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A theoretical re-assessment of the use of the distinction between everyday and academic knowledges in Basil Bernstein’s theory of educational transmissions.

By

Donald Muunze Mwiinga MWNMUU001

A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy in Education

School of Education
Faculty of the Humanities
University of Cape Town
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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: [Signed by candidate] Date: 31st August, 2012

Signature removed

For my wonderful parents:

Bruno and Agnes
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ABSTRACT

This project assesses a popular position at present in the Bernsteinian subfield of the Sociology of Education, that Basil Bernstein’s main ideas are sufficiently represented by frameworks constructed around the distinction between everyday knowledge/thought and academic knowledge/thought. A survey of some contemporary literature within the Bernsteinian subfield was undertaken to generate a question for the project, i.e., whether it is indeed the case that the everyday/academic knowledges distinction is a productive condensation of the major ideas of Bernstein’s theory. A historical study of Bernstein’s papers from 1958 to 2000 is undertaken with the view of unearthing what it is that gives the theory its impetus over time. The theoretical and methodological implications of major categories generated by the theory at various times are taken note of, with the view of relating them to the basic theoretical and methodological suppositions that are generated by scholars using the everyday/academic knowledges distinction. Hegel’s “logic of essence” as spelt out in his Science of Logic enables the analysis of a partitioning of Bernstein’s corpus into a series of four phases, showing how the problem of the theory is realised in each phase and what the logic of the theory is within and across phases. The four phases are referred to as: (1) the linguistic thesis phase, (2) the code theory phase, (3) the pedagogic discourse phase, and (4) the knowledge structures phase. A major finding of the project is that the condensation of Bernstein’s work is the use of the everyday/academic distinction does not productively render either Bernstein’s major ideas or the interesting twists in the logic of the theory, not least because the uses of the distinction can be read as deriving from a non-Bernsteinian understanding of classification. The reframing of Bernstein in terms of the everyday/academic knowledges distinction ultimately amounts to a questionable retroactive reading back of that simplistic distinction onto his corpus of work, flattening out the theory and altering its developmental trajectory so that it moves in a
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Chapter one

1.1 Preamble
In this project, the central object of my study is Basil Bernstein’s theory of educational transmission in its various formulations across a period of 42 years [1958 – 2000]. Bernstein was a professor at the Institute of Education of the University of London, where he was director of the Sociological Research Unit for a significant period of time. He is viewed by some as one of the greatest sociologists of education of the 20th century (Sadovnik, 2001, p. 687).

Bernstein’s work is collected in four volumes referred to together as Class, Codes and Control, 1-IV, and a fifth titled Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity: Theory, Research, Critique. Through these works, Bernstein constantly revised his ideas.

Diaz characterises Bernstein’s program, and I agree, “[...] as a search for a system of rules, which regulate relations between the external configurations of power (boundaries, classifications, and distributions) and the internally shaped means of recognition and realisation of such configurations as a semiotic system” (Diaz, 2001, p. 83). One of the major experiences that appears to have motivated Bernstein to engage in this program was his teaching experiences at City Day College, where he was baffled by the low level educational attainment of pupils from working-class families, a phenomenon he later demonstrated did not correlate positively with intelligence levels (Bernstein, 1971, p. 4 & 6). In this light, one could then characterise the elementary interest of Bernstein’s theoretical trajectory within the educational field as being a concern with how activities within and about the schooling system function, who gains access to educational knowledge, how, and with what consequences.
The influence of Bernstein’s work is quite wide. This can be evidenced by a look at various engagements some scholars from different parts of the world have had with the work, as well as the many scholars who have engaged with his work as a resource for thinking about the education system. A glance at the contributors to the book *Towards a Sociology of Pedagogy: the Contribution of Basil Bernstein to Research*, for example, is illustrative of his wide influence. Some of the countries represented by contributors to the book include Australia, France, Greece, Portugal, South Africa, England, Norway, Colombia, and Wales. Even if Bernstein’s work is widely appreciated and used, it has suffered intense criticism over the years. In the introduction of his last book, Bernstein writes: “in fact, since the original formulation, criticisms appear to have been more plentiful than examples of use” (Bernstein, 2000, p. xv). In spite of the many criticisms, I believe that Bernstein’s work has quite a lot to offer to reflections about both the structuring and the practice of education, and is, therefore, worth studying.

### 1.2 An introduction to the project

This project emanates from my observation that in a substantial number of contemporary Bernsteinian pieces in the research literature, especially the secondary literature, use is made of the distinction between so-called commonsensical and academic knowledge (and thinking). For brevity I’ll refer to the distinction between commonsensical and academic knowledge as it is deployed in Bernsteinian literature as the *everyday/academic distinction*. The contemporary neophyte can be forgiven for believing that the everyday/academic distinction is foundational, given its widespread use in the literature. However, when one takes up any of Bernstein’s texts, one does have to wonder whether it is indeed the case that the everyday/academic distinction is foundational to his project. The everyday/academic distinction is, of course, intimately bound up with Bernstein’s notion of *classification*, and I believe that it is not unreasonable for those Bernsteinian scholars who are
interested in schooling, curriculum and pedagogy to think classification in terms of everyday/academic distinction, especially in the present educational context, national and international.

This dissertation is partly a record of an investigation into the extent to which the everyday-academic distinction structures Bernstein’s work, but its main achievement is really the production of a reading of Bernstein’s corpus that shows that he is far more interesting than the rather simplistic condensation of his thought into the everyday/academic distinction might suggest. The literature survey that follows is a fair representation of the literature that utilises the everyday/academic distinction as a major instrument for doing research in education within the Bernsteinian framework. The majority of the literature represented below is focussed on criticisms of the South African Curriculum 2005, which drew theoretical and analytic resources extensively from Bernstein.

1.3 An initial survey of the literature
In the South African context, specifically as it pertains to the everyday/academic distinction, the place to start an interrogation of the distinction is in the work of Paul Dowling, one of the last PhD students of Basil Bernstein. The beginnings of the use of a notion of classification to mark out the distinction between the disciplinary knowledge and non-disciplinary knowledge, particularly school mathematics and everyday mathematics can be tracked in Dowling’s work from as far back as, at least, March 1992. Dowling (1992a) looks at a range of textbooks to analyse the ways in which mathematics is set in everyday and academic contexts. The interest of this project is on this elementary distinction that Dowling seeks to achieve. Dowling (1992b) continues the development of this distinction between mathematics used in everyday settings and mathematics in academic contexts. Terms like public domain and esoteric domain are used at this point, which refer to everyday and academic knowledges, respectively. Bernstein’s notion of classification is instrumental in the construction of Dowling’s theoretical framework enabling him to distinguish between academic mathematics and the use of
mathematics resources in non-mathematical settings. However, it was only in 1995 that Dowling published a more systematic paper in which the everyday/academic distinction was brought to the fore.

Dowling’s (1995) paper uses the everyday/academic distinction to comment on aspects of Curriculum 2005, influenced by recommendations of various documents, mainly the ANC Education Policy of 1994 (Dowling, 1995, p. 210) and the 1995 South African Government Gazette referred to as the White Paper on Education. Dowling’s purpose in this paper is to bust the widely held “myth”, also implied in the ANC Education Policy of 1994, that academic knowledge can be made relevant to working practices in a straightforward way (Dowling, 1995, p. 209). In order to realise his purpose, Dowling develops a theoretical framework, sociological in nature, which partly draws on Bernstein’s *vertical* and *horizontal discourse* distinction. In line with Bernstein, the paper argues that the nature of social relations, determined by the division of labour, is what generates either academic or everyday knowledges and practices (ibid. p. 209). Dowling uses the differences in the degree of *discursive saturation* (DS) to distinguish between academic and everyday practices and knowledge:

An academic discipline entails a highly complex and articulated regulation within language: a ‘discursive formation’. This regulation will comprise a combination of explicit principles and canonical texts. The utterances of such a discipline are highly generalised and relatively independent of context. Such activities are described as exhibiting high discursive saturation (DS+). Everyday activities, on the other hand, do not, generally, exhibit regulation within language in the same way or to the same degree. The principles in such activities are, in general, tacit rather than explicit, and there are no canonical texts. The utterances of such practices are highly local and context-dependent. These practices exhibit low discursive saturation (DS-) (ibid., p. 213).
Dowling’s “academic discipline” corresponds to Bernstein’s *specialised knowledge, schooled knowledge* or *vertical discourse*, while his “everyday activities” correspond to Bernstein’s *everyday knowledge or commonsense knowledge* or *horizontal discourse*. Dowling’s concepts here are quite different from Bernstein’s, as they are based on his concept of “classification”, which is different from Bernstein’s concept of classification. Dowling uses a heuristic notion of a Global Semantic Universe to get at what he intends by classification:

Any specific practice/knowledge – I use the term ‘activity’ – will constitute and will be constituted by a particular state or articulation of that Universe. The value of signs within a system will be given by the specific form of relations with other signs established by the articulation as a specific activity (ibid. p. 214).

Dowling argues that attempts to incorporate the everyday into the academic do not result in the understanding of the academic, but that it is in the acquisition of academic discourses, within their structuring disciplines, that one is then enabled to appreciate and extend everyday practices. In other words, the everyday does not help to understand the academic, but rather it is the academic that enables the enrichment of the everyday (ibid. p. 223).

Muller & Taylor (2000) first appeared as (Muller & Taylor (1995), although Dowling (2005) refers to it as (Muller & Taylor (1994), an unpublished paper. The purpose of the paper, it seems, is to investigate the nature of the relationship between academic and everyday knowledges and what implications that might have for the structuring of school curriculum. Muller & Taylor are critical of the suppositions of Curriculum 2005, based on constructivist assumptions about knowledge development. They use a distinction between *insulation* and *hybridity* to provide the general context for discussing their major
The argument here is that the position of the constructivists is a genre of radical politics that should give all progressives pause. The dual strategy recommended is, in the words of Gloria Anzaldúa, ‘one that knows the border and crosses the line’... not one that crosses the line by acting as though the border were not there (Ibid. p. 71).

For Muller & Taylor, the point is that academic and everyday knowledges qualitatively belong to different orders, and therefore the boundary between them has to be treated with care: “The question is how to cross, and that means paying detailed attention to the politics of redistribution and translation and to the means required for a successful crossing” (Muller & Taylor, 2000, p. 71). Academic knowledge has to be foregrounded in the learning process, although everyday knowledge may be appropriately and carefully used, though according to the basic principles of academic knowledge. In short, Muller & Taylor join efforts using the classification principles, expressed in terms of ‘insulation’ and ‘hybridity’, to make a case about curriculum form, in terms of relations between academic and everyday knowledges.

Using the everyday/academic distinction, Ensor (1997) offers a constructive criticism of the National Qualifications Framework (NQF). In brief, the NQF’s intention was to provide a framework for deciding the suitability of people to be enrolled for various studies, on the basis of their previous educational but
especially work experiences. The NQF was designed in such a way that it would “[…] achieve the unity of the mental and manual, the academic and vocational, an equivalence between school knowledge, work knowledge and the everyday knowledge of domestic and recreational settings” (Ensor, 1997, p. 36). This is the point against which Ensor makes her case. Ensor argues that there should not be a simplistic attempt to make equivalences among various forms of knowledge, because such would result in all sorts of knowledge distortions. Using Bernstein’s notion of classification, but especially as adapted by Dowling, Ensor makes her case against the NQF, arguing for, as the title of her article goes, the “non-equivalence” of school mathematics and everyday life.

Taylor (1999) is a paper analysing curriculum structure, principally that of Curriculum 2005. In brief, his conclusion is that:

In foregrounding the everyday at the expense of conceptual knowledge, and in expressing the latter in the most general terms at the expense of a deep study of key concepts, Curriculum 2005 seems designed to promote superficiality at the expense of systematic and grounded conceptual development (Taylor, 1999, p. [no page number]).

It is clear from the conclusion above that Taylor underscores the centrality of the everyday/academic distinction in understanding the educational system. Taylor borrows instruments for analysing Curriculum 2005 mainly from Bernstein’s two pairs of terms: “performance” and “competence” curriculum types, and the “vertical discourse” and “horizontal discourse” distinction. Taylor defines curriculum as the structure that regulates the process of education: “While school level actors, and teachers in particular, always reinterpret policy, effectively remaking it, a curriculum framework remains the chief instrument for aligning the work of the multiple sets of actors who deliver teaching and
The curriculum form is, therefore, crucial to the realisation of educational goals. The basic difference between curriculum forms lies on two fronts: the intended outcome of the learners and the means for attaining that end. For competence models, as the name suggests, the learners are helped to develop competences, which are in line with the logic inherent to the knowledges to be acquired, while the performance model seeks to realise specific education contents and texts (ibid. [no page number]). The means for the realisation of either curriculum models is largely based on the strength of classification principles, one realisation being the level of accommodation of everyday knowledge into the context of education. In short, Taylor’s analysis, through his utilisation of Bernstein’s resources, specifically the vertical and horizontal distinction, suggests a way of thinking about educational issues affecting the, then, present debates, specifically around Curriculum 2005.

Taylor & Vinjevold (1999) synthesise the findings of an extensive group of research works comprising the President’s Education Initiative projects (PEI) and a number of “evaluation studies” that were aimed at evaluating the success of the implementation of Curriculum 2005, particularly in poorly resourced schools. Although Bernstein’s terms of “everyday” and, particularly, “academic” remain largely silent in this synthesis, it is evident that the encounter between everyday and academic knowledge is pivotal to Taylor & Vinjevold’s reading of the studies. The theoretical context that provides the framework for discussing the varied works are ‘teacher-centred’, on the one hand, and ‘learner-centred’, on the other. The primacy of the everyday/academic distinction is evident in a number of utterances spread across the paper. For example, one of the major conclusions of the paper is that: “The most unequivocal finding about teachers is that a poor grasp on the part of teachers of the fundamental concepts in the knowledge areas they are responsible for is a major problem in disadvantaged classrooms” (ibid. [no page number]).
number]). In their attempt to mediate academic knowledge, some teachers were using everyday knowledge, for example: “Setati found that real world examples were frequently used by teachers in an attempt to mediate between informal discourse and the formal mathematical register. But in the overwhelming majority of cases they did not serve as an entry into higher level conceptual thinking” ([no page number]). Taylor and Vinjevold express pessimism about whatever strategies might be used, other than a direct engagement with academic knowledge: The “learning profile remains largely constant whatever classroom strategies are employed, be they group work, whole class teaching, or real life simulations. In essence, learning seldom goes beyond a superficial engagement with either the technologies or substance of conceptual knowledge” ([no page number]). The major learning type that is criticised by the paper is ‘rote learning’, which is described and evaluated as follows:

Rote learning is learning which fails to engage with the conceptual knowledge underlying the topic. At best it is characterised by the blind following of procedures without understanding why and how these work. Curiosity and an enquiring mind are the enemies of rote learning, but our research indicates that these attitudes are themselves only developed with increasing teacher self-confidence and the growth of knowledge skills ([no page number]).

In brief, the paper is arguing for the need to use academic knowledge in order to realise positive results in education, and to desist from the use of strategies that employ everyday knowledge with the hope of realising educational ends.

In his persuasive and wide-ranging paper, Muller (2001) engages with the different manifestations of postmodern sceptics who endeavour to undermine attempts at making sure and universal claims that transcend what, for example, Bourdieu & Passeron (1990) refer to as simply a play of interest and power
Muller draws much of his theoretical resources from Durkheim and, especially, Bernstein, contained under distinctions between the profane and the sacred, and horizontal and vertical discourses, respectively. He argues for the existence of two forms of knowledge which are discontinuous with each other. Between the two knowledge forms, there is a boundary with no breaks and cannot be penetrated by making horizontal and vertical discourses continuous. Muller opposes constructivist attempts to collapse the so called “Great Divide” between the two knowledge types which he characterised as: “[...] strongly insulated from each other, non-translatable and non-comparable” (ibid. p. 140). The particular area of interest for Muller’s purpose here is to challenge views of the ‘New Literacy Studies’ (NLS) on literacy:

A core precept of NLS, shared with much of contemporary ethnology, is that the Great Divide between oral and literate cultures, and between related binaries like concrete and abstract thought, is a self-serving one that should be collapsed forthwith. Formal reading and writing, or print literacy, should be seen as only one literacy amongst others; hence, literacies (ibid. p. 141).

Even after giving an example that seems to challenge claims that suggest that literacy is necessary, hence formal education, for the attainment of vertical discourse, Muller still underscores the distinction between horizontal and vertical discourse and their different levels social role significance as symbol systems (Muller, 2001, p. 146). The ultimate response that Muller gives to the challenge posed by the NLS “is to understand the role of vertical discourse in social change and the ways in which access to it is or is not, can or cannot be, advanced by education” (ibid.). In brief, in this paper, Muller’s argument pivots on the distinction between academic and everyday knowledges, and the need to foreground academic knowledge in the schooling context.
Moore & Muller (1999) present a strong critique of what they refer to as ‘voice discourse’ and its various manifestations, because of its misleading suggestions. They attempt to capture the basic arguments of voice discourse and analyse their implications, dismantling their claims. In essence, voice discourse could be characterised as perspectives that reduce “knowledge and truth claims as being relative to a culture, form of life or standpoint and, therefore, ultimately representing a particular perspective and social interest rather than independent, universalistic criteria” (Moore & Muller, 1999, p. 190). I suppose that the contradiction in voice discourse is best captured by Socrates’ famous maxim that ‘all we know is that we know nothing,’ to which one could ask, ‘how do you know that we know nothing?’ If it is indeed the case that all we know is that we know nothing on the grounds that we have no way of knowing that we know, it follows that we cannot know that we know nothing, making such a claim self-contradictory. Moore & Muller argue that although reason is socially constructed, it, nevertheless, produces knowledges that come about via procedures and criteria that are comparable and therefore deserving different value: “Although it is true that we do not know or agree about exactly how it is that some explanations are better than others or how we know this, the one thing we know beyond serious doubt is that all explanations are not equal” (ibid. p. 198). Accordingly, Moore & Muller utilise Bernstein to distinguish between knowledge forms and among knowledge structures, thereby providing a way of thinking and talking about education; classifying and assessing ways of talking about education, and ultimately prescriptions on how to organise education. Bernstein’s vertical and horizontal discourses are used to provide a structure for engaging with voice discourse. The interesting thing from the discussion is that, within this Bernsteinian framework, the everyday/academic distinction, under the names of vertical and horizontal discourse, is at the fore of their analysis.
Gamble’s (2004) work offers some helpful insights, particularly to those with the responsibility of reforming vocational education and training in South Africa, specifically in the field of craft. Gamble believes that vocational education and training reforms would have to have to take seriously the epistemological issues that are at play in the context of knowledge transmission and acquisition. Gamble refers to some theoretical resources available that could inform the discussion and try to build on them in order to come up with a language of description that would bring out finer distinctions of knowledge forms. She uses theoretical resources from Bernstein and Dowling, among others, upon whose resources she builds her own. From Bernstein’s vertical and horizontal discourses distinction and others from other scholars, Gamble develops a set of fractal couples emanating from the major distinction of general and particular knowledge forms. Through her conceptual framework, Gamble was able to reach, at least so she thinks, finer levels of analysis that would even expose some limitations contained in works by the likes of Bernstein:

What I hope I have succeeded in doing, through the explicit elaboration of this conceptual framework, is to show why Bernstein is able to position craft within vertical discourse and how it is that principled knowledge which, by virtue of its operating at the level of ‘type’, always constitutes the abstract, can manifest as ‘particular’ knowledge in the case of craft (Gamble, 2004, p. 198).

In short, on the one hand, Gamble provides the diverse contexts within which craft could be understood. On the other, she develops a framework that attempts to clearly distinguish the circumstances/conditions under which discourses could be deemed vertical and when horizontal, their subsequent knowledge structures and the appropriate form of transmission. In essence, Gamble develops a Bernsteinian language of description that attempts to provide means for distinguishing
between vertical and horizontal discourses of craft, specifically those that are not so easy to decide where they belong.

Muller (2006a) challenges attempts by Curriculum 2005 to subvert “differentiation” and “progression” in curricular subjects, especially in subjects that are content-rich. Muller is interested in investigating and assessing the underlying concerns of Curriculum 2005, in opposition to those of the model of the apartheid curriculum. The apartheid curriculum was modelled upon differentiation, with rigid progression, sequencing and pacing criteria for all subjects, while Curriculum 2005 was opposed to differentiation, placing emphasis on skills and activity (Muller 2006a, p. 69). By exploring the epistemological roots of both curricula, Muller argues that Curriculum 2005’s suppression of differentiation is a mistake, since curricular subjects have structural differences, with different “[...] content stipulatory requirements, [...] content/concept linkage requirements, [...] pacing stipulatory requirements, and [...] progression requirements” (ibid. p. 83). In this paper, Muller uses Bernstein’s distinction between vertical and horizontal discourses and the characteristic knowledge structures to provide a theoretical resource for arguing for the differences in structure, extension and progression among curricular subjects. This theoretical resource underlies Muller’s proposed principles guiding the formation of curriculum, and its implementation.

Young & Muller (2007) search for a sufficient foundation for the sociology of knowledge in educational studies (p. 196). They consider various attempts at providing this foundation, affirming the contributions and also building on the limitations of these various attempts. Young & Muller first challenge the assumptions of the pragmatist view of the 1970s by drawing on the comparable criticism of Durkheim
on pragmatism. The basic thesis of the constructivist position is that “[...] all knowledge is in some sense a product of human activities [...]” (ibid., p. 177). From this, they [constructivists] conclude that all forms of givenness express the interests of some groups against others (ibid., p. 178). Durkheim affirms the premise of the constructivist view, but not its conclusion: “[...] Sociality of knowledge does not undermine its objectivity and the possibility of truth, but is the condition for it” (ibid., p. 196). In other words, even if knowledge grows out of people’s experiences, insights and shared wisdom, it does not follow that anything goes, but that there remains a component to knowledge that points to its internal logic. Knowledge has a component of discovery, not simply production. Durkheim also provides some insight into the social differentiation of knowledge under the sacred/profane distinction. Young & Muller then use Bernstein’s theory, particularly his typology of vertical and horizontal knowledges to build on Durkheim’s ideas on the differentiation of knowledge. The limitation of Bernstein’s theory, according to Young & Muller, is, mainly, its inability to account for knowledge progression in sociology (ibid., p. 196). Because of this lack in Bernstein’s theory, Young & Muller turn to Ernest Cassirer. We shall not here go into the details of Cassirer’s account. In brief, “[...] [Cassirer] explains the differential prospects of knowledge growth in sociology in terms of the expressiveness of its object domain” (ibid. p. 197). In short, through a series of steps (four), Young & Muller work “[...] to find an adequate basis for the sociology of knowledge in educational studies (and more generally)” (Ibid., p. 196).

Moore (2007) explores epistemological issues of aesthetic theory within the bounds of sociology. He seems to be engaged in a systematic dismantling of ‘dogmatic scepticism’, which affirms that there is only either absolutism or relativism. He goes on to argue against absolutism, particularly as expressed by John Carey, in his book, What Good are the Arts? Moore uses Bernstein’s language of description: vertical and horizontal discourse, and hierarchical and horizontal knowledge structures, to challenge the...
basic claims of dogmatic scepticism. Bernstein’s language of description, on one hand, dismisses suggestions of the absolutist position on judgements, and on the other, rejects the claims of relativism that say that judgements are nothing more than preferences, by affirming shared rules of evaluation, developing in time. Moore also uses theoretical tools from Randall Collins and others to accomplish his purposes. In short, the intention of Moore in this paper, using especially Bernstein’s theoretical tools of vertical and horizontal discourses and knowledge structures, is to offer an alternative position to some theories of knowledge, particularly against the absolutist and relativist positions. His view is that knowledge is a product of “a particular form of structured inter-subjectivity associated with a distinctive form of activity that occurs within a distinctive type of supra-individual social arena that is extended in time and space: a canon” (Moore, 2007, p. 32).

Breier’s (2004) work investigates the opportunities as well as challenges “[…] associated with the recruitment and recognition of prior informal experience in the pedagogy of adults in a formal educational context” (Breier, 2004, p. 204). Her work considers the teaching of law and labour law (Ibid). Breier uses Bernstein’s concepts of vertical and horizontal discourses, which she complements with other theoretical instruments from Dowling and Bourdieu, to construct a theoretical framework for achieving her purpose. She argues that Bernstein’s concepts on their own are vague, for they provide no “clear indicators of what counts as ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ in empirical data on real-life interaction between knowledge acquired informally and formally” (Ibid., p. 208). Utilising theoretical tools from the mentioned authors, Breier developed a language of description that enabled her to concretise the problem associated with relating the horizontal and vertical discourses in the formal educational context of labour law, at the same time enabled to make recommendations on how the lecturer/student relationship could deal with the interplay between formal and informal knowledge. She argues that the
relationship between formal and informal knowledge is complex, and therefore needs to be carefully managed, as this recommendation attests: “Ideally, lecturers should have used the everyday as means to scaffold acquisition of the relevant gaze. In this way, they could have helped students to recognise the border between informal and formal and how to cross the line” (Ibid., p. 215). In short, Breier uses Bernstein’s theoretical tools of vertical and horizontal discourses to develop her own and argue, contrary to common understanding, that there was no simple equivalence between the experiences of the law for the people in the work place, and law as a codified system in the university. One could argue that Breier’s distinction is not exactly the everyday/academic distinction, but some sort of workplace trade union bargaining vs. the law. That kind of practice is not what one encounters in everyday life.

Hoadley (2007) is a research project on how social class inequalities are reproduced through the schooling system by the differential distribution of social symbols of meaning and school knowledge. Hoadley utilises Bernstein’s classification and framing distinction, as well as Dowling’s domains (public and esoteric) and strategies (specializing and localizing) to develop “a mode for the analysis of pedagogic variation and the types of knowledge meanings [...] exchanged in different social-class schooling contexts” (Hoadley, 2007, p. 703). Hoadley’s work is based on data derived from four schools, situated in different social-class neighbourhoods, two in a middle-class context and the other two in a working-class context. She discovers that in a middle-class school, mathematical knowledge and everyday knowledge are strongly classified, while in a working-class school, they are weakly classified. By weakly classifying the mathematical and everyday knowledges in the learning context in working-class schools, instead of clarifying issues and helping the process of acquisition of mathematical knowledge, the result was actually the blurring and obstruction of the learning process. As a conclusion, therefore,
Hoadley advocates for a strong classification between the two knowledge forms in the learning context at school as a guarantee for positive pedagogic results.

All the scholars discussed above seem to be making their case in terms of the relations between the everyday and the academic. Most of these scholars outline the differences, whether epistemological or/sociological, of the everyday/academic distinction, and thereby caution moves that advocate the incorporation of the everyday into the curriculum and pedagogic practice. Davis (2001), however, proposes a different outlook to the ‘problem’ of the incorporation of the everyday into curricula and academic texts: “Might it not be more productive to approach the curriculum [2005] as one exhibiting a utilitarian bias so that references to the everyday can then be seen as functioning in the interests of utilitarian moral regulation?” (Davis, 2001, p. 15). Davis comes to this proposition on the basis of an understanding of education proposed by Freud, the basic point being that the goal of education is “’[...]' the conquest of the pleasure principle, and [...] its replacement by the reality principle,’ so that pleasure is indissolubly part of mental functioning” (ibid., p. 15). Using propositions from Bentham’s utilitarianism, Davis argues, in line with Freud’s basic thesis of education, that Curriculum 2005, contrary to criticisms by the review committee, actually does not embody contradictory pedagogic principles but that: “The simultaneous occurrence of both progressive and explicit statements announcing the use-value of pedagogic action are completely compatible, provided we recognise that the new curriculum is utilitarian” (ibid., p. 11). Even as Davis proposes a different approach to the question of the commensurability of academic and everyday knowledge, he makes his case by exploring how the everyday and academic knowledges relate to each other within a specific way of understanding education:
Putting all of this together, we must raise a few questions about those conclusions – drawn from the demonstration that everyday and academic knowledges are incommensurable – that dismiss curricula and academic texts incorporating the everyday as epistemologically self-contradictory and therefore doomed to fail (ibid., p. 15).

Maybe one fair conclusion of the literature survey is that in talking about curriculum, pedagogy and policy, one finds in the contemporary literature within the Bernsteinian universe that the everyday/academic distinction is in attendance. As a result, the puzzle that prompts this project is the question: to what extent does the everyday/academic distinction structure Bernstein’s work? Of course, the substantial notion of concern here is that of Bernsteinian classification, but the contemporary field cannot wish away its insistent rendering of classification in terms of the everyday/academic distinction, as the review of the literature demonstrated.

1.4 Statement of the problem
What is the function of the theoretical distinction between the categories of academic and everyday knowledges in the construction of Basil Bernstein’s theory of educational transmission?

1.5 Purpose of the study
The purpose of this project is to investigate the place of the everyday/academic distinction in Bernstein’s general theory of educational transmissions. If the everyday/academic distinction is not the primary feature of Bernstein’s theory, as this project hopes to show, then this work could open up a different, hopefully more accurate and fruitful, approach to educational research in the Bernsteinian framework.
1.6 Elementary considerations
Bernstein’s theory is complex, as its form tends to change at different points of its articulation. The development of the theory over time constitutes a substantial amount of this project’s investigation. It should suffice at this point of the project to simply say that Bernstein’s categories seem to develop towards the generation of extensional categories, where membership to a category is less and less based on an *a priori* rule, until a point when the categories generated suddenly imply strong membership rule. This sudden change in the theory seems to be unfaithful to the general inclination of the development of the theory. As such, a substantial part of this project is to seek to propose a reconstruction of Bernstein’s theory. The resources utilised for studying Bernstein’s work would have to facilitate for the recognition of the changes, substantial as well as otherwise.

It has been noticed from the literature survey that some of the scholars prefer using Dowling’s notion of classification, over and above Bernstein’s own. On the point of classification, it is worth mentioning that this project is of the view that one of the most productive concepts in the work of Bernstein has been the notion of “classification”, particularly in the structuring of modalities of pedagogic discourse. One of the ways in which this concept has been used, especially in the more contemporary work, has been to support the marking out of the distinction between disciplinary knowledge and non-disciplinary knowledge and, more specifically, to mark out academic knowledge from everyday knowledge. One of the major adaptations of the use of classification sits in the work of Paul Dowling (1998; 2009). Dowling’s work has been instrumental in informing and modelling the marking out of the academic and everyday knowledges, using his concept of classification. Since the notion of classification in Bernstein, as well as in Dowling, is pivotal to the understanding of the categories of everyday and academic knowledges, they will be briefly discussed below.
1.6.1 "Classification" according to Bernstein

In Bernstein, *classification*, sits within a multifaceted relationship with a range of other terms, operating at various levels of analysis. Each level is represented by a conceptual couple whereby the concepts always imply each other. Three levels of analysis are distinguishable: macro, meso and micro. At the macro level, the conceptual couple that Bernstein uses is *power* and *control*, at the meso level, *classification* and *framing*, while at the micro level, the *recognition rule* and *realisation rule* couple is used. These various levels of analysis correlate with one another in a specific way. Power correlates with classification and recognition rules, while control correlates with framing and realisation rules.

Power relations, in this perspective, create boundaries, legitimate boundaries, reproduce boundaries, between different categories of groups, gender, class, race, different categories of discourse, different categories of agents (Bernstein, 2000, 5).

In this outlook, power works on the associations between categories and thus creates valid relations of order (Ibid). Bernstein’s early work considered relations of categories in terms of communication codes. He later worked with relations of categories in terms of official and non-official knowledges. How these categories are produced, distributed and reproduced, in Bernstein’s view, is basically regulated by power relations. In Bernstein, power and class relations are reproduced at different levels, as mentioned above, and Bernstein uses different tools to explain how they are reproduced at these different levels. On the other hand, “Control [...] establishes legitimate forms of communication appropriate to the different categories” (Ibid). Through the forms that interactions take within each category, the power relations are reproduced, although, in Bernstein’s view, here too lies the possibility for the change of power relations (Ibid).

Classification and framing are, respectively, renditions of power relations and control relations (Ibid). Classification “refer[s] to the relations between categories, these relations being given by their degree of
insulation from each other” (Bernstein, 2000, p. 99). Strong classification generates categories with specialised characteristics and weak classification creates categories that are less specialised (Ibid). Bernstein also talks about classification in terms of relations within a category, “internal classification”, for example “relations between objects, between tasks and between persons within a classroom” (Ibid). Framing refers to, within the school context, “the locus of control over selection, sequencing, pacing and criteria of the knowledge to be acquired” (Ibid). When framing is strong, the teacher has control over these notions, whereas when framing is weak, control seems to be with the student (Ibid). Framing also has internal and external forms:

We can, as with classification, distinguish between the internal strength of framing ($F_i$), that is framing within a given pedagogic context, and the external strength of the framing ($F_e$), that is, the strength of the framing between the pedagogic context and a context external to it; for example, between communication in the school and communication in the local communities to which the students belong (Ibid, p. 99–100, emphasis in original).

As can be seen, in Bernstein, classification and framing are, as it were, as with power and control, two sides of the same coin:

In short, the principle of the classification regulates what discourse is to be transmitted and its relation to other discourses in a given set (e.g. a curriculum). The principle of the framing regulates how the discourse is to be transmitted and acquired in the pedagogic context (Ibid., p. 100, emphasis in original).

Recognition rules and realisation rules operate at the level of an acquirer, in the context of acquisition within a specific framing. Recognition rules, precisely, express what one is able to recognise as relevant within a specific context of acquisition. It is the classification principle that translates into the
recognition rule: “the classificatory principle provides the key to the distinguishing feature of the context, and so orientates the speaker to what is expected, what is legitimate to that” (Ibid., p. 17). In this way, recognition rules flow from power relations and the classificatory principle. Realisation rule, on the other hand, enables the expression of appropriate communication, on the basis of the recognition rule: “the realisation rule determines how we put meanings together and how we make them public” (Ibid). With regards the realisation rule, it is the framing principle that regulates the appropriate expression, as implied by the form of control.

This simple background places Bernstein’s notion of classification within its complex theoretical context and serves to describe how Bernstein understands classification. This background helps one to understand Dowling’s contribution, together with some other contemporary scholars working within a Bernsteinian framework.

1.6.2 “Classification” according to Dowling

Dowling’s definition of classification is better understood in terms of the three qualifications he makes to Bernstein’s definition. The first qualification is that Dowling does not use the idea of boundary in his notion of classification, but understands it in terms of an articulation of a Global Semantic Universe (Dowling, 1998, p. 117). Umberto Eco’s work is critical to this aspect of Dowling’s work. Dowling’s point here is that Bernstein’s concept of boundary does not adequately express the nature of the relationships among various elements among categories.

An element in one system can be considered to be metonymically, or connotatively, linked with elements in other systems. Where the availability of such connotative links between the elements of two ideologies is high, we can describe the strength of classification between them as low. Where the availability of connotative links is low, or, alternatively, where such
connotations are predominantly ones of ‘otherness’, the strength of classification is high (Ibid., p. 117).

The second qualification is that “the strength of classification of mathematics is not a fixed quality of mathematics, but varies, depending upon the particular mathematical content under consideration, or upon the manner in which it might be expressed” (Ibid., p. 118). The third qualification is that “the subjectivities constructed by ideologies are [...] implicitly rather than explicitly defined in terms of [...] major dimensions of social structure [for example, age, gender, ‘ability’, ethnicity, etc.]” (Ibid., p. 119). In my view, these qualifications show that Dowling has a strong membership rule, which he believes is not well developed in Bernstein.

How then can one construct Dowling’s case against Bernstein? The initial point of dissatisfaction for Dowling is the distinction among Bernstein’s “levels of analysis”: “The source of the confusion in Bernstein, for me, resides in the fact that, [...] power and control and so classification and framing operate at different levels of analysis” (Dowling, 2009, p. 78). Dowling argues that such description, which puts boundaries among categories, falsely gives an impression that there are simple interactions among categories. Dowling asserts that “a boundary is of necessity a moment in the precise region of a system in which it is constituted as a boundary. Classroom walls, then, create punctuations of space not curricular subjects” (Ibid., 79). In this outlook, it is then difficult to see how one can legitimately move from one region of a system to another. Dowling goes on to argue that “strongly classified curriculum is achieved by strategies that – at any given level of analysis – specialise the various contents. Specialising always takes place within; the between is always established in terms of intertextuality” (Ibid., emphasis in original).
With regards to the notion of framing, Dowling argues that it always coincides with *classification*, as long as framing and classification are referring to the same thing:

Where that which is classified is the privileged content (that which is to be transmitted) in a pedagogic situation, then the strength of framing of interactions must coincide with the strength of classification. Only where that which is classified is decoupled from this privileged content can classification and framing vary independently (Ibid., p. 80).

Dowling traces Bernstein’s inability to see the necessary coincidence between classification and framing to have been necessitated by the “decoupling of space and time”. Dowling recognizes this “decoupling” in structuralisms of people like Saussure, Marx, Freud and Lévi-Strauss and he goes on to show how these structuralisms have been successively challenged (Ibid). In Dowling’s view, “Essentially, a space-time decoupling can be sustained only to the extent that we ignore a shuffling between levels of analysis and that we keep our distance from the empirical” (Ibid., p. 80 – 81). From this background, Dowling then drops Bernstein’s concepts of power, control and framing, and only retains classification, which, as shown above, is given a different meaning via the three qualifications discussed.

One sees an evolution in Dowling’s theory, from a greater reliance on Bernstein’s theoretical language and framework to a more original theoretical framework and even terminology. Dowling’s use of the term classification, initially borrowed from Bernstein although qualified in meaning for his purposes, as shown above, seems to be his major theoretical instrument (Dowling, 1998, ps. 116 – 119). The term classification in the work of Dowling is later replaced by “institutionalisation”, which is apparently further away from Bernstein’s term of classification. “In my own language I use the term institutionalisation to refer to the extent to which a practice exhibits an empirical regularity that marks it out as recognisably distinct from other practices (or from a specific other practice)” (Ibid). As with the
term classification, Dowling’s concept of institutionalisation operates on its own, unlike with Bernstein, where the term framing is always implied by and implies classification.

As has been indicated in the earlier survey of the literature, many of the papers drawing on the everyday/academic distinction tend to use a version of classification that is much closer to Dowling’s notion as developed in Dowling (1998).

1.7 Organization of the study
Chapter One sets out to construct the problem of the project. It introduces quite an extensive literature survey work which uses the everyday/academic distinction as a major feature for thinking about educational issues within the Bernsteinian framework. The authors that have been looked at to develop the problem of this project are: Dowling (1992a; 1992b; 1995), Muller, & Taylor (2000), Ensor (1997), Moore & Muller (1999), Taylor (1999) Muller (2001; 2006a), Taylor & Vinjevold (1999) Young & Muller (2007), Gamble (2004), Breier (2004), Moore (2007), Hoadley (2007) and Davis (2001).

Chapter Two introduces some of the tools proposed by some authors for beginning to think through Bernstein’s work. This is by way of segmenting Bernstein’s work into phases. Chapter Two does two things: firstly, it shows how various authors have segmented Bernstein’s work into phases. Four phases are proposed: “Language thesis”, “Code theory”, “Pedagogic discourse”, and “Knowledge structures”. The second task of Chapter Two is to investigate the reasons proposed by these various authors for the segmentation of Bernstein’s work. This second task takes note of the (supposed) resources upon which Bernstein was drawing to provide ultimate claims of the various phases of his theory. My own establishment of segments of Bernstein’s work will not be done at this point, for it is one of the outcomes of my analysis. The point here is to introduce some tools for beginning to think through Bernstein’s work.
Some of the authors whose work is considered for the purposes of chapter two include: Atkinson (1985), Adlam (1977), Sadovnik (1995) and (2001), Halliday (1995), Davies (1995) and (2007), Solomon, J. (1999), Diaz (2001), Moore & Muller (2002), Maton & Muller (2007), Hoadley & Muller (2009). These authors have been chosen because they explicitly discuss the segmentation of Bernstein’s work.

Chapter Three generates theoretical resources used to establish what constitutes a phase. Each phase has to have some kind of unity; some distinguishing feature(s) differentiating it from the other phases. Each phase also needs to register some kind of break with the phases that come before it or after or both. In chapter three, I search for specific theoretical resources that would enable me to distinguish among the various phases. The theoretical resources in this chapter will need to draw out certain central features of a phase: its problematic, the particular terms, and the manner in which the structure the phase develops is delineated. For example, a look at Bernstein’s earliest work, the one thing that is immediately apparent is the binarism of his thinking, e.g. public vs. formal. These distinctions seem to be relations of contradiction. The antagonism is embodied in the failure of the teacher to mediate the acquisition of knowledge by particular students. The staging of that general antagonism in that setting seems to generate, at this level of immediacy in the theory, the production of categories which are kinds of antagonistic pairs. Here, the antagonism between, in Plato’s words, knowledge and ignorance, is dealt with by developing conceptual couples that are mutually antagonistic. One is the annihilation of the other. Other phases deal with the antagonism between knowledge and ignorance in different ways. It is worth mentioning here that it is not always the case that Bernstein represents his problematic in terms of pairs, but that there are some terms that contain both features. The theoretical resources to be produced in chapter three would have to clearly state the peculiarity of each phase.

The analytic framework is established in Chapter Four. The different instruments to be used for constructing an analytic framework for generating data will here be put together. The analytic
framework would have to produce data in exactly the same way every time, but the data produced would be qualitatively different in each of the phases. The categories used in each of the phases and the nature of their relations to one another would have to be brought to the fore by the help of the analytic framework in the form of data. Something of a warning: although the categories used in each phase are somewhat different from those used in the other phases, the shift from one phase to another does not necessarily entail the abandonment of previous categories altogether, but could entail a theoretical development of the categories. Ideally, to prevent confusion, such a change might need to be represented by different categories, but in Bernstein’s work this does not always happen. The analytic framework enables for the investigation into how the various categories are used and how they operate in each phase.

The analytic framework to be developed in the Fourth Chapter draws its technical apparatus from Hegel’s logic of essence. Some of the specific resources to be utilised when constructing the analytic framework include: Žižek, S. (1989), (1993) and (2008), Hegel (1979), and McTaggart, J.E.M. (1910). The analytic framework constitutes four moments of the dialectic process: Actuality, Possibility, Necessity, and Contingency.

Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight constitute the data generation of phases one, two, three, and four, respectively. The instruments set up in Chapter Four will be used to produce data in these Chapters. The papers needed to establish each of the phases would be included in their appropriate chapters. In addition, the criticisms of each phase by various authors are briefly discussed in these Chapters. I then make an analysis of the data generated in each phase, particularly by investigating the validity of the necessity that the phase makes.
Chapter Nine is the concluding Chapter. A summary of Bernstein’s theory and an overview of the project is provided to conclude off the project.

1.8 Conclusion
This chapter states the problem that this project seeks to investigate and generally introduces the way in which this investigation progresses. The problem has been stated in terms of a question, generated from a survey of a range of literature that seems to propose that the central feature of Bernstein’s theory is the everyday/academic distinction.
Chapter Two

2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews some of the literature that has critically engaged with Bernstein’s work and proposed some tools for thinking through it. The literature proposes that Bernstein’s work should be viewed as developing through a series of phases. To help me engage with this literature, I set out two major objectives to be met in this chapter: the consideration of how some scholars have segmented Bernstein’s work into various phases and the investigation into the reasons proposed by these scholars for the segmentation. The reasons for the segmentation sometimes coincide with the consideration of the resources upon which Bernstein drew when making ultimate claims of each phase. This is simply because each phase is built on specific assumptions whose roots can be confidently traced. It might be worthwhile to make it clear at this point that I do think that it is the case that Bernstein’s work is best understood as a series of phases. I cannot, however, at this point establish exactly what those phases might be. That can only emerge after the analysis. It is for this reason that I rely on what others have said about the categorisation as an entry into Bernstein’s work. The major terms in each phase will be discussed in order to give a fairly detailed context of each phase.


I suppose that it is one thing to have objectives and that it is another to move towards meeting them. As a kind of background guide towards meeting the objectives of this chapter, at this point I try to identify the supposed guiding principle in the general development of Bernstein’s theory. I first consider some
characterisations of Bernstein’s general program. According to Diaz (2001), as noted in the preamble, “Bernstein’s program can be seen as a search for a system of rules, which regulate relations between the external configurations of power [...] and the internally shaped means of recognition and realisation of such configurations as a semiotic system” (Diaz, 2001, p. 83). According to Atkinson, Bernstein’s basic intention was “to develop a complex argument concerning cultural transmission, the division of labour, changes in the moral order, power and discourse – indeed, the major themes of the sociological tradition” (Atkinson, 1985, p. 3). In similar terms, Sadovnik (2001) says: “From his early works on language, communication codes and schooling, to his later works on pedagogic discourse, practice and educational transmissions, Bernstein produced a theory of social and educational codes and their effect on social relations” (Sadovnik, 2001, p. 688). Danzig (1995) states that: “His [Bernstein’s] early work argues for the need for an explanation of student success (or failure) in school that would go beyond what was typically provided by looking at student intelligence” (Danzig, 1995, p. 146). Finally, Atkinson again, in line with Danzig, says that “the guiding preoccupation [of Bernstein’s theory] appears at the outset to be how persons acquire and manipulate certain structural understandings and relationships” (Atkinson, 1985, p. 41, emphasis in original).

From the above, I suppose one would be right to say that Bernstein’s guiding motivation for enquiry is on the issue of the clash between knowledge and its absence, with interest in features that facilitate/hinder the smooth acquisition/transmission of knowledge to overcome ignorance. In this way, we shall be interested to know what explanations Bernstein gives for the obstacles/facilities in the acquisition/transmission of knowledge, in general, but most importantly what reason or feature is drawn from the range of possible explanations and given an “overdetermining” character, borrowing Althusser’s term. It is this overdetermining element that will tend to be in line with the specific influence on Bernstein’s theorising at different points within a phase and, generally, in each phase.
There are two extreme characterisations of the development of Bernstein’s work: On the one hand, there are those who view Bernstein’s work as a, more or less, systematic development of ideas and explanatory tools regarding educational transmission. Atkinson (1985, 39), for example, views these changes as a development of the original ideas becoming more and more sophisticated:

He [Bernstein] has gradually worked his way from his original sources and inspirations [...] to a much more sophisticated paradigm, and a much more general theory of cultural reproduction. Nevertheless, many of the more general ideas [in the later papers] are identifiable in the earlier papers.

On the other hand, there are those who view Bernstein’s shifts as haphazard: “Bernstein’s papers display frequent changes in terminology, largely unacknowledged shifts in focus, ambiguities and obscurities” (Gordon, 1981, p. 66). With this background, we can start looking at the proposed segmentation of Bernstein’s theory.

2.2 Language thesis

Bernstein’s earliest papers are thought to constitute a relatively discrete theoretical identity of their own. These papers have a distinguishable set of terms that do not appear elsewhere in the theory, i.e., “formal” and “public” languages. Atkinson (1985) calls this phase of Bernstein’s theory the “language thesis” (p. 39) and we shall stick with this term to characterise the proposed first phase. Sadovnik, in agreement with Danzig, argues that these early papers had a specific concern to explore, namely the examination of relations between “public language”, “authority”, and “shared meanings” (Sadovnik, 2001, p. 688). In this phase, according to Atkinson, “Bernstein’s interest lies in expressing not simply issues of language variation, but orientations to means, ends and objects, relationships between objects, the creation and re-creation of identities, and modes of social control” (Ibid., p. 40). The above
characterisations of Bernstein’s work provide one level of response in the basic structure chosen to
guide the engagement with literature in this chapter. Danzig could be stated as saying that “public
language”, “authority” and “shared meanings” are the crucial components in facilitating/hindering the
acquisition/transmission of knowledge. Similarly, Atkinson could be understood as saying that “language
type”, “orientations to means, ends and objects”, “relationships between objects”, and “one’s sense of
self” all facilitate/hinder the acquisition/transmission of knowledge. I think that it is fair to interpret
both Danzig and Atkinson as saying that whenever Bernstein uses the term “language use”, he implies
all the other factors mentioned above. In this way, in this phase – language use, with all its condensed
meaning, is responsible for the facilitation, in terms of formal language, or hindrance, in terms of public
language, of the acquisition/transmission of knowledge. In brief, two reasons are discernible for the
segmentation of this phase: the terms used, and the assumption that language use is the
facilitator/obstacle to the acquisition/transmission of academic knowledge. I shall now define the
conceptual distinction characteristic to this phase and related ideas and concepts.

The major conceptual distinction of this phase, as noted, is formal and public language use.

A formal language is] rich in personal, individual qualifications, and its form implies sets of
advanced logical operations; volume and tone and other non-verbal means of expression,
although important, take second place. [Bernstein characterises public language as constituting]
[...] a high proportion of short commands, simple statements and questions where the
symbolism is descriptive, tangible, concrete, visible and of a low order of generality, where the
emphasis is on the emotive rather than the logical implications (Bernstein, 1958, p. 28).

Atkinson discusses the modes of language use in relation to their associative social contexts. The two
major points are, firstly, the mode of language use has a direct relation to forms of authority and
control, with particular reference to early socialization within the family. The second observation, implied by the first, is that the mode of language use is linked to social class (Atkinson, 1985, p. 43). The issue here is the relationship between the mode of language use and the form of early socialisation or family type of the learner. In this phase, Bernstein does not use umbrella terms to characterise the child's early environment or family types. He, however, describes some features of family types, mainly in terms of class. The features typical of middle-class families (their opposites being true for working-class families) include:

1. An awareness of the importance of the relationships between means and ends and of the relevant cognitive and dispositional attributes.

2. A discipline to orient behaviour to certain values but with a premium on individual differentiation within them.

3. The ability to adopt appropriate measures to implement the attainment of distant ends by a purposeful means-end chain (Bernstein, 1958, p. 25).

(It is surely curious that Bernstein attributes the above features to middle-class learners only.)

The first feature points to the “instrumental”, in terms of middle-class, and “non-instrumental”, in terms of working-class, attitudes to social relations and objects (Ibid). The view here is that in middle-class families, the growing child is socialised within an explicit environment, while the working-class child is socialised within a largely implicit environment. Bernstein supposes that the above features are communicated to the child by society through language. In this way, language provides the perceptual tools of a child. Bernstein observed that the school operates according to formal language, therefore middle-class children were better prepared to benefit from the school experience than working-class learners, who faced a discontinuity between home and school (Halliday, 1995, p. 128).
I have observed above that there is a case made by the noted authors that Bernstein’s language use, in this phase, implies a way of viewing and experiencing the world. But why did Bernstein choose language, over and above all the mentioned features, to communicate the difficulty or ease with which a learner acquires knowledge? Bernstein drew theoretical resources from some theories that viewed language as the major medium through which one comes to knowledge. Some of the authors who provided the foundations of his theory include Mead, Sapir, Malinowski and Firth. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis sufficiently expresses the views that provided these foundations. It goes as follows:

Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built upon the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached [...]. We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir 1958 , p. 69)

Like Atkinson, Sadovnik views the first phase of Bernstein’s theory as anticipating the second phase: the "code theory". According to Sadovnik, the concept of "code" would enable a systemic analysis of social class, family, and schooling within a theory of symbolic control, ideas all present in the first phase
(Sadovnik, 1995, p. 27). As a result, Sadovnik does not give a detailed and independent discussion of the first phase, but only in the ways it relates to the second phase.

In brief, the first phase of Bernstein’s theory, as proposed by the authors noted above, is characterised by a specific theoretical distinction – formal/public language use. The distinction implies other features like orientation to means, ends, objects, etc. This phase is based on the assumption that language is the medium through which people experience the world.

2.3 Code theory
The second phase of Bernstein’s theory is marked by an introduction of a new set of terms: “elaborated” and “restricted” codes, to replace “formal” and “public” modes of language use, respectively (Atkinson, 1985, p. 61). It was in Bernstein (1962a) that these new terms were first introduced. We refer to the second phase as the “code theory”. Atkinson argues that the shift to the second phase is more than just terminological, saying it is the beginning of Bernstein’s structuralist project – proper (Atkinson, 1985, p. 61). He justifies this on the basis of Bernstein’s (1968, p. 143) use of the “genes” metaphor: “The biological genetic code and the cultural communication code are formally equivalent in that they are mechanisms for intergenerational transmission whereby structural properties of similarity and difference are systematically reproduced” (Atkinson, 1985, p. 61).

Bernstein initially characterises the empirical recognition of code “on a linguistic level, in terms of the probability of predicting for any one speaker which syntactic elements will be used to organise meaning” (Bernstein, 1962a, p. 76). An elaborated code, relative to a restricted code, offers a greater range of different patterns for organising the syntactic elements (ibid., p. 77). Bernstein drew from Goldman-Eisler’s work the tools for articulating this notion of predictability in code type. “[...] Goldman-Eisler’s contribution was the analysis of linguistic features hypothetically related to verbal planning, and
thus bearing directly on the notion of predictability” (Atkinson, 1985, p. 64, emphasis in original). How are we to understand the codes?

Atkinson supposes that Bernstein’s treatment of linguistic codes relates to the terms “paradigmatic” and “syntagmatic”, which he seems to attribute to Saussure, but are actually Jakobson’s (1956) terms:

> These terms refer, respectively, to ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ relations between linguistic units. [...] These two axes and the two types of relations thus expressed, provide an elementary framework for his [Bernstein’s] expression of the structural, systematic character of language composed of arbitrary signs (Atkinson, 1985, p. 67).

These dimensions relate to each other in the process of the formation of meaning. The vertical dimension; the paradigmatic or associative relations, the axis of selection, constitutes the repository of all possible constituent parts, while the horizontal; the syntagmatic, the axis of combination, constitutes the unit of elements put together to form a meaningful composition (Saussure, 1983, p. 122-124). Atkinson goes on to assert that just as these dimensions of selection and combination are central to Saussure’s program, so too are they in Bernstein’s project. This reference to Saussure’s program seems to be intended to validate the claim that Bernstein’s program is structuralist: Just as in Saussure’s linguistics, Bernstein’s codes “are descriptive terms for regulative principles which are realised through different possibilities of selection and combination” (Atkinson, 1985, p. 68, emphasis in original). This way of describing codes implies different ways of ordering meaning in each of the two codes.

Halliday makes an essentially linguistic reading of Bernstein’s code theory. He identifies three features as characteristic of codes: an elaborated code is explicit, individuated with a high degree of planning, and construes meanings in terms of general principles, while a restricted code is implicit and undifferentiated with a low degree of planning, with meaning construed in concrete, everyday
experiences (Halliday, 1995, p. 129). Restricted code is accessible to all people, while elaborated code is accessible to those having a decision-making role in social processes: “semantic generalization = knowledge = authority = power, and power in the social is by definition available to some members but not all” (Halliday, 1995, p. 130). In this view, linguistic codes are a function of the forms that social relations take. Social structure generates distinct codes, the codes transmit the culture, therefore regulate behaviour (Bernstein, 1965, p. 122).

Within Bernstein’s code theory, the meaning of the term “code” changes. Halliday interprets the changes in the meaning of code, saying Bernstein’s formulation was seeking, with difficulty, to find comfort within the general linguistic framework of the day. He identifies the two linguistic variations trendy at the time as ‘dialectal’ and ‘diatypic’.

Dialectal variation is regional and social: Your dialect, or dialect repertory, is determined by where you come from, geographically and/or social-hierarchically, and dialects differ in form and expression rather than meaning. Prototypically, they are different ways of saying the same thing. Diatypic variation is functional: Your register range is determined by what you do, in the division of labour and registers prototypically differ in meaning. They are ways of saying different things (Halliday, 1995, p. 130-131).

Between these two variations, according to Halliday, Bernstein identified with diatypic linguistic variation.

Bernstein was faced with the challenge of constructing or identifying a theory that he would use to analyse speech patterns. Hoadley & Muller (2009) posit that Bernstein turned to Halliday’s linguistic theory, rather than using Chomsky’s transformation grammar, the leading theory at the time (p. 70):
[Chomsky's theory] [...] divorced linguistics from semantics and it was thus not appropriate to a study where the major enquiry was about the relationship between the social structuring of relevant meanings and the form of their linguistic expression. Halliday’s linguistic theory, [...] satisfied the requirements created by the sociological aspects of the thesis, as it put forward a set of interrelated linguistic contexts [regulative, instructional, imaginative and interpersonal] in which the child is socialised into language (Ibid).

The concept code would undergo some modifications, where it would operate on the level of meaning: “Codes affect or act upon symbolic structures and produce, in specific context, meaning matrices in which and through which subjects recognise and realise their practices” (Diaz, 2001, p. 94). Hoadley & Muller (2009) view Holland (1981) as exemplifying this shift in the redefinition of “code” (Hoadley & Muller, 2009, p. 70).

Stubbs offers a chronology of Bernstein’s papers reflecting this change in the definition of code:

In the earliest paper on linguistic codes [1962a] he implies that restricted and elaborated codes can be partly defined in terms of features of language structure [...] But by the 1965 paper [...] Bernstein no longer defines the codes as actual language varieties. They are defined as abstract frameworks at a psychological level of verbal planning (Stubbs, 1983, p. 57).

Adlam et al (1977) provides a clear description of how the sociolinguistic codes could be discerned from the comparative analysis of texts representative of the four contexts which Bernstein deemed crucial in the socialisation of a child. These contexts, as mentioned above, are the regulative, the instructional, the imaginative, and the interpersonal (Adlam, 1977, p. 1). In addition, Adlam clarifies some of the, otherwise vague terms used to distinguish the elaborated and restricted codes from each other. For
example, he shows the different levels on which the three major pairs used to differentiate codes from each other operate:

universalistic/particularistic; implicit/explicit; context-independent/context-dependent, might be applied to the levels of, respectively, meaning, lexical/grammatical choice and text. The third level – that of text – includes the other two and, since it derives directly from the more general theory, [it] is an important means of ensuring that the description of speech in one context is comparable with the description in another (Ibid. p. 15 - 16).

Adlam’s contribution, with his colleagues, could simply be characterised as providing some comprehensive empirical studies that seek to demonstrate that the elaborated and restricted sociolinguistic codes generate distinctive texts.

I shall now introduce some of the major terms used in this phase as a way of providing a detailed context for the phase. The first term I discuss is “social structure”. Bernstein initially uses the terms “mechanical” and “organic” solidarity to describe forms of social structure. The terms mechanical and organic solidarity have their origins in Durkheim’s work, who uses the terms to typify differences between the social bonds typical of “simple” undifferentiated societies (mechanical), and those typical of highly intricate and differentiated “modern” developed societies (organic) (Atkinson, 1985, p. 24). Bernstein uses these terms to signify different “principles of differentiation” operational within society, but with internal divisions and disparities, which have different implications for the social positions of individuals (Ibid). In brief, mechanical solidarity, as understood by Bernstein, is a system of organisation where there is a high degree of “uniformity” and “consensus”, while organic solidarity is a system of organisation where there is increased “specialisation” of purpose in individuals (Ibid). In Bernstein’s view, the two forms of solidarity manifest fundamental antagonisms within society. Organic solidarity
correlates with an elaborated code, while mechanical solidarity correlates with a restricted code. This is a potentially misleading relation between forms of solidarity and codes. As we shall see in Bernstein’s third phase, both forms of solidarity could imply an elaborated code. Other than the terms of mechanical and organic solidarity, which operate at a general level, Bernstein also uses terms “positional” and “personal” family type, which explore more particular social relations at the family level.

Bernstein borrowed the terms “positional” and “personal” from Margaret Mead, and adapted them for his purposes. Mead applied the distinction to entire cultures, while Bernstein applied it to relations within a family (Atkinson, 1985, p. 72).

Families which are characterised as mobilizing ‘positional’ modes of authority and control are said to be organised in terms of ascribed characteristics – gender, age or generation. By contrast, within the person-oriented family there is much less emphasis upon such ascribed status (Ibid., p. 73).

The consequences of relations in these family types are different degrees of explicitness of communication systems. The positional family type gives rise to implicit communication systems (restricted code), while person-centred family types give rise to explicit communication (elaborated code) (Ibid., p. 74).

The next set of concepts to be discussed is “universalistic” and “particularistic” orders of meaning. “Universalistic meanings are those in which principles [of intellectual change] and operations [of meaning] are made linguistically explicit, whereas particularistic orders of meaning are meanings in which principles and operations are relatively linguistically implicit” (Bernstein, 1970a, p. 175). As can be thought, the more one accesses the principles of intellectual change and operations of meaning, the
greater his/her chances of exploiting social resources. In academic circles, access to underlying principles of education is essential to success, and therefore to power. The two orders of meaning “[...] imply different capabilities for power, control, self-regulation and determination” (Atkinson, 1985, p. 76). Diaz is in agreement with Atkinson when he says, “Meanings not only serve as relays for communication and interaction but also for investing power and class relations in subjects and positions” (Diaz, 2001, p. 88).

In brief, under code theory, we have seen that there are two distinct formulations. The first one, rooted within the language thesis, rests on the assumption that language is the regulator of one’s view of reality. As mentioned in the language thesis, it is most likely informed by Sapir, Mead, Malinowski and Firth, whose formulation I have summarised by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Of course, Bernstein’s formulation under linguistic codes is more advanced than the formulation in the first phase, but the basic influence, it seems, remains the same. The second part of this phase, where the code theory evolves into sociolinguistic codes, the foundation upon which the theory stands changes. As mentioned, at this point, Halliday provides the sociological dimension to the thesis. In brief, we can say that two reasons account for the constitution of this phase: the terminological change from the first phase, where the formal and public language use evolve into elaborated and restricted codes, respectively. The second reason, which becomes consolidated in the second part of the second phase, is the basic assumption upon which the thesis stands, where one’s orientation to meaning becomes the major regulator of consciousness, put differently; the facilitator or obstacle to the acquisition of school knowledge.

2.4 Pedagogic Discourse
Diaz (2001, p. 92) calls the third phase of Bernstein’s theory “pedagogic discourse“. Atkinson views the theory on language use, sociolinguistic codes and that of pedagogic discourse as having a common form,
with differences only in their expressions (Atkinson, 1985, p. 131). One indication of this continuity, at least between code theory and pedagogic discourse, is in the use of the term code: “Bernstein’s theory of language and his theory of knowledge are formally equivalent. Ultimately, they are but two (of the many) possible manifestations of a single theoretical vision” (Ibid., p. 132). In pedagogic discourse, the concept code is retained in curricula types: “collection” and “integrated”. Like the sociolinguistic codes, these curricula types are ideal types (Ibid., p. 137). Again, like sociolinguistic codes, curricula types are formulated in terms of principles of “selection” and “combination” (Ibid., p. 132).

Diaz argues that the model for the construction of Bernstein’s pedagogic discourse was derived from Foucault:

Bernstein drew upon Foucault’s ideas in providing us with the most elaborate effort available in search of the language of the pedagogic device and of pedagogic discourse, including the isolation of their specific rules, presenting them as a means to model knowledge, practice, and subjectivity (Diaz, 2001, p. 93).

The major differences between Bernstein and Foucault, according to Diaz, is that in Bernstein’s discourse, “social relations” constitute a major component, while in Foucault’s discourse, there is no place for social relations (Ibid).

Bernstein viewed pedagogic discourse as a tool for creating meaning, within the structure of social relations (Ibid). In the words of Sadovnik, “Bernstein’s work on pedagogic discourse was concerned with the production, distribution and reproduction of official knowledge and how this knowledge is related to structurally determined power relations” (Sadovnik, 2001, p. 691).

The pedagogic discourse phase of the theory is constituted by two different types of pedagogies: “visible” and “invisible”, which are distinguished in term of three criteria, which Bernstein calls “message
systems”: *classification*, *framing*, and *evaluation*. Classification regulates curriculum, framing regulates pedagogy, and evaluation assesses consciousness (Atkinson, 1985, p. 136). “Curriculum defines what counts as valid knowledge, pedagogy defines what counts as valid transmission of knowledge, and evaluation defines what counts as a valid realisation of this knowledge on the part of the taught” (Bernstein, 1971a, p. 85).

Bernstein discusses two model types of curricula: “collection” and “integrated” that regulate operations of the pedagogic discourse. The collection type curriculum is constituted by strongly classified and bounded domains, while in an integrated type curriculum, domains are weakly classified and bounded (Bernstein, 1971a, p. 205). Invisible pedagogy utilises an integrated type of curriculum, while a visible pedagogy utilises a collection type of curriculum. Similarly, framing will be weak on the level of pedagogy according to invisible pedagogy, while it will be strong according to visible pedagogy. Equally, on the level of evaluation, visible pedagogy explicitly states to the learner what he/she is supposed to know, while in invisible pedagogy, there is no “objective grid” (Bernstein, 1975, p. 131). According to Sadovnik, from the analysis of the rules that determine either form of the pedagogy, Bernstein was able to study what social class assumptions were hidden behind either form of pedagogy (Sadovnik, 2001, p. 691). Diaz argues that discourse is an occasion upon which power regulates society and subjects (Diaz, 2001, p. 93). The form that pedagogic discourse takes implies power relations of advantage vs. disadvantage. Other than the form of the discourse, the social relations (in this case pedagogic relations) typical to either pedagogic discourse are also occasions for the reproduction of power relations: “In Bernstein, these social relations are the material substratum for the incorporation of an individual subject into the social space of discourses and practices” (*ibid.* p. 94). According to Sadovnik, this analysis of social class assumptions of pedagogic discourse and practice mark the beginnings of an attempt at constructing a single theory that would integrate the macro (power/social relations) and
micro (school) levels of analysis (Sadovnik, 2001, p. 691-2). Bernstein introduced the term “pedagogic device” to articulate the conditions for any pedagogic discourse.

Bernstein understands “pedagogic device” to mean the ordering and disordering principles of the pedagogising of knowledge (Singh, 2002, p. 573). Diaz suggests that “pedagogic device” should be understood as:

semiotic grammar able to act upon the universe of potential meanings in society and to produce pedagogic identities in different contexts, we can understand the potency of pedagogic discourse in selectively producing subjects and their identities in a temporal and spatial dimension” (2001, p. 95).

Davies (1995) reiterates this view when he relates the pedagogic device and its realisation (pedagogic discourse) to Saussure’s langue/parole categories (p. 49).

Davies locates the inspiration for Bernstein’s formulation of the pedagogic device in Durkheim’s discussion of the religious system (in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915)). In this text, Durkheim argues that the religious system was responsible for the construction of legitimate thought, feeling and commitment to social relations of order and identity and the forms through which they are transmitted (Davies, 1995, p. 49). Contrary to this view, Diaz is convinced, as stated above, that the model for Bernstein’s “pedagogic discourse” and “pedagogic device” come from Foucault. In his 7th note, Diaz says, “What Foucault defines as pastoral power is an implicit allusion to the pedagogic device in education” (Diaz, 2001, p. 97).

In short, above is a crude discussion of various features of the phase we have called pedagogic discourse. This phase stands on its own because of the basic assumptions on which it is built, the main one being that what facilitate/hinder the acquisition/transmission of knowledge are, borrowing Hoadley
& Muller’s terms, “organisational” and “interactional” aspects of pedagogy (2009, p. 71). Diaz thinks that Foucault provides the model, with some modifications, for the formulation of this phase. In addition, a whole range of new terms has been introduced in this phase in the construction of the theory.

2.5 Knowledge Structures
The final phase of Bernstein’s theory, like other phases, is marked by the introduction of a set of new descriptive terms. We call this phase “Knowledge Structures”. The major terms here are “vertical” and “horizontal” discourse. Moore & Muller (2002) trace the roots and development of this phase through Bernstein (1972 and 2000 chapters 6, 7, and 9). In this phase, Bernstein is interested to investigate the relationship between the two knowledge types and how they progress. This investigation considers the different forms that academic knowledge takes in different intellectual fields, how they relate to everyday knowledge, and how they grow. Because of its subject matter, this theory has been called the “theory of theories” (Moore & Muller, 2002, p. 628). Moore & Muller (2002) identify two opposing theories on knowledge growth prevalent at the time when Bernstein was writing the theory: “Popperians with their account of methodical advance through the succession of conjectures and refutations, and on the other, postmodern generalised scepticism about the possibility of any knowledge advance at all” (Ibid. p. 628). Bernstein’s theory seems to be a kind of amalgamation of these two views, in that it draws from both of them, and comes up with a single and unique view.

Bernstein’s final phase is concerned with the nature of knowledge: “It was only late in his career that Bernstein turned to the question of what knowledge was, its structure and social base” (Hoadley & Muller, 2009, p. 74). This focus on knowledge structures and the social base is the characteristic feature of this phase that distinguishes it from other phases.
Moore & Maton suppose that the fourth phase of Bernstein’s theory naturally follows from previous developments in the theory. They argue that a close look at Bernstein’s “approach highlights [the production of knowledge] as the next stage in the analysis of intellectual fields” (Moore & Maton, 2001, p. 154). One might actually wonder whether the interaction between Bernstein and Paul Dowling, Johan Muller and Nick Taylor had anything to do with the development of the theory into the knowledge structure phase. This is because both Dowling (1995) and Muller & Taylor (1995) contain discussions on the knowledge forms and structures, even using the terms [vertical and horizontal, for example] that Bernstein uses. Of course, they do acknowledge Bernstein as their source, from a book that he (Bernstein) would only publish the following year in 1996.

It is worth mentioning here that Bernstein’s work in this phase is comparable to Foucault’s work, particularly on the relationship between “power” and “knowledge”, as well as “discourse”. Foucault argues that sciences or discourses are generated by the necessary relationship between power and knowledge. In this regard, Foucault argues that the knowledge foundations of human sciences, medicine and economics (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p. 57) are “much less stable and far more difficult to control. Yet, somewhat disturbingly perhaps, these are also the knowledges most quick to pronounce truths about human nature, human potential, human endeavour, and the future of the human condition in general” (Ibid). These sciences “work together with such institutions as mental hospitals, prisons, factories, schools, and law courts to have specific and serious effects on people” (Fillingham, 1993, p. 12). Throughout his work, Foucault demonstrates the historicity of the concepts and objects with which these knowledges deal. He thus exposes the fragility of these concepts: far from a slow evolutionary refinement of concepts, there was more often a total incongruity between a concept developed at a particular period of cultural history and another concept developed later (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p. 58).
In short, for Foucault, discourse is generated by a combination of power and knowledge. In Bernstein, however, discourse is generated through power, recontextualisation and knowledge.

2.6 Summary
In this chapter, I outline how various authors have segmented Bernstein’s work and what reasons they have given for segmenting the work in that way. The segmentation of Bernstein’s work is offered as a tool for thinking about the work. It is a resource for understanding the development of Bernstein’s theory from the start to the end. I have also tried to trace some of the resources upon which Bernstein drew for the development of his theory in each phase. These resources provide both an understanding of the justification of the form of the theory and assumptions that (supposedly) gave authority to the theory. I also provide part of the context in each phase by discussing the major terms that constitute the theoretical frame.
Chapter three

3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, a case was made that Bernstein’s theory can be approached productively as developing through a series of phases. This was substantiated by appealing to how various authors have argued for the three shifts in the development of the theory. In this chapter, we take a look at some formative features of any phase. It is indeed the interest of this chapter to draw together the various features of a phase, which would shed some light as to why each of the phases deserves to be considered as a unit, distinct from the other phases. I initially develop theoretical resources that highlight fundamental components of any social science theory, using tools from Althusser. The theoretical resources for purposes of this project culminate in a discussion of the moments of Hegel’s dialectic process. The resources developed in this chapter provide guiding principles for deciding what features to look for in a phase, how to understand their character and how they relate to one another. Some of the central features of each phase that I am interested to distinguish include: its problematic, the particular terms that constitute the descriptive framework, and the manner in which the theoretical structure that each phase develops is delineated.

I draw some resources for purposes of this chapter from McTaggart (1910), Althusser (1971), Hegel (1979), Laclau & Mouffe (1985), Althusser & Balibar (1997) and Žižek (1989; 1993; 2008).

3.2 First things first
Every study develops from specific epistemological (and ontological) suppositions: what is knowledge and how do we acquire it? Historically, one can identify three general views (traditions) with different sets of suppositions. This work is situated within the third view. Each of these views finds expression in
different ways through different theorists. I will here make very general statements about the other two views in order to provide the foundations for discussing the methodology used in this project. Only extreme cases of these two views are here adumbrated. The first view is rationalism.

Rationalism or idealism asserts that ideas and knowledge are gained separately from sense experience. An example from Plato could be used to explain this view. In his Republic, under the “Divided Line”, Plato summarises both his ontology and epistemology. Plato’s ontology asserts the reality of two ‘worlds’: the sensible and the world of Forms. He further divides his worlds, each in two: the world of Forms is composed of higher Forms and mathematical Forms, while the sensible world is composed of sensible things and images of things. Concurrently to his ontology, Plato articulates an epistemology that accounts for how we come to know the two worlds he asserts. Images are known by imagination, sensible things are known by perception, mathematical forms are known by reason, while higher forms are known by understanding. According to Plato, intellectual certainty increases from the knowledge of sensible things to the knowledge of Forms. This is a classical example of a rationalist view. Descartes is another one of the rationalists, who says that “I think that all those [ideas] which involve no affirmation or negation are innate; because the sense organs do not bring us anything which is like the idea which arises in us at their stimulus, and so this idea must have been in us before” (Descartes, 1970, p. 108). By this, Descartes is claiming that intelligence is the sole means by which we come to the knowledge of innate truths, not sense experience. Descartes suggests “methodical scepticism” as the way to knowledge. Ponzer proposes two (negative) characteristics to capture the commonalities among idealists: “[... they do] not accept that (1) knowledge emerges from or is reducible to natural or material ‘realities’ that (2) [these material realities] exist as self-sufficient things in themselves” (2008, p. 50).

The second epistemological view is called empiricism. In simple terms, empiricism is a doctrine that asserts that knowledge originates from sense experience (Glasersfeld, 1995, p. 31). In this way, all our
ideas and all our knowledge initially come from sense experience. The mind is here conceived as being a blank sheet upon which experience inscribes knowledge. According to Laird, “all our knowledge, all our belief, and all our conjectures begin and end with appearances; that we cannot go behind or beyond these; and that we should not try to do so” (Laird, 1932, p. 25). This view is clearly opposed to rationalism.

The third view, which is a kind of synthesis of the above two views, just like those views, has taken different names and forms through history. Emmanuel Kant’s “Transcendental Enterprise” formulates a highly sophisticated and quite persuasive formulation of the merger between rationalism and empiricism. Before Kant, Giambattista Vico and then Jeremy Bentham had developed works that sought to synthesise rationalist and empiricist views. Glasersfeld argues that the ideas of these thinkers (Vico and Bentham) anticipated the most important ideas of the merger between rationalism and empiricism (Glasersfeld, 1995, p. 36). What is the crux of Kant’s synthesis?

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops a “Transcendental idealism” that distinguishes two forms of cognition: a priori and a posteriori. Kant understands as “a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience” (Kant, 1998, p. 137; emphasis in original). On the other hand, Kant understands a posteriori cognitions as those that occur out of experience (Ibid., p. 158). Kant synthesises the two opposing views by affirming them both, and also pointing out their limitations. There are things we know out of experience, and there are things we know without sense experience. Through his articulation of synthetic and analytic judgements, Kant shows how a posteriori and a priori cognitions, respectively, are come about. In spite of his affirmation of both synthetic and analytic judgements, Kant leans more towards analytic judgment as the higher of the two types of judgements:
That there are principles anywhere at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure understanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to that which happens, but rather itself the source of the principles in accordance with which everything (that can even come before us as an object) necessarily stands under rules, since, without such rules, appearances could never amount to cognition of an object corresponding to them (Ibid., p. 283).

Clearly, for Kant, forms of thought have priority over material things. This is the point on which Hegel differs with Kant: “Speculative idealism is based on a dialectical universal in which reason and reality have equal value and which Hegel envisions as an identity of opposites” (Ponzer, 2008, p. 50). This idea is sufficiently represented by Hegel himself: “In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the [dialectic] system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” (Hegel, 1979, p. 17; emphasis in original). In the words of Žižek (1993), “[...] the process of knowledge, i.e., our comprehending the object of knowledge, is not something external to the object but inherently determines its status” (p. 154).

In short, this project believes that Bernstein takes seriously both the empirical data, as well as the theoretical systems that account for the form of that data. This claim is justified in due course.

3.3 Theoretical resources justified
I think that it is legitimate to have a suspicious attitude towards the choice of the theoretical resources chosen for this project. I suppose that the legitimacy of the resources depends on what one understands Hegel’s dialectic process to be, as well as what one assumes the nature of Bernstein’s theory to be. If we understand Hegel’s logic, as some scholars like Feuerbach, young Marx, and Althusser do, as only idealistic, then we would be faced with the challenge of transforming his dialectic to become applicable to problems of “real life” situations, in line with Bernstein’s concerns. Althusser understands Hegel's
dialectic as a purely rational conceptualisation, without regard for the real world. Althusser thought of Marx as having overturned the Hegelian rational conceptualisation by applying it to the real world, to material circumstances of history, society and economics:

I hope it is now clear that if we are truly to be able to think this dramatic genesis of Marx’s thought, it is essential to reject the term ‘supersede’ and turn to that of discoveries, to renounce the spirit of Hegelian logic implied in the innocent but sly concept of ‘supersession’ (Aufhebung) which is merely the empty anticipation of its end in the illusion of an immanence of truth, and to adopt instead a logic of actual experience and real emergence; in short, to adopt a logic of the irruption of real history in ideology itself, and thereby – as is absolutely indispensible to the Marxist perspective, and, moreover, demanded by it – give at last some real meaning to the personal style of Marx’s experience, to the extraordinary sensitivity to the concrete which gave such force of conviction and revelation to each of his encounters with reality (Althusser, 1979, p. 82; emphasis in original).

If Althusser were right in his criticism of Hegel, I would have had the task of finding and justifying ways of “transforming” Hegel’s (in that case) “idealism” in order to apply it to real life situations, in the process of developing an analytic framework for engaging with Bernstein’s work. The view taken by this thesis is that Althusser was wrong in branding Hegel’s logic as purely idealistic, but that Hegel was as much of a realist as he was an idealist. I shall now briefly represent Althusser’s criticism of Hegel and then align myself to those who argue that there are, in Hegel’s work, adequate resources to response to Althusser’s criticism. Actually, the “inverting” that Althusser proposes fits sufficiently with a set of terms present in Hegel’s work.
Althusser’s criticism of Hegel’s Speculative Idealism (together with Feuerbach and Young Marx) is that: “the hidden obverse and ‘truth’ of speculative idealism is positivism, enslavement to contingent empirical content; i.e., idealism only confers speculative form on the empirical content simply found there” (Žižek, 1993, p. 138). Althusser introduced the concept of “overdetermination”, which he argued was the basic lack in Hegel. Žižek argues, and I agree, that Althusser’s terms do not introduce anything new to Hegel’s project, but that they are already there in Hegel’s work: “Hegel himself articulated in advance the conceptual framework of Althusser’s critique; i.e., his [Hegel’s] triad of formal, real, and complete ground corresponds perfectly to the [Althusserian] triad of expressive, transitive, and overdetermined causality” (Žižek, 1993, p. 140). Althusser understands “overdetermination” as “the determination of either an element or a structure by a structure” (Althusser & Balibar, 1979, p. 188; emphasis in original). Žižek views this very category as coinciding with the “Hegelian paradox of a totality which always comprises a particular element embodying its universal structuring principle” (Žižek, 2008, p. 45; emphasis in original). In this project, I take it that Althusser’s proposed terms of expressive, transitive, and overdetermined causality correspond with Hegel’s triad, therefore shall use them interchangeably henceforth in this project. In the meantime, how do we relate Hegel’s conceptual framework to Bernstein’s work?

3.4 Preliminary considerations for developing theoretical resources

Althusser argues that a social science theory, using the Marxist theory of “state” as an example, is composed of three components, which he calls “phases”. I shall use the word “component” for these Althusserian “phases” to avoid unnecessary ambiguity from the phases of this project. Žižek (1989) too, in addressing the Freudian interpretation of dreams, argues that “The structure [or theoretical edifice] is always triple; there are always three elements at work: the manifest dream-text, the latent-content or thought and the unconscious desire articulated in a dream” (p. 6; emphasis in original). Althusser calls
the first component the “descriptive theory”. This component marks the beginning of a process of enquiry. It is, as the term implies, the description of what observable piece of evidence is to be investigated. In other words, this is the naming of the problematic of the investigation to be conducted. Althusser calls this component the “expressive causality”. 

The second component consists of distinct traits about the phenomena to be investigated that might give some clues as to the nature of the problem. These traits are to be the focus of enquiry. Althusser calls this component, within his discussion of the Marxist theory of a state, the “Ideological State Apparatuses”, and he defines it as “a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialised institutions [...] to be organised in detail, tested, corrected, and re-organised” (Althusser, 1971, p. 136). Laclau & Mouffe (1985) view the possible relations among realities in this category as either existing on the conceptual or empirical levels: “Either the objects are separated as conceptually discrete elements – in which case we are dealing with a logical separation; or else, they are separated as empirically given objects – in which case it is impossible to elude the category of ‘experience’” (p. 104). The clarification on the nature of the relations of objects in this component saves us from unfavourable epistemological confusions that might jeopardise the whole enterprise of investigation. Althusser calls this component “transitive causality”. 

Althusser calls the final component of the Marxist theory of a state the “ruling ideology”. This, he argues, is the ultimate power that is responsible for deciding the nature of the relations within the second component: “It is the intermediation of the ruling ideology that ensures a (sometimes teeth-gritting) ‘harmony’ between the repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses, and between the different State Ideological Apparatuses” (Althusser, 1971, p. 142). The ruling ideology is a part of the Ideological State Apparatuses, and it is dominant. In our terms, the third component is a part of the second component, the difference being that it is the dominant among the other components.
Along similar lines, Žižek argues that “unconscious desire” (or third component in the terms developed here) is “[...] not ‘more concealed, deeper’ in relation to the latent thought (second component), it is decidedly more ‘on the surface’, consisting entirely of the signifier’s mechanisms, of the treatment to which the latent thought is submitted” (Žižek, 1989, p. 6). The relationship between elements of the second component and the third component is not always a straightforward and simple one. I hope that when looking at the individual phases, the complexity in their relationship will begin to become apparent. Althusser calls this component “overdetermined causality”.

Some of the major characteristics of the third component will be elaborated at this point. The first one is that it “colours” the other realities within the second component to the point where their identity is only defined from its point of view. In Žižek’s terms, within the discussion of the role of ideology in social reality: “[...] ideology is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence – that is, the social effectivity, the very reproduction of which implies that the individuals ‘do not know what they are doing’” (1989, ps. 15-16; emphasis in original).

The second characteristic of the third component, partly similar to the first one, is that it is both “genus” and “species”:

the ‘symptom’ is, strictly speaking, a particular element which subverts its own universal foundation, a species subverting its own genus. [...] It consists in detecting a point of breakdown heterogenous to a given ideological field and at the same time necessary for that field to achieve its closure, its accomplished form (Žižek, 1989, p. 16; emphasis in original).

We could also understand this characteristic in terms of Althusser’s concept of overdetermination. By overdetermination, Althusser means: “the determination of one structure by another and of the
elements of a subordinate structure by the dominant, and therefore determinate structure” (Althusser & Balibar, 1997, p. 188).

Another quality of the third component is that it is both the reason for the form that theory takes and at the same time the reason for a possibility of change of the theory:

We find, then, the paradox of a being which can reproduce itself only in so far as it is misrecognized and overlooked: the moment we see it ‘as it really is’, this being dissolves into nothingness or, more precisely, it changes into another kind of reality (Žižek, 1989, p. 25).

Since the third component attempts to close the theory, it is bound to fail some time, because social circumstances do not change in a necessarily predictable way: “If this ultimate determination were a truth for every society, the relationship between such determination and the conditions making it possible would not develop through a contingent historical articulation, but would constitute an a priori necessity” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 98; emphasis in original). In this way, the third component would be the point of crisis as well as stability, permanence and change, stagnation and progression. Change from one phase to another is signalled by the change in the meaning of the third component. According to this logic, once the form of the third component changes, the theory is no longer the same because the basic claims of the theory change, and therefore the relationships and meanings among the various components of the theory also change.

Althusser’s term of interpellation fits well within this theoretical exposition of the third component of the theory. Althusser uses the term to interpellate when arguing for his view that individuals are always subjects (Althusser, 2001, p. 119). An elaboration of this will now be made. The question here is, if, reminiscent of Saussure, there is an arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified, then what determines the relationship between the two in society? Using the concept of ideology, Althusser
attempts to account for this relationship. He defines ideology as “the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group” (Ibid., ps. 106-7). The claim being made here is that any person views reality from the standpoint of a specific system of ideas, of course, the system of ideas need not be necessarily systematic, coherent and rational, but it is an established point of view, anyway. There is no one who views reality from an unmediated reference point. Ideology, in this way, forms an individual into a subject, by providing for him/her perceptual resources about the self and about the world. Althusser uses the terms “recognition” and “misrecognition” to refer to the perceptual effects of ideology on an individual. In this way, all individuals are subjects, in as much as everyone is informed by some ideology. “You are always already subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantees for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects” (Ibid., p. 117; emphasis in original). Althusser uses the terms “hail” or “interpellate” to designate the merger of an individual with ideology to form a subject. “Ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: individuals are always-already subjects” (Ibid., p. 119; emphasis in original).

My supposition is that Bernstein’s work, like any other work of research, is an attempt at capturing, in a comprehensive fashion, the causal chain within which his motivating problem finds its definition. It is an attempt at accounting for a specific state of affairs. Bernstein’s task, always remotely but sometimes immediately, was to explain the simple fact that within the school system, the majority of students who failed to be adequately educated, or with whom the education system failed to score success, were from working-class families. His purpose was to account for the causal chain responsible for that state of
affairs. How, one might wonder, does Bernstein go about articulating his theory? In his language of description, Bernstein sets out the conditions the theory must meet:

1. Writing [...] principles of communication, their social construction and institutional basis;
2. [...] modalities of transmission and acquisition as pedagogic discourse and their institutional basis;
3. Identifying the various realisations of members, groups/classes/agencies as cultural displays of a specialised consciousness (Bernstein, 2000, p. 120).

Bernstein explains that the first two conditions above are sometimes intertwined, although the first one is prior to the second (Ibid., p. 123). Bernstein also explains that in his theory, he is not always explicit in articulating the third condition, although being a component of the theory, it is always operational throughout his theorising: “Perhaps as the theory developed I became more interested in the more general question of symbolic controls than in their class specifics” (Ibid). In this project, I treat the first two characters of the theory outlined above as one, so the third now becomes the second character. Actually, Bernstein himself does reduce the above list to two, by way of combining the first two:

Thus there are two elements: one modelling agencies, agents, practices and specialised forms of communication, so as to reveal varieties or modalities of regulation and their organising principles as cultural relays; the second showing how such principles are themselves, directly or indirectly, media for the reproduction of class relations (Ibid).

In short, the language of description comprises, on the one hand, what has to count as empirical relations and, on the other, the transformation of those relations into conceptual relations (Ibid., p. 133). The claim of this project is that, with regards to the first element, Bernstein does not just articulate principles that model agencies, agents, practices and specialised forms of communication, but that he
always emphasises one element among the principles as the ultimate or, using Althusser’s term, “overdetermining”. This is in line with the theoretical frame developed above. In short, this project distinguishes three elements of Bernstein’s theory: (1) the various realisations of members, groups/classes/agencies as cultural displays of a specialised consciousness. (2) Principles modelling agencies, agents, practices and specialised forms of communication. (3) Finally, the overdetermining element.

Having characterised Bernstein’s work in the above fashion, it is now possible to justify the choice of Hegel’s work as a key component of the conceptual framework for the methodology. It is clear from the above discussion that Bernstein takes seriously both the operations of principles and the corresponding empirical state of affairs. In addition, his theory always has a central element which is ultimately responsible for the form that the theory takes. These features of Bernstein’s theory correspond to the Hegelian moments of Actuality, Possibility and Necessity. Hegel’s conceptual framework is not only applicable to the analysis of happenings within Bernstein’s phases, but through its concept of “Contingency”, Hegel’s conceptual framework can be used to analyse the nature of the changes from one phase to another. This point is expanded below.

Recall that the question of this project has been generated from a body of work that seems to assign the everyday/academic distinction as a central feature in Bernstein’s work. One might then wonder what the role of the everyday/academic distinction is through the four phases of Bernstein’s work.

In the Second Chapter, it has been discussed that Bernstein’s theory undergoes changes or transformations from phase one to the next. To analyse such work, it is necessary to have theoretical resources that would facilitate a detailed description of what the nature of these changes is. As was mentioned in the Second Chapter, there are those who argue that the transformations in Bernstein’s
theory from one phase to another are modifications within the same basic framework and those that argue that they are changes of basic frameworks. These differences could be understood in terms of Piaget’s conception of “transformation” (Piaget, 1992, p. 215-224), on the one hand, and Darwin’s concept of “variation” (Darwin, 2008, ps. 140-173), on the other. The following paragraph briefly discusses these concepts.

In Piaget’s account of cognitive development, transformations are genetically generated, hence determined already from the beginning. Transformations occur within the determinations of genes, therefore transformations are necessary and largely predictable. On the other hand, in Darwin’s concept of variation, within the notion of “natural selection”, there is no actual selection of any kind. There are random changes and variations in individuals in the species. For contingent reasons, individuals with particular characteristics tend to outlive individuals that do not have those characteristics, which might seem as a necessary selection, when it is just an outcome of contingent circumstances.

Hegel’s dialectics are capable of helping this work to construct an account of the nature of the movements of Bernstein’s theory from one phase to the next. Hegel’s dialectics only allow the movement from one phase to the next when the changes are of basic frameworks, i.e., extreme cases. In this way, the dialectics are capable of revealing mere modifications within the same basic framework, although they would not qualify for extreme cases needing change to another phase. For Hegel, changes from one phase to another occur when necessity displays its conditions as contingent:

‘Dialectics’ is ultimately a teaching on how necessity emerges out of contingency: on how a contingent bricolage produces a result which ‘transcodes’ its initial conditions into internal necessary moments of its self-reproduction. It is therefore necessity itself which depends on
contingency: the very gesture which changes necessity into contingency is radically contingent. (Žižek, 2008, p. 129; emphasis in original).

I trust that it is clear by now that this preferred theoretical resource (Hegel’s general framework) is appropriate because it provides for the analysis of all levels of Bernstein’s theory as well as the nature of the movements from one phase to another. With this, we now discuss Hegel’s dialectic process in terms of its four moments.

3.5 Hegel’s Moments
It is necessary to acknowledge that Hegel’s logic, (including the one of interest to us – the logic of essence), through which he expounds the dialectic process, is complex and has been appreciated differently by different interpreters. I limit my interpretation of Hegel’s logic of essence to that proposed by Žižek (1993 & 2008) and Ponzer (2008). According to Žižek, Hegel’s dialectic process develops via a set of four moments. There are some interpreters of Hegel who perceive only three moments in Hegel’s logic, for example the wide-spread triad of “thesis, antithesis, and synthesis” (Žižek, 1993, p. 263). I shall now introduce these four moments that constitute the dialectic process.

The four moments of Hegel’s logic of essence are: Actuality, Possibility, Necessity and Contingency. I discuss these moments as stages in the process of grasping an object under investigation. The Actuality (or Impossibility when viewed in opposition to Necessity or contrary to Possibility when thought about in terms of the “Greimassian semiotic square”) is, simply, the state of affairs calling for reflection – e.g., as is the case in Bernstein – the general difficulty of working-class learners to do well at school, relative to middle-class learners. Here, the problem under investigation is described. The description of the problem does not bring about any new knowledge. The description, of course, takes the form or language particular to the describing discipline. Hegel gives an example of a patient explaining the
nature of his ailment, and the doctor placing a name on the symptoms stated. There is no new knowledge that the doctor brings about at this stage, only a form of translation of stated symptoms into a medical term. Now, Actuality always draws its significance and meaning within a symbolic power. This symbolic power is what Hegel refers to as Possibility.

Possibility is the enumeration of likely accounts/explanations of the problem under investigation. All the likely explanations available for consideration are here included.

The shift from actuality to possibility, the suspension of actuality through inquiry into its possibility, is therefore ultimately an endeavour to avoid the trauma of the real, i.e., to integrate the real by means of conceiving it as something that is meaningful within our symbolic universe (Žižek, 1993, p. 157).

In Bernstein’s terms stated above, Possibility would constitute what was referred to as “principles modelling agencies, agents, practices and specialised forms of communication”. In Hegelian terms, Actuality and Possibility are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin. They are not to be conceived of as distinct from each other.

Necessity is the next moment in the dialectic process. According to Hegel, Necessity is the supposed ultimate reason for the state of affairs beyond the Possibility moment: “in external reflection [Possibility], appearance [Actuality] is the elusive surface concealing its hidden necessity, whereas in absolute reflection [Necessity], appearance is the appearance of this very (unknown) Necessity behind contingency” (Ibid., p. 154). Necessity is used to designate the aspect from the Possibility, emphasised as the overdetermining element, the element under whose aspect all else is seen the way it is. Every time the relationship between an object and its symbolic form is given the standing of Necessity, the
unexpected, the unforeseen, the exceptional case comes to undermine the order of the supposed relationship between the Actuality and the Possibility. This is the moment of Contingency.

Contingency raises its head when there is disruption to the theory. Contingency is a moment when an explanation for whatever state of affairs is faced with some unanticipated or exceptional case, which undermines the theoretical cover that guaranteed coherence and order within the causal interplay of the theory. This is a time of criticism leading to the collapse of the theory, thereby needing reform. From here, the process of investigation starts again by way of re-describing the Actuality, and the process continues as stated above, via the moments of the dialectic process, only this time attracting to themselves different meanings from the ones before.

In this project, Hegel’s terms: Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity are sometimes replaced by, respectively: “Formal Ground”, “Real Ground”, and “Complete Ground”, or with “Positing Reflection”, “External Reflection”, and “Determining Reflection” to mean exactly the same thing but just as a way of distinguishing moments from different papers or phases, for purposes of avoiding confusion. In addition, these terms are used simultaneously with Althusser’s terms: “expressive causality”, “transitive causality”, and “overdetermined causality”, which are used in a similar sense to Hegel’s terms.

3.6 The levels of the dialectic process
Modifications within the same basic framework or changes of basic framework in a theory are captured within the general dialectic process formulated above: through the four moments outlined. When engaging with Bernstein’s work, all the moments are sought in each paper. Contingency is always outlined as the previously supposed Necessity, but now acknowledged as limited. In this way, Contingency is the link between the paper or phase under investigation and the preceding one. The first
paper and the first phase do not start from the moment of Contingency because they have no reference to any preceding formulation.

It is clear at this point that the engagement with Bernstein’s theory is on two levels: on the level of papers, each as a relatively discrete unit, and on the level of phases, each formed by a collection of papers. The hope is that the data will clearly bring out the changes/breaks on both the level of papers (though not always at this level) and (always) on the level of phases.

### 3.7 Summary

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to report on the theoretical resources used for engaging with Bernstein’s theory. Resources from Althusser, Hegel and others have been utilised to come up with a theoretical frame for this work. The theoretical resources developed highlight the essential components/moments necessary for the definition of a phase. In brief, the Actuality moment is concerned with defining the problem that the paper discusses. The Possibility moment consists of a range of reasons noted as possible accounts for the problem under investigation. The Necessity moment consists of a commitment, on the part of the theorist, to a specific reason as being ultimately responsible for the problem. The form or nature of delineation of the theory is determined by the Necessity moment. The Contingency moment is a time of crisis, a time when the previously supposed explanation for a problem is brought to question. It is a time of change to an explanation that responds to concerns and questions that undermine the previous formulation of the theory.
Chapter Four

4.1 Introduction
It might be worthwhile to take stock of what has been done so far. After setting up the problem, an effort was made to generate some resources for thinking about Bernstein’s work more generally. It was proposed that Bernstein’s work develops through four phases. Then, an attempt was made to draw together some features that are characteristic of a phase. Theoretical resources were developed to help draw together the various features of a phase in a systematic manner. The search for descriptive and analytic resources culminated in Hegel’s dialectical process as represented in his “Logic of Essence”. Hegel’s logic of essence sits within a larger epistemological context of investigating what the object of knowledge is, and how we come to grasp it. Hegel proposes that our attempt to grasp the object of knowledge develops through its constitution in a dialectical process. The dialectical process presupposes that every entity or activity should be understood within a larger symbolic context. Every activity/entity/object is part of a series of relations within which it finds its identity and significance. The dialectical process, therefore, brings to the fore the causes for an entity/activity/object. It is worth noting that Hegel does not view the identity of an object as being isolated from the conditions that bring it about. In this way, the process of seeking knowledge of/about an object is not external to the object’s identity (Žižek, 1993, p. 154).

4.2 Object of study
To start with, the object of study for this project is Bernstein’s corpus of work. Bernstein’s work was initially composed of some journal articles and chapters in books, together with public lectures. However, the major corpus of the work has been put together in five volumes, the first four referred to
as *Class, Codes and Control, 1 – IV*, and a fifth one titled *Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity: Theory, Research, Critique*. In Chapter Two of this project I appealed to scholars who suggest that Bernstein’s body of work is productively understood as developing through four phases. As such, I am starting my engagement with Bernstein’s work on the basis of the authority of these scholars – understanding Bernstein’s work in terms of phases. I am not necessarily in agreement with them, but at this stage I am relying on their guidance. Each phase is constituted by a series of papers. At this point, therefore, the object of this study could be diagrammatically represented as in figure 4.1.

![Diagram of Bernstein's work phases]

**Figure 4.1**

There are some challenges for understanding this corpus of work, which could partly be expressed in terms of the following questions, particularly as regards phases and papers.

At the level of phases, the first challenge is how to establish the necessity of each phase: What are the central propositions and central problem(s) of each phase? The second challenge at this level is how to establish the nature of the transition from one phase to the next: How does one move from one phase to another?
At the level of papers, do the papers that constitute a phase always exhibit strict chronology? Are there anticipatory papers, which really belong in a phase that is temporarily distant from the one populated by the papers that are chronologically close to it? Or more, are there later papers that really participate in a phase earlier than the papers close to them chronologically. What is each paper trying to generate propositions about?

There is also an issue of the relationship between papers and phases. How do papers that constitute a particular phase come together to realize the phase? In other words, how is the necessity of the phase constituted in the papers of each phase? How does the coordination of classes of propositions of various papers form a phase?

The theoretical resources developed in Chapter Three have, precisely, been put together to enable this project to find a way of engaging with Bernstein's work in a systematic manner, by providing a descriptive and analytic framework. As stated before, the Hegelian moments constitute the basic framework used to engage with Bernstein's work. The diagrammatic representation in Figure 4.2 and the discussion that follows illustrate my use of Hegel to read the papers and produce data.

![Figure 4.2](image)
It is my understanding that any paper or journal article or public lecture, whatever form of presentation that Bernstein’s work takes, has a motivating problem, which is discernible. In his paper, “Some sociological determinants of perception”, for example, Bernstein clearly states the problem for his investigation: “The purpose of this paper is to indicate a relationship between the mode of cognitive expression and certain social classes” (Bernstein, 1958, p. 24). The basic argument here is that different people tend to view the world in different ways, the differences are class-based, and the differences impact on educability. Bernstein sometimes expresses the problem of a paper in terms of objective manifestations whose characteristic features he attributes to working-class subjects, on one hand, and middle-class subjects, on the other. This project does not depend on stated problems of a paper, but investigates those, about which the paper might be preoccupied, whether or not they are explicitly acknowledged in a paper. The motivating problem for a paper constitutes the Actuality moment.

It is also my understanding that Bernstein’s papers always offer a range of possible explanations for the problem. Bernstein has subjective traits which correlate to objective characteristics that he sees as specific to middle-class subjects, as well as others specific to working-class subjects. Such an array of propositions that seem to indicate possible explanations for the problem would constitute the Possibility moment.

The Necessity moment is the raising of one element from other elements of the Possibility moment to a necessary status. The interest here is not only in what element is raised, but what is responsible for affording the element that status. It could be some theory upon which a particular paper draws to arrive at some necessity. This is the overdetermination by one proposition of the other propositions, whereby one element colours the others. At this stage of the engagement with the paper, the focus is on the overdetermining component and how it structures the whole argument. This stage of investigation constitutes the Necessity moment.
Contingency appears in the form of unanswered questions. They may be contained in the paper whereby they are explicitly stated as pointing to some area needing more investigation, or they may be raised by criticisms on the work. The moment of Contingency could be thought about in the light of Hegel's concept of “Notion”, which shows the complexity of the relationship between the thing “in-itself” and the thing “for-itself”:-

A universal Notion [thing in-it-self] arrives at its being-for-itself, it is posited as Notion, only when, in the very domain of particularity, it reflects itself in the form of its opposite (in some element which negates the very fundamental feature of its notional universality) (Hegel, 2008, p. 124).

As such, at the moment of Contingency, the theory collapses and stands in need of a claim at another universal Notion, which aims at “totalization”, hence stabilizing the theory. When this happens, a shift takes place from one phase to another. It should be possible to understand that the change might have been prompted by a change in the problem under investigation, which naturally leads to a different structuring of the theory.

Maybe the question here with respect to Bernstein is, whether the phases are continuous? Or do they emerge from points of discontinuity? It is difficult to see how they would be phases if they were continuous. To identify different phases is to notice some qualitative shift from one point to another. Is the distinction merely in terms of a problem or an object being focused? Or is it a matter of dialectical shift in the theory that then reconstitutes the problem around a new object? Questions like these, though necessary to clarify at this point, are best kept at the back of the mind, as they can only be responded to as we analyse individual phases. Whatever the nature of the shifts from one phase to
another, the methodology chosen is capable of explaining phases as continuous or points of discontinuity.

As such, therefore, in addition to being utilized on the level of papers, the methodology for this work is also utilized at the level of phases, whereby the Hegelian moments are used to talk about the structuring of each phase. The following diagrammatic representation summarizes the way in which the methodology engages with the phases.

When shifts from one phase to another take the form of dislocation, the Hegelian story is specifically useful because of its moment of Contingency. The moment of Contingency enables the investigation into what generates a dislocation. The Hegelian dialectical process would also be a useful resource for engaging with papers and phases to greater depth, because it makes possible the analysis of their nature and how they relate with one another. It will be remembered that the kernel of the dialectical process is that the categories develop to a point where they collapse, and then an attempt is made to
redefine the object of investigation using other categories or the same categories in a different fashion.

In other words, the dialectical process is

the presentation of a series of aborted attempts by the subject to define the Absolute and thus arrive at the longed-for synchronism of subject and object [...] This is why its final outcome ('absolute knowledge') does not bring about a finally found harmony but rather entails a kind of reflective inversion: it confronts the subject with the fact that the true Absolute is nothing but the logical disposition of its previous failed attempts to conceive the Absolute – that is, with the vertiginous experience that Truth itself coincides with the path towards Truth (Žižek, 2008, p. 100; emphasis in original).

The Hegelian resource should, therefore, provide sufficient guidelines for deciding what qualifies for a phase, at the same time clarifying what exactly changes in the process of a shift.

4.3 Descriptive and Explanatory adequacy

Ordinarily, this Chapter would be concerned with matters of “validity” and “reliability”. By validity, the concern would be “the relationship between theoretical concept variables [...] and empirical indicator variables (or indicators)” (Dowling & Brown, 2010, p. 24; emphasis in original). Similarly, reliability would be “a measure of the consistency of a coding process when carried out on different occasions and/or by different researchers” (Ibid). This project rather generates a framework for engaging with the object of the study, which is constant from one paper to another. As such, the methodology of this project is better represented in terms of Chomsky’s notions of “descriptive” and “explanatory adequacy”. Chomsky is addressing the field of linguistics, but his claims are applicable beyond linguistics.

The idea of descriptive adequacy is concerned with generating general terms of specific phenomena one is looking at, that can account for the significant features of the phenomena (Chomsky, 2000, p. 7). The
Hegelian dialectical process, as a descriptive device for studying Bernstein’s work, enables me to account for significant features in each of Bernstein’s papers. I suppose that the Hegelian descriptive device, since it does not make any prior assumptions about the nature of the object of this study, has a heightened descriptive adequacy. The descriptive adequacy, in its effort to be accurate, generates a whole series of distinct descriptions. As such, on the level of descriptive adequacy, the scope of description is on individual papers. The data generated on the basis of individual papers is an attempt at providing a descriptive adequacy.

The idea of “explanatory adequacy is concerned with the internal structure of the device; that is, it aims to provide a principled basis, independent of any particular [description]” (Chomsky, 1993, p. 63). In other words, explanatory adequacy works to limit the series of distinct descriptions, by focusing on more general generative principles that have generated all the papers that constitute any particular phase. The overarching general features that cause the story to come out the way it does is what is sought at this level. The approach taken for explanatory adequacy, in the context of Bernstein’s work, is breaking down the work into phases, whereby the structuring of the work is articulated as taking different forms in different phases. This level of description is only possible after adequate descriptions have been generated. To that end, explanatory adequacy is discussed towards the conclusion of each data Chapter, at which point an engagement with the basic claims utilized to arrive at the necessity of each phase is made.

4.4 Partitioning of the corpus of papers into specific phases
In this section, I look for clues from the resources utilized to partition Bernstein’s work into phases in Chapter Two to decide how to distribute Bernstein’s papers across the four phases. The challenge is that none of the resources utilized for purposes of Chapter Two provide a comprehensive mapping out of the papers into phases. In fact, there are papers that do not necessarily express Bernstein’s ideas at a given
time, but may be describing an experiment, responses to criticisms, a book review and the like. In addition, there are papers whose main ideas are developed more fully in other papers. Also, there are questions of the chronology of papers in relation to their place in the story of phases. At this point, a simple chronology of the development of ideas in papers on the basis of their time of being written, as well as their appearance in the *Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity: Theory, Research, Critique* volume will be assumed, except for the paper “Codes and their positioning: A case study in misrecognition”, which appears at the end of the final volume, but basically utilizes ideas from the second and third phases. For purposes of the segmentation at this stage, this paper will be placed under the third phase.

After establishing what papers belong to each phase, I choose from the pool of papers in each phase those that I use for generating the basic data in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight, corresponding to the four phases, respectively. I look at all the papers but focus my analysis on those that I see fit and more suitable for this work. I reckon it is more productive to have a more manageable class of papers for more focused analysis, trusting that they are sufficiently representative of the general corpus of Bernstein’s work.

### 4.4.1 Language Thesis

The Language Thesis phase is mainly characterized by the theoretical distinction of formal and public language use. Atkinson (1985, p. 39) and Sadovnik (2001, p. 688) are among those who consider the mentioned theoretical distinction as one of the major marks for the first phase. There are other marks associated with the first phase. However, there is no simple way of reconciling them as has been discussed in Chapter Two. As a result, the major criterion for deciding which papers belong to the first phase shall mainly be on the basis of the formal and public language use distinction as a major resource of the paper. The second criterion is all papers that were written before the shift to the second phase.
Only two of Bernstein’s papers meet the first criterion, although two others are included in this phase because they appear before the second phase was developed. The first paper that is included in this phase because it meets the second criterion is “Language and social class”, which mainly describes an experiment to justify the asserted relationship between speech mode and social class. The second is “A review of ‘The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren’”, which is a review of a book. Therefore, four papers are recognized as belonging to this phase, and they are listed below:

- “Some sociological determinants of perception” (1958)
- “A public langue: some sociological implications of linguistic form” (1959)
- “Language and social class” (1960a)

4.4.2 Code Theory
The Code Theory marks a terminological shift from public and formal language use to restricted and elaborated codes. In Chapter Two, we noted that it was in Bernstein’s “Linguistic codes, hesitation phenomena and intelligence” paper that the terms restricted and elaborated codes were first used. This paper, therefore, marks the upper limit of this phase. In Chapter Two, we noted that the Code Theory evolves from operating on a linguistic level only, to including the idea if orientation to meaning. In Bernstein’s work, the term code, as has been noted in Chapter Two, is later used to refer to curriculum type: collection and integrated. However, it is only this phase that has restricted and elaborated codes as the major distinction in the papers. In fact, as noted in Chapter Two, in his interview with Solomon, Bernstein acknowledges that the distinction between elaborated and restricted codes was a major distinction at some point, until the codes got “subsumed under higher order concepts” (Solomon, 1999, p. 273). Bernstein identifies the (1971a) paper as being the point at which this shift in the theory took place (Ibid). Papers that were written between the acknowledged upper limit and the (1971) paper
would naturally seem to fall under this phase. It can be noticed that some of the papers that have been included under this phase do not use restricted and elaborated codes, but they appear within the period when Bernstein’s major theoretical distinction is elaborated and restricted codes. From this outlook, the list below contains papers that fall under the second phase.

- “Linguistic codes, hesitation phenomena and intelligence” (1962a)
- “Social class, linguistic codes and grammatical elements” (1962b)
- “A social-linguistic approach to social learning” (1965)
- “Sources of consensus and disaffection in education” (1966a)
- “Rituals in education” (1966b)
- “Open schools-open society?” (1967)
- “A social-linguistic approach to socialisation: with some reference to educability” (1968)
- “A critique of the concept of compensatory education” (1969)
- “Social class, language and socialisation” (1970a)
- “On the curriculum” (1970b)

4.4.3 Pedagogic Discourse

In Chapter Two, one of the major characterizations of the Pedagogic Discourse phase noted was that it “was concerned with the production, distribution and reproduction of official knowledge and how this knowledge is related to structurally determined power relations” (Sadovnik, 2001, p. 691). The concern is no longer about the sociolinguistic codes but with the knowledge codes. In addition, as noted under the discussion of the Code Theory phase, Bernstein places the 1971 paper as the first in this phase, and views the next shift in the “Vertical and horizontal discourses: an essay” paper (Solomon, 1999, p. 273). Therefore, all the papers between these papers fall under this phase, and they include:
- “On the classification and framing of educational knowledge” (1971a)
- “The sociology of education: a brief account” (1972)
- “Class and pedagogies: visible and invisible” (1975a)
- “Social class and pedagogic practice” (1987a)
- “Elaborated and restricted codes: overview and criticisms” (1987b)
- “Education, symbolic control, and social practice” (2000)
- “The social construction of pedagogic discourse” (2000)
- “Pedagogic codes and their modalities of practice” (2000)
- “Thoughts on the Trivium and Quadrivium: The Divorce of Knowledge from the Knower” (2000)
- “Research and languages of Description” (2000)
- “Codes and Research” (2000)
- “Sociolinguistics: A Personal View” (2000)
- “Codes and their positioning: A case study in misrecognition” (2000)

4.4.4 Knowledge Structure
The authors referred to in Chapter Two argue that the Knowledge Structures phase has only one paper – “Vertical and horizontal discourse: An essay”. It has been mentioned in Chapter Two that there are some papers that seem to have some ideas that get developed into the “Vertical and horizontal discourse: An essay” paper, but are not considered as belonging in this phase. The major theoretical distinction of this phase is the vertical and horizontal discourses.
4.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter, I initially define the object of this project in terms of three levels: Bernstein’s papers that initially appeared in different journals, chapters of books as well as public lectures, which now have mostly been put together in the in the \textit{Class, Codes and Control}, I, III and IV, and the fifth volume titled \textit{Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity: Theory, Research, Critique}. Secondly, the object of the study has been defined in terms of clusters of papers, distributed across four phases according to the partitioning discussed in Chapter Two. The last level of defining the object of this project entails a focus on individual papers. The theoretical resources developed in Chapter Three were discussed in terms of how they will engage with Bernstein’s work to generate data in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight. The moments of Hegel’s dialectic: Actuality, Possibility, Necessity and Contingent are recognized as the basic resources that would be used to provide the basic mode of analysis for this project. Two levels of analysis have been discussed, in terms of descriptive and analytic adequacy. The descriptive adequacy would be the primary production of data of individual papers. The explanatory adequacy is the secondary level of analysis, whereby using the primary data generated, the structuring of the work enabling for the establishment of each phase is sought. Finally, on the basis of some of the partitioning of Bernstein’s work into phases in Chapter Two, as well as the chronology of the papers, Bernstein’s papers have been placed in the various phases they reasonably belong.

It is proper that my construction of the research object has not concerned itself with the question of the everyday/academic distinction. The idea is that we first construct an appropriate object and then ask whether or not it exhibits the particular features that would situate the use of the everyday/academic distinction as foundational within and across the phases. If it already appears to be the case that that distinction is fading from view, so much the worse for those who insistently present Bernstein’s work as substantially grounded in that distinction.
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter employs the analytic resources developed in Chapters Three and Four to generate data from papers that constitute the first phase, as per segmentation developed in Chapter Two. It will be remembered that these papers constitute the fundamental distinction of formal and public language use. It will also be remembered from the previous Chapter that four papers have been identified as belonging to this phase, and they include: “Some sociological determinants of perception” (1958), “A public language: some sociological implications of linguistic form” (1959), “Language and social class” (1960a), and “A review of ‘The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren” (1960b). As has been alluded to in the preceding Chapter, the data is generated via the four moments of Actuality, Possibility, Necessity and, maybe Contingency from the second paper. The discussion of Contingency leads to the consideration of some of the criticisms that some scholars have levelled against Bernstein’s first phase. Finally, an engagement with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is made, since it is what Bernstein uses to establish the necessity of the first phase.

It has been mentioned that the major propositions of this phase subsist in the categories of public and formal language use. The categories are roughly associated with working-class and middle-class children, respectively. Public language is characterised as followings:

if the words used are part of a language which contains a high proportion of short commands, simple statements and questions where the symbolism is descriptive, tangible, concrete, visual and of a low order of generality, where the emphasis is on the emotive rather than the logical implications, it will be called a public language (Bernstein, 1958, p. 24; emphasis in original).
The characteristics of formal language use are binarily opposed to those of public language, and therefore supposed complex, “rich in personal, individual qualifications, and its form implies sets of advanced logical operations (Ibid). The implications that go with these characterisations of the two language uses are discussed below.

5.2 Data

5.2.1 “Some sociological determinants of perception”
In this paper there is a specific educational phenomenon which is being focused on by Bernstein, indicating to him that working-class learners are not doing as well as the middle-class learners. He is, therefore, investigating what might be responsible for this state of affairs. Bernstein makes quite strong distinctions that seem to emanate from the fact of failure, on the part of working-class learners, and relative success on the part of middle-class learners. As if correlating to success and failure, respectively, Bernstein discusses supposed characteristics of learners from middle-class families and those from working-class learners. Various characteristics are given in the paper about working-class and middle-class learners. One can disaggregate the different characteristics that Bernstein identifies as follows:

With regards characteristic traits of middle-class children and their families, the first is that they use a formal language (Bernstein, 1958, ps. 28 & 29) as well as an additional language, which is “the language between social equals (peer groups), which approximates to public language” (Ibid., p. 30). The second is that they have an instrumental attitude to social relations (Ibid., p. 25). The third is that they are sensitive to the structure of objects (Ibid., p. 24). The fourth, that they appreciate present activities in relation to their long term ends (Ibid., p. 25). The fifth one is that they perceive symbolic relationships and even impose new relationships among events (Ibid).
Coming to the characteristic traits of working-class children and their families, the first is that they use only a public language (Ibid., ps. 28 & 29). The second is that they have a non-instrumental attitude to social relations (Ibid., p. 25). The third is that they are sensitive to the content of objects (Ibid., p. 24). The fourth is that they rarely view present activities as means to long term ends (Ibid., p. 25). The fifth is that they perceive events as only loosely connected with one another (Ibid).

This seems to be the way in which Bernstein articulates the problem that he is treating in this paper. As such, this is the moment of Actuality.

Moving on to the mode of reflection, which indicates the moment of Possibility, one can detect a number of symbolic features in the paper which are presented as correlated with the characteristic traits identified in the moment of Actuality, and which seem to together represent an array of possible explanations for the problem of the paper. The following question could be used as a guiding framework for understanding the activities here: What is the symbolic universe within which the encounter between schooling and working-class children, resulting in educational failure, is being made meaningful? The following symbolic features are found in the paper and they include form of language, form of subjective engagement, engagement with objects (or mode of perceiving), temporal focus and sensitivity to causality.

Bernstein discusses these symbolic features in their interrelatedness, not individually. As such, what follows articulates some of the causal relations of these features. The form of language use and sensitivity to causality are differently expressed with regards either social class. Middle-class learners use formal language which, it is claimed, enables them to “differentiate different ranges of experience and thus modify what is actually responded to in an object” (Ibid., p. 27). As a result, middle-class learners are able to perceive symbolic relationships and even impose new ones (Ibid., p. 30). Curiosity is
high as a result. The working-class learners, with their public language, learn to respond to direct perceptions: “The stress on the present in the means of communication precludes the understanding of the meaningfulness of a time continuum other than of a limited order” (Ibid., p. 33; emphasis in original). As a result, a descriptive cognitive process is developed, and events are perceived as only loosely connected with one another, thereby resulting in low levels of curiosity (Ibid., p. 33).

Similarly, the form of subjective engagement and temporal focus find unique expression among middle-class learners and working-class learners in the paper. Middle-class learners are supposed to have an instrumental attitude to social relations and to objects, where present activities are appreciated in relation to their long term ends, as a result, they are able to respond to and exploit the school framework, whose structure is similar to that of a middle-class family (Ibid., p. 25 & 30). In addition, in the middle-class family, the child is related to in ways that differentiate him/her as an individual (Ibid., p. 27). The ultimate result of this is an increased ability of the learner to discriminate and elaborate objects in the surrounding and this finds realisation in the form of language use (Ibid., p. 28). Working-class learners are seen as having a non-instrumental attitude to social relations and objects, in the sense that present activities are hardly viewed as means to long term ends. As a result, they would not easily respond to and exploit the school framework, which is structured in such a way that present activities have bearing on long term ends (Ibid., p. 29). In the working-class family, a child is not related to in ways that differentiate him as an individual, therefore, objects in the surrounding are not sufficiently discriminated. Such social relations have implications on the form of language use developed by the child.

Finally, the mode of perceiving (engagement with objects) is also supposed to find different expression among learners, according to their social class. The language use and mode of social relations among middle-class families facilitate the development of sensitivity to the structure of objects, which is in
harmony with the way in which the school operates (Ibid., ps. 28 & 29). Along similar lines, the language use and mode of social relations among working-class families facilitate the development of sensitivity to the content of objects, which is contrary to that operative at school, thereby resulting in some discontinuity between home and school (Ibid). Such discontinuity disadvantages the working-class learner.

As can be seen from the above, the distinctions that Bernstein makes in this paper are quite strong, where characteristics distributed to learners from one social group by Bernstein’s descriptive apparatus are almost diametrically opposed to those distributed to the other group. In this paper, the causal relations among the symbolic features is not always clear, until Bernstein begins aligning himself with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, at which point the moment of Necessity comes into the picture, which is the next moment for discussion.

On the basis of language use and supported by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Bernstein makes statements that situate language use as causal of cognitive features of students from different social backgrounds: “the mode of a language structure – the way in which words and sentences are related – reflects a particular form of the structuring of feeling and so the very means of interaction and response to the environment” (Ibid., p. 26). Social class is determinant of forms of language use, which in turn regulate particular forms of consciousness. In line with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which goes from language to thought, Bernstein moves from the form of language use to forms of consciousness. However, Bernstein has the social relations as primary, where the way in which children are related towards results in the exploitation of a particular type of language use, which in turn regulates forms of consciousness (Ibid., ps. 28 & 29). Formal language has a greater attunement with what is required in school, hence middle-class children are more successful in school (Ibid). On the other hand, public language is not capable of
organising the world in ways favourable for the school context, therefore does not enable success in schooling for working-class learners (Ibid).

In conclusion, it is language use that is the overdetermining element in this paper, constituting the arrival at Necessity. It is language use that enables the causal relationships among the various symbolic features to find a definite form.

### 5.2.2 “A public language: some sociological implications of a linguistic form”

Just as in the previous paper, this paper seems to take the differential academic performance of learners from different social groups as its motivating problem. However, this paper foregrounds language use as the major cause for differential academic performance among social groups: “Language is considered one of the most important means of initiating, synthesizing, and reinforcing ways of thinking, feeling and behaviour which are functionally related to the social group” (Bernstein, 1959, p. 43; emphasis in original). With this background the paper focuses on the characteristic traits of both public and formal language use, as well as what it is about them that could be responsible for the class correlated differential academic performance. Characteristic traits of the categories of one form of language use are sought and contrasted with those of the other. The characteristic traits of language use and their effects could be represented in terms of public language on one hand and formal language use on the other.

Starting with public language, the first characteristic trait is that it has grammatically simple and syntactically poor sentences, which do not facilitate the development of ideas and the sensitivity to associations (Ibid., P. 44). The second one is it lacks impersonal pronouns, which confines one to immediate experiences (Ibid). The third is that it prefers categorical statements, which reinforce the personal (as opposed to the logical) (Ibid., p. 45). The fourth characteristic trait of public language is that
it has a predominance of the use of social (idiomatic) expressions, which exploits the emotive, as opposed to the logical impact of language (Ibid., p. 46). The fifth trait is that it has implicit individual qualifications, which lead to crude differentiations of meaning (Ibid).

Coming to characteristics of formal language, the first is that it has precise grammatical command and sentence structure, which enhances the communication of thoughts and associations (Ibid., p. 44). The second one is that it requires a regular use of impersonal pronouns, which leads to a transcendence of personal experience, enabling for characteristic relationships with persons and objects (Ibid). The third is the frequent use of prepositions, which reinforces logical reasoning (Ibid., p. 45). The fourth is that individual feelings are mediated by language use, enabling the development of high causal level of generality (Ibid., p. 46). The fifth is the presence of explicit individual qualifications, which lead to logically overt and delicately differentiated meanings (Ibid).

All the above elements seem to constitute the staging of the problem of the paper or the formal ground. As such, it indexes the moment of Actuality.

The real ground of the paper constitutes a number of symbolic features, which are correlated with the characteristic traits identified in the moment of Actuality, and seem to, together, represent an array of possible explanations for the problem of the paper. The following question could be used as a guide for staging the representation of the symbolic features of the paper: What is the symbolic universe within which characteristic traits of public language use, as the major determinant of academic failure among learners from working-class backgrounds, is made meaningful in the paper? The following constitute the symbolic features of the paper: the form of syntactic construction, regularity of use of pronouns, the level of distinction between reason and conclusion in a sentence, the level of explicitness of individual intent and degree of explication of meaning.
According to Bernstein, in public language, the “short, grammatically simple, often unfinished sentences, a poor syntactical construction with a verbal form stressing the active mood” (Bernstein, 1959, p. 42) lead to the development of sensitivities to the individuality of things, as opposed to processes (Ibid., p. 44). The form of the language, from the perspective of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, is therefore responsible for the nature of thought.

The simple sentence construction and simple use of conjunctions necessarily affect the length and type of a complete idea (Ibid., p. 44). As a result, the level of conceptualisation is reduced, since the order of causality is limited (Ibid., p. 50). It follows, therefore, that conceptualisation or thought is a product of the language. It is worth remembering that this paper, from the beginning, foregrounds the complete ground with which it operates, which is the primacy of language in facilitating the development of thought processes. As a result, it makes sense for Bernstein to suppose that the language form that is characterised by simple sentences and use of conjunctions lead to low levels of conceptualisation for its users.

Another characteristic trait of public language use states that where statements of fact are used as both reason and conclusion, curiosity is limited (Ibid., p. 45). Here too, the validity of such a claim depends on the plausibility of linguistic determinism, because it would follow that the form that language takes would have consequences on the thought processes.

The last characteristic trait of public language which we discuss here states that socially generated idiomatic expressions “tend to operate on a low causal level of generality in which descriptive, concrete, visible, tactile symbols are employed, aimed at maximising the emotive rather than the logical impact” (Ibid., p. 46). The suggestion here is that since the learner socialised into this kind of language responds to things immediately given, rather than to the implications of a matrix of relationships, the intensity of
curiosity would be low for them (Ibid., p. 50). This trait of language use contains the causal relations starting from the nature of social order, which gets reflected in language and realised in thought of its members.

All the considerations above lead to the conclusion that “the linguistic form is a powerful conditioner of what is learnt and how it is learnt, and so influences future learning” (Ibid., p. 54). As has been said all through the consideration of the characteristic traits of public language use, this way of understanding language (form) is derived from basic suggestions of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis or linguistic determinism, which foregrounds language in the structuring of thought. The consideration of the characteristic traits of public language use is the real ground of the paper and constitutes the moment of Possibility. This discussion naturally leads to the focus on the investigation of complete ground.

In this paper, it has been mentioned that the complete ground of the paper is language use as the major regulator of thought, therefore responsible for poor academic performance among learners from working-class backgrounds. However, within the consideration of various characteristic traits of public language use, Bernstein seems to foreground the degree of explication of meaning as the major component that is ultimately responsible for the resultant capabilities for thought for learners: “Finally, [the degree of explication of meaning is] the [...] most important characteristic [which] may be regarded as the determinant of the previous [ones]” (Ibid., p. 46). Bernstein considers this element as the most important because, for him, it is the one that conditions one’s experience of the world; what is significant and what is not: “The result of this mediating process orients the speaker to a distinct relationship with objects in the environment and so to a different order of learning” (Ibid., p. 47; emphasis in original). This is the moment of Necessity for the paper.
As can be seen from the above, there is no change in the overdetermining element, as such, because language use remains the essential determinant of consciousness. Of course, this paper and the previous one I discusses operate on different levels of analysis, therefore there is a seeming difference in ultimate claims of the papers. This paper, unlike the previous one, is wholly committed to analysing the characteristics of language use, since it takes for granted the supposition that the form of language use is the major cause of the difference in academic performance between learners from different social backgrounds.

Below, I first look at the various criticisms that have been levelled against this phase of Bernstein’s theory by some scholars, before engaging with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, in which this phase is grounded. Such an engagement is potentially capable of highlighting the points of Contingency in the first phase of Bernstein’s theory.

5.3 Criticisms
A number of scholars, among them Danzig (1995), Gordon (1981), Jackson (1974) and Stubbs (1983), have criticised Bernstein’s first phase. Danzig (1995) initially describes Bernstein’s language thesis and the code theory, before focusing his discussion on two major criticisms levelled against both these phases of Bernstein’s work: as a “deficit” and “differences” theory. Actually, Danzig’s discussion is mainly focused on the code theory, vis-à-vis these two criticisms. Stubbs and Jackson discuss the language thesis only indirectly, taking that its limitations are brought to light with a criticism of the code theory. The criticisms raised by Danzig, Stubbs and Jackson are covered by Gordon (1981), who, in my view, is the most interesting of the critics. Consequently, the criticisms represented here mainly come from Gordon. Some of the responses to these criticisms, specifically those by Bernstein himself, are also represented in the discussion that follows.
Gordon (1981) criticises Bernstein’s language thesis as containing “a set of interlocking propositions [six] in which the main concepts and the links themselves were ill-defined or undefined” (p. 73). Gordon focuses his criticism on Bernstein’s lists of characteristics of both public and formal language. He analyses the lists and considers their value in linguistic terms. His findings are that Bernstein does not provide sufficient linguistic recognition conditions to which Gordon responds by proposing the following:

In order to convert these propositions into a testable theory it would, at the very least, have been necessary to define all the key elements involved – namely, social class, family structures, modes of perception and varieties of speech, perhaps even educational attainment – strictly independently of one another and in terms of allowing for the derivation of appropriate and unambiguous recognition criteria (Ibid., p. 73).

Gordon thus dismisses Bernstein’s early work as fundamentally unscientific (Ibid). In similar lines, Stubbs argues that the major inadequacy of Bernstein’s language thesis is its lack of “linguistic exemplification”, rendering the theory non-testable (Stubbs, 1983, p. 61). Bernstein himself seems to concur with Gordon and Stubbs when he says, “Between 1958 and 1961 I used a list of unreliable features as an initial attempt at a description which included [...] ten [linguistic] features” (Bernstein, 1987b, p. 95).

In response to the criticism, Bernstein gives some examples of empirical work that had been done by various scholars, like Wells (1985), Aggleton (1984), Adlam et al. (1977) and in Bernstein (1968 & 1971c), by way of giving evidence to the fact that the theory even at this time could be tested, therefore scientific (Bernstein, 1987b, p. 120-121).

Another problem that Gordon has with Bernstein’s language thesis is that, “Public language and formal language were presented as types of language manifest in observable speech varieties: it was assumed
that public language or formal language are actually spoken” (Gordon, 1981, p. 74). I suppose that there are some points of ambiguity in this regard in the work of the language thesis. This ambiguity is overcome in the code thesis phase, where a code is viewed as only a regulative principle of speech (Ibid).

It seems to me that the criticisms noted above demand greater clarity on the causal relationships among various symbolic features and, at a more fundamental level, question the validity of the assumptions informing some of the causal relationships asserted. In this regard, it seems more productive to approach the assessment of language thesis by questioning the basic assumptions of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which is the content of the discussion that follows.

5.4 Reconsidering Sapir-Whorf and linguistic determinism

It has been mentioned before that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis represents the basic expression of the resources upon which Bernstein draws to foreground language use as the overdetermining element of the language thesis phase. We have just seen what some of the criticisms of Bernstein’s first phase are, but I suppose a far more substantial critique should be an engagement with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, since it is what is used to establish the necessity for the main proposition in Bernstein’s work at this point in time. Bernstein is sometimes explicit in his reference to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, but sometimes he is not, although his position seems to be very close to that of Sapir-Whorf. Here I assess the validity of the claims of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, supposing that such an effort would bring to bear comparable points of need in the language thesis phase.

It is worth acknowledging that the basic suppositions of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis have found expression in a number of fields, maybe the most forceful ones since the middle years of the 20th century to the present, some of which have been in linguistics, anthropology, psychology, philosophy
and even the natural sciences. As such, it would be unfair to quickly rubbish away these ideas without at least showing the complexity of the matter. However, it is not the scope of this project to do a comprehensive treatment of the various dimensions of the debate on and about the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, but it should suffice to identify pointers that could expose one to some of the research work done around the area. The basic suppositions of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis coincide with those of “linguistic determinism”. Therefore, the sustainability of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can only be attained on the basis of the validity of linguistic determinism.

The basic idea of linguistic determinism, and hence of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, is that how people reason is defined by the language they speak (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005, p. 634). In this way, how people conceive reality is as a result of their language. The debate here is not whether language has any effect on thought, but the degree to which the form of language determines one’s thought processes. The issue, therefore, is better represented as: “Do formal aspects of a particular linguistic system (e.g., features of the grammar or the lexicon) organize the thought processes of its users?” (Ibid).

There is no better place to start this discussion than a consideration of some research work done to understanding knowledge acquisition in infants. It would follow from linguistic determinism that before infants acquire language, they would be completely devoid of cognition, and that it is at the time of learning language that they enter the conceptual world. However, as Gleitman & Papafragou (2005) and Pinker (2007) show, such a position is difficult to sustain. Actually, there is some research work that demonstrates that “infants [...] possess some ‘core knowledge’ that enters into first categorization of objects, properties, and events in the world” (Ibid., p. 635). Some of this research work that even Gleitman & Papafragou (2005) refer to includes Carey (1982), Kellman (1996), Gelman & Spelke (1981), Leslie & Keeble (1987), Mandler (1996), Quinn (2001), Spelke et., al., (1992).
Another area of research on the matter is best represented by the widely referenced misconception that the Eskimos have a remarkably vast number of words for snow. The truth-value of this understanding is not of importance here but the interpretation of the phenomenon. The interpretation in line with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that the language for Eskimos enables them to perceive many classes of snow, because of the resources of language. However, Pinker argues against this, and I agree, that: “The stoke of words in a language reflects the kinds of things its speakers deal with in their lives and hence think about” (Pinker, 2007, p. 127). Similarly, the work of Bloom (1999) points to a conclusion that the more an experience or phenomenon becomes part of a people’s lives, the more they incorporate it into their language system, and hence facilitate its reference in language. It is the experience first, then language, not language first, then experience.

There is some work, particularly in psychology, which shows that, at least on the level of working memory, people tend to use specific words and images to store information (Baddeley, 1999, ps. 49 - 66). This is a possible case for linguistic determinism. In addition to this, it is common knowledge that people use “verbal mnemonics” to remember various concepts. Pinker offers two responses to the above claims, which seem to satisfactorily respond to the claims of linguistic determinism here. The first is that the words used for remembering concepts or ideas are not part of the language (Pinker, 2007, p. 129), in which case it is not the language as such that affects thought. The second reason is that “For one thing, the stoke of words in a language is not a closed inventory, permanently cramping its speakers’ thoughts, but is constantly being expanded as people respond to cognitive needs by coining jargon, slang, and specialized words” (Ibid). In this light, there seems to be something more fundamental than language at work in the process of remembering, although at first sight it seems that people remember in words.
Another possible case for linguistic determinism is the view that each language tends to characterise reality in specific ways, whereby through language, certain aspects of an occurrence are more prominent than others. Pinker makes reference to some work that shows how English tends to emphasize tenses, Turkish makes explicit whether one saw the incident first-hand or heard about it from another person, while verbs in Spanish and Greek put together the fact of motion and direction (Ibid., 132). A helpful distinction here, which Pinker uses, is that of “thinking for speaking” and “thinking for thinking” (Ibid). Thinking for speaking is a way of selecting and organising words for purposes of communicating some meaning. It seems that there is no problem in establishing that there is a correlation between language and thought when one is thinking for speaking. At least Gleitman & Papafragou argue persuasively along these lines and even make reference to the big names in this discussion, like Slobin (1996; 2001) and Levelt (1989), who “have pointed to some cases in which a distinction across languages in the resources devoted to different conceptual matters seems almost inevitable” (Gleitman & Papafragou (2005)). However, according to Pinker, the argument should be focused on thinking for thinking. Thinking for thinking is “reasoning about objects and events for purposes other than just describing them” (Pinker, 2007, p. 132). The differences among languages observed above seem to fit the thinking for speaking description, which seems to have some effect on thinking, as has been observed. Besides, it seems sensible to argue that, “When a thought process becomes automatic, it gets deeply embedded in the language system as a cognitive reflex, and its internal workings are no longer consciously available” (Ibid., p. 133). The work of Gentner & Goldin-Meadow (2003) and Gleitman & Papafragou (2005) support this conclusion.

The fact that there is no simple or one-to-one relationship between words and meaning is one of the arguments against linguistic determinism. Pinker (2007) refers to the term “polysemy” (p. 150) to bring out this idea, while Gleitman & Papafragou demonstrate the sheer ambiguity of words and sentences
The relationship between words and meaning is a complex one, and to assume otherwise is difficult to maintain.

Another way of framing the question of the relationship between language and thought is whether the “categories of language become the categories of thought” (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005, p. 640). As expected, there are varying views on this matter. In the view of Gleitman & Papafragou, an important figure in the investigation on this matter is Brown (1957), who supposes that his work gives credible reasons for accepting that there are significant relations between categories of language and categories of thought. Through some experiments, Brown “show[s] how one kind of grammatical practice, the allocation of words to one or another part of speech, does affect cognition” (Brown, 1957, p. 1).

However, authors like Gleitman (1990), Fisher (1996) and Bloom (1994), among others, argue against Brown’s interpretation of his research findings, asserting that “persons, places, and things surface as nouns – are universal and can play causal roles in the acquisition of language – of course, by learners who are predisposed to find just these kinds of syntactic-semantic correlations natural” (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005, p. 640).

There are a variety of other research works on the matter that one can refer to, some of which look at the following themes and objects: “special relationships”, “special frames of reference”, “time”, “number”, “orientation”, (Ibid., pp. 644 – 653). The view taken here is that language is one, among other human faculties, which make up the essence of thought structure, as shown from some research work on the way in which infants learn language by Carey (2008), Soja, Carey, & Spelke (1991), Spelke (1995), for example. Some of the other influences of thought include sensitivity to cause and effect, human agency, spatial relations, among others (Pinker, 2007, p. 149). In addition, “we also know that human thoughts are stored in memory in a form that is far more abstract than sentences” (Ibid), as the research work of Bransford & Franks (1971) demonstrates. Also, the possibility of communication among peoples
from different language groups is itself a case against linguistic determinism. In cases where one language does not have sufficient conceptual resources to engage with some ideas represented by another language, the speakers of that language “stretch it [their language] with metaphors and metonyms, borrow words and phrases from other languages, or coin new slang and jargon” (Pinker, 2007, p. 149).

In short, it seems that claims of linguistic determinism are difficult to sustain. Even if language plays a role in the development of thought processes in people, it seems that its role is rather secondary, maybe superficial. As a result, it seems plausible to conclude that “rather than pointing to cognitive discontinuities among speakers of different languages, cross-linguistic diversity could reveal principled points of departure from one another, otherwise common linguistic-conceptual blueprint humans share as a consequence of their biological endowment” (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005, p. 654). This conclusion sits well with Chomsky (2000).

What then does this discussion of linguistic determinism mean for this phase of Bernstein’s language thesis? It will be remembered that the starting point for this phase is the differential academic performance of students from different social groups, specifically the difficulty of working-class learners to do well at school. Bernstein focuses his investigation on the way in which the form of language use is implicated in the lack of success for working-class learners. There is a very strong suggestion that Bernstein is aligning himself with strong linguistic determinism (in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis), hence the necessity to discuss the validity of that idea in itself. Some ambiguities have also been pointed out, where Bernstein talks about the form of language as being associated with social class. How they are related is not very clear at this point. It is as if the particular form of language is a straight forward phenomenal feature of members of various social classes. One form of the language facilitates acquisition of school knowledge, the other does not. The reason for this is that language form structures
the way in which the world is perceived, and so assign meaning to things in the world in different ways. This is the statement of linguistic determinism. The question, then, has been whether such a claim can be validly sustained. The research work referred to above suggests that these claims cannot be sustained. As such, at the end of the attempt to explain the problem at hand, we are still faced with the question of the differential academic performance that tends to be along the lines of social classes of learners. The language thesis has not enabled a solution to the problem. Therefore, the phase has been closed and another attempt at explaining the problem is necessary.

5.5 Conclusion
The general problem in this phase is a kind of differential outcome for education for learners from different social classes. The focus was on trying to find what is significant about these groups that is causal in generating this kind of distinction with respect to education. We have seen that there are some ambiguities on the causal relationships among symbolic features used in the phase, until the theory aligns itself with the Sapir-Whorf story, which says that language structures and regulates thought. This alignment with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis places the theory within the challenges of the claims of linguistic determinism, whose claims have been put into question. Here lies the point of contingency for the language thesis phase. In addition, even after the theory is aligned with the Sapir-Whorf story, there is always a suggestion that one might be able to turn the causal arrow in the opposite direction, as if somehow suggesting that there is something other than language, which causes the language, and it is not language that causes thought, it is the form of thought that causes the form of language. But, one might ask, where does the form of thought come from? The next phase seems to attend to this question.

We should, of course, ask how the results of the analysis presented in this Chapter sit in relation to the everyday/academic distinction. Well, I suppose that some scholars might be tempted to read the public
language/formal language distinction as a realisation of the everyday/academic distinction, reading the putative lack of a formal language for working-class subjects as confining them to forms of thought that privilege everyday, common-sense thinking, while middle-class subjects get easier access to academic discourse because of their possession of a formal language. What the criticisms of Sapir-Whorf indicate, however, is that the habits of language use of the working-classes cannot be used as a reliable index of the forms of thought available to learners from such backgrounds. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that working-class children are incapable of thinking in ways that enable them to engage in academic work productively.

In fact, it may be the case that a general, commonsensical, belief in linguistic determinism authorizes the distribution of non-academic forms of knowledge and thought to working-class children in schooling. Dowling (1998) certainly presents a very strong case for arguing that it is schooling that distributes “mathematics” rendered as everyday/commonsensical/non-academic drivel to working-class learners.
Chapter six

6.1 Introduction

In the first phase discussed in the previous Chapter, it has been seen that in an attempt to understand the problem of differential academic performance of learners from different social classes, Bernstein generates a set of opposing categories that he generally distributes to working-class and middle-class subjects. Some of these categories include the form of language use, the form of subjective engagement, engagement with objects (or the mode of perceiving), temporal focus, and sensitivity to causality. Further, it has also been shown that Bernstein places emphasis on language use as a major regulator of thought, drawing enrichment from specific authors whose ideas have been represented in the terms of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. At the end of Chapter Five, it was shown that the claims of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and, therefore, those developed by Bernstein in the phase, are unsustainable.

This Chapter represents another attempt by Bernstein to engage with the issue of the generally superior academic performances of children from middle-class families, relative to those from working-class families. As in the first phase, in this phase Bernstein generates a set of opposing categories that he distributes to the children from the two social classes.

The major propositions in this phase include propositions on sociolinguistic codes, social relations at the family level and cognitive activities. Bernstein emphasises sociolinguistic codes as primarily responsible for differential academic performance of children from different social classes. Initially, codes are understood in terms of social functional uses of language which create patterns of relevance and meaning. Later in this phase Bernstein discusses codes in terms of orientation to meaning, on the basis of one’s place in the division of labour. The data generated from Bernstein’s papers in this Chapter
substantiate the characterisation of the phase made and also shows the development of some of the ideas in the phase.

It will be remembered that the second phase has been referred to as the “code theory”. The main feature of the code theory is the “elaborated” and “restricted” codes distinction, which constitutes a major distinction of the theory. It will also be remembered that the following papers have been suggested as belonging to this phase: “Linguistic codes, hesitation phenomena and intelligence” (1962a), “Social class, linguistic codes and grammatical elements” (1962b), “A social-linguistic approach to social learning” (1965), “Sources of consensus and disaffection in education” (1966a), “Rituals in education” (1966b), “Open schools-open society?” (1967), “A social-linguistic approach to socialisation: with some reference to educability” (1968), “A critique of the concept of compensatory education” (1969), “Social class, language and socialisation” (1970a), “On the curriculum” (1970b). As in the previous chapter, after the generation of data from the papers via the four moments of Actuality, Possibility, Necessity and Contingency, is a section discussing some of the criticisms by various scholars. The final section before the conclusion is a general assessment of the ideas that Bernstein develops in the phase, particularly those he uses to establish the necessity of the code theory phase.

6.2 Data

6.2.1 “Linguistic codes, hesitation phenomena and intelligence”
In this paper, there seems to be an immediate problem as well as a more fundamental one. On the surface, it seems that Bernstein is concerned with providing some evidence to support claims that there are two codes: elaborated and restricted, associated with social groups, middle- and working-class, respectively. Bernstein uses the notion of “verbal planning”, using the technique of analysing “hesitation phenomena”, as used by Goldman-Eisler, to make his case (Bernstein, 1962a, p. 82 & 92). However, at a
more fundamental level, the paper seems to be concerned with investigating the reasons for the differences in academic performance, which tended to be distributed along social class lines. As though relating to success and failure, Bernstein examines some characteristics of leaners from middle-class families and those of working-class learners, respectively. One can represent these different characteristics that Bernstein identifies as follows, starting with characteristic features of middle-class children: individuals relate in ways that enhance the construction and exchange of individuated symbols (Ibid., p. 78), they have access to an elaborated code (Ibid., p. 92) and the families develop universalistic meanings (Ibid., p. 78).

The characteristic features of working-class children include: individuals relate in ways that enhance the construction and exchange of social symbols (Ibid., ps. 77 & 78), they only have access to a restricted code (Ibid., p. 92) and the families develop particularistic meanings (Ibid., p. 78).

The positing reflection of the paper, therefore, seems to be represented in terms of recognisable characteristics apparently correlating with social groups, within the context of differential academic performance between the groups. This is the moment of Actuality.

With regards to external reflection, a number of symbolic features, which are correlated with the characteristic traits identified in the Actuality moment, seem to represent an array of possible explanations for the problem of the paper. This array of possible explanations constitutes the symbolic universe within which the encounter between schooling and working-class learners resulting in educational failure, and schooling and that of middle-class learners resulting in educational success, is made meaningful. The symbolic features of the paper include form of social relations, linguistic code and cognitive activity.
It is clear from the paper that Bernstein supposes that the form of social relations is an important component in explaining the problem of the paper. He argues that, in middle-class families, individuals are related to in ways that enable the construction and exchange of “individuated symbols”, while in working-class families, relations are such that they facilitate the construction and exchange of “social symbols” (Ibid., p. 78). The form of social relations acts selectively on the resultant code type, elaborated or restricted, which then becomes a symbolic expression of the social relations. The code type does not only reflect the form of the social relations, it also reinforces them, as well as creates for its users ranges of meaning (Ibid., p. 76).

It might be worth saying how Bernstein understands codes at this point in time.

The term “code” refers to the principles which regulate the following process: “Orientation” – examination of the incoming message: “associations” – recognition of patterns of dominant signals, and “organisation” and “combination” of signals to generate an appropriate response (Ibid., p. 80). Bernstein argues that elaborated codes orient users to universalistic meanings, while restricted codes orient users to particularistic meanings (Ibid., p. 78).

As can be seen above, cognitive activities are considered as important for understanding the problem of the paper. Bernstein sees differences in cognitive activities in learners from different social classes. Middle-class families develop universalistic meanings in their children, “summarising general means and ends”, while working-class families develop particularistic meanings, “summarising local means and ends” (Ibid., p. 79).

At this level of external reflection, one cannot quite understand the specific order of relationships among the mentioned symbolic features of the paper. This is the moment of Possibility.
A closer look at the paper enables one to extract some clues about the underlying causal relations supposed by Bernstein. In the introduction to the paper, Bernstein refers to Luria’s thesis on the “regulative function of speech”, from which he formulates his own, which is indicated thus: “I shall here propose that forms of spoken language in the process of their learning initiate, generalize and reinforce special types of relationship with the environment and thus create for the individual particular dimensions of significance” (Ibid., p. 76). The “forms of spoken language”, which Bernstein later refers to as “codes”, are a product of social relations and they then regulate one’s experience of the world. In this way, academic performance as a product of one’s specific “dimensions of significance” is caused by one’s form of spoken form of language or code. The causal order, therefore, is something like: the form of social relations generates one’s orientation to linguistic codes, which then regulate one’s cognitive activities. As such, the orientation to linguistic code constitutes the determining reflection or moment of Necessity.

There seems to be a change in the overdetermining element in this paper, from language use in the preceding paper (and the preceding phase, generally), to linguistic code in this paper. However, there does not seem to be much of real change from the basic claims of the previous phase. In the previous phase, the supposition that language use regulates the way one experiences reality has been disputed. It is difficult to see how much different the introduction of code, which is here understood as a form of language, can escape the criticisms developed in the previous phase. This concern brings to light some points of contingency present in this paper. A detailed discussion of this is presented towards the end of this Chapter.
6.2.2 “A social-linguistic approach to social learning”

The expressive causality of this paper, as in the previous papers, seeks to explain what is responsible for the differential academic performance that seems to be distributed along the lines of social class, where middle-class learners generally do better than their working-class counterparts. Again, Bernstein proceeds by identifying some characteristic features of working-class children/families and middle-class children/families that are immediately suggested to him. Some of the characteristic features of learners from different social classes that he draws attention to are distinguished.

Starting with characteristic traits of working-class children, their cognitive activities are particularistic with reference to meaning (Bernstein, 1965, pp. 129 & 130), their social relations emphasise the use of social symbols (Ibid., p. 131) and they have access only to restricted codes (Ibid., p. 136).

On the other hand, the characteristic traits of middle-class children are that their cognitive activities are universalistic with reference to meaning (Ibid., ps. 129 & 130), their social relations are of an individuated type (Ibid., p. 131) and they have access to an elaborated code (Ibid., p. 136).

This level of analysis in the paper, where the apparent differences between learners from different social classes are highlighted within the differential academic performance of learners, is what constitutes the moment of Actuality.

From this level of expressive causality Bernstein identifies symbolic features which constitute the symbolic universe within which the encounter between schooling and working-class children result in educational failure, and that of schooling and middle-class children result in educational success, is made meaningful in the paper. This is the transitive causality, which constitutes symbolic features that represent possible explanations for the problem of the paper, and they correlate with the characteristic traits of learners from either working or middle-class. These symbolic features include an orientation to
meaning: universalistic vs. particularistic, social relations: individuated vs. social symbols and linguistic codes: elaborated vs. restricted.

Bernstein discusses orientation to meaning, either universalistic or particularistic, in terms of degree of explication of meaning. Where meaning is made explicit through the facilities of language, meanings are deemed universalistic (Ibid., p. 29). Where meanings are only made implicit through the resources of language, meanings are considered particularistic.

Social relations, as another important component to understanding the problem of the paper, are discussed in terms of the role they play in the formation of linguistic codes, which are viewed as transmitters of culture (Ibid., p. 122). Social structure is acknowledged as the “originating determinant” of linguistic codes (Ibid., p. 131). In this way, the designing traits that form social structure find expression in the linguistic codes, via the form that the social relations take. A restricted code develops where social relations are based on a “[...] common, extensive set of closely-shared identifications and expectations self-consciously held by the members” (Ibid., 127). “An elaborated code develops where social relations emphasise the verbal elaboration of explicit referents” (Ibid., p. 128).

The consequence of one’s orientation to either “linguistic form is the formation of specific [...] forms of experience, relevance, identity, and meaning” (Ibid., p. 125). It is clear, then, that linguistic form is here supposed to be the primary regulator of experience. Bernstein supposes that elaborated codes tend to be analytic and abstract, while restricted codes tend to be concrete, descriptive and narrative (Ibid., pp. 28 – 29). In addition, since for Bernstein schools supposedly, operate according to an elaborated code, a child oriented towards the use of an elaborated code has a better possibility of profiting from the school experience:
Where a child is sensitive to an elaborated code the school experience for such a child is one of symbolic and social development; for the child limited to a restricted code the school experience is one of symbolic and social change (ibid. p. 136).

In Bernstein’s view, two modes of an elaborated code are discernible: one ordering verbal elaboration of “interpersonal relations”, and another ordering verbal elaboration of “relations between objects” (Ibid., p. 133). As a result, specific orders of significance, of interpersonal relations or relations among objects, are regulated by an elaborated code (Ibid., 131). Family or/and school settings can familiarise a child to either one or both of the modes of an elaborated code (Ibid., p. 133).

The symbolic features described above constitute the moment of Possibility. Such a broad discussion of the moment of Possibility only gets a clear expression when the overdetermined causality is identified and understood as defining the relations among the symbolic features.

The overdetermined causality of the paper, as already intimated, is constituted by the linguistic codes, which are supposed to regulate forms of consciousness. From the paper, one can identify extracts that attest to the primacy of the linguistic codes in the regulation of consciousness, some of which include the following: “Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and process” (Ibid., 121). “The fact of the matter is that the real world is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group” (Ibid). “In the context of a common language in the sense of a general code, there will arise distinct linguistic forms, fashions of speaking, which induce in their speakers different ways of relating to objects and persons” (Ibid., p. 123; emphasis in original). Clearly, then, Bernstein places linguistic code as the primary responsibility for the differential academic performance between social groups. This is in line with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. This is the moment of Necessity.
There seems to be no change in the overdetermining element in this paper, relative to the preceding one. Along the same lines, the possible points of challenge, vis-à-vis the assumptions of the overdetermined causality of the previous paper seem to have been brought forward to this one. There are interesting indicators in this paper that point to the specific materials upon which Bernstein depends to make claims about his propositions. Bernstein claims that he distances himself from the Whorfian hypothesis, and even imagines that he relativizes it, and identifies his thinking with the work of Vygotsky and Luria (Ibid., p. 123). The two matters of interest here are “change of culture”, on one hand, and “language”, on the other. For Bernstein, Whorfian theory supposes that language determines the change of culture, while the thesis he develops in this paper “places the emphasis on changes in the social structure as major factors in shaping or changing a given culture through their effect on the consequences of fashions of speaking” (Ibid). Other than the causal order that seems different between the thesis Bernstein develops in this paper and that of Sapir-Whorf, Bernstein’s thesis is concerned with distinctions between linguistic forms, not languages as such. Bernstein is aware that there might be features of the culture that all members share but not quite sure about what implications those features might have for his thesis. At the same time, however, Bernstein exposes his confusion in the causal order: “It leaves open the question whether there are features of the common culture which all members of a society share which are determined by the specific nature of the general code or language at its syntactic and morphological levels” (Ibid; emphasis in original). This again brings out the Whorfian bias prevalent in the paper. Towards the end of this Chapter is a detailed discussion of the sustainability of the claims of the resources upon which Bernstein draws the necessity for this paper. It should suffice at this point to specify the orientation, if not the nature, of the moment of Necessity of this paper, as well as possible areas of question.
6.2.3 "A social-linguistic approach to socialisation: with some reference to educability"

In this paper Bernstein continues the investigation into the relations between social structure, code orientation, orders of meaning and relevance, as well as educability. The basic problem of the paper is, once again, concerned with the differential academic performance among learners from different social groups. Bernstein identifies some characteristic features that he attributes to working-class children/families and middle-class children/families as immediate expressions of the problem, and they are as follows. Starting with characteristic traits of working-class children, their role systems are mainly closed. They have a crude awareness of the complexity of the relatedness of persons and of objects, since the sense of the communal/collective is emphasised, as opposed to that of the individual (Bernstein, 1966a, ps. 148, 149 & 150). Secondly, they are mostly oriented to collective meanings. Learners are socialised in environments that emphasize a communal sense, or within a positional type of family (Ibid., ps. 148, 150, 152 & 153). Thirdly, they mostly have access to restricted codes (person and object), although the “upwardly mobile working-class children would move towards the object rather than the person mode of the elaborated code” (Ibid., p. 151).

As regards the characteristic traits of middle-class children, firstly, their role systems are of an open kind, with learners having a highly developed awareness of the fine distinctions and complex relatedness of persons and of objects (Ibid., ps. 148, 149 & 150). Secondly, they are mostly oriented to “individualized” orders of meaning and relevance. Learners are socialised in environments that emphasize an individual sense, or within a person-oriented family (Ibid., ps. 148, 150, 152 & 153). Thirdly, they have access to elaborated codes (person and object), as well as the restricted codes (Ibid., p. 150).

This level of immediacy of the problem is the formal ground, or moment of Actuality.
Moving to the real ground, the characteristic traits identified between members of either social group are then given symbolic features, where the encounter between schooling and working-class children result in educational failure, and that of schooling and middle-class children result in educational success, is made meaningful. These individual symbolic features, which correlate with the characteristic traits identified in the moment of Actuality, include role systems, orientation to either an individualized or collective order of meaning and linguistic codes: elaborated and restricted.

According to this paper, role systems give rise to closed or open types of object meanings and person meanings. Open types give rise to elaborated codes while closed types give rise to restricted codes. By “social role systems” is meant “a complex coding activity controlling both the creation and organisation of specific meanings and the conditions for their transmission and reception” (Ibid., ps. 144-5; emphasis in original). In this way, social structure is the originating determinant of codes. Simple social structures give rise to restricted codes while complex social structures give rise to elaborated codes. At the level of family, Bernstein discusses how social structures are translated into social relations. He distinguishes between positional and person-oriented families. Depending on specific factors, either positional or person-oriented family types could give rise to restricted or elaborated codes, in relation to objects and persons. Positional controls that are based on “authority”, in relation to objects, result in restricted codes, while positional controls based on “rationality”, in relation to objects, result into an elaborated code (Ibid., p. 164). Personal controls based on “authority identity”, in relation to persons, result in restricted codes, while those based on “identity”, in relation to persons, result into elaborated codes (Ibid).

Linguistic codes, elaborated and restricted, make up the means whereby order and significance are generated in a child (Ibid). What is made accessible for learning through either elaborated or restricted codes is significantly different (Ibid., p. 151). A distinction between two modes of both elaborated and
restricted codes: object and person, further elaborates levels and orders of significance. The elaborated modes are rich in the verbal elaboration of both interpersonal relations and relations with objects. The restricted modes are impoverished with respect to the verbal elaboration of both interpersonal relations and relations with objects. Middle-class children are capable of manipulating language in ways that could both verbally elaborate interpersonal relations and relations with objects, and also employ social expressions of restricted codes to elaborate interpersonal relations and relations among objects. Most working-class children are limited to restricted modes of the restricted code and, as mentioned above, only those relatively higher on the social continuum may access the object mode of the elaborated code (Ibid). Where working-class learners are limited to a restricted code, major problems of educability would be experienced. Less difficulties of educability would be experienced among children with access to at least the object mode of the elaborated code (Ibid). Problems of educability are greatly reduced in teaching learners with both modes of elaborated code. The above represents the basic symbolic universe of the paper, vis-à-vis the problem it engages. The symbolic universe represented above constitutes the moment of Possibility.

Coming to the complete ground, this paper foregrounds linguistic codes as a major cause of differential academic performance between learners from either social class. The following quotation attests to this:

Where children are limited to a restricted code, primarily because of the sub-culture and role systems of the family, community and work, we can expect a major problem of educability whose source lies not so much in the genetic code but in the culturally determined communication code (Ibid., P. 151; emphasis in original).

As can be seen, the role systems within which a learner is socialised orients him/her towards a particular linguistic code, which creates either communal or individualized orders of meaning (Ibid., p. 150). There
is clearly supposed a causal relationship among the three elements of the Possibility moment, however, even as the quotation above shows, the “communication codes” are seen by Bernstein as the primary determinants of success or failure in school between learners from different social groups. This is the moment of Necessity.

In this paper, the linguistic codes, just like in the preceding paper, are viewed as the overdetermining element. Towards the end of the paper, however, Bernstein points to areas needing further research in the theory: “This paper is really a plea for a more extensive research into the social constraints upon the emergence of linguistic codes, the conditions for their maintenance and change and above all their regulative function” (Ibid., p. 166). This plea shows the awareness of the limitations of the thesis he had developed to this point. In addition, Bernstein reverts to an association with Whorf, from whom he distinguished himself in the previous paper:

In another paper I have distinguished my position from that of Whorf, but I believe that there are distillations or precipitations from the general system of meanings which inhere in linguistic codes which exert a diffuse and generalized effect upon the behaviour of speakers. What I am tentatively putting forward is that imbedded in a culture or sub-culture may be a basic organizing concept, concepts or themes, whose ramifications may be diffused throughout the culture or subculture (Ibid., p. 164).

This quotation shows the difficulty that Bernstein had to free his theory from those of scholars upon whom he drew to make authoritative statements, as well as the lack of confidence in the current form of his theory. All these factors would necessitate an attempt to formulate a clearer and more authoritative argument. The validity of the ideas that Bernstein uses to establish the necessity of the paper are discussed towards the end of the Chapter.
6.2.4 “Social class, language and socialisation”
In this paper, the concern for understanding the differential academic performance of learners from different social classes persists. However, this concern is placed within the frame of a larger question concerned with the way in which the transmission of cultural capital is realised, through the medium of symbolic systems. Two concerns immediately ensue from this: “fundamental linkages of symbolic systems, social structure and the shaping of experience […]. The second difficulty is in dealing with the question of change of symbolic systems” (Bernstein, 1970a, p. 172). Bernstein seems to express the immediacy of the problem in terms of two major strands of interrelated traits that either hinder or facilitate access to cultural riches of society, some of which are represented below.

Starting with those that hinder access, belonging to simple divisions of labour, which generally enables for the generation of knowledges with particularistic meanings, and which limit the “sense of the possible” (Ibid., p. 175). Secondly, operating with, mainly, restricted social relations, “[…] based upon communalized roles and the verbal realization of their meaning” (Ibid., p. 177). Thirdly, having access only to a restricted code.

Characteristic features that facilitated access to cultural riches include, firstly, participating in complex divisions of labour, which generally enable the generation of knowledge with universalistic meanings, which enhance the sense of the possible (Ibid., p. 175). Secondly, operating within both positional and personal type of social relations. Thirdly, having access to an elaborated code.

The above elements together form the moment of Actuality for the paper.

From this immediate representation of the problem of the paper, Bernstein then identifies symbolic features that correlate with the characteristic traits outlined above. These symbolic features form the symbolic universe, within which the encounter between schooling and working-class learners results in
educational failure, and that of schooling and middle-class learners resulting in educational success, is made meaningful. This is the moment of Possibility. The symbolic features correlating with the characteristic traits identified in the moment of Actuality include place in the division of labour, form of social relation and speech codes.

The occupational role systems of either simple or complex division of labour place different social and knowledge demands on members (Ibid., p. 186). Simple societies orient members towards restricted codes, while complex societies orient members towards elaborated codes. Both simple and complex divisions of labour could presuppose positional, personal, or both forms of social relations.

With regard to social relations at a general level, they are characterised in terms of either “organic” or “mechanical solidarity”. At the level of family, they are distinguished in terms of positional or person-centred families (Ibid., p. 184-5). The family types are different because of differences in the strength of boundary procedures. Organic solidarity has weak boundary procedures and mechanical solidarity has strong boundary procedures. The family types focus the codes either upon persons or objects (or both) (Ibid., p. 185).

Speech codes of the elaborated type could be focused on persons more on the basis of person-centred families or on objects on the basis of the positional families (Ibid., p. 185). The restricted codes tend to be based on positional families (Ibid., pp. 185 – 6). Speech codes are not only realisations of the structure of social relationships, they are also the regulators of the structure of social relationships (Ibid., p. 171). Speech codes orient users towards specific orders of meaning (Ibid., p. 176). Universalistic orders of meaning are freed from context, whereas particularistic orders of meaning are closely tied to a context (Ibid., p. 179). The restricted codes among working-class learners orient them to particularistic
orders of meaning, while the elaborated codes among middle-class learners orient them to universalistic orders of meaning.

The school system is organised according to the social relations, speech code, and orders of meaning corresponding particular to middle-class families, hence the issue of educability is generally experienced along the lines of social class. At this level, Bernstein simply identifies important symbolic features that he supposes are responsible for the problem discussed in the paper. As has been shown, the causal relations among these symbolic features at this level are not quite clear. This is the moment of Possibility.

There are intimations at resources that feed into the work which Bernstein uses to establish the necessity for the paper. Before talking about the work and input of these resources, I shall mark out a few statements that help to identify the point of emphasis among the symbolic features outlined above. In this paper, Bernstein emphasizes the social basis of linguistic codes, hence the term social-linguistic codes: “I am suggesting that the critical orderings of a culture or sub-culture are made substantive – are made palpable – through the forms of its linguistic realizations of these four contexts [regulative, instructional, imaginative and interpersonal] – initially in the family and kin” (Ibid., p. 181). In Bernstein’s terms, restricted codes are products of communalised roles and they give rise to particularistic orders of meaning (Ibid). Elaborated codes are products of individualized roles and they give rise to universalistic orders of meaning (Ibid., pp. 181 & 182). Ultimately, the differential academic performance is caused by the difference in orientation among learners to orders of meaning. This discussion constitutes the moment of Necessity.

There are a number of utterances in the paper that signal some contingency. To start with, towards the end of the paper, Bernstein acknowledges that the framework he develops in the paper is a rather
“coarse interpretative framework” (Ibid., p. 187). There are some statements that are rather ambiguous, and probably signal some ambiguity necessitating another attempt at theorizing the basic problem. For example, Bernstein says, “The concept of social-linguistic code points to the social structuring of meanings and to their diverse but related contextual linguistic realization (Ibid., p. 171; emphasis in original). Elsewhere, Bernstein says “I shall postulate that the deep structure of the communication is a restricted code having its basis in communialized roles, realizing context-dependent meanings, i.e. particularistic meaning orders” (Ibid., p. 181). In the first quotation, social circumstances structure meanings, and the social circumstances are reflected in the linguistic systems, among other symbolic systems. In the second quotation, social circumstances are realized in communication codes, which then structure the form of meaning. The causal chain reflected in these two quotations are not congruent. Such lack of consistency, in the paper signals points of contingency.

The above quotations show that the social is given foundational role in the formation of speech codes and orders of meaning. However, there are moments in the paper when this is not clear. For example, “The general social-linguistic thesis attempts to explore how symbolic systems are both realizations and regulators of the structure of social relationships” (Ibid., p. 171). It will be remembered that speech codes have been deemed one among other symbolic systems. This quotation implies a vicious circle, whereby the causal order is ambiguous. Bernstein, however, attempts to overcome the ambiguity by using Mead, from whom Bernstein derives the following causal order: division of labour ------------> class system --------------> focusing of codes --------------> order of meaning. This is an interpretation of what Bernstein himself calls a “[...] coarse interpretive framework” (Ibid., p. 187).

Finally, as has been mentioned before, speech codes are seen by Bernstein as one among other symbolic systems of socialization: “Finally, it is conceivable that there are general aspects of the analysis which might provide a starting point for the consideration of symbolic orders other than languages”
(Ibid). All along Bernstein has supposed that language, specifically social-linguistic codes, form the order of meaning, one would imagine, which is either congruent or not congruent with schooling. The above quotation shows a complete lack of confidence in such a claim, acknowledging that that might just be part of the story, not quite the whole story. In my view, this is the ultimate point of contingency for this paper. As usual, this would necessitate another attempt at theorizing further, from the basis of the limitations of the present analysis.

6.2.5 “Sources of consensus and disaffection in education”
This paper builds on the interests generated in the previous paper, even if it was published before the previous paper, although this one appears in volume three, while the previous one in volume one. That says something about how Bernstein views the development of his ideas. There is seemingly no longer much interest exploring the differential academic performance between learners from different social classes, but rather the way in which culture is transmitted from one generation to the next. Bernstein argues that “school acts as a major source of social, occupational and cultural change” (Bernstein, 1966a, p. 37). The interest of the paper seems to be the understanding of what about school makes it the major source of social, occupational and cultural change. A closer look at the paper enables one to understand that Bernstein brings to the fore what in the school he supposes to be responsible for the access to cultural goods. A successful acquisition of cultural goods, ordinarily, would be reflected in the success of learners, while the unsuccessful acquisition would be reflected in the non-success of learners. In this view, therefore, I suppose that the elementary motivation of the paper is the difference in academic performance among learners. There are characteristic traits in the paper that seem to objectify the problem at this elementary level in terms of children from different social classes. Starting with those of working-class children, firstly, they have low levels of awareness and acceptance of means
and ends of both the instructional and expressive orders. Secondly, they tend to engage in low-level role involvement friendship patterns (towards alienation). Thirdly, they tend not to easily understand/recognise the school procedures, practices and judgments transmitted. Fourthly, they have minimal awareness of their occupational fate in society.

On the other hand, characteristic traits of middle-class children are, firstly, they have high levels of awareness and acceptance of means and ends of both the instructional and expressive orders. Secondly, they tend to engage in high level role involvement friendship patterns (towards commitment). Thirdly, they tend to easily understand/recognise the school procedures, practices and judgements transmitted. Fourthly, they have a greater awareness of their occupational fate in society.

As usual, this is the moment of Actuality.

From this basic level, Bernstein provides a number of symbolic features, which correlate with the characteristic traits identified in the moment of Actuality, which seem to together represent an array of possible explanations for the problem of the paper, and they include the family setting and social origins of the child: the level of understanding and acceptance of means and ends of the school’s instructional and expressive orders, the age group and friendship patterns of the child, the ease with which learners can recognise forms of procedures, practices and judgments transmitted at school and the learner’s perception of his occupational fate.

Starting with the symbolic features of family setting and social origins of the child, Bernstein suggests that there are a range of possible family settings imaginable at the level of awareness of means and acceptance of ends of both the instructional and expressive orders; from commitment, detachment, deferment, estrangement, through to alienation. The greater the level of understanding and acceptance of instructional and expressive orders within a family, the greater the probability of such a family to
inculcate those procedures to their children. In this light, children coming to school are differently prepared to be involved in school.

The age group or friendship patterns of the child could also affect the role involvement of pupils at school, from commitment, detachment, deferment, estrangement, to alienation. In this way, the age group or friendship patterns may oppose or support the role involvement of a pupil at school.

Bernstein distinguishes two orders at play at school – the instructional and the expressive. The instructional order is the complex of behaviour and activities to do with the acquisition of specific skills and sensitivities (Ibid., p. 38). The form of the content of the instructional order is mainly influenced by the economy and class structure (Ibid., p. 39). The expressive order is the complex of behaviours and activities to do with conduct, character and manner (Ibid., p. 38). The authority of the school expressive order has its origins in ideas of particular cultures or groups within society (Ibid., p. 39). The imposition of an originally partial code of conduct onto the whole of the context of school necessarily evokes different degrees of tolerance from the learners from different social and cultural groups. The form of a regulative order at any time is a function of a particular social group. In this way, the instructional and expressive orders are selectively accessible.

Teachers, as in the case of learner’s role involvement, could exhibit commitment, estrangement, alienation, deferment, or detachment, according to their understanding and acceptance of means and ends of, the instructional and expressive orders. That has ultimate consequences on the pupil’s performance.

Other than the learner’s relation to the instructional and expressive orders being influenced by family setting and social relations, it can be shaped by the school (Ibid., p. 43). Practices at school can influence the learner’s role and shape his/her view of society and occupational fate within that society (Ibid). The
learner’s roles range from commitment to alienation, through detachment, deferment and estrangement (Ibid., p. 44). The greater (more committed) the pupil’s role is, the greater his/her awareness of his/her place (or occupational fate) in society. The lower (towards estrangement) the pupil’s role is, the less his/her awareness of his/her eventual place in society. The level of involvement of a pupil here is determined by the level of understanding the means and his acceptance of the ends for both instructional and expressive orders (Ibid).

As we have seen, in the life of a student, the interplay among “the family setting and social origins of the child, the age group or friendship patterns of the child, the school itself, and the pupil’s perception of his occupational fate” (Ibid., p. 37), vis-à-vis the instructional and expressive orders is the basic symbolic universe that Bernstein composes in the light of the problem of the paper. This discussion constitutes the external reflection or moment of Possibility.

It seems that in this paper, Bernstein’s determining reflection is much more subtle than expressed in the previous papers. The determining reflection is not one of the symbolic features listed above, but inheres in all the symbolic features listed. Access to the instructional and expressive orders is the overarching element of the paper, because it alone determines the ease with which learners can recognise forms of procedures, practices and judgements transmitted at school. Actually, this argument is in line with what Bernstein himself says in Appendix B of the paper: “Instructional and expressive orders refer to the social structures which control the transmission of skills and morals” (Ibid., p. 52; emphasis in original). This is the moment of Necessity.

There is clearly a change in the overdetermining element. Social-linguistic codes are not viewed as regulators of orders of meaning, but the access to the instructional and regulative orders. One may ask, how do the instructional and expressive orders relate to the social-linguistic codes? Perhaps there is no
significant difference, just a change in the terminology used. I am not convinced that the change is insignificant. The social-linguistic codes tended to operate in an oppositional fashion, where one was about one group of people and another, others, with different orientations to meaning. The instructional and expressive orders, on the other hand, are operational among learners from both social classes, the difference being the level of accessibility to learners, which ultimately gets reflected in the success or failure of learners. In addition, the instructional and expressive orders seem to relate in a complementary fashion, whereby operation of one are influenced and influence the other.

In addition, this paper marks the beginnings of the focus on the school, in addition to the home, as a “culprit” in the differential success influenced by social class. Bernstein himself would later say:

At that time, in the early 1960s, we were beginning to get a picture of how the stratification features within schools affected the careers of the pupils. [We felt ...] that it was important to keep together in one analysis the inter-actions between the family and the school, and to show the variations in this relationship, both within and between social classes (Bernstein, 1975b, p. 3).

All these factors seem to point to the need for a new way of approaching the problem of success and failure among learners, which seemed to generally correlate with social groups of learners. The details of the implications of the overdetermining elements of the paper are discussed towards the end of the Chapter. For now, it should suffice to take note that there seems to be a new approach to the problem from linguistic and social-linguistic codes to the what of school knowledge and how it is transmitted. This change signals the moment of Contingency in the theory.
7.2.1 “On the curriculum”
This paper, as the title indicates, is primarily concerned with the analysis of curricula, specifically two types: “collection” and “integrated”, each of which was preferred at different times within the British education system. Actually, the paper anticipated a move from the collection type curriculum to the integrated type. The implications of that change, vis-à-vis the form of content of knowledge to be transmitted and the corresponding context of transmission/acquisition, are a matter of interest for the paper. Implied from this is the question of accessibility of the knowledge transmitted within the context of either curriculum type. This paper does not dwell on the usual class expression of the problem, in terms of middle vs. working-class, but in terms of the old middle-class and new middle-class. It should suffice, therefore, to express the problem of the paper in the question, “what regulates access to educational knowledge?” This is the expressive causality or moment of Actuality.

From this way of characterising the problem of the paper, one sees a number of symbolic features which represent an array of possible explanations for the problem of the paper, and they include the selective organisation of the form of the curriculum, based on the patterns of authority, the selective transmission of the form of the pedagogy, based on the patterns of control and the selective evaluation of knowledge, based on both the patterns of authority and the patterns of control.

We now look at each one of the above symbolic features in detail, according to the paper.

Starting with curriculum, Bernstein’s view of curriculum is that it “entails a principle or principles, whereby of all the possible contents of time [how the period of time is filled] some contents are given a special status and enter into an open or closed relation with each other” (Bernstein, 1970b, p. 80). A curriculum where contents enter into an open relationship with each other is called integrated, whereas a curriculum where contents are in a closed relationship is called a collection (Ibid). Patterns of authority determine whether contents enter into an open or closed relationship.
Pedagogy is the form that the transmission takes. The form that the transmission takes according to an integrated curriculum emphasises ways of knowing, guided by theories of self-regulation, as opposed to a collection type curriculum, which emphasises states of knowledge, guided by didactic theories (Ibid., p. 83). Here, patterns of control determine the form that the transmission takes.

Coming to evaluation, the criteria for evaluation are made explicit under collection type curriculum, while under integrated type curriculum, criteria are implicit (Ibid., p. 84). Both the patterns of authority and control subsist in the form of the evaluation. The above three symbolic features: curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation, constitute the transitive causality or moment of Possibility.

Bernstein’s response to the problem as expressed in a question form in the moment of Actuality of this discussion is that patterns of authority and control are ultimately responsible for the regulation of access to educational knowledge. This is the overdetermined causality or moment of Necessity of the paper.

In relation to the previous one, this paper is more focused on the educational system and practices within it, and less on the family and friendship patterns of learners. Of course, there is within the analysis a discussion of the role of social relations in the distribution of facilities and values that correlate with educational knowledge. This paper, as well as the previous one, is clearly out of place in view of the basic claims of the code theory phase.

As a way of beginning a detailed discussion of the phase as a whole, I here look at some of the criticisms that have been levelled against the code theory phase.

6.3 Criticisms
After a discussion of each criticism, some of the responses, mostly those from Bernstein, are given. I make some comments along the way but my major criticisms comes after a consideration of what
others have to say, since my criticisms are based on the findings of the research so far, as well as other considerations.

One of the major criticisms of the code theory phase is a claim that the codes signal two different kinds of languages: “There are two different kinds of languages, restricted and elaborated code, which are broadly related to the social class of speakers” (Stubbs, 1983, p. 49, emphasis in original). This criticism is sometimes expressed in terms of “dialects”; that restricted and elaborated codes are two distinct dialects. In his defence, Bernstein says, “What is at stake is not the issue of the intrinsic nature of different varieties of language but different modalities of privileged meanings, practices, and social relations which act selectively upon shared linguistic resources” (Bernstein, 1987b, p. 114). My view on this matter is that, as has been shown in the first phase and as evidenced by allusions in Bernstein's work to influences on his work by specific authors, specifically linguists, one could sometimes suppose that Bernstein’s language codes refer to corresponding language claims of these authors. The validity of the basic claims of these authorities are rather my interest, and shall be discussed below.

Atkinson is critical of authors, mainly linguists (like Gordon (1981)), who interpret Bernstein’s language thesis and code theory in purely linguistic terms. In Atkinson’s view, there is sufficient evidence to show that even as early as the language thesis phase, Bernstein’s thesis was not a purely linguistic exercise, for if it were, Bernstein would not have put the characteristics of ‘public language’ in a footnote (Atkinson, 1985, p. 40). In Atkinson’s view, in the code theory, (just as in the language thesis), “Bernstein's interest lies in expressing not simply issues of language variation, but orientations to means, ends and objects, relationships between objects, the creation and re-creation of identities, and modes of social control” (Ibid). In as much as Atkinson’s view is attractive, it is difficult to see how the various ideas that Bernstein develops in the various papers are a homogenous theory, even as the
discussion in this Chapter has shown so far. Each paper seems to represent a complete set of ideas that do not quite fuse with those represented in another paper.

Another major criticism, related to the one above, is the assertion that Bernstein’s public language use and restricted code estimate a “verbal deficit theory” and a “difference position”. Gordon (1981, p. 85), Stubbs (1983), Bourdieu (1991, p. 53) and Boocock (1980), among others, give this interpretation of Bernstein’s early papers. Gordon provides a detailed and helpful summary of what verbal deficit theory is:

A verbal deficit theory is any hypothesis that (i) seeks to explain differential educational attainment to any significant degree in terms of the intrinsic nature of the two fundamentally different varieties of language used by schoolchildren, both at the commencement of their school careers and subsequently; and (ii) seeks to explain the unequal social distribution of educational attainment in terms of which social groups are deemed to speak one of the two varieties rather than the other (Gordon, 1981, p. 60).

In this way, according to the deficit theory, the learner fails because his/her language is not sufficient to facilitate the learning process. Danzig (1995) adds cultural deprivation to language limitations in his understanding of the deficit theory (p. 153). The language difference position purports that Bernstein’s restricted code represents a non-standard language or dialect, while an elaborated code represents a standard language or dialect (Gordon, 1981, p. 95). Danzig (1995), as above, adds a cultural component, which means that learners come to school with different prior experiences, which results in different experiences when they encounter schooling (p. 156). The differential recognition and valuing by schools of these prior experiences of learners is what is the matter in the difference position. Bernstein rejected the interpretation of his theory as a deficit theory or as having a difference position, maintaining that
the point of the matter “is the social distribution of privilege and privileging meanings, or, more explicitly, the social distribution of dominant and dominated principles for the exploration, construction, and exchange of legitimate meanings, their contextual management, and their relation to each other” (Bernstein, 1987b, p. 118).

Danzig (1995) also argues that Bernstein’s code theory represents neither a deficit theory nor a difference position. On the deficit theory criticism, Danzig argues that “although speech initially may be a function of a given social arrangement, the speech form may in turn modify or even change that social structure that initially evolved that speech form” (Danzig, 1995, p. 154). By this intervention, Danzig means to show the importance that Bernstein places on the role of schooling in the education process of learners, not simply on their backgrounds or speech code. However, it is easy to identify the point in Bernstein’s work when such a move – placing some emphasis on the structure of schooling – is made. Danzig himself makes mention of a particular paper: Bernstein (1969) when such an emphasis is made in Bernstein’s work. One may ask, does the criticism hold before that paper? As can be seen from the work of this Chapter, it was only in Bernstein (1966a) that the site of analysis shifts from family to school. On the basis of Danzig’s response to the criticism of deficit theory, it seems reasonable to say that there might be a case for deficit theory in Bernstein’s work before the 1966a paper. Similarly, on the criticism that Bernstein’s code theory represents a difference position, Danzig uses papers written much later to show that Bernstein was mainly interested to show the workings of the schooling process, not the cultural background of learners and their codes, linguistic or social-linguistic. The question posed above is also relevant here, about whether the criticism holds true up to a point in the development of ideas in this phase.

Bourdieu (1992) criticises Bernstein’s articulation of the elaborated and restricted codes. In Bourdieu’s view, Bernstein puts more value and weight on the importance of elaborated code over restricted code,
failing to recognise the arbitrariness of either code, in that way helping to “normalise” an otherwise “non-normal” language code. “The ‘elaborated code’ is thus constituted as the absolute norm of all linguistic practices which then can only be conceived in terms of the logic of *deprivation*” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 53; emphasis in original). For Bourdieu, the form that the official language takes (in Bernstein’s terms – elaborated code) contains suppositions, wishes, advantages and all such like of the dominant group and through the official language reproduce the advantage/disadvantage relationships among social groups:

The dominant competence functions as linguistic capital, securing a profit of distinction in its relation to other competences only in so far as certain conditions (the unification of the market and the unequal distribution of the chances of access to the means of production of the legitimate competence, and to the legitimate places of expression) are continuously fulfilled, so that the groups which possess that competence are able to impose it as the only legitimate one in the formal markets (the fashionable, educational, political and administrative markets) and in most of the linguistic interactions in which they are involved (Ibid., pp. 56-57).

Bernstein rejects such claims against his theory by bringing to the fore the fundamental purpose of the theory.

Gordon argues that Bernstein is inconsistent in his use of the term “code” and sometimes even confusing:

Unlike grammar, which is a linguistic regulator, codes are at one and the same time linguistic, psychological and sociological in character. These three dimensions of the codes are discussed in most of Bernstein’s papers and some give definitions of one or more dimensions. However, none of the papers presents a fully worked-out, integrated definition, and during the period
1962-73 there is a gradual shift in emphasis away from the linguistic to the sociological dimension (Gordon, 1981, p. 74).

Maybe Bernstein is best described as attempting to capture the totality of his theoretical universe in each paper and that his ideas are not static. This could be supported by quoting what Bernstein himself said about his attempts at giving an account of the development of the theory:

I think that this question about the development of the theory is one (I have tried) to address on a number of different occasions but each time the recontextualising had been somewhat different and the papers I selected as being important, seemed to have changed (Bernstein, 2001, ps. 369-70).

Bernstein explains this change in emphasis in terms of the circumstances/challenges at the Sociological Research Unit (Ibid). I concur with Gordon that Bernstein is sometimes inconsistent in his use of the term “code” and that he is not sufficiently explicit and clear about the changes in the meaning of the term, and that such lack of clarity could be confusing.

On a more particular note, Gordon rejects one of Bernstein’s initial experiments used to distinguish between elaborated and restricted codes – where Bernstein borrowed tools from Goldman-Eisler’s hesitation phenomena to express the degree of predictability of the syntax (in extreme cases even of the lexis). Gordon says

The experiment merely tested hesitation phenomena and pausing [...] The notion that the [...] [middle-class] paused more frequently because they spent more time planning their utterances in greater detail and their syntax was less predictable, is no more than a set of arbitrary assumptions (ibid. p. 75).
Gordon further argues that “The most serious weakness of all, however, is that Bernstein defines the linguistic dimension of the codes in terms of syntactic predictability and in the self-same paper presents the results of an experiment which tests something else” (ibid. p. 76).

6.4 My analysis
It seems that the last two papers considered in this Chapter (1966a & 1970b) do not fit within the basic framework developed by the other papers. The theory they develop is more in line with that discussed in Chapter Seven. As such, the bases of the ideas they generate are discussed in the next Chapter. Also, even as evidenced by the data generated in this Chapter, papers written before the 1970a paper have sociolinguistic codes for their overdetermining element, while the 1970a paper conceives of codes in terms of orientation to meaning. As a result, the discussion here will be an engagement with linguistic codes and orientation to meaning. It should be mentioned also that Bernstein utilizes resources from a number of authors, some of whom have been mentioned above. I think it is not productive to discern the validity of the claims of each one of the resources utilized, but rather to focus on how Bernstein formulates his thesis, although enabled to appreciate his claims with a considerable appreciation of the origins of the ideas.

We start our engagement with the discussion of (socio)linguistic codes. The data generated from the 1962a paper shows that codes are a product of specific social relations and they in turn regulate the form of meanings that users operate with. Restricted codes are said to be based on close associations that enhance the construction and exchange of social symbols, and in turn enable users to develop particularistic (context-dependent and implicit) meanings, while elaborated codes, based on social relations that enhance the construction and exchange of individuated symbols, enable users to develop universalistic (context-independent and explicit) meanings. At the linguistic level, the codes are supposed to regulate combinatorial possibilities and syntactic alternatives. It has been shown that the
basic understanding of code remains consistent from the 1992a paper to the 1965 paper, although the techniques used to demonstrate the reality of codes in empirical data change. Does the introduction of codes overcome the linguistic determinism of the first phase?

In Chapter Five, it was argued that the major limitation of the phase is confusing correlation with causality. When a group’s language reflects the ways in which they do things and work, it is not the case that language is causal, as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis claims, but rather that the habits and traditions of people are exhibited in their linguistic habits. Maybe a look at the work that Bernstein uses to construct the necessity of his claims could be helpful. Halliday (1973; 1995; 2003) is a source of ideas that were influential in the construction of Bernstein’s sociolinguistic codes. The main idea from Halliday of relevance here is that of “systemic functional linguistics”, which means that functional systems of language emerge in particular contexts. Halliday has seven functional linguistic contexts, from which Bernstein utilizes four to construct his primary socializing contexts: regulative, instructional, imaginative and inter-personal. In Halliday’s view, “Learning one’s mother tongue is learning the uses of language, and the meanings, or rather the meaning potential, associated with them” (Halliday, 2003, p. 296). In this way, systemic functional linguistics seems best thought of in terms of “genre”, which entails particular ways of speaking, using appropriate forms of communication at particular circumstances. For example, the way of talking in a classroom context would be different from that appropriate at a dinner party.

In extension, Bernstein seems to define the linguistic codes in terms of structures of meaning and function, on the basis of his primary socialising contexts. At this level, the Bernsteinian codes seem attractive, however, Bernstein retains a causal relationship between linguistic codes and one’s experience of reality. The experiments that Bernstein uses and refers to in order to justify the reality and characteristic general distribution of sociolinguistic codes suggest that codes basically manifest
themselves in language forms. Some of the works that demonstrate this claim, even as recognised by Bernstein, include Robinson (1973); Turner (1973); Aggleton (1984; 1987) and: Wells (1985). There is some ambiguity in Bernstein’s work, where the relationship between speech and meaning in the code is not clarified. There is a supposition about linguistic codes, that speech has bearing on consequent orders of meaning. Even Adlam (1977) seems to be aware of this ambiguity and actually magnifies the ambiguity, in the guise of solving it, by arguing that the terms of context-dependent and context-independent operate on both speech and meanings (ps. 13 – 14). To suppose speech expression as being part of a causal chain structuring one’s experience of the world, and not just a symbolic system reflecting cultural habits of a people, makes this part of this phase susceptible for question by the criticisms advanced in the previous Chapter. It seems that Bernstein is somehow holding on to the suppositions of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis even with the introduction of the code theory.

The second part of the code theory has sociolinguistic codes expressed in terms of one’s orientation to meaning. The 1970a paper starts the discussion on this way of understanding codes. It is an individual’s position in the division of labour that essentially structures their experience of the world, Bernstein is arguing. This argument appears to have been derived from, among others, Luria (1976) and Vygotsky (1962). Luria argues that there is to be a strong correlation between ways in which people think about the world and the modes of production in which they are involved (Luria, 1976, p. 120). For example, he argues that uneducated peasants will think about the world in terms of the specifics of their everyday life. On the other hand, the educated, living in the city and working in more abstract systems, would think about the world more abstractly and construct more abstract categories – where categories not experienced together could be placed together, on the basis of more abstract relations. For Luria, therefore, the mode of production is a major regulator for experiencing the world. Bernstein then translates these ideas, in association with works like Cook-Gumbperz (1973) and Adlam (1977), but
more directly through the work of Holland, for example Holland (1981), his student, into a story about the division of labour. What is interesting here is that Bernstein is talking about people living in the city and dividing them into two groups: working-class and middle-class. There seems to be a comparison between Luria’s peasants and working-class and the city dwellers and middle-class. The question here is, as in the previous phase, is there a kind of determinism, or is the case rather that one is simply busy with particular kinds of cultural practices?

In Luria (1976), change in cognitive process is only possible with the change in social life:

The facts show convincingly that the structure of cognitive activity does not remain static during different stages of historical development and that the most important forms of cognitive processes – perception, generalization, deduction, reasoning, imagination, and analysis of one’s own inner life – vary as the conditions of social life change and the rudiments of knowledge are mastered (Luria, 1976, p. 161).

As mentioned above, for Luria, one’s cognitive activities are a product of one’s place in the division of labour. Therefore, change in cognitive activities is only possible when one’s place in the division of labour changes. Again, Luria’s subjects of study constitute uneducated village peasants, on the one hand, and educated town dwellers involved in abstract work systems, on the other. It follows that as long as one remains in the lower levels of the division of labour, he/she will only engage in everyday cognitive processes and hence will not be able to access abstract cognitive activities.

Bernstein correlates Luria’s peasants to working-class people, involved in manual labour, and his town-dwellers to middle-class people, occupying managerial positions. Through the work of Holland, for example, Bernstein argues that one’s orientation to meaning is a product of one’s social class, or position in the hierarchy of the division of labour. What this then implies is that as long as one belongs
to the working-class, he/she will only have capacity for particularistic orders of meaning. Although Bernstein is rather hesitant to accept this implication in his work, it remains, as has been argued in relation to Luria, an implication of the work. Is it not the case that Bernstein, time and time again, points to the disconnect that working-class learners experience, since they do not have access to relevant modes of production that correlate positively with the operations of schooling?

Bernstein refers to the work of Holland (1981), whose experiments involve children from working-class and middle-class social groupings as research subjects. Her study shows how learners from different social classes grouped pictures of food items in different ways. Working-class learners grouped pictures on the basis of some specific experience they had had with the food item in the picture. Holland concludes that this exhibits context-dependent and particularistic meanings. Middle-class learners initially grouped pictures in ways that did not immediately relate to some specific experiences they might have had with the items on the pictures, and only later grouped them in ways that directly related to some specific experiences they had with the food items on the pictures. Holland calls the grouping of pictures in ways that did not show reference to specific experiences as exhibiting context-independent and universalistic meanings. To this study, Holland concludes:

In this particular study as we have seen, class differences in orientation to meaning are apparent, and we consider these results interesting and suggestive, and that taken in conjunction with earlier studies within the framework of the sociolinguistic theory of familial transmission and its interrelation with the practices of the school, the results provide some support for the general thesis (Holland, 1981, p. 17; emphasis in original)

Bernstein incorporates the basic conclusion of Holland, vis-à-vis the differences in orientations to meaning between middle and working-class children. Is this a suggestion that working-class children are
trapped in restricted cognitive processes? Bernstein’s use and interpretation of findings from these experiments seem to suggest a return to strong determinism of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Bernstein’s choice of the word “orientation” seems to protect him from strong determinism, however, as even Holland’s conclusion shows, and in relation to Luria, there is always a supposition of determinism in the theory. In line with the criticisms of the first phase, it seems reasonable to conceive of differences in cognitive processes among social classes simply in terms of their accustomed ways of doing things, which is part of their traditional habits, not that they cannot act otherwise as long as they are in a specific social class.

The view taken here is that working-class learners are not in a fixed situation from which they cannot escape until their socio-situation changes, but that changes in cultural habits can bring about changes in cognitive processes. The criticisms, therefore, advanced against the Sapir-Whorf, could be reconstructed and hold against the idea of orientation to meaning, as it relates to individual’s social class memberships.

6.5 Conclusion
The papers looked at in this Chapter have been judged as better classified into three groups, one group having been deemed distant from the basic ideas developed by the other two groups. As such, the in-depth analysis of the papers of that group has been deferred to the following Chapter. It has been argued that Bernstein emphasises sociolinguistic codes as primarily responsible for differential academic performance of children from different social classes. The first papers in this phase understand codes in terms of social functional uses of language which create patterns of relevance and meaning. The later papers in this phase understand codes in terms of orientation to meaning, on the basis of one’s place in the division of labour. A consideration of the implications of the major claims of this phase has ended with major concerns. As such, the analysis of this Chapter ends with major question marks on the code
theory. The next Chapter constitutes another attempt at the problem of differential educational performance between children from different social classes.

If we now turn to the question of the everyday/academic distinction as it might be conceived of in relation to the code theory phase, then it could be claimed that commonsensical, everyday thinking (restricted code/restricted orientation to meaning) is the fate of the working-class and more sophisticated and universalistic thinking (elaborated code/elaborated orientation to meaning) the cognitive mode of the middle-class. These two cognitive modes are correlated with the everyday (restricted code/orientation) and the academic (elaborated code/orientation) by contemporary work that insists on reading the class-related differences in the performances of school learners in terms of the everyday/academic distinction.

Once again it could be argued that it is schooling that differentially distributes restricted and elaborated codes/orientations to working- and middle-class children, respectively, and in that way (re)produces the very social, cultural and cognitive characteristics that are imagined to be generated by other mechanisms, like participation in the division of labour (see Dowling (1998), for example).
Chapter seven

7.1 Introduction
We have seen that the previous phase tended to generate propositions that mark out features of two
groups of people, particularly social groups. For example, the working-class have been said to engage in
closed social relations that enhance the use of social symbols, they essentially have access to restricted
codes and have particularistic orientations to meaning, while the middle-class have individuated social
relations, have access to both restricted and elaborated codes and have universalistic orientations to
meaning. Initially, the emphasis of the theory, vis-à-vis the reason for the problem, is in the form of
language or speech, then shifts to the idea that it is the place of individual/groups in the division of
labour that is fundamental. At the end of the previous Chapter, we discussed some challenges of major
claims of the theory, which led to the conclusion that the theory is limited and needing reformulation.

This phase takes up the basic problematic of differential educational attainment between learners from
different social groups, which is somewhat masked under the general idea of cultural transmission. This
phase approaches the problem with the introduction of specific kinds of categories, which change across
the phase, but the essential idea remains the same. This phase coheres around one central idea, and
that idea subsists in the generation of mutually entailed categories. The movement across the phase in
the articulation of categories mainly goes from power and control, classification and framing, and the
same theoretical gesture is repeated over and over again to generate various other similar kinds of
categories like recognition and realization rules and, in the structuring of pedagogic discourse,
instructional and regulative discourses. The general approach to the problem in this phase consists in
the operations of these mutually entailed categories, mainly operating on three levels, to generate
mechanisms of control. It is only on the third level that the stabilisation of these mechanisms of control takes place. The process of the development of the story of how mechanisms of control operate in this phase is shown in the papers that are discussed below. Some papers focus on specific levels of the analysis, but the general context of the analysis in this phase extends from the level of policy, through curriculum, and the school context. Each of these levels consists of mutually entailed control mechanisms that attempt to define “what” is to be transmitted and “how” it is to be transmitted. Towards the end of this phase, Bernstein focuses the effectiveness of the control efforts to structure the consciousness of learners in the evaluative rule on the classroom level. Figure 7.1 details the abstract structure of the theory as presented in each paper in this phase.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 7.1**

It will become clear that the notions of classification and framing are fundamentally ambiguous, as markers of relations between and within categories. These markers are essentially arbitrary and essentially cultural. On the one hand, any attempt to specify the boundary between “purity” and “pollution” leads to a need for specifying rules of membership, therefore intensional. However, classification could also be understood in a spatial sense, as marking out of boundaries, in which case everything that falls within a boundary is considered as part of the collection. In this case, classification implies extensional collections. In other words, there are two approaches to research implied by Bernstein’s notions of classification and framing, on the one hand, one has an explicit rule of what belongs to an educational context and what does not:- or, on the other hand, one enters a research
context open to discovery of a rule, if any, operational within the particular pedagogic context. These approaches most definitely lead to different conclusions. That inherent ambiguity, it seems, would lead Bernstein to develop notions that would overcome the ambiguity. In the pedagogic device, Bernstein overcomes the ambiguity inherent in the notions of classification and framing by developing notions that favour an extensional approach.


7.2 Data

7.2.2 “Classification and framing of educational knowledge”
This paper is rather silent about performance and educability issues as they relate to social classes. The focus is on the form of that structures of power and principles of social control that are transmitted and
perpetuated. Educational knowledge is highlighted as “a major regulator of the structure of experience” (Bernstein, 1971a, p. 85). In other words, educational knowledge is the major medium through which structures of power get transmitted and perpetuated. Bernstein is also proposing that educational knowledge is capable of disrupting and changing the structures of power and principles of social control. The form that educational knowledge takes is a function of the classification and framing principles. Changes in the strength of classification and framing principles change the form of educational knowledge, which in turn can change the power structures and principles of social control. The problem of the paper, is the investigation of the ways in which structures of power and principles of social control get disseminated in society, and how they could be changed. Even if Bernstein articulates the problem of the paper in this way, it is highly probable that the motivating interest is rooted in the academic differences among learners from different social classes. It is my view that the motivating problem of the paper is carried forward from previous attempts at understanding the differences in academic performance of learners from different social classes. This expression of the problem of the paper is the formal ground or moment of Actuality.

The symbolic universe within which the dissemination of structures of power and principles of social control as expressed in the paper constitutes the real ground of the paper. As Bernstein posits educational knowledge as a major instrument through which structures of power and principles of social control get disseminated, it follows that the symbolic universe here would constitute the basic makeup of educational knowledge. Bernstein argues that educational knowledge gets realised through what he calls “message systems” (Ibid), which include:

A. Curriculum, which is regulated by classification principles
B. Pedagogy, which is regulated by framing principles
C. Evaluation, which is regulated by both classification and framing principles.
Bernstein understands classification as “the degree of boundary maintenance between contents” (Ibid., p. 88; emphasis in original). The principles of curriculum regulate the degree of specialisation, in collection type curricula, and determine the basis – whether teacher or teachers based, in the case of integrated type of curricula (Ibid., 91). The strength of the classification is responsible for the form that the structure of curricula take.

The principles of pedagogy determine the emphasis of the pedagogy; whether in terms of ways of knowing, according to integrated type curriculum, or states of knowledge, according to collection type curricula. The strength of framing is responsible for the form that the structure of the pedagogy takes (Ibid., p. 89). Bernstein defines framing, which he initially calls “frame” as “the degree of control teacher and pupil possess over the selection, organization, pacing and timing of the knowledge transmitted and received in the pedagogical relationship” (Ibid). Bernstein also discusses framing in terms of degree of accommodation of everyday knowledge in educational knowledge (Ibid).

The principles regulating evaluation determine whether evaluation criteria are explicit, as in the case of collection code, or implicit, as in the case of integrated code (Ibid., ps. 108 & 109). Both the principles of classification and framing structure the form of evaluation. Bernstein sees the actual control of pupils to be concentrated in the evaluation. The example of integrated code may demonstrate this:

   The weak frames enable a greater range of the student’s behaviour to be made public, and they make possible considerable diversity (at least in principle) between students. [...] The ‘right’ attitude may be assessed in terms of the fit between the pupil’s attitudes and the current ideology (Ibid., p. 109).

Even if Bernstein sees this capacity of evaluation in deciding what is appropriate and therefore marking out successful and unsuccessful learners, he seems to rather think about principles of classification and
framing as ultimately effective in success and failure. Of course, classification and framing principles essentially make up the context of evaluation, but so do they at the levels of curriculum and pedagogy.

Classification and framing principles regulate the form of the educational knowledge codes, which are underlying principles that shape curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation, to evoke, maintain, and change experience, identity, and relation. In short, educational knowledge, composed of three message systems, constitutes the real ground or the moment of Possibility.

Even from the discussion above, it seems that Bernstein has the classification and framing principles as constituting the complete ground. The classification and framing principles are the regulators of educational knowledge through their structuring of the three message systems of educational knowledge. This is the moment of Necessity.

There is a change in the overdetermining element from sociolinguistic codes to classification and framing principles. Interestingly, it will be remembered that the sociolinguistic codes, just like the language use distinction, were characterised as rigid categories that were essentially opposed to each other. However, the classification and framing principles enable the formation of a range of forms of educational knowledge codes, on the basis of the strength of classification and framing principles. Further, classification and framing principles are mutually complementary categories. The classification and framing principles relate positively with the regulative and instructional orders of the “Sources of consensus and disaffection in education” paper from the previous Chapter, as well as the authority and control patterns of the “On the curriculum” paper, also from the previous Chapter. The in-depth discussion of these ideas will be done towards the end of this Chapter.
7.2.2 “Class and pedagogies: visible and invisible”

In this paper, Bernstein seems to be interested in showing how power relations within specific divisions of labour are reproduced through the form of pedagogy and what challenges and opportunities lie therein. The specific interest of the paper within this broad context is to show the workings of invisible pedagogies, specifically revealing the discrepancies between what it seems to propagate and what it actually propagates. Implicit in all this is a belief that schooling, particularly with respect to the form of pedagogy, is the major instrument for the maintenance, reproduction and possible change of power relations within a given division of labour. The development of the idea of division of labour here implicitly inserts distinctions between middle- and working-classes. Of course, there might be distinctions within those categories, as indeed Bernstein refers to implications on new and old middle-class. As such, though remotely, the differential accessibility of educational knowledge, resulting in the failure of working-class learners to do well at school, relative to their middle-class counterparts, is most likely at play. This is the positing reflection or moment of Actuality of the paper.

The external reflection, constitutes the actual symbolic universe within which invisible pedagogy is supposed to reproduce power relations. Bernstein seems to identify a series of characteristics that together enable invisible pedagogy realise this purpose. They include the following:

A. Invisible pedagogy assumes a middle-class notion of educational time and space (Bernstein, 1975, p. 125)

B. Invisible pedagogy supposes an elaborated code of communication (Ibid)

C. Invisible pedagogy takes for granted a middle-class mother who acts as a means of cultural reproduction (Ibid)
D. Invisible pedagogy presupposes a small class of pupils, rare in working-class schools (Ibid., p. 125, 129).

E. Invisible pedagogy accentuates ways of knowing, as opposed to states of knowledge, relative to visible pedagogy (Ibid., p. 134).

F. Invisible pedagogy supposes well qualified teachers, who will mainly be found in middle-class schools (Ibid., p. 129).

In short, the causal relations among the various features in this paper are as follows: pedagogy (visible/invisible), formed by classification and framing principles, is accessible by specific dispositions, elaborated code, living standard; and hence selectively accessible or resulting in differential access of educational knowledge. This is the moment of Possibility.

Bernstein supposes the classification and framing principles as constituting the determining reflection. The classification and framing principles regulate the form that pedagogy takes, invisible or visible, through which power relations in the division of labour are maintained and reproduced, at the same time posing a possibility for their disruption and change. This is the moment of Necessity.

In the previous paper, the classification and framing principles were recognised as constituting the overdetermining element, just as in this paper. It should suffice at this point to make mention of the repetition in the overdetermining element between the two papers, and discuss their role in the general purpose of the papers. The actual engagement with these ideas is done towards the end of this Chapter.
7.2.3 “Social class and pedagogic practice”
This paper considers pedagogic practice as a major instrument through which structures of power are
maintained and reproduced in society: “A pedagogic practice can be understood as a relay, a cultural
relay: a uniquely human device for both the reproduction and the production of culture” (Bernstein,
1987a, p. 64). The addendum to this paper attests to the fact that this paper is a revision of the paper
just discussed above (Ibid., p. 88). In the same addendum, Bernstein says that the focus of the present
analysis is on the practice of pedagogy, therefore framing, not quite the makeup of pedagogic discourse,
which would imply a focus on classification principles as well (Ibid., p. 89). However, Bernstein goes on,
the focus on pedagogic practice (hence framing) always implies the workings of classification principles
in the structuring of pedagogic discourse. In this way, one can suppose that, as the previous paper was
bent on discussing pedagogic discourse, and this one on pedagogic practice, Bernstein views both the
form, as well as the realisation, of pedagogy as equally important in the production and reproduction of
culture. The purpose of this paper, within this larger context, is to investigate the ways by which the
practice of pedagogy works to produce and reproduce culture, and hence the arena of power relations.
This level of expressing the problem of the paper is the expressive causality or moment of Actuality.

Moving to the transitive causality, Bernstein proposes a set of rules which together constitute any
pedagogic practice. They include the following:

A. Hierarchical rules, constituting power relations, and they are either explicit or implicit.

B. Sequencing/pacing rules, constituting control relations, and they are either explicit or implicit.

C. Criterial, constituting power and Control relations, and they are either explicit or implicit.

Below is a discussion of invisible and visible pedagogies, and how, through the above rules, produce and
reproduce culture, according to the paper.
**Invisible pedagogy**

Invisible pedagogy has cultural and economic rudiments for the successful understanding and acquisition of its practice (Ibid., p. 80). The centre of attention of the paper is the family, through which it is shown that there are supporting home practices necessary for the classroom milieu and practices to be understood for their educational importance (Ibid., p. 84). Some of these practices include the following:

- Relative to visible pedagogy, invisible pedagogy requires more space, and is therefore more expensive.

- Classrooms of invisible pedagogy accommodate few pupils, and therefore more expensive than those appropriate for visible pedagogy (Ibid).

- The family space required is generally satisfied by middle-class families, due to the implications on cost, etc. (Ibid).

- Following from the above, the spatial grid implied by invisible pedagogy promotes and makes easy the showing of personalised representations, contrary to that facilitated in a working-class context (Ibid., p. 81).

- “Invisible pedagogies give rise to procedures of control based upon multi-layered class patterns of communication necessary to support and promote their concept and practice of social order” (Ibid., 83). In cases where the learner’s family does not inculcate these competences, most likely a learner from a working-class family, he/she is likely to misunderstand both the practice and its pedagogic relevance (Ibid., p. 84).
**Visible pedagogy**

The sequencing and pacing rules are comprised of hidden social class suppositions which act selectively on who can obtain the main pedagogic code of the school through the distributive outcomes of the visible pedagogy's strong sequencing and pacing, and its control over the basic configuration of sociolinguistic aptitudes (Ibid., p. 78-9).

Bernstein argues that when sequencing rules cannot be met, strategies are adopted that affect the content and sequencing. As a result, the resultant content is likely to accentuate processes that are local and context-dependent (Ibid., p. 75). On the other hand, when sequencing rules are met, access to the principles of the discourse is made available. Middle-class learners are likely to meet the requirements of the sequencing rules, while working-class learners are not. As a result, sequencing rules are “likely to distribute different forms of consciousness according to the social class origins of acquirers” (Ibid., 76).

With regard to pacing rules, which refer to and regulate the rate of expected acquisition (Ibid., p. 76), Bernstein proposes that in order for the school's academic curriculum to be successfully acquired, there must be two sites of acquisition – school and home (Ibid., p. 76-7). Homes of poor learners do not supply the second site of acquisition, because favourable space is not available in such homes, nor is there adequate time (and help) (Ibid., p. 77). Middle-class homes have favourable conditions and resources for successful acquisition in both sites.

Strong pacing rules will have different consequences on the form of communication of learners from different social classes. Working-class learners develop a rhythm of narrative communication, whereas middle-class learners develop an analytic modality of communication (Ibid., p. 78). School privileges an analytic type of communication, as opposed to a narrative type, as a result the pacing rules of the transmission act selectively on who can acquire the dominant pedagogic code (Ibid).
From the above, it seems plausible to summarize the causal relations proposed by the paper as follows: pedagogic practice, is a cultural relay and is formed by power and control rules, via hierarchical, sequencing, and criterial rules, form the content, which selectively acts on successful acquisition. The power and control relations operate in terms of classification and framing principles. The above symbolic universe of pedagogic practice constitutes the moment of Possibility.

Bernstein seems to have the classification and framing principles as constituting the overdetermined causality. The classification and framing principles structure the rules that constitute the form and actuality of pedagogic practice. This is the moment of Necessity.

As can be seen, the overdetermined element of this paper is the same as that of the previous paper. A detailed discussion of the classification and framing principles and their explanatory capacities in the phase, is addressed towards the end of this Chapter.

7.2.4 “Pedagogic codes and their modalities of practice”
This paper seems to consider pedagogic practice as the basic instrument through which culture is produced and reproduced. The paper interestingly views the model it develops to be more general than a concern for relations within school context, including other occasions of relations, like between a doctor and a patient, architects and planners, among others (Bernstein, 2000, p. 3). The intrinsic workings of a pedagogic practice, wherever it finds realisation, is the matter of interest for the paper. Bernstein argues that three levels of operation constitute any pedagogic practice, each of which is constituted by mutually supplementary principles: power and control, classification and framing, and recognition and realisation rules. In this light, the problem of the paper is an investigation into the ways
in which any pedagogic practice functions to produce, reproduce and even change cultural relations. This discussion of the problem is the formal ground, or the moment of Actuality.

Bernstein proposes features that constitute the basic makeup of any pedagogic practice, which constitute the real ground, and they operate on three levels and include the following:

A. Macro level operations:
   - Power
   - Control

B. Institutional level operations:
   - Classification/Framing
     1. Classification
        a. Internal value
        b. External value
     2. Framing
        a. Instructional discourse
        b. Regulative discourse
           - Internal value
           - External value

C. Micro level operations:
   - Recognition rules
Realisation rules

Power operates to order the social space by regulating relations between categories: “Power relations, in this perspective, create boundaries, legitimise boundaries, reproduce boundaries, between different categories of groups, gender, class, race, different categories of discourse, different categories of agents” (Ibid., p. 5). Control regulates relations within categories: “Control, on the other hand, from this point of view, establishes legitimate forms of communication appropriate to the different categories” (Ibid). Power without control is incapable of producing results, and so is control without power. The two categories depend on each other to be effective.

Classification transforms power relations to generate pedagogic discourses, within the context of the school. In this way, classification is the central quality for the form that relations between categories take (Ibid., p. 6). On the other hand, framing is the defining attribute of the form that pedagogic communications take; the “control over selection, sequencing, pacing, criteria and the social base” (Ibid., p. 13).

The recognition rule operates at the level of an acquirer, where he/she is able to develop a sensitivity towards the ordering of meaning implied by the strength of the classification rules: “the classification principle at the level of the individual creates recognition rules whereby the subject can orientate to the special features which distinguish the context” (Ibid., p. 17). On the other hand, the realisation rule establishes the ways in which meanings are formed and communicated. “Simply, recognition rules regulate what meanings are relevant and realisation rules regulate how the meanings are to be put together to create the legitimate text” (Ibid., p. 18).
It seems that the category of power needs control for it to be effective. It also seems that the power and control categories need classification and control categories to be effective, which in turn need recognition and realisation rules to be effective.

This basic makeup of pedagogic practice constitutes the moment of Possibility.

Bernstein has principles of power and control, classification and framing, and the rules of recognition and realisation as constituting the complete ground. As has been seen, these various components on each level of operation get translated into specific components on another level. One could argue that Bernstein has found a way of conceptually differentiating the workings of, otherwise same procedures, at different levels of operation. This is the moment of Necessity.

It seems that the explanatory capabilities of the overdetermined elements of this paper, vis-à-vis the construction of modalities of pedagogic codes, remain the same as those developed in the previous paper. The contingency in this paper, it seems to me, is signalled by some recognition of pedagogic practices, other than that of schooling, as also important means through which culture is produced and reproduced. In addition, the ending of the paper reads “what is now required is a model for the construction of pedagogic discourse and to this we shall attend in the next chapter” (Ibid., p. 22). Why does Bernstein need the pedagogic device as a conceptual resource at this time in the theory? This seems to be a sign of contingency in the theory, hoping that this addition would complete the theory.

7.2.5 “The pedagogic device”

In this paper, Bernstein attempts to show the various processes through which pedagogic communication is constructed from the level of production, reproduction and acquisition. The starting point seems to be a supposition that the form and content of pedagogic discourse is a major instrument
through which society regulates consciousness. As such, the problem of the paper is a search for “general principles underlying the transformation of knowledge into pedagogic communication” (Bernstein, 2000, p. 25). This is the positing reflection or moment of Actuality.

The specific general principles that Bernstein supposes as underlying the transformation of knowledge into pedagogic communication, or the external reflection, is expressed in terms of three rules: distributive, recontextualising and evaluative rules.

Distributive rules operate at the level of the production of knowledge. Bernstein argues that the production of knowledge is a consequence of a specific structuring of meaning, by way of relating two worlds: “esoteric” and “mundane”. The distribution of power or specific social division of labour is ultimately responsible for the specific structuring of meaning, as there are infinite possible ways of ordering meaning (Ibid., p. 30). In other words, there is a variety of possible relations between the esoteric and mundane worlds in the structuring of meaning and each particular choice of this relation contains within itself a particular order of power relations in the division of labour. There are infinite possible relations between the esoteric and mundane worlds because of what Bernstein calls a “potential discursive gap”: “I want to suggest that this gap or space can become (not always) a site for alternative possibilities, for alternative realisations of the relation between the material and the immaterial” (Ibid). It is through the control of this gap that any distribution of power tries to order meaning and therefore reproduce itself (Ibid).

Recontextualisation rules consist of instructional and regulative discourses. The instructional discourse consists of skills of numerous types and their relations to one another (Ibid., pp. 31-32). The regulative discourse creates “order”, “relations” and “identity” (Ibid., p. 32). With regards its formation, pedagogic discourse is “constructed by a recontextualising principle which selectively appropriates, relocates,
refocuses and relates other discourses [from the field of production] to constitute its own order” (Ibid., p. 33). The content and the form of instruction are both regulated by the recontextualisation rules.

Finally, the evaluative rules operate on the level of any specific pedagogic practice, whereby “criteria” for appropriate acquisition of pedagogic communication are stated. Bernstein argues that it is at the level of evaluation that consciousness is specialised. In this way, it is on the level of evaluative rules that the meaning of the whole device is condensed (Ibid., p. 36).

This level of the symbolic universe within which the specialisation of consciousness is realised through the form and content of pedagogic communication is the moment of Possibility.

Bernstein seems to have distributive rules as the determining reflection. This is because the basic makeup of the form and content of pedagogic communication is rooted in and generated by the distributive rules. As mentioned before, distributive rules are said to “distribute forms of consciousness through distributing different forms of knowledge” (Ibid., p. 28). The other symbolic features seem to be considered to be secondary in the regulation of various features that are ultimately responsible for the differential distribution of forms of consciousness between social groups. This is the moment of Necessity.

The overdetermining element, distributive rules, taking into consideration the focus of the paper, has not changed from the previous one. In the previous paper, the power and control relations translated into classification and framing principles, which in turn translated into recognition and realisation rules. This paper uses the umbrella term of distributive rules, which are essentially expressing the power and control relations. The forms of categories that are generated by distributive rules seem to be in line with those generated by classification and framing principles, which differ in terms of the strength of classification and framing principles. Here, the form depends on the control of the pedagogic discursive
gap, which is a new concept. Bernstein’s discursive gap is a structural gap, an ontological feature that hinders any attempt at closure to the identity of systems. What capacity the potential discursive gap has to Bernstein’s theory is a question I shall return to later. It will be remembered that the culminating point of the pedagogic device is in evaluation, which seems to imply something beyond the bounds of the theory at this point in time. Here, then, seems to be the point of contingency in this paper. Actually, the centrality of the idea of the evaluative rules will become clear in Chapter Eight.

7.3 Criticisms
Dowling has issues with Bernstein’s claims that classification and framing principles may vary independently of each other. Dowling proposes conditions and ways in which these principles relate to each other:

Essentially the situation is as follows. Where that which is classified is the privileged content (that which is to be transmitted) in a pedagogic situation, then the strength of framing of interactions must coincide with the strength of classification. Only where that which is classified is decoupled from that privileged content can classification and framing vary independently (Dowling, 2009, p. 79).

Dowling argues for this claim by first ignoring the movement between levels of analysis, whereby from among Bernstein’s concepts of power, control, classification and framing, he only retains classification and deems the others redundant. This enables him to talk about the specialisation of strategies in terms of practices that are either strongly “institutionalised” (classified), from the content that is not to be transmitted or otherwise weakly classified (Ibid., p. 79). This discussion has already been made in Chapter One of this project. A mere mention here should suffice.
Dowling also accuses Bernstein of inconsistency and unnecessary inventions of neologisms (Ibid., p. 81). He quotes the following passage to justify his point.

*pedagogic discourse is a recontextualizing principle.* Pedagogic discourse is constructed by a recontextualizing principle which selectively appropriates, relocates, refocuses and relates other discourses to constitute its own order. In this sense, pedagogic discourse can never be identified with any of the discourses it has recontextualised. We can now say that pedagogic discourse is generated by a recontextualizing discourse […]. The recontextualizing principle creates recontextualizing fields, it creates agents with recontextualizing functions. These recontextualising functions then become the means whereby a specific pedagogic discourse is created. (Ibid. p. 81, emphasis in original).

Dowling shows how the consistency and clarity that might sometimes be wanting in Bernstein’s use of concepts does not signal a fundamental limitation in the theory, as the basic claims of the theory are demonstrated by a look at specified examples.

Dowling further argues against Bernstein’s claim that the pedagogic device is a site for “appropriation”, “conflict” and “control”; actually, that it is a site at all (Dowling, 2009, p. 83). His major reason for arguing against these claims is that the pedagogic device is “not, ultimately, empirically operationalisable” (ibid.).

### 7.4 My analysis
This phase, including the noted two papers supposed to belong to the code theory phase, on the basis of the segmentation generated in Chapter Two, is constituted by a central idea that generates pairs of categories that are mutually entailed. Various names have been used to characterise the central idea. In
the 1969 paper, represented in the previous Chapter, Bernstein generates two orders of categories, which correlate with social class categories. However, he also introduces a set of categories: instructional and expressive orders, which together operate on both sides of the opposing categories. The instructional and expressive orders are presented as mutually entailed categories. In the 1970b paper, “message systems” are introduced, that would characterise the theory’s levels of analysis, which initially constitute of curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation, then changing to hierarchical rules, sequencing/pacing rules and criterial rules, and finally to distributive rules, recontextualising rules, and evaluative rules. In association with these systems are mutually entailed categories, which include couples like authority and control, power and control, classification and framing, and recognition and realisation rules. The exact terms used in each paper at each level can be seen in the discussion of each paper above. The idea here is to show the basic form of categories generated in this phase and what they imply as to the approach to doing research. The power/control, classification/framing, etc. distinctions are mutually entailed and are shown to be able to construct a range of realisations of modalities, on the basis of their relative strength.

Couples of power/control, classification/framing, recognition rule/realisation rule, etc. can be modelled in various ways. They are couples of necessary principles responsible for any possible pedagogic realisation. For example, classification and framing principles are understood as generative mechanisms for showing the different possible forms for pedagogy. The classification and framing values (internal and external) are utilized to further explain various possible pedagogic situations. The “what” and “how” of pedagogy can therefore be represented in terms of the classification and framing values. On the surface, the introduction of these categories seems like a move away from strong membership rules generated in the first and second phases. It is as if classification and framing, as a generative base, which can take various values, means that any pedagogic realisation can be accounted for in terms of this
generative structure. In principle, at least, one should be able to represent all pedagogic encounters or contexts from this generative structure. This way of understanding collections is such that whatever falls in the given space is included and subjected to analysis, in terms of its influence to the transmission of pedagogic discourse. However, when one looks at any education situation, it seems there must be a clear collection of what is in each individual category. The task, then, is to find the rule for the membership. Saying strong and weak classification seems coherent when one is referring to form, but it becomes problematic when one considers the content, because one is forced to confront the idea of its rule. Where does the rule come from? Does the researcher enter the empirical context with the rule already in hand, or is the rule to be discerned through the employment of some methodology, from the empirical? The former seems to be the case, at least when one considers the research used to establish the problem of this project. Whatever the case, the empirical seems to operate on the basis of some membership rule.

When one looks at the pedagogic device, there is no longer classification: strong/weak, but rather classification seems to transmute into the distributive rule: who gets what? Among social groups, social agents and such like, the question is who is in and who is not. At this level the idea of membership rule seems to persist. Framing and control seem to have been changed into recontextualising rule: how does one construct a series of mechanisms for enabling the realisation of who must get what, according to the distributive rule? Finally, the evaluative rule comes along. Interestingly, the strong/weak of classification/framing approach is no longer part of the discussion here, but, it is evaluation that seems to be the issue, where one can look at evaluation and ask what the evaluation is generating. This seems to be a shift away from an attempt to insert an a priori rule of membership. The rule of membership is no longer necessary, at most, the rule of membership is viewed as a political act (these individuals must get this and those that), but not in terms of pedagogy as such. The pedagogy is now discussed in terms
of its components, like selection of content, sequencing, pacing, control of a criteria, etc. Whether all these are realised needs to be sought at the level of the evaluation. The evaluation is then the object of analysis, rather than going into research with an a priori idea of what is in and what is out.

There seem to be some similarities in Bernstein’s approach to categorising phenomena in this phase, particularly in the pedagogic device, with Chomsky’s approach to language study, through the “Principles and Parameters”. Bernstein may have actually been influenced by Chomsky. Bernstein appeals to Chomsky’s “language device” to construct his “pedagogic device”, even as Bernstein himself acknowledges (Bernstein, 2000, p. 26). It is worth mentioning that Chomsky’s approach is opposed to and actually undermines structuralism. In Chomsky’s view, one cannot define structures that emerge in the world through structuralism, but rather what one needs to have is a system of generative rules (Chomsky, 2010, p. 121). In this view, structure emerges on the basis of generative principles. A particular realisation of a structure is an effect of parameters: “Each language, then, is (virtually) determined by a choice of values for lexical parameters: with one array of choices, we should be able to deduce Hungarian; with another, Yoruba” (Ibid., p. 122). In essence, this approach is against the foregrounding of membership rules:

This ‘Principles and Parameters’ approach, as it has been called, rejected the concept of rule and grammatical construction entirely: there are no rules for forming relative clauses in Hindi, verb phrases in Swahili, Passives in Japanese, and so on. The familiar grammatical constructions are taken to be taxonomic artifacts, useful for informal description perhaps but with no theoretical standing. [...] And the rules are decomposed into general principles of the faculty of language, which interact to yield the properties of expressions (Chomsky, 2010, p. 8).
Chomsky proposes that we think about languages as sharing general rules, whereby the variety of each language is a function of specialised boundaries, which seem unique but otherwise ultimately find their basis in the general principles that all languages share in:

We can think of the initial state of the faculty of language as a fixed network connected to a switch box; the network is constituted of the principles of language, while the switches are set one way, we have Swahili; when they are set another way, we have Japanese. Each possible human language is identified as a particular setting of the switches – a setting of parameters, in technical terminology (Ibid).

This is a similar kind of way of thinking about categories that Bernstein develops in the pedagogic device. Actually, it may be remembered that in Chapter One, a reference was made to Dowling, and other authors used to construct the problem of this work, as criticising Bernstein’s notion of classification as lacking the capacity to provide fine distinctions that specify the criteria for membership and non-membership. However, the evidence available in this phase points to the generation of categories that do not operate in terms of membership rules. More discussion is certainly necessary on this matter.

In the language device, on one hand, there are general principles, and on another, the selection of parameters, which fix languages realised. In other words, the realisation is shaped by a particular kind of regulation. There is a particular kind of structuring that happens, given by the principles, and then the regulation, set by the parameters, which realise particular I-language: “there is a clear conceptual distinction between the state of the language faculty, on the one hand, and an instantiation of the initial state with parameters fixed, on the other” (Chomsky, 2010, p. 123).
So, it seems, the pedagogic device is meant to exhibit a similar kind of functioning, in that absolute principles in the background are the distributive, recontextualising and evaluative rules. How does the particular realization of the device get set? Bernstein needs a kind of equivalence to Chomsky’s parameters. The parameters are set by experience (context). The distributive, recontextualising and evaluative rules are structural or may be taken as principles. They have no effective bearing, but serve to provide the guidelines for an appropriate realisation. The distributive rule says who gets what, the recontextualising rule says how the message is to be realised, and evaluative rule says what the criteria for the specific realisation at the level of the learner’s text must be. A closer look at each of these rules reveals that they each implicate the other rules: “Indeed, the rules of the pedagogic device are essentially implicated in the distribution of, and constraints upon, the various forms of consciousness” (Bernstein, 2000, p. 28). These rules each contain “who gets what”, “how the message is to be realised”, and “how the (above two relations) what and how are needing to be realised”. In other words, one finds a version of the distributive, recontextualising and evaluative rules in each of the rules (cf. Davis (2005)). In this way, what is equivalent to parameters in Bernstein is the question of the what/how and their realisation, at each level. The diagram in Figure 7.2 represents the idea being developed here.

Bernstein is making a further point: what is it that this structure generates in the end that has distributive consequences for the agents involved? There is a difference between the quality of education provided in schools and the opportunities provided as one goes across the educational system. There remains huge differentiation of access to knowledge, and it tends to be realised along social class lines. But the prescription on what and how education should be organised and realised (distributive (policy level)) and recontextualisation (curriculum level rules) is the same. But why the difference in the quality of the output at the end of the child’s schooling career? As can be seen from Figure 7.2, the moment of the pedagogic device is from distributive rule, through recontextualisation
rule, to evaluative rule. It seems the difference in academic output hinges on the effects of the evaluative rule. The whole device, therefore, seems to be condensed in evaluation, as Bernstein argues. If this is indeed the case, then that is the place at which to focus research, in order to understand the differential academic performance among children from different social classes. The whole phase seems to lead to this point.

What the pedagogic device is driving towards is what Chomsky would refer to as an “internalist account”: getting at the internal mechanisms that generate particular meanings in these pedagogic contexts (Chomsky, 2010, p. 125). It is no longer possible to construct a universal story, but rather to construct the resources for describing the evaluative realisations in a given context. One cannot say upfront what these evaluative realisations are going to be. The movement as described in this phase, from the classification and framing story, to pedagogic practice via curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation and the pedagogic device seems to be a progressive movement away from categories that generate
strong membership rules understood in terms binarily opposed categories. The reference to Chomsky’s work seems to confirm this move.

7.5 Conclusion
This phase generally considers pedagogic discourse as a major instrument of cultural transmission, production, reproduction and possible change. The analysis has tended to be on the level of the production of pedagogic discourse, reproduction and transmission. On each of these levels, mechanisms of control have been shown to be pivotal to understanding the reasons behind the general problematic of the theory. The mechanisms of control are presented as mutually entailed categories, which mark out both the what of the discourse and the how of transmission. Bernstein uses a variety of names to signify the what and how of the discourse. Towards the end of the phase, particularly in the discussion on the pedagogic device, we see that the key to understanding the problem of the theory has been condensed in the evaluative rule. We can recognise that although the distributive and recontextualising rules are important, they remain incapable of effecting the actual regulation of consciousness desired for the learner. In other words, there seems to be a realisation that if the control mechanisms do not extend down to the ways in which the individual agent, like the school child, realises the educational content they are exposed to, then that has the potential to subvert the imperative that emanates from power. So, whatever power says can be significantly either enhanced or undermined through the form that the content of the evaluative rule take. As such, the phase comes to a close without providing sufficient resources for understanding how it is that the evaluative rule acts selectively on who can successfully meet the criteria for valid acquisition of the discourse.
Those who are interested in reading Bernstein in terms of the everyday/academic distinction read the contents of the distributive, recontextualisation and evaluative rules in terms of that distinction. In that way, rather than using the resources of the theory to generate an account of the internal principles of the ordering of curriculum and pedagogy in specific educational settings, they impose a reading of all educational activity in terms of the everyday/academic distinction. Such readings might be thought of as producing moral descriptions of educational activity, prescribing that what it is that ought to be prioritised is (what it determines) as the academic, rather than asking the more interesting question of what it is that is constituted as the academic. In other words, rather than following the generative possibilities afforded by the recasting of the terms of the theory as multivalent, mutually entailed categories, the widespread contemporary insistence on entering the Bernsteinian universe through a reassertion of the everyday/academic distinction generates a blind spot in which the generative possibilities of the theory are lost. Having taken us to the point where it is the content of the evaluative rule that is determining, and so requiring us to generate our accounts of education from that point, holding on to the use of the everyday/academic distinction as the central explanatory frame seem to be a retrogressive move.
Chapter eight

8.1 Introduction
Chapter 7 ended with a conclusion that the composition of evaluation is central to what is realised in pedagogic discourse. Bernstein focuses the problem of differential educational achievement, manifesting itself along social class lines, on the workings of evaluation, as the place where all control mechanisms are condensed. The culmination in evaluation drives Bernstein towards a consideration of the knowledge that emerges from the evaluative activity in pedagogy and from attempts to order and prescribe – at the levels of policy, curriculum and training – what form such activity takes. Bernstein chooses to focus on what he imagines to be the possible forms of knowledge, in general, and the social organisation of its production and reproduction in this final phase of the development of his theory.

This phase is essentially constituted by the paper “Vertical and Horizontal Discourse: An Essay” (2000). There are other versions of this paper. Other than the one discussed here, we have the paper “Discourses, knowledge structure and fields: some arbitrary considerations” (1996), “Vertical and horizontal discourse: an essay” (1999). The basic ideas of the 1996 paper get developed into those represented in the 1999 paper. Other than the presence of an abstract, the 1999 paper is essentially the same as the 2000 one. For purposes of generating data for this phase, I limit myself to the 2000 version of the paper.

8.2 “Vertical and horizontal discourse: An essay”
In this paper, the major propositions refer to two discourses types: vertical and horizontal. For Bernstein, “a horizontal discourse entails a set of strategies which are local, segmentally organised,
context specific and dependent, for maximising encounters with persons and habitats” (Bernstein, 2000, p. 157).

Vertical discourse takes two forms:

a coherent, explicit and systematically principled structure, hierarchically organised as in the sciences, or it takes the form of a series of specialised languages with specialised modes of interrogation and specialised criteria for the production and circulation of texts as in the social sciences and humanities (Ibid).

The two forms of the vertical discourse are also distinguished in terms of the knowledge structures they exhibit. The first form (coherent, explicit and systematically principled structure, etc.) has “hierarchical knowledge structures”, while the second (which takes the form of a series of specialised languages, etc.) has “horizontal knowledge structures.” Bernstein uses a triangle to illustrate the structure of hierarchical knowledge structure, whereby the apex represents a small number of “integrating propositions”, while the broad base represents the varied components that are to be understood in terms of the integrating propositions: “This form of knowledge attempts to create very general propositions and theories, which integrate knowledge at lower levels, and in this way shows underlying uniformities across an expanding range of apparently different phenomena” (Ibid., p. 161). Bernstein represents horizontal knowledge structure, as the definition indicates, in terms of a series of languages: “L₁ L₂ L₃ L₄ L₅ L₆ L₇ … Lⁿ” (Ibid). For Bernstein, the acquisition of horizontal knowledge structures is in terms of what he calls a “gaze”, which he defines as “a consequence of the perspective created by the recontextualising principle constructing and positioning the set of languages of a particular Horizontal Knowledge Structure, or privileging a particular language in the set” (Ibid., p. 171; emphasis in original).
It is quite a challenge to pinpoint the problem for this paper. Bernstein appears to agree with such an interpretation in the conclusion where he refers to the paper as “wide-ranging” (Ibid., 170). It seems that Bernstein is proposing a certain development of languages of description in research that would not only be concerned about internal consistency but also be strong as regards “empirical description”, specifically in sociology of education and sociology in general: “What is being advocated here is linguistic challenge by the dynamic interactional process of research; not a displacement but a re-positioning of the role of specialised languages” (Ibid., p. 171). The important phrase seems to be “the dynamic interactional process of research”, which is about an interplay between theory and empirical phenomena.

As stated at the head of this Chapter, the major propositions of the paper are framed in terms of the categories of horizontal and vertical discourses. Bernstein argues that the empirical characteristic of horizontal discourse is that it is composed of local practices, that context specificity is achieved through segmentation, that social relations are communalised, and that acquisition takes the form of some or other competences (Ibid., 160).

On the other hand, Bernstein characterises vertical discourse as composed of official/institutional practices, with context specificity achieved through recontextualisation, where the social relations are Individualising and where acquisition takes the form of graded performances (Ibid).

These characterisations constitute the formal ground or moment of Actuality of the paper.

With regard to the real ground, there are a number of symbolic features that correlate with the characteristic traits identified in the Actuality moment, which together seem to represent an array of possible explanations for the problem of the paper. They include the form of the practice, distributive principles, the form that social relations take and the form that acquisition takes.
The differences from, and similarities between horizontal and vertical discourse are described in terms of the four qualities outlined above. We now discuss each quality in some detail.

On the point of practice, in horizontal discourse, practices are local, in that “they are contextually specific and context dependent, embedded in on-going practices, usually with strong affective loading, and directed towards specific, immediate goals, highly relevant to the acquirer in the context of his/her life” (Ibid., p. 159; emphasis in original). On the other hand, the practice of vertical discourse is institutionalised, in that it “is not consumed at the point of its contextual delivery but is an on-going process in extended time” (Ibid., p. 160).

In horizontal discourse, the transmission of “knowledge”, “behaviour” and “expectations” are regulated by distributive rules (Ibid., p. 157). The strategies to be circulated have no necessary relation to one another, for they are local and segmentally structured. Therefore, they are distributed via segmentation (or are exhausted at the moment of communication) (Ibid). In vertical discourse, “access”, “transmission” and “evaluation” of knowledge are regulated by strong distributive rules (Ibid). “Circulation is accomplished usually through explicit forms of recontextualising affecting distribution in terms of time, space and actors” (Ibid).

Social relations, too, are thought of as having different realisations within each discourse. In horizontal discourse, social relations are structured in ways that make possible the exchange of strategies and procedures in line with the form of the discourse itself. The closer people interact with one another (or share strategies and procedures), the greater the possibility of the circulation of strategies among members. Conversely, the less people share strategies and procedures with one another, the less the occasion of circulation of procedures among members. As a result, the exchange of the knowledge of horizontal discourse requires communalised type of social relations (Ibid. p. 160). Social relations for
vertical discourse are individualised, as everyday life has no necessary bearing on the discourse, for the discourse has independent internal principles and meanings (Ibid).

On the point of acquisition, in horizontal discourse, acquisition takes the form of “competences” that are quite independent of each other, therefore segmentally related (Ibid., p. 159). On the other hand, in vertical discourse, acquisition takes the form of “graded performance”, where the “social units” (what is to be taught/learnt) is “structured in time and space by principles of recontextualising” (Ibid., p. 160; emphasis in original).

Bernstein seems to pick up distributive principles, among other symbolic features, as constituting the complete ground. The following quotation seems to suggest thus: “The arbitrary of both discourses is constructed by distributive rules regulating the circulation of the discourses” (Ibid., p. 160).

### 8.3 Criticisms
Dowling views this phase of Bernstein’s theory (particularly knowledge structures) to have its roots in the work on “speech codes and orientation to meaning” (Dowling, 2009, p. 89). He argues that both the work on the speech codes and that on knowledge structures fail because they do not take seriously the specifics of cultural practice: “The speech codes work detaches the linguistic from the social by dealing hastily (or not at all) with the empirical observation of linguistic production. The characterising of knowledge structures does much the same thing in fetishising knowledge or ideas” (ibid. p. 93).

Along similar lines Breier (2004) argues that none of Bernstein’s concepts “related to horizontal and vertical knowledge forms provide clear indicators of what counts as ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ in empirical data in real-life interaction between knowledge acquired informally and formally” (p. 208). In addition, Breier argues that Bernstein did not take into consideration the structures of “region” (the combination of traditionally different subjects to form one course), to which law, Breier’s object of analysis, belongs.
Breier concludes that Bernstein’s theory on vertical and horizontal knowledge structures was incapable of providing delicate characterisations between expressions that employ, on the one hand, the "general", "distant", "abstract", and, on the other, the "particular", "local" and "concrete" (ibid.).

Dowling finds the categorisation of some disciplines under hierarchical knowledge structure and others under horizontal knowledge structure questionable: “my suspicion is that any discipline will exhibit variations in terms of horizontality and hierarchizing as we shift attention between these and other contexts” (Ibid., p. 88). The contexts that Dowling is referring to here are horizontal and vertical discourses, or “day-to-day working practices of practitioners [on the one hand], or [on the other] in the structure of learned journals, in the lexicon of specialised terms, in the activities of research funding agencies, in models of apprenticeship of new practitioners” (Ibid).

Similarly, Muller (2007) argues that Bernstein does not sufficiently clarify the relationship between what Muller terms “verticality” and “grammaticality”. The definitions for these terms are represented below:

“[Verticality means] how theory develops internally, with what Bernstein later called the internal language of description [...] while grammaticality] has to do with how theory deals with the world, or how theoretical statements deal with their empirical predicates, the external language of description” (Muller, 2007, p. 71; emphasis in original).

In addition to this observation of a lack of clarity, Maton adds –

Similarly, what the principles of L1 and L2 constitute are not made clear and so what makes a ‘language of description’ stronger or weaker remains unclear. It is also unclear how these two dimensions are related in different knowledge structures and work together to shape the building of knowledge over time” (Maton, 2011, p. 24).
Maton (2011), utilizing the ideas of “verticality” and “grammaticality” of Muller (2007), argues that Bernstein’s idea of verticality seems to suggest a “deficit model”: “Bernstein’s account views verticality as a categorical principle of presence/absence: a field either has verticality or it does not” (p. 24). Maton argues that such an approach is as a result of Bernstein’s “dichotomous and ideal typical model of knowledge structures which establishes a fault line between the two forms, and constructs horizontal knowledge structures as lacking any capacity for integrative and subsumptive development of ideas” (Ibid). Maton argues, contrary to Bernstein’s claims, that horizontal knowledge structures do actually progress vertically, particularly within their specific methodologies (Ibid). This idea resonates with Dowling’s questioning, as noted above, of a rigid distinction between disciplines exhibiting hierarchical knowledge structures and those exhibiting horizontal knowledge structures.

Another limitation of this phase for Maton is a gap between descriptions for fields in general and those for distinct theories: “the framework remains divided between concepts for intellectual fields (verticality/grammaticality) and for individual theories (L1/L2). How the two couples can be integrated within a more encompassing framework has yet to be explored” (Ibid).

It is worth mentioning that there are a number of scholars who view their work as complementing some of the limitations of this phase, to mention but a few: Gamble (2004), Moore & Muller (2002), Moore (2006), Muller (2006b & 2007), Maton (2006; 2010 & 2011) and Tyler (2010). Maton (2011, p. 25), for example, understands his work as aiming “to build cumulatively on Bernstein’s framework with concepts that deepen and extend his [Bernstein’s] insights and are applicable to both individual theories and whole intellectual fields”. In addition to scholars who seek to advance the theory at the fourth phase on the conceptual level, there are a number who work within Bernstein’s framework to do research, and in that way demonstrating the usability of the theory. The authors referred to in Chapter One to construct the problem of this project are some of those who serve this purpose. However, it seems most scholars
take it for granted that the move of the theory in this direction, from the previous phase, is necessarily consistent with the previous trajectory of the theory.

Only a real concern for understanding the fundamental orientation of the development of the theory can justify the move of the theory to this phase. To that we now shift.

8.4 My analysis
Ordinarily, after looking at the criticisms of various scholars, in the previous three Chapters I have been spending sometime investigating the plausibility of Bernstein’s attempts to construct the necessity of the phase. This phase is rather different, as it constitutes the primary concern of the project, in its relation to previous formulations of the theory. As such, what follows is an investigation of the plausibility of the move from the third phase to the fourth one, vis-à-vis the basic development of the theory.

To start with, I quickly refer to some of the significant writings that have attempted to make some commentary, as well as improvements, on the theory that Bernstein develops in phase four, with the view of drawing some expert understanding of the place of the fourth phase of Bernstein’s theory, before making my conclusions based on the data generated from Chapter Five to Eight.

Moore & Muller characterise the purpose of the fourth phase in terms of conditions for an intellectual field, particularly sociology:

The concepts that he [Bernstein] develops describe in a theoretical language the condition of an intellectual field characterised by fragmentation; the history of which is the successive proliferation of sub-disciplines and perspectives or approaches, and one that fails to secure an integrative general theory or produce cumulative knowledge (Moore & Muller, 2000, p. 628).
This move in the theory, at least according to the above characterization, does not immediately attend to the problem of educability. Of course, as an approach to research, it would be possible to engage with the problem of educability tending to manifest itself along social class lines. This can be evidenced by looking at the work of scholars referred to earlier, who have, at least in part, attempted to use the framework developed in this phase to think about the problem of educability, particularly in relation to working-class children. The point here is that Moore & Muller do not see the fourth phase of Bernstein’s theory as primarily building on the achievements of the third phase, nor concerned with the problems of the third phase. The following quotation seems to confirm this claim, “it was in a review of the sociology of education in the early 1970s that he first presented an extended account of the field in which the later concepts have their probable origin” (Moore & Muller, 2002, p. 628). It is interesting that Moore & Muller make this claim partly to show the “continuity of the line of thought” in Bernstein. The continuity in thought referred to here manifests itself in the 1970s and then in 1999. What has been happening to the theory between these moments in time? Or maybe, which seems plausible, Bernstein comes back to the basic problematic that he once attended to in the 1970s. A quotation from Moore clarifies issues a bit:

In keeping with his more general approach, it is assumed that there is a relationship between the structures of fields and the character of the knowledge (the symbolic forms) that they produce. These ideas can be traced back to a paper from the early 1970s, ‘The Sociology of Education: a brief account’ (Moore, 2006, p. 28; emphasis in original).

Whether Bernstein’s “continuity” of thought when writing the paper of the fourth phase sufficiently takes into account the development of ideas between the periods of time alluded to is an interesting question.
Maton seems to think that the fourth phase takes into account some of the major insights of Bernstein between 1977 and 1999. He argues that,

Basil Bernstein (1977, 1990, 1999) shows how structures of knowledge in intellectual and educational fields specialize discourses and actors in ways that have structuring significance for those discourses and actors as well as the fields of social and symbolic practice they inhabit. Using the concepts of educational codes, the pedagogic device and knowledge structures, Bernstein’s framework helps reveal the effects of the structuring of pedagogic and intellectual discourse for social relations, organisation, disciplinary and curricular change, and identities (Maton, 2006, p. 44).

This observation suggests that Maton views the development of the theory, at least from the third phase to the fourth phase, as being in order. It is as if the various stages of the development of the theory focus on different structuring elements, within the educational field.

Bernstein himself somewhere seems to suggest that the fourth phase complements previous efforts in the theory. In the paper of the fourth phase, at the end of a brief introduction of the development of the theory, Bernstein says that there was “no analysis of the discourses subject to pedagogic transformation” (Bernstein, 2000, p. 155). Bernstein therefore sees this paper as providing for the lack of analysis of the nature of pedagogic discourses. In the same lines, elsewhere, Bernstein argues that,

the first major attempt at ‘relations within’ was the pedagogic device in order to show how pedagogic discourse was itself constructed. And then this was followed, there was still something missing, because though that paper showed, or at least, attempted to show in principle, at least conceptually, what pedagogic discourse was, how it was organised, how it was produced and reproduced and changed ... it didn’t actually, [...] do everything, [...] it didn’t
actually show the nature of pedagogic discourse. It showed how it was put together but it didn’t show its nature; it did actually show its distinguishing features and the vertical and horizontal discourse paper was a complex paper which aimed to show the distinguishing features of these two very powerful modes of discourse (Bernstein, 2001, p. 373).

Muller (2006), in line with Moore & Muller (2002), is full of praise for Bernstein’s treatment of an old standing issue of the dichotomous nature of knowledge:

much of the discussion, instead of elaborating the dichotomous distinction, perpetually collapses the terms of discussion back into the crude simples, which simultaneously distorts the discussion and keeps it mired in ideology. Bernstein’s analysis explicitly sets out to break this vicious circle (Muller, 2006, p. 12).

As has been observed when considering the criticisms, Muller (2006) has issues with the lack of distinction between verticality and grammaticality, and he therefore attempts to fill this gap in Bernstein’s theory. Muller (2006) addresses the question of knowledge growth, and argues with some conviction that only when the issue of knowledge growth is addressed can the challenge of educating “poor children” be fruitfully resolved (p. 26).

Moore (2006) examines some of the resources that Bernstein develops as approaches to research within the sociology of education. Moore shows how at various moments in Bernstein’s work, ideas that find finality in the paper that constitutes the fourth phase had been developing, against two major trends that foreground the consideration of “relations to education”, on the one hand and “relations within education”, on the other, in their approach to research. Bernstein’s approach integrates the two kinds of relations within the same framework. In addition, Moore expounds on the two languages of description which Bernstein develops and how the development of both languages in the approach to research
could raise sociology of education to a field “with a strong grammar” (Moore, 2006, p. 42). In short, Moore rearticulates what Bernstein has already said. Perhaps the value of his paper is in making some important connections, essentially among Bernstein’s ideas of knowledge codes, pedagogic device, and knowledge structures. As the other scholars considered, Moore does not have issues with the development of Bernstein’s theory from the third to the fourth phase.

Maton (2006) also offers some insights into of the implications of Bernstein’s fourth phase that might prove productive in thinking about research in the area of sociology of education. Maton (2006) develops a model of “knower structures”, after the model of knowledge structures. In fact, Maton believes that the notion of knower structures complements the use of knowledge structures in research, as both are always operative in discourses and their practice. Maton aims to “integrate” his knower structures with Bernstein’s knowledge structures with a view to extending the analytic, as well as descriptive power of the theory. Maton demonstrates this extended capacity of the theory by using it to discuss research on Music in school curriculum.

Hugo (2006) relates the model of hierarchy and pedagogy in Bernstein to Plato’s model of hierarchy and pedagogy. Hugo shows that, after all, the major elements of Bernstein’s fourth phase are contained in the work of Plato. Hugo shows that in Bernstein, just like in Plato, the kinds of hierarchy operative in the theory have both the extensional and intensional components, and both components are equally regarded. Hugo points to the pedagogic device as specifically implying both hierarchies for pedagogy (Hugo, 2006, p. 70). The pedagogic device harmonizes the two hierarchies accordingly: “The danger is getting the two [hierarchies] mixed up and maintaining that the biggest has to be the most abstract, or the abstract has to be the largest” (Ibid). Hugo seems to view Bernstein’s later work to have placed greater weight on the intensional hierarchy, although he does not quite overtly say that: “As Bernstein reached the end of his highly productive life he pointed to precisely that sacred end point of Plato’s
ladder, the terrain beyond Dialectic where assumptions and principles of knowledge are generated” (Ibid., p. 71). The tension in the methodological implications of the pedagogic device and the work on knowledge structures does not arise in Hugo’s paper because he considers both papers to constitute the same framework. In this way, the ideas from both works are seen as essentially complementary.

Tyler (2010) seems to be asking the same question that this project is investigating, i.e., the place of the everyday/academic knowledge, or as has been termed in the phase, vertical and horizontal discourses, within the general purpose of Bernstein’s project. Tyler argues that what we have termed the fourth phase is opposed to earlier efforts and motivations of Bernstein’s inquiry:

What was originally a critical sociological analysis of the role of decontextualized meanings and their forms of transmission has now been subsumed into a defence of those very forms of knowledge production, which have historically been associated with elitist forms of selective schooling whose strongest adherents are to be found in the private and most selective schools and universities (Tyler, 2010, p. 144).

Tyler uses two international testing regimes: TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Studies) and PISA (Program for International Student Assessment), which he argues are essentially based on the horizontal and vertical categories, to ultimately demonstrate the limitations of the vertical/horizontal categories to represent Bernstein’s approach to pedagogic discourse (Ibid). In his investigation, Tyler identifies two issues, which he suggests are the points of neglect in the scope of Bernstein’s vertical/horizontal categories, vis-à-vis Bernstein’s general scheme: on the one hand, “grounding the logic of evaluation itself in a framework, which is consistent with the social realist foundations of the Bernsteinian notions of pedagogic discourse as articulated in his socio-semiotic analysis of the changing relations between education and society” (Ibid., p. 152) and on the other, some
methodological issues, where the approach to research takes into consideration “entire national systems on unidimensional measures in individual performance” (Ibid).

Tyler reiterates Bernstein’s point, as has been shown in our discussion of the pedagogic device, that the control mechanisms operating at various levels of the device are essentially effective at the level of evaluation: “The three axes of the pedagogic device [...] find a source of stability in the ‘objective’ performativities of a testing regime, which can operate at all levels of the classroom, the school, the regions and [...] that of the state” (Ibid., p. 150). Similarly, Tyler shows how evaluation models are based on specific socio-semiotic realities, thereby advancing an approach to research into pedagogic discourse that takes seriously all dimensions at play on all levels of analysis.

Tyler seems to suggest that instead of generating a theoretical nomenclature essentially characterised by conceptual categories that operate as polar binaries vertical and horizontal discourses – Bernstein should rather have focused the development of the theory on the idea of evaluation, at the same time generating categories that would be encompassing of social and political aspects of educational policy and practice. Tyler intimates at this in terms of possible areas of development in the field, with the background of the criticisms he places on Bernstein’s models of vertical and horizontal discourses:

It remains to be seen how a more complex reading of the interaction between Bernstein’s formulation of the pedagogic device and the dynamics of global cultures may generate a more theoretically informed basis to evaluation than that which typifies the crude positivism of the rankings of the international testing surveys (Ibid., p. 152).

Looking at the arguments of the scholars referred to above, who have provided some commentary on Bernstein’s fourth phase, only Tyler seriously asks the question of whether the fourth phase appropriately follows from the previous works of the theory. The other authors seem to take it for
granted that the move from the third phase to the fourth phase was positive, and therefore they try to justify it and even complement it by making explicit some of its implications, as we have seen above.

In the terms of Tyler, what has been generated in this project, vis-à-vis the question of the productivity of the move to the fourth phase, could be represented in terms of two ideas. The first, ensuing from the conclusions from the third phase, is that at the end of the third phase, it seems that the area of development would be the provision of theoretical resources for understanding how the evaluative rule acts selectively on who can successfully meet the criteria for valid acquisition of the discourse. This conclusion was come about because there was a realisation that only when the control mechanisms extend down to the ways in which the individual agent, an example was given of school children, realise the educational content, can the imperative that comes from power be guaranteed.

The second point, which is the major outcome of this project, has to do with the orientation of the nature of the categories that the theory generates along the progression from phase one, as well as the methodological implications of the foundational progression. In phase one, we saw that Bernstein generates categories that are binarily opposed to each other, which strongly mark out characteristics of people to be found under each category. In phase two, although there is a retention of strong binarisms on the theoretical level, there is less rigidity with regards empirical realisation. In fact, we have seen that the second part of the second phase has “orientation to meaning”, which, as has been discussed, is rather moving away from clear-cut classification into either groups implied by the categories generated. In the third phase, the first part, with the classification and framing as the main couple used to explain the structures of the various categories, there is an effort to move even further away from strong membership rules of the second phase. However, it was noted that there remains an ambiguity in the categories that retain the tendency to generate categories that imply strong membership rule. However, the latter part of the third phase, the pedagogic device, overcomes that ambiguity, by generating a
framework, similar to that of Chomsky, where there are generative rules on one level, in which all relevant phenomena participate, and, on the other hand, explain how particular realisations get set. Such a framework allows for a comprehensive approach to research, where no element is overdetermined, but all are incorporated into the system and their influences assessed within particular cases. The fourth phase, against this basic development summarised above, seems to go back to the generation of categories based on strong binarism. This seems to be a regression in the theory. As has been noted above, this is also the view of Tyler (2010, p. 144).

8.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, this Chapter seems to end on a rather problematic note, where the theoretical nomenclature generated in the fourth phase does not signal development in the theory, but rather a regression. Two major reasons have been identified for this characterisation of the phase: the first one is that from the third phase, the place of development in the theory should have been around the workings of the evaluation rule. The second reason is the nature of the categories that the theory generates, and their implications for the approach to research. It has been noted that the nature of the categories generated by the theory undergoes some progressive change from the first phase to the third phase, and then the fourth phase goes back to the basic categories of the early formulations in the theory. It is this phase that we see the theory developed in a manner that suggests the everyday/academic distinction, where the everyday is aligned with horizontal discourse and the academic with vertical discourse.

A reference has also been made to some scholars who provide some commentary and some work to develop the descriptive capabilities of the fourth phase. Among these, only Tyler (2010) has been seen
to ask the question of whether the theoretical nomenclature of the fourth phase advances the previous achievements of the theory. The others take it for granted that such a move was legitimate and consistent with previous works of the theory. Interestingly, Tyler’s conclusions are consistent with the findings of this project.
Chapter Nine

9.1 Introduction
This is the concluding Chapter of the project. Initially, this Chapter gives a summary of the development of Bernstein’s theory of educational transmission. Then, some comments on the general orientation of research in the field of sociology of education, inspired by Bernstein’s fourth phase and influenced by Dowling, are given. A discussion on the possibilities for future study that are implied by the project is had, after which the limitations of the study are discussed. An overview of the Chapters of the project is then given, as a conclusion to the project.

9.2 Summary of Bernstein’s theory
Bernstein’s corpus of work has been re-described in this project as a series of four successive phases by drawing on commentaries on Bernstein’s work by Bernsteinian scholars and by some of his detractors. Phase 1 was concerned with Bernstein’s construction of a sociolinguistic thesis concerning the educability of children; Phase 2, with his development of a theory of educational codes; Phase 3, with his construction of a sophisticated account of the structuring of educational transmissions; and Phase 4, with his account of the general structure of knowledges, both commonsensical/everyday and specialised/academic.

By using Hegel’s discussion of the dialectic as it is laid out in his logic of essence, I have argued that each of the phases can be rearticulated in terms of Hegel’s dialectic, from some Actuality, through an exploration of Possibilities, culminating in the production of a conceptual Necessity, but then foundering on the rock of Contingency. The arrival at the moment of Contingency demanded of Bernstein the labour to reconstitute the theory in a new way. Borrowing a turn of phrase from Žižek, one might argue that Bernstein’s work shows the construction of a totality out of a series of successive failures.
Phase 1 starts by announcing the problem of educating children and specifically with attention to the
difference in achievement for working-class and middle-class children. Bernstein states the problem in
terms of two groups of people who perceive the world in different ways. Their view of the world is
determined by their language use, and the latter is correlated with their social class membership. The
ways in which they view the world is thought to impact on their educability.

Insofar as the everyday/academic distinction rears its head in this phase, its correlate is the
public/formal language distinction. However, the latter distinction is really what results from a
somewhat simplistic reading of middle-class children being relatively more successful than working-class
children at school, and where the lack of working-class success is read as produced by the absence of
middle-class speech qua formal language, the latter being strongly aligned with the linguistic forms
privileged by schooling. This outcome derives from the belief that it is the case that language determines
thought (Sapir-Whorf).

The propositions which have an overdetermining effect on the theory map out a series of definite traits
for working-class and middle-class children, effectively essentialising the individuals who belong to those
social groups and dooming the working-class to relative failure while anointing the middle-class with
relative success. The categories generated in this phase take the same form as those of the fourth phase
of Bernstein’s theory, as they are based on strong classification between categories.

The question that arises is, how do the working-class end up with a public language and the middle-
class with a public as well as a formal language? Bernstein provides a partial answer to this question,
finding a source to the phenomenon in parent-child relations. It is as if we have a vicious circle for the
working-class, in that the discourse of the parents, particularly that of the mother, (re)produces only a
public language: but it is a virtuous circle for the middle-class, because the parents (re)produce both
public and formal languages. Bernstein attempts to establish the necessity of the central propositions of the theory at this point by drawing on ideas that are aligned with the linguistic determinism of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is, however, very problematic and has been subjected to devastating criticisms. This generates a moment of contingency which unsettles the theory, requiring the reconstitution of the theory in a way that overcomes the destabilising effects of the Contingent.

The code theory develops from this situation of crisis in the theory. Generally, codes can be understood as systems of rules that transform particular kinds of entities and generate some output that looks different. In this way, to understand what one is confronted with, one has to understand the rule. With regards Bernstein’s elaborated and restricted codes, it seems that the rule for the constitution and/or reporting of experience is different. Bernstein seems to point to social relations as responsible for the difference. Social divisions of labour, specifically, are seen to be responsible for the structuring of social relations.

The strong linguistic determinism of the first phase is transmuted into a story about the production of elaborated and restricted codes, and elaborated and restricted semantic orientations, out of the participation of individuals in the division of labour. Linguistic forms are now recognised as the products of participation in modes of production (simple/complex) via the cognitive demands of social reproduction on individuals, the latter producing elaborated or restricted codes/orientations to meaning. In short, linguistic determinism is replaced by a determinism that is generated by social relations understood in terms of participation in the division of labour. Since working-class individuals inhabit the lower positions in the division of labour, cognitive demand is low and restricted codes/orientations are produced. Of course, given the binary logic that still infects this phase of Bernstein’s work, middle-class individuals enjoy cognitive qualities diametrically opposite to those of working-class individuals.
In the background here we have the deployment of Durkheim’s categories of mechanical and organic solidarity, but where Durkheim used those terms in his construction of a teleological account of the progressive development of societies from simple to complex and their attendant forms of solidarity relations, Bernstein uses them to distinguish between the working- and middle-classes in modern, complex society. What this does is enable Bernstein to still hang on to some of the ideas of the first phase, continuing to damn working-class individuals to cognitive simplicity while anointing middle-class individuals with cognitive complexity.

The arguments that show linguistic determinism to be a bad idea apply to this phase as well since all that forms of social solidarity do are mark identification with and membership of particular social groups, but they do not determine cognitive abilities. Habits of existence are not indexes of cognitive possibilities or limits. Bernstein himself recognised a convergence on the idea of innate human competences within a number of intellectual fields (Bernstein 1996: 54 ff.), where a new understanding of how the individual and the social interact was developing. While he attempted to deal with the idea by constructing an account of what he called competence and performance pedagogies, focusing on the manner in which evaluation worked in such pedagogies, it does appear that one of the central principles used by those who distinguished between competence and performance in humans was picked up him: structure is constituted off a generative base rather than externally imposed on the social and its participants. The consequence was that the simple structuralist binarisms of the first and second phases could no longer hold, producing a moment of contingency in Phase 2.

The third phase is concerned with pedagogic discourse and makes extensive use the categories of classification and framing. A close look at these categories reveals that they are defined in terms of relations of mutual entailment, with classification (what/power) requiring framing (how/control), and
vice versa. The strong binary logic of the structuralist Bernstein of Phase 1 and Phase 2 is displaced, making way for a new logic based on generative principles.

In the pedagogic device paper, Bernstein refers to scholars like Bourdieu, arguing that they explain schooling as merely a relay for power relations within society. He argues that the attempt should rather be made to construct an explanation of the generative mechanisms at play, which he declares as his intention. Not surprisingly, given the need to shift to a generative account of education, he appeals to Chomsky’s language device for inspiration. Making that kind of reference has far reaching implications that signal some major shift from what had been going on in the theory before then. For Chomsky, structures are the outcomes of the operations of generative principles, which can be realized in particular ways, with parameters set by the participation in particular contexts. The pedagogic device, therefore, is to be associated with the idea of a generative grammar, and not with a structuralist account of education. As a consequence, the idea of universal principles with the contextual parameters is probably the logical direction in which the theory ought to have developed at the end of the third phase of the theory.

In the pedagogic device, classification is transmuted into the distributive rule: who gets what: framing into the recontextualising rule: how does one construct a series of mechanisms for enabling the realization of who must get what, according to the distributive rule. That is why framing is explicitly defined as pedagogic discourse. The whole of the device is condensed in the evaluation, so that classification and framing come together in evaluation (Davis (2005)). One therefore needs to look at evaluation to construct an account of what the device is generating. It is as if the suggestion is to analyse the evaluation, rather than go with an a priori idea of what is in and what is out, because whatever is happening in the context is in. Internal to the theory at this point is a drift to a position where its mechanisms are such that the approach to research is to discover the rule at play from the data, rather
than starting from externally defined rules that are imposed on educational contexts. It is not that classification and framing disappear here, but that the content of classification and framing can now be constituted from an examination of context-specific evaluation, rather than approaching those categories externally. Prior to the condensation of the whole of the device in evaluation, the content of the classification and framing principles had to be defined in a manner using externally defined distinctions. In Dowling’s early analyses, using the idea of classification, for example, markers for strong and weak classification with respect to mathematics are constructed and then imposed on educational contexts (school mathematics textbooks, in his case). However, what the content of the classification principle might be for any given text is not engaged with.

What Dowling’s work did highlight for Bernstein was the need to specify the nature of the knowledge generated in educational settings. So, while the device arrives at its sharp point in evaluation, an account of the nature of knowledge produced at that point is clearly absent from the theory. This absence reinserts the Contingent into the theory.

Bernstein takes up the work of overcoming the Contingent once one more by focussing on the forms of the knowledge and knowledge structure rather than pursuing the nature of evaluation. I believe that this is the point of intrusion of the everyday/academic distinction that has an overdetermining effect on the whole of his sociology of education. The idea of discourse and knowledge structure gets thought about in terms of a distinction between everyday knowledge and academic knowledge. For me, this generates categories that signal a retardation in the growth of the theory as they revert back, essentially, to a form of the code theory phase.

Why does the theory drift in this direction? Bernstein acknowledges, and is reputed, to have done much of the research using his PhD students. It is interesting to notice that the work of Dowling using the
everyday/academic distinction predates Bernstein’s use of the horizontal/academic knowledge categories. In Chapter One, we referred to Dowling (1992a & 1992b) as constituting some of the early work using the distinction between school knowledge and everyday knowledge as the main theoretical resource for research. Bernstein supervised Dowling’s PhD and some of the work that Dowling was doing in the mentioned works would feed into the research work for his PhD studies. It does seem plausible to conjecture that Dowling’s trajectory influenced Bernstein in his construction of his account of knowledge structures. If one is to produce an adequate genealogy of Bernstein’s ideas, I believe that one would have to study the work of Bernstein’s PhD students as well as his corpus.

9.3 Comments over current trends in the field
Most, if not all, of the work used to construct the problem of the project seems to approach research with readymade rules. Might it just be the case that the analyses of the content are profoundly weak, but they seem to make sense because there is already an *a priori* rule? It would be interesting to follow up this question. It will be remembered that the characteristic feature of Dowling’s classification, relative to Bernstein’s own, is that it has a strong membership rule. This is precisely, in my view, the point where some difficulties creep into his work. The mere use of any particular term, mathematical or non-mathematical, is subject to problems, in the sense that there is nothing in reality that has a direct link with any term whatsoever. The work of Strawson (1950) provides helpful material to understanding this basic phenomenon. Whether derivative, integral, metrics, functions or shoes, socks, dog, whatever; there is no one-to-one relation between any of these words and something in the world. It is only always when any particular human agent uses the terms to refer; otherwise there is no such thing as reference. “Meaning (in at least one important sense) is a function of the sentence or expression; mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence or expression” (Strawson, 1950, p. 327). Language does not enjoy referencing in a one-to-one direct way. If this were
not the case, education would not be a problem, because one would only say the words and they would be understood as intended. The same term can be used to refer to very different and diverse things. One cannot just look at a signifier and then make a claim that it is definitely referring to this or that. That is at the heart of Dowling’s classification. When one looks at the definition of classification in Bernstein, it is a definition with less emphasis on a membership rule. Dowling approaches the question of what is mathematics by positing a strong membership rule. Bernstein can swing both ways, though within the context of research, his account of the pedagogic device suggests that he ought to incline towards a minimal membership rule. That is one of the central ways in which Dowling and Bernstein’s work of the third phase are different: where Dowling (1998) approaches the object of research with a rule in mind, Bernstein’s work of the third phase suggests that one ought to construct the rule at play, if it exists, from the data. It seems that the everyday and academic emphasis has a strong membership rule element to it, like marking out specific properties of the object that is in and if some objects do not meet those properties, they are out. That is a point of ambiguity in Bernstein’s own understanding of classification. He does not really follow through on the implications of that kind of way of talking about classification. So in one sense, Dowling removes the ambiguity, but then falls into the trap of implicitly claiming that language refers.

9.4 Possibilities for the future
The major question that this project identifies as a possible area of investigation for advancing Bernstein’s work is, how do we account for the effects of the evaluative rule at the heart of the pedagogic discourse? The basic position of this project is that the theoretical language developed in Bernstein’s “Vertical and horizontal discourse: an essay” paper does not advance the theoretical resources for accounting for the content of the evaluative rule. In addition, this project supposes that the categories of the vertical and horizontal discourse do not provide sufficiently helpful theoretical
resources for thinking about the educational system, vis-à-vis curriculum development and the structuring of an education policy in general, or even pedagogy. Having in mind the literature surveyed at the beginning of this study, one could say that simply arguing that the vertical and horizontal discourses are incommensurable leaves a lot of questions hanging, particularly about the “why” of the pedagogic discourse (Davis, 2003, p. 94). Davis argues, and I agree, that what the work of Moore & Muller (1999) (and the similar works that have been used to formulate the problem of this project),

[...] begins to make apparent is an impasse in the curriculum theory in which the central antagonism that inheres in the (re)production of knowledge is crystallised – the Universal/Particular dialect – in the form of an opposition between knowledge (as it is concerned with the production of universal statements) and morality (as it is concerned with the existential specificity of individuals), and it is the earlier Bernstein of the pedagogic device and pedagogic discourse rather than the more recent Bernstein of horizontal and vertical discourses who might prove more productive in addressing such issues (Ibid., p.73-74; emphasis in original).

Focusing the attention of the investigation on the workings of evaluation provides an opportunity for advancing Bernstein’s ideas and enables the development of more productive resources for thinking about education systems.

It has also been mentioned that an adequate genealogy of Bernstein’s ideas would involve the study of Bernstein’s corpus, as well as the work of his PhD students. This project has not dwelt much on the work of Bernstein’s PhD students, save for a brief look at Dowling’s work. Therefore, the study of the interplay between Bernstein’s corpus and the work of his PhD students is another area of possible study in the future.
9.5 Limitations of the study
The proposed area of possible development to Bernstein’s thought has only been posited, without substantiating, neither theoretically nor explicitly in pedagogic practice, how that can be achieved. It is the proposition of this project that such an endeavour would be an area of study on its own. It is also acknowledged that because of the limited space, having in mind the complexity of the different ideas that have to directly engaged with and those that are relate to the major ideas being engaged with, there are some conceptual moves that are not sufficiently dealt with.

9.6 Overview
This project set out to investigate whether the everyday/academic knowledges distinction is central in the work of Bernstein’s theory of educational transmission. We have seen that the everyday/academic distinction is a way of thinking about the notion of discourse and knowledge structure, as expressed in Bernstein’s fourth phase. Bernstein’s work has been seen to constitute a series of different phases, which tend to build on the limitations of each preceding phase, particularly from the first to the third phase. However, the fourth phase has been seen to be a regression.

In this way, it is the conclusion of this project that the everyday/academic distinction is not central in Bernstein’s theory, but should instead be considered to be a retroactive reading back onto the past from certain propositions in the present. What has been found to be central in Bernstein’s theory, vis-à-vis the primary problem of the theory, is the working of the evaluative rule. The current approach to research in the Bernsteinian subfield of the sociology of education by a number of scholars is premised on using a version of the everyday/academic distinction to organise and read educational contexts. Such an approach is well articulated by Moore (2006), who says, referring to an expression of Bernstein’s model of pedagogic codes, “If this expression were to be successively unpacked it would undergo the process of fractal elaboration whereby its terms would acquire increasingly concrete forms as it closes
the discursive gap between concept and data” (p. 38). On the contrary, this project has revealed that at the end of Bernstein’s third phase, the approach he proposes is an engagement with data with the view of discovering the rule(s) at play. Finally, one may ask, are we to characterise Bernstein’s theory as a systematic development of ideas (as Atkinson would) or as haphazard (as Gordon would). Well, neither, since Atkinson is really imposing a teleology that doesn’t exist in Bernstein’s work, and Gordon fails to see that Bernstein’s labours represent a sustained effort to deal with the Contingent as it rears up to destabilise every momentary Necessity. The Hegelian reading of Bernstein avoids the problems of both readings.
Bibliography


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