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The Impacts of International Non Governmental Organisation networks on housing policies: a study of Kenya

by

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DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in this minor dissertation from the work, or works of other people has been attributed, and has been cited.

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ABSTRACT

An assessment of the influences and impacts of development NGOs reveal that in spite of their diverse and resourceful nature, NGOs working in the field of advocacy tend to predominantly have incrementalist influences. These influences, being predominantly short term in nature, do have long term implications for public policy in developing countries. Well resourced NGDO networks, historically rooted in the missionary movement of the post Second World War period have succeeded in firmly establishing themselves in the body politic of poor Africa countries. Over the last few decades these NGDO networks have filled the gap left by an absence of progressive political organisations and social movements that embody the aspirations and class interests of shack dwellers. NGDO networks exercise an ideological control over shack dweller communities which allows for the infusion of neo-liberal political views into these communities.

The absence of class based political analyses linked to overt class-based political action, invariably lead struggles under the aegis of NGDOs for decent housing to become truncated and politically compromised. The Kenyan situation reflects the involvement of NGDOs across a broad spectrum, including slum improvement. At a socio-economic level small scale improvements have occurred through the efforts of the IIED-SDI-Pamoja Trust alliance. The impact of this alliance on housing policy in Kenya is conditional on the collaboration of affected parties at different levels. Small advances made in housing policy impact hold the possibility of future higher level impacts materialising. A qualitative shift away from conventional neo-liberal politics is a requirement for this to occur.
ACRONYMS

ACHR  Asian Coalition of Housing Rights
AMT   Akiba Mashinani Trust
ALBA  Bolivarian Alliance for Latin America and the Caribbean

COP15 Conference of Parties
CSOs  Civil Society Organisations

DFID  Department for International Development, UK

IFIs   International Financial Institutions
IIED  International Institute for the Environment and Development
IMF   International Monetary Fund

KENSUP Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme

MDGs  Millennium Development Goals

NGOs  Non Governmental Organizations
NGDOs Non Governmental Development Organisations.
NISCC Nairobi Informal Settlements Coordinating Committee
NSFD  National Slum Dwellers Federation

OECD  Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation

PAD   Public Administration and Development

SAP   Structural Adjustment Programme
SDI   Shack Dwellers International
SIDA  Swedish International Development Agency
SPARC Society for Promotion of Area Resource Centres

TAC   Treatment Action Campaign
TPA   Tri Partite Arrangement

UN    United Nations Organisation
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION...........................................................................................................................................................I
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................................II
ACRONYMS.............................................................................................................................................................III

CHAPTER ONE ..........................................................................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................................1
1.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................1
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM...............................................................................................1
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..........................................................................................................................2
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW....................................................................................................................................2
1.5 SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS..............................................................................................................................3

CHAPTER TWO .........................................................................................................................................................5
SLUM SETTLEMENTS AND POLICIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ....................................................5
2.1. SLUM SETTLEMENTS: 21ST CENTURY DEVELOPMENTAL CHALLENGES ....................................................5
2.2 SLUM POLICIES SINCE THE 1960s ................................................................................................................11
   2.2.1 The 1960s and 1970s ................................................................................................................................11
   2.2.2. The 1970s and 1980s ..........................................................................................................................12
   2.2.3 The 1980s and the 1990s ..........................................................................................................................12
   2.2.4 The 1990s and Beyond............................................................................................................................13
2.3 EVOLUTION OF NGOs SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ..............................................13
   2.3.1 Impact of Economic Recessions: Mid-1970s and Early 1980s ..............................................................19
2.4 PREVALENCE OF SLUMS AND OPERATIONS OF NGOs AND SDI-IIED IN AFRICA ................................23

CHAPTER THREE ...................................................................................................................................................26
NGOS: THEIR THEORETICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS .............................................26
3.1 GENERAL THEORETICAL REVIEW OF NGOs ...............................................................................................27
   3.1.1 Representativeness and Accountability of NGDOs .................................................................................27
   3.1.2 On Empowerment of the Poor ..............................................................................................................30
   3.1.3 Implementing NGO Programmes: Perspectives from the Left and the Right ....................................31
   3.1.4 Participation of the Poor in NGO Programmes ....................................................................................34

CHAPTER FOUR ..................................................................................................................................................38
NGDOS AND THE POLICY PROCESS: THE CASE OF THE IIED-SDI-NGDO PARTNERSHIP ...............38
4.1. THE IIED-SDI-NGO INTERNATIONAL NETWORK ......................................................................................38
   4.1.1. The IIED-SDI-NGO network in a generalised policy cycle .................................................................38
4.2. MOVING BEYOND LINEAR POLICY PROCESS THINKING ..................................................................46
CHAPTER FIVE: NGO IMPACTS ON KENYAN HOUSING POLICIES ........................................................ 50

5.1. BACKGROUND TO KENYAN NGO OPERATIONS .................................................................................. 51
5.2 IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SDI: IMPLICATIONS FOR KENYAN HOUSING ...................... 53
5.3 PAMOJA TRUST OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACTS ............................................................................ 57

5.3.1 Policy Impact Indicators: Ascertaining and Measuring Policy Impacts ................................................... 59

CHAPTER SIX .......................................................................................................................................................... 67

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 67

6.1. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED .......................................................................................................................... 67

END NOTES............................................................................................................................................................... 69

REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................................... 70
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Dimensions of Change: Policy change indicators .......................................................... 66

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Illustration of the policy cycle (adjusted) ......................................................................... 39
Figure 2: The policy formation process .......................................................................................... 50
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
The importance of NGOs in the international political field has become very noteworthy. The growth in their prevalence and relative influence has meant that they started to play a more overt political role. The importance attached to their role in academic writings in recent years is reflective of the need to raise and enhance the levels of understanding of NGOs.

This investigation will focus on a particular United Kingdom based NGO, the International Institute for the Environment and Development (IIED) and the network that it has succeeded in building internationally. The network involves the IIED itself, an international association of shack dweller federations named the SDI (Shack Dwellers International), and NGOs operating in the housing field in a range of developing countries.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
This minor dissertation investigates the evolution and nature of powerful international NGO networks, and how that power is exerted on the housing policies in Kenya. The formulation and implementation of policies in the field of housing, reveals a capacity to exert political influence. Many African countries have been described as dysfunctional or weak states. Their institutional capacity to deal with major social issues such as housing is therefore a major political point of contention. In the investigation the perennial question of the acquisition and wielding of power by NGO networks and what this portends will be dealt with.

From one perspective the role and influence of NGOs are considered to be benevolent and benign. The impacts of their actions are considered to be socially beneficial albeit on a local, small scale. However, when dealing with international NGO networks and the potential influence that they can exert, then the scope of the discussion starts to involve the question of the overt and covert political role these networks play in countries such as Kenya.
1.3 Research Methodology

The research presented is a product of a theoretical investigation into the impacts of international NGO networks on housing policies, specifically an investigation into Kenyan housing policies. The case study method is therefore of relevance. The research is based on the use of secondary sources which included academic papers, journal articles, university databases, books and the web pages of relevant organisations. Accessing documentation of the United Nations required the use of the internet. The limited scope of the investigation prohibited engagement in primary research methodologies.

1.4 Literature Review

The texts consulted for the background section of the study represent contributions that can broadly be categorised firstly as those that represent a leftist perspective, namely Ungpakorn (2004), Went (2001) and Petras (1999). Manji and O’Coil (2002) consider the missionary movement’s contribution to the emerging character of NGOs to have had a telling influence. The aforementioned authors provide perspectives that are critical of conventional capitalist-liberal views. The left contributors consider NGOs as instruments of the rule of capital.

Alternately other authors consider NGOs as being progressive alternatives to the state in the developing world. Authors that broadly fall into this category are Korten (1987), Mitlin and Tandon (2000). These authors base their theoretical contributions on their personal involvement in NGOs. Consideration of these contrasting views produces an enhanced understanding of the fundamental arguments that obtain.

The main points addressed in chapter three stem from the contribution made by Atack (1999), who offers extensive criticism of the way NGOs operate and what the objective effects of these actions are. The inherent character of NGOs reveals them to possess characteristics that critics tend to focus on. Arguments are that they lack legitimacy and that their claim to representativeness is a false one. Linked to this is the criticism of not being accountable to the poor communities they claim to represent. On the other hand NGO protagonists claim that NGOs are more efficient than governments at what they do and that they empower poor people in need of social upliftment. Clark (1995) represents one voice for the latter category. Patel and Mitlin
(2005), together with Satterwhaite make their written contributions as part of the IIED leadership. The journal Environment and Urbanization is the channel through which their perspectives are made public. As NGO practitioners the IIED leadership reinforce the neo-liberal thinking on NGOs through the above publication.

The policy process section deals with authors and texts that are brought into relation with Young and Quinn’s (2002) graphically represented policy cycle. Pollard and Court (2008) proposes ways how NGOs or Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) can intervene in this process to the advantage of poor communities. The contributions of Patel and Mitlin (2005) and Bolnick (2008), as IIED representatives, provide the means to apply their views to the practicalities of the policy cycle. Najam (2000) provides a more dynamic way through which NGOs can influence policy, which is premised on weighing up the factors of complimentarity, cooptation, confrontation and cooperation in NGO-government interactions.

The Kenyan case study encapsulates the essential points of the foregoing discussion by focussing on the role and impact of the NGO Pamoja Trust, on housing polices. Patel and Mitlin (2005) and Weru (2004) advances the cause of the slum dwellers through measures such as savings schemes, close cooperation with the Kenyan government and collaboration with grassroots organisations such as Muungano wa Wanvijiji. Kanji, Braga and Mittulah (2002) present additional text that provides important detail regarding enumerations and tangible impacts of advocacy work done by Pamoja Trust.

1.5 Synopsis of Chapters

Chapter 1
Provides a background to the study by addressing the research problem, the research methodology and a literature review.

Chapter 2
Presents a synopsis of the second half of the 20th century as regards the development of slums and the generic policies that governments in the developing world followed after the Second World War. The growth of slums and the parallel emergence of NGOs that addressed the slum
problem are addressed. The role of economic crises in the five decades since the 1950s is considered as a major contributor to the growth in the global slum problem.

Chapter 3
Deals with the essential characteristics of NGOs that distinguish them from historically different organisations. Major debates between the protagonists and antagonists of NGOs deal with issues such as NGO accountability and the question of power. These issues invariably form part of the social-political landscape NGOs operate in.

Chapter 4
Draws the theoretical and practical components of NGO endeavours together. The Institute for the Environment and Development – Shack Dwellers International-Non Governmental Organisation alignment, which is replicated in the countries where operations exist, has certain operative characteristics that are dealt with in this section. These operations are considered within the context of a generalised policy cycle.

Chapter 5
Analyses the impact of NGO operations in the Kenyan slum housing environment. These operations are based on a particular ideological orientation of the leadership of the IIED-SDI-NGO tri-partite arrangement. The identification and measuring of policy impacts represent a vital aspect in the overall analysis.
CHAPTER TWO
SLUM SETTLEMENTS AND POLICIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Chapter two discusses the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations, and then revert back to the post-Second World War period. The chapter will start with an examination of the global historical context within which developmental NGOs (NGDOs) function.

A starting point when sketching the present status quo regarding NGO networks is a consideration of what the United Nations system considers its role and purpose to be. The UN is one of the major organisations, apart from academic institutes, governments and private charities who sponsor Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were formulated and adopted (September 2000) as part of a roadmap for all subscribing countries to sign up to, and endeavour to achieve these goals. Most of the MDGs refer to “halving”, “ensuring”, “eliminating”, “reducing” the prevalence of hunger, gender disparity, child mortality amongst others.

Taken as a whole the MDGs were endorsed by 189 governments at the 2000 Millennium Summit; it is supported by the World Bank, the United Nations and all of the major donor governments. The 1996 document produced by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD entitled “Shaping the 21st Century” and the World Bank-IMF paper entitled “A better world for all”, produced in 2000, formed the basis for the Millennium Development Goals. The tools employed in working towards attainment of the goals are what Nelson (2007:2041) refers to as “classic development tools: donor pledges, goals and benchmarks, multi-volume reports and sophisticated monitoring by United Nations agencies and other major donors”. Nelson goes on to contrast the MDGs with what he refers to as “rights-based approaches” to the development debate and developmental practices. These rights-based approaches “seek to link the development enterprise to social movements’ demands for human rights and inclusion and to tie development to the rhetorical and legal power of internationally recognized human rights”. The implication here is that the MDGs are premised on the agenda of the rich and powerful, while the
rights-based approaches represent the views of those whose development needs are acute and pressing – the poor millions residing in slums across the “developing” world.

The UN Millennium Declaration, a resolution adopted by the General Assembly (United Nations, Fifty-fifth session, Agenda Item 60 (b), 18 September 2000) has as part of section III, a section dealing with development and poverty eradication, point number 19 which resolves to “by 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers as proposed in the Cities Without Slums” initiative. In section VII, dealing with “meeting the special needs of Africa”, the resolve is “to take special measures to address the challenges of poverty eradication … including debt cancellation, improved market access, enhanced Official Development Assistance and increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment, as well as transfers of technology”. The emphasis on “special measures” is itself an indication of the ad hoc nature of the development envisaged. It is therefore not a consistent implementation of policy, but measures to be decided on at the behest of donors and international agencies involved in the continent’s development. The goals as formulated in the relevant UN document “Millennium development goals and targets” (http://millenniumindicators.un.org), are indeed short on detail and focus essentially on the restating of goals in very general terms. In tone and language the document’s wording resembles the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar documents of the UN. A reason for this vagueness is probably to cause as little friction between participating governments and make its acceptance as diplomatically painless and less time consuming. On the other hand, as it is a General Assembly document it can, as with many other United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) documents, be considered as documents filled with good intent but falling short on active implementation. The unenforceability of UNGA resolutions is a generally accepted major weakness of this organisation. Critics of the goals base their criticism on the neo-liberal orientation that underpins the goals. The major tenets of neo-liberalism are generally accepted as reflecting the prominence of countries like the United States of America (USA) in UN operations.

In the realm of housing provision the goal of note is goal number 7, with target 11 being the operational objective governing the activities around the goals. Goal 7 reads as follows: “Ensure environmental sustainability”. A subsection of the goal is target 11. It reads: “By 2020 achieve
significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers”. This is part of the United Nations–Habitat global campaign for “Secure Tenure”. A programme named “Cities Without Slums” forms part of this global campaign. This global campaign was started by UN–Habitat as part of a twofold global initiative which also incorporates a global campaign focusing on “good global governance”. Hence it is observed that the reach of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) by virtue of its adoption by close to 200 countries, is indeed global. The “Cities without Slums” programme is aimed at strengthening institutions and partnerships for slum upgrading initiatives at citywide level, with decision making that is inclusive of the organisations of slum dwellers and their supporting NGOs (UN Habitat, 2005 as cited in Huchtenmeyer:8). Numerous UN-Habitat reports document in detail the country specific activities that have been undertaken as part of the implementation of the agenda of the agency. Kenya is one such country where UN-Habitat has a prominent presence. The major challenge that underpin these endeavours is encapsulated by a comment in a fact sheet issued by the UN Department of Public Information, 25 September 2008, that states that “even if the target of significantly improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 were met, this number represents only 10 percent of the estimated world slum population which, at current rates of expansion, is expected to triple, to 3 billion by 2050”. (UN Fact sheet, End Poverty 2015, Goal 7: 1)

Nelson (2007:2041) argues that “the MDGs are a careful restatement of poverty-related development challenges, in language that avoids reference to rights; they are a donor country interpretation of the key issues, for a donor country audience”. Huchzermeyer (2005:1) reasons that there is a tendency for governments to “use targets to remove and thereby further marginalize households living in informal settlements”. More importantly Huchzermeyer (2005:3) identifies the critical role of the globalizing market in fixed commodity trade (land) not having much concern (as it has in the case of non-fixed commodity trade) for slum dwellers’ objective need of becoming consumers in an ever expanding trade in land in urban areas. Hence, the intentions behind the MDGs can from the point of view of social movements and critics of the UN-Habitat, basing themselves on the rights-based approaches, be considered as deliberately not seriously addressing the improvements in the standard of living of shack dwellers. The deliberate exclusion of shack dwellers from the housing market is one of the ways the neo-liberal consensus is constructed.
Organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom and numerous others like the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa are all orientated to the promotion of rights-based approaches. Contrary to this, UN-Habitat contends that contradictions exist between economic and social objectives in what is commonly referred to as “the international community” (UN Habitat [a], 2007: 4). On the one hand the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) pursue market-oriented policies that “increase social exclusion and marginalisation” while on the other hand “socially oriented approaches” are meant to address the human rights of the urban poor. The document states that a key lesson learnt is that there should be and in fact has been an “increasing convergence” between these two approaches. The reference to “tensions” existing between the two approaches suggests that there is nothing fundamentally different in what each is proposing and undertaking. Each represents one side of the same coin.

Nelson (2007:2044) refers to the same comparison in his examination of 40 NGOs and social movement organisations in the North and South and the degree to which the MDGs and human rights issues form part of their respective organisational programmes and orientations. His conclusion is that civil society organisations in the South hardly refer to the MDGs in their programmes; the opposite holds true for the organisations in the North. What is to be made of this? On the one hand it can be concluded that the rights–based organisations in poor countries of the South have not assimilated the import of the MDGs and as such the governments in these countries will by the same token not show great concern about addressing the MDGs. On the other hand it can be argued that the ostensible differences between the MDGs and their government based focus, and the rights-based civil society orientation are not that fundamental. Indeed, given the pre-eminence of the role of civil society organisations in the North, they can ,in this regard, be seen as being conduits for the translation of the MDGs into human rights rhetoric in the countries of the South. In other words the MDGs and what they portend becomes translated into human rights language, but in the final analysis both have the same fundamental effect: short term alleviation of pressing problems of poverty. A counter to this is the role played by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa where advocacy around health issues has had an impact on long term public policy. It has, however, been a trademark of UN-sponsored
programmes that they are conceptualised and implemented in such a way as to achieve relief for millions of people in the shortest possible time. Given the power imbalances that exist in the world, lasting solutions to the problems identified have been limited. One example deals with the protection of the earth. In 1992, the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit witnessed the adoption of Agenda 21. The 1995 Copenhagen World Social Summit carried the message of sustainability forward. This was followed in 2002 by the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg. The 2009 COP15 meeting in Copenhagen was the latest instalment in this process. Generally speaking, countries that are signatories to agreements and resolutions of these global gatherings respond differently with regard to their implementation. Inconsistent implementation of resolutions by most countries therefore nullifies the effective functioning of this international system of cooperation.

The 100 million shack dwellers referred to in the MDG number 7 represents only 10% of the total number of shack dwellers. According to the UN-Habitat document (UN [b] Fact sheet, Goal 7), “...progress towards achieving target 11 of goal 7 will be considered to have been accomplished if the 100 million slum dwellers “have received relief in relation to any one of the slum criteria – reduced overcrowding, access to water and basic sanitation, improved building structures, reduced environmental and health risk and improved tenure security or social inclusion” (UN-Habitat, 2005, as cited in Huchzenmeyer, 2005:8). The above figures assume greater importance if it is considered that in the first three decades of the 21st century the total global slum population will increase to slightly over 1 billion; this from a 2000 figure of 924 million people (UN-Habitat, 2005, as cited in Huchzenmeyer, 2005:8).

The extremely limited scope implied in these MDG projections circumscribes a development agenda to any government in accordance with neo-liberal practices. Latter impels many governments of developing countries to reduce expenditure on social services – including housing. Neo-liberal governments would prefer for market mechanisms to take care of housing matters. Nelson (2007:2045) refers to historical precedents where the goals to have been achieved by UN agencies during the 1970s “has been a series of international commitments to soft goals and commitments”. As an example he refers to a 1974 commitment by governments at the World
Food Conference pledging their countries’ support to eradicate hunger in ten years time. This has clearly not happened.

Given the criticism of the MDGs there are however institutions and international agencies who believe that the goals represent a new opportunity to refocus attention of the world on poverty reduction and upliftment of the poor.

Given the shortcomings of the MDGs, the IIED, as an NGO of professionals and technical experts considers ways on how to make them attainable. As part of this approach Hasan et al (2005:10) offer a contribution to the MDG discussion on how city development involving slum dwellers should be tackled practically. Academics who are members of the IIED are members of the Shack Dwellers International. Their theoretical point of departure is, as with many commentators, the macro economic consensus of neo liberal policies. Their starting point is a tacit acceptance of the political prescriptions that are integral to the MDGs. Making the goals workable tends to occupy the writings of the parties concerned. The main argument that is presented is for the implementation of changes at local government level, in cities where millions of shack dwellers live. The call is for a city-wide collaboration to the benefit of shack dwellers. The reference to the squatter problem in Sao Paulo and the role of the Workers’ Party in Brazil (Hasan et al, 2005:13) is one instance where the participation of the urban poor in, amongst others participatory budgetary processes has indeed represented a definitive step forward. This, however is treated as a peculiarly Brazilian phenomenon. To then argue for changes at local government level, at the instigation of or dependent on government structures implementing a neo-liberal political agenda is a fundamental contradiction in terms. The essential point is that the start to the solution of shack dwellers lies at the political level, not a community, city based level. This does not suggest that local political power struggles are not important; the national and international dimension of the political power relations is what should in this respect be primary. The two should indeed be considered in tandem.

This critique is to some degree in line with Nelson’s contention that the goals, the MDGs in particular “belong to states and the international organizations in which they are negotiated. They refer to the people who suffer the indignities of poverty, but those individuals are the objects of
the goals, not their agents” (2007:2045). The agenda is set by governments and states. That agenda is moreover geared to management of problems of poverty, not solutions thereof. Some commentators refer to it as “the management of exclusion”.

2.2 Slum Policies since the 1960s

This section on the historical overview of slum policies and approaches provides a framework within which the evolution of NGOs, presence of slums and operations of NGO networks can be better portrayed and understood.

UN - Habitat ([b] 2006-7: 1-4) provides an overview of how governments and organisations ranging from the UN, its various agencies, the IFIs, NGOs, private capital etc have since the 1960s-1970s till the present, adopted different approaches to slums. The essence of these policies is that they have progressively reflected the growing need for slum dwellers to involve themselves in the determination of their own destinies. The division of the periods according to decades is for convenience sake. Slum policies to be discussed do not correspond exactly with the relevant decade. Resettlement or relocation of slum dwellers, in this period, is identified in the document as having “been associated with virtually all approaches … dealing with slums” (UN Habitat[b], 2006-7: 3). The following sections will outline the main characteristics of the decades from the 1960s to the end of the 20th century.

2.2.1 The 1960s and 1970s

The UN-Habitat report ([b] 2006-7:1), states that, as efforts were undertaken by post-independence neo-colonial governments to set their countries’ housing policies in motion, only about one hundred thousand dwellings were built in this period. The reasons for the numbers being so low are not provided or even implied. This will be addressed in section 2.2 where the issue of the 1970 recession and what followed in its wake is discussed. The role of private provision of housing was predominantly absent in the period leading up to the early 1970s. The contention by UN– Habitat is that many governments simply denied or ignored the existence of slums; that they were unavoidable but merely existed due to rural-urban migration. The reasoning on the part of governments was that if urban-rural migration could be effected through economic growth then slums would fade away. Aided self-help schemes were also part of the approaches
that were adopted in this period. These developments occurred at a time when decolonisation was the order of the day.

2.2.2. The 1970s and 1980s
Evictions of slum dwellers by highly centralised national governments were a norm during this period. Forced evictions could not be challenged by what has become known as “civil society” because these formations were not recognised by the governments concerned. This implied that repression by the new governments was an indication of their inability to solve intractable social and economic questions. Urban renewal projects served as justification for the removal of inner-city dwellers in this period. Slum upgrading (improving existing slum infrastructure) combined during the 1980s with the start of self-help programmes under the banner of the UN-Habitat’s Global Strategy for Shelter (UN Habitat [b], 2006-7:2). This involved galvanising the support of the private sector as well as the energies of slum dwellers. Government’s role in these self-help programmes was to facilitate housing programmes. This was the time of the advent of monetarism, of Structural Adjustment, and the associated reduction in the involvement of governments in provision of social services.

2.2.3 The 1980s and the 1990s
The aforementioned processes brought about recognition on the part of international agencies and national governments in developing countries, of the importance of the involvement of slum dwellers in decision making. Government’s role was to provide “support” in the form of “training, organisational assistance, financial help and managerial advice” (UN Habitat, [b] 2006-7: 3). This was part of a policy orientation known as the “enabling approach” (UN Habitat,[b] 2006-7: 3). As in the 1970s and the start of the 1980s it occurred at a time of the active implementation of Structural Adjustment in many developing countries. It implied the gradual withdrawal of the state from housing delivery and for “ground level mobilisation” with state support, referred to above, to be allowed to take its course. In 1988 the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR) was established in response to widespread evictions in Asia (Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington, 2007:1707). This was indicative of the fact that the state still wielded power in ways it deemed appropriate, notwithstanding “participation” having become an operational principle.
2.2.4 The 1990s and Beyond

The policy of ‘Participatory Slum Improvement’ of this decade, retained some of the characteristics of the previous decades, and is ongoing. City-wide projects incorporating slum improvements were the norm, and government’s facilitative role was again highlighted. NGO and local government involvement formed an important part of this approach. Governments are also expected to maintain financial accountability and adhere to quality norms (UN Habitat,[b] 2006-7: 4). African examples of such partnerships include Alexandria in Egypt and Dakar in Senegal.

The progression from exclusion of shack dwellers to the current policy of ‘participatory slum improvement’ has however not been a linear one. The UN-Habitat document ([b] 2006-7:4) concludes by saying that “all the approaches to slums …continue to be used in different locations around the world, including the less enlightened approaches of neglect and eviction”. Also, resettlement or relocation of slum dwellers is identified in the document as having “been associated with virtually all approaches … dealing with slums” (UN Habitat [b], 2006-7:3). Governments therefore applied policies in the field of housing they deemed appropriate at particular times in their own countries.

The next section will therefore address the question as to how the nature and role of NGOs came to be defined in the half century since the end of the Second World War.

2.3 Evolution of NGOs since the end of the Second World War

In the middle of the 20th century NGOs were organisations that operated at two levels: one was as welfare bodies involved as “war charities” in Europe and the USA. Oxfam is one such example. At another level their operations stemmed from their presence as welfare and missionary bodies in what was then known as the Third World. An example referred to by both Mitlin and Manji is that of the National Council of Churches of Kenya. This initial geographical separation has over time become less pronounced. Their existence as organisations came about due to private citizens’ voluntary organisational initiatives. These initiatives subsequently became part of the broader system of colonialism.
The contributions to be discussed here outline the emergence, growth and consolidation of NGDOs in the post-1950 period, and in one case from the start of the 20th century. They vary in terms of the background from which the respective authors approach the matter. Manji and O’Coil, Ungpakorn as well as Petras’ contributions represent a left, anti-capitalist perspective on the matter. Tandon, as an NGO practitioner embedded in the neo-liberal system, provides an overtly positive slant to NGO contributions. The same can be applied to the contribution of David Korten. The contribution of Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington (2007:1699) offers an abridged history of NGOs as development alternatives. Their account is in broad agreement with that of Tandon, focussing on phases that roughly correspond with individual decades from the 1960s up until the present. Citing Schuurman (1996:1), Steward maintains that the boost in NGO practice stemmed from “development’s ‘lost decade’ – the eighties – and the corresponding “impasses” or “crisis” in development theory.

Bratton (1989:570-572) traces the forerunners of modern development NGOs to the organised collectivised action of Africans in pre-colonial times. The subsequent emergence of churches and missionary societies came to represent those institutions that were the main providers of health and education services for the indigenous population. The strong missionary character found in former mission stations in South Africa, where the central role of the church is still prevalent testifies to this. The attitude of colonial governments to the missionary organisations ranged from one of “laissez-faire to antagonism toward links between the mission system and the nationalist movement” (Bratton, 1989:571). The nationalist movements that were later to constitute the post colonial governments had organic links with the missionary system during the time of the struggles for independence. The African National Congress in South Africa is one example of such historical linkages. Bratton sees the seeds of the NGO phenomenon in Africa as coming about in the form of “ethnic welfare groups, professional associations and separatist churches which articulated the demands of newly-modernised Africans”. More significantly he adds that “such NGOs formed the building blocks of nationalist political parties and played an explicitly political role in contesting the authority of the colonial government” (Bratton, 1989:571). Hence a culture of political–ideological dependence on the part of the leadership of nationalist movements started to crystallise due to the long term organisational influence of the missionary movement. Manji and O’Coil (2002: 567) in their treatment of the missionary question do not
deal with this organisational link and influence. This is however critical in understanding the political conduct of the newly independent, post colonial governments. In criticising the NGOs, an equal amount of criticism should be reserved for the political leadership that succumbed to the political influences of the missionary movement.

Hailey (1999:481) provides a succinct summary of the evolutionary pathway of NGOs. The essence of the summary amounts to the fact that there was a systematic growth in the stature and importance of NGOs: from low-keyed, missionary–based voluntary organisations, to ones that in the 1990s actively engaged with governments in developmental partnerships. The author recognises that the coverage in the PAD journal lacks references to class, gender, human rights and the like and reflects a basic Eurocentric, western perspective. One major omission in dealing with the 1970s, as an example, is a reference to the severe economic crisis that was experienced worldwide, and how this affected NGO operations in the neo-colonial world. In the quotation below, a short summary of the fifty years from 1950 to 2000 is provided by Hailey. It captures in broad terms how the role and nature of NGOs came to be expressed in the newly independent, post colonial world. The review states that:

The articles in the 1950s reflect the diversity of activities of co-operatives, trade unions and voluntary self-help organisations. They also highlight the close and supportive role of colonial government officials in developing such non-governmental initiatives. Articles in the 1960s are focused on the role and performance of community development programmes in political and economic development; others offered some high-profile support for new development NGOs. Articles in the 1970s were marked by their increasing diversity and geographic spread and included analysis of integrated rural development programmes. Articles in the 1980s, the move of the Third Sector (civil society) to centre stage, concentrated on the operational challenges facing NGO, social change organisations and self-help groups, as well as the management problems facing co-operatives. The articles in the 1990s suggested that NGOs and voluntary organisations had now moved to the centre of the development stage. Typologies of different NGOs were produced, management issues explored and, above all, they analysed the increasingly close relationship between NGOs and government. (Hailey, 1999:481).

Hailey’s appraisal of the historical evolution of NGOs is generally speaking amplified by that done by Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington (2007), although latter’s contribution is more in-depth. Korten’s angle of presentation deals with NGOs as generational orientations.

In dealing with the historical progression of NGDOs, Korten (1987:148) identifies three distinctive orientations in programming strategy namely relief and welfare, small-scale self
reliant local development and lastly, sustainable systems development. Underlying these is the strong argument in favour of foreign aid to not only be channelled through central governments but through agencies like NGOs who are considered to be more accountable and organisationally better placed to facilitate development. Instead of being time–bound, Korten suggests that these strategies or orientations can co-exist in any given situation of NGO involvement across the world. The first orientation refers to temporary alleviation of the plight of the poor and destitute stemming from amongst others, war, famine and natural disasters. The second orientation focuses on NGO assistance, stemming from the 1970s, aimed at promoting local self-reliance of the local population. NGO involvement in a neighbourhood or village was temporary, project based and did not concern itself with policy and broader issues of governance.

Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington’s reference (2007:1704) to the colonial period characterises missionary organisations as being “small agencies” who received “little external support”. Mitlin’s et al second period extends from the mid 1960s to 1980, one in which the start of NGO growth was observed. This period was characterised by the start of what became known as a debate on “alternative development”: where critiques of the state became common currency. Accompanying it was the emergence of competing NGO networks, some with conservative, others with more radical sources of funding. Globally the phenomenon of NGOs aligning with political and social movements came to the fore (Mitlin et al, 2007: 1705). The third orientation of Korten, stemming from the mid 1980’s (the advent of SAPs) saw the emergence of collaborative efforts between NGOs and governments. To NGOs this collaboration presented opportunities as well as threats, since the NGO practitioners placed a high premium on the autonomy of the organisations. The sustainability of NGO inputs required an expansion in the scope of the operations of NGOs. This brought forth the need for technical and professional staff since the level of expertise required to do developmental work was raised. Korten maintains that NGOs had to face up to the potential to assume 3rd generation roles in areas such as local government, health and small enterprise – through self-help efforts, amongst others (Korten, 1987:150). Korten’s orientations are meant to “co-exist” in NGOs whose size can allow for all three orientations to be contemporaneously operational (1987:149).
The third period of Mitlin et al., covers the period from 1980 to 1995. SAPs led to a series of demands for NGO intervention “as program implementers, knowledge generators and activists” (2007: 1706). Mitlin et al. highlight the “systemic shifts” that occurred in this period as well as the importance of appraising and understanding NGOs as part of the political economies in which they exist. The growth in the recognition for NGOs, especially in the context of the unfolding neo-liberal agenda, implied that rapid NGO growth was in fact a response to the development needs of Third World countries becoming more acute. The trend towards NGOs becoming incorporated into the government programmes on the basis of their potential contributions regarding service delivery by the state, started to manifest itself in this period (Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington, 2007: 1707).

Atack (1999:856) refers to Korten as having added a fourth generation of development NGO strategy as “involving support for ‘people’s movements’ promoting a broader ‘social vision’”. This addition is specifically relevant in the era of social movements and global networks of civil society having emerged since the 1990s. A major weakness in the presentation of Korten is the non-differentiation between the operation of NGOs in the metropolitan countries (Western Europe and the USA specifically) and the countries of, what was then known as the Third World. In addition to this, as noted by Manji (2002:570) is the denial by Korten of the missionary societies and voluntary organisations’ influence on the emergence of NGOs in the immediate post World War Two period. This point is important in relation to developing an understanding as to the ideological motivations (own emphasis) that underpin NGO operations, especially in Africa. These motivations deal with class, racial, gender and the general question of civil liberties and human rights. Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington’s (2007) emphasis regarding the period since 1995 falls on the vexing questions of representation by NGOs of the poor, their access to policy processes, questions of their legitimacy, the strongly emerging poverty reduction agenda (the MDGs) and related questions.

Manji and O’Coil (2002: 571) provide an account of the continuity of aid and charity as it found political expression during the time of colonial rule as well as in the post independent, neo-colonial period. They pose the question whether modern day NGDOs are not in reality similar to
the missionary organisations of the colonial period who actively participated in the physical and psychological oppression and exploitation of the African masses.

After the Second World War, charitable organisations managed to maintain themselves, changed their ideological orientation from a defence of colonial racism to one of the need for Africa and Africans to “develop”. Manji and O’Coil (2002: 570) maintain that these organisations underwent a process of reconstruction, one in which they “discovered the appeal of expressing concerns about poverty with as much conviction as they had justified racial exclusion in the past”. They started to evolve as the modern, indigenous “development NGOs” (Manji and O’Coil, 2002: 570). On the other hand, the role of the new governments became central in the provision of social services to the populations. During the 1960’s, with programmes aimed at addressing poverty and “development”, international NGOs like Oxfam, War on Want and Christian Aid were international extensions of welfare provision inside African countries. The basis for the involvement of NGOs then, was the need to engage in the development discourse and contribute towards poverty alleviation of Africans, charity provision and what Manji and O’Coil (2002: 570) consider to be “deep paternalism” towards Africans. The extent of the involvement of these NGOs was therefore limited, given the centrality of state–driven development. In similar accounts dealing with the realities of the colonial experience for Africans, Nosipho Majeke in Role of Missionaries in Conquest also develops the historical nexus between the missionary moment and the liberal, capitalist political and economic structures that subsequently evolved in South Africa.

According to Manji and O’Coil (2002:576), much headway was made by post independence central government with programmes that were aimed at social provision in African countries. With the Cold War in progress and western governments and aid agencies limited in terms of the scope of their operations, the potential influence of NGOs was reduced. Manji and O’Coil (2002:576) continues that “while international NGOs had a license to run their projects in Africa, this freedom was conditional, based on an unspoken assumption that they accepted or did not comment on the manner in which the state exercised its power”. Furthermore, NGOs were allowed to carry out project work in peripheral areas that the state considered non-essential. Housing provision was not one of these projects. This relationship of NGOs having a healthy
respect for the governments in whose countries they operate is one which is current. Also, the historical linkages between present-day NGO operational styles and what these practices were like in the period under discussion are shown: project work is what drives NGOs; shying away from overt criticism of the state was done then, as it is at present.

2.3.1 Impact of Economic Recessions: Mid-1970s and Early 1980s

The economic recession that hit the world during the middle of the 1970s, due in part to the oil crisis, was to prove the catalyst that came to define the indebtedness and subsequent socio-economic decline in Africa. African governments found themselves drawn into a vortex of economic strangulation, one in which they still find themselves today. In the wake of this and subsequent economic downturns in the capitalist world economy, specifically during the early 1980s, the emergence of NGOs found prominent organisational expression. The neo-liberal capitalist system that emerged, accompanied by Thatcherism, Reaganomics, and monetarism left African governments with major economic hurdles to overcome.

Petras (1999:432) comments on how the increase in the number of NGOs during the 1980s and 1990s coincided with repressive government policies in response to popular revolts. NGOs responded to the plight of the victims of these repressive policies. The revolts he refers to “loosened the purse strings of overseas agencies and millions poured into Indonesia, Thailand and Peru in the seventies; Nicaragua, Chile, Philippines in the 80s; El Salvador, Guatemala, Korea in the 90s”. Commenting further on the real intent of NGO operations he contends that “the NGOs were essentially there to “put out the fires.” Under the guise of constructive projects they argued against engaging in ideological movements thus effectively using foreign funds to recruit local leaders, send them to overseas conferences to give testimonials” (Petras, 1999:432). In support of these examples is the contribution by Ungpakorn (2004:1) which states that the growth in the number and operations of NGOs occurred at a time when state repression against the left was severe, such as in Thailand and Indonesia as well as where bureaucratisation of left wing parties such as in India “has prevented socialists from becoming representatives of the oppressed in society”. These perspectives represent a major critique of NGDOs in general. The critique does not include NGDOs that promote progressive, labouring classes’ interests. The
above criticism of Petras and Ungpakorn do not, however, consider this dimension of the NGO debate.

The multilateral lending agencies (the International Monetary Fund and World Bank) gained political leverage through the indebtedness of African nations. These countries took out loans from international banks, for national economic development, at low interest rates. Subsequent escalation in these rates as part of the economic recessions that occurred meant great difficulties in repayment of loans by affected African governments. The IFI-agencies could therefore start to impose their neo-liberal policy prescriptions, as the new commanders of post-colonial economies (Manji, 2002: 578).

The proliferation of NGOs in developing countries started at this time. The impact of the recession and the structural adjustment that came with the neo-liberal order was accompanied by a decline in the social conditions of the African masses.

The package of measures that came with IMF/World Bank prescriptions included currency devaluation, deregulation of prices and wages, reduction of public spending on social programmes and state bureaucracies, removal of state subsidies, trade liberalisation, privatisation of para-statal enterprises and the expansion of the export sector (Hoogvelt, 2001:181). According to Hoogvelt, (2001:181) twenty-nine Sub-Saharan African countries accepted the IMF/World Bank prescriptions during the 1980s. This constituted roughly half of the total number of African countries. The all pervasive influence that the new international order came to imply for African countries will be confined to these few references. An in-depth analysis of the period from 1974 to 1984 will however reveal all the economic and political factors that were to be the foundation for what was later to become known as “globalisation”.

Opposition to the neo-liberal agenda during the 1990s had the effect of the IFIs and western donor governments repackaging development through neo-liberal economic and social programmes. This was done to make them more acceptable to the recipient populations. NGOs began to fulfil the role of champions of the debt ridden countries in Africa on a world-wide scale with international networks such as the Shack Dwellers International (SDI) being established.
Campaigns run by NGOs such as Jubilee and Jubilee South for the scrapping of debt of developing countries came to represent the public face of civil society’s reaction to the new international order.

Part of the new arrangement by OECD donor governments and the IFIs was that official aid agencies (such as DFID, SIDA and others) “have come to expect NGOs to act as a substitute for state welfare programmes, a solution to welfare deficiencies at a time when structural adjustments have hugely increased the extent of welfare needs” (Manji and O’Coil, 2002:581). The essential characteristics of the present day modus operandi of NGDOs revolve around what the authors refer to as “the missionary position”, by which they mean “service delivery, running projects that are motivated by charity, pity and doing things for people, albeit with the verbiage of participatory approaches” (Manji and O’Coil, 2002:581). If colonialism represented one system of dominance and control with its missionary organisations as corollaries, then the new restructured, global “financialised” capitalist economic order found in NGDOs a similar corollary. Petras (1999: 432) adds weight to this argument by stating that “as outside money became available, NGOs proliferated, dividing communities into warring fiefdoms fighting to get a piece of the action”. Each “grass roots activist” cornered a new segment of the poor (women, young people from minorities, etc) to set up a new NGO and take the pilgrimage to Amsterdam, Stockholm, etc. to “market” their project, activity, constituency and finance their centre – and their careers (Petras, 1999: 435). NGOs therefore started to find themselves being pressurised from two main directions: from the political left and from the mainstream, neo-liberal establishment.

While many development NGOs might disagree with the above criticism, the objective political role they perform have definite elements to it as described above. On the other hand, the 1999 anti-World Trade Organisation (WTO) protests in Seattle suggest that social movement opposition to the neo-liberal consensus has NGOs as a major component. This duality in the perception of the role and function of NGOs occupies two central angles of how NGOs are viewed. A further elaboration on these themes follows in chapter three.
Tandon (2000: 319) presents a diametrically opposed analysis of the organisational evolution of NGOs to that presented by Petras. The focus in his analysis falls on the period from 1970 to 1995, with the Alternative Development Paradigm (ADP) being his point of departure. It is argued that the ADP (being anti-statist and focussed on small scale, inclusive developmental agendas) developed by NGOs in the 1970s, proved to have been a success. This success is framed in terms of the pre-eminence NGOs assumed in advancing the developmental agenda. The adoption by multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the IFI’s of an open and accommodating attitude to NGO’s leads the author to conclude that the 1970s ADP agenda was in fact initiated and driven by NGOs.

This is historically inaccurate and misleading at best. The funding of many NGOs in this period by OECD countries established a relationship of dependency right from the start. To assert that NGOs were the champions of the ADP and that states, governments and international organisations followed in its wake is historically inaccurate. When considering Manji and O’Coill’s reference to the missionary organisations transforming themselves into NGOs and war charities (that operated in Europe and the USA only) extending their operations to the newly independent, post colonial countries then it is difficult to see how these organisations could from the outset set a development agenda that others followed. They had neither the financial resources to do this, nor the organisational power. The 1970s economic crisis brought in its wake a change in the structure of the capitalist world order (Went, 2001; Hoogvelt, 2001). Part of this change saw the introduction of organisational operations in the post colonial countries that were meant to serve the purposes demanded by a restructured mode of operation of the system of capitalism – and its extension, neo-colonialism. The restructured system of capitalism was now premised on the dictatorship of the financial markets. Finance capital became prominent in the organisation of the capitalist system.

The afore-going accounts aimed to show how NGOs developed from a low basis of an atomised, organisational presence to a situation where they currently form an influential part of the international development agenda. The above analysis shows that NGOs flourish in a climate of poverty. United Nations Habitat reports clearly indicate that the poverty reduction programmes of governments in developing countries, when measured by progress made in the attainment of the
MDGs, are failing, or have failed. The implication for NGOs is that their present role will continue and in future become even more closely scrutinised.

2.4 Prevalence of Slums and Operations of NGOs and SDI-IIED in Africa

As part of providing background information on the subject, it is important to present basic facts and figures as regards the prevalence of slums in Africa. UN-Habitat figures and information sheets reflect the position of slum dwellers on the continent. The involvement of the IIED and SDI will then subsequently be considered in this context.

Most recent UN Habitat figures (UN-Habitat, [c] State of the World’s Cities 2010/2011), highlight the following insofar as Africa and slum conditions are concerned. The “absolute number” of slum dwellers in the world has increased from 776.7 million to approximately 827.6 million in 2010. Around 50.6% of the world’s population (or 3.49 billion people) now live in urban areas. Regarding projections, it is reported that the world slum population will probably grow by six million each year (or another 61 million people) to reach a total of 889 million by 2020. At present sub Saharan Africa has the largest slum population where 199.5 million people (or 61.7%) of its urban population live in slum areas. In North Africa, 11.8 million people, i.e. 13.3% of urban dwellers live in slums. About 30% of the 14 million people who join the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa every year, go on to live in “formal” urban areas; the remaining 70% live in informal settlements or slum conditions. Of these, it is reported, only 2% can expect to escape these slum conditions (UN-Habitat, [d] Urban Trends: 1).

Against this backdrop the Slum Dwellers International (SDI) was established in 1996. Its emergence and growth, with the assistance of and in partnership with certain NGOs, initially in India and subsequently in Cambodia, South Africa, the Philippines, Kenya, Zimbabwe and a few Latin American countries, was as a direct consequence of this historical phenomenon. It describes itself as “an international people’s organisation which represents member federations of urban poor and homeless groups” (Patel, 2001:45).

The origin of shack dwellers organisations can be traced back to Indian cities in the 1970s. The involvement of NGOs linked to shack dwellers organisations that started to operate on a national
and later on an international scale started in India in the city of Mumbai. In 1985 Mahila Milan, an organisation of women pavement dwellers linked up with SPARC (Society for Promotion of Area Resource Centres), an NGO created in 1984 by professional social workers concerned with urban poverty in Mumbai (Coit, 2003:7). This organisation’s subsequent linking up with the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF) in 1995, created a broader organised constituency of shack dwellers. Collectively they embarked on initiatives aimed at improving the living conditions of Indian slum dwellers. The policies they pursued were at one influenced by the understanding of the shack dwellers as to what their immediate and long term interests were. It was also conditioned by the inputs of the NGO which brought resources to the partnership that the shack dwellers lacked. As an example, the SPARC assisted the shack dwellers “to create a dialogue with the authorities” (Coit, 2003:7). The outcome was a positive one for the shack dwellers in that city authorities became more amenable to their inputs regarding slum living and working conditions. Coit considers “the expertise that SPARC made available” in conjunction with the energies of the shack dwellers to have been a major factor in scoring victories. In subsequent years the SDI grew into an international organisation of more than 15 member-federations on four continents. Collaboration between NGOs and the shack dwellers organisations became common practice in the fifteen countries where the SDI currently has a presence.

The organisational background to the operations of the NGOs functioning as adjuncts of the shack dwellers organisations reveals the following international connections. The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) is organisationally linked to the Institute for Development and Policy Management, which is based at the University of Manchester. Part of the programmes of this professionally staffed NGO (the IIED), is the Human Settlements Programme. Numerous academic papers have been and are produced by the IIED, dealing specifically with the SDI. SAGE Publishers publishes these papers on behalf of the IIED. David Satterthwaite is editor of Environment and Urbanization, the name of the publication under which the series of academic papers are published. Authors of papers in many instances include participants in the NGOs in the different countries - in collaboration with the editor. Another major contributor is Diana Mitlin. This arrangement provides the research and ideological backbone for the NGO-shack dwellers partnerships under discussion. For the purpose of the dissertation the terms ‘slum’ and ‘shack’ are
used interchangeably. The former is however more frequently used and more widely analysed in the existing literature.
CHAPTER THREE
NGOS: THEIR THEORETICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

This chapter deals with NGOs as organisational expressions – in terms of their essential characteristics - from the 1980s to the start of the 21st century.

References to the IIED and SDI in this section is intended to provide an introduction to the manner in which NGO networks such as the IIED-SDI orientate themselves to influence policy regarding housing in the countries they operate. Chapter four addresses the question of these policy impacts. What then are the major points relating to the emergence and eventual establishment of NGOs as local NGOs in African countries as well as establishing themselves as major, well resourced international NGO networks? The emphasis will fall on analysing how NGO’s evolution as outlined above came to be expressed as particular organisational characteristics.

It needs to be restated that, as argued by Korten, NGOs can embody different generational attributes. On the other hand any one NGO might have very particular characteristics and modus operandi that might be unique, and which might be single issue based and have very definitive alliance attachments. The discussion on the IIED as a professionally-based NGO (Hickey and Giles, 2005:7) having partnership links with the Slum Dwellers International will investigate these aspects in part two of this chapter. Two main perspectives on NGOs are those that are represented by a left, class based perspective on the one hand and on the other, a capitalist-imperialist, neo-liberal perspective.

The perspectives of various authors on what NGOs represent theoretically and organisationally reflect the dominant views on NGOs. These aspects cover participation of the poor in NGO operations; also, aspects regarding NGO operations such as legitimacy of NGOs, the question of representation and their claim to empowerment of the poor they purport to represent. The theories that inform their operations will also be dealt with. In dealing with these aspects there can, for obvious reasons, not be a Chinese Wall erected between them.
It is conventionally assumed that NGOs achieve little with respect to the alleviation of poverty. This section presents the view that, based on evidence, NGOs have indeed been instrumental in effecting poverty alleviation. The discussion addresses the question as to what it is that make NGOs the influential actors that they are.

3.1 General Theoretical Review of NGOs

NGOs refer to private and autonomous formations rather than public ones; they are mostly not membership based. Instead they are service organisations, existing to help others. Together with churches, trade unions, the media, business and special interest bodies they constitute civil society which is considered to comprise the public space that exists between individual citizens and the state (Atack, 1999:856; Bratton, 1989:571). NGOs are non profit and voluntary meaning that their operations depend on the willingness of their members, constituents or partners to cooperate and participate in their operations (Atack, 1999: 860). Civil society as understood by Bratton, is counterposed by a left perspective that hold that “civil society” is essentially a construct of the neo-liberal consensus; that it argues for an amorphous, classless alignment or compendium of social and political actors. Hence in deliberately and consciously joining or meshing antagonistic classes in to one social force, the essence of the conflictual relationship between these classes becomes obliterated. This, from a left perspective, renders “civil society” ineffectual and a mere appendage of the capitalist political enterprise.

Atack (1999: 862) provides a useful starting point by suggesting the use of four criteria of NGDO –legitimacy, as standards to which NGO practice should attempt to conform. He divides the four criteria according to one set (representativeness and distinctive values) being the means to the attainment of the second set (effectiveness and empowerment), being the outcomes. The relationship between the two sets is therefore one of cause and effect.

3.1.1 Representativeness and Accountability of NGDOs

Legitimacy relates to the right of NGOs to participate in the development process, i.e. actions aimed at improving the social and economic conditions of peoples of the South. Bratton poses the question as to “who has the right to assert leadership, to organise people, and to allocate resources in the development enterprise?” (1989:570). The power relations in any given situation
determines when, how and to what effect a NGDO might come into existence in a particular developmental context. An argument can be made for legitimacy on the basis of existing developmental needs justifying the insertion of a NGDO into a particular poor community. The historical existence of an organisation or the continuation of its traditions carries substantial weight when issues of legitimacy are raised. The fact that NGOs are not membership-based organisations raises the question as to who represents what to whom. This is a matter which the IIED in its relations with SDI homeless federations has had to deal with consistently (Satterthwaite, 2001:137). Slum dwellers raised legitimate questions as to the real intentions of the professionals’ involvement with their situation of homelessness. Generally speaking though, the issue of democratic representation is ignored by recipients when beneficial social change can be achieved. Communities become tied into what can be considered to be pleading for handouts. Disengaging from these dependency relationships require enlightened thinking and political leadership. NGOs can claim to represent communities on major international platforms where the issue of poverty reduction has been a perennial developmental issue. The danger of these claims is that they can be both spurious and based on rhetorical intentions on the part of the NGOs involved. Atack (1999:860) cites Edwards and Hulme (1996: 967) in emphasising the inevitability of powerful Northern-based organisations enforcing a certain type of representativeness onto poor communities. They claim legitimacy based on them being transparent, accountable and acting in the spirit of genuine partnership with poor communities. The problem of presenting externally drafted plans and programmes to the poor, expecting of them to “fall into” these plans is a major one. The reverse scenario should instead obtain.

The above scenarios can be raised to a level of operation at which local NGO representatives can bypass existing local organisations when either setting up their own projects or selecting partner agencies. In South Africa, as in other developing countries the phenomenon of NGOs taking on the functions of local government, without any mechanisms of accountability or appeal for the local population has been an on-going one. This runs counter to the very essence of democracy which is meant to be “rule of the people, by the people, for the people”. The infusion of corporate, private interests at this level of social organisation is however an integral part of the neo-liberal agenda. It is bound to be implemented on a wider global scale. Privatisation of social services such as water provision in many developing countries might progressively come to
include privatised, NGO run local government. If a large number of single-issue NGOs operate in a particular region in a particular country in isolation, the cumulative effect of their operations can be that state provided social services start to diminish over time. The proliferation of NGOs since the 1970s in Kenya indicates patterns to this effect. It is argued that the logic of “NGOism”, leads these organisations to act against the long term social and economic interests of communities they claim to offer development assistance to. The accountability that NGOs need to adhere to, apart from being downwards to the communities they are involved with, is also upwards, i.e. to the donors and governments and agencies who provide the financial resources for the NGOs to operate. The problem of NGOs losing credibility, legitimacy and their representativeness being questioned is tied to the reality that NGOs are heavily reliant on donor funding. In such situations they become perceived as advancing the agenda of the donor, not of the community in need of development assistance.

In one sense, NGOs can therefore be described as historically transient organisations. They aim to address the social needs of the poor. The poor, due to their lack of resources are however compelled to mainly rely on donations from the rich and powerful to improve their social conditions. The objective need for the poor to themselves be involved in planning their future brings forth a situation where NGOs, existing at the behest of the rich need to become transformed into something else. They could therefore become transformed into organisations that require the use of the resources being controlled by the rich, for the exclusive use by and for the poor. At present the poor cannot appropriate these resources.

Legitimacy, as argued by contributors on the left of the political spectrum, does not flow from the democratic nature of NGOs (i.e. democratic election of a leadership, accountability to a membership etc.) but from the objective effect these organisations have on societies. If they are seen to be doing positive work in poverty stricken communities, then they gain legitimacy as a result of this effect, not because they are principally democratic organisations, or even have the attainment of democracy as one of their organisational goals. The role of Pamoja Trust in Kenya is instructive in this regard.
3.1.2 On Empowerment of the Poor

Empowerment is related to the criteria for NGO legitimacy as proposed by Atack. He quotes Brohman (1996: 265) to suggest that self-help, self-reliance, collective decision making and collective action lie at the basis of the process of empowerment. All of these might exists in any given situation, but will nevertheless not make any serious contribution to genuine empowerment. Bratton (1989: 569) asserts that NGOs should be seen as “an instrument of empowerment that will enable ordinary folk to take control of development decisions”. One vital aspect not considered by these authors is that of independent organisation on the part of the needy, of the poor. This type of organisation is the only type that can arguably ensure that no dependency develops on donor funding. This is indeed what the IIED-SDI partnership purportedly attempts to cultivate – with varying degrees of success. Notwithstanding the fact that the term “empowerment” has become a much abused term by NGO practitioners, it is nevertheless important to consider who it is that becomes empowered through NGO actions: is it the community members concerned, the NGO professional staff who provide the contractual service to the community or the donors? Conventionally, empowerment has come to mean that community members are left with positions, skills and resources that did not exist before. It is assumed that as part of “trickle down theory”, the poor will acquire skills appropriate to their developmental needs. This is a very restrictive way of addressing the issue. It is argued here that the professional NGO staff and the donors whose positions become more powerful. This empowerment grows in direct relation to the dependency that the poor communities start to develop on the donors of developmental projects.

Complicating the empowerment process is what Atack (1999: 862) refers to as “class, ethnic, gender and similar social and political divisions within communities and households” resulting in development projects involving “only local elites or specific social groups” that “end up reinforcing (own emphasis) rather than subverting local structures of inequality and discrimination”. This reinforces the objective need for communities to escape the “localism” that NGOs imply, and strike out on a path that deals directly with the acquisition of power in the broader political sense of the word. The resolution of the divisions and inequalities referred to above is therefore tied up in communities generalising the need for development beyond the local.
3.1.3 Implementing NGO Programmes: Perspectives from the Left and the Right

Petras (1997:1) contends that NGOs are essentially agents of imperialism. He bases himself mostly on NGO experiences in Latin America. This view is however a generalisation that is disproved by the existence of NGOs that offer alternatives that are directly opposed to neo-liberal development theories. Ungpakorn (2004: 1-11) argues that NGOs should be recognised for being inherently reformist organisations. He disagrees with Petras’ assertion that NGOs, as “agents of Imperialism” should be merely dismissed out of hand. He proposes a working relationship between leftists and NGOs to represent the class interests of the working class and peasantry more productively. The characteristics of NGOs that up till the present prevented them from playing this more progressive role are discussed below.

Single issue campaigns run by NGOs can result in the fragmentation of broader programmes that are launched under the auspices of social movements. Social movements aim to draw these single issues into a collective programme of advocacy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one response of leftists to the authoritarian nature of Stalinism was to embrace the notion of having “no fixed ideology” (Ungpakorn, 2004: 3). In essence it was a response to the dogmatism of left i.e. Stalinists organisations. This process resulted in leftists rejecting class analysis or the need to overthrow the state (Ungpakorn, 2004: 3). As a substitute for this, an elaboration of alternatives culminated in the employment of concepts like “civil society”, “new social movements” and “autonomism”. These are organisational principles that NGOs generally adhere to. The “new social movements” came to be regarded as the agent for building “civil society”, which is meant to act as a counterweight to the neo-liberal state apparatus (Ungpakorn, 2004: 3). The argument further holds that “civil society” can neutralise or reduce the power of the state. This thinking stems from situations in which social movements and NGOs (through their campaigns) succeed in winning victories in defence of democratic reforms. According to Ungpakorn the notion of “autonomism”, linked to the above arguments promoted by NGO practitioners, is a self defeating one since it merely serves the purpose of NGO activists ignoring the state, being forced in the end to “turn to clauses in the constitution … or negotiations with state officials … in order to solve villagers’ problems” (2004:4). The authoritarianism of NGOs and the claim to empowerment of the poor by NGOs are linked to the internal structures of most NGOs. With no elections being held to elect officials, serious problems of representativeness of NGOs are raised.
Atack (1999: 861) suggests that NGOs concentrate on particular areas or communities. This is in NGO-speak referred to as “localism”. If dependency on NGOs is built in a few localities, then it can “reinforce a lack of uniform and reliable social service provision for all the residents of a country”. This point relates directly to single issue character of NGOs. This criticism centres on NGOs, due to the emphasis on single issues as well as operating in the way outlined above, ending up “lacking a unified political analysis”. This gap prevents them from propagating national policy proposals. With NGOs having “no analysis or political organisation independent of the state and capitalist class” (Atack, 1999: 861), it invariably means that the capitalist state ends up the victor in any confrontation with NGOs. Hence NGOs will be compelled to rethink their political ideological orientation as they become more directly drawn into mainstream political contestation for power.

The conventional neo-liberal view of what civil society, NGOs and social movements represent, is reflected in what Clark (1995:593-601) argues. His views, and those associated with “autonomism”, “no fixed ideology” and “authoritarianism”, tend to reinforce each other. Writing from an unofficial World Bank perspective, the author explains what it is that “civil society”, should be doing and how it should be done. Clark asserts that “when a government endeavours to give greater weight to reducing poverty … it is likely to find its normal macro instruments inadequate” (1995:593). It is furthermore argued that the state has become “overextended” and that this provides opportunities for the private sector and NGOs to rise to “greater prominence”. This links with the notion of “rolling back the state” meaning that the state will voluntarily, or through the pressures of civil society actually create space for NGOs and the rest of civil society to exploit. Stewart (1997:11-34) considers this a fallacy. She maintains that this is a political myth since strengthening NGOs and civil society actually means strengthening the state. The acceptance of neo-liberal ideological assumptions such as “rolling back the state” by elements of the left and the right, provides a false start to any meaningful discussion on the role and function of NGOs. Clark contends that NGOs that emerged as part of civil society during the 1980s and 1990s started to make the transition from a “supply side approach” (delivering services to communities), to a “demand side approach” in which communities are assisted to articulate their concerns and “become active participants in the development process” (1995:593). As part of this “demand side” approach, Clark adds that “good governance” should be considered as an adjunct
to the “local” focus. The author cites an example (1995: 594) of the Colombian government having allowed NGOs and by extension the communities they came to represent, to become part of the establishment of primary health care programmes. In subsequent sections dealing with the relationship between the state and NGOs, the recurring theme which Clark focuses on is one of poor communities being “invited to participate”; of these communities through NGOs acting as interlopers, having a greater voice in matters that directly affect them. The essence of this approach, which has been historically proven to be false and not serving its stated objectives and developmental goals, is based on the “trickle down theory” of the neo-liberal consensus. “Good governance” is a method through which governments of poor countries are compelled to account for their political actions. This is, however, in essence an agreement and arrangement between international agencies and the ruling elites in these poor countries. The reason for it is not necessarily to promote democratisation but to facilitate inter-elite transactions. The claim that macro instruments of a government are inadequate to address poverty alleviation serves as a façade behind which private voluntary organisations can and do operate with a fair amount of legitimised authority. In instances where the governments have intervened to alleviate, though not eliminate poverty it has been proved that macro instruments are available to be used. The fact that they are not used as a rule implies that the macro instruments are being used in a different manner or for different purposes. The instances of the Bolivarian Alliance for Latin America and the Caribbean (ALBA) project in Latin American countries practically addressing poverty alleviation whilst fundamentally remaining capitalist states serve as evidence to the contrary.

Evidently the World Bank and its associates wish to maintain control over political processes. There are numerous contradictions in the points raised by Clark. One is the centrality of “local” activity of NGOs being an essential determinant for NGO-civil society success. Clark (1995: 597) refers to the fact that “NGOs often display a distinct preference for isolation” and that they “often coordinate poorly with one another”. This reality is tied to the fact that individual NGOs aspire to achieve competitive advantage where donor funding is concerned. This competitive element is translated into competition between individual communities. Communities that benefit from NGO projects can consider non-benefiting communities as different and to be denied assistance. Clark suggests that operational isolation of NGOs stems from them wanting to escape government attention. However, irrespective of size, NGOs are always monitored by government
for possible transgressions of regulations or alternately for their usefulness in cooperative arrangements.

3.1.4 Participation of the Poor in NGO Programmes

Mitlin and Thompson (1995: 231) cite practical examples of how communities in urban centres can be assisted via participative practices to promote community development in their own interests. On a time scale starting from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s it became common practice for development agencies to start propagating terminology that was reflective of the changed world situation: one in which the harmful, oppressive economic impacts of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) had to be mitigated with palliatives starting with concepts such as “participation”, “good governance” and “democratisation”.

Citing Thompson, Mitlin and Thompson (1995:233) embrace these perspectives when stating that “in a more cynical vein, it could be asserted that donors and states perceive democratic participation as part of a broader process of structural reform, the shift towards market oriented economies, and the decentralization and privatization of public services”. The proponents of the neo-liberal school of “participation” argue that people’s participation should be promoted since it strengthens empowerment and democratic processes. The real intent as suggested by Mitlin and Thompson is rather that the state is shedding its own responsibilities in line with the minimalist state. As to the responses of groups working with and for low-income communities, it is stated that two strategies are generally adopted: “they either provided welfare services to mitigate the worst effects of poverty or they adopted a political stand and undertook advocacy and political education to organize direct resistance” (Mitlin and Thompson, 1995:234). This lies at the heart of the participation question: the first level is a socio-economic one; the second, higher level is the political level.

The argument at the centre of the entire discussion is that participation theories and programmes should be instrumental in moving communities from the first to the second level. Such processes are by their very nature highly protracted and dynamic. Failure to do this inevitably means that participation becomes meaningless. It becomes self defeating. Although the issue can be transformed into a direct political one, the association with mainstream political parties tied to the
neo-liberal consensus can stifle development. Once a particular community has, as an example “solved” its immediate problem e.g. housing, to then revert back to an economistic programme would be counterproductive. It is argued that to maintain momentum insofar as solving social problems is concerned the political, programmatic requirements have to be kept at the forefront of advocacy initiatives. Failure to do so will mean each new battle for social reform starting from the same low point, without being raised to a higher political level.

The question posed as to how locally driven development programmes can be linked with higher level planning structures and policy-making procedures (Mitlin and Thompson, 1995: 249), begs the question as to why these considerations are not operationalised outside (own emphasis) of the existing government structures. To do so will invariably place such initiatives on a higher political plane, directly addressing housing issues from a direct political perspective.

Stewart (1997:11) adds to the critical appraisal of the political assumptions and ideas that constitute the ideological architecture of NGDOs. She addresses a variety of points, most of them linked to the participation debate involving poor communities.

The first aspect Stewart deals with is the supposed efficiency of NGOs i.e. the assumption that NGOs “do it cheaper, better, faster”. The idea of comparative advantage that NGOs are meant to have and what make them more efficient than state or civic organisations is one heavily promoted as part of pro-NGO advocacy. Included in this array of arguments is the case in favour of NGOs being made on the basis of them being small. Citing Edward and Hulme, Fowler and others who are considered to be strong proponents of NGOs as representing the best organisational form for real development to occur, Stewart disputes the validity of the “small is best” argument. Stewart maintains that being small implies not being able to have “extensive developmental impact”. This impact is what is required for broad developmental purposes. Moreover, the vastness of the development challenges that NGOs and governments have to face up to can only be addressed by “vast logistically sophisticated organisations or vastly well coordinated groups of smaller organisations” (Stewart, 1997:12). Albeit valid, the limitation of this argument is however still rooted in the fact that Stewart, like other authors critical of developmental NGO theory and practice, do not move beyond the strictures imposed by the current debate on NGOs which
confines NGO theory and practice, form and content to the proclivities of neo-liberal politics. It is argued here that given the characteristics, history and the implicit limitations of NGOs the next requirement to be addressed should be the transformation of NGOs into broader, functional, politically independent peoples’ driven organisations. The participation of the poor can come to practical fruition under such conditions. In chapter four the IIED-SDI NGO partnership addresses this question.

Stewart deals with is the notion of “scaling up” (increasing the organisational scope) of NGO activities. This raises the participation question in that “scaling up”, can potentially facilitate greater community involvement and derived benefits for communities. It implies “flexibility, lack of bureaucracy and closeness to the target group” (Stewart, 1997:13). The theory of “scaling up” holds that replication of the form of NGOs as they grow (organically, through lobbying) can lead to a situation of organisations being turned over to clients (the specific community), thereby freeing resources for starting similar initiatives elsewhere, or collaborative provision of service with government agencies (Stewart, 1997 :14). Edwards and Hulme (1992:77) , reporting on a workshop held at the University of Manchester in January 1992 hold that delegates to the workshop preferred to refer to “creasing the impact” of NGOs rather than “scaling up” which for them implied a restrictive reference to mere organisational or programme growth. In this process of scaling up the two authors consider a range of strategies emanating from the workshop, ranging from working with government structures to strengthening organisations of the poor (Edwards and Hulme, 1992: 78). Their suggestions, as in the case of Mitlin and Thompson do not go beyond neo-liberal NGO prescriptions. What does emerge from the contributions discussed above is that contradictions in NGO operations do come about. One contradiction NGOs have to face up to is the reality that as they grow bigger (greater funding requirements, bigger staff numbers, more extensive networking linkages, more projects running in parallel etc.) they lose the characteristics of ‘smallness’, thereby neutralising the positive, advantageous attributes referred to above.

The third aspect dealt with by Stewart is the assertion that strengthening civil society (of which NGOs form a major part) is about “strengthening, not weakening the state” (Stewart, 1997:14). Disillusionment with the neo-liberal state offers fertile soil for the argument in favour of civil
society (Stewart, 1997:17). Considering this, Stewart adds that “the space where the state, market and civil society operate is characterised by crosscutting, shifting and blurred alliances, few of which benefit the disempowered” (1997:17). One such crosscutting alliance is that between governments and vested private business sector interests. Collectively these two forces can act, if they wish, against NGOs and civil society, depending on the situation that obtains in a particular country. The one central point to emerge when dealing with NGO – state relations is that it inevitably has to address the question of power: the power of the disempowered poor communities, the power of the market in relation to both the state and the poor communities and the power of the state itself. The argument that a “weakening of the state” can occur in inverse proportion to the strengthening of civil society ignores the reality of elite management of the capitalist state. Also, ruling classes in capitalist states are unlikely to weaken one instrument they have at their disposal in the name of broader popular, civil participation and democratisation. Arguably, if a deliberate weakening of the powers of the capitalist state is to be effected by capitalist ruling classes then it would be in response to the need to change the manner in which the state as an instrument of class rule is used, not the abdication of the use of the instrument itself. Hence the substance will remain, but the form might change. The limitation of the participation debate in the literature on NGOs and civil society dealt with in this document, reveal a tendency towards scaling down the question of political power.

A seemingly more progressive angle is provided by Hickey and Mohan (2005: 237) in their propagation of a “critical modernist” perspective on the question of “participation” of the poor in their own social development. Ungpakorn (2004:3) asserts that in Thailand NGO activists “unwittingly reflect postmodernist ideas when they claim that theirs is a movement without fixed ideology, unlike the dogmatic leftwing organisations of the past”. The post modernist thinking reflects argumentation away from a class based analysis of society. One weakness is that it embodies a spirit of amorphous politics and limited economic analysis. Its failure to propose workable alternatives for future social progress makes it revert to political positions akin to the neo-liberal political school.
CHAPTER FOUR
NGDOS AND THE POLICY PROCESS: THE CASE OF THE IIED-SDI-NGDO PARTNERSHIP

This chapter deals with a discussion on the policy process and its role in revealing when, where and how NGOs impact on policies of the state. The organisational expression is the IIED and the SDI, as well as the associated NGOs that are involved in the struggles for housing provision for slum dwellers. The NGO in Kenya which will be discussed in chapter five is Pamoja Trust.

4.1. The IIED-SDI-NGO international network

The IIED started off in 1971 and is today registered in the UK as a charity organisation. It has evolved into a think tank with linkages to partnership organisations such as the OECD. It refers to itself as an independent international research organisation. The focus of its research work is in developing countries and continents and emerging economies like South Africa. The themes of its research work cover sustainable development as a point of emphasis. Apart from the SDI alliance it forms part of, it also forms an alliance with the Poverty and Conservation Learning Group, the Latin American Centre for Rural Development, amongst others (http://www.iied.org/).

The central point in its links with the SDI and related NGOs is that the IIED is in a position of “steering” these organisations in directions that are essentially pre-determined. The steering part is contained in the homepage document of the IIED. The question to address is how, in a general manner the IIED influence policies in the countries where SDI national federations operate in tandem with IIED – steered NGOs.

4.1.1. The IIED-SDI-NGO network in a generalised policy cycle

In addressing this question, a generalised policy cycle that outlines the various stages in which policy impacts can be made is discussed. Pollard and Court (2008: 135) cites the policy cycle as presented by Young and Quinn, 2002 as a starting point for a consideration of stages in which CSOs can play a role. It represents a linear process commencing with “problem definition/agenda setting” and ends in “evaluation”. It also represents an idealised model of the policy cycle. The involvement of CSOs in this process should therefore ideally be consistent throughout the policy
cycle. However, in the real world of policy making this seldom occurs. Agenda setting, once achieved, should in an idealised situation lead to the formulation of policy. At the end of the process, new agendas can be developed on the basis of evaluation having been done.

Figure 1: Illustration of the policy cycle (adjusted)

The diagram illustrates the public policy process as followed by state bodies. It is however flexible enough to be used to understand the operations of NGOs.

The entry of these NGOs into the domain of public policy has resulted in them assuming characteristics that resemble those of public institutions. Where NGOs or CSOs wish to influence government policies, it follows that the former needs to tailor their organisational efforts to dovetail with those of latter. Were CSOs to gain greater traction in African countries on a much
wider scale than at present, then situations of complete assimilation of CSOs into government structures can become a political reality.

There might also be stages interspersed between these stages as outlined in the diagram. By the same token certain stages might not feature in any given country, given the differences that exist between countries. A mechanical approach to an analysis such as this is to be avoided. As an example, a particular stage in the policy process might have been reached in a particular country and then come to an abrupt end. In other situations a completely different trajectory can possibly emerge which is at variance with the policy cycle shown here. In Kenya these processes could have played themselves out in different ways in different cities and have gone through repeated cycles, illustrating why a mechanistic approach is to be avoided.

The discussion that follows is meant to create a framework for the case study which will follow in chapter five. Not all the six stages as shown on figure 1 will be addressed. It should be understood that this model merely provides a context for deliberation on the issue of how policy processes are configured. Added to this is the question as to how the diagram includes or excludes the input or involvement of NGOs. It should also be noted that the essential separation of state powers in former colonial countries (in Kenya, based on the Westminster System) created distinctive executive and legislative functions that are intrinsically part of the policy process. The rise in prominence of NGOs has essentially changed the policy making landscape. New actors are impacting on the policy process - ones that are different from those functional during the decades preceding the 1990s.

The following subheadings deal with an application of the role of the IIED-SDI-NGO to the policy cycle as outlined. The application is restricted to those stages in the policy cycle that are relevant to the operations of the IIED-SDI-NGO as identified in research conducted.

**4.1.1.1 Agenda Setting**

Agenda setting is the first stage identified. The IIED-SDI-NGO axis, hereafter referred to as the tri-partite arrangement (TPA) strives to dominate the agenda regarding slum dwellers and the improvement in their living conditions. The emphasis the World Bank placed on “participative” practices in the poverty reduction business forms the backdrop to the agenda of the TPA. The
emergence of the IIED as a think tank occurred at a time of major ideological flux in the world. Emphasis is placed on “steering” the TPA to engage governments on the basis of evidence of the positive results flowing from self-help initiatives (http://www.iied.org/).

The arguments of Patel, Mitlin and Satthertwaite amount to the need for slum dwellers to be organised independently from governments and ruling party influence (Mitlin & Patel, 2005; Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2007). The real political nature of this independence is however not explicitly elaborated on. Through the interaction of the TPA with governments, the TPA incrementally succeeds in influencing policy making. The former South African housing minister, Lindiwe Sisulu considers the SDI collaboration on housing issues as having been mutually beneficial (Sisulu, 2006: 3). On the basis of these incremental policy changes, the TPA argues for the continuation of this course of action. In numerous papers produced by Mitlin, Satthertwaite and others it crystallises that the governments the TPA engages with generally adopt a positive attitude to their initiatives. This is confirmed by the Kenyan case study. Pollard and Court (2008:136) maintain that “evidence” ought to be used in conjunction with “macro level analysis” in order to make full use of what they refer to as “policy windows”. This “evidence” the TPA produces, is by way of funding provision and housing construction (Mitlin, 2003). The TPA has demonstrated that it can use “policy windows” to good effect on the basis of this “evidence” it has produced.

Pollard and Court (2008:136) furthermore contends that the “key is to coin ideas which have resonance within a particular social context”. From this it flows that through the “coining of a particular vocabulary” and popularising it, certain “policy narratives” can be used to shape the “policy trajectory” (Pollard and Court, 2008:136). One result of the above is that it becomes extremely difficult, once a policy narrative becomes entrenched and accepted by slum dweller communities, for another narrative to take root. In papers produced, the TPA’s use of terms such as “development”, “upgrading”, “improvement” and “poverty reduction” serves the exact purpose of mobilising opinion in favour of the prevailing TPA narrative.

Part of the agenda setting process is the use of evidence in a “massive” manner in order to make the case for slum dwellers compelling enough for governments to be favourably disposed
towards it. Using evidence in a “massive” manner refers to the knowledge of the situation the NGOs involved contribute to the policy process. It also refers to material improvements that come about for slum dwellers – albeit on a small scale - due to NGO interventions. Agenda setting or the definition of the problem can also to a considerable extent determine whether a particular development trajectory will or will not have positive outcomes. It is also not to be assumed that the TPA as described above starts their collaboration from a clean slate, and as three separate formations. As in the case of Kenya, there initially existed grassroots organisations dealing with the slum dweller question, which in the course of time became integrated into the TPA organisational network.

4.1.1.2 The Construction of Policy Alternatives
The construction of policy alternatives/policy formulation is the next stage in the linear policy process as illustrated in figure 1. In the case of India, South Africa and Kenya, the failure of the leadership of national liberation movements to effectively deal with national questions such as housing provision and land reform, resulted in intermittent protests of the populations against the post colonial independent governments. This culture of direct protest politics against government policies and practices is directly opposed by the TPA. The approach of the TPA is to engage authorities, claiming that the former approach of protest and direct contestation has been counter-productive. This leaves the question as to which approach is most appropriate. It is argued in this paper that the tendency to want to deal with the politics of poverty and housing as a special problem requiring special measures for its solution has become common currency and problematic insofar as not offering a progressive road ahead for slum dwellers. This concerns CSOs and NGOs directly. Viewing it as a vexing problem that requires fundamental and radical political solutions from above and below is an opposing view advanced in this paper. Patel and Mitlin (2005: 16) argues that the NGO approach of engaging authorities on the basis of “self help” and “evidence” of “independence” in operations is the way to go about to “turn protest politics on its head”. From this vantage point politics should remain the preserve of the political administrations to which representations and requests by slum dwellers for “buy –in” should be forthcoming. The political shortcomings of this approach are addressed in the Kenyan case study.
Consistent with this apolitical approach – which itself has serious political implications e.g. maintaining and protecting existing power structures - is the fact that NGOs and other CSOs tend to assume a mediatory function in the processes of policy construction and adoption. Under conditions such as these the post-colonial repressive political administrations that emerged across Africa is more likely to prevail over slum dweller communities. Pollard and Court (2008: 139) argues that in order to influence policy formulation from outside of government frameworks, CSOs must at one be simultaneously persuasive to policy makers and the locals alike. The approach that the IIED-SDI has consistently followed in the seventeen countries where it is operative has been to integrate itself with grassroots organisations and then use those platforms to initiate negotiations with the authorities. Successes achieved can in part be ascribed to this organisational positioning. The question to be asked is whether any positive developments will continue in situations where the NGO as a partner completely or even partly withdraws operations. If such withdrawals result in a collapse of slum improvement then it would imply that the positive role of the NGO can only be one that will play itself out in the long term rather than the short to medium term. It will essentially amount to the NGO becoming a major de facto role player and stakeholder in the social organisation of a particular community or city or country. A rhetorical question, for the moment is whether NGOs under certain conditions have not become the organisational force in the social organisation of many poor countries. The growth in the number of TPA – situations worldwide indeed points to a scenario of NGO pre-eminence in the social and political affairs of a growing number of developing countries.

Another dimension to the mediatory role of NGOs resides in them becoming “de-legitimised” if they opt to venture into the corridors of state power. In so doing the “legitimacy” label is in danger of becoming unstuck. The TPA considers the ‘independence’ of the SDI affiliated national federations to be a fundamental principle. A problem the TPA has to confront is that in semi colonial countries the allure of government office on the one hand, and NGO employment on the other hand can result in high staff turnover. High staff turnover can potentially improve or reduce the efficacy of the work being done by organisations linked into this arrangement. This, combined with a situation of NGO withdrawal or scaling down to other localities, can create a situation in which continued CSO-NGO influence might be compromised. The entire NGO project might collapse or be seriously jeopardised.
Consistent NGO involvement in the policy process might be subjected to such compromised situations. One way of ensuring the continuation of NGO operations in a particular setting is to guarantee that “strong links to local communities” exist (Pollard and Court, 2008:140). The credibility with which NGO work is undertaken even within government policy frameworks is wholly dependent on how well “evidence” is presented as well as its political position being acceptable to the powers that be. Many cases in Africa exist of governments e.g. Zimbabwe and the Sudan where government antagonism towards NGOs was premised on their perceived political antagonism.

Stage three in the policy cycle deals with the selection of a preferred policy option. This choice of policy option by the TPA has been addressed in the discussion in this chapter. Stage five is the important stage of implementation.

4.1.1.3 The Implementation of Policy

Consideration is given here to how NGOs influence the implementation of policy. The assumption is that it can either be in a situation where NGO involvement was present from the start of the policy process, or only started in later stages. In the diagram the reference is to “policy implementation and monitoring”. The TPA makes its initiatives have a substantial effect on what emerges in government housing programmes.

A problematic concept or notion systematically advanced by the research papers of the IIED is that of “independence” of the slum dwellers organisations and national federations. Firstly these organisations do not have an independent existence from the NGOs that operate side by side with them. Bolnick (2008:320) argues that the dependence of the slum dweller organisations on the NGOs is something that is regrettable but which is the reality they as the leadership in the TPA has had to face up to. Engagement with government on government neo-liberal terms e.g. through negotiations for land allocations also imply developing a dependence on government goodwill for any progress in slum existence to be made. It is argued here that it would be more realistic to rather speak in terms of this supposed organisational “independence” being something which is being aspired to. Presenting it as a real and existing political fact is at best inconsistent with the facts of the situation. Independence can only stem from an ideological orientation that underpins
organisational practice. In the case of the TPA the situation amounts to dependence, not independence. Of secondary importance is the retention of control over the NGOs by the IIED leadership through funding.

Secondly the independence from governments is merely in the realm of internal organisational functions. Requesting permission from governments to operate implies that organisational activities will go nowhere unless government permission is obtained. A point of departure stressed by Pollard and Court (2008: 141) is the use of the “expertise” of NGOs to decisively influence policy. This expertise, based on experience does benefit the slum dweller communities. It can be argued that this expertise and experience is present in government departments, making NGO claims of efficiency appear less attractive. This aspect is linked to the question as to whether the impact of NGO on policy is direct or indirect. Pollard and Court (2008: 142) argue that NGOs exert a “direct influence on policy as a course of action” but that their work “is often disconnected from any influence over policy as a plan of action”. The case of the TPA suggests that this discontinuity does not exist in the Kenyan slum dweller situation: that through the think-tank activities of the IIED and the NGO involved (Pamoja Trust), a dual strategy of direct and indirect influence is followed. This is done through merging the theoretical, technical dimension of operations with actual implementation via a particular grassroots organisation, Muungano wa Wanvijiji.

Citing James (2002), Pollard and Court (2008: 143) argues that in NGO language, “capacity building” should address the need to foster what is considered to be a “learning approach”; of following a “people-centred approach to capacity building, focussing on the personal and cultural challenges involved, and that technical “experts” need to be more adept at asking questions than knowing the answers.

Combining the use of evidence, and working constructively with governments, begs the question as to whether NGO inputs can exert policy influences at a legislative level. Assuming that they can, it would more often than not be as a result of governments tailoring their housing policies to proven NGO efficiencies and production of evidence. The use of enumerations and the construction of housing units as part of TPA operations in Kenyan cities and towns is one
example of “massive” evidence being produced to bring about policy direction shifts in favour of NGO initiatives. Policy shifts by the Kenyan government on slum dweller housing has as a result of the operations of the TPA shown to be more favourable to slum dweller communities. Such outcomes are exactly what the neo-liberal agenda of the Kenyan government promotes: self initiatives with reduced government involvement; but not with less government control.

4.1.1.4 Evaluation of Policy
Evaluation with monitoring deal with the important aspects of who should be doing the monitoring and evaluation: the TPA, the government, the slum communities themselves? These processes are embarked on for the purpose of establishing the “legitimacy” of organisational influences such as the TPA. These processes are undertaken for the policy issue to be raised as high priority in the public domain. The progressive use of evidence by effectively communicating it to governments is an important aspect of this evaluative process. Another major aspect is the question as to what would be considered to be successful or unsuccessful policy. These aspects will be addressed in an analysis of the slum dweller situation in Kenya and the specific role and impact of the TPA.

A weakness of the linear policy process discussed above is that it does not make provision for the dynamics of the policy environment in which governments and NGOs participate in varying types of relationships. Sutton (1999) contends that the policy cycle does not reflect the reality of policy making and implementation in governments. She argues that policy making reveals more often than not an amalgam of all the stages identified in the linear process; that clearly defined stages are in most if not all instances a misnomer. Importantly, it should be understood that the nature of NGO-government relations determines the degree to which NGOs can influence the policy process in any given country’s political system. In the following section, two contributions to the NGO-government narrative address this question from different angles.

4.2. Moving beyond linear policy process thinking
Najam (2000:383) proposes the four C’s model as a conceptual framework to analyse how the strategic institutional interests of NGOs and governments lead them to position themselves in the policy domain. Stratton (1999: 5) approaches the issue of policy making from an analysis of the
key ideas emanating from five disciplines including Political Science and International Relations. In the following section the cross cutting aspects pertaining to the policy process from these two contributions will be addressed.

Najam’s four C’s refer to “cooperation”, “cooptation”, “complimentarity” and “confrontation”. Each one of these can on its own or as part of a “policy influence factoral mix” determine the extent to which the operations of NGOs will impact on government policy. Agreement or disagreement on policy means and ends constitute the elements of the four C’s. For the purpose of an analysis of the TPA discussed above, all four factors feature but “complimentarity” emerges as the dominant of the four. “Complimentarity” refers to a situation of similar goals, but different strategies being the operating principle. Generally in countries where the TPA situation obtains, the point of Najam (2000:387), that “where the goals of government and NGOs are similar, they are likely to gravitate toward an arrangement – either independently or contractually – in which they complement each other in the achievement of a shared end, even through dissimilar means” should be noted. In the countries where the SDI has a presence, governments espouse the social objectives of adequate housing provision for its citizens; NGOs do likewise. For obvious historical and political reasons the means are dissimilar. To appreciate the dynamic interlink between the four C’s, Najam argues further that “where the preferred means are also similar, complimentarity will blossom into cooperation” (2000:387).

Sutton (1999:7) argues that the operation of policy networks will make the policy making and implementation process proceed more smoothly; thus enhancing “complimentarity”. Sutton regards these networks (as opposed to policy communities) as being “a broader system of relationships which are less stable and less restrictive” compared to policy communities that are “stable, tightly-knit group of relationships, with more restrictive membership and greater insulation from other institutions than a policy network”. Where differences exist between constituent parts in such networks, these are most likely to be on means rather than on ends. Governments on occasion regard the work done by NGOs as a usurpation of its domain of functions and might on this basis oppose intrusion.
An additional aspect that enhances “complimentarity” is the use of a policy narrative – an aspect dealt with under point one in the discussion on “agenda setting” as part of the linear policy process. In this regard Pollard and Court dealt with the importance of a policy narrative in terms of the acceptance of the language of the narrative. Sutton (1999: 8) considers it to resemble a “story” meant “to bring order to the complex multitude of interactions and processes which characterise development situations”. Sutton argues further that “narratives are criticised because it is believed they cause “blueprint” development that is, a prescribed set of solutions to an issue is used at times and in places where it might not be applicable. Narratives serve the interests of certain groups, usually the epistemic communities or policy networks that sustain them; and help to transfer ownership of the development process to members of these epistemic communities” (1999:11). This argument adds an important perspective to the operations of the IIED with its associated NGO networks. Sutton’s views, when applied to the IIED, translate into the IIED striving for and taking ownership of the housing development process. The simple narrative of using self-help as a means to improve housing and living conditions is in this instance a case in point.

Citing Hasenclever et al (1997), Sutton (1999:16) argues that epistemic communities play an important role in knowledge based theories in that they can influence four stages of the policy process: policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection and policy persistence. This domination of the policy process by means of NGOs makes think tanks such as the IIED wield enormous influence.

The confrontational dimension of the four C’s is explicitly rejected by the IIED think tank (Patel and Mitlin, 2005). This in itself does not mean that confrontational positions will not be adopted by the governments in question – if and when they perceive the need for it. “Cooptation” is another dimension which is eschewed by the TPA. The insistence on the “independence” of the community organisations and NGOs that form part of the TPA, illustrates the desire to be seen to be acting from an autonomous basis. An inherent pitfall in cooptation is the de-politicisation of the issues involved. Once a government has succeeded in establishing a political agenda to which NGOs - through cooptation - agreed to subscribe to, then the question of political contestation is effectively reduced to nil. The question of political power gets shifted off the policy agenda. A
new and neutral political vocabulary starts to emerge. Terms that are ignored include “conflict”, “class interests”, “political domination”, “expropriation”, “power struggle”, “class struggle”, “political violence” et al. Neutral terms germane to the neo-liberal development agenda emerge and eventually dominate political discourses: “civil society”, “interest groups”, “poverty alleviation”, “self-help”, “participatory development”, “decision making” and “consultation” are examples.

In scenarios such as these, Najam contends that “while cooptation is certainly a function of power, the source of power (own emphasis) can be varied: financial, political, coercive, even epistemic” (2000: 389). The issue of power is central to an evaluation of Najam’s contribution. The central theme of this research paper deals with the issue of power: of who wields power and towards what end. In the TPA situations the financial and epistemic aspects are crucial factors. Hundreds of thousands of pounds in donor aid channelled through the IIED and SDI gives TPA initiatives a substantial lift. The expertise that accompanies NGDOs incursions into countries like Kenya has historically been shown to be a unique selling proposition of NGO operations. Cooptation carries within it a strong element of policy compliance by NGOs, as opposed to policy defiance, which will amount to confrontation. Najam (2000:388) adds a debatable point to the discussion on the element of cooptation through imitation, by arguing that “NGO activists are no less desirous of converting government agencies to become more like them than government bureaucrats are of doing the same to NGOs”. A categorical statement like this begs the question as to what influences privatisation and commercialisation of state functions (through agencies such as NGOs) can have in the medium to long term. According to Najam (2000: 388) the process of “catalyzing” i.e. of NGOs acting as catalysts for policy change in society, is considered to be a universally positive attribute. It is argued in this discussion, as has been stated before that the likelihood exist of NGOs, with all their associated organisational characteristics becoming more firmly integrated in the political systems of poor countries. Future privatised government representation can therefore not be discounted or its importance minimised.
CHAPTER FIVE: NGO IMPACTS ON KENYAN HOUSING POLICIES

The above discussion serves as basis for the Kenyan case study. Aspects discussed above that are germane to the Kenyan shack dweller situation will be addressed.

Figure 2 is the model offered by Keely (1997), as adapted from Meier (1991) (Sutton, 1999:26), of the policy formation process and the forces acting on it. The figure illustrates, on the one hand, society centred forces and how these inform the policy process. On the other hand it shows state centred forces and how these inform the policy process. The numbers 1 and 2 have been inserted in the graphic to show the levels at which NGOs have an impact on the policy process. NGOs have an impact on two levels if the above power configuration is to be used as a starting point. These are shown as points 1 and 2 on the diagram: 1 – Through the existence of the ‘epistemic communities’, meaning think tanks. 2 – NGDOs position themselves politically amongst the actors as indicated. The case study information has a direct bearing on this diagram. The processes, in which the NGO Pamoja Trust is involved, are reflected in the diagram.

Figure 2: The policy formation process
CASE STUDY - KENYA

5.1. Background to Kenyan NGO Operations

In the late 1980s and through the 1990s international agencies lead by the World Bank promoted an “enabling” approach for housing delivery. Governments were encouraged to create incentives and policies that “fostered and facilitated improvements in housing through the private and NGO sectors” (Alam et al, 2005:8). Against this background, official housing policy of the Kenyan government evolved. This policy environment creates the framework within which Pamoja Trust and other NGOs focussing on slum dwelling find themselves operating. The third Sessional Paper of the Lands and Housing Department of the Kenyan government contains two sections dealing with Goals and Objectives, and the upgrading of Slums and Informal Settlements (Sessional Paper No 3: 4-16). The section on the goals refers to the housing policy aiming to “facilitate” the provision of “adequate” shelter …at an “affordable cost” etc. The section dealing with the objectives employ the use of verbs such as “facilitate”, “promote”, “increase”, “improve”, “encourage”, “mobilise” etc. The government of Kenya usually has a term of office of five years. It is assumed that these stated objectives ought to be achieved in this period of being in office. With no specified period identified (in the Sessional Paper) within which to achieve these objectives, they become meaningless. Any objective needs to be SMART: specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-bound (George, 2008:86). Those contained in this policy document do not meet these criteria. A striking characteristic of the objectives is that many place the government in an intermediary position, meaning that the attainment of the objective is not the task of the government alone; that other parties (e.g. the private sector) must be part of the equation. The same applies to the section on the upgrading of slums: “facilitation” is the guiding word, together with “participative” arrangements. It is with this as background that the role of NGOs in Kenya should be understood.

The conditions prevailing in Nairobi in terms of slums are explained by Warah (2001:1) as being of a type that requires urgent attention. High income households account for less than 10% of Nairobi’s households but occupy 64% of all residential land, while low-income households constitute 55% of the population while occupying only 6% of the residential land in the city. Nabutola (2009:1) presents figures that prove this trend: 10% of the population controls 90% of the country’s resources. This pattern of socio-economic segregation is accentuated by the
ongoing rural-urban migratory processes that characterises countries like Kenya. Nabutola’s figures indicate that Nairobi occupies 8% of the total land surface but generates 40% of Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These figures confirm the anomalies described above. The high residential densities in poor areas require housing policies that will fundamentally and decisively reverse present patterns.

Kameri-Mbote (2000-2:2) provides a background to the operations of NGOs in Kenya, strongly based on a legalistic framework of analysis. The political pluralism that emerged in Kenya towards the end of the 1990s allowed for much greater versatility in NGO types and scope of operations to crystallise. The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes and the changing role of the state were discussed in previous chapters. The suspicion with which NGOs were viewed stemmed from a perception on the part of the Arap Moi government of NGOs as becoming instrumental in the whittling away of state sovereignty. Kameri-Mbote speaks of there being “no need for a shadow state that bypasses the powers left of government”. Also, cooperation between NGOs and the government is what is understood to be acceptable, since “each has its own comparative advantage over the other” (Kameri-Mbote, 2000-2: 5). Of importance in this analysis is the legal foundation on which NGOs operate in Kenya. The NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990 brought in its wake the establishment of the NGO Coordination Board which, as the name indicates was meant to exercise control over the operations of NGOs. Registration of NGOs was part of the formalities. The old (before adoption of the new constitution in 2010) Kenyan constitution provided for the fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to form or belong to associations, of the individual (Kameri-Mbote, 2000-2:7). Three registration options exist for NGOs ranging from one, being administered by the Ministry of Culture and Social Services , the other with the Attorney General’s Office (under the Societies Act) and lastly by the NGO Coordination Bureau of the Office of the President of Kenya. Under latter option NGOs might be deregistered if deemed necessary by the government (Kameri-Mbote, 2000-2:8). The Finance Act and the Immigration Act add to the legislative requirements NGOs need to abide by. Significantly, also covered under the NGO Act of 1990 is regulation 21 which “prohibits NGOs from becoming connected with any groups of a political nature established outside Kenya except with the Board’s consent” (Kameri-Mbote, 2000-2: 12). In this respect the focus of the SDI organisations on single issues campaigns and not broadening these to
include direct political agitation for the scrapping of such political restrictions limits the scope of potential policy influences. Failure to engage at the direct political level holds the potential of more restrictive policies being implemented to curtail NGO operations in future.

Pamoja Trust and the SDI formation operate under semi repressive political conditions in Kenya. The government’s closer scrutiny and monitoring of “policy-focussed” NGO activities stems from terrorist activity in the country in 1998. The case of Wangari Maathai’s involvement as coordinator of the Greenbelt Movement NGO in a dispute over the use of land in a recreational park by private concerns is also instructive in this regard.

5.2 Ideological Underpinnings of the SDI: Implications for Kenyan Housing

Patel and Mitlin’s (2005:2) argue that NGOS and their related organisations (in this case the SDI) should be party to the reformist neo-liberal agenda and seek to find redress for slum dwellers in the capitalist system. This emphasis on reformism, of seeking economistic (meaning restrictive, narrow economic, defensive) advantages and fighting battles aimed at achieving incremental material gains for the slum dwellers permeates the writings of the authors of IIED and by extension, SDI position papers. Satterwhaite (2001:136) highlights the fact that it is difficult to make the transfer from being professionals to being community based activists.

Patel and Mitlin (2005: 4) argue for a departure from what is termed the ‘rights-based’ approach to the problems of development in poor societies. The right-based approach is, according to Patel and Mitlin, based on an overt focus on politics, reliance on the state, legalistic procedures and too little on what it is that works for poor shack dwellers in Kenya. The authors are involved as ideologues in the IIED and by extension in the SDI. Their arguments presented in this paper holds true for all NGOs that are part of the TPA. A few points of criticism of their stance is necessary since the ideological claims made and the realities that confront shack dwellers in Kenya do not necessarily coincide. The criticism is not a defence of the “rights-based approach”, but based on observations considered to be germane to the debate. It is also of importance since it lies at the root of how the impacts on housing policy eventually pan out, and the value of the political interpretation that is attached to it.
Starting from the premise that the role of shack dwellers federations and the supporting NGOs is to build up organisations of the poor, to seek “pro-poor urban developments (notably secure tenure, basic services and housing)” (Patel and Mitlin, 2005:5) the argument fails to proceed from this restrictive cryptic formulation. It fails to state the goals involved in this building process. Underlying the “politics of patience” approach of the SDI and affiliates is the concern about forestalling possible evictions from and demolition of shacks – as was the case during the 1980s and 1990s (Weru: 2004: 49). Acceptance of the fact that savings groups and active membership have been, are and will inevitably mostly be women, arrests the organisation’s potential growth and drowns it in politically backward gender inequalities. Notwithstanding the fact that national federations consists of essentially reformist, NGO backed civic oriented organisations, it is politically naïve to proceed from the assumption that gender inequalities forced on shack dwellers by an oppressive state apparatus should merely be duplicated inside the grassroots organisations themselves. This shows a clear lack of progressive political leadership.

A second point of contention is the insularity that national shack dwellers federations display insofar as their national and international linkages are concerned. As stated above, the TPA endeavours to seek “pro-poor developments” in all its activities. Part of such developments should without fail include collaboration with organisations active in the same fields, but coming from different backgrounds. Single issue focuses is a trade mark of most NGOs. The SDI in its approach and orientation is not different. The social and political advancement of the cause of shack dwellers can arguably proceed at a much faster pace if energies and efforts are combined. Collaboration with state structures are considered to be in order, but collaboration with similar organisations to enhance the struggles of the SDI appears problematic. In South Africa the South Africa Homeless People’s Federation never featured in eviction battles waged under the auspices of the Anti Eviction Campaign or Shack Dwellers Movement that originated in Durban. Patel and Mitlin (2005:12) further argue in favour of both fighting for citizen rights as well as negotiating when necessary. The two authors argue that the role of the state should be reduced to it being the provider of essential services to shack dwellers, if and when required. “Lasting pro-poor development” raises the spectre of the poor’s conditions lasting to perpetuity - of not even a possibility existing of it being eradicated any time in future. While the single issue of shack dwellers is proper housing, related social issues cannot be considered to be of no consequence.
Education, health and gainful employment are aspects that have a direct bearing on the process of building up organisations of the poor.

A third approach adopted by the SDI-TPA, and not discussed in much detail in any of the papers of the TPA, is the question of the promotion of direct political representation in the institutions of state. This relates to local government structures where housing policy implementation is done at its most basic level. It is argued that in cases where procedural, representative democracy exists – Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia, India, South Africa – that the cause of shack dwellers can be promoted using these channels, limited and circumscribed as they might be. The insistence of Patel, Mitlin and Weru of dealing with the state as ‘them’ and the shack dwellers as ‘us’ and simply looking at interfaces between the two where negotiations on housing issues are concerned, restricts the scope of operational influence the TPA can have on housing and related policies. The thinking of the TPA leadership in this regard is that organisational independence has to be protected. It does however surface that active disengagement of shack dwellers from the formal, neo liberal political processes e.g. participation in elections is covertly promoted by the ideologues in the TPA. The argument is that the state is ineffectual in effecting pro-poor policies and associated development. The flip side of the argument however raises the matter of shack dwellers’ lives becoming systematically depoliticised.

Related to the above is the safeguarding of the autonomy of the shack dwellers organisations through the use of savings groups to enhance self-reliance. Self-reliance and the independence that it implies does not in any manner extend to ideological self-reliance and it is not addressed in this manner by the ideologues in the SDI. This refers to the fact that shack dwellers, in promoting their own cause, ought to develop politically independent organisations for the purpose of promoting their specific social and class issues. The modus operandi of SDI members results in them basically perpetuating existing power asymmetries through the insistence on social reformist, incrementalist approaches that can only have similar small scale, incrementalist impacts on the policy environment that obtains. An example of this is the issue of SDI members demonstrating people’s solutions. “Federations collectively take the risk to demonstrate new solutions to the state. Rather than contesting things that don’t work, they engage the state to review alternative options. This strategy “turns protest politics on its head” (Patel and Mitlin,
2005: 14). This line of reasoning might sound very plausible since it deals with the offering of practical solutions to real, practical social problems. However, two questions in response to this assertion are: why demonstrate to the state and not to political or social allies that might lend even more weight to the proposals? Also, does the refusal or acceptance of the state in its response to the proposals represent the final word on the matter? In other words the onus in the final analysis will still rest on the state, as presently constituted, to sanction and implement solutions. The “non-alignment” of SDI affiliates where it concerns forging broader collaboration with similar social and political formations on the one hand and its overt reliance on state acquiescence leads to the conclusion that references to people-centredness, empowerment, redistribution, securing pro-poor attitudinal change and pro-poor regulatory reform, being aspirations sought by SDI (Patel and Mitlin, 2005:15), merely amount to reflecting neo-liberal political expressions of a particular kind.

Celine d’Cruz, David Satterthwaite (2006: 14) and Jane Weru (2004: 48) are advocates of the policies of the IIED and SDI. In separate papers they have argued in favour of certain methods on how shack dwellers should pursue their campaigns for improved housing. “The federations form the best hope (own emphasis) for urban poor groups to be able to influence local and national governments to change their policies so that they are more pro-poor. Federation organising methods actively promote the transformation of traditional relationships with governments (d’Cruz and Satterthwaitte: 16). Weru contends that the work of Pamoja Trust and Muungano wa Wanvijiji “centres on developing a consensus (own emphasis) among the inhabitants of informal settlements around issues of land and structure entitlements, and building community capacity to address these …” (2004:47). d’Cruz also refers to the need to “create a new leadership (own emphasis) that is different from the old and which includes the very, very poor. Muungano, which is the federation, as it exists today, has traditional leadership that has their own vested interests” (d’Cruz, 2001:2). The impression is created of the superimposition of systems of control.

From the above a range of politically debatable points emerge. In Kenya the existence and influence of traditional (tribal) political figures in the urban housing environment adds to the social-ethnic tensions that exist in slum settlements. The TPA in its engagements with the shack
dwelling issues has had to face up to this reality. Internal community conflicts due to claims on resources available have historically always been simmering below the surface. Added to this is the existence of shack owners who rents out shacks to poor urban dwellers. In many instances they are absentee slum-lords. In its efforts to “develop a consensus” among slum dwellers Pamoja Trust is attempting to reconcile the interests of owners of property with the interest of those in need of housing. This reconciliation, when implemented on a localised level has been shown to be possible. The case study of Huruma, discussed in a later section, serves as proof.

Insofar as offering the “best hope” for poor slum dwellers, it can be considered a political imposition that presuppose that the SDI approach is above criticism. To categorically state that this approach is the way out of a seemingly hopeless situation presuppose that home-grown, independent solutions of shack dwellers count for little or has in the past come to nought. The creation of “a new leadership” whose politics are basically a variation on the politics of the government similarly offers few progressive alternatives that will take the campaigns of the shack dwellers forward in a decisive manner – and onto a higher political level.

5.3 Pamoja Trust Operations and Their Impacts

In this section the grassroots organisation Muungano’s wa Wanvijiji’s involvement is considered as part of the role of Pamoja Trust. Pamoja Trust as an NGO established links with Muungano when it started to take up the battles of slum dwellers in Kenya.

Muungano emerged in the period during the 1990s when opposition to evictions and slum demolitions was prominent. Weru (2004: 50) documents its origin as it “emerged from dialogues and workshops organised by a Nairobi based NGO, the Mazingira Institute, and initially focussed on a land rights campaign”. The self-help principle as expressed in the formation of savings schemes was adopted by the campaign. Pamoja Trust originated in 2000 as a formation to assist civic bodies, organised on the same “self help” organisational principles. The trust obtained support from MISEREOR (a German international NGO) as well as Oxfam.

Pamoja Trust collaborated with two other NGOs namely Shelter Trust and Kituo in the promotion of land rights of slum dwellers. Pamoja has more direct organisational links with Muungano wa Wanvijiji which is the coalition of settlement dwellers operative in a number of urban centres in Kenya. The intention here is not to provide a narrative on the operations of
Pamoja but to ascertain what the objective impacts of its operations are. Kanji, Braga and Mittulah (2002) elaborates on the specific actions of Pamoja. These involve “work on the community level in order to build capacity for policy influence”. Furthermore it “promotes credit and savings groups to bring informal settlement residents together and to build community structures capable of addressing land and housing issues …Pamoja provides communities with support in lobbying skills, policy influence (own emphasis), coalition building, and research aimed at identifying community resources” [1]. The brief of the organisation extends further to include city level operations. In these, the organisation “facilitate the exchange of ideas (own emphasis) among professionals, NGOs and other developmental actors who have skills on land issues, by organising forums, networking and exchanging experiences (own emphasis) in the area of urban land and housing at city, national and international level. The city level networking is done in close collaboration with provincial government administrators” (Kanji, Braga and Mittulah, 2002:16). In considering the scope of operations of the IIED, Pamoja Trust’s work in terms of possible points of influence on housing policy are shown by the points emphasised above. Points 1 and 2 inserted on figure 2 indicate where Pamoja Trust positions itself in order to effect policy influence. These points of interaction imply that the policy influences do not come about in a uni-linear but rather a multi-faceted manner.

Kanji, Braga and Mittulah adds that Pamoja has worked to nurture Muungano wa Wanvijiji [2]. This nurturing amounts to the infusion of NGO politics into the civic body. It is an indirect way in which the potential influence on housing policy can be exerted. The nurturing of Muungano is a critical factor since the course of action decided on initially, stemming from this infusion then becomes decidedly one-directional. It is invariably the path of limited social reforms within neo-liberal economic strictures. The resources at the disposal of Pamoja Trust allow it to exert this “nurturing” influence on the grassroots body. In this process, organisational dynamics dictate that agendas are set for the organisation being nurtured. A course and plan of action is laid out for the affected communities. Muungano in turn was involved with a range of other NGO initiatives aimed at promoting the cause of shack dwellers. One example is raising alarm when land grabs occur.
In addition to these specific actions, all the above organisations have a working relationship with policy makers and civil servants (at low and higher levels of government) involved in land and housing issues. The relationship between the SDI organisations (Pamoja Trust and Muungano) and government officials range from one of making common cause through visitations by these officials to SDI programmes in other countries, to one of indifference and aloofness at a local and national level. Between these two extremes the dynamic of influencing housing policy in tangible and intangible ways plays itself out in slum settlements on a daily basis. It can therefore be observed that various agencies are involved in the network within which Pamoja Trust functions and through which it exerts influence on housing policy. These and other organisational activities that impact on housing policy can productively be examined through the use of impact indicators.

5.3.1 Policy Impact Indicators: Ascertaining and Measuring Policy Impacts
A theoretical appraisal of policy impact indicators is provided by Laney (2003). Laney argues that “you need to design indicators at the beginning of any intervention, and systematise their collection and analysis in your monitoring and evaluation system” (2003:3). Policy change is presented as one type of advocacy impact and is said to come about when “specific changes in the policies, practices, programmes or behaviour of major institutions that affect the public, such as government, international financial bodies and corporations” (Laney, 2003: 3) come about. Laney further argues that change in public policy can be effected on paper (agenda setting) or by influencing policy implementation.

Three cases where analyses focus on policy impact indicators involving Pamoja Trust follow. One way through which policy influence is practised is through observation of SDI-Pamoja Trust operations in different countries by government officials from other countries. This is known as “horizontal exchanges”. The underlying idea is to, on the basis of tangible evidence, make bureaucrats aware of the possibilities of international collaboration on housing policies.

5.3.1.1 NGO Links with Government
Kanji, Braga and Mittulah (2002:19) consider relationships NGOs have with governments as one indicator of impact that can be monitored and measured. Pamoja Trust, Kituo and Shelter Forum collaborate in the Nairobi Informal Settlements Coordinating Committee as a united front when engaging government on shelter related issues such as evictions and land titling. The nature of the
collaboration is such that it amounts more to lobbying than structured, systematic engagement on policy issues. The drawback of this kind of interaction is that it can at best be described as ad hoc. The mistrust that government officials harbour for NGO policy advocacy also serves as a damper on the degree of impact that might be effected. Using networking methods in which governments officials become involved as individuals (who are sympathetic to the NGO cause) also holds the possibility of NGOs in effect fostering a culture of patronage and political opportunism. The actions of individuals accumulating or building their own individual power profiles through NGO networking is virtually impossible to control: he or she might or might not offer patronage under varying conditions. Using these networking methods as a method of building and extending influences inside state departments cannot in the long term be more effective than state officials executing political mandates given by slum dwellers through direct political, electoral processes.

As argued earlier, the conscious sidestepping by NGOs of direct political electoral representation of slum dwellers compels it to employ methods that in the long term amount to political ad hocism. This negatively affects the housing policy impact that can be exerted.

At another level the longevity of the involvement of NGOs like Pamoja Trust in slum dwelling issues acts as another policy impact indicator. Pamoja Trust has been in existence for a decade and its advocacy on slum dwelling is a long term undertaking. Kanji, Braga and Mittulah (2002:19) contends that “NGOs felt there was insufficient recognition by donors of the difficult, long term nature of advocacy which cannot be assessed using conventional impact indicators”. These “conventional impact indicators” are ones that relate more to short term, service provision projects. A third impact indicator identified by the authors refers to the relationships Pamoja Trust has forged with other NGOs. The Nairobi Informal Settlements Coordinating Committee (NISCC) is one example. Efforts at higher level collaboration amongst NGOs in Nairobi dealt with arriving at common positions on slum upgrading.

A key policy impact indicator deals with the relationships Pamoja Trust has with communities. These relationships, if perceived by the affected communities as being beneficial to their material well being can be used by Pamoja Trust as evidence that its work benefits communities. By the same token the approach adopted by the organisation can through advocacy, be presented as suitable for codification in housing policies of the government. The enumerations undertaken under the aegis of Pamoja Trust in Korogocho (a village-slum settlement in Nairobi) is a case in
point. These activities focus the attention of government officials on the practicalities and possibilities of slum improvement.

At the other end of the spectrum, the actions of Pamoja Trust can have decidedly negative impacts on communities. Kanji, Braga and Mittulah, (2002:20) relates an account where 40% of Nairobi slum dwellers in a questionnaire survey felt that “leaders tend to discriminate against certain sections of the communities, gave false promises and worked with NGOs to exploit communities”. The advocacy of Pamoja Trust centres on the acquisition of land for shack dwellers to build and own houses. Not all shack dwellers succeed in this, resulting in internal community divisions emerging due to the advocacy of Pamoja Trust. Positive policy impacts can therefore be nullified due to the very nature of the advocacy that is being conducted. Related to this aspect is the essence of what the “self-help” concept of the SDI and Pamoja Trust entails. James Petras (1999:437) refers to this concept as ‘self-exploitation’. He argues that slum dwellers, whilst contributing to the creation of social wealth, do not benefit from this wealth and are called upon to make an added contribution from their own meagre resources for their upkeep. They are therefore contributing doubly to society but are denied a fair share in the accumulated national wealth.

The organisational structures and operational characteristics of NGOs reveal the essential undemocratic nature of NGOs. As a policy indicator related to organisational structure, it is argued here that there is a fundamental contradiction between what NGOs like Pamoja Trust advocates in relation to democratic organisational practice for slum dweller communities, and what they themselves practise. Pamoja Trust is on record as advocating the “building of internal capacity” as well as “internal community governance structures” (Weru, 2004:49) in communities in order for them to take up struggles on their own behalf. A noticeable word not included in the abovementioned paper is “democracy”; the reference is to “representative”, not “democratically elected representative”. This contradiction is reflective of the top-down imposition of NGO politics referred to earlier. In essence, NGOs like Pamoja Trust use their huge financial, technical and human resources to prescribe solutions to slum dweller communities that are highly questionable in relation to the ideological import thereof. Given the range of issues taken up by individual NGOs in places like Nairobi, it would make simple practical sense for a
single political formation to take up all these single issues and combine them into a single democratic political programme, representing the class interests of the slum dwellers in Kenya.

**5.3.1.2 Columbia University Investigation**

The Columbia University investigation into slum upgrading conducted by Pamoja Trust is an academic research endeavour that set out to discover the nature of the impact of Pamoja Trust on housing policy. The study was conducted using field research (household surveys, focus groups and individual interviews) and the report was finalised in 2005.

The study concluded that the work of Pamoja Trust done in the villages (subsections of Huruma section in Nairobi slumland) of Kambimoto and Gitathuru showed “successes in improving perception of tenure security, community’s self financing of upgraded houses through the saving scheme, enhanced community transparency and cohesion through enumeration, technical capacity building through designing exercises and construction training, and community consensus in selection of housing beneficiaries” (Alam et al, 2005: iii). Shortcomings identified were “issues of exclusion, affordability, and lack of critical skills …for long-term sustainability of the process”. Added to latter is the recommendation that “enumerations should be adapted for larger-scale efforts” (Alam et al, 2005: iii). The report indicates that the Kenyan government has come to rely on (own emphasis) Pamoja Trust for training on enumerations. This reliance is an indication on the one hand of the low level of expertise government has at its disposal and on the other hand, the low priority that government pays to improvement of slum settlements. It also shows the extreme reach one NGO can achieve in influencing a very particular aspect of government housing policy. It reaffirms the technical expertise NGOs can deliver to slum dwellers. It also affirms the reality of governments becoming progressively more, not less reliant on NGO expertise.

One aspect that has a direct bearing on policy impact initiated by Pamoja is that of negotiations between itself (with Muungana), and government officials at local and higher levels. The report refers to negotiations for “legalized land tenure and the provision of infrastructural needs with state agencies and other service providers that form the backbone of the process”. Pamoja assists Muungano to “build connections with municipal officials by opening doors that might have
otherwise remained closed to inhabitants of slum communities” (Alam et al, 2005:18). The process is augmented by what is referred to as “precedent-setting” – of the importance of tangible results being shown from negotiations that have been conducted. The report cites two such examples (Alam et al, 2005:19) that gave vital impetus to the sustainability of the initiatives. One example was the granting, after negotiations with the community assisted by Pamoja Trust by the Kenyan government of a “Special Planning Area” in Huruma. This concession, which amounted to an adaptation in the housing policy of the national government, meant that the government of Kenya “agreed to allow residents to build on the land using more affordable materials and smaller structures …and to give the land to the community and to provide public services in exchange for the community’s investments in upgrading the structures within the slums” (Alam et al, 2005:23). Preceding the implementation of this programme was the completion of an enumeration process which quantified the characteristics of the shacks and related aspects such as the shack owner – slum dweller ratio, size of shacks etc. As for the empowerment of the slum dwellers, the report concludes that over 70% of Kambimoto residents felt that their negotiation power with city council officials increased (Alam et al, 2005:31). Sutton (1999:8) refers to this as the ability of communities to make an imprint on the actions of the street level bureaucracy: the ward councillors, the local state officials etc. Sutton considers this to be important since she considers these small bureaucrats as the individuals who shape the eventual implementation of housing policies. They are the ones who serve as the decisive link between the community and those bureaucrats who at a city and national level can either block policy proposals or make them progress. In the case of Kambimoto a more transparent atmosphere regarding negotiations was realised.

The ad hoc approach of the government in this regard shows how it is willing to consider granting of land to communities under special conditions only. This Pamoja Trust initiative had the objective effect of placing on the agenda the potential roll out of similar programmes in the rest of Kenya’s slums. A point of criticism of the project and the advances made insofar as policy influences were concerned is that the progress was confined to two subsections (villages) of one ward (Huruma) in one city (Nairobi), affecting a relatively small number of slum dwellers. “Smallness” in their scope of operations and the benefits that poor communities derive is a singular criticism raised in chapter two of this report. A process which runs parallel to the
Huruma project is the UN Habitat’s Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). The difference here is that KENSUP is driven by national government and international agencies – in this instance the UN Habitat programme.

In summarising the findings of the investigation, Alam et al concluded that tenure security for the residents of Kambimoto was basically guaranteed by government and that evictions were not to be repeated. They were willing to share costs for the construction of their new dwellings and were willing to invest more in the development of their community’s infrastructure. In this settlement the tensions between shack owners and shack occupants were also ameliorated. This lead to greater consensus in the community. Strong advocacy platforms were created in this process by means of active participation of the residents. This in turn built confidence to tackle bigger challenges. The mediation role performed by Pamoja Trust in bringing government officials, shack owners, shack dwellers and external agencies together was, the report concludes, a successful one. The role of donor-fed funds channelled through Pamoja Trust, combined with government willingness to make land available to shack dwellers laid the basis for this success.

5.3.1.3 Savings Schemes, the Akiba Mashinani Trust and Policy Influence Linkages

In concluding the discussion on the role of Pamoja, the creation and existence of the Akiba Mashinani Trust (AMT), linked to the fundamental element of the community savings schemes as administered by the SDI, is addressed.

Alam et al (2005:15) considers the purpose of the savings to be to “give slum dwellers a safe avenue for obtaining small loans in order to avoid loan sharks who can trap borrowers in a cycle of debt through high interest rates. Savings schemes also bring people together, building stronger ties within the community. Furthermore, in the absence of a representative local government, the weekly savings meetings serve as a time when local concerns and issues are aired, discussed and resolved”. One drawback of the schemes is that it excludes those who are extremely poor and can therefore not participate due to poverty. Other slum dwellers are simply opposed to the idea of savings schemes. Issues of maladministration and corruption have surfaced in this regard. However, the scheme as operated in Kambimoto has proven to be strongly supported by residents: 50% of residents are members and many others expressed an interest to join. The AMT
supports the savings scheme in that funds can be made available to members of the savings scheme to obtain land and build houses. Weru (2004:60) explains that the fund “lends to the savings schemes, which then on-lend to members. Members have to pay a 10 per cent deposit, the savings scheme also contributes 10 per cent, and 80 per cent comes from the fund. The cost of a complete unit measuring around 55 square metres is around 200 000 Kenya shillings (ca. US$2,500)”.

A micro-credit system such as this is meant to tie borrowers into the tentacles of finance capital, albeit at a level outside of standard financial institutions. The system is part of a public-private partnership programme which essentially revolves around the privatisation of housing provision. The Kenyan government is willing to support these schemes because it reduces its responsibilities and accountability for the social function of housing provision. The rolling out of the system is done incrementally basing itself on the willingness of slum residents to tie themselves into the system, borrowing funds from private sources who, like conventional banks would demand repayment of loans. In cases of defaulting on loan repayment the houses would then technically speaking belong to Pamoja Trust through the AMT, which have private, foreign funders as capital providers. In short, Pamoja Trust is, through the AMT and savings schemes strengthening the privatisation agenda of the Kenyan government. Therefore, while the strenuous efforts of Pamoja Trust to get resident to participate in their own slum upgrading programmes lead to positive short term impacts, the medium to long term impacts are arguably more fundamental to the issue at stake.

Laney (2003:3) provides a useful table to assess the dimensions of change insofar as policy change indicators are concerned. The above discussion raised aspects that either directly or indirectly dealt with these policy indicators. The conclusion reached here is that where it concerns indicators of change (impact), that the incremental nature of the processes in Kenya militates against the changes listed in the bottom right section of the table. These are the changes being striven for by organisations such as Pamoja Trust. These changes are long term and overtly political in nature.
Table 1: Dimensions of Change: Policy change indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of progress (outcomes)</th>
<th>Indicators of change (impact)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Increased dialogue on an issue at policy level</td>
<td>• positive change in people’s lives as a result of the policy/legislative change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Raised profile of issue</td>
<td>• Changed policy (e.g. shown in agreed texts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Changed opinion of target, or key influentials</td>
<td>• Change in legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Changed rhetoric (in public/private)</td>
<td>• Budgets and expenditure shown change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change in written publications about the issue</td>
<td>• Policy-legislation change implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Changes in clauses of legislation/policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Laney (2003)
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

6.1. Lessons to be learned

The question of slum settlements and their inhabitants is assuming greater prominence in the literature on NGOs, on urban studies and on the ecological issues that accompany these. The attention paid to the question by international agencies like the United Nations through specialised bodies such as UN Habitat has to shift from the level of high level analysis to high level intervention. This is required as a necessary step to resolve the manifold problems that are associated with slum living.

The Kenyan case study points to a duality in the situation which in essence amounts to a contradiction between the social-economic and the political dimensions of the processes at work. At the socio-economic level, NGDOs influence the quality of life of the slum dwellers directly. The numbers who benefit are small. However, in creating an organisational platform for advancing the cause of the slum dwellers, it becomes possible for NGDOs to advance the cause of the slum dwellers politically. However, even though these opportunities to advance the housing question as a political question exist, the NGDOs as a rule ignore it. They act as political inhibitors.

The role of NGDOs in an economic sense has been shown to be generally wide in range but shallow in depth. The involvement of these NGOs in slum-dwelling dynamics has historically been in the form of service provision. Their involvement in advocacy processes to influence policy has tended to follow the narrow agenda of neo-liberal reformist strategies. These have been shown to have small scale impacts. The long term impacts of these types of interventions have been shown to offer minimal relief for slum dwellers – as the Kenyan situation illustrates. At the centre of this situation lies the question of the control of resources. This is a directly political matter. According to UN Habitat urbanisation figures, slum dwellers are denied this access in ever growing numbers. It has been argued that through the progressive raising of overt demands for access to national resources, slum dwellers will be enabled to improve their material living conditions.
The positive impacts of NGDO work on policy processes are by their very nature subject to reversal, due to political and economic conditions that might obtain. One example is the political violence that followed in the wake of the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya. In Kenya the initial indirect impacts the NGDO work had, can however be translated into greater direct impacts on policy provided clear political goals are set.

This investigation has endeavoured to show that these limitations are as a direct result of NGO practitioners consciously avoiding the presentation of the social question of housing provision on a clear political platform, requiring direct political measures for their long term resolution.

Policy impacts can be considered as being practically possible, depending on what the resources and the orientation of the NGO involved is. The international collaboration between the IIED, the SDI and Pamoja Trust has shown to be instrumental in creating an enabling environment for advocacy on housing issues in Kenya. The utilisation of these “policy windows” however falls short of maximising the policy impact through direct political intervention.
END NOTES

1. Has been funded by Ford Foundation, Homeless International and WaterAid (UK); it has worked in collaboration with Intermediate Technology Development Group, UN HABITAT, the World Bank and the Kenyan government.

2. The Columbia University report (Alam et al) suggests that it has about five or six leaders; there is no established leadership or, most importantly, NO formal organisational structure governing the numerous groups in Kenya. This situation lends itself to all manner of possible manipulation.
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