The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

LAURENCE NATHAN

Thesis Presented for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Department of Historical Studies
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

AUGUST 2009
ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores and analyses the establishment, evolution and effectiveness of the regional security arrangements of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) between 1992 and 2003.

SADC was established in 1992 with a mandate to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and institutions. With the ending of the Cold War and the imminent demise of apartheid in South Africa, it was a time of great hope and promise in Southern Africa. In the decade following SADC’s formation, however, the region remained wracked by violent conflicts, which included the long-running civil war in Angola, a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in the Democratic Republic of Congo and state repression and violence in Zimbabwe.

In these circumstances SADC had a woeful record of peacemaking and was distinguished chiefly by its fractious internal quarrels. The major disagreements were around the orientation and strategies of peacemaking and regional security. The formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, a common security regime, was bedevilled by acrimonious disputes among member states over a ten-year period. Perversely, a vehicle that was intended to ease tensions and enhance unity and confidence had exactly the opposite effect. The process of drafting SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact was similarly protracted and tortuous. This story is the subject of the dissertation.

The dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: What are the reasons for SADC’s failure to establish a viable security regime and engage in effective peacemaking? Why did SADC experience so much difficulty in forging its Mutual Defence Pact? Does SADC constitute an emerging security community? And what is the relationship between domestic stability and the establishment of a security community?
I argue that SADC’s failure to create effective security arrangements was due to three problems. First, there was an absence of common values among member states. There were two key lines of division in this regard: between democratic and authoritarian domestic dispensations and between pacific and militarist tendencies in the foreign policies of states. The development of both the Organ and the Defence Pact floundered on the division between the pacific and militarist camps. The absence of a consensus on democracy prevented the organisation from addressing the violence and insecurity caused by authoritarianism and human rights abuses.

In order to explore the significance of these divisions, I distinguish between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic, which is strong in Southern Africa, refers to the interests, gains and objective conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the assessment of member states. The internal logic, which is weak in the case of SADC, refers to the normative congruence in the policies of member states that enables these states to engage in close political and security co-operation. In the absence of sufficient congruence, states are unable to resolve their major disputes, build trust, develop common policies and act with common purpose in crisis situations. Whereas the external logic is the fuel that drives a regional organisation, the internal logic is the glue that holds it together.

The second major problem was that member states were loath to surrender a measure of sovereignty to regional structures and they were especially reluctant to set up a security regime with binding rules and decision-making. The concerns about diluting sovereignty stemmed from the political weakness of SADC states, which have only a tenuous hold on sovereignty, and from the lack of common values and shared vision of the security regime.

The third critical problem was that Southern Africa was (and remains) characterised by small economies, underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity, which impaired the effectiveness of all SADC’s forums and programmes. This problem was compounded
by the aversion of member states to centralising the co-ordination of regional programmes in a strong secretariat.

The main conclusion regarding the problems that have frustrated SADC's efforts to create effective security arrangements - the absence of common values; fear of losing sovereignty; and weak states - is that these problems cannot be solved at the regional level. The capacity and orientation of a regional organisation derive from, and are constrained by, the capacity and orientation of its members.

A number of writers have argued that the SADC region is a 'nascent' security community. I refute this claim on empirical and theoretical grounds. The claim does not take proper account of the circumstances of the region, many of whose people and states are deeply insecure, and it does not pay close attention to the content of the organisation's security agreements. These agreements anticipate the possibility of inter- and intra-state violence and thus do not indicate movement towards the attainment of 'dependable expectations of peaceful change', which is the benchmark of a security community.

I contend that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence in a country, is a necessary condition of a security community. Large-scale domestic violence blocks the emergence of security communities because it makes people and states acutely insecure and creates the risk of cross-border destabilisation and violence. It also generates uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, militating against integration and a sense of collective identity. I conclude that the security community benchmark of dependable expectations of peaceful change should apply as much within states as between them. The practical import is that SADC has no prospect of becoming a security community while its member states are plagued by domestic instability.

In course of the dissertation I describe my personal involvement in SADC's efforts to set up a common security regime and show that the contribution and originality of the research derive in part from participant observation and access to official documents that are not in the public domain.
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 1</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.2</td>
<td>Regional organisations as conflict resolution forums</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.3</td>
<td>Accounting for the peacemaking effectiveness of regional organisations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.4</td>
<td>Research focus and questions</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.5</td>
<td>Definition of terms</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.6</td>
<td>Main findings and conclusions</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.6.1</td>
<td>SADC’s failure to create effective security arrangements</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.6.2</td>
<td>SADC as an emerging security community</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.6.3</td>
<td>The significance of common values</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.7</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1.8</td>
<td>Structure of the dissertation</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 2</th>
<th>The Formation of SADC and the Era of Hope</th>
<th>38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.2</td>
<td>The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.3</td>
<td>The motivation for establishing SADC</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.4</td>
<td>The SADC Treaty</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.5</td>
<td>Common values and sovereignty</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.6</td>
<td>Embryonic policy on regional security</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2.7</td>
<td>The early disputes over regional security structures</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 3</th>
<th>The Struggle to Establish the Organ</th>
<th>62</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 3.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3.2</td>
<td>The launch of the Organ</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3.3</td>
<td>The ‘two summits’ debate</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7  Conclusion  180
Section 7.1  Introduction  180
Section 7.2  Regional security arrangements  180
  Section 7.2.1  The internal and external logic of regional organisations  180
  Section 7.2.2  The limitations of regional organisations  185
Section 7.3  Security communities  186
  Section 7.3.1  Nascent security communities  186
  Section 7.3.2  Domestic instability and security communities  188

References  194
Official documents  194
Academic and policy publications  199
Newspaper articles  222
ABBREVIATIONS

AFDL  *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre*
ANC  African National Congress
ASAS  Association of Southern African States
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations
ASF  African Standby Force
AU  African Union
CSBM  confidence- and security-building measure
CSCE  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSSDCA  Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EU  European Union
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GNI  Gross National Income
ICD  Inter-Congolese Dialogue
IGAD  Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ISDSC  Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
ISPDC  Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee
MDC  Movement for Democratic Change
MONUC  *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en RD Congo*
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RCD  *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*
RISDP  Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RPTC  Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCBRIG</td>
<td>SADC Standby Force Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARPCCO</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This dissertation explores and analyses the establishment, evolution and effectiveness of the regional security arrangements of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) between 1992 and 2003. The founding members of SADC were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The countries that subsequently acceded to the SADC Treaty were South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997 and Madagascar in 2005. The Seychelles withdrew in 2003 and then rejoined the organisation in 2008.

The first Section of this introductory Chapter sets the scene, discussing the international expectation that regional organisations will play a prominent role in maintaining peace and security within their geographical domains, the mixed empirical record of regional organisations in this regard, and the dismal peacemaking history of SADC. The following Section considers some of the general factors that might account for the success or failure of regional organisations as conflict resolution formations. The Chapter then presents the focus and research questions of the dissertation; explains some of the key terms that are used in the study; summarises the main findings and conclusions; presents the research methodology; and concludes by outlining the organisation of the dissertation.

1.2 Regional organisations as conflict resolution forums

From the outset the United Nations (UN) has envisaged the engagement of regional bodies in conflict prevention and resolution. Article 52 of the UN Charter promotes regional arrangements and agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and in a manner
consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. Article 52 states further that the members of these arrangements and agencies must make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring the disputes to the Security Council, and the Council will encourage pacific settlement of local disputes through such arrangements and agencies. Article 53 provides that the Council shall, where appropriate, use regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority but insists that regional enforcement action should not take place without the Council’s authorisation.

Since the end of the Cold War, regional organisations have grown in number, prominence and assertiveness and the UN, whose own peacekeeping and peacemaking capacity has been overstretched, has strongly supported this trend. In 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali issued a seminal report, *An Agenda for Peace*, which presented a bold and far-reaching perspective on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era. The report endorsed the role of regional organisations in all these spheres of activity, in co-operation with the UN, in order to lighten the burden of the UN Security Council and contribute to a “deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs”. The report also called for closer co-operation and co-ordination between the UN and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. This topic has subsequently been addressed in various ways: in a declaration passed by the UN General Assembly in 1994; in a resolution and statements issued by the Security Council; in

---


3 Ibid, para 64.


reports issued by the Secretary-General; and at regular high-level meetings between the UN Secretary-General and the heads of regional organisations.

The African Union (AU), set up in 2002 as the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), regards SADC and the other “regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution” as an integral part of its security architecture. The AU’s Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the AU Commission are enjoined to work closely with the regional bodies and ensure that there are effective partnerships between these bodies and the Council in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability.

Against this background and in light of the success of European institutions – chiefly the European Union (EU), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the CSCE’s successor, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – donor governments have assiduously promoted the replication of European models of integration in the South. They have pushed for the formation of regional organisations in areas where none are present, such as Central Asia, and have invested

---


7 For an overview of efforts to enhance co-operation between the UN and regional organisations, see Security Council Report, 2008, ‘UN Cooperation with Regional and Subregional Organisations and Conflict Prevention’, Update Report, no. 2, 14 April.


9 Ibid, article 16(1).


A number of regional entities fall somewhere between these poles, successful at certain times or in certain respects but not others. For example, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is credited with the major achievement of preventing a war between member states but it has not played a useful role in intra-state crises (Section 6.4). The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa has generally failed to address, let alone resolve, violent conflict between and within member states but between 2002 and 2005 it facilitated negotiations between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, culminating in a peace agreement that ended Africa's longest running civil war. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been extremely active in regional peacemaking; in the 1990s it undertook peace enforcement operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, drawing mixed reviews.

Where does SADC fit into this picture? The organisation was founded in 1992 with a mandate to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and institutions. It was a time of great hope and promise in Southern Africa. In the late 1980s the Cold War had drawn to a close, easing regional tension as the intrusion of Superpower rivalry dissipated, and at the start of the new decade the global wave of democracy swept through the region with multi-party elections being held in several countries for the first time. Most importantly, the system of minority rule in South Africa was about to be replaced with a democratic dispensation.

This would not only bring an end to Pretoria's destabilisation of its neighbours but would also bring the region's most powerful country into the community of Southern African states. The historical patterns of conflict and war looked set to be replaced by amity and co-operation. With the involvement of South Africa, whose economy was treble the size of those of the other SADC states combined, it would be possible to foster development and tackle socio-economic problems in a co-ordinated and synergistic fashion. The region was awash with optimism, anticipating an era of stability, peace and development.

Notwithstanding the spirit of optimism, the founders of SADC had no illusions that the region would be free of conflict. They agreed that it was necessary to create a framework and mechanisms to provide for stability, peace and security. The SADC Treaty of 1992 thus provides that the organisation's principles include peaceful settlement of disputes, its objectives include the promotion and defence of peace and security and its member states must conclude a protocol on co-operation and integration in the area of "politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security". In 1996 SADC formed the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, a common security regime charged with promoting peace and security through political, military and security co-operation and the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflict. In 2001 the SADC heads of state and government approved the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which sets out the objectives, jurisdiction, structures and modus operandi of the Organ. Two years later the heads of state and government concluded the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, which deals with military collaboration and collective action in response to an armed attack against a signatory party.

---

22 This figure is based on the economic data contained in SADCC, 1992, 'Theme Document', Maputo, 29-31 January, pp. 9-11.
25 There are many SADC documents that refer to the security body as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (e.g. SADC, 2001, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre). However, the amended SADC Treaty of 2001 refers to the body as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.
In the decade following SADC's formation, the region remained wracked by a high level of violent conflict. The most prominent conflicts were the long-running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002; election disputes, a mutiny and an external military intervention in Lesotho in 1998; a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in the DRC, which began in 1998 and continues to flare up periodically; and, continuously from 2000, state repression and violence in Zimbabwe.

Despite the existence of the Organ, SADC has a woeful record of peacemaking. In most of the crises that beset the region it refrained from diplomatic engagement and critical comment. It played no meaningful role in relation to the Angolan civil war and was sorely divided over the DRC rebellion. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia responded to the rebellion by deploying troops in support of Congolese President Kabila while South Africa, backed by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, pursued a diplomatic solution and championed a ceasefire. The divergent strategies generated acute animosity within SADC and crippled the Organ. The organisation fared no better in relation to the Zimbabwe crisis. For several years after the onset of the reign of terror in that country, the SADC heads of state expressed solidarity with Harare and ignored the human rights abuses. It was only in 2007 that they appointed one of their members, President Mbeki of South Africa, to mediate in Zimbabwe.

In short, the promise of peace and security in Southern Africa has not been realised and SADC has been distinguished less by its peacemaking efforts than by its fractious internal quarrels. Of great significance and irony is the fact that the major quarrels have been around the orientation and strategies of peacemaking and regional security. The formation of the Organ was bedevilled by acrimonious disputes among member states over a ten-year period. Perversely, a vehicle that was intended to ease tensions and enhance unity and confidence had exactly the opposite effect. The process of drafting SADC's Mutual Defence Pact was similarly protracted and tortuous. This story is the subject of the dissertation.
1.3 Accounting for the peacemaking effectiveness of regional organisations

As noted above, the effectiveness of regional organisations in relation to peace and security differs from one organisation to another. There are specific historical and political reasons for success and failure in each case but it is also possible that there are general explanatory factors that apply across a range of cases. There has been no rigorous comparative study in this regard, however, with the result that there are no general theories that explain why certain regional organisations are better than others at conflict prevention, management and resolution.26 A review of the published case studies suggests that the following factors are significant:27

- Conflict in the region. The prevalence, scope, nature and intensity of intra- and interstate conflict in a region shape the regional organisation’s peace and security agenda and its ability to deal successfully with that agenda. As in the case of SAARC and IGAD, a high level of conflict between member states might prevent the organisation from functioning in a cohesive manner. Regional organisations might consequently be least effective at peacemaking in those regions where they are needed most.

- State capacity and cohesion. The political, economic and administrative strength of member states is likely to have a major bearing on the effectiveness and efficiency of the regional body. A regional organisation might or might not reflect its members’ strengths but it will almost certainly inherit their weaknesses.

- Organisational mandate. The organisation’s mandate in relation to peace and security will naturally influence its activities in this regard. For example, the formal or informal mandate might exclude efforts to address intra-state conflict on the grounds that such efforts would undermine sovereignty and violate the principle of non-

26 One of the studies on regional organisations cited above – Acharya and Johnston, Crafting Cooperation, op cit – compares the effectiveness of regional organisations but does not focus specifically on peace and security.

interference in domestic affairs. The mandate might even go so far as to exclude inter-state disputes and 'contentious issues'.

- **Common values.** The degree of normative congruence among member states has a strong influence on their level of trust, their willingness to forge and adhere to common policies on security and foreign affairs and their ability to act with common purpose in crisis situations. Over time, common values might come to constitute the strategic or political culture of the organisation. On the other hand, as discussed at length in this dissertation with respect to SADC, the absence of common values might render the organisation ineffectual in the domain of high politics.

- **The regional hegemon.** The role and posture of the regional hegemon or dominant state has a major bearing on the organisation's effectiveness. This might explain why the peacemaking initiatives of ECOWAS, which have been driven by Nigeria, have been much more extensive and robust than those of SADC, which has been relatively neglected by South Africa (Section 5.6). Yet in certain regions the critical factor is not simply the posture of the hegemon but rather the relationship between the two most powerful countries. Whereas the co-operative relationship between France and Germany since World War II has spurred the process of European integration, the conflictual relationships between South Africa and Zimbabwe and between India and Pakistan have impeded progress in their respective regions.

- **Extra-regional actors.** The role played by extra-regional actors in relation to regional politics and the regional organisation might be a significant enabling or constraining

---

28 This is the case with ASEAN. See Sridharan, 'Regional Organisations and Conflict Management', op cit.
29 The SAARC Charter of 1985 expresses a desire to promote peace, stability, amity and progress in South Asia through methods that include peaceful settlement of disputes but it also states that bilateral disputes and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations of the organisation. See the *Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation* at www.saarc-sec.org/data/docs/charter.pdf.
factor. The relevant actors include foreign powers, the UN and other international bodies.

- **Regional political economy.** The relevant factors here include the actual and comparative economic strength of member states and the extent of regional economic integration, trade and infrastructure. In the 1960s and 1970s functionalist theories of integration, based on the experience of Europe, suggested that increasing economic co-operation and interdependence within a region would have a pacifying effect, reducing the risk of inter-state violence in particular.32 In the current period the policy emphasis of the AU is different: achieving political stability through peacemaking and good governance is viewed as a necessary pre-condition for investment, trade and economic growth.33 This logic is also evident in SADC's founding documents (Section 2.3).

- **Domestic politics and policies.** Domestic politics and policies shape regional politics and the regional organisation in various ways. For example, as explored in this dissertation, whether the regional body has a pacific or militarist approach to security and peacemaking depends on the foreign policies of member states. Domestic politics might favour regional integration endeavours or they might give rise to conflictual relations between neighbouring states and thereby impede such endeavours.

- **Learning organisation.** Although difficult to observe and measure, the degree to which a regional organisation identifies and acts on lessons from its previous peacemaking engagements might be a relevant factor. There are countless publications and seminars on 'lessons learnt' from the peace and security initiatives of the UN and regional bodies but it is not always clear that these organisations have in fact learnt and applied the lessons.


33 This is one of the main themes of the New Partnership for Africa's Development, which is an integrated socio-economic framework for Africa's development. See [www.nepad.org](http://www.nepad.org).
Role of leaders. The leaders of member states (e.g. presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers) might have a major impact on the organisation's direction and effectiveness. For example, since the end of World War II regional integration in Europe has been championed by French, German and Belgian leaders. In Southern Africa, by contrast, there have been few national champions of the regional integration project. In the 1990s President Mugabe of Zimbabwe was the most active head of state regarding the creation of regional security arrangements (Chapter 3), while President Mbeki was more interested in the continental mechanisms of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) and the AU (Section 5.6). In 1999 the Foreign Minister of Swaziland, Albert Shabangu, played a pivotal and courageous role in unblocking the SADC Organ impasse (Section 3.5).

Through a comprehensive historical examination of SADC's security arrangements and performance, this dissertation aims to enhance our understanding of the factors outlined above and thereby contribute to the generation of knowledge about the effectiveness of regional organisations in relation to peace and security.

1.4 Research focus and questions

The focus of the dissertation is on the establishment, evolution and effectiveness of SADC's regional security arrangements between 1992 and 2003. Three types of institutional arrangement are considered: a common security regime; a mutual defence pact; and a security community. These terms are defined in Section 1.5.

---

The dissertation seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the reasons for SADC's failure to establish a viable security regime and engage in effective peacemaking?

- Why did SADC experience so much difficulty in forging its Mutual Defence Pact?

- Does SADC constitute an emerging security community?

- What is the relationship between domestic stability and the establishment of a security community?

1.5 Definition of terms

This Section explains briefly some of the key terms that are used in the dissertation.

In the discourse of SADC the concept of 'security' has different meanings depending on the context. It refers variously to stability within and between states, to the security of states and people and to the military and non-military dimensions of security. The term is generally used in a broad, holistic sense. When applied to cabinet ministers or the security services, however, 'public security' refers to policing and 'state security' refers to the intelligence sector.

A 'security regime' can be defined as a set of principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures that constitute institutionalised co-operation and permit states to exercise restraint in the belief that others will reciprocate. In the International Relations literature the terms 'regime' and 'institution' are used interchangeably. A security regime can take a number of forms, including a common security regime and a mutual defence

The dissertation seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the reasons for SADC's failure to establish a viable security regime and engage in effective peacemaking?

- Why did SADC experience so much difficulty in forging its Mutual Defence Pact?

- Does SADC constitute an emerging security community?

- What is the relationship between domestic stability and the establishment of a security community?

1.5 Definition of terms

This Section explains briefly some of the key terms that are used in the dissertation.

In the discourse of SADC the concept of 'security' has different meanings depending on the context. It refers variously to stability within and between states, to the security of states and people and to the military and non-military dimensions of security. The term is generally used in a broad, holistic sense. When applied to cabinet ministers or the security services, however, 'public security' refers to policing and 'state security' refers to the intelligence sector.

A 'security regime' can be defined as a set of principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures that constitute institutionalised co-operation and permit states to exercise restraint in the belief that others will reciprocate. 35 In the International Relations literature the terms 'regime' and 'institution' are used interchangeably. A security regime can take a number of forms, including a common security regime and a mutual defence

treaty. States can belong simultaneously to a range of security regimes that have the same or different members and territorial boundaries.

'Common security' is the conceptual basis and organising principle of the Organ. It flows from the Palme Commission's thesis that states are interdependent and more likely to obtain security through political co-operation than military competition. In the Southern African context, the concept of a 'common security regime' reflects SADC's view that member states are interdependent, regional security is consequently a collective enterprise and "institutional arrangements [are] required to ensure political stability and mutual security as critical components of regional co-operation and integration". From this perspective, 'common security' can be regarded as synonymous with 'co-operative security'.

A 'mutual defence treaty' typically entails a commitment by the signatories to a high level of military co-operation and to support each other, if necessary through the use of force, in the event that one of them is subject to an armed attack. This arrangement is referred to as 'collective defence', the best known example being the NATO Treaty.

According to Karl Deutsch and his colleagues, a 'security community' exists where a group of people has attained a level of integration and sense of community strong enough for its members to enjoy dependable expectations of peaceful change and a real assurance that their disputes will be settled by means other than fighting. States that comprise a security community regard the threat and use of force against each other as unthinkable and eschew preparations for fighting one another. The features of a security community are explored in Chapter 6.

37 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community, op cit, pp. 9-10.
38 The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 can be viewed at www.nato.int/docu/basicstxt/treaty.htm.
In the course of this dissertation I claim that the SADC debates on security arrangements were polarised between militarist and pacific camps. By ‘militarist’ I mean a foreign policy preference for military forms of regional conflict resolution, and the term ‘pacific’ refers to a foreign policy preference for diplomatic and other political forms of peacemaking. These orientations reflect preferences rather than absolute dispositions. As we will see in chapters 3 and 4, the militarist camp in SADC was not opposed in principle to political negotiations and the pacific camp did not reject the use of force in all circumstances.

1.6 Main findings and conclusions

In this Section I summarise the main findings and conclusions of the dissertation and indicate the ways in which it differs from and contributes to both the literature on regional security in Southern Africa and the International Relations literature on security communities. In the following Section on methodology I describe my personal involvement in SADC’s efforts to set up a common security regime and show that the contribution and originality of the dissertation also derive from participant observation and access to official documents that are not in the public domain.

1.6.1 SADC’s failure to create effective security arrangements

Many analysts in Southern Africa have attributed SADC’s inability to establish a viable security regime to disagreements among member states over the regime’s status and structures, to a struggle for hegemony between South Africa and Zimbabwe and to personal animosity between their respective presidents. This perspective is not wholly

---

inaccurate but it is incomplete and superficial because it focuses on manifestations of
deep problems. By way of example, Mark Malan has suggested that defining the
concept of the Organ and determining its relationship to SADC was not as daunting as it
appeared if viewed in isolation from regional jealousies and power plays.41 This claim
reflects a misreading of the situation. Underlying the regional power plays were major
policy and strategic differences between member states and it was precisely these
differences that made SADC’s labours to define the concept of the Organ so daunting and
protracted.

In an article on the challenges of security integration in Southern Africa, Ann
Hammerstad distinguishes between a traditional military alliance, which aims to ensure
collective defence against internal and external enemies, and a common security
approach, which seeks to overcome animosities and fears between states and to create
mechanisms for peaceful resolution of inter- and intra-state conflict.42 Hammerstad
maintains that most SADC governments prefer the collective defence strategy; this
approach is unsuited to the Southern African context, she argues, and should be
abandoned in favour of a common security strategy. This, too, constitutes a misreading of
the situation. As discussed in Chapter 3, for over a decade the SADC states were split
between into two groupings, the one promoting collective defence and other advocating a
common security regime; the two groupings were of roughly equal political strength,
giving rise to the lengthy impasse around the Organ; and the official outcome, in the form
of the Organ Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact, is a hybrid model weighted in favour
of common security.

41 Malan, ‘Regional Power Politics under Cover of SADC’, op cit, pg. 3.
42 A. Hammerstad, 2005, ‘Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions? The Challenge of Security Integration in
In this dissertation I argue that SADC's failure to create effective security arrangements between 1992 and 2003 was due to three substantial problems. First, there was an absence of common values among member states. There were two key lines of division in this regard: between democratic and authoritarian orientations in the domestic policies of these states, and between pacific and militarist tendencies in their foreign policies. The development of both the Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact floundered on the division between the pacific and militarist camps. The two camps held their respective positions so strongly, and regarded these positions as so divergent, that they found it extremely difficult to bridge the differences and forge a collective stance on regional security and peacemaking. The absence of a consensus on democracy did not inhibit the endorsement of democratic norms in SADC's official statements but it prevented the organisation in practice from addressing the violence and insecurity caused by authoritarianism and human rights abuses.

In order to explore the significance of the normative divisions in SADC, I distinguish between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic, which is strong in Southern Africa, refers to the interests, gains and objective conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the assessment of member states. The internal logic, which is weak in the case of SADC, refers to the normative congruence in the policies of member states that enables these states to engage in close political and security cooperation. In the absence of sufficient congruence, states are unable to resolve their major disputes, build trust, develop common policies and act with common purpose in crisis situations. Whereas the external logic is the fuel that drives a regional organisation, the internal logic is the glue that holds it together.

The second major problem was that member states were loath to surrender a measure of sovereignty to regional structures and they were especially reluctant to set up a collective security regime that encompassed binding rules and decision-making and the possibility of interference in domestic affairs. The concerns about diluting sovereignty stemmed
In this dissertation I argue that SADC's failure to create effective security arrangements between 1992 and 2003 was due to three substantial problems. First, there was an absence of common values among member states. There were two key lines of division in this regard: between democratic and authoritarian orientations in the domestic policies of these states, and between pacific and militarist tendencies in their foreign policies. The development of both the Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact floundered on the division between the pacific and militarist camps. The two camps held their respective positions so strongly, and regarded these positions as so divergent, that they found it extremely difficult to bridge the differences and forge a collective stance on regional security and peacemaking. The absence of a consensus on democracy did not inhibit the endorsement of democratic norms in SADC's official statements but it prevented the organisation in practice from addressing the violence and insecurity caused by authoritarianism and human rights abuses.

In order to explore the significance of the normative divisions in SADC, I distinguish between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic, which is strong in Southern Africa, refers to the interests, gains and objective conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the assessment of member states. The internal logic, which is weak in the case of SADC, refers to the normative congruence in the policies of member states that enables these states to engage in close political and security cooperation. In the absence of sufficient congruence, states are unable to resolve their major disputes, build trust, develop common policies and act with common purpose in crisis situations. Whereas the external logic is the fuel that drives a regional organisation, the internal logic is the glue that holds it together.

The second major problem was that member states were loath to surrender a measure of sovereignty to regional structures and they were especially reluctant to set up a collective security regime that encompassed binding rules and decision-making and the possibility of interference in domestic affairs. The concerns about diluting sovereignty stemmed
from the political weakness of states, which have only a tenuous hold on sovereignty, and
from the lack of common values, mutual trust and shared vision of the security regime.
There has been very little discussion on sovereignty in SADC's official documents and in
the academic literature on regional security in Southern Africa. This is surprising because
the conservative approach of member states to sovereignty has severely undermined the
operation of the Organ, the SADC Treaty and the integration project as a whole.

The third critical problem was that Southern Africa was (and remains) characterised by
small economies, underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity, which have
impaired the effectiveness of all SADC's forums and programmes. This problem was
compounded for many years by the aversion of member states to centralising the co­
ordination of regional programmes in a strong secretariat. Given their opposition to
transferring sovereignty to the regional organisation, states favoured a decentralised
model with a small secretariat that lacked authority. With respect to security
arrangements, they preferred an informal and flexible approach to one that was
centralised, bureaucratic and based on formal rules and procedures; this had the effect of
thwarting the achievement of institutional cohesion, continuity and predictability. Several
writers have bemoaned the SADC Secretariat's limited capacity to support the
functioning of the Organ. They fail to recognise, however, that this is due not to a
shortage of funds but rather to the conviction of member states that the Secretariat should
not be involved in regional security and other aspects of 'high politics'.

The main conclusion regarding the problems that have frustrated SADC's efforts to
create effective security arrangements – the absence of common values; fear of losing
sovereignty; and weak states – is that these problems cannot be solved at the regional
level. The capacity and orientation of a regional organisation derive from, and are
constrained by, the capacity and orientation of its members. Analysts who imagine that
SADC is something other than a forum of states, that it can somehow transcend the
differences between them and that it can do things without their consent have

43 See, for example, L.M. Fisher and N. Ngoma, 2005, 'The SADC Organ: Challenges in the New
Millennium', ISS Paper, no. 114, Institute for Security Studies, pg. 7; and A. Adebajo, 2005, 'ECOWAS
and SADC: A Tale of Two Invalids?', City Press, 22 May.
misunderstood the essence of the organisation. By way of example, Augustinho Zacarias and other writers have suggested that SADC should drive the democratic transformation of its members, adopt a structure that ensures the promotion of democratic governance; tackle domestic security problems; and forge a consensus on human security and appropriate peacebuilding strategies. None of this is in fact possible because SADC has no identity, authority and capabilities other than those conferred on it by its member states, many of which have little interest in democratic transformation and human security and all of which reject emphatically any external interference in their domestic affairs.

Given these dynamics, it is erroneous to suggest that the Organ will gradually evolve and become more successful with the passing of time. The security body is only likely to become effective if it is driven energetically by a core group of democratic states that are willing to devote adequate resources to it, provide incentives for compliance with SADC’s democratic norms and put pressure on states that deviate from these norms. The necessary composition and size of such a group is a matter of debate but it would have to include, at the very least, South Africa and a democratic Zimbabwe working with common purpose.

1.6.2 SADC as an emerging security community

A number of writers have claimed that the SADC region is a ‘nascent’, ‘embryonic’ or ‘emerging’ security community. They justify this claim with reference to the

---

46 Hammerstad, ‘Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions’?, op cit, at pg. 87.
construction of SADC's security architecture through the formation of the Organ in 1996, the approval of the Organ Protocol in 2001 and the conclusion of the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003. I argue on empirical and theoretical grounds that this perspective is mistaken. It is based on official agreements and structures rather than on the actual circumstances of the SADC region, many of whose people and states are deeply insecure, and it does not pay proper attention to the content of the agreements. The Protocol and the Pact anticipate the possibility of large-scale violence within and between countries and thus do not indicate movement towards the attainment of 'dependable expectations of peaceful change', the benchmark of a security community. On the contrary, the documents reflect a community of insecurity and this indeed is an accurate reflection of the Southern African reality.

At a theoretical level I contend that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence in a country, is a necessary condition of a security community. Large-scale domestic violence blocks the emergence of security communities because it makes people and states acutely insecure and creates the risk of cross-border destabilisation and violence. It also generates uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, militating against integration and a sense of collective identity. I conclude that the security community benchmark of dependable expectations of peaceful change should apply as much within states as between them. The practical import is that SADC has no prospect of becoming a security community while its member states are plagued by domestic instability.

---

The theoretical argument is an original contribution to the International Relations literature, which neglects the connection between political stability and security communities and misconstrues Deutsch's concept as applying exclusively to an absence of war between countries.\textsuperscript{50} I show that Deutsch also viewed large-scale violence within countries as a fatal impediment to the formation of a security community.\textsuperscript{51} He put his position very briefly, though, without offering any empirical or theoretical elaboration. This dissertation seeks to address that gap. It explores the relationship between security communities, domestic violence, structural instability and the character of political systems, and concludes that democratic systems are a necessary feature of these communities.

1.6.3 The significance of common values

Of the various obstacles to SADC playing a useful role in relation to peace and security, the most important has been the absence of common values. The lack of collective support for the democratic principles enshrined in the SADC Treaty prevented the organisation from dealing decisively with the crisis that commenced in Zimbabwe in 2000, from addressing other undemocratic practices in the region and from promoting human security through the rule of law and respect for human rights. For over a decade the normative differences between the pacific and militarist camps, and the animosity and mistrust induced by these differences, obstructed the establishment of a workable security


strategies for pursuing their interests, through the lens of values and ideas that are rooted in domestic history and politics and sometimes inspired by international developments.\textsuperscript{52}

At the time of SADC’s formation the drafters of the organisation’s founding documents recognised the importance of common values as the glue that would bind member states and lay the platform for regional security. The documents thus placed a premium on the evolution of common political values, systems and institutions (Section 2.5). Subsequent events showed that this perspective was eminently correct but that the aspiration could not be met. The Southern African experience supports Connie Peck’s observation that common values, their codification into well-developed norms and adherence by member states to these values and norms are key determinants in the success or otherwise of regional organisations.\textsuperscript{53}

1.7 Methodology

Between 1992 and 2001 I was involved in official efforts to set up a common security regime in Southern Africa. I served as an advisor on regional security to the SADC Secretariat from 1992 to 1996; to the Foreign Minister of Mozambique, Pascoal Mocumbi, in 1994 and 1995; to the South African Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, and Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, between 1994 and 1999; and to the Foreign Minister of Swaziland, Albert Shabangu, when he oversaw the finalisation of the Organ Protocol in 1999 and 2000. As a result of these engagements, I was the drafter of the section on regional security in SADC’s 1993 \textit{Framework and Strategy} document (Section


\textsuperscript{53} Peck, ‘The Role of Regional Organizations’, op cit, pp. 578-579.
In light of the above, the primary research undertaken for this dissertation was based on three sources: documents produced by SADC, such as reports, minutes and communiqués; observations as a participant in the organisation's endeavours to forge cooperative security arrangements; and personal communication with officials in the SADC Secretariat, the South African departments of foreign affairs and defence, and foreign affairs officials from Mozambique and Swaziland. The arguments contained in the dissertation have evolved over a number of years.56 While on sabbatical at the London School of Economics in 2004 and 2005, I benefited greatly from the opportunity to present papers and receive feedback at seminars and conferences in the UK and South Africa.57 The feedback identified the need to formulate some of the arguments more clearly and led to a refinement of the main ideas. There were

57 In 2004 and 2005 I presented papers on SADC’s security arrangements at seminars hosted by the Centre for Southern African Studies at Sussex University; the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University; Kings College, London; the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics; the Department of Geography at Royal Holloway, University of London; the Department of Political Studies and the Centre for African Studies at the University of Cape Town; and the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town. In 2004 I also presented papers on SADC’s approach to security at the Conference on Futures for Southern Africa, Catholic Institute for International Relations, Institute for Commonwealth Studies and Nordic Africa Institute, London; the Conference on Looking at South Africa Ten Years On, Institute of Commonwealth Studies and School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; and the annual conference of the Crisis States Research Centre in Delhi.
two recurring challenges, the one relating to the salience of values (Section 1.5) and the other relating to the determination of organisational effectiveness.

There are a number of methodological difficulties in attempting to gauge the effectiveness of a regional organisation in relation to peace and security. First, we cannot be certain of the full impact of the organisation because we do not know what the security situation would have been like had the organisation not existed; the body might have a poor track record but in some instances the level of conflict might have been higher in its absence. Second, it is hard to establish causality and the relative weight of the factors that shape effectiveness since war, conflict and peace are complex phenomena that flow from many interrelated elements and processes. Third, it may be relatively easy to assess the impact of peacemaking activities like mediation and peace support operations, since they either succeeded in ending violence or failed to do so, but it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which political, economic and functional co-operation between countries builds trust, affinity and practical linkages that contribute over time to the prevention of interstate violence.

Fourth, judgements about a regional organisation’s effectiveness depend not only on an analysis of the facts but also on normative and theoretical perspectives concerning the security and peacemaking potential of these organisations. Some commentators might have modest expectations of a regional body while others set the bar much higher. Humanitarian concerns about suffering and insecurity might lead to a damning judgement of a regional organisation’s failure to prevent and resolve violent conflict, whereas an appreciation of the inherent limitations of regional organisations and the inherent difficulty of peacemaking might lead to a less critical assessment.

Flowing from these methodological problems there is the all-important matter of deciding what criteria to use for determining effectiveness. In this dissertation I assess SADC in terms of its stated objectives, an approach that seems analytically sound since all organisations are set up for the purpose of achieving one or more objectives and their effectiveness hinges on their ability to do so. The approach is also normatively ‘fair’ as it
avoids judging an organisation according to goals that the organisation’s members do not consider relevant. However, there is no a priori assumption that SADC’s objectives genuinely reflect the interests of member states. Whether they are genuine or merely rhetorical is a matter that requires investigation if the organisation does not pursue its objectives.

Given the focus of this dissertation, the relevant objectives in the SADC Treaty are to evolve common political values, systems and institutions, to promote and defend peace and security and to establish organisational arrangements for co-operation and integration in the arena of politics, international relations, peace and security (Section 2.4). The general objective of the Organ is to promote peace and security in the region. Its specific goals include protecting the people of Southern Africa from instability and conflict; promoting the evolution of common political values and institutions; developing common foreign policy approaches; promoting regional co-operation and co-ordination on security and defence; preventing, containing and resolving inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; and promoting the development of democratic institutions and practices (Section 3.7). As discussed in the chapters that follow, SADC has largely failed to achieve these goals and objectives. The overarching question at the heart of the dissertation is why this is the case.

Finally, it should be noted that research on the Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact is constrained by the uninformative nature of SADC’s communiqués on regional security. The heads of state and government are extremely sensitive about the confidentiality of security and defence matters, they are loath to admit publicly that they are disunited and they do not feel any obligation to keep their citizens informed of deliberations and developments in this area. According to Lt Col Walter Tapfumaneyi, a Zimbabwean military officer, even government officials have struggled to discern the decisions taken at Summit meetings:

The communiqués issued at the end of [Summit] meetings are blunt working instruments. They do not give the average SADC minister, official or the
independent analyst any clear insight into what actually transpired. They are designed for public consumption, either to portray a certain calculated image or for damage control, and they seldom capture the true proceedings of a meeting. 58

The research constraints are heightened by the fact that the majority of SADC states have not published their policies on regional security arrangements. Only South Africa, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe, have articulated publicly their positions (Chapter 3). These research difficulties are alleviated to some extent by my personal involvement in official processes to set up a common security regime.

1.8 Structure of the dissertation

This Section sets out the organisation and structure of the dissertation.

Chapter 2 covers the establishment of SADC in 1992 and the initial attempts to develop regional security policies and mechanisms. It looks at SADC’s predecessor, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), examines the motivation for setting up SADC, outlines the main features of the SADC Treaty and considers the ways in which the organisation’s founding documents addressed the issues of sovereignty and common values. The Chapter concludes by tracing the intellectual and institutional origins of the regional security debate that became increasingly antagonistic in the 1990s.

Chapter 3 focuses on the key debates and developments regarding SADC’s security arrangements between 1996 and 2003. It begins by exploring the Organ deadlock and the process of finalising the Organ Protocol in 2001. The Chapter then summarises the content of the Protocol and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), examines the tortured evolution of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact and describes the activities of

the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The Chapter highlights the acute tension between Zimbabwe and South Africa, which was both a consequence of historical circumstances and, more fundamentally, a clash of ideas around the strategic character of the Organ.

Chapter 4 deals with SADC's poor record of peacemaking. It concentrates on the organisation's response to three conflicts in particular: the Zimbabwe crisis, which began in 2000 and brought to the fore SADC's obsession with maintaining state solidarity at the expense of human security; the Lesotho mutiny in 1998, which led to a politically damaging military intervention by Botswana and South Africa; and the 1998 rebellion in the DRC, which sparked Africa's biggest war and divided SADC so severely that it threw the organisation's survival into question.

Chapter 5 seeks to explain the reasons for SADC's inability to construct a viable security regime and undertake effective peacemaking. Three major problems are discussed: the absence of common values among member states, which inhibited unified action and the development of common policies on regional security; the unwillingness of states to surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime with binding rules and decision-making; and the economic and administrative weakness of states. I suggest that the Organ travails can be understood theoretically by distinguishing between the internal logic of a regional organisation, which is based on common values and trust, and its external logic, which is based on state interests. I explore this distinction by comparing SADC with the EU. The final Section reviews the role of South Africa as the major power in the region.

Chapter 6 interrogates the concept of a security community. It challenges the claim that the SADC region is an emerging security community and advances the thesis that domestic stability is a necessary condition for the attainment of such communities. The Chapter demonstrates that Deutsch's work has been misrepresented in the International Relations literature and offers some possible explanations for this.

The Conclusion consolidates the theoretical framework distinguishing between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary conditions for cohesion.
and effectiveness; the argument that SADC's failure to create a viable security regime was due principally to an absence of common values; and the thesis that domestic instability poses an insurmountable barrier to the formation of a security community. The Chapter underlines the political and structural limitations of SADC, which derive from the organisation's primary feature as a forum of states and prevent it from doing things that lie beyond the will and capacity of these states.
CHAPTER 2: THE FORMATION OF SADC AND THE ERA OF HOPE

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter discusses the formation of SADC in 1992 and the early efforts of the organisation to develop regional security mechanisms and policies. The Chapter provides background information on SADCC, explores the economic and political motivation for establishing SADC and presents the key features of the SADC Treaty of 1992. The Chapter then examines the ways in which the organisation's founding documents treated the issues of common values and sovereignty. It ends with a discussion on the intellectual and institutional origins of the acrimonious debate on regional security.

One of the historical factors that contributed indirectly to the disputes around security arrangements was SADCC's mandate, which focused exclusively on economic and development matters. Over a period of ten years prior to SADC's establishment, the SADCC states forged a consensus on the key concepts and strategies for regional economic integration. As discussed in this Chapter, there was no similar consensus on the most appropriate concepts and strategies for regional security. SADC's leadership, staff and structures, which were largely the same as those of SADCC, were ill-equipped to provide direction in this field. SADC was thus born with a clear vision of economic integration but no clarity at all on a security regime. Some member states went so far as to argue that SADC should be devoted solely to development and economic integration and that a separate organisation should be founded to deal with politics and security. For a brief period after SADC's formation the Secretariat attempted to craft a regional security policy based on democratic and anti-militarist norms. The initiative failed because these norms were not shared by all the member states.
2.2 The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

In 1980, against the backdrop of minority rule in South Africa and regional destabilisation by Pretoria, the leaders of the newly independent countries of Southern Africa established SADCC and set up its Secretariat in Gaborone. The founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The organisation’s goals were to promote regional co-operation through development projects, mobilise development assistance from the international community, reduce the economic dependence of member states on apartheid South Africa and forge links to create equitable regional integration.¹

A decade after its formation, SADCC concluded that these goals had not been met. In a frank assessment of its weaknesses, it acknowledged that little progress had been made towards development, economic growth and reducing the region’s dependence on South Africa.² The organisation had not become an effective instrument for economic integration and transformation. Although the international community had offered generous material support, SADCC lacked the capacity for successful project initiation and implementation, leading to low disbursement rates by donors. For their part, member states had pursued national development strategies that took no account of the imperative of regional co-operation. Consequently, no synergy had been generated and there was often conflict between national programmes and SADCC’s putative regional programmes. The absence of harmonised macro-economic and sectoral policies had led to sub-optimal national investments and constrained regional trade and growth.³

SADCC believed that a further problem was its failure to involve all sections of society in regional co-operation endeavours. It was almost exclusively a forum of states and government officials. This was not an adequate basis for building a regional community: “Regional co-operation will remain a ‘paper castle’ until it touches the lives of the ordinary citizens of the region and until they can be involved in determining its form and content.” In SADCC’s assessment, the biggest failure of all had been its inability to mobilise the region’s own resources for development and thereby lay the foundation for sustainable progress.

SADCC considered its greatest achievement to have been the building of a regional identity and sense of common destiny among member states. These states had remained united in the face of relentless aggression and divide-and-rule strategies by Pretoria.

Now, in the early 1990s, the Cold War had ended, apartheid was in its death throes and SADCC was optimistic about the future: “These developments will contribute in no small measure to moving the region from an era of conflict to one of peace, stability and security, primarily concerned with improving the quality of the lives of the peoples of the region…”. Having weathered the storm of destabilisation, the region faced the prospect of a democratic South Africa joining the community and contributing to the processes of development and integration. It was time for a major reorientation of the regional body.

### 2.3 The Motivation for Establishing SADC

In 1992 SADCC was dissolved and its members concluded a treaty establishing SADC.

SADC differs from its predecessor in three significant respects: its mandate extends beyond economic and development issues to encompass the political and security

---

5 Ibid.
7 SADCC, ‘Theme Document’, op cit, pg. 5.
8 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 1992, Windhoek. The Treaty can be viewed on SADC’s website at www.sadc.int.
domains; it includes the regional power, South Africa; and it is constituted as an international body with a legal persona.

The decision to replace SADCC with SADC and broaden the institution’s mandate and goals was based on five considerations. First, in the early 1990s African leaders were deeply concerned about the growing international marginalisation of the continent. The marginalisation was due principally to Africa’s economic and commensurate political weakness in global terms. It was exacerbated by the ending of the Cold War, which had led to declining interest in Africa among the major powers. African politicians and scholars warned that the continent was “drifting almost to the point of delinkage from the attention of the rest of the world”; it had “moved from being at the periphery to the periphery of the periphery of the global economy – the permanent political underdog, the world’s basket case for which there is little hope”.

The marginalisation was bound to intensify if the continent did not join the emerging global trend towards regional integration. As noted in SADCC’s Theme Document of 1992, industrialised countries throughout the world were in the throes of forming economic blocs. Western Europe was constructing a common market, Canada, Mexico and the United States (US) were creating a free trade area and similar moves were underway in the Asia-Pacific region. In South America the Mercosur project had been launched, with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay committed to a common market with free movement of goods, and an agreement to eliminate trade tariffs had been reached by Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. At the micro level the regional blocs were expected to provide private sector companies with bigger markets and economies of scale, making them more competitive internationally. At the macro level the blocs were

---

likely to lead to a realignment of economic and political power that would radically change international relations. 12

Africa had no option but to follow suit. In 1991 the member states of the OAU concluded the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. The goal was to promote the integration of African economies in the interests of greater self-reliance. The principal strategy for creating the continental Community was through the formation, co-ordination and integration of regional economic communities. Member states were expected to strengthen the existing regional communities, establish such communities where they did not exist and co-ordinate their policies. 13

SADC was set up the regional economic community for Southern Africa. Its founders argued that the region was compelled to “strengthen itself economically and politically if it is to become a serious player in international relations”. 14 SADCC’s 1992 Theme Document identified a number of imperatives in this regard. The region needed deeper economic co-operation and integration that facilitated cross-border investment and trade and allowed freer movement of factors of production across national borders. It also needed common economic, political and social values and systems, such as free enterprise, free elections, multi-party systems and respect for human rights and the rule of law. In addition, regionalisation entailed the overarching challenge of forging “among all the countries and peoples of Southern Africa a vision of a shared future, a future within a regional community”. 15

The second set of factors motivating the establishment of SADC related to the host of chronic socio-economic problems afflicting Southern Africa. These problems included underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment; a proliferation of small arms in private hands; a large number of demobilised soldiers who were destitute; illicit trafficking in weapons and stolen goods; countless refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis

---

15 Ibid.
and a net outflow of capital; and rampant disease and environmental degradation, compounded by natural disasters like drought. Most of these problems were present in all the Southern African states, they transcended national borders and they therefore had to be tackled in a co-ordinated fashion. The core logic was that regional co-operation and co-ordination would generate synergies that were unattainable if states acted unilaterally.

The magnitude of the underdevelopment burden was starkly evident in comparative statistics on Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 1989 the SADCC countries had a combined GDP of $27.2 million, less than Nigeria’s GDP of $28.9 million. By way of further comparison, GDP figures at that time were $29 million for Hungary, $100.8 million for Finland, $150 million for Iran and $319 million for Brazil. GDP per capita in the SADCC region was a paltry $363, less than that for Africa as a whole (excluding South Africa) and vastly less than the figure of $2,300 in South Africa. This grim situation showed no signs of improving. During the previous decade economic growth rates had declined across Southern Africa, in the case of most countries to levels below the rate of population growth.

South Africa’s entry into SADC would make an appreciable difference. In 1989 its GDP was $80.3 million, making a regional total of $107.5 million when added to the ten SADCC countries. This was not significant in global terms, however, and the sharp disparity between the size of South Africa’s economy and that of its neighbours was not conducive to regional growth. In 1988 the value of South Africa’s exports to the SADCC states was more than five times the value of its imports from these countries. The prospects for growth were further dimmed by the colonial legacy of a regional economy and infrastructure designed to serve South Africa and its minority white community. Given the small size of national economies, low incomes and inadequate infrastructure, individual countries could not on their own attract the investment needed for long-term

---

18 Ibid, pg. 9.
19 Ibid, pg. 12.
development and growth. Nor, without the synergies generated by regional co-operation, did these countries have the resources to address their socio-economic problems.

Third, in contrast to the bleak economic situation, the political environment had improved dramatically and offered new opportunities to strengthen the regional community. The demise of the Cold War had led to the cessation of Superpower contestation on the sub-continent, an attenuation of ideology as a source of tension between and within states, and apparently widespread acceptance of political pluralism. Many of the major historical conflicts had consequently been resolved or were in the process of being settled: South African and Cuban troops withdrew from Angola in 1988 and 1989 respectively; Namibia attained independence in 1990; Frelimo and Renamo concluded a partial ceasefire in Mozambique in 1990 and a general peace accord in 1992; and democratic elections were held for the first time in Angola, Mozambique and Malawi.

From a regional perspective the most important political development was the imminent ending of minority rule in South Africa. This would remove the major source of regional instability and at long last create the potential for an inclusive formation in Southern Africa. The spirit of the time is captured eloquently by Peter Vale, who records the expectation that the emergence of a democratic South Africa into the regional community would register a kind of zero-hour, a moment from which all the states and people of the region began to interact constructively after years of cross-border wars and chronic insecurity associated with minority power.20 Vale and many others believed then that “a strong, confident South Africa could halt the region’s downward spiral – and around this, economies would grow, democracy prosper, education flourish: the region’s people, as Isaiah so triumphantly proclaims, would beat their swords into ploughshares”.21

Fourth, South Africa’s forthcoming entry into SADC might have been welcomed but it was also threatening in certain respects. The African National Congress (ANC) had not achieved an outright victory and the balance of power was such that there were bound to

---


21 Ibid.
be compromises with the ruling National Party. Amongst other things, it was possible that the military, intelligence services and other elements of the apartheid regime would be incorporated into the new state. There were also concerns that South Africa, by virtue of its economic strength, would inevitably dominate not only the region but also the regional body. It therefore seemed prudent to set up SADC prior to South Africa’s democratic elections and Pretoria’s accession to the organisation. This would enable the comparatively weak states of SADCC to prepare unified negotiating positions on trade and other economic issues, craft a treaty based on progressive principles and entrench the concept of “balance, equity and mutual benefit” as the maxim for regional coordination.22

Fifth, despite the generally positive political trends and new sense of optimism, there was a sober awareness of the violent history and precarious stability of the region. Southern Africa had been wracked by violence for decades, ranging from foreign conquests and repression by colonial and settler regimes to liberation struggles, apartheid destabilisation and civil wars. The political, social and cultural legacy of this violence would not be overcome quickly and the transitions to democracy in the early 1990s were fraught with uncertainty and danger. In Angola the cease-fire agreement of 1991 and the subsequent election in 1992 were thrown into turmoil when Unita rejected the election results and the country returned to civil war. In South Africa and Mozambique the processes of democratisation were threatened by political and criminal violence. It seemed clear that the ending of apartheid and the Cold War had not obviated the need for a regional forum for peace and security.

At the inception of SADC, member states declared that political stability was a prerequisite for development and that institutional arrangements were required to achieve and maintain stability:

War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare.
Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region,

---

and peace and mutual security are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.\footnote{SADC, \textit{Towards the Southern African Development Community}, op cit, pp. 9-10.}

Prior to the formation of SADC, regional security issues were addressed through the coalition known as the Frontline States. This was an informal political grouping that emerged in 1976 with the aim of securing the liberation of Zimbabwe. It subsequently focused on Namibian independence, minority rule in South Africa and regional destabilisation by Pretoria.\footnote{By the early 1990s the Frontline States comprised Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For a history of the coalition, see G. Khadiagala, 1995, \textit{Allies in Adversity: Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975-1993}, Athens: Ohio University Press; and A. Omari, 1995, 'Regional Security: One View from the Front Line States', \textit{The Arusha Papers: A Working Series on Southern African Security}, no. 5, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape and Centre for Foreign Relations, Dar es Salaam, July.} In the late 1970s the Frontline States created the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), a little publicised body comprising defence ministers, defence ministry officials and senior military officers, which held regular meetings and built a high level of trust among the participating armed forces and governments.\footnote{Author's interview with Major-General Pheto, Chief-of-Staff of the Botswana Defence Force, Maputo, September 1991.} Following South Africa's democratic election in 1994, the Frontline States was dissolved and replaced by the SADC Organ, and the ISDSC was reoriented and reconstituted to include all the SADC countries (Chapter 3).

### 2.4 The SADC Treaty

The SADC Treaty of 1992 presents the objectives of the organisation as follows: to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty and enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa; to evolve common political values, systems and institutions; to promote and defend peace and security; to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance; to achieve

---

---
complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; to promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources; to achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and to strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.  

The Treaty sets out the strategies for achieving these objectives. The principal strategy in relation to economic integration is the development of regional and national policies that progressively eliminate obstacles to the free movement of people, capital, labour, goods and services. The main strategy for peace and security is the harmonisation of the political policies and international relations of member states. In this regard the Treaty stipulates that the organisation and its members must act in accordance with the following principles: sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes. These principles constitute the official values of SADC. 

The highest decision-making body of SADC is the Summit, comprising heads of state or government. The Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the Summit rotate annually among member states. The second highest body is the Council of Ministers, which advises the Summit on overall policy and oversees the implementation of SADC policies, the execution of its programmes and the functioning and development of the organisation. The Treaty also provides for a Standing Committee of Officials to render technical advice to the Council; a Tribunal to adjudicate disputes; an Executive Secretary appointed by the Summit; and a permanent Secretariat located in Gaborone. SADC institutions must make decisions by consensus and the quorum for meetings of these institutions is two-thirds of the member states.  

---

26 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit, article 5(1).  
27 Ibid, article 5(2).  
28 Ibid, article 4.  
29 Ibid, article 10.  
30 Ibid, articles 18 and 19.
The Treaty provides that member states must conclude protocols specifying the objectives, scope and institutional means of co-operation and integration in seven sectors: food security, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; industry, trade, investment and finance; human resources development, science and technology; natural resources and the environment; social welfare, information and culture; and politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. After approval by the Summit, the protocols become an integral part of the Treaty and must be ratified by the parties thereto.

SADC decided at the outset to adopt a decentralised approach to sectoral co-ordination, with responsibility for co-ordination of the sectors being allocated to individual states. This approach, which proved to be inefficient and ineffectual (Chapter 5), was motivated by a desire to promote a sense of ownership of SADC programmes among member states, avoid the bureaucratic procedures and costs associated with a centralised model and avert a transfer of sovereignty to the regional body. At the end of 2001 there were twenty-one sectoral co-ordinating units and commissions in twelve countries. The exception in this regard was the sensitive sector of ‘politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security’, which the Summit was unwilling to allocate permanently to a single country. Instead, as described below, it sought to establish a central co-ordinating body that would be chaired by member states on a rotating basis. This body eventually took the form of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.

2.5 Common values and sovereignty

Given the emphasis that this dissertation places on common values and sovereignty, it is worth noting the importance that SADC attached to these issues at the time of its formation. The SADC Declaration regarded common values among member states as a

---

31 Ibid, article 21.
32 Ibid, article 22.
33 In 2001 the Summit approved a plan to phase out the decentralised approach and restructure the organisation (Section 3.6).
vital condition for unity, co-operation and regional security. Southern Africa had historically been united in the struggle for liberation and the fight against apartheid but this was not an adequate basis for co-operation in the post-apartheid era. Instead, "a new Southern Africa concerned with peace and development must find a more abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation in order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region". The foundation for enduring political solidarity and co-operation would be provided by greater economic co-operation and integration and by common economic, political and social values and systems. The recent political breakthroughs in Namibia, South Africa and other Southern African countries had already brought about a greater convergence of values across the region and this would help to create the appropriate environment for deeper co-operation.

Accordingly, as noted in the previous Section, the SADC Treaty included as one of the organisation's objectives the evolution of common political values, systems and institutions; it presented the harmonisation of political policies and international relations as a key strategy for peace and security; and it enshrined as the core values of the regional body the principles of sovereign equality of states, solidarity, peace and security, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, equity, balance and mutual benefit, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

In the decade following SADC's establishment, the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law were breached in significant ways, generating conflict and insecurity within and between countries. Moreover, the lack of harmonisation of domestic politics and foreign policies prevented SADC from playing an effective peacemaking role. The weight that the organisation's founding documents had placed on common values proved correct. During the 1990s SADC enjoyed sufficient normative convergence to undertake multilateral co-operation in a range of functional areas but lacked the

35 SADC, *Towards the Southern African Development Community*, op cit, pg. 5.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, pg. 2.
normative consensus that was needed to act in a unified manner in the sensitive realm of regional security (Chapter 5).

On the basis of SADCC's lacklustre performance and the experience of regional bodies elsewhere in the world, it was also evident to the drafters of SADC's founding documents that the achievement of regional integration would depend on the willingness of member states to surrender a measure of sovereign decision-making to the regional forum. The extent to which states were willing to do this would mark the region's progression from co-operation to co-ordination to integration. SADCC's Theme Document of 1992 asserted categorically that integration would not occur if left to market forces alone. A high level of political co-operation and intervention by states was needed to shape the scope, scale and nature of integration, and this in turn required strengthening the powers of regional decision-making, co-ordinating, executive and enforcement structures.39

There were several ways in which the regional structures could be strengthened, all of them at the expense of sovereignty. For example, the Executive Secretary could be authorised to make certain decisions on behalf of member states. Even without such formal authority, a properly empowered Secretariat could wield influence through the preparation of agendas, briefings and policy papers. At a higher level, states could agree to be bound by SADC's protocols and the decisions of Summit and thereby accept the resultant constraints on their national decision-making and freedom of action. States could also agree to submit their disputes to the SADC Tribunal and abide by its decisions. The most intrusive challenges to sovereignty would arise if the Summit took punitive action against a member state that violated SADC's principles or if the Summit sought to interfere in the internal affairs of a member that posed a threat to regional security.

The prospect of diluting sovereignty was a vexed issue in Southern Africa, however. Having acquired sovereignty relatively recently and at great cost through liberation struggles, few if any SADC states were disposed towards giving it up. Furthermore, while all the states enjoyed de jure sovereignty, many of them were struggling to gain de facto

sovereignty: they were still in the process of state formation, they did not have full administrative control of their territories and they did not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The absence of common values was a further disincentive to transferring sovereignty. States that had substantially different political dispositions were not only bound to experience difficulty in making collective decisions but were also likely to ignore the decisions that were contrary to their national policies.

The drafters of the SADC Declaration attempted to address state apprehensions about diminished sovereignty by arguing that the transfer of sovereignty to the regional organisation was not in fact a loss of sovereignty:

Integration does imply that some decisions which were previously taken by individual states are taken regionally, and those decisions taken nationally give due consideration to regional positions and circumstances. Regional decision-making also implies elements of change in the locus and context of exercising sovereignty, rather than a loss of sovereignty.40

The Declaration observed further that the transfer of sovereignty to SADC was itself an exercise of sovereignty:

Member States recognise that the attainment of the objective of regional economic integration in Southern Africa will require us to exercise our sovereign right in empowering the organisation to act on our behalf and for our common good. This is the challenging mission of SADC.41

These arguments regarding the transfer of sovereignty might have been ingenious but they were also disingenuous. Regardless of how the ‘challenging mission’ was packaged so as to make it more palatable, the bottom line could not be finessed: member states either would or would not confer decision-making authority on the Executive Secretary.

---

40 SADC, Towards the Southern African Development Community, op cit, pg. 10.
41 Ibid, pg. 11.
and they either would or would not consider themselves bound by the organisation's principles and decisions. We will see in the course of this dissertation that they were averse to both of these undertakings and that their resistance was intimately linked to the absence of common values on politics and security.

2.6 Embryonic policy on regional security

When SADC was launched in 1992 its founders did not know what kind of regional security model they wanted to adopt. The conceptual planning for the new organisation was done by SADCC Secretariat officials and the academics they used as advisers. Because SADCC's focus had been confined to economic co-operation and development, these people were unfamiliar with the literature and debates on regional security. The SADCC Theme document of 1992 thus presented a well-researched, comprehensive and sophisticated perspective on economic integration, comparing various models and selecting the one deemed most appropriate for Southern Africa, but it provided no details on the institutionalisation of security co-operation. It merely contained the following tentative statement:

This Document will not address the security issue in any detail, but simply draws attention to the need for new mechanisms and possibly institutions to address regional political and security issues. Such institutions will need to operate [sic] a concept which relates issues of peace and security to those of co-operation and development.42

The absence of security expertise in the Secretariat was compounded by the composition of the SADC Council of Ministers, the body responsible for the direction and operations of the organisation. The Treaty provided that the Council must "consist of one Minister from each Member State, preferably a Minister responsible for economic planning or

42 SADCC, 'Theme Document', op cit, pg. 18.
The decision to put these ministers in the driving seat reflects both the history of SADCC as a development organisation and the core conception of SADC as a regional economic community. One consequence of the decision was a leadership vacuum with respect to peace and security. The Treaty expected the Summit to address major conflicts in the region but did not provide for a regional committee of foreign ministers or defence ministers and there was no ministerial forum charged with constructing SADC’s peace and security architecture. For domestic political reasons the economic affairs and finance ministers who served on the Council dared not trespass into the security terrain. The Council’s advisory staff who served on SADC’s Standing Committee of Officials were likewise drawn from the economic affairs and finance departments of member states and were similarly loath to tackle security issues.

In contrast to the lack of security expertise within SADC’s embryonic structures, numerous researchers and think tanks in Southern Africa were active in this field. They published theoretical and policy papers on regional security, organised seminars and conferences, invited foreign experts to visit the region and facilitated discussions among government officials, military officers and academics from member states. As discussed below, the SADC Secretariat was supportive of these activities but most of the governments were not receptive to civil society inputs and engagement.

Between 1992 and 1994 the Secretariat attempted to drive the formulation of regional security policy and imbue it with a democratic and anti-militarist character. The key individual in this process was the Secretariat’s chief economist, Dr Charles Hove. Since the Secretariat had no staff member dedicated to regional security and the Council of Ministers and Standing Committee of Officials had no inclination to provide leadership

---

43 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit, article 11(1).
44 The think tanks included the Centre for Southern African Studies at the University of the Western Cape; the Institute for Defence Policy (later Institute for Security Studies) in Pretoria; the Military Research Group in Johannesburg; the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais in Maputo; the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies in Harare; the Centre for Foreign Relations in Dar es Salaam; and the Centre for Intergroup Studies (later Centre for Conflict Resolution) at the University of Cape Town.
on the subject, Hove took it upon himself to co-ordinate the regional security discussion and promote a progressive agenda. His academic training lay in the field of economics, however, and he therefore commissioned two researchers at the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town to prepare draft policy on regional security: in 1992 he asked me to draft the section on 'politics, diplomacy, peace and security' in SADC's 1993 *Framework and Strategy* document, and in 1994 he asked me and my Mozambican colleague, Joao Honwana, to draft the terms of reference and protocols for SADC’s security organ.

In preparing the draft policies, our main point of reference was Europe because of its democratic values, its achievement in forging a security community after World War II and its success in managing peacefully and eventually overcoming the Cold War, a situation seen as similar in some respects to the dynamics of Southern Africa after the ending of apartheid. We were fascinated in particular by the experiences of the CSCE, which for twenty years had provided a forum for the US, the Soviet Union and West and East European countries to engage in dialogue and conclude agreements on security, economic co-operation and human rights. During the Cold War the CSCE had contributed to a more stable security environment in Europe, promoted co-operation across the ideological divide and raised human rights standards in the communist bloc.

The conceptual attraction of the CSCE was the linkages it drew between security, human rights, development and economic growth as mutually reinforcing imperatives. Elsewhere in Africa at this time, the CSCE inspired the formation of the Conference on Security,
Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), an initiative launched in 1991 by the Africa Leadership Forum headed by Olusegan Obasanjo who was later to become the President of Nigeria. Coincidently, in 1991 the President of South Africa, FW de Klerk, proposed the establishment of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Southern Africa, modelled on the CSCE.

Our approach to regional security policy was also grounded in the anti-militarist concepts of disarmament, non-offensive defence, common security and 'new thinking on security'. So-called 'new thinking on security' was a reaction to the state-centric and militarist strategies adopted by many countries during the Cold War. It emphasised human security rather than state security and conceived of security as a holistic phenomenon that was not confined to military matters but broadened to include the political, social, economic and environmental spheres. Underpinning this approach was the conviction that the state was often the greatest threat to the security of citizens and that human security would be promoted by redirecting public spending away from the armed forces to support development programmes and social services.

We invoked the notion of 'common security' as the principal organising concept for regional security in Southern Africa. This concept had achieved international prominence


in the 1980s through the reports of the Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.\textsuperscript{54} The Commission argued that countries had become increasingly interdependent in the modern technological age and that common problems transcended national borders as never before. States could no longer protect their citizens through unilateral military means. They shared an interest in joint survival and should begin to organise their security policies in co-operation with each other.

The ideas outlined above were incorporated into SADC's 1993 \textit{Framework and Strategy} document, prepared for the Council of Ministers by the Secretariat and the resource people it had commissioned and then convened in Gaborone. The aim of the document was to translate the principles and objectives of the SADC Treaty into a practical programme for regional integration. This was done by identifying and addressing the strategic challenges of integration in a range of areas, such as human resources development, science and technology; food security, land and agriculture; transport and communications; social welfare and health; employment and labour; investment and trade; energy; and natural resources and the environment.

The section on 'politics, diplomacy, peace and security' in the \textit{Framework and Strategy} document was SADC's first detailed policy statement on these topics.\textsuperscript{55} It called for the forging of common political values based on democratic norms, the establishment of mechanisms for conflict avoidance, management and resolution, and the creation of a 'non-militaristic security order' that was not dependent on armed forces and military action. The new security order was motivated on two grounds. First, the military steps taken by a state to enhance its security might make other states feel threatened, leading to an escalating arms race, a heightened risk of war and a lower level of security for all the states concerned.\textsuperscript{56} Second, non-military problems like abuse of human rights, economic underdevelopment and a lack of food and energy were serious threats to the security of


\textsuperscript{56} In the International Relations literature this classic problem is referred to as the 'security dilemma'. See R. Jervis, 1978, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', \textit{World Politics}, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 167-214.
people. These problems, which could also threaten the security of states since they might lead to conflict between governments and citizens, could not be tackled by military means.

The Framework and Strategy document presented the following additional strategies for ensuring peace and security: the cultivation of a new discourse that promotes peace, reconciliation and unity; the creation of a forum for mediation and arbitration; greater transparency and public debate on the formulation of national and regional security policy; the strengthening of mechanisms to ensure the accountability of armed forces to governments and parliaments; the ratification by member states of key principles of international law governing inter-state relations; the adoption by states of the military doctrine of non-offensive defence, which aims to ensure adequate defence while minimising offensive capabilities; reductions in force levels and military expenditure; the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty that includes a commitment by states to defend each other in the event of an external attack; and the introduction of confidence- and security-building measures such as exchange of military information and joint military training.

The section on peace and security in the Framework and Strategy document concluded with a passage that was inconsistent with the preceding anti-militarist philosophy:

There is a sense in which military force is an acceptable form of foreign policy. The region would have to agree on conditions under which this will be acceptable. The region would also need to consider conditions under which military intervention in a fellow member State might be acceptable. Humanitarian considerations, peacekeeping and the restoration of constitutional order would be acceptable grounds for such intervention.\(^57\)

This passage did not appear in the draft prepared by the Secretariat’s resource team and was probably added by the Council of Ministers before the document was presented to

the Summit. The significance of the passage is heightened by comparing it with the drafter’s original formulation: “Military force is a legitimate means of defence against external aggression but an unacceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and resolving inter-state conflict”. The differences between the two texts — the official version viewing the use of force as an acceptable instrument of foreign policy under certain circumstances and the draft version depicting force as an unacceptable policy instrument — presaged the divisive debates in the second half of the 1990s around the orientation of the Organ (Chapter 3) and SADC’s response to the DRC rebellion of 1998 (Section 4.4).

2.7 The early disputes over regional security structures

In July 1994 the Secretariat organised the Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek with the aim of elaborating on the Framework and Strategy document and identifying the mechanisms required to promote, co-ordinate and oversee regional security. The workshop was attended by ministers, government officials, parliamentarians and members of non-governmental organisations. It ended with a closed ministerial meeting that recommended to the Council of Ministers that a Protocol on Peace, Security and Political Co-operation be concluded and that the following structures be set up: an independent human rights commission; a SADC committee of foreign ministers charged with “peace promotion”; a SADC committee of defence and security ministers; and a SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation. Shortly thereafter, the SADC countries that comprised the Frontline States proposed the formation of a new organisation, named the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), to serve as the regional forum for security and peacemaking. In two major respects this proposal was at odds with the ministerial recommendations made at the

Windhoek workshop. Whereas the envisaged Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation would be a SADC institution that functioned in a formal manner, the Frontline States grouping wanted ASAS to be independent of SADC and to have an informal and flexible *modus operandi*. In August 1994 the Summit approved the creation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security but did not specify its objectives, features and structures. Instead, the heads of state requested their foreign ministers to harmonise the proposals of the Namibia workshop and the Frontline States.

In February 1995 SADC held a consultative conference in Lilongwe, attended by the Council of Ministers and representatives of the EU and other international donors. Amongst other things, the conference welcomed the creation of the sector on politics, peace and security. According to the conference communiqué, the “international Cooperating Partners also expressed their interest to cooperate actively with SADC in that Sector. They, however, urged SADC to expeditiously work out the modalities, structures and mandates for the Sector”. The interest shown by the international partners proved more of a hindrance than a help. Within SADC circles the proponents of ASAS were able to win support for their position on the grounds that the EU was pushing the option of a sector, wanted to fund it and would thereby have the power to dictate the regional security agenda; in the interests of national and regional sovereignty, an independent ASAS free of foreign interference was the better course of action. At a meeting in Harare in March 1995 the SADC foreign ministers recommended the establishment of ASAS as the institutional mechanism for security co-operation.

After the Harare meeting the Secretariat took the bold step of urging the Council of Ministers to reject the foreign ministers’ recommendation, insisting that the concerns

---

65 Author’s correspondence with SADC Secretariat officials, March 1995.
about donor interference could be accommodated in a SADC sector co-ordinated by a member state. At the Council meeting in August 1995, the ministers were unable to reach consensus on the matter. In the absence of ministerial consensus, the Summit meeting in 1995 could not make progress towards setting up a common security forum. A further controversy arose when Zimbabwe insisted that the forum should follow the tradition of the Frontline States and be chaired on a permanent basis by the longest-serving head of state in the region, namely President Mugabe; other countries preferred the option of a rotating chair. Mugabe was reportedly piqued that his seniority and leading role in regional politics were being undercut by the emerging dominance of post-apartheid South Africa and the international stature of President Mandela. The Summit ended up accepting the request by foreign ministers to defer the allocation of the peace and security sector to a member state and to be given more time for ministerial consultations on the sector’s structures, terms of reference and operating procedures.

At the time, the disputes and tension around SADC’s security arrangements were hard to understand. While some differences on strategy were apparent, it seemed as if the main issues in contention related to less significant questions about the status, structure and procedures of the security body. This impression turned out to have been mistaken. Over the next few years it became clear that states were divided on substantive political grounds and that many of them did not support the anti-militarist and democratic norms championed by the Secretariat. As discussed in the following Chapter, antagonistic and recriminatory debates around the security body’s status and structure persisted throughout the 1990s as manifestations of the underlying political and strategic differences.

It became evident too that most of the SADC members viewed regional security in excessively statist terms. States were not only the sole providers of security and the primary objects of security, they were also to be the exclusive drafters of regional

67 Ibid.
71 Nathan and Honwana, ‘After the Storm’, op cit.
security policy. At the Council of Ministers meeting in 1995 the majority of states supported the argument that defence and security were so sensitive that they should be discussed at the level of ministers and presidents without "interference from the SADC Secretariat bureaucracy" and "unnecessary long lines of accountability". Subsequent to the 1994 Windhoek workshop, parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations were excluded from SADC's deliberations on regional security. Over the following decade no effort was made to consult or even brief the SADC Parliamentary Forum, which was formed in 1996 as an autonomous institution of SADC and comprised parliamentarians from all the member states. The Secretariat was itself excluded from the process of drafting the Organ protocol in Swaziland in 1999-2000.

Nor did the Summit consider it necessary to issue meaningful public reports on its regional security discussions. Many member states believed that transparency on security matters was foolhardy and they were unwilling to admit publicly that SADC was disunited. As a result, the communiqués issued after Summit meetings were deliberately bland and uninformative. We will see in the following Chapter that this had the perverse effect of generating intense disagreements among states on what they had decided at previous meetings. It also left government officials unclear about the Summit mandates they were expected to implement.

By 1995 the short-lived era of hope was over. Contrary to the optimistic expectations that had prevailed at the birth of SADC, the region was about to be plunged into bitter disputes on regional security arrangements (Chapter 3), deep divisions over the 1998 rebellion in the DRC (Section 4.4) and, most seriously, violent conflicts and repression in several member states (Chapter 4).

---

72 Author's correspondence with a Mozambican official who attended the Council of Ministers meeting in Johannesburg on 25-26 August 1995.
73 This observation is based on the author's discussions with Ntho Ntema, Chairperson of the SADC Parliamentary Forum and Speaker of Parliament in Lesotho, between 1999 and 2002.
74 For information about the SADC Parliamentary Forum, see www.sadcpf.org.
75 This observation is based on the author's participation in the drafting of the Organ protocol in Swaziland in 1999-2000.
CHAPTER 3: THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH THE ORGAN

3.1 Introduction

The main protagonists in the regional security debates were Zimbabwe and South Africa. Of all the Southern African countries, Zimbabwe was by far the most committed to the creation of a regional security body and President Mugabe showed greater interest in this matter than any other SADC head of state. Pretoria’s attention was comparatively low. The Mandela government between 1994 and 1999 was preoccupied with the domestic challenges of consolidating the new state and democratic dispensation, and the Mbeki presidency between 1999 and 2004 was more interested in building political and security structures at the continental level through the AU than at the regional level through SADC. Nevertheless, South Africa’s status as the regional power was inescapable and its defence and foreign affairs officials who participated in the Organ debates were assertive and influential.

As far as the other states were concerned, Angola and Namibia supported Zimbabwe as close allies, Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Swaziland and Tanzania generally backed South Africa, the DRC had no presence in the debates and Malawi, Lesotho and Zambia contributed erratically without conforming to any discernible pattern. In truth, it was only Zimbabwean and South African officials that consistently arrived at meetings on regional security arrangements with a prepared position. Because South Africa and Zimbabwe dominated the discussions and were the only SADC states to articulate their positions publicly, the account that follows focuses on these countries.

This Chapter explores the main developments and debates regarding the orientation, methods, structures and status of SADC’s collective security body. It discusses the reasons for the Organ impasse in the second half of the 1990s and describes the initiative taken by the Swazi Foreign Minister to finalise the Organ Protocol. It then summarises
the content of the Protocol and SIPO, examines the fractious evolution of SADC's Mutual Defence Pact and outlines the activities of the ISDSC.

The Chapter highlights the acute tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe, which to some extent was a product of historical circumstances but was more importantly a clash of ideas around norms and strategy. At the heart of the Organ imbroglio were fundamentally different approaches to regional conflict management and resolution, with one group of states led by Pretoria emphasising diplomatic methods and the other group led by Harare favouring a military approach. This normative cleavage similarly bedevilled the process of concluding the Mutual Defence Pact, although here it was Botswana that most forcefully opposed a militarist position.

3.2 The launch of the Organ

In June 1996 the Summit met in Gaborone to launch the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. The Summit communique stated that the Organ would be governed by the principles contained in the SADC Treaty, and added a further principle: “Military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided upon only after all possible political remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the OAU and the United Nations”.¹ This formulation was significant in the context of the tussle between the militarist and pacific tendencies in SADC. It will be recalled that in SADC’s 1993 Framework and Strategy document, member states had rejected the view that military force is an unacceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and resolving conflict; instead, they maintained that “there is a sense in which military force is an acceptable form of foreign policy”, noting that “the region would have to agree on conditions under which this will be acceptable” (Section 2.6).² Now, in the 1996 Summit

¹ SADC, 1996, ‘Communique: Summit of Heads of State or Governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’, Gaborone, 28 June, para 4.1
the content of the Protocol and SIPO, examines the fractious evolution of SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact and outlines the activities of the ISDSC.

The Chapter highlights the acute tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe, which to some extent was a product of historical circumstances but was more importantly a clash of ideas around norms and strategy. At the heart of the Organ imbroglio were fundamentally different approaches to regional conflict management and resolution, with one group of states led by Pretoria emphasising diplomatic methods and the other group led by Harare favouring a military approach. This normative cleavage similarly bedevilled the process of concluding the Mutual Defence Pact, although here it was Botswana that most forcefully opposed a militarist position.

3.2 The launch of the Organ

In June 1996 the Summit met in Gaborone to launch the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. The Summit communiqué stated that the Organ would be governed by the principles contained in the SADC Treaty, and added a further principle: “Military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided upon only after all possible political remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the OAU and the United Nations”.¹ This formulation was significant in the context of the tussle between the militarist and pacific tendencies in SADC. It will be recalled that in SADC’s 1993 Framework and Strategy document, member states had rejected the view that military force is an unacceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and resolving conflict; instead, they maintained that “there is a sense in which military force is an acceptable form of foreign policy”, noting that “the region would have to agree on conditions under which this will be acceptable” (Section 2.6).² Now, in the 1996 Summit

¹ SADC, 1996, ‘Communiqué: Summit of Heads of State or Governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’, Gaborone, 28 June, para 4.1
communique, SADC's stance was grounded in international law and the use of force was presented as an instrument of last resort after political efforts had failed.

The communique stated that the Organ would have the following objectives:

- protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression;
- promote political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
- promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states and encourage the observance of universal human rights;
- promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security;
- engage in regional security and defence co-operation through conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- mediate in inter-state disputes, use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region and seek to end conflict as quickly as possible through diplomatic means;
- develop a collective security capacity, conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats and establish a regional peacekeeping force; and
- encourage and monitor the ratification of UN and OAU treaties on disarmament and arms control, human rights and peaceful relations between states.3

The Organ's principles and objectives thus reflected a pacific, democratic and holistic perspective on security. This was due in large measure to the preparatory work done by the Secretariat, which had drafted the terms of reference of the peace and security sector for consideration at a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, defence and SADC affairs in Gaborone in January 1996.4 Once again, but for the last time, the Secretariat sought to steer the security debate in a progressive direction.

3 SADC, Gaborone Summit communiqué, op cit.
In light of the prevailing disputes among member states, the terms of reference prepared by the Secretariat included three institutional options for the sector. The ministers could not reach consensus on the matter. In their memorandum to the Summit, they omitted the options and simply presented a brief and insufficiently clear set of proposals on organisational arrangements. As on other occasions, an inability to reach agreement was ‘resolved’ by the expedient of recording an artificial consensus in a bland and ambiguous manner. The ministers gave the sector a new appellation – the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, named after the Central Organ of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The ministers added that the Organ would operate in a flexible and informal manner.

At the Gaborone Summit the heads of state rejected the reference to flexibility and informality but otherwise accepted, and reproduced in the communiqué, the ministers’ brief proposals on the Organ’s structural arrangements: the Organ would operate at Summit, ministerial and technical levels; it would function independently of other SADC structures; it would incorporate the ISDSC; the Chair of the Organ would rotate annually among member states; and the Chair would serve on a Troika basis, meaning that he or she must act in consultation with the outgoing Chair and the incoming Chair for the following year. The Summit appointed Mugabe as the first Chair of the Organ and he “assured the Summit that he [would] work closely with all member States and consult on all issues pertaining to the work of the Organ”. The Secretariat was given no role to play in the administration of the security body. Instead, the country that held the annually rotating chair of the Organ would be responsible for administrative, logistical and financial matters.

The Summit’s decisions in Gaborone generated much unhappiness and friction in subsequent years. This was partly because the launch of the Organ was premature given

---

6 Ibid.
7 SADC, Gaborone Summit communiqué, op cit.
8 Ibid, pg. 4.
the lack of consensus among member states; most seriously, the strategies and jurisdiction of the Organ were unclear and disputed. In terms of the SADC Treaty, moreover, the formation of the Organ required a protocol approved by the Summit and ratified by two-thirds of the member states, a process that was not completed until 2004. Prior to this, the Organ did not exist *de jure*. Nor did it exist properly *de facto*: Mugabe did not set up any of its envisaged structures, the Chair did not rotate annually and the ISDSC continued to operate independently of SADC. Over the next five years Mugabe made pronouncements and decisions as the Chair of the Organ without consulting all member states. The most controversial decision related to the deployment of troops from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola to support President Kabila during the 1998 rebellion in the DRC. This was done in the name of SADC but without the organisation's blessing and contrary to the wishes of South Africa and the other member states that wanted to tackle the DRC crisis through diplomatic rather than military action (Section 4.4).

Further problems arose from the Gaborone Summit's decision that the Organ would function independently of other SADC structures and at a summit level. This gave rise to the anomalous prospect of two separate entities at the level of heads of state being responsible for addressing conflict in the region. The mandates of both the Organ and the SADC Summit covered peacemaking and security but the Gaborone communique did not specify the respective jurisdictions of these bodies and the relationship between them. During his tenure as the SADC Chairperson in 1997/8, President Mandela became so frustrated with Mugabe's rival authority as the Chair of the Organ that he threatened to resign if the Organ were not properly integrated into SADC and made accountable to the Summit. The threat did not receive a great deal of media attention but within SADC circles it was a controversial and provocative move that reflected and exacerbated the growing tension around regional security arrangements.

The Summit was unable to resolve the Organ disputes at its meetings in Maputo and Mauritius in 1998. At the former meeting the issue was referred to an ad hoc working group comprising Mozambique, Malawi and Namibia. The foreign ministers of these

---

countries produced a stillborn ‘compromise’ proposal that the Organ should be constituted as a committee of five member states with a mandate to “intervene in all conflicts arising within the region”. South African officials claimed that the Maputo Summit effectively suspended the Organ. This view was contested by Zimbabwean officials. In August 1999, following the DRC crisis that had rent SADC asunder (Section 4.4), the Summit decided that the Organ should continue to operate and be chaired by Mugabe but that the Council of Ministers would review the operations of all SADC institutions, including the Organ, and revert to the Summit within six months. Mugabe was reported to have agreed that he would not act in the name of the Organ without consulting the Chair of SADC.

3.3 The ‘two summits’ debate

Pretoria’s position on the Organ’s status was set out publicly by Horst Brammer, who was centrally involved in the debates on regional security arrangements in his capacity as the Deputy Director for SADC Political Affairs in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs. He argued that while regional security was a principal responsibility of the Organ, it was also, by virtue of the SADC Treaty, a core function of SADC and therefore of the SADC Summit. As noted in Section 2.4, the Treaty includes the promotion and defence of peace and security as one of the institution’s objectives, it anticipates the ratification of a protocol on politics, peace and security, and it states that the SADC Summit is the supreme decision-making body of the organisation. Brammer concluded that the Organ was subsidiary to the Summit and should be answerable to it.

---

15 Brammer, 'In Search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism', op cit.
Brammer also reasoned that Southern Africa needed a single organisation covering political, security and economic co-operation. His motivation mirrored the holistic perspective expressed in the CSCE and the CSSDCA (Section 2.6), namely that the political, security, social and economic spheres were so intertwined that progress in any one sphere depended on progress in, and institutional linkages with, the others. Brammer elaborated further:

If southern African governments are serious about [economic] integration, they will have to agree on a structure that would ensure regional stability and security. Security and economic development go hand in hand – one is inconceivable without the other. Investor confidence and donor assistance can only be promoted if the region proves to the international community that it is willing and able to harmonise and implement policies which promote an environment conducive to peace and stability.16

Zimbabwe's stance on the status of the Organ was put across by Lt. Col. Walter Tapfumaneyi, a defence ministry official based in the Directorate of Defence Policy in Harare. Like Brammer, he was a key participant in the drafting of the Organ Protocol. He maintained that South Africa's "legal argument against two summits [was] contrived and untenable".17 It was clear from the Gaborone communique that the regional leaders had intended to "create a parallel and independent structure from the SADC economic forum".18 As heads of state, they were entitled to "create new institutions, dissolve old ones, or sign new treaties as they see fit".19 It was therefore "mischievous to engage in superfluous legalese in a bid to imprison the SADC Organ in the SADC Treaty".20 Tapfumaneyi asserted that while South Africa's legal status in SADC was equal to that of the other members, "the peculiar historical circumstances which saw South Africa as an adversary to the rest of southern Africa for many decades dictate that it is morally

---

16 Brammer, 'In Search of an Effective Regional Security Mechanism', op cit.
18 Ibid, pg. 25.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
incompetent to challenge the substance of the Treaty, or to invoke it in a manner that defeats its spirit and purpose”.21

The tone and substance of Tapfumaneyi’s remarks revealed Zimbabwe’s hostility towards Pretoria. The antagonism stemmed from a range of factors: apartheid aggression in the 1980s; Mandela’s iconic status and Pretoria’s lack of deference to Mugabe as the regional leader; South Africa’s perceived domination of SADC; and Harare’s belief that state decision-making in South Africa was still firmly in the clutches of apartheid era officials. Tapfumaneyi identified the causes of the Organ impasse as including Mandela’s threat to resign as the SADC Chair in 1997, Pretoria’s “isolationist and hegemonic behaviour”, its domineering presence at SADC and Organ meetings and, when its opinion failed to prevail, its unilateral actions that were usually at cross-purposes with the rest of SADC. Tapfumaneyi went so far as to claim that Pretoria was being manipulated by the US administration and that the retention of white personnel in the South African state had resulted in a “hidden but potent pro-apartheid hand that is manipulating South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy in a counter-progressive direction vis-à-vis a regional security consensus in Southern Africa”.22

The apparent anomaly of two summits reflected Harare’s long-standing conviction that the regional security forum should be independent of SADC. In the early 1990s Zimbabwe had argued that SADC, like its predecessor SADCC, should focus exclusively on economic matters and that a revamped version of the Frontline States should be responsible for politics, defence and security. As noted in Section 2.7, in 1995 Zimbabwe and the other members of the Frontline States had proposed that a new organisation, the Association of Southern African States, be set up as the regional security body.

Harare’s position was based on three considerations. First, Zimbabwean ministers and officials insisted privately that the SADC Secretariat would not maintain confidentiality on security issues because it was beholden to foreign donors; at meetings with donor

representatives, Secretariat staff were bound to pass on classified information. In his article cited above, Tapfumaneyi raised this contention publicly: "It is no secret that SADC is over 90 per cent donor funded, and donors of all hues and persuasions sit on its boards. For this reason, more than anything else, SADC is an inappropriate forum to preside over sensitive regional security issues." Underpinning this perspective was the strong anti-imperialist stance that remains firmly in place in Southern Africa as a result of colonialism and its modern incarnations like structural adjustment programmes.

Second, Zimbabwe was convinced that conflicts in the region should be dealt with along the lines of the informal and flexible arrangements of the Frontline States. During the liberation struggles and after the SADCC countries gained independence, the regional leadership developed a close rapport. As a result, Mugabe, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola were able to communicate quickly and easily without the burden of excessive protocol and bureaucracy; formal rules and procedures, on the other hand, would limit the freedom of SADC presidents and their speed of manoeuvre in times of crisis. Thomas Ohlson captures the appeal of the informal character of the Frontline States as follows: "Each national leader can pursue the foreign policy of his country, while the summitry format allows for flexibility, pragmatism, and rapid collective responses to questions of vital importance to the common goals."

Third, Zimbabwe's preference for informality derived from its concern that formal rules and procedures would undermine sovereignty by constraining national decision-making. According to Tapfumaneyi, sovereignty should not be compromised:

---

23 Author's discussions with Zimbabwean officials at SADC's Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek in July 1994 and at the meeting of the ISDSC in Cape Town in September 1995.  
Any fears about the separate SADC Organ Summit being abused by the SADC Organ Chairman are unfounded. This is not only because the leaders have the prerogative to limit the SADC Organ Chairman’s powers in the documents that lay down the Organ’s structures and operational modalities, but more importantly, because all the member states retain their sovereign right to act independently or to stand aloof if they are unhappy with the collective arrangements.27

As discussed further in Chapter 5, Zimbabwe’s opposition to diluting sovereignty was shared by most if not all of the SADC states. Inevitably, their aversion to subordinating national decision-making to regional decisions and norms had negative consequences. It stifled progress towards integration, building a regional community, creating a viable security regime and acting with common purpose in crisis situations.

3.4 The pacific-militarist debate

In addition to the debate around ‘two summits’, SADC was polarised around incompatible pacific and militarist models of regional security. One camp, comprising Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, regarded the Organ as a common security regime whose primary basis for co-operation and peacemaking would be political and not military. The militarist camp, comprising Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, preferred a mutual defence pact and prioritised defence co-operation and military responses to conflict. Mugabe stated that he foresaw the Organ evolving into a “kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for the region”.28

The divergent visions spawned heated debates on a range of issues, such as the structure of the Organ and the relative primacy of defence ministers and foreign ministers in relation to regional security. Brammer put the pacific case as follows:

> From South Africa’s point of view it would be important to place the regional security organisation in the realm of foreign ministers. Only such an arrangement would fall into the conflict resolution paradigm, which places emphasis on political, rather than military solutions to conflicts. Southern Africa should not follow an approach that falls out of this accepted international norm.²⁹

In 1999 Tapfumaneyi maintained that a primary reason for the Organ impasse was Pretoria’s opposition to the use of armed force in peacemaking. He argued that this approach was severely mistaken:

> All the conflicts that have arisen in southern Africa since 1989 have shown that is necessary, at least in the early stages of the conflict resolution and peace-building continuum, to apply collective military force, not as an end in itself, but as a catalyst to an effective political solution. It is therefore superfluous and hypocritical for the South African government and its apologists to advocate a strict adherence to early warning and diplomatic solutions to SADC conflicts.³⁰

Tapfumaneyi’s historical observation was correct in the sense that armed struggles and military support from the Frontline States in the 1970s and 1980s had been successful strategies in the fight for independence in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Flowing from that history, the foreign policies of independent Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe had retained a strongly militarist ethos. Tapfumaneyi also poured scorn on South Africa’s pacific posture in light of its military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 after

a mutiny in that country (Section 4.3). He described the deployment by Pretoria, with Botswana's "token support", as an invasion that had occurred without SADC's endorsement and that was reminiscent of apartheid destabilisation.31

Notwithstanding the Lesotho intervention, however, Pretoria had indeed embarked on a radical demilitarisation of its national and regional security policy after the democratic election in 1994. Under the new ANC government, the armed forces were no longer a major instrument of policy and were no longer involved in state decision-making. The government proclaimed that national security was "no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem" but had been "broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters".32 The security of people rather than the security of the state was declared to be the paramount concern and the primary threats to security were perceived to be social and economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education and limited social services, none of which could be solved by military means.33 Defence spending began to fall sharply and the government announced that the armed forces would have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.34

In the course of the 1990s South Africa was the only SADC country to publish its policy on regional security. Incorporated into the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the policy was based on an avowedly anti-militarist posture and the concept of common security:

Regional instability and underdevelopment can only be addressed meaningfully through political reform, socio-economic development and inter-state co-operation in these spheres. Similarly, the prevention and management of inter- and intra-state conflict is primarily a political and not a military matter.

31 Ibid, pg. 25.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
Following trends in other parts of the world, South Africa will encourage the development of a multi-lateral 'common security' approach in Southern Africa. In essence, the SADC states should shape their political, security and defence policies in co-operation with each other. ...Common security arrangements would have many advantages in [the Southern African] context. They could facilitate the sharing of information, intelligence and resources; the early warning of potential crises; joint problem-solving; implementing confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs); negotiating security agreements and treaties; and resolving inter-state conflict through peaceful means.35

The White Paper thus sought to entrench the primacy of political action over military engagement in maintaining regional security. Along these lines, the document added that certain common security activities were the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs, chief among them the settlement of conflict through preventive diplomacy, mediation or arbitration. The Department of Defence would be responsible for other activities, such as regional defence co-operation, CSBMs, military support for disaster relief and assistance with clearing minefields in neighbouring countries.36

Pretoria was convinced that pacific methods of conflict resolution were the most effective forms of peacemaking in civil wars and other crises in Africa. This conviction stemmed from the success of South Africa’s own negotiated settlement and from the relatively low impact of the ANC’s armed wing during the liberation struggle. Military action had been important symbolically but, in contrast to Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, it had not been a major factor in achieving liberation. The other relevant consideration was the style of politics favoured by both Mandela and Mbeki. They preferred the art of persuasion, and negotiations they could direct, to the blunt and unpredictable use of force. Force was seen as a limited tool, applicable only in exceptional situations and then mainly in order to provide space for diplomacy and negotiations.

36 Ibid.
The government was supportive of traditional peacekeeping that enjoyed the consent of the belligerents, it was uneasy with more robust peace enforcement and it insisted that its external military deployments should conform to international law and have the approval of the UN Security Council. The 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Support Operations asserted that the main pillars of peace operations were the non-military endeavours of preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding and peacemaking. During the DRC crisis in 1998 and over the subsequent decade, South Africa's international behaviour was consistent with its stated policy preference for diplomatic forms of conflict resolution and for military action to take place under UN auspices (Section 4.4). The one major exception was its military deployment in Lesotho in 1998 (Section 4.3).

The other members of the pacific camp in SADC shared South Africa's disinclination to give the regional security regime a predominantly military orientation. In light of the history, contemporary disputes and uncertain political future of Southern Africa, they were especially opposed to the grand strategy of collective defence via a Nato-type treaty; they believed that this strategy carried the grave danger of being sucked into a war without good cause and proper deliberation (Section 3.8). As Major-General Herman Lupogo from Tanzania put it in 1997, there was no need for a mutual defence pact since this would only serve to draw states into "unnecessary wars which were not of their own making" and the better option was "friendly co-operation that exists in security and defence issues".

Of the various disputes that impeded the construction of SADC's security architecture, the differences between the militarist and pacific camps were the most significant and the most divisive. There were three reasons for this: the approaches derived from core national values and policies that were held so firmly by states that they were unwilling to

38 Ibid, chapter 4.
compromise their positions; the different emphases of the two approaches proved too
divergent to be ignored, finessed or bridged satisfactorily; and the strategic implications
went to the heart of the most serious business of all, war.

The DRC rebellion in 1998 brought these strategic implications into sharp relief when the
pacific group promoted negotiations and a ceasefire while Namibia, Zimbabwe and
Angola engaged in hostilities. According to Brammer, this “difference in approach
towards conflict resolution was identifiably along the same lines as the debate on the
Organ”.40 The cleavage around the DRC crisis led to dramatic public sparring between
Pretoria and Harare, generated lasting antagonism between member states and crippled
the Organ (Section 4.4). Rocky Williams, a senior official in the South African
Department of Defence, captured these dynamics when he invoked the notion of “two
SADCs”.41 In 1999 Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the DRC signed a defence treaty
without official notice to the Summit,42 a controversial move that reinforced the
impression of ‘two SADCs’ split along militarist and pacific lines (Section 3.8).

3.5 The Swaziland breakthrough

In August and September 1999 the South African Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota,
held consultations with his Namibian and Zimbabwean counterparts on taking the Organ
process forward. With their consent, he approached King Mswati III of Swaziland, which
held the rotating chair of the ISDSC, to convene an extraordinary ministerial meeting
aimed at finalising the Organ Protocol and structure. A working group comprising
officials from Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe was set up to prepare the
documentation for this meeting.43

41 R. Williams, 2000, ‘From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding? South African Policy and Practice in Peace
43 The information in this paragraph is based on the author’s discussions with South African defence and
foreign affairs officials, September 1999.
The tiny landlocked kingdom of Swaziland was one of the least influential members of SADC and this seemed unlikely to change in relation to the politically charged subject of regional security arrangements. Moreover, the ISDSC was subordinate to the Organ and had a technical rather than an overtly political character (Section 3.9). Yet the Swazi Foreign Minister, Albert Shabangu, seized the initiative with a sense of purpose and energy that had hitherto been absent. Whether through lack of interest or excessive caution, the ministers whose countries had held the chair of the Organ, the ISDSC and SADC in previous years had done little to drive the Organ process. A former member of the democratic trade union movement, Shabangu was an activist at heart. Given his outspoken opposition to the authoritarian monarchy in his country, he was surprised to have been appointed Foreign Minister and was uncertain how long he would remain in that post.44 He was determined to “do something useful” and finalise the Organ Protocol during the one-year period that Swaziland held the ISDSC chair. He invited me to be his advisor on this mission.

Fortuitously, Shabangu was able to convene combined meetings of foreign ministers and defence and security ministers. In Swaziland the defence portfolio was held by the King who, as head of state, did not attend the ministerial meetings of the ISDSC but instead delegated his Foreign Minister to represent the country. So it was that in October 1999 and May 2000 Shabangu convened two extraordinary meetings of ISDSC ministers and SADC ministers for foreign affairs to finalise the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which specifies the objectives, methods, structures and jurisdiction of the Organ. Notwithstanding the prior consultation undertaken by Lekota, Zimbabwean officials argued that the Chair of the ISDSC had no authority to call meetings of foreign ministers and that the responsibility for drafting the Protocol lay with the Chair of the Organ rather than the ISDSC.45 When the Zimbabwean officials told Shabangu that their ministers would boycott the meeting scheduled for October 1999, he

44 Author’s discussion with Minister Shabangu, Mbabane, September 1999. As it turned out, Shabangu was later ‘demoted’ to Minister of Housing.
45 The author was present at this discussion, which took place during the preparations for the ministerial meeting in Mbabane on 26-27 October 1999.
called their bluff and said that it would go ahead regardless. In the event, the Zimbabwean ministers did attend the meeting.

In the course of finalising the Protocol it was necessary to confront the various disputes that had prevented the Organ from being set up earlier. The structural disagreement around the Organ’s status was resolved in favour of the security body being part of SADC, rather than independent of it, and being subordinate and accountable to the Summit. The major strategic disagreement between the pacific and militarist camps could not be resolved, leading to an uneasy compromise whereby the Organ would have a pacific orientation and, in accordance with the Gaborone communiqué of 1996, states would later draw up a regional defence treaty. The Protocol thus provides that one of the Organ’s objectives is to consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats.

The other disputes over the structural features of the security body were dealt with through compromise agreements, described below, that were inefficient in terms of the Organ’s responsibility for regional security, crisis management and peacemaking.

- Given Mugabe’s tenacious hold on the Organ for several years and his controversial actions as its Chair, most of the member states were keen to avoid a concentration of power in the hands of one country. They also wanted to ensure that the Chair could not make significant decisions without adequate consultation. The Protocol therefore provides that the Organ Chair must rotate annually but may not simultaneously be the Chair of the Summit; the Organ will have a Troika structure (Section 3.2); and the head of the Organ must consult not only the Organ Troika but also the Troika of the Summit. A more expeditious arrangement would have been to make the Chair of

---

46 Ibid.
48 Ibid, article 4.
49 Ibid, article 3.
50 Ibid, article 4. The Troika of the Summit comprises the current Chair of SADC, the incoming Chair for the following year and the outgoing Chair from the previous year.
SADC simultaneously the head of the Organ, working with the SADC Troika and answerable to the Summit.

- Zimbabwe prevailed in its view that the SADC Secretariat should not be linked to the Organ. The draft Protocol of May 2000 stated that the Organ secretariat would rotate annually with the rotating Chair of the Organ. This provision, which was later overturned by the Summit, would have greatly compromised efficiency and effectiveness, preventing the development of sound systems and procedures and precluding institutional capacity-building and learning over time.

- The dispute over the relative primacy of foreign ministers and defence ministers was resolved by providing that the Organ would have three ministerial committees – one comprising foreign ministers, a second comprising the ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence and the third comprising all these ministers – and that each of these committees could report directly to the Chair of the Organ (Section 3.7).

In May 2000 the King of Swaziland presented the draft Protocol to Mugabe in the latter’s capacity as the Chair of the Organ. This was followed by another fifteen months of procrastination and behind-the-scenes wrangling, during which time Zimbabwe sought to shelve the document on the grounds that the preparation of the Organ Protocol lay with the Chair of the Organ and not the Chair of the ISDSC. There was unconfirmed speculation that Botswana threatened to walk out of SADC if the draft Protocol were not tabled at a Summit meeting. Finally, in August 2001 the Summit approved the Protocol at its meeting in Blantyre and appointed President Chissano of Mozambique as the new Chair of the Organ. The Summit amended the draft Protocol to provide that the SADC

---

53 Author’s correspondence with South African government official on 16 August 2000 and with Minister Shabangu on 21 August 2000.
54 Author’s telephonic discussion with Minister Shabangu, June 2001.
Secretariat would render administrative services to the Organ.\textsuperscript{55} The requirement that the Organ Protocol be ratified by two-thirds of the SADC states was met in March 2004.

It is to be expected that efforts to create multilateral institutions will give rise to disputes between states because they have different interests, values and ideologies. The creation of institutions that regulate security, defence and foreign policy are likely to be especially difficult and disputatious because of the sensitivity of these sectors and the reluctance of states to surrender sovereignty and make concessions on issues that lie at the heart of their statehood and survival.\textsuperscript{56} In the course of negotiations, states might nevertheless be able to reconcile their differences, forge common ground and consequently conclude agreements that reflect a genuine consensus and commitment. This was not the case with the Organ Protocol. The Protocol formally resolved the disputes around SADC's security mechanism but it did not overcome the mistrust and tension among states and it did not bridge or transcend the deep political and normative divisions between them. As a result, the signing of the Protocol did not establish a stable platform for managing conflict and enhancing security in the region.

3.6 The amended Treaty of 2001 and the RISDP

The Blantyre Summit of 2001 endorsed a far-reaching plan to restructure SADC and centralise its operations in the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{57} Over a two-year period the organisation's twenty-one sectors that had been co-ordinated by member states would be grouped into programme clusters co-ordinated by four directorates in the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{58} The directorates would concentrate on regional integration, mobilisation of financial resources and policy development and harmonisation. An Integrated Committee of Ministers, comprising two


\textsuperscript{56} For an account of the EU's difficulty in developing a common security and foreign policy at the same time as the Organ debates, see P.H. Gordon, 1997/8, 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy', \textit{International Security}, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 74-100.


\textsuperscript{58} The four directorates cover trade, industry, finance and investment; food, agriculture and natural resources; social and human development and special programmes; and infrastructure and services.
ministers from each member state, would oversee the work of the directorates and make decisions on strategic direction and integration. Each member state would set up a SADC National Committee to ensure co-ordination and implementation of the organisation's policies and programmes. The restructuring led to the amendment of the SADC Treaty. The revised Treaty reformulates SADC's objectives, which are described as the Common Agenda of the organisation and include the promotion of "common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective".

The amended Treaty states that the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation is an institution of SADC. It contains the following provisions in this regard: the Summit shall elect from among its members a Chair and Deputy Chair of the Organ, save that the Chair of the Summit shall not simultaneously be the Chair of the Organ; the Chair of the Organ shall consult the Troika of the Summit and report to the Summit; there will be a Ministerial Committee of the Organ, comprising the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security (i.e. policing) and state security (i.e. intelligence) from each of the member states, which will co-ordinate the work of the Organ; the structure, functions, powers and procedures of the Organ shall be prescribed in a Protocol; the Secretariat will provide secretariat services to the Organ; and decisions of the Organ shall be taken by consensus. The organogram appended to this dissertation indicates the new structure of SADC and the place of the Organ therein (Appendix 1).

In 2003 the Summit approved the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, referred to SIPO (Section 3.7); the Mutual Defence Pact (Section 3.8); and the Regional Indicative

---


60 An organogram of SADC's new structure can be found in Le Pere and Tjønneland, 'Which Way SADC?", pg. 48.


62 SADC, Amended Declaration and Treaty, op cit, article 5A.

63 Ibid, article 9.

64 Ibid, article 10A.
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The RISDP is intended to be a fifteen-year regional integration development framework that sets out the priorities, policies and strategies for achieving SADC’s long-term goals. Its objectives are to define the priority integration areas; set up a logical implementation programme; ensure effective sectoral linkages and enhance synergy amongst sectors; and provide members states, the Secretariat and other stakeholders with a coherent and comprehensive long-term implementation agenda. The intervention areas of the RISDP are divided into two categories. First, there are ‘cross-sectoral intervention areas’, which include poverty alleviation; combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic; gender equality and development; science and technology; information and communication technology; environment and sustainable development; private sector development; and statistics. Second, there are ‘sectoral co-operation and integration intervention areas’, covering trade/economic liberalisation and development; infrastructure support for regional integration and poverty eradication; sustainable food security; and human and social development.65

After the Regional Plan was approved, a tighter focus was provided by the 2004 RISDP Implementation Framework, which contains detailed implementation plans over fifteen years, five years and one year for each of the directorates in the Secretariat. The Framework was followed in turn by the preparation of business plans for the directorates, a list of priorities and a ranking of RISDP projects. In 2005 SADC’s overarching priorities for the next five years were as follows: integration of markets and economic development; infrastructure, including information and communication technology; statistics; and emergency services, including HIV/AIDS and food security.66 The organisation’s political and security plans and priorities were not addressed in the RISDP documents but were dealt with separately in the Organ Protocol and SIPO, reflecting the long-standing cleavage within SADC between socio-economic issues and politico-security matters.

65 This summary is taken from SADC, 2003, ‘Summary of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan’, Gaborone. See also SADC, 2003, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, Gaborone. Both documents are available on the SADC website at www.sadc.int.
66 This information in this paragraph is drawn from Le Pere and Tjønneland, ‘Which Way SADC?’, op cit, pp. 26-27.
3.7 The Organ Protocol and SIPO

The Summit's approval of the Organ Protocol in 2001 marked an official end to the disputes around the status and character of the common security regime. The Organ is part of SADC and reports to the SADC Summit, its secretariat is housed in the SADC Secretariat and its structures, methods and procedures have a formal character. The normative orientation of the security body revolves around four pillars: democratic norms; political, security and defence co-operation; respect for international law; and a pacific approach to peacemaking. The main provisions of the Protocol are presented below.

The Preamble reaffirms the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. It acknowledges the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the role of the Central Organ of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. According to the Preamble, peace, security and strong political relations are critical factors in creating a conducive environment for regional co-operation and integration. The achievement of peace and security must be pursued through close co-operation on matters of politics, defence and security. Such co-operation must at all times promote the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration.

Article 2 of the Protocol provides that the general objective of the Organ is to promote peace and security in the region. The specific objectives of the Organ are as follows:

a) protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression;
b) promote political co-operation among the State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions; 67

c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policy collectively in international fora;

d) promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;

e) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;

f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;

g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of the State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the UN and the OAU;

h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats;

i) develop close co-operation between the police and the state security services of the State Parties in order to address cross border crime and promote a community based approach to domestic security;

j) observe, and encourage the State Parties to implement, UN, AU and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states;

---

67 Article 1 provides that a "State Party" means a SADC state that has ratified or acceded to the Protocol.
k) develop the peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of the State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and

l) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance.

Article 3 provides that the Organ is an institution of SADC that will report to the Summit and function through a Troika consisting of the Chair of the Organ, the outgoing Chair and the incoming Chair for the following year. Article 4 states that the Summit will elect the Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Organ from among its members on a rotating basis and for a period of one year, provided that neither the Chair nor the Deputy Chair of the Summit may simultaneously be the Chair of the Organ. The Organ Chair may request any ministerial committee of the Organ to consider any matter within its competence and may request the SADC Chair to table matters for consideration by the Summit. The Chair will report to the Summit, consult with the SADC Troika and be responsible for the overall policy direction of the Organ and the achievement of its objectives.

In addition to the Troika, the main structures of the Organ are the Ministerial Committee, the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the ISDSC. The Ministerial Committee comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each of the State Parties. It reports to the Organ Chair and is responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Organ and its structures. The ISPDC comprises foreign ministers and must perform such functions as are necessary to achieve the Organ's objectives relating to politics and diplomacy. The ISDSC comprises the ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence and must perform the functions that are necessary to achieve the Organ's objectives relating to defence and security; this committee will assume the objectives, functions and structures of the existing ISDSC. The ISPDC and the ISDSC will report to the Ministerial Committee without prejudice to their obligation to report regularly to the Chair.
b) promote political co-operation among the State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;\textsuperscript{67}

c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policy collectively in international fora;

d) promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;

e) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;

f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;

g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of the State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the UN and the OAU;

h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats;

i) develop close co-operation between the police and the state security services of the State Parties in order to address cross border crime and promote a community based approach to domestic security;

j) observe, and encourage the State Parties to implement, UN, AU and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states;

\textsuperscript{67} Article 1 provides that a "State Party" means a SADC state that has ratified or acceded to the Protocol.
k) develop the peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of the State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations; and

l) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance.

Article 3 provides that the Organ is an institution of SADC that will report to the Summit and function through a Troika consisting of the Chair of the Organ, the outgoing Chair and the incoming Chair for the following year. Article 4 states that the Summit will elect the Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Organ from among its members on a rotating basis and for a period of one year, provided that neither the Chair nor the Deputy Chair of the Summit may simultaneously be the Chair of the Organ. The Organ Chair may request any ministerial committee of the Organ to consider any matter within its competence and may request the SADC Chair to table matters for consideration by the Summit. The Chair will report to the Summit, consult with the SADC Troika and be responsible for the overall policy direction of the Organ and the achievement of its objectives.

In addition to the Troika, the main structures of the Organ are the Ministerial Committee, the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the ISDSC. The Ministerial Committee comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each of the State Parties. It reports to the Organ Chair and is responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Organ and its structures. The ISPDC comprises foreign ministers and must perform such functions as are necessary to achieve the Organ’s objectives relating to politics and diplomacy. The ISDSC comprises the ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence and must perform the functions that are necessary to achieve the Organ’s objectives relating to defence and security; this committee will assume the objectives, functions and structures of the existing ISDSC. The ISPDC and the ISDSC will report to the Ministerial Committee without prejudice to their obligation to report regularly to the Chair.
The three ministerial committees must convene at least one annual meeting but may hold other meetings that are deemed necessary. They may establish sub-structures as they see fit. Each of the committees will be chaired by a minister from the same country as the Chair of the Organ, for a period of one year and on a rotating basis. The committees may determine their own rules of procedure but must make decisions by consensus and the quorum for all meetings will be two-thirds of the State Parties. The SADC Secretariat will provide secretariat services to the Organ.

Article 11 deals with the Organ’s international obligations, functions, jurisdiction, methods and procedures in respect of conflict prevention, management and resolution. It states that, in accordance with the UN Charter, the State Parties must refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack. The exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence must be reported immediately to the UN Security Council and the Central Organ of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

The State Parties must manage and seek to resolve any dispute between two or more of them by peaceful means. Similarly, the Organ must seek to manage and resolve conflict by peaceful means. The methods employed by the Organ to prevent, manage and resolve conflict by peaceful means shall include preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration, and adjudication by an international tribunal. The Organ will endeavour to obtain the disputant parties’ consent to its peacemaking efforts.

The Organ may seek to resolve any “significant inter-state conflict” between the State Parties or between a State Party and another state. A “significant inter-state conflict” includes a conflict over territorial borders or natural resources; a conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened; and a conflict which threatens peace and security in the region or in the territory of a State Party which is not a party to the conflict. External military threats to the region will be
addressed through collective security arrangements to be agreed upon by the State Parties in a Mutual Defence Pact.

The Organ may also seek to resolve any "significant intra-state conflict" within the territory of a State Party. Such conflict includes large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights; a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a state; a condition of civil war or insurgency; and a conflict that threatens peace and security in the region or in the territory of another State Party. The Organ must respond to a request by a State Party to mediate in a conflict within the territory of that state and must strive by diplomatic means to obtain such request where it is not forthcoming.

Where peaceful means of resolving a conflict are unsuccessful, the Chair acting on the advice of the Ministerial Committee may recommend to the Summit that enforcement action be taken against one or more of the disputant parties. The Summit will resort to enforcement action only as a matter of last resort and, in accordance with Article 53 of the UN Charter, only with the authorisation of the UN Security Council. The Organ must seek to ensure that the State Parties adhere to and enforce all sanctions and arms embargoes imposed on any party by the UN Security Council.

Article 15 provides that the Protocol in no way detracts from the rights and obligations of the State Parties under the charters of the UN and the OAU; it in no way detracts from the responsibility of the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security; and it does not derogate from existing agreements between a State Party and another State Party, another state or an international organisation other than SADC, provided that such agreements are consistent with the principles and objectives of the Protocol. The Protocol will be subject to ratification by the Signatories in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. It will enter into force thirty days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the State Parties.
At its meeting in Blantyre in January 2002, the Summit mandated the Organ to prepare SIPO. The Plan is intended to operationalise the Protocol and provide guidelines and an institutional framework for the day-to-day implementation of the Organ’s activities. The document considers these activities in four sectors, covering politics, defence, state security and public security. For each of these sectors, the Plan provides a brief analysis, identifies the key challenges, reproduces the relevant objectives from the Protocol and presents a list of strategies and activities per objective.

SIPO is a weak document that does not amount to a viable plan because most of the designated strategies and activities are overly general and vague. Three examples of this problem are presented below:

- In the political sector, the first objective is to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra- and inter-state conflict and aggression. This objective has the following strategies and activities: promote exchanges of information on and reviews of regional and other developments; establish appropriate mechanisms to avert aggression against Member States through diplomatic initiatives; consolidate peace, security and stability to achieve sustainable socio-economic development and eradicate poverty; establish and strengthen bilateral commissions; and devise measures to combat the HIV and AIDS pandemic.

- In the state security sector, one of the objectives is to promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end. The strategies and activities are as follows: undertake regular exchange of intelligence; hold regional workshops, seminars and training programmes; hold regional meetings; and share financial and technological resources.

---

70 Ibid, pg. 33.
In the public security sector, one of the objectives is to promote the development of
democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and
encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters
and conventions of the AU and the UN. The strategies and activities are to develop a
common code of conduct for law enforcement agencies; undertake regular joint
training programmes; and develop a culture of observance of the existing
international provisions on human rights.71

The strategies and activities listed above are too bland (e.g. 'hold regional meetings'), too
general and lofty (e.g. 'consolidate peace, security and stability') and too vague (e.g.
'establish and strengthen bilateral commissions') to constitute a meaningful strategic
plan. By contrast, SIPO's provisions on structure and staffing are concrete and clear. The
SADC Secretariat must provide administrative services to the Chair and committees of
the Organ, keep records of meetings, assist in policy development and monitor the
implementation of decisions. To this end, a department for politics, defence and security
would be set up in the Secretariat, headed by a Chief Director who reports to the
Executive Secretary. The department would comprise a directorate for politics and
diplomacy, a directorate for defence and security and a strategic analysis unit, also
responsible for the Situation Room.72 In the implementation of SIPO, the department was
downgraded to a directorate, which suffers from a range of organisational problems
(Section 5.5).73

3.8 The tussle over the Mutual Defence Pact

The normative and strategic cleavages between the pacific and militarist tendencies that
hampered the formation of the Organ over a ten-year period also greatly hindered the

71 Ibid, pg. 40.
72 Ibid, pp. 47-50.
73 This observation is based on the author's work with the Department in a project to build SADC's
capacity and expertise in the area of mediation, 2007-2009.
formulation of the Mutual Defence Pact and made this process every bit as fractious as the Organ deliberations. As noted previously, the official call for a mutual defence pact against external military threats first appeared in SADC's 1993 *Framework and Strategy* document and was reiterated in the 1996 Gaborone Summit communiqué and the Organ Protocol of 2001. When the Summit finally approved the Pact in 2003, the text had been so watered down as a result of the pacific camp's concerns that it did not entail a binding commitment to collective self-defence.\(^74\) Whereas South Africa had championed the pacific position in the Organ debates, it was Botswana that pushed this position most concertedly in relation to the Pact.

The pacific group was adamant that the decision to go to war should not be triggered automatically by a treaty but should in every case be based on an assessment of the prevailing circumstances. In the heat of conflict between states, a defence treaty might be activated in a hasty manner that precluded such assessment and foreclosed the options for dealing with the conflict. This would be imprudent, dangerous and contrary to the pacific camp's preference for tackling conflict through diplomatic rather than military means. The further major consideration was that the SADC states did not have a sufficiently close political relationship to justify the risks associated with a collective defence agreement. From the perspective of the pacific group, all these factors were reinforced by the SADC rift over the DRC crisis in 1998 (Section 4.4).

During the official drafting of the Organ Protocol in Swaziland in 1999, the Zambian government distributed a draft defence pact for discussion.\(^75\) Lusaka was no doubt motivated by Angola's recent threat to invade Zambia on the grounds that it was providing sanctuary to Unita and supplying arms to the Angolan rebel movement. Albert Shabangu, the Swazi foreign minister who was chairing the proceedings on the Organ Protocol, declined to table the document. Given the controversy around the idea of a defence pact, he regarded the matter as a distraction from the business of finalising the


Nevertheless, the Zambian document became the basis for subsequent versions of the SADC defence pact.

Modelled on the NATO Treaty of 1949, the Zambian text provided that an attack on one of the parties was an attack on all of them:

[The parties agree] that an armed attack against one of them shall be considered an attack against [the] others and that in the event of such an attack, each of them will assist the Party so attacked by taking forthwith in collaboration with other Parties such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore peace and security in the territory of the Party. Any such attack and measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the United Nations Security Council.77

This formulation was typical of a collective defence arrangement but the Zambian text had an additional feature. It defined ‘attack’ to mean not only an armed invasion of a signatory state but also “internal subversive activities that threaten the legitimate authority of a constitutionally established government”.78 The motivation for this unusual definition of ‘attack’ stemmed from Zambia’s belief that its own internal subversion and external threats were closely linked. In 1997 the country had experienced a failed coup attempt, and a retired military officer testified in the subsequent treason trial that the Zambian armed forces had obtained intelligence warning that the coup was to be followed by an Angolan invasion.79

76 The author was present at this meeting in Mbabane in October 1999.
77 Zambia, ‘Non-Paper’, op cit, article 6. This provision is based on article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which reads as follows: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”. See the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949, available at www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
78 Zambia, ‘Non-Paper’, op cit, article 1.
While SADC as a whole was split on the issue of a collective self-defence commitment, the militarist allies of Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe were united and decisive. In 1999 these countries signed a defence treaty, stipulating that an armed attack against one of the signatories would be considered an attack against the others and that each of them would assist a signatory under attack through such action as it deemed necessary, including the use of armed force, to repel the attack and restore peace and security. It is possible that Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe drew up the treaty at this time because they wished to legitimate their 1998 deployment in the DRC, which they justified as being in defence of the Congolese government against an external attack by Rwanda (Section 4.4). The signatories were also manifestly frustrated with the delays in getting the Organ off the ground. It will be recalled, too, that Mugabe’s vision of regional security arrangements was modelled on NATO (Section 3.4).

The conclusion of the treaty, without official notice to SADC, was extremely divisive. Naison Ngoma goes so far as to say that the treaty and the DRC deployment constituted “the region’s most serious test to the survival of SADC as a political unit... [and] almost dealt a mortal blow to the sub-region’s efforts at enhancing co-operation”. At the time, Tapfumanyi rejected claims that the treaty sounded the death knell for the Organ and signified dwindling confidence in SADC. He insisted that “although a toothless Organ, divided by internal rifts and perpetual procrastination in the face of crises, is a worrying encumbrance to regional progress, the [treaty] is not intended to undermine or replace the SADC Organ”. Rather, said Tapfumanyi, the treaty was in line with the 1996 Gaborone Summit communiqué, which envisioned the introduction of a SADC mutual defence pact. Because of South Africa’s stance, however, the sub-region still lacked a legal instrument that regulated collective action to prevent, manage and resolve conflict.

84 Tapfumanyi, ‘Regional Security Cooperation in Southern Africa’, op cit, pg. 35.
85 Ibid.
Military officers from Zimbabwe and Namibia maintained further that there was nothing divisive in countries belonging simultaneously to several security arrangements, a practice that occurred elsewhere in the world, most notably in Western Europe. The treaty was simply a more advanced form of security co-operation than the Organ, entailing a military commitment that some but not all the SADC states were ready to embrace; in due course, the other states might come on board. Tapfumaneyi made this point as follows:

Historically it has always been difficult to reach consensus on issues of high politics in southern Africa – the original approach of SADC towards the SADC Organ may therefore have been attempting the impossible. Like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the [defence treaty concluded by Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe] could, in time, begin to attract new members and, perhaps in the not so distance future, all SADC states would become members.

There is no doubt that a defence pact entails a higher level of commitment than a common security regime and it is also true that state membership of more than one security arrangement is not intrinsically divisive. Yet in the midst of the crisis in Southern Africa over the Organ and the DRC intervention, the treaty confirmed the impression of two SADCs, split along pacific and militarist lines.

In July 2001 the SADC defence ministers met in Lesotho and approved a draft mutual defence pact. The South African Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, announced that the pact provided a mechanism for preventing conflict between SADC countries and for these countries to act together against outside aggressors. Peaceful means would always be the first course of action when there were “difficulties” but if these means failed, then SADC would have to take enforcement action. Lekota added that the draft pact would be

86 Author’s discussions with Namibian and Zimbabwean military officers at the United Nations Workshop on the UN Arms Register, hosted by the Namibian government, Windhoek, 18-20 June 2002.
87 Ibid.
studied by member states and then submitted for adoption at the Council of Ministers meeting in Blantyre in August 2001. 89

It turned out that the enthusiasm of the defence ministers was not shared in all cases by their cabinet colleagues and presidents. At the Council meeting in 2001 and again at the Summit meeting in Luanda in 2002, Botswana rejected the pact, resolute that disputes should be settled through dialogue and consensus-building rather than military action. Botswana objected in particular to the provision that made it mandatory for SADC countries to undertake collective military action in the event of one of them being attacked. This provision, declared President Festus Mogae, undermined the sovereignty of states and their right to make independent decisions. 90

In 2003 the Summit finally approved a watered down text. 91 The articles that deal with “collective self-defence and collective action” are as follows:

- An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such attack shall be met with immediate collective action (article 6(1)).

- Collective action shall be mandated by the Summit on the recommendation of the Organ (article 6(2)).

- Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate (article 6(3)).

- Any such attack, and measures taken in response thereto, shall immediately be reported to the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council (article 6(4)).

91 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, op cit.
It will be evident that these articles are quite different from the collective defence provision in the Zambian document of 1999. Through negotiations around the draft Pact at meetings of the ISDSC and other SADC forums between 2000 and 2003, three major amendments were made in order to accommodate the concerns of the pacific camp: the conception of an armed attack against a state party was changed from being an attack on all the parties to being a threat to regional peace and security; collective defence action could not be initiated by states acting on their own discretion but required a mandate from the Summit; and states were permitted to participate in the collection action in any manner they deemed appropriate. South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, made a point of explaining that the Pact was not as binding as the NATO Treaty because it did not view ‘an attack on one’ as ‘an attack on all’; if an act of external aggression occurred, then SADC would have to decide whether collective intervention was warranted.92

Article 6(3) effectively removes the collective self-defence obligation. Naison Ngoma’s disapproving conclusion is that this squanders the promise of the Pact since collective action could now amount to a mere charade.93 He notes correctly that the provision was included in order to avoid a situation where some states refused to sign the document, adding that it might also have been the result of lobbying by foreign powers that wanted to prevent Zimbabwe from receiving military assistance from its neighbours. He offers no evidence to support this assertion, which downplays the long history of resistance to a mutual defence pact among certain SADC states.

The objective of the Pact is to “operationalise the mechanisms of the Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters”.94 In order to achieve this objective, the parties “shall individually and collectively, by means of continuous co-operation and assistance, maintain and develop their individual and collective self-defence capacity to

94 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, op cit, article 2.
maintain peace, stability and security". Further, the parties shall co-operate in defence matters and facilitate interaction among their armed forces and defence-related industries in areas such as military training, joint exercises, military intelligence and production, supply and procurement of military equipment and services. The Secretariat of the Organ will co-ordinate the implementation of the Pact.

The Pact reiterates some of the principles that are contained in the Organ Protocol, stating that the parties must settle any international dispute in which they are involved by peaceful means, avoid the threat or use of force in their international relations, respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and refrain from interfering in each other's domestic affairs. The parties also undertake not to nurture, harbour or support any person, group or institution whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, territorial, economic or social security of a State Party. The term 'destabilise' covers an armed attack, sabotage and activities intended to change the constitutional order of a State Party through unconstitutional means.

3.9 The Inter-State Defence and Security Community

The ISDSC was established in 1975 as a committee of the Frontline States, comprising defence ministers and senior military commanders (Section 2.3). After the ending of apartheid in 1994, the Frontline States was dissolved, the ISDSC was reconstituted to include all the SADC countries and in 1996 it was incorporated into the Organ (Section 2.4). The Organ Protocol stipulates that the ISDSC comprises the ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence and must perform the functions that are necessary to achieve the Organ's objectives relating to defence and security (Section 3.7).

95 Ibid, article 4.
96 Ibid, article 9.
97 Ibid, article 11(2).
98 Ibid, articles 3 and 7.
99 Ibid, article 8.
100 Ibid, article 1(2).
In the period under review the ISDSC was officially divided into three sectoral subcommittees, whose overall purpose was to promote technical co-operation and coordination on security problems and goals. The members of the Defence Subcommittee included the ministers of defence, the chiefs of defence forces, the civilian secretaries for defence and their staff; the Public Security Subcommittee formally comprised police, customs and immigration ministers and officials; and the State Security Subcommittee consisted of the intelligence services. In reality, only the Defence Subcommittee was operational and it set up subordinate structures that covered defence intelligence, logistics, operations, personnel, aviation matters, maritime affairs, military chaplains and medical services.\textsuperscript{101}

The police services preferred to meet under the auspices of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), allowing them to avoid the Organ travails, and the intelligence services were disinclined to conduct their business through multilateral forums.\textsuperscript{102} The low level of engagement by the police and intelligence agencies was also due to their being treated as the junior partners of the armed forces. The ISDSC was always chaired by a defence minister from one of the SADC countries, effectively marginalising the ministers responsible for policing and intelligence. By the late 1990s this legacy of the Frontline States was patently anachronistic and dysfunctional but no effort was made to change it.

The ISDSC had three major projects. The first was to prepare SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact (Section 3.8). The second was to undertake training and other preparations for regional peace operations and the third was to establish a regional peacekeeping force.


The formation of this force was listed as one of the Organ’s objectives in the 1996 Gaborone Summit communiqué that gave birth to the security body (Section 3.2). In the wake of the UN’s ignominious withdrawal from Rwanda after the onset of the 1994 genocide, there was a continental-wide view that Africa should build its own capacity for peace operations. In 1997 a meeting of African chiefs of defence staff, held under the auspices of the OAU, proposed that the organisation should have at its disposal brigade-sized standby forces from each of Africa’s five sub-regions; this would enable the OAU to take preventive action in emergency situations prior to a more comprehensive response from the UN or if the UN were unresponsive.103

Following the Gaborone Summit in 1996, the ISDSC took a number of significant steps towards building national and collective capacity to engage in regional peacekeeping operations. It created a satellite communication system linking all the SADC governments, approved a training syllabus for peace support operations, developed appropriate operational procedures and requested the Zimbabwe Staff College to use its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare to co-ordinate and harmonise peacekeeping education and training for all the countries of Southern Africa.104 In 2005 Zimbabwe transferred ownership of the RPTC to SADC.105 The ISDSC also mounted three peacekeeping training exercises – Exercise Blue Hungwe, hosted by Zimbabwe in April 1997 with 1,500 troops from ten of the SADC countries; Exercise Blue Crane, hosted by South Africa in April 1999 with close to 5,000 troops from thirteen SADC states; and Exercise Thokgamo, hosted by Botswana in July 2005 at brigade level with the participation of all the member states except Mauritius and the DRC.106

106 For an assessment of Blue Hungwe and Blue Crane, see Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 169-172.
In 2002 the AU endorsed the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and specified its mandate, composition and structures. The Force would be composed of standby multi-disciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components based in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. Since 2002 a great deal of effort has been devoted to setting up the ASF and the regional brigades in North, East, Central, Southern and West Africa; the brigades are expected to be capable of deploying in a variety of scenarios, ranging from observer missions to complex multi-dimensional operations, post-conflict peacebuilding and peace enforcement in a hostile environment. The AU’s decision served as a further stimulus to the endeavours of the ISDSC, which centralised the planning of the SADC Standby Force Brigade (SADCBRIG) in the Organ Directorate. SADCBRIG was launched in 2007.

In terms of meeting its goals and objectives, the ISDSC, as a forum of defence officials, was one of the most successful of all SADC’s structures. It accomplished the tasks it set for itself, ensured institutional memory and continuity, achieved a high level of cooperation and co-ordination and built a sense of community among the armed forces of the region. The success was due principally to three factors. First, military officers in Southern Africa, as elsewhere, are trained to be administratively efficient, task-oriented and competent in the skills of planning and implementing plans. Second, from the mid-1990s the reconstituted ISDSC regarded the building of cohesion and esprit d’corps within its committees and among military personnel more broadly as a primary objective; with notable foresight, it envisaged that the construction of dense interaction among soldiers and officers would serve as an important confidence- and security-building measure. Third, the ISDSC’s members had the demeanour of ‘apolitical military

professionals', avoiding or at least downplaying regional politics even in the midst of the Organ storm swirling around them. As a result, the ISDSC was able to weather the storm and maintain collegial relations despite the tensions between member states.
CHAPTER 4: FAILED PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

Between 1995 and 2003 there were a number of violent conflicts in SADC countries. They included the long-running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002 when the leader of the rebel movement Unita, Jonas Savimbi, was killed; a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in the DRC that began in 1998; election disputes, a mutiny and an external military intervention in Lesotho in 1998; a failed secessionist bid in Namibia in 1998/1999; election disputes in Malawi in 1999; a constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001; election disputes on the Zanzibar island of Tanzania in 2001; and, continuously from early 2000, state repression and violence in Zimbabwe. In 1998 Angola threatened to invade Zambia in order to halt supplies to Unita and in 2000 Zambia accused Angola of conducting military attacks on its territory.

In addition to being unable to prevent such conflicts, SADC does not have a record of successful peacemaking. In most of the intra-state conflicts it refrained from critical comment and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and crises in governance as purely domestic affairs. There were several reasons for this that remain applicable at the time of writing in 2009. First, member states are keen to avoid adversarial relations that might jeopardise trade and functional co-operation. Second, governments that are not fully democratic are naturally unwilling to speak out against neighbouring states that engage in undemocratic practices. Third, SADC states are determined to maintain a public posture of unity and solidarity. Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, this posture militates against public criticism of each other. The imperative of solidarity is greatest when foreign powers take positions that are perceived or can be portrayed as reflecting a ‘neo-colonial’ agenda.

SADC’s poor record of peacemaking is also attributable to the impasse around the Organ. The lack of an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing high
intensity conflict has contributed to collective inertia, divergent and parochial approaches by individual states, ill-conceived interventions and a confused mixture of peacemaking and peace enforcement. Most of these problems were apparent during the crises in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998. In both cases a small group of SADC states embarked on military action in the name of the organisation despite the absence of a SADC mandate authorising such action.

This Chapter focuses on SADC’s response to three of the conflicts: the Zimbabwe conflict, which illustrates SADC’s obsession with maintaining solidarity among states at the expense of protecting citizens and adhering to the organisation’s formal commitment to democratic norms; the Lesotho conflict, which led to a remarkably inept and damaging military intervention by South Africa and Botswana, the two leading proponents of the pacific position in the Organ debates; and the bloody conflict in the DRC, which was Africa’s biggest war and split SADC so severely that it brought the survival of the organisation into question.

4.2 The Zimbabwe crisis, 2000-

As discussed in Chapter 2, SADC’s founding documents appreciated the need to forge common values among member states as the basis for unity, co-operation and regional security. The common political values enshrined in the 1992 Treaty, the amended Treaty of 2001 and the Organ Protocol of 2001 were those of democracy and respect for human rights. In truth, however, the majority of SADC countries were not fully democratic and some of them were authoritarian (Chapter 5). The norms that bound member states were in fact those of anti-imperialism and state solidarity.

These norms were most evident and least appropriate in the case of state repression and abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. In February 2000 the Zanu-PF government lost a constitutional referendum, its first defeat at the polls since independence in 1970. The defeat coincided with the emergence of a new opposition party, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), which had its roots in the trade union movement. The rise of the MDC and its potential to win a free and fair election reignited the ruling party’s authoritarian and brutal tendencies, leading to a sustained drive to crush domestic opposition through violence, intimidation and manipulation of elections.¹

In a parallel development, war veterans who had participated in the liberation struggle began to seize white-owned land and farms through violence. The land question was a long smouldering problem; in the late 1990s the racial inequities in land ownership arising from colonial conquest and white minority rule were still largely in place.² The government backed the invasions by the war veterans and its subsequent ‘land reform programme’ was characterised by disregard for judicial rulings, the emasculation of the judiciary, violence perpetrated by state-sponsored militia, the accumulation of farms by the ruling elite and the immiseration of farm workers.³ The land invasions and political crisis provoked economic collapse and the risk of state failure as inflation spiralled out of control, there were chronic food shortages and vital services were terminated.

In its public statements SADC endorsed the land reform programme, ignored its violent and illegal dimensions, trivialised the human rights violations and disparaged the international condemnation of Zimbabwe. After a Summit meeting in Windhoek in 2000, the heads of state released a statement decrying the “partisan and biased manner in which a sector of the international media has misrepresented the land policy of the government


of Zimbabwe, which seeks to effect a just and equitable redistribution of land in a situation where one percent of the population owns seventy percent of the best arable land". The heads of state accepted Mugabe’s assurance that land reform would be handled peacefully and within the parameters of the law. They called on the region’s civil society groups and parliaments to rally behind the people of Zimbabwe in opposing foreign censure of Harare. A few days after the Summit meeting a South African foreign affairs official said that the invasion and occupation of white farms were understandable given the war veterans’ frustration at Britain’s failure to fund land redistribution. SADC delegated President Mbeki and President Bakimi Muluzi of Malawi to request the British government to fund the purchase of farms in Zimbabwe.

In August 2001 the Summit raised concern about the regional impact of the Zimbabwean economic situation and formed a task force comprising Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa “to work with the government of Zimbabwe on the economic and political issues affecting the country”. In September the leaders of these countries publicly chastised Mugabe for the first time. The Chair of SADC, President Muluzi, expressed alarm about the decline in the rule of law and the rise in political instability, attributing the political and economic crisis to the manner in which the land reforms were being implemented.

The criticism was short-lived. In December 2001 the ministerial members of the task force noted the “improved atmosphere of calm and stability” in Zimbabwe, welcomed the mechanisms the government was putting in place to guard against violence, rejected the “distorted and negative perceptions of Zimbabwe projected by the international and regional media” and reiterated SADC’s opposition to the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe. This statement was issued in the midst of harrowing accounts of violence.

---

5 Ibid.
against members of the MDC. In 2002 the ISDSC denounced “the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some Member States, especially in Zimbabwe which has embarked on an agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of poverty”. In 2003 the Ministerial Committee of the Organ “took note that those opposed to Zimbabwe have tried to shift the agenda from the core issue of land by selective diversion of attention on governance and human rights issues”. For its part, the Summit repeatedly expressed solidarity with Harare.

The 2002 Summit communiqué was a perfect illustration of SADC’s failure to deal squarely with human rights abuses in a member state. The communiqué “welcomed the following actions to be undertaken by Zimbabwe”: full respect for human rights, including the right to freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly for all individuals; a commitment to investigate fully and impartially all cases of alleged political violence in 2001; ensuring that the electoral supervisory commission was adequately resourced and able to operate independently; a commitment by the government to the independence of the judiciary and to the rule of law; and the transfer of the occupiers of non-designated farms to legally acquired land. These provisions were implicit criticisms of the Zimbabwe government – it was necessary to raise them only because of the government’s abuses – but they were formulated as an expression of support for Harare. The communiqué also welcomed Mugabe’s assurances that the forthcoming presidential election would be free and fair and noted with appreciation the government’s decision to launch a peace campaign that would include the opposition and other stakeholders. The only explicit concerns raised publicly by the Summit were directed at the Zimbabwe army, whose chief had warned that the military would not

recognise an MDC victory at the polls,15 and sections of the media that were accused of negative reporting.

The SADC leaders might have believed that their cautious diplomatic approach was more likely to succeed than castigating Mugabe and they would probably have been applauded had Mugabe restored the rule of law and allowed free and fair elections. Instead, he blithely ignored the Summit, making it look foolish, and SADC's tolerance of his intransigence and transgressions severely damaged its credibility.16 In order to protect the organisation from growing international censure and donor pressure, the Summit replaced Mugabe as the Deputy Chair of SADC in 2002, preventing him from assuming the Chair the following year. Yet in 2003 he received standing ovations from his fellow heads of state at the Summit meeting in Dar es Salaam and they elected him to represent Southern Africa as one of the AU's five regional vice-chairpersons.17

SADC's position on Zimbabwe revealed the potency of the anti-imperialist sentiment in Southern Africa, a product of the bitter struggles against colonialism and the continued political and economic domination of the South by the North. It gives rise to the imperative of closing ranks when an African country is taking flak from foreign powers. Given this tendency and the undemocratic nature of many Southern African countries, SADC's support for the Zimbabwe government was not surprising. In an article entitled "Mugabe Will Not Be Swayed by the Polite Coaxing of Despotic Peers", Mondli Makhanya captured vividly the fatal impediment to a more critical response from SADC:

SADC's main problem is that it has not established its own platform of good governance on which to base peer judgements. In most countries in the region,

democracy and respect for human rights play second fiddle to the comfort and power cravings of leaders. Angola’s Eduardo dos Santos is a ruthless despot presiding over a ruling elite of kleptocrats. Namibia’s Sam Nujoma manipulated the constitution to ensure he secured a third term of office and has strong-armed opponents and the media. Swaziland’s King Mswati dislikes democracy even more than Mugabe does and comes close to the Zimbabwean leader in his lack of tolerance for dissent. Many other leaders in the region are either unelected or treat elections and the countries’ democratic institutions as necessary irritations. With democrats like these, how could the world and Zimbabwe’s people expect the regional body to take the lead in disciplining Mugabe?\textsuperscript{18}

Whereas there were low expectations of SADC, the expectations of South Africa were high. The country was not only a vibrant democracy and one of the leading proponents of democratic governance in the construction of the AU, it was also the regional power in Southern Africa and its own economic growth was being jeopardised by international investor concerns extrapolated from Zimbabwe. For these reasons, South Africa was widely expected to apply pressure on its less powerful neighbour. Instead, Pretoria adopted an approach of ‘quiet diplomacy’, generating a great deal of local and international surprise and disapproval.\textsuperscript{19} The critics were not confined to Western countries and liberal and conservative organisations but included the ANC’s left-wing allies, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions.\textsuperscript{20}


Pretoria's contrary stance was due to four sets of factors, some of them specific to Zimbabwe and others reflecting general strands of foreign policy. First, President Mbeki had little sympathy for the MDC and was apparently convinced that its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, would not make a competent head of state. In addition, it seemed certain that Zanu-PF would never concede power to the MDC through the electoral process and Mbeki was worried about the possibility of the military staging a coup in order to prevent, or in response to, an MDC victory at the polls. Given these considerations, he defined the goal of his peacemaking efforts as stability rather than democracy and he believed that this goal would be achieved not through free and fair elections but through either a reformed Zanu-PF (without Mugabe) or a negotiated settlement leading to the formation of a government of national unity.21

Second, Pretoria was concerned that taking a strong stand against human rights abuses in African states would breach the norm of solidarity and weaken the country's influence on the continent. In 1995 President Mandela had been soundly rebuffed by other African leaders when he called for sanctions to be imposed on the dictatorial regime in Nigeria. Foreign affairs officials in South Africa were chastened by this experience, which subsequently informed Mbeki's strategy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe. In 2001 the head of the ANC's department of international affairs justified the Zimbabwe strategy on the grounds that the government would not repeat Mandela's "terrible mistake" when he acted as a "bully" against the Nigerian dictatorship, failed to consult SADC and the OAU and "everyone stood aside and we were isolated".22 Pretoria was also extremely sensitive to regional fears of South African domination and to the regional memory of apartheid destabilisation. The legacy of apartheid and liberation politics had created a balance of power based more on history and ideology than on formal power, inhibiting Pretoria from playing the role of a local hegemon and enabling Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of influence.23

---

21 This paragraph is based on the author's discussions with colleagues in the South African Presidency and other government departments, 2001-2004.
22 Quoted in J. Kindra, 2001, 'We Won't Make the Same Mistake with Zim', Mail and Guardian, 2 March.
23 See P. Bischoff, 2003, 'External and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Ambiguity: South African Foreign Policy and the Projection of Pluralist Middle Power', Politikon, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 183-201; and M.
The third explanatory factor was Pretoria's conviction, as a matter of strategy rather than principle, that the international community was much more likely to induce positive change in problematic regimes through diplomatic engagement than through condemnation and coercive measures; coercion and isolation, it was felt, only heightened the regime's intransigence. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007/8, South Africa thus sought to block criticism of Zimbabwe, Burma, Iran and Sudan. Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma defended Pretoria's voting record on the Council as follows: "Our own national experience has taught us the value of seeking negotiated solutions to problems, no matter how intractable they may at first seem, and of engaging all the relevant role players in a dialogue". Numerous analysts and activists pointed out that this was a false depiction of South Africa's negotiated settlement, which was the outcome of a liberation struggle, global solidarity and international sanctions against the apartheid regime. Nevertheless, government officials were adamant that "shouting from the rooftops" would accomplish nothing in the case of Zimbabwe.

Mbeki insisted that the only viable solution was one that was determined by the people of Zimbabwe themselves. In a vitriolic broadside against his critics, he presented the necessity for a domestic solution and the strategy of external pressure as mutually exclusive:

These same detractors, who have their own partisan agendas, which they dress in the language of high-sounding principles, are firm in their conviction that

27 See, for example, R. Munusamy, 2002, 'SA Battles UK over Zimbabwe: Screaming from the Rooftops Has Not Helped, Says Pahad', Sunday Times (South Africa), 29 September.
we have some divine right to dictate to the people of Zimbabwe what they should do about their country. They seem to believe that if we issued some instructions to the political leaders of Zimbabwe, as determined by themselves, this leadership would meekly obey what the baas across the Limpopo would have told them. 28

At the time at which the SADC task force criticised Mugabe’s policies in 2001, Mbeki issued his own criticism, observing that the Zimbabwe crisis was deepening as the government denied voters their rights, beat people up and suppressed the press; he called on SADC to intervene urgently to stop the descent into chaos and appeared to have abandoned his policy of quiet diplomacy.29 The state-owned newspaper in Harare, the Herald, responded by claiming that Mbeki had betrayed Zanu-PF and joined the “neo-colonialist plot” to overthrow it.30 When Mbeki raised concern about the arrangements for the forthcoming presidential election, the Herald accused him of “removing his gloves for a bare-knuckled fight with Zimbabwe” and of mobilising SADC states to “justify a regional and international onslaught” against the country.31 Just as the SADC task force retreated quickly from its critical stance, so did Mbeki. In 2002 South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs justified the resumption of quiet diplomacy on the grounds that the only alternative was a war with Zimbabwe.32

The fourth factor that explains South Africa’s posture on Zimbabwe was the anti-imperialist character of Pretoria’s foreign policy. I have argued elsewhere that Mbeki’s approach to international affairs was based on three paradigms: democratic, Africanist and anti-imperialist. Whereas the Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms were seldom

31 ‘President Thabo Mbeki Given a Lashing’, op cit.
if ever in conflict with each other, both were occasionally in conflict with the democratic paradigm. In these instances it was the democratic position that gave way.33

The anti-imperialist thrust revolved around the following themes: the political and economic power imbalance between the North and the South, to the great detriment of the poor; the need to transform the UN and other international bodies in order to address global inequities; the domineering, hypocritical and self-serving approach of Western countries that chide and bully developing states; South-South co-operation and solidarity; and multilateralism and respect for international law in the conduct of international affairs.34

In this context, Pretoria regarded the international human rights arena as one of the sites of struggle between the North and the South. According to Dumisani Kumalo, South Africa’s Permanent Representative to the UN during the Mbeki presidency, the developed and developing countries were “locked in a ‘cold war’ on the correct approach to human rights”.35 Among other things, there was a tendency for the developed countries to sit in judgement of the governance and human rights performance of selected developing countries. This gave rise to “double standards, hypocrisy, and the abuse of the UN’s human rights machinery [by the developed countries] to serve national political agendas”; it also “leads to a situation where developing countries are forced to rally to the support of the targeted country, irrespective of its actual human rights performance”.36 Whatever judgements might be made about this statement, it goes a long way to explaining South Africa’s stand on Zimbabwe.

Pretoria had similar concerns about the UN Security Council. The critique ran as follows: whereas the UN General Assembly is a representative and democratic forum in which the balance of forces does not favour any single state, the Council’s arrangements privilege

34 These themes are drawn from a review of President Mbeki’s foreign policy speeches on the website of the African National Congress, retrieved from www.anc.org.za on 2 August 2005.
36 Ibid.
the five permanent members (P-5), which enjoy the right of veto; the P-5 therefore want the issues they deem important to be dealt with in the Council, even if this entails encroaching on the mandates of other organs, such as the Human Rights Council, that fall under the General Assembly. Moreover, the P-5 control the process of defining international security and identifying the existence of international threats. Developing countries have watched powerlessly as the Security Council has become increasingly intrusive in this regard, assuming quasi-judicial authority and directing states to amend their national laws. Pretoria raised this critique to justify its opposition to Security Council resolutions on human rights abuses in Burma and Zimbabwe in 2007. It argued that these issues lay outside the Security Council’s mandate on international threats to peace and security and should be tackled instead by the Human Rights Council.

The anti-imperialist position constituted an ideology in the sense of comprising a set of fixed ideas and doctrines that laid the basis for political thought and action. It provided the lens through which human rights and other democratic tenets were viewed, it shaped the determination of priorities when government was confronted by competing principles and pressures and it elevated the importance of South-South solidarity. A further consequence was that political crises like Zimbabwe, Darfur and Burma were addressed not on their own merits but in terms of the power dynamics between the North and the South. Pretoria’s commitment to human rights was thus subordinated to the struggle against the North’s domination and perceived abuse of international forums. In short, South Africa’s foreign policy was overly determined by its anti-imperialist paradigm.

The privileging of anti-imperialism over human rights was strongly evident in Mbeki’s perspective on Zimbabwe. While critical of Mugabe and the “forcible process of land redistribution”, he was much more agitated by the historical role of Western countries as colonial powers, their recent contributions to the land crisis and their contemporary

37 See Dlamini-Zuma, ‘Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs’, op cit.
38 Dumisani Kumalo, quoted in Van Nieuwkerk, ‘A Critique of South Africa’s Role’, pg. 64.
condescension in telling Africans how to behave. From this perspective flowed the fatal flaw in his analysis, shared by most of the other SADC heads of state, which was to view the land crisis as being vastly more important than the human rights crisis and to regard the latter as a misplaced concern of the West rather than a legitimate concern of the people of Zimbabwe. Writing in the ANC newsletter in 2003, Mbeki bemoaned the fact that the core issue of land had “disappeared from public view [and] its place had been taken by the issue of human rights”. He cited Henry Kissinger as having said that President Regan and his advisers had treated human rights as a tool for overthrowing communism and democratising the Soviet Union. Mbeki continued as follows:

It is clear that some within Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the world, including our own country, are following the example set by ‘Regan and his advisers’, to ‘treat human rights as a tool’ for overthrowing the government of Zimbabwe and rebuilding Zimbabwe as they wish. In modern parlance, this is called regime change.

It is hard to find fault with the analysis of inequitable global relations that underpinned Pretoria’s anti-imperialist paradigm but it is equally hard to see any productive results emanating from the ensuing strategy. Blocking international action against dictatorial regimes did nothing to alter the inequities of the international system and yielded no benefits to South Africa or the South. In Zimbabwe and elsewhere, the only winners were the dictatorial regimes and the clear losers were their victims. The poor, who were the intended beneficiaries of the anti-imperialist agenda, ended up sacrificed on its alter. This outcome was not emancipatory or in any way transformative. In so far as it helped to retain repressive governments in power, the strategy was reactionary.

41 Ibid, pg. 5.
42 Ibid, pg. 5.
Developments after 2003 lie beyond the focus of this dissertation but for the sake of completeness it should be noted that in 2007, seven years after the onset of the Zimbabwe crisis, SADC mandated Mbeki to mediate between the government and the MDC. The mediation was controversial, with Mbeki repeatedly accused of being biased in favour of Zanu-PF. In March 2008 the MDC won parliamentary elections and Tsvangirai won 47.9% to Mugabe’s 43.2% in the presidential elections, leading to a run-off that was boycotted by the MDC because of the high level of repression. In September 2008 the Mbeki mediation resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement and the formation of a government of national unity, with Mugabe retaining the presidency, Tsvangirai becoming Prime Minister and cabinet posts being shared between the two parties. The coalition remains fragile at the time of writing (August 2009).

4.3 The Lesotho intervention, 1998

Lesotho, a small mountainous country entirely surrounded by South Africa, has had a turbulent political history since it gained independence in 1965. Tormented by the apartheid regime in the 1980s because its leader, Chief Leabua Jonathan, was willing to provide sanctuary to ANC guerrillas, the country was subsequently wracked by tension between political parties and the monarchy. In early 1994 conflict between King Letsie III and the Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, began to escalate. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe formed a task force to play a mediating role. This initiative emanated from the Frontline States, with Pretoria a partner in the exercise. When the King suspended the constitution and dissolved Mokhehle’s administration, the task force condemned the ‘royal coup’ and set a deadline for the restoration of constitutional rule. In September 1994, in response to the King’s intransigence, Pretoria deployed combat aircraft and mounted a mass drop of paratroopers near the Lesotho border. The show of force had the intended effect. Letsie reinstated the government and abdicated in favour of

43 See, for example, M. Hartnack, 2005, ‘Zim Opposition Rejects South Africa as Neutral Broker’, Mail and Guardian, 21 April.
his father, Moshoeshoe II. The Basotho protagonists agreed that Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe would serve as the guarantors of their agreement.  

Four years later Lesotho was once more confronted by a political crisis. Against the backdrop of growing dissent over the results of a national election, there were fears of an imminent coup when a group of junior officers ‘deposed’ and imprisoned the commander and other senior officers of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force, seized control of the national broadcasting station and forced the closure of government offices. On 16 September 1998 the newly elected Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, wrote to SADC warning that “we have a coup on our hands. The only intervention I can and do request urgently is of a military nature”; three days later he wrote again to SADC, exclaiming that “the situation is so tense that some of us may not see the planned [SADC] meeting of Sunday the 20th.”

In consultation with the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana decided to launch a joint operation. The South African contingent of 500 troops with air and medical support entered Lesotho on 22 September and the smaller contingent from Botswana arrived the next day. Operation Boleas, as it was named, met with unanticipated resistance from sections of the Lesotho army. Eight South African soldiers and an estimated 58 Basotho soldiers were killed in battles over several days. A state of anarchy ensued. Public demonstrations against the intervention led to the virtual sacking of the capital city, Maseru, and thousands of people were displaced. Operation Boleas was riddled with strategic and tactical errors and was viewed by many as a military and political disaster. The critics included outspoken South African military

---


48 See, for example, Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 184-190; F. Makoa, 1999, ‘Foreign Military Intervention in Lesotho’s Elections Dispute: Whose Project?’, Strategic Review for

115
officers and defence officials.\textsuperscript{49} \textit{SouthScan} claimed that the operation had done lasting damage to South Africa's reputation and Lesotho's sovereignty; it had also raised the prospect of heightened and more protracted instability in Southern and Central Africa by firmly establishing the legitimacy of external military action in volatile situations.\textsuperscript{50}

In response to the criticism, Pretoria insisted that the deployment had been requested by the head of a legitimate government facing a potential coup and had been authorised only after efforts to end the mutiny through negotiations had failed.\textsuperscript{51} South African officials sought variously to justify the legality of the intervention on one or more of the following grounds: it had taken place under SADC auspices; it flowed from a SADC decision to not permit \textit{coups d'etat} and other unconstitutional changes of government in Southern Africa; and it was based on the 1994 agreement that South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana would be guarantors of stability in Lesotho.\textsuperscript{52} No reference was made to international law on the use of force. The South African ministers and state law advisers with whom I spoke at the time of the operation had not considered the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and were unfamiliar with them.\textsuperscript{53}

In an article published two years after the intervention, Rocky Williams, a senior member of South Africa's Department of Defence, pointed out the flaws in Pretoria's arguments regarding the legality of the deployment: the 'SADC decision' to not allow coups in the region had in fact been a proposal from the ISDSC to the SADC Summit; the proposal


\textsuperscript{50} 'More Questions Than Answers', \textit{SouthScan}, op cit.


\textsuperscript{53} Author's discussions with officials in the South African Presidency and Department of Defence, September and October 1998.
had included the proviso that UN, OAU and SADC approval be obtained prior to any 
military intervention by SADC; the Summit had neither endorsed the ISDSC's proposal 
nor authorised military action in Lesotho; and, in the absence of Summit approval, the 
decision by the neighbouring states to launch the operation was in breach of SADC's 
decision-making rules. Williams observed further that "considerable uncertainty 
prevailed at the time of the intervention as to the scope, content and wording of the 
SADC mandate (and, indeed, whether a written mandate existed at all!)."

There is no mystery regarding South Africa's motivation and goals. According to the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the political aim of the operation was 
to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order and the commencement 
of negotiations among the Basotho political parties, and the military objectives were to 
establish control of the border between South Africa and Lesotho, protect South African 
assets in the mountain kingdom and stabilise Maseru. The actions on the ground were in 
keeping with this formulation of aims and objectives. South African assets were 
perceived to include the joint Lesotho/South African Highlands Water Project at the 
Katse Dam, which supplied water to South African agriculture and industry. The 
mutineers had threatened to destroy the dam if Pretoria sent troops into Lesotho, and 
South African officials stated explicitly that securing the dam was one of the objectives 
of the mission.

Nor is it difficult to understand the political and military ineptness of the South African 
intervention. A mere four years after the formation of the Government of National Unity, 
there was still a general lack of policy and strategic coherence within and between state 
departments. Decision-making procedures on military operations were ad hoc and 
rudimentary, and the government had not yet come to terms with the doctrinal and

54 Williams, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding?", op cit, pp. 99-101. See also Makoa, "Foreign Military 
Intervention", op cit; and Malan, "Regional Power Politics under the Cover of SADC", op cit, pp. 7-8.
55 Williams, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding?", op cit, pg. 101.
56 Directorate Corporate Communication, "The SADC Intervention in Lesotho", op cit; and V. Kent and M. 
Paper, no. 72, Institute for Security Studies.
operational implications of the radical policy shift from aggressive military engagements to peacekeeping operations that were consistent with international law and South Africa’s membership of SADC. The lack of proper attention to the political and legal dimensions of Operation Boleas was also due to the absence of thorough deliberation within government. The Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the Defence Force were in the decision-making loop but foreign affairs personnel, the Secretary of Defence and his policy and planning staff were not.\textsuperscript{58}

The puzzle concerning the operation was the rash employment of the SANDF, which ran counter to the ANC government’s policy aversion to the use of force in international affairs (Section 3.4); only one month earlier, in August 1998, Mandela had opposed a SADC military engagement in the DRC (Section 4.4). It might be relevant that both President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki were travelling abroad when the Lesotho operation occurred. The decision to deploy was taken by Acting President Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in consultation with Mandela and Mbeki according to a government official.\textsuperscript{59}

There is no way of telling whether a different course of action would have been followed had Mandela or Mbeki been in the country. Nevertheless, it seems clear with hindsight that the intervention was an anomaly. Over the past fifteen years South Africa has adhered to its anti-militarist posture. It is therefore plausible to interpret the military action in Lesotho as a reflection of the transitional nature of the South African state, a product of the residual apartheid paradigm rather than a manifestation of the new government’s foreign policy.

The South African Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, attributed the public criticism of Operation Boleas to perceptions clouded by the fog of war.\textsuperscript{60} Equally serious was the fog of politics arising from the disputes within SADC over the Organ and the DRC crisis. Prior to the operation, the Lesotho government was reported to have engaged in behind-the-scenes efforts to get Zimbabwe to intervene in Lesotho “in return for

\textsuperscript{58} Berman and Sams, \textit{Peacekeeping in Africa}, op cit, pp. 186-187; and author’s discussions with defence officials at the time of the intervention.

\textsuperscript{59} ‘More Questions Than Answers’, \textit{SouthScan}, op cit, pg. 154.

\textsuperscript{60} Kasrils, ‘Lesotho Proves Transformation’, op cit.
supporting Robert Mugabe in [his] battle with South Africa for regional political dominance. After the operation, the King of Lesotho claimed that his country had been sacrificed in the interests of healing the rift between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Whatever the validity of these claims, Operation Boleas highlighted the legal, military and political complications that can arise when collective enforcement action is undertaken in the absence of agreed mandates, rules and procedures.

In the aftermath of the operation, South Africa facilitated negotiations between the Basotho political parties with the aims of restoring constitutional rule, forging an agreement on the disputed election and embarking on a process of much needed electoral reform. In November 1998 the parties agreed to recognise the elected government and set up the representative Independent Political Authority to restructure the first-past-the-post electoral system. The South African and Botswana military contingents remained in Lesotho and were joined by troops from Zimbabwe when Operation Boleas was replaced with Operation Maluti, designed to reorient and retrain the Lesotho Defence Force. The foreign forces withdrew in May 1999, a new electoral system was adopted and elections were held successfully in 2002. In 2003 Roger Southall concluded that four years after the bungled military operation of 1998, the South African government could claim that its multi-faceted intervention had been immensely beneficial.

4.4 The DRC rebellion, 1998

In September 1996 the Banyamulenge, a minority Tutsi community in eastern Zaire, mounted an uprising under the leadership of Laurent Kabila that culminated in the overthrow of President Mobutu Sese Seko. The rebellion of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) had two proximate causes, both linked to the virulent anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Great Lakes Region. The first was

---

61 Quoted in Star, 9 September 1998 as cited in Makoa, 'Foreign Military Intervention', op cit, pg. 73.
the decision by a provincial governor to expel the Banyamulenge from Zaire, where they had lived for over two hundred years. The second was the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, which had been stopped by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), forcing the flight of the Interahamwe and other genocidal groups into neighbouring Zaire. For the newly installed RPF government in Rwanda, which orchestrated and drove the Zairean insurrection, the abiding threat was Mobutu’s support for the Interahamwe and the presence of these Hutu militia in refugee camps in eastern Zaire.

More broadly, the structural and historical causes of the rebellion and the subsequent uprising in 1998 related to the chronic regional instability in Central Africa, the brutality, divisiveness and neglect of colonial rule and three decades of authoritarianism under Mobutu. In addition to Mobutu’s legendary corruption, organised chaos and harsh repression, the economic and humanitarian situation was disastrous. In the mid-1990s state hospitals and health facilities were virtually non-existent, preventable and curable diseases accounted for at least 50% of all deaths, child and maternal mortality rates were among the highest in the world and inflation had reached 24,000%.

As the AFDL moved rapidly towards the capital, Kinshasa, the international community was seized with a sense of impending catastrophe in anticipation of a bloody last-ditch stand by Mobutu’s army. The UN Secretary-General and a number of Western countries and relief agencies called for the urgent deployment of an international peacekeeping force. President Mandela intervened diplomatically, famously travelling to the hotspot on the naval warship SAS Outeniqua. He was able to convene a meeting between Mobutu and Kabila on board the ship, stationed off the coast of Congo-Brazzaville, but the initiative had a slightly quixotic flavour. Whether Mandela’s aim was to broker some kind of government of national unity or simply enable Mobutu to step down gracefully without a fight, the timing and the balance of power were not conducive to a mediated solution. Poised to take the capital, Kabila had no need to do a deal with Mobutu.

In 1997 Kabila became the President of Zaire, which was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo and became a member of SADC. In July 1998 he accused his Rwandan allies of plotting against him and expelled them from the DRC. With the support of Rwanda and Uganda, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) launched a rebellion against him. Kabila appealed to SADC for military and political assistance. On 7 August, in his capacity as the Chair of the Organ, Mugabe convened a meeting in Victoria Falls of the heads of state and government from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. At this meeting a task group was set up to consider an appropriate response. Although South Africa held the chair of SADC at the time, it was not invited to the indaba because of the friction between Mandela and Mugabe over the Organ. At a Summit meeting the previous month Mandela had threatened to resign as the SADC Chair if the Organ were not made accountable to the Summit (Section 3.2); Mugabe had not relented, continuing to insist that the Organ should be independent from the Chair of SADC. On 18 August 1998 Mugabe referred the recommendations of the Victoria Falls task group to an ISDSC meeting in Harare, at the conclusion of which he declared that SADC had decided unanimously to meet Kabila’s appeal. The next day Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia announced that they would deploy troops in the DRC on behalf of SADC. They subsequently referred to themselves as the SADC Allied Forces in the DRC.

The intervening states justified the deployment as an act of collective defence against the ‘invasion’ of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. Zimbabwe presented the following motivation to the UN Security Council: the decision to deploy was based on a formal request from an internationally recognised government; it was permitted in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows a state to request military assistance when its

---

66 SADC’s motivation for accepting the DRC’s application for membership, despite the country being located in central and not southern Africa, is discussed briefly in Chapter 5.
70 Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 176-177.
security, sovereignty and territorial integrity are threatened; the decision was consistent with a 1997 resolution of the OAU condemning changes of legitimate government by military means; and it was in line with a 1995 resolution of the ISDSC whereby SADC countries would take collective action in the event of an attempted coup against a member state.  

The intervening countries also claimed that the deployment had been authorised by the Organ and the ISDSC. However, the Organ was not operational as a multi-national regional body, the ISDSC had no mandate to initiate military action and only a handful of SADC countries were present at the meetings in Harare and Victoria Falls. Mandela’s spokesperson stated emphatically that “there is no way that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under the auspices of SADC”. When Mandela challenged Mugabe’s authority to send troops on behalf of SADC, the latter responded with a thinly veiled insult: “No one is compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want to keep out, fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help”. Kabila accused Pretoria of being “puppets of the aggressors” in his country.

Supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, South Africa argued that the DRC crisis had to be tackled diplomatically. To this end, and with the additional aim of asserting SADC’s authority over the Organ, on 23 August Mandela convened an emergency Summit meeting in Pretoria. Mugabe failed to attend the meeting and a pre-Summit consultation arranged by Mandela, saying that “we must now enlist the OAU which has an organ for conflict resolution. It is not possible for us to resolve [the crisis]
as SADC because we are divided".76 Angola and the DRC were also absent from the meeting, and Uganda and Kenya were present as invited guests. The Summit declared that military action was an unacceptable way of addressing the problems that had given rise to the war and called for an immediate ceasefire and a peaceful process of political dialogue to solve the problems.77 The Summit mandated Mandela to pursue these goals in consultation with the OAU Secretary-General and to harmonise the Pretoria agenda with the Victoria Falls initiative.78 On 31 August the UN Security Council called similarly for “a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, including an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the initiation of a peaceful process of political dialogue with a view to national reconciliation”.79 Tanzanian military instructors in the DRC were evacuated and Mozambique’s Prime Minister, Pascoal Mocumbi, said that his country would not send troops to the DRC without the backing of SADC and the OAU.80

At the Non-Aligned Movement Summit hosted by South Africa at the beginning of September, Mandela declared unexpectedly that SADC unanimously supported the military intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. According to South African officials, the apparent turnabout was not a shift in policy but was intended to ease the tension with Mugabe and restore a semblance of unity to SADC.81 For many months thereafter, South African cabinet ministers reiterated that Pretoria would only deploy troops in the DRC under the direction of the UN.82 The government was reported to have mobilised troops in anticipation of the establishment of an internationally sanctioned

76 Quoted in Berman and Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, pg. 178.
78 Ibid.
peacekeeping force. South Africa maintained its view that a military standstill, a ceasefire and elections were necessary to resolve the conflict and Mandela continued to champion a negotiated settlement. In October 1998 he offered his good offices to the warring parties but the DRC government spurned the offer.

On 13-14 September the SADC Summit met in Mauritius and mandated President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, the incoming chair of SADC, to facilitate a peace process for the DRC. By this stage the international dimensions of the conflict had become even more prominent and complicated. The DRC’s neighbours in the north, Sudan and Chad, had also come to Kabila’s defence, while Burundi had lined up with Rwanda and Uganda against him, making a total of nine state belligerents in what became known as ‘Africa’s biggest war’.

Although the war created a deep and lasting rift in SADC, the communique issued after the Mauritius Summit sought to present a unified front by endorsing the positions represented by both South Africa and Zimbabwe:

The Summit expressed deep regret at the outbreak of war in DRC, as a result of attempts by rebels and their allies to forcefully remove the Government of President Kabila from power. The Summit welcomed the initiatives by SADC and its Member States intended to assist in the restoration of peace, security and stability in DRC, particularly the Victoria Falls and Pretoria initiatives. In that regard, the Summit reaffirmed its call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for timorously [presumably, “timeously”] providing troops to assist

84 Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pg. 179.
the Government and people of the DRC defeat the illegal attempt by rebels and their allies to capture the capital city, Kinshasa, and other strategic areas. The Summit emphasized the need for all political actors in the DRC to commit themselves to an orderly and peaceful transition to multi-party democracy, primarily through constructive consultations and negotiations involving all stakeholders.88

On the battlefield, the combined Namibian, Angolan and Zimbabwean forces quickly reversed the RCD’s gains in western DRC, reclaiming captured territory and repulsing the rebel offensive on the capital. Elsewhere in the country, however, the RCD and its allies gained territory. By late 1998 an effective stalemate had been achieved, with the country effectively split in two.89 There were more than twenty attempts to broker peace but it was only the Lusaka accord, signed by the state belligerents and main rebel movements in July and August 1999, that provided a potentially viable basis for a lasting cessation of hostilities.90 Nevertheless, the war continued to simmer and flare, further complicated by fighting between Uganda and Rwanda on Congolese territory.91 It was another three years before these countries left the DRC.

The Lusaka accord, brokered by Zambia, South Africa and Tanzania, sought to address both the internal political dynamics of Congo and the regional security concerns of Angola, Rwanda and Uganda.92 It provided for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) comprising the belligerent parties. The JMC was mandated to investigate ceasefire violations, design mechanisms to disarm the genocidal forces and other armed groups and monitor the withdrawal of all foreign troops according to specified deadlines. The agreement also covered the initiation

89 For details on the fighting, see Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 180-183.
the Government and people of the DRC defeat the illegal attempt by rebels and their allies to capture the capital city, Kinshasa, and other strategic areas. The Summit emphasized the need for all political actors in the DRC to commit themselves to an orderly and peaceful transition to multi-party democracy, primarily through constructive consultations and negotiations involving all stakeholders.88

On the battlefield, the combined Namibian, Angolan and Zimbabwean forces quickly reversed the RCD’s gains in western DRC, reclaiming captured territory and repulsing the rebel offensive on the capital. Elsewhere in the country, however, the RCD and its allies gained territory. By late 1998 an effective stalemate had been achieved, with the country effectively split in two.89 There were more than twenty attempts to broker peace but it was only the Lusaka accord, signed by the state belligerents and main rebel movements in July and August 1999, that provided a potentially viable basis for a lasting cessation of hostilities.90 Nevertheless, the war continued to simmer and flare, further complicated by fighting between Uganda and Rwanda on Congolese territory.91 It was another three years before these countries left the DRC.

The Lusaka accord, brokered by Zambia, South Africa and Tanzania, sought to address both the internal political dynamics of Congo and the regional security concerns of Angola, Rwanda and Uganda.92 It provided for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) comprising the belligerent parties. The JMC was mandated to investigate ceasefire violations, design mechanisms to disarm the genocidal forces and other armed groups and monitor the withdrawal of all foreign troops according to specified deadlines. The agreement also covered the initiation

89 For details on the fighting, see Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, op cit, pp. 180-183.
of a Congolese national dialogue, under the authority of a neutral facilitator, which would lead to a new political dispensation in the DRC.

The accord shifted the locus of international support and facilitation from SADC to the UN and the OAU. It provided for the formation of an OAU/UN Observer Group to assist the JMC and for the OAU to help organise the inter-Congolese dialogue (ICD). The accord also called for the deployment of a UN military force to ensure the implementation of the agreement. The force would have both peacekeeping and peace enforcement functions and would be responsible for disarming the armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to refugees and displaced people. In February 2000 the UN Security Council authorised the establishment of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known by its French acronym MONUC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en RD Congo), with an authorised strength of 5,537 military personnel; by 2008 the authorised force level had risen to 19,815 military personnel.93

In 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son Joseph. This contributed to creating propitious conditions for the ICD, which the OAU had mandated former President Ketumile Masire of Botswana to facilitate. The ICD kicked off in Addis Ababa in late 2001 and then relocated to Sun City in South Africa in February 2002. The participants included the government and various rebel groups, militia, political parties and civil society formations. The talks broke down when Kabila and one of the rebel movements struck a deal on the sidelines of the negotiations. By now President Mbeki had become the central mediator and in the course of 2002 he facilitated agreements between the DRC and Rwanda and between the DRC and Uganda, leading to the exit of their armies from the Congo. In December 2002 the parties to the ICD met in Pretoria and Mbeki facilitated the conclusion of the Accord Global et Inclusif, ushering in a transitional government of national unity and paving the way for the DRC's first democratic election in 2006.94 Following the Pretoria accord, Mbeki remained involved

93 See the website of MONUC at http://monuc.unmissions.org/.
94 For details on the ICD, see Koko, 'The 'One-Plus-Four' Formula', op cit.
in peacemaking efforts and the South African government assisted with security sector reform, preparations for the elections and other aspects of the transition.95

The war was a drain on the intervening states’ economies but appears to have been highly profitable for the members of their ruling elites who secured lucrative mining and other commercial contracts in the Congo. Accusations of profiteering and illegal exploitation of natural resources, regarded as motives for the continuation of the war, were levelled chiefly at Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.96 A UN report attributed Zimbabwe’s military involvement to a number of factors, including its desire to assert its role within SADC and rally domestic support for its leaders in a context of falling standards of living and “gross mismanagement of the economy, unchecked public expenditure, corruption and one-party rule”.97 The Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs dismissed the report as a “pack of lies”.98

The war had a devastating impact on the people of the DRC. Between August 1998 and 2002 the number of deaths in the eastern part of the country was estimated at 3.5 million, of which 350,000 were a direct consequence of the violence and the others a result of malnutrition and disease; there were two million internally displaced Congolese and some 330,000 refugees in neighbouring states; and approximately eighteen million people were in need of humanitarian assistance.99 Violence has continued to wrack the Ituri, South Kivu, North Kivu and Katanga provinces and in 2009 the UN regarded eastern DRC as the site of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.100

95 Ibid.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that the resolution of complex intra-state conflicts is an immensely challenging endeavour. There is no international organisation, including the UN, the EU and the AU, that is able to end these conflicts quickly and easily. In the case of SADC, the inherent difficulties of peacemaking and pre-conflict peacebuilding were greatly compounded by the two major divisions that wracked the organisation – democratic versus authoritarian tendencies and militarist versus pacific foreign postures. These divisions inhibited unified action in crisis situations and impaired the functioning of the regional security body mandated to play a peacemaking role.
CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF THE ORGAN

5.1 Introduction

This Chapter seeks to explain the reasons for SADC’s inability to establish a viable security regime and engage in effective peacemaking. Three major problems are discussed. First, there is an absence of common values among member states, which has inhibited the development of common policies on security, politics and foreign affairs and frustrated the organisation’s ability to contribute to the resolution of conflict. In this regard I distinguish between the internal logic of a regional organisation, which is based on common values and trust, and its external logic, which is based on state interests. This distinction is explored by comparing SADC with the EU. I consider whether there is a particular set of common values that would ensure the success of a security regime, whether common values might emerge over time and whether the principles of solidarity and anti-imperialism have had a positive or negative effect in Southern Africa.

The second major problem is that states have been reluctant to surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime with binding rules and principles, partly because of their tenuous hold on sovereignty and partly because of their normative differences on the character and strategies of the regime. Third, the economic and administrative weakness of states has undermined the effectiveness of all SADC’s forums and programmes. The Chapter concludes by examining the role of South Africa as the major power in the region.

5.2 The absence of common values

As noted in the Introduction, the UN encourages regional organisations to take responsibility for maintaining peace within their geographical domains. The rationale is based on proximity and relates to interests, trust and norms. Regional bodies are assumed
to have a strong interest in resolving conflicts within their neighbourhood. When the UN was being designed at the end of World War II, for example, Winston Churchill proposed the formation of regional councils in addition to a Supreme World Council on the grounds that only those countries directly affected by a dispute “could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement”.¹ Regional organisations are also assumed to be well-equipped for peacemaking because of their familiarity with the actors and issues involved in a local crisis.² According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, they can contribute to conflict prevention because they build trust through the frequency of interaction among states, have a good grasp of the historical background of a conflict and can “provide a local forum for efforts to decrease tensions and promote and facilitate a comprehensive regional approach to cross-border issues”.³

Additionally, the UN maintains that regional organisations can contribute to peace and stability by setting and upholding appropriate norms. In a major report on conflict prevention, Annan noted that “often regional agencies have credibility as local actors to encourage their members to adhere to accepted international and regional norms”.⁴ In 2008 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon observed that conflict prevention centres and early warning systems had been established by the EU, the OSCE, the Organisation of American States, the AU and several regional organisations in Africa; of fundamental importance in the formation of these structures was the “development of agreed regional norms and principles on governance and prevention”.⁵

In the UN material cited here and in the Introduction, there is only one brief acknowledgement that proximity might be an impediment to local peacemaking by

regional bodies: Ban Ki-moon observes that although these bodies have a keen interest in resolving crises that erupt in their backyard, they "may be caught up in and made less effective because of the complex dynamics of regional conflicts". This problem is only to be expected since regional organisations are not independent of local states involved in conflict but comprise these states. In some instances, such as with IGAD and SAARC, the conflict between member states has been so intense as to render the organisation inoperable as a conflict resolution forum (Section 1.1). The disputes in SADC have been less severe than those in IGAD and SAARC but have nevertheless precluded effective conflict resolution and the construction of a useful security regime.

The disputes that bedevilled the development of the SADC Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact related to norms, values and trust rather than interests. In order to explore this assertion further it is helpful to distinguish between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic refers to the interests and objective conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the judgment of member states. These states must believe that their interests will be served through institutionalised co-operation and co-ordination in respect of one or more political, economic or security problems and goals. Indeed, it would be illogical for states to pursue co-operation, let alone integration, if they were not convinced that the likely gains outweighed the costs.

The external logic of SADC has been articulated clearly in official documents and encompasses the following concerns and incentives: regionalism and integration as a response to globalisation and Africa's marginalisation in international trade and politics; the promotion of development and economic growth through regional projects and trade; the many socio-economic problems that transcend national borders and require a coordinated response; the synergistic benefits of co-operation in sectors like water, energy, policing, health and transport; the necessity for a regional forum for conflict resolution; and the peacekeeping and confidence-building benefits of multilateral defence.

6 Ibid, para 9.
7 On the various ways in which state interests are served by participating in regional organisations, see Fawcett and Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics, op cit.
collaboration (Chapter 2). More specifically in relation to security, the logic is that integration and development require political stability, which in turn requires a security regime with a peacemaking mandate.

Some scholars in the realist school of International Relations are wholly pessimistic about the utility of international security regimes. John Mearsheimer exemplifies this position when he argues that institutions cannot enhance stability in an international system defined by anarchy and a relentless competition for power and security among states; there is no evidence that regimes have an independent effect on state behaviour and constitute an important cause of peace. Mearsheimer does not explain why, if this were true, many states in many parts of the world put a great deal of effort into building and maintaining regional institutions whose goals include peace and stability. One of the striking features of the Southern African case is that states persisted in their mission to create a security regime when there were good reasons to abandon it. They not only devoted scarce funds and much time to the Organ with little positive result, but their disputes over its status and orientation damaged their relations. Their perseverance signified their conviction that their interests would be served by a collective security mechanism. They agreed on the need for the mechanism but disagreed bitterly on its character.

The assertion that the disputes around the Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact were primarily normative, relating to values and ideas embedded in the political and strategic culture of states, does not imply that state interests were unimportant. The positions taken by member states were necessarily informed by their interests regarding national security, regional security and alliances with other Southern African countries. Yet these interests

---


10 Mearsheimer addresses this issue only with respect to the US, arguing that realism’s pessimistic outlook runs counter to American idealism and core beliefs. See Mearsheimer, ‘False Promise’, op cit, pp. 47-49.
do not account for the pacific-militarist divide. Neither camp had a set of interests that was common to its members and different from that of its rivals. SADC countries differ markedly in terms of resource, geographic, demographic, economic and security factors, giving rise to varying interests, but the variations were much greater within the camps than between them.

The internal logic of a regional organisation, on the other hand, refers to the normative congruence in the domestic and foreign policies of member states that makes these states willing and able to engage in close political and security co-operation. A high level of congruence engenders the affinity and trust that are prerequisites for states to develop common policies on a range of sensitive issues, adopt a set of binding principles and rules and accept the resultant constraints on their decision-making and behaviour. The internal logic holds the organisation together as the external logic drives it forward.

At the time of its formation in 1992, SADC recognised the importance of common values as the glue that would bind the organisation (Section 2.5). With the dawning of the post-apartheid era, it was apparent that the unity forged during the struggles against minority rule and colonialism required a new foundation. According to the SADC Declaration, the “abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation in order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region” would be provided by economic co-operation and integration and by common economic, political and social values and systems. It will be recalled that SADC’s objectives include the “evolution of common political values, systems and institutions” and that its core principles are sovereign equality of states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes (Section 2.4).

In the decade following SADC’s establishment, the principles that were adhered to most firmly and consistently were those of solidarity and anti-imperialism. In the sphere of domestic policy there was no consensus among member states on the basic tenets of

---

12 Ibid, pg. 5.
governance. In addition to Swaziland and the DRC that were not democratic, there were many de jure democracies whose governments were intolerant of dissent, hardly account able to parliament and insufficiently committed to respect for human rights and the rule of law. The 2004 Freedom House survey of political rights and civil liberties classified Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa as ‘free’; Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia as ‘partly free’; and Angola, the DRC, Swaziland and Zimbabwe as ‘not free’. Although some of these classifications are debatable, they indicate the extent to which Southern African countries spanned the political spectrum.

One of the distinguishing features of the political landscape in Southern Africa has been the disjuncture between the rhetoric and trappings of democracy on the one hand, and the determination of ruling elites to maintain power on the other. The SADC Parliamentary Forum, an independent body of parliamentarians from the SADC states, has observed that politicians in the region “talk democracy but use undemocratic means to stay in power”. Jonathan Moyo, an outspoken academic before becoming Zimbabwe’s Minister of Information in 2000, made the same point in a 1998 article on the African Renaissance:

The assertion that the majority of African governments are now democratic... has no empirical basis. It is true that multiparty elections are now common in Africa but this truth does not describe a fundamental development. The change is strategic, not substantive. ...Just look at Zambia and Malawi since the fall of Kenneth Kaunda and the late Kamuzu Banda. Zimbabwe is following suit with reckless abandon.15

In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that SADC failed to express concern and disapproval when member states deviated from its official norms regarding democracy. Nor is it surprising that the organisation was unable to deal effectively with the conflict

and repression that commenced in Zimbabwe in 2000, the reason summed up neatly in the title of Mondli Makhanya’s opinion piece, “Mugabe will not Be Swayed by the Polite Coaxing of Despotic Peers” (Section 4.2). 16

In the sphere of foreign policy SADC was torn between two approaches to regional security and conflict resolution. One group of countries, led by Zimbabwe, emphasised defence co-operation and collective security through a defence treaty that would evolve over time into a NATO-type organisation. The other camp, led by South Africa, prioritised political co-operation and diplomatic means of peacemaking through a common security regime (Chapter 3). This normative and strategic cleavage lay at the heart of the decade-long disagreements over the nature of the Organ (Section 3.4) and the content of the Mutual Defence Pact (Section 3.8). The disagreements immobilised the Organ, prevented the Summit from performing its conflict resolution functions and, as noted previously, gave rise to the impression of “two SADCs”. 17

The security models that were under consideration were not inherently incompatible. Many European countries belong to several political and security organisations, chiefly the EU, NATO and the OSCE, which have different orientations. In Southern Africa, however, the debates on security arrangements revolved around competing priorities and there was no common ground to be found between prioritising a military response to conflict and prioritising a political response to conflict. These priorities were irreconcilable and the protagonists were unwilling to compromise positions that derived from core national policies and values. The animosity that wracked the debates was partly due to the fact that regional security arrangements became the fulcrum of the struggle between South Africa and Zimbabwe for regional leadership. But the deep significance and intensity of the debates was due to the fact that they covered the most sensitive areas of statehood, namely sovereignty, security and use of force.

The members of the pacific camp were deeply opposed to an agreement that entailed a collective defence obligation. They believed that entry into war should be determined on a case-by-case basis rather than triggered by a treaty (Section 3.8). It was relevant in this regard that an attack on a SADC country seemed just as likely to emanate from another member state as from a country outside the region: in 1992 Namibia and Botswana had mobilised troops in their dispute over the ownership of a riverine island on their common border, and in 1998 Angola threatened to invade Zambia on the grounds that the latter was supporting the rebel movement Unita. In circumstances such as these, the pacific camp wanted to engage in diplomatic peacemaking rather than be bound to deploy troops.

When the pacific-militarist schism was played out during the DRC war in 1998, with the pacific group promoting negotiations and a ceasefire while Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola engaged in hostilities in support of the DRC government, SADC was rent asunder. President Mugabe excluded South Africa from deliberations of the Organ, refused to attend a Summit meeting called by President Mandela and declared that SADC was too divided to play a peacemaking role in the DRC (Section 4.4). In 1999 Walter Tapfumaneyi wrote that “the two camps have clearly worked at cross-purposes resulting in either divergent action or no action at all in the face of an increasing number of crises”.18 According to Naison Ngoma, the Congo deployment and the defence treaty signed by the military bloc in 1999 almost destroyed SADC.19

The story of the two defence pacts in Southern Africa underlines the salience of the internal logic of a regional institution. On the one hand, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe were able to conclude a defence treaty because they enjoyed a high level of normative congruence and trust as a result of their long-standing alliance in the Frontline States and their similar post-liberation political dispensations. On the other hand, the members of SADC as a whole lacked such congruence and affinity and the organisation’s Mutual

Defence Pact was therefore watered down so that it did not create a collective defence commitment (Section 3.8).

The internal logic is a relative rather than an absolute imperative. Even when the members of a regional organisation are prepared to accept a set of rules based on shared values, they do not surrender sovereign decision-making lightly and completely. They invariably encounter serious differences of opinion and experience difficulty in collective decision-making on policy matters and in crisis situations, leading at times to independent and divergent courses of action. Some member states might also deviate occasionally from the agreed rules and policies. For the organisation to withstand these differences and deviations, there must be sufficient political commonality and trust among its members. In other words, there is a minimum threshold of normative congruence for a successful regional organisation, below which the organisation lacks cohesion and its members are unable to develop and abide by common policies.

The internal logic is also relative in the sense that the degree of congruence required for success varies according to the focus, type and form of multilateral engagement. The Southern African experience confirms what might be expected intuitively in this regard: the threshold is lower in non-sensitive areas than in the realm of high politics; it rises in the progression from co-operation to co-ordination to integration; and it is higher in a formal regime than in an informal association. Notwithstanding their disputes around the Organ, SADC states have sufficient affinity and trust to co-operate in a range of functional sectors, such as water and energy. They have also been able to co-operate in sectors that have political and security dimensions but are relatively uncontroversial, a good example being their technical co-operation on military and police matters through the ISDSC and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation.

---

In the 1980s the Frontline States coalition achieved cohesion on the basis of its members' common opposition to apartheid and colonialism but it did not seek to regulate their conduct through binding rules. The requisite threshold of political congruence is much higher in the case of a security regime like the Organ, which encompasses principles and rules that are intended to constrain state behaviour and decision-making. If the domestic and/or foreign policies of member states are incompatible, the regime is unlikely to be effective for a host of reasons: there are no common values on which to base the rules, develop common policies and achieve cohesion; the organisation will instead be wracked by divisions that inhibit collective decision-making and action; its members will often breach the declared norms that are inconsistent with their national policies; and member states that are authoritarian will not fulfil a mandate to respect human rights and the rule of law. These problems lie at the heart of the Organ failure and SADC's dismal record in relation to peacemaking and democratic governance. Frequent interaction between states will not in itself overcome the divisions and mistrust that derive from incompatible national policies. Common values are thus the foundation rather than the outcome of close political and security co-operation.

Four questions emerge from the preceding discussion: Is there a particular set of common values — say, those of democracy — that ought to be present for a security regime to be effective? Do common values emerge over time? How is the normative threshold for success determined? And what has been the impact of the values that SADC states do have in common, namely solidarity and anti-imperialism? These questions are addressed in the following Section.

5.3 Comparing SADC and the EU

In this Section I discuss a number of similarities and differences between the EU and SADC in terms of the internal/external logic framework. The thesis that the internal and external logic of a regional organisation are necessary but separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness, especially in the political and security fields, is strengthened
if it can be shown to apply both to a weak organisation in a developing and impoverished region and to a strong organisation in a highly industrialised and prosperous region.

Unlike SADC, the EU was constituted on the basis of common political values. Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 declares that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States”. Precisely because these assertions are true, the EU has been able to achieve a high level of integration, develop communal policy on many issues and establish bodies with supranational authority. In addition to its customs, economic and monetary unions, it has produced a plethora of laws, rules and standards in various sectors that are binding on states and justiciable before the European Court of Justice. Highlighting the significance of the internal logic, the EU distinguishes between the negotiability of common policies and the non-negotiability of the common values that underlie them.22

The EU’s admission criteria illustrate the idea that shared values are the foundation rather than the outcome of close political co-operation in a regional organisation. Article 49(1) of the TEU provides that admission is only open to European countries that respect the principles set out in Article 6(1). Central and east European states would consequently not gain membership on the grounds that they might thereby come to accept democratic norms; they would only be admitted if they already adhered to these norms.23 By contrast, in 1997 the SADC Summit decided that the DRC satisfied the requirements for entry into its ranks.24 These requirements had nothing to do with the democratic values that were espoused in the SADC Treaty and absent in the DRC. They related instead to the external logic of regional stability, the DRC’s mineral, water and other natural resources and its potential hydroelectric power and infrastructural projects.25

23 Ibid.
I suggested in the previous Section that the internal logic is a relative condition in the sense that the degree of normative congruence required for success varies according to the focus of multilateral engagement and is highest in the realm of high politics. There are striking similarities between the EU and SADC in this regard. Just as the DRC war in 1998 created a political crisis for SADC, so the Iraq war in 2003 provoked a crisis for the EU. Both crises revolved around the appropriateness of using military force and reflected a broader, unresolved debate on the foreign policy of the organisation. Like SADC, the EU has struggled to agree on a unified security and foreign policy. In 1998 Philip Gordon argued that the EU had failed to achieve security and foreign policy integration for the following reasons: its members did not have sufficiently similar interests; they believed that the costs of lost sovereignty outweighed the potential gains; and they had too great a diversity of historical relationships, foreign policy traditions, strategic cultures, values, and attitudes towards the use of force.26

Further similarities are evident with respect to the origins of regional co-operation in Southern Africa and Western Europe. In both contexts the initial impetus for co-operation was intimately linked to the need to enhance security in the face of a common threat — an aggressive South Africa in the case of SADCC in the early 1980s, and an aggressive Soviet Union and historically aggressive Germany in the case of Europe after World War II. Yet the presence of an external threat is not an enduring substitute for common values. Rather, it has to be substituted by shared values if the organisation is to maintain cohesion after the demise of the common enemy. SADC appreciated this critical point in the early 1990s and defined the challenge in a fashion not unlike the EU. The SADC Declaration argued that in the post-apartheid era it was essential to find an enduring basis for political solidarity and co-operation through “the establishment of common political,

social and other values, such as democracy, respect for human rights [and] respect for the rule of law." 27 Whereas SADC failed to meet this challenge, the EU succeeded.

The EU’s difficulty in forging a collective security and foreign policy is overshadowed by the fact that European integration has been a remarkably successful security project in its own right. As Bjørn Møller puts it, the EU’s main contribution to European security lies not so much in doing something as in being something, namely an immensely attractive market and community of nations, which induces democratisation among non-member states wishing to join it. 28 In a region wracked by violence for over two centuries, moreover, institutionalised political and economic co-operation since World War II has achieved the primary aim of preventing another war among member states. In contrast to SADC, the EU has acquired the status of a security community, defined by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues as a level of integration, common identity, loyalty, trust and sense of community such that its members enjoy the assurance of dependable expectations of peaceful change (Chapter 6). 29

In the 1950s Deutsch and his collaborators conducted an extensive inquiry into the means by which war had been eliminated in certain geographic areas and historical periods through the formation of security communities. They distinguished between pluralistic security communities, comprising states that retained their sovereignty, and amalgamated security communities, where there was a merger of political units such as when independent provinces or countries became a unitary state. The amalgamated communities they studied included the US, Italy, Canada, The Netherlands and Switzerland, and the pluralistic security communities included Norway and Sweden, the US and Canada, and France and Belgium. 30 The researchers found that “compatibility of

30 Deutsch, Political Community, op cit, pp. 29-30.
major values relevant to political decision-making” was one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of these communities. Yet they did not discern a set of values that applied equally to all successful cases. The key values differed from one instance to another and depended on historical factors and the domestic politics of the participating units. In some processes of integration leading to a security community, states had tacitly depoliticised certain incompatible values.

Although Deutsch focused on security communities and not regional organisations, his findings shed light on two questions that have so far gone begging in this Chapter: Which values are most relevant to the internal logic of a regional organisation, and how is the normative threshold for success determined? In the absence of a comparative study of regional organisations, these questions cannot be answered definitively but, following Deutsch, the answers are probably as follows: the values that enable close political and security co-operation are a matter of choice by states in a given set of circumstances; states decide whether their normative commonalities and differences lie at the centre or the penumbra of their concerns; and they determine whether the threshold for co-operation, co-ordination or integration has been met. In short, the internal logic of a regional organisation is a subjective condition that requires sufficient compatibility of values that member states deem cardinal.

There is no reason to believe that the unity and cohesion of a security regime or regional organisation need be based on democratic values. The defence treaty concluded by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1999 illustrates this point. A collective defence commitment demands a high level of congruence, affinity and trust, which in this case were provided not by shared liberal norms but by an entirely different set of factors: historical solidarity during the liberation struggles; the retention by the ruling parties after independence of their ethos as liberation movements; their authoritarian tendencies in domestic politics; and their militarist approach to regional security and conflict resolution.

32 Ibid., pg. 46.
ASEAN is another example of a regime whose unity is based on values other than those of substantive democracy. The organisation is credited with having contributed to the prevention of a war between member states, a hugely significant achievement given the intense conflicts in Southeast Asia prior to ASEAN's formation in 1967 and the on-going tensions between some of its members thereafter. The maintenance of pacific relations is often attributed to the 'ASEAN way', which comprises a set of norms and principles on inter-state relations and a strong preference for addressing disputes through informal procedures. The norms and principles include dialogue, consultation, decision-making by consensus and 'agreeing to disagree'; non-interference in domestic affairs; peaceful settlement of disputes; avoidance of the threat or use of force; and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. While most of these norms can be found in international conventions and thus have a universal character, Amitav Acharya shows that they have a distinctly Asian nuance in their adoption and application by ASEAN.

The principles of solidarity and anti-imperialism are an exception to the absence of common values among SADC states. Forged during the liberation struggles against colonialism and minority rule, these principles have since been reinforced by the Western powers' global domination and prescriptive policies in Africa. Solidarity is the natural response of the weak against the powerful. It was consequently brought strongly into play during the Zimbabwe crisis (Section 4.2). Through the collective statements issued by the Summit and the Organ, even the democratic members of SADC condemned the UK, the

33 In 2008 the members of ASEAN were Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
US and Europe for pressurising Harare to respect human rights and restore the rule of law. The regional posture was captured succinctly by the Summit communiqué of 2003: in the midst of intense repression against MDC politicians, the heads of state reiterated their rejection of smart sanctions against Zimbabwean officials and “re-affirmed the indivisibility of SADC and solidarity with Zimbabwe”.

SADC attributed the conflict in Zimbabwe to two main factors: the compromises on land ownership that Britain had forced on the Zimbabwean liberation movements during the Lancaster House negotiations for independence in 1979, and the UK’s alleged failure subsequently to honour its promise to fund the redistribution of land to the black majority. Deviating from this line led to dramatic vilification. When Mbeki criticised the Zimbabwe government in 2001, he was lambasted by the state-owned media, which claimed that he had joined the ‘neo-colonialist plot’ to overthrow the ruling party (Section 4.2). In 2003 Botswana, the SADC country most openly critical of Harare, felt obliged to denounce media reports in the region that it was conspiring with the US and Britain to launch a military attack on Zimbabwe.

Although the principles of solidarity and anti-imperialism had a powerful effect in the case of Zimbabwe, they are a weak rather than a strong exception to the absence of common values. They bolster regime security at the expense of human security and regional security and they impede rather than contribute to the resolution of conflict. They are reactive and defensive rather than proactive and programmatic, they mask rather than transcend the substantive disputes between member states and they have therefore not provided an adequate normative platform for a common security regime. Invoked when foreign powers put pressure on a SADC state, the principles have no utility when SADC states are at loggerheads with each other.

---

The final question concerning the internal logic of regional organisations is whether member states are likely to develop common values over time. Is there an inexorable process towards convergence? It will be recalled that one of SADC's objectives is precisely "to evolve common political values, systems and institutions".40 In the literature on regional security in Southern Africa one finds the view that this objective is indeed being achieved. Gavin Cawthra makes the case as follows.41 Common democratic values in Europe never emerged overnight. They evolved over the past generation and were constructed through processes of interaction and political change. Accordingly, "it might be expected that the same will happen in SADC through the development of protocols, treaties and other arrangements such as the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, which sets out goals and frameworks for trade [and other issues]".42 On the security and political fronts, the relevant instruments include the Organ Protocol, SIPO and SADC's Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.43 Cawthra anticipates the objection that these texts are merely rhetorical. He observes that "it might be argued that these are relatively empty vessels, but they do provide a framework for, and are giving rise to, practices based on shared democratic values".44

The empirical weakness of Cawthra's argument is the lack of any supporting evidence. He provides no examples of SADC's legal instruments 'giving rise to practices based on shared democratic values'. There are significant counter-examples, though, the most glaring being the repression, defective elections and abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe (Section 4.2).45 Cawthra's argument is theoretically flawed because it assumes that progress towards shared values is driven at the regional level. In truth, the values in question are shaped at the national level. They reflect and are embedded in a country's

40 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit, article 5(1).
42 Ibid.
43 SADC, 2004, 'Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections', Grand Baie, Mauritius. This document can be viewed on the SADC website at www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/117.
history, constitution and political culture. This is not to say that they are immutable. National values can change over time but they can change in various directions. Some Southern African countries might become more democratic in the future but others might become less so. Normative convergence over time is thus possible but hardly inevitable.

In this Section I have compared SADC with the EU in order to highlight the importance of common values as the glue that binds the members of a regional organisation in their pursuit of national and communal interests. Comparisons are also instructive because of the African tendency to seek to reproduce European institutions. Broadly speaking, the AU was modelled on the EU; the AU Commission on the European Commission; SADC on the European Community; the SADC Mutual Defence Pact on the NATO Treaty; and the CSSDCA, which is part of the AU, on the CSCE. This tendency stems from a desire to emulate successful organisations and from the proclivity of European countries to promote and fund their models on the continent. The tendency is inappropriate given the different conditions in Africa, not least because it is too ambitious. Most of the European institutions evolved incrementally on the basis of progress achieved in earlier phases and all of them were constructed by strong states. Weak states, by contrast, inescapably establish weak multilateral bodies. The following two sections consider the ways in which the political, economic and administrative weakness of SADC states have hindered the creation of a viable security regime.46

5.4 The problem of sovereignty

Nowhere in the world do states surrender sovereign decision-making lightly. There are three additional factors that make Southern African countries especially cautious and sensitive. First, they guard their sovereignty jealously because many of them attained it 

relatively recently and at great cost through liberation wars. Second, most of them do not enjoy full sovereignty in any event: they do not have a monopoly of violence within their territories; they do not have adequate control of movement across their borders; their administrative reach in rural areas is weak; and their ability to mobilise resources and collect taxes is limited. Their national authority is further undermined by the economic and financial dimensions of globalisation and by the structural adjustment programmes and other prescriptive policies of international financial organisations and foreign donors. States that have weak de facto sovereignty are naturally resistant to regional mechanisms that would dilute it further through binding rules and decision-making that limit their discretion and heighten the possibility of interference in their domestic affairs.

Third, an absence of common values and commensurate lack of affinity and trust make it highly improbable that states will relinquish sovereignty on political and security matters. Given the substantial normative gaps between the militarist and pacific camps and between the democratic and authoritarian countries in Southern Africa, governments have not been prepared to subordinate their national decision-making to collective decision-making and rules because they cannot be certain that the decisions and rules will be consistent with their national policies and interests.

The drafters of the 1992 SADC Declaration understood that the success of integration depended on states being willing to surrender a measure of sovereignty to the regional body (Section 2.5). Anticipating the reluctance of states to do this, the Declaration claimed that empowering SADC as a collective decision-making forum was itself an exercise of sovereignty and that regional decision-making would entail not a loss of sovereignty but rather a change in the locus and context of exercising sovereignty.\(^\text{47}\) In general and especially in relation to peace and security, this argument fell on deaf ears. As noted earlier, the Zimbabwean defence ministry official involved in the drafting of the Organ Protocol maintained that the Organ’s operational modalities did not deny member states their sovereign right to act independently or stand aloof if they disagreed with

\(^\text{47}\) SADC, *Towards the Southern African Development Community*, op cit, pg. 10.
collective arrangements (Section 3.3). No member state has advanced a different position.

The SADC countries have not discussed openly the challenge that regionalism poses to sovereignty. Their collective view can nevertheless be discerned from official documents and decisions. For example, in 1996 the SADC Secretariat proposed that the Organ should be mandated to monitor the performance of member states in the fields of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The ministers responsible for preparing the Organ's terms of reference rejected this proposal but were willing to permit the Organ to monitor the ratification by states of UN, OAU and other international conventions and treaties on human rights. During the finalisation of the Organ Protocol in 2000, collective monitoring even in relation to state ratification of international treaties was deemed too intrusive and all references to human rights monitoring were excluded from the document. Instead, the Protocol merely provides that one of the Organ's objectives is to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for by the UN and the OAU. The Summit has never discussed the formation of the independent human rights commission recommended by the Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek in 1994 (Section 2.6).

By way of further example, the SADC Treaty, drawn up in an era of emerging pluralism and optimism, presents the principle of sovereignty simply as "sovereign equality of states". The Organ Protocol, prepared in a period of intra-state conflict and inter-state tension, is more elaborate and includes in the Preamble a commitment to "strict respect for sovereignty", sovereign equality, political independence and non-interference in

---

52 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit, article 4(a).
domestic affairs. The Mutual Defence Pact of 2003, concluded in the midst of the Zimbabwe crisis, contains two substantive provisions on non-interference in domestic affairs. Although the original aim in 1996 was that the Pact would address threats from outside the SADC region, the final version adds that the “State Parties undertake not to nurture, harbour or support any person or group of persons or institutions whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, territorial and economic or social security of a State Party”.

The story of the SADC Tribunal is also instructive. The Summit was in no hurry to establish this supranational mechanism, which is provided for in the 1992 Treaty. The Tribunal is intended to adjudicate upon disputes between states and ensure adherence to the provisions of the Treaty. With the potential thus to pose a significant challenge to sovereignty, it languished in the doldrums for many years. The Summit eventually approved the Protocol for the Tribunal in 2000 and the mechanism was set up in 2005. Its jurisdiction covers disputes between states, and between natural or legal persons and states, over the interpretation and application of the Treaty and the validity of acts undertaken by SADC institutions. Its rulings, according to the Protocol, are final and binding. In 2008 this bold and intrusive provision was put to the test when a group of Zimbabwean farmers petitioned the Tribunal for relief over their government’s seizure of their land. The Tribunal ruled in their favour, finding that the land seizures were unlawful, violated the SADC Treaty and should be halted immediately. President Mugabe dismissed the ruling as an “exercise in futility”. When the farmers appealed to the Zimbabwe High Court to enforce the Tribunal’s decision, the Court held that the...
Inevitably, the aversion of states to subordinating national decision-making to regional decisions and norms has stifled progress towards integration. It has also created an irresolvable tension between the SADC Treaty and state practice. The Treaty is supposed to be a legally binding document: member states must take all steps necessary to ensure the uniform application of the Treaty; they must take all necessary steps to accord the Treaty the force of national law; the protocols approved by the Summit are an integral part of the Treaty and must be ratified by the parties thereto, and the Summit may impose sanctions on a member that implements policies which undermine the organisation's principles and objectives. The integrity of the Treaty and the credibility of SADC have been sorely compromised by the failure of some states to adhere to democratic principles and by the failure of the collective forum to tackle this problem decisively.

Furthermore, the idea that states retain their right to act independently or stand aloof if they are unhappy with collective security arrangements has greatly reduced the efficacy of these arrangements and states' confidence in them. In 1995 Joao Honwana and I highlighted the disadvantages of a non-binding and informal approach to conflict management and resolution: such approach would not regulate inter-state behaviour and the settlement of disputes in an agreed and predictable fashion, it would allow states to act in divergent and contradictory ways in crisis situations and it therefore militated against certainty and cohesion at the very times these elements were most needed. These assertions were validated by SADC's divided response to the DRC rebellion in

---

63 Treaty, op cit, article 6(4).
64 Ibid, article 6(5).
65 Ibid, article 22.
66 Ibid, article 33(1)(b).
ruling had no legal effect as Parliament had not ratified the Tribunal Protocol.\textsuperscript{62} The SADC Summit made no public comment on the matter.

Inevitably, the aversion of states to subordinating national decision-making to regional decisions and norms has stifled progress towards integration. It has also created an irresolvable tension between the SADC Treaty and state practice. The Treaty is supposed to be a legally binding document: member states must take all steps necessary to ensure the uniform application of the Treaty;\textsuperscript{63} they must take all necessary steps to accord the Treaty the force of national law;\textsuperscript{64} the protocols approved by the Summit are an integral part of the Treaty and must be ratified by the parties thereto;\textsuperscript{65} and the Summit may impose sanctions on a member that implements policies which undermine the organisation’s principles and objectives.\textsuperscript{66} The integrity of the Treaty and the credibility of SADC have been sorely compromised by the failure of some states to adhere to democratic principles and by the failure of the collective forum to tackle this problem decisively.

Furthermore, the idea that states retain their right to act independently or stand aloof if they are unhappy with collective security arrangements has greatly reduced the efficacy of these arrangements and states’ confidence in them. In 1995 Joao Honwana and I highlighted the disadvantages of a non-binding and informal approach to conflict management and resolution: such approach would not regulate inter-state behaviour and the settlement of disputes in an agreed and predictable fashion, it would allow states to act in divergent and contradictory ways in crisis situations and it therefore militated against certainty and cohesion at the very times these elements were most needed.\textsuperscript{67} These assertions were validated by SADC’s divided response to the DRC rebellion in

\textsuperscript{63} Treaty, op cit, article 6(4).
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, article 6(5).
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, article 22.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, article 33(1)(b).
1998 (Section 4.4) and by the lack of clarity on the mandate with which South Africa and Botswana deployed troops in Lesotho that year (Section 4.3). In 1999 the Zimbabwean Defence Minister appeared to concede the point when he observed that the organisation’s conflict resolution efforts had been conducted “on an ad hoc basis [that] is not good for the region”.68 The Organ Protocol formalises SADC’s approach to peacemaking but unified and consistent action has remained elusive because of the absence of common values.

At the time of its inception, SADC noted that “many integration schemes [initiated by SADCC] in the past have failed because they were based on weak commitment by governments”.69 This malaise has continued to plague the organisation because of the unwillingness of member states to cede sovereignty and, as discussed below, because of their limited economic and administrative capacity.

5.5 Weak states

Southern Africa is characterised by small economies with low productivity. In 2003 the combined Gross National Income (GNI) of the fourteen SADC states was $185.2 billion, of which South Africa accounted for $125.9 billion. The average GNI per capita was $1,711 and seven countries had a GNI per capita of less than $600. By way of comparison, in 2003 the GNI per capita was $2,250 in the Middle East and North Africa, $3,260 in Latin America and the Caribbean and $22,850 in the European Monetary Union.70 As a result of the low level of development, Southern African countries are heavily dependent on donor assistance. In 2004 SADC received approximately eighty per

68 M. Mahachi, 1999, ‘Remarks by the Zimbabwe Minister for Defence, Honourable M.E. Mahachi, During the Official Opening’, presented at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee and SADC Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Mbabane, Swaziland, 26-27 October, pg. 2.
69 SADC, Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy, op cit, pg. 27.
70 All figures are in US dollars and were drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database at www.worldbank.org/data/quickreference/quickref.html on 14 November 2004.
cent of its project funding from the EU and other foreign sources, and it struggled to expend these funds.\textsuperscript{71}

SADC's core mission to promote integration assumes that the problem of small economies and underdevelopment can be addressed through the synergies generated by regional co-ordination and integration. Yet the weakness of states makes it extremely difficult for them to undertake co-ordination, let alone integration. The chronic lack of resources and expertise in the public sector undermines SADC in three ways: states that cannot effect proper co-ordination between their own departments struggle to fulfil the vastly more complicated task of co-ordination between countries; states that are unable to attend adequately to their domestic priorities devote scant attention and resources to regional projects; and the skills deficit cripples the implementation of multilateral programmes.

Southern African leaders are acutely aware of these problems. In 1992 they noted that "the most binding constraint to development of the region is inadequate professionally and technically qualified and experienced personnel to plan and manage the development process efficiently and effectively".\textsuperscript{72} In 1995 the Council of Ministers described the region's capacity constraints as follows: "shortages of skilled manpower; poor policy environment; low level of expertise; weak institutional capacity; inability for the retention of skills and expertise; [and] lack of incentives".\textsuperscript{73} In these circumstances the potential to achieve synergy through regional projects is extremely low.

The problems flowing from weak state capacity were exacerbated by the aversion to centralised structures at the regional level. Anxious to avoid the diminution of sovereignty that might arise from having a strong Secretariat, SADC decided at its inception to allocate responsibility for co-ordinating multilateral programmes to individual states (Section 2.4). This approach was largely unsuccessful. Ten years after its

\textsuperscript{71} E. Tjønneland, 2004, 'Foreign Aid and Regional Co-operation', \textit{SADC Barometer}, no. 4, January, pp. 15-16.

\textsuperscript{72} SADC, \textit{Towards the Southern African Development Community}, op cit, pg. 6.

\textsuperscript{73} SADC, 1995, "1995 Annual Consultative Conference: Communiqué", Malawi, 4 February, para 5.2.1.
formation, SADC estimated that only twenty per cent of its 470 projects met the criteria for properly integrated regional projects, the rest being essentially national projects. Following an extensive organisational review, in 2001 the Summit decided to centralise planning, co-ordination and implementation functions in the Secretariat (Section 3.6). The Secretariat’s mandate remains administrative, however, and it has no political decision-making power.

At the time of the restructuring in 2001, Jan Isaksen and Elling Tjønneland pointed out that capacity constraints would continue to be a daunting challenge:

The management of complex regional co-operation efforts requires the availability of a pool of political and technical experts. Such expertise is rare in the region. This is one reason why many sector co-ordinating units have performed so badly. The Secretariat is bound to experience difficulties in recruiting professionals. The technical capacity of most member countries to participate [in] and to implement [programmes] is also very limited.

By mid-2005, according to Garth le Pere and Elling Tjønneland, an efficient Secretariat had not yet been established. Major capacity constraints were evident and there were unresolved issues relating to staffing and management. The Secretariat was gripped by bureaucratic inertia, the performance of governance structures was less than optimal and there were difficulties in defining priorities and finalising work programmes. Staff appointments had to conform to a quota system that had the positive aim of ensuring a balanced representation of member states but had the negative outcome of impairing efficiency since it prevented the organisation from hiring the best candidates.

---

75 Ibid, pg. 21.
77 Ibid, pg. 19.
The opposition of member states to centralised structures was most intense with regard to regional security arrangements, with Zimbabwe and other countries wanting to retain the informality of the Frontline States and avoid the creation of a permanent bureaucracy (Section 3.3). In addition, government officials believed that the staff of the SADC Secretariat would disclose confidential information to the organisation's donors (Section 3.3). Consequently, the ministers responsible for drafting the Organ Protocol in 1999/2000 decided that the Organ would not have a permanent secretariat; instead, its administrative functions would rotate annually among member states along with the rotating Chair of the Organ (Section 3.5). In 2001 the Summit rejected this position in favour of the Secretariat providing administrative support to the Organ.

Since its establishment, the Organ Directorate in the Secretariat has experienced a number of problems arising from the political dynamics of the security body. Because the Organ is chaired by a head of state and because the members of SADC treat security and defence issues with a great deal of sensitivity, the Directorate staff are unsure whether they are accountable to, and should take their instructions from, the Executive Secretary or the Organ Chair and ministers. The staff are also uncertain whether their political principals want them to play a purely administrative role or take initiative on policy development, peacemaking and regional security projects. The uncertainty is heightened by the fact that the Chair of the Organ and the ministers who head the Organ's committees rotate annually. Different presidents and ministers have different expectations of the Directorate because their governments have different political orientations and different organisational and policy capacities. Adding to these complications are the deep political and strategic divisions within SADC (Chapter 3). In the absence of a strong consensus on regional security policy, and in the wake of the Organ imbroglio of the 1990s, the staff of the Directorate are reluctant to take initiative and be assertive. Indeed, this is also true of the countries that chair the Organ. As a result of all these problems, the Directorate suffers from lethargy and low morale and is unlikely to attract dynamic staff.78

---

78 These observations are based on the author's work with the Organ Directorate in a project aimed at building SADC's mediation capacity, 2007-2009.
The problem of weak and limited administrative capacity has not been of the same order as the political disputes between states but it has contributed to the lack of cohesion, consistency and co-ordination, prevented the development of sound systems and procedures and inhibited institutional capacity-building and learning.

5.6 The role of South Africa

South Africa accounted for 65 per cent of SADC’s imports in 2001, 66 per cent of SADC’s world-wide exports in 2002 and 79 per cent of SADC’s exports within the SADC region in 2002. In 2007 South Africa’s GDP of $277 billion was 66 per cent of the combined GDP of SADC countries; the next highest proportions of the combined GDP were those of Angola with 14 per cent, Tanzania with 3.9 per cent and Botswana with 2.8 per cent. The size of South Africa’s economy, coupled with its democratic dispensation and comparatively substantial military capabilities, have given rise to expectations that it will play a hegemonic role or at least an active leadership role in the region.

In the period under review, Pretoria did not play these roles and did little to drive the integration project. Although some Southern African officials and scholars accused it of dominating its neighbours and behaving like a bully, this was true mainly with respect to the sheer weight of its economy and to the conduct of South African private sector companies that were expanding into the region. In the realm of regional politics and security, the main dynamic was one of neglect rather than domination. Officials from SADC states complained that Pretoria devoted less attention to its relations in Southern Africa than elsewhere, citing as evidence the absence of South African leaders from

---

80 These figures are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, retrieved on 16 November 2008 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
82 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, op cit, pp. 235-238.
important regional meetings because they were travelling abroad. For example, in 1995 the Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, missed the annual meeting of the ISDSC in order to attend an arms exhibition in Saudi Arabia; the non-attendance was particularly striking because Modise was due to chair the ISDSC meeting. According to Mwesiga Baregu, the SADC countries "wonder whether South Africa is a SADC team player or is driven purely by self-interest".

While Pretoria developed a coherent vision of common security in Southern Africa (Section 3.4), it did not have a comprehensive strategy and plan of action. Its defence, foreign affairs and intelligence officials often arrived at regional meetings on security cooperation without a co-ordinated position, without ministerial directives and uncertain of the executive's stance on controversial issues; some of the officials complained privately of their difficulty in getting ministerial attention on regional security arrangements. Local analysts noted wryly that Deputy President Mbeki presented his vision of an African Renaissance at a greater number of non-African forums than African ones. After Mbeki became President in 1999, he championed political, security and economic institution-building at the continental level through the AU and Nepad but devoted virtually no attention to these processes in Southern Africa.

South Africa's failure to play a leadership role in the SADC region was due to a number of factors. First, under the Mandela presidency between 1994 and 1999 the ANC was confronted by the formidable challenge of becoming a government and the government was preoccupied with the daunting challenges of national reconciliation, transforming

---

84 The author attended this meeting as an advisor to the South African Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils.
86 This observation is based on the author's participation in official meetings on regional security and on communication with South African government personnel between 1994 and 2001 (Section 1.7).
87 Ibid.
state departments and addressing the socio-economic legacy of apartheid. These challenges detracted from a sustained focus on the region and posed practical obstacles to regional engagement. For example, the ability of the armed forces to participate in multinational peace operations was constrained by the political and organisational complications arising from the merger of government and guerrilla armies in 1994.

Second, during the Mbeki presidency Pretoria pursued an assertive foreign policy but, as noted above, the President largely ignored SADC as he devoted considerable energy to constructing the structures and policies of the AU. The reasons for this are a matter of speculation and probably reflect Mbeki’s personal aspirations, strategic calculations and frustration with the limitations of his fellow heads of state in SADC. To assume leadership at the continental rather than the regional level was more in keeping with his ambition and fervent commitment to an African renaissance and was bound to do more to advance South Africa’s profile and interests internationally. At the UN and in other global fora, the champion of Southern Africa would have been peripheral figure while the champion of Africa had stature, authority and influence.

Third, South Africa is strong only by African standards. Viewed objectively, it is a developing country with a relatively weak state, a small economy, substantial poverty and unemployment and limited capacity to contribute to regional development. Given the combination of objective weakness and regional strength, Pretoria might believe that in many respects it has more to gain from economic and development co-operation with industrialised countries and strong developing states like Brazil and India than from co-operation with its neighbours. The 2004 Strategic Plan of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs stated that “within the [Southern African] region the SADC remains the primary vehicle for South African policy and action to achieve regional development

in all development sectors". The unanswered question was whether the Southern African region was considered a high priority, if a priority at all.

Fourth, the government has been wary of adopting a prominent political posture in Southern Africa because of its sensitivity to regional fears of domination, which are due both to the comparative strength of the country and to its ugly history of destabilisation in the 1980s. I have argued elsewhere that this cautiousness is excessive, falsely conflating leadership with domination, becoming a substitute for strategy and resulting in inertia. Still, it is relevant that the legacy of apartheid and liberation politics has created a regional balance of power based more on history than on formal power, preventing Pretoria from playing the role of a local hegemon and enabling Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of influence. In the context of the debates around collective security arrangements, the contest between South Africa and Zimbabwe and their respective allies led to a prolonged stalemate in the 1990s and has still not been resolved.

---

CHAPTER 6: THE FICTION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AS AN EMERGING SECURITY COMMUNITY

6.1 Introduction

The concept of a security community was developed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in a seminal study published in 1957. In the International Relations literature the concept refers to a group of states whose ties are so close and whose affinity is so strong that they enjoy dependable expectations of peaceful change and thus regard the prospect of a war between them as inconceivable. A number of writers have claimed that Southern Africa is an ‘emerging’, ‘embryonic’ or ‘nascent’ security community (Section 1.6.2). In this Chapter I refute that claim on empirical and theoretical grounds.

The Chapter advances the thesis that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence in a country, is a necessary condition of a security community. Large-scale domestic violence precludes the existence of security communities for three reasons: it renders people and states insecure; it creates the risk of cross-border destabilisation and violence; and it generates uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, inhibiting mutual confidence and a sense of collective identity. I conclude that the benchmark of a security community – dependable expectations of peaceful change – should apply as much within states as between them. In order to illustrate and validate this thesis, I consider not only SADC but also ASEAN and the Great Lakes region of central Africa. Both SADC and ASEAN aspire to become security communities but they will not succeed while they are plagued by domestic instability.

The theoretical argument is an original contribution to the International Relations literature, which neglects the relationship between security communities and political

---


2 For references, see note 48 in Chapter 1.
stability and misinterprets Deutsch’s concept as applying only to an absence of war between countries. For example, Alexander Wendt describes a security community as a social structure “composed of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war”;³ Ole Waever depicts it as “a constellation where states don’t expect to use war as a means in their quarrels”;⁴ and John Mearsheimer portrays it as a group of states that renounce the use of military force and have a shared expectation of peaceful change.⁵ In like manner, Mohammed Ayoob presents the essence of a security community as follows:

The fact that regional security complexes are based on interactions of a conflictual as well as cooperative nature distinguishes them from the pluralistic security communities envisaged by Karl Deutsch. The latter are premised primarily on the existence and persistence of patterns of positive communication and interaction among a group of states that create shared identity and rule out the use of force in the settlement of disputes among them (Deutsch et al. 1957).⁶

Many other International Relations scholars similarly define the Deutschian concept of a security community exclusively in terms of an absence of inter-state war.⁷ Deutsch, in fact, also maintained that large-scale violence within countries was a fatal impediment to

---

the formation of a security community. He stated his position very briefly, however, providing no theoretical or empirical elaboration. This Chapter aims to address that gap.

The Chapter begins with a brief discussion on the concept of a security community and the claim that SADC is moving towards the formation of such a community. It then explores the reasons for viewing domestic stability as a necessary condition of security communities, focusing in turn on the security of people, the external impact of internal instability, and the volatility, uncertainty and risks that are associated with instability and militate against dependable expectations of peaceful change. The final Section presents Deutsch’s position more fully and offers some explanations for the misreading of his position.

6.2 The concept of a security community

Deutsch and his colleagues defined a security community as “a group of people which has become integrated”, where integration is understood as “the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population”. The ‘sense of community’ encompasses a “we feeling” and a dynamic process of mutual sympathy, consideration, loyalties, trust and responsiveness in decision-making. In all the cases studied by Deutsch, “compatibility of main values” in the political domain was found to be an essential ingredient in the emergence of a security community. Contemporary security communities include Western Europe; the US and Canada; and the Nordic group.

---

9 Deutsch et al, *Political Community*, op cit, pg. 5.
10 Ibid, pg. 36.
11 Ibid, pp. 46-9, 66 and 197.
The benefits of establishing lasting pacific relations among a group of countries are substantial and self-evident. From a theoretical perspective, security communities pose a significant challenge to the core tenets of the realist school in International Relations. Realism holds that the anarchic structure of the international system necessarily and inescapably gives rise to fear of military confrontation and to relentless security competition among states; states are not involved in war at all times but they can never exclude the possibility that they might be attacked and they must therefore at all times be prepared for war.\(^\text{15}\) Contrary to these assertions, states that comprise a security community regard the use of force against each other to be unthinkable and eschew preparations for fighting one another. As Deutsch put it, "there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way".\(^\text{16}\)

Largely because of the onset of the Cold War and the dominance of the realist paradigm in the field of International Relations thereafter, Deutsch’s pioneering work lay fallow for many years. In the 1990s his ideas were resuscitated, the most influential contribution being an edited volume by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, which develops the ideas, explores their application in different regional settings and offers a rich agenda for further research.\(^\text{17}\) Adler and Barnett construct an analytical framework in which mutual trust and collective identity among a group of states are the necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Peaceful change is defined as "neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes".\(^\text{18}\) Evidence of a security community “should be sought in behaviour that suggests both the renunciation of military violence and the existence of deeply entrenched habits of peaceful resolution of conflict”.\(^\text{19}\) The emergence of the community is set in motion by any number of precipitating conditions that motivate the states to

\(^{15}\) Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise’, op cit.
\(^{16}\) Deutsch et al, Political Community, op cit, pg. 5.
\(^{17}\) Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, op cit.
\(^{19}\) Ibid, pg. 35.
adopt similar orientations and engage in co-operation and policy co-ordination. Over time a positive interplay of interactions, institutions, social learning and other factors generates the requisite trust and transnational identity, which are themselves reciprocal and mutually reinforcing.

The relationship between security communities and domestic stability has been neglected in the revival of Deutsch. Although several writers see instability as an obstacle to the formation of a security community in a particular case, others ignore the issue and there is no systematic treatment of the problem at a general level. As indicated above, Adler and Barnett define dependable expectations of peaceful change in terms of inter-state disputes. In their concluding chapter they note that some of the studies in their book hinted that political instability might be a barrier to the development of security communities but they do not discuss the matter further.

The Adler and Barnett volume inspired research on security communities in various parts of the world, including Southern Africa. The writers who argue that the SADC region is a nascent, emerging or embryonic security community do so principally on the basis of the construction of SADC's collective security arrangements through the establishment of the Organ in 1996, the Summit's ratification of the Organ Protocol in 2001 and the approval by heads of state of the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003.


There are two major flaws with this argument: first, it focuses on formal structures and agreements rather than the actual state of affairs in Southern African countries, many of whose states and people are chronically insecure; and second, it ignores the fact that the agreements themselves are predicated not on expectations of peaceful change but on the possibility of violent conflict. The Organ’s peacemaking mandate covers insurgencies, civil wars, coups and “large-scale violence between sections of the population or between a state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights”. The mandate also covers inter-state conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened. These scenarios are not compatible with any convincing notion of an emerging security community.

In 1996 SADC declared its intention of concluding a mutual defence pact in order to deal with external military threats to the region (Section 3.8). When the Pact was signed in 2003, however, the organisation anticipated the possibility that the territorial integrity, political independence and security of a member state might be under threat from another SADC state. The Pact also stipulates that the signatories will not harbour or support any person or group whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, territorial, economic or social security of a signatory party (Section 3.8). Consequently, the Pact does not lend support to the notion of SADC as an emerging security community but points in the opposite direction. In the decade following SADC’s formation in 1992, its members had not built mutual trust, collective identity and common values such that they were moving towards expectations of peaceful change. If anything, their confidence in this benign scenario had fallen.


24 Ibid, article 11(2)(a)(ii).
26 Ibid, article 8.
There are two major flaws with this argument: first, it focuses on formal structures and agreements rather than the actual state of affairs in Southern African countries, many of whose states and people are chronically insecure; and second, it ignores the fact that the agreements themselves are predicated not on expectations of peaceful change but on the possibility of violent conflict. The Organ’s peacemaking mandate covers insurgencies, civil wars, coups and “large-scale violence between sections of the population or between a state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights”. The mandate also covers inter-state conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened. These scenarios are not compatible with any convincing notion of an emerging security community.

In 1996 SADC declared its intention of concluding a mutual defence pact in order to deal with external military threats to the region (Section 3.8). When the Pact was signed in 2003, however, the organisation anticipated the possibility that the territorial integrity, political independence and security of a member state might be under threat from another SADC state. The Pact also stipulates that the signatories will not harbour or support any person or group whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, territorial, economic or social security of a signatory party (Section 3.8). Consequently, the Pact does not lend support to the notion of SADC as an emerging security community but points in the opposite direction. In the decade following SADC’s formation in 1992, its members had not built mutual trust, collective identity and common values such that they were moving towards expectations of peaceful change. If anything, their confidence in this benign scenario had fallen.

24 Ibid, article 11(2)(a)(ii).
26 Ibid, article 8.
6.3 The security of people

The first reason for insisting that domestic stability is a necessary condition of a security community relates to the security of people and the question of credible terminology. If domestic stability were not a necessary condition, then it would be possible to classify as a security community a group of countries that enjoyed dependable expectations of peaceful change at the inter-state level but experienced large-scale violence at the intra-state level. The inhabitants of such countries would not be remotely secure, however, and substantial internal violence would threaten the security if not the survival of the state. It would strain credulity to claim that people and states in these circumstances are part of a 'security community'. This term is admittedly a specialist one in the International Relations literature but its definition and usage ought to be convincing in their own right.

By way of illustration, in 1998 Timothy Shaw described the Great Lakes region as an embryonic security community in light of a strategic alliance that had been forged between Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC in 1996. At that time Uganda was afflicted by fighting and terrorist activities in its northern and western provinces; Rwanda was confronted by the armed forces that had been responsible for the genocide in 1994 and were now conducting attacks on the country from bases in neighbouring DRC; Burundi was under military rule and beset by civil war; and the failed state of the DRC was shortly to be consumed by a rebellion and full-blown war in which the erstwhile allies fought each other. In August 1998 Uganda and Rwanda moved to overthrow the Congolese government and subsequently fought each other in pitched battles inside the DRC. The Great Lakes region was not an embryonic security community by any stretch of the imagination.

The need for credible terminology and analytical clarity is not met by adopting a bifurcated approach that treats a group of unstable countries with co-operative relations

as a security community at the inter-state level but not as a security community at the
intra-state level. Frederick Söderbaum applies this approach to Southern Africa: "In so far
as intergovernmental relations are concerned, Southern Africa has been transformed from
an explosive security complex towards a security community with cooperative relations,
that is, the level of regionness has increased"; on the other hand, "when moving beyond
intergovernmental relations, Southern Africa is not of course a security community".29

Beyond intergovernmental relations, according to Söderbaum, lay civil wars in Angola
and the DRC as well as "potentially explosive" situations in "Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Lesotho, Swaziland, etc [where] order is upheld mainly with power and by the armed
forces".30 To suggest that these countries were part of a security community, however
qualified, defies common sense. Elsewhere Söderbaum takes a different and preferable
position, maintaining that a security community exists where "the level of regionness
makes it inconceivable to solve conflicts by violent means, between as well as within
states" [emphasis added].31

Whatever the nature of inter-state relations within a constellation of countries, a citizenry
engulfed by internal violence cannot plausibly be said to inhabit a security community.
Deutsch’s work will be discussed more fully below but it can be noted at this stage that
an emphasis on the security of people is consistent with his academic orientation as a
sociologist. From that perspective, the members of a security community are not limited
to states but include “individuals”, “citizens”, “groups” and “populations”.32 In Deutsch’s
much-cited summary definition, a security community comprises a group of people that
has become integrated, and the subject of dependable expectations of peaceful change are
not states but rather the population of the territory covered by the community.33

This sociological orientation leads Andrew Hurrell, in an article contending that Brazil
and Argentina have forged a loosely knit security community, to conclude that other

30 Ibid, pg. 80.
at pg. 11.
33 Deutsch et al, Political Community, op cit, pg. 5.
South American and Central American countries are not part of that community or any other security community. Although civil wars and social violence in these countries have largely been contained within national borders, the levels of violence have been very high and include the killing of 165 000 people in Colombia in the 1980s. Hurrell insists that these phenomena are antithetical to the concept of a security community:

If, as Deutsch originally argued, security communities have to do with groups of people, as well as collectivities, integrated to the point that they will not fight each other, then it becomes impossible to hide behind the distinction between international wars and other forms of social conflict [original emphasis].

Hurrell does not explore the point further, adding simply that “precisely how one deals with the relationship between social and international violence [in the context of security communities] is not clear”. The solution advocated in this dissertation is to define a security community as excluding both types of violence. This has the analytical benefit of avoiding misleading terminology and the normative benefit of avoiding a state-centric model that neglects the security of people.

6.4 The impact of domestic instability on inter-state relations

The second reason for insisting that domestic stability is a necessary condition of a security community has to do with the linkages between intra- and inter-state conflict. Large-scale internal violence can lead to cross-border violence in various forms: hostilities between states; rebel attacks from neighbouring countries; military operations by governments against these forces; and collective enforcement action aimed at restoring domestic order. Even if local violence has not had any of these effects in a given case, the

---

36 Ibid.
risk that they might arise in the future cannot reasonably be excluded. Dependable expectations of peaceful international interaction are therefore unattainable.

Chapter 4 described some of the dramatic linkages between intra- and inter-state conflict in the SADC region. In 1998 the DRC was thrown into turmoil when rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda moved to overthrow President Kabila. When Kabila called on SADC for support, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia responded positively and deployed troops in the Congo (Section 4.4). The DRC’s neighbours in the north, Sudan and Chad, also came to Kabila’s defence, while Burundi lined up with Rwanda and Uganda against him. The continent’s biggest war began as an internal rebellion and soon involved as many as nine African countries.\(^{37}\) Hostilities raged until 2002, when most of the state belligerents withdrew from the Congo, and continued to simmer and flare thereafter.

The state belligerents had several reasons for initiating and prolonging their military engagement, including access to the DRC’s abundant natural resources. In addition, a primary motivation for the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi related to national security concerns arising from instability in their own countries. Each of them was subject to attacks by one of the rebel groups based in the DRC. These groups included the Interahamwe and other forces responsible for the Rwandan genocide; the Ugandan guerrilla movement known as the Allied Democratic Forces; the Angolan rebels, Unita; and the Burundi rebels, the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie. Zimbabwe’s motivation was also related to internal instability. As noted previously, a UN report on the DRC war asserted that Harare’s military involvement was due partly to its need to build domestic support for the government in light of the country’s declining standards of living and “gross mismanagement of the economy, unchecked public expenditure, corruption and one-party rule” (Section 4.4).\(^{38}\)


There are many other examples from central and southern Africa of cross-border destabilisation and violence flowing from domestic instability. In the 1980s apartheid South Africa repeatedly launched military attacks on countries that provided rear bases to the liberation army of the ANC. In the post-apartheid era Angola was involved in an attempted coup against President Chiluba of Zambia in 1997 and threatened to invade Zambia the following year on the grounds that Unita was operating from Zambian territory and receiving assistance from its officials. In 2000 Zambia accused the Angolan army of conducting operations against Unita on its territory. In 1997 Angola provided military aid to General Sassou-Nguesso in his coup against President Pascal Lissouba of Congo-Brazzaville, the latter's government having had close ties to Unita.

The DRC war illustrates how internal violence can thwart progress towards a security community by undermining trust and cohesion within a regional organisation. The war was not the original cause of the division between the militarist and pacific camps in SADC but it deepened the division and heightened the antagonism between member states (Section 4.4). The DRC war also showed the potential for collective enforcement action in response to domestic instability, although in this case the military action was taken not by the regional organisation but by a sub-set of its members. Similarly, in 1998 South Africa and Botswana deployed troops in Lesotho with the aim of restoring domestic order in the face of a mutiny and incipient coup; the intervention led to protests and anarchy in Maseru and, more broadly, confounded expectations of a peaceful regional environment after the ending of apartheid and the Cold War (Section 4.3).

In Southeast Asia, as in the SADC region, domestic instability has proven to be a major impediment to the emergence of a security community. The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 institutionalised a reconciliation process among member states and has provided


40 On Angola's military interventions as external projections of its internal conflict, see N. McQueen, 2001, 'Angola', in Furley and May, African Interventionist States, op cit, pp. 93-117.
them with a forum in which to address or ignore their disputes peacefully. The organisation’s success in this regard is attributed to a set of inter-state norms and principles referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’. As noted in Section 5.3, these norms and principles include dialogue, consultation, decision-making by consensus and ‘agreeing to disagree’; non-interference in domestic affairs; peaceful settlement of disputes; avoidance of the threat or use of force; and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. In 2003 ASEAN declared its intention of building on this approach with the explicit goal of becoming a security community by 2020.

The ‘ASEAN way’ has had contradictory effects on prospects of achieving that goal. On the one hand, it has helped to manage bilateral disputes between states and prevent their escalation into violence and regional destabilisation. On the other hand, the non-interference norm has prevented ASEAN from addressing gross human rights abuses and domestic violence that severely undermined the security of large numbers of people. The organisation was paralysed when separatist insurgencies and anarchy gripped Indonesia after the fall of President Suharto in 1998, it was ineffectual in relation to the East Timor catastrophe in 1999 and it has been stung by criticism of its soft approach to the military regime in Myanmar. These failures, the resulting damage to ASEAN’s credibility and the persistent problem of domestic instability have provoked a contentious debate around softening the non-interference doctrine in favour of ‘enhanced interaction’ or ‘flexible engagement’ when internal problems have negative external implications.

In the 1970s and 1980s ASEAN regionalism was driven by the vulnerability of states to internal political threats, especially those of communist insurgency. This led to close cooperation against cross-border movement by guerrillas, promoting solidarity and mitigating tension around territorial disputes. Yet when the internal threat was posed by popular movements and resistance to authoritarianism in the 1990s, state solidarity bolstered regime security at the expense of human security. Amitav Acharya argues further that authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia have pursued co-operation and community-building mainly at the inter-governmental level. This type of regionalism, he maintains, does not translate into the kind of societal co-operation and sense of community envisaged by Deutsch. The emergence of a regional civil society opposed to ASEAN’s position on human rights, democracy and the environment indicates the dissatisfactions with, and incompleteness of, the community-building enterprise led by elites. Even at the inter-governmental level, domestic instability and the fragility of regimes have inhibited multilateralism in certain areas, most evidently in the defence sector where no multilateral co-operation had taken place by the late 1990s.

Significantly, Indonesia’s plan of action for the creation of the ASEAN security community, tabled in February 2004, included a proposal to form a regional peacekeeping force for deployment in internal conflicts. According to the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the force was needed because “most conflicts in the world today are not between states but within states, and internal strife has a way of spilling over from the embattled country to the rest of the region”. Equally significant, the proposed peacekeeping force was the most controversial aspect of the plan. The proposal was rejected by Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand, and was shelved by ASEAN in June 2004.

The spill-over effects of internal strife can be illustrated with reference to the tension between Thailand and neighbouring Myanmar in 2002. The tension stemmed largely from the activities of two ethnic rebel armies in Myanmar, the Wa and the Shan. In May the Thai military moved heavy artillery, infantry and special force units to the border area and launched an offensive against the Wa, which it blamed for the flow of drugs into Thailand. Simultaneously, the Shan engaged in hostilities with the Wa and the Myanmar army. Thai villagers were evacuated and Burmese civilians fled across the border. Rangoon claimed that the Thai army was supporting the Shan and rebel Karen militias and had violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In protest, it closed its major border checkpoints with Thailand, denied visas to Thai officials and launched a stream of anti-Thai invective. In June fighting between Myanmar soldiers and Shan guerrillas spilled over into Thailand, forcing more villagers to flee; unidentified gunmen attacked a school bus, killing and injuring Thai students; Myanmar officials welded shut the steel gate on the Thai-Burmese Friendship Bridge; and both countries stepped up naval patrols of border waters. This is an incomplete picture of the external impact of the Myanmar conflict but it exemplifies the obstacle that instability poses to mutual trust, a sense of community and dependable expectations of peaceful change.

In terms of both human security and relations between states, domestic instability precludes the attainment of a security community in Southeast Asia. A more detailed account of these dynamics would cover the effects of Indonesia’s political volatility on its de facto leadership of ASEAN and on strategic assessments of peaceful change in the region; Malaysia’s harsh treatment of refugees fleeing violence and repression in Indonesia; and the extent to which Singapore’s military posture derives from concerns about a recurrence of the violence directed at the Chinese minority communities in Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1960s.

---

53 The information in this paragraph is drawn from the website of the Thai newspaper, The Nation, retrieved on 8 March 2005 from www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/burma.
6.5 The problem of volatility and uncertainty

The third reason for arguing that domestic stability is a necessary condition of a security community relates to the volatility and uncertainty associated with instability. As noted above, a security community entails so strong a degree of mutual trust and sense of community among a group of states that they consider the use and threat of force against each other to be unthinkable. Each of these elements requires consistency and predictability in the international behaviour of states: trust is a social phenomenon that rests on "the assessment that another actor will behave in ways that are consistent with normative expectations,"54 the requisite sense of community includes "mutually successful predictions of behaviour",55 and reliability in the conduct of states is a *sine qua non* of dependable expectations of peaceful change.

Realist scholars of International Relations maintain that the problem of uncertainty can never be overcome sufficiently to eliminate mistrust and the fear of war: states cannot divine perfectly the intention of other states and therefore cannot be completely certain that other states will refrain from attacking them.56 Established security communities refute this position. The Nordic states, the West European countries, and the US and Canada have achieved sufficient trust and sense of community to have made long-term security decisions of a pacific nature with a high level of confidence. As Sean Shore asserts with respect to the US and Canada:

> It is simply unimaginable to most observers... that the two North American countries could fight a war over any issue that is likely to arise. As 5,000 miles (and 125 years) of undefended border attest, neither side regards the other as even a potential military threat, despite the fact that interstate anarchy supposedly makes war an ever-present possibility.57

---

54 Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', op cit, pg. 46.
56 Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise', op cit, pg. 10.
57 Shore, 'No Fences Make Good Neighbors', op cit, pg. 333.
When states are unstable, however, the problem of uncertainty is acute. The domestic outcomes and regional repercussions of large-scale internal violence are not controllable or predictable. Some negative effects might be foreseeable but the volatility associated with instability can also throw up nasty surprises. For example, the conflicts between Angola and its neighbours that supported Unita were inevitable but the scope of the DRC war, the impact of that war on SADC and the hostilities between Uganda and Rwanda were unexpected. In the early 1990s Uganda had supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which seized power and ended the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In 1996 Uganda and Rwanda combined forces to help Laurent Kabila overthrow President Mobutu in the DRC and in 1998 they orchestrated a rebellion to oust President Kabila. Despite this military alliance and close political and familial relations, in 1999 and 2000 Rwanda and Uganda fought each other inside the DRC.\textsuperscript{58} By 2001 their relationship had deteriorated to the point that they appeared to be supporting each other’s armed opposition and preparing for war.\textsuperscript{59}

As illustrated by this conflict and the tension between Thailand and Myanmar, domestic instability can precipitate a sequence of retaliatory moves that are not easily contained. Moreover, instability can provoke sudden changes in political leadership, through rebellions, assassinations, coups or palace revolts, which give rise to radical shifts in political orientation. Even if the leaders of a group of unstable states are confident of a common commitment to pacific inter-state relations, they cannot be certain that this commitment will be shared by future leaders.

Although domestic instability does not always lead to cross-border violence, the risk of such violence cannot be ruled out. The nature and level of the risk may be indeterminate but it would be imprudent of states in a volatile environment to base their security and defence plans on long-term expectations of peaceful change. They are more likely to err on the side of caution. This is precisely what SADC did when it gave the Organ a mandate to address a range of violent scenarios between and within member states; the

\textsuperscript{58} International Crisis Group, ‘Scramble for the Congo’, op cit
Organ Protocol also includes the option of collective enforcement action when peaceful forms of conflict resolution have failed.\textsuperscript{60} In Southeast Asia, concerns about the spill-over effects of domestic strife motivated Indonesia to advocate the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force as part of the ASEAN security community.

In light of the preceding discussion, some tentative observations can be made about the factors that heighten the risk of domestic instability leading to cross-border violence. The observations are tentative because the sample of regions drawn on here is small and the volatility of unstable countries militates against definitive generalisations.

\textit{Scale, intensity and duration of domestic violence.} The duration, scale and intensity of internal violence are among the most significant risk factors. In the African examples cited above, with the exception of the intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho, the domestic violence that led to cross-border use of force was large-scale, widespread and sustained. There have been many incidents of low level and short-term violence in SADC countries that did not spill over national boundaries. The most prominent of these incidents in the period under review include a failed secessionist bid in Namibia in 1998/9, election disputes in Malawi in 1999, a constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001 and election disputes on the Zanzibar island of Tanzania in 2001.

\textit{Proximity.} The risk of cross-border violence emanating from domestic instability is naturally greatest among contiguous countries. Rebel movements are more likely to be based in neighbouring countries than further afield, and military operations undertaken by states are easier to mount and sustain across immediate borders than over longer distances. States that are separated from one another by other countries or a geographical buffer are generally less vulnerable to being affected by each other's instability. For example, the islands of Mauritius and Seychelles are members of SADC but have not been destabilised by conflict on the mainland.

\textsuperscript{60} Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, op cit, article 11(3)(c).
Balance of power. States are likely to weigh up the military balance of power when contemplating whether to use force against other states and whether the objective of such force is to send a warning, hold territory or overthrow a government. Weak states are obviously less likely to attack strong states than the other way round. Balance of power considerations are also relevant in regional enforcement operations. It is improbable, for example, that South Africa and Botswana would have sent troops into Zimbabwe or Angola had the latter countries experienced the conditions that prevailed in the tiny kingdom of Lesotho in 1998.

Strategic culture of states and regional organisations. The foreign policy and strategic culture of states are important factors. As discussed at length in this dissertation, in the period under review SADC was split into pacific and militarist camps with respect to regional conflict management and resolution. Other regional bodies might have a more unified posture. At one end of the spectrum, member states might generally view enforcement action as an appropriate strategy. ECOWAS, which has often resorted to peace enforcement, falls into this category. At the opposite end of the spectrum, ASEAN has studiously avoided such interventions.

Defensive versus offensive motivations. States that are subject to cross-border violence have a strong incentive to defend themselves by employing force aimed at neutralising the threat. Yet the distinction between offensive and defensive motives in external military interventions is often blurred. In the African cases considered above, most of the intervening states were driven by a mixture of national security concerns, regional aspirations and economic interests. Moreover, all the belligerents in a given case invariably profess to have a defensive motivation and independent observers may be hard pressed to make a categorical judgement on the competing claims.

Structural instability. The preceding discussion has focused on the proximate relationships between domestic instability and cross-border violence in Africa, such as

when the rebels of one country are based in another country. However, the proximate relationships and relevant causal factors can only be properly understood in the context of deep structural instability on the continent, which flows from state weakness, authoritarianism and repression, marginalisation of ethnic groups and underdevelopment and inequality. These problems are compounded by the legacy of the colonial powers’ arbitrary demarcation of national boundaries that split ethnic communities. As a result of these structural and historical factors, many African states have a propensity to large-scale internal violence. Their weakness prevents them from halting the flow of violence, weapons and armed groups into and out of their territories and contributes to the absence of a clear dividing line between domestic and regional instability.

6.6 Deutsch revisited

As noted in Section 6.1, Deutsch is widely understood by International Relations scholars to have defined security communities in terms of dependable expectations of peaceful change only at the inter-state level. I show below that this is mistaken.

It is helpful to begin by recalling Deutsch’s distinction between pluralistic and amalgamated security communities. In the former, which are the subject of contemporary scholarship, the states that comprise the community retain their sovereignty. In the latter, now largely ignored in the literature and unlikely to occur in practice, there is a merger of political units such as when independent provinces or countries become a unitary state. Deutsch considered the following to be amalgamated security communities: the US since 1877, Italy since 1859, Canada since 1867, the Netherlands since 1831 and Switzerland since 1848. The pluralistic security communities that he studied included, inter alia, Norway and Sweden since 1907, the US and Canada since the 1870s and France and Belgium from the nineteenth century.

63 Deutsch et al, Political Community, op cit, pp. 29-30.
Deutsch regarded actual and potential large-scale internal violence as an absolute impediment to the formation of amalgamated security communities. He maintained that amalgamation per se did not necessarily lead to a security community because the "subjects of a common government may feel acutely insecure and act accordingly. They may fear or expect the outbreak of large-scale violence in civil wars or wars of secession". They might even welcome such wars if they perceived existing institutions to be a threat to some of their major values or an intolerable frustration of some of their desires. Examples of political communities "which are not in fact security communities are certain types of dictatorships, and countries on the eve of civil war or revolution".

Deutsch’s general remarks about security communities, whether pluralistic or amalgamated, similarly reflect a concern with internal violence. He argued that these communities, by definition, exclude "organised preparations for war or large-scale violence among their participants" and "imply stable expectations of peace among the participating units or groups, whether or not there has been a merger of their political institutions". It followed that the attainment of a security community “can be tested operationally in terms of the absence or presence of significant organized preparations for war or large-scale violence among its members”. No security community existed where military action by one political unit against a "smaller political unit, whether a state, a people, or a territory... was considered a sufficiently practical possibility to warrant a significant allocation of resources". Nor was a security community established where a political community ended in secession or civil war. According to Deutsch, judgements about the stability of amalgamated and non-amalgamated governments would thus reveal much about the likelihood of achieving or maintaining a security community in a given area.

---

64 Deutsch, 'Security Communities', op cit, pg. 99.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid, pg. 103.
67 Ibid, pg. 98.
68 Ibid, pg. 99.
69 Deutsch et al, Political Community, op cit, pg. 32.
70 Ibid, pg. 6.
71 Deutsch, 'Security Communities', op cit, pg. 103.
Given these emphatic assertions, how might the subsequent misreading of Deutsch and the neglect of internal stability in the literature on security communities be explained? There are three possible explanations. First, it may simply be the case that the importance of political stability has gone unnoticed, or been taken for granted, because all the established security communities, such as Western Europe, Scandinavia and the US and Canada, comprise stable countries. Second, Deutsch barely mentions the problem of instability in his famous co-authored book of 1957. He is more forthcoming in his 1961 article cited above, which appears in the first edition of an International Relations reader edited by James Rosenau but does not appear in the more commonly found second edition of that reader. Third, security communities are a promising solution to what Deutsch described as the fundamental problem of international politics and organisation, namely "the creation of conditions under which stable, peaceful relations among nation states are possible and likely". Security communities are consequently a matter of scholarly interest mainly in the field of International Relations, which concentrates on the external conduct and relations of states rather than on their domestic politics.

If domestic instability characterised by large-scale violence is a necessary condition for the formation of a security community, then a number of further questions arise: Does instability obstruct the emergence of these communities even in the absence of large-scale violence? What impact does structural instability have on security communities? What is the relationship between security communities and domestic political systems? And is it possible for non-democratic states to constitute a security community? These questions are addressed in the following Chapter.

---

74 Deutsch, ‘Security Communities’, op cit, pg. 98.
7. CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

The first Section of this Chapter consolidates the thesis regarding the internal and external logic of regional organisations and the argument that SADC's attempts to create a viable security regime foundered on an absence of common values rather than an absence of common interests. It concludes by underlining the political and structural limitations of SADC, which flow from the organisation's primary feature as a forum of states and preclude it from doing things that lie beyond the will and capacity of these states.

The second Section summarises the errors in the claim that Southern Africa is a nascent, emerging or embryonic security community and casts doubt on the validity and utility of the concept of a nascent security community. It then discusses the relationship between security communities, structural instability and the character of political systems and concludes that democratic systems are a necessary feature of these communities.

7.2 Regional security arrangements

7.2.1 The internal and external logic of regional organisations

In the decade following SADC's formation in 1992, the organisation's efforts to establish collective security arrangements were constrained and undermined by the political, economic and administrative weakness of member states, by their reluctance to surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime comprising binding rules and procedures and, most importantly, by their lack of shared values. These deep-rooted and inter-linked political and structural dynamics also prevented effective peacemaking.
7. CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

The first Section of this Chapter consolidates the thesis regarding the internal and external logic of regional organisations and the argument that SADC’s attempts to create a viable security regime foundered on an absence of common values rather than an absence of common interests. It concludes by underlining the political and structural limitations of SADC, which flow from the organisation’s primary feature as a forum of states and preclude it from doing things that lie beyond the will and capacity of these states.

The second Section summarises the errors in the claim that Southern Africa is a nascent, emerging or embryonic security community and casts doubt on the validity and utility of the concept of a nascent security community. It then discusses the relationship between security communities, structural instability and the character of political systems and concludes that democratic systems are a necessary feature of these communities.

7.2 Regional security arrangements

7.2.1 The internal and external logic of regional organisations

In the decade following SADC’s formation in 1992, the organisation’s efforts to establish collective security arrangements were constrained and undermined by the political, economic and administrative weakness of member states, by their reluctance to surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime comprising binding rules and procedures and, most importantly, by their lack of shared values. These deep-rooted and inter-linked political and structural dynamics also prevented effective peacemaking.
In order to explain SADC's difficulty in setting up a viable security regime, I distinguished in Chapter 5 between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for effectiveness. This framework gives equal weight to interests and values. The external logic refers to the promotion of state interests, which is the motivation for forming the body. If the external logic is not met to the satisfaction of member states, there is no incentive for them to co-ordinate their activities, bear the costs entailed in maintaining the organisation and agree to be bound by principles, rules and procedures that restrict their sovereign decision-making.

The internal logic refers to the necessity for member states to have common values, in the absence of which a regional organisation will struggle to achieve cohesion, adopt communal policies and pursue collective strategies. According to Stephen Krasner, the constituent elements of an international regime are rules, procedures, norms and principles, which are intended to facilitate co-operation towards the attainment of some objective.\(^1\) The defining features of a regime are its principles and norms rather than its rules and procedures; the latter are but a technical expression of the former.\(^2\) It follows that states will not be able to set up a viable regime if they cannot reach agreement on its core principles and norms. Common values are the glue that binds the regime. They contribute to building trust between states, facilitate the formulation of common policies, minimise the compromises that states might have to make in order to achieve consensus and reduce the risk that some of them will deviate from the communal policies.

There is no universal set of common values applicable to regimes across time and space. The relevant values depend on the focus and purpose of the regime, the character of its member states and the circumstances pertaining to the regime. Deutsch suggested that the values that bind the members of a pluralistic security community are those that the members themselves deem cardinal (Section 5.3). This position is likely to apply equally to regional organisations and security regimes. The internal logic, in other words, is a subjective condition. It is the member states that decide which values are critical to

---

\(^1\) S.D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Krasner (ed), *International Regimes*, p. 3.

\(^2\) Ibid.
progress, whether there is sufficient normative congruence among them and whether their normative differences are impediments to co-operation, co-ordination or integration. Unsurprisingly, the Southern African experience indicates that the threshold for normative congruence is higher in a formal organisation with binding rules than in an informal coalition, it is higher in the realm of security than in less politicised areas of functional co-operation, and a regional organisation might consequently make more progress in certain areas than others.

In the case of SADC, the external logic of a common security regime was satisfied at the time at which the organisation was formed and this has not changed in the intervening years. The founding documents spelt out clearly the rationale for co-operation and co-ordination on regional security and conflict resolution in order to maintain a peaceful and stable environment conducive to integration, development and economic growth (Chapter 2). The evidence that this discourse genuinely reflected state interests, and was not simply rhetorical, lies in the effort that member states put into constructing regional security arrangements, the intensity of their disputes over the strategic orientation of the Organ and the Mutual Defence Pact and their persistence when the disputes escalated to the point that they were damaging state relations and SADC as a whole.

Whereas the external logic of a security regime was met, the internal logic was not. The absence of common values considered cardinal by SADC states was the major obstacle to progress. States regarded the division between the militarist and pacific camps as fundamental and, for many years, as largely unbridgeable. This stifled the development of the Organ and the Pact, rendered unattainable the cohesion and unity of purpose needed for effective peacemaking and generated acute mistrust and animosity between states. The absence of shared democratic values made it impossible for SADC to play a useful role in relation to the violence and insecurity induced by authoritarianism and human rights abuses in member states.

The principles of state solidarity and anti-imperialism constituted a weak exception to the general problem of an absence of common values. These principles were brought to the
fore during the Zimbabwe crisis, uniting the SADC members against Western criticism of Harare (sections 4.2 and 5.3). The principles were limited in scope, however, and strictly defensive and reactive. They were relevant when foreign powers put pressure on a SADC state but they had no utility whatsoever when SADC countries were at loggerheads with each other in relation to the Organ imbroglio, the impasse around the Mutual Defence Pact, the DRC rebellion in 1998 and the tension between Angola and Zambia in 1998-2000. In relation to policy development and institution-building, the principles of solidarity and anti-imperialism did not lay the basis for a forward-looking agenda, a programme of action or a common foreign policy; nor did they provide a foundation for regional security arrangements. Their net result was to promote regime security at the expense of human security and regional security.

One of the striking features of SADC’s travails in the sphere of security and peacemaking is the foresight of its founding documents, which recognised the limitations of historical solidarity, the significance of common values and the importance of democratic norms. The 1992 SADC Declaration put the case as follows:

Southern Africa has also been an arena of conflict and militarisation, associated with the struggle for political liberation and the fight against apartheid and racism, aggression and destabilisation. A new Southern Africa, concerned with peace and development, must find a more abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and cooperation in order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region and to free resources from military to productive development activities.

The countries of Southern Africa will, therefore, work out and adopt a framework of cooperation which provides for .... common economic, political [and] social values and systems, enhancing enterprise and competitiveness,
democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty.\textsuperscript{3}

The SADC Treaty of 1992 formalised this aspiration by making the evolution of common political values, systems and institutions one of the objectives of the organisation and by enshrining human rights, democracy and the rule of law as core principles (Section 2.4). SADC's official commitment to forging common values never wavered thereafter. The Common Agenda contained in the amended Treaty of 2001 states that SADC's policies include the promotion of "common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate, and effective".\textsuperscript{4} Similarly, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan of 2003 presents SADC's vision as follows:

The SADC vision is one of a common future, a future in a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa. This shared vision is anchored on the common values and principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist amongst the peoples of Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{5}

The argument that SADC's failure to set up an effective security regime was due to normative divisions does not imply that interests were unimportant. As noted above, Southern African states believed that a security regime would serve their interests. Given the different size, location, political dynamics, economic strength and security circumstances of these states, there were undoubtedly different interests at play, as well as competing interests. Most prominently, South Africa and Zimbabwe were engaged in a struggle for regional leadership. Nevertheless, the members of the pacific grouping were united around common values rather than common interests, this was equally true of the

\textsuperscript{3} SADC, 1992, \textit{Towards the Southern African Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of Southern African States}, Windhoek, pg. 5.
\textsuperscript{4} SADC, 2001, \textit{Amended Declaration and Treaty of SADC}, article 5A.
\textsuperscript{5} SADC, 2003, \textit{Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan}, Gaborone, section 1.2.1.
members of the militarist bloc, and the disagreements between the two groups stemmed not from different interests but from a normative dispute on the best way of pursuing the communal interest in regional security.

The divergent reactions to the DRC crisis in 1998 provide a specific example of this point (Section 4.4). The different responses of South Africa and Zimbabwe cannot be explained in terms of different interests. Both countries appear to have been motivated by a similar combination of economic interests and strategic and political concerns. This might explain their competitive relationship but it does not account for their opposing strategies. Instead, as with SADC's security disputes more broadly, their preferred strategy was shaped by core values embedded in their political and strategic culture.

7.2.2 The limitations of regional organisations

At the heart of all SADC's difficulties lies a systemic tension between regional goals and national constraints. The overarching dilemma is that regional integration is an endeavour intended to strengthen states in various ways but Southern African countries are in various ways too weak to undertake this endeavour successfully. SADC's ability to build strong states and contribute to the transformation of authoritarian states is severely limited because its capacity, orientation and mandate derive from these states. SADC cannot drive their transformation, attend to their domestic security problems or adopt a structure that ensures the promotion of democracy, as some writers recommend, because it is a forum of states that will not permit it to do this. Nor can SADC forge a genuine consensus on peacemaking and governance, as other writers advocate, since the major

---


disputes relate to the primary political features of member states and are not susceptible to compromise. Paradoxically, the challenge of common security in Southern Africa is thus more of a national than a regional challenge.

It cannot be assumed that Southern Africa will follow the trajectory of Europe, with common values gradually emerging over time and giving rise inexorably to effective political and security institutions. The communal values that are needed to generate affinity and trust derive from national policies, which can change over time in the direction of either convergence or divergence. Progress is therefore uncertain. It seems clear, though, that without greater normative convergence, the Organ is unlikely to become more effective. If, at some point in the future, the regional security project were driven with enthusiasm and a common strategic outlook by South Africa and a democratic Zimbabwe, most of the other SADC countries would follow suit. It would probably then be possible for SADC to make a meaningful contribution to security in Southern Africa.

7.3 Security communities

7.3.1 Nascent security communities

For a security community to exist, it is not sufficient that states have a formal commitment to pacific relations, that they perceive the risk of war among them as low or even that they have avoided hostilities for a lengthy period. Formal commitments can be breached and the low probability or absence of war might be due to the balance of power, limited military capabilities or other dynamics unrelated to a security community. Instead, in the International Relations literature a security community is understood to arise where states have achieved a level of integration, trust, collective identity, common values and sense of community sufficiently strong for them to have dependable expectations of peaceful change. They regard the use and threat of force against each other as unthinkable and hence avoid preparations for fighting one another.
The writers who argue that Southern Africa is a nascent, emerging or embryonic security community base this assertion on the development of SADC's security agreements and mechanisms (Section 6.2). The argument is mistaken because it ignores the content of the agreements, which anticipate the possibility of large-scale violence and thus do not reflect expectations of peaceful change. Nor does the argument take proper account of the failure of the security mechanisms to prevent and resolve violent conflict, the absence of common values among member states and the pervasive insecurity, high level of mistrust and low level of integration in the region.

The idea of a 'nascent' security community derives from the temporal model constructed by Adler and Barnett, who distinguish between 'nascent', 'ascendant' and 'mature' phases in the evolution of these communities.\(^8\) Adler and Barnett define the nascent phase as one in which states begin to co-ordinate their relations, increase their communication and interaction and set up international organisations in order to build mutual trust, enhance security and pursue other objectives.\(^9\) In the concluding chapter of their edited volume, however, Adler and Barnett note that nearly all the case studies in the book indicate significant deviations from the temporal model and they add that the classification is only intended to be a heuristic device to aid research.\(^10\)

The notion of a nascent security community lacks precision if it is divorced from the defining characteristic of security communities, namely dependable expectations of peaceful change. For example, Anne Hammerstad, drawing on the framework of Adler and Barnett, describes Southern Africa as a nascent security community because of positive security developments, including growing security communication and cooperation among the SADC states, but she also maintains that the region is not likely to become a fully fledged security community.\(^11\) In this formulation, then, SADC is a

---

9 Ibid, pp. 50-53.
11 Hammerstad, 'Domestic Threats, Regional Solutions?', op cit.
nascent security community even though the benchmark of dependable expectations of peaceful change is neither present nor foreseeable. This is an unsatisfactory formulation. The term ‘nascent security community’ surely implies that the states in question are progressing towards dependable expectations of peaceful change but do not yet discount the risk that some of them might use force against others of them. Definite movement of this kind – from uncertainty and insecurity to an absence thereof at some unknown point in the future – is very hard to ascertain and prove as a contemporary claim about a group of countries. The identification of a nascent security community is far easier and more plausible when reviewing retrospectively the historical trajectory of a well established security community.

7.3.2 Domestic instability and security communities

The International Relations literature pays no attention to the relationship between security communities and domestic instability. Yet instability, in the form of large-scale violence, appears to preclude the emergence or existence of these communities. It generates tension and suspicion between states, preventing the forging of trust and common identity. It can also lead to cross-border violence through inter-state hostilities, enforcement action by regional organisations, rebel attacks on neighbouring states and government operations against rebels based in other countries. Even if domestic instability in a given state has not had any of these effects, it rules out dependable expectations of peaceful international change because other states cannot exclude the possibility of spill-over violence and cannot be certain about the reliability of unstable regimes. In the national context, instability undermines the security of both citizens and the state. The inhabitants of a country wracked by violence cannot plausibly be said to live in a security community. Dependable expectations of peaceful change at the domestic level should therefore be considered to be a necessary condition of security communities.

This formulation is consistent with the approach adopted by Deutsch. In the International Relations literature he is portrayed as having focused exclusively on the absence of inter-
state violence but in fact he also insisted that security communities could not be attained in a context of large-scale domestic violence (Chapter 6). Moreover, Deutsch, who was a sociologist rather than an International Relations scholar, placed people and not states at the heart of his theory. According to Deutsch, a security community consists of a group of people that has become integrated and the holder of dependable expectations of peaceful change is the population of the territory covered by the community. 12

In the case of SADC, domestic instability has generated acute mistrust among member states, weakened the sense of regional community, in several instances led to cross-border violence and in all cases rendered citizens profoundly insecure. Instability in Southeast Asia has similarly impeded the development of trust and certainty required by a security community. By contrast, the Nordic, West European and US-Canadian security communities are comprised solely of stable countries. Broadening the necessary conditions of a security community to encompass political stability would therefore not alter their classification as such. It would be most relevant when considering whether groups that include unstable countries have attained or could attain that status. In all likelihood, security communities lie beyond their reach.

The argument presented here gives rise to a number of questions about the relationship between domestic stability and security communities. The first set of questions flows from Deutsch's observation that these communities exclude large-scale violence and preparations therefor. 13 Does the term 'large-scale' require a more precise specification according to the intensity, duration and scope of the violence or would such specification inevitably be arbitrary? In any event, is the emphasis on large-scale violence entirely necessary? As described briefly below, domestic instability without substantial violence has prevented the formation of a security community between the US and Mexico and between the members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). 14 What kind or level of

14 The GCC states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
instability short of violence obstructs the emergence of a security community? Conversely, what kind or level of instability can be sustained by a security community?

Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard contend that US concerns about Mexico's lack of political stability and democracy contributed to the absence of a tightly coupled security community between the two countries in the 1990s; the concerns inhibited the development of trust, institutionalised co-operation, common identity and US confidence in Mexico's capacity to make credible international commitments. In the case of the GCC, domestic instability without large-scale internal violence has likewise stifled progress towards achieving relations of trust and a sense of common identity. All the GCC countries are monarchies, they are situated in a broader, turbulent region with competing religious and nationalist pressures from more powerful states and, with the exception of Bahrain, they have Sunni majorities and substantial Shi'i minorities. The ruling elites' fear of instability has led to some internal security co-operation among the GCC members but it has also generated mutual suspicion. The elites are apprehensive that their neighbours might support their domestic opponents and undermine their regimes. Accusations of domestic interference in the 1990s were partly responsible for reversing the progress towards security co-operation that had been achieved by the GCC in the 1980s and during the Gulf crisis of 1990.

A second, related set of questions arises from the fact that the problem of violence in connection with security communities is not limited to extant manifestations of physical force. The perceptions of relevant actors about the future are also germane because a security community rests on the subjective notion of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Notwithstanding the absence of violence in a given country, its citizens and neighbouring states might believe that there is a strong possibility of domestic or cross-border violence occurring in the future. These perceptions are likely to be based on assessments of the country's structural stability. Should this phenomenon feature more

---

prominently in the equation? How might the relationship between structural instability and security communities be defined in a general fashion?

Structural instability is typically associated with weak states. Most African states are weak in the sense that they have limited economic, political and military resources and also in the sense that they have low levels of socio-political cohesion. Both aspects of weakness inhibit the emergence of security communities. The lack of social cohesion, political legitimacy, consensual decision-making, control over borders and monopoly of force combine to make states vulnerable to internal violence, external interference in their domestic affairs and destabilisation as a result of strife in neighbouring countries. As noted in Section 6.5, there is consequently no clear dividing line between domestic and regional instability. In the post-Cold War period, state weakness, military interventions by states and state system frailty have been mutually reinforcing. As Christopher Clapham expounds, in the 1990s “the OAU consensus on respect for existing boundaries and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states crumbled under the strain [of state decline and collapse], as smugglers, guerrillas and refugees moved back and forth across frontiers that were quite impossible to police”.

Structural instability and domestic violence in Africa and Southeast Asia are frequently linked to authoritarian rule, raising a third set of questions concerning the relationship between security communities and the character of domestic political systems. Although Deutsch found that “compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making” was a pre-requisite for the birth of these communities, his historical survey did not reveal which values were most conducive to their attainment; instead, the relevant values differed from one security community to another across time and space (Section 5.3). Adler and Barnett were similarly unable to reach a definitive conclusion on the basis of the case studies in their edited volume. They note that the prevailing view among

scholars is that security communities are associated with liberalism and democracy.\textsuperscript{20} However, they believe there is insufficient evidence to say that liberalism is the cognitive structure best suited to building trust between states and they caution against the presumption that security communities cannot exist in non-Western regions, such as Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{21}

If domestic stability and human security are indeed essential components of a security community, then it is hard to imagine that a security community could encompass authoritarian states. Unlike democracy, authoritarian rule does not provide citizens with the means to effect political change freely and peacefully. In most instances the state must rely on coercion to ensure compliance, there is an inherent potential for violent resistance, and rebellions can unleash massive violence, topple governments and destabilise adjacent countries. Deutsch maintained that security communities exclude "certain types of dictatorships".\textsuperscript{22} It is unclear why any type of dictatorship would make the cut. In response to the concern of Adler and Barnett regarding Southeast Asia, it is worth noting that ASEAN’s 2003 vision for its envisaged security community includes the promotion and achievement of democracy.\textsuperscript{23}

In light of the above, an analytical framework for understanding the relationship between domestic stability and security communities would entail a matrix whose variables include actual and potential violence; structural instability; the security of states and people; the linkages between intra- and inter-state conflict; subjective perceptions of these dynamics held by citizens and neighbouring states; and the nature of the constituent domestic political systems. A comprehensive general description of the relationship might thus be elusive or overly complicated because of the large number of interacting variables. A parsimonious theoretical solution would be to define a security community in terms of dependable expectations of peaceful change at both domestic and

\textsuperscript{22} Deutsch, ‘Security Communities’, op cit, pg.103.
international levels. The complexities and contingencies would then be treated as empirical and analytical problems that require investigation in each set of circumstances.

In conclusion, SADC, ASEAN and other regional organisations that include unstable countries will not succeed in their quest to become security communities if they focus exclusively on inter-state relations and adhere rigidly to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Large-scale internal violence cannot be quarantined and invariably begets regional instability. Yet regional bodies are ill-equipped to deal with this problem. They might engage in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding from time to time with varying degrees of success but their ability to strengthen weak states and transform authoritarian ones is severely limited. Weak states unavoidably establish weak organisations, authoritarian regimes set up multilateral forums that tolerate authoritarianism, and insecure governments are loath to create regional bodies with supranational authority. These constraints are compounded by the fact that regional forums are themselves destabilised when domestic instability generates tension between states. For the foreseeable future, Southern Africa will remain a community of insecurity.
REFERENCES

Official documents


ASEAN, 2003, *Declaration of ASEAN Concord II*, Bali, 7 October

ASEAN, 2004, ‘ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’

Botswana Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, untitled press release, Gaborone, 8 August


*Defence Treaty among the Republic of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Namibia and the Republic of Zimbabwe*, 1999, Luanda


SAARC, 1985, *Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation*, Dhaka


SADC, 1995, ‘SADC Summit Communiqué, Johannesburg, 28th August, 1995’


SADC, 1996, ‘Communiqué: Summit of Heads of State or Governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’, Gaborone, 28 June

SADC, 1997, ‘1997 SADC Summit Communiqué’, Blantyre, 8 September


SADC, 2000, Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure

SADC, 2000, 'SADC Heads of State and Government Support Zimbabwe', Windhoek, 7 August

SADC, 2001, Agreement Amending the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Blantyre

SADC, 2001, Amended Declaration and Treaty of SADC

SADC, 2001, 'Final Communiqué of the SADC Ministerial Task Force on Developments in Zimbabwe', Harare, 11 December


SADC, 2001, 'SADC Summit Final Communiqué', Blantyre, 14 August


SADC, 2003, Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, Gaborone

SADC, 2003, '2003 SADC Summit Final Communiqué', Dar es Salaam, 26 August

SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003, Dar es Salaam

SADC, 2004, *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation*


*The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington DC, 4 April 1949


Academic and policy publications


Ayoob, M., 1983/84, ‘Security in the Third World: The Worm about to Turn?’, *International Affairs*, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 41-51


Bischoff, P.H., 2003, 'External and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Ambiguity: South African Foreign Policy and the Projection of Pluralist Middle Power', *Politykon*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 183-201


205


Mahachi, M., 1999, ‘Remarks by the Zimbabwe Minister for Defence, Honourable M.E. Mahachi, During the Official Opening”, presented at the Extraordinary Ministerial
Meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee and SADC Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Mbabane, Swaziland, 26-27 October


Pedersen, T., 1998, *Germany, France and the Integration of Europe: A Realist Interpretation*, London: Pinter


Pugh, M. and W. Sidhu (eds), 2003, The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Boulder: Lynne Rienner


Tjønneland, E., 2004, ‘Foreign Aid and Regional Co-operation’, *SADC Barometer*, no. 4, January, pp. 15-16


**Newspaper Articles**

Adebajo, A., 2005, ‘ECOWAS and SADC: A Tale of Two Invalids?’, *City Press*, 22 May


‘Army Top Brass Slam Incursion into Lesotho’, *Star*, 1 October 1998
‘ASEAN Drops Regional Peacekeepers Plan’, *Asian Political News*, 21 June 2004


Brown, K., 2004, ‘Zimbabwe Makes It on To Alliance Agenda’, *Cape Times*, 16 December


‘Complex War, Ambitious Peace’, *Africa Confidential*, vol. 40, no. 18, 10 September 1999, pp. 1-2


‘Congo Wins Membership in Sudden Expansion of SADC’, *SouthScan*, vol. 12, no. 33, 12 September 1997


Hartnack, M., 2005, ‘Zim Opposition Rejects South Africa as Neutral Broker’, *Mail and Guardian*, 21 April


‘Key Countries and Regions Neglected in Foreign Affairs’, *SouthScan*, vol. 13, no. 20, 2 October 1998

Kindra, J., 2001, ‘We Won’t Make the Same Mistake with Zim’, *Mail and Guardian*, 2 March


‘More Questions Than Answers as Smoke Clears around Maseru’, *SouthScan*, vol. 13, no. 20, 2 October 1998, pp. 153-154


‘Old Farts’ Club Damages Us All’ (editorial), *Mail and Guardian*, 11-17 August 2000

‘On Brink of ‘Unprecedented Conflict’ Hardliners Split SADC’, *SouthScan*, vol. 13, no. 17, 21 August 1998


‘SA Seeks to Recoup Its Diplomatic Losses on Congo Intervention at Peace Summit’, *SouthScan*, vol. 13, no. 18, 4 September 1998, pp. 137-138


‘South Africa’s Odd President: Thabo Mbeki’s Odd Views Irk His Allies, *The Economist*, 18 December 2003


