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“THEY COME HERE AND TAKE OUR HOUSES!”
COMMUNITY CONFLICTS IN LANGA IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE HOUSING CRISIS IN CAPE TOWN: ‘BORNERS’ AGAINST
‘MIGRANTS’

A minor dissertation in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Simon Eppel (EPPSIM001)

Supervisor: Associate Professor Lungisile Ntsebeza

April 2007
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature _______________________

Date ___________________________
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is not easy conducting research. This is probably true for many reasons, but two stand out particularly. The first is simply methodological. Methodologically it can be confusing to know how to proceed when so many new findings expose an often confusing web of possibilities. Navigating through the chaos of research takes guidance, and this in turn requires guides. I have had numerous guides in the process of researching and writing this thesis.

Most importantly were the residents of Langa whom I interviewed during research and who gave graciously of their time. Few started off knowing me as anything other than a stranger walking around, full of sometimes difficult-to-answer questions. Yet the willingness to speak with me and allow me to engage with an issue which often carries much pain was forthcoming. For that I am grateful. I am also immensely grateful to Athini Melane, my friend, comrade and fieldwork assistant from Workers World Media Productions. He assisted me superbly during research, often undertaking his own investigations before coming to me to suggest useful resources and contacts.

Thanks are also due to the government officials, researchers and community leaders whom I interviewed. Among these, three need special mention: Martin Legassick, Warren Smit and Selby Tindeni. Although we only met once, Martin Legassick was important in helping begin my research and his insightful contribution to South African history has been of great importance to me throughout my university education. Mr Warren Smit constantly surprised me with his readiness to answer my questions and provide assistance. I am much in his debt. Selby Tindleni, the chairman of the Langa Backyarders Association has a committed passion to improve the housing situation of residents in Langa and he campaigns despite the fact that he does not share in their homelessness. Mr Tindleni’s readiness to assist me in my research and talk to me about the housing issues of Langa was remarkable, as was his friendliness.

The first few months of research also required expert academic guidance. There were two people whose eyes assisted me to penetrate through the mists of my confusion.
The first, my friend Jonathan Grossman, has contributed to this work since before its inception. During the writing of this thesis, he had the trust to believe in me when I doubted myself most, and the kindness to say it in a way that was sincere and affirming. When he offered advice, its profundity was belied by the simplicity of his words. But so are the ways in which he talks.

The other person whose help and advice was so vital and necessary was my supervisor, Lungisile Ntsebeza. It is in large part due to him that this research has been possible at all. The discussions with him in the early days of research helped me collect my thoughts and direct them towards the present body of research. Upon request, he always served up vast quantities of suggestions and the most useful advice, and he had the patience to repeat them to me when I failed to hear. It has been in the last part of writing up this research that he has proved himself to have the uncanny ability to find order in the chaos of my writing. That he has also graciously and tirelessly participated in the backwards, forwards, backwards again editing and rewriting of my work has been most appreciated.

Thanks also to my large and constantly extending family. And to my Sara, who has patiently and lovingly given her support to me while I have struggled to finish this work. Podemos viajar a Peru ahora!

The second reason why it is not easy doing research has to do with the context of poverty chosen for this research. Would that another world was possible where there was no place for researchers to conduct research with ‘the poor’, but rather simply conduct it with people. Such an alternative requires that the (im)balances of power be shifted and changed, and such an outcome requires commitment and hard work. *Aluta continua!*
ABSTRACT

"They come here and take our houses!"
Community Conflicts in Langa in the Context of the Housing Crisis in Cape Town: ‘Borners’ against ‘Migrants’

That “there will be houses, comfort and security for all” was one of the rallying cries of the South African progressive movement under apartheid. When, in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) toppled the apartheid National Party in the country’s first ‘free and fair’ elections, the promise of ‘housing for all’ again formed an important part of the vision of a ‘new’ South Africa. Yet in Cape Town, thirteen years later, the promises of housing for all conflicts strongly with the reality of an increasing housing backlog in the city. Apart from the obvious growth of informal and overcrowded dwellings around the city, one of the consequences has been that a narrative has emerged among residents born in the city, known as ‘borners’, that places responsibility for the continuation of their homelessness on people who are born outside of the city. Known as ‘migrants’, it is against such people that ‘borners’ have begun to articulate their entitlement to housing in Cape Town. This thesis is an attempt to examine such claims and the divisions which such claims imply. Using a case study of a township called Langa, the thesis attempts to understand how and why such claims are being made. Doing so requires an exploration of South Africa’s past and present.

By examining the past, the thesis argues, the categories ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ can be seen as products of the attempt by South Africa’s past segregationist regimes to mediate between the need for labour by capital and the racist desire to achieve a ‘white’ South Africa. In the post-1994 era however, the claims about division are not only encouraged by the discursive legacy of the past, but also by contemporary factors which have encouraged ‘borners’ to define themselves as different and in opposition to ‘migrants’. Factors commonly cited by ‘borners’ include the facts that housing delivery is slowed by the increased demand for houses that results from large-scale in-migration and that housing delivery is biased in favour of ‘migrants’. Ultimately however, such conceptions about who is responsible for either producing, or usurping the tiny offerings forthcoming in Langa, misjudge political-economic reasons for the lack of housing. Working-class people waiting for houses pit themselves against others who are also without adequate housing, and the more direct causes of their housing woes, the present housing development strategy and the current direction of the macro-economy, essentially remain unchallenged.
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>Anti-Privatisation Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLLP</td>
<td>Coloured Labour Preference Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAG</td>
<td>Development Action Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iSLP</td>
<td>Integrated Serviced Land Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION ........................................................................................................... I

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................ II

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ IV

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................... V

## CHAPTER ONE

OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................................................ 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1

1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................................................. 5

1.3 CHOOSING THE SITE FOR RESEARCH ................................................................................. 13

1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ....................................................................... 14

1.4.1 Data collection .............................................................................................................. 14

1.4.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................ 18

1.5 CHALLENGES OF RESEARCH ............................................................................................. 21

1.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................................. 23

1.7 CHAPTER STRUCTURE ......................................................................................................... 25

## CHAPTER TWO

TOWARDS AN EXPLORATION OF THE HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROBLEM UP TO 1994 .................................................................................................................. 27

2.1 HISTORY OF HOUSING IN CAPE TOWN ............................................................................. 28

2.2 'BORNERS' AND 'MIGRANTS' IN CAPE TOWN .................................................................... 34

2.3 THE HISTORY OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN 'BORNERS' AND 'MIGRANTS', AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM IN LANGA ........................................................................... 43

2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................................................................................... 50
CHAPTER THREE

‘BORNERS’ AND ‘MIGRANTS’ IN CONTEMPORARY LANGA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.2 HOUSING DELIVERY SINCE 1994: POLICY DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION

3.3 HOUSING DELIVERY IN CAPE TOWN

3.4 THE GROWTH OF THE HOUSING BACKLOG

3.5 CONSEQUENCES OF HOUSING DELIVERY

3.5.1. Case Studies: RDP, Hostels-to-Homes and the N2 Gateway Project

3.5.1.1 The Delivery of RDP Houses in Cape Town

3.5.1.2 The delivery of Hostels-To-Homes conversions

3.5.1.3 Delivery in the N2 Gateway Project

3.6 REASONS FOR THE GROWTH OF THE HOUSING BACKLOG

3.6.1 Corruption, politicking and inefficiency

3.6.2 The Housing Budget

3.7 INCOME POVERTY IN POST-APARTHEID LANGA

3.8 CONCLUSION

CHAPTER FOUR


REFERENCES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: LIST OF KEY RESPONDENTS

APPENDIX B: COPY OF BACKYARD DWELLER PROTEST MEMORANDUM

APPENDIX C: RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

APPENDIX D: UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN RESEARCH: HOUSING AND MIGRATION

vii
LIST OF GRAPHS

Graph 1: Number of Households by Dwelling Type, in Langa (Statistics South Africa 2001).................................................................................................................. 59
CHAPTER ONE

OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM

All over the place, working class and poor people are being forced into struggle around housing. From the backyards, the shacks, the RDP houses, private houses bought with loans – no-one can say: I am sure that tomorrow, I will be able to return to a house that is good enough. Tomorrow I know that I will have housing security. But what is happening? People fighting for the same needs are being turned against each other. They are hearing the laws of capitalism which say: you must compete all the time. You must struggle for yourself against others. They can see that there is no plan from the government which will solve the housing problem. They are driven by fear – if someone else gets a house, I will not. If someone else gets a house before me, I will be forgotten... This is what capitalism does to people. It turns us against each other – instead of against the capitalists and the government that serves them.

Cape Town Anti-Privatisation Forum, Housing Pamphlet, ‘Housing For All’, 2005

1.1 Introduction

The year 2005 marked the 50th anniversary of the Freedom Charter. As part of the anniversary celebrations, the Charter was invoked in speeches and events held by the African National Congress (ANC) government around the country. In Cape Town, fragments of the Charter were displayed on giant billboards that thronged the section of the N2 highway which passes by the city’s informal settlements and reaches on to Cape Town International Airport. The placing of these billboards appeared to be strategic; near the townships and informal settlements where ‘the poor’ live, to impress upon the nation that the ideals of the Charter live on: “The People Will Share In the Country’s Wealth”, “Slums Shall Be Abolished”, “There Shall Be Houses, Comfort and Security For All”.

1 A copy of the pamphlet was given to me by a friend, a member of the Anti-Privatisation Forum, in February 2006.
2 The Freedom Charter was drawn up in 1955 in Kliptown, Soweto, by a coalition of anti-Apartheid movements. The Charter was a manifesto of the ‘progressive movement’ which articulated the collective vision of what the ‘progressive movement’ was fighting for and what a post-apartheid South Africa would look like.
3 The N2 exists as the main artery into the city for two ‘visiting’ groups entering Cape Town, but with entirely different purposes; the international tourists arriving at Cape Town International Airport, and migrant workers who arrive along the N2 artery which stretches from Cape Town up into the Eastern Cape, and the former apartheid homeland of the Transkei. Therefore, the notion of ‘strategy’ can perhaps be extended; to lessen the impact that thousands of crowded tin shacks must present for
More than 50 years after the Freedom Charter, and 13 years into South Africa’s new democracy, the aspirations embodied in these statements remain, perhaps, as elusive, and as necessary to work towards as they were in 1955. A glance at the African National Government’s (ANC) post-1994 track record does not necessarily encourage the perception that the party is achieving its aim of liberating the majority of South Africans from chronic material poverty. For instance, while the South African economy grows, the country’s unemployment rate is massive at 40%, and most of the jobs being created for poor people are casual ones, temporary and low-waged (Bezuidenhout et al. 2003; Bond 2004; Desai 2003). On the housing front too, while 1.6 million low-cost houses have been delivered to poor people around the country since 1994, this is far below the 330,000 houses per annum that government was aiming to deliver (Thurman 1999). Housing delivery has simply failed to make up, let alone keep up, with demand. Consequently, the number of people living in informal houses (shacks in shanty towns and the backyards of formal houses) in the urban areas in South Africa actually increased from 1.5 million in 1994 to 2.4 million in 2004 (Western Cape Department of Local Government and Housing 2005: 8). After a recent audit of the City of Cape Town’s housing waiting list, it was found that there are nearly 400,000 people needing houses in the city (Cape Times 2 August 2006).

A corollary of the housing shortage has been the competing claims around entitlement to low-cost housing and this has proliferated in recent years. Lines have been drawn in the proverbial sand and ‘insider’/ ‘outsider’ categories have been used by different groups of people in the city to distinguish themselves as supposedly more ‘legitimate’ claimants to housing than others (Mail and Guardian 3-9 June 2005). The categories that are used can draw on the apartheid racial classification system and pit coloured people against black people. For example, some coloured communities have

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4The degree to which material change has occurred since 1994 is a contested issue. While the ANC government has generally emphasised the gains it has made over the last thirteen years, other commentators (Bond 2004; Desai 2003) castigate the government for proceeding too slowly or only improving the lives of a small ANC-aligned clique and the already-wealthy.

5I am cautious in this thesis to speak of ‘Black’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘White’ as actually existing ‘racial’ categories. Rather they are socially constructed and politically manipulated terms and caution is needed when using the terms (Boonzaier 1988). Yet despite their socially constructed nature, the terms have, unfortunately, become embedded in the identities of many South Africans and remain important (although problematic) references by which people relate to others in the ‘new’ South Africa. It is while bearing these tensions in mind that the terms are used in this thesis.
complained that the government has overlooked them while it has focussed on delivering houses to black communities (Cape Argus 6 February 2005). Consequently, recent demands made for housing by some coloured communities have argued that they should be given preference in local housing delivery (Cape Times 5 February 2005; Sunday Argus 20 February 2005). The logic in such an argument is both racial, and leading on from this, situational; the claim that coloured people have ‘always’ lived in the city whereas black people originally come from the Eastern Cape. These categories/ divisions articulate entitlement by trying to distinguish between ‘authentic’ Cape Town citizens and those who are ‘from elsewhere’. As such they draw on a distinction created by South Africa’s apartheid past, which distinguished between supposedly legitimate non-white, urban ‘insiders’ and illegitimate, non-white ‘outsiders’.

A similar distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ is present too, within the City’s population of black South Africans. One such claim which illustrates the presence of these divisions, is that black South Africans who are born outside the city - but who have recently moved to Cape Town - are benefiting from housing delivery, while those born in the city are being neglected (Cape Argus 15 February 2005). Often referred to as ‘Cape borners’/ ‘borners’ (or in isiXhosa as abantu baseKapa or other similar references to ‘localness’), the local-born people have therefore claimed that they should be entitled to receive housing before people born elsewhere – whom they refer to as ‘migrants’ or amagoduka (those who ‘go home’) or amatshipa (those who are born elsewhere but wish to stay in the city) (Cape Times 14 February 2005).

Most often the division is narrated by people who identify as ‘borners’, and by the various associations that have been formed in townships around Cape Town in order to represent the interests of ‘borners’ to the Local and Provincial Governments. The common claims such individuals or organisations often make about entitlement to housing are based on two premises: the first is that people born locally should have priority to local resources, irrespective of their age or actual time spent waiting for a house within the city. The second favours a ‘waiting list’ system, whereby those who have lived in the city longest (thus an older ‘migrant’ privileged over a younger ‘local’) should be given houses first. However it has been the tendency of post-apartheid housing delivery practice thus far to build houses in informal shack
settlements rather than in existing formal, township housing areas. This leads to a privileging of those living in informal settlements over those people living in the shacks erected in the backyards of formal houses. Considering that informal shacks are often assumed to be the residence of ‘migrants’, ‘borners’ argue that ‘migrants’ (those living in the shack settlements) have received houses whereas ‘borners’ (those living in the backyards) have not. Proponents of the second claim state that they are not opposed to long term migrants receiving houses proximal to town. Nevertheless, for this group, the consequence of government policy thus far has been to make the very presence of migrants the immediate and visible obstacle to receiving a home.

This is a context in which the terms ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ are common references for individuals decrying their own homelessness, as well as functioning as common devices by which politicians and communities refer to the problems of housing delivery in the city. As such, it is necessary to apply an analytical lens to the claims. Consequently this thesis asks the following question: what is the nature of the claim that ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ are in competition with each other for houses in Cape Town, and what are the reasons for the claim being made?

This necessitates a wide angle examination of both the real and imagined distinctions between those labelled ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ within Cape Town, and a historical excursion into the origins and uses of these terms. However, it is around the specificity of these narratives in the context of the social discourse around access to housing with which this thesis is concerned. Indeed, the housing component of this

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6 The logic therein is that the older black South African residents of Cape Town mostly live in the formal houses in the ‘locations’ in the townships and their children have had to erect shacks in the backyards because of the lack of new formal houses being built in the city. On the other hand it is assumed that people migrating to Cape Town from elsewhere have moved into the informal settlements around the city. What makes proponents of this claim particularly upset is their assertion that ‘backyarders’ have been on the City’s housing waiting list for longer than people in the shack settlements – again because ‘backyarders’ are assumed to be ‘borners’ who have been on the city longer than ‘migrants’.

7 Interview with Mr Tindleni, 29 August 2006, Langa

8 For an example of a community petition which refers to the ‘problem’ of ‘borners’ losing out to ‘migrants’, see the petition of demands made to ex-Mayor of Cape Town, Nomaindia Mfeketo – Appendix B

9 As it shall be shown, the colloquial, everyday use of the terms is broad and homogenising. Therefore, in order to signal that the terms being used are problematic, the terms ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ are used in inverted commas throughout this thesis.
question is of importance because of the very context of scarcity of housing (and then of any decent housing\textsuperscript{10}) within which these claims are being made.

How, then, did the housing shortage arise, and why does it continue into a 'new' South Africa, one which the manifestos of the anti-apartheid movement (embodied in documents such as the Freedom Charter) promised would provide 'Houses for All'?

In order to prepare for discussion later, this thesis first proceeds to lay out the foundations of a theoretical framework from which to consider the claims. The analysis begins by contextualising the categories 'borners' and 'migrants' within prominent theories of migration. The emphasis upon 'migration' is important here, because the categories of 'insider/outsider' ultimately embody claims about whether one is aboriginal or alien to the city — and therefore imply a process of movement whereby some people move into the territory of others. Beginning the theoretical framework with an analysis of migration is also important for the sake of chronology, as the history of the presence of black South Africans in Cape Town began with migration to the city. After this has been achieved, it is necessary to attempt to theorise the underlying causes of the existing tensions, in particular the role of the apartheid regime in shaping the way in which the division is articulated. This extends into the role that the post-apartheid regime has (and continues) to play in shaping the context in which such categories have become mobilised vis-à-vis 'the other'.

\textbf{1.2 Theoretical framework}

The study of migration is dominated by two main approaches that attempt to theorize the causes and purpose of migration, as well as migrants' motivations for migrating. Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan (2003) refer to the two approaches as the Marginalist and Marxist approaches, while Silvey and Lawson (1999) refer to them as the Modernisation approach and Political Economy approach respectively. Although they

\textsuperscript{10} There is not a scarcity of accommodation in Cape Town, for the numerous shacks and similar informal structures around the city constitute accommodation. However these houses are not considered 'decent' by the people who live in them. The ideal house tends to be conceived of as one that is made of bricks, is serviced with water and electricity, has rooms that allow privacy for each individual living within the house, and is on a stand large enough to allow for a yard, garden or leisure area surrounding it. Defined as such, these houses are in short supply.
are opposed to one another in some important aspects, both Marginalist and Marxist approaches share a similar basis; that migrants are essentially involved in the economics of selling labour and/or pursuing wealth (Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003; Silvey and Lawson 1999). That is, the catalyst which impels people to migrate is assumed to be a desire/need to earn a higher income than is available in one's place of origin (specifically a cash income).

The Marginalist approach conceives of migration as a process set against the backdrop of a dual economy, made up of capital-scarce areas and capital-rich areas. In the context of 'developing' countries, of which South Africa is characterised as an example, these categories translate respectively into rural, subsistence, agricultural (so-called 'traditional') economies on the one hand and urban, industrial (so-called 'modern') economies on the other (Gelderblom 1987; Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003; Silvey and Lawson 1999; Smit 1998). In Marginalist technical language, migrants will follow a "gravity flow" and move from rural areas to urban areas - because agricultural economies of the former have a surplus of labour that they necessarily export to industrial economies of the latter. Marginalism, as Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan (2003: 189) note, proposes that "the marginal value product of labor is lower in the agricultural sector relative to the industrial because of demographic pressure, poorer production technology, and relatively inelastic demand for agricultural products".

Marginalist approaches to migration are based on a modernization conception of social change. In essence, this is a belief in the teleological notion that societies can be ranked in a hierarchical manner from 'less advanced' to 'more advanced' and that social change follows an evolutionary process tending towards 'progress' (Gelderblom 1987; Silvey and Lawson 1999; Smit 1998). In imaginings of modernization, industrial economies (perceived as 'more advanced') are able to offer greater technical and material benefits than agricultural economies and consequently people are assumed to want naturally to migrate to industrial economies to claim those 'benefits'. Underlying Marginalist approaches to migration is the Neo-Classical

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11In this view it is self-explanatory as to why particular places are characterised by particular economic activities: some places and the people in them have not yet modernised while others have. In other words the difference in economic activities between different places requires little interrogation other than to attribute it to a 'natural stage' of development (modernization).
belief that people are rational agents seeking to maximize utility. Consequently, labour is considered to be essentially adaptable and mobile and migrants' decisions to migrate are voluntary, based on their rational assessment of costs and benefits (Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003; Silvey and Lawson 1999; Smit 1998).

Like the Marginalist school, the Marxists also begin their analysis of migration by positing a dual-sector economy in developing countries against which migration occurs, but unlike the Marginalists, they are far less sanguine about the purpose of migration within this system (Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003; Silvey and Lawson 1999). Rather than attributing primary importance to migrants’ desires to maximize utility (which they may be trying to do), the Marxist approach emphasises the fact that migration fulfils the exploitative needs of capital. Marxist proponents therefore take issue with the causal reasons for migration. The Marxists propose a relationship of dependency between rural and urban areas and believe that those in rural areas have been drawn to the urban areas because they have been ‘made poor’ as part of the process of the uneven penetration and growth of capitalism (Silvey and Lawson 1999). By this, it is meant that the capitalist system does not provide uniform material benefit to all areas, but rather produces differentiated environments of wealth and poverty. Marx (quoted in Magubane 1979: 72-73) suggests that, historically, the origins of differentiation (at least in many so-called ‘developing’ countries) can be traced to colonial, capitalist industries’ attempts at expansion. In Marx’s words:

[in the colonies] the capitalist regime encounters on all hands the resistance of producers who own the means of production with which they work, and who can gain wealth for themselves by their labour instead of working to enrich a capitalist. The contradiction between these diametrically opposed economic systems works itself out in practice as a struggle between the two. When the capitalist is backed up by the power of the mother country, he tries, by forcible means, to clear out of his way the modes of production and appropriation that are based upon the independent labour of the producers...

Within South Africa, the Marxist analysis of migration gained currency in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly with the publication of Harold Wolpe’s (1972) ‘Articulation of the Modes of Production’ and Bernard Magubane’s (1979) ‘The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa’. Both identified migration as generally resulting from various coercive measures (such as land seizures and taxes of various kinds) taken by colonial powers to create poverty among local black South Africans and dependency on the colonial economy. Indeed, Magubane (1979) explains that, during the colonial
era, capitalists sought to maximize their profits and expand capitalist industry by coercing the colonized subjects into selling their (cheap) labour power. Yet colonized subjects did not readily present themselves *en masse* for labour to white colonialists, being able either to self-provide from their subsistence activities or, in fact, sell their own produce (for instance wool) to European buyers and therefore bypass the need to work for colonialists\(^\text{12}\). Consequently colonial capitalists were faced with the problem of a shortage of cheap, exploitable labour.

In South Africa, so Magubane (1979) claims, the labour shortage was resolved in very much the way Marx had predicted it would be, and land expropriation was used by the colonial state (by first the Glen Grey Act of 1894 and then the Land Act of 1913) to undermine the independence of colonised peoples from colonial industry. With their means of production undermined, coupled with overcrowding in the reserves, the rural economy of black South Africans collapsed, resulting in an available supply of labour - especially from the areas which had been declared the ‘reserves’ (and later homelands) in which black people were legally compelled to live after 1913.

Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan (2003: 189) suggest that the differentiation that capitalism creates between areas is necessary, not only to serve as a catalyst to initiate migration, but also to ensure that the developed capitalist centres (in South Africa, the ‘white’ urban areas) are supplied with a constant source of abundant, impoverished labour, who can only but accept any wage offered them. According to Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan (2003: 189),

\[\text{[D]ominant classes... sustain or expand levels of (absolute and relative) surplus extraction by exploiting spatially uneven patterns of proletarianization and depeasantization... [L]ocally dominant classes in “core” areas recruit... migrants from “peripheral,” economically underdeveloped sites as a way of creating a surplus labor pool that exerts downward pressure}\]

\(^{12}\text{This is contrary to the Marginalist position which claims that labour naturally gravitates to industry because the benefit derived from waged employment is greater than that from a subsistence economy. Indeed Wolpe (1972), Bundy (1979) and Magubane (1979) all describe how labour migration in South Africa needed coercive catalysts to proceed: for example, just prior to the implementation of the 1913 Land Act, South African capital had actually faced a labour shortage as local African labour was not, on the whole, seeking employment in the burgeoning colonial industries. Yet this is not to say that there was no voluntary labour migration but that if there was, the proportion of people who sought labour in the colonial industries up until this point were numerically too few for the demands of industry (Beinart 1995).}\]
on local wages and, in addition, makes the local demand for labor more elastic, thereby weakening the likelihood of collective bargaining by resident workers.

To the Marxists therefore, migrants are ultimately caught in a double bind: they have been forced off their land by capitalism and coerced to the cities to become cheap labour (or excess labour) to aid the profit-making of capitalism. Migrants therefore fall foul of capitalist development and are not its (immediate) beneficiaries (Silvey and Lawson 1999).

Marxist approaches to migration, like Marginalist ones, expect that, all things being equal, migration will be a one-way process (Gelderblom 1987). However such predictions have not been borne out in practice, particularly in the so-called ‘developing’ countries. Part of the reason why the predictions did not occur is because of the theoretical weaknesses of both theories. Indirectly commenting on both, Escobar (1995) claims that it is arrogant to pretend that the historical experiences of Europe and North America are the templates that other parts of the world will inevitably follow in a process of ‘development’. In terms of Marginalism in particular though, Ferguson (1990a; 1990b; 1999) questions the theory’s theoretically weak conceptualizations of society and social change.

In South Africa, only a small proportion of the total black migrants became bona fide permanently settled proletarians in urban areas; in other words, the first ‘borners’ within the city. As shall be seen in more detail in the following chapter, though the beginnings of a permanent black proletariat in the urban areas had begun to emerge relatively unrestricted by the early 1900s, very soon the process was controlled (Saunders 1996). Indeed, the presence of a relatively small population of black people in urban areas was reluctantly sanctioned by first the segregationist, Union

13 Throughout this thesis is have used square brackets, ‘[]’, to indicate where I have inserted letters or words into the quotation.

14 Both approaches believe that urban areas and their industries represent a higher stage of development. However while Marginalist approaches tend towards seeing capitalism as the highest stage which attracts people to the cities and ultimately enriches them with abundant material wealth, Marxists predict that those arriving in the urban areas will be transformed into a settled urban, exploited proletariat. Only after this has occurred however does socialism, and later communism, become possible (Marx and Engels 1885 [1848]).

15 The use of the term bona fide to refer to one category of black people in urban areas is borrowed from Posel (1986). However, it appears as if the term may also have had social currency among black people in Cape Town during apartheid, as was suggested during an interview with an official from the city of Cape Town’s housing department (interview with Mr Dyiki, 16 February 2007, City Council offices)
governments (1910-1948) and then particularly, later by the apartheid regime (1948-1990). This was because a small, settled black urban proletariat was considered a practical compromise between the dominant racist, whites-only ideology in the urban areas and the very real reliance of white industry on black labour (Hindson 1987; Posel 1984; Posel 1986).

While *bona fide* urban proletarians constituted a labour pool from which industry was initially required to recruit labour, 'superfluous' labour requirements were satisfied by the system of migrant labour (Hindson 1987; Posel 1984; Posel 1986). This category of migrant labourers represented those black South Africans who were prevented from becoming settled, *bona fide* urban proletarians. Instead, their presence in the urban areas was sanctioned only as long as their employment contract lasted, after which they were legally compelled to leave the urban areas. Engaged in circular migration, that which entails migration backwards and forwards between two or more locales, it is to this group of people that (historically at least), the label 'migrants' was first applied (both by the state and by *bona fide* black residents of the city) (Silvey and Lawson 1999).

It is in such a historical context that 'borners' claim legitimacy as residents of Cape Town (and legitimacy as claimants of housing) based on a longer period of permanent settlement in urban areas than 'migrants'. The historical logic to such claims is documented by Wilson and Mafeje (1963) in research that they conducted in Langa township in the 1950s, where 'town' and 'rural' became identity markers of authenticity. Yet why have such claims survived into the 'new' South Africa and, moreover, why do they seem to be amplified, especially since the divisions were supposed to have been eclipsed in the 1980s by the solidarity which grew out of the common struggle against apartheid (Ntsebeza 1993)?

Firstly, there has been an aggregate increase in the numbers of black people moving into urban areas (particularly into the Western Cape and Gauteng) in South Africa. This is, of course, because of the very changes in legislation which legalised the

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16 There have been a number of ethnographies conducted in South Africa around the issue of 'town' people and 'rural' people. Most notable among these are Mayer and Mayer (1961), Pauw (1963), Wilson and Mafeje (1963), MacAllister (1991) and Bank (2002).
presence of black people within the cities. Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the legal legitimacy of black South Africans within cities means that all are entitled to urban services, housing included (Cape Metropolitan Council and University of Stellenbosch 1999). But mass delivery of such services has not been forthcoming and the result has been an environment of competition for the scarce resources. Certainly this is suggested by the quotation by the Cape Town Anti-Privatisation Forum (2005) with which this chapter began, for the Cape Town APF pamphlet notes that people “are driven by fear – if someone else gets a house, I will not. If someone else gets a house before me, I will be forgotten”.

Thus while a world of difference characterises the present for black South Africans, it appears, to some extent, as if the re-emergence of these divisions has also been compounded by continuities in the migration patterns of the past. Circular migration continues in South Africa despite the abolition of the legislation which implemented it almost twenty years ago. While the legislation which demanded the existence circular migratory patterns has been abolished, strategies of survival entail that the pattern remains the same: Cox et al (2004), Dorrit Posel (2003), Gelderblom (2005) and Smit (1998) all suggest that circular migration now occurs as a strategy to mitigate the risks of contemporary urban and rural poverty. In this sense then, some of the characteristics of the past exist within the present.

Why are “people driven by fear” and what are the circumstances which have discouraged mass delivery of housing in South Africa? The Cape Town APF (2005) asks the same question: “how can it be that... housing is a problem and a crisis for the working class? How can it be when there are laws which say that there must be decent shelter as a right?” In Chapter Three, a proposition by the Cape Town APF (2005; also asserted in Legassick 2005) will be explored; that much of the responsibility for the continued lack of housing can in fact be related to post-apartheid development strategies which have maintained the basic inequalities of capitalism in South Africa. As Richard Peet has observed (1975: 564)

Inequality is inevitably produced during the normal operations of capitalist economies, and cannot be eradicated without fundamentally altering the mechanisms of capitalism. In addition, it is functional to the system, which means that power-holders have a vested interest in preserving social inequality. There is little point, therefore, in devoting political energies to
the advocacy of policies which deal only with the symptoms of inequality without altering its basic generating forces.\(^{17}\)

In post-apartheid South Africa, capitalist inequalities have been exacerbated by a particularly conservative macro-economic development agenda, the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy (Bond 2002; Desai 2004; Koelble 2004; DAG 2004: 8). Under GEAR, housing delivery has been seriously curtailed and it is in the context of the resulting backlog that the claims about ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ must be interpreted. This thesis therefore argues that the categories have been resuscitated by people as a means to understand why they have not benefited from housing delivery. Consequently, the thesis argues, the categories are then mobilised as instrumental tools to give some claimants to housing supposedly greater legitimacy than others. The result is that, as the Cape Town APF (2005) notes, blame is shifted away from the underlying causes of continued deprivation “(the capitalists and the government that serves them”) and towards other people experiencing similar conditions of material poverty.

Finally, it must be noted that the instrumental nature of the claims is highlighted by the fact that, while the categories certainly have an historical basis, the distinction between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ may sometimes be made quite arbitrarily. This is because, on one hand, ‘migrants’ may be stereotyped as not being ‘of the city’, but in reality many ‘migrants’ spend their entire working lives in the city. On the other hand, as Sharp (2002) suggests, the dualism is often constructed on the basis of assuming that particular categories of people live in particular kinds of houses (city people in formal houses and rural people in hostels and informal settlements). However as early as the 1970s, “long-standing urban residents began moving out of the formal townships and into the informal townships” (Sharp 2002: 155)\(^{18}\). Considering the above, it is evident that long-term urban tenancy is not always realistically portrayed

\(^{17}\)Peet (1975) has also commented that the relative deprivation that characterises slum areas in cities is necessary within the capitalist system. According to Peet (1975: 569) “the hierarchy of... environments which makes up the social geography of the... city is a response to the hierarchical labour demands of the urban economy. Just as the capitalist system of production must lead to a hierarchical social class structure, so it must provide differentiated... environments in which each class reproduces itself”.

\(^{18}\)Another reason why the dualism could prove not altogether definite is due to “domestic fluidity”, a term that refers to the fluid nature of domestic units/households among many poor people in South Africa. Ross 1996, Jones 1993, Spiegel et al 1996a/b and van der Waal 1996 have all suggested that reifying the household (and by extension the categories of ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’) ignores the fact that people in different locales (urban/ rural) are often intimately linked. In fact some black South Africans may consider themselves ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ by virtue of having been raised in both areas.
by the categories ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’, and Sharp (2002: 154) refers to the
categories as only an “opening gambit in the process by which people think about and
discuss the residents of the city”. That residents of Langa are enmeshed within the
contradictions of the supposed dichotomy is evidenced by the fact that the terms do
not define all social interactions. Indeed many respondents (though not all) noted that
they “get on fine” with ‘the other’. Moreover, under conditions which do not relate to
scarcity of resources, no distinction between themselves and ‘others’ as a primordial
reality of difference is made. The use of the categories in relation to demands for
housing therefore emphasises the instrumentality of the categories as a weapon to be
used to justify one’s own legitimacy in a specific context of scarcity; specific to this
thesis, a scarcity of houses.

1.3 Choosing the site for research

By choosing to focus on the ‘borner’/ ‘migrant’ distinction, I have been able only to
provide a partial story of the complex social dynamics occurring around housing in
Cape Town. But, because of the contemporary importance of the ‘borner’/‘migrant’
division, and the impact this has on the struggle for access to housing in Cape Town, I
have not pursued other lines of enquiry, aiming at depth instead of breadth\(^9\). Whereas
the ‘borner’ vs. ‘migrant’ narrative has been heard all over Cape Town, and
apparently in other areas of South Africa too, a city-wide exploration of the narrative
seemed beyond the limited scope of a Masters dissertation such as this. For instance,
James Ferguson (1999) in an ethnography of Kitwe in Zambia, has cautioned that
fieldwork in the city is disorientating and lacks the intimacy and precision of smaller
scale research. Methodologically, this makes for problematic research, if that research
occurs in different areas of the city, and many times it probably does.

Thus Langa was chosen as the site from which to generate a case study. Langa is the
oldest existing township in Cape Town and was chosen in large part due to the
prominence of the ‘borner’/ ‘migrant’ debate there in recent years following a fire in
Joe Slovo informal settlement in Langa on January 15 2005. Moreover, the decision to
focus on Langa was made because I was already somewhat familiar with Langa, as I

\(^9\) I have also focused in part on the distinction between backyarders and shack-dwellers as they often
accompany the claims about ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’.
engaged in fieldwork there in 2003. Furthermore a study of Langa facilitates the aim of methodological practicality; to conduct fieldwork in a smaller, rather than a larger, place. I have focused on Langa as an attempt to better understand the local dynamics behind the claims being made about entitlement to housing. As shall be seen, there have been and remain Langa-specific reasons for the occurrence of the tensions there. However, in exploring Langa, I have continuously contextualised events in Langa against broader happenings in Cape Town. This is necessary because boundaries between Langa and the other townships in Cape Town, and South Africa as a whole are porous, and the situation in Langa has been shaped in many ways by external forces. As such, the 'lessons' learnt about 'borners' and 'migrants' in Langa will no doubt have relevance to other townships in the city.

1.4 Research design and methodology

1.4.1 Data collection

In collecting data and conducting research into 'borners' and 'migrants', many different methods were used. Research was begun in November 2005 by collecting, reading and analysing newspapers articles that related to the divisions between 'borners' and 'migrants'. The timing was perfect to be rewarded with an abundance of articles on the subject- the year 2005 proved a heated year for the mobilisation of such categories for reasons that will be explored further in Chapter Three.

To inform upon these reports, I began to collect a personal collection of information by interviewing various knowledgeable 'experts', officials and researchers associated with housing delivery in Cape Town. Preliminary interviews and conversations were also conducted with people I knew living in Langa in order to get a sense of some 'local' perspectives. The result of all three categories of sources (newspapers/ interviews with officials/ interviews with residents of Langa) suggested that certain key issues existed that underlay the divisions in Langa; namely the shortage of housing in Cape Town, the slow pace - and skewed nature - of housing delivery in the city and the fact that the demand for housing is growing.
Using the above issues as guides therefore, I began to try to get a sense of housing delivery post-1994. How was it planned? What was it supposed to look like? To understand the policy side of housing delivery, I sourced and read outlines of current housing policy from the National Department of Housing and examined discussions about the evolution of housing policy, and analyses of housing policy, from a variety of sources. These included academic articles from journals as well as those issued by non-governmental organisations involved in housing in South Africa. Notable among these is the Development Action Group (DAG). Other particularly useful sources therefore included those by Baumann (1998), Bond (2002) and Khan and Thring (2004), Rust (2003) and Watson (2002).

In tracking why housing delivery has been so slow, many of the sources mentioned above were used – for discussions of housing policy often included discussions about the extent of the housing crisis and reasons for the slow rate of delivery. But other articles that dealt specifically with the problems of delivery were also sought. Common to all these discussions was the identification of bureaucracy as a central reason for the slow pace of delivery. Similar concerns were highlighted in newspaper reports that discussed the pace of housing delivery. In fact, despite interviewing City of Cape Town officials – in an attempt to engage more deeply with reasons for the slow pace of delivery - bureaucratic inefficiencies again surfaced as central to the housing shortage. Such reasons however are markedly apolitical. There are only a few commentators who pay particular attention to the political economy of housing delivery and who, rightly I believe, emphasize the fact that the failure to deliver houses is primarily the result of political decisions, not just bureaucratic problems. In this regard, commentators such as Baumann (1998), Bond (2002) and the Development Action Group (DAG) (2004) were especially useful.

Understanding housing delivery post-1994 also requires an understanding of the housing shortage in Cape Town, for housing delivery is by definition contingent upon a scarcity of housing. However, understanding the housing shortage in the post-apartheid period requires both an analysis of the past and the present. Put differently, the present housing shortage is both the result of apartheid housing policies and the consequence of present delivery policies and practices. Therefore to examine the role of apartheid in the creation of the housing shortage, various academic sources were
used. Most useful among these were Fast (1993), Pinnock (1989) and Western (1981).20

Once a general picture of housing delivery in Cape Town had been established, it was necessary to explore housing delivery in Langa in particular. Again, it was important to understand the differences between pre- and post-1994 housing delivery in Langa. For delivery that occurred before 1994, fragments of information were collected from articles and books by Anon (1976); Collins (undated); Horrell (1952/3; 1970); Saunders (1979) and Wilson and Mafeje (1963). The most useful of these was the paper written by Collins (undated), though it is very short and unreferenced. For government-led delivery that occurred after 1994, the only mention made about housing delivery, concerns the ‘hostels-to-homes’ conversions. Thurman (1997) is used in this regard. The rest of the recent history of housing delivery in Langa has been reconstructed through the sparse information offered by interviews with government officials Mr Sogayise, Mr van Blerk, Mrs Cloete, Mr Dyiki, Councillor Ross and Councillor Gophe. An interview with the chairman of the Langa Backyarders Association, Mr Tindleni, also proved invaluable.

Furthermore, I contacted the Cape Town Deeds Office and obtained copies of all the deeds that have been issued for houses in Langa since 1994. These represent all the houses that have become privately owned since that time and, as market mechanisms represent one of the two strategies of housing delivery, I used this data to supplement the information on houses delivered by the government.21 Further assistance in the reconstruction of a picture of housing delivery in Langa post-1994 was gained by using statistical data from Census 1996 and Census 2001 (Statistics South Africa 1996; 2001). Both can be narrowed down to the geographical confines of Langa and offered quantitative figures that could be compared with the information supplied by academic papers and interviews.

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20 Tracking the size of the current housing shortage in Cape Town proved difficult. On one hand, this is because it is arguable whether accurate figures about the shortage do exist. The city of Cape Town itself recently (2006) re-evaluated the housing shortage in the city following an audit which suggested that the housing crisis in the city was almost double what the council thought it had been for that same year.

21 When the deeds were printed, they were too expensive to me to afford. Luckily, after talking to officials at the Deeds Office, they reduced the price from R1110 (about $150) to R110 (about $15).
However, understanding housing delivery was only one component of the research into understanding the nature of the division between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’\textsuperscript{22}. It was also necessary to explore both the historical and contemporary factors (social, cultural, political and economic) which have played a role in constructing these categories of difference. There has been no prior research done which focuses specifically on the categories of ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ (at least in those terms) in Cape Town, or indeed in South Africa as a whole\textsuperscript{23}. In the attempt to reconstruct the history of the terms, it was therefore necessary to spread the research net quite widely.

I began by re-reading anthropological ethnographies, most notably those by Mayer and Mayer (1961), Pauw (1963) and Wilson and Mafeje (1963). These were useful because while they did not explicitly refer to the categories of ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’, they did explore categories which compared favourably with both. Wilson and Mafeje (1963) were particularly useful because their study was conducted on social groups in Langa and therefore offered insight into how the divisions had manifested there in the past. Other ethnographic studies that dealt with comparable divisions were also useful, such as Bank (2002), Ntsebeza (1993), McAllister (1991), Mitchell (1954) and Ferguson (1999).

From the ethnographies, and particularly from critiques of the ethnographies (especially Magubane 1973), it became clear that, while the divisions may often have been articulated in communities as being cultural in origin, the origins of these divisions in fact lay in the history of the structural and political constraints surrounding urbanisation in South Africa. Thus it became necessary to explore the history of migrant labour in South Africa. What function did it serve? Why was it implemented? What effect did differentiating between legitimate or illegitimate urban dwellers have on the population of black South Africans? Central to understanding these questions were studies by Wolpe (1971), Magubane (1979), Deborah Posel (1984; 1986), Hindson (1987), Qolote (2001) and Makosana (1988).

\textsuperscript{22} I approached the apparent division as my former anthropological training had taught me to do; being wary of the neat dichotomy presented by the conflict.

\textsuperscript{23} Most sources, if they mention the categories at all, do so only in passing, and in a manner which suggests a familiarity with the terms, rather than a critical engagement or questioning of their use as terms of difference to begin with.
Following the precedent set for analysis in the pre-1994 period, I attempted to understand the structural contexts of the current division. Much insight had been offered by what I had learnt about housing delivery in Langa. However, further insight was required, and this was aided by conducting fieldwork. While fieldwork will be elaborated on below, it is important to note that one of the consequences of fieldwork was that further library research was conducted into issues that 'borners' and 'migrants' identified as central to the tension. These were issues such as (1) frustration with the continuation of poverty in Langa – and South Africa in general – and (2) the role played by migration rates and patterns into Cape Town. In terms of the first, various political economic analyses of Cape Town and South Africa were sought to contextualise the claims about poverty in South Africa. Notable among these were Bond (2004), Desai (2003), Koelble (2004), De Swardt (2004) and Du Toit (2005). For the second, both existing academic articles and Cape Town City Council documents were used and analysed. An interview with Mr Craig Haskins, an official at the city council helped with interpreting the migration data.

1.4.2 Methodology

The methodology used in this research required two general strategies, library-based research and fieldwork-based research. From what has been seen above, it is clear that the former consisted of collecting, reading and analysing relevant information from: academic journals, papers and books; government policy documents and reports; Cape Town City Council documents and reports (both current and those archived in the Cape Archives); papers produced by a variety of civil society organisations; newspaper reports (both current and archived) and statistical data from a number of national and local surveys and censuses.

Fieldwork-based research constituted the second methodological approach to research. To this end, formal interviews with relevant officials at various levels of government (local and provincial), formal interviews with knowledgeable activists and researchers, formal interviews with people living in Langa; observation, and
'deep hanging out' was practiced\textsuperscript{24}. Fieldwork was vital to supplementing the data collected from the library based research.

Fieldwork began with formal interviews with city officials from various departments within the City Council, as well as with a member of a housing NGO, in order to supplement the literature on 'borners', 'migrants' and housing. From April – August 2006, formal interviews were conducted with Mr Craig Haskins (the Head of the City's Department of Strategic Information), Mrs Cloete (an official at the City's Housing Department), Mr van Blerk (a housing official in the Langa Housing Office), Councillor Neil Ross (from the City's Housing Portfolio Committee), Mr 'Zama' Sogayise (the Head of Office of the Provincial Housing Department), Councillor Eleanora Mthiya (of Ward 53 in Langa), Councillor Xolile Gophe (of Ward 52 in Langa), the Station Commander of Langa Police Station and Mr Warren Smit (from the Development Action Group). While most of the interactions with these respondents were based on one-on-one interviews, I also attended meeting of the Langa N2 Gateway Steering Committee on 18 October 2006. The stated purpose of the Committee was to bring members of various interest groups around housing in Langa (backyarders, Joe Slovo residents, local Ward Councillors and City Council and Provincial Housing officials) together in order to discuss the progress of the allocation of houses in the N2 Gateway Project and thereby 'calm' the divisions in the community.

Formal interviews were also conducted with thirteen residents in Langa (six 'borners' and seven 'migrants') between June – September 2006\textsuperscript{25}. Being mindful of the fact that 'migrants' and 'borners' are often equated with people living in certain kinds of housing types and certain parts of Langa, I attempted to interview people from the hostels and informal settlement of Joe Slovo (both commonly assumed to be the dwellings of 'migrants') as well as from the old Apartheid formal council houses and the backyards - which make up the 'location' which is popularly assumed to be where 'borners' live. At times, respondents were met just walking around in areas of Langa and meeting people who then agreed to be interviewed. In these circumstances, respondents were chosen in the immediate situation, without me knowing if the

\textsuperscript{24} What is meant by all these terms will become clear when each is dealt with below.

\textsuperscript{25} For their names and who were 'borners' and 'migrants' respectively, see Appendix C.
people I met were born locally or born elsewhere in the country. Other times a snowball sampling method was used whereby I was referred to respondents by people I had just interviewed, or by people I knew. In this sense, respondents were selected by virtue of where they lived (as I looked to interview people from all three areas of Langa) and occasionally by virtue of whether or not they were born in Langa.

The interviews with respondents in Langa were guided by a list of guide questions prepared prior to fieldwork - but modified as fieldwork progressed. As some questions pertained to people born in the city and other ones applied to those born elsewhere, the questions asked were different for people from both categories. Questions which applied to all respondents sought to gauge information about where respondents were born and information about respondents’ households and income. Also asked were questions about how long respondents had been on the housing waiting list and what respondents felt about the division between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ that had been reported in newspapers. Questions pertaining to migration were asked of people within both categories. However, for people born outside of the city, an emphasis was placed upon the issue of migration, as issues around reasons for migrating to Cape Town and feelings about living in the city were of far greater pertinence to their situation.

Interviews were in-depth, open-ended and semi structured and tended to last about 90 minutes each. Although the questionnaire guided interviews, the interviews were conversational so as to attempt to make respondents more comfortable with the interview process and diminish the power imbalance that comes with the interview process. Respondents were given the choice of terminating the interview at any stage if they wished, or of choosing not to answer questions that they felt uncomfortable answering.

In conducting interviews, I was greatly helped by the fact that I had the assistance of a superb fieldwork assistant, Mr Athini Melane. He not only helped find respondents and negotiate interview arrangements but also translated when necessary between

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26 For a copy of the guide questions, see Appendix D.
English and isiXhosa, the dominant language spoken by residents of Langa. Seven of the thirteen interviews were arranged and conducted with his help. The other six interviews were conducted alone, and proceeded solely in English. Due to technical difficulties (the voice recorder was out of action for two weeks), I made brief notes during the interviews, and set down the interviews in full immediately upon returning home.

Apart from the formal interviews, I also used the fieldwork technique of 'deep hanging out'. This involved spending time with residents of Langa without formally interviewing them. Instead, I would sit and listen (and talk and observe) as people talked to me about their lives in Langa, and about the tensions around housing. As a fieldwork technique, 'deep hanging out' can change the dynamic of power between interviewer and interviewee and potentially allow things to be said because they are chosen by the interviewee (not because they are asked). It is also less likely that people censor themselves out of concern that they might say the 'wrong' thing.

1.5 Challenges of research

A number of challenges were posed by research. In the realm of data collection, for example, understanding housing delivery in Langa (both pre- and post-1994) was made particularly difficult by the fact that no comprehensive study of housing delivery in Langa exists. This is true of academic studies as well as City Council documentation. Indeed, not even the local Langa Housing Office was able to provide an accurate account of housing delivery, past and present – on the basis of not having a complete record of housing in Langa. Even tracking and engaging with the most recent forms of housing in Langa, the N2 Gateway Project, proved somewhat difficult. The Project was (and remains) a highly politicised development and gaining information on this project also proved very difficult. In fact, it was only after eight months of repeated attempts to interview someone about the Project that any representative of the government eventually agreed to be interviewed.

27 Athini also transcribed the interviews that were conducted in isiXhosa.
28 The then-mayor of Cape Town, Nomandla Mfeketo, and National Housing Minister Lindiwe Sisulu deliberately withheld information about the Project from the public. In fact, when I first phoned the Western Cape Housing Department in August 2005 to enquire about the Project, I was told that no-one in the department had any information at all. The person I spoke to on the phone claimed that she only
Consequently, as mentioned above, Census data was used as one of the ways to supplement the limited existing data on housing in Langa. Yet there were limitations to the utility of these statistical sources. This is because the most recent Langa-wide survey was the Census 2001, which is already six years old. The more recent, Joe Slovo-specific survey\(^{29}\), commissioned by the City council in 2004, is also problematic because it covers an area that has been radically altered since fires occurred in the area in January 2005 (City of Cape Town 2005). The Joe Slovo settlement has also been altered by the beginning of construction of both phase 1 and 2 of the N2 Gateway Project. But it is questionable as to whether survey data could ever be reliable given the flux and fluidity that characterizes households, and houses in the townships.

In a similar vein, comparisons between the data recorded by Census 1996 and Census 2001 are problematic (Statistics South Africa 1996; 2001). In comparing the data generated about ‘dwelling types’ in both Censuses, I found important inconsistencies. It appeared from the data as if there were fewer numbers of some kinds of housing units in 2001 than there were in 1996. Though such realities could have been possible for some kinds of houses, the comparison suggested that there were over 1000 fewer ‘rooms in block of flats’ in 2001 than in 1996. It seemed impossible, because the Census is specific about differentiating ‘hostels’ from ‘flats’, and only if the ‘hostels-to-homes’ conversions are taken into account could this figure possibly come anywhere close to being correct. This is an opinion that has been corroborated by all respondents that I consulted. As a result I obtained the help of Statistics South Africa to help understand what had happened. They agreed upon my hunch about the hostels figures. Correspondence with Stats SA began in mid January 2007. At the beginning of April 2007, they submitted the reply that the fieldwork must have been conducted incorrectly, interviewers must have become confused and included ‘hostels-to-homes’ conversions into their ‘flats’ data and thus, admitted that the available data is faulty. Therefore, considering the difficulties with the data presented by both Censuses and by the Joe Slovo survey, what will be drawn out from the surveys are general trends

\(^{29}\) Joe Slovo is the informal settlement in Langa and has been at the centre of the tensions around housing in Langa.
that I hope provide some generalized context in which to situate the contestation for houses in Langa.

In terms of data collection about the relationship between 'borners' and 'migrants' too, some challenges existed. Notable among these was the fact that I could not get my hands upon the only document containing a direct reference to 'borners' and 'migrants' that I came across during the breadth of this research. Written by Snel (1993) in (apparently) a Crossroads community newsletter, and titled 'Amagoduka' against 'Abahlali baseDolophini' (literally 'migrants' vs. 'people of the city'), the document was nowhere to be found. Not even the person who had referenced the article knew where to find it (personal communication with Prof Huchzermeyer), and searches of all the libraries in South Africa, as well as of the resource centres of relevant NGO's, failed to produce it30.

As far as fieldwork was concerned, other challenges also existed. Most importantly was the difficulty in conducting participant observation in Langa. This was because Langa is too large a place to conduct intimate, qualitative research. Furthermore, the fact that my research was multi-sited (at different places in Langa) made it difficult to get to know any one place (and its residents) thoroughly31. Such difficulties were only compounded by the fact that research was restricted due to it being for a mini thesis.

1.6 Ethical considerations

Consent was given by all respondents to be interviewed, as indeed it should, and all were explained the nature of research. Although some respondents consented to having their real names used, some (six) did not wish this to be done. Consequently

30 The reference is: Snel S 1993, 'Amagoduka against Abahlali Base Dolophini,' Crossroads Action for Peace and Justice, June, page 5. It was cited by the Wits University Informal Settlement Policy Research Unit, compiled by Prof Marie Huchzermeyer, January 2000.

31 Certainly, the size and apparent chaotic structure of some parts of Langa hampered research. For instance, on one occasion when I met, and made an arrangement to interview two women living in Joe Slovo informal settlement, I was unable to find their shack – despite supposedly clear directions to it. This was because the shacks in Joe Slovo, though numbered, do not follow any recognisable pattern. Numbers adorned the outside shack walls in the most haphazard fashion; a number seventy juxtaposed to a shack three hundred and eighty three on its left. They seemed closer to decoration than to an ordered system, and the residents complained of being as lost as I in this confusing situation.
Thabiso, Joseph, Cynthia, Nontobeko, Mr Ndlovu and Mondi are not the real names of those respondents.

Some of the questions posed to respondents about ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ during interviews were ethically and methodologically awkward to negotiate. This is because I did not want to impose the categories on respondents but rather wished to see how respondents framed their answers to questions about housing delivery. Were ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ necessarily the categories that respondents used when thinking about their own sense of homelessness? It was fortunate that people born in the city volunteered these categories as terms with which they were familiar. But some of the respondents born elsewhere in the country did not, and in such instances it was necessary to ask respondents what they thought about the claims about ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’. These respondents did not always know these exact terms, but certainly knew of the distinction between ‘people born in the city’ and ‘people born in the Eastern Cape’, even though all disagreed with the claims that ‘migrants’ benefited from housing delivery whereas ‘borners’ did not.

Another ethical challenge was the fact that some respondents felt the questions elicited feelings of pain and frustration. Of the fourteen respondents interviewed, one respondent, Thabiso, asked to end the interview. Thabiso’s desire to end the interview was based on some of the questions about his ‘home’ in the Eastern Cape, which he missed and wished he could go back to, but could not. Frustrated, he said that he has dreamed of going back home for so long but he knows it is impossible because he does not have the money. He claimed that he did not want to talk about his ‘home’ because it was too painful to think about and that if I asked another question of that sort he would end the interview. Instead we moved on to other questions, avoiding those about his ‘home’, and the interview continued.

Another respondent, an eighty year old gentleman named Mr Ndlovu, chose to end the interview because of his feelings that, “we are black people fighting against one another in Langa”, and this made him too upset to continue the interview. During the

32 It is significant for this thesis that ‘borners’ and not ‘migrants’ volunteered the categories for it highlights the fact that the categories have more significance to ‘borners’ than to ‘migrants’. This is because the use of the categories is intended to further the claims to housing for ‘borners’ and not ‘migrants’. 
interview, Mr Ndlovu also indicated to me his dislike and distrust of white people, as the group responsible for creating and inciting the divisions and tensions amongst black South Africans. As such, the interview with him posed particular ethical challenges. Not only were his feelings about the division too painful to talk about, but he perceived me to be part of ‘the other’, and as such, responsible for those divisions.

While my ‘whiteness’ was not explicitly mentioned as a problem by other respondents, my positionality as a researcher certainly had ethical repercussions for research. A number of respondents asked what I could do with the information they gave me, ‘would I be able to help them get a house or a job’? ‘Would I make the government listen’? Such requests are the unfortunate consequence of an economic system which produces the environments of poverty in which people live and a political system in which people feel as though their voices cannot be heard.

1.7 Chapter structure

Having introduced/ outlined the central concerns of this thesis in the Introduction, the rest of the thesis is organised into three further chapters:

Chapter two: Towards an exploration of the historical construction of the problem up to 1994

This section explores the creation of the housing crisis up until 1994 and situates the concomitant establishment of the categories within the context of (and in relation to) that crisis.

Chapter three: ‘Borners’ and ‘migrants’ in contemporary Langa

This section explores the post 1994 contemporary conditions which have helped re-establish the categories ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’. It begins by exploring the post apartheid policies surrounding housing delivery. After this is done, the chapter moves to examine the consequences of housing policy and practice and the ways in which both have exacerbated tensions in Langa.
Chapter four: Towards a conclusion: ‘Borners’, ‘migrants’ and the political economy of division

In this chapter we will summarize the key arguments emerging from the data and draw links between various important themes that the thesis highlights in preceding chapters.
CHAPTER TWO
TOWARDS AN EXPLORATION OF THE HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROBLEM UP TO 1994

[During apartheid] housing struggles... [were] linked to capital's need to reproduce the labour force in the least costly way. It... [was] not beyond the means of capital in South Africa to provide good housing for the working class in the cities. But there... [was] a contradiction between good housing and social control... [A]s capitalism developed in South Africa, it deepened the uneven distribution of resources, demanded more labour and required a 'reserve army of labour' on stand by to keep down wages. This sharpened class conflict which raised the need for social control.

Don Pinnock 1981: 5

This chapter lays a historical foundation from which to proceed to a contemporary analysis of how the terms 'borners' and 'migrants' have come to be used as instrumental references that articulate entitlement to housing. In order to differentiate between the factors which contributed to the construction of the problem under the racist politics of the past, and those of the 'new' South Africa, the historical analysis of this chapter finds its conclusion with the year 1994. Broadly, three themes are traced in the chapter. The first historicises the current shortage of houses among black people in Cape Town, paying particular attention to Langa. The lack of housing delivery during this period was, at least in part, related to attempts to control the migration of black people into Cape Town. The second theme therefore looks more closely at migration, particularly the attempts by both the Union Government and the Apartheid regime to place limits on the numbers of black people within Cape Town city. It is here that the chapter proposes the origins and formation of the categories 'borners' and 'migrants' are to be found. Thirdly, an historical examination is conducted into aspects of the relationship between those people defined as 'borners' and 'migrants' in Cape Town. As noted in the Introduction, there has been no prior research conducted specific to the categories of 'borners' and 'migrants' (at least in those terms) in Cape Town, or indeed in South Africa as a whole. However there has been a fair amount of research conducted on the process of urbanisation among black South Africans, and on the kinds of identities that have become important as a result. It is to this literature, then, that the third avenue of exploration turns in order to reconstruct a brief social history of the terms in Cape Town.
2.1 History of housing in Cape Town

There has long been a shortage of adequate housing for the African population of Cape Town. For instance by 1900, Saunders (1996: 2) suggests that there were 10 000 Africans living in the city, but the majority ("8000") had made their homes, temporary shacks, in places such as District Six and "on the slopes of Table Mountain" (Saunders 1979: 166-168). It was only a minority whom "were housed by their employers, some in compounds specially designed for them... others [were] scattered throughout greater Cape Town on their employers' premises, or wherever a room could be found nearby" (Wilson and Mafeje 1961: 3-4).

By 1900 – as shall be seen later - the local, white population of Cape Town became concerned about the changing racial character of the city, as explained by Don Pinnock (1989) and John Western (1981). As more black people migrated to the city, the 'whiteness' of the cities was threatened, and therefore, the racial, political and economic status quo of power. At the same time, whites were also concerned about the presence of the bubonic plague in Cape Town. Paul Maylam (1995:22) notes that "the plague first hit Cape Town in 1901. Its popular name, the 'black death', was to have unfortunate connotations in South Africa, as the plague came to be associated more with the black urban presence than with the rats that carried it".

Using the plague as an excuse, all black people living in the local municipality were required to live in the new 'Native Location' of Ndabeni, on the periphery of the city (Pinnock 1989; Saunders 1984; Western 1981). Importantly, the legislation surrounding the creation of Ndabeni, the Reserve Locations Acts No 40 of 1902 and No 8 of 1905, also denied most of the Africans living in Cape Town – except for the small minority of those who already owned a property worth over 75 pounds - the possibility of freehold title outside of the location (Saunders 1979: 184-185). However Saunders (1984: 210) records that only 6000 people lived in Ndabeni, as there was much resistance by Africans to moving there.
Eventually Ndabeni was decommissioned as a government reserve following a clause in the Urban Areas Act of 1923\textsuperscript{33} which prohibited Africans from having accommodation within 5 miles of the city centre (Fast 1996: 34). Consequently Langa was built in 1927 for the urban African population and "...segregation of the city's 'native' population... was deepened and extended" (Wilkinson 2000: 196). In contrast to Ndabeni, Langa is about eleven kilometres from the centre of Cape Town (Collins undated: 3) and as Ndabeni no longer exists, Langa is the oldest existing township in Cape Town. For long (from 1927-1959) it was also the only formal township for black people in Cape Town (Fast 1996).

The early residents of Langa were those who had been moved from Ndabeni, as well as black people who had been living in Bellville and Tygerberg. Migrant workers too were moved to Langa (Collins undated: 3). Two types of housing were provided by the state. The first kind of housing built in Langa, in the 1920s, was single sex, male only hostels; a kind of barracks' for the contract labourers. Contract labourers epitomized the 'temporary sojourning' principals of the Urban Areas Act of 1923, and the hostels were the physical manifestation of that policy - an attempt to control the urbanization of Africans in the city (Simon 1981: 191). Hostels were intended to solve the problem of African urbanisation by providing temporary controlled accommodation for single men, which would foster the desire among hostel dwellers to 'return home' to one's family (Ramphele 1993). According to Sarah Thurman (1997: 45)

\begin{quote}
The hostels consolidated the migrant labour system. They served not only to control the amount of black labour residing in the cities but also to manage its behaviour. Men could live in the hostels so long as they had work in the cities but wives and families were prohibited from residence, entitled only to short-term visiting permits. These regulations were rigorously enforced; regular and violent raids were carried out by the authorities both night and day during which wives were chased away, arrested or bussed back to the homelands. The hostels were designed to be unattractive and uncomfortable and many comparisons have been drawn between hostels and institutions such as prisons, lunatic asylums and army barracks.
\end{quote}

The other kind of housing, built in Langa in the 1930s, was family housing for African families. These houses were only available to a proportionately small number of black people; those who had settled permanently in the city. By the 1930s in Langa,

\textsuperscript{33} The Act marked the official beginning of the attempt by the government to halt the growth of a permanently urbanized African population and satisfy all future labour requirements by migrant labour (Fast 1996, Maylam 1995; Pinnock 1989; Western 1981; Wilkinson 2000).
‘migrants’ outnumbered those living in family housing by 18 500: 7 500 (or 2.46: 1) respectively (Saunders 1984: 223).

When migration rates to the city increased with the advent of an economic boom that followed from World War Two, the numbers of black people requiring housing increased. An estimated 150 000 black people were squatting all around the city (Cole 1987: 6). In Langa too, housing delivery had not kept up with demand and by the end of World War Two, “only 7849 people” were accommodated in formal housing (of both kinds) in Langa (Wilson and Mafeje 1963: 4). Two new housing developments were then undertaken in Langa, but both aimed at housing contract labourers. First, between 1944-1948, the eight, massive four-storied ‘Old Flats’ (migrant labour hostels on the Vanguard Drive side of Langa) were built. Then, between 1944 and 1957, “eight hundred and fifty small row hostels were built to accommodate thirteen thousand six hundred single men, which became known as the Zones” (Collins undated: 3).

Qotole (2001) claims that the housing backlog that was created under the Union government (up to 1948) was, in fact, contrary to the laws surrounding housing delivery at the time. For Qotole (2001: 108) explains that the local City Council was actually legally “bound to provide adequate alternative housing before relocating squatters and, because African housing had to be financed by the cash-starved Native Revenue Account, it was usually unable to do so”. In addition to this, Saunders (1984) has claimed that white tax payers were not always willing to have their money spent on the housing of black people, and Pinnock (1989) notes the shortage was also driven by the belief that Africans did not belong in the cities and should not be given the chance to ‘consolidate’ their lives in the city.

Once the National Party came to power in 1948, the responsibility of the state to provide houses for black people in the urban areas was revoked. Again, Qotole (2001: 108) notes that “the Nationalists did not take long to provide the local government with new legislative tools, such as the 1951 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act and the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952, allowing it to press ahead with removals”.

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The National Party did not accept that black people should be in the urban areas, even though it grudgingly admitted that the presence of black people was necessary for the economy. In the Western Cape however, the Party believed that it would stand a chance of removing all black people from the province - because the needs of capital could be met by the existing 'coloured' people living in the Western Cape. As a result, the provision of houses by the state to black people became used as a tool to try to control the numbers of black people settling in Cape Town. Control was exerted by removing the right to own land in the townships from black people (Evans 1996: 70), and by differentiating between those who could qualify for houses, and those who could not.

The differentiation for state-funded housing delivery relied on the creation of distinct categories of black people in the city. For, as shall be seen below, not all black people living in Cape Town were accorded the same status under apartheid. Some were considered *bona fide* urban dwellers. For instance, those born in the city were given Section 10 (1) (a) status. Those who had worked in the city continuously for one employer for ten years, or who had worked for two or more employers for more than fifteen years were given Section 10 (1) (b) status. The other black African residents of Cape Town were divided into migrants legally on employment contracts in the city, and those people residing illegally in the city (Wilson and Mafeje 1963; Makosana 1988: 29-30; Posel 1986). Noteworthy for this research, it appears as if after 1965, only people defined as Section 10 (1) (a) qualifiers, or those born in Cape Town (in other words 'borners'), could be eligible to receive family housing (Makosana 1988: 30)\(^\text{34}\).

In 1954, as part of the strategy to favour the delivery of housing for migrants, the government announced that no more family units were to be delivered in Langa. Langa was to be reserved for hostels only, the underlying logic being that Langa offered employers the possibility of housing contract workers within the closest, and therefore most well-placed township to allow employees to travel to work everyday\(^\text{35}\).

\(^{34}\) Prior to this date, Section 10 (1) (b) qualifiers could also receive houses (personal correspondence, Warren Smit)

\(^{35}\) This does not mean however that hostels could not be built in other townships.
To this end, 148 “cottage hostels” were planned to be provided in the Zones (Horrell 1953/4).

While family housing was not provided in Langa, people qualifying for such housing still lived in Langa. Such people either moved to stay in non-family housing in Langa (in backyards or, if they were boys of 18 years old, in the hostels), otherwise they had to access family units in other townships, further on the edges of the city. In the 1950s and 1960s, family units were constructed in Nyanga and Gugulethu (formerly Nyanga East) (Horrell 1952/3; Fast 1996; Kinkead-Weekes 1992: 222; Cook 1986: 58; Makosana 1988).

By 1966, the policy of the state towards using housing delivery to favour the presence of migrants over that of permanent residents was strengthened. In that year, “the state refused to build any more [family] houses for Africans in Cape Town” (Bickford-Smith et al 1999: 182; West 1984). According to Horrell (1970: 199), the policy only became effective from 1970 onwards. But the restrictions only pertained to state delivered housing. As a result, a ‘loophole’ in the law existed: Section 10 (1) (a) qualifiers were still provided with the right to access family housing and could therefore privately fund the construction of their own houses. In order to block this eventuality, from 1972, “no private construction of family housing was allowed” (Cook 1986: 59).

Despite the ‘freeze’ on family housing, migrant labour hostels could still be built, and in Langa a new hostel complex, New Flats, was constructed during the 1970s. The hostel was intended partly to absorb the growing African presence in the city and partly to accommodate migrants who had spent years living in overcrowded conditions in the older hostels of Langa (Collins undated). To indicate how the population of Langa had grown, predominantly as a result of the presence of migrants, an anonymously authored survey from 1976 (anon 1976:2) suggests that by the mid-1970s, the number of residents in Langa had risen by 23 646 people since the end of World War Two. According to Selvan (1976, in Collins undated), hostel accommodation accounted for three quarters of all the accommodation at this time in Langa (an increase by a quarter in the proportion of hostels to houses from the 1930s [Saunders 1984: 223]).
From the 1970s onwards however, the migrant labour system began to break down and the attempts by the government to ensure that the majority of black people in Cape Town would leave the city after their employment contracts expired appeared to have failed. Indeed, Cook (1986: 59) has noted that in the context of the growing lack of housing (and squatter crisis), the freeze on housing delivery became untenable. Compounding the situation was the increased spirit of resistance among black people towards the apartheid state, such as happened in Langa, especially following the brutalities of the 1976 Soweto riots (Fields undated).36

Following the repeal of the freeze, Cook (1986: 59) comments that, by 1981, 1,731 new family houses were built between Nyanga and Gugulethu, and in 1982, 1,441 new family units were also supplied. Some of these latter ones occurred in Langa through a program of converting the old hostels in the Zones into family units (Collins undated: 4). By 1985, 5,036 houses were then delivered when the new ‘super township’ Khayelitsha was constructed. However delivery such as this was nothing compared to the scale of the housing shortage. In terms of the family housing units available in the city, in 1985 there were estimated to be only 19,041 formal family dwelling units for Africans in Cape Town – but 183,400 Africans lived in the city (Cook 1986: 58).37 The discrepancy between demand and supply meant that the vast majority of black people in the city still lived in informal settlements.

By 1986, the National Party realised that it could no longer prevent black people from living in the urban areas. To this end, the influx control laws were abolished in 1986. However the government desired that ‘orderly urbanisation’ occur (Murray 1987). ‘Orderly urbanisation’ required that urbanisation rates paralleled job creation and housing construction. Yet, the apartheid government did nothing to encourage either and as a result, shack settlements burgeoned and formal housing units, such as family

36 Following the Soweto uprising in 1976, student activists from all over South Africa, including Langa, mobilized against repressive apartheid measures. The mobilization in Soweto is known as the “Soweto Riots”. (Fields, undated: 29)
37 I have arrived at this total because Cook claims that there were an estimated 206,484 black people living in Cape Town, of which 23,083 were migrant labourers living in hostels. Migrant labourers therefore had accommodation and should be excluded from the total number of people needing accommodation. This leaves one with a total of 183,400 people who needed houses in the context in which only 19,041 formal family dwellings had been constructed.
houses and hostels, became increasingly overcrowded (Wilkinson 2000). A growth of backyard shacks and informal settlement shack occurred.

In Langa, no family houses had been constructed since the conversion of the Zones in the 1970s, and the hostels remained chronically overcrowded. Yet, interestingly, it was only in 1990 (or 1991 - according to which respondent was being interviewed) that an informal settlement was created in Langa. Named Joe Slovo, it was founded on a plot of ground that bordered the N2 highway. It appears from interviews as if the original residents of Joe Slovo settlement were residents of the backyards in Langa who, not wanting to move out of Langa, moved into the bush and erected shacks there. By 1994 the settlement had grown, as people from outside of Langa arrived to erect shacks there too. In subsequent years Joe Slovo earned the reputation of being a place where ‘migrants’ live, and was the subject of controversy between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’. In the next section therefore, an analysis is conducted into aspects of the historical relationship between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ in Cape Town and Langa.

2.2 ‘Borners’ and ‘Migrants’ in Cape Town

A popular narrative about Cape Town which was championed under apartheid, depicted Cape Town and the Western Cape as unique in South Africa for its being a territory that lacked an indigenous black population, and which was therefore first settled by white people (Judges and Saunders 1976). As such, according to Judges and Saunders (1976: 122), “many white people believe that [black] Africans are relative newcomers to Cape Town”. While it may be true that by the time of the arrival of Europeans at the Cape of Good Hope, groups such as the amaXhosa or amaZulu had not settled as far south as Cape Town, it is not true that their presence in the city has been short-lived. For example, Judges and Saunders (1976) explain that barring the presence of black slaves from places such as East Africa and Madagascar, there has been a long presence of black South Africans living in Cape Town, probably beginning in the 1830s. As such, their presence in Cape Town can be seen to predate

38 Interview with Councillor Gophe, 18 July, 2006, Langa ; Interview with Mrs Motaung, 10 September, 2006, Langa
39 However there were in fact local Khoekhoen people resident in the area. But their presence was considered irrelevant by Afrikaaner Nationalist historians whose main aim was to prove that white people had arrived in Cape Town before (apartheid categorised) black people.
that of many European colonialists - who only arrived in the city after the discovery of diamonds and gold in Kimberly and the Rand in the 1860s and 1880s.

Judges and Saunders (1976: 122) claim that the catalyst for the first permanent settlement of black people in Cape Town in the 1830s was provided by the upheaval caused by the expansion of the Zulu kingdom in the early 1800s (a period known as the Mfecane). According to Judges and Saunders (1976) these first residents were overwhelmingly amaMfengu people from the Eastern Cape. At the time of the first settlement in 1830, though the exact numbers are unknown, there were numerically few Africans in Cape Town (Judges and Saunders 1976: 122). By 1879, the officer of the city's "Kafir Depot" was in a position to hint that "many" of the Africans living in the city had made Cape Town their permanent home and would not return to the Eastern Cape (Saunders 1980: 26).

Throughout the 1800s the numbers of black people living in Cape Town grew, until by 1900 there were about 10 000 black people living in the city (Saunders 1996: 2). Saunders (1980: 20-23; 1996: 2) identifies three factors, apart from natural population growth, to explain why the local black population increased during this time. First was the "disastrous cattle-killing of 1856-1857" which left "many thousand Xhosa" destitute 40 (Saunders 1980: 20-23). The second factor, Saunders (1980: 32; 1996: 2) claims, was the devastation wrecked by the Rinderpest plague in 1896. Lastly, migration to Cape Town increased after the dispossession of land that resulted from the Glen Grey Act of 1894 41. Passed by Cecil John Rhodes' Cape parliament in 1894, the Glen Grey Act of 1894 prohibited communal land tenure among black people in much of the Eastern Cape - where communal land tenure had overwhelmingly been practiced. As there was not sufficient land for all people to benefit from the 'one-man, one-plot' policy, many black people became landless and the long-standing economic independence of black South Africans from the colonial economy was undermined (Saunders 1983: 70-71; Magubane 1979). Termed a "gentle stimulus" by Cecil John Rhodes, the Glen Grey Act was the product of collaboration between the government

40 During the cattle killing, a large proportion of amaXhosa people slaughtered all of their cattle at the behest of Nonqawuse, a young prophetess. Nonqawuse claimed that only by doing so would the ancestors of the amaXhosa assist in reclaiming the land and power of the amaXhosa from Europeans (Peires 2003).

41 While the Rinderpest does not (directly) concur with Marxist interpretations of the causes of migration, the Glen Grey Act of 1894 certainly does.
and local capital and effectively represented the first legislated attempt to ‘lure’ black people into migrating to look for work in colonial industries (Saunders 1983: 70-71).

Up to 1900, the influx of black people to Cape Town – or to any other urban area in South Africa for that matter – was unrestricted. As has been seen above however, by 1901 the increase in the numbers of black people in the city caused Ndabeni to be built in 1902. To achieve this, the Reserve Locations Acts No 40 of 1902 and No 8 of 1905 were passed which required all black people living in the municipality to live in the ‘Native Location’ of Ndabeni - unless they were registered voters or unless they had received permission to live outside Ndabeni (Fast 1996: 28). While in-migration had not yet been restricted, the creation of Ndabeni introduced a “rudimentary pass system” into Cape Town (Saunders 1979: 184-185). Importantly, at this stage there were still “relatively few permanent [black] residents [of Cape Town. They were]... vastly outnumbered by a floating population of migrants (amagoduka)” (Saunders 1983: 73, emphasis added).

Up until 1910, there were no nationally applicable policies controlling the rights of black people to live in particular places. This changed with the formation of the Union government in 1910. The 1913 Land Act effectively legislated the existence of a ‘reserve’ system, as it prevented black people from possessing land in most parts of South Africa. Like the Glen Grey Act of 1894, the passing of the Land Act was motivated by the national demands of industry for cheap labour. It achieved this by annexing more than 90% of South Africa’s total land, reserving it for the use of the country’s ‘white’ minority (Magubane 1979). The remaining (approximately) 7% of the land were designated as ‘reserves’ in which all black people were required to live – imposing overpopulation in the reserves, leading over time to soil degradation and less ability to self provision off subsistence farming. Indeed early South African ethnographic studies of urbanisation among Africans noted with worry the deteriorating conditions in the reserves: For example Hobart-Houghton described that, in the former Ciskei, “…the land is entirely incapable of supporting so dense a population” (1952: 176), and Elton Mills and Wilson noted that “none of the families

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42 The passing of the 1913 Land Act did not begin the reserve system, as such a system had been informally implemented and enforced earlier through the actions of colonialists. Instead the 1913 Land Act merely formalized and legalized the system (Magubane 1979).
in the Keiskammahoek District make a living out of farming” (1952:128). As was intended by the Act, many Africans were compelled to migrate to the cities to look for work in a bid to subsidize their declining agricultural yields, as well as pay for various (coercive) taxes. Some of these came to Cape Town. It is conceivable that at least some of those people migrating to Cape Town in this period eventually settled permanently in the city.

While at one level, the increased rates of migration to the urban areas fulfilled the needs of capital, at another, the growing presence of black people in the urban areas worried white people. Prompted by a ‘swart gevaar’-like fear, the Union government appointed the Stallard Commission in 1922 to propose solutions to their crisis of urbanisation. The Commission proposed that “the Native should be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man’s creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he so ceases to minister” (cited in Fast 1996: 30).

Following the Commission, the Urban Areas Act of 1923 was passed. The Act marked the official beginning of the attempt by the government to halt the growth of a permanently urbanized African population and satisfy all future labour requirements by migrant labour (Fast 1996, Maylam 1995; Pinnock 1989; Western 1981; Wilkinson 2000). The Act was applied to Cape Town in 1926, when

the municipal area of Cape Town was declared a ‘proclaimed area’ in terms of section 12 of Act 21 of 1923. All Africans coming into Cape Town were required to report to the registering officer within forty-eight hours of arrival, while all male Africans employed in the municipal area had to obtain a registered contract of service or a casual labourer’s permit. Registered parliamentary voters, the owners of certain properties, and certain other specified groups were exempted from these provisions. The local authority could not refuse registration if accommodation was available for work-seekers. The right of women to travel to and live in an urban area was not restricted, so that a man could have his family living with him (Wilson and Mafeje 1963: 182).

Despite the rhetoric, Fast (1996: 31) has claimed that the Urban Areas Act of 1923 did not manage to limit African urbanisation to Cape Town. One of the reasons was that although the expressed purpose of the Act was to discourage Africans from being in the city, a few categories of black people were free from strict regulation: namely

43 Literally the ‘swart gevaar’ means the ‘black threat’. It was a term used later in apartheid by the National party to instill fear in white people about black people taking power.
exempted Africans and women. The presence of the former, usually wealthier, educated, 'Europeanised' black people - registered as voters in the Cape - allowed for the existence of a settled, urbanised, black population. The presence of women allowed migrants the possibility of having children born in the city. Though in 1923 such a category of people were still legally considered migrants, their status changed with the passing of the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act. The Amendment Act of 1937 "defined some Africans as permanent urban dwellers on the basis of birth or continuous residence" (Fast 1996: 35).

Commenting on the context in which the 1937 Act was passed, Davenport (1969: 101) has noted that the African population living in the urban areas of South Africa had increased dramatically since the 1920s, and

was increasing at a steady rate in response to the demands of expanding industry. Under these... conditions, above all now that African women were entering the towns and raising families there in significant numbers, people began to ask whether the traditional view that Africans had no permanent place in the towns really made sense.

Indeed, Proctor (1979: 67, quoted in Hindson 1987: 28) has claimed that

Whatever the intention behind segregation, legislation and pass laws in theory, in practice far from being used to maintain a predominantly migratory labour force (and of preventing the uncontrolled flow of labour from the farms to the towns), they were deliberately worded and applied so as to 'enable' the creation of an increasingly stabilised industrial workforce in the urban areas in the late twenties and thirties.

Yet admitting that a small number of black people had a right to live in the city did not equate to admitting that all other black people shared that same right, and clauses in the 1937 Act tightened the restrictions on migrants coming to the city. Work-seekers now had 14 days to look for work in the city, after which - if they were unsuccessful - they had to leave. African women too were targeted and were now required to "obtain a certificate of permission from the magistrate of her home district as well as a permit from the local authority" (Wilson and Mafeje 1963: 182-183). Even those Africans previously exempt from the Urban Areas legislation, the black registered voters, were required to have on their possession the passes which the Act of 1937 made compulsory (Fast 1996: 35). It is to this Act then that Fast (1996: 35) suggests that one look to find the origins of the legal distinction between _bona fide_ urban residents and temporary urban migrants.
During World War Two, African migration to Cape Town increased as the wartime economy required more African labour. Elderly Mr Ndlovu, one of the respondents interviewed during research, was among those who migrated to Cape Town at this time. Though influx control measures were mostly ignored at this time – in order to ensure a relatively unimpeded flow of labour to industry - Wilson and Mafeje (1963: 182-183) claim that after the war, the increase in the local black people resulted in new legislation being passed in 1947. This legislation prevented African migrants from working in Cape Town unless their employers “guaranteed to repatriate them on discharge of employment”. But the increase of black migrants to the city during the War, and the fear that migration elicited from white people, also helped the National Party come to victory in the national elections of 1948 (Maylam 1993: 67). Thus the National Party increased the power of influx controls. In 1952, Act 54 was passed which made it an offence “for any African to remain in an urban area for longer than seventy-two hours, unless he either fell within the scope of a narrow definition of exceptions, or received a temporary permit from an official to be in the area”.

The categories of Africans who were exempted from the dictates of the 1952 Act were defined in Section 10 (1a, b and c) of the Act. These included those people born and permanently resident in Cape Town. Also included, however, were those people not born in Cape Town but who had worked continuously in the city for one employer for at least ten years, or those who had lived in the city for at least fifteen years, working for different employers. Similarly, the “wives, unmarried daughters, and sons under 18 years of age” were permitted to stay (Wilson and Mafeje 1962: 182-183).

Deborah Posel (1984) has commented on the reasons why the apartheid government distinguished between bona fide urban residents and migrants. Posel (1984: 2) explains that

the bedrock of the apartheid system...[was] the utilisation of an abundant supply of black labour in ways which protc[ed] and entrench[ed] white supremacy. Once the National Party came to power in 1948, economic growth was to be directed within a political process which barred the black population from the institutions of parliamentary democracy in the country... so as to pre-empt the black majority’s advance to economic and political power... The Nationalist solution was to reduce the presence of blacks in “white” South Africa, the urban

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44 Mr Ndlovu eventually married and moved into a house in Langa in the early 1960s. He has lived there ever since. Interview with Mr Ndlovu, 05 September, 2006, Langa
areas in particular, but without jeopardising the supply of black labour to each sector of the economy.

Thus in order to charter a course between the ideology of racial segregation and the ‘practicality’ of needing labour for industry, control was sought over the “the allocation of black labour to all sectors of the economy”, as this provided a means to control urbanisation while at the same time providing labour to industry (Posel 1984: 3).

One of the ways in which the apartheid regime envisaged fulfilling their aims of limiting the presence of black people in South African cities – without compromising on the labour needed by capital - was by using the framework of the distinction between the two categories of urban black people created in 1937: *bona fide* permanent urban residents and ‘superfluous’ migrants. Such categories became the basis for the later distinction between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’. Under the Urban Labour Preference Policy advocated by the Urban Areas (Amendment) Act of 1952, *bona fide* black urban residents would constitute a readily available pool from which industry was obliged to first select their labourers (Posel 1984; Posel 1986). The presence of such a category of Africans would (supposedly) match the demand for labour with that supplied by the *bona fide* black urban population. Any labour required over and above this locally available reservoir of labour could be met by contract labourers, a category of black labourer who were ‘imported’ into urban areas to perform specific jobs - after which they were ‘endorsed out’ and returned to the reserves (and later homelands)\(^4\)5. Thus, under apartheid, this category of black people was denied the legal opportunity to settle permanently in the cities (Posel 1984; Posel 1986). Indeed Posel (1986: 10) has noted that

> it must be stressed however, that [giving Section 10 (1) status to some urban Africans] was no liberal or philanthropic concession on Verwoerd’s part, and did not lessen the hardships imposed on the majority of Africans during this era of Nationalist rule. Rather, the concept of a residential right possessed by “urbanised” Africans formed part of a strategy aimed at drawing rigid boundaries between urban ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, which would shut out the ‘outsiders’ from the urban enclave.

\(^4\)Eventually, so the Apartheid government planned, the need for the labour of black South Africans in urban areas could be eradicated altogether, as human labour was replaced by a program of mechanisation. Furthermore, the Apartheid government wished to encourage labour intensive industries to relocate to the peripheries of the homelands (Deborah Posel 1984). Until such time, however, consent was to be given for some black people to live in urban areas.
Within the Western Cape, however, a different Urban Labour Preference policy was enacted, one that Fast (1996: 250) refers to as “stricter” than elsewhere in South Africa. While Section 10 (1) laws meant that the province was home to a *bona fide* black proletariat, the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (CLPP) of 1954 attempted to remove such a population from the province. The CLPP dictated that the labour requirements of the Western Cape, Cape Town included, should be met by the existing population of coloured people in the province before any further black labour was employed. The policy was to be implemented in stages. Firstly, the number of *bona fide* African families in the Western Cape was to be frozen. Then migrant labour was to be replaced by coloured labour. Where extra labour was needed, it was to be drawn from migrants and not *bona fide* residents46 (Fast 1996: 180-188). This was done because, helped by later amendments to the 1952 Urban Areas Act, the government had new powers to rescind Section 10 (1) status for *bona fide* urban residents who failed to maintain their qualifications47 (Fast 1996: 180-188; Posel 1984; Posel 1986; West 1982). Indeed, as a result of these new powers, the protection afforded to Section 10 (1) (b) qualifiers (migrant workers who had lived in Cape Town long enough qualified for permanent residence) was removed in 1965 (Bickford-Smith et al 1999). From this date onwards only ‘borners’ were regarded as *bona fide* residents.

Despite all these measures, Fast (1996: 262) queries whether or not these laws made substantial differences to the African population in Cape Town, for she notes that migration to the city increased relatively steadily during this period of apartheid. Indeed, the mothers of two of the ‘borner’ respondents interviewed during research,

46 By the 1960s, a ‘flaw’ in the influx control system seemed to have appeared as migrant labourers were able to gain permanent residence in the urban areas if they had worked for one employer for ten years, or resided in the city for fifteen years and lived continuously in the city for the entire duration of their employment (Posel 1984). Thus instead of the bona fide black urban population being controlled and growing slowly, in a manner which suited the desire of apartheid’s policy to minimise such a population, the numbers of Section 10 (1) qualifiers grew. In response, the apartheid government attempted to limit the length of employment contracts of migrant labourers to one year, after which they had to return to the reserves/homelands. Only once there could migrant labourers resign an employment contract, thus preventing migrant labourers from staying the cities long enough to qualify for Section 10 (1) rights on the basis of continued residence (West 1982: 466). While such policies placed further limits on the rights of migrants, the apartheid government decided it was easier to control the presence of migrant labourers in the city than that of the bona fide proletariat. Consequently labour preferences were changed to favouring the employment of migrant labourers.

47 For example, a Section 10 (1) qualifier could lose their status if they lost their job, or if they took an “extended holiday” outside of Cape Town. They could then be endorsed out’ of the city (West 1982: 466; Fast 1996: 180-181).
Monica and Elizabeth, moved to Cape Town from the Eastern Cape between the early 1960s and 1970s and despite the legislation, settled permanently in the city. By 1986 there were estimated to be 206,482 Africans in the city (Cook 1986: 58). Noting the failure of the influx laws all over the country, the apartheid government eventually repealed the laws in 1986.

While numerically the laws may have not made much difference, the influx control laws do seem to have bequeathed a discursive legacy to the Cape. For it is in the manner in which these laws operated, and the ways in which they defined legitimate insiders and illegitimate outsiders, that the origins of the terms ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ are to be found. As first, the Union governments and then the apartheid regime implemented and amended their policies of segregation, so differentiated categories of urban black people were created. These categories determined much about the ability of black people to remain in urban areas, or to be deported. Indeed, Qolote (2001: 113) has observed that the influx control laws

Sharpen[ed] the distinction between urban insiders and rural outsiders. While offering some protection and formal housing to those whose urban status was recognised, it hounded ‘outsiders’ with increasing intensity. [Yet] Urban status for Cape Town’s Africans came with strings attached. If they accepted urban status, it became extremely difficult to retain their links with the countryside. If a worker were to break the continuity of his urban employment and return to the country for any length of time, he was in danger of losing his urban status. [Similarly] urban status always seemed tenuous and there was great reluctance on the part of migrant workers to give up their safety nets in the reserves.

In the later years of apartheid, in the era of ‘grand apartheid’ and the establishment of the Bantustans, the distinctions between Section 10 (1) (a) residents and ‘other’ residents became more fluid as the government continued to undermine the permanence of urban Africans (Fast 1993). However the distinctions nevertheless remained legislated until 1986. Yet how did these legislated categories manifest ‘on the ground’? The next section seeks to answer such a question and therefore examines the social manifestations which this legislation incurred.

48 Interview with Elizabeth 15 August, 2006, Langa; Interview with Monica 02 September, 2006, Langa
2.3 The history of the division between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’, and the relationship between them in Langa

It has been seen above that the greatest number of people accommodated in Langa were men on contract labour to the city. However a large number of bona fide, permanently urbanised families also resided in Langa, and Wilson and Mafeje (1963: 32) claim that during the 1950s and 1960s, “the majority of middle-class Africans in the Cape live[d] in Langa”. In their research in Langa in the early 1960s, Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje (1963) identified that both of these categories (‘city people’ and migrants) were important references used by people living in Langa when thinking about their imagined community. The first category, referred to locally asabantu basedolophini (or ‘city people’), comprised those people who had been born in the city, and some of those who had been born in the rural areas but had moved to the city and aspired to urban life. On the other hand, those of the second category, abantu basekhaya (home people) or amagoduka (rural migrants), viewed the city as hostile and eventually wished to ‘go back’ to the rural areas.

Wilson and Mafeje (1963) aver that there were tensions in Langa between ‘city people’ and ‘home people’. It is significant for this thesis that Wilson and Mafeje did not mention of the tension existing in relation to housing despite the fact that they claimed that overcrowding existed in Langa at the time. Rather, according to Wilson and Mafeje (1963: 16-46), differences were articulated around the concepts of ‘respectability’ and ‘proper behaviour’, or rather the lack of both in ‘the other’ group. City-people saw themselves as ‘insiders’ (of the city) and the migrants as ‘outsiders’ and thought of the migrants as backwards, unsophisticated and “raw”, while migrants saw city-people as crass, undisciplined and lacking respect for ‘traditional values’. Importantly, the view of ‘insiders’ was that ‘migrants’ did not really belong to the city (Wilson and Mafeje 1963).

49 There is a danger in the structural-functionalist attempt to create fairly definite typologies, as Wilson and Mafeje (1963) have done. This is because typologies reduce diverse and heterogeneous phenomena into rigidified categories.

50 Wilson and Mafeje (1963) do not offer an explanation as to why housing was not a point of contestation between the two categories.
Wilson and Mafeje (1963) note that the division between 'city people' and 'migrants' was such that people of each group did not readily interact with one another. Partly this was a result of their mutual dis-ease with each other, and partly this was because the spatial arrangements of housing in Langa led to social distance. For Wilson and Mafeje (1963) explain that the division between migrants and city people could be represented geographically, between the township proper, or location (the living quarters of city people or *abantu basedolophini*) and the hostels (where the migrants or *amagoduka* mostly stayed) (Wilson and Mafeje 1963: 32-34). As shall be shown in chapter three, the connotations of localness and foreignness which these spaces embody, and the tensions between them, resonate with some of the narratives about 'borners' and 'migrants' currently being heard in Langa.

Wilson and Mafeje noted that, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was another division in Langa too, one between Red and School migrants. Red migrants (*abantu ababomvu* or *amaqaba*) were those who had allegiance to 'tradition', whereas School migrants (*abantu basesikolweni* or *amaggoboka*) were Christian converts who placed value on European education. However, where Philip and Iona Mayer (1961) (who studied migrants in East London) equated School migrants with 'city people' and Red migrants with 'rural migrants', Wilson and Mafeje (1963) claim that in Langa, School people generally considered themselves to be migrants who would return to the rural areas (*amagoduka*). Like Red people, School people intended only to use the city as a means to invest in their rural futures.

As seen above, Wilson and Mafeje (1963) noticed that the division between 'urban' and 'rural' social categories used in Langa was often articulated as though it was cultural. Yet they were hesitant to interpret the divisions as being rooted primarily in culture. This was due to their recognition of the fact that the distinction between urban-orientated people and rural-orientated people was made particularly salient by the influx control policies of apartheid. As has been seen above, only the presence of a minority of black people was condoned in the urban areas, making some 'legitimate'...
residents of the city, and others mere ‘temporary sojourners’. In light of the structures surrounding access to urban areas, Patrick McAllister (1991: 134) explains that cultural articulations of difference had to be understood in terms of the nature of... [the] incorporation [of black people into the regional political economy]. Black workers from areas such as the Transkei... [were] long... unable to escape the status of migrant, due to legal and social institutionalisation of the migrant labour system. Linked to this... [were] poor wages and working conditions, lack of bargaining rights, poor housing in cities, and other factors, making urban areas most unattractive places in which to be. Being unable to identify with life in town, and legally prevented from doing so... it is understandable that migrants with rural assets and ties should have clung to alternative sources of security and fulfilment [and identity].

Echoing such sentiments, and reflecting on their research over 40 years later, Mafeje (1997) notes how he and Monica Wilson sought to understand the divisions in Langa as ones which represented the success (or failure) of people born in the Eastern Cape to become members of the urban working-class. According to Mafeje (1997: 8-9)

we tried to see whether urban orientatedness among the migrants was at all correlated with more than average rates of education among what were called amagoduka. It turned out that the least education or uneducated migrants tended to be more conservative and rural orientated than those who had received better education and found it easier to interact with the location people whose codes they acquired through modern education. This had nothing to do with detribalisation. It had something to do with social differentiation or class formation among urban Africans in Cape Town.

The distinction Mafeje (1997) draws between the two categories, a budding urban-orientated, more established working class on one-hand and peasant migrants, part of a less established working class, on the other, is perhaps a more nuanced way of apprehending the relationship of black South Africans to the process of urbanisation than one that veils political processes in an overarching language about culture. However Mafeje’s (1997) suggestion that migrants to Cape Town were “peasants” requires some interrogation. To claim that people from the rural areas in South Africa were peasants is to suggest that their lives in the rural areas were separate from the regional capitalist political economy of apartheid and the migrant labour system. Yet research conducted by Hobart-Houghton (1952), fairly soon before Wilson and Mafeje (1963), suggests that at that time, migrant wage earners played an important role in supplementing the reproductive capacity of households in the reserves.
In this sense then, Mafeje’s (1997) suggestion that the difference between ‘migrants’ and ‘city people’ was one of class formation may need to be adjusted slightly. Instead, as Bundy (1979) suggests, it may be better to think about ‘rural migrants’ as a migrating working-class that is based both in the urban and rural areas, moving between both when need arises – and when it was allowed to, considering the restrictions of the migrant labour system. Thus, perhaps, it was not that ‘migrants’ did not constitute an established working class, but rather that they were not a primarily urban-based proletariat.

Historically, in Langa, the relationship between so-called ‘city people’ and ‘migrants’ has been complex. For although Wilson and Mafeje (1963) have noted that the categories were generally accepted as recognisably different, Mr Tindleni, the current chairman of the Langa Backyarders Association, remembers that the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was not always easy to make. On one hand, Mr Tindleni claims that there were many connections between the older Langa families and migrants during apartheid. According to him, many people in the hostels had relatives in the township:

If we were going to have a ritual at home, we would wait for our uncle, or our grandfather, who were migrants in the hostels. Sometimes, if their wife came to stay, then one of the migrants, a relative, would stay at our house for a while. For privacy. There was even an open secret that some of the woman of the township would go to the hostels and have sex for money with the people in the hostels. Then they would have babies and their babies would be from fathers in the hostels.52

Mr Tindleni’s point is repeated by Ramphele (1993) and Fast (1996), and Fast (1996: 327) claims that the relationship between hostel dwellers and house dwellers was complex and involved both conflict and cooperation. Some men in the hostels in fact had been house dwellers, until their wives were ‘endorsed out’ of the city after influx control measures were tightened after the 1950s. Furthermore, as Qolote (2001: 109) has suggested, many people living in Cape Town and Langa (whether ‘city people’ or ‘migrants’) maintained some kind of connection to the Eastern Cape. He suggests that

[F]ew Africans in Cape Town had an exclusively urban identity… Through a number of formal and informal networks, their ties to the countryside remained strong. This was not a phenomenon confined to the migrant hostels in Langa. In Cape Town, the extent of coming

52 Interview with Mr Tindleni, 29 August, 2006, Langa
and going between the reserves and *emlungwine* (the place of the white men) varied amongst Africans.

Indeed, Mr Tindleni’s claim that sometimes close relationships existed between ‘migrants’ and ‘city people’ is supported by similar claims by Mr Xolile Gophe, Councillor of Ward 52 in Langa and by Ramphele (1993).²³

Yet despite the linkages between the two communities, there were occasions in the past when tensions between urban and rural people erupted. According to Mr Tindleni, this would occur when the hostel residents would get frustrated with being robbed by city-born youth. For example, Horrell (1966: 167), writing in 1966, records that “the unattached contract workers are known locally as *magodukas*. Ill feeling has developed between these men and the permanent residents... assaults and murders have resulted”. Similarly, Mr Tindleni has remembered that, on occasions, migrants from the hostels would put on white sheets and go out and beat up any person they came across. When that happened, we would say ‘where are the *amavolonteya*?” and we would avoid them. Some people got badly hurt. There is even one guy I know who lost his eyesight because he was beaten up so badly.²⁴

The accounts of violence by Horrell (1966) and Mr Tindleni resonate with popular South African perceptions that the relationship between hostel dwellers and township dwellers was characterised by violence. But as has been seen, this was certainly not always the case – and certainly not to the extent that conflict occurred between people of both areas in other parts of South Africa (Segal 1992).

Yet the division between the insiders and outsiders was “consistently exploited by those in authority” (Ramphele 1993: 86). Ramphele claims this was particularly the case in the 1970s when “the security forces... encourage[d] the actions of vigilantes (popularly known as the ‘witdoeke’)... from the racks of ‘outsiders’, such as happened in 1976 and 1977 in Langa and Nyanga” (Ramphele 1993: 86). Here Ramphele echoes Cole (1987) whose study of the history of Crossroads shows how

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²³ Interview with Councillor Gophe, 18 July, 2006, Langa
²⁴ The *amavolonteya* were people living in the hostels who volunteered for these jobs.
²⁵ Interview with Mr Tindleni, 29 August, 2006, Langa
the security forces supported the ‘witdoeke’ there and allowed for the eviction of 70,000 people in the informal settlements surrounding Crossroads in 1985.

A document by the Office of the Premier of the Western Cape, however has explained the actions of the Witdoeke differently:

During the [early] eighties... tensions erupted in civil war between the ‘witdoeke’ and ‘borner’ groups in Cape Town’s informal settlements. Such behaviour was understandable, given the very scarce resources and opportunities available even to the ‘borners’. Differential access to housing meant that the different groups were physically separated, militating against the possibility of bridging social capital across the two groups (Western Cape Provincial Government 2006).

While the analysis of the Premier’s document lacks any acknowledgement of the role of the state in encouraging the divisions, research by Ramphele (1993) also suggests that the scarcity of resources available to black people in the city contributed to encouraging the use of the divisions to articulate entitlement vis-à-vis ‘the other’. This would seem to be validated by Ramphele’s observation that

Conflict [between migrants and townspeople] also centres around scarce resources, for example leisure facilities, but it is over land that most bitterness has arisen. This is likely to escalate in the future. Township residents seem to feel that they are more entitled to housing to relieve the overcrowding which they experience, even if this is done at the expense of [others] (Ramphele 1993: 86 emphasis added).

Ramphele’s (1993) observation suggests that, by at least the 1980s, housing had become one of the sites around which conflict between ‘townspeople’ and ‘migrants’ constellated. Makosana (1988) explains the entitlement felt by townspeople for housing as being rooted in the social stratification of the influx control strategies to create legitimate and illegitimate urban Africans. Such policies resulted in township people “perceive[ing] themselves... [to be] a privileged group and more superior than” migrants (Makosana 1988: 81). Given the scarcity of housing in Cape Town, and the limitations regarding who could access family housing, “inzalelwana yaseKapa, those born in Cape Town [who] were holders of Section 10 (1) (a) of the Urban Areas Act prided themselves on the possession of a house” (Makosana 1988:

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56 It is necessary to contextualise Ramphele’s (1993) observation that a scarcity of houses existed under apartheid. Yapa (1996) and Green (undated) both note that scarcity is not necessarily an objective phenomenon but often exists as a consequence of the ways in which people distribute resources. Thus scarcity is the result of social relations. Certainly Pinnock’s (1985) quotation with which this chapter began suggested that the housing shortage for black people in Cape Town was remediable. Yet it was deliberately exacerbated as a means of exerting control over black people in the cities.
When it came to demanding more housing, their experience of housing delivery throughout apartheid informed ‘borners’ that they should be the legitimate recipients whereas ‘migrants’ should not.

By the late 1980s however, Ntsebeza (1992: 101) has suggested, the distinctions between ‘city people’ and ‘rural people’ became less prominent; “old categories began to disappear, whilst new ones emerged”. He claims that this was in large part a consequence of the politicisation of the black urban population following the brutalities visited on black youth in the 1976 Soweto riots. Bank (2003) has suggested the same; that the distinctions between rural and city people became less prominent as a united front against apartheid began to develop. While both commentators have used East London as their case study, their analysis appears to be relevant for Cape Town. Certainly Councillor Gophe, who lived in Langa throughout the period to which Ntsebeza (1992) and Bank (2003) refer, seems to be of the same opinion. He believes that while there were conflicts between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ during the 1970s, by the 1980s “those categories were not there. People were united against apartheid”.

Councillor Gophe proceeded to explain that even by (at least) the early 1990s, the tensions had still not manifested. He claims this was because “the ANC came with a new set of beliefs”. Central to these beliefs were the ideas that all people were equal, South Africa belonged to all who lived in the country, people could choose to live where they wanted to live and the state would provide ‘a better life for all’. The anticipation about the changes that the ANC would bring after 1994 instilled hope within black communities all over South Africa. It was, claim Ashwin Desai and Peter Huesden (2002: no page number) “only the very cynical [who] didn’t assume that the position of the residents of... the townships in the Cape Peninsula where Africans lived, would receive particular attention” in the post 1994 period.

But a ‘better life’ could not only mean a life free of racism, it needed to be one of material progress too. This posed challenges for sure: endemic poverty required addressing, and in the realm of housing alone, nationally there was a need for 1.5 million houses (a number which would grow by 170 000 a year with population

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57 Interview with Councillor Gophe, 18 July, 2006, Langa
growth) and 7.4 million people lived in squatter settlements or backyard shacks which needed upgrading (Rust 2001). These conditions had been borne of the convergence of race and class inequalities. Consequently, any future attempts to create a society free of the legacy of the discrimination of the past needed to tackle both factors.

2.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter describes, by way of an exploration of the history of apartheid land, housing and employment policies in South Africa, the extent to which those policies contributed to the creation of the urban black working class in Cape Town. The focus of this chapter has been on the development of bona fide residents within the cities, and those classed as migrants, and the competition these two designated groups faced for resources, particularly for this thesis, in the realm of a dire housing shortage. It is here, within the attempts by the apartheid government to limit and control the numbers of black South African living and working within the city, that this thesis locates the origins of the development of the categories of ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’. Difference and conflict between the two developed as a result of their being classed as two distinct groups enmeshed within the city space, while both being held subject to its specific legislation.

While the difference between the two categories largely disappeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ramphele’s warning, that the scarcity of resources available to black people in Cape Town could mean that conflict between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants was “likely to escalate in the future”, proved astute (Ramphele 1993: 86). So too was her warning that housing is an important catalyst in making an often benign, and sometimes arbitrary, social distinction between people born in Cape Town and people born elsewhere into a potentially divisive one. This warning leads the discussion into the following chapter, which focuses on the reconstitution of these categories as indicators of one’s entitlement to houses in the current context of scarcity.
CHAPTER THREE
'BORNERS' AND 'MIGRANTS' IN CONTEMPORARY LANGA

South Africa’s housing policy is an excellent example of the defining characteristic of the 'New South Africa' political economy. This is the contradiction between the imperatives of capital accumulation in the modern global context and the political imperatives of the post-Apartheid polity.

Ted Baumann 1998:2

3.1 Introduction

The ‘new’ South Africa promised new beginnings, encapsulated within the inaugural speech by newly elected president Nelson Mandela on May 9 1994: “The people of South Africa... want change! And change is what they will get” (Mandela 1994). One of the forms of change that was envisaged entailed the state promising to provide “homes for all”. The principles that everyone was entitled to housing and that the state was responsible for providing such housing, represented a radical shift from the past. Such principles were woven into the fabric of the new South Africa by being written into the constitution: “everyone has the right to adequate housing” (South African Constitution, Section 26). Furthermore, the Housing Act of 1997 described that: there would be mass delivery of houses, prioritized for poor and previously disadvantaged communities; the delivery process would be people-centred and would economically empower communities; the product would be of a decent standard, on well located land and provide access to amenities (Thurman 1999: 12-13).

Yet despite the stated intentions to create housing for all, the pace of housing delivery has not proceeded as planned and the housing backlog around the country has grown. In Cape Town, this has led to the re-emergence of the division between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ and narratives have been articulated in which ‘borners’ assert their rights to housing against ‘migrants’. This chapter therefore examines the nature of such claims in the post-apartheid period. The chapter begins by examining the nature and intentions of South African housing policy, as well as briefly introducing and describing some of the housing delivery initiatives that have occurred in Cape Town.
and Langa since 1994. Once this has been completed, the chapter explores some of the consequences of the failed practice of housing delivery in the city. This necessitates revisiting the housing delivery initiatives and exploring the ways in which these projects have contributed to the articulation of division between 'borner' and 'migrant'. Finally the chapter moves to explore the reasons why the provision of housing in Cape Town and Langa has not been forthcoming.

3.2 Housing delivery since 1994: Policy description and formulation

At the time that the Housing Act of 1997 was passed, the template by which housing delivery could be achieved in South Africa had been broadly determined by the national development strategy adopted by the ANC in 1994. Known as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), it was an attempt to charter a course between central planning and the capitalist free market (ANC 1994). The compromise having been chosen, the RDP, was a (Keynesian) development strategy that relied on the capitalist market and private enterprise to drive economic growth, but which allowed for mediation of the market by the state (Marais 1998; Bond 2004; Saul 2002; Koelble 2004; Taylor and Williams 2000)58. Using the model of the RDP, housing delivery in South Africa is planned to rely, broadly, on two approaches; one state-orientated and the other market-orientated (Blake 2000). The relationship between the two is not altogether separate because state delivery is planned as a collaboration with the market, and involves the state facilitating the provision of housing rather than providing housing itself (Blake 2000: section 2.3).

Greater clarity into the roles of both state and market can be gauged from a closer analysis of the key strategies for implementing housing delivery which are described in the Housing Act of 1997. In terms of the responsibilities of the state, this act distinguishes between the duties of each of the three tiers of government; national, provincial and local. As Thurman (1999:13-14) has explained, it is the responsibility of the National Government to “set policy, norms and standards; set and monitor delivery goals; assist provinces and municipalities to carry out their roles; mobilise

58 Keynes feared that, left to its own devices, the capitalist market would concentrate wealth among the already-wealthy. To ensure such an outcome did not occur, Keynes suggested that the state needed to be involved in managing the market and ensure that redistribution of wealth to the poor occurred (Heilbroner 2000).
and distribute funds to provinces and municipalities”. Furthermore, the National Government is expected to acquire the land on which housing developments are to be constructed, develop the infrastructure that will be needed for those houses and create an environment in which the housing goals can be met.

To the Provincial Government, Thurman (1999: 13-14) explains, falls the task of promoting the delivery of houses in the province. To this end, the Province is expected to adopt the necessary legislation (which is informed by national housing policy), allocate subsidies for housing programmes and administer those programs. However, as the South African political model is one which has attempted to decentralise power, it is to local government that the responsibility of practically implementing housing delivery falls. The local government is required to “take all reasonable and necessary steps to ensure that its inhabitants have access to housing on a progressive basis” (Thurman 1999: 14). Thus local government is expected to identify land for housing and provide the basic services and infrastructure for human settlements (water, electricity, storm water drainage, roads). Furthermore, their role is to

initiate, plan, co-ordinate, promote and enable housing development; the Housing Act also enables local authorities to proactively engage in housing provision, either by acting as developers, promoting or entering into partnerships with developers, setting up separate business entities to undertake housing development, or by administering housing programmes by applying accreditation (Thurman 1999: 14).

From the above, it is possible to disaggregate a number of roles set for both the state on one hand and the market and private enterprise on the other. Apart from policy making, it is apparent that it is the duty of the state to provide services and infrastructure for housing developments. It is also their responsibility to acquire and process (in a timely manner) the land on which the development is to occur. Finally, in line with the state-assisted development (Keynesian) tenets of the RDP, the state commits itself to provide a subsidy to fund the construction of housing (Baumann 1998; Jones and Datta 2000; Pugh 1994; MacKay 1999; Rust 2003).

The subsidy forms the ‘backbone’ of the state’s involvement in housing delivery. Within the subsidy system, the state provides a once-off, lump-sum capital contribution to which any person who has never owned a formal house before is
entitled - provided they meet particular requirements (Baumann 1998; Jones and Datta 2000; MacKay 1999; Rust 2003). One of those requirements is based on income: only households with an income of less than R3500 a month are eligible. The size of the contribution is determined on a progressive scale by household income, the maximum subsidy currently being R36 528 for those earning R1 500 or less a month. For those earning between R1500 and R3500, the subsidy is R34 049, with the remaining R2 479 needing to be met by the recipient (National Department of Housing, Subsidy Information 2007)59.

In this subsidy-based form of housing delivery, the state receives help from private enterprise in two ways. The first is in the realm of development. In this sense, the private developer can be subcontracted by the government to construct low-cost housing, and is funded by the accumulated total of the subsidies that each recipient in the housing development can claim (Baumann 1998; Rust 2003). The second instance in which private enterprise are invited to supplement housing delivery via the subsidy, is for individuals who are assured of only a partial subsidy – because they earn more than R1 500 but less than R3 500 a month. Such people are required either to save or to seek credit from a financial institution. In so doing, the participation of private enterprise is required in financing the delivery of low-cost housing.

But the roles of private enterprise and the market in housing delivery are not limited simply to assisting subsidy-driven delivery. Instead, the state also expects housing delivery to occur from market-driven delivery (Blake 2000). By this is meant that the government believes that it can be assisted in the delivery of houses by creating the 'right' market conditions (an 'enabling environment') which it hopes will increase employment, provide people with an income and therefore enable people in South Africa to fund the construction of houses themselves60 (Pugh 1994).

59 The amount of the subsidy is adjusted every year.
60 This form of delivery applies to people who earn more than R3 500 a month and do not qualify for a state subsidy. In these instances, banks are allocated the task of providing credit to such people if they cannot afford the full cost of the house from their savings. Such a model of involvement can be initiated by beneficiaries, meaning that people initiate the involvement of financial institutions in housing delivery by applying for financial assistance. But delivery can also be initiated by banks which are provided the right to fully fund the construction of housing projects and then select beneficiaries once construction is completed.
3.3 Housing delivery in Cape Town

Housing policies in the Western Cape and Cape Town have largely been determined by national housing policies (Thurman 1999). Consequently local housing delivery rests on the input of both the state and the market. While delivery from the market shall be discussed later, it is important here to examine delivery as planned by the local government. In this endeavour therefore, it is necessary to examine more closely the kinds of housing subsidies that exist and the ways in which such subsidies have been translated into housing delivery initiatives in Cape Town. Although there are seven subsidies available for housing delivery in South Africa, there are four subsidies which require analysis in order to facilitate a discussion about housing in Langa. This is because these subsidies have provided the basis for the delivery of houses that have occurred in Langa since 1994, and which – as shall be seen – have contributed to the resurgence of the divisions between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’.

Probably the most important subsidy of all in South Africa, and central but indirectly related to post-1994 housing delivery in Langa, is the Project-Linked subsidy (Baumann 1998; Thurman 1999). In this model of delivery, a developer (either private or the local government) draws up plans to construct mass low-cost housing. Once the plans have been approved, and the funding released, it is expected that developers will deliver houses en-mass. Developments can either occur as in situ (on site) upgrades - whereby the construction of housing occurs in the area where people already live (in informal settlements) - or (more likely) the housing developments can be greenfields developments, ones that occur on unsettled, empty land. Recipients of houses built in this form of delivery are either selected on the basis of their proximity to the housing development, or on the basis of how long they have been waiting for houses (the ‘waiting list’) (Mail and Guardian 3-9 June 2005).

In Cape Town, the Project-Linked subsidy has formed the largest proportion of housing delivery in the city. For instance, from 1994 – 2005, it was used as a vehicle to fund the major housing initiative of the municipality of Cape Town, the Integrated Serviced Land Project (iSLP). Run by the Western Cape Provincial Government, the website of the iSLP notes that the project was
conceived primarily in order to address the housing needs of a specific constituency - the shack-dwelling population in and around the long-standing “Black townships” of Nyanga, Guguletu and Langa. Most households resided in informal settlements, but many were accommodated in shacks located in the backyards of township houses. It was agreed at an early stage that those in informal settlements would be given priority, on account of the relatively abysmal and unhealthy conditions pertaining in those areas (Western Cape Provincial Government 2004).

While the iSLP’s explicit focus was on informal settlements, it also sought to cater for backyard dwellers. In the planning of the iSLP, backyarders would be given priority in housing developments that occurred in “buffer strips” – the areas of land that the apartheid government had left open between ‘white’, ‘coloured’ and ‘black’ settlements. By August 2004, the Western Cape Provincial Government (2004) claimed to have provided basic services to 29 217 new sites and to have built 32 239 new ‘top structures’ (the actual housing unit) around the city.

Another subsidy relevant to delivery in Langa is the Discount Benefit Scheme (National Department of Housing, Subsidy Information 2007). It applies to people living in former apartheid council ‘cottages’, who have occupied such houses since before July 1993. The subsidy makes R7 500 available to the occupier, if the occupier wishes to buy the house from the council. Consequently the tenant is given the opportunity to own the house, but only on the condition that they have settled all municipal debts. In Cape Town, the Discount Benefit Scheme has been active since 1994 and has resulted in the transfer of ownership of former apartheid housing in areas such as Bo-Kaap, Mitchell’s Plain, Nyanga, Gugulethu and Langa. In Langa by the year 2007, 1943 council cottages had been transferred out of a total of 2243 cottages.

A third subsidy is important for this research, and is known as the Public Hostels Redevelopment subsidy. It is available for the conversion of hostels into rented ‘family units’ (Thurman 1997). Unlike the previous two subsidies however, the Public Hostels Redevelopment subsidy provides rental housing and not freehold tenure. In Cape Town, the conversions are known as the Hostels-to-Homes projects.

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61 Interview with local Department of Housing official, Mrs Cloete, 12 August 2006, Department of Housing, Bree Street
62 Interview with Langa Housing Office official, Mr van Blerk, 13 October 2006, Langa
63 The other subsidies are (1) the Discount Benefit Scheme, (2) the Consolidation subsidy, (3) the Institutional subsidy, (4) the subsidy available for the People’s housing Process and (5) the Relocation Subsidy (Department of Housing, Subsidy Information 2007)
and are managed and overseen by the city of Cape Town, in partnership with local and international NGOs. Generally in Cape Town, (unconverted) hostel rooms have typically been about 20m² in area with as many as sixteen people living in one room (Thurman 1997: 47). Research by Mpetsheni (2003) in Langa confirms Thurman’s (1997) observations: Mpetsheni (2003) found that, on average, each hostel room accommodated four beds - with a family of four on each bed (this resonates with Ramphele’s (1990) A Bed Called Home which makes similar observations).

The conversions have predominantly focussed on converting the formerly public sector hostels in Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu. In Langa, hostel conversions have occurred in the hostels of New Flats, Welcome Zenzile, and some in the Old Flats. According to Mr Dyiki from the city council, about three thousand, one hundred hostel conversions have occurred in Cape Town since 1994 (1 282 conversions in total had been completed in Langa by March 2007)⁶⁴.

The last subsidy is the Institutional Subsidy and like the Hostel Redevelopment subsidy, allows for rental housing to be constructed. The most recent state-led housing project in Cape Town has been of this form and is known as the N2 Gateway Project. The Gateway Project has been touted since 2005 by the government as the key to help solve the housing shortage in Cape Town (Cape Argus 10 September 2004). The Gateway represents the Government’s “Breaking New Ground Policy” and Langa is the first site where construction is taking place by virtue of the fact that a massive fire occurred in January 2005 in Joe Slovo informal settlement - effectively clearing the ground for construction. The plan is that by 2010, some 22 000 houses will have been built on both sides of the road, all the way to airport.

3.4 The growth of the housing backlog

Since there have been a plethora of good intentions and numerous policies and strategies for delivering houses as have been described above, it appears somewhat contradictory that housing delivery for South Africa in general, and in Cape Town specifically, has not been forthcoming. In fact, the housing delivery scenario in Cape

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⁶⁴ Interview with local Department of Housing official, Mr Dyiki, 16 February 2007, City Council office
Town appears very disheartening. For instance, Smit (1994) estimated that in 1994 there were 190 000 inadequately housed households in Cape Town, but in 2006 a recent audit of the housing waiting list in the city currently puts that figure at 400 000 households (Cape Times 2 August 2006). Using comparable figures suggested by a city council Housing Portfolio Committee (City of Cape Town, Housing Portfolio Committee 2006) presentation, it appears as if 300 000 households live in informal settlements and 100 000 live in overcrowded hostels and backyards. It seems then that the housing backlog is worse in 2007 than it was in 1994.  

When an attempt is made to reconstruct a (rough) recent history of housing delivery in Langa by using comparative data from Census 1996 and 2001, it appears that the housing situation in Langa is also getting worse. The graph below shows a breakdown of housing units in Langa for 2001 and is useful for reconstructing housing delivery in Langa:

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65 The reasons for the poor performance of housing delivery are explored later in the chapter.
66 As noted in the Introduction, an overview of the shortage of housing in Langa can be gauged only from data available from Census 2001, as the Census is the most recent survey of Langa. Consequently the data is dated and the data from the Census cannot be claimed to represent contemporary housing conditions in Langa. Another recent survey is available, one generated by the City council of the City of Cape Town in 2004, but this is limited to Joe Slovo only - which itself is problematic because the fires in January 2005, as well as the construction of the N2 Gateway Project, have radically altered the numbers of people living there. Yet these two surveys are the only two available and as such they will be used, if not to portray contemporary housing accurately, then at least to provide a recent account of the housing shortage in Langa.
From the graph, one can see that in the year 2001, there were 15,542 households in Langa (Census 2001). The largest proportion of households (30%), or 4,737, lived in shacks in the informal settlement of Joe Slovo. Yet Census 1996 shows that, in that year, there were 2,317 informal settlement shacks in Joe Slovo — indicating that the number of shacks in the informal settlement increased by more than 100% (2,420 shacks).

According to Census 2001, the next largest category of housing constituted those which were formal brick houses (21% of the total) (Statistics South Africa 2001). Since 2,243 of these houses were council cottages built before 1994, and Census 1996 records the presence of 309 other (non-council formal houses) in 1996, it is apparent that the inter-Census years saw the construction of only 633 new formal houses. When this total is added to the 136 hostel conversions that had occurred by 2001, it is

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67 The category ‘Not Applicable’ (2,838 units) includes a number of institutions of which hostels comprise only one. However hostels make up the largest proportion of the ‘N/A’ category with 2,689 units, or 17% of the total units in Langa (personal communication, Mrs Nireen Naidoo, 3 March 2007).

68 By 2004, the City of Cape Town (2005: 3) recorded that the number of shacks in Joe Slovo informal settlement had grown again by 890 shacks. Over the eight year period between 1996 and 2004 therefore, the number of shacks increased by 3,310.
apparent that by the year 2001, only 769 new houses had been built in Langa\textsuperscript{69}. Such delivery was vastly outnumbered by the growth of informal housing\textsuperscript{70}.

### 3.5 Consequences of housing delivery

The growth of the housing backlog has provided the central context against which tensions between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ in Langa have resurfaced. One of the reasons is that ‘borners’ have objected to the manner in which housing delivery is occurring, claiming that they find themselves part of the backlog because ‘migrants’ are receiving houses before them. An analysis of the housing delivery initiatives highlighted above show how this has been the case.

#### 3.5.1 Case Studies: RDP, Hostels-to-Homes and the N2 Gateway Project

#### 3.5.1.1 The Delivery of RDP Houses in Cape Town

As noted above, until 2005, the iSLP was the major vehicle for housing delivery in Cape Town. The project’s intended strategy of housing delivery was to synchronise the development of the greenfields sites and the upgrading of the informal settlements, so that most of the residents of informal settlements could relocate to the greenfields areas, releasing the informal settlements for development. At the same time the ['buffer zones']... would be developed, but primarily for the benefit of the burgeoning population living in shacks in the backyards of formal houses in the old townships (Western Cape Provincial Government 2004).

While the iSLP made provisions for housing backyard shack dwellers in RDP houses in ‘buffer zones’ around the city, the original intentions of the iSLP (as has been seen

\textsuperscript{69} Within the housing delivery discourse of the state, the local government refers to the number of ‘housing opportunities’ it creates each year. The term is used in order to include all the forms of housing that the government has provided, both new and old. In this sense then, new RDP houses are counted along with hostel transfers and council cottage transfers. In suggesting that there were only 769 houses delivered in Langa between 1996 and 2001, I have excluded the transfer of cottages. I have left them out because I am attempting to show how many new houses have been created in Langa.

\textsuperscript{70} According to a comparison of Census 1996 and 2001, there was a decrease in the numbers of backyard shacks in Langa (by 600 shacks). Yet it appears as if this finding is questionable. When approached for insight, a representative of national statistics agency (Statistics South Africa which conduct the Census), Ms Nireen Naidoo, a representative of Statistics South Africa, suggested that it was probable that the numbers represented inconsistencies with capturing the data (personal communication, Mrs Nireen Naidoo, 16 March 2007). Certainly respondents in Langa did not seem to feel that there were fewer backyarders in Langa. Rather, they felt that the numbers had increased.

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above) was to favour those living in informal settlements. Mrs Cloete from the city council’s Housing Department claims that informal settlements are the most visible forms of the housing problem because backyard shacks are hidden within formal housing areas. Indeed, in the overview of the iSLP, the Western Cape Provincial Government (2004) repeats Baumann’s (in Mail and Guardian 3-9 June 2005) claim and notes that informal settlements were prioritised above backyard shacks because of their “relatively abysmal and unhealthy conditions”.

Such policy choices have contributed to creating a division between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’. Backyarders associations, of whose constituency ‘borners’ claim to constitute the largest part, have in recent years began to express dissatisfaction with the fact that allocation of housing is done on the basis of where one lives and not on the basis of how long one has been waiting for housing in the city. Mr Tindleni, the chairman of the Langa Backyarders Association, for example complained that

I know makhulus [grandmothers] and tatomkhulus [grandfathers] who have been living in backyard shacks for fifty years. How can they get houses after people who have only been waiting for houses since 1994? Those people are new in Cape Town but they are getting houses first! It is not right!

The situation is compounded by the fact that there has been little development of RDP houses in the ‘buffer strips’. In the overview of the iSLP, the Western Cape Provincial Government (2004) claims that part of the reason is that such areas have tended to become occupied by informal settlements, resulting in few housing opportunities becoming available for backyarders. In fact, according to Mrs Cloete of the city’s Housing Department, from 1994 to 2004, only a minority of the 26 969 houses delivered through the iSLP were allocated to backyarders.

At first glance, the policy of favouring informal settlement dwellers over backyard dwellers seems irrelevant for the immediate context of housing delivery in Langa.

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71 Mrs Cloete from the city council’s Housing Department also claims that backyards are ‘hidden’ from view because they are in the backyards of formal houses (Interview with local Department of Housing official, Mrs Cloete, 12 August 2006, Department of Housing, Bree Street)

72 Interview with Mr Tindleni, 29 August 2006, Langa

73 Exact figures are not available but this fact is suggested by the interview with local Department of Housing official, Mrs Cloete, 12 August 2006, Department of Housing, Bree Street
This is because there have been no RDP houses delivered in Langa since 1994\textsuperscript{74}. City official Mr van Blerk claims that this is because “there is no space for RDP houses in Langa”. Yet respondents living in Langa disagreed with this point. Mr Tindleni claims that “there are places to build! There are the fields next to Isilimela Primary School standing empty”. The same location was identified by Joseph, a ‘borner’ living in the informal settlement of Joe Slovo\textsuperscript{75}. He claimed that local authorities are forcibly moving residents out of Joe Slovo to make space for the construction of the N2 Gateway Project, while other spaces exist where houses could be built.\textsuperscript{76}

Mrs Motaung, who lives in a formal house, similarly exclaimed that

There is plenty of space in Langa. Like here, if you go out here, even if it is small there are plenty fields where they can make quick flats... There is a big space near Langa station... They said they are going to make a shopping mall here! We don’t want any shopping centre because we are used to take taxi’s to town, to Mowbray, to Athlone to buy our groceries. We are used to that. We don’t need a shopping centre, we need places to stay?\textsuperscript{77}

The reason given by Mrs Motaung for the empty spaces in Langa not being used for housing was confirmed by housing official, Mr van Blerk. He claimed that “the land [that is standing empty] is zoned for other things”\textsuperscript{78}. Yet such a scenario had two effects. The first, discussed in more detail later, has been to intensify the feeling among residents in Langa, ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’, that little is being done by the government to provide housing to people in Langa. The second however has been to intensify the feeling among ‘borners’ that they are losing out to ‘migrants’ in housing delivery in the city. This is so because local residents of Langa have been forced to compete with residents of other areas of Cape Town for the RDP houses being built in those other areas. In this competition, residents of Langa are at a disadvantage.

\textsuperscript{74} Interview with local Department of Housing official, Mrs Cloete, 12 August 2006, Department of Housing, Bree Street; Interview with Langa Housing Office official, Mr van Blerk, 13 October 2006, Langa; Interview with Mr Tindleni, 29 August 2006, Langa
\textsuperscript{75} Interview with Joseph, 26 October 2006, Langa
\textsuperscript{76} Joseph’s claim went even further; that the very positionality of the N2 Highway mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, that of it being the artery which connects Cape Town International Airport with Cape Town city, plays a vital role for why it is chosen as a site along which the construction of houses should begin. “They just want Joe Slovo because it is next to the highway. They want to make Cape Town look pretty for the World Cup, that’s why they are building next to the N2 and not on the other side of Langa”.
\textsuperscript{77} Interview with Mrs Motaung, 10 September 2006, Langa
\textsuperscript{78} Interview with Langa Housing Office official, Mr van Blerk, 13 October 2006, Langa
According to Mrs Cloete from the city of Cape Town’s housing department, there is a bias within the policies of housing allocation that dictates that in the rare instance that RDP houses become available to people on the waiting list, residents of the immediate area where the development is occurring qualify for houses above residents of surrounding areas - even if they have been on the waiting list for less time. According to this policy, only once all local residents have been catered for, can applicants from surrounding areas be considered. Thus, since all construction of RDP houses have occurred outside of Langa, residents of Langa are severely disadvantaged.

Yet even in rare cases where residents of Langa are selected for RDP houses, and Mrs Cloete claims this has been the case, the offers are sometimes turned down. Mrs Motaung, explains that this decision is motivated partly by a sense of community but more importantly by the fact that residents of Langa often feel they are too poor to attempt the risk of moving to another township and losing their local support networks:

People of Langa, they don’t like to move out of Langa. They don’t want to go and stay elsewhere. They will say ‘hayi man, we don’t like to go and stay, like, in Gugulethu. We are used to each other. When you don’t have something like bread, you go next door – we know each other. But if they take you somewhere else, you don’t know the people, and then you have nothing to eat. And you don’t know who you can go to. You don’t know.

Mrs Motaung’s concerns about the breakdown of social support mechanisms have been noted by researchers in other areas of Cape Town and South Africa (Smit 2000; Yose 1999). Essentially they suggest that the provision of housing without the ensuring of economic stability can result in the move to a new community, and formal housing, being risky for people with low (or no) incomes. Mrs Motaung suggests

79 Interview with local Department of Housing official, Mrs Cloete, 12 August 2006, Department of Housing, Bree Street
80 Interview with Mrs Motaung, 10 September 2006, Langa
81 To make matters worse, the move into formal housing often brings with it new expenses, such as rates, water and electricity, which residents in shacks have often not had to pay for before (Baumann 2004; Ross 2005b). Although the City of Cape Town has attempted to reduce a portion of potential household expenses by provided a limited subsidy for services such as water and electricity, thus ‘helping’ poor people, Mrs Cloete notes that “Life is not free! Yes the government has given free water and electricity, but that is for a small family. How can a large family honestly live off that? And what about food, transport, education, clothing? You must have money to live!”. Researchers Ross (2005) and Baumann (2004) have both recognize that one of the consequences of such one-dimensional housing delivery brings with it the problem of recipients of RDP houses selling their houses because of the financial constraints of moving into formal housing prove too great.
that the risk is known by residents of Langa, contributing to the fact that if - and when - residents of Langa who have long waited in the waiting list are offered the rare opportunity to benefit from ‘mass’ RDP housing delivery, such an ‘opportunity’ is not taken.

3.5.1.2 The delivery of Hostels-To-Homes conversions

Although the pace of delivery of the Hostels-to-Homes conversions was slow between the years 1994 and 2001 (136 units), the pace of delivery has subsequently increased. In the last six years, 1 146 units have been converted. Yet it is significant for this thesis that the Hostel-to-Homes conversions are geared towards benefiting those who already live in the hostels. Non-hostel residents cannot access the converted units, as Councillor Mthiya explained:

These people [in the hostels] have been staying there for a long time. Now the rooms are being converted in the Hostels-to-Homes project. But you can’t just go and take someone out who has been there for so long. It is like if I have lived in this office for many years and then this office is redone and made into a home, and then you tell me that I must leave; that you must live here instead. When government is making the changes and making the hostels into homes, it is for hostel residents, not for the people who are staying in backyards.

Considering the history of apartheid and the function of hostels within the migrant labour system, hostels are still largely perceived as the places where ‘migrants’ live. Consequently the ‘hostels to homes’ project has fuelled perceptions by ‘borners’ in Langa that ‘migrants’ benefit from housing delivery while local people suffer. Mncedisi, a respondent born in Langa, complained:

The government has been doing delivery on the other part of Langa., not here in the location. There are no RDP houses or anything. There was always just the work on the hostels... The conversions for families in the hostels. But those houses are not for us. Not for the borners. Government doesn’t build us houses, they don’t worry about us. It’s only for those other people. Those people who come from the Eastern Cape.

As the above quotation shows, non-hostel dwellers have felt aggrieved by the process of selection for the ‘hostels to homes’ conversions. Indeed, frustration with the system

82 Interview with local Department of Housing official, Mr Dyiki, 16 February 2007, City Council office
83 Interview with Councillor Mthiya, 18 June 2006, Langa
84 Interview with Mncedisi, 7 September 2006, Langa
of allocation in the Hostels-to-Homes conversions accompanied the beginnings of the project in 1994. Thurman (1997: 48) notes that in March 1994, “29 demonstration units” were destroyed in an arson attack that may have been the result of “dissatisfaction with the allocation process”.

More recently however, frustration reached violent proportions in 2005 when a confrontation occurred between hostel dwellers and backyarders. A young group of the latter occupied some of the newly renovated hostel units in New Flats and claimed them as their own. They argued that it was not fair that hostel dwellers, whom they claimed were essentially new, young migrants, should get all of the newly renovated houses while the backyarders got nothing. Eventually the occupiers were arrested and a retaliatory march was staged by the hostel dwellers who toyi-toyied to the house of the head of the Langa Backyarders Association, Mr Selby Tindleni, having assumed that he was responsible for the occupations. Mr Tindleni explained,

The young men had come to me to say ‘Tata, we are going to occupy the new hostels because we are getting none of the houses built there. It is unfair’. I told them that we should rather try and write a letter to the council asking to allocate some of the houses to backyarders. But they went ahead and occupied the houses anyway. When they were arrested I was called to negotiate with the police and eventually I managed to get them released. Later that night when I had gone home, I heard this sound at the front, so I opened the door to see what was going on. There were hundreds of men from the hostels dancing and singing outside my house. They were threatening me, saying they would kill me. The metro police came but they just sat in the cars on the far side of the road watching. Eventually the residents from around here, the borners, came and stood in front of my gate and saved me. They said that the hostel dwellers would have to hurt them to get to me. Finally the other police came and everyone cleared away, but I was under police protection for a long time afterwards.

The confrontation Mr Tindleni described was a serious one and apparently, according to the Station Commander of the Langa Police station, confrontations of this nature happen “every now and then”.

Similar confrontations, though less violent, have occurred since the unveiling of the N2 Gateway housing Project in Langa in 2005.

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85 Interview with Mr Tindleni, 29 August 2006, Langa
86 Interview with the Station Commander of Langa Police Station, 8 September 2006, Langa
3.5.1.3 Delivery in the N2 Gateway Project

The N2 Gateway Project is supposed to represent the 'new' future of housing delivery in South Africa, but much of the current tension between 'borners' and 'migrants' in Cape Town centres around the houses that the Gateway promises. Partly the tension is a result of the preference of government to provide houses to informal settlement dwellers before backyarders (noted above). Commenting on such policy choices in the context of the N2 Gateway Project, Ted Baumann (Mail and Guardian 3-9 June 2005) noted that the government is reluctant to abandon the housing waiting list, which favours 'insiders' such as those in Gugulethu and Langa, but the most visible manifestations of urban poverty and homelessness, such as the Joe Slovo informal settlement along the N2 highway, are populated by 'outsiders'. This dilemma began to take its current form when the N2 Gateway Project was foisted on the city by the national government. Despite its developmental rhetoric, the project is driven by a desire to change the physical appearance of the city as quickly as possible – hence the focus on newer, 'outsider' settlements such as Joe Slovo... to the detriment of backyarders of Langa and Gugulethu who are invisible.

The biases of such policies were exacerbated in early 2005 after a fire swept through Joe Slovo informal settlement, leaving twelve thousand people homeless (Cape Times 17 January 2005). In the efforts to remedy their homelessness, tensions between 'borners' and 'migrants' emerged.

Immediately after the fires, the local political authorities announced that temporary accommodation would be provided for the Joe Slovo fire victims (Cape Times 20 January 2005). They also announced that the land cleared by the fire in Joe Slovo would be used as the site on which the N2 Gateway Project would be built. Once the first phase of houses were built, the people who had lost their homes in Joe Slovo would be given preference in the N2 Gateway Project (Cape Times 20 January 2005). The perception that Joe Slovo residents had been 'preferred' sparked outrage in neighbouring communities.

In terms of temporary accommodation, members of other communities believed that they already had residents who were homeless or housed in squalid conditions. Subsequently they argued that members of their communities should receive houses in the area before 'outsiders' could come and stay there (Sunday Argus 20 February
Resistance to the provision of housing to people from Joe Slovo took the form of threats of evictions (from residents of the backyards of Langa) and even threats by residents of Delft (a new township on the outskirts of Cape Town) to "petrol bomb" the temporary accommodation of Joe Slovo fire victims provided in Delft (for reactions from residents of Langa, see Cape Argus 20 February 2005 and Bush Radio News 04 September 2006. For reactions from residents of Delft, see Bush Radio News 28 July 2006).

In terms of the housing promised in the N2 Gateway Project, similar disgruntlement was articulated. Within Langa, the Langa Backyarders Association demanded not to be forgotten in the allocation of houses in the Project. Joe Slovo residents were described as 'migrants' from the Eastern Cape, newly arrived in Cape Town and undeserving of special treatment. By being given housing, 'migrants' would jump the waiting list and more deserving residents of Cape Town would lose out (Cape Argus 15 February 2005). One woman from Langa confronted then-Mayor Nomaindia Mfeketo and objected in frustration to the provision of houses (even temporary accommodation) to Joe Slovo residents:

People from Joe Slovo only arrived recently in Cape Town... Every year their shacks burn down, now look, they're even being given houses by the government... I know we're all black and we shouldn't be fighting among ourselves, but look at me, I'm a 40-year-old with three kids but I'm still living with my mother in her four-roomed house... Where were the people from Joe Slovo when we struggled?... Many of them only arrived after 1994 (Cape Times, February 14, 2005)

Another objection raised by 'borners' about 'migrants' getting houses in the N2 Project was that "when the migrants get houses, they don't even want them because they have houses in the Eastern Cape. So they sell them when they go back there. The government must give houses to 'borners'. We were born here. We can't go somewhere else". Such a statement echoes the claims to legitimacy made by 'borners' under apartheid; that 'borners' are authentic, full-time residents of Cape Town, whereas 'migrants' are simply 'temporary' residents.

87 Interview with Elizabeth, 15 August 2006, Langa. Yet the first of these complaints assumes that 'migrants' already have houses elsewhere, which is not always the case. Indeed interviews with 'migrants' suggested the opposite, and coming to work in Cape Town is often an attempt to be able to earn enough money in order to be able to buy a house 'back home'. However, even if migrants do have another house in the Eastern Cape, the fact that they need to work in Cape Town should not disqualify them for houses.
Eventually the Langa Backyarders Association undertook a protest march in 2005, from Langa to Cape Town City centre ("taking over the N2 highway") in order to convey their grievances to the relevant political authorities, and demand that allocation of housing in the Project be "fair".88

Reflecting on the tensions at the time, Agnes Moniwe, a ‘migrant’ now resident in the Gateway Project, thinks that "there could have been war".89 The local and provincial government apparently also feared such an outcome because they eventually decided that the conflict between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ in Langa required intervention. As a result, the N2 Gateway Project Steering Committee was formed. The Steering Committee acts as a consultative forum in which all stakeholders around housing in Langa come together and discuss their concerns about the N2 Gateway Project90. Subsequently the tensions between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ over the N2 Project have become less explicit. Partly this is the result of the efforts of the Committee, but more likely this is because the houses that have been completed in the N2 Project (only 705) are no longer the source of envy that they once were. Barely a year old, the flats are falling apart and, as rental units only, are too expensive for most backyarders or informal settlement dwellers to acquire.

The fact that the delivery of housing in Cape Town is skewed is of much importance to the resurrection of the divisions between borners and migrants in Langa. Yet it is only one aspect of the context which has provoked the divisions, and it is important to situate the skewed pace of delivery within the broader context of the growth of the housing backlog.

88 Interview with Mr Tindleni, 29 August 2006, Langa
89 Interview with Agnes, 14 August 2006, Langa
90 On attending one meeting, it was impressed upon me by the local ANC councilor that I was asking the wrong question in my research. I was told that the media had misrepresented the conflict in Langa, that there really was no conflict between ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’. I was then asked what I wished to do with the information in the research, because the councilor feared that I might exacerbate the conflict if I gave the information to the wrong people. Similarly I was asked to respect the committee because it was intended to manage the conflict. While it is definitely true that the media representations of the conflict can be simplistic and do not, perhaps, do justice to the complexity of the issue, the request that I not exacerbate conflict contradicts the assertion that the conflict in Langa was solely a media distortion of the ‘truth’. For if there was no conflict, there would be no reason for having the committee manage one, nor would there be a problem with exacerbating it. It appears as if the councilors concern was two-fold: first, and rightly, that I not produce research that was over simplistic. Second, that he had a political agenda to appear to manage the situation so as to not bring the ANC into disrepute within the community of Langa.
3.6 Reasons for the growth of the housing backlog

3.6.1 Corruption, politicking and inefficiency

There appear to be many reasons why the housing backlog has grown in Cape Town (and South Africa). Some of them are obvious to people living in Langa and they form part of the explanations their testimonies reflected as causes for the growth of the backlog. Other reasons are less obvious. Of those that were provided as reasons by ‘borners’ in Langa, perhaps the most commonly cited reason was the fact that there has been a large increase in the numbers of people who have migrated to Cape Town since 1994. In fact, between 1996 and 2001, in-migration accounted for 58% (192 623 people) of the population growth of Cape Town; the highest nett migration of any Metropolitan area in South Africa (City of Cape Town, Integrated Development Plan, 2006). High rates of in-migration are confirmed by a joint study between the Cape Metropolitan Council and the University of Stellenbosch (1999) survey of the Cape Metropolitan Area which found that three-quarters of black respondents were born in places outside of Cape Town.

Undoubtedly the proportion of the population of Langa derived from people not born in Langa (or the city) has also increased since 1994. Consequently, while Langa has always housed a relatively high population of people categorised under apartheid as ‘migrant labourers’ – because of the presence of hostels in Langa - it is probable that since 1994, the number of ‘migrants’ living there has increased. Certainly, it appears as if 6 428 people moved into Langa directly from other provinces in South Africa – with the Eastern Cape accounting for the largest share: 5 818 (Statistics South Africa 2001).

91 Interview with Monica, 02 September 2006, Langa; Interview with Mncedisi, 07 September 2006, Langa; Interview with Lindikhaya, 23 September 2006, Langa; Interview with Elizabeth, 15 August 2006, Langa
92 It would appear, if the Census data is correct, that proportionately more people (though only 1% more) moved into Langa directly from the Eastern Cape since the last census in 1996 than in the neighbouring townships of Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, Crossroads and Nyanga. Why this is however is unclear. It is possible that the reasons could include some of those given by residents of Langa, both ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’, about why that they like about Langa. The first is that Langa, being the closest township to the city, is a particularly desirable township in which to live because transport costs are relatively cheaper and Langa is closer to potential employment opportunities. Also however, Langa has, until fairly recently, been considered safer than some neighbouring townships (Interview with Mncedisi, 7 September 2006, Langa)
From the above, it would seem to be reasonable to suggest that in-migration into Cape Town, currently at 16 000 people a year, has placed a strain on the ability of housing delivery to perform adequately. Such a suggestion at least was made by Councillor Neil Ross of the City’s Housing Portfolio Committee93. It is also one that has found particular appeal among ‘borners’. For example, Monica claimed that “There are so many people coming to Cape Town. They just put up a shack anywhere. The government can’t keep up with them”94. Similarly Mncedisi exclaimed that “when the government builds one house, people coming from the Eastern Cape build two shacks. It’s like that you know”95.

But identifying in-migration (and by extension, ‘migrants’) as the cause of the housing backlog, rather than simply a complicating factor, may be a case of confusing causes with effects. For instance, for about the last seven years, an average of only four thousand housing opportunities have been made available each year in Cape Town96. This does not even meet the demand derived from natural population growth; nine thousand locals requiring houses each year97. Furthermore, city council research in Joe Slovo informal settlement in 2004, found that “many” of the residents of Joe Slovo had lived in Cape Town for as many as 25 years (City of Cape Town 2005)98. While these people may only have been in Langa for a relatively short period of time (the research suggests an average of five years), such people have probably been waiting for houses in Cape Town for as long as (or in some instances longer than) many ‘borners’ in Langa. In this light then, their presence in shacks in Joe Slovo represents an effect of the failure of housing delivery to provide houses – rather than simply a cause.

93 Interview with Councillor Neil Ross, 17 June 2006, Constantia
94 Interview with Monica, 02 September 2006, Langa
95 Interview with Mncedisi, 07 September 2006, Langa
96 Personal communication, Warren Smit, 26 March 2007
97 Warren Smit suggests that the backlog grows by 25 000 people a year. Since 16 000 of that number consist of migrants, 9 000 are therefore local people (Personal communication, Warren Smit, 26 March 2007)
98 The Census is not useful in understanding the migration rates into Langa from neighbouring townships – which the city council research (2004) suggests is how many residents of Joe Slovo come to be living there. This is because the Census does not record where respondents were born, only ‘the place of previous residence’ - if respondents did not live in the same place at the time of the last Census in 1996. The question proposes the choice of answers in terms of province only, and therefore answers from the category ‘Western Cape’ are problematic. For while the Census records that 43 081 people in Langa had lived in the same province since 1996, one is unable to know whether, at the time of the last Census, such people lived in Langa or one of the other townships nearby in the city, or even another area in the province. The same answer would be recorded for all.
Other causes for the slow pace of housing delivery offered by ‘borners’ (and often having the support of many ‘migrants’) was that housing delivery is slow because of corruption. Mrs Motaung and Mondi referred to the fact that the government has spent millions of rands on a now notorious ‘arms deal’; Lindikhaya felt politicians just wanted to make themselves rich; Joseph believes that local councillors take bribes from people to allocate them houses\textsuperscript{99}. Such perspectives are reinforced by research by Bahre (2002) and Cross (2005) which have also suggested that corruption plays a role in slowing the pace of delivery.

While in-migration and corruption form the substance of the analysis of the causes for poor housing delivery raised by ‘borners’ (and to a lesser degree ‘migrants’), Thurman (1999), Watson (2002) and Wilkinson (2003) suggest others. Namely, that much responsibility rests with the fact that Cape Town has undergone significant organisational restructuring at local government level, as well as a protracted political battle between the ‘New’ (now defunct) National Party, the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA).

In terms of restructuring, it was necessary in the post-apartheid period to consolidate the range of diverse authorities whose task it had been to manage and govern the population of Cape Town according to the racialised system of politics of the time. As a result, the “local government was rationalised in a phased process, which included a major restructuring and a democratic election in 1996” (Western Cape Provincial Government 2004). Peter Wilkinson (2003: 219) notes that this process of restructuring local government resulted “in December 2000, in the formation of a unitary metropolitan local authority”. However Smit (2004: 66) notes that by 2004, the process of restructuring was still continuing in Cape Town and, in many ways, the turmoil of restructuring diverted the attention of the council away from aspects such as housing delivery.

\textsuperscript{99} Interview with Mrs Motaung, 10 September 2006, Langa; Interview with Mondi, 17 August 2006, Langa; Interview with Lindikhaya, 23 September 2006, Langa; Interview with Joseph, 26 October 2006, Langa
According to Smit, a consequence of restructuring was to retrench large numbers of staff in the council. Indeed the lack of capacity forms a prominent part of contemporary political discussions about the inability of the local government to deliver houses. Democratic Alliance politician, Councillor Neil Ross for example claims that

there is a serious lack of capacity in the council. They don’t have enough people to run all the projects in the city. We do not have the adequate staff. For each project you need one person as the project manager. At the moment in Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain we have 8 projects on the go and we have one person supervising them. And they are stretched very thin.

Councillor Neil Ross identified the ANC as responsible for the problems with local housing delivery. While there may be content to this claim, the very long-standing pattern of politicking of which this claim is a part, is in itself a reason for the slow pace of housing delivery. This is because, as Wilkinson (2003) has explained, local politicking in Cape Town has contributed importantly to the lack of delivery, with the Western Cape and Cape Town at the centre of many attempts by both the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA) to wrest power from one another, and take control of the city. While Wilkinson’s observations are made about the pre-2002 period, recent events demonstrate a repetition of the cycle. Following the rise of the DA to power in the city in the latest municipal elections in 2006, the process of shuffling various managers and bureaucrats has been repeated. From their side, the ANC provincial government have been attempting to undermine and usurp the power of the local government. It is an environment in which, as Wilkinson (2003) notes, disillusionment has spread among bureaucrats in the council, causing them to be disinclined to effectively implement the policies of the local government.

All the explanations discussed above, true though they may be, are decidedly silent about the role of current housing policies in creating the backlog. Certainly restructuring, local politicking, corruption and a lack of capacity have been (and in

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100 Personal communication, Warren Smit, 28 March 2007
101 Interview with Councillor Neil Ross, 17 June 2006, Constantia. In contrast to the claim by Councillor Ross, Smit (2004: 73) claims that “Although lack of capacity has been a real constraint, it is not an insurmountable one. Indeed, if sufficient resources were made available... problems of capacity could be overcome”. He has also asserted that the city council has, in the past, managed to deliver more houses than it currently does – but with the same number of people (personal communication, 28 March 2007). Such a fact is important for it draws attention away from discussions about ‘capacity’ and allows one to engage with other reasons that are important for the failure of housing delivery. Notable in this instance is the limitation discussed later – the limitation of the housing budget.
some instances remain) monumental obstacles to overcome, but the rhetoric that blames the bureaucratic inefficiency of underlings or political bickering does not offer a complete picture of culpability. Rather it serves to mask the limitations and failings of political decisions taken by higher levels of government. Notable in this regard is the fact that housing delivery policies contain a number of important limitations.

3.6.2 The Housing Budget

A major reason why housing delivery has been so slow is simply because the national budget does not allocate much money to housing delivery. Indeed, Warren Smit claims the low budget allocation to housing is “almost entirely responsible for the fact that delivery has been so slow”102. Between 1996 and 2004 for instance, the housing budget commanded between 2.2% (1996) and 1.4% (2004) of the national budget respectively, giving South Africa one of the lowest housing budgets for any ‘developing’ country in the world (Smit 2004; MacKay 1999). According to DAG (2004: 10-11)

The Housing White Paper (1994) gave the National Housing Goal as increasing the housing budget to 5% of total government expenditure, in order to be able to achieve a delivery rate of 350 000 houses a year (which was estimated to be necessary to reduce the housing backlog within a reasonable period of time). In 1997/1998 a peak of almost 300 000 houses was delivered, followed by almost 250 000 houses in the following year. Since then, however, the delivery rate has averaged just under 180 000 housing units per year. The net result has been growing informal settlements and growing numbers of inadequately housed people, especially in metropolitan areas.

Despite admissions by the current national Minister of Housing, Lindiwe Sisulu, that the housing budget is a problem, in the latest South African budget, housing was again allocated “about 1.4% of the national budget”103 – still too little to reduce the housing backlog.

Turok (2001) has noted that in some senses the inefficient bureaucratic functioning of local municipalities should not be seen as isolated from the issue of the budget. This is because, as Turok claims, local authorities have been discouraged from pursuing large-scale mass delivery by the fact that the costs of housing delivery sometimes

102 Interview with Warren Smit, 10 August 2006, Observatory
103 Personal communication, Warren Smit, 26 March 2007
exceed the allocation of money to the department. Commenting on the case of Cape Town, Turok (2001: 2369) explains:

The local authorities... have reservations about the sustainability of the [housing delivery] scheme. They have to pay for much of the essential planning, management and maintenance costs of the new neighbourhoods, and for the service charges of people who cannot afford to pay or default. Yet, they receive no funding from the government for either obligation. This provides a considerable disincentive to large-scale participation in the scheme and helps to explain the delay in some cases.

The budget allocation can therefore, to some degree, provide a political economic context for the inefficiency of local authorities in delivery.

The budget has also proved to be a disincentive for attracting private developers to assist in the delivery of houses. Smit (2004) has noted that private developers have generally found that there is too little profit in low-cost housing to make it worth their involvement\(^{104}\). This has been compounded by the fact that, until recently, the profits of developers and the costs of the land on which housing is built have had to come out of the same subsidy. As a result, developers have either not been readily involved in delivery (adding to the slow pace of delivery), or they have sought to increase their profit margins by reducing their expenses. The consequences of participation have therefore not produced houses of the sort advocated by the Housing Act of 1997, and houses that have been built have been tiny (17-31m\(^2\)) and made of poor quality materials (Baumann 1998; Thurman 1999).

Since the budget allocation to housing is too little, and the value of the land that is purchased for housing is determined by market forces, Turok (2001) has suggested that when private developers have been involved in low-income housing development, they are encouraged to build on peripheral land where land prices are cheaper. Turok explains that the “poor are excluded from the prosperous city core and

\(^{104}\) Ted Baumann (1999) has noted that the need for profit for private developers involves a fundamental contradiction about housing delivery: "Developers seek profit. The [poor] seek houses. One group is typically well-off and white; the other dirt-poor and black. Yet in many ways, contemporary housing debates suggest that the interests of profit seeking capitalists can not only be reconciled with those of the... poor, they are identical. People get ‘houses’; the construction and finance industries are enabled to ‘create wealth and jobs’. The developer driven subsidy system may divert up to 50% and more of funds to non-material costs (fees and profits, etc), but in the long run this is seen as ‘good for South Africa’. Undermine the banks, the builders, and the materials suppliers (or force them to submit themselves to bothersome ideologically-inspired community consultation) and you hurt the homeless".
suburbs through the operation of the land market. The general implication is that income, social class and market forces have replaced race and state control as the forces directing urban development” (Turok 2001: 2362).

This then has been one of the reasons why the RDP houses built in Cape Town have tended to be developed in peripheral areas of Cape Town, in places such as Delft and Philippi (the other has simply been a bias on the part of developers towards the relative simplicity of undertaking greenfields developments as opposed to in situ upgrades) (Thurman 1999; Turok and Watson 2001).

Despite all these faults with the delivery process, Smit claims that all things being equal (if local departments of housing operated with complete efficiency and all bureaucratic problems were removed), the current size of the housing budget is still vastly unsuited to overcome the backlog\(^{105}\). According to Smit, the most recent housing budget for the Western Cape aims at creating 16 000 houses in the province over the next year. Considering that the annual demand for housing in Cape Town alone grows by 25 000 people a year, the current rate of delivery is completely unsuited to overcoming the crisis in the backlog of houses in Cape Town\(^{106}\).

Yet why is there a low budget allocation given to housing delivery? In previous years, the government has asserted that there has not been enough money in state coffers to finance housing delivery (Koelble 2004). More recently however, the government has recorded a financial surplus in the treasury (Department of Finance 2007). Yet still the budget allocation to housing remains below the 5% allocation that DAG (2004) believes is necessary to achieve the constitutional goal of meeting the citizenry’s right to housing. In the context of a budgetary surplus therefore, the budget allocation can no longer claim to be determined by the fact that there is actually too little money in the national treasury. Instead, it is important to perceive that the actions of the state are rooted in another factor: the ideological bias of believing in the tenets of

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\(^{105}\) Personal communication, Warren Smit, 26 March 2007

\(^{106}\) Smit suggests that the Cape Town city itself needs at least 45 000 houses delivered a year if the backlog is to be reduced in time by 2014 – the date which South Africa’s president, Thabo Mbeki, has set for the eradication of all shacks in South Africa (Personal communication, Warren Smit, 26 March 2007)
development via the free market. A component of such a belief is that the state should strive to achieve fiscal discipline in its budget by reducing social spending on issues such as housing delivery.

The desire to strive for fiscal austerity is one that finds its origins in the adoption by the ANC of the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) development framework in 1996 (Department of Finance 1996; Bond 2004; Desai 2003; Koelble 2004; Marais 1998; Taylor and Williams 2000). The move from the RDP to GEAR as the guiding principal of South African development policies came after a prolonged campaign by local and international capital to convince the South African public in general, and the ANC in particular, that adopting a ‘structurally adjusted’, liberalised economy was the only viable development strategy (Bond 2004; Desai 2003; Koelble 2004; Marais 1998; Taylor and Williams 2000). Under this pressure, and in the context of the apparent failure of communism in the late 1980s, and the threat by foreign investors to pull out of South Africa in early 1996, the ANC eventually implemented GEAR.

Briefly, GEAR directs the government to create an ‘enabling environment’ which is favourable to the growth of capital. By reducing the impediments to profit-making and ‘free-trade’ (i.e. by creating conditions which are attractive to capital), it is assumed that investment (both local and foreign) in the country shall grow, and jobs shall be created (Bond 2004; Desai 2003; Koelble 2004; Marais 1998; Taylor and Williams 2000). In terms of housing, it is assumed that the incomes earned from the jobs created will allow individuals to purchase their own houses via the market (Pugh 1994).

However, there are tensions in South Africa’s development principles, represented by the divergent development policies of the RDP (state-led) and GEAR (free-market), and consequently the adoption of GEAR has not meant the wholesale abandonment of state involvement in housing delivery. Instead, the government uses GEAR only to justify reducing the housing budget (but not eliminating it all together), hoping that

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107 Even when there was a budget deficit, it is arguable as to whether there was actually too little money in South Africa to fund the construction of housing. Must governments ‘balance their books’? Should the wealth hoarded by private institutions and people be kept apart from issues of public concern, such as the lack of housing?
the market shall instead play a role in enabling people to buy their own houses (Pugh 1994).

The fallacious assumptions of neo-liberalism have been well documented (Bond 2002; Desai 2001; Visser 2004), and when GEAR was adopted in 1996, one South African economist predicted that the development objectives of a new South Africa were unfeasible under GEAR, because the policy was "analytically flawed, empirically unsupportable, historically unsuited for the country and... will lead to disappointment and failures in achieving RDP objectives of fundamentally transforming the inherited patterns of inequality" (Adelzadeh, cited in Visser 2004:12). An analysis of income in Langa demonstrates the fallacy of assuming that a free-market development strategy will create an 'enabling environment' that in turn will provide (jobs and) houses.

### 3.7 Income poverty in Post-Apartheid Langa

Adelzadeh's prediction about the impact of GEAR on South Africa noted above has proved astute, and poverty and inequality have deepened in South Africa since GEAR was adopted. According to Andries Du Toit (2005), despite an increase in economic growth, gross national income per capita decreased in South Africa between 1998 and 2002. There has also been a loss of over one million jobs since 1996 (Bond 2004; Desai 2003; Koelble 2004; Marais 1998; Taylor and Williams 2000). However Du Toit (2005, quoting Seekings 2003; Seekings, Nattrass & Leibbrandt 2003) concedes that there has been net job growth over the last twelve years, and that 1.4 to 2 million jobs have been created since the beginning of the 'new' South Africa. Yet where these new jobs have gone to working-class people, they have mostly been in the form of casual jobs, are very poorly paid and have no job security (Bezuidenhout 2003; Pieterse 2002).

Within Langa, the effects of unemployment and underemployment (casual work) are very apparent. For example, according to (albeit dated data from) Census 2001, in that year only 36% of the total population of Langa was employed. The rest of the population in Langa was unemployed and consequently the vast majority of people in
Langa were dependent upon a minority of wage earners (Statistics South Africa 2001). Yet where an income was earned, it was often very little, and according to Census 2001, 72% of the total households in Langa survived off less than R1 600 a month in 2001 (Statistics South Africa, 2001). In 2001, the largest proportion of households in Langa (4042, or 26%) earned no income at all.

The data from Census 2001 can be supplemented, to some degree, by data generated from my research in Langa in 2006. Among the 12 respondents of working-age (the thirteenth respondent, Mr Ndlovu, was retired) interviewed during fieldwork, six (50%) were unemployed. Only two of their number made a living off informal work (as an informal mechanic and a vegetable stall owner). The other four respondents claimed that they had been actively seeking employment but had not been able to find any at the time of research. Of the six respondents who were employed, all were the sole wage-earners in their families. Yet of these six, only two respondents were permanent employees at the companies at which they worked. Their salaries were R4500 and R4000 a month respectively. Considering that they had both been in their current employment for over 18 years, it is evident that among the respondents surveyed in this research at least, none had received formal jobs since 1994.

The other four wage-earning respondents were employed on a casual basis. They earned substantially less than the respondents employed permanently: only one earned R2300 a month; the others earned between R1600 and R600 a month, placing them in the category of what De Swardt (2004) calls “the chronic working poor”. To indicate the trend of casualisation further, ten of the thirteen total respondents had, during the last 5 years, been employed casually - though six had since lost their jobs. With such large numbers of people unemployed or earning too little money to support

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108 The categories of unemployed peoples is recorded as follows: people having given up looking for work altogether (39%); scholars (15%); pensioners (2%); housewives (3%); people with disabilities who could not work (2%); seasonal workers (1%); people who chose not to work (2%) (Statistics South Africa 2001).
109 88% survived off less than R3200 a month (Statistics South Africa 2001)
110 Due to the fact that the research conducted in Langa did not involve a comprehensive survey of Langa, it is not possible to say whether or not the 42% unemployment among respondents represents a general trend of growing unemployment among residents of Langa - or whether the sample is simply unrepresentative of the total population.
themselves, household incomes in Langa are desperately low, and the average per capita income among the households interviewed was only R330 per month\textsuperscript{111}.

Considering the environment of income poverty in Langa, housing delivery strategies that rely heavily on market mechanisms can be seen to have been short-sighted. Ironically, housing delivery via market means, at least until 2001, appears to have contributed the largest proportion of newly constructed, individually owned houses delivered in Langa since 1994 (Statistics South Africa 2001)\textsuperscript{112}. Yet this appears to have benefited only 4% of households in Langa (assuming that those who moved into the 633 new houses which the Census records between 1996 and 2001 were in fact local Langa residents to begin with, and not originally residents from surrounding townships)\textsuperscript{113}. Such a figure corresponds well with the suggestion from Census 2001 that less than 5\% of the total households in Langa earned above R7 500; until recently the required monthly income to ensure that one could take a loan from a bank\textsuperscript{114}. Furthermore, 88\% of residents in Langa earned less than R3 400 a month, placing them well out of range of bank loans and making them dependent upon government-led housing delivery. Consequently, the market-led approach to housing delivery can be seen to be failing because it is relies on a level of capital investment that most residents of Langa have been unable to afford.

3.8 Conclusion

As houses have not been forthcoming in Langa, and residents still find themselves living in poverty, it is perhaps not surprising that residents of Langa have found themselves trying to understand the reasons for their deprivation in a context in which they have been promised that life would be better. This chapter has suggested that the reasons why change (both in terms of housing and income) has not been forthcoming have been largely a result of bureaucratic complications, politicking and, most importantly, policy decisions that place too much emphasis on the capitalist free

\textsuperscript{111} If one were to use the fairly arbitrary poverty datum line used by the UN of $1 or $2 dollars a day, then the respondents would generally be seen to fall in between these data.
\textsuperscript{112} The Hostels-to-Homes units are rental units and the cottage transfers are not technically 'new' houses.
\textsuperscript{113} I have arrived at 4\% because there were 15 543 households in Langa in 2001 and 620 new houses built between
\textsuperscript{114} Interview with Councillor Neil Ross, 17 June 2006, Constantia
market as a central agent in the process of delivery. While many respondents identified the government as responsible for some of these shortcomings (but not budgetary ones), it was nevertheless still common for ‘borners’ to identify ‘migrants’ as a primary source of their woes. “They come and take our jobs and our houses” was a refrain mentioned by Lindikhaya, Elizabeth, Mncedisi and repeated by Mrs Motaung. In one extreme example of this competition, Lindikhaya revealed to me that his younger brother, who “is a tsotsi” (a gangster), always mugs the people of Joe Slovo in particular “because they have come to take our houses and jobs. They make us poor, so he takes their things”. The next chapter therefore concludes the thesis by revisiting the insights made throughout the thesis in order to discuss the limitations of identifying ‘migrants’ as the other.

115 Interview with Elizabeth, 15 August 2006, Langa; Interview with Lindikhaya, 23 September 2006, Langa; Interview with Mrs Motaung, 10 September 2006, Langa
CHAPTER FOUR
TOWARDS A CONCLUSION: ‘BORNERS’, ‘MIGRANTS’
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIVISION

There was a wall. It did not look important. It was built of uncut rocks
roughly mortared. An adult could look right over it, and even a child could
climb it. Where it crossed the roadway instead of having a gate it degenerated
into mere geometry, a line, an idea of a boundary. But the idea was real. It
was important. For seven generations there had been nothing in the world
more important than the wall.

Like all walls it was ambiguous, two-faced. What was inside it and what was
outside it depended on which side of it you were on

Ursula K. Le Guin 1975: 1

The quotation above by Ursula Le Guin is drawn from a novel that is, amongst other
things, about divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Considering that the present
discussion about ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ is essentially a scenario of claims about ‘us’
and ‘them’, the quotation seems a useful point with which to embark on a conclusion
of this thesis, for it suggests three things that are relevant to a study of ‘borners’ and
‘migrants’ in Langa.

The first suggestion is that the divisions may not always “look important” to all
residents of Langa; they do not always, in all circumstances, permeate and define all
social interactions. Indeed, while some respondents certainly did articulate a sense of
separation between themselves and ‘the other’, others pointed out that “we share the
same soccer fields, the same cricket pitches”\textsuperscript{116}.

One reason why the categories are not all-pervasive is because there is fluidity
between them, and many of those who claim to distinguish themselves from
‘migrants’ by being ‘borners’ in fact have kin who are ‘the other’. In many instances,
‘borners’ can have one or more parents who were born in the Eastern Cape (for
example, Elizabeth and Monica)\textsuperscript{117}. In other instances ‘borners’ are married to people

\textsuperscript{116} Interview with Mncedisi, 07 September 2006, Langa
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with Elizabeth, 15 August 2006, Langa; Interview with Monica, 02 September 2006,
Langa
born outside the city (for example Elizabeth and Mrs Motaung). Some ‘borners’ in
fact still travel every year to visit relatives in the Eastern Cape. Others have spent a
number of years living in the Eastern Cape as children (for example Monica). Consequently there are links between people of each category which suggest unity
and not separation.

But there are also other inconsistencies in mobilizing the categories as dichotomised
entities, and it has been seen in this thesis that labelling someone a ‘migrant’ just
because they were born elsewhere obfuscates the fact that many migrants have been in
the city for many years. It may be, and it was certainly found during research, that
some ‘migrants’ have in fact been waiting longer than some ‘borners’ for houses in
Cape Town. In this regard it is instructive that Nontobeko (a ‘migrant’) has waited for
housing for nearly twenty years while Lindikhaya (a ‘borner’) has waited only three.
Similarly, equating ‘migrants’ with shack-dwellers and ‘borners’ with
backyarders – and concluding that ‘backyarders’ have been waiting for housing longer
than shack dwellers - encounters the same problem of fluidity. Indeed the lack of
housing options in Cape Town often compels both ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ to move
between a number of different housing types in their lives. People born in Cape Town
can live in formal houses, backyards, shack settlements and hostels – as can people
who migrate into the city.

What emerges from the above then is that the use of the categories ‘borners’ and
‘migrants’ as means to articulate entitlement to housing, make claims based on
hypostatised identities. What is important in the representation of the categories
therefore is not that they necessarily embody an incontestable reality, but rather that
they highlight the circumstances in which such categories are used.

The second application of Le Guin’s (1975) quotation to the subject of ‘borners’ and
‘migrants’ is in the realm of history. Although it would be wrong to suggest that the
‘idea’ of division among ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ has been as important as Le Guin’s

118 Interview with Elizabeth, 15 August 2006, Langa; Interview with Mrs Motaung, 10 September
2006, Langa
119 Interview with Monica, 02 September 2006, Langa
120 Interview with Lindikhaya, 23 September 2006, Langa; Interview with Nontobeko, 24 September
2006, Langa

82
'wall', it is noteworthy that like her 'wall', the division between 'borners' and 'migrants' has had an important history.

It has been seen in Chapter Two that the circumstances out of which the divisions emerged were largely defined by the policies of influx control and the attempts to secure labour for capital while simultaneously controlling the movement of black people into the urban areas (Posel 1984; Posel 1986). To create a permanent, available black urban proletariat, some black people were legally defined as legitimate, permanent urban dwellers. The fluctuating demands for labour by capital were supposed to be met by illegitimate, temporary urban visitors. While influx control therefore defined the broad context against which categories of legitimate and illegitimate urban insiders and outsiders derived meaning, as apartheid progressed and attempts were made to reduce the numbers of legitimate urban dwellers, those categorised as Section 10 (1) (a) qualifiers – or 'borners' – eventually emerged as the only legitimate category of permanent black urban dwellers in the Western Cape (Makosana 1988). The result of policies that discriminated between categories of urban Africans was to reify those categories 'on the ground'. One way was by qualifying 'borners' to receive family housing: a rarely bestowed marker of urban permanence. The result was to aid social differentiation among black people in Cape Town and Ramphele (1993) has noted how, in the past, such policies led to 'townspeople' feeling that they were more entitled to housing than 'migrants'. This belief appears to have continued into the current era.

It is useful in the present to perceive that part of the substance of the current articulations about entitlement to housing is motivated by a discursive legacy created under apartheid. Certainly such a legacy seems to lie behind the comments by some respondents, that "The government must give houses to 'borners'. We were born here. We can't go someone else"\(^{121}\), or that "people from Cape Town must get houses first"\(^{122}\). Such statements are the legacy of the discourse which suggests that only some black people in Cape Town are legitimate residents of the city and therefore have legitimate right to local resources. But it is important that the analysis of the

\(^{121}\text{Interview with Elizabeth, 15 August 2006, Langa}\)
\(^{122}\text{Interview with Mrs Motaung, 10 September 2006, Langa}\)
current articulations does not stop there, for their resurgence in the present period is more complex.

At one level, as has been seen in Chapter Three, the housing shortage in Cape Town has continued and, in fact, has grown since 1994. Of the reasons for the growth of the shortage, one at least appears most evident to ‘borners’: The high rates of in-migration to Cape Town over the last thirteen years. The results are physically manifested all over the city in the growing informal shack settlements. In the context of the extreme scarcity of houses, and the obvious influx of people to the city, the re-mobilisation of the categories ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ by ‘homers’ represents an attempt to establish themselves as a preferred and distinguishable minority from the many others requiring housing in the city.

Yet at another level, the re-emergence of the categories has also been influenced in great part by the biases of the practice of housing delivery in Cape Town. In the previous chapter it has been seen repeatedly how residents of Langa, particularly backyard shack dwellers, have been disadvantaged by the practice of allocating housing to informal settlement dwellers. Does this therefore necessarily mean that ‘borners’ have been disadvantaged? It is possible. However considering the fact that many ‘migrants’ living in Joe Slovo informal settlement, for example, have been in Cape Town for as long as 25 years, it is not necessarily the case that favouring informal settlements, or ‘migrants’ for that case, equates to disadvantaging ‘borners’. Furthermore due to the fluidity between housing types, it is both likely that ‘borners’ who have lived in informal settlements have received houses, and that longstanding ‘migrants’ who have lived in backyards have been overlooked. Moreover in the context of slow and poor delivery, the idea of one group being ‘privileged’ over another may itself be a moot point.

What might a more progressive housing policy look like? The Development Action Group (2004) suggests that it would be one in which the housing budget was trebled. This is obviously a desirable goal. However addressing the question of housing in Langa (indeed throughout South Africa) by such means would constitute only a piecemeal remedy to the structural inequalities of capitalism. A sufficient quantity of housing might be developed, but this would not likely be a solution to the question of
poverty in South Africa. Rather it would be remediation of a symptom and Richard Peet (1975) suggests that those new houses that were allocated to the poor would still remain deprived relative to those that belonged to the capitalist class.

In envisioning a future for housing delivery, the words of Lakshman Yapa are instructive. He notes that “poverty is not experienced by society at large, but by particular social groups; it is a socially specific condition” (Yapa 1996: 714). In the task of disentangling and understanding the variety of social relationships that cause poverty (and the housing shortage), it is useful to heed the words of anthropologist Maia Green. Green (undated, 38) councils that

Poverty is... the outcome of social inequalities that must be confronted. Only an emphasis on how the rich and powerful came to have wealth and power can fully bring to light how this process works. The poor are poor not because of ‘poverty’, but are poor because of other people.

Green’s advice is sage and pertinent. It unwittingly invokes the words of Frederick Engels (2000 [1873]: 9) who, commenting on the ‘housing question’ in Germany during the 1800s, noted that “it is not the solution of the housing question which simultaneously solves the social question, but only by the solution of the social question, that is, by the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, is the solution of the housing question made possible”.

It is this from last point then, the issue of class, that the quotation by Le Guin (1975) is recalled for a third time, for in its conclusion the quotation suggests that there are always two ways of perceiving divisions. In Langa, the one is that division exists between the people of Langa, that ‘borners’ and ‘migrants’ are opposed to one another. This is the division to which black urban residents of Langa (and Cape Town) are encouraged to gravitate because of the discursive legacies of the past and the current practices of housing delivery. Yet the other way of perceiving division is the one advocated by Yapa (1996), Green (undated) and Engels (2000 [1973]). Such a perception requires that class be adopted as the lens though which the ‘wall’ is perceived. In this light, the inadequate housing for the poor in South Africa is but one manifestation of a greater inequality, the inequality of class
It has been outlined in Chapter's One and Two that poverty was produced in South Africa as a consequence of the expansion of capital. As shown in Chapter Three, in the 'new' South Africa, the attempts to encourage the growth of capital are again leading to greater impoverishment. If South Africa is to build a new and more effective policy for housing delivery in South Africa, it needs to be one that confronts the issues of class.

In such a light, the interpretations of the housing shortage which suggest that 'migrants' are responsible for either producing, or usurping the tiny offerings forthcoming in Langa, misjudge the reasons for the lack of housing and causes of the continuation of poverty. The result is that working class communities divide internally and struggle against one another. Those waiting for houses pit themselves against others who are also without adequate housing, and the more direct causes of their housing woes, the present housing development strategy and the current direction of the macro-economy, essentially remain unchallenged (APF 2005; Legassick 2005). By identifying one of the main reasons for their suffering as lying with 'migrants', and by looking within the working class for the 'other', 'borners' have only found people who, like themselves, are suffering.
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Appendix A: List of key respondents

Interviews:

Residents of Langa

Agnes 14 August 2006, Langa
Andile 22 August 2006, Langa
Elizabeth 15 August 2006, Langa
Joseph 20 September 2006, Langa
Lindikhaya 23 September 2006, Langa
Mncedisi 07 September 2006, Langa
Mondi 17 August 2006, Langa
Monica 02 September 2006, Langa
Mr Ndlovu 05 September 2006, Langa
Mrs Motaung 10 September 2006, Langa
Mr Tindleni 29 August 2006, Langa
04 September 2006, Langa
Nontobeko 24 September 2006, Langa
Sindiswa 17 August 2006, Langa
Thabiso 20 August 2006, Langa

Officials/ Researchers

Mr Dyiki, Local Department of Housing 16 February 2007, City Council offices
Mrs Cloete, Local Department of Housing 12 August 2006, Department of Housing, Bree Street
Mr van Blerk, Local Department of Housing 13 October 2006, Langa
Mr Craig Haskins, City Council Knowledge Management and Strategic Information offices 03 June 2006, City Council
Mr Warren Smit, Development Action Group 10 August 2006, Observatory
Station Commander of Langa Police Station 08 September 2006, Langa
Councillor Theodora Mthiya 18 June 2006, Langa
Councillor Xolile Gophe 18 July 2006, Langa
Councillor Neil Ross 17 June 2006, Constantia
Mr 'Zama' Sogayise, Provincial Department of Housing 20 June 2006, Provincial Department of Housing, Bree Street

Correspondences

Mr Craig Haskins, Cape Town City Council, Department of Knowledge Management and Strategic Information 23 June 2006
Mrs Nireen Naidoo, Statistics South Africa 03 March 2007
Prof. Marie Hutchzermeyer 02 June 2006
Prof. Martin Legassick 01 July 2006
Mr Warren Smit, Development Action Group 26 March 2007
28 March 2007
Appendix B: Copy of Backyard Dweller protest memorandum

Backyards Dwellers

Memorandum

The Backyards Dwellers in Guguletu, Nyanga and Langa have, in the past years taken to the streets their anger as the ANC government, Cape Town City Council and the Housing Ministry in the Western Cape have shown no respect of people's demands. It is clear that Backyards Dwellers in these three old townships have been sidelined from housing development in the past 10 years. The ANC government consistently sidelined backyards precisely because Backyards Dwellers have been honest to the government call that Backyards should stay in their Backyards until further notice but the government has done the opposite of what they promised Backyards, by giving the squatter camps the priority in housing Development and allocation until now. A living is that the vacant land in Lansdowne Road was supposed to be full of houses that were supposed to belong to Guguletu Backyards as a Donation a certain Company from overseas. What has happened is that, from 1994 till now only one that has been built in that land and we don't know what happened to the rest of the houses that were supposed to be built in the land

In a number of attempts, Backyards have tried to occupy the same land having seen that the land is only occupied by one house and it continues to remain vacant. The response from the Municipality and the government was to bulldoze and destroy the shacks of those who occupied the vacant land. For the Backyards Dwellers it was shocking to see that when the squatter camp people occupy any vacant land, nothing the Government and IKAPA municipality has done. This trend is still continuing as we can see that nothing is being done when other areas occupy vacant land. It is strange that when Backyards occupy vacant land they are brutally removed by the police and the Municipality Law enforcement. Even the fact that when the Dwellers shacks get burnt down nothing is being done, but when squatters shacks burn down they are given emergency attention with ease.

This is a clear signal that the government is still applying the policy of Divide and Rule in this new Era of Democracy, a system that was used by the Apartheid Regime.

The recent emerging struggles by Backyards Dwellers is a clear signal that the government was not fair enough in providing housing. The concentration of the government on the housing question was mostly on the squatter camp areas as one can see the vast majority of RDP houses are in the squatter camp areas. The Western Cape MEC for housing, Mr Richard Dyantyi has, in one meeting held in Guguletu, acknowledged that the Housing ministry focused mainly on squatter camps, which he agreed that the housing department has been one sided in dealing with issue of housing. However, in his acknowledgement, he does say how are they going to bridge the gap they opened up and what is the plan, in the light of the present N2 Gateway project plan.
It is not clear whether Backyarders will be part of the N2 Gateway project plan and if they are considering Backyards, what is the Criteria for allocating houses in the N2 Gateway.

As Backyards Dwellers we are not clear whether people who do not work do qualify in the N2 Gateway or not. Moreover, if Backyarders don't qualify to get houses in the N2 Gateway houses, what is the plan for Backyards Dwellers. As Backyards Dwellers, we condemn the both the National, Provincial and Local governments in its Zig-zag pattern in dealing with Backyard Dwellers housing.

**We therefore Demand:**

1. Better and decent houses for all.
2. That the Government must accommodate the jobless people in the housing plan.
3. Land next to Fezeka Municipality (Erf 8448) to be waiting Land for Guguletu Dwellers
4. That the Government come with a proper Housing Development for Guguletu, Nyanga and Langa.
5. That any Housing Development plan must involve Communities concerned.
6. The Provincial government must publicize the Waiting List of N2 Gateway and Criteria they use in allocating houses with immediate effect.
7. That the Extend Public Works Program must continue with full participation of residents in decision-making
8. Government should stop harassing and arresting our community activists when they express their views and take action for their rights.
9. There must be a transparent allocation of houses.

We demand that the government must respond positively in less than 14 days. Should the Government not respond within the time, we shall embark on a mass action for our rights which we fought for during apartheid era.

Appendix C: Respondents interviewed for in-depth interviews

Of the thirteen residents of Langa with whom in-depth interviews were conducted, four were people born in Langa, two were people born in Gugulethu who had moved to Langa, and seven were people born in the Eastern Cape. I have used the names that respondents supplied, which is why some are known by their first names and some by their surnames. Their names are listed below, and have been categorised depending on where they were born:

Table 1: Respondents Interviewed for Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Born in Langa</th>
<th>Born Elsewhere in Cape Town</th>
<th>Born Elsewhere in South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Motaung</td>
<td>Elizabeth</td>
<td>Cynthia *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mncedisi</td>
<td>Monica</td>
<td>Agnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindikhaya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thabiso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph *</td>
<td></td>
<td>Andile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nontobeko *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mondi *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Ndlovu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Names have been changed, as requested by respondents
Appendix D: University of Cape Town Research: Housing and Migration

Guide Questions

Basic details

1. What is your name?
2. How old are you?

Personal migration/housing info

3. Where were you born?
4. How long have you been in Cape Town?
5. How long have you lived in (this Area)?
6. Why do you live in (this Area) particularly? [If migrants, how do they decide where to come and live when they come to CT?]
7. Is this the only place in Cape Town where you have lived?
   • If no, where else in Cape Town have you lived?
   • Do you always stay at this house everyday of the week?
8. How many people stay in your house at the moment?
9. [If migrant] Why did you come to Cape Town?
10. [If migrant] Where did you come from immediately before coming to Cape Town?
11. How many other places in South Africa have you lived?
   • Where?
   • When?
   • Why?
12. If you could choose to live anywhere in South Africa now, where would you most like to live?
   • Why would you live there?
   • Why can’t you live there now?
13. If the government gave you land to farm in the rural areas, would you decide to live there rather than here in the city? Why? Why not?
14. Where do you want to live when you are old? Why?
15. Where do you think of when you think of the word ‘home’?
   • Where would you like it to be?
   • Why?
16. How would you describe your ‘home’? What makes a place a ‘home’?

Government and housing

17. Have you applied for a formal house? If so, when? If not, why not?
18. Have you ever heard of the government’s waiting list? What do you know about it?
19. What do you think about the way the government is giving people houses?
20. Why do you think that you have not got a house yet?
21. Do you think that you will get a house?
22. How do you think the government chooses the people who get the houses in the Langa?
23. Why do you think they chose/did not choose you?
24. Do you think some people should get houses before other people?
   • Who?
   • Why
   • (Depending on their answer about where they want to live when they are old, ask if they think people who want to settle eventually in the rural areas should get houses in the city)
25. How do you think the government should decide on who gets houses?

Urban-rural links

26. Do you have relatives in the Eastern Cape? Where?
27. How often do you visit them?
28. Is it important to you to visit your family in the Eastern Cape? Why?
29. How often do you go to the Eastern Cape?
   • Why do you go there?

Incomes

30. Do you have an income/job?
   • If so, what kind of income/job?
31. How long have you had your source of income/job?
32. How many different jobs have you had?
   • Were they all in Cape Town? If not, where else have you worked?
   • For how long at each place?
33. How did you get this job?
34. How many people do you support on your income?
   • Who are they?
   • Where do they all live?
35. How many people in your house have an income?
   • Job?
   • Grants?

Borners vs. Migrants

36. How would you describe the relationship between people in this community?
37. What is the relationship between borners and migrants in this area?
38. Do you think this relationship has changed at all in the time that you have lived here? If so, why?
39. How would you describe yourself, as a bomer, or as a migrant? Why?
40. What do you think about ‘the other’ group? (If ‘City’ then ‘migrant’/ if ‘migrant’ then ‘city’

107