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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
of the
KUNENE RIVER HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEMES.

Thesis Presented for the Degree of Master of Arts
in the University of Cape Town.

Renfrew Christie.

July 1975.

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RENFREW CHRISTIE.

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Frontispiece: The South African Flag and the flag of the Kaiser flying over a War Memorial in Swakopmund.

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SONG OF THE INVIGORATING EFFECT OF MONEY

Upon this earth we hear dispraise of money
Yet, without it, earth is very cold
And it can be warm and friendly
Suddenly through the power of gold
Everything that seemed so hard to bear
In a gleaming golden glow is cloaked,
Sun is melting what was frozen,
Every man fulfils his hopes!
Rosy beams light the horizon,
Look on high: the chimney smokes!
Yes, all at once this world seems quite a different one,
Higher beats the heart, the glance sweeps wider,
Richer are the meals and clothes are finer,
Man himself becomes another man.

Ah, how very sorely they're mistaken,
They who think that money doesn't count.
Fruitfulness turns into famine
When the kindly stream gives out.
Each one starts to yell and grab it where he can.
Even were it not so hard to live
He who doesn't hunger yet is fearful,
Every heart is empty now of love.
Father, Mother, Brother – cross and tearful!
See, the chimney smokes no more above!
Thick displeasing fog about us furled,
All is filled with hatred now and striving.
None will be the horse, all would be riding.
And the world becomes an icy world.

So it goes with all that's great and worthy.
In this world it's quickly spoiled indeed,
For when feet are bare and bellies empty
Love of virtue always turns to greed.
Gold, not greatness is what people need.
Poverty of soul puts out our hopes.
Good plus money, too, is what it takes
To keep man virtuous without a slip.
He whom crime's already given breaks
Looks up on high: the chimney smokes!
Faith in the human race again grows bright.
Man is noble, good, so on and so forth.
Sentiment awakes. Need dimmed its light.
Faster beats the heart. The glance sweeps wider.
We know who the horse is, who the rider.
And once more it's clear that right is right.

Bertold Brecht.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION.

In Leo Marquard's view, water and power are the two chief economic requirements of the Southern African region:

"to fulfil those needs, flood waters must be controlled for irrigation, and, in the process, harnessed to produce cheap industrial power" (1)

Many other authorities concur in this analysis. As one example, the German geographer Jürgen Bähr writes:

"The economic development of South West Africa is greatly handicapped by the lack of water and by the lack of every source of energy" (2)

This work essays a political understanding of these two chief economic requirements, in the belief that political conflict has its roots in an economic base that consists not only in social classes but also in the particular geographical and technological infrastructural development of a region. For example, the nature of railway development in colonial Africa had long-lasting particular political and economic effects. Similarly, the nature of a hydro-electric scheme has wide implications.

The Government of Portugal and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, who are, respectively, the rulers of Angola and the illegal occupiers of Namibia, as I shall show, agreed in 1964 and 1969 to develop the resources of the Kunene river basin. The river forms much of the boundary between Angola and Namibia. Portugal and South Africa are developing the river in a particular way. I shall argue that this particular way of developing the river benefits some of the people concerned far more than others. I shall show that if the plans succeed, a colonial region will be modernised, further to facilitate large capital accumulation in the hands of the few.

Consultation with the people of Angola and Namibia has been lacking. Their specific approval has certainly not been obtained, for there was minimal formal or informal inclusion of these people in the decision-making processes which affect them. Further, the legitimacy of neither government was
derived from universal adult franchise in their respective metropoles.

It is small wonder, therefore, that the dams and powerlines are being erected in the midst of what South Africa's leaders call a "low intensity war"\(^4\), in which people nevertheless die high-intensity deaths. Both structural and physical violence are seen to be necessary by one grouping to impose their rule, while the "armed struggle for liberation", as it is termed, is seen by another grouping to be necessary.

This paper will examine the Kunene River hydro-electric schemes, in their historical, legal, military, strategic, technological, economic and political contexts, in order to bring about greater understanding of the society and its conflicts. The schemes will be seen in a relatively loose theoretical framework, involving concepts of modernisation, development and under-development, colonialism and imperialism, together with capital accumulation and violence in the struggle between social groupings. The primary aim of the work is an impressionistic examination of the detail of the region's social formation, rather than an explicit contribution to the more abstract general theory.

The region is not well researched: the lower reaches of the Kunene River are among the least known of any in Africa. Further, throughout the world many thoughts on energy and water remain mere pipe-dreams. Further still, the Southern African war prevents much crucial information from being obtained or published. Therefore this work is a first note on the subject: it is not the last word in its field, for that cannot yet be written.

Hegel's Axiom of Internal Relations states that the relations by which terms are related are an integral part of the terms they relate\(^5\). This underlies not only conceptual structures of reality, and linguistic systems, but also physical, economic and political systems. It is an extraordinarily useful axiom of general systems theory. Energy and water are among the most pervasive of all the systems by which mankind is related. Hence, they are in and of mankind, an essential part of the process of his polity.
The politics of water in a dry region are so obvious as often to be taken for granted by the political sciences; we have needed the fossil-fuel crisis of the current decade to remind us of the politics of energy distribution. The energy and the water systems of "White" Southern Africa are an integral part of that society, yet they have too often been ignored or simplistically treated in political studies of the area. This work is an attempt to redress the balance: it is written with a passionate belief in the totality of human existence and enterprise.

Hence, many disciplines will be used, from poetry to military science to hydrology. In essence, however, this is a study in political economy, a study of who might benefit and to what extent, by a particular planned infrastructural allocation of scarce resources.

Regarding the terminological tangle, the word "Namibia" is used in preference to "South West Africa", and the descriptions "Ovamboland" or "the Northern areas" are used in preference to "Owambo" and "Okavango" wherever the context allows for this. The Northern peoples patently prefer the term "Ovamboland" to "Owambo". However, when Dirk Mudge, M.E.C., proudly asserts that he is a born and bred "Suidwester", it would be arrant nonsense to call him a Namibian.

Generally, however, "Namibia" is used, following the example set by the United Nations and by the British Government in the latter's White Paper, Command 4363, of May 1970. This usage is supported by the spirit of the 1971 'World Court' ruling. In contrast to John Dugard's approach "Namibia" here does imply a judgment on the status of the territory and on the unlawful occupation by the South African regime. This is done because I accept the validity of Danziger's remark:

"where the ubiquity of social conflict excludes the possibility of non-commitment, the intellectual stance corresponding to it would become simply another version of the "status-quo" ideology" (7)

As this is being written there is rioting in Luanda and fighting between the MPLA, the FNLA and Unita: the future of Angola is exceedingly uncertain. Therefore this paper
will concentrate on the Namibian aspects; but Angola is also discussed not only because there is some information available, but also because most authorities stress the stupidity of conceiving of river basin development in anything less than the totality. This work reviews events up to December 1974. Occurrences thereafter can at best be recorded only partially.

Research for this work involved over five thousand kilometres of travelling in Southern Africa, the use of material in five languages — German, Afrikaans, English, Kwanyama and Portuguese — and work in eleven archives or libraries — the South African Library; the South African Museum; the Jagger Library of the University of Cape Town; the Johannesburg Public Library; the Gubbins Collection and the Wartenweiler Library of the University of the Witwatersrand; the Government Archives, Union Buildings, Pretoria; the South West African Archives in Windhoek; the Library of the South West African Administration; the Library of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg; and the Library of the South West African Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft, Windhoek.

In a number of cases the documents used were the only extant copies or the only copies available in Southern Africa. I express my particular gratitude, therefore, to the librarians and others concerned. I also thank those who assisted with translations either during interviews or of written work, and I particularly thank Deborah Budlender, Lonka Murray and Antonia von Stiernhelm for their help in this way.

Many people aided me in this work: I record my appreciation. Among others, I thank John Dugard, Caroline Clark, Dr W. Pitman, John-Kane Berman, Chris Saunders, Jeanette Curtis, Helene Budlender, Robert Gordon, Francis Wilson, Dudley Horner, Wilfred Moroff, Frances Lund, Robin Hallett, Professor G. Marais, Professor Eric Axelson, Eric Abraham, Geoffrey Budlender, Barry Streek, Penny Cumming, Richard Moorsom and Horst Kleinschmidt, as well as Richard and Cathy Wood, Tim Owen, and other friends in the Diocese of Damaraland.

I acknowledge the financial assistance of the Human Sciences Research Council, and a Scholarship from the Council of the
University of Cape Town. The work and its conclusions are my own, and are not, of course, necessarily the opinions of either Council.

The present work is an enlarged and revised version of an earlier paper on the same topic. Keith Gottschalk was especially helpful in the revision, not only in providing meticulous criticism, but also in suggesting additional sources of material. The revision also benefitted from my participation in two conferences - the UCT Extra-mural Studies Course, organised by Helene Budlender, and the Conference on Energy and its Future in Southern Africa, organised by Professor Dutkiewitcz.

I especially acknowledge the help and support of my supervisors, colleagues and friends in the School of African Studies and elsewhere in the University of Cape Town, as well as the stimulation and aid provided by many people throughout Southern Africa during my period with the National Union of South African Students, when much of my thinking was developed. Contrary to much commonly-held belief, leadership of Nusas carries many academic benefits. An academic work is never the product of one person: I willingly acknowledge the contribution made by my environment.

I am grateful to the following for granting me interviews in Namibia in July 1974:

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- Mr Braune, Senior Hydrologist, Department of Water Affairs, SWA Administration;
- Dr J.L. de Vries, Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Windhoek;
- Mr L. Kremer, Consul in Windhoek of the Federal German Republic;
- Mr Dirk Mudge, M.E.C., Acting Administrator of South West Africa;
- Mr H. Stengel, Department of Water Affairs, SWA Administration;
- Mr Strauss, Department of Information, Windhoek;
- Mr T. Truebody, Director of Water Affairs, SWA Administration;
Mr Stephanus Venter, Administrative Manager of the SWA Water en Elektriese Korporasie;


In addition, Bryan O'Linn, Vice-Chairman of the United Party in SWA, and Kurt Dahlman, editor of Die Allegemeine Zeitung, were kind enough to give of their experience in off-the-record interviews, as were a number of black Namibians from many walks of life, including priests, teachers, students, and migrant labourers.

I am particularly grateful to officials of the SWA Administration for their cordiality and co-operation. All strategic information on Namibia is confidential, and while I must record that no official in any way broke that confidentiality, nevertheless, within the bounds of what was permissible, the officials of the SWA Administration were very generous.

The material available on Namibia is voluminous: Heinrich Stengels' "Bibliographie Wasserwirtschaft in Südwestafrika" (1974) runs to 514 titles, while Richard Logan's geographical bibliography lists 2009 items, and John Dugard, giving only "standard works in a highly selective bibliography" records over 500 names. Nonetheless, the area is 'under-researched', and political studies of the infrastructure are well-nigh non-existent. The bibliography given comprises works consulted in the preparation of this work, rather than all those potentially relevant.

The following is inscribed on the arches of the Central Government Buildings, New Delhi:

"Queen Victoria said, 'in their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment, our security, and in their gratitude, our best reward'" (9)

This dissertation will measure the Kunene schemes against Her Majesty's imperial teaching.
NOTES: CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION.

1. Marquard, 1971: 107
2. Jürgen Bähr, April 1971: 86
7. van den Berghe, 1965: 12
9. Gaitskell, 1959: frontispiece
CHAPTER TWO

THE LEGALITY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA.

Increased accumulation, in Johannesburg, London and New York, of the profits made from the extraction of Namibia's raw materials depends on power and water from the Kunene River schemes, as will be shown below. The legality of these profits and the legality of South Africa's plans for the Kunene River depend on the lawfulness or otherwise of South Africa's presence in the territory over which South Africa was given a mandate as a "sacred trust of civilisation" by the League of Nations after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

In December 1974, unanimously, without debate or dissent, the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation delivered an ultimatum to the Republic of South Africa to withdraw its "illegal administration" from the territory. The Security Council set as a deadline the 30th May 1975. In the event of non-compliance, the Council would immediately consider the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter of the United Nations. Much had changed since the 1919 Peace Conference.

The Peace Conferences of Europe, be they in Paris or Vienna, would seem either to create or to ignore as many problems as they might solve. One eminent historian has claimed that the 1919 Treaty of Versailles caused the Second World War "as much as one event causes another". A more tragic indictment of a Peace Conference would be difficult to find. This century's pre-eminent Western economist, writing what has been called "one of the finest pieces of polemic in the English language", condemned the treaty as "an act of wickedness and folly".

However, whatever the results in Europe, the Treaty had long-lasting and unhappy consequences for the people of one ex-colony of the Kaiser, that land first named "South West Africa" by the explorer Andersson in 1861 and now known by the nations of the world as "Namibia". This chapter will examine some aspects of the political and legal wrangle which followed the decision that:
'A mandate should be conferred upon His Britanic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa to administer the territory aforementioned" (6)

A.J.P. Taylor gives a cynical view of the Paris proceedings:

"The fate of the German colonies had also been settled, mainly on the insistence of the British Dominions. South Africa and Australia refused to surrender the territories which they had conquered - German South West Africa and New Guinea. Lloyd George derived malicious amusement from the way in which the spokesmen of these two democratic countries, supposedly unspotted with European wickedness, defied Wilson on old-fashioned imperialist lines. Mandates were hastily invented to save appearances, and the British themselves took German East Africa, and some miscellaneous territory in West Africa, as their share"

These themes, of South African imperialism defying those statesmen who wished to create a "good" international order, and of the resulting shabby compromise being shrouded in high-sounding words which may or may not have meaning, run through the paper pribble-prabble which lawyers now call "The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute". The world's judges have deliberated upon it often and at length, while copious screeds have been written, but the two themes remain, right through to the Secretary-General Waldheim's visit to the territory in 1972, and beyond.

John Dugard, from the plethora of relevant documents, has produced an excellent and meticulously researched 581 page volume of writings on this "international cause célèbre of the century". His work should be read in the original:

I shall attempt neither to summarise nor to compete, but shall give the bare political and legal facts, followed by an assessment of the present situation.

Imperialism in Southern Africa was no new phenomenon in 1919. The sub-continent had been divided by Shaka, by Portugal, by Germany, by Britain, and by the Boers. Yet South Africa has never been monolithically imperialist, as this conversation between Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger in 1890 demonstrates:
"Rhodes: We must work together. I know the Republic wants a seaport. You must have Delagoa Bay.

Kruger: How can we work together there? The harbour belongs to the Portuguese, and they won't hand it over.

Rhodes: Then we must simply take it.

Kruger: I can't take away other people's property. If the Portuguese won't sell the harbour, I wouldn't take it even if you gave it to me, for ill-gotten gains are accursed". (9)

Smuts had no such scruples about ill-gotten gains when he conquered German South West Africa and nor did the Germans when they took it from its people. By 1919 the imperialist aims of some South Africans were clear. A.T. Hennessy, Secretary of the Unionist Party in South Africa, wrote to Patrick Duncan about Botha's plans for the Peace Conference as follows:

"I have some pretty good inside information as to Botha's plans. He expects to come back with German South West, Rhodesia, and perhaps a long-lease of Delagoa Bay" (10).

At the Peace Conference Smuts and Botha confronted Wilson and an ambiguous compromise resulted. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established a Mandates System with wording "ambiguous enough to satisfy annexationists and internationalists simultaneously". Thus Smuts and Botha achieved their goals and yet had conceded one crucial point: civilisation could call those who exercised its 'sacred trusts' to account for their actions. South Africa did not annex the territory, but accepted a Mandate, on behalf of civilisation, to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory". Smuts conceded this with his customary skill and addressed the Peace Conference as follows:

"If you give your sanction to our work you will demonstrate that world public opinion is in favour of the ultimate self-government of all peoples, without distinction as to race, religion, or colour, or previous condition of servitude. It provides for a careful supervision and scrutiny as to the way in which the mandates are exercised". (13).
In the following twenty years pressures arose repeatedly in South Africa for the inclusion of the territory as a Fifth Province of the Union, and South Africa's own "South West Africa Commission" found that South Africa was not doing all that it might in the exercise of its 'sacred trust'.

"It is on the constructive side of the government that Native Administration is not entirely satisfactory, i.e. in regard to those functions which go beyond the bare necessities of government and the maintenance of law and order......Education is defective and medical services for the Natives, primitive and inadequate. In the North very little is done for the improvement of their daily lives" (14).

South Africa has, however, claimed that the Permanent Mandates Commission was completely satisfied with her administration of the territory. By contrast, J. Karina, in a thesis for Edinburgh University, has shown that South Africa was more heavily criticised for her administration of the territory than any other mandatory power administering mandated territories.

By 1946 Smuts was prepared to try again for annexation or incorporation and this time "consulted" what were known as the "Non-White" inhabitants, through their "tribal leaders", claiming the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For:</th>
<th>208 850</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Against:</td>
<td>33 520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Consulted:</td>
<td>56 790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This "consultation" was heavily criticised and the General Assembly did not accede to Smut's request, recommending instead that the territory be placed under trusteeship, which South Africa refused. With the coming to power of the Nationalists, reports on the territory were no longer submitted to the United Nations. A deadlock was reached and the political conflict was channelled into legal argument, leading to the involvement of the International Court of Justice, which has given its Opinion four times - in 1950, 1955, 1956 and 1971--- and its Judgment twice - in 1962 and 1966.

In 1950 the Court gave its opinion by 12 votes to 2 that South Africa had obligations internationally under the mandate, notwithstanding the demise of the League, but that South Africa
was not obliged to place the territory under the UN Trusteeship system. Further, South Africa had no power to modify unilaterally the international status of the territory, but had to act with the consent of the United Nations. South Africa rejected the opinion.

In 1955, following the conflict over the procedure to be followed at the General Assembly in dealing with the territory, the Court unanimously gave its opinion that the voting procedure proposed by the General Assembly was correct. "South Africa rejects this opinion on the grounds that it was premised on the unacceptable 1950 opinion".

In 1956, the General Assembly, lacking reports on the territory from South Africa, asked the Court whether oral hearings from petitioners could be permitted, again in terms of the 1950 opinion. The Court gave its opinion, by 8 votes to 5, that such hearings would be consistent with the 1950 opinion. The oral hearings took place and the UN "Committee on South West Africa" concluded, in 1957, that the policies pursued by South Africa were contrary to the mandate.

In 1962, after Ethiopia and Liberia had again brought the question of the territory's status before the ICJ, the Court, by 8 votes to 7, rejected South Africa's four preliminary objections and held that the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of the dispute. Four years of written and oral debate ensued on the merits of the case. In 1966 the Court gave a judgment. The Court of 1962 had been changed by intervening elections and, in addition, three judges did not participate because of death, recusal and illness. The 1966 Court refused to give judgment on the merits and returned to the question of jurisdiction. It held, by the President's casting vote, the votes being tied, that Ethiopia and Liberia had not established a legal right or interest in the matter.

This judgment was explosive. Dugard writes:

"In effect, this decision constituted a reversal of the finding of the Court in 1962 on the third
Assembly of the Mandate and considered that South Africa's presence in the territory was illegal\textsuperscript{22}. This was reaffirmed in Resolutions 269 and 276, while in Resolution 284 the Security Council asked the International Court of Justice for an opinion on "the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)".

The composition of the Court had again altered, although this time not during a hearing. In 1971 the Court gave its opinion:

"by thirteen votes to two,
(1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to the occupation of the territory;

by eleven votes to four,
(2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognise the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and that the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to such presence and Administration;

(3) That it is encumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia" (23).

Thus, in terms of decisions of the world's General Assembly, Security Council, and Court of Justice, South Africa's occupation and control of Namibia are illegal. More particularly, the fragmentation of the territory into separate ethnic "nations" by South Africa is illegal, and the Kunene River schemes are illegal.

South Africa is refusing to obey an advisory Opinion on international law, having gone before the International Court of Justice, and lost her case.

South Africa has rejected the Opinion on political and legal grounds. This rejection has been considered in a recent
publication of the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, by Professor John Dugard and Advocate E.M. Grosskopf, S.C. Dugard examines in detail the accusations levelled at the Court by Mr Vorster and by Mr Justice van Wyk that the Court used an unacceptable "mumbo-jumbo", illegal form of reasoning and that the Court was deliberately "packed". Grosskopf queries the reasoning used in four of the Court's major findings: on whether the Council of the League of Nations had the power to revoke the Mandate; whether the General Assembly has the power to do what it purported to do in Resolution 2145 (xxi); whether the Security Council was acting within its powers; and, finally, he queries the conclusion of the Court that apartheid constituted a breach of the Mandate and a violation of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The most obvious replies to these charges of "mumbo-jumbo legal reasoning" and of "court packing" are brief. It ill becomes positivist upholders of law, order and firm government to ignore and reject a court's final opinion, no matter how illogical that opinion may seem. Further, it ill becomes a government whose present electoral strength may partially be the result of a disenfranchisement of "Coloured" voters achieved only after the Appeal Court had been enlarged from five to eleven judges, to complain of "court packing". If "mumbo-jumbo legal reasoning" and "court packing" do occur, they can never increase faith in a legal system, be it national or international. Nevertheless, in reality, the processes are not entirely alien to the South African "way of life".

However, the objections to the 1971 Opinion must be examined in turn. As to "court packing" Dugard shows "that the 1971 Court is no different from previous Courts". It complies with its statute in consisting of "juriconsults of recognised competence" from the major legal systems and main forms of civilisation. What better arbiters of civilisation's 'sacred trust'? Grosskopf makes great play of Dugard's concession that the Court in rejecting South Africa's applications as to composition had used a narrow and literal interpretation
of the Statute. However, Grosskopf ignores Dugard's next sentence:

"With the knowledge of hindsight, one can safely say that even if these applications had been upheld, the Opinion on the merits would not have been materially different" (27).

Grosskopf makes four major charges against the Court and, having the advantage of a reading of Dugard's paper, reiterates them in an addendum.

Grosskopf first challenges the Court's finding concerning the ability of the League of Nations to revoke the Mandate. The question was whether the C-mandates, under which the territory fell, were so close to annexation as to be irrevocable, or whether the right to international supervision carried the corollary of revocation in the event of breach.

The weakest point of international law is that it is so seldom effectively enforced. Prima facie, law requires teeth if it is to be law and not mere moral exhortation. The mandate instruments are silent on revocation. However, can one believe that the authors of the systems were so insincere in their high-sounding words that they conceived of Mandates with no teeth, with no ultimate sanction? Did Smuts's "careful supervision and scrutiny as to the way in which mandates are exercised" (quoted above) have no method of enforcement, no ultimate penalty for abuse of the mandate? These are not the words of the "internationalist" Wilson, they are those of the "annexationist" Smuts from South Africa. Smuts was later to draft the Preamble to the United Nations Charter. Are we to believe that on both these occasions his words were nothing but pious patter? Ought we not, in determining his intentions, to take the ordinary meaning of his words?

In 1971 the Court invoked the customary legal rule that a treaty, saving an express indication to the contrary, is revocable in the event of an important breach. This is a common method of interpretation, for if a statute is silent on a point, the common law is held to apply.
In attempting to show that the revocation was not among the intentions of the authors of the system, Grosskopf takes a technical procedural point, claiming that the Council of the League of Nations would not have been able to revoke a mandate because the relevant Member would have to be represented and could therefore prevent the unanimity required by the procedures of the Council. The Court rejects this suggestion, claiming that obviously the agreement of a wrongdoer to the sanction to be applied to him could not be required.

Both Grosskopf and Dugard note that the Court had previously affirmed this requirement for unanimity, but Dugard remarks that on these previous occasions the Court had merely assumed its applicability, without a finding being necessary. Further, Judge de Castro, in a Separate Opinion, found that the purpose of the unanimity rule was the protection of a State's sovereignty, but that it was inapplicable to the mandates system as a State's sovereignty was not in question.

Smuts certainly envisaged revocation where necessary. The 1971 Opinion quotes Smuts writing in 1918:

"In case of any flagrant and prolonged abuse of this trust the population concerned should be able to appeal for redress to the League, who should in a proper case exert its authority to the full, even to the extent of removing the mandate and entrusting it to some other state if necessary" (30).

It is surely not conceivable that Smuts meant the League to be prevented by the unanimity rule from ever removing a mandate. Smuts drafted the Preamble to the United Nations Charter. Could he have held so low an opinion of international law as to require the consent of a wrongdoer before the wrongdoer could be punished? Yet even if Smuts did hold this view, the World Court now does not, for international law is not forever immutably fixed.

The second and third objections raised by Grosskopf relate to the powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council to do what they purported to do. Resolutions of the General Assembly are normally only recommendatory rather than binding.
However, the Court seems to find that Resolution 2145 (xxi) derives binding legal force from confirmation by the Security Council. The Court has read the powers and duties of both bodies very widely, no doubt on the above given premise that the law should have teeth if it is to be law and not prayer.

It is here that the divergence between South African attitudes and the Court's attitudes can best be seen: Dugard conceives of a conflict between legal ideologies, between positivism and teleological, natural or sociological theories of law. The Court has used wide interpretations of the various statutes in the teleological belief that the high-sounding words of the authors of the 'sacred trust of civilisation' should have meaning in practice. South Africa has argued for narrow interpretations, for a limited, muzzled version of international law. The one doctrine sees a close link between international law and morality, the other sees the two concepts as being very distinct from each other. The Court has chosen, in effect, to pay heed to the high principles expressed by those who drafted the law and to interpret the law in that light. In my opinion this is a correct approach for, as a bitter opponent of the legality of Resolution 2145 (xxi), Professor Marinus Wiechers has written:

"Law does still provide the best and most acceptable means of solving an international dispute. At the same time law affords the most solid basis on which states can conduct their foreign relations with other states. Seen in that light, international law is not merely a set of rules which can be applied mechanically; it must be realised that international law also serves as a vehicle for conveying and giving expression to philosophical and moral values" (31).

The final major objection raised by Advocate Grosskopf concerns the merits of the case and the Court's finding in that regard. Grosskopf maintains that, having declined to hear South African factual evidence on whether "Separate Development" constituted a breach of the Mandate, and having then ruled that South Africa's refusal to submit reports on the territory to the United Nations constituted sufficient grounds for revocation, the Court should not have devoted space to a discussion of the alleged iniquities of Apartheid, and should not have reached the conclusion that
Apartheid constituted a violation of the **Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations**. He concludes that the Court produced a propaganda piece dressed up as a legal opinion.

John Dugard, by contrast, maintains that the Court should not have given an opinion on Apartheid because the Court had found that it was for a political body, the General Assembly, to determine whether the Mandate had been violated. Once the General Assembly had done so there was no need for the Court to do so of its own accord.

What is of note, however, is that both Dugard and Grosskopf deem the finding about Separate Development's incompatibility with the United Nations Charter to be irrelevant. They see it as an obiter dictum on which evidence had not been taken. It thus does not detract markedly from the Court's major finding that South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal and that she should withdraw.

However, concerning the Court's remarks on apartheid in the territory, it must be noted that South Africa's ready willingness to give evidence as to the "facts" is worthless so long as her opponents do not have equal access to the "facts", or, indeed, so long as there is no free political debate and no free black press in the territory. So long as South Africa's more Draconian political laws, such as the Terrorism Act, are extended to the territory, so long will the "facts" of the situation be hidden. Guided tours for the Secretary-General of the United Nations are no substitute: such tours are remarkable for what the Secretary-General does not see.

An example of the usual restrictions on information about the territory can be found in the **PERMIT TO ENTER NATIVE AREAS OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA** issued by the authorities, which includes the following:

"...Lodging by whites with coloured or natives is not permitted. Under no circumstances may a permit holder interfere with the domestic affairs of the native.

No trading whatsoever with the natives in the Native areas may be undertaken."
No kraals and/or the Ruacana Falls may be visited without written permission. The behaviour of the permit holder in dealings with the natives where necessary must at all times be worthy.

No agitation may be started and the administration of the Government or any of its officials may not be criticised. It is strictly prohibited to shoot or interfere with wild animals or game and no places of concealment at waterholes for photography or any other purpose may be constructed. The taking of photographs for publication purposes; for instance, cinema distribution, television, newspapers or magazines, is prohibited....

If a permit holder enters native areas as a guest of permanent European residents he may only travel in the area or leave public roads in the company of his hosts....

The wearing of ultra-mini skirts or shorts by women in the Native Areas is prohibited...." (32).

The Ruacana Falls are, of course, the site of the major power plant in the Kunene scheme. The document demonstrates the usual limitations placed on access to the "facts" of the situation. The weakness of South Africa's version of the facts was adequately demonstrated in late 1971/early 1972. South Africa published a book on "Owambo", which, in its section on the migrant labour system, gives the impression of a satisfactory system, with some minor defects. Attempts were being made to cure the defects, but on balance the system was "beneficial to the general economy". Within a few weeks of the book's publication the Owambo migrant labourers staged a general strike on a huge scale - precisely because the migrant labour system was unsatisfactory. South Africa's "facts" are thus questionable.

The other major argument as to the "facts" concerns the plebiscite offered by South Africa in 1971. John Dugard is correct in persistently maintaining that a free plebiscite would be the best available way of ascertaining the "facts". However, perhaps Judge Zafrulla Khan of the Court is correct in maintaining that South Africa should withdraw before a free plebiscite could be held, for South Africa's powers of influencing a plebiscite are great. The question is probably academic, for South Africa is highly unlikely to agree to all the requirements, such as freedom for political prisoners, which
Dugard lists, and nor is she likely to risk a free plebiscite after the fiasco of the "Owambo Legislative Assembly" elections in August 1973, where a boycott campaign was so successful that only thirteen hundred (1 300) people voted, which represented 2.5% of the registered voters, and even less of those eligible for a vote.\(^{34}\)

The above paragraph was originally written before the second "Owambo Legislative Assembly" elections were held in January 1975. These latest elections confirm the assertion that South Africa is highly unlikely to risk a free, nationwide plebiscite in Namibia.

In the 1975 elections the boycott campaign did not succeed inside Ovamboland, but it was highly successful among contract workers in the South. However, some 60 000 voters, or 55% of the registered voters, did go to the polls. The vast majority of these votes were cast in Ovamboland towards the end of the five-day election: in some areas the polls were taken to the voters by nine mobile units — away from Press eyes.\(^{35}\)

Superficially, the election was "freer" than the previous one, for political parties no longer had to submit their constitutions to the "Owambo Cabinet" and candidates were exempted from a clause of Proclamation R17 of 1972 which required prior permission for public meetings to be held. (This Proclamation will be examined in detail in a later chapter).

Nevertheless, the elections cannot be described as free or democratic, even if one accepts for a moment an ethnically-delimited electoral system. The elections were clearly a fraud.

Both Proclamation R17 of 1972 and the Terrorism Act, No 87 of 1967 still applied and provided for indefinite detention without trial. Political prisoners were not freed in order to participate. In the words of a journalist not noted for his support of SWAPO, the "Owambo" tribal police, "spend much of their time making use of naked intimidation, unlawful assault, and arbitrary detention to stamp out political opposition".\(^{36}\)
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The system of "tribal floggings" had not yet even received the "improvements" made later in 1975, let alone been stopped.

The entire cabinet was appointed to the Legislative Assembly in advance, two months before the elections. Most of the appointed Legislative Assembly members were loyal to the ruling Owambo Independence Party which needed to win only four of the forty-two elected seats to retain power.

SWAPO was thrice refused permission to hold a public meeting in connection with the elections. Nevertheless, a meeting was finally held, but it was forcibly broken up by the tribal police.

Finally, there are widespread and seemingly well-founded allegations that most of the votes cast were coerced. These allegations are borne out by the fact of the tiny number of votes cast by migrants in the South, where coercion would be more difficult and less secret.

Bishops Aula and Demeni reported that workers en route south were forced to vote before being allowed through the Oshivello border post. It was reported that voters were prevented from ploughing, or were threatened with the loss of essential services, pensions, education for children, or employment, unless they voted. "SWA Administration" vehicles were used in Ovamboland for hunting out and picking up anyone to take them to vote, quite regardless of whether the persons concerned were on their way to the polls or not.

Even if no "Owambo" was in fact forced to vote, the elections can still not be called "free". If coercion to vote did occur the elections are merely that much more fraudulent. The elections were hailed by most sections of the South African press as a "defeat of SWAPO", yet at most one can perhaps declare "no contest". The organisation had clearly called its youth leaders to leave the territory to be educated and trained for a contest that has still to be fought, in which "ethnic" elections do not play a part. The boycott was
vividly successful among contract workers in the South, who could not be coerced into voting. We cannot know for certain what occurred inside Ovamboland, but perhaps we need not seek too far for the reasons behind the startling rise in the poll – from 2.5% to 55% of the registered voters. Be that as it may, the 1975 elections may not in fact determine with whom the rulers must eventually bargain at a conference table, and SWAPO may yet be at that table if they in fact have support among the people of Namibia.

The point to be demonstrated here was that South Africa is unlikely to risk a free nation-wide plebiscite in Namibia. The successful boycott by contract workers in the South emphasises this. The elections do, however, call into question the usefulness of the proposed constitutional conference of the "leaders" of the different "peoples" of the territory, if this is the manner in which those leaders are to be chosen.

To return to the legal aspect of the dispute about the status of the territory: in short, it was submitted that South Africa had contravened the spirit and the letter of the Mandate given to her to administer the territory as a 'sacred trust of civilisation', and the International Court of Justice has in due course given its Opinion that South Africa's occupation of the territory is illegal. With the exception of South Africa, all the States of the World; including all the major powers, accept that Opinion as part of the 'law of the United Nations'. From the Opinion it flows that South Africa's activities in the territory are illegal, the Kunene River schemes are illegal, and the proposed fragmentation into separate nations is illegal. A constitutional conference based on "elections" which in their turn are based on that ethnic fragmentation would, if held under South African auspices alone, also be illegal.

The legal debate is voluminous and has been covered very briefly here. The arguments for South Africa, as advanced by Advocate Grosskopf and others, have been considered and some
They did this despite their belief that the South African occupation was illegal.

Eveleigh's words, in one sense, proved truer than their writer knew. The Namibian dispute is tightly tied to détente in Southern Africa, and *vice versa*. South Africa, by June 1975, had not convinced the rest of Africa that appreciable change was occurring fast enough in Southern Africa. The essence of the conflict lay in colour discrimination and gross exploitation. Neither was diminishing fast enough, if at all. Hence Africa demanded a mandatory arms embargo and the Western Great Powers cast their vetoes for assorted and geo-political reasons.

The South African Prime Minister's attempts at achieving détente will be considered in a later chapter, in the light of his strategic economic plans. In this chapter we have discussed the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia, and we have seen that Namibia is an integral part of the armed conflict in Southern Africa. The next chapter will consider the questions of military and structural violence in Namibia.
NOTES. CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGALITY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA.

2. R.F. Harrod, 1951: 298, writing of J.M. Keynes's "The Economic Consequences of the Peace".
3. ibid: 303
5. U.N. General Assembly: Resolution 2372 (xxii), 1968
8. Dugard, 1973: xi
10. Letter, 1919, from A.T. Hennessy to Patrick Duncan, now in the Patrick Duncan Collection (BC 29A D 282) of the Jagger Library, University of Cape Town
16. See the speech by Eric Louw, in Dugard, 1973: 103, on the question of "Annexation" or "Incorporation".
18. ibid: 191
19. ibid: 198
20. ibid: 293
21. ibid: 422 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 245)
22. ibid: 439 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 264)
23. ibid: 481 (ICJ Reports, 1971)
24. Dugard and Grosskopf, 1974
26. Dugard and Grosskopf, 1974: 31
27. ibid: 24
28. ICJ Opinion, 1971: Clause 101
CHAPTER THREE

MILITARY AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE¹.

The Prime Minister of South Africa, the Honourable B.J. Vorster, has promised the "Owambo Executive Council" that the Kunene project would be zealously defended². To this, and other ends, South Africa is arming rapidly and massively. Popular movements of Angola and Namibia, such as UNITA, SWAPO and the MPLA, have condemned the Kunene schemes and aim to prevent their completion³. This chapter will examine aspects of the military conflict, together with the structural violence by which domination is maintained in Namibia.

Tables One and Two show that South African military expenditure is expanding astoundingly. She now spends in one year what in the 1960's she spent in five. According to Grundy⁴, writing in 1973, she has, in the ten years from 1960, increased her military expenditure by 800%. However, in the sixteen years from 1960 the increase has been over 2100%! This is at current prices because a price index for military goods is not publicly available. However, for a rough guide, the wholesale price indices could be used. If wholesale prices correspond to military prices, South African current account expenditure on defence, at 1963 constant prices, has increased from some forty-seven million Rand in 1960 to approximately four hundred and seventy-seven million Rand in 1975/76, that is, a real increase at constant prices of approximately 1000%⁵.

What was adequate to cope with African nationalism at the time of the Sharpeville killings, when the ANC and the PAC were reaching their prime in South Africa (so far), is but a tiny fraction of what the South African Parliament now believes is needed.

Arms are expensive, and are financed in South Africa from profits achieved perhaps at the expense of just returns to black labour. The proportion of the national income devoted to guns is
increasing.

At current prices from 1950 to 1965 South African military spending averaged only 1.23% of the G.D.P., but by 1975/6 military expenditure is 15.8% of the State's spending, and 3.7% of the G.D.P. These percentages are still low by world standards, however. Canada from 1962 to 1967 spent on defence between 16.6% and 22.6% of her state budget; Tanzanian spending ranged from 14.3% to 17.6% from 1963 to 1969; in the United Kingdom the range was from 13.7% to 16.8% from 1962 to 1967.

**TABLE ONE.**

**S.A. CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFENCE ESTIMATES 1960 TO 1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>R 44 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>72 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>120 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>157 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>210 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>230 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>256 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>253 000 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>272 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>257 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>317 000 000 (Budgeted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>344 000 000 (Budgeted) (at current prices)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE TWO.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973-4</th>
<th>1974-5</th>
<th>1975-6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Current Account</td>
<td>R 492 232 000</td>
<td>705 567 000</td>
<td>954 832 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Account</td>
<td>11 343 000</td>
<td>18 538 000</td>
<td>47 543 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armscor Ltd</td>
<td>23 121 000</td>
<td>10 496 000</td>
<td>22 539 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armaments Board, etc</td>
<td>15 362 000</td>
<td>19 596 000</td>
<td>29 927 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE</td>
<td>R 542 058 000</td>
<td>754 197 000</td>
<td>1 054 841 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL STATE EXPENDITURE</td>
<td>R4 494 167 000</td>
<td>5 622 800 000</td>
<td>6 643 408 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of State Expenditure on Defence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>12,06</th>
<th>13,41</th>
<th>15,87</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

% of G.N.P. spent on Defence (9)

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<th>2,9</th>
<th>3,8</th>
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It was suggested that the 1974/75 budget was extraordinary in that it took advantage of the current buoyant financial position to buy early what would otherwise have been bought later in the ten-year armaments plan. The bulk of the defence budget for that year was reported to have been completed in November 1973, so that it is supposedly not a response to the coup in Portugal in 1974. There was certainly unusual wealth available, for the Republic experienced a comfortable real growth rate of its Gross Domestic Product of 4,3% in 1973 and 7,2% in 1974. Greatly improved export prices for gold, maize, and other goods resulted in a real growth of Gross National Product of 9,5% in 1973 and 10% in 1974. The per capita growth in real G.N.P. averaged 7% per year over 1973-1974, although the skewed distribution of South African G.N.P. probably did not change markedly. South Africa's rulers had more money to spend.
Ostensibly the 1974/75 budget aimed to use part of this "windfall" wealth, and future budgets ought to have been correspondingly smaller. However, the 1975/76 defence budget again showed marked increases despite a reversal of the previously favourable balance of payments. The 1974/75 "windfall year" argument was then deftly turned round and the explanation of the 1975/76 increases reads as follows in RSA WPE '75, the Defence White Paper:

"34: Despite the increases, these figures will compare favourably with most Western countries, and mainly reflect merely the systematic replacement of obsolescent equipment. This replacement forms part of a long-term programme under which the S.A. Defence Force is being modernised so as to maintain a preparedness, meeting the prevailing circumstances. The accent falls on the improvement of the capability of the S.A. Defence Force rather than expansion of its weaponry. A further important factor is that extended payments have to be made for equipment ordered or delivered during the more favourable fiscal and balance of payments conditions of the preceding years. The larger operating costs involved in taking into commission the more sophisticated equipment also contribute to increasing expenditure" (emphasis added)

We now understand: in a "rich" year one increases the defence budget to buy early what had been planned to be bought later, and one thus places additional orders and receives new equipment. In the following year, however, one has to increase the defence budget still further, not only because of increased operating costs in commissioning new equipment, but also to pay for the additional equipment ordered or received during the previous ("rich") year.....

Whatever the official explanation, to the laymen one thing is clear. There are vast real increases in defence spending, and these are being paid for, at least in part, from the increase in national income. That is, South Africa is spending an increasingly larger part of an increasingly large state budget on defence. To suggest that the "windfall" growth in Gross National Product, resulting from better gold and farm produce export prices, might rather have been used more directly for black mineworkers or black farm labourers would no doubt be to underestimate the threat facing South Africa. As the
Defence White Paper 1975 speaks for itself:

"45: The National Service System. The revised national service system now provides for the manpower needs of the S.A. Army without plunging the country into a state of mobilisation..."

Enormous South African military expansion has meant the creation of a large state-controlled armaments industry. The military-industrial complex is capable of producing a vast range of modern weapons, not least the French Mirage F1 fighter, a devastating weapon due for production in large quantities by 1977, which will make military defeat of South Africa far more difficult.

The South African factories presently manufacture an armoured personnel carrier, two versions of the French Panhard armoured car, and a 90mm gun. The Minister of Defence recently announced plans to produce battle tanks in South Africa. The South African war machine is becoming huge and versatile.

However, the regime's defence depends more on the loyalty, neutrality or, at least, demoralisation of the black people, than on technological superiority. Therefore, police and security force expenditures must also be considered, and they too are increasing rapidly. As one parliamentarian put it: in 1974 the annual cost of sleeping soundly at night was a record R891 million. By 1975, Defence, Police and Prisons cost over R1 348 million.

This militarism is a part of a world trend: in 1967 the world spent on arms three times what it spent on health, and forty percent more than its education spending. However, South Africa's military growth is disproportionately high for Africa. In 1960 she accounted for 20% of Africa's military spending, but in 1968 she spent 36.3% of the total spent by African countries. She is expanding her forces more rapidly than the African bloc is.

One result is a regional arms race that retards African
development. Instead of investing for development, a small country like Zambia buys sophisticated Rapier missile Air defence systems. Could a better example be found to demonstrate Hegel's Axiom of Internal Relations, given above? The relations between South Africa and Africa are an integral part of each and the development of both is stunted thereby.

Ali Mazrui and A. Gingyera-Pincywa have commented:

"Southern Africa is not a dormant target waiting to be attacked and to defend itself against freedom fighters. It poses challenges of its own, beyond its borders - challenges that form an important rationale for military expenditures in neighbouring states, especially Zambia and Tanzania. The regional arms race between Southern Africa and free Africa is leading to a diversion of Zambia's and Tanzania's resources away from development and towards more sophisticated deterrents" (17).

However, this regional arms race is negligible in global terms. Hoagland has shown that only six countries (America, Britain, France, Russia, China and West Germany) account for some 85% of the world's military spending, while the remaining 130 countries account for merely 15%. The super-powers can change any African military situation overnight in many ways as was demonstrated in the recent war of the Day of Atonement.

General Spinola has emphasised the point, claiming that despite their rhetoric, the "communist bloc" did not wish to end the conflict in Portuguese Africa:

"The Soviet Union is fully aware that when it wanted to it could provoke an uncontrollable deterioration in the situation of Portugal Overseas.... Even today the communists prefer their protagonists to be martyrs, not policemen" (19).

He suggests three reasons for the Soviet Union's action, political prudence in refraining from forcing the West to choose between the new countries of Africa and the Portuguese; convenience in avoiding the need for large aid to newly independent areas; and global strategy in not eliminating the centres of tension by which communist ideology might be spread.
Similarly, despite Western rhetorical dislike of apartheid, the West's actions exhibit more complex motivation. NATO authorised the Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic to plan for contingencies outside the NATO area, and one SACALANT official disclosed plans "designed to go to the aid of our potential allies in Southern Africa if the need should arise", although another claimed that the interest was only in the sea route around the Cape. The United States has allegedly supplied military defoliants in large quantities to white regimes in Southern Africa and has reportedly decided to sell reconnaissance aircraft to South Africa\(^{20}\).

South Africa's "internal security" operations depend on Belgian small-arms and on French helicopters, armoured-cars and fighter-bombers, most of which are built under licence in South Africa. In addition, they depend on British Bedfords and Land-Rovers. In 1973 the Defence Department reported that while truck bodies and trailers were being made entirely locally, other truck components were still being imported to a large extent\(^{21}\). Even under a Labour Government the Royal Navy carried out exercises with the South African fleet until June 1975 and it is not known whether the supply of truck components has been stopped. Thus rhetorical opposition to apartheid is translated into military co-operation with the South African forces.

The West is not monolithic and different groups say and do different things. In such a situation prediction as to future behaviour is difficult, especially if the West in effect is hedging its bets, backing both the Vorster government and the guerilla movements.

However, Western investment in apartheid may be crucial. South Africa's enormous increase in defence spending since 1960 is in part an exercise prompted by the huge capital outflow after the Sharpeville killings, to convince foreign investors of the security of their assets in the country. In turn, some Western investors perhaps insure their profits from the apartheid system by lobbying for military assistance.
The South African war bears some comparison with the Vietnam war and with the war on Laos and Cambodia, for even after Nixon, United States decision-making on war does not seem too radically altered. Walter Goldstein has argued very convincingly that a refusal to change the basic structures and procedures of the American political system will lead almost inevitably to another Vietnam-style war. It will not require a paranoid President who secretly records his own intimate conversations, for one should remember that the Vietnam war was planned by the liberal advisers of liberal Presidents and given solid backing by the military-industrial complex, which still exists. The institution of one man, Henry Kissinger, as a world peace-maker is no guarantee against such a war if its causes are fundamental. Hoagland is among many writers who list racial confrontation in Southern Africa as a conflict area for the 1970's. Western investment in apartheid, coupled to Western political systems of decision-making about war, can lead to Western support for apartheid in an escalated South African war. The support may be open or secret, by governments or by military and industrial interest-groups, for Western profits from cheap black labour in Southern Africa are very high. ("Détente" may allow "racial mixing" in theatres and "even" on rugby-fields, but it is unlikely materially to reduce profit rates, and the Southern African conflict is economically based. Desegregation of a R5-a-seat theatre is largely irrelevant to the squatters of Crossroads or the "useless appendages" of Dimbaza).

Nevertheless, the South Africans seem to be planning at most for Western neutrality: there is a tone of loneliness in their official plans. They face the possibility of a majority-ruled hostile Angola and Mozambique, together with a growing war in the rebel British Colony of Southern Rhodesia, which colony will have about 90% of its borders surrounded by potentially hostile states. South African military planners see their problem as follows:

"THE THREAT".

"It is common knowledge that for the past two decades or more our country has been the whipping boy on the international scene. We must endure attacks on many fronts; the motives of our enemies
differ, but to all of them our country's government is the immediate object of their attacks. There are clearly identifiable courses in their strategy against us. These embrace:

(a) Efforts to isolate the Republic of South Africa from the rest of the world community, for example by the imposition of economic boycotts, by persistent unfavourable propaganda, boycotts and demonstrations in the spheres of sport and art and even in those of science and culture;

(b) The creation of disturbances to disrupt law and order;

(d) The support and encouragement of terrorism against the Republic of South Africa;

(e) The creation of real and fictitious situations that can be exploited so as to persuade the United Nations to declare that these are a threat to world peace;

(f) Efforts to persuade the Western Powers to approve and support the United Nations in a possible intervention by force.

The present South African Minister of Defence, the Honourable P.W. Botha, explains:

"The statement that the Republic of South Africa is engaged in a struggle to preserve and protect that which rightfully belongs to it would probably be regarded as a truism...... As a result of the relative check-mate in the struggle between the super-powers in the sphere of nuclear weapons, we find ourselves in a position of increasing importance in that struggle. Like the rest of the free world, The Republic of South Africa is a target for international communism and its co-horts, - leftist activities, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies. In addition, the Republic of South Africa has been singled out as a special target for the by-products of their ideologies, such as black racialism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans employed against us on the basis of double standards...... Because the Republic of South Africa holds a position of strategic importance, these ideological attacks on the Republic of South Africa are progressively being converted into more tangible action in the form of sanctions, boycotts, demonstrations, isolation and the like. This renders us - and the Free World - the more vulnerable to the indirect strategy applied by the radical powers in the form of undermining activities and limited
violence, whether employed openly or
dissimulated behind ideological fronts.
Geographically, the Republic of South Africa
is a part of the Third World; in the military
and cultural spheres it is a captive ally of
the West, and ideologically a direct obstacle
in the path of communism".

The Minister concludes that internal policy, foreign policy
and defence policy must be co-ordinated and integrated:
"particularly in the present international
climate which is typified by total strategy and
which obliges us to face the onslaughts of
monolithic organisations which are in absolute
control of all the means available to their states".26

Without wishing to deny the enormity of the threat facing the
Minister, one must point out that the only monolithic
organisation in absolute control of all the means available
to its states would be a Supreme Deity. However, the South
African Defence Force is convinced of the support of the
Almighty, and it encourages the religious beliefs of its troops:
"the Chaplain has a message to convey - the
message of the Bible, the Soldier's firmest anchor".27

This analysis of increasing militarism in South Africa,
displayed by the remarks of the Minister of Defence and by
the growing military expenditure, is given further support
by the "ATTITUDE SURVEY OF STUDENTS AND NATIONS" shown in
Table Three. Five thousand students in different nations
were surveyed, and a "compulsion-comparison factor" was
established. A rank/order comparison of students' and
nations' attitudes and behaviours was prepared, in terms
of the categories of conservatism, militarism, nationalism,
religiosity and compassion. By comparison with fourteen
other countries, the survey found "white" South African
students, and their nation, to be extremely militaristic
and lacking in compassion, as defined by the authors.
TABLE THREE: MILITARISM AND COMPASSION.
RANK ORDER SCORES OF STUDENTS AND NATIONS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATION</th>
<th>STUDENT ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR</th>
<th>NATIONAL ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>RELIGION</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Ceylon</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
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Sample Size: 5 000  
r = .74, significant at the .01 level of confidence.

The survey does not attempt to distinguish between English- and Afrikaans-speaking students, and it must be queried whether a single poll of so small a sample can adequately ascertain the attitudes of people in fourteen countries, speaking many
languages, but the results do perhaps give a statistical description of white South African attitudes compared to those of other countries. As a further table prepared by Alcock and Eckhardt shows, in Amnesty International's Reported Incidence of Torture by Nation, South Africa falls in the category of nations where torture is widespread and encouraged. Again, this information must be treated with some reservations, for nations do not give publicity to the torture they use. In short, however, there is evidence of a rapidly-arming highly militaristic group in South Africa, whose methods deviate from the Queensbury and Geneva rules for conflict.

The strategy of this group has been clearly stated:

"Our posture is defensive and not offensive. Defence, however, cannot be merely passive; our policy demands a measure of retaliatory capability. The main task of the Defence Force is to ensure within its capabilities and the terms of Government policy that the Government will have the time and freedom of action needed to develop its internal and foreign policies.... Departmental strategic policy of the Defence Force is aimed at preventing crises rather than seeking solutions when matters have come to a head. Prevention includes the deterrent element, preparedness and presence in the threatened sphere.

The Defence Force must at all times be able to assist the S.A. Police in preserving internal order". (30).

The stress is laid on the importance of buying time in which the Government can carry out its plans for Southern Africa, notably the creation of separate nations based on the old 'tribal' divisions of the people of the region. "Separate development" is dealt with more fully below with regard to Namibia, but it must be noted that the RSADF sees itself as necessary in gaining time to achieve "separate development".

General Spinola saw a similar role for his army:

"To the armed forces therefore only belongs the duty of creating and maintaining for the necessary length of time - naturally not very long - those conditions of security which will allow of finding those political and social solutions which are the only ones which can put an end to the conflict" (31).
negotiated future settlement based on federalism or qualified franchise, in which the mine-owners will still be able to make a (slightly smaller) profit. From all three groups the "West" still draws its raw materials at low prices, and is hence prepared to tolerate the situation, despite rhetorical denunciations of apartheid. The Defence Force on the borders and backing up the police provides the threatened or actual violence whereby the system has survived so far.

Can the RSADF win its civil war in Southern Africa or, more especially, in Namibia? General Spinola asserts that for the rulers, "a purely military victory is not possible". Lewis Gann, by contrast, writes that there is "no hope for violent liberation in Southern Africa". The General has much combat and command experience; Gann is a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institute for War and Peace. Gann wrote in 1972 and has already been proved wrong in the case of Portugal Overseas where the present decolonisation is clearly a result of the "war of liberation". Gann may yet be proved wrong in other areas too, especially in those areas where the terrain is suitable for guerilla operations, such as much of Southern Rhodesia, and Northern Namibia. At least one authority, C. Petersen, has stressed the vulnerability of Ovamboland, which has very few white inhabitants, and thick sub-tropical bush. Thus Gann's dogmatic denial of any "hope" for violent liberation must be more carefully examined, especially for some areas. Depending on the course of events in Angola, Ovamboland may prove very difficult to hold militarily.

Jean Baechler has drawn on the extensively-documented French counter-revolutionary wars in Indo-China and Algeria to produce a strategic assessment of such wars which may shed some light on the Southern African conflict, especially in Namibia, whose white settler society is similar in some ways to that in Algeria. He gives a framework, based on von Clausewitz's classic.

War is a duel between two protagonists with two grand strategies, either the attack (to win the war), or the defence (to avoid losing the war), and is the continuation of politics
by other means. To these classical maxims, Baechler adds features applying to revolutionary war.

Each of the protagonists has three features to be examined: the combatant forces, domestic politics, and the attitude of the international community. Political occurrences in any of the three spheres may affect the war more directly than in conventional war. Political dynamics are thus more important in revolutionary wars than in conventional wars. This means that especially in revolutionary wars the political goal must determine the military objective. The defence, seeking not to lose, is superior to the attack in such wars. Finally, the opposing strategies are dialectically linked: one should not sneer at the strategy of one's opponents (as the French did to their cost in Indo-China).

The insurrection's political goals are sovereignty and legitimacy. It seeks decolonisation and the re-conquering of national identity; it seeks the possibility of freely choosing a place in the international system. Baechler writes:

"What is probable is that the longer and harsher the war, the more extremist the regime which will finally take over from the colonists" (40).

This is a foreboding note for Southern Africa, whose leaders are arming for a long battle, despite moves towards "détente". The Namibian insurrection fits Baechler's framework: its political goal is independence, sovereignty and de-colonisation.

For the insurrection, Baechler maintains, the conquest of the people by its opponents will result in the people's support for the insurrection, or at least neutrality. The insurrection should seek to convert neutrality to active support, especially by political training, and by popular programmes, such as demands for land reform. Both these occur in the Namibian case, where leaders leave the territory for training, and where opposition to land apartheid is the paramount political tactic.

The international environment is equally important: the
insurrection seeks to destroy alliances made by the colonists internationally, and to influence world opinion against the colonists, while seeking direct help. Again, the Namibian case is in point: world opinion is actively lobbied, and direct help received as much from the constitutional monarchies of Scandinavia and Europe as from America or the "East".

If the political goal is legitimate sovereignty and de-colonisation, the military strategy is to destroy the enemy's moral and material centre of gravity which might lie, as with Charles XII or Gustavus Adolphus, in the Army, or, given a revolutionary war, in the national will to fight. The strategy of insurgents is to turn into a majority the group that supports negotiation and peace. In the Namibian case this means convincing the occupiers that a long war would be more expensive than negotiation. This may not be difficult in the Namibian case. The strategy is that of defence, for the insurgents seek not to lose, not to be destroyed. To this end they follow the classical maxims, retreating before superior forces, attacking only when sure of absolute superiority, never engaging all their strength in a single battle, and breaking off combat if losses are excessive. The strategy of attack (such as the battle at Dien Bien Phu) is not currently applicable in Namibia by the insurrection, for they do not have sufficient strength. The grand strategy is the destruction of the colonists' will to fight for the territory, and the means is a long protracted war.

The strategy for the occupiers can be seen in the same framework. The political goal is a particular reform of the society so as to protect the income and life-style of the ruling group, and so as to satisfy or control the aspirations of other groups. The goal in Namibia is thus the fragmentation of the country into separate "nations", in which process the living standards of the ruling "nation" may not fall. However, this political goal is by no means totally accepted by the ruling groups in Namibia or South Africa, and other goals exist, from baaskap to federalism.
The ruling groups have internal political tensions and are divided or divisible. This weakness has perhaps not yet been fully exploited by the insurrection. "All options are open;"

For the occupiers, the enemy's centre of gravity is the people of the territory. Thus, short of genocide, which would have huge international ramifications, the occupier's military strategy must be to win or to neutralise the population. Baechler lists several methods: the occupiers are using all simultaneously, excepting rapid genocide. The first method is to win hearts and minds, which is accurately shortened to WHAM! This involves actual or promised economic and political reform; skilful propaganda; sensitive, responsive administration; and highly-trained, tactful soldiering. The South African forces recently announced their intention of using this method in Namibia: its efficacy will be considered below. The method has the disadvantage of alienating those supporters of the occupation who categorically oppose reform, but in Namibia these seem to be unable materially to influence the situation, for Dirk Mudge and John Vorster are consummate politicians.

The second military strategy for the occupiers is a large-scale mobilisation of the people, the elimination of the potential enemies, and the atomisation or demoralisation of the population, which is packed into armoured hamlets or aldeiamentos, as in Southern Rhodesia, Portugal Overseas, Vietnam, and Algeria. South Africa's re-settlement camps, such as Dimbaza, are perhaps a non-military version of this method. It is a method that has seldom been militarily successful, and offers excellent opportunities for the opposing forces. Further, it is unlikely to aid a WHAM campaign.

The third military strategy is the use of the cleavages which might divide the population, be they ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages. This is obviously used in Namibia, for both separate development and federalism are sophisticated political versions of this strategy. One cannot easily measure the unity of the people of the territory, but the common bonds between them presently do seem to be
very strong.

Within these strategies, various military tactics are available: the war of movement, the war of territorial security, the counter-guerilla war, and the war of annihilation.

The war of annihilation has been used before in Namibia: the Herero population was reduced by the Germans from 80 000 to about 16 000 people in 1904 to 1905, in such a war. Baechler writes:

"on the whole it was impossible for France to resort to such extremes. However, a totalitarian regime with hegemonial power might not hesitate to do so" (43).

The war of territorial security, usually linked to the strategy of atomisation (above), involves garrisons guarding limited areas, having recourse to rapid re-inforcement. Such a war requires vast numbers of troops, which leads to political difficulties for the occupier.

The classical war of movement, in World War II style, involves huge mechanised attacks. In revolutionary warfare such methods are generally foolhardy: the enemy merely disappears and receives propaganda opportunities from the inevitable "mistakes" of huge attacks. If South Africa does intend using its specially created conventional force, it must have other objects in mind, for conventional attacks on guerillas are foolish.

The counter-guerilla war has proved very effective. It involves small professional bands of soldiers using guerilla tactics to chase and destroy guerilla groups. The bands are as self-sufficient as is possible for government forces - a successful guerilla is supported by the countryside, however. The bands are licensed to use extreme methods; they have one advantage over the guerilla, which is air support. The method was very successful in Malaysia under the British and, using the "style-para", the Casbah of Algiers was cleaned out in six months. South Africa probably envisages using this method. Al Venter remarks about the Republic's "Parabats", 
"Tough and relentless, they are trained to operate with an almost automatic fury" (45)

However, the method has disadvantages, especially in Namibia. The extreme methods used would mean harmful international propaganda, and a strengthening of those at home who wish to negotiate peace. These methods preclude any winning of hearts, preclude easy political solutions, and invite United Nations intervention, especially if the counter-guerilla band crosses the border in chasing its foe. Counter-guerilla military "victory" can mean political defeat.

Baechler, writing about successful revolutionary wars, concludes that it is difficult for a revolutionary war not to succeed. The various strategies and tactics of the occupiers, outlined above, all have exploitable weaknesses. Baechler writes:

"All the insurrection needs is not to lose militarily in order eventually to win politically. Because of the strategic defensive advantages of the insurgents, the established authorities cannot win a counter-revolutionary war; they can only lose the war or pervert their political ideals" (46)

Spinola agrees in part:

"The forces of the law and order can always lose a subversive war, but they will never win one, for the simple reason that the construction of victory does not lie in their sphere" (47).

Thus Baechler argues that political victory is inevitable for the insurgents if they do not lose militarily, while Spinola claims that victory can only be achieved politically, not militarily, by the occupiers. I would avoid any suggestion of inevitability, for such things have no time-limit, but on balance, a military and political victory in Namibia, in the long run, is very difficult for South Africa to achieve. To do so she must maintain her national will to fight a long, expensive and bloody war, she must win the population, or totally destroy the insurgents, she must make separate development or federation work in Namibia, and this must be done in such a way as not to disturb the high standard of living of the ruling group, on whose support the regime depends.
A tall order — or is a politically-creative strategic withdrawal the answer?

The military leaders may see the benefit of a WHAM campaign but can they implement it, as they recently attempted in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel? The racialism of their troops probably militates against a successful WHAM campaign, as is shown by the "Guide for the South African Army on how to treat Bantu" issued to troops in the Transvaal:

"Every tribe has its totem, usually an animal, the best known being a baboon, blue ape, fish or kudu. Avoid the bad habit of abusing a Bantu as an ape or baboon, or saying his mouth is like a crocodile, because one of these animals can be his totem, and this is a gross insult to him....

The Bantu is also a person, an entity with a name and surname. If it is known to you, call him by his name and surname and add Mister (--------), particularly if you are in his Homeland....

If a hand is extended to you for greeting, take it. Your hand will not change colour". (49).

When I asked a meeting of Namibian migrant labourers and students whether South Africa could win the hearts and minds of the Northern peoples of Namibia, the reply was polite laughter. The meeting stressed its hatred of war and violence, and pointed out that the WHAM campaign arose from a desire to win the war, not to alter the social system.

It may be instructive here to consider the views of U.S.A. strategists, schooled in the white heat of the Vietnamese inferno. Michael T. Klare writes:

"Rather than acknowledge the political nature of the insurgent battlefield, the academic strategists would have us view insurgency as a system, a mechanical process that is subject to external manipulation. From this perspective it is not necessary to win the hearts and minds of the peasantry, but only — through bribery and intimidation, — to secure their withdrawal from the insurgent movement"

He goes on to quote Charles Wolf, Jnr., of the Rand Corporation:

"The main concern of counter-insurgency efforts should be to influence the behaviour and actions of the populace, rather than their loyalties and attitudes. The leadership of the countries
concerned with insurgent movements can do much to influence the behaviour and actions of the populace that make the operation of the insurgent system substantially more difficult. The primary consideration should be whether the proposed operation is likely to increase the cost and difficulties of insurgent operations, rather than whether it wins popular support". (50).

In Ovamboland the "reforms" of early 1975 would seem to have made little effect on the harshness of South Africa's indirect hegemony. Admittedly, official flogging must now be done in private rather than in public, but setting aside such dubious "improvements", it can be seen that the severity of laws such as proclamation R17 of 1972 remains essentially unaltered. Could it be that South Africa is heeding the advice of the American strategists and is "increasing the difficulties of insurgent operations" through "bribery and intimidation"? This is perhaps their true goal rather than "winning hearts and minds". It is, of course, a more realistic goal in the short term.

However, whatever the outcome of the military conflict, be it "inevitable" victory or defeat, the purpose here is more to show the actual and latent military violence which maintains the system in the territory, as well as to show the potential for conflagration. The Kunene schemes are in the firing line, are important to a political victory for South Africa, and will, if completed as presently planned, assist in large capital accumulation in Johannesburg, London and New York. The linkage between capital accumulation and violence, traced for South Africa by Legassick, can be seen in Namibia. It should be recalled that the South African occupation is illegal and it must be questioned whether General S.L.A. Marshall of the United States who testified so eloquently at the World Court in 1965, that the territory was "less militarised than any of its size he had ever seen", could undertake a tour of the country today and still give the same evidence.

Even a journalist such as Dennis Gordon, not entirely
unsympathetic to the interests of the South,\textsuperscript{55}, reports from Oshikati:

"You see the occasional White soldier on border duty, in his drab brown, and even less frequently you see a policeman.....Yet at the same time you know that Ovamboland is in a very tight security grip". (56)

Whereas earlier clashes and shootings in Ovamboland usually involved police troops, in 1975 such incidents also involved the South African Army \textit{per se}\textsuperscript{57}.

Further published evidence of militarisation of Namibia comes from press reports of a recent air crash at the Grootfontein air base, near Tsumeb\textsuperscript{58}. A South African Air Force Buccaneer bomber, valued at R2 250 000 was totally wrecked "after a cross-country exercise" and a commission of enquiry has yet to report. (The Buccaneers were, of course, sold by Britain to South Africa under the guise of sophisticated naval weapons, unsuited for landward "internal security" operations: why then a "cross-country exercise", terminating at Grootfontein?). The point remains: even with South African tight control of Defence information, publicly available evidence would indicate that Namibia is now somewhat more militarised than General Marshall's testimony shows. Nevertheless, South Africa continues proudly to cite his evidence\textsuperscript{59}.

The tanks of the military may lumber threateningly by, but the society they defend is supported more subtly and effectively by another weapon: the structural violence of the migratory contract labour and influx control systems, allied to the political control resulting from legislation such as the \textit{Terrorism Act, Number 83 of 1967}, and \textit{Proclamation R17 of 1972}, in Ovamboland.

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Kwazulu has described a similar system operating in South Africa as follows:

"The migratory labour system is destroying my people. Families are not just living apart, but also growing apart in different cultures. Zulus now have to maintain two households on a wage that would be laughable to any other race group". (60)
The social disruptions and devastation caused by the system have been documented, but they could never be completely described, for language has its limitations. Helen Suzman's speech on her Private Member's motion to abolish the system, made in 1972, is an excellent summary of the damage and demoralisation achieved by the system; there is no need of extensive elaboration here. A South African Cabinet Minister (before joining the Cabinet) once said of the system:

"It is not possible to ensure any stability in a society which struggles for social existence, which cannot find a basis for any permanent relations at all" (63).

The 1971/72 mass Ovambo strike bears adequate testimony to the existence of this structural violence in Namibia: the workers struck not only for higher wages, but also because of the whole oppressive system which split their families, prevented their free movement or association, and prevented any labour mobility. Marginal "changes" resulted but fundamentally the system is no less oppressive.

For an understanding of the attitude to the migrant that existed on the mines, where conditions were perhaps slightly better than on the farms, we turn to H.C. Eedes, "These Contracted Ovambo Workers Live Well", which was published in 1955 in the SWA Annual:

"A radio address system is in operation, and this assists the Compound Officers in summoning and locating labourers required in the offices. It is also used for providing light recorded music during the day. Flood-lights have been installed in the enclosure of the compound, and at the most suitable points, and the whole compound can be suitably lit....The Native labourers are given a great amount of freedom in the compound in their off-shift time. They may do carpentry work, repair bicycles, in fact do anything useful which will keep them out of mischief. They may also apply for passes to leave the compound for the purpose of visiting in the town. These passes are usually granted".

The above quotation speaks for itself, and needs no comment. The labour system has been reformed since 1955, but the compound system is still with us. It is perhaps better called a
labour battery system, in which labour is produced in much the same way as the ill-fated battery hen. As pressure increases for reform it is, however, conceivable that family housing will replace the compound. Today new mines are designed with this in mind.

The labour reforms of 1972 to 1975 in Namibia represent the extension to Namibia of the sophisticated South African system of bureaucratic control of labour. A legal/administrative machine for the complete control of labour was created for the Republic by, inter alia, the Bantu Labour Act, Number 67 of 1964, and the Bantu Labour Regulations of 1965 and 1968. The essential elements of the South African labour-controlling machine were extended to Namibia by legislation such as the Owambo Nation Registration Enactment; the Labour Enactment for Owambo (as amended); and the Regulations for the Establishment of Employment Bureaux in the Territory of South West Africa. The essence of South African influx control had been extended to Namibia much earlier by the Native Urban Areas Proclamation (as amended).

None of these was repealed during the much-vaunted "scrapping of pass-laws" (timed to coincide with the debate arising in the Security Council). With the possible exception of the Masters and Servants Proclamation, most of the laws scrapped had largely been superseded by more sophisticated methods of achieving the same ends. The letter from the South African Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 27th May 1975 was diplomatically ambiguous on the point:

"... on 9 April 1975 various proclamations long in force in the territory were repealed or amended because they were obsolete or embodied unnecessary restrictive or what might be termed discriminatory aspects" (emphasis added).

Thus the crucial legislation still remains in force.

Even if the special committee set up to remove points of friction in the law recommends that the influx control measures of the Native Urban Areas Proclamation be removed,
the essential control of movement and of labour could still be carried out under the various labour laws.

The labour bureaucracy installed by these laws ensures a complete control over all employment of "Natives" in the territory. It thereby controls most "Natives", for in general "Natives" do not have any alternative to employment, although for some, there is access to land in the "homelands". Generally the productive resources are not in the hands of "Natives" who must therefore seek employment. A "Native" may only be employed through a labour bureau in a proclaimed area, and once classified as an "employee" or "work-seeker" he must report for employment within a certain time after becoming unemployed. The officer-in-charge of the employment bureau has enormous powers to control, in various circumstances, when, where, and by whom an employee shall be employed. In certain circumstances he may even, for example:

"order that such workseeker and his family, if any, return to his home or last place of residence or any other place indicated in the order" (emphasis added)

An elaborate system of registration of employees, employers and employment has been established. The labour bureau system was extended to the "homelands" and under laws such as the Owambo Labour Enactment, tribal labour officers classify work-seekers into categories:

"Provided that the classification shall, as far as possible, be made according to the wishes and qualifications, physique and ability of the person, and the availability of employment in the various categories" (emphasis added)

The implications of the system, which are not immediately apparent, are illustrated by the following example of workers under a similar system in South Africa:

"Mr Thupudi is a young man who recently left school in the Orange Free State and, very much against his own wishes, has been classified as a mineworker by the labour officer. When he argued, he was told that he had to work on the mines because his father had done so".

"Mr Senone is registered as a workseeker at a labour bureau which is closed to all areas except a nearby
industrial growth point. He is earning R16 a month in a factory and is forbidden by law to sell his labour for what it is worth in any other place”.

For a Namibian example, the following is extracted from a letter signed by a group of Ovambo contract workers:

"The Ovambo goes to the labour bureau and says, 'I am a driver and want work as a driver'. He is told, 'You are going to build rooms, and the pay is R5 a week'. If he says, 'I don't want building work, and I am not satisfied with R5 per week', he is chased back to Ovambo and there are no means of self-protection. Is this a good system in which to find work?".

In Namibia the labour laws are, it would seem, being enforced with some vigour, although it is within the powers of the authorities to vary the vigour of enforcement to meet various political or economic needs. The contract seems to have been substituted for the "IP" of previous years. Blacks are still "repatriated from the white areas" at "enormous cost to the State" according to the Divisional Commissioner of Police. He reported that in the past the police had concentrated on rounding up deserters or vagrants, but in future they would concentrate on illegal employment. Thus influx control still exists, and is achieved by the contract employment system, as well as by laws preventing unauthorised departure of "homeland citizens" from their "homelands".

The enormity of the Southern African migrant labour system may be becoming increasingly well-documented; the vastness of the mass population removal scheme may be receiving increasing attention; yet the basis of these schemes has received relatively little attention by comparison. One must have a population registration system to back up such schemes if they are to succeed and it is here that the South Africans have used modern technology on a surprising scale to register and control people from all over the sub-continent, including Namibia.

The hugeness of the South African computerised data processing system for registration of people is proudly described in the latest Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and
Development:

"One operator has already maintained 21 735 key depressions per hour measured over a period of a month, which feat is regarded as a world record. The Department was the first in the world to make use of this type of punch equipment on such a large scale". (78).

The report advises that at the 31st March, 1974 the Department's Reference Bureau had on record twelve million, twenty-eight thousand, three hundred and fifty-six sets of fingerprints of people from all over Southern Africa, including an unknown number of deceased people. During the year, 1 676 932 comparisons of fingerprints were made for the issue of replacement identity documents where the identity numbers were known; 928 100 other sets were compared with the record to guard against duplication; and 256 646 sets were identified by search. These figures included 335 844 fingerprint sets of citizens of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique.

The system has included Namibia in its ambit. For example, under the Owambo Nation Registration Enactment, a National Register is created of "Owambo Citizens". Their particulars, including photographs and fingerprints, are listed. This enactment makes provision for an arrangement whereby the R.S.A. Department of Bantu Administration and Development compiles and maintains the Register. Provision is made on the registration application forms for a full set of fingerprints, which is added to the Department's Register.

The Department reports that in the year ended 31st March, 1974 "mass registration of the citizens in Owambo, Kavango and Eastern Caprivi" was completed. Registration cards were issued to 56 730 male and 73 953 female adult "citizens of Owambo", a total of 130 683 people. The estimate of the total population of "Owambo" at the time, including migrants and children, was 396 000. The registration would seem therefore to have been a thorough process.

It is, of course, no simple scientifically-based task to divide people into "nations" by place of origin, descent, or
skin-colour. The activities of the Race Classification Board in South Africa itself bear ample testimony to the difficulties involved. Despite the practical problems, Namibia is, however, being divided up by the registration of her people in separate "nations". While in practice the process may be highly arbitrarily carried out, in law the separate nations exist.

Thus, based on population registration into separate "nations", structural violence controls Namibia. Freedom of movement, of employment, of association, and even of family life, are all affected. This structural violence is maintained by an enormous computerised bureaucracy which can identify individuals and thereby ensure that they perform their allocated function in the economy. Changes brought about in the "move away from discrimination" have so far been marginal. There is nothing petty about apartheid, but even if one were to accept the concept, the elimination of "petty apartheid" in no way means that "grand apartheid" is to be forsaken. In Namibia the labour and population registration systems are continuously at work, enforcing "grand apartheid".

The result is a legal-administrative machine which, by imposing criminal penalties on deviations from the imposed employment pattern, effectively controls the economic and social behaviour of the people of Namibia. Yet, what of their political behaviour? Here too violence is used to punish serious political opposition. The full story may never be known: Clive Cowley lists several "mysteries", such as the destruction of the Ovambo-Kavango Church printing press by an explosion on the 11th May 1973; the shooting of five men in Epinga by police "in the course of executing their duties"; the numerous allegations of torture since the 1971/72 strike.

Yet, in addition to brute force, structural methods are used to criminalise political opposition, in much the same way as economic mobility is criminalised. As well as statutes such as the Terrorism Act, No 37 of 1967, Ovamboland is controlled by Proclamation R17 of 1972, enforced by some
300 tribal police and an unknown number of South African policemen or troops.

Proclamation R17 needs to be read in the original. No summary can convey the Proclamation's import, but its essential aspects will be discussed here.

Firstly, it was retrospective in that it validated acts done after the 25th January 1972, a date prior to the publication of the Proclamation. After the strikes, large numbers of workers had returned to Ovamboland, and the Proclamation validated the suppression of the resulting political activity. Actions of the officials were protected by a retrospective indemnity against civil action and against criminal prosecution where the official had acted in good faith under the Proclamation.

The Minister is empowered to prohibit any person from entering into, being in, or remaining in any part, or the whole, of Ovamboland.

With exceptions, such as bona fide church services, concerts, or sports gatherings, any meeting is unlawful, unless authorised in writing by the Native Commissioner. Any individual may be prohibited from attending an otherwise lawful meeting. The onus of proof is reversed: a meeting is deemed unlawful until the contrary is proved. A meeting is defined as a gathering at which more than five persons are present at any one time.

A person suspected of having information concerning an offence, or having committed an offence, or of being about to commit an offence, may be indefinitely detained, without access to legal advisers, until the person has answered fully and truthfully, to the satisfaction of the responsible officer, all questions put to him concerning the suspected offence. A detained person may be released upon such conditions as the Minister lays down, and commits an offence if he does not abide by these conditions.
Special conditions relating to, for example, the carrying of dangerous weapons, may be applied to certain areas, called Prohibited Areas\(^95\).

It is an offence to say or do anything intended or likely to have the effect of subverting or interfering with the authority of the State, the Ovamboland Government, or any official, chief or headman. Further, one may not organise or take part in any boycott of a meeting convened by officials, chiefs or headmen, nor any boycott against any person with the object of causing him loss, disadvantage or inconvenience. It is an offence to make certain threats, or to disobey lawful orders from chiefs or headmen, or to treat any chief or headman with disrespect, contempt or ridicule\(^96\). Chiefs or headmen are empowered to try and to punish those who commit certain of the offences against those chiefs or headmen; that is, they may judge in their own cause\(^97\).

Some of the above provisions may have been temporarily suspended or amended — for example, during elections — but, in short, any serious political opposition is criminalised almost completely at the discretion of the various authorities, under this obviously Draconian law.

This Chapter has shown that South Africa is arming mightily and now has the ability to use vast direct or structural violence in its defence of, among other things, the Kunene River schemes. However, the Chapter has also shown that continued control of Namibia by the ruling groups is no small task and that they may, in fact, lose control, although no certain predictions can be made. A contradiction present in any migrant labour system is that the oscillating migrants form a perfect channel for ideas and organisation to flow between town and countryside, as was seen in the 1971/72 strikes. Whether that channel will need to be used is uncertain.

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When considering military and structural violence in Namibia,
one should recall that the South African government did not send a representative to the recent Conference to update the Geneva War Convention.

"Informed sources said South Africa had decided not to send a delegation because of the delicate stage in relations between South Africa and Black African countries....South Africa did not want to clash with representatives of....African national liberation movements" (98).

Whatever the reason for not attending the conference, it is likely that if structural violence is replaced by more direct violence, the conflict will be marked by ruthlessness - on both sides. Even at present there is evidence of ruthlessness. The Bishops of the Churches of Ovamboland were asked by the authorities why the young and educated people were fleeing the country in 1974. They gave a number of reasons, among them the following:

"The oppressive powers of the police have caused grievances among Ovambos and all South West African people. Those who oppose the inhuman constitution are being flogged, tortured with electric shocks, detained for long periods without trial and the conditions of imprisonment are inhumane". (99).

To summarise: South Africa is illegally occupying Namibia, and intends to back that occupation with vast military might. The population is being fragmented, atomised and demoralised, even to the extent of floggings being imposed on political leaders.

Military and structural violence are essential to the system, but attempts are simultaneously made to win hearts and minds, and to achieve "separate development", or at least some form of "self-determination".

One Namibian, whose doctoral dissertation concerned the German colonisation of the territory, was recently made Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Windhoek. He summed up the situation:

"The brutal, bloody colonialism of the Germans has been replaced by a brutal bloody new colonialism of the South African Government".100
NOTES. CHAPTER THREE. MILITARY AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE.

1. Military information in this work is taken only from published sources available in Southern Africa.


5. Own calculations, based on price indices in RSA-WPB'75 : 26.

6. Comparative figures can only be tentative, for different bases of calculation may be used. For sources, see: D. Carney, 1971 : 26; C. Legum (ed), 1973 : C223; RSA-WPB'75; RSA-WPE'75: 9; Anglo-American Corporation, 1975.

7. From Grundy, 1973 : 217


10. ibid.


12. Cape Times, 17/9/1974: "SA is on the Way to Building War Tanks"


14. F. Arkhurst, 1972 : 18


16. see page 2 above.

17. A. Gingyera-Pincywa and Ali Mazrui, 1970 : 33

18. ibid. : 39


20. New York Post, 10/5/1974. Further allegations on NATO and USA links with South Africa were repeatedly made in 1974 and 1975. See, for example, Cape Times, 6/1/1975 : "CIA dossier reveals US stand on SA", dealing with the secret "National Security Study Memorandum 39".

21. Republic of South Africa: Defence White Paper, 1973 (RSA-WPB'73) : 18. See also The Argus, 16/6/1975 : Bedfords and Land Rovers are used for internal security operations in Namibia, as shown by the photograph.

22. Goldstein, 1971 : 96


ibid, Preface by P.W. Botha : 2
ibid.
ibid, : 24
Alcock and Eckhardt, 1974 : "Table Three"
ibid : "Table Five"
(Emphasis added)
Spinola, 1974 : 20
Bromberger, 1972 : 73, 74.
ibid.
Spinola, 1974 : 20
L. Gann, 1972 : 19
G. Petersen, 1972 : 299
Baechler, 1971 : 74. The words "insurgent" and "insurrection" are Baechler's terms.
Baechler, 1971 : 76
see, for example, Bryan O'Linn, 1974.
Union of South Africa: Report on the Natives of SWA, 1918 : 34-35. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Five below.
Baechler, 1971 : 93
ibid : 91
Al Venter, 1974 : 45
Baechler, 1971 : 94
Spinola, 1974 : 20
see, for example, Lt General Fraser, 1970.
Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 14/7/1974 : Soldiers told how Treat Blacks"
The schemes are not only strategically in the firing-line, but also tactically. The FNLA and UNITA are reported to have fought a battle in the village of Calueque, near the dam site, in May 1975 : See, Cape Times, 28/5/1975 : "SA Families Caught in Crossfire".
Legassick, 1974.
See Chapter Two, above.
See his misleading report, "SWA Pass Laws Scrapped", in the Cape Times, 29/5/1975, and see the subsequent apology by the Editor.
56. Cape Times, 21/1/1975: "Dennis Gordon: Journey behind the Thorntree Curtain".

57. Cape Times, 24/6/1975: "3 Shot in SWA Incidents".

58. Cape Times, 16/5/1975: "Probe into Jet Crash".

59. RSA, 1975: "SWA Survey 1974" : 17

60. Quoted in Hansard, 25/2/1972: Column 1904.

61. see, for example, Voipio, 1971.


63. ibid: Col 1916.

64. See the strikers' demands, listed in Kooy, 1973: 99

65. I am indebted to Geoff Budlender for improving my insight into S.A. Labour legislation; see Duncan, 1974: 69:-

"In terms of the law, Africans need permits to seek work, to work, to reside, to rent a house, to change jobs, to live with a husband or wife, to have their children living in the same house, to visit relatives for a weekend, to move to another place, to be on the streets after curfew where this applies, to obtain a pension. A Black man can only be born and die without a permit from the White authority." (Emphasis added).


68. Proclamation R83 of 1972

69. Proclamation 56/51, as amended by Ordinance 25 of 1954, the Native Urban Areas Proclamation Further Amendment Ordinance, which inserted the equivalent of South Africa's famous Section 10(1) a, b, c and d, of the Bantu Urban Areas Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, providing that no "Bantu" may remain in an urban area for longer than 72 hours unless qualified to be there by way of: birth and continuous residence; long, lawful, crime-free employment or residence; being the wife, young son or unmarried daughter of such a person, after lawful entry; or having a permit from an officer appointed to run a labour bureau.


71. See regulations 5, 6 and 7 of Proclamation R83 of 1972.

72. Proclamation R83 of 1972, Regulation 3(5).
73. Labour Enactment for Owambo, s5(3)(a).


75. As may repeatedly be seen in South African history!

76. "9 000 Blacks sent from SWA", Cape Times, 20/6/1975. States do not usually consciously persist in costly operations unless those operations are to their benefit, or, rather, to the benefit of the ruling groups.

77. see Baldwin, 1974 : 93, who estimates that two and a half million people have been resettled in South Africa, half a million more will be removed under "Bantustan" consolidation, and up to four million may yet be resettled with the creation of urban sites in "Homelands" near "border areas". The most important original research work in the field, done by Cosmas Desmond, may not be quoted here.

78. RSA. RP21/1975 : 10.

79. ibid : 38


81. ibid : Sections 4, 6, 7 and 12(d).

82. ibid : Section 12

83. RSA RP21/1975 : 39

84. RSA 1975: "SWA Survey 1974" : 4

85. Cowley, 1975 : 7-8


87. RSA RP21/1975 : 23

88. Proclamation R17, 1972 : section 22

89. ibid : sections 15 and 16

90. ibid : section 13

91. ibid : section 3 (1)

92. ibid : section 3 (6)

93. ibid : sections 3 (8) and 1.

94. ibid : sections 19 and 20

95. ibid : sections 4 to 10 inclusive.

96. ibid : section 11

97. ibid : section 12


99. Rand Daily Mail, 16/8/1974 : "Why Ovambos are quitting the Homeland"

100. Dr J.L. de Vries, Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, in an interview with the writer, July, 1974.
CHAPTER FOUR

NAMIBIA AND NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI.

"One mode of good government is taken as being for the people to obey those laws that are laid down, but another is to lay down well those laws that the people abide by".

Aristotle: Politics (1).

The theories underlying German and subsequent South African domination in Namibia are not new. Twenty-three centuries ago, Aristotle presaged the wisdom of indirect rule, albeit in a different moral framework (above). Nearly two centuries ago, Prince Metternich provided the model for the diplomacy of détente. Global détente under Henry Kissinger, and local détente under John Vorster, are steeped in Metternich's doctrines. However, to understand the political instance of the Namibian social formation, we must turn to the work of Niccolò Machiavelli, placed in the context of twentieth century capitalism.

Four hundred and sixty years ago, the grand master of the theory of realpolitik laid down the groundrules of colonialism and neo-colonialism, in Book Five of "The Prince", entitled: "How cities or principalities which lived under their own laws should be administered after being conquered". His groundrules have been applied by the Germans and South Africans in Namibia almost as Protestant Biblical Commandments.

After a short geographical description of Namibia, this Chapter will examine techniques of domination there, in the context of Machiavelli's groundrules, and in the context of the development of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. In short, drawing on "The Prince", this Chapter will discuss aspects of Namibia's history, geography, and apartheid economics.

These topics are tightly inter-related, but the economic base is perhaps the most important. We saw in a previous chapter
that the labour system was crucial to the structural violence by which Namibia is controlled. We also saw that the size of the South African Gross National Product was important in determining the military capability which backs up social and economic violence in controlling Namibia. In the same way, an understanding of the economy is crucial to an understanding of the development of political domination by the ruling groups.

The labour system outlined in the previous chapter is internally related to the property relations system which the colonists imposed in bringing capitalism to the territory. These labour and property relations are the cornerstones of domination at the political level. An awareness of them must be used to enrich Machiavelli's analysis, which was written before the advent of capitalism as we know it.

In as blatantly capitalist a system as that found in the territory it is not being too "economic deterministic" (in a non-Marxist framework), nor too "economistic" (in a Marxist framework), to stress not only the importance of labour and property relations, but also the importance of wage levels and income distribution, in describing colonial political domination. Relations of production, and the resulting distribution of income, lie beneath and interact with the political process. The interaction must be examined, which is no mean task. It is an ongoing task, as well, but a start will be made here.

This chapter will, accordingly, examine the establishment of these relations of production by the colonists. However, Namibia has a particular distribution of productive resources. Therefore, to understand the political economy, the geography of the territory must first be examined.
MAP ONE: WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF ARID HOMOCLIMATES.

(White, 1961: 17)
MAP TWO: MAJOR TOPOGRAPHIC REGIONS

(ICJ Pleadings, 1966 Vol. II : 292)
MAP FOUR:
MEAN ANNUAL RAINFALL.


MAP FIVE:
MEAN ANNUAL RAINFALL.

(R.S.A. Yearbook, 1974: addendum)
MAP SIX:
RAINFALL VARIABILITY.

(Wellington, 1967 : 35)

MAP SEVEN:
RAINFALL VARIABILITY.

(R.S.A. Yearbook, 1974 : addendum)
MAP EIGHT: MEAN ANNUAL RAINFALL: OVAMBOLAND (Ottweiler, 1906)
Namibia is a warm, dry country, falling into the "extremely arid" and "arid" world homoclimatic regions shown on Map One. Arid climates are so lacking in moisture that they cannot regularly support ordinary crop growth. They are among mankind's most fundamental physical problems, for they cover more than one-third of the earth's land surface, while cultivated ground covers barely one-tenth.

It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that, with the possible exceptions of Australia, the south-western United States of America, and the Republic of South Africa, states having arid climates generally fall into what is popularly called the "Third World" - an expressive term, despite its disadvantages.

Namibia, with its arid climate, is no exception. It displays the familiar features of a "Third World" state. It is an outpost of imperial capitalism. It is essentially a producer of primary raw materials for the world market. It is generally not a centre for secondary and tertiary industries, nor is it a locus of accumulated capital, in world terms. Its people labour largely to survive, and for capital to be accumulated elsewhere.

Namibia is extremely sparsely populated, but has a vast area of 824 269 square kilometres, including the South African enclave at Walvis Bay. In this huge area, roughly the size of Nigeria, fewer people live than in the city of Cape Town. Namibia's 852 000 people would form but one percent of Nigeria's 80 000 000 people. The territory is the size of Britain and France taken together, but its population is a tiny fraction of theirs, and it has an average population density of approximately one person per square kilometre.

Of forty-nine areas or states in Africa listed by Hodder and Harris in 1967, Namibia was fifteenth largest by area, but only fortieth largest by population at that time. Thus, only nine African territories had a smaller population in 1967. Table Four shows the comparative physical sizes of some African states: population figures have been omitted, for they have changed markedly since Harris and Hodder wrote.
# TABLE FOUR

**AREAS OF SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>AREA IN THOUSAND SQUARE KILOMETRES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>2,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>2,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA AND CABINDA</td>
<td>1,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>1,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
<td>824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN RHODESIA (ZIMBABWE)</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAZILAND</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The territory straddles the Southern tropic. Its three major perennial rivers, the Kunene, the Okavango, and the Orange, form the boundaries with South Africa and Angola. These rivers mainly drain the South African and Angolan highlands, not Namibia. The territory's remaining boundaries are the Atlantic Ocean, which joins the mouths of the Kunene and Orange Rivers; the parallel of latitude $17^\circ 23' 23.73" S$, which joins the Kunene River at the Ruacana Falls to the Okavango River; the meridians $21^\circ E$ and $20^\circ E$, stepped along the parallel $22^\circ S$, which join the Caprivi Zipfel to the Orange River; and finally the borders of the Caprivi Zipfel, a finger-like extension of Namibia across Northern Botswana to touch Zambia and Zimbabwe.

As is obvious, these boundaries were politically drawn by European imperialists, and bear little relation to geographical or local human factors. Thus the Cuvelai River system with its non-perennial system of drainage by Oshanas into the Etosha Pan is split in two by the Angolan border, as is the Kwanyama tribe of the Ovambo people, who draw their water from the
Cuvelai drainage system. We see that "separate development", in allocating land, must cope with this uncomfortable historical division, which is repeated throughout Africa. Further, the use of the perennial rivers as boundaries has greatly complicated modern river-basin development and disputes have arisen over both the Orange and the Kunene Rivers.

These boundaries enclose three major topographical areas: the Namib desert, between the coast and the great escarpment; the central plateau, running from the Baynes Mountains in the North to the Fish River Canyon and the Karasberge in the South; and the monotonous plains of the Kalahari basin in the North and East. The Central plateau is romantically called the "land between two deserts". Map Two shows the topographical areas.

These three topographical areas have climatic divisions. Geographers classify climatic regions using a system called the Köppen-classification, named after its designer. Map Three shows a Köppen-classification of Namibian climate by W.S. Barnard. An essentially similar map was included in South Africa's "Counter-Memorial" to the International Court of Justice in 1966: A climatic region is defined as an area having approximately uniform conditions of rainfall, winds, temperature and sunshine. Barnard's Köppen-classification for Namibia is as follows:
### TABLE FIVE

BARNARD'S KOPPEN-CLASSIFICATION FOR NAMIBIA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cool coastal desert of the Namib</td>
<td>BWkln</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cool desert of the Central Plateau</td>
<td>BWkw</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cool desert of the Southern Plateau</td>
<td>BWkx'</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm desert of the Inner Namib</td>
<td>BWht'w</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm desert of Namaland</td>
<td>BWwh</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional desert of the Eastern Kaokoveld</td>
<td>BWhgw</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional desert of the Orange River Valley</td>
<td>BWhx'</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-desert of Damaraland</td>
<td>BSshw</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cool Central Highland semi-desert</td>
<td>BSskw</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm sub-tropical steppes of North and North-East</td>
<td>BSshgw</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:**

- **B** Dry zone
- **W** Desert
- **S** Semi-desert or steppes
- **h** Mean annual temperature over 18°C
- **k** Mean annual temperature below 18°C
- **g** Maximum monthly temperature in early Summer
- **t'** Maximum monthly temperature in Autumn
- **l** All monthly means between 22°C and 10°C
- **w** Summer rainfall
- **x'** Rain seldom at any time of the year
- **n** Coastal mists
This climate is the result of Namibia's position on the African continent. Her coast is washed by the Benguela Current flowing northwards from the very cold South Atlantic regions. The winds on the Coast circulate around the South Atlantic high, and blow from the South or the South East. These cold winds, blowing over a cold current off-shore bring little rain, but they cause mist banks on the coast, and cool the coastal Namib desert.

Temperature increases generally from South to North towards the tropical areas, and from East to West towards the interior of the continent. Temperature is affected by altitude, however, and very high temperatures are recorded in the low-lying Orange River valley, in the South, while more moderate temperatures occur much further North, on the Central Plateau.

The mean annual distribution of rainfall is shown by Maps Four and Five, drawn by different geographers. Their maps are dissimilar, but the basic pattern emerges. In the same way, Maps Six and Seven show the pattern of rainfall reliability. Map Eight is taken from a 1906 German map of precipitation in the territory, and shows the lower Kunene region in detail. It can clearly be seen that rainfall increases towards the North-East.

Rain is brought by two streams of air, flowing towards the Kalahari summer low, meeting at the inter-tropical front over the North-Eastern corner of the territory. The North-Easternly winds bring rain from the wet tropical belt, while the South-Easternly winds move across the continent from the Indian Ocean. Both air-streams pass over large areas of high ground before reaching Namibia and are nearly dry on arrival.

Rainfall is therefore generally low and unreliable, increasing to the North and East away from the almost totally dry Namib coastal regions. Rainfall reliability also increases to the North and East, and on the coast rainfall may vary by as much as an 80% deviation from the mean annual rainfall. The result is that the only perennial rivers crossing Namibia do not
originate within the territory, evaporation is high, ground-water is hard to come by, and there are severe periodic droughts. Water is therefore a problem.

Soils and climate interact in determining the types of vegetation which in turn affects agriculture. There are in Namibia two basic types of vegetation: those of the dry West and South, and those of the wetter, hotter North-East. Climate relegates cultivation to the status of a minor industry. Stock-farming is the major agricultural occupation. The best stock-farming land is the hard-veld of the Central Plateau. The Namib is obviously useless for stock-farming, while the Kalahari sandveld in the East is waterless, and the hotter, wetter North, with exceptions, is unhealthy and unsuitable.

Namibia's physical characteristics have been geographically described. In this harsh, arid land, how did the German and South African colonists interact with the people they encountered, to produce the social formation which now exists? We noted above that Machiavelli set out the groundrules in 1514:

"How cities or principalities which lived under their own laws should be administered after being conquered".

"When states newly acquired as I said have been accustomed to living freely under their own laws, there are three ways to hold them securely:

- first, by devastating them
- next, by going and living there in person
- thirdly, by letting them keep their own laws, exacting tribute, and setting up an oligarchy which will keep the state friendly to you.

In the last case, the government will know that it cannot endure without the friendship and power of the prince who created it, and so it has to exert itself to maintain his authority. A city used to freedom can be more easily ruled through its own citizens, if you want to keep hold of it, than in any other way". (14)

Care must be taken in transposing sixteenth century doctrines into the twentieth century. World industry now produces in three years as much as it did in all the years from mankind's beginning until the end of the Second World War, and production
continues to expand astoundingly. Such quantitative increases in production represent a qualitative jump into a new industrial political economy. Hence, the doctrines of even one of the sixteenth century's greatest minds may not always be apposite.

For example, Machiavelli's careful distinction between Republics and Principalities is not always useful in a century where monarchs, if they exist, seldom have real power. In the same way, whereas Machiavelli speaks of "exact ing tribute", and is treating of an essentially tributary mode of production, we are dealing in Namibia today with a social formation whose dominant mode of production is capitalism.

Nevertheless, in establishing and maintaining capitalism, Namibia's rulers have clearly used variations on all three of Machiavelli's themes: the major fault of the rulers perhaps lies in their inability to choose clearly between the three options - or is it a desire to obtain the best from all three worlds?

**Firstly**, the Germans devastated Namibia's central region during the Herero genocide of 1904-5.

**Next**, both the Germans and the South Africans settled there in relatively large numbers.

**Thirdly**, both regimes allowed certain groups, notably the Ovambo, to keep their own laws, setting up an oligarchy which would keep the state friendly to the conquerors. Each of Machiavelli's options can be seen in Namibian history, and we shall trace each in some detail, while describing the penetration and domination of Namibia by capitalism.

It is not suggested, of course, that the rulers had either read Machiavelli or explicitly planned all their strategies in advance. History is a far more complex organism than that, and should rather be seen as a rich network of chance occurrences, probabilistically linked to the future and to the past, with each chance occurrence being determined by its internal relationships with all the others, with the social formation, and with the dominant mode of production. Nevertheless,
Machiavelli's general theory, adapted for the circumstances of capitalist production, cogently illuminates Namibian history.

To deal firstly with the devastation: we see that its roots lie in the late nineteenth century and in a military pride and fury epitomised by General von Trotha, which rapidly eclipsed the more political diplomacy of Governor Leutwein.

German rule in Africa in the nineteenth century was marked by an imperial brutality perhaps rivalled only by Muhammed Ali's conscription of the Egyptian fellahin to conquer the Sudan, and by Leopold of the Belgians in his extraction of wealth from the Congo. Hendrik Witbooi, leader of one rebellion, wrote in 1892 to the British magistrate at Walvis Bay about "the German", as follows:

"he has already beaten our people to death for debt. It is not just and right to beat people to death for that. He flogs people in a shameful and cruel manner. We stupid and unintelligent people, for so he thinks us to be, we have never yet punished a human being in such a cruel and improper way, for he stretches people on their backs and flogs them on the stomach and even between the legs, be they male or female, so Your Honour can understand that no-one can survive such a punishment". (20)

The 1904 to 1905 annihilation was documented by the Union Government in 1918 after their conquest of the Germans. This report\textsuperscript{21} is far more than an imperial power justifying its actions by the misdeeds of another imperial power: it is a sickening history of cruelty, right up to 1915. In the year 1914, some 46 719 strokes were officially inflicted on 2 787 people, an average of 17 lashes each, for "crimes" such as "being cheeky", "refusing to obey orders", or "being lazy and not working well"\textsuperscript{22}.

In his dissertation on the subject, Arnold Wallenkampf makes great play of not using the South African Report of 1918, nor the German reply of 1919, on the grounds that both the "Blue Book" and the "White Book" are obvious propaganda. Nevertheless, using other archival sources, Wallenkampf
arrives at conclusions which are probably very little removed from those which could be drawn from a reading of the two Books.

The order of magnitude of Herero people killed cannot be questioned: some 16 000 survived out of a population of between 90 000 and 60 000 (giving highest and lowest estimates respectively)\textsuperscript{23}. Table Six is extracted from the Union Government Report, 1918, and illustrates the results of Dr Karl Dove's maxim of 1902, "leniency towards the natives is cruelty towards the whites"\textsuperscript{24}.

TABLE SIX

POPULATION ESTIMATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEOPLE</th>
<th>ESTIMATES BY LEUTWEIN, 1894, AND SCHWABE, 1903</th>
<th>1911 CENSUS</th>
<th>DECEASED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HERERO</td>
<td>80 000</td>
<td>15 130</td>
<td>64 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOTTENTOTS</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>9 781</td>
<td>10 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERGDAMARA</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>12 831</td>
<td>17 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>130 000</td>
<td>37 742</td>
<td>92 258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drechsler, whom Bley cites with approval in this connection, while criticising him severely in other contexts\textsuperscript{25}, argues that the best proof of the accuracy of these figures, at least concerning the Herero and the "Hottentots", is the lack of a contrary response in the German "White Book" of 1919. Drechsler\textsuperscript{26} makes two small corrections, pointing out firstly that 1 000 Hereros had escaped into British territory, and thus should be added to the total of survivors, and secondly, that the 1898 Typhus epidemic killed some 10 000 Herero, which decreases the number for which the Germans must be held responsible. Drechsler concludes:

"With these qualifications, however, it cannot be denied that German Imperialism brought upon itself the charge of brutal bloodshed and genocide". (27)
What prompted the Hereros to rebel, producing this passionately bitter, controversial colonial war, which culminated in genocide? With the hind-sight of history we can see, right across the African continent, many similar examples of resistance to the land alienation which follows initial conquest. More generally, we can view resistance and devastation simply as one of Machiavelli's three possible types of domination after conquest.

Historians of the more detailed record have, of course, listed more particular causes. Wallenkampf, for example, suggests that repeated miscarriage of justice, unsavoury trade relations, the mixing of cultures, and, above all, the alienation of Hereroland, had all created friction between colonist and colonised. de Vries shows that the political goal in the territory was "the robbery of ground and property from the Hereros". He writes:

"The earlier centres of Hereroland (Okahandja, Otjosazu, Waterberg, Omburo and Omaruru) were taken from them. That these centres were not only the political nerve-centres of the nation, but also, which is more important, the site of the graves of the Herero-ancestors, was, in the eyes of the Herero, the greatest evil which a people could do to them". (29)

For whatever reasons, when the Bondelswarts rebelled far to the South and forced the German administration to move their troops away from Hereroland,

"The Hereros rose to throw off the yoke". 30

As in all colonial societies, there had long been speculation of rebellion. The years since 1884 had, of course, been marked by many minor campaigns. Nevertheless, when the Herero rebelled on the 12th January 1904, many Germans were taken by surprise - not least the Administration, which, surprisingly for a settler society, had no facilities to cope with a general insurrection. Military forces comprised seven hundred and twenty-nine men, one paymaster, twenty-seven officers, nine sanitary officers, three veterinary officers, and eight hundred horses - to control an area one and a half times the size of Imperial Germany. 31
The bulk of these forces were hundreds of miles to the south, putting down the Bondelswarts uprising. Without reinforcement, they would have proved hopelessly inadequate to the task of repressing the Herero and subsequent Nama rebellions against colonial rule and colonists' land-grabbing.

Similarly, the Director of the German Colonial Office, Steubel, was unprepared, as were the German General Staff and the Chancellor himself. Many reasons were advanced for the "sudden" revolt: while others blamed Governor Leutwein's "leniency towards the Natives", Steubel decided that the uprising was "an act of God".

The lack of preparation prompted Imperial Germany to an excessive military response, thus turning a revolt into a full-scale war of annihilation, furiously waged to defend the military reputation of Wilhelm II and his army. Martial Law was declared on the 19th May 1904, and by July 1904, the "lenient" Leutwein had lost his supreme command to General Lothar von Trotha, a veteran of the Boxer revolt, commander of the troops who had put down the Wahehe revolt in East Africa, and as vicious a soldier as any ever to fight in the sub-continent.

In response, the Herero assembled round the Waterberg, (which, incidentally, once more stresses the importance of water in the territory) and they were routed in a great battle on the 11th August 1904, those escaping being ruthlessly chased to die of thirst in the arid Omakeke sandveld.

Lothar von Trotha, resolved on extermination, ordered that:
"....every Herero, with or without a rifle, with or without cattle, will be shot. No women and children will be allowed in the territory; they will be driven back to their people, or fired on. These are the last words to the Herero nation from me, the Great General of the mighty German Emperor". (35).

Von Trotha wrote to Leutwein a few weeks later:
"The Herero nation must perish: since I did not succeed in exterminating it with my cannon, then it must perish in this way". (36)
However, the mighty German Emperor was persuaded, in the uproar that broke out both in DSWA and in Germany, to countermand on the 8th December 1904, the order of his Great General. The Great General's other policies, however, remained in force: that all Herero cattle should be confiscated, that Hereros would be employed in return for food but without payment, and that gang-leaders and murderers would be tried by special courts.

General von Trotha was finally replaced by Lindequist in November 1905. Not only had von Trotha wrought the destruction which was described statistically above, but, moreover, peace had not yet been established and the war dragged on until early in 1908. Leutwein wrote in 1906:

"At the cost of several hundred million marks and several thousand German soldiers, we have, of the three commercial assets of the territory, - mining, farming, and native labour - managed to destroy the second entirely and two-thirds of the last. What is, however, more blameworthy, is the fact that with all our sacrifices we have up to this day, not been able to restore peace". (38).

Leutwein describes a temporary destruction of the economy of the territory. In analysing the social formation, it is clear that there were many complex "causes and effects" of the war. However, at a more abstract theoretical level, it is equally clear that the rebellion was of great importance in the establishment of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. The economy, recovered, and is capitalist to this day.

Some whites died in the rebellions: Bley puts the figure at over two thousand casualties, but a more accurate death count, perhaps, exists in the public gaze, recording 1750 deaths. Table Seven gives an English translation of the plaque on the equestrian statue which dominates Windhoek. This perfectly maintained monument is perhaps the second-most macabre in the whole territory today. (The most macabre monument to German rule in the territory will be described further below).
TABLE SEVEN

PLAQUE ON WINDHOEK MONUMENT\textsuperscript{40}.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{SOLDIERS} & 100 OFFICERS & 254 NCO's & 1180 CAVALRYMEN \\
\textbf{MARINES} & 7 OFFICERS & 13 NCO's & 72 MEN \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Soldiers and Marines totals.}
\end{table}

Thus, not without some cost in men, the Germans exercised the first of Machiavelli's options for a conqueror. Their detailed reasons for doing so have been examined in the works of scholars such as Bley, Drechsler, de Vries and Wallenkampf, all of whom worked from primary sources. The essential outline of the process has been given above, based largely on secondary sources, in explaining Machiavelli's first option.
Bley's scholarly work concludes that in the Herero rebellion ideas developed that were not to become relevant to Germany until 1914, nor fully until 1933. Perhaps, in this context a piece from Aimé Césaire's "Discourse on Colonialism" is the best comment on the Herero annihilation:

"Until Nazism had been endured, one supported it, one absolved it....one legitimated it because, until then, it had only been applied to non-European peoples..... If the very Christian middle-class man of the 20th century does not pardon Hitler, it is not because of the crime itself, of the crime against mankind, of the humiliation of man himself. It is because Hitler's crime was directed at the white man, was a humiliation of the white man, and because Hitler applied to Europe Imperialist methods which were until then only applied to the Algerian Arabs, the coolies of India, and the African blacks". (Translated in Kesteloot, 1973: 66).

Certainly there was objection to the Herero annihilation, but it was nevertheless allowed to continue for some time, and no material reparation was made. The ruling groups continue to profit to this day by that massacre, as we shall see when considering the territory's economic geography. The South Africans and the "West" never exercised the colonist's option of devastation, for the Germans had been allowed to do so with an efficiency which left a mark visible to this day. There was no longer a need for devastation, but the South Africans and the "West" condoned, inherited and perpetuated the results, making little material reparation, despite propaganda to the contrary. They therefore cannot escape Césaire's bitter indictment of greed and hypocrisy.

If the South Africans did not massacre a people, but merely benefited by the results, they were still not averse to the use of force. They crushed the final Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922 very fiercely, for the Administrator was, in his words, "determined to inflict a severe and lasting lesson". Similarly, the Rehobothers were forced into submission in 1925.

Machiavelli's second method of ruling a conquered state is far less spectacular, but it is, of course, more productive. Under
capitalism it is not the Prince who "settles there in person", for a Wilhelm II or a George V would far prefer the glory, power and comforts of Europe to life in what might be called a backwater were it not a desert. Nevertheless, Germans, Englishmen and South Africans were enticed and encouraged to settle in the territory. The leaders they produced, men such as Lindequist, Hahn, Hofmeyer, even Jannie de Wet, and of course the highly competent Dirk Mudge, have been able to retain control at least as well as their "Princes" might have. The institutions and history of settlement will not themselves be examined here, for they are not markedly different from similar settlement projects elsewhere.

It will suffice to say that Machiavelli's second strategy was also used, and we proceed to examine the results of the application of the first two strategies, devastation and settlement, in Namibia, after which the third strategy will be considered.

The result of the application of policies of devastation and settlement in Namibia is the establishment of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. Land and productive resources were alienated from the people of the territory in large measure, and a wage labouring class was thereby created. A fraction of this wage labouring class has a special relationship to production in what are now called "homelands". This will be dealt with when considering the third strategy, below. Generally, however, alienation of land and productive resources accompanied the establishment of imperial monopoly and oligopoly capitalism. This linked Namibia into the world system of capital accumulation.

The most macabre monument in Namibia today to German rule is not the equestrian statue in honour of 1 750 Germans who died while 92 258 "Natives" were killed. It is the system of land allocation which was inherited by the South Africans from the Germans, which was violently enforced during subsequent resistance, and which is being entrenched today by the plan for "separate nations". We have seen that the present
allocation of land ownership is maintained both by the threat of military violence and by the structural violence of the influx control and contract labour systems. We have also seen that much of the land was violently taken in a war of annihilation, rather than being freely given or sold.

To understand the result of Machiavelli's first two strategies, of devastation and settlement, and to understand the present land and resource allocation, we must return to the economic geography of the territory.

Namibia is not, as we saw above, generally suited to crop production, with the possible exception of the Kunene, Cuvelai, and Okavango regions. Again with these exceptions, soil, vegetation and climate dictate that the Central Plateau is the best stock-farming land. It was over this land that the Herero and Nama wars of devastation were fought in 1904-1908, with the result that today the settlers own and occupy the best pastoral land.
MAP NINE:

LIVESTOCK AREAS

(Wellington, 1967: 97)

MAP TEN:

LAND OCCUPATION BEFORE 1906.

(Wellington, 1967: 132)
MAP ELEVEN:  LAND OCCUPATION BEFORE 1904

(Bley, 1968, 1971: xxx)
MAP TWELVE:
EUROPEAN
SETTLEMENT,
1903
(Schmidt,
1922: Karte V.)

Arten der Siedlungen
für den 1. I. 1903.

1 : 4 050 000

- Militärstation oder
  Sitz der Verwaltung.
- Missionsstation.
- Handels- oder
  Verkehrssiedlung.
- Farmwirtschaft.
- Militärpostamt mit angeschlossenen
  Missionsstationen, Handelsstätten u.s.w.
  in sinnvoller Variation.

Farmgebiete:

- In genauer Flächenangabe.
- ohne "
- Straßen
- Eisenbahn

Schriften des Instituts für Ureinwohner- und Auslandsdeutschland, Heft 1.
MAP FOURTEEN: EUROPEAN AND TRIBAL AREAS, 1911

(Bley, 1968, 1971: xxxi)
MAP FIFTEEN: SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT IN NAMIBIA

(Afrika Instituut, 1970 : 1).
This can be very clearly seen on the map. Wellington, working from the Report of the SWA Long-Term Agricultural Policy Commission, has drawn a map – reproduced as Map Nine – showing the best areas in use for stock-farming. In Map Ten he has drawn the pattern of land use by the inhabitants before 1904. The best stock-farming areas, delimited in the East by the Kalahari sandveld and in the West by the Namib desert, are clearly the areas occupied by the people of the territory before 1904, although some German settlement had commenced. Map Eleven, taken from the work by Bley, shows the combined pattern of German and tribal land use before 1904.

The German geographer, Carl Schmidt, presented a dissertation in 1922, studying European settlement in DSWA in great detail. His detailed map of European settlement in 1903 is reproduced as Map Twelve, while that for 1911 is reproduced as Map Thirteen. Helmut Bley's combined map of European and Tribal areas in 1911 is reproduced as Map Fourteen, and, finally, the "separate development" proposals for the territory, as drawn by the Africa Institute, appear as Map Fifteen.

A careful comparison of Maps Nine to Fifteen clearly shows that the result of devastation and settlement from 1904 to 1911 was the alienation of the best productive pastoral land from the people of the territory by the colonists, the Northern areas excepted. Further, this pattern of settlement was taken over by the South Africans, and with minor exceptions appears as the plan for separate development as outlined by the Odendaal Commission. Thus, the ruling groups, with their "separate nations" plan of the nineteen sixties, have taken for their "nation" most of the best pastoral land, with the Herero, particularly, being displaced to the dreaded Kalahari sandveld.

The settlers are, of course, far fewer in number than the ruled groups, but have far more land. Wellington's discussion of this is now famous: he showed that on the 1960 census figures, the "average" "white" rural family controls 2 008 hectares, while an average "black" rural family has 68 hectares. This thirty-to-one ratio is, as we have seen,
exacerbated by qualitative differences: for a further example, the "white areas" usually have sufficient ground water, whereas the same cannot be said for much of the "homeland" area.

Referring back to the "sacred trust of civilisation", Wellington has written:

"...the Union Government's policy was crystal clear. So far as the land was concerned the best must be kept for the whites; for the Natives the worst was good enough....The adoption of a sound land policy which would be just to the Natives was surely of the utmost importance for the fulfilment of the sacred trust. Failure in this at the very beginning was not merely a blunder, it was moral turpitude". (45).

This division of land, resulting from devastation and settlement, has produced the present pattern of ownership of productive resources, and hence the present grossly-skewed distribution of both income and wealth in Namibia. The economy is based on primary industry, and the major primary production sectors are fishing and mining, in addition to pastoral farming, discussed above. In the same way that the best pastoral farmland is owned by the ruling groups, so too is fishing kept away from the ruled people. Map Fifteen clearly shows that no "homeland" has any access to the sea, under the Odendaal Plan, and the ports are in the "white" areas, with Walvis Bay, the most important harbour, being technically a part of the Cape Province.

Aside from the ports, the barren coastal Namib areas would generally not be a loss to a "homeland", and the Namib's population would be negligible, plan or no plan. However, the Namib has one item of enormous value: diamonds. These, on land and on beds offshore, are also kept firmly in the control of the ruling group.

Apart from diamonds, the other large source of revenue is base mineral mining. The Ovambo peoples, and even the Ovahimba of the harsh Kaokoveld, have been smelting and trading in iron and copper since they moved into the region, which has been estimated by Vedder to have occurred in about 1550, long before the "white" man penetrated the area. The Ovambo mined or
traded in copper from Tsumeb, and obtained iron from various places, notably in what is now Southern Angola. The Ovambo still mine at Tsumeb, but they do it now as contract workers for the benefit of the ruling groups, in Southern Africa, in Europe and in America.

Map Thirty-One shows the major mineral developments in Namibia: with very few exceptions they fall outside the "homelands". The Tsumeb copper, lead and zinc mines are a very clear case of a colonial or imperial group exploiting resources which had anciently been the preserve of a local group. The territory has a long list of base mineral resources, some of which are in the "homeland" areas, such as a large haematite iron-ore deposit in the forbidding and inaccessible Kaokoveld. Generally, however, economically exploitable deposits are in the areas taken by the ruling groups.

Diamond and base mineral mining are clear examples of the importance of monopoly capitalism in Namibia. Over three-quarters of the mineral exports are accounted for by two concerns, which are either wholly owned or controlled by three firms, one South African and two American. Thus, not only does the settler area presently cover the better mining areas; but ownership of the mines presently vests in foreign capitalist enterprise, which also has the crucial control of mining technology. The territory's largest single employer is the Tsumeb Corporation Limited, whose profits averaged R12 900 000 per annum in the decade up to 1972. American Metal Climax Incorporated (AMAX) are large shareholders in the Tsumeb Corporation, and reported in 1974 on the labour regulations in the territory as follows:

"There are a number of laws which affect employment in the mining industry......These regulations require that mining employees in nearly every position of senior responsibility, such as mine managers, mine captains, mechanical and electrical engineers, surveyors, shift-bosses, onsetters (cagers), and hoist drivers (for conveyance of men), must be white. The regulations effectively limit black employees to unskilled, semi-skilled service and clerical positions". (48).

Those settlers, therefore, whose relations to production are
not simply embodied in ownership, have nonetheless been able so far to reserve for themselves access to skills and even to a share in the surplus. Their role as settlers in the political economy has until now enabled them to be allied to the ruling, owning groups at the expense of the colonised workers, from whom they are divided.

Settler workers have far greater rights of ownership of productive resources than colonised workers, although not all, of course, are able to exercise those rights. They have generally been able to appropriate to themselves a greater share in the economy by way of their more extensive rights to ownership and to legitimate political participation.

Some workers, thus, are more privileged and have relations to the productive sources different from those of other workers. The settler workers will fight to maintain these privileges, but it is not impossible that in time they will lose control of their exclusive rights to ownership, skills, or political participation, although geographic separation presently protects their position. At present, settler workers are clearly part of the ruling groups, entitled to own, and having political control of, the best productive resource areas.

Thus devastation and settlement, after conquest, have resulted in the ruling groups gaining control of the major productive resources - the best pastoral farmland, the mines, and the fishing industry. In addition, such capital accumulation as is not expatriated, is located largely in the settler areas. With small exceptions, secondary and tertiary industry is located in what are presently settler areas. More importantly, the modern communications infrastructure is carefully kept in the hands of the ruling groups.

Railways, shown on Map Fifteen, are routed to the outside world only via Walvis Bay, Luderitz or the Northern Cape. Thus even an enlarged Ovamboland, including the Tsumeb mines, given "independence" at some future date, would still be tied by infrastructure to the South. Ironically, Ovambos were
information, and can therefore withhold it from public scrutiny\textsuperscript{57}.

Thus, the ruling groups in linking the territory to world capitalism have acquired most of the important productive resources of the territory, in the form of fisheries, farms, mines, factories, harbours, towns, transport, communications, information and expertise. They did this, as we have seen, by following at least two of Machiavelli's three groundrules for conquerors.

Yet, what of Machiavelli's third groundrule? What of the strategy which he clearly prefers?

"A city used to freedom can be more easily ruled through its own citizens, if you want to keep a hold of it, than in any other way". (58).

The South Africans and the Germans used this strategy too, from the time of their first occupation of the territory. Embodied in phrases such as "separate development", "self-determination", and "the future of the territory will be decided by the people themselves", Machiavelli's third groundrule is becoming the primary strategy of the ruling groups in their search for a suitable political solution to conflict in Namibia. Whether the rulers can use this strategy successfully in some form or another will depend on the consciousness and organisation of the ruled groups.

At its most successful in the capitalist era the strategy results in efficient neo-colonial exploitation. This is the equivalent of what in Machiavelli's era was "exact ing tribute". However, under capitalism the process is more opaque. We cannot trace the exaction of surplus as clearly as we could point to the payment of tribute. However, we can study the geographical location of the accumulation of physical capital resources, which seldom occurs at the periphery of a neo-colony, but occurs far more often at the centres of the world or local economy.
Machiavelli's third strategy has clear military application. It is the equivalent at the political level of the "win hearts and minds" military strategy. Thus, it is not entirely an accident that those areas of Namibia whose "separate development" towards "self-determination" is most advanced, are also the areas in the military firing lines, the areas in which a "WHAM" campaign is being carried out, and the areas least touched by devastation or settlement in earlier times.

"East Caprivi", "Kavango" and "Owambo" in the north of the territory are the "separate development" nations closest to independence; they are also the areas where the military threat is most immediate.

It is not surprising to find correlation between military and political strategies. We saw above, with von Clausewitz, that war is but an extension of politics, and that in an "insurgent" situation, political goals are of special importance. We also saw that for the ruling groups to win, in the longer term a political solution is required.

The case of Ovamboland illustrates the development of this possible political solution. With the possible exception of the early slave and other trading before formal conquest or control, Machiavelli's third groundrule has always informed European relations with Ovamboland.

For several centuries geographical factors, such as deserts and "skeleton coasts", together with the fierce reputation of the Ovambo warriors, deterred European penetration. Once the Europeans had overcome these mental or physical hazards, they travelled through, but did not stay in, the Southern Kunene basin or Ovamboland.

The Germans and the Portuguese did, however, vie with each other for control of Ovamboland as a labour source, and for access to the Ruacana Falls for power generation. The Ovambo Kwanyama tribe, caught between the two, sporadically resisted German, Portuguese and South African penetration. Mandume,
Ovamboland. In 1972 the "Owambo Government Services" comprised ten "white" officials and some thirty-eight chiefs or other Owambo officials to govern 342,455 people in 53,300 square kilometres of land. In 1975 The Department of Bantu Administration and Development reports their staff in Ovamboland to be 74 "whites" and 299 "homeland citizens". These are assisted by 300 Tribal Policemen, 3 Traffic Officers and an unknown number of South African policemen or soldiers.

Lack of "white" settlement does not, however, mean lack of "white" influence. The industrial economy has penetrated to the farthest corners of Southern Africa in its labour recruitment schemes. Pressure of increasing population on a restricted land area, among other factors, as we have seen, resulted in Owambo people working in very large numbers on the farms and mines of the south. Even the small Owahimba group of the remote and untamed Kaokoveld are not untouched: Davis reported a meeting with an Owahimba in 1964, who spoke Fanagalo, the lingua franca of the gold mines, and who had been to the Witwatersrand.

Thus capitalism became the dominant mode of production, although vestiges of other modes may still be seen. The contemporary labour position illustrates this. Reliable figures on employment are not released, but very tentative estimates have been made. These indicate that of a total male and female labour force of 116,000 people in 1970, 46,000 people were involved in subsistence agriculture, whereas 59,000 were involved in other production in Ovamboland and in the South. Some 43,000 of these latter are migrant contract workers. At an arbitrary 10% unemployment rate, 11,000 are estimated to be unemployed.

From these figures it is clear that although many workers will have a relationship with subsistence agriculture, the people of Ovamboland today are highly dependent on employment, especially in the South, where most of Namibia's productive resources are located.
Thus Ovamboland may be seen as a labour reservoir, in which workers are born, educated, grow old, and die, being supported (at least in part, perhaps) by the land, and from which workers must "temporarily" migrate on a contract basis. The labour bureau system by which this is controlled was discussed in a previous chapter.

Ovamboland thus becomes a place in which workers may be allocated "political opportunity" by the ruling ideology. The denial of rights in the other areas of Namibia in which the workers spend much of their lives is thereby officially validated.

Similarly, as in other areas of Southern Africa, income from the land may be used by the ruling ideology to legitimate low wages paid in the South. The workers and their families are said to have two sources of income, even though the income from the land may often be tiny or non-existent.

However, in the face of increasing population, a redefinition of the people's needs, and low agricultural productivity, this legitimation is becoming less tenable. Development schemes, such as those of the Bantu Investment Corporation, or the Kunene schemes, are therefore both ideologically and economically useful. They may be seen as an attempt to improve the reproduction of the labour force in a politically safe way. They may also assist or enlarge the class of owners in Ovamboland, whose existence may in time become valuable to the ruling groups, in terms of the maintenance of a friendly oligarchy.

Separate development is thus a modernisation of "indirect rule". Customary law, suitably modified, and the royal houses, suitably pruned, are used in the creation of an oligarchy which will keep the state friendly to the ruling groups. This oligarchy is modernised: increasingly more people are "elected", rather than appointed, to the Legislative Assemblies.

The people of these areas do not themselves generally have
access to important productive resources. They must therefore seek employment. The ruling groups have ownership of most of the productive resources of Namibia; they rule the other areas indirectly, and extract labour from these areas through a vast bureaucratic network.

At the same time an even older rule is followed than those laid down by Machiavelli: *divide et impera*. By perpetuating the division of the people of Namibia into separate "nations", the South African Prime Minister is able to declare, "the peoples of Namibia must decide". By contrast, a democratic method would be for the people of Namibia to decide.

In the longer term, Machiavelli's third strategy applied to Ovamboland means eventual independent government of the "Owambo" state by an oligarchy both able and willing to keep it friendly to the ruling groups to the South. The friendship would, of course, be spurred on by economic necessity, and the South would thereby continue to get its labour.

The third strategy may not, in fact, prove viable, for the simple reason that the oligarchy may not be able to maintain control. Rule of a state through its own citizens requires some support for those citizens who must rule. This support is by no means easily created in Ovamboland. Possibly the situation is more like Machiavelli's "Republics" than his "Principalities".

"...in Republics there is more life, more hatred, a greater desire for revenge; the memory of their ancient liberty does not and cannot let them rest; in their case the surest way is to wipe them out, or to live there in person". (78)

How many South African soldiers must now "live there in person"?

The third strategy has further stumbling blocks. The "economic necessity" whereby the politically independent states are to be kept friendly may, in fact, be turned against the rulers. There are three crucial factors which, in the economic geography which we have described, do not lie in the hands of the ruling groups. The mines, the farms and
fisheries need large quantities of power, water and labour before they can produce profit. The small, but growing, secondary industry and the growing industrial and administrative towns also need these three factors. The achievement of the twin goals, of separation, and of economic prosperity for the ruling groups, depends on a solution being found to the problems of energy, water and labour. For the economy to expand, these problems must be solved. The three commodities must be provided at the centres of production in sufficient quantity and at suitably low prices. This must be done in such a way that the ruling groups continue to dominate, no matter how indirectly.

Namibia has no known important coal or oil deposits, and these fuels must be imported. The only other inanimate source of power is hydro-electricity, which can come only from the three major perennial rivers. Two of these are in "homelands", and the third is not very suited for the production of hydro-electricity in most of its lower reaches, although some development is being considered. Thus, to find the power needed for the mines, the South African occupation must import coal for thermal power stations, or the waters of the Northern rivers must be harnessed. The planned South African solution is discussed in a separate chapter below.

Namibia has been blessed by some dedicated and imaginative water engineers, serving black and white alike. There is now generally sufficient ground-water or other water for the white farms to get by. However, the growth of new mines, and of the industrial and administrative towns, is beginning to overtax the available water supplies. Accordingly the South African occupation plans to bring water over long distances from the Fish River tributary of the Orange River in the South, and from the two Northern rivers, which are, of course, in "homeland" regions. These plans are discussed in a chapter below.

The present solution to the problem of the supply of labour at suitable prices has been described above. What is
important here, however, is the realisation that, given sufficient consciousness, the ruled groups may be able effectively to interrupt supplies of power, water and labour, and thereby enforce dramatic changes.

In the light of Machiavelli's strategies for colonists, this chapter has considered aspects of the economy, geography and history of Namibia, to show that the land allocation to the "separate nations" proposed and implemented under "separate development" is grossly skewed in favour of the ruling occupying groups. The three resulting problems for the ruling groups are labour, water and power. The labour "solution" has been briefly considered. Before discussing the planned "solutions" to the water and power problems, South African economic strategic planning for the whole of Southern Africa must be examined. In doing so in the next chapter, the application of Machiavelli's third (or "neo-colonial") strategy will be demonstrated further.
NOTES:  CHAPTER FOUR:  NAMIBIA AND NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI.

3. White, 1973 : 1
4. see P. Jaleé, 1965, 1968 : 3, for a discussion on the merits of the term "Third World".
5. see R. Logan, 1961 : 331ff, for an assessment of the territory as an arid land.
   1966 Population: 610 000 (Africa Institute,1970 : 5)

   For descriptions of Namibia, see ICJ Pleadings Vol II, 1966 : 289; Wellington, 1967 : 1;

7. Hodder and Harris, 1967 : 28. Islands such as São Tome and Príncipe have been omitted here.
8. Extracted from Hodder and Harris, 1967 ; 28
9. see Map IX and Maps of the Cuvelai drainage system in
10. see SWA Annual 1952, and Barnard, 1965(b) : 56, re the dispute over the Orange River.
11. Discussed below, Chapter Six.
13. Adapted from Barnard, 1965(a) : 74 ff
17. see Samir Amin, 1974(a) for a clear treatment of the distinction between modes of production and social formations.
18. For discussion in English of the genocide of the Herero, see inter alia: Calvert, 1915 : 29; Union of South Africa Report - 1918; Hailey, 1938 : 726; Steer, 1939; Bruwer,1966; Wellington, 1967 : 201-224; Bley, 1968, 1971 : 149-225; Wallenkampf, 1969; Goldblatt, 1971. A major untranslated German work is Drechsler, 1966 : 150-259; a major Afrikaans work is J.L.de Vries, 1971, esp. 191-224. The topic is receiving well-deserved attention in an otherwise seldom-researched area of African history, but the sources used by most writers have been necessarily European rather than African, as Bley notes with regret on pages v and xix. For a defence of the term "genocide", see Bley at xvii and Drechsler, 1966 : 364, note 329.
19. This viewpoint of history has mainly been synthesised from the arguments of Beer, 1966, who is a systems analyst and cybernetician; and Ollman, 1971, whose work contains an important critique of Marx's philosophy of internal relations. See especially Ollman, 1971: Chapter Three and appendix; and, Beer, 1966: Chapter 11.

22. ibid: 113

24. Dove, 1903: 189
27. ibid, own translation
31. ibid: 228
32. ibid: 3-4
34. Lothar von Trotha's military viciousness stands out even in a sub-continent whose military history includes Jagga war-bands and British concentration camps.

38. Leutwein, quoted in Dundas, 1946.
40. Transcribed by the writer from the equestrian statue, Windhoek, and translated by D. Budlender.
42. see SWA Administration, 1925: 10; Steer, 1939: 88-89; and, Wellington, 1967: 273, 303 for accounts of land settlement problems.
43. see Rust, 1956, for a vivid map of the demographic pattern.
44. Wellington, 1967: 415
45. ibid: 407-408
46. For a description of the way by which control of the diamond fields was obtained, see Gregory, 1962. See also E. Oppenheimer and A.F. Williams, 1914.
48. Consolidated Diamond Mines are owned by de Beers Limited. The Tsumeb Corporation Limited is controlled by American Metal Climax Incorporated, and Newmont Mining Corporation, each of which held 29.6% of the issued shares in February 1974. See Amax, 1974: 3. The quotation is from AMAX, 1974: 6.
49. The suggestion of redrawing the boundaries of the Northern areas, doubtless to include the Tsumeb mines, was mooted by the Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation Limited in a speech to the SAIRR in January 1973. The suggestion has been repeatedly canvassed since that time, and a "two-part" division of the territory may yet occur. Mining capitalism, having world-wide production and marketing interests, and having crucial control of expertise, has proved almost infinitely flexible in maintaining operations in "new states". Particularly so long as railway linkages were routed to the south, the mining capitalist fraction of Namibia's ruling groups would not be averse to a "North/South" split as a "solution" to conflict in Namibia. See, for example, Sunday Times, 23/2/75 "Mine men back nationhood for Ovambo", and Sunday Times 25/5/75,"A SWA Scenario".
50. Stals, 1967: 194
51. Great Britain, 1920(a): 19
52. see Hailey, 1938: Ch.23. Transport has long been a strategic military problem in such a vast, arid land. See, for example, UG38/1915: 2, para.14; UG37/1917: Report of Col.de Jager to the Administrator; Collyer, 1937: 24, 25, 84, 121; and, in the present decade, The Argus, 16/6/75, "Police on guard at Windhoek township" gives a photograph, and a caption reading, "A convoy outside the railway station in Windhoek. National Servicemen arrived from the Military Base in Walvis Bay in case of a confrontation with protest marchers". South Africa intends spending R166 million over the next five years on maintenance and expansion of roads - see SWA Survey 1974: 54.
53. For discussion of the strategic economic implications of transport infrastructures in linking Africa to imperial capitalism, see Seidman, 1972b: Section III; Katzenellenbogen, 1973: passim and esp. 132ff; and, Charles Miller's delightful "Lunatic Express", 1971: passim.

54. The Argus, 22/5/75: "FM Network for SWA".

55. The Argus, 12/6/75: "Private sector to get stake in new plant". See also: RSA: SWA Survey, 1974: 39

56. For example, the SWA Survey 1974 (RSA 1975) discloses only the GDP. See also, Thomas, 1975: 2; on the non-availability of useful data.

57. For GNP and GDP estimates see Financial Mail, 21/3/73; and, Thomas, 1975, 17.

58. Machiavelli, 1514, 1961: 48

59. On the importance of Ovamboland as a labour source, see inter alia: Stals, 1967: Ch. VII; UG 38/1915: passim; UG 37/1917: passim; Great Britain 1920(a): 43-44; Government Archives, Pretoria, Prime Minister's files EM 99, 36/1, 1915-1925: passim; Great Britain 1920(b): 43.


61. UG 38/1915: 17

62. UG 37/1917: 4

63. ibid: 6

64. ibid

65. ibid

66. ibid


68. UG 26/1936: 56

69. ibid: 59

70. ibid: 70

71. ibid: 72

72. Owambo Regeringsdiens, 1972: 11

73. RSA: RP 21/1975: 37

74. S. and S. Davis, 1964

75. Thomas, 1975: 16 and 58.

76. The term "labour reservoir" is not new: for example, the geographer Georg Nitsche uses it in his dissertation in 1913: 130-139. A modern version in United States parlance when talking of Southern Africa is "labour corral"!

77. See Louw, 1967, for a detailed consideration of the modification and use of customary law. Regarding the pruning of the royal houses, another Chief,
Impumbu, was exiled in 1932, in addition to Mandume's killing in 1917.

CHAPTER FIVE

STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PLANNING BY SOUTH AFRICA'S RULERS.

In February, 1974, the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, envisaged a Southern African economic power bloc of sovereign, independent states, unlinked politically or constitutionally, in which every state could realise its own aspirations without being instructed by another on internal affairs. Mutual economic interdependence would bind these states together into a power bloc which would be a bulwark against communism. The ultimate aim of the communists was not Mozambique, Angola or Rhodesia, but rather it was South Africa, and control of the sea route in the event of a conventional war. For South Africa, Mr Vorster rejected any idea of federation, for all time: the solution was black independent states in South and Southern Africa. In a federation every person and state would sacrifice sovereignty: this would not occur in Mr Vorster's economic bloc of politically independent states.

It is in the light of his plans for an economic bloc that Mr Vorster's "move towards détente" in 1974/75 must be seen. To establish viable politically independent states in what he calls "Rhodesia" and "South West Africa" requires, in the longer term, an end to their constitutionally ambiguous positions. In attempting to resolve these ambiguities he is greatly aided by South Africa's economic dominance in the region.

In this spirit the South African government declares:

"...all options are open to the peoples of South West Africa in regard to their political and constitutional future. One of the options open to them is a unitary form of government. It is, however, a matter for them to decide among themselves, and in terms of its stated policy the South African Government will not interfere in the decision of the peoples, whatever that might be". (2).

The use of "peoples" in the plural is important. South
Africa hopes that an ethnically divided, consultative conference will make the decision for the territory's future. Mr Vorster made this clear in his famous Windhoek speech in May, 1975:

"...nothing will occur in the territory which is not in accordance with the free choice of its population groups. It is for them and nobody else to choose - and, as I have repeatedly said, 'all options are open to them'". (3). (emphasis added).

We examined in an earlier chapter the manner of election of what Mr Vorster calls the "true leaders" of those population groups. However, there was a far more important paragraph in his Windhoek speech, a paragraph which did not, perhaps, receive sufficient attention:

"Without wishing to anticipate the results of these consultations, I nevertheless want to put to you my firm conviction that the peoples of South West Africa will not be so short-sighted as to pursue a course which will disrupt the foundations of the economic system of the Territory, to the material detriment of all the population groups which have their homes there". (4).

Thus, even in his Windhoek speech, shortly before the meeting of the Security Council, Mr Vorster ingenuously discloses the great influence which the "foundations of the economic system of the territory" may have on the eventual choice between the "options". The economic foundations have been carefully built over a long period of time.

"Economic interdependence and political independence" of small states could fragment and control the people, not only of Namibia, but also of all of Southern Africa, as Mr Vorster's speech of February 1974 made clear. This speech, and the subsequent "move towards détente", is clearly rooted in Machiavelli's third groundrule for dominance, which was discussed in the previous Chapter.

The "move towards détente" has the support of most of the South African ruling groups. Mr Vorster and Mr Oppenheimer both see benefits, perhaps for different reasons, or perhaps to some extent for a similar reason: Machiavelli's third ground-rule.
Several authors make the easy generalisation that South African planning is monolithic. To separate the various planners and interest groups is very difficult when the real planning is not done publicly. There are, however, discernable different groups planning for Southern Africa, such as the National Party, or the large mining and industrial groups such as the Anglo-American Corporation, Limited. Each group has some power over South Africa's future. The groups do not always act in concert. Thus South African planners are not monolithic, although the State has the upper hand in many cases. I shall attempt to differentiate, where the information is available, but generally the sum of the plans is given.

Since the introduction in this century of conscious scientific State economic planning, debate has occurred about its effect on group and individual freedom. This debate is perhaps more important in the increasingly interdependent states of today than it was originally.

The inimitable Barbara Wooton wrote a simple, pragmatic book in 1944 called "Freedom under Planning". She set out her safeguards for freedom under the mild "socialist" economic planning which she advocated. For Wooton, the goal is that the resources of the State are a common possession, managed on behalf of all, for the benefit of all, by the representatives of all. Within this, the justification of planning is that "by conscious collective decision of economic priorities our frustrations are diminished and our freedom enlarged: we have more opportunity to do what we want to do". (page 23)

To achieve this, objectives that are for the benefit of all must be ascertained and continuously pursued by those who have the duty of making decisions for the benefit of all and on behalf of all. She suggests methods of ensuring that this occurs.

Passionate opposition to state planning came, in 1944, from F von Hayek, in his fascinating polemic called "The Road to Serfdom". He advocates free competition under a type of laissez-faire liberal state firmly controlled by the Rule of Law. Socialist and National Socialist planning, in his
view, led to serfdom; free individual competition and open markets were preferable.

At the other extreme were the Soviet economists, pre-eminent amongst whom was Preobrazhensky, writing somewhat earlier. To them freedom was a relative concept, linked with the freedom of the proletariat to achieve socialism in one or more countries. Freedom without planning was not freedom, for freedom without planning meant grinding poverty, and it meant wage slavery to a capitalist class. Poverty also meant the vulnerability of the proletarian revolution to intervention by foreign capitalist powers. Freedom thus required planning.

Today, most states have economic planning, be it central socialist planning or state and corporate planning in a "mixed" economy. World organisations make fumbling attempts at rudimentary planning. African states have plans, many of which fail, because African and "Third World" states are seldom permitted to control their own destinies. ("Political independence and economic dependence" operates at a world level, too). States form blocs to raise commodity prices like that of oil, while multi-nationals are accused of conspiring with State spies to bring down governments, as in the allegations of the ITT, the CIA, and Allendé in Chile. All these are a far cry from the economist safeguards for freedom envisaged by von Hayek, Wootton, or Preobrazhensky.

"Freedom" under South African planning is, however, even harder to find. The economy is planned and owned in large measure by the state or by the very large corporations. The economic system is overlaid by a net of "racial" or "ethnic" boundaries. Much legislation, such as the Physical Planning Act, dictates the location of industry or raises barriers to entry into markets. A large section of the labour force is oligopsonistically employed. The private sector teems with oligopolies. Marketing boards dominate agricultural production and marketing. A tiny minority of adults may vote for the central government. Para-statal corporations
have a large share of the economy, for example ISCOR, ARMSCOR, ESCOM, IDC, SWAWEK and the BIC. The state plans not only at a "macro-economic", but also at a "micro-economic" level. The state manipulates the labour market, and labour mobility is strictly controlled.

The Rule of Law, as von Hayek defined it, is now dead in South Africa, if it ever existed.

In addition, South Africa plans not only for herself and for her captive, Namibia, but also for other neighbouring states. The Chief of the Mines' Labour Organisation states bluntly that the industry's policy is "to encourage interdependence among the countries of Southern Africa". Mr Vorster envisages politically independent states, which nonetheless somehow form a "bulwark against communism".

Perhaps, when speaking of "freedom" under South African planning, SWAPO is not incorrect when it claims:

"South Africa is trying to keep Namibia by trying to let it go". (8).

In essence, South African planning would be anathema to von Hayek, to Wooton, or to Preobrazhensky, for it transgresses all three concepts of freedom, those of free-enterprise capitalism, or "mild" socialism, or of Marxist socialism.

One Pretoria authority has commented on South Africa's relations with its neighbours, as follows:

"Few people can seriously believe that sovereign independent states' international relations are determined by motives other than self-interest. The question is only whether this self-interest is enlightened or not". (9)

I shall treat below of whether South Africa's motives are enlightened self-interest, or plain self-interest. Regional development is agreed by many authorities to be generally good: interdependence is generally to be encouraged. However, in each case one must study who designs and controls the development, what the nature of the development is, and who
benefits by it. It is in these terms that South Africa's "enlightened self-interest" must be evaluated.

The major economic factors linking Southern African states include monetary, customs and tariffs agreements; water; power; labour; technological skill; direct investment; export credits; tourism; and trade in raw materials, finished goods or services. The political linkages range from common interest to open or covert manipulation. Military relations range from alliance to potential or actual conflict. In all these fields South Africa has significant power.

These inter-relationships are dynamic. The linkages change, as can be seen in the problem for Ian Smith in the finding of routes to the sea after the Spinola coup, the independence of Mozambique and the Zambian border closure. A detailed examination of Southern Africa would be untenably lengthy here: Grundy\textsuperscript{11} should be consulted, as well as Leistner\textsuperscript{12}, who gives a South African reply to critics.

Leistner suggests that South Africa's approach is "humdrum" and "highly pragmatic", having no "grand design for the economic future", and is "lacking in visionary schemes". Be that as it may, Defence Minister P.W. Botha emphasises the interaction and interdependence of South Africa's military, foreign and internal policies: he speaks of the need for "total strategy"\textsuperscript{13}.

One authority, J.E. Spence, takes this further. He writes:

"The structure of power in South Africa as it has been elaborated over the past two decades suggests in some respects the notion of a garrison-state, in which the civil and military instruments of coercion have been fused together to inhibit in advance any threat to its integrity.... Basically the (foreign) policy rests on the assumption that the territories of Southern Africa constitute a regional system which in economic terms is dominated by South Africa". \textsuperscript{(14)}

South Africa does have an integrated policy for Southern Africa.
Dr Verwoerd wanted a common market for the region, and Mr Vorster wants an economic bloc of politically independent states to stave off "communism". All the linkages cannot be examined here. I shall deal only with the water and power relationships.

South African planners envisage an economic interdependence resulting from water and power systems stretching from the Cape to Zaïre. They see South African skills as being a key factor in creating these systems. Mr Vorster sees this interdependence as a way to save the sub-continent from "communism", as he defines it.

The previous Chief Engineer, Planning, of the Department of Irrigation, Dr D.F. Kokot, argues that rivers bind South Africa to her neighbours, and that these rivers will play a very important role in the relationships between Southern African states. He lists possible and actual projects on the Zambesi, the Ovango, the Kunene, the Limpopo, the Komati, the Krokodil, the upper Orange, the Kwando, and other rivers, in which South Africa can play a part. He concludes:

"So is die Republiek en sy buurstate onderling ten nouste deur riviere en rivierstelsels verbind. Namate die vraag na water en elektriese krag toeneem, sal die band belangriker word. Daarom is dit van die opperste belang dat Suid Afrika aktief sal strewe na 'n gesonde en vriendskaplike verhouding met sy buurstate....". (16).

Dr Kokot first put this view forward many years ago, and for at least a quarter of a century South African planners have worked in terms of a sub-continental analysis. Dr Kokot, in a 1949 paper on hydro-electric possibilities, wrote:

"For the Union of South Africa alone,.....the possibilities are rather meagre. To relieve a somewhat gloomy picture, I have therefore included the rivers of our northern neighbours, namely the Cunene, the Okavango and the Zambezi". (17)

As another example, H.J. Quinton writes in the South African Mining and Engineering Journal:
"In December 1969 Dr H Olivier, Chairman of L.T.A., foresaw the emergence of an electricity common market grid to link the whole Southern African region..... It is not beyond the realms of possibility to visualise a Southern African common market for water". (18).

South Africa's leading water engineer, Professor Midgeley of the University of the Witwatersrand, writes:

"There is little doubt that throughout the Southern African sub-continent larger and larger quantities of water will have to be conveyed over greater distances". (19).

However, in another article, he shows that South Africa is not being entirely altruistic in assisting her neighbours' river developments:

"By the year 2000 the water needs of irrigation in South Africa will have risen from 265 cumec to 480 cumec. ("Cumec" = cubic metres per second). Urban and industrial needs will rise from 53 cumec to 530 cumec.... The total demand of 1 010 cumec exceeds the estimated safe yield from all sources". (20)

Midgeley recognised the fact that:

"....large water, and especially hydro-electric, schemes can only be economically beneficial if they are undertaken on a large scale and if their potential is utilised to the utmost". (21).

It became obvious in the nineteen-sixties, largely through the work of Dr H.J. van Eck of the Industrial Development Corporation, that

"The provision of cheap water and electricity is vital for the development of the countries of Southern Africa, but that large projects are only possible if markets can be found for water, and especially power, beyond the borders of those countries where the schemes are erected". (22).

With the growing demand for electricity in South Africa, and with the technological improvements being made in the transmission of power over long distances using high-voltage transmission lines, Dr van Eck saw that the Republic's capital and buying power could finance river development in many of her neighbouring states. They could not achieve this development
themselves. News/Check wrote of this:

"It implies a closely-knit Southern Africa, and it implies, too, a signal contribution by an outward-looking Republic to all the African countries clustered in the South. Malawi, Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia and Moçambique can all benefit by South Africa being used as a first-stage buyer of power that they for the moment cannot consume. Later the Republic will not need that power, and they will use it more and more as their own requirements expand. In this way all the lands of Southern Africa will help each other to advance and out of mutual development mutual friendship must grow". (24).

Professor Midgeley estimated that the power demand in South Africa is expected to increase eight times, requiring a total capacity of over sixty thousand megawatts. The bulk of this must come from thermal stations on the Transvaal coalfields: he predicts that these coalfields will feed the greatest concentration of power-stations of any kind to be found anywhere in the world. Coal will have to be supplemented not only by nuclear energy but also by hydro-electricity, from all over Southern Africa. He envisages a 15000 MW sub-continental grid, drawing power from Wankie coal-field thermal stations and from hydro-electric plants on rivers such as the Kunene, Okavango and Zambesi. Finally he considers the possibility of a link to the world giant: the Inga power plant on the Congo River, which could have a capacity in the region of 30 000 MW. (By comparison, the Aswan high dam on the Nile has a planned capacity of 2 200 MW.) The Afrika Instituut has estimated that the Congo River embodies one quarter of the world's water-power potential. If South Africa needs energy, this may be a source.

Thus, South Africa's buying power is seen by experts like Midgeley, and the I.D.C's van Eck, as the way to achieve their sub-continental water and power grid. Midgeley writes:

"(Because) the revenue to be derived from the sale of power to the Republic could, by the turn of the century, be R300 million per annum, it is hard to think of a better way for our neighbouring states to achieve economic take-off".
Ignoring the possible invalidity of the Rostowian concept of "economic take-off", which would take too much space to discuss fully, it should be noted that the sum of R300 million per annum in the year 2000 is not as large a figure as Midgeley implies. The Republic of South Africa is already spending over three times that amount each year on her military forces.

Midgeley in fact sees investment in sub-continental water and power infrastructures as being of great military or strategic value:

"Looked at from a narrow financial cost-benefit point of view, there may appear to be little more than aesthetic merit in making the desert bloom, but from strategic and socio-economic angles, the need to create modes of development in or near a desert may in fact be crucial, almost regardless of direct cost. Sometimes the indirect costs, for example, in the defence budget, of neglecting to develop a region, bear careful scrutiny". (28).

Accordingly, the South African ruling groups laid plans and entered into negotiations aimed at establishing sub-continental water and power networks. They did so for economic, political, and military reasons. The South African government, private enterprise, and Universities (English and Afrikaans-speaking alike) all enthusiastically worked towards the achievement of the dream of economic interdependence in Southern Africa.

These plans were made in the sixties: they are being carried out today. Dr Henry Olivier of the L.T.A., Limited, a major engineering company controlled by the Anglo-American Corporation of S.A., Limited, said in September 1974 that the Pan-African power transmission grid was slowly becoming a fact:

"Such a grid can be in existence within a decade and will make possible the beneficial use in thermal stations of the coal reserves lying fallow in countries like Swaziland, Botswana and Rhodesia. The Zambian, Rhodesian and South African grids have been completed. The Kunene scheme is proceeding and the transmission lines will come South and go North. Zaire has recently let a contract for a high-voltage transmission line from Inga on the Congo River to Tunga Fungurumo near the Zambian-Rhodesia border. This line is similar to the Cabora Bassa-Pretoria link. The Shire River project
(in Malawi) is barely 300Km from Cabora Bassa".
Dr Olivier stressed the irrigation potentials of these hydro-electric projects:

"By linking the resources of the wet North with those of the dry South, and I include capital resources, we could first make the entire region self-sufficient in food and basic items, and then proceed to become one of the biggest granaries or food-banks for the rest of the world.

The engineering, scientific, financial and managerial skills for the Pan-African grid are all available. It is a field in which South Africa, by virtue of her industrial and financial strength could and should make a major contribution if permitted". (29).

This is the crux. The Southern African sub-continent has great potential for development. Dr Olivier's plans could be executed in a way that fairly and equally distributed Africa's wealth to all its inhabitants, that did not divide her people along "racial" or ethnic barriers, that gave equality of education and opportunity, and that used labour-intensive methods when full employment was lacking. Alternatively, his plans could be executed to maintain the present system of large inequitable income-gaps, of exploitation, of unemployment, of starvation, and education for serfdom. The question is: who controls this Pan-African development, who controls the means of production and distribution?

South Africa's military build-up shows that South African ruling groups intend to control this development of South and Southern Africa. They may develop the region, but they will do so primarily for their own benefit, using direct rule, or using the subtle form of indirect rule known as Separate Development. Such is the nature of South African planning for Southern Africa: it foresees the creation of political "independence" and economic dependence, so as to perpetuate minority rule, no matter how indirect, and minority enjoyment of affluence.

It is in this context of South African strategic planning that
the Kunene scheme must be examined, in the context of the creation of separate, politically independent nations to serve South African interests. The water and power infrastructure of Southern Africa is very important to the twin apartheid goals, which are separation, and the accumulation of riches by the ruling groups. If the military situation allows the completion of the Kunene project, it could make a great contribution to apartheid in Namibia and in the sub-continent. We shall consider below whether the Kunene projects, if completed, might be used in the interests of all the people by some future democratic government.

In this chapter we have seen South African planning in the light of a debate on freedom under planning, and we have discussed the visionary Pan-African water and power schemes of the South African government and of the large mining-industrial groups. The schemes must be seen in the political context of Mr Vorster's expressed method of saving the region from what he terms "communism".

In the following chapters, the plan for the use of the Kunene's water will be discussed. The Minister of Water Affairs said of this plan in 1969:

"It might even be the most ambitious water scheme on the continent of Africa". (32).
NOTES: CHAPTER FIVE: STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PLANNING BY SOUTH AFRICA'S RULERS.

1. Cape Times, 5/2/1974
3. B.J. Vorster, 20/5/1975
4. ibid.
5. Anglo-American Corporation, Limited's Chairman's address, 1975: Cape Times, 15/5/1975
7. Cape Times, 5/2/1974
8. SWAPO of Namibia: Press statement, 17/1/1975
12. Leistner, 1972(a) and 1972 (b): passim
15. Leistner, 1972(b) : 42
17. Kokot, 1949 : 255
18. Quinton, 1970
19. Midgeley, 1969
20. Midgeley, 1970 : 261 forward
22. Smit, 1967 : 292
25. Midgeley, 1970 : 261 forward
26. Africa Institute, 1963 : 80
27. Midgeley, 1970
28. Midgeley, 1971
30. For an example of labour-intensive engineering, the three mile long, four hundred and six foot high Nagarjunarsagar Dam across the Kistna River in Andhra Pradesh, India, is being built of masonry, almost entirely by hand, employing some 30 000 workers. See, Norman Smith, 1971; and, Leonard Cantor, 1970 : 118 and Plate 13B
31. See Francis Wilson, 1972(a): 140ff, for a discussion of exploitation in South Africa.

CHAPTER SIX

THE KUNENE, THE CUVELAI, AND THE BORDER DISPUTE.

In 1886 the German Empire and the Kingdom of Portugal reached agreement about the border between their territories in South-Western Africa. The boundary would run from a certain point on the Kunene River along a parallel of latitude to the Okavango River. By 1896, the border was in dispute; by 1926 the South Africans and the Portuguese had reached a settlement. In 1974 the "Owambo Executive Council" announced that it was re-opening this border dispute, which had been settled for fifty years.

The present border runs from the Ruacana Falls on the Kunene across to the Okavango, thereby splitting the Cuvelai River basin in half. This chapter will examine aspects of the history, the geography, and the political economy of the two rivers, and of the border dispute.

Over one million years ago, the Kunene River probably drained into the Etosha Pan\(^1\). Today, a sandstone scarp\(^2\) separates the Cuvelai River, which drains southwards through Ovamboland to the Etosha Pan, from the Kunene, which has been captured, or "beheaded", and flows to the Atlantic Ocean. Map Sixteen shows the drainage system of the region.

The Kunene drains a basin whose catchment area measures 106 500 square kilometres, of which 14 100 square kilometres are in Namibia. The river is one thousand and fifty kilometres long, from its source on the Angolan Bihê Plateau, near the town of Nova Lisboa, to its mouth on the Atlantic Coast, some two hundred and thirty kilometres south of the port of Mossamedes. The river flows 550 kilometres southwards from Nova Lisboa, then turns and flows 150 kilometres south-westwards to the Kazambua rapids and the Ruacana Falls, where it swings westwards to form the international boundary for the
remainder of its course to the sea.3

The Kunene's source is on the great Angolan watershed, along which the Benguela railway is laid, and which is the source of several other major rivers, such as the Okavango, the Kwando, and the Zambesi. The Kunene obtains most of its water from this watershed, which receives a high rainfall, in excess of 1 500mm per annum. There are many rapids and falls in this initial stretch. On leaving the highland areas at Matunto, the river meanders sluggishly across the flat Kalahari sands of its middle reaches until it comes to the rapids and the Ruacana Falls, below Calueque. Thereafter it plunges rapidly to the sea through the harsh, broken Baynes Mountains and the sands of the well-named Skeleton Coast. Rainfall in these lower reaches is only a few millimetres per annum, and evaporation is high. The river is therefore exotic to Namibia, and receives very little water from the territory.

For many years it was believed that the Kunene overflowed its banks in the wet season, and thus watered Ovamboland. This was an understandable error, for the Cuvelai water channels are extraordinarily difficult to understand or map. Their courses change, and the gradients are very slight. Nitsche, presenting a dissertation on the region's geography to the University at Kiel in 1913, wrote about the first detailed maps of the area, as follows:

"When one looks at the three maps of Duparquet, Bernsmann and Roçadaz, one does not at first get the impression that they deal with one and the same area, that is, the floodplain of the Kunene and the Cuvelay Omurambas". (5).

Duparquet's work is reproduced as Maps Seventeen to Twenty; Charles Andersson's earlier map is reproduced as Map Twenty-One; a later map by the explorer of the Lower Kunene, Maudslay Baynes, published in 1923 and reproduced as Map Twenty-Two, still shows ignorance about the Cuvelai, although Baynes knew the Kunene well.
MAP SIXTEEN: REGIONAL DRAINAGE. (Stengel, 1963: 91)

DRAINAGE MAP OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND SOUTHERN ANGOLA
1:4,500,000
MAP EIGHTEEN: OVAMBOLAND (Duparquet, 1881, 1953).

Viagem do P. Duparquet, do Humbe às Amboelas

Viagem do Padre Duparquet, do Humbe às Amboelas
MAP NINETEEN: THE KWANYAMA AND THE OVAMBO.

(Duparquet, 1880, 1953)
CARTe DE LA CICMBÉBASIE
présentant les délimitations établies en cette contrée depuis sa soumission au protectorat de la Colonie du Cap.
d'après des renseignements officiels. 1878.
Echelle

Carte de Cimbebasia

MAP TWENTY: CIMBEBASIA. (Duparquet, 1878, 1953)
MAP TWENTY TWO:  SKETCH-MAPS OF THE KUNENE REGION.

(Baynes, 1923: 373)
Fig. 1. Portion of the Middle Kunene and Oshana Etaka, based on a survey by F. Hudson Spence. Heights in metres above sea-level, corrected by precise levelling carried out by the Surveyor General of South West Africa in 1937 and 1938. "M.Ch." 5 miles east of Ohshandja, refers to Mahola Chiamo.

MAP TWENTY-THREE: THE MIDDLE KUNENE.

(Wellington, 1938: 27)
MAP TWENTY FOUR: OVAMBOLAND.

(Eggers, 1969: 25)
Today, we have a clearer picture of the relationship between the Kunene and Cuvelai basins, which are separated by a sandstone scarp. Although the scarp is cut in several places, notable at Eriksson's Drift (Calueque) where the Kunene may have flowed to the South in ancient times before its "capture", it is not possible for water to flow unaided from the one river basin to the other. In the gaps in the scarp the gradients are in fact increasing with erosion over time. This is clearly illustrated by Map Twenty-Three.

The watershed in the oshana Etaka is marked "Critical Point". Obviously, Kunene water cannot reach the Etosha Pan unaided. The watershed can also be seen in Egger's map of Ovamboland (Map Twenty-Four), and in Heinrich Stengel's map of the Cuvelai basin (Map Twenty-Five).

Namibia has been blessed with some highly competent water-engineers, and Heinrich Stengel is among them. He has been bringing water to man, animal, and plant in Namibia for forty years, twenty seven of those as an employee of the Department of Water Affairs. Today's water engineers have more sophisticated tools than he had originally, but they are no less imaginative, as we shall see.

Stengel's map shows the Cuvelai basin lying between the Kunene Basin and the Okavango Basin. The rainfall of the Cuvelai Basin decreases sharply from North to South, from 1 300mm per annum in Angola to 400mm per annum in Ovamboland. The wet upper regions are a confusion of water courses, but the major river is the Cuvelai, with its tributaries, the Mui-Mui and the Caundo. The Cuvelai drains southwards through a maze of rivers and grassed watercourses, called oshanas. At Lake Ossouk (or Oponono) it is joined by the oshana Etaka, which drains western Ovamboland, and which lies on the old course of the Kunene in ages gone by.

The Cuvelai system annually floods the oshanas of Ovamboland in a welcome inundation called the Efundja, on which the Ovambo agricultural economy depends. In flood times, the oshana provides fish which are caught and dried for food through the year. The floods refill the water holes for
men and animals, and water the basic crops which are nutritious types of millet and sorghum. The oshana system is drained from Lake Oponono through the Ekuma into the Etosha Pan, a dry endoreic lake.

The problem, however, is that the Efundja is highly unreliable and can vary from very little water to heavy floods. Thirteen of the twenty years from 1941/42 to 1960/61 saw floods, but seven were dry. The Ovambo pastoralists depend on the Efundja, and, as the shaded areas of Map Twenty-Four show, most of the people live near the oshanas. Today, seventy percent of the population are estimated to live close to the main roads from Ondangua to Ruacana and Oshikango, shown on Map Twenty-Four.

The unreliability of the Efundja means repeated and destructive droughts. Two metres below the surface of most of Central Ovamboland lies a bitter brine underground lake: boreholes can therefore only be used to combat drought in the east and in a narrow belt in the west. For the remainder, the most populous area, there are only two solutions. Water must be conserved from the Efundja for use in dry periods, and water must be brought from the Kunene through the gap in the scarp. Map Twenty-Three, drawn in 1938, shows the scarp gap at Calueque (Eriksson's Drift) between Olushandja and Molola Chicola. To conserve the water of the Efundja, an ingenious system of storage dams and canals was devised by the Department of Water Affairs, and was very successful. However, this was by no means enough: the Kunene had to be utilised. From this necessity the border dispute had already arisen, early in the twentieth century, as we shall see below.

The history of the Kunene River, especially in the south, is very poorly recorded, and there is scope for a modern historian to piece together the Portuguese material, the reports of other travellers, and local tradition, based on the pioneering work by Heinrich Vedder. Lack of space precludes a detailed analysis here, but some points may be mentioned.
The name of the river derives from the Ovambo word "Okunene", meaning "the wide, or right, side" of the river. (That is, Southern Angola, as opposed to "Okaoko", meaning "the small, or left, arm", whence derives today's name "Kaokoveld".) The word "Okunene" would seem to have been misunderstood by an unknown Portuguese who, according to Vedder, named the river "Kunene". Another version is that the full name is Omulonga-Okunene, meaning "river-big", and that this was shortened by the Portuguese.

The earliest European information about the river and about Ovamboland comes from Andrew Battels, an Englishman taken prisoner in 1589 by the Portuguese in Brazil and brought to Angola, where he was captured by the cannibal Jagga tribe. He spent sixteen months with them in Southern Angola and in Ovamboland, escaped from them and from the Portuguese, and returned to England, where he wrote about his travels. The Portuguese called the area the "Kingdom of Mataman", but, despite their slave-trading operations in the region, had little knowledge about it until the nineteenth century. The Skeleton Coast, the fierce Jagga, and the Kwanyama warriors combined to prevent European penetration, but there are no doubt Americans today whose forebears were Ovambo people from Southern Angola.

In the centuries that followed, travellers sailing down the coast occasionally came across the river mouth. de l'Isle's map of 1720 shows a small nameless river flowing to the coast, whereas the "Cuneni" is an unconnected inland river running southwards and ending in the region which we today know as the Etosha Pan. This is the earliest recorded version that I have been able to find of the belief that Kunene water once flowed to the Etosha Pan.

In 1732 John Barbot published a vast 716 page tome describing the coasts of Africa. It mentions the "Cuneni" river of "Lower Ethiopia", where live the "Jagos", who "eat all the slain". In this region, too, may be found the land of AMBONDE, inhabited by AMBONDES.
A 1736 Latin map, by one Matthia Hasio, is perhaps for its time the most accurate that I have seen. It shows the "fl. Cuneni Magnus" running through "Cimbebasia" to the coast, while Etosha is unmarked.

The early Portuguese knowledge of the river is summarised in the 1854 reports on the overseas territories. Even at this date the question of the direction of the flow of the river was not entirely certain.

In 1785 a Portuguese official found a smooth, inscribed stone near what is today the port of Moçamedes. On this stone travellers, from 1645 to 1770, recorded their names, and among the inscriptions is the following statement:

"RIO CUNENE"
"The Captain Jose da Rosa Alcobaca passed here on his way to the Cunene, in the frigate Nossa Senhorah da Nazareth, on the 4th January 1765". (15).

In 1787 Colonel Pinheiro de Laverda reported:

"The Cunene is the largest river from Zaïre to the Cape. Its source is in Candumbo, near Caconda". (16)

The Governor of Benguela reported in 1799:

"The Cunene river has its source in the Huambo; it passes through Galangue, Caconda, Quilengues, and flows into the sea at Cabo Negro, where it causes a rough sea". (17).

Not having read the works in English of Battels or of Barbot, and thus ignorant of all this, a British ship "discovered" the river in 1824 and named it the "Nourse".

An English traveller, Morrell, wrote:

"The river Nourse, which was said to have been discovered in 1824 by L'Espiegl, was closed at the time we passed this part of the coast". (18)

The 1854 Portuguese reports continue:

"In 1824 the English warship Espiégle captained by Chapman discovered a river on the coast of Africa whose mouth was at 17°15' latitude S, and 11°48' longitude E of Greenwich: he called it the Nourse river". (19)
From 1850 onwards, European knowledge of the Kunene increased dramatically. Explorers and hunter-traders approaching from both North and South reached the fabled river. Hahn, Rath, Galton, Green, Smuts, Perreira, Ladislaus Magyar, Brochado, and, of course, Andersson all visited the region and described their travels. After several attempts, Andersson finally reached the river with Axel Eriksson in 1867, and, after writing his wife some exquisitely detailed accounts of the passions of tropical illness, Andersson died there on the 5th July 1867.

In 1854 Fernando da Costa Leal explored the mouth where Portuguese vessels had watered previously, but it was not until the present century that the vast, inhospitable lower reaches, from the Ruacana Falls to the sea, were explored by people from Europe. This was no easy task: Baynes, after whom the mountains were named, writes of his 1911 journey:

"... (it) began in a spirit of picnic and developed into a struggle for bare existence". (22)

The Kaokoveld was largely left alone, for only the Ovatjimba could cope adequately with its harshness. However, Christian missionaries found they could work in the more physically hospitable region to the east of the Kaokoveld. Bishop Gray of Cape Town wrote in 1860:

"There is a great field beyond this diocese in the West among the Ovambos untouched: I have long been anxious to found a mission there". (23)

Assorted types of Christianity were soon to be available in Ovamboland from a variety of preachers, speaking many languages. In time, a Kwanyama bible was produced. Christianity is a literate religion, and our knowledge of Ovamboland is enriched by the works of men such as Duparquet, who explored the region from 1878 to 1880. Unhappily, other Christian writing is not available to current researchers, for one important archive in Rome operates not a fifty but a one hundred-year rule. Despite this, our knowledge of the region's history is deepening: I have merely noted here some of those Europeans involved in opening it up to the world.
In the 'scramble for Africa', the region was parcellled out between the Germans and the Portuguese. A border was created which was to become one of Africa's silliest and least-observed boundaries, yet one that is highly unlikely to be changed.

The original partition seemed a clear and rational delineation between the two countries' respective de facto spheres of influence. There were few, if any, Germans to the north of it, and few, if any, Portuguese to the south of it. It was simple to describe, and only slightly less simple to measure out on the ground.

Article One of the Agreement between the Government of H.M. the German Emperor and the Government of H.M. the King of Portugal and the Algarves, signed on the 30th December 1886, read as follows:

"The boundary line which shall separate the Portuguese and German possessions in South West Africa follows the course of the River Kunene from its mouth to the waterfalls which are formed to the south of Humbe by the Kunene breaking through the Serra Cana. From this point the line runs along the parallel of latitude to the River Kubango". (Okavango) (26).

Within ten years two problems became obvious. The first was the Ovambo Kwanyama, whose land had been sliced in half by the foreigners. At that stage the Kwanyama were not overly worried, for they were not yet ruled by those foreigners, and they blithely ignored the boundary. However, the foreigners became worried as the economy of the region developed: who was entitled to recruit labourers from the Kwanyama? Virtually all secular and much religious writing on Ovamboland has stressed the area's primacy as a source of labour27. With the development of the Otavi copper mines, and later the diamond fields28, the demand for Ovambo labour increased dramatically, and Germans came into conflict with Portuguese over recruitment rights.

Labourers can walk across the border if necessary, but river dam sites cannot. When it was realised in 1896 that the Kunene was a highly important potential source of energy and
water, the Germans also realised that the boundary line excluded from their territory the best possible dam-sites: for example, at Eriksson's Drift. The boundary might also effectively prevent the Germans from using the Ruacana Falls to generate electricity. The result was that the boundary line was placed further to the North by the Germans, to include the labour supply and the power and water sources. The British noted more far-reaching desires on the part of the Germans:

"Knowing that the Germans placed the boundary line somewhat further to the North than the Portuguese placed it, the latter made repeated proposals for an amicable adjustment, but these overtures met with no response, as it suited the Germans to keep the question open until their plans for an administrative protectorate over Angola should ripen. Meanwhile, the Germans made free use of the Ovambo country, both within the disputed belt and in admittedly Portuguese territory, as recruiting ground for their copper and diamond mines at Tsumeb and Luderitz Bay". (29).

The Germans never achieved any of the far-reaching dreams they may have had for all of Angola. However, they did dispute the Southern border. They did this not only "for the sake of re-uniting the Kwanyama people" (which would mean more labour for the Germans), but also to gain control of the Kunene, to water Ovamboland and to generate power.

The earliest known plans for watering Ovamboland from the Kunene were made in 1896 by Brincker 30, who wished to persuade the Kunene to return to its old habits of flowing to the Etosha Pan. These plans were discussed in Cape newspapers in the same year 31, and were enthusiastically taken up Gessert 32 in 1897, who noted that the plans had also been proposed in several other journals. By 1904 Gessert had costed the whole proposal, and wished to link the Kunene to the Okavango Swamps via the Etosha Pan, thereby creating lakes which would dramatically change the climate for the better. He went so far as to envisage ships travelling in canals from the Etosha Pan to the Okavango. He passionately argued the economic viability of this scheme, claiming that the country
was slowly drying up, which was a problem far worse than that of the Herero uprisings at the time.

"With the Natives we can cope, but far worse will be the fight between whites around the drying water-holes". (33).

Gessert's schemes were impossible dreams, yet he had in essence a solution to the territory's water problems. Nitsche commented on them in 1913:

"Whether an improvement of the climate, amounting to a doubling of the rainfall would be observed, is very questionable. Just as we are so little able, despite numerous attempts, to influence the weather by means of high explosives, just so little can we make the splendid phenomena of the atmosphere dependent upon us". (34)

Even for his more practical schemes there were some prior problems: the Portuguese and the Kwanyama. Germany did not rule the required sites. Nitsche wrote:

"So long as the Germans are not the absolute master of ground and soil, extensive undertakings are unreal phantasies". (35).

They were to remain unreal phantasies for half a century, although many scientists continued to debate them. The Portuguese attempted to become master of the ground where Mandume ruled his Kwanyama people, in 1915. We saw in an earlier chapter how, after a great battle, Mandume fled across the border to the South Africans who killed him two years later.

By 1915 there were two borders: the German one, drawn on the line of latitude 17°17′10″S from Eriksson's Drift (now called Calueque); and the Portuguese one, drawn correctly, in accordance with the 1886 treaty, from the Ruacana Falls along latitude 17°23′10″S. Some maps showed an attempted compromise, drawing a diagonal line from the North-west to South-east across the disputed zone, thus giving the Germans access to the river. Colonel Pritchard, who had received Mandume's pleas for protection from the Portuguese, arranged a provisional boundary along 17°18′10″S latitude, and declared the whole disputed zone to be neutral. Mandume was ordered to stay to the South, although his people straddled the border.
It was Mandume's persistent attempt to rule all his people on either side of the border which eventually provoked the South Africans to "dispose of him" (as they put it) in 1917. Mandume's kraal from 1915 to 1917 is marked on Map Twenty-Six, which clearly shows the neutral zone, and the provisional boundary running through Namakunde.

Map Twenty-Six also highlights the results of an important translation error. The German boundary is shown to run from the confluence of the Kunene and a tributary, called the Serra Lana River. The German version of the 1886 treaty had read:

"Die Grenzlinie...folgt dem Laufe des Kuneneflusses von seiner Mündung bis zu denjenigen Wasserfallen, welche südlich von Humbe beim Durchbruch des Kunene durch die Serra Canna gebildet werden". (38).

The South Africans, discovering this in the Record Office in Windhoek, translated it as follows:

"The boundary....shall run from the mouth of the River Kunene up to the waterfalls of the Kunene which, south of Humbe, are formed by the junction of the Serra Lana river with the Kunene river". (39).

The "Serra Cana" is, of course, not a river, but a mountain formation, through which the Kunene breaks at the Ruacana falls. However, the South Africans found a river, further upstream near Eriksson's Drift (Calueque) which they thought might be the "Serra Lana" river, shown on Map Twenty-Six. At this point, there were small falls, known as the Kozumbue cataracts, which, the South Africans thought, might be the falls referred to in the 1886 treaty.
According to Portuguese claims this ground is theirs, which if admitted would be unavailable for necessary water developments, pipelines, etc.

Lat. 17° 23.10" (approx)


(Pretoria Archives, EM 99 File 36/1)
Thus, for a crucial time the South African officials in the field believed themselves fully justified by the 1886 treaty in claiming the more northerly boundary. They were certainly very aware, at the same time, of the Kunene's enormous potential, as one can see from Map Twenty-Seven, which reached the Prime Minister's desk in 1916. The need for ground above the Ruacana Falls on which to build waterworks is clearly recognised.

For twelve years after the 1915 South African conquest, a combination of bewildering diplomatic confusion between South Africa, Great Britain and Portugal, together with deliberate South African delaying action, prevented settlement of the dispute. By 1926 a settlement had been reached, in such a way that the border was correctly fixed in terms of the 1886 treaty, but the South Africans had gained certain rights to build inside Angola. The South Africans achieved these rights by the sheer dishonest chutzpah of their demands, a fact which the private letters of those involved readily conceded.

In 1917 the Portuguese put forward a memorandum asking that it be agreed that the boundary run from the cataract to which the 1886 treaty obviously refers, the magnificent drop at Ruacana. The South Africans at first suggested that the matter could only be dealt with at the end of the war, but when they were pressed by Portugal, and asked by the British Imperial Government to accept Ruacana, as the starting point, the South Africans sought clarity from their Administrator in Windhoek. He wrote:

"The fact that the boundary-line by intersecting certain tribal areas might cause difficulties with the Natives was, as the correspondence will show, for long recognised; but it would seem that eventually the value of the falls for future electric-power and irrigation schemes became the dominant factor in the respective claims.... The Ovakuanyama south of Namakunde are now, since Mandume's death, living very quietly and giving no trouble". (42).

Accordingly Balfour replied to the Portuguese, having

"....the honour to state that His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the line claimed by the Portuguese Government, provided
that the Portuguese Government will grant to the Government of the Union of South Africa the right to draw from the River Cunene, by the construction of works at the great rapids, as much water as may be required for irrigation and electric power". (43).

Thus the South Africans would give Portugal what was rightfully hers, only if Portugal would allow the South Africans to use as much water as they required, from Portuguese territory! The Portuguese, realising that this foolish boundary might otherwise completely prevent the use of the Ruacana Falls by either side, replied that they had nothing in principle against the drawing of water, provided only that a suitable amount of water and electric power be allocated to Angola44. At this point the South Africans delayed further.

Their officials in Windhoek realised that an error had been made concerning the "Serra Lana River", and that, in fact, it was the "mountains of Canna" that were referred to in the 1886 treaty45. The Windhoek officials had also become aware of the plans put forward by Professor Schwartz of Rhodes University College for utilising the Kunene. The Administrator wrote asking that the area be surveyed to examine the scheme's viability46. He received the reply that the Government was not anxious to unduly press (sic) this matter, so the papers could go forward in the ordinary way, and the visit to Ovambo-land could well be put forward until after the rains47.

These delaying tactics were continued in 1919: the Portuguese suggested a joint commission into the matter, and the Imperial government refused to consider the suggestion until the Portuguese replied to them on the Swaziland/Mozambique border question48. Two boundary commissions were then proposed, but Smuts still felt he needed more information about the river before a commission sat:

"This question, therefore, must be hung up until we have had the opportunity of investigating the position on the Kunene River so as to be quite clear what attitude the Union Government should take up on the matter. I would be glad therefore if the matter could be allowed to stand over indefinitely". (49)
Under further pressure, the South Africans appointed a three-man team, led by F.E. Kanthack, to form a boundary commission with the Portuguese team, led by Colonel R. Machado. The Commission met at Ruacana in June 1920, where Kanthack drove a very hard bargain. In passing, his report to Smuts contains a telling comment on indirect rule, and a clear support for Machiavelli's third way of keeping a state friendly to a conqueror. Kanthack wrote:

"The personality of the two solitary officials, Major Manning and Lieutenant Hahn, is sufficient to maintain peace, order and goodwill throughout Ovamboland. The Portuguese to the North are unable to do the same with chains of military posts, and a considerable garrison of European soldiers and Askaris. The Germans considered it best to keep out of the country". (50).

Kanthack realised that for the irrigation of Ovamboland, Ruacana was useless. He wrote to Smuts:

"It is no wonder that the Portuguese are quite ready to our having power and water rights at Ruacana. From a practical point of view our interests in the water of the Kunene are concentrated in the long flat reach from the Kavalo rapids near Eriksson's drift up to Humbe and beyond... there must obviously be some limit to our claims, and it was felt that in claiming to extend our control so far to the North as Humbe, we were pushing matters to the extreme possible limit. It is moreover believed that by artificial means all that is desired can be attained by control of the river below Humbe". (51).

The boundary commission therefore considered three questions, on only two of which had the Portuguese commissioners been given powers. The first was the question of the starting point of the boundary-line; the second, that of the division of the water at Ruacana for hydro-electricity; the third was the question of watering Ovamboland from any point as far north as Humbe.

The boundary was provisionally agreed to run from the centre of the lip of the Great Cataract at Ruacana, and a beacon was established on the eastern side, (marked in Kanthack's handwriting on Map Twenty-Eight). Each country was to have one half of the river to use for hydro-electric purposes at Ruacana,
and a detailed set of rules was established concerning the building of a weir, not more than three kilometres into Portuguese territory, for the use of both parties.\(^52\)

On the third question, where the Portuguese commissioners had no instructions, they merely noted Kanthack's demands that the "South West Africa Protectorate" should be given the right to one-half of the water of the Kunene as far north as Humbe for irrigation and power purposes, and should also have extensive rights to dam the river and divert water into Ovamboland. Kanthack affirmed in the provisional agreement that ratification of any part of the agreement depended on ratification of the agreement as a whole.

This naturally incensed the Portuguese: their rights to recognition of what was patently the correct boundary were being made to depend on the cession to their Southern neighbours of extensive rights to use the Kunene far into Portuguese territory. An official of the Portuguese Legation in London, as the Foreign Office reported, put it as follows:

"When the Commission got to work, the Portuguese were dismayed to find that in return for the recognition of the frontier line, which was merely a Portuguese legal right, the British (South African) commissioners demanded that the Portuguese should concede to them the right to half the water in the Kunene river from a point many miles further north than the cataract specified in the treaty, together with the right to make canals from the river through the admittedly Portuguese territory into British territory.... The result would be twofold: (1) to hand over to the Union Government a tract of territory admittedly Portuguese (2) to drain this Portuguese territory of Natives who would pass over the frontier into the henceforth well-irrigated British territory".\(^54\)

He added that:

"...the South African authorities were even now recruiting natives in the so-called 'neutral zone' to the annoyance of the Portuguese Government". (55)

The Portuguese Commissioner, Colonel Machado, wrote bitterly in similar vein in a Lisbon newspaper about the boundary commission, concluding on the same note:
"...our southern neighbours of the mines have succeeded in deviating to the South the Cuanhama people with presents, with insinuations of no taxes to pay, and telling them that they are slaves with us!" (56).

Accordingly, the Portuguese accepted the first two parts of the provisional agreement, but not the third. Kanthack remarked on this in a frank private letter to Smuts's secretary:

"I am scarcely surprised that the Portuguese Government have raised some objection. My motives for making these somewhat sweeping demands, involving considerable infringement of Portuguese territory and jurisdiction, will, no doubt, be remembered and appreciated by General Smuts. I hardly expected these demands to be conceded in full". (57).

Kanthack's demands were thus an initial posture. In the event, these exorbitant demands resulted in a compromise which was very much in South Africa's favour.

The Portuguese, from writings such as those of Professor Schwartz and August Karlson, realised that the Kunene was a very valuable asset. Further, the demands by the South Africans hurt something else very dear to them: national pride. Ernest Oppenheimer became involved, and wrote about this aspect as follows:

"When visiting Angola in order to enquire into its business potentialities, one must keep on reminding oneself that one is in a Portuguese colony and that the Portuguese there will continually talk about 'A Portugal in Africa', and the 'Portuguese will make their homes there' - in short, nationality is the Alpha and Omega of every conversation with Portuguese Officials. But subconsciously they know they cannot do it, and this makes them all the more anxious to do it by word of mouth. It also makes them unduly sensitive to anything the foreigner may say or do.

This national movement is particularly championed by His Excellency the High Commissioner, and it finds its outlet in Decrees and Ordinances. Once these are printed the national spirit is 90% appeased, and if the foreigner makes even a semblance of complying with them, the decrees themselves remain dormant. They only become alive if one points out deliberately that they are unworkable, or against international law, etc."
Then, as they know they cannot enforce anything against powerful influences they become snappy and make minor difficulties, with the result that they interfere with the work of exploitation.

The High Commissioner is an exceptionally clever man; an autocrat and a great patriot. He believes he can make a great country of Angola, and so he would if his citizens were not Portuguese. He has no wish to settle in Portugal for the time being. The political position there is too unstable for him; he is so keen on Angola that I believe if Bolshevism got the upper hand in Portugal he would not hesitate to break away from the Mother Country and make an independent republic". (58).

Words that might have been written fifty years later!
Oppenheimer discussed the border dispute with the High Commissioner, and sent the following summary to Smuts:

"His Excellency affirmed that there was, in his opinion, no objection to water being taken from the Cunene, but he was opposed to a foreign power acquiring sovereign rights in his territory. He was quite prepared to give to a Company half Portuguese and half South African a concession to build such a dam and to construct a canal for irrigation purposes,... I do not know whether His Excellency's suggestions offer any chance of a compromise, but my impression is that he is so anxious for a settlement that such a Company could get considerable land concessions from the Angola Government". (59).

The eventual compromise was not far removed from this suggestion. To cope with "national sentiment" the Portuguese again asked in 1923 that Parts One and Two of the draft agreement be ratified, whereafter it would be easy to reach amicable agreement on a compromise concerning water rights. However, this was transmitted by the Governor-General to the Union Government "for information only", and neither Smuts, nor Hertzog following him, saw any need of reply.

In 1923 a Portuguese delegate who was to see Smuts in England about the dispute was indisposed in Lisbon for three weeks, thus missing Smuts. The South Africans continued to delay in 1924, taking advantage of the Portuguese Government's instability.
"The Secretary considers that the question should be re-opened by the Portuguese, and that no action should be taken by the Government on behalf of SWA, as the Governor-General's minute of 22/10/1923 was sent only for information and not for reply". (62)

"The new Portuguese Government, after settling their internal difficulties, will probably open the question at a later date". (63)

Even under pressure from both the "Advisory Council of SWA" and the Permanent Mandates Commission, South Africa was in no hurry to reach a settlement. By February 1925, the South Africans had decided to re-open negotiations. However, their offer was not sent via London this time, but direct to the Angolan High Commissioner, who forwarded it to Lisbon, where it was merely acknowledged without any further action, because:

"...Hitherto negotiations had taken place through the British Foreign Office, and the Portuguese Government were not unnaturally a little suspicious at being engaged in a triangular correspondence". (66)

After the matter had been aired again at the Permanent Mandates Commission and in the South African press, the two sides finally agreed to meet to settle the matter in 1926. In essence Parts One and Two of the 1920 provisional agreement were ratified, and a form of compromise was reached whereby Portugal and South Africa could build in Angola at Erikssen's Drift (Calueque), to provide water for the Ovambo people. A mixed technical commission sat the following year to examine the possibility of this diversion of the river, but met with little success for the Portuguese would not consider the building of a dam more than 4 metres high. The question of using the Kunene's water was left alone for the next thirty-five years, and will be examined in the next chapter.

Thus, the boundary came to be fixed, running from:

"A point at the Ruacana falls above the crest or lip, where the middle (of the river) intersects the parallel of latitude 17°23'23.73" South, thence eastwards along the said parallel of latitude" (69)...to the Okavango River.

This boundary, as we have seen, divides in half the Cuvelai River basin and its peoples, the Kwanyama. The Kwanyama
were never involved in the decision, and to this day they accord the border a healthy disrespect.

However, in due course a dam came to be built at Erikssen's Drift (Calueque), and with Portugal's diminishing control in Angola, the prospect of an independent Angolan Government meant that the dam was very vulnerably exposed from South Africa's viewpoint. At the same time the Kwanyama were still a source of labour for the South. Further, at a time when the ruling groups were attempting to foster "tribal" loyalties against the growing loyalty to "one Namibia", this division of the Kwanyama tribe must have seemed more vexing than it had been before.

Thus it was that Chief Elifas of the "Owambo Executive Council" came to reopen the border dispute fifty years after it had been settled. He announced this while announcing the second "Owambo" elections. Some may have considered it a useful election ploy to persuade the Kwanyama to vote. After the "successful" election, which was discussed in a previous chapter, Chief Elifas announced that he would immediately enter into negotiations with the Angolan authorities.

Whether the Chief will be successful in "re-uniting the Kwanyama", who had been so callously split by the European powers, is open to question. The dispute took at least twelve years to solve, fifty years ago, and the diplomatic correspondence might now involve not merely three, but six or more parties. The issues are not markedly different, although Chief Elifas does not mention them all. Labour, energy and water are still at stake, in addition to the "unity of the Kwanyama people".

However, perhaps the best comment on the "new" border dispute was made by a Windhoek journalist:

"The Namib desert will turn into a rose-garden, before Angola parts with its Southern Province". (72).
NOTES: CHAPTER SIX: THE KUNENE, THE CUVELAI, AND THE BORDER DISPUTE.

1. Regarding the ancient course of the Kunene, see Barnard, 1966: 90; Kanthack, 1921: 327-328; and, Wellington, 1938: 29.

2. For a discussion of the sandstone scarp, see Wellington, 1938: 28.


4. Many authors believed in the Kunene's overflow to the Etosha Pan. See, for example, Schmidt, 1922: 9; Gessert, 1897(b): 298; Frey and Ansley Watts, 1924: 65.


9. ibid: 133.

10. Letter, Major Manning to Administrator, Windhoek, 30/3/1923.


13. ibid: 515.


15. ibid: 130.

16. ibid: 130.

17. ibid: 130.


20. For the explorations, see Vedder, 1938; Andersson, 1856, 1967; Andersson, 1861; Andersson 1875, 1969; Galton, 1853, 1891; Magyar, 1859; Portugal, 1854: 131.


27. For example, Stals, 1967: 234 concludes his dissertation as follows: "Dit is duidelik dat die aanraking tussen blankes en Ovambos uiteindelik saamgetrek is in die een saak, naamlik, die arbeidskwessie".
30. Brinker, 1896 : 80
31. I am grateful to Keith Gottschalk for informing me of this, from his work in the Windhoek Archives. The actual discussion in Cape newspapers could not be traced in the South African Library.
32. Gessert, 1897a and 1897b
33. Gessert, 1904, and Afrika Post, 1904.
35. ibid : 142
36. Report, 20/3/1916, Major Manning, Ovamboland, to Secretary, Windhoek. The following discussion is based on the voluminous documentation in EM 99, File 36/1, Vols 1-6, Pretoria Archives.
38. H. von Bismarck to Dr Goering, 26/1/1887. EM 99 File 36/1.
39. UG 38/1915 : 10, paragraph 67. The erroneous translation is also in EM99 File 36/1
40. Kanthack to Smuts's secretary, E.M. Lane, 18/1/1923.
41. Walter Long to Governor General, 11/10/1917, enclosing copy of Portuguese Memorandum
42. Administrator, Windhoek, to Secretary for Defence, Cape Town, 31/1/1918
43. Balfour to Vasconcellos, 2/4/1918.
44. Portuguese Government to His Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 22/4/1918.
45. Administrator, Windhoek, to Secretary for Defence, Cape Town, 31/1/1918
46. Administrator, Windhoek, to Secretary for Defence, Cape Town, 2/9/1918
47. Secretary for Defence to Administrator, Windhoek, 5/9/1918.
49. Smuts to Lord Buxton, Governor General, 13/10/1919.
50. F.E. Kanthack to Smuts, 26/7/1920.
51. ibid.
53. ibid : 9
54. Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, 14/12/1921.
55. ibid.
56. R. Machado, "The Cunene Neutral Zone", Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, 12/10/1921. (Translation in EM 99 File 36/1)
57. Portuguese Government to Lord Curzon, 14/10/1922
57a F.E. Kanthack to Smuts's Secretary, E.M. Lane, 18/1/1923
58. Ernest Oppenheimer in confidence to Louis Oppenheimer, 20/7/1923: a copy was sent to Smuts.
59. Ernest Oppenheimer to Smuts, 20/7/1923
60. Teixeira-Gomes to Curzon, 12/9/1923
61. Ministers' Minute no 120, signed J.B.M. Hertzog, 13/2/1925.
62. Prime Minister's Secretary to Registry, 22/9/1924
63. Prime Minister's Secretary to Secretary for SWA, Windhoek, 24/9/1924
64. "Advisory Council of SWA" resolution dated 9/12/1924.
65. Ministers' Minute to Governor General, no 120, 13/2/1925
66. Law Advisers' Memorandum, 29/9/1925
67. The correspondence concerning the final agreement of 1926 is at present unavailable under the 50 year rule.
68. "W.M." Neue Zücher Zeitung, 12/10/1969
69. SWA Official Gazette, 1/2/1973
70. Radio South Africa, 9.00p.m. News, 1/10/1974
71. Cape Times, 20/1/1975: "Ovamboland Prepares for Self-Government"
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE WATER PLANS.

"The Ovambo make a great fuss about water. If I wanted any to drink I had to buy it with beads".
C.J. Andersson, 1867.

In arid regions water is the most crucial factor in determining man's progress. Industrial development cannot occur without it. As we have seen, since the last century man has dreamt of using the Kunene River to water the arid lands to the south of it. Early plans were devised by Germans in 1896-1904, but these were fruitless. A South African/Portuguese joint economic commission reached stalemate in 1927 over less ambitious plans than those of the Germans. The Ovambo people continued to scratch for water, and development further South was limited by the availability of water for several decades more. Yet by the 1970's water was flowing from Calueque into Ovamboland. This chapter will examine the water plans and their implementation.

By 1962 political and military factors were combining with increased economic demands, to bring the Portuguese and South Africans back to the negotiating table. The 1961 Angolan uprisings, and the subsequent war, together with the possibility of war in Mozambique, meant that the Portuguese wished to develop the Overseas Provinces, (in accordance perhaps with the strategy of economic reform described by Baechler in Chapter Three above). Mineral developments meant the Angolan "boom". South Africa was under increasing United Nations pressure. Ovamboland needed water. Mining, and other development in Namibia generally, meant an increased demand for water. Dr Verwoerd's policy of Separate Development implied development, which required water. Power was needed to pump this water. Mines throughout the region also needed power. The Kunene was the obvious source of Water and Power. Talks began in March 1962, and initial surveys were carried out.
In 1963 the blueprint for Separate Development in the territory, the Odendaal Commission Report\textsuperscript{2}, recommended a hydro-electric scheme for the Kunene. The territory needed water and industrial development could only occur "if cheap power were available". "The Commission sees the generation of electricity on the Kunene as the most important contribution which the State could make towards the further development of South West Africa"\textsuperscript{3}.

One authority commented upon this report and said that:

"The supply of water is probably essential for the success of the homelands". (4).

In 1964 a preliminary treaty was signed\textsuperscript{5}. This treaty envisaged collaboration between the two countries on rivers of mutual interest. It set out an initial agreement to exchange data, to consult each other, and to undertake joint study of plans, methods and financing. South Africa was to submit a plan for a diversion of the Kunene to Ovamboland. Portugal wanted a larger power plant to be erected at their existing dam at Matala, which could sell power to Namibia, but this was earmarked for further discussion. A hydro-electric scheme for the Kunene was agreed to in principle.

A previous manager of the South West Africa Water and Electricity Corporation (Pty) Limited has described the formation in the next year, 1965, of SWAWEK:

"By a White Paper in 1965, the South African Government accepted practically all the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission.....and in particular agreed to the Industrial Development Corporation undertaking the financing of a private company formed in South West Africa under the title SWAWEK, with the object of turning to account...the very considerable potential of the Kunene river". (6).

The negotiations with the Portuguese were protracted. Final agreement was not reached until South Africa refused to agree to its part in the Cabora Bassa scheme, which Portugal badly needed, unless the Kunene scheme were agreed to as well\textsuperscript{7}. The final negotiation took place in October 1968, and on the
21st January, 1969, a Treaty concerning the first phase of the Kunene schemes was signed. On the 19th September, 1969, the Cabora Bassa treaty was signed. The notable difference between the two treaties is the absence in the Kunene Treaty of escape clauses in the event of "Force Majeure", which is widely defined in the Cabora Bassa Treaty to include strikes, wars, explosions, floods and blockades. Evidently the parties did not foresee a major threat for Kunene, as they did for Cabora Bassa.

Before power can be generated, a river's flow must be regulated, especially when the annual variation is great, as with the Kunene. The 1969 agreement aimed to regulate the river by a large dam at Gové, high in the upper reaches and from where most of the river's water came. The power plant at Matala could then be improved, although South Africa did not agree to buy power from Matala as the Portuguese had hoped originally. Water would be supplied for initial irrigation projects, for men, and for animals, in the middle reaches of the Kunene in Angola. A smaller dam at Calueque would give further control of the river immediately above the Ruacana, and would also allow up to six cumecs of water to be pumped across to Namibia to provide for:

"...the supply of water for human and animal requirements in South West Africa and for initial irrigation in Ovamboland". (11).

Thus, what had been in 1926 a recognition of the water rights of the Ovambo people south of the border, was in 1969 converted into an agreement to supply water to all of Namibia.

Finally, the Treaty envisaged a power station at the Ruacana Falls, fed through pressure tunnels from a diversion weir above the falls. The falls are 120 metres high, but the head of water from the diversion weir is 134 metres.

The financial and property rights agreed to in the Treaty took on increasing importance after the Lisbon coup and the
Angolan fighting. South Africa paid entirely for the Gové dam, one half as a loan and one half as a grant, the amount being of the order of eight million Rand. The loan is to be repaid over twenty years at an interest rate of 5% per annum on the outstanding balance: that is, the loan is a "soft" one. In exchange for the financing of the dam, which was to be the property of the Portuguese Government, Portugal agreed not to use more than 50% of the regulated flow of the river.

The smaller dam at Calueque was to be paid for entirely by South Africa, who also paid the Portuguese Government R220 000 as compensation for the flooded land. No mention is made in the treaty of compensation to be paid to the local inhabitants if any. South Africa agreed to credit Portugal with a royalty of one half of the flow used for power at Ruacana, at a royalty rate of 11c per kilowatt hour initially, calculated to pay off the loan from South Africa to Portugal over 20 years. Once the loan has been paid off, the royalty rate was agreed to be R0,05 per kilowatt hour on the energy generated by half the flow at Ruacana. In short, Portugal, in exchange for the Gové dam and the immovable parts of the Calueque dam, purported to mortgage Angola's water for the next twenty years, and thereafter to accept the very low royalty of 5c per kilowatt hour.

The Calueque dam has a complicated system of controls. It is remotely controlled by the South Africans at Ruacana, who can adjust both the release of water to Ruacana and the amount pumped to Namibia. However, a duplicate control panel is installed at Calueque so that a failure in the remote control system can be remedied, and so that a Portuguese Operating Authority could override the South Africans if they operated the dam in conflict with the agreement. In terms of the 1969 Treaty the South Africans may appeal to the "Governado-Geral de Angola" in the event of a dispute; the Operating Authority may not interfere with the setting without instructions from the "Governado-Geral". As an uncontrolled, or spurring, dam could play havoc with the generation of power, it is small wonder that the "Owambo Government" announced on the 1st October 1974 that it
wished to regain the territory previously occupied by the Kwanyama Ovambo tribe. That territory is presumably drawn to include the Calueque dam, so essential to South Africa's power and water plans for Namibia. The boundary dispute "settled" in 1926 is not yet over, as we saw in the previous chapter.

To summarise the 1969 Treaty, illustrated by Map Twenty-Nine: a large dam fifty-eight metres high was to be built at Gové to regulate the flow; a small dam was to be built at Calueque to enable water to be pumped to Namibia, and further to regulate the flow; a diversion weir and power station were to be built at Ruacana. South Africa was to pay for all these, one half of the Gové costs being a loan repayable over twenty years from the royalty on the Angolan share of the water at Ruacana. Portugal could use the regulated water above Calueque for energy generation, especially at Matala, and for other purposes, provided she did not abstract more than 50% of the flow. Chapter Nine discusses the Portuguese plans for Angola.

The treaty was not between Angolan and Namibian or Ovambo people. Whether a future Angolan government will uphold the treaty remains to be seen, as does the question whether a future Angolan government will negotiate with the unlawful occupiers of Namibia. Angola has received two free dams and a regulated river, which is of great use, as will be seen in Chapter Eight. In exchange she has flooded areas of the river basin, and has mortgaged her water for twenty years, whereafter she may sell energy at a low rate, if the 1969 Treaty applies. She has the potential strategic weapon of an uncontrolled or irregular river in her hands, although I do not have sufficient information to judge the effectiveness of this weapon.

The South Africans may have made a crucial mistake in refusing power from Matala, for there is, under the 1969 Treaty, no ongoing payment to Angola for the next twenty years. A future government of Angola would not have the economic incentive to
negotiate that existed in the case of Cabo Rojo, unless the rulers of Namibia were prepared to re-negotiate the matter, offering some current economic incentive other than royalties offset against loan repayments. However, more recent reports indicate that the royalty, which amounts to some R800 000 per annum, will be paid to Angola itself, notwithstanding the 1969 Treaty, and that other arrangements will be made to pay off the debt to Portugal. If these reports are correct, then the point remains that Angola may be able to bargain for a higher royalty, or use her control of the river as part of a composite strategy to bring about change in Namibia.

Table Eight gives the capacities of the Mata, Gove and Calueque dams, by comparison with the large dams of the Orange River Development Project.

**TABLE EIGHT**

**COMPARATIVE STORAGE CAPACITY OF DAMS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAM</th>
<th>GROSS STORAGE IN MILLION CUBIC METRES.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gove</td>
<td>2 574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matala</td>
<td>60?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calueque</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hendrik Verwoerd</td>
<td>5 958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.K. Le Roux</td>
<td>3 185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the 1969 Treaty departs materially from the suggestions of the Odendaal Report. As the schemes have developed, modifications are continually being made: care must therefore be exercised to deal with the current situation at any given moment.

The first phase of the scheme outlined in the Treaty is nearly complete. The crucial dam, at Gove, was completed by a Portuguese consortium in 1972 and its gates were first closed in March 1973.
"The Calueque pump system was commissioned on 21st August, 1972 and water from the Kunene River reached Oshikati on 1st September 1973. A total of 8 053 800 cubic metres of water has already been pumped". (19)

In 1970 an emergency pipeline of 157Km was laid from Calueque to Oshikati in Ovamboland, consisting of two pipes capable of delivering 1 cumec each, to cope with the drought. With the commissioning of the full pump station at Calueque, using the Ovamboland canals, this pipeline is no longer needed, and is being taken up20.

Work on the Calueque dam itself is continuing and is nearing completion. Draft tender documents were submitted to the Portuguese Authorities in 1972 for approval. The dam consists of a central concrete structure and long earth embankments21. The Pretoria water engineering firm, Hydroconsults (Pty) Limited, advertised for engineers to administer this contract in July 197422. The contractors for this dam may by agreement only be South African or Portuguese firms. This qualification does not apply, it would seem, to the Ruacana power project. The contractors will be detailed in the next chapter. Work on the Ruacana weir and power plant is proceeding. A small plant was installed to power the Calueque pumping station. The full installation is due for completion by July 1977, although SWAWEK are attempting to achieve completion by May 197723. By March 1973 the Department of Water Affairs had spent some R4½ million on behalf of SWAWEK on the Kunene project24.

Having moved the water across the sandstone scarp into Namibia, where does it go? Presently it is used only in Ovamboland, and less than 3 cumecs of the 6 cumecs envisaged in the Treaty is pumped across25. The water is pumped to Oshikati by means of the Owambo canal, where it is purified, and then piped for domestic use to towns such as Ondangua and Onguediva. A pipeline is planned to supply the border post of Oshikango. The canal system is not yet complete: the Etaka canal is being reinforced. (The canals can be seen on Map Twenty-Four).
Apart from domestic water in the towns, some water is used for rural, human and animal consumption. Research farms have had good results from irrigation, but only using a highly sophisticated fertiliser system, ill-suited to the needs of the Ovambo farmer. To judge by reports on the research station and agricultural college, given by Ovambo contract workers in Windhoek, irrigated farming is unlikely to be widespread in Ovamboland for some time, for strong complaints were lodged about the conditions and teaching methods. The Ovambo Master Water Plan of 1968 has had to be modified in the light of new knowledge on Ovamboland soils for irrigated farming.

South African colonial attitudes may be preventing large scale irrigated farming in Ovamboland at present, but South African planners voice an awareness of the need for successful irrigation, in view of the increasing population.

"It has been estimated that in order to satisfy the food requirements of the population at a level commensurate with standard of living likely to be attained at the end of the century, it will be necessary to irrigate at least 160 000 hectares in South West Africa". (28).

It is to be hoped that by that time those responsible for irrigating the area will have the enthusiastic support of the people involved, but at present the rulers and the technicians seem unable to win that support.

Whatever may be the results of irrigated farming, water is provided for the towns in Ovamboland, and for man and beast in a pastoral countryside. The extent of this provision is uncertain, for contract workers interviewed in Windhoek still spoke of the people of Ovamboland digging and scratching for water. Attractive maps produced by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs must, therefore, be treated with care, for their green irrigated areas are at present merely dreams.

On balance, the water engineers seem to be achieving much by bringing Kunene water to offset the droughts caused by the unreliability of the Efundja; there is little information.
 available on the distribution of this water among the people of Ovamboland, however. If the "success" of a "homeland" depends on water, the potential, at least, exists in "Owambo" for "success" in this respect.

It is in the "white" south that water is urgently needed, however. Increased demand comes primarily from mines, especially the Rössing uranium mines, but also from the towns. The problem was officially seen in 1972 as follows:

"In South West Africa mining development has been accelerated in recent times. During the period 1954 to 1969, mining and related industries contributed between 28,6 and 44,6 per cent to the gross national product of the territory, and this sector maintained an average growth rate of 8,9 per cent during the fifteen years. Mines played a dominant role in starting up development in certain specific regions..... The claims that the mines made on the water resources of the Territory brought them into competition with the agricultural sector, and this in turn led to stricter legislation and greater state control. The policy has therefore been laid down that the Department is to act as bulk supplier of water to mines in order to ensure that the available supplies are distributed and used in the most beneficial way. Mines are also the only consumers who are obliged to pay the full costs of the water.... Revenue from water that will be supplied to mines in the future will increase considerably". (30).

An official report published in late September 1974 describes the problem and its planned solution:

"During the year reconnaissance work and investigation advanced to such an extent that it was possible to examine the long-term water source development of South West Africa.

The results that arose out of this broad planning were illuminating and showed that the pattern of water source development which up to now has been able to meet the territory's water needs, will in the foreseeable future undergo a complete metamorphosis in order to be able to assure a sufficiency of water for continued development in the territory. A move has already been made away from local supply systems towards regional systems which can ultimately be integrated into a national network".

The report continues:

"This broad planning has been carried through to the year 2000 in respect of every catchment area in South
West Africa and the analyses have in broad outline brought the following to light:

i) Water shortages may occur in the central area of Namibia as early as 1977 and these water shortages cannot be relieved from local sources.

ii) A bulk water system from the Northern boundary rivers will have to be put into operation by 1986 at the least in order to prevent serious water shortages in the Northern and Central areas of South West Africa.

iii) Arising out of this, estimates have shown that the annual capital expenditure on water source development will have to rise sharply in the near future, and that there must be a considerable augmentation of the present available manpower in order to cope with the expected load of work...."

"Northern River schemes:

Comprehensive route reconnaissances and cost analyses of alternative schemes and combinations of schemes were carried out with a view to the broad long-term planning of water source development for the whole of the territory, and proposed schemes on the basis of a master water plan for South West Africa were drawn up with a view to their approval in principle....." (32).

"The serious water shortage in Hereroland has been thoroughly examined along with a long-term water supply for the whole territory and is a strong argument in favour of a water network to import water from the Northern boundary rivers Southwards to the interior". (33)

A journalist summed up the problem in 1970:

"All our internal water resources will be exhausted by 1985" (34)

He was writing before the large expansion in mining in Namibia in the seventies. The development of the Rössing uranium mine necessitated a sudden change in the water plans in the Western areas, and several other new mines, such as the copper mine at Otjihase, near Windhoek, created a large demand for water.

Some of this demand can be met from the Kunene river. The flow of 6 cusecs, which may be drawn in terms of the 1969 Treaty, is equal to one half of the water flow used by the entire Witwatersrand industrial complex in 1968. Ovambo-land today, despite the few small factories established by the
Bantu Investment Corporation, cannot use anywhere near that amount of water, especially if the irrigation plans have encountered problems. The water is therefore to be taken South, in a flow of at least 3 cumecs. A further 6 cumecs from the river may be negotiated at a later stage, especially if the demand at Rössing increases. Another five pumps can be installed, to increase the flow from Calueque to the South to a total of 12 cumecs, only a small portion of which will be used in Ovamboland.

On the 24th July 1974, the Minister of Water Affairs, S.P. Botha, speaking at a National Party Congress in Windhoek, announced a 600 million Rand project to be completed over twenty-five years, to bring water southwards from the Kunene and Okavango, and northwards from the Fish River basin, to the central and western areas of the territory. These are, of course, primarily the "white" areas, and the areas of most urban, fishing, and mining development. However, water is to be brought to "black" areas as well, especially to the dry area allocated to the Herero people of Namibia.

Map Thirty was prepared from interviews and newspaper reports. It shows the directions of the planned water supplies, but does not necessarily show the actual routes. The money is to be found by the South African treasury. R120 million would be spent to take water to Hereroland and Windhoek, R90 million on a second Okavango phase, and R200 million to supply Swakopmund, Rössing, and Walvis Bay with Kunene water. R100 million would be spent on bringing water northwards from the Fish River, but this by itself could not meet the demand; hence the northern river projects were essential. Unless the plans were executed, Windhoek would have an annual shortage of 29 million cubic metres of water, Hereroland would lack 6 million, and the West coast 31 million cubic metres. The Minister stressed that it was unrealistic to supply water only to one area, for example, the "white" area, and not to the rest. He stressed the demands made by the developing mines. The reports are not clear, but at a later stage, a line may take water down the coast to the Walvis Bay area from a point further West on the Kunene, that is, on the international border.
The 1974 SWA Survey describes the position as follows:

"A master water plan for the various regions of South West Africa is being evolved in order to ensure that the overall cost of developing water resources will yield the optimum socio-economic benefits for the people of the territory. As plans stand at present, the main supply schemes alone will involve several pipe-lines of more than 1 metre in diameter and well over 1200Km in length, with the necessary pumping stations to lift the water against static heads of up to 1500 metres. Only the availability of ample power will bring these requirements into the realms of possibility". (39).

These plans mean that Namibia's regions are being finally economically linked into a unit. If separate development is carried through, the separate politically independent states will be economically interdependent. The question of who benefits and by how much will be dealt with in Chapter Ten.

The "white" areas are dependent on Angola and the northern "black" areas for water; the "black" areas presently depend on the "white" areas for employment. Mr Vorster's strategy of economic interdependence to achieve his political goals may work: alternatively, it may misfire, if the northern areas can deny the South water, power and labour, by political or military means.

This chapter described the water problems of Namibia. It analysed the Treaties and plans to use the Kunene River to solve those problems. It was seen that mining and urban growth in the centre of Namibia created huge demands for water, which could only be met from the Northern rivers. The South Africans thus plan to develop the territory as an economic unit, but politically "all options are open" to the ethnically selected "true leaders". The South Africans are taking the wise and obvious step of using the Northern rivers to water the drier South, and are using the Kunene to generate the required energy for pumping.

Mr Dirk Mudge, Acting Administrator of the Territory, described the scheme as follows:

"The one contribution that Owambo and Kavango can make is water - we will assist them in distributing it to develop the whole territory". (40)
1. Galton, 853, 1891 : 137
3. Lawrie, 1964 : 8, quoting RP12/1964
4. ibid : 8
5. RSA : Treaty Series 7/64
6. C.D. van Jaarsveld, 1971
8. RSA : Treaty Series, 1/69
9. RSA : Treaty Series, 7/69
12. Midgeley, 1966 : Fig.2.
15. The possibility of an Angolan Government using the flow of water as a weapon is briefly considered in Financial Mail, 9/5/1975 : 482
17. Interview, Senior Hydrologist, Windhoek, July 1974
18. ibid
20. ibid : 141
22. Sunday Times, 21/7/1974
23. Interview, Administrative Manager, SWAWEK, July 1974
24. RSA RP61/74
25. Director of Water Affairs, Interview July, 1974
26. ibid.
27. ibid.
29. RSA : Department of Foreign Affairs, 1971 : 18
30. RSA : Water Affairs, 1972 : 126
31. RSA : RP61/74 : 130–131
32. ibid : 133
33. ibid : 135
34. Windhoek Advertiser, 30/12/1974
35. Interview, Director of Water Affairs, July, 1974; and, Press Interview, Ruacana Construction Manager, May, 1975

36. Windhoek Advertiser, 24/7/1974; Interview, Director of Water Affairs, July, 1974; African Wildlife, 1975:7; Die Burger, 21/6/1975

37. ibid

38. Die Suidwester, 25/7/1974:3

39. RSA, 1975:50

However, in the following years, the economy grew rapidly, as did the demand for electricity. At current prices the Gross Domestic Product grew by over 400% from R142,2 million in 1960 to R615,6 million in 1973. At constant 1963 prices the GDP more than doubled, growing from R147,1 million to R320,0 million.

Stoffberg has recently shown that there is a stable linear relationship between a nation's economy and its energy consumption, if the latter is measured as the electricity equivalent of the energy used by the final consumers (net energy). Moreover, in growing economies electricity has an increasing share in the total net energy supply. Data are not publicly available to test these propositions in the Namibian case, but there would seem to be a high correlation between growth of the GDP and growth of the demand for electricity, although the electricity demand will increase slightly faster if, in fact, it has an increasing share in the total net energy supply. In Namibia, over the last fifteen years, the economy grew fast and the demand for electricity probably grew slightly faster. This resulted largely from growth in the mining sector.

We saw above that the growth of the mining sector averaged 8.9% per annum over the fifteen years to 1969, and that it contributed up to 44.6% of the Gross National Product. Since 1968 economic statistics for the territory have been integrated with those of South Africa, and figures are not available, but the mining sector continues to expand. Mines demand great quantities of electricity. Hence the demand for electricity is escalating enormously. In 1967 it grew by 5% per annum; in 1972 the growth rate was 10%; it is even higher today. SWAWEK believes that "increasing mining and prospecting activities will intensify the demand in future years". The expected demand is given in Table Ten below. The growth is phenomenal.

SWAWEK was established to use the Kunene River to provide cheap power for Namibia via a 'National Grid'. However, the demand for electricity grew so fast that a large thermal
station had to be built to fill the gap, before Ruacana was completed. Hence, the van Eck station was built at Windhoek, and the first generator was commissioned on the 5th June 1972. The van Eck station has a capacity of 90 Megawatts (90MW) from three 30MW generators. A further thermal station is being built at Walvis Bay. A national grid, shown by solid double lines on Map Thirty-One, distributes the power to the major mining and urban areas which, as we have seen, are presently in the "white" sector. Map Thirty-One demonstrates very clearly the relationship between electricity demand and mining in Namibia. Power in Namibia is supplied for mines rather than for people.

The routing of the national grid power line from Ruacana has been changed at least twice. Map Thirty-One, drawn in 1967, shows the original concept in which the power lines fed Ongandjera and Oshikati; while a third line crossed Ovamboland to link up with the grid at Tsumeb. Map Thirty-One shows the changes made in 1972. Perhaps for strategic reasons, the power line no longer crosses Ovamboland directly to Tsumeb, but instead runs south, then kinks to the south-east to link with the grid near Omaruru. The 1972 SWAWEK map gives no indication at all of a power line to Ovamboland! SWAWEK felt that the cost would be too high for the "Owambo Government", but a subsidised line may be installed in the future. Thus, although Ruacana is in Ovambo territory, Ovamboland will not initially benefit by its power, which will be taken to the south.

Map Thirty-Three shows the route planned in 1975. The broad kink to the west has been removed and the line is to run directly through Kamanjab towards Omaruru, presumably to save money. However, this creates a part of the Etosha dilemma, shown in Map Thirty-Three. The power line cuts through a corner of the game reserve and, according to ecologists, may seriously disrupt the movement patterns of the game. Even more seriously, the water route to the south cuts the reserve almost in half, as the map shows.

The problem with the water route is that it would cost R50 million
MAP TWENTY-NINE: THE KUNENE RIVER BASIN

MAP THIRTY: PLANS TO BRING WATER FROM THE NORTHERN RIVERS
TO WINDHOEK AND WALVIS BAY.
(Showing general direction but not necessarily actual routes).
(D. Budlender, 1975).
MAP THIRTY-TWO: OVAMBOLAND

(Afrika Instituut, 1967: 96)

OVAMBOLAND

PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT

Hydro-Electric Power Plant
Power Lines
Canal Scheme
Dams
Tarred Roads
Other Roads
Airfield
New Hospital
Abattoir
Proposed Enclosure

MAP THIRTY-THREE: THE ETOSHA DILEMMA

(African Wild Life, 1977)
MAP THIRTY-FOUR: LOWER KUNENE POTENTIAL HYDRO-ELECTRIC SITES.

(SWAWEK, 1972 : 2)
MAP THIRTY-FIVE:
Upper Kunene Development Schemes.
(Moreno, 1967).

ESQUEMA DE APROVEITAMENTOS
extra to go round the reserve. A canal built through the reserve could either be deep, in which case the necessary fences would completely cut the game routes, or shallow, in which case the game, as they crossed, would pollute the water with diseases. Presumably a sufficiently large underground pipe-line would be exceedingly expensive, although the reason for the use of canals, rather than pipe-lines as originally announced, has not been given. The solution to this dilemma has, however, not yet been stated by the authorities. They must move power and water to the South, but the Etosha Pan, with its precious game, blocks the route.

The Ruacana Falls are seen as the answer to Namibia's sharply rising demand for electricity. However, as Professor Midgeley writes:

"...in Southern Africa, because of the strongly seasonal distribution of rainfall, the rivers are subject to wide fluctuation of flow. To extract the maximum benefit from hydro energy it must be used in conjunction with a uniformly available, albeit more expensive, source of energy, e.g. in an integrated hydro-thermal system; it should also be assigned to meet demands near the peak of the load curve, or held in reserve to meet unplanned outages". (12).

Using sophisticated mathematical techniques, including synthesised monthly flow hydrographs where accurate data were not available over a sufficiently long time period, Professor Midgeley calculated the minimum flow of water available at Ruacana by month from 1937 to 1972. Relating this to the energy demand and load patterns projected for the territory, he deduced the maximum firm capacity which the hydro-electric component could have at Ruacana, feeding the Namibian grid.

Table Ten shows the situation in a period of extreme drought, for the month of June, when the electricity demand is highest.
### TABLE TEN

**RUACANA HYDRO-ELECTRIC CAPACITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINIMUM OUTFLOW FROM CALUEQUE TO RUACANA</th>
<th>174</th>
<th>$10^6\text{M}^3$ per month.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENERGY EQUIVALENT OF STREAM FLOW</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>GEGAWATT HOURS PER MONTH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMIBIAN ENERGY DEMAND</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>GEGAWATT HOURS PER MONTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>433</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AVAILABLE HYDRO-ENERGY AS A PERCENTAGE OF ENERGY DEMAND</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>PER CENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORRESPONDING PERCENTAGE OF PEAK DEMAND</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>PER CENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEAK DEMAND</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>134</th>
<th>MEGAWATTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>370</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERMISSIBLE INSTALLED ELECTRIC CAPACITY AT RUACANA</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>115</th>
<th>MEGAWATTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>312</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Midgeley puts it:

".....in terms of the load situation in 1977, the maximum capacity that can be installed at Ruacana without duplicating plant elsewhere in the system is 115MW; by 1990 this may be increased to 196MW and, by the year 2000, 312MW will be permissible, provided the pattern and growth of load turn out to be as predicted". (15).

Thus, from a total installed capacity of 58MW in 1963, Namibia's peak demand by the year 2000 is expected to be 800MW! Ruacana is designed to have four 80MW generators, giving an installed capacity of 320MW, but this will be insufficient, and other sources must be found, for even with Ruacana, by 1985 Namibia's capacity will be fully extended."
To meet growth in the demand for electricity after 1985, it was originally planned to create a further hydro-electric scheme on the lower Kunene River\textsuperscript{17}. Map Thirty-Four shows the potential sites, with their estimated capacities, which were considered. However, experience at Ruacana may have shown the high cost and difficulty of erecting such stations on the inaccessible lower reaches. Security and strategic considerations may be important, in addition to simple cost, demand and capacity analyses.

It is possible that the original decision to build the Ruacana station was taken more on strategic grounds than in terms of simple financial cost-benefit, and that a link with the South African grid may have been marginally cheaper. Professor Midgeley's remark, quoted in a previous chapter, should be recalled:

"...from strategic and socio-economic angles, the need to create nodes of development in or near a desert may in fact be crucial, almost regardless of direct cost. Sometimes the indirect costs, for example, in the defence budget, of neglecting to develop a region, bear careful scrutiny". (18)

For whatever reason, it has been decided not to build further stations on the lower Kunene, but rather to link the Namibian grid to the Escom-run South African grid\textsuperscript{19}. A line will be built from the existing grid on the Orange River up to the grid in central Namibia. A power grid will then exist from Cabora Bassa in the east to Kunene and Calueque in the west, drawing power from sources such as the Drakensberg scheme, the Orange River scheme, the nuclear plant planned for the Cape, and the thermal stations of the Eastern Transvaal.

The Consolidated Diamond Mine at Oranjemund will also be linked into this grid. Escom will bring the power down the Orange, but as the works are on Namibian ground, SWAWEK will probably handle the final distribution of the power in Oranjemund\textsuperscript{20}.

There are important strategic implications in the decision to
link Namibia to the South African grid. Once more, economic interdependence is being established, and once more, it may in fact affect political "independence". The South African Prime Minister speaks of "full independence" within eight to ten years\textsuperscript{21} but his planners are expecting to link the territory to the South African grid, also in ten years time.

Until then, however, it is the Ruacana plant that must cope with most of Namibia's increasing demand for energy, which will come, as we have seen, mainly from the mining industry. Whereas firms constructing Gové and Calueque had to be South African or Portuguese, this limitation is not imposed at Ruacana. Hence, many international firms are involved in the building of the Ruacana plant.

The excavation of the 1\textsuperscript{1}2 kilometer tunnel and the vast machine cavern, 140m long by 40m high by 25m wide\textsuperscript{22}, has been entrusted to an Italian firm, COSINT, the directors of which have great experience of such projects in Africa. They employ Italian and Turkish, as well as locally recruited, workers. Other firms involved include L.T.A., G.E.C., Borie Dumez, Voist Alpine, Elektro-Hinsch, S.D.E.M. Grenoble, and Dorman Long, in addition to SWAWEK, ESCOM, the SWA Water Affairs Department, and the Portuguese Water and Electricity authorities.

Although most of the Kunene's water will be needed for power generation, and will flow from a diversion weir along a causeway to the tunnel, through the huge turbines and out into the "hippo pool" below the falls, the beauty of the Great Cataract will not be lost forever. The South Africans plan to turn it on at 10.00a.m. and at 3.00p.m. for tourists.

Whatever troubles may have been experienced earlier, the Ruacana project is now on budget and on schedule. By May 1975 it was expected that the first section of the power plant would be completed by May 1977, the second by October 1977, and the remaining sections by April 1978, when the full capacity would be installed\textsuperscript{23}. Apart from Gové, the Calueque-Ruacana complex will have cost something in the region of R133,3 million, as shown by Table Eleven.
TABLE ELEVEN

COSTS OF CALUEQUE AND RUACANA.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost (Rm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calueque Dam</td>
<td>15,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim power station and Calueque infrastructure</td>
<td>10,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Ruacana Power Station</td>
<td>91,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission line to existing grid</td>
<td>16,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL (in Million Rand)</strong></td>
<td><strong>133,3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whether the scheme will be completed as expected is not certain: there is fighting in Angola, and the situation in the Kunene basin is thus fluid. However, this chapter has shown that if the schemes are successful, Ruacana power is to be delivered primarily to the "white" area of Namibia, mainly to meet the demand created by the mines – which accumulate their capital in Johannesburg, London and New York, rather than in Windhoek or Oshikati. Ruacana will temporarily solve the otherwise impossible problem of the soaring demand for energy, and will also create the economic interdependence which Mr Vorster foresaw. We shall return to the relative benefits in a chapter below, but the next chapter will discuss the Portuguese plans for the Kunene in Angola.
NOTES: CHAPTER EIGHT: THE POWER PLANS.

1. Interview, Administrative Manager SWAWEK, July 1974. The "SWA Survey, 1974" (RSA 1975 : 50) gives a slightly lower total cost of coal at Windhoek, of R10,80 per ton. The pithead price of South African coal rose in 1975, however, and may rise again.

2. Interview, Administrative Manager SWAWEK, July 1974

3. Afrika Instituut, July, 1963: 88


5. Stoffberg, 1975 : 6

6. ibid: 4

7. RSA, Annual report of the Department of Water Affairs, 1971/1972 : 126

8. SWAWEK, "van Eck", 1972 : 5

9. ibid.

10. ibid. :3; and interview, Administrative Manager SWAWEK, July 1974.

11. Die Burger, 21/6/1975

12. Midgeley, 1975 : 1

13. ibid: 4

14. ibid : 5

15. ibid : 6

16. Interview, Administrative Manager, SWAWEK, July, 1974

17. Myburgh, 1971 : 157

18. Midgeley, 1970 : 261 forward

19. Interview, Administrative Manager SWAWEK, July 1974

20. ibid.


CHAPTER NINE

THE ANGOLAN PLANS.

"It is not geography alone that is involved in the successful working of water-power schemes. Technical and political factors are of great importance. The problem of capital is also a basic one". (1).

The grandeur of Portugal's dream in Africa is shattered. An aristocratic general decided that the problem of a tiny corner, Guinea Bissau, could not be solved militarily. His coup d'état opened Pandora's Box. At least for Portuguese Africa, the Portuguese people ceased to believe Salazar's dictum: "A Pátria não se discute, defende-se". Hence came independence, and perhaps an end to several long, hot wars.

The economic reforms, centred on the Kunene River's hydro-electric potential, were ended also - at least as strategically conceived of by the old regime. Without such reforms the battle was, in the long run, lost anyway. Fighting an expensive war, the old regime simply could not raise the capital, to win on the economic front. Not for nothing has "Portugal in Africa" been called "uneconomic imperialism". The battle was lost for many other reasons, but the regime's inability to achieve economic reform fast enough was among the more important. Such capital as could be raised went largely into primary export industries, especially mining - which is no way to win over a people.

The South Africans contributed capital, but too little and too late for the old regime. The South Africans paid only for those Kunene projects which they themselves needed for their control of Namibia. The development of the basin as a whole was a lesser goal. The needs of the south were paramount.

As contemporary Africa clearly shows, colonialism is a hardy plant. The needles sunk into the Angolan tree will continue
to suck the sap long after the Portuguese have flown from their troubled nests, long after the migration back to Europe. The Kunene's water resources may yet be developed to feed the tree — or to feed the parasites in Johannesburg, London, Paris, New York and elsewhere. The Angolan people may or may not rise above this law of the colonial jungle, but, either way, the Kunene has potential for development.

Experts stress that river basin development should be complete and integrated. For political and military reasons it seems at present that development of the Kunene basin will be skewed towards the needs of Namibia. This chapter will examine the plans drafted by the old regime for the Kunene.

The Portuguese drafted very ambitious plans for the development of South-Eastern Angola, based on water and power from a series of large dams on the Kunene River. These schemes would take more than a generation to complete, and involved the settlement in Angola of more than 500 000 Portuguese, "living in good economical conditions", as one translation puts it. Power would be provided for the whole region, and particularly for the Cassinga mining developments; water would be provided for the irrigation of an eventual total of 147 700 hectares of land under crops; and water would be supplied to cattle-farms covering 347 000 hectares. When one compares these figures to those of the Vaal-Hartz irrigation scheme, their size can be appreciated. The Vaal-Hartz scheme irrigates only 36 140 hectares of land for crops, compared to the 147 700 hectares mentioned above for the Kunene schemes. The Portuguese thus planned vast radical change for the economy of the basin. Such schemes would be very costly. A recent report of the U.N. Committee on Decolonisation estimated the cost at 640 million dollars.

The South Africans never intended to supply all this money, as the U.N. report claims. Under the 1969 agreement, South Africa was to pay R8 125 000 for the Govê dam, and the entire cost of the small Calueque dam, which was estimated at R15 700 000. These figures are far removed from the grand total of $648 million.
which was the estimate for all the schemes over many years.

Further proof of this comes from the South African statistical surveys. The South African Government paid R878 000 abroad for Kunene in 1973/74; R254 000 in 1974/75, and budgeted R353 000 for 1975/76. These amounts are of a different order altogether from the amount suggested by the United Nations report.

The United Nations report also claims that the Calueque project was completed in 1971. This is also untrue, as reference to the World Council of Churches' report of 1971 will show. As was mentioned above, advertisements appeared in 1974 for engineers for the building of the Calueque dam.

The United Nations document is in error concerning a third important item. It claims that the Matala power plant would supply electricity to Ovamboland. The 1969 Treaty reads as follows:

"5.1 The provisions of the Agreement of 13th October 1964, referring to the construction of the power lines from Matala to the border between Angola and South West Africa and to the installation of a third generator at Matala are revoked, provided that this shall not preclude further negotiations should both parties be interested therein" (11).

South Africa is not presently "interested therein" and no plans have been approved to bring power to Ovamboland from Matala.

Six hundred and forty million dollars is not a sum that can be raised easily. One of Portugal's major problems was, therefore, finance capital. South Africa was prepared to pay only for those items directly needed for its Namibian schemes. The Govê dam regulates the river, and is therefore essential. The Calueque dam diverts water for pumping to Namibia, and also gives better control of the river immediately above the power plant at Ruacana, which supplies power to Namibia. South Africa paid for these, and these were the first to be built. South Africa would not even finance an irrigation network on the Angolan side at Calueque. Throughout his book, published before the coup d'état, General Spinola emphasised
the importance of the economic problems facing Portugal\textsuperscript{13}. The problem facing the old regime was its inability to finance the grandiose schemes needed to save 'Portugal in Africa'. South Africa made a contribution at Cabora Bassa, and a smaller one at Gové and Calueque, but these were a tiny fraction of what was needed.

The plans drafted by the old Portuguese regime are shown on Map Thirty-Five, and listed in Table Twelve.
TABLE TWELVE

KUNENE HYDRO-ELECTRIC, IRRIGATION AND STOCK FARMING SCHEMES.

A. HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEMES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHEME</th>
<th>WATER STORAGE</th>
<th>POWER CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. GOVÉ</td>
<td>2 436</td>
<td>25 MW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. JAMBIA-IA-OMA</td>
<td>1 240</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CHIVONDA</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. JAMBIA-IA-MINA</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>81,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MATALA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. MATUNTO</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. CHISSOLA</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. CARINGO</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. GUNGUE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. LUCUNDE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. CAMBUNDI</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>14,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. CATEMBOLO</td>
<td>1 060</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 878 Mm³</strong></td>
<td><strong>297,5 MW</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. IRRIGATION SCHEMES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHEME</th>
<th>AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MATALA</td>
<td>3 000 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. MATUNTO</td>
<td>92 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DON GOENA</td>
<td>19 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CATEMBOLO</td>
<td>13 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CHIBIA</td>
<td>11 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. COVA DO LEAO</td>
<td>12 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>147 700 hectares</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. STOCK FARMING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHEME</th>
<th>AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MATUNTO</td>
<td>87 000 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CATEMBOLO</td>
<td>173 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. COVA DO LEAO</td>
<td>87 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>347 000 hectares</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Portuguese also hoped to develop, with the South Africans, the power resources of the lower Kunene. The schemes planned for below Calueque are shown on Map Thirty-Four and listed in Table Thirteen.

**TABLE THIRTEEN**

**SCHEMES PLANNED FOR BELOW CALUEQUE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHEME</th>
<th>WATER STORAGE</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CALUEQUE</td>
<td>352 Mm³</td>
<td>10 MW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACAVALE</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUANDEGE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUACANA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONDORUSU</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZEBRA</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPUPA II</td>
<td>4750</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPUPA I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAYNES</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARIEN</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARTMAN</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMBOLO</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCHA</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6740 Mm³</strong></td>
<td><strong>1310 MW</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(It will be noticed that the figures in Table Thirteen do not correspond exactly to the South African estimates on Map Thirty-Four). However, as the South Africans have decided against these schemes, it is not certain whether the lower Kunene plants will be built, for there is no other obvious source of capital. They illustrate the potential of the river for energy generation, which will not be used in the foreseeable future. This is a world-wide feature, for we presently use less than 5% of the planet's hydro-electric potential, preferring to put capital and energy into other things.

The Portuguese planners have published prolifically on all
these development schemes and on farming in Southern Angola

I shall not attempt a full review of all their works. Briefly, they are convinced of the economic viability of this huge scheme over some thirty years, given the time and the money. The nomadic herdsmen of the region would be regrouped, together with the peasant crop-farmers, leaving space for settlement of Portuguese family units in large numbers, each unit having 20 hectares of irrigated land or 8,000 hectares of pasture. Power would be supplied for the huge mining industries of Cassinga, and for towns and ports such as Nova Lisboa, Sa da Bandeira and Moçamedes, where industry would develop. It should be noted that the initial emphasis was on primary extractive export industries such as mining and cattle-ranching, which would earn foreign currency for Portugal.

The strategic implications of the scheme are obvious. Economic reform is on Baechler's list of classic counter-revolutionary methods, and so is the regrouping of the population. Settlement, from the mother country, of people loyal to the established order would also make control of the countryside far easier. The existence of a power and water infrastructure would encourage foreign investment in the area, which would strengthen the likelihood of foreign military support or, at least, neutrality. The economy, having raised the initial finance, would grow and could more easily support the war effort. Development was a necessary factor for belief in Portugal's "civilising mission" and, in all, the projects would strengthen "Portugal Overseas."

The plans did not materialise, and they will not do so now in their original form. Gove dam is finished, although a power plant has not been installed. In January 1974, a start was made on dams at Jamba-ia-Mina and at Jamba-ia-Oma. It is not known how far they have progressed, and with changes of power in Lisbon, together with the possibility of independence soon, the development of the river may be greatly altered. However, the extractive primary industries and foreign companies will continue to demand power and water, and some form of hydroelectric development may continue.
In passing, it should be noted that the Cassinga Iron Mines are polluting the Kunene's water with industrial effluent. Samples of the water show a high pollution index, containing minerals such as kaolin and haematite. With increasing mining in Southern Angola, the quality of the water may further deteriorate.

The scope exists for an integrated development of the whole region and river basin, rather than the strangely skewed development that seems to be occurring in Angola and Namibia. The whole sub-continent could form an integrated economic unit with a democratic polity, in which primary production would not be for the export market, but for industrial growth, and in which a criterion for planners would be a more just distribution of resources, wealth and income, according to need. The perpetuation of the present skewed underdevelopment is the price which the region must pay for ethnic and national consciousness, and for capitalism.

This chapter has briefly examined the grandiose plans of Portugal for the Kunene River basin. War and lack of finance has prevented fulfilment of these plans so far, but the river has been shown in detailed studies to have enormous development potential, which may be achieved in time. The development of the river basin to date is skewed, for only those projects serving the interests of South Africa have been completed so far. Despite occurrences in Lisbon and Luanda, some form of river development is needed, and may continue, in different forms, if finance can be found. The opportunity costs of this particular method of development have been questioned, and will be discussed further in the next chapter, on Namibia.
NOTES: CHAPTER NINE: THE ANGOLAN PLANS

1. Sircar, 1961: 133
2. "The Fatherland is not to be argued about, but defended", quoted in Spinola, 1974: 26
4. ibid.
5. Gunthorp, 1973: 44.
10. Sunday Times, 21/7/1974
11. RSA Treaty Series 1/69: 23
12. Senior Hydrologist, Windhoek: Interview, July 1974
13. Spinola, 1974: passim
19. ibid: 89
20. Interview, Administrative Manager SWAWEK, July 1974
21. Interview, Director of Water Affairs, Windhoek, July 1974
CHAPTER TEN

WHO BENEFITS?

The Kunene schemes, if completed, will allocate two essential scarce resources in a particular way. Future governments will not be able to change this particular allocation easily or quickly. I shall now consider the relative benefits for the groups involved, and in so doing, assess the opportunity costs. The opinions held by several people concerned will be recorded.

Only in a simplistic sense does everybody benefit by a water scheme. Obviously, everybody may have access to some water or power. Obviously, the region's economy may grow. At these simple levels, everybody may benefit. To assess adequately "Who Benefits?" requires deeper questions, however.

The first crucial question is how much more water or power each group or individual is allocated, by comparison with the additional amounts allocated to other groups. The relative benefits must be measured, not merely the benefits.

Secondly, one must see what is possible for each group to achieve with their new water and power, in a given situation. Water for one group for difficult low-profit irrigated farming is different from water for high-profit mining, in terms of economic benefits. This means that whereas the region's economy may grow, one must measure how that growth is distributed, geographically and financially. In doing so it should be noted that irrigated farming, if successful, could further perpetuate the contract labour system of low wages. Workers' families will be enabled to continue to live on the land, saving the costs of urbanisation in the richer south. Yet the riches of the south will still be produced by the labour of the north. Migrant labour is perhaps better seen as frustrated urban labour.
Thirdly, one must not compare with what existed before, but with what might have been done in another way with an equal amount of labour, skill and finance. The opportunity costs must be included.

Finally, the schemes must be measured in their totality. It is not enough to measure only financial or economic benefits. Military, strategic, political, educational and other social benefits must be measured as well, if we are to answer the question "Who Benefits?" completely. Midgeley's comment on the strategic value of making a desert bloom, quoted in Chapter Four above, perhaps answers the question for us.

Such a question cannot presently be answered rigorously and precisely. We do not have the necessary facts, such as Gross National Product statistics or accurate measures of the distribution of wealth. We do not have a mathematical model which could predict the effects of a new water and power network on an economy like that of Namibia. Such a model belongs in the more complex realms of cybernetics, and even there it is but a dream for the future. The effects may not be predictable with any accuracy even only in the economic field. In the totality, there is no agreed measurement of military, strategic, political, educational and other social benefits.

I shall therefore attempt a general assessment here, for a precise measurement is not presently possible.

It is clear from the above chapters that the ruling groups will benefit primarily and massively from the Kunene schemes. We have seen that the best agricultural, fishing and mining areas are allocated to "whites", and that the Kunene schemes will bring water and power to these "white" areas in great quantities, to facilitate their development.

The ruled groups will benefit far less. In relative terms, and when opportunity costs are included, it is doubtful whether
the ruled groups benefit at all. It is possible that irrigated farming will succeed in Ovamboland on a large scale in due course, although this is by no means certain. Certainly, more water will be available for man and beast in a previously drought-stricken area. However, any schemes investing capital on the scale of that in the Kunene project ought to solve such a problem.

The costs for the ruled groups exceed the benefits. Not for the first time, South Africa's rulers are carrying out a hydro-electric scheme for strategic and ideological motives, as much as for direct economic benefit. The Kunene schemes will maintain the inequitable distribution of land and resources, perhaps to achieve "separate development" of politically "independent" ethnically divided "states", and perhaps to create economic ties between those states in such a way that the ruling groups continue to rule. "Separate development" does not benefit the people of Namibia: it is a sophisticated method of protecting the power and prosperity of the ruling groups. The Kunene schemes could solve two of the big problems facing "separate development", which are a lack of water and a lack of power in the "white" areas. Even if "all options" are in fact open, and independence is achieved by a unitary Namibia, the Kunene schemes might still benefit those who designed them to serve the interests of a ruling minority.

Clearly the ruling groups will be allocated more power and water than the ruled groups. There seems to be no indication so far that the Ovambo people will be paid a royalty on this power and water, taken from a river in their land, but this payment may occur in due course. Thus both groups get water and power, but the ruling group gets more than the ruled group, and does not presently pay for it, except in terms of capital investment. The ruling group, through SWAWEK, owns most of the scheme.

One Windhock authority has analysed the project as follows below - his analysis supports the one given above:
"As a project designed to bring material progress to both races, Kunene will bolster the interdependence of White states and Black states-to-be, like Owambo. It will also help create social and economic stability on S.W.A's Northern border, which is the frontline of the terrorist assault on the western part of White-ruled Southern Africa". (2).

The group that benefits the most, financially, is that group which profits by Namibia's mines. Mining expansion is enormous, and mining profits are high. Neither could be achieved without water and power. We have seen above that, at present, the mines are mainly in white areas, and that their managers and other highly-paid staff must be white, and that no black man, therefore, may manage or own a mine in "white" Namibia. Wages and labour conditions, both on the mines and elsewhere, were so bad that they recently resulted in a massive strike despite the absence of formal organisation. We have seen above that the strike produced no fundamental changes in the system of migrant labour for the mines, and that the migrant system is socially devastating. Water and power from the Kunene will enable Namibia's mine-owners and white mine workers to continue amassing wealth from the migrant system.

Who owns Namibia's mines? Where do the profits go?
The mines are generally not owned by Namibians, and much of the profit is remitted outside the territory. The owners include American Metal Climax, Incorporated; the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Limited; Charter Consolidated, Limited, of the United Kingdom; Consolidated Gold Fields, Limited; Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Limited, of Canada; General Mining/Federale Mynbou, Beperk; the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa; ISCOR; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company, Limited; Metallgesellschaft AG, of West Germany; Newmont Mining Corporation; Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Limited; and Union Corporation Limited³. In short, many of the giant mining companies of the United States, Canada, West Germany, Britain and South Africa will profit by huge mining expansion, made possible by Kunene water, or power.
These high mining profits are not necessarily re-invested in the territory. The last available figures relate to 1962, in which year the Gross National Product was thirty per cent less than the Gross Domestic Product. Put another way, one third of the country's product accrued to foreign capital or labour, as we saw in an earlier chapter. The Johannesburg Financial Mail suggests that this proportion has increased in the ensuing years. The gap between white and black income has also increased, according to the Financial Mail. In 1962 it was twenty-one to one, or R352 per annum per capita for whites, and R17 per capita for blacks in the homelands. The planned allocation for water and power in the Kunene scheme is unlikely to decrease that income gap.

Minerals are wasting assets: they are resources which should be carefully used. The Kunene River, with its water and power, will exist when the minerals are gone. When should Namibia's minerals be mined, and by whom? What should be done with the wealth? Chief Clemens Kapuuo, not a noted left-winger, gave his answer in 1972, as follows:

"This country, which is our country, is being exploited by greedy entrepeneurs, robbed of its wealth, and rendered barren for the future. Our fear is that when freedom finally comes to this land, it will be returned with no minerals left. Thus you will see the one wonderful asset which we have for developing the land for the well-being of its peoples will have been taken away from us". (5).

Perhaps the greatest indictment of the Kunene scheme is that it will greatly speed up this process of exploiting Namibia's minerals, for the benefit of people other than Namibians. Obviously the minerals must be extracted over time, but their wealth should be used for the territory. Botswana is attempting to use its mineral wealth to build up its agriculture (and manufacturing industry, if possible) against the day when minerals are depleted. Namibia should do the same. An opportunity cost of building the present schemes inside the strategic framework of the ruling groups is that the mineral wealth of the territory will be extracted rather than re-invested.
The mines are presently a spur to some other growth. For example, they process minerals, earning foreign exchange, as in the case where 10 000 tons of lead concentrate from Alaska was off-loaded at Walvis Bay for processing at Tsumeb, from where the lead ingots were shipped to the United States. However, this other growth is small; the economy is still dominated by primary extractive industries working to priorities set by large foreign firms.

The other groups who benefit financially by the Kunene schemes are the owners and "white" workers of the fishing industry, and of the small, but growing, secondary manufacturing industries. These are, as we have seen, located mainly in "white" areas, and will be able to expand using power and water from Kunene.

It will be argued that this growth will mean more employment for "black" workers, and this is conceded. However, there is no indication that, except perhaps in the long term, growth itself will break the stranglehold which the "white" farmers and workers have on the polity and on the economy. Growth has probably led to an increase in the wage gap, rather than a decrease. The "whites" have shown great skill in expanding the economy in such a way that they retain power and prosperity in their hands. The Kunene schemes will probably assist them in this.

Another ruling group that is likely to benefit is the "white" farming community. We saw above that the growth of mining led to competition for water between mines and farms, according to official reports. The Kunene schemes will benefit the "white" farmers by reducing this competition for an essential resource. Without the schemes, perhaps Gessert's 1904 spectre of "whites" fighting round drying water-holes is not too fanciful after all.

The rulers of South Africa are highly unlikely to invest between R600 million and R800 million in Namibian infrastructure out of pure altruism. They see large strategic, political and economic benefits for the ruling groups in South Africa and in Namibia. The question must be asked, however, whether the
money could not be better used in another way, in a way that developed all of Southern Africa for the benefit not only of whites and their few black allies, but also for all of the people of the region. Obviously the Kunene should be developed, but not in this way by these people.

To summarise: The ruling groups benefit by the Kunene schemes. The vast profits from mining are accumulated in Johannesburg, New York, and London, while white mine-workers receive high returns and black mine-workers receive low returns. The white farmers no longer face competition from the mines for water. The fishing and secondary industries receive relatively cheap power and water. Black farmers and herdsmen receive water, but the problem of irrigated farming in the "homelands" has still to be solved. The Kunene schemes assist in achieving the political and strategic aims of the white ruling groups.

However, the Kunene schemes are a gamble. There is a point of view in Windhoek that believes too much is being done for the black people of Namibia, and that the schemes may be a mistake. It is possible that the northern regions, together with Angola, have been given a weapon by which they can hold the richer southern areas to ransom. It may be possible to deny the south water, power and labour, all at once, and thereby to negotiate a more equitable distribution of land, resources and power. To do so requires organisation, which the ruling groups well know. Therefore, political leaders are suppressed, and stringent "emergency" regulations have been imposed on political activity.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that "elections" are boycotted, for free political activity is impossible. The ruled groups are also controlled by structural violence. If one adds to this the threats or the use of direct violence by the police or military forces, then effective use of the water, power and labour weapons becomes very difficult, although still possible.
To complete this assessment of who benefits, and by how much, by the Kunene projects, I shall record some of the opinions given by different people involved.

Asked by a reporter what effect the change of Government in Portugal would have on the schemes, Mr Pik Botha, a South African parliamentarian who became Ambassador to the United Nations, replied as follows:

"One can only hope that no attempts will be made from any quarter to disrupt any progress in this regard. The people themselves will be deprived of benefits if any such attempt is made. This project will be of great benefit to the peoples of Angola and South West Africa". (8)

Mr Dirk Mudge, M.E.C., acting Administrator of the territory, holds a similar view, and told me:

"There should be one economic scheme for the whole of South West Africa, for we will always be interdependent. Some non-white groups, however, are not yet prepared to co-operate, because they believe it is a trick on the part of the whites..... In South West Africa to solve all our problems we need a strong economy to support everybody, especially considering that a large percentage of the people is unskilled. The Kunene scheme is very important, for one just cannot develop these territories without water and electricity..... We need a strong economy to provide jobs in the southern sector for people from the native homelands. One cannot have a strong economy without infrastructure". (9)

I asked Mr Mudge to comment on the stand taken by SWAPO overseas against South Africa's presence in Namibia. He replied:

"They harm their own people. Inexperienced people like SWAPO leaders talk of independence for South West Africa. It is impossible without South Africa. The railways operate at a terrible loss, there is no separate monetary system, there are no separate institutions. No other organisation would invest millions in this underdeveloped territory. The National Convention agrees that whites have a role, for without whites the economy would be ruined. SWAPO don't really appreciate the problem. They think freedom is everything, but they don't know what freedom is..... Whatever the political system, we will have different groups. Most are not prepared to lose their identity. I know that because I have lived here."
An Ovambo does not want to be called Herero. The Hereros and Damaras will not be prepared to accept that Ovambos rule the country, which would be the position in a unitary state.

The people must first learn to govern their own territory, to gain political experience. They must start from the bottom. It will take years to gain independence, but as a result of outside interference we are forced to do things faster than we would like. They should not become independent before they are able to accept responsibility.

SWAPO are against the Kunene scheme because they are not prepared to co-operate. They are doing their own people harm? This has nothing to do with separate development. The territory must be developed. Their opposition to government policy should not stand in the way of development.

By contrast, Richard Wood, Bishop Suffragan of the Anglican Diocese of Damaraland, told me:

"The schemes are not being carried out in consultation with the people. These schemes take development at its European face value, and they imply that our needs can only be met by a capitalist system. However, one would be only too glad for regular water in the drought-stricken areas.

Basically the plans have been made to generate power. Water is a bonus, but it is power that has encouraged South Africa to put in vast capital sums, sums which might otherwise have been used to enable the "homelands" to achieve viability.

The plans represent an extrapolation of white hopes for the future of our country. A black person who has no appreciation of the technology can hardly conceive of what is involved, and can therefore have no effective say or part in it. Were it to be done truly benevolently one might say, 'go ahead', but the dice are loaded.

Do the people want to join the Western way of life? That is where money lies for the elite, but constructive schemes must be aimed at the village communities, before we have high capital outlay on technological development.

One cannot basically oppose bringing power and water - it's like making food cheaper. However, we must fit it into the whole development picture, so that the political scheme involved must be benevolent and humanistic. For example, the Katatura Hospital is useful, but it represents an extension of white man's dominion. Blacks are not trained to staff it, for there are no black doctors there. We need paramedical, partially trained staff in village health schemes, which are preventative, rather than curative. It is, of
course, still good to have a hospital, but the people are never consulted, and are given no training to use these things. Such projects become an exhibition of white man's domination, and he then expects thanks for it". (10)

I asked Dr J.L. de Vries, Namibian Bishop of the Evangelical Luthern Church, whether the Ovambo people would not want water from the Kunene schemes. He replied:

"The Ovambo are very anti-government. If any ethnic group were to oppose any particular government move, it would be the Ovambo. It is not that they do not want development, but that they are against schemes imposed from above. The country needs development, not as a military strategy, but as human development. The Ovambo would therefore say NO to the Kunene schemes. The people of Namibia do not want to be separate. We want to be one Namibia. Development should be for the whole of Namibia, but behind the schemes we think there lies only the security interests of the whites in the first instance. They may want to develop blacks, but only secondarily.... The Superintendent of the Katatura township says that each ethnic group will build its own nest in the tree of South West Africa. I disagree: we will build one nest in Namibia. We are willing to live with the white man in the same tree, but not in separate nests....

All these schemes are not for the black man but for the privilege of the white man. If we look at these schemes, which ethnic group will benefit? We will only get the crumbs from the table of the white man. We are for development with co-operation of all the races, not development planned in Pretoria. We say to Pretoria, 'keep your development until we can decide...'. They bring in great projects, but we are not willing any more only to receive. The whites must stay, but we should be co-workers.

The whites build good roads, but we see them only as a military strategy, for easy movement of troops. The roads are a military policy. In the same way power and water are a military strategy.

We feel that the system is run without consultation. We feel that we stand aside from the development of the country.... We want to be free of White colonialism, we want to be partners, not slaves. We ask these things because Namibia belongs to us. We worked for it: every mine-worker worked for the State or for the whites. We have a right to participate with the white in the development of the riches. The white fears the impact of the black man when they
share in the wealth of the country. We want
to deal as partners, not merely get cents....
The whites fear the time when all the black
nations stand together. They will not be
able to keep the black man down, with all their
guns. Their policy is one of fear of unity.
We are not for the homeland policy. It is the
old DIVIDE ET IMPERA". (11)

A man who had worked as a migrant for very many years told me:
"As far as I know, the younger generation will
have many questions (about the Kunene projects).
Firstly, the power goes to the white area. How
can we then develop the economy of the Northern
regions on an equal basis? We could use the
power for other purposes. In the mines there
is no good co-operation. There is the shuttle
back and forth from the "homelands". Is it then
possible to develop the economy?.... The Ovambo
ask, where is the water? Why do we not get the
water? They promised there would be water
everywhere in Ovamboland, but it has not happened". (12)

I asked whether separate development had divided the people.
A student replied:
"The answer comes from the practice. It has
NOT succeeded. The work brought the people
together years ago. They go together in the
locations. My father is an Ovambo and my
mother a Damara. It does not come from the
government..... There must be co-operation for
all of South West Africa, not for one area.
The time is ripe that South Africa should leave,
and a new man should come to develop the land,
as a class gets a new teacher. They say
development is coming, but it does not come". (13)

Another Namibian in Windhoek said:
"We are against these schemes. They are not
for the people of Namibia. They are for
exploitation, not for anything else. The
government talks as though the whole purpose
is for the Ovambos - I am certain it is not..."

He summed up:
"Separate development has no place here...." (14).

The above gives a range of the opinions held in Namibia in
answer to the question: "Who benefits?". I have given my
own answer.
NOTES: CHAPTER TEN: WHO BENEFITS?

1. see, for example, Rubin and Warren, 1968: 133; the Cabora Bassa project is another clear case.
3. Objective: Justice, June 1974, gives a list of mining interests on pages 16-20.
5. Letter quoted by Manchester Group, 1972
9. Dirk Mudge, interview, July 1974
12. Meetings with Namibians, July 1974 - translated from Kwanyama, German and Afrikaans.
13. ibid
14. ibid.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION.

This has been an essay in contemporary political economic history, treating the detail of a particular social formation. It perhaps needs a larger caveat than do most contemporary histories. Secrecy, lack of time, war, languages, distances, and travel restrictions are problems faced by every writer of detailed contemporary history. I am not unconscious of the restrictions present in the South African Statute book. To these problems must be added the dearth of rigorous conceptual analysis of Namibia. Study of social conflict in the territory is still in its infancy. We have neither the necessary refined conceptualisation nor the required data. No rigorously applied general theory exists for the territory, nor for the region, and even now, theoretical progress is halting and slow, as much current research shows.

The present work has not been overly concerned rigorously to apply and refine such general theory as exists. It has rather concentrated on impressionistic portrayal of detail. It has used simple theoretical bases such as those given by Machiavelli, adapted for a Capitalist era. A thorough refinement of a general theory of social conflict for Namibia would constitute another volume equally long.

Just as any language is incomplete, so too is any history. More things happen in the world than can ever be recorded, orally or in writing. The only complete record is the human condition in operation. Secrecy, bewildering variety, and the opacity of social processes, ensure that recorded history is necessarily inaccurate and incomplete. Historians, like South African Select Commissions of Inquiry, are remarkable for what they do not discover, despite voluminous research.

This caveat having been made explicit, rather than left implicit, what conclusions can be reached?
I have discussed the Kunene schemes in some depth, showing that South Africa is presently illegally occupying her former mandated territory, and that she is arming mightily, to enforce her occupation. Land in Namibia is divided between "white" rich areas and "black" poor areas. South Africa wishes to create "nations" in each of these areas, so that her strategic plans for the whole region may be fulfilled.

I have shown, too, that the "white" rich areas need labour, water and power from the "black" poor areas. The Kunene schemes satisfy at least two of these needs. The schemes may satisfy the third need as well, if Ovamboland's economy is in fact "developed" very slowly by the schemes, so that the Ovambo workers must seek employment in the "white" rich areas, and yet their families have some agricultural income.

I have shown increasing internal and external, political and military conflict about the future of Namibia. Clearly the ruling groups will benefit by these schemes, economically and strategically. However, the schemes could be used in the conflict against their designers, if water, labour and power were to be simultaneously withheld from the southern areas.

The schemes, if successful, will allow great (illegal) accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few people. This (illegal) accumulation of wealth is backed by, and in turn finances, massive force and structural violence.

It has been suggested that the political conflict has an economic base, which includes the economy's infrastructure. This infrastructure is not a neutral factor in the political and economic conflict between groups in a society. Thus, a country's infrastructure may be designed by those who rule, to serve their own economic and political interests, both in the short and long term.

However, the economic interdependence which is created thereby could be used against the rulers. Given awareness and
organisation on the part of the ruled groups, it may be possible
to turn the infrastructure against its designers to end formal
rule. Accordingly, the ruling groups attempt to hamper or
destroy awareness and organisation among the ruled groups, by
the use of structural and physical violence.

The outcome of the conflict in any particular political economy
of this type is not certain in the short or medium term, for,
in addition to the above, there are other important variables.
For example, where infrastructural domination is attempted in
a colonial political economy, international factors may be
crucial in determining the outcome, following what Spinola
calls the Law of the Internationalisation of National Problems.
The ruled groups in Namibia would be foolhardy, however, to
depend on international factors to solve their problems for them,
especially as important foreign interests benefit by the
Namibian colonial situation.

Despite this, in time, international pressure and the border war
may force South Africa to perform a strategic withdrawal from
direct rule of Namibia. Even then, the design of the Kunene
schemes is such that they might continue to underdevelop the
northern areas, and Namibia generally, for the benefit of those
who accumulate capital in the world system. Such a "neo-
colonial" solution would be an efficient application by the
ruling groups of Machiavelli's third law for conquerors,
adapted for a Capitalist age. A ruling social class will
have been created which will allow the continual expatriation
of Namibia's wealth, yet the country will have its independence.

How can one oppose colonial development projects? Surely
dams, pipe-lines and power-plants can only benefit the
territory? Surely they will be useful after independence?

Let us look at the motive behind such schemes. We saw above
that one Pretoria authority remarked:
"Few people can seriously believe that sovereign
independent states' international relations are determined by motives other than self-interest. The question is only whether this self-interest is enlightened or not". (3).

As to enlightenment, one need only look at the pattern of distribution of the world's wealth and income in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Meillassoux summarises the problem:

"The aim of the intervention of the capitalist nations in the economies of the underdeveloped countries is not the development of those countries, still less the granting of aid; it is rather the exploitation, under the cover of humanitarianism, of resources and men. 'Exploitation', not development, is the key word to describe the relationship between these nations; all the so-called techniques of development are, in this context, no more than the techniques of exploitation designed to expatriate wealth". (4).

Surely water and power are good things to bring to an arid land? Does not the present diminished opposition to the Kunene schemes, since the failure of the Portuguese Angolan settlement dream, show that the schemes can be used for the people of Namibia "after independence"? Superficially, perhaps yes, yet the problems are more complex.

The Kunene schemes bring water and power primarily to Namibia's export industries. They will not necessarily promote integrated regional self-sufficient development. They will perpetuate Namibia's status as an exploited peripheral region, serving the world economy on a basis of unequal exchange and low returns to labour.

The assumption "after independence" cannot easily be made. By increasing the wealth and, hence, the power of the ruling groups; by diminishing the contradictions within the fractions of Capital, which will no longer compete for inadequate power and water resources; by enabling the continued fragmentation of the people of the territory; by maintaining a monopoly over the technology of production; possibly by increasing returns to otherwise potentially hostile foreign interests, the schemes
may delay formal independence, and allow time for the creation of a neo-colonial solution.

Moreover, both before and after "independence", racism remains to be abolished. Pinpointing ownership of the means of production is the fundamental tool of understanding social conflict, to which must be added an awareness of the "nationalities problem" and racism. One cannot read Winthrop Jordan's astounding work\(^5\) without realising the destructive deep-rooted power of ethnic consciousness fostered by ruling groups. As Bishop Wood showed in his arguments quoted above, the Kunene schemes in themselves do little to improve the situation.

The schemes have their drawbacks even "after independence". They represent skewed development of the river basin, biased towards the needs of the world and South African capitalist systems. In the same way as expanding ground-nut production is worse for Senegal and better for French, or world, capitalism, than developing the Senegal River, so too are the Kunene River schemes not completely in the regions' interests. Like ground-nut development in Senegal, they will not "permit really integrated agro-industrial self-sufficient and independent development"\(^6\). Together with the balkanisation of the Southern African sub-continent, they perpetuate dependency and underdevelopment.

But are not the Great Powers forcing accelerated change on Southern Africa? Will there not be a "move away from discrimination", bringing reform and progress? Despite, or rather, because of, our recent history, I believe Leo Marquard correctly understood the folly of reformism when he wrote, almost forty years ago:

"It is apparent that the limits of reformism have been reached, and that any further improvement in the living conditions of the non-European proletariat will have to be achieved along the lines of industrial action, rather than by liberal influence in politics". (7).

It is exceedingly unlikely that South African rulers, or their
North Atlantic counterparts, will bring about reforms truly in the interests of the people of Southern Africa.

To quote Leo Marquard again, writing of an earlier period:

"South Africa's apparent political independence prevents the Imperial Government from interfering in its internal arrangements, but its dependent economic status binds it securely to Imperial interests in Britain. The ruling class in Britain is thus able to enjoy the financial benefits of association with South Africa, while discarding all responsibility for the welfare of the mass of the inhabitants.... Union Governments have secured the interests of capitalists by a similar arrangement called, in this case, segregation, or 'governing the Native along his own lines'.... South Africa will not escape the consequences of capitalism merely by becoming independent of Great Britain". (8).

Transposed, his analysis is apt for Namibia today. Namibia will not escape the consequences of capitalism merely by becoming independent of South Africa; the economic capitals of the Southern African empire will still hold sway; liberal reformism, by Great Power pressure or by 'verligtes', will not bring real change in the condition of the proletariat; apparent political independence, or "governing the Native along his own lines", will not end exploitative relationships, internally or internationally.

These statements are true only to the degree that the people of Namibia and of the whole region remain unconscious of their own potential to achieve radical change and, hence, to the degree that they are disorganised and unled. Self-determination, freedom, and a lack of exploitation, are not commodities given away in tinsel wrapping inside a tall building in New York: they have to be created on the ground. I have suggested that the Kunene schemes will not necessarily aid this creation.

This is not to suggest that the Kunene schemes are not potentially useful in the long run. They may yet be used to end formal colonial rule. After independence, under a government conscious of the problems, they may yet play their part in the
formation of an integrated self-sufficient, and just economy for a united Southern African region. Water and energy are useful in a desert. This is a far-off dream, however. For the present, the ruling groups will perhaps find it easier to rule and prosper with the Kunene schemes than without them.

Regarding the immediate conflict, one Namibian, tried under South African law, said in court in April, 1968:

"We believe that South Africa has a choice - either to live at peace with us or to subdue us by force. If you choose to crush us and impose your will on us then you will not only betray your trust, but you will live in security for only so long as your power is greater than ours. No South African will live at peace in South West Africa, for each will know that his security is based on force and that without force, he will face rejection by the people of South West Africa". (9)
NOTES: CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSION:


2. "Neo-colonialism" is used here in the sense defined by the All-African Peoples' Conference of 1961, that is: "...the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries, which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means".


5. Winthrop Jordan, 1974
6. Amin, 1974 c : 87
7. Marquard, 1939, 1942 : 244 (pseudonym J Burger)
8. ibid : 250-251

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