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TITLE: TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND PUBLIC OPINION IN BOTSWANA

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A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

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Faculty of the Humanities
University of Cape Town
2011

COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: ___________________________ Date: ____________________
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

My sincere gratitude to all whose invaluable support, assistance and inspiration contributed to the completion of my research. Firstly, I would like to thank the almighty God, bless His holy name because only He knows my journey.

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ABSTRACT

Renewed scholarly interest on chieftaincy hardly pays attention to the interaction between traditional leadership and modern democratic citizens. It is the state-chieftaincy relationship that has dominated much of the current research on traditional leadership in modern Africa. Even work that has been done on traditional leadership and the modern democratic state is mostly qualitative and speculative. This has led to the field being flooded by mostly qualitative and speculative assumptions on traditional rule. Botswana has not been immune to this anomaly.

By employing public opinion data from the Afrobarometer surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008, the study hopes to contribute towards the limited empirical research on traditional leaders, particularly in Botswana, which will make a valuable contribution to a more profound and grounded picture of traditional leadership in an era of heightened democratization resulting from economic development and modernization.

Earlier, proponents of the modernization theory suggested a linear and unidirectional shift from traditional values with the advent of modernization. They argued the two were incompatible. While contemporary contributors disagreed with the incompatibility of tradition and modernity and the movement away from traditional values, they maintained that indeed, with modernization, comes changes in social life such as urban living, higher education, news media use, internal efficacy and occupational specialization, which make it conducive for democracy to thrive while in the process diminishing alliances to traditional ways of life.

By comparing Batswana’s perceptions on traditional and democratic authorities, the study sought to establish whether as the country has long accommodated chieftaincy in its modern structures, and as Batswana continue to develop economically and educationally, do they support their traditional leaders less than they do their democratic authorities. Hence, the following question; how committed and supportive are Batswana to traditional and democratic leadership? And how has this changed over time?
Results from the descriptive analysis showed that Batswana highly support democracy and they prove this by going further to reject non-democratic alternatives such as one-party rule, one-man rule and military rule. On the other hand, while they disapprove of traditional leaders and do not engage with them much, they also called for an increase in the influence traditional leaders currently have and for traditional leadership structures such as the kgotla to be preserved. Support for traditional leadership remained lower than support for democracy throughout the survey years, but in terms of engagement, Batswana do not adequately engage with either their traditional or elected leaders.

For the explanatory analysis, the results showed that the modernization hypothesis does not explain much of the differences in support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities. However, a number of the modernization variables on their own offered a better explanation of differences in perceptions on authorities. While the study mainly set out to test the modernization argument, it acknowledged the possibility of other explanations and so tested socio-demographics (age and gender) and performance evaluations (leadership trust and corruption). Performance evaluations also did very little to explain Batswana’s support for and engagement with traditional and democratic leadership. Age on the other hand proved to be a stronger predictor of support and engagement with authorities. This has been attributed to the fact that most of the modernization variables tested are embedded within age. For instance, it is mostly the younger generation who are highly educated, who expose themselves to news media, have higher feelings of efficacy and show more interest in political issues. In the end, the study suggested a further look into reasons why Batswana fail to engage with both their traditional and elected leaders; the role they want their chiefs to play and what else since the modernization argument is not adequate, can explain how Batswana formulate opinions about their traditional leaders.

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1 In particular, education, news media use, internal efficacy and interest in politics in particular.
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

Introduction and the Problem

Africa has in the past two decades experienced renewed scholarly interest in the institution of traditional leadership, borne from the wave of democratization that swept over the continent in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This global movement towards democracy rekindled debates about the relationship between traditional leadership and modern democratic rule. African countries were faced with the challenge of defining the proper role and position of the institution of traditional leadership within their new democratic structures, with some successfully blending the two and others struggling to do so. Botswana is one of the countries that apparently blended their traditional and democratic institutions successfully. Hence, the country has a much longer experience with the issue at hand as it has enjoyed continuous democratic rule since attaining independence in 1966, and at the same time has retained the institution of traditional leadership at both the national and local levels. Since independence, the country has despite its legacy of poverty, experienced greater economic growth and development, which have resulted in greater security, mass education and urbanization.


4 Proctor (1968:59), Düsing (2002) and Molomo (2004) articulate that in Botswana, a solution has been sought not only at the level of Local government, where much of the chief’s powers has been transferred to elected district councils, but also at the national level, where a house of Chiefs has been created to advise government and parliament. See also Düsing (2002) Traditional Leadership and Democratisation in Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.

5 Mogalakwe (1997:25) argues that at independence, Botswana was listed amongst the world’s poorest countries, having inherited very little from the colonial period. That the country was able to transform itself led many to refer to it as an African ‘miracle’. The country reached the highest growth rate in the 1990s (see also Good K. 2008:1).

Economic development through its resultant attributes mentioned above, is argued to promote changes in social structure and values, which in turn promote democracy. This has led to the rising scholarly interest on the relationship between traditional leadership and democracy. The relationship between traditional and democratic authority has two parts: first, it touches on the way in which the modern democratic state and traditional leadership have managed to coexist and accommodate each other; and second it relates to the interaction between the institution of traditional leadership and the modern democratic citizens. While the state-chieftaincy accommodation and compatibility has dominated much research (Fokwang 2009; Williams 2010 & 2004; Molomo 2004), it is the second part that delves into people’s opinions on traditional leadership and their motives for the views they hold that remains under-researched. Yet as many would agree, the importance of opinions held by the masses on issues such as this one cannot be ignored as people are the primary beneficiaries of the state-chieftaincy accommodation.

This study purposes to interrogate popular perspectives on traditional leadership in Botswana, with the aim to establish how Batswana evaluate their traditional and democratic authorities in an era of heightened modernization. Because, not only has the country been labeled as one of the fastest modernizing economies, Batswana have also been found to be highly supportive of modern democratic structures. They however continue to live under the authority of chiefs, especially at the local level. The present study asks; how committed and supportive are Batswana to traditional and democratic leadership? And how has this changed over time? In answering the above, the following supporting questions are to be answered;

i) Do Batswana approve of and support the institution of traditional leadership in this modern era? How does this compare with their support for democracy and democratic authority?


ii) To what extent do they engage with traditional leadership? How does this compare with their engagement with democratic authority? And;

iii) What best explains or predicts Batswana’s support and engagement with traditional leadership?

The Argument:

i) Hypotheses

The above questions are asked and framed within the following descriptive and explanatory hypotheses;

i. Firstly, I expect Batswana to be less supportive of traditional leadership than they are of democratic authority. I expect them to engage less frequently with traditional leadership than they do with democratic authority. I also expect that support for and engagement with traditional authorities should be declining over the years while support for and engagement with democracy and democratic authorities should been rising;

ii. Secondly, I expect that modernized Batswana (hereby referring to educated, urban, efficacious citizens as well as those who frequently expose themselves to news media, those interested in politics, those belonging to professional and associational groups, those with better living standards - not living in poverty - as well as skilled workers), will be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities as compared to non-modernized Batswana. The former are in addition, expected to be more supportive of democracy as well as more engaging with democratic authorities, than the latter whom I expect to be more supportive and more engaging with traditional authorities.

ii) Theory and Logic

The above hypotheses are rooted within modernization theory whose origin can be traced to the Enlightenment era, when economic development began to be linked with cultural
change. At its beginning, modernization was understood within two theories; the evolutionary and functionalist theories which according to So (1990:19) were born in the early nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the industrial revolution and French revolution. The industrial revolution with its application of science and technology, led to rising productivity, a new factory production system, and the conquest of the world market while the French revolution created a whole new political order based on equality, liberty, freedom and parliamentary democracy.

Changes in production systems and political order were linked to various transformations of social life but mostly they have been credited with changes in human thought and activity, giving birth to differences between modern and traditional societies (Huntington 1971; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Modernization theory gained popularity in the post World War II period, a time during which the Western capitalist and communist superpowers, United States of America and Soviet Union in particular, sought to extend their influence over other nations that emerged weak from the war as well as developing nation-states seeking to promote and enhance their economies and political independence.

Classical modernization theorists envisioned changes brought about by modernization as having a universal impact upon all individuals and societies experiencing political and economic change. It is within this understanding that earlier contributors to the literature on socio economic development and social change emphasized the passing away of traditional life ways in the face of modernization (Lerner 1958, Inkeles and Smith 1974). The main argument of classical modernists hinged on the idea that traditional structures would eventually make way for the modern ones, as they were incompatible with modernity.

However, these classical conceptualizations of modernization did not escape criticism, as a number of contemporary social scientists (Bendix 1970; Dube 1988; Inglehart 1997; Norris 2002) found fault with them, raising the following questions; are tradition and modernity really incompatible? Can modernization totally displace traditional values? Critics of the

---

9 See Inglehart and Welzel (2005:16) Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence

earlier conception of modernization disagreed with assumptions of a unidirectional and linear transition from traditional to modern settings as well as the incompatibility between tradition and modernity, noting that change is not necessarily linear.

Nonetheless, contemporary contributors to the modernization theory did not completely dispel the classical version of modernization as Inglehart and Welzel (2005:1) further consent that:

> Although the classic view of modernization ... was wrong on many points, the central insight – that socio economic development brings major social, cultural and political changes – is correct.

As such, there remains consensus between earlier and contemporary advocates of the modernization theory, on the applicability and utility of the basic idea of modernization even at present. Furthermore, contemporary literature on modernization displays renewed belief in the perspective that socio economic development does bring about long-term changes in people’s life-ways, believed to be driven by certain characteristic features of modernization such as; rising educational levels, news media use, changing gender roles, wealth and high degree of social mobility and heightened participation among others.11

The stated hypotheses are also influenced by scholarly writings such as those of Keulder (1998) and Sekgoma (1994) who posit that traditional leadership in Botswana faces a crisis in the advent of modernity. In particular, Keulder (1998:131) states,

> ... traditional leaders and their institutions are facing a crisis as the modern state continues to achieve important victories over them and as modernization strongly affects (rural) life.

Sekgoma further purports that as Batswana develop educationally and economically, with more people living in urban areas, the place and relevance of traditional leadership becomes increasingly minimal. Therefore, the future of traditional leadership in Botswana has been questioned and has been portrayed as rather ‘gloomy’ and ‘far from bright’.

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Significance of the Study

As alluded to earlier, research on traditional leadership hardly pays attention to how modern people feel about traditional authorities. This has led to the contention that popular perceptions of traditional leadership remain under researched. This study hopes to contribute towards chieftaincy literature with empirical data, and in the process towards our understanding of individual attitudes towards traditional leadership in modern democratic Botswana. The study also hopes to provide enlightenment on the future of traditional leadership in the country, by establishing whether popular perceptions of traditional leadership are rising or declining.

Establishing that Batswana’s commitment to traditional institutions persists despite their encounter with modernization, cautions against the inaccuracy of the modernization theory, while corroborating the study hypotheses that with economic development and modernization, traditional alliances are broken, speaks volumes about the gloomy future of Tswana chieftaincy, as Batswana continue to experience greater economic development.

On the other hand, continued support for traditional leadership calls for an understanding of how Batswana wish to relate with their traditional authorities, especially at a time where they also have democratic leadership to meet their needs.

Study Outline

This study comprises of six chapters organized as follows; chapter one as presented is the introduction which covers the problem statement, study questions, the argument as well as the significance of the study. Chapter 2 presents the state of knowledge elaborating current understanding on the issue at hand. Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methodology of the study while chapter four presents and discusses data on the descriptive hypothesis. Chapter five presents the explanatory data analysis while the final chapter (six), concludes the study, providing recommendations and directions for further research.
CHAPTER TWO – STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

Introduction

Previous research (Williams 2004 & 2010; Fokwang 2009; Logan 2008 & 2009; Oomen 2005; Keulder 1998; Nyamnjoh 2002) contributing to our current understanding of the relationship between traditional leadership and modernization affirms the resilience and continued relevance of traditional authority in the modern democratic era. Traditional leadership has been found to continue to play a role in local communities such as; mobilizing local populations for development projects, resolving disputes as well as providing order and security (Molomo 2004; Williams 2010). When speaking about the role played by traditional leadership in Botswana, various contributors\(^1\) often make reference to pre-colonial and post independence times, asserting that chiefs in the pre-colonial period held unlimited powers, which saw them performing all legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Upon encounter with the colonial and post independence administrations traditional leadership experienced a great loss of the unlimited powers they previously held. Most of the chiefly powers and responsibilities were transferred to the newly created local institutions in the form of land boards and district councils.\(^2\)

Though traditional leaders lost most of their previously held powers, scholars concede that in the face of modern changes, traditional leadership has shown its ability to adapt by constantly reinventing itself to accommodate and be accommodated within the modern state. However, understanding popular perceptions on traditional leadership has become indispensable at a time when much evidence points to how traditional authorities have resurfaced and only scant evidence shows how people actually feel about traditional leadership. Because, even though there is consensus amongst scholars that traditional leadership


\(^2\) For example, Acts such as the Matimela Act of 1968 and Tribal land Act of 1968-70, bestowed the responsibility to handle stray cattle upon district councils, leaving chiefs to no longer have power over collecting and disposing stray livestock, an important matter in a country whose economic success lies upon this commodity and one which the chiefs for a long time used to enrich themselves, as well as transferring the power to grant and withdraw land rights to the land Boards.
leadership continues to play a role in the lives of many today especially at the local level, this does not tell us much about how people feel about this institution. Hence as noted in the previous chapter, it remains under researched how modern people perceive the role played by traditional leadership and their willingness to live under them, especially where there now exists democratic alternatives.

The Resilience and Persistence of Traditional Authorities

In this section, I highlight some of the reasons often cited as justifications for the continued role of traditional leadership in modern Africa. Oomen (2005:193) argues for instance that traditional leadership resilience can be explained through a number of spheres such as: i) tradition and culture ii) state weakness and iii) the default need for a leader or the lack alternatives leadership.

In terms of tradition and culture, traditional leadership is viewed as a sanctified entity, connected to the ancestors and God. Mgadla (1998) argues that in Botswana, the chief is seen as a necessary link with the ancestors, hence the respect accorded him. He is regarded as a spirit medium who could communicate with the ancestors. When viewed in this manner, traditional leaders are placed at the top of religious or ritual practices by their communities. Which is why in Botswana for example, a traditional leader has been defined as one, who gave permission for and presided over important tribal rituals such as rainmaking (Mgadla 1998; Linchwe 1994). However, it is questionable whether the traditional sanctity of the chief remains so pure especially that in modern Botswana, ‘rainmaking’ is not as prominent as it used to be. Additionally, scholars such as Mamdani (1996) claim that, in modern society traditional leadership is not purely traditional, as it has been corrupted by colonial rule. Mamdani argues for instance that during colonial rule, the kgotla\textsuperscript{14} turned into a place where decisions were no longer discussed and debated with the

\textsuperscript{14}Mgadla P. (1994) conceptualizes the kgotla as an assembly or courtyard, where national (tribal) issues were discussed and debated, and laws and resolutions were passed. It was and still is a forum for the Batswana leaders and their subjects to announce laws and discuss matters affecting the village. In addition, the villagers had the opportunity to air their views.
populace, but a place where decisions were announced by the colonial administration. He further discredits the institution as causing divisions in the society where people become divided into citizens and subjects, the urban and rural dwellers as well as the central and local governments. The question then remains whether in this era, people still see the sanctity of this institution.

The persistence of traditional leadership has also been attributed to the weakness of the modern state.\textsuperscript{15} The thrust of the weak state argument is that chieftaincy remains useful mainly because the central government lacks the necessary capacity to fulfill its duties toward the masses and so it utilizes the chieftaincy to achieve its responsibility towards the people. Linchwe (1994) argues for example that,

\begin{quote}
...throughout the modern world where modern institutions and systems of government seem to fail, traditional institutions are looked upon as sources of support and sometimes as alternatives.
\end{quote}

According to the weak-state approach, chieftaincy remains a fortunate benefactor of an inefficient African state incapable of responding to the needs of the whole populace. This ties in with the ‘default need for leadership’ perspective as in some remote areas are close to people and can easily involve them in decision-making. Hence, chieftaincy is often believed to be the important link between the government and the local people.

However, Williams (2010:15) argues that while the weak-state explanation helps us to understand the ways in which the central state accommodates and utilizes the chieftaincy, it focuses too much attention on interactions with the state and too little on the specific relations between the chieftaincy and local populations. Additionally, how the weak-state argument applies in successful economies such as Botswana remains questionable, as the state apparatus is responsible for all social and economic provisions. In addition, as Williams notes, a lot remains unexplained about attitudes of individual citizens interacting with these authorities on the ground.

\textsuperscript{15} See Ubink (2007); & Chazan (1994)
Modernization Indicators and Commitment to Traditional Leadership

As highlighted in the previous chapter, contemporary modernization theory maintains the existence of a link between socio-economic development and a shift away from cultural and traditional life ways. Contemporary contributors to the modernization debate (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart 1997; Lerner 1958; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Dube 1988; Norris 2002) have brought to the fore inexhaustible list of qualities of modernized personalities, which they say affects the way modern men view their traditional authorities. Therefore, while justifications as those discussed above are often advanced and refuted as reasons for the way local populations view their chieftaincies, proponents of modernization theory posit that certain elements affect these views at the individual level. These elements include among others; urban living, rising education levels, news media use, higher public participation, higher mobility, readiness to form and hold opinions, the need to achieve, lesser poverty as well as increasing independence from authority. Socio-demographic attributes such as age and gender have also been linked to these components.

The modernization hypothesis posits that people living in urban areas display less commitment to traditional authority than those residing in rural areas. This is because traditional leadership influence is believed to be strong in rural areas where, due to the preservation of traditional norms and values in these communities and their geographical and political distance from the centre, people still hold their chiefs in high regard. It is mostly in rural areas that chiefs are viewed as the link between central government and the people at large whereas in urban areas there are many channels that can be used to reach the government other than the chiefs, leading to the belief that the institution remains significant to rural people than to those in urban areas. Kamrava (1993) also argues that, urban living causes an alteration in the values and behavior, as those who have migrated to cities in search of better jobs and higher living standards eventually develop a culture that does not resemble the values they adhered to when they were in their rural settings. Kamrava (1993:72) further states;
... the change from rural to urban surroundings carries with it definite, though at times gradual... alterations in the values and the behavior of those involved. Urbanization involves considerably more than a mere transfer of residence from rural to urban areas... (because) sooner or later, willingly or through force of time, even the more recent arrivals develop an ‘urbanized’ culture of their own which resembles neither the values they adhered to in the countryside...

Bratton et’al (2005:167) argue that socio-economic development in many parts of Africa has been characterized by urban bias, where urban residences have benefited more from development than rural areas, causing the latter to be abandoned by young, able populations in search of better opportunities in urban areas. The migration from rural to urban areas is argued to have left rural areas populated by older, unskilled workers as well as female citizens (ibid). As a result, rural areas are believed to be populated by people lagging behind in modern advancement as alluded to by Inkeles and Smith (1974) who posit that the average person of urban origin is more modern than the average person in a rural setting. Additionally, as people move from rural settings to urban areas and encounter different changes, they tend to detach themselves from the values they had while in the village, including respect for traditional authority (Kamrava 1993).

That withholding, Dube (1988:18) and Lerner (1958) add that people do not necessarily have to physically or geographically move to urban areas to experience such a change. They also experience change as they begin to identify with and demand new things from wherever they are, as well as place new demands upon themselves that are outside their rural experiences.

Formal education on the other hand is believed to be the highest predictor of individual modernity and catalyst to change. It is deemed to have the ability to shape people’s orientations towards politics (Bratton et’al 2005:204). Inkeles and Smith (1974) further argue that is is uncontested that education is a force behind behavior patterns of many as,
... no attribute of a person predicts his attitudes, values and behavior more consistently and powerfully than the amount of formal schooling he or she has received.

While it is also known that each culture has its own traditional wisdom and knowledge, it is formal schooling that impacts greatly upon individuals’ political attitudes. Hence the belief that people who have gone through the school system the longest will display different attitudes to those who have not been to school or those who have spent the least number of years in school. This is because education goes beyond the fundamentals of reading and writing, as instilling pro-democratic values in learners, promoting democratic citizenship as it furthers learners’ understanding of the political environment, making them begin to see democracy as preferable to any other alternatives (Mattes and Mughongho 2009). It is in this light that Bratton et al. (ibid) label education as a catalyst of change, capable of shaping people’s views. This view is reiterated by Kamrava (2003:158-159)’s argument that higher education plays a paramount role as an agent of political socialization, seen for example from the way university students are often quick and active in questioning authorities and voicing their displeasures over administrations of state affairs.

Education is also linked to other elements of modernization such as news media use mainly because it is often those who have been through formal schooling who see the value in using the news media such as listening to news from television or radio or even reading newspapers. Hence, like education, news media use is seen as the backbone of democratic behavior because it is from the news that people get information upon which they base their decisions about their political environment. Hence Lerner (1958) and Sechele (1994)’s argument that the mass media is influential in shaping people’s lives, by giving them information which people use to base their thinking and reactions upon. It is again the educated who often go on to get better jobs and receive cash payments, which they use to improve their standards of living.

Higher education levels and exposure to news media are also related to rising self-expression values. The two are believed to have the ability to increase people’s intellectual independence. This becomes evident as people begin to exercise their individual judgment
and do not depend on others to interpret the world for them (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Inkeles and Smith (ibid) further state that modern man is highly independent and autonomous especially when he is making basic decisions about how to conduct his personal affairs. For this reason, modern men find it worthy to discuss political matters, join trade unions as well as to belong to professional organizations, which they regard and follow more than they do their traditional leaders. In an attempt to explain what efficacy is, political scientists have divided the concept of political efficacy into two forms; internal and external efficacy. While the latter is about the responsiveness of the state and its structures to people’s needs, it is the former (internal efficacy), that I focus on, which is understood as individuals’ confidence that their actions can make a difference as well as bring about change. As such, there is a general belief among scholars that feelings of efficacy influence people’s social and political life. Such feelings are also believed to increase with one’s level of education.

Additionally, certain socio-demographic attributes such as age and gender have also been linked with changes in perceptions held about traditional rule. In traditional settings, decision-making power was based on age and though no law formerly prohibited them, young people were not expected to participate or contribute because they were viewed as minors, who could not make sound decisions. They were thought of to be adequately represented by their elders in all decision-making arenas. It is for this reason that traditional leadership has been accused of exclusion of youth and being biased towards the elderly. It can therefore be expected that young people will have a critical mind towards an institution that discriminates against them. The elderly on the other hand, are bound to be positive about an institution that has systematically favored them (Oomen 2005:108).

In connection with the above, Tswana traditional societies, like most traditional societies around the world, were characterized by patriarchal practices. The patriarchal nature of Tswana chieftaincy manifested itself in instances of participation and assumption of office which Somolekae (1994) summarizes as follows;

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In the traditional constitution, women had no recognized rights in public life. They could not participate in or attend public assemblies. Where their interests required consideration by authorities ... they were expected to process these through their male relatives (fathers, husbands, uncles, or sons).

Hence Oomen (2005:188) posits that the opinion held by women towards traditional leadership is similar to that held by young people because just as them, women suffered exclusion and discrimination from traditional institutions. Women’s duties in traditional societies did not extend beyond household chores, raising a family and working in the fields. Their lower status was evident in many instances such as the times when they got an invitation to sit at the kgotla, which often only occurred when they were asked to testify or give evidence in the traditional courts, where still, as Mgadla (1994) and Oomen (ibid: 189) note, they had to remain seated on the ground, their head covered and their eyes downcast.

**Previous research findings**

Addressing this study’s questions is largely affected by the limited empirical research on popular perspectives on the institution of traditional rule not only in Botswana but also throughout the rest of Africa, particularly in relation to how these have been influenced by the modernization theory. Most scholarship (Vaughan 2003, Sekgoma 1994, Gillert, Sharma, Jones, Somolekeae & Lekorwe 1994) on traditional leadership focus on the historical account of the institution, entailing its nature prior to colonial rule, and how it has interacted with the colonial and post-independence state.  

At the same time, most of these studies have remained speculative and qualitative about the relationship between traditional rule and democracy, even authors who complain about this anomaly, such as Morapedi (2010) and

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17 Oomen (2005;166) further notes that many recent works focus on the co-optation of traditional authority by the nation-state and describe the way in which traditional leaders have come to draw on different sources of legitimation in their role as ‘hinge points’ between the state and their community.
Keulder (1998) go on themselves to make qualitative and speculative conclusions on this issue. Nonetheless, an important work that offers a first cut at understanding how socio-demographic and modernization factors shape the way people evaluate their traditional leadership and democratic institutions in Southern Africa, is Logan’s (2009) study in which she makes use of the 1999 and 2003 Afrobarometer survey data to establish popular perceptions of traditional and elected leaders in 15 African countries. By her own admission, more still has to be done to broaden our understanding of how traditional authorities are faring in the minds of Africans in this era of democracy. Logan also admits her work is just a stepping-stone in gathering information on the relationship between traditional leadership and modern democracy in terms of perceptions held by the modernized citizens, and as such is far from providing enough understanding on this issue.\(^\text{18}\)

Whereas Logan focuses on support for traditional and democratic authority, the present study assesses in addition to popular support, an important aspect of support: popular engagement with authorities. Engagement with traditional and democratically elected leaders goes a step further to say if people profess support for their authorities, do they go on to engage with them? The study also uses a wider range of factors that tap on individuals’ modernization levels. Furthermore, this study attempts to establish the trend of support and engagement with traditional and democratic authority, to see whether such have been increasing or declining over the years.

Summary

Drawing from the above discussions, it is clear that traditional authority remains a part of modern governance, hence Molomo (2004)’s argument that chieftaincy should not be overlooked when discussing democratization in countries that still uphold it such as Botswana. While various reasons have been advanced for resilience of traditional authorities, such as on the basis of culture and tradition; state weakness as well as a link to central government. These however do not say much about the formulation of individual

\(^{18}\) See Logan (2009) Selected Chiefs, elected councilors and hybrid democrats: popular perspectives on the co-existence of democracy and traditional authority.
perceptions about traditional leadership. Additionally, it has been argued that economic development and modernization affect the way people evaluate their traditional institutions, hence the quest to establish how this plays out particularly in Botswana.
CHAPTER THREE—RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

As highlighted in chapter one, this study purposes to analyze popular perceptions on traditional leadership in Botswana, in comparison to those of democracy and democratic authority. This was driven by the realization that while state-chieftaincy relations dominated much research lately, public perceptions on traditional authorities in the modern era remain under researched. This chapter outlines the study design, methodologies and instruments used to address the research questions and hypotheses as proposed in chapter one.

Overview of the Data and Analysis

While data analysis for this study is mainly quantitative, when assessing popular perceptions of traditional leadership and democratic authorities I combined both descriptive and explanatory approaches in chapters four and five respectively, using public opinion data from four Afrobarometer surveys for Botswana conducted in 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008. Quantitative research provides precise numerical understanding of issues, however, using it may result in lost understanding of the theoretical aspect of situations as focus is placed on hypothesis testing. The knowledge generated may also be too abstract for application to the larger population. This is often the case particularly when dealing with people’s perceptions as people are unique and do not all respond in the same way to phenomena. Nonetheless, these concerns have been addressed in this study by providing theoretical discussions and explanations where applicable.

Afrobarometer surveys in Botswana are carried out by academics from the University of Botswana with the help of trained research assistants. For each survey, data were collected

19 The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of national mass attitudes on democracy, markets and civil society. The project is implemented by an international network of researchers in universities and non-governmental research institutes, primarily based in Africa. Afrobarometer is dedicated to producing reliable data on public opinion in Africa, which are used by decision makers in government, non-governmental policy advocates, donor agencies and academic researchers (www.afrobarometer.org)
from a sample of 1,200 adults selected from across all 26 districts in the country. Selection of respondents was done in such a way that every eligible adult had an equal and known chance of being selected. Afrobarometer questionnaires for Botswana were administered face-to-face using one of the country’s two official languages; Setswana and English. The choice of which language to use when administering questionnaires depended largely upon each respondent’s most preferred or understood language.

Conceptualization and Measurement of Variables

Dependent Variables

Drawing from the study questions and hypotheses, the following are the dependent variables; i) Support (for traditional leadership and democracy) and ii) Engagement (with traditional and democratic authorities).

Support for Traditional leadership, Democracy and Rejection of Non-democratic Alternatives

An institution of Tswana social and political organization, traditional leadership was the centre of political life in various Tswana states from time immemorial. At the centre of the institution are two prominent features: the chief and kgotla system. As noted in chapter two, the institution is based largely on ideas of deference and respect for authority, heredity of leadership particularly in the male line, as well as emphasis on community ahead of the individual. These features of traditional leadership formed the basis for arguments by modernists on the institution’s incompatibility with the ethos and practices of modern democracy, which provide civil and political liberties such as the freedom for people to choose their leaders. Support for traditional leadership is herein conceptualized as popularly held perceptions that indicate popular acceptance of traditional rule. In order to establish

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20 See Logan (2009) and Somolekae & Lekorwe (1994)
how much support or rejection is there for traditional authority, the study made use of a series of questions adopted from Afrobarometer survey instruments;

- **Do you approve or disapprove of decisions to be made by traditional leaders or chiefs?** 1) Strongly disapprove, 2) Disapprove, 3) neither approve nor disapprove, 4) Approve or 5) strongly approve.

- **Do you approve of or reject rule by traditional leaders?**

While the following two questions did not ask directly about traditional leadership, they were used to trace support for traditional leadership governance at the local level:

- **Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your local community should increase, stay the same or decrease?** 1) Decrease a lot, 2) Decrease somewhat, 3) Stay the same, 4) Increase somewhat or, 5) Increase a lot.

- **Which of the following is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or statement 2.** Statement 1: The kgotla system is too cumbersome and outdated; it is no longer useful as a forum of public consultation. Statement 2: the kgotla system is part of our culture and helps to strengthen our democracy; it should be retained as a forum of public consultation.

Measuring support for democracy took into consideration arguments advanced by contributors to the modernization hypothesis that economic development makes democracy probable. Support for democracy is hereby conceptualized as favorable orientations towards democratic authority, which result in preferring it as the best form of government. To measure these, the following question asking respondents whether they prefer democracy to any other form of governance was used;

- **Which of these statements is closest to your opinion?** A. Democracy is always preferable B. Non-democratic government can be preferable C. makes no difference.”
When people support democracy, they are in turn expected to reject non-democratic alternatives and as such the following question asking Batswana whether they approve of or reject alternative forms of governance such as one man rule, one party rule and military rule is used; *would you approve or disapprove of the following alternatives?* A. *Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office;* B. *the army comes in to govern the country;* C. *Elections and the parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.*

**Engagement with Traditional and Democratic Authority**

Engaging with traditional and democratic authorities is seen as a way through which people can get involved with the affairs of their communities. It is arguably an extension of support. Bratton *et al* (2005:193) define engagement as people’s actions that are more or less aimed at influencing leadership and these they acknowledge, include among other things, contacting leadership for reasons such as informing them of their problems. Assessing the extent to which Batswana engage with traditional leadership was hence operationalized in terms of contact with traditional leadership and the following question was used;

- *During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about an important problem or to give them your views: A traditional leader?* 0) *Never,* 1) *only once,* 2) *a few times or* 3) *Often.*

On the other hand, contact with local elected leadership was traced through the following question;

- *During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about an important problem or to give them your views: local government councilor?* 0) *Never,* 1) *only once,* 2) *a few times or,* 3) *Often.*

It is important to note here that questions on support for traditional and democratic authority are asked at the national level, while those on engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities are asked at the local level. It is argued that it is at the local level
that people are truly faced with competing claims of authority by both traditional and democratically elected leaders in the capacity of councilors.21

Independent/ Explanatory variables

While chapter four offers an analysis of support for and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities displayed by Batswana in general, in chapter five I made use of several indicator and attributes of modernization to establish whether they account for the differences in support for and engagement with these authorities. These include; education, urban living, news media use, interest in politics, internal efficacy, lived poverty, professional and associational memberships as well as occupational status.

Competing explanations

While the above indicators were used to explain support for and engagement with traditional and democratic leadership, the present study acknowledges that people’s perceptions about traditional and democratic leaders are not only determined by social forces.22 Other variables may also possess explanatory power to the manner in which people support and engage with their authorities. In this regard, the following factors were also included in the analysis; socio-demographic factors (mainly age and gender) and performance evaluations (leadership trustworthiness and corruption).

Leadership trustworthiness was captured through the following question;

21 See Logan (2009)

• How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Traditional leaders? 1) Never, 2) Sometimes, 3) Most of the Time, 4) Just about always or 5) haven’t heard enough.

And, leadership corruption on the other hand was traced by means of the following question;

• how many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Traditional leaders? / elected local government councilor? 0) None, 1) Some of them, 2) Most of them, 3) All of them or 5) haven’t heard enough.

Statistical tools and Analysis

The first hypothesis (descriptive), posits Batswana to be generally less supportive of traditional leadership than democratic authority and to assess this I used frequency distributions23 in chapter four to establish general scores for the dependent variables. Output is displayed through bar charts and line graphs. Analyzing data from all four rounds of Afrobarometer of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008 was considered important here especially for purposes of establishing the pattern of support and engagement with authorities over the years.

For purposes of testing the second hypothesis (explanatory), which suggests that modernized personalities will be less supportive and less engaging with traditional authorities than non-modernized personalities, the study employed the following statistical techniques; The first step involved running crosstabulations with each independent variable (rural/urban status, education, news media use, interest in politics, self efficacy, lived poverty, occupational status and professional and associational memberships) and the dependent variables (support for traditional leadership and engagement with traditional leadership), to determine the existence of a relationship between the independent and

23 Kranzler J.N (2007:35) Statistics for the terrified states, ‘Frequency distributions organize and summarize data by displaying in tabular form how often specific scores were obtained’.
dependent variables. The next step established the strength and direction of the association of the variables through Kendall’s rank order tau-c (Kendall’s tau-c) correlation coefficients. Kendall’s tau-c was used since all the predictors together with the dependent variables, are ordinal. Values of Kendall’s tau-c coefficients range from -1 denoting a negative association to +1 denoting a positive association between the two variables. On the other hand, a correlation of 0 indicates the absence of a relationship between the two variables. Lastly, multiple regression analysis was used to determine how much impact each of the explanatory variables has on support for and engagement with traditional leaders. This was done using the forced entry method, where all the independent variables were entered into the model (Kranzler 2007; David de Vaus 2002).

Recoding/Collapsing variables

One of the disadvantages of secondary data is that it is not always arranged or gathered for all the issues that the researcher using it may want to address. Hence, the need to recreate some variables as needed. For instance, in terms of news media use, interest in politics, lived poverty, self-efficacy, professional and associational memberships and occupational class, I had to collapse a number of variables to create these.

Handling Missing data: Missing values and ‘Don’t know’ responses

When analyzing data, I had to deal with gaps occurring in the data as a result of respondents having given non-valid responses which were labeled as ‘missing data’ as well as instances where they had ‘refused to answer’. I excluded such cases from the analysis through “pair-wise deletion”. Pair-wise deletion is a method often used in bivariate analysis to exclude any case that has a missing value on either of the pair of variables for which a variable is being examined.24

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24 See David de Vaus (2002:72-73)
Secondly, where respondents were offered non-responsive options such as ‘don’t know’, it is often a challenge to understand what exactly the respondent meant when giving such a response. Nonetheless, a number of ways have been suggested to handle these cases, including treating them as a middle position and including them in the analysis. In this way, dealing with ‘don’t know’ responses requires careful consideration of the circumstances leading to respondents giving a ‘don’t know’ response. For instance, where the scale of responses contains neutral options such as ‘neither approve nor disapprove’, as well as ‘don’t know’, the latter will be recoded into the neutral position because in such cases, don’t know reflects a neutral position between two sides of an attitude. Additionally, in instances where there is no option for neutrality, such as where the scale is set as follows; ‘never’, ‘only once’, ‘a few times’ or ‘often’, a don’t know response will be recoded into the ‘never’ category and still be included in the analysis because chances are that if one has ever participated in something, even if they were to forget the frequency with which they did participate, chances are they would report that as ‘only once’ or ‘sometimes’.

Criteria of Acceptance and/or Rejection

Results from testing the first hypothesis through frequency distributions are acceptable when percentage values of support for and engagement with traditional leadership are found to be generally less than those of democratic authority as this will be an indication of general lesser support for traditional leadership as hypothesized. On the other hand, acceptable statistical significance for the second hypothesis is set at the 0.05 level and results falling within this significance level will be accepted as corroborating the modernization argument. However, results falling outside this significance level will not be out rightly rejected but will be accepted as an indication of the particular explanatory factor’s weakness in explaining variance, hence weakening the modernization argument.
Challenges and Limitations

While I set out to analyze data from all four Afrobarometer survey rounds (1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008), I found that not all questions I intended to use from the surveys were asked throughout all the four surveys. In particular, the 2005 survey instrument did not ask questions in relation to support for or approval of traditional authorities. For instance, while respondents were asked in all four survey instruments of their support for democracy, the same was not done for support for traditional authorities. Therefore, only two questions that tapped on support for traditional leadership asked in the 1999 and 2003 surveys were used to measure support for chieftaincy. This inconsistency was however less of a challenge in terms of support for democracy. Another challenge I faced was with the use of statistical tools for data analysis. While at the beginning I had no statistics background, I however had to use statistical methods to analyze data in chapters 4 and 5. I nonetheless overcame this challenge by enrolling for a semester statistics course and as such was able to do the data analysis.
CHAPTER FOUR – SUPPORT AND ENGAGEMENT WITH TRADITIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITIES - DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Introduction

As has been reiterated in the previous chapters, contributors to the modernization debate such as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Norris (2002) posit that as societies experience socio-economic development and industrialization, they experience changes such as urbanization, formal schooling, leading to skilled workmanship and more professional classes as well as lesser lived poverty. As a result, links to traditional livelihoods are weakened while in the process support for democracy is increased. In line with this argument, the chapter presents the descriptive analysis of Batswana’s perceptions of their traditional and democratic authorities. In doing so, the chapter addresses the following descriptive questions proposed in chapter one:

- do Batswana approve of and support traditional leadership in the modern democratic era? How does this compare with their support for democracy?
- To what extent do they engage with traditional leadership and how does this compare with the way they engage with democratic leadership?
- How has support for and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities changed over time?

The above questions carry with them descriptive hypotheses that were outlined in the introductory chapter as follows:

- that Batswana will be more supportive of democracy than they are of traditional leadership;
- that they will engage less frequently with traditional leaders than they will engage with democratically elected leaders and;
that support for and engagement with traditional leadership will be declining over the years while support for and engagement with democratic authority will be rising.

As also noted in Chapter 3, support for democracy and traditional authority is assessed at the national level, while engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities is assessed at the local level. It is at the local level that people are faced with competing claims of authority by both traditional and democratically elected leaders in the capacity of councilors.

**National Regime Preferences**

The advent of the third wave of democratization brought about fundamental transformations to Africa’s indigenous political structures. As most African countries sought to liberalize their economies and adopt democratic values primarily due to international pressure, different political regimes emerged. However, in most developing countries it proved difficult to set up stable democratic governments. Bratton et al. (2005:15) reiterate that the formation of new political regimes and the road to independence in many African countries did not follow a linear and smooth process, it was characterized by the formation of one-party states as well as military governments, which however did not deliver on their promises to the people and as such were met by demands for change from the masses.

While Batswana have not experienced authoritarian rule in the form of one-man rule or military rule, the country has not evaded criticism especially regarding the accommodation of traditional leadership, which is arguably undemocratic, in its modern structures. On the other hand, arguments about one-party rule in the country surface when considering the lengthy dominance of politics by a single party (the Botswana Democratic Party), which has consistently won all the elections since the first democratic elections leading to independence in 1965 (Lekorwe 2009; Good 2008). Additionally, President Ian Khama’s leadership style has been criticized by many as having elements of one-man rule (ibid). Nonetheless, the country is still regarded as one of Africa’s success stories in terms of
upholding democratic values (Molomo 2009). Below, I analyze Batswana’s support and rejection of different regime types; democratic rule, traditional leadership and authoritarian or non-democratic alternatives (in the form of one-man rule, one-party rule and military rule).

**Support for Democracy**

Support for democracy is hereby assessed by means of a standard question asked in all four Afrobarometer surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008 as follows: *which of these statements is closest to your own opinion?* Statement 1: to someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have, Statement 2: in some situations, a non-democratic government can be preferable, Statement 3: Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. Respondents who expressed that democracy is always preferable are herein considered to be supportive of democracy. Results from the 2008 Afrobarometer survey as displayed in figure 4.1 below show that Batswana are highly supportive of democracy (86 percent). Less than 10 percent in both instances of respondents said it did not matter which form of government they had or that in some instances non-democratic government can be preferable. From the result, it is evident that democracy enjoys greater popular support in Botswana.
Rejection of Non-democratic Alternatives

Following from the above, democratization scholars posit that popular support for democracy should extend to the point where people see democracy as ‘the only game in town’, rejecting all non-democratic alternatives. To see whether Batswana’s support for democracy goes beyond just an expression of preference, respondents were asked the following question through which they had to state whether they approve or reject non-democratic alternatives such as one man rule, one party rule and military rule: *there are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?* A. Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office; B. the army comes in to govern the country, C. Elections and the parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.

When measuring support for democracy, it becomes necessary for researchers to look beyond simple attitudes of support for democracy as Lekorwe argues, to people’s willingness to reject non-democratic alternatives. Unlike many Africans, Batswana have never been subjected to any form of authoritarian governance, yet, results of the 2008
survey data as presented in figure 4.2 reveal a massive rejection of non-democratic alternatives, with one-man rule being the highest rejected at 92 percent. Hence, not only do Batswana express support for democracy, they further reject non-democratic forms of government.

![Figure 4.2: Rejection of non-democratic alternatives - 2008](image)

**Approval of and/or Rejection of Traditional Leadership**

While the above regimes; one-man rule, one-party rule and military rule are out rightly undemocratic, scholars such as Molomo (2004) and Somoleke and Lekorwe (1998) acknowledge that traditional leadership in Botswana does not amount to authoritarian rule. However, some of its features such as deference of authority, lack of election for office as well as its patriarchal nature make it seem ambiguously undemocratic. Hence the need to seek an understanding of how Batswana’s support for traditional rule fares in the face of modernization and heightened support for democracy. To do so, I use the following questions asked in 1999 and 2003 surveys: *do you approve or disapprove of decisions to be made by chiefs? Do you approve or reject rule by chiefs? Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing their local community should increase, stay the same or decrease?* While these questions did not ask respondents directly whether they
support traditional leadership as is the case with the question asked about support for
democracy, they give an indication of whether people approve of or reject it. Note that the
2005 and 2008 Afrobarometer surveys did not ask any questions that tap on approval or
rejection of chieftaincy. It is also important to bear in mind that the comparison being made
here between support for traditional leadership and democracy does not suggest that
Batswana have ever been subjected to a situation where they have had to choose either
one or the other. But, finding themselves living under both authorities, people are expected
to have and to display differing loyalties and reactions towards the two authorities, mainly
because of the rational behavior of human beings which drives them to place interest in
that which benefits them the most.

Figure 4.3 below reveals a higher rejection of traditional leadership. For instance, in 1999,
when 18 percent of the respondents expressed approval of having decisions made by chiefs,
74 percent of them disapproved. However, the 2003 results show a rise in support for
traditional leadership as well as a decline in rejection of the chieftaincy.

Figure 4.3 reveals a higher rejection of traditional leadership. For instance, in 1999,
when 18 percent of the respondents expressed approval of having decisions made by chiefs,
74 percent of them disapproved. However, the 2003 results show a rise in support for
traditional leadership as well as a decline in rejection of the chieftaincy.

Assessing how support for democracy and traditional leadership has fared over the years,
figure 4.4 below shows that throughout the four Afrobarometer survey rounds, Batswana
expressed greater support for democracy. Although such support dropped to 66 and 69
percent in 2003 and 2005 respectively, from an original score of 83 percent (1999), it was again recorded at its highest in 2008 (86 percent). On the other hand, support for traditional authority as measured through the different questions asked about traditional leadership at each survey (excluding the 2005 and 2008 surveys), has also been rising, yet it has constantly remained lower than support for democracy.

![Figure 4.4: Support for democracy and traditional authority - Trend](image)

**Traditional Leadership and Local Governance**

Since much of the literature as mentioned in Chapter 2 affirms the continued relevance of traditional leadership in modern societies, in terms of the role chiefs play in their local communities, such as land allocation, dispute resolution and mobilizing local communities for development projects, I find it necessary to establish Batswana’s perception on the powers chiefs wield in the administration of local affairs, especially considering the transfer of chiefs’ previous absolute powers to democratic structures such as land boards and district administration. In this regard, the 2008 survey instrument enquired of respondents if they thought the influence currently held by traditional leaders in their communities should increase, stay the same or decrease. Most of the respondents (78 percent) expressed that they would like traditional leadership influence to increase while a tiny four percent of
them called for a reduction of the influence held by traditional leaders (see figure 4.5 below).

In addition to the above, I also probe support for the kgotla system, a prominent feature of traditional rule. Noting that most of the chiefly powers were and are still exercised and dispensed at the kgotla, the 2008 survey enquired of people whether they still considered the kgotla necessary especially as there exist today various avenues through which issues can be raised and discussed between the leadership and the populace such as radio, television, newspapers and internet. To establish popular perceptions held about the kgotla system, respondents were asked the following question; which of the following is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or statement 2. Statement 1: the kgotla system is too cumbersome and outdated; it is no longer useful as a forum of consultation; statement 2: The kgotla system is part of our culture and helps to strengthen our democracy; it should be retained as a forum of public consultation. As can be seen from figure 4.6 below, most of the respondents (89 percent) viewed the kgotla as part of their culture that should be retained while only 10 percent of the respondents thought it is a cumbersome and outdated system that is no longer useful. Based on this result, not only are Batswana willing for traditional leadership influence to increase, they also feel that its features such as the kgotla, should not be done away with.
Engagement with Traditional and Democratic Authority

Bratton et al (2005:295) argue that public opinion can only be taken seriously if attitudes are converted into action. The intensity of popular support for either traditional or democratic authority becomes more apparent when those who express such support actually go beyond just saying it and get actively involved with their authorities. Engaging with authorities involves various activities such as voting, protesting and contacting leaders among other things. While protest demonstrations are not a common occurrence in Botswana, voting has largely been limited to selection of democratic authority and assumption of traditional leadership office has mostly been hereditary. For purposes of this study, I focus on engagement with authorities by way of contacting leadership. Contacting leadership applies to both traditional and democratically elected authorities especially at the local level, where tribal administration and district councils make up the local government structure. As such, engagement herein takes into account the frequency with which people contact their local chiefs and democratically elected leaders in the capacity of councilors. The hypothesis being tested here assumes that there will be more contact with
elected democratic leadership than there will be with traditional authority and this is assessed through the following standard question posed throughout the four Afrobarometer surveys: “during the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about an important problem or to give them your views: A traditional leader? / local government councilor?”

Though this question was consistently asked throughout the four Afrobarometer surveys, in the first survey conducted in 1999, the question was posed a little differently from how it was subsequently asked in the 2003, 2005 and 2008 surveys. This makes results from the 1999 survey to be slightly incomparable with those from the other three surveys, especially when analyzing the pattern of engagement with authorities over the years. Nonetheless, when asked in 1999, 2 percent of the respondents reported to have made contact with traditional leaders while 5 percent said they had contacted their local elected leaders.

Figure 4.7 below shows a higher lack of contact with both traditional and democratically elected authorities, with slightly more respondents (76 percent) reporting to have never contacted their chiefs in the past twelve months. On the other hand, in all attempts of contact made, a slightly higher percentage of respondents in all instances reported to have made contact with their local councilors. Based on results from the 2008 survey as shown below, Batswana do not actively engage with their authorities.
Figure 4. 7: Engagement with Traditional and Democratic Authorities - 2008

For purposes of understanding the pattern of contact with authorities, figure 4.8 below presents a picture of contact made with traditional and democratic leaders over a period of years. While contact with both authorities has remained low (at less than 50 percent) throughout, it is important to note that people have constantly contacted traditional leaders less than they have contacted elected councilors. Nonetheless, as contact with local councilors improved over the years, engagement with traditional leaders has also been rising.
Discussion of Findings

What surfaces from the above findings is that Batswana are highly supportive of democracy, as evidenced in the way they choose it as their preferred form of government (see figures 4.1 and 4.5) as well as in the way they highly reject all non-democratic alternatives suggested to them in the form of one party rule, one man rule or even military rule.

At the same time, as much as they highly support democracy and reject non-democratic alternatives, it also emerges from figures 4.3 and 4.4 that Batswana do not reject traditional authority either. This is important to note especially that earlier, scholars such as Mamdani (1996) castigated traditional authority for being undemocratic and corrupted. However, other scholars including Molomo (2004) and Mgadla (1998), acknowledge that though traditional rule tended to be autocratic in most of its duties, it by and large, employed a degree of democracy. This includes the fact that chiefs did not rule on their own, they had advisors, councils of headmen and elders with whom they consulted before implementing decisions. Additionally, consultation processes through the kgotla have also been viewed as some form of participatory democracy as they offer those in attendance an opportunity to air their views. As such, Batswana may not necessarily see traditional authority as completely undemocratic, hence they support it while they still favour democratic
governance. This is sentiment is reiteratd by Nconco (1989) who held that many batswana believe Tswana tradtion in particular the kgotla was and is democratic.

When comparing how support for both democracy and chieftaincy has changed over the years (see figure 4.5) it is evident that, support for traditional rule remained less than support for democracy throughout the surveys. Even so, perceptions of both democracy and traditional authorities have together been rising over the years. These findings corroborate findings from Logan (2009)’s study in which she concluded that, positive evaluations of traditional authorities go hand in hand with those of democracy, with people often finding no need to make an either or choice between democratic and traditional leadership.

Yet again, it is surprising that though they express greater support for democracy and as such could be regarded as having a better understanding of democratic citizenship, do not engage with their elected leaders that much. As it emerged from the findings (see figure 4.6), lack of contact reigns high for both democratic leadership. Many factors could be at play such as the fact that generally Africans (Batswana included), have been found to ‘be politically busy during elections but less so between elections’ (Bratton et al 2005). Hence Batswana may be limiting their engagement with democratic authorities to election time, after which they sit back and wait for the next elections. Still, some scholars (Morapedi 2010) have criticized the absence of elected leaders at grassroots level, arguing that elected leaders are temporary, distant and often only make themselves available when seeking for votes. Hence, some authors including Linchwe (1994) and Mgadla (1998) argue that in such situations, chiefs become the necessary link between local populations and the central government. However, this argument is challenged by the above findings, as contact with chiefs is also not sufficient.

On the other hand, higher lack of contact with traditional authorities could be an indication that while people still value their chiefs and approve of their presence in the modern era, they do not want chieftaincy as a system of rule in place of democracy, but rather want to engage with their traditional leaders at other levels not captured by the question. For instance, the question asking about contact with authorities, suggests to respondents that contact is made to raise issues or to give advice, which could be something that may not easily happen within traditional settings. Considering that traditional authorities are viewed
as ‘a god-given’ gift as Oomen (2005:194) argued, it may be that whatever goes on within traditional rule is accepted as ‘god-given’ and stands to not be questioned. People may therefore, not necessarily have never contacted chiefs, but may have done so not to give advice per se, but for other matters such as seeking traditional leadership’s judicial services, which are inexpensive (free), easily accessible and comprehensible to many Batswana. This may explain why in figure 4.5 people call for an increase in the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing local their communities.

Summary

The conclusion drawn from this chapter in relation to the descriptive hypotheses is that: 1. Batswana are indeed more supportive of democracy than they are of traditional authority; 2. they engage less with traditional leaders than they do with democratic leaders, but; 3. contrary to the expectation that there will be an inverse support for and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities, perceptions of both authorities have been rising together over the years. What emerges here is that, while on the one hand, Batswana report greater support for democracy and though they disapprove of rule by chiefs, they however want the influence of their traditional leaders to increase. On the other hand, they engage very little with both their traditional and democratic authorities. Is this a question of approving of the system or the office, and disapproving of the incumbent?

In the next chapter, I test the modernization argument, using modernization variables to assess whether these have an impact on popular evaluations of traditional and democratic authorities. The chapter further assesses the impact of competing explanations on support and engagement with authorities, in the form of socio-demographic factors (age and gender) as well as performance evaluations (trust and corruption).
CHAPTER FIVE – EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR AND ENGAGEMENT WITH TRADITIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITIES

Introduction

Following from the previous chapter, this chapter puts to use a number of modernization indicators to explain Batswana’s support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities. Modernization affects the social structure, bringing about changes such as; rural-urban migration, rising levels of education, occupational specialization and professionalism as well as improved living standards (lessor poverty). These have been blamed for declining support for traditional leadership as they make the environment conducive for democracy to thrive. When people have moved to urban areas, and have received better education, they are believed to show different behavior patterns such as increased (news) media use, interest in politics as well as internal efficacy. Bearing this in mind, I test in this chapter whether these changes bring about decreased support for traditional leadership, or whether they promote support for democracy and democratic authorities. The following explanatory hypothesis as stated in chapter 1 is herein tested; modernized Batswana (comprising of the educated, urban, skilled, those not living in poverty, efficacious Batswana as well as those frequently exposing themselves to news media, those interested in politics, those belonging to professional and associational groups), will be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities than the non-modernized Batswana (the less educated, rural, unskilled, those living in poverty and non-efficacious Batswana, as well as those with no exposure to news media and those not interested in political issues), who, in turn are expected to be less supportive of and less engaging with democratic authorities.

While in this chapter I mainly test the explanatory power of modernization variables on support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities, I nonetheless acknowledge that on its own, the modernization argument may not offer an extensive explanation of support for and engagement with traditional and democratically elected authorities. For that reason, I also test the following competing explanations; socio-
demographic variables (in terms of age and gender), as well as performance evaluations (in terms of leadership trust and corruption). For these two, I expect young and female Batswana to be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities than elderly and male Batswana. In terms of performance evaluations, I expect people to support and engage with those authorities they see as more trustworthy and less corrupt.

The decision to also assess the explanatory power of socio-demographic as well as performance evaluations is driven by a number of reasons. For instance, as discussed in chapter two, earlier discussions tended to portray young people as having a rebellious attitude towards traditional institutions, especially where decision making is concerned. Traditional leadership institutions have been criticized for having systematically discriminated against young people in this regard. As is well known, decision-making power in traditional structures was accorded to people based on age, with the elderly often being favored by this scenario. Hence the thinking that while young people may have anti-traditionalist tendencies as a result of exclusion and discrimination, elderly people who may have enjoyed one way or the other some perks from traditional rule may be more lenient towards the traditional rule and hold it in high regard than the young. As such, I envision underlying historic influences in the way young people view their traditional leaders and hence I seek to establish if age differences affect how people perceive their democratic and traditional leaders.

The argument about gender and perceptions held about authorities follows from the same argument about young people and traditional leadership, where critics have also pointed to the discriminatory disposition of the chieftaincy towards women. Coupled with its patriarchal tendencies that limited women’s access to chiefly politics, traditional rule also tended to silence women as they were often regarded as minors often represented by their husbands and fathers.25 This I also believe could play a role in women’s perceptions on traditional authorities.

Performance evaluations which as noted involve assessing whether seeing authorities as trustworthy and corrupt-free impacts upon perceptions held about those authorities or not,

are based on the understanding that people are risk calculators who may not want to associate themselves with corrupt and untrustworthy authorities. Oomen (2005:195) argues for instance that self-interest guides the way people assess their authorities, often calling for the abolition of authorities who are corrupt and only serve their own interests.

As outlined in Chapter 3, testing the above hypotheses is done through three statistical tests. The first step tests the existence of a relationship between the stated modernization variables and the dependent variables being; support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities through crosstabulations. The next step tests the strength and direction of the established relationship through Kendall’s tau-c correlation coefficients and the last test involves the use of multiple regression analyses to estimate the impact of these modernization as well as socio-demographic and performance evaluation variables on support and engagement with authorities.

As was done in the previous chapter, the following questions are used to measure support for democracy; which of these statements is closest to your opinion? A. Democracy is always preferable B. Non-democratic government can be preferable C. makes no difference’. On the other hand, support for traditional leadership is traced through two questions asked in the 1999 and 2003 Afrobarometer surveys. In 1999, respondents were asked if they approved or disapproved of decisions to be made by traditional leaders while in 2003, they were asked if they approved or rejected rule by chiefs. Engagement with authorities is also traced through a standard question asked in the 2003 and 2008 surveys where respondents were asked if they made contact with their traditional or elected leaders in the past twelve months. Like in the previous chapter, I do not analyse data from the 1999 survey with regards to engagement with authorities because, while the question on engaging with or contacting authorities was asked in that survey, it was framed differently causing it to yield results slightly incomparable with those from the other surveys.
Rural/Urban Status

The argument about rural-urban living centers on the idea that urban Batswana will be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional leaders when compared with their rural counterparts. In turn, attachments to democracy are expected to be shallow in rural areas. Table 5.1a below presents crosstabulation and correlation results of support for traditional authorities by rural/urban status. The results show that most of both the rural and urban respondents disapproved of decisions made by chiefs. Though the levels of support were low in both instances, slightly more of the rural respondents showed a little more support for traditional leaders. Support for traditional leadership is shown to have improved in the 2003 survey for both rural and urban residents, yielding a statistically significant relationship in that year.

Table 5.1a: Crosstabulation - Support for Tabulation Leadership by Rural/Urban Status (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>Neither Approve nor Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban 77</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural 73</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In terms of who supports democracy better, rural and urban residents did not display any major differences (see table 5.1b below) as support for democracy was high for both rural and urban respondents. The tiny insignificant correlation results reveal a weaker relationship between support for authorities and a person’s rural/urban status. Furthermore, urban respondents did not necessarily show support for democracy any better than rural respondents did. Hence, I argue that support for traditional and elected leaders has little to do with whether one resides in an urban or rural setting.
Table 5.1 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Rural/Urb
Analyzing engagement with authorities, results from tables 5.1c and 5.1d show that while lack of contact with both traditional and elected authorities was reportedly high for both rural and urban respondents, it was rural respondents who reported better contact. However, this was not only with their traditional but also with their elected councilors. The correlation coefficients reveal a substantial positive relationship between rural/urban origin and engagement with traditional and elected authorities. Tests of significance also reveal a statistically significant relationship. While it is not surprising that rural people engaged with their traditional leaders more, because as discussed in Chapter 2, in most rural areas chiefs are the main vehicles of development used by the central government to reach the general rural populace, it is interesting to note that urban people do not necessarily contact their democratically elected leaders any better, and that it is the rural dwellers still, who engage with their elected councilors more.

Table 5.1 c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leadership by Rural/Urban Status (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations: Kendall’s tau-c; i) 2003 = .056**; ii) 2005 = .067***; iii) 2008 = .075***.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05

Table 5.1 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Democratic Leadership by Rural/Urban Status (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations: Kendall’s tau-c; i) 2003 = .037; ii) 2005 = .059**; iii) 2008 = .052. ** p < .05
Education

As argued in chapter 2, formal education is believed to be a catalyst for change, capable of instilling pro-democratic values in those receiving it by increasing their political knowledge. I test here the assumption that highly educated Batswana will be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities and be more supportive of and more engaging with democratic authorities than the non or less educated.

Crosstabulation and correlation results presented in tables 5.2a show that while disapproval of traditional leadership was high across all groups of the different education levels, it increased with one’s level of education. Approval of traditional leadership in turn decreased with the rise in education level. Correlation coefficients reveal a weak negative relationship between supporting chiefs and one’s education level. Although the relationship is weak, it is statistically significant. Hence it can be inferred that generally, highly educated Batswana do not support traditional leadership.

Table 5.2 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Education (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Formal Schooling</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary/High school</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Post Secondary Qualification</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/University</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.104***; 2003 = -.192***; (** p < .01).
With regards to support for democracy, table 5.2b reveals that respondents from all education levels chose democracy as the most preferable form of government even though slightly more educated respondents supported democracy better than the lesser educated. Correlation coefficients reveal a positive relationship between education and support for democracy, however weak, this relationship is statistically significant.
## Table 5.2 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Education (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doesn’t Matter</td>
<td>Non-democratic can be preferable</td>
<td>Democracy is preferable</td>
<td>Doesn’t Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Formal Schooling</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary/High School</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Post/Secondary qualification, not University</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations: Kendall’s tau-c; i) 1999 = -.026; ii) 2003 = .001; iii) 2005 = .064***; iv) 2008 = -.038**. *** p < .01; ** p < .05.
When analyzing engagement with traditional and democratic authorities, table 5.2c below shows that while most respondents reported that they never made contact with their chiefs in the past 12 months, the differences between the least educated and the highly educated are minor and this observation applies even in the instance where contact was made. Correlation coefficients revealed a negative relationship between education and engagement with chiefs. Though weak, the relationship is again statistically significant. On the other hand, crosstabulation results from table 5.2d reveal that engagement with elected authorities lessens as education levels increase. Just as well, correlation coefficients also produced negative and weak, but statistically significant results, between education and engagement with elected authorities.

| Table 5.2 c: Crosstabulation – Engagement with Traditional leaders by Education (%) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                 | 2003            | 2005            | 2008            |                 |
|                                 | Never made      | Contacted       | Never made      | Contacted       | Never made      | Contacted       |
|                                 | Contact Leader  | Traditional     | Contact Leader  | Traditional     | Contact Leader  | Traditional     |
| No Formal Schooling             | 70              | 30              | 85              | 15              | 71              | 29              |
| Primary School                  | 79              | 21              | 80              | 20              | 66              | 34              |
| Secondary/High School           | 83              | 17              | 87              | 13              | 84              | 16              |
| Other Post Sec, not Univ        | 63              | 37              | 85              | 15              | 74              | 26              |
| College/University              | 72              | 28              | 93              | 7               | 87              | 13              |

Notes: Kendall's tau-c Correlation coefficients: i) 2003 = -.016; ii) 2005 = -.045**; iii) 2008 = -.087 ***. Significance levels *** p < .01, ** p < .05
Table 5.2 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Leadership by Education (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
<td>Contacted Local Councillor</td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Formal Schooling</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary/High School</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Post Sec qual, not University College/University</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlations: Kendall’s tau-c: i) 2003 = -.022; ii) 2005 = -.083**; iii) 2008 = -.045**. Significance levels ** p < .05

Occupational class

The impact of large-scale economic development and industrialization is often reflected in the rise of the working class. Professional and skilled workers have gone through the formal schooling system and have been professionally trained for the work they do. As mentioned before, education and the number of years one spends in school shapes the way they think and formulate ideas. Hence, the assumption tested here that skilled workers and professionals, would be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities than unskilled workers.

From table 5.3a below, one sees that there exist moderate differences in the way skilled and unskilled workers evaluate their chieftaincies, as shown by the percentage differences between those who hold white-collar jobs and the unskilled workers in terms of their disapproval and approval of traditional rule. Kendall’s tau-c coefficients confirm the existence of a statistically significant negative relationship. However, support for democracy is not so much a matter of one’s occupational status (see table 5.3b). While many support democracy, only slight
percentage differences exist between the skilled and unskilled workers, with correlation coefficients revealing a statistically insignificant relationship.

Table 5.3 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Occupational Class (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>Neither nor approve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Kendall's tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.075***; 2003 = -.153***; (***) p < .01.*

Table 5.3 b: Crosstabulation – Support for Democracy by Occupational Class (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't Matter</td>
<td>Sometimes democratic can be preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Kendall's tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = .015; 2003 = .016*
In terms of engagement with traditional and democratic authorities by respondents’ occupational status, results from the 2003 survey as displayed in table 5.3c below show that, most unskilled workers reported to have not made contact with both their chiefs and councilors. Yet again, it is more of the same group who reported to have made contact with both authorities. This particularly unclear relationship proved to be statistically significant.

**Table 5.3c: Crosstabulation – Engagement with Traditional and Democratically Elected Leaders by Occupational Class (2003) %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional Leaders</th>
<th>Elected Councilors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
<td>made Contact</td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Workers</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: Traditional Leaders = .058**; Elected leaders = .036 (** p < .05)
Lived poverty

Many believe that socio-economic development contributes towards the alleviation of poverty. For instance, when people move from rural to urban areas, apart from standing a better chance of engaging in wealth generating activities, they also stand a better chance of being employed based on the skills they acquired through formal schooling. As a result, they are able to graduate from poverty and this enables them to focus on secondary needs such as political issues, as some would say, many times the poor are too poor to care about secondary things. For it is a common belief amongst democracy researchers that poverty undermines democracy, mainly because poor people have far less time to worry about political issues than about where their next meal will come from. Lived poverty is hereby understood as the standard of living of individuals, highlighting the need for people to be able to secure the basic necessities of life such as shelter, water, fuel, electricity, cash income and medical care.

While respondents were not asked directly if they lived in poverty, their poverty status is measured through a series of questions from the Afrobarometer surveys such as; in the last twelve months, how often have you or your family gone without food/water/fuel to heat your home? I expect that people who report instances of poverty will be more supportive of traditional leadership and not democracy when compared to those who do not report to be living in poverty. For the simple reason that, poverty as mentioned above, inhibits democratic behavior. Just as well, I expect engaging with traditional authorities to be done more by the poor than the well off.

From table 5.4a below, one sees that more respondents who have never experienced poverty, do not show much support for traditional leadership as they mostly disapprove of decisions made by chiefs and also reject rule by chiefs. On the other hand, those who have lived in poverty support traditional leaders more. While the crosstabulation results show a relationship,

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26 See Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No.4
correlation coefficients reflect a statistically significant negative relationship. However, the relationship is not that strong as shown by the smaller correlation coefficients.

Table 5.4 a: Crosstabsulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Lived Poverty (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>Neither Approve nor Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced poverty</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the other hand, support for democracy as shown in table 5.4b, is not necessarily a prerogative of the well-off respondents. What the results reveal is that in some instances, more respondents who have experienced poverty support democracy more and in other instances those who have never experienced poverty support it more. Correlation results show a statistically significant positive, however weak relationship between supporting democracy and one’s poverty status or standard of living.
Table 5.4 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Lived Poverty Index (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doesn't Matter</td>
<td>Sometimes non-democratic can be preferable</td>
<td>Democracy is preferable</td>
<td>Doesn't matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Have experienced poverty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have experienced poverty</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Kendall’s tau-c Correlation Coefficients; i) 1999 = - .096***; ii) 2003 = - .004; iii) 2005 = - .076**; iv) 2008 = -.011. ** p < .05, *** p < .01
In terms of engaging with traditional and democratic authorities, crosstabulation results as shown in table 5.4c reveal only slight percentage differences between those who reported to have lived in poverty and those who did not. Correlation coefficients reveal a statistically significant positive relationship. Additionally, during the 2003 and 2008, more respondents who had not lived in poverty reported to have made contact with their democratically elected leaders more than those who had experienced poverty (see table 5.4d).

### Table 5.4 c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leadership by Lived Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never/ Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/ Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/ Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have experienced poverty</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 5.4 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected leadership by Lived Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never/ Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/ Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/ Made no Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have experienced poverty</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

News Media Use

News media exposes people to information, which they use to formulate political attitudes and in this section, I seek to establish whether exposure to news media or the lack thereof, causes Batswana to evaluate traditional leadership differently from democratic authority. Does exposure to news media make one less traditionally oriented and more democratically oriented? Results from table 5.5a reveal the existence of a relationship between news media use and support for traditional leadership. Crosstabulating these two yielded clear percentage differences in terms of respondents’ who frequently expose themselves to news media and their choice of whether they approve or do not approve of traditional leaders. The statistically significant negative correlation coefficients though weak, reveal that generally Batswana who frequently expose themselves to either television, radio or newspaper news are less supportive of traditional rule.

Table 5.5a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by News Media Use (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>Neither Approve nor Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Use News media</td>
<td>57  19  25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses/Exposed to News media</td>
<td>75  7  17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.036***; 2003 = -.046***; (** p < .01).*

Crosstabulating news media use and support for democracy (as shown in table 5.5b below), shows moderate percentage differences between those who expose themselves to the news and those who do not and their choice of democracy as the most preferable form of
government. The relationship is however weak as shown by the tiny correlation coefficients, and was only significant (statistically) from the 2008 survey data.

Table 5.5: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by News Media Use (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News media</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposed to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Media</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels ** p<.05

On the other hand, when testing whether engaging with traditional and elected leaders is related to one’s exposure to news media or not, results from table 5.5c show a negligible relationship between engagement with traditional leaders and news media exposure evidenced by minor percentage differences as well as statistically insignificant correlation coefficients, which remained so throughout the three surveys. While analyzing engagement with elected leaders does not produce greater percentage differences between those who do not frequently use television, radio or newspaper news and those who do, it does prove the existence of a positive yet weak relationship (see table 5.5d) between engagement with elected leaders and exposure to news media.
Table 5.5  c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leaders by News Media Use (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Use News media</td>
<td>76 23</td>
<td>85 15</td>
<td>78 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposed to News Media</td>
<td>78 22</td>
<td>85 15</td>
<td>76 24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlations: Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: i) 2003 = -.001; ii) 2005 = .001; iii) 2008 = .005*

Table 5.5  d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Democratic leadership by News Media Use (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Use News media</td>
<td>80 20</td>
<td>73 27</td>
<td>73 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposed to News Media</td>
<td>76 24</td>
<td>74 26</td>
<td>64 36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlations: Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: i) 2003 = .010; ii) 2005 = -.005; iii) 2008 = .031**. ** p < .05*
Interest in Politics

While respondents were not asked a straight forward question like, ‘are you interested in politics?’ various questions were asked which tap on their interest in politics and I use these to form an index of interest in politics. Questions utilized for this purpose covered aspects such as; i) joining others to raise issues, ii) discussing political matters, iii) voting in the past elections as well as iv) closeness to a political party. Respondents who answered yes to the above are hereby treated as being interested in politics. Consequently those who show interest in politics are expected to be supportive of democracy than they are of traditional rule. I also expect them to engage more with elected leaders than with traditional leaders.

Crosstabulation results from table 5.6a below show minor percentage differences between those interested in politics and those not so interested in terms of their of approval and disapproval of traditional leadership. Nonetheless, the results show that those interested in political matters reject chieftaincy more. On the other hand, correlation coefficients show a statistically significant negative relationship between one’s interest in politics and support for traditional leadership. A positive relationship is established between support for democracy and respondents’ interest in politics (see table 5.6b). Even though Batswana generally support democracy, results show a weak relationship, which however is statistically significant.

Table 5.6 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Interest in Political matters (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>Neither Approve nor Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not interested in Politics</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.049; 2003 = -.070**; (** p < .05).
Table 5.6 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Interest in Politics (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doesn’t Matter</td>
<td>Sometimes non-democratic can be preferable</td>
<td>Democracy is preferable</td>
<td>Doesn’t matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No interest in Politics</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested Politics</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Kendall’s tau-c Correlation Coefficients; i) 1999 = .077***; ii) 2003 = .082***; iii) 2005 = .080**; iv) 2008 = .117***. ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Results from tables 5.6c and d show that respondents who showed interest in political issues make the most contact with their authorities, be they traditional or democratic. In all instances, the relationship is positive and statistically significant. However, the relationship has remained weak.

Table 5.6 c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leadership by Interest in Politics (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Never/Made Contact</th>
<th>No Contacted Traditional Leader</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No interest in Politics</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No interest in Politics</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No interest in Politics</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.6 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Leadership by Interest in Politics (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Never/Made No Contact</th>
<th>Contacted Local Councillor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No interest in Politics</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No interest in Politics</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No interest in Politics</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Internal Efficacy

The assumption being tested here is that individuals with higher levels of internal efficacy will be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities than those with less feelings of efficacy. Tables 5.7a – d below present crosstabulation and correlation results of support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities against internal efficacy. Table 5.7a depicts a negative relationship between support for traditional leadership and internal efficacy, while table 5.7b shows a positive relationship between internal efficacy and democracy. Correlation coefficients between support for chiefs and internal efficacy are not so strong. Crosstabulation results show that those who display efficacious behavior disapprove of traditional leaders more than those who do not have strong feelings of internal efficacy. On the other hand, efficacious respondents reported the highest support for democracy.

Table 5.7a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Internal Efficacy (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>Neither Approve nor Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not efficacious</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacious</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.125***; 2003 = -.127***; (** p < .01).*
Table 5.7 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Efficacy (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t Matter</td>
<td>Sometimes non-democratic can be preferable</td>
<td>Democracy is preferable</td>
<td>Doesn’t matter</td>
<td>Sometimes non-democratic can be preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not efficacious</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacious</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of engaging with authorities, tables 5.7c and d below reveal that while most respondents reported no contact with their authorities (traditional or democratic), in the past year, there exist minor differences between those with internal efficacy and those without, in terms of contacting their traditional leaders. A negative relationship is revealed between engagement with chiefs and internal efficacy while a positive relationship is established with regards to engagement with elected councilors.

Table 5.7 c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leadership by Efficacy (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not efficacious</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacious</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: i) 2003 = -.067**; ii) 2005 = -.002; iii) 2008 = .023. ** p < .05

Table 5.7 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Democratic leadership by Efficacy (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never/ Made No Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not efficacious</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacious</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Professional and Associational memberships

Membership in voluntary and professional associations has been linked to interest in politics because people who get involved in associational life show their interest in politics by frequently engaging in discussions about political matters. Scholars such as Maundeni (2005) and Fung (2003) have also linked membership in voluntary and professional associations with enhancement of democracy, especially looking at the contribution that associations make to democratic governance. For instance, associations provide participants with political information and thus leading them to be more critical of decisions made by their leaders. Since members of associations are more likely than non-members to take part in politics, I assume that those involved will be more supportive of and more engaging with democratic leadership than with traditional leadership.

Results from table 5.8a show that, approval of traditional leadership does not differ much by one’s membership to associations. This is shown by the tiny percentage differences, as well as the statistically insignificant correlation coefficients. On the other hand, crosstabulating support for democracy and membership to associations also yields a weak and statistically insignificant relationship (see table 5.8b).
Table 5.8 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Professional & Associational Memberships (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a member</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.013; 2003 = -.012

Table 5.8 b: Crosstabulation – Support for Democracy by Professional and Associational Membership (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t Matter</td>
<td>Sometimes non-democratic can be preferable</td>
<td>Democracy is Preferable</td>
<td>Doesn’t Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a member</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.016; 2003 = -.020; 2005 = -.017; 2008 = -.006
Engagement with traditional and democratic authorities as shown in tables 5.8c and d reveal a different scenario from that of support. It shows from the results that those with membership in professional and voluntary associations made contact with both their traditional and democratic leaders more than those who are not members. Kendall’s tau-c coefficients also revealed a moderate and statistically significant relationship between associational memberships and engagement with authorities.

Table 5.8 c: Crosstabulation – Engagement with Traditional Leadership by Professional and Associational membership (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a member</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.8 d: Crosstabulation – Engagement with Democratically Elected Leadership by Professional and Associational membership (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
<td>Never made Contact</td>
<td>Made Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a member</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple regression analysis

In this section, I establish through multiple regression analysis, how much support for and engagement with traditional and democratic leadership is accounted for by the variables in the preceding analysis. As also noted at the beginning of the chapter, I include in the regression analysis, an assessment of the impact of socio-demographic (age and gender) factors and performance evaluations (leadership trust and corruption), as predictors of support and engagement with authorities.

Tables 5.9a and b below present multiple regression output for support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities. From table 5.9a, one sees that modernization variables do not explain much variance in support for traditional leadership as shown by the tiny adjusted $R^2$ values. Neither do they explain much of support for democracy. For both traditional leadership and democracy, the variables explain less than 5 percent of variance. When considered individually, not all the modernization variables contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the model. For instance, only education, news media use, internal efficacy and interest in politics have a statistically significant effect on variance in support for traditional authority and democracy. It is also worthy to note the negative impact these variables have on support for traditional leadership and the positive impact they have on that for democracy.

In terms of the competing explanations, age stands out as having better explanatory power of the variance in support for traditional leadership as shown by its larger statistically significant beta values. Just as well, beta values for age are positive showing that support for traditional leaders increases and decreases with age and the negative values for support for democratic authorities showing that the older one gets, the less they support democracy. Performance evaluations on the other hand account for very little variance in support for both authorities.
On the other hand, results from table 5.9b show that modernization variables explain better variance in engagement with authorities than they do with support. Education and interest in politics continue to have statistically significant effect. And, rural/urban status, interest in politics as well as professional and associational memberships and occupational status this time around have greater statistically significant impact on engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities. Performance evaluations continue to explain little variance in engagement with authorities, while socio-demographic variables account for moderate variance in engagement, while age again proves to be the highest predictor of engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities, shown by its greater statistically significant beta values.
### Table 5.9 a: Multiple Regression analysis – Support for Traditional Leadership and Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural/Urban status</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td></td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>-.115**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Media Use</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>-.128***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
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<td>Interest in Politics</td>
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Notes: Beta entries are standardized coefficients.


N= 1200

**p <.05

***p <.01
Table 5.9 b: Multiple Regression analysis – Engagement with Traditional and Democratic Authorities

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Notes: Beta entries are standardized coefficients.


N= 1200

**p <.05

***p <.01
Discussion of Findings

Almost all the modernization variables under scrutiny, except rural/urban and lived poverty have a negative relationship with support for traditional authority and a positive relationship with support for democracy. This is shown by the negative and positive correlation coefficients, respectively. While rural residents support their chieftaincies, urban residents on the other hand do not necessarily show better support for democracy than rural residents do. This corroborates Harding (2010)’s argument in his study titled “Urban – Rural Differences in Support for Incumbents Across Africa”, that urban people do not give as much support to the authorities in place when compared with their rural counterparts. Because when it came to engaging with authorities, rural people again contacted both chiefs and councilors more than their urban counterparts did. The fact that rural people contact both chiefs and councilors could be about who is able to meet their needs at the time. Being far from major developments, they are bound to use whatever means available to meet their needs, be they traditional or modern. On the other hand, urban people may not feel compelled to contact any of these authorities because in urban centers, there are various means of accessing services at people’s disposal. This is similar to Oomen’s finding that rural people generally do not care much about who does what, as long as their needs are met. On the other hand, results from multiple regression analysis, proved rural/urban status to be an insignificant contributor to support for traditional leadership, but proved to be a better predictor of engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities. Hence support and engagement with authorities is not based on where one stays as Bratton et’al (2005:108) argue, residential location hardly influences the formation of political attitudes.

In terms of education and support for traditional and democratic authority, results showed that the more educated one is, the more they reject traditional leadership, as shown by the negative coefficients between support for traditional leadership and educational level. On the other hand, education has a positive relationship with support for democracy, corroborating literature as discussed in Chapter 2, that education instills democratic values in those who have gone through it. In terms of engaging with authorities, it is the less
educated who contact chiefs more than those with higher levels of education. It is interesting to note that education proved to have a negative relationship with contact for elected leaders. This could be a result of a number of reasons, for instance, that the education level of the elected leaders or councilors may cause highly educated people to undermine them and hence lack confidence in dealing with them. As Sharma argues, the caliber of elected officials has often been a target of criticism. Nonetheless, education increases people’s critical thinking as Oomen (2005:190) argues, the more educated people are, the more critical of leaders they become.

News media use, and internal efficacy, yielded negative coefficients in relation with support for and engagement with traditional authorities and positive coefficients in relation with support for democracy and engagement with democratic authorities. On the other hand, interest in politics yielded negative and positive correlation coefficients for support for traditional leadership and democracy respectively. It furthermore yielded positive coefficients for engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities. This shows that those who reported interest in politics though they support democracy and not traditional leadership, they nonetheless engage with both traditional and elected leaders.

This could be because these are a group of people who are vocal and opinionated and will go to either of these authorities to voice their opinions on whatever issue is bothering them, depending on who is relevant to contact the time. In the case of internal efficacy, a negative relationship was established between efficacy and contact with chiefs, and a positive relationship is established with engagement with councilors. This proves that Batswana with higher feelings of efficacy prefer to engage with democratic than traditional authorities. Negative Regressions coefficients further prove that as Batswana continue to get exposed to news through radio, television and newspapers, their allegiance to traditional authorities lessens. In terms of those with interest in political matters, engagement with authorities remains not a matter of whether they are chiefs or councilors, but that these are a group of people willing to go to either chiefs or traditional leaders as and when it suits them.
In terms of professional and associational memberships, correlation coefficients revealed a statistically significant negative relationship between this group of people and support for both traditional authorities and democracy. However, the coefficients were positive and statistically significant for engagement with both authorities. This shows that this group of people engages equally with both chiefs and councilors. This variable is made up of people belonging to various associational groups such as trade unions, business and professional associations and community groups. Hence, it is not surprising that the results show that they engage with their authorities equally as they often seek to engage with all authorities willing to give them an ear. For instance, in the recent major public strike in the country, when political leaders would not listen, unions resorted to deliver their petitions to their local chiefs.27 The other two variables; lived poverty and occupational class, yielded statistically insignificant coefficients.

The explanatory power of the modernization variables put together is weak as shown by the minor adjusted $R^2$ values from tables 5.9a and b. while not all the modernization variables contribute towards explaining the differences in support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities, especially lived poverty and occupational class, those that do, together explain only less than 10 percent of variance in all instances

Turning to competing explanations, performance evaluations did not offer any better explanation of variance in support and engagement with authorities, as they for most of the time yielded statistically insignificant coefficients. On the other hand, socio-demographics offer better explanation of variance, with in particular showing to be a significant predictor of support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities, shown by all its statistically significant beta values.

The findings regarding age show that young and elderly Batswana differ significantly in the way they formulate attitudes about traditional and democratic authorities. This corroborates Bratton et’al (2005)’s argument that age influences political attitudes at the country level. It is nonetheless important to note here that this could be a result of the fact that most of the modernization attributes used in the analysis such as education, urban living, news media use, interest in politics and internal efficacy are embedded within the young which puts age at a better advantage in explaining variance compared to the other explanatory variables.

Furthermore, it is argued that as people grow older, they somehow return to their roots, which has nothing to do with modernization or lack of it, but rather just a matter of aging people starting to appreciate where they come from. Hence, it comes out that as people age, they support democracy less and traditional leadership more.
CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION

Introduction

This study set out to analyze Batswana’s perceptions of traditional leadership in comparison with those of democracy and how these have been affected by modernization. This approach was motivated by modernist argument which according to its proponents, brings about changes that make the process of democratization conducive such as higher levels of education, urban living, news media use, internal efficacy, occupational specialization and interest in political issues. In the process of advancing democracy, cultural and traditional ties arguably take a strain and are ultimately broken. Furthermore, some scholars (Sekgoma 1994; Keulder 1998) expressed concern and skepticism about the future of traditional leadership in Botswana, especially in a country that has experienced greater socio-economic development, and whose citizens are continually developing both economically and educationally.

The decision to analyze public perceptions on traditional leadership was also motivated by the realization that the relationship between traditional leadership and those living under it in the modern democratic era has been largely under-researched. It was apparent from the literature on traditional leadership in modern Africa that the state-chieftaincy relationship has received the most attention from researchers. Hence, this study employed public opinion data from Afrobarometer surveys conducted in Botswana in 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008 to assess how Batswana evaluate their traditional and democratic authorities. The study asked the following main question; how committed and supportive are Batswana to traditional and democratic leadership? And how has this changed over time? Success in answering these rested upon successfully finding answers to the following questions; do Batswana approve of and support traditional leadership in this modern era? How does this compare with their support for democracy?; To what extent do they engage with traditional leadership? How does this compare with their engagement with democratic authority? And; what best explains or predicts their support and engagement with traditional leadership?
How has support for and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities changed over time?

The above questions carried with them the hypotheses that; Batswana will be more supportive of democracy than they are of traditional leadership; that they will engage less frequently with traditional leaders than they do with democratically elected leaders; and, that support for and engagement with traditional leadership will have been declining over the years while support for and engagement with democratic authority will have been rising. Secondly, it was hypothesized that, in accordance with the modernization argument, modernized Batswana will be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities as compared to non-modernized Batswana (the less educated, rural, non-efficacious Batswana). Furthermore, modernized personalities were expected to be more supportive of and more engaging with democratic authorities. In addition to these, the study also included in the regression analysis competing explanations of support and engagement with authorities in terms of socio-demographics (age and gender) and performance evaluations (trust and corruption). In terms of age and gender, the younger generation was expected to be less supportive of traditional leadership and more supportive of democracy than the elderly. On the other hand, batswana were expected to evaluate positively those authorities they viewed as trustworthy and less corrupt.

Main Findings and Directions for Further Study

From the descriptive analysis conducted and presented in chapter 4, Batswana were found to be supportive of democracy more than they support traditional leadership. While with this came an overwhelming rejection of non-democratic alternatives such as one-man rule, one-party rule and military rule, it however did not convert into a total rejection of traditional authorities. Respondents called for an increase in the influence of traditional leadership and also asked for
Furthermore, though evaluations of traditional leadership were lower than those of
democracy and democratic authority, they nonetheless were positively related,
corroborating Logan (2008 & 2009)’s argument that perceptions of both traditional and
democratic authorities are positively linked and they go hand in hand. Results from chapter
5 revealed that the modernization hypothesis does not offer a strong explanation of how
Batswana formulate perceptions about their traditional and democratic authorities.
However, regression results revealed that a number of the attributes; education, news
media use, political interest, internal efficacy, helped to shape popular opinion on
traditional and democratic leadership. In terms of the competing explanations, while the
impact of performance evaluations was insignificant, age proved to be a better predictor of
perceptions on authorities. It was not surprising that age explained better variance in
support and engagement with authorities because, it is mostly the young who have better
education, who are highly into active politics, they have higher feelings of efficacy and they
possess skills necessary for employment.

In the end, the following future research questions emerged from the study: Firstly, while
Batswana are highly supportive of democracy, they however barely engage with their
democratically elected leaders; why is this the case? What bars people from engaging with
their elected councilors? Secondly, having established that, as with their councilors,
Batswana do not adequately engage with their traditional leaders, what is the cause?
Thirdly, though they disapprove of traditional leaders as decision makers and reject their
rule, as well as engage less with them, Batswana desire for the influence of traditional
leaders to increase and they also wish for features of the chieftaincy such as the kgotla to
be retained. What exact role do Batswana want their chiefs to play in this era? Lastly, since
the modernization argument does not offer a good explanation of Batswana’s perceptions
and behavior towards their traditional and democratic authorities, what best explains how
modern Batswana formulate perceptions about their traditional and democratic leadership?
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