaps we may assume that religious knowledge must necessarily be different from philosophical knowledge and there thus emerges in the Hellenistic world a new aspect of knowledge of which Gnosticism is the most typical example.

The Nag Hammadi library no doubt leads in a new era in the study of Gnosticism. "The texts so far published", according to R McL Wilson, "belong to the Christian era and derive from the 2nd century or later.....As it happens, the editor of one of the latest volumes, claims to have found a pre-Christian document among his texts"\(^51\). The Jewish, especially, as we have seen, the apocalyptic, influence on Gnosticism seems to be generally acknowledged. "But Gnosis and Gnosticism are not to be derived from Judaism alone", says Wilson, "for other cultures have also made their contributions"\(^52\). The clear-cut dualism in Gnostic teaching between the spiritual and material, which is found in its a) cosmology, b) anthropology, may well be traced back a) to the "dualistic world-outlook
of Iranian religion" and b) to the "religious and philosophical traditions of Greece", according to Schmithals.

At this stage we may, with Schmithals, make an inventory of "the major motifs in which this Gnosticism is objectified:

1. a cosmological dualism, whether of an original or of a derived kind;
2. the myth of the fall of the light-substances into the power of the evil forces, i.e. the primal man myth;
3. the presence of the knowledge of this human essence and destiny, i.e. the redemption.

The following concepts....correspond to these major motifs:

1. Light-darkness; good-evil; life-death; from above-from below; spirit-flesh; God-world;
2. Anxiety; wandering; 'thrownness'; captivity; sleep; drunkenness;
3. Call; wisdom; illumination; knowledge; salvation; redemption; resurrection; ede_teleios; freedom.

"In recent years, the psychology of C G Jung has achieved widespread recognition in connection with an understanding of Gnosis", says Haardt. Jung seems to have preferred Gnosticism to Christianity on the grounds that "it is truer to natural realities and finds better symbolic expressions for the self".

Quispel regards "the essential factor in the origin of Gnosis....(to be) the mythical projection of the experiences of the self" and acknowledges with thanks the help Jung gave him in his research through "his important counsel and his inexhaustible interest". Jung always stresses the importance of the myth as being a revealer of important psychological truths.

It is interesting to compare Bultmann's interpretation of Gnostic thought with the above. It is, says Bultmann, "so radical that to it the impulses of one's own senses, instincts, and desires, by which man is bound to the world, appear alien and hostile - hostile to man's real self, which cannot achieve its own nature in this world at all....".

"The totality of Gnosis can be comprehended in a single image", and says Foerster, "this is the image of 'gold in
"The ineffable primal Father emanates Sophia who together with the Primal Father brings forth Anthropos who then falls into the power of the dark forces." These demonic powers desperately need the Light contained in the body of Primal Man to sustain the world; they tear Anthropos in pieces and create mankind; the sparks of light are then imprisoned in human bodies (cf Orphism, p 50 above). The consequence hereof is that the spirits/souls/selves of individual men are parts of this one divine being.

Among the many names given to these 'selves' are: 'Light-Dew', 'Light-Spark', 'logoi' (reason). "It should be stressed", as Haardt points out, "in order to avoid misunderstanding, that in many texts... the Spirit-Self is termed Soul, in contrast to others in which it is the Dark Powers which bears this name". The 'Dark Power' is the influence which the Archons of this world exert upon man in order to keep him in a stage of 'drunkenness' and 'sleep', a stage in which he completely forgets his origin. In some systems, says Haardt, we thus find "a trichotomos anthropological design according to which man consists of his Spirit-Self, on the one hand, and of body and demoniac power, often called 'soul', on the other. Behind this triple division a bilateral pattern seems to lie, since the element 'soul' would seem to belong to the side of Darkness rather than that of Light".

The divine 'sparks of light' consist of pneuma; psyche, on the contrary, "like the body, is a garment imposed on the real self by the demonic powers... this 'soul' is the worldly vital urge, the urge that is found in the senses, instincts and the will". Foerster suggests that sometimes "the 'soul' is taken to be an entity intermediate between body and
spirit, it has no part in the destiny of the divine element and must obtain for itself by its good deeds a lower salvation which is clearly delimited\textsuperscript{62}.

Only through \textit{gnosis}, knowledge, can the 'I', the self of a man, be freed. "The decisive turn to Gnosticism lay in the fact that man recognised his real self, his \textit{soul}, as part of the god 'Man'\textsuperscript{63}. "Salvation is bestowed upon the Gnostic......who has come to knowledge of himself, of his heavenly home, and of the way back to it, when the self separates at death from body and \textit{soul} and soars, released, into the heavenly world of light\textsuperscript{61}. During life the Gnostic had to memorise the right "magic passwords" and to achieve "the most potent amulets which would enable the delivered \textit{soul} to force the monstrous powers, barring the ascent, to open their doors and allow him to pass onward and upward to the realm of light\textsuperscript{64}.

When comparing the use of the word 'soul' (underlined here for this purpose) by the scholars just quoted, it is evident that they are using the concept in different ways. This uncertainty in the use of \textit{psyche}, 'soul', was evident also in Philo's teaching, and especially noticeable in the attempts of different scholars to interpret him, as well as in the terminology of the Hellenistic religions and of philosophic thinking in general.

Even though the basic myth was common to the different Gnostic systems, the details in interpreting the same varied widely, especially with regard to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a) the division of mankind according to their participation in the divine light;
  \item b) the ethical aspects of human life;
  \item c) the necessity of a redeemer and his place in the system, and the 'Great Journey';
  \item d) the relationship between the Godhead and the Demiurge;
  \item e) the degree of evilness and lowness attributed to the world.
\end{itemize}
a) The different systems give different answers to whether all men are in the possession of Light-Sparks.  
i) Some of the Gnostic systems ascribe the divine 'selves' to all men.  
ii) In some, mankind is divided into two basic types: those who can, and will eventually, be saved, and those without any hope.  
iii) In still other systems men are divided into three classes, as in Valentinianism: "pneumatics, hylics (material men) who must perish; and psychics who are capable of comparative salvation...."65. In all three views, however, the 'self', "the core in man, the soul or the spirit, cannot be created through any kind of effort on the part of man;.....The decisive thing is not something man must do, he has it; or better, he is it.

Systems of types (ii) and (iii) produce a 'Gnostic' who feels superior to the world: "The Gnostic - in whom the spark of heavenly light is alive - is the 'spiritual' man, the 'pneumatic', who disdainfully looks down upon others who do not bear with them the spark of light but are mere 'men of the soul' (in the derogatory sense), 'men of flesh' or 'men of matter'"66. The 'Gnostic' has felt himself addressed and has answered the call. "He feels that he is encountered by something which already lies within him, although admittedly entombed"67. In a single moment of recollection he KNOWS who he is, whence he came, the illusions of the world and his way back to the Divine Realm. This is illustrated in the "Acts of Thomas", where the King's son, who has forgotten who he is, and serves the king of Egypt, receives a letter telling him: "Get up and sober up out of your sleep, and listen to the words of this letter. Remember that you are a king's son..... And immediately I remembered that I was a son of kings, and my freedom longed for its kind.....And I found on the way the letter that had roused me.....and (it) also showed me the way by the light (shining) from it.....And with love guiding and drawing me, I went past Sarburg" (The Acts of Thomas, 110-111)68.

(b) With regard to ethics it is interesting to note "that from the basic theme of hostility to the body Gnosis derived
not only asceticism but also its converse, libertinism, in which man shows his contempt for the body and satisfies its desires because fundamentally they are no concern of his. Most sects, however, found liberation of the divine soul "in an ascetic life with rules for the mortification of the flesh and a special prohibition on marriage....".

Poerster points to "the call from the invisible world, which reveals the heavenly homeland, (and) brings redemption." In some systems this awakening 'call' is found in some form of learning, in a word or in a text or through some individual Gnostic leader. 'Poimandres' is a pagan gnostic writing in which there is no redeemer figure. "That is why man, unlike all the living things on earth, is twofold: mortal because of the body, immortal because of the essential Man. For he who is immortal and has authority over all things experiences mortality, being subject to fate. He who is up above the Harmony (of the spheres) has become a slave inside the Harmony. Bisexual from a bisexual Father, and unsleeping from an unsleeping Father, he is ruled (by love (eros) and sleep)" (Poimandres, 15)

The author of 'Poimandres' "has learned that he is immortal" through his vision and if he now recognises this and lives accordingly "then he goes after death into the higher world."

In the systems believing in a redeemer, we meet different interpretations of the actual 'Being' of this Light-Figure. The common idea was that he was sent down to the world by His Father, the Godhead, to help the sparks of light to remember. They are sometimes said to be "drawn out" of death into life by the redeemer. The Saviour is often thought of as being the original, though re-created Anthropos, and thus man is asserted to be substance of his substance. In other systems, the redeemer is not assumed to be directly related to humanity, that is, not of the same substance. "Gnosticism known from the Johannine writings, to which the substantial connection between man and redeemer obviously is foreign, precisely for this reason", according to Schmithals, "exhibits close contacts with the gnosticising Judaism that stands close
to orthodoxy"\textsuperscript{72}.

Also involved in Gnostic thinking about redemption is the doctrine of the transmigration of souls; many systems include this teaching which plays a "considerable role in the possible successive selection of Light-Sparks to be saved", according to Haardt\textsuperscript{73}. Foerster, however, assumes that for some Gnostic systems, reincarnation is "the special cause of terror" as for them one of the aims of life is "no longer to come into being"\textsuperscript{74}. It seems we have here strong Hindu elements. These elements could easily have attached themselves to a system like the Gnostic which denies the world. Orphic influences are, no doubt, very evident.

The last stage in the Gnostic's life away from his divine home is his final ascent, the Great Journey, to the realm of light through the seven planetary spheres. According to some of the Gnostic sects, each planetary sphere was ruled by a guardian demon and "the soul, in order to win its freedom, had to ascend through the spheres over which they ruled, subduing their guardian demons by passwords and charms; the adept was prepared for this journey by lustrations and sacraments and by instruction in the mysteries." This escape", says Driver, "was conceived as a rising from the material to the spiritual world"\textsuperscript{75}.

When we come to enquire (d) into the relationship between the Godhead, on the one hand, and the creator of the world, on the other, as well as (e) about the status of this lower world within the Cosmos, we can easily appreciate the difficulties in connecting the typical Gnostic dualistic thinking with Hebrew monotheistic beliefs. In Jewish Gnosticism Yahweh had to be both Godhead and the Creator of the world. This belief could, however, only be retained "with a certain inconsistency", and says Bultmann, "the difficulty was in a measure cleared up in apocalypticism by attributing to Adam's fall the consequence (still unknown to the Old Testament) of having brought upon Adamitic man, and 'this Aeon', the curse of sin, distress, and death"\textsuperscript{76}.
Bultmann suggests that this apocalyptic solution had been influenced by Gnostic ideas.

At the base of the Gnostic dualism stands only one entity, God. The reason for the severe dualism is explained in different ways, one of which is "a 'Fall', an illegitimate action on the part of a being created by God". The world, and in some systems, the whole cosmos, is all evil and cannot be redeemed. The end of the world will come when all the gnostics together, as 'sparks of lights' go "into the Pleroma". According to Foerster, in the world, the gnostics feel themselves "as people divided" but they are "destined to unity in the kingdom of light". The end of the world depends on the gnostics; when its time comes "it (the world) is either annihilated by fire or remains here below, a burnt-out heap of ashes, powerless and dead, or even continues in a contentment free from aspiration or desire...

For its teaching, its symbols and myths, Gnosticism "lays hold of the whole of ancient religion, and also of ancient philosophy, if it harmonises with its system, or can be made to harmonise". We discussed the Eleusinian Mysteries earlier, how they taught rebirth, regeneration, and immortality; gradually opened their doors to everyone living in Greece; emphasised purifications and ritual washings; also the question of their relationship to Orphism. Undoubtedly, Orphism, Pythagoreanism, Gnosticism, and the Mysteries grew out of the same basic myths and show much affinity. Also "Hasidic apocalyptic wisdom... was strongly influenced by Greek Orphic conceptions of the beyond" in its attempts to find an answer to "the burning problem of a theodicy", says Hengel. "The fate of the individual after death... (i.e) the basic question of human existence... had burst forth in an elementary way in the Hellenistic period and favoured the spread of the mystery religions from the 2nd century BC forwards."

Stacey points to the mystery which Oriental religious cults possessed, and how these cults "swept in over the eastern
Mediterranean like a flood". These cults would show forth all the "paraphernalia to attract the inquisitive. Processions, spectacles, dances, pass-words, magic formulae, weird rites, ecstatic utterances, and glowing promises were all proffered. On the more positive side, they faced the problem of personal sin, claimed to achieve expiation, and the promise of sinless eternity\(^{31}\).

It was nothing unusual to "polytheistic mythology" to believe in a man who became a god or in a god who became a man. Also the idea found in the Mystery cults of a god who dies and returns to life was widely current in the pagan world, and Klausner points out that "a number of their religions promised resurrection..... to the man who had attached himself to the god and had been sanctified by him"\(^{82}\). Gradually the Mysteries and their ancient vegetation gods changed their character as they became "detached from their native cultures", says Selby, thus later the "references to the fertility of nature were interpreted symbolically"\(^{83}\).

Among the most important of the Mysteries "infiltrating Hellenistic and Roman religious culture"\(^{34}\) were the Isis Cult, Mithraism, and the Cult of Attis and Cybele. The ritual of the Isis Cult was centred on the three figures of Osiris, Isis, and their son Horus; the mother-goddess being the dominant member of the family. Isis was depicted as the mother "nursing her holy child like the Madonna" and "profound emotions (were) evoked by initiation into the exotic mysteries" of this goddess\(^{85}\). Chadwick also describes Mithraism (an ascetic religion for men only) as having "sacred meals not unlike the Christian eucharist" and offering souls "a way through the seven planetary spheres which bar the ascent to the Milky Way after death"\(^{85}\). Of course, the likeness with Gnosticism is obvious. The sacred meal in Mithraism was a preparation for the "end of the world" when the god Mithras would come down to earth and give eternal life to the righteous, to the living as well as to the dead, who would leave their graves, arising to life again. They would be given eternal life by drinking out
of a cup in which Mithras had mixed the fat of a sacrificial bull with holy wine. Onians traces this mixture of fat and wine to the old Persian belief that "the food of immortality consisted of sap of the heavenly haoma (like the juice of the vine) and the marrow of the ox killed by Saosyant". Onians compares this drink with ambrosia and nectar, the former being "the oily and greasy and nectar the watery liquid of life" (Onians, 299).

Interesting facts about the Cult of Attis and Cybele were "the public ceremonies of 15-27 March when, after fasting and the Day of Blood (22 March) on which Attis was mourned, sorrow was turned into joy with the Hilaria celebrating his resurrection on 25th March". Chadwick points to the "striking parallel to the Christian Holy Week and Easter" and to the fact that "in the 4th century pagan critics accused the Church of plagiarism on this count". It seems quite evident that the sacraments of early Christianity were taken over, being adapted to their new use, from older traditional rites, especially the view of baptism as a spiritual re-birth; (cf John III 3: "born again", and Titus III 5; "bath of rebirth").

The belief in the power of the sacraments "hinges upon the assumption" says Bultmann, "that under certain conditions supranatural powers can be bound to natural objects of the world and to the spoken words as their vehicles and mediators. If the conditions are fulfilled... then the supranatural powers go into effect, and the act, which apart from these conditions would be on a purely worldly, natural one like a bath and a meal, is itself a supranatural ceremony which works a miracle. (Thus) in the primitive stage of the history of religious sacramental action can hardly be distinguished from magic".

The need to "live the symbolic life", which came so strongly to the fore in the Hellenistic world, is still felt today, or rather the rejection of this strong need is felt. Jung points out how the majority of his patients were "the lost
sheep" without faith. "To live and experience symbols", he says, "presupposes a vital participation on the part of the believer, and only too often this is lacking in people today".87

"Sacraments like the Taurobolium (Mithraism) were so impressive that it was not difficult to see them as the vehicle of expiation or rebirth. Though the blood-bath is not heard of before the 2nd century AD, there can be no doubt that the cults included similarly impressive sacraments", says Stacey.88 The ceremonies were intended to offer "soteria, freedom from the cramping limitations of this world, freedom from moia, and this not by an arduous moral struggle, but as a divine gift, dispensed through a magical ritual".88 The supersensory vision of Deity to which the adept attains through the magical act is in the later Mystery cults called Gnosis. This use of 'Gnosis' differs from the use made in Gnosticism, says Schmithals. Gnosis causes the Gnostic to "recognise his divine nature"; a 'nature' he already has. In the Mysteries the adept was given his divine strength through the miracle of a rebirth. Both theories can be found in early Christian thinking.

The fact that the Mysteries offered new life was of great importance; the "initiate was reborn into eternity ('in aeternum renatus'), not to share the misery of Achilles in Hades, but to the purified life of which earthly existence was but a base copy".88

Bultmann suggests that Paul, when interpreting the death of Christ in analogy with the death of a divinity in traditional pagan religion, combined the mystery idea with Gnostic thinking and that this gave his view "a new more comprehensive meaning", that is that Paul could regard Christ's death as "unified with his incarnation and resurrection or exaltation ....". It is plausible to assume, according to Bultmann, "that the mystery conception....readily combined with the Gnostic myth in certain Gnostic groups organised as mystery-cults. In one such group, for example, the mystery-god
Attis had coalesced with the Gnostic Redeemer-figure. At any rate, and this Bultmann states with emphasis, "such a combination is present in Paul".  

It is also interesting to compare the use made of pneuma in the Mystery-cults with the Pauline use of this concept. For both it was of great importance. Kennedy suggests that "so far as we can judge, the 'pneumatic condition' in the Mystery-literature seems always to be associated with states of ecstasy". Possibly then the Mysteries assumed that pneuma was "a divine element that raised man above his normal level and did not permanently affect his nature". Because of this it was necessary for the Mystery-adapt to live a moral life if he wanted to attain the bliss of the future life and the salvation of his soul; "the privileges of initiation could be squandered by base conduct afterwards".

The urgency for salvation of the 'soul' and the need for right spiritual knowledge are found also in the later development of the Stoic schools of philosophy. It is about the Stoicism of Seneca (c 3 BC - 65 AD), Epictetus (c 50-136 AD) and Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD) that Klausner remarks: "It is an established fact that there is a close relationship of ideas between the Stoics, on the one hand, and the Sages of Israel and the early Christians, on the other, in spite of all the important differences between them". As examples, Klausner mentions "the evaluation of spirit and soul above matter and the body, the extreme ethics, the excessive importance which they attached to the world to come....".

Stoicism was in existence from 315 BC to circa 200 AD and during these many centuries quite different views were presented as Stoic philosophy, especially with regard to the 'soul' and the spiritual side of man. In Epictetus's and Marcus Aurelius's writings, we find, in fact, a fully developed soul-body dualism which is in strong contrast to the original metaphysics of the school. Actually, as Stacey points out, the first Stoics had set themselves against the spirit of the age. "After Plato there was a tendency to
turn away from the sensible world to the world of the soul, to seek salvation and rebirth to a life free from the anxieties of this mortal coil. With characteristic courage the Stoics faced the present age and life as it was, seeking not salvation, but stability and resolution. 93

The 'dogmatic materialism' of Stoic teaching is often pointed out. Ferguson, for example, asserts that "when we encounter the world-embracing philosophies of the Hellenistic Age, Stoics and Epicureans, differ as they might on other points, unite in asserting the corporeity of the soul." 94 Copleston, when comparing Epicureanism and Stoicism, points out that "the Epicureans denied the immortality of the soul and asserted its atomic character; but they did so in the interest of their own ethic and not, of course, because they had discovered that the soul is in reality composed of atoms, though it must be admitted that the Epicurean psychology fits in better with their banal ethic than the Stoic psychology with the Stoic idealist ethic. Both Stoic psychology and Stoic ethic were constantly striving, as it were, to break the bonds of the traditional materialistic monism in which they were bound...." 95

In the above quotation a few points seem too generalised to be left unexplained. Epicurus's teaching was, in its essence, not banal, though it did become so in the hands of 'banal' followers; also, whenever the term 'materialistic' is used about Stoic Monism, one has to point to the differences in its meaning from the word 'materialistic' in modern usage.

The Stoics were traditionally monists, their universe consisting of one substance only. Hengel says of the difference in Stoic thought between 'soul' and 'matter' that it "was only a relative one. The soul itself was merely a 'fine body' (γόμα) of a substance like fire." 96. In a note to this statement, Hengel refers to the early Stoic Eratosthenes (275-194 BC), who had ascertained that "the soul always possessed a body, but there were degrees of fineness". Hengel also points out that "in the transformation of Enoch
to Metatron his body becomes 'a heavenly fire'"97, and that the feature of the soul as a 'fine body' may be "connected with the Semitic presuppositions" of the Stoics and that this "connection also is significant for the Pauline conception of the resurrection (I Cor XV 44, 50; Phil III 21)"96. We may point out here that the founder of Stoicism (315 BC) was Zeno from Cyprus, a man probably of Semitic origin, who, it is said, seemed more like a prophet than a philosopher.

This one, divine, primitive substance, which seems to be something like the living stuff of the pre-Socratic philosophers, is by Bouquet described as "a kind of compressible gas or expansible solid - perhaps not unlike molten hydrogen"98. This essence divides into the active and the passive, into force and matter. "As a force, the deity is fire or warm vital breath, pneuma; as matter, it changes itself out of moist vapour partly into water, partly into earth"99. According to Windelband, for the Stoics 'fire is the soul and the 'moist' is the body of the world-god; and yet the two form a single being, identical with itself"99. The Universe is thus regarded as an animate, living being. The 'World-God' had many names; the terms and concepts were not kept apart but overlapped and were confused; thus the Divine Being was called sometimes Reason, or Nature, and often Divine Fire or Pneuma. As 'IT' was completely real and rational, 'IT' was, according to Stoic thinking, undoubtedly matter. Their materialism certainly differed from what we would call materialism today.

As was said earlier, Reason (logos), also called nous or dianoia, is the Ruling Principle of the Universal Fiery Breath. Nous was also assumed to be a 'material' thing in spite of its immaterial character. Thus "even pure abstractions had bodily existence, for without matter of some kind, there was no existence at all"100. Nous in a man is the highest and truest expression of his soul. "Nous directed the whole man to achieve that conformity with nature which was the basis of Stoic morality"100. Pneuma as Nature was somehow THE LIFE and consisted of "all human
souls together with the divine fire"\textsuperscript{101}. The human soul, \textit{psyche}, was not differentiated from \textit{pneuma} in any exact way, but flew as \textit{pneuma} into man through the breath. Somehow, \textit{psyche} was the personal in man, and "\textit{pneuma} the substance from which it was made" says Stacey. It seems also that "sensuous, emotional and intellectual activities depended upon the strength and movement of the \textit{pneuma}"\textsuperscript{100}.

In the same way as \textit{nous} (\textit{logos}, or the Cosmic Principle) controls the entire living Universe (\textit{pneuma}, or the Divine Fire), and in a man controls his soul, so has also "each species a specific principle, to which is given the title \textit{Spermatikos Logos}. The idea is that each sperma or seed contains within itself the principle of its own development, and this is its own \textit{Logos}, a specific and individual formula of '\textit{pneuma-tonos}'\textsuperscript{102}. There is found in each level of existence a particular kind of \textit{tonos}, or 'tension'. The particular tension in inorganic subjects is \textit{hexis} = cohesion; in vegetables it is \textit{physis} = power of growth; in animals it is \textit{psyche} = material soul; in man it is \textit{nous} = reason\textsuperscript{102}.

As we have seen, God is related to the world exactly as the soul is to the body. The seat of the deity "was located by the Stoics sometimes in heaven, sometimes in the sun, sometimes in the midst of the world"\textsuperscript{103}. The ruling part of the individual soul, its \textit{logos} or \textit{nous}, with ideas, judgments and emotions, was thought to be located in the heart and to be circulated through the blood-stream\textsuperscript{104}. In this analogy between macrocosm and microcosm not only is the individual soul, the vital force of the body, regarded as fiery breath (\textit{pneuma}), but, says Windelband, "all the individual forces which are active in the members and control their purposive functions, are also such vital minds or spirits (\textit{spiritus animales})"\textsuperscript{103}. Thus we find here again the stress on 'blood' and 'breath' and the heart centre.

On the level of the macrocosm we find 'forces' on a greater scale. As emanations of the World-God there appear mediating powers, the ruling spirits of the world's life, which,
according to Windelband, "represent, each in its realm, the vital force and Providence of the World-Reason, and to them the piety of the Stoics turned in the forms of worship of positive religion. The polytheism of the popular faith was thus philosophically re-established...into metaphysical pantheism". It is interesting to note the Stoic attempt to give a philosophical meaning to the creations of myth and "to bring natural and positive religion into harmony".

Posidonius of Apamea (c 130-46 BC), an influential philosopher of the Middle Stoa, was an eager admirer of Plato and might be responsible, says Wallis, "for much of the Platonising Stoicism in Cicero and late Stoic writers, notable Seneca". Posidonius believed that the immortal soul after death left the body and lived in the air until the next world-conflagration. "There is no hell", says Bertrand Russell, "but the wicked are not so fortunate as the good, for sin makes the vapours of the soul muddy, and prevents it from rising as far as the good soul rises. The very wicked stay near the earth and are reincarnated: the truly virtuous rise to the stellar sphere and spend their time watching the stars go round. They can help other souls; this explains the truth of astrology".

Posidonius believed, as did Philo, and along the same lines, in the pre-existence of the individual soul. According to Stacey "this is out of harmony with Stoic pantheism and suggests that 'pandaemonism' sometimes replaced it", in other words, that there is a place where the 'daemons' and the human souls wait for the next incarnation. It is suggested by Bevan that "by his revival of Orphic notions and incorporation of Neo-Pythagorean beliefs, Posidonius may have paved the way for Gnosticism".

It is interesting to compare Plato's vision of the soul's previous knowledge, the Platonic recollection theory, the Gnostic myth of the Sparks of Light and their hidden Gnosis, the Stoic perception of knowledge as the kindling of the small light from the Great Light; Cicero's view that
right knowledge is implanted by God in the soul – with the early Christian doctrine of right knowledge as Divine revelation within the human soul.

As we remarked earlier, late Stoicism in its development through the 1st century philosophers Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, shows close relationship with Christianity. Bultmann points to possible Stoic influence on Christian thought. "An easy point of contact", he says, "could be the Stoic battle against 'desire' and their exhortation to 'renounce' and to 'regard as foreign' to one's self all that is not truly in one's power: i.e. everything external". When comparing Stoicism and Gnosticism, Bultmann assumes that, in fact, "the motifs of Gnostic dualism could operate on Christian thinking even in conjunction with Stoic ideas, since for both Stoicism and Gnosticism the sphere of flesh and sensuality is degraded, although 'the Spirit', which is the opposite of sensuality, is differently conceived by the two".

The difference Bultmann is implying is, of course, the fact that to the Gnostic the spirit is completely in opposition to the world, which is evil and created by anti-Godly powers; whereas to Stoic, pantheistic thinking, the world is part of God, of pneuma. Referring to Marcus Aurelius, Bertrand Russell asserts that, "he finds comfort in the thought of the universe as a closely-knit whole; it is (for him) one living being, having one substance and one soul". But, on the other hand, Marcus Aurelius contradicts this vision of a metaphysical unity through the thorough-going anthropological dualism which he shares with Seneca and Epictetus. Marcus Aurelius makes a distinction, not only with regard to man's sensuous nature, that is between "the coarse material and the psychical breath of pneuma which animates it", says Windelband, but he also separates, very decidedly, from the latter, "the soul proper, the rational spirit or intelligence (nous or daiancia), as an incorporeal being". This was a development of the original conception of the Stoic Logos along, as it seems, Aristotelian lines.

In Seneca we meet the typical Orphic soul/body opposition
between 'soul and flesh': "The body is only a husk, it is a fetter, a prison for the mind...." 112. Among the sayings of Epictetus we find: "Zeus could not make the body free, but he gave us a portion of his divinity"113. "God is a merciful father, who takes care of mankind....all men are equal in relation to deity"114. "Man carries God within him, in his inmost soul"114. "On earth we are prisoners, and in an earthly body"113. "For wretched indeed is the body, and the source of all misfortunes to the one for whom there is nothing better than the flesh, who does not recognise the divine soul and spirit within him"114. "Thou are a little soul bearing about a corpse"113.

On the question whether the soul survives death, there have been many conflicting answers from Stoic thinkers through the centuries. Most Stoics believed that the soul perished with the body, but some believed in a kind of duration of all souls, or the souls of the wise only, until the universal conflagration of the world, when all souls would be reabsorbed into the whole. This event would be repeated at certain intervals in the life of the Cosmos, at times when things were again in need of being restored to their basic nature, that is, to fire.

One might have assumed that the later Stoic philosophers, with their dualistic view of man, believed in an individual immortality of the soul. This does not seem to have been the case. Armstrong asserts of the Stoic Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, that "he does not, however, share the confident Platonic belief in immortality, but follows the Stoic tradition which regarded the survival of the soul as doubtful at best"115. Brehier finds that the Emperor believed that "through death the individual is returned to the universe and diffused throughout it, that death is an emancipation, and that it enables us to escape from the danger of intellectual decrepitude"116.

Undoubtedly, Stoicism exerted much influence on the contemporary world. Copleston emphasises the following Stoic traits: "the insistence on man's kinship with God, on
purification of the soul by self-control and moral education, on submission to the 'Divine Will', together with the broadening influence of its cosmopolitanism. Klausner points out that "Stoic universalism prepared the way for the equality of all nations and the equality of slaves and freemen in Christianity as a religion." Windelband, too, mentions the very high values which Christianity took over: "the idea of an ethical community of all men", the demand for "justice and the universal love of man", and the hope of an ideal state which would be a "spiritual unity of knowledge and will".

All this may sound positive and optimistic, but with regard to the last great Stoics, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, "the general impression is a saddening one. They preach magnificently the nothingness and futility of all earthly things." A critic of Stoicism is the Middle Platonist, Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca 45 AD) who, among his many works, wrote several books against the Stoics and the Epicureans. He was influenced by Plato, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, and especially by the Neo-Pythagoreans. In fact, Windelband remarks that "scarcely to be separated from the Neo-Pythagoreans are the eclectic Platonists of the 1st century of our era, such as Plutarch of Chaeronea and Apuleius of Madaura." Plutarch looked for a purer and more personal religion, as did nearly all the philosophers and pseudo-philosophers of his time; they wanted "knowledge of the truth about the divine world and the greatest possible likeness to god".

Plutarch is known as philosopher, priest and theologian all in one, and protests "against the rationalist interpretation of the gods; against both the interpretation that reduces the gods to faculties and passions of the soul, and against Stoicism that treats them as natural forces", says Brehier. Plutarch believed strongly that in every religion the same God is worshipped, though the names are different. Copleston explains how he made use of "allegorical interpretations, in order to justify popular beliefs."
in his 'De Iside et Osiride', he tries to show that Osiris represents the good principle and Tryphon the evil principle, while Isis represents matter, (the neutral principle) which is not evil in Plutarch's view but, though neutral in itself, has a natural tendency and love for the Good.\textsuperscript{124}

We thus find that Plutarch conceived of matter "as formless Not-Being", and that he did not seek the principle of evil there, "but rather in a force or power standing in opposition to the good deity"\textsuperscript{125}. The conception of the 'evil world-soul' was very much in the air at this time. It was a conception which could be traced back to Plato's 'Timaeus' and the 'Laws'. Plutarch thus stated that besides God there was the 'evil World-soul', the third principle which took part in the formation of this indifferent matter into a world.

However, even if the 'World-soul' is the cause of sin and imperfection, it is not completely without reason, indeed, it may even show harmony. Plutarch somehow assumed that the world-soul had become divine "at creation by participating in, or being filled with, reason, which is an emanation from the Godhead"\textsuperscript{124}. In Middle Platonism we find beliefs in many intermediary beings on a scale between the Godhead, the first principle of reality, and the lower world, forming a link between God and man. The good demons were thought to be the instruments of Providence, a concept which was of great importance to the philosophy of Plutarch.

We referred earlier to the Neo-Pythagorean theory that the Ideas were the original thoughts of God. Armstrong points to the development of this doctrine in Middle Platonism: "The Platonic Forms are represented as thoughts (of the Supreme Mind); they are not only its content and the object of its thinking, but it (the Supreme Mind) is actually their cause."\textsuperscript{122} "By placing the Forms in the Divine Minds they prepared the way for a more satisfactory conception of the Divine Being than had yet been arrived at (in Greek Philosophy). The
making of the Forms the 'thoughts of God' was in particular a development of utmost importance\textsuperscript{126}. Later this doctrine passed through Neo-Platonism into the Christian tradition\textsuperscript{127}.

Supreme Mind, in this form of Platonic thinking, is remote and transcendent and, at the same time, the source of all 'mind' and of all that is spiritual. It is "exalted to such a height that it cannot be thought of as in direct contact with the material world or accessible to the human soul in this life, except in occasional flashes of illumination"\textsuperscript{128}. In 'De Iside et Osiride', Plutarch writes: "While we are here below, encumbered by bodily affections, we can have no intercourse with God, save as in philosophic thought we may faintly touch Him, as in a dream. But when our souls are released, we have passed into the region of the pure, invisible and changeless, this God will be the guide and king of those who depend on Him and gaze with insatiable longing on the beauty which may not be spoken by the lips of man"\textsuperscript{129}.

"Liberation of the body is the necessary preparation for that reception of the working of Divine grace which forms the goal of human life", as Windelband expresses it\textsuperscript{125}.

No doubt, the theology or metaphysics of Middle Platonism, with its view on the nature and destiny of the human soul and with its prophecy, revelation and enthusiasm, had great influence on its own contemporary philosophers as well as on later thinkers like Plotinus and Origen. We find in this philosophy a "general conception of the nature of man and of the good life which was thoroughly Platonic. The human soul was a divine being which had been sent by God, or had descended of its own free will, into the body and the object of man's life is to purify himself by philosophy and so prepare for final disembodiment, a return to the life of the god, and the vision of the Supreme"\textsuperscript{130}.

The syncretic nature of Plutarch's philosophy is shown in his conception of \textit{nous} and its relationship to \textit{psyche}. \textit{Nous} is the rational spirit and is separated from \textit{psyche} "which
possesses the sensuous nature and the passions together with the power to move the body." There are matters of degree: 'psyche' is better and more divine than the body, and 'nous' is better and more divine than 'psyche'. As 'psyche' is subject to passions and emotions, 'nous' should rule.

On the question of the immortality of the individual soul, we may assume that Plutarch believes in a future life of the soul. He "depicts the happiness of the after-life, when the soul not only attains to a knowledge of the truth but also enjoys once more the company of relatives and friends." Plutarch wrote several imitations of myths concerning destiny. Brehier tells of one of these myths how "souls after death ascend toward heaven, first crossing a celestial Styx and reaching the moon, where those that are neither bad nor impure reside; there follows a second death, and, just as the soul had separated from the body on earth, the mind separates from the soul, leaving it on the moon and ascending through the celestial spheres. No trace of a subterranean Hades is to be found in the myths; the world in its entirety serves as a theatre for the drama of the soul." When we later discuss Johannine conceptions and Pauline anthropology we shall no doubt find that the different religious sects and schools of religion and philosophy, which we have discussed here, have left their imprint on their thinking and writings. Perhaps the imprint which can be discerned is so indefinable that one must fit it in under the general term of Hellenism. Stacey, in an attempt to define Hellenism, says that it was "not a religion... nor a school of philosophy, like Platonism, nor a system of ethics, as, from certain points of view, Stoicism was, yet it affected religion, philosophy and ethics, and, indeed, society, government, trade, art, language, recreation, and every part of life... It created little, but it modified much. It was a way of life, an outlook, a tradition, and was at the same time elusive and inescapable."
After the 1st century AD the development seems to have been, in Bertrand Russell's words, that "the philosophers took refuge, with few exceptions, in Neoplatonism; the uneducated turned to various Eastern superstitions, and then, in continually increasing numbers, to Christianity, which in its early form, placed all good in the life beyond the grave..."^133.
Notes to Chapter XV.

2. G Verme, The Dead Sea Scrolls in English, p14
3. Walter Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth, p297
5. Dimont, p134
6. Russell, cf p72 (Between the Testaments)
7. Selby, cf p62
8. Hengel, Vol I p190
9. Robert Haardt, Gnosis, Character and Testimony, p9
10. van Groningen, First Century Gnosticism, pp182-3
12. Black, p99 (Dead Sea Scrolls/Christian Origins)
13. Dimont, pp131, 133
14. Edmund Wilson, The Dead Sea Scrolls, p134
15. G R Driver, The Judean Scrolls, p587
16. Driver, p590
17. Lasor, cf pp41-2
18. Jones, p13
19. Verme, p13
20. Dimont, p102
22. Hengel, pp198-9
23. Stendahl, p8 (Collection, ed)
24. Henry Chadwick, The Early Church, p74
25. Dupont-Sommer, pp34, 34 n2
27. Stacey, p110
28. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol I Pt II p201
29. Windelband, p214
30. John Ferguson, Athens and Jerusalem, Essay in Religious Studies, 8, p7
31. Hengel, Vol I pp245-6
Notes to Chapter XV/continued 2.

33. Vermes, p76
34. Evans, pp28-30
35. Cadbury, pp148-9
36. Menahem Mansoor, The Dead Sea Scrolls, p108
37. Pryke, p57
38. Hengel, Vol I p217
39. Vermes, p71
41. Windelband, p233
42. ibid., p230
43. Copleston, p190
44. Hengel, p210
45. Windelband, p211
46. Hengel, p229
47. Hengel, Vol II, p152 n770
48. ibid., p247
49. Chadwick, p35
50. R McL Wilson, cf p142
51. ibid., p29
52. ibid., p142
53. Schmithals, pp30-1
54. Haardt, pp19-20
55. G Quispel, Gnosis als Weltreligion, p17
56. C Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p250
57. Bultmann, Vol I p165
58. Werner Foerster, Gnosis, A Selection of Gnostic Texts, p2
59. Schmithals, p34
60. Haardt, p6
61. Bultmann, p165
62. Foerster, p5
63. Schmithals, p33
64. Chadwick, p36
65. Haardt, p8
66. Bultmann, Vol I p166
67. Foerster, pp2-3
68. ibid., p357
Notes to Chapter XV/continued 3.

69. Chadwick, p36
70. Foerster, pp13-14
71. ibid., p331
72. Schmithals, p299
73. Haardt, p8
74. Foerster, p4
75. Driver, p563
76. Bultmann, p173
77. Foerster, p5
78. ibid., p8
79. ibid., p21
80. Hengel, pp201-2
81. Stacey, p80
82. Klausner, p106
83. Selby, p106
84. Smart, p331
85. Chadwick, p24
86. Bultmann, p135
87. C G Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p162
88. Stacey, p18
89. Schmithals, p149
90. Bultmann, Vol I p288
91. Stacey, p80
92. Klausner, p80
93. Stacey, p76
94. Ferguson, p10
95. Copleston, p242
96. Hengel, Vol I pp99,200
97. ibid., Vol II, p133.
99. Windelband, p186
100. Stacey, p78
101. ibid., p76
102. Bouquet, p141
Notes to Chapter XV/continued 4.

103. Windelband, p187
104. Stumpf, cf p124
105. Windelband, p211
106. R T Wallis, Neo-Platonism, p28
107. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p266
108. Stacey, p77
110. Bultmann, Vol I pp106-7
111. Bertrand Russell, p272
112. Windelband, p230
113. Bertrand Russell, p269
114. Klausner, p75
115. Armstrong, p145
116. Emile Brehier, The Hellenistic and Roman Age, p161
117. Copleston, p248
118. Klausner, p64
119. Windelband, pp175-6
120. Armstrong, p145
121. Windelband, p213
122. Armstrong, p149
123. Brehier, p172
124. Copleston, p198
125. Windelband, pp231-2
126. Armstrong, p155
127. Copleston, cf p192
128. Armstrong, p151
129. Copleston, pp197-8
130. Armstrong, p154
131. Brehier, p172
132. Stacey, p18
133. Bertrand Russell, p259
PART IV

EARLY CHRISTIAN THINKING.
CHAPTER XVI

THE NEW TESTAMENT ON THE MESSAGE OF JESUS.
Bultmann states that the message of Jesus is a presupposition for the theology of the New Testament rather than a part of that theology itself, in other words, that the theology of the New Testament begins with the kerygma of the earliest Church and not before. Bultman writes, "But the fact that Jesus had appeared and the message which he had proclaimed were, of course, among its historical presuppositions, and for this reason Jesus' message cannot be omitted from the delineation of New Testament theology".\(^1\)

This statement would no doubt have a shocking effect on most Christian laymen, but it was in accordance with the "famous programme of demythologisation" which began to receive "widespread attention during the second world war, when Bultman published his article 'New Testament and Mythology'\(^2\). "Bultmann's point of departure is that biblical mythology expresses a truth in an absolute way", says Dinkler, "the mythological elements of the Bible are in no way an inherent part of our Christian message - they are but time-bound clothes of thought".\(^3\)

Quite early in the 20th century, Albert Schweitzer had stated, "This historical Jesus is necessarily a stranger and foreigner to us and our time, and the recognition of this fact sets us free to follow the dictates in our own conscience of the spirit of Christ released into the world by the death of the historical Jesus".\(^4\) This deep agnosticism with regard to the figure of Jesus continued, especially in Germany, during the first half of the 20th century, and there was "an acute pessimism about the possibility of our ever knowing anything substantial about him".\(^5\) A "dangerous dichotomy" has followed on this and, says J A T Robinson, this dichotomy "is in peril not merely of producing a split mind in the critical believer, but of reintroducing a docetic Christ-figure impervious to history because untouched by it".\(^6\)

It is thus today as Perrin remarks, "no longer self-evident that the historical Jesus is in fact the central concern of Christian faith;...it may no longer be assumed that the
major aspect of that faith is to follow the dictates, encouragements and challenges of the teaching of that Jesus". Perrin is, however, convinced that "the absolute identification of the earthly Jesus of Nazareth with the risen Lord of Christian experience is the key, and the only key, to understanding the phenomena in the New Testament tradition".

J A T Robinson, in discussing the correspondence between "the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history" assumes that there can be no "1:1 correspondence such as uncritical piety has demanded... But", he says, "that the judgment of faith is dependent on, in the sense of being vulnerable to, the facts of history is surely inescapable for any historical religion such as Christianity". That we must begin with Jesus, and not include Him, as it were, on second thoughts, is made clear by Nineham, too, who finds that "however sceptical we may be as historians, and however much we may be prepared to attribute to the creativity of the earliest Christians, clearly something must have happened to account for the rise of this new religious movement which, for all its Jewish colouring, was markedly, and increasingly, distinct from Judaism.

Nineham suggests that instead of attempting "the impossibility of writing a life or biography of Jesus, as the word biography is now generally understood", we should turn to the "religious character and implications of Jesus and his teaching... The Evangelists may often have got these wrong, but at least they were passionately interested in them; indeed they preserved the material they did precisely in the attempt to pass on the truth about them. Accordingly, the Gospels constitute, at least prima facie, a source of accurate information, however critically they may have to be handled in the process of extracting it; and, even if we have to say with Tillich, "that it is not the refined argument of Paul or the mystical wisdom of John, but the simple sayings of Jesus, as recorded in the first three evangelists, which are the most difficult to interpret... we discover one level of meaning after another". The Gospels do not
really answer the question of how to classify Jesus. "For some he seems a simple ethical preacher; to others, a mystical prophet; to others, an eschatological visionary; yet to others, a political revolutionary; and to still others, the founder of a church", and Greeley concludes, "even in his own time he puzzled most of his contemporaries".  

As we know, in Jesus' times there was a feeling expressed on many levels that "God had retreated far off into the distance as the transcendent heavenly King, and (that) his sway over the present could barely still be made out. For Jesus, God again became a God at hand"; and He is near enough to be called by the intimate title 'Abba'. Jeremias emphasises the word ABBA. "We are confronted with something new and unheard of which breaks through the limits of Judaism. Here we see who the historical Jesus was: the man who had the power to address God as Abba and who included the sinners and publicans in the kingdom by authorising them to repeat this one word, 'Abba, dear Father'".

"Certain elements in the Judaism of Jesus made it non-Judaistic", says Klausner. "he overemphasised that God was 'my Father in heaven'". It is interesting to compare Klausner's conclusion with what Jeremias says: "With the help of my assistants I have examined the prayer literature of ancient Judaism - a large, rich literature, all too little explored. The result of the examination was that in no place in this immense literature is this invocation of God as Abba to be found.....No Jew would have dared to address God in this manner". "The Spirit of the New Testament is essentially the spirit of sonship, which is the spirit of Jesus himself". Taylor also points out that it was "Jesus' continuous and total possession by the Spirit (which) was, together with his resurrection, the ground on which the apostles came to be convinced that he was not only Messiah but Son of God. His unique unity with the Father was, as they saw it, both given and attested by his unique relation with the Spirit". We must recognise, says Taylor, "that here for the first time we see Man in total and unbroken union with the Holy Spirit."
It is interesting to follow Taylor's subsequent reasoning: he proposes that for fear of being charged with 'adoptionism' "the church began from the 4th century to minimise the part the Spirit played in the earthly existence of Jesus, and... to drive a wedge between the almost identical concepts of Spirit and Logos. But in its earlier innocence the primitive church found it natural almost to identify the divine nature in Jesus with the Holy Spirit".

Jesus was unique and he knew it. "It is this confident awareness of himself that lies behind all his moral demands with their authority and urgency and behind the assured conviction that his offer is unprecedented and unrepeatable: who does not gather with him scatters." "To make the reality of God present: this is the essential mystery of Jesus." The role of God's son "waits to be filled by a true representative. And it is this function" says J A T Robinson, "this prepared position, that the gospels present Jesus as occupying. He is marked out at his baptism and tested in the wilderness as the true son that the old Israel was called - and failed - to be. In contrast with the prophets, who were sent as God's servants, he is the son in whom all is vested, the representative who stands in and acts for God himself".

We read of his authority, of the directness of Jesus, in Mark I 22: "And his teaching made a deep impression on them because unlike the scribes, he taught them with authority," and again in Mark I 27: "The people were so astonished that they started asking each other what it all meant. 'Here is a teaching that is new', they said, 'and with authority behind it: he gives orders even to unclean spirits and they obey him. And his reputation rapidly spread everywhere, through all the surrounding Galilean countryside." "There can be no question", according to J A T Robinson, "but that in Jesus men did sense what can only be described as a breakthrough. The entire evidence of the gospels shouts aloud that here was, in their judgment, a new development, which could not be contained within the skin of the old...".
On the other hand, Greeley points out that it is important to stress "that Jesus made no claim to preach a gospel that was 'different'. His message was not a new attempt to define the good or the true or the beautiful. It was not a revelation of some deep substantive truth that men had not understood before.....There is but one secret that Jesus wanted to reveal: Reality is love. The Kingdom of my Father is the kingdom of love, and all you have to do is accept that kingdom and joyously receive his love".*

What Jesus brought to his brethren, says Nineham, was "the promise of the kingdom, a promise based on no external authority. God was coming to all who were in need of him, particularly to those who had traditionally been excluded from salvation and kingdom, the poor, the sick, the publicans and sinners, all those who did not by rights belong to it. These people need no longer run from God, for he would be their refuge". Tillich writes about the promised woes and beatitudes in Luke VI 20-26 that the 'woes' will be meted out "to all of us who are well off, respected and secure, not simply because we have such security and respect, but because it inevitably binds us, with an almost irresistible power to this eon, to things as they are". The beatitudes, on the other hand, are promised "to all of us who are without security and popularity, who are mourning in body and soul....not simply because we lack so much, but because the very fact of our lacks and our sorrows may turn our hearts away from things as they are, toward the coming eon".

"It is probable that the key to the teaching and the ministry of Jesus, and indeed to the whole New Testament, lies in a single phrase", says Manson, and this phrase is: the kingdom of my Father. Thus "to have life", "to inherit life", and "to enter into life", are synonymous with "to inherit the kingdom", and "to enter into the kingdom". Eternal life does not begin in the beyond, but now at the very moment in which we are living. No doubt, as Evans asserts, "two kinds of statement about the kingdom like cheek by jowl in the synoptic gospels and in their sources, that which speaks
of the kingdom as having in some sense arrived and as present with men, and that which speaks of it as still in the future, though immanent". We may note here, however, that John uses the themes of eternal life and Son of Man in preference to the Kingdom of God.

"But if it is through the Spirit of God that I cast devils out, then know that the kingdom of God has overtaken you" (Mt XII 28 = Lk XI 20). The claim of this saying, according to Perrin, "is that certain events in the ministry of Jesus are nothing less than an experience of the Kingdom of God". And Bultmann remarks that "though he refuses the demand made of him to legitimate himself by a 'sign from heaven' (Mk VIII 11f), he nevertheless sees God's reign already breaking in, in the fact, that by the divine power, that fills him, he is already beginning to drive out the demons, to which he, like his contemporaries, attribute many diseases.

Perrin finds established "beyond reasonable doubt" that the above saying is authentically a saying of Jesus and that "the evidence for exorcism in the ministry of Jesus is very strong indeed. Examples are to be found in every strata of the synoptic tradition, and the ancient Jewish texts regard Jesus as a miracle worker, i.e. an exorcist". Perrin observes that Ernst Käsemann once exclaimed that "he had no choice, if he wished to remain a historian, but to accept the historicity of the tradition that Jesus was an exorcist". Stafford Wright who has made a study of the occult in Christianity is of the opinion that we must not reject the possibility of individuals being possessed by evil spirits. He says that "Christian ministers who are used to exorcism recognise these, but modern thought is suspicious of the concept of demon possession....Yet Jesus Christ believed in it, and distinguished between normal illnesses, to be cured by laying-on of hands or anointing, and demon-possession to be cured by the word of command."  

McNeill finds that the "range of this uncharted field is well suggested by the most striking miracle of mental healing in
the Gospels, that of the insane man (demoniac) whose disease (a legion of demons) at Jesus' bidding passed from him to the Gadarene swine. In all the Synoptics the details of the incident accord with prevalent 1st century notions of demon possession, and the miracle is a dramatic act of exorcism. We said earlier that many features in Esseneism, such as magic, were of interest to non-Jewish observers. Hengel points out that Jewish magic is "witnessed to us by many ancient writers from the 1st century AD onwards, and even early gnosticism will not have been uninfluenced by it. Its roots go well back into the pre-Christian Hellenistic period; this is true for the magical Solomon literature and for the travelling Jewish miracle workers."

Hengel suggests that Matt XII 27: "And if it is through Beelzebul that I cast out devils, through whom do your own experts cast them out? Let them be your judges, then" shows "that the Pharisees, too, were active as exorcists"; and he adds that "the origin and extension of Jewish magic is fundamentally another expression of the feeling of superiority in Jewish religion; men believed that it possessed 'higher' powers, especially in connection with the holy name of God." According to Perrin we may here be moving "in the world of a holy-war theology such as we find at Qumran, where references to God and his Kingdom are to be found in the context of the eschatological conflict of the 'War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness'. "God is here acting in a situation of conflict." Stewart assumes that the successful work of saving and healing must also for Jesus have been "a token that the whole kingdom of Satan was being shaken to its foundations.... and that the kingdom of goodness and light and God was at last coming into its own." Bultmann sees the message of the New Testament as mythological, as drawing its material from the myths of Jewish apocalyptic literature and from the Gnostic myths of redemption. However, he finds Jesus' teaching "free from all the learned and
fanciful speculation of the apocalyptic writers...(Jesus) completely refrains from painting in the details of the judgment, the resurrection, and the glory to come. Everything is swallowed up in the single thought that then God will rule; and only very few details of the apocalyptic picture of the future recur in his words43. What comes through clearly in Jesus' message, though, according to Bultmann, is that the salvation of the faithful will consist not in national prosperity, and splendour, but in the glory of paradise43.

Examples of the Evangelists' attempt to pass on the message of Jesus, in its simplicity and purity, are the following two passages:

"Now after John was arrested, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the gospel of God, and saying: The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe in the gospel" (Mk I 14)44.

"From that moment Jesus began his preaching with the message, 'Repent, for the Kingdom of heaven is close at hand!'" (Mt IV 17)45.

'Repent' in Greek is metanoia. "It means more than giving up sinful habits. It means rather the transformation of the basic structure of one's life"46. Only as changed individuals can we earn the right to enter the kingdom of heaven. It is interesting here to compare with Plato's vision of education: "a matter of conversion, a complete turning around from the world of appearances to the world of reality" as we pointed out earlier. It was Plato who coined the word which we translate as 'conversion' in English. There is much stress on the importance of the conversion of one single individual in the great parables in Luke XV. "These parables are fraught with the gladness of redemption", says McNeill. "We feel the exultant joy of the shepherd at the recovery of the one lost sheep, and the happiness of the woman who has found her one lost coin"47.

It would seem, according to Greeley, "that only a crazy
shepherd or a foolish housewife would act so absurdly, just as only a slightly demented father would shower honour on him who was a wastrel\textsuperscript{47} .... The novel element in his (Jesus') Good News was that God's love was so powerful that it pushed Him to the point of insanity. God's passion for his people is so great that he dispenses with the normal canons of discretion and good taste in dealing with us!\textsuperscript{48}.

There was a rabbinical story very similar to the parable of the Good Employer\textsuperscript{49}, a story which must have been familiar to Jesus' audience. The rabbinical story emphasised that, in spite of having come at the last hour, those late-comers worked so hard that they did, in fact, deserve to be paid the whole day's wages. "But in Jesus' version of the story", says Greeley, "the emphasis is not on the hard work of those who came at the end, but rather on the generosity of the employer"\textsuperscript{48}. "Thus in this apparently trivial detail lies the difference between two worlds: the world of merit, and the world of grace; the law contrasted with the gospel\textsuperscript{49}. "Here, as in the "Antithesis in the Sermon on the Mount....legalism and the will of God (are thrown) into sharp contrast", says Bultmann\textsuperscript{50}.

"You have learnt how it was said: You must love your neighbour and hate your enemy. But I say this to you: love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you; in this way you will be sons of your Father in heaven, for he causes his sun to rise on bad men as well as good, and his rain to fall on honest and dishonest men alike. For if you love those who love you, what right have you to claim any credit? Even the tax collectors do as much, do they not? And if you save your greetings for your brothers, are you doing anything exceptional? Even the pagans do as much, do they not? You must therefore be perfect just as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mt V 43-48)\textsuperscript{51}.

In this passage "Jesus seems to make an impossible demand", says R Newton Flew. "The boldness and originality of the link between perfect love of God to us, and our consequent
forgiveness to the uttermost, had never been more exquisitely sung. However difficult the verse and its translation into act may be, it does clearly mean that men ought to love as God loves". Referring to the above passage, C G Montfiore affirms that "Jesus teaches an excess in virtue, an excess in forbearing, an excess in forgiveness, an excess in gentleness, an excess in giving and yielding. He does — and here there is originality — very often oppose the principle of measure for measure, as He is doing here".

Perhaps one can see three types of 'reward' in the Gospels. Cadbury, though emphasising the 'law of retaliation' in Jesus' teaching, points out that besides this there are "two rather different principles at work. One is the idea that independently of individual merit, God in the end equalises good and bad experiences for all men, so that evil now will be balanced with good hereafter and vice versa, (The Beatitudes)....The other is the prophetic emphasis on God's sheer generosity, meting out to men more mercy than they deserve, a kind of divine example of 'the second mile'. In the theistic framework of Jesus and his contemporaries such theology and theodicy is to be expected".

Cadbury, however, assumes that "in general references to the future life for Jesus as for Judaism....are connected with the idea of retribution. It may not be clear whether that life itself is retributive to the good alone, or whether resurrection is prior to a judgment at which rewards and penalties are allotted, or mainly a subsequent period in which they are carried out.....Formally at least the future is the sanction for what is recommended now". Cadbury stresses that "this utilitarian-sounding approach would suit the standpoint of his hearers. Jesus' own difference of emphasis would lie in what he recommends, not on why he recommends it. Even sacrificial, disinterested conduct is rarely mentioned by him without appeal to future consequence".

Nineham describes Cadbury as seeing in Jesus the moral teacher,
who "was interested in right conduct for its own sake, who sometimes supported and sometimes contradicted the Law without having any completely consistent theory on the subject, and — incidentally — whose understanding of moral priorities and motives was sometimes very much of his time and rather different from ours. If the rich man, for example, was to sell all his goods and give the proceeds to the poor, that was for the good of his soul, not the good of the poor. The reward motive is constantly present in the teaching of Jesus; demands for altruism, in our sense, are curiously lacking".

Cadbury, in his turn, refers to Jeremias, and quotes him as saying: "the perpetual twofold issue of all preaching in the gospel is: the offer of mercy and the threat of impending judgment inseparable from it, deliverance and fear, salvation and destruction, life and death". Cadbury, himself, finds that "this, if anything, is an authentic feature of Jesus' teaching".

"Jesus looked steadily at him and loved him, and he said, 'There is one thing you lack. Go and sell everything you own and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow me'. But his face fell at these words and he went away sad, for he was a man of great wealth" (Mk X 21-22).

It seems Cadbury has misunderstood Jesus' message. The point in the above saying is surely that one thing the young man lacks is love. He must change himself completely before he can help anyone. All the altruism in the world is only a poor substitute for love flowing from a changed heart, a heart that has repented. Love must come first and then that love will be to the good, not only of the soul of the young man, but to the good of the poor.

"And if you lend to those from whom you hope to receive, what thanks can you expect? Even sinners lend to sinners to get back the same amount. Instead, love your enemies and
do good, and lend without any hope of return. You will have a great reward, and you will be sons of the Most High, for he himself is kind to the ungrateful and the wicked" (Luke VI 34-35).

It seems this saying clearly stresses the difference between 'return' and 'reward'. The reward for someone who does not want a 'return' is the reward of the relationship with God.

Evans assumes that "if the notion of reward plays a considerable part in this teaching, it does not do so as a motive, but as a consequence and it cannot be dispensed with... The consequence can only be stated in terms of the consumption proper to it, which lies with God, whose kingdom it is, whose creatures men are and who is the author of the demand, to confer". Accordingly, that reward, as consequence, cannot be "stated in terms of what is self-evident and automatic (as, e.g. that virtue is its own reward), or in terms of abstract and autonomous ethic (as, e.g. that the good is to be done for its own sake), or in terms of some further stage along the line of man's earthly development and achievement".

Evans then concludes that "if the good action is good because, being done in faith and out of non-possession, it leaves the door wide open to God's use and consummation of it, it can be said to be an action which is capax resurrectionis, and in the long run it cries out for something like resurrection.

Taylor, too, refers to the difference between the world of merit and the world of grace when pointing out that whereas "the best of the Pharisees were men of principle: that is, not how anyone would describe Jesus. Even to call him 'good' is to miss the point; God was his reality, not Goodness. He would never have said with today's moralists that love means justice." For him there were no rules, only God. "No conditional merit - only forgiving acceptance. The openness of such a stance threatens every religious system and calls all principles in question.... In a world where there
is no condemnation but a welcome to anyone who can accept the
fact that he is accepted; goodness takes on an entirely new
meaning. For the first time one can be good gratuitously
because it is no longer necessary to be good. One really
can 'sin no more' because it has ceased to matter in the
old sense. For it was the awful obligation to be good
and the awful consequences of failure that made it so
impossible. No wonder the teachers of Judaism saw that the
pillars of their society were being shaken".

Bultmann writes, "Knowledge of God's reality frees one from
sin". Socrates said, "Knowledge is virtue". If you
really know, you cannot sin. Before you have that kind
of knowledge it is better for you to admit, i.e. to know that
you do not know. We quoted earlier: "Blind? If you were
you would not be guilty, but since you say, "We see', your
guilt remains" (Jn IX 41). To 'see' is to have that
knowledge of God's reality which knows that God is LOVE.
St Augustine understood this when he said "Ama et fac quod vis".

Bultmann emphasises that "God's Will which Jesus so urgently
proclaims is the imperative: 'Love!' Perhaps the incongruous
idea to demand us all to 'Love!' presents the real paradoxl
the most unobtainable goal?". Referring to the parable
of the Good Samaritan which clearly indicates that "to do
nothing where an act of love is required would be to do evil",
Bultmann points out that this is an ethic which "by demanding
more than the law - that regulates human society - does and
requiring of the individual the waiver of his rights, makes
the individual immediately responsible to God". And we
must not misunderstand the intent of this demand of God: "it
aims neither at the formation of 'character' nor at the
moulding of human society". Undoubtedly, however, if
this demand of God, this ethic, were really followed, character
would be 'formed', and the human society would be 'moulded'.

The following quotation from Bultmann expresses this train
of thought very clearly and very beautifully: "The Reign
of God, demanding of man decision for God against every
earthly tie, is the salvation to come. Hence, only he is ready for this salvation who in the concrete moment decides for that demand of God which confronts him in the person of his neighbour....Whoever has his will set upon God's Reign also wills to fulfil the commandments of love. It is not that he fulfils the commandment of love as an irksome requirement while his real will is directed at something else (viz. God's Reign), for the sake of which alone he obeys the commandment of God. Rather there is an inner connection: Both things, the eschatological proclamation and the ethical demand, direct man to the fact that he is thereby brought before God, that God stands before him; both direct him into his Now as the hour of decision for God"69.

We said earlier that of the two lines developing in Jewish religious thinking, one was limited to human understanding of Divine Justice whereas the other expressed the 'assurance of eternity' in the presence of God; the soul/spirit lives in a NOW where the right and wrong aspects are of no importance. Where there is the 'will to love' "one really can sin no more"70.
Notes to Chapter XVI.

1. Bultmann, Vol I p3
3. Erich Dinkler, Myth (Demythologising), in A Handbook of Christian Theology, ed Halverscn and Cohen, pp242-3
4. Norman Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus, p215
5. Dennis Nineham, Jesus in the Gospels, in coll: Christ for us Today, ed Pittinger, p52
7. Perrin, p208
8. ibid., p245
9. Nineham, p46
10. ibid., p46
11. ibid., pp52-3
13. Andrew M Greeley, The Jesus Myth, p31
17. Klausner, p5
18. Taylor, pp84,86,88,89
19. Jones, p149
20. Nineham, p55, ref to Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth.
22. Jerusalem Bible, NT p66
23. J A T Robinson, p123
24. Greeley, p55
25. Nineham, p55
26. Tillich, p35
27. Greeley, pp40-1 ref to T W Manson, The Sayings of Jesus, p345
28. Mt XIX 16
29. Mk X 17, IX 43-45
30. Mt XXV 34
31. Mk X 47; Lk XVIII 24; Mt XVIII 3, cf Charles pp370-1 (Eschatology)
32. Evans, p34
Notes to Chapter XVI/continued 2.

33. John Painter, John, Witness and Theologian, p44
34. Jerusalem Bible, NT p34
35. Perrin, p67
36. Bultmann, Vol I p7
37. Perrin p65
38. J Stafforfd Wright, Christianity and the Occult, p104
   (cf Mt X 8; Mk VI 13; Lk XIII 32.)
   (cf Mt VIII 28-34; Mk V 1-20; Lk VIII 26-39)
40. Hengel, p241
41. Perrin p67
42. James Stewart, A Man in Christ, p105
43. Bultmann, Vol I pp4-5
44. Jerusalem Bible NT p65
45. ibid., NT p20
46. Greeley, p44
47. McNeill, p75; Lk XV 4-7,8-10,11-22.
48. Greeley, pp47-8
49. ibid., p48 ref to Joachim Jeremias, The Parables
   of Jesus, p139
50. Bultmann, Vol I p13 (cf Mt V 21-48)
51. Jerusalem Bible, NT p23
52. Robert Newton Flew, Perfect Perfection, in the Handbook
   of Christian Theology, pp266-7
53. Newton Flew, p267, ref to C G Montefiore.
54. Cadbury, p146
55. ibid., pp142-3
56. Nineham, p61
57. Cadbury, p144, ref to Jeremias, (Parables of Jesus) p15
58. ibid., p144
59. Jerusalem Bible, NT p79
60. ibid., NT p102
61. Evans, p26
62. Taylor, p99 (Mk X 18)
63. ibid., p99 ref to Joseph Fletcher, Situation
   Ethics, pp87-102
64. ibid., p100
65. Bultmann, Vol II p18
Notes to Chapter XVI/continued 3.

66. Jerusalem Bible, NT p168
67. Bultmann, Vol I p10 (Lk X 29-37)
68. ibid., Vol I pp18-19
69. ibid., Vol I p21
70. Taylor, p100
CHAPTER XVII

THE GOSPELS ON THE SOUL
Charles explains that the meaning attached to the concepts soul and spirit "as found in the Gospels and the other books of the New Testament (save the Pauline Epistles)....is in the main that which prevailed among the people". Thus the soul is regarded as being "the bearer of the bodily sensuous life, and also of the emotions and of the higher spiritual life,....(and) is identified with the 'personality'". When describing the soul "in its higher aspects", says Charles, it "can be cleansed"; and "preserved from evil", and that "by the sacrifices of its lower and sensual life it can attain to the higher and eternal life". It is "capable of eternal salvation". "You and I are not the sort of people who draw back, and are lost by it; we are the sort who keep faithful until our souls are saved" (Heb X 39).

"....accept and submit to the word which has been planted in you and can save your souls" (Jms I 21).

"My brothers, if one of you strays away from the truth, and another brings him back to it, he may be sure that anyone who can bring back a sinner from the wrong way that he has taken will be saving a soul from death....." (Jms V 19,20).

"You had gone astray like sheep but now you have come back to the shepherd and guardian of your souls" (I Pet II 25).

As Charles points out, in the above sayings psyche has the meaning which was usual among the people. We have seen how in the manifold literature of the intertestamental period soul, and spirit, were used for that form of life in which man survives death. Something within man was thought to have been created (or re-created) 'immortal', deathless, whether called nous, pneuma or psyche. However, as R McAfee Brown affirms, "The recent recovery of 'biblical theology' in Protestant thought, has rendered the term 'immortality of the soul' suspect on two counts: 1) as failing to convey the fullness of the biblical concern with the ultimate fulfilment of the total life of man, and 2) as stressing rather the negation and ultimate worthlessness of a part of that life (e.g. the discarding of the 'corrupt' body).

The following passages, with their paradoxical truth, link
up with the motive of reward and merit which was discussed in Chapter XVI. We discussed whether Jesus rejected the counting of merit and reward, or, on the contrary, promised reward for right conduct. "Anyone who finds his life (psyche) will lose it; anyone who loses his life (psyche) for my sake will find it" (Mt X 39). "Anyone who tries to preserve his life (psyche) will lose it; and anyone who loses it will keep it safe" (Lk XVII 33). Bultmann assumes that this apparent contradiction can be resolved in the following way: "The motive of reward is only a primitive expression for the idea that in what a man does his own real being (psyche) is at stake - that self which he not already is, but is to become. To achieve that self is the legitimate motive of his ethical dealing and of his true obedience, in which he becomes aware of the paradoxical truth that in order to arrive at himself he must surrender to the demand of God - or, in other words, that in such surrender he wins himself."

"...Go and sell everything you own and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven;" (Mk X 21). "But store up treasures for yourselves in heaven, where neither moth nor woodworms destroy them and thieves cannot break in and steal" (Mt VI 20). The 'you' and 'yourselves' (underlined for our purposes) in the above sayings certainly refer to the 'soul' or the 'spiritual' self who does not need 'material' things. The same 'himself' which man is supposed to win, this 'his own real being', in Bultmann's words, is psyche in the Greek text. Martin Israel writes, "The Spiritual Self is called the soul in religious literature", the virtue of Israel's statement being that he is prepared to call psyche 'soul'. "For it is clear from Jesus' parables that the self which faces judgment after death is the same, self that has lived on earth in the body", says Hick. This scholar affirms that "in Christian thought the soul, whether detachable from the body or including the body, is the conscious, responsible ego which earns rewards and deserves penalties, which becomes or fails to become conscious of God by faith, and which is to enjoy hereafter the blissful life of heaven or (in the patristic and medieval tradition) to suffer eternal
loss of heaven".  

In 'The Theology of the New Testament' psyche is discussed at great length, the authors sometimes coming very near to calling it 'soul' (in actual fact, psyche is translated 'soul' on two occasions), but on the whole skillfully avoiding the use of this word so out of favour among contemporary theologians. Charles, as we have seen, writing some 70 years earlier, boldly uses 'soul' as appropriate for psyche whenever it stands for 'that something' which is invisible but still is thought of as having some kind of 'existence'. Barclay too uses 'soul' when accounting for the view of man "in the simpler thought of the Gospels". Man is "composed of the outward and visible part which is his body, and of an inner and unseen part which is his soul. The body will ultimately perish, but the soul lives on".

"The New Testament certainly knows the difference between body and soul, or more precisely, between the inner and the outer man", says Cullmann, who, however, stresses that this inner man requires a body in order to have genuine life. With the emphasis on 'body' Wright states: "If we say that a person is a body we are not denying anything in the Bible. We should be if...we said only". According to Wright we find the word 'body' 145 times in the New Testament, the term 'spirit' being used about 40 times of the human spirit, and "sometimes" says Wright, "it is debatable whether it refers to the Holy Spirit indwelling the Christian". 'Soul', then, is used "some 50 times of an inner and persisting something in addition to the body; sometimes also it is used in the sense of an individual, or as animal life....The fact is clear that the body is to be treated neither as an enemy nor as the whole man, but is to be the temple of the Holy Spirit, in which we are to bring glory to God."

It is interesting to read the commentary in the Jerusalem Bible with reference to Mt X 28: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; fear him rather who can destroy both body and soul in hell". The
commentators ascertain that "psyche can be used in a wider sense as the opposite of the body to indicate what it is in a human being that behaves and feels... or even to indicate the spiritual and immortal soul"\textsuperscript{16}. And the same scholars write about Mt XVI 25 (parallel to Mt X 39, quoted above on p 266): "Paradox. This dictum and those immediately following oscillate between two senses of human 'life': its present stage and its future. The Greek psyche, here equivalent to the Hebrew nephesh, contains all three senses of 'life', 'soul', 'person'\textsuperscript{17}.

For the present writer, the above passage, in all its variations, as well as Mt X 39 seem to imply all three senses: if a man worries only about himself (i.e. his earthly living form) in a situation where he should stand up for his faith, then he will later find that he should have worried more about his soul (i.e. himself as an eternal, living being) in the 'Beyond'.

Discussing the meaning of psyche in Mt X 39 (and parallels) with their slight variations, Schweizer, in 'The Theology of the New Testament', points out that Jesus' original saying may have been: "He who would save his psyche will lose it. He who loses his psyche will save it". Both the reference to preserving the psyche, says Schweizer, "and also the positively assessed losing of the psyche show that primarily the reference is to what is commonly called life, i.e. physical life on earth. The promise that life will be saved, however, shows that what is in view is true and full life as God the Creator made and fashioned it"\textsuperscript{18}. Schweizer also points out that although psyche may have no adequate equivalent since it means soul, life and self, "the word is not really ambivalent and does not hint at the supreme value of the soul. The psyche is this creaturely life when it is lived in the freedom which God intended... Dautzenberg defines psyche (here) as 'concrete existence reaching out to life in this world as well as in the world to come'\textsuperscript{19}.

When analysing Mk VIII 35 (parallel to Mt X 39): For anyone who wants to save his life will lose it; but anyone who loses
his life for my sake and for the sake of the gospel will save it"\textsuperscript{20}, Schweizer proposes that the meaning is that "death is not stronger than this life....\textit{psyche} will be preserved by God even though the loss of physical life is entailed.... Resurrection is the final actualisation of the fact that man receives his life wholly as a gift from the hands of God\textsuperscript{21}. Quoting from Dautzenberg, he adds, "we have here the opposite of the immortality of the soul in which the soul is regarded as a continuous possession of man even on the basis of God's gift"\textsuperscript{22}. We are here reminded of the view expressed in the intertestamental period, which we discussed earlier, with regard to the possibility of \textit{psyche} being a man's natural possession, whereas '\textit{pneuma}' was derived directly from God.

It is emphasised by Schweizer that in Mt X 39, as well as in all the parallels, the saying has reference to earthly as well as to eternal life; the two spheres are bound together through the \textit{psyche}. And it is because the believer already has \textit{psyche} that the "awakening to eternal life is not a magical change....Again the \textit{psyche} is not an immortal soul, for otherwise we should not be called upon to hate it"\textsuperscript{21}. We may point out however that it is in fact only in John that the verb 'hate' is used: "Anyone who loves his life loses it; anyone who hates his life in this world will keep it for the eternal life" (Jn XII 25)\textsuperscript{20}. It may perhaps be suggested that there seems to be much affinity here, that is the thought expressed in Mt X 39 and elsewhere, with Hindu thought. Detachment from the \textit{finite self} is the goal. The 'false' \textit{Ego} is the great obstacle to the knowledge of the true, the One, Reality. In his book about the 'Religions of Man', Huston Smith, when discussing Hinduism and its view of the world, writes: "The world can develop character and teach men to look beyond it - for these it is admirably suited - but it can never be converted into a paradise in which man is fully at home. 'Said Jesus, blessed be his name, this world is a bridge! pass over it, but build no house on it'. It is true to Indian thought that this apocryphal saying should have originated on her soil"\textsuperscript{23}. As we said earlier, with Bertrand Russell, "Christianity in its earlier form, placed
all good in the life beyond the grave.......

Schweizer does not object to psyche being translated SELF or EGO in the above passage, that is, a self or ego lived only in unity with the body. He finds that "the Greek division into body and spirit, into bodily and earthly life, on the one side, and a heavenly and spiritual life, on the other, is plainly overcome". And it is overcome because soma "maintains the concrete corporeality of the self from which one may not escape into mere spirituality", and because psyche is a guarantee "that human life is not just health and wealth, but is the life that is constantly given by God". It is through man and his attitude towards God that psyche, as life, "receives its character as either mortal or eternal".

We find what seem like paradoxes also in Mk VIII 36 (and parallels): "What gain, then, is it for a man to win the whole world and ruin his life (psyche)? And indeed what can a man offer in exchange for his life?". When discussing this saying Schweizer again refers to "this true life which is lived before God", stating that "man finds it, not by gaining the whole world, but by being a disciple of Jesus". Although psyche is in some respects, like being physically alive, it is more than this. "In the faithfulness of God, it also, applies beyond physical death"; and, says Schweizer, "even here the psyche is not just a future, eternal life nor is it a part of man that is thought of in isolation from the body. It is life lived in the body which can lose itself and find itself, and which will be unmasked as such, and consummated by God, in the last judgment". That psyche is "not a substance which survives death" is made very clear in Schweizer's emphasis on it as "life by God's action, the event of fellowship with God which will come to its fulfilment through the judgment".

"What gain, then, is it for a man to have won the whole world, and to have lost or ruined his very self" (Lk IX 25). Here psyche is not used, and it seems that Luke, who wrote for the Greeks, avoided the use of this concept lest it should
be given the Orphic-Greek meaning of immateriality; but the use of 'his very self' is not very different from Socrates' use of psyche as the real personality. Bultmann affirms that for Paul, as for the New Testament writers in general, a man "factually lives only by constantly moving on, as it were, from himself by projecting himself into a possibility that lies before him. He sees himself confronted with the future, facing the possibilities in which he can gain his self or lose it"26.

"You will be betrayed even by parents or brothers, relations and friends; and some of you will be put to death. You will be hated by all men on account of my name, but not a hair of your head will be lost. Your endurance will win you your lives (psychai)" (Lk XXI 16-18)25. Schweizer, in his comments on this passage, seems, to the present writer, unnecessarily vague and constrained. This saying is surely very clear and points directly to a better life in the 'Beyond', for that 'form of life in which man survives death', that is, for the psychai. Schweizer suggests: "One might ask whether ktesesthe tas psychas ymoun does not simply mean the preservation of earthly life. But after verse 16b, and in replacement of Mk XIII 13: "He that endures to the end shall be saved", the saying is probably to the effect that those who hold out in persecution will find true and authentic life. This goes beyond the passages already adduced to the degree that the psyche is not something that one only attains to. If it might be inferred from the other sayings that true life is simply given when it is orientated to God and does not seek itself, psyche here is plainly understood as eternal life. On the other hand, this saying, too, steers clear of the idea that Luke rejects, namely, that of an immortal soul which man does not attain to only in the future"27.

To come back to Dautzenberg, as quoted by Schweizer, when the former describes psyche as "concrete existence reaching out to life in this world as well as in the world to come", it seems difficult to understand what he is talking about. Why does he want to call psyche 'concrete existence' instead
of calling it 'soul'? He is using a kind of new language but he is back to exactly the same problems, for the difficulties are and remain the same. He seems only to be replacing one confusing term with another. His terms certainly show a more abstract and 'immaterial' terminology, even though he uses the word 'concrete', than does the use of the word 'soul' in the same situation, and nothing seems to be gained by it.

Schweizer calls psyche "the God-given Existence which survives Death"²⁸. What is the difference between this expression and 'the immortal soul'? There would be a difference if we thought that the latter concept automatically contained the idea that the soul is immortal independently of God, and that only the former conception contained the idea that it would become eternal because of God's action. If we, however, take God as the basis for all our beliefs about life after death, as well as for our understanding of life in the sensuous world, then we are already acknowledging: i) that everything exists only because God created it; ii) that there is nothing so 'dead' that God cannot re-create it; iii) that there is nothing so 'alive' that it has its life without God's will. An immortal soul would be immortal because God willed it to be so.

Even when discussing, probably the most Hellenised psyche passage in the New Testament, namely: "I urge you, my dear people, while you are visitors and pilgrims, to keep yourselves free from the selfish passions that attack the soul" (I Pet II 11)²⁹, Schweizer writes "here psyche is clearly a life which is given by God and lived before him. Fleshly desires war against it. It thus seems to be a part of man, the flesh being another part. The first part..... is summoned to a life which, even though lived in the earthly sphere, is already at home in the heavenly sphere. Nevertheless, this is the only New Testament passage where psyche plainly stands in antithesis to sārxa..... psyche comes close here to Greek understanding"³⁰. Schweizer's efforts to use under no circumstances the concept SOUL seem unnecessary, especially when he describes this life "as a part of man".
Has the other part, flesh, no life? Certainly when Peter wrote his letter he was using psyche for 'soul' in the manner in which it was used all around him, that is in the same manner as the English word 'soul' has been used by English speaking Christians right down the centuries.

Hick remarks that in our Western and Christian culture the soul "has generally been equated with the individual self-conscious mind or ego..."31. The soul has been regarded as the vehicle, in the next life, for everything that makes the individual that particular individual. "Dives and Lazarus remember their former lives and are aware of the moral appropriateness of the consequences which they encounter after death", says Hicks31. If we call psyche "a life lived in the body", or even "eternal life", can "eternal life" remember? If, then "eternal life" is only another name for the old concept SOUL, that is, for that form of life in which man survives death. It seems evident that we are being diverted from what the New Testament writers try to make clear to us because we do not have the equivalent to the meaning behind psyche/nephesh, that is, one word meaning self-soul-life in English. In the old Bible versions, this psyche used to be translated, as we know, in what is perhaps the most appropriate way, "The LIVING SOUL".

We discussed earlier another saying of Jesus which has been interpreted in many different ways, namely Mt X 28. There is a parallel in Lk XII 4,5: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body and after that can do no more. I will tell you whom to fear: fear him who, after he has killed, has the power to cast into hell. Yes, I tell you, fear him"32.

Owen assumes that in the above passages "the phrase 'body and soul', though its occurrence is rare in both Testaments, stands for the Hebrew idea that man is an 'animated body' and not for the Greek view that he is an 'incarnated soul'"33. We shall here make a short interpolation and let Ferguson refute Owen's assumption with regard to the Greek view. Ferguson writes: "It has become a commonplace of theological writing
to say that to the Hebrew, man is a body endowed with a soul, while to the Greek he is a soul imprisoned in a body. A corollary of this is supposed to be that the Greeks believed in the immortality of the soul, and the Hebrews in the resurrection of the body. As a matter of fact the natural Greek for a living thing is empsychon soma, precisely a body endowed with a soul, as even Plato shows, and Aristotle actually defines soul as 'the primary actuality of a natural body endowed with organs'.

To return to the above saying, Owen admits that "this saying is always cited by those who believe that the New Testament and indeed Jesus himself, asserts the essential immortality and incorruption of the soul, with all the dualistic implications of this belief...". As an example of the Greek interpretation, which he believes was decisively not in Jesus' thoughts, Owen quotes the following from E R Fairweather's book 'In Defence of Immortality': "The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, subject only to divine omnipotence is plainly indicated". Owen's own interpretation of the passage is: "Fear not man who can only bring your present existence to an end but cannot annihilate the essential self; but fear God who is able to destroy the whole man eternally".

Except for the fact that Owen succeeds in evading the unpopular concept soul there does not seem to be a very great difference between what Fairweather said and what Owen says. We discussed this fact of God's omnipotence earlier.

"That God has power to cast into Hades and to take out of it is an Old Testament concept", says Schweizer. Also, "the Rabbis agree that God can kill both in this aeon and in that which is to come". In 4 Macc 13: 13-15 we find a "summons not to fear him who only seems to kill. God is the giver of psychai and somata, and there awaits evil-doers a more serious conflict of the psyche and the danger of eternal torment". Schweizer then affirms that "the doctrine of the immortal soul is plainly intimated here."

However, when analysing Mt X 28, which was probably written
at about the same time as 4 Maccabees, the above scholar, on the contrary, stresses that the "reference to God's power to destroy the psyche and the soma in Hades is opposed to the idea of the immortality of the soul". Schweizer admits that Greek ideas have "influenced the formulation". But he is nevertheless quite sure that "here again psyche is ultimately life in the authenticity which God intended and which is still to be regarded as bodily life even in hell. Thus man can be presented only as corporeal, but what affects the body does not necessarily affect the man himself, for whom a new body has already been prepared by God".

Schweizer adds that one might logically refer the first part of Mt X 28: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul" to the "intermediate state when man is without a body", and the second part: "fear him who can destroy both body and soul in hell"; to "the time after resurrection". Schweizer, however, proposes that one may well doubt "Whether the dogmatic idea that God will put the soul back in the body and then judge both together is presupposed".

Of the same passage Cullmann remarks "that is seems to presuppose the view that the soul has no need of the body, but the context of the passage shows that this is not the case.....Therefore those who kill only the body are not to be feared. It can be raised from the dead. The soul cannot always remain without a body....The soul, too, can be killed. The soul is not immortal. There must be resurrection for both".

Boros reacts very strongly against the idea that the soul should at all be assumed to remain without a body. He stresses "that the conception held by many, according to which the soul would exist without a body between death and the universal 'resurrection at the end of time', and God would specially intervene to keep the soul from inhabiting a body, as is proper to its nature, seems to me bizarre, logically unsatisfactory and even grotesque".

Boros, too, prefers the word 'existence' to SOUL. "Existence is the whole man", he says, "in so far as in him world-reality
is consumed entirely 'into' the sphere of inwardness. In other words: Man is the being that can die into God....The absolute is 'reached' in death. For a person, for a 'being' which has wholly 'come to be itself', this 'reaching' always means a meeting - an encounter.....Man as a person is not dissolved at death, but, on the contrary, becomes a 'full person' for the first time.....The event proper to death is co-existence with or rejection of the Absolute Person by a finite person which has wholly come to be itself. In consequence, death is a wholly personal and total decision in regard to a personal God"40.

As I Peter II 11 clearly tells us, for the early Christians 'the hereafter' seemed very close and very real. Their 'otherworldliness' made them courageous in the face of death and martyrdom; they knew 'their real selves' would not die. They clearly express the view that the 'real self', the psyche, is of greater value than the whole world. 'The whole world' stands for all the material 'advantages' which are full of dangers and temptations for the psyche and may lure it astray and make it unworthy of 'real life' with God. The important thing for all the New Testament writers is that there is a "continuing life wherever God reigns"41.
Notes to Chapter XVII.

1. Charles, p464 (Eschatology)
2. I Pet I 22
3. I Pet IV cf v19, cf Heb XIII 17
4. Mt X cf v39 and parallels.
5. Charles, p465 (Eschatology)
6. Jerusalem Bible, pp383, 397, 400, 403
7. Robert McAfee Brown, Immortality, in A Handbook of Christian Theology, p188
8. Jerusalem Bible, pp31, 122, 79, 24,
10. Martin Israel, An Approach to Mysticism, p7
11. John Hick, Biology and the Soul, p9
12. William Barclay, Flesh and Spirit, p12
13. Cullmann, p24 (Immortality)
14. Wright, pp43-4
15. Jerusalem Bible, NT p30
16. ibid., p309 n(1)
17. ibid., p43
18. Kittel/Bromiley, Band IX, p642
19. ibid., p642 n159
20. Jerusalem Bible, pp76, 173
21. Kittel/Bromiley, pp643-4
22. ibid., p643 n162
23. Huston Smith, The Religions of Man, p81
24. Kittel/Bromiley, pp644-5
25. Jerusalem Bible, pp76, 106, 128
27. Kittel/Bromiley, p647
28. ibid., p644
29. Jerusalem Bible, p402
30. Kittel/Bromiley, p653
31. Hick, pp9, 8
32. Jerusalem Bible, pp30, 114
33. Owen, p182
34. Plato, Phaedrus, 245 E
Notes to Chapter XVII/continued 2.

35. Ferguson, p10: de Anima 412b5
36. Kittel/Bromiley, pp645-6
37. ibid. p646 n176
38. Cullmann, pp27-8 (Immortality)
40. Boros, pp16-17
41. Ferguson, p11.
CHAPTER XVIII

THE NEW TESTAMENT ON THE RESURRECTION.
In his essay 'Has Life a Meaning?' Boros writes about the resurrection of Christ as follows: "In the resurrected Christ, the significance of the surpassing of earthly restrictions was made apparent: for Christ entered into the utter non-restriction of life, of space, of time, of energy, and of light. In the eventual consequence of his resurrection we shall enjoy the very essence of life". Romaniuk remarks that "St John never proves that God is life. He takes it for granted that this truth is known and accepted by all the readers of the gospel....To have life in oneself means to depend on no one for existence....life, existence, belong to the very nature of the Father, as well as of the Son".

"For the Father who is the source of life, has made the Son the source of life" (Jn V 26). "I am the resurrection (and the life). If anyone believes in me, even though he dies he will live" (Jn XI 25).

Cullmann however warns us to be sure that we understand the message of the New Testament aright. It is this author's conviction that "everything that is said about death and eternal life stands or falls with a belief in a real occurrence, in real events which took place in time. This is the radical distinction from Greek thought". As Paul writes: "Now if Christ raised from the dead is what has been preached, how can some of you be saying that there is no resurrection of the dead? If there is no resurrection of the dead, Christ himself cannot have been raised, and if Christ has not been raised then our preaching is useless and your believing is useless;" (I Cor XV 12-16).

But what do we know, what can we know, about this event "which took place in time"? Wilckens has carefully and deliberately worded the following sentence, taking into account the essential agreements and differences of the New Testament witnesses in their statements: "Jesus passed from death, which he died upon the cross, to new and eternal life with God in heaven above, where he is now enthroned in glory, and from whence he will shortly appear at the end of the age". This, he claims, is all that can be said with certainty from the

After methodological studies of the New Testament tradition, Marxsen is not willing to say more than "in historical terms, it can only be established that people after Jesus' death claimed that something had happened to them which they described as seeing Jesus, and reflection on this happening led these people to the interpretation that Jesus had been raised from the dead". van Iersel, who has studied the resurrection narratives with the intent of finding out whether they are meant to be informative or interpretative, finds that only Luke XXIV 36-43 can be identified as "traditional with sufficient probability".

"They were still talking about all this when he himself stood among them and said to them, 'Peace be with you!' In a state of alarm and fright, they thought they were seeing a ghost. But he said, 'Why are you so agitated, and why are these doubts rising in your hearts? Look at my hands and feet; yes, it is I indeed. Touch me and see for yourselves; a ghost has no flesh and bones as you can see I have'. And as he said this he showed them his hands and feet. Their joy was so great that they still could not believe it, and they stood there dumbfounded; so he said to them, 'Have you anything here to eat?'. And they offered him a piece of grilled fish, which he took and ate before their eyes. (Lk XXIV 36-43)."

This passage shows the emphasis laid on the corporeality of the risen Christ by Luke, but van Iersel remarks that he would not be prepared to argue for its authenticity. "This tradition", he says, "was meant to underline...the rejection of the notion that the risen Lord is only spirit (pneuma) and not flesh (sark), and that therefore there could be no question of a 'resurrection of the flesh'...this passage is polemic and directed against docetic opinions, which began to emerge, with or without connections to the gnosis".

Dinkler seems to bring the problem to light when asking, "How
is it possible to preserve the very essence of Christian faith, namely, that God acted with men and through Christ Jesus, without demanding the acknowledgement of the mythological pattern of its presentation? To believe in Christ Jesus as our Lord and Saviour is it necessary to believe in the physical resurrection and the empty tomb, in the events of the 'Last Day' as the end of this-worldly history, in the virgin birth, etc? Is it not a pious self-deception to pretend that we believe literally in the Apostles Creed?\textsuperscript{11}

This is a vital question today when Christianity is the object of so much critical assessment. Would it be easier to believe that Jesus' dead body was in fact removed by his disciples, or others, but that his soul or spirit made its presence known as an apparition; that it was seen in the same way as apparitions have been seen and believed in throughout the centuries?

Greeley depicts how "immediately after his (Jesus') death there was a fantastic experience of him as alive. Jesus' own message of the coming of the kingdom was preached once again, but now he himself, together with his death and resurrection has entered into this message and become the core of it"\textsuperscript{12}. "There could be no gospel, no one account, no letter in the New Testament, no faith, no Church, no worship, no prayer in Christendom to this day without the message of the resurrection of Christ....even in a completely historical sense", writes Bornkamm, but he also admits that it is difficult and indeed impossible "to gain a satisfactory idea of how the Easter events took place"\textsuperscript{13}.

A thorough examination of the Synoptic Gospels leaves "a confused and contradictory impression", according to Cadbury, who finds that this impression is caused by "the inherent unreality of the subject, the consequent conjecture and inference based on the equally fragmentary and unprecise statements in scripture, and the fusion of ideas of collective or national destiny with the problems of individual fate"\textsuperscript{14}. 
Cullmann describes the atmosphere among the followers of Christ after the crucifixion and the horror of death which they experience in vivid colours at the same time stressing that only by taking "death seriously as death" is it possible to comprehend "the Easter exultation of the primitive Christian community and understand that the whole thinking of the New Testament is governed by belief in the resurrection". Cullmann also states that "Jesus, who is so closely tied to God, tied as no other man has ever been, for precisely this reason must experience death much more terribly than any other man....He had to undergo death in all its horror not only in his body, but also in his soul".  

In this connection we must not forget, however, that John's gospel has a different approach. As Bultmann writes, "John's passion-narrative shows us Jesus as not really suffering death but choosing it - not as the passive victim but as the active conqueror". The crucifixion is regarded from the outset as Jesus' 'elevation' or as his 'glorification'.

In Cullmann's opinion "the radical difference between the Greek doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the Christian doctrine of the resurrection" lies in the fact that in the latter case death is something unnatural and opposed to God. Cullmann therefore contrasts Socrates' exalted and sublime acceptance of the necessity of his death with Jesus' death, and concludes that "for Christian (and Jewish) thinking, the death of the body is also destruction of God-created life. No distinction is made: even the life of our body is true life; death is the destruction of all life created by God. Therefore it is death and not the body which must be conquered by the resurrection".

It seems Cullmann does not reckon with all that is included in the full scope of the Greek psyche. When he writes "even the life of our body is true life", what does he mean? Platonic psyche is, in one of its aspects, just that: 'life of the body'. A corpse is a body without this life.
Cullmann would certainly not say that "the life of the corpse is also true life"?

On the same page Cullmann posits the following statement: "Belief in the immortality of the soul is not belief in a revolutionary event. Immortality, in fact, is only a negative assertion: the soul does not die but certainly lives on. Resurrection is a positive assertion: the whole man, who has really died, is recalled to life by a new act of creation by God. Something has happened - a miracle of creation." 17.

To call the conception 'immortality' a negative assertion already seems paradoxical, even when followed by: "the soul does not die"; but it seems still more so when the sentence goes on: "it simply lives on". Why would it be more 'positive' to be "recalled to life" than to "live on"? Or to say about someone that he "has really died" than to say that he really "lives on"? One can understand that Cullmann wants to emphasise the positiveness of God's miracle of creation but he appears to use the wrong arguments. For someone who holds the view that God, who is Life, once and for all WILLED that 'souls will never die' - this 'decision' by God may give the same feeling of a revolutionary event, a miracle of creation. Someone with this latter view could equally well turn the argument of Cullmann round and say that to state that the whole man has to die is simply a negative assertion and that immortality is a positive assertion as the soul never dies but really lives on.

Cullmann is dramatic in his statements when emphasising how Jesus conquered death and therefore sin. "When one wishes to overcome someone else, one must enter his territory. Whoever wants to conquer death must die; he must really cease to live - not simply live on as an immortal soul, but die in body and soul, lose life itself, the most precious good which God has given us" 18.

Is Cullmann quite logical in the above statement? Who are
the 'us' who have been given 'life' as 'the most precious good'? Can 'we' at all be discussed apart from that 'life'? If 'we' can be given life, then 'we' must be identical with the body of dust. Cullmann seems to be giving the impression that there is an entity who has died in body and soul, but who is, all the same, entering the territory of death. Clearly this is not at all what Cullmann wants to say, but it is a good indication of the difficulties involved in talking about the 'real us', our identity, THE LIVING SOUL.

We find another paradoxical statement in Cullmann's essay. On page 13 he says that for Socrates, in the Phaedo, "our body is only an outer garment which...prevents our soul from moving freely", and on page 23 we read: "To be sure the Jewish and Christian points of view also see something else besides corporeality. For the whole creation is corrupted by sin and death. The creation which we see is not as God willed it, as he created it; nor is the body which we wear". It appears one may well ask: who is the 'we' who 'wear' the body? And if we 'wear' the body, then it seems it must be something like an outer garment. Cullmann seems almost to imply, as he is using the same language as did Socrates, that it is the soul which 'wears' the body.

Another example of the difficulties experienced in wording this type of resurrection statement is found in an essay by Althaus, who writes, "In the question of death and the new life we do not distinguish dualistically between soul (or spirit) and body. But we are concerned with the person and his individual form of being. To die means that God destroys totally the earthly form of the person; to be resurrected means that God gives to the person a new, eternal form of being of body and soul. Thus the resurrection will be a transformation of the whole human being but will maintain at the same time the identity of the person and his history with God". Here we may ask: Who is the 'person' who is being given a 'new, eternal form of being of body and soul'? When 'the earthly form' is totally destroyed, what is then
left? Apparently 'the person' without 'soul' and 'body'. What kind of 'thing' is that very 'person'?

Cullmann's interpretation of early Christian beliefs has no doubt prompted many Christians to rethink their own attitudes. As is pointed out in the editorial of Concilium, December, 1970, "For many Christians life after death has been for centuries a matter of course.....granted by a prevailing dualistic anthropology. That man has an immortal soul was for many in actual fact one of the pillars that supported their life of faith". The editors continue, "For a number of reasons this notion is no longer self-evident with the result that this kind of experience of the faith has become almost impossible".20.

In this connection Evans asks a pertinent question. "Did the resurrection create the lordship and messiahship of Jesus, or simply establish from God what was already there?" Perhaps there has recently been too much emphasis on the resurrection of Christ as the one pillar on which Christianity was built?

Considering the centrality of the resurrection in apostolic Christianity, "it is a puzzling fact", says Evans, that "very little is said about it by Jesus himself as he is represented in the synoptic gospels, even though these are written from the standpoint of a belief in his resurrection and in resurrection in general.....This notable scarcity in the recorded teaching of Jesus of reference to resurrection.....presents a problem both in relation to the supposed currency of the doctrine in Judaism and to its dominant place in early Christianity".22. Evans here makes us aware of the different aspects from which the concept of resurrection can be discussed, and also of the general uncertainty about the resurrection tradition. We discussed earlier to what degree this doctrine was a common belief in Judaism at the time of Jesus.

Gnilka points out that when the New Testament especially mentions the resurrection "as the ultimate destiny of the
faithful, it is invariably the 'resurrection of the dead' that is meant, or 'from the dead'—not the resurrection of the body. With the exception of St John's gospel, all such statements naturally presuppose an identity between the resurrection of the dead and the resurrection of the body, in which light the concept of the resurrection of the body can be seen to contribute to an interpretation of what is meant by resurrection of the dead. Other interpretations are possible, even if rejected by the New Testament writers.\(^\text{23}\)

The question of resurrection as such comes up for discussion once only in the Synoptic Gospels, namely Mark XII 18–27 (and parallels): "Then some Sadducees—who deny that there is a resurrection—came to him and they put this question to him. 'Now at the resurrection, when they rise again, whose wife will she be, since she had been married to all seven?' Jesus said to them, 'Is not the reason why you go wrong, that you understand neither the scriptures nor the power of God? For when they rise from the dead, men and women do not marry; no, they are like the angels in heaven. Now about the dead rising again, have you never read in the Book of Moses, in the passage about the Bush, how God spoke to him and said: I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob? He is God, not of the dead, but of the living. You are very much mistaken!'\(^\text{24}\).

With reference to this passage, Charles points out that even the Legalistic Pharisees reinterpreted the Old Testament books in the light of the higher theology of the apocalyptic school and the significance which our Lord read into the words, 'I am the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob', as a proof of the resurrection of the dead, is essentially a reinterpretation after the manner of the apocalyptic school of Pharisaism.\(^\text{25}\) The same interpretation is to be seen in 4 Maccabees 16:25: "Inasmuch as they know that these, who have died on behalf of God, live unto God, as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and all the patriarchs."\(^\text{26}\).

We quoted Charles earlier with regard to the above quotation from 4 Maccabees, where he emphasises that this passage clearly
advocates an immortality of the soul. He says in fact, and we shall quote again in more detail: "There can of course be no resurrection of the body. This is all the more remarkable since this discourse is founded on II Maccabees, which takes a very material view of the resurrection. Only a blessed immortality of the soul is taught".

With regard to Mark XII 27, however, Charles points out that in this passage 'life' stands for "a true existence in the enjoyment of the divine fellowship - an existence of which the resurrection is the natural outcome; for this is the question at issue. Such a life, which is in essence the life eternal, the blessed now enjoy, and this life leads of necessity to the resurrection life".

Now why should the same phrase as we find it in 4 Maccabees 16:25 and in Mark XII 27 on the one hand "necessarily lead to the resurrection life", and on the other hand lead to the conclusion that "there can of course be no resurrection of the body"? It seems that Charles bases his conclusion in the first case on the fact that resurrection "is the question at issue". But certainly it is nothing but a trap question and as such deserves an answer in kind.

When Evans discusses the fate of the woman with seven husbands, he calls it "the somewhat ridiculous conundrum posed by the Sadducees...as a reductio ad absurdum (it) is hardly a promising basis for the elucidation of a great matter, and the answer is of necessity confined by the terms of the question to the assertion that resurrection, which is here not argued but simply assumed, involves the creative power of God to transform human life into a non-physical form like that of the angels".

Ferguson goes still further and emphasises that "the teaching of Jesus is not about the resurrection of the body, either immediately or at the last day. It is about continuing life wherever God reigns. When Jesus calls God the God not of the dead but of the living "those living include, be
it noted, not merely Abraham, the type of faith, but the
scoundrelly Jacob". Ferguson concludes, "I do not know
whether or not to call this the immortality of the soul.
It is closer to what I understand by the immortality of the
soul to what I understand by the resurrection of the body;
there may be no Hebrew word for immortality, but *athanasia*
is inescapably in the New Testament":29.

In Schep we get the totally opposite point of view represented.
He advocates a bodily resurrection, 'in the flesh', and has
scrutinised much of what has been written in this connection.
He writes, "Some conclude from these passages that 'in the
life hereafter' we will have no body and consequently will
be 'freed from' the limitations which necessarily belong to bodily existence. Others suggest that Jesus ascribes to
those that enter the resurrection life 'angelic bodies, made
from the light and glory of God'. There are also some who
interpret Jesus' words as implying that the sexual difference
between male and female will cease to exist. Schleiermacher
even went so far as to declare that Jesus teaches here the
future cancellation of the difference between male and female
souls":30.

Schep is quite adamant that "not a word is said about a future
cancellation of the difference in sex, either in body or in
soul and he finds this statement proved in Luke XX 34-36:
"Jesus replied, 'The children of this world take wives and
husbands, but those who are judged worthy of a place in the
other world and in the resurrection from the dead, do not
marry because they can no longer die, for they are the same
as the angels, and being children of the resurrection they
are sons of God":31. "Luke immediately subjoins the reason
for there being no marriage", says Schep, and the reason is:
'For they can no longer die', not "they will be sexless like
the angels. Only then do we read that they are 'angel-like'
which in the light of what follows means that they are
immortal like the angels":32.

It seems to the present writer that Evans and Ferguson, among
others, are justified in emphasising that the above passage cannot be taken to prove, in any way, that Jesus preached a physical resurrection as Schep, for example, suggests. It would appear that Jesus clearly says you are very much mistaken when you think that there are any dead at all. All and sundry live on as angels, that is, as spiritual beings. Evans points out that Mk XII 18-27 and parallels, cannot be taken as "proof of resurrection in general, but rather the opposite. It says of certain special persons, to whom could be added from Jewish tradition such other special figures as Elijah, Enoch and Moses himself, that they are in some sense alive with God apart from and without resurrection."  

With regard to the parable of Dives and Lazarus, Evans finds, what he calls, "a similar ambiguity....The rich man's request that Lazarus should return from the dead to warn his brethren is interpreted as an instance of resurrection, but this cannot be so by reference to what came to be the normal Jewish doctrine of resurrection, since this concerns all men together at the end, while in the parable the brethren are single individuals still alive on earth."  

"Now the poor man died and was carried away by the angels to the bosom of Abraham. The rich man also died and was buried. In his torment in Hades he looked up and saw Abraham a long way off with Lazarus in his bosom" (Lk XVI 22-23). This parable affirms, according to Mussner, that Jesus shared the beliefs "peculiar to the eschatological outlook of late Judaism" in a resurrection at the end of time. The text seems however to indicate that "this other life begins immediately after death, perhaps in the form of an 'intermediate stage'". That Jesus is thinking of an intermediate stage has often been suggested to be implied in His answer to the thief on the cross: "'Jesus', he said, 'remember me when you come into your kingdom'. 'Indeed, I promise you', he replied, 'today you will be with me in paradise'" (Lk. XXIII 42-43). Jesus' answer must be understood in its context, and Cullmann suggests that when the thief makes his request, 'the kingdom' he is thinking of, can, in accordance
with the Jewish view of the Messiah, "only refer to the time when the Messiah will come and erect his kingdom. Jesus does not grant the request", says Cullmann, "but instead gives the thief more than he asked for: he will be united with Jesus even before the coming of the kingdom". Cullmann concludes that what is really stressed here is "the fact that the thief will be with Jesus".

It is interesting to note that Wolfson, on the contrary, assumes that if "Jesus tells the penitent thief, 'Today you will be with me in paradise', the accent is on the place or time, not the company". It seems to the present writer that Cullmann's interpretation is certainly more in accordance with that which is of importance in Jesus' message. As Wright states, "Heaven is where Christ is, and in one sense even on earth we are 'in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus'. Whether or not we call the intermediate state Hades, with Paradise as the sphere of the saved, it is where Christ radiates His presence in a fuller way than we have known on earth.

Charles, who does not hesitate to use 'soul' whenever psyche is used in the Greek text, assumes that "the soul surviving death (Mt X 28) passes first to an intermediate abode of the departed. This abode is either the blessed department of Hades (AA II 27), called Abraham's bosom (Lk XVI 23) or in the unblest part of Hades (Lk XVI 23). According to Revelations VI 9 the souls of martyrs are beneath the altar in heaven." The souls of all the people who had been killed on account of the Word of God (Rev VI 9).
It appears that we find in these passages as well as in the Lazarus-Dives story "a certain cycle of thought" referring to the souls in Hades awaiting the final judgment and possible resurrection. That we have the same type of thinking in Jesus' answer to the thief does not seem to follow from the text. It would rather seem that Jesus implies the next life in its fullness to begin immediately after death. In this connection, Cadbury draws some interesting conclusions from Luke XVI 27-31: "The rich man replied, 'Father, I beg you then to send Lazarus to my father's house, since I have five brothers, to give them warning so that they do not come to this place of torment, too'. 'They have Moses and the prophets,' said Abraham, 'let them listen to them'. 'Ah no!, father Abraham', said the rich man, 'But if someone comes to them from the dead, they will repent'. Then Abraham said to him, 'If they will not listen either to Moses or to the prophets, they will not be convinced even if someone should rise from the dead".41.

Referring to Abraham's answer, Cadbury finds his words "so surprising for any early Christian document, (i.e. that) reformed conduct in this life would not be promoted by more convincing evidence of the future life or judgment. What Jesus omits to emphasize in his teaching about the future is no great loss. It would add no useful information".42.

"They will not be convinced even if someone should rise from the dead" says Abraham, and it seems that Cadbury may be right when pointing out that these words are surprising considering "the rocklike post-Easter conviction of the first disciples"43, that Jesus had in fact risen. But on the other hand, the words may have been appropriate in an early Christian document among disciples who strongly believed in the resurrection as a warning to those who, even then, did not want to be convinced, who denied or rejected the resurrection of Jesus, "the crucial issue for belief".

Perhaps Allegro is right when he suggests, with regard to the details in the New Testament record of Jesus' life, "that
the scrolls give added ground for believing that many incidents are merely projections into Jesus' own history of what was expected of the Messiah. As we know, the eschatological outlook of intertestamental Judaism was concentrated on speculations about what form the 'resurrection' would take and what role the Messiah would play.

There is a further reference to the resurrection, and this is found in the most 'spiritual' of the gospels, the Fourth. "Do not be surprised at this, for the hour is coming when the dead will leave their graves at the sound of his voice; those who did good will rise again to life; and those who did evil, to condemnation" (Jn V 28-29). Charles writes of this passage that "in fact, it would be hard to find a more unspiritual description of the resurrection in the whole literature of the first century AD". According to Charles, Wendt has succeeded in showing that "not only is the teaching of these verses at variance with that of the rest of the Gospel, but they are also at variance with their actual context". Painter remarks that "Bultmann attributes the future eschatological emphasis (here) to an eschatological redactor". The former finds, however, that there is no evidence for this conclusion but that it "appears to arise from Bultmann's own theological views".

Gnilka finds the above passage to be "the most important witness to belief in the resurrection of the body in the fourth gospel", but he too admits that it might be regarded as "a product of the later ecclesiastical editing" and not typical of what could be assumed to be St John's own thinking.

It is very difficult to assess these different views but it certainly appears that John V 28f differs from most of Jesus' other sayings. This passage is more typical of the apocalyptic literature in general. Perhaps we may here, with Greeley, point out that "most of St John is not included in the certainly historical category because methods have not yet been discovered by which the scholars can confidently separate the various layers of tradition to be found in that
highly complex gospel.\(^49\)

Cadbury makes an interesting summary of "all the many beliefs which were 'current' in Jesus' time, beliefs which we have discussed in earlier chapters. As we have pointed out, the most contrasting views were held in the intertestamental period; there were no uniform intellectual beliefs on the nature of a resurrection. Different answers were possible on every question put forward as to the 'life beyond the grave'. If we accept the actual fact of the risen Christ we can say with Evans that "the difficulty is not, as Barth seems to think, whether to believe in the resurrection, but what is to be believed"\(^50\). And we can further say with Cadbury that "all these beliefs could arise in any order and would tend in the end to confirm one another"\(^51\).

One aspect of Judaism which, according to Cadbury, Christians, both before and after the events of Easter, may have shared was quite different from any resurrection belief: this was "the belief that in individual instances men had escaped death altogether. They were quite literally immortal - not in the sense that having once died they would live forever - but in the sense that they had not died and perhaps would not die". We discussed earlier the Greek belief in what they called 'translation'. Cadbury explains that some of the names theology have used are "removal, ascension, assumption, rapture", and that the instance first noted by the Jews and Christians, though differently described, are Enoch, Elijah and probably Moses\(^52\).

Cadbury now suggests that, even if in the case of Jesus his real death was taken for granted, somehow "the ascension belief was added to the resurrection belief"\(^53\), and that probably the early Christians read this out of Jesus' own teaching. "If Jesus sometimes emphasises the nearness of the Kingdom he is shortening the interval not so much for the dead as for the many living who would 'not taste death'. Obviously this differs a good deal from any modern concern for the situation after death"\(^54\).
In this connection, Cullmann assumes that a "widespread misunderstanding - that the New Testament teaches the immortality of the soul - was actually encouraged by the rocklike post-Easter conviction of the first disciples that the bodily resurrection of Christ had robbed death of all its horror and that, from the moment of Easter onward, the Holy Spirit had awakened the souls of believers into the life of the resurrection". As we said earlier the 'hereafter' seemed very close and very near to the early Christians. It must have been a shock to "the little congregation of the end of days" to find that there were those amongst them who still died, and their concern would be that their brothers would be at a disadvantage at the Lord's return. In the First Letter to the Thessalonians, the oldest document of the New Testament, Paul comforts his fellow Christians by affirming that these dead brothers would certainly not be left out but would rise and take part, with those who had remained alive, in the Lord's Last Coming. "We can tell you this from the Lord's own teaching, that any of us who are left alive until the Lord's coming will not have any advantage over those who have died.....Those who have died in Christ will be the first to rise and then those of us who are still alive will be taken up in the clouds, together with them to meet the Lord in the air. So we shall stay with the Lord for ever" (I Thess IV 15-17). "In fact that is why many of you are weak and ill and some of you have died. If only we recollected ourselves we should not be punished like that" (I Cor XI 30-31).

As we said earlier there was a strong feeling that sickness and death should not occur any longer. Chadwick assumes that for Paul this expectation of the first Christians; that Christ would return in glory very shortly and that thus the end of the world could be expected in the immanent future was a "liability rather than an asset in evangelising the Greek world where the dominant speculative interest was in the beginning of things". Chadwick suggests that Paul gradually changed the emphasis from "Christ as the end to Christ as the Wisdom of God in creation, pre-existent from
eternity and the immanent power by which the manifold
diversity of the cosmos is saved from disintegration.\textsuperscript{58}

However, with regard to the earliest Church, "by designating
itself congregation", says Bultmann, it declared "that it
itself was the fulfilment of the hopes of the apocalyptists.
Its members accordingly bear the eschatological titles 'the
chosen', or 'the elect', and 'the saints'......It is 'the
little flock' to whom God will give His Reign....It is
represented by 'the Twelve' who, when God's Reign has
appeared, will sit upon twelve thrones to rule the tribes
of Israel". Bultmann points out that "the less likely
it is that the twelve were called by Jesus himself, the more
characteristic they are for the eschatological consciousness
of the Church; for they are 'the Twelve' not as Apostles
but as the eschatological regents\textsuperscript{59}.

Perhaps modern believers do not generally realise "the
dependence of these Christian beliefs on the primitive Jewish-
Christian eschatology", that is, how historically conditioned
they are, and says Cadbury, "insofar as the primitive
eschatology is outgrown or abandoned as myth, we must admit...
that the significance of Jesus and beliefs in his or our
afterlife are byproducts or survivals or developments of
the archaic and outmoded dreams of the apocalyptic dreamers\textsuperscript{60}.

Pannenberg, on the contrary, does not find the 'apocalyptic
dreams' outmoded, but stresses "that the Easter event is not
to be separated from apocalyptic categories of thought (the
last judgment, the general resurrection, the parousia, etc.)
which remain valid and may not be exchanged for others\textsuperscript{61}.
The significance directly inherent in the raising of Jesus,
that is, the influence from his late Jewish apocalyptic
environment, is summed up by Pannenberg as follows:
1. If Jesus is raised, then the end of the world has begun.
2. If Jesus is raised, then for a Jew it can only mean that
God Himself has confirmed the pre-resurrection ministry of
Jesus.
3. Being raised from the dead, Jesus was so closely associated
with the Son of Man, that the inference was obvious: the Son
of Man is none other than Jesus who is to come again.
4. If Jesus being raised from the dead, has been exalted to
God, and if the end of the world has thereby begun, then God
is finally revealed in Jesus"61.

From these typical apocalyptic visions in circulation at
Jesus' time we shall turn back to the development of the view
we began discussing earlier, which was the view that some
people had been 'removed' from earthly life into another
dimension. Evans discusses the theme humiliation/exaltation
and, referring to Schweizer, finds that the latter sees this
theme as to "a great extent determining the Church's early
understanding of Christ"62. Schweizer, thus, assumes
that "the humiliation could take various forms, including
suffering and death, and the exaltation could be represented
as a transfiguration, an ascension or assumption into heaven,
or as being taken by the angels at death, but not, apparently,
as a resurrection, though in the Wisdom of Solomon it is
represented as the gift of immortality". "It may well
be asked", according to Schweizer, "if the reports of the
first appearances have been lost because they told of Jesus'
exaltation to God and, on account of that, were not sufficiently
realistic in the eyes of a later generation. At any rate,
this would explain that Paul places his appearance on the
road to Damascus entirely on the same level as the appearances
to the twelve"63.

According to Evans we shall find a firmly established relation
between resurrection and exaltation only in the Lukan writings
where the resurrection period is limited to forty days, in
which interim time Jesus gives visible and tangible proofs
that he is alive. Exaltation then follows "in the form
of a further visible and describable event, the ascension". Evans
finds it possible that the concept of exaltation to the
right hand of God was prior to the idea of resurrection in
establishing belief in Jesus' lordship and messiahship, for
it leads directly to it, while resurrection from the dead, as
such, does not"64.

That the tradition about the empty grave may have arisen at
"a comparatively late stage, as a way, simply, of affirming against docetism, the real death and the real aliveness of one and the same Jesus" is suggested also by Lampe. "The notion that the body actually emerged from the tomb was the only way at that time available of stressing the continuity and the identity between the Jesus who was crucified and the Jesus who lived; and the use of Psalm XVI. 10 - as a testimonium - added momentum to the idea that the body of Jesus did not see 'corruption'".65

In presenting the four essays in the book 'Immortality and Resurrection' which he edited, Stendahl remarks that "both immortality and resurrection in their original settings are ideas which require creative interpretation and demythologising if they are to fit into any pattern of 20th century thought.... To many of us, both concepts are equally suspect from the point of view of what is reasonable in accordance with common sense or experience. Once both concepts are recognised as mythological there is a new possibility of assessing the role and significance and truth of such linguistic symbols".66

When exploring different possibilities with regard to the empty tomb, "empty for non-external reasons", we should have an open mind and rather allow agnostic than dogmatic reasoning, according to J A T Robinson, who stresses that he would not wish categorically to rule out anything "except what is excessively improbable on historical or psychological grounds. I certainly would not deny the possibility of total molecular transformation", he says, "but equally I do not think that the doctrine requires it - let alone substantiates it". Where paranormal phenomena are concerned, Robinson points out that we must remember that "the power of spirit over matter is still so marginally understood that it would be dogmatic to discount the possibility that 'the next development in man' might be in the direction of the transformation of material energy, and therefore material substance, into spiritual". Robinson concludes, "An empty tomb would thus be the logical conclusion and symbol of the complete victory of spirit over matter".67
It is interesting to compare Robinson's assessment with the results of Pryke's research into the beliefs of the Qumran sect. His conclusions were, and we repeat the quotation here, "The bliss of the elect as described in the Manuale... is much nearer to the 'immortality of the soul' than to the resurrection of the flesh (and) on the whole the community's belief in the future life seems to have been transmutation of matter into spirit.....".

When we try to understand what the rising of Christ meant to the early Christians we may acknowledge with Benoit that they had "received from Judaism the expectation of the Day of Yahweh with its cosmic upheaval but were obliged to combine it with the experience of Christ's victory over death". Benoit emphasises that one must not sacrifice "what is fundamental in the very novelty of Christianity, namely, the vital union of the believer in the risen Christ obtained even now by faith and baptism to the traditional belief received from Judaism of a final accounting put off until the end of this world". Here we must turn back to the two lines of thought which we traced earlier in Hebrew religious thinking and which can be compared with the above two aspects of Christianity. The one line is the assurance of eternity in the human spirit's communication with the Spirit of God; a feeling of 'living in the now for a soul/spirit attuned to God - or as here: to God through Christ, a knowledge of God's and Christ's presence which can almost be called 'mystical'. The other line is the belief in the messianic kingdom, and here we find many different developments. The first line of thought has much affinity with the Greek side of Hellenism expressed in Neo-Pythagoreanism, Gnosticism, the Mystery Cults, and even in Essenism (Qumran Sect). The other line is often expressed in the apocalyptic literature and seems to take many details from the Babylonian and Iranian religions, as well as from Eastern Hellenism in general.

Cadbury finds that among the first Christians the need for the demythologising of their futuristic hopes was evidently
felt, if not expressed, at an early stage, and "much of it was translated to other forms of expression; if one may use the word, it was remythologised. Something like the Greek Platonic view of immortality unconsciously modified the expression of normative Jewish resurrection beliefs". No doubt, we must acknowledge Greek influence on the origin of Christianity from the very beginning.

Owing to their different backgrounds, the Christian Jew would understand the resurrection either as the restitution of the old man, or as 'a fresh act of creation', whereas the Christian Greek, if he did not reject the resurrection altogether, would believe in a restoration of the soul, which had naturally survived death, into a new spiritual body - the soul being quite capable of independent life before being dressed in 'garments of glory'.

In any case, according to Cadbury, "the old and new continued side by side in uneasy juxtaposition, and without the thorough supremacy of either view. The gradual increase of the immortality concept can no doubt be traced, and its reasons understood. The parallel persistence of the doctrine of bodily resurrection, not merely because of the authority of the New Testament and the Creeds but also because of human nature's craving for the familiar assurance of sensory phenomena, is also intelligible".

"The real issue is the kingdom and not the resurrection" says Greeley. "The resurrection is the supreme vindication of the kingdom and the promise that the kingdom will be fulfilled for all of us". The Kingdom of God, says Tillich, is however "a kingdom not only of men; it involves the fulfillment of life under all dimensions". And he continues, "This agrees with the multidimensional unity of life; fulfillment under one dimension implies fulfillment in all dimensions". The hope for man includes also the hope for the natural world. And we can add that, accordingly, there is a personal and a universal and a cosmic dimension to the salvation history.
"The whole creation is eagerly waiting for God to reveal his sons. It was not for any fault on the part of creation that it was made unable to attain its purpose, it was made so by God; but creation still retains the hope of being freed, like us, from its slavery to decadence, to enjoy the same freedom and glory as the children of God. From the beginning till now the entire creation, as we know, has been groaning in one great act of giving birth; and not only creation, but all of us who possess the first-fruits of the Spirit, we too groan inwardly as we wait for our bodies to be set free" (Rom VIII 19-23).

What is at stake is indeed the kingdom, but it is hardly sufficient to say this. We are concerned with what does or will comprise the kingdom. The question in the end is one of ethics, of the true relationship between God, man and the non-human creation. To over emphasise the human soul to the detriment of the human body in a manner which suggests that man is significant only in that aspect in which he differs from the rest of creation (e.g. in the belief that only man has an immortal soul) can lead to that dualism which many modern writers, rightly or wrongly, have attributed to our Greek heritage, in which men are encouraged to relegate the material to a lower, if not an evil, status and to believe that the soul is best improved by detachment from, perhaps even the deliberate hardship towards, the body.

The alternative to this dualism is a monism which, while uniting mankind with the rest of creation, tends to reduce man to all that is associated in the dualistic view with the material aspect. Clearly this is not what the New Testament was about. The emphasis, particularly clearly expounded in the above quotation from Romans VIII, is that the resurrection is not simply about the survival of individual men, but as a break through for the whole of creation. This could only be so if man shared in a unity with the rest of creation and that in the end that unity is characterised by what in a dualistic view would be ascribed to the spirit.

Jesus Christ may be said to be the spiritual principle of
that unity; He is the uniting force of the whole of creation: on its visible as well as on its invisible levels, of the old as well as of the new creation, as is expressed in Colossians I 13-20. Verse 17 is especially relevant in this connection: "and he holds all things in unity".
Notes to Chapter XVIII.

1. Boros, p18
2. K. Romaniuk, I am the Resurrection and the Life, in Concilium, Dec 1970
3. Jerusalem Bible, pp155,171
4. Cullmann, p10 (Immortality)
5. Jerusalem Bible, p307
9. Jerusalem Bible, p135
10. van Iersel, p66
11. Dinkler, p242
12. Greeley, p169
13. ibid., p169 ref to Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, pp184,181
14. Cadbury, p138
15. Cullmann, pp19,17
17. Cullmann, p19 (Immortality)
18. ibid., p18
19. Paul Althaus, Eschatology, in Collection A Handbook of Christian Theology, p107
21. Evans, p143
22. ibid., pp31,33
24. Jerusalem Bible, p82
25. Charles, p155 (Between the Testaments)
26. Charles, p322 (Eschatology)
27. ibid., p397
28. Evans, p32
29. Ferguson, p11
Notes to Chapter XVIII/continued 2.

30. cont: ref to W. Strawson, Jesus and the Future Life, pp207, 227; Dorothy Sayers, The Man Born to be King, p224, J Baillie, And the Life Everlasting, p136, S Barton Babbage, Reformed Theological Review, IX,4,23. W Manson, Their Mode of Life is like that of Angels.

31. Jerusalem Bible, p127
32. Schep, p213
33. Evans, p32
34. ibid., p33
35. Jerusalem Bible, pp121,133
37. Cullmann, p38 n 32 (Immortality)
38. Wolfson, p142
39. Wright, p115 ref to Eph II 6, Lk XXIII 43, Phil I 23.
40. Charles, p145 (Eschatology)
41. Jerusalem Bible, pp30,202,436,121
42. Cadbury, p145
43. Cullmann p10
44. John Allegro, The Dead Sea Scrolls, p175
45. Jerusalem Bible, p156
46. Charles, p429 (Eschatology)
47. Painter, p46
48. Gnilka, p132
49. Greeley, p25
50. Evans, p175
51. Cadbury, p120
52. ibid., pp122-3
53. ibid., p123
54. ibid., p141
55. Cullmann, p10 (Immortality)
56. Bultmann, Vol I p37
57. Jerusalem Bible, pp352,303
58. Chadwick, p20
59. Bultmann, Vol I pp37-8
60. Cadbury, p124
61. Evans, p179 ref to W. Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Man pp62-4.
62. ibid., p139
Notes to Chapter XVIII/continued 3.

63. Evans, p140 ref to E Schweizer, Lordship and Discipleship, p38ff

64. ibid., p137


66. Stendahl, pp5-6


68. Pryke, p57

69. Pierre Benoît, Resurrection: At the End of Time or Immediately after Death? in Concilium, Dec 1970 p105

70. Cadbury, p130

71. Greeley, p84


73. Jerusalem Bible, p280
CHAPTER XIX

PAULINE ANTHROPOLOGY
Paul's message was primarily eschatological and fitted the end-of-the-world atmosphere which had for a long time been permeating Judaism through the prophecies of the Apocalypses. Jewish thinking at these times seems to have been concentrated on speculations about the destruction of the kingdoms of man and the raising up of the Kingdom of God. Cerfau points out that "everybody was waiting for something or someone: a king sent from heaven...or a divine intervention...", something which was to be the "beginning of the final era of the world".

The Pharisees especially fostered hopes for a royal Messiah, a son of David, and for the resurrection of the dead. And so Paul could say: "Brothers, I am a Pharisee and the son of Pharisees. It is for our hope in the resurrection of the dead that I am on trial" (AA XXII 6).

We have also traced the deep religious trends in the Greek world which kept step with a gradual understanding of the One Supreme Power behind all worldly changes. We found the same thoughts developing in Pythagoreanism, in Orphism, in Socrates, and in Platonism; and in Hellenism, among the followers of the above philosophies, as well as among the Stoics and the earliest Gnostics; and these thoughts came to be more and more directed towards a future life, towards beliefs in the immortality of the soul and the possibility of future rewards and punishments.

Cerfau affirms that "the times were as productive of despair as of faith in world renewal, but influences from the ancient Babylonian and Persian religions and from the contemporary mysteries and religions of the East -- Judaism among them -- were active in the latter direction". Paul became the great eschatological worker who took it upon himself to bring the joyful Christian message to the Gentile world. In so doing he fulfilled "the dream that Judaism saw happening at the last days...the Gentiles joining in the worship of the one God".

The nearness of the next world, the New Age, was no doubt felt very strongly within the early Christian
Church. As was pointed out, it was at first even believed that death had lost its power and that no Christian would die before the Second Coming of Christ.

In the meantime, however, the believers had to be on their guard. They could not have and keep the Spirit unless they completely denied 'the flesh'. "The demonic reaches out for man objectively from cosmic breadth and depth (in Hellenistic terms it reaches out from the stars with the force of ananke) in order to enslave him and even continues to threaten the Christian community", says Käsemann.

Because Paul's cosmos is alive, filled with good and evil forces, his cosmology and his anthropology can be described in the same terms on macrocosmic and microcosmic levels. The believers must fight their battle both individually and as an involvement in the universal struggle between civitas dei and civitas terrena.

In very general outlines it seems Paul has the following views on the constitution of a human being. Man consists of soma, body, which is neutral matter, and of psyche, soul, which is the life-fluid, the living force, giving life to the physical body. Body and soul are both originally good and form together the living being, an easily influenced entity constantly pulled and pushed in different directions - good and evil. Since the 'fall' of man 'flesh' is 'the evil principle' in man, it is an active demonic power and endangers not only man but the whole cosmos. Through Christ the picture has changed. 'In Christ' and with the help of the Holy Spirit the believers will eventually conquer the deadly power of the flesh. Through baptism they are already filled with the quickening power of the Holy Spirit which, to a certain degree, takes the place of psyche, they have thus, now and here, a 'new life' lived 'in the Spirit' and in the hope of the return in the very near future of Christ Jesus. In the resurrection they will receive new glorious bodies, in the likeness of the risen body of Christ, and these bodies
will be 'heavenly' and deathless, quickened by the Spirit in all eternity.

In the above we recognise many concepts, ideas and imagery current in apocalyptic and also in Hellenistic sects and philosophies. Selby finds in this connection that even if "Paul on occasion expressed ideas similar to theirs, we cannot infer that he had abandoned Judaism in favour of Stoicism or the Mysteries, or that he attempted to graft pagan branches on the Judaeo-Christian stalk. The language of religion and philosophy was common currency; Paul must use it if he was to be understood". "In his own mind and in the minds of those about him, Jewish and Greek anthropological terms were mixed together in carefree confusion".

No doubt Paul's terminology is used loosely and imprecisely and the different terms may overlap, sometimes being synonymous, sometimes contrasted, but adjusted to their new usage. Stacey affirms that there is "conclusive evidence of the Semitic cast of Paul's mind" in his synthetical rather than analytical approach to anthropology, that is, in his use of "psyche, pneuma, sark, soma and kardia to describe man as a unity under various aspects".

Pneuma seems to be the key word for Paul and to take the place which psyche had in common usage. As Stacey asserts: "A new view of man...arises with a new view of God"; God had now been experienced in Christ and "in this new relationship, psyche, the term that began and ended with man, was plainly inadequate, pneuma supplied the need".

Pneuma is used in many different ways. It can refer to God's Pneuma or to the human pneuma, as well as to 'something' linking the two together. When pneuma is used in its divine aspect it may indicate:
1. An invading personal force, a force which can fall upon a man from the outside and take possession of him.
2. "A spiritual power creating a new atmosphere, a new
environment in which life of a new quality could be lived"¹⁰, or as Bultmann expresses it, "an impersonal force which fills man like a fluid"¹¹.

3a "A 'person' with whom the believer lives in constant communion and through whom all the spiritual needs of both man and communion might be supplied"¹⁰.

3b The special gift of 'the spirit' in redeemed man, a spirit which can communicate with God's Spirit and which has been created for the sole purpose of this communication. This is not the ordinary human pneuma. What Paul is stressing here is that, if the Holy Spirit is really communicating with the spirit within man, then that man has already received an eschatological gift.

"The spirit who is central to Paul's theology is the same being whom the Old Testament knew as the Spirit, or Breath of God", as Taylor stresses, and therefore the "symbolism of the Pentecost experience - rushing wind, fire and ecstasy - linked the new experience with the familiar images of the Old Testament, as did the Johannine account of Christ's breathing the Spirit upon his disciples"¹².

We shall look more closely at Romans VIII 1-11 where we find the expression 'Spirit of God' and 'Spirit of Christ' apparently as synonyms. To possess the 'Pneuma of Christ' is equivalent to having 'Christ in you'; so too the 'We in Christ' corresponds to the 'Christ in us'¹³.

In Romans VIII 1-11 we read:
"1. There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus.
2. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death.
3. For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do: sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh,
4. in order that the just requirement of the law might be
fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit.

5. For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit.

6. To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace.

7. For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God; it does not submit to God's law, indeed it cannot;

8. and those who are in the flesh cannot please God.

9. But you are not in the flesh, you are in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God really dwells in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him.

10. But if Christ is in you, although your bodies are dead because of sin, your spirits are alive because of righteousness.

11. If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit which dwells in you.

The phrases 'in the Spirit' and 'the Spirit in you', in Romans VIII 9 clearly indicate, according to Stewart, that Paul "thinks of the Christian as living and moving and having his being in a pneuma element which is the very breath of life. Just as it might be said that the human body is in the atmosphere which surrounds it on every side, and yet that atmosphere is also within it, filling it and vitalising it, so it may be said of the Christian soul that it both exists in the Spirit and has the Spirit within it. Here then is the key to the phrase 'in Christ'. Christ is the redeemed man's new environment."

When explaining what Paul means by 'in Christ', Grundmann suggests that "the best image is one drawn from physics, that of a field of force, for example an electro-magnetic field". Grundmann refers to G R Heyer, who "has transferred this concept to the psyche, and has ascertained that the psyche no less than the external world is organised as a field of
force. To be in Christ means to be in Jesus Christ's field of force....The invisible power of this field of force is the Holy Spirit"16.

Hunter, too, calls the Holy Spirit "the divine energy or dynamic of the new life", he adds, "And always the Spirit stands for what we call the supernatural: not only God as a presence in man but God as a power transcending human experience"17.

In Romans VIII 16 a meeting occurs between the Divine Spirit and that spirit in man which can communicate with God: "The Spirit himself and our spirit bear united witness that we are the children of God"18. "The whole message of Christianity is contained in this statement", says Tillich. "For although we are in the flesh and under the law and in the cleavage of our existence, we are at the same time in the Spirit and in the fulfilment and unity with the ultimate meaning of our life"19. This "unity of our spirit with the Divine Spirit", as well as the phrases 'in the Spirit', 'in Christ', 'in God' and vice versa ('the Spirit in you', etc.) have often been taken to have mystical connotations. We shall come back to this aspect presently.

'Our spirit' in the above passage is used in a sense which is essentially Pauline. In this sense it should be distinguished from 'mind' or 'reason'. However, at other times pneuma stands for 'mind' or 'reason'. When trying to explain the complex nature of man as an experiencing being, Paul has to "resort to popular Palestinian Judaism, or else to Hellenistic, for his conceptions and terminology", according to Charles, who refers to the concepts 'inner man', 'nous' and 'pneuma'. The phrase 'inner man' (α ἐσο ἄνθρωπος) is taken from Hellenistic Judaism and "has no reference to man as created anew or otherwise but denotes him simply as an intellectual and moral personality", says Charles. Nous is taken from the same source and adopted by Paul to signify "man's higher nature", and is generally translated 'mind' or
'reason' in English. At other times Paul uses the term 'pneuma' in what seems to be exactly the same sense "after a current usage of Palestinian Judaism".\(^{20}\)

The following examples are taken from Charles's book 'Eschatology': "In my inmost self (o eso anthrope) I dearly love God's Law" (Rom VII 22). "I can see that my body follows a different law that battles against the law which my reason (nous) dictates" (Rom VII 23). "...In short, it is I who with my reason (nous) serve the Law of God, and no less I who serve in my unspiritual self the law of sin" (Rom VII 25).

"I was so continually uneasy in my mind.....(ouk esheka anesin to pneumati mon....) (I had no relief in my spirit)" (II Cor II 13)\(^{21}\).

The commentator of the Jerusalem Bible finds with regard to 'the inner man' that there are texts (e.g. II Cor IV 16) where this term is spoken of "in the Christian sense of the 'new self'"\(^{22}\). "That is why there is no weakening on our part, and instead, though this outer man of ours may be falling into decay, the inner man is renewed day by day" (II Cor IV 16)\(^{23}\).

Bultmann asks, "What does Paul call man, and how does he regard him, when he is the subject of his own willing and doing, when he is his real self who can distinguish himself from his soma-self?", and the answer is, "the inner man". Referring to Romans VII 22 and to II Corinthians IV 16, Bultmann points out that they convey two different things. It must be admitted that Bultmann's description is somewhat unclear at this point (or the translator's), but it seems that he understands the 'inner man' in Romans VII 22 to stand for: the real self in contrast to the physical body; unredeemed man under the Law; the nous (mind) which belongs to man's essence. "The inner man' in II Corinthians IV 16, and here Bultmann and the Jerusalem Bible agree, is: man's real self in contrast to the self that has come under the 'away of sin'; the Christian in whom God's power is at work and in whom the Spirit dwells; the self transformed by the Spirit.\(^{24}\)"
Bultmann's explanations with regard to Romans VII 23 are interesting. He finds that nous here takes up the meaning behind 'o eso anthropos', thus becoming dualistically distinguished from soma. It is the self, he says, "which has become objectivised in relation to himself......In the nous which affirms God's demand in the Law lurks the human nous whose innate inclination is toward 'what is good', but as 'depraved inclination' may factually be striving toward the bad, having in itself, as nous, the possibility of heeding or rejecting God's demand".

Charles suggests that there is one more sense in which Paul uses pneuma, and this is "to denote man as an immaterial personality surviving death". Pneuma here is a translation of Ruah from Palestinian psychology and is in this sense found in I Corinthians V 5: "Though I am far away in body, I am with you in spirit, and have already condemned the man who did this thing as if I were actually present. When you are assembled together in the name of the Lord Jesus, and I am spiritually present with you, then with the power of our Lord Jesus he is to be handed over to Satan so that his sensual body may be destroyed and his spirit saved on the day of the Lord". Pneuma is here used to denote 'something' which is left when a man's sensual body has been destroyed. A note in the Jerusalem Bible points out that the punishment "is intended to convert the man: his 'spirit', that is his soul, is to be saved".

It is interesting to note that the above commentator finds it necessary to point out that when using 'spirit' soul is meant. This no doubt shows the different terminology used by Paul compared with Christian writings in general. It appears that Paul is using pneuma here in the same way as psyche was generally used in Greek 'dualistic' thinking. Stacey, keeping pneuma and psyche well apart, suggests that from I Corinthians V 5 might have been deduced a doctrine of the immortality of the spirit were it not that I Thessalonians V 23 offers a similar prayer that spirit, soul and body might be preserved at the parousia: "...may you all be kept safe and blameless, spirit, soul and body" (I Thess V 23).
The above is the only place where Paul depicts a tripartite division, but even so the commentator of the Swedish Standard Bible suggests that this passage gives "the right Pauline understanding of a man's being, i.e. his threefold division. Bultmann, on the contrary, would suggest the word 'unity' to be the natural one in Pauline usage, and not 'division'". "Man does not consist of two parts, much less of three", he says; "nor are psyche and pneuma special faculties or principles, (within) the soma, of a mental life higher than his animal life. Rather, man is a living unity. He is a person having a relationship to himself (soma). He is a person who lives in his intentionality, his pursuit of some purpose, his willing and knowing (psyche, pneuma)....".

How is psyche used in the Pauline epistles? What place does it occupy in his anthropology? We said earlier that it is the life of the physical body.

"....who risked death to save my life (psyche)..." (Rom XVI 4)

"I am perfectly willing to spend what I have, and to be expended, in the interests of your souls (psychai). Because I love you more, must I be loved the less?" (II Cor XII 15)

It stands also for the person, in a general sense:

"Pain and suffering will come to every human being (psyche) who employs himself in evil...." (Rom II 9)

Psyche, for Paul, is never the bearer of a higher spiritual life. Charles remarks that "as the supreme function of the body, it would, logically conceived, embrace all the intellectual powers, like the psyche of the Greek philosophers. But St Paul does not so accept it. To him it is essentially the transitory element in man". Stacey compares the use made of psyche in Pauline and in the Rabbi's writings and finds that "the Rabbis fostered Greek ideas of the moral nature of psyche, and of its pre-existence". On the other hand, their conception of pneuma "lacked vigour" as it had become almost a synonym for psyche.

Christ as Logos in John's Gospel links together the visible and the invisible world. Psyche had this function, in
general, in the Gospels. Greek thinking in the Orphic tradition had long seen in the psyche the real 'immortal' self, the link with the divine. When pneuma seems to be Paul's term for this very same conception we may perhaps conclude that it is to a large extent a question of terminology. The understanding of the concept pneuma/psyche was changing in the Hellenistic world, and in the changes which occurred, the boundaries between terms like psyche, pneuma and nous were very fluctuating.

When we look at the adjectives derived from pneuma and from psyche, and used by Paul, we find, as Stacey points out, that "the adjectives themselves have no Hebrew counterparts, so that it cannot be properly said of psychikos as it was said of psyche that it reproduced, in a measure, the Old Testament equivalent. It may be possible to trace a connection between these adjectives and Jewish thought through their nouns, but that is not the same thing"\textsuperscript{35}.

We find psychikos four times in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians: in II 14; twice in XV 44; and in XV 46; but nowhere else in his writings. Each time the term is used it is in contrast to pneumatikos, a word that is used more often - more than twenty times.

The Revised Standard Version renders I Corinthians XV 42-46 as follows:

"42. So it is with the resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable, but what is raised is imperishable. 43. It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. 44. It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body. 45. Thus it is written, 'The first man Adam became a living being'; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. 46. But it is not the spiritual which is first but the physical, and then the spiritual"\textsuperscript{36}.\"
The Jerusalem Bible translates the same passage as follows:

"42. It is the same with the resurrection of the dead: the thing that is sown is perishable but what is raised is imperishable;
43. the thing that is sown is weak but what is raised is powerful;
44. when it is sown it embodies the soul, when it is raised it embodies the spirit. If the soul has its own embodiment, so does the spirit have its own embodiment.
45. The first man, Adam, as scripture says, became a living soul; but the last Adam has become a life-giving spirit.
46. That is, first the one with the soul, not the spirit, and after that, the one with the spirit".37.

The word *psychikos* has always been a problem for translators, and we see above how the Revised Standard Version and the Jerusalem Bible each give their own version. The Swedish Bible uses *själisk* (literally soulish) which is not an acknowledged Swedish adjective at all, not any more than 'soulish' would be English, but the commentators find that *själisk* is better than using physical or natural, or any other word.38.

There have been endless speculations with regard to *psychikos* and *pneumatikos* and the two 'bodies' made so decisively different from one another through the character of those two adjectives. At first it does not appear to be so very difficult to understand what Paul is saying: the one body is the old, 'dishonourable' and weak creation, made of flesh and blood which gets its life from the *psyche*, and the other is a heavenly, glorious creation, powerfully animated by the *pneuma*. The one is perishable, meant for this life only, the other is imperishable and will live for ever. Snaith affirms that "generally, in the writings of St Paul *psyche* belongs to this side of the grave, and *pneuma* to the other side".39. But as different scholars try to get beyond the surface, they all give their own versions and their own explanations, and there is much disagreement.

According to Bultmann there is a terminological confusion
in Paul's thinking "between 'soma' in the basic sense of
that which characterises human existence and 'soma' as the
phenomenon of the material body". This is the reason why
Paul connects "somatic existence" at the end of the Age with
'soma' "as a thing of material substance or as the form of
such a thing". Bultmann further points to the fact that
"since the substance of the resurrection-body cannot be 'flesh
and blood' (I Cor XV 50), the unfortunate consequence is that
pneuma must be conceived as a substance of which that soma
consists. In distinction from this mythology the real
intention of Paul must be made clear. It is that he
asserts specific human existence, both before and beyond
death, to be a somatic existence...."40.

Stacey too speculates on the material of the new body. He
maintains, however, and this seems to be a more logical
conclusion, than the Bultmann one that "there is no more
reason to suggest that the 'soma pneumatikon' was made of
'pneuma' than that the 'soma psuchikon' was made of 'psycho'.
In fact, the latter was made of flesh and blood"41. Along
the same lines, the Jerusalem Bible comments with regard to
I Corinthians XV 44 that the resurrection body here is no
longer "subject to the laws of matter, it does not even
answer the description of matter"42.

Owen, quite on the contrary, indignantly protests against the
views of "some theologians" who maintain that "the resurrection
body cannot be regarded as a 'body' in the ordinary sense at
all". Referring to verses 44 and 50 he quotes theologians
who attempt to prove that "the resurrection body is an
entirely new body and bears no relation to the old whatever;
it can be called a 'body' only in the sense that it is an
instrument and expression of the 'spirit', and not in any
'crudely materialistic' sense". Owen concludes that if
these scholars were right "the material factors of our
present existence would have no eternal significance"43.

It seems difficult to understand exactly what Owens means
when implying that 'material factors' should have 'eternal
significance'. And of course it all depends on what he means by 'matter'. According to Dahl, "St Paul is not saying that we are to have 'material bodies' in the resurrection, because he does not say that they are 'material' now....(in fact) the idea that our bodies are 'material' in the modern sense of the word....(was) unknown to Paul and many of his contemporaries" who were steeped in the "Semitic totality concept"\(^{44}\). There were, as we know, no real borderlines between the 'material' and the 'immaterial', even in Hellenistic thinking. It seems safe to say, however, that there is much more implied in the words 'imperishable body' than the fact that there would be a 'body' which could not be destroyed. The promise to the followers of Jesus is that they are going to share not only his resurrection but the exaltation in Glory; they will be glorified with him.

"Yes, the troubles which are soon over, though they weigh little, train us for the carrying of a weight of eternal glory which is out of all proportion to them" (II Cor IV 17; cf II Cor IV 16)\(^{45}\). Earlier it was pointed out that when, in the apocalyptic literature, the term of 'my glory' is used, it is always in connection with the next world, as, for instance, in the case of Enoch who was going to be 'dressed in garments of 'my glory'" (2 Enoch 22 : 8). We find the term 'glory' in the New Testament applying to Christ "as the perfect revelation of the glory of God"\(^{46}\). Klausner explains that "Jesus' heavenly body" has for Paul "a supreme radiance like the brightness of deity or the glow of the shekinah"\(^{47}\). The first Christians conceived of this 'glory' "as a sort of light-substance", says Cullmann, who finds it impossible to find words to describe it. Grünewald's painting of the Resurrection may be the closest vision of what "Paul understands as the spiritual body"\(^{48}\).

The plant, in its fullness, has a glory that the seed had not. This seems to be implied in Paul's reply on 'the stupid question' about the raising of the dead and the sort of body they will have.
They are stupid questions. Whatever you sow in the ground has to die before it is given new life and the thing that you sow is not what is going to come; you sow a bare grain, say of wheat or something like that, and then God gives it the sort of body that he has chosen; each sort of seed gets its own sort of body" (I Cor XV 36-38)\(^{49}\).

We must remember that Paul's message was, above all, eschatological and that he had grown up as a Pharisee. He was conditioned by his background and had the assumptions of his times. Dahl affirms that "the conceptions of the nature of matter, life, time, the world, etc., held by the biblical writers may have been very different from what we have been inclined to assume they were"\(^{50}\).

"It does not appear", says Dahl, "that any evidence has yet been adduced to the effect that St Paul had abandoned this totality-concept when he wrote I Corinthians"\(^{51}\).

According to Dahl, Paul and his fellow Christians, felt that they were living in a time of great tension, in a time belonging "to the generation of Adam as well as to the generation of Christ". They were waiting for the Second Coming of Christ when they would enter with him into Eternal Glory. What Paul is saying about the next life is the following: "Though Christ has completely changed us, we are yet the same people as we were before we believed; so we shall be the same people in the final resurrection, though wonderfully altered in accordance with the regeneration that has taken place in us". The accepted exegesis (with reference to I Corinthians XV) has misunderstood Paul when he talks about a new existence "so that it comes to imply a completely new nature altogether"\(^{52}\).

Käsemann is one of those who finds that the "notion of an inherent continuity of life is alien to Paul's thinking. In places where we would speak of development, the idea of miracle takes hold in Paul, the miracle which bridges the gap between different things". Käsemann stresses that
"the point of the analogy is not the growth through change but the breach which dying makes between the old and the new".53

It is not easy to give an opinion on who has the right emphasis for what Paul wanted to say, Dahl or Käsemann. It might perhaps be assumed however that the use of a plant in analogy with the raising of the dead would indicate that Dahl has drawn the right conclusions. No miracle has occurred when an oak grows out of the acorn; there is a continuity between the 'old creation', the seed in the ground, and the 'new creation', the oak. Though, in fairness to Käsemann, they are not the same thing and the one has to disappear before the other can appear.

Onians's research may throw some light on our problem. Having proved the importance of the head in ancient thinking, this scholar explains that the tail-end of the spine (at the other end of the important marrow) also had its role. It was regarded as the 'holy bone' for the Greeks and was thought to be "the seed that grew into a new body according to Jews and Mohammedans".54 Onians explains the interesting fact that "Rabbinic tradition taught that in the grave, while the rest of the body perishes, the lower end of the spine remains (known as 'luz'), which when the dew falls upon it will become a complete body again and live". And this, says Onians, is how "the mystery of the Resurrection of the Body" is solved.55

Whatever Paul thought about this ancient myth, he clearly appreciated that "each sort of seed gets its own kind of body". A faithful follower of Christ might well have expected that according to God's promise after his old body had died and "been sown" into the grave, a new glorious 'body' would germinate and grow in heaven, and that it would still be the same person who would enjoy eternal life.

It seems as if almost every word in I Corinthians XV has
become a bone of contention among scholars. Thus, the word 'it' (or 'the thing' or 'what'), which is found in verses 42, 43 and 44, has been the subject of much discussion. Dahl calls it "the mysterious it" and suggests that for Paul this word stood for the "human totality". "God's eschatological plan demands that if man is a body-animate, he can and will be body-spiritual.....The first man is simply 'dust of the earth'.....but the second man derives his glory and power direct from heaven. He is eschatological man living under the final dispensation of the Spirit".

"47. The first man, being from the earth, is earthly by nature; the second man is from heaven.
48. As this earthly man was, so are we on earth; and as the heavenly man is, so we are in heaven.
49. And we, who have been modelled on the earthly man, will be modelled on the heavenly man.
50. Or else, brothers, put it this way: flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God: and the perishable cannot inherit what lasts forever" (I Cor XV 47-50).

When explaining the meaning concealed in the first and the last Adam, or the earthly and the heavenly man, J A T Robinson, like Dahl, emphasises the human totality rather than the individual. The former finds that these expressions stand for the human condition in general, that is for what he calls "the form of our humanity or manhood". Thus Paul is here referring not to the two individuals, Adam and Christ, but to "two different 'bodies' or conditions of humanity, adam and anthropos being ways in Hebrew and Greek of referring to 'man' with a capital M". Whenever Paul uses terms like 'inner man', 'outer man', 'the new man', 'the old man', he refers to "collectives in which the individual participates". "In the same way, 'the man from heaven' corresponds to 'the habitation from heaven' - the new corporeity".

Robinson further assumes that II Corinthians III-V have much in common with I Corinthians XV as they are also "concerned with entry upon the new corporeity, the new man, which is the body of Christ". (Other themes in common are:
'the earthly' and 'the heavenly'; 'being changed'; 'putting on that which is from heaven'; 'the mortal being swallowed up'; and, 'death being vanquished in life')\textsuperscript{59}. It appears that those conclusions which Robinson draws may well be deducted from the text of I Corinthians XV. With reference to II Corinthians V 1-10, however, it does not seem necessary to conclude that Paul is thinking of 'the human condition' in general, but rather of individuals.

"1. For we know that when the tent that we live in on earth is folded up, there is a house built by God for us, an everlasting home not made by human hands, in the heavens.
2. In this present state, it is true we groan as we wait with longing to put our heavenly home over the other;
3. we should like to be found wearing clothes and not without them.
4. Yes we groan and find it a burden being still in this tent, not that we want to strip it off, but to put the second garment over it and to have what must die taken up into life.
5. This is the purpose for which God made us, and he has given us the pledge of the Spirit.
6. We are always full of confidence, then, when we remember that to live in the body means to be exiled from the Lord.
7. Going as we do by faith and not by sight - we are full of confidence, I say, and actually want to be exiled from the body
8. and make our home with the Lord.
9. Whether we are living in the body or exiled from it, we are intent on pleasing him.
10. For all the truth about us will be brought out in the law court of Christ, and each of us will get what he deserves for the things he did in the body, good or bad" (II Cor V 1-10)\textsuperscript{60}.

It is interesting to follow the summary which Schmithals made of some of the many different views which have been read out of the above verses.
1. a) "Paul is here no longer counting on the Parousia;
b) he regarded the death of the believer to be the normal thing;
c) he is thinking only of the Parousia.

2. a) Paul had the conception that the departed one received the heavenly body immediately after dying;
b) he must first endure a state of nakedness;
c) he is clothed at the Parousia.

3. a) The old garment will first be taken off before the new is put on;
b) the new will be put on over the old and will swallow it up;
c) after putting off the old robe man still has a pneumatic garment over which the new will be placed, and so on....''61.

It seems most astonishing that the difference in the many propositions about the real meaning behind Paul's words can be so great. With regard to this passage it appears to the present writer that the text lends itself quite naturally to the following interpretation. It should however be kept in mind that the translators of the text in the Jerusalem Bible may have already turned it in this particular direction.

What Paul appears to be saying is that he and the other followers of Christ are certain that God has prepared a home in heaven for each and all of them. (Perhaps it can be assumed, when compared with Pauline thinking in general, that this habitation would be like "the garments of glory", so often mentioned). They would all of them have preferred the change from earthly to heavenly life to happen soon, now, when they are still alive; it would mean a great disappointment for them to die before the Parousia, death being described, as it seems quite objectively, as a state when the 'we' = 'they', the real persons, have left their bodies behind, that is, when the 'soul' is naked.

No doubt, they do groan about being in their present bodies,
"yes, we find it a burden to be still in the tent", but the reason is not that they want to die, (thus long to leave their bodies in the way it generally happens when one dies), no, the reason is that they are experiencing this great disappointment with regard to the delay in the Parousia, and thus also with regard to their firm hope and faith in not having to die at all. They had hoped to be transferred into eternal life, into the heavens, body and all. Paul is describing expectations which seem to have been along the lines of an ascension or translation, a conception which was among the many beliefs current in the Judaism of those days, as we have discussed earlier. Enoch was one of those who had been transferred into the heavens in his earthly form and was there taken out of his body and put into garments of glory.

"Full of confidence", Paul then stresses his complete faith in God's promise that He has made man for Eternal Life. Thus, if the Parousia is indeed to be an event very far in the future, then they must accept the fact that none of them will be transferred directly from their earthly bodies into the 'divine garments'. Once this is understood and accepted, they will gladly die, that is, leave their earthly bodies, because this will mean that they can make their home with the Lord. They must always remember, however, that whatever will happen in the future, they have to live in accordance with the wishes of the Lord, now and here, as their future eternal life will depend on how they live on earth.

Of particular interest in V 5-10 is the Pauline use of the pronouns 'we' and 'us'. If the above is, in any way, an acceptable interpretation of the passage then the pronouns will be seen as standing for the conceptions 'inner man', 'the true personality' or 'our real selves', in fact, what was commonly, among the people of those times, thought of as psyche, and not for "the form of our humanity or manhood". Schmithals explains II Corinthians V 1-10 according to his
particular assumptions, and begins by stressing that in spite of the many different opinions there is agreement on one thing, that most exegetes believe that Paul changed his views after having written I Thessalonians and I Corinthians, and had just "begun to think in Hellenistic fashion" when writing II Corinthians. Schmithals, on the contrary, points to "the polemical aim" of this epistle which is directed against Paul's Corinthian adversaries. Schmithals firmly asserts these opponents to be Gnostics who "reject the celestial corporeality and hence wish to remain 'naked'". In his arguments Paul clearly shows that he misunderstands his opponents' views. He thinks, says Schmithals, that "the people in Corinth surely must see that one cannot at the same time hold to an eternal life and a bodiless state in that life". Paul attempts to meet the "Gnostic justification of a disembodied state worth striving for by pointing to the higher, unearthly and divine quality of the heavenly habitation for which we rightly yearn".

Thus, according to Schmithals, there are no specific changes in Paul's thinking, but a new attempt is made to make his opponents understand his view on some form of corporeality in the Beyond, an attempt which fails because he himself does not understand what the 'gnostic' beliefs are. The conclusion that the opponents in Corinth were necessarily gnostics have been much criticised. Scholars, in general, seem to find that the delay in the Parousia was causing a changed attitude, which is traceable in Paul's epistles, but there is no agreement on the question whether this actually caused him to "think in Hellenistic fashion" or not.

No doubt the Pauline texts compel us continuously to ask questions. "Does biblical anthropology allow us to hold that there is real life without the body?", asks Benoit. "How are we to regard man's state during this long period of waiting?". The commentator of the Jerusalem Bible suggests that Philippians I 21ff as well as II Corinthians V 8ff imply that "the (good) Christian who dies is with Christ at once without any temporal gap between death and
the last 'judgment'"64. We discussed possible answers earlier: in connection with apocalyptic literature in the intertestamental period, as well as in connection with the soul in the New Testament in general.

"Life to me, of course, is Christ, but then death would bring something more; but then again, if living in this body means doing work which is having good results - I do not know what I should choose. I am caught in this dilemma; I want to be gone and be with Christ, which would be very much the better, but for me to stay alive in this body is a more urgent need for your sake" (Phil I 21-24)64.

Sevenster gives a non-committal answer to the above questions. "It cannot even be established with certainty from his letters", he says, "whether he visualised death as the detachment of the soul from the body, and it is most noteworthy that Paul never even mentions the word 'soul' in those passages in which he speaks of his expectations. He probably believed that after death the soul would continue to live on separately for a time", that is, until the general resurrection65.

We said earlier that in the Pauline view soma was neutral matter which, together with psyche, formed the living being. The Gnostic, on the other hand, regarded the body as a prison for the 'light-sparks'. The attitude of Gnosticism leads to mysticism and asceticism, as Bultmann also affirms, that is, to "a turning aside from bodily existence". There are, however, passages in which we must assume, says Bultmann, that Paul "so keenly feels the plight of the man who loses his grip upon himself and falls victim to outside powers, that he comes close to Gnostic dualism. That is indicated by the fact that he occasionally uses soma synonymously with sarx"66.

There are also passages in which it seems that Paul is "clearly reckoning with the possibility that the self can separate from the soma even in this present life, and this soma can only be the physical body", according to Bultmann,
who is here referring to II Corinthians XII 2-4, "where Paul is speaking of a pneumatic experience of his, doubtless an ecstasy as mysticism uses the word"67.

"Must I go on boasting, though there is nothing to be gained by it? But I will move on to the visions and revelations which I have had from the Lord. I know a man in Christ who, fourteen years ago, was caught up - whether still in the body or out of the body, I do not know; God knows - right into the third heaven. I do know, however, that this same person - whether in the body or out of the body, I do not know; God knows - was caught up into paradise and heard things which must not and cannot be put into human language. I will boast about a man like that, but not about anything of my own except my weaknesses" (II Cor XII 1-5)68.

Schmithals assumes the above passage also to be polemical and motivated by Paul's debate with the Gnostics who "emphasised that during their rapture they were ek tos tou somatos, out of the body"69. Thus, when Paul twice declares that he does not know whether he had been in the body or out of the body during his vision, it appears that "Paul at least considers it possible that he did not leave the body. Therewith, however, the central concern pursued by the Gnostic dualist with the practice of his celestial journey, namely, the liberation from the body, is directly and apparently deliberately denied"70.

It may seem, that even if the passage is polemical, its main importance lies in the fact that it implies some form of ecstatic experience, a divine revelation, on the part of Paul, either in the Greek-Orphic manner or in the Jewish prophetic tradition. Klausner several times emphasises that Paul was a man of profound religious insight and a mystic, and also that he was "influenced by pagans and Hellenism"71. Whitemann traces three phases in the development of Christian theology and finds that "the seeds lie in the mysticism of two of the world's greatest mystics,
St Paul and St John. However, any attempt to abstract "a clear theological system" from these writers meets with great difficulties because, according to Whitemann, "their writings are packed with obvious or obscure references to the mysteries of Greece, Egypt, and Asia Minor, and to Hebrew prophetism and mysticism, with use of gnostic terms, and both authors make important use of Dionysian-Orphic symbolism and myth."72.

We said earlier that the apocalyptic writers claimed divine inspiration for their works and that it seems possible that this inspiration had taken place as part of experience of psychical, ecstatic and/or visionary art. Paul, as a Pharisee, most probably in the apocalyptic tradition, would have been sensible to his ecstatic gifts and visionary experiences long before his meeting with Christ on the Damascus road. Underhill, the popular writer on mysticism, proposes that "not only the epistles of St Paul and the Johannine writings, but also the earliest liturgic fragments which we possess show how congenial was mystical expression to the mind of the Church; how easily that Church could absorb and transmute the mystical elements of Essene, Orphic and Neoplatonic thought."73.

The following passage from Romans VI uses language which strongly indicates not only affinities with the mystery tradition but also seems to imply a tendency to mysticism in Paul's thinking. Also Romans VIII 1-11 and several other passages where we have expressions like 'Christ in you' or 'You in Christ' appear to indicate a mystical union between man and the Godhead.

"You have been taught that when we were baptised in Christ Jesus we were baptised in his death, in other words, when we were baptised we went into the tomb with him and joined him in death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the Father's glory, we too might live a new life" (Rom VI 3-4).74.

"If, according to the classical philosophical and religious
definitions, mysticism consists in a contact, experienced as such, with the beyond, Paul is the greatest of the Christian mystics", says Cerfaux. "The vision of the Damascus road was never dimmed and remained with him as the light and power by which the pagan world was evangelised"75.

Painter very decidedly rejects the assumption that St Paul or St John would have been mystics; on the contrary, they were both occupied with fighting on "two fronts", against legalism and against mysticism by which "the Church down the ages has been plagued". Painter finds that "John gives a clearer and more consistent rejection of the threat of mysticism than Paul, because of the manner in which the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith are united in the Gospel.....Paul has not given a clear treatment of this aspect"76.

It may be suggested that Painter is only seeing the one side of Paul's teaching, the one concerned with the practical problems of the young church, but there is another one as well. We shall discuss the two aspects further in the conclusion in connection with Scholem's views. However, both Happold and Cerfaux see two sides, the former remarking that interwoven with the practical work which Paul is administering there are "superb passages of mystical illumination and insight"77. And Cerfaux points out that St Paul would reserve "the term mystical for the privileges of his visions, for the 'wisdom' that brought him into contact with the mystery of God, for the trials, the consolations, and the miraculous power of his apostolic life, and for the spiritual gifts of his charismatic knowledge"78.

For the present writer it is impossible to read St John's Gospel and many passages from St Paul's Epistles without sensing that undercurrent of mysticism which spiritualises the text. In this connection we may point out that for Paul, Christ took the place of the Torah and that the "cosmic understanding of the Torah" was "the gateway to Jewish mysticism", according to Hengel79.
It is interesting to notice the influence exerted on Rabbinic thinking about the Torah by Platonic interpretation of the Logos. Hengel points out that "like the Logos in Plato, the Torah is understood as a living organism, comparable to the work of a weaver. Dialectical discussion of it raises the learned man into a higher world". The Law is looked upon as "the divine plan of creation", as a spiritual principle. "Therefore, uninterrupted occupation with the Torah...brought the highest reward in the other world" and the scribes, because they were the only authoritative exponents of the same had the key "to the mysteries of the present and the future world". The terms used in connection with the scribes and their occupation were almost like those which are found in "the thought-world of Hellenistic mysticism".

Christ, for Paul, is the 'divine plan of creation'. In Him all things unite, all things were made. He took the place of the Torah which was weakened 'by the flesh' and showed a new way of living, a life in the Spirit. Full of hope and faith, Paul could proclaim: "Everyone moved by the Spirit is a son of God. The spirit you received is not the spirit of slaves bringing fear into your lives again; it is the spirit of sons, and it makes us cry out, 'Abba, Father!' The Spirit himself and our spirit bear united witness that we are children of God. And if we are children we are heirs as well: heirs of God and coheirs with Christ, sharing his sufferings so as to share his glory" (Rom VIII 14ff).
Notes to Chapter XIX.

1. Lucien Cerfaux, *The Spiritual Journey of St Paul*, p43
2. Cerfaux, p44
3. Jerusalem Bible, p240
4. Cerfaux, pp47-8
6. Selby, p112
7. Stacey, p237
8. ibid., p222
9. ibid., p144
10. ibid., p229
12. Taylor, p6
13. II Cor III cf. v17 and V 16.
14. Revised Standard Bible, pp144-5
15. Stewart, p157
18. Jerusalem Bible, p278
20. Charles, p470 (Eschatology)
21. ibid., p471
22. Jerusalem Bible, p279 n(k)
23. ibid., p314
24. Bultmann, Cf Vol I p203
26. Charles, p471 (Eschatology)
27. Jerusalem Bible, p296, 354
28. ibid., p297 n(c)
29. Stacey, cf p142
30. Swedish Bible, p426
32. Jerusalem Bible, pp290, 320, 270
33. Charles, p467 n1 (Eschatology)
34. Stacey, p226
Notes to Chapter XIX/continued 2.

35. Stacey, p146
36. Revised Standard Bible, p163
37. Jerusalem Bible, p308
38. Swedish Bible, p426
40. Bultmann, Vol I p198
41. Stacey, p149
42. Jerusalem Bible, p309 n(1)
43. Owen, p172
44. M E Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body, p91
45. Jerusalem Bible, p314
46. David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, p45
47. Klausner, p494; cf II Cor III 18, IV 6
48. Cullmann, p36 (Immortality)
49. Jerusalem Bible, p308
50. Dahl, p9
51. ibid., p72
52. ibid., p83 n7
53. Käsemann, p8
54. Onians, p126, n3
55. ibid., p288
56. Dahl, p82
57. Jerusalem Bible, p308
58. J A T Robinson, pp167-8-9
59. ibid., p169 n123
60. Jerusalem Bible, p314
61. Schmithals, cf p260
62. ibid., pp260, 263, 264 n202
63. Benoit, p104
64. Jerusalem Bible p339
65. J N Sevenster, Paul and Seneca, p238
66. Bultmann, Vol I p199
67. ibid., Vol I p202
68. Jerusalem Bible, p320
69. Schmithals, p215
Notes to Chapter XIX/continued 3.

70. Schmithals, p211
71. Klausner, pp486-7
73. Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism, p435
74. Jerusalem Bible, p277
75. Cerfau, p94
76. Painter, p136
77. F C Happold, Mysticism, A Study and an Anthology, p185
78. Cerfau, pp95-6
79. Hengel, p171
80. Jerusalem Bible, p280
CHAPTER XX

THE JOHANNINE CONCEPTS:
ETERNAL LIFE, LOGOS, ETC.
"Yes, God loved the world so much that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not be lost but may have eternal life" (Jn III 16). 

"I have come so that they may have life and have it to the full" (Jn X 10). 

"And eternal life is this: to know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent" (Jn XVII 2). 

"It is the spirit that gives life, the flesh has nothing to offer. The words I have spoken to you are spirit and they are life" (Jn VI 63). 

"In the beginning was the Word: the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things came to be, not one thing had its being but through him. All that came to be had life in him and that life was the light of men, a light that shines in the dark, a light that darkness could not overpower" (Jn I 1-5). 

These are words which speak to the soul of man, deep, penetrating, awe-inspiring, sacred words. They still that longing that has always been within mankind. These words justify the assertion, says Romaniuk, "that everything that Jesus said, did, felt, all his joys and sadness, his whole life, his death and entrance into glory were to obtain for us eternal life." 

Jesus gives us life because he is the Life; he brings us words because he is the Word. In John's Gospel, according to Bultmann, "Jesus' words communicate no definite content at all, except that they are words of life, words of God." The real content is to be found at a deeper level and is contained in the relationship between the words 'speak' and 'do', 'word' and 'work'. When the 'Word' of Life takes flesh, its 'work' is to lead men to possess true life. And
Jesus can give life because He expresses the total victory of life over death; because He IS the resurrection.

In the paragraphs quoted above 'life' (zōē) stands for 'eternal life'. Romaniuk maintains that when John implies earthly, physical life he uses psyche and never zōē. Some typical examples would be: "I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd is one who lays down his life (psyche) for his sheep" (Jn X 11). "Anyone who loves his life (psyche) loses it; anyone who hates his life (psyche) in this world, will keep it for ever in the eternal life (zōē)" (Jn XII 25). No doubt, psyche is often used in this meaning in the Fourth Gospel, but we must keep in mind that this concept stood for the unity life-soul-self. It was earlier suggested that psyche binds this world and the world of eternal life together and that therefore, as the believer already has psyche, the awakening to eternal life will not be "a magical change". If the soul can be said to bind the two worlds together it cannot be merely 'earthly life'.

It has often been suggested that John's Gospel conveys spiritual knowledge. Already Clement of Alexandria made the remark that "having observed that the bodily things had been exhibited in the other gospels John, inspired by the Spirit, produced a spiritual gospel". Perhaps this gospel should rather be seen as working on two levels, thereby spelling out the spiritual implications of the historical happenings. It has also been said that it is making explicit what is implicit in the other gospels.

Psyche has from earliest times conveyed as one of its meanings that of being the life force within man on, what we would call, the 'material' level. Analogically, on the 'immaterial' level, in the spiritual world within the physical, the Word gives Life. When Bultmann suggests that one of several possible meanings behind John I 3-4 could be "In that which was created the Word was the life" we get the vision of Jesus Christ as the life-force within the whole creation. Through him the resurrection into life will take place - IS already
taking place. 'The resurrection' in John XI 25ff was not discussed in Chapter XVIII because it seems to be on a different level from the doctrine of the resurrection in general, that is, it may be assumed that the whole story of the raising of Lazarus emphasises that we, our real selves, can never die if we truly believe in Jesus, the Christ.

"On receiving the message, Jesus said, This sickness will end not in death but in God's glory and through it the Son of God will be glorified. 'Your brother', said Jesus to her, 'will rise again'. Martha said, 'I know he will rise again at the resurrection on the last day'. Jesus said: 'I am the resurrection (and the life). If anyone believes in me, even though he dies he will live, and whoever lives and believes in me will never die. Do you believe this? 'Yes, Lord', she said, 'I believe that you are the Christ, the Son of God, the one who was sent to come into this world'" (Jn XI 4, 25-27).

Martha had never thought of any other 'resurrection' than the resurrection at the end of time. But in a flash of insight a new understanding came to her; through the presence of the Son of God, who had come into this world and brought salvation to all who believed in him, life and death took on a new dimension. Eternity had entered time, "because eternity is not simply long time but a timeless modality of existence", says Jones, "it pervades time like an atmosphere". When becoming flesh Logos accepted the limitations of life and death within time. We have thus the paradox of God's eternal life-giving Word in the finite human form of Jesus.

J A T Robinson discusses at some length the dilemma we today cannot avoid feeling with regard to the contradictions involved in the 'pre-existence' and the 'humanity' of Christ, especially when both concepts are equally emphasised. Possibly "our dilemma did not exist for New Testament writers" like Paul or John or the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Robinson suggests that they would not have felt this contradiction
if something like the Buddhist conception of incarnation were present in their thinking. In Buddhism the individual soul and the individual body are destroyed by death. "Yet the spirit is no more destroyed than the matter: it is reunited with its source, emanations of it are released into all the world to reappear in new configurations or individuals..... Thus, the Buddha can be incarnate in, and the source of enlightenment to, countless other individuals....."\(^\text{10}\).

One may speculate on the possibility that "this is how Paul and John see the spirit of Christ released by the death of the individual Jesus to become incorporate, as his alter ego, in the body of his followers", according to Robinson. The latter emphasises that the intention is not to discuss the likenesses and differences between the Christian and the Buddhistic religions, but only to examine "a way of thinking about incarnation which finds expression in Buddhism"\(^\text{10}\).

To recapitulate the two possibilities with regard to "that which is pre-existent and takes flesh", we have on the one hand "an individual substance of a rational nature", and on the other hand "a life, power or activity (whether divine or spiritual) which is not as such a person (and which) comes to embodiment and expression (whether partial or total) in an individual human being". Robinson is of the opinion that the latter possibility has more in common "with the understanding of pre-existence in late Judaism and early Christianity" than has the former\(^\text{10}\).

In the thinking of the patristic period, however, the concept 'pre-existence' was used to affirm the position of the Logos as a person of the Trinity in the fullest sense. In this view, Jesus became human like the rest of us only by sharing our life and this assumption makes it very difficult to visualise him as being with the rest of us "a genuine product of the evolutionary process". Robinson maintains that although the conception of the Logos gradually changed during the 1st century AD, the New Testament writers had not yet looked upon the concept of pre-existence as necessarily
involving "the hypostatisation of an individual heavenly person"\textsuperscript{10}.

The development of the personification of not only the Word of God, but also His Wisdom, His Spirit and the Torah in the last centuries BC were discussed earlier. There seem to be many facts which prove Robinson right when he points out that these personifications were regarded more like spiritual powers than independent individuals until the time of the Church fathers who then, all too literally, interpreted John's vision of the Logos as a real person in existence from all eternity.

In this connection we referred to the possibility that the Church was responsible for drawing too sharp a distinction between the Word and the Holy Spirit. According to Painter "John more than any other writer in the New Testament, presents us with the evidence which forced the Early Church, almost against its will to formulate the doctrine of the Trinity"\textsuperscript{11}. In the following we shall notice that John speaks of 'the Spirit', 'the Spirit of Truth' and 'the Holy Spirit', and that he speaks of the 'Spirit' as 'he'.

"John also declared, 'I saw the Spirit coming down on him from heaven like a dove and resting on him" (Jn I 32)\textsuperscript{12}.

"I shall ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate (parakletos) to be with you for ever, that Spirit of truth whom the world can never receive since it neither sees nor knows him; but you know him because he is with you, he is in you" (Jn XIV 16-17)\textsuperscript{12}.

"...but the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you everyday and remind you of all I have said to you" (Jn XIV 26)\textsuperscript{12}.

The author of John's gospel acknowledges the immense importance of spiritual change by placing Jesus' discussion with Nicodemus at the very beginning of his account of the public ministry of Jesus. This spiritual change could only be likened to a new birth.

"Nicodemus said, 'How can a grown man be born? Can he go
back into his mother's womb and be born again?

Jesus replied: 'I tell you most solemnly, unless a man is
born through water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom
of God: what is born of the flesh is flesh; what is born of
the Spirit is spirit. Do not be surprised when I say:
You must be born from above. The wind (pneuma) blows
wherever it pleases; you hear its sound, but you cannot tell
where it comes from or where it is going. That is how it
is with all who are born of the Spirit" (Jn III 5-8)\(^\text{13}\).

Jesus knew that only through a complete change from a life
in the flesh to a life in the spirit could a man see the
Kingdom of God who IS Spirit. There is here a stress on
the return to the womb, according to Taylor, who points out
that a "birth of water and Spirit was to be the start of a
new life in water and Spirit as its permanent condition".
It appears as if the church has forgotten to perceive in the
'waters of baptism' "the symbol of that element in which the
Christian lives and moves and has his being, namely the
Spirit himself", says Taylor. "The point about the
Christian's baptism is that he remains in that element into
which he is baptised"\(^\text{14}\). It is interesting to compare the
above with the dynamics in the element of the Spirit.

Taylor stresses the role of these 'waters' as an archetypal
symbol representing 'the life in the Spirit' and finds that
what has been sadly lacking in Christian thought through the
centuries has been the boldness "to accept the primitive
meanings in the symbols in our religion", the symbols which
are clearly brought out in I John V 8: "There are three
witnesses, the Spirit, the water, and the blood, and these
three are really one" (Bishop Wand's translation)\(^\text{14}\).

It is interesting to note how Taylor's reference to the
importance of ancient symbols fits in with Onians's studies
and with what we have traced throughout this thesis with
regard to the identification of the 'soul' with the life-
liquids: water (\(\text{\textit{aion}}\)), breath and blood. No doubt, symbols
and myths reveal important psychological truths. The
emphasis on water and the Spirit and the relationship between these conceptions are very much stressed in the following passage: "If any man is thirsty, let him come to me! Let the man come and drink who believes in me! As scripture says: From his breast shall flow fountains of living water. He was speaking of the Spirit which those who believed in him were to receive; for there was no Spirit as yet because Jesus had not yet been glorified" (Jn VII 38-39).

Onians's research, as we have seen, was not limited to the concepts water, breath or spirit, and blood, but included also 'seed' and 'oil' and 'blessing'. The belief that when anointing the head with holy oil the Spirit of Yahweh was transmitted can, according to Onians, be traced back to ancient thinking about the seed as an oil stored in the head. Oil and water, spirit and 'blessings' can all be seen as related to the soul as the life-force, the liquid of life and strength. They were accordingly assumed to be 'poured out'.

When a king of Old Testament times was anointed with the holy oil he literally became the son of Yahweh. In accordance with this ancient thinking Acts X 38 certifies: "how God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power" and John proclaims Jesus as "the only begotten Son of God".

Onians points out that "the occasional visiting of a woman by Yahweh to bring to birth a son seems to be implicit in Paul's interpretation of the story of Yahweh's promised visit to Sarah and the consequent birth of Isaac, son not of the flesh (of Abraham) but of 'the promise'". It is reported that Philo of Alexandria explained such passages to indicate the actual begetting by God. It thus seems that the idea of Divine Fatherhood was part of existing thought.

For John, Christ was uniquely the Son of God, but, in another way, all Christians "are already the children of God". "No one who has been begotten by God sins; because God's seed
remains inside him, he cannot sin when he has been begotten by God" (I Jn III 9)¹⁸. Following Onians' explanations we would here see God's 'seed' as the cause of the spiritual birth of a new man, a man who would literally have become one of the children of God. And anyone who has been born again through a birth 'from above', 'through water and the Spirit', and lives accordingly has been made deathless already in this life.

Cullmann points to the stress on the continuity of the 'inner' man of converted people before and after death which we find especially in the Gospel of John, "where death is presented for all practical purposes only as a natural transition". However, according to Cullmann, even if this shows a "certain analogy to the immortality of the soul", we must not forget the fact that "living with Christ does not correspond to the natural essence of the soul. Rather it is the result of a divine intervention from the outside, through the Holy Spirit, who must already have quickened the inner man in earthly life by his miraculous power"²⁰. As was just said, a man has to be born again.

The first Christians felt, as we have seen, that the 'next world' was almost as near and real as this world. Through Jesus' resurrection the new age has already come into being and the old world would very soon come to an end. The 'otherworldliness' of the early Christians appears to be strongly emphasised in the following passage: "You must not love this passing world or anything that is in the world. The love of the Father cannot be in any man who loves the world, because nothing the world has to offer - the sensual body, the lustful eye, pride in possessions - could ever come from the Father but only from the world; and the world with all it craves for, is coming to an end; but anyone who does the will of God remains for ever" (I Jn II 15-17)²¹.

Just as the affirmation of the essential significance of the things of this world is made in John I 1-5: "not one thing had its being but through Him....", the question, as we have said before, is one of emphasis, not of a division between
this world and the other world, between spirit and matter. Given that the spiritual and natural aspects have a common source in God, the question is will man get absorbed in the material itself to the exclusion of God, or will he, having in himself that "mind which was also in Christ Jesus" (Phil II 5), view the world with God's eyes.
Notes to Chapter XX.

1. Jerusalem Bible, pp151,168,182,159,146
2. Romaniuk, p70
3. Bultmann, Vol II p63
4. Romaniuk, p69
5. Jerusalem Bible, pp168,173
7. Jerusalem Bible, p 170
8. ibid., p171
9. Jones, p124
11. Painter, p64
12. Jerusalem Bible, pp145,178
13. ibid., p150
14. Taylor, pp44-5
15. Jerusalem Bible, p162
16. Onians, cf pp484,299
17. Revised Standard Bible, p119
18. Onians, p503
20. Cullmann, p44 (immortality) ref to Jn III 36, IV 14, VI 54.
21. Jerusalem Bible, p413
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Beginning with primitive man, it is generally accepted, as we have pointed out in this thesis, that people of all races and times have held similar beliefs about a 'something' which was the life, or gave life, to the visible body and which was connected with blood-breath-vapour. There was also a 'something' which was able to lead an independent life, 'out-of' the visible body, in dreams, trances and ecstasy, and after death. Parallel with the above, we have encountered, what has been called, the primary, religious experience, the religious Ur-Erfahrenheit. This is a numinous, psychical experience which, from earliest times, has been attributed to the soul (or spirit), that is, the inner man, being literally 'inspired', or possessed, by gods or goddesses, or by the Spirit of God.

Because primitive man does not distinguish between the material and the immaterial, the living body and the living soul is for him a unity. We noted the fact that neither Homer's Greeks nor the Old Testament's Hebrews had need of a specific term for 'body'. However, in spite of the apparent unity of the living body/soul, beliefs about that independent 'something' within the 'body' have been firmly held from the earliest times. Primal man interprets some of the phenomena occurring within and around him as indicating the existence of this independent entity, the 'little man' within.

With regard to the mental acts of thinking, feeling and willing, primitive man, at one level, interprets these as a divine, almost concrete, interference from the outside but working within his heart, lungs, liver, that is, within his 'physical' soul-as-life. At other levels, these acts are interpreted as divine communication with, or possession of, the invisible 'spiritual' soul-as-self. As primal man's reasoning develops he assumes the soul (or spirit) to be the seat of his own thoughts, feelings and sensations; divine possession or inspiration is reserved for certain memorable exceptions only.

The overlapping of terms and concepts and the indeterminate
and irregular use of the same are typical features in all primitive thinking. The difficulties in doing justice to all this variety has caused the outreach and circumference of the concept soul to become very wide. In fact, in English for example, 'soul' has sometimes to express the meaning not only of nephesh but also of ruah and leb(ab), not only of psyche, but of pneuma and nous as well. On the other hand, the scope of the English word 'soul' is not felt to be wide enough, or is felt to have unduly 'spiritual' implications, and so the words 'life' and 'self' or an appropriate pronoun are often used in a more idiomatic rendering.

There is much disagreement among scholars when interpreting primitive thinking. For example, we have the question whether "the idea of an independent soul", or "the idea of life", came first in time. Onians answers that at a later stage psyche came to mean "not the concrete soul but the life which it confers". Nyman finds that "a condition for life was confused with life and later with the soul".

The evidence shows that from earliest times man has had dreams and seen apparitions of the living and the dead which contributed to his beliefs in a 'concrete soul'. Man has also always taken notice of physical phenomena and, when pondering the facts of birth, death; breathing, nourishment; growth, ageing; he drew conclusions about a force of life working within all creatures. To primitive man both kinds of phenomena were equally 'concrete' and real.

As we trace ancient thinking towards and during Hellenistic times we find that on the one hand, the concept soul kept its basic meaning as the principle of life, the life-force, in all living beings; on the other hand, the particular expressions of human life were discovered to be so various, so full of contradictions and so complex that the opinions and views concerning the true nature of the human soul became more and more diverse.
A new development has set in with the Platonic discovery that man's ability to think in abstract terms, about subjects like mathematical formulae, was indeed a mysterious phenomenon displaying what seemed to be an inherent knowledge in the human soul independent of the physical world. It was assumed to have been collected during the soul's earlier dwelling in the spiritual world of the Forms. Plato's interpretation of abstract knowledge as a memory within the immortal human soul has hardly ever ceased to influence religious thinking.

The Platonic view was easily combined with those common experiences interpreted as involving surviving souls (or spirits), experiences which have been found on all levels of the population and at all times. As Cicero said, "faith in immortality was sustained by the facts of spirits returning to the world of sense"\(^3\). The Old Testament and the Greek writings from Homer onwards give clear indications of professed communications between the living and beings from another world, both in waking states and in dreams. These apparitions were firmly believed to be real; they were seen and heard, sometimes by many witnesses simultaneously. In the Old Testament messages were delivered by angels; seers and prophets had visions of past, present and future events providing guidance and giving warnings. Out-of-the-body experiences, objects moving (what is today called Poltergeist phenomena), have been reported from earliest times. And there were the Mystics. Individuals have sought, and apparently gained, union with the Divine whether through the wild ecstasies of the Dionysian worshippers or through the ardent, silent worshipping of the participants in the Mysteries. The Old Testament also reports conversations with Yahweh, in the course of which, voices were heard and physical phenomena occurred.

We referred earlier to the episode in I Samuel when Saul consults the necromancer at En-Dor who, according to Saul's wishes, conjures up Samuel. It seems evident that the passage is written in the belief that Samuel really appeared
and talked to Saul. Typical of the general outlook today is the comment about this event in the Jerusalem Bible. It is categorically stated that in the above case, as well as "in other seances, credulity and trickery were at work". One may ask whether this is a fair judgment, but we shall come back to this question presently.

The concept soul, as used in the last centuries BC retains, to our logical minds, its earlier incongruity in using the same word for a 'something' which can live consciously on its own, either within or apart from the 'living unity' of a human being and for the principle of life, the life-force, ensouling this same living unity.

Plato, with the assumptions of his time, did not find it difficult to explain the relationship between the individual, independent soul and the soul as the principle of life in the whole of the universe, in macrocosm as well as in microcosm. The human soul was an individual concentration of the 'stuff' of the universal soul and brought life and intelligence to the body it occupied and ensouled.

The point is that not only is it paradoxical for 20th century thinking to use psyche as Plato does for an independent 'something' as well as for the 'something' running the machine of the entity 'man', but also the latter 'something' is characterised by two incongruous sides. On the one hand, psyche retains, as one of its characteristics, that of being a gaseous vapour, the basic breath-blood-vapour-soul, thus something apparently quasi-physical, a concrete force. On the other hand, it is something spiritual, mental, connected with thinking, an abstract principle.

To the ancients this duality was not felt to be incongruous. All matter was somehow alive, adapted to its purpose and displaying 'soul'. At the same time, all abstract and spiritual conceptions, as reasoning for example, were connected with and were manifestations of the 'breath' of the living universe.
Pneuma (רעות) literally stood for wind, breath and spirit, and thus, what for us are three different concepts, were originally an inseparable concept. We must also remember that breath, words and thoughts were intimately and firmly related, almost part of one single mental-physical act.

In his commentary to "The Secrets of the Golden Flower", Jung points to something very similar in Chinese thinking. "The ideas in this book", he says, "all deal with this 'in-between' world which seems unclear and confused to us because the concept of psychic reality is not yet current among us, although it defines our sphere of life. Without soul, mind is as dead as matter, because both are artificial abstractions; whereas man originally regarded mind as a volatile body, and matter as not lacking in soul...." ⁴.

'Blood' is a good example of this apparently physical as well as spiritual aspect of 'soul' which seems to be so paradoxical in today's thinking. In early Greek, as well as in early Hebrew, thinking, the 'blood' may be said to be the 'soul', or one of several 'souls'. The blood is 'alive' and must therefore be given to Yahweh. The blood is the power of thought; thinking occurs in the heart where the blood is concentrated. Eating the raw, bleeding meat was felt to unite the ecstatic, worshipping women with the god Dionysius. For Aristotle, too, the heart, with the blood, is the point at which the body is actuated by the soul and therefore the centre of thinking. The Hebrews, too, regarded leb(ab), the heart, where the blood is pulsating, as the seat of intellectual activity.

In some forms of Gnosticism the soul is described as the "worldly vital urge" connected with the blood and the cause of false thinking. Stoicism, too, stresses the heart region, where breath and blood are concentrated. For them the breath is the soul and the thinking part of the soul, its logos, is situated in the heart. In Mithraism, bloodbaths are the means of attaining union with the god. In Holy Communion, the Christians drink the blood of Christ. Whether
the wine is the blood, or becomes the blood, has, of course, been a much discussed question.

Many of the seeming contradictions in early views seem to arise not so much from the views themselves as from the contemporary person's inability to get inside the world-view of earlier man. Most Westerners are so firmly steeped in a materialistic outlook, so conditioned in the view which splits apart the material and the immaterial sides of life, that they cannot easily accept the Platonic description of the Universe as "a living being with a soul". They are apt to say with the scientist "we know already what is possible and what is impossible in the physical world. These things must be false because they strike at the foundations of our outlook".

No doubt, the unbelievably rapid development of our scientific knowledge puts the use of the word 'impossible' out of place. There have been clear indications from the 1960's onwards that the 'old' attitude among scientists, especially among physicists, is changing and that a new way of looking at the universe is emerging. Today, we have the "modern versus the post-modern scientific world view", says Schilling in the following explanation of these attitudes. "According to the former view (the modern) the world was closed, essentially completed and unchanging, basically substantive, simple and shallow, and fundamentally unmysterious - a rigidly programmed machine. The second (post-modern) regards it increasingly as unbounded, uncompleted, and changing, still becoming, basically relational and complex, with great depth, unlimited qualitative variety, and truly mysterious - a restless, vibrant, living, growing organism forever pregnant with possibilities for novel emergences and developments in the future".

Not only Plato, but also St Paul, would have agreed with Schilling when the latter points out that "to be conscious of the world in our time means to realise that the world is a unitary, integrated whole and to be aware of the systematic interdependence, solidarity and common destiny of all its
inhabitants and components".

We come now to the world of the New Testament writers and in order to understand their concept of soul (a conception which made possible not only the vision of a resurrection which would include the entire creation and change it from a state of corruptibility into incorruptibility, but also the belief in the possibility of the soul's spiritual relationship with God, somehow beyond the limits of space and time as we conceive of the same), it is necessary to grasp the fact that, in the thinking of those days, "matter was not lacking in soul".

In the same way as birth, life and death were for the Hebrews points on the one scale, so it appears that more-or-less soulless matter and more-or-less matterless soul (or spirit) are two points on the matter-spirit scale. We may see these assumptions as influenced by Greek, especially Aristotelian, thinking but they were, in a more primal form, inherent in Hebrew thinking as well.

Dahl points out that those scholars who today stress that, according to Paul our resurrection bodies will be material, are neglecting the fact that "the Semitic totality concept precludes the idea that our bodies are 'material' in the modern sense of the word". Paul never says that our earthly bodies are 'material' and neither would the 'post-modern scientist'. It is interesting to note that according to Chauvin the word 'matter' is meaningless for today's physicist, as he "is concerned only with protons, electrons, elementary particles, waves and trajectories". "As science has explored the micro-world within the atom it has not found there anything to which the traditional notion of substance might be applied usefully" says Schilling, who also points out that "it would seem that neither matter nor energy is 'the basic stuff' or physical reality. It is matter-energy that plays the fundamental role".

By analogy with the 'modern' versus the 'post-modern' world view discernable in the changing attitudes among 20th century scientists, it appears that in religious thinking, too, there
are visible changes from the 'modern', materialistic, pragmatic interpretation of the Christian message to a 'post-modern', charismatic, spiritual interpretation of the same. When attempting to distinguish the original, true meaning, which the evangelists wanted to share with the world, from later understanding of the same, the 'modern' approach introduced a sharp demarcation line between the apparently unbiblical Greek elements and the truly Hebrew biblical ones. However, as Stendahl admits, "it is now obvious that such a model requires many modifications". Having looked at the background to the New Testament views of the soul it becomes clear from our study that the patterns of interrelated views were in some sense much more complex than the rather simplistic contrasts between the so-called Hellenistic and the so-called Hebraic views which were posited during the 1950's and the 1960's.

As an example of the changing views apparent during the 1970's we may look at the report in the Swedish newspaper 'Svenska Dagbladet' of the 27th May 1973, concerning a conference at the Sigtuna Foundation where 'the immortal soul' was under discussion. The organiser, U Söderlund, pointed out that "this ancient enigmatic question is now frequently coming into the light again, and is perhaps the actual background cause of today's interest in spiritualism, parapsychology, meditation, etc. Ultimately the question is of great importance in spiritual guidance, especially in confrontation with the riddle of death".

Whether the new interest in the conception of soul created the great interest in the phenomena or vice versa is not important. Important is that we today are in a position of seeing the Christian message from what we called a post-modern, charismatic, spiritual point of view and, in so doing, we may well be approaching the true world of Jesus and his contemporaries.

We discussed the extra-sensory or paranormal experiences in the ancient Greek and Hebrew world. No doubt in the
opinion of those days such experiences were not distrusted "but rather were received as being from God". It is easily assumed today that in all seances "credulity and trickery were at work" and we are as "suspicious of a message purportedly transmitted by an angel, or of a prophetic vision or dream, or of a revelation directly from the Lord" as we would be of a communication through a medium. People of those times were credulous, after our standards, but perhaps we are the losers in our incredulity.

We quoted the scientist who said that things "which strike at the foundation of our outlook" must be false. The Bishop of Southwark quotes Dr Joad as saying, "If these things are true then the universe must in some respects be totally other than what one is accustomed to suppose". 'Things' in both cases being extra-sensory phenomena of different kinds.

Returning now to the period in question, that is, to the beginning of Christianity, we have noted that there was a strong Greek-Hebrew interchange in thought during the Hellenistic period and one cannot, without doing damage to the very foundation of Christianity, attempt to loosen the one element from the other. It is a fact that "the two cultures affected one another to a much greater extent than had hitherto been supposed". We earlier referred to this interrelationship in great detail, but shall here quote Blenkinsopp, as the following passage is to the point.

"Platonic thinking about the destiny of the soul began to influence Judaism during the Hellenistic period at the same time that faith in an eschatological resurrection was widely cherished in apocalyptic circles. Both forms can be found in Jewish writings from the intertestamental period, sometimes in the same book, and the reconciliation of the two which has been widely accepted in Christianity was already being attempted in Judaism before the time of Christ."

We discussed earlier the "carefree confusion" of terms and conceptions, views and beliefs, which are indeed to be found
in the writings of this period. The attempts by theologians to neglect the some 330 years of Hellenism in the history of the Jews before the times of Jesus and to concentrate on a direct link between the Old Testament and the New Testament with regard to beliefs in a resurrection of the body must be regarded as totally unrealistic.

As just pointed out, at the time of the Gospel writers and earlier, the concept 'immortality', especially when standing for deathlessness in general, was often found in the same text as the concept 'resurrection' and both terms were applied in a vague, indistinct manner indicating some form of continuous life in the 'Beyond'.

The concept 'immortality', when distinct from the concept 'resurrection', implied, generally speaking, a) that man in his essence was an immortal soul, independent of the body, destined for eternal life, with the will and ability to choose, here as well as in the 'other world', between the good and the evil, and subjected to divine judgment and punishment or rewards. Beliefs in some form of reincarnation often accompanied this type of conception.

The concept 'immortality' could also be used in a sense b) which indicated this state as a reward for the faithful only, the chosen ones. There was also the related view c) implying an immortal, spiritual, inmost part of man which would not die because it always remained in a pure, loving relationship with God. Views b) and c) could complement each other, but view c) could also be an expression of psychical or even mystical experiences, as suggested by Psalm XXXIV 8: "Oh taste and see that the Lord is God". These are the experiences of the type we called religious Ur-Erfahrungen, which have a deeply stirring, emotional effect and lead to a strong feeling of the soul (or spirit), within, having achieved true 'knowledge' of God.

With regard to the concept 'resurrection', this indicated an act of God concerned with re-creation. We encounter the
conceptions: resurrection of 1) the flesh; 2) the body; 3) the dead; 4) the soul. Admittedly, 4) is questionable, but the soul seems in some cases to have been the object of an act of resurrection on its own.

No doubt the soul is not only the real object of any thoughts concerned with immortality, but is very much involved in all the different forms of resurrection. We discussed earlier the many different attempts at explaining the manner in which the soul was eventually joined with the body, or managed simply to slip in at the general resurrection. The same kind of imaginative speculations were applied to the actual timing of the resurrection event; suggestions vary from the soul (or spirit) being dressed in 'garments of glory' immediately after its arrival in the 'Beyond' to an interim period when the soul either 'sleeps' or somehow exists 'naked' until the final event at the end of the Age.

The word 'psyche', as employed in the Gospels in general, had been taken over from current usage. The Gospel writers were not talking about something which was new to their audience when they placed psyche in a Christian context. As White points out, "they announced its immortality, its rebirth and sanctification through God's love, the conquest of its final destruction at the death of the body, even its eventual reunion with the body typified and effected through the resurrection of Christ"15.

However, besides this concept of the psyche as an entity which could be the object of the above transmutations, the psyche still retained those aspects of i) being the physical life-force, and ii) being the seat of the mental acts of feeling, willing and thinking.

We discussed Jesus' answer to the somewhat ridiculous question about the fate of the woman with seven husbands at the resurrection. Jesus clearly implies that speculations about earthly details in the next life seem nonsensical when one is faced with the great important truth that Eternal Life IS
wherever God rules. When picturing a resurrection in bodily terms the human ideas of retribution, rewards and punishment, judgement and condemnation mingle into the scene and the Justice of God is looked upon and stated according to human standards. Against this stands the 'knowledge' we just mentioned, the experience of the Living God within where the spirit of man can meet the Spirit of God.

The soul, in one of its aspects, is thus seen in the New Testament as the link between the spiritual and the 'material', between the visible and the invisible. Jesus has been described as the divine counterpart of the soul as he, too, is a link between the two worlds, between man and God. For Jung, Christ, as a mythical symbol of the human soul, exemplifies "the archetype of the self.....a totality of a divine or heavenly kind.....unspotted by sin"16.

We have many times during this study come across the 'deep longing' within the human soul to be 'drawn' into relationship with the spiritual world. But even here and now we can, through a complete change, a new birth, become part of the spiritual world within this apparently material world. For Jung, this change 'within' is "a change also known to us through the testimony of the Apostle Paul: 'Not I live, but Christ liveth in me'". Jung explains the change as somehow giving the feeling of having been 'replaced' without having been 'deposed', that is, "a higher spiritual being of human form is invisibly born in the individual"17.

In Chapter XIX we discussed, among other subjects, Paul's stand to mysticism. We agree with Stewart that what Paul experienced was a mystical union with Christ. Stewart is one of the many scholars who find that the term mysticism stands for something "indispensable and essential in religion", and he stresses that for Paul true mysticism which is "the inmost nature of Christianity" lay in the "daily ever-renewed communion, rather than in the transient rapture". Through this almost continuous relationship with the Lord, life would be experienced in a "new pitch of zest and gladness and power"
"Mysticism", says Scholem, "works on a place where the world of mythology and that of revelation meet in the soul of man". It is interesting, and applicable to the development of the concept 'soul', to follow Scholem's reasoning and explanations about the role of mysticism in the history of religion, and because the structure of his thought so parallels our own, we shall summarise his position below. Scholem divides the historical development of religion into three stages which all display certain well-defined conditions. In the same way as Plato saw the State as "man writ large", we may see Scholem's three stages in analogy with the spiritual growth of the individual.

The first stage is the mythological epoch, the childhood of mankind. At this stage there is no feeling of an alienation between man and the divine, man is placed firmly in and as part of Nature which is felt to be "full of gods.... whose presence can be experienced without recourse to ecstatic meditation". A man's soul is attuned to, and part of, the soul of the world and his relationship to the divine is not mystical but mythical - the scene of religion is Nature.

As mankind grows up the 'creative epoch' follows; the 'classical stage' in the history of religion. This is where religion, as such, emerges and becomes institutional. According to Scholem, "religion's supreme function is to destroy the dream-harmony of Man, Universe and God, to isolate man from the other elements of the dream stage of his mythical and primitive consciousness". In fact, religion now creates an absolute abyss between man and God by making man aware of the duality which is fundamental in a universe where God is infinite and man finite. Only the voice links the two worlds together: "the voice of God, directing and law-giving in His revelation, and the voice of man in prayer". To the monotheistic religions Nature has played out its role;
the scene of religion is now "the moral and religious action of man and the community of men, whose interplay brings about history as, in a sense, the stage on which the drama of man's relation to God unfolds".19

The third, the Mystical epoch, coincides with what Scholem calls the "romantic period of religion". At this stage, man may be said to be concerned above all with finding the secret knowledge which will close the gulf between man and God. Mysticism "strives to piece together the fragments broken by the religious cataclysm, to bring back the old unity which religion had destroyed"19. The emphasis is now on the soul and the main preoccupation of the soul is to find a path from multiplicity to "the primordial unity of all things" that is, to Divine Reality.

Historically, there is another factor which is connected with "the appearance of mystical tendencies", says Scholem, referring to, what may be called, the creative power of the religious consciousness. Within almost all religious systems the time comes when "new religious impulses may and do arise which threaten to conflict with the scale of values established by historical religion". Scholem finds that what encourages the emergence of mysticism is a situation in which "these new impulses do not break through the shell of the old religious system and create a new one, but tend to remain confined within its borders"21.

In order to stay within the old established religion, but at the same time to satisfy the longing "for new religious values corresponding to the new religious experience", the mystic will reinterpret the old values and often to such a degree that they do not only become "more profound and personal", but that their meaning becomes completely transformed. Scholem points out that when this happens, important religious conceptions like Creation, Revelation, and Redemption "are given new and different meanings reflecting the characteristic feature of mystical experience, the direct contact between the individual and God"21.
Scholem himself does not refer to the emergence of Christianity in this connection but, if one does apply his views to the actual birth of Christianity, we may perhaps draw the conclusion that if Jesus' teaching had been limited to the foundation of a new Jewish sect within Judaism, Jesus and his disciples would have been known as mystics and as partakers in the long development of Jewish mysticism ("which was later crystallised in the medieval Kabbalah")

Instead, Jesus' life, death and teaching became the foundations for a new religion. There would thus have been two possibilities inherent in Christianity from the very beginning: a) to develop into a mystical sect within Judaism with Jesus as the reinterpreter of the "sacred text of old", or b) to cut loose from the old and become a new independent religion with Jesus himself, not only his teaching, as part of its historical message.

Scholem writes about the mystical religion that it "seeks to transform the God whom it encounters in the peculiar religious consciousness of its own social environment from an object of dogmatic knowledge into a novel and living experience and intuition". There is also a theory, or ideology, of mysticism and this is "a theory both of the mystical cognition of God and His revelation, and of the path which leads to Him".

The question whether or not there are mystical tendencies in the New Testament, especially in the writings of John and Paul has, as we have pointed out, long been a bone of contention among scholars. Both sides are equally convinced that the Bible reinforces their particular statements and so we are left with two completely opposite views. On the one hand, the New Testament is interpreted to be concerned with speculations and worries about death and sin and a resurrection according to merit - certainly there are no mystical trends in this kind of teaching. On the other hand, there is the promise that by becoming one of Jesus' "brethren", of Jesus who spoke of "the Father and I" as One, we should all of us enjoy the same true and full relationship
to the Living God, Our Father, who is Pure Love and beyond all human understanding of rewards and punishments, a relationship which is, to all appearances, described in the language of mysticism.

Men like John and Paul may well be called mystics, seers, prophets. They had a new insight, a flash of knowledge, a mystical understanding through the contact, in flesh and/or spirit, with Jesus, their Lord and Messiah. But they had been placed in a situation where they had to build the practical foundation for a new-born religion. The spiritual experiences within and the emphasis on, and nearness to, the world Beyond had to serve the day-to-day life in the Christian communities in this world. There had to be a mystical 'now' as well as a practical 'not-yet'.

Our concern is not of mysticism as such but with the soul as conceived in the New Testament. But one cannot completely divorce the two for within the mystical tradition the soul is the seat of man's direct intuitive knowledge of God and therefore the soul's most important function. For the 'Knowledge of God' is Life itself.

Thus for the mystical approach the language of the 'immortal soul' was the natural one. For practical purposes and as one of the foundation dogmas for what was to become a new religion, resurrection of the body would have seemed appropriate and understandable to those of Jewish origin. Both beliefs were 'in the air' at the time; in fact, as we have noted, there were very many different beliefs in circulation. Undoubtedly each Christian neophyte must have listened to the joyful message from out of his own framework of beliefs and thus given it his own interpretation. However, whatever those contemporary men's understanding regarding the teachings of, and happenings around, the figure of Jesus Christ might have been, one may be sure that their understanding was on a very different plane from the generally accepted understanding of today.
No doubt, the apocalyptic expectancy among the Jewish people of those times was directed towards the happenings at the End of the Age and as they were sure that this End of Time would come very soon, their thoughts were concentrated on survival. There was general agreement on the fact that there would be survival (at least for the faithful) but as to the details of the same there were the most various answers.

The emphasis was no longer, as in Old Testament times, concentrated on the survival of the nation but on the continuity of the individual essential 'selves' from a life here and now to a life in the 'new' world.

That there was an 'inner something' which could survive death (depending on the Grace of God) was hardly even doubted, (even if only as a shade in Hades). Neither was there any doubt about an 'outer something' which existed in the visible world as the outmost layer of the human entity; the soul was the life of the body and the body the expression of the soul.

We discussed the differences and variities which arose with speculations about matter, space and time and their place and importance in the Next World. In popular thought the 'inner something' was called psyche (or nephesh). Paul uses other words: pneuma, nous, inner man and often 'we' and 'us' when talking about the same entity. Also in the Gospels we find the personal pronouns used for the essential 'you' or 'yourselves'. However, when we say it is the 'essential self' and thus think of this 'something' as the personality we must acknowledge that our personality has a different connotation to the 'personality' the New Testament is talking about.

We have earlier quoted several Gospel passages where psyche is used. Among others the following: "Anyone who tries to preserve his life (psyché) will lose it; and anyone who loses it will keep it safe" (Lk XVII 33); "What gain, then,
is it for a man to win the whole world and ruin his life (psyche)?
And indeed what can a man offer in exchange for his life?"  
(Lk VIII 36-37).

When we try to grasp what psyche stands for here we find that it was something concrete and tangible, (the force in the breath, blood, seed and in the water and sweat of the body), as well as an extension of a person's own self; it was in his name, in his children, in his reputation. This 'something' is the essential person both here and in the Beyond and can even in this life, at times, leave the body and move round independently. For the Hebrew, as for the Greek, nephesh/psyche had gradually become the seat of the whole complicated soul-as-self-aspect of man even though it was still, to a very important degree, soul-as-life.

The body forms the outer layer of this entity, man; it is said psyche 'wears' the body as a garment; it is dressed in the body. Enoch is a typical example of this thinking: God tells the Angel Michael to take Enoch out of his earthly garments and put him into the garments 'of my glory'; also, Adam is said to have 'gone out of his body'. As we remarked in connection with II Corinthians V 1-10, Paul seems there to identify 'being alive' with 'wearing of clothes' and death as a state of nakedness for the essential self, that is, the soul.

In the same passage, Paul also emphasises the most important truth of all: that God has made us for Eternal Life. The whole of the New Testament affirms this truth. All has been leading up to this; all the solutions posited by Greek philosophers, Hebrew Wise Men and Hellenistic thinkers, all the answers given to still the longing within the soul of mankind, are the same: man in his essence is made for eternal life and the 'essential man', his soul is the bridge between the two 'worlds', the visible and the invisible. Jesus on the cosmic level, is the symbol of the human soul. He too is the bridge between two 'worlds', the human and the Divine.
"The Bible is the book about the soul", said Söderblom, the soul in communication with God. Man is not merely dust of the earth, he is also of God's breath. God's breath-spirit ensouled the dust. The whole creation is not merely dust; it is The Creation because God ensouled it. Without God's Spirit, God's Presence, there would be only 'dead' dust.

Jesus' whole teaching emphasised that he had come to bring the message of Life and Light; God is God of the living; for those who believe there is no death. When Jesus died and the world became dark there was a time of doubt and terror for his disciples. He, who was the Life and the Light, who proclaimed a God of Love and Eternal Life, was he really dead?

He was alive, He is alive. And so his promises of Eternal Life are true and we are in fact, what the earlier English renderings of the Old Testament called all creatures, LIVING SOULS.

And the debate concerning immortality or resurrection is a debate within ethics and never has affected SOUL in its essence.
Notes to Summary and Conclusions.

1. Onians, p208
2. Nyman, p19
3. Tyrrell, p40
5. Rayner C Johnson, A Religious Outlook for Modern Man, p27
6. Schilling, p44
7. ibid., p24
8. Dahl, p91
10. Schilling, pp25, 27
11. Bishop James A Pike, The Other Side, p221
13. Gnilka, p130
15. Victor White, Soul and Psyche, p24
16. Jung, p 37 (Aion)
17. Jung, p132, (Golden Flower)
18. Stewart, p102
19. Gerschem Scholem, Jewish Mysticism, p8
20. ibid., p7
21. ibid., p9
22. ibid., p40
23. ibid., p10
24. ibid., p268
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