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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-SEGREGATION
THE CASE OF UNIVERSITY STUDENT FRIENDSHIP GROUPS

Thesis Presented for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Faculty of Humanities

Buhle Zuma

Department of Psychology

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work, both in concept and execution, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it contains no material written by another person nor material that has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text.

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Buhle Zuma (Mr)           Date
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Abstract

Against the contrasting backdrop of the ideal and value of social inclusion captured by the image of a ‘Rainbow Nation’ in South Africa and the academic record of self-segregation, the main objective of this study is to identify social and psychological factors and processes that influence the formation of racially heterogeneous and racially homogeneous social relations. The study uses first year students naturally forming friendship groups as ‘case studies’. The study is both empirical and theoretical. The empirical component is furnished by qualitative interviews conducted over an academic year in 2011. The theoretical component is found in relating the data to a knowledge fund that extends beyond social psychology to include sociology, political science, historical and contemporary socio-political South African literature and issues. The study is important because while there is now a large body of research that shows the benefits of friendships for intergroup relations we still know relatively little about the factors that facilitate or hinder the formation of friendships outside of laboratory settings. The study specifically explores the relation between ‘race’ and class at the intergroup, institutional and societal levels and how these different levels of analysis come to bear on everyday intra- and intergroup relations. At the center of all this are collective projects of identity re-articulation and reproduction. Some of the study findings can be summarised as follows. Much
of what goes on within the university context in the participants lives can be summarised as the reproduction of social and psychological worlds revolving around social identities. It was demonstrated that even where opportunities for intergroup interactions were available their actualisation was mediated by the meanings and interpretations that participants had learned to associate with intergroup contact. In this regard the study joins with work that draws attentions to the importance of emotions in intergroup contact. The study goes some way in trying to understand the place, role and uses of ‘race’ and class and their interdependence at the level of everyday relations. This is important because a great deal of social psychological work has left this labour in the hands of sociology, anthropology and economics.
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Chapter One: Self-segregation.
Outlining some aspects of the problem and the research method

Introduction

The present study investigates what in social psychology is called ‘informal or self-segregation’, amongst first year university students in a historically White university in South Africa. The study treats students’ friendship groups as ‘case studies’ and explores their formation specifically within the university context. There is however, an attempt in certain cases to draw out the development of friendships prior to university. In following this approach I investigate the properties (factors) and processes that lead some friendship groups to be characterised by racial homogeneity and others by racial heterogeneity. In such an investigation it is salient not to assume the importance and influence of ‘race’\(^1\) but rather to investigate its uses and relation with other factors such as language and class in the formation of student friendship groups. The study is important because while there is now a large body of research that shows the benefits of friendships for intergroup relations we still know relatively little about the factors that

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\(^1\) In this work ‘race’ is understood to be a social construct and thus refers to no fundamental essence of a people. It is instead a historically and socio-politically constructed classificatory scheme that captures the relational process of categorisation and ‘othering’. As a social construct, ‘race’ always takes its character in relation to other factors such as social class. This means that its articulations and uses are always located within the specificities of context and time. The writing of ‘race’ in inverted comma is to acknowledge all is.
facilitate or hinder the formation of friendships outside of laboratory settings\(^2\). The study is both empirical and theoretical. The empirical component is furnished by qualitative interviews conducted over an academic year in 2011. The theoretical component is found in relating the data to the social a knowledge fund that extends beyond social psychology. In addition, although in a limited way, there is also an attempt to draw links with historical and contemporary socio-political South African literature and issues. In all this, the study seeks to contribute to the micro-ecology of contact approach developed in South Africa (see Dixon, Tredoux and Clack, 2005; http://www.contactecology.com). This chapter offers an overview of the present study. First, I address what I perceive to be the problem and its interrelated aspects. Second, I argue for the psychological, social and political importance of studying self-segregation in South Africa. Third and last, I spell out what I want to do in this study and how I want to go about doing it vis-à-vis the identified problem.

**Self-segregation in South Africa:**

**Considering some aspects of the problem**

Self-segregation refers the practice of forming voluntary social ties such as friendships that are characterised by categorical similarity. For example, the practice of self-segregation can be observed in a group of friends who are all Black, males, working-class, and reside in similar neighbourhoods. Given that we live out our lives in space and time self-segregation can be

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\(^2\) See the literature review in Chapter Three.
conceived as an inherently spatio-temporal manifestation of social relations. This initial conceptualisation of self-segregation will become evident in the unfolding of the present study. Perhaps the best known expression that captures this phenomenon is ‘birds of a feather flock together’ (Lazersfeld & Merton 1954). The phrase is captured concisely by the term homophily, which refers to the principle that “similarity breeds connection...and structures network ties of every type...” (McPherson et al., 2001, p. 415). Similarity and difference, expressed most effectively through ‘race’ and class, were pathologically accentuated during the apartheid system of White minority rule in South Africa. Apartheid was finally overturned in 1994 through processes of struggle and negotiation. Post-apartheid South Africa continues to be challenged by issues of ‘race’ and class even as the country attempts to unearth the roots of apartheid at various levels of society. Speaking on the processes of societal transformation in South Africa I have noted elsewhere that

The image of a rainbow captured the national imagination of South Africa as a society rich in diversity and united in that diversity. It also speaks to the process of nation building and a process of social inclusion... the image of a ‘rainbow’... took material form through the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established in line with the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (No. 34 of 1995) and thus framed in terms of national unity and reconciliation (Zuma, 2010, p. 1).

The instalment of this statute and others was important because it marked a decisive shift in the political and social values and vision of the nation from apartheid to democracy. Also crucial in this democratic transition are the actual social relations between social groups that for
decades were set against each other. It is at this juncture that the issue of self-segregation as a specific manifestation of post-apartheid social relations draws our attention. Homophilous and particularly racially homophilous social relations appear to undermine the historical and political triumph of the new democratic order. This is to say that what people do and how they do it matters because democracy, transformation, diversity and integration are all ideas and ideals that come to life in the actions and interactions of human beings in space and time. In view of this, the practice of self-segregation is a problem not only because it contradicts the spirit and values of democracy but also because it appears to reincarnate the embodiment and psychology of segregationism (apartheid). What I am suggesting is that there is more to self-segregation than a mere practice of social association and relations. I see at least four closely interrelated aspects, although not the only ones, of self-segregation in South Africa. These aspects will be highlighted in italics below.

First, the everyday micro-ecological exchange of intergroup emotions, thoughts and behaviours is one of the key barometers of socio-political change in South Africa. This is because of the simple observation that the character of human encounters has more purchase in everyday unmonitored interactions than the objectives of statutes and institutional policies. If citizens continue to develop formal and informal associations along racial and class lines as designed by apartheid this seems to suggest that intergroup thoughts and feelings that characterised apartheid have not changed. We can refer to this as the attitudes, thoughts and behaviours aspect of self-segregation. Second, without contradicting the foregoing, we can also grant the importance and place for the congruence between ideals and values stipulated in statutes and
policies and lived experience. Here we can appreciate the ideological role of statutes and policies in capturing the image and spirit of the nation as an imaginary community. Taken together, this shows the close relationship between, on the one hand, political, moral and social ideals and values and on the other hand, the living out and embodiment or the absence thereof, of these ideals in lived experience. To use a common binary, we can think of this as a *macro-micro relationship of values and practices*. Self-segregation appears to rupture the relation between the “*form* of multicultural intimacy” (e.g. the ‘Rainbow Nation’) and the “*content* of multicultural intimacy” (e.g. spatial and non-spatial proximity) (Fortier, 2007, p. 107). Third, there is in self-segregation, especially its racial and class character, the symptoms of the challenges of transforming South Africa into a more equitable society. These challenges are political, economic, social, historic and psychological (e.g. see van der Berg, 2006; Lefko-Everett et al., 2010, 2011; Buccus, 2010, Gumede, 2010, Gumede, 2011; Spicer, 2011; Malikane, 2011; Chisholm, 2011; Finn et al., 2011). Such challenges represent a possible *danger of political and social instability in the face of transformative attempts*. Fourth, it is possible that the issue of self-segregation would be less alarming if it was only found amongst older generations who lived through apartheid. What partly makes self-segregation an issue of immediate concern is that it is also practiced by younger generations who have had nothing of apartheid and who are often thought of as the ‘beneficiaries of democracy’. The issue here turns to that of imagining the future as radically different from our past and still better than our present state. Self-segregation amongst the youth and young adults undoubtedly shatters the imagination of South Africa as a ‘Rainbow Nation’. At the same time however, it is a reminder that these young
adults are part of the evolution and tapestry of South African society with all that is beautiful and ugly in its history and present. It also urges us to *imagine the future now* that is invested in the youth and young adults. To this end the character and quality of our social relations now will be an asset or liability in the future. With this consideration of some of the aspects of self-segregation in mind let us turn to a related issue: the social, psychological and political importance of studying self-segregation in South Africa.

**The social, psychological and political importance of studying self-segregation in South Africa**

Although the heading of this section suggests that I will be separately attending to the social, political and psychological this is not strictly the case. While I appreciate the conceptual clarity that could be found in separating these three categories I have found it strenuous and unhelpful to maintain this separation. The reader should thus expect to find much fluidity between the conceptual categories even as I write on one.

In addressing the social importance of studying self-segregation I want to place emphasis on the structural configuration of the conditions of possibility (i.e. the materiality of social existence). I do this not to make a Marxist or Weberian argument for the place of class in organising and differentiating South African society. Rather it is because I see apartheid segregationist discourse to have been nothing short of a systematic design of distinct life chances and experiences. Quite simply, segregation was an instrument of racist and oppressive
politics whose binary operation created distinct worlds of White privilege and Black\textsuperscript{3} disenfranchisement from mainstream society. It created different social worlds on the basis of skin colour and supported these differences by creating a preferential system that ensured the unequal distribution of material support for social existence and life chances. By and large, people who had the same skin colour also had the same conditions of possibility and life experiences. Essentially when we speak of segregation in South Africa it is nothing less than a systematic creation of similarities and differences primarily based on ‘race’ and class (on segregation also see Cell, 1984; Lemon, 1991; Dubow, 1989; Posel, 1991). I contend that post-apartheid South Africa has inherited this long history of complex racial and class homophilous relations as a product of segregation\textsuperscript{4}.

Let us for a moment suspend all social categories of identification and think in an abstract way simply of conditions of possibility that are unequally distributed amongst various sectors of a population. Let us furthermore bring to this the principle of homophily—‘similarity breeds connection... and structures network ties of every type’. I understand ‘connection’ here to mean the formation of social relations amongst people. ‘Similarity’ is taken to primarily concern the structural organisation of social life and its attendant ways of being, doing, and forms of psychological and emotional life that spring from such worlds. Therefore, in my view, to say ‘similarity breeds connection’ is to say that conditions of possibility and life chances whose process of production have been the same have the probability of goodness of fit. From this

\textsuperscript{3} I use Black to refer to all sectors of the population who under apartheid were classified as non-White (i.e. Bantu Blacks, Coloured, and Asians).

\textsuperscript{4} See Chapter Two for further development of this argument.
may arise all manner of networks from the most formal and institutional to the most informal and casual. Seen in this way, the issue of self-segregation is about the reconstitution of social worlds through the formation of social relationships. Hitherto there seems nothing objectionable about any of this. The issue appears to arise when we perceive that the social worlds that are being reconstituted are those that have been inherited from apartheid’s segregationist discourse. It is at this point that we confront the first and second aspects of self-segregation outlined above. Put differently, the micro-ecological exchange of intergroup emotions, thoughts and behaviours has a relational existence with the structural arrangement of people’s life conditions and chances, and the transformation of society calls for close attention to both. For example, it may be hard to change interracial attitudes, thoughts and behaviours if the life conditions of the various groups show little change from those designed under apartheid. Similarly, the instalment and celebration of democratic values and ideals is incomplete without the supporting structural configuration of life experiences in tune with these ideals. Finally then, the study of self-segregation is important because it gives us the opportunity to recognise the complex interrelations between human psychology, political ideals and values and the socio-economic arrangement of people’s lives.

The foregoing argument is not intended to suggest that the social determines the psychological or that the social is more salient than the psychological. In a future world in which people live under approximately equal conditions could pursue their life’s interests with little or no structural limitations, and live dignified lives, the psychological character of their social relations and networks would still be important in the totality of their lives. By the psychological
character of social relations I mean whether social relations are characterised by conflict, suspicion, mistrust, avoidance, destructive competition and so on. Or whether they tend to be characterised by empathy, support, and a general friendly mood. Indeed, in reality things may not be this neatly categorised and especially in South Africa where divisions have not only been racial and ethnic but in both cases have been acrimonious as well. This situation is further aggravated by the economic scarcity that has confronted Black communities for decades. Ironically there are instances in these communities where animosity is directed at those Black people who are making economic gains in their lives. They are usually seen as ‘better than’ and referred to by all manner of derogatory names such as ‘coconuts’ and many of these people eventually leave the townships for the suburbs (see Hunter, 2010, Matlwa, 2007). The point here is that the psychological character of social relations is not strictly a racial issue although it takes a sharp focus where interracial relations are concerned, given the history of apartheid. Perhaps the importance of the psychological character of social relations amongst people is best illustrated in those dire circumstances where survival is at stake. Although varying in degrees of extremity, both the situation of the Jewish prisoners in Nazi concentration camps and the struggle for liberation in South African Black communities, in its most intense years between the mid to late 1980s, bears witness to the role of cooperation for survival. In times of relative peace and stability and notwithstanding the continuation of structural inequalities, the exchange of intergroup positive emotions, thoughts and behaviours can mediate intergroup hostility and violence (see Pettigrew et al., 2011) and by extension the risks of political and

5 Meaning you are Black on the outside and White on the inside. Essentially it means that one is not ‘authentically’ Black because they are perceived to have White tendencies.
social instability. Thus, the psychological importance of studying self-segregation is in the possibility that we may understand psychological obstacles to and facilitators of positive intergroup relations. It is also in this view that despite all its shortcomings (e.g. see Dixon, Durrheim & Tredoux, 2005; Erasmus, 2010; Dixon et al., 2012) the intergroup contact research literature after Allport (1954) must be applauded for all its attempts at fostering harmonious intergroup relations.

It may already be clear from the foregoing that one of apartheid’s main preoccupations was the control of contact and interaction of human bodies by creating spaces which, as much as possible obeyed the logic of racial and class segregation. The frustration of the state and other civil institutions (despite arduous mechanisms) was that there were always instances and spaces of human contact and relations, despite being prohibited in law. These spaces co-existed alongside those that were sanctioned by the state. In turn, the present democratic era seems concerned to transform the social spaces and human relations given to it by the hand of apartheid. One of the preoccupations of democratic South Africa is the promotion of human contact and interaction by creating spaces of diversity. Here too, the frustration of the state (despite spirited mechanisms) is that there are still instances and spaces of avoidance of cross-group contact and interaction that are not sanctioned by state law or institutional policies. In fact, we have no laws that enforce intergroup contact in the way that apartheid enforced intergroup segregation. We have instead the ‘Freedom of association—everyone has the right to freedom of association’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 18, p. 1249). This provision is antithetical to the racial engineering of human contact under apartheid
that was supported by laws such as the Group Areas Act of 1950, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages of 1949, Immorality Amendment Act of 1950, Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, Pass Laws Act of 1952 and others. Deposited in this constitutional right is the hope that citizens will embrace diversity in their formal and informal associations. This of course, does not mean that people consciously go about forming associations and relations with this provision explicitly held in mind. It does however mean that we have no legal and political ground to object to the configuration of their social networks which we must assume to be the outcome of the exercise of their ‘freedom of association’. Indeed, it is unlikely that anyone in South Africa today would publicly protest against, for example, interracial friendships and other racially diverse social networks. Many find these types of associations to be in keeping with the spirit of racial reconciliation and the Constitutional founding value of ‘non-racialism’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 1 (b), p. 1243). On the other hand, some people, including some in this study, take issue with associations and social networks that are racially homogeneous. Surely the people who form such social networks are also exercising their ‘freedom of association’ whether such relations are by conscious design or not. The issue here however, is not the questioning of citizens’ constitutional right - although this happens - but only as an unintended consequence. The challenging of racial homogeneity primarily has to do with the political imagination of a radically different future than our past: imagining the future now—the fourth aspect outlined above. Perhaps there are some who may hold the view that racial diversity in South Africa will come about through some organic process. It is difficult to believe that without local and international opposition that apartheid would have organically
dissolved with democracy eventually replacing it. This view is misleading because it suggests that there is a divine logic to human affairs and ours is to be patient and passive and all will be well in due time. Against this view and on the basis on of the insights we can glean from our distant and recent histories I contend that there is a need for a political ideology of a future that we aspire toward. The study of self-segregation makes a political statement in this regard which says that ‘freedom of association’ should not be used to resist the transformation of social relations.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to set the scene for the present study by outlining what I perceive to be some aspects of the practice of self-segregation in South Africa. I identified the following aspects of self-segregation: attitudes, thoughts and behaviours; macro-micro relationship of values and practices; the danger of political and social instability in the face of transformative attempts; and ‘imagine the future now’. These aspects of self-segregation were linked to an outline and discussion of the social, psychological and political importance of studying self-segregation. The interlocking social, psychological and political issues relating to self-segregation cannot of course, be resolved in this study and that is certainly not the aim. The aim has been to point out that a single social phenomenon has the possibility to carry a range of complex issues. Critical understanding of self-segregation lies in the recognition of and attempts to interrogate these interlocking issues and how they play out in everyday intergroup relations. The latter is precisely the aim of this study. The following chapter traces and explores
the development of racial segregation in South Africa and also highlights what I identify as one of the legacies of this history—the scarcity of social capital amongst social groups.
Chapter Two: The history of racial segregation in South Africa and the scarcity of interracial social capital

Introduction

The chapter is composed of two sections. The first section offers a limited overview of the development of racial segregation in South Africa. The main aim is to provide a histo-political context for the investigation of self-segregation amongst university students. To this end, the survey of texts is necessarily selective. The links between the historical works surveyed in the first section of the chapter and the subject matter of this study take two forms. First, to study the processes and factors that influence racial self-segregation amounts to studying the obstacles to and the catalysts for the formation of social relationships across racialised groups, on the one hand. On the other hand, the attempt to trace the historical development of segregationist discourse and practice in South Africa is in effect an exploration of some of the factors and processes that shaped the legacies that the country is presently seeking to overcome. In both cases, the principle and practice of segregation is central. Second, the link is made in the unspoken assumption of the first point. The assumption is that the history of racial segregation in South Africa finds some of its nuanced legacy in present day self-segregation. This assumption is conceded and is in turn presented as an argument developed in section two.
The second section of the chapter introduces and outlines the concept and theory of social capital as a bridge to the argument that the practice of self-segregation partly reflects the scarcity of socially inclusive intergroup social capital in South Africa. “The central idea of social capital is that social networks are a valuable asset. Networks provide a basis for social cohesion because they enable people to cooperate with one another...for mutual advantage (Field, 2008, p. 14). For purposes of the present work I wish to employ the idea of social capital as a metaphor rather than a theoretical concept to be measured in any way in this study. A subsection of this section specifically makes the argument that self-segregation is partly a symptom of the scarcity of cohesive intergroup social capital born of the history of segregation. As a coherent unit then, the chapter surveys the history of racial segregation in South Africa. It then argues that one of the outcomes of segregationist discourse and practice manifests itself today specifically as ‘race’ and class self-segregation—an indication of enduring intergroup divisions and a poverty of trust and supportive social networks.

The history and politics of segregation in South Africa

Segregation and apartheid

The ideology and practice of racial segregation is an important feature of South Africa’s historical and political legacy and the complexity of which is evinced by dedicated works (e.g. Dubow, 1989; Cell, 1982; Fredrickson, 1981; Keegan, 1996; Welsh, 1971; Maylam, 2001). There is in South African historiography a debate about whether segregation was distinctly different
from apartheid. The former is often associated with Dutch and British colonial projects in South Africa and the latter with Afrikaner nationalism. It has also been argued that what distinguished segregation from apartheid is that the latter was implemented with strategic and ideological rigour (e.g., Barber, 1999); that the changes brought about by the post-WWII context distinguished the two (e.g., Sparks, 1994). And still, others combine these perspectives (Beinart, 1994). Furthermore, Guelke (2005) has argued that to the extent that historical works distinguish and compare segregation and apartheid three classes of writers can be identified. (1) There are those who see apartheid as a form of colonialism and compare it with Nazism and regard all three (i.e., colonialism, Nazism and apartheid) as essentially illegitimate; (2) are writers who separate apartheid from totalitarian regimes such as Nazism and point to the paternalism infused in the development of apartheid although also acknowledging that such a benign idea rarely featured in the implementation of apartheid; (3) is a group that draws a line between segregation and apartheid. In so doing they also set the latter apart from Western racism and colonialism and see it as an Afrikaner nationalism anti-colonial movement.

There is also the view that segregation and apartheid followed each other as successive stages. Dubow (1989) argues that many people are not aware that apartheid was preceded by segregation—“a policy dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century, and which in many respects established the ideological and political framework out of which apartheid was constructed” (p. 1). Guelke (2005) points out that the view that segregation and apartheid were successive stages has tended to accentuate differences between the two and to attenuate their similarities and interdependence. “Yet part of the inspiration for apartheid was concern that
segregation was being eroded by social and economic forces” (p. 4). These different views also point to different approaches to historical reconstructions between those who favour an historical continuity thesis and those who argue for historical discontinuity. For instance, there are those who argue that the seedlings of segregation can be traced back to colonial South Africa. It is argued that segregation was primarily a process and outcome of White racism and the perception of White superiority; and the domination and exploitation of the racial ‘other’.

At the turn of the twentieth century segregation became a useful tool that supported South Africa’s industrial revolution and the formation of the country as a united White South Africa (Union of South Africa). These authors can be taken to be presenting an historical continuity thesis (Cell, 1984). On the other hand, there are, for example, Marxists/neo-Marxists who reject the continuation narrative and argue instead that segregation is specifically a twentieth century phenomenon arising within the context of the specificities of twentieth century South Africa. Here segregation is placed in relation to processes such as “state formation, changes in the mode of production, formation of capitalist and proletarian classes among whites, the development and subsequent underdevelopment of African peasants” (Cell, 1982, p. 55; also see Maylam, 2001, on the idealist/materialist division).

Grappling with the same issue, Maylam (2001) has asked the question: “To what point in South African history can one trace the source of racial discrimination and separation? Is it Dutch settlement in the Cape...? The era of the frontiers...? The mineral/industrial revolution...?” (ibid, p. 5) Or would it have to be the beginning of British rule in 1795 or the formation of Union in 1910? The emphasis on the historical discontinuity of South Africa’s racial order, argues
Maylam (2001), often leads to the view that apartheid signaled a drastic departure from what had preceded it and not a final point in the long trajectory of racial oppression. Historical continuity, on the other hand, has the risk of moderating the wrongs of apartheid. “Does it not make those who laid the building-blocks of the racial order no less guilty than those who strove to bring that order to its hideous completion?” (ibid., p. 6). These issues are raised here not with the hope to address them. Indeed, that is not aim of the chapter. I highlight the different approaches and contentions only to make the point that the history of racial segregation is much more complex than this brief overview can hope to achieve. Despite these analytical distinctions, it is common knowledge that segregation was a significant pillar of the ideology and practice of apartheid. Thus, in the following discussion no hard lines are drawn between the two. Holding all this in mind we can move to trace the development of racial segregation in South Africa and in this there seems no better place to start than Dutch settlement in the Cape.

*Dutch settlement in the Cape*

In a study of the origin of White supremacy in South Africa, Guelke (1989) takes the position that the Dutch imported their prejudices to the Cape. In other words, White supremacy in South Africa finds its source in the Dutch colonial vision of the world established on European dominance. The Dutch sense of superiority found expression in the colonial context through ‘institutional racism and slavery’ (p. 40). The sense of European superiority amongst the Dutch

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6 The issue of continuity and discontinuity is also raised in the work of Stevens, Franchi and Swart (2006) although they are interested in legacy of apartheid and racism in post-apartheid South Africa.
argues Guelke, was strong to the extent that “the Dutch came to South Africa with the expectation to be served rather than to serve” (ibid., p. 41-42). Arguing in the same direction, Giliomee & Elphick (1979) concede the importation of European superiority and racism from the Netherlands to South Africa: “…the structure of the early colony was heavily influenced by attitudes and institutions inherited from earlier Dutch experience in Europe and the Indies” (ibid., p. 365). Giliomee & Elphick (1979) however, differ from Guelke (1989) in that they emphasise the particulars of economic and institutional factors operating in the Cape: “Emerging racial attitudes and stratification on racial lines were shaped both by European heritage and the economic, demographic and institutional forces operating in the colony” (p. 385).

For Fredrickson (1981), the Dutch colonial project was not established on rooted racism but rather on the Dutch East India Company’s uncompromising commercial interests. “Overriding all other considerations…was the economic interest of a large capitalistic trading enterprise… their interest was control of what these societies produced rather than direct domination of their territories and population” (p. 19). Joining with Fredrickson (1981) and Elphick and Giliomee (1979), Van den Boogart (1982) holds that Dutch attitudes were influenced by their own cultural norms and their views of Africans. Dutch attitudes, he holds, were also shaped by the “forms of contact” the Dutch had with Africans (p. 40). While some features of African life “remained strange and threatening” to the Dutch, the commercial necessity of “dependencies and reciprocity…allowed the Dutchmen to develop some sympathetic interest and the feeling

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7 Hereafter DEIC
that Africans could not be totally different from themselves” (ibid., p. 43). Van den Boogart accepts the negative connotation the Europeans attached to Africans and argues that they manifested in those instances when the Dutch felt threatened by Africans. In addition, Van den Boogart emphasises cultural difference rather than differences in skin colour for the emergent Dutch racism.

Some of the literature on the origins of racial segregation and White racism in South Africa has made much of the apparently liberal sexual attitudes present in the Cape during Dutch rule in the 17th century. This is not altogether surprising in view of apartheid’s obsession with controlling interracial contact and sexual relations. The attitude toward interracial sexual relations amongst many Whites in 20th century South Africa was that such relations were “repugnant and repulsive” (Maylam, 2001, p. 39). Such attitudes together with those relating to work, territorial proximity and political rights became indicators of racism in South Africa. Therefore, some historians when searching for the origins of racism in South Africa have investigated sexual attitudes in the 17th century Cape.

In a work that investigates the use of legislation to engineer social relations in South Africa, Zaal (2005) argues that seventeenth century miscegenation statutes produced by the DEIC are “the earliest use of colonial law as a manipulative tool for the purpose of promoting racial policies at the Cape” (p. 1). Against Böeseken (1970) who has argued that Jan Van Riebeeck, the first Commander of the DEIC in the Cape, was uneasy about interracial sexual relations (and especially extramarital ones) and attempted to discourage them using the law. Zaal (2005) argues that if this were the case then Van Riebeeck could be taken to have laid the first
legislation that centuries later would capture elements of apartheid. In his analysis, Zaal (2005) exonerates both Van Riebeeck and his immediate successors from the charge that their policies discouraged interracial sexual relations. To the contrary he finds that they supported such relations as a phase in the DEIC’s population policy in line with that which the Company had developed in the Indies. At the time of Van Riebeeck’s office tenure in the Cape there was a small population of white women, Zaal (2005) tells us, and to allow for marginal increase in the settler population Van Riebeeck allowed for a few mixed marriages between European males and “carefully selected and Christianised” local women (p. 2). This process was controlled by DEIC marital laws and ensured that European and non-European integration did not unsettle the “racially-prejudiced DEIC leadership...” (ibid., p. 2-3). This policy had been enacted in India from 1617 and was now being implemented in the Cape. In effect, it meant that interracial marriages, insofar as they were well controlled, were not the issue more than informal sexual relations between European men and local Khoi and slave women that could not be controlled. Even in this regard it seems that the issue was less about the existence of such relations. The DEIC was at the time interested to reduce the mortality rate of fair complexion children born of the union of European and slave or local women (Zaal, 2005; Fredrickson, 1981).

Zaal (2005) thus concludes that if anything Van Riebeeck covertly facilitated sexual relations between DEIC slaves and Europeans in line with the Company’s policies in the Indies. Serious attempts to use criminal law to curb interracial sexual relations appear only in late seventeenth century 1678, 1681 and 1685 legislation promulgated as part of a morality campaign initiated by visiting DEIC Commissioners. Visiting Commissioners to the Cape were appointed by
Company directors and granted authority to enact and amend laws and practices (Zaal, 2005). In essence, Zaal’s argument is against the view that the Dutch imported European superiority and racism to South Africa and suggests that Dutch attitudes were emergent in the colonial context. Against Zaal and the corollary of his argument, some literature paints a different picture of Van Riebeeck. Maylam (2001) has argued that some of Van Riebeeck’s writing soon after arriving in the Cape show him as holding a “virulent racist outlook” (p. 32). Prior to his departure for the Cape, Van Riebeeck, on the basis of second hand experience, was of the view that: “Though “Sieur” Leendert does not seem to have any fear of the natives, I beg to state my opinion that they are not to be trusted, being a brutal gang, living without conscience” (MacCrone, 1937, p. 17). Soon after his arrival, it is said that Van Riebeeck issued a proclamation controlling contact between the local Khoikhoi people and the DEIC workforce. In the proclamation the Khoikhoi were described as “very brutal ...a wild nation...very bold, thievish, and not at all to be trusted” (MacCrone, 1937, p. 19). A year later Van Riebeeck wanted to be deployed to a different post and on writing to the directors of the DEIC requesting his move he wrote: “I will now, to conclude, most humbly, respectfully, and earnestly pray that your Honours will think of removing me hence to India...for among these dull, stupid, lazy, stinking people, little address is required...” (ibid., p. 22). Taking these arguments together, Zaal’s (2005) position seems to be built around the idea that the interracial sexual relations attitudes held by the Dutch residing in the Cape were an indication of their liberal racial attitudes which changed largely due to external influences. The practice of miscegenation in the Cape is not disputed by the evidence (see Fredrickson, 1981; Shell, 1994; Elphick & Shell, 1979).
However, Maylam (2001) has warned of the myth of lusotropicalism\(^8\) that “rests on the false assumption that the easy practice of interracial sex is an accurate gauge of relaxed racial attitudes” (ibid., p. 26).

There are thus, historians who reject the idea that the seedlings of apartheid were planted in the 1650s (e.g. Elphick & Giliomee, 1979; Ross, 1994). In contrast, the eighteenth century (the liberal school) is seen to have had lasting impact on the development of the ‘racial order’ (Maylam, 2001) in South Africa (e.g. MacCrone, 1937; Elphick & Giliomee, 1989; Keppel-Jones, 1963; Roux, 1964). And still, Afrikaner nationalist writers favour the historical continuity thesis with Dutch settlement as point of origin; and others have emphasised the more recent nineteenth century influence (the radical school) (Maylam, 2001). The question of periodization and the search for the origins of the ‘racial order’ can turn out to be futile, argues Maylam (2001) without the consideration of the broader question: “what is the evidence for racist thinking and practice in the Cape before 1800?” (p. 36). Maylam goes on to explore this question in much detail searching for racial ideology and theory; the slavery-racism debate; and the miscegenation-racism debate. He concludes,

Racial differentiation and discrimination were not readily discernible in the legal, institutional structures of the Cape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The emergent racial order rested much more on informal practice, evident in everyday thought, behaviour and patterns of interaction. But the historian who moves into this realm faces

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\(^8\) The idea or belief that the Portuguese were better colonisers when compared with other Europeans because they had a keen interest in forming sexual relations with local people (see Vale de Almeida, 2008).
difficulties. It is hard enough to capture popular consciousness in the modern years, so much more daunting a project when going back 200 years into the past (p. 38).

The colonial frontiers

European settlement did not begin and end in the Cape but expanded inland toward the east and north. Some have argued that this expansion led to “different, harsher attitudes and social relations among these remote communities of colonists” (Maylam, 2001, p. 52). It is this expansion that has been called the ‘frontier thesis’ and which is believed to have been central in shaping racial consciousness in South Africa (Maylam, 2001). The ‘frontier thesis’ is said to have originated in America with Frederick Turner who argued in the 1890s that American society was greatly influenced by the North American frontier experience that led to a democratic and egalitarian culture (ibid). The ‘frontier thesis’ was taken up in South Africa in the 1970s by liberal historians who argued that the frontier experience in South Africa was significant in the making of South Africa’s racial order (ibid). Maylam (2001) argues that this view was an assumption embedded in the liberal frontier thesis maintaining that the racist attitudes present in the frontier environment were imported into the 19th and 20th century and finally culminated in apartheid. Frontier racist attitudes and ways of life are said to have been transported by what came to be known as the Great Trek of the voortrekkers in the 1830s.

At the close of the 17th century the DEIC in the Cape was unable to provide for the needs of the ships that pulled into its harbour. Simultaneously, agricultural exercise was on the increase with
the livestock of colonists showing a dramatic increase partly due to illegal trading (Lemon, 1976). In view of this, the government was successfully petitioned to expand farming beyond the existing settlement. When Willem Adriaan van der Stel, the then governor of the colony was accused of building a personal monopoly, the outcry of the colonists led to his overthrow in 1707. This Lemon (1976) contends, opened a new phase of colonisation by a group that would later be known as the Afrikaners who “regarded the function of government as protection, in the sense of ensuring that farmers had sufficient labour and that farm prices were high” (p. 19).

The Trekboers (trekking farmers) are said to have been large-scale cattle farmers who left the Cape colony due to “difficulties and frustrations of life under Company rule” (ibid). The trekking farmers significantly increased the area of White occupation between 1703 and 1809 but had difficulty convincing Company authorities and Europeans in general that theirs was a project “contributing to the triumph of civilisation over barbarism” (Fredrickson, 1981, p. 36). It is said that the classic trekboer’s way of life was not significantly different than that of the Khoikhoi people that they were displacing from their lands. It was thus the view of many who remained in the colony including European visitors to the interior that the frontier was in fact promoting a “White degeneration” and that trekboers were likely to succumb to savagery instead of extending civilisation (ibid).

One of the first historical works from the liberal school described the frontiersmen as “hardy and venturesome...governments found the Boer not a little intractable in his independence, when it came to imposing legal restraints on his dealings with the coloured races... Liberal views
were hardly to be looked for, least of all in their attitudes towards the Native races” (MacMillan, 1927, p. 20-21). MacCrone (1937) had this to say about the trekboers:

The frontier farmer, above all things, lacked discipline, and much of the unruliness of frontier life sprang from an exaggerated individualism, an insistence upon rights at the expense of obligations, that was anti-social in its tendencies...The general run of frontier farmers had a mind that, as a result partly of his type of religion, was narrow, hard and intolerant, especially in its dealings with those who fell outside the pale of that religion (p. 108-109).

On the self-image of the trekboers Fredrickson (1981) writes that these farmers placed much emphasis on what was an obvious cultural difference between them and the Khoikhoi people. Thus, religion became central to their self-image with some among them believing that they were spreading the Christian gospel into the Africa wilderness. Of all that constituted their social heritage the trekboers “clung with greater fervour” and highly prized their religion next to none MacCrone (1937, p. 126). Notwithstanding their loss of communication with their European counterparts and the mainstream of their culture, the trekboers are said to have retained the 17th century Calvinism tradition of their background as they moved further inland. It is this Calvinism that is said to have “survived and flourished in isolation” to which the ideas of “predetermination and the elect, notions which, by analogy with the Old Testament Israelites, were transformed into a sense of national calling as a chosen people, with a mission to subdue the heathen” (Keegan, 1996, p. 4). MacCrone argues that on the basis of their religion the trekboers could justify their domination over the local peoples they encountered in
addition to the Khoikhoi who they had largely defeated and displaced. In their trek eastward of the
Cape the trekboers were to encounter the Xhosa in the 1770s who had occupied what is now known as the Transkei as early as the 16th century (ibid). Clashes over pastoral land and cattle theft by both parties led to the First Frontier War of 1779-81 which was won by the Boers and a second followed in 1793 and a third in 1799 (MacCrone, 1937). By 1834-35 the Xhosa and Boers were to fight another war, this time a massive attack by the Xhosa that dealt a great damage to the Boers who were saved by the British army as had been the case in the war of 1799. The British had permanently taken rule of the Cape by 1806 after a short stint between 1795 and 1803 (ibid). The Boers ultimately moved northward hoping for greener pastures and a secure environment but this was not to be so as they soon encountered the Zulu, Ndebele and Sotho who were no less ready to defend their lands from Boer invasion. In 1838 the Boers and Zulus fought it out in what became known as the Battle of Blood River in which the Zulu were defeated (MacCrone, 1937, Fredrickson, 1981).

MacCrone (1937) has argued that the religious and social implications of frontier life were characterised in the race attitudes of the trekboers that rejected, with suspicion and hostility, any attempts by missionaries or government officials to improve interracial relations. The Boers, it is said, perceived such attempts as a threat to existing group privilege and racial inequality that was to their benefit.

Under such circumstances, the intense and exclusive group consciousness of the frontier found expression in a consciousness of race and social supremacy which coincided almost uniformly with the distinctions based upon creed and colour. Christianity and skin-colour,
membership of a particular group and social superiority, became so closely associated with one another that any one by itself could serve as a criterion of group membership (ibid., p. 130).

The trek of the Boers, argues Fredrickson (1981), was more than a response to demographic and ecological circumstances. It was as much an escape from British rule and a political protest against that government’s native policies. The Boers frequently complained that the British government paid more attention to native interests than to their own. This is not quite true and yet the tendency of some missionaries to blame the Boers whenever a conflict ensued and to point out that their way of life was not much different than that of their indigenous rivals was not well taken and only confirmed the Boer perception of the British (Fredrickson, 1981). Thus, it was that the Boers were deeply unhappy about British native policy and complained about British interference with their methods of disciplining and controlling the natives whom they competed with for land and cattle or those who worked for them on their farms (ibid). All this gave great impetus for the Great Trek that was already underway. Around this time (1820s to 1840s) British policy makers are said to have been influenced by humanitarian/missionary pressure groups and therefore, attempted to avoid the mistreatment of indigenous peoples by settlers by implementing measures to protect them from frontier Whites. This was also to give the missionaries a chance to convert the natives and civilise them before they were corrupted by settler values (ibid). All this was of course, to change when the British decided to make firm their colonisation of South Africa.
Writing against the historiography of the liberal historians, Keegan (1996) notes that if these historians painted the frontier tradition as the “source of all evil” (p. 4) they also tended to portray British imperialism as overwhelmingly good. British imperial forces however, were in reality contested and ambiguous needing often to be persuaded to fulfil their purported Christian mission in the world (Keegan, 1996). He further argues that liberal historians were supporters of imperial expansion of a different type: “in pursuit of the task of protecting, civilising and converting indigenous peoples… Direct rule by the imperial power was always the liberal historians’ preferred prescription” (ibid., p. 5). Maylam (2001) joins with Keegan in pointing out the historiographical leanings of liberal historians. Maylam goes further and highlights the challenges to the frontier thesis mounted by writers such as Legassick (1971), Giliomee & Elphick (1979), Guelke (1985), and Giliomee, (1989). He argues that there were hidden agendas to the liberal frontier thesis, one of which was to “pin the blame for racism, segregation (and later apartheid) on the Boers/Afrikaners” (ibid., p. 64). The consequence was that English-speaking colonists and the British were portrayed as free from racist attitudes and practices. Maylam thus concludes that

Neither slavery nor the frontier produced a racial order in South Africa... However, it is evident that in the era of slavery and the frontier whites had a sense of their physical and cultural differences from racial ‘others’; and differences generally meant superiority... But of all generalisations that have been made, one of the least acceptable is that which represents Boers/Afrikaners as the archetypal racists, to be contrasted with the supposedly
more urbane, enlightened English-speakers. This is one of the great (among many) myths of South African history (p. 66).

*British rule and the industrial revolution*

The discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in 1870 set in motion what was to be South Africa’s industrial revolution. Kimberly was to become the springboard of thought and practices that came to be the legal backbone of apartheid South Africa (van Schoor, 1951). With the opening of the diamond mines a large supply of labour was desperately needed and to ensure an easily accessible and steady supply of cheap African labour, Cecil Rhodes constructed labour compounds or locations near the De Beers mines (van Schoor, 1951; Maylam, 2001). As a guard against the trafficking of diamonds and to control the labour force, Rhodes implemented a rigorous curfew and pass applied specifically to Black labourers. This, argues Schoor, was the real beginning of racial segregation in South Africa. Rhodes was able to achieve this partly because the British had already applied a policy that had worked well for them in other places—they deprived the indigenous people of both their land and cattle i.e. their source of livelihood (ibid). This had largely been achieved in what Schoor’s calls the ‘land wars’ of 1799, 1811, 1819, 1834 and 1840s against the Xhosa people. Thus the presence of a large supply of African labour that could be grossly exploited was possible because these people had been “rendered voteless, rightless, and voiceless” (ibid., p. 14) and effectively infantilized under Rhodes’ policy of trusteeship.
Thus, there was soon to emerge White ownership and control in the mining industry that had not been apparent in 1869 when Griqua, Hora and Tlhaping people dominated the industry (Maylam, 2001). By the 1870s and 1880s the amalgamation of the diamond industry had advanced such that big companies were buying out individual owners and employing White diggers as supervisors and skilled miners (ibid). Consequently, perceiving themselves as superior to Black workers, White miners pressed for differential status and rejected attempts to be treated as equal to Black workers. Maylam (2001) argues that in the 1880s legislation became explicitly racial with the Mining Act of 1883 restricting Black workers from handling explosives; in 1889 another piece of legislation prohibited Black workers from working in any form of mining work without the supervision of a “white man as his master or ‘baas’” (ibid, p. 119). It was in 1885 that racialised residential segregation for mine workers was established, accommodating African workers only. In 1889, De Beers then already a diamond monopoly was to construct a model residential village for its White workers (Turrell, 1987). The fact of a dominant White class was nothing new having been already in place in the Cape by the close of the 18th century. Early industrialisation however, did bring a new dimension i.e. the racial division of labour (Maylam, 2001).

The diamond mining industry, like the gold mining industry later, came to depend on the exploitation of thousands of low-paid, tightly controlled African migrant labourers performing predominantly unskilled tasks. Above them in the labour hierarchy was a class of more skilled workers, artisans and overseers who were drawn almost entirely from the ranks of the white population (ibid., p. 119-120).
Johnstone (1976) also points out that the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 made it a legal offence for Black workers to breach their contract; it restricted their mobility and bound them to their employers; pass laws were enforced only on Black workers; and it was only Black workers who were housed in stringently policed compounds. The Mines and Works Act of 1911 (amended in 1925) practically locked non-European workers into non-skilled labour in the mines, railway, roads and building sectors (van Schoor, 1951). Johnstone (1976) argued that this structural oppression and racial discrimination were the foundation of class exploitation and White wealth accumulation. Similarly, van Schoor (1951) has argued that “The Glen Grey Act of 1894, the 1913 Land Act, the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act were part of a series of laws to deprive the African of his independent means of subsistence, his cattle and his land, and to strip him of every possession except his labour power” (p. 20-21). It is these laws amongst others (e.g. 1918 Factories Act, 1922 Apprenticeship, 1924 Industrial Consolidation Act) that van Schoor believes established and consolidated economic segregation. Political and social segregation were consolidated post the 1910 Union Act that unified the then separate republics: Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange River Colony (ibid). Maylam (2001) adds that segregationist policies produced by the union government focused on four main areas: “land, labour, political differentiation, and urban control” (p. 147).

On the land issue, Maylam argues that the Land Act of 1913 was important for its impact on the political economy of segregation and apartheid; it formalised the reserves for migrant labour; and laid the groundwork for apartheid’s bantustans. The 1920 Native Affairs Act was similar to the Glen Grey Act in that it allowed for the constitution of local councils in African reserves. This
was in essence a measure of political segregation because it granted self-governance to Africans but only in the reserves while keeping urban and central governance under White control (Maylam, 2001; Dubow, 1989). Urban segregation and control of African urbanisation was embodied in the 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act. “The act empowered municipalities to establish segregated locations for Africans, implement a rudimentary system of influx control, and to set up advisory boards, bodies which would contain African elected representatives with the right to discuss local issues affecting Africans, but without any power to change policy” (p. 149). Labour segregation was initiated under the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 discussed above. This was elaborated under a 1922 Apprenticeship Act that in effect preserved skilled labour for White workers only. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 established a bargaining medium but only for unionised White and Coloured workers (ibid). Lastly, social segregation was promoted through the passing of the Immorality Act, 1927 (No. 5 of 1927) that prohibited sexual relations between White and Black people. Amendments were made in 1950 under the first apartheid government producing the Immorality Amendment Act, 1950 (Act No. 21 of 1950) that extended the prohibition of sexual relations between Europeans and non-Europeans and not only Black and White people. This brief survey shows that from the mid-19th century to the turn of the 20th century segregationist practice and discourse intensified in the various areas of social life. This pattern was to continue and intensify under apartheid which we will now consider briefly.
Apartheid

The story of apartheid in South Africa, like the preceding historical periods, is complex and contested (e.g. Bundy, 1979; Huntley, Alexander, Guiaraes, & James, 2001; Terreblanche, 2002; MacDonald, 2006). In spite of this Maylam (2001) has argued that apartheid had six closely related aspects that held it together and it is on these that we will focus on here. These aspects were forms of segregation not different from those discussed in the preceding discussion although their implementation under apartheid was more exacting.

First, political segregation had been set in motion in the Cape when the political franchise was abolished for non-Whites. By 1910, the measure was extended to the Orange Free State, Natal and the Transvaal (Maylam, 2001). The token political representation that had been granted to the Indian community under the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 was abolished by the National Party soon after coming into power in 1948. Further political alienation was pursued through the ‘homeland’ policy. Maylam argues that the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was an attempt to retribalise the African communities by setting up an authority in which government-appointed chiefs effectively became state administrative agents. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 was intended to divide the Africans, already territorially segregated in the homelands, into ‘national units’ which were presumed to be ethnically and culturally different. The nations were to be incrementally granted self-governance and eventually independence. This was of course nothing short of a divide-and-rule strategy meant to crush solidarity amongst Black people (ibid). Second and related to political
segregation, was spatial segregation. “The aim, albeit an impossible one, was to achieve a correspondence between racialised political differentiation and racialised spatial separation” (ibid., p. 181). The Land Act of 1913 had laid the ground-work and in the 1960s it was to be implemented with thoroughness through the state’s forced removals programme. Wilson and Ramphele (1989) report that an estimate of 3.5 million people, mostly Black, were forcibly removed from one place to another between 1960 and 1983. To work, spatial segregation relied on the state’s strict control of people’s mobility enforced through influx control. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1954 restricted permanent African urban residency by imposing strict and absurd conditions for the removal of Africans to the homelands who were deemed to be surplus labour (Maylam, 2001). Third, the racialisation of labour has already been discussed. It must be noted that WWII undermined the racial division of labour and job reservation when many White men left to fight in the war. In the 1950s this was to be restored through the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 and 1959 according to which the Minister of Labour had the power to reserve certain jobs for specific racial groups; prohibit cross-race trade unions; criminalise labour strikes by Africans; and not recognizing African trade unions (ibid).

Fourth, education was racialised and segregated and under the Bantu Education Act of 1953 the structure and content of education reflected, supported and legitimated the apartheid stratification system and perpetuated the domination of the Afrikaners over Africans (Johnson, 1982). Overall, African education compared to White education was phenomenally poor, classes were overcrowded, teachers were inadequately trained and there was a chronic shortage of books and equipment (Johnson, 1982; Nkomo, 1990). In 1959 apartheid was
extended to universities with the Extension of University Education Act being passed in that year. ‘Open universities’ like Witwatersrand (Wits) and the University of Cape Town (UCT) were not allowed to register new Black students without special permission being granted by the state (Christie, 1985). Fort Hare was to only register Xhosa students and two new ‘tribally-based’ university colleges were established— the University College of Zululand at oNgoye for Zulu speakers; the University College of the North at Turfloop for the Sotho, Tswana, and Venda people. The University College of the Western Cape was designated for Coloured people and Indians to the University College of Durban Westville (Christie, 1985). Fifth, social segregation came in the form of the Immorality Act, 1927 (No. 5 of 1927) that prohibited sexual relations between White and Black people. Amendments were made in 1950 under the first apartheid government producing the Immorality Amendment Act, 1950 (Act No. 21 of 1950) that extended the prohibition of sexual relations between Europeans and non-Europeans and not only Black and White people. Entertainment and sports were also segregated in the 1950s when racially mixed clubs and contests were banned; and sports spectators had segregated seats. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 racially segregated public facilities such as “toilets, lifts, public transport, post office counters, beaches, parks, park benches, and entrances to public buildings” (Maylam, 2001, p. 184). This is what came be known as ‘petty apartheid’ and it too constituted spatial segregation.

Apartheid was also supported by what Maylam (2001) sees as “key pillars” of “crucial importance” and these being “the system of racial classification, the state’s repressive apparatus, the apartheid bureaucracy, and racial ideology” (p. 184). First, apartheid made
‘sense’ in so far as people could be strictly categorized as belonging to one or other racial group and thus the Population Registration Act of 1950 required that everyone be classified as either White, African (or Bantu), Asiatic or Coloured. Racial classification was significant to the functioning of apartheid because it determined a person’s place in society and their access to privileges or lack thereof (ibid). Second, state repression was crucial to dealing with protest and resistance against the government. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 banned the Communist Party and extended by the Minister of Justice to outlaw political organizations against the apartheid government. State repression measures were increased in the 1960s under the General Laws Amendments Acts of 1962, 1963, 1964.

The Minister of Justice was given the power to place people under house arrest. The police could detain suspects for periods of 90 days, without bail, in solitary confinement... At the same time the strength of both the police and defence force were increased in terms of personnel and coercive capacity (Maylam, 2001, p. 185).

Third, apartheid bureaucracy took a significant turn in the 1950s away from the paternalistic approach of the beginning of the 20th century to being more authoritarian (see Evan, 1987). It was the Department of Native Affairs that underwent drastic changes and it is said that H.F Verwoerd played an important role in this change when he became Minister of Native Affairs in 1950 (Maylam, 2001). There was an increase in staff capacity from 1750 in 1948 to 3000 in 1960; power was centralised in the hands of the Department’s ‘professional’ administrators many of whom held degrees in “Bantu administration from Afrikaans universities” (ibid., p. 186); ‘scientific’ research was used to legitimate the operations of the Department; and in the
course of time the Department of Native Affairs came be to know as a ‘state within a state’ for all the power and influence it came to hold (ibid). Fourth, was apartheid’s ideological support. Maylam (2001) argues that apartheid was not primarily driven by a set of beliefs although ideology did serve an important legitimating role largely perpetuated by Afrikaner nationalists who sought to ground apartheid policy on theology and science. According to Afrikaner nationalism God is the ‘Great Divider’ and apartheid was the fulfilment of a divine plan to separate the nations and ethnic groups according to their languages, cultures and political systems (ibid). Outdated scientific ideas were also drawn on in support of apartheid. The idea of White superiority and Black inferiority justified White political domination. Also important was the idea that racial differences were real and fixed as suggested by both science and scripture and this view was used to justify the 1960s apartheid phase of ‘separate development’ (ibid).

All this amounted to a

...thoroughly implausible attempt to justify apartheid – Afrikaner self-determination amounted in reality to an abhorrent system of white domination; and apartheid-style ‘self determination’ was imposed forcibly on other groups without regard for their own wishes and aspirations (ibid., p. 187).

This section of the chapter has surveyed historical works with the aim to offer an overview of the development of segregationist discourse and practices in South Africa. Partly the aim has been to contextualise the study of self-segregation within this long and complex historical narrative of ‘race’, class, social and political relations. On this background, self-segregation in South Africa should hardly be a surprise although it is certainly of concern in view of present
day ideals and values. Admittedly this historical review has been quite detailed and some may question whether this is necessary for a study investigating self-segregation amongst university students. My view is that it is necessary because what has been undertaken here is nothing short of an historical exploration of the social, psychological and political aspects of racial and class segregation in South Africa. In this regard the historical overview is an extension of the discussion presented in Chapter One. The detailed exploration is also an expression of the note, also made in Chapter One, on the importance of retaining a temporal dimension to human practices or the *historicality of human practices*. While not everything contained in this section will have immediate relevance to the present study the detail stands in its own right as an attempt to understand the complex history of ‘race’ and class relations in South Africa. The task which I turn to below is to argue that this history has had the effect (among others) of giving us intergroup relations generally marked by social, emotional and class distance; and a lack of trust and support both within and between social groups although the emphasis is on the latter.

*Socia Capital*

The evolution and implementation of segregation and apartheid, as explored above, are clearly different from the seemingly personal choices or voluntary associations that are the concerns of this study. Quite simply, segregation and apartheid created distinct worlds of White privilege and Black disenfranchisement from mainstream society. It created different social worlds on the basis of skin colour and supported these differences by creating a preferential system that
ensured the unequal distribution of material support for social existence and life chances. By and large, people who had the same skin colour also had the same conditions of possibility and life experiences. This racialised structural, material and experiential similarity has affinity to the metaphor – ‘birds of a feather flock together’ or homophily – “similarity breeds connection...and structures network ties of every type...” (McPherson et al., 2001, p. 415) as spelled out in chapter one.

When we bring this outline to the South African case, ‘race’ and class as a relational couple become inescapable. Again, this is because historically in this country the principle of homophily found expression in segregation and apartheid. I emphasise life conditions, possibilities and experiences because in my view, there is nothing inherently racial about ‘race’ relations other than that which has its source in the differences in life conditions, possibilities and experiences. Attempts at historical redress and social change are directed not at changing people’s skin colour (from which racial identities are read) but their life conditions, possibilities and experiences in the world. To say it differently, “Propinquity –the propensity to form relationships with others who share the same social situation” (Stearns Buchmann & Bonneau, 2009, p. 173; Fischer, 2008) leads to the formation of networks of every type: familial, professional, political, religious, social and so on. In all this we come to realise the possibilities and limitations imposed by the history and legacy of segregation and apartheid on the formation of social connections and networks.

However, in a future world in which people live under approximately equal conditions, could pursue their life’s interests with little or no structural limitations, and live dignified lives, the
psychological character of their social relations and networks would still be important in the totality of their lives. This is to say whether social relations are characterised by support and trust or conflict and bad faith. In reality, of course, things may not be this neatly categorised with social relations shifting on a continuum between harmony and conflict at various times. Both the structural and material constitution of social relations and the psychological character of such relations contribute to the totality of social life and also link with the idea of social capital.

I wish to employ the idea of social capital here as a metaphor to describe the emotional intimacy and psycho-social value of social ties rather than a theoretical concept to be explicated and measured in this study. There is nothing strange in taking this approach for as Field (2008) points out, the term social capital was first used as a metaphor to describe “social ties as a form of capital…it was invented at least six times during the course of the twentieth century, each time to suggest that using connections to cooperate helped people to improve their lives” (p. 14). The metaphor, in other words, suggests that social relations like other forms of capital (e.g. economic and physical) can be used in a profitable way by social agents who invest in social capital and thus get returns on their investment (ibid). However, it was not until the 1960s that ‘capital’ originally meaning the accumulation of money, was extended to people and their capacities (ibid). Schults (1961) and Becker (1964) used ‘human capital’ to refer to the value of employees’ skills, meaning that labour could for example, be made more productive through educational investment, and could be measured and compared (ibid). The conceptual history of social capital identifies Lyda Hanifan as the first person to systematically use the term
in his 1961 study of the sense of community in rural districts (Field, 2008). Hanifan argued for the development of community centres in rural areas after finding that “goodwill, fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse” contributed to a sense of community (ibid., p. 15).

I will not give a detailed exposition of social capital, due to space limitations. I do however want to point out that the influence of the concept is far reaching, being used in fields such as “economics, sociology, health science, urban studies, regional studies, social policy, criminology, business studies, social and economic geography and history” (Field, 2008, p. 2).

The concept draws its contemporary importance from the works of Pierre Bourdieu (sociology), James Coleman (sociology) and Robert Putman (political science). Briefly then, the American school of social capital (Putman and Coleman) sees social capital as allowing people to effectively pursue shared objectives on the basis of their social networks and the norms of trust and reciprocity (Arneil, 2006). In this, Putman joins with Coleman who views social capital as a “set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community organisations...” (p. 4) and thus community is the source of a shared civic culture (ibid). Putman and Coleman hold the view that civic life in America that was once robust has drastically declined leading to a range of negative outcomes in government, communities, the economy, and education (Arneil, 2006).

Thus, for Coleman (1994) and Putman (2000) their theories of social capital “focus...largely on the amount of social connectedness rather than a detailed analysis of the nature of any past or present connections” (ibid., p. 5). On the other hand, Bourdieu’s take on social capital is influenced by Marxist thought, meaning that he is concerned with understanding the foundations of social order, unequal access to resources and the holding of power. This also
means that his thoughts on social capital are part of “a wider analysis of the diverse foundations of social order” (Field, 2008, p. 16) that include other concepts such as ‘cultural capital’, ‘symbolic capital’, ‘habitus’ and ‘field’. In Bourdieu’s hands, social capital and thus the constitution of civil society, is centrally influenced by history and power relations. Consequently, for Bourdieu social capital is not a functional means of exchange but

...is built up or accumulated over time in particular ways. Moreover, the opportunities for social capital accumulation are not equally open to all... The past accumulation of social capital weighs heavily on the types of group and social activity that currently exist...as well as shaping the nature of future opportunities for further development (Arneil, 2006, p. 8).

What is more, social capital is not an undifferentiated asset. Michael Woolcock has recently provided a helpful set of distinctions:

- Bonding social capital, which denotes ties between like people in similar situations, such as immediate family, close friends and neighbours;
- Bridging social capital, which encompasses more distant ties of like persons, such as loose friendships and workmates; and
- Linking social capital, which reaches out to unlike people in dissimilar situations, such as those who are entirely outside the community, thus enabling members to leverage a far wider range of resources than are available within the community. (Woolcock, 2001 cited in Field, 2008, p. 46).
What is notable about ‘bonding social capital’ is the reference to similar situations and close friends. In this regard, bonding social capital aptly captures the principles of homophily and propinquity, discussed earlier. This relationship finds its empirical expression in this study in primary friendship ties/close friendships lived out in emotionally intimate spaces. Unsurprisingly, these friendships are characterised by racial and socio-economic homogeneity. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, is ‘exchanged’ in secondary friendships/casual friendships which in this study are often but not always racially heterogeneous and lived out in emotionally less intimate spaces.

**A history of segregation and the scarcity of social capital**

Bourdieu’s insistence on the role of history and power relations makes his take on social capital useful to my argument that there is presently in South Africa a scarcity of cross-racial and cross-class social capital (i.e. social networks of trust, support and reciprocity) as a function of the history of racial, spatial, economic, and social segregation and inequality. In other words, the formation of student friendship groups is more than the exercise of personal preference because such choices involve the use of markers and artefacts that are the products and processes of history and the present constellation of material and symbolic power relations. In this we see the probabilities for the continuation of social relations designed from a segregationist blueprint.
dilemmas of transformation, Ramphele (2008) also recognises the poverty of intergroup social capital,

South Africa’s transformation process also rests on a weak social capital base that is often unacknowledged. ‘Social capital’ is used here to denote the complex web of networks of support, trust relationships and intergenerational transfer of values and wisdom that sustains a reasonable quality of life for human community... In addition, our progress is undermined by mistrust that still exists between and within sectors of the South African population (p. 23-24).

This weak social capital base is a result of the histories discussed in the first section and its expression is partly found in the general character of social ties and networks (i.e. whether they are homogeneous or socially inclusive). We can refer to this as the face of social relations behind which lies a corresponding historical, social, economic and psychological order. That is to say the character of social relations is an outcome of conditions of possibility given to us by the hand of history. Notwithstanding important inroads that have been made since 1994 to redress historical racialised inequalities, life in South Africa still largely reflects the social and economic architecture of apartheid. Making a similar observation Mbeki (1998) speaks of ‘South Africa as a country of two nations’

One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure... The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled... This reality of two nations, underwritten by the
perpetuation of the racial, gender and spatial disparities born of a very long period of colonial and apartheid white minority domination, constitutes the material base which reinforces the notion that, indeed, we are not one nation, but two nations (p. 71-72).

In this general structure of social life which is both unequal and segregated the formation of social ties and networks, as a general rule, tends to be restricted within these distinct nations. Put differently, propinquity – “the propensity to form relationships with others who share the same social situation” (Stearns et al., 2009, p. 173; Fischer, 2008) leads to the formation of homophilous networks of every type. The concept of propinquity links with Bourdieu’s (1985, p. 725) phrase ‘conditions and conditionings’ that he uses to argue that people who have similar conditions of life possibilities are probably subjected to similar conditionings or socialisation processes such that their dispositions and practices will be similar. In this historical trajectory, to exist socially is to exist in objective divisions, classes and categories that are relationally and comparatively organised—“network of oppositions” (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 468). Thus, claims to social difference made by social groups largely emanate from differences in material and symbolic conditions of life; and social and psychological processes of being and co-existing in the world. It is these material and symbolic differences created by historical and political processes that constitute various kinds of struggles—e.g. social, economic, political— between social groups in which the weapons of struggle (e.g. ‘race’, class, gender, sexuality, age, disability) are the very principles of social division. In other words, the struggle against racial and political oppression is simultaneously a struggle to validate racial and political identities and to construct the social world in particular ways.
Furthermore, Bourdieu (2001) speaks of ‘nomos’—the principle of vision and division. By this Bourdieu is saying that categories of differentiation come with particular ways of being in and seeing the world and ourselves—“schemes of perception and appreciation” (p. 5). This is to say, the divisions of, for example, class, gender, ‘race’ and so forth do not only divide but also give us psychological visions that are in tune with the categories of division. For all this, the conundrum that faces the student of society is best captured as the fact of ‘living together apart’ (Fallah, 1996) not as an intellectually constructed problematic but one which is found readily available in the social world.

At the centre of all this is the issue broadly of the nature of human relationships that arise under such conditions and conditionings of possibility. More specifically it is the issue of social capital i.e. the type of social capital that has been accumulated over time between various social groups. It is my argument that the homophilous student friendship groups that are the object of this research are partly an expression precisely of the divisive or segregationist type of social capital inherited from apartheid. Consequently, it is also an expression of the poverty of the type of social capital that is socially inclusive as characterised by relationships of reciprocity, trust, and support across the divisions of conditions and conditionings. It is through the lack of inter and intragroup social capital that one finds some of the broad history of South Africa operating in the specificities of every day social relations. For instance, take the excerpt below taken from the data collected for the present study (see chapter four and five) as an example of the lack of intra-group social capital through the lingering perception of Whiteness as a yardstick for social existence and the definition Black aspirations:
Leko: We are such a different clique. I think our group is so different to all the other Black cliques.
Lungi: We aren’t ghetto.
Msomi: We’re not the Blacks [emphasis].
Lungi: The typical...
Lungi: Ya I know, I say ghetto very shamefully. I didn’t grow up in...We’re not Black [emphasis].
Msomi: We have things, we do things, and we go out to places. In going out to those places we do things that one would typically associate with White people. Like ‘Oh White people do that’.
The following excerpt, also part of this study, illustrates the lack of intergroup social capital and the expectation that non-White people should assimilate White cultural practices that are treated as normative within a historically White university.

Jessica: I think because your accent isn’t like, I’m being serious because it’s not like that heavy Black accent I felt more comfortable than I would have been if you had like a heavy Black accent. So your skin actually didn’t matter it was the fact that...

Marcia: ...you’re eloquent [in English].

For this study then the metaphor of social capital is useful because it captures and summarises the complexities of racial and class relations observed in the participants’ lives and specifically as exemplified in their voluntary social networks. In other words, social capital is a useful concept to designate and speak about relations of distance and intimacy in social relations. In this regard it can be used as a loose indicator of the tenor of intergroup relations in the current context of various societal transformation initiatives.
Conclusion

Taking a descriptive approach this chapter has explored the development of racial segregation in South Africa, the aim of which was to provide a histo-political context for the study of friendship formation amongst first year students. In this exploration one comes to see the depth and complexity of intergroup relations that for much of South Africa’s history rested on an asymmetrical power base. White superiority, privilege and wealth has historically been achieved by means of systems of oppression including state and corporate brutality and thievery. Through these means the so-called non-Whites were forced into a fundamentally dismal life of under development, social and economic poverty, stifled culturally, religiously, and intellectually. Acrimonious relations not only developed across racial groups but also ethnically as a consequence of apartheid’s pursuit of separate development that amounted to a divide-and-rule strategy. One of the outcomes of this history, I have argued, is a set of racial, ethnic, and class relations marked by distrust, suspicion, lack of support and a general lack of compassion among South Africans today. This is what I have referred to as the poverty or scarcity of socially inclusive social capital. In investigating the factors and processes that influence the formation of friendship groups amongst first year university students this study also illustrates the poverty of social capital. This is witnessed not only in the racial and class distance between students but also importantly in the psychology and structural relations operating within and behind scenes, so to speak. The two excerpts above illustrate this point. Thus, there is in self-segregation not only the challenges raised in Chapter One but also, as we
have seen in this chapter, subdued continuation of historically troubled racial and class relations because of a lack of social capital. Taken as a whole, the chapter raises the challenge of co-creating a social existence from the ruins and legacies of apartheid that is radically different from the social order of apartheid.
Chapter Three: A literature review. Desegregation and intergroup friendships

Introduction

In social psychology and specifically in the field of intergroup relations, Gordon Allport’s scholarship is secured as canonical and there are good reasons for this. Many social psychologists have found fertile ground in Allport’s psychology, applauding it, for example, as “one of psychology’s most effective strategies for improving intergroup relations” (Dovidio, Gaertner & Kawakami, 2003, p. 5; also see Dovidio, Glick & Rudman, 2005; Reicher, 2007). Consequently, a great deal of the literature reviewed in this chapter is inspired by Allport’s (1954) thoughts contained in The Nature of Prejudice. Given the lifespan of this work it would be both impossible and unnecessary to attempt an exhaustive review of the field. My review begins with a brief historical sketch of contact theory and some of the research it has inspired. This is an historical and descriptive exercise that focuses on North American mainstream literature and its importation into and influence in South Africa. I also offer my view of what I perceive to be the foundational logic and aims of the work undertaken under the ambit of contact theory. In the second section I turn attention to a review of desegregation literature within institutions of higher education that specifically focuses on student intergroup relations. This section of the review is in keeping with the fact that the present study uses student friendship groups to study the phenomenon of self-segregation. The review of South African
literature in this section includes literature from sociology, education studies and political science. The third section takes a critical turn and looks at a number of recent critiques of contact theory and at the end I offer my own critique, focusing on the epistemological status of prejudice.

**Contact theory research. A brief sketch.**

Prior to the study of intergroup prejudice, ‘race psychology’ had laboured to show (mainly through intelligence tests) that Black people were inferior to White people (Samelson, 1978). Although ‘race’ psychology was still fashionable in the 1920s, criticism from outside and within psychology emerged at this time. Soon afterwards a related issue began to receive the attention of psychologists,

Instead of trying to determine the objective mental differences between non-white and white, as well as among the white races, psychologists became interested in the subjective side, the attitudes of the “racial” groups toward each other (Samelson, 1978, p. 268).

Sociologists took the lead in investigating race relations and prejudice in the American South (e.g. DuBois, 1901; Thomas, 1904; Ellis, 1915). Some of the early social psychological studies in intergroup prejudice appeared from the beginning of the 1930s (e.g. Katz & Allport, 1931, 1946; Katz & Braly, 1932, 1933; Williams, 1947). It was on this backdrop and in the context of post-WW II inter-racial strife in America that Gordon Allport (1954) produced his study of intergroup prejudice: *The Nature of Prejudice*. The title itself suggests the focus of this seminal text.
The present volume does not pretend to deal with the science of human relations as a whole. It aims merely to clarify one underlying issue—the nature of prejudice. But this issue [the nature of prejudice] is basic, for without knowledge of the roots of hostility we cannot hope to employ our intelligence effectively in controlling its destructiveness (1954, p. xvii).

As for the seat of prejudice itself, Allport was clear that notwithstanding the multiple sources of prejudice he believed that it was lodged in, and found expression through the individual personality.

While plural causation is the primary lesson we wish to teach... It is true that I believe it is only through the nexus of personality that we find the effective operation of historical, cultural, and economic factors... it is only individuals who can feel antagonism and practice discrimination (1954, p. xviii).

Indeed, after fifteen chapters of exploring the nature of prejudice and at the end of the sixteenth chapter ‘The Effects of Contact’, Allport concluded that

Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and a common humanity between members of the two groups (1954, p. 281).

It is this conclusion that became known as Allport’s (1954) ‘Contact Hypothesis’. The publication of Allport’s text was soon followed by the USA Supreme Court ruling on the Brown v Board of
Education case in the same year. The ruling of the Supreme Court in the Brown v. Board of Education case gave way to unprecedented contact between Black and White children in the American school system. This contact and interaction was referred to as the desegregation of American education that “was promoted in the belief that greater contact would quickly produce more positive attitudes” (Forbes, 1997, p. 42). This event set the scene for a social psychological ‘social experiment’ (ibid) and specifically for the ‘Contact Hypothesis’ that focused on the contact and interactions of Black and White children in the American school system. From that point on, contact research sought to “uncover the social psychological conditions that lead to favourable intergroup contact...” (Dixon & Reicher, 1997, p. 361). In this regard Allport’s contact hypothesis has been treated as a research and theoretical guide in the resolution of intergroup conflict. The entire research field is based on the following logic. First, prejudice is taken as the root cause of undesirable intergroup relations. Second and consequently, in cases where intergroup relations do not embody the ideals of social inclusion, cohesion and respect for social differences as espoused by democratic regimes, intergroup contact can improve intergroup relations by reducing, if not altogether, eliminating intergroup prejudice. It is in this theoretical and social intervention programme that the most energy and innovation has been invested over the decades. The solution was ‘discovered’, and the problems that remained were that of design and implementation. In this view, contact theory research can broadly be summarised as the social psychology of harmonious intergroup relations through the reduction of prejudice.
Pettigrew (2010) points out that what is now called Contact Theory “strictly speaking...is not a racial theory” (p. 426). The theory is broadly concerned with creating an environment in which members of different social groups who are in or have a history of conflict would have a chance to come into contact, interact and initiate non-conflictual relations. This logic was based on the observation that in situations of conflict social groups are segregated and live under unequal conditions in almost all spheres of life. Thus, it was thought that segregated life engenders unfamiliarity, prejudice, negative stereotypes and discrimination, whereas people who establish friendly relations irrespective of social group membership show care and compassion for each other (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner & Christ, 2011, p. 272). That is, people who were members of social networks of trust and support irrespective of their politicised identities could in times of strife draw on the social and psychological resources of such networks. Social capital\(^9\) between different social groups in these instances seems to have ensured harmonious relations even in the face of conflict.

The theory has been extended to other areas of contact and interaction, for example between children with and without mental (Manetti, Schneider & Siperstein, 2001) and physical (Maras & Brown, 1996) disabilities, students and people with HIV/AIDS (Werth & Lord, 1992), students and mental patients (Desforges et al., 1991) and interaction between heterosexuals and homosexuals (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). As the above remarks suggest, there is in this tradition of work a strong sense of activism that seeks to intervene in the world for its betterment. For instance, a number of prominent social psychologists (Kenneth Clark and 32 other social psychologists)...

\(^9\) See Chapter 2.
scientists) were actively involved in the Brown v Board of Education case. These social scientists, at the request of the Supreme Court, made a significant contribution that became known as the ‘Social Science Statement in Brown v. Board of Education’ (see Forbes, 1997; Zuma, 2010). This scholar-activist tradition (Cherry, 2008) continues to-date. Despite some inconsistencies in research findings (e.g. Amir, 1969, 1976; Forbes, 1997; Stephan, 1987) the vast and complex research literature overwhelmingly supports Contact Theory (e.g. Cook, 1984; Harrington & Miller, 1992; Jackson, 1993; Patchen, 1999; Pettigrew, 1971, 1986, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2008, 2011; Pettigrew et al., 2011).

Alongside these supportive findings, Allport’s prejudice and intergroup contact treatise has been revised over the years. Eagly and Diekman (2005) offer a definitional corrective to Allport understanding of prejudice. Where Allport had argued that prejudice is “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation” (1954, p. 9). They argue that

…it is insufficient to view prejudice solely as a rigid, generalised attitude toward a group...

everyday prejudice consists of the relative devaluation in specific role contexts of members of a particular group...The key eliciting condition for prejudice is the potential or actual entry of group members into social roles to which they are stereotypically mismatched (2005, p. 31).

Pettigrew (1998) offers in place of “a list of conditions” a “longitudinal model” of contact theory (p. 76). The theoretical salience of the model is in that it

…it involves the meso-level of analysis...placed within the micro-and macrolevel context (B)
of participants’ experiences and characteristics as well as the larger societal setting of the
situation. The basic features of this reformulated version consists of (A) the essential and facilitating situational factors and (C, D, E)... (p. 76-77).

Figure 1: Reformulated contact theory from Pettigrew, 2008, p. 76

A number of intergroup contact models have been offered over the years. The contact models are premised on social identity theory or at least its concept of social categorisation. They also all subscribe to Allport’s (1954) conditions of ‘cooperation’ and ‘common goals’ and in some cases ‘equal status’. The De-Categorisation Model (DCM) developed by Brewer and Miller (1984) claims that intergroup bias is activated by the mere categorisation of people into distinct groups. Therefore, to reduce in-group bias, category salience should be reduced in intergroup contact situations. In turn, this would create opportunities to know out-group members as individuals. The Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM) was first developed by Gaertner, Mann, Murrell and Dovidio (1989) and revised by Gaertner et al. (2000), and suggests that in-group and out-grout categories should be subsumed into one superordinate category, thus
dissolving intergroup boundaries. This, they argue, would reduce intergroup bias through the same cognitive and motivational processes that invoke in-group bias when out-group members are perceived as in-group members. In other words, this model argues the opposite of what is suggested in the previous model, i.e. it argues for re-categorisation of in-group and out-group into a single common group identity. Hewstone and Brown (1986) developed the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (MIDM), which was revised by Vivian, Hewstone and Brown (1997), and claims that intergroup bias can be reduced while groups maintain their original group categories on condition that they have equal status and that they are not threatened by intergroup contact. Unlike the above models, this model does not argue for an abandonment of existing group categories. Lastly, is the Dual-Identity Model (DIM) developed by (Dovidio et al., 1998; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman & Anastasio, 1994, 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) which proposes that simultaneously holding a group identity and a superordinate identity may better promote the generalisation of positive intergroup relations when intergroup encounters are cooperative. These models have inspired research that has broadened our understanding of intergroup relations as much as they have raised new questions and left some unresolved challenges.

For instance, it has been pointed out that the study findings reported by Brewer & Miller’s (1984) DCM need to be interpreted with caution as it is not clear whether they are as the result of category manipulation alone or the combination of category manipulation and social orientation (Vivian, Hewstone & Brown, 1997). Another challenge is that if indeed the de-categorisation model works to its optimal predictions, it may be psychologically difficult to
generalise contact to other unknown out-group members (Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Rothbart & John, 1985). Lastly, purely interpersonal interactions may lead people to interpret the contact encounter as ‘exceptional’, thus making contact generalisation difficult (Allport 1954) but again such contact is only theoretically possible for in reality we are at all times members of multiple categories. The original studies by Gaertner et al. (1989) were compromised by design issues that led to confounded variables, that made their results difficult to interpret, and which subsequent studies have attempted to improve (Gonzalez & Brown, 2003). Studies supporting the CIIM have shown reduction of intergroup bias in the research setting, but generalisation beyond it has been hard to achieve and where it has been found it has been rather weak (Dovidio et al., 1997). Finally, re-categorisation may not only be difficult to achieve but it may be politically and psychologically undesirable, particularly for minority groups whose group identity may be salient for the political struggle for survival (Van Oudenhoven, Prins & Buunk, 1998). The MIIM also has its weaknesses in that accentuated group members may have both positive and negative effects on generalisation of attitudes (Brown, Vivian & Hewstone, 1999) and heighten intergroup anxiety (Greenland & Brown, 1999). As for the DIM we are told that there are three reasons, at least, why this model is important for reducing intergroup bias. First, theoretically it is premised on Contact Theory’s condition of ‘equal status in the situation’; on Social Identity Theory’s proposition that groups seek and maintain positive group identity; and on the benefits of re-categorisation (Gonzalez & Brown, 2003). Second, the model is expected to increase positive intergroup attitude generalisation without threatening or losing group
distinctiveness and finally, the model is in line with multiculturalism policies (Gonzalez & Brown, 2003).

The contact-prejudice model below – from Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) - is based on a meta-analysis test of “contact theory’s basic contention that intergroup contact typically reduced prejudices of many types” (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008, p. 922). The model is offered as a psychological explanatory mechanism for the relation between intergroup contact and prejudice. This psychological mechanism is presumed to be in operation in all the above contact models.

Figure 2: Contact-prejudice model from Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008, p. 928.

Of concern is when (situational specifications) and how (psychological processes) intergroup contact leads to these effects. Allport’s conditions and two additional factors (intimate contact and accentuated group membership) moderate the contact-prejudice relationship thus attending to when intergroup contact leads to positive outcomes (Pettigrew et al., 2011). On the issue of how contact reduces prejudice it turns out that knowledge of the ‘other’ plays a minor role thus giving emotional processes premium of place. Under optimal situational
specifications, intergroup contact reduces anxiety and other related negative emotions (e.g. fear, anger, threat). In the absence of these negative emotions prejudice too diminishes. In the absence of negative emotions positive emotions such as empathy and perspective taking in favour of out-group members have a chance to develop. This too leads to prejudice reduction (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Pettigrew et al., 2011). The recognition of the importance of emotions (especially anxiety) in intergroup relations is not necessarily new, having been observed in earlier studies (e.g. Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1985, 1989, 1992; Stephan, 1992; Stephan & Finlay, 1999; Wilder, 1993a, b). Such intergroup anxiety is often ephemeral, being characteristic of initial encounters and even in the absence of intergroup prejudice (see Devine, Evett & Vasquez-Suson 1996). Ironically, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 2008) have also argued that there are positive outcomes in intergroup contact even in the absence of Allport’s (1954) conditions. Their meta-analyses find that Allport’s conditions are not necessary but do facilitate optimal contact outcomes (also see Pettigrew et al., 2011; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). This appears to support the long discarded view that casual contact is sufficient for positive contact outcomes. In fact, Pettigrew et al. (2011) now speak of a ‘mere exposure’ effect (p. 275) which, seems to me, to be on a continuum with positive outcomes reported from vicarious contact (e.g. Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe & Ropp, 1997). Lastly, Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) in response to various criticisms of contact theory have offered a ‘combined model of intergroup contact and threat’ (p. 196) intended to address the issue of negative intergroup contact. Space limitations preclude a full discussion of the model but Pettigrew & Tropp point out that “...intergroup contact and intergroup threat are not separate
phenomena...negative contact is related to greater prejudice, while positive contact is even more closely related to lowered prejudice (ibid., p. 200).

### South African intergroup attitude research

Turning our attention to South Africa, we find that social psychological research in South Africa has historically focused on intergroup relations, at the centre of which has been the issue of ‘race’ (Foster & Louw-Potgieter, 1991). The inauguration of psychology as practice and academic discipline in the early 1920s gave way, in the 1920s and 1930s, to the focused task of psychological assessment (ibid). Consequently ‘race’ and intelligence were soon studied (see Fick, 1927, 1929; Loram, 1921; MacCrone, 1926, 1928). Between the 1930s and 1950s the work of I.D. MacCrone on ‘race’ attitudes was the most dominant. One finds in MacCrone’s work not only the study of racial prejudice but also an historical account of the development of racial prejudice. Writing on the complexity and interrelatedness of racial prejudices with other attitudes MacCrone noted that

> Since the race attitudes are only one element in a pattern of group attitudes, we find that all the social attitudes of the group, racial, religious, social, and political, come into play in a mutually supplementary way (1937, p. 126).

The 1950s saw the beginning of a sustained importation of mainstream North American social psychology into South Africa. Broadly the focus was on “authoritarianism and its relation to

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10 Much of this discussion is drawn from (Foster & Louw-Potgieter, 1991).
race attitudes” (ibid., p. 74). More specifically it was also at this time that the contact hypothesis found its way into South Africa. Continuing the authoritarianism research theme that MacCrone had already been working on Pettigrew (1958; 1959) found a correlation between prejudice and authoritarianism, political party preference and ethnicity (Afrikaans or English speakers). This type of research focusing on White racial attitudes soon flourished (e.g. Bloom, de Crespigny & Spence, 1961; Danzinger, 1958; Mann, 1962; 1971; Pettigrew, 1960; Van den Berghe, 1962). Works on Black racial attitudes and perceptions were small in comparison (e.g. Biesheuvel, 1955; Brett, 1963; Crijins, 1958; 1959; Edelstein, 1972; 1974; Mangayi, 1973; 1977). Research on children’s racial attitudes was first produced by Rakoff (1949) who also drew inspiration from MacCrone’s work (Foster & Louw-Potgieter, 1991). Research drawing directly on Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis also found something of a ‘social experiment’ (Forbes, 1997) in South Africa with the Group Areas Act of 1950 just as the contact hypothesis found a social experiment with the Brown v Board of Education case of 1954. These studies were conducted in work-places, schools, residential areas and the military (Mynhardt & du Toit, 1991). Jack Mann, who had been supervised by Gordon Allport studied interracial contact in townships around Durban (see Mann, 1955; Russell, 1961). Work contact was studied in universities (Spangenberg & Nel, 1983), a mine (Gordon, 1977), a bus company (Hahlo, 1969) and the defence-force (Lever, 1968; Nieuwoudt, 1973; 1976; Nieuwoudt, Plug & Mynhardt, 1977). Intergroup contact in schools was studied by (Luiz & Kringe; 1981; Mynhardt, 1982; Watson, 1970). Summarising some of the findings of some of the above studies Foster and Finchilesescu (1986) noted that
Existing contact between black and white South Africans generally takes the form of domination, with substantially unequal status and an absence of co-operation or common goals which allows little opportunity for intimate or personalised relations (p. 130).

Against this backdrop a considerable body of interdisciplinary research has been generated that converges on what Habib (2008) has described as the dilemma confronting South Africa’s democratic dispensation: “how to advance redress in order to address the historical injustices while simultaneously building a single national identity” (p. 337). My intention is not to review this vast literature but only to highlight some of it that has a bearing on the social psychological study of intergroup relations.

On the issue of ‘race’ and racism(s) Erasmus (2005) argues for an understanding of ‘race’ as a socio-historical and political construct. Understood in this way Black and White refer not to skin colour but to the ways hierarchical structures of meaning attached to skin colour materially fashion people’s lives and their self-perceptions, that of others and the world around them. She draws on secondary sources to point out that during apartheid ‘race’ and class overlapped and that they continue to do so although inequality appears to becoming a function of class. She cautions though that this should not be read to mean that ‘race’ has become an irrelevant factor in determining inequality. Furthermore, Erasmus provides evidence that race remains a site of exclusion and division in South Africa. Drawing on studies in the higher education sector (Erasmus & de Wet, 2003; Steyn & van Zyl, 2001;), in secondary schools (Carrim & Soudien, 1999; Vally & Dalamba, 1999), in the corporate sector Luhabe (2002) and the public sector Erasmus (2000) Erasmus highlights the experiences of marginalisation reported by Black
people; and banding along racial lines and the enactment of racially homogeneous settings in historically white institutions. She notes that the most common finding in these studies was that “historically white (and also coloured and Indian) institutions tend to assume that black, and particularly black African, learners and managers will assimilate into the existing dominant institutional cultures” (p. 14-15). I return to some of the studies cited by Erasmus in the section that follows.

On their work on public attitudes since the transition to democracy Orkin and Jowell (2006) maintain that there is sufficient evidence of attitudes reflecting racial divisions. On the one hand, most people hold the view that ‘race’ relations have improved and on the other, White people are least enthusiastic about its practicalities such as school integration. Even though White South Africans are more satisfied with their present circumstances than their Black counterparts, white people are less confident about their future. On a consolatory note: “However, it is crucial to realise that these sorts of divisions—by class or race, or both—also exist in many other countries and have done so for a much longer period of time” (Orkin & Jowell, 2006, p. 292).

On their work on surveys about ‘race’ and redress Friedman and Erasmus (2008) caution on the following: surveys do not necessarily find consensus on the same issues; questions posed by survey designers are not particularly insightful on matters of ‘race’ and redress; and surveys tend not to differentiate within racialised communities thus focus only on Black or White opinion. A salient point is highlighted by these authors: a clear message from the surveys is that “the perceptions of ‘race’ and redress are far more complex than much of the public debate
implies” (p. 65). They report two broad findings (1) “contrary to the wishful thinking of some surveyors, there is overwhelming support for redress among black Africans and significant support among coloured and Indian communities, demands for racial redress are secondary to interventions aimed at addressing poverty and inequality which are higher priorities” (p. 66); and (2) “while white people’s perceptions do indicate significant resistance to redress, there may be greater leeway to win white compliance with redress than most accounts of these perceptions would suggest” (p. 67).

Durrheim and Dixon (2010) analysed data from surveys conducted between 1991 and 2005 and a specific survey of 2006 to answer the question: “what effect have desegregation and political change had on intergroup relations in the South African context” (p. 274). Some of the findings they report show that: “...the majority of Whites have casual and close contact with Blacks, but the majority of Blacks have no contact with Whites at all... By and large, Blacks believed they interacted with higher status Whites, whereas Whites believed they interacted with lower status or same status Blacks” (p. 277-278). Concerned with whether intergroup contact garners support for policies designed to attain racial equality the authors observed that: “The results for Whites were in the expected direction. More, and cooperative, contact with Blacks was associated with stronger support for these policies...For Blacks, the direction of association was in the opposite direction. More intergroup contact among higher status Blacks was associated with less support for transformation policies” (p. 15). Furthermore, their results revealed

...widespread racial segregation among Black people; ambivalent attitudes to racial integration among Whites, who support integration in principle but are opposed to it
personally; and contrasting outcomes of contact for Blacks and Whites. Contrary to the predictions of contact theory, attitudes of Blacks and Whites toward Coloured and Indian compatriots were generally more negative in provinces with high levels of intergroup contact between these groups (p. 273).

In a study that takes up “Wright and Lubensky’s (2009) call for a more politically reflexive understanding of relationships between contact and social change” Dixon et al., (2010), investigated, by means of a survey, how intergroup contact affected perceptions of discrimination among Black South Africans, on the one hand. On the other hand, they wanted to examine the social psychological processes that could explain this relationship. They found that “…the more positive contact Blacks have with Whites, the lower their perceptions of group discrimination and relative deprivation” (ibid, p. 411) and that the social psychological processes mediating this contact relationship were “racial attitudes and personal experiences of discrimination” (ibid) with the latter being salient. They further argued that these findings support the contentions of contact theory to the extent that

..positive personal encounters with Whites may reduce Blacks’ reliance on overgeneralizations about intergroup relations and thus temper their beliefs about racial discrimination...By encouraging greater emotional acceptance of Whites, contact reduces Blacks’ readiness to believe that Whites would treat their group unfairly (p. 412).

However, when they placed their finding against a “collective action perspective on social change” (ibid) that calls for the galvanising of disadvantaged groups to unseat injustices that subjugate them, they concluded that “certain forms of racial integration may have the “ironic”
side effect of diminishing Blacks’ recognition of ongoing systemic injustice” (p. 413). For other recent social psychological works that explore the complexities of intergroup relations in post-apartheid South Africa see van Ommen and Painter (2008); Bornman (2010); Finchilescu (2010); Gibson and Claassen, (2010); Finchilescu and Tredoux (2010); Ratele and Duncan (2003).

Contact theory and cross-group friendships

Against this backdrop of mostly social psychological literature on intergroup relations in the USA and South Africa I wish now to turn attention to a focused review of literature on intergroup relations amongst university students. Here too I will review literature from the USA before turning to the South African literature. In the preceding section Pettigrew’s (1998) reformulation of contact theory was discussed. As part of that reformulation Pettigrew highlighted four processes (“learning about the out-group, changing behaviour, generating affective ties, and in-group reappraisal”) that are activated by optimal intergroup contact and which mediate attitude change (p. 70). It is at this juncture that Pettigrew finds that “intergroup friendship is potent because it potentially invokes all four mediating processes” (p. 75-76). Consequently,

The power of cross-group friendship to reduce prejudice and generalise to other outgroups demands a fifth condition for the contact hypothesis: The contact situation must provide the participants with the opportunity to become friends (p. 76 italics in original).
What is more, “friendship potential” is an essential, not merely facilitating, condition for positive intergroup contact effects that generalise…Allport’s conditions are important in part because they provide the setting that encourages intergroup friendship” (ibid). Pettigrew added this fifth condition of contact theory based on work (see Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Pettigrew, 1997a,b) that had found that “…Europeans with out-group friends scored significantly lower on five prejudice measures even after controlling for seven variables (ibid, p. 72). Put differently, Allport’s conditions are instituted as the situational conditions for cross-group friendships to develop. Cross-group friendship in turn is treated as the flagship case of contact theory’s contentions and which “requires time…to develop” (ibid). Turner et al. (2007) account for the focus on intergroup friendship in this way

First, the factors associated with optimal intergroup contact mirror those found to facilitate the formation of interpersonal friendship…It follows that, in an intergroup context, friendship might lead to intergroup attraction. Second, previous research on intergroup contact has shown that…contact that is comfortable and pleasant—is associated with more positive outgroup attitudes… it makes intuitive sense that [cross friendship] would be particularly effective at reducing prejudice (p. 214).

In their review of both direct and extended cross-group friendships these researchers “…consider the relationship between both types of cross-group friendship and prejudice and the processes that mediate and moderate these relationships” (p. 212). They find compelling evidence for two emotional mediators of the relation between direct cross-group friendship and positive outgroup attitudes—reduced intergroup anxiety and increased self-disclosure.
“The relationship between self-disclosure and outgroup attitude was further mediated by empathy, trust, and perceived importance of contact...” (p. 232). On indirect cross-group friendship they find “evidence for all four mechanisms...to underlie the [prejudice-contact] relationship: intergroup anxiety, in-group norms, out-group norms, and inclusion of the outgroup in the self... We have also demonstrated two additional mediating mechanisms; self-disclosure...and outgroup trust...” (p. 238). These social psychological processes answer the question: why do direct and indirect cross-group friendship work. The next question Turner et al. (2007) attend to is when these forms of intergroup friendship work. They find that

...when no direct experiences with outgroup members are available, extended cross-group friendship forms the only possible source of contact with the outgroup that could, and does, impact on intergroup attitudes. In contrast, however, when an individual already experiences direct cross-group friendship, intergroup attitudes seem to be based on information from these direct experiences... these studies also demonstrated that extended cross-group friendship was not related to attitude strength, whereas direct contact with outgroup friends was (p. 243-244; also see Vonofakou et al. (2008).

The emerging message from the foregoing studies and others (see Davies et al., 2011a,b; Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton & Tropp, 2008; Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, Alegre & Siy, 2010; Page-Gould & Mendoza-Denton, 2011; Turner & Feddes, 2011; Swart, Hewstone, Christ and Voci 2011; Vonofakou et al., 2008;) can be summarised in this way. First, the social psychology of prejudice and harmonious intergroup relations appears to have taken an ‘affective turn’ through the recognition of the place and role of emotions in the form and content of intergroup
relations. Second, there also seems to be a ‘friendship turn’ expressed in the research attention being given to cross-group friendships as the most compelling case for the contentions of contact theory and as the convergence point of a range of affective mediators in intergroup relations. With this sketch as the background I turn now more directly to a review of intergroup friendships within the university context in the USA and South Africa.

**University cross-group friendships**

It is now well-known that despite its diversity, American society remains segregated (e.g. Blau, 2003; Goldberg, 1998; Massey & Denton, 1989, 1993, 1999; Sigelman, Bledsoe, Welch & Combs, 1996). Researchers have also reported an increase in segregation in elementary and secondary schools (Clotfelter, 2002, 2004; Moody, 2001; Orfield, 2001). At the same time desegregation efforts have also declined (Clotfelter, 2004; Frankenberg & Lee, 2002) in elementary and secondary schools. This has led some to view the university as a context that “may provide the first opportunity for many young adults to interact closely in academic, residential, or social settings with members of different racial and ethnic groups” (Stearns, Buchmann, & Bonneau, 2009, p. 174). Many institutions of higher education have responded with attempts to diversify their student and faculty bodies and creating courses that directly attend to issues of diversity (Odell, Korgen, & Wang, 2005). However, it is now on record that a diverse student body does not in itself necessarily lead to harmonious intergroup relations let alone friendships (Pascarella, Edison, Nora, Hagedorn, & Terenzini, 1996; Chang, 1999; Gurin,
Dey, Hurtado & Gurin, 2002). Moreover, study findings are not always consistent even on the same research issue. For instance, Gurin, (1999) found a positive relation between exposure to greater diversity at university and the diversity of friendships, work settings and residential areas nine years post-university. On the other hand, Ordell et al. (2005) found that prior cross-group contact and university friendships counteracted intergroup social distance far better than university demographic diversity and diversity curricula. In what follows I focus on university friendship studies and attempt to highlight the factors that influence and those that do not influence the formation of intergroup friendships at university.

Levin, van Laar and Sidanius (2003) conducted a longitudinal student cross-group friendship study that examined the effects of these friendships on ethnic attitudes (ingroup bias and intergroup anxiety) at the end of university. They found that students’ prior ethnic attitudes influenced their university friendships such that White, Black, Asian and Latino students had more ingroup friends and fewer outgroup friends if in the first academic year they showed ingroup bias and outgroup anxiety. They thus, concluded that “Once formed, then, ethnic attitudes become causal factors affecting ingroup and outgroup friendships in college” (p. 87). Using the same data set, Van Laar, Levin, Sinclair, and Sidanius (2005) studied the effects of randomly allocated cross-ethnic roommates on cognitive, emotional and behavioural indicators of prejudice. Their results were in support of the contact-prejudice reduction model (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). They showed that the ethnic diversity of roommates in the first year of university resulted in positive affect towards Latinos, African Blacks, Whites and Asians Americans. In addition, ethnic heterogeneity improved intergroup interaction competence, and
decreased both symbolic racism and opposition to interracial dating and marriage. It is interesting to note that in addition to the overall positive outcomes that these authors found that the contact effects were also subject to the specific groups in interaction. It was found that exposure to Asian American roommates tended to increase prejudice amongst Blacks and Latinos, with the same effect being accentuated for White students. These authors also found that student perceptions of campus climate “have an independent effect on friendship choices, over and above other reasons why people might select friendships from particular ethnic groups” (ibid., p. 88-89). However, it is not clear to the authors what factors influence perceptions of campus although they suspect that it is both internal campus factors and broader societal issues.

Using a national probability sample Fischer (2008) conducted a study that investigated the influence of campus characteristics, outgroup social distance, and pre-university friendships on friendship formation at university. Similar to Levin et al. (2003), she found that prior university intergroup contact influenced the formation of cross-group friendships on campus (also see Odell et al., 2005). In addition, she reported that campus racial and ethnic diversity also influenced the formation of intergroup friendships. However, this effect was qualified by the finding that although campus diversity generally increases the formation of intergroup friendships such friendships are particularly formed with Hispanic and Asian students and not Black students. Also investigating the formation of interracial friendships among university students, Stearn, Buchmann and Bonneau (2009) followed students in their first academic year in a small private university. They sought to answer three questions: (a) how does the racial
profile of friendship network change as a function of the transition from secondary school to university? (b) do pre-university cross-group friendships increase the likelihood of university cross-group friendships? and (3) how do various aspects of the campus environment affect the racial composition of friendship networks? These authors found that the profile of friendship networks for Whites and Blacks remain racially homophilous in the transition from secondary school to university. For Asians and Latinos they found that their friendships remained cross-racial prior to and during the first academic year. These findings again support the view that pre-university intergroup contact predicts cross-group friendships at university. In accord with White students’ homophilous friendships prior to and at university, the authors noted that these students showed the least interracial friendships “in their precollege friendship networks than did any other group. They also lived in neighbourhoods and attended high schools with the highest concentration of Whites” (ibid., p. 182). Interestingly, while Black students have more interracial friendships than White students (White students show an increase in intergroup friendships at university but still remain lower than other groups) prior to university they also show the most dramatic decline of cross-group friendship at university compared to any other group. Two accounts are offered by the authors for this phenomenon. First, Black students may purposefully seek each other out to form supportive alliances in a predominantly White environment – ‘cocooning’ behaviour’. Referring to a similar practice Golderg (2004) speaks of ‘abstract familial connectivity’:

That I am like them, or they are like me, must mean that we are familiarly connected...I can presume to know you because your somehow looking like me on some supposedly crucial
markers (skin color, hair texture, facial shape mannerisms, ways of speaking, even dress and the like) suggests also social dispositions and perhaps even beliefs” (p. 214).

It is important to stress that Stearn, Buchmann and Bonneau (2009) do not believe that the predominantly White campus is a foreign environment for Black students in their study because most, although not all, Black students come from middle-class families and racially mixed schools. The issue, they believe, is that university for these students may in fact be the opportunity for them to develop same-race friendships and to develop such a social network. Second, it may be that these students form same-race friendships in response to discrimination from other students who may prefer to form friendships with Whites, Asians and Latinos. Similar to Van Laar et al. (2005) these researchers also found that mixed-‘race’ roommates significantly increased intergroup friendships compared with same-‘race’ roommates. Students who had no roommate also had more intergroup friends than those with same-‘race’ roommate but no more than those with cross-group roommates. In halls of residence, Stearn, et al. (2009) found that here too White students reported the least number of intergroup friendships while Black students reported the most interracial tension. Taking a closer look at university roommates, Trail, Shelton and West (2009) conducted a study that attempted to unpack the dynamics of interracial interactions across time in a natural setting. Their focus was partly on the influence of intimacy-building and intimacy-distancing behaviours on roommate’s emotions, intimacy and desire for future interactions. Analysing for daily emotions they found that overall interracial roommates reported less positive emotions than did same-race roommates. Specifically, there was no change over time in the positive emotions reported by
White roommates and by White and minority roommates. However, positive emotions amongst minority students increased over time while they decreased between White and minority students. A similar pattern was found when analysing for intimacy such that same-race roommate felt more intimate than did cross-race roommates. Similarly, interracial roommates showed less desire to live with their roommates and same-‘race’ roommates showed more desire to live with their roommates and this pattern did not change over time. Perceptions of roommate’s intimacy-building behaviours showed no difference in pattern with same-‘race’ roommates perceiving more intimacy-building behaviours and the reverse for interracial roommates. Lastly, intimacy-distancing behaviours were perceived to be more amongst interracial roommates than they were amongst same-‘race’ roommates. In concluding their study Trail, Shelton and West (2009) note, among other things, that

...intimacy-building behaviours changed (declined) over time but intimacy-distancing behaviours did not ...Our findings show that this divergent experience grows worse over time... interracial relationships face particular challenges in developing into intimate, close friendships (p. 681-682).

Schofield, Hausmann and Woods (2010) also conducted a study on the formation of university friendships that specifically sought to attend to what the authors perceived as gaps in the existing literature. They acknowledge the place and importance of variables such as pre-university intergroup friendships and contact, positive intergroup attitudes, and outgroup roommates. Thiers, also a longitudinal study, examined the influence of the aforementioned variables and in addition also explored prior indirect contact, quality ratings of intergroup
contact, and assessed whether different factors influence the formation of casual and close friendships. Consistent with previous studies, Schofield, Hausmann and Woods (2010) found that pre-university intergroup contact (Levin, et al., 2003; Fischer, 2008; Stearn et al., 2009) predicted intergroup friendship. For both casual and close friendships they found that contact in secondary school, neighbourhood, university and social organisations predicted intergroup friendships by the end of the first academic year. Existing intergroup attitudes also predicted cross-group friendships (Levin et al., 2003); African American students had more interracial friendships than their White counterparts (Stearn et al., 2009); and males had more intergroup friendships than females (Fischer, 2008; Stearn et al., 2009). They also found that indirect contact at secondary school which had not been studied as a positively influencing factor of intergroup friendship at university had an association with outgroup friendships at university.

The effects on intergroup attitudes of membership of ethnic organisations among minorities and Greek fraternities among White students were investigated in a longitudinal study by Sidanius, Van Laar, Levin, and Sinclair (2004). Drawing on social identity theory they anticipated that the association between intergroup attitudes and organisational membership would be mediated by social identity. For minority students it was found that “…whereas a sense of ethnic victimisation and a perception of zero-sum group conflict do not appear to be among the motives for joining minority ethnic organisations for minority students, they do appear to be among the results of membership in these organisations” (p. 103). Similarly for White students, “…a sense of ethnic victimisation, opposition to intergroup dating and marriage, and symbolic racism do not appear to be among the motives that White students have for joining Greek
organisations, they do appear to be among the consequences of membership in such organisations” (p. 104). In addition, for these students, prejudice racial policy preferences and social identity appear to be affected by and to affect membership in Greek fraternities. In line with social identity theory, the effects of membership of ethnic organisations on intergroup attitudes for both minorities and Whites were partially mediated (small but statistically significant) by ethnic identity. Overall the findings reported by Sidanius et al. (2004) do not bode well for harmonious intergroup relations and interracial friendships. They suggested that the effects of membership in ethnic fraternities are specifically negative for White students. For White students membership showed a greater link with negative attitudes towards out-groups whereas for minority students’ membership to ethnic fraternities showed positive attitudes toward the in-group and own group identification.

Taking these studies together, there seems to be consensus that prior intergroup attitudes; prior university intergroup contact; campus racial and ethnic diversity; and roommate heterogeneity are all reliable predictors of cross-group friendships on campus. It is interesting to note that roommate heterogeneity is a predictor of cross-group friendship given the evidence that its positive emotional valence declines over time; are less desirable; less interactive; and less satisfying (Trail et al., 2009; Shock & Fazio, 2008a, 2008b; West, Shelton & Trail, 2009). Like cross-group friendships, heterogeneous roommates are said to satisfy Allport’s (1954) contact conditions making them ideal especially for minority students who may not have many such contact opportunities. It was found however, that although roommate heterogeneity improved intergroup attitudes that thoughts and behaviours towards the same
groups show less change. Two reasons are offered to account for this. First, it is thought that living with an outgroup member may ironically personalise the contact experience thus limiting its cognitive and behavioural effects toward the outgroup. This is because such an experience activates individual attribute processing rather than group processing. Second, roommates may come to be perceived as an exception to the outgroup allowing the perceiver to retain their thoughts and behaviours toward the outgroup (Levin et al., 2003). Notwithstanding the finding that non-White students generally make more interracial friendships at university it is still the case that by and large student friendships remained racially homogeneous (ibid) and that overall social distance between social groups did not reduce over time (Odell et al., 2005). The issue of generalisation of positive intergroup affect is central to intergroup studies and van Laar et al. (2005) address it in their study. They find evidence of cross-group generalisation but only for Black and Latino students. They argue that “Perhaps generalisation was limited to these groups because they were the only two ethnic groups with the same general level of social status that we examined” (p. 343).

These findings are sobering in view of the increasing value and hope now placed on intergroup friendships within social psychology. Although not by any means treated as a panacea, it is nevertheless seen as perhaps the most successful case of positive intergroup relations with lasting positive outgroup attitudes (see Pettigrew et al., 2011). Indeed, research shows that intergroup friendships lead to a decrease in social distance (Odell et al., 2005); interracial friendship decreases in-group bias and intergroup anxiety (Levin et al., 2003) and thus lead to more intergroup friendships. Lastly, research has also showed that some factors do not predict
or are not associated with intergroup friendships at university. These include institutional curricula programmes aimed at increasing awareness about diversity issues (Odell et al., 2005). These authors found that cross-group friendships are the only factor that reduced intergroup social distance and therefore, suggest that extracurricular activities hold the most potential for cross-group contact (also see Bowman, 2009). Schofield et al. (2010) concur, adding that intergroup contact can be increased through conscious development and support of activities that appeal to a wide range of students. All this of course touches on one of the conditional specifications of contact theory - ‘institutional support’ – and specifically about its meanings and implementation. Other non-predictors are perceptions of racial climate (Levin et al., 2003; Stearns et al., 2009; Schofield et al., 2010); perceptions of campus unity and quality of intergroup contact (Schofield et al., 2010). Against the finding of Levin et al. (2003) that intergroup anxiety and perception of campus unity predicted friendships, Schofield et al. (2010) found no such effect. They however added that perhaps these variables are more salient in highly diverse environments such as that studied by Levin et al. (2003) where intergroup contact has a greater likelihood to be anxiety provoking and/or unity compared to the predominantly White university that they studied. In the final analysis, it appears that while intergroup friendships are desired in accord with democratic values they are nonetheless not the easiest relationships to form between groups. Understanding some of their precursors certainly enriches our social psychological knowledge fund. It also presses us to ask some searching questions. Does the absence of intergroup friendship necessarily mean the presence
of intergroup hostility? Is it a feasible programme to turn communities, institutions and various social and professional networks into cross-group friendship groups?

**Intergroup relations in South African universities**

Departing from research practice that has treated segregation at a macro level, a group of social psychologists, most of them based in South Africa, are championing a tradition of research under the banner of – *micro-ecology of contact*.11 These researchers argue that segregation can be better understood as a ‘micro-ecological practice’—this is to say that segregation is a “phenomenon sustained by boundary processes operating at an intimate scale and in everyday life spaces where social relations tend to be fleeting, informal, and subject to constant realignment” (Dixon, Tredoux & Clack, 2005, p. 339). They maintain that segregation creates inequality and sustains prejudice. This continued life of segregation has been termed the “new segregation”—and is thought to be in service of the old political agenda of segregation and privilege (ibid). Hitherto, a great deal of this work has, through observational methods, mapped intergroup contact in space and time using the same methods as Massey and Denton (1989, 1993) but also through their own innovative techniques (see Tredoux at al., 2005; Dixon & Durrheim, 2005) and a mixture of standard qualitative and quantitative methods. Schrieff et al. (2005) studied seating patterns at a university residence dining hall and observed segregation along racial lines in the seating arrangement of students. They conclude, “What is

11 [http://www.contactecology.com](http://www.contactecology.com). Also see the work by Hodegetts et al. (2010) which has close affinities with that of the micro-ecology of contact.
particularly apparent is how the segregation is manifested spatially, that is, through the spatial organisation of the sitting arrangements in the dining halls” (p. 441) and that this spatial organisation was consistent with Black and White demarcated tables. At the same university Tredoux et al. (2005) also undertook a naturalistic observational study, this time in a public space (a set of steps at the centre of the university plaza). These authors too observed a racialised sitting pattern noting that “even though the space is informal and easily rearrangeable, students of a particular race group prefer to sit in the same area across different days” (p. 425). In addition, they report that “students occupy public space on their campus, and when the space is relatively empty they self-segregate. However, when the space fills up, and there is competition for seats (or less choice) the seating pattern becomes less segregated” (p. 428).

In her study, Alexander (2007) sought to intrude on these racially homogenous spaces by using black and white confederates. She reports “…we found that both black and white racially homogenised tables were highly resistant to intrusions and violations of group boundaries” (p. 751). The author however, reports an instance where the presence of a White confederate temporarily disturbed the homogeneity of a ‘Black table’ thus making that space contested. In keeping with the above studies she concludes that “overall, the research findings suggest that intergroup contact in the student dining halls is governed by a set of implicit shared assumptions, norms and values that regulate the use of space” (p. 754). Alexander and Tredoux (2010) conducted a mixed methods study that combined longitudinal naturalistic observation and focus group discussions to examine seating patterns in a number of undergraduate tutorial
groups, and to elucidate the practices of informal segregation. Their findings revealed segregated seating patterns in tutorial classrooms throughout the academic year; contact was generally superficial and restricted to the classroom; Black and Coloured students nevertheless reported the interactions to be enjoyable, despite being forced while White students experienced contact as problematic and conflicted (p. 25). These authors further reported that some students saw racialised spaces on campus as a place for collective identity, security, acceptance, comfort, self-expression, mutual interests and supportive relationships. While recognising racial spaces, students in this study rejected the idea that these spaces were deliberately designed to be such and to exclude other students. Even though racialised spaces were seen as an unintended consequence by those who occupy them it did not prevent others from seeing such spaces as exclusionary and thus feared to enter these spaces (Alexander & Tredoux, 2010). The most cited fears were that of being the racial ‘other’ in an otherwise homogeneous space and the anticipation of a possibly uncomfortable experience (Alexander, 2006). These micro-ecological studies appear to be in accord with the argument advanced in chapter two that links the structural segregation of apartheid with intergroup self-segregation of post-apartheid. The crucial link, I have argued, lies in the largely unchanged structural design of apartheid that still has racial and ethnic groups living in geographically segregated areas and unequal conditions of existence. If Alexander and Tredoux (2010) find that contact amongst students is superficial and restricted to spaces of academic work this may be highlighting longstanding trends in broader society. This of course, is not to argue that there has been no change in intergroup contact and attitudes post-1994 for indeed there are, although decidedly
complex (e.g. Gibson & Claassen, 2010; Dixon, 2010; Swart, Hewstone, Christ & Voci, 2010). Despite such changes and the fact of being in a racially diverse university, racially homogeneous spaces exist. Not only that but they appear to be rich in social capital to the extent that students describe them as spaces for collective identity, security, acceptance, comfort, self-expression, mutual interests and supportive relationships.

We should not of course, easily accept the claims about the benefits derived from mono-racial spaces and their unintentional creation. This has the risk of reifying racial and cultural differences and treating ‘race’ as a default category of identification. Instead, the place and importance racial identity needs to be investigated and its relations to other factors such as language, class, accent and gender. Pattman (2010) argues in the same direction in his study on ‘race’ and social cohesion at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Asking whether various students’ voluntary associations reproduce or challenge racialised interactions, he found the former to be the true. This was the case amongst students who were part of his participatory research exercise, and whom he instructed to be in groups “comprising preferably people they did not know very well” (p. 958). In an exercise in which Pattman asked these students to “identify and map student groupings on campus…” (p. 957) the students not only identified racialised groupings but also the racialisation of space in conjunction with social class. Instances of racial integration were taken as exceptions, a fact that was not questioned but accepted as a norm. Furthermore, Pattman found some of the following dynamics to be at play: conflating the raising of racial issues with being racist; the construction of racial identities in opposition to each other, thus creating the perception of fixed and divergent interests; the deployment of
essentialist views of ‘race’ in ways that also conflated culture, sexuality and gender issues. Pattman argues that such uses are partly accounted for by “anxiety rooted in feelings of subordination...experienced by black students living in residences” (p. 962). The residences were constructed as ‘Black residences’ owing to the exodus of White students and were thus perceived by White students as dangerous and markers of racial difference. Interestingly, when students took the opportunity to work in racially mixed groups they found that they revised their perceptions about those different from them. Lastly, the interplay between race and social class was most evident in the divisions between Black students who attended historically White (Model C) schools and those who attended Black township schools. The former were perceived by the latter as ‘acting White’ and superior. Ironically, the White students whom they had little contact with were not seen as privileged and distant. White students were instead praised for greeting them (Pattman, 2010). A kind of ‘apartheid psychology’ is at play here in a type of ‘black-on-black’ hostility in the complex workings of ‘race’ and class in students’ lives. The complexities are also observed by Soudien (2008) in his study on the intersection of ‘race’ and class in the lives of Black university students at the University of Cape Town. His central arguments are that (1) ‘race’ in conjunction with other factors such as language use, home background, schooling background and so on takes on a sublimated form within the university context; (b) the university institution plays an important role in the production of particular identities and especially for those students who have lived in the margins of privilege; (c) the desire for social mobility by Black students puts most of them in a ‘home-and-university worlds’ struggle that weakens their racial identities and accentuates their social class aspirations.
A study by Finchilescu et al. (2007) sought to account for the lack of interracial mixing amongst Black and White students from four South African universities using an internet-based survey. The investigators found that reasons for the lack of interracial contact were differentially endorsed as a function of race. Endorsed to varying degrees by Black and White students, the eight reasons that accounted for the lack of interracial contact were language, interests, racial dissociation, behaviour, race issues, culture, rejection and socioeconomic status. Black students gave high endorsement to racial dissociation, economic status, culture and rejection while White students endorsed language and race issues in greater proportion than Black students. Both Black and White students gave similar rating for interests and behaviour. Viewed in the light of broader historical processes these findings are not alarming. For instance, that White students find language to be a barrier and Black students do not may partly reflect the history of unequal ‘race’ relations where Black people have had to closely observe and learn as much as possible from the ways of life of their White counterparts, but this was not reciprocated. This was indeed a matter of economic and social survival. Under such circumstances, language was not only an instrument of communication but also that of domination (e.g. see Christopher, 2004). The imposition of the Afrikaans language as a medium of instruction in Black schools under apartheid is a classic example that led to the Soweto uprising (Brink et.al., 2006; Hlongwane, Ndlovu and Mutloatse, 2006; Magubane, 1986). Many in the White community simply had no incentive to learn any of the so-called Bantu languages and one suspects that even today in South Africa most White people still do not know any of the other official languages other than English and Afrikaans. On the other hand, we can, for example,
understand Black students’ citing of rejection and socio-economic status in view of the work by Pattman (2010), and Soudien (2010). Assuming that the students who cited rejection also come from living conditions fundamentally different than those of their White counterparts the issue is also then about socio-economic status. More pointedly, it is about the type of life and privileges that socio-economic status allows and constrains insofar as this is racialised in South Africa and can supposedly be ‘read off’ from such things as neighbourhood, school, clothes, social interests and other material possessions. Some Black students may compare themselves to their White counterparts and feel that they do not measure up and thus perceive that they might be rejected. To be sure, this is not a fundamentally racial issue more than it is a class issue and thus some Black students may feel that they may be rejected by other Black students of higher status.

Also investigating Black students’ identities, Bangeni & Kapp (2005) traced (in a three year longitudinal case study) the progress of twenty-two first generation Black undergraduate students at UCT. Their study was concerned with changing constructions of identity and the relationship between home and university. The study revealed struggles to present “home” identities and how these identities are challenged by dominant university discourses and rejected by their home communities. While a desire to command proficiency in "Western" knowledge was expressed by respondents so too was the need to conserve traditional ethnic identities and to defend these identities against ethnic stereotypes in a context where White discourse is hegemonic. Citing Homi Bhabha (1994), Bangeni and Kapp (2005) contend that the students had become "unhomed" - a term which has less to do with homelessness than the
ambivalent space students occupy as they straddle multiple (and often conflicting), discourses. For instance, one of the respondents remarked, "[The Zulu language] tells the other person who I really am, no matter where I am or what I do I still remain umZulu as I want to be recognised as that only and nothing else" (p. 6). At the same time, students expressed a struggle to find or construct their identities, a process that was intertwined with the search for a place of belonging. Home, on the one hand, came to be associated with boredom, and frustration: "when I'm here, I want to be there and when I'm there, I want to be here..." (p. 13). Bangeni and Kapp (2005) and Soudien (2008) concur on the continuous negotiation of student identities between home and university and the place and role of university context in this process. While Soudien (2010) emphasises the sublimation of race and the accentuation of social class in the construction of identities, Bangeni and Kapp (2005) highlight the complexities and confusing expectations students experience between who they are and who they should be between home and university.

The Faculty of Health Science at the University of Cape Town commissioned a study in the context of complaints about racist practices notwithstanding transformation initiatives that were underway at the Medical School (Erasmus & de Wet, 2003). Using in-depth interviews, White and Black students in their second, fourth and sixth year participated in the study. Both Black and White students reported that they “stick to racial groups” (ibid., p. 2) during classes and some reported this practice to be persistent in residences, student societies and other student life spaces. The students, however, reported these practices, as not necessarily reflecting animosity among black and white students instead black and white students were
said to “work well together” (Erasmus & de Wet, 2003, p. 2). This is in line with the findings of social psychological studies above (e.g. Alexander & Tredoux, 2010, p. 19-23). Although slightly more than half of the Black respondents in the Erasmus & de Wet (2003) study reported to not have had any personal experience of racism, hurt, or to have been compromised or misunderstood, they reported that their limited interracial interaction had caused them discomfort, triggered by some of the following factors: (1) the abrupt shift for them from segregated living and schooling to the racially heterogeneous university environment; (2) language differences as a source of discomfort among themselves; (3) their marginality and powerlessness in both learning and social contexts which they perceive as dominated by White students and staff; (4) that it is hard for anyone to name ‘race’ in this environment; (5) White staff and students’ perceptions of them and insensitivity to difference in these contexts; and (6) their own perceptions of differences among themselves (p. 3).

In the context of limited and uncomfortable interracial encounters, Erasmus and de Wet (2003) report that black students bear the weight of doing ‘race’ work

...the burden of responsibility for enabling cross-racial interaction lies with black students...black students carry the negative projections of failure and incompetence at ...white staff and students consciously and/or unconsciously expect these students to disapprove negative constructions of blackness... the feelings related to this burden of ‘race’ (anxiety, anger, irritation, powerlessness, invisibility, marginality, fatigue) are for the most part held by these students (p. 4).
Consequently, White students (and staff) are spared what in some ways amounts to the drudgery of interracial interaction while their default privilege position makes awareness of these racial dynamics unnecessary. On the other hand, some Black students reject this unequal racial division of ‘race’ labour by avoiding contexts that they perceive would impose upon them the work of ‘race’; the need to interact across racial lines for purposes of transformation is recognised but interaction is still difficult because “all the responsibility for making such interaction work lies with them” (p. 4). Black students see racially homogeneous groups as comfortable and safe spaces where they do not have to do ‘race’ labour. Erasmus and de Wet (2003) however, argue that while this may be understandable it contributes to White students’ sense of freedom from this burden. All this should alert us that interracial contact and interaction is for some students psychologically and socially challenging (see Trail et al, 2009).

Using in-depth interviews and participant observations to explore the nature of racial segregation in a student community village and students’ experiences and perceptions of it, Moguerana (2007) reported the following. First, a discourse of sameness and individual preference were used to account for the lack of cross-racial ties. Second, she found that students avoided mentioning ‘race’ as a factor in the absence of interracial ties. In the first instance, her findings link with those of Alexander and Tredoux (2010) and in the second instance, to Erasmus and de Wet’s (2003) expression ‘not naming race’. In the case of the latter, Moguerana (2007) links with the works of Walker (2005) and Franchi and Swart (2003) who also point out “a tendency to not articulate but, rather to ‘silence’ race” (p. 46) amongst university students. Against an open embrace of transformation policies in the historically
White Afrikaner university Moguerena (2007) found that the fact of racially segregated living spaces was not official but nonetheless openly practiced. She further found that her respondents, irrespective of racial identity, perceived cultural differences to be “natural and irreconcilable” (ibid, p. 49). To be sure, racial segregation was preferred by both Black and White students with some students entering the post-graduate student village with longstanding friendships from undergraduate residences. There was also a sense of apprehension from the possibility of being alone and excluded if placed with racially different students. Lastly, in concluding her study Moguerena notes, among other things, that

...racial identities in post-apartheid South Africa have predictably been ‘maintained’ and continue to exist under the rubric of notions of the importance and significance of so-called ‘cultural differences’… [the] Student Village is characterised by a racial tolerance, rather than ‘racial integration’… (2007, p. 58).

This work also joins with that of Pillay and McLellan (2010) who found that the linguistic embrace of diversity and transformation at a historically Afrikaner university are at times used to resist institutional change, conflate ‘race’ and culture, and to sometimes essentialise difference and hence justify separation in residential halls.

These studies, by no means exhaustive, are important because they all converge on the message that all is not well with students’ social relations and networks in the South African higher education system. Self-segregation is recorded mostly by social psychological observational studies that point to the spatio-temporality of self-segregation. Sociological studies have emphasised, through qualitative methods, the complexities of lived experiences
and the (re)production racial identities; the essentialisation of cultural differences; the reconstitution of power and privilege in historically White universities; fluidity and ‘doings’ of Blackness and Whiteness; and the complex interplay of ‘race’ and other identity markers such as gender, class, sexuality in the (re) constructions of student identities. All these studies recognise that while desirable, what might be called racial integration still largely remains an ideal despite spirited transformation policies. In this, cross-racial friendships are explicitly or implicitly held as one of the important symbols of racial integration (see Pattman, 2010).

Compared with the North American literature, it is clear that South African studies are dealing with a somewhat different stock of issues. It must be remembered that the American education system was legally desegregated in the mid-1950s while in South Africa the transformation of the education system began post-1994. Consequently, the present issues besetting the higher education sector in South Africa are not only that of social cohesion and intergroup relations amongst students as is the focus of much social psychological and sociological research in North America. In addition to this, the South African higher education sector is still contending with issues that broadly derive their character from colonial and apartheid experiences while at the same time keeping up with contemporary changes internationally in economics, politics and education (Soudien, 2008).
Some critiques of contact theory

As with any theory, contact theory has had its share of criticism (e.g. Pettigrew, 1986; Dixon et al., 2005; Reicher, 2007; Erasmus, 2010). Pettigrew (1986) argued that the contact hypothesis...

...is not a testable hypothesis at all. Rather, as a long laundry list of conditions, it has proved to be expandable and imprecise. No systematic arguments accounting for how these various conditions interact with each other have been advanced; and even the conditions themselves are often not well specified (p. 179).

In the light of the recent meta-analytic works by Pettigrew and his colleagues and the reformulation of contact theory discussed above it is likely that Pettigrew may no longer hold these views about contact theory. In fact we find Pettigrew adding a fifth condition ‘friendship potential’ thus making his charge of a ‘laundry list’ redundant. The specification of how and when intergroup contact reduces prejudice has gone a long way in giving us a systematic account of the contact-prejudice relation. The explanatory power of this account is however, undermined by the claim that positive intergroup contact can be achieved even without Allport’s conditions—a ‘mere exposure’ effect (Pettigrew et al., 2011, p. 275).

Dixon et al. (2005) charged the theory as follows. First, they point out the theory’s utopianism of an ideal and abstract world in which Allport’s conditions are law, thus ensuring that positive contact is maximised and prejudice reduced. Second, is a conception of contact and interaction that is generic, thus undermining the contextuality and specificity of social relations and ordinary people’s meanings of contact. This charge holds notwithstanding Pettigrew’s (1998)
reformulation of contact theory because a great deal of contact research is still laboratory based. Third, the theory is charged with theoretical individualism, expressed by the theory’s proposal to rehabilitate the prejudiced individual. This charge too stands because there have been no revisions in this regard. Reicher (2007) takes issue with Allport’s ‘prejudice problematic’ and specifically the “premises upon which it is founded and thereby questions ‘contact’ as the primary means of challenging prejudice” (ibid, p. 821). Reicher identifies five ‘critical assumptions’ and works through each one revealing its complexities and flaws. These assumptions are: “(a) prejudiced views consist of negative mental states relating to the outgroup; (b) prejudice is a matter of (mis)perception; (c) prejudiced views are to be located in ordinary members of the (dominant) ingroup; (d) the focus of prejudice is on how they see the (subordinate) outgroup; (3) the solution to prejudice lies in altering the views of dominant group members” (p. 821). He then moves to question whether intergroup contact is indeed an effective way of challenging and reducing prejudice and discrimination. In this regard he advances two critiques.

The liberal critique would be to stress problems of omission...Perhaps more could be achieved by addressing the ways the ingroup is defined: who is doing it, through which techniques, in whose interests...The radical critique is to stress problems of commission. That is, contact might be good for the dominant group. It might allay their anxieties about subordinate group members...However, the presence of dominant group members may impede the self-organisation and the empowerment of subordinate groups...
the salience of structural inequalities and promote the illusion that the social system is permeable (p. 830)

Reicher’s radical critique finds support in the work of Durrheim and Dixon (2010) and Dixon et al. (2010), reviewed above. Taken together these critiques form a rather serious offensive for contact theory. Erasmus (2010), building on the Dixon et al. (2005) critique, advances a further offensive on contact theory. Firstly, she argues that not only is contact theory utopian but that its methodologies are couched within a “psychometric imaginary”\(^\text{12}\) (p. 389) that treats “socio-political, cultural, discursive phenomena” (ibid) as fixed, controllable and manageable. Secondly, she criticises contact theory for treating ‘race’ as given and racialised groups as stable and homogeneous and thus legitimating apartheid categories (ibid). Thirdly, is a construction of a contact/non-contact dualism of social formation, which Erasmus argues simplifies South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past. Fourthly, is a charge that because contact theory assumes ‘race’ as given it tends to leave “…whiteness unquestioned. This omission considerably undermines the efficacy of contact in the face of reconfigurations of privilege in contexts of assimilation” (p. 391-392). In the final analysis Erasmus concludes that contact theory is ‘too timid for “race” and racism’ and that “In their combined effect these four limitations locate contact theory within raciological thought, making contact a reformist, not a transformative antiracist strategy” (p. 393). Responding to Erasmus, Pettigrew (2010) had this to say “…I agree

\(^{12}\) The conception of “questions about changing sociopolitical, cultural, and discursive phenomena—racism(s) and racialization—as questions of objective measurement” (p. 389).
with Erasmus that intergroup theory is not “transformative”. But whoever said that it was?” (p. 427).

Building on Reicher’s (2007) critique, Dixon, Levine, Reicher and Durrheim (2012) begin their critique by offering an account of prejudice research that highlights its emergence and rise to prominence in social psychology and the social sciences broadly; its continued theoretical salience to date; its various definitions; debates about the relation between its cognitive and affective components. They summarise this historical and conceptual account of prejudice by observing that “at the heart of most prejudice research is a deceptively simple question: Why don’t we like one another?” (p. 3). This question, they argue is related to the prejudice reduction research enterprise “which has become an interdisciplinary rallying call: ...how can we get people to like each other?”(ibid). Following a similar outline adopted by Reicher (2007) these authors first attend to prejudice with the intention to explore the limits of the orthodox conception of prejudice as a negative evaluation. In this regard they level five serious criticisms (see p. 3-7). They then turn to address ‘the limits of a prejudice reduction model of social change’. Here contact theory’s intergroup contact intervention aimed at rehabilitating prejudiced individuals is questioned on the account of ‘theoretical individualism’ (see Dixon et al., 2005). Its rehabilitative power begins with the individual and proceeds to interpersonal encounters and relations and finally to institutional and intergroup relations is questioned by these authors. The prejudice reduction model is then juxtaposed with a collective action model that
...highlights the role of collective action in achieving social justice. Its guiding assumption is that social change is predicated upon mass mobilization, a process that typically brings representatives of historically disadvantaged groups (who stand to benefit from change) into conflict with representatives of historically advantaged groups (who stand to lose out from change) (p. 8).

There is simply limited space to do justice to the elegant argument put forward by Dixon et al. (2012) as they grapple with these two seemingly opposing models of social change. I will only point out their final position on the matter

We believe that it is time to reevaluate this model [the contact-prejudice model] of social change. We need to ask ourselves if prejudice reduction deserves its status as the preeminent framework through which we approach the problem of “improving” relations between groups within historically unequal societies (p. 15).

I join with these critiques and specifically that of Reicher (2007) on the ‘prejudice problematic’. While Reicher critiques the foundational assumptions of prejudice I question its epistemological status and thus the process through which it came to being the central pillar of contact theory. The ‘prejudice turn’ in psychology is highlighted by Samelson (1978), discussed earlier. Even if intergroup contact does lead to a reduction in prejudice (e.g. Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2008), the original choice of prejudice as a primary causal factor of conflictual group relations appears a priori and reductionist. In an earlier study before the publication of The Nature of Prejudice,
Allport and Kramer (1946) presumed prejudice to be an active property and only sought to discover its roots.

If ethnic and religious prejudices are not inborn—and there seems to be almost unanimous agreement among psychologists that they are not...The present study takes certain steps toward discovering the roots of prejudice... (1946, p. 9).

In *The Nature of Prejudice* Allport offers examples from various parts of the world of human relations characterised by intergroup antagonism. At the end of his survey of world intergroup hostilities, he concludes that “No corner of the world is free from group scorn. Being fettered to our own respective cultures, we...are bundles of prejudice” (1954, p. 4). Contrast this with DuBois who begins his treatment of race relations in a similar observational fashion as Allport but without the immediate attribution of a causal factor.

The world-old phenomenon of the contact of diverse races of men is to have new exemplification during the new century...we are compelled daily to turn more and more to a conscientious study of the phenomena of race-contact...We must ask: What are the actual relations of whites and blacks in the South... (1901, p. 122).

The charge I am laying is that given a possible catalogue of intersecting and complex causes of intergroup strife the original choice of prejudice by Allport (1954) was a work of ‘artificialism’ (Bourdieu, et al., 1991) that has been hardly corrected since then. Artificialism is the
illusory representation of the genesis of social facts according to which the social scientist can understand and explain these facts merely through “his own private reflection” rests, in the last analysis, on the presupposition of innate wisdom... rooted in the sense of familiarity... (Bourdieu, et al., 1991, p. 15).

This is a failure at “epistemological vigilance” (ibid., p. 13). One of the primary functions of ‘epistemological vigilance’ is a ‘radical doubt’ of ‘ordinary language and everyday notions’ or what Émile Durkheim called ‘prenotions’. The need to break with prenotions deposited in everyday language has nothing to do with the “misapprehension that scientificity is characterized above all by the use of complex technical terminologies, and by the distance between research and the problems of practice...” (Krais, 1991, p. viii). To the contrary, what is at stake is “Challenging the “truths” of common-sense” and “the principle on which common-sense is based” (Bourdieu et al., 1991, p. 93). The utility of such an exercise is to distinguish between ‘everyday opinion and scientific discourse’. After decades of research and theorising who can confidently say that prejudice is the correct representation and/or causal factor of estranged intergroup relations, rather than simply a prenotion? Durkheim holds that prenotations are

...products of common-sense, their main purpose is to attune our actions to the surrounding world...they are formed by and for experience. Now a representation can effectively perform this function even if it is theoretically false (cited in Bourdieu et al., 1991, p. 93).
Proponents of contact theory may argue that prejudice has never been proposed as the only causal factor. They may further point to Pettigrew’s (1998) reformulation of contact theory and research that has focused on European prejudice and discrimination (e.g. see the collection of articles edited by Zick, Pettigrew & Wagner, 2008; Wagner et al., 2003; 2006). The problem though is that notwithstanding these varied societal contexts, prejudice is by far treated as the most salient and tested variable. Thus, if we pay attention to research practice rather than salutary remarks the charges of artificialism and explanatory reductionism hold. And still, the point is not that social scientists ought to be immune to common sense knowledge but that it is suspicious when common sense operates as some kind of metaphysical theory upon which an academic enterprise is established.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed research literature mainly on the social psychology of prejudice and desegregation and specifically that inspired by Gordon Allport’s work. In this the exercise was historical, descriptive and at certain points analytical and critical. The review began with a brief overview of contact theory research in the USA before turning to review social psychological research in South Africa on intergroup relations and the influence of contact theory in this work. I then turned more specifically to a review of student cross-group friendship at university both in the USA and South Africa. Lastly, I presented a review of some recent critiques of contact theory and also added my own critique on the epistemological status of prejudice. As a whole the review has attempted to narrate the scholarship inspired by the work of Gordon
Allport over time in the USA and in South Africa. In this we have come to understand the complexities, hopes, challenges and inroads made in this field of intergroup relations. What makes this work exciting is its resolve to understand and intervene in the betterment of intergroup relations in societies with long histories of conflict and social tensions. Recent developments in the field, as the review revealed, have turned to a debate on what is the best way to achieve social change. One suspects that this development will take the field into new and exciting directions both in research and theory. However, what is ironic about this new development is that the focus is on the ‘pathways’ to social change yet it seems to me that what exactly is understood by this concept is not fully grasped. This is especially since the version of social change espoused by the contact theory has been challenged as not only insufficient but ultimately benefiting those groups that have historically been in power and which may still continue to hold various forms of power. In view of this perhaps the field needs first a thoroughgoing debate on social change before moving to discuss means to that change. Another exciting development comes from South Africa in the work pursued under the banner of the micro-ecology of contact also discussed in the review. What is most interesting about this work is the attention it pays to the contextuality of intergroup contact and relations and the meanings people make of intergroup contact (see Dixon et al., 2005); the uses of space in ways that articulate racial boundaries and social distance (see Alexander, 2007; Alexander & Tredoux, 2010; Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Shrieff et al., 2005, 2010; Tredoux et al., 2005). These developments are exciting and insightful because they break with the mainstream generic conception of intergroup contact. From this growing tradition of work we can hope to learn
more about the so-called mundane of everyday life and from this hopefully construct theories that are closer to people’s experiences outside the laboratory. The present study specifically departs from insights gleaned from the work of Schrief et al. (2005) which found that (1) self-segregation is the operation of group spatial identities that are “spatial zones within which members operate comfortably; it involves knowing one’s place and having a sense of who belongs there with ‘us’. Such identities may both reflect and reconstitute the broader societal organisation of space” (p. 441); and (2) that segregation is a function of friendship patterns. The present work joins with the micro-ecology of contact approach (Dixon, Tredoux & Clack, 2005) and seeks to make a contribution by qualitatively exploring the social (including the political, historical, and economic) and psychological factors and processes that shape the formation of racially homogeneous and racial heterogeneous student friendship groups.
Chapter Four: Research method

Introduction

There is a growing body of research in South Africa from various disciplines that investigates social relations amongst secondary school and university students. This study contributes to this broader knowledge fund of intergroup relations and specifically to the micro-ecology of contact approach. This chapter spells out the research method or in other words, what I did and how I did it in undertaking the study. Before this however, the study objective, central research question, and theory question are presented. The latter part of the chapter discusses the epistemological status of the data gathered for the study.

The research project

Study Objective

The study attempts to identify social and psychological properties and processes that influence the formation of racially homogeneous friendships and hinder the formation of racially heterogeneous friendship ties among first year students in a post-apartheid university.
Central research question

What psychological and social factors and processes influence the constitution of racially homogeneous and heterogeneous friendship groups amongst first year university students at the University of Cape Town?

Theory Question

How do these factors and processes work together and culminate in the practice of self-segregation as psychological and social practice?

Sampling

Non-probability purposive sampling was used in this study, meaning that respondents were chosen because they were undertaking first year studies, they were in university residences, and they agreed to participate in the study meaning that the sample was not drawn on randomly. Residences as sites of study were chosen using the following selection criteria.

- The residence must not have been used as study sites in the previous observational studies on informal segregation that have been recently conducted at the University of Cape Town (UCT). This is to avoid research fatigue of participants.
- The residence population must include male and female students. This is to ensure gender representivity. In addition, it ensures that if there is a gender dimension to the phenomenon being investigated that it will be accounted for even if descriptively.
• The residence population should represent a variety of faculties on campus. This goes some way to ensure some degree of representivity of the university student population in this regard.

Eleven residences qualified (in a total of nineteen at the time of study) according to these criteria and of these pilot observational data in the dining halls was collected from five residences. Pilot data were collected from four residences (Kopano, Marquard, University House, and Rochester House. For the main study data were collected from three residences (Kopano, Grace and Rochester. The small number of residences was chosen on the practical reason that I needed to be able to manage the various study tasks (e.g. participant recruitment and data collection) especially because I did not have a research assistant. The specific residences were chosen (in addition to the above criteria) because I initially had intended to explore the gender dimension in addition to ‘race’ and class (Kopano Residence houses male students, Graça Machel Hall is a female-only residence and Rochester House is a mixed gender residence). I abandoned this intention when I realised that investigating ‘race’ and class alone was complex enough and that I needed more writing space to explore these two issues in some detail. Actual recruitment of students did not begin before I had meetings with the residence management teams of the various residences I had identified for study. The meetings were held at the end of the 2010 academic year and at the beginning of the 2011 academic year and consisted mostly of my ‘negotiation of entry’ into the residences. This involved explaining what the intention of the study was and presenting official documents from the Director of Student Affairs and the Deputy Vice- Chancellor for Transformation documenting institutional support
for the study. Once I was granted access I then requested to meet the new cohort of students the first day they arrived at university and at the residences. I was given an opportunity to address the incoming cohort of students as part of the welcome activities organised by the residence management team. It was at this point that I recruited the students to participate in the study which I presented as a ‘university friendship study’. I explained who I am, what I am studying and why I am interested to study student friendships. In the end I attended to some brief questions and then I handed out a sheet of paper and students who were interested gave me their contact details. A week later I contacted the students and set up a meeting in which I explained the intention of the study again and addressed any issues they had. It was also at this time that I informed students that their participation would be effective if they asked their friends to join them in participating in the study. Some of the students had already come to the meeting with their friends and others indeed requested their friends to join them. In this way the study deals with naturally forming friendship groups rather than aggregate groups. This process was repeated in all three residences.

The Participants

A total of 69 participants were recruited to participate in the study: 62 first year students; the Director of the Admissions Office (1), a Transformation Officer (1), and residence sub-wardens (5). The Director of the Admission Office, the Transformation Officer, and the sub-wardens were interview individually and once. In the student sample two were interviewed individually
and the remaining 59 were interviewed as groups of naturally forming friends. The racial profile of the sample was as follows: 6 Black males, 39 Black females, 7 coloured females, 8 White females, 1 White male and 1 Chinese female. Participants were between the ages of 18 and 20. I was able to collect data at all three time points (March, June and September) for 7 focus groups (28 participants) and it is these interviews that will provide the main data set and the additional data will be used to support and/or challenge the arguments being made on the basis of the main data set.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Data collection}

The decision to primarily use focus groups over individual interviews was taken after a set of pilot interviews (individual and focus group) conducted in 2010. From these initial interviews it became clear that focus group discussions offered more detailed data. This was due to the obvious fact of multiple participants co-constructing the data in approximately naturalistic conversations. It is also noteworthy that the use of focus groups accords with the decision to interview natural groups of friends with the aim to going some way in understanding their collective perspectives vis-à-vis the research aims. Wilkinson (2004) outlines some advantages of using focus groups which, I concur with, in the following ways.

- Focus groups provide a way of collecting data relatively quickly from a large number of participants.

\textsuperscript{13}The reduction in the number of focus groups was due to the friendship groups disbanding or merging or merging with other groups in the study. In some instances students could not find a time that worked for all members of the group resulting in them not being able to meet in the second or third time point.
• Focus groups are more naturalistic than interviews in that they typically include a range of communicative processes—such as storytelling, joking, arguing, boasting, teasing, persuasion, challenge and disagreement.

• Focus group interactions allow respondents to react to and build upon the responses of other group members’, creating a synergetic effect. This often leads to the production of more elaborate accounts than are generated in individual interviews.

• Simply by virtue of the number of participants simultaneously involved, focus groups inevitably reduce the researcher’s control over the interaction, making focus group interviewing a relatively ‘egalitarian’ method (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 180-181).

The friendship groups had between 2 and 6 students in a group and other groups merged to form one group of friends in the process of the study. A total of 50 focus group discussions (consisting of a total of 17 focus groups) were conducted between March, June and September 2011. I conducted all the focus group discussions and recoded them using a digital voice recorder and field notes.

Data analysis

The ‘narrative inquiry’ approach (Chase, 2005) was used as the broad framework for the description and interpretation of the data. The framework’s principles and illustrative examples from the data are presented below. The Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis procedure was followed in analysing the data and is presented in Appendix A.
The concept of narrative is used in two senses in the thesis. First, it is used in the broad and commonsensical sense to refer to the practices or actions of telling stories in the context of focus group discussions that produced the empirical data for the study. In this sense narrative refers simply to the act of improvisation in telling a personal and collective story for the present audience, especially the researcher, who has requested the meeting and has provided the initial impetus for the narrated story by posing particular questions. Second, for the present work narrative inquiry has epistemological and analytical relevance. Epistemologically, the focus group narratives are conceived as retrospective meaning making accounts of events and everyday ways of being that are often taken for granted because they are not questioned in the ways in which they were in the focus group discussions. This is also the application of the first principle of narrative inquiry — narrative as retrospective meaning making.

First, narrative researchers approach narrative (oral or written) as a distinct type of discourse that highlights the idiosyncrasy of human practice and events rather than common properties. Narrative is seen as retrospective meaning making; a way of understanding one’s and other’s actions; and of organising events into a meaningful whole (Chase, 2005). The merit of this method of analysis is the attention it gives to people’s unique behaviour and making of meaning. This idiosyncratic perspective was held during the interviews, the reading of transcripts and their interpretation as a way of acknowledging and retaining each friendship group’s lived experiences.

Second, narrative inquiry views narratives as both enabled and constrained by a host of social structures and circumstances. This view is in accord with attention given in this study to
structural arrangements that are beyond the control of individuals but which nonetheless have an impact in their lives” (pg. 117). An illustrative example of this in the thesis is highlighted on page 170 where the participants are narrating the material and structural difference between White and Black people in Mafikeng. This structural difference is not only beyond the control of the participants who are born without choice into the specific configuration of their home-world but also their experience of the world is to some degree shaped by this structural arrangement. Consequently, the identity constructing discursive resources available to them partly emerge from the material stratification of their home-worlds. It is in this sense that the narrative of who they have become in the course of their social trajectory into UCT is enabled and constrained. Primarily by their home-worlds and secondarily in the new UCT context which too allows and constrains certain ways of being.

Third, also important are the similarities and differences across narratives. In this there is attention to the idiosyncrasies of each group (and at times individuals within the group) narrative thus giving room to identify similarities and differences in respondents’ experiences that allowed me to take note of themes within and across group narratives. Analytical illustrative examples of this principle are found on pages 160-165 in what I referred to as participants’ theories accounting for the racial composition of their friendships. Here not only do we perceive similarities and differences between focus group narratives but differences, similarities and contradictions within group narratives are also teased out to give a detailed description and analysis.
Fourth, narratives are also taken as verbal action, that is, when a person tells a story they are in fact constructing, shaping and performing the self, experience and reality. Salient in this type of analysis is the narrator’s voice that draws attention to how and what is being communicated as well as to the subject positionalities or social locations from which the narrators speaks (Chase, 2005). This type of analysis required me to be constantly conscious that although the respondents are all students they emerge from different social trajectories and that these and their present context shaped the identity constructing narratives they produced in the group discussions in my presence as an audience and researcher. This is both an epistemological and analytical principle which is already satisfied above in the spelling out of principles one and two.

Fifth, is a consideration of the researcher’s interpretation and presentation of the narratives under study. Here the four analyses outlined above apply to the researcher as much as they do to the researched. This means that when researchers interpret and present their work they also assume the position of a narrator. As narrators, then, researchers develop meaning out of, and some sense of order in the material they studied; they develop their own voice(s) as they construct other’s voices and realities; they narrate results in ways that are both enabled and constrained by the social resources and circumstances embedded in their disciplines, cultures, and historical moments, and they write or perform their work for particular audiences. This principle makes explicit the reflexive turn necessarily incorporated in qualitative work. The requirements of the principle are spelled out on pages 124-127.
Data analysis whether qualitative or quantitative does not begin and end with the specific methods employed to organise data into meaningful segments that answer the research questions. This task is what the thematic and narrative methods outlined about attend to. In addition, data has to be constructed or narrated to produce a coherent and defensible theoretical narrative based on the available evidence. In this study I used description and interpretation to that end and will spell out each below.

The intention to investigate properties and processes may have an unintended effect to leave in the reader’s mind the impression that I intend to study ‘the way things really are’ at an ontological level. This possible misperception may not be helped by the fact that I have also made reference to the ‘psychological’ as distinct from the ‘social’. While I do think of what we call psychological to be a realm of human activity that we cannot directly observe, I do not necessarily hold the view that there are in actual fact hidden but real cognitive entities that generate human behaviour. This is to say that I do not follow a realist philosophy of science. Instead I join with Pleasants (1999) who favours Wittgenstein’s descriptive approach. Wittgenstein is concerned to avoid a particular kind of theoretical explanation he calls a philosophical picture.

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A philosophical picture, in Wittgenstein’s sense, is a theoretical representation which has lost its representational status and has been reified into a peculiarly compelling portrayal of the essence of some phenomenon. (ibid., p. 3).

To be sure, I develop theoretical concepts in the process of this project, but not for the purpose of theoretical explanation which presupposes that I am “in possession of any special insight into (social and political)” or psychological reality (ibid., p. 2). Wittgenstein, Nigel tells us, “is not necessarily opposed to ‘theory’ or ‘explanation’ as such; but he does regard the cognitive and transcendental phenomena postulated in philosophical theories as artefacts of the theorist’s own practice, which are brought about by their mode of representation” (ibid., p. 76 emphasis in original). Still, the trap of all this is that it is a “psychological and intellectual compulsion” (p.3) in which “we feel that we can directly; not only theoretically, see how things must be inherently, in and of themselves” (ibid). This belief and practice is supported by a view of science that attempts to “uncover the hidden mechanisms, powers, states, processes and structures which are assumed to generate, and hence ‘explain’, phenomena such as consciousness, language, meaning, etc.” (Pleasants, 2000, p. 293). Heeding this advice the concepts developed in this project are not intended as surrogates for real cognitive, psychological or emotional structures—they are theoretical tools of vision. Additionally, they are not developed as general concepts to be readily used in a totally different investigation. They are instead specifically designed for this particular project investigating a particular social practice. This however, does not mean that the concepts cannot and should not be used
elsewhere but that if they are used it should be with caution and only if useful. This is, I believe, what I have done here in borrowing different lines of thought from different scholars.

The present study is an inquiry into a social practice with the view to understand the practice being investigated and to use the study itself as an occasion for ‘critical social reflection’ (Pleasants, 1999, p. 180) on our social relations. This is partly the goal of Wittgenstein’s descriptive approach which argues that “...the difficulty [in critical self-understanding] is one of getting people to look at and question, that which surrounds them but which is so taken-for-granted that it is not usually seen or thought about at all’ (ibid., p. 309).

I spell this out because I do not share in the belief and attempt by some social scientists to explain, predict and where possible control human behaviour. It is true that my use of language and metaphors has at times intentional or explanatory tones. Perhaps to some extent this is unavoidable - however, at all times the intention is to describe through interpretation.

I turn now to the issue of interpretation. Dilthey is regarded as the pioneer of modern hermeneutics in the human sciences. One of the questions that Dilthey laboured on was whether the human sciences could in fact use the same methods as the physical sciences notwithstanding the differences between the two. (Tappan, 1997). Dilthey proposed a method of analysis he called hermeneutics, “the deliberate and systematic methodology of interpretation” (ibid., p. 646).

The interpretive process is evidently inductive, being the “process by which a particular interpretation is derived from a series of instances, which then serves to unify those instances
as part of a larger whole—a ‘hermeneutic circle’ (ibid). Equally salient in the hermeneutic methods is preservation of the sense of time in human practice or the “historicality of the subject’s lived experience” (ibid, p. 649).

The importance of the historicality of human experience cannot be overemphasised. Its theoretical utility is found in the attention it draws to time, space and place as active dimensions and properties of the tapestry of human experience. In other words, social practices are not random but have evolved over time, space and places. This means that the present study is a snapshot in a motion picture of the participants’ lives. This snapshot is of course taken from a particular point of view—a ‘scholastic point of view’ (Bourdieu, 1990) “...a very peculiar point of view on the social world... made possible by the situation of skholè,...as an institutionalised situation of studious leisure” (ibid., p. 381). In addition there is also the seduction of common sense, prejudices and unspoken interests that may influence the researcher. On this point Manicas (1987) notes that “it would be amazing if commonsensical knowledge did not play a role in providing the background meaning of hypotheses in social science. Indeed it is unavoidable. What is avoidable however, is the uncritical appropriation of this stock of ideas” (p. 288).

I suspect that these views may invite incredulity on the scientific status of the hermeneutic turn and especially because it has nothing of the view that the researcher ought to bring nothing of himself into the research process. Instead it admits what is often denied or suppressed through various means.
This brings us to the issue of validity in interpretive work. The hermeneutic approach treats the object-subject dualism between the knower and the known as a pursuit of ‘objectivity’ in the characteristic empiricist and rationalist approaches to psychological research (Tappan, 1997). In response, the hermeneutic approach joins with the Wittgensteinian descriptive stance outlined above. Consequently, the issue is not validity but ‘interpretive agreement’ (ibid). The implications of all this are immense. The academic universe is a collection of communities not only for interpreting but also of seeing and understanding the world. Different characterisations of the world correspond to different academic communities and thus the divisions of academic labour. That a particular characterisation or interpretation has premium is only a function of academic ethnocentrism from which ways of seeing and understanding are objectified as universal. Yet, the objectivity and universality of knowledge and constructs are products of consensus whose means of production are agreed upon by the use of similar instruments of investigation and terms of reference. Therefore, solutions to the problems of the social world are only solutions to the problems that a particular academic community has interpreted and understood from the position of their professional and disciplinary vision. All this means is that the present project is written for the scholastic community to which I belong with the view to attain ‘interpretive agreement’ on a particular vision of the world. It is important though to stress that I do not believe that the interpretive method necessarily grants the researcher an unmediated grasp of people’s psychological and social worlds.

*Epistemological status of the data*
When all the data are in, the question must still be asked: what is it that the researcher now has in his/her possession? The answer largely depends on the researcher’s chosen approach, for instance, ethnomethodology, naturalism, postmodernism, or emotionalism. In keeping with many debates and practices in academia, the issue of the epistemological status of qualitative data is cast in dualistic terms. The positivists aim for a mirror reflection of reality extracted from the pure interview constructed in a sterile context. The constructivists, at the other end, reject the idea of objective reality to be discovered in interviews and insist that the interview is a construction of the interviewer and interviewee and the production of which is their version of the world (Miller & Glassner, 2004, p. 125). I follow Miller & Glassner (ibid, p. 126-127) when arguing that

Research cannot provide the mirror reflection of the social world that positivists strive for, but it may provide access to the meanings people attribute to their experiences and social worlds. While the interview itself is a symbolic interaction, this does not discount the possibility that knowledge of the social world beyond the interaction can be obtained.

Emphasis should be drawn to the reference to ‘the social world beyond the interaction’ which carries the risk of contradiction with the ‘mirror reflection of the social world’ renounced by Miller and Glassner. Of interest is precisely the social world that is co-produced in the interview context through inter-subjectivity15 and mutual understanding of shared experiences. The

15 Subjectivity “refers to the conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, her sense of herself and her ways of understanding her relation to the world…. (P)ost-structuralism proposes a subjectivity which is precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being constituted in discourse each time we think or speak” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32-3).
crucial point made by Miller and Glassner (2004), drawing on Charmaz (1995), is that this social world exists for participants whether or not they participate in our research. It is in this sense that I believe they speak of a social world beyond interaction that the interview process offers an opportunity to grasp. It is still important to emphasise that this has nothing to do with the epistemological practice that holds participants’ talk as some kind of ‘transparent window’ through which the research can grasp the participants’ pre-given social and psychological worlds (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 187). The social world is (re)constructed in the heat-of-the-moment turns in conversation for the purpose and audience at hand.

I turn now to the issue of co-construction of narratives and participants’ social worlds and in this regard the influence the researcher has as a consequence of his/her categorical memberships. The following are some of the factors that in all likelihood influenced much of the nature and direction that the focus group discussions and thus the data took. The bullet points below refer to some of my characteristics and others independent of me which I believe may have influenced the participants and in turn the nature of the data that was produced. This point is well illustrated in an excerpt in Chapter Six.

- A South African Black male
- A PhD student at the University of Cape Town
- A psychology student
- My ability (or lack thereof) to build rapport with the participants
- My proficiency in English and accent
• The participants’ understanding of the intent of the study
• Their interpretation of the questions asked
• The racial and gender memberships of the participants
• The political background and present context in which the study is pursued

It is such issues that in qualitative scholarship raise epistemological concerns. This calls for ‘epistemic reflexivity’ (Bourdieu et al., 1991) on the part of the researcher but certainly not of the sort where researchers undertake a type of inappropriate autobiography (Miller & Glassner, 2004). Epistemic reflexivity...aims...to grasp everything that the thinking of the anthropologist (or sociologist) may owe to the fact that she (or he) is inserted in a national scientific field, with its traditions, habits of thoughts, problematic, shared commonplaces...which unconsciously orient her scientific choices (of discipline, method, objects, etc.) (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 284).

In other words, epistemic reflexivity is the act of turning the critical gaze back onto the researching subject. For me this is a call to reflect on my own position in the social world, my ‘scholastic situation’ and ‘scholastic view’ from which I think and question the social world. The first recognition is that being a graduate student in a university, a PhD student in a Psychology Department entails “…a very peculiar point of view on the social world...on any possible thought that is made possible by the situation of skholè,...as an institutionalised situation of studious leisure” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 381). Thus, the questions I pose and the answers I seeks, my methods of investigation and the analyses I conduct are not divorced from the fact that
they are all undertaken in an academic situation that presupposes a social condition of ‘retirement’ from the world in order to think that world. Universities and their departments are spaces of cultural production (various forms of knowledge) and therefore, being part of a department means that I am a producer of cultural goods (which are produced according to particular values and methods of production). To this extent my position (PhD student and not professor) influences the choices I make with regard to epistemic posture, theoretical framework, concepts adopted, research method and methods of analysis in undertaking my research.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the research design and method of procedure of the study. In this regard the aim was to make transparent what I did and how I did it in undertaking the study. It was also to make clear why I have adopted particular epistemological and analytical approaches in organising, making sense of and presenting the data. The reader may not always agree with the choices I have made here but I hope that he/she will find them useful and appropriate for the present study and its aims. The following chapter is part one of two that presents and interprets the results of the study.
Chapter Five: Results Part I. The reproduction of social and psychological worlds.

Introduction

In chapter four—Research methods—under the sub-section—Epistemological status of the data—I argued that the empirical data generated through focus group discussions is not taken as a mirror reflection of the world beyond the interview contexts. Their epistemological status is that of social realities co-constructed, in the interview contexts, in response to the questions I had posed about the participants’ experiences and practices that are often taken for granted in the practicalities of their everyday life. Following Miller and Glassner (2004) I took the position that although participants’ shared and divergent experiences and practices concerning the formation of friendships and consequently the practice of self-segregation are not a reflection of the world they are nevertheless a reflection of their social world. This world exists for participants whether or not they participate in research studies. Therefore, the data presented in this chapter and the next carry the epistemological status of being primarily the accounts of participants’ experiences and social practices. Secondarily, since the accounts were produced for the researcher as audience and who in essence had challenged the participants to be accountable for their friendship choices, they should also be perceived as accounts intended to achieve particular outcomes or goals for the participants. This is to say that it is conceived that
the participants used the focus group discussions to assemble particular versions of themselves as individuals and as groups of friends using a repertoire of linguistic, cultural, psychological and social resources. For the purposes of the present work however, the focus is on the latter status of the data which means that we are not concerned with a discourse or conversation analysis of the data. Rather we are interested to understand, through description and scholarly analysis, the participants’ experiences and practices relating to the formation of their friendship groups. In doing so I aim to achieve two goals. Firstly, we get closer to answering the research question— What psychological and social factors and processes influence the constitution of racially homogeneous and heterogeneous friendship groups amongst first year university students at the University of Cape Town? Secondly, focusing on students’ experiences and practices in keeping with the micro-ecological approach precept to give attention to the often messy and ambivalent nature of everyday intergroup encounters.

The epistemological status accorded to the data in general is also given to the spontaneous participant theories presented in this chapter. These participant theories are treated as insightful as accounts and justifications for the friendship choices that participants have made. As this chapter will show these participant theories, although varied, all converge on the view that being with others who are similar to oneself is easier, preferred, and comforting. This of course, is in line with the conceptualization of self-segregation presented in Chapter One—the social identity organizing principle of homophily and propinquity. This conception of self-segregation was elaborated in Chapter One and indeed the thesis labours to interrogate this conception of self-segregation by asking after the processes and factors that make self-
segregation possible. In other words, the conception of self-segregation as homophily is used as a point of departure without necessarily being accepted as satisfactory justification for the everyday practices of social exclusion. Thus, there is in my view an important distinction between accepting, as general psychological imperative, that we tend to organise ourselves and everything in the world into categorical divisions. This in itself inscribes similarity and difference as organizing principles. However, this psychological tendency of itself does not justify nor as a matter of necessity prescribe social exclusion, or discrimination, because as human beings we are both intentional and have the capacity for reflection. Thus, of itself self-segregation as a psychological distinction is not necessarily objectionable. What would be objectionable however is if we found that the processes and factors underlying self-segregation are those constituting systems of privilege and oppression.

Lastly, a note of caution is advised in regard to the findings reported in Chapters Five and Six. The data reported are of a qualitative nature and yet at times my use of language reads as though I am making causal relations of a quantitative kind. This is not the aim and my writing throughout should be understood as reporting on, describing and interpreting qualitative experiences and practices of participants and bringing these in conversation with research and theoretical literature.

This and the following chapter attempt to construct an interface between the social and psychological components of the human practice referred to as self-segregation in this study.
The contextual frame of this study is the University of Cape Town\textsuperscript{16} in South Africa. The students who are participants in this study presently live out a significant amount of their everyday lives within this institution. For these first year students the university is indeed a new world in which they have come to pursue their future aspirations through the acquisition of academic or ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986). I am here however, interested in the social dimension of their university lives and particularly the close friendship groups they form within the university and those that they are already part of prior to arriving at university. An attempt is made, although limited, to trace the social genesis of these friendship ties.

In doing this I want to have a grasp of some of the properties that influence these human relations and particularly the properties that influence their homophilous character. The hope of capturing something of this I believe is made possible by keeping alive a sense of time and movement that is characteristic of human relations. It is interesting and useful to think of human relations in terms of space and time. The former can be used as a surrogate for stability and the latter for fluidity. Taking this spatio-temporal view offers the chance to theoretically capture some of the properties and processes that constitute the stability and change that configure the human relations that I am here referring to as self-segregation. This and the following chapter are structured such that what follows is a presentation of data organised to answer the research questions posed in chapter two. The presentation of data is accompanied with my interpretation of it. In doing this I have deliberately suspended theoretical and research work as much as possible. The main themes in the data are discussed alongside theory

\textsuperscript{16} Hereafter UCT.
and research in the discussion. The utility of this approach is it allows me to develop my voice in relation to the data.

Social genesis: Before the university

Opportunity structures\textsuperscript{17} and the exchange of thought and feeling

The following interview excerpts are of students whose friendship and/or acquaintanceship predate their university experience. The excerpts attempt to reconstruct the participants’ initial encounters. The reader may indeed find them long however, I have decided to keep them long in an attempt to retain and represent some of the context and content of contact and interaction which is often missing in mainstream intergroup contact. It is in this that we can begin to grasp the contextuality and meanings of intra and intergroup contact (Dixon et al., 2005). I also think that it is important to get a sense of initial intra- and intergroup encounters because it may be in these encounters that the possibility for future contact and the formation of relations is born or eliminated. The following excerpts thus give an impression of the thoughts and feelings exchanged by the participants during their initial encounters. In addition, we also get to have a sense of the role of contextuality or what I am here referring to as opportunity structures (McPherson et al., 2001). This is an aspect of contact that we have no control over but which, as the data will show, influences the formation of social relations.

\textsuperscript{17} The term, used here as a metaphor, is borrowed from Merton’s (1938) ‘Social Structure and Anomie’. Also see Merton (1959). By the term I mean primarily the various contexts of contact such as schools, neighborhoods, university residences, lecture halls, extracurricular activities etc. In chapter 7 I expand this understand.
Group 1

Buhle: Okay where did you meet?
Lerato: We met at the kitchenette; well I met them [referring to the other participants] at the kitchenette.
Nobuntu: We met her later on [pointing to Lerato], where did I meet you two?
Gugu: We met during “O” Week\textsuperscript{18}, do you remember? We were in the same group doing that treasure hunt thing.
Gugu: Yes, I met those two [pointing to Claris and Moba] last year at Stellenbosch
Buhle: What were you doing there at Stellenbosch?
Claris: No, they’re just Medical student, like when you apply there [the University of Stellenbosch] they picked 40 people that applied, then we met there and they showed us around and the whole medical campus in and around Cape Town and that was for how many days?
Moba: 3 or 4 days.
Buhle: So that is where the three [Gugu, Claris and Moba] of you guys met?
Moba and Gugu: Yes
Buhle: So coming here, you already get some kind of connection?
Claris: Yes
Buhle: And you [facing Lerato] didn’t know anybody amongst this group?
Lerato: Yes
Buhle: So you just met them where you usually hang out? The kitchenette?
Lerato: Yes
Buhle: And you Nobuntu also met before, or during O week?
Nobuntu: No, during O week, I just met everyone this year

\textsuperscript{18} Orientation Week. ‘Orientation is a set of programmes designed to introduce first-year students to the different facilities and unique aspects of university life. It usually begins with Parents’ Orientation, where the parents of new students are invited to familiarise themselves with the university. Each faculty also runs its own Orientation programme, as does the International Academic Programmes Office (IAPO). For students in residence, there is also a residence Orientation programme. Faculty Orientations include academic advice about courses and programmes, assessment tests and questionnaires, computer training, campus and library tours, as well as introductions to student services like the Careers Office, the Counselling Service and AIDS Community Educators (ACEs). During Orientation Week or "O" Week the more than 80 student clubs and societies also showcase their activities and invite students to join.’ (http://www.uct.ac.za/students/orientation/progs/)
**Group 2**

Buhle: Okay, where did you guys meet? Earlier on, of course, you were already starting to tell me how you met.

Msomi: I think she thinks that we met at DYC but I actually met her in the bus.

Lungi: Ya but I never talked to you.

Msomi: I think in the 8th grade, I get on the bus and…

Leko: Grade eight; we are not in America, grade eight.

Msomi: Sorry (short silence) grade eight (short silence) forgive me. In grade 8 I get on the bus and there she is with this pack of girls and I forgot what happened but it was something obviously embarrassing because then they started laughing at me and I was like ‘ahhh die!’ Then she is laughing and the point is that I remember that face and then all of a sudden I see her at DYC in the 10th grade…grade ten.

Leko: Well done.

Lungi and Msomi: [laughter]

Msomi: And it’s like ‘oh that’s her’.

Lungi: Oh really? Oh well, I just thought he looked familiar when I met him in the 10th grade [emphasis] at DYC. I thought he looked very familiar, I was ‘like ahh cause you take the same bus’ so I don’t remember the incident.

Buhle: Sorry but what is DYC?

Leko: Oh, the Durban Youth Council.

Buhle: Oh okay.

Lungi: And we were all on the Durban Youth Council and that is how we met Leko as well.

Leko: I was like the new kid on the block, I didn’t know anyone when I went to the Durban Youth Council and she was Mayor so I didn’t really speak to her at all.

Buhle: She was mayor?

Leko: Ya.

Leko: Ya I did not speak to this one [pointing to Lungi] at all.

Lungi: He was on…

Leko: It’s like a hierarchy thing…

Lungi: Oh come on! [Laughter]
Leko: No for real. She was like up there and I was like... [Laughter]

Msomi: Oh, don’t be like that. On paper it was like that but you could talk to anyone.

Leko: I don’t know I just never talked to you.

Lungi: It’s because we [referring to herself and Msomi] took the same bus and we went home together.

Leko: Ya, and then he was on my committee thing.

Msomi: Ya, we were on the same committee.

Leko: We were on the same committee but I still...

Buhle: You were in the same committee?

Msomi: It was like different portfolios.

Buhle: Portfolios? Oh, okay so it’s like a mock parliament, well provincial parliament.

Lungi: Ya but not politically affected.

Msomi: Ya, not politically inclined.

Leko: Ya, and even though he was on my committee we didn’t talk, we didn’t talk at all.

Msomi: We didn’t talk. Because I had my reservations about him [Leko laughs]

Buhle: Oh really?

Msomi: I had my preconceived ideas which were backed up. He even admitted them later on [Leko and Lungi laugh]

Msomi: I was like you little pretentious “teeeet” because he came with this whole like idea that he could fit in, he was trying so hard to fit in.

Buhle: In the council you mean?

Msomi: Not just in the council but around us, he is from Crawford and I guess being from Crawford, Crawford is a private school. Like really private, private school. Well there were quite a few up there schools like whatever, if you want to call it that but with you being from there you get this judgement like ‘oh you’re bourgeoisie or you think you’re better than us’. So I guess he thought that people would think that he was like that so he tried so hard (emphasis) to be like ‘I am down, down’.

Leko: No I wasn’t that bad. Was I that bad?

Lungi: Okay I really wouldn’t know [group laughter and over-speaking]

Leko: But anyway I don’t think I was like that.
Lungi: That’s how we met.
Leko: Ya that’s how we met.
Buhle: Okay so that’s how you met and clearly there is a lot of debate about that aspect anyway. I think what we can already establish is that you guys are all from Durban.
Group: Yes
Buhle: Okay so now you are also from different schools? Are the two of you [referring to Msomi and Lungi] from the same school?
Msomi and Lungi: No
Msomi: All three of us from different schools.
Buhle: Okay, you went to Crawford, am I right?
Leko: Ya Crawford, Durban North.
Buhle: And you went to?
Lungi: Durban Girls High.
Msomi: George Campbell[19].
Buhle: George Campbell. Alright and you were saying something about these schools being as a matter of fact middle or upper class schools?
Msomi: Ya, I mean if you go to a private school like College or something, people tend to believe that ‘okay you are clearly the upper crust of life and you probably wouldn’t treat other people the same way’. Like I don’t know, nicely I guess. I guess most people that I encounter are like ‘ah’, especially in Durban, ‘you’re from a White culture’ [said in isiZulu] and it’s like ‘what does that mean?’ and then all of a sudden they are like ‘just because you go to school here doesn’t mean you are better than us’ and you already have this preconceived idea that people think that you are better than them even though that’s not the case as we found out [pointing in Leko’s direction].

Group 3

Buhle: Now if I recall from our last conversation[20], you guys have been friends for quite a while now, is that so? Okay, so please tell me about that, please tell me how you met if you still remember.

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[19] These are all private schools that have featured in the Sunday Times Top 100 South African schools (see http://www.rghs.org.za/sites/default/files/top100schools09.pdf)
[20] This was a participant recruitment meeting.
Thwaro: That’s like a lifetime ago.
Lulama: We were in primary together, but we were not that close at all.
Lulama: And then in high school then we became friends [in grade 8] and from there on... We were five in a group or six and then...
Tshwaro: And then increased and then we went back to five at some point.
Masego: And then to six. We stayed at six.
Buhle: Yeah and what happened to the other three?
Lulama: They are in other universities.
Buhle: So you guys have known each other for close to what 7 years, that’s quite a long time, no?
Masego: We have known each other, like known the other one exists for about 11 years, friends for about 6 years.
Buhle: Okay, so tell me a little bit then about how, how did you cross that bridge from knowing that you exist to actually becoming friends? Do you guys still remember?
Masego: [Laughs] I remember it quite clearly.
Buhle: Please, share with me.
Tshwaro: Sure, go ahead. Knock yourself out.
Masego: I wouldn’t say I was forced to be [laughs], to uhm, but I was part of another group of friends, I think we all were part of a different group of friends in primary school. And the different group of friends I was part of we all did come to the same high school, but we just, I guess we grew apart because we just didn’t share the same views on life values and stuff like that. Because I think when you’re a child anything goes, you know, ya okay we make fun of other children, ya, that’s what you do, but when you hit 13 you think of, you know, what am I doing and I found myself at that place, I think we all did, and they decided to go along with how they were in primary school and I was like ‘No, I want a new start, I wanna do things differently’. And ya, I was on my own for I think about two months and then I started befriending, I think she’s like the main character in our friendship and her name is Masego as well and she’s in, I think Vaal University [over-speak] Vaal Campus, and then ya, and they, she became friends with them and then she kind of brought us together. Ya, that’s what happened.
Common among all three accounts is the sharing of contextual frames or ‘opportunity structures’ (McPherson et al., 2001) (Durban Youth Council, Health Sciences Orientation at Stellenbosch University, and the same secondary school) as a prerequisite for social contact and interaction\(^\text{21}\). On its own, the fact of shared opportunity structures reminds us that our lives unfold within institutional contexts as frames for our experiences and their meanings. Group 2 offers some noteworthy points. Leaving aside the incident of Msomi’s and Lungi’s first encounter in the bus while in grade 8 and what each made of it, the point is that they shared the bus between home and school for two years (between grades 8 and 10) without an acquaintanceship developing between them. Indeed, many contingent factors may have prevented the development of acquaintanceship. Similarly Leko and Msomi were in the same committee but did not interact; Leko and Lungi saw each other at Durban Youth Council (DYC) and initially did not interact. Thus, the first point to note which is well supported by common sense, is that the *sharing of (or frequent contact within) an opportunity structure is necessary but not sufficient for the possibility of acquaintanceship development*. It is however, interesting to note that the increase of shared opportunity structures and thus the multiplicity of points of contact may activate new possibilities for interaction. For example, Msomi and Lungi begin to interact in grade 10 when in addition to taking the bus together they are also now both members of DYC. This is not to suggest that they started interacting because of DYC but rather that this fact added a new common context between them and by extension the possibility that

\[^\text{21}\] I use *contact* to refer to the sharing of physical space between people that engenders a sense of familiarity by fact of frequently encounter each other. On the other hand, I use *interaction* to refer to the exchange of thoughts and feelings between people. Thus, people can be in contact but not necessarily in interaction.
they may actually share other commonalities such as interests, beliefs and opinions. The second point to note then is that when people share *multiple opportunity structures that are part of their daily routines this may increase the possibility that they will move from contact to interaction*. Common experience also supports this observation. For instance, people who may only ever meet in the workplace seem to have restricted contact and interaction while those who meet at work, the gym, the dance class and the pub seem to have more chances for contact and interaction.

It seems a small leap from frequent contact and more importantly shared activities to interaction. Still we should not lose sight of the salience of the original context of contact which in new contexts may give people a sense of familiarity. That is, old/original spaces and places of contact may serve as surrogates for commonality in a new and/or different context. Faced with the task of meeting new people in a new context the recognition of someone familiar holds the promise of the least effort to be expended in creating a social connection. This logic can be extended to the case of group 1 where three of its members (Claris, Moba and Gugu) met the previous year at Stellenbosch University and by work of chance were all admitted to UCT. The fact that they met and spent a few days together the previous year cannot be overlooked in an attempt to understand how they have come to be a group of friends in this new environment. The same is true for groups 2 and 3 and as is evident, group 3 entered UCT with a six year friendship history. The point about opportunity structures is that they do not impose relationships upon people but may suggest them and provide a platform for their actualisation. In this, we find both the role and limitation of opportunity structures.
The influence of human psychology in the relationships that form within opportunity structures should enrich our investigation of self-segregation. The excerpts above give us intimations of some of the psychological processes at play. In her account, Masego in group 3 suggests a reflective process in which she felt a disconnection in life views and values with her primary school friends, leading to a split in the friendship. She gives the impression that in what was then a new context (secondary school) she wanted to be different and to do things differently. We can from this speculate that the new acquaintanceship and later friendship that developed with Lulama, Tshwaro and others had something to do with the perception of shared life views and values. Leko perceived a hierarchical relation between himself and Lungi, with Lungi being in a position of higher status (Mayor). The distance between them may not have only been positional power but also emotional and psychological. Msomi who was in the same committee with Leko perceived him as pretentious and trying too hard to fit in and for a while the two did not develop an acquaintanceship. Taking this together we arrive at the third point which highlights the role of individual perception in initial social encounters. Masego perceived a commonality of life views and values between her and the people who later became her friends; Leko perceived status difference between him and Lungi; while Msomi perceived Leko to be pretentious. These initial perceptions of the ‘other’ influenced, even if temporarily, the nature or ‘spirit’ of the participants’ initial contact and interaction (see Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).

Psychological perception however, does not appear to obey the personal-social conceptual that we often make either for conceptual clarity or out the habit of dualist thinking. It appears that
in its practical everyday use psychological perception collapses the distinction. Masego may have perceived the values and views of her potential friends as their personal qualities. Msomi, on the other hand, imposes his preconceived ideas on Leko, based on the fact that the latter attended Crawford College. Crawford College in this instance is a surrogate for a social class category and a host of attitudes and behaviours which in Msomi’s perception and/or experiences are attributable to members of this category. What follows from this is a reading of Leko’s actions as pretentious, which can also be seen as a judgement of his character. Interestingly both Msomi and Leko were attending what they describe as middle class private schools. Yet Leko’s school is perceived by Msomi to be in the upper cluster of private schools. Msomi is making an in-category class distinction and perceives a class distance between him and Leko. Consequently, the ‘fact of Blackness’\(^{22}\), and being in the same committee and council seem to become insignificant common properties between them. On the other hand, finer class distinction is accentuated as a significant difference. In this, not only has a social category been personalised, it is a marker of distinction inaugurating a social and emotional distance between people in the same opportunity structure.

Returning now to the practice of self-segregation, we can take note of the following. First, the initiation and development of social and emotional bonds between young adults appears to be one of the key psychosocial drivers of self-segregation. The influence of shared opportunity structures is found in frequent contact and in turn the multiplicity of shared opportunity structures increases the possibility of interaction and thus the chance for the initiation of social

\(^{22}\) To borrow a chapter title from Frantz Fanon’s (1967, 1986) ‘Black skin, white masks’.
ties. This however, does not suggest that social ties do not form in the absence of shared multiple opportunity structures. Second, because self-segregation is recognisable and condemned on the basis of social categories, we ought to guard against the intuitive thought that the sharing of social group identities would lead to an easy formation of interpersonal and social relations. To the contrary, what is evident from the above data is that psychological identification despite shared identity markers is liable to psychological negotiation. Third, we need to guard against a rigid conceptualisation of the already problematic dualities of the social and personal; and the psychological and social. Such distinctions are the ‘things of logic’ in theoretical discourse and not the ‘logic of things’ in the practicalities of social relations.\footnote{This line of thought is borrowed from Bourdieu (1980), who in turn borrowed it from Marx, who criticised Hegel for ‘taking the things of logic for the logic of things’ (p. 63).} In practice people may deduce personal attributes from social markers and the reverse. Fourth, taking all this together we should recognise that there are students who enter the university context with existing social bonds, the character and history of which can be expected to influence the formation, if at all, of new social ties.

**On entering the university**

*Chance and opportunity structures*

We have already seen in group 1 that Moba, Claris and Gugu met briefly the previous year at Stellenbosch University. The two additional members (Nobuntu and Lerato) met each other and the other three group members at UCT. The fact that they are part of this study tells us that
in addition to applying to Stellenbosch University they also applied for admission to the UCT.

From this the work of chance is seen in two movements: First, the Stellenbosch encounter, and second, being admitted to study at UCT. What we see below are further two instances of chance.

*Group 1*

Claris: Hold on I just want (unclear)... We met just before we went to thingy right? To Long Street.

Nobuntu: No [group laughter]

Claris: It was way before then?

Nobuntu: Ya, because we live on the same block remember? And weren’t you in the same group as me for treasure hunt? Ugh!

Overtalking: Ya, we were all in the same group

Moba: We all live on the same floor.

Buhle: Oh, you all live on the same floor? Oh nice. Okay. Now this seems to be a trend. I think the group that was here before you guys, I think they all live on the same block, if I’m not mistaken. And certainly the larger group that I had first, they certainly most of them share the same floor. So, this is interesting, this thing with friends sharing floors.

Moba: Ya, but this was a coincidence [over talking].

Claris: This (emphasis) was a coincidence.

Buhle: What was a coincidence?

Moba: Ya, because when you got here on the first day, it was like this bowl with like room numbers, and then you picked out your room number.

Moba and Claris: So, it just happened.

Nobuntu: I met you guys before I actually knew they were on my floor.

Nobuntu: So I met them then we kind of started talking. And then I got out one day and there she was standing and it was like, ‘oh you live here’.

Claris: So we knew each other...so we picked those things, right and we got our places but then we knew each other before that.
Buhle: Oh, so it was just a coincidence that you met... okay, that you had met before and then you stayed in the same corridor not that you stayed in the same corridor then met. ) No, that’s thank you for that clarification actually. I almost made a wrong conclusion.

Claris: So the coincidence was very high that we met... [Over-talking]
Moba: Yes, yes...

Group 2
This is the group of friends who met at the Durban Youth Council. Here too the fact that they all were admitted to UCT suggests the work of chance. Although this information does not come up in any of the interviews it is noteworthy that Msomi and Leko live in the same residence and that Lungi stays in a residence approximately one kilometre away. It is also noteworthy that Msomi and Lungi have been friends for a while and that Leko has been more of an acquaintance up until now.

Buhle: So let me just get this straight. You guys in any event knew each other prior to UCT although you wouldn’t say you were friends necessarily and this goes for the three of you?
Lungi: Oh we were friends [referring to Msomi and herself].
Msomi: Ya, we were friends though.
Buhle: So you guys were friends even before coming to UCT?
Msomi: Ya.
Lungi: Ya we were friends.
Buhle: Now was the decision to come to UCT, specifically for the two of you, a conscious one that you guys made? Or was it something that somehow was a work of chance that the three of you ended up here at UCT?
Msomi: No, I wouldn’t say chance but then it wasn’t a conscious decision of because she is going there I should go there or because he is going there I should go there. It was just like he had his personal reasons for going there, she had her personal reasons and I had my personal reasons.
Buhle: But certainly UCT was a choice anyway?
Lungi: Ya. I think most people chose UCT because it is the best institution in the country. It is an added bonus that your friends are also going so I think you feel like it’s the best decision because it’s the best apparently and your friends are going. So ja, UCT.

Buhle: So was that the reasoning to come to UCT?

Msomi: I also ran away from home straight up.

Lungi: Because it’s the best institution.

Leko: I got a scholarship and I have always thought I was a Cape Town person so here I am.

Group 3

Buhle: And you guys were friends until you left high school and then the other friend, Masego went to the University of the North West and you guys came here. So, so you guys knew that you were coming here all along, you knew in high school that you were all coming here or was it by chance that you ended up here at UCT, the three of you?

Masego: By chance...?

Masego: I don’t understand what you mean? [Group laughter]

Buhle: So did you guys consciously decide to apply to come here to UCT together?

Lulama: Together like, friends, we all applied to UCT?

Group: No [laughter]

Buhle: How did that happen?

Masego: I think in matric you just apply, and wherever you get in, you get in. And since this is the best university, you know everyone...

Buhle: So the three of you, of course applied to come here?

Masego: As one of the options, and then we took the best one.

Buhle: Alright, and you also happened to apply to come to this residence?

Group: No

Masego: No, you don’t apply for residences.

Buhle: Oh, so it was pure coincidence that you all ended up here.
There emerges from these excerpts a sense of continuation of relationships whose life, as we have seen, began prior to UCT. When this observation is related to self-segregation it seems plausible to argue that the latter is partly a function of the continuation of pre-existing friendship and acquaintanceship ties. The condition of possibility for the continuation of social bonds within the new university context largely comes down to chance rather than the strategic actions of participants. The diversity of reasons that participants offer for choosing UCT over other institutions cannot account for the fact that they were admitted at UCT. It is well known that admission into university is characterised by high competition for a limited number of places in academic programmes. Thus, not all those who apply are admitted. Here, however, we have a situation where friends and acquaintances are admitted not only to the same university but in some instances to the same academic programmes, residences (or residences close to each other), and the same block or corridor of rooms in a residence. This is particularly striking as a work of chance because the various university administrators in the Admissions Office where the application process begins to the residences where room allocation takes place do not know anything about the existing social ties between students. Group 1 suggests an attempt at random room allocation, the surprising outcome of which we find in their account.

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24 I use the term ‘chance’ here without intending to invoke or make claims based on Probability Theory. It is simply to say that the eventuality of the participants being placed in close proximity/same opportunity structure was not of their making and although things could have turn out otherwise they turned out this way.

25 This insight is gained from my interviews with the Director of the Admissions Office, and residence sub-wardens who are responsible for allocating students into rooms.
What is theoretically interesting in this is what is accomplished by chance. Chance drastically reduces the physical space between the participants by locating them within the same institutional context in which their lives unfold. What were once dispersed individual paths of daily living and occasional crisscrossing (in varying degrees) are now structurally consolidated. Consequently, this significantly increases the frequency of contact and interaction compared to what it was prior to university. The benefit of spatial proximity is found in that social agents need not invest a great deal of time and effort for contact and interaction. The effect is the possibility of the processes of continuation of social relations initiated elsewhere. From this viewpoint and up to this point, self-segregation within the university would appear to be anything but the strategic design of the participants.

(Contextual transition:

_Psycho-emotive bond, psycho-social labour and the spaces of friendships_

The foregoing exploration has begun to trace the social trajectory of the participants from their home-worlds into the university. The focus has been to reconstruct their initial encounters prior to and at university and in this also highlighting the place and role of the structural, social and psychological dimensions. In this subsection the focus is on the transition to university and the influence of existing psychological and emotional bonds (psycho-emotive bonds)\(^\text{26}\) between the

\(^{26}\) By psych-emotive bonds I mean psychological identification as outlined in Social identity Theory (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and emotional attachment as two sides of social identification. These bonds find their source in collectively created and shared experiences, emotions and memories that work like a membrane that binds social agents and simultaneously, even if inadvertently, seals them off from other people.
participants who enter the university either as friends or acquaintances. These psycho-emotive bonds come with crucial benefits as we shall see. Participants who enter the university without friends have to undertake the work of developing friendships which I call psycho-social labour\textsuperscript{27}. Lastly, in this subsection we also begin to understand that not all friendships are equal. Some are lived in emotionally invested spaces while others are not and it is at this point that the issue of ‘race’ explicitly enters the picture.

\textit{Group 3}

Buhle: And what’s your experience been like? You wanted to say something?

Tshwaro: No, I was just saying socially, we’ve become more than just friends to being sisters, this is like, this is our family right here, this is my family. Yeah.

Buhle: And what has made that possible, what has made you regard your friends as more than just friends, as family?

Tshwaro: As sisters, I think, you don’t have a choice [laughter] to make them your sisters.

Buhle: Okay. Would you say the same thing?

Masego: Definitely. I think you meet different kinds of people here, and they find you where you are, you know. And you’re going through this transition thing and that’s all they know, but to know that there’s a group of people who know you

\textsuperscript{27} By this term I mean the psychological and social aspects of all the effort and time invested in the initiation, development and maintenance of social relations. The concept of psycho-social labour is put to use a great deal in this work and it is important to spell out its relation to the literature that has investigated the efforts involved as a condition of possibility for positive intergroup encounters. This literature has brought to our attention the obstacles of miscommunications through signal gestures (Vorauer & Sakamoto, 2006); delayed audiovisual feedback as opposed as opposed to real life conversations (Person et al., 2008). Other work has revealed divergent impression management goals—being respected versus being liked (Bergsieker, Shelton & Richeson, 2010); and interracial contact concerns—appearing prejudiced, experiencing prejudice and confirming prejudiced stereotypes (Kamans, Gordijn, Oldenhuis & Otten, 2009; Richeson & Shelton, 2007; Shelton, Richeson & Shelton, 2006). All these issues are obstacles to positive intergroup encounters and the possibility of intergroup friendship formation and require effort to overcome them. In the present work the term psycho-social labour would include all these issues and extend beyond them to include: the investment of time and effort, the courage to step out of the familiar, the courage to face the possibility of being vulnerable, and the courage and resolve not to recoil into habitual, stereotyping and stereotype affirming practices when faced with challenges during intergroup encounters.
outside of this, you know, um, it’s comforting, you know. I might not be doing well right now at school, or whatever, but I know that my friends who know me, and in ah, in a sense they have faith in me, you know, I can go to them, and they can tell me, girl we know you can do this. But the people who don’t know you, they pick up from what they can see and they work on that. You know, so, I think we’re family because we’ve been through so much together, we’ve watched each other grow and we know which buttons to press if something goes wrong, you know. So, so that’s why it’s family, I think that’s it because it’s like having brothers and sisters at home because they know, if things are not going well they know exactly what to do for things to get better. And I, I couldn’t have asked for a better, um, people to share this with, it’s really cool

Buhle: Anything else you want to add, Lulama, to that?

Lulama: No, no, everything she said is [pause] is absolutely true, it’s absolutely true.

Tshwaro: Okay, um, when I came here [UCT], I was really antisocial. Like, I, I couldn’t bear the thought of having to start all over from scratch, like new people, make them understand me. ‘cause I, I cry, I can cry here and then Masego, they won’t stare because they know I cry, and then now I’d have to explain to them [group laughter] you know I’m like this, and so I wouldn’t like to go through that ... So, I couldn’t, I didn’t want to go through that, I couldn’t bear to, to start [unclear], so it’s comforting to have people who know you, who understand you.

Tshwaro: Ya, I was saying, at least when you start from scratch here [UCT] when you have someone who knows you, it’s not like a very clean slate; you know that you have something to build up on. So it’s better to find new friends, when you know that, that if they don’t understand you, you can say ‘wait a minute’ and then you can go to friends who truly understand you.

From Masego’s account it is possible to construct a sense of the mood and feeling of ‘going through this transition thing’. With caution, one can invoke Goffman’s (1961, p.25) concept of a ‘civilian death’ that he used to describe the stripping away of the sense of individuality from people who enter total institutions such as psychiatric clinics and prisons. Here the case is not that extreme and instead we may want to speak of liminal identities to suggest an experience of having left the familiarity of the home-world and all its identity anchors (the experiences, people, places and routines through which our identities are formed and performed) and
entering a new institutional context in which we have not created a social existence. Attached to the sense of liminality is anxiety that one will be misperceived to be someone contrary to one’s self-image. This feeling is aptly captured in these words: ‘and you’re going through this transition thing and that’s all they know.... the people who don’t know you, they pick up from what they can see and they work on that.’ Thus, transition here represents both a sense of being out of place and an attempt to be physically and psychologically in place. On this backdrop what is of interest is the psychological safeguard offered by the fact of entering the university context with existing friendships. The existing friendship operates out of what I have called a *psycho-emotive bond*. This is what allows Tshwaro to say ‘...it’s comforting to have people who know you, who understand you.’ Put differently, the existing friendship moderates the experience of liminality because one believes that they are in the presence of people who know and understand them. In this sense old friends are like a piece of the home-world in a new context accounting for the psychological and emotional feeling of comfort. To use a metaphor, we can say that for these students the psychological, social and emotional umbilical cord that binds them remains intact in spite of the present change in institutional context. Perhaps less of a metaphor is the use of the words ‘sisters’ and ‘family’ by the participants to refer to the various ways in which their friendship has evolved in the context of their present experiences.

Tshwaro remarks ‘...I couldn’t bear the thought of having to start all over from scratch, like new people, make them understand me.’ Yet it is precisely because of what I call psycho-social *labour* that she and her friends are exempt from because they enter the university as a group of
friends. Her remark is therefore better taken as a retrospective realisation of the benefit of going through this transitory experience with her friends. As she herself acknowledges ‘…at least when you start from scratch here when you have someone who knows you, it’s not like a very clean slate; you know that you have something to build up on.’ The exemption from psycho-social labour is a benefit emanating from a collective psycho-emotive bond which is a component and outcome of a close friendship tie.

In reaction to the sense of liminality the psycho-emotive bond may have the effect of strengthening social bonds between participants making their friendship a semi-closed entity that confirms and grounds their home imported self-images in a new environment. Masego put it this way,

...you get to university and you get people acting so differently and you hear, you know, whoever wasn’t like this at home and now they’ve come here and they’ve changed, and they’re like this and this and now I know that my sisters are here and I can’t do that, not that I want to, but they kind of keep me in check... I think it takes longer even to find your place, ah, at University because you feel like [sigh] you, you don’t have to explain yourself to anyone, you can do whatever, you can do your own thing, but when you have people who are from home they can come and you can talk about it, and then you keep grounded, they keep you grounded, the people that you know. It’s like coming here with your parents...

This last point should also serve as a guard against the overly romanticised view that coming to university is a fresh start. The context and the experiences it brings may be new for these students but their social bond has a history and their present experiences are the latest addition to their evolving relationship and social trajectory. The social context has shifted and
social relations have remained approximately unchanged. Here is an account from group 3 that corroborates with Masego’s view,

Lungi: Ya but I think the other day, I don’t know who mentioned it but it was like ‘oh we are meant to be starting fresh here at UCT’ but then you are actually, it was Saturday in fact, you sit back and you realise I haven’t started fresh. The girl I was talking to, she went to the same school for thirteen years, a girls school for thirteen years, been in the same class with some people for thirteen years and now ten of them are in her class again now still doing the same degree so they have been together for literally like their whole lives. She was saying that actually it’s not a fresh start because everyone is here and it’s just really carrying on living in a different place. I don’t think I have made a fresh start here because I have still got my same people. It’s people that I knew. As much as I have met some people, not necessarily completely a fresh start, it’s like continuing just in a different place.

In such a constellation of relations and experiences it is plausible that those who may be allowed to join the existing friendship group at this point will in all likelihood be perceived to confirm the friendship group’s (or acquaintanceship) identity on a number of personal and social dimensions. To give weight to this postulation and to those made above let us consider the slightly different case of group two.

Group 2

It will be remembered that in this group Lungi and Msomi have been friends for some time prior to coming to UCT and it seems that they are both part of a larger network of friends admitted to study at UCT. Leko, on the other hand has hitherto been an acquaintance.

Buhle: Okay, so I am interested to know up to now, at least, how would you describe your transition and your adjustment into UCT particularly academically how are you finding it and socially how is it going?

Lungi: Socially it hasn’t been that much of a transition for me because my good friends are here and with my good friends our groups has just gone a little bit bigger
but we basically all knew each other. So everyone I am friends with, everyone I can say really is my friend, I think 98% of them I knew before I came to UCT so it hasn’t been that much of a transition. With regards to everyone else around me like with residence and stuff, even though we are not really close, I haven’t had a problem getting along with people. You don’t necessarily say I want to be your friend; I want to have that close relationship with you. I know that happens naturally but I haven’t had much of a problem adjusting socially. The transition, I haven’t felt it really.

Leko: I felt the transition a lot. Most of my close friends from back in Durban didn’t come to UCT. It’s not a bad thing at all, I am fine with that. A lot of my friends didn’t come here and then I feel I was the only one out of my friendship circle therefore forcing me to get to know more people and I think I automatically just jumped into his friendship circle and I don’t see it as a bad transition.

Buhle: Okay. I want to come back to a point you are raising in a sec.

Msomi: I feel totally the same way as her because I mean most of the people that came down here I knew and it was pretty much a matter of ‘okay you’re here so it’s all good’. Haven’t had to...you know, I would see myself a social person, I like talking to people etc. [group laughter]. So I don’t mind making friends [group laughter]. I don’t mind making friends so I make friends. I have made friends, extra friends but it hasn’t been that much of a problem. I don’t have much of a problem adapting in terms of socially.

What Lungi and Msomi are saying supports the postulations above on *psycho-emotive bond* and *psycho-social labour*. Their accounts also support the claim about the continuation of social bonds whose genesis and trajectory predates a life at UCT. Leko’s case is interesting because he is exempt from psycho-social labour through his acquaintanceship with Lungi and Msomi that gives him access to Msomi and Lungi’s friendship circle. However, even with this *acquaintanceship benefit* Leko is not free from all psycho-social labour precisely because as he put it ‘A lot of my friends didn’t come here and then I feel I was the only one out of my friendship circle *therefore forcing me to get to know more people*’. The issue at hand becomes clear when his statement is juxtaposed with Lungi’s statement ‘Socially it hasn’t been that much
of a transition for me because my good friends are here and with my good friends our group has just gone a little bit bigger but we basically all knew each other’, on the one hand. And Msomi’s account ‘I feel totally the same way as her because I mean most of the people that came down here I knew…’, on the other hand. Taken together this suggests that students who enter the university with existing friendship have an advantage that exempts them from the psycho-social labour of forming new friendships. This point is further illustrated below.

Buhle: Okay but before we get into the academic discussion, I want to get back to what Leko, what you were saying a minute ago and that is something about the fact you came to UCT but not with your whole entourage of friends as it were and how that in a sense although you say it has not been a challenge in adjusting socially but you do seem to be suggesting that the fact that you came here alone has had implications in terms of making friends. Would you like to say something?

Leko: No I just feel like even last year, when you are still in matric you like hear your friends ‘I’m going to this place whatever’. Automatically I think at the end of the year I started realising ‘oh my gosh I am going to be alone’ because they were all going to different places themselves and they seemed all excited about it. I was like ‘okay cool I am going to UCT’; they all hated it by the way. Then I felt like ‘damn I am going to be by myself’ but when I got here I think the implication of it was just that I had to open up more if you get what I mean. I had to be more open to meeting new people.

Lungi: Ya, I think had I come alone I think I would be closer to other people. But because I came with my friends I didn’t see the need to actually make the effort to make good friends with other people and I think that is an implication of coming with your circle of close friends because you know that you already have people to rely on. They are already here so as much as I am a social person but I am not the kind of person to go around making close friends with everyone. My circle of close friends has never been very big so I am comfortable with the people I have and I haven’t tried to make it any bigger and I think that’s just because I came with my friends.

Msomi: I feel exactly the same way I feel because I would normally go out and try to make friends with almost everybody, that’s what I do. If I knew that I didn’t have these guys with me I would be like I will tackle this whole world and they will all be my friends, that is what I would do but because I knew these guys were here, I didn’t have to necessarily try so hard. I would just be like ‘okay you happen to be in
the same place as I am so maybe I will try to make friends with you but I am not going out of my way as I normally would have if they weren’t here.

We can deduce from this a conceptual and psychological distinction between students who enter the university with friends and those who do not. The former may be said to be in a psychological comfort zone that distances them from the urgency and necessity to form new social relations in a new institutional environment. This is why we find Tshwaro saying ‘...it’s comforting to have people who know you, who understand you...’ and Lungi and Msomi’s views above. From this also comes support for the postulation that pre-existing friendship ties are semi-closed. If group members are doing very little or nothing to make new friends at a time when other students are doing exactly this, the group and/or its members may be perceived as semi-closed to the possibility of new friends. The latter group who come to university without friends can be said to be in a psychological discomfort zone that presses upon them the urgency and necessity to be part of a social network. Therefore, to avoid a ‘social death’ and a psychological discomfort—‘Then I felt like ‘damn I am going to be myself...’— psycho-social labour must be performed—‘...but when I got here I think the implication of it was just that I had to open up more... I had to be more open to meeting new people’

Lastly, and in the light of the above discussion it may be helpful to address the question: what are friendship groups and how do they relate to the practice of self-segregation? I suggested in the introduction that it is useful to think of human relations in terms of space and time and at this juncture we can invoke the concept of space as a metaphor. In doing this we can then think of the student friendship groups observed above as emergent and collectively created
psychological and emotional relations of proximity between the participants. Yet as we have seen that in the formation of friendship ties the distinction between the personal and social is often blurred as they are put to use for particular ends. Thus, friendship groups embody both interpersonal and social relations. The latter, when in the form of visible markers of identity (e.g. skin colour) - which are also the most controversial - tend to caricaturise self-segregation and hide from view equally salient processes like the performance of psycho-social labour. On this view of friendship groups we can begin to see self-segregation as being partly the voluntary creation of psychological, emotional and social relations of proximity between people.

*On ‘race’ and class*

One of the striking features of human life is the extent to which it is organised on the principle of division or classification applied to things and people. This principle appears to have a double but integrated logic. On the one hand, there is what has been called ‘Cartesian dualism’, the logic of which is comparable to what Bourdieu (1979) calls a ‘network of oppositions’—‘...between high (sublime, pure) and low (vulgar, modest), fine (elegant) and coarse (heavy, fat), free and forced, broad and narrow, unique (rare, exclusive and common (ordinary, routine)…’ (p. 468). Forms of identity also fall within this network such that we have man and woman, heterosexual and homosexual, and so forth. On the other hand, the categorisation of things and people is almost always accompanied by an unequal distribution of resources and privileges or simply power. For example, heterosexual and especially hegemonic heterosexual men have
access to a range of privileges that homosexual and non-hegemonic men do not. Yet, when compared to most women homosexual men may have access to privileges that women do not. This principle of categorisation which is in effect a drawing of boundaries extends to almost anything that can be called a social category. It could be argued that categorisation helps to organise the world but categorisation is not unproblematic and perhaps most of our social and political problems arise from the exercise of power that comes with categorisation. As Bourdieu put it, the network of oppositions “is a matrix of all the commonplaces which find such ready acceptance because behind them lies the whole social order…the opposition between the dominant and the dominated” (ibid).

‘Race’ and class are examples of the many tools of categorisation of the world. The former is deduced and elaborated on the basis of the skin colours of human bodies and the latter from the conditions and resources (forms of power and privileges) that support and shape the existence of these bodies. ‘Race’ and class have a cyclical relationship that is historical, political and psychological. On its own, skin colour is as good as dead flesh. What injects life into skin colour and thus the idea of different ‘races’ is, firstly, the distribution of the conditions (material, symbolic, social and economic) that support the existence and life opportunities of human bodies. Second are the emergent thoughts and feelings (psychology), partly a consequence of the body-materiality relation. Ironically, it is also a particular type of psychology that sets this whole process in motion. In South Africa under the spell of colonial and apartheid psychology what are called black bodies were generally attended by conditions of inequalities,
injustices, trauma, displacement, violation, overcrowding and unemployment. Thus, the thoughts and feelings that defined the experience of Blackness in the world as characterised for example, by disease, violence, crime, the breakdown of families and alcohol abuse, were not without their structural underpinning. Consequently, black bodies came to stand for all that was made possible by the conditions of their existence and the accompanying thought and feeling. By contrast white bodies and the experience of Whiteness was characterised by conditions of privilege, security, wealth accumulation and land appropriation. Consequently, white bodies stood for all that was progressive, intelligent, refined, correct, upward, objective, virtuous, scientific, moral and rational. These are of course, ‘pictures of reality’ and social relations produced and maintained by a specific logic of categorisation and power. This means that while these pictures may capture something of the reality of things they are also a simplification of things.

We should not be satisfied with only the spelling out of ‘race’ and class as divisions of the world because gender, sexual orientation, disability, age, nationality, language and so forth are all divisions and visions of the world. ‘Race’ and class are given premium over other dividers of the social world because, as we observed in chapter one, they were the ‘flagship projects’ of both colonial and apartheid eras that the present democratic dispensation and its own flagship projects are attempting to transcend. This means that of all the principles of division, ‘race’ and class in South Africa are probably the most power-saturated and most difficult to change. Thus,

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28 See Chapter 1.
29 ‘A picture of reality’ according to Wittgenstein is a “theoretical representation which has lost its representational status and has been reified into a peculiarly compelling portrayal of the essence of some phenomenon (Pleasants, 1999, p. 3).
changes in ‘race’ and class relations are taken as important indices of social change in South Africa.

The tendency in academic works to use as explanations the very things that need to be explained has frequently been observed and lamented (see Bunge, 2006). For example, in a study on self-segregation it may be reported that ‘race’ and class are key determinants of self-segregation and thus the obstacles to the formation of diverse social bonds between people. What we are not told is how ‘race’ and class become obstacles or how ‘race’ and class are practically used by participants in the initiation and maintenance of social relations. We therefore learn very little about the operations of ‘race’ and class in social relations. In this section I attempt to explore the thoughts, feelings and actions relating to ‘race’ and class that are exchanged between participants within friendship groups. In this the hope is to reveal how ‘race’ and class manifest in social relations. Put differently, the attempt is to show the psychology of ‘race’ and class in friendship bonds and its influence on self-segregation.

Group 1

Buhle: Okay, now do you have in your group of friends do you have ah, friends from other racial groups as part of your group?

Claris: Oh you mean like this in group, or separate from?

Buhle: I meant in this group, in this particular group of friends.

Nobuntu: I think, basically it’s just one of those, I spend, ‘cause I spend most of my time here in residence, I spend most of my time with them, they’re my immediate group of friends ‘cause we’re here in residence together. But like when I go to main campus I’ve got like other friends. Like I make friends with a lot of Indians, White people [over-speak], like I’ve got lots of other friends. But they’re [referring to the present group] like the main friends because we live together.

Group: Yes
Buhle: Do you guys agree?
Group: Yes.

*Group 2*

Buhle: So tell me this then; what would say is the racial profile of your friendship groups? Do you have Indian, White friends?
Msomi: In our groups?
Lungi: Predominantly black [Lungi and Leko laugh]
Msomi: They’re all Black. But here is the thing.
Buhle: What’s the thing?
Msomi: Externally for me, a lot of my other friends are actually White.
Buhle: What do you mean externally?
Msomi: Like you see I hang with them but I mean like how do I explain this?
Leko: When you’re not around us.
Msomi: Ya, when I’m not around them my other friends that I do have are also White and they are Coloured.
Buhle: Where do you usually hang out with these friends?
Msomi: Normally at campus or wherever I see them, if I see them, I stop and talk to them etc. I am also going to meet this one chick, Nicole, I am supposed to meet her this week but we will see. But you know like...
Buhle: Okay, I get you, what you are saying we may call your close or core group of friends...
Leko: They are predominantly Black.

Let us refer to the friendship groups involved in this study as the participants’ *primary* friendships. This is because at the time of their recruitment there existed between them developed or developing psycho-emotive relations of proximity. The fact that all these groups are composed of the same racial group members may seem un-alarming if we argue that they entered the university already in this composition. That is, we could argue that these students
simply reproduce or continue the same social relations they have had prior to university. Even if this social and psychological reproduction argument is plausible it is still necessary to show, as much as possible, its social dimension and how it relates to the psychological. Let us then, for sake of conceptual clarity argue that the foregoing arguments have been purely psychological, arguing only for psychological and emotional proximity between people and nothing of their social characteristics.

Let us in turn be alarmed by the fact that these participants’ primary friendship group members are not predominantly Black, as Msomi suggests, but are all Black. For Nobuntu and her friends the absence of ‘racial others’ in their primary friendship group can be explained by the fact that they spend most of their time together in residence. This once again suggests the importance of shared physical space as we will recall that this group (group 1) of friends lives in the same corridor and not only in the same residence. Thus their proximity is both psycho-emotive and physical, suggesting the least effort and time needed to sustain the relationship. We could provisionally argue then that a combination of non-psychological factors made it such that the composition of this friendship had the probability of being same-race members only.

There is also here the presence of what I call secondary friendship groups. These are the friends with whom interaction is confined to university campuses (and when primary friends are not present or available) and who are also of different racial identities than the participants. On the one hand, this can be taken as an indication that friendship groups are a part of larger social networks and that friendship group members in different contexts may move between groups that are part of their social network. If we remain with the issue of ‘race’ however, the racial
profile of primary and secondary friendships becomes theoretically intriguing. Students who stay in university residences soon come to refer to residences as ‘home’ and hence a private/personal space. The terms home and residence become interchangeable such that it is common to hear students saying for example, ‘I am going back home after the lecture’. Sometimes this causes confusion and clarification is needed. For example, student 1: ‘I am going back home after the lecture’. Student 2: ‘You’re going home?’ Student 1: ‘Home as in residence.’ Student 2: ‘Oh, I’m staying on campus because I still have a tutorial’. This emotional attachment to the halls of residence should not come as a surprise because in effect these students undertake a significant number of daily living activities in residence such as meals (that are often taken with friends), sleeping, socialising, studying and a range of other activities arranged by the student leadership structures in the residence. This is the reason I referred to the university as a semi-total institution. In comparison then, residence can be taken as a private space that has more emotional significance for the students while campus may represent a public space in which academic activities are undertaken with correspondingly less emotional investment. Against this backdrop, the different spaces of primary and secondary friendships suggest different degrees of psycho-emotive proximity within friendships. The racial profiles of primary and secondary friendships further suggest that participants feel emotionally and psychologically closer to members of their own racial group. Even if provisionally, this suggests a conceptual relation between racial identities, psycho-emotive proximity and the spaces of friendships.
Even if we grant that these participants may be emotionally and psychologically closer to their own ‘race’ friends as is suggested by the racial profile of the friendship groups and the emotionally meaningful spaces in which these friendship are lived, we still want to know what makes this possible. I asked the participants how they would explain the fact that their primary friendship groups are composed of same ‘race’ friends:

*Group 1*

Buhle: And in residence this is generally your core group of friends?

Group: Yes

Buhle: Why is this... do you think?

Nobuntu:  ‘Cause, I think if they were White it wouldn’t make a difference for me. So if I had met primarily Whites and Indians it wouldn’t make a difference for me. They would still be my friends, you know? So, I don’t know. It’s not even like the whole different racial groups. Ya, because, even at school I had lots of White friends.

Buhle: Right. ‘Cause that’s the next thing I was going to ask. Almost all of you went to, or come from multiracial schools, so you did have contact with other racial groups. Am I correct to say that?

Nobuntu: Ya, in school I had close [emphasis] White friends...

Moba: My like close friends were Black.

Nobuntu: If they were Indian people, they would still be my friends.

Buhle: Right, but the fact of the matter is that they, of this skin colour, are your friends. How does this work out, how is this possible?

Claris: Okay, this is my theory right? Is that, when you come, when you go to a new and foreign place right? And you meet up with people. You’re, I think most people are bound to go and meet up with people that are similar to them. You get what I mean? So, for example, a Xhosa person is more likely to go and chill with and talk to a Xhosa person rather than a German person. But then it’s not saying that that Xhosa person is not going to talk to that German person because they will. But you’re more comfortable, you feel more comfortable, because the person relates to you. But then, I don’t know if that worked in our case, ‘cause I think we just met up and started talking. But then I think that just works for a lot of people.
Moba: I think it also has to do with who you meet first.

Buhle: Who you meet first, okay?

Moba: ‘Cause when you’re here on your first day, I mean, you don’t wanna go around wondering all over the place [over-talking] looking for people.

Claris: No, but you don’t look. But, no I don’t think you go looking for people, I think it just happens. Like in a group of people when you put people in the room right? Normally the boys, it’s bound to happen, the boys separate and the girls separate, it’s a subconscious thing.

Nobuntu: The first people I spoke to when I got here were White. The girls that I chilled with were White girls. The first day of “O” Week, were White girls.

Claris: Okay, so my question is why aren’t they in your group of friends? Because, I mean...

Nobuntu: We’re still friends....

Claris: Because, no I mean...

Nobuntu: Because the other one moved out, she went to live, she’s in a flat and the other one is sort of is in another programme, so we don’t really see each other. But when we see each other it’s like ‘hi’, we still talk, we’re still friends.

Claris: No, no, but I’m talking, I’m saying if those girls were the first girls you met and talked to, right? Then shouldn’t they be the ones sitting here with you? Wouldn’t you have developed a stronger bond, a stronger relationship with them, according to [unclear].

Nobuntu: I think, essentially, you sort of like differentiate, you sort of like have those people that you grow to like and you grow to...because obviously she, like she was in another corridor, so she found other people. ‘Cause you meet other people, like the first people I spoke to were White, but you meet different people and then you decide that ‘okay, she’s going to be my friend. She’s going to be closer than she will be’.

Buhle: Does, does that answer your question Claris?

Claris: No

Nobuntu: You sort of sift your friends [in a desperate voice].

Claris: No, I understand what you said. It just doesn’t really answer my question.

Gugu: No, since Moba said that it’s the people you met first, and then you related. Like she met White people first.

Moba: Ya, like the people you meet first and then you find that, like you’ve got like a connection.
Claris: Ya, but the people you meet first aren’t necessarily going to be your, your friends. [Over-speaking]. They might be people that you see and say ‘hi’ to and have that random conversation in the corridor with, but they’re not necessarily going to be your friends. Get what I mean?

Group: Ya, ya.

We can extract two opposing theories from this account. The first theory we will call First Encounters theory is put forward by Nobuntu and Moba. The argument is that on entering the university students are most likely to develop friendships with the people they initially meet and interact with. This is partly because in the early days of arrival when one is unfamiliar with the people and the place, one does not embark on a search for people who look like oneself. Thus, the possibility of friendships and their racial composition is largely determined by the random chance of initial encounters. This is why Nobuntu holds the view that ‘...if I had met primarily Whites and Indians it wouldn’t make a difference for me. They would still be my friends...’ In this account ‘race’ features as an outcome of chance and not a deliberate choice of social agents—‘It’s not even like the whole different racial groups’. Nobuntu supports this by pointing out that—‘...in school I had close (emphasis) White friends...’ Moba had close Black friends at school which according to this argument must be accepted as a work of chance as much as her present friends are given to her by chance. Nobuntu’s emphasis that she had White close friends at school must also be understood as support for her view that the racial composition of friendships is given by the chance of first encounters.

This theory is challenged by Claris who points out that if it is true then Nobuntu should have developed a close friendship with the White students she met first. Yet Nobuntu insists that
they are still her friends. The conceptual distinction between primary and secondary friendships is helpful here. We must understand Nobuntu to be saying that the White girls are part of her secondary group of friends who are not part of the spaces she shares with her primary group of friends. In her account Nobuntu suggests that the possibility of a close friendship was jeopardised by the absence of shared opportunity structures.

Claris is not satisfied with this and presses her challenge to Nobuntu - ‘I’m saying if those girls were the first girls you met and talked to, right. Then shouldn’t they be the ones sitting here with you?’ It is at this point that Nobuntu’s theory fails. Initial encounters are now posed as only a piece in on-going processes of relating and building relationships with other people. ‘I think, essentially, you sort of like differentiate, you sort of like have those people that you grow to like...you meet different people and then you decide, that okay, ‘she’s going to be my friend. She’s going to be closer than she will be’. The crux of the matter is precisely what she presents as the essential issue of differentiation: Who will be closer to oneself and who will be kept at a distance? As things stand and despite Nobuntu’s theory there is a correlation between racial identity and psycho-social proximity.

Claris offers an opposing theory which we will call Categorical Membership Commonality theory. It is argued that in a new context people have the tendency to seek contact and interaction with people who are similar to them. The seeking of similar others and hence separation from those who are different is however, said to be subconscious, which creates the feeling that ‘it just happens’. Furthermore, the seeking of contact with similar others does not preclude contact and interaction with people who are different from oneself. The critical issue
is that contact and interaction with similar others is more comfortable because the fact of similarity is a condition for the ease of transmission of thought and feeling between people. According to this account the fact that their friendship is composed of members of the same gender and racial categories is not surprising. In fact, in line with this argument we would expect that the more attributes shared by the members the more they would feel comfortable and relate to each other. In contrast then, this account admits the role of race in the formation of social ties, arguing that in the context of opportunity structures people seek connection with similar others.

On the one hand, Claris’s argument attends to the issue of differentiation raised by Nobuntu’s theory. According to Claris, differentiation is influenced by the seeking of similarity. It is this which accounts for the fact that their group consists of Black females only. This principle of differentiation through similarity joins with the postulation made in the previous section that those new members who are allowed to join existing friendships (and acquaintanceships) will in all likelihood be perceived to confirm the friendship group identity on a number of personal and social dimensions. Thus, we note here again that Nobuntu and Lerato who have joined the recent acquaintanceship of Moba, Claris and Gugu are also Black and female. Furthermore, this also links with the psychological reproduction argument made earlier claiming that social agents seek psychological and emotional continuation in their social relations. On the other hand, in invoking the issue of comfort, Claris’s theory joins with the accounts given by Masego and Tshwaro, who also argued that the fact of entering the university with friends was comforting because they are in the presence of people who understand them. It is important to
note that in both accounts the feeling of comfort does not lead to distinctly different things—feeling understood by others and a feeling of relating with others both point to proximity with others. It is from this that I suggested the concept of ‘psycho-emotive proximity’. Even if we conceptually accept the similarity and psycho-emotive proximity relation it remains to be understood why similarity (and in this case racial similarity) should lead to the feelings of comfort and being understood and hence psycho-emotive proximity. I do believe that there is something theoretically insightful in this conceptual scheme, or to reformulate Bunge’s (2006) phrase, ‘promissory note’, it holds the promise of being theoretically insightful. I offer an account at a later stage.

Msomi’s remark below comes immediately after we have ascertained that their broader friendship network is composed of Black students only. Here too the participants offer accounts for the racial composition of their friendship group.

**Group 2**

Msomi: I mean I don’t see colour, I want to state that out. I seriously do not see colour.

Buhle: What do you mean? [With a tone of confusion]

Msomi: Like I have never seen colour like ‘okay they are Black so I am just quickly going to go to that table’. You know how one has this sense of, when we are eating; I see this a lot in the dining room when people are eating there’s going to be that White table, that Black table and that Coloured table. It is just predominantly that race but I have done this before I just go sit with the White people or I just go sit with the Coloured people. It really doesn’t matter, I don’t feel like ‘I need to go sit with the Black people because they are Black and maybe I will fit in there or something’.

Leko: For me it’s not like that. Like even though a lot of you, everyone is like Black, all my friends at the moment but I haven’t always had Black friends. So therefore, when I went to Crawford I made a point that I wanted to have more black friends
than White friends because where I came from I didn’t really have any Black friends. A teacher of mine, he was doing this little study thing where he was trying to figure out if we chill with people because of our races or whatever and what you noticed with us; it wasn’t because there was the Black table, it was more like the cool kids, the boarders, the losers, the emos and what not. When you go into those different cliques it was like majority of them, there is no majority, it’s more like it’s mixed. People like Siya and them she’ll be with the cool kids but she’s Black around a few white people, around a few Indians but because I made a point to be around Black people because my issues of having come from [inaudible] I think that’s why now...

Buhle: Sorry having come from?

Leko: My old school where it was just White everywhere. Having made that point to just get more Black in me...

Buhle: This is when you went to Crawford?

Leko: That’s when I went to Crawford. I think that’s just followed me here as well but I didn’t make a point this time, it was just naturally. It just happened that now they are all Black.

Buhle: Okay. What’s your take?

Lungi: I won’t lie. My close friends have mostly been Black and maybe it’s because over the past few years I haven’t really had many close friends. I have just really had like two or three close friends and they just happen to be Black. The reason we were close is we had so much more in common than just our skin colours. I feel, especially with girls though, I feel I have more to say with Black girls than I do with the White girls. I talk to everyone but I always feel that the Black girls talk more. The White girls I don’t think, I feel like they want to also just stay in their, and I do think that it’s a race thing. I think they also want to stay in their racial cliques and I think they do that because they go partying together, they do things together and that’s who they are and that’s what they have in common with each other. I don’t think they think they really have anything in common with me because here I don’t really have close White friends but I haven’t been making the effort to make any close friends.

Buhle: Okay. So let me just ask you a few questions just to get a broader picture of where we are going with this conversation. Would you describe all your residential areas where you come from racially mixed?

Group: Yes.

Buhle: And your schools were also racially mixed?

Group: Yes.
Buhle: So in other words, we could not make the argument that you’re circle of friends is predominantly Black because you’ve had minimal exposure to other racial groups?

Group: No.

Msomi: We wouldn’t make that argument.

Buhle: Okay. Now what argument would you make?

Leko: For the reason it being this way?

Buhle: Ya, because I hear the fact that Leko, for example, is making it a point to have black friends particularly at Crawford given where he had been before. I hear the point you are raising partly about having common interests and I also hear the point that you are making about being colour blind as it were or not seeing colour but the fact still remains doesn’t it?

Lungi: I really think it’s because we actually have something to talk about and they understand me. They understand me because uhm uhm I’m Black, they’re Black and we grew...just don’t think, sometimes with... I think with our clique, I don’t necessarily think it’s the same with every other Black group; with our clique I think it’s because we understand...

Msomi offers what we might call a *Colour Blind* theory, arguing that who he interacts with is not influenced by ‘race’. He further argues that racial similarity does not necessarily for him signal the possibility of fitting, relating to, or being understood by others of similar racial identity. This account however, like that of Nobuntu and Moba, fails to reconcile the non-racial thesis with the racial similarity found in their primary friendship groups. Lungi’s argument is akin to that made by Claris, and we will give it the same name - *Categorical Membership Commonality* theory. Like Claris, Lungi argues for the role of commonality and highlights ‘race’ and gender as important in her experience. There is more to be said between her and other Black girls and they understand each other because they are Black. Furthermore, she believes that the same is true for White girls who too, like she and her friends, want to remain in their racial groups and
do things together. The remark of having ‘much more in common than just our skin colour’ is somewhat ironic because the ‘much more’ seems to take source in skin colour hence she has more to say to Black girls. There is also the issue of a presupposition used as support for her view of commonalities that have a racial source— ‘I don’t think they think they really have anything in common with me because here I don’t really have close White friends’. Lastly, there is here too, as in Claris’s account, the invocation of the view that it ‘just happens’ without the strategic actions of social agents. Leko’s argument is slightly different although it has traces of the other arguments. Let us call it the Consciously Black theory. In reaction to previous schooling experiences in which he did not have Black friends because it was ‘White everywhere’, he made a conscious decision to make Black friends. He argues that he took this decision since the last high school he attended prior to coming to university and adds that this time however, the process was natural, it just happened that his friends were all Black. In this he joins with Claris and Lungi. On the one hand, this could be read as an inconsistency for someone who consciously wants to have Black friends. On the other hand, his remark can be seen in the light of the fact that he indeed this time ‘automatically’ joined Msomi’s’ friendship circle, as we saw above. We could say that it just happened because he was spared the burden of psycho-social work which he otherwise would have had to do if he formed his own friendship circle. However, given his resolution to make Black friends even if he had to perform psycho-social labour, the outcome may have been a group of Black friends. There is also the suggestion, made through the story of the school teacher who undertook a study that his past and present friendships are not chosen on the basis of ‘race’. Instead his friendships are based on other
shared interests or ways of being in the world although he makes it a point to be friends with other Black people. Here he links with Lungi’s claim of ‘much more in common than just our skin colour’, which ironically ends with skin colour.

What is theoretically interesting here is that notwithstanding the diversity of views and reasons they all culminate in the fact of same ‘race’ friendships. What makes this particularly interesting is that almost all these participants attended racially mixed schools and resided in racially mixed neighbourhoods. These contexts are held up as ideal for the promotion of a non-racist South Africa and thus represent something of an ideological Rainbow Nation melting pot. The observation that even when students claim that they have in the recent past had close interracial friendships this experience does not necessarily transfer into the university context raises doubts about the success of this strategy. This cautions against the now popular claim that positive interracial encounters lead to the seeking of more interracial encounters in the future (e.g. see Pettigrew et al., 2011; Levine et al., 2003). Leko’s account is particularly instructive in this regard. There are a number of other theoretical issues emerging from the above that will be addressed in the conclusion. For now let us consider a case that is slightly different from the above.

We have seen the social and psychological character of racial relations that emerge from participants who have had some years of interracial contact in residential and schooling contexts. In a comparative turn I now explore that of those participants who have not had this experience.
Group 3

Lulama: The problem with me I would say it was that our school didn’t have White people and in primary it was the same thing, lots of Black people. We never had White people, maybe one or two White teachers and that was it. The rest were Indians or Blacks. So I guess not being exposed to it because you see the children from primary schools, they just talk to White people like its normal. Black people talking to White people, it’s normal, they have accepted because they have been exposed to them, they have lived with them and so it’s fine. Now for me it is a totally different subject and now in Mafikeng White people are in wealthy places so the interaction is so very, very small between White and Black people. So in Mafikeng they are on a pedestal, there is a separation from us but you find them in Mafikeng. There is a school called Mafikeng High School. Were there more Blacks than Whites?

Masego: I think there are more Whites there than anywhere else.

Lulama: So for me I would say the lack of exposure.

Buhle: So in other words, you are saying that before coming to UCT generally your exposure to White people has been very minimal?

Lulama: Yes absolutely.

Buhle: Would the two of you also say the same thing?

Tshwaro and Masego: Ya.

Lulama: For all of us.

I have expressed my doubts about what can be achieved by racially diverse contexts if we expect them by some default to produce close interracial relations. To be clear, this is not to categorically claim that close interracial relations cannot or do not exist for common knowledge shows us that they do - and perhaps the best example of this would be interracial romantic relations. This excerpt however, seems to me to indicate what we may expect as the minimal positive outcome of racially diverse contexts. Racially diverse spaces make interracial contact and interaction a non-event: ‘...you see the children from primary schools, they just talk to White people like its normal. Black people talking to white people, it’s normal, they have
accepted because they have been exposed to them, they have lived with them and so it’s fine.’

Interracially diverse opportunity structures provide the condition of possibility for the exchange of thoughts and feelings between people who otherwise would not if apartheid ideology and architecture were maintained. In these situations interracial interaction is removed from the realm of the mystical and taboo to a commonplace experience.

On the other hand, an immediate qualification is necessary. The character of exchanged thought and feeling in interracially shared spaces is influenced by the objective conditions of existence distributed between the groups in contact. In the case at hand, not only is there minimal interracial contact but where it exists it seems to confirm the apartheid script of White superiority and Black inferiority, expressed here in terms of living conditions. This institutes a physical and social space correspondence that entrenches unequal racial relations: ‘...in Mafikeng white people are in wealthy places so the interaction is so very, very small between White and Black people. So in Mafikeng they are on a pedestal, there is a separation from us but you find them in Mafikeng.’ The relations that are produced in such a living arrangement are not only objective (e.g. the material support of existence) but also importantly psychological such that the pedestal metaphor refers not only to physical distance but also to a psycho-emotive distance between racial groups.

Lulama: I have a phobia of White people.

Buhle: You have a phobia of White people? Tell me a little more about that.

Lulama: I don’t know, I don’t know where it came from... I don’t know. I have a phobia but at the same time I’m absolutely fascinated by White people. I don’t know how that turns out [group laughter], but I’m absolutely scared of them. Like, to even initiate a conversation, my gosh! It’s such a challenge for me. I don’t know
why, I don’t know why I have a phobia. So, if she wants us to sit we have to fight, [unclear] I think, I just...

Tshwaro: At the end of the day you’re going to sit [laughter]

Lulama: I don’t know, I’ve just placed them on this pedestal. I don’t know. And I wasn’t even there during apartheid, so I don’t know why, so I’ve just placed them on a pedestal and they’re just normal people, but I can’t seem to grasp that concept that they’re just normal people.

I have suggested that Lulama’s pedestal metaphor refers to physical, material and psycho-emotive distances that entrench unequal relations of White superiority and Black inferiority. This is in effect Bourdieu’s (1979) ‘network of oppositions’—‘...between high (sublime, pure) and low (vulgar, modest)...’ (p. 468) and it is from this that Lulama’s feeling of mysticalness and intrigue or what she calls phobia and fascination must partly be located. It is from this too that the rupture between knowing (or at least wanting to believe) that White people are ‘just normal people’ and the experiential observation of all the differences between Black and White people that makes it difficult to ‘grasp the concept that they’re just normal people’. What also appears to contribute to the sense of phobia and fascination is the intergenerational transmission of racial and class thought and feeling as evidenced below.

Masego: So, okay I can relate to that definitely. Hmm, but I, I push myself to [unclear] to forget about that, because as she said, I’m also very fascinated, so I think my fascination kind of negates the fear a bit. But like she said you think you have to kind of polish the way you talk when you talk to a White person. ‘Cause like with a Black person you can say something wrong and its fine, but with a White person, you feel like they’ll maybe judge you or something like that, I don’t know. I think it’s ‘cause from, it comes from my parents and the way they’d say, ‘White people don’t do this’. You know, you do something and they’d say, ‘You know, White people don’t act like that’, or like you spend money, my mom likes to say ‘You know, white people save money and buy things that matter. You never see White people buying expensive clothes because you know White people spend
money on things that matter’. So, there’s this perception that White people, that White is right, you know [group laughter]. And then, Black people are kind of getting there, but we still have a lot to learn. So I guess it’s from that that we sit with White people, so am I going sit right? Am I going to eat properly? To them will this be the right way to do things? You know. Whereas with Black people, if you can’t eat with a knife and fork you know, you can look at them, ‘You know you haven’t eaten with a knife and fork all your life, you know, lay off’ [group laughter]. But with White people you wonder, you know they’re masters at this. The other thing is they’ve been eating with forks and knives since they were little babies. You know they’ve had plastic forks and knives since they were 2 years old, but you realise it wasn’t like that but it doesn’t take that away.

This excerpt directs our attention to an important channel for the transmission of some of apartheid’s ideological scripts and ‘pictures of reality’. Such remarks from parents may be highly influential in shaping content and perception of the racial ‘other’ in South Africa post-apartheid. When combined with the social arrangement of life, as we have observed it in these participants’ lives, the impact can only be greater and the message clearer: ‘White is right...And...Black people are kind of getting there, but we still have a lot to learn’. In its combined effect this establishes what we might call a psycho-social white normativity\(^{30}\) in the lives of these participants. It is from this white normativity too that the feelings of phobia and fascination emerge. If White people are the benchmark of what is ‘right’ and Black people ‘still have a lot to learn’ Whiteness induce fascination as the embodiment of Black aspirations and simultaneously fear that comes from the pressure to perform Whiteness in the presence of White people. Consequently, it is not necessary for Lulama to have lived through apartheid to feel and think the way she does because as much as she may not realise it traces of apartheid

\(^{30}\) By psycho-social white normativity I mean precisely the perception and feeling that White people are better than and are the benchmark for Black people’s aspirations. Whiteness becomes the normative experience in the world.
thought and feeling are part of her social and psychological worlds. Juxtapose this generational transmission of thoughts and feelings with that of this group:

Group 8

Siviwe: I guess also it’s based on how you are brought up like for me my parents just said ‘it doesn’t matter what colour my son, you can be with whoever you want. Don’t let people tell you that because you’re black you’re very inferior, do not apply it’ and stuff like that, so I was just brought up like that.

Kgopelo: That’s exactly how it was for me as well.

On the issue of generational transmission of psychological and social worlds these two groups of participants can be said to be living in different worlds. This point is further illustrated below.

Buhle: Um, do you want to add anything?
Tshwaro: Okay, the fear, the fear, it’s there maybe for all of us. Because I would sit there, but I would never say anything.
Buhle: You’d sit there, but you wouldn’t necessarily talk?
Tshwaro: I wouldn’t start a conversation. Yeah, ‘Hi, Bye’ that’s enough. That’s a conversation [laughter] between me and a White person, what’s more than enough. I’ve greeted, right, what more do you want? [Laughter]. Yeah, and then do what I’m doing and then yeah. It’s not being rude just sitting there and just staring.
Masego: I remember the other day I was coming down the corridor and I was talking to the other White girl, Abbey. Abbey has a car and her dad is the CEO of some major company in Johannesburg and I thought to myself for a second, ‘she sleeps in the same room that I sleep in, on the same bed that I sleep in and everything’ and it was kind of weird. I couldn’t take it, I just moved away from that train of thought, I couldn’t wrap my head around the fact that when we’re here [UCT] we’re equal because it doesn’t feel like that.
Masego: Also, all the White people at UCT are smart. It’s a fact because for you to get into UCT when you are White, it’s harder than when you are Black. So when especially you are at Medical Campus with all the Health Sciences you know it. You know that all the White people that you see are clever and they are probably cleverer than you. Ya, that is a reality here.
Buhle: You say you know this because?
Masego: Because when you apply, the APS [Admissions Points System\textsuperscript{31}] for White comes to higher than Black students so it is harder for them to get in than for us.

Masego: So when you are sitting next to a White person in class then you can actually have an exact number that you know this person’s APS is higher than yours. Haven’t checked, haven’t had the time but you could find that out and from that being in your head, you are kind of like ‘Okay you can’t do this.

Buhle: What is it that you can’t do?
Lulama: You just can’t hang around with them, I don’t know, you just can’t, you know.

Masego: Ya, and it’s easier coming from Black people. It’s like even if a Black person could have a higher APS than you it’s like ‘Whatever, I don’t care’. But with White people it’s like ‘No’.

These experiences appear to me to be profoundly shaped by what we have called a psychosocial white normativity. In the presence of White students, Tshwaro will not say more than greeting probably because she wonders ‘Will I speak right?’ Masego experiences something of a fragmentation between the ‘White pedestals’ she knows from home and the supposed ‘White-Black equality’ present at UCT. The ‘race’ and class difference between Abbey and herself have reverberations of her home world and the fact of sleeping in the same room and bed does very little to alter the experience of being different from Abbey. Furthermore, an admissions policy, designed to increase the chances of admission for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, is interpreted as confirmation of White intellectual superiority. Perhaps again feeling that they come short against the White intellectual standard they deduce from the admissions policy. They in turn distance themselves from White students.

\textsuperscript{31} The Admissions Point System is used to convert secondary school matriculation symbols (e.g. A, B, C) into numerical points. These points are what determine whether an applicant will be admitted for study in their chosen academic programme which will have a minimum requirement score.
Interestingly, the same standard of intellectual superiority is not granted to Black students who have high APS scores. This is another example of ‘White is right’ that entrenches Whiteness as the normative experience in the world. It also locks all Black people into the category of inferiority—‘You are no better than me because we are all aspiring toward the same White standard’.

We have so far focused on the uses and operations of ‘race’ and we now turn to the uses and workings of class.

Group 2

Leko: We are such a different clique. I think our group is so different to all the other Black cliques.
Buhle: How so?
Lungi: We aren’t ghetto.
Msomi: We’re not the Blacks [emphasis].
Lungi: The typical...
Buhle: Okay. Now please unpack this for us.
Lungi: Ya I know, I say ghetto very shamefully. I didn’t grow up in...We’re not Black [emphasis].
Msomi: We have things, we do things, and we go out to places. In going out to those places we do things that one would typically associate with White people. Like ‘Oh White people do that’.
Lungi: I think our favourite pastime at the moment is to go to Cocoa Wah Wah\(^\text{32}\) and play Thirty Seconds. We have coffee and cake and we play Thirty Seconds and this is what we do. Actually, I think it’s more of who we are really [emphasis] than the fact that we’re Black. You know, the fact that we’re Black might have an influence on who we are and I don’t think that anyone can deny that. Your skin colour really does influence who you are because it really just says a lot about how you grew up. But

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\(^{32}\)This is a restaurant located in one of the main streets close to the university. It is popular with students who frequent it for meals, board games and small social gathering with friends.
that’s not the main cause. That’s not the real reason because I think the things that really hook us up, mainly are not really influenced by our skin colour.

Buhle: What has influenced that?

Lungi: What are we influenced by? I think the schools that we went to [short silence], what we actually liked doing.

Msomi: What we were all interested in.

Lungi: Ya, and how focused we are in life. In our group, you won’t find someone who just wants to be a nobody.

Msomi: Ya, everyone has like a trajectory like I want to do this and by that time I want to have done this. Everyone knows where they want to go.

These students will not explicitly say that they are of middle-class background just as in all discussions on ‘race’ none of the participants in the study mentioned ‘race’ until I had explicitly introduced the term in our discussions. That is, there is a refusal to name both ‘race’ and class even when it is evident that the discussion is about these issues. In their work that specifically focused on ‘race’, Erasmus and de Wet (2003) encountered the same phenomenon and referred to it as ‘Not naming ‘race’’. This suggests that in post-apartheid South Africa people may strategically avoid using terms such as ‘race’ and class when talking about themselves and their experiences. There may be three reasons for this. First, it may be an attempt, inadvertently or not, to erase apartheid categories and legacies by not including them in everyday talk. Second, it may be an attempt to avoid the accusation of being racist or at least holding on to the apartheid experience and using it in the present at the earliest available opportunity. These speculations are in accord with the accusations in present day South African public discourse on ‘race’ that Whites want to quickly forget apartheid and that Blacks want to hold on to apartheid. Third, Black participants whose parents have achieved some degree of
social mobility and now enjoy what were once the exclusive privileges of a large portion of the White community, may avoid using ‘race’ and class as a means to avoiding being accused of acting ‘White’. Instead, utterances such as ‘we’re not ghetto’ and ‘we’re not the Blacks’ or simply ‘were not Black’ are used by these participants’ as proxies for their middle-class background. While not unproblematic what this talk directs our attention to is the tight-knit ‘race’-class relationship born of the histories of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa. In a society where indigenous communities were systematically subjugated and impoverished Whiteness and Blackness came to have axiomatic material and symbolic differences. Thus ‘ghetto’ and ‘Black’ amount to the same things: poverty and a lack of life opportunities. Consequently, ‘not being ghetto’ or ‘not being Black’ refers not to ‘being White’ but to having access to privileges and life opportunities that have historically been preserved for White people. The social mobility that the parents of these participants have attained amounts to a \textit{rupture of historical ‘race’ and class relations} that allows them to have things, do things and go to place that have historically been, and presently are, associated with Whiteness. It is at this nexus of Blackness and material and symbolic acquisition that utterances such as ‘You’re White because you’re rich’ or ‘You’re a coconut’\textsuperscript{33} emerge.

There is in all this a subtle but profound ‘race’-class contradictory relationship. On the one hand, the above seems to pin ‘race’ onto class in the crude sense that it is one’s class position that determines one’s racial identity. Hence, ‘you are White because you are rich’ with its flip-

\textsuperscript{33} A South African post-apartheid term meaning that one is black on the outside and white on the inside. The term is considered derogatory.
side ‘you’re Black because you’re poor’. In this crude materialism money is the admission fee into Whiteness and the lack of it the ball-and-chain of Blackness. On the other hand, ‘race’ is still linked to class but the emphasis shifts to the acquisition of materials, occupation of spaces and consumption of commodities associated with middle and upper social class positions. The end point is however still the same: ‘You’re White because of your middle or upper social class status’. This is because the historical relation between Whiteness and power (in the forms of wealth, privilege and status) and Blackness and disempowerment (in the forms of poverty and ignominy) largely remains intact. In the final analysis Whiteness remains a benchmark of desirable existence or what I have called a psycho-social white normativity. The above excerpt speak to all this.

We should go further and enquire after the relations that these students have with those they perceive to be working-class or the ‘Blacks’.

Buhle: Great, well one last question though, something that jumped at me when you guys were telling me about where you come from. It seems to me and this is a label I might be putting on you guys as you may say ‘no it’s not true’. It seems to me that it is still largely the case that you guys are from middle class backgrounds right? [Long silence]

Msomi: Define middle class?

Leko: Oh come on! You are either poor, middle class, or are you like royalty.

Buhle: Right. Okay so let’s get a quick example of this. How much did you pay for school fees at your school?

Msomi: R15,000.00

Buhle: R15,000.00 per annum right?

Msomi: Ya.

Buhle: How much did you pay?
Lungi: I paid the same.
Leko: [Short silence and group laughter]
Buhle: Okay, so you get the idea of what I mean by middle class? Alright. Let me put it this way. For example, do any of your close friends come from so-called squatter camps?
Msomi: Like impoverished backgrounds...
Leko: Oh God! I can’t do that.
Buhle: What is it that you can’t do?
Leko: Uhm… [short silence and Lungi laughs]
Leko: No, uhm... [Lungi laughs]
Lungi: Leko you’re horrible! [Laughter]
Msomi: I do have working class friends; I do [in a desperate tone]. And honestly I can, I can....
Lungi and Leko: Who are your working class friends Msomi?
Msomi: No, not in this room. Not these people but here’s the thing...
Buhle: Now this is an interesting thing. This is your circle of close friends. You do have them [working-class friends] but they are not part of your close friends...
Leko: When you think of friends first, do you think of those people or do you think of us?
Msomi: I think of you. No, what did he ask? I thought you asked friends, you asked close friends?
Buhle: Ya close friends [laughter].
Msomi: Oh sorry, I thought you just asked about friends.
Buhle: Okay, no close friends?
Msomi: No.
Leko: I can easily say that there are so many working class friends [makes inverted commas with his hands] but none of them are mine. When I think about friends I don’t think about them. They are just people that I...
Lungi: Do you even know any working class people? [Group laughter]. I am sorry, I think that is a relevant question.
Msomi: Ask him! [said in isiZulu] [Group laughter].
Leko: No, no I do, I do... [Group laughter].
Msomi: The church brethren from where you’re from…they don’t count [Leko laughs].

Leko: Oh! They’re my main source [Group laughter].

Msomi: Thank you for that [Group laughter].

Leko: Ya, but I don’t think of... It’s very nice to say I have friends with those people but when you think about your friends you don’t think about them, you think about...ya.

Buhle: Earlier on you were saying ‘I am sorry I can’t do that’ but what is it that you cannot do? [Group laughter].

Lungi: Yes, what can you not do?

Msomi: Po!

Leko: Yes, that. I can’t do poverty. I just, for some reason that scares me. You said this is anonymous so it’s fine [group laughter].

Leko: I don’t know, for some reason I have just always found that people... I am very sensitive towards them. I look at them and I am like ‘shame’. I would like to help in some way but not to the extent where I am like ‘I would like to help you and become your friend’. It’s never been like that for me, I look at them and I’m like ‘I’ll help you one day when I am financially stable and all of that stuff’ and you know it’s a sad case. I am trying to show that there is compassion in a sense but it’s not to the extent where I look at them and I’m going to be friends with them. For me it’s just like ‘I don’t have much to say to you and you don’t have much to say to me’. When we talk, I am talking about how much I am in love with my Blackberry at this moment and what you are talking about?

Lungi: Hmmmm...deep.

Msomi: Deep

Lungi: I don’t really have friends from uhm squatters [said with hesitation] but that is just because of where I come from. My background, well not my background because I am not rich but where I grew up I just haven’t been exposed and my school and that’s where I really made friends, there weren’t people from squatters or so.

Buhle: Okay so let’s put the squatters aside. Townships?

Lungi: Township. There were people from townships I won’t lie but the thing is it just depends on who the person is, like they were loud. I mean, I am from uMlazi, until I was like four I lived in uMlazi and then I went to live in Yellowwood Park and what you find is there is actually a difference between the kids who come from the suburbs and the kids who come from townships. I found that I stuck to the suburbs
mainly because also I found I had more in common with them. I don’t know how to dance to house\textsuperscript{34}, I don’t say some of the things that they say, I find they speak a lot more Zulu than I do and that’s why I stuck to my suburb Black friends.

The idea of primary and secondary friendships introduced above seems applicable to both ‘race’ and class categories. Msomi insists that he has working-class friends but when questioned by his friends on this he admits these are not close friends. This means that both same ‘race’ and same class friends are more likely to constitute primary friendship networks and different class and ‘race’ friends to constitute secondary friendship groups. Lungi accounts for this by arguing that she has generally not been exposed to working-class people. However, where an opportunity structure (school) was shared with pupils from townships she distanced herself from them on grounds that they were different, loud, danced to ‘house’ music, and spoke a lot of Zulu. Some of these are of course, standard stereotypes of Black people who stay in townships in South Africa. Interestingly, she does not have a list of the things that made her associate with her ‘Black suburb friends’ other than that she had ‘more in common with them’.

In this view, the lack of exposure argument does not hold. If there has been lack of exposure it is not because pupils from the townships were absent from her school but because she consciously distanced herself from them. For his part, Leko simply cannot ‘do poverty’, by which he means that he cannot have poor Black friends. Important in this is his view that he has little, if anything, to talk about with poor Blacks because the content of his conversations consists of things that poor Blacks may not have. In other words, there exists a class distance

\textsuperscript{34} House is a dance music genre that evolved from Kwaito, which originated from the townships in Johannesburg in the mid-1990s.
between him and those Blacks who have not achieved the same social mobility as his family has and thus do not have things, do not go to (interesting) places and do not do things associated with Whiteness as he does.

All this returns us to the concept of a *psycho-social white normativity* and we now come to the realisation that the concept operates on a ‘race’-class relational register. On the racial register it operates as an unacknowledged benchmark in the lives of some Black people. The above excerpt shows us how it operates to unite and divide social agents on a social class register. On a racial register it leads some Black students to feel and/or believe that ‘White is right’. An example of this is found in group 3 where the participants psychologically compare themselves to their White counterparts and feel somewhat socially inadequate in their ability to do seemingly mundane activities such as speaking, seating and sitting in the presence of White students. Key in this register is a sense of racial inferiority and the unacknowledged pressure to perform Whiteness. On the class register we find in group 2 the use of various strategies of avoidance such as stereotypes, false arguments (e.g. lack of exposure) and ridiculous fears (e.g. fear of poverty by which, is meant poor Black people). By the use of these tactics people who have not achieved middle-class social mobility are kept at a distance because it is perceived that they do not have possessions, do not occupy spaces and places, and do not partake in activities that historically have been associated with Whiteness. Furthermore, the participants in group 2 feel that it is their class identity more than racial identity that defines who they really are. A class identity they feel links them closely with things and places associated with Whiteness and distances them from things and place historically associated with Blackness or
more specifically impoverished Blackness. The combined effect of these two registers is predictably to produce racial and class distance, although not in any simple way, as we have observed here.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted a number of things. First, it has attempted, in a very limited way, to capture something of the social trajectory of the participants’ lives from their various home contexts into the university context. In doing this the chapter marked a conceptual distinction between students who enter the university context with pre-existing friendships, and those who do not, with the focus of the chapter being the former case. Second, in our exploration there has been an attempt to remain committed to the concepts of time and space that carry and shape the lives of the participants here under investigation. Similarly there has been an attempt to conceptually distinguish and spell out the psychological from the social and to highlight the instances where they work in unison. Third, on the basis of our explorations, a range of concepts have been introduced, somewhat developed, and their operations spelled out.

Three conceptual accounts relating to self-segregation emerge from the foregoing work. First, there are students whose home-world has been constituted by racially diverse spaces (e.g. schools and neighbourhoods). These students are accustomed to interracial contact and interaction such that by the time they enter university, interracial contact is to them a non-event. This is precisely because they have had cross-racial physical proximity and exchange of
thought and feeling. In the transition into the university context however, the personal histories of previous interracial proximity do not appear to correspond with cross-racial psycho-emotive proximity. Instead we see an interracial psycho-emotive distance manifest in the fact that racially different friends are not part of one’s close friendship group. Correspondingly, a psycho-emotive proximity is expressed in the keeping of same ‘race’ close friends. The spatial representation of this is found in that primary and same ‘race’ friendships are developed and lived in emotionally significant (e.g. residence) spaces while secondary and racially different friendships are developed and lived in emotionally less significant spaces (e.g. non-residence spaces on campus).

Second, there are those students who enter the university with minimal interracial contact and interaction because their home-world is constituted by racially divided spaces. For these students, interracial contact and interaction is a non-event in the sense that it is avoided or kept minimal. When it does happen it tends to be an occasion that affirms a world and experience of White superiority and Black inferiority imported from their home-world. In this case we find a physical and psycho-emotive distance from racially different others. The final outcome is the same self-segregation practice witnessed with those from racially diverse backgrounds. What distinguishes this experience is that its interrelated components make self-segregation as outcome somewhat unsurprising. That is, the collaboration of different conditions of existence and possibility (physical and class space); the intergenerational transmission of apartheid thought and feeling (psycho-emotive relations/psychic space); and the avoidance or minimal interracial contact and interaction (social space). The combination of
these elements culminates in a psycho-social white normativity through which present experiences are received and projected. From this view, the first conceptual account appears as an anomaly because the combination of its components should logically lead to diversified friendship networks. However, this does not happen because the psycho-social white normativity has a double ‘race’-class register that offsets what one would logically expect from participants raised in racially diverse home-worlds.

This leads us to the third account, where social class plays a key role. Students of middle-class background institute a class distance (simultaneously a physical distance) from those of working-class background. Class position becomes the active principle of differentiation within the same racial category and class disposition is taken as the essential element of being in the world. In other words, the possession (and consumption) of things, the taking up of activities and the occupation of spaces that are class (and historically racialised) marked are given premium in social relations. Interestingly, this class register does not appear to make room for racial diversity thus creating some sort of racial enclave—meaning that in this account self-segregation is simultaneously racialised and classed. This becomes all the more interesting when we recall that this account emerges from students whose social geneses are racially diverse spaces.

All this begs the question: why should racial and class similarity generate psycho-emotive proximity? Put differently, why do we want to be close to those similar to us and distant from those who are different? If we for a moment suspend all the histories and politics of ‘race’ and class we could make the following argument. We could argue that human beings are bent on
simplifying most things as a strategy to make a complex world manageable, meaningful and predictable Tajfel and Turner (1979). Given that we are always in some form of relationship with things and people, the initiation and maintenance of these relationships presupposes an expanding of energy and the investment of time and emotions. To minimise this effort or what I have called psycho-social labour, we use markers of similarity as indicators of ease, and comfort, and those of difference as dis-ease and discomfort at a psychological level. The fact that in the real world with real people this may not always be the case is barely a point of dispute. The point is that it operates as if there is a psychological mechanism that allows for the easiest possible way to live and orientate oneself in the world. Thus, despite claims of open mindedness, this may be true to the extent that one is not pushed beyond one’s psychological comfort zone. Differences that do not require the performance of psycho-social labour or very little of it, are easily accommodated while others are likely to be rejected. In this view, self-segregation is psycho-emotive closeness with entities similar to or associated with oneself. At this psychological level, self-segregation is the process of including in the psychic space of the self (self-concept) that which carries a piece of it.

Matters get quickly and seriously complicated when we realise that the so-called markers of identity are not arbitrarily created and selected. In fact, they are not created by the individuals who put them to use but rather are power saturated historical and political entities with present day refurbishments. ‘Race’ and class are examples par excellence. These entities

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If it is good to recall, against certain mechanistic visions of action, that social agents construct social reality, individually and collectively, we must be careful not to forget, as the interactionists and the ethnomethodologists
have nothing personal or individually unique about them, otherwise they would be useless to us as indicators of similarity and difference needed to order and categorise the world. And yet, we appear accustomed to using these categories, meaning that in dealing with social relations human psychology is always historical, political, and steeped in relations of power. In this sense self-segregation is an enactment of political histories and political economies deposited in human bodies. This creates a psychological and social dilemma. We seek simplification in categorisation but in doing this there is almost always a risk of reincarnating a condemned past. In a different formulation, self-segregation is a psychological and social reproduction of identities whose psychological and social conditions of possibility and articulations in the world converge on the same versions of reality and existence.

 often do, that they have not constructed the categories that they put to work in this work of construction” (Bourdieu, 1989, in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 10).
Chapter Six: Results Part II. The reproduction of social and psychological worlds.

Introduction

I have argued that self-segregation is a psycho-social reproduction of identities whose conditions of possibility and articulations in the world converge on the same versions of reality and existence. This understanding of self-segregation is preferred for two reasons. First, it does not place a negative connotation on self-segregation, which in effect is a form of self/group-distinction Tajfel and Turner (1979). In this sense, a jazz band, an academic discipline, a cheese and wine society, a religious association, and a political party are examples of forms of self-segregation. By creating and/or joining these groups we are in essence reproducing particular ways of being, seeing and making meaning of ourselves, others who share these memberships with us and those who do not. Put differently, self-segregation is one method through which we take up particular visions of and positions in the world. It may also be possible to construct a catalogue of personal dispositions (even if some turn out to be social) upon which people may find ground for similarity - such as an interest in languages, a sport, views and opinions on all manner of things and so forth. On this view, self-segregation appears to be a characteristic of social life. The difference is that some forms of self-segregation are denounced while others are left unquestioned if not encouraged. Second, while the backdrop of apartheid makes it
necessary to seek the place and influence of ‘race’ and class in the friendship ties between university students, it is equally necessary that we question whether there is not a danger of viewing things with overly sensitive racial and class eyes. Is it possible to know when ‘race’ and class issues are primary and when they are secondary? The present conceptualisation of self-segregation seeks to acknowledge the place and role of ‘race’ and class without demonising self-segregation as the antithesis of the kind of non-racial post-apartheid South Africa in the South African Constitution.

In the previous chapter I argued that students who enter the university with friends are in a space of psychological ease that frees them from the necessity to insert themselves in new social relations and networks. The first two sections of this chapter explore the experiences of those students who do not enter the university with existing friendships or acquaintances. In undertaking this task we want to be able to show what the similarities and differences are between the two above mentioned groups of students. The third section includes the experiences of new and old friendships and mixed and same-'race’ friendships to investigate the various uses of social and psychological materials (self-concept, conversation, language, ‘race’ and class) in the formation of friendships and hence the practice of self-segregation.
Opportunity structures, racially diverse home-worlds and the formation of psycho-emotive bonds

It was argued in the previous chapter that the fact of sharing an opportunity structure in itself does not lead to the development of social relations amongst participants but that the sharing of multiple opportunity structures does seem to increase the likelihood for contact and interaction. One of the achievements of Orientation Week is that it provides a multitude of university-wide and residence-specific opportunities for contact and interaction through a range of social activities. The fact of being in the same residence increases the probability of contact and interaction because Orientation Week activities are co-ordinated through the residences such that new students will not only undertake in the same activities but where relevant, will also travel to events together, eat together and so forth. The following excerpt is taken from a racially and gender mixed friendship group living in the same residence.

Group 4

Buhle: The next question I have for you guys, did you all meet here at UCT or do some of you know each other before you came to UCT?

Group: No, we all met here.

Nicole: But then Sam, that’s supposed to be here, but is not here, I knew her from high school.

Buhle: Okay. When did you meet?

Jonno and Debbie: “O” week.

36 The racial profile of the group is as follows: Nicole and Marcia (Coloured), Jessica (Chinese), Jenna, Megan, Debbie and Jonno (White). Jonno is the only White male in the group.
Marcia: Megan and I met in the line on the first day of residence. And I met her [pointing to Jenna] on the same day [over talking], I met her in the morning. And I met her in the evening, on the same day.

Debbie: I met Jenna and Megan on the first day.

Megan: And Nicole and Jonno...

Marcia: I met Nicole on the 7th on the way to Mzoli’s on the bus.

Jessica: I met Jonno in the TV room ...rugby!

Jonno: The TV room, she watches rugby.

Debbie: I don’t even know when I met you [pointing to Jessica].

Megan: And I met Debbie down my corridor. She lives in my corridor.

Debbie: No, no, no. We were part of the scavenger hunt group.

Nicole: And then I met Marcia through Vanessa, I think.

Group 5

Buhle: Now can we start by you telling me where you met?

Jenny: We met here.

Samantha: We met here in residence.

Buhle: Alright, did you meet during orientation week or was it after orientation week, do you still remember?

Samantha: First week.

Jenny: Yes in orientation week. She was...

Malin: And then we met like after that.

Samantha: Yes we met after that and then she... I moved in later, I was in a different residence so I met them after orientation week.

Jenny: In the laundry room.

Samantha: Yes in the laundry room I met Jenny.

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37 ‘Just off Klipfontein Road in Guguletu is Mzoli’s restaurant - a gem of a place known either as Mzoli’s Place, Mzoli’s Meat, Mzoli’s Butchery or even Kwa-Mzoli. Despite the confusion over its name, Mzoli’s is principally a popular day and night spot that happens to be a butchery, but it is also a place to hang-out in the township on the outskirts of Cape Town... Despite the merry making and general hubbub that is Mzoli’s Place, it is extremely popular...’ (http://www.sa-venues.com/attractionswc/mzolis-place.htm).

38 This group is a racially mixed and same gender friendship group. Samantha (Black), Jenny (Indian), Malin (White) and Adi (Coloured).
Malin: And I met her in the dining hall.

Adi: Dining hall.

Buhle: Okay great, but how did it come about that you ended up being in a group or becoming a group of friends?

Malin: Because we all would go to like breakfast, lunch and dinner together, then we ended up just sitting together.

Jenny: We have like a lot of other friends in our group and it kind of started out like we were here first day of registration, we were in the line together and we just ended up hanging together. We just had like common interests and stuff.

Samantha: And we went everywhere together.

Jenny: Yes we did the whole “O” Week experience together and then like we just integrated.

Samantha: I came here with just one friend from my other residence because we were roommates. I came here not really having any friends, so I don't know, the one time I met Jenny first, because she folded my laundry in the laundry room and I found that to be very nice. Usually if somebody's laundry is overdue in the laundry then they just throw it out and then like you come fetch it, but Jenny like folded it all nicely for me. I didn't know who it was but I saw that all my laundry was folded and I saw the name after me on the laundry list and it was Jenny and it was like okay and then I see her and I was like ‘oh did you fold my laundry?’ and she was like ‘yes’ and I said ‘thank you so much, it was very sweet of you.’ And that was basically our first encounter.

The numerous opportunities for contact and interaction recounted in these excerpts arise from the fact of being in the same residence and undertaking the same Orientation Week activities (a type of opportunity structure) is well illustrated here. What is clear is that almost any given situation or encounter within the opportunity structure is readily available to be taken up by social participants and used (consciously or inadvertently) as an occasion for initial interaction that may lead to acquaintanceship development. If not taken, these encounters drift away as unused/missed opportunities. There is in these excerpts a sense of what Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux (2005) refer to as the messy and ambivalent spaces of our everyday lives, found
outside of academic abstractions of human contact. For example, in the moment of contact whether it be in the queue, the TV room, the dining hall or some other place, there is no telling what people will think and feel and how they will behave in their encounters with others. We can with reason speculate that how each individual acts/responds, thinks and feels is influenced by the various factors making up the space of contact at that given moment, their personality and their accumulated personal and social trajectory to that point. Also salient in this are the first impressions people make of each other which influence whether people seek that first interaction, future interaction or avoid interaction altogether. This also returns us to the point argued in the previous chapter that in the practicalities of everyday life the conceptual distinction between the personal and the social may collapse. That is, people may use social properties attached to individuals to make personal judgements of those individuals or the reverse. Similarly, in the above excerpts we cannot know whether it was personal, social, or the combination of both properties, and what degree of influence they had on the initial encounters. In all this it is clear that even as we seek understanding of a part of human interaction and relations in the real world the task at hand is messy and ambivalent and relied largely on these retrospective accounts. Any of the above encounters could have led to outcomes other than the development of friendships. A turn to Contact Theory would also not help us much here because there is no way of telling whether the friendships that developed did so because any of the situational variables specified by Contact Theory were satisfied. For example, what exactly would have constituted friendship potential in the above excerpts?

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39 A contact variable stipulated by Pettigrew (1998) as essential for positive intergroup contact outcomes.
How would it have been recognised in the midst of fleeting encounters? Is it an objectively or subjectively grasped potentiality? And how is it converted from potentiality to actuality? Positing the condition does not in itself help us answer any of these questions.

While the present data cannot suggest in an unambiguous way the activated psychological processes in these encounters, it does however suggest the undertaking of psycho-social labour. We will recall that psycho-social labour is the psychological and social aspect of all the effort and time invested in the initiation, development and maintenance of social relations. For example, it is expressed through having meals together, and experiencing a range of fun activities together during “O” Week.

In this we see the effort extended to initiate social relations which is simultaneously the labour it takes to form a psycho-emotive bond between people (i.e. a social and psychological move). It is instructive at this point to recall a remark made by a participant in the previous chapter who entered the university with an existing friendship—‘...I couldn’t bear the thought of having to start all over from scratch, like new people, make them understand me’. Yet, this is precisely what the participants who enter university without friends have to do. Thus, the success of psycho-social labour is found in the formation of psycho-emotive bonds.

**Interracial friendships: A desired form of self-segregation**

There are numerous dialogues and debates on various platforms (e.g. in universities, student-led organisations and non-governmental organisations) on the issues of race and racism in
contemporary South Africa. Too often these debates are characterised by a lamenting about the undesired state of inter-racial and class relations (see Department of Education, 2008). One possible reading of this is that those who debate these issues would like to see an increasing development of harmonious interracial relations and a positive change in social class differences. Taking this to be the case, the interracial friendships we are exploring here are a piece of that ‘ideal picture’ of a post-apartheid South Africa. In the introduction I argued for a broader conceptualisation of self-segregation such that we can treat interracial friendships as one form of self-segregation. This is to say to the extent that self-segregation is a psychological and social reproduction and articulation of identities it seems that we are not in principle against self-segregation more than particular kinds of self-segregation.

Other than the fact of psycho-social labour which must be performed irrespective of the racial profile of a friendship group, we want, in this section, to investigate additional factors that may influence the formation of racially diverse friendship groups. The previous chapter showed us that the fact of a racially diverse home-world alone does not necessarily lead to the formation of primary interracial friendships at university. At the same time, we saw that the lack of interracial encounters tends to generate a particularly cumbersome psychological vision of the world. Given that the students who make up interracially diverse friendship groups all come from racially diverse home-worlds, we will credit the their home-worlds for partly influencing the racial profile of their friendships groups at university (see Levin et al., 2003; Van Laar et al., 2005). For this reason, we want to investigate – at least preliminarily - what makes racially diverse home-worlds possible, and its psychological influence on friendship formation.
The conditions for a racially diverse home-world

Group 5

Buhle: Now before we continue with UCT exciting experiences, let's hear a little bit about where you come from. So I'm interested in the types of neighbourhoods you come from so to speak and the types of schools that you come from. Why don't you go first Jenny?

Jenny: Okay. I'm from Namibia an international school there. So I've always been surrounded by like lots of different nationalities and different cultures and I'm also from India so I have like a lot of ties there and I also went to an international school over there. We had so many different people in our class. I don't know, there was no focus on which groups you were in at all. It was so small anyway.

Buhle: All right, would you describe your neighbourhood the same way? In the sense of the people who stay there would you say it was a diverse group or was it predominantly one particular group?

Jenny: My neighbourhood, I think so. In Namibia you don't really meet your neighbours. You just like stay in your house. I think it was like a middle class kind of neighbourhood, they were like more politicians.

Malin: I was born in Sweden but I grew up in Africa. I went to the American school in Mozambique. So it's basically the same as her, an international environment.

Buhle: How did you end up in Mozambique?

Malin: My dad works there.

Buhle: Okay great and tell us a little bit about your neighbourhood in Mozambique.

Malin: Well I live in like in a compound, so it's just...like a nice compound, everybody just knew everybody, it's really nice.

Adi: Well I grew in Johannesburg. I went to Crawford College, Sandton\(^\text{40}\), so it's very mixed. There are lots of different kinds of people. My neighbourhood was predominantly White but there were quite a few different people, but it was predominantly White yes.

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\(^{40}\) Sandton is a wealthy suburb in Johannesburg, South Africa.
Samantha: I grew up in Johannesburg same as Adi. We're kind of from the same area, Sandton. My school is St. Stithians College which is in Bryanston\textsuperscript{41}, Randburg basically. So I'm kind of from two different places because my parents were divorced so there was a point where I did go to another school, St. Andrews School for Girls which was in Bedfordview and where my mother lives. I'll describe both neighbourhoods because I feel like I'm from both neighbourhoods. Okay when I moved to St. Stithians I was staying with my father, he lives in Bryanston Drive, we were pretty much the only Black family who lived in Bryanston Drive. Then with my mom in Bedfordview my neighbourhood is also predominantly White, it's a bit more diverse than my father's neighbourhood in Sandton but it is not as ... it's like middle class, that neighbourhood is middle class, so there's a bit more diversity in that area. My schools as well, my schools were very White dominated, St. Stithians was very like majority White westernised culture.

Let us for a moment leave aside Jenny and Malin who are international students and consider Adi and Samantha. Racial diversity is possible for these students because their parents have moved to historically White neighbourhoods and have sent them to historically White schools. Common knowledge in South Africa tells us that the movement of Black\textsuperscript{42} families into White suburbs is predicated on socio-economic upward mobility of the former. Such a movement, as I suggested in the previous chapter, is a rupture of historical ‘race’ and class relations. In other words, the social and economic labour of racial diversity in South Africa lies with Black families and/or individuals who have to achieve middle-class aspirations as a kind of admission fee into historically preserved and presently White-dominated areas. The racial diversity that Adi and Samantha have been socialised in is the product of a generational transfer of social-economic labour into life possibilities and conditions that in part make racial diversity possible. One

\textsuperscript{41} Bryanston and Bedfordview are both wealthy suburbs in Johannesburg.

\textsuperscript{42} I use Black to refer to all sectors of the population who under apartheid were classified as non-White (i.e. Bantu Blacks, Coloured, and Asians).
should be careful though not to suggest that Black families move into White neighbourhoods because they seek contact and interaction with White families. White communities represent the dignified and comfortable lifestyle denied Black communities through decades of systematic frustration of economic mobility and various repressions and oppressions. Part of the reason that we have not witnessed a movement of White families into Black communities is because the latter in many ways and in most cases represents almost all that was the antithesis of a dignified and comfortable lifestyle in South Africa. Perhaps more than neighbourhoods it is schools that are the sites of interracial contact and interaction given the amount of time that pupils spend in school in a year. The role of schools as sites of interracial encounters is also made below.

Group 4

Buhle: Alright. Now what kind of school did you go to? How would you describe your school, semi private, private, public, boarding school, mixed schools, mixed gender, mixed racially?

Debbie: I went to an all-girls school, it was half boarding, like you could board if you wanted to, it was a public school but it was very, very traditional. Like if you saw and you didn’t know anything about it you would think it was private, but it was very public.

Jonno: Yes I was in a private, mixed gender, we only had a boys’ residence. Yes it was quite mixed racially.

Jenna: Yes I was in a mixed public school, Afrikaans. Racially it was like mostly White but a bit like, I think there were Coloured people.

Marcia: I went to a mixed public school, it was half private, half public and like Debbie’s school, everybody just thought it was a private school, but it was really a very public school.
Megan: I went to a public school and it was a mixed gender and it was very mixed racially as well.

Jessica: I went to a very, very private all-girls school very, very private. Yes it was like three kilometres from my house. It was mostly Whites but there were a few Blacks and Coloureds and stuff.

Nicole: I went to an all-girls, well it was mixed race at the school and it was semi private so they call it Model C, but it was like voted best school in KZN last year [group laughter] and we’d always get 100% pass rate and like 96% of our girls make it into university, so they pass with Bachelor passes. So, I’m just putting it out there [group laughter].

If only to over-emphasise the point that the rupture of historical ‘race’ and class relations is achieved through social-economic labour, I include this excerpt.

*Group 4*

Buhle: Now still sticking with your schools, do you guys remember how much you were paying in school fees while you were at high school?

Group: [short silence]

Debbie and Megan: No, no idea.

Buhle: [feeling a sense of unease in the group]

Debbie: Sorry I’m thinking about that.

Jessica: Okay, since it was all-girls, very, very private, it was one hundred thousand per year.

Megan: Mine was eighteen thousand.

Jenna: Mine was like sixteen thousand.

Marcia: Mine was fifteen.

Nicole: Mine was fourteen.

Jessica: You make me feel so bad!
Debbie: I think mine was nine thousand [group laughter].

The social and psychological dividends and limitations of racially diverse home-worlds

Group 5

Buhle: It sounds like in any event in your school and neighbourhood backgrounds for the most part you have been exposed to a lot of diversity and a lot of different people. Now, would you say that those experiences have had an impact in how you have gone about in forming friendships when you arrived at UCT?

Adi: Well, like when you're used to hanging out with different kinds of people all the time then like meeting people who are not so similar to you, or aren't from the same place is easy because you learn to just be accepting and you learn to make friends based on the person and not people just the same as you.

Malin: For me it's just because I move like every four or five years I've had to move so it's always... you're forced to make new friends, you have to be just open and make new friends wherever you go. So I'm just used to that now.

Jenny: I also feel like, when you're used to many different people, you're used to stepping out of the comfort zone of the people who are exactly like you. You see lots of people who are in a group because they share common interests, come from the same place and like I love my friends for being different and for having a different opinion, not coming from the same place. Yes I think you're more open to that when you've been around that more often, you're ready to make friends out of your own stereotype in a way.

Samantha: I agree with Jenny, it's more like because I've been in such a secluded kind of environment where you're used to the same kinds of people or you make friends with people who are from your neighbourhood or just like you and kind of do the same things. You do the same sports; your families are friends, so you're kind of all the same basically. And then you come here and I think I was more willing to be open to different kinds of people because I wanted to experience them and their diversity, not even meaning in like race wise, diversity in character wise. So like our friends are so different, we're completely different but we get on so well, that's like the beauty of our friendship I think.
I have already argued that racially diverse spaces endow upon those who inhabit them the feeling of *familiarity with diversity* or what is the same thing, these spaces make diversity a non-event. This experience and feeling is conveyed in the above excerpt. Perhaps instead of racial diversity it would be helpful to speak simply of diversity of which ‘race’ is a piece for indeed, the home-worlds of these students may have encompassed more than just racial diversity. Yet, it is this very issue of diversity and similarity that is under cross examination here.

The above excerpt suggests recognition of social differences and perhaps a learned ability to negotiate and live with these differences in a way that makes them commonplace. For instance, the fact of racial similarity may not in itself become a default point of interconnectedness. On a discussion of ‘race’ in Chapter Five, Leko made this point. This in turn can be taken to lend support to Adi’s claim that friendships are formed on the basis of personalities. This claim however, is not unique to students who come from racially diverse home-worlds and when investigated it turns out to not be entirely accurate as we will see below.

Consequently, I could not without some difficulties argue that it is solely the fact of growing up in racially diverse environments that cultivates the psychological ability to identify with and form friendships on the basis of peculiarities of personalities such as interests and tastes rather than social categories and structural differences. Again, an example from Chapter Three will

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43 We will recall that Leko’s home-world is in many ways similar to those of Adi and Samantha. ‘A teacher of mine, he was doing this little study thing where he was trying to figure out if we chill with people because of our races or whatever and what you noticed with us; it wasn’t because there was the Black table, it was more like the cool kids, the boarders, the losers, the emos and what not. When you go into those different clique it was like majority of them, there is no majority, it’s more like it’s mixed. People like Siya and them she’ll be with the cool kids but she’s Black around a few White people, around a few Indians…’
make the point. Leko remarks ‘I am trying to show that there is compassion in a sense but it’s not to the extent where I look at them\textsuperscript{44} and I’m going to be friends with them. For me it’s just like ‘I don’t have much to say to you and you don’t have much to say to me’. When we talk, I am talking about how much I am in love with my Blackberry at this moment and ‘what you are talking about?’

The aim is not to be overly cynical of what racially diverse opportunity structures can achieve by way of ‘race’ relations. Rather we want to have a realistic grasp of what is possible in these spaces and its influence on the formation of social ties. Let us then grant that indeed spaces of diversity endow upon its inhabitants the familiarity of living with social differences and consequently the willingness to take the risk of stepping out of the zone of the familiar. This would appear to contradict the claim I made in the concluding remarks of the previous chapter that to minimise the psycho-social labour of initiating and maintaining social ties we use markers of similarity as indicators of ease and comfort and those of difference as dis-ease and discomfort. Instead, we find here a seeking out and celebration of difference in friendship ties ‘...I love my friends for being different and for having a different opinion, not coming from the same place. Yes I think you're more open to that when you've been around that more often, you're ready to make friends out of your own stereotype in a way.’

However, this picture of unity in diversity is complicated by Samantha’s comment ‘...it’s more like because I've been in such a secluded kind of environment where you're used to the same kinds of people...’ It would therefore, be misleading to suggest that all spaces of diversity

\textsuperscript{44} People of working-class background.
achieved through the rupture of historical ‘race’ and class relations are configured in an identical fashion. However, and this is what Samantha is correctly pointing out, they are ironically secluded environments. I think there are two accounts by which this is the case. First, because in the broad scheme of things in South Africa these spaces are minimal precisely because of one of their key conditions—socio-economic labour that is the burden of Black individual and families. The histories of Bantu education that have not been radically addressed (e.g. Davids, 2010; Chisholm, 2005) and the present economic policies of the ANC combine to make the number of Black people who can successfully perform the prerequisite socio-economic mobility an insignificant fraction of the population (see Southall, 2006; Roberts, 2006). Moreover, socio-economic mobility does not only involve social-class but language45 as well and what we may broadly call cultural assimilation. Wealthy suburbs, private and semi-private schools are examples of such spaces of cultural assimilation. Second, universities are another example, where the admission fees - both financial and cultural (e.g. senior certificate with exemption and other middle-class dispositions) - are scarce resources in Black communities. This means that the preferred institutions of higher education which, are also historically White institutions are largely constituted by students whose home-worlds are characterised by wealthy suburbs, private and semi-private schools. In this sense, historically White universities are in practice little more than bigger and better private schools. Thus, wealthy suburbs, private and semi-private schools and historically White universities are

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45 For example see Painter (2006); and Painter and Baldwin (2004).
*secluded environments* in the sense that they exclude far too many people who cannot afford their various forms of admission fees.

This brings us to the issue of similarity and difference in these spaces of diversity. Samantha comments that in this secluded environment ‘you're used to the same kinds of people or you make friends with people who are from your neighbourhood or just like you and kind of do the same things. You do the same sports; your families are friends, so you're kind of all the same basically.’ When juxtaposed with Jenny and Adi’s remarks this account brings out the different meanings and uses of similarity for these students. It now appears that Jenny and Adi understand similarity in terms of social categories and structures (e.g. ‘race’, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion etc.) while Samantha understands similarity in terms of similar lifestyles. Samantha is thus making the point that despite the apparent racial diversity they cannot get away from the fact that one of the central commonalities they share as a group of friends is their parents’ social-class standings that are approximately the same. In other words, behind the face of racial diversity lies a middle and upper-class condition of existence and life chances that largely subsumes and mutes differences into a singular experience of the world. Homogeneity of social experiences projects itself outward as readily visible heterogeneity. It is this approximate singularity of social experiences that leads participants to take personality peculiarities as diversity: ‘And then you come here and I think I was more willing to be open to different kinds of people because I wanted to experience them and their diversity, not even meaning in like race wise, diversity in character wise’. This is a blind spot that prevents these participants from seeing that notwithstanding the diversity of personalities in their friendship
group they are ‘kind of all the same basically’ insofar as their worlds have been shaped by approximately the same conditions of possibility and have thus received similar socialisation processes. Consequently, their experiences in, their dispositions toward, and their visions of the world are approximately the same irrespective of their racial, ethnic, linguistic, and gender identities.

When the analysis is taken in this direction it leads us to what we may call the *indices of social change problem*, which confronts us when we attempt to study social practices against the backdrop of apartheid. In the previous chapter I argued for why I think that ‘race’ and class relations are treated as important with regard to social change in South Africa. It is conceivable that many would readily denounce same-‘race’ friendships on the grounds that they perpetuate a racist discourse that goes against the spirit of non-racialism espoused by the South African Constitution. It seems to me that racially diverse friendships are encouraged, or at least viewed as a desirable challenge to racist discourse and are seen as a preview to a possible future of social relations in South Africa. Thus, racially mixed friendships, it seems to me, to capture something of the winds of change in South Africa. However, what this view omits is the *classism* that operates as a subtext of racial diversity as seen in the above exploration. As far as we can see, students of middle class background, irrespective of racial identity, choose friends whose home-worlds are approximately the same as their own. The outcome is racial diversity founded on social class unity. Racially mixed friendships embody a ‘race’-class contradiction. On the one hand, these friendships are a representation of what I have called the *rupture of historical ‘race’ and class relations* achieved, as I have argued, through the socio-economic labour of Black
individuals and families. On the other hand, they can be taken as a prelude to a class struggle that some commentators are projecting will be the next struggle to replace the ‘race’ struggle in South Africa (e.g. Bond, 2004; Satgar, 2012). The data we have reviewed in this section of the chapter strongly suggests that racially mixed friendships are a form of self-segregation based on class. Now the question arises as to whether the often overly racialised view of social relations in South African is not misleading when it leads us to overlook other equally salient issues for the transformation of South African society.

The psychological principle that the psycho-social labour of initiating and maintaining social ties is minimised by the use of markers of similarity as indicators of ease and comfort, and those of difference as dis-ease and discomfort, is not rejected but confirmed by forgoing discussion. The principle remains the same and what has changed are the markers of similarity which for these participants would be identified with a middle or upper-class socio-cultural experience. Skin colour seems insignificant to the fact that these participants share a vision of the world taken from the same social, economic and cultural positions in the world. With this we come to the conclusion that (1) same-‘race’ and racially diverse friendships are both forms of self-segregation; (2) that the fact of being socialised in a racially diverse home-world in itself does not lead to formation of racially diverse primary friendships; (3) and that the same psychological principle of differentiation through similarity, as identified in the previous chapter, is active in the formation of cross-‘race’ and same-‘race’ friendships; (4) racially diverse friendship groups hide the class homogeneity which appears to be an important condition for the existence of racially mixed friendship groups.
Lastly, perhaps one of the most important psychological dividends of racially diverse spaces in the present study is the absence in students’ lives of what I have called a *psycho-social white normativity* that founds a psychological perception in the lives of some Black students that ‘White is right’. This absence may be the effect of both familiarity with diversity that comes from contact and interaction within opportunity structures and also importantly the feeling of equal status that comes from the materiality of their lives. This is not the kind of nominal or abstract equal status that is often charitably granted to all even in the face of obvious and disparate conditions of existence. It is the fraud of this abstract equality that Masego was pointing to in the previous chapter when she remarked ‘...I couldn’t take it, I just moved away from that train of thought; I couldn’t wrap my head around the fact that when we’re here [UCT] we’re equal because it doesn’t feel like that.’ This is not to suggest that everyone will or should have a middle-class lifestyle but rather it is to point out that the materiality of existence distributed between groups has a great deal of influence on their perceptions of each other and the thought and feeling that develops between them. Unequal conditions of existence set-up unequal power relations that might be difficult to challenge and easy to confirm, as Masego’s words above taken from group 3 in Chapter Three illustrate. Students from racially diverse home-worlds appear to be free of this psychological burden, a fact that must not be underestimated for its psychological and social implications for individual and group life.
Psychological visions and social divisions

I now want to consolidate the strands of thoughts that I have suggested in this and the previous chapter that present a social psychological account of self-segregation. I have suggested that the fact of being in relationships with things and people is one of the key features of human experience. Perhaps the simplest illustration of this is found in the relationship between the unborn baby and its mother. In this case the relation is one of total dependence of the former on the latter and thus an unequal relationship of power. The unborn baby is affected in all manner of ways through its prenatal environment that is in turn shaped by a host of factors that constitute the mother’s health, social, emotional, and psychological circumstances. In the most elementary sense, this study is about understanding the formation of human relationships that involve power relations and the uses and misuses of a host of tools/materials, most of which are not the creation of those who use them. Examples of such tools/materials are racial identities, gender identities, language, socio-economic standing, ethnic identities, generational transferred forms of capital (economic, cultural, and symbolic) and so forth.

The formation and maintenance of human relationships is ironically never a completed task but always a kind of unfinished business requiring the investment of psychological and social labour. Central to this group life formation project are individuals who without choice are thrown into the drama we call social life precisely by having to form relationships with other social agents. A ‘resource book’ or best practice guide for this task is the psychological understanding of the self or the ways in which an individual thinks about and sees themself in
the world (self-concept). Consequently, the formation of relationships becomes a task of identifying with and including within the self-concept those entities that the individual perceives to be similar to it. This is a psychological strategy that has three related functions. First, by drawing toward itself entities similar to it, it works to keep the individual’s self-image approximately intact (a means of obtaining or maintaining psychological security). Second, psychological and social proximity allows for many social practices and daily rituals to be taken for granted precisely because there is implicit consensus on those things. Thus, everyday life does not have to be negotiated at every turn, which is what allows for the almost seamless flow of life and orientation in the world. Third, the proximity of people who perceive themselves to be similar in dimensions that are important to them also allows for the production of a psychological and social narrative about who they are as individuals and a collective in the world. The material for this narrative is not only psychological but indeed economic, political, historical, linguistic, cultural—in essence the tools/materials that they have not created. The combined effect is that a group of people can be said to have a more-or-less synchronised psychological vision of themselves and the world. Examples of such groups include those that are voluntarily assembled (e.g. friends), professional groups (e.g. medical doctors, social psychologists, soldiers), and interest groups (e.g. environmentalists).

However, the social agent is not the author of her own self-concept, meaning that she is not an uncreated creator. Individual psychology in interaction with social environments encounters other individual psychologies. Yet these individual psychologies are already socialised entities,

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46 A charge Bourdieu (1980) lays on Sartre “who created the intellectual as an uncreated creator” (p. 11).
meaning that they are imbued with the collective and historical competencies and properties that constitute and give meaning to the social worlds that constitute them as individuals. Thus, by individual psychology we mean not the idiosyncrasies of personalities but rather the individual psychologisation of collective life (or socialised psychology) forms that are products of historical, political, social, economic and symbolic processes. In this the personal turns out to be as much political, historical and social. Consequently, when the individual perceives in the ‘other’ similarities in opinions, life views, tastes and beliefs it is not because the ‘other’ is a duplicate of the self but because such attributes are collective (social) properties that the individual uses for self-understanding. Psychological perception does not appear to obey the personal-social conceptual distinction and in fact seems to collapse it. In this sense, we can speak of a social psychology precisely because the individual-society, individual-group and personal-social distinctions are more permeable then we often allow. Psychologically, social life is possible because the self is able to join with the ‘other’ in the journey of social existence in ways that operate as if a generative mechanism for all manner of collective practices and life forms. However, this is not to say anything about how individuals in different or similar circumstances may think, feel and act. We need to be careful here to note that the partnering of the self with the ‘other’ we are referring to is not a purely psychological achievement but also draws its foundation from the symbolic and materiality of existence shared between people. In a different formulation, people are able to easily identify, relate or understand each other partly because they stand on the same material and symbolic platform, or their conditions of reality are approximately the same and thus the way they have been socialised
may also be somewhat similar. Their life experiences have the probability of being similar because their positions and thus dispositions in the world are products of the same mould. The combined effect of all this leads to the same conclusion reached in the previous chapter that self-segregation is “a psycho-social reproduction of identities whose conditions of possibility and articulations in the world converge on the same versions of reality and existence”. We now turn our investigation to the psychological and social materials used by social agents to construct and negotiate a synchronised psychological vision.

*Self-other perception*

*Group 4*

Buhle: ...What has, as you were saying, drawn you guys to these people that are here [referring to the group]?

Debbie: I think it’s just our personalities. We all have very different personalities. But we all just click well together. I don’t know, we just go well together.

Marcia: I think we’re all the same type of people. We’re all the type of people who would sit in somebody’s room and watch movies on a laptop. Instead of going out and like strip all our clothes, like have twenty per cent of our body covered. We’re not those types of people, we’re similar people.

Megan: I think what bonds us is humour as well. Like in the dining hall, if someone makes a joke and like we’d find it funny. And we’d talk about the same sort of stuff and find the same sort of stuff funny or entertaining.

Marcia: I think that the differences that we’re talking about are all superficial. Like whether, I swear in Afrikaans and she swears in Japanese doesn’t really affect us on a basic level. Like, Debbie and Jenna can relate to each other as people on a core, basic level and the differences are superficial they don’t really matter.
It has already been suggested that the psychological and social proximity of people who perceive themselves to be similar in dimensions that are important to them also allows for the production of a psychological and social narrative about who they are as individuals and a collective in the world. This narrative is what we can also refer to as the more-or-less synchronised psychological vision of selves and the world. At first appearance the above account embodies a similarity-difference contradiction—‘I think we’re all the same type of people’ and ‘we all have very different personalities’. This contradiction however, can easily be resolved. The formation of social ties has very little to do with the founding of the league of personality types but is rather the creation and consolidation of a psychological vision of selves and the world. The latter is central because it is a collective attempt to answer a question to which perhaps there is no real or satisfactory answer—who am I? In this sense we can think of the formation of collective life forms and hence self-segregation as a type of organising, mobilising and comradeship toward a sense of shared meanings and understanding of who we are in the world. For this reason, different types of personalities can join forces in the journey of co-creating versions of realities. This is not to imply that anybody can get along with everybody for indeed personality peculiarities may get in the way of harmonious co-existence. The point is that when people are united by what they perceive to be salient to who they are, or to who they have become in the world, personality differences are treated as superficial and can be said to be differences that don’t make a difference. That is, they do not challenge the structure of the collective narrative. The question then arises about what is meant by ‘same type of people’. As far as I can see, this is what I referred to as “socialised psychology” (p. 210)
— people are able to easily identify, relate or understand each other partly because they stand on the same material and symbolic platform. Marcia is saying the same thing in the above excerpt and so is Samantha as we witnessed in group 4. Thus, their psychological vision of themselves in the world is approximately synchronised which is partly why they believe that they ‘can relate to each other as people on a core, basic level and the differences are superficial, they don’t really matter.’ The self-other perception principle is not unique to students who begin new friendships at university as is evident below in this group of students who have been friends for seven years.

**Group 3**

Buhle: And how have all of these experiences and particularly God and Church being very important in your lives influenced who you’ve chosen or have allowed into your group, into your lives as it were?

Masego: I think the boys that we’re friends with, they’re just normal boys. I think we look for normal. I think that we have this normal thing that we look for and, I guess, I don’t know, some people may see it is being judgemental of people, but we’re very weary of the kind of people that we don’t want to be our friends. I guess its people that are superficial and kind of like all about the outside and not natural. I think we’ve gone past that, I think it’s not that we feel like we’re better, but we’ve grown out of that place in our lives. We’ve found that coming here, you really need people that we can be real with and these guys are real guys, just normal boys because we’re not men and women yet and they’re not trying to be. You find a lot of people that are trying to be adults, they’re not there yet either and it’s so wonderful that we can just be kids and watch TV and it will be fine, and everyone goes back to their rooms and no-one asks, ‘so what are we doing later?’

Buhle: Okay, so that part I get. You also spoke about superficial people and of course, you’re not judging here but what are the kind of people that you would say are superficial and will not be part of this friendship group?

Tshwaro: That’s a good question. I would have to acknowledge that.

Lulama: I would have to say if they have God in them, Jesus. That’s the one thing that draws me to them, but the others...eish! [Long silence]
Masego: I guess maybe we are not normal but I don’t know, to us this is normal. I guess I should be with like, I don’t know maybe that’s them. Maybe that’s really who they are, I find it very hard to believe that they’re normal, that’s who they are. I mean you can get... I believe a human has a body, mind and spirit so body and soul, mind and soul, the words are interchangeable. These people have this habit of hiding their souls, you know, and with outside stuff like their own relationships they have with each other. You find out a lot about someone from how they relate to their own friends. How they relate to their own friends would be about school marks, academics, cars and money and things. You know guys, boyfriends and girlfriends and it’s very, very difficult to get to someone’s heart on something. That is the kind of threat that we avoid because you just never know. I think another thing is that we have spoilt each other in the sense that we never keep each other guessing, it’s never about I wonder what she is going to do today. I mean for me with them; maybe I am a naughty. I never have to wonder what they are thinking or that they have changed, you know, and I guess I would describe it as superficial, they are changing all the time. This fashion and it changes all the time and we go with whatever is in so you can’t build a sustainable relationship based on something like that so I think these are the people that I would say, you know.

The self-other perception or synchronised psychological vision we are investigating here is a product of psycho-social labour of which conversation, language, ‘race’ and class are some of the materials used in its production. We turn to these materials respectively.

The uses of conversation

Group 6

Buhle: You [pointing to Bulelwa] were saying earlier on that the people that you are friends with now were certainly not the only people you met during orientation week. So what has made it possible for you guys to, in the sense move beyond just that superficial contact with people and to getting to what you’re talking about Tumi, that kind of personal stuff. How did that happen?

Tumi: It was a deep conversation we had that made her to become my friends, you know? We surpassed that artificial friendship and it, ja.

Buhle: Right, are you suggesting that one of the things that in a sense allow you to transcend that superficial contact with people is the sharing of the personal or what
you’ve described as deep conversation? In a sense, it gives you a glimpse of that person...

Bulelwa: Precisely.

Vatiswa and Tumi: Ja, exactly, exactly.

Bulelwa: Like, a glimpse in terms of you can actually make sense of how they think, their personality, their likes, their dislikes and knowing that, like do I kind of fit in that. Is that also who I am? I don’t think you can have, okay, you could have friends that are completely different from you because I do. But then somehow, like, what you guys talk about, you kind of can’t get into a conversation properly because you guys are so different. So I think that sharing and then having that idea helps you decide, okay, ‘can I become friends with this person? Is she for keeps, is she for like, dismissal?’ kind of thing but...

Group: [laughter]

We often feel that we cannot claim to know someone if we have not had the opportunity to talk with them. Even then we often feel that we cannot claim to know a person very well if we have not spent time with them engaging in conversation and thus getting to know each other better. The place and importance of language and conversation in human relationships is perhaps a matter that anyone reading this document need not be persuaded about. The point to be made here is that in the number of possible ways that conversation could be used, people also use it as a means of self-disclosure, which presupposes that there is already established between them a degree of trust and connection. For the participants above, self-disclosure or deep conversation was the bridge from acquaintance to friendship. We have explored the role of the self-other perception/agreement and the above account suggests that conversation is one of the means by which participants may perceive, negotiate and consolidate a collective vision of themselves in the world. Bulelwa is saying the same thing when she asserts ‘...like do I kind of fit in that? Is that also who I am?’ Put differently, conversation can be used to test
whether the people we are interacting with would give a similar answer as we would to the question—who am I? Conversation allows participants to figure out whether they are ‘basically the same people’ and if so, they will probably form a primary friendship group. This last point contributes to the discussion on secondary friendships in Chapter Five which gave the impression that secondary friendships were formed with those who are racially different. The present view broadens this racial view and suggests that secondary friendships may primarily be formed with those whom a self-other perceptual agreement is not reached.

Although I argued that personality peculiarities are secondary to a synchronised psychological vision I also suggested that they should not altogether be discounted. However, it does appear to me that when participants use the term ‘personality’ they are largely referring to the self-other perception rather than to the psychology of personality types that either work or do not work together to varying degrees. Again, conversation is used here to ascertain the degree of fit between self and other towards an approximate psychological vision.

Language, accent and ethnic identities

The politics of language in the imposition of apartheid and the struggle against found its most vivid expression in what became known as the Soweto Uprising on June 16 1976 see Brink et.al., 2006; Hlongwane, Ndlovu and Mutloatse, 2006; Magubane, 1986). It seems that the issue of language, accent and identity is no less important today regarding the formation of voluntary social ties.
Group 3

Buhle: I have one last question, for you, at least for today, and that is what language do you often use when you’re together?


Buhle: Why is that?

Masego: Because we’re trying to keep it alive [emphasis].

Buhle: You’re trying to keep it alive? You feel like it’s being threatened?

Lulama: Yoh, every day!

Buhle: Everyday? What happens every day?

Masego: People are more and more like [puts on an accent] ‘Oh my God’ [group laughter], everybody talks like that.

Buhle: Like what? [laughter]

Masego: Like, ‘oh my God, like, what are we gonna do today?’ [putting on an accent, over-speak and laughter]. And it was like the first thing we noticed and we were all like, ‘okay guys, no, no we’re not going to be like this’. So when we are together we try to speak seTswana and not just seTswana, but the way that we speak it at home. And it’s funny, because some of the people like some of the girls from my floor, they know seTswana because some of them are Sotho and some are Pedi, they know it. But they can’t even hear us when we are talking because we have that accent, that way we talk from home. Because it’s like, it’s just. Just to keep it alive.

Tshwaro: Ya, and it makes you feel at home it makes you feel that you’re with your family right here. Like we say that we’re not just friends but we’re family. So you feel at home, you’re like yeah, I spoke today [said in seTswana].

SeTswana is used here as a proxy for ethnic identity and its ‘proper’ use as resource and expression of authentic ethnic identity. This posture is taken against other ethnic in-group members who are perceived as inauthentic in their ethnic identities. Thus, the use of seTswana is not only an attempt ‘to keep it alive’ but also an attempt to keep what they perceive to be an
authentic ethnic identity alive. The death of seTswana and ethnic identity comes in the taking up of an accent that is not of seTswana as it is spoken at home. The benchmark for ‘proper’ use of seTswana is the participants’ home-brewed accent and not the English accent they find at UCT. Thus, the speaking of seTswana with an appropriate accent appears for these students to be associated with the home-world they have left behind and which they seem to be intent to preserve perhaps for all that it holds for their collective self-concept. Interestingly, the issue is not only about speaking seTswana with an incorrect accent but also about Tswana, Sotho and Pedi students taking up an accent that is decidedly English. In doing this they are perceived as having abandoned their ethnic identities and having bought into a UCT accent. What this UCT accent is, is not hard to grasp if we accept that UCT has been and remains a largely White middle-class institution. In this view, what these students are rejecting is a White middle-class way of being at UCT; it is a rejection of linguistic and identity assimilation through accent.

Lulama is saying as much when she remarks

Lulama: The sad part is that you find third years, second years who are from Mafikeng but you can never tell because they always speak in that English, ‘oh my God, oh my God’, they all speak in that English. So you could, like it’s sad, it’s sad in the fact that you comply man, you comply and then you’re just one of the, one of the people at UCT. Agh no man, I’m sorry, I’m sorry I can’t do that.

On the same issue, Siphokazi below sees it as a matter of identity crisis and an attempt to impress White people. In reaction she asserts her ethnic identity through language use.
Group 7

Siphokazi: I don't specifically stick to certain people, or should I say I don't observe people that much. I have this feeling of not caring too much about people who don't care about themselves and if therefore, you depict a different picture to me than what you are, that's your own struggle, you're having an identity crisis, you're putting pressures on yourself, not me, so I don't really mind whether you're trying too much to be White or you're trying too much to fit into a certain group of people. I know where I come from and I live to the best of it and almost every time I show who I am and what I stand for, so if it means I come to a group of girls who speak Zulu and that day they decide to speak English, I'm not going to speak English. I'll speak English if there's a person who doesn't understand what I'm saying but when I'm there I'm going to speak Zulu because that's who I am. I'm not trying to impress and it's their struggle, it's not mine, that's what they're fighting against. I let them find themselves I don't want to interfere.

It is important to always hold in mind that this disposition toward language is held within a context perceived to be radically different to the home-word. There is in this a strong suggestion that these students are not only dealing with language and identity but also the different worlds and identities that are partly instituted through language and accent. To return home with a new accent and perhaps even a preference for English over seTswana or isiZulu would amount to a self-imposed marginalisation in the home-word. Indeed, a tragedy, for they would be perceived to have 'become one of them', to have become White because they do not speak seTswana 'properly' and are thus inauthentic in that world. This disposition on language matters also contributes to the production of a shared vision of the group as Lulama points out below.

Lulama: I think that’s what we share. We can’t, we just can’t do that. We can’t just comply and start speaking ‘Oh my God’.

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47 This is a same-‘race’ group of female friends (Ursula, Siphokazi and Khethiwe). Although they come from Black townships they report to have had interracial encounters particularly through their schools.
Masego: I would hate that hey. I would go home and people are like what happened to you, you know [group laughter]. Because at home, there are very few people like that, very few Western people, there’s very few of them and to come home and suddenly become one of them, that would be, that would be tragic. Especially because we learnt Setswana even at school.

The complexities of language and the worlds it institute are further illustrated by Khethiwe below.

*Group 7*

Khethiwe: You know it’s funny, you know you might say that it’s UCT but it’s actually a world-wide thing for people to be conceited if I might say because I think most of it comes from how you look and how you speak and such things. Like a typical example would be Facebook, so I decided on my birthday I’m going to deactivate that account. I’ve been wanting to deactivate that account because I feel like you only befriend a person, you don’t even know them, you just see how they look and you decide this is the person I want to associate myself with, so because of that ... yes that bothers me a little bit and you know because I’m from Johannesburg because I grew up in the township ... I don’t know, I’ve just been put in a box a lot. Do you know it’s funny at home I speak a lot of English, I’m called a ‘coconut’, when I get here I choose to speak Zulu for certain reasons and I’m called ‘ghetto’ and I don’t get it, it frustrates me. That word, first of all its non-existent in South Africa, something ghetto is something so American but it bothers me and already if you’re ghetto I don’t think it’s seen in a positive light.

Thus, the risk that Masego and her friends are circumventing is being called ‘coconuts’ when at home. Yet Khethiwe’s experience points out that while Masego and her friends may not be labelled coconuts in Mafikeng they may be called ‘ghetto’ at UCT. We can see here that language and accent operate as ‘admission fees’ both at home and at university and the challenge is in possessing the appropriate fee for the appropriate space. Masego below sees language ‘as admission fee’ to also be a matter of adaptation and survival. Although she is probably correct in thinking that most people adopt an accent without much reflection she
comes short in realising that she was able to abandon this type of adaptation because she has a
group of friends with whom the UCT accent is not part of how they see themselves.

Masego: I think, it’s just, it’s not to make you think a person lacks character or has
more of it, it’s just that it’s a human survival thing. So you come here and you have
to adapt, so it’s an adaptation kind of technique that most people kind of just adopt
without thinking about it. I saw, because when I got here I also started speaking
differently. When I’m with them I speak normally, but when I’m with other people
and my other friend who is, his name is Safa, he was with me when I was speaking
to this other girl. After she left he was like, ‘why do you talk like that’ [Lulama:
laughs, did he say that?]. Ya, he actually, he was, I thought he was joking, because
he jokes a lot, and then I saw his face go really serious and he was like ‘why are you
talking like that?’ And I was like, ‘okay, wow, so I do it too’. But it’s very easy
because it, it helps you kind of like, it makes your fitting in process happen faster.
But then when you realise that you don’t have to, and this boils down to actually
thinking, ‘Cause people don’t think often [laughter]. But when you think about,
you don’t actually have to do that, and then you’re fine.

In all this it becomes clear that matters of language and accent are not only useful as
mechanism of self-disclosure and the self-other perception but are also used as ethnic identity
markers and a proxy for class identities, an issue we turn to below.

*Accent, class and race*

*Group 6*48

Buhle: I still wanted to talk about the language issue because that is something that
did come up a lot in the other conversations, about how language is also one of the
factors that plays a role in who you associate with others.

Qhayiya: We don’t want to admit it to ourselves. I don’t want to admit it. I don’t
know how to explain it. When you are new and you’re making friends and
somebody is inviting you on Facebook. They give you an inbox message, you look at

48 This excerpt is taken from the second interview of this group by which time two new members had joined this
group without a change in its racial profile.
them differently, it’s not like you don’t want to be friends with them, you look at
them differently if the language is not aah...and I’m very red pennish with language.
Buhle: What do you mean red pennish?
Qhayiya: Red pennish? I like to correct. I spot grammar, so when someone, their
language is a bit off. I don’t mind, but speak your language, maybe it’s hard here
because not everybody speaks Xhosa, but it just makes me see you, I don’t want to,
but I immediately see you in a different light. I think when I talk to you I must be like
this, you know. Friendships shouldn’t be like that, you should just be free in
friendships.
Buhle: So, let me get this straight. You are saying that language in this particular
instance plays a role in so far as the example you are giving, somebody
communicates in English and somehow their English is broken, right? Now you feel
the urge to get all red penned over it and correct the English, that is the first thing,
but not only that, but then it also changes your perception of the person. Or at
least, it starts to slightly influence how you are now going to act or communicate
with them, using this very language that you now know that they don’t command
well.
Qhayiya: I feel ashamed to say it.
Bulelwa: May I just ask? Is English not somehow linked to class?
Qhayiya: Yes, that’s why I’m saying, I’m ashamed because in essence, I am actually
judging someone by their class.
Buhle: Language is linked to class?
Group: The English language.
Vatiswa: The words you use and your accent.
Group: [Laughter]
Vatiswa: Accent is very important, I’m telling you.
Tumi: There is a Black accent that is just hmmm...
Group: [Laughter and over-talking]
Buhle: There is a black accent at UCT that is?
Vatiswa: It must be put through the washing, the tumble drier, everything.

There is the view here that command of the English language is linked to class such that English
fluency indicates a middle-class status and a poor command of English indicates a working-class
status. Perhaps this may not immediately make sense but its source is none other than common sense. Drawing on historical and present day ‘race’-class relations in South Africa it is still the case that access to quality education and thus a good command of English is linked to socio-economic upward mobility, which is what buys access to reputable public, semi-private and private schools. It is in these institutions that a command of English, with an accompanying accent, is acquired. The reverse is true for those who have not broken the shackles of poverty. Poor education received in under-resourced public schools and in these institutions students generally acquire a poor command of English, and an accompanying accent. By historical design the latter are still by and large Black youth living in Black townships and rural areas. The former are largely White youth and a small number of Black youth whose families have ruptured the historical ‘race’ and class relations of apartheid. It is on this logic, taken as a general principle, that English and accent become surrogates for class position. Irrespective of the racial identity of the person that Harmony is making reference to, the point she is making is that a poor command of English changes her perception of that person. Qhayiya claims to feel ashamed of her changing perception, which she sees as a judgement based on class position given the language-class link.49

In addition to the grammar, accent and the choice of words are also seen as important when using English. It is suggested by the participants that English should not be spoken with a Black accent, which according to the way we have constructed this argument, is a Black working class

49 This language-class link must be taken only as a general postulate because it is well known in South Africa that many men and women who during apartheid worked for long periods in White households became very fluent in English and Afrikaans.
accent. Thus, to speak English with the acceptable accent is not only a linguistic achievement but also a class achievement or at least an aspiration towards a class position. When it is remembered that these remarks are made within a White middle-class institution, speaking English with an accepted accent becomes an indication that one has integrated and belongs to this institution and its ways of being in the world. Consequently, the Black accent ought to be purged within this institution for all that it represents does not belong to this institution. In this we see that language proficiency and accent can be used as resources in the construction of a synchronised psychological vision of selves and the world. Claris from group 1 confirms this view below.

*Group 1*

Claris: From what I have seen, not that I do it, right, but then the people I talk to and the things they say just catch up with them. Let’s say you have a good accent and you have a group of people with a good accent and let’s say someone with a not so good English accent, let’s say the Black accent or the Indian accent comes into your group, some people feel that maybe they are bringing their style down. Let’s look at it this way, when Trevor Noah uses the whole Black accent, people find it funny, people generally tend to find any Black accent or any Indian or Chinese accent funny. Some people might take it like this person is bringing our swag down and therefore they should not be in this group, because when you go out, each person represents the group. So I think that is how some people maybe see the whole thing.

The issue of accent and ‘race’ is not as easy as saying there is a Black and a White accent. On the one hand, accent is of course, not a racial property in the sense that there is a Black and a White accent. For instance, people who stay in the Northern part of England have a different

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50 Trevor Noah is a famous South African stand-up comedian.
51 Swag here means not drapery but is colloquial term meaning style or image.
accent than those in the Southern part and yet all are native English speakers. On the other hand however, the matter becomes racialised and classed when the White English middle-class accent is taken as the standard format for speaking English at the University of Cape Town. English spoken with what might be called a Xhosa, Venda, Pedi or Tswana accent is simply not good enough. Unfortunately socio-economic mobility and educational achievements do not by some default bestow accent. The excerpt below illustrates not only this point but also that the White experience remains normative in this institution.

Group 6

Bulelwa: May I share something with you? I will use, this certainly is not linked to class, but then it’s linked to language and then the accents. Just this term we had a new lecturer. So we were expecting some White lady and then it’s ‘bang’ this Black guy. Then cool, not bad and then he starts talking and he really has this Black Venda accent. Hard-core, hard-core like seriously. It’s hard-core, he’s just the African man, seriously, but obviously that was not linked to his socio economic. You know he is well off, we know that he is rich in a way because he’s a lecturer and he’s got a PHD and he’s smart because he’s teaching us chemistry. But then that somehow made us look down on him because he could not speak English with a proper English accent and then the whole class, really did not respect him. It was so bad and then everyone kept on mimicking what he said in the background, we really didn’t look at him as a Black guy because we’re also Black, we didn’t look at him as poor or rich because we knew he was well off, it was just the language thing, it was so evident.

Tumi: More specifically the accent.

Vatiswa: Because his English is good the words he was using and everything.

Bulelwa: Everything, in terms of how to structure English sentences was good, it’s fine.

Vatiswa: Accent, you know when someone can speak good English, you can’t have a good English sense of humour if you can’t speak English, it just doesn’t work. He has got an excellent sense of humour, that guy is hilarious, he’s very funny, but people, just because it’s him, we even said it from the first lecture it’s just because he’s Black. If he was a White person, even if you didn’t know what he was doing, we would still be respectful towards him, but because he’s Black, he knows exactly what he’s doing but because of the accent you can’t give him proper respect.
Bulelwa: May I just mention something. It’s so crazy, if an African man has an African accent or someone African has an African accent. But then, if someone is from London comes, obviously the English accent is good because they’re English, if someone from America has an American accent, speaking English, it’s all cool. If someone from Ireland has an Irish accent, everything is okay... ‘Oh my word you’ve got an Irish accent’. But nobody goes, ‘Oh my word, you’ve got an African accent’. So we have accepted some accents as amazingly cool and others as not.

In this account the lecturer in question is not given respect not so much because of his ‘hard-core Venda’ accent but importantly because it combines with his racial identity. It appears to me that Bulelwa and Vatiswa are not entirely off the mark when they remark that had the lecturer been White, American or Irish reaction to his (hard-core) accent would in all likelihood have been different, if not admired. If we accept this we are then dealing with what I have called a *psycho-social white normativity* that founds Whiteness as ‘right…and Black people are kind of getting there...’ in Masego’s words. I have already argued that this normativity is a burden specifically for those students who emerge from contexts that still maintain an apartheid script. Perhaps, we should now say that this normativity is intensified in the lives of such students but that in reality it has a bearing on almost, if not all of us, in ways that are not readily recognisable in our everyday lives. The following excerpt touches on most of the points we have argued hitherto on the issue of accent.

**Group 4**

Buhle: I’m not sure so I just want to put this out there. This is something I found with talking to other participants that certain people feel slightly uncomfortable talking to me, particularly when I talk to White students. Sometimes at first they find it uncomfortable, I’m not sure if this was the same experience you had. Feeling that you couldn’t say certain things or that you had to hold back because of that, because of my skin colour perhaps, I’m just curious to know that.
Group: No, no.

Jessica: I think because your accent isn’t like, I’m being serious because it’s not like that heavy Black accent I felt more comfortable than I would have been if you had like a heavy Black accent. So your skin actually didn’t matter it was the fact that...

Marcia: SES, you’re eloquent.

Nicole: You know what, Trevor Noah puts it nicely, when a Black person has a bad accent like an English accent, it is immediately associated with being stupid, it just is and maybe it can be unconscious but you’ll realise it.

Megan: I think accent is a big part as well, I mean even more than race it’s how you speak. So as soon as someone speaks sort of the same as me I feel safer with them, sort of like I think we come from the same sort of place even though I have no information to ground that on. If someone is totally different it’s weird.

At this juncture we can now ask the question: what does accent have to do with friendship ties and self-segregation?

*Group 6*

Buhle: Of course, how we could relate it back is to ask the question, how does this bear on friendship formation? Does it have an influence to some degree on whom you would associate with on that friendship/acquaintance level?

Qhayiya: I think a major part of friendships, Harmony actually touched on this, is being accepted and I think we associate with people who are on the same level of maturity or class or language or whatever as we are because somehow, if we try and associate with those people, we almost feel that we’re entitled to be friends with them. I mean we don’t associate with somebody who we perceive to be of a higher class because we don’t feel entitled. We don’t feel as good as they are and ultimately we want to be accepted in our friendships. So by associating with people who we think are at our level we think, okay I’ve got a shot at this, ‘why shouldn’t they be friends with me?’ I’m entitled to this. Almost, you have a better chance of being accepted there than you are there.

Buhle: What if, for example, Harmony spoke English with a similar accent that your lecturer spoke English, what would happen then.

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52 Socio-economic status.
Bulelwa: I feel that I would have to stoop down, it would create this idea of her and who she is, so I would have to be, ‘Yes Harmony, how are you?’ I don’t know, I would have to change. I don’t know, it would create a different picture.

Buhle: Harmony wants to respond in her own defence.

Harmony: It’s okay, personally I can’t. I’ve been through that, being Venda, automatically they expect you to be friends. I have a friend right, and his English is not that great, she knows what I’m talking about. He doesn’t live here. But, his English is not good, even to this day and the first time I started speaking to him, I found myself washing down my English. The point is, when you get somebody who doesn’t speak like you, you feel like you need to wash it down a bit because I might be making you feel insecure about yourself and then the friendship won’t form and stuff like that, if that makes sense.

The idea of a picture used by Bulelwa is useful. This is a picture that is created by all kinds of materials including accent, language, ‘race’, and class. This picture is none other than a self-image and others can join the self in this picture and be accepted if they are perceived to be ‘on the same level of maturity or class or language or whatever’. In this way the participants can collaborate in creating a single picture of the themself in the world or what is the same thing, a synchronised psychological vision. In this instance, if the ‘accent and language elements’ are not correctly balanced this in turn requires the undertaking of psycho-social labour ‘when you get somebody who doesn’t speak like you, you feel like you need to wash it down a bit because I might be making you feel insecure about yourself and then the friendship won’t form’. Thus, this labour is avoided which is also an avoidance of a possible friendship that is perceived might be difficult to form precisely because of the labour it would require. The important point here is that language proficiency and accent create an image of the other that is either compatible or not with the one’s self-image and incompatibility indicates labour and dis-ease. A similar account is given below.
Group 4

Nicole: It’s like some people, although they are Coloured, I don’t like the way they speak, so I wouldn’t want to be their friend.

Group: [Laughter]

Nicole: I am being honest.

Marcia: There are some points that are necessary and then there are some points that aren’t.

Nicole: I wouldn’t, I just wouldn’t sit with a bunch of Coloured people that speak like that, I’m sorry. There are lots of other things for me, even humour and the way people express themselves. I wouldn’t be certain people’s friends, depending on whatever race because of that. With certain people I share more and I like the way they express themselves, like sometimes people can be very loud and out there. I like that and certain things about people I find that it is independent of race, but the way they speak, the way they dress even.

Megan: Last time you said the way people sound, like if you sort of sound the way I do, it’s okay, but if you have a really thick accent, it is going to be really hard to associate myself with you.

Nicole: Ja, like even their twang is heavy, I can’t handle that. Imagine having a DNC and the person is hitting those high notes. I just couldn’t.

Group: [Laughter]

Lastly, due to the extent to which ‘race’ and class in South Africa are contentious issues there is a real danger that one may take an overly racial and class view on human practices. Partly what the excerpt above does is caution us against the risk of racialising even those aspects of our human relations and practices that may not necessarily and primarily be racial or about class relations. The problem with overly racialising is that we give up our ability and responsibility to be reflective as students of society. There is also the danger of omitting those instances where the people we study are being reflective on their practices precisely because the interview gives

53 Colloquial term meaning accent.
54 Abbreviation for ‘deep and meaningful conversation’.
them the opportunity for reflection. This in turn, creates a particular and incorrect picture of social agents who are caught up in circumstances they are unaware of, on the hand. On the other hand, participants reflective moments have the chance to disrupt the theoretical narrative that we might be attempt to construct about them and their world. My view is that social studies such as is this one should in its process offer people the opportunities to be reflective of their circumstances because this in effect may be the only authentic way that as researchers we can hope to have made an impact in the lives of our participants. I refer to this as critical self-reflection after Pleasant (1999) who speaks of “critical social reflection” (p. 180).

The following excerpt illustrates such a moment of reflection and there are others which are omitted due to space limitations. Such narratives fragment the image of participants as unreflective dupes that some may deduce from our explorations hitherto. The point is simple, sometimes we are reflective of our every day practices and routines and most of the time we are not.

*Group 6*

Buhle: Isn’t there a sense in which we want to speak English as people may say like White people speak.

Bulelwa: We conform a lot. We conform a lot.

Qhayiya: English is spoken by White people and it sounds a certain way, I don’t know.

Vatiswa: If a White person tries to speak Xhosa and they can speak it with a fluent, a good accent then they are immediately held up here by the Black people, so I think it’s the same with White people, if you can speak English with a good accent and you can pronounce all the words you are immediately held up here by the White people.

Tumi: That makes sense because we don’t only make fun of African people.
Harmony: You know we make fun of Boer accents, you make fun of Afrikaner accents, you make fun of Venda accents, you make fun of Xhosa accents, you make fun of every accent that doesn’t sound correct, for me, even British accents are irritating, I think there is that tone, I think we want to reach a particular tone which is just, you can’t reach it, I don’t know how to put it.

Bulelwa: I think we have funny ‘hahahaha’ and then we have the ones we look down on. This is linked to class, because I’ve never seen... I’ve never met someone from the UK that is trying to conform to the White, to the South African way of speaking English. They are so comfortable with their own that when we meet them, it’s like ‘Oh my gosh, you’ve got this accent and it’s so cool...hahaha funny’...I agree you have to speak a certain language, you can’t speak Zulu with a Xhosa accent, it’s not going to sound right, but I feel like Black people, we conform and we set standards for everything that is what creates looking down on things and judging.

Harmony: The way I see it in my mind and I’m about to do it, we criticize ourselves way too much. It’s always us Black people do this, us Black people do this, but the reality is, everybody wants to be better. I was watching Oprah, I don’t know what I was watching, but it was a talk about the different classes in Britain and even in Britain and America they have different accents for different classes. Some British people speak nonsense English and they’re British, but it’s because they are a lower class. Some American people speak nonsense English and they are at a lower class. It’s not that we’re Black and we want to speak better, it’s just that we always want to be better. Everybody wants to be accepted by everybody and we just have inferiority within ourselves as people. Each single person, White, Black, Indian, Coloured, rich, non-rich, everybody feels like you’re inferior and certain things, material things in the world help you to feel not so inferior as the next person. Maybe I have an upper hand on this person. We just use material things to cover up a little inferiority complex within ourselves and unfortunately among Black people, its I speak English better or I live in a better house or I have more money or I went to this school, we just use material things to better ourselves.

**Conclusion**

The chapter began by exploring the experiences of students who enter the university context without friendships and argued that this is an experience that requires the performance of psycho-social labour as prerequisite for the formation of new friendships. Due to the fact that
many of these students are from racially diverse backgrounds our exploration soon turned to investigating the conditions that make such home-worlds possible. Here too the issue of labour emerged as a salient factor albeit this time what I called socio-economic labour performed primarily by Black individuals and families as an admission fee to historical White only spaces. In addition, English proficiency also suggested itself as important if one is to be part of White middle-class neighbourhoods and schools. Exploring the conditions for racially diverse home-worlds is important because it has implications for the social and psychological spaces of those participants who are socialised in such spaces and this in turn has influence on the formation of social ties. In this regard it was argued that one of the psychological dividends of being socialised in racially diverse spaces is that it lightens the burden of a psycho-social white normativity. More specifically it lightens the racial burden that is part of the ‘race-class’ registers of the psycho-social white normativity. Its limitation, on the other hand, is that it does not necessarily influence the formation of racially diverse social ties and when it does these friendships tend to be chosen from within the same middle-class bracket. In these cases, racially heterogeneity seems to be premised on class homogeneity. Constructing the theoretical narrative in this form is helpful because it shows the spurious divisions between the so-called macro-micro, social-psychological, structure-agency debates which are almost always debates of academic convenience.

We then turned to the matter of psychological visions and social divisions which in essence is social identification and self-categorisation in social psychological terminology. The point being argued here is that most, if not all, forms of human affiliations should be viewed as types as
self-segregation. This section showed that social human relations are formed on the basis of a shared psychological perception of who they are in the world. This vision however, is constructed using all manner of historical, political, economic and cultural materials and of these we investigated the uses of language and accent and their relation to ethnic, racial and class identities. On all accounts whether it is racially diverse or same-‘race’ friendships the principles of association and the use of these materials is to the same end—creating a synchronised vision of selves in the world. The outcome is life forms lived almost seamlessly and with little effort thus, allowing us to repeat patterns of practices and to create a stable narrative about who we are to ourselves and to others.

Confronted with the explorations of this and the previous chapter we want to ask what is the most useful, unapologetic and non-interventionist way of making sense of self-segregation amongst first year university students at the University of Cape Town? I do not believe that we are dealing here with a case of racial prejudice that can be ameliorated by special types of contact as has been argued for decades by Contact Theory researchers. However, I do think that in its presently advanced form, Contact Theory does shed light on some important aspects of human relations. Nonetheless, psychological rehabilitation models that have been developed in Contact Theory laboratories may in the final analysis not be the answer sought by those whose passion is to change the world through academic discourse. Nothing can be done about self-segregation because it is a principle way in which we organise our human relations and lives—an endless drawing of boundaries. Thus, self-segregation is a false problem that entices us because it is readily visible to the eye. Our real challenge which is also our real problem is the
creation of realities/worlds and the materials and institutions we use to this end. Put
differently, our challenge is how to overcome our ugly histories and build a radically different
future when our histories reincarnate in the present like a recurring nightmare of despair and
horror. The social, economic, psychological, political, symbolic, linguistic and historical content
of present forms of self-segregation is what needs to be changed and I suspect that we do not
know how.
Chapter Seven: Discussion and conclusion

Introduction

The following discussion is in effect a continuation and consolidation of the interpretative work undertaken in Chapters Five and Six. There was a deliberate attempt in writing those chapters to suspend, as much as possible, theoretical ideas and insights. The aim was two-fold. To give space for the expression of the participants’ voices as they grappled with and collectively constructed the narratives of their realities and identities, on the one hand. On the other hand, it was to give space to my own voice in my attempt to describe and interpret the participants’ retrospective accounts of their worlds and themselves in it. The themes around which the narratives presented in Chapters Five and Six are organised and the concepts I introduce in elucidating these narratives are best thought of as interpretative tools. In continuing the work of interpreting here I bring in different theoretical concepts and insights to enrich the theoretical narrative being constructed from the participants’ accounts. This in other words, is a completion of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ – the “process by which a particular interpretation is derived from a series of instances, which then serves to unify those instances as part of a larger whole” (Tappen, 1997, p. 647). The discussion is organised under three concepts: space, tools of identification, and the body. Selectively drawing on various works, each concept is elaborated and the themes presented in Chapters Five and Six are discussed under each. As in Chapters Five and Six I am here still concerned with constructing the interface between the
social and psychological in an attempt to understand the practice of self-segregation. Lastly, the
discussion cannot attend to all the issues that were raised in chapters four and five and must
therefore be read as a summary and theoretical rendition of the major issues.

Producing social space

The heading to this section is inspired by Lefebvre’s (1991) Marxist text The Production of
Space, which is concerned with everyday life and the expanding urbanisation of cities in
western societies throughout the 20th century. Molotch (1993) notes that ‘production’ and
‘space’ are both saturated terms which Lefebvre devotes his text to explaining. For Lefebvre,
production

...means that humans create the space in which they make their lives; it is a project shaped
by interests of classes, experts, the grassroots, and other contending forces. Space is not
simply inherited from nature, or passed on from the dead hand of the past...Space is
produced and reproduced through human intentions, even if unanticipated consequences
also develop and even as space constrains and influences those producing it (Malotch,

Production implies human labour which for our purposes will carry the same meaning as
‘psycho-social labour’, a concept introduced in chapter four. Psycho-social labour is the
psychological and social aspect of all the effort and time invested in the initiation, development
and maintenance of social relations. Social space is thus produced by the actions and
interactions of people who co-exist within opportunity structures (the various structures of contact such as schools, neighbourhoods, university residences, lecture halls, extracurricular activities etc.). This also means that social space is the embodiment of the mood and character of social relations— the lived experience of for example, social inclusiveness, or war.

Viewed in this way social space is a ‘living’ property of human relations. In addition social space has a ‘double helix’. On the one hand, it is influenced by opportunity structures that can be extended to include the accumulated historical, political, economic and symbolic relations between social groups in a society, region, community or institution. On the other hand, it is influenced by the actions, thoughts and feelings exchanged between people in their interactions with each other within the contexts of opportunity structures. This way of conceiving social space is useful because it sidesteps the structure/agency dichotomy while retaining the role and importance of both structure and agency.

To maximise the theoretical utility of this conception of social space we need to further elaborate the structural component. We can do this by relating opportunity structures to Bourdieu’s take on social space:

It is true that one can observe almost everywhere a tendency toward spatial segregation, people who are close together in social space tending to find themselves, by choice or by necessity, close to one another in geographic space... Interactions...mask the structures that are realised in them. (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 16).
Spatial segregation expresses the mood and character of relations between social groups (e.g. avoidance, in-group preference, social exclusion etc.) arising out of conscious choice, or inadvertently. Bourdieu’s insight is in arguing that behind such spatial relations is an order of structural relations that are reproduced in spatial relations. Bourdieu is urging us to move beyond a visual reading of social relations and to search for their materiality, as it were. It is in this sense that Bourdieu’s thought supports the metaphor of social space as a double-helix.

Elsewhere he notes that

...social space is so constructed that agents who occupy similar or neighbouring positions are placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, and therefore have every chance of having similar dispositions and interests, and thus of producing practices that are themselves similar (1985, p. 725).\(^{55}\)

For Bourdieu there exists a correspondence between the structural conditions of life possibilities (i.e. opportunity structures) that approximately determine (through conditioning or socialisation processes) the dispositions\(^ {56}\) and practices that people take up in constructing their social existence and identities. Finally then, we can understand social space as social

\(^{55}\) When Bourdieu refers to the construction of social space he primarily has in mind the task as undertaken by the theorist building an explanatory model. He therefore emphasises that the groups represented by such a model are not real groups organised around any issue but instead are ‘theoretical groups’ or ‘groups on paper’. An example of a ‘real group’ for Bourdieu would be a trade union and political party while a friendship groups would be an example of a ‘theoretical group’.

\(^{56}\) In Bourdieu’s hands the term has three different meanings that are not without contradiction (see Jenkins, 1992, p.76). For the present discussion disposition “…expresses first the result of an organizing action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 214 italics in original).
relations that are mapped onto physical space through specific arrangements of human bodies. The arrangement of bodies in space and time is influenced by the forces of opportunity structures that provide limited and limiting socially scripted dispositions and practices of social identities. These limits, however, can be transcended through conscious and creative human practices (psycho-social labour) that forge new identities and ways of co-existing in the world.

*Self-segregation: reproducing the social and psychological structures of the home-world*

On the preceding backdrop we can begin to reconstruct and reinterpret the explorations of Chapters Five and Six. The participants of this study can be said to be on a trajectory that is primarily experienced as a personal journey through life. This is also a social trajectory in which the participants have joined in the collective experience and living of social life. In this regard their trajectory is also historical and political in that the present forms of social life and relations that they are immersed in are products of past economic, political and social opportunity structures and the struggles within these structures to constitute the world in particular ways. The experiences captured in this study are a fraction of a larger and complex flow of the participants’ social life and the University of Cape Town (UCT) is one institutional context, amongst others, in which their experiences are lived.

There was a limited descriptive and speculative attempt in Chapters Five and Six to assemble a picture of the various home-worlds from which the participants emerge from prior to their life at UCT. I suggested a dichotomous scheme of racially diverse and racially homogeneous home-
worlds. This scheme seemed to broadly map onto a class structure to the extent that the participants who described their neighbourhoods and schools as racially mixed also reported that their neighbourhoods are middle-class suburbs that were historically White-only neighbourhoods. In addition, the schools they attended, even if they may not have been private schools, have historically been White-only schools that offered better education standards and charged high fees. By and large, the reverse was reported by participants whom I describe as coming from racially homogeneous Black neighbourhoods. Against the backdrop of apartheid and the general present order of ‘race’ and class relations this scheme broadly captures the reality that can be caricaturised as ‘Black and poor, White and rich’.

...the 1994 election of an African National Congress (ANC) majority... did not alter the enormous structural gap in wealth between the majority black and minority white populations. Indeed, it set in motion neoliberal policies that exacerbated class, race, and gender inequality (Bond, 2004, n.p).

My scheme is simplistic and problematic because it does not capture the changes and complexities of the present South African class structure. For example, Seekings (2003) has noted that

The growth of the black elite and ‘middle class’ is evident in advertising as in real life. At the same time, huge numbers of black people are confined to an ‘underclass’ of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. Most white people have retained the advantages conferred by their class position at the end of apartheid. But, at the same time, a small number of white people are downwardly mobile (p. 2).
There are also problems with assuming class categories on the bases of neighbourhoods and schools. I did not collect any data that would allow for a class analysis of the participants’ home background. A critique of these shortcomings should also acknowledge that the limited scope of the present project simply did not allow for a detailed class exploration and analysis. Ultimately the crude class categories used in this study are useful insofar as they point to other issues that they are linked to. Seekings (2003), again:

...the empirical value of class categories lies in part in their use in predicting other things – such as inter-generational mobility, lifestyles, attitudes and consciousness, political behaviour and so on (p. 3).

Thus, notwithstanding these shortcomings, it is still useful to treat the participants’ home-worlds as their point of social genesis. The racial and class constitution of home-worlds play an important role in providing the social and psychological conditions and materials out of which arise approximately stable social identity dispositions and practices. This means that by the time students enter the university context they are competent agents in navigating the social world, negotiating and living their social identities in the particular ways made possible by their home-worlds. Like the home-worlds from which they have come, these students find the university space already in existence with all its history, contradictions, symbols, hegemonic and marginalised ways of being, its norms and its continuities and discontinuities. The university institution is a world in its own right although not separate from the influences of broader society. The university is not only an institution of higher education but is also a
middle-class cultural institution (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979). This means that those students who are from middle-class home-worlds can expect an easy transition into the university because both the subtleties and dominant ways of being mirror the culture of their home-world. For those students to whom a middle-class culture is foreign, so too will the cultural experience of the university seem foreign. They will be like ‘fish out of water’ and if they are to avoid a ‘social death’ (Goffman, 1961)\(^5\) they need to invest a great deal of psycho-social labour in learning the landscape and ways of being in this institution. This is a story of cultural continuity and rupture, respectively.

In spite of this difference the crucial point to note is that irrespective of the nature of the home-world new students must find ways to insert themselves in the ‘living tissue’ (Elias, 1991) of the already existing social relations and spaces within the university. Yet at the same time new students have the opportunity, by virtue of being in a new place, to recreate themselves and their relations with others in ways that will confirm or contradict the dominant patterns of social relations on campus. By dominant patterns I mean the racial self-segregation that is now taken as a fact of life within the university (see Erasmus & de Wet, 2003; Tredoux, Dixon, Underwood, Nunez & Finchilescu, 2005; Schrieff, Tredoux, Dixon & Finchilescu, 2005; Bangeni & Kapp, 2005; Alexander, 2006; 2007). How then do new students begin to navigate this new environment and negotiate their social existence in it?

\(^5\) By ‘fish out of water’ I am suggesting that for students whom a middle-class life experience is foreign they may find the university as a middle-class institution and especially its unwritten codes to be a little disorientating precisely because they do not yet possess the middle-class cultural capital that their counterparts possess. We can think of this as a kind of ‘cultural rupture’. By ‘social death’ I am referring to the failure to acquire the necessary cultural capital that would allow these students to partake in the life of the university as culturally and socially competent members.
It is helpful to think of the newly arrived university students as being out of place and without people. They are out of place because they are not familiar with the university space and how to navigate in, through and around it. They are without people because they have yet to establish relationships with others in this space. The latter is not true for all students, for there are indeed students who enter the university with friends from their home-worlds. As a general observation we can note that the first hours, days and weeks after arriving at the university offer new students a multitude of opportunities to initiate new friendships. Opportunities for initial contact and interaction come in the form of structured activities that include: residence registration, faculty registration, and a range of social activities that form part of Orientation Week. The importance of Orientation as an opportunity structure for students to initiate new friendships was highlighted in Chapter Five. It is during these initial encounters that students put to use their accumulated (social and personal) histories, identity dispositions and varied resources to insert themselves within the social fabric of the university through the forming of social ties. For example, students use shared past spaces as nodes of commonality upon which to fashion an initial encounter. These commonalities may include attendance at the same secondary school, or coming from the same neighborhood, and these may be used as a ‘platform’ to initiate contact with someone recognized as familiar. Alternatively, students may come to have contact with another student(s) for the very first time in one of the university-structured initiation activities (e.g. ‘ice breaking’ games, campus tours, city tours, night life social activities, meal sharing, faculty registrations, etc.). In this instance, students’ initial encounters may reveal that they share common properties (cultural background, home
province, ethnic identities, a range of social interests, academic department and/or programme). For most of the students in this study, living in the same residence meant that they were in close proximity. This created a condition of ‘ease of contact’ and in turn increased frequency of contact and the probability of actual interactions.

We can thus begin to understand the process of initial encounters through what Goldberg (2004) calls the ‘abstract presumption of familialism’

The traits or characteristics I take myself to share with those I consider like me conjure an abstract familial connectivity. That I am like them, or they are like me, must mean that we are familially connected...I can presume to know you because your somehow looking like me on some supposedly crucial markers (skin color, hair texture, facial shape mannerisms, ways of speaking, even dress and the like) suggests also social dispositions and perhaps even beliefs (p. 214).

Goldberg’s ‘abstract familialism’ is relevant here to the extent that students’ initial contacts are based on external signs or cues (e.g. attending the same high school, language, living in the same residence or corridor, etc.) and the readily visible bodily characteristics that afford a simple and quick assessment of the ‘other’ as similar to oneself on certain shared properties. It is on this that the probability of an acquaintanceship is imagined and often established. The combined effect is that within a short time frame students organise themselves into groups of acquaintances. This appears to be driven by an emotional need for a sense of being part of something rather than nothing, of being with people rather than alone, by the feeling of having
a place rather than being misplaced. What we have here are the beginnings of claims to social identity in this new context.

However, as I argued in Chapter Five there is a qualitative experiential difference between students who enter the university with friends and those who do not. The issue largely comes down to the investment of psycho-social labour in the formation of friendship groups. As noted in Chapter Five those without existing friendships have to be proactive in initiating and developing friendships. Those with friends for the most part seem to continue ‘life as usual’ within the context of their friendship groups. For the former group, psycho-social labour involves willingness, if not a necessity, to open oneself to the possibilities of new relationships with others, on the one hand. On the other hand, it is to experience all the weight that the initiation of new relationships invites (i.e. the vulnerability of showing oneself to others, the possibility of rejection, an evaluation of goodness-of fit between self and others, etc.). In all this, the task is to co-create a psycho-emotive bond\(^{58}\) out of which interpersonal and social relations will be lived. Put differently, psycho-social labour is invested toward the creation of a psycho-emotive bond as the psychological founding stone of social ties. It is precisely at this juncture that we find a difference between these students and those who enter the university with existing friendships. Those with existing friendships are spared the investment of psycho-social labour because they do not have to recreate a psycho-emotive bond. They draw from the existing bond that they bring into the university. It is in this sense that these participants

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\(^{58}\)By psycho-emotive bonds I mean psychological identification as outlined in Social identity Theory (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and emotional attachment as two sides of social identification. These bonds find their source in collectively created and shared experiences, emotions and memories that work like a membrane that binds social agents and simultaneously, even if inadvertently, seals them off from other people.
continue ‘life as usual’ because what has changed for them is the context of their experiences and not the psycho-emotive contents of their social ties. Illustrative examples of this were given in Chapter Five. In both cases (of existing and new friendships) the important role of chance in bringing participants in close physical proximity within the university was also highlighted.

We now come to the question of the relation between opportunity structures and the psycho-emotive; the social and the psychological; conditions and conditionings. In coming to that understanding we can recast the preceding discussion in the following terms. The processes of student friendship formation begin within hours of their arrival at university. A range of opportunity structures facilitates this process by bringing students into close physical proximity and by structuring their initial encounters. In this, and especially for those students who enter the university without friends, there is a tendency towards the ‘presupposition of abstract familialism’ (Goldberg, 2004) as a strategy to ‘read’ the social scene and to identify possible social collaborators in the quest to found a new social existence in this new context. This forms part of the psycho-social labour that these students must undertake as much as it is a social ‘screening’ process at the center of which is the principle of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001)[59]. In Chapter One I interpreted homophily by breaking it into two components (One: such that ‘connection’ means the formation of social relations amongst people; Two: ‘similarity breeds connection’ which is to say that conditions of possibility and life chances whose process of production have been the same have the probability of goodness of fit). From this may arise different forms of networks from the most formal and institutional to the most informal and

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[59] The principle that “similarity breeds connection...and structures network ties of every type...” (p. 415).
casual. This understanding of homophily resembles that of social space elaborated in Chapter Six. In both cases the argument is the same: the structural conditions of the social worlds that collude and give way to social relations determine the psychological character of those social relations. Once in motion the process may become relational or dialectical meaning that the psychological and the social are interdependent in such a way that it would be difficult to postulate cause and effect. At best we can say that the process is relational. With this in mind let us then attempt to pull together the social-psychological relations of first year student friendships.

‘Race’ and class: the architectural blueprint of two nations

Racial diversity (e.g. in interpersonal and social relations, the composition of communities and institutions) is one of the key ideals of post-apartheid South Africa. In Chapters Five and Six I argued that this ideal has been achieved in large part because of a unilateral movement of Black people into historically White-only spaces whether these be communities, schools or universities. The admission fee into these spaces is paid by the socio-economic advancement of Black people to middle class status. This is what I referred to as the rupture of historical ‘race’-class relations. In other words, it is the rupture of apartheid’s architectural blueprint—the systematic economic and social advancement of White people founded on the systematic arrested economic and social development of Black people. This rupture however has been achieved by a small fraction of the Black population while the majority continue to live under apartheid’s social and economic underdevelopment blueprint. It is for these reasons that Mbeki
has remarked that ‘South Africa is a country of two nations’ (Mbeki, 1998). It is from these two nations that the participants of this study emerge. We have already seen that the students who come from racially diverse middle-class schools and communities do not always form racially diverse friendship groups at university as is generally hoped and as the social psychological literature suggests (e.g. Levin et al., 2003; Laar et al., 2005; Odell et al., 2005). I want to focus the discussion on what is socially and psychologically achieved and made visible and invisible as a function of the ‘two nations of South Africa’.

Racially diverse middle class home-worlds close the historical racial physical distance through the sharing of communities and schools. This also seems to give way to the formation of psycho-emotive relations of proximity as shown by the participants’ accounts of their home experiences and their racially diverse university friendship groups. To the extent that this is true, it seems to be an effect of the approximately levelled interracial material base of social existence. This means that irrespective of racial identities these students’ social and economic life chances and experiences are similar because they arise from similar opportunity structures. Consequently, by the time these students enter university intergroup encounters are for them a ‘non-event’—racial identities no longer carry the weight of history that generally characterises intergroup relations in South Africa. Thus, the racial diversity of their friendship groups reflects the racial diversity of their social genesis. Given the history of the country and the present aspiration toward social inclusiveness this achievement is a significant inroad. On this backdrop it is unsurprising although disheartening to observe that these racially diverse friendship ties include only those students of middle-class standing. This suggests that racial heterogeneity in
social relations is materially supported by socio-economic homogeneity. In a different formulation, the racial heterogeneity of social relations is a high-end socio-political commodity consumed by a minority and produced by the socio-economic labour of a fraction of that minority. It is also in this regard that some have suggested that the racial struggle is being replaced by a class struggle that shows more intra- than intergroup inequalities.

The reality is that South Africa has witnessed the replacement of racial apartheid with what is increasingly referred to as class apartheid—systemic underdevelopment and segregation of the oppressed majority through structured economic, political, legal, and cultural practices (Bond, 2004, n.p).

Furthermore, this shows the complexities of social change in South Africa arising from ‘race’-class relations. This case is complicated by the further observation that even in those instances where students from middle class home-worlds have racially homogeneous friendship groups the members of these groups are decidedly of middle class background. Here it seems that socio-economic mobility prompts instances of intra-racial class self-segregation.

We now turn to the case of students who come from racially homogeneous communities and schools. Spatially segregated from other social groups these home-worlds still retain much of apartheid’s ‘race’ and class architectural blueprint. In instances where there is physical proximity this tends to set up a spatial juxtaposition of ‘two nations’ divided on ‘race’ and class. In this case Black students observe that their lot is underprivileged in physical, social and economic terms and the reverse is true of their White counterparts. The inequalities that arise
from this lopsided interracial material base of social existence are deposited in racial identities, entrenching apartheid’s ‘race’-class design: Black and poor, White and rich. This establishes in the lives of these students what I have called a **psycho-social white normativity**— the perception that Whiteness represents what is right and valuable and thus what Black people should aspire to attain. In the words of a participant, ‘White people are on a pedestal’ and Black people look up toward them for legitimate ways of being in the world\(^6\). Bringing all this psycho-social weight into the university context these students reinstate the physical and social distance of their home-worlds in the general orientation towards their White counterparts. At the centre of this is a schism—fascination and phobia. This schism partly has its roots in the generational transmission of apartheid psychology in which parents portray White people as ‘better than’ Black people in the remarks they make to the participants—‘White people don’t do that’, At university, participants elaborate this script, for example by interpreting the requirements of the Admission Policy as confirmation that ‘White people are cleverer than Black people’. The sense of phobia expresses itself as a fear of a ‘Whiteness judgemental gaze’—‘Will I sit right? To them, will this be the right way to do things?’ Altogether this reincarnates the psychological mood and spirit of apartheid in these participants’ lives even though they may have been born after its annulment in law. It seems then that these students find in these experiences and their interpretations of them ground to distance themselves from

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\(^6\) One can loosely invoke Du Bois’s (1903, 2007) concept of ‘Double Consciousness’: “It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (p. 8). Also see Moore (2005).
their White-counterparts. Instead they form social relations with those whose life conditions and experiences resembles their own. In all likelihood those ‘others’ would be Black students.

In these accounts the experiential differences born of the different home-worlds that the participants emerge from should be clear. Interestingly for Black students, irrespective of their social genesis, there is a sharp splinter that pierces through their existence— a psycho-social white normativity. On a racial register, the psycho-social white normativity leads some Black students to feel and/or believe that ‘White is right’. Key in this register is a sense of racial inferiority and the unacknowledged pressure to perform Whiteness. This register is operative in the lives of some students from racially homogeneous and less developed communities. On the class register we find some Black students of middle-class standing using various strategies of avoidance such as stereotypes, false arguments (e.g. lack of exposure) and ridiculous fears (e.g. fear of poverty by which, is meant poor Black people). By the use of these tactics students who have not achieved middle-class social mobility are kept at a distance because it is perceived that they do not have possessions, do not occupy spaces and places, and do not perform activities that historically have been associated with Whiteness. Here too one finds an unacknowledged performance of Whiteness.

The preceding accounts must be taken as two exemplary cases that do not exhaust the complexities and contradictions inherent in the processes of establishing a social existence and articulating social identities in a new environment. The central argument I am making here, as in Chapter Five and Six, is as follows. The construction and articulation of our social identities through the formation of social relations is primarily shaped by the opportunity structures (life
opportunities and experiences) of our social genesis. Opportunity structures not only define and prescribe our social universe but set the boundaries of that world. Being social products of these opportunity structures we come to constitute them as much as they constitute us. This means that whether we are aware of it or not we tend to reproduce the opportunity structures of our social worlds through the social relations we form and the ways we articulate our social identities. In other words, much of what we do in our social relations is a reproduction and re-articulation of things already existing. This is what the foregoing discussion has attempted to illustrate. Yet what is missing in this is an understanding of how social agents identify each other as representatives of similar social universes as a prerequisite for reproduction and re-articulation. Put differently, what are the tools of identification used in the processes of the reproduction of social worlds and the re-articulation of social identities? This is what we now turn to.

*Tools of identification: psychological visions and social divisions*

In Chapter Six I argued that the formation of human relationships involves power relations and the uses and misuses of a host of tools or materials. It is these tools that I now suggest we think of as tools of identification. Key in this is the idea of the self-concept/image (the ways in which a social agent thinks about and sees him/herself in the world). People strive to “…preserve the integrity of the self-image…” (Tajfel, 1969, p. 92) which means that social agents will identify with others who re-affirm their existing self-definition. This also means that

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in this case social identification is the bridge between the individual and the group and the means by which the self and the group image are merged. This is the social psychological process of ‘self-categorisation’ to which Social Categorisation Theory is dedicated (see Turner et al., 1987). To the extent that self-categorisation is a process of drawing social and psychological boundaries, of inclusion and exclusion and of ‘we’ and ‘them’ it appears to me to be similar to the phenomenon of self-segregation. Put differently, self-categorisation (a social-psychological process) finds its expression in bodily distance and proximity in space and time. The psychological and social proximity arising from this allows for many things to be taken for granted, precisely because there is implicit consensus on those things. This is partly what allows for the almost seamless flow of life and orientation in the world. As I argued in the previous chapter this is in effect “a collective reproduction of a psychological and social narrative about ‘who we are in the world’. The combined effect is that a group of social agents can be said to have an approximately synchronised psychological vision of themselves and the world. This is crucial because it is a collective attempt to answer a question to which perhaps there is no real or satisfactory answer—who am I? In this sense we can think of the formation of collective life forms and hence self-segregation as a type of organising, mobilising and comradeship toward a sense of shared meanings and understanding of ‘who we are’ in the world” (p. 212). The explorations in Chapter Six under the sub-heading ‘self-other perception’ dealt with this issue.

The material for this collective psycho-social narrative is again what I am here calling the tools of identification. These tools are in their nature social, economic, political, historical, linguistic,
cultural and so forth. Social agents do not invent these tools but find them ready for use in the world (Bourdieu, 1989, in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 10).\(^6^2\)

*Conversation: the uses of language in constructing collective identities*

In this sub-section of the analysis I make use of post-structuralist views on the salience of language and discourse in the construction of social reality and subjectivities. In doing so, my intention is primarily to draw out maximum insights from the data and not because I now wish to take the position that language and discourse, in this study, have premium about other factors and processes that have been explored. Rather it is to acknowledge the importance of language and discourse in an arsenal of discursive resources available to the participants of this study.

People use language to express themselves and aspects of their experience. This is the traditional way of understanding the relationship between language and personhood (Burr, 2005). In this view language is a catalogue of labels that describe pre-existing internal states independent of language and thus persons and language are independent entities. This is a structuralist approach to language associated with the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1974) and at the centre of which is the view that “…the structure of language determines the lines along which we divide up our experience” (Burr, 2005, p. 36).

In Saussurian linguistics the *signifier* refers to a word or sound image and the *signified* refers to the idea/concept linked to the word. de Saussure’s contribution was in arguing that the link

\(^6^2\) See footnote 18 in the conclusion of Chapter 5.
between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. de Saussure however, believed that once the signifier was attached to the signified the relationship was fixed even though it was arbitrary (Burr, 2005, Weedon, 1987). Post-structuralist thinkers have developed de Saussure’s ideas and argue that language does not reflect or point to a pre-given reality but that language constitutes reality for us (Weedon, 1987). Consequently, “the meanings carried by language are never fixed, always open to question, always contestable, always temporary…” (ibid., p. 39). Post-structuralists argue that it is through language that persons come into being. Experiences, feelings and thoughts are a result of language rather than being expressed through language. (Weedon, 1987; Burr, 1995). Burr (1995) spells out two implications from the post-structuralist view of language. First, our understanding of what it means to be a person (e.g. having a personality, desires, love, etc.) is not an essential human nature that exists independently of language but becomes available through language as a means of structuring our experiences. Second, what a particular person is or has turned out to be could have been constructed differently. However, the work of construction is not an individual achievement but a collective effort:

> Every time we telephone a friend, visit our bank manager…or tell someone we love them, we, and the other people either actively or implicitly involved in that exchange, are in the process of constructing and reconstructing ourselves (Burr, 1995, p. 39).

This post-structuralist take on language leads us to the treatment of written and spoken language and social encounters as sites of struggle in which power relations are contested. This is partly because spoken and written language is tied to individual and group social practices
and the organisation and running of society (ibid). All this leads us to the concept of discourse.\textsuperscript{63}

If we bring the post-structuralist view of language outlined about to that of discourse we come to understand that concerning any issue, person, group, event, and so forth, there are a range of discourses that can be activated to represent the thing in question to the world (ibid).

Consequently, the status of the things social agents write and say are understood as

...manifestations of discourses...They have their origin not in the person’s private experience, but in the discursive culture that those people inhabit...[ (ibid., p. 50).

Lastly then we can say that both our personal and social identities are constructed using various discourses available to us in communication with other social agents. With this in mind we can begin to understand the importance of what students described as ‘deep conversations’ to which they attributed the turning point from acquaintanceship to friendship. Conservations were used by the participants as channels through which various discourses were exchanged and perhaps re-adjusted and re-articulated as they co-constructed a particular version of who they are in the new university context. Conversations allow students to collectively weave together a psycho-social discourse of who they are in the world. It is in this sense that participants’ accounts in this study reveal how they used conversations as a site of struggle in which discourses on language and accent were important resources in the contestation of social identities. For example, in Chapter Six some participants used language and accent to

\textsuperscript{63} The term ‘discourse’ has varied meanings, depending on the theoretical framework being used and the issues being addressed. For our purposes “A discourse refers to a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of an event. It refers to a particular picture that is painted of an event (or person or class of persons), a particular way of present it or them in a certain light” (Burr, 1995, p. 48). Important to note as well is that a discourse is “…a historically evolved set of interlocking and mutually supporting statements...” (Butler, 2002).
affirm their ethnic identities in an institution perceived to celebrate a White middle-class culture. Similarly, other participants used language and accent to affirm their middle-class identities. In the former case the ‘White middle-class accent’ was represented as inauthentic in relation to Tswana and Pedi ethnic identities (‘...they [other Tswana and Pedi students] can’t even hear us when we are talking because we have that accent, that way we talk from home’).

The students who do not understand Tswana or Pedi when spoken in the ‘home accent’ are portrayed as having succumbed to the pressure to assimilate into the university culture which in this instance is represented by the English accent. They are said, by the participants holding this view, to have lost their identities and to have become ‘one of many at UCT’. Furthermore, these participants see students who speak with an English accent to be experiencing an identity crisis and under that spell are attempting to impress White people or perform Whiteness. We must also understand this disposition toward language and accent in view of the fact that these participants come from communities where their ethnic language is their home language and not English. Thus, to speak the home vernacular is to claim and bring into the university both the identity and social world it institutes. It is claiming social existence within the university without agreeing to the consensus and unwritten dominant cultural and linguistic code. The accounts in Chapter Six further show that what is also being circumvented by adopting this discourse is a charge of being a ‘coconut’ (a derogatory term meaning that one is Black by skin and White in culture). This charge is likely to be faced back at home where English is not the spoken language while at university they run the risk of being labelled ‘ghetto’ (a derogatory
term suggesting that one behaves in ways stereotypically attributed to Black crime- and violence-ridden communities).

In the latter case, where participants used language and accent to affirm their class-identities, the ‘heavy Black accent’ was represented as unintelligent and a surrogate for something ‘unsafe or discomforting’ (‘I think because your accent isn’t like that heavy Black accent I felt more comfortable than I would have been if you had like a heavy Black accent’). This view of the ‘heavy Black’ accent derives from the history of ‘race’ and class relations in South Africa. The view is that a command of the English language is linked to class such that English fluency indicates a middle-class status. The key point here is that historically a middle-class social existence has been preserved solely for White people, save for a slim minority of Black people during apartheid, and in the present epoch. Correspondingly, a weak command of English indicates a poor or working-class status. Presently, access to quality education and thus a good command of English is linked to socio-economic upward mobility which is what buys access to reputable public, semi-private and private schools. For most Black people who achieve social mobility it is in these educational institutions that a command of English, often with the accompanying ‘appropriate’ accent, is acquired. It is in this way that English, accent, and class are conjoined. Middle-class participants (irrespective of racial identities) take issue with both a poor command of English and speaking of the language with an inappropriate accent i.e. ‘heavy Black’ accent. This is nothing different to what the former group of students do in relation to their ethnic language. In doing so, White students in this group are mobilising a discourse that

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64 See Chapter 6.
affirms their ethnic identity. Black students on the hand, may not necessarily be claiming a
White ethnic identity as much as a linguistic and class achievement that has historically been
tied to Whiteness. When it is remembered that these remarks are made within a White middle-
class institution, speaking English with an accepted accent becomes an indication that one has
integrated and belongs to this institution and its dominant cultural ways of being. In all this we
see that language and accent involve ethnic identities, ‘race’ and class relations. Yet there is
also the issue of a psycho-social white normativity that accentuates the importance of ‘race’. In
discussing accent in Chapter Six we came to the realisation that the issue is not only about
disparaged accents (e.g. Black, Venda, Indian) which are located in Black bodies. In this case,
that one is educated or may be of middle-class standing does little, if anything, to change the
unfavourable attitude towards the disparaged accent. However, a White person with an
American or Irish accent invites a different and almost always a favourable response. This
attitude was observed in the participants irrespective of racial identity and class position. We
realise then a correspondence between racial identity, accent and institutional context. Within
a predominantly White middle-class university ‘Black, Venda and Indian’ accents fall outside of
what has been established as “a right way of doing things” (Gergen, 2009, p. 32) and in this
instance, talking. Thus through the presence of (e.g. Zulu and Venda) accents in this institution

...we begin to recognise disruptions, glitches, and failures. The establishment of “the good”
creates the context for its violation... the disruption of “the good” functions as a threat to
the accepted reality and all those patterns of action into which this reality is woven (ibid).
Taken together, language and accent are tools of identification as much as they are principles of social division through which claims to social difference are made. They are also the ‘psychosocial weapons’ in the struggle to construct social identities that are in effect a consensus definition of self and ‘other’—i.e. the social identification and self-categorisation process. Through these processes and specifically through the discourses of language and accent discussed here particular versions of social reality are instituted.

‘Race’: the geography of intimate and distant bodies in space

The correspondence between the constitution of home-worlds and the racial profile of friendship groups was highlighted above. Here I must add that while that general picture is valid there are instances that require it to be examined much more closely. These are instances where we observe that irrespective of the socio-economic background of the students, a significant number (13 of 17) of the friendship groups in this study are racially homogeneous. This is in large part because, as illustrated in Chapter Five, student friendship groups are organised into primary and secondary friendship groups. The former are generally racially homogeneous and the latter racially heterogeneous. Furthermore, the former are lived and experienced in emotionally invested spaces or personalised spaces such as residences while the latter are reserved for public spaces such as lecture halls. The correspondence between spaces of friendship (public or personal), types of friendship (primary or secondary), and bodily distance and proximity require a closer examination.
Recall that the *micro-ecology of contact* approach to intergroup relations discussed in Chapter Four maintains that segregation is a “phenomenon sustained by boundary processes operating at an intimate scale and in everyday life spaces...” (Dixon, Tredoux & Clack, 2005, p. 339). Through this work we know that students’ self-segregation practices have a decidedly spatial dimension—the configuration of bodies in space (dining halls, lecture halls, tutorial rooms, and public spaces) reveals racialised body topographies. The finding that intergroup contact was generally superficial and restricted to the classroom (Alexander & Tredoux, 2010) echoes the findings of this study in what I have called ‘secondary friendship groups’. Similarly, the finding that students see racialised spaces on campus as a place for collective identity, security, acceptance, comfort, self-expression, mutual interests and supportive relationships (Alexander & Tredoux, 2010) links to the notion of ‘primary friendship groups’. This relation between space and non-spatial relations of proximity and distance was also suggested by Schrieff et al. (2005) when they hypothesised that self-segregation is a function of friendship patterns; and that group spatial identities operate as “spatial zones within which members operate comfortably; it involves knowing one’s place and having a sense of who belongs there with ‘us’” (p. 441). In its combined effect this converges on two points.

First, it points to the stubbornness of racial homophily as an organising force of social identity and social relations in post-apartheid South Africa. The force of racial homophily is illustrated by the number of racially homogeneous primary friendship groups in this study. Notwithstanding the varied ‘theories’ given by participants (Chapter Five) to account for the racial homogeneity of their friendship groups, racial homophily remains. These participant
‘theories’ can be likened to what Durrheim and Dixon (2005) call working models of contact which is a concept they use to argue that the meaning people attach to intergroup contact is not the achievement of individuals but is a collective effort\textsuperscript{65}. The outcome of which is “a common frame of reference in which contact comes to be understood in terms of consensual meanings and values” (p. 66). The concept of working models is useful to these researchers because it allows them to make sense of otherwise complex and contradictory discursive repertoires used by their White participants in grappling with their dislocated place-identity as a consequence of desegregation. In this regard indeed the participants do seem to have consensual meanings and values of intergroup contact in a place that was once reserved for them alone. For participants in the present study, their working models do not represent a consensus of meanings and values on intergroup contact. Rather there is a sense in which the meanings and evaluations of the racial homophily of their primary friendship groups is contested and characterised by contradictions. For instance, one finds that some participants understand the racial homogeneity to be a result of the random chance of initial encounters. On the other hand, some participants see it as an outcome of a subconscious tendency to seek contact and interaction with similar others. There are also those who espouse a colour blind, or non-racial thesis emphasising instead other commonalities such as interests and values. Still others claim to be consciously forming racially homogeneous social ties as a reaction to being saturated by Whiteness prior to university. These accounts are characterised by an attempt to break with the force of racial identity while simultaneously claiming that very identity. It would

\textsuperscript{65}In a social constructionist point of view we can think of working models as discourses.
seem then that all thirteen racially homogeneous friendships groups consist of students holding very different positions on the importance of racial identity in their friendship group. This may be so although is it unlikely considering that friendship groups are voluntary associations. This means that if there were fundamental differences on what the racial profile of the friendship group ought to be then one would expect these groups to split or reach a compromise which would result in racial heterogeneity. What then holds together these varied discourses of racial homogeneity? Similar to the case of racially heterogeneous friendship groups in which I argued that such heterogeneity is held together by class homogeneity, here the varied and contradictory discourses of racial homogeneity are held together by a racial preference consensus, be it conscious or subconscious.

For Durrheim and Dixon (2005) “…the question of whether or not ‘preferences’ help to account for the persistence of segregation is a trivial one. They clearly do” (p. 214). They further add that this ingroup preference “…reflects a universal desire to belong and to differentiate one’s self from others, an explanation that echoes the social identity account…” (ibid). We must not stop at pointing to racial preference as an explanation for the persistence of self-segregation, we must interrogate it. Racial preference is the behavioural and social component of psychological differentiation. Psychological and social differentiation largely comes down to the question of space and more specifically ‘the space in between’—who is going to be close, and who is going to be distant from me. ‘Same race preference’ answers this question satisfactorily to the extent that similarity is generally taken as a reliable proxy for collective identity, security, acceptance, comfort, self-expression, mutual interests and supportive relationships (Alexander
& Tredoux, 2010; Chapter Five and Six). Similarity carries these attributes not capriciously but because they are partly social psychological products of similar material conditions of social existence. They are also partly the products of the generational transmission of thoughts and feelings that reinforce or rupture apartheid psychology (Chapter Five). Thus, behind racial preference is a psychological and structural order of ‘living together apart’ (Falah, 1996) that is a living memory of colonialism and apartheid.

Second, racial homophily invites a bodily reading of social relations in space. Here bodies are like exhibitions of the exchange of intangible thoughts and feelings that can be likened to the nervous system of social relations. What I have referred to as psycho-labour and psycho-emotive relations of proximity are lived out in the spaces between human bodies. Thus, racial homophily points not only to the proximity of racialised bodies but also to non-erotic bodily intimacy that corresponds with psychological identification and social categorisation. This brings us to the doorsteps of two different but related areas of study— ‘the sociology of the body’ and ‘affect’. I will restrict my comments to broad remarks due to space limitations. I want to discuss the body from the theoretical viewpoint of symbolic interactionism and particularly as conceptualised under the canopy of American pragmatism by Herbert Blumer. Blumer’s (1969) conceptual distillation of symbolic interactionism holds that

66 We will recall from the explorations of Chapter Five and Six that same ‘race’ preference does not mean that students are also forming friendships across class categories. That is, within the same racial group students still distinguish each other according to class categories.
(1) people act toward things, including each other, on the basis of the meanings they have for them; (2) that these meanings are derived through social interaction with others; and (3) that these meanings are managed and transformed through an interpretive process that people use to make sense of and handle the objects that constitute their social worlds (p. 2).  

Consequently, the body is seen as a medium of meaning important to both personhood and society. The body as object (that is acted upon) cannot be separated from the body as subject (as experienced and lived through) which leads to the view that

...a person does not ‘inhabit’ a static body object but is subjectively embodied in a fluid, emergent, and negotiated process of being. In this process, body, self, and social interaction are interrelated to such an extent that distinctions between them are not only permeable and shifting but also actively manipulated and configured (Waskul & van der Riet, 2002 cited in Waskul & Vinnini, 2012, p. 3).

This is embodiment, the process by which “the object-body is actively experienced, produced, sustained, and/or transformed as a subject-body” (Ibid., p. 3). We can think of the object-body as an historical artefact that has been politicised, racialised and socialised for example through both macro and micro apartheid (see chapter two). The subject-body, on the other hand, can be conceived as the personal and collective meanings attached to, interpretations made of, and social practices emergent from historical, political and social processes imposed on the object-body. From this vantage point the persistence of racial homophily or racial self-segregation is

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67 See McCall (2006) for a concise historical overview of symbolic interactionism and Snow (2001) for an expansion of Blumer’s conceptualisation.
partly a persistence of the object-body as an historical and political racialised object and project. Racial homophily sustains this object-body as a crucial pillar in the collective construction of subjectivity⁶⁸ and hence the subject-body. Social interactions and relations thus become a collision of embodied political histories and present identity constructing practices. The contradictions inherent in this process as emphasised by post-structuralism are evident—the history of racial self-segregation is reincarnated even as we seek to move beyond it.

If, as according to symbolic interactionism, the body is a vessel of meaning and social agents are active in constituting the social world through what they do (with their bodies), what does racial self-segregation recorded in this study and in the observational studies cited earlier mean? The meanings carried and conveyed by our bodies can be of an emotional nature—affect—“embodied meaning-making” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 4 italics in original). Affect however, is more than (bodily) meaning making. According to Thrift (2008) affect is “a form of thinking, often indirect and non-reflective, true, but thinking all the same” (p. 175). Furthermore, the configuration of bodies into primary and secondary friendships and the experiencing of these friendships in emotionally differentiated spaces captures what Thrift’s (2008) calls ‘spatialities of feeling’. Thrift’s (2008) concept of affect corroborates with that of Ahmed and Stacey (2001) who argue that “the practices of thinking are not separated from the realm of the body but are

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⁶⁸ Subjectivity “refers to the conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, her sense of herself and her ways of understanding her relation to the world.... (P)ost-structuralism proposes a subjectivity which is precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being constituted in discourse each time we think or speak” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32-3).
implicated in the passion, emotions and materiality that are associated with lived embodiment” (p. 3).

The meaning we can deduce from this body-space relation is that of bodily and social intimacy (primary friendship groups) and distance (secondary friendships groups). Furthermore, if affect is a type of bodily thinking then we see here that it typifies ‘apartheid thinking’ that reproduces apartheid subjectivities through social interactions and relations. I have argued that such thought has a structural and material base. This argument is valid to the extent that students form friendship groups only with those who share their conditions of life chances. In the formation of primary friendship groups this ‘structuralist’ logic reaches its limits as I suggested above. At this juncture I return to the concept of social capital introduced in Chapter Three. In that chapter I argued that colonial and apartheid histories bequeathed upon us a poverty of social capital—intergroup but specifically interracial relations and networks of trust and support. The bodily geographies of intimacy and distance in space reflect this poverty of social capital (and one can now add affective capital) that in turn reinforces the condition of ‘living together apart’.

The attention given to the body in this analysis is important because it “refuses to privilege mind over body, and... assumes that the body cannot be transcended” (Ahmed & Stacey, 2001, p. 3). In this regard we may want to return to the issues of accent as form of cultural capital and thus as a marker of those who belong and do not belong to UCT as a cultural institution. The shunning of those who do not speak English with the benchmark middle-class accent can be seen as an effective way of marking them as strangers ‘out of place’ in a cultural and
institutional space. Given our view that the body cannot be transcended and that accent is literally projected out of the body through the voice being; deemed not to have the appropriate accent is thus to be recognised as a body out of place—a stranger’s body—a strange some(body) in a community of culturally competent citizens. Accent thus because a linguistic and discursive resource of identifying alien bodies and a technique of inclusion and exclusion. We can go further and use voice as a metaphor for identity as we would say—his intellectual voice is underdeveloped—to mean that his intellectual identity is not fully formed. Since accent is inseparable from one’s voice and to the extent that we can speak of Venda, Zulu, French and Scottish accents—accent can also be a marker of ethnic and national identity. In this sense, the participants who were of the view that the Venda and Zulu accents should be ‘washed out’ of UCT could be seen as suggesting that such identities do not belong at UCT. Thus the privileging of a middle-class accent at UCT renders the material body and ethnic, cultural and class identities of those who do not possess it as strangers. Using stranger and alien interchangeably Ahmed (2000) notes that “the alien here is one who does not belong in a nation space...” (p. 3) and for our purposes we can think of a cultural and institutional space. Ahmed (2000) further notes that the stranger “as the outsider inside” (ibid) “takes on a spatial function, establishing relations of proximity and distance within the home(land)” (ibid). This is of course, affirms the argument already made above on spatialities of feeling. To the extent that accent can be conceived as means of inclusion and exclusion, as I have argued, it can perhaps be seen as a single strategy amongst an arsenal of “techniques for differentiating between citizens and aliens... [and] ...allows the familiar to be established as the familial” (ibid). That is those with a
familiar middle-class accent become, by a form of ‘abstract familialism’ (Goldberg, 1998) citizen
of the cultural institution and the ‘others’ become estranged and strange bodies. The analytical
attention given to the body while important in refusing the privileging of mind over the body
should not lead us to the trap of making a fetish of the body. Indeed, the place and importance
of the body is acknowledged but it should not blind our view “of the function of social
differences in establishing the very boundaries which appear to mark out ‘the body’. Otherwise,
we are in danger of fetishizing ‘the body’ by assuming that it contains these differences within
the singularity of its figure” (Ahmed & Stacey, 2001, p. 3).

By way of summary and conclusion let me recast some of the above remarks in the following
way. Using first year student friendship groups as case studies, I have explored the social and
psychological properties and processes that influence the formation of racially homogenous
and heterogeneous social relations. Although focusing on students’ university experiences, the
study did make a limited attempt to draw out the social trajectories of the students leading up
to university. This is the first point from which theoretical advancements can be made. The
literature review revealed that up to now research on cross-group friendships at university
focuses on the university experience and where pre-university intergroup contact is
investigated it is generally by means of surveys. This study has attempted although through
retrospective and speculative means to begin exploring the complexities of pre-university
contact and encounters. What this study highlights is the salience of what I have variously
referred to, following Pierre Bourdieu, ‘life conditions and conditioning’, ‘life possibilities’, and
the ‘materiality of social existence’. This material is social and psychological, structural and
symbolic, and forms foundational ground upon which participants build their social worlds and identities. The second theoretical insight the study offers is in illustrating that much of what goes on within the university context in the participants’ lives can be summarised as the reproduction of social and psychological worlds. This is not particularly good news, especially for those who think that the university is a space of ‘new beginnings’. In the main, students reproduce through their friendship groups the home-worlds that they are products of. Ironically in some instances students who have been socialised in racially diverse middle-class contexts do not necessarily reproduce racially diverse friendship groups on campus. This contradicts the now accepted view that positive intergroup contact leads to future positive intergroup contact (e.g. Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2008; Levin et al., 2003; Van Laar et al., 2005). Third, the role of opportunity structures in configuring the possibilities and limitations of intergroup contact were highlighted. It was demonstrated that even where opportunities for intergroup interactions were available their actualisation was mediated by the meanings and interpretations that participants had learned to associate with intergroup contact. In this regard the study joins with work that draws attentions to the importance of emotions in intergroup contact. Certainly and especially for students from township backgrounds characterised by racial division and economic scarcity, intergroup contact anxiety was evident. However, more than this, what was also evident was how the pre-university experience profoundly shapes the reality that these participants construct—constructions that affirm previous experiences that are anchors of present personal and social identities. All this draws out theoretical attention to the need to move away from the practice of treating participants’ experiences under the broad
and vague categories of ‘prior intergroup contact’, ‘positive intergroup contact’ and ‘negative intergroup contact’ and begin to qualitatively explore what is subsumed in these categories. In this way we have the chance to theoretically grasp the complex ways in which past socio-political projects reinsert themselves in the ‘micro-ecological’ (Dixon, Tredoux & Clack, 2005) tapestry of everyday social relations. Fifth, the micro-ecology approach to intergroup relations has pointed to the importance of time-space-body dimensions and this study has taken that insight seriously. This was done through the insistence to trace the historicality of practices and experiences from home-worlds to university (Chapters Five and Six); arguing for the present manifestation of recent and distance histories (chapter Three, Five and Six); and arguing that human bodies are useful tools in the triumph or failure of political projects (Chapter One); and the bodily relations of proximity and distance in space are a manifestation of psychological identification and self-categorisation (Chapter Seven). Sixth, the study goes some way in trying to understand the place, role and uses of ‘race’ and class and their interdependence at the level of everyday relations. This is important because a great deal of social psychological work has left this labour in the hands of sociology, anthropology and economics. One suspects that if the explorations of this study are put against both the original contact hypothesis and its recent revisions that we may find that much is left underspecified or ignored altogether in contact theory. For instance we could ask what exactly is meant by ‘equal status in the contact situation’ when we do not understand the meanings people have of contact (Dixon, Durrheim & Tredoux, 2005). How do people’s past experience influence their meanings of contact and their interpretations of the institutional context they find themselves in vis-à-vis their cultural, class
and racial identities? How does contact theory contend with the different and sometimes contradictory participant ‘working models’ (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005) that culminate in racial and class self-segregation? Altogether the complexities of intergroup relations reported in this study call for a careful and patient investigation that aims for context-specific critical understanding before generalizable solutions generated in laboratories or university campuses. At an ontological level - and this is something I have attempted to begin doing here - it requires us to avoid the temptation to reduce social practices to either the psychological or the social but rather to search for the relational essences and interfaces. Still, we ought to do this without emptying practices of their historicality (time) and situatedness (space).

Notwithstanding the theoretical insights garnered from this study it also has limitations. The study would have benefited greatly from a systematic collection of data structured to allow a detailed class analysis beyond the descriptive and speculative class-analysis done in the present study. Also limiting is that the study sample which was chosen using qualitative methods (purposive sampling) does not allow for general claims to be made based on the findings. Perhaps this may not be such a severe limitation give that the study was largely exploratory and does not in fact seek to make any generalisations.

With regard to future research in this area there is a need for more qualitative work to explore various issues flagged here as important. For instance, future work could attend to the limitations stated above. It is clear that students from middle and working class background have qualitatively different experiences of university and future work could explore these differences and how they might be influencing intergroup relations. Accent turned out to be
important as a proxy for class and ethnic identities and future work could further explore this issue. Also requiring further exploration is the possession of material goods and associations made with particular spaces (e.g. cafés) that students occupy and how these factors are used in identity construction and how they influence intergroup relations. This line of possible research is suggested by the importance attached by some Black students of middle-class standing (Chapter Six) to the things they possess, the things they do and the places they go to as function of their class identity. Lastly, to the extent that we regard ourselves as ‘students of society’ and in this are interested in studying the psychological and social interface of human practices, it appears to me that we would greatly benefit from broadening our theoretical scope. This could be done, as I have attempted in this study, by moving beyond our disciplinary boundaries and following the object of our interest, wherever it may take us be it into sociology, anthropology, feminism, philosophy and so forth. In doing this, of course, there are risks of simplification and misappropriation as much as there is the reward of gaining depth and breadth of the object of study at hand.
References


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Appendix A: Thematic Analysis

The thematic analysis procedure I adopted in this study is drew the work of Braun & Clarke (2006). In what follows I will outline thematic analysis and the specific variants of it that I applied in the present study.

Thematic analysis is a qualitative data analysis “method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006). “A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned responses or meanings with the data set” (ibid., p. 82). This makes thematic analysis useful for the present study which, as we will recall, is largely exploratory in nature seeking to understand the properties and processes that collaborate and culminate in the practice of self-segregation. This is specifically because thematic analysis is not necessarily attached to any theoretical framework (ibid) thus making it flexible and particularly useful in inductive exploratory work. The choice of thematic analysis and the processes it entails is also not divorced from the decisions of ‘description and interpretation’ and the ‘epistemological status of the data’ spelled out in chapter two. I used thematic analysis to generate “a detailed and nuanced account...of a group of themes within the data” (ibid., p. 83). In doing this I followed an inductive approach meaning that “the themes identified are strongly linked to the data...[it] is therefore a process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a pre-existing code frame, or the
researcher’s analytic preconceptions” (ibid). This is different from saying that data analysis happens within a theoretical and epistemological vacuum but that one stays very close to the data and without taking flight to theoretical abstractions. The coding of the data was done manually rather than using a software programme like NVIVO. Below is a take of the phases of thematic analysis I followed taken from Braun & Clarke (2006, p. 87).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description of the process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Familiarizing yourself with your data:</td>
<td>Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Generating initial codes:</td>
<td>Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Searching for themes:</td>
<td>Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reviewing themes:</td>
<td>Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Defining and naming themes:</td>
<td>Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Producing the report:</td>
<td>The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.</td>
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</table>

1. **Familiarise yourself with the data**

I began by listening to all the recorded focus group interviews and making notes for each interview. I then sent the interviews for transcription to a private company. When these were returned I checked for the accuracy of the transcripts against the audio recordings. I then
undertook a close reading of each transcript for each of the focus groups for the three time points (March, June and September) that data was collected.

2. Generating initial codes

While reading I made notes for each transcript and in the process I was able to begin identifying recurring themes. This was repeated for all transcripts and was undertaken manually. For example, I noticed that in almost all the transcripts that the formation of friendship had its genesis before participants were students at UCT. This led me to a closer reading of the transcripts for a sense of the configuration of the kinds of contexts that the participants came from. This led to the code—‘home-worlds’. The participants had explicitly been asked in the first interviews to describe their neighbours (e.g. suburb, township, rural area etc.), schools (e.g. private, semi-private, government school etc.). Although not comprehensive these descriptions in addition to related conversations gave me a sense of the different types of home-worlds that the participants came from. From this data I could distinguish between ‘racially homogeneous’ and ‘racially heterogeneous’ home-worlds which in turn became sub/secondary codes under the primary code—‘home-worlds’. Furthermore the reading of the transcripts suggested a correspondence between the racial profile of neighbourhoods and schools and opportunities for intergroup encounters prior to coming to university. Thus another sub-code was created—‘home-world intergroup encounters’. In addition I read the transcripts for the ‘character of intergroup encounters in the home-world’. In this sub-code I was concerned to see how the participants described their intergroup encounters for those who
had such encounters in their home-world. The character of intergroup encounters appeared to correspond with the structural and material arrangements of the home home-worlds such that intergroup encounters in middle-class settings tended to be inclusive and segregated in township areas. This process of identifying and relating initial codes was repeated for all fifty transcripts.

3. Searching for themes

Given that I had already collated the codes I simply turned these into themes and sub-themes. This meant that the code ‘home-world’ became a theme under which the sub-themes ‘racially homogeneous’ and ‘racially heterogeneous’ were placed. I then re-read the transcripts to make sure that these themes were present in most, if not all, the transcripts. The sub-code: ‘character of intergroup encounters in the home-world’ was integrated with the previous sub-code and used to enrich the description and analysis of the ‘home-world’ theme. Again, the process was repeated for the other themes that were identified such as ‘race’, class, psychological visions and social divisions’.

4. Reviewing themes

At the end of the previous phase I have a large number of themes and sub-themes and I read the transcripts again to identify any data that would fit into these themes and sub-themes and to search for any new themes. Once this was done I then decided to check the now existing themes and sub-themes against each other to check that data extracts had been appropriately
coded or that the codes and themes were appropriate for the extracts chosen in each transcript and in the entire data pool.

5. Defining and naming the themes

At this point I began a preliminary write-up and analysis of the data. This inevitably led me to rethink some of the themes in terms of their salience. This is because the focus groups had generated far too much data and I could not include all of it in the analysis and had to make a decision about which themes I was going to include in the final report given the limited thesis space. In the end I decided to focus on the themes that, in my view, were most relevant and controversial in South Africa given our history of apartheid—class and ‘race’. However, I also wanted to show how themes actually operate in our everyday lives in ways that may not be easy to grasp. To do this I closely looked at the existing themes and sub-themes and sought their relation to the issues of ‘race’ and ‘class’. Given that I had not originally conceived of the analysis in this way I had to re-read the transcripts for any connections to issues of ‘race’ and class. In the end themes such as language, accent, ethnic identities, emerged as important and themes which I had thought salient such as gender and sexual identities were excluded in the finally analysis.
6. Producing the report

In producing the final report attention was given to the selection of extracts that best captured the analytical value of the final selection of themes and sub-themes. Here the aim was also to select those extract which were most relevant and useful in drawing out the most interesting insights from the data. In all this the intention was to present data that answered the research questions in the most interesting and insightful fashion.
Appendix B: Interview Schedule Guide

The first interview schedule to appear below was used as a guide for all first (March) focus group discussions. The second interview schedule was used for the second (June) focus group discussions. The third round (September) of focus group discussions were more focused on the specific issues that had surfaced in each group and for this I did not generate an interview schedule but mostly because the discussions returned to the issues that had been raised in the first and second focus groups and we dealt with these in some detail the third focus group discussions.

Interview Schedule Guide 1

Thank you for making the time to attend our first research focus group discussion. Perhaps I should start by introducing myself again more formally and then you can take turns introducing yourself to me.

1. Where do you come from in terms of your home town or city?
2. Would you please describe what kind of place it is (i.e. is it a township, a suburb a farm village etc.)?
3. How would you describe your high/secondary school (i.e. was it a public government school, a semi-private ‘Model C’, or a private school)?
4. Were your schools historically reserved for a specific rail group? If so, which group?
   4a. Had this changed much or at all at the time you attended the school?
4b. Would you then say that prior to coming to university that you have had contact with other racial and ethnic groups in your school?

4c. What has been your experience of such contact?

5. How about your neighbourhoods? Were they historically reserved for a specific racial group?

5a. Has the racial profile of your neighbourhood changed over time?

5b. Again, would you say that you have had contact with other racial groups in your neighbourhoods?

5c. If so, what has been your experience of that contact?

6. Would you share with me what type of work do your parents or the people who provide for your needs do?

7. We certainly return to some of your home experiences time and again. For now I would like us to talk a little bit about your university experiences in the past few weeks or so.

7a. How has your transition to university been so far especially socially?

7b. Where and how did you meet?

7c. What in your view has mostly influenced your experience of the transition to university?

8. Let’s talk a little more about how you met and the circumstances around your first encounters?
1. During our last conversation a number of interesting issues came up and I would like for us to return to some of those issues today.

1a. First, there was the issue staying in the same residence and how that influenced or made it easier to see each other often. Could you say more about that?

1b. Second, we had also briefly started talking about the factors that influenced or drew you toward the people who are sitting here in the group with you today. I remember that you had started talking about personalities, conversations, values, interests, humour, and language as some of the important factors. Could we have a discussion about all this and, of course, anything else that has been important in the formation of your friendship?