FROM TSONGA TO MOÇAMBICANIDADE:
CIVIL RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS IN MOZAMBICAN NATIONALISM

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between the Romande Mission and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) has been the subject of study by a number of Mozambicanists. Most of them agree that the Romande Mission played a key role in educating nationalist elites and in shaping political consciousness among the Africans. Notwithstanding the relevance of this approach, the current study argues that the Tsonga tribal and Mozambican national identities are civil religious constructs. They resulted from sacrificial ritual performances, the expropriation of traditions and symbols, and the creation of sacred spaces. Formed as a linguistic, cultural, religious and tribal unity, the Tsonga provided a historical genealogy and structural template for the emergence of Moçambicanidade as a civil religion. Drawing upon postcolonial theory and discourse analysis, the thesis uses the analytical category “civil religion” as a focusing lens in order to explore the dynamics of national solidarity in four main archival sources: First, the construction of the Tsonga narratives of the tiMhamba, the Sacred Woods and the expropriation of local traditions recorded in Henri-Alexandre Junod’s, *The Life of a South African Tribe*; second, the pedigree of a heightened value for union, Protestant work-ethics and education, bequeathed to Eduardo Mondlane and evident in his *The Struggle for Mozambique*; third, Jose Craveirinha’s deployment of religious and theological symbolism portraying the earliest signs of Moçambicanidade in *Xigubo, Cela 1 and Karingana Wa Karingana*; and, finally, the successful nation-building story signified by the Constitutional documents. Since the focus of the thesis is on productions of civil religion rather than their reception, evidence is drawn from textual analysis rather than from fieldwork methods. As a consequence of the analysis, the study argues that both Tsonga and Moçambicanidade are subaltern identities to modernity, perhaps destined to fail, but existing within the frame of modernity as its alter ego. By highlighting civil religious constructions of Tsonga and Moçambicanidade, the thesis hopes to shed new light and advance a discussion at the nexus of African religion and politics.
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DEDICATION

To Joina T. Ngale and to his grandson Kaleb J.C. Ngale
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preface
This study examines how the creation of Tsonga, as a tribal identity, provided a historical genealogy and structural template for the emergence of Moçambicanidade as a civil religion. Civil religion is defined throughout the study as a belief system that produces self-identity of a collective body of people forming a state, that is, a collectivity. It has to do with a specific kind of discourse that relates state histories to extra-historical forces—gods, spirits of the dead, ancestors, saints, and to a lesser extent, larger-than-life figures—to the degree that they (the state narratives) are ascribed transcendent statuses. Civil religion can be found in one of its two forms: the “organic” and the “instrumental” (Johnson 2005). Accordingly, in the organic form civil religion can be identified within the shared repertoire of practices near the will (longings, desires, wishes) of the collective. Whereas, in the instrumental form, it is to be found in the institutions of the state, such as texts: official reports, documents, speeches; and generally enacted through liturgical performances, often following an established calendar in set-aside spaces (Ibid.). The research maps the theoretical terrain of the two imaginary group identities as they are produced by the elites. Hence, the use of the instrumental civil religion as the analytical lens on the archival material for evidence. The case advanced is that an instrumental civil religion has been at the heart of the successful campaign to establish a sacred group identity—or national unity—which, so far, has kept the project of Moçambicanidade alive, although, as a subaltern project, it is perhaps destined to fail.

There are two reasons Tsonga tribal/national identity is a good case for the study of civil religious dynamics in Mozambican nationalism: firstly, the Tsonga identity is, according to historical records (Newitt 1995, Liesegang 1996), the oldest and most successful modern national identity reinvention, with long lasting effects in southeast Africa. There where the Yao, the Maravi, the Karanga Kingdoms and other smaller pre-modern tribal identities scattered across the region, yet they had less of modern influence when compared to that of the Tsonga. Secondly, the Tsonga identity has a direct genealogical and structural link to Moçambicanidade, through the person of Eduardo Mondlane, who is both the spiritual offspring of the Romande Mission and the founder of FRELIMO, the most successful modern political organization (when compared to UDENAMO, UNAMI, MANO and others) in the region, with equally long lasting influence.
In the late nineteenth century a complicated spectrum of groups, involving the Portuguese, the British and the Boers in the political sphere, and the French, the German, and the Dutch Protestant Missions in the spiritual, competed for property ownership. The Free Churches of Vaud’s position as regards the Gwamba refugee groups was a survival strategy. It was in the interests of both the Romande agents and the Gwamba people, particularly the elites, to form a strong alliance. The Romande agents created urgency round their decision to form the Tsonga because they knew, from the recent history of Switzerland, the problems brought by massive modern industrialization. They had little power to negotiate on their own with the mighty British, the Dutch or Portuguese empires.

When in July 1875 Paul Berthoud and Ernest Creux found land at Klipfontein (Berthoud 1875; Berthoud & Grandjean 1900) and its people apparently aimless and without leaders, they declared that to have reached the “New Jerusalem”, and began to build a nation. The Gwamba leadership did not protest against this new identity. This identity gave them back some of the lost power and veneration amongst their people. They had lost high regard and power, due to challenges of climate, and disease, which lead to “interclanic” warfare and banditry in their homelands, the main reasons for them being refugees. Despite a lack of sufficient proof that these groups had anything in common, a new creation, the Tsonga tribe was celebrated. This acceptance of the Tsonga tribe as the new identity testifies to the strategic success of the Romande agents’ survival by creating a reality out of a crisis. Two ambitious goals for the Tsonga were set, namely to rescue the dying culture of the autochthonous groups, and to unite the Gwamba groups toward forming a single tribe (or a unit, or an imagined community, or a nation), capable of withstanding the challenges of the then eminent European modernity.

Nearly seventy years later a new nationalist movement emerged, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), the Liberation Front of Mozambique. It was an outcome of the joining of three political organizations exiled from Mozambique by the colonial state to the neighboring countries of Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania. Eduardo Mondlane, largely a product of the Romande Mission, united the three organizations in order to form a formidable challenge to the Portuguese colonial state in Mozambique. FRELIMO bore traits comparable to the Tsonga in its projects, such as the prioritization of modern education programs; the creation of one lingua franca; the establishment of national symbols such as doctrines or Constitutions; a special liturgical calendar; shrines; national heroes and villains; and the formation of a theological rationale. The resemblance
is confirmed by recent historical studies (Silva 1998a & 1998b, Harries 1994), which reveal that the Tsonga historical and religious background informed considerably FRELIMO’s civil religious orientation.

This study engages the colonial archive; it uses as method the postcolonial study of religion, a strategy that regards religion, the religious and the sacred as phenomena dealing with a transcendent, but also socially produced reality, i.e., as an outcome of power relations at the nexus of politics and society. The method is informed by the postcolonial discourse analysis, inaugurated by Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978), which enables a reading of the colonial archive with sensitivity to the relationship between text and its context. The method is deployed in the study as a way of looking at the texts, or as a strategy of reading, and an approach to, texts that attempts to unearth the unsought within commonly accepted matters. The strategy demands a method of dealing with written and non-written texts. This method consists of placing the texts at the same level of priority in the examination process, thus providing a “combined interest in the textuality of history, the historicity of text” (Montrose 1996: 130).

The above position is reinforced by the perception that religion in the colonial context, like anthropology, philology and even biology, has been always entangled in the politics of colonialism itself (Young 1995; Mamdani 2004; Asad 1973). As a case in point, Junod’s ethnographic work among the Tsonga exerted a profound political, social and economic impact on the colonial policy as well as on local subjects. This research examined key documents in the tribal/national construction of the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade. The creation of the Tsonga as well as Moçambicanidade is largely a result of, and about, the power that Henri-Alexandre Junod and Eduardo Mondlane, as the advocates, exerted over the targeted subjects within colonial and contemporary bureaucratic apparatuses. The use of the postcolonial study of religious strategy helps to grasp the dynamics involved in the formation of tribal and national identities. The texts analyzed revealed that the Tsonga provided context (space, mood, spiritual and material support) for the defeated, old and glorious memories of the Nguni Empire, not only to remain alive but also to ultimately re-emerge and dream of new victories. Can FRELIMO’s Moçambicanidade be the representation of this dream as it strives to constitute a united, free and modern society?

Although recent scholarship on the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade focuses on Tsonga’s impact from the standpoint of established social science’s disciplinary paradigms or of Protestant and Catholic Christian denominations, the current research focused on the nexus between the
Tsonga and Moçambicanidade as imagined group identities and religion, particularly using the instrumental civil religion as lens of analysis. The study’s finding is that civil religion, like ideology, history and politics, has been a key factor in the formation of the new national identity. This is a point that Mozambicanists have not, according to our findings, noticed that Tsonga and Moçambicanidade are group identities as much as civil religious phenomena, existing independently from established religious institutions such as mosques, synagogues or churches. Much like Bellah who recognized that in modern democratic America there actually exists alongside of and rather clearly differentiated from the established forms of religious, an elaborated and well institutionalized civil religion (1967: 1).

Definition and the selection of relevant texts were key requirements toward addressing the research question. Any selection or definition entails limitations, particularly on a beginning project. That is, that the beginning involves an act of delimitation by which, the researcher carves something out of the great mass of data, separate it and make it to stand for, as well as be, a starting point, a beginning. In the monumental study of *Orientalism* Edward Said shares his challenging experience of beginnings as having been “the most difficult of the things [he] faced as a researcher” (1978: 17). This is due to the fact that “beginnings have to be made for a project in such a way as to enable what follows from them to stand on their own” (Ibid. 17). Likewise, the study of civil religious dynamics in Mozambican nationalism has been an exercise in beginnings, with the presumption that the outcome stands on its own as a sustainable and comprehensive work.

There were multiple challenges in the process: the researcher had to identify, not only a point of departure, or problematic, but also the selection of texts, authors and the periods that best suit the study. Accordingly, four texts were selected for the study of civil religious dynamics in the making of Mozambican nationalism. This is because in the view of the subject matter these four selected texts are unmatched when it comes to yielding evidence for the thesis. For instance, Junod and Mondlane are the most successful nationalist pioneers, covering the political and religious aspects in the modern southeast Africa. Whereas, Craveirinha’s aesthetic representation of Mozambique provides a long spanning portrait of Moçambicanidade, and in the process he employs religious symbolism, an eschatological vocabulary, charged with civil religious impulses. Finally, the Constitutional documents give evidence of a flourishing national unity under the political leadership, which goes to explain the thesis proposition that beneath all the apparent state
exuberance an instrumental civil religion is at work, and the reason the research focused on key archival texts that testify to the work of civil religion.

There were other political, ethnographic, artistic and official texts eligible for the study of civil religious phenomenon as complete as the four selected texts, such as Antonio Rita Ferreira, Alf Helgesson, Mia Couto, Bernardo Honwana and perhaps more, yet those, in the view of the subject matter, cannot cover the Mozambican landscape better than the four chosen texts. Throughout the study Moçambicanidade is perceived phenomenologically as a group identity, or as Anderson’s elusive imagined community (1983). Moçambicanidade is elusive because it is always under construction and characterized by a great sense of arbitrariness. The thesis is limited to the theoretical landscape of the subject. It studies instrumental civil religion, mostly found in archival material, in state documents and discourses. Even within the colonial archive, the large body of classical religious material had to be cut out in favor of the aforementioned four texts, as they yielded substantial evidence. In others words, although practiced subjectively by the members of the state, instrumental civil religion cannot be found in ordinary people in the same way one can do to the established conventional religions (Johnson 2005). As such, it can only be identified through textual analyses. For instance, members of a particular Christian congregation can easily tell their religious denomination, their doctrines and perhaps their theological orientation and the history of the congregation. It can be said that the members of a given Christian denomination believe in the teachings and works of the character called Jesus, who they believe is their Savior. While a messiah and a set of beliefs are to be found in instrumental civil religion, one cannot identify those figures in the same way, due to instrumental civil religious subjective nature and it being a by-product of a state. One cannot practice it or belong to it like a congregation, but one can recognize it as phenomenon inherent to the labor of state formation.

Civil religion, however, must not be confused with political religion, which is another close, yet distinct, concept. Gentile argues that political religion is a form of sacralization of politics for an exclusive and integralist purpose (Gentile 2005: 30), whereas civil religion has to do with the symbols and signs that the state uses for self-representation (Ibid.). Accordingly, political religion is an outside element to the state, used for advancing a certain ideological agenda, whereas civil religion is what the state itself produces as part of the institution. Civil religious analysts seem to suggest that political religion is a degenerate form of civil religion (Westerlund 1980; Cristi 2001; Johnson 2005; Gentile 2005). The degeneration occurs when civil religion
attempts to force a group identity and to legitimize an existing political order by injecting a transcendental dimension or a religious gloss to the justification (Cristi 2001).

Regarded in this way, political religion cannot be a positive force. Because it usually rejects a coexistence with other political forces and ideologies; denies the autonomy of the individual with respect to the collective; prescribes the obligatory observance of its commandments and participation in its political cult; and sanctifies violence as a legitimate arm of the struggle against its perceived enemies. In the same vein Gentile further asserts, “Political religion tends to adopt a hostile attitude toward traditional institutionalized religions” (Gentile 2005: 30). Accordingly, it can seek to eliminate them or to establish with them a relationship of symbiotic coexistence, in the sense that political religion seeks to incorporate traditional religion within its own system of beliefs and myths, assigning to it a subordinate and ancillary role.

Yet one must acknowledge the thin line that separates civil religion from political religion. They are difficult to separate because, while they are clearly different, they have some important aspects in common: both consecrate “a collective entity”, formalize a “code of commandments”, consider their members a “community of the elect”, with a “messianic role”, and institute a “political liturgy” which represents a sacred history (Gentile 2005: 32). The key difference between the two is clearly visible when comparing a tyrant with a democratic state, for instance, the colonial and fascist Portuguese state in Mozambique when juxtaposed with the FRELIMO and Frelimo party state. In the current study FRELIMO stands for the Mozambique’s Liberation Front, created in 1962 in Dar-es-Salaam; whereas Frelimo denotes the party that emerged from the FRELIMO’s Third Congress recommendations in 1977.

However, in certain circumstances, even civil religion can degenerate into a political religion such as with Rousseau’s legitimizing approach, thereby becoming integralist and intolerant. That happened, in fact, during the First Republic of Frelimo when Samora Machel launched Operação Produção (literally: productivity campaign), where apparently unemployed citizens and those deemed to be socially at the margin in the major cities, were captured and sent to concentration camps where they were forced to work under deplorable conditions (Munslow & Wolfers 1985: 51-54). The state decided on such a policy allegedly with the rationale that every citizen had to be productive for the benefit of the state. This example illustrates how throughout FRELIMO’s history coercive leanings can be detected. These leanings explain the difficulty in
drawing a clear line between civil and political religions, and justify Rousseau’s fears of civil religion being employed to legitimize an intolerant political regime.

It is commonly held among experts that civil religion has always been formulated as an interested intervention in a moment of perceived crisis (Bellah 1967; Hammond & Bellah 1980, Hughey 1983; Gentile 2005; Cristi 2001). For instance, the social unrest and declining authority of the ancient régime leading up to the French Revolution in the eighteenth century informed Rousseau’s concept of civil religion; and the anomie of industrialized urbanization at the turn of the twentieth century conditioned Durkheim’s analysis on the links between religion and society. The same applies to Gramsci’s study of subalternity and hegemonia: the fascist transformation of Italy. Junod’s Tsonga representation was a reaction to the events surrounding the Berlin conference of 1884 and its aftermath, whereas, the crisis of the Portuguese colonial state Moçambique prompted the emergence of Mondlane’s FRELIMO.

The interventionist trait of civil religions explains the other related aspect: the contingency trait, that is, civil religions are often transient in nature, or at least have appeared to be so up to now. This crucial trait of civil religions is what distinguishes them from the established metaphysical religions. Metaphysical religions have endured for millennia, while the majority of civil religions have surfaced for mere decades. However, their apparent short life is largely due to the contingent nature of states, the sources from which they emerge. Gentile, however, argues that civil religions do not die completely; he believes that they” metamorphose into subsequent group self-identities” (2005: 31). This metamorphosing into new group self-identities is seen in the case of the Tsonga civil religion, as they emerged to provide a platform for the more comprehensive Moçambicanidade.

The study does not intend to engage in the current established religious or political institutions and current events taking place in Mozambique, nor does it try to provide solutions for current events but, point out that a successful establishment of Tsonga and of FRELIMO had largely to do with the leaders’ skills in converting organic civil religious elements into cohesive social programs and practical political agenda (instrumental civil religion) with clear goals and purposes. It should be pointed out that due to the focus limitations the current research hopes to indicate the role of instrumental civil religion in national identity formation and problematize the apparently secure and unchallengeable notions and assumptions at the nexus between the religious and political fields. It does not claim to bring a complete account of the instrumental civil religious
phenomena in Mozambican nationalism, neither to bring answers to immediate situational questions, but it hopes to set a good start for a debate at the intersection of religion and politics.

There has been a concerted effort to reduce the assumptions about the data under study, which afforded, it is hoped, every text the same fair privilege. Thus, the study of the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade is not conducted primarily as an acknowledgement of their existence but to reveal the ignored religious component at the core of their formation. The next section presents the way in which the research has been divided.

1.1.1 Research Divisions

Six chapters constitute the research. After the introductory chapter, there are two lead-in chapters, Chapters Two and Four, which are genealogical as they address the origins of both the Tsonga and FRELIMO as tribal/national identities. Focusing on the Tsonga, the second chapter begins by introducing the concept of Tsonga and the power surrounding it. The Tsonga had more importance to the colonial powers in the process of scramble and control of the subjects: that is, unlike the commonly held idea that Tsonga tribal/national identity preserved the Gwamba refugees from the negative effects of modernity, in fact, the tribal identity creation further exposed them to massive exploitation. Once created, the concept of Tsonga had unpredictable dimensions as it acquired a life of its own. The fourth chapter studies the genealogy of FRELIMO and its national project, Moçambicanidade.

As a product of modern epistemic conditions, Moçambicanidade manifests unique civil religious values worthy of a close study. By examining the modes, means and forces involved in the production of the emerging new sacred and elusive imagined community, the study points to the role of civil religion. These two chapters examine Tsonga and FRELIMO genealogies: as they make the genealogical link between the two nations and advance the research proposition, which is that civil religion has been at the heart of the successful campaign to establish national unity, for the Tsonga first and FRELIMO afterwards. The objective of this genealogy analysis is twofold: to prove that there is a close link between the Tsonga tribe and FRELIMO nationalism and that civil religious features from the Tsonga informed the content and structure of Moçambicanidade.

The research problem, its relevance, the methodology by which the study approaches the matter and its rationale are all introduced in the first section of the first chapter. The second section provides the history of the problem by way of a literature review. The proposition is addressed
accordingly throughout the chapter. While focusing on the problem the postcolonial study of religion is identified as a method of analysis. This method not only regards religion as a socially produced reality but also as an outcome of power relations at the nexus of politics and society. The concept of civil religion has had a history since its coinage in the French Republic of the 1850s. The third section traces the concept and the movement towards its adjustment to fit into the postcolonial context of southeast Africa. The study of religion cannot be engaged in without a reference to the sacred, that is, there is an inseparable relationship between the two concepts. The fifth section presents this link and its importance in the study of belief systems that produce the self-identity of collectivities such as the Tsonganidade and Moçambicanidade identities. Finally the last section brings African case studies of civil religion with the objective of showing that Moçambicanidade is a civil religious phenomenon emerging among others. Chapters Three, Five and Six are structural, as they present key organizational evidences of the link between the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade. These are formed by values and norms, dogmas or systems of belief that proved crucial in the organization of the Tsonga, such as language, coordinated modern education for all, the ethics of hard work, and so on.

The structural chapters open with the third chapter, which is an up-close examination of Junod’s work aimed at presenting its civil religions elements. The focus is on the ways in which the concept Tsonga has itself been successfully built under a solid system of beliefs and that; it often masqueraded as Protestant Calvinist ethics, that is, under an established religious system. Later on, the same system of beliefs, or its civil religion elements, provided a platform for Moçambicanidade. The first section of Chapter Three illustrates the civil religious nature of two stories in Tsonga tradition. The second section examines how the Tsonga nation’s rites of sacrifice not only represented civil religious performance, but also helped define the collectivity’s self-image. The relationship between civil religion and tradition in the making of meaning is the subject of the third section. The argument is that through repetition, rites create myths or tradition. That is, civil religion generates and legitimizes tradition. The last section examines Junod’s narrative of the Tsonga tribes’ religious sacred spaces. It advances the premise that Tsonga sacred spaces were sites for civil religious performances.

Using the method applied in the third, the fifth chapter examines Moçambicanidade as a product of a successful civil religious performance generated by the state for its own use. It demonstrates the power struggle behind the creation of the Moçambicanidade as an identity of a
collectivity. The focus is on the civil religious representations that Junod’s project provided, with which Mondlane and his comrades staged their own nationalist project. The chapter is a close examination of the making of Mondlane’s Mozambique Liberation Front. FRELIMO was a reaction to Salazar’s *Estado Novo* and before Salazar there was the making of Mozambique as Portugal’s set-aside space, hence the first section brings the history of the setting-aside of a territory under the name of Mozambique. FRELIMO became the high point of Moçambicanidade. The second section presents the dialectics within Moçambicanidade. The third section informs the reader of the challenges that the FRELIMO new state faced and the interpretations around those challenges. By focusing on poetry, the last section shows the aesthetic manifestations of Moçambicanidade. Craveirinha’s poems manifested organic civil religious traits, prior to the emergence of FRELIMO as a coherent discourse. By focusing on poetry, the last section focuses on poetry, thereby reveal organic civil religious traits.

The sixth and concluding chapter, “From a Tribe to a Nation”, examines the status of the Mozambique nation and argues that the state not only inherited a civil religious positivist traits but also a subaltern condition that keeps the nation in a situation no different from what the Tsonga always has been. Despite its magnificent natural ports, resources and people, Mozambique remains a subaltern nation because that was how the Portuguese conceived it. It was, and still is, a cheap labor reserve and a place for raw material extraction, despite FRELIMO’s revolution of 1975. This subaltern condition has informed the distinctive characteristics of the Mozambican civil religion.

1.2 Literature Review

Since the advent of *The Life of a South African Tribe* 1912-1913, a number of studies have been done on this important monograph. These works are divided into three major groups. The first group portrays Junod’s anthropological work on the Tsonga tribe as honest, objective and aimed at the advancement of the subjects (Haddon & Quiggin 1910; Pratt-Chadwick & Lamprey 1921; Berg 1987; Resenstiel 1959; Kuper 1973; Newitt 1989). Most of these authors praised and relied on Junod’s work to build their ideas and disciplines, thus disseminating and canonizing the tradition through proper channels such as religious programs, universities and other teaching institutions and colonial policies and apparatuses. This is by far the largest group.

The second group is more skeptical of Junod’s scientific/anthropological work. This group is comprised of Junod’s selected missionary colleagues who, from practical knowledge in the field,
were worried that their evangelistic ambitions would be compromised (Berthoud 1896, Berthoud 1900, Monnier 2005). They felt, and rightly so, that Junod’s hard-line, purportedly scientific approach would weaken their message of unity and Christian brotherhood among the peoples of the southeast region. These missionaries did not oppose his scientific methods but from a Christian missionary’s perspective were skeptical of the results. The history of the Presbyterian Church of Mozambique, the offspring of the Romande Mission in southeast Africa, confirms this skepticism to be well founded (Butselaar 1987).

The third group comprises those who, while acknowledging Junod’s impact, argue that the adverse consequences stemming from his work deserve serious scholarly attention (Harries 1981, 1994, 2007; Ngoenha 1999, 2000; Silva 1998b). Largely composed of Africanists and African scholars, this group regards Junod’s work critically as more problematic than it appears at a quick encounter. There are those within this group who, despite having contemporary theoretical tools, still manage to shy away from pointing to the real issues. This is that Junod is the central figure in the formation of the Tsonga as a tribal identity, and prefer instead to settle for other answers; alternatively, they simply address Junod from their disciplinary perspectives and try to find support answers for their views.

Having considered all three groups, this study, then, works closely with the last group, starting with Jan van Butselaar who discusses matters of theology, culture and colonial conflicts of interest between Portuguese colonial officials and the Romande agents. These conflicts centered on the ethical contradictions between Lusitanist and Tsonganist projects, that is, the two national projects were in competition for the same subjects of Delagoa Bay and its hinterland (Butselaar 1987). In this context, the Portuguese perceived the Romande agents and any Protestant institution in the region as competitors in building national awareness. The Tsonga were viewed as another European power with an interest in the region. Van Butselaar’s account of these tensions has wider significance for an understanding of the Lusitanists and Tsonganists’ strategies for extending their control over the region. Van Butselaar based his knowledge of the region on Junod’s anthropological study of the Tsonga. He was the first, among Mozambicanists and Tsonga scholars, to praise Junod’s “groundbreaking” and thorough study on the natives (Butselaar 1987: 6). He argued that Junod’s work in particular and the Free Churches of Vaud’s mission in general, brought light and modernity to the autochthonous (Ibid. 23). Despite being critical of the brutality of the Portuguese colonial state in southeast Africa, van Butselaar was short of seeing Junod’s
work as having contributed to such state, as he provided the intellectual background for labor law definitions. Van Butselaar regarded religion from the standpoint of “institutional religion”, that is, in the same way as already established religious denominations with institutions such as mosques, churches, and synagogues. In this perspective, he depicts the region’s Protestant churches and the Free Churches of Vaud Mission as bringing light to the dark world of the southeast Africans.

Bibber’s ideas regarding the Romande Mission’s impact on the region resonate with van Butselaar’s (Biber 1987). Although he recognizes that the first evangelization of the region cannot be attributed to the Romande Mission but rather to the black missionaries returning from the rapidly industrializing Transvaal, he cannot think outside the frames set by Junod and his colleagues. Biber had only praise for the Romande Mission. With this in mind, he described Mondlane in messianic terms, as being the great Tsonga who emerged in the international scene calling his native people to bring the country’s pride into being. Patrick Harries’ interest in Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa led him to explore the Romande Mission’s influence on the politics of the region. His 1994 work charts the economic forces that led to the making of a working class and explains the cultural norms through which migrant workers gave meaning to their lives. Butterflies and Barbarians (2007), the most recent of his book, center particularly on the work of the Romande Mission in the region, with the aim of establishing how these Romande agents constructed their knowledge of Africa and Africans. Harries argues that the Romande agents constructed an understanding of Africa and Africans through the lenses of their own desires, experiences and expectations.

Without disagreeing with that notion, the current study argues that Romande agents constructed the Tsonga as a tribal identity for their own purposes: they needed it more than the Africans they purported to represent. Junod looms prominently in Harries’ work as he addresses the Romande Mission in southeast Africa, since Junod’s anthropological work has had such influence in the region. In addition to the works published between 1994 and 2007, there are a number of published papers on the impact of the Romande Mission in the region. Harries’ Butterflies and Barbarians reads as a collection of these separate papers on the Romande Mission and Delagoa Bay. Harries’ work covers the development of the Tsonga. However, it does not indicate directly that the creation of the Tsonga tribal identity had dire consequences for the subjects. Secondly, his work does not demonstrate how the Romande Mission’s work reinforced or challenged the way history is being written in and about Mozambique. Thirdly, civil religion
does not figure in Harries’ analysis of the Tsonga as a relevant element for understanding the political dynamics of the emerging modernity.

Scholarship about Junod by the Mozambican intelligentsia aimed, for the most part, at revealing the consensual affinity between the Romande missionaries’ educational and evangelical activities and the development of national consciousness, particularly among the clergy and political elites. In this regard, Teresa Cruz e Silva’s work becomes an important reference (Silva 1998a; 1998b). Silva’s main argument is that the Romande Mission played a key role in educating the nationalist elite and in shaping political consciousness among Africans. Silva, however, does not make a key distinction between the Tsonga as a small nation born in the late nineteenth century and Moçambicanidade, born in the late nineteen fifties. Silva took the concept of the Tsonga for granted in her work. In addition, in Silva’s work, religion is seen as the institutional social structure represented by the Protestant and Roman churches and their doctrines. They are regarded as the source of inspiration for the missionaries who brought a comprehensive literacy campaign within them. This is the leading philosophical approach to the relationship between religion and nationalism; and thus is the major difference between the commonly held approaches and the current study. That is, in the present research, religion is seen as part of the very fiber of the construction of a nation, not merely as a supplier of positive elements to help build that nation.

Ngoenha departs from praise of the work of Romande agents to a more critical, hence balanced approach. His 1998 article starts by indicating the importance of distinguishing the Tsonga from Moçambicanidade, basing his argument on geography, that is, that the Tsonga transcends current Mozambique borders into South Africa and Zimbabwe, whereas Moçambicanidade is closed within the modern borders of Mozambique. He moves on to argue that the relationship between the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade is symbiotic and unbreakable; since the “Romande Mission only exists for the Tsonga and vice versa” (Ngoenha 1998: 14). Ngoenha’s crucial distinction is a key to the current study as it permits treatment of the two subjects as separate phenomena. Ngoenha’s separation strengthens the important notion that the creation of the Tsonga liberates and defines the Vaudois, the Evangelical Churches of Vaud and ultimately, the Francophone area of Switzerland as an entity in the history of the Swiss, within the context of a nineteenth century Europe ravaged by modernity, theological battles and rapid industrialization.

Macamo conducted a study, from a sociological standpoint, on the Romande Mission’s work. His own work was driven by the question of whether or not the Romande Mission helped to
bring modernity to southeast Africa. In his 2002 work “Denial of Modernity,” he argued that by creating a Tsonga tribal identity Junod influenced colonial policy-making in some very specific and deep ways, ultimately hurting, more than helping, his subjects. Both in South Africa’s emerging economy and the Portuguese political economy, administrators were better informed and equipped to exploit human and natural resources after reading Junod’s scientific works on the people of Delagoa Bay. Colonialism, in which Junod was an active participant, thus denied modernity to southeast Africans. In his “European Tradition in the Study of Religion in Africa” (2004), Macamo addresses religion and sociology. He criticizes the selfish and self-serving way that the sociology of religion, since its birth, used religion. Accordingly, whenever practical manifestations of religious experience were of any help, sociologists did what they perceived to be their task: to better describe and analyze society. Macamo used Weber and Durkheim as cases to support his argument. However, his work does not develop the relationship between civil religion and nationalism.

Nicolas Monnier’s study, “Strategie Missionnaire et Tactiques d’Appropriation Indigenes: La Mission Romande au Mozambique 1888-1896” (1995), argues that Romande agents made a terrible mistake by categorically assigning the Gwambas the name Tsonga, regardless of their will. Monnier missed the whole point of the Romande agents. Junod, Creux and the Berthouds were not interested in finding a true name for these refugees. Instead, they were seeking their own name, a past, a history and an identity, which was increasingly hard to find in the fast changing Swiss landscape. Like the other Mozambicanists studying Junod’s place in the construction of nationalism in southeast Africa, Monnier’s analysis was not able to find a civil religious construct necessary for a better and more wholesome approach to the nationalism phenomenon in a post-colonial context.

The civil religious aspects of Moçambicanidade remain untouched by Mozambicanists, mostly due to a theoretical blind spot. Even skeptical researchers still function from the classical modern European definition of religion. They have developed a Durkheimian logic (Macamo 2004), used Hegel’s model (Ngoenha 1998), or employed a tight disciplinary perspective like history (Silva 1998b and Harries 2007). The current study’s challenge is to conceptualize religion outside the notion of it as only having to do with the “supernatural” and the “holy” as in Otto’s model (1926) or Leeuw’s “awesomely powerful force” (1964) or Eliade’s manifestation of the
The current study must also work through Durkheim’s often confusing repetitions in the definition of the religious, religion, the sacred, and their relationships.

The current research does not suggest that the transcendental attributes of religion and the religious should be done away with, but rather that the social context in which religion is practiced is not only a passive element in the whole of religious performance but also provides the key to defining what is, or is not, religious and/or religion. Thus, an understanding of national phenomenon as sacred matter will make sense and be an important part of a hermeneutical exercise. The civil religious blind spot, in the analysis by Mozambicanists, may be at the heart of the shallow approaches to important matters concerning contextualization of Moçambicanidade in the regional and world order. These include the matter of subalternity, the problem of fast changing world ideologies without allowing enough time for results, and the tendency to adopt decadent and outdated ideological systems; for instance Marxism, capitalist liberal theory and even the Western imported democracy as a form of governance. Studies on the civil religious phenomenon have been conducted since Rousseau brought the concept into mainstream social science debates. These include some African countries such as Tanzania, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho. It is paradoxical that studies done on the making of southeast African nationalism omit the civil religious dimension of national construction.

The study of the Tsonga indicates that the majority of contemporary researchers agree that Junod’s Tsonga positively influenced the formation of Moçambicanidade; a few are skeptical of such a claim. Nonetheless, both groups are silent on the civil religious dimension in the process of national construction. The nexus between nationalism and civil religion is the focus of the study, leading to the assessment of how the Tsonga as a tribal identity provided a historical genealogy and structural template for the emergence of Moçambicanidade as a civil religious entity. The civil religion (which entails the sacred ritual, sacrificial dimension of a nation) is a vital component for an understanding of the dynamics of nation building. The following section presents the civil religious concept with the view of carving out a working analytical frame.

1.3 Civil Religion and Its Critics

The notion of a civil religion has been of interest throughout the history of societies (Cristi 2001), “In a broader sense it is a question of legitimacy or of good citizenship” (Hammond 1976:169). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his political and social reflections entitled The Social
Contract (1993), first published in 1762, and was the first to use the term. There it referred to “a civic faith to be created and imposed by the sovereign as a way of promoting civil virtues and political unity” (1993: 277). It was Rousseau’s belief that with this civic faith no exclusive national religion was to exist. Tolerance was to be granted to all religions that tolerate others, so long as their dogmas had nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship.

His objective was to design a religion that would elicit feelings of civic membership and enforce the duties of citizenship in national communities no longer bound by what he called “traditional” religious ties. According to Rousseau, civil religion was essential to the fostering of social discipline in a modern liberal polity, and to the binding of all individuals to the state. Indeed, his overall concern in The Social Contract and other political writings was to provide practical political principles by which to evaluate a legitimate social order. More specifically, Rousseau’s main concern was to justify the authority to set jurisdictional boundaries and invoke transcendental sanctions (Bellah and Hammond 1980: 43). He wrote, for instance that “the power of the state derives not from force but from the moral grounds that legitimate it, and that no state had ever been founded without a religious basis” (1993:272). It was his thinking that the problem of ‘legitimation’ of the group identity in the modern world could be properly addressed by the creation of a national civil religion, capable of binding all individuals to a collectivity, i.e., the state, the tribe or the imagined community.

Almost a century later, Durkheim used the notion of civil religion in his study of religion and society, although he never mentioned the term itself. In Elementary Forms of Religious Life (2001) he indicates that the purpose of his work is to study, analyze, and explain “the most primitive and simple religion which is actually known” (Ibid.). His main argument is that the origin, function and meaning of religion can be understood and explained only by reference to social forces. It is in such argument that he articulated a concept of religion as being “a unified system of beliefs and practices, relating to sacred things, which integrate into one single moral community (Ibid.). It was his perception that every relatively healthy society is based upon a set of shared beliefs, rituals, and symbols that produce and express its most basic values. These values, Durkheim argued, acquire a transcendental meaning, as members of the group consider them sacred. “They serve to bring the group together” (Bellah & Hammond 1980: 128), thus providing the order, stability and integration of the society as a whole. In this context, civil religion acts as a
spontaneous integrating factor upon the hegemonic community, by providing a common morality and loyalty to the group.

There is a distinction between Rousseau’s and Durkheim’s definition of civil religion: in Rousseau, civil religion is a state produced system with the objective of integrating and legitimizing its citizens, whereas in Durkheim, civil religion is a spontaneous phenomenon of society with a more consensual character. This distinction became the focus of study by the following generations of civil religion’s scholars, as they came with their own contextual questions. Robert Bellah published an essay entitled “Civil Religion in America”, in the winter 1967 issue of *Daedalus*. This essay was an analysis of John Kennedy’s and Lyndon Johnson’s inaugural addresses, where Bellah argued that these speeches, and those of the founding fathers, provided a clue to understanding the relationship between religion and politics in the United States. The speeches, which often mentioned God, revealed a profound religious spirit in American society, Bellah notes that what the United States has “is a collection of beliefs, symbols and rituals with respect to sacred things institutionalized in a collectivity” (1967:8). In his understanding, civil religion in America was independent of religious and political institutions and, at the same time not in competition with either church or state, “neither sectarian nor in any specific sense Christian” (Ibid.). An important aspect of American political tradition is the belief that Americans, individually or collectively, have an obligation to carry out God’s will on earth. In this view, civil religion served and still serves as a genuine vehicle of national religious self-understanding (Ibid. 4). Accordingly, civil religion provided a transcendent goal for the political process, and contributed to the unity and collective identity of Americans as a national community (Ibid. 5). The principal effect of a United States’ civil religion had been to generate powerful symbols of national solidarity and to encourage Americans to achieve national aspirations and goals.

Bellah’s introduction of Rousseau’s concept of civil religion into the American landscape with new interpretation was widely received. Many in the scholarly community were inspired by Bellah’s essay to take up civil religion as an important theme in national self-understanding. This galvanization resulted in scores of subsequent articles about his thesis and, primarily in the United States, initiating debate about civil religion. Others before him had advanced similar ideas, and had spoken of the “Religion of the Republic,” “The Religion of the American Way of Life”, even of “American Shinto”, but they failed to provoke substantial discussions of analysis (Bellah 1974: 255). Gehrig, however, writes that Bellah’s interpretation of a “national faith”, or of a religious
dimension of American society, generated concerns about the actual meaning and definition of the term, its applicability as a sociological concept, and whether it could be considered a religion or not (Gehrig 1981a: 51). The publication of a collection of essays entitled Varieties of Civil Religion (1980) came as an acknowledgement of the above conceptual issues. In the years following the 1967 essay, Bellah came to realize that there is more than one form of civil religion, and that the term can be applied to a variety of societies and contexts, not only an American one. Nonetheless, the sociology of religion split into two camps: those who accepted Bellah’s thesis and those who simply dismissed the notion of civil religion (Bellah 1974: 255). The latter camp not only questioned Bellah’s interpretation, but also doubted the very existence of a civil religion in America.

The current research, however, takes up from Rousseau’s integrationist and ‘legitimationist’ approach in which the political elite produces civil religion in order to instill order and loyalty to the state; but also, from the Durkheim/Bellah consensual approach particularly in the sense that civil religion and the sacred are locally produced. Civil religion, for the current study, adopts a middle ground approach, in which both Rousseau’s and Durkheim’s schools must be taken into consideration when defining civil religion. In this regard, Marcela Cristi suggests a middle ground approach (Cristi 2001). Accordingly, civil religion has to be concerned with both the social and the political order, with a tendency to consecrate certain aspects of civil life by means of public rituals and collective ceremonies (Ibid. 41).

Under the above framework, the current study examines how the Tsonga historical and religious frame provided a template for the emergence of Moçambicanidade. The reason for applying a little of both integrationist and consensual schools is that, in the writers’ view, they complete and complement each other. Such conceptual reconciliation proved to be important for the definition of the sacred in relation to the religious or religion, and is a matter to be addressed in the following section of the chapter. However, Johnson’s observation is taken seriously in the current analysis, which is that, throughout history, “there has been a tendency for the consensual schools to dominate the field at the expense of the integrationist” (2005: 298). This was the case with Bellah’s civil religion definition as it relied too closely on Durkheim’s normative and functionalist understanding of religion, to the extent that, in Wuthnow’s words, “Bellah’s civil religion was analytically construed as an ever-present social quality, rather than a particular content of discourse” (1994: 92), that is, as the human sacralization of community symbols.
whatever they may be. The fallacy of a strict Durkheimian argument for civil religion is that there is no reason for assuming the necessary presence of religion to anchor group identity.

In this model, it appears that very little power struggle is involved, but it is well known that the process of recycling traditional religious signs and symbols into civil religious ones is not an egalitarian contest conducted at the same level. Chidester defines and explains these often violent dynamics of contestation of the sacred when developing the notion of the political economy of the sacred (Chidester & Linenthal 1995 and Chidester 2005); a matter to be explored in relation to the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade civil religious dynamics in the current study. Key here is the understanding that the religious field of seemingly neutral words and symbols is already highly circumscribed by violence at the level of symbols. In the current study, civil religion must be understood as having a fluid boundary that is, and always has been, contested and debated, though that instability is usually occluded in narratives of locals’ established religious histories.

The sacred is inseparable from religious performance. For instance, in moments of crisis civil religion emerges to legitimate both the social and political order through the consecration of certain aspects of civil life by means of rituals and collective ceremonies. The next section articulates the relationship between the concepts of civil religion and the sacred.

1.4 Civil Religion and the Sacred

Religion, the religious and the sacred, as concepts, are woven together, often eliciting confusion in their use. This section defines and explains their differences, and describes how they are employed in the study. This is in view of addressing the question: can the adjective ‘religious’ or ‘sacred’ be applied to a subject like Moçambicanidade? The question requires that the concepts of religion, religious, and the sacred national phenomena be broadened and made inclusive of emergent social matters. Only then can one understand the nation as being sacred and nationalism as the power source that forges group identity. In other words, once a nation state is conceived as being more than a historically conditioned phenomenon, but also as constituted of humans, it becomes “a natural organization proper to homo sapiens, one through which life itself is rendered untouchable or sacred” (Debray 1977: 26).

With this insight in mind, one can reasonably affirm Moçambicanidade as a sacred subject. It becomes important to study civil religious phenomenon because a nation is made of symbols and signs, which at the same time, have to do with religious matters. An example of its application
in a southeast African modern nation can be seen in Moçambicanidade display of national symbols such as flags, shrines, a national anthem, revolutionary songs and poems, triumphalist art, war heroes, and battlegrounds, all symbols that characterize the sacred. One cannot fully grasp the nature of nationalist phenomenon without understanding civil religious representation. Civil religion in itself can only be well defined if the notion of the sacred is also contextualized, a fact that, according to Evans, can benefit of a better articulation (2003: 44). Accordingly, the sacred has been narrowly conceptualized in terms of group totems, mores, symbols, and ritual activities set apart and oriented to the supernatural or otherworldly (Ibid.). He is critical of the ways in which the concept of the sacred, despite its long pedigree in social theory, its particular importance in sociology of religion, there has been too much focus on the religious sacred. A fact that often lead to failing in recognizing the similar totems, mores, symbols and activities in social institutions like nation, states, the family, race, class, and gender.

Despite conceptual frailties of the sacred the history of the discipline provides the ground for further study. Chidester suggests those two broad lines in the definition of the sacred are prominent, one substantial and the other situational (1995: 5). Accordingly, the substantial line places the sacred at the crossroads between a Supreme Being and a human agent, where the humans are the powerless subjects. This line is known to replicate an insider’s evocation of certain experiential qualities that can be associated with the sacred. For substantial hardliners—Rudolph Otto (1926) with his “holy”, Gerardus van der Leeuw (1964) with his “power”, or Mircea Eliade (1963) and the “real”—the sacred is defined as the supernatural, awesome, or powerful manifestation of reality, full of ultimate significance.

The second line is the situational line. According to Chidester this line locates the sacred at the nexus of human practices and social projects. The situational line Durkheimian oriented as it argues that the sacred is understood as a phenomenon unfolding only due the existence of humans and their contingencies. There is also an underlying sense in this argument of the notion that the sacred is a social phenomenon that takes place within a particular society for the well-functioning of every constitutive element. It is in this context that Chidester argues that from this perspective nothing is inherently sacred (1995: 8). This is because according to Chidester, once the notion of the sacred is emptied of all mythical connotations attached it becomes a blank sign, hence landing itself for any meaning (Ibid.). It becomes clear that sacred from the situational perspective stems
from the natural processes of social construction, a necessary element of the daily labor of human activities in a social setting. Sacralization happens in space, time, persons, and social relations.

We have learned of the theoretical weaknesses of the sacred and that the substantial and situational lines are the most practiced approaches, it is time to try and understand the differences between the sacred and the religious. What is religious? Chidester argued that most specialists avoid defining what religion is because subtle difficulties stand in the way of defining religion; too many assumptions are attached to the term and everyone already “knows” what it means (1995: 9). People are relaxed about defining the religion they practice. Most people tend to view religion to what Chidester calls “binary oppositions”, which is that most people know their religion and not the religion of the others (Ibid. 9). A view that first, makes people appear to know the true and real religion from false and fake religion but at the same time, relax about defining what they believe to be true religion. Hence, not a single wholesome definition has been set forth.

The disinterest in rationalization of religion however, there is a classic definitions of religion that, according to Chidester, “focus on its importance as a way of thinking, as a way of feeling, and as a way of being human in relation to other human beings in a community” (Ibid. 9). Of the three ways, the last one is the focus of analysis of this thesis. The above view regards religion to be more than merely a matter of personal thoughts and feelings. It involves beliefs and practices, but always in the context of social relations. In fact, as Durkheim argues, “Religion might very well be central to the formation of society” (2001: 62), and thus is, more appropriate for the subject of analysis for the current research.

Religious thinking and feeling, action and experience, in Durkheim’s formulation, realize their function in the construction of any human society around the sacred. Despite the predominance of Durkheim’s school in the study of religion, a growing number of studies identified some issues. They found that his simplistic definition of religion and a lack of clear distinction between the concepts of religion and the sacred are at the heart of some mixing and confusion in the use of the terms (Becker 1950; Crippen 1988; Stark and Bainbridge 1996; Stark and Finge 2000; and Stark 2001). Durkheim asserted that “all religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: they presuppose a classification of all things into two classes or opposed groups, “profane and sacred” (2001:52). A good example is his definition of religion as “the unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden” (1951:62).
There are three issues related to this interesting but compromising definition of religion: the ambiguity, breadth, and foundational nature of the “sacred.” The first problem is that this central concept remains vague (Stark 2001; Stark & Finke 2000) and largely tautological—the sacred is what the group defines as sacred. Second, and perhaps to accommodate religions that have a thin line between secular and sacred, Durkheim tried to leave himself some maneuvering space by choosing a word that may connote religious and/or set apart—a term that is understood as referring to religion, but not necessarily so.

The phrase ‘sacred things’ is not a problem by itself when applied as a reference to religious things or set-apart things in society. Yet, two things happen when the notion of religion is based on Durkheim’s notion of the sacred: firstly, it becomes unnecessary tautology, that is, religion is concerned with the religious things. Secondly, it creates conditions for unmanageable growth in the meaning of religion by not requiring a supernatural referent, or any other particular referent, that is, religion is concerned with whatever a society sets apart. Thus, because it is based on a substantively unbounded concept, the third problem is the derivative nature of Durkheim’s concept of religion. Notwithstanding, some secondary problems with a classical definition of the concept of religion (which limited the term to systems concerned in some way with the divine or supernatural) provide a ground whereby to draw a realistic work plan. Hence, Durkheim is championed and used for research by current scholars such as Evans, Chidester, Stark and colleagues (e.g. Stark 2001; Stark & Bainbridge 1996; Stark & Finke 2000).

Durkheim’s view of religion—as a multi-dimensional, complex system of mythic and doctrinal belief, of ritual and ethical action, and of personal and social experience—is popular among social scientists nowadays. It fueled an understanding of religion as an arena of human activity marked by the concerns for the transcendent—that which rises above and beyond the ordinary; as an arena that engages the sacred—that which is set apart from the ordinary; and as an arena that engages the ultimate—that which defines the final, unavoidable limit of all our ordinary concerns. Robert Bellah is a case in point of scholars whose analytical inspiration came from Durkheim’s logic, as he argued that the United States was animated by a collective, public, or civil religion, an understanding of the nation’s historical destiny in the light of transcendence, which served as a religious warrant for American nationalism.

The current research has carved a working definition of religion as that which is substantively concerned with the supernatural, whereas sacred refers to that which is set apart. This
‘working definition’ minimizes the confusion between the concepts of religion and sacred, while maintaining their relationship in cases when they overlap, i.e., when a sacred object is also a religious object. The core assumption is that a nation is made, among other things, out of sacred material. Moçambicanidade, as a claim to national identity, is treated as a civil religious phenomenon that keeps the country’s shared values working. The underlying premise is that human political processes produce the sacred; hence, the sacred cannot be taken as a given and immutable natural condition or a transcendental product. Granted that such notion can be entertained, the question of how such a product is manufactured becomes the inspiration of curious minds. The place of rites of sacrifice in the myth of origin as well as the relationship between violence and religion become important in the study of nationalism.

1.5 Africa and Civil Religion

Moçambicanidade is an instrumental civil religion as it results from gathering spontaneous experiences (or organic civil religion) into a consistent and organized force, which is deployed afterwards with a clear political objective. Although not thoroughly investigated, a civil religious phenomenon thrives in Africa, as in any other society of the modern world; that is, Moçambicanidade does not stand alone. In a short comparative approach, this section looks at Moçambicanidade in relation to other African civil religious experiences. Though uneven and often conducted under varying methods, case studies of African civil religious experience can be found. What makes Moçambicanidade different from other postcolonial civil religious experiences?

After the successful debut of Bellah’s essay on the American civil religion (1967), it seemed that the subject of civil religion would be only an American affair. It took a few theoretical tests for Bellah himself to notice that civil religion was not a peculiarly American political phenomenon. His own experience with Shintoism, the Japanese state religion, had opened his perception of the universal nature of civil religion. It was in this context that in 1980 Bellah and Hammond edited a collection of essays with the objective of exploring other civil religious experiences around the world. Moçambicanidade’s experience falls under postcolonial civil religious experience with the specific traits of a southeast African context. It is a result of the colonial state’s oppression of the indigenous population as well as a result of the Tsonga civil
religious experience, one of the early modern nations established in the region at the dawn of the twentieth century.

Rousseau’s notion of civil religion, as being produced by the state for its own use; that is, for the state to legitimize its own power, is appealing in the postcolonial context. The researcher can go beyond the common study of state versus established religious institutions to reveal that the role played by the state produced a religion in the construction of collective identities. Civil religion, thus, sheds more light onto the dynamics of religion and group identity formation. Yet, even Rousseau’s legitimating approach needed to be integrated into the ever-changing postcolonial setting. Rousseau feared that civil religion would produce super nations or monster nations (like the Italy of Mussolini yet to be born), yet Moçambicanidade civil religion has generated a subaltern identity, which has developed a sophisticated strategy in order to survive in the fast changing modern context (see section 6.1).

The prototypical three cases share some common aspects with Moçambicanidade. These are TANU’s Ujamaa policy on established religious institutions in Tanzania; the Osogbo City kingship rituals in modern Nigeria; and the ongoing South African Motshekga traditional leadership retrieval and claims of power in a post-apartheid period. For instance, in *Ujamaa na Dini* (1980) Westerlund aimed at the religious policies of Ujamaa and the reactions of different established religious institutions in Tanzania to such policies (Ibid. 8). As in many countries, Nyerere’s Tanzania was rich in religious diversity, generating considerable management challenges for the politicians. Westerlund’s work is relevant here as he was interested in examining how TANU managed the challenges of religious diversity. He looked at the religious policies of Ujamaa, the state ideology, in the light of the religious pluralism that characterized the emerging nation of Julius Nyerere in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Westerlund found that in the context of revolutionary Tanzania, the primary goal of TANU’s Ujamaa was to build a nation. This meant that, religious interests had to be subordinated to the avowedly common interests of Ujamaa. Westerlund noticed that TANU leaders were interested in harnessing the power that religious institutions exerted on people (1980: 182). It is this context that Ujamaa leaders kept good relationships with the various religious denominations across the country by setting forth decrees that discouraged religious divisions amongst the citizens and encouraged tolerance between different religious organizations. This policy was applied equally to all religious traditions. Nation building was the most important task of the day, and
every citizen was called to contribute. According to Westerlund, TANU had to create clear boundaries for its members in regard to religion. Supposedly, TANU was a secular party in a religiously diverse country. Often religio-political factionalism threatened the unity of TANU, leading the political leaders to warn religious organizations to “stay out of politics” (1980: 8). In TANU’s Ujamaa, religion was described as a private matter, something concerned with metaphysical matters. Westerlund, however, found that since there was also an admitted social aspect of religion, it was implied that socio-political consequences had to coincide with Ujamaa or else they would be resisted or even outlawed. Politics and religion were always intertwined in the Ujamaa regime, and despite the leaders’ effort to portray a secular state, religious elements often be found in political discourses.

Civil religion for Westerlund had mainly to do with the ways in which Ujamaa related to various established religious institutions, for political leaders needed to harness and properly manage the potential provided by these religious institutions. Nonetheless, this situation is a type of civil religious phenomena. For instance, the tendency to blur the separation between religious symbols and political agendas in the pursuit of national construction results in the creation of civil religious performances. Such can be seen, as Westerlund indicates, when the “national anthem and the parliamentary prayer were presented verbatim as two very important documents of civil religion of Tanzania” (1980: 182). Nationalism had been mixed with religious elements in these documents, especially those elements common to both Islam and Christianity.

Ujamaa also discouraged religious divisions amongst the citizens. In political meetings, prayers were often said, and in his speeches, Nyerere several times affirmed his belief in God, particularly in situations where it was likely that such affirmation would be favorably received. Westerlund points out that Nyerere and other political leaders were very careful when using religious symbols in their speeches. Nyerere’s religious statements were normally within the realm of civil religion, that is, within the framework of the Ujamaa policy of welcoming every religious organization but he also used them for the advancement of ideological agendas. Westerlund asserts that an increasing number of citizens came to see their religious denomination as supporting Ujamaa’s agenda of nation building, “the civil religion grew”, he adds, “and strengthened national integration” (Ibid. 182).

The emergence of the Yoruba traditions of divine kingship in the Nigerian city of Osogbo in a modern context can be related to Moçambicanidade. Olupona studied the myths and rituals of
sacred sovereignty of the ancestral traditions within changing conditions of modern urbanization, democratization, and religious diversity (Olupona 2001). In “Orisa Osun”, Olupona reports how the goddess Osun is associated with the values of thrift, entrepreneurship and commerce, activities as exemplified by the market women in Nigeria; making this deity a popular symbol of success in business. In this alliance there are rituals prescribed to be followed for those wanting success. Accordingly, a detailed ritualistic order, developed around Osun, is performed yearly in Osogbo (Ibid. 15). Olupona argues that the meticulous organization and insight displayed in ceremonies for the Yoruba deities indicates that a high level of hybridization is taking place between traditional Yoruba and modern Nigerian self-production. Accordingly, rituals of divine kingship, sacred narratives, songs, poetry, and ritual procedures reinforce the ongoing connection between people and the spiritual realm mediated by the divine king. Sacred kingship, in this regard, regularly reinforces ongoing community ties in the city and in the larger Nigerian national sphere. As in Tanzania, the context of the city of Osogbo is complex, diverse and modern. This is illustrated by the fact that in the Osogbo rituals of the sacred kingship, the divine king in charge of presiding over the annual ancestral rituals was a devout Muslim who also was a chartered accountant (Olupona 2001: 16).

The Yoruba divine kingship seems to merge reconstructions of ancestral heritage, the reality of religious diversity, and the modern dynamics of a constitutional democracy. Therefore, sacred kingship first strengthens community ties in Osogbo, rather than within the larger Nigerian political ideology. Meanwhile, citizenship appears to have transformed the sacred kingship into a kind of civil religion. Divine kingship has become an institution that fulfills a dual function in anchoring indigenous religious spirits in the city and affirming the city. The kingship in Osogbo at first appears complex due to its hybrid nature but one can notice a production of collectivity’s self-identity at the merger of traditional African kingship, religious diversity and the complex modern city context.

Another case of civil religious dynamics in Africa is to be found in South Africa. In a work in progress Chidester examines how the post-apartheid South African democratic political elite attempt to retrieve the integrity of traditional leadership by revisiting possible linking narratives, and in the process, a visible civil religious performance is manifest. Mathole Motshekga is the political figure behind the project of recovering the integrity of indigenous African traditions of identity, culture and religion. Chidester’s research indicates that through civil religious
performances, Motshekga attempts to revive divine kingship in a contemporary democratic South Africa (Chidester 2010). Born in a family of Lobedu, in the realm of Modjadji, the Rain Queen, Motshekga, a lawyer by training, is also a member of parliament and a prominent member of the ANC. He has invoked ancestral authority in the context of religious diversity within a democratic state (Motshekga 2006). In order to advance the recovery of African spirituality, culture, and history, Motshekga founded the Kara Heritage Institute in 1982. Since the dawn of the new South African democratic nation in 1994, he has been moving back and forth between modern politics and traditional royalty. His is a Hermetic, Kemetic, and Afrocentric understanding of the indigenous African religious tradition, which he promotes as the shared heritage of all southern Africans.

Motshekga has made appearances on various media, including the radio stations of the South African Broadcasting Corporation on behalf of the Kara Institute. There he has been regularly presented as the authoritative spokesperson for African religion. He has also made presentations to audiences as diverse as the South African Parliament, the Gauteng Legislature, the Black Management Forum, the Department of Education, the South African Human Rights commission, the South African Heritage Resources Agency, and at annual public celebrations, sponsored by various arms of government for South Africa’s Heritage Day. On all these occasions, Motshekga is consistent in his efforts to trace South African indigenous religion, culture, and identity back to ancient Egypt. As the shared heritage and common spirituality of all Africans in the region, this Egyptian origin is advanced as a religious foundation for a new South Africa. In his religious strategy and tactics, Chidester asserts, “he seems to be pursuing all three dimensions of civil religion formulated by sociologist of religion Robert Bellah” (2010: 4). Referring to the cultural, the nationalist, and the transcendental, Motshekga describes the sacred culture of Africa by drawing religion into nation building, and by interpreting African historical experience, with special attention to political struggles in Southern Africa, in the light of transcendence.

While for the Osogbo City kingship ceremonies, the intentions are simply to consolidate traditional religious values; the same cannot affirmed in Motshegka’s case of South Africa. What seems to be problematic in Motshegka’s project is his attempt to hold theosophical, theocratic and democratic views all at once. Motshekga’s theosophy holds political implications by requiring the recovery of African theocracy. African monarchs and kings, representing God on earth, are intermediaries between humans and the heavens. Observing the Hermetic maxim, “As above, so
below,” Motshekga sometimes calls for a restoration of an ancient Egyptian model of theocracy in which the earthly order in both church and state reflect the heavenly order. The centralized, hierarchical authority of divine kingship, as Motshekga observes, represents a “governance structure that applied in heaven and in both church and state (Motshekga 2008: 4). Although he is not a secessionist like the amaThembu King Dalindyebo, Motshekga has insisted on restoring the “territorial integrity” of divine kingship (Motshekga 2007: 8). Looking back to the ancient model of divine kingship, he has argued that royal councils, on behalf of the king, must exercise government efforts to accommodate traditional leaders, such as the formation of traditional councils and a government commission to resolve traditional leadership disputes.

On other occasions, Motshekga defers to democratic pluralism to identify African divine kingship as a “faith community” amongst other communities of faith in South Africa. African kings, queens, chiefs, and other traditional authorities,” he observes, “like faith communities, are custodians of spiritual and cultural values” (Motshekga 2008: 5). Dedicated to preserving these African values, divine kingship can operate within a democratic division of labor between religion and politics in a modern democratic state, with African royalty performing “spiritual and cultural functions while political parties assume social and political functions” (Ibid.). Motshekga also has positioned African divine kingship, religion and spiritual heritage in the context of the constitutional separation of religion and state in a democratic order. Accordingly, Motshekga plays a leading role in the National Interfaith Leaders Forum, representing the interests of African religion as Chairman of the African National Congress’s Commission on Religious and Traditional Affairs (Shiceka 2009).

Despite apparent contradictions in Motshekga’s enterprise, one can learn that against the background of European conquest, colonization, and imposition of indirect rule, which was formalized in the traditional leadership of the Bantustans created under apartheid, civil religion may find fertile ground to prosper and help the emerging political orders to assert their position of power. One may well ask what the purpose of such an endeavor might be. It should be recalled that Rousseau warned about the use of civil religion to legitimize tyrannical forms of power (Rousseau 1993: 277). Motshekga’s project appears unclear and it could lead to a degenerated form of political religion. Otherwise, he seems to offer an alternative discourse to Bellah’s ways of engaging civil religion.
In summing up: for Westerlund, civil religion had to do with the relationship between the state and religious institutions. That is, civil religion in Tanzania is produced at the nexus between national-identity production and the established religion. For Osogbo city and South Africa cases, civil religion is produced at the encounter of the ancestral traditions within changing conditions of modern urbanization, democratization and religious diversity. In the prototypical three cases, the context is postcolonial Africa; Moçambicanidade is located in it, a milieu well described as hybrid, ambiguous and often mockingly imitative. Although FRELIMO founders used symbols and values of established religious institutions for their own benefit (see the Chapter 5.2), the nation-state itself was the generator of civil religion. Attempts to retrieve ancient narratives and interpret them as transcendent occurred in Tsonga and in Moçambicanidade. For instance, Junod explained the Psikwembu as ancestors who, by their great work in defending good causes of the nation, rose to the status of gods (1927b: 401). From such a rationale, Junod claimed that the Tsonga culture and religion were to be defended at all cost against the vices of modernity.

Likewise, Frelimo turned back to history to retrieve persons like Ngungunhane and canonized them as heroes, allegedly because these ancestors were national kings who died in the good cause of the nation. It is outrage to consider Ngungunhane a Tsonga or Frelimo hero. He was a Nguni monarch. If history is interpreted correctly, the Nguni Empire was an invading political power in southeast Africa, much like the Portuguese (Liesegang 1986). It not surprising, then, that even today, Ngungunhane is still remembered for the cruel way he dealt with his subjects (Kossa 2000). Even if the founder of FRELIMO, Mondlane, did evoke Ngungunhane, he knew from his own grandparents what the Nguni presence meant in the region (Mondlane 1969). Tsonga and Frelimo attempts can be compared to the work carried out by Motshekga. The study approached Moçambicanidade using a combination of Rousseau’s notion of legitimation and Johnson’s categories of organic and instrumental civil religion, in a concerted effort to balance Durkheim’s functionalist and consensual rendering of religion. Hence, the study regards Moçambicanidade as a belief system produced by the state primarily for the state’s own consumption. Due to the sacred nature of nation, at least to its citizens, the study of Moçambicanidade took into consideration the frequently violent dynamics of contestation in the identity production process, particularly in the context of postcolonial Africa.

The first chapter has introduced the main question of the research as being the historical and religious role of the Tsonga in the formation of Moçambicanidade as a civil religious entity.
The introduction postulated the key proposition to the question, i.e., that the Tsonga as an instrumental civil religion has been at the heart of the successful campaign that established a sacred group identity responsible for keeping Moçambicanidade alive. A review of Moçambicanidade scholarship was presented as well as the conceptual issues surrounding the notion of civil religion. The objective has been to summarize the debate and define in a clearly how the key concepts such as religious or religion, civil religion and the sacred are employed in the current study of Moçambicanidade.

Informed by Rousseau’s and Durkheim’s schools and the later developments by Bellah, the current research proposes a working definition of religion or the religious as being that which is substantively concerned with the transcendent; whereas, that which is set-apart or set-aside is defined as sacred. However, the sacred can be transcendental if there is an overlap between the religious and the set-aside, that is, when a sacred object is also a religious one. This overlapping is visible in civil religious formation in self-identity of collectivities, like the Tsonga or Moçambicanidade, where a national symbol like the National Anthem is placed at the center of religious ceremonies and at the same time considered sacred. Moçambicanidade is one among other civil religious manifestations in the postcolonial Africa. Accordingly, the chapter brought three studies of Tanzania, Nigeria and South Africa. These cases are the typical cases showing how African states relate to civil religion. While some similarities are recognizable these case studies looked at the relationship between the state and established religious institutions; whereas, Moçambicanidade is a state produced belief system for the state’s own legitimation.

The following chapters present the formation of the Tsonga and FRELIMO civil religions respectively.
CHAPTER TWO
THE PRODUCTION OF THE TSONGA

The Tsonga tribal identity creation played a key role in the overall colonial scheme of mapping and knowing, managing, scramble and control of the subjects. Unlike the commonly held idea that the Tsonga preserved the Gwamba refugees from the negative effects of modernity, the emergence of the Tsonga tribal identity further exposed the already ravaged Gwamba groups in exile to massive exploitation. Once created, the concept of the Tsonga had unpredictable dimensions as it acquired a life of its own. One chief dimensions was the influence it had on the formation of Moçambicanidade under the skilful leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, nearly seventy years later. In both cases civil religion played an important role in legitimizing the emerging new political order.

The second chapter presents the Tsonga genealogy and focuses on the power struggle behind the creation of the Tsonga tradition. The first two sections introduce the concept of the Tsonga and its power; the third discusses Junod’s evolutionist influences that helped strengthen his reasons for creating the Tsonga identity. Most of Junod’s success is owed to a decided approach to language as a key tool in identity formation; the fourth section pays particular attention on the role of language in the creation of the Tsonga.

2.1 Scope of the Tsonga

The section investigates the origins of the concept Tsonga and its range of influences. By so doing it is hoped to reveal that from the start of the Romande Mission the agents interpreted, converted and recycled local stories and myths, into new and powerful symbols, later deployed toward the new identity formation. This process also meant that the Tsonga identity creators were busy harvesting organic civil religion elements and converting them into new values and symbols, which later on, will produce the self-identity of the Gwamba groups. So then, what is the origin of the Tsonga as a group identity, the range and the power surrounding its emergence? Tsonga is the term Junod used to designate the southeast groups southeastern people of Delagoa Bay and its hinterland. The current research adopts the designation Tsonga as an imagined group name to describe the so-called Thonga, Shangaan and Rongas. However, like Edward Said’s Orientalism, the term Tsonga should be perceived as corresponding to the Europeans’ representation of their
colonial subjects. To treat the term as a European colonial representation does not mean necessarily that there are no such subjects known as the Tsongas. Contemporary scholarship indicates that there are people today who perceive themselves as Tsonga (Feliciano 1998, Harries 1981). Yet, unlike Orientalism and the Orient, there is no place named Tsonga today. From its conception the term Tsonga, which later was canonized as a people’s denomination, was fraught with conceptual, disciplinary and ethical problems. Despite such contentions, however, the Romande Mission’s invention and Junod’s standardizing of the invention became the canon by which the subjects perceived themselves, and by which the West knew the southeast African people and based its judgments on the subjects.

The scope of Tsonga leads one to question the origins of the concept itself. Like most concepts, Tsonga has its own conditions of possibility. Although already in use since 1873-5 when Berthoud, Creux, and the Gwamba leaders adopted it at Klipfontein Farm, it was in 1905 that Junod attributed the “recognition of the identity” of the Tsonga as a tribe largely to the work of the Swiss Mission (Junod 1905: 28). Junod’s monograph, *The Life of a South Africa Tribe*, elevated his status in the academic world to that of a pioneer in the field of anthropology and, by doing so, the term Tsonga was canonized as the legitimate name for the people of southeast Africa. However, research reveals that the term was forced onto the Gwambas—a loose heterogeneous refugee groups—despite their resistance to it (Xavier 1894; van Warmelo 1935; Harries 1981; van Butselaar 1987; Monnier 1995; Maluleke 1995). The term did not correspond to political, linguistic or geographical reality. Strictly speaking, the term Tsonga should refer only to a loose linguistic relationship, as do generic terms such as Nguni, Shona or Sotho (Feliciano 1998). The term itself seems to be foreign in origin and its implementation. In this regard Harries asserts that, in its original form as Tonga, the term came into general usage only during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, when intrusive Nguni groups used it to refer to the conquered people of southeast Africa (Harries 1981). Accordingly, Junod understood the origins of the term Tsonga as stemming from the Zulu sound shift of the word Ronga to Tsonga, both meaning easterners, or in the fact that the Tsonga were original inhabitants of the coastal areas north of the Nguni settlements (Ibid. 37). So, term or a word that sounded like Thonga, Tonga or Tsonga was in use in the Zulu language. Through its Zulu usage however, the term became effectively synonymous with pejorative terms such as ‘slave’ or ‘dog’, which were used by the ruling Gaza Nguni to differentiate themselves from the people whom they exploited (Cruz 1910; Erskine 1875; Grandjean 1921).
Junod himself testifies to the negative stereotypical connotations attached to the term (1927a: 14-5; 1927b: 625), yet his ego prevailed over his conscience as he carried on with the naming project, notwithstanding that those named rejected the term Tsonga as being derogatory, insulting and denigrating.

In the travail of mapping the land Junod divided the country in the lines of north of Nkomati (classified as the Lhengue and Mhandla countries) and south of Nkomati River as the Tsonga nation (which he classified as *BaRonga*) (Junod 1927a). In Durkheimian terms Junod set-aside, a space for the establishment of Tsonga as an imagined group identity. However, according to Monnier this distinction between the chieftdoms south of the Nkomati, and those to the north, which he called the “northern clans”, does not have any scientific accuracy (1995). He was aware of the problems involved in this classification and recognized that there was no feeling of national unity in the tribe as a whole: its unity consisted only in a language and in certain customs, which were common to all clans. As van Warmelo has pointed out, those customs were just as easily shared with neighboring peoples (1974), and Junod glossed over his own and others’ evidence that, even among the so-called *BaRonga*, there were considerable linguistic and cultural differences and that these differences were not immutable but were adapted to fit the contingencies of the period.

Although social scientists today, like Feliciano (1998) or Biber (1987), on one hand recognize three to four Tsonga linguistic divisions in the Delagoa Bay area and its hinterland, all of which have been derived from Junod’s work, on the other side, however the same scholars recognize that these divisions were never accepted by the people themselves as they cannot imply any cultural or political homogeneity (Silva 1998b, Harries 2007). It becomes clear now that Junod’s use of “tribe” was unorthodox as it referred to a linguistic rather than a political grouping (Monnier 1995). In his tendency to classify, Junod was trapped within the limitations of his age. The rationalism of the French philosophers of the Enlightenment had bequeathed to him an intellectual system, which demanded a classification of the myriad of new details brought to their attention by a rapidly expanding world.

In the introduction to *The Life of a South African Tribe*, Junod writes that there are two classes of men to whom he wanted to bring some practical help in their work: “the native commissioners, and the missionaries” (1927a: 8). This is because, according to him, “to govern savages, you must study them thoroughly in order both to receive and avoid hurting their feelings unnecessarily” (Ibid.). This attitude toward the “natives” was necessary if the governors,
missionaries, and other European powers wanted to win their confidence and maintain a friendly understanding of their culture and traditions.

As far as the missionaries were concerned, this piece of advice followed the recommendations mandated by the 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference (Sanecki 2006). The Edinburgh Conference was crucial in refocusing missionary work toward maximizing the number of converts and minimizing the problems arising because of the encounter between missionary cultures and those of the subjects of change (Ibid. 31). The Conference urged its members to be sympathetic to “native” beliefs and to study their culture and customs. It also recommended that in each field a thorough investigation be undertaken, in order that the message of the gospel may be presented in a way that would appeal to those aspirants so that the gospel reveals itself in the “natives’” religious and social rites. History records reveal that Junod attended the Edinburgh Missionary Conference “not only as a missionary in the field but also as a researcher and an authority on the Tsonga”, with a manuscript ready for publication at hand (Harries 1981: 42). As a consequence of Junod’s creative efforts, portrayed in The Life of a South African Tribe, a complex Tsonga subject emerged which became suitable for study in academy, for display in museums, for reconstruction in the colonial office, and for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe. Junod and his colleagues from the Romande Mission drew such a classical modern canvas (of paternalism, superior vs. inferior, etc...), which developed under the general heading of “knowledge of the Tsonga,” under the umbrella of the Free Churches of Vaud’s hegemony over the Tsonga.

It was on this flourishing European capitalist canvas that in 1938 Henry-Alexander Junod’s son, Henri Philippe Junod, published Bantu Heritage, for the Transvaal Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg. The book is a compilation of lectures, based on his father’s work. The lectures were delivered to the Transvaal Mine Medical Officers’ Association of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, as much of the work done by Junod, the father, dedicated to training the company’s directors in how to deal with the Tsongas. Two major motives compelled Junod to do his research on the Tsongas: one was the fragile relationship between the whites and the “natives,” the so-called “Native Problem”, especially in South Africa where relations between the two races were poor on account of intolerance (Junod 1927a: 8). The other issue had to do with the “colossal” changes taking place in an Africa under an increasingly Western influence (Ibid. 10). These changes were
a danger to “indigenous cultures” because they would wipe out their existing way of life. Accordingly, Junod felt that with his anthropological undertaking on “indigenous culture”, a chance had arisen for something to be done regarding the preservation of the local culture (Junod 1927a: 3). How could these goals be achieved, and was he able to achieve them through his anthropological adventure?

In both the 1912 and 1927 editions of The Life of a South African Tribe, Junod wrote that, among those races so long stagnant, an evolution had started which moved with great rapidity and a kind of fatalism. He did not view the recording of social change as part of his work. He asserts, for instance, that the ethnographer does not concern himself with such questions, for it was “enough for him to note the facts carefully and to describe them accurately” (Junod 1927a: 11). For him, the task was to be a faithful and an impartial ethnographer in the study of customs, which still existed, but would soon have passed away. At the core of Junod’s work was the concern over what he perceived to be the danger of the extinction of the Tsonga culture, a notion that can be related to an evolutionist mind, for if a social institution has an origin it must have an end. Yet, for the previous five hundred years mercantile capital had transited Mozambique through both Delagoa and Inhambane Bays (First 1983), but the culture was not annihilated. According to First, workers had, for more than 80 years, been migrating from southern Mozambique to the labor markets of South Africa. It is known that by 1897, the number of Shangaan employed on the Witwatersrand totaled almost 80,000 and by 1936, this number had almost doubled.

Historians reveal that Junod lived and worked at a crucial time in terms of politics and economics in southeast Africa (Harries 1981; First 1983). It was just after the 1885 Berlin Conference, the so-called ‘Scramble for Africa’ gathering between European colonial powers, that a serious exploitation of the natural resources of Africa was the order of the day and capitalism, as an economic system, was being consolidated. Junod lived in the region from 1889, when the Portuguese had little control over the independent chiefdoms, to 1896, when the conquest of southern Mozambique was fully accomplished, and again from 1913 to 1920. Junod was at the intersection of all these forces: for instance, he was in a position to use Karl Marx’s analytical framework to understand the disintegration of the threatened social structure of his subjects. This would have enabled him to grasp what First called “proletarianization,” which was fast engulfing the region (First 1983). Yet, according to his two-volume monograph, evolutionist ideas made him
understand science as being separate from the political arena and, ironically, to romanticize the reality around him.

His disinterest in those who had abandoned the “old restraints of tribal life,” emerges when he compares a dignified meeting of *indunas* with “an assembly of half-civilized natives in a town location, a low class tea-meeting … of men with no respect for anyone, addicted to drink and immorality, having rejected the authority of white missionaries because they believe themselves to be so much better informed” (Junod 1927a: 630). His description of *BaRonga* speakers living in the mines was limited to an appendix on “unnatural vice” in *The Life of a South African Tribe*. His ‘romanticization’ of the old social order gave Junod’s political writings a reactionary ring, in that he wished to maintain, preserve and separate the tribe from the European civilization that was causing its disintegration. However, here Junod contradicts himself. He was a product of modernity yet, he thought it possible to step away from it and prevent it from reaching the Gwamba folk, his subjects. This contradiction was also visible in his theology where, according to scholars, he complained rapid degradation of the old social order on one hand, but fostered the creation of modern Christian communities that fed on, and lived separately from the indigenous population on the other hand (Harries 2007). The same is witnessed in the relation to the colonial state, where Junod complained of the disintegrative effects of migrant labor, he advocated “the gospel of work…which is a blessing for the Blacks as it is for any other” (1927a. 630).

The section strived to present the ontology of the Tsonga as a concept. It argued that the term was a free-floating Zulu word with derogatory connotations. It was harvested and recycled and used to brand the northern refugee groups exiled in the Zoutpansberg Mountains. The section also suggests that the Tsonga as an imagined group identity occurred not in an easily accepted, but a contested phenomenon.

### 2.2 Of Tsonga: The Impact of the Concept

The current section assesses the implications of the name in the modern, capitalist southeast Africa. This was the beginning of a long process of collectivity identity production, which sets the historical genealogy and structural template for the formation of Moçambicanidade later on.

The Tsonga as an idea had revolutionary consequences, both for the creators and the subjects. To illustrate the point let us revisit (refer to section 2.1 in the current chapter) the
successful lectures series delivered by Henri Philippe to the Gold Mine Medical Association staff of the Transvaal Gold Mines, on April 12th-16th, 1938. The Tsonga were the object of analysis in the lectures that became known as Bantu Heritage. The index of the lectures bears titles like “African Races and Tribes”, “Bantu Language”, “Bantu Folklore” and “The Bantu Mind and Bantu Etiquette”. Taking one of the lectures, such as “Bantu Folklore” as a random example, one realizes that the speech is divided into subtitles as follows: “God and Heaven,” “Origin of Mankind,” “Animal Stories” and “Tales about Ogres and Cannibals.” These were lectures on historical and scientific facts, concerning the native inhabitants of Delagoa Bay and its hinterland, the region known to be the source of cheap labor for the mines and, in earlier times, slaves for the transatlantic trade in black gold.

As stated in the previous section, H. P. Junod hoped, as his father did, to influence those in charge of the development of the African, the authorities dealing with the so called “Native Problem,” and particularly with the purpose of improving relations among Europeans. H. P. Junod’s preface to the Bantu Heritage lecture collection ends with H-A. Junod’s guiding blessing that is also found in second volume of the father’s The Life of a South African Tribe; which reads:

…South Africander population, formed by the amalgamation of some of the best of the Aryan race, certainly has a great future in store. May it be blessed on the sunny shores, and on the high lands of South Africa. May it enrich itself, and humanity, by bringing to light the marvelous mineral wealth, hidden in the rocks of this old country (1938: 389).

The sealing blessing and the content certify that the work of Junod’s son was a reproduction and continuation of his father’s. Junod’s son addressed the Transvaal Gold Mine Managers and staff with the authority and expertise of someone who knew his field of work. The lectures were the fruit of two generations collecting data while living with the Africans in the region, enduring all African challenges and ultimately dying for the cause. Two themes dominated his lectures: knowledge and power. Knowledge meant the survey of civilization’s origins, its evolution and flourishing through time. As Said argued, this knowledge gave power to the European explorers (1978). Knowledge therefore, implied rising above immediacy, beyond self to the foreign and distant.
In following the line of Said’s thought, one can argue that the object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny (Ibid 34). This object, a “fact” which, if it develops, changes or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, is nevertheless, fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such knowledge of a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. Authority here means for “us” to deny autonomy to “it”—the Tsonga—since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it. The West’s knowledge of Tsonga, for Junod, is Tsonga; without the West, there could not be Tsonga. Junod nowhere questions the European traders, explorers and adventurers the right to the riches of South Africa, the superiority of the white population or the inferiority of the Tsonga as conveyed in the blessing quoted earlier. It would appear that the burdens of knowledge make such questions regarding inferiority and superiority appears irrelevant and petty.

The Tsonga as an idea is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely there, just as the Occident itself is not there. It had conditions of possibility, its circumstantial history and a creator. Once Vico observed “men make their own history, what they can know is what they have made” (1999: 269). For the Romande mission and Junod in particular, the Tsonga was a knowable subject. The Tsonga phenomenon in the Delagoa Bay area was, to an extent, inevitable. Junod and the Romande Mission could reproduce a reality familiar only to themselves. The elder Junod’s childhood experiences and his religious and moral views were those of a Neuchâtel, Romande Mission, Geneva and Switzerland’s reality. Ngoenha goes as far as arguing that they actually needed the Tsonga identity (1999), and that is what they produced. Accordingly, Junod not only created Tsonga as a tribal identity, but also his own identity, the identity of his own world, the West in general, and the Romande Mission society of the nineteenth century. Along Ngoenha’s line, it is argued that the Romande Mission existed only for the Tsonga. The Tsonga creation liberated and defined the Romande Mission as an identity in its battle for space within the European Christian milieu of the Enlightenment. The victory of the Romande Mission in that battle took place only through the establishment of a Tsonga identity in southeast Africa.

Judging by the Junod’s courage in facing stronger opponents, such as the colonial administrators and the other Christian Missions already established in the region, it appears to be convincing that these two entities produced each other, as they needed each other dearly: they were two sides of the same situation; one could not exist without the other. However, the idea that Tsonga is the other side of the Romande Mission does not excuse one from facing the fact that
there exist both the creators and the created. It is the current section’s task to reveal the reasons behind the creation, i.e. the power play behind the creation. In following this path one cannot fail to realize, as Franz Fanon did before, that Europe was created by its other (the ‘niggers’, Indians, Orientals), who not only died working hard to enrich Europe but also existed as the alter ego in which Europeans could see their differences (Fanon 2004).

The Tsonga, as much as the West itself, is an idea with a history that has a tradition of thought. The two entities support and reflect each other through imagery and vocabulary that were brought into existence in the West. These two entities sustain and reproduce each other. The Tsonga as an accepted and internalized identity is a fact. Yet the debate over who benefited from the name rages in academic circles in the southeast region, previously known as the Delagoa Bay region. Silva argues that Junod’s Tsonga contributed greatly to the creation of a Mozambican consciousness (1998a). Silva, whose focus of study was the Presbyterian Church of Mozambique (a Protestant denomination affiliated to the Swiss Romande missionaries), finds Junod to be the pillar in promoting an education program that later made it possible for Mozambicans to start to critically question their identity (1998a: 223). In her words: Swiss missionaries, like Junod, used the term Tsonga to refer to a “tribe” or “nation” (Ibid.). Thus, they played an important role in developing and promoting the written form of the language. They standardized the vernacular language, and produced dictionaries and a formally elaborated grammar. They laid much emphasis on the importance of the vernacular in religious and social life, and Tsonga was widely used in schools and religious instruction (Ibid. 228).

For Silva, the above factors made a significant contribution to the development of a notion of Tsonga identity: the expansion of literary material based on a standard orthography and style exposed Tsonga speakers to a wider community, which shared a language transcending local political, social and economic barriers. She makes her point in interviews with three of the most well-known revolutionary heroes who claim to have learned and been inspired by the evangelical and educational policies promoted by Junod and his colleagues in Mozambique. Silva relies mostly on the work of van Butselaar (1987), Ferreira (1993), Harries (1988 and 1994) and Maluleke (1995), the leading contemporary scholars whose work concentrates on the present Tsongas and Junod’s work in southeast Africa. Van Butselaar and Harries, however, do not see only uncontested successes in the education and evangelization programs of the Romande Mission and in Junod in particular.
In any of the above cases one argument seems uncontested, namely that Romande missionaries had an impact on the autochthonous people of southeast Africa. Their religious and educational missionary programs contributed to the formation of this Tsonga consciousness, yet, at the same time, they helped create a tribal identity, all in favor of its authors. In other terms, the Tsonga identity enabled the author to project on the subjects all that the creator was not as well as to have better control, more power over the subjects. In support of the above point, existing scholars concur that, through the Romande Mission programs, Junod invented the Tsonga in a specific way. It was through education programs that the Romande Mission contributed to the raising of nationalist consciousness as it brought many youths to an awareness of their non-Lusitanity (Lusitanity was the myth of unity that Portugal attempted to bring to its African territories), which had to be replaced by Tsonga identity. Such process of identity shift becomes a reality with the 25 June 1975 declaration of national independence. In so doing, the Tsonga provided an example in the political history of southeast Africa that was explored, seventy years after the birth of the Tsonga, by the founders of Moçambicanidade.

The underlying and guiding assumption throughout the section is that ideas, cultures and histories cannot be understood without seriously studying configurations of their power and scope. Power, the key word here, is to be understood from Foucauldian tradition, which postulates power as being “exerted implicitly by the way in which discourse is formed and exerted by denying its own truth, or by myths that misrepresent the source of power by pointing to less powerful sources” (1976: 98). Knowledge is not innocent but, rather, profoundly connected with the operations of power. This Foucauldian insight informs Said’s foundational work, *Orientalism*, which points out the extent to which “knowledge” regarding “the Orient” as it was produced and circulated in Europe was an ideological accompaniment of colonial “power.”

Foucault’s definition of power does not end here. He goes on to assert that resistance also fuels power, for, in his understanding, power without resistance fades. Foucault’s definition of power provides a theoretical platform for Mozambicans to examine and explain their own situation: why Tsonga, as a concept, took root among the southeastern people of Africa. Foucault’s understanding of power as being “everywhere and nowhere” not only indicates that Junod was not “all powerful” over the southeast African people but also that they had a share in the naming process.
There is a need in the historical course to recognize the involvement of the Gwambas and the Romande missionaries in the process of bringing into being the Tsonga. This argument informs the premise of the chapter: that the Tsonga emerged at the encounter between two refugee groups. To believe that the Tsonga were created and to believe that such things happened simply as a necessity of the imagination is to be disingenuous. The relationship between the Tsonga and Junod is, to varying degrees, a relationship of power, of domination. Illustrations in Junod’s work abound but let us just focus on the notion of describing the people of southeast African in *The Life of a South African Tribe*. Such an act presupposes dominium over the subjects. This is a dominium exerted, not by force in a brutal way, nor even necessarily by active persuasion, but by what has been called “hegemonía”, a kind of “dominion by consent.” This kind of dominium is usually wielded by more subtle and inclusive power over education policies and ethical conduct by which, the ruling class’s interest is presented as the common interest and thus comes to be taken for granted (Gramsci 1971). Dominium by consent is achieved by *interpellation* that is, calling people up as subjects, in an Althusserian way, to describe a function of colonial ideology (Dowling 1984: 37). The ideological state apparatuses such as the Church and education programs perpetuate ideology like the police *interpellate* subjects. This is a typical example of Rousseau’s legitimating civil religious performance in the collective identity production process, a matter to be addressed in the fourth chapter.

The Tsonga was not only a one-sided initiative. First, they are Tsonga because they could be; that is, they acquiesced to being made Tsonga. It is important also to note that Tsonga is not some out-of-nowhere creation of a European and missionary man. It is a created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment. Tsonga, therefore, is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions, neither is it a considerably large and diffuse collection of texts about a Bantu subgroup living in the southeastern part of Africa, nor is it representative and expressive of some heinous “Westerner” imperialist plot to hold down the southeast African world. It is, rather, a multidimensional and multilayered attitude launched toward the other in process of making sense of the strange world, or what Said defines as a “distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts” (1978: 12). Tsonga identity, therefore, implies an understanding of a certain will to know, and in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different world.
Tsonga identity is, above all, a discourse that is, by no means, in a direct corresponding relationship with political power. Rather, it is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange of power political (having to do with colonial or imperial establishments), power intellectual (allied to reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy), power cultural (associated with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), and power moral, as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do.

At the end Tsonga identity had profound impact for both the objects and the subjects. It facilitated the mapping and domination of the region by the colonial powers, but it also facilitated the patriotic recovery of the Gwamba groups from desolate refugee conditions. It gathered their strength toward formation of one imaginary group identity, a unit. While the Tsonga identity is attributed to the Romande Mission work, Henry-Alexander Junod was the man who dedicated most of his energy in canonizing the Tsonga as a modern phenomenon. The following section focuses on Junod’s modern influences.

2.3 Junod’s Scientific Influences

Junod was the product of an age obsessed by theories of causation and origins. He was a member of an intellectual class whose economic triumphs were deeply Cartesian and Positivist in orientation, and rooted in logic and rationalist beliefs. Evolutionism was a popular theory readily used for the mapping of the “new world”. This, then popular, European approach helped develop the Tsonga as a tribal identity, an organic unit with a physical presence and soul, a life of its own and a capacity to reproduce itself. This section, therefore, probes how evolutionism helped strengthen Junod’s argument for the Tsonga identity creation.

Junod’s approach to his southeast African subjects was first and greatly influenced by the work of Johann Jacob Bachofen (1815-1887), a Swiss anthropologist and sociologist whose highly considered work, Das Mutterrecht, published in 1861, is often connected with his research into the matriarchal clans around which primates evolved into hominids (1967). Bachofen believed the significance of the mother’s brother to be a remnant or vestige of an earlier, matriarchal phase in the development of the family in some societies. From such belief he advanced the argument that, simply put, motherhood was the source of human society (Ibid: 23). His Das Mutterrecht was particularly concerned with explaining the role of a family member such as the mother’s brother.
Bachofen’s studies led Junod to believe that an investigation of the structure of modern social institutions and practices could be pushed further back through time by the study of primitive cultures in Africa, just like Bachofen, who took a serious and pioneering interest in the customs of the people of Europe. Although still very young, Junod took Bachofen’s ideas to heart and these later became very influential in his anthropological development, particularly on the importance of studying the indigenous people of southeast Africa.

In addition to his attraction to Bachofen’s work, during his stay in Berlin, Junod developed an interest in Kant’s short but influential essay on the Enlightenment, and in natural history and social geography as practiced by Karl Ritter’s disciples (Junod 1968). Franz Boas also moved in these intellectual circles (Kuper 1999; Stocking 1982). The Junod that arrived in Rikatla, a location about 34 km north of Maputo, was thus influenced by Europe’s popular cultural experience, particularly in the fields of theology, missiology, a general understanding of social sciences and the fast growing discipline of anthropology. Within this new field of studies, Junod preferred the direct observation method, which entailed concentrating on one group of people (Junod 1968). This focus provided anthropology with an alternative methodology to that used by seasoned travelers, which depended on hearsay, or a brief encounter with the subject of study (Ibid. 334). It also presented a gentle, though implicit, assessment of the stress on theory as developed by armchair experts in the metropolis.

Junod’s early monograph, *Les Ba-Ronga* (1898), displayed the influence of a long sociological tradition in France, for it treated the *Ba-Ronga*, the indigenous people of the region, as a biological organism made up of various functioning parts. This approach appealed to the editors of *L’Annee Sociologique*, a new journal largely devoted to analyzing field studies from various parts of the world. However, Durkheim’s review of Junod’s lengthy piece also criticized his ignorance of comparative ethnography, which caused the missionary to “pay too much attention to detail and not enough to explanation” (1898: 370). In a separate review, Marcel Mauss welcomed Junod’s monograph, but thought the *Ba-Ronga* of little interest, as “they did not display the elementary forms of social life, for they were too caught up in the forces of change” (1898: 220). Meanwhile, in London the work acquired a more appreciative reception from Sir James Bryce, who had become a parliamentary expert on the subcontinent after the publication of his *Impressions of South Africa* (1897). In a sharp contrast to Mauss, who saw only remnants of primal
life in Junod’s account of the *Ba-Ronga*, Bryce valued the book for its record of a “savage” people whose primitive customs were threatened with extinction (Bryce 1897: 4).

For Junod the biological and theological sciences were organically tied, he reminded his superiors of this detail, as he wrote that “nature is the work of God and that it merits attention and calls for study” (1927a: 9). The glorification of God through the examination of his handiwork was only one of the reasons for Junod’s interest in the natural sciences. By ordering the world of plants and animals, Junod seemed to bring an element of domestication to the amorphous and chaotic world that surrounded the mission. He used a scientific method in his entomological and botanical studies, which later he applied to the study of humans. He was thus able to explain the local environment in terms of a system of understanding that he later came to qualify as universal.

At this stage of Junod’s mission he began to understand that the “indigenous” were excellent observers and collectors of data. He admitted that though the “natives” might have their own ideas about classification, they “might” nevertheless contribute in a way to “scientific” knowledge (Junod 1898: 58). Despite this, it was his belief that they “were unaware of the true system underlying the organization and understanding of nature” (Ibid.). Junod, therefore, did not hesitate to apply his scientific method of analysis, which he considered it to be the true system and which, as this thesis suggests, helped create for the indigenous a new tribal identity. The use of the same scientific method of analysis for both insects and humans, yielded useful results for Junod; the creation of a tribal Tsonga identity is one of them. The tribal identity granted, unconsciously perhaps, more power to the colonial administration in the process of seizing not only the land but also his objects of research, the people he called Tsonga. On his arrival, Junod, the missionary and anthropologist, brought with him the power, not only from God, bestowed to the Church in Switzerland through the Romande Mission, but also the authority bestowed upon him by the Enlightenment of modern Europe. He was both a sign and symbol of a cultural model of Europe.

Preserving a dying culture, for Junod, meant keeping a description of the old values on paper in a way that provided Europeans with a picture of their own early beginnings. This meant that, in order to preserve African cultures that were in danger of extinction, there was a need to go back in history to an early European past. In other words, his aim was finding Europe’s “self” in the “other” contemporary southeastern African culture and people. Africa is used by the West to define and establish its own superiority as a “civilized” culture against the “darkness” of a “primitive Africa (Achebe 1978: 9). The South African historian Patrick Harries assertion that men
like Junod and Liengme, his missionary colleague, the primitive simplicity of Africa brought relief to the corruption of a society caught up in the materialism and greed of an industrial age (2007), could have grounds.

Junod’s vision of southeast Africa reflected what plagued his own Swiss Vaud society and Switzerland in general, which seemed to suffer deep anxieties about the precariousness of its civilization and to have a need for constant reassurance by comparing itself with Africa. If Europe, advancing in civilization, could cast a backward glance periodically at Africa, trapped in primordial barbarity, it could say “There go I, but for the grace of God”, with faith and feeling. To extend Achebe’s analogy, the Tsonga is to Junod as the picture is to Dorian Gray: a carrier, onto whom the master unloads his physical and moral deformities so that he may go forward, erect and immaculate (Achebe 1978: 3).

When Junod arrived in Africa he thought the condition of the people he met there had remained unchanged “for centuries, perhaps for tens of centuries”, and found their civilization to be “of an extremely ancient date” (1927b: 147). By confusing differences between culture and time, he was able to compare the archaeological remnants of Stone Age communities on the banks of Swiss lakes with those of “the blacks in present-day South Africa” (Junod 1927a: 1, 151). For the time in which he was writing, this was not an odd speculation. Contemporary drawing of Dorei in “primitive” New Guinea strongly influenced the reconstruction of the first Stone Age lacustrian village discovered at Obermeilen, near Zurich in 1853-54 (Oechsli 1922). This led Junod to value African societies for the glimpse they gave of the world Europeans had lost. “When we turn to these primitives to decipher their conception of life and the world, our own ancient history surges up before our eyes”, he wrote in 1898. “These societies explain certain problems afflict our civilized souls, which are merely grownup versions of their primitive ones, we become more conscious of ourselves and of the mysteries of our evolution” (Ibid. 8). Junod reiterated this opinion twelve years later, when he ascribed “the great interest in the study of these primitives,” to the fact that “they help us to understand ourselves” (Junod 1910: 616).

Africa was a living museum in which to study the evolution of language at first hand. It was possible to see how words were invented, adopted and changed in a continent where languages had not yet been codified by writing. “Directly observing the evolution and growth of oral linguistic forms in Africa,” Junod wrote, “can do much to explain the origin of language” (Junod 1927b: 166). Accordingly, looking at ‘primitive’ cultures enabled Europeans to recover a picture
of their true, unexpurgated selves. Europeans drew different messages from their reading of the “Dark Continent”, but most agreed that Africa was a place of fear where, without the trammels of civilization, disquieting and deeply repressed instincts could surge to the surface. For many Swiss people “European civilization was stale, moribund and weighed down by customs and tradition” (Javelle 1886). Europe was burdened by dissension and doubt caused by wars of religion, dry rationality, cold logic, and sterile materialism, and “a civilization built on the moral leadership of the Church had been fatally undermined by the rise of the secular state” (Petry 1981). The result was to be seen everywhere in the morally ravaged and alcohol-dependent population of Neuchâtel.

Some of Junod’s most learned missionary colleagues were of the opinion that his studies came a bit late. They thought that European colonialism had already invaded and irredeemably altered most of African lifestyle. For instance, Arthur Grandjean thought the “real Africans” lived in the interior (Grandjean 1892: 78). For him, those on the coast were too influenced by European civilization, as he wrote, “natives of the south have been bastardized and demoralized by influence of an unhealthy civilization, whereas those of the north, further removed from the seaport, have been more sheltered from the deleterious influences that have gradually annihilated their brothers” (Ibid.). The missionary Georges Liengme, who lived with Ngungunhane, the Nguni monarch, for a period in Manjakaze, was particularly lyrical about the people he found at Antioka in the interior, as he reported to have fallen in love with the country in 1891, because “it is the real Africa, with its rich nature, its immense plains, and its far-off horizons, lit morning and evening by a fiery sun” (Liengme 1901: 99). He thought of it as being a place where the natives, like the natural landscape, were real Africans. For him “they had not been bastardized by contact with the white civilized world” (Ibid.).

The term “savage” has performed an important service in Eurocentric epistemologies and imperial/colonial ideologies. The history of Tsonganism, as part of the savage dictionary, has both an internal consistency and a highly articulated set of relationships to the dominant culture surrounding it. As Torgovnik notes, terms like “primitive, savage, pre-colonial, tribal, third world, undeveloped, developing, armchair, traditional, exotic, the anthropological record, non-Western and Other… all take the West as norm and define the rest as inferior, different, deviant, subordinate, and sub-ordinate able” (1990: 12). The savage Tsonga or the tribal identity Tsonga responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West.
In the modern world, the West’s construction of itself may be regarded as being dependent on the savage/civilized dichotomy in a more complex way. As Torgovnik (speaking from a Western perspective) puts it, our sense of the savage impinges on our sense of ourselves, and it is bound up with the selves who act in the ‘real’ political world (1990: 21). A striking point in all of these representations is the fact that it did not matter whether Junod’s construction was correct. What really mattered was its strength as a metaphor for the hierarchised relationship between Europe and its others. Junod could go unchecked before the world about his creation, and the dissemination and canonization, regardless of his being correct or not. Here lies a serious matter for consideration. It indicates that the uttering of a name is a powerful act in itself, as explained by Austin in his argument in respect to linguistic performance (Austin 1977). An alternative notion is that of Achebe who views it as a psychological problem, one in which Europe needs to pass onto Africa its own issues to know itself better (Achebe 1978). Tsonga borrowed from, and was frequently informed by, strong ideas, doctrines and acknowledged trends of the dominant culture. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution greatly influenced Junod’s thinking throughout his anthropological enterprise in southeast Africa. Initially he used Darwinian ideas to explain his entomological work. A more concerted evolutionist approach, however, was applied to his anthropological material after the publication of the *Les Ba-Ronga* monograph. Influenced by E. S. Hartland, Junod sought to explain many of his observations, particularly in the field of kinship, by searching for the origins of institutions and practices and by tracing their evolution over time.

Junod’s interest in the origins of polygamy also had practical consequences. He speculated that it could have emerged under slavery, or when the Tsonga were engaged in warfare. As practiced, polygamy could also be read as a remnant of the “old system of group marriage” when men and women formed polygamous and polyandrous unions (Junod: 1927a: 283). Evolutionism led Junod to re-evaluate the religious beliefs and practices of the Tsonga. In 1898, he stated categorically that “the Gwamba” people worshipped their male ancestors, had no idea of “a unique and supreme God” and that their religion had most probably experienced a form of degeneration (Junod 1898: 403; Rivers 1920: 71). As he read the work of the evolutionists and anthropologists, he came to realize the importance of a good understanding of local culture. In the process of spreading the gospel, he broadened his concept of religion and started to discern a system in the way the Tsonga related to the spiritual world. Elias Spoon Libombo, one of his key informants, helped Junod to see many of the “superstitions” of the Tsonga as legitimate manifestations of a
religious belief that, in the end, was advancing slowly towards the same objective as Christianity (Junod 1927b: 337).

Junod aimed at a strictly scientific method for his anthropological study, as he makes clear when he asserts his aim, through the collection of the material, is to be twofold, namely, “scientific” and “practical.” Forcefully, he argued, “an ethnic group was a collection of biological phenomena, which must be described objectively and which are of great interest, representing, as they do, a certain stage of human development” (1927a: 7). To his credit, this approach became his contribution to the field of anthropology; pioneering a method that consisted of concentrating on the minute details of the life of a single people (Junod 1968). As noted above, Junod built his anthropology on the methodology employed in his entomological and botanical studies. He carried into his ethnographic writing the impersonal, authoritative style of the scientist, which played in his favor as well as against him, by making him seem distanced and abstracted from his subjects. He was self-conscious at times of his double personality and he attempted to address the contradiction between the humane missionary and the detached scientist. In this regard, Harries suggests, the compassionate, romantic and objective scholar, Junod, took the subjective commentaries scattered throughout Le Ba-Ronga and placed them in passages “carefully separated from the scientific treatise” (Harries 2007).

While reading Junod’s oeuvre, particularly in an attempt to understand his so-called “scientific’ method, one gets a sense that either he had a deeply conflicted personality or that he was acting out a double role. Junod was a deeply ambiguous modern person. How else can one explain that, on the one hand, he refers to the Tsonga people as a collection of biological phenomena, standing for a certain stage of human evolution, and on the other, that “an African tribe is not just an object of study like the birds, animals or insects displayed in the windows of our museums and dissected by diligent scientists” (Junod 1898: 481). Junod used the detached, cold, scientific approach to study his subjects, both insects and people. Against all the evidence to the contrary, he went on to create a tribal identity, which he called Tsonga, arguing that language is the key-uniting element of the tribe.

The section argued that Junod used Evolutionist, Positivist and Cartesian notions to forge a strong tribal identity in the southeast Africa. The rationale was that these Gwamba primitive refugees needed a strong collective definition in order to survive the looming avalanche of modernity. Junod used these European traditions to carve the Tsonga. The travail of creating the
Tsonga tribal identity, which involves the expropriation of traditions and symbols, and the creation of sacred spaces and sacrificial rituals, implied the production of civil religious system, with the ultimate goal of legitimating the emerging collective identity. Language was another key element in the production of the Tsonga tribal identity. The following section probes into how the Junod explored language in his identity creation enterprise.

2.4 The Role of Language in Creating the Tsonga

The last section expounded evolutionism as having been crucial in defining the Tsonga tribal identity; the current section demonstrate how language was a decisive factor in establishment the Tsonga identity to the local people. The section’s proposition is that the establishment of *BaRonga* as a lingua franca became the corollary feat toward the institution of the Tsonga tribal identity. *The Life of a South African Tribe* is a work abounding with illustrations in this regard. Although his initial thoughts were on evangelical work at Rikatla, his deep interest in entomology and botany, and the necessary task of understanding the local language there led him to the transcription of *Grammaire Ronga* (1896). However, Harries reveals that the urgent and important task of mastering the *BaRonga* language made him acquainted with the local peoples (1981), and thus his focus shifted from natural history to linguistics and oral literature and, finally, to the primitive people’s way of doing things (Ibid.).

When writing to Phillippe Godet in June 1893, Junod mentioned that the *Ba-Ronga* (the *Ronga* speakers) customs were “overflowing with the picturesque” and later was to comment favorably on the singing of the Africans (Junod 1898; 1927b: 282; Mauss 1898, 1899; Durkheim 1898). With his *Elementary Ronga Grammar* near completion, Junod began preparing a new and long ethnographic article, published as *Le Ba-Ronga* in 1898 by the Bulletin of the Geographical Society of Neuchâtel, Volume X (Junod 1898). This 500-page work stood out in two specific ways. Firstly, it extolled the role of direct observation; and secondly, it stressed the need to offer the autochthonous views by means of an understanding of their language. Junod believed that language constituted a natural form of ethnic taxonomy that grouped together (even) those who, because they were unaware of their membership of a common linguistic community, had no shared name for themselves as a group. He defined the Tsonga as a *Kuturvolk* marked by tribal practices and beliefs that depended on language for its coherence and unity. In his words, “the *Ronga* language ought to be considered as the oldest element in the life of the tribe, and we can then
understand how it has given it its unity" (Junod 1927a: 32). Accordingly, this made language and culture far stronger markers of identity than political unity, common historical experience or, especially, physical type (Junod 1927b). His understanding of the role of language in culture was influenced not only by his use of Darwinian notions of evolution but also by Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt who held that a common language imbued a “nation” with “Soul” (Junod 1927a: 33; 1927b: 153). It is clear here that what Junod wanted was to establish a nation. His work on language, ethnology, education and evangelical programs were only means by which to reach one end: the Tsonga nation.

Nonetheless, his view of the tribe as a primordial unit of identity and belonging was challenged early on by his own colleagues. One of these was Henri Berthoud, who opposed Junod’s approach to language. Berthoud saw no primordial connection between language and identity (1896). A native of the Francophone Canton of Vaud, Berthoud’s understanding of how a nation is made may have been influenced by Ernest Renan who argued that the nation was less the natural product of a common language than a voluntary act, “an everyday plebiscite” through which people articulated their desire to form a nation (Ibid. 2). From this perspective, people constructed their language in much the same way that they constructed their history and invented the tradition on which they based their identity. This led Berthoud to stress that people were at liberty to choose and change both the language they spoke and the group to which they belonged. Despite his insistence on one lingua franca for the Tsonga tribe, Junod was aware of variations in the cultural practices of the people he classified as the Tsongas. He saw the Nkomati River, in particular, as the border dividing the Ronga (the subject of his 1898 monograph) from the northern clans. He supported this geographical division between the language groups with biological data, as he traced the Ronga origins to “Likalahumba and Nsilambowa, the northern clans that regarded Gwamba and Dzabana as their founding ancestors” (Junod 1927b: 302, 348-50).

In spite of his initial unease Henri Berthoud had already asserted, without hesitation that “among many names that they are known of they will scientifically be known as the Tsongas” (Berthoud 1896: 38). The rationale being that the term Tsonga has the advantage of being tribal, uniting the nation. In his view the epithet Tsonga had the potential of congregating many small differences into one tribe under the same conqueror and leadership (Ibid.). Despite the linguistic and cultural differences among the so-called Tsongas, Junod portrayed them as an organic unit whose customs and level of culture were increasingly defined through comparison with other
societies. Our argument however, is that the term Tsonga, by itself, is a meaningless epiphenomenon if taken outside of an integrated, large and multifaceted context: Christianity-secularization, national Church or Free Church, Protestantism-Catholicism, and Portuguese-Swiss. At the linguistic level, the Romande-Tsonga paradigm is preceded by Portuguese-Landim and Zulu-Thonga paradigms. Some languages sharing the same Bantu root also have a few common words, which retain the same meaning. For instance, “ngoma” means “a drum” in most southern African languages. Yet, if examined carefully, these languages have grown widely apart in their principal linguistic characteristics. This was no less the case in nineteenth-century southeast Mozambique and in parts of northeast South Africa where the language of those called Gwamba was predominant. According to Harries Gwamba is the early name for those Junod called Tsonga (1981). The Romande agents did not realize that there is no language equal to any other, on the contrary, differences often found in languages used in a seemingly homogenous community. This testifies to the notion that no discourse is homogenous even in a tightly closed community (Benveniste 1971). Therefore, the current thesis employs the Saussurean notion of language as being the system of communication within a speech community (Saussure 2006).

The fact that Gwamba could be compared to some South African languages initially misled Berthoud and Creux, earlier agents of the Free Church of Vaud Mission (which later became the Romande Mission), into thinking that the whole region spoke almost the same language, and to generalize that Gwambas, MoSothos, Zulus, AmaPondos and others are the same people (Berthoud 1875). It did not take them long to notice their mistake and to realize they had much work ahead of them. Berthoud and Creux believed that their success in understanding the Gwamba people’s language was urgent and important. Their survival as Free Swiss commissaries depended on their skills in learning the local language and its linguistic system. This meant that a start had to be made in translating Gwamba. As it turned out, this was not an easy task. Berthoud himself was overwhelmed by the difference between Gwamba and Sotho. In a report letter to his Mission Council, he revealed that he had gotten help from his “Makoapa” domestics and Eliakim Matlanyane in translating the Lord’s Prayer and the first few of a series of hymns (Berthoud 1900). In his 20 July, 1876 correspondence to the Council, Berthoud says that he came to the realization that “koapa” was a Sotho term applied to the immigrants arriving from the east. He decided to find out from the people themselves their real name. He concludes by writing that” the more authentic term for the people and their language was Gwamba” (Ibid: 246).
The Gwamba language (SiGwamba), in the written form, proved particularly hard for Berthoud, as he noted in his letter of 14 March, 1878 to the Council, where he says that SiGwamba is neither Cafre nor Setchwana, it is a cousin, perhaps a brother, of Zulu. He even suggested, in the same letter, that the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society’s South Sotho should be replaced as the basic reference of ShiGwamba by the IsiZulu, which had been drawn up by the missionaries of the American Board in Natal. Moreover, the translation of the Bible into Ronga brought structural misrepresentation concerning content and interpretation of the language. Thus, frequently meanings of terms were translated word by word.

Due to the sub-position of meanings and pre-suppositions imposed by the missionaries’ cultural backgrounds, word-by-word translation also carried evangelical meanings. Often these meanings corresponded to an entirely different cultural setting. Thus, meanings were imposed on Ronga language. African words/terms that were translated acquired new meanings and a semiotic sense was fabricated or brought from the Swiss Protestant experience, i.e. a Gwamba term acquired Biblical connotations and meanings after translation (in sermons and homilies Gwambas refugees were referred to as the “Israeli” exiles of southeast Africa). Obviously then, translations would be strongly influenced by the background of the translators. The Gwamba (later called Tsonga) language connotations are steeped in the symbolic vision and culture of the Occident. The so-called Tsonga finds himself saying about himself in his own language that he is black. Meanwhile, he finds everything black sinful, bad, lacking purification. The Ronga as language was turned against its purported proprietor. In this regard Ngoenha argues that an explanation of such ironic behavior may be found at the “auto negation brought by the Tsonganidade and by how this new language described natives of Delagoa Bay and its hinterland” (2000: 151).

Missionaries did more than cause the adulteration of Ronga by injecting Western connotations and meanings into the language. This adulteration was a partial step toward a bolder act, which was to erase the name Gwamba and replace it with Tsonga, the term by which their subjects were now labeled. The Ronga became not only the name used for the locally known language but the scientific term by which the Mission Romande’s subjects became known. This is because records show that Ronga became the standard teaching language used in local elementary schools (Butselaar 1987). Ronga became, thus, the reference language by which to identify the tribe. From then on Ronga belonged no longer to the world of dialects.
With a grammatical structure open to receive new meanings and interpretations, Ronga thus graduates from being a dialect to a class of languages. In this Ngoenha reveals that with the upgrade Ronga acquires new connotative values that it never had before, as it metamorphoses into a written language: The linguistic community divides itself into two blocks: those belonging to the written Ronga and those to the oral tradition (2000). This division between the Tsongas who can write their language and those who cannot is at the heart of some turbulence within the Tsonga nation, matters that are beside the point of the current study. Yet, in all of the details of the emergence of Ronga as a written language values change. At the level of identity, writing inevitably introduced a new cultural dynamic. Rather than talking about Tsonga as an identity, the Tsonga speakers also acquired a new identity as soon as the Portuguese colonial system introduced a new school policy for the inhabitants of the region. On this regard Harries informs that the writing of Ronga made it easy for the locals to understand master the written and spoken Portuguese language, achieved good writing skills, therefore becoming easily assimilados to Lusitanidade (1981). Language, after all, is the base on which creativity happens. The Saussurian parole sense of language, the actual linguistic behavior, i.e. what the language users do with it, describes the situation perfectly, as does Chomsky’s term performance (Chomsky 2006: 28), which also deals with how individuals specifically make use of language. For Saussure, parole conveys one of the principal senses of the word language, the others being langage, the general faculty of language, and langue, which specifies the abstract code to which all users of a particular language have access. Parole specifies their linguistic behavior, i.e. what they do with language. This parole indicates the specific products of those processes.

For the purposes of this section of the thesis, Saussure’s use of the term parole is used to interpret the results of the Tsonga identity creation. This was the genesis of the Mission Romande’s Ronga language as a connected series of utterances or discourse. A tradition came into being as a manufactured combination of concerns, concepts, themes and statements within a text in Foucault’s sense (Foucault 1972: 79). This is because discourse cannot be disassociated from language for discourse is language as far as it can be interpreted with reference to the speaker, to his or her spatio-temporal location, or to other such variables that serve to specify the localized context of utterance (Benveniste 1971). Missionaries learned the Tsonga linguistic code in order to Christianize it or inject into it the Biblical discourse. Junod and his colleagues went to the
Tsonga ‘field school’ to learn its structure to consider it their own at the end. It must be asked how well schooled in Ronga these missionaries were.

If language is what users do with words, then perhaps it is important to investigate what has been done with Ronga during the process of translation. For instance, the question of a God who is a “Creator, not created”, as related in the Buku (early translation of Old Testament books and passages into Ronga) by A. Berthoud, raises not only metaphysical but linguistic issues. The name reflects how Berthoud, Creux and Junod were creative. They had to be artistic when a literal translation was not a possibility, specifically by injecting foreign and unknown meanings into Ronga words. For example: the word triuno or tri-in-one—the notion that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are one—is meaningless, a useless word when applied outside its Biblical context.

It is noticeable that the Western Christianity failed to penetrate the Ronga language, despite the overwhelming power of its philosophies and culture. Many words gained new meanings, with some of them ending up having more than one meaning. This means, then, that there has been language acculturation but not meaning acculturation. Certainly, Ronga words gained new meanings and some of these metamorphosed into other meanings just as languages do in their organic way of being.

The partnership between the people labeled Tsonga, Junod and his Romande colleagues manufactured a heterogeneous cultural language that marked a profound paradigmatic linguistic shift throughout the region. The language shift deeply influenced the core of socio-economic events unfolding in the wider region. According to Ngoenha some of these included the Portuguese colonial consolidation in the region, subsequent to the total defeat and eventual deportation of Ngungunhane from Mandlakaze, and by the first Anglo-Boer War in the north of what is today South Africa (2000). Linguistically, all of these events meant that a new Portuguese vocabulary and grammar was taught in local primary schools in the region; the South African mine workers’ vocabulary was brought from the Rand by Mozambicans at work on the Rand, and the Ronga vocabulary widened its reach through church classes, Sunday School Bible studies, and vigorous church youth programs (Butselaar 1987). Despite being aware of the different languages being taught at the same time, the Romande agents felt called to evangelize amongst the people using their newly created Ronga language (Junod 1927b). They felt that it was their duty to eradicate paganism from the Ronga language and inspire it with a positive Christian spirit.
Being that the word Gwamba has its roots in some Zulu sound shifts, which later became Tsonga, one realizes that, in the case of both Gwamba and Tsonga, they were free-floating sounds, captured randomly and used to label a group of people. The “turning words into things”, i.e. turning Gwamba into Tsonga, indicates an apparent mindlessness on the part of agents as they cared little, and “disregarded the fact that, the subjects had their own names” (Monnier 1995: 16). Linguists argue that there cannot be thought without language, and therefore, our knowledge of the world is determined by the expression we give to it. Language re-creates the world by organizing it in an intelligible language structure (Benveniste 1971; Saussure 2006; Chomsky 2006). What comes to mind is the concept of Logos, which, as the Greeks defined it, is also discourse and reason. Humans always sensed and felt and poets described feelings through song and word, etc… poets sang the language's creative powers. These powers can create imaginary realities and animate lifeless things. In Benvenistes’ assertion, “words can make you see that which is not yet there, and bring to the present that which is in the past” (1971: 25). Accordingly, the power of language resides in its capacity to use symbolism. It is in conceptual functions that a world can be conceived and molded according to the creator, whereas thought is not only a reflection of the world, but also categorizes reality (Ibid. 27).

Discourse emerges as a key socialization agent, the carrier of particular cultural representations such as values, myths, beliefs and knowledge. Language embodies, more importantly, the society’s constitutive dimension where values are located and collective practices are founded. What Junod does with his Life of a South African Tribe is not just to acknowledge that Gwambas are there, but that, actually, they are acting toward an identity. He did not even hesitate to say, for that matter, that “missionary stations harbored the real Tsongas, those genuine Tsongas kept away from city contamination; from [the] degradation of the world of alcohol and superstitious Tsonga and Nguni counter values” (1927a: 557). The establishment of Ronga as the Tsonga national lingua franca is also one of many experiences the founder of FRELIMO learned and implemented it when executing his nationalist project. Like Junod, Mondlane established one national language that served as a linking to the various other tribes composing the nation.

The second chapter has addressed the matters of the power behind the concept Tsonga; a power exerted through programs such as the canonization of a tribal lingua franca, education programs and the formation of Tsonga mntlawa (youth groups). Despite disputes and controversy surrounding the its creation, the Tsonga as a concept took root and became canonical for the
southeast African nation was known, both in and outside of academic circles. Like some Mozambicanists (Harries, Monnier and Ngoenha), the current study finds Junod’s linguistic treatment arrogant and hegemonic. If Junod had not coerced the Gwamba groups as he did, however, there may not have been a Tsonga nation.

The origins of FRELIMO and its Moçambicanidade, a complex nationalistic phenomenon with civil religious dimensions, can be traced back to Junod’s Tsonga tribal identity by analyzing their strategies of national identity establishment: expropriation of traditions, recycling of symbols and signs, the adoption of a national lingua franca. The Romande Mission’s will to re-create itself in Delagoa Bay was pervasive, overwhelming local epistemologies into subjection. Seventy years after the Klipfontein Farm treaty that brought the Tsonga tribal identity and an intellectual tradition, perhaps unintentionally, its experience influenced the formation of a more autochthonous revolutionary nationalism with far reaching consequences in Mozambique. The following chapter examines the civil religious features of Junod’s Tsonga. These civil religious dynamics provided both an historical genealogy and structural template for Moçambicanidade.
CHAPTER THREE
CIVIL RELIGION AND THE TSONGA

The last chapter examined how the Romande Mission and Junod’s work in particular, created the Tsonga as a tribal identity. Once established, the Tsonga tribal state generated a belief system that helped consolidate state power. This belief system also conditioned a consensus and legitimized the cultural, religious and legal systems of the emerging authorities. Produced by the state, the belief (or civil religion) system shaped the self-identity of Tsonga as a collectivity. By examining Junod’s narrative on (1) the rites of passage, (2) of sacrifice, (3) the tradition and (4) the sacred spaces of the Tsonga, the chapter shows that the Tsonga tribe exists due to a successful generation and consolidation of a civil religious system. That is, that along with the multiple rites, instrumental civil religion was at the heart of the Tsonga tribal identity construction.

Junod’s detailed narrative on the Tsonga religious performance suggests the existence of a belief system generating a self-identity of the Tsonga as a nation. The first section illustrates the civil religious nature of two stories. The second section examines how the Tsonga nation’s rites of sacrifice not only represented civil religious performance but also helped produce the collectivity’s self-image. The relationship between civil religion and tradition in the making of meaning is the subject of the third section. The section advances that through repetition, rites create myths or tradition; one of the traditions being the civil religion, which relies also on ritual repetition to generate and legitimize tradition. The fourth and last section of chapter five examines Junod’s narrative on the Tsonga religious sacred spaces. It argues that the Tsonga sacred spaces were sites for civil religious performances.

3.1 Tsonga Rites of Passage

The Tsonga identity construction, like any other tradition, required effort in creating a cohesive collection of narratives. This section examines two traditional religious ceremonies in a pool of many narratives, to identify the civil religious undercurrent, testifying thus, to the notion that narratives of the Tsonga rites of passage provided a platform for the construction of a sense of group identity or unity among the subjects. The inquiry is both on the content of the stories and on the context of the narrative itself.

What Junod describes is not a world outside himself or his experience. The Tsonga project is anchored in a paradigm that existed only as an outcome of Junod’s creative imagination. Thus,
narratives about the Tsonga rites and other cultural characters are an exercise in subject production, ultimately, an exercise of power over the subjects. How do narratives of the Tsonga rites of passage provide a platform for the construction of a sense of group identity? The formation of Tsonga tribal religion, its rites of sacrifice, the way they are performed and the objectives behind the work is an act of civil religion. The detailed narrative of how the Tsonga perform traditional religious ceremonies aims at presenting a belief system that ultimately produces the self-identity of the Tsonga as a nation.

Junod’s *Life of a South African Tribe* 1927b is dedicated to the mental life of the Tsonga; while half of the nearly 700 pages are on the subject of religion and of magic. In a painstaking 150 pages he tried to “bring to order” the matters of the Tsonga national religion, with some success. He begins by refuting the idea advanced by a nameless Portuguese imperial envoy, who after a long stay in Delagoa Bay, reported back to his officers that “the inhabitants are Hottentots, and have no religion” (1927b: 371). Junod was shocked by the envoy’s ignorance, because, in his own words, “anyone attentive would notice a whole range of ritual performances in the citizens’ gatherings” (Ibid.). Accordingly, the Tsonga tribe had a vibrant religious life; it believed in *Psikwembu* and *Tilo*. To be part of this religious order one had to undergo a ritual process, which allowed integration into the tribe. What theoretical tools did Junod use to “call to order” the religious life of the Tsonga tribe, in other words, what was his theoretical framework?

At the time of Junod’s research (or invention) on the Tsonga tribe a number of metropolitan anthropologists and social theorists were already establishing their disciplines. Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, E. B. Tylor, William Robertson Smith and Henri Hubert had already theorized about rites, religion, magic and other ethnographic themes. Some of them had even read his earlier *Le Baronga* and commented on it. Most comments, however, were not favorable. For instance, Durkheim was appreciative of the effort but critical of the results. Durkheim considered Junod’s monographs on Tsonga to be a wealth of descriptive detail about a savage tribe, but believed the author did not have the skills to explain those details. On this account, he dismissed Junod’s ethnographic work as being a “useless collection of folklore” (1898: 370). In a separate review, Mauss welcomed Junod’s monograph, but thought the *Ba-Ronga* of little interest, as “they did not display the elementary forms of social life, for they were too caught up in the forces of change” (1898: 220). Meanwhile, in London the work garnered a more appreciative reception from Sir James Bryce, who had become a parliamentary expert on the subcontinent after the publication of
his *Impressions of South Africa* (1897). In sharp contrast to Mauss, who saw only vestiges of primal life in Junod’s account of the *Ba-Ronga*, Bryce valued the book for its record of a “savage” people whose primitive customs were threatened by extinction (Bryce 1897: 4).

It was in this same period that Hubert and Mauss published their important work on sacrificial rituals, which disputed earlier theories on the subject, such as E. T. Tylor’s “gift theory”, or William Robertson Smith’s “communion theory.” Hubert and Mauss introduced a new theory of sacrifice as the dynamic mediation between the sacred and the profane. To sacrifice was to consecrate, to make sacred, to “set apart”, which entailed transforming the social status of the performers, the participants, the beneficiaries, and the sacrificial objects from the ordinary, profane realm of life (James & Allen 1998). According to Hubert and Mauss, sacrifice was not a bribe to the gods, an act of giving something of value to spiritual beings so they give in return, nor was sacrifice merely a shared meal with the gods, an occasion for participating in a communal meal by sharing the sacrificial victim. As a social process, sacrificial ritual mediated between ordinary, everyday life and the sacred, enabling participants to enter and exit the sacred realm, transformed, as the sacrificial victim was transformed by being destroyed in the ritual (Strensaki 2002).

While informed of all these new developments in sacrifice and ritual themes, Junod did not want to use any of them. This theoretical prejudice was perhaps understandable, considering the unsympathetic reviews he received from the “armchair” metropolitan leaders of the field. He turned therefore, to the work of Arnold Van Gennep for ritual theory: his *Les Rites de Passage* (1960) guided much of Junod’s analysis of life-cycle rituals of birth, adolescence, marriage and death in the Tsonga religion. Accordingly, rites of passage are associated with a change of status, whereby three stages can be identified: separation, segregation and integration. Among many rites, the circumcision ritual fulfills all three ritual stages and Junod, under Van Gennep’s ritual theory, considered circumcision a rite of passage par excellence (1927b: 405). He compares the Tsonga rite of passage to established Jewish religious circumcision or Christian baptism as they denote an entrance into a collectivity.

These two rites are especially important as they are performed following a particular liturgical calendar and have significant ethical and moral impact on the Tsonga nation. The first and clearly well classified rite is the boys’; the reader will notice that the rite described by Junod follows Van Gennep’s classification mentioned earlier. In order to keep the freshness of the story the text purposely kept close to the original.
The narrative starts with the *first separation* rite as the time of year arrives for the rite to take place. According to Junod (1927b: 405), the candidates from many clans gather in the capital, where the chief of the tribe oversees the academy, helped by the council of headmen (*tinduna*). The construction and logistical details of the lodge were taken care of by men under the supervision of the council of the headmen. The boys circumcised in the last four years must attend the school sessions as shepherds and as servants of the headmen and watchers over the candidates. Once the shepherds conclude building the lodge, the chief declares the academy open. The shepherds usually build the lodge outside the village, in a remote place, yet not too far way, because the women must bring food each day for the inmates. After having slept in the capital, the band of the uncircumcised must leave the village to the lodge in the wilderness, early in the morning when *Ngongomela* (the sun) rises in the east. This departure from the world of civilized into the wilderness marks the end of the first separation (1927b: 405).

The *second separation* follows the first (Junod 1927b: 406), as the uncircumcised boys march through the thickets of the bush to find on the road a fire made of strongly scented wood. The headmen instruct the boys to smell the smoke and jump over it. This rite Junod defines as ‘Tlula ritsa,’ or the rite of jumping a firebrand. Later on, still at some distance from the newly built lodge, they hear a loud noise, a song accompanied by the beating of drums and blowing of antelope horns. The headmen instruct the boys not to try to understand the meaning of the words sung by the hosts of shepherds and the men, as it would frighten them too much. The marching boys are halted in the middle of the songs and loud talks. Eight of them are chosen and told to go forward. Each one is given an assegai, and they are pushed between the singers, who hold sticks and stand facing each other in two rows, leaving a passage between them.

The headmen shout the boys to go through the passage where they receive a good whipping. The flagellation, Junod explains, is also understood as part of the separation rite. Having gone through the unexpected experience, the boys are caught at the other end by four men and deprived of all their clothing. Their hair is also cut and they are brought to eight stones and seated on them. The idea behind the whipping, the cutting of hair and clothes, Junod explains, symbolizes the separation, the cutting themselves off from the past. The eight stones are not far from the entrance of the yard, in a spot called ‘the place of crocodile.’ Opposite them are eight other stones on which eight men are sitting. These men are called *Nyahambe*, the Lionmen. With the heads covered in lion’s manes the men land a fearful appearance. As soon as a boy is seated on a stone facing a
Nyahambe, he received a severe blow from behind and when he turns his head to see who struck him, he sees one of the shepherds laughing at him.

While the Nyahambe and the headmen divert the boys, the surgeon takes the opportunity to seize the foreskin of the boys’ penis and cut it in two movements, first the upper part, secondly the lower part and the string. The first part is quicker but the second takes a while to finish, hence the last is more painful operation. The circumcised receive rings woven from a very soft grass, which they put on their wounds, tying them round the loins with a string. The chief consider the boys to have achieved the objective of the rite of passage as they are now circumcised, which means that they crossed over the old ways into adulthood. One back in the lodge the boys are introduced into the manners of the place. Junod highlights that the removal of the foreskin is distinctly a separation rite, because the part of the body cut represent the ancient contemptible childish life from where the initiated emerge (Ibid. 406).

A typical aggregation rite follows the two separation rites; it is also named ‘kunga’ or the breaking of the silence in the long men’s circumcision ritual that Junod described (1927b: 407). It is the happiest in the whole circumcision ritual; this rite of passage ends with the chameleon procession. It leads into the nation’s capital, the home of the chief, who takes place on the day of the closing of the sungi and on the one that follows it. Junod writes that the boys start this part covered with ochre, marching on mats spread on the ground to avoid them touching the dust with their feet, they advance slowly, bowed to the ground, stretching out one leg at the time, with a sudden brisk motion that resembles the gait of the chameleon, understood by the tribe as the wise and prudent animal. The message conveyed to the tribe is that the circumcised are men who think, no longer boys without intelligence. They arrive and sit silently at the entrance of the center square, with their heads still bent.

From different villages and clans, sisters and mothers of the boys must approach to recognize their children. Each woman brings with her a bracelet or a shilling or another small present and searches for her boy on the queue. When she thinks she has found him, she kisses him on the cheek and gives him the present. The boys carry two sticks in their hands. The first stick bears short lateral branches on which, the boys will hang the bracelet. The other is smaller and when the mother has discovered her son and has kissed him, he strikes her, a soft blow if it is his mother or grandmother, a much harder one if it is his sister, and utters the new name that he has chosen. In answer to this demonstration, the mother begins to dance and to sing the praises of her
son. The chameleon procession is performed in the villages of the main headmen of the tribe during the following few days until, at least, the ochre of the initiated is removed and they return home (1927b: 408).

The other important rite of passage is the *Luma*, which Junod described in details in the first volume (1927a: 396-406). The ordinary meaning of the word *Luma* is to bite, Junod explain. Its ritual sense is to remove the injurious character of a given food by a certain ceremony. The *Luma* offering is appropriate for this study as it is at the nexus of national rite and the rite of passage from one season to another, where special rules apply such as sexual abstention and violence cessation. National offerings are those offered at the capital to the ancestors of the chief. They are on behalf of the whole collectivity because the gods of the reigning family have control over the nation, just as the chief has control over the families and of his subjects. The regular national offering is the *Luma* of the first fruits and their consecration. He considered the *Luma* offering to be the principal manifestation of national life (Ibid.). He highlights that a special attention is paid to the hierarchy when performing this ceremony of *Luma*: “the gods must be the first to enjoy the produce of the New Year, then the chief, then sub chiefs, the counselors, the headmen, then the younger brothers in order of age” (Ibid. 396).

According to Junod there is a stringent taboo directed against the person who precedes his superiors in the enjoyment of the first fruits, at law applicable to Kafir corn or bukanye (Ibid.). Certain clans also include sorghum, pumpkin leaves and beer. The sexual taboo is enforced. Those who contravene this law are said to ‘destroy the efficacy of the offering, “nyumbisa Mhamba.” At the Ngoni Court, where sexual excesses were prevalent, it is said that the chiefs used to remain celibate for a fortnight at the time of *Luma*. This is because the *Luma* signified the entering upon the New Year, a new season, and is thus a rite of a passage. The religious meaning of the rite is clear: the gods, if deprived of the right they possess by virtue of their hierarchical position, would avenge themselves by threatening the harvest, so they must be given their share first.

Junod writes that the first ripe ‘makanye’ are gathered and pressed at the tribal capital. The sour liquor thus obtained is poured out on the tomb of the deceased chiefs in the Sacred Woods. These deceased chiefs are invoked to bless the New Year and the ceremony about to start in the following formula: “May this bukanyi do no harm! May we not slay each other under its influence. May it cause no serious quarrels” (Ibid. 399)! During the month of bukanye drinking, all business is at a standstill. Junod compared this to what happens in the Christian Church where business,
bankruptcy proceedings and all prosecutions for debt are held in abeyance for two weeks during the New Year holiday. The gods having *Luma* first, the bones are consulted. Should the throw be propitious, the chief will *Luma* next; thus the opening ceremony of the feast is concluded (1927a: 396).

But before he sat his pen Junod asserted that all *Luma* rites of the first fruit seem to have primarily a religious origin (Ibid. 399). Accordingly, the Tsonga do not feel that they dare enjoy the products of the soil unless they have first given a portion to their gods because there is a belief that gods make the cereal grow, and they have the power to control even the wizards who bewitch the fields. These rites are also evidently dictated by the sense of hierarchy. A subject must not precede his chief, or a younger brother, the elder in the use of the new harvest; else they would kill those in authority. Such an act is against the order. Even when the seeds are sown, the elders take the lead. The idea also has been motivated by the notion of passage. There is a passage from one year to another. There is observed in *Luma*, bukanyi, a kind of marginal period of license, when the ordinary laws are more or less suspended. The taking of the first mouthful signifies the aggregation to the new period. The magical powder used on this occasion is a protective measure to shield the citizens from the calamities of this unknown year.

The circumcision and the *Luma* rites illustrate that the Tsonga tribe exemplified a cohesive political, religious and legal system that would characterize any contemporary modern nation-state. The Tsonga existed within a tribe composed of clans that followed the established norms, rules and mores of a cohesive and harmonious society (Junod 1927a & 1927b). As a political entity, the Tsonga produced a belief system of its own, independent of any other nation or established religion. This belief system was only bound and controlled by the Tsonga state. The current research defines civil religion in terms of the belief system that the Tsonga tribal state produced, with the objective of self-affirmation. Such a system would be concerned with both the social and political order, that is, that members of the community would be made to feel secure, belonging to a unit and following the orders of the higher ruler. Civil religion in the Tsonga tribe was performed and generated through rituals, paraded to the citizens in appropriately chosen seasons, in chosen spaces and through a well-crafted liturgical calendar. By the use of public rituals and collective ceremonies, common things, certain aspects of civic life of the tribe or nation, beliefs and behaviors, acquired a sense of transcendence.
In Junod’s narratives of the Tsonga, however, a consensual (Durkheim & Cladis 2001) or organic and instrumental (Rousseau 1772, Johnson 2005) civil religion seems to be prevalent. At the initial stage of national building Junod was more interested in forming a consensus in certain key aspects, a formidable coherent unit, with a strong belief in itself in order to withstand what he perceived to be the greatest danger of all: modernity. The integrating and justifying strands are identifiable in the notion of Tsonga building. The mere fact of putting clans of different cultures under the strange word ‘Tsonga’ is already an identity imposition, a form of coercion to homogeneity. What makes a difference, however, is that at the Klipfontein Farm the Gwamba chiefs also contributed to creating this new unity. According to history records the exiled Nguni and Gwamba elites among the refugees realized unity would bring them into prominence and respect again in their clans (Harries 2007). It was for their own benefit to keep some of the royal dignity they had before adversity in their homeland made them refugees. Hence, the Tsonga tribal identity was a consensual agreement between Romande agents and the Gwamba leadership.

3.2 The Tsonga Rites of Mhamba and Civil Religion

The Tsonga tiMhamba (the plural of Mhamba) or sacrificial rites played a key role in setting the boundaries of the sacred vs. the profane within the tribe. They were called upon to restore broken rules that otherwise could have resulted in tribal disorder and sin and ultimately divisions. Sacrificial rites were the most visible stage for civil religious performance as they defined the self-image of the collectivity and strengthened the sense of unity. By presenting Junod’s selected stories, the section examines the connection between tiMhamba rites and civil religion. The argument is that tiMhamba in the Tsonga tribe were the stage on which civil religion was performed.

Rituals are the performed sacrifices, offerings or Mhamba. Junod defined Mhamba as being “any object or act or even person, which is used to establish a bond between the gods and their worshippers” (Junod 1927b: 421). Inspired by Van Gennep’s views, Junod formulated the Tsonga sacrificial rites as being mostly to propitiate and appease the ancestral gods, and sometimes to coerce them into granting a particular thing: “for mercy, for rain, peace, victory against the enemies, productivity and many others” (Junod 1927b: 420).

Like the rites in any society, tiMhamba are complex phenomena and vary according to the problem at hand. In this perspective, Junod set a principle of classification thus: first, the individual
and family *Mhamba*—those, which concern a man or his family alone—and national offerings—those, which concern the whole tribe. Second, the simple offerings called *gandjela*, and the sacramental ones, accompanied by the famous *tsu*, responsible for making them a *hahla* or *phahla*, that is, *Mhamba* material. Third, offerings attended with bloodshed and those where victims are killed and fourth, the regular offerings made at certain dates and in connection with definite events in the life of the family or of the clan, and those made in special circumstances. The study focuses on the national *Mhamba* as they address the greater community, and because they were performed at the national capital and are directly led by the head of the state (Junod 1927a). The special national *Mhamba* is usually connected to matters of national security, purification and thanksgiving to the gods of the nation, which are usually the ancestors of the head of the state (Ibid. 402). Throughout this thesis, state is defined as a combination of Durkheim’s notion of being the institution within society, legitimized to use whatever means (including physical force) to defend itself and to determine the conditions under which other institutions/individuals have that right (1996: 6) and as a form in which the bourgeoisie organizes its social power (Foucault 1976: 68). In this Durkheim/Foucault arrangement, attention is broadened beyond the Weber’s notion of what the state does—defense of property rights, regulation of monopolies (Weber 1965)—to the equally important question of how the state acts, how it projects certain forms of organization on its citizens’ daily activities. Tsonga was a state, in the Foucault’s sense of being a set of cultural forms and imagery that the elites classified as acceptable, thus projecting them into the daily activities of the subjects.

Therefore, the Tsonga National *Mhamba* is impressive in its elaboration. According to Junod’s narrative, the *Mhamba* in the Tembe and Zihlahla clans is so highly venerated that people fear to call it by its own name, and refer to it as *hlengwe* or riches (1927b: 406). According to the description of *Hlekisa*, a Tembe native, it consists of the nails and hair of the deceased chiefs. When a chief dies, the more or less imperishable portions of his body, such as the nails and the hair of his head and beard, are carefully cut, kneaded together with the dung of the oxen which have been killed at his death, and a kind of pellet is thus made. This is bound round with thongs of hide. When another chief dies, a second pellet is made and added to the first and so on down through centuries. The *Mhamba* of the Tembe clan is now about one foot in length, Junod’s informant revealed.
Due to the *Mhamba’s* importance, clan leaders must carefully choose a man to guard it (Ibid. 406). The guardian had to be of a particularly calm temperament, and must not be given to the use of strong language, or to intoxication. The chief gives him money or perhaps a wife, for his trouble, because of the responsibility, which he has undertaken on behalf of the nation. He keeps the *Mhamba* in a hut specially built for the purpose, at the back of his own village. Whenever he is called upon to use it for a religious purpose, he must abstain from sexual relations for a month. The sacrifice then performed will consist of a goat, slaughtered in the usual way, but consecrated without the ordinary *tsu*. *Tsu* is replaced by the *Mhamba*, which the officer will brandish in the same way as the *nkanye* twig, in the funeral ceremony, tracing circles in the air, and invoking the gods. Junod explains that the object is wrapped in great mystery. The object is protected at all costs; it is looked upon as the greatest calamity for it to fall into the hands of enemies in times of war. When the clan is forced to seek refuge in flight, the keeper of the *Mhamba* is first to flee.

The whole army stands between the enemy and the guardian of the precious amulet of the clan. It is more than a national flag, and will not be taken until all the warriors have been killed or dispersed. It is said that once during the war between the Tembe and the *Maputju*, when the later succeeded in gaining possession of the *Mhamba*; a terrible drought ensued, for the gods of *Maputju* were irritated, as they were of the same family as those of the Tembe (1927a: 329). Not knowing what to do with it, the *Maputju* at length cut open a goat between the hind legs, and inserted the *Mhamba* into its body. They then led the goat to the river, which marks the boundary of the Tembe country, and threw it into the water. Junod ends this story with a note that reveals his innermost motive in the narratives, that of legitimizing the Tsonga nation as a sovereign, self-reliant tribal state, with as old a civilization as any other in the world. This strategy was not unique to the Tsonga tribe, particularly in the emerging modern states and the consolidation of European republics.

Decades before the establishment of the French republic Rousseau identified the legitimizing strategy as “justification” and Johnson understood it as “instrumental”. The narrative concerning the *Mhamba* of the Tsonga is strikingly similar to the story that Junod refers to the Bible, regarding the capture of the Ark of the Covenant by the Philistines in the Old Testament (1927a). At the root of this comparison is the intention to argue that the Tsonga tribe is a tribe of Israel, or at least similar to it with stories as old as the Israelites’. Sacrificial rites or *ti*Mhamba narratives similar to the one above come one after another in Junod’s work. However, the reasoning behind the stories is always the same: to justify Tsonga nationalism.
The following selected story reflects another angle of *Mhamba*: Junod narrates the *Mhamba* ritual story meant to ask the gods for national protection. His collaborator Mankhelu, a powerful diviner and herbalist of the Nkuna clan, conveyed the story to him. The story was about a particular battle of November of 1901, during the Sikororo War of which Mankhelu was a participant. Suddenly jumping to his feet and taking a small bundle of grass like those which women in the country, used for binding their sticks, and feverishly separating the blades, Mankhelu said: “Let them fail to surround us, or decoy us!” Then Mankhelu is said to have scattered the sticks and blades in all directions and exclaimed: “Let them be so dispersed, carried off and destroyed!” And this is exactly what happened. On his return from the battle, Mankhelu showed all the army how he had prayed. The old general’s spontaneous appeal to the gods on behalf of his country in its hour of supreme danger is indeed worthy of notice, and also furnished proof that ancestor-worship was still a living force and had not become a matter of mere ritual amongst those who practiced it. All these acts, however, are *Mhamba*: they are accomplished with the idea that the gods hear and see what is said and done and will be induced to deliver their worshippers.

The third story is about the *Mhamba* of rain, which Junod found to be called *Phokolo* in the in Bilen country. He describes it as follows: the bones are consulted and a special pot, called *Phokolo*, is buried just below the surface of the ground, in the middle of a clean spot, and well hidden in a dense thicket of thorny shrubs. The sacrifice, a black ram without any white spot, is brought there, and killed in accordance with the ceremonial rites. The undigested grass of the paunch is squeezed over the pot, so that the green liquid drips into it, and the blood is spread over the ground. Four furrows have been dug in the form of a cross with the pot as a centre, pointing towards the four cardinal points. Little girls, who are not yet wise, i.e. not yet informed regarding sexual matters, are sent to fetch water and to fill the pot until it overflows into the furrows. This being the done, they go back to their mothers. This *Phokolo* sacrifice is the religious act in connection with ancestrolatry. The *Phokolo* performance is made to awaken the gods so that they will come and enjoy the sacrifice given to them. In many Sacred Woods, a living human victim is offered to the gods. The *Phokolo* rite is a regular sacrifice attended with bloodshed.

The *Mhamba* in Junod’s Tsonga also can be a human that is given to the gods for their own consumption, depending on the severity of the case and the mood of the gods at that particular moment (Junod 1927a). Moreover, there is another subtle nuance, particularly about human *Mhamba*. For instance, Elias Libombo told Junod of the death of his brother Klass (Ibid.). In a
mournful tone, he explained that Klass was the Mhamba of the Libombos, “my younger brother was to be awarded the title of the Mhamba of the Libombos” (Ibid. 404). This means that Klass was not dead in the literal sense of losing one’s breath but that, he was given a very important role in the Libombo clan, that of being a living Mhamba. Klass became the indispensable intermediary between the ancestral gods and the community. Klass was not the first in his family to receive this title; Nkolele and Elias were Libombo Mhamba before Klass. This was another meaning of sacrifice or Mhamba in the Tsonga tribe.

These four timhamba are of a national order as they address matters of national security. Junod formulated them as part of the Tsonga tribal identity, an important asset with which to build consensus and strengthen Tsonga as a unit. The presence of civil religious elements in the Tsonga nation is well illustrated throughout these four timhamba stories, although Junod did not use the term civil religion. If civil religion is taken as the belief system that produces self-identity of a collectivity, then the four timhamba are examples of this state belief system as they are directed to establish social and political order in the Tsonga nation. Offering a Mhamba asking for rain to fall is intended to guarantee high productivity for the agricultural season underway. That in itself will guarantee food for everyone but also prospective good trade for the nation. A good business year means most citizens will be able to pay their taxes fully and perhaps offer fatter presents to the head of state. The land will be green and cattle will grow fat and healthy. Everything, in the region, benefits from a good rain. Hence, the rain provides social and economic stability.

A Mhamba is usually performed in public open space where everyone is invited to be a part. Public performance of religious ceremonies authenticates the authority of those who hold it. They are seen in the public setting as an example of how citizens should carry themselves and common habits are idealized through such acts. At the same time however, public performance sets the standard of what is or is not acceptable in the community. The chiefs’ behavior sets the standards of what is or is not acceptable, hence, legitimizing and consecrating certain aspects of civil life, and affording common costumes and behaviors a religious dimension. For instance, ancestors becoming gods are interpreted as turning the ordinary dead person into an extraordinary being, god. At some point in the narrative, Junod himself manifests skepticism of the ancestors being regarded as gods; in fact, throughout his work he referred to these ancestors not as Gods using the (G), but gods in a minor letter (g) and in plural, denoting his disbelief in the idea of comparing them to the real God.
Marcel Mauss and Henry Hubert’s approach to sacrificial ritual would have shed a different light onto Junod’s Tsonga narrative. In their study on sacrificial ritual, Mauss and Hubert argued that sacrificial ritual is a dynamic mediation between the sacred and the profane (1898). To sacrifice was to consecrate, to make sacred, to “set apart,” which entailed transforming the social status of the performers, the participants, the beneficiaries, and the sacrificial objects from the ordinary, profane realm of life (Mauss and Hubert 1898: 49). According to Mauss and Hubert, sacrifice was not a bribe to the gods, an act of giving something of value to spiritual beings so they would give in return, nor was sacrifice merely a shared meal with the gods, but an “occasion for participating in a communal meal by sharing the sacrificial victim” (Ibid.). Strenski further explains that as a social process, sacrificial ritual mediated between the ordinary, everyday life and the sacred, enabling participants to enter and exit the sacred realm, transformed, as the sacrificial victim was transformed by being destroyed in the ritual (2002: 27). Junod would have had a different perspective on the Tsonga sacrificial rites; he would have learned that through the repetitive liturgical performance tiMhamba actually generate religion and the religious in this sense of turning the ordinary into extraordinary. Yet, Junod was not concerned about perspectives on Tsonga rites but on the Tsonga identity justification and consolidation. He was obsessed by his nationalist agenda of establishing the Tsonga nation at all cost (Junod 1927a & 1927b).

The section attempted to show how national Mhamba ceremonies served as the platforms for the production of civil religious; that is, it was through the Mhamba rituals that common affairs of the collective were related to extra-historical forces to the degree that they gained transcendental status, thus producing a Tsonga national unit. The utterance of the sacramental tsu was the moment when the ordinary turns sacred, thus giving the religious seal that legitimizes the event.

3.3 Traditions and Civil Religion in the Making of the Tsonga

There is a close relationship between civil religion and traditions in the making of meaning. Through repetition, rites generate traditions (Hughey 1983), including civil religion. In the Tsonga tribe, the latter’s role has been to legitimize and justify the former. Traditions emanate from other traditions (Spear 2003). The production of meaning is the prime reason for traditions to exist, whether new, like the Tsonga, or old, as in the Indian Hindu tradition. A new myth, story, narrative or tradition is “a set of practices normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of ritual of symbolic nature” (Hobsbawm 1984: 1). Therefore, tradition is invented with an objective
of instilling certain values and norms of behavior, using the method of repetition (Ibid.). This, in itself, implies two things: first, the repetition implies rituals, and rituals are closely linked to religion and religious phenomena; second, a new tradition is always generated from an existing one, hence, it cannot be entirely independent or cut off from the past. The Tsonga identity is a tradition formed in these molds.

There is a debate concerning the use of the term “invention” when referring to traditions. Spear argues that there had been abuse of the term “invention of tradition” in social sciences. He finds, rather, tradition to be “complex discourses, in which people continually reinterpret the lessons of the past in the context of the present” (2003: 3). He proposes the use of the term “reinterpretation” instead of “invention” when addressing emerging traditions. In the light of Spear, the Tsonga intellectual tradition was a reinterpretation, a rearrangement of traditions already existing, as opposed to an invention from nothing, a new tradition. Spear’s contribution cannot be underestimated. For over half a century, social scientists tended to attribute the fate of colonized people to the colonizers as if their lives were completely at the hands of the missionaries, explorers and other Western agents of the colonial era. Spear brings to the fore the idea that the encounter between Europeans and Africans was far more complex than a simple action from top down, where Europeans are on top and Africans on the bottom.

It is a fact that African chiefs sold their own people into the booming slave market of the seventeenth century (Newitt 1995). Based on the contemporary research on the Tsonga, (particularly by Monnier, Harries, Ngoenha, Silva, Manguzi, Violain Junod and others social scientists) the current research stands with the premise that the Tsonga tribal identity was an outcome of a treaty, the “Klipfontein treaty” where two groups of refugees sat down to ratify a compromise, with benefits for both parties. Hence, the assertion is made that tradition is an outcome of a compromise between the parties and in some sense a continuation of the past. However, another trait of a tradition is its hybrid nature, which gives reason for scholars like Mudimbe (1988), Mamdani (1990), Leroy Vail (1989), and even Hobsbawm (1984), to use the term “invention.” The outcome of the reinterpretation of older pieces of tradition is a hybrid that, in some cases, has little to do with the older pieces of culture. The “invention” advocates use the term, when referring to emerging traditions, for emphasis rather than in the classical sense of the term “invention,” perhaps in the same way that the early European explorers, when arriving in the
new lands, claimed to have “discovered” the lands. The Tsonga was an invention in the sense of being a novelty in the region, emerging with the advent of modernism.

Tsonga was also an invention in the sense that the concept did not look or feel like anything that had come before, and not because it came *ex nihilo*. There were people and a context that produced this hybrid tradition; the hybrid nature of tradition negates, therefore, the notion of a pure homogenous tradition. What matters most for this research is not only the lexical semantics of terms, but also the fact that the invented or reinterpreted tradition seems to have benefited the colonial enterprise more than the autochthonous people. Junod’s work, which took charge of assembling the pieces of culture, was more interested in establishing a Tsonga intellectual tradition that spoke more about and to Valdezia, Leman, Vaud, Switzerland, Europe, and their interests than the objects of the study. What the current research “uncovers” in Junod is an archetypical modern man, with personal ambitions, high modern ethical ideals, contradictions, miscalculations and fears projected into the “Other.” He often saw the world through the above psychological spectacles but he also projected his views into the world around him; these perceptions and projections are well reflected in his award winning ethnographic monograph *The Life of a South African Tribe*. For instance, the notion that the southeast African people were in danger of losing their culture with the modernity was fuelled by Junod’s own Swiss experience with industrialization (1927a: 465).

The making of a tradition is both a political and a consecrating process; the Tsonga is not an exception to this fact. A tradition is sacred for two reasons: it uses ritual and symbolic gestures in a repetitive method in order to establish itself; and secondly, it generates set-aside phenomena, space, and things as sacred (Johnson 2005). Additionally, tradition occurs through an appropriation and exclusion process similar to that of the making of the sacred, “political” in as far as individuals or groups of individuals always create it in order to generate a sense of order and stability in a particular context. In the case of the Tsonga, the seasonal *Mhamba* of Luma was announced the end of the harvest and the beginning of the festive seasons. By being performed each year it gave to the nation a sense of order. One this *Mhamba* was established it would be strange if someone would plow a new field before the harvest was done.

Tradition normally attempts to establish continuity with a suitable past. Unsuitable knowledge or data is excluded or sacrificed as the signifiers usually mind a particular agenda to accomplish. For instance, the Tsonga tribal inventors did not hesitate to force their name onto individuals who had nothing to do with such a name. What mattered for them was that an order (a
meaning) had to be established, regardless of what some might think of it. That constitutes the rationale for the current section: to assert that Junod’s apparent perplexity, when confronted with a massive Gwamba oral culture, was not indicative of inexperience as a scientist or simple misinterpretation of data before him. It was, rather, a strategic attempt to mold a Tsonga nation of his liking. In the Tsonga affair, the Gwambas were coerced to accept the term, in the sense that the term was pejorative and insulting. Junod himself attests to this as he says that they do not like the name but they will get used to it (1927b). From civil religious perspective Junod was in the process of transforming organic civil religious organisms into an instrumental civil religion. That is turning the everyday lived experience of the amorphous Gwamba groups in the challenging exile into an academic organized agenda.

Additionally, the forcing of an identity onto a complex and heterogeneous collectivity is also where civil religion enters the scene, with the important purpose of justifying and legitimizing the action. If it is recalled, Rousseau’s views of a modern state were that it must generate a belief system or religion that would not be attached to any particular established religious order. Rather, this system of belief should be designed and controlled by the state: that is, solely for political ends. In Rousseau’s view, this religion is, essentially, a coercive political device (Rousseau 1993). Junod’s Tsonga, from civil religious approach, can be interpreted as an identity forced onto loose Gwamba groups. The making of Tsonga’s original myth established a new identity by providing a common platform on which citizens found a common ground. It also created a stage where differences were discussed and compromises reached.

Despite apparent harmony, tensions brewed underneath as the paternalistic tendencies of Junod and Berthoud grew as the church expanded through the Tsonga country. Junod and Berthoud thought they had the duty to set the limits of what was or was not acceptable in the Tsonga tribe. Butselaar points to heated doctrinal debates that developed between Joseph Mhalamhala, Junod and Berthoud (Butselaar 1987: 15). Accordingly, Mhalamhala was one of the early converts who proved to be a good preacher to his folks, so the Mission decided to ordain him as a pastor after some training in Homiletics, Ecclesiology and a basic Bible Study course in Valdezia (Ibid.). He was sent east toward Delagoa Bay as a preacher. In Butselaar’s view, Mhalamhala’s problem emerged due to his style of relaxed and inclusive leadership. Such an attitude made him an easy person to relate to. Faris further reveals that his evangelists loved him, and his revival program became an overnight success (2007: 141). Powerful visions and dreams that produced emotional
and spontaneous conversions were reported in the local churches he visited (Ibid.). The emotions displayed by revivalists were a sign of the raw energy needed to revitalize the Christian message and rejuvenate the entire church. He accepted women to read the Bible and use the word during worship services and allowed people to receive the power of the word and speak in tongues.

Butselaar narrates that when Junod and Berthoud heard of these practices, they came at once to Rikatla to charge Mhalamhala with being womanlike and not fit for leadership (Ibid. 17). However, this was because Junod and Berthoud had never seen such Christian expression. It was an unorthodox approach to the Gospel, foreign to Calvinist theology. Their pietism and individualist theology could not cohabit with a more democratic liturgy stressing God’s work on his people through spirit that Mhalamhala and his followers preached. Junod and Berthoud felt they were losing control of the Tsonga religion. Hence, they established a church policy of discipline and an examination of faith for the new African converts. According to van Butselaar, they believed that the Mission had to be run by a man with a firm grasp of the “full meaning” of Christianity, not by a Black pastor with elementary theological training, a feminine sensitivity, and easily carried away by uncertified spirituality (Ibid. 17). These missionary tendencies to control and to think of the Tsonga as their own identity degenerated to a point that, in the years after National Independence in 1975, the Presbyterian Church planned a peaceful independence from the United Churches of Vaud. Romande missionaries were welcome but were not allowed to take seats of power in local churches. As van Butselaar reveals, they had to abdicate the power of leadership to the local synod under the native people (Ibid). Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the Tsonga tribe provided a safe space for self-affirmation for its citizens. The new tradition played an essential role in maintaining the project, if only to safeguard it against numerous challenges and adversaries.

The section began by stating that tradition generates tradition. The production occurs through repetition but repetition as duplication that happens by a process of “othering,” that is, reproducing the other. It is known that a copy is not quite the same as the original no matter how apparently similar it may be. It is just that: “similar” to the original and not the same. Rites however, are believed to be not replicated or be replicated in the sense just explained above. A rite reenacts a particular event. Consider, for instance, the Luma ritual examined in the first section. Briefly, the Luma ritual starts with the collection of the fruit nkanye pressed and kept a few days to brew at the national capital. A small portion of sour liquor thus obtained is poured out on the
tomb of the deceased chiefs in the Sacred Woods; they are invoked to bless the event, with the opening of the New Year and the festive ceremony that is about to be celebrated in the following way: “May this bukanyi do no harm! May we not slay each other under its influence. May it cause no serious quarrels?” According to the narrative, during the month of bukanye drinking, all business is at a standstill. The gods having Luma first, the bones are consulted. Should the throw be propitious, the chief will Luma next; thus ends the feast’s opening ceremony.

The Luma ritual, like circumcision, is classified as regular because it happens each New Year, and thus, follows a regular tribal calendar. The reenactment of the same ritual normalizes a tradition, and establishes a culture, i.e. on one hand, the tradition becomes a product ready to be consumed, and on the other, the tradition makes the public its property, in the sense that the tradition brings its consumers to order under ritual reenactment. The ritual is at the center of production while the civil religion works on authenticating the product. The reenactment makes this prayer a tradition, and civil religion, also being a tradition generated in the repetitive process, acts as the provider of legitimacy to the tradition. The tradition, in its turn, creates a sense of meaning, unity and purpose for its adherents.

The Tsonga tribal state generated a civil religion to legitimize its power and create unity among its citizens through consensus. In nearly seven decades of raising consciousness of the Tsonga as a unit, blessed by religious practices, supported by the other members of the tribe in Switzerland and backed by a long tradition of resistance to foreign invasion, a new nation arose to fight for its dignity. With the Tsonga tradition, came dignity and self-esteem. Hence, Tsonga is a hybrid culture, an outcome of expropriated local and foreign cultural values. It only makes sense in the hybridizing context of the encounter of Western and African traditions.

3.4 Civil Religion in the Sacred Woods

In The Life of a South African Tribe, Junod identified the South of the Save River in the North, down to Sta. Lucia Bay (28 Lat. S.) on the Natal Coast, as “the Tsonga national territory” (1927a: 13). Such an act of space demarcation is, in itself, a space consecration, an act of space setting-aside. This section examines Junod’s narrative on the Tsonga tribe’s religious sacred spaces. It advances the proposition that the Tsonga sacred spaces were sites for civil religious performances.
Humans consecrate (and desecrate) the spaces: the history of societies testifies that acts of consecration are often performed for private and contingent political purposes. The scramble for Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century can be interpreted as an act of massive space consecration. The consecration of a space is never a pacific act. It entails disputes, inclusions and exclusions, desecration and defilement (Chidester 2005). For instance, Portugal did not have enough power, compared with the other European contestants to overcome the local polities in southern Africa. Although it arrived earlier than the others, it did not manage the territories under its control as expected, hence the Berlin conference of 1885 handing to Portugal an ultimatum that forced her to effectively demarcate (consecrate) and exert control over her colonial territories. It was in this same context that the Romande Mission in the region was forced to be resourceful in finding its own sacred space, effectively appropriate, and manage it.

It should be recalled that the Romande Mission had adversaries from two sides; firstly, the other Protestant evangelical enterprises, such as the Paris Evangelical Mission, the Berlin Lutheran Mission and the Dutch Mission. Harries reveals that these other Protestant Missions were already well established in the region as they arrived far earlier (2007). They had many advantages over the Romande Mission because of their familiarity with the cultures and languages of the locals. Moreover, van Butselaar discloses that the other missions could count on their home imperial support (1987). That is, that if the colonial administrators, the army and money were needed, these Missions had access to the power of their home nations and were in close tune with their home political developments. The second challenge came from the British, Dutch/Boers and the Portuguese colonial administrators (Harries 2007). They were usually accompanied by the army, which made sure that state affairs were adequately conducted. If the Swiss had conflicts, they were more often with these colonial administrators and their economic agendas than with the Gwambas, Sothos, Zulus or any other local states.

Unlike the other Missions, the Romande agents did not have good relations with the home political order. In fact, the Mission represented the Free Churches of Vaud, which had recently been excommunicated by the liberal political leadership of the Confederation of Switzerland (Bachofen 1967). They were outcasts in their own country who had ventured into foreign Mission affairs in search of a new self. In addition, the Mission could not count on strong financial support: it depended on their associated churches to fundraise for it through Sunday worship service collections in local churches (Butselaar 1987). This situation made the work difficult and
dangerous. However, there were positive aspects; for they were free from any pressures from higher bodies. Missionaries had to report to only one board in Switzerland, the Board of Foreign Mission of the Church (Berthoud 1875). Such a position gave them room to be more creative and to rely on personal skills to survive. Thus, when an opportunity arrived to create their own identity, they did not hesitate, performing to the best of their capacities. The work of Junod is a great example of the point above.

Upon arriving at a place near the headwaters of the Levubu and Small Letaba Rivers in July 1875 (Berthoud 1875), the Romande agents, Creux and Berthoud, quickly expropriated a considerable stretch of land, at the place called Klipfontein and made it their “new found land.” Once the Klipfontein Farm treaty was celebrated, Creux and Berthoud busied themselves fashioning a new identity through translating the Bible into the local language and initiating evangelical and educational programs (Berthoud 1896). However, they had another major obstacle: space. Here lies the fundamental difference between the Tsongas and the Orientals that Edward Said examined in his postcolonial work *Orientalism* (1978). The Egyptians, Arabs or Indians, for example, had always related to a particular geographical space, whereas the Tsongas could not. Nonetheless, the Gwamba groups of refugees had their own homeland in the Delagoa Bay and its hinterland.

Although Berthoud and Creux had started to move eastward and set a small advance post in Antioka, located east of Klipfontein Farm in the Mozambican territory at the bend of Nkomati River, little production was achieved; meaning that there were no people to bring to their flock or do any other evangelical work. They had set the Antioka advance post following the mass return of their new subjects who were being squeezed out of expanding land owned by Boers who did not want many Blacks in it (Harries 2007). This was due to the fact that whites owned most of the lands in the area of the Zoutpansberg and, as a result, pushed out the Gwamba who were also the subjects of the Tsonga tribe (Ibid.90). In response, the Romande Mission followed its flock back into Delagoa Bay. Accordingly, they also took the chance to set up a post at Mandlakaze, the Nguni capital, sending Dr. Liengme there to persuade the monarch to become a Tsonga citizen (Harries 1981). Prior to the making of Tsonga, Romande agents had no place to call home, and thus, no way of inventing themselves. However, their partners, the Gwambas, had a land of their own, so it was natural that the Tsonga tribe moved eastward and settled in the Delagoa Bay region. The erudite Junod, who later joined the Romande Mission, proved to be a great boost to the Romande
project (Butselaar 1987). He used his scientific experience with butterflies and beetles to canonize Tsonga as a tribal identity (1927a).

Junod consecrated the territory already indicated, which was large enough, rich in natural resources and had access to one of the best natural ports on the east coast, for the Tsonga tribe to thrive in. The Tsonga tribal narratives unfold in this sacred territory; and the tribal state naturally develops a system of beliefs that generated self-identity, the civil religion. This belief system is developed in order to create a consensus, and to legitimize and justify the emerging political power of the tribe. In this territory, sacred rituals, sacrificial rituals, and sacred places, especially the central Sacred Woods, are crafted. There is a close link between space and identity, such that an identity must be fashioned on a particular sacred geographical and physical location. Sacred space is an arena where meaning is produced. At or in such places, crucial questions “about what it means to be a human being in a meaningful world,” are interpreted (Chidester and Linenthal 1995: 12). With a new homeland, the Tsonga produced a space, which implied a production not only of meaning but also concepts and consciousness of space. It was in this process of meaning production that Junod narrates four stories under the heading “Sacred Woods” in *The Life of a South African Tribe*. Civil religious elements, such as the problem of consecration versus desecration, emerge and enter into play in the formation of the Tsonga tribal identity. Although Delagoa Bay and its hinterland are the set-aside space for the Tsonga nation, the current study focuses on the sacred spaces within the Tsonga nation. The argument is that these sacred spaces are the fields or arenas for civil religious performance. The reader will notice that the story is kept close to the original; this is in order to keep its freshness.

The first story (in Junod 1927a: 473) Junod tells as follows: when a woman passing by on a rainy day saw a child who had climbed a tree and was eating berries from branches, she decided to go ask for some berries but the child did not reply. Because of the child’s silence, the woman moved on to the tree and picked berries for herself. Realizing that the child seemed alone in the rain, she decided to take it home and give it shelter. She carried the child on her back, without realizing that it was not a child. Once the woman arrived at her compound, she wanted to put down the child but she was unable to. The baby seemed glued to her back. Then the villagers asked her where she got this baby, and to their sadness, the woman replied that the baby was from the Libombo forest. They sent for a magician to throw bones, and he immediately knew what was wrong. The baby was no baby; it was Makundju, the ancestor god of the Libombo clan. They tried
to remove him by force, but he clung still more closely to the woman’s back, stiffening his legs round her waist, and his arms around her neck. They tried to unclench his hands, but it was impossible! Then they begged her to go back to Libombo, and implore the owners of the forest to set her free from this child. She took her basket, and returned to the tree where she had found him. The guardian of the forest soon appeared. It was Makundju, the ancestor of Nkolele, who had appeared to her in the form of the child. He inveighed against the woman and those who accompanied her, saying: “When you find fruit in the forest do not pick it! If it be maize, leave it alone, or, if you pick it, spare at least one ear. If your chicken flies into the wood, do not go after it. If your goat runs away into it, you must not follow it. We are worn out, we folks of Libombo, with offering sacrifices for you passerby… Your troubles are the consequences of the sins you commit in this place.”

A white hen was caught and sacrificed on behalf of the woman. Emitting the tsu the priest said: “Behold our ox, by which we present our petition. Let this God leave her back. She did not do it on purpose. She thought it was a child; she did not know it was a god. Which way can people go henceforth if you, gods, put obstacles in the way?” While this sacrifice was being offered, the being suddenly left her back, disappeared, and no one knew how, or whither he went. She had defiled the sacred place and a sacrificial ritual was required to cleanse her. This story is replicated several times in Junod’s award winning ethnographic monograph, The Life of a South African Tribe, four times under the heading of Sacred Woods, using different persons. In it, a cycle of consecration and defilement is repeated time after time in order to justify and assert the Tsonga as a comprehensive body of tradition worth preserving.

The following is the most recent of the stories (in Junod 1927b: 339): The hero himself, Nkolele, the aged priest of Libombo, related it to Junod. After the war of 1894-95, the Portuguese authorities established a camp at Morakwen (currently Marracuene), and decided to build a town there. To do this, it became necessary to widen the primitive pathway that led to Lourenço Marques and natives had to cede trees and grasslands, to the extent of several meters on each side of the path; then a fine road was built of some 20 kilometers in length. This road passed close by the Sacred Woods, as it had been decided to follow the line of the pathway, which skirted these woods for a distance of about half a mile. Amongst many other trees was one huge mahogany, under whose shade I have frequently passed, which sent out a low branch and the people living in the neighborhood were entrusted with the job. “When they began the work, I went to see what they
were doing with the mahogany tree. As I was seated, the gods came to me, saying: “What are you doing here? You ought to have stayed at home.” I fell backwards unconscious, and remained in that state for four days. I could not eat: they had closed my mouth. I could not speak! My people picked me up and carried me home. My relatives and my children were all summoned: the villagers said: “Our medicine-man has left us! He is dead!” then my eldest son went to offer a sacrifice in the sacred wood. He let loose a fowl, which flew away and never returned; he prayed: “Oh! My ancestors! Here is my ox. Do not slay my father!” Then I got up. Ah! It was he, who saved me, Ngelenwana, my eldest son! I looked around and said: “What have all these people come here for?” They were terror stricken. The gods said to me, by means of bones: “Take an ox-cock”, that is an ox, an animal for sacrifice, which may be a cock, “and go to your brother ShiHubane. Let him give you a fowl, and go and sacrifice. Why did you go there? You ought to have stayed at home, and have sent your children.” I did not go any more by the big road. I go by the path through the marshes, and never by the avenue made by the Whites. Now I can go that way, for I have sacrificed, and the gods have said: “he has asked our pardon by means of his gifts.”

Junod interpreted this last story as the prelude to the invasion of modernity with deadly consequences. This invasion of civilization penetrates irresistibly, crushing everything in its way, and cutting remorselessly, perhaps unwittingly, through the edge of the Sacred Woods. “And there, under the mahogany tree, the aged priest, the guardian of its traditions, swoons away and asks forgiveness for having been an involuntary witness of the sacrilege” (Junod 1927b: 337). When the (unnamed) woman in the previous story was found guilty of desecrating the Sacred Woods, the place of the ancestral gods, she was lectured on how to behave when walking near forests but the lecture was not enough, it was necessary to remove the god stuck on her back. A cleansing sacrifice was needed. An ox chicken had to be provided and, emitting the tsu, the priest said: “Behold our ox, by which we present our petition. Let this god leave her back. She did not do it on purpose. She thought it was a child; she did not know it was a god.” Everyone that came with her witnessed the sacrificial ritual. The last story also presents the Sacred Woods as sacred space that modernity desecrated by building a road too close to it and cutting the mahogany tree branches. By Junod’s narrative, it is not clear why Nkolele, the guardian and priest of his clan’s Sacred Woods fainted for four days. Did he try to stop the Portuguese from cutting the mahogany branches and consequently was physically molested or did he climb the tree and fall down? Perhaps it does
not matter. What is important is that his son performed a sacrificial ritual, equal to that in the previous story, in the Sacred Woods of his family and Nkolele gained consciousness.

Both stories illustrate the importance of the Sacred Woods to the Tsonga tribe. There is where the gods reside. The stories also indicate that when the law of the Tsonga tribe is broken there must be an atonement sacrifice to restore order and maintain peace between the citizens. The process of ritual performance is where civil religion is enacted. That is, those symbols and gestures that produce the self-identity of Tsonga, as a collectivity, are played out in order to marginalize the impure, cleanse it and incorporate the member in a clean state. The stories also show that there are both easy and difficult desecrations. The careless woman who, out of mercy brought a god home is a problem that is easy to deal with, whereas the Portuguese desecration was not quite eliminated by cleansing through tribal rites. Modernity demanded a greater sacrificial ritual. The whole of Junod’s work was directed toward preparing the Tsonga to face modernity and its destructive character. The Portuguese colonial state was the major enemy both for Junod as a person and for his Tsonga project as he stood against the Lusitanian project of turning Mozambicans into Portuguese citizens. For the colonial state, the chief enemy, important sacrifices were required, including human sacrifices with blood being shed.

The defeat of the Gaza Empire at the Coolela in November 1895, and the subsequent deportation of Ngungunhane, its monarch, was proof that sacrifices were required far more than had been imagined. It proved also that modernity had arrived with the intention of retaining its vices. Junod wrote extensively in describing and attacking the vices of modernity and their consequence to the Tsonga citizens (Junod 1907; 1927b: 609). The conversion of Ngungunhane was the Romande Mission’s agenda (Liengme 1901). Liengme was already living in Ngungunhane’s court when Mousinho de Albuquerque attacked Ngungunhane (Ibid.). The Romande Mission failed to prevent the Coolela calamity. The Tsonga tribe lost a key partner in the Nguni monarch, but Coolela was not the end of the story for the Tsonga.

In the decades following the Coolela event the Romande Mission tried to redeem itself by working harder to consolidate the Tsonga project and create a space and climate for the defeated Nguni leadership to regroup and develop a good strategy. According to Silva education and evangelization, with a strong emphasis on spiritual uplifting sermons, intensified among the Tsonga (1998b). The Biblical liberation themes were common in sermons and Bible Studies. Violain, Junod’s the personal biographer, explained that he enjoyed the Pentateuch narratives such
as those of the enslaved Israelites in Egypt where God sent Moses to liberate them and sermon with themes that spoke of equality of all humans before God (Junod 1968: 335). The point was to raise the Tsonga citizens’ consciousness of their subaltern status if they accepted the Lusitanian colonial identity.

This chapter was aimed at demonstrating that through Tsonga tribal stories, traditions, sacred spaces, tiMhamba were the stages where civil religion was produced and played out. TiMhamba generated traditions, whereas civil religion justified, and legitimized the tiMhamba product. TiMhamba and civil religion collaborated in the consecration of Tsonga tribal stories, turning them into symbols of high power and authority, thus giving them a sense of transcendence. Such dynamics justify the notion that the Tsonga tribe exists greatly due to a successful generation of civil religion. Along with the multiple rites, the creators of myths, gods, and traditions, civil religion is at the heart of Tsonga tribal identity. In 1960s, a little over a half a century later, a Moses arose from the Tsonga tribe. A new national state emerged formed by Eduardo Mondlane, the direct spiritual child of the Tsonga tribe and a son of the Nguni and Gwambas. The fourth chapter goes as far back in memory to provide a background from which Moçambicanidade emerged.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE EMERGENCE OF MOÇAMBICANIDADE

The chapter examines the making of Mondlane’s Mozambique Liberation Front and its subsequent evolution. The colonial and postcolonial archives indicate that the creation of Moçambicanidade as a collective identity was and continues to be a power struggle, from inside and out. Like the second chapter (The Production of the Tsonga), the current chapter is genealogical, as it presents the origins of FRELIMO, the political organization that consecrated Mozambique as a nation-state.

Although Mozambique as Portugal’s set-aside space was effectively established in the years after 1895 Coolela event, FRELIMO was a direct reaction to Salazar’s Estado Novo policies. The first section, thus, reviews the history of the setting aside of a territory under the name of Moçambique. FRELIMO became the high point of Moçambicanidade. The second section presents the dialectics within Moçambicanidade. The third section discusses the challenges that the 1975 born FRELIMO new nation-state faced and identifies the interpretations around those challenges. By focusing on poetry, the last section shows the aesthetic manifestations of Moçambicanidade, which bear religious themes underlying the civil religious dynamics of Moçambicanidade.

4.1 The Paradoxes of Mozambique as a Modern Nation

As a defined geographical space, Mozambique emerged between the 1885 Berlin and 1891 Brussels conferences. Portugal had an ultimatum at Berlin to take effective control of its colonial territories. The Portuguese devised a map that became known among historians as the mapa cor de rosa (the pink map) that “envisioned a Portuguese Central African empire linking Angola and Mozambique” (Isaacman& Isaacman 1983: 78). After the 1895 defeat of the Gaza Empire and the subsequent deportation of its leader, Ngungunhane, to Madeira, Mozambique became a Portuguese colonial territory and remained so until the rise of Mondlane’s FRELIMO in the early sixties.

Due to the importance of the Mozambican Liberation Front’s role, as the first most successful native political movement in the region, against the Portuguese colonial state, it is important to introduce briefly the biography of its founder. His name was Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, born on 20 September 1920 in the little village of Nwadjahane, located about 8 km
north of Mandlakazi and only 4 km from Coolela, the site of Ngungunhane’s last battle. Mondlane comes from a family well known for its rebellious spirit. The examples of his father and his uncle, who had both fought in anticolonial struggles at the end of nineteenth century, as well as his mother’s quiet militancy, had inspired Mondlane (Silva 1998a). Eduardo started his modern education at the Swiss Mission of Mausse.

Later on he enrolled in mintlawa, (sing. Ntlawa a Changaan word for group) a Swiss Mission’s organized special education program for youth. Mintlawa was the Swiss Mission’s new education strategy inspired by the life of a Tsonga herder and by the Christian ethics of respect, loyalty and self-worth (Faris 2007). After attending the Swiss Mission schools in Mausse, Lemana and Nkovo in the capital, he moved on to South Africa where he received a scholarship in 1947 to Witwatersrand University. There, he came into contact with and collaborated with students opposed to racial segregation, causing his deportation two years later. Back in Mozambique, he helped to organize and was a leading force in NESAM, the Mozambican student movement. His powerful critique of Portuguese colonialism and the value he attached to Mozambican culture and history inspired a whole generation of younger high school students, a number of whom subsequently became prominent members of FRELIMO.

Mondlane’s activities brought with them police surveillance, interrogations, and harassment (Manghezi 2001). Anxious to reduce his influence and simultaneously to co-opt him, the colonial regime, in 1950, sent Mondlane to Portugal to continue his education. There he encountered other militant African students trying to forge a coherent anticolonial ideology out of Pan-African, Pan-Negro, Marxist, and antifascist philosophies. Among his cohorts were Amilcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto, who subsequently led the liberation struggles in Guinea-Bissau and Angola respectively, and Marcelino dos Santos, who was to become secretary general of CONCP and a founding member of and leading figure in FRELIMO (Chilcote 1969). Mondlane fled Portugal due to police harassment in order to continue his education in the United States. The doctoral degree he received in 1960 made him Moçambique’s first Ph.D. (Ibid. 47). In 1961, protected by diplomatic immunity as a United Nations employee, Mondlane returned home a hero. In shantytowns on the outskirts of Lourenço Marques and in his rural Gaza homeland he met secretly with dissidents, who detailed increased oppression and urged him to organize a nationalist movement (Ibid.). A little more than a year later, he arrived in Dar-es-Salaam and was elected president of FRELIMO.
After failed attempts to negotiate independence with Portuguese authorities, FRELIMO resorted to war, in which, ten-years later, it managed to militarily defeat the Portuguese and declare the territory and its people free from colonial control in 1975. The first thing in Mondlane’s agenda was to create one strong political unit out of three exiled and small political organizations. These organizations single handedly tried unsuccessfully to persuade, in a peaceful manner, the fascist Portuguese state to grant freedom to some areas in the north. By calling on the values that united them and by identifying the common enemy, Mondlane was able to get the groups together, forming one front: Liberation Front of Moçambique-FRELIMO (Brito 1991).

Nations emerge to gather dispersed and displaced people who share common myths, symbols and rituals. According to political historians, the concept of nation appeared first in an expanding Europe that was busy conquering faraway places and spreading its people throughout them (Gellner 1994 and Giddens 1994). There was a need to create uniting myths and nations. A powerful human organization, the idea of a nation transcending tribal and parochial limitations gave a sense of belonging like nothing else. Can Mozambique be considered a nation in the classical European sense?

The idea of the nation is now so firmly fixed in the general imagination, and the form of state it signifies so widely accepted, that it is hard to realize how recent its invention has been. In 1882, the French Orientalist Ernest Renan, addressing an audience at the Sorbonne in his lecture “What is a nation?” felt it necessary to remind his audience of the historical beginnings of the idea of a nation. Accordingly, nations are new phenomena in history “antiquity was unfamiliar with them; Egypt, China and Chaldea were in no way nations, they were flocks led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of Heaven” (Bhabha 1990: 9). According to Renan, neither in Egypt nor in China were there citizens as such, nor nations. Classical antiquity had republics, municipal kingdoms, confederations of local republics and empires; yet it can hardly be said to have had nations, in our understanding of the term. An outcome of the 1885 Berlin conference’s pressure on Portugal, Mozambique may be a modern nation in Walker Connor’s ethno-nation sense, i.e. “a human population occupying a historic territory or homeland and sharing common myths and memories” (1994: 68). However, a true modern nation was born just a few years earlier: for the Tsonga nation was born in 1875 in Valdezia on the foothills of the Zoutpansberg Mountains. The Tsonga, since then, had its share in shaping Mozambique’s political reality, through modern education and religious programs and the Protestant ethos (Silva 1998b), hence, providing the historical
genealogy and a structural template for the emergence of Moçambicanidade. However, one must ask: how is Mozambique a nation? What is a nation?

Nation and nationalism as concepts are as elusive and ambiguous as locating Mozambique within the framework of modernity. In agreement with Renan, most scholars such as Giddens (1994), Connor (1994), Ernest Gellner (1994), Eric Hobsbawm (1990), Benedict Anderson (1983), John Hutchinson (1994) and Homi Bhabha (1990), argue that nationalism creates nation and not the opposite. Yet the same scholars have, to date, failed to agree on a definition of nationalism, even in its narrower sense. Some, like Kedourie (1960), see it as a doctrine of the collective will. Others, like Breuilly (1993), see it as a political argument, still others such as Kohn (1967) and Seton-Watson (1977) as a collective sentiment. The difficulty is that even as a movement, ideology or symbolic language, the term “nationalism” covers a wide variety of beliefs, ideals and symbols. However, certain common motifs can be identified in the words and actions of self-styled “nationalism,” including the ideals of distinctiveness and identity of the nation, unity and fraternity of its members, and autonomy and autarchy of the territorial community.

There is even more disagreement over the definition of the concept of “nation”. Few scholars tend to equate the nation with the state, and nationalism with state-oriented and state-grounded movements, but others have criticized this position. Connor sharply differentiates ethno-nationalism from (state) patriotism, from the nation as a self-aware, participating, and ancestral ethnic group and from the state as an autonomous set of public institutions (Geertz 1973; Tivey 1980; Connor 1994). An attempt to settle one single good definition seems difficult, an activity perhaps not very important now. However, a combination of Anderson, Hobsbawm, and Smith proposals provides a more useful provisional definition: a nation as a human population that occupies its historic homeland and share common myths and memories, a distinctive public culture, with territorial mobility, and common laws and customs (Anderson 1983: 7; Hobsbawm 1990: 9 and Smith 2000: 63). Based on these criteria most existing states, the Mozambican state being one of them, cannot be counted as “nation-states” in the strict sense: they have significant ethnic minorities and present ample scope for minority nationalisms. Instead, they should be regarded as “national states,” that is, states that aspire to become unified nations, and are legitimated by the principles of nationalism (Smith 1995).

Due to its importance in the modern age, the national phenomenon has been a subject of inquiry. Renan traces the emergence of the nation-state to the break-up of the classic and medieval
empires, locating its cultural provenance in a specifically European political and social environment (1890: 19). Nations are profoundly unstable formations, always likely to collapse into sub-divisions of clan, language, or religious group. For instance, by the end of 1891, the political situation in and around Valdezia worsened for the Tsonga, the Portuguese, the Boers, and the British were fighting for a bigger, better, richer pieces of land in the region. According to Harries, the Tsonga were forced to pay high taxes just for squatting on the land owned by white farmers (2007). This tax issue might have been at the heart of the disintegration crisis that appalled the Tsonga nation shortly after its establishment in 1875. Followers of the Valdezia Mission were leaving the farms on which they dwelt and were looking to the independent areas back east toward Delagoa Bay for a better life (Butselaar 1987). However, this organic character of the nation is nothing new; it has its explanation in the fact that nationalism precedes the nation. That is, one the reason that people form a nation surpasses the level of challenges, then other means of survival are usually sought after.

Mozambique is composed of over seventeen nations within its modern frontiers: Makua, Yao, Sena, Quimane, Nhungue, Chuabo, Chiute, Ndua, Makonde, Tsonga, Chopi, Nyanja, Lomue, Tswa or Changana. It is only fair to regard the modern Mozambique as a confederation of nations, or even as a ‘United Nations of Mozambique.’ This is admissible once the entity ‘united nations’ is perceived as a group of nations that aspire to become one under the same accorded program. Moçambicanidade emerges in this multi-national context of the late fifties and early sixties, an outcome of the union of various nations against one enemy, the Portuguese colonial state, united for one goal, that of the creation of a modern nation.

Mozambique falls under the category of what Smith, defined as Ethnie, a “given human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” (2000: 65), This is as opposed to Michel Cahen’s argument that Mozambique cannot be a nation. Against all the leftover enthusiasm from the liberation veterans of 1975, Cahen further asserts that, “the term Mozambique itself is of Portuguese making, having little to do with any social or cultural reality” (Cahen 1987: 218). It is Cahen’s belief that in the rush to assert their imperial expansion, the Portuguese labeled the land Mozambique, for the creation of an economy in that region of Africa meant the creation of Mozambique (Ibid. 220). This imperialist-made country is not based
on the existing ethnic diversity of the region. Thus, those inside Mozambique are not necessarily conscious that they constitute one nation.

Cahen advanced these notions when studying the origins and nature of Frelimo and its discontents. Cahen’s underlying interest was to deconstruct Frelimo’s often-misleading socialist paradigm. He worked for a number of years at FRELIMO’s headquarters in Maputo. His findings led him to argue that the Mozambican Revolutionary Front (FRELIMO), in the Liberation struggle years, was made up of creoles, a direct product of colonial policies. These mulattos were the local elite from townships around major cities, mostly Lourenço Marques and Beira and commercial centers, who felt alienated from the colonial administration, and who found it suitable to impose their vision of what Mozambican society should be. They do not represent the masses of Mozambican people. For Cahen, the detachment between the township creole elites and the masses of Mozambicans explains the failure of FRELIMO’s nationalistic project (Ibid. 222). If the (tentative) definition of the nation as a human population occupying its historic homeland and sharing common myths and memories, a distinctive public culture, territorial mobility, and common laws and customs is considered, Cahen’s argument that Mozambique is not a nation, is “almost” sound. Macamo finds Cahen’s argument “lacking intellectual rigor, thus, unfounded and irrelevant” (Macamo 1996: 360). Yet, Cahen has a justifiable point; he at least provided grounds for problematizing the almighty FRELIMO on practical and theoretical foundations; in all his ‘sensationalism’ and technical ‘inaccuracies,’ which Macamo reveals, he raises crucial ontological issues of Mozambique as a nation and Moçambicanidade.

It is legitimate to question FRELIMO’s originality after the disillusionment that followed in the postcolonial area. Mondlane’s national project not only failed to deliver to its people the promises of modernity but waged a civil war against its adversary, Mozambique’s National Resistance group (RENAMO), for sixteen years, thus devastating the already fragile national economic infrastructures and turning Mozambicans into refugees in neighboring countries. Perhaps Mozambique, as a nation, has been an ideal not yet experienced by most of its citizens. The problem could be that the myth of nationhood, masked by ideology, tries to perpetuate nationalism but fails, as political scientists pointed out, to represent the diversity of the actual national community (Brito 1991, Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1992). As a result, the political elites try to cast an image of a homogeneous nation, but this image misleads, for in practice it only
represents and consolidates the interests of small but dominant group, and other small power groups within a national formation.

Although his objectives were to deconstruct the ideological construction of Mozambique as a nation, Cahen has a point. Considering that, the construction of the nation provides a potent site of control and domination within modern society, there is a justifiable ground for questions to be raised, particularly on the reasons for the failure of FRELIMO as a nationalistic project. This is because, according to Kohn, nationalists use the myth of a ‘national tradition’, a ‘national unity’, not only to legitimize a general idea of a social group but also to build a modern idea of a nation-state, in which all the instrumentalities of state power, such as military and police agencies, judiciaries, religious hierarchies, educational systems, and political assemblies or organizations, are subsumed and legitimized as the ‘natural’ manifestation of a unified national history and culture (1967: 64). The hard line FRELIMO’s ideological school of the First Republic tended to collapse the nation into nation-state.

Political elites often obscure the fact that a nation is both historically determinate and has a life. Kohn further explains that there is an effort to muddy the fact that, as a concept, a nation refers both to the modern nation-state and to something more ancient and nebulous, a local community, domicile, family, and condition of belonging (Ibid.). The blurring of the idea of the nation and the nation-state makes nationalism one of the most powerful forces in modern society. It also makes it an extremely contentious site on which ideas of self-determination and freedom, of identity and unity collide with ideas of suppression and force, and of domination and exclusion. That is what FRELIMO did and lately the Frelimo party and other regional liberation parties often do in order to place their own idea of a ‘country’ in an ‘immemorial past’ where its arbitrariness, failures, and barbarity against its own people are not be questioned.

The Mozambique national state and the Tsonga nation are both outcomes of a modern colonial context. Nationalism and nations are profoundly important in the formation (and deformation) of colonial practice. While explaining the economic emergence of late nineteenth-century imperialism, Hobson argued that colonialism may be considered a genuine expansion of nationality, where it consists in the migration of part of a nation to vacant or sparsely peopled foreign lands, the emigrants carrying with them full rights of citizenship in the mother country (Hobson 1902). However, the link between nation and expansion is much older, the emergence of the nation-state and the imperial-capitalist economies being inseparable. It is also arguable that,
without the provision of a greatly expanded source of supply for the dominant European standards of exchange (gold and silver), the rapid development of long-distance trading ventures in the Renaissance period would not have occurred.

Just as the modern European nation-states, which come into being in the wake of the breakup of the old imperial forms of the classical and medieval world, the colonial empires designed modern nations with the same practical structure (Kohn 1967). However, one thing imperialists did not take seriously was that these new subject nations would have similar internal dialectics of resistance and demand for separation based on autochthonous cultural traditions. Mozambique encompasses over seventeen well-distinguished nations in its modern borders, one of them being the Tsonga nation, so it is only fair to take Mozambique as a nation-state. But then in the utopian state effort to forge one heterogeneous nation, among many, the challenge seems colossal: how to manage one national soul, how to handle Moçambicanidade.

Mozambique is a national state, still aspiring to be a fully-fledged nation in the modern sense of the concept. A study of Constitutional documents indicates that Moçambicanidade is still a project in the making, under intense pressure to uphold the principles of sovereignty and legitimacy meaningful to its citizens. As to a concise definition, nothing is or should be guaranteed, starting from the notion of the nation itself. Renan’s lecture was about reminding people of the fragilities and contingent nature of a nation. Because politicians tend to legitimize the nation by any means, including making it looks old as civilization itself. Mozambique emerged under the pre-colonial era and later on, FRELIMO elites were no different from those French politicians Renan addressed. The concept of nation only got more complicated as postcolonial revolutionaries, demanding the use of a refreshed hermeneutics for the context, inspired the nation. The functioning of democratic institutions such as the parliament, the judiciary and a political executive who claim to represent Mozambican people and their common values are substantial evidence of the existence of a Moçambicanidade, although there may be divergent notions of what those common values are. The next section addresses the different understandings of Moçambicanidade.

4.2 The Schools of Moçambicanidade

The section probes into the nation-sate dynamics that shaped Moçambicanidade by tracing the dominant ideological lines that made up and still are influential in the national project. Like the discussions among Romande agents over the Tsonga tribal establishment, (where Junod wanted
to go one way, Berthoud and Creux wanted to go another, and the mother Church of Vaud felt entitled to yet a different plan), disputes on Moçambicanidade have been intense and often deadly. Moçambicanidade represents an ideal and imagined community in Anderson’s sense of the term, as it is “elusive,” hence something that inhabits the imagination of some, but is unreal to many others (Anderson 1983). It materialized through the 1962 nationalistic project hatched by Eduardo Mondlane’s FRELIMO. Its high moment was at National Independence Day celebrated on June 25, 1975. Mozambican spiritual roots—in Renan’s sense of a nation—date back to the sixteenth-century when the first Portuguese set foot in the region to dispute the space with the local chiefdoms, the oriental caravans of traders and scattered tribal societies. However, can these small and shifting “clanic” constituencies be considered nations?

The awareness that there is more than one narrative of origin already recognizes an element of competition between the schools, an attitude that is turning bolder in recent years. Hence, the issue of whether there is something called Moçambicanidade tops the debate on the agenda of the elite Mozambican intelligentsia, which in itself is positive. The dispute over the narrative legitimacy clearly indicates the importance of the Mozambican nation as an idea. The debate resonates with how Africa itself is, or has been, defined, what Mudimbe called The Idea of Africa (1994). There is a major debate between African intellectuals on the conceptual statute of Africa. One of the routes this debate has taken has been through the discussions of the existence of an African philosophy, inquiring whether an African philosophy exists or not (Appiah 1992; Kaphagawani 2002). Even when the above question is answered in the positive, there is still the dispute regarding the nature of such African “love for knowledge.”

In this regard, there are two opposing groups of intellectuals: those who argue that Africa constitutes one homogeneous culture based on common epistemological and metaphysical concepts, essentially one distinctive African philosophy (Tempels 1959; Mbiti 1991: 12) and, in contrast to this essentialist and homogenizing group is the second group which claims that the concept of Africa has its history (Mudimbe 1988; Bodurin 1985; Odera 1990; Appiah 1992). The last group points to the role of Western social sciences in the invention of African alterity, which in both the past, and in the present, legitimized colonialism of the continent. Yet, a close scrutiny of the debate reveals that it creates space for that which it purports to reject: the African philosophy. In other words, the debate creates Africa. As in the case of the African philosophy debate, the fact
of a “debate” on the existence of Moçambicanidade only goes to prove that it exists. At the very least, the debate itself creates it, for one can only debate that which already is.

Mozambique as a space underwent historical processes similar to those that the rest of African countries experienced. Local processes of political, social and economic development were interrupted. Yet, Portugal’s invention of Mozambique forced, in a particularly acute way, local people away from their cultures and into European history. Cabral’s notion of “cultural roots celebration” through negritude had, as one of its key objectives, the creation of space where Africans could confront the historical processes (Mondlane 1969: 24). Granted that the existence of Moçambicanidade is without dispute and then the question is: how does such identity manifest itself? How many strands of Moçambicanidade are there, if there are more than one?

A considerable body of the social science research on Moçambicanidade is available (Liesegang 1986, 1996; Araujo 1998; Khosa 2000; Silva 1998; Mazula 2000; Rocha 2002; Serra1998; and others) as well as short stories, poems, and oral and popular literature. The social research began to emerge in Salazar’s Estado Novo of 1929, having intensified as the colonial conditions of oppression worsened in the ensuing couple of decades. This section groups the divergent opinions into two schools: the Proto-nationalist school and the Ideological school. These two schools are loose, and to an extent, arbitrary. The division is an analytical tool devised for a better understanding of how different sections participated, in some form or another, in shaping Moçambicanidade.

According to the Proto-nationalists’ narrative, national consciousness formation emerged in a slow process that had its origins in the nineteenth-century, and was started by the small societies of intellectual black and mestiços elite clustered in the outskirts of Maputo and Beira (Rocha 2002; Ngoenha 2004). These clustered elites, in reaction to marginalization and oppressive colonial policies, protested by affirming their African personality in their gatherings. According to Rocha, they used media and “associativism” to create and affirm their African identity (Rocha 2002). Continuing victories of the Portuguese army from 1886 onwards, led to a total breakdown of the already divided groups of African chiefdoms in the region. Hence, the centre of resistance against the powerful European expansionism moved from the older broken hierarchies to intellectual urban groups and associations, which Andrade called “typical proto-nationalists” and rural individuals educated in religious missions, mostly Protestant missions, the atypical proto-nationalists (1997: 227-228). Rocha even argues that the “older hierarchical chiefdoms and
societies were impotent before the situation; thus, some of them were domesticated instruments of colonial administration” (2002: 19). Proto-nationalism took place during the implantation of the colonial administrative system following the Berlin conference of 1885. That also was the year the Portuguese army attacked the military state of Massangano, which marks the beginning of successive Portuguese military campaigns of occupation up to 1919. In this phase the scattered African clans fought unsuccessfully to defend themselves.

The second stage began even before the end of the first (that of military and administrative occupation of the territory) when small groups of natives, in an isolated way, started to lift up their voices in protest against various discriminative and oppressive acts of the colonial administration. This phase continued from 1900 through to 1930 (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983). Initially small groups of mulatto literate elites championed a separate identity from the Portuguese settlers. They used their perceived hybrid status and their basic literacy, attributes that allowed them to lead the local media and social clubs, to fight for a separate identity (Rocha 2002). From these small groups emerged a regionalist vision that protested their economic social state. Ultimately, out of these minority protests came the more politically aggressive period of nationalism, the formation of regional rebellious groups in the neighboring countries and ultimately the formation of FRELIMO out of those parties in 1962 in Dar-es-Salaam (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983). This association consisted of artists, writers, poets, journalists, lyricists, and a cast of public servants like schoolteachers, doctors, and administrators. Most of the skilled Frelimo cadres were formed from this section of modern Mozambique. The Proto-nationalist’s point is that, without knowing and acknowledging these early gestures, one cannot fully do justice to Mondlane’s modern nationalist activity. They recognized the events leading up to the political independence of 1975 to have been crucial for the formation of the nation yet, they claim that tribal nations like Tsonga, Karanga, Makua, Macondes and even the Nguni empire were already there and strong before the European invasion and should not simply be forgotten.

The Ideological school is, perhaps, the most publicized. Due to its privilege of representing the historic, and almost unchallenged Frelimo political party, cadres like Armando Guebuza, Marcelino dos Santos or Sergio Vieira claim to be poets. Most of the Frelimo elite claimed to be poets. Most of the ex-combatants of the FRELIMO are public service men and women, artists, teachers, doctors, and the majority of the middle class educated Christian community. The ideological school defends the idea of Moçambicanidade, which flourished with the 1975 advent
of national political independence and it has clear territorial boundaries. For this school, Moçambicanidade is a recent and unique political project. Like the Portuguese political project that was born of Portugal’s refusal to be a Spanish province, the Mozambican project was born out of the refusal of Mozambicans to continue to be Portugal’s province inhabitants. At the heart of this project is the aspiration for total independence, which in turn is located within the large pro-independence group of Blacks throughout the world. Born in 1962 in exile, the project was set to unite all the political micro-communities and make them into a powerful community. Moçambicanidade emerged as the ideal citizen’s freedom, a space where particularities of each member, ethnic, and religious, cultural and linguistic were put aside in order to address a common problem.

Moçambicanidade’s key ambition has been to transcend biological, social, religious, and cultural differences among its constituting micro-political organizations such as UDENAMO, MANO, and MANI. Moçambicanidade was opposed to micro-nationalisms, tribalism, and regionalism. Renan has shown that race, language, and religion were not sufficient geographical definitions of a nation. For him, a nation was a spiritual principle, a consequence of historical changes; a spiritual family is not a determined group confined to a particular geographical space. From this subjective definition, Renan moves on to argue that nation is the “soul,” a spiritual principle, solidarity and a moral conscience (Bhabha: 1990: 19). Moçambicanidade is a modern national concept, not only because it was located within the colonial physical space but also because it set itself to overcoming differences through political means (Mondlane 1969).

In the post-independence era, there is an increasing number of multi-disciplinary research works, and literary works in particular, are dedicated to the subject of Moçambicanidade, the most eloquent of them, by Ngoenha, is entitled Por Uma Dimensão Moçambicana da Consciência Histórica (1992), literally meaning “Mozambican dimension toward consciousness of history.” The title is self-explanatory and in the context of African constitution, means to search for, in the African historical processes, the elements that distinguish Mozambicans from other nationalities. That is, to locate specifically Mozambicans and bring to the fore the elements that can lead to the definition of a national identity. Accordingly, Mozambican identity must be regarded, largely, as a heritage from men and women who fought against the colonial regime, sacrificed and even died in the effort to achieve political freedom. The struggle of Moçambicanidade is linked to the overall African struggle for liberation. Consequently, African philosophy is referenced as that which gives
meaning to and reason for being of a Mozambican identity or of Moçambicanidade. If African philosophy is contained within the search of Black African freedom, Moçambicanidade’s corollary was reached through the establishment of African states in the Americas and in Africa. Mozambique is one of the last chapters in the long process toward the liberation of the Black people. Mozambican identity is an outcome of the creation of the Mozambican nation, which means that the former constitutes the finished product in the long process. Therefore, Mozambican identity is within the African philosophy debates mentioned on the page 94.

Popular lyrics and poetry were the means by which people expressed their ideas. Both Proto-nationalist and Ideological schools are well represented in literature. Most of the early Frelimo cadres were poets and writers. Thus, nationalist or revolutionary literature is a valuable source-material for understanding the formation of national identity in Mozambique. Moçambicanidade literature is a large category, and it could be claimed that most of its writers are engaged in creating “a” Mozambican literature. This is in reference to those writers who consciously decided to write a specifically Mozambican literature and who sought the literary means of doing so by turning to what one can broadly call the culture(s) of Mozambique, a Mozambique that did not yet exist as a nation, and to the construction of which this literature naturally contributed. The differences between the two schools can be summed up thus: Mozambique’s Proto-nationalism started back in the 1895 with the fall of the Nguni Empire. It was composed of two overlapping stages, the stage of coping with the defeat (1896-1919) and that of city-based minority reactions (1900-1940s); whereas, the Frelimo Ideological School started in the late 1950s and continued through 1975, the year of independence. Secondly: Proto-nationalists were politically more cautiously aggressive than the ideological Frelimo School. The difference of intensity makes sense, given the contexts and capabilities each group had to help it withstand a possible backlash.

Finally, the FRELIMO school gives less emphasis to older experiences in the building of the new modern nation, whereas, the proto-nationalist school cannot envision a modern nation without acknowledging the earlier struggles of groups and societies like the Maputo-born African elite (Rocha 2002). What is common in these schools is that they are both political, with a nationalistic agenda, and intended to build a nation. Both used artistic expressions as a political strategy and both were aware of their multi-ethnic background, driving their will to build a heterogeneous nation.
Civil religion emerges and finds justification through the disputes in the identity creation process (Cristi 2001); it is from those disputes that civil religion works to legitimate the emerging political discourse (Ibid. 7). It may be difficult to perceive the gap and adversities between the two schools of Moçambicanidade by hearing Frelimo elite speeches. However, developments on the political landscape, often determined by internal divisions and international World Order paradigm shifts, had a profound impact on the otherwise idealistic, positive, and promising national project at the onset. This section engages the two FRELIMO schools in a critical genealogical debate towards probing their epistemological grounds. The underlying assumption is that disputes, contestations and conflicts are inherent facts in any consecration or desecration of a space, principle or a thing. The focus is on the ideological school, because it is the most successful and has had greater impact.

In its early days, Mozambique’s Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was a deeply divided party, with strong factions at war over the leadership, military tactics, and the long-term political direction of the movement (Hall 1997). The first president, Eduardo Mondlane, was reported to have been assassinated by a rival faction and a number of important figures broke away and even attempted to form competing movements (Vines 1991). However, from these early splits, the Front emerged in 1969 under the leadership of Samora Machel as a remarkably cohesive party. Most of the leading group members came from the south, which included intellectuals and poets, whites and mestiços. Although disagreements occasionally surfaced and minor adjustments were made in the “ministerial team,” the inner core of FRELIMO’s leadership remained united and largely unchanged for twenty-five years after independence (Newitt 2002: 206). However, after the Third Congress of 1977, FRELIMO saw itself as a “vanguard” party leading the people to victory against imperialism and its allies (Frelimo 1977). Critics observe that it became authoritarian, with orders coming from top to bottom (Cahen 1987; Geffray 1990). It was in this Congress that FRELIMO changed from a Front or movement to a party, hence no longer FRELIMO but Frelimo. Notice that throughout this study FRELIMO (in capital letters) means the Mozambique Liberation Front before the 1977 Congress whereas, Frelimo means the party.

The party adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology as the orientation line (Frelimo 1977). The party became exclusivist and elitist and its membership dropped significantly (Brito 1991), and
thus, became a party without a mass membership. As one observer has put it, “Frelimo came to depend on a numerically weak but relatively privileged urban proletariat, a burgeoning state bureaucracy, and an external network centered on Moscow” (Simpson 1993: 323). The Third Congress ushered in a sharp shift, a paradigm change, in Frelimo’s course. Today it is not difficult to see that what followed for the next twenty to thirty-five years were small gains for the leadership in exchange for large losses for the masses. Analysts point to a number of Frelimo’s political shortcomings, which collectively led to the weakening of the nation. The list of shortfalls is long; some of the most relevant issues include Machel’s unwelcoming style of exhortation. According to Newitt his appeal for self-sacrifice and hard work were not attractive to people after independence (1995). The strategies that succeeded in wartime and might have been relevant in facing emergencies were unattractive to people as an everyday practice. Secondly, the party was deliberately exclusive and its policies alienated large sections of the population (Hanlon 2002). Thirdly, it appeared to be heavily dependent on expatriate advisers to the disadvantage of homegrown expertise in many fields (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1995), and the problem with expatriate advisers, is that their commitment tended to be temporary (Ibid. 325). Fourthly, with the flight of the Portuguese settlers, Mozambique was short of skilled personnel in every sector of society and simply lacked the expertise and professional cadres needed to carry out ambitious central planning. Inheriting the intensely bureaucratic administration of the Portuguese, government soon became a byword for delay and official obstruction; fifthly, Frelimo’s excessive confidence in its own policies proved disastrous (Geffray 1990).

With all of Frelimo’s shortcomings and drawbacks there are reasons to admit that FRELIMO has been a failed project. In this regard, Newitt states that although the FRELIMO leadership had a clearer idea than most others of the elite of postcolonial Africa did about what needed to be done to transform the colonial inheritance, “the state in Mozambique was nevertheless to collapse more swiftly and more completely than in any other former colony” (2002: 195).

Newitt’s opinion represents a large pool of researchers who not only regard FRELIMO as a failed project, but also that the nation collapsed. These scholars include Chabal & Daloz 1999; 2002; Hanlon 1984, and Hall 1997 and others. The events around the death of Machel in 1986 signaled a major ideological paradigm change. Marxist-Leninist philosophy gave way to a sort of capitalist, free market strategy. The defeat of the East by the West was symbolized by the birth of Mozambique’s Second Republic. Another group of scholars argue that Mozambique as a nation
did not die along with Machel at Mbuzini, but only the political plan of a socialist nation-state
died. This group composed mostly of active and retired Frelimo sympathizers, who believe that
the state was always operational, and that the judicial, executive and legislative branches were not
interrupted in any of the events leading up to the multiparty nation of 1994.

A third group, represented by Cahen, finds it pointless to talk about a Mozambique nation
because there has never been one (Cahen 1990). Cahen argues that the Mozambican nation is an
invention of the internal elites marginalized by the colonial administration, who in reaction to this
marginalization, created what it thought to be a representation of a Mozambican identity. Cahen
however, is of the opinion that such nationalists could not claim to represent the African people’s
interests because they were detached from real Africans in the countryside (Ibid.).

The argument that the state failed is increasingly acquiring substance in consciousness of
most Mozambicans. Such notion has profound impact into the relationship between state and
society. The consequences of the state’s failure pervade every relation at many levels of society,
such that it has become hard to undermine the fact. In the light of this a panel of social scientists
conducted a study to measure the relationship status between the state and society (Etica 2001).
Up to the year 2001 more than half of Mozambicans believed the state was corrupt (Ibid. 82).
People believed that the majority of state employees were involved in acts of corruption (Ibid.).
The state corruption has not gone down since the corruption survey done by Etica in 2001.

The problem in assessing the postcolonial state of Mozambique seems to reside with how
the imported models of governance were assessed, namely the purportedly Social Marxist of the
First Republic and neoliberal free market Capitalism of the Second Republic. This has been
influenced by silence of critical voices characteristic of politics dominated social systems, where
for anyone to get any state service must use channels of loyalties. Channels of loyalty usually
discouraged critical assessments by anyone, particularly by the members of the party. Anyone
perceived to be thinking differently from the leader is considered counter-revolutionary (Brito
1991). There is the issue of fear of critical analysis by the members. The study analyzes the
nationalism as a civil religious phenomenon, that is, Moçambicanidade as a group identity, which
is also a civil religious phenomenon; thus, the importance of knowing the welfare of postcolonial
nationalist state of Moçambique is fairing.

An assessment of the state should start from the quality of the state and society’s
relationship. That politics must be understood in terms of the patterns of political legitimacy,
accountability, redistribution, and the use of power. This means that, for instance, the evolution of Frelimo as a process, by which society re-affirmed control over Marcelo Caetano’s colonial order, via the state, rather than simply as a process by which the holders of state power exercised their hegemonic powers. As the Etica study indicated, the state faces high levels of corruption (2001). It is undeniable that since the political independence of 1975, politics has been handled according to who knows whom. This is to the detriment of using legal procedures, where everyone has the same rights, in order to achieve their own objective.

The widespread corruption in the state institutions indicates the fragilities, which affect negatively the relation of the state and society. The social unrests of February 2008 and September 2010, throughout the country and particularly in the major cities, are indications that society is at the critical point with its state. The perception that the state is corrupt gives a sense of despair to its constituents. A loyalist state only serves those who know someone positioned at the top within the system. Because, while at the formal macro-analytical level it has often been convenient to view state and society as competitors for national resources, at the real but informal micro-level, what matters are the strong complicities woven within the loyalist networks that bind individuals, from the top to bottom. In effect, then, the loyalist networks linking state and society are so numerous and so extensive that they guarantee the maintenance of a political system in which the state is only paramount over, in so far as it is colonized by society. Political leaders, derive their legitimacy from their ability to placate their clients. Hence, the political system is regarded as largely informal, where citizens can access power only through powerful connections with politicians.

Could Moçambicanidade survive without FRELIMO or Frelimo? Is it warranted to argue the death of Moçambicanidade along with the Socialist First Republic? Mozambique is a multiethnic territory that does not fit the modern definition of a nation. It is a political entity within a clear territory and a historic nation in the sense conveyed by Hobsbawm in Nations and nationalism (1990). Moçambicanidade refers not only to a pre-planned project into which social engineers have worked to fit people. However, Moçambicanidade as a group identity of a people located in a historic territory exists. The study points to the critical conceptual crisis installed in Frelimo, a crisis caused by a systematic misplacement of reality within the Frelimo leadership, particularly after the Third Congress of 1977 (Geffray 1990). An outdated ideological import, the lack of dialog between state and the majority of its people, and a reliance on a small proletariat
section in Maputo city, are facts at the heart of the crisis (Cahen 1993; Newitt 1995). Having defended the existence of Moçambicanidade, although in a moribund state, one should keep in mind the contingent nature of both a nation and a national identity; nation must always be framed within a limited space and time (Hobsbawm 1990). Hence, the section indicates the inevitable genealogical disputes in the making of a set-aside group identity. Accordingly, Moçambique may not be an exception to such rules of nature. With all of the above said, the organic nature of identity should not be forgotten. Moçambicanidade may take a course different from what Frelimo wanted to impose.

A brief assessment of the purported liberal capitalist environments in the country, makes one realizes that a Mozambican identity or Moçambicanidade has never been as much of a focal point in public or private debates as it is now. At the same time, such identity has not experienced so much pressure since political independence. The pressure is internal as well as external. From outside, the challenge is sovereignty, trade barriers, and greedy capitalism, whereas the exaltation of individuals and their needs, at the expense of common citizens, are the major enemies from within. However, future challenges are not the focus of this chapter as it limits itself to showing the conceptual flaws, which lead to the crisis of the Moçambicanidade experience after 1977.

Mozambique’s complex political analysis in this section began by presenting an early FRELIMO challenged by inside contestations for power between the different group representatives. Such quarrels were perhaps not surprising for Eduardo Mondlane because of the ethnic diversity but they ultimately ended with his life. As Mondlane founded it, Moçambicanidade was based on a multi-ethnic culture. With his death and Samora at the helm, FRELIMO gained political independence in 1975, the high point of national building. The fights within FRELIMO were not entirely extinguished. A number of marginalized key members were forced to leave the party (Brito 1991). Some of those who were at the founding of the movement were executed in an obscure prison (Ncomo 2003). A majority of those malcontents constitutes the National Resistance Movement, RENAMO (Alden 2001), which came into existence in the period 1975-1977.

In 1977, Frelimo shifted to a Marxist-Leninist ideology, thus marking a hard-line political orientation. The separation between the state and its people was evident thereafter. In the new context common Mozambicans felt intimidated. Gradually, these people, who played a key role in supporting FRELIMO in the ten-year struggle for independence, were marginalized in the decision-making process of the Frelimo party because they were not consulted on the destinies of
the nation (Casal 1996). Citizens, then called comrades and members, received orders that were, for the most part, only from top to bottom. The government became everything, knew everything and everything belonged to it.

Some argued that Moçambicanidade was passé (Chabal & Daloz 1999), and some went as far as to argue that there could be no such a thing as Moçambicanidade (Cahen 1987). To these Mozambicanists, citizens were misled into thinking that the idea of nation was real. Yet, another group, amidst Africanists’ nihilism and Frelimo’s continuing misjudgments, was positive that Moçambicanidade was real and still existed (Macamo 1996; Ngoenha 1992). Such existence cannot be credited only to Mozambicans themselves but also to the organic nature of identity. A suppressed identity finds ways to survive, depending on the adaptability of its consumers. Moçambicanidade is manifested largely in subtle cultural forms and gestures, mostly in an aesthetic representation. The next section probes how poetry by Craveirinha helped defined a Moçambicanidade through the use of eschatological civil religious symbols.

4.4 Aesthetic Representation

This section examines the literary work of Jose Craveirinha primarily to indicate that Moçambicanidade existed as a civil religion in organic form before it was consolidated into instrumental; secondly, to reveal the eschatological civil religion underlying Craveirinha’s aestheticism.

Of mixed parentage, Craveirinha was born to a Portuguese white father and black MaRonga mother of the Mafalala barrio in 1936 and died in 2004. Craveirinha understood poetry as art; he performed it for the sake of art. The reality he described is real in the artistic sense first, before it became real in other fields of understanding. His poetry is revolutionary in a meaningful sense only with reference to itself. This is in contrast to politicians who claim to be artists of “revolution.” In this sense, one finds Craveirinha’s poems more revolutionary than those of declared political artists like Sergio Vieira or Armando Guebuza, for if the political propaganda element is taken from their work, little or nothing of art is left; whereas in Craveirinha’s poems, the political potential lies within the aesthetic dimension. Craveirinha’s poems are captivating, regardless of their political significance; i.e. they transcend the immediate political situation of the time and move on to the aesthetic dimension, to be inspiring and liberating as art for art’s sake.
Among the most significant ‘themes’, the realist, the negritude, the cultural, the prison poetry, the social and the political should be highlighted. This section touches on these themes in order to give a sense of how they contributed to, and reflected the evolution of Moçambicanidade. In a vivid eschatological symbolism Craveirinha’s poems represent and reflect the genealogies of Moçambicanidade as collective identity formation, this in turn meant the emergence civil religion. As stated at the thesis introductory section I, Moçambicanidade as a group identity is an ideal and imagined community, in Anderson’s sense of the term, due to its elusive trait. The study examines archival material, in this particular section Craveirinha’s poems, from where it draws evidences; hence, the focus on the theoretical mapping.

In Karingana Ua Karingana’s “Fabulario” (2008a: 9) Craveirinha wrote in a typically neorealist fashion about everyday life in colonial Mozambique. The deliberate decision to write in the simplest possible language about the most mundane aspects of the life of ordinary people has been Craveirinha’s essential elements in the creation of a ‘national’ consciousness, for it asserts powerfully that such reality is a legitimate, worthy and relevant source of inspiration not only for literary creation but also for people’s attention over the common issues. Wherever there is a platform to discuss issues of a group, it is more likely that the same space can be for common cultural values interaction, and if common cultural values are discussed an imagined community can also be forged. This is how Craveirinha’s artistic representation played a mediating role by bringing common cultural values and problems to peoples’ consciousness. For this purpose he deployed eschatological discourse in which, gods, spirits of the dead, ancestors, saints, and larger than life figures, such that the emerging nation under FRELIMO leadership acquired transcendental status.

The poem entitled ‘Fabula’ is one of the several polished examples of Craveirinha’s talent in this respect:

Menino/gordo comprou um balão/ e assoprou/ assoprou com força o balão amarelo./ Menino gordo soprou/ assoprou/ assoprou/ o balão inchou/ inchou/ inchou/ e rebentou!/ Meninos magros apanharam os restos/ e fizeram balõezinhos. [Fat boy bought a balloon/ and blew it/ blew it with vigor the yellow balloon. Fat boy blew/ blew/ blew the balloon grew/ grew/ grew and exploded!/ Thin boys collected the bits/ and made little balloons] (Craveirinha 2008a:18).
There is, in the theme of the fable, a description of a reality that everyone in the barrios around the cities easily related to in the colonial era. But, at the same time there is a clear reference to one of the archetypes of African oral literature—hence, the deep impact of Craveirinha’s poems in the context of an emerging Moçambicanidade and Mozambican literature. At the very beginning of the book Craveirinha describes the poet thus:

Este jeito/ de contar as nossas coisas/ a maneira simples das profecias/---Karingana ua Karingana—/ é que faz o poeta sentir-se gente./ E nem/ de outra forma se inventa/ o que é propriedade dos poetas/ nem em plena vida se transforma/ a visão do que parece impossível/ em sonho do que vai ser./ Karingana! [this way/ of telling our things/ in the simple way of prophecies/---Karingana ua Karingana---/ is what makes the poet feel/ human’ and there is no/ other way of inventing/ what it is that poets do/ in real life to change/ the vision of what appears impossible/ in the dream of what is going to be./ Karingana!] (2008a: 11).

The negritude phase is, of course, universal in the evolution of African literature, even if it has taken various forms and has been called by entirely different names. Briefly, what is meant by “negritude,” in this section is the attempt to recover, redeem, and proclaim African indigenous culture as the basis for African literature. Negritude is thus the most overt and explicit phase of cultural nationalism to be found in modern African literature. Craveirinha’s work contains two types of poems that speak directly to the negritude experience. The first and largest group of poems, many of which are found in Xigubo, is on African culture and history. Through this style Craveirinha writes in order to inspire his fellow people motivating them to feel just about themselves. The second, chiefly from the late 1940s and 1950s, are made of poems that refer to the experience, sometimes the achievements, of Blacks across the world. Poems like “Joe Louis nosso campeão”, “Grito Negro” and “Manifesto” come under this rubric. Of these “Grito Negro” and “Africa” (Ibid. 20) are especially powerful and original. The first is a brilliant display of irony on the theme of the colonial exploitation of African labor, irony with a jagged edge in the pounding repetition of the grating Portuguese sound “ão”:

Eu sou carvão./ E tu arrancas-me brutalmente do chão./ E fazes-me a tua mina./ Patrão!
Eu sou carvão./ Tenho que arder./ E queimar tudo com o fogo da minha combustão./ Sim!/ Eu serei o teu carvão/ Patrão. [I am coal/ And you tear me brutally from the soil/ And make me your mine/ Boss!..// I am coal!/ I will be coal/ Boss!] (Craveirinha 2008b: 19).
“Africa” stands the values of the European colonizer on their head as a way of redeeming that, which is Africa. The poem opens thus:

Em meus labios grossos fermenta/ a farinha do sarcasmo que coloniza minha mae Africa/… (Ibid. 15). [In my thick lips, there ferments/ the flour of the sarcasm that colonizes my Mother Africa] (2008b: 20).

Similarly “Manifesto” begins:

Oh!/ Meus belos e curtos cabelos crespos/ e meus olhos negros como insurrectas/ grandes luas de pasmo na noite mais bela/ das mais belas noites inesqueciveis das terras do Zambeze./… [Oh!/ My beautiful short curly hair/ and my negro eyes like the revolted/ large moons of wonderment in the most beautiful night/ of the most unforgettably beautiful nights of the land of the Zambezi] (Ibid. 38).

Cultural affirmation is very closely linked to negritude but, in this thesis, refers much more specifically to the cultural values of Mozambique—as opposed to those of blacks generally. Xigubo, “Hino a minha terra” (Hymn to my homeland) and “Sangue da minha mãe” (My mother’s blood) are some examples of the many poems in which Craveirinha expressed the virtue of Mozambican culture and attempted to transform the apparent cultural inferiority of a defeated, colonized and subjugated people into a redeemed culture of creativity, strength and hope. Xigubo (the name of a dance) is a fine example of how negritude works. By writing about some of the strongest African traditions, the poet asserts the value of that very culture.

Minha Mae Africa/ meu irmao Zambeze/ Culucumba! Culucumba!/ Xigubo estremece terra do mato/ e negros fundem-se ao sopro da xipalapala/ e negrinos de peito nus na sua cadencia/ levantamm os braços para o lume da irma lua/ e dançam as danças do tempo da Guerra das velhas tribos da margem do rio/… (Ibid 9) [My mother Africa/ my brother Zambezi/ Culucumba! Culucumba!/ Xigubo shakes the soil of the plain/ and negroes melt in the sound of the xipalapala/ and bare-chested young negroes rhythmically/raise their arms to the light of the sister moon/ and dance the war dances of the ancient tribes of the river] (2008b: 9).

The other classic method by which negritude seeks to redeem African culture is by asserting its very identity in the most fundamental way that is by enunciating its component parts. There can be few finer lyrical examples of such poetic enunciation than “Hino a minha terra”: 
Amanhece/ sobre as cidades do futuro./ e uma saudade cresce no nome das coisas/ e digo
Metengobalame e Macomia/ e é Metengobalame Mutamba, Massangulo!!!/ E torno a gritar
Inhamussua, Mutamba, Massangulo!!!/ e outros nomes da minha terra/ afluem doces e
altivos na memória filial/ e na exacta pronúncia desnudo a beleza../’ (2008b: 13).

[The day breaks/ on the cities of the future./ and the longing grows on the name of things/
and I say Metengobalame and Macomia/ and Metengobalame, Mutamba, Massangulo/ And
I cry Inhamussua, Mutamba, Massangulo!!!/ And I cry again Inhamussua, Mutamba,
Massangulo!!!/ And other names from my land flow softly and proudly into my filial
memory/ and in their exact pronunciation I unveil their beauty] (2008b: 13).

Craveirinha’s prison poetry, a sub-genre of the literature of suffering and oppression,
appears in Cela 1. Craveirinha went to jail in 1964 for being a FRELIMO supporter. While
he shared the experience of many other nationalists. Although prison is an intensely personal
experience, as is evident in the poetry published in Cela 1, there is in Craveirinha’s writing a
meditation the relationship between the meaning of his experience and the construction of
Mozambique as a nation. Poems like “Calabouço”, “O meu preço” and “Inclandestinidade”
exemplify the cultural implications of oppression and incarceration. Craveirinha’s talent is always
apparent but it is particularly striking in the simplicity of poems like ”Aforismo:”

Havia uma formiga/ compartilhando comigo o isolamento/ e comendo juntos./ estávamos
iguais/ com duas diferenças: não era interrogada e por descuido podiam a pisar-la. Mas aos
dois intencionalmente podiam por-nos de rastos mas não podiam ajoelhá-nos. [There was
an ant/ sharing my isolation/ and we ate together./ We were equal/ with two differences:/
it was not interrogated/ and it might by accident be crushed./ but though they could decide/
to make the two of us crawl/ they could not/ make us kneel) (1980: 16).

Craveirinha’s social concerns, or rather his concerns about the social aspects of ordinary
life, are everywhere apparent. Much of his poetry is a commentary on a mostly urban life from the
1940s to the present. He has been the ever-watchful witness to the interaction between the world
of the white “cement” city and that of the black suburbia. As suggested earlier, one of the great
strengths of Craveirinha’s poetry has always been the degree to which it responds to the simple
human aspects of life around him. As a result, his poetry provides a great depth of insight into the
lives of Africans in colonial times. From the earliest poems, published in Karingana Ua
Karingana’s “Fabulario”, to those like “Os dois meninos maus estudantes” (1980: 39) and up to
his recent “As tanjarinas de Inhambane,” Craveirinha has shown that his poetry resonates vibrantly
to the very texture of society around him. He has shown too that the most effective “social”
literature is that which is expressed most poetically. Hear for example, his poem “Ninguem”:
Andaimes/ ate ao decimo quinto andar/ do moderno edificio de betão armado./ O ritmo
florestal dos ferros erguidos/ arquitectonicamente no ar/ e um transeute curioso/ que
pergunta:/ Já caiu alguém dos andaimes?/ O pausado ronronar/ dos motores a óleos
pesados/ e a tranquila resposta do senhor empreiteiro:/ Ninguem. Só dois pretos.
[Scaffolding/ to the fifteenth floor of the modern building in reinforced concrete./ the forest
like rhythm of the erect iron/ architecturally in the air/ and a curious passer-by/ asks: Did
anyone ever fall from the scaffolding?/ The interrupted purring/ of the engine with heavy

The following two poems illustrate the author’s ability to deploy fully his literary gift in
the cause of social commentary. What is striking is not only the distinctiveness involved in writing
about everyday life but also the narrative quality of the most austere poetic language. ‘História do
magaiza Madevo’ [History of the migrant worker Madevo] opens with the following limpid lines:

Madevo/ foi no comboio do meio-dia/ casa de caniço ficou la na terra/ mamana escondeu
coracão na xicatauana/ Água de chuva secou no ceu./… [Madevo/ left on the mid-day train/
the thatched hut remained back there/ mother hid her heart in the xicatauana/ rainwater
dried in the sky](2008b: 58).

“Afinal… a bala do Homem mau” is a poem of simple language carried forward in a spiral
by the momentum of a pulsating rhythm, which tears the darkness of the night.

Era noite/ o menino vadio tinha fome/ na papaeira a papaia estava madura/ e o menino
vadio estendeu a mão./…/ Era noite!/ Era noite e o menino estendeu a mão/ e afinal nao
era o menino que tinha fome/ e afinal a bala do homem mau no Chamanculo/ é que tinha
mais fome no menino./…/ Afinal ara a bala que tinha fome/ da fome do menino do
Chamanculo. [It was night the homeless boy was hungry the papaya was ripe on the papaya
tree/ and the homeless boy extended his hand. /…/ It was night! It was night and boy was
hungry/ and in the end it was the bullet from the evil man from Chamanculo/ which was
hungrier for the boy/…/ In the end it was the bullet which was hungry/ for the hunger of
the boy from Chamanculo](2008b:50).

The same literary quality can be found in Craveirinha’s “political” poetry. “Manifesto” is
a clear call to arms. In “Jambul” (symbol of the African who resisted European colonization), the
last few lines are also without ambiguity: …Jambul o terceiro homem,/ Jambul o homem da
esperança/ Jambul azagaia da Redenção. [Jumbul the third man/ Jumbul the man of hope/ Jumbul
Different but equally powerful is “Em quantas partes”:

Em quantas partes se divide um grito/ em quantos corações se parte uma terra/ em quantos olhos se come o sol/ e em quantos pães se mata um sonho?/. [Into how many parts can you divide a cry/ into how many hearts can you split a land/ into how many eyes can you eat the sun/ into how many breads can you kill a dream/] (2008a: 158).

There is also strong political resonance and much subterranean power in his well-known poem “Quero ser tambor”:

Tambor está velho de gritar/ o velho Deus dos homens/ deixa-me ser tambor/ só tambor gritando na noite quente dos trópicos/…/ Só tambor ecoando a canção da força e da vida/ só tambor noite e dia/ dia e noite só tambor/ até a consumação da grande festa do batuque!
[Drum is old from shouting/ oh men’s old God/ let me be drum/ only drum calling out in the hot tropical night/…/ Only drum echoing the song from strength and life/ only drum night and day/ day and night only drum/ until the consummation of the great dancing feast!]
(Ibid. 124).

His biting poem “As tanjarinas de Inhambane” is proof that Craveirinha has retained, in independence, the subversive streak, which marked his poetry of the colonial era. In his long poem, the poet asks why it is that the tasty “tanjarines” of Inhambane fail to reach the capital, a mere sixty kilometers away. The answer is a sustained and acute (but always witty) indictment of the corruption and incompetence of the power-hungry crowd, which runs the government and its many ancillary bodies. The poem opens thus:

Serão palmas induvidosas todas as palmas que palmeiam os discursos dos chefes?/ Não são aleivosos certos panegíricos excessivos de vivas?/ auscultemos os gritos vociferados nos comícios./ E nas bichas são ou não são bizarros os sigilosos sussuros?/… [Is the applause always plausible that applauds the bosses’ speeches?/ Are certain over-exuberant panegyrics to be trusted?/ Let us heed carefully the shouts bawled at the rallies./ Isn’t there something odd in the secretive whispering in the queues? (Ibid. 129).

It continues:

…/ É preciso, nós vamos fazer estratégia de mestre Lenine/ e vamos avançar duas dialéticas cambalhotas atrás/ Moçambicanissimamente objectivas/ concretissimamente bem moçambicanas/…[it is necessary. We are going to use the strategy of maestro Lenine/ and go forward with two dialectical backward somersaults/ objectively in the most Mozambican of styles/ and Mozambican in the most concrete of senses] (Ibid.).
And it ends:

Agora casca uma tanjarina e prova um gomo mas outro gomo./ É doce ou não é doce Camarada Control?/ Pronto!/ Muito obrigado Camarada Control!/ E viva as saborosas tanjarinas d’Inhambane!!!/ VIVA!!!. [Now peel a tanjarine and taste it bit by bit./ in’st it sweet Comrade Control?/ Right!/ And long live the tasty tanjarines of Inhambane!!!/ VIVA!!!] (Ibid.).

A study of Craveirinha’s poems reveal not only a great aestheticist but also a civil religious theologian who lived, listened and ultimately gathered the ordinary everyday experiences of his people and turned them into a powerful conscience-awakening and thought provoking discourse. His masterly use of religious themes made it possible for Psikwembu forces (gods, spirits of the dead, ancestors, heroes and, to great extent, larger-than-life figures, like Maguiguana, Ngungunhane, Mahazule and Jambul), become active in common events, thus according them a transcendent status. Craveirinhas’ writings, over forty years and cited above, reflected a shared repertoire of practices representing the collective Mozambican aspirations for freedom. More importantly, his work portrays an undercurrent of religious themes such as old gods, the ngomas, the collective rituals of feasting and preparing for war, and the simple prophecies that promise liberation by the spear of redemption. Craveirinha dreamed of an independent Mozambique, of a new citizenship, other than the assimilado or molattoe identity attributed to him by the colonial state. This dream of a new identity is quite vivid in the poem of the future citizen in which he identifies himself as someone who

Come(s) from anywhere, from a nation still to be born. I came and here I am!/ I was not born only me, nor you or any other…but brother./But I have got love in full hands to offer. Love of who I am and nothing else./ And I carry agonies not only mine, because I come from a nation still to come./ Citizen of a nation still in the making (2008b: 24).

The deliberate tendency to recycle the repertoire of ordinary life experience into extraordinary events justifies the assertion that an implicit civil religious undercurrent is present in Craveirinha’s aesthetic representation of Moçambicanidade. A poet, for Craveirinha, is not just someone who tells stories that commoners can relate to, a poet is an envoy of the gods, a prophet who conveys the message of the gods using simple analogies and parables. What makes a poet feel
a fully human, Craveirinha believed, is the realization that his work reveals, enlightens and projects a comprising future. It was in such a context that he wrote thus:

This way/ of telling our things, / in the simple way of prophecies—Karingana ua Karingana—is what makes the poet feel/ human and there is no/ other way of inventing/ what it is that poets do/ in real life to change/ the vision of what appears impossible/ in the dream of what is going to be. / Karingana! (2008a: 11).

On other occasions, Craveirinha felt that a prophet is a night watcher, sometimes ngoma itself. Poets not only awaken people to a particular situation but they are part of the spirit itself, moving people in a particular direction. His work reveals that as the ngoma, Craveirinha felt his role was to thunder a warning to the community (2008a: 11).

His voice had to be strong, the voice of a strong hard leather that when drummed, awakens life in the plantations. Its millenary calling sound must not be confounded./ Its mad cry of the roots of the land. Its enormous rhythms, very mystic batuque sounds/… and the jungle awakens in lunar nightmares. (Ibid.)

This is because, according to Craveirinha, the old ngoma ferments the powerful spirits, like the great god Maguiguana at the heart of Africa. Ngoma, the poet or the prophet acts in accordance with the great spirits of Psikwembu like Maguiguana, Ngungunane, and Mahazule. Poets are part of the vision of justice, liberation and peace to the land. His visions of liberation were, however, to be preceded by war. Craveirinha had terrible visions of war on the mother Africa. He thus wrote:

My mother Africa/ my brother Zambezi/ God! God! /Xigubo (Xigubo is an orchestra of ngomas and other musical instruments when assembled together) shakes the soil of the plain/ and Negroes melt in the sound of the xipalapala/ and bare-chested young Negroes rhythmically/raise their arms to the light of the sister moon/ and dance the war dances of the ancient tribes of the river (2008a).

In the liberation war old myths of old glories are assembled to assure victory against the enemy. Craveirinha paints the Jambul character as the arch hero who, despite the defeat of
Magiguana by the Portuguese, never capitulated under the invading colonial enemy. Jambul preferred to sacrifice his own life rather than to face humiliation by the enemy, in the style of the legendary Nipponic Samurais who, upon realizing the inevitability of a defeat, end their own lives before being shamed by the enemy.

Jambul is [the third man/ Jambul the man of hope/ Jambul the spear of Redemption] (2008b: 42).

His view of the poet as a prophet and a visionary, gave him reason to claim to be the messenger of the gods, and the ngoma, the drum that thunders the message. For instance, he wrote thus:

Oh, old God of men, I want to be ngoma./ Not river, not flower, for now not an assegai, nor poem./ Only ngoma echoing the life’s power force./ Only ngoma night and day. / Only ngoma until the consummation of the great banquet of the ngoma! / Oh, old God of men, let me be ngoma! (2008a: 118).

Craveirinha had a deep sense of confidence that the old gods, the *Psikwembu* of the old men will deliver the nation from tyranny, but he also knew that such redemption will not come easily. This is well reflected in his short but sharp poem of hope for change:

On the Canhoeiro three, a galagala hesitates his blue head./ On a dark corner of a room the spider weaves her net./ And us? Ah, we wait on sweating, that salt of accumulated despise deflagrates (2008a: 31).

By describing Craveirinha’s portrayal of Moçambicanidade’s early stages the section presented that organic production of civil religion was present, prior to the emergence of FRELIMO as a coherent political organization. That is, before the organic civil religion was consolidated into instrumental civil religion. It is hoped also that the section has revealed the role played by the powerful civil religious theology underlying Craveirinha’s aestheticism in the shaping of Moçambicanidade civil religion.
This chapter demonstrated the power struggles at the origin of FRELIMO, the political organization that consecrated Mozambique as a free nation-state. Grounded in history, this chapter presented Mozambique as a modern nation-state, characterized by what Bhabha understood to be the relations of ambivalence, mimicry and hybridity (1990), where parts involved dispute in the construction of the emerging identity. In the process of asserting themselves and their ideals of national homogeneity, Marxist-Leninist ideologues tended to blur the dividing line between nation and nation-state (Brito 1991), thereby downplaying the deep and important ethnic differences in the makeup of the state. Such an attitude was not only a misinterpretation of the Marxist-Leninist communist utopia but also a deliberate approach by the nationalist party, and was regarded as the best approach to firmly cement and sanctify the national victorious myth.

African post-colonial nation-states in general were unsuccessful in fulfilling promises made to their people (Chabal 1992). FRELIMO (the liberation movement), and later Frelimo (the vanguard party), were no exception (Cahen 1993). Internal as well as external reasons for the failure abound. Throughout the chapter it has been indicated that the failure of FRELIMO as a project, does not translate into total death, as some scholars suggested. Moçambicanidade is more than a simple ideological project; it is about people, their space and culture. Hence, the last part of the chapter presented Craveirinha’s art as one of the spaces in which one finds, not only the lively spirit of Moçambicanidade, but also its long trail since the Lourenço Marques’ African intelligentsia of the 1920s.

Poems, flags, shrines, anthems, revolutionary songs, creeds, war heroes, and battlegrounds are all symbolic elements used to represent a nation, but the same components also characterize civil religion. The chapter indicated Mondlane’s strong links to the Romande Mission, which greatly influenced his vision of what Moçambicanidade was to become. The next chapter probes how the Tsonga provided not only a genealogical but also a structural basis for the emergence of Moçambicanidade, and how these symbols, also elements of civil religion, produce Moçambicanidade.
CHAPTER FIVE
CIVIL RELIGION AND MOÇAMBICANIDADE

Mozambicanists agree that the Tsonga tribal identity provided historical platforms for the emergence of nationalist consciousness (Macamo, Newitt, Ngoenha, Harries, First, Liesegang, Butselaar, Biber, Silva, Monnier, and others). The Tsonga historical and religious influence is found in many persons such as Lina Magaia, Sebastião Mabote and Zedequias Manganhela, who became key personalities in the formation of FRELIMO and the subsequent struggle for national independence (Silva 1998b). The Romande Mission’s influence is particularly highlighted in the person of Eduardo Mondlane, the founder and the first president of FRELIMO. Through informal education programs known as mintlawa, the Romande Mission raised the self-esteem associated with and the consciousness of belonging to a group, a nation under threat of annihilation by Portugalization (Ibid. 14). As in any modern group identity materialization, civil religion plays a key role in legitimization and consecration the emerging national identity. Scholars above, however, have not examined the role played by the Tsonga civil religion in setting the platform (genealogical and structural) for the emergence of Moçambicanidade, the anti-colonial national consciousness.

The study of key works such as Mondlane’s Struggle for Mozambique (1969), The Constitution of the Popular Republic of Mozambique (1975) and the Republic of Mozambique amended versions of 1990 and 2004, and the literary work of Jose Craveirinha, reveal the insightful relationship between religion and politics in Mozambique; that is, that among other traits, Moçambicanidade is a civil religious phenomenon. This is because Moçambicanidade comprises of symbols, rituals and beliefs, with the purpose of legitimizing the emerging political order. This chapter starts from Silva’s proposal of “consciousness formation” as a base to ask (1) whether it could be that the Tsonga civil religious history created a platform for the emergence of Moçambicanidade as a civil religious entity and (2) what kind of civil religion was produced by the emerging national state? The archive analyzed proves the existence of a direct link between the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade civil religion, the kind that in 1967 Bellah qualified as “religious nationalism,” reflecting both organic and instrumental civil religious expressions. Through the five themes of reinterpretation of symbols, space consecration, hero canonization, sacrificial rites and myth reinvention, the chapter examines the unfolding of the civil religious phenomenon.
5.1 From Sacred Woods to Sacred Nation

The section investigates the ontology of Moçambicanidade toward demonstrating the ways in which, the Tsonga civil religious notions created the platform for the civil religious nature of Moçambicanidade. Upon reading Junod’s oeuvre it becomes evident that what clearly distinguished the Tsonga Sacred Woods from any other space was the Mhamba; particularly the sacrificial timhamba. Important sacrificial timhamba were done or delivered in the Sacred Woods. These timhamba had various purposes but the most important were those performed for national interests. TIMhamba at the national level were, for the most part, petitions for peace, success at the next harvest, victory in the next battle, rainmaking and appeasement of the Psikwembu, in case they were angry over some offense that often was inadvertent. An example is the story of the woman who defiled the Libombo Sacred Woods by trying to help what appeared to be a child hanging on branches, eating berries on a rainy day. She thought, according to the Junod’s narrative, “Poor child, let me give some comfort by carrying the child home.” When the apparent child, however, did not want to come out of her back, the whole scenario changed. By trying to help, the woman desecrated the holy woods, upsetting the Psikwembu, causing her family embarrassment and ultimately, the loss of her life. The Sacred Wood’s keeper had to perform a cleansing sacrificial ritual in order to set things back to normal.

The story above is replicated four times in Junod’s work, under the heading of Sacred Woods, using different characters. In it, a cycle of consecration and defilement is repeated time after time in order to justify and assert the Tsonga as a comprehensive body of tradition worth preserving. Timhamba were key for national unity and the building of a sense of group identity amongst the members. Did FRELIMO’s founders learn any of these values and implement them in the process of nation building? It has been argued in Chapter Three that the Tsonga rites, particularly the sacrificial rites, were the occasion for civil religious display and performance. Rituals were the platform upon which common cultural habits and attitudes of everyday life acquired transcendental meaning. The same phenomenon is experienced in the process of inventing the myth of Moçambicanidade. The Sacred Woods of the postcolonial Moçambicanidade are located in the cities, that is, the National Heroes Plaza, Shrines of Independence Plaza and even the national heroes statues placed in key corners of the city are the contemporary Sacred Woods of the postcolonial Moçambicanidade. These chosen (sacred or set-
aside) places are settings for national memorial worship services, occurring in an established liturgical calendar. That is, the sacred places are stages for sacrificial *tiMhamba*, which in themselves provide a platform for civil religious performances with a purpose that resembles the one found in the Tsonga tribal civil religion.

In pursuit of the invention of the new nation, the Mozambique’s Liberation Front created sacred spaces, rituals, and symbols in chosen geographical locations in order to generate meaning and purpose for the new national myth of origin. The National Heroes’ Plaza was built in the middle of the capital, Maputo, shortly after National Independence Celebration Day in 1975, with the purpose of honoring fallen national heroes. It is located on a large circle in the middle of the city on one of the large avenues that links the downtown and Maputo International Airport, so anyone visiting or leaving the capital will go around the heroes’ shrine. In a star format, the structure is over two meters high, with a large cavern underneath ready to hold over fifteen coffins. Flat on the ground, the five-point star symbolizes the birth of a new, powerful, and brilliant nation. It represents a sense of national unity, love of freedom, and memory of sacrifice, pain and suffering. The Maputo Heroes’ Plaza has been replicated, a smaller in size, in every District town centers throughout the country. The same star that is on the national flag takes center stage on the monument. The flag has five colors, one of them being red to symbolize the blood spilled in the war. On the right side of the star lays one broken cannon with two large iron wheels.

On the eastern side of the area is a four by fifty meter mural. Painted by Malangatana Valente Ngwenha, the famous nationalist painter; colorfully, it tells the whole national myth of origin, from the people chained and oppressed by the colonial state through the time of national awakening and going to Tanzania to start the Liberation Front. All the national saints, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, Josina Machel, Francisco Manyanga, Filipe S. Magaia and others are honored there. Anyone who arrives in Maputo at the Heroes’ Plaza is confronted with a sight that informs or defines what Mozambican nationals are today. A curious omission is of the Nguni monarch, Ngungunhane, whose remains are at the Maputo Fortress downtown. However, Ngungunhane’s absence has to do with the fact that when the mural and the nationalist paintings were done, the nation did not need him as a hero. FRELIMO was still benefiting from its high popularity for delivering the nation from colonialism, political capital that, began to decline sharply soon after the Third Congress of 1977. This decline called for a fast-tracking of a hero canonization process that saw Ngungunhane become, in 1985, one of the exalted. Thus, Frelimo
ideologues were pressed into speeding up Ngungunhane’s into canonization to legitimate an ideological program created in order to solve an immediate political crisis caused by the destabilizing war waged by RENAMO. Here is a good example of an organic civil religious element being turned into an instrumental civil religious one. It should be recalled that Mondlane’s FRELIMO was skeptical of the old Nguni Empire’s. Although brought up near Mandlakaze, the Nguni capital, Mondlane was not a supporter of the methods of the Nguni Empire (Manghezi 2001). FRELIMO was not only against Portuguese oppression but also against any locally produced oppressive traditions, which the Nguni Empire was known to have been. Ngungunhane’s canonization indicated a profound political crisis that ushered in the Second Republic as well as the deliberate rise of instrumental civil religious massive tendencies within Frelimo.

The new postcolonial national monument deals with matters of sovereignty and identity. The space defines Mozambican politics of protest by Africans against colonial domination. It defines the restoration of decency to black people who, under the colonial state, were sacrificed for the benefit of Portuguese interests. The National Heroes’ Plaza also symbolizes a national shrine, a memorial place that honors the freedom fighters that lost their lives during the war. Their memory is venerated there, as families convene at the site on National Day are able to feel that the sacrifices made by their beloved ones are remembered, to experience the honor that has been bestowed on those lost and to experience the continuing connection between the living and the dead. This honor is extended to surviving relatives in a real way, as a government program compensates families of ex-combatants, giving them a sense of security at both family and national levels.

Built shortly after Independence Day, the National Heroes’ Plaza has a visible religious symbolism. Machel, the first President of the First Republic, oversaw the initial liturgical ceremony, a gathering of the members of the government, the military elite, various diplomatic members accredited in the country, various non-government organization representatives, the Youth League, retired military, and the public. The national anthem was sung to announce the President’s arrival. In a military commando style, the President walked up to the front stone on which he placed a wreath of flowers. This was followed by the Presidential address, which ended with the authorization of the opening of the Plaza, allowing the crowds to place their flowers inside the monument. This religious ritual is reenacted each year. The Plaza is a sacred center that inspires
a sense of unity. It symbolizes the idea of nation building and the ideals of racial harmony and national reconciliation.

A similar public monument to heroes can be found in many other modern nations. The phenomenon is common in the southern region of Africa (see Verrier 1986 for Zimbabwe’s national story; Tylden 1945 for Lesotho, and Westerlund 1980 for Tanzania). The description of the national myth of origin of Mozambique is thus, not a novelty. The current study uses historical phenomenon in order to indicate the subtle civil religious ritual that the whole myth of national origin symbolizes as well as to indicate the sacredness of the stage on which the political drama is performed. As such, the National Heroes’ Plaza is a significant space that functions as a place of order and citizen classification. It is a place where national identity is re-created with each ritual reenactment; it is where super-humans are separated from ordinary humans in order to be worshiped and ordinary humans are excluded, manipulated, dominated, degraded and or sacrificed for the national ideals. It is in sacred places that the center is distinguished from the periphery, inside from outside and a recollected past from a meaningful present or anticipated future.

Through the figure of Mondlane, a genealogical Tsonga influence was manifested in his educational trail from the mintlawas (a Changaan word for groups; education or youth groups) to the PhD in Illinois-USA, but also in Mondlane’s political choice of shaping FRELIMO as a movement meant to deliver the people from Portuguese colonialism as well as from other African oppressive systems. FRELIMO emerged from an assemblage of small political organizations namely, MANO, UDENAMO and UNAMI (Mondlane 1969). These organizations represented the masses of Mozambicans living under the difficult conditions imposed by the colonial state (Ibid.). Mondlane, the founder of FRELIMO, attested to having lived under these same conditions from childhood up to his high school years (Faris 2007). His visit in the late fifties to oppressed and rebellious Mozambicans made him decide to gather evidence of a need for a national group identity construction. Accordingly, FRELIMO was an outcome of negotiations between the leading elites of the aforementioned movements, with Mondlane at the helm, unfolding his notion of what and how the future imagined community was to be.

As in the Tsonga nation, the performance of sacrificial rites on and at the established dates and places gave religious connotations to the organization. The Tsonga notion of sacrificial timhamba, which were focused on the creation of national unity, provided a model for the ways in which Moçambicanidade as a civil religious entity practiced its liturgy. As with the Tsonga
nation that centered its *timhamba* in the Sacred Woods, the Memorial Plaza is the central space where the Mozambican state performs its *timhamba* of a national magnitude. The leader of the civil religious performances does not change significantly in either nation: the consecrated national chief for the Tsonga and the elected president for FRELIMO both lead the main course of the celebrations.
5.2 Religious Symbolism and Moçambicanidade

In heat of territorial dispute between the rebellious nationalists and the Portuguese colonial state the formers expropriated, recycled and redeployment of symbols from locals and the established religious orders, as a result Moçambicanidade emerged. The current section examines this development in the construction of the imagined community.

Symbols are simultaneously the tools and means through which meaning occurs, that is, the whole process of national formation. Any human process for that matter relies on the capacity of the actors for symbol expropriation and management. From a political standpoint, Moçambicanidade, as an emerging identity, illustrated a skillful expropriation and management of symbols. In most cases, this process occurred through aesthetic representation under the background of a repressive colonial state. The lyrics found in village songs of Chopis, the Maconde sculptures and in the poems of Craveirinha and other, are just some examples.

Although symbols and signs may appear to be synonymous, they are, in reality, different. A symbol stands for something that cannot be known and that cannot be made clear or precise (Saussure 2006). An object, a picture, a written word, a sound, or particular mark that represents something else by association, resemblance, or convention is a symbol. For instance, a raised clenched fist may be a symbol for a fight. The red strips on the Mozambican flag may symbolize the blood spilled in the liberation war against the Portuguese colonial state. Numerals are symbols for numbers. Symbols are never entirely arbitrary; they are not empty configurations because they show at least a vestige of a natural connection between the signal and its signification (Ibid. 23). For instance, a violin could hardly replace a coffin inside the Heroes’ Plaza of Maputo.

Signs, on the other hand, tend to be more formal, that is, they are conventions constructed by society and bear meaning, particularly to those who conceive them. The distinction between a symbol and a sign is important when studying religious phenomena because religion generates a succession of symbols that can be easily mixed. The Heroes’ Plaza in Maputo symbolizes a special place for the citizens, as it honors those who are held in great esteem by the nation. It is a sacred space, and sacred space is a symbol, as it is barely known except as a space that symbolizes something; i.e., the relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary, the connotation given to the place has nothing to do with the physical space itself. Mondlane symbolizes national unity and freedom for the citizens of Moçambique. He united the exiled small and weakened political organization to form one strong unit. Malangatanas’ mural at the National Heroes’ Plaza
in Maputo, narrating the trials of the national struggle for independence, is a sign within the Plaza. Signs and symbols were there before the space; without them, there cannot be any meaning. Hence, space, be it sacred or profane, depends entirely on the meaning attributed to it by the social process of signification.

Symbols create space by making it one of their own, i.e. by turning the chaos into something meaningful and significant. Every space means something; it is a symbol of something to someone. Once invented, a place is ascribed a certain value or meaning according to local political criteria. Valdezia, for the Tsonga tribe, was the materialization of a promised land (Berthoud 1875). It may be recalled that upon arriving at this plain, a calm valley in the foothills of the Zoutpansberg in July of 1873, Creux and Berthoud thought of it as the New Jerusalem, the Promised Land for the wandering children of God in the desert (Ibid.). Creux and Berthoud began to carve the space, giving it a new meaning, which made sense to Romande agents in a turbulent political situation generated by the fast changing regional context of industrialization and proletarianization. One might recall that the treaties and conventions between the Boers, the British, and the Portuguese over the ownership of land, cheap labor of Blacks, diamonds, and ports were the major reasons for the tensions between them. The Tsonga nation or tribe emerged out of a turbulent political and social context in the region. The new entity was represented by symbols, which gave it value and its sense of a sacred entity. Symbols and phenomena are inseparable; there cannot be a thing outside symbols; every occurrence means something. Therefore, symbols are meaning makers.

A space increases its value when it gains the status of a set-aside place, as the sacred itself is already a value that is added to the commonplace or mundane (Johnson 2005). Those Mozambicans who could not afford a decent living in Salazar’s Estado Novo crossed the border into South Africa, Rhodesia or Zambia to the nearest farm where work was better (First 1983). At least, out of Portuguese territory, they would not be hunted like wild savages and humiliated in the many ways in which colonial agents were known to specialize. Mozambique’s neighboring countries increased their value, as they became safe places for Mozambicans in need for better working conditions. These refugees did not have an easy life in exile (Harries 1994). Squatting on farms and depending on menial day jobs is never easy, yet that was better than staying home. The labor market has been, since the advent of modernity an influential phenomenon in southern Africa. Since the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and Transvaal in the nineteenth century, the
labor market has been following the same path. Due to the Portuguese colonial labor laws of the 1930s, Mozambique has been the largest supplier of cheap labor to the burgeoning capitalist world of South Africa (First 1983).

Values in the labor market have not changed significantly in the last one hundred and seventy years despite radical political regime changes; life for refugees, whether of two hundred years ago or of two days ago, has not changed significantly. Could this mean that the changing of symbols and signs depends largely on factors such as political paradigm shifts? What is it that makes symbols and signs take on new meaning? When some Mozambican refugees heard of the independence movement in their country, they thought it was time to return, restore their homes and start life anew.

Still riding the wave of political popularity after the conquest of the country, Machel’s political programs, after the party’s Third Congress of 1977, were directed toward having every Mozambican come home to rebuild their broken country. Irrigation systems were imported for the extensive fertile Limpopo valley; local communities were encouraged (or gently coerced) to join together in farming cooperatives; and education and health programs designed for the population and sponsored by the state, backed all of these development programs (Frelimo: 1977). Ideas for bettering citizens’ lives in the First and Second Republic abounded, but the problems were real, large and could not be wished away. That is, Moçambicanidade’s welfare depended not only on the good will of some Frelimo elite members but, perhaps more seriously, on the external world order (Geffray 1990). In most cases, political propaganda did not match expectations. Life in Mozambique was not favorable for those who came back hoping to find jobs and a good livelihood (Harries 1994). Most of the returning refugees ended up unemployed with no social programs to secure their dignity. Even those who, under exchange programs between Eastern Europe and Asia, managed to go to East Germany, China, and Russia for technical training came home after the training unable to find jobs (Rasmussen 2010). Even today, a group called “Madgermani” still holds regular rallies throughout the capital asking for their pay which has never reached them since their arrival from Europe in the late 1980s (O Pais 2010). The promise of building a new nation, a just and socialist society that does not practice exploitation, never materialized for the common citizen. Some critics even question whether there was a Mozambican nation or if FRELIMO itself was possible (Cahen 1993).
Such disenchantment had numerous causes, whether due to miscommunication or misunderstanding, intentional or otherwise. Yet, it could be also due to the arbitrary attributes of symbols. Symbols change according to the meaning given to them by the users (Saussure 2006). According to Saussure, users are in a particular culture it follows that symbols tend to change as much as the cultures that create them. Hence, symbols cannot have a fixed reference in the sense of always representing the same object. For instance, Mondlane tells a story about the irony of a place called Bagamoyo, the village where FRELIMO set up its first camp in exile (Mondlane 1969: 106). The name Bagamoyo means “broken heart” and it originated from the time of the slave trade, when the village was one of the main points of departure for the slaving ports of the East Coast. After the slave business ended, the same village became the capital of the German imperialist venture in East Africa. However, with the Liberation Front “the broken heart” (Ibid.), Bagamoyo, acquired a completely different significance, for it was here that FRELIMO was able to take the first practical steps towards stamping out servitude in Mozambique. In Mondlane’s account, Bagamoyo changed from being the place of heartbreak to the place of building a new nation. Bagamoyo, in the myth of FRELIMO, is no longer the place of despair but of hope and inspiration for liberation. In honor of the place, a beautiful street in the capital, Maputo, is named Bagamoyo and a large residential barrio in the outskirts of the city bears the same name. In the same vein, symbols usually acquire new significance in conformity with the dominant paradigm.

In Mozambique, wherever the presence of the colonizing power was felt, some kind of resistance was shown. This took various forms ranging from armed insurrection to wholesale exodus (Newitt 1995). However, Mondlane’s understanding was that this resistance often took place in a disorderly and isolated fashion, making it easy for the colonial state to control. Narratives from local peasants from different corners of the country convinced Mondlane of the need to organize these sparks of small resistance (Manghezi 2001), toward forming one strong unit that could withstand the power of the colonial state. There was a widespread psychological rejection of the colonizer and his culture (Mondlane 1969), but such reaction was not an organized or consciously rationalized act; it was an attitude bound up with the cultural tradition of divided groups, their past struggles with the Portuguese and the present experience of subjugation. This revulsion for Portuguese culture was often conveyed through songs, dances, and even carvings—traditional forms of expression, which the colonizer did not understand, and through which he could thus be secretly ridiculed, denounced and threatened.
Mondlane’s *The Struggle for Mozambique* describes in detail the aesthetic manifestation of Moçambicanidade. Mondlane identified numerous songs, poems and paintings throughout his work. Yet, the true meeting of religious symbols, art and culture occurs in Makonde crafts. Mondlane observed that some of the carvings of the Makonde people expressed a deep-seated hostility to the alien culture. It happened that in the Cabo Delgado region, the place of the Makonde people, Catholic missionaries had been very active, and under their influence, many carvers made Madonnas and crucifixes, imitating European models. However, Mondlane points out that, unlike Makonde work on traditional themes, these Christian images were often rigidly stereotyped and lifeless. Sometimes, however, a piece departed from the stereotype, and when it did it was nearly always because an element of subversion or ridicule or defiance had been worked into it. In such cases, Mondlane observed, “a Madonna is given a demon to hold instead of the Christ child; a priest is represented with the feet of a wild animal, a pieta becomes a study not of sorrow but of revenge, with the mother raising a spear over the body of her dead child” (Mondlane 1969: 101).

A number of observations can be drawn from of this hybrid, imitative, and ambiguous context of organic nationalist identity production. First, stable conventional symbols of a well-established religious order are used to convey nationalistic messages in an organic civil religious style. Mondlane used aesthetic organic production to de-legitimize the colonial state. In a subtle way and beneath the Roman Church’s religious symbols there was a new religion emerging: a strong belief that the nation state, Moçambicanidade, was better than the pharisaic Roman Church was. It should be recalled that throughout his work Mondlane clearly demonstrated his disfavor of the Roman Church because of its support of the Portuguese state. There was a subtle suggestion to depose the established religious order of the Roman Church and replace it with the national state. Such a suggestion that a nation can be better than an established religious order already creates the rationale for a civil religious order. The distortion of established religious symbols by the masses (organic religious expression), thus, serves in the construction of an instrumental civil religion. While a particular group of people can create symbols that represent and strengthen their group identity in a particular space/time, those symbols cannot be owned absolutely.

FRELIMO’s first two years in power were characterized by promises of a better life for the people, yet the state had inherited a complex and heavy administrative apparatus and there were not enough people with the skills to handle it (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1995). Moreover, soon after the independence, insubordination plagued the political order. The Third Congress was
organized to address these problems. It was in this context that the State Information Ministry decided to create a cartoon figure called Xiconhoca. What the Information Ministry team meant to accomplish by creating the Xiconhoca cartoon in the First Republic was, certainly not what the Frelimo vanguard party wanted it to be. Xiconhoca was a comic cartoon created by FRELIMO’s Department of Information and Publicity in 1976 (Frelimo 1977) and was meant to alert good citizens to the internal enemies of the state, those (insubordinates) who were working undercover in collaboration with the imperialist powers attempting to nullify the gains of the free Mozambique.

Xiconhoca missed the old colonial state where he could exploit and mistreat good Mozambican citizens; he embodied evil and depravity in society. He helped the colonial invaders in their oppression of the people. At times Xiconhoca was pictured to be a lazy alcoholic person who lived at the expense of the hard-working citizens of the Republic (*Tempo* 1977). Xiconhoca was a powerful symbol used as political propaganda to further the work ethic directed toward building national unity. This cartoon figure emerged a few months before the Third Congress of FRELIMO, which was perceived as the total ideological overhaul of the movement. Xiconhoca came to announce the direction the nation was taking, where new lines were conceived, detailed and put into practice. There was a need to define who was in or out of Moçambicanidade (Graça 2003). In such a context, Xiconhoca, like any other symbol, signified both an argument over definition and a contest over appropriation. Although the FRELIMO of the First Republic (1975 to 1990), might have tried to show the symbol of Xiconhoca as the enemy of the people who collaborated with the enemy to invade, control and oppress people, Xiconhoca resisted their characterization and remained available for reinterpretation.

At some point in the transition to the multi-party democratic period, Xiconhoca was no longer used in the media, and disappeared from circulation. This banishment could be attributed to his refusal to be pinned down and frozen in one absolute persona. The creators of Xiconhoca did not know what to use him for, as they were now what Xiconhoca was conceived to attack. Xiconhoca re-emerged in the Second Republic of 1992, and continues today, with the booming of private media. Leftist media, particularly the Savana weekly newspaper, uses Xiconhoca to point to the aberrations of greed and corruption perpetrated by senior members of the ruling Frelimo party, in the face of an attitude of indifference from the other elite members and the impotence of the opposition party in its ability to take measures of any significance. Moçambicanidade, as a
civil religious phenomenon, is manifested through symbols and signs of the state such as the coat of arms, the national anthem, the flag and events such as Independence Day, Women’s Organization Day, Youth Day, and Heroes Day. These special days are not just liturgical days when committed citizens get together to performing rituals, but they also can be regarded as symbolic phenomena with civil religious significance. Symbols and signs are made meaningful through competing claims on their ownership. Religious symbols are product of cultural dynamics of stealing and recycling which, in turn, generate sacred symbols in a process highly charged with activity of appropriation and re-appropriation (Chidester 2005). What can be seen with the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca is that, as a symbol, it was never quite completely fixed, even by its creators. It always defied all the claims of privilege and exclusive ownership, keeping itself available for new appropriation and new interpretation.

Based on the study of The Struggle for Mozambique, it can be safely stated that Mondlane used established religious symbols to discredit mostly the Roman Church as well as to affirm his own immediate ideological plan, the new national identity agenda. There was an intense semiotic reinterpretation process going on, hence, no pure invention, but a hermeneutical reworking of old symbols into an emerging new identity. The nexus between aesthetic, religious symbols and national representations is, without any doubt, illustrative of the ingenuity involved in the construction of Moçambicanidade, and it reflects the postcolonial nature of a collectivity construction that is captured by Bhabha’s terms “hybrid,” “ambiguous” and “imitation.”

5.3 Mozambique as Sacred Space

After 1895, Portugal consecrated Mozambique as a labor and natural reserve under the colonial political economy. Meanwhile, Junod’s Tsonga coped with modernity, and its vices, by re-establishing traditional myths and religious rites of passage, whereas the FRELIMO postcolonial nation-state, born in 1975, claims Mozambique as a sacred space that belonged to the people, through the creation of the myth of national unity and a new symbolic system typical of a modern nation-state. This section examines the ways in which Mozambique as a sacred space was disputed in a modern context of a contested southern Africa.

From time immemorial to the eighteenth-century, ethnic nations existed along the east coast of southeast Africa. Local chiefs and sheiks ruled these nations. The first modern nation, the Tsonga, emerged in 1873-5, followed by the drawing of Mozambique’s national frontiers in 1891
In the period of its birth, the modern nation of Mozambique consisted of no more than a series of natural ancient sea and river ports with their commercial hinterlands. Notwithstanding the demands from the 1885 Berlin Conference, which was that Portugal must fully occupy and govern its colonies, no significant deployment occurred at that time, due to internal political conflicts and the weakness of the monarchy. Portugal experienced a serious political crisis during this period. History records reveal that from 1820, the year a revolution toppled the ruling monarchy and forced a written constitution onto the Portuguese kingdom for the first time ever, until 1910, when yet another revolution established a Republic, Portuguese politics experienced a slight liberal orientation (Ibid.). As far as colonial policy was concerned, this liberal orientation found its expression in a series of laws that were passed and were to culminate in the formal abolition of slavery and forced labor in the year 1879.

Four decades passed before a consistent political and social order became visible in the overseas Portuguese territory of Mozambique. As argued in the case of the Tsonga identity in the third chapter, the setting apart or consecration of a place entails the hard work of attention, memory, design, construction and control, and calls for cultural labor and ritual performance in specific historical circumstances that Portugal, was not ready to handle. Financial bankruptcy and political anarchy plagued Portugal in the transitional period. Only in the 1930s did Mozambique become a unified colonial state. Accordingly, two factors were at the heart of the changes (Ibid). Firstly, the emergence of the Estado Novo of Salazar in Portugal, among other changes, promulgated new labor and citizenship laws for the Portuguese colonies. The second was the defeat and the takeover of the Nguni, Karanga, Maravi, Barue, Kiteve, and Monomotapa states and of the Afro-Portuguese’s feudal political system along the shoreline of the central and northern region. It was in Salazar’s era that Mozambique, as a sacred colony of Portugal, was fully recognized. However, this was after nearly forty years of contending with regional powers. Mozambique, the sacred space, became a product of dispute, an intersection of many sacred spaces.

The labor laws were conceived in a context of political crisis and financial bankruptcy in Portugal and territorial disputes and vassalage in the southeast African colony. Several local political powers formidable challenged Portuguese regional claims in the years 1885 to 1895, particularly by the “prominent ruler of Gaza, Ngungunhane” (Liesegang 1996: 55). The Maravi chiefs north of Zambeze River were still attempting to assure themselves of their power and trade route control in their territories. The colonial officers, for their part, were busy persuading their
superiors in Lisbon to develop a political strategy different from the assimilationist one that was proving unsuccessful. The spokesperson for these colonial officials in the field was Antonio Enes, a man of letters who had come to fame in Lisbon through his newspaper criticisms of his own government’s colonial policy. He was appointed Royal Commissioner to Mozambique in 1891 and soon after his appointment, called and chaired a commission entrusted with the task of looking into the problem of native labor and drawing up proposals for its reform (Newitt 1995).

A sharp critic of Portugal’s colonial policies, Enes, along with a number of other officials, felt that by joining the antislavery movement without a proper replacement of cheap labor force, Portugal was misusing her resources at a very critical time. Even though opposed to slavery he argued that Portugal could not do without native labor. In a manner reminiscent of the Portuguese standard argument against international pressure to abolish slavery, Enes insisted that work was the only tool the Portuguese had to carry out their civilizational mission in Africa. A close look at the spirit of the colonial labor law that Antonio Enes proposed in 1893, better reveals the dynamics of the making of Mozambique as a sacred space. Labor power was, in his view, “the only valuable resource the African native population had” (Enes 1893: 07). Therefore, it was up to Portugal to use this resource in an intelligent way to fulfill its twin objectives of achieving glory and civilizing Africans.

While probing the role of colonialism in denying modernity to Mozambicans, Macamo argued that Enes and the critics of liberal assimilationist politics heavily influenced the law that emerged from the deliberations of the commission on native labor in 1899. It was based on two central concerns, namely to introduce the obligation to work on the part of the native, and to make the colonial state responsible for the well-being of the natives. In the first instance, Macamo reveals, “the single most important innovation introduced by the Labor Laws was the obligation to work along the lines argued for by Enes” (Macamo 2002: 02). In Macamo’s words, “the relationship between the Portuguese colonial authorities and their African subjects was mediated by what the former saw as their duty towards the African, namely forcing him to earn a living from his own toil” (Ibid.).

For the advocates of Portugalization of Africa, the new law has a basis on the distinction that the lawmakers made between Europeans and Africans. Or as Macamo further explains, “the law presumed that an African can only be human, civilized or Portuguese, until he has proven himself through work” (Ibid.). Therefore, along with Macamo, one can argue that the regulation
of native labor not only produced the colonial state but also the colonial subjects. It produced the colonial state in the sense that, over time, the institutional requirements for the implementation of the regulations became consistent with the management of social relations within the framework of Portuguese authority claims over their subject population. In other words, the regulation of native labor became the raison d'être of the Portuguese colonial state, and to the extent that this was so, it was the main vehicle for the management of social relations (Ibid.). The law comprised of 65 paragraphs, reasserting the obligation to work on the part of the Black native population and calling for the institutions that would ensure its execution (Enes 1893).

As suggested in Chapter Three, European agents in southeast Africa, such as Junod, who claimed to have knowledge from within the Black native population, contributed to the shaping not only of colonial laws but also of national colonialism. Colonial officers actually had insufficient knowledge of the Black ‘natives’ to form an intelligent judgment; hence, they relied on the surrogate agents in the field, Junod for one. His “scientific” advice was taken very seriously in their administrative daily affairs. Macamo enlightens the above as his research led him to argue that the labor law defined work as wage labor and in so doing, was responding both to a perceived need to turn African labor into the backbone of the economic exploitation of the colony, and the framework for the institutionalization of colonial rule (2002: 3). Thus, work, as it came to be defined and practiced, became the means through which Portuguese claims over Mozambique were given substance and legitimacy (Ibid.). Therefore, the substance derived from the way in which the management of labor became the raison d'être of colonial rule.

From the political economy of the colonial state, two key factors characterized territory or the set-aside space. First, was that Portuguese claims over the country relied almost entirely on the ability of its colonial administration to control the movement of labor. Second, for the Portuguese colonial administrators, Mozambique was nothing more than a labor reserve for foreign companies operating in the territory or for neighboring countries. Extensive research has been conducted on this fact (of Mozambique being a labor reserve for the neighboring countries,) particularly Ruth First (1983), Penvenne (1982a, 1982b, 1994, 1995), and Harries (1994; 2007). In the midst of the pressure to curb slave trade by the Berlin Conference decision, Portuguese officials advanced an argument that the obligation of native men to work was part of bringing Africans to civilization. It entailed getting two things for the price of one: getting the Blacks to work at producing for Portugal, while they were becoming civilized. Accordingly, Macamo refers to Brito Camacho, a
Portuguese governor of Mozambique in the 1920s, who commented, “civilization was concerned with creating new needs and the means to meet them” (Macamo 2002: 7). Such comment meant, in other words, that only the creation of such needs would make the African see the value of work and make it easier for Portugal to take a better advantage of the native’s labor (Ibid.).

At the dawn of the twentieth century, the nation, Mozambique, was created through labor laws for the benefit of Portugal. Minor changes over the years occurred with an insignificant impact on the spirit of the colonial law. However, a number of amendments to the labor laws occurred over the years, influenced by the centralizing-decentralizing and legislative definitions of citizens as *assimilados* and *indígenas* (Penvenne 1994). These amendments adjusted the law to suit regional markets, particularly to the growing mining industry in South Africa, but the philosophy behind the laws, which was of service to metropolitan Portugal, was never in question. In Salazar’s Estado Novo, Portugal’s labor laws for the overseas Portuguese territories were articulated more forcefully and reinforced by addendums, such as the Portugalization Act, the 1928 Agreement in Respect of Labor, and the Parallel 22 Clause of 1914, which established the relationship between the state and its subjects (First 1983). Although it could be argued that underneath all the colonial enterprise there was a belief system that produced self-identity of the emerging Portuguese state, one cannot avoid the notion that Mozambique was Portugal’s set aside as colonial space. Mozambique as a sacred space was not merely found, discovered or constructed; it was claimed, owned and operated by Portugal with specific capitalist and imperial interests. In Portugal’s process of manufacturing Mozambique, meaning and power came together, making the “sacred space entangled with politics” (Chidester & Linenthal 1995: 15).

The subjects distinguished themselves from the objects, served and servers; the superior and the subalterns could not be confused. As a sacred space, Mozambique has been an arena of power relations in which conflicts between insiders and outsiders, rulers and subjects, elders and juniors, males and females were manifestly played out. Or as Macamo puts it: there were those, on the one hand, who had the duty to ensure that the others work, and through work, become civilized into true Portuguese citizens. On the other, there were those who had to toil without any pay and rest in order to qualify to humanity (2002). In this process, the national question was answered in the ritualization of memory and the divination of a shared future. The Portuguese colonists understood themselves as playing an important role in building a nation. Just as in Bellah’s United States of the 1960s, which he described as being animated by a collective, public, or civil
religion, an understanding of the nation’s historical destiny in the light of transcendence served as a religious warrant for nationalism.

Portuguese colonial officials and Romande missionaries arrived in the same period had common as well as different goals. The dispute over ownership of the land and its inhabitants was a common character. How did Junod’s Tsonga deal with migrant labor? The Tsonga tribe that Junod constructed was intended to be culturally and economically self-contained and autonomous. He conceived the Tsonga tribe as a unit that would independently produce and manage all its moral, political, theological and economic values. Migrant labor was not a welcome phenomenon as far as Junod’s conception of the Tsonga identity was concerned, as it revealed the failure of the efforts to contain the problems of modernity. Migrant workers often brought back with them, vices of alcohol, prostitution, and moral degradation. Accordingly, Junod’s Tsonga developed a range of rituals for almost every important social matter, such as birth, death, sickness, marriage and others. However, for the men departing to distant countries there were three national religious tiMhamba to be performed: the Separation rite, which was done to prepare the departing. Second is the Liminal Mhamba, which is performed with the person coming has not yet entered the homestead, but standing at the gate ready to be welcomed back to the tribe. And once the person has arrived and almost settled the head of the clan was report to the chief of the tribe and on a decided date the recently arrived paid a visit to the chief where an Aggregation Mhamba, which is the last Mhamba, takes place. For a detailed account on how the tiMhamba, using the same classification structure, are performed, refer to Chapter 3.1.

Van Gennep had a profound influence in the way in which Junod established a classification system of the Tsonga, particularly, as alluded to before in the fourth chapter, that liminality ritual had key role regeneration and in keeping the order intact. These rituals were not national in the sense that the elder member of each family had the authority to perform them, thus, they did not need the whole clan to participate nor the ritual to be presided over by the head chief of the tribe. The rituals were performed in the Sacred Woods at the clan’s sacred spot within the homestead space. Perhaps, as a way of acknowledging the chief, the head of the clan might share the news of the arrival or departure of the son from the clan; and, on that occasion, the head of the clan usually brought a gift from the son for the head of the tribe.

Mondlane’s FRELIMO stood against the colonial political economy. Under the new revolution Mondlane argued that “migrant labor was drain of human power into the capitalist
scheme, which left the country poor, underdeveloped and in ruins” (Mondlane 1969); henceforth, migrant labor was a system with numbered days. FRELIMO was a political movement set to change the colonial system into a modern nation-state in which, everyone would feel welcome, no fear for all. Such a feat, however, was to be achieved by a balance between modern style nation-state and a recycling of non-oppressive local traditions. Not a mechanical return to the cultural roots or revert to some glorious African and often nebulous past, without a critical screening for oppressive elements. In the light of Mondlane’s paradigm the liberated zones were the places in which FRELIMO began to change the colonial political economic system (Silva 1998b). It did this by imparting basic reading and counting skills and by fostering agricultural cooperatives where locals produced their own food, hence, freeing them from external dependence and from selling themselves as cheap migrant labor to the capitalist corporations. It was through providing an atmosphere of production backed by labor laws that FRELIMO consecrated the territorial space to the cause of the masses. Once the myth of unity for freedom was established, every project was conceived around it.

The first president of the Popular Republic, Machel, established the socialist economic system at the Independence Day celebration of June 25, 1975. He drew his inspiration from the founder of the movement but also learned from Nyerere’s model of Ujamaa and from Mao-Tse-Tung’s Chinese rural economic revolution (Negrão 2001). At the eighth FRELIMO Central Committee meeting of 1976, a plan to solve what was then called “the question of peasantry” was decided. Based on the typology of the areas used by household production units and by the Portuguese farmers, it was decided that people should live in Communal Villages (Frelimo 1977). Land ownership thus became a nationalist question, and so there was nothing more natural than the liberation of the land in the name and for the use of all Mozambican people in the Communal Villages.

However, can it be said that his national project truly consecrated the space for its citizens? The three editions of the Mozambican Constitution, when analyzed, indicate key philosophical differences, revealing the challenges facing the postcolonial nation. The central theme of the 1975 Constitution was liberty and independence, whereas the focus of the 1990 and 2004 Constitutions and their amendments has been liberty and democracy. In the 1992 document, liberty, as opposed to colonialism, allies itself with democracy, which is, theoretically, a noble claim. However, Mozambican public opinion holds, at least at the level of basic liberty (independence and
sovereignty), that Mozambique—and Moçambicanidade by default—has gone backwards and has actually degraded (Ngoenha 2009). The recent massive return of Portuguese entrepreneurs backed by Portuguese financial credit lines, and that Mozambique’s economy is under tutelage under Bretons Woods institutions only confirms the point. The question perhaps to be posed is whether it is possible to progress in democracy (politics) and regress in sovereignty (liberty)? The Second Republic was born out of the ashes of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. The values being conveyed by the West, the victorious bloc from the Cold War, were diametrically opposed to the values and spirit defended by the First Republic.

The section showed that through the establishment of labor laws, backed by the myth of portugalization of the natives, a highly equipped military force, Portugal claimed the southeast Africa its own sacred space, whereas, the Tsonga tribe dealt with migrant labor through the establishment of rites of passage, of separation, and of liminality and reincorporation. Finally, FRELIMO constructed the myth of unity, established its own national symbols through the dispute of the space with the colonial state. As it claimed to be a modern egalitarian state, it established labor laws, which also reinforced the myth of national unity.

5.4 Civil Religion and the Making of National Heroes

Heroes are inseparable from the vital moments of historical processes considered important to the construction of national myth. A key part of building a belief system that produces the identity of a collectivity is hero canonization. As a stage in the long process of building a nation, hero canonization in Mozambique also reflects an instrumental civil religious performance as it clearly legitimizes Frelimo’s emergent ideological agenda. As in the Tsonga aggregation session of the circumcision process, hero canonization is surrounded by ritual performances that aim at drawing a sharp distinction between esoteric, extraordinary persons and common folk. In the figures of Ngungunhane, the 1890s Nguni monarch, and the late twentieth century founder of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, the current section traces postcolonial hero canonization in Mozambican nationalism. Ngungunhane and Mondlane, among numerous eligible figures, have been chosen as examples of such canonization, because the leading roles they played in the resistance against Portugal’s invasion and the rooting out of its subsequent colonial nation-state, respectively. Ngungunhane lead his nation-state resistance struggle in the 1890s against the invasion, as did Mondlane, the founder and leader of Mozambique’s Liberation Front in the 1960s.
Both of them united various divided nationalistic movements to form a nation against the Portuguese colonial state in southeast Africa.

The presence of Portugal was little felt in the region, until the end of the nineteenth century. The Berlin Conference of 1885 made tough recommendations to Portugal, including a demand for an effective occupation and imposition of a visible colonial infrastructure (Henriksen 1978). This meant that Portugal had to develop a more serious policy in respect of the area than that of maintaining a half-dozen deteriorated fortresses and weary garrisons at Lourenço Marques, Sofala, Tete, Sena, Quelimane and on Moçambique and Ibo Islands. Portugal’s major obstacle, particularly in the south of the country, was the state of Gaza (Liesegang 1986, Newitt 1995, Isaacman & Isaacman 1983, Pelissier 2006), led by the ruthless emperor, Ngungunhane. Named Umdungazwi at his birth in 1845 in Chaimite, Ngungunhane displayed an aggressive character at an early age. Having failed in all attempts to subordinate this Nguni political leader to Portugal’s colonial dominion and after long years of tension during which Ngungunhane had proved to be a hard target for Portugal’s interests, a military option became inevitable. Portuguese officials’ vigilance and control were acute throughout 1894. Official documents and personal correspondence reflect this tension. For instance, in a reading of the letters between the Inhambane governor and his superior, the general governor in Lourenço Marques, the fear of an imminent outbreak of war was sensible (Vilhena 1910; Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino 1894).

This war took place in Coolela on the 7 November 1895, resulting in the total defeat of Ngungunhane’s army. Details of this battle of Coolela are well known. One of the most eloquent accounts is from Junod (1927a: 460). The principal objective of the Portuguese army was to neutralize Ngungunhane. With the imprisonment of Ngungunhane, the possibility of any rebellion in the south vanished (Albuquerque 1896). Time proved Mousinho de Albuquerque, the Portuguese commander in the field, to be right as Portuguese sovereignty was established for decades without any rebellion taking place in the territory. Heroes must have their opposing side, their enemies. Ngungunhane had Portugal’s colonial state as his enemy. In popular memory, the figure of Ngungunhane and all the myths around him are well remembered both in Mozambique and in Portugal. The Coolela defeat became a symbol, in the collective memory of the Gaza people, of the greatest battle of locals against a colonial state. Progressively the Coolela battle became the earliest reference to a national heroic act. National elites turned the memory of the defeat into a power source for the construction of national identity (Liesegang 1986). The conversion of a
military defeat into a source of strength for national identity is an act of bravery. Other nations have had similar experiences. For instance, the Pearl Harbor military memorial in the United States or Polje Battle Memorial in Kosovo in 1389, stand as examples of defeats turned into motivation. Ngungunhane had a contradictory personality. His iron wills, disguised by the sweet look in his face was in contrast to the cruelty for which he was known among his followers: his witty and astute looking face hide tyrannical personality, devoid of ethical or moral feeling and the contradictions in his personality were compounded by his excessive consumption of alcohol (Ibid. 1986). Yet, as often happens in the process of hero invention, the sordid, most negative aspects of Ngungunhane were expunged, while his positive attributes such as courage, intelligence, and leadership were highlighted. Gradual and secure was the process of wiping out Ngungunhane’s negative records by the state with the help of the laziness of the puppet intellectual community.

Despite recent objections from Ungulani baka Khosa, in fewer than two decades after the fall of the Nguni Empire, a positive and apologetic view of Ngungunhane and his role in history began to emerge. Since 1914 when the early signs of Mozambican nationalism surfaced, caused by a growing colonial presence in the urban areas, Joao Albasini wrote in O Africano that the last Gaza emperor was responsible for the unification of the south before he fell under the Portuguese domination (1929). The Tswa historian Aaron Mukhombo established the first clear connection between Ngungunhane resistance and the nationalist actions carried on by Mozambicans (Mukhombo 1931). However, his ascension to national hero status was a gradual process characterized by vicissitude.

While in 1978 one could read in newspapers, “he knew how to organize people to resist the invasion and maintain his kingdom free,” one could also read elsewhere in the media that “as a feudal king he repressed his subjects… had slaves and forced inhumane religious rites” (Tempo 1978). These divergent perspectives attest to the stubborn negative perceptions of Ngungunhane. Another glaring proof of negative perceptions and doubts concerning Ngungunhane is that, during the 1975 “Unity Flame” epic trail from Rovuma to Maputo, just before Independence Day, Samora Machel visited Mandlakaze; accompanied by Marcelino dos Santos and Fernando Matavel. No mention was made of Ngungunhane there (Notícias 1975). The process of establishing Ngungunhane as a national hero suffered setback, Frelimo elites were not sure how to handle his negative record. It was only in 1982 when Machel again visited Mandlakaze, in the heat of
RENAMO’s destabilization war that Ngungunhane was returned to the position of a national hero. On this occasion, Machel said:

We visit this district because the Mozambican history is intimately linked to Mandlakaze… great battles were fought here. Citizens here never accepted domination. Hence, we come to pay you homage, see the trees where Ngungunhane rested (Lopes 14/03/1982).

Machel’s visit to Mandlakaze decidedly wiped away, or at least buried, all the negative traits and new attempts to canonize Ngungunhane as national hero were underway. The strengthening of RENAMO attacks throughout the country forced Frelimo to counterattack on a grand scale by bringing Ngungunhane to hero status as one of its strategies. Like the Portuguese, RENAMO was considered a foreign invading force (Lopes 1982). For Frelimo elites, Ngungunhane, as a national hero, could boost the spirit of national unity that was under pressure, just as Frelimo guerrillas, to inspire unity in the fight against Portuguese colonial state, used Ngungunhane’s image. The next step toward canonization was an attempt to retrieve Ngungunhane’s remains from Portugal where he was taken in 1895. A long article published by the state magazine Tempo named Ngungunhane an anti-colonial hero (Tempo 1983). Once his remains arrived, a public ceremony was held in the capital with full honors for the new Ngungunhane. Among various state press and media, Tempo, vividly described the event thus:

Crowds from various walks that streamed down on Saturday the 15th of June made a colorful human cord along the streets. Crowds from distant and near, bound by the same sentiment of honor for that who, left the homeland in chains—Machel’s words—to captive, more than a century ago, returns to mother land a hero, by men who, following his example did not let down the sense of dignity and sovereignty (Ussene 23/06/1985).

The popular enthusiasm may have been encouraged in part by Frelimo’s activists charged with mobilizing people. However, the religious symbolic element in the canonizing process had a stronger effect on the crowds. Some would argue that people participated in order to tranquilize the spirit of the deceased so as not to upset the harmony of the spirits. People did not want to upset the spirits and therefore bring disgrace upon the living. They were already tired of the endless civil war, which by 1985 had almost paralyzed the entire country and created hundreds of thousands of
refugees. They could not afford tumult over Ngungunhane’s remains, potentially causing more calamities. This line of thinking had its foundation in the old and still dominant African theological belief that the spirits of those who die far away from their homeland must be brought back to their home through a welcoming ritual. “Everyone in this ritual must be present and peaceful with each other” (Martinez 2007: 209). Here we see the religious phenomenon happening in two ways. People reflected old religious perceptions in the homecoming ceremony itself by returning Ngungunhane’s remains. The same crowds also were part of the canonization of a national hero; i.e. an invention of a new culture, a sacred symbol, the making of sacred Moçambicanidade.

Ngungunhane was recognized as a national hero in 1985 (Ussene 1985). Frelimo successfully expropriated Ngungunhane to reinforce the myth of national unity. His resistance became a heroic example to colonialism and, more importantly, Ngungunhane became a reminder, for the Frelimo elite, that a solid national unity plan was an important element if victory was to be assured. From then on, Ngungunhane was shaped to fit into the mainstream triumphalist discourse, in which Frelimo elites argued that Ngungunhane was defeated because of the lack of national unity, thereby, stressing the importance of learning history’s lesson.

The other national hero figure is Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane. As noted in the fourth chapter, he came from the little village of Nwadjahane. Although both are national heroes, everything sets him apart from Ngungunhane. Mondlane was a man of a cosmopolitan culture, engaged in the struggle for a new destiny for his people. The struggle, for Mondlane, was not only about the Portuguese rule in Mozambique but also about a challenge to all oppressive cultural attitudes. His criticism was directed not only at the colonial oppressive tactics based on race supremacy, but also at his own culture, which he did not regard as perfect (Manghezi 2001). Despite his humble peasant upbringings in a Mozambican traditional family, surviving on subsistence agriculture and cattle herding, he became the first educated Black who would show that a Black man is equal to a white man (Faris 2007). He was educated in the United States after having been expelled from South Africa for getting involved in student movements against the apartheid state.

After ten years in foreign lands he visited Maputo in February of 1961 (Faris 2007). During this visit, he made an important visit to Rikatla, Joao Belo (currently Xai-xai), Cambine, Maússe, and Chicuque (Ibid. 34). He was always received with great admiration, large crowds and pageantry. Faris add, however, that the popular enthusiasm surrounding his visits indicated the
political potential and prestige capital he enjoyed amongst his people (Ibid.). This was because the attributes he had acquired as an international personality were being recognized at home. He personified the wills of the people as being one of the people and as their representative. Manghezi reveals that the Portuguese colonial authorities were powerless before him; they had no way of making him vanish (2001: 204). He left no possible intimidating evidence for them to use against him. Moreover, Mondlane skillfully mobilized all his diplomatic talents in order to avoid any friction with the colonial leadership. Some long-term colons even accompanied him in his various trips in the south, helping to organize banquets in his honor, such as the one in Joao Bello. The same happened when he visited Mandlakaze. Accordingly he was received with high emotions of jubilee from a large crowd (Ibid). The colons accompanying him saw nothing other than people happiness in welcoming a son of the land.

The 1961 visit to Mozambique was decisive moment in Mondlane’s life. He was confronted with two difficult realities in the field: the Portuguese government’s total rejection of a political solution for Mozambique on one hand, and the willingness of a large number of Mozambicans to fight for the national cause on the other (Mondlane 1969). This posed a serious challenge and resulted in an eventual siding with the cause of his people. His personal life was replete with qualities that would make him a hero. During the journeys of 1961, Mondlane had several life-changing experiences. The colonial state secret agents (PIDE) orchestrated a road accident in Maxixe, where allegedly, a bomb was in one of the cars of Mondlane’s convoy. The other was the growth of his link to the people, resulting in his decision to commit his life to making their lives better. “He was perceived to be very committed to people, ready to take their issues as his own”(Manghezi 2001:204-9). Today Mondlane is everywhere. An enormous statue at the beginning of Maputo’s largest avenue bears his name. His name is seen in almost every village, town, school, and cultural center around the country. A national hero, Mondlane is also the Frelimo party’s hero. He is the most commonly accepted hero linked to the armed struggle for independence, both from within the party and across the opposition parties. Historians, Frelimo elite, and the media amplify Mondlane’s feats and his contributions to national unity.

Mondlane’s popularity is unquestionable, as his name can be found in school textbooks, public speeches, and appears regularly in the media as the one inspiration for national unity. In contrast to Mondlane, Ngungunhane features mainly in history books. It is regularly stated that he helps to mold personality. The constant highlighting of his humble origins, his connection to his
people despite his cosmopolitan style, the sublimation of his mother’s role in inculcating rebellious cultural values against colonialism, and the exaltation of him as an honest and hard working person, all contribute to making him a person of the people. This is, if not in contrast, at least not quite the same, as Ngungunhane who is remembered for having intelligence, leadership abilities and being a tough individual. Mondlane belongs, alongside Ngungunhane, Samora Machel, Filipe Samuel Magaia and Josina Machel, to the pantheon of heroes and founders of the modern nation. These heroes, however, are not entirely untouchables. They are challenged by other emerging political forces, which claim that some important citizens who gave equally of their lives for the cause of national unity have been intentionally left out of the pantheon.

The invention of a nation-state is a process in which the creation of heroes and villains is an integral part. Personal accomplishments and strong will are the stuff of heroes, yet these attributes alone are not enough to create heroes unless they are associated with a particular history of a people. In the case of Ngungunhane and Mondlane it was necessary that those holding authority in policy decision making worked toward setting them apart from the crowd. Ngungunhane and Mondlane are tangible expressions of the will and power found in the FRELIMO armed struggle against Portuguese colonial domination and later on, in the civil war between the rebellious Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) and the ruling Mozambique’s Liberation Front Party, Frelimo. Collective memory is both a depository of attributes and symbols of a society as well as one of its legitimizing instruments. To speak of collective memory is to speak of cultural elements selected to form one tradition. It is to speak of the setting apart of uniting values to form a new sacred nation. The work of assembling the parts of a past to build a present involves a liturgical rehearsal. Ritual and liturgical rehearsal are both elements in the tradition making process that allow for the practice of symbolic actions.

Ngungunhane’s public homecoming ceremony of 1985 initiated a ritual in bringing home those canonized as national heroes. The national Heroes Day, 25 September, has been celebrated with more pageantry since Ngungunhane joined the pantheon of heroes. A spacious national monument to the heroes has been built to accommodate more people when the celebration day arrives. On that day, the national flag flies high, the national anthem is sung by the special military forces, all the retired army is called up, there is a presidential speech, and flowers are laid on the ground. Liturgy similar to that found in an established religious institution, such as a mosque, synagogue or church, is common in the order of activities of national hero celebration.
There is everything religious about the whole ceremony, specifically, a civil or popular religious manifestation. The effectiveness of the rehearsal of rituals in inculcating perceived shared values in the nation made it possible for national symbols, such as discourses on unity, national anthems, flags, national heroes and others, to be taken seriously; hence, creating a good dialogical space and inspiring national identity. The civil religious moments with their ritual rehearsals produced answers anchored in the past in order to address identity challenges of the present, such as pre-existent ethnic, linguistic and religious differences. These seem to have been the most serious challenges for the national unity project. The ritual practices in historical event ceremonies like Independence Day, Youth Day, or Heroes Day are concrete moments of collective memory focused on the traditions of a common past, present, and destiny for the people, forging a single tradition for the nation.

Unlike the Nguni monarch, the Frelimo elite declared Mondlane an indisputable hero of Moçambicanidade without any disagreement from within the party or from opposition political parties (Newitt 1995). Hence, Frelimo elites erected a monument at his birthplace in Nwadjahane village for the celebration of the 40th anniversary of his death. Frelimo elites sponsored a large monument launch celebration that included speeches from a diverse range of people, with traditional religious leaders at center stage. 2009 was declared Mondlane’s year and public institutions were encouraged to celebrate through any creative cultural means. Unlike Ngungunhane’s homecoming celebration to which people flocked because of a fear of upsetting the spirits, there was no fear in Nwadjahane. People came out to celebrate their national political hero, and most locals came to celebrate a son of the land, just as they had at his first visit in 1962. The liturgy (i.e. the act of public service) was organized around the celebration of a public hero’s welcome, exemplifying a form of civil religion production.

This chapter has examined the Tsonga notion of the tiMhamba, the expropriation of religious symbols from established religious institutions and culture, the labor laws and hero canonization process, as being the means by which a civil religion manifested itself. These themes revealed a close link between the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade civil religions. Mondlane’s ties to mintlawas, modern education, and Protestant ethos formed the platform from which majority of values informing Moçambicanidade emerged. In addition to being an ideological program, Moçambicanidade also comprises a belief system that produces self-identity of Mozambique as a
nation, that is, a civil religion of the kind Bellah qualified as “religious nationalism” (1980), while leaning to what Johnson called “instrumental” civil religious productions (2005).

Religious nationalism, as it is produced by the state itself for its own use in the political process of advancing programs, tends to maintain the ruling class in power, despite claims of being secular and independent, this nationalism uses existing symbols from established religions. Moçambicanidade is organic as it comes from a shared repertoire of spontaneous, less organized or everyday lived experiences and practices. Mondlane and his colleagues simply harnessed these everyday lived experiences and made them into an organized, academic discourse, with a clear political objective at and, this is what is meant by instrumental. They gathered the spontaneous experiences into a consistent and organized force, and then tactically deployed it with a clear political objective.
CHAPTER SIX
FROM A TRIBE TO A NATION

This chapter locates Moçambicanidade in the context of other forms of civil religious manifestations, starting from the broader world outside Africa. The focus is no the internal dynamics of modern and traditional values and the role that these dynamics play in shaping the emerging Moçambicanidade. Through sacrificial ritual performances, the expropriation of traditions and symbols, and the creation of sacred spaces the Tsonga historical and religious experience created a platform for the emergence of Moçambicanidade; and that the values that have been at the heart of the creation of a successful ‘imagined community’ still exist in contemporary southeast Africa.

Moçambicanidade is different from some world religions as it presents the trait of subalternity, which is a particular feature of a post-colonial national identity. The first section explains why. While there are some similarities, most of these studies looked at the relationship between the state and established religious institutions; whereas, Moçambicanidade is a state-produced belief system for the state’s own legitimation. The dynamics between traditional African values and a modern democratic state produced a hybrid culture. The second section examines how these interchanges also produced a hybridized set of beliefs that are the self-productions of Moçambicanidade.

A brief section closes the study by providing a review of the main arguments of the research and proposing the postcolonial study of religion as an alternative method for investigating the connection between religion and nationalism. This study comes nearly fifty years after most countries reached independence from Western colonialism. African states and their citizens need to reassess their projects, and reconnect with the initial reasons for their election to power. The postcolonial study of religion helps us understand the dynamics between religious institutions and the state, but more importantly, it helps the citizens recognize the state as a creator of religion.
6.1 Moçambicanidade as Subaltern Identity: Limits of Civil Religion

By examining Moçambicanidade’s position among the world’s civil religions, the section points out the ‘dysfunctions’ as the ‘limits’ of civil religion. Let us assert, from the start of the section, that the study argued throughout the previous chapters that civil religion usually inspires or legitimizes the power structure of the state that generates it, which can be characterized in one of the few ways known in the history of nationalism. While other states became totalitarians, authoritarians or fascists, the current study suggests that Moçambicanidade is a subaltern identity. It is our understanding that the link between the adjectives ‘subaltern’ to the subjective Moçambicanidade is in line with the central argument of the research, as it describes the subject.

In eighteenth-century France, Rousseau recognized the socio-political need for a strong patriotism and a love of nation and its law, so he designed a civil religion to enhance those values. Later on, Durkheim found patriotism to be the civil religion of modern times. Despite divergent conceptual positions between Rousseau and Durkheim, in the final analysis, both presented proposals that required instruction, indoctrination, and a measure of state control to keep the spirit of patriotism alive. In dealing with the issue of civil religion or nationalism, one is confronted with a serious dilemma—a dilemma that haunted both Rousseau and Durkheim. This is, how to instill in citizens a healthy love of their country (as advocated by Rousseau) or national pride (as Durkheim wished) and avoid the dark side of nationalism and its excesses? While the French Revolution may have given birth to the idea of nationalism in its more civilized form, Nazism and Fascism unveiled its most perverted face (Gentile 2005, Cristi 2001). In his enlightening study of the origins and background of the idea of nationalism, Kohn conclusively found Fascism as having “pushed nationalism to its very limit, to a totalitarian nationalism, in which humanity and the individual disappear and nothing remains but the nationality, which becomes the one and whole” (1967: 20). However, unlike Nazism or Fascism, Mozambican nationalism is subaltern and dependent (it cannot exist on its own, outside of that which conditioned it).

It speaks to a particular circle of political audience; hence, it speaks more to subjects than to the majority of Mozambicans commoners. This last is a critical issue unforeseen by Rousseau or Bellah. The Italian civil religion of the 1950s created conditions for Fascism and Pinochet created a tyrant regime in Chile during the 1980s (Cristi 2005). In Mozambique, civil religion legitimized the FRELIMO elites that fought for the unfinished independence of the country. Upon gaining independence, however, FRELIMO had insufficient conditions to hatch a coherent plan.
It, therefore, had to rely on imported ideological opinions that were largely foreign to the constituents (Brito 1993b). Moreover, these new political elites did not stick solidly to one strategy long enough to see results (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1995). In fewer than four decades, Frelimo converted from socialist ideology to liberal free market ideology, two extremes (Ibid. 325). Such changes occurred only at the formal level, with the same party people still in charge; there was no adjustment in symbols, ritual or sacred space, elements that could have brought innovative ideas on how to involve local people in constructing their own group identity. Therefore, compared to most Western civil religious phenomena, Moçambicanidade has another type of issue, inherent in a postcolonial southeast African state, which is that Mozambican nationalism did not afford a comprehensive civic education throughout its territory such as that afforded by Rousseau or Durkheim’s France or Bellah’s America or Mussolini’s Italy. Civic education in Mozambique has not been successful in reaching the far corners of the territory, despite the fact that from the early FRELIMO campaigns in zonas libertadas formulated by Mondlane (1969).

Rousseau believed that in order to create good patriots, individuals should be taught to love their country and protect their homeland (Rousseau 1993). Accordingly, individuals would naturally respect and obey the law, not out of fear, but because the law represented nothing other than the “inward assent for their will” (Macfarlane 1970: 109). His concern was not to pursue national supremacy or even national uniqueness often associated with modern nationalism. Rather, his concern was love for, and a deep sense of being a part of, the national community. Nationalism, thus understood, “requires a sense of belonging, a concern for the common good, and a moral attachment to the nation” (Sandel 1996: 5). These attributes, however, do not come at will, according to Rousseau they must be inculcated through a good education program. In order to have attachment to the community, one must be educated to become a good patriot and citizen; this role Rousseau assigned to civil religion and to education. Both are necessary to promote social unity; both are indispensable for engendering a sense of “public-spiritedness” (MacFarlane 1970: 196). In the same vein, Durkheim defined patriotism as “the ideas and feelings as a whole which bind the individual to a certain state” (1996: 202). For him these ideas and feelings can only be instilled through education. Morality and citizenship go hand in hand: a good patriot is a moral citizen. Morals, however, do not exist a priori in the individual conscience. They are the product of society;
therefore, are strong only insofar as society itself is stable and organized (Ibid. 203). As such, the state must “be present in all spheres of social life and make itself felt” (Ibid. 194).

As asserted in the fourth chapter of this thesis, education occupied a privileged spot in FRELIMO programs. In the struggle for independence, Mondlane considered education to be as important an instrument as a good army (Mondlane 1969). Efforts in education were undertaken throughout the liberated zones during the struggle against the Portuguese state. The education experience of the war period was carried into the new Mozambique as a strategic instrument in the beginning of the nation. Although successful to some extent, most citizens were not reached. There seems to be a force larger than the collective will to form a nation, a force that the current study considers to be coming from the subaltern heritage status from the Tsonga tribe. Tsonga and Moçambicanidade share more than the positive traits of nationalism. A close study of the two nations indicates that they share the subaltern condition. Like the constructive experience inherited from the Tsonga, the subaltern status is also acquired, unconsciously perhaps, from the Tsonga experience because, on the large canvas of rising modern discourse in southern Africa, Tsonga was a subaltern identity.

Was Junod’s project of Tsonga creation an absolute success? It will be recalled that the Tsonga project had two objectives: the first was to save a dying “species” by forging a strong nation able to withstand modernity and its adversities; and the second was to re-create an identity for the Swiss Romande Mission.

Based on the fact that since the Nguni Empire’s annihilation at Coolela in 1895, the establishment of the Portuguese colonial state was effective in southeast Africa, an argument for or against the notion of the absolute success of the project can be put forward. It was, on one hand, a success in so far as it established a lasting elusive imagined community or group identity, modeled to serve both parties: the Swiss missionaries and the amorphous groups of refugees that roved the foothills of the Zoutpansberg Mountain. Although the Tsonga accomplished more for the creators than for the subjects in the emerging modern political economy, it cannot be denied that small groups of Africans, particularly their chiefs, benefited from a sense of unity and belonging to a large group that the Klipfontein treaty offered. This imagined community raised group leaders’ sense of confidence and self-esteem. Their chance to enjoy chiefly treatment once more was restored.
On the other hand, the Tsonga project did not fulfill its objectives as it failed to prevent the side effects of modernity that Junod wanted to avoid. It may be recalled that Junod narrated a sad story describing the time that Portuguese officials invaded the Sacred Woods and cut the branches of the old sacred mahogany tree as they opened the 20km road linking Moracuene to Mapoutsu (see Chapter 5 for more details). Junod also wrote extensively about the vices of miners in Transvaal and the effects of alcohol on the native people (1927b: 46, 609-13), which indicate that by the time Junod published his monograph; the notion of preventing the problems of modernity from plaguing the natives was impractical. The reader recalls that the Gwamba groups around the foothills Zoutpansberg Mountain, some under the tutelage of Joao Albasini, did not accept the tribal identity without opposition as it was forced upon them (Harries 2007). It was in canonization of this identity that, a decade and half after the Klipfontein event of 1873, Junod chose the Ronga language of the Mapoutsu area of Delagoa Bay to be the lingua franca of the Tsonga tribe. He quickly used it to write the Ronga Grammar in collaboration with the Portuguese colonial governor, his personal friend, Mr. Andrade, who not only encouraged the work but also sponsored its publication and sale (Harries 1988). With such advances by the Romande agents, the Gwambas had little more to do than take the identity as a fact. Thus, the Gwamba refugee groups were subjected to a new identity. Regardless of initial resistance, the Gwamba chiefs and elites wanted effective units for action just as the Romande agents, like Berthoud, Creux, Liengme, Junod and the colonial officials wanted effective units of government. The Gwambas had strong personal motives for creating new units, which they could lead. The Romande agents, on their side, believed that Africans belonged to tribes. In response, the Africans built tribes to belong to (Iliffe 1979). The following generations appropriated the name and the tribal identity; today it is possible to find people who proudly understand themselves as Tsonga. They are still scattered all around the Delagoa Bay area, and as far south as the Limpopo province of South Africa. Recent generations often have little idea of the origin of their name.

The subaltern status of the people remained a constant feature from the advent of the Tsonga through effective colonial control and the emerging post-colonial periods. In the pre-colonial period, the Tsonga were a source for slaves and cheap labor for the booming mining industry in Transvaal (First 1983). Throughout the colonial period South Africa continued to need a cheap labor reserve for the mining and farming industries. The Portuguese colonial state also used cheap labor for local needs and the needs of the concession companies that reigned in the
northern parts of the country (Ibid.). In the post-colonial period the mining and farming industries continued to use the cheap labor of Mozambicans. In the Cold War logic, Frelimo had ties with the eastern bloc lead by the Soviet Union. However, when this collapsed under the unchallenged West, Frelimo found itself on the losing side of the conflict (Geffray 1990). It was forced to adjust quickly its ideological strategy, from socialist to liberal capitalism (Ibid.). The position of subalternity has always been part of Mozambican life in every way throughout modern history. The other factor that contributes significantly to the condition is the international community’s role in running the nation. According to Alden it the strong player in the lives of Mozambicans during and after the sixteen years the war of destabilization that ended soon after the end of the Cold War (2001).

The objective of the international community has been to provide support for the fragile nation in its efforts toward the establishment of a functional democratic apparatus and the relief of the citizens’ from the acute hardship stemming from extreme poverty. Due to an apparent arrogance reflected in the tendency to interfere in national internal affairs, the international community is often viewed as a type of surrogate colonialist power (Ngoenha 1999; Castel-Branco 2010). Like the international community, democracy also appears to be yet another foreign governance scheme not fitting easily into people’s consciousness. Average Mozambicans cannot afford the system, as it requires an established modern social apparatus currently nonexistent in the country: media for all, telephones, roads, and a high quality education.

Like the scenario of the Klipfontein Farm treaty (that brought the Tsonga tribe between Romande Mission and the Gwamba groups), where a heterogeneous group of refugees coped with the Tsonga tribal identity, the Rome Treaty (that brought democracy to Frelimo and RENAMO political elites) can be understood as an act of coping with the new political situation. The new identity appears to have been taken up as the ‘easiest-to-cope-with’ proposal.

The lack of a political will attests that political elites of both the ruling Frelimo and RENAMO parties were only coping, not living legitimately according to the true democratic spirit, of which for instance, Rousseau visualized for the French Republic. Thus, the state is plagued by matters of fairness and transparency in government, lack of political strategy in addressing extreme poverty. Frelimo has been maintaining a good record of complying with all international treaties since the Rome Peace Agreement of 1992, particularly with the Breton Woods institutions (the WB and IMF). This is being done as a way to ensure that endorsements for democratic apparatus
are kept working (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1995). But also to ensure that a group of deputies and public servants sit in a parliament, where they earn high salaries with the pretense of discussing matters of national interest (Ibid.). Such performance can be viewed as an act of coping in a world order where Moçambicanidade is but a subaltern identity.

Antonio Gramsci used the term subaltern to refer to those groups in society who are subject to the hegemony of the ruling classes. Subaltern groups may include peasants, workers, and other groups denied access to “hegemonic” power. Since the history of the ruling classes is realized in the state, and history being that of states and dominant groups, Gramsci was interested in the historiography of the subaltern classes. In “Notes of Italian History,” he outlined six points for studying the history of the subaltern (Gramsci: 1971). There are key points that speak directly to the Tsonga and Moçambicanidade. The first point is Gramsci’s argument that the history of the subaltern classes was just as “complex as the history of the elites” (1971: 54). The second is that the history of the subaltern is fragmented and episodic” (Ibid.).

If asked why the Gwamba groups were all thrown into the far southwest corner of their region, Delagoa Bay, the answers may show a complex socio-political picture more likely to reflect the complexities of being Gwamba at that time. The formation of the Tsonga as a tribal identity was largely a way of providing these refugees with a sense of permanence, stability, and unity. Nonetheless, the Tsonga tribal identity was subject to the activities of more powerful players, the ruling classes of the colonial administrators. Therefore, the Tsonga as a group cannot be thought of outside the colonial frame. In such a position of subalternity, the Tsongas had little access to the means by which they might control their own representation, and little access to modern cultural and social institutions. Moçambicanidade, like the Tsonga, identity cannot be outside the whole canvas of modern Portuguese colonial state in southeast Africa. Only permanent victory (that is, a revolutionary class adjustment—which Mondlane attempted to undertake with FRELIMO) could break that pattern of subordination, and even that did not take place immediately, as the FRELIMO biography illustrates.

In southeast Africa the political elites failed, both in Klipfontein Farm and in Rome, to truly speak for the people they purported to represent, but to represent their own interests using the platform of the state (Brito 1993b). There are a number of reasons for such failure, some of which are indicated throughout this essay, namely (1) the misreading of local as well as world order history, and (2) the lack of an understanding that with freedom comes responsibility. Such
lack of accountability was shown, not only by the elites (who in reality are elected public servants) but also the citizens who elected these public servants. Gramsci’s research on the peasant and working population of mid-fifties Italy indicates that following a revolution that resulted in the overthrow of the ruling elites, it was possible to have a change of the working class status of subalternity. However, in the case of Mozambique, there are reservations as to the application of this Italian experience. Can the subaltern Mozambican really speak? Gayatri Spivak challenged Gramci’s apparently simplistic approach to the question of the subaltern. She was the first to ask whether the subaltern Indian woman in a caste-ruled society has a voice. (1985: 127). This question, she claimed, is one that the group must ask. She challenged the Gramscian point of autonomy of subaltern group, arguing that no amount of qualification can be saved from its fundamental essentialist premise. As argued earlier, the Tsonga as a subaltern group identity could not exist on its own without the colonial administrators who constituted the elite ruling group on their side. This is because “the subaltern is a group defined by difference from the elite” (Ibid. 27).

Mozambique undertook a national revolution in which, for the first time in memory, the peasants in the liberated zones experienced some share of freedom (FRELIMO 1977). Yet, such experience was mirage, because in less than three years after the Independence Day, the country sank into a destabilizing and terrorist war that lasted for sixteen years (Casal 1996). The relationship between the ruling elites and the subaltern groups is complex, both in colonial and in postcolonial (supposedly free nation as well) relations. Independent nations are not exempt from this complexity; even an act of dissent or resistance that may take place on behalf of an essential subaltern subject cannot be entirely separated from the dominant discourse. This discourse actually provides the language and conceptual categories with which the subaltern voice speaks. In such a complex and interdependent relationship as that between the subaltern and the ruling elites, the former speak and negotiate their presence at the dialogue, yet there is longing for the Mozambicans’ chance to pursue their destinies in dignity. This stands in contrast to the portrait, which Junod canonized and disseminated through the modern world, of the Tsongas as degraded, uncivilized, superstitious, dependent and violent brutes (Junod 1927a, 1927b); or the image of Frelimo, of the Second Republic, which portrays a deep dependence on international aid (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1995).

Dependent and elusive, the Tsonga tribal identity as an imagined community still exists and is even stronger now than ever, due to the lack of a concerted counter strategy, formidable
enough to mount a serious challenge to the prevailing colonial and neo-colonial paradigm, which the Romande agents set their role as surrogate agents of the West. The founder of FRELIMO came from this Tsonga tribal identity, thus influencing the foundation of Moçambicanidade. With the fall of the Eastern bloc in the late eighties, the little hope for an alternative to capitalism disappeared and Moçambicanidade found itself still in a subaltern position to the West. Such is reflected in the desperate need of the international community to keep feeding the democratic apparatus, the life source for the inconsequential local political elite. It only makes sense that the current political elite shows little interest in fighting the Tsonga or the international community because the latter is the former’s source of income.

Since the Klipfontein Farm treaty, the political elites have participated actively in the creation and maintenance of the Tsonga image in two major ways: by not mounting a formidable resistance to the name, and by being complacent in the face of the degraded situation. The Klipfontein Farm treaty between Swiss Romande agents and the Gwamba groups is comparable to Rome treaty between RENAMO and Frelimo. Just as the Gwamba refugees agreed to the name Tsonga as a survival strategy, Frelimo elites, particularly after Mondlane, entered into treaties as a survival strategy. Consequently, Moçambicanidade identity is a subaltern identity; it depends on its alter ego (the West), the major actors in the modern world order. Moçambicanidade has no independent means of existence in a fast changing landscape of the modern world.

6.2 Traditional Values and Modern Governance

The sight of a diviner and traditional leader performing religious rituals, surrounded by a top government leader and his entourage, is common (West & Kloeck-Jensen 1999). These ritual performances can be seen in remote villages and in downtown areas anywhere in the country (Ibid.). As part of formal protocol, Frelimo political leaders often invite traditional leaders and diviners to perform sacrificial rituals whenever a government agency launches a development project, such as placing the first brick for the building of a new school, the opening of a remodeled hospital, the drilling for a new water fountain or the start of road construction (Lundin 1996). In the light of this, it may be easy to forget that such a phenomenon is quite recent in the political landscape of the young nation/state. The positive relationship between the traditional or community leaders and Frelimo leaders is new; in their study of the relationship between traditional authorities and the modern democratic government, West & Kloeck-Jensen argued that
the amiable relationship came about with the dawn of the Second Republic in the early 1990s (1999). It would be interesting to explore the reasons why Frelimo decided to consider the traditional authorities as partners in the country’s development. However, this section focuses on something less obvious, which occurs in seemingly normal politics: that is, the high level of hybridization of traditional values in the process of ritual performance in post-modern democratic institutions, which produce a new system of beliefs that generates national identity. An attentive reader can notices that, at the nexus of customary values and modern governance, a specific kind of discourse is produced that relates the Frelimo myth to extra-historical forces, such as local deities, spirits of the dead, ancestors, saints, and to a lesser extent, larger-than-life figures, hence, ascribing to the myth transcendent status.

The establishment of the FRELIMO party/state upon independence in 1975 was, for most rural Mozambicans, inseparable from the FRELIMO policy on former autoridades gentilicas, under which chiefs were recognized and utilized by the Portuguese colonial regime as administrative intermediaries (West & Kloeck-Jensen 1999). In The Struggle for Mozambique, Mondlane outlined the causes and justifications for FRELIMO’s guerrilla campaign against the Portuguese, in which colonial administrative posts were divided into regedorias or regulados or chiefdoms “in which a chief, usually deriving power rather from appointment by the Portuguese than from the original tribal structure, simply carried out the instructions of the administradores (Mondlane 1969: 40). In concert with Mondlane, FRELIMO leaders emphasized that, in obeying these instructions, there was a symbiotic relation between the two: autoridades gentilicas had not only facilitated colonial rule (through taxation, labor conscription and policing), but they had also from administradores derived personal benefit and accumulated power. When FRELIMO declared independence from the colonial state, it also outlawed the traditional authorities and diviners, which were regarded as power brokers of the colonial state and characterized as feudal and obscurantist apparatuses of the old African oppressive societies.

At the first session of the FRELIMO Council of Ministers, soon after taking power, the leadership advanced party policies in the hope of bringing about the “total transformation” of rural Mozambican society when it abolished the chieftaincy” (Monteiro 1989: 14). FRELIMO was to construct its own hierarchy composed of grupos dinamizadores (dynamizing groups) reaching deep into rural settlements, villages, towns and urban neighborhoods. Os comprometidos—those individuals “compromised” by their past association with the colonial state—were to be
systematically excluded from positions of responsibility in these new structures (Hanlon 1990: 170). However, this ideological position shifted in time. In June of 1995, nearly twenty years later, the Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano told the press: “Nós queremos que a autoridade tradicional exista;” that is, we want traditional authority to exist (Mussa 21/06/1995). He made this statement upon returning to Maputo from the remote province of Niassa, where he had just met with a group of former regulos (the highest ranking among ex-autoridades gentílicas). These were strange words, coming from the current leader of a party, whose official pronouncements had previously stated that “traditional authority” had long ceased to exist (Mondlane 1969).

After the country’s devastation brought about by the destabilization war of 1977-92, a deep anxiety reigned among Frelimo elites. One of the lessons appeared to dawn on them, at last, was that ignoring the traditional leaders; and that, it was inaccurate and costly to make traditional authorities eternal enemies, due to an alleged involvement with the past colonial state. High-ranking government officials, thus, sought a compromise, which can help advance reconstruction programs of the Second Republic.

Before the end of 1995, the Ministry of State Administration hatched a plan aimed at finding the best way of exploring the political capital of the traditional leaders (Lundin 1995). This occurs few months after Chissano’s revealing words recorded by the state-owned Newspaper Notícias (21/06/1995) above mentioned. A great many doubts, characterized this process. The resistance was not only from the old FRELIMO guard who felt that the great myth of Moçambicanidade—the national unity—could be threatened, but also because the relationship between the traditional leaders and Frelimo had never been peaceful. However, it did not take long for Frelimo to change its attitude: it started to draw objectifying discourses toward traditional authority and its relationship to rural population. That is, that Frelimo started arguing that “traditional leaders exist in a depoliticized spheres of personal trust and community based networks” (Lundin 1996: 11); or saying that they “represent the whole community, beyond political differences, embodying the will of all the people, and not excluding anyone” (Ibid. 08).

Based on the above rationale the State Administration Ministry (MAE) planned a series of traveling workshops (Lundin & Machava 1995), initially intended to study the viability of running in the rural areas kin-based institutions, which might play a role in the post-war government effort to reconstruct the country (Ibid. 1). These workshops also alluded to matters of government decentralization and democratization of leadership—themes which implied that traditional leaders
could think that they can have a chance of ruling side by side with the Frelimo officers (Ibid.). A close study of Frelimo officers’ speeches in workshops suggests that some leadership position could be given to traditional leaders (Ibid. 22). Moreover, the fact that prominent state officers together with the traditional local authorities inaugurated most of the workshops created a sense of an informal recognition of local traditional authority.

To a greater extent, these government workshops for traditional leaders were successful, particularly in two ways: they raised the expectations that traditional leadership were partners in setting the destiny of the state; and brought into being a two-volume manual published by the State Administration Ministry (MAE) entitled Autoridade Tradicional e Poder (1995) [Traditional Power and Authority]. This manual serves today as instructive tools for the new recruits entering the government ministries. They explain the obvious to everyone, but apparently not to the government staff, that is, that “traditional authorities exist” (Lundin & Machava 1995: 151). The document conclusive tone asserts that despite not being established by the law, traditional authorities manifest themselves before the judicial system and the state. Throughout the MAE manual there is concerted attempted to distinguish traditional authorities from colonialism and postcolonial party politics. Rather underhandedly, Frelimo tried to downgrade the role of RENAMO in forcing a change of mind, as it argues that Frelimo’s intention to share power with traditional authorities predates the multiparty politics of the 1990s, an apology that cannot be supported by any evidence. Even said, the apology has been empty and not followed by any practical action. In reality, an acknowledgment of traditional authorities’ existence should have been made in the years before the Third Congress of 1977 and the internal crisis that resulted in the emergence of RENAMO and the subsequent destructive war.

Ireae Baptista Lundin, a social anthropologist by training, headed MAE’s technical team in the workshop campaign across the country. Her key argument was that people relate more to their own traditional authorities than to, apparently, a far distant political organ called state. In her words: “people still needed a sense of belonging to something larger than local communities” (Lundin 1996: 02). Accordingly, the idea behind the recognition of traditional authorities is to build a nation, a citizenship from below and to give the Mozambican people a sense of this “belonging to something important, the community beyond the local community, something that pulled everyone together, and a nation state” (Ibid. 02). A number of strategies were used to attract traditional authorities, the most effective was the highlight the democratic nature of the programs.
carried by the Frelimo government; to emphasize the ability of the traditional authorities in solving problems in their communities; and encourages them to form council of elders that will take responsibility of monitoring popular use of power. Another strategy, implied and less visible, used by MAE speakers in the workshops was to advance the notion a timeless, depoliticized traditional authority. That is, that the local leaders are strategic for the Frelimo government because they are not involved in modern and dirty politics and they belong to the times of the beginnings of society itself. In other words, traditional authorities transcend the profane; they are sacred entities, holding extra-ordinary powers. They made it possible for rural people to feel that they belonged to a community.

The MAE workshops across the country proved that traditional leaders were ready, and, all were willing to be part of development programs (Lundin & Machava 1996). In principle, according to Lundin & Machava, the state only needed to identify the true chiefs in order to enable an effective community participation in governance (Ibid.). Lundin and her MAE team had little resistance in reaching their subjects. They understood that traditional authorities and the communities they represented can be used as a foundation for the rural democratic governance. This is conclusion the MAE team arrived at, after months of workshops around the country.

Legislation proposals were prepared and taken to Parliament. The bill proposed to provide traditional authorities with the right to participate in decision making for the local communities they represented. The Decree 3/94, became the first decentralization act in which, the government promised a comprehensive devolution of political decision-making to locally elected governments in rural and urban areas, and the inclusion of traditional leaders as advisers to local governments. In 1997 a municipal law, known as the Decree 2/1997, followed and replaced the Decree 3/94, set up locally elected governments in 33 urban municipalities, but left out the rural areas. In 2003 another bill passed into law, this one had a plan to include consultative forums in the new local state organs (Lei dos Orgãos Locais do Estado). This law covered the three-tier hierarchy of district, administrative post and locality (Localidade). Based on this law a new set of consultative forums, the (Instituições de Participação e Consulta Comunitária), was launched, with the objective of regulating the law of local organs of the state. Similar to the Portuguese colonial state and other regional modern states, the Frelimo government launched a concerted campaign toward the reconstruction of Moçambicanidade.
Despite an ambiguous history, the integrity of traditional authority, diviners and their values is being recovered and consolidated. In the Second Republic, the multiparty democratic political system of governance, the State Administration Ministry (MAE), under the advice of President Chissano led the initiative in incorporating them into the democratic Republic. The democratic state recognized the need to reconstruct a traditional spiritual heritage, and incorporate the reality of religious pluralism and the dynamics of a constitutional democracy in southeast Africa. The reason may be that the ruling party realized the political capital held by the traditional leaders in local communities. Soon enough, the traditional authority, including diviners and healers were visible in formal protocols of Mozambique’s modern democratic government, performing sacrificial rites, healing people, solving local disputes and celebrating economic innovations in the villages or cities where they are located, as partners in leadership alongside the modern democratic institutions (West & Kloec-Jensen 1999), contributing significantly to molding a new hybrid national identity. Thus, through legal decrees and other government systems, the traditional leaders have been involved through a long process of integration into the mainstream democratic governing order, making a hybrid belief system that produces the nation’s self-identity. Diviners and the so-called traditional community leaders brought with them ancestral values, which now are mixed with democratic institutions, resulting in a sort of civil religious phenomenon.

As in the case of the Orisa Osun deity of the Nigerian city of Osogbo, the Second Republic of Mozambique reveals a fertile meeting ground between traditional African values and modernity. A close look at ritual ceremonies being performed in those development project inaugurations indicates that fast adaptation is taking place in both sides. Through the sacrificial rituals in often-improvised set-aside spaces, and performed by specially appointed persons, diviners or community leaders, one finds forms of civil religious production in Bellah’s three styles: religious nationalism, a public cultural religion and a shared history interpreted in the light of religious transcendence. Yet, civil religious manifestations are different from those commonly found in the region because they are at the organic level; they have not reached the level of a theosophy or theocracy that can be found in the South African enterprise carried on through Motshekga’s Kara Heritage Institute (Chidester 2010). This does not mean that Mozambican traditional leaders cannot settle territorial disputes with the modern state. So far, however, the democratic state manages these leaders well and seems to get the legitimation they want amongst the electorate.
Citizenship in this context accomplishes a dual function: it anchors indigenous spirits in the villages and modern towns as a means for legitimate national self-identity, and affirms the districts (villages and towns) as the centers of development. By describing the ways in which traditional African values are being incorporated and consolidated into modernity through the recovery of traditional community leaders and diviners in a religiously pluralist context of postmodern Mozambique, the section revealed an underlying civil religious production, which legitimizes the ruling political party.

6.3 Conclusion

The analysis of the four texts indicated that the history and religion of the Tsonga created a historical genealogy and structural platform for the emergence of Moçambicanidade as a civil religious entity. This occurred as the Tsonga imagined community nurtured values such as unity, the ethos of hard work, and a sense of self-worth to Gwamba elites who were in exile. Few decades later, Eduardo Mondlane, a Tsonga offspring, emerged inspired by the same values to form FRELIMO, a concerted political project that brought a much larger and inclusive group identity or imagined community by the name of Moçambicanidade. In other words, the above values proved important values in the production of an instrumental civil religion called Moçambicanidade.

In the light of the postcolonial study of religion as a reading strategy, which not only regards religion as a socially produced reality but also as an outcome of power relations at the nexus of politics and society, and specifically applying civil religion as the lens, the study raised a number of issues:

Firstly, how Junod’s ethnographic monograph narrates the genesis of the Tsonga tribe, its aptitudes and lack thereof in culture, religion and the arts. The first modern nationalist experience in Delagoa Bay and its hinterland began in July 1875, when Paul Berthoud and Ernest Creux found a land at Klipfontein where the people appeared to be aimless and without leaders. The two Romande agents declared that they had reached the “New Jerusalem,” and began to build a nation for themselves. Later on, the two of Junod’s works (Le BaRonga in 1898 and The Life of South African Tribe in 1912-13) created the Tsonga as an intellectual tradition and canonized it as a tribal identity. It was through these two works that Junod established a consistent narrative of the Tsonga identity, and gave him a rationale for claiming the need to save it from modernity’s destructive
forces. The establishment of a *lingua franca* not only facilitated the study of the subjects but it also became an important means of communication, contributing to the spread of cultural identification within the communities of southern Mozambique. Such acts created more connections at the social and political level, with chiefs and community leaders. It is no surprise that a number of innovations were experienced with the written version of language, such as the development of spatial and temporal borders and class stratifications amongst the members.

Oral languages were highly mobile and dynamic and observed no frontiers in space and time, whereas written language was bound by rules that delineated and fixed it both spatially and temporally. This demarcated the self from the other, thus reinforcing the distinction between people’s own community and the community of others, and emphasizing self-consciousness. Another innovation is to be found in the missionary’s heightened capacity to preach their Gospel using vernacular sacred texts, as well as their influence on the communities in which they worked. Backed by hard work and prayer, Calvinist ethics and the close importance between religious and social life, Junod and his colleagues managed to create a strong group identity among the Gwambas. They focused on evangelization and education, programs that worked hand-in-hand in the construction of Tsonga identity. Evangelization programs brought the message of self-worth and self-reliance to Tsonga tribe, hence fostering ethnic awareness and identity; whereas education programs concentrated on widening the intellectual horizons of the youth through science and ethics. Inter-cultural contacts constructed through *mintlawa* introduced in the 1930s, generated a more multi-faceted identity still embedded in African roots, but not specifically tied to a particular single ethnic group. Youth groups traveled to visit distant congregations, thus setting up a network of exchange meetings that ultimately had not only a moral impact but also political and economic consequences. Together, these religious and educational programs led to the development of important skills, such as information collection and interpretation and critical analysis. Consequently, participants felt confident to analyze their contexts critically; this understanding of reality lead to a better quality of analysis, enabling participants to adapt it to their own individual or collective advantage and continue with their education, even within the Portuguese system.

Junod’s work also describes *tiMhamba* as being an important element in the Tsonga religion. *TiMhamba* generated traditions, whereas civil religion justified and legitimized the *tiMhamba* product. *TiMhamba* and civil religion collaborated in the consecration of civil elements, turning them into symbols of high power and authority, thus giving them a sense of transcendence.
Based on the above, it can be argued that the Tsonga tribe exists only due to the successful generation of a civil religion. Along with multiple rites, the creators of myths, gods, and traditions, civil religion is at the heart of Tsonga tribal identity. His spoke of Tsonga Sacred Woods, as a space deemed sacred, given that it was the cemetery where great men were buried. Political personalities, such as tribal chiefs, respected elders of the clans and witchdoctors were considered *Psikwembo*, i.e., ancestors, who ultimately became gods. Sacred Woods were the places where Tsonga gods dwelt. The narratives of sacred spaces and sacred heroes who became gods created a system of beliefs that provided reasons for sacrifices to be performed in a routine fashion. Sacred spaces, sacrificial rites and other rites of passage legitimized political programs aimed at strengthening national or tribal ties. The above view of Junod indicates that the union of the diverse Gwamba groups into one was key to the success of his project. It was the same value that seventy years later became crucial to Mondlane in his quest of establishing the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO).

Secondly, Mondlane’s work illustrates the link between Tsonganidade and Moçambicanidade. His eminence as the founder of the nation illustrates the connection between the Tsonga and FRELIMO. His person resembles the Israelite Moses who staged a revolution that delivered his people from oppression. Mondlane envisioned a modern democratic nation where justice and equal rights would be a reality for every citizen, regardless of gender, creed, color or ideological orientation. FRELIMO founders benefited greatly from the Tsonga historical and religious experience, adopting values, recognizing the importance of the establishment of a *lingua franca*, and of education, and hard work ethics, in the liberation struggle. Mondlane’s writings and early FRELIMO documents indicate that education, and the unifying creation of a *lingua franca*, were taken as important aspects of the revolution. Tsonga and FRELIMO were two nationalist movements that offered asylum to runaway people, namely the Swiss and the Gwambas. Against the colonial administration, and some of his own colleagues, Mondlane relentlessly promoted Moçambicanidade. His determined commitment made it possible for a nation actually to come into being because he skillfully managed existing feelings of hostility against the colonial state, a sort of organic experience that he found in villages and townships he visited. With these organic experiences, Mondlane generated a belief system that constructed the self-identity of a nation.

The analysis of Tsonga tribal identity, an intellectual tradition recorded in *The Life of a South African Tribe*, indicates that an evolved and independent system of religious beliefs existed
alongside the established religious institutions. It was a belief system generated by the tribe itself, with the sole purpose of legitimizing the tribe’s identity. What kept the tribe alive was not the brutal force of its army or a tyrant leader but its capacity to generate a reliable belief system that produced the self-identity of the group. The stories of the Sacred Woods illustrate an instrumental civil religion produced by the tribal political elite for its own consumption. The manner in which the Tsonga tribe applied education programs, the adoption of a lingua franca, the expropriation of symbols from established religious institutions and the generation of a belief system set to construct the Tsonga identity as a collectivity became models for the postcolonial nationalist state. Mondlane, with his upbringing and international connections, and helped by his Romande Mission background, was able to stage the creation of a large nationalist state that overthrew the colonial regime. Drawing together existing movements of diverse opinions and programs, he led the formation of a Mozambican national front, FRELIMO, which was then able to contest the Portuguese national project with a project of its own in the 1960s.

Thirdly, Craveirinha’s selected works indicated that Moçambicanidade is more than a simple ideological project; it is about people, their space and culture. His writings span from the early forties all through Frelimo’s Second Republic, cataloging the times of the fall of the colonial state and Frelimo’s shortfalls and crises. More importantly, Craveirinha’s work reveals a powerful civil religious symbolism (an eschatological theology) underneath his art. The evocation of old gods, drums, prophecies and spirit of redemption indicate a deep call for old myths of glory that had to be re-conquered through rituals. In rituals where “drums rumble,” calling for the “sons of chiefs, the kings and old heroes,” to come alive. At some point Craveirinha takes himself as the prophet king and the witchdoctor who, in a trance, possessed by the war spirit, which must cleanse the warriors going to a war of liberation. Craveirinha’s art is one of the spaces in which one finds, not only the lively spirit of Moçambicanidade, but also its long trail from the Lourenço Marques’ African intelligentsia of the 1920s up to 2005. Craveirinha and Mondlane’s works are linked closely: they both use the poetic expressions of the people to rally support for the emerging FRELIMO. Both use religious or secular symbols in their texts to call people to consciousness of their social condition (Craveirinha) and manipulate religious symbols to indicate the need for revolution (Mondlane). Poems, flags, shrines, anthems, revolutionary songs, creeds, war heroes, and battlegrounds are all symbols used to represent the nation, yet these same components also characterize civil religion.
Fourthly, Mozambique’s Constitution regards national unity as one of the highest values just as in the case of the Tsonga tribe. This is not a simple coincidence. It has to do with the fact that the founder of FRELIMO had a direct link to the Tsonga and evidence that the Tsonga history and religion provided platform from where the new nationalism came to be. As the most important legal institution of the Republic, the Constitutions reflect the different stages of the nation’s phases and the complex relationship the nation had with other social institutions. The Constitution is, at the same time, evidence that the state exists and successfully instructed. The existence and good functioning of the state is, in itself, a good proof of the research’s main argument: that Tsonga instrumental civil religion has resulted in the formation of the postcolonial Mozambican national identity.

Influenced by Mondlane’s views on the role of traditional leaders in the colonial state, the 1975 Constitution establishes a hostile relationship between traditional leadership, values and the First Republic. Modern in its orientation, the First Republic regarded traditional leadership as a force to be eliminated because it had collaborated with the colonial state in oppressing local people and carried oppressive elements within itself that were not fit for the new Mozambique that Frelimo leaders had in mind. Traditional values, including religious and secular rituals and divination, were all deemed obscurantist, which FRELIMO fought against. The 1990 Constitution, however, had a different perspective on traditional authority and values. After the destabilization war of 1977-1992, Frelimo, under the relentless skepticism from the intellectual community, appears to have understood that traditional leaders can be helpful political partners. Junod also used the traditional rites, highly valued nowadays and used by the government to legitimize their political programs toward what they call “national unity” in order to legitimate Tsonga tribal identity. Therefore, the Constitution of the Republic is a key institution of the nation in which rites that created the Tsonga are being used to legitimize Moçambicanidade as a civil religion.

In summary: the first two works by Junod and Mondlane, provided evidence of the link between the Tsonga tribe and FRELIMO through the work of the Romande Mission. The writings of Craveirinha, in addition, attested to the existence of Moçambicanidade prior to FRELIMO. It was aesthetically expressed though lyrics, sculptures, songs and poems. As Craveirinha kept on writing in the postcolonial period, through drumbeats his “prophecies” kept on flowing, providing a critical voice for the emerging generation of nationalists. The Constitutional documents place
the value of national unity at their core, thus providing evidence that the Tsonga historical
genealogy and structure provided a template by which the new nationalism came to be.

How does a study of Moçambicanidade as civil religion help us understand the challenge of
nation building in Mozambique today? National identity is an important subject for Mozambicans in our days. The growing number of studies dedicated to this issue testifies to this reality. The study of Moçambicanidade as a civil religious construction brings to the fore the religious element of politics as a key factor in the analysis of nationalism. Under the spectrum of cultures, languages, extreme poverty, post-liberation political apathy and globalization, the construction of Mozambican nationalism (or Moçambicanidade) proves to be a challenge far beyond the comprehension of common social-scientific approaches to nationalism. Classic theories in the social sciences tend to view religion, the religious, or the sacred as mere suppliers of positive values in the process of nation building. For example, they might contribute to raising political consciousness among local elites who staged widespread popular political revolts against the western colonial state. This approach often takes religion as an outside contributing factor in the making of nation, rendering it of little help in the analysis of the complexities of collective identity construction.

The analysis of Moçambicanidade, or any other national identity, as civil religion, helps us understand that a nation is made out of sacred material, meaning that religion is part of the very fiber of nationalism and not merely an external supplement to nation-building projects. Therefore, as the current study argues, any analysis of nationalism must take into account the religious elements. Religion legitimizes and justifies the emerging political powers, rendering their political agendas urgent and indispensable in the process of building collective identity or the nation. It has been the key argument of the dissertation that the successful consolidation of civil religion explains the accomplishment of the Moçambicanidade nationalist project.

It is about time that the categories of religion and nation and their connection to group identity formation come to be studied within the postcolonial southern Africa. It is time to acknowledge that nations are sacred entities that rely largely on religious symbols (borrowed or invented) in order to convey their meanings. The postcolonial study of religion helps one understand the state dynamics of belief system production, which must produce the self-identity of the group. Rousseau understood, back in eighteen hundreds, that states need a strong army and persuasive speeches from able leaders to build hegemony but more importantly, that the states
need to generate a civil religion, which legitimizes its ideological programs and campaigns. The study of postcolonial nationalism shows that Rousseau’s notion of civil religion is to be used with proper contextual adjustment. If civil religion helped produce tyrant states around the world in the twentieth century, in Mozambique it helped produce an alienated, in Karl Marx’s sense of the term, identity. The current study argued that this alien or subaltern identity has its roots in the Tsonga tribe, (see the section on subaltern identity above). The rationale is that Tsonga provided a positive platform for the emergence of new collective identity but also an adverse element came along—the subaltern trait. If there are various forms of civil religious expressions, as Bellah recognized in later writings (Bellah 1975 and 1980), then it must be recognized that some civil religious motivations can be positive and others negative.

As a belief system produced by the state for its own justification, some types of civil religions come into being at the right time to bring justice and fairness to the citizens of the state (Gentile 2005). However, some civil religions may be supporting a tyrant state (Cristi 2001). For instance, some civil religions have legitimized national supremacy, that is, citizens have been incited into thinking that their nation is better than others, a feeling that usually generates the need to subjugate others. In the postcolonial context of Mozambique however, a peculiar form of nationalism emerged having to do with subaltern status. This condition is what this study means by the limitations of civil religion, that is, when civil religion, under specific postcolonial state conditions, helps strengthen an alien and subaltern identity. Can a subaltern (identity) speak? This is perhaps the most challenging question for Mozambicans in their quest to construct Moçambicanidade.
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