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**PHILODEMUS *ON RHETORIC* BOOKS 1 AND 2:  
TRANSLATION AND EXEGETICAL ESSAYS**

by

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## ABSTRACT

The Epicureans were notorious in antiquity for denigrating most forms of civic participation and for rejecting those cultural activities, such as poetry, music, and rhetoric, which are broadly labelled *paideia*. In this, as in all else, they ostensibly took their cue from Epicurus and the other original Founders of the School. In the light of this, Philodemus, who lived and worked in Italy in the first century B.C., presents an interesting case, since a large portion of his work is occupied with investigations into these subjects and with demonstrating how an orthodox Epicurean is to approach them.

This thesis attempts to elucidate Philodemus' approach to one aspect of *paideia*, that of rhetoric as treated in the first two books of his *On Rhetoric*, and to account for this approach within the broader tradition of Epicurean thinking on this discipline. As a preliminary to the investigation of this topic a complete English translation is provided of the most recent edition of the text (Longo Auricchio [1977]). The subsequent study takes the form of a series of three essays which seek to clarify Philodemus' conception of the problem and, through a close reading, to provide an exegetical commentary on the most important features of Philodemus' approach, especially the way he manages citations from the works of the Founders of Epicureanism in support of his own views. Careful analysis of Philodemus' choice and explication of citations from the works of the Founders indicates that, though his interpretation might stretch the evidence, it is not for that reason unorthodox. The final essay investigates the basis for Philodemus' rejection of rhetoric as an art of persuasion and locates it firmly within orthodox Epicurean doctrines on the physics of sound and the mechanics of hearing in human beings.

In memory of Margaret Mezzabotta: teacher, colleague, and friend.

University of Cape Town

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A kind letter from the late Don Fowler helped me to get started on this project and alerted me to some of the difficulties which I was likely to face. But he was the first of many who either intentionally, or inadvertently, assisted me. I should therefore like to express my thanks to Prof. Longo Auricchio, for generously supplying me with a copy of her edition of Philodemus *On Rhetoric* at the outset (it was not available in my university library), to Prof. Gigante and the delegates at the 1993 conference "Epicureismo greco e romano" in Naples, Prof. Travaglione and her staff at the Officina in the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples for their hospitality and assistance, Prof. Gaines and Prof. Milanese for their helpful conversations and correspondence, Prof. Blank for allowing me access and permission to reproduce in the thesis drafts of some of the passages from the edition of *On Rhetoric* books 1 and 2 which he is preparing for publication, my departmental colleagues at the University of Cape Town, especially Assoc. Prof. David Wardle for help with proofing and printing, Mrs. Beamish and her highly efficient staff in the Inter-library Loans Department at UCT, my wife Daniela for her continual efforts to deceive me into believing that I *could* finish the thesis and my son Christian for restraint quite uncharacteristic of a toddler.

Finally, I should reserve most of my gratitude for my supervisor, Prof. Richard Whitaker, whose tireless patience and paedagogic *parrhesia* were directly responsible for the completion of this thesis.

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## PREFACE

The format of this doctoral thesis is perhaps a little unusual and therefore might require some explanation. It seemed to me that a full English translation of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* would be a worthwhile enterprise, particularly since Hubbell's 1920 translation was based on Sudhaus' text (which is already obsolete for certain sections of the work). However, since new editions of certain books of the treatise are still being prepared, and since Longo Auricchio has already produced a good text of the first two books of the work, I decided to restrict my translation and exegesis to those books. Given the lacunose nature of this text and uncertainties as to the total extent and plan of the *On Rhetoric*, I have avoided setting forth a continuous argument but have opted instead for a looser sequence of exegetical essays. The first chapter is devoted to an introduction to Epicurean attitudes and approaches to the issues implicit in *paideia*, art, and rhetoric and seeks to contextualise Philodemus' position within this tradition. The second chapter contains my translation of Longo Auricchio's edition (1977) of books 1 and 2 of *On Rhetoric*. I shall have to assume that any reader of this thesis has access to Longo Auricchio's edition. I have sometimes adopted changes to the text which Longo Auricchio made in subsequent publications and those which have emerged from Blank's published and unpublished work on these books. Prof. Blank has kindly allowed me access to drafts of his new text for columns II to VII of *PHerc.* 1427 and for columns II to IV of *PHerc.* 1674. Then there are three essays (chapters 3 to 5) which constitute an exegetical commentary on the text and generally follow the sequence of topics discovered in Philodemus: (i) a critical survey of arguments (chapter 3), (ii) a clarification of the meaning of the term τέχνη (chapter 4), (iii) Epicurean textual authority for Philodemus' interpretation of the orthodox position on the issue (chapter 5). In the sixth and final chapter I offer one

explanation of why Philodemus might have thought that the rhetoricians are bound to fail in their quest for persuasion.

For abbreviated references to ancient authors and texts I have followed the third edition of *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford 1996) pp. xxix-liv; for scholarly works I have followed the conventions of *L'Année Philologique*. In Auricchio's text, the surname is abbreviated to Longo; Sudhans volume 1, volume 2, and the *Supplementum* of S. Sudhans (Leipzig 1892-1896).

Note on sigla for extracts from Longo Auricchio's edition.

I have reproduced Longo Auricchio's system of representing

[.] = lacuna of size which can be determined

[ ] = lacuna of size which cannot be determined

... = traces of letters

α = incomplete letter

[[α]] = letter deleted by the scribe

{α} = letter deleted by Longo Auricchio



<α> = letter inserted by Longo Auricchio

'α' = letter written above line or in the margin

[α] = Longo Auricchio's supplement

⌊α⌋ = letter which Longo Auricchio puts in  
by the *disegni*

[α] = letter recovered from *PHerc.* 1086, 408



outcome until the issue has been systematically researched at some length, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ὑπομνήσομεν. The use of the verb ἀποφαίνονται is also significant because it implies that the Founders' views are explicit,<sup>80</sup> and permits Philodemus to accuse the dissidents of incompetence in their reading of the canonical texts. Whether the views of the Founders are as clear as Philodemus claims they are is debatable.

The first two books of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* address the issue of whether rhetoric is an art or not. The question is a very old one and I shall reserve fuller discussion of it for chapters three and four. But a brief synopsis will be useful here. Philodemus attempts to demonstrate that rhetoric is indeed an art but only epideictic rhetoric or panegyric, what Philodemus prefers to call 'sophistic'. Philodemus proceeds as though he were restating the views of the Founders of the School and a substantial portion of his treatise is occupied with quotation, paraphrase, and exegesis of the texts of the founders which he claims discuss this question or shed light on it. In several respects Philodemus' work would appear to be directed at an Epicurean audience despite the evidence that it was dedicated to a Roman addressee<sup>81</sup> (hence the reference to parricides<sup>82</sup> at the end of the first book) and the author presents himself as a champion of orthodoxy. Philodemus also seems to offer some contributions of his own as a

<sup>80</sup> A helpful parallel for the force of this verb is provided by its occurrence in the second part of Philodemus' *De piet.* part 2 *PHerc.* 1428 Henrichs (1974) τοὺς δι' ἀληθείαν ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν (sc. θεοὶ) ἀποφαινομένους, "those who declare openly that the gods do not exist"; it commonly denotes the exposition of philosophical views and has overtones of clarity and frankness. See Obbink (1996), 304.

<sup>81</sup> The two need not be mutually exclusive, especially since Dorandi's (1996), 41-42 re-examination of the papyrus of Book 4 has led to the discovery that the text (*PHerc.* 1007 col. XLIIa.4 ff. = I, 222 Sudh.) does not read ὦ Γάιε παῖ (as previously thought) but ὦ Γάιε Πάνσα, an altogether more helpful identification since Caius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus was both sympathetic to Epicureanism (see Castner (1991), 80) and was interested in rhetoric (see testimonies assembled by Dorandi art. cit., 42 n. 8) The dedicatee, if that is what he is, is only mentioned in Book 4, where Philodemus moves to more concrete material; it is not impossible that only that part which is considered practically serviceable is so dedicated, and it is not unknown for a portion of a work to be dedicated to one party. Jensen held the view that Philodemus' works were intended for a Roman audience and Roman pupils, (see Gigante (1990), 20). The intended audience remains uncertain, but Blank's suggestion that the work looks as if it is attempting to dispel the confusions of students of Epicureanism is quite attractive.

<sup>82</sup> The metaphor in this instance may well be connected with the notion of the γνήσιος Ἐπικούρειος preserved by Diog. Laert. 10.26. But it is certainly more widespread as the Lucretius passage referred to above shows (*tu pater es, rerum inventor, tu patria nobis / suppeditas praecepta* 3.9-10).

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1. The Epicureans and *paideia*

The Epicureans were notorious in antiquity for denigrating or rejecting most forms of civic participation.<sup>1</sup> They also withheld approval for the cultural disciplines and activities which most other Greeks held in high esteem, both for their formative properties and for their potential to enrich the quality of a person's life. *Paideia* in its various manifestations — in particular, poetry, rhetoric, and music<sup>2</sup> — was not only an educational process or a means to validating citizenship through familiarity with accepted frames of historical, cultural and ideological reference, it could even be regarded as something which contributed to a person's right to define himself as Greek.<sup>3</sup>

Of course the Epicureans were certainly not the first philosophers to examine the received value of these activities critically. The history of Greek philosophy and education reveals that there invariably existed an uneasy relationship between forms of contemporary *paideia* and proponents of an alternative knowledge. The Presocratics scrutinised those practices and disciplines which they identified as responsible for the construction of a citizen's belief-system.<sup>4</sup> Plato was particularly merciless in his examination and evaluation of all components

<sup>1</sup> An attitude encapsulated in the injunction λάθε βιώσας fr. 551 Us.; cf. also ΚΔ VII, fr. 548, 554 Us., Cic. *Att.* 14.20.

<sup>2</sup> I am of course, defining *paideia* in very general terms, and do not wish to debate an issue raised by Russell (1989), 219 as to whether rhetoric was considered part of the cycle of general studies in the Hellenistic period. In any case, Philodemus certainly gives the impression that rhetoric could be viewed as part of one's general education, cf. esp. *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. XVI.2-11 (Longo, 75) where it is included among τῶν κοινῶν καὶ καλῶν εἶναι δοκούντων μαθημάτων.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Isocrates καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδείσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας, *Paneg.* 50. See also Wallace-Hadrill's succinct remarks on *paideia* as a cultural and social phenomenon (1988), 226.

<sup>4</sup> Philosophers initially focused on the erroneous beliefs transmitted in poetry, especially Homer and Hesiod. Some of the earliest and most unambiguous statements to this effect are to be found in the fragments of Xenophanes (fr. 10-16 DK). The practice persists in post-Socratic philosophy: criticism of traditional *paideia*, or even rejection of it, is also associated with Diogenes the founder of the Cynic movement (cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1043b 24 οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαιδευτοί, and Long (1986), 7). Since philosophers were seeking to compete with more traditional systems of education, or

of culture and education; his remedy was a blend of rejection and reform. Plato, like many before and after him, was preoccupied with the 'truth-value' of such activities and their ability to mislead the ordinary citizen in the search for knowledge and to impede his contemplation of the truth. Notwithstanding this, Plato was prepared to engage with *paideia* in an attempt to discover a solution to its less satisfactory aspects. The *Republic*, for instance, provides a useful illustration of his effort to select and preserve those elements of traditional *paideia* which were unobjectionable or even serviceable to his goals. Aristotle, on the other hand, stands out for his willingness to confront *paideia* on its own terms and to integrate the examination of it into the broader study of the human being and society.

The post-Aristotelian schools tended either to come to terms with *paideia* and accommodate it within their philosophical system (like the Stoics and Peripatetics) or to reject it (like the Epicureans and Skeptics). As far as we can tell, Epicurus' dismissal of *paideia* was founded on several basic considerations:

- it was not deemed a necessary prerequisite for the pursuit of philosophy
- there was a risk that the pursuit of *paideia* would become an end in itself and divert the attention of the aspirant philosopher from his quest for *ataraxia*
- it was the source of several misguided opinions which inevitably led the philosopher into error and thereby into discomfort
- it might draw the philosopher to participate in assorted cultural and civic activities (though participation in civic and private cult was not necessarily precluded, as Philodemus' *De pietate* indicates)<sup>5</sup>

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to disentangle their adherents from a web of misconception, their reservations on the content of *paideia* are unsurprising.

<sup>5</sup> Part 1 coll. 26-35, lines 730-1002 (Obbink). Among Epicurus' injunctions Diogenes Laertius includes, μάλλον τε εὐφρανθήσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις (10.120). It is not surprising, then, that cult hymns were generally approved by Epicurus, while most other forms of poetry associated with

While the earlier Epicureans emphasised the importance of *physiologia*, they treated most other arts and sciences rather disparagingly.<sup>6</sup> The Epicurean indifference or even hostility to the very arts and sciences which most Greeks valued and trusted became a commonplace.<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, closer inspection reveals that many of our sources for this attitude are not the Epicureans themselves but outsiders, most of whom were in fact hostile to Epicureanism.<sup>8</sup> The polemical context in which authors like Cicero, Quintilian, Plutarch, and Sextus Empiricus mention this Epicurean attitude suggest that it was a useful generalisation which could be used to exclude the Epicureans from serious consideration: "they reject all culture, so we need not waste time in refuting their views in detail." Yet it remains true that indications of reserve or hostility are discernible in Epicurus' own writings, which opponents of Epicureanism sought to exploit in order to confirm, or perhaps exaggerate, the school's rejection of the arts of civilised life. A favourite seems to have been a remark made by Epicurus in a lost letter to Pythocles:

παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεῦγε τὰκάτιον ἀράμενος (Diog. Laert. 10.6)

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religion were rejected, see Obbink's comments on *De piet.* part 1 col. 27 lines 768-70 (1996), 407 and col. 34 line 986 (1996), 454-455.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. *Ep. Hdt.* 78, KΔ 12 and cf. Angeli (1984), 552. As always, investigations into the natural world were subordinate to an ethical goal and were designed to free the human mind from superstitious terror (cf. KΔ 11 and see Wasserstein (1978), 484, 493-94).

<sup>7</sup> Cicero, who rehearses what Gigante (1990), 38 describes as "la stanca accusa tradizionale d' incultura e rozzezza a Epicuro", exemplifies this; cf. *Cic. Fin.* 1.26. In *Cic. Div.* 1.5 Epicurus stands alone - with Xenophanes - in denying the validity of divination. Rhetoric was no exception: in *De or.* 3.63 Cicero singles out Epicureanism as a philosophy which is completely unsuitable for an aspiring orator, *delicate nos avocat* (sc. *ea philosophia*) *a rostris, a iudiciis, a curia*; cf. also Quint. *Inst.* 2.17.15 *nam de Epicuro, qui disciplinas omnes fugit, nihil miror (quod contra rhetoricam scripsit)*, and 12.2.24.

<sup>8</sup> Timon called Epicurus ἀναγωγότατος ζῳόντων (Diog. Laert. 10.3). Barnes makes an apposite remark: "Epicurean theories were always traduced by their opponents, who, ignoring the subtle and sophisticated reality, represented Epicureanism in terms of rude and risible slogans: 'All perceptions are true', 'The only good thing is pleasure' - 'Words mean things'" (*EGR* I (1996), 202). It must be admitted, however, that the Epicureans were partly responsible for this reaction; Epicurus' epitomised tracts almost seem to take delight in provocative statements.

The fragment appears in the section which Diogenes devotes to quotations from Epicurus' own works which detractors used against him. Its location might therefore raise the suspicion that it has been taken out of context.<sup>9</sup> The phrasing of this sentence — somewhat pompous and elevated — gives the impression that Epicurus is being jovial<sup>10</sup> and is possibly warning Pythocles to avoid the misleading opinions which one finds in normal education.<sup>11</sup>

Another epistolary fragment which is often taken to exemplify Epicurus' dismissal of the value of *paideia* is preserved by Athenaeus and Plutarch,<sup>12</sup> and is presented in the following form by Usener (fr. 117),

μακαρίζω σε, ὦ Ἀπελλῆ, ὅτι καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας<sup>13</sup> ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὤρμησας

Like the Pythocles fragment, this too seems to have become a hackneyed sentence. It is found in two authors, and one of them — Athenaeus — does not preserve the name of the addressee, which probably indicates that he was unaware of the original context.<sup>14</sup> The remark is couched in metaphorical language: the student is likened to a prospective initiate who has satisfied the requirements of purification which will facilitate his entry into the mysteries. Both Athenaeus and Plutarch recognised the allusion. One can only speculate as to the purpose of this strategy in this particular letter, but one can imagine that if Apelles

<sup>9</sup> Its repeated use by other authors unsympathetic to Epicurus (Plutarch and Quintilian in fr. 163 Us.) indicates that it was part of an established anti-Epicurean armoury.

<sup>10</sup> Bailey (1926), 395 calls this "a playful extract", and this interpretation is strengthened by the statement's affinity with Circe's advice to Odysseus to steer clear of the Sirens in book 12 of the *Odyssey* (cf. Ronconi (1972), 64 and Cabisius (1979), 245). In addition, I detect a possible subversion of the practise of using quotes from poetry in education.

<sup>11</sup> One thinks particularly of the vanities associated with the myths which formed the subject-matter of most traditional Greek poetry which might lead to irrational opinions and fears, e.g. *Ep. Hdt.* 81 and reports in other authors, Heraclitus *Quaest. Hom.* 4.2 = fr. 228-29 Us., Sext. *Emp. Math.* 1.296-99. See Gale (1994), 14-15.

<sup>12</sup> Ath. 13.588a and Plut. *Contra Epicuri beatitudinem* 12 1094d.

<sup>13</sup> Schweighäuser's emendation (αἰτίας MSS) must surely reflect the meaning of the original (even if it is not palaeographically convincing as Smith (1978), 331 n. 10 points out) since it is presupposed by the exegesis of Athenaeus (ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἀμύητος ὄν) and Plutarch (τῶν μαθημάτων ἀποσχόμενος).

<sup>14</sup> Although Plutarch preserves the name, Ἀπελλῆν δέ τινα . . . , his words make it clear that he did not

harboured feelings of inadequacy because of a poor (or non-existent) education, it might have served to reassure him that instead of being an unsuitable disciple he was in fact a perfect candidate, since his mind was not cluttered by the misconceptions which traditional education implanted. The exaggerated praise (μακαρίζω σε) and the initiation metaphor suggest that Epicurus is anticipating (or answering) and nullifying protestations of inadequacy on the part of the addressee.<sup>15</sup>

It should also be remembered that Epicurus is himself reported to have used the terms ἀμοθής and ἀπαίδευτος of Pyrrho.<sup>16</sup> So we should pause before we take literally a term which was widely applied to one's opponents in order to label them idiots. We should not, I think, assume that the Founders themselves were at all ignorant of Greek *paideia*. They would, after all, have received a traditional education in their youth<sup>17</sup> and there is no evidence that later Epicureans organised an alternative educational system for youngsters.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, there is some evidence from the writings of later Epicureans that members of the school even had a certain respect for the basic cultural and literary skills which were inculcated through traditional education:

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know who the individual was.

- <sup>15</sup> If the opening sentence of the *Epistula ad Menoecium* is to be taken at its face value μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρον ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν, then Epicurus welcomed both the young (whose education might not have been complete) and the old (who might have received a full education). Even slaves like Mys were admitted to Epicurus' circle (Diog. Laert. 10.3 and 10). See Bailey (1928), 233-34 for Epicurus' desire that his doctrines be accessible to "the average man", and Pesce (1988), 22.
- <sup>16</sup> Diog. Laert. 10.8. But Sedley (1976), 137, after due consideration of what Epicurus would have found attractive in Pyrrho's conduct, thinks that by using these terms Epicurus intended rather to praise Pyrrho as untainted by any learning or *paideia*. Laks (1976), 59 and Gigante (1981), 41 disagree. Sedley's suggestion is tempting, but I suspect these labels were rather general terms of abuse; we catch snatches of the same sort of abuse in a different context, quoted in the work of a later Epicurean, "ἀγράμματοι -- φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκο[υ]ρος -- ἀνθρώποι" καὶ ἀγοίκου[ς] φήσιν / Ἐ[ρ]μαρχο[ς], Philod. *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1672 col. XXXV.21-24 (Longo, 265).
- <sup>17</sup> Uncomplimentary sources assert that Epicurus' own father was a school teacher and that Epicurus himself followed that profession for a time, Diog. Laert. 10.2-3.
- <sup>18</sup> See Frischer who argues that, in the absence of firm evidence, it is more likely that the Epicureans sent their children to ordinary schools; a standard education may even have constituted a prerequisite for conversion: "one can only escape from a prison in which one has been incarcerated" (1982), 64. Yet Longo Auricchio (1988), 32 n. 41 draws attention to evidence from Epicurus' will that the sons of Metrodorus and Polyaeus were studying within the school (Diog. Laert. 10.19).

--]. δ[ύ-  
 να[ται] μ[έν] τοῖς [β]ιβλίοις  
 παρακολουθεῖν οἱ καὶ  
 τετυ[χ]ότες ἀγωγῆς Ἑλλη-  
 σι καὶ [ο]ῦ [Πέρσαις] πρεπού-  
 σης καὶ παι[δευθέ]ντες  
 ἐν μ[α]θήμασι, δι[δά]σκου-  
 σι καὶ [τ]ὰ τῶν ἐπιτετη-  
 δευκότων ἀσάφειαν ἐξ-  
 ευρίσκειν καὶ ὁμοειδῆ  
 γ', εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἐκ παι-  
 δίου μέχρι γήρως φι[ι]λο-  
 σοφῆσαντες καὶ τοσαῦ-  
 τα καὶ τοιαῦτα ταῖς ἀκρι-  
 βείαις συντεθεικότες·  
 οἱ[ι] δὲ δουλεύσαντες ἐρ-  
 γατικῶς ἢ ἀνάγκ[ω]γοι καὶ  
 γράμματα μὴ μ[α]θόντες  
 [- - -

*PHerc. 1005 Philodemus To the [Friends of the School] col. XVI.1-18, Angeli (1988), p.181*

Those who have acquired an education which suits Greeks and not [Persians] can understand the books, and having undergone a training in traditional studies teach also how to discover the affairs of those who have made an occupation of obscurity or at least things of the same class, if nothing else, having studied philosophy from childhood to old age and having composed a great many treatises of this kind in great detail. While those who were enslaved by manual labour, or the uneducated, who did not learn even to read and write . . .

Admittedly, this respect usually seems to emerge in polemical contexts where the literacy of opponents, and therefore their reliability, is called into question. It is therefore a highly selective posture and can by no means be taken as an unambiguous doctrinal position. Nonetheless, it is a posture that was available to Epicureans.

Despite what I have said above, it would of course be foolish to try to claim that the Epicureans were in fact in favour of *paideia* and that all ancient evidence to the contrary is unjustified slander. In fact, it would be more surprising if Epicurus had *not* questioned the value of *paideia*, just as the Presocratics and the great intellectual figures of the fourth century had before him. The Epicureans were certainly critical of traditional education, not

only because of its content, but because of the assumptions which lay at the foundation of most, if not all, arts and sciences.<sup>19</sup> If traditional *paideia* were not seen to be flawed, there would, after all, be no need for philosophy. Unfortunately, the remnants of Epicurus' works and those of his colleagues do not permit us to ascertain how often literary texts were cited or cross-examined in the philosophical process.<sup>20</sup> It is, however, abundantly clear that Philodemus and other later Epicureans used and alluded to such texts, and that they expected their audience to be familiar with them.

## 2. The writings of the founders

Another aspect of the Epicurean school upon which outsiders remarked was the united front which its followers presented on matters of doctrine,<sup>21</sup> whereas the doxographical tradition on the Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics records and tolerates considerable variety in views, even if direct contradiction is generally avoided.<sup>22</sup> There is some slight evidence that not all Epicureans agreed with each other: Diogenes Laertius (10.26) provides a list of famous Epicureans,

Ζήνων θ' ὁ Σιδώνιος ἀκροατῆς Ἀπολλοδώρου, πολυγράφος ἀνὴρ καὶ  
Δημήτριος ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Λάκων, Διογένης θ' ὁ Ταρσεύς ὁ τὰς ἐπιλέκτους  
σχολὰς συγγράψας, καὶ Ὡρίων καὶ ἄλλοι οὗς οἱ γνήσιοι Ἐπικούρειοι  
σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν

which suggests that some Epicureans considered themselves genuine or orthodox (γνήσιοι)

<sup>19</sup> I should state clearly that I do not follow Giancotti's thesis (1978) that Epicurus' hostility to poetry was confined to the mythological content of poetry, but I do believe that his point about the hostile source of so much of our information is a valid one and that this fact should encourage us to exercise caution before we make sweeping generalisations of the kind found in Bartalucci (1972), 51-52. Gale's assessment of the controversy is sensible (1994), 15-16.

<sup>20</sup> Despite Diogenes' claim that Epicurus' works did not contain a single citation from other authors (γέγραπται δὲ μαρτύριον ἕξωθεν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐδέν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ εἰσιν Ἐπικούρου φωναί), allusions to, and even a citation from, Greek poetry are found in the surviving fragments of Epicurus, Diog. Laert. 10.137 (= fr. 66 Us.), though modern scholars disagree as to their significance, see Ronconi (1972), 70-72.

<sup>21</sup> Atticus is portrayed as acknowledging unswerving loyalty Cic. *Fin.* 5.3, and can only entertain un-Epicurean notions when no fellow Epicureans are present (Cic. *Leg.* 1.7); see Erler (1992), 175 and references at n. 20, Canfora (1993), 269. Occasionally, a divergence of opinion within the school is recorded, e.g. Cic. *Fin.* 1.31.

<sup>22</sup> As Blumenthal (1978), 141 has observed in the case of the Academy and the Peripatos, "... opposition on one or more specific points does not entail general disagreement."

and others outsiders (σοφισταί).<sup>23</sup>

Still, the peculiar unity of the Epicurean school, as it is represented in the tradition, is difficult to explain satisfactorily when one considers that they were subject to most of the same influences and pressures as members of other schools: the need to secure their prosperity within the Hellenistic kingdoms and, ultimately, a profitable relationship with Roman patrons,<sup>24</sup> their geographical dispersion, and, I think very important although it is rarely raised, perhaps because it is so unquantifiable, the understandable desire of highly intelligent individuals to leave their personal mark on the direction of the School.<sup>25</sup> Why should personality have made such an impact within the Academy and Stoa but not, apparently, in the Kepos?

One thing that did distinguish the Epicureans from all other Schools was their extreme reverence for the writings of the founders, especially Epicurus.<sup>26</sup> While it is true that the Stoics honoured the writings of Zeno, and the Academy those of Plato, the Epicureans still

<sup>23</sup> Hubbell (1920), 256 points out that it is not clear whether the antecedent of οὗς includes all the names on the list (Zeno, Demetrius, Diogenes and Orion) and ἄλλοι or just ἄλλοι; see Angeli-Colaizzo (1979), 53 for interpretations favoured by various scholars. I am inclined to interpret οὗς as referring only to ἄλλοι, since that is the only item which lacks a name or further specification; given the fact that the targets of polemical attacks were often not named, the σοφισταί Epicureans may even have been anonymous in Diogenes Laertius' source. The familial metaphor implicit in this designation is paralleled in the label Philodemus gives Epicureans who deny that sophistic rhetoric is an art, in flagrant contradiction, he claims, to the writings of the Founders: οἱ τοῦτοις / ἀντιγράφωντες οὐ / πάνυ τι μακρὰν τῆς / τῶν πατραλοῶν / καταδίκης ἀφρο/τήκασιν, *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. VII.24-29* (Longo, 21). On the subject of dissent within the school, see Longo Auricchio-Tepedino Guerra (1981)

<sup>24</sup> Crawford (1978), esp. 206-207 outlines the difficulties and advantages which changes in the balance of power in the first century B.C. posed for Greek intellectuals. Swain (1996), 2-3 implies that dependence on Roman patrons by Greeks of the second and first centuries B.C. and the consequent migration of these people to Italy effectively marks this period off, culturally-speaking, both from the earlier period and from what is termed the Second Sophistic.

<sup>25</sup> And the Epicurean school enjoyed its share of strong personalities if Diogenes Laertius' report that Apollodorus was called ὁ Κηποτύραννος (10.25) is to be trusted.

<sup>26</sup> The Founders, termed οἱ ἄνδρες or οἱ καθηγεμόνες by Philodemus, were Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaeus. For an explanation of these and associated terms in Philodemus, see Longo Auricchio (1978), 22-23.

stand out for the canonic status they conferred on the works of their Founders.<sup>27</sup> Epicurus himself had endorsed this approach by training his own friends to commit his writings to memory.<sup>28</sup> In a sense, Epicurus' doctrines were viewed as revelatory, a rending of the fog of ignorance, fear, and superstition, as attested by the overwhelming gratitude which certain adherents express towards the Founder and the institutionalised reverence for his memory within the school.<sup>29</sup> Advances in our understanding of how Epicurus developed his doctrines now indicate that he did not dispense wisdom to all mankind in a single flash but in fact wrestled with problems, debated them with his colleagues, and refined his philosophical views.<sup>30</sup> But this does not seem to have affected the general reception of his achievement by later disciples. The works of the first Founders were a constant benchmark and point of departure for all subsequent Epicureans: the unimpeachable authority. Thus it was inconceivable that Epicurus could ever have been wrong and when later Epicureans were confronted with doctrines which were becoming increasingly difficult to sustain they tended to either reinterpret Epicurus' words in such a way as to remove the problem or simply

<sup>27</sup> While Erler (1992), 173 may be right to assert that philosophers of the first century B.C. identified less with the institution of a specific school than with the founder of the school, the distinction does not really hold for the Epicureans for whom Founder and school were inseparable. Sedley (1989a), 97-98 emphasises that the Stoics also regarded Zeno's works as canonical but that the somewhat unsystematic nature of his writings left a great deal of room for subsequent manoeuvre and debate; Plato's writings also permitted widely differing interpretations. Epicurus, on the other hand, constructed a highly detailed system which almost stifled development. Yet I doubt whether some of Epicurus' polemicising works presented doctrine which was immediately coherent. Perhaps the popularity of the epitomised works contributed to later conformity.

<sup>28</sup> Diog. Laert. 10.12, and it was to facilitate memorisation that Epicurus composed epitomised tracts such as letters, the Ἀναφωνήσεις (fr. 3 Us.), Στοιχειώσεις δώδεκα (fr. 56 Us.), Μεγάλη ἐπιτομή (fr. 24-26 Us.), and the Μικρὰ ἐπιτομή (fr. 27 Us.), cf. the introduction to the *Epistula ad Pythoclem* (Diog. Laert. 10.84); on the whole topic, see Clay (1983), 54-81. As Capasso points out (1988), 257-58 the Epicureans developed an extraordinarily detailed historiographical - almost hagiographical - literature of Epicurus and the Founders which included a substantial amount of biographical and anecdotal material, all of which lent support to, and probably served as an additional exegetical tool for, the doctrines of the treatises themselves.

<sup>29</sup> The *locus classicus* is of course Lucretius' magnificent apostrophe of Epicurus in *DRN* 3.1-30, but the notion is expressed less effusively elsewhere e.g. by Torquatus in *Cic. Fin.* 1.14 and 32. Epicurus is given almost oracular status in Athenaeus' epigram (Diog. Laert. 10.12). On the institutions of veneration see Boyancé (1936), 322-27, Poland (1909), 64, 236 n. \*\*\*†, and Capasso (1982), 41-50, 111-115.

<sup>30</sup> Certain extant portions of the lengthy *De natura*, for example, have been thought to resemble a 'work in progress', or as Clay (1983), 19 put it "[i]t is an esoteric book in the sense that it was gradually elaborated and written in and for a circle of close associates . . ."; for remarks on this and other aspects

maintain a stubborn adherence to the doctrine, even in the face of available contradictory evidence.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, within the school, the works of the Founders formed the battle ground, and conflicts on points of doctrine were frequently characterised, and decided, by debate on the interpretation of these writings. Philodemus occasionally remarks that an Epicurean has gone beyond the brief of the Founder when constructing an argument, or has not understood or read Epicurus' own explicit views on an issue and has thus contradicted the Founder.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, the Epicureans do show some degree of disagreement, although it may have been insufficiently conspicuous to be noticed by other Schools or by readers of less esoteric literature. This probably explains why the Epicureans are normally viewed as presenting a united front.

Our evidence suggests that work on the texts of the Founders within the school was systematic and well organised.<sup>33</sup> As noted above, Epicurus himself had established the tendency to cherish the works of the Founder through specific arrangements for the bequeathing of his own library to his successor Hermarchus.<sup>34</sup> In the Athenian Kepos, efforts

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of that work, see also pp. 57-58. Yet in a more recent assessment of the entire work, Sedley (1998), 104-109 argues that the stylistic features of Epicurus' *De natura* show that it was a lecture course.

<sup>31</sup> A classic example of how one of Epicurus' more controversial doctrines gave later Epicureans a headache is his assertion that love for one's children is not natural. Demetrius Lacon argued that we should not interpret Epicurus as meaning that such love is unnatural and perverse but rather that it is not inevitable or unavoidable, [ἀλλ' οὐ φύσει ἐστὶν ἢ πρὸς τὰ τέκνα στοργή] // ἐπειδήπερ οὐ κατηναγ/κασμένως στέργουσιν οἱ / ἄνθρωποι τὰ ἔκγονα. τῶν / γὰρ κατ' ἀνάγκην γεινομέ/ων ἴδιον τὸ ἀκούσιον πα/ρακολούθημα . . . *PHerc.* 1012 col. LXVIII.1-6; for edition of relevant passages and discussion, see Puglia (1988), 249-255. On the other hand, Barnes provides a fine analysis of Epicurean intransigence in the case of the doctrine of the size of the sun, where advances in technical astronomy did not, apparently, alter the later Epicurean stance on this issue (1989), 38-41; see also Romeo (1979).

<sup>32</sup> In cases where Epicurus had not left explicit advice on a specific issue, later adherents were apparently at liberty to take a position which Epicurus was likely to have approved, *Cic. Fin.* 2.58.

<sup>33</sup> A facet of activity which the Epicureans shared with other schools, such as the Academy and the Peripatos.

<sup>34</sup> *Diog. Laert.* 10.21.

had been made at an early stage to order and date individual works and letters, by the year of the archon where possible.<sup>35</sup>

Following, perhaps, Epicurus' own example, later Epicureans also compiled compendia and epitomised versions of the writings and doctrines of the Founders.<sup>36</sup> Our evidence for this type of exercise is incomplete, but we have sufficient testimonies for examples from the second and first centuries B.C.: Philonides of Laodicea composed a summary of the letters of the Founders,<sup>37</sup> and Diogenes Laertius makes frequent use of the epitomising work of Diogenes of Tarsus.<sup>38</sup>

Within this testimony there are hints that much of this compilation and summary was intended for those who did not have the time or inclination to read all the original texts of the Founders carefully. There is thus a distinct didactic, or at least introductory, purpose to the exercise.<sup>39</sup> It is quite likely that such summaries and epitomes eventually enjoyed a wider circulation and readership than the originals on which they were based.<sup>40</sup> They certainly

<sup>35</sup> See Clay (1982), the series of extracts from Epicurus' letters dated by archon in *PHerc.* 1005 fr. 111 and 114 (Angeli), in *PHerc.* 1418, e.g. coll. VII.4, X.8, XIV.11 (Militello), references in Philodemus *De piet.* part 1 col. 28 lines 797-801, coll.29-30 lines 840-845 (Obbink), and a letter of Hermarchus in *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XLIV.19-23 (Longo, 135).

<sup>36</sup> The project would have been almost inevitable given the sheer number of texts produced by Epicurus (see Diog. Laert. 10.26) and his early associates.

<sup>37</sup> Information preserved in *PHerc.* 1044 fr. 14.3-10

<sup>38</sup> The extensive *Ἐπίλεκτοι σχολαί* (10.26, 97, 119, 136, and 138) and the *Ἐπιτομή τῶν Ἐπικούρου ἠθικῶν* (10.118). The list could be extended.

<sup>39</sup> In her discussion of the phenomenon of epitomes within the Epicurean school Angeli identifies two main objectives: to facilitate memorisation of details contained in the more extensive analytical works, and to isolate the main points of Epicurean doctrine (1988), 38-42. Such texts were originally intended both to instruct those who had not read the detailed treatises and to provide advanced followers with a more complete grasp of the doctrine in its finished form.

<sup>40</sup> I am confining my remarks here to the dissemination of Epicurus' texts within Epicurean communities, but I might add in passing that I do not believe that the evidence is sufficient to support Frischer's hypothesis (1982), 50 that Epicurus' works were inaccessible to the "general reading public" and that this might have been a deliberate policy related to recruitment by passive means. Frischer admits that Cicero's remark in *Tusc.* 2.3.7-8 concerns the unapproachability of Epicurus' style rather than the fact that such texts were impossible to obtain, and his citation of Usener (1887), lxiv for the paucity of ancient *testimonia* for Epicurus' writings is a little misleading: Usener writes "praeter sectatores et Laertium testimonia de Epicuro magis locupletia et copiosa non sunt quam M. Tulli Ciceronis et Plutarchi. et Plutarchi quidem plures fuerunt contra hanc philosophiam dissertationes". Surely Usener

performed a convenient service for those content with a broad appraisal of the doctrines of the school, as is suggested by Diogenes Laertius' focus on the Epicurean letters and his citations from the works of Diogenes of Tarsus. This may ultimately have led to the gradual neglect of the original writings by all but the most erudite of Epicurean adherents. Perhaps in the work of the Epicureans of the second and first centuries B.C. we are seeing the first indications of this process.

As Epicureanism was disseminated over a broader geographical area, new adherents and new centres were confronted with the problem of acquiring seminal texts for their own study and teaching. Given the emphasis which Epicureans placed on the texts of their Founders, the securing of reliable copies must have been an urgent enterprise. Not much is known about how Epicurean schools outside Athens acquired their texts. The commercial book trade was unlikely to provide much beyond the most populist works (perhaps epitomised treatises and the more well-known letters).<sup>41</sup> It is conceivable that Epicureans who enjoyed personal influence at Hellenistic courts could persuade those in power to keep copies of Epicurean works in the libraries sponsored by the ruling house or elite, but this is mere speculation.<sup>42</sup> On the evidence available to us, the most likely means of acquiring reliable and authoritative

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is only saying that after the Epicureans themselves and Diogenes Laertius, Cicero and Plutarch offer the richest and most abundant testimony, two authors whose works are indispensable for the reconstruction of so much post-Aristotelian philosophy? Usener's *index fontium* (pp. 421-439) offers a great many other sources, with sizeable contributions from Athenaeus, Seneca, and Sextus Empiricus. I suspect that many of Epicurus' more technical treatises were difficult to obtain and certainly not part of the regular book trade, but that was probably the case for most other Hellenistic philosophers, and specialised works would have to be secured through private circulation. Nor should we be surprised that Epicurean texts have not turned up in the parochial sites of Egypt: if the sample can be trusted to be representative of the quantities of copies of individual authors then it will reflect the reading tastes of that particular provincial community or the authors used in schools (Homer, Demosthenes, Euripides, Menander). All the Hellenistic schools are quite poorly represented, and of the testimonies to Epicurus collected in *CPF* (vol. 1.2 pp. 153-193) none, with the possible exception of *PBerol.* inv. 16369 (see Vogliano (1936), 281), can be securely identified as being of Epicurean authorship as opposed to containing doctrine drawn from Epicureanism in *gnomologia*, commentaries, or treatises. On the subject see Roberts (1953), esp. 268-269, though I am not convinced that the absence of philosophical texts conceals an ominous discouragement by the despotic regimes of Egypt.

<sup>41</sup> See Steckel *RE* Suppl. XI coll. 594-598.

<sup>42</sup> If the letter from Egypt described by Keenan (1977) which mentions several Epicurean works and the

copies of Epicurean texts would be from contact with the Kepos at Athens itself. Either a representative from the foreign school would have visited Athens to make copies of the works himself or, conceivably, the copies could have been commissioned and delivered by some reliable individual.<sup>43</sup> The collection of Epicurean texts from Herculaneum constitutes our most important evidence for the kind of Epicurean works which could have made their way to foreign schools.<sup>44</sup> Since we do not know the original extent of this collection in the first century B.C. it is dangerous to regard its surviving contents as representative of all that was originally there,<sup>45</sup> but scholars have noted some peculiarities, especially if we assign importance to Philodemus' connection with the collection. The works by Epicurus and some of the earlier disciples have been dated on palaeographical evidence to the third and second centuries B.C., before, that is, Philodemus' lifetime.<sup>46</sup> This would suggest that the copies in question were executed in Athens itself (or somewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean) and were brought to Italy only later. There are also certain other facts which have been interpreted as pointing to a selective process in the constitution of the 'library'. While Sedley thinks it "not unlikely" that the Herculaneum collection originally possessed at least one complete set of volumes from Epicurus' *De natura*, he detects signs that certain books from that famous work (books 1-2, 11-15, 25 and 28) were particularly treasured.<sup>47</sup> It should also be noted that whereas the greater part of Philodemus' surviving output was concerned with

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sending of books, was written in Alexandria (as Obbink thinks probable [1989], 107-108), it might indicate Epicurus' texts were available in a library.

<sup>43</sup> Cicero was able to secure a copy of Phaedrus' work from Atticus (*Att.* 13.39.2) who, residing in Athens, presumably had close contacts with the Kepos.

<sup>44</sup> Of course, there is always the possibility that the collection retrieved from the Villa dei Papiri is unique, the result of a particular set of historical accidents. But it is surely more constructive to conjecture that it is not entirely atypical.

<sup>45</sup> There are too many imponderables: interference with the collection from middle of the first century B.C. to the destruction of the villa in A.D. 79, the destruction of a number of rolls by eighteenth century excavators and unrollers, rolls yet to be opened, the possibility that more rolls are still somewhere *in situ* awaiting discovery. With this in mind, almost everything I shall say in the lines below must remain speculative.

<sup>46</sup> For description of relevant papyri see Cavallo (1983), 58-59, and (1984), 5-8. Cavallo (1983), 65 does date some copies of Epicurus' works and those of early Epicureans to the late first century B.C. or the beginning of the first century A.D.

<sup>47</sup> Sedley (1998), 99-101.

logical, ethical, and aesthetic issues, the works of the earliest Epicureans which might have provided the most assistance in these areas are not represented in the collection.<sup>48</sup> This might indicate that Philodemus did not have an opportunity to accumulate a reference collection for his own purposes but rather had to rely on a selection of titles which had been assembled by someone else.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, his citations from, and references to, other Epicurean works which were more relevant to his particular researches might have been supplied either by his own memory or from notes he had taken from his own reading and studies abroad.<sup>50</sup>

But Epicurean work on the texts of the Founders was not limited to collection, arrangement, and copying. Editorial work of various kinds was also practised. Works were subjected to tests of authenticity, textual emendation, exegesis, and summary.<sup>51</sup> The origin and progress of this work is difficult to trace on the evidence available, but studies of extant texts from the second and first century B.C. give us some idea of how later Epicureans operated.<sup>52</sup> I shall address in more detail the question of how Epicurus' works were used by Philodemus when I

<sup>48</sup> I am thinking specifically of Epicurus' *De rhetorica* which Philodemus cites in his own work on that subject but which has not turned up in the surviving papyri.

<sup>49</sup> Vogliano (1954), 194 suggests that the collection was made by Philodemus' teachers. Cavallo (1983), 60, (1984), 9-12 offers a clear review of the problems confronting anyone attempting to reconstruct the history of the collection prior to Philodemus, but seems confident that it was Philodemus who transferred the collection to Herculaneum. Yet I find it strange that Philodemus omitted works which would have been most useful to him; none of Zeno's writings, for instance, have so far been discovered among the the papyri of the collection, though Gigante argues (1998), 92-95 that evidence exists that Philodemus used Zeno's works on style and poems. I have been informed that a new papyrus has been deciphered and found to contain a work of Zeno, but it has not yet been published.

<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, one would imagine that Philodemus would have had little difficulty in securing copies of the works he required from Athens if he so wished.

<sup>51</sup> Owing to the Epicurean reliance on the works of the Founders, Capasso (1981), 388 sees textual criticism as an indispensable part of the Epicurean method of practising philosophy, and describes the school's activity as "una vera e propria civiltà del testo scritto". Scribal errors are an issue in Demetrius Lacon's work on textual and exegetical problems in Epicurus, *PHerc* 1012 coll. 38.13-14, 42.3, and 44.8-9. Examples of proposed emendation and applied exegesis are found in Philodemus *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1672 coll. XVII.19-32 (Longo, 199, 201) and XVIII.8-XIX.30 (Longo, 203, 205, 207, 209).

<sup>52</sup> In addition to remarks gleaned from a number of works preserved in the Herculaneum collection the most illuminating text are *PHerc.* 1012 which contains a study by Demetrius Lacon of exegetical and textual problems in the writings of Epicurus (see Puglia (1982) and the edition by Puglia and Gigante (1988)), and *PHerc.* 1044 which provides information on the activities of Philonides (see Capasso's summary (1981), 390 and Puglia (1982) pp. 19-21).

analyse in chapter five his approach to the Founders' writings in the first two books of *On Rhetoric*.

### 3. The transformation of doctrine

Subsequent Epicureans were compelled to justify their approach to *paideia* when pressed or challenged by their philosophical rivals. In the course of the debate with Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics, all of whom held very different views on *paideia*, the Epicureans sought to refute the doctrines of their opponents and at the same time distinguish their own grounds for rejection from those of the Skeptical movements.<sup>53</sup> The posture adopted on the issue of *paideia* was one of the distinguishing marks (along with atomism, pleasure, and Epicurus' canonic) which contributed to the overall identity of the Epicureans.<sup>54</sup> Although Epicurus himself may have given some justification to the rejection of *paideia*, he could not have foreseen every detail and implication of such a stance.<sup>55</sup> In the face of evermore sophisticated polemics with their rivals, later Epicureans were induced to articulate repeated and sometimes innovative strategies of defence and justification. At the same time, the Epicureans could not be seen to be deviating substantially from the guidelines set out in the writings of their Founder. The challenge, then, was to formulate arguments which remained faithful to the spirit of their Founder's writings but also succeeded in meeting head-on the new directions generated by polemic with other schools. No doubt, not all Epicureans were completely successful in negotiating this tension, or at least that was the perception of some.<sup>56</sup> Unfortunately, most of the Epicurean efforts in this regard between the death of Epicurus and

<sup>53</sup> In his introduction to the series of works against liberal studies Sextus Empiricus begins by acknowledging that the Epicureans also attack these activities but is quick to emphasise that they do not do so from the same motives as the Pyrrhonists (*Math.* 1.1).

<sup>54</sup> It is surely significant that Cicero manages to include a reference to Epicurean rejection of high culture in his summary of the chief tenets of that philosophy, *Fin.* 1.26.

<sup>55</sup> On the *paideia*-rhetoric-Epicureanism nexus, see Milanese (1989), 11-12.

<sup>56</sup> Philodemus criticises the attempts of his fellow Epicurean Bromios to accommodate political and forensic rhetoric within the purview of Epicurean philosophy, *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 coll. XXXIV.14-

Philodemus have been lost, but from the extant texts of the Herculaneum library (mostly the works of Philodemus) we are able to reconstruct some of the vagaries of this debate.

#### 4. On art and rhetoric

##### a) The issue of Philodemus *On Rhetoric*

One aspect of traditional *paideia* stood out among the others and constituted a major test-case in the confrontation between philosophy and *paideia* in general: that of rhetoric. More specifically, a perennial subject of debate in many philosophical schools was the status of rhetoric among those arts and sciences which hold claims to knowledge and usefulness, and the question whether it was an art worth cultivating by the philosopher. Any discussion in the Hellenistic period of the technicity of a practice was grounded in previous discussions of what constitutes an art. Plato and Aristotle were perhaps the most commanding voices in this debate, and their influence can be detected in virtually all the Hellenistic schools. In the *Gorgias* (465a 2-5), Plato had divided the so-called τέχναι into genuine arts and their spurious imitations (εἰδωλα), distinguished with respect to whether their aims are good or simply pleasurable, while in the *Philebus* (55e-56b) he separated those arts which have an exact method from those that are merely conjectural. Aristotle also arranges the arts and sciences in a sort of hierarchy while avoiding the more uncompromising aspects of Plato's assessment.<sup>57</sup> The debate on rhetoric's status within the hierarchy of disciplines continued in the Hellenistic period.<sup>58</sup>

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XXXV.10 (Longo, 115, 117). Adorno goes quite far (excessively so, in my opinion) in describing the philosophical chasm that separates the Founders from Epicureans of the first century B.C. (1987), 102.

<sup>57</sup> E.g. Arist. *Metaph.* 1.1 and *Eth. Nic.* 1139b 14 - 1141b 8. For an extensive discussion of post-Platonic developments in the concept of τέχνη, see Isnardi Parente (1966).

<sup>58</sup> Cf. the definitions assembled by Spengel (1863), 514, nos. VI-VIII, esp. Quintilian *quidam* [sc. *rhetoricen*] *usum . . . nominaverunt* (*Inst.* 2.15.2), . . . *Critolaus usum dicendi* [sc. *eam putavit*], *nam*

Like several philosophers of other schools, the Epicureans also adopted the prevailing conceptual framework when they turned to evaluate activities as arts. Proclus preserves some information on the views of later Epicureans on art in the course of his commentary on Euclid's *Elementa*:<sup>59</sup>

τῶν δὲ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν ἐνστάντων οἱ μὲν πλείστοι πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἠπόρησαν ἀνυπόστατα τὰ μέρη δεικνύουσι σπουδάσαντες -- ὧν καὶ οἱ λόγοι διατεθρύληνται, τῶν μὲν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναιρῶντων καὶ ὥσπερ πολεμίων καρπούς ἐξ ἀλλοτρίας χώρας καὶ γονίμου τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀφανίζοντων ὥσπερ τῶν Ἐφεκτικῶν, τῶν δὲ τὰς γεωμετρικὰς μόνως ἀρχὰς ἀνατρέπειν προθεμένων, ὥσπερ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων -- οἱ δὲ ἤδη καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιτρέψαντες οὐ φασι τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποδείκνυσθαι, μὴ συγχωρηθέντος αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλου τινός, ὃ μὴ προεἰληπταὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. τοῦτον γὰρ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως μετῆλθεν Ζήνων ὁ Σιδώνιος μὲν, τῆς δὲ Ἐπικούρου μετασχὼν αἰρέσεως, πρὸς ὃν καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ὅλον γέγραφε βιβλίον δεικνύς σαθρὰν αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν.

Of those who attack geometry,<sup>60</sup> the greatest number have raised objections with regard to the principles, spending their efforts on showing that these parts<sup>61</sup> [i.e. the principles] are without foundation. In this class there are two groups whose arguments have been widely reported; the members of the first actually try to destroy all knowledge like hostile troops doing away with crops from a foreign land, namely the one productive of philosophy: they are the Sceptics. The members of the second are those who propose to overturn geometrical principles only: the Epicureans. But there are others who already even concede the principles, but deny that what follows the principles [i.e. the propositions] are demonstrated without something else being admitted for them, which is not actually contained in the principles. It was this kind of controversy that Zeno of Sidon pursued, although he was an Epicurean. Posidonius wrote an entire book against him, showing that his whole conception was unsound.

The passage raises many questions,<sup>62</sup> but what emerges clearly is that in attacking the principles of arts and sciences mainstream Epicureanism did not aim to destroy the very foundations of all epistemology. Rather their concern was to question the tenability of the foundations upon which the entire edifice of the science was built.<sup>63</sup> It is also interesting to

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*hoc* τριβὴ *significat*. See also references and bibliography assembled by Calboli-Montefusco (1979), 249-250.

<sup>59</sup> *In Euclidis elementa* pp. 199.3-200.6 (Friedlein) = fr. 46 Edelstein-Kidd, = Zeno fr. 27 Angeli-Colaizzo .

<sup>60</sup> I use Kidd's translation (1999), 100-101 of this passage.

<sup>61</sup> Kidd (1999), 100 n. 23 has adjusted the (1972) text to <ταῦτα> τὰ μέρη.

<sup>62</sup> On this passage and the subject of Epicurean 'mathematics' in general, see Vlastos (1966), Mau (1973), and Angeli-Colaizzo (1979), 63-68.

<sup>63</sup> Especially if the arts were seen as ends in themselves or capable of producing pleasure, see Schneidewin's notes on Philodemus' remarks on geometry (1905), 11-12.

note that Epicureanism did not present a featureless surface on this issue. Individual creativity was discernible, since Zeno's approach is deemed worthy of specific mention.<sup>64</sup>

This is not to say that the Epicureans did not consider some arts and sciences possible or useful,<sup>65</sup> yet from the few extant remarks which are independent of Philodemus it is extremely difficult to reconstruct any precise view of what the earlier Epicureans took art to be and whether they judged rhetoric to be one.<sup>66</sup> On the notion of art in general, a scholiast on Dionysius Thrax offers the following comment:

οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοι οὕτως ὀρίζονται τὴν τέχνην· τέχνη ἐστὶ μέθοδος ἐνεργούσα τῷ βίῳ τὸ συμφέρον. ἐνεργούσα ὅσον ἐργαζομένη.<sup>67</sup>

The Epicureans define art thus: art is a method which produces (*energousa*) that which is advantageous to life. The term *energousa* is equivalent to *ergazomene*.

I shall return to this remark at a later stage when I come to Philodemus' description of art in chapter 4. For the moment I note that the scholiast ascribes a definition (ὀρίζονται) to the Epicureans and that method (μέθοδος) and advantage (σύμφερον) are essential qualities of this kind of activity.

Another remark is transmitted by Ammianus Marcellinus (30.4.3) and pertains to forensic rhetoric:

<sup>64</sup> Although Philodemus' teacher is singled out here, he was not the only Epicurean who investigated geometry. Polyaeus had been a mathematician (cf. Hermarchus, a rhetorician prior to 'conversion') before he was won over by Epicurus (Cic. *Acad. Pr.* 2.33.106; nos. 31-38 are ascribed in Tepedino Guerra's (1991) collection of his fragments to geometrical problems). Philonides also occupied himself with geometric subjects (*PHerc.* 1044) and Demetrius Lacon wrote a *Περὶ γεωμετρίας* and a work entitled *Πρὸς τὰς Πολυαίνου ἀπορίας*, cf. Angeli-Dorandi (1987). Kidd II (1988), 206 interprets the Proclus passage as showing that Zeno is to be distinguished from the Epicureans who refuse Euclid's principles (like Vlastos (1966), 152-53, against Crönert *Kolotes und Menedemos* (1906), 109), but he thinks that it is still an attack on the whole of Euclidean axiomatic geometry falling under Proclus' heading *τῶν πρὸς γεωμετρίαν ἐνοστάτων*. The thrust of Zeno's attack is against *methodology*: even (καί) if you grant the principles (in any axiomatic system) what follows (i.e. the propositions and theorems) cannot be demonstrated.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Blank (1995), 180.

<sup>66</sup> It is not even clear whether the earliest Epicureans recognised the distinction between conjectural and exact arts, or whether, as Longo Auricchio (1985), 47 believes, it was adopted under the influence of other Hellenistic schools.

<sup>67</sup> 108.27 = fr. 227b Us..

hanc professionem oratorum forensium ... Epicurus ... κακοτεχνίαν nominans inter artes numerat malas<sup>68</sup>

The phrasing suggests that Epicurus drew some sort of distinction between 'bad arts' and others, presumably 'good arts', even if we are not informed in this context as to the precise grounds on which he terms forensic oratory bad.<sup>69</sup> In her discussion of the term κακοτεχνία in the Ammianus passage Isnardi Parente is concerned that its application here is at odds with information derived from Philodemus: Epicurus denied that practical rhetoric was an art at all. She therefore suggests that Ammianus has mistakenly attributed to forensic rhetoric what was originally an epithet applied to sophistic devices.<sup>70</sup> Yet a passage from Sextus Empiricus introduces the view that rhetoric (like burglary or robbery) has no duties (καθήκοντα) or rules (θεωρήματα), and so is not an art (*Math.* 2.12);<sup>71</sup> further, that the Peripatetic school under Critolaus and the Academy under Plato labelled rhetoric a κακοτεχνία on these grounds (εἰς τοῦτο ἀπιδόντες ἐκάκισαν αὐτὴν ὡς κακοτεχνίαν μᾶλλον ἢ τέχνην καθεστηκυῖαν, *Math.* 2.12). Since Sextus uses the term κακοτεχνία to deny rhetoric's technicity altogether, not only its usefulness, Epicurus too may not have intended to imply that rhetoric has technical status by labelling it a κακοτεχνία. Epicurus limits his attack here to the forensic branch of oratory, but it is likely that he objected to the philosopher's involvement in other forms of public oratory, including deliberative.<sup>72</sup> Diogenes of Oenoanda seems to offer a valid justification for the Epicurean rejection of rhetoric when he includes

<sup>68</sup> Fr. 51 Us.

<sup>69</sup> In the light of this and the general tenor of our available evidence, the isolated injunction recorded by Diogenes Laertius (10.120) καὶ δικάσεσθαι, implies that the Epicurean *should* go to court when he is required to serve as a juror.

<sup>70</sup> Isnardi Parente (1966), 393-394.

<sup>71</sup> See Barnes' discussion of the argument (1986), 11-13, who points out that by focusing on καθήκοντα (a possible sign of Stoic origin, (1986), 21 n. 61) Sextus fails to distinguish between technical and moral duties.

<sup>72</sup> Among a rather chaotic list of Epicurus' injunctions, which Diogenes Laertius has probably taken from a summary by the Tarsian Diogenes, we find οὐδὲ ῥητορεύσειν καλῶς (10.118), οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι (10.119), and οὐ πανηγυριεῖν δέ (10.120). Ferrario's survey (1981) of the evidence available for a reconstruction of Epicurean views on rhetoric from the time of the Founder until that of Philodemus shows how little we know for certain.

public speaking among those practices which cause discomfort because they are not within the individual's control:<sup>73</sup>

χαλεπὸν στρατεία  
κάν ἐτέρων ἀρχῆ. *vacat*  
τὸ ῥητορεύειν σφυγμοῦ  
καὶ ταραχῆς γέμον,  
εἰ πείσαι δύναται. τί οὖν  
μεταδιώκομεν πρᾶ-  
γμα τοιοῦτον, οὗ τὴν  
ἐξουσίαν ἔχουσιν ἄλλοι;

Another portion of the text apparently contains a quotation from a letter, possibly by Epicurus himself, which seeks to entice an unknown addressee away from rhetoric to the pursuit of philosophy:<sup>74</sup>

[τῆς ἄλλο-  
τριότητος οἷξαι τὰς εἰς  
τὸ συνελθὸν ἡμῶν [συν-  
παθεῖς εἰσόδους, καὶ  
τῶν ῥητορικῶν ἀπο-  
κάμψεις λόγων ὅπως  
ἀκούσης τι τῶν ἡμῶν  
ἀρεσκόντων. ἔνθεν  
σε καὶ κατελπίζομεν  
τὴν ταχίστην τὰς φι-  
λοσοφίας κρούσειν θύ-  
[ρας . . .

Thus two considerations begin to emerge in the Epicurean approach to arts: (i) art perceived from the point of view of its usefulness and its contribution to happiness; (ii) art perceived from the point of view of methodology. This explains the formulation of the definition of 'art' in the scholiast to Dionysius Thrax in terms of both usefulness and method.<sup>75</sup> It would appear that Epicureans could avail themselves of either strategy in their evaluation of individual arts, and their emphasis on any occasion was probably directed by the specific polemic in which they were engaged at the time. It should, however, be stressed that the

<sup>73</sup> Fr. 112.4-11 (Smith), who cites (p. 542) Tac. *Dial.* 13 for the general idea.

<sup>74</sup> Fr. 127 (Smith). It should be remembered that Epicurus' trusted companion Hermarchus started life as a rhetor (Diog. Laert. 10.24) before he was wooed from that profession by the philosopher, and some (e.g. Casanova (1983), 132) interpret the addressee of the epistolary fragment contained in the Diogenes of Oenoanda inscription to be Hermarchus. The fragment attracted a fair amount of debate in the past; for summary and discussion see Smith (1993), 559-60 and Longo Auricchio (1988), 176-77.

<sup>75</sup> See Blank (1995), 178.

Epicureans were not interested in destroying arts simply for the sake of it (as Proclus already acknowledges when he distinguishes them from the Skeptics). They attacked the principles of an art when they perceived that those principles contradicted their own world view or when they believed that the art interfered with the attainment of happiness. Ultimately, their goal in discussing arts at all was ethical.

In addition to the efforts of Zeno mentioned above, we also possess, through Philodemus, tantalisingly brief testimony to Bromios' attempt to establish which activities were arts and which were not.<sup>76</sup> He discussed medicine, grammar and rhetoric, and probably several others. Philodemus criticises his contemporary for considering only political rhetoric an art, and not the other branches of this discipline. Unfortunately, we have no idea of Bromios' criteria for 'art', although some think it likely that he treated the subject in the manner previously established by Polyaeus.<sup>77</sup>

Whatever Epicurus' position on arts, and rhetoric's status within that position, Philodemus finds it necessary to devote the first two books of his *On Rhetoric* to the issue of whether rhetoric is an art. It must be conceded that by this time such discussions were almost de rigeur whenever rhetoric was treated, even by rhetoricians themselves.<sup>78</sup> However, Philodemus' contribution to this debate is interesting because it includes a review and appraisal of arguments of various origins which were used either to demonstrate that rhetoric was an art or to demonstrate that it was not. In addition, Philodemus explains the Epicurean position, as he

<sup>76</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XXXIV.15-22 (Longo, 115).

<sup>77</sup> See Tepedino Guerra (1991), 64-65.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Cic. *De or.* 1.102-104, Quint. *Inst.* 2.17.1 *an rhetorice ars sit?* Barnes (1986), 2 comments that this is hardly a serious question because by this stage it is usually a game, a test of ingenuity. Kennedy (1963), 321-322 takes the whole subject more seriously and traces the origin of the philosophical onslaught on rhetoric to increasing competition between the two disciplines for Roman pupils in the second century B.C.

sees it, on this issue, and attempts to support his view with citations from the writings of the Founders of the school.

The passage which closes the first book encapsulates the aims of Philodemus' project, since here Philodemus unequivocally asserts that the Founders of his school took sophistic rhetoric to be an art:

τοῖς δ' ἡμε-	
τέροις μεμπτέον	10
ἂν εἶη καὶ περιττότε-	
ρον τοῖς γέ τοι[σ] τοιούτ-	
οις, ὅσοι καὶ τὴν σοφισ-	
τικὴν ῥητορικὴν οὐ-	
κ] εἶναι τέχνην διειλή-	15
φασι καὶ τούτου συστα-	
τικούς λόγους πεποιή-	
κασι. εἰ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος	
καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἔτι	20
δ' Ἑρμαρχὸς ἀποφαί-	
νονται τέχνην ὑπάρ-	
χειν τὴν τοιαύτην	
ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ὑπο-	
μνήσομεν, οἱ τούτοις	25
ἀντιγράφοντες οὐ	
πάνυ τι μακρὰν τῆς	
τῶν πατραλοῖων	
καταδίκης ἀφες-	
τήκασιν.	

*Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. VII.9-29 (Longo, 21)*

Strong words indeed, but not out of place for dissident Epicureans who contradict the express statements of the Founders Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus. Longo Auricchio has repeatedly stated that we have no reason to believe that Philodemus misrepresents the Founders on this question,<sup>79</sup> but one should note that Philodemus' phrasing suggests that the task he has set himself is not quite so straightforward. First it is couched in the form of a conditional, εἰ γὰρ . . . ἀποφαίνονται τέχνην ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην . . ., which, while being a perfectly idiomatic expression, does at least have the effect of postponing the

<sup>79</sup> Longo Auricchio (1985), 42, (1988), 150, though she rightly warns that the question of rhetoric's technical status may not have occupied Epicurus as much as it does Philodemus. Philodemus constantly reiterates that the Founders considered sophistic rhetoric an art: *Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 coll. XXIII.33-XXIV.9, XXXVII.12-15*; whereas political rhetoric is not an art *Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXVI.28-31*.

outcome until the issue has been systematically researched at some length, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ὑπομνήσομεν. The use of the verb ἀποφαίνονται is also significant because it implies that the Founders' views are explicit,<sup>80</sup> and permits Philodemus to accuse the dissidents of incompetence in their reading of the canonical texts. Whether the views of the Founders are as clear as Philodemus claims they are is debatable.

The first two books of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* address the issue of whether rhetoric is an art or not. The question is a very old one and I shall reserve fuller discussion of it for chapters three and four. But a brief synopsis will be useful here. Philodemus attempts to demonstrate that rhetoric is indeed an art but only epideictic rhetoric or panegyric, what Philodemus prefers to call 'sophistic'. Philodemus proceeds as though he were restating the views of the Founders of the School and a substantial portion of his treatise is occupied with quotation, paraphrase, and exegesis of the texts of the founders which he claims discuss this question or shed light on it. In several respects Philodemus' work would appear to be directed at an Epicurean audience despite the evidence that it was dedicated to a Roman addressee<sup>81</sup> (hence the reference to parricides<sup>82</sup> at the end of the first book) and the author presents himself as a champion of orthodoxy. Philodemus also seems to offer some contributions of his own as a

<sup>80</sup> A helpful parallel for the force of this verb is provided by its occurrence in the second part of Philodemus' *De piet.* part 2 *PHerc.* 1428 Henrichs (1974) τοὺς διαφραζόμενους ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν (sc. θεοὶ) ἀποφαινομένου, "those who declare openly that the gods do not exist"; it commonly denotes the exposition of philosophical views and has overtones of clarity and frankness. See Obbink (1996), 304.

<sup>81</sup> The two need not be mutually exclusive, especially since Dorandi's (1996), 41-42 re-examination of the papyrus of Book 4 has led to the discovery that the text (*PHerc.* 1007 col. XLIIa.4 ff. = I, 222 Sudh.) does not read ὦ Γάτε παῖ (as previously thought) but ὦ Γάτε Πάνσοα, an altogether more helpful identification since Caius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus was both sympathetic to Epicureanism (see Castner (1991), 80) and was interested in rhetoric (see testimonies assembled by Dorandi art. cit., 42 n. 8) The dedicatee, if that is what he is, is only mentioned in Book 4, where Philodemus moves to more concrete material; it is not impossible that only that part which is considered practically serviceable is so dedicated, and it is not unknown for a portion of a work to be dedicated to one party. Jensen held the view that Philodemus' works were intended for a Roman audience and Roman pupils, (see Gigante (1990), 20). The intended audience remains uncertain, but Blank's suggestion that the work looks as if it is attempting to dispel the confusions of students of Epicureanism is quite attractive.

<sup>82</sup> The metaphor in this instance may well be connected with the notion of the γνήσιος Ἐπικούρειος preserved by Diog. Laert. 10.26. But it is certainly more widespread as the Lucretius passage referred to above shows (*tu pater es, rerum inventor, tu patria nobis / suppeditas praecepta* 3.9-10).

sort of argumentative complement to the textual citations, although the extent to which the exegesis is owed to his teacher Zeno is difficult to ascertain. In the course of his examination of various (often disembodied) arguments for and against the thesis that rhetoric is an art, Philodemus also refers to other more recent Epicureans with whom he takes issue.

### b) The context of current polemic

Philodemus is not simply rehearsing a clichéd exercise. His discussion of rhetoric forms part of a larger project which attempted to establish a coherent Epicurean position on the main subjects of ancient *paideia*: rhetoric, poetry and music. More specifically, in the second book of *On Rhetoric*, he has a more immediate task: to meet the challenge of a recent view expressed by unnamed Epicureans on the islands of Rhodes and Cos. Philodemus claims that he is following Zeno's research on the issue and reasserting the doctrines of the Founders. At the same time, he seeks to clarify what the Founders understood by the term 'rhetoric' as he demonstrates that the subject of the polemic is confused by an imprecise conception of what is meant by the term. Hence he criticises other Epicureans for omitting sophistic from their considerations in discussion of arts. So much for what is explicitly stated on the context for this polemical venture. One can only speculate on further motivations. If Philodemus represents a new Epicurean community (and I use the term 'community' in a loose sense) one may suspect that Philodemus is seeking to promote his own group within the broader community of Epicureans.<sup>83</sup> As a relatively new community, the Campanian Epicureans may well have been perceived as living on the margins of mainstream Epicurean thought, especially when compared with the more established communities at Athens, Rhodes, and the Near East.<sup>84</sup> It should be remembered that Rhodes was a popular destination for Romans in

<sup>83</sup> Rawson (1985), 59 believes that, although the Campanian Epicureans will have read works like Philodemus' *On Rhetoric*, they were aimed at the international community.

<sup>84</sup> This suggestion entails the assumption that Philodemus composed the first books of *On Rhetoric* in Italy, and consequently that he was already in the country at the earlier date favoured by Philipsson *RE*

search of acquaintance with Greek rhetoric and philosophy. By entering the debate, Philodemus would be aiming to put the Campanian community "on the map" by showing that it too could contribute to Epicurean thought and was in a position to provide instruction in philosophy.<sup>85</sup> In fact, there are hints that Philodemus suggests that his own community has, in some respects, a superior understanding of Epicurean doctrine and is thus more orthodox than some other communities.<sup>86</sup> He is also concerned to demonstrate that his community is following the lead taken by the original Kepos, hence the frequent appeal to the authority of the scholar Zenon, whose views he claims to be repeating.

There may be additional influences and considerations. One should not forget that although Philodemus rarely makes mention of it,<sup>87</sup> he is working within a Roman context. Rome's earliest contact with Epicureanism is poorly documented. While a few of Rome's early Hellenised authors had some grasp of the school's tenets, and in some cases may even have been sympathetic to the doctrines,<sup>88</sup> it is fair to speculate that Epicureanism was one of the lesser-known philosophies throughout the second century B.C. In fact, certain events of the middle of the second century B.C. give the impression that Epicureanism found itself at a

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XIX.2 (1938) coll. 2444-45 and Asmis (1990), 2371 n. 7. In a more recent review of the evidence Sider (1997), 8-9 tentatively places Philodemus' arrival in Italy and his work on *On Rhetoric* in about 74-73 B.C. I have not been able to read J. Wisse's essay, 'The presence of Zenon. The date of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* . . . etc.', in R. Risselada et al. (edd.) *On Latin. Linguistic and Literary Studies in Honour of Harm Pinkster*, pp. 173-202, Amsterdam (1996).

85 Gigante, commenting on "il Belvedere" which was part of the complex of the Villa dei Papiri, uses a playful hyperbole: ". . . un concreto indizio della resurrezione del Kepos ateniese a Ercolano" (1990), 2). Amoroso, following Gigante's lead (1974), 37, believes that the existence of the work *περὶ ὁμιλίας* (*PHerc.* 873) and mention within it of *κοινολογίαί* presuppose that Philodemus was actively engaged in teaching (1975), 63, 70.

86 At *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. LII.8-10 (Longo, 151) he implies that he is better versed in Epicurean writings than his opponents. I cannot accept Sedley's suggestion that due to his isolation in Italy Philodemus was nervous of developing doctrinal ideas for himself (1989), 105. His pursuit of orthodoxy is surely quite understandable and the ardour with which he confronts his Epicurean opponents displays remarkable confidence.

87 In *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 fr. 5 lines 5-10 (Longo, 31) Romans are mentioned together with Spartans as nations which managed to administer treaties without the aid of rhetorical training. For a brief commentary on this and a couple of other references to Rome in Philodemus, see Gigante (1988), 154-155.

88 Ennius shows a degree of familiarity with Epicurean doctrine. Plautus and Terence on the other hand reveal no obvious allusions to the school or its teachings.

certain disadvantage with respect to competing schools of philosophy at Rome. While the Stoa, Peripatos, and Academy will have profited from the exposure afforded by their representatives in the diplomatic embassy of 155 B.C., the Epicureans did not receive the same opportunity for a public advertisement of their own doctrines. The sources on this episode provide no information on the reasons for the exclusion of the Epicureans, but we may speculate: either the Athenians passed them over as unsuitable for such a diplomatic enterprise or the Epicureans did not make themselves available out of obedience to the doctrine of non-participation in civic business.<sup>89</sup> Whatever the reason, Epicureanism was also the target of a specific attack at some time in the second century.<sup>90</sup> This took the form of a *senatus consultum* which decreed the expulsion of two Epicurean philosophers, Alceus and Philiscus. The motives for this expulsion as presented by the sources are questionable because they appear so stereotypical.<sup>91</sup> Whether or not Epicureanism in the second century B.C. confronted serious problems in overcoming a Roman perception that the school's doctrines were irreconcilable with what the Romans themselves regarded as life's priorities,<sup>92</sup> Epicureanism appears to have made considerable gains in the first half of the first century B.C. and found a number of Roman adherents and sympathisers.<sup>93</sup> Some of these apparently

<sup>89</sup> The incident was frequently rehearsed in antiquity, e.g. Cic. *De or.* 2.155, Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22, Gell. 6.14.9. Yet Cicero surmises that Diogenes the Stoic and Carneades the Academic could hardly have been chosen for their practical expertise in diplomacy, *qui cum rei publicae nullam umquam partem attigissent* (*Tusc.* 4.5). Gruen (1990), 177 n. 86 suggests that the Epicurean absence may be explained by their lack of interest in rhetoric. This is quite possible, but I do not think we need be even that specific.

<sup>90</sup> In addition to the apparently indiscriminate ban of 161 B.C.

<sup>91</sup> Ath. 12.547a and Ael. *VH* 9.12 both mention that the Epicureans were leading the youth into pleasures (ἡδοναί). Gruen (1990), 177-178 speculates that Epicureanism's reputation as a philosophy of pleasure made teachers from that school convenient scapegoats in a token review of what the Roman elite found acceptable in Greek philosophy. Naturally, this thesis relies on the date of the decree being 154 and not 173 B.C.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Bayet (1954), 89 "... l'épicurisme restait presque impensable à une société engagée dans l'action violente, vouée à la fois à l'ambition personnelle et au service de l'État."

<sup>93</sup> The evidence permits only an impressionistic view, mainly because Cicero's claims of Epicureanism run riot in Italy (*Tusc.* 4.6-7) appear exaggerated for rhetorical purposes (Howe (1951), 61-62 sees Cicero's late attacks on Epicureanism and its ubiquitousness as politically motivated). But it is well known that many prominent Romans of the first century B.C. did profess Epicurean sympathies, and the presence of Roman authors who disseminated Epicurean doctrines, Lucretius, Amalfinius, Catus, and Rabirius, indicates a not insignificant interest. On Roman Epicureans see Gigante (1983), 25-34 and Eler's review of the subject (1994), 363-380

felt no significant conflict to exist between Epicurean beliefs and a life of political participation.

We may not go so far as to view Philodemus as Epicureanism's apostle to the Romans, a sort of Epicurean Panaetius or Posidonius, but he was surely conscious that he was competing, to a certain extent, with other philosophical schools for the hearts and minds of Roman patrons.<sup>94</sup> This may partly account for his views on rhetoric, which could be construed as a defence of an innovation, possibly introduced by Zeno in Athens, to attract students by incorporating some training in rhetoric within the curriculum.<sup>95</sup> The only problem with this thesis, as I see it, is that Philodemus systematically and repeatedly denies that forensic and political rhetoric have any efficacy at all: hardly a sound promotional strategy if he intended to attract well-to-do Romans who invariably sought promotion within the *cursus honorum*.<sup>96</sup> In fact, it is difficult to detect any evidence from Roman authors of the first century B.C. that Epicureanism, as practised in Italy or anywhere else, was in the least sympathetic to rhetorical studies. We do, however, possess references to the incompatibility of Epicureanism and rhetoric. In Cicero's *De oratore* 3.63 (which I cited briefly above) we are informed that Epicureanism is of no assistance to the budding orator (*procul abest . . . ab eo viro quem*

<sup>94</sup> Most Romans seem to have sampled a variety of philosophical schools. Cicero is a fine example of this tendency to "shop around": he attended lectures given by the Epicurean Phaedrus (*Fam.* 13.1.2), Philo the Academician (*Brut.* 306), and the Stoic Diodotus (*Brut.* 309) among others.

<sup>95</sup> This is Blank's feeling (*privatim*), if I undertood him correctly. Sedley (1989a), 108 took a similar view and suggested that Zeno was anxious to justify his own eloquence in lecturing. For Zeno's style (*distincte, graviter, ornate*), cf. *Cic. Nat. D* 1.59.

<sup>96</sup> One might also question whether the Epicureans would have been successful in persuading prospective students that they were committed to instruction in forms of traditional *paideia* or even competent to do so. Suetonius *Gram.* 8 records the interesting case of the Syrian Pompilius Andronicus who though a *grammaticus* was also an Epicurean; he enjoyed little success as a teacher and retired, somewhat appropriately, to Cumae. Suetonius suggests that because of his Epicureanism his reputation as a teacher was somehow impaired, which in turn led to the ruin of his school (*studio Epicureae sectae desidiosior in professione grammatica habebatur minusque idoneus ad tuendam scholam*, 8.1). This despite the fact that he wrote a highly respected work on Ennius. See Bonner (1977), 152 and Kaster (1995), 122-128. Although his is an isolated case, he shows that in the first century B.C. some Epicureans at least were prepared to pursue careers which others might have thought incompatible with their philosophy. Suetonius' testimony, however, indicates that it was not easy for Epicureans who embraced *paideia* to overcome the prejudice of other members of society; cf. Kaster (1995), 124-125.

*quaerimus*), while in Virgil *Catalepton* 5 the writer celebrates his migration from the *inanes* . . . *rhetorum ampullae* to the *docta dicta Sironis*. Such testimonies suggest that educated Romans continued to perceive Epicurean philosophy and rhetoric as inimical to one another.<sup>97</sup> And, whatever the truth of the matter, perceptions of prospective students are important.

### c) The format of the polemic

As the earlier part of the rolls of books one and two is missing, we are not in a position to reconstruct the format and order of the contents of these books with complete precision. An initial reading of the surviving text is often confusing, but if one persists with a second or third reading one will discover that what remains, despite the interference of lacunae, is actually quite systematically arranged. The surviving portions indicate that Philodemus adopted a format which is discernible in several other works. This section of the treatise falls broadly into two parts. The first examines various arguments from various sources which propose that rhetoric is an art or is not an art. The issue of rhetoric's technicity is tackled initially as a sort of dialectical problem. Philodemus confronts or comments on an array of fairly standard premises on which conclusions as to rhetoric's technicity are based, to show that each premise does not have to be conceded or that, even if it is, the conclusion intended does not necessarily follow. The arguments cited are not, in his opinion, persuasive. After the critical review of an array of arguments, Philodemus turns to a brief survey of previous Epicurean treatment of the issue, most of which, in his opinion, is inadequate or misconceived. He then proceeds to show that the problem requires more precise examination of what an art is and what rhetoric is. The foregoing arguments were deficient in that they failed to appreciate an error in understanding of the crucial words 'art' and 'rhetoric'. He then

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<sup>97</sup>

Siro never wrote anything and since he died in 42 B.C. the dramatic date for this utterance would be almost contemporary with Philodemus. Presumably the phrase *docta dicta* is meant to recall Epicurus'

completes this section of his work by illustrating from the texts of the Founders that sophistic rhetoric is an art, because the Founders said it was.

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## CHAPTER 2: TRANSLATION

In this translation, words and phrases within square brackets indicate (unless otherwise specified) conjectures and supplements made in Longo Auricchio's edition, words and phrases within rounded brackets indicate interpretative additions posited by Longo Auricchio or myself to complete the sense of a fragmentary passage.

### PHILODEMUS ON RHETORIC BOOK I PHERC. 1427

*The fragments of PHerc. 1427 cannot be placed in any certain order. The surviving fragments contain remarks on several familiar issues surrounding the notion of arts and sciences and rhetoric's status among them: definitions (frr. 1 and 3), variety, level of expertise required by practitioner (frr. 2 and 4), degree of success to be expected from an art, and so forth. It is not really possible to identify which of the opinions represented in these fragments are Philodemus' own; they are more likely critical surveys of opinions commonly held.*

#### fr. 1 (Longo, 3)

... [to(?)] conceptualise science, and fitting rhetoric into the conception they declare it to be an art, in order that in this way the so-called ball-game of the blind<sup>1</sup> comes about. Of course, they are constrained by the type of fault we are talking about. For because of the innumerable differences which exist in arts, whenever they encounter a special characteristic they immediately exclude from the category of arts (the practice) which contributes this. So we shall leave the other differences alone for the moment. For though some arts will always provide a certain assistance (for life(?)) they do not need anything ...

#### fr. 2 (Longo, 5)

...

And some arts have no need at all for training, but having taken hold of a uniform(?)<sup>2</sup> nature in a remarkable way they achieve the most by means of themselves. Others, requiring not nature but only practice, produce the rest in a methodical way. Furthermore, the works of

<sup>1</sup> Longo's conjecture from τυφλῶν; cf. the expression used of Dionysodorus in Pl. *Euthyd.* 277 b3, ὥσπερ σφαίραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον.

<sup>2</sup> Longo has ὁμοειδοῦς] from Sudh. *Suppl.*, which if correct might imply that the practitioner's nature is so perfectly attuned to the art in question as to make its execution quite effortless, almost robotic. Would ὁμοίργου] (Sudh. I) be a possibility, giving the practitioner's talent a supporting role?

some arts, at least those which are specific and important, fall not only to experts but also to those who are ignorant. While not even a single work of some arts falls to people who are not experts because of their crudeness and . . .

fr. 3 (Longo, 7)

. . . (some say that art is)<sup>3</sup> that which contributes firm precepts,<sup>4</sup> like grammar, others that which alone contributes wisdom, others that which has a rationale "by which it administers what it administers", as Plato says,<sup>5</sup> while others say that it is that which has been introduced for some advantage of life; and when they exclude rhetoric from the arts because it is not like this, whether trying to reverse the kind of art [it appears (?)] to be (?) . . .

fr. 4 (Longo, 7)

. . . or we shall make mention in the specific refutations of the arguments.

For some of the sciences have from nature all or most of what has to form their basis, and little that occurs in addition through training, while others accomplish their ends through themselves,<sup>6</sup> while still others require in addition the existence of some natural talent which does not really result from training . . .

*The continuous text only begins towards what was the concluding part of the book. The first twenty lines of column I are too fragmentary to permit translation.*

*When the text becomes legible, we find ourselves in the middle of a review and classification of arguments which seek to establish that rhetoric is not an art. All the arguments listed and described are discovered to be flawed.*

<sup>3</sup> So Longo, 7 following the logic of the priamel, although the letter traces she records for line 1, . . . ] . XAN [ . ] Σ [ , are of no help.

<sup>4</sup> [έ]στηκότα θεωρήμα]τα. The term θεωρήματα recurs at *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. III.11-12, III.25-26 τῆς τέχνης θεωρημάτων], *PHerc.* 1672 col. XXXIII.16-17 [θεωρημάτων πολιτικῶν [παραδόσεις; the term [παρ]αγγέλι]ματα which occurs at *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. III.29 is a synonym (cf. [Longinus] *Subl.* 2.1 τεχνικὰ παραγγέλματα).

<sup>5</sup> *Grg.* 465 a4.

<sup>6</sup> Presumably these are sciences where the ability or dedication of the practitioner is largely irrelevant; the phrase δ[ι] ἐαυτῶν τελεσιουργοῦσιν (lines 10-11) recalls τὸ κλειτῶν τῶν δ[ι] ἐαυτῶν συντελοῦσιν of fr. 2 lines 7-9, where talent and art are practically co-extensive.

## col. I (Longo, 9)

... (one speech possesses)<sup>7</sup> only the theoretical, another the rhetorical, another both of these when the delivery of the speech occurs before a mob; and if this were so in the case of the other sciences then perhaps the theoretical (speech) would not be simply dialectic. And perhaps, even along with these interchanges some other interchanges will be found in sciences ...

## col. II (Longo, 11)

... they will not appear to propose<sup>8</sup> that it is not an art, but rather that it is not the only discipline that produces its goal. For it is not perhaps without precedent nor unseen in the phenomena that what occurs by means of art has a share in being achieved both by the (relevant) art and by means of some other art,<sup>9</sup> and in this way perhaps the useful too is naturally distinguished from the necessary. The majority of the arguments, if not all of them, are also open to comparisons. But it is a pathetic argument, even if it is another kind of argument, when, by proceeding with the same arguments, with which someone supposes he is offering a refutation, people can disprove that which is true or appears true to the man constructing the proof. Thanks to these proofs, no one will prevent those who champion the opposing position from saying that the fully qualified<sup>10</sup> artist is he who [has taken part] in the art and has been thoroughly trained [in all] its [col. III (Longo, 13)] parts,<sup>11</sup> but that there are

<sup>7</sup> So Longo, 9. It is difficult to guess what the subject and verb were in this sentence, but the subject was probably something like λόγος rather than a person.

<sup>8</sup> Taking Blank's παρακαλεῖν instead of Longo's παραιστάγειν.

<sup>9</sup> A difficult sentence: after line 11, the scribe seems to have omitted a line (numbered 11a in Longo) and to have restored it in the margin of the next column (Longo, 10 app. crit. and Blank app. crit.). For my translation of lines 11-11a-13 I have adopted Blank's text, τοῦτο καὶ / τοῦ τῆι τέχνῃ συντελεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἄλλης / [διαλλ] [ουεκδηλοσ] τινός αὐτῷ / κοινωνῆσαι τέχνης, instead of Longo's τοῦτο [διὰ] / 'αὐτῆς τεχνῆς) συντελεῖσθαι καὶ [δι] ἄλλης' / [διαλλ] 'τῆς δὲ ἐ) κοινωνῆσαι τέχνης]. The expression still seems so condensed that the meaning is rendered obscure.

<sup>10</sup> I adopt Blank's text for lines 36-37 εἶναι τινα τέλειον τεχνεῖτην, instead of Longo's εἶναι τὸν) ἀτέλειον τεχνεῖτην. The term ἀτέλειος τεχνίτης is a strange one and occurs nowhere else in the surviving sections of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* books 1 and 2.

<sup>11</sup> I adopt Blank's text for col. II.37 - col. III.2 δς / [μεταλαβὼν τῆς τέχνης ἐν πάσιν] ἐκπεπληρόνηται μέρεσιν, where Longo has δς / [.....] ΗΣΤΕ / [.....] ΚΠΕ / ΠΕ . . Η [.] ΤΑ [.] Ι μέρεσιν. Blank's supplements seem quite plausible since the words [ἐν πάσιν]

some others who have acquired (only) some of the parts of the science; if someone supposes that, in criticising them, he is criticising the fully-qualified artist, he has failed to notice that by this very means he will show that even those who are currently under examination are involved. Since these things have been established, it will be possible to fabricate a very negative character when one makes a case against sciences which is based on specific practitioners, something which has already been comprehended as wrong by the most asinine of people, but occurs amongst these men. However, it will be easy to say too that while many, even of those who are not rhetors, persuade in a general sense, this is not the goal of rhetoric, but rather persuasion by speech, and so he will accuse those who bring up things like beauty and other nonsense of great irrelevance. [col. IV (Longo, 15)] For I think that even if he concedes that some laymen persuade with speech at times, he will not however have demonstrated that they persuade better than the professionals, either according to what is specific to speaking or as frequently as they do. And you will find<sup>12</sup> that many of the proofs have overstepped what is effective in composition, apart from the obscurities already indicated, proofs which are artificially constructed with ambiguity in words, which is the most unprofessional mistake a philosopher can make. (And you will find many proofs) which do not differ in power (from those mentioned), but which, when they clothe themselves in different forms or simply different examples, reveal the wealth<sup>13</sup> of the people who employ them. And often in the arguments there is too much plain assertion and complete absence of elaboration, and perhaps if some avoid this they will not fail utterly. And a certain error pervades [col. V (Longo, 17)] almost the majority of the treatises, and it is of the following character: they accept without evidence that the art does not exist at some time or other in the past and or in some place or other, whenever they suppose that they have proved in any way

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offer a satisfactory contrast with μέρη τινά, and he has identified more letters in the first line of column III.

<sup>12</sup> Adopting Blank's text at the end of line 11 εὐρήσεις instead of Longo's εὐρήσει].

<sup>13</sup> Surely ironic, i.e. "poverty".

possible that certain technical manuals had not been set down in writing, since the era did not allow arts to have been worked out at all<sup>14</sup> amongst those men or in those periods where not even the art of writing existed or had come into existence. But I think that all, and if not all at least most of the arguments, even if their premises are conceded, will not lead to the conclusion which their composers intend, and especially if their syllogisms lead them to conclusions concerning sophistic rhetoric's not being an art; but if then (it is valid to say) that political and practical rhetoric do not come about by means of it (i.e. sophistic rhetoric), (it is not valid that), if then<sup>15</sup> music does not comprise writing and reading, on account of this cause it is not even a [col. VI (Longo, 19)] science of some other subjects. And in their syllogistic arguments on political rhetoric, many conclude that it does not come about by means of sophistic, if they make a good guess. And it is important to attend (to this fact) in case one ever says things which are not convincing:<sup>16</sup> as, for example, that just as dialectic is an art but does not achieve anything by itself unless combined with ethical and physical arguments, a procedure which even some of the Stoics have grasped, so too is rhetoric an art, but by no means produces results unless linked with political subject matter.<sup>17</sup> Thus the fact that the majority of arguments are inductive has not perhaps escaped the notice of even those who are moderately intelligent. Perhaps other types of fault pervade their syllogisms but we do not see fit to elaborate in detail those arguments [col. VII (Longo, 21)] whose failure is easy to spot at the same time,<sup>18</sup> and in the refutation of specific arguments some of the things which have been passed over now will be thought worthy of mention. Our people might have to be

<sup>14</sup> I adopt Blank's text for lines 12a-b (12a-b-c in his edition) ὥσπερ οὐκ ἔμε[νε]ν ὁ χρόνος ἐκπεπο[ν]ῆσθαι τι / τέχνας, instead of Longo's ὥσπερ οὐκ εἴ[τα] ὁ χρόνος ἐκπεπο[ν]ῆσθαι τι[νας] τέχνας.

<sup>15</sup> I adopt Longo's interpretation of the letters ΕΙΔΗΜΟΥΣΙΚΗ in line 33 (εἰ δὲ μουσική) instead of Blank's (εἰ δ' ἡ μουσική)

<sup>16</sup> I adopt Blank's text for line 9 μήποτε οὐκ ἀπίθαν[α], instead of Longo's μήποτε οὐκ ἀγαθά.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. the opening of Aristotle's *Rh.* 1.1 1354a 1-4 ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ ἀμφοτέραι γὰρ περὶ τοιοῦτων τινῶν εἰσὶν ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφορισμένης· διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν, and 1.1 1355b 8-10.

<sup>18</sup> I adopt Blank's text for lines 1-2 ὧν [ε]ἰδυσυ/θεώρητον ἔχουσιν, instead of Longo's ἄ[ν] ὅ

censured and particularly all those sort of people who assume that sophistic rhetoric too is not an art and have composed confirmatory arguments of this view. For if Epicurus and Metrodorus and moreover Hermarchus declare such a practice to be an art, as we shall record in what comes next, then those who write against them are not very far from being condemned as parricides.

**PHILODEMUS ON RHETORIC BOOK 2 PHERC. 1674**

**fr. 1a and b** (Longo, 25)

*Too fragmentary to translate*

**fr. 2a and b** (Longo, 27)

. . . the practical (speeches), [so that] there is nothing [which he says (?)] nor (that) [they seem] to have made any other [art], but only [the artist] of the [goal] . . .

**frr. 3 and 4** (Longo, 29)

*Too fragmentary to translate*

**fr. 5** (Longo, 31)

. . . it should be said (?) in the first and the [famous (?)]; and in the case of the other arts this (?) holds likewise. So since Romans and Spartans administer the affairs which concern treaties without rhetorical education . . . [but] have thrown out the rhetorical speech . . .<sup>19</sup>

**frr. 6 - 7 - 7a - 7b - 8** (Longo, 33-39)

*Too fragmentary to translate*

**fr. 9** (Longo, 41)

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υπ'θεώρητον ἔχουσιν.

<sup>19</sup> The Spartan rejection of rhetoric is something of a commonplace in discussions of rhetoric's value, cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2. 22-23, where two specific historical examples of Spartan treatment of foreign ambassadors are cited.

... (whenever) they take for assistance those who have the skill and the cities accept the arts which correspond to them, but some cities ban rhetoric and the Spartans used to ban the art of manufacturing perfume and the art of purple-dyeing, so let us say that they are not arts ...

... the cities ban (?), but not for this reason, he says, ...

fr. 10 (Longo, 43)

*Too fragmentary to translate*

*When continuous text becomes legible we find ourselves in the middle of a critical survey of specific arguments which are cited and then commented on so as to be shown to be invalid in themselves. The first section is concerned with specific arguments which are presented in support of the thesis that rhetoric is not an art.*

Col. I (Longo, 45)

... if an architect demolishes]<sup>20</sup> a house [and] ... a captain [snaps]<sup>21</sup> a ship (in two) and a physician kills a human being by using method, let us not concede that these are arts or, for that matter, all those arts which the argument foolishly considers useful, just like the one before it.

"The different arts do not achieve each other's goals, but both the philosopher and the grammarian and the dialectician will achieve rhetoric's goal in passing."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Longo's conjecture from ]ΟΜΟΣΟΙΚΙΑΝΚΑ[. . . . / ]Ε[. . ., in lines 1-2, καταφθείρει Sudh. *Suppl.* As Hubbell suggests (1920), 268, the lost argument must have stated that an art always produces a beneficial or intended result.

<sup>21</sup> Longo's conjecture from .....]ΣΕΙ in line 4, περιτρέπει Sudh.

<sup>22</sup> Longo's punctuation; she interprets this sentence as a new argument which Philodemus then proceeds to comment on. She is probably right: the sentence seems to introduce a different issue from what has come before, and a horizontal line beneath line 12 could indicate a new argument. In the rest of my translation, I shall indicate arguments to be criticised by inverted commas, and will only indicate occasions where I do not agree with Longo. The tenor of the argument cited is reminiscent of remarks Philodemus made in *PHerc.* 1427 col. II.3-13. The phrase τοῦ δὲ / [τῆς] ῥητορικῆς τέλους / . . . παράξει (lines 14-18), which I have translated as ". . . will achieve rhetoric's goal in passing", is a difficult one. LSJ does not provide a parallel to the use of παράγω with the genitive case. I assume that it is intransitive and have tried to bring out the force of the preposition παρά: the point is, I think, that philosophers etc. achieve what rhetoric achieves in the process of completing their own goals; they do this without practising rhetoric *per se*, which indicates that rhetoric is not an art with its own discrete goal and means to that goal.

If we mean something [concerning] the business of rhetoric, [such as] the objects which it desires (to achieve), these [will] not [be present]; for the product . . .

. . . whenever so-called experts gain in addition one of the goals, they bring in<sup>23</sup> both ample research and practice. And persuasion by means of rhetorical speech is the goal of rhetoric, [not] persuasion (by some other means) . . .

[Col. II (Longo, 47)]

. . . he (?) persuades] (in a sense), but he does not persuade by [rhetoric] but rather by dialectic or by action, for even Phryne persuades (in a sense) both by beauty and music, but does not [compose] rhetorical devices, if the argument can produce a valid result in any way.<sup>24</sup>

"Not even one of those who are not experts beats the expert in the work of the art, but in the work of rhetoric not even this is universally the case."

For in the case of some (arts) which are conjectural, there are times when the non-expert beats the expert, just as in the case of medicine too (it results) that the expert is outdone by some individual from among those who are partially expert, while (for one) of those who are [completely non-expert] it is impossible to conceive (anything). [But there is uncertainty] as to who is being discussed here: if the argument takes the non-expert to mean "the man who has not been trained in the rhetorical schools", and the expert to mean "the man who comes from the schools", by showing that sophistic rhetoric is not an art and political rhetoric is not

<sup>23</sup> Longo's conjecture from .]A[. . .]ΥΣΙΝ in lines 30-31, παράξουσιν Sudh. *Suppl.*

<sup>24</sup> Unlike Longo, I have taken the protasis εἰ [δὲ / [πῶς ὁ] λόγος [δύναται τι / [προσά]γειν ἄλ[η]θές (lines 7-9) as part of the conclusion to the objection and not as the beginning of the next cited argument. I believe it is easier to interpret it semantically as a comment on the previous argument than as part of the next argument cited (which in any case is self-sufficient and much clearer without the clause), and Longo records a *diple* beneath line 9 which could indicate that the new argument cited

an art, but that rhetoric . . .

[Col. III (Longo, 49)]

*The first eleven lines of this column (Blank has identified an additional line so that line 1 in Longo is actually line 2) are too lacunose to translate.*

" . . . the [majority] of rules are valid, while those relating to rhetoric are false."<sup>25</sup>

[But according to this line of reasoning not even]<sup>26</sup> philosophy should be called an art, nor medicine, nor music, [because in no respect] on the basis of the things laid down [from beginning to end by certain people] is it possible to discover whether some people have made a mistake or whether, [while attempting]<sup>27</sup> to achieve the rules of the entire art, [they actually have no knowledge].<sup>28</sup> The fact that rhetoric . . . false rules not to be art. With regard to [the man who says] that he who is not an expert in geometry and the other sciences . . . to observe . . .

[Col. IV (Longo, 51)]

*The first line of this column is too fragmentary to translate.*

. . . but earlier we have spoken of the most important points, and we have spoken also with regard to the issue in question.

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only begins in line 9 (with the definite article τῶν) and ends with the *paragraphos* at line 14. Of course, this leaves the new argument without a connective.

<sup>25</sup> I adopt Blank's text for lines 12-14 (= Longo lines 11-13), τὰ πλείστα θεωρήματα ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, ψευδῆ / τὰ κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν. Blank interprets these lines as a cited argument, which is supported by the identification of a *diple* at line 11 and a *paragraphos* or *diple* at line 14.

<sup>26</sup> Blank's re-examination of the papyrus for line 15 (= line 14 in Longo) and the crucial π at the beginning of the line πλὴν οὕτως οὐδὲ, makes Sudhaus' supplement (adopted by Longo) [δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ] impossible.

<sup>27</sup> Blank confirms ἀπάσης but his re-examination of this line in the papyrus makes Sudhaus' [ἀστοχοῦντες (adopted by Longo line 23) or ἀμοιροῦντες (Sudh. *Suppl.*)] impossible, for we now have . . . X . . . YNTEΣ; the gap between χ and υ is too great to permit ἀστοχοῦντες. Blank adopts Cirillo's [ἐπι]χ[ε]ροῦντες.

<sup>28</sup> I adopt Blank's text for lines 25-28 (lines 24-27 in Longo), ἐφίκε[σθαι] τῶν [ἀληθι]ν[ων] τῆς

"The expert does not deny he is an expert; but the rhetor (does)".

If there is some difference in arts and it is of this type, that some people are impeded<sup>29</sup> from achieving the goal if they say they do not possess the art and others are impeded if they say they do, assuming<sup>30</sup> that method exists, how, simply because of this, can we say that rhetoric is not an art? And in fact some experts will continuously deny<sup>31</sup> that they possess [the] art, although . . . not denying<sup>32</sup> . . .<sup>33</sup>

. . . Even philosophers tell some people that they do not have it, as well as [musicians] and poets and . . .<sup>34</sup> For they do not always deny (that they possess) the art nor (do they deny it) to all men, but only [sometimes] and to some men,<sup>35</sup> the reason being that they think they are removing fear from those who expect to be deceived by necessity. And they deny that they possess the art of sophistic [Col. V (Longo, 53)] [and they say that sophistic]<sup>36</sup> is [not] perhaps a property of rhetoric, but they never apologise for methodical experience in practical things or the ability to express them or the possession of these things, in fact, they continually boast [about] it, as Demosthenes does.

τέχνης θεωρημάτων [οὐδὲν ἐπίσταν]ται.

<sup>29</sup> Adopting Hammerstaedt's ἐνκόπτεσθαι [πρὸς] τὸ τέλος] (accepted by Blank) in place of Longo's ἐνκόπως / [ἢ μηδέ]ποτε [μαν]θάνειν].

<sup>30</sup> Adopting Blank's εἰάν [ἀρ/νηθῶσι] τοὺς δὲ εἰάν ὁμο[λογῶσιν, δ]ταν ἦι (lines 10-12) in place of Longo's [μαν]θάνειν/ τινάς], τοὺς δὲ σ' υ [νομο]λο[γεῖν τ]ῆς κλ[άνης].

<sup>31</sup> Adopting Blank's ἀπαρνήσονται (line 17) in place of Longo's ἀποφαινόνται; Sudhaus *Suppl.* had ἀπαρνοῦνται.

<sup>32</sup> The participle ἀρνομένων is in the genitive but the following lacuna makes the syntax unclear.

<sup>33</sup> Blank's careful examination of the text at this point (lines 20-22) has made Longo's supplements untenable: .....]ιστο[.]]τ'τα[.]νιειραν[.]ιστασεχ ἐπαρνή[σεσθαι].

<sup>34</sup> Adopting Blank's text (lines 22-26), καὶ φιλόσοφοι γ' ἐπαρνοῦνται πρὸς τινὰς / [καὶ μουσικοὶ τ]ε καὶ ποι[ηταὶ] καὶ [.]α . [.....]σιν ἐ[πιφ]αίνεσθαι, instead of Longo's [οἱ] καὶ φιλοσοφῶτε[ρον] οἶον[ται] πρὸς τινὰς / πάντα λέγειν] καὶ ποι[εῖν] καὶ [π]ῶ[σαν] δόνα[μιν] ἐμ[φα]νίζειν.

<sup>35</sup> Adopting Blank's text (lines 26-30), οὐ γὰρ διὰ παν/τός ο]ὔδε πρὸς πάντας ἀλ/λ' ἐνίοτε καὶ πρὸς ἐνίους / ἐπαρνοῦνται τῆ[ν] τέ[χνην].

<sup>36</sup> Longo's conjecture from .....]KHN (lines 1-2), ῥητορικὴν Sudh. *Suppl.*

"On the contrary some would be in a bad position if they were ashamed of their art."<sup>37</sup>

Not necessarily. Anyway, since rhetoric thanks to this does not contribute method how is it likely to win (people) over? Therefore it is quite clear that some people impute an art to certain people and that it has something unique with regard to the other sciences; and in the case of other arts which are harmful, or have a reputation for being harmful, some people reproach certain people not for having the power which they profess to have but for having a power which they do not wish to prevail.

"Every expert claims he will achieve his goal, but the rhetor does not claim he will persuade."<sup>38</sup>

Not every expert, if he has sense, [col. VI (Longo, 55)] claims he will achieve his goal on every occasion. For a physician does not, nor does a pilot, nor an archer, nor, in short, do any who possess sciences which are not certain, but conjectural. And so either one should not call these practices arts, or one should call rhetoric too an art. And the rhetor too claims he will achieve his goal. And his goal is that which the nature of the circumstances presents, and it is not fixed on every occasion, not even, by Zeus, on [most occasions]. But he achieves [the] task much more frequently than those who are not rhetors.

"Every expert procures the work of his art much earlier for himself; how on earth does [another] make the advocate sufficient and most [effective]?"<sup>39</sup>

[By means of] these arguments let us exclude medicine [too]<sup>40</sup> from the arts, <if> a

<sup>37</sup> I take this sentence to be another interjection from the imaginary opponent.

<sup>38</sup> For this argument and the response to it, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 2.17.22-24 who also mentions a pilot, and Quintus' defence of divination as a conjectural art in Cic. *Div.* 1.24.

<sup>39</sup> Both Caudeher (1981), 183 and De Lacy (1980), 100 identified a difficulty with Longo's text at lines 22-25 [πῶς / δ' ἕτερος [ἄν] παρά]σχηι ἰκ[α]μ[ὸν] κ[α]ὶ δεινό]τατο[ν] / τὸν συνήγορο[ν].

<sup>40</sup> Adopting Sudhaus' καί instead of Longo's κά.

[physician], when he is sick, brings [to himself] other people who are good at healing. And the rhetor does not even entrust lack of art to others, and by means of debating exercises appropriates not even the corresponding [faculty] [col. VII (Longo, 57)], so that it must be said that rhetoric is not even a practice and [art of arrangement].<sup>41</sup> For they would procure much earlier for themselves that which (comes about) by means of practice, (if this were the case).

"Before the arts were formulated (people) were better orators, but when they were systematised, (people were) worse (orators)."

If one wanted to deny this, it would be [easy]. For once the arts were already formulated, those (who came) after Demosthenes [were] much less [strong]. And another thing: if rhetoric is not really an art, and requires [a good deal] of practice and can achieve the best results [by means of] natural talent and exercise, [how] can you now because of this [be surprised] that it continues to exist? And what is there to be surprised about, if earlier there existed men of great talent and wisdom, while after the invention of technical manuals they were such (as they are)? By this method of argument let us then say that poetry and medicine and many other activities are not arts, and according to [col. VIII (Longo, 59)] us [one could] claim that good orators do exist, and not only in the old days either. And the fact that [the] sophists are likely [to have prevailed] before the advent of technical manuals does not prove (it),<sup>42</sup> [rather] someone will say that the [arts] were introduced [by] statesmen not by researchers, but that they (i.e. arts) are better when not drawn up in writing, just as they are not (written down) amongst many barbarian nations.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> τακτικῆν, Longo's conjecture from Π. ./. .JKH].

<sup>42</sup> Or possibly: "And it does not prove that [the] sophists are likely [to have prevailed] before the advent of technical manuals, but . . . etc.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. the observation in Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2.34 that there is no, or little, rhetoric among the barbarians..

*Philodemus now indicates that he has completed the task of reviewing arguments which attempt to prove that rhetoric is not an art. He will now proceed to those which seek to prove that it is.*

[And] since we have argued quite sufficiently in response to these who argue that rhetoric is not an art, we shall next examine briefly those who propose that it is an art; and even if most of them do not completely go along with all of these arguments, they are still indebted to them, not the kinds which have now been inferred for the same arguments in their minds.

Furthermore since this kind of error of the majority of men is at issue and the false reasoning of those [col. IX (Longo, 61)] people who themselves advertise the subject matter of the art and the profession as if it is a method, they connect it with and are preoccupied with the [notable (arts)], they do not draw together the things which (actually) happen to crowds.

And they are unaware too that not only do the things that are acquired by means of art not occur naturally without art, but also that those which are acquired by means of practice do not follow without practice. The same goes [for some of those] who approach the art of sophistic or the art of politics and then must turn away, since they make abundantly clear that they have been deceived by the rhetor — for there [is not actually] an art concerning these things — and [what is more they should exclude these men from] the category of rhetoric.

[And if] it turns out that it is called an art or science, [not] perhaps [in the way they mean], but the faults are common [to some others]. But since there is no need for an extended treatment regarding these faults, we should go on to [col. X (Longo, 63)] the refutation of specific arguments which in certain cases require premise and conclusion.

"If the rhetors did not pursue an art methodically many people would not approach them giving money".

(This argument) is worthy of attention: some people never approach others for the sake of acquiring art only but also for the sake of the things which result from other means, of the kind which rhetoric also furnishes. And furthermore, since it appears<sup>44</sup> through the treatise that sophistic rhetoric then belongs to the political category, and is an art, and it is claimed that people would never approach unless method<sup>45</sup> [in some respect] was linked to these things [perfectly]. Epicurus in his *On Rhetoric* says that those who attend the professors of the schools are deceived, and would probably not<sup>46</sup> for this sort of reason; for whenever they listen to speeches at displays and panegyrics, because [the speech] is neither concerned with deliberation [or] anything which is of advantage to the state, hence [col. XI (Longo, 65)] [those who] have sworn the oath or are in danger, as long as they listen adoringly to [what] has been done, that . . .

*The text of this column is too fragmentary to translate for the next eleven lines*

. . . being psychologically stirred, they expect, as long as they have made a fine noise, to get off scot-free in assemblies and law courts, being unaware that they would not last . . .

*Too fragmentary to translate for two and a half lines*

. . . hence they [come] to [squander] fees on [the] sophists [and] immediately realise that they have lost their money. For nothing is ever achieved by them [with regard to the issue] but the

<sup>44</sup> ΕΜΦ[.]ΝΕΙΝ Ρ, ἐμφαίνει Longo.

<sup>45</sup> Longo has ὁ / μέθο'δ[οτ]ος (lines 23-24), thereby indicating scribal corrections (addition of letters θο above the line and removal of οτ); but the masculine article is odd. Is it possible that the scribe meant to write ὁ μεθοδικός, which would then be rendered, "unless the [perfectly] methodical professional was linked to these things"?

opposite [is procured]. [Furthermore] by this line of argument we say [col. XII (Longo, 67)] that even the entire art of prophecy belongs to the category of activities for the sake of which people approach it offering money on account of fear. And if he said<sup>47</sup> it is the false reasoning of those who approach these men and drug-sellers and countless others, how [shall] we not infer that the same [holds] in the case of rhetoric?

And another point: in reply to the assertion that a certain assistance occurs for some of those who have been despatched from the schools, [one could] say that in all probability, by Zeus, they have [acquired] in [assemblies] not an art of political capability with respect to [the same] (arts), as some of those who make war upon the dialecticians . . .

. . . to have confidence,<sup>48</sup> and select, and despatching [a certain speech] to [cities] and [rulers] and kings, [to demand the] gift [and] not to be afraid . . .

*The last four lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

col. XIII (Longo, 69)

"But quite a few, who were [incapable] before, became capable by attending and studying."

First, not all, but some people actually come out worse depending on the amount of time they have visited the sophists. Furthermore, some people become good at speaking, but for other reasons which we [shall list] in other places at a more appropriate time.

<sup>46</sup> Longo has οὐκ ἄν εἰκότως in line 29. De Lacy (1980), 101-102 prefers Usener's emendation οὐκ ἀπεικότως, "not unreasonably for the following reason".

<sup>47</sup> Presumably Epicurus.

<sup>48</sup> I have taken Longo's [ἀ]Μ[α]βλέπ[ειν] in this sense, anticipating μὴ φοβ[ε]ῖσθ[ο]ι in line 31.

"Be that as it may, they *have* visited schools."<sup>49</sup>

Even if this is conceded, the inference still does not follow that it is an art. For it is possible that some who visit those who are in charge of exercise gain mastery of the subject both by exercise and practice. They would not make the majority of those described good and [others] weak. [And yet] we see, among some who are not experts, people who come out in greater numbers and [more capable] than among those who make a detailed and [scientific] [col. XIV (Longo, 71)] study of this, which suggests rather that rhetoric is not an art. And the same thing is evident even if only a few come out good and [capable] without having learned an art from those who are termed non-experts.

Another point: even if it is possible to win with exercise and not with art, it must follow that some people [apply themselves] with more care and experience, while others with less, and because of this some people turn out superior, while others (turn out) inferior. And those who leave the subject matter of sophistic to a child, and have common sense, train people skilled in legal matters and [produce] what they have observed in assemblies and courts as much as they are able.<sup>50</sup> For people like these [pay no attention to the schools], and, proclaiming the sophists' lack of practical expertise, they devote themselves to their training, and - as happens sometimes with people who are talented at speaking - they [are said at times] to have set aside [col. XV (Longo, 73)] [technical instructions] and, deriving immense benefit from [this practice], they give the impression that they have become what they are with the aid of the sophists.

<sup>49</sup> I take this as an imagined objection and note that Longo seems to record a *paragraphos* beneath line 16.

<sup>50</sup> (?) Or: "and reproduce what they have observed as much as they are able in assemblies and courts".

"Public speakers and advocates send their sons to sophists to learn what they themselves were taught and were made capable in."

First of all, not all do so, but a few cry out that they have wasted the time [which] they spent visiting the school of the sophist, and take their sons to their own teacher, that is the people. Nevertheless, once they have been fashioned by the schools, to a certain degree they can desire that their sons were not deprived of this; (but that is) not (to say) that an expert acquired the art of politics from that source. Even if there is a factory (which produces eloquence), and one considers the school of exercise in speech a fine one, one could easily perceive that the same people became [much] worse by [means of] sophistic in [disputes because] the politicians possess research [or] [col. XVI (Longo, 75)] observation.

And some send their sons to the rhetoricians in the same manner in which they send them to other disciplines, not entirely in order that they might gain profit for political ability, but rather until such time as they have grasped some portion of studies which are reputed to be general and fine. For I grant that we shall not be ashamed to say that those who send (them) are in error, since they are short-sighted when it comes to what leads to [this] practical [capacity].

"Just as in music and grammar there are transmissions of certain unknown things, so too as regards rhetoric; and the practice is not without method."

Certain transmissions of unknown things can exist even if they do not take place in accordance with a certain art. By research or observation or some such manner, some people

do not produce practices or methods, since they are [dependent] only by assertion<sup>51</sup> [col. XVII (Longo,77)] upon the practical elements regarding the art.

And if the argument intends to force the conclusion that sophistic rhetoric is also an art concerned with real contests, then the issue is about things which are completely false. For the sophists transmit nothing methodical in their exercises for the learning of ability in real contests, nor anything which contributes towards speaking with a view to action or . . .

*The next eleven lines are too fragmentary to translate. I suspect that Philodemus introduced another argument at this point, possibly one which claimed that the existence of technical manuals proves that rhetoric is an art.*

. . . this argument can furnish some truth with regard to the other, and I shall gladly say so. For we [think] that they have <not><sup>52</sup> possessed the art, since they [believe] they are publishing so-called technical manuals [col. XVIII (Longo, 79)] but that arts are absolutely unable to have the same (power) as sciences.

And by publishing technical manuals they are able to publish dreams for the purpose of deceiving those who read them, as the Chaldaeans and diviners do, and perhaps they too are in error themselves.

And it follows, if anything, that sophistic is an art, but that it is also an art of politics, [not even] they themselves urge. And no one, surely, intended to derive those who speak with ability and intelligence in assemblies and courts as experts [from that source].

<sup>51</sup> Or "in a dogmatic sense"?

<sup>52</sup> Longo's addition.

And yet [it was proposed] with regard to rhetoric [whether] certain people [seem] to conduct themselves technically [in assemblies] and courts. But those who are trained in the schools do not share even one of the virtues of those men.

Despite that, someone will say that we speak badly in that we fail to distinguish what kind of things occur by means of art and what kind of things occur without it. For we are all acquainted at times with the so-called unreflective way (of speaking)<sup>53</sup> [col. XIX (Longo, 83)] and we often misuse the noun "art"<sup>54</sup> in ordinary language: for example we sometimes say "to tie sticks together *artfully*", or "to steal *artfully*", or "to be an *artful* rogue", and one would have trouble denying that we are doing the same now. Analogously, the same will go for when we say that one of two men is not an artist while the other is.

"Just when you see a fine statue, you would say without reflection that it is a work of art, in the same way, when you have observed the works of the politicians you will say the same."

The panegyric rhetoricians [themselves] have assigned [this] as an assumption to their compositions. But even if one were to recognise without reflection that these are works of art, it is not convincing if they propose [the same] concerning political works; nor (is it convincing) [when] someone who has a lot of sense in these things seemed to display art [col. XX (Longo, 85)] or capability, [nor] would it be possible to judge another man who does not have method to be unpractised nor completely untried, and so the result is that we assert that until such time as some proof is introduced which compels us to accept the same view in the case of this and the activities which have been compared with it, on account of [this], the attempted proof only seems to have validity, and nothing more, unless we assert that what [those who are well] taught do is a certain art of the proofs themselves. But not only is the

<sup>53</sup> With Longo's [τὸν / [ἄ]λογον λεγόμενον I choose to understand something like τρόπον.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Plato *Resp.* 7 533d 4-5, of dialectic as opposed to other "ἐπιστήμαι": ἄς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου . . .

man who has not learned the art unable to achieve the works of the art, but even he who lacks exercise, a certain research, and observation is unable to accomplish what results by means of these things, and if he observes, I shall say, that which pleases the crowds most, and practises, and deals with the other things, he will soon conduct himself with distinction in rhetorical figures like a perfect orator, not lacking a single thing, and the facts have supplied, and will continue to support, the proof of this.

[col. XXI (Longo, 87)] And that, at least, is a very strong indication that sophistic is not the art of politics, which one could assert by a transposition of the terms. If it is a certain art, then let the man who has learned its technical manuals go and speak in the assembly or court.

So then, as for those things that are said by some either to argue that rhetoric is an art or that it is not an art, let them rest examined by us in the way we have.

*Philodemus has now completed his critical survey of arguments. He proceeds to review previous Epicurean assessments of rhetoric.*

One could rightfully criticise, in the following way, those of our school who say that rhetoric is an art of writing speeches and composing display pieces but not an art of pleading cases and speaking to the people, in that they seem to suppose that sophistic alone is called rhetoric. For they say that rhetoric is the art of these things. And when one, having commended their general view as to [how] sophistic is an art, starting from the fact [that] (it is) not an art of pleading cases [col. XXII (Longo, 89)] and speaking to the people, could on the other hand charge that they have continually omitted in their [argument] one aspect of the subject under investigation. By this I mean whether there does exist an art of pleading cases well and addressing the people, or not. For if it turns out that sophistic is not an art concerned with these things, it has not then been proved that those things do not result by means of another method.

For the argument which they have quoted as authoritative does not help in this regard, but only in regard to the fact that some people who have employed talent and practice plead cases and address the people without the aid of rhetoric. And they have not set out arguments [which are complete in themselves], although they are trying to, nor (have they set out) the proof that sophistic is an art concerned with writing speeches and display pieces, as will be obvious when the evidence<sup>55</sup> of the Founders of the School is cited [in due course], as we shall describe. They<sup>56</sup> comprise the refutation of those who talk without making any distinction as to by what they categorise [col. XXIII (Longo, 93)] rhetoric an art, <by><sup>57</sup> having pointed out, as we have demonstrated, what has been left out by them. The work *On Rhetoric* ascribed to Polyaeus, but not in fact his, as we have made clear, brings to our attention the confusion of the arguments in this way too.

Yet those who say that it is an art, but one that requires talent and practice, not for its acquisition but for the successful achievement of its goal, these people are completely mistaken as to the truth and judgement of the Founders of the School. For they did not distinguish the various usages of rhetoric, and thus they are prone to every mix up in what they say, as if sophistic were practically the same as that which is called rhetoric, and they have set out what they say accordingly.<sup>58</sup>

Since Epicurus and his followers [col. XXIV (Longo, 95)] reveal that sophistic is an art of writing speeches and composing display pieces, and is not an art of pleading cases and addressing the people, [these] state that sophistic is an art; and likewise, although later

<sup>55</sup> τὰ μαρτύρια(t) Longo, TAM[.]PTYPIAI P.

<sup>56</sup> The Founders of the School?

<sup>57</sup> Added by Longo.

<sup>58</sup> De Lacy (1980), 104 suggests this point may have been drawn from the pseudo-Polyaeus treatise.

Epicureans have said that the art of political capability does not exist, [they themselves]<sup>59</sup> allow [some] science [concerning] it.

And their prescription that sophistic does not require talent and practice for its acquisition is also manifestly false, otherwise even philosophy must be said not to require these things either.

Their argument about grammar does not hold in the way they intend, and at the same time it goes against them. "For just as," they say, "talent must be assumed in the case of grammar, so too [in the case of rhetoric]". But in the case of grammar there is a need for talent [and] practice for [col. XXV (Longo, 97)] its acquisition, not for the successful achievement of its goal. And so, if the same must be said in the case of rhetoric too, then rhetoric too must be said to require talent and practice for its own acquisition, since they say also that resounding delivery [and] expressive gestures of the hands require talent if one is to be inclined to those things which are able to persuade,<sup>60</sup> while practice and [the] faculty [which comes from] it provide knowledge of timing (for these things), aim at the characters, and understand many people, especially the ones who are in court often.<sup>61</sup>

[And] in fact I wonder whether they have left anything to art.

And what is more, just as talent and practice by themselves have provided not for the acquisition of the art but for the successful achievement of its goal, so too they at least must demonstrate to us what precisely [it is that] contributes to its acquisition [and if] it belongs to

<sup>59</sup> The Founders or Philodemus' opponents?

<sup>60</sup> A view mentioned but dismissed by Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.10.

<sup>61</sup> Isocrates notes that a comparison is often made between the art of reading and writing and the art of the orator; but he argues that the comparison is misconceived because knowledge of γράμματα, once acquired, does not change, while rhetoric is a creative activity (*C. soph.* 12-13).

art, . . . [col. XXVI (Longo, 99)] those things which when added make (people) able to achieve the goals. One must not think that they are right who reveal that it is not an art, if one presumes that art possesses information to be transmitted in a methodical and fixed way, and if one calls art the complete observation which aims achieving its goal most of the time with a reasonable chance of success, like medicine and navigation. For first of all, just as the art has been presumed to be named not in one sense or the other, but rather as certain people wish to label it, so too they have used the (word) "instruction". At the same time, while criticising those who speak without careful distinction (of terms), they themselves did not distinguish what art or non-art they intend to demonstrate rhetoric to be.

In addition to this, although politics is not an art and is said by the Founders of the School [not] to be, [they themselves] have considered it to be an art, at least in accordance with this distinction. For in neither one [col. XXVII (Longo, 101)] of the two senses which have been set out is it possible to say that political rhetoric is an art. For they are in agreement that it does not possess methodical transmission which contributes stable knowledge. But Epicurus, in the first book of *On Ways of Living* and in his *On Rhetoric*, makes it clear, as does Metrodorus in his *Against those who say that from the study of nature come good orators*, that it doesn't (even) possess observation which aims to achieve its goal most of the time with a reasonable chance of success . . .

*The last seventeen lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . for the most part [col. XXVIII (Longo, 103)] and with a reasonable chance of success and is certainly taken from Epicurus and his followers. I mean the uncertainty of many (in that) it is sometimes believed by, and sometimes gives offence to, the same people.

And the (view) that its aim is to achieve its goal most of the time and with a reasonable chance of success is completely senseless, being such.

The fact that orators have observed what persuades most of the time<sup>62</sup> and have introduced these (observations) into (their) transmission of precepts, and because we shall persuade most by beginning with a preface and then giving a narrative, and then finishing the [rest] in order, makes it clear that rhetoric is an art in the second sense.

(Yet) the rhetors have not observed that which persuades most of the time. And if by handing down, as they suppose, these prefaces and narratives and the other parts of the speech, they have also introduced (them) into transmissions of precepts [col. XXIX (Longo, 105)] then natural talent (would) easily have contributed to the observation of this. And the fact that by speaking prefaces and narrating and providing summaries we persuade most, is not well said. And if not, (it turns out that) both this and that which has been mentioned before have been thrown out in an indemonstrable fashion, while the proposal is to introduce a proof.

What is more, by neglecting to show that sophistic is an art of other things, when in fact it is, they wish to deduce that it is an art of those things which contribute nothing, thereby disagreeing with the Founders of the School on both counts in that they are variously constrained [by rationality] of the soul. Others, having written their pamphlets only [in response to] the schools, when they composed a complex reply both on the basis of this (argument) and from the one [indicated] earlier, were only mentioned, in order that we don't say the same things on the subject. Let it also be noted [col. XXX (Longo, 107)] [that] by

<sup>62</sup> I adopt De Lacy's suggestion (1980), 104 to emend 'τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πείθοντα' (lines 15-16) to 'τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πείθοντα.'

saying that rhetoric is the kind of art [which] one would call the faculty derived from the exercise of some kind of observation, in accordance with which the goal which is set results most of the time and with a reasonable chance of success, they cancel the special characteristic of the art itself. For this is observed in method and in any transmission of certain common principles which extend to particular cases, whether it be of stable sciences or conjectural ones.

The common language of the Greeks does not really call things which are practised on the basis of observation and a certain research "arts" in the proper sense, but there are times when it misuses (the term), as when sometimes it calls tightrope walkers at spectacles "artists",<sup>63</sup> and says that someone is "terribly artistic" in splitting logs cleverly and putting them together and laying snares, and calls "arts" the tricks in comedies and all things similar to these.<sup>64</sup> [col. XXXI (Longo, 109)] Furthermore, [by] calling observation and exercise an art, we would soon call the majority [of activities in] life arts, and we would not categorise [exercise] or observation or method as different (from each other) in any way. If this is so and if [this man] does not say that politics comes from some art nor yet that it achieves its [goal] most of the time and with a reasonable chance of success, [then] I think that the differences between arts and [non]-arts originate [from other sources].

They [continually] said that (politics) is [something like] a maintenance for [life] and [a means of procuring] friends, and in accordance with it [it is impossible] to construct a speech within real [contests], or to hunt for [some] prize, O Corybantes.

<sup>63</sup> Gal. *Adhort. art.* 9 (Kühn vol. 1) mentions τὸ πεττευρίπτειν καὶ βαδίζειν ἐπὶ σχοινίων λεπτῶν as examples of ματαιοτεχνίαι, activities which do not possess τὸ τέλος βιωφελές; as he says, ταῦτ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τέχναι.

<sup>64</sup> Philodemus' remarks here recall those made in col. XIX.1-16.

[Well, who would call] this kind of activity an art [of politics, which] when undertaken, profits the artist very little or not at all [col. XXXII (Longo, 111)] nor trains a craftsman in its special characteristics, but even brings it about that these things are mentioned in some degree by those [who have not learned] it? And a faculty [practised] by means of some kind of observation, by which people achieve the proposed [goal] most of the time and with a reasonable chance of success, [has been assumed] to be an art. For once again it will be agreed that (people) call both politics and sophistic real [arts] of this kind, if we test and find that some [of those who] claim to be artists undertake them and do not make mistakes.

Nevertheless, those who say that rhetoric differs from these, demonstrate at least that it [often] has the method of [art without however] all or [even the majority] of those . . . who have acquired the arts [being able to speak] in assemblies [and courts]. Oh what a strange skill indeed, when without having learned it [they say] that they will achieve the work at some time in the future, nor must they conjecture (when). And as to the other [col. XXXIII (Longo, 113)] differences which they have demonstrated, we shall find that they have no other purpose than to show that it is not an art in any sense at all. For it differs, they say, in as much as, whenever it does contribute something, its contribution is small and haphazard, and in as much as it does not have the scope of inevitability, but even someone who has not learned (it) can do its works, and in as much as its technical instructions are static (?) and in as much as most of the benefit consists in exercise in speaking and remembering, and it has not seen anything technical at all [anywhere], so to speak, or are they able to bestow upon it [any] name or [notion] from the Greek-speaking world. At any rate, by using these (arguments) in a summary fashion [I shall demonstrate] the lack of method of the capability. As to the arguments which they have introduced in addition, that it contributes the differences which were mentioned, [it has been shown] that [col. XXXIV (Longo, 115)] they introduce

that which is blameworthy. But if (the differences) are permitted to stand, they will not hurt us at all but rather those people themselves, unless it is possible to refute, with respect to (the differences), something from what has been said before; and certain contradictions are observed which derive from nature and circumstances. [And] once these things have been examined [there remains (a question) which] one should ask my esteemed colleague Bromios: how, when he proposes to write about arts and inquires whether medicine is an art and whether grammar is, [and] having proposed also (to inquire) whether rhetoric is an art, he disregarded sophistic as rhetoric, being of the opinion that it is not called such both in common language and in Epicurus' usual usage, but connected it with political (rhetoric) alone, in as much as most of the attention amongst those who discuss speeches resides in this kind (of rhetoric). And how, since sophistic is an art and is said to be by the Founders of the School . . .

. . . (he) rashly [col. XXXV (Longo, 117)] did not demonstrate in what way they (i.e. the Founders of the School) say it is an art?

How did he reveal and attempt to make clear political rhetoric an art when it is said not to be an art by the Founders of the School and very far removed from the defining characteristic of art?

How does he say that rhetoric has observed the things which are able to persuade crowds? And again (how can he say) that the good politician, having assessed<sup>65</sup> what things naturally stir up anger, and pity and impulse to action and dissuasion from action, uses these

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<sup>65</sup> This is the only instance of the verb ἐπιλογίζεσθαι in books 1 and 2 of *On Rhetoric* and the term may have been employed by Bromios himself. I follow Schofield's interpretation (1996) of the standard meaning of the verb as "assess" or "appraise", whether in observation or thought.

continuously? For he will not, I think, say that there exists anyone who becomes capable by observing the things which are able to persuade crowds, nor that they use these things (whatever they are) continuously. For he has tested things which are not always suitable, and often even produce the opposite effect.

Yet whenever he says that it is easy to demonstrate those who, in specific cases, conduct themselves artistically in assemblies and courts, he claims not a small [col. XXXVI (Longo, 119)] thing. For he will show that they have succeeded in what they intend, but he will not show that those who are not artists have conducted themselves artistically.

By Zeus, those who have observed what succeeds, and what does not, achieve the goal more than those who are not artists. And [those] who have applied practice in anything and much exercise, achieve the goals, and continuously, but not more than those who are trained.

Furthermore, not one of those who are untrained achieves the goal at all, but one will [not reveal] it [to be] an art on account of [this] reason; and the assertion that most of the technical precepts which are written in manuals are [not] pointless, requires investigation. For Epicurus and his followers at least will seem to say that all and not just most (of the technical precepts) are completely pointless, at least as far as preparation for political capacity is concerned. However, [we] will clarify these things [if anything] should be unclear.

[col. XXXVII (Longo, 121)] It would be the appropriate time to free ourselves from all (other debates) and come to our own views, and forthwith the main points in the order of the discussion will be set out as follows: (i) to mention briefly what an art is said to be in ordinary language; for otherwise it is not possible to demonstrate our views; (ii) that sophistic

rhetoric is said to be an art in the writings of the Founders of the School, in accordance with whom we practise philosophy . . .

*The next five lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . (iii?) the fact that sophistic is an art concerned with the writing of speeches and display pieces, and is not an art concerned with pleading cases and addressing the people; (iv) and further that the art of politics lies in research and practice, but does not contribute anything technical.

[And], by Zeus, because it is said in some circles in response to what was [demonstrated] by us that they remove in accordance with the capability of each individual one of the things which have been set out [col. XXXVIII (Longo, 123)] now we must inveigh against the first (one). Well then, among the Greeks, art is conceived and spoken of as a faculty or disposition derived from observation of certain common and basic elements which pervade the majority of specific cases, a faculty which apprehends something and achieves it in the kind of way which only some of those who have not learned it do, and does this firmly and securely [and not]<sup>66</sup> by conjecture.

Let us leave aside for the time being the question whether that which results is advantageous or not advantageous in every case. Let us also leave aside [whether] it is called art in a more [general sense] or a more specific one, or derived entirely from practice or in general of this sort. For we have intended to set out that which is a property of every art which is so-called in any sense at all. And the exact and stable sciences like grammar, music, painting, and

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<sup>66</sup> There is some uncertainty whether the papyrus has the Δ of οὐδέ. See my discussion.

sculpture have the following [col. XXXIX (Longo, 125)] characteristic: grasping any object of the art and achieving it by observing certain basic elements which extend across a greater proportion of individual instances; while the characteristic of those sciences which do not have stability but conjecture is inevitably the following: having a grasp of certain common elements which extend to specific cases, which have not yet been encountered, if it happens thus, even if the goal does not follow on every occasion upon the instructions and products of the science. This is due to the fact that the conjectural method is not of the kind which is effective on every occasion, but rather of the kind which is effective for the most part or on more occasions than those who have no art.<sup>67</sup> For example, even if someone achieves the goal in some cases or [not], yet were to deviate from the disposition [which is able to acquire] the common and basic elements for the [(actual) production] of specific results, [it would appear he has not achieved ] (it) from art [col. XL (Longo, 127)] but rather the one who has the disposition from art, even if the latter [fails] in the case of some specific instances. We [say] that it is not an art at all.<sup>68</sup>

For we term (an art) that which possesses this firmly. And [if] knowledge of [certain basic elements which] pervade is not a characteristic . . .

*The next three and a half lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . in proportion to those which are successful and not successful. [For] art has been proposed as [being] continuous; . . . and if . . . method . . .

*The next two lines are too fragmentary to translate*

<sup>67</sup> Cauderlier (1981), 184 criticises Longo's text here.

<sup>68</sup> I follow Barnes (1986), 12 and 21 n.57, who punctuates with a comma after τέχνης in line 2 of col. XL (Longo punctuates with a full stop), and a full stop after κατὰ μέτρος in line 4; however, I do not follow his translation of [τὸ] πᾶν in lines 4-5 and I agree with Longo's adverbial rendering, since I believe that this short sentence refers to the man who sometimes achieves results without a technical disposition.

... (and that) there will not be [something] common between methodical (arts) and common elements and those which have not grasped specific cases. As for "hit-and-miss" activities, we term them "skill" or "observation" or "practice", and all that sort of thing, but on no account "art", [because we assert] that that which has these things all the time is the same thing as art, but [not according] to differences too . . .

*The last three lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

... [col. XLI (Longo, 129)] and of the beautiful, he has observed how he must position himself, and how he must walk, and where he must put his foot, and in what direction he must gesture, but he has observed only certain details, and alone accomplishes the task and on every occasion. But he does not possess method and a certain transmission of elementary (precepts) which pervades the majority of cases, as the grammarian and musician do.

The same kind of thing goes for acrobats and sword-dancers too. And even if someone insists that these possess art, he will not say that the man who binds sticks together is worse, nor the man who lifts (heavy loads), nor the man who steals and lies successfully, or the good merchant, or the hunter, and all people like these.

When we say that the faculty of such things is not called an art and the men (who possess them are not called) artists, we say that it is not being so-called in its principal sense, we do not contend that it is not being so-called in a misapplied sense. For it is obvious that [col. XLII (Longo, 131)] we call a fugitive an artist, and a flatterer [and] a gourmand and many others; and each of these has observed some successes and some failures in what he has set out to achieve. However, I say that common parlance does not call these activities and ones

like them arts in the principal sense, but rather those which contribute method, (a concept) which, according to the utterance of art, most readily falls under that of science too; whenever (an activity) contributes the same as the art and according to the same form, from [which] it simply comes, it causes one to call the most diverse activities in life "arts". As far as we are concerned, there is nothing to prevent also the [entire] observation of the places which exist in each area, or the actions, or certain other things which are often useful and, by Zeus, unknown, from accomplishing entirely scientific results, and producing nothing untechnical. For avoiding all hair-splitting which is not relevant we shall alter the labels, and [col. XLIII (Longo, 133)] we shall say that those activities, which we term arts now, have the sort of form which grammar and sculpture do, while those which (we now say are) not arts are deprived of this sort of form, but have an empirical form, like the one we enumerated earlier, and we shall despise them accordingly.

By connecting these types of forms and the rhetorical arts, we declare that sophistic is an art and that political rhetoric is not an art. And if someone forces us to apply the labels, we shall say that the one, as we have laid out, is marked with an identifying characteristic, while the other is not. And we shall think we are quite justified in replying to those who argue against these things, just as we decided.

[But] now let us proceed to the claim that it is not we who say that sophistic is an art, but that the Founders of our School stated it in the course of their polemics, and that political rhetoric is a certain research and practised observation, not we. But I shall also set out where and how [col. XLIV (Longo, 135)] these things are made clear by Zeno.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>69</sup> This translation requires that  $\tau\alpha\theta\tau\alpha$  be the subject of a plural verb.

Well then, what could one say of the fact that Epicurus in his *On Rhetoric* continually mentions "those who come from the schools", and "the capabilities that come from the schools", and in addition "the symmetries that come from the schools", and "the teachings of the rhetoricians", and "their business", and "the teaching and instruction concerning both speech and enthymemes and the rest", and everything analogous to these things? Furthermore Hermarchus too, in a letter addressed to Theopheides in the archonship of Meneclēs, has the same opinion. For when Alexinus in his *On Education* accuses rhetorical sophists on the grounds that they investigate many things to no purpose, including their work on expression and memory, and where they inquire whether Homer means "*are in conjunction*" in the verses which begin "and the stars *have gone far on their course*"<sup>70</sup> and [col. XLV (Longo, 137)] concerning certain other things both in Homer's works and those of Euripides, Hermarchus makes objections in the summary of what has been said and in the conclusion. And (Alexinus goes on to claim that) when rhetors turn their hand to certain other things, and praise now one person, now another and - would you believe it - each one of them, it could be demonstrated concerning them that they undertake in a superficial manner to compose the kind of arguments on a great many useful things which it is possible to regard as the province of philosophers.

[And] if they don't [deduce] their own conclusions in accordance with science, but in accordance with probability and conjecture . . .

. . . So while Alexinus uttered nonsense like this, (Hermarchus) arguing against the assumption which pervades the whole work says "if one must interpret the argument concerning useful things as equivalent to that which concerns the kind of things from which

<sup>70</sup> Il. 10.252, Lattimore's translation (1951). De Lacy (1980), 105 points out that ἐπιζητοῦσι λέγειν "Ὅμηρον" "συμβέβηκεν" (lines 31-33) cannot mean that the sophists investigated whether Homer used that word, because it is unmetrical. The point must be exegetical, and De Lacy refers to Arist. *Poet.* 1461a 26 where the Homeric passage is cited as an example of ambiguity.

financial profit originates for those able to turn out speeches in any sense [col. XLVI (Longo, 139)] and constitutes total control, then regard it as completely insane." Then, having shown in a suitable way the madness of the supposition . . . he says "concerning the kind of things from which is composed . . .

*The next seventeen lines of this column are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . now of the great to have the small mistake amongst these (?). For let us pass over the fact that rhetoric tends not<sup>71</sup> to trip up intelligent and reasonable men in affairs which involve crowds,<sup>72</sup> cross-examinations, [col. XLVII (Longo, 141)] informers, oaths, and false testimonies. For it is better to lose a lot of money, or a piece of land [scorning] a juror<sup>73</sup> while avoiding totally with the faculty of the soul the most important and greatest fears, than to have these fears and win all court cases . . .<sup>74</sup>

*The next four lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . not to practise court cases nor [to have] experience in rhetorical art but to avoid [those who] offer (it) . . .

*The next four lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . to praise<sup>75</sup> the business of [the] rhetors in as much as they teach one how to deliberate in

<sup>71</sup> ἀσυνή[θειαν], Longo translates "arroganza". See my discussion in chapter 5.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Scaevola's remark in Cicero *De or.* 1.44 that as an orator you can only hope *ut prudentibus diserte stultis etiam vere dicere videaris*.

<sup>73</sup> I adopt the text printed by Longo (1988), 155 for lines 5-6, [δικα]στήν / [χλευ]άσαντα; she follows Sudhaus and De Lacy (1980), 105. A similar form of expression is used by Epicurus in an exhortation to avoid luxury, fr. 207 Us.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. the information preserved in part 1 of Philodemus' *De piet.* 1508-1512 (Obbink) that Epicurus was never involved in a lawsuit with anyone. On the horrors of the active rhetor's life, cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2.30.

<sup>75</sup> The verb ἐπαινετέω is unusual, yet the apographs seem to support this reading (ΕΤΑΙ/⟨ΕΤΕ⟨Ν Ο 1526, ΕΠΙΑΙ/ΝΕΤΕΙΝ Ν Col.47). LSJ cite only this occurrence of the verb ἐπαινετέω and assume its meaning is identical with ἐπαινέω. When I examined this portion of the papyrus, I could only read the

public. Next, by logical necessity, also relevant to this part (is the administration) [of the household], in the case of those who are going to know all these things too . . . [col. XLVIII (Longo, 143)] . . . worthy to admire the rhetoricians for being useful citizens, his argument does not constitute novelty in itself. For we could interpret cooks and shopkeepers as doing something useful for us, but . . .

*The next seven lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . it is a false argument in the case of the art of building and bronze-working, (to say) that these [obtain] little revenue but acquire it quite easily. For even an uneducated man who is completely [unacquainted] with writing, let alone devoid of rhetorical experience, is able to find out what is advantageous for the people and to express it clearly.

And moreover, [how] should one interpret the fact that some rhetorical speeches are accomplished not in accordance with [science] [col. XLIX (Longo, 145)] but with experience and conjecture? For, naturally, one should not think that by this expression is meant that the speeches do not contain dialectical syllogisms; for this is the case not only with *some*, but with *all* speeches, despite the fact that Alexinus is not too willing to concede this. In any case, Alexinus accuses Ebulides on one occasion of dismissing speeches which don't contain syllogisms; for he says that we understand the facts without these.

We have presented the citations in their entirety in case it suits someone to have them, but we are well aware that they will appear to have been written down concerning another subject and not the present issue.

Metrodorus too in the first book of his *On Poems* seems to emphasise adequately that sophistic rhetoric is an art. For in the course of arguing against one of those who [col. L (Longo, 147)] have composed works on [poetry], he brings up other things, as I am well aware,<sup>76</sup> but perhaps [defines these things] too . . .

*The next seven lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . and other [such] men who speak competently among the people on subjects which are useful to the people, but have not learned Thrasymachus' art at all, or anyone else's for that matter, but by simply being observers (of what men in politics do) it would be possible for them to understand how such men (work) on every occasion. But he thinks [the opposite] by demonstrating that Thrasymachus and a considerable number of those others who think they possess such arts of political and rhetorical speeches, actually achieve none of the things they claim their arts possess. This evidence<sup>77</sup> is presented, in that it is one thing to possess method and the means by which and from which fine speech occurs, and another to be a fine orator. [col. LI (Longo, 149)] And going on a little further, he explains<sup>78</sup> that the fact that no one ever became a great poet or a competent orator just from technical manuals bears witness (that) . . .

*The next six lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . " [but] with (an art which) has all [this with the aid of] mental exercise and instruction."<sup>79</sup>

NETE but no sign of I. The final N was clear, but the space between E and N seemed too large for a single iota. One wonders whether the papyrus had something like *ἐπαινετέον*.

<sup>76</sup> Adopting Longo's replacement of *τε* with *γε* in the supplement of line 2 in her 1985 version of this text.

<sup>77</sup> Adopting Longo's *τοῦτ' ἐμπειροῦν* (1985), 33 in place of *τοῦτ' ἐμπειρώς* Longo (1977).

<sup>78</sup> Adopting DeLacy's *προβάς*, <sc. τίθεται> ὡς . . . in place of Longo's *προβάς πως* . . . But the lacuna which follows makes any certainty impossible.

<sup>79</sup> Adopting Longo's text for lines 13-15 . . . [ἀλλ' ἅπαν ἐχούση] τῶ[ι] ἐν διανοίαι γυμνάζεσθαι / καὶ διδάχῃ (1985), 33. Judging from what comes next, Longo is justified in taking this to be a direct quotation from Metrodorus.

And a little [later], "He who has decided to speak [in] public or be a poet, starts with the precepts and then, after that which coheres with such precepts, goes in search of someone whom he regards as a kind of model and is then seen to himself to achieve the man's art so that he does not miss out on any means by which he might become a better orator or poet."<sup>80</sup>

So, what we are able to present from (Metrodorus') treatise are the sort of things which elude both misinterpretation and the assumption [col. LII (Longo, 151)] that the argument is concerned with the precepts of sophistic rhetoric, arts, of course, which themselves are called by the same name, just as everyone who has paid intelligent attention to what we have quoted will realise, and even more so the man who has grasped the complete writings of the Founders of the School.

Now some of those who presently live in Rhodes write that while on [Cos] and again in [Rhodes] people lectured<sup>81</sup> on the subject that rhetoric is not an art, in each of the cities certain people who have recently come from Athens say that they are in conflict with the Founders of the School who taught that it is an art.<sup>82</sup> And they report that when the visitor to Cos was asked where this was made clear, he replied both in the *Symposium* and in the *On Ways of Life*. And the other (when asked, replied) that he was unable to say where (it was made clear) but he knew that those who lecture in Athens hold this view on the sophistic branch of rhetoric; [col. LIII (Longo, 153)] (and they write that) once again some of those

<sup>80</sup> I have adopted Longo's later text (1985), 33 for lines 20-29 because it contains her own improvements and those suggested by DeLacy (1980), 105 and Gigante: τὸ ἐφεξῆς τοῦ ἀκολούθου τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἐπαγγέλμασιν, ὃν δυνάμειος / οἷαν εἰκόν' ἀποβλέπει / καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ ἔργον [συ]ν[τε]λεῶν τῆς τοῦτο[υ] τέ[χ]νης φαίνεται, μηποῦ τι / αὐτὸν διαφεύγει δι' ὧν / ἂν βελτιῶν γίνοιτο ῥή[τω]ρ ἢ ποιητής. The main changes from the (1977), 149 edition are ὃν for ὅ[ς] in line 22, ἀποβλέπει for Sudhaus' ἀποβλέπει in line 23, and διαφεύγει for διαφεύγει in line 27. De Lacy suggested τὸν ἀκόλουθον in line 22, but Longo's repeated examination of the papyrus confirms the reading τοῦ ἀκολούθου (1985), 43.

<sup>81</sup> Adopting Blank's σχολα/σάντων (lines 14-15) in place of Longo's σχολα/[ζόν]των.

<sup>82</sup> Adopting Blank's δι[.]δοκομένο[υ]ς τὸ[ν] τέ[χ]νην αὐτ[ῶ]ν ἢ ἐν[υ]πάρχειν (lines 21-23) in place of Longo's λ[ί]αν εὐ[.]δοκούμενοι[ε] περι[ε]χόμενα[ι] ἐν τῷ τέ[χ]νην αὐτ[ῶ]ν μ[ὴ] ὑπάρχειν.

present from Attica have proclaimed these same things on Rhodes too and advise them not to begrudge the rhetors the possession of an art. This man alluded to as [living in] Athens and having this opinion is our own Zeno; although Zeno did not write on this subject, it did not prevent the fellow (from writing) a rebuttal against him.

However, winding back and forth artfully in the same treatise, he himself says that he has not found any trace of rhetoric's being an art, but an incredible number of instances of the fact that no branch of it is technical, and he claims to have made a collection of them.

Now, as to how much we think this philosopher misses the point in his treatise,<sup>83</sup> we shall not hesitate to record point by point and investigate with friends whom both we and he share. For the present [col. LIV (Longo, 155)] we shall mention those things which are likely to seem relevant to the present inquiry, without being obstinately persistent about it — for, by the Dog, as I see it, what he says does not require a collection — and again, not in a conjectural way<sup>84</sup> but in a way sufficient for the purposes of refutation. So then, setting out the headings by which his argument will proceed, it proves (he says) his opinion that Epicurus and Metrodorus and their followers do not allow either the political or the judicial or the panegyric branch of rhetoric to be technical, but state that the political and judicial branches require exercise and practice and a certain empirical research, and that (they say that) the panegyric branch lies in practice and familiarity with a certain type of expression without need of practical research.

<sup>83</sup> Adopting Blank's κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν [γρ]αφὴν (lines 27-28) in place of Longo's κατὰ τὴν ἀντιγραφὴν.

<sup>84</sup> Adopting Blank's συναγωγῆς ὁφθαλμοῦς - οὐδ' ἔτι στοχαστικῶς (lines 7-9) in place of Longo's συναγωγῆς ὁφθαλμοῦς ἔτι στοχαστικῶς; De Lacy had suggested supplementing line 8 ὁ φιλοσοφῶν].

In addition, in his opinion, (he says) that according to the Founders of the School an art [col. LV (Longo, 157)] which persuades crowds simply cannot exist; and that the aforementioned exercise, practice, and experience is not sufficient to persuade on every occasion nor in the majority of cases, and because it happens that speeches which are not rhetorical are sometimes more persuasive than rhetorical ones, and because among these, the panegyric speeches of the sophists (are) less [successful (?)] when delivered among crowds . . .

*The next three lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . not even indeed a precept, but that Epicurus and his followers recognised that certain arts too have been laid down and because of this they termed them experts and these [arts] . . .<sup>85</sup>

. . . that they did not agree that they achieve the goal too . . .

*The last six lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

[col. LVI (Longo, 159)]

*The first line is too fragmentary to translate*

. . . briefly . . . in connection with what they think;<sup>86</sup> and that even if someone, for the sake of argument, has an ability to persuade the majority on every occasion, this is a cause not of good things but great evils.

And having constructed each one of these arguments in an artful way, so he thinks, he supposes he has shown thoroughly that those who demonstrate that either the whole of

<sup>85</sup> Adopting Blank's προσ[σ]α[γ]/γορεύειν [αὐτοὺς] [εἶναι] / τεχνίτας καὶ ταύτας (lines 21-23) in place of Longo's προσαγορεύειν / τέχνη καί.

<sup>86</sup> Adopting Blank's βραχέως λεγ[ε]το παρὰ / τί νομίζουσι (lines 2-3) in place of Longo's βραχέως κε . . . ΠΑ/ τί νομίζουσι.

rhetoric or a branch of it is technical are adopting a position contrary to Epicurus. I, of course, am amazed at the students of the man who lectures at Athens.<sup>87</sup> One of them said that he believed that Epicurus wrote about rhetoric in the *Symposium*, if one should trust those who speak, not perhaps as philosophers, about philosophers; the other said he did not know where Epicurus and his followers say (this). So the students or judges were no more attentive to whatever they heard than the Rhodian who [col. LVII (Longo, 161)] is writing to this very day to the effect that he is unable to learn from anyone where it is said. Once curiosity has begun and the examination . . .

. . . in twenty-six years . . .

*The next five lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . setting out from Zeno's school, who does not live among the Persians but at Athens. However, in order to relieve them from having to ask a lot of questions from a lot of people, we say that it is not in the *Symposium* nor in the *On ways of life*, nor are we telling them to look for a needle in a haystack, but we have already cited where and on what grounds we say that the fact that sophistic rhetoric is an art is revealed; even if the (citations) are shown to strengthen our own judgement, yet they require an argument [col. LVIII (Longo, 163)] for all the members of our philosophical school. And we show our own handiwork and the reason why we say so-called sophistic rhetoric is an art and not a branch of rhetoric. For the panegyric, the political, and the forensic are not branches of rhetoric in the way he himself supposes in his entire treatise, just as the marine creature and the land (animal) are not species of dog . . .

**PHILODEMUS ON RHETORIC BOOK 2 PHERC. 1672**

<sup>87</sup>

I.e. Zeno.

[Col. VIII Longo:165] . . .and we congratulate the gentleman on the sheer number of points he makes to besiege our opinion in the belief that he is refuting it; but no, by the gods, we would not like to bring them up. For what was their purpose? For neither . . .

*[Philodemus did not rehearse his opponent's points in order to refute them one by one but simply to illustrate how misguided some philosophers can be]*

. . . being in note-form (?), but in order that we know that some people do strange things [col. IX (Longo, 167)] in philosophy in extending them pointlessly to these (subjects) also. For I ask you, "O best of all the Ephesians", of what interest are these things to those who have occupied themselves with our philosophy? And the fact that in Epicurus' view there does not exist [at all] an art which can persuade crowds is (surely) a complete refutation of those who claim that the speeches of Isocrates and such-like are not without method whether extemporised or composed in written form . . .<sup>88</sup> (so that) neither in the case of ambassadors (the fact that) those who have not been trained by rhetoricians are [sometimes] more persuasive than those who have been, and the fact that panegyricists, although they possess subject matter of the art, are less likely to meet with rowdy situations than those who (have) nothing . . . (that) Epicurus also calls . . .

*The next seven lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . many, it had to be a power not of good things . . . but a cause of great evils. So what . . .?

*The next four lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . not even beauty . . .

<sup>88</sup> I suspect that this sentence is actually a question, since surely Philodemus would regard Isocrates' speeches as examples of sophistic rhetoric and thus as having nothing to do with persuading crowds. Such speeches would therefore not be affected by his assertion with respect to technicity.

*The last two lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

[col. X (Longo, 171)] . . . experienced in the other things too, that not in this way do we say that it is produced, if however these things are introduced throughout the treatise; and leaving out the other things . . . which are discussed in the work, and taking everything which occupied nearly the entire book as read, considering for ourselves only that part in which he says certain branches of rhetoric are said explicitly to be non-technical . . .

*The next three lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . of about three thousand words we shall consider . . . without dispute. And Epicurus depicts that young man, who is claiming that panegyric and political rhetoric are a single power of being a sophist derived from rhetorical exercise in the process of being refuted.<sup>89</sup> And after the words "let him speak his mind", he makes Idomeneus with the words ". . . to you" ask for forgiveness if the youngster is impertinent, because of his youth, and makes him<sup>90</sup> add the following words: "It would be strange indeed if you were not hindered at all because of your youth, as you yourself would admit, from exceeding in rhetorical capacity all those men who, because you are young, are old as far as you are concerned and very reputable" [col. XI (Longo, 175)], just as you would have said when you meant "Let him speak openly" and . . . "strange indeed, I say, if you were not hindered at all because of your age, from excelling in rhetorical capability [which] seems to be (the result) of practice and much familiarity, but it is possible to be prevented from seeing things as they are because of

<sup>89</sup> Adopting Angeli's ἐλεγχόμενο[ν] in line 22 (1981), instead of Sudh *Suppl.* Longo ἐλεγχομένου.

<sup>90</sup> Adopting Angeli's [σ]υνάπτοντά τι/να [λόγοις] col. X.32-33 (1981), instead of Longo's [σ]υνάπτοντά τι/ν' α[ὐτῶ]ν.

one's age, something for which science would rather appear to be responsible than practice and familiarity."

On account of . . . they say . . . they say that the whole of rhetoric, of the kind they demonstrate, would result quite simply from practice and familiarity, and that not even one branch of it (would result) at all from art, and clearly . . . to instruct thoroughly, distinguishing in addition what kind of things will be possible from science, and what kind of things from practice and familiarity . . .

*The next three lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . [if] that which is hard to master because of its absence of method is accessible to a young man, then much more that which occurs by means of science inasmuch as it is grasped with methods and elementary principles which can be applied universally. If, that is, art . . .

*The next line is too fragmentary to translate*

. . . or even a branch of it, the argument would be senseless, being of the following kind: "If that which occurs by means of method is not inaccessible for a young man, (then that which occurs) without method (should be) even more accessible."

[col. XII (Longo, 179)] For one will say that he (Epicurus) does not accept a political and judicial branch. For he explicitly says "rhetoric" when replying to the sophist who claims he possesses all the branches. Therefore since he does not retract, Epicurus has made use of the analogy in a humorous fashion.

And such things, so to speak, having been written with capability . . .

*The next eight lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... of these expressions the sophist declares nothing on this (subject) ...

*The next two lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... and of *enargeia* ...

... concerning political rhetoric and ... for the reason of ... alone and ...

... sophist ...

... but ...

... and (if) it is accepted, to the extent that it is accepted, that rhetoric is an art, but an art which requires a great deal of practice and familiarity — for it is not impossible or excluded by the Founders of the School that certain arts [require] much practice and familiarity — how [from these] (does it result that) Epicurus is being rather senseless? And if the political form or branch of [col. XIII (Longo, 183)] rhetoric requires much practice and familiarity while the sophistic branch requires science alone, how is the argument senseless? By the gods, let someone show us!

For the argument is not, as he says, of the following kind: "If that which comes about by method is accessible to a young man, then that which occurs by method will be much more accessible," but rather of the following kind: "If that which comes about not only by means of method (is accessible to a young man, then that which occurs only by method will be much more accessible)." For if it is possible for a young man to gain mastery of the two, it is of course possible that one of the two results for a young man ...

*The next three lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... not to write, by the gods, "those things which are the result of practice and familiarity" ...  
when introducing the proposition, but to add the word "seems" (denotes) hesitancy ...

*The next six lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... for he was aiming at ... the rhetorician and because of this (he thought) that it is enough to say that which provokes. If (the word) was added with a certain hesitation and because he was conjecturing ... he took precautions [not] only in the case of rhetoric but also in the case of the act of thinking, adding the word "seems" there too. And we shall obviously accept the word "seems" in the case of the political [col. XIV (Longo, 187)] branch too which they have declared unequivocally elsewhere to be non-technical, and the persuasiveness of the argument would be derived not from disagreement but from consensus.

And in what way will we be considered wise, not simple-minded, if we have become accustomed to these things? For to shrink from telling the truth and ... concerning the ... for himself, aiming at the rhetorician is unfitting both for the young man in the dialogue and for Epicurus writing the dialogue, and these with freedom of speech ... and without hesitation [especially] in this one of the arguments constructed in reply to the man. How could it be possible to attack someone in a harsher manner?

*The next three lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... having assumed, that which is advanced by some others or at present ...  
... considering whether it possesses something of art or nothing technical, which is true too and characteristic of the Founders of the School to do regularly, and observed even in the case of the act of thinking; and in the very next words there would be [an aiming] [col. XV

(Longo, 191)] at the rhetorician, since the word "seems" is present there too. The man who claims he is going to quote arguments word for word must not insist that his audience accept (the meaning) that he wants, if other (interpretations) are revealed too. For in fact, he says that with the term "hesitating" Epicurus does not mean by the term that he agrees with those who say that rhetoric is without method, especially since in other places it is clearly revealed to be an art in reality. Is it not madness to call this an allusion to the rhetor? But we shall accept the word "seems" in the case of political rhetoric too. If you wish, let us accept it without fearing whether they say it is without method elsewhere; for we now accept in addition that the word "seems" [applies] in the case of sophistic rhetoric by the fact that the argument is now accepted not (to be) against this (view), although it is called an art in [many places]. If one asked whether Epicurus made it absolutely clear with arguments what kind of thing he says is technical and what sort of thing (he says) is without method . . .

. . . even if there were agreement on another uncertainty . . .

. . . to call . . . the thing at issue; for there is uncertainty as to whether it (is) entirely the result of practice and familiarity [col. XVI (Longo, 195)] but agreement on the fact that it requires a lot of practice and familiarity; so, by adding the word "seems" to the matter in doubt, he derives the issue from that which is given, even if he highlights the uncertainty.

He [will speak] for the purpose of organising (an argument), because [if] rhetoric is [not] an art according to Epicurus, then we have shown it is by saying if he considered it to be a practice and familiarity he would [not have added] the word "seems". But they said that our argument was not made clear by us, or at least this point alone is not made clear. If the former is the case, then we do not understand people who speak Greek; if the latter, then why do they themselves use ambiguous terms in their refutations [in response to] us?

*The next line is too fragmentary to translate*

... of the things at issue ...

... Epicurus ...

*The next line is too fragmentary to translate*

... for which science would rather seem to be responsible than practice; again to have set down ambiguous expressions ...

*The next two lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... those that show that the goal of rhetoric occurs both by means of a certain science and familiarity and practice rather than (exclusively) by means of practice and familiarity or by means of art, while the goal of thinking [col. XVII (Longo, 199)] occurs by means of both, but rather by means of science than by means of familiarity or practice, revealing that thinking is the result of both rather than one of them, while rhetoric is the result of one of them alone; and thirdly, the fact that thinking occurs by means of science, but does not result by means of research and practice; and he who composed this work, having chosen this by chance, says that they show that rhetoric occurs artlessly by means of practice and familiarity, while thinking occurs by means of science alone.

But even if we do not add the word "seems" in the passage, but remove it completely and assume that the words have been recorded thus: "you were not prevented from excelling in rhetorical capability which is the result of practice and much familiarity", [in what way] ... do they think that it is made clear that rhetoric does not occur by art but only by practice and familiarity? For by the same line of argument we could say: "it is clear that philosophising and philosophy (is the result) of much hard work, kingship (the result) of an excess of good fortune, poverty (the result) of bad luck, and friendship (the result) of much familiarity"; [and

yet] [col. XVIII (Longo, 203)] no one would be so uneducated as to assume that we (think) that philosophising and philosophy occur by means of hard work alone, or that kingship occurs by means of good fortune alone, and so too for the rest.

So in this way, when Epicurus said that "rhetoric is (the result) of much practice and familiarity" one should not understand the word "alone", but only the meaning "requires much practice and familiarity". For he writes the word "is" in place of "requires", just as we do when we speak in ordinary conversation, where by the standards of common parlance the most normal (meaning) is meant by the words; and one should not insist that the other meaning only is all the time meant in general. Furthermore, for the sake of the expression which this man has used, I say that it is unclear whether Epicurus means that rhetoric comes about from familiarity and practice alone or by means of art as well as practice, or not entirely from practice and familiarity. For at the beginning it is proposed: "We say that it is remarkable if you were not prevented at all, because of your youth, but [said] you were far superior in rhetorical capability to all men older than you and reputable."<sup>91</sup> [col. XIX (Longo, 207)] And similarly: "Remarkable indeed, if you were not prevented at all, on account of your youth, from excelling in rhetorical capability." To these words has been appended: "which seems to be (the result) of practice and much familiarity."

So to these two phrases, I mean "rhetorical capability" and "excelling by far all those who are older and reputable", has been added the phrase "which seems to be (the result) of practice and much familiarity". And naturally when something refers back to two antecedents, it becomes ambiguous in every way as to which of the antecedents it has been linked with. Therefore it is ambiguous whether the phrase "which seems to be (the result) of practice and

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<sup>91</sup> Somewhat different from the wording at *PHerc.* 1672 coll. X.34-XI.1.

much familiarity" is to be referred to "rhetorical capability" or "excelling everyone by far". For if he actually supposed that the acquisition of rhetorical capability occurs only by art, while excelling all those who have already acquired rhetoric occurs by practice and familiarity, yet for the observation of affairs themselves, not for excelling, science is sufficient, this . . .

. . . wording . . . but, I think, no one would say such a thing is true concerning a young man indeed . . .

[col. XX (Longo, 211)]

*The first line of the column is too fragmentary to translate*

. . . according to art, requires practice and much protracted familiarity, (he) agrees (he) has possessed this, and Epicurus would rather be aiming at him,<sup>92</sup> granting that which appeared great to him, but does not hinder that which has been proposed. [However] by Zeus, even if you wish to examine [how] the man who proposes this is understood . . .

. . . he will say that the word "seems" refers to the excelling rather than rhetoric . . .

*The next line is too fragmentary to translate*

. . . but that which has been granted to be unknowable, that is, to which phrase this word is appended. Each one, as if struggling against what is explicitly said, has entailed slanderous facilities which he summons to his aid. And yet what could one discuss more - for it is nearly (so) - than these things too, which are sufficient for the passage? For we say that the evidence which is written in Metrodorus no more refutes our view than that of this man and . . .

. . . from these Epicurus . . .

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<sup>92</sup>

I.e. the youth?

*The last three lines of this column and the first of the next are too fragmentary to translate*

[col. XXI (Longo, 215)] . . . the ones being joined with the others, and we ourselves distinctly, as we said, will also touch on these things. But now, by adding the concluding matters and the rest of the exposition, we could finish the treatise.

So then, that according to the Founders of the School sophistic rhetoric does not produce practical<sup>93</sup> and political rhetoric, is shown by the first book of *On Poems*<sup>94</sup> in several passages. Certain of the passages cited from that source by us will suffice, not only because they reveal it by pure assertion but also because they contain proofs. Hermarchus too, by what we have cited, shows this, as does Epicurus with his entire treatment in *On Rhetoric* by teaching that the capabilities<sup>95</sup> are completely independent of one another and that the schools contain nothing for the political faculty, but often even change it, things which it seems pointless and superfluous to offer now when they lie exposed for everyone. However, while many (passages) in the works (of the Founders of the School) show (this), the statements in Metrodorus are sufficient to instruct clearly that this skill in speaking before the people and pleading cases [col. XXII (Longo, 217)] derives from a certain practice and research of things which take place in cities.

"So does one mean rhetorical capability by looking to the distinction of what must be done [and not done] by the man who intends to be and to continue to be happy, and says that this (capability) derives from the science of nature, or does he mean political experience in accordance with which one is likely to observe from practice and research in the affairs of a city that which is advantageous to the people?" And a little further on; "For what is the

<sup>93</sup> On the technical force of ἐμπρακτος in Philodemus, see Longo Auricchio (1985), 44.

<sup>94</sup> By Metrodorus.

<sup>95</sup> I.e. sophistic, judicial, and political?

foundation?<sup>96</sup> That which observation produces, such as observation concerning what one should choose and reject and the political consequences that derive from research?"

Since this subject has been summed up by us, let us proceed to the third. It was this: to prove that sophistic rhetoric is really an art concerning the kind of display pieces which they themselves compose, and the arrangement of the kind of speeches which they themselves write and improvise. So then, we say that it has method, but not much, just like the art of poetry and . . . [on account of] this cause . . .

*The last two lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

col. XXIII (Longo, 221)

*Whole column (40 lines) is too fragmentary to translate*

col. XXIV (Longo, 223)

*Whole column (38 lines) is too fragmentary to translate*

col. XXV (Longo, 225)

*The first two lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . that . . . not without method, in this way the experience of the sophists. So of all the branches of rhetoric there is not one for physical need.<sup>97</sup> But since some success has been laid down which directs a path sometimes in certain circumstances, then this too possesses art when success follows them. Yet we would not say that it is a subordinate<sup>98</sup> art or for practical

<sup>96</sup> Longo's (1985) punctuation, and she is surely right. The content of this citation is reminiscent of the polemic with Nausiphanes.

<sup>97</sup> Necessary vs. useful arts?

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1.1 1094a 9-14.

... [to refute the] facts themselves ...

*The next line is too fragmentary to translate*

... but can someone, by quoting one of the works of a sophistic rhetor, imitate, like a talented expert at the game of odds and evens ...?

*The next two lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... but how can one imitate badly and at a distance? Similarly ...

... a speech too ... says Epicurus, how will one imitate from afar with regard to [things that are rather close]? ...

*The next line is too fragmentary to translate*

... other people (say) they have other differences in the case of the written work, although the art is one. And how in the case of poetics and painting and many other sciences will they persuade? But, as I said often, the forms of transmission of such (arts) are, by Zeus, few in number and differ from the sciences, because both of close things and ...

... they have method which is easy to comprehend ...

*The next two lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... they construct their speeches to follow the precepts. Therefore ...

... of such non-technical ...

... producing in agreement unmethodical ...

... but also of poets ...

*The last three lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

col. XXXI (Longo, 247)

*The first line of the column is too fragmentary to translate*

... to provide such examples for imitation of the forensic, symbouleutic, ambassadorial, speeches. These (speeches) then must be placed apart and those which are like them, and one should exclude the demonstrations and each of the others, so that everyone is wrong and all (treatises (?)) almost produce the assumption that [this] (art) too produces political experience and capability, which art it adequately seems to reveal. For one could not conclude falsely by chance or without the application of method, even if (one concludes that) the majority (occupy themselves with things) of which (he) is not (in fact) knowledgeable, as if he were knowledgeable.

We are satisfied with certain arguments like these with regard to the present issue. On the other hand let them be perfectly contented with the man who has become accustomed to not worrying at all about the truth.

If one has paid close attention to what is said, it will not appear to him that some of the things attributed by us to another have been removed by these kinds of (proofs). For we have refuted the man who charges that those things which have not yet succeeded for them before because of them ...

... to show as following because sophistic knowledge is not concerned with political rhetoric [col. XXXII (Longo, 251)] we are putting off this branch to be written up in the next portion of the treatise.

For in that one it will be shown that political capability can no more be accomplished from

these sophistic schools than by means of grammarians or philosophers, and often the possession of it was even a cause of considerable harm, since it does not produce success in real contests. And as soon as he has been confounded, no argument will be left any longer, I think, for those who suppose that sophistic is an art which produces politicians.

But let us go back to the last of the subjects, which was concerned with the fact that the capability which has a good reputation in assemblies and law courts does not derive from another science at all.

So in response to the suppositions, it suffices to demonstrate that the art of the rhetorical schools does not achieve a single thing for this. For, of course, no other method for politicians was imagined besides that which the sophists transmit for rhetorical speeches . . .

*The next two lines are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . extends [and] somehow with regard to the capability it is well concluded that those who possess it possess it without science. Nevertheless . . .

*The last two lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

**col. XXXIII (Longo, 255)**

*The first fifteen lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

. . . [transmissions] of political theorems . . .

*The next eleven lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... but also existing by means of writing, such as architecture and ship-building and navigation and painting ...

*The last seven lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

col. XXXIV (Longo, 259)

*The first three lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

... a man induced neither by philanthropy nor by ambition nor by any other cause to bestow a certain gift was able to give a reason both to his own contemporaries and those who came after him, unless someone by offering the political arts of the philosophers ...

... (lest) we incur unspeakable rage ...

... occurring to all and ...

... but not ...

... some men ...

... if teachers of political capabilities ...

... those much more ...

... and counselling ...

*The next line is too fragmentary to translate*

... and carrying now, [but] each of those who demand that the affairs [of the city]<sup>101</sup> be put in his hands supposes that he himself [possesses completely] the research and exercise that takes place in assemblies and law courts — says Metrodorus — by practice of political experience.

However, it is more evident to everyone [in every way] that a philosopher and a grammarian who is shrewd and undertakes [affairs] at home is sometimes far superior to all ...

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<sup>101</sup> Longo (1985).

*The next two lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... a common and basic theorem (?) ...

**col. XXXV (Longo, 263)**

*The first line is too fragmentary to translate*

... being, unless it is a science which is contemplated by reason, going completely unnoticed and having people who are able to argue on things which are difficult to contemplate concerning themselves. For it is not possible to allege that some people's arts do not derive from others but are concluded by means of themselves. For they too know that they were not taught by others, but they themselves are able to say, and are aware, that they themselves possess certain methods, by which they proceeded by themselves and from which they proceed to the division of things ...

... and say these ...

... having set out from education would not have been conceived but "illiterate fellows" — says Epicurus — and Hermarchus calls them boors, since learning involves the rational faculty ...

*The next six lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... whenever ...

... they acquire research and practice, they are in control of the cities; and life is evidence of this for those to whom we say ...

*The next seven lines are too fragmentary to translate*

**col. XXXVI (Longo, 267)**

*The text of this column is too fragmentary to translate*

col. XXXVII (Longo, 269)

... of affairs ...

... war ... (41 lines largely unintelligible)

...peace and ...

... of wealth ...

col. XXXVIII (Longo, 271)

(43 lines unintelligible)

col. XXXIX (Longo, 273)

... being persuaded [and] often advising that which is disadvantageous and being liked and being just and being wealthy [or] poor and (being) lowly <or> distinguished or handsome or ugly or often having such and such a name or being thin or ... [or] having such and such clothing or thousands upon thousands of other things about which it would be utterly impossible to name an art, will the politicians not be more likely to succeed than the others? For how were they not going to be? For what is more, they continually expose themselves to danger, and for some the revenue is slender, and though knocked around they put up with (it) and by this very means they sometimes win. In addition to this they have more research ... and one could have observation (?). But others who do not have ...

*The next four lines are too fragmentary to translate*

... they have less art by means of which they succeed ...

*The last nine lines of the column are too fragmentary to translate*

col. XL (Longo, 277)

*The eight lines which constitute this column are too fragmentary to translate*

### CHAPTER 3: ARGUMENTS "FOR AND AGAINST"

In this chapter I shall attempt to review the surviving material from book 1 of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* and then proceed with a brief examination of his survey of arguments which are put forward to attack or defend rhetoric's claim to being an art.

#### (i) PHILODEMUS' DISCUSSION OF ART IN BOOK 1

The first legible lines (2-8) of the first fragment from *PHerc.* 1427 (Longo, 3) contain a reference to the difficulty which hampers any discussion of rhetoric's technicity,

... ] ΕΣ έννο[εῖν] ἐπι-  
 στή]μη[ν], καὶ τὴν ῥητο-  
 ρικὴν ἐναρμόσαντες  
 εἰς αὐ]τὴν ἀποφαινου- 5  
 σι τέχνην, ἴν' οὕτως ὁ κα-  
 λούμενος γένη[ται] τῶν  
 τυφ[λῶν] σφ[αιρι]σμός.

... [to (?)] conceptualise science, and fitting rhetoric into the conception they declare [it to be an art], in order that in this way the so-called ball-game of the blind comes about.

The absence of context makes any interpretation of these lines somewhat speculative, but I suggest that Philodemus is criticising those who form a general notion of what art is and then fit, or even adapt, rhetoric to it so that rhetoric can be shown to conform to their notion of art.

The terminology (έννοια, ἐναρμόσαντες) recalls the Stoic notion of generic conceptions which underlie definitions. This procedure seems to have become quite standard.

Olympiodorus, for example, in his commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* states:<sup>1</sup>

δεῖ τοὺς τῆς τέχνης ὄρους εἰπεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἀρμόζουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δῆλον ὅτι τέχνη ἐστίν.

and then proceeds to enumerate several Stoic definitions of art, two of which, in his opinion, rhetoric satisfies.

<sup>1</sup> *In Platonis Gorgiam* 12.1 p.69 Westerink = fr. 392 Hülser.

In the Philodemus passage, the verb ἐννοεῖν would therefore denote an ἔννοια which is acquired by repeated observation and experience, that is a general notion upon which a definition is based. For the connection between definition and general notion and their relation to reality we may cite Diogenes Laertius 7.42,<sup>2</sup>

καὶ τὸ ὀρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται.

The mysterious "blind men's ball-game", absent from Otto's *Sprichwörter*, I take to be a proverbial (καλούμενος) expression to describe argumentation which repeatedly misses the mark and has no purpose.<sup>3</sup> If the formation of ἔννοια is dependent on the senses, there is an additional point to the choice of the word τυφλῶν. Although the Stoics, with their predilection for definitions, appear to be the likeliest candidates for Philodemus' criticism, no one group or school is entirely exempt from it: all are guilty of conceiving art to be one thing or another and then of trying to fit the various disciplines which actually exist into this notion. In order to avoid this trap himself, Philodemus will have to address the problem of the meaning of the term τέχνη at some length later on.<sup>4</sup> In this case, the people who are criticised find that rhetoric coheres with their conception of art, and this would exclude the Academics, but not the Stoics or Peripatetics.

The fragment continues (lines 12-18, Longo, 3),

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also August. *De civ. D* 8.9 = *SVF* 2.106 *etiam ipsi Stoici...a corporis sensibus eam (sc. dialecticam) ducendam putarent, hinc asseverantes animum concipere notiones, quas appellant ἐννοίας, earum rerum scilicet quas definiendo explicant*, and Long and Sedley (1987) vol.2, 194. On ἔννοια in Epicureanism, cf. Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 69, *RS XXIV*, Philod. *Ir.* col. XLV.26, and Bailey (1928), 591 and Asmis (1984), 61-63.

<sup>3</sup> Cic. *De or.* 1.73 uses the analogy of ball-players who illustrate artistic dexterity; in *Att.* 2.19.1 (59 B.C.) he uses a strange expression, *ego fortasse τυφλώτω*, cf. Michel (1965), 335.

<sup>4</sup> In *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 coll. XVIII.29-XIX.16, XXX.19-XXXI.11, XXXVIII.2-15.

διαφορῶν γὰρ οὐ-  
 σῶν ἀπλάτων ὄσων  
 ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, ὅταν  
 ιδιότητι προσπέσω- 15  
 σιν, ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν εὐ-  
 θύς ἐξορίζουσιν τὴν  
 τοῦτο προσφερομένην.

For because of the innumerable differences which exist in arts, whenever they encounter a special characteristic they immediately exclude from the category of arts the practice which contributes this.

These lines describe the corresponding result of taking a particular prescriptive view of what constitutes an art and explain why such a view is flawed. The differences which are encountered from one art to another are ἀπλατοί. Philodemus has chosen an interesting adjective. Although it must signify something like "countless" (hence Longo, 3 "innumerevoli") Philodemus has avoided the colourless πολλάί or something similar and selected an adjective which implies "monstrous" or "unformed".<sup>5</sup> This is an appropriate selection if Philodemus is trying to say that it is difficult to make arts as they actually exist conform to one simple standard notion. Because an art may have an ιδιότης, a quality which is peculiar to it alone, people who have too narrow a notion of what an art is are forced to exclude the art from the category art. From the scholiast to Dionysius Thrax we learn that the Stoic Chrysippus asserted:<sup>6</sup>

ὅτι ὄρος ἐστὶν ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις<sup>7</sup>

thereby defining the very term definition. According to Philodemus, a person who attempts to classify disciplines in accordance with a single property will often find that a discipline possesses a property which does not appear in the prescription of his classification.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the connotations of many limbs or serpent's coils: of Kottos, Briareus, Gyges in Hes. *Op.* 150-51, the Gorgons in Pind. *Pyth.* 12.9, the serpent guarding the apples of the Hesperides in Eur. *HF* 399.

<sup>6</sup> 107.5-7 = *SVF* 2.226.

<sup>7</sup> The text continues with the scholiast's explanation, τούτῃσιν ὁ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδίδους. Long & Sedley II(1987), 193 remark that the masc. ὁ is odd and the text should perhaps read ὁ <λόγος ὁ> . . .

Another fragment from the same papyrus contains a select list of the variety of definitional notions of art which various people follow, and it may serve to illustrate what Philodemus means in fragment 1,

... ] . ΧΑΜ[ . ]Σ[  
 ἐ]στηκότα θεω[ρήμα-  
 τα προσφερομένην  
 ὡς τὴν γραμματικὴν,  
 οἱ δὲ τὴν σοφίαν [μό]νην, 5  
 οἱ δὲ τὴν λόγον ἐχ[ουσα]ν  
 ᾧ προσφέρει, ἃ προσφέ-  
 ρει [κα]θάπερ Πλάτων,  
 οἱ δ[ὲ] τὴν ἐπὶ σύμφ[ο]ρ[ό]ν  
 τι τοῦ βί[ο]υ παρεισηγμέ- 10  
 νην, καὶ [τὴν] ῥ[η]τορικὴν  
 α[ὐ]κ οὐσα[ν] τοιαύτην] ἐκ  
 τῶν τεχνῶν ἐξ[ο]ρ[ι]ζώ-  
 σιν, εἴτ' ἀπ[ο]κ[λί]ν[ει]ν πρὸς  
 τοῖ]ναντίον ἐπιχει- 15  
 ροῦντες, ὅποια εἶναι

*Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 fr. 3 (Longo, 7)*

... (some say that art is) that which contributes firm precepts, like grammar, others that which alone contributes wisdom, others that which has a rationale "by which it administers what it administers", as Plato says, while others say that it is that which has been introduced for some advantage of life; and when they exclude rhetoric from the arts because it is not like this, whether trying to reverse the kind of art [it appears (?)] to be (?) ...

The descriptions are familiar from other sources, although only Plato is singled out by name (line 8). The list comprises views which evaluate arts in terms of method, product, and utility. This variety must be deliberate, since Philodemus wants to illustrate that arts can be approached from several directions and where they satisfy one of these prerequisites they may not satisfy others.<sup>8</sup> The first notion, that art is what provides ἐστήκοτα θεωρήματα, is quite narrow, and will encompass only the so-called exact sciences, such as grammar,<sup>9</sup> and exclude those arts that are often termed "conjectural", such as navigation and rhetoric. The second

<sup>8</sup> Philodemus seems to have opted for a more confusing range of definitions because it suits his immediate polemical purpose. In a different context, Sextus Empiricus can reduce the types of arts to two, the exact and the conjectural (*Math.* 2.13), and insists that rhetoric *must* fall into one category or the other if it is to be considered an art. Later in the second book, Philodemus will fall back on this simple two-tiered system (*PHerc.* 1674 coll. XXXVIII.2-XXXIX.24).

<sup>9</sup> Later he will add music, painting, and sculpture to the list (*Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XXXVIII.32-35).

considers art that which produces σοφία and nothing else. Here the art is viewed in accordance with its "product". The adjective μόνην is a little problematic. If it is taken with σοφίαν<sup>10</sup> then the phrasing suggests that the wisdom which is produced, and defines the art as an art, is quite abstract: wisdom and nothing else. This approach also is exclusive, perhaps even more so than the first: only arts like mathematics or astronomy, under a certain point of view, could be said to produce this sort of wisdom.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, if the adjective is to be taken with the noun τέχνην implied ("others say that only <that art> which produces wisdom is an art) then the implication would be that there are only a very few arts which qualify, but the nature of the wisdom is less explicit. Either way, most ancient philosophers would surely have argued that only philosophy can produce wisdom. Less exclusive is Plato's formulation from the *Gorgias*, where the art has to be able to give an explanation or reason for what it does, which, at least in the *Gorgias*, excludes rhetoric from this list, and several other conjectural sciences besides. The final example is of those who think that an art is something which is introduced to provide some benefit for human existence. This is a fairly general conception which could embrace a wide range of human disciplines and practices that may be of some utility for mankind. At the same time, it is an ambiguous category, since, as Philodemus seems to observe, rhetoric could be construed as not being of benefit, even as being harmful, and therefore excluded from the category of art.

The views of art listed by Philodemus betray a bewildering variety of requirements which have something to do with whether the art is conceived from the stand-point of methodology or of product, or some other general attribute.

<sup>10</sup> As it certainly is by Longo, 7, "altri quella che consta di mera abilità".

<sup>11</sup> A further possibility is that it means something weaker here, like "skill" or "cleverness", and the participle προσφερομένην could be understood to mean "contribute", making "cleverness" a characteristic of art, not a product.

In matters of methodology, not all arts are the same. One of the ways in which this is illustrated is by the amount of training or experience a practitioner requires once the basic precepts of the art have been mastered. The common notion was that the more an art depended on theory and the less on experience, the more exact that art was. Philodemus rehearses familiar observations on the way different arts require different degrees of talent, training, experience and expertise:<sup>12</sup>

τῶν	
γάρ ἐπιστημῶν αἱ	
μὲν τὸ πᾶν ἢ τὸ πλείσ-	5
τον ἔχουσιν ἐκ φύσε-	
ως] ὀφ[α]εἶλον προὔπο-	
κεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐπιγ'εἶν[ο]εσ-	
θαι διὰ σ[υ]να[σ]κήσεως	
ὀλίγον, [αἱ] δὲ δ[ι]᾽ ἑαυτῶν	10
τελεσιουργ[ο]ύσιν, [[αλ-	
λα]] αἱ δὲ [κ]αὶ γ[έ] τινας προσ-	
δέονται ὄντο<ς φ>υσικοῦ	
πά[ν]υ διὰ τῆς ἀσκήσε-	
ως οὐ περιγ[ι]νομένου	15

For some of the sciences have from nature all or most of what has to form their basis, and little that occurs in addition through training, while others accomplish their ends through themselves, while still others require in addition the existence of some natural talent which does not really result from training

*Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 fr.4 lines 3-15 (Longo, 7)*

The text of the fragment is not in a good state as displayed by the scribe's crossing-out of characters and words and his omission of certain letters. However, the lines immediately preceding this portion of the fragment (lines 1-3) indicate that Philodemus is attempting to refute certain arguments one by one. The section quoted above appears to outline some general characteristics of arts which Philodemus feels are acceptable in a general sort of way. The important thing is that not all arts are alike, but can be divided very generally into basic categories (the list is probably not complete since the fragment breaks off):

i) arts which rely on the talent of the practitioner and have little need of practice;

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *PHerc. 1427 fr. 2* (Longo, 5), and *Dion. Hal. De imit. fr. 1 Aujac* (= 2 Us.) τρία ταῦτα τὴν ἀρίστην ἡμῖν ἐν τε τοῖς πολιτικοῖς λόγοις ἔξιν καὶ ἐν πάσῃ τέχνῃ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ χορηγήσει· φύσις δεξιὰ, μάθησις ἀκριβής, ἀσκησις ἐπίπονος.

ii) arts which fulfil their function on their own ( $\delta\iota'$   $\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ ), the talent of the practitioner being immaterial;

iii) arts which require a little talent which does not result from practice (this last category is somewhat speculative because the pivotal negative  $\omicron\upsilon$  is an editorial supplement).

Now all three of these categories are variations of an "exact science". It is important to note that no one of them is equivalent to a conjectural art, since the arts in question do not rely on experience or trial and error. However, even among the exact sciences there are some which do presuppose a special natural aptitude, extraneous to the art, on the part of the practitioner. This observation is especially relevant to the appreciation of the technicity of rhetoric, since the debate on the amount of natural talent required by the orator as a starting point is at least as old as Isocrates.<sup>13</sup>

So much for the problem. No doubt, Philodemus gave it ample preparation in book 1, most of which is lost. The surviving continuous text represents the last few columns of the book and as such contains Philodemus' concluding remarks and the announcement of a more detailed treatment of specific arguments in the next book.

In his summary, Philodemus seems to isolate some of the salient points which characterise a multitude of arguments on rhetoric's status.

The first type of approach on Philodemus' list appears to involve the objection that rhetoric does not have an exclusive claim on its professed goal (presumably persuasion). The issue had already been raised by Plato in the *Gorgias*, and had since, apparently, become a stock theme in discussions of rhetoric's technicity. Thus Sextus Empiricus, assuming that rhetoric's

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Antid.* 189-191, *C. soph.* 15-18. On Philodemus' use of references to Isocrates' works, see Hubbell (1916), Indelli (1993), and Di Matteo (1997). The issues of talent, training, and practice in oratory are debated in Cic. *De or.* 1.113-136 (talent), 145-159 (practice).

goal is persuasion, reminds us that other arts (he names medicine specifically) also persuade by employing speech.<sup>14</sup> Philodemus' retort is introduced by an ironic pleonasm,

οὐ γὰρ] ἴσως  
 ἀγέννητον οὐδ' οὐχ ὁ-  
 ρώμενον ἐν τοῖς φαι-  
 νομένοις, ὃ [ἐ] γίγνεται 10  
 διὰ τέχνης, τοῦτο καὶ  
 'τοῦ τῆι τέχνῃ συντελεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἄλλης'  
 (διαλλ) [ουεκδηλος] 'τινὸς αἰῦ] κοινωνῆσαι] τέ-  
 χνης, καὶ ταύτη τά-  
 χα καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον 15  
 ἀπὸ ἀναγκαίου δι-  
 ορίζεσθαι πέφυκεν.

*Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. II.7-11-11a-16 (Blank)*

For it is not perhaps without precedent nor unseen in the phenomena that what occurs by means of art has a share in being achieved both by the (relevant) art and by means of some other art, and in this way perhaps the useful too is naturally distinguished from the necessary.

Although Philodemus does not supply specific examples, he claims that it is a common enough and self-evident fact that the strict boundaries which are often thought to separate arts and their respective goals do not always hold. Arts are often complementary (κοινωνῆσαι), and two arts may collaborate or arrive at more or less the same ends, and rhetoric was frequently identified as playing an auxiliary role to a number of other arts. Presumably, Philodemus might have in mind the commonplace example of the physician who requires the kind of communicative skills which will assist him to convince a patient to adopt a prescribed regime. Philodemus reserves the right to classify some arts (for example medicine) as necessary or essential (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον), and others (for example the good bedside-manner which rhetoric might claim to provide) as useful or supportive (χρήσιμον). In any event, the objection as framed is not sufficiently powerful to deny that rhetoric is an art in its own right.

<sup>14</sup> *Math. 2.5*, though he draws a distinction between rhetoric which seeks to secure πειστικὴ πείθω from other arts (e.g. geometry) which aims to produce διδασκαλικὴ πείθω.

Another weakness lies in the way enemies of rhetoric rely on comparative analogies and individual examples in order to attack its status as an art. Such arguments can rebound against those who employ them if the examples are replaced with different ones. Philodemus seems to refer to the tendency to select imperfect examples of orators in arguing that rhetoric has no efficacy,

ἐξουσιάσει πα-	
ραπλάττεσθαι χαρα-	15
κτῆρα μοχθηρότα-	
τηον, ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν	
ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνδρῶν	
κατηγορί[[ω]]αν τῶν ἐ-	
πιστημῶν ποιῆται	20
τις	

*Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. III.14-21 (Blank)*

it will be possible to fabricate a very negative character when one makes a case against sciences which is based on specific practitioners

Philodemus introduces the notion of the τέλειος τεχνίτης who has full command of all aspects of his art.<sup>15</sup> Arguments which seek to exploit the weaknesses of individual orators are exposed to counter-arguments which may appeal to better ones.

Arguments which attempt to nullify rhetoric by showing that its end (persuasion) is not unique to it can be countered by pointing out that rhetoric seeks to persuade only by means of discourse, not some other medium,

ἀλλὰ μὴν πρό-	25
χειρον ἔσται λέγειν	
καί, διότι πείθουσιν	
μὲν πολλοῖ] κατὰ τὸ	
κοινὸν καὶ τῶν οὐ ρη-	
τόρων, οὐ μὴν τέλος	30
τοῦτο τῆς ῥητορικῆς	
ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ	
λόγω] πείθειν, ὥστε	
καὶ πολλὴν ἀπροσλο-	
γίαν καταγνώσεται	35
τῶν τὰ κάλλη κῆαι	

<sup>15</sup> *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 coll. II.36-III.2 (Blank).*

τὰς ἀλλὰς] φλ[υαρίας  
 παραφερόντ[ιτ]ων.

*Rh 1 PHerc. 1427 coll. III.25-IV.1 (Blank)*

However, it will be easy to say too that while many, even of those who are not rhetors, persuade in a general sense, this is not the goal of rhetoric, but rather persuasion by speech, and so he will accuse those who bring up things like beauty and other nonsense of great irrelevance.

Philodemus will make the same point again, and the argument was obviously something of a commonplace in discussions of rhetoric's τέλος.<sup>16</sup> It is, of course, important to remember, that Philodemus does not commit himself intellectually to this, or any of the rebuttals listed in this section. Elsewhere he denies that there exists an art of persuading an audience at all, but at the present stage he is content to meet the arguments on their own terms to show that the premises need not lead to the conclusions which the opponents of rhetoric desire.

In his summary of faults in argumentation Philodemus identifies the following characteristics, some of which receive further treatment in the surviving portion of the next book:

- the arguments tend to be sloppy in the employment of key terms, taking no account of ambiguities which arise from a term's use in a specific sense;<sup>17</sup>
- essentially the same arguments are repeated with minor formal changes or the inclusion of different examples;<sup>18</sup>
- arguments tend to make assertions as if they were facts without the necessary effort at justification;<sup>19</sup>
- unquestioned assumptions are often made on the basis of unverifiable information;<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. II.4-7* where the case of Phryne is alluded to; cf. *Sext. Emp. Math. 2.2-5* which includes the Phryne anecdote.

<sup>17</sup> *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. IV.10-22.*

<sup>18</sup> *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. IV.23-31.*

<sup>19</sup> *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. IV.32-38.*

<sup>20</sup> *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 coll. IV.38-V.12-12a-12b-12c-17 (Blank).*

- the arguments tend to be inductive.<sup>21</sup>

Philodemus' dissatisfaction with the cogency of these arguments is motivated by a specific concern: they fail to distinguish sophistic rhetoric from other activities which are generally labelled "rhetoric" and thus there is a risk that sophistic rhetoric too might be construed as not being an art,

VO-

μίζω δ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάν-  
 τας, εἰ δὲ μήγε, τοὺς  
 πλείστους λόγους, καὶ 20  
 συνχωρουμένων  
 τῶν λημμάτων, οὐ  
 σὺνάξειν ὃ θέλουσιν οἱ  
 κατασκευάζοντες, καὶ  
 μάλιστα [[α]], ἐὰν ἐρωτῶν- 25  
 ται περὶ τοῦ τὴν σοφισ-  
 τικὴν ῥητορικὴν οὐ-  
 κ εἶναι τέχνην

*Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. V.17-28 (Longo and Blank)*

But I think that all, and if not all at least most of the arguments, even if their premises are conceded, will not lead to the conclusion which their composers intend, and especially if their syllogisms lead them to conclusions concerning sophistic rhetoric's not being an art

To a large extent, the failure to differentiate adequately sophistic rhetoric from other disciplines which share the label "rhetoric" is ascribed to a lack of attention to linguistic precision.<sup>22</sup> This is why Philodemus himself is careful to give a full explanation of what he means by the term "art" and to differentiate sophistic from other activities in the constructive section of the next book.

<sup>21</sup> *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. VI.25-30.*

<sup>22</sup> Hence the complaint about ἀδιαληψιῶν and τὴν ἐν ταῖς φωναῖς κοινότητα in *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 col. IV.17, 18-20*, which anticipates the discussion in *Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXXVIII.2-15 (Longo, 123)*.

(ii) PHILODEMUS' APPRAISAL OF ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEK TO DEMONSTRATE THAT  
RHETORIC IS NOT AN ART IN BOOK 2

Our legible text begins towards the closing section of a review of arguments which aim to prove that rhetoric is not an art. This is clear from the statement,

ἐπ[εὶ δὲ] [πρ]ὸς ἅπαντας	15
[τ]οῦτους] εὖ ἄποχρώντως	
[δι]ειλέγμεθα τοὺς ἥρω-	
[τ]ημ[έν]ους ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ	
εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν	
τέχνην, ἐξῆς ἀποψό-	20
μεθα τ[α]χέως καὶ τοὺς	
ὑπὲρ τοῦ τέχνην αὐτὴν	
εἶν[αι] προφερομένους	

*Rh.2 PHerc. 1674 col. VIII.15-23 (Longo, 59)*

[And] since we have argued quite sufficiently in response to these who argue that rhetoric is not an art, we shall next examine briefly those who propose that it is an art

where what preceded must have dealt with arguments against the technicity of rhetoric. Only eight and a half columns of this section of the argument survive, but from them we can construct a general impression of the argument's strategy and the kinds of issues raised. Philodemus cites points and observations from an established armoury of standard arguments and proceeds to answer them one by one. This approach is familiar from several other treatises of Philodemus.<sup>23</sup> The responses are swift and conducted in a summary fashion. They also tend to be as eclectic as the objections they serve to nullify.

The text presents some difficulty to the interpreter in that it is by no means always clear whether one is reading the opponent's objection or Philodemus' response to it. Longo Auricchio identified six quoted arguments against rhetoric in the surviving portion of the text

<sup>23</sup>

E.g. in *De poem.* 5.

The first three arguments are founded on what are taken to be self-evident facts:

- 1) the fact that pupils pay fees to rhetors means that the rhetors must be able to teach an art;<sup>32</sup>
- 2) a significant number of pupils come out of the rhetors' schools with skills which they did not possess when they first entered;<sup>33</sup>
- 3) fathers who received an education at the hands of the rhetors and are now involved in civic and forensic business continue to send their sons to the rhetors, which must mean that they recognise that they themselves learned their art there.<sup>34</sup>

All three of these arguments which rely on generalised empirical facts perhaps qualify as inductive. Philodemus observed in book 1 that the majority of arguments on the issue of rhetoric's technicity have this character.<sup>35</sup> But as Philodemus points out with deliberate care, the arguments also rely on an interpretation of what sort of science the art of rhetoric is. In the case of the first argument, it is assumed that because people pay fees the rhetors possess an art which is methodical (τέχνην μεθώδευον οἱ ῥήτορες, col.X.4-5). Associated assumptions would follow, and are addressed in Philodemus' response: that the rhetors possess an art which is useful or practical, otherwise people would not pay money to learn it; that the art is useful for civic life; the fact that rhetors are able to teach something implies that they possess an art which can be reduced to a system.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Rh. 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. X.3-7 (Longo, 63). Cf. Isocrates' remarks on those who profess to teach political discourse (πολιτικοὶ λόγοι), ἡγοῦνται δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν τέχνην, ἣν ὡς πλείστους τῆ μικρότητι τῶν μισθῶν καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων προσαγάγονται καὶ λαβεῖν τι παρ' αὐτῶν δυνηθῶσιν (*C. soph.* 9).

<sup>33</sup> Rh. 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. XIII.1-5 (Longo, 69).

<sup>34</sup> Rh. 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. XV.5-11 (Longo, 73).

<sup>35</sup> τοί/γαρ ἐπακτικῶδες] εἶναι τοὺς πλείονας / τῶν λόγων οὐκ ἴσως / λέληθεν οὐδὲ τοὺς / μετρίως συνέντας, Rh. 1 *PHerc.* 1472 col. VI.25-30 (Longo, 19).

<sup>36</sup> This point is made explicitly later in another quoted argument, [ῶ]σπερ ἐμ[μου]/σικῆι καὶ γραμμ[ατικῆι] / παραδόσεις τινῶν / εἰσιν] ἀ[γ]νοῦμ[ε]ν[ον], οἴ[ου]τως καὶ ἐπὶ ῥη[τορικῆν], Rh. 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. XVI.18-22 (Longo, 75).

Philodemus' reply is reasonably full, and, despite the uncertainties posed by the lacuna in column XI, I assume that he continues with his comments until the end of column XII. He does not choose to question the fact that pupils *do* pay fees to rhetors. To do so would be foolish, since it is undoubtedly the case that they do. Instead he cites remarks from Epicurus' *On Rhetoric* to the effect that people attend the schools of the rhetors in the anticipation of gaining skills for civic life but are soon disappointed on leaving the school when they realise that all their learning is of no use in the practical world.<sup>37</sup> Besides, presumably on an analogy drawn by Epicurus himself, if the fact that people pay money to a practitioner proves that the practitioner possesses an art, then soothsayers, drug-sellers, and any number of other frauds may also be deemed to possess an art.<sup>38</sup>

It can thus be seen that the second quoted argument is introduced as a sort of attempt to reply to Philodemus' response to the first: it is an empirically verifiable fact that many people are more competent (in civic life) after having attended the rhetors' schools.<sup>39</sup> Philodemus' opening remarks serve to highlight the weakness of crude inductive arguments of this type: one could find sufficient examples of people who were worse after they attended the rhetors' schools than before, and ascribe the reason that some become good at speaking in public to another source.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, Philodemus implies that the same argumentative form could be used to show that on empirical grounds people without technical training sometimes excel at public speaking at the expense of those with technical training:<sup>41</sup>

καίτοι γ]ε ὀρώ[μ]εν

<sup>37</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 coll. X.24-XI.34 (Longo, 63, 65).

<sup>38</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 coll. XI.34-XII.13 (Longo, 65, 67), and Epicurus denied that there existed an art of prophecy, μαντικήν δ' ἅπασαν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀναιρεῖ ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ Μικρᾷ ἐπιτομῇ καὶ φησί: "μαντικὴ οὐσα ἀνύπαρκτος, εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτή, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἡγητέα γινόμενα" (Diog. Laert. 10.135).

<sup>39</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XIII.1-5 (Longo, 69).

<sup>40</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XIII.5-14 (Longo, 69).

<sup>41</sup> The point seems to echo Isocrates' pronouncement, πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν φιλοσοφῶντων ιδιώται διετέλεσαν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ τινες οὐδενὶ πάποτε συγγενόμενοι τῶν σοφιστῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι δεινοὶ γέγονασιν, *C. soph.* 14.

παρ' ἐνίων ἀτέχνων  
 ὄντων πολλῶι πλείονας 30  
 ἐνίοτε κ[αί] δυνατωτέ-  
 ρους ἐξιόντας ἢ παρ[ά]  
 τῶν ἐπιστημονικῶς  
 τοῦτο ἀκριβοῦντων, ὁ  
 μᾶλλον [ἐ]μφατικόν ἐ-  
 στίη τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τέχνην  
 τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 coll. XIII.28-XIV.4 (Longo, 69, 71)*

[And yet] we see, among some who are not experts, people who come out more numerous and [more capable] than among those who make a detailed and [scientific] study of this, which suggests rather that rhetoric is not an art.

Empirical arguments which try to play the 'numbers game' are open to such objections.<sup>42</sup>

Apart from this weakness, there persists, in Philodemus' opinion, an important misconception in the understanding of what it is that the rhetors actually teach. Empirical experience tells us that in practice the skills required in civic life are best acquired by watching and copying those who are already successful in these pursuits,

οἱ τε ἀφέντες τὰ τῆς σο-  
 φιστικῆς [π]αιδί, νοῦν δὲ 20  
 κοινὸν ἔχοντες, τῶν τε  
 νομικῶν ἐμπείρους κα-  
 τασκευάζουσιν καί, ἃ  
 παρατετηρήκασιν ἐν  
 δήμοις καὶ δικαστηρί- 25  
 οῖς, ὡς ἐνδέχεται] μά-  
 λιστ', ἐνποιούσι. τῶν γὰρ  
 διδασκαλείων ἀμελοῦ-  
 σιν] οἱ τοιοῦτοι, [τ]ὰς δὲ σο-  
 φιστικὰς ἀπραξίαις ἀνα- 30  
 διδόντες κατὰ τῆς βου-  
 σιν, καὶ -- σ[υ]γκυρεῖ δ' ἐνίο-  
 τε τισιν εἰς ἡφύεσι πρὸς  
 τὸ λέγειν -- παραβ[ε]βλη-  
 κέναι πο[τ]ὲ λέγονται πα-  
 ραγγέλματα] καὶ λί[σ]αν τοῦ- 5  
 τον] ὠφελούμενοι τῶν  
 τρόπων, δόξαν παρέχου-  
 σιν ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν  
 γεγόνασιν τοιοῦτοι.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 coll. XIV.18-XV.5 (Longo, 71, 73)*

<sup>42</sup> Note the way in which Philodemus begins his reply to the second argument, πρῶτον μὲν / οὐ πάντες, ἀλλ' ἐνιοί . . . κτλ. col. XIII.5-6, and the third, πρῶτον / μὲν οὐ πάντες ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι . . . κτλ. col. XV.11-12

And those who leave the subject matter of sophistic to a child, and have common sense, train people skilled in legal matters and [produce] what they have observed in assemblies and courts as much as they are able. For people like these [pay no attention to the schools], and, proclaiming the sophists' lack of practical expertise, they devote themselves to their training, and - as happens sometimes with people who are talented at speaking - they [are said at times] to have set aside [technical instructions] and deriving immense benefit from [this practice], they give the impression that they have become what they are with the aid of the sophists.

The strategy of acquiring competence in public speaking through practical experience, observation (presumably of those who are already involved in such activities), and familiarity with laws and procedures is here not offered as an alternative but as a statement of what actually happens in practice. It is reminiscent of the old-fashioned methods of acquiring civic skills which are raised by Antonius in Cicero's *De oratore*.<sup>43</sup> Philodemus even seems to go so far as to suggest that education in the rhetorical schools is best relegated to a preliminary stage in an orator's preparation, and that to a large extent, adults engaged in civic life have to ignore, or unlearn, what they were instructed to do in these schools.

All of this is aimed at consolidating Philodemus' position on the nature and status of sophistic rhetoric. The rhetors claim that they are equipping their pupils for participation in civic life by teaching them rhetoric. Philodemus argues that what the rhetors teach does not, in fact, do this. He does not, however, say that they do not teach *anything*.

The third quoted argument raises the question as to why orators continue to send their own sons to the schools of the rhetors, if they themselves abandon the instructions of the rhetors once they are in the outside world.<sup>44</sup> Again, Philodemus remarks that one might find orators who do not do this and prefer that their children are exposed to real theatres of civic

<sup>43</sup> E.g. *neque enim sum de arte dicturus, quam nunquam didici, sed de mea consuetudine; ipsaque illa, quae in commentarium meum rettuli, sunt eiusmodi, non aliqua mihi doctrina tradita, sed in rerum usu causisque tractata* (1.208).

<sup>44</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XV.5-11* (Longo, 73).

business.<sup>45</sup> As for those who do continue to send their sons to the schools of the rhetors, they must be suffering from a misconception as to the value such education holds for civic participation. Yet Philodemus also offers another explanation,

ἔνιοι δ' [οὐ]δ' ἄλλως  
 ἵνα [π]ρὸς πολιτικὴν δ[ύ]-  
 ν[α]μιν ὠφελ[η]θῶσιν, ἀλλ-  
 λ' [ἔ]ως ἂν τῶν κοινῶν 5  
 καὶ καλῶν εἶναι δοκούν-  
 των μαθημάτων με-  
 τα]λάβωσι, πέμπουσι  
 τοὺς υἱοὺς [ώ]ς πρὸς [τ]ᾶλ-  
 λα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ῥητορι-  
 κοὺς. 10

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XVI.2-11 (Longo, 75)*

And some send their sons to the rhetoricians in the same manner in which they send them to other disciplines, not entirely in order that they might gain profit for political ability, but rather until such time as they have grasped some portion of studies which are reputed to be general and fine.

Philodemus asserts that not all parents send their children to the schools of the rhetors with the expectation that they will thereby receive instruction in skills required for civic participation but rather so that they can acquire the general accomplishments which are expected of any educated gentleman. Philodemus has effectively downgraded rhetorical education by stripping it of its claim to offer preparation for an active life in the *polis*, and by locating it with other studies which were part of a citizen-child's general education, disciplines such as grammar, poetry, and music.<sup>46</sup> Whether or not Philodemus' statements constitute the view of the majority of parents whose sons attended the rhetors' schools, he has probably identified what had long become a tendency. Not all Greeks or Romans of his era who underwent a rhetorical education were actively occupied with civic business in adult life.

<sup>45</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XV.11-18 (Longo, 73).*

<sup>46</sup> This notion is anticipated a little earlier with the words ἀφέντες τὰ ἄλλης σ[ο]φιστικῆς [π]αιδεί col. XIV.18-19.

But by the second and first centuries B.C. rhetoric was considered an indispensable part of a young adult's education.<sup>47</sup>

It can be seen, then, that the first three arguments in favour of rhetoric's technicity constitute a coherent sequence, where the subsequent argument is formulated in order to salvage the refuted thesis of the argument formulated before it.

The fourth argument introduces a fresh approach, but one that is perhaps suggested by Philodemus' apparent equation of rhetoric with other traditional arts of paedagogic value. Rhetoric, it is argued, like music and grammar involves the transmission of unknown things (παράδοσεις τινῶν ἀγνοουμένων) and its practice is methodical, at least in some sense.<sup>48</sup>

Philodemus points out that the transmission of knowledge alone does not necessarily guarantee that the knowledge constitutes an art and repeats his view that none of the rhetoricians' lessons have any practical value for a pupil who intends to participate in active civic life.<sup>49</sup> These remarks are interrupted by a lacuna in lines 17-26 of column XVII, but when the text resumes Philodemus appears to be engaged in a continuation of a line of argument. An additional point has probably been made, either by Philodemus himself or in the form of another quoted argument, which introduces the issue of technical manuals (τεχνολογ[ο]γ[ί]ας, col. XVII.34), as if these might guarantee that the παράδοσεις of the rhetoricians constitute an art. Philodemus' reply is reminiscent of his earlier dismissal of the

<sup>47</sup> It is interesting that Crassus, in Cicero's *De oratore*, prefaces his summary of precepts of the rhetoricians' schools with the words *nam principio illud, quod est homine ingenuo liberaliterque educato dignum, non negabo me ista omnium communia et contrita praecepta didicisse* (1.137), as if such knowledge was taken for granted in any educated person.

<sup>48</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XVI.18-24 (Longo, 75).

<sup>49</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 coll. XVI.24-XVII.16 (Longo, 75, 77).

argument which relied on the payment of fees — astrologers and soothsayers also publish technical manuals.<sup>50</sup>

In the course of his treatment of these arguments, Philodemus has occasion to question what can be attributed to the art of rhetoric and what should be attributed to experience or knowledge acquired from some other source. This is especially important for the issue of whether rhetoric is an art of politics. At one point, he interrupts the discussion to clarify what he means by art. The passage is extensive but deserves to be quoted in full and analysed carefully:

<p>οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κακῶς ἐρεῖ τις [ἡ]μᾶς λέγειν καὶ πα- ρ' ἀδικοῦσιν τοῦ [τὰ ποῖα] διὰ τέχνης καὶ τὰ ποῖα χωρὶς τέχνης πε- ρηγίνεται. καὶ γὰρ [τὸν ἀλογοῦν λεγόμενον ἐνί- col. XIX οτε πάντε[ς] ἐπιστάμ[ε]- θα καὶ καταχρώμε- θα δὲ πολλάκις ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ τῶ&lt;ι&gt; τῆς τέ- χνης ὀνόματι, καθά- περ καὶ ξύλα [συνδεῖν ἐνίοτε καὶ βασιτάζ[ειν] καὶ πονηρεῦσθαι τε- χνικῶς λέγομεν, καὶ νῦν ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἂν ραι- δίως τις ἀθετήσαι]. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ π[α]ραπλησίως [ἐ- φαρμόσει [καὶ ἐπιδεί- ξαι] τῶν [τῶν] μὲν ἄ- τεχνῶν λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν δὲ τεχνίτην. ὡς- περ ἰδῶν ἀγαλμα [καλὸν λεῖπ[η]σαις ἂν χωρὶς λόγου τέχνης ἔργον' εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐρεῖς ἰστορήσας τὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἔργα:</p>	<p>30  35  5  10  15  20</p>	<p>[τοῦτο δὲ καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν συγ- γραμμάτων [αὐτοὶ τε]τά- χασιν [οἱ] πανηγυρικοὶ ῥή- τορες ἀξιούμενον. οὐδὲ [πιθα]λὸν ἔστιν, εἰ καὶ χ[ω]ρὶς λόγου γνοίη τις ὅτι τέχνης ἔργα ταῦ- [τ' ἐσ]τιν, εἰ περὶ τῶν πο- [λειτικῶν] ἔργων [τὰ] πα-30 ρατιθέασιν, οὐδ' [ἄ- τα]ν ὁ [περὶ τούτων] πολ- [ύ]ν [ν]οῦν ἔχων, τέχνην ἐμφανίζειν [δόξειεν col. XX ἢ δύναι] μ[εν] οὐτ' ἂν [ἀμέθο- δον ἐν]κρίναι] ἄλλον ἢν ἀνάσκητον οὐδὲ ἀπεί- ραστον τελείως, ὥστε κάντυχεῖν εἰπεῖν ἕως ἂν τις ἐνεχθῆ[ι] πίστις ἀναγκάζουσα ταῦτ' ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τούτ[ο]υ τε καὶ τῶν παρατεθέντων [προσδέ- ξασθαι, δι' [ὃ] μὲν δοκεῖ μό- 10 νον ἔχειν ἀξιοπιστίαν τοῦπιχείρημα, πλείον δὲ οὐδ' ἓν, εἰ μὴ τέχνην τι- νὰ τῶν πιστῶν [φα]μ[εν αὐτῶν, ὃ ποιοῦσιν οἱ εἰδ 15</p>
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Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XVIII.5-12 (Longo, 79), cf. coll. XI.34-XII.6.

διδαχθέντες. ἀλλ' [οὐ] μόνον] ὁ μὴ μαθῶ[ν] τ[ῆ]ν τέ-  
 χνην] ἀδυνατεῖ τὰ τῆς  
 τέχνης] ἔργα συντελεῖν,  
 ἀλλὰ καί] τὰ δι' ἀσκήσε- 20  
 ως καὶ τινος ἱστορίας  
 καὶ παρατηρήσεως [ἀ-  
 δυνατεῖ ποιεῖν ὁ τούτων  
 ἀμοιρήσας, ἐάν τε [παρα-  
 τηρήσῃ], φήσω, τὰ τοῖς 25  
 ἄλλοις μάλιστα ἀρέσκον-  
 τα καὶ τὴν τριβὴν περι-  
 ποιήσεται καὶ τὰλλα  
 προσ[ε]νέγκηται, τάχ' ὡς  
 τέλειος, οὐδέ] ἴσ[τ]ιν προσ- 30  
 δεθεῖς ἄκρως ἐν τοῖς  
 τρωπικοῖς] ἀναστρα-  
 φήσεται, καὶ τὰ πράγμα-  
 τα τὴν τούτου παρέσχη-  
 ται καὶ [συμπαρέ]ξεται 35

col. XXI

πίστιν.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 coll. XVIII.29-XXI.1*

(Longo, 81-87)

Despite that, someone will say that we speak badly in that we fail to distinguish<sup>51</sup> what kind of things occur by means of art and what kind of things occur without it. For we are all acquainted at times with the so-called unreflective way (of speaking) and we often misuse the noun "art" in ordinary language: for example we sometimes say "to tie sticks together *artfully*", or "to steal *artfully*", or "to be an *artful* rogue", and one would have trouble denying that we are doing the same now. Analogously, the same will go for when we say that one of two men is not an artist while the other is.

"Just when you see a fine statue, you would say without reflection that it is a work of art, in the same way, when you have observed the works of the politicians you will say the same."

The panegyric rhetoricians [themselves] have assigned [this] as an assumption to their compositions. But even if one were to recognise without reflection that these are works of art, it is not convincing if they propose [the same] concerning political works; nor (is it convincing) [when] someone who has a lot of sense in these things seemed to display art or capability, [nor] would it be possible to judge another man who does not have method to be unpractised nor completely untried, and so the result is that we assert that until such time as some proof is introduced which compels us to accept the same view in the case of this and the activities which have been compared with it, on account of [this], the attempted proof only seems to have validity, and nothing more, unless we assert that what [those who are well] taught do is a certain art of the proofs themselves. But not only is the man who has not learned the art unable to achieve the works of the art, but even he who lacks exercise, a certain research, and observation is unable to accomplish what results by means of these things, and if he observes, I shall say, that which pleases the crowds most, and practises, and deals with the other things, he will soon conduct himself with distinction in rhetorical figures like a perfect orator, not lacking a single thing, and the facts have supplied, and will continue to support, the proof of this.

Philodemus has anticipated that his discourse will be criticised as being too ambiguous.<sup>52</sup> The imaginary opponent will declare that he cannot grasp what Philodemus believes is achieved by art and what is achieved without it. In other words, the opponent demands from Philodemus a precise explanation of what doing something with art is and, by implication, a definition of art itself. The charge of ἀδιαληψία is a common one and was often laid by Stoic against Epicurean and vice versa.

Philodemus begins his response by acknowledging that he is aware of the problem. The imaginary opponent is not introducing something which is startling or new (καὶ γὰρ . . . πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα, coll. XVIII.35-XIX.2). There exists in ordinary language (ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ, col. XIX.3-4) a tendency to use words in a way which does not make perfect sense

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Phil. *De sign.* 10 (De Lacy), where a Stoic charges the Epicureans with failure to distinguish the various applications of the term ὁμοιότης (ὕπὸ φωνῆς / κοινότη[τ]ος, col. VII.12-13). Epicurus himself wrote a work entitled περὶ ἀμφιβολίας, fr.13 col.V inf.8-col.VI sup.1 Sedley (1973), 49 = Arr.<sup>2</sup>[7] p.161.

<sup>52</sup> Col. XVIII.29-35.

because it is done spontaneously without rational reflection (ἄλογον, col. XVIII.36),<sup>53</sup> at least when scrutinised by those who are linguistically astute, i.e. philosophers and advanced grammarians. In fact, Philodemus points out, we are all guilty of *katachresis* in everyday speech when we use without reflection the kind of idioms he lists. But these are linguistic facts, whether they conform to a precise definition of what it is to do something with art or not.

Most scholars take lines 16-21 of col. XIX as spoken by the imaginary opponent.<sup>54</sup> If their interpretation is correct, the opponent has attempted to expand Philodemus' list of examples with an additional one: the viewing of a statue. The recognition of a statue as a work of art does not require reflection (χωρίς λόγου, col. XIX.18),<sup>55</sup> it is patently obvious and would elicit the word "art" from the viewer in the same way as an impressive ability to bind sticks would. So too, argues the opponent, the actions of politicians will be labelled art once Philodemus has examined them. The distinction between seeing (ιδών, col. XIX.17) a fine statue and examining (ιστορήσας, col. XIX.20) the actions of politicians is surely significant. The implication is that it takes longer to identify and appreciate the art which lies behind the actions of politicians, and this demonstrates that political actions and fine statues are not of the same order. Philodemus listed actions and objects which are immediately recognised as 'artistic' by the observer even if the same observer would not normally think to classify them as proper arts. The opponent's examples include one, sculpture, which is both immediately recognisable as an art on viewing and is universally judged to be an art by Greeks and

<sup>53</sup> Cf. χωρίς λόγου col. XIX.18.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. Longo, 83, Blank (1995), 181. There are no marginal symbols to indicate that this is the case (but then there often aren't). Perhaps a change of tone is discernible in the use of the second person (εἶπαις, col. XIX.18) and the attempt to extend the analogy (ὥσπερ col. XIX.16, picking up Philodemus' καθάπερ, col. XIX.5). Yet the most forceful grounds for attributing these statements to the opponent lie in the assertion that one will term the actions of politicians "art" in the same way if one takes the time to examine them.

<sup>55</sup> See Blank (1995), 181.

Epicureans alike (thus the term "art" is not applied catachrestically),<sup>56</sup> and another, the actions of politicians, which are not immediately recognisable as art and are not judged to be an art by all Greeks and Epicureans. The attempted analogy is a false one.

The same claim to art, says Philodemus, is made by the panegyricist orators for their compositions. But Philodemus refuses to accept that the case of the panegyricists and the politicians is the same. Even if one were to recognise without reflection that the works of the panegyricists are the products of art (εἰ καὶ χωρὶς λόγου γνοίη τις ὅτι τέχνης ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστίν, col. XIX.26-28) it does not follow that one would recognise the same for the politicians. Once again, Philodemus detects a difference between epideictic and political discourse which renders the attempt at analogy invalid.<sup>57</sup> With regard to political discourse there is no cogent argument which can show that an individual who has a great deal of sense when it comes to statecraft (ὁ περὶ τούτων πολλὸν νοῦν ἔχων,<sup>58</sup> col. XIX.32-33) possesses a science or, conversely, that an individual who is untrained but not entirely inexperienced in politics does not possess a science (ἀμέθοδον, col. XX.1-2). What Philodemus is prepared to assert (φήσω, col. XX.25) is that if an orator watches and records the kind of things which please crowds, and practises, he will become superbly adept at rhetorical figures.

Thus, the reply to the claim that technical manuals prove that rhetoric is an art ends the section on standard arguments (favourable or hostile) on the technicity of rhetoric. The treatment of standard arguments in favour of rhetoric's technicity does not appear to have been exhaustive, and, as I have already remarked, fewer arguments of this type are quoted than in the section devoted to arguments against rhetoric's technical status. I believe that

<sup>56</sup> Quite the contrary, as Philodemus later includes sculpture among the exact sciences, *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XXXVIII.30-35 (Longo, 123).

<sup>57</sup> As he notes a few lines later, δοκεῖ μόνον ἔχειν ἀξιοπιστίαν τοῦπιχείρημα, col. XX.10-12.

<sup>58</sup> The words are carefully chosen: πολλὸν νοῦν ἔχων is not equivalent to "artist".

Philodemus has been deliberately selective, and has included sufficient examples which are relevant to his main concern: that sophistic rhetoric is not concerned with political or forensic practice and that only sophistic rhetoric qualifies as an art.

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## CHAPTER 4: PHILODEMUS ON ART AND RHETORIC

The preceding passages examined in the last chapter, where Philodemus treats the notion of art and rhetoric's status within it are fraught with impediments to interpretation. It is extremely difficult to follow the thread of his thought because, while the text itself is often in a fairly good state, the compression and complexity of the argument require a precise attribution of the various demonstratives and pronouns. In addition, despite the aid of marginal marks, it is not always clear whether the statements are Philodemus' own or citations from arguments he is examining. A little further on in book 2 we reach a section where Philodemus appears to state some of his own views unequivocally. The introduction is promisingly systematic,

καίρως δ' ἂν εἴ-	
η] πάντων ἀπολελυ-	
μένους ἐπὶ τὰς ἡμε-	
τέρας ἔλθειν [δ]όξας καὶ	5
σχεδὸν κεφάλαια τῆς	
οἰκονομίας [ἔσ]ται προ-	
κείμενα το[ι]α[ύ]τα: τέ-	
χνη τί λέγεται κατὰ	
τῆν συνήθειαν ὑπομ-	
νησαι βραχέως. [οὐ] γὰρ	10
ἄλλη] τὰ [ἡ]μέ[τερα] ἔστι	
δειῖξαι. τὴν σοφιστικὴν	
ρήτορικὴν τέχνην λε-	
γομένην [πα]ρὰ [το]ῖς ἀν-	15
δράσιν, κ[αθ'] οὗς [φι]λοσο-	
φοῦμεν, . . . ]ΔΟ[. ]ΑΙΤΙ	
. . . . . ]ΠΙ. ]Ν	
. ]ΚΗΣΓΙ.]ΟΜΕΙ.]ΟΙ	
. ]ΕΠΡΟΣΑ[.]Α[. . . . ]Η	20
ΜΑΣΑ[. . . ]ΕΚΑΠ. ]ΟΥΣ	
. ]ΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΥΣ[. ]ΣΤΩ	
. . . . τὸ τὴν [σο]φιστι-	
κὴν περὶ μὲν λόγων γρ[α]φᾶς	
καὶ ἐπι]δειξεις τέχνην	25
εἶναι], περὶ δὲ τὸ δι[ί]κας	
λέγειν καὶ δημηγορεῖν	
οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην· ἔτι	
τὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐν ἱ-	
στορίαι καὶ τριβῆ] [καθ]ε-	30
στη]κέναι, τεχνικὸν δὲ	

μηδὲν προσφέρεσθαι.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXXVII.1-31 (Longo, 121)*

It would be the appropriate time to free ourselves from all debates and come to our own views, and forthwith the main points in the order of the discussion will be set out as follows: (i) to mention briefly what an art is said to be in ordinary language; for otherwise it is not possible to demonstrate our views, (ii) that sophistic rhetoric is said to be an art in the writings of the Founders of the School, in accordance with whom we practise philosophy . . . (iii ?) the fact that sophistic is an art which is concerned with the writing of speeches and display pieces, and is not an art which is concerned with pleading cases and addressing the people, (iv ?) and further that the art of politics lies in research and practice, but does not contribute anything technical.

There is an unfortunate lacuna in the central section of the column (lines 16-22) which makes it difficult to establish the precise number of κεφάλαια in the text. Sudhaus' supplements are purely speculative and do not even conform with all the legible letters in Longo's edition. I suspect that points (iii) and (iv) are actually summaries of the views Philodemus ascribes to the Founders of the School, views which he will proceed to demonstrate in succeeding portions of book 2.

Several characteristics of Philodemus' approach to art and rhetoric emerge from this passage. Although Philodemus has mentioned the multifarious notions of art which other philosophers hold<sup>1</sup> he has so far neglected to give a satisfactory definition of art himself. This is not surprising. The Epicureans were generally suspicious of definitions, but at the same time they respected the need for clarity in the way terms were used. The Epicureans encouraged awareness of what words mean and how they are used, and they realised that arguments can be flawed by failure to identify instances where one term is used to denote things which are not quite the same.<sup>2</sup> Epicurus himself devoted considerable effort to the eradication of ambiguity in the language used in philosophy.

<sup>1</sup> *Rh. 1 PHerc. 1427 fr. 3 (Longo, 7)*, discussed in chapter 3.

<sup>2</sup> Philodemus has already alluded to this in his survey of the application of the adverb τεχνικῶς to a range of actions which are not arts in the strict sense of the word. He also points out that the word ῥητορικὴ has a fairly broad application, a fact which he claims the people he is attacking have failed to realise, οὐτε γὰρ τὸ πλεοναχὸν διέστειλαν τὸ τῆς / ῥητορικῆς, διὸ καὶ τὴν / πᾶσαν ἐν τοῖς λεγομέν[ι]νοις ἀναδέχονται κύ/κησιν, ὡς κ[οι]νῆς τε σχ[ε]δὸν τῆς σοφιστικῆς οὐ/σης κ[α]ὶ καλουμένης ῥη/τορικῆς, *PHerc. 1674 col. XXIII.24-32 (Longo, 93)*.

In order to appreciate Philodemus' procedure at this stage of his argument it is necessary to review the evidence for the earlier Epicurean position on the issue of how language relates to what it signifies. The usual starting point in such an investigation is a passage from Epicurus' *Epistula ad Herodotum*.<sup>3</sup>

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὧς Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ εἰληφέναι, ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡμῖν <ἴη> εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ κενούς φθόγγους ἔχωμεν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἔξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ' ὃ ἀνάξομεν.

Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 37-38

To begin with, Herodotus, you must have grasped the things which are arranged beneath utterances, in order that by referring to them we may have a way to test opinions, investigations or problems and in order that everything does not go on untested for us demonstrating *ad infinitum* nor that we have utterances that are empty. For one should look to the primary concept in the case of each utterance and it should require no additional demonstration, if, that is, we are going to have something to which we shall refer the investigation or problem or opinion.

As a general statement of Epicurean methodology, this text is especially relevant to my discussion of Philodemus. Although Epicurus no doubt intended to present here guidelines for the investigation and description of physical phenomena - the subject of the *Epistula ad Herodotum* - it may, I think, be taken as a methodology of sorts which can be applied to any problem, even an investigation into what people think an art is and what an art really is (τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα). That the focus here is on the use of language as a descriptive tool in philosophy is supported by the inclusive nature of its application (τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα): i.e. language which is used in any context where philosophy is applied. The interpretation of certain features of this passage is much disputed, and in particular the meaning of the phrase τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις. Some translate

<sup>3</sup> Diog. Laert. 10.37-38.

<sup>4</sup> Suppl. Usener.

φθόγγοι as "words,"<sup>5</sup> others as "utterances",<sup>6</sup> or, as Milanese has recently argued,<sup>7</sup> "atti linguistici", that is "speech acts", the "suono articolato" of language.<sup>8</sup> Diogenes of Oenoanda, discussing the origins of language, glosses φθόγγοι as ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα.<sup>9</sup> Even if we judge such considerations over-subtle, we are still left with the problem of how to interpret the substantivised participle τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα. If we assume that Epicurus deliberately avoided a term like ὄνομα, ῥήμα, or λέξις, we are led to suppose that he wished to distinguish the purely phonetic aspects of speech from the "things" which are somehow linked to them. If we retain the basic meaning of φθόγγος as "utterance", then we can interpret τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα as that which gives the "utterance" meaning. φθόγγος without τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα is simply articulated sound without meaning - gobbledy-gook! - and thus only φθόγγος combined with τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα qualifies as a "word" in the usual and significant sense.

There is debate over whether Epicurus means by τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα mental references or the actual things which words denote.<sup>10</sup> I suggest that just as Epicurus was careful to use the term φθόγγος in order to distinguish the sound of the utterance from the meaning, so too he did not

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Bailey (1928), 268 "the ideas attached to words", Hicks (1931), 567 "what it is that words denote", Arrighetti (1973): 36 "ciò che sottostà alle parole".

<sup>6</sup> E.g. Asmis (1984), 20 "what is subordinate to the utterances".

<sup>7</sup> *EGR* I (1996), 270-286.

<sup>8</sup> A survey of translations from a collection of recent (published 1996, although the papers were delivered in 1993) scholarship, *L'epicureismo greco e romano* (edd. Giannantoni and Gigante), reveals that there is still no substantial agreement on the precise translation: "the items which are collected under the sounds" Barnes p. 200, "ciò che sta sotto le parole" Hammerstaedt p. 222, "il significato peculiare dei termini" Erler p. 517, "the underlying meanings of words" Chandler p. 599.

<sup>9</sup> fr. 12.II.11-14 (Smith), who translates "the words and phrases" (p. 373), and suggests that the phrase does not mean "the nouns and verbs" in this context; see Bollack (1977), 795.

<sup>10</sup> The problem is exacerbated by the paucity of the evidence available on the Epicurean view of language and meaning: Sextus Empiricus (*Math.* 8.258) reports that the Epicureans denied the existence of incorporeal signifieds, what the Stoics were to term λεκτά (so too *Math.* 8.13 and Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1119F). But the passage from *Ep. Hdt.* and Diog. Laert. 10.33 can be taken to assume the existence of at least mental concepts. Diogenes is of course our source for the *Epistula* and he has obviously derived his interpretation from that text which is evident from his own paraphrase, παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι. Diogenes' interpretation may not be correct. For a characteristically intelligent discussion of the problem see Barnes *EGR* I (1996), 197-220.

use a more neutral word for the meaningful part, e.g. τὰ ὑποκείμενα.<sup>11</sup> If this is a valid observation, then we should surely pay close attention to the fact that he employed a form of τάττω in this context. The verb unavoidably implies some degree of organisation and arrangement - "the things which have been arranged under utterances" - which in itself implies a certain coherence and regularity.<sup>12</sup> Why should Epicurus have to give this advice? Presumably because confusion arises if the philosopher has not grasped the existing and ordered distribution of meanings (be they references or denotations) to articulated sounds in language. Amidst the apparent morass of words and meanings, of homonyms and synonyms and catachrestic usages, there can in fact be discerned and apprehended a fundamental *taxis* which the philosopher should exploit to avoid the need for constant definition of basic terms.<sup>13</sup> The system of utterance comes ready-ordered, and to avoid confusion the philosopher has simply to look to the πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἕκαστον φθόγγον. This πρῶτον ἐννόημα is perceived by Epicurus as some sort of constant, and since he gives it no further specification than the adjective πρῶτον, we must assume that it is immediately obvious.<sup>14</sup>

If the passage from the *Epistula ad Herodotum* is interpreted in this way, I submit that Philodemus can be viewed as pursuing the very methodological course that the Founder prescribed. In his survey of definitions of art and whether rhetoric qualifies as such, Philodemus emphasised the confusion caused by the apparently multifarious applications of the term, in effect, the meanings attached to the utterance τέχνη. If the philosopher follows

<sup>11</sup> As to why he did not use a term like πρόληψις, there are various possible explanations, one being that the term was not "invented" by him until later, see Sedley (1973), 60.

<sup>12</sup> Barnes *EGR I* (1996), 213 employs two texts from Epicurus' *De nat.* 28 which use the verb ὑποτάττω to express the notion that belief (δόξα) is collected under an utterance (*PHerc.* 1479/1417 fr.6 col.I.11 and fr. 13 col. VI inf.2- col. VII sup.5, Sedley). Clay suggests that Epicurus conceived language to possess "irreducible kernels or 'atoms' of meaning which resist analysis εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον" (1983), 71.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. De Lacy (1939), 85 who insists that the objects of experience exhibit a definite formal structure, and that words refer to divisions within that structure.

<sup>14</sup> A fragment from Colotes' work on Plato's *Lysis* (T. IV p. 10 d5-9, Crönert and Mancini) seems to support this interpretation, [ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε κοινὴ πάντων ἡμῶν ὁμιλία ἦν εἴη εἶναι τοὺς φθόγ-

that road, he could wander forever and never find his destination. We can compare Philodemus' procedure here with statements made by Epicurus himself in Book 28 of *De natura*. This work is particularly relevant for an understanding of Philodemus both because it represents a revision or at least a refinement of the remarks which Epicurus made in the *Epistula* on language in philosophy,<sup>15</sup> and, since it was part of the library recovered from the Villa dei Papiri, it is reasonable to assume that it was a work with which Philodemus himself was familiar. In the portion of the text which I quote, Epicurus appears to be pondering the use of words in philosophical exposition, specifically the kinds of words which Epicurus and his followers have selected in the past:

εἰ δὲ  
 τότε [τα]ὐτό τι δια[νο]ούμε-  
 νοι ἐλέγομεν κατὰ [τ]ὴν [ἐ]κ-  
 κειμένην ἑρμηνίαν τῶι 5  
 ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ ἀμ[α]ρτία ἐστὶν  
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἕτε-  
 ρον ἔχουσα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ  
 τῶμ προλήψεων γιγν[ό]-  
 μενον καὶ τῶμ φαινο[μ]ένων 10  
 διὰ τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐθι-  
 σμοὺς τῶν λέξεων, καὶ [ . . . ]<sup>16</sup>

*PHerc.* 1479 fr. 12 col. III.2-12 (Sedley, 44-45)

If in those days we used to express an opinion equivalent, in the terminology we then employed, to saying that all human error is exclusively of the form that arises in relation to preconceptions and appearances because of the manifold conventions of language, and . . .<sup>17</sup>

The context, as ever, is obscure and thus any interpretation of the meaning of this passage must remain speculative.<sup>18</sup> Epicurus may be referring to an earlier stage in his philosophical

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γ/γού[ς] κα[τὰ] τὸ ἐν[α]ργές, / [οὐ] τὸ δοξαζόμενον, Mancini (1976), 61-62. The problem of the πρῶτον ἐννόημα is complex; see discussions by Long (1971) and Asmis (1984), 31-32.

<sup>15</sup> See Sedley (1973), 13-14 who after an examination of the evidence concludes that the *Epistula ad Herodotum* was composed at about 301/300 B.C. whereas the archon year below the title of *PHerc.* 1479/1417 locates Book 28 of *De nat.* in 296/5 B.C.

<sup>16</sup> The passage continues and προλήψει can be read in line 14.

<sup>17</sup> The translation, as for all portions of *De natura* 28 cited here, is Sedley's (1973), 44.

<sup>18</sup> As Sedley himself admits: it is difficult to ascertain whether εἰ . . . ἐλέγομεν is the protasis of a fulfilled or unfulfilled conditional (1973), 60. Glidden (1984), 401-403 questions the fundamental assumptions underlying Sedley's interpretation of the term προλήψεις in this passage, suggesting

career when he identified confusion between the variety in the applications of words and the things they signify as the basis for all error.<sup>19</sup> Whatever Epicurus meant, it would appear that he recognises that language, as practised in normal discourse, is not always a precise phenomenon but rather one which allows for many applications (τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐθ[ι]σμοὺς τῶν λέξεων).<sup>20</sup> Even if this is not the only cause of error, it surely remains, in Epicurus' view, an important cause, and it might assist the philosopher if he is aware of how words are applied in different contexts so that he can be vigilant with respect to his own articulation and exposition of philosophy. When Philodemus explains how the word "art" is applied καταχρηστικῶς to a variety of pursuits (such as tying up sticks etc.), he seems to be demonstrating this very point. Although οἱ πολύτροποι ἐθισμοὶ τῶν λέξεων are no longer the only (οὐδὲν ἕτερον . . . ἢ, lines 7-8) culprits, it is unlikely that this text went on to assert that they are not responsible for error at all. They are simply no longer considered to be the only sources of error. This is a perfectly reasonable statement if we refer once again to Epicurus' advice in the *Epistula ad Herodotum* which was quoted earlier.

A little further on in book 28 of *De natura*, Epicurus says:

.....] δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς  
τινω]ν ἐθισμ[ῶν συ]νοικειώ-  
σεως ἐπιφέρω[ν τότε ἔ]τυχες, 5

instead that προλήψεις be understood as a species of αἴσθησις (which is why they are conjoined with φαινόμενα here).

<sup>19</sup> Sedley (1973), 22-23, 60-61.

<sup>20</sup> The choice of the adjective πολύτροπος may be significant in an additional sense: it is of course the epithet associated with Odysseus in Homer, and its meaning covers "much-wandering", "shifty" or "shifting", "versatile", and even "fickle". Its application to the element ἀήρ by Diogenes of Apollonia (DK B5 II p. 61) describes and accounts for the variety of manifest phenomena which are versions of ἀήρ. Plato (*Hp. mi.* 364e 5-8 and 365b 4-5) interprets the Odysseus' epithet as implying deceitfulness, lies and trickery (see also Antisthenes *apud* Porphyry *schol. ad Od.* α 1 and Brancacci (1990), 47-48 and n. 10). The fundamental point is that whatever is πολύτροπος is really the same throughout its apparent or manifest various shapes and qualities. Its *true* nature is concealed. Thus when Epicurus uses the adjective of the conventions of language, he must mean that the conventions use a word in so many different ways that the actual meaning of the word that subsists throughout the transformations is often obscured; but, presumably, it can be identified with a little effort. Commenting on Epicurus' account of the origin of language in *Ep. Hdt.* 75, Arrighetti (1973), 521 believes that Epicurus was conscious that language was constantly transforming and developing.

μή] δῆλομ ποιῶιης τὸ πάν-  
 τα φθόγγον ἐπιφέροντα  
 δοξάζειν τόδε τι καί] τὴν  
 τῶν ὀνομάτων καί] πραγμά-  
 Fr. 13 col. III sup.  
 τῶ[ν ἀ]δι[α]ληψία[ν ὀ]κῶμ  
 περ[ι]νοῶιης. κά[γῶ] δ' ἔβλε-  
 πον ἄ[τ]η οὐ ποιήσας διάφο-  
 ρα τά[δε] ἢ τάδε εἶναι λέγειν  
 τάδε [φ]ῆς αἰρεῖσθαι τῶι] δ[ὲ] 5  
 βελ[τί]οι]ν εἶναι ἢ τάδε· ἀλλ' ὀ-  
 νόμασιν οἷς δήποτε χρώ-  
 με[ν]ον οἷον τε φ[ή]σας [εἶ]ναι  
 λέγει]ν τὰ πράγματα, πᾶ-  
 σιν ἐνε]δικνύου ἡμῖν τε τοῖς 10  
 τε σοφίας] μετεσχηκόσιμ  
 μόνον ὅτι οἰ]κειότερόν ἐστ[ι]ν<sup>21</sup>

. . . and you also used in those days to assign [names] without adapting certain conventional usages, in order that you should not make plain<sup>22</sup> the principle that by assigning any name one expresses a particular opinion, and see and reflect upon the indiscriminate treatment of words and objects. And I too used to notice that you did not establish a difference between two sets of words and then say that you chose one set because it was better than choosing the other; instead, by saying that it was possible to use any name at all in speaking of things, you demonstrated to everyone, both to us and to those who have a share of wisdom, merely that it is more suitable . . .

Sedley interprets this passage as meaning that Metrodorus used to borrow words from ordinary usage without thought to whether they represented opinions contrary to his own.<sup>23</sup>

This need not mean that Epicurus disapproves of the philosopher's use of ordinary language, but simply that the philosopher must take care when using it. When one assigns a name to a thing it is tantamount to committing oneself to an opinion as to what that thing is,<sup>24</sup> and because false opinions are a source of error, the philosopher must be aware of and take note of the ambiguity which often surrounds the relation between word and thing (τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ἀδιαληψίαν).

<sup>21</sup> *De nat.* 28, *PHerc.* 1417 fr. L col. V.3-9 - *PHerc.* 1479 fr. 13 col. II inf. 7-1, Sedley (1973), 46.

<sup>22</sup> The construction may be the sort of final clause where the consequence is unintended or accidental, "only to find that you did not make plain . . . or notice and reflect upon . . .", cf. *Phld. Rh.* 1 *PHerc.* 1427 fr. 1.6-8 (Longo, 3) ἵν' οὕτως ὁ κα/λούμενος γένη[ται] τῶν / τυφ[λ]ῶν σφ[αιρι]σμός.

<sup>23</sup> Sedley (1973), 61, who also identifies an attitude similar to that in *Ep. Hdt.* 37-38.

<sup>24</sup> In the words of *Ep. Hdt.* τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα, i.e. all the "baggage" which comes with the word.

Like the Founder of the School, Philodemus is conscious of the risk of ἀδιαληψία<sup>25</sup> which is why he devotes space to the relation between the ὄνομα "τέχνη" and the πρᾶγμα. Philodemus feels that in order to clarify what an art is and what qualifies its products as the products of an art (τὰ ποῖα) we must first understand what the word τέχνη means in ordinary Greek, not what one philosopher or another takes it to mean. In performing this exercise, Philodemus can be viewed as obeying the fundamental procedural system that Epicurus established.<sup>26</sup> If ordinary language is to be used as an instrument of philosophical expression, the philosopher must see the distinguishing characteristic which marks one class of thing from another, thereby making τὰ ποῖα evident, and not alter it by applying a term to something which does not have the same distinguishing characteristic:

ἐπεῖ  
καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον που, [ὀρθῶς  
ταῖς αὐταῖς αἰρέσεσιν] τῶν φω- 5  
νῶν] κατὰ τὴν διδ[α]σκαλίαν  
χρησάιτο τις ἄν, εἶπερ ταῦτα  
ἡμῖν βλέποι ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [γ]ε  
ιδίου εἶδη, μὴ πολὺ παρηλλα-  
γμένας] φύσει περιπέσοι.<sup>27</sup> 10

For, as I have said, a person would be correct to make the same choices of vocabulary in the exposition of philosophy, provided that we could count on his seeing that these are classes resulting from the same distinguishing characteristic, in order that we should avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative changes.

Although the fragments of Epicurus which I have used are derived from a different context, and are probably concerned with how the Epicurean philosopher is to expound the facts about the universe, I believe they do shed light on Philodemus' approach to the problem of whether rhetoric is an art. Philodemus has already mentioned the fact that whether people regard rhetoric as an art or not depends largely on what they construe an art to be. This prescriptive approach will, Philodemus suggests, get us no closer to an appreciation of whether rhetoric is

<sup>25</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XVIII.31-35 (Longo, 81).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. on Epicurus, Asmis (1984), 34 and n. 37.

<sup>27</sup> *De nat.* 28, *PHerc.* 1479 fr. 13 col. IV sup. 3-10, Sedley (1973), 47.

an art or not. A closer examination of the kinds of activities which are designated "arts" in ordinary usage will provide a starting-point, as will, later, scrutiny of the kinds of activities which are covered by the term "rhetoric". Philodemus has already revealed that he is aware that the term "art" is applied to activities which are obviously not arts in a precise sense, but are so designated by some sort of metaphorical transference of the qualities of art.

Philodemus too is trying to establish τὸ ὑποτεταγμένον τῷ φθόγγῳ. For Philodemus, τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα, which will provide clarity, is supplied by the usage of ordinary language:

νοεῖ-	
ται τοίνυν καὶ λέγεται	
τέχνη παρὰ τοῦς] Ἑλλη-	
σιν ἕξις ἢ διάθεσις] ἀπὸ	5
παρ[α]τηρή[σ]εως τινῶν	
κοινῶν καὶ [σ]τοιχείω] [ν]-	
δῶν, ἃ διὰ πλειόνων δι-	
ήκει τῶν ἐπὶ μέρ[ο]υς], κα-	10
ταλαμβάνουσα [τ]η καὶ	
συντελοῦσα τοιοῦτον,	
οἷον ὁμοίως τῶν μὴ	
μαθόντων ἔνιοι, ἐστη-	
κότως καὶ βεβ[αί]ως [οὐ-	
δὲ στοχαστικῶς].	15

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXXVIII.2-15 (Longo, 123)*

Well then, among the Greeks, art is conceived and spoken of as a faculty or disposition derived from observation of certain common and basic elements which pervade the majority of specific cases, a faculty which apprehends something and achieves the kind of result which some of those who have not learned it achieve, and it does this firmly and securely [and not] by conjecture.

The strategy which Philodemus adopts in order to clarify the meaning of the term 'art' appears to be sanctioned by Epicurus himself if we consult another passage from *De natura*,<sup>28</sup>

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ εὐκαιρὸν  
 ἐστὶ ταῦ[τ]α] προφέροντα μη-  
 κύνειν· καὶ μαλ' ὀρθῶς [γε, ὦ  
 Μητρόδωρε· πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι  
 σε πολλὰ ἂν ἔχειμ προε[ν]έγ-  
 κασθαι ἃ ἐθεώρεις γελοίως [π]κ[ά]ς  
 τίνας ἐγδεξαμένους καὶ πάν-  
 τ[α] μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον  
 κατὰ τὰς λέξεις, οὐκ ἔξω τῶν

<sup>28</sup> *De nat. 28, PHerc. 1479 fr. 13 col. IV inf. 1 - col. V sup. 12, Sedley (1973), 48.*

ἰθισμένων λέξεων ἡμῶν  
 χρωμένων οὐδὲ μετατιθέν-  
 των ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶν φανε-  
 ρῶν.

But perhaps you'd say this isn't the right time to prolong the discussion by bringing these up. Quite so, Metrodorus, because I'm sure you could bring up lots of cases of words you've seen certain people taking in some ridiculous sense or other, in fact in any sense rather than their actual linguistic meaning, whereas our own usage does not go beyond ordinary language, nor do we change names with regard to things which are evident.<sup>29</sup>

From what Philodemus says next it is clear that his description cited above is intended as the most basic designation of the word τέχνη: at this point he is not concerned with questions such as whether an art is something which is beneficial or not, or to what extent practice plays a role.<sup>30</sup> All he is concerned with at present is to give the basic significance of the term which is valid for every art:

ἀφείσ-  
 θω γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόν-  
 τοῦ, εἴτε συμφέρον ἐ[ῖ]τ' οὐ συμφέρον τὸ  
 γιγνόμενον πάντως.  
 ἀφείσθω δὲ καὶ εἰ κοινό-  
 τερον καὶ ιδιώτερον 20  
 τέχνη λέγεται [καὶ πα-  
 ρὰ τριβῆς πάντως [καὶ  
 πανόλωσ τὸ τοιοῦτον.  
 αὐτὸ γὰρ, ὃ πάσῃ τῇ κα-  
 θ' ὀνδήποτε τρόπῳ [[ν]] 25  
 προ[σ]αγορευομένῃ τέ-  
 χνῃ πρόσεστι, τοῦτο ἐκ-  
 θεῖναι βεβουλήμεθα  
 καὶ δὴ προενηνέγμεθα.

*Rh.2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXXVIII.15-29 (Longo, 123)*

Let us leave aside for the time being the question whether that which results is advantageous or not advantageous in every case. Let us also leave aside [whether] it is called art in a more [general sense] or a more specific one, or derived entirely from practice or in general of this sort. For we have intended to set out that which is a property of every art which is so-called in any sense at all.

<sup>29</sup> Here I use Sedley's (1998), 105 translation.  
<sup>30</sup> Col. XXXVIII.15-23 (Longo, 123).

In other words, although the *πολύτροποι έθισμοί* of ordinary language may apply the term 'art' to any number of activities, Philodemus believes it is possible to identify the underlying characteristic which is shared by all arts, no matter how the term is applied (*καθ' όνδήποτε τρόπον*). At the same time Philodemus is aware that a term can be used in a more general (*κοινότερον*) or more limited (*ιδιότερον*) sense.<sup>31</sup> Thus, Philodemus does not deny the ambiguity of language but seeks to salvage something stable from it which is essential if the philosopher is to be able to proceed at all.

According to Philodemus' understanding, art normally signifies some faculty or ability which a person acquires through observation (*παρατήρησις*) of phenomena and processes which are shared by the majority of specific instances. In other words, it is any activity which is founded on the detection of certain patterns, certain shared features amidst the great variety of actions. This recognition gives the agent a sort of faculty or disposition or ability - a more neutral term than 'knowledge' - which is capable of grasping what needs to be done and then performing it.<sup>32</sup>

One notes that the significance of the word is suitably broad. It could be applied to a large number of human activities. Of particular interest is the emphasis on the empirical source of this faculty. The noun *παρατήρησις* itself first appears only in the first century B.C., although the verb *παρατηρέω* is of course frequent earlier. Its application in a text of Dionysius of Halicarnassus perhaps gives some support to the way Philodemus uses it here:

ή γάρ ψυχή του άναγιγνώσκοντος ύπό τής συνεχούς παρατηρήσεως τήν όμοιότητα του χαρακτήρος έφέλκεται.

*De imit. fr. 31.1*

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Crassus' question whether rhetoric qualifies as an art according to *opinio vulgaris* even if it fails to qualify on the *definitio subtilis* of philosophers Cic. *De or.* 1.109.

<sup>32</sup> See Isnardi Parente (1977), 20 on the centrality of empiricism to the formation of all knowledge in Epicureanism.

Here, in a somewhat different context, we see the notion of repetition in the observation and the consequent discernment of likeness (ὁμοιότης).

The terms ἔξις and διάθεσις are familiar enough from other definitions and descriptions of arts<sup>33</sup> and, within the context of Philodemus' passage, they are terms reproduced from the standard Greek description of the word τέχνη. However, both are also terms commonly used by the Epicureans and I am tempted to ask whether it is possible to identify anything particularly Epicurean about the understanding of these terms. For the Epicureans, the soul was a material entity and thus any διάθεσις within it should also be a material configuration, a psychosomatic constitution. The subject of the Epicurean understanding of διάθεσις has been well discussed by Grilli<sup>34</sup> who cites a text from Diogenes Laertius (10.117):

τὸν ἀπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν ἐκόντα.

The disposition of the sage, once achieved, cannot be altered or transformed into its opposite. By analogy, we should expect something similar of the disposition of the artist or technician. Here too, the soul of the artist is materially distinct, in certain respects, from the soul of a person who is either artless or does not possess the same art. Unlike the sage, however, we might expect an artist to lose something of his technical disposition if he allowed his art to lapse. Such an artist might well "forget" how to perform his art competently, although empirical observation would indicate that even artists who have not practised their art for some time remember an astonishing amount of it. It might even be possible to include within this understanding a distinction between exact sciences or conjectural sciences, or at least

<sup>33</sup> Cf. the Hippocratic *Praecepta* 9.54.2 (Littre, Loeb vol. 1 p. 314 chap. 2) ἔξιν ἦν δὴ ἱητρικὴν προσαγορεύομεν. In connection with rhetoric too: once the theoretical precepts have been grasped, Quintilian prescribes a thorough course of reading, writing, and speaking so that the orator might attain *firma quaedam facilitas, quae apud Graecos ἔξις nominatur*, *Inst.* 10.1.1.

<sup>34</sup> A. Grilli (1992) = (1983).

those sciences which depend a great deal on practice and those which do not. This is perfectly coherent if we assume that the Epicureans believed in a hierarchy of dispositions: the Epicurean sage's disposition is at the top and is immutable;<sup>35</sup> that of the technician is less secure in as much as it is inferior.

Philodemus' phrasing, ἔξις ἢ διάθεσις, implies that he regards the terms either as synonyms or perhaps that ἔξις denotes a less "internalised" state which depends rather on a kind of habituation.<sup>36</sup> One point seems certain: Philodemus does not understand the term in the Stoic sense, where ἔξις is responsible for holding bodies together. "Art", therefore, is a disposition which a person acquires by deliberate and conscious exposure to a select set of phenomena. As such, Philodemus finds that the term as understood by the ordinary speaker of Greek involves notions and cognitive operations which are perfectly acceptable to an Epicurean philosopher. This, of course, is rather convenient, and probably quite contrived.

The relative clause οἷον ὁμοίως τῶν μὴ μαθόντων ἔ[νιοι] (lines 12-13) is somewhat problematic. Longo's examination of the text has ruled out Sudhaus' [οὐδεῖς]. If Philodemus was cautiously unwilling to rule out the possibility that no one who has not learned the art can perform it competently, one would have expected something like ὀλίγοι instead of ἔνιοι.<sup>37</sup> Perhaps Philodemus is attempting to give as general a description as possible, where ἔνιοι (almost like τινες) is in fact less specific than ὀλίγοι. An additional problem is encountered in lines 13-15,

ἔστη-

<sup>35</sup> In that he has attained perfection in his atomic structure and consequently is in a state of ἡσυχία, Grilli (1992), 49.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Grilli (1992), 51, "...per Epicuro la ἔξις è l'"abito" che si forma attraverso la συνήθεια, l'abitudine. Grilli (1992), 52 goes on to assert that the term ἔξις is often used by Philodemus in the non-technical sense of "habit", but he does not give examples.

<sup>37</sup> The reading ἔ[νιοι] also causes Barnes discomfort (1986, 18 n. 32).

κότως καὶ βε[βαί]ως [οὐ-  
δ]ὲ στοχαστι[κῶς].

The two categories of artistic activity signified by ἔστηκότως καὶ βε[βαί]ως and στοχαστι[κῶς] are clearly legible and familiar enough. However, the presence of the supplemented conjunction [οὐδ]ὲ almost seems to contradict the previous relative clause where it was stated that some of those who have not learned the art can achieve the result, and, even more seriously, it would commit Philodemus to denying that all conjectural arts are arts, which would not really cohere with what he says later. Since only the final ε of the missing conjunction is in fact legible it is possible that the supplement is incorrect.<sup>38</sup> Personal examination of the papyrus was, as might be expected, inconclusive, although traces to the left of the epsilon do not appear to be compatible with a delta, but are with a tau or gamma. This permits the supplement [εἴ]τε,<sup>39</sup> and one could cite in support the phrasing from a previous passage in the papyrus:

ἂν τ' οὖν ἦι τῶν παγίων  
ἐ[π]ηστημῶν, ἂν τε τῶν  
στοχαστικῶν.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXX.17-19 (Longo, 107)*

But the sequence καὶ . . . εἴτε . . . raises problems. I suggest [καὶ γε], "exactly, and securely, and even conjecturally". The combination καὶ γε is characteristic of post-Classical Greek,<sup>40</sup> and might be appropriate within a list which ends with an item which might not have been expected or to which some people might wish to object. One can compare a text from Plato where there is a similar usage although the conjunction and particle are separated from each other in accordance with Classical practice:<sup>41</sup>

ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπτευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι  
πολλὰ τέχναι.

<sup>38</sup> Sadly, Barnes' attractive [ἡ καί] (1986), 6 is ruled out by the presence of ε.

<sup>39</sup> Gaines (pers. comm.) has intimated that this is the restoration he favours.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Denniston (1954), 157, Kühner-Gerth II (1955), 176, Blass-Debrunner (1961), 226 sect. 439 (2).

<sup>41</sup> *Grg.* 450d 6-8. See Dodds (1959), 197, who understands the combination καὶ . . . γε as signifying the addition of an unexpected item to the enumeration, "yes, and the art of playing draughts".

Philodemus has avoided giving a definition, and this is hardly surprising in the light of the reputed Epicurean distaste for such an exercise.<sup>42</sup> This eschewal is in marked contrast with other philosophical schools, and in particular the Stoics, from whom a considerable number of definitions of "art" or "science" survive.

In his commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* Olympiodorus lists three definitions of art and attributes each to a separate Stoic scholarch:<sup>43</sup>

1) Κλέανθης τοίνυν λέγει ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ πάντα ἀνούουσα"

2) ὁ Χρύσιππος προσθεὶς τὸ "μετὰ φαντασιῶν" εἶπεν ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ προιοῦσα μετὰ φαντασιῶν".

3) Ζήνων δέ φησιν ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων<sup>44</sup> πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ"

The definitions vary in their particulars. Cleanthes calls art a ἕξις, and in so doing he seems to be using ordinary language; the most important aspect of art is method (ὁδῶ). Chrysippus includes an explicit cognitive aspect to the definition: for him, art is a ἕξις which proceeds by method (ὁδῶ) in connection with impressions (μετὰ φαντασιῶν). Zeno replaces the term ἕξις with σύστημα, a system which is derived from co-exercised apprehensions for a certain useful end of the things in life. Only Zeno's definition mentions the notion of utility as a distinguishing feature of an art.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>42</sup> As Asmis points out (1984), 39, this is not stated by Epicurus explicitly in any of his extant writings but is often implied and is attributed to him by Cicero and others. She cites two late testimonies to this effect.

<sup>43</sup> Olymp. in Plat. Gorg. 12.1 p. 69 = Hülser vol 2 p. 420 fr.392.

<sup>44</sup> von Arnim, Mansfeld, Hülser : -μένον cod., Westerink.

<sup>45</sup> Zeno's definition is echoed by Sextus Empiricus, πᾶσα . . . τέχνη σύστημα ἐστὶν ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῷ βίῳ λάμβανον τὴν ἀναφορὰν (*Math.* 2.10).

It will be useful to compare Philodemus' description of the meaning of the ordinary Greek word τέχνη and the Stoic definitions listed above. Has Philodemus come up with a formulation which simply restates the Stoic definitions? On first examination there appear to be a number of similarities between Philodemus' description and the Stoic definitions, especially those of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Like them, Philodemus regards τέχνη as a ἔξις, that is, as a sort of mental state, but as I have explained above, Philodemus probably understands this state in Epicurean terms.<sup>46</sup> Method is an essential aspect in Cleanthes and Chrysippus (ὁδῶ), and is implied by Zeno ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τι τέλος. Philodemus does not use the terms ὁδός or μέθοδος here, but again method is implied by the adverbs ἐστηκότως, βεβαίως, and στοχαστικῶς.<sup>47</sup> If my suggested supplement ((καὶ γ)ε) is accepted in lines 14-15 of the column, then Philodemus discerns a more embracing view of "methodology" within the general term τέχνη. Other similarities, though apparent, are misleading. The way in which such a ἔξις is acquired is not explained by Cleanthes or Chrysippus. The latter's addition μετὰ φαντασιῶν does not seem to account for the acquisition of the ἔξις but describes the operation of the τέχνη once it has already been acquired. Zeno does seem to offer an explanation which resembles Philodemus': his ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τι τέλος looks very much like Philodemus' phrase κα/ταλαμβάνουσα [τ]η καὶ / [σ]υντελοῦσα,<sup>48</sup> but we must beware of this coincidence. Philodemus has based the acquisition of τέχνη on an explicit empirical foundation (ἀπὸ / παρ[α]τηρή[σ]εω[ς] τινῶν / κοινῶν καὶ [σ]τοι[χειω] [ν]δῶν, ἃ διὰ πλειόν[ω]ν δι[ή]κει τῶν ἐπὶ μέ[ρ]ο[υ]ς)<sup>49</sup> and the participle καταλαμβάνουσα constitutes the second phase

<sup>46</sup> Barnes (1986), 7 finds that the Stoic definition as framed by Sextus Empiricus (*Math.* 2.10, quoted in the note above) is really concerned with a branch of knowledge (σύστημα), while Philodemus is actually describing the mental state or disposition of the τεχνικός; yet he admits that the term τέχνη has both uses in Greek and that Sextus' and Philodemus' approaches are complimentary.

<sup>47</sup> *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. XXXVIII.13-15 (Longo, 123).

<sup>48</sup> *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. XXXVIII.9-11 (Longo, 123).

<sup>49</sup> *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. XXXVIII.5-9 (Longo, 123).

which is itself preliminary to achieving the goal which has been set (συντελοῦσα). Furthermore, Philodemus elects to ignore considerations as to whether the goal is always beneficial,<sup>50</sup> whereas in Zeno's definition this is quite explicit (πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ).

To summarise. Although Philodemus' appears to resemble the Stoic definitions closely, there are sufficient differences between his description of the normal meaning of the word τέχνη and the Stoic definition for us to conclude that Philodemus is aware of the Stoic definitions but is offering a description which confronts them with a different emphasis - the empirical basis of τέχνη. The resemblance is due perhaps to the fact that Philodemus is forced to contend with a rather different debate on the issue of τέχνη from that of the Founders of the School.

It will also now be appropriate to reconsider briefly the isolated definition of art preserved by the Dionysius Thrax scholiast:

οἱ μὲν Ἐπικουρεῖοι οὕτως ὀρίζονται τὴν τέχνην· τέχνη ἐστὶ μέθοδος ἐνεργοῦσα τῷ βίῳ τὸ σύμφερον. ἐνεργοῦσα ὅτιον ἐργαζομένη.

It is of course impossible, on the evidence available, to determine whether this is an accurate report of a definition formulated by "Epicureans" at some time or place. It might simply represent a convenient "definition" given, perhaps even without much reflection, by earlier Epicureans who were not afflicted by the polemics which were waged in a later period. However, it could also be said that it resembles a rather simplistic formulation of the Stoic definition, with its insistence on method and a beneficial goal. It certainly eschews any mention of the empirical basis of τέχνη, an aspect which, as we have seen, is of central importance in Philodemus' explanation of the term. I should therefore prefer to leave this

<sup>50</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXXVIII.15-18 (Longo, 123).*

reported definition aside as being of little, or at least questionable, consequence in the analysis of Philodemus' view of art.<sup>51</sup>

Once Philodemus has established what is meant by the term τέχνη in Greek he is free to expatiate with more precision on his understanding of its significance for the art of rhetoric.

Philodemus chooses to begin with a consideration of method in activities designated as τέχναι by Greeks. In this case, method seems to be linked with the art's ability to achieve its goal. The term τέχνη is thus applied to activities which can be divided into two basic categories: the exact arts and the conjectural arts.<sup>52</sup> The categories are identified by their requisite qualities:

#### Exact Arts

πρόσ[ε]στιν τὸ  
διὰ τινος παρατηρή-  
σεως στοιχείων τῶν  
διηκόντων διὰ πλειόνων  
τῶν κατὰ μέρος κατα-  
λαμβάνειν ἕκαστον  
καὶ δημιουργεῖν

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 coll. XXXVIII.35-XXXIX.6 (Longo, 123, 125)*

(to the exact arts) belongs the characteristic of grasping any object (of the art) and achieving it by observing certain basic elements which extend across a greater proportion of individual instances

#### Conjectural Arts

τοῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
ἴδιον πρόσεστιν τὸ κοι-  
νῶν τινῶν κατοχὴν  
ἔ[χ]ειν διατεινόντων

10

<sup>51</sup> Blank (1995), 178 astutely speaks of "the definition *attributed* to the Epicureans" (my italics), and is surely correct to point out that by explicitly omitting the question of an art's utility Philodemus is indicating that he is conscious that this is generally assumed to be a defining attribute (p. 179).

<sup>52</sup> ταῖς ἐστηκυῖαις γέ / τε καὶ παγίοις, like grammar, music, painting, and sculpture (*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXXVIII.30-35 (Longo, 123)*), and ταῖς / οὐχ ἐχούσαις τὸ ἐστηκός ἀλλὰ τὸ στοχαστικόν, no examples given at this stage.

εἰς τὰ κατὰ μέρος, οἷς  
 οὐδεπώποτ', ἐάν οὐ-  
 τω τύχη[ι], γέγονεν ἐγκύ- 15  
 ρησις, κἂν μὴ διὰ παν-  
 τὸς ἀκολουθῆ<ι> τὸ τέλος  
 τοῖς τῆς ἐπιστήμης πᾶ-  
 ραγγέλμασι καὶ ποιήμα- 20  
 σιν, διὰ τὸ μὴδ' εἶναι τοῦ  
 πάντως τὴν στοχαστι-  
 κὴν μέθοδον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ  
 κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἢ τοῦ  
 μᾶλλον τῶν ἀτέχνων.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXXIX.9-24 (Longo, 125)*

(to conjectural arts) belongs, necessarily, the characteristic of having a grasp of certain common elements which extend to specific cases, which have not yet been encountered, if it happens thus, even if the goal does not follow on every occasion upon the instructions and products of the science. This is due to the fact that the conjectural method is not of the kind which is effective on every occasion, but rather of the kind which is effective for the most part or on more occasions than those who have no art.

Philodemus has identified the characteristic (πρόσεστιν XXXVIII.35, τὸ ἴδιον πρόσεστιν XXXIX.10) which separates the two kinds of τέχνη. It is noticeable that Philodemus spends more time in describing conjectural art than he does in describing its exact counterpart. I suggest that this is to be explained by the fact that the conjectural arts were the main source of dispute in discussions of the technicity of activities. It must, however, be emphasised that Philodemus ascribes a portion of method to conjectural arts too. It is difficult to ascertain what significance, if any, the difference in phrasing has for the method of the respective arts. The distinctions may be quite subtle. In the case of exact arts certain elements (στοιχεῖα) are derived from observation (παρατήρησις); these elements extend over (διήκοντα διὰ) the majority (πλείονα) of particular cases; this cognitive "equipment" allows the practitioner to "grasp" (καταλαμβάνειν) any object and achieve it (δημιουργεῖν). In conjectural arts, on the other hand, common elements are termed κοινά and they extend into (διατείνοντα εἰς) particular cases (note the word majority, πλείονα, is omitted); these are somehow "possessed" (κατοχὴν ἔχειν) by the practitioner.

One could speculate as to whether the difference in terms (στοιχεῖα vs. κοινά, παρατήρησις vs. κατοχὴν ἔχειν, διήκοντα διά vs. διατείνοντα εἰς) reflects a difference in the nature and acquisition of the two types of art.<sup>53</sup> But what emerges clearly is the fact that exact arts have a more complete grasp of elements which apply to particular cases (hence πλείονα). The match between theory and practice is more exact, the attainment of goal more frequent and predictable. At the same time, the *similarities* in phrasing leave no doubt that conjectural arts also have some degree of method, but one that is inferior to the exact arts, and this is reflected in a lower frequency of achievement of the goal of the art.

It is unfortunate that the text which follows the passages I have discussed above becomes more difficult and that there is a particularly lacunose section in the centre of the next column. Longo offers the following text:

οἶον, κὰν τυγχάνη<ι> τις	25
πρὸ] τέλους ἐπὶ τινῶν ἢ	
μῆ, μέντοι γε ἀπὸ τῆς δι-	
αθέσεως τῆς τῶν κοινῶν]-	
νῶν καὶ στοιχειωδῶν	
ἐντελεστικῆς ἐπὶ τῆν ἀπ-	30
εργασίαν παραλλάξαι	
τῶν] κατὰ μέρος, [φανερῶς	
μὲν ἀπὸ] τέχνης οὐ τετευ-	
χέναι, τὸν δ' ἔχοντα τῆν	
διάθεσιν ἀπὸ τέχνης.	

Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 coll. XXXIX.25-XL.2 (Longo, 125, 127)

For example, even if someone achieves the goal in some cases or [not], yet errs in the passage from the disposition which possesses the common and basic elements to the [actual production] of the particular cases, [he would appear] not to have achieved (it) from art but that the man who has the disposition from art.

As it stands, the text is frustratingly difficult to construe. The relative οἶον (line 25) presumably serves to introduce an example or illustration which is intended to clarify the

<sup>53</sup> For example, στοιχεῖα might imply basic principles which are ontologically more dependable than things which are merely shared; παρατήρησις might be more systematic than a "grasp" (κατοχή); διήκοντα διά might imply an actual extension throughout the particular case, while διατείνοντα εἰς might imply a *tendency* to extend into them, but not completely.

previous statement. Philodemus appears to be reiterating the importance of the relation between theory and practice in art. But there are syntactic problems. The extent of the protasis and its relation to the apodosis are not clear: the first verb, which definitely belongs to the protasis (κἄν τυγχάνη<ι>, line 25), is in the expected subjunctive, but the flow of the protasis is interrupted by a clause which is introduced by the particle combination μέντοι γε (line 27) and furnished with the verb παραλλάξαι (line 31) in the optative. If we assume that this clause is an additional part of the protasis the shift in mood is very odd. In addition, it is most unusual for a clause to begin with the particles μέντοι γε.<sup>54</sup>

Longo's text is most probably a faithful reproduction of what the scribe actually wrote, but the scribe may have made mistakes. With some minor adjustments, the passage will be more comprehensible. De Lacy suggested that some of the emendations in Sudhaus' *Supplementum* could give the required sense: the text should have read οἷον, κἄν τυγχάνη τις τοῦ τέλους ἐπί τινων, μὴ μέντοι γε ἀπὸ τῆς διαθέσεως . . . παραλλάξει . . ., "For example, if a person attains the end in some cases, but does not proceed from a disposition conversant with things common and basic to the working out of particulars, he would not appear to owe his success to art."<sup>55</sup>

Philodemus continues:<sup>56</sup>

κἄ[ν] ἐπί τινω[ν] ἀποτυγ-  
χά[ν]η[ι] τῶν κατὰ μέρος· τὸ  
πάν οὐ δὴ φ[α]μεν] τέ-

<sup>54</sup> But apparently not impossible. Although Cauderlier (1981), 184 objects strongly to this oddity in Longo Auricchio's text, in Blomqvist's discussion of this particle combination there are two cases where it occupies the beginning of the sentence or clause, LXX Ps. 38.7 and *PAmh.* 135.11 (1969), 28. However, later in the same work (p. 129), Blomqvist remarks that μέντοιγε appears as the first word of a sentence only in the *Septuagint* passage and that the parallels adduced from papyrus texts are doubtful. Whether a full analysis of all works transmitted through the Byzantine tradition would yield further examples is uncertain. Yet even Josephus, for whom a search on the *TLG* produced 75 instances of μέντοι γε, never positions the particles at the beginning of a sentence or clause.

<sup>55</sup> De Lacy (1980), 104-105.

<sup>56</sup> Adopting some of Barnes suggestions (1986), 12 and 21 n. 57, see note to translation in chapter 2.

χνην· καλοῦμεν γάρ, δ' [ἐ-  
χει τοῦτο[ν]] παγίως.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XL.3-7 (Longo, 127)*

And if he sometimes [fails] in particular cases, we most certainly deny that it is an art at all. For we term (an art) that which possesses this firmly.

This passage must be understood in connection with the sentence which immediately precedes it, or else we are in danger of accepting a contradiction in Philodemus' argument. The sentence does not deny the existence of conjectural arts, otherwise Philodemus' careful distinction of the two categories of art and their respective "methods" outlined above will have been absurd. It concerns the failures of a person who does not have the benefit of an artistic disposition at all. Such a person, Philodemus has argued, cannot be considered an artist simply on the basis of occasional success from the fact that his success does not result from a grasp of common elements. When such a person fails to achieve his goal on a specific occasion the absence of art is at once obvious. In this context the adverb παγίως serves to emphasise the distinction between the artistic appreciation of common elements and the absence of such an appreciation.

It would appear then that Philodemus acknowledges three kinds of activity: 1) exact arts, 2) conjectural arts, 3) "hit and miss" activities. These last are distinguished from the other two in that they lack method, and hence cannot properly be termed "art". Philodemus offers a variety of suitable terms for such activities instead:

τάς δ' ἐπιτυχίας καὶ ἀπο-  
τυχίας ἐμπειρίαν μὲν  
καὶ παρατήρησιν καὶ ἄ-  
σκησιν] καὶ [πάν τὸ τοιοῦ-  
το προσαγορεύομεν, τέ-  
χνην δ' οὐδαμῶς

*Rh. 2 Pherc. 1674 col. XL.24-29 (Longo, 127)*

As for "hit-and-miss" activities, we term them "skill" or "observation" or "practice",<sup>57</sup> and all that sort of thing, but on no account "art". . .

The four lines that follow do not provide an intelligible text but, from the point where the argument becomes legible again, Philodemus seems to reinforce his point with a specific example. It is not clear what kind of performer Philodemus has in mind, but he cites the example of someone who has *observed* (παρατετήρηκεν col. XLI.1-2) how he should stand, move, and gesture in accompaniment to the discourse.<sup>58</sup> The description might be appropriate to an actor, or, more likely given the context, to aspects of oratorical delivery (*hypocrisis, actio*). Such a performer, Philodemus argues,

παρατε[τ]ή- 5  
ρηκέ τινα<sup>59</sup> μόνον, καὶ  
μόνος τοῦργον ποιεῖ καὶ  
διὰ παντός· μέ[θ]οδ[ον]  
δὲ καὶ στοιχειώδη [τινὰ  
πράξ]ισιν διὰ πλεί- 10  
ων διήκου]σαν, ὥσπερ  
γραμματιστής, ὥσπερ μου-  
σικός οὐκ ἔχει.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XLI.5-13 (Longo, 129)*

he has observed only certain details, and alone accomplishes the task and on every occasion. But he does not possess method and a certain transmission of elementary (precepts) which pervades the majority of cases, as the grammarian and musician do.

The passage is illuminating as it exemplifies the criteria Philodemus uses to distinguish arts from other practices. Even frequency of success (διὰ παντός) is not *in itself* sufficient to qualify a practice as an art. To qualify as an artist a practitioner must possess method and the

<sup>57</sup> The term ἄσκησις is an editorial supplement but quite likely given its occurrence in *Rh. 2 PHerc. 1672 col. XXXIV.28* in connection with political oratory.

<sup>58</sup> This is Longo's interpretation, who translates ποῖ ο[υ]νεκινεῖται as "in quale direzione accompagnare il discorso con gesti" (p. 129). Cicero both acknowledges the importance of the contribution of *actio* (which includes *vultus* and *motus corporis*) to the orator's success and bewails its neglect in theoretical training (*De or. 1.18, 3.213, Part. or. 25*). In his discussion of gesture within delivery Quintilian prescribes that gesture *et ipse voci consentit et animo cum ea simul paret* (*Inst. 11.3.65*); although Quintilian offers some guidelines on this subject he implies that it is difficult to give definite rules, *multum ex iis, quae praecepimus, mutuari necesse est ab iis, qui dicunt apud tribunalia* (*Inst. 11.3.134*): context will dictate the best strategies and there are too many imponderables to permit rigid prescription.

<sup>59</sup> Longo accents the word τίνα but I prefer to take it as the neuter plural of the indefinite pronoun.

common elements which extend through the majority of cases,<sup>60</sup> and this system of method must be transferrable through instruction (παράδοσις). In other words, Philodemus seems to imply that an art is something which can be taught and it can only be taught if it has method. By contrast, the performer of gestures is the only person who is able to achieve his goal (μόνος τούργον ποιεῖ): he is unable to communicate his knowledge to another because he in fact has no method to impart. Grammar and music emerge as examples of exact arts,<sup>61</sup> whereas the acrobat, the sword-dancer, and a host of other dexterous practitioners belong to the same category as the performer of gestures.<sup>62</sup> But once again, Philodemus repeats that he is not claiming that the latter are not termed artists by Greek-speakers *catachrestically* (καταχρηστικῶς, col. XLI.33-34), simply that they are not really artists in the *proper* sense of the Greek word (κυρίως, col. XLI.31-32, XLII.9).

Philodemus has established the meaning of his terms and can now proceed with the argument without the risk of ambiguity. The catachrestic applications of the term τέχνη are easily recognisable and can be discounted. But his investigation into the meaning of the term in Greek has revealed a possible source of complication in that the same term can be used in both a stronger sense (to denote an exact art) and a weaker sense (to denote a conjectural art). At this stage of the argument, Philodemus elects to use the term τέχνη for practical purposes as denoting only exact arts, to distinguish unequivocally those practices which are done with art from those that have no art at all:

φεύ-  
γον[τες γὰρ ἀπασαν οὐ πρα-  
γμα[τικὴν ἀμφισβήτη-      35  
σιν [μ]εταληψόμεθα τὰς

<sup>60</sup> The phrase recalls the distinctive characteristic of exact art described earlier in the section, τὸ / διὰ τινος παρατηρή[σεως στοιχείων φιλῶν / [διη]κόντων ἑαυτῶν / τῶν κατὰ μέρος καταλαμβάνειν ἕκαστον, *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 coll. XXXVIII.35-XXXIX.5 (Longo, 123, 125).

<sup>61</sup> Blank (1995), 181 notes that these, together with painting and sculpture, serve as Philodemus' models of exact arts (see his nn. 9-11 to p. 181 for textual references).

<sup>62</sup> *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XLI.13-27 (Longo, 129).

ὄνο[μ]ασί[α]ς, καὶ ταύτας  
 ἄς νῦν φαμεν εἶ[ν]αι τέ-  
 χνας, τὸ τοιοῦτ' ἔχειν  
 εἶδος ἐροῦμεν ὡ[ς] ἢ  
 γραμματικὴ καὶ [πλ]ασ-  
 τική, ταύτας δ', ἄς οὐ [τέ- 5  
 χνας, τὰς [ἐ]σ]τερημέ[ν]ας  
 τοῦ τοιοῦτου, παρατηρη-  
 τικὸν δ' [ἔ]χειν εἶδος, οἷον  
 ἀρχαίως ἐξηριθμησά-  
 με[θ]α, παραπλήσιον [καὶ 10  
 φθ[ο]νήσομεν αὐταῖς.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 coll. XLII.33-XLIII.11 (Longo, 131, 133)*

For in avoiding all hair-splitting which is not relevant we shall alter the labels, and we shall say that those activities which we term arts now have the sort of form which grammar and sculpture do, while those which we now say are not arts, are those which are deprived of this sort of form, but have an empirical form, like the one we enumerated earlier, and accordingly we shall refuse to acknowledge them (as arts).

Philodemus offers a simplified distinction for the moment between a [τεχνικὸν] εἶδος and a παρατηρητικὸν εἶδος of activity. The distinction explicitly ignores the conjectural category of art as this will only needlessly complicate the point Philodemus is trying to make, which is that sophistic rhetoric is an art, whereas political and forensic rhetoric are not:

[εἶ-  
 δη <δὲ> τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰς ῥ[η]-  
 τορικὰς ἐναρμόττω[ν]-  
 τες, τὴν [μ]ὲν σοφιστικὴν  
 τέχνη[ν] ἀποφαινόμε- 15  
 θα, [τ]ὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν [οὐ  
 τέχνην. [ἄ]ν δὲ συναναγ-  
 κά[σ]η[ι] [τις] ἡμᾶς προ[φ]έρ[ε]σ-  
 θαι τὰς ὄ[ν]ομασί[α]ς, τὴν  
 μὲν, ὡ[ς] ἐκτεθεῖκαμεν, [ιδι- 20  
 ὡματι κε[χ]αρ[ά]χθαι, φή-  
 σομεν, τὴν δ' οὐ φήσομεν.  
 καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα τοὺς ἀντι-  
 λέγοντας ἀ[πα]ντᾶν ἀξι-  
 ὴσομεν, καὶ <ὧσ>περ κατε[σ]τη- 25  
 σάμεθα.

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XLIII.11-26 (Longo, 133)*

By connecting these types of forms and the rhetorical arts, we declare that sophistic is an art and that political rhetoric is not an art. And if someone forces us to apply the labels, we shall say that the one, as we have laid out, is marked with an identifying characteristic, while the other is not. And we shall think we are quite justified in replying to those who argue against these things, just as we decided.

The passage recalls an earlier one where Philodemus censured definitions which were too rigid and founded on mistaken assumptions.<sup>63</sup> In the earlier passage, Philodemus' opponents were mistaken not only in constructing a definition of τέχνη (instead of grounding their understanding in ordinary language) but also in their failure to perceive that rhetoric is not a single indistinguishable entity but a term which is used as a sort of short-hand for two very different activities: sophistic and political/forensic. This last point is emphasised by Philodemus' use of the plural adjective τὰς ῥητορικός instead of the singular. The distinction between sophistic rhetoric and political/forensic rhetoric reflects a difference in εἶδος. The two things denoted by the term rhetoric are actually two different creatures. Philodemus asserts this strongly and with characteristic irony when, in the last sentence of *PHerc.* 1674 he says,

καὶ]

χειρᾶς ὑποδείκνυμεν  
 ἑαυτῶν [καὶ] [δι]ότι τέχνην  
 τὴν σοφιστικὴν] καλοῦ- 5  
 μένην [ῥητορικὴν] [λέγο-  
 μεν οὐχὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς]  
 μέρους. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν τῆς]  
 ῥητορικῆς μέρος τὸ πα-  
 νηγυρικὸν καὶ [τὸ] πολει- 10  
 τικὸν καὶ [τὸ] δικαντικόν,  
 ὃν τρόπον [αὐτὸς οἶεται]  
 κατὰ τὴν [ἅπασαν γρα-  
 φήν], ὡς [περὶ] [οὐ]δὲ τοῦ] [κυ-  
 νός], μέρος τὸ θαλάττιον] 15  
 ζῷον καὶ τὸ χερσαῖον]

*Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. LVIII.2-16 (Longo, 163)

And we show our own handiwork and the reason why we say so-called sophistic rhetoric is an art and not a branch of rhetoric. For the panegyric, the political, and the forensic are not branches of rhetoric in the way he himself supposes in his entire treatise, just as the marine animal and the land (animal) are not species of dog . . .

Panegyric is synonymous with sophistic. Philodemus rejects the view of the majority of rhetoricians and philosophers that sophistic is simply one species of the genus rhetoric (a

<sup>63</sup> *Rh.* 1 *PHerc.* 1427 fr. 1.2-4.

classification articulated most coherently by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*),<sup>64</sup> but an entirely different activity which shares nothing but the term 'rhetoric' with the others. The analogy chosen is quite apposite: political/forensic rhetoric and panegyric are not simply different animals, they do not even share the same environment.<sup>65</sup> In making this assertion, Philodemus is also reversing the implicit assumptions of the traditional hierarchy of the rhetorical species. Most rhetoricians and philosophers regarded the political and forensic branches as somehow superior to the panegyric because the former were perceived as concerned with serious and important matters (τὰ μέγιστα) while panegyric was sometimes in danger of being relegated to entertainment and display. This appraisal of rhetorical discourse also gives a privileged position to the utility of the activity: political and forensic oratory are more clearly useful than epideictic. Certainly this was the view which was dominant in the second and first centuries B.C., and especially at Rome. Philodemus chooses to concentrate on what he perceives as the technical credibility of all three activities and argues that political and forensic oratory are wanting in this respect. Only sophistic rhetoric displays the *ιδίωμα* which qualifies an activity as an art, that is μέ[θ]οδ[ον] / δὲ καὶ στοιχειώδη [τινὰ / παρά]δοσιν διὰ πλ[ειό]νων δι[ή]κου[σαν].<sup>66</sup>

This strategy may explain why Philodemus elects to ignore questions of utility when describing the meaning of the word τέχνη in Greek, despite the fact that utility was invariably an important consideration in the identification of arts. Yet Philodemus does not omit

<sup>64</sup> 1.3 1358a 36 - 1359a 29, though Aristotle employs the term ἐπιδεικτικόν where Philodemus uses σοφιστική. While Aristotle speaks of εἶδη or γένη of rhetoric and speeches, Philodemus seems to use the term μέρος in an equivalent sense and εἶδος to denote more separate entities. See Calboli-Montefusco (1979), 260-61 for further examples and the view that it was a term employed by the Stoics.

<sup>65</sup> Perhaps Philodemus also means that there are several creatures which are termed κύων in Greek, but one is the canine creature with which we are familiar on dry land, and the others are species of fish or sharks, cf. Hesych. s.v. κύων (Latte) καὶ τὸ ὑλακτοῦν ζῶον . . . καὶ τὸ θαλάσσιον ζῶον, and LSJ s.v. IV.

<sup>66</sup> *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 col. XLI.8-11 (Longo, 129).

comment on the question of utility altogether. As we shall see in the next chapter, Philodemus seeks to demonstrate that the supposed 'utility' of political and forensic rhetoric is nullified by its actual technical failure. Political and forensic rhetoric claim to possess a method for achieving conviction or persuasion in an audience. Philodemus shows that this is impossible.

Philodemus has demonstrated to his satisfaction the grounds on which he thinks that sophistic rhetoric is an art and should be distinguished from political and forensic rhetoric. He now proceeds to the section of his argument which aims to demonstrate that this conclusion is justified in terms of the writings of the Founders of the School (a topic which I shall address in the next chapter):

[ἀλλὰ] νῦν ἐπ' [ἐ-  
κείν[ο] βαδίζωμεν, ὅτι  
τέχνην οὐχ ἡμεῖς λέγο-  
μεν τὴν σοφιστικὴν, οἱ  
δὲ τὴν αἴ[ρ]εσιν κτίσαντες 30  
ἡμῶν ἀντιφωνοῦσιν,  
καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἱστο-  
ρίαν τινὰ καὶ παρατή-  
ρησιν συνησημένην  
οὐχ ἡμεῖς. 35

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XLIII.26-35 (Longo, 133)*

[But] now let us proceed to the claim that it is not we who say that sophistic is an art, but that the Founders of our School stated it in the course of their polemics, and that political rhetoric is a certain research and practised observation, not we.

## CHAPTER 5: TEXTUAL AUTHORITY

Once Philodemus has dispensed with the arguments for and against the proposition that sophistic rhetoric is an art he is free to illustrate his thesis by citation from the works of the Founders of the School. These quotations and references form an essential service in that they validate the thesis in a way that no amount of argumentation can. As the most unimpeachable authority, Epicurus' evidence is led first. This is followed by citations from Hermarchus and Metrodorus.<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to ascertain whether there is any significance in this order vis-à-vis the relative authority of the last two or the suitability of their testimonies for Philodemus' purpose. By far the simplest explanation would be that Philodemus follows the same order for the citations as the source from which he is working (see below).<sup>2</sup>

Philodemus announces the new section unequivocally:

[ἀλλὰ] νῦν ἐπ' [ἐ-  
 κείνῳ] βαδίζομεν, ὅτι  
 τέχνην οὐχ ἡμεῖς λέγο-  
 μεν τὴν σοφιστικὴν, οἱ  
 δὲ τὴν αἴρῃσιν κτίσαντες 30  
 ἡμῶν ἀντιφωνοῦσιν,  
 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἱστο-  
 ρίαν τινὰ καὶ παρατή-  
 ρησιν συνησκημένην  
 οὐχ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ κάκει- 35  
 νο παραθήσομ[εν]α[ί], ὅ-  
 που καὶ δι' ὧν ἐφαίνο]ν-  
 το [Ζ]ήνων[ι] ταῦτα διασα-  
 φεῖσθαι:

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 coll. XLIII.26-XLIV.2 (Longo, 133, 135)*

[But] now let us proceed to the claim that it is not we who say that sophistic is an art, but that the Founders of our School stated it in the course of their polemics, and that political rhetoric is a certain research and practised observation, not we. But I shall also set out where and how these things are made clear by Zeno.

<sup>1</sup> Polyaeus' testimony is omitted since Philodemus has stated that the work *De rhetorica* ascribed to him is in fact spurious (*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXIII.7-11, Longo, 93*).

<sup>2</sup> Or the order could simply be alphabetical!

The new section is marked by a *diple* beneath line 26 (recorded by *O* and *N*, Longo, 132). The statement recalls the close of book 1, and is characterised by an emphatic style (οὐχ ἡμεῖς lines 28 and 35). Philodemus is anxious to proclaim that his position on this issue is thoroughly orthodox and that he is merely repeating the stance of the Founders. Philodemus promises to set down where these views are to be found (δοῦν) amidst the works of the Founders and reproduce or summarise the wording in which their views were articulated (δι' ὧν). Philodemus assumes that the position which the Founders took on this issue will be self-evident and unequivocal (ἐφάινοντο). As such, they should silence all argument since they will constitute incontrovertible support for Philodemus' own thesis. It is interesting that Philodemus acknowledges his debt to Zeno at this point in words which suggest that it is the scholar who was responsible for this research. We are however, presented with something of a problem. How much of Philodemus' argument is derived directly from Zeno and how much is his own contribution? As Philodemus proceeds it emerges that Zeno did not actually compose a treatise on the subject but rather a compilation of excerpts. One may speculate as to his reasons for doing so. It is possible that the compilation was intended as a teaching-tool for the systematic study of the subject of rhetoric within the school.<sup>3</sup> Such a compilation would simultaneously serve as a proof of Zeno's commitment to Epicurean orthodoxy in the face of opposition to his views on epideictic rhetoric.

### **Epicurus (*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLIV.2-19)**

Appropriately, Philodemus begins with the works of Epicurus and, not surprisingly, Epicurus' *On Rhetoric*, the most obvious place to search for an answer. Here, if anywhere, the

<sup>3</sup> For the history and use of compilations which served an ethical or didactic purpose in antiquity, including those which treat a chosen subject, see Barns (1950) and (1951). But Zeno's compilation is rather different from those discussed by Barns because it is far more focused in subject and source and more limited in circulation; it was almost certainly not intended as a literary form. Nor (hardly surprisingly, given the context) does it display a preference for ἀντιλογίαι which Barns (1951), 3 sees

reader might expect a clear exposition of the stance which Philodemus champions. Yet his initial references are disappointingly vague. He simply asserts that throughout that work (διατε/λε[ι] λέγων) Epicurus used terms and phrases like τὰ διδασκαλεία τῶν ῥητορικῶν, τὰς ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων εὐμορφίας, πραγματείαν αὐτῶν, τὰς παραδόσεις καὶ παραγγελίας περί τε λόγου καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLIV.5-17). No further exegesis or argument on the occurrence, context, or meaning of these terms in Epicurus' work is forthcoming. Instead, Philodemus assumes that their implications are self evident (τί ἂν λέγοι [τις]; col. XLIV.18-19) i.e. they demonstrate that Epicurus acknowledged that rhetoric is an art by the simple fact that Epicurus did not question whether terms like διδασκαλεία, πραγματεία, παραδόσεις, παραγγελίαι are appropriate in describing rhetoric's artistic status or challenge the identification of the art's subject matter as εὐμορφίαι, λόγος, and ἐνθυμήματα.<sup>4</sup> According to Philodemus, then, Epicurus recognised that the rhetoricians do have teachable precepts (which can be transmitted in systematic form) and that these precepts concern both the aesthetic (εὐμορφίαι) and argumentative (λόγος, ἐνθυμήματα) aspects of discourse. Philodemus, naturally, does not make any mention of *persuasion* as one of rhetoric's concerns, nor does he cite a forensic or deliberative application for this science. It is difficult for us to judge whether Philodemus is being faithful to Epicurus' work or whether he has deliberately omitted any reference to a practical or civic application of rhetoric. However, if his argument was to have any efficacy at all we have to assume that Epicurus either did not make any such connection or explicitly denied one.

#### **Hermarchus (*PHerc.* 1674 coll. XLIV.19-XLIX.19)**

At this point, Philodemus passes abruptly from Epicurus to another authority, Hermarchus.

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as an important ingredient in the tradition of literary *gnomologia*. For a discussion of Epicurean *compendia* and *eklogai*, see Angeli (1986).

<sup>4</sup> Von Arnim (1898), 75 remarks that the citations do not really prove Philodemus' thesis.

Initially he claims that Hermarchus supports Epicurus (τὴν αὐτῆ[ν] / ἔχε[ι] γνώμην, col. XLIV.22-23), although the connection between the citations becomes less clear as Philodemus proceeds. The citation from Hermarchus comes from a letter addressed to an otherwise unknown Theopheides which is dated to the archonship of Menecles.<sup>5</sup> The passage has drawn some attention because it also preserves a testimony to the Megarian Alexinus, who is the target of Hermarchus' comments here.<sup>6</sup> Hermarchus' attack on Alexinus is not unexpected since Epicurus and Metrodorus are both known to have written works against the Megarians.<sup>7</sup> In a work attested only here, *Περὶ ἀγωγῆς*, Alexinus charged the rhetorical sophists with conducting useless researches (πολλὰ ζητοῦσιν ἀχρήστως, XLIV.27-28), which included:

- work on style (τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν αὐτῶν πραγμάτευμα)
- work on memory (τὸ περὶ τὴν [μ]νήμην)
- close reading of Homer and Euripides (ἐν οἷς ἐπιζητοῦσι κτλ.)

*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLIV.28-XLV.3 (Longo, 135, 137)

The title of the work suggests that Alexinus approached the activities of the rhetoricians with a view to assessing their contribution to education, and hence we are faced with the familiar tussle between philosophy and rhetoric.<sup>8</sup> But the fact that the rhetors indulge in many useless things does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that *all* their efforts are pointless. Alexinus

<sup>5</sup> And therefore to be dated 267/66 B.C., Dorandi (1980), 160-161. The whole citation is included in Longo Auricchio (1988) as Hermarchus fr. 36, with detailed commentary pp. 151-157.

<sup>6</sup> A portion of the passage is included in Döring's collection of testimonies to the Megarians (1972) as fr. 88 (vol. 2 pp. 25-26), but his work predates Longo Auricchio's publications of 1975 and 1977 and so is based on Sudhaus' inferior edition.

<sup>7</sup> Diog. Laert. 10.27 includes a *Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικούς* among Epicurus' works and a *Πρὸς τοὺς διαλεκτικούς* among those of Metrodorus (10.24), and the Megarians were the target of Epicurus' defence of the senses in *De nat.* 28 (esp. fr. 8 col. II and fr. 13 col. VII inf.). Spinelli (1986), 34 cautiously ascribes certain fragments of the Herculaneum collection to Metrodorus' work; Spinelli's thesis is challenged by Tepedino Guerra (1992). For relations between Megarians and early Epicureans see Gigante (1981), 93-98.

<sup>8</sup> So too Döring (1972), 118.

saw some common ground between rhetoric and philosophy when rhetoric is concerned with the construction of arguments on subjects of the highest importance:

περὶ χρη-  
σίμων [γε] πλείστων  
ἔξωθε[ν] ἐπιχειροῦσ[ι]ν  
λόγους [ποιεῖ]σθαι τοιού- 15  
τους, οἷους] ἐγκρ[ί]ναι τῶν  
φιλοσόφων ἐστίν.

*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLV.12-17 (Longo, 137)

they undertake in a superficial manner to compose the kind of arguments on a great many useful things which it is possible to regard as the province of philosophers.

The crucial terms here are ἔξωθεν and τοιούτους . . . οἷους. In some aspects, Alexinus seems to claim, rhetoric *resembles* philosophy in what it attempts to do with subjects which are of the most use to humans, but its attempts are superficial or frivolous.<sup>9</sup> The rhetoricians' failure is apparently ascribed to a lack of science. They rely entirely on conjecture as shown in the next lines, despite the lacuna at the end:

[καὶ  
γὰρ εἰ μὴ κατ' ἐπιστή-  
μην περὶ]γονται τὰ πα-  
ρ[ά] ἑαυ[τῶ]ν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ  
τινα εἰκοτολογία καὶ  
σ[το]χασμὸν ΟΥΕΣ[.]ΗΥ[

col. XLV.17-22 (Longo, 137)

[And] if they don't [deduce] their own conclusions in accordance with science, but in accordance with probability and conjecture. . .

If von Arnim's supplement [περὶ]γονται is correct, Alexinus could be thinking particularly of argumentation (as already suggested by ἐπιχειροῦσ[ι]ν λόγους [ποιεῖ]σθαι τοιούτους,

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Döring (1972), 120, "er erkannte aber an, dass man bei ihnen eine gewisse nützliche Fertigkeit im Argumentieren erlernen könne, freilich nur auf einen vergleichsweise niedrigen Niveau". Döring finds Alexinus' judgement of the rhetors "erstaunlich wohlwollend".

οἵτους] ἐγκρι[τ]ίνας τῶν [φιλοσοφῶν] ἐστίν in lines 14-17 above).<sup>10</sup> The rigour of the philosopher's argumentation distinguishes him from the rhetor, although the subject-matter of the argument may be shared.

Naturally both Alexinus' and Hermarchus' remarks are out of context and we cannot be certain of the full significance of certain terms and phrases. Philodemus does not appear to have read Alexinus' *Περὶ ἀγωγῆς* himself but is relying on Hermarchus' summary of some of its points.<sup>11</sup> Of course, we may even doubt whether Philodemus has Hermarchus' letter to Theopheides before him. It is more likely that he is relying on Zeno's notes (see col. XLIII.35-XLIV.2, Longo, 133, 135). When Alexinus denigrates certain rhetorical studies as useless (ἀχρήστως) does he imply that others *are* useful, and further, is 'usefulness' one of his criteria for determining whether a practice is an art or not, or is the designation confined in this context to its educational function? Presumably Alexinus considers them useless because they have nothing to do with rhetoric's goal: effective argumentation and persuasion.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Compare Hermarchus' rejoinder later on, τὸ δὲ δὴ μὴ / [κατ'] ἐπιστήμην περαί[νεσθαί] τίνας τῶν ῥητο/[ρη]κῶν λόγων, coll. XLVIII.31-XLIX.1. It may be, though, that I overtranslate περαίνονται and that it means simply "finish, complete".

<sup>11</sup> The rarity of the term εἰκοτολογία (not found elsewhere in Epicurean texts according to Longo Auricchio (1988), 155) and the fact that it is replaced with another term later on (col. XLIX.1-2) combine to suggest that Hermarchus reproduced it from Alexinus' treatise.

<sup>12</sup> Döring (1972), 120 concludes his commentary on this fragment of Alexinus by stressing that we do not know the motivation behind the Megarian's stance on rhetoric and its relation to logic here. I suspect that the issue is confused by the way terms were understood by Alexinus and Philodemus. Philodemus describes Alexinus as [κα]τηγοροῦ[ν]τος τῶν ῥητορικῶν [σοφιστῶν] (col. XLIV.25-26). The formulation is quite specific - not simply ῥητόρων - and if Alexinus has been reported accurately he probably meant those teachers who specialise in training people how to speak, the characters familiar from Plato's dialogues. For Philodemus, σοφιστική is equivalent to epideictic, and he seeks to distinguish it from political or forensic rhetoric. Alexinus had no such agenda.

When Philodemus turns to Hermarchus' response to Alexinus, it soon becomes apparent that Hermarchus takes issue with the Megarian's understanding of χρήσιμον.<sup>13</sup> Hermarchus first assumes that Alexinus uses the term in a crude material way:

τὸ

περὶ χρησίμων διαλέ-  
 γησθαί, φησιν, εἰ μὲν ταύ-  
 τῶν δεῖ λαβεῖν τῷ πε- 30  
 ρὶ τοιούτων ἐξ ὧν γί-  
 νεται τὸ κέρδος ἐπ' ἀργυ-  
 ρ[ίωι] λόγ[ου] στρέφειν δυ-  
 ναμένοις παντοδα[ί]α-  
 πῶς, πᾶσα δ' ἐξ[ου]σία ἐστ[ι],  
 θέτε μανικῶν τελετί-  
 ως.

*PHerc.* 1674 coll. XLV.27-XLVI.3 (Longo, 137, 139)

if, Hermarchus says, one must interpret the argument concerning useful things as equivalent to that which concerns the kind of things from which financial profit originates for those able to turn out speeches in any sense and is complete power, then regard it as completely insane.

Presumably, Hermarchus was able to make this charge because Alexinus did not specify what he meant by τὰ χρήσιμα. According to Hermarchus the rhetor's view of τὰ χρήσιμα, even τὰ πλεῖστα χρήσιμα, is influenced largely by the financial rewards which derive from knowledge or expertise, not by the practitioner's psychological well-being. Things are only important or useful inasmuch as they bring some pecuniary advantage. Hermarchus' continuation of his point is unfortunately interrupted by a substantial lacuna, but when the text becomes legible again seventeen lines later it emerges that he is seeking to correct assumptions on the rewards rhetoric confers:

παραχα[ρῶ]μεν  
 γὰρ τὴν ἀσυνή[θειαν] αὐ-  
 τῆς <σ>φάλλειν τοὺς φρο[ν]ι- 30  
 μους καὶ ἐπεικεῖς ἐμ  
 πράγμασιν εἰς ὄχλ[ου]ς βα-  
 δίζουσι καὶ ἐλέ[γ]χ[ου]ς  
 καὶ συκοφάντας καὶ ὄρ-  
 κο[υ]ς] καὶ μαρτυρίας

<sup>13</sup> This concentration on the use of terms recalls Metrodorus' attacks on opponents who are probably to be identified as Megarians recorded in Epicurus' *De nat.* 28 fr. 13 col. IV inf. 1.2 and 1.11 and Epicurus' own *De ambiguitate* (ibid. fr. 13 col. V inf.); see Gigante (1981), 94-95.

ψε[υδ]εῖς. ἀπολέ[σ]αι [γ]ὰρ  
 κρεῖττον ἀργύριον πο-  
 λὺ καὶ χωρίο[ν] δικαστήν<sup>14</sup> 5  
 χλευάσαντα [κ]αὶ τοὺς  
 κ[υ]ριωτάτους] καὶ με-  
 γί[στο]υς φόβους [τῆι] τῆς  
 ψυχῆς ἔξει [φυγόν]τα τε-  
 λέως, ἢ τούτους ἔχον- 10  
 τα νικᾶν τὰς συμπάσας  
 δίκ[ας]

*PHerc.* 1674 coll. XLVI.28-XLVII.12 (Longo, 139, 141)

For let us pass over the fact that rhetoric tends not to trip up intelligent and reasonable men in affairs which involve crowds, cross-examinations, informers, oaths, and false testimonies. For it is better to lose a lot of money, or a piece of land, [scorning] a juror while avoiding totally with the faculty of the soul the most important and greatest fears, than to have these fears and win all court cases . . .

Hermarchus' main point is clear. How can an art like rhetoric be deemed "useful" to its practitioner when it is the source of so much worry and preoccupation? Financial loss is preferable to loss of equanimity. But the passage is not without difficulty. The verb παραχω[ρῶ]με[ν] (col. XLVI.28) might suggest that Hermarchus is making a concession, and this, I suppose, is why Longo translated the verb "concediamo". But the object of the concession, τὴν ἀσυνή[θειαν] αὐ[τῆ]ς, is difficult. Longo assumes that αὐ[τῆ]ς refers to rhetoric, and that would be the most natural interpretation. But what then are we to make of ἀσυνήθεια?<sup>15</sup> It would appear that Hermarchus' opponent had, or could have, argued that rhetoric does not normally work on intelligent people. It is to avoid this difficulty that Longo translates the word "arroganza", but ἀσυνήθεια surely denotes that which does not normally happen. My own examination of the papyrus vindicated Sudhaus' conjecture <σ>φάλλειν,<sup>16</sup> Hermarchus would be stating that rhetoric does not normally fool intelligent and reasonable

<sup>14</sup> Using Longo's (1988) version of this text, p.75.

<sup>15</sup> Longo (1988), 155 notes that this is apparently the only incidence of the word in the Herculaneum texts.

<sup>16</sup> Accepted by Longo. The letters ΦΑΛΛΕΙΝ are very clear, though *N*'s ΨΑΛΛΕΙΝ is understandable since the upper hemisphere of the Φ is extremely faint and only clear under higher magnification. Enhanced magnification yielded two sigmas in front of the phi, i.e. ΣΣΦΑΛΛΕΙΝ although the first two letters of the line TH were less easy to discern. The scribe was thus not guilty of haplography. The apographs seem to provide testimony for σφάλλειν, since *O* has ΤΙΣΣΦΑΛΛΕΙΝ and *n* ΤΚΣΦΑΛΛΕΙΝ (the left half of the kappa resembles the left half of an eta and the right half of the kappa resembles a sigma).

men (τοὺς φρίομιμους καὶ ἐπεικεῖς). It remains unclear whether these men are followers of Epicurus or simply the more intellectually-gifted portion of any population. The particle γάρ (col. XLVII.3) indicates a continuation of the line of reasoning. The Epicurean is invulnerable to the onslaught of his opponent's rhetoric simply because he does not enter the rhetorical game in the first place. The worry of winning court cases outweighs the discomfort of losing money in a suit. If this interpretation of the flow of Hermarchus' argument is correct, we shall have to review the translation of παραχωρῶμεν (XLVI.28). It cannot be a concession to Alexinus' position (or an argument implied by such a position). It must rather be a point which has escaped Alexinus' attention, introduced now with the figure of *praeteritio*: an additional consideration but not as important as the main one, ἀπολέ[σ]αι [γ]ὰρ κρεῖττον ἀργύριον . . .

Hermarchus' comments are marred by a further lacuna, but at line 25 of column XLVII the text resumes:

π[ρα]γμάτ[α]ευ[γ]μα  
τὸ τῶν] ῥητόρων ἐπαι-  
νετεῖν, ἐν οἷς διδάσκου-  
σι συμβουλεύειν δημ[ο]-  
σίῳ[ς].

*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLVII.25-29 (Longo, 141)

. . . to praise the business of [the] rhetors in as much as they teach one how to deliberate in public.

The syntax of this sentence is not entirely clear because of the lacunae which precede and follow it, but it evidently marks a consideration of another aspect of rhetoric. The previous passage, discussed above, dealt with forensic rhetoric. Hermarchus apparently now considers whether and in what sense rhetoric could be conceived of as useful in a deliberative context.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Bearing in mind that τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν was the goal of deliberative rhetoric in Aristotle (*Rh.* 1.3 1358 b21-22), a view challenged in Cicero *De or.* 2.334 and Quintilian *Inst.* 3.8.1-3.

The beginning of the next column contains Hermarchus' assessment of this view:

ἄξι- ον ἐπιθαυμάζειν τοὺς ῥητορικῶς ὡς χρησί- μως πολιτευομένους οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ καινὸν ἔστηκεν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ. καὶ γὰρ μαγείρους καὶ καπήλους χρήσιμὸν τι πρᾶττειν ἡμῖν [ύ]πο- λαμβάνοιμεν ἂν, ἀλλὰ	5        10
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*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLVIII.1-10 (Longo, 143)

... worthy to admire the rhetoricians for being useful citizens, his argument does not constitute novelty in itself. For we could interpret cooks and shopkeepers as doing something useful for us, but ...

Once again, Hermarchus seems to be suggesting another way in which one might understand Alexinus' vague claims about the useful subjects treated by rhetors (περὶ χρησίμων [γε] πλείστων, XLV.12-13). In this case, rhetors might be viewed as making a useful contribution to the functioning of the *polis* (χρησίμως πολιτευομένους). This, Hermarchus observes, is hardly an innovation, and it could be argued that any number of demeaning occupations serve a similarly useful function.<sup>18</sup> By placing rhetoric in the company of these humble occupations, Hermarchus belittles, somewhat facetiously, its contribution, since no Greek philosopher would regard cooks and shopkeepers as contributing to the most useful things, and he would certainly not advise pupils to undertake any such profession for the sake of the utility it affords the state. For the same reason, no philosopher would advise a pupil to study rhetoric.

Unfortunately, the passage quoted above is followed by another lacuna, making interpretation of the nearest legible text difficult:

<sup>18</sup> Compare *PHerc.* 1674 XLI.13-27 and XLI.35-XLII.3 where Philodemus employs a similar strategy to argue that although Greeks call some humble activities "arts" it does not mean that they are fully deserving of the term.

Ι. .ΓΕ [κ]α[τ]ὰ τῆς τε-  
κ[τ]ο[ν]ικῆς κ[α]ὶ χ[α]λκευτι-  
κῆς ψεύδεται, τούτους  
κτησθ[α]ί πόρον μικρόν ἀλ-  
λ' ἀναλαβεῖν αὐτό<ν> ραι-  
δίως τι.

*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLVIII.18-23 (Longo, 143)

... it is a false argument in the case of the art of building and bronze-working, (to say) that these [obtain] little revenue but acquire it quite easily.

I take the subject of [ψεύδεται] to be not Alexinus but a *logos* or argument which he either used or might have used. Hermarchus finds it invalid. Presumably the relevance of building and bronze-working here is to be found in some sort of comparison with rhetoric. Some clarification is offered by the next lines. The words καὶ γὰρ which immediately follow suggest that Hermarchus is now illustrating his point with an example (as he had in line 7 of the same column):

καὶ γὰρ ἄγροικος ἄνθρωπος καὶ γραμμα- τῶν ὄλως ἀνεπιστή- μων οὐ ρητορικῆς μό- νον ἐμπειρίας ἔξω κα- θεστηκώς, ἱκανὸς ἐξευ- ρεῖν τὰ δήμοις συμφέ- ροντα καὶ διερμηνεῖσ- θαι [σαφ]ῶς.	25
	30

*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLVIII.23-31

For even an uneducated man who is completely [unacquainted] with writing, let alone devoid of rhetorical experience, is able to find out what is advantageous for the people and to express it clearly.

Longo's supplements are fairly secure since the notion expressed here is found elsewhere in Philodemus.<sup>19</sup> Rhetoric differs from arts such as building or bronze-working in that it is

<sup>19</sup> Longo (1988), 155, *PHerc.* 1573 fr. VIII.1 ff. Sudh. II, 71. Longo (1988), 157 regards a short passage from *PHerc.* 1672 col. XXXV.20-25 (= Hermarchus fr. 37) as confirmation that the sentiments are those of Hermarchus. The notion is something of a *topos* in attacks on rhetoric and its claims to technical status. Cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2.16 who cites the example of Demades, once a boatman, who became a fine orator without rhetorical training, although Sextus does not go so far as to claim that he was illiterate too. The case of Demades is cited by Philodemus himself in fragments from *On Rhetoric*

possible for someone without even the preliminary foundations of formal education (and of course most rhetoricians would have regarded γραμματική as a prerequisite for rhetorical studies) to enjoy success in it: to find the subject matter (ἐξευρεῖν τὰ δῆμοις συμφέροντα) and communicate it clearly (διερμηνεῖσθαι σαφῶς).<sup>20</sup> In one breath, Hermarchus has exploded the rhetors' claims that to speak effectively one must be taught *inventio* and the virtues of style. No one could walk off the street and enjoy the same success in building or bronze-working. Hermarchus' remarks raise some interesting possibilities but we can only conjecture as to their import. How are we to understand the phrase ἐξευρεῖν τὰ δῆμοις συμφέροντα? Presumably the ἄγροικος can discover τὰ δῆμοις συμφέροντα by observation and by canvassing the opinions of the majority. This need not imply that τὰ δῆμοις συμφέροντα are particularly elevated or arcane, and it certainly does not imply that their identification requires scientific expertise. The use of τὰ συμφέροντα in place of its virtual synonym τὰ χρήσιμα is probably deliberate, since the term is frequently associated with the goal of rhetoric, at least in political contexts. Even if this is not the case here, Hermarchus need hardly be viewed as committed to agreeing that the things thus discovered really are to the people's advantage. It will be sufficient if the people believe that they are.

Hermarchus then moves on to criticise another implication of Alexinus' reasoning:<sup>21</sup>

τὸ δὲ δὴ μὴ  
κατ' ἐπιστήμην περὶ-  
νεσθαί τινος τῶν ρητο-  
ρικῶν λόγων [ἀλλ' ἐμπει-  
ρία καὶ στοχασμῶι [πῶ]ς]

---

preserved in *PHerc.* 409 fr. VIII.3 (Sudh. II, 97) and possibly 425 fr. VIII.11 (Sudh. II, 103) as well as in *PHerc.* 1506 col. V.10-13 (Sudh. II, 37); see Longo Auricchio (1984), 462-463 and nn. 68-71. Champions of rhetoric, on the other hand, argued that rhetoric must have predated writing, since the very establishment of civic communities presupposes a "science" of speaking; cf. Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 1.3 *ac mihi quidem hoc nec tacita videtur nec inops dicendi sapientia perficere potuisse . . .* etc.

<sup>20</sup> Sext. *Emp. Math.* 2.57-58 declares that the efforts of the rhetoricians actually impede clear and concise speech, ἐκκλείονται τῆς σαφούς ἅμα καὶ συντόμου τῶν πραγμάτων ἐρμηνείας; on τὸ συμφέρον as the goal of rhetoric, see *ibid.* 79 and 85.

<sup>21</sup> A *paragraphos* beneath line 31 of column XLVIII seems to mark that this is a new point.

δεῖ πάλιν λαβεῖν; οἷ] γὰρ  
 αὐτό γε τοῦτο δῆ[πο]υ [ν]ο-  
 εῖν δεῖ, σημαίνεσθαι κα- 5  
 τὰ τὴν λέξιν ταύτην  
 τὸ μὴ συλλογισμοὺς δι-  
 αλεκτικούς ἔχειν αὐ-  
 τούς.

*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLVIII.31-XLIX.9 (Longo, 143, 145)

And moreover, [how] should one interpret the fact that some rhetorical speeches are accomplished not in accordance with [science] but with experience and conjecture? For, naturally, one should not think that by this expression is meant that the speeches do not contain dialectical syllogisms.

Hermarchus has thus moved beyond questions of subject matter to consideration of Alexinus' views on the very nature of the rhetors' discourse. Hermarchus is trying to understand what Alexinus means by μὴ κατ' ἐπιστήμην . . . ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαι<sup>22</sup> καὶ στοχασμῶι and surmises that he cannot mean those speeches which do not contain συλλογισμοὺς διαλεκτικούς, that is conclusions which follow strict logical rules.<sup>23</sup> Hermarchus' interpretation is reached by an ironic attempt to preserve some measure of coherence for Alexinus' statements:

οὐ γὰρ τινες τοῦτο  
 πεπόνθασιν ἀλλ' ἄπαν- 10  
 τες, χωρὶς τοῦ μῆδ' αὐ-  
 τῶι συναρέσκειν τοῦτο  
 λῖαν. [Εὐ]βουλίδι γοῦν  
 ἐγκα[λεῖ] που καταφρο-  
 νοῦν[τι] τῶν μὴ συλλο- 15  
 γισμοὺς ἐχόντων λόγων  
 μανθά[ν]ειν γὰρ (τούτων)  
 καὶ ἄνευ τοῦτων ἡμᾶς  
 τὰ πράγματα [φησ]ιν.

*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLIX.9-19 (Longo, 145)

for this (sc. the absence of dialectical syllogisms) is the case not only with *some*, but with *all* speeches, despite the fact that (Alexinus) is not too willing to concede this. In any case, (Alexinus) accuses Eubulides on one occasion of dismissing speeches which don't contain syllogisms; for he says that we understand the facts without these.

<sup>22</sup> As Longo Auricchio points out (1988), 156, either Hermarchus or Philodemus replaced Alexinus' εἰκοτολογία with the more familiar ἐμπειρία. She also suggests another possibility: that ἐμπειρία, recovered from *PHerc.* 1672 since there is a lacuna in *PHerc.* 1674, represents the later draft.

<sup>23</sup> See Döring (1972), 119 n. 1.

If Longo's supplement  $\tau\iota\nu\alpha\kappa\varsigma$  in col. XLVIII.33 is right, Hermarchus has possibly misrepresented Alexinus' assertion.<sup>24</sup> Yet this is the very word upon which Hermarchus pounces in his efforts to correct an erroneous assertion. All rhetorical speeches lack the sort of rigorous logic expected of philosophical discourse by the Megarians. Hermarchus insinuates that Alexinus is guilty of some dishonesty or at least a certain reluctance to face the facts. Hermarchus reminds us that Alexinus disagreed with Eubulides<sup>25</sup> on the role of syllogisms in speeches: they are not necessary for understanding things or facts. The term  $\tau\acute{\alpha}$   $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$  would be an appropriate concern for a great deal of practical rhetoric - deliberative and especially forensic.<sup>26</sup> Alexinus, then, would be closer to Aristotle in observing that different types of discourse require different degrees of argumentative and logical rigour. If Alexinus asserted elsewhere that syllogisms were not necessary in rhetorical speeches then, reasons Hermarchus, it would be nonsensical that he demand them in rhetorical speeches here. But, as I observed above, for Alexinus to be liable to a charge of inconsistency he will have had to have claimed that only *some* speeches are executed without  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$ .

Philodemus admits at the end of this section that he realises that the citations really pertain to a somewhat different debate:

πα-  
 ρεθέμεθα δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐ- 20  
 [πῆ πασι λέξεις, εἴ τωι  
 γενήσετ' α[ι] φίλον καὶ ταύ-  
 τας ἔχειν, οὐκ ἀγνοοῦν-

<sup>24</sup> There is no trace of this formulation in the preserved quotation of Alexinus; guided by Hermarchus' reprise, von Arnim offered a different text from Sudhaus for col. XLV.19-20,  $\tau\iota\nu\epsilon\varsigma$  /  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ . Sudhaus later printed  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$   $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ . Longo, who examined the papyrus, vindicated Sudhaus' original text,  $\tau\acute{\alpha}$   $\pi\alpha/\rho[\acute{\alpha}]$   $\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon[\tau\acute{\omega}]\nu$ . Von Arnim's text is the more attractive but seems ruled out by the presence of rho at the beginning of line 20. It is just conceivable, though unlikely, that some suggestion of Hermarchus'  $\tau\iota\nu\epsilon\varsigma$  has been lost in the lacuna of lines 22-23.

<sup>25</sup> The word  $\pi\omicron\upsilon$  col. XLIX.14 implies that Alexinus criticised Eubulides in a different work. Döring notes (1972), 120 that Alexinus is therefore less strict than the older Megarians (as well as Diodorus and Philon) in this regard.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2.65 for view that rhetoric is superfluous in situations where the facts are self-evident ( $\tau\acute{\omicron}$   $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\rho\gamma\acute{\omega}\varsigma$   $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$ ).

τες, ὅτι περί τινος ἄλ-  
λου δόξουσι καὶ οὐχι πε-  
ρὶ τοῦ προκειμένου κα-  
ταγεγράφθαι.

25

*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLIX.19-27 (Longo, 145)

We have presented the citations in their entirety in case it suits someone to have them, but we are well aware that they will appear to have been written down concerning another subject and not the present issue.

One is tempted to ask why Philodemus used this passage of Hermarchus as evidence at all. That he does might suggest that he was simply working mechanically through a list of citations drawn up by Zeno where rhetoric is mentioned by the Founders and consequently felt the need to interpret everything he had in front of him, no matter how intractable and marginal the material for his argument.<sup>27</sup> Even if this were the case, it would at least indicate that Philodemus was not simply repeating Zeno's exegesis, but rather offering his own. Zeno might then have excerpted the passages but not always (if ever) have provided them with commentary, and Philodemus is filling in the gaps. Thus we might have some evidence that Philodemus was engaged in independent and creative thought, and was not only repeating lecture notes as some have charged.<sup>28</sup>

But I think there are good reasons for his decision to use them anyway. First, the very things about rhetoric which Alexinus despises are precisely those which Philodemus values most highly and attributes to Epicurus' understanding of rhetoric as an art. Philodemus has only suggested this point: his citations from Epicurus' *De rhetorica* made no explicit mention of

<sup>27</sup> See Mejer (1978), 18 on the fact that excerpts are, by definition, out of context and often used for a different purpose from the original.

<sup>28</sup> Sedley (1989a), 104 is a strong proponent of the view that many of Philodemus' works were derivative, but even Gigante, a more sympathetic scholar, believes that Philodemus followed Zeno very closely (1998), 86.

Philodemus' assertion seems to emerge from within the wide-ranging polemic in which Metrodorus was engaged. The adverb τάχα (line 3) is particularly hard to define: it could denote an air of uncertainty, exposing Philodemus to a charge of special pleading, or it could simply be an ironical touch.

Before proceeding to quote directly from Metrodorus' treatise, Philodemus paraphrases the context where Metrodorus evidently thought it necessary to turn to rhetoric for illustration of some point:

[καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους  
 εἰπεῖν] μέν] ἐν πλήθει  
 περὶ τῶν πλήθει χρησί-  
 μα[ν] [ἰ]κανῶς, τὴν δὲ  
 Θρα[σ]υ[μ]ά[χ]ου [τ]έ[χ]νην ἢ  
 ἄλλου] ὁποδῆπο[τ] αὐτῶν  
 οὐ μ[α]θόντας οὐδ' ὀ[λ]λας, ἐ-  
 πισ[τ]άτας [δὲ] ὄντας κα-  
 τα[νοεῖν] ἂν ἐκάστο-  
 τ' ἢν [το]ύς το[ι]ο[ύ]τους ἀ[ν]θρώ-  
 πους, τοῦνα[ν]τίον [δὲ] [κα-  
 [τ]α[ν] [οεῖ] παρ[α]δ[εικ]νύων  
 [Θ]ρα[σ]ύ[μα]χ[ο]ν καὶ ἄλλους  
 [ο]λίγους] τῶν δοκ[ο]ύ[ν]-  
 [τ]ων τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχει[ν]  
 λόγων πολιτικῶν ἢ ῥη-  
 τορικῶν τέχνας οὐθ[ι]έν],  
 ὧν φ[α]σιν ἔχειν τὰς τέ-  
 χνας συντ[ε]λοῦντας.

*PHerc.* 1674 col. L.11-29 (Longo, 147)

... and other [such] men who speak competently among the people on subjects which are useful to the people, but have not learned Thrasymachus' art, or anyone else's for that matter, at all, but by simply being observers (of what men in politics do) it would be possible for them to understand how such men (work) on every occasion. But he thinks [the opposite] by demonstrating that Thrasymachus and a considerable number of those others who think they possess such arts of political and rhetorical speeches, actually achieve none of the things they claim their arts possess.

Despite the lacuna which precedes this passage I assume that Philodemus is paraphrasing Metrodorus. The description of people who have not studied in the schools but are still competent orators and the rejection of rhetoric's claims to expertise in political participation

are familiar from earlier sections of Philodemus' treatise and apparently uncontroversial. In stating that the arts of the rhetoricians do not achieve what they are advertised as being able to achieve Metrodorus would seem to be unequivocally denying that rhetoric can persuade. The next section proceeds to describe what the rhetorical schools *do* in fact achieve:

[τοῦ]-  
 τ' ἔμπειρον τίθεται, ὡς 30  
 ἄλλου μὲν [τὸ] λόγον ἔχειν  
 καὶ ἄ[τ]τα πῶς ἂν καὶ  
 [ἐκ τίν]κων γ[έ]νοιτο καλλί-  
 σ[τη] ρητορ[ε]ία, ἄλλου δε 'τὸ καλῶς'  
 [ρῆ] [τορ]εῦ[ει]ν. καὶ [μ] [κρ]ὸν  
 προβά[ς], ὡς μαρτυρεῖ τὸ  
 μηδέ[να] πῶποτε γενέ[σ]-  
 θαι ποητὴν ἐν τοσοῦ[τοις]  
 ἢ ρήτορα ἰκανὸν ἀπὸ γε 5  
 τῶν τεχνολογίῳν

*PHerc.* 1674 Coll. L.29-LI.6 (Longo, 147, 149)

This evidence is presented, in that it is one thing to possess method and the means by which and from which fine speech occurs, and another to be a fine orator. And going on a little further, he explains that the fact that no one ever became a great poet or a competent orator just from technical manuals bears witness (that) . . .

Once again, a lacuna impedes reconstruction of the entire argument, but enough survives to show that Metrodorus<sup>30</sup> sought to distinguish between a 'science' or 'art' of speaking where the discourse becomes καλλίστη if certain procedures are followed, and the actual practice of speaking well in public. This involves more than a discrepancy between theory and practice. Speaking in the schools and speaking in public are in fact two different things. The two forms of discourse are described with similar terminology but are at the same time subtly distinguished. The term καλλίστη ρητορεία (col. L lines 33-34) must be deliberate. The word ρητορεία is only found in one other place in Philodemus' *On Rhetoric*<sup>31</sup> and is used by

<sup>30</sup> I assume again, of course, that Philodemus is continuing to paraphrase and has not inserted an inferential comment of his own at this point. The lack of connectives or particles at the beginning of this sentence suggest that the paraphrase continues.

<sup>31</sup> *PHerc.* 1506 col. XXXII.18 Sudh. II, 231.

Isocrates and Aristotle in the sense of 'set speech';<sup>32</sup> in her commentary on this passage, Longo Auricchio is probably right to suspect a hint of irony in its application here.<sup>33</sup> The artificial and aesthetically charged nature of this phrase contrasts quite starkly with the more prosaic τὸ καλῶς ῥητορεύειν (Coll. L.34-LI.1), where the practical flavour of the task is enhanced by adverb and -εύω verb. The schools may have rules which render a speech aesthetically beautiful but they will not simultaneously make the speech effective in public. The rhetors have failed to see that the two environments demand very different forms of discourse: on the technical side, the discourse is viewed as artefact, without regard for author or performance context; on the practical side, the orator himself and the specific context of his performance must play an important role.

The passage quoted also indicates that Metrodorus referred to rhetoric in order to illustrate a point he wished to make on poetry, and this would appear to have been on the subject of the usefulness of technical manuals for the poet. Such precepts are incapable of producing great poets just as they cannot produce competent orators.

καὶ μετὰ μι-	15
κρόν· "[ὁ προτεθειμένος	
λέγειν [έν] ὄχλοι καὶ ποι-	
τῆς εἶναι θηρεύει ἀ-	
πὸ τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων,	20
τὸ ἐφεξῆς τοῦ ἀκολου-	
θου τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἐπαγ-	
γέλμασιν, ὃν δυνάμειος	
οἶαν εἰκόν' ἀποβλέπει	
καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ ἔργον [συ]-	25
τελεῶν τῆς τούτου] τέ-	
χνῆς φαίνεται, μήπου τι	
αὐτὸν διαφεύγει δι' ὧν	
ἂν βελτίων γίνοιτο ῥη-	
τωρ ἢ ποιητής."	

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LI.15-29 (Longo, 149 and (1985), 33)

<sup>32</sup> Cf. references to Isoc. and Arist. in LSJ s.v. In Isoc. *C. soph.* 21 it signifies "skill in oratory", cf. Pendrick (1998), 12.

<sup>33</sup> Longo (1985), 43.

And a little [later], "He who has decided to speak [in] public or be a poet, starts with the precepts and then, after that which coheres with such precepts, goes in search of someone whom he regards as a kind of model and is then seen to himself to achieve the man's art so that he does not miss out on any means by which he might become a better orator or poet."

Philodemus, or his source, has managed to select passages which emphasise the difference between the aesthetically-pleasing rhetoric which is taught by precept in the schools and the thoroughly practical rhetoric which is required and practised in the 'real' world. Whether Metrodorus intended the inference which is drawn or not, Philodemus quotes him in support of the view that

- 1) school (i.e. sophistic) rhetoric and civic rhetoric are two very different things with very different purposes and are not to be confused;
- 2) sophistic rhetoric can be taught and reduced to artistic precept;
- 3) civic rhetoric is a matter of experience, imitation, and practice.

We are, of course, constrained by what Philodemus (or Zeno) selects from Metrodorus' work, but even if we are to judge from his own excerpts, his interpretation of the Founder's remarks appears a little laboured. A cynic might say that Philodemus has manipulated the evidence to prove more than it justifies. Point (3) is undoubtedly a legitimate inference and surely a view shared by Metrodorus and other early Epicureans. It is also supported by quotations Philodemus will make later on. But points (1) and (2) are less uncontroversial. Certainly, Metrodorus argues that what goes on in schools has little to do with being an effective orator in public, but does he also identify school rhetoric as something positive or valuable in its own right,<sup>34</sup> especially since he gives no hint that the schoolmasters themselves recognise the

<sup>34</sup> A great deal depends on the what tone to give the phrase *καλλίστη ῥητορεία*, which is fine if taken literally but may also conceal a sneer.

independent value of what they do or appreciate that their teachings are irrelevant to civic participation? How seriously are we to take Metrodorus' observation that if certain procedures are followed καλλίστη ῥητορεία is produced? At face value, it appears that Metrodorus accepts that school rhetoric does proceed systematically to produce a determinable result — though not, I repeat, all the results claimed, for example, persuasion in court and assembly. But if we examine how rhetoric is used in this context as an illustration of the inadequacy of technical manuals for poets it would appear that the 'scientific' aspect of school rhetoric is of negligible importance to Metrodorus' argument. His point must be, surely, that if each relies simply on technical manuals, the school orator will fail to make the grade in the real world, just as the poet will fail to achieve greatness.

Philodemus concludes his examination of Metrodorus' texts with the following statement:

ἄ μὲν [οὖν	
ἔχομεν ἐκ τῆς πραγμ[α-	30
τείας παραθέσθαι το[ια]υ-	
τ' ἐστὶν ἐκπεφευγότα	
καὶ τὴν καταχρηστικὴν	
ὑπάκουσιν καὶ τῆν] ὡς	
περὶ τῶν σοφιστικῶ[ν]	
παραγγελμάτων ὄντος	
τοῦ λό[γο]υ], αἱ δὲ τέχναι	
καὶ αὐτὰ ἢ ὁ μ[ικρ]όνυμωσ λέ-	
γονται, καθάπερ εἴσεται	5
πᾶς ὁ μετὰ συνέσεως καὶ	
τούτοις μὲν, οἷς παρεθέ-	
μεθα, προσεσχηκῶς, μᾶλ-	
λον] δ' ὁ τὰς συνόλας γραφὰς	
τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀνειληφῶς.	10

*PHerc.* 1674 coll. LI.29-LII.10 (Longo, 149, 151)

So, what we are able to present from (Metrodorus') treatise are the sort of things which elude both misinterpretation and the assumption that the argument is concerned with the precepts of sophistic rhetoric, arts, of course, which themselves are called by the same name, just as everyone who has paid intelligent attention to what we have quoted will realise, and even more so the man who has grasped the complete writings of the Founders of the School.

Philodemus' remarks constitute a helpful guide to the requirements for reading the texts of the Founders. The biggest problem for a correct reading of the text is καταχρηστικὴ

ὑπάκουσις. The term suggests a sort of 'mishearing' or 'misreading', a misinterpretation based on a careless misunderstanding or deliberate misconstruing of certain key words in the text.<sup>35</sup> In this case, Philodemus identifies the source quite explicitly: it involves the inclusion of sophistic rhetoric within Metrodorus' dismissal of civic rhetoric, when, Philodemus believes, it is not the target. The imaginary culprit has failed to observe the distinction because the arts of sophistic, forensic, and political rhetoric are commonly designated by the same word, ῥητορικὴ. Reading the texts of the Founders correctly requires concentration and intelligence, but the reader will also derive benefit from a complete assimilation of the entire corpus. The breadth of one's reading provides a guide to interpretation of individual passages and enables one to avoid misinterpretations which might arise if one lacks comprehension of the main doctrines.

This last comment effects a bridge to Philodemus' next task, the refutation of other contemporary Epicureans who deny that the Founders believed that any part of rhetoric is an art. Philodemus begins with a careful account of the emergence of the dispute.

ἔνιλοι δὲ τῶν νῦν ἐν τῇ  
 [Ρ]όδωι διατριβόντων γρά-  
 φουσιν ἐν [τῇ Κῶ]ι πάλιν  
 καὶ ἐν [τῇ Ῥόδωι] σχολα-  
 σάντων αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ 15  
 μὴ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν  
 τέχνην, ἐν ἑκατέραι τῶν  
 πόλεων ἀρτ'εἰως τινὰς  
 ἤκοντας Ἀθηναίους λέ-  
 γειν, ὡς διαφώνως ἴσταν- 20  
 ταί] πρὸς τοὺς ἀνδρας, δι-  
 δοκουμένα[υς τὸ] [δέ]-  
 χνην αὐτ[ο]ῖ[ν] ἢ [μ] ἐνυπάρχειν.

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LII.11-23 (Longo, 151 and Blank)

Now some of those who presently live in Rhodes write that while on [Cos] and again on [Rhodes] people lectured on the subject that rhetoric is not an art, in each of the cities certain people who have

<sup>35</sup> Capasso (1981), 392 n. 81 is surely right to think that the καταχρηστικὴ ὑπάκουσις condemns the opponent's misinterpretation of the whole of Metrodorus' work, but I suggest that the misinterpretation of the whole derives from an error in construing key terms like ῥητορικὴ.

recently come from Athens say that they are in conflict with the founders of the School who taught that it is an art.

The Epicurean communities at Cos and Rhodes were confronted by the news that their attitude towards rhetoric conflicted with the orthodoxy which emanated from Athens. It would be interesting to know Philodemus' source for this information and the date of the event. His wording suggests that he is relying on a written source, emanating apparently from the Epicurean community on Rhodes. The "authors" are first designated by the plural (ἔνιοι . . . γράφουσιν col. LII.11-13) but later there emerges a single (unnamed) author of a treatise (τὰ νθρώπων] col. LIII.14, ποικίλως αὐτὸς ἀναστρεφόμενος [ἐν τῇ πραγματείαι φησί col. LIII.15-17). The fact that Philodemus seems to have quite detailed knowledge of the contents of this treatise indicates either that it constitutes the source for his awareness of the disagreement or that he has a full synopsis of it in a letter from the Rhodian community.

From what Philodemus reports it would appear that the Rhodian's aim was to demonstrate that all rhetoric was to be rejected as an art on the basis of the writings of the Founders. In effect, the Rhodian was offering a reading of Epicurean works counter to that of Zeno. The phrase ποικίλως . . . ἀναστρεφόμενος (col. LII.15-16) implies a work of some subtlety and complexity, interpreted here as sophistry. The Rhodian claimed that his arguments were based on a substantial survey of various Epicurean works (τούτων [ἐπαγγέλλεται ποιήσασθαι τὴν / συναγωγὴν col. LIII.23-25). Philodemus proclaims that both he and other Epicureans will meet the challenge more fully at a future date, but that for the present treatment he will be satisfied with the refutation of the main points in the Rhodian's thesis. Unhappily, the points which were listed from coll. LIV.10 to LVI.9 are interrupted by damage to the papyrus in the lower half of column LV and the first lines of column LVI, but we can recover some of his principal assertions:

## 1) The early Epicureans declared that all forms of rhetoric are non-technical

ἐκτιθεὶς	10
τοίνυν, δι' ὧν ὁ λόγος αὐ-	
τῶι προελεύσεται κε-	
φαλαίων, ὁ τὸ π[ρ]οκε[ί]με-	
νον [ἀπ]οδεικνύων δο-	
κεῖν αὐτῶι] -- φησιν -- τοῦς	15
περὶ τὸν Ἐπί[κου]ρον]	
καὶ [Μητρ[όδωρον] μήτε	
τὸ πολιτικὸν μήτε τὸ	
δικανικὸν μήτε τὸ πα-	
νηγυρικὸν μέρος τῆς	20
ῥητορικῆς ἐντε[χ]νον	
ἀπολείπειν	

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LIV.10-22 (Longo, 155)

So then, setting out the headings by which his argument will proceed, it proves (he says) his opinion that Epicurus and Metrodorus and their followers do not allow either the political or the judicial or the panegyric branch of rhetoric to be technical

According to the Rhodian's reading of the works of the Founders, not one of the branches of rhetoric qualifies as an art. Philodemus agrees that political and forensic rhetoric are not arts but believes that the Founders assert explicitly that epideictic rhetoric *is* an art.

## 2) Political and forensic rhetoric are skills which require practice

τὸ	
μὲν [πολι]τικ[ὸν] καὶ δι-	
κανικὸν μελέτης καὶ	
τρίβης φάσκειν προσδεῖσ-	25
θαι καὶ τινος ἐμπειρι[κοι]-	
κῆς ἱστορίας	

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LIV.22-27 (Longo, 155)

(sc. the Founders) state that the political and judicial branches require exercise and practice and a certain empirical research

According to the Rhodian the Founders asserted that political and forensic rhetoric are skills which are based on observation and practice in action. They are, therefore, not even conjectural arts.

3) Epideictic rhetoric is also a skill which requires practice but it does not require observation, rather familiarity with a certain way of expressing things

τὸ δὲ πα-  
νηγυρικὸν ἐμ μελέ-  
τη καὶ τριβῇ λέγειν κείσ-  
θαι καὶ συνῆθειαι τινός] 30  
φράσεως χωρὶς πραγμα-  
τικῆς ἱστορίας.

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LIV.27-32 (Longo, 155)

and (the Founders say that) the panegyric branch lies in practice and familiarity with a certain type of expression without need of practical research.

It is quite clear that the Rhodian was at pains to show that epideictic rhetoric was to be included within the view of rhetoric in general. He explicitly distinguishes epideictic from the other two branches and in so doing notes that it is a somewhat different species. But although it is distinguished by the fact that it does not rely on observation for its success it is nonetheless a skill not a science. Instead of conceding that epideictic rhetoric has a scientific basis, the Rhodian allows it something less rigorous: an easy familiarity - probably acquired through constant practice and exercise within the rhetor's classroom - with a certain way of speaking. To a certain extent, the Rhodian is aware that this "type of expression" is conventional or at least an appropriate register for the discursive form of epideictic.

4) the Founders deny the existence of an art of persuading crowds altogether

κατὰ τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐ δύ-  
νασθαι συστήναι τέχνην  
κἢ ἀπαξ ὄχλων] πεισ-  
τικήν

*PHerc.* 1674 coll. LIV.34-LV.2 (Longo, 155, 157)

according to the Founders of the School an art which persuades crowds simply cannot exist

Once again, there is nothing particularly controversial about this proposition as far as Philodemus is concerned. In his review of arguments in favour of rhetoric's technical status, Philodemus explicitly stated that the political branch of rhetoric was not an art and that the

Founders said that it was not.<sup>36</sup> He will, however, object to the suggestion that epideictic, or sophistic, rhetoric be necessarily rejected along with forensic and political.

5) Despite practice, practitioners of forensic and political rhetoric very often fail in their enterprises or are outdone by speakers without the same skill

ἀρέσκειν δὲ καὶ  
 [τ]ῆν [προει]ρημέν[η]ν με-  
 [λ]έτ[η]ν καὶ τριβήν] καὶ ἐμ-  
 πειρίαν [μή]τε διὰ παν- 5  
 τὸς πείθειν] μήτε πλεο-  
 ναζ[όν]τως], καὶ διότι  
 τοῦ[ς] [οὐ ρ]ητορικ[οῦ]ς] λό-  
 γους] [συμβέβηκ]εν [έ]νιο- 10  
 τε πείθειν] μᾶλλον τῶν  
 ῥητορικῶν

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LV.2-11 (Longo, 157)

the aforementioned exercise, practice, and experience is not sufficient to persuade on every occasion nor in the majority of cases, and because it happens that speeches which are not rhetorical are sometimes more persuasive than rhetorical ones

6) Epideictic rhetoric is even less effective (?)

καὶ μετὰ  
 τούτων [έν] τοῖς θορύβοις  
 ἤ[ττο]ν οἱ [π]ανηγυρικοί

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LV.11-13 (Longo, 157)

and because among these, the panegyric speeches of the sophists (are) less [successful (?)] when delivered among crowds . . .

The lacunose condition of the column from this point onwards impedes interpretation. In fact line 12 is largely reconstructed from Sudhaus' supplements. However, the Rhodian appears to argue that epideictic rhetoric has even less success in the hurly-burly of real life.

7) The Founders were aware that there were such things as arts and therefore used the term "expert", but that does not imply that they also recognised rhetoric's ability to attain its goal (?)

οἰδ[έ] τοι

<sup>36</sup> τῆς πολιτικῆς οὔτε / οὔσης τέχνης, λεγομένης / τε πρὸς τῶν ἀνδρῶν [οὐκ εἴναι] *PHerc.* 1674 col. XXVI.29-32 (Longo, 99).

π[α]ρ[ά]γ[γ]ε[λ]μα, γινώσκειν  
 δ[ὲ] κ[α]τ[ι] τέχ[νας] τινὰς κα-  
 ταβ[ε]β[λ]ημένα[ς] τοὺς  
 π[ε]ρ[ι] τ[ὸ]ν Ἐπ[ί]κο[υ]ρο[ν] 20  
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο προσ[σ]ο[φ]ο[ύ]οι-  
 γορεύειν [αὐτοὺς] εἶναι  
 τεχν[ί]τας καὶ [ταύτας]  
 ΑΣΚΑΙΟΠ. ΞΣΔΕΙΞ οὐ  
 συνκατατίθεσθαι δ' ὄ- 25  
 τι [καὶ] τοῦ τέλους [τυγχά-  
 νοῦσι] κατὰ. . .

*PHerc. 1674 col. LV.16-27 (Longo, 157, and Blank)*

... not even indeed a precept, but that Epicurus and his followers recognised that certain arts too have been laid down and because of this they termed them experts and these [arts (?)] ...<sup>37</sup>... that they did not agree that they achieve the goal too ...

The text has been improved by Blank but remains difficult. It would appear that the Rhodian is trying to account for the Founders' terminology. He asserts that the Founders recognised that arts did exist and therefore used the term 'experts' (τεχνῖται) but it is unclear to whom they applied this title. It may be that the Rhodian is claiming that the Founders sometimes used the terms 'art' and 'expert' loosely when referring to rhetoric (or any other art for that matter) and its practitioners, but that they did not thereby mean that any of these arts actually achieved their goals.

8) Even if one were to concede for argument's sake that someone was able to persuade a mass audience, it would be the cause of bad things, not good

κἂν ἔχηι  
 τις καθ' ὑπόθεσιν δι-  
 ἅ παντὸς πειθο[ύ]σαν 5  
 τοὺς πολλοὺς δύναμιν  
 οὐκ ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ κα[κῶν]  
 μεγάλων αἰτίαν εἶναι  
 ταύτην.

*PHerc. 1674 col. LVI.3-9 (Longo, 159, and Blank)*

even if someone, for the sake of argument, has an ability to persuade the people on every occasion, this is a cause not of good things but great evils.

Philodemus would no doubt agree with the core of this argument, but since, in his view, it only affects the civic branches of rhetoric and not epideictic it is irrelevant to his defence of the latter.

Philodemus feels that he has already refuted the Rhodian's interpretation by means of the passages from the Founders' works which he cited earlier. But he is prepared to support the citations with argument to demonstrate that the Rhodian is wrong in thinking epideictic or sophistic rhetoric to be a branch of the larger science of rhetoric. For Philodemus, sophistic is a separate science in its own right:

[καὶ]  
 χεῖρα[ς] ὑπ[ε]δείκ[ν]υμεν]  
 ἑαυτῶν [καὶ] [δι]ότι τέχ[νην]  
 τὴν σοφισ[τικὴν] καλο[υ]- 5  
 μένην [ῥητορικὴν] [λέγο-  
 μεν οὐχὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆ[ς]  
 μ[έ]ρο[ς]. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν τῆς]  
 ῥητορικῆ[ς] μέρος τὸ πα-]  
 νηγυρικὸν κα[ὶ] [τὸ] πολι[τ]- 10  
 τικὸν καὶ [τὸ] δικαν[ικόν],  
 ὃν τρόπον [αὐτὸς οἶετ]αι  
 κατὰ τὴν [ἅπασαν γρα]-  
 φή[ν].

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LVIII.2-14 (Longo, 163)

And we show our own handiwork and the reason why we say so-called sophistic rhetoric is an art and not a branch of rhetoric. For the panegyric, the political, and the forensic are not branches of rhetoric in the way he himself supposes in his entire treatise

Although Philodemus agrees that Epicurus and the Founders did make some of the core assertions which the Rhodian claims,<sup>38</sup> he is strongly critical of the invalid inference drawn from them, i.e. that the Founders did not consider sophistic rhetoric an art. I shall focus here on the use he makes of the Founders' writings once again in order to refute his opponent.

<sup>38</sup>

These seem to be summarised in *PHerc.* 1672 col. IX.7-33 (Longo, 167, 169).

Philodemus takes issue with the Rhodian's interpretation of a passage from a treatise of Epicurus. Philodemus implies that the work, which was quite extensive (ἐπῶν [[λογον]] / σχεδὸν τρισχιλίων, "nearly three thousand lines"),<sup>39</sup> treated a variety of other topics,<sup>40</sup> all of which the opponent has deliberately ignored in order to select only that portion (perhaps an insignificant one) which suits his own agenda,<sup>41</sup>

καὶ τᾶλλα ΠΕΡΙΣΕΜΝΙ 5  
 Θ, εἰ διοκεῖται, παρέντες  
 κα[ῖ] πα[ρα]δεξάμενοι πάν-  
 τα τὸ [ὄλο]ν σχεδὸν βυβλίον  
 κατεσηκῶτα, τὸ δὲ μέρος 10  
 ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἠγησάμε-  
 νοι πρὸς αὐτούς, δι' οὗ φησι[[ν]]  
 ῥητῶ[ς] ἄτεχνα [[τα]] μέρη  
 τῆ[ς] [νᾶ] [λ] [έγ]εσθαι τῆς ῥη-  
 το[ρικῆς]

*PHerc.* 1672 col. X.5-14 (Longo, 171)

leaving out the other things . . . which are discussed in the work, and taking everything which occupied nearly the entire book as read, considering for ourselves only that part in which he says certain branches of rhetoric are said explicitly to be non-technical . . .

The text in question seems to have come from a work in dialogic form, and one of the interlocutors is named as Idomeneus (*PHerc.* 1672 col. X.28 Longo, 173). It is likely that it is taken from the *Symposium*.<sup>42</sup> Sedley, however, objects that it cannot be from that work for two reasons: (i) Philodemus has already stated that rhetoric was not discussed in the *Symposium* and (ii) several sources inform us that all the participants in the dialogue were Epicurean philosophers, which ἐκεῖνος ὁ νέος is evidently not.<sup>43</sup> As to the first objection,

<sup>39</sup> *PHerc.* 1672 col. X.18-19 (Longo, 171).

<sup>40</sup> If the work in question is the *Symposium*, as I shall argue below, these would include the heating properties of wine (Plut. *Adv. Col.* 6 1109e-1110a = fr. 58-60 Us.), indigestion, fevers, stuttering (Ath. 5.187a = fr. 57 Us.), and sex (Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 3.6.1 653b (= fr. 61 Us.).

<sup>41</sup> Ironically, Philodemus himself may have been vulnerable to the same charge in his use of Hermarchus' letter to Theopheides (*PHerc.* 1674 col. XLIX.19-27 [Longo, 145]) and Metrodorus' *De poem.* 1 (*PHerc.* 1674 coll. XLIX.33-L.4 [Longo, 145, 147]).

<sup>42</sup> So Sudhaus I, xxxiv and (1895), 85, Von Arnim (1893b), 8, Hubbell (1920), 281, and Arrighetti (1973) fr. [21.4] and comm. on p. 576.

<sup>43</sup> The description of the opponent in *PHerc.* 1672 col. X.23 (Longo, 171). Sedley (1989a), 114 n. 40, citing specifically Athen. 5.177b and 187b (= fr. 56 Us., p. 115), though Arrighetti (1973), 576 simply discounts Athenaeus' testimony in the light of the Philodemus passage. It may not be irrelevant to note

closer examination of the relevant text reveals that it does not really support Sedley's interpretation:

οὐκ ἐν τῷ  
 Συμποσίῳ λέγομεν οὐ-  
 δ' ἐν τοῖς Περὶ βίλων οὐ-  
 δὲ κελεύομεν αὐτὸν  
 ψῆφον ἐμπελάγει ζη- 25  
 τεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμέν  
 καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν δηλοῦσ-  
 θαι τὸ τὴν σοφιστικὴν  
 ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑ-  
 πάρχειν παρατεθείκα- 30  
 μεν

*PHerc.* 1674 col. LVII.21-31 (Longo, 161)

we say that it is not in the *Symposium* nor in the *On Ways of Life*, nor are we telling them to look for a needle in a haystack, but we have already cited where and on what grounds we say that the fact that sophistic rhetoric is an art is revealed

Philodemus is not saying that rhetoric is not treated in the *Symposium*, he is simply stating that one should not look to that work for a clear exposition of the doctrine that sophistic rhetoric is an art. In addition it could be argued that Philodemus thought that the *Symposium* did not treat rhetoric in any systematic way, even if at some point in the dialogue the question of what a 'sophist' is was raised (*PHerc.* 1672 col. X.21-27, see below). In any event, if certain remarks within that work did prove awkward for Philodemus it is not surprising that he attempted to play down its relevance to the issue. As to the second objection, I would suggest that since we cannot identify the youth positively there remains the possibility that he is portrayed as a prospective pupil or one who though initially sceptical about the value of Epicurus' philosophy was eventually won over at some stage in the discussion. As such, he might then have been considered an Epicurean to all intents and purposes. It might have been dramatically advantageous to include within the dialogue one interlocutor who was not initially as closely affiliated to the school as the others, to act as a catalyst to debate and

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that Athenaeus represents a hostile tradition where Epicurus' *Symposium* is compared unfavourably with those of other authors (including Plato) on a number of grounds, including the intellectual

exposition.<sup>44</sup> I shall therefore continue on the assumption that the texts discussed by Philodemus do come from the *Symposium*.

Although it is true that Philodemus has denied that the *Symposium* contains support for the view that the Founders' approved of sophistic rhetoric,<sup>45</sup> it was precisely this work which others had wrongly claimed as a key text in the debate<sup>46</sup> and we are entitled to assume that the Rhodian examined it only to find, in his own opinion, that he could employ a short passage from it to actually contradict the doctrine favoured by Zeno and Philodemus. Philodemus is thereby obliged to re-examine the passage in order to demonstrate that it does not in fact pose a serious threat to his own view of sophistic rhetoric's status.

The text is located and its subject summarised,

καὶ δὲ παρίστησιν  
 ἐλεγχομένον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος  
 τὸν νέον [ἐ]κ[εῖνον] [ἐκ μ]ε[λ]έτης ῥητο-  
 ρικῆ[ς] μ[ί]αν δύ[ναμ]ιν [ἐπ]αγ-  
 γε[λλόμε]νον τοῦ σοφισ[τ]ε[ύ]- 25  
 [εἶ]ν τὴν [π]ανηγυρικὴν καὶ  
 τὴν πολ[ε]μικὴν [ν] <καὶ> [π]οιεῖ τὸν  
 ἴδομε[ν]α μετὰ τὸ "πα<ρ>ρη-  
 σιάσ[θω]" μετὰ τῶν "ΕΓΧ . .  
 . . ]μενων" αἰτούμενον 30  
 συγγνώ[μ]ην, εἰ νέος ὢν θρα-  
 σύνε[ψ]α καὶ σ[υ]νάπτοντά τι-  
 να [λόγοις] τοιαῦτα κατὰ λέξιν  
 "θαυμαστὸν [δὴ, εἰ σὺ μὲν οὐ-  
 δὲν ἐξε[ί]ργου διὰ τὴν ἡλι-  
 κίαν, [ὡς] αὐ[τ]ὸς ἂν φήσαιο, 35  
 τῶν κατὰ σεαυτ[ὸ]ν ἀπάν-  
 των νέος ὢν π[ρ]ε[σ]βυτ[ῶ]ν  
 ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἐ[ν] δόξω  
 πολὺ ἐ[ν] τῇ ῥητορικῇ [ἢ] δυνά[μ]ει-

allegiance of the interlocutors.

44 Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 3.6.1 653 b (= fr. 61 Us.) informs us that young men were present (μειρακίων παρόντων) in Epicurus' *Symposium*.

45 *PHerc.* 1674 col. LVII.21-22 (Longo, 161).

46 As Philodemus informs us, *PHerc. coll.* LII.26-28 and LVI.21-24 (Longo, 151, 159).

μει ὑπερέχειν."

*PHerc.* 1672 coll. X.21-XI.1 (Longo, 171, 173, 175, and Angeli [1981], 63 =  
Idomeneus fr. 7)

And Epicurus depicts that young man, who is claiming that panegyric and political rhetoric are a single power of being a sophist derived from rhetorical exercise, in the process of being refuted. And after the words "let him speak his mind", he makes Idomeneus with the words "... " ask for forgiveness if the youngster is impertinent, because of his youth, and him add the following words: "It would be strange indeed if you were not hindered at all because of your youth, as you yourself would admit, from exceeding in rhetorical capacity all those men who, because you are young, are old as far as you are concerned and very reputable."

The passage quoted imitates the register and peculiarities of refined discussion, an aspect which further supports the view that this is drawn from the *Symposium*. The somewhat artificial politeness of the phrasing, and the efforts of the speaker to mediate, leads to hyperbaton. I suggest that Philodemus contextualises the relevant comment in this way not only to assist the reader in locating it within the work from which he is quoting but also to highlight the *dramatic* context in which it is uttered. By reminding the reader that the comment is made in order to excuse (or patronise) the youthful interlocutor, it will be more difficult to attach serious doctrinal importance to its contents, since it can now be seen as a sort of conversational mannerism which is generated by the specific personal dynamic of the dialogue. With this in mind, I take the words which immediately follow this passage,

ὡς δ' ἂν αὐτοῦ  
ἔφησας τ(αὐ)θ' ἤ ἵπερ ἠθέλησας  
"παρ'ρησιάζεσθ(ω)" καὶ [.] . ΟΝΗΣΙ . ΚΑΟΤΟ'

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XI.1-3a (Longo, 175)

just as you would have said when you meant "Let him speak openly" and ...

as expressing Philodemus' own interpretation of the meaning of this utterance: a long-winded extension of the idea contained in the imperative "Let him speak his mind".

In the next line, the speaker apparently repeats his first statement, but this time in a manner which provides Philodemus' opponent with more ammunition,<sup>47</sup>

"θαυμαστὸν δὴ φη-  
 μι, εἰ σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξείργου  
 διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐν τῇ ῥητο- 5  
 ρικῇ δυνάμει προέχειν, [ὁ  
 δοκεῖ τριβῆς εἶναι [κ]αὶ σϋνη-  
 θεία[ς] πολλῆς, τοῦ δ[ὲ] θεωρη-  
 σαι τὰ πράγμα'τα], ὡς ἔχ[ει], διὰ  
 [τῆ]ν ἡλικίαν ἔστιν [ἐ]ξείρ- 10  
 γεσθαι, οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν [δ]όξα[ι  
 εἶ]π[ι] [σ]τήμη αἰτία εἶ[ν]αι ἢ-  
 περ [τριβῆ καὶ συνήθεια".

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XI.3b-13 (Longo, 175)

"strange indeed, I say, if you were not hindered at all because of your age, from excelling in rhetorical capability [which] seems to be (the result) of practice and much familiarity, but it is possible to be prevented from seeing things as they are because of one's age, something for which science would rather appear to be responsible than practice and familiarity."

Once again, the interlocutor's pronouncements are immediately relevant to the young man in question. But in this instance an additional point is made. His ability to express himself adequately is questioned because he is too young to have gained the experience required to put forward his point in a polite and pertinent manner, and at the same time his grasp of knowledge (τοῦ δ[ὲ] θεωρήσαι τὰ πράγμα'τα], ὡς ἔχ[ει]) is also compromised by his youth and lack of science. Although the observations on what expression (rhetoric) and knowledge (science) require of their practitioners are made as part of an *ad hominem* strategy against the youth they do contain assumptions which might damage Philodemus' entire thesis, if they can be shown to represent the original Epicurean position on rhetoric. For on the surface they do indeed suggest that the interlocutor proceeds on the assumption that ῥητορικῇ is distinct from

<sup>47</sup>

There remains an alternative interpretation: that Philodemus is providing a more precise paraphrase of the meaning which underlies the speaker's vague utterance. The cramped and lacunose addition of the added line 3a makes the relation of this passage to the preceding one a little unclear, but given the fact that Philodemus proceeds to analyse the text of our passage in detail, it is much safer to assume that it too is a quotation from the original Epicurean text.

τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἔχει both on some ontological level and in terms of methodological status (practice for the former and knowledge or science for the latter).

Philodemus' opponents certainly interpreted the remarks in this way,<sup>48</sup>

δι-

ἀ ΤΕΤ[ . . . ]φασιν ΕΡ . [ ] φασιν  
τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀπ[λῶς] ἄ- 15  
πασαν ἄ[ν, οἷ]αν ἀποφαί[ν]ο[ν]-  
ται, τρι[βῆι] περιγίνεσθαι  
καὶ συνηθείαι καὶ οὐ[δὲ] ἐν  
μέρος ταύτη[ς] οὕτωι [ψ]ηλ[ῶ] [ς]  
τέχνηι καὶ σαφῶς Π. ]ΑΣΙ 20  
ΘΕ[. ]ΕΙΝ ἐγδιδάσκειν' προσ-  
διαστέλλ[ω]ν τὰ ποῖα τ' [ἔ]σ-  
ται ἐπι[στ]ήμηι καὶ τὰ ποῖα  
τ[ρ]ιβῆι καὶ συνηθείαι[ι]

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XI.13-24 (Longo, 175)

On account of . . . they say . . . they say that the whole of rhetoric, of the kind they demonstrate, would quite simply result from practice and familiarity, and that not even one branch of it (would result) at all from art, and clearly . . . to instruct thoroughly, distinguishing in addition what kind of things will be possible from science, and what kind of things from practice and familiarity . . .

For Philodemus' opponent, the argument of the Epicurean in the *Symposium* illustrates quite clearly that *all* rhetoric must be separated from art, and that no exception is justified in the case of epideictic or panegyric. Otherwise, the opponent continues, the Epicurean's argument in this passage would be pointless.

Philodemus' opening salvo is frustratingly difficult to reconstruct because of a number of lacunae. However, he seems to begin by studying the erroneous and valid paraphrases of what the text actually states:

<sup>48</sup>

Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1.3 1095a 2-6 for the notion that a young person is not a fit student of politics because he has no experience of life and conduct, and it is these which supply the premises and subject matter of this branch of philosophy.

(1)

[εἰ] τὸ  
 δυσκράτητον διὰ τὸ ἀμέ-  
 θοδον ἔστι γίνεσθαι περὶ  
 νέον, πολλῶν ἢ μάλλον τὸ 30  
 δι' ἐπιστήμης ἅτε μεθό-  
 δους καὶ στοιχειώσεσιν [κα-  
 θολικαῖς ἀναλαμβάνο-  
 μενον.

*PHerc. 1672 col. XI.27-34 (Longo, 177)*

... [if] that which is hard to master because of the absence of method is accessible to a young man, then much more that which occurs by means of science inasmuch as it is grasped with methods and elementary principles which can be applied universally.

Activities which lack elementary rules which can be learnt in theory and applied to specific cases thereafter are skills which depend on experience. Sciences do not depend on experience (or not to the same extent). A young man is someone who has not lived sufficient time to acquire experience. Yet, if a young man is able to master a skill it would go without saying that he would be able to master a science.

(2)

εἰ δέ γε τέχνη ἰο  
 Ν[.] ΠΝΕΡΥ[.] ΠΟ[.] 35  
 ... ] ἢ καὶ μέρος [α] ὑπὲρ κω-  
 φὸς ἂν ὁ λόγος ἐγίνετ[ο] τ[ο] τ[ο] ἰ[.]  
 οὔτος ὦν "εἰ τὸ μεθόδω  
 γινόμενον οὐ κωλύεται  
 περ[ὶ] νέ[ο]ν ὑπάρχειν πολ- 40  
 λῶν ἢ μάλλον οὐδὲ [τὸ μεθό-  
 δω]."

*PHerc. 1672 coll. XI.34-XII.1 (Longo, 177, 179)*

If, that is, art ... or even a branch of it, the argument would be senseless, being of the following kind: "If that which occurs by means of method is not inaccessible for a young man, (then that which occurs) without method (should be) even more accessible."

This is the reverse of the previous formulation and goes against the axiomatic proposition "skills take more experience to master than sciences". Here we have the invalid argument that a man with little experience has mastered a science and should be able to master a skill which requires experience.

Philodemus reminds us that the speaker in the *Symposium* said ῥητορική and meant by that all the categories which the youth claimed to possess. The claim is erroneous, so Epicurus has used a *metabasis* with ironic intent,

διόπερ οὐκ ἀπο-  
χωρήσαντ' ὅς, γελοίως ὁ Ἐπί-  
κουρός ἐστ[ι] τῆι μεταβάσει  
κεχρημένος

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XII.7-10 (Longo, 179)

Therefore since he does not retract, Epicurus has made use of the analogy in a humorous fashion.

The crucial part of the Epicurean text is ἐν τῆι ῥητορικῆι δυνάμει προέχειν, [δ] δοκεῖ τριβῆς εἶναι [καὶ σ[υ]νηθειά[ς] ] πολλῆς (col. XI.6-8) and Philodemus focuses on this. The immediate question is whether mention of τριβή and συνήθεια necessarily disqualifies sophistic rhetoric from the category of art. The answer is that it does not, because the Founders were aware that some arts do require a considerable amount of practice:

οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνα-  
τον οὐδ' ἀθετούμεν[ον] ὑπὸ  
τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπιστήμας  
τι[ν]ὰς πολλῆς τριβῆς ἐπιδει-  
σθα[ι] | καὶ σ[υ]νηθει[ας]

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XII.34-38 (Longo, 181)

for it is not impossible or excluded by the Founders of the School that certain arts [require] much practice and familiarity

Philodemus has worded his claim very carefully; the litotes οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατον and οὐδ' ἀθετούμενον may be symptoms of special pleading in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, or they may simply serve to emphasise the point. Be that as it may, Philodemus must have felt confident that no citations from the works of the Founders could be brought to categorically refute his statement. Nor does Philodemus think that the quotation in question makes nonsense of a methodological distinction between sophistic and civic rhetoric (*PHerc.*

1672 coll. XII.40-XIII.4 (Longo, 181, 183)). If Philodemus is prepared to concede that some part of rhetoric is an art, the Rhodian would be completely wrong to assume that Philodemus would construe Epicurus' argument as follows —

εἰ τὸ μεθόδῳ περιγινόμε-  
νον ἔστι περὶ νέον, πολλῶι μάλ-  
λον ἔσται τὸ μεθόδῳ γινόμενο{ο}ν

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XIII.7-8-8a-8b (Longo, 183)

If that which comes about by method is accessible to a young man, then that which occurs by method will be much more accessible

— which would be pleonastic nonsense. In fact, Philodemus asserts, the argument runs,

εἰ τὸ μὴ  
μόνον διὰ μεθόδου παραγι-  
νόμενον

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XIII.9-11 (Longo, 183)

If that which comes about not only by means of method (sc. is accessible to a young man, then that which occurs only by method will be much more accessible).

Philodemus' interpretation of the Epicurean text is now considerably clearer. He assumes that all three types of rhetoric (πολιτική, δικανική, and σοφιστική) have been termed rhetoric for the sake of simplicity, and because the youth thinks he is competent in all three. The civic types of rhetoric are skills, not sciences, while the sophistic type is a science but may require practice, like any number of other sciences. Within the immediate context of the argument represented in the passage, Epicurus found it strategically convenient to emphasise the *experience* aspect of rhetoric but did so ironically. If analysed formally, however, Epicurus must mean not that all rhetoric is derived from experience, because that would be untrue of sophistic, but that all rhetoric requires something more than science, i.e. a measure of practice in the case of sophistic.

Thus Philodemus' first strategy is to defend his interpretation of the passage by showing both logical inconsistencies in his opponent's position and that his own interpretation might be misconstrued as nonsensical as a consequence of his opponent's misunderstanding.

Having completed his analysis of the logic of the proposition as a whole, Philodemus proceeds to focus on semantic and syntactic aspects of the passage. First he addresses the problem of the significance of the verb *δοκεῖ* (and *δόξαι*) in the Epicurean text ἐν τῇ ῥητορικῇ δυνάμει . . . [ὁ] δοκεῖ τριβῆς εἶναι [καὶ σ]υνηθείας πολλῆς, τοῦ δι[ε] θεωρῆσαι τὰ πράγματ[α], ὡς ἔχ[ει], . . . οὐ μάλλον ἂν δόξαι ἐπι[σ]τήμη αἰτία εἶ[ν]αι (*PHerc.* 1672 col. XI.5-12 [Longo, 175]).

Little sense can be made of *PHerc.* 1672 col. XIII.15-18 (Longo, 183), but where the text becomes legible again we find ourselves in the midst of an appeal to semantics,

μη̄ θεῖνα[ι] πρὸς θεῶν "ἂ [τρι-  
βῆς ἐστ[ιν] καὶ συ[ν]η[θ]είας"  
BATEN[. ]ΓΟΠ[ι] προσάγων  
τ[ὸ] προκείμενον, προσθεῖ-  
ναι δὲ τ[ὸ] "δοκ[ε]ῖ" [δισ]τα[γ]μὸν

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XIII.19-23 (Longo, 183)

. . . not to write, by the gods, "those things which are the result of practice and familiarity" . . . when introducing the proposition, but to add the word "seems" (denotes ?) hesitancy . . .

Philodemus detects an air of hesitancy in the fact that Epicurus chose to insert the verb *δοκεῖ* instead of the more confident *ἐστί*. The succeeding lines are in a terrible state, but from line 29 it would seem that this argument is amplified. Epicurus' aim was to make a provocative statement, and since it is a generalisation it has to be couched in terms of a conjecture. The conjectural aspect of the statement explains, for Philodemus, why the verb *δοκεῖ* is repeated,

[οὐ]  
μό[ν]ο[ν] ἐπὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς

ἀλλ[ὰ] καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φρονή-  
σεως ἐτήρησε, κακεῖ τὸ "δο-  
κεῖ" 'προ[θ]εῖς'

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XIII.35-39 (Longo, 185)

... he took precautions [not] only in the case of rhetoric but also in the case of the act of thinking, adding the word "seems" there too.

I take the phrase ἐπὶ τῆς φρονήσεως to be a paraphrase of the expression τοῦ δὲ θεωρῆσαι τὰ πράγματα, ὡς ἔχει in the Epicurean passage quoted earlier (*PHerc.* 1672 col.XI.8-9, (Longo, 175)). Philodemus draws attention to the fact that Epicurus repeated the verb (δόξαι) even in a context where the contribution of science cannot be doubted by anyone. In doing so, he is attempting to alert the reader, once again, to the rhetorical strategy employed in this passage. Epicurus' interlocutor is engaged in a dialectical debate, and is thus at liberty to introduce premises which are either generally agreed upon or held by one's opponent. We should not therefore expect that every premise advanced by an Epicurean philosopher in the course of a dialectical discussion will necessarily be an Epicurean doctrine, or even true.<sup>49</sup> At least this is how I interpret the next lines,

καὶ τὸ "δοκεῖ" δεξόμεθα δη-  
λαδὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ π[ο]λιτικ[ο]ῦ  
40  
κοῦ μέρους ὃ [π]ανταχῆ  
κεκράγασιν, ὡς ἐστὶν ἄ-  
τεχνον, καὶ τὸ π[ρ]οσειστικόν  
τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως οὐκ ἐ-  
5  
γ δισταζόμε[νου] προσ-  
άγοιτ' ἂν ἀλλ' ἐξ ὁμολογου-  
μένου.

*PHerc.* 1672 coll. XIII.39-XIV.7 (Longo, 185, 187)

And we shall obviously accept<sup>50</sup> the word "seems" in the case of the political branch too which they (i.e. the Founders) have declared unequivocally elsewhere to be non-technical, and the persuasiveness of the argument would be derived not from disagreement but from consensus.

<sup>49</sup> As Socrates explains in the *Meno*, ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογή εἶδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος 75e 5-7.

<sup>50</sup> Puglia (1982), 34 includes the verb δέχομαι within a list of exegetical terminology; its opposite is ἀφαιρέω "expunge", cf. *PHerc.* 1672 col. XVII.21.

Within dialectic premises have to be generally acceptable (ἐξ ὁμολογουμένου) if they are to have persuasive force. But the premise advanced here as to the status of rhetoric, whatever types of rhetoric are meant,<sup>51</sup> does not exclude the possibility that one type is not completely without method or art even if the political branch is emphatically declared non-technical by the Founders elsewhere. The word *δοκεῖ* then reveals that we are faced with a dialectical premise which, in Philodemus' view, allows the interpretation that,

διστάζεται μὲν  
 γὰρ, εἰ πᾶ[ν] τῆρι βῆι καὶ συνη-  
 θείαι, σύμφωνόν δ' ἔστιν τὸ δεῖ-  
 σθαι πολλῆς τριβῆς κα[ὶ] συν-  
 ηθείας· τὸ τοίνυν "δοκεῖ" τῶι  
 δισταζομένωι προσθεῖς  
 ἐκ τοῦ, κὰν τὸ δισταζόμε-  
 νον παρεθῆ<ι>, διδομένο[ς]υ [παρ-  
 άγει τὸ προκείμενον

5

*PHerc. 1672 coll.XV.38-XVI.7 (Longo, 193, 195)*

there is disagreement as to whether it (is) entirely the result of practice and familiarity but consensus on the fact that it requires a lot of practice and familiarity; so, by adding the word "seems" to the matter in doubt, he derives the premise from that which is given, even if he highlights the uncertainty.

No one would deny that all types of rhetoric require practice, but there would be considerable disagreement as to whether they require practice alone. Naturally, for dialectical purposes, Epicurus chooses to articulate the premise in a way which is most likely to win acceptance. At the same time, the inclusion of the verb *δοκεῖ* signifies that at least one type of rhetoric — sophistic in Philodemus' opinion — is not acquired by practice alone.

So far Philodemus has sought to defend his views by careful scrutiny of the text as transmitted and accepted by both himself and the Rhodian. He now proceeds to examine the consequences of not admitting the verb *δοκεῖ* within the text, in other words, if the text read instead, [σ]ὺ μ[ἐ]ν οὐκ ἐξείργα[ς] τῆ[ι] ῥητορικῆ[ι] δυνάμει προ[έ]χειν, ὃ τριβῆς ἔστιν

<sup>51</sup> Philodemus claims that his argument is not damaged even if we accept that the verb *δοκεῖ* applies to sophistic rhetoric as well despite the fact that the Founders say it is an art in many other passages

καὶ συν]ηθείας πολλῆς (*PHerc.* 1672 col. XVII.24-27 [Longo, 199, 201]). Presumably this is to anticipate an objection from the opponent based on an editorial or text-critical justification. Philodemus asserts that even if ἐστὶ is read instead of δοκεῖ εἶναι it will still not support the Rhodian's contention.

Philodemus offers two solutions. The first exploits the ambiguity of the word ἐστὶ with reference to other analogous uses in Greek,

τῆ[ι] γ[ὰρ] αὐ[τῆ]ι φορ[α]ῖ  
 ἄν] εἴ]παμεν· πολλ[ῆ]ς μ[ὲν]  
 φιλοπ[ονί]α[ς] ἐ[σ]τ[ι] [δῆ]λο[ν] [ὅ]τι  
 τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἡ φιλοσο- 35  
 φία, πολλῆς [δ' ἄγ]αν εὐ]τυχι-  
 ας ἢ [β]ασιλεία], καὶ πολλῆς  
 ἐστὶ κακοπ[ρ]α[γί]ας π[ρ]ω[χ]εί-  
 α] καὶ πολλῆ[ς] ἐ[σ]τι συνηθε[ί]-  
 ας φιλία· κ[αί]τοι οὐτ[ω] γ[ὰρ] οὐ- 40  
 δεῖς ἐγέ[ν]ετο ἄγροῖ[κο] [ς] ἄν  
 ὥσθ' ὑπο[λ]αβεῖν ἡμᾶς δι[ὰ]  
 μόνης φι[λο]πονίας τὸ φι[λο]-  
 σοφεῖν καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν  
 περιγίνεσθαι καὶ τὴν βασί- 5  
 λείαν διὰ μόνης εὐ]τυχίας  
 καὶ τᾶλλα παραπλησίως.

*PHerc.* 1672 coll.XVII.32-XVIII.7 (Longo, 201, 203)

For by the same line of argument we could say: "it is clear that philosophising and philosophy (is the result) of much hard work, kingship (the result) of an excess of good fortune, poverty (the result) of bad luck, and friendship (the result) of much familiarity"; [and yet] no one would be so uneducated as to assume that we (think) that philosophising and philosophy occur by means of hard work alone, or that kingship occurs by means of good fortune alone, and so too for the rest.

When the verb ἐστὶ is used with the genitive case to describe the instrument or means by which something is accomplished it does not necessarily imply that this is the only instrument. In order to render unambiguously that something is accomplished by only one instrument one would have to add a clear indication that this were so. And Philodemus points out that since Epicurus does not add the adjective μόνης it must not be supplied in the

reader's head.<sup>52</sup> Epicurus' usage is quite acceptable in ordinary educated Greek speech, and the latter (as exemplified in the analogies Philodemus listed earlier) is appealed to as offering a standard by which we may interpret Epicurus' meaning in the most reasonable way,

τὸ γὰρ "ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ (επιτου) "δεῖται" τίθησιν, ὅταν	15
οὕτως ὁμειλῶμεν, ἢ συνη- θείαι τό γε μετριώτατον ὑπὸ [τ]ῶν λέξεων σημαί- νεται· καὶ οὐχ[ί] θάτερον μό- νον ἀεὶ [συ]νόλω[ς] σημαί- νεσθ[αι] ῥητέον.	20

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XVIII.14-21 (Longo, 203)

For he writes the word "is" in place of "requires", just as we do when we speak in ordinary conversation, where by the standards of common parlance the most normal (meaning) is meant by the words; and one should not insist that the other meaning only is all the time meant in general.

Philodemus favours an interpretation of ἐστὶ which he claims is the most standard one in this context. Ordinary language (ὁμειλῶμεν, ἢ συνηθεία) is once again summoned to assist in a question of semantics.<sup>53</sup> While Philodemus concedes that there remains a possibility that the Epicurean sentence *could* be read in the way the Rhodian would prefer, in ambiguous cases such as these ordinary language provides the only valid criterion and it supports Philodemus' view.

The second point which Philodemus introduces concerns the antecedent of the whole relative clause ὃ δοκεῖ . . . πολλῆς. As we noted above, the assertion quoted from the *Symposium* was marked by a high degree of hyperbaton and verges on anacoluthon. Philodemus exploits this tendency by claiming that there is a case for questioning which clause forms the antecedent to the relative, ῥητορικῇ δυνάμει οἱ τῷ πολὺ ὑπερέχειν πάντων τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καὶ ἐνδόξων (*PHerc.* col. XIX.7-13 (Longo, 207)). When faced with two

<sup>52</sup> *PHerc.* 1672 col. XVIII.8-14 (Longo, 203).

<sup>53</sup> As it was when Philodemus was trying to establish the meaning of the word τέχνη, *PHerc.* 1674 col. XXXVIII.2-29 (Longo, 123).

equally deserving antecedents, it is difficult, if not impossible, to resolve the ambiguity with complete confidence (πάντως [ἀ]μφ[ί]βολο]ν [[τι]] / γίνεται col. XIX.15-16 (Longo, 207)).

Whether Philodemus' second point is plausible or not, he seems to feel at this stage that he has successfully cast enough doubt on the Rhodian's interpretation of the passage to show that it cannot be used as a reliable source for Epicurean views on rhetoric of any kind, let alone sophistic rhetoric. His earlier pronouncements on the unsuitability of the *Symposium* as a source-text for the issue of the technicity of rhetoric has been vindicated to his satisfaction. Consequently, he chooses to move on to a general synopsis of the evidence provided by the texts of the Founders to the effect that sophistic rhetoric is not a science which produces competence in political addresses (*PHerc.* 1672 col. XXI.10-15 (Longo, 215)). Philodemus refers to the same works which he cited earlier, except that he includes two additional quotations from Metrodorus' *De poematis* 1, both of which, he claims, state clearly that civic rhetoric is not a science but based on experience and observation,

"πότερον οὖν τὴν ῥη-  
τορικὴν δύναμιν λέγει[[ν]]  
τις βλέπων ἐπὶ τὴν διάγνω-  
σιν ἄ[ο] [ῥ]ῆ[του], ὃ πρακτέον ἐστὶν τῷ μέλ- 10  
λοντι εὐδαίμον[ι] [[εἰ]] εἶναί τε  
κ[α]ὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ [οὐ] πρακτέον,  
καὶ ταύτην φησὶν ἀ[π]ὸ φύσι]ο-  
λογίας παραγείνεσθαι, ἢ [κ]αὶ 15  
τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν,  
καθ' ἣν ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ ἱστορί-  
ας τῶν πόλεως πραγμάτων  
συνορώ[ι]ηι ἂν τις οὐ κακῶς  
τὰ πλῆθ' εἰ συμφέροντα";

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XXII.7-19 (Longo, 217)

"So does one mean rhetorical capability by looking to the distinction of what must be done [and not done] by the man who intends to be and continue to be successful, and says that this (capability) derives from the science of nature, or does he mean political experience in accordance with which one is likely to observe from practice and research in the affairs of a city that which is advantageous to the people?"

and the second,

"τί γὰρ [ὕ-  
 πόκειται; ὁ θεωρεῖα ποιεῖ,  
 ὥσπερ ἢ περὶ τὰς αἰρέσεις  
 καὶ φυγὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς πολει-  
 τικὰς ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας πα-  
 ρακολουθήσεις";

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XXII.20-25 (Longo, 217, 219)

"For what is the foundation? That which observation produces, such as observation concerning what one should choose and reject and the political consequences that derive from research?"

Philodemus has not provided these quotations with context although he does inform us that the second passage comes not long after the first (καὶ μικρὸν προβάς, col. XXII.20). On the face of it, Metrodorus is apparently addressing an ambiguity as to what one means when one talks about ῥητορικὰ δυνάμεις. All Philodemus seems to be interested in here is the manner in which Metrodorus seems to emphasise the empirical and practical aspects of success in political life. The phrase πολιτικὴ ἐμπειρία and the description of its origin (ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ ἱστορίας τῶν πόλεως πραγμάτων) suggests quite strongly that Metrodorus (and hence the Founders) does not consider political activity to be an art. It is practical experience acquired through political activity which directs the politician in what he chooses to do and in what he avoids doing in each specific case.<sup>54</sup>

Philodemus now proceeds to prove his last assertion, that sophistic rhetoric is a discrete art with its own subject matter and aims,

κατ' ἀλή-  
 θειαν ἢ σοφιστικὴ ῥητο- 30  
 ρικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστὶν περὶ  
 τε τὰς ἐπιδείξε[ι]ς, οἷας αὐ-  
 τοὶ ποιοῦνται, καὶ τὰς τῶν  
 λόγων δι[ι]αθέσεις, οἷων αὐ-  
 τοὶ γραφουσί' ν' τε [κ]αὶ σχεδι- 35  
 ἀζουσιν.

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XXII.29-36 (Longo, 219)

<sup>54</sup> Or have I conflated two separate parallels which Metrodorus was drawing? The expression αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγαί was a standard way of speaking about moral choice (cf. Indelli & Tsouna-McKirahan (1995), 19 who cite *PHerc.* 1251 col. II.10-12 and col. XI.10-11). Of course, moral choice and political activity may not be unconnected.

sophistic rhetoric is really an art concerning the kind of display pieces which they themselves compose, and the arrangement of the kind of speeches which they themselves write and improvise.

In designating the subject matter of sophistic as display pieces (ἐπιδείξεις) Philodemus removes any of the usual practical application claimed for rhetoric. Its technicity is confined to a certain type of prose discourse considered in itself, whether the prose be composed in written form or extemporised. The expression τὰς τῶν λόγων διαθέσεις recalls the same expression in *PHerc.* 1427 col. I.24-26 (τῆς διαθέσεως τοῦ λόγου γεινομένης) and provides a terminological connection with the art of poetry.<sup>55</sup> The connection is confirmed when, in order to clarify the degree of sophistic rhetoric's technicity, Philodemus likens it to the art of poetry,

φαμέν τοίνυν  
τὸ μεθοδ[ι]κὸν ἔχειν αὐτήν,  
οὐ πολὺ δὲ καθά[περ] οὐδὲ τὴν  
ποιη[ι]κὴν καὶ [ . . . .

*PHerc.* 1672 col. XXII.36-39 (Longo, 219)

So then, we say that it has method, but not much, just like the art of poetry and . . .

The comparison with poetry is revealing and it is supported by assertions which Philodemus makes elsewhere. Essentially, sophistic rhetoric comprises the field of creative prose while poetry covers creative discourse in verse. Both activities share a number of discursive features, but they are nevertheless distinct.<sup>56</sup> The degree of science enjoyed by sophistic is modest by comparison with other sciences, and this too is to be expected given the fact that Philodemus has conceded earlier that it may depend on practice and exercise for its perfection.

<sup>55</sup> In his criticism of Neoptolemus' poetic terminology Philodemus prefers to replace the Parian's ποιήσεις with διαθέσεις (*De poem.* 5 col. XIV.12-14 Mangoni) which he likens to the "web" of a poem (ὄψη *ibid.* lines 16-17, cf. Nonnus' gloss *poesis est textus scriptorum* p. 691, 5 L). See Ardizzoni (1953), 18-24 and Mangoni (1993), 224-225.

<sup>56</sup> On the essential prerequisites which both prose writers and poets share (e.g. συντομία and ἐνάργεια), see Mangoni (1988), 127-131 and *id.* (1993), 199-201, 211-212.

It is a great pity that the text breaks down from this point. We cannot say whether Philodemus drew further on the works of the Founders in support of his assertions on the technicity and subject matter of sophistic rhetoric. The text is sporadically comprehensible again from column XXV, but throughout the remainder of the extant text Philodemus seems to have shifted to the question of whether the rhetoric taught in the schools has any practical application in civic contexts. Metrodorus is cited in col. XXXIV.27-32 in a context which looks like a reprise of the philosopher's statements in col. XXII.7-19, Hermarchus' name appears once, and Epicurus' twice.<sup>57</sup>

It is now time to summarise briefly some of the main features of Philodemus' selection and exegesis of the works of the Founders. Quite clearly, Philodemus attributes the groundwork for this survey to his teacher Zeno. If Philodemus is concerned to advertise his own orthodoxy and the legitimacy of the Campanian chapter of the Epicurean school, this would be an expedient acknowledgement of debt. The question is, whether Philodemus has added anything of his own to the investigation or has simply regurgitated Zeno's notes. For lack of direct evidence to the contrary, we shall have to trust Philodemus when he claims that Zeno provided him with the lemmata relevant to the issue of rhetoric's technicity. But Philodemus also claims that Zeno did not compose a treatise on the subject. I find it quite likely that all Philodemus had to work with was a stark series of lemmata which were not equipped with any commentary. Philodemus' exegesis of the texts is therefore his own, although he may well have been guided by his memory of what Zeno had communicated orally on the subject.

This section of *On Rhetoric* also sheds light on how texts were exploited and read during polemics within the school. A thesis, in this instance the technicity of sophistic rhetoric, is put

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<sup>57</sup> *PHerc.* 1672 col. XXV.24 (Longo, 265) (Hermarchus), col. XXIX.13 (Longo, 239) and col. XXXV.22,

forward with textual support drawn from the unimpeachable authority of the writings of the Founders. It was obviously important that the writings of Epicurus and the other three *καθηγεμόνες* were represented. Yet it is interesting to note that the evidence of Polyaeus -- the only member of the "big four" (Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaeus) not included in the textual armoury here -- is discounted because the work *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* transmitted under his name is declared spurious.<sup>58</sup> A counter-thesis is advanced by a representative of the Rhodian chapter, supported in turn by another array of citations from the Founders' writings. It is interesting that Philodemus does not choose to refute the counter-thesis by compiling an additional compendium of lemmata, but decides instead to rely on the first compendium for support and to examine a crucial passage from the opponent's collection, that from the *Symposium*. I assume that Philodemus is to be trusted when he says that Zeno never offered a reply to this counter-thesis. If that is the case, the entire counter-attack which occupies a large section of *PHerc.* 1672 is probably Philodemus' own contribution and owes nothing to Zeno directly. Philodemus' strategy is to call into question his opponent's reading of the passage. In order to achieve this he utilises a range of discursive approaches, literary, dialectical, and philological. It is worth remarking that Philodemus departs from his usual practice and gives us rather more of the context for this passage than for any of his own citations. By doing this, he is, I believe, implying that a reader should be aware of the dialogic nature of the work from which the passage is quoted, and the rhetorical interplay which exists between the interlocutors. Such literary sensitivity impedes a more literal reading of what is said by the Epicurean interlocutor: the proposition quoted is not a

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(Longo, 265) (Epicurus).

<sup>58</sup> *PHerc.* 1674 col. XXIII.7-11 (Longo, 93) = fr. 43 Tepedino Guerra. Philodemus claims that he has already shown that the work was spurious (*καθάπερ ἐνεφανίσσαμεν*, col. XXIII.10-11), presumably in earlier lost columns of *PHerc.* 1674 or 1427. For a discussion of the title and authenticity of Polyaeus' work on rhetoric, cf. Tepedino Guerra (1991), 62-64 and 188.

doctrinal absolute but something said to a specific person at a specific point in the dialogue. Linked to this is Philodemus' insistence on the dialectical status of the proposition. He makes a great deal of the wording of the proposition and the inclusion of the verb *δοκεῖ*. Finally, he anticipates an objection to the wording of the proposition as transmitted. Even if the text were to read *ἐστὶ* instead of *δοκεῖ εἶναι* it would not necessarily be rendered in the way the Rhodian wishes.

On many occasions Philodemus uses terms to describe passages from the works of the Founders which declare that such passages provide clear and incontrovertible evidence for the thesis which he champions. However, his critique of the Rhodian's reading of one particular passage of Epicurus indicates that Philodemus acknowledged that some readers are capable of misunderstanding the texts of the Founders, either through negligence or through a deliberate effort to support their own, ultimately unfounded, dogmas. The orthodox reader on the other hand is assisted in his task by a secure grasp of the doctrines expounded in all the writings of the Founders which offer a criterion for deciding the interpretation of any specific passage, no matter how problematic. Thus Philodemus assumes that the doctrine which emerges from the Founders' writings will be coherent. In the case of an occasional difficult or intractable passage, there exists a body of linguistic and logical apparatus to assist the reader to acquire the correct reading. This "apparatus of reading" is employed not only to confirm orthodoxy but can also serve to refute alternative readings.

CHAPTER 6: *PSYCHAGOGIA* AND PHILODEMUS' *ON RHETORIC*

... *ut omne*  
*humanum genus est avidum nimis auricularum*

Lucretius *DRN* 4.593-94

In the previous chapters we have seen how Philodemus rejects the technical status of activities usually termed political and forensic rhetoric and yet insists that sophistic rhetoric is an art. The exclusion of practical rhetoric presents few difficulties: it is entirely consistent with Epicurus' prescriptions for a life free from needless anxieties. Philodemus' defence of sophistic is a little more puzzling. A solution might be found in a full investigation of Philodemus' view of its relationship to other discursive and creative activities, such as poetry and music, but such an enterprise is beyond the scope of this study. However, I should like to devote this, the final chapter, to a consideration of one aspect of discourse which might help to explain why political and forensic rhetoric cannot achieve their intended goal — persuasion —, unlike sophistic rhetoric which has both aesthetic value and practical purpose in communication.<sup>1</sup>

One striking term stands out in a quotation Philodemus makes from Epicurus' *De rhetorica: psychagogia*.<sup>2</sup> As Philodemus does not comment explicitly on this term in his own *On Rhetoric* I intend to discuss how Philodemus would react to the connection between *psychagogia* and rhetoric, and to explore the theoretical and physiological foundation for Philodemus' view of the effect of sound on an audience. In order to achieve this I shall be

<sup>1</sup> It might serve to inculcate the kind of discursive principles which produce the only prerequisite Epicurus apparently demanded of speech, σαφήνεια (Diog. Laert. 10.13). On this aspect of style see Milanese (1989), 34-40. Longo Auricchio (1990), 177 defines sophistic as an art of literary or philosophical prose which helps the Epicurean philosopher to disseminate his doctrines efficiently. Gaines (1982), 75-80 uses passages from book 4 of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* and book 5 of *De poematis* to reconstruct six qualities of expression.

<sup>2</sup> The term occurs in *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 col. XI.17-18 (Longo, 65) in the form ψυχάγωγ[όμ]ε/ν[ο]ι.

compelled to review the Epicurean theories of perception and particularly the Epicurean understanding of the production and apprehension of sound. Philodemus does not appear to connect what he says about rhetoric to any peculiarly Epicurean assumptions about the physiology of hearing, but certain texts from his works *De poematis* and *De musica*<sup>3</sup> do allude to these assumptions and can thus be used to elucidate related aspects of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric*. I hope that from such a study a more coherent picture will begin to emerge of Philodemus' view of the effect of artistically produced audible phenomena on human beings, that is prose, poetry, and music, which in turn will provide a sort of physiological explanation of Philodemus' attitude to these disciplines at the macroscopic level.

The term *psychagogia* conjures within us an image of the quasi-magical and mysterious power of manipulated discourse. It is associated particularly with the sophist Gorgias. At first glance its appearance in Hellenistic literary criticism and philosophy may seem somewhat quaint, a sort of terminological fossil. Yet even a standard intellectual history of this period includes some discussion of the term in the work of Neoptolemus of Parium and Eratosthenes of Cyrene,<sup>4</sup> and its survival in subsequent writers attests that, alongside its debased meaning "entertainment", it retained something of its former significance: the power to set the soul in motion and lead it wherever one wants. I suggest that the earlier notions associated with the term *psychagogia*, 'transportation of the soul, ability to influence the soul' - usually without the conscious acquiescence of the audience - are not extinct in the Hellenistic period. Philodemus seems to employ the term in both senses, that of 'entertainment' and that of

<sup>3</sup> This work, even more than *De poematis*, is recognised for its contribution to our understanding of Hellenistic aesthetic theories in general: Rispoli (1983), 101.

<sup>4</sup> Kennedy (1989), 200-214 and Innes (1989), 215-219.

'transportation',<sup>5</sup> and this chapter will discuss Philodemus' view of whether such transportation is possible, and if it is, what produces it and under what conditions.

A passage from Quintilian's section on *compositio* contains assumptions which are pertinent to this topic and presents a view of acoustic phenomena which many rhetoricians of the first centuries B.C. and A.D. would find plausible:

ideoque eruditissimo cuique persuasum est, valere eam plurimum non ad delectationem modo sed ad motum quoque animorum, primum quia nihil intrare potest in adfectus, quod in aure velut quodam vestibulo statim offendit; deinde quod natura ducimur ad modos. neque enim aliter eveniret ut illi quoque organorum soni, quamquam verba non exprimunt, in alios tamen atque alios motus ducerent auditorem.

*Inst.* 9.4.9-10

The passage illustrates an important assumption: there exist certain sounds which delight human beings and even stir their souls. In order to gain entrance to the soul, the sound must first delight the ear. Once it has gained entry, it can actually influence the emotional disposition of the audience. This represents a widely-held assumption in antiquity. It goes without saying that orators and rhetoricians actually believed that the sound of their speech contributed a good deal to its effect on an audience, even if they were not very certain as to *how* this occurred, and a significant portion of the theoretical and prescriptive work of the rhetoricians, at least from Gorgias onwards, if not earlier, was devoted to the identification and exploitation of the kind of sounds which would assist in persuasion.<sup>6</sup> Thinkers who were suspicious or hostile to rhetoricians did not question this basic supposition seriously.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> I accept Wigodsky's point (1995), 65-68 that when Philodemus uses the terms *ψυχαγωγία* and *ψυχαγωγείν* he is echoing the language of his textual source, and that the effect on the soul denoted by the terms is rather imprecise; but I suspect that Philodemus was not oblivious to the word's etymological meaning.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. the belief that music could interfere with the will of an audience, Abert (1899), 3.

<sup>7</sup> Plato's discussion of the effects of music and rhythms in *Republic* 3 is a case in point.

The quotation at the very beginning of this chapter illustrates that the Epicurean Lucretius was well aware of humanity's desire to hear. Hearing is an important and perfectly natural function, and as such, is something which humans take delight in. As materialists, the Epicureans were committed to the view that sound is body,<sup>8</sup> and the registering of sound by a person is a result of this body striking the organs of hearing. Lucretius puts it succinctly thus:

principio auditur sonus et vox omnis, in auris  
 insinuata suo pepulere ubi *corpore* sensum.  
*corpoream* quoque enim vocem constare fatendumst  
 et sonitum, quoniam possunt inpellere sensus.<sup>9</sup>

4.524-27

Thus sound is something real, it has an ontological status which is independent of the consciousness of the human who registers it.<sup>10</sup> But what is the nature of that ontology? The Epicurean explanation of the mechanics of all sensation and the way information from the senses is processed remains controversial. The extant relevant passages from Epicurus' *Epistula ad Herodotum* are extremely condensed and the text is disputed in several important places, so we require the assistance of Lucretius and the polemical discussions of other authors if we are to attempt to reconstruct the Epicurean view.

Yet the fundamental features are clear enough. The senses somehow register corporeal substances (variously termed τύποι, εἶδωλα, ὄγκοι) which constitute effluences emitted by real objects in the world. The effluences are *real* because they are themselves bodies, that is they actually exist, and, because they are generated from real objects, they preserve some correspondence with those objects. Both body and soul seem to be viewed as responsible for

<sup>8</sup> A view which was not universally held, cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 6.54.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 52-53; for sound as body (σῶμα), fr. 322-23 Us.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. fr. 321 Us. (= Aët. (Plut.) IV 19,2 p. 408D.

sense-perception, with the soul taking the lion's share.<sup>11</sup> Motion, termed κίνησις, maintains a crucial role.<sup>12</sup> But beyond this, there are many uncertainties. There is still no agreement among scholars, for instance, as to what Epicurus meant when he asserted that all sense impressions are ἀληθεῖς,<sup>13</sup> and the mechanics of sensation after the image has made its initial impact on the percipient remain problematic.<sup>14</sup>

If we are particularly concerned with investigating Epicurean theories of sound and hearing we are immediately confronted with an obstacle. The extant fragments of Epicurus' views on perception tend to focus on the sense of sight with only slight differentiation of the other senses.<sup>15</sup> The emphasis on sight is not surprising, since it was universally considered the most important sense.<sup>16</sup> No doubt, the physics of sight provides the basic model for all sense perception. In Lucretius, sound too is viewed as an incessant and varied phenomenon which moves through the air between bodies:

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<sup>11</sup> *Ep. Hdt.* 64-65.

<sup>12</sup> Emphasised in *Ep. Hdt.* 53 and 65.

<sup>13</sup> Useful studies of this topic are to be found in Striker (1977) and Taylor (1980). Furley (1993), 90-93 has an intelligent review of the problem and the solutions offered. Everson (1990), 161-183 gives a lucid and plausible argument for interpreting ἀληθεῖς as 'true' rather than 'real' or 'existent', and alludes to Aristotle's practice of talking about perceptions being true (p. 169 n. 13). I believe that the adjective denotes only *existent* (which would go without saying) but also *true*. I suspect that Epicurus means that sense perceptions are 'true' in the same way as witnesses or depositions may be true; admittedly perception offers no 'account' as such, and human witnesses are rational beings, not inanimate phenomena, but the senses are perhaps conceived as analogous to witnesses who are objective and do not seek to misrepresent what they have seen; in which case Epicurus is exploiting an established Greek idiom which would be immediately familiar to everyone. But Annas (1992), 169-173 raises some thought-provoking questions as to what precisely Epicurus could mean by stating the 'truth' of sense, and locating error in opinion. See also Asmis (1984), esp. 143-144, and remarks made by Furley in his review of her book (1988), 109-111.

<sup>14</sup> The role of the so-called 'fourth element' of the soul, for instance, continues to elude identification. Kerferd (1971), 85-88 gives a considered review of the possible explanations along with an honest appraisal of the flaws in each one.

<sup>15</sup> Consequently, treatments of hearing by modern scholars are understandably oblique or tentative, e.g. Long (1986), 22.

<sup>16</sup> And, if Annas (1994), 164-65 is correct, provides the fundamental paradigm for all Epicurean theory of perception and epistemology. Note too that for Aristotle, the soul never thinks without a mental image (*De an.* 3.7 431a).

nec variae cessant voces volitare per auras (4.221)

But there are some difficulties in extrapolating all the features of the sense of sight to the other senses. It is not easy to see, for example, precisely how the theory of *eidola* which are continuously shed by objects can be applied to sound. Objects are constantly shedding streams of atoms which are delineations (τύποι) of themselves, but objects are not always shedding streams of atoms that produce sound, or at least not at the macroscopic level.<sup>17</sup> A living creature, or even an inanimate object, may remain silent unless acted upon so as to produce sound or itself initiate a series of physical actions so as to emit a sound. Conversely, the differences between sight and hearing also preclude some of the problems which are peculiar to the former, such as the problem of the size of an object and the size of the visual image.<sup>18</sup>

There is some evidence in what remains of Epicurus that he did acknowledge the existence of slight differences between hearing and the other senses, at least sufficiently to give them separate treatment. We know that Epicurus wrote a separate books on sight,<sup>19</sup> and Lucretius emphasises that each sense has its own separate capacity and power,

... nam seorsum cuique potestas  
divisast, sua vis cuiquest . . . (4.489-90)

So separate are the senses that they are incapable of refuting one another,<sup>20</sup> even where they may *appear* to contradict each other. This can be explained by the fact that the senses are not

<sup>17</sup> See Koenen (1999), 436 "whereas the *simulacra* can be described as 'automatical emissions', . . . the clusters of voice constituting atoms appear to be 'non-automatical emissions'".

<sup>18</sup> Although there is an analogous problem in the fact that loud noises appear faint from a distance, discussed in Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.208.

<sup>19</sup> Περὶ τοῦ ὁράν Diog. Laert. 10.28.

<sup>20</sup> Lucr. 4.495-96.

discriminatory of the same things, i.e. each sense has as its object its own particular kind of material flux.<sup>21</sup>

But we should begin with the section from the *Epistula ad Herodotum* which discusses the sense of hearing, which I shall quote in full owing to its complexity,

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν γίνεται ρεύματος φερομένου ἀπὸ τοῦ φωνοῦντος ἢ ἠχοῦντος ἢ ψοφοῦντος ἢ ὅπωςδήποτε ἀκουστικὸν πάθος παρασκευάζοντος. τὸ δὲ ρεῦμα τοῦτο εἰς ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους διασπείρεται, ἅμα τινὰ διασφύζοντας συμπάθειαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐνότητα ἰδιότροπον, διατείνουσιν πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν καὶ τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ποιούσαν,<sup>22</sup> εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸ ἔξωθεν μόνον ἐνδηλον παρασκευάζουσιν. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀναφερομένης τινὸς ἐκεῖθεν συμπαθείας οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἡ τοιαύτη ἐπαίσθησις. οὐκ αὐτὸν οὖν δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν ἀέρα ὑπὸ τῆς προιεμένης φωνῆς ἢ καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν σχηματίζεσθαι -- πολλὴν γὰρ ἐνδειαν ἔξει τοῦτο πάσχωσιν ὑπ' ἐκείνης -- ἀλλ' εὐθύς τὴν γινομένην πληγὴν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν φωνὴν ἀφίωμεν, τοιαύτην ἐκθλιψιν<sup>23</sup> ὄγκων τινῶν<sup>24</sup> ρεύματος πνευματώδους ἀποτελεστικῶν ποιεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἀκουστικὸν ἡμῖν παρασκευάζει.

*Ep. Hdt.* 52-53

And what is more, hearing occurs as a result of a flux which is conveyed from that which utters voice or produces sound or makes a noise or in any way produces an effect on the hearing. This flux is scattered abroad into masses which are homogeneous with the whole and which at the same time preserve shared characteristics<sup>25</sup> with one another and a unique unity<sup>26</sup> which extends across to the source of the emission; this unity also usually produces the perception for that thing,<sup>27</sup> and if not, provides only that which is apparent from outside. For without some correspondence in qualities conveyed from that source, such a perception would not occur. So one should not think that the air

<sup>21</sup> οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικάι Diog. Laert. 10.32. On the whole subject of the objects of the various senses, and on common sensibles, see Sedley (1989); he discusses in some detail (pp. 126-130) *PHerc.* 19/698, a fragmentary text by an unidentified Epicurean, which in its surviving part seems to treat κρίματα ("spheres of discrimination", "objects") of the various senses. Unfortunately, for my purpose, the extant text focuses on sight and touch.

<sup>22</sup> The MSS have the feminine singular of the participle here and for παρασκευάζουσιν, agreeing with ἐνότητα ἰδιότροπον; thus Bailey (1926), 200 ". . . a perfectly concrete 'chain' of particles which actually causes the hearing". Usener, however, emended the participles to masculine plural which would make them agree with ὄγκους.

<sup>23</sup> Brieger's emendation of the MSS reading ἐκλίθην or ἐκλήθην is accepted by Bailey (1926), 30 and many others. Usener suggested ἐγκλισιν.

<sup>24</sup> This is the reading of P<sup>1</sup>Q adopted by Hicks (1925) Bailey (1926), 30 and Inwood & Gerson (1994), 10; other MSS (FGHP<sup>2</sup>f) have τινῶν ὄγκων, while B (followed by Usener and Bignone) has ὄγκων τινός, where τινός must agree with ρεύματος despite the strange word order.

<sup>25</sup> Bailey (1926), 31 translates "correspondence of qualities".

<sup>26</sup> Bailey (1926), 200 translates "a unity consisting in peculiarity of character".

<sup>27</sup> τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνου: "the object", or Inwood & Gerson (1994), 10 "the perceptual experience occasioned by the flow". Bailey (1926), 200 translates "comprehension in the recipient", distinguishing ἐπαίσθησις from mere ἄσθησις, the idea being that we not only hear a person speaking but also "catch his words", i.e. understand what he is saying; Usener's apparatus (p. 14) informs us that B originally had αἴσθησις and that the prefix ἐπ-- was added in a later hand. It is interesting that Philodemus uses the term ἐπαίσθησις for the senses from which hearing is to be distinguished in *De mus.* 4 col. II.8 (Neubecker). After this phrase the MSS have ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ("most of the time"), which Usener expunged as a gloss, but Bailey (1926), 30 and Inwood & Gerson (1994), 10 retain.

itself is shaped by the voice which is emitted or even by things of the same type<sup>28</sup> (for this will hardly be affected by that), but rather whenever we emit sound immediately the impact which occurs within us produces such an expulsion which is productive of masses of a certain air-like flux, and it is this which produces the acoustic effect for us.

This passage illustrates the fact that sound too is a flux or stream (ῥεῦμα) which has a "breath-like" character (πνευματώδες). The flux consists of masses or chunks of matter (ὄγκοι),<sup>29</sup> which are in some way consistent with one another (no matter in which direction they fly) and maintain a sort of link with the source of their emission. Sound and hearing thus conform to the general model of perception which Epicurus sketches in *Ep. Hdt.* 46.

But there are some important differences. Epicurus chooses to employ the term ὄγκοι for the matter emitted, not τύποι or εἶδωλα, a choice which seems to result from an attempt to distinguish the physicality of sound-information from that of sight. Both sound particles and sight particles are corporeal and have shape, but sound particles do not create 'pictures' or 'images' in quite the way sight particles do. It is perhaps significant that Epicurus makes no mention of φαντασία or its cognates in this context.<sup>30</sup> Thus, although they maintain a unique unity (ένότητα ιδιότροπον) with the source of the sound, they cannot be said to preserve the θέσις (*Ep. Hdt.* 46) of the object as such. In addition, the 'passage' of sound flux differs from that of visual images in that sound is able to negotiate obstructions, which suggests that it does not have to travel in straight lines: hence Lucretius' observation,

conloquium clausis foribus quoque saepe videmus,  
nimirum quia vox *per flexa foramina rerum*  
*incolumis transire potest, simulacra renuntant.*

4.598-600

<sup>28</sup> Presumably Epicurus means that even where there is no *articulation* as such, i.e. in the case of inanimate objects which produce noise.

<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, Epicurus does not give us further detail concerning the constitution of these masses. It would seem, however, that they are already quite complex bodies which are themselves reducible to particles, hence ὁμοιομερεῖς.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Lee (1978), 28-30. Although Lucretius does employ the phrase *imagine verbi* in *DRN* 4.571, there it denotes a mere echo or 'reflection' of a real word produced by collision with something solid.

This quality of sound's motion will also explain how it gains access to the human ear: *in auris / insinuata* (4.524-25) quoted above.

Lucretius is quite emphatic in his assertion that atoms do not actually in themselves possess qualities like colour, temperature, sound, moisture or smell,

sed ne forte putes solo spoliata colore  
 corpora prima manere, etiam secreta teporis  
 sunt ac frigoris omnino calidique vaporis,  
 et sonitu sterila et suco ieiuna feruntur,  
 nec iaciunt ullum proprium de corpore odorem.

2.842-46

Thus, the phenomenon of sound is the consequence of an interaction between a particular kind of material flux and a sense organ which is specifically suited to the registering of that flux.

So what of the basic qualities that can be ascribed to sound? Lucretius attempts to make a crass differentiation between sounds of differing quality (roughness, *asperitas*, and smoothness, *levor*) and ascribes a physical cause to these qualities,

asperitas autem vocis fit ab asperitate  
 principiorum, et item levor levore creatur.  
 nec simili penetrant auris primordia forma,  
 cum tuba depresso graviter sub murmure mugit  
 et reboat raucum retro cita barbara bombum,  
 et †validis necti tortis† ex Heliconis  
 cum liquidam tollunt lugubri voce querellam.

4.542-48

The text is difficult, corrupt, and invites transposition.<sup>31</sup> One notes that the quality of *asperitas* which is applied in Latin to sound is traced to the tactile *asperitas* of the basic constituents of sound. One also notes the absence of qualifiers such as *quasi* and *ut* which

<sup>31</sup> I have used Smith's edition (1992).

would otherwise emphasise the metaphorical aspect of his language here. I suggest that this quality is not presented metaphorically or analogically but is to be taken quite literally.<sup>32</sup> So too the quality *levor*. The adjective *levis* is used by rhetoricians to denote speech and composition which is the opposite of *asper*.<sup>33</sup> The texture of the sound would seem to be the product of the source of the sound: thus a *tuba* emits a hoarse boom (*raucum . . . bombum*),<sup>34</sup> while the throat of swans<sup>35</sup> produces a limpid lament (*liquidam . . . querellam*). Lucretius employs a subtle blend of figurative and concrete applications in his phrasing. There is the distinction between the manners of the emission: the *tuba* appears to press down on the sound-particles in some way (*depresso graviter sub murmure*), while swans appear to release the sound without oppressing it (*tollunt*). This results in sound materials which are characterised by different shapes and which have different motions: the sound of the *tuba* is *raucum* (i.e. it is rough and causes friction as it moves), while that of swans is *liquidam* (i.e. it moves as easily as water, and is clear). But Lucretius also ascribes secondary or interpretative qualities to the sound emitted. The *tuba* is *barbara*, the voice of swans *lugubri*. How are we to account for this? Are these qualities inherent in the physical nature of the sound, or are they simply the result of the interpretation of a human audience? Or is Lucretius taking poetic licence and should we not understand these terms as applying to Epicurean theory? It is possible that the idea of *querella* is supplied from an accepted fact that the swan

<sup>32</sup> Contrast Sextus Empiricus' explanation of the terms ὀξεῖα and βαρεῖα as applied to sound, the result, he says, of a transference (μεταφορικώτερον) of these terms from the sense of touch to that of sound (*Math.* 6.40); see Riethmüller (1975), 188 n. 15 who demonstrates Sextus' debt to Aristotle here. The Skeptic then regards all attempts at description of sound as inevitably metaphorical because sound cannot be demonstrated to be corporeal (*Math.* 6.54). The Epicurean view, however, would seem to allow a basic and modest application of adjectives derived from the sense of touch for the very reason that sound is corporeal and therefore has at least some of the qualities which we associate with solid objects.

<sup>33</sup> E.g. Cic. *Orat.* 5, *De or.* 3.43.171, Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.15, 2.5.9.

<sup>34</sup> Koenen (1999), 449-450 also points out that the cow-like sound is made explicit.

<sup>35</sup> Assuming that the corrupt *et †validis necti tortis†* in line 545 conceals something like *et convallibu' cycni intortis*, see Smith (1992), 318, and Koenen's (1999), 452-455 review of the problem and solutions offered by scholars.

is actually lamenting, and the sound of the *tuba* has, by convention, funereal connotations,<sup>36</sup> but the problem remains. We are faced with a similar problem in 4.584, where Lucretius employs the phrase *dulcisque querellas*. Are these sounds really pleasant and if so, how precisely?

The safest interpretation would be to assume that sound particles which are not rough but smooth and move easily (in a manner analogous to that of liquids) are most likely to cause a human agent pleasure.

This is all very well, but what of sound which is more complex than the cry of an animal or the timbre of a particular instrument? What sort of effect does music or spoken language have on the percipient? Lucretius depicts the organs of speech as a craftsman;<sup>37</sup> like a carpenter, they fashion the crude sound which we emit into language,

hasce igitur penitus voces cum corpore nostro  
 exprimimus rectoque foras emittimus ore,  
 mobilis *articulat* verborum *daedala lingua*  
 formaturque labrorum pro parte figurat.

4.549-552

Once again, the carpenter analogy is not selected fortuitously. Sound is conceived as something corporeal which can be given shape, a shape that can be "felt" by the organs of hearing. In other words, there is a kind of artifice in even the most basic and unselfconscious use of language.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Prop. 2.13.20 *nec tuba sit fati vana querella mei*.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. 1.7 where the same metaphor, *daedala tellus*, is used to describe the earth offering flowers to Venus. Note again the absence of markers of explicit metaphor, such as *quasi* or *ut*.

Is there a straight forward physical explanation for the effect of sound, or does the percipient employ *prolepseis* in evaluating the impressions made by this kind of sound? What sort of *prolepseis* would a percipient be likely to have for these kinds of sounds?

The passages I have quoted or referred to in the footnotes either imply, or state explicitly, that sound has shape. Does this constitute a sensible quality, and if so, does it provide a preliminary foundation for a classification of all sounds into two distinct groups: those which are inevitably pleasant and those which are inevitably unpleasant? In other words, does Epicureanism view the appreciation of the aesthetic quality of sound as purely arbitrary or not?

I suggest that these details have implications for the way the Epicureans viewed human perception and reaction to sound. Because sound is a different sort of phenomenon from that which is registered by the eyes, the mouth, or the nose, it should be evaluated on its own terms and not confused with the characteristics of the other senses. Sound cannot have colour, for example, nor does it contain in itself the attributes of the object that emits it. A bird's call does not *resemble* that particular bird, nor does it *smell* or *taste* like it. However, the Epicureans would hardly have denied that the percipient has some way of identifying the object which produces sound even if the percipient is unable to see the object directly. The song of certain birds, for instance, can communicate the presence of edible prey to a hunter, even if a view of the birds themselves is obscured by foliage. As a result of the sound registered by the hunter, an image of a bird which is edible is simultaneously apprehended. Precisely how the Epicureans accounted for this "matching up" of sense data remains a mystery, but there is an analogy in the use of language, where words are somehow referred to *prolepseis* (which are generally conceived as visual entities) with the result that meaning is

derived from sound. So this sort of "natural" identification of sound with object appears uncontroversial even if the mechanics are not understood. When, however, a percipient claims that a piece of music reminds him of a cat, then, I suspect, an Epicurean would begin to disagree. If the music attempted quite successfully to mimic the meow or purr of a cat, then, perhaps, the percipient is making a valid claim.<sup>38</sup> If, however, the music sounds nothing like a real cat, but is perceived to somehow encapsulate a cat's aloofness or agility or inscrutability, the Epicureans would have to object that it does nothing of the sort, but that it is purely the opinion of the percipient that it is so.

These assumptions seem to underlie comments made by Philodemus in book 4 of his *De musica* where it is clear that he rejects the notion that music has mimetic or ethical qualities. In refuting, it is thought, Diogenes of Babylon's view<sup>39</sup> that different people perceive the same piece of music differently, Philodemus asserts that this might be the case with certain other senses, but not with hearing,

καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν [γ]ε τοῦ-	5
τα[ν] παρὰ τινὰς προδιαθέ-	
σεις ἐνδέχεται παραλλατ-	
τούσας συμβαίνειν ἐπαισθή-	
σεις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀκοῶν οὐ-	
δ' ἔστιν ἄλλως διαφορὰ τις, ἀλ-	10
λὰ πᾶσαι τὰς ὁμοίας τῶν	
ὁμοίων μελῶν ἀντιλή-	
ψεις ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς ἡδο-	
νάς παραπλησίους ἀπολαμ-	
βάνουσιν, ὥστε καὶ τῆς ἐναρ-	15
μονίου καὶ τῆς χρωματικῆς	
διαφέρονται [ο]ὐ κατὰ τὴν	
ἄλογον ἐπαίσθησιν ἀλλὰ	
κατὰ τὰς δόξας, οἱ μὲν ὡς-	
περ οἱ τοῦτα[ι] παραπλήσι[ο]ι	20

<sup>38</sup> There are references to the ability of certain people to imitate the sound made by animals and inanimate objects (cf. Pl. *Resp.* 3 397a 3-7, *Leg.* 2 669c 8-d 2, Plut. *De aud. poet.* 18c, 674 b), but then these would hardly have qualified as 'music' in antiquity.

<sup>39</sup> Diogenes' name survives in three places in this book, coll. VII.24, XXI.19, XXIII.28, and no other. Delattre (1989), 54 ff. has demonstrated that the whole of book 4 was devoted to the summary and refutation of Diogenes' own work *De musica*. Diogenes is probably the target of those fragments of book 1 which contain theories which recur in book 4, cf. Rispoli (1983), 91 n. 2 and Schäfer (1936), 178-79; Schäfer went so far as to suggest that all fragments of Kemke's book 1 belong in fact to book 4, but was not supported by Rispoli in her edition of book 1 (1969).

τὴν μὲν φάσκειντες εἶναι  
 σεμνὴν καὶ γενναίαν καὶ  
 ἀπλήν καὶ [καθ]αράν, τὴν [δ'  
 ἄ]νανδρον [καὶ φο]ρτικὴν  
 καὶ ἀνελεύθερον, οἱ δὲ τὴν 25  
 μὲν αὐστηρὰν καὶ δε]σποτι-  
 κήν, τὴν δὲ ἡμερον καὶ πιθα-  
 νήν προσονομάζοντες, ἀμ-  
 φότεροι δὲ ἂ μηδετέ[ρ]αι πρόσ-  
 εστ[ιν] ἐπιφέροντες. 30

*De musica 4 PHerc. 1497 col. II.5-30 (Neubecker)*

And in the case of these at least, with certain predispositions it is possible for perceptions to alternate,<sup>40</sup> but in the case of the senses of hearing, there is no difference at all, but rather all (senses of hearing) produce the same kind of apprehensions of the same kind of tunes and derive corresponding pleasures from them, with the result that people differ in their view of what is enharmonic and chromatic not by virtue of perception, which is a non-rational faculty,<sup>41</sup> but by virtue of opinions, just as some people, who are similar to this man, say that one type of music is solemn, and noble, and simple, and pure, while another is unmanly and vulgar, and slavish; while others term the former type of music austere and imperious, and the latter gentle and persuasive. Both groups of people are attributing things to the music which are not present in either type.

This text illustrates that for Philodemus the actual apparatus of hearing, that is the organs that come into direct and preliminary contact with the sound, is not responsible for the different reaction different people often display towards the same piece of music. Thus there is nothing intrinsic in the sound itself which is responsible for the different interpretations which human beings bring to bear upon it. Such interpretation is not justified by either the sound itself or the organs of hearing, for, after all, sensation is ἄλογος,<sup>42</sup> but rather is the result of a more conscious, perhaps intellectual, process of evaluation.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Presumably, Philodemus is thinking of cases where the circumstances of the observer may interfere with his perception, e.g. a sick person may see things differently from a healthy person, cf. the commonplace that persons suffering from jaundice (*arquati*) see everything as if it were greenish-yellow (*lurida*), Lucr. 4.332-335. Neubecker (1986), 127 notes that the term διάθεσις is frequently employed in Philodemus' *On Music 4* in the sense of "constitution" or "condition" of the soul. On this term — Lucretius' *dispositura* — and its significance for the soul, Grilli's paper (1983) is informative. As to the differentiation of hearing from the other senses, the answer may lie in the fact that Epicurus seems to recognise that for the other senses objects do have qualities other than shape: i.e. colour is a quality of an object seen, heat of an object touched, and others of objects smelled and tasted (cf. Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 49, Lucr. 4.72-89, 90-92, 218-24, and Furley (1993), 83-84).

<sup>41</sup> And hence unable to make those sorts of judgements.

<sup>42</sup> Diog. Laert. 10.31. Cf also Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 23 p. 202 Usher . . . τὸ ἄλογον ἐπιμαρτυρεῖ τῆς ἀκοῆς πάθος, although he does not draw the same conclusions.

<sup>43</sup> See Rispoli (1991), 92, 94-95.

Philodemus' remarks are broadly consistent with what we are told by Epicurus,

καὶ ἢν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων, μορφή ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ στερεομένου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου· τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ διημαρτημένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ ἀεὶ ἐστὶν <ἐπὶ τοῦ προσμένουτος><sup>44</sup> ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῆσθαι εἴτ' οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρουμένου <ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρουμένου>.<sup>45</sup>

*Ep. Hdt. 50*

And whatever appearance we receive by focusing with the mind or the organs of sense, be it of shape or properties, this is the shape of the solid object, which arises from the sequential repetition or remainder of the image. Falsehood and error always lie in an opinion which is added <in the case of that which is waiting> to be testified for or against, and then is neither testified for <or against>.

Admittedly, the context of Epicurus' remarks is somewhat different. Epicurus is discussing visual sense-impressions, not those of hearing, but falsehood and error are explicitly located within a δόξα, opinion, which is reached before sufficient sense data have been registered or collected. Epicurus would seem to be talking about basic error in the percipient's identification of the actual characteristics of an object — whether the tower is round or square, for instance, although he does not specify this — while Philodemus is alluding to a more complex set of misconceptions and errors, where a quality or property is ascribed to a phenomenon. But despite these differences, it is δόξα which is responsible for the error in each case.

Philodemus denies music any mimetic capacity, it has no *ethos* properly-speaking, and is thus unable to induce the soul to mimic any given *ethos*.<sup>46</sup> This is in marked contrast to Plato and Aristotle. Plato, for example, views Ionian and "certain Lydian" *harmoniai* as μαλακαὶ τε καὶ συμποτικά (Resp. 3 398e 9-10), and insists that there should exist separate *harmoniai* for different types of human activity which require different emotional dispositions in human

<sup>44</sup> Usener's supplement.

<sup>45</sup> Usener's supplement.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Rispoli (1974), 86. *PHib.* 13, published by Grenfell-Hunt in 1906, has become a classic example of the kind of views which were held on music's ethical properties.

beings.<sup>47</sup> In contrast to this view, all Philodemus seems prepared to attribute to the preliminary registering of sound is the ability to distinguish *pleasant* sound, presumably from unpleasant ones. But the interpretations which humans indulge in confuse even this basic level of discrimination: what sounds slavish to one audience sounds persuasive to another, with the result that it becomes difficult to establish whether the music in question is pleasant or unpleasant.<sup>48</sup>

But we are justified in asking what kind of sound should be pleasurable, given that pleasure plays such an important role in Epicurean philosophy. In Epicurus' *Epistula ad Menoeceum* 129-131, for example, we are informed that pleasure provides the criterion for human behaviour as the first and natural good (πρῶτον ἀγαθόν . . . καὶ σύμφυτον), although the concept of pleasure is itself further refined. But where, precisely, does the pleasure which human beings derive from sound fit into all this? In the first edition of his *Kolotes und Menedemos* Crönert opined that the apostate Menedemos had charged that the Epicureans were incoherent in their condemnation of poetry because they admitted that φθόγγοι can excite a sensation of pleasure and that Colotes responded by asserting that φθόγγοι<sup>49</sup> only pertain to clear communication and not other discourse.<sup>50</sup> This would suggest that sounds which comprise language cause pleasure only if they are of such a kind as to permit the sense of what is being said to be grasped with ease.

I have spent some time discussing Epicurean theories of sound and hearing because it is

<sup>47</sup> *Resp.* 3 399a 6-c 1. Aristotle also assumes that different *harmoniai* have different ethical applications, *Pol.* 8 1340a 40- 1340b 5.

<sup>48</sup> It is quite possible that Philodemus credited the organs of hearing only with the capacity to register pleasure in response to rhythm.

<sup>49</sup> The term φθόγγοι is also used for "musical sounds", see LSJ s.v. who cite Eur. *El.* 716 and Pl. *Leg.* 7 812d 1; in Sext. *Emp. Math.* 6.1 it seems to mean "musical notes".

<sup>50</sup> Crönert, 6-8, discussed by Mancini (1976), 63.

important to establish whether the Epicureans admitted that sound by itself could have an insidious effect on an audience. While the Epicurean Polyaeus can speak idiomatically of a sophist who "blasts the ears of young men" (μειρακίων ἀκοὰς ἐκπλήττειν)<sup>51</sup> it seems unlikely, in the light of the above, that the Epicureans believed that sound alone was capable of enchanting an audience. In this they appear to have been something of an exception to the general consensus. Aristotle, for example, stated that there was a great similarity between certain rhythms and tunes and the human emotions, and regarded it as an established fact that we change our emotional disposition (μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν) when we listen to this kind of music.<sup>52</sup> Aristotle's view can be conceived as a distillation of less precise notions of the same kind on the interconnection between music, rhythms, and the human soul which pervade Greek educational thinking in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.<sup>53</sup> And the power of music to enchant was a commonplace that was hard to eradicate. In Philodemus' *De musica*, the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, for instance, cites with approval a verse of Archilochus to the effect that everyone is enchanted by song,

κηλ[ῆ]ται δ' ὅτις [ἐστὶ]ν ἀοιδαῖς<sup>54</sup>

Even if the Epicureans conceded that people derive some sort of pleasure from certain sounds, including music, it did not follow for them that people could be enchanted or induced to adopt specific forms of behaviour as a result of this pleasure.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Stob. *Flor.* II.15, 44 p. 192 Wachsmuth = fr. 44 Tepedino Guerra.

<sup>52</sup> *Pol.* 8 1340a 18-23.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Pol.* 8 1339b 2 ff. and 1342b 32-33 on the influence of music, and the statement ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν ἀντοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν (1340a 38-39) as opposed to sculpture and painting. Rispoli (1969), 77 points out the difference: music comprises a ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἡθεσι while painting and sculpture constitute σημεία μᾶλλον . . . τῶν ἡθῶν.

<sup>54</sup> Kemke p. 20 (= fr. 262 Lasserre-Bonnard). More recently Gigante proposed that the text should read κηλῶ<ν>ται δ' ὅτις / [. . . ἀστῆ]ων ἀοιδαῖς (1993), 10. Mancini (1976), 62 suggests that mention of Archilochus by Colotes in his Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Λύσειν could also be linked to comment on this very verse.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Rispoli (1969), 88.

This brief review hardly suffices as an explanation of Epicurean theories of acoustics, but it does, I think, have significant bearing on how Philodemus views the claims of musicians, poets, and rhetoricians that they can influence people's souls by the manipulation of sound. This is because, at the level of sophistication claimed by these technicians, Philodemus believes that sound by itself is incapable of having the automatic, insidious effect which so many practitioners claimed for it.

In his discussion of music, Philodemus is able to concentrate on "pure sound", that is sound which is, undeniably, completely separate from language, or in his terms, ἀσήμαντος.<sup>56</sup> It is a distinction he will continue to emphasise in his discussion of those arts which employ language, that is poetry and rhetoric. Language is not just sound, but *significant* sound. Language without sound is impossible, but so is language without significance, that is sense, content, thought, that which is, unavoidably, signified. There are, of course, grades of significance, from nonsense at one extreme, to clearly articulated thought on the other.

In his work on poetry, Philodemus comments on the concept of *psychagogia* on several occasions.<sup>57</sup> Philodemus is drawn into remarking on the role of *psychagogia* because of the importance attributed to sound in poetry by several of the opponents he refutes. In outline, Philodemus takes issue with a widely held assumption that it is euphony, or the formal features of poetry, which generate poetry's emotive power and that the actual semantic constituents are of no real consequence. This stance on poetry, attributed by Philodemus to

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *De mus.* 4, *PHerc.* 1497 coll. XXVI.30-31, XXIX.18, 31 (Neubecker). Plato too distinguishes the words (λόγοι) of a song from its musical elements when he views the qualities of the former as invariable whether they are set to music or not. But this does not prevent him from assuming that the non-linguistic elements of a song (*harmonia* and rhythm) have significance too, and one that should be appropriate to the words used in a song (*Resp.* 3 398c 11-d 10).

<sup>57</sup> The references were assembled by Schächter (1927) who came to the conclusion that Philodemus recognised as real *psychagogia* that which acts in a rational way and only on those who are furnished with *paideia*.



For it is not that which is unelaborated which stirs but rather that which is elaborated, and thoughts are the latter also

If anything, composition should be subservient to the meaning,

ἢ σύνθε-  
σις . . . ὄ[υ]κ ἀέριος οὐδ' ἐπαι-  
νουμένη καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλ-  
λ' ὅτι προ]σπαρίστησι διανοι-  
ας, αἷς ψ[υ]χαγωγούσιν

*De poem. Tr. C col. XVII.19-24 (Nardelli)*

composition . . . is not something celestial, nor is it praised in itself, but rather because it brings the thoughts (to the audience's mind), and it is by thoughts that they stir the soul

According to Philodemus, then, *synthesis*, the manipulation of significant words into compositions, is something very different from music.<sup>59</sup> Because of the significance of words, it is the rational element in human beings which is compelled to process the finished product, otherwise meaning cannot be grasped, and language enforces the attempt to reconstruct meaning. Naturally, sound is an important, and inevitable, constituent of all poetry and prose; but for Philodemus it is certainly not the only one or the most important one: it is always bound to the sense of the words, and the sense takes priority.<sup>60</sup> It has been suggested that Philodemus failed to grasp that the theory of poetic *synthesis* is ultimately concerned with literary tastes which are a product more of artistic techniques and conventions than natural inclinations.<sup>61</sup> I prefer to think that Philodemus was aware of this,<sup>62</sup> but that various champions of *synthesis* (perhaps the majority of them) believed that one could achieve a kind of euphony which would be appreciated spontaneously by an audience, irrespective of its conventions and tastes.

<sup>59</sup> *De poem. 5 col. XXIV.18-21 (Mangoni).*

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Sbordone (1983), 179-180. Philodemus seems to understand sense, or thought, content, in the most general way, and as far as poetry is concerned, makes no prescriptions as to the nature of the content. In one passage he implies that a poem may contain thoughts that are indifferent, non-beneficial, or downright harmful, and still be a very fine poem (*De poem. 5 col. XXXII.9-14*).

<sup>61</sup> Porter (1994), 79.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. his inclusion of the participle ἐκπαιδευόμενοι in *Tr. D fr. 19.1-2*, quoted above.

One notes that there is, in Philodemus' discussion of poetry and its psychagogic effect, a limitation or circumscription of this effect. It cannot make you do what you do not want to do. The stirring of the soul is more an aesthetic process in which the audience consciously participates. And to a certain extent, it appears the audience must be cultured enough to enter into this process. Its effects are perhaps limited to the enjoyment of aesthetic experience: anything the audience takes away with it is the result of rational reflection on the goodness or badness of the thoughts expressed. An audience cannot be made to do bad things after, for example, watching a play. And if they do bad things after watching it, they are responsible for their behaviour, and are doing it for reasons which are unrelated to the actual aesthetic experience. It is at this point that we realise that Philodemus' view of *psychagogia* is a sort of extension of its meaning as 'entertainment', but in the passages I have cited, he is using it to try to describe the physics of the aesthetic process.

Now all of this has important consequences for rhetoric. Philodemus stresses continuously that rhetoric does not 'persuade' in quite the way the rhetoricians claim. This is the unavoidable conclusion from his reiteration of the notion that rhetoric is of no use in the very contexts where it is expected to give assistance in persuasion: law courts and public assemblies. Philodemus asserts that only the epideictic branch of rhetoric, what he terms σοφιστική, has any grounds to be considered artlike at all. According to Philodemus, Epicurus and his early followers reveal that,

τέ-

χνην [εἶν]αι τὴν σοφιστι-  
κὴν τοῦ λόγου συγγράφειν  
καὶ ἐπιδειξίεις ποιέισ-  
θαι, [τοῦ δὲ] δίκας λέγειν      5  
καὶ δη[μη]γορεῖν οὐκ εἶ-  
ναι τέ[χνη]

*Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. XXIV.1-7 (Longo, 95)*

sophistic is an art of writing speeches and composing display pieces, and is not an art of pleading cases and addressing the people<sup>63</sup>

So, rhetoric's efficacy is much more circumscribed, and comes across as a sort of prose counterpart to poetry. In fact, the differences between poetry and prose are not that easy to discern from Philodemus' treatment, since they share a good many characteristics.<sup>64</sup>

In a passage from the third book of his *On Rhetoric*, Philodemus employs a somewhat rambling quotation from a lost work of Epicurus, most likely his own *De rhetorica*,<sup>65</sup> where a psychological effect of some sort in epideictic speeches appears to be acknowledged,

δ-

ταν γὰρ ἀκούσῳσιν αὐ-  
 τῶν ἐν ταῖς δεῖξεσι καὶ  
 [ταῖς π]ανηγύρεσι, [φ]ησὶν [ὁ  
 [Ἐπίκουρος], καὶ ψυχ]αγωγ-  
 [γηθῶσι δ]ιὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι  
 [περὶ σ]υμβολαίου τινὸς  
 [τὸν λόγ]ο[ν ἢ] περὶ τῶν  
 [συμφερό]νων, ὥσπερ ἐν  
 [ταῖς ἐ]κκλησίαις καὶ τοῖς  
 [δικ]α[σ]τηρίοις γίνεταί --  
 [ἐν μὲ]ν γὰρ τούτοις ὑπὲρ  
 τοῦ ἐν κ]εφάλου τοῦ δὴ ἐ-  
 γόμεν]ο[ν] κινδυνεύοντες  
 [ὅ]ταν [ἐ]κκλησι[ά]ζωσιν,  
 [ὅ]ταν δὲ δικ[ά]ζ[ω]σι [τὸν]  
 [ὄ]ρον φοβ[ο]ύμενοι προσ]-

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1672 col. IX.7-22 (Longo, 167, 169).

<sup>64</sup> This emerges from remarks which Philodemus makes in response to a variety of unascrbed views on what constitutes excellence in poetry, e.g. certain speeches share with poetry the fact that the audience is stirred by plots which contain unexpected dénouements (κοινὰ δ' εἰσι] καὶ / τινῶν λόγων . . . , *De poem.* 5 col. XXXV.32-33); in poetry, style should be appropriate for the protagonists introduced — that goes for prose too ([κοινὸν γὰρ καὶ τῶν] πεζῶν λόγων, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τῶν] ἱστορικῶν ἢ τῶν γε δ[ι]αλόγων, col. XXXV.2-6). While Mangoni admits (1988), 129 that Philodemus does not declare what he thinks the ἴδιον of good prose is, she argues that he maintains that poetry and prose are two distinct fields (p. 137).

<sup>65</sup> So Hammerstaedt (1992), 67; the parallel passage from *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 coll. X.24-XI.23 (Longo, 63, 65) identifies this work as the source.

ἔχουσι τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγο-  
 μένοις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πανη-  
 γύρῃσι καὶ δειξίξεσι τῶν  
 σοφιστῶν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ὑπὲρ  
 ὄρκου φροντίζοντες (οὐ  
 γὰρ ὁμολοκασιν ὁρθῶς  
 κρῖναι) οὔθ' ὑπὲρ τῶν λε-  
 γομένων, εἰ συμφέροι τῆι  
 πόλει ἢ μὴ (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν  
 ὑπὲρ πολέμου κἀν ἐπιρήνης  
 ὁ λόγος, ὑπὲρ ᾧ ἀναγκα-  
 ῖόν ἐστιν ἄττα δεῖ ποτε  
 ψηφισασθαι, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ὑ-  
 πὲρ πολέμου καὶ ἐπιρήνης  
 ἢ <ι> γ' ἢ καὶ ἄλλου τιμῶς, ᾧ γ' ἐν  
 ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις βουλευ-  
 ονται, οὐ 'περὶ' κατεπελεγοντός  
 τιμῶς γε οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐν  
 τῷ <ι> παρόντι ὁ λόγος), ὥστε  
 σφόδρα ἔξω ὄντες τοῦ ἀ-  
 γωνιᾶν ἀκούουσιν ἐν ταῖς  
 πανηγύρεσιν

*Rh.* 3 *PHerc.* 1506 coll. L.22-LI.24 = *PHerc.* 1426 coll. II<sup>a</sup>.7-IV<sup>a</sup>.14 (Hammerstaedt, 26-29)

Every time they listen (to sophists) in displays and at festivals, says Epicurus, and when they are stirred in their souls because the speech is not about a contract, [or] not about advantageous things, as is the case in assemblies and law courts — for since, as one says, they risk life and limb in these when they participate in an assembly and fear the oath when they sit in judgement, they take notice of what is said, while in the festival and display speeches of the sophists they waste neither a thought for an oath (for they have not sworn to judge correctly) nor for whether what is being said is to the city's advantage or not (for the speech is not advocating war or peace, issues on which they have to vote when the debate concerns war or peace or something else they discuss in assemblies — in fact the speech is about nothing urgent) — so that they listen at festival speeches in a state where they are detached from the debate.<sup>66</sup>

The quotation from Epicurus is out of context and it is difficult to discern the extent and precision of Philodemus' citation of the Master. But the information we can draw from it is extremely valuable. It would appear that some sort of psychological experience is acknowledged but only under certain conditions. This experience is expressly limited to the context of epideictic performances (πανηγύρεις, δειξίξεις), and excludes contexts where there are issues of importance (peace or war) or other considerations (such as an oath) which

66

The precise wording and extent of the quote from Epicurus remain problematic.

determine the manner in which an audience will evaluate a speech.<sup>67</sup> Thus, for Epicurus, it appears that the *context* and *content* of discourse are of primary importance in determining the reaction one can expect from an audience.

In addition, Epicurus implies that context, content, and audience-reception are somehow insolubly linked. The audience will only indulge in an aesthetic response where the audience itself deems it appropriate. It is also significant that the verb *ψυχαγωγέω* is employed to designate the effect which epideictic speeches have on an audience. We cannot be absolutely certain, but it seems most likely that it is a term that Epicurus himself applied in this context, and so Philodemus is compelled to use it too. I do not think it is a term that Philodemus would have preferred unless his source made it unavoidable. One can compare the attention he is forced to give to the term in his refutation of others' views in *De poematis*. One also notes the somewhat cumbersome explanation in col. III<sup>a</sup>.17-IV<sup>a</sup>.14 of *PHerc.* 1426 (*On Rhetoric* 3) which interrupts the flow of the sentence. In a parallel passage where the same piece of Epicurus is quoted in book 2 of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric*,<sup>68</sup> this section appears in a very abbreviated form and is phrased rather differently. It is tempting to conclude that Philodemus has indulged in some special exegesis of his own at this point, in order to emphasise what he considers to be Epicurus' intention: that an audience listens to a speech in a very different manner, depending on whether they are there for entertainment or for serious civic business; in the case of the latter, *psychagogia* does not occur.

As the passage continues we receive an impression of what sort of elements in a speech Epicurus thought responsible for an audience's psychological transportation,

<sup>67</sup> Whereas in Pl. *Phdr.* 261a 7-9 Socrates asks whether rhetoric is *ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις.*

<sup>68</sup> *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 coll. X.30-XI.31 (Longo, 63, 65).

[ῥταν] δ' οὐ-  
 τω[ς] [ἀκούω]σι, τοῖς] μὲν  
 [λεγόμενοις] [οὐ π[ρ]ο]σέχου-  
 σιν, [π]ότερα [σ]υμ[φ]έρον-  
 τα ἢ οὐ συμφέρον]τα,  
 καὶ τὸ [.] σύνολον ἀληθῆ  
 ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ  
 δὲ τοῦ ἥχου καὶ τῶν [π]ε-  
 ριόδων καὶ τῶν παρι-  
 σῶ[ν] καὶ ἀ[ν]τιθέ[των]  
 καὶ ὁμοιο[τελεύ]των  
 ψυχαγωγ[ο]ύ[μενοι] ἤ-  
 δη προσεδ[ό]κησαν, εἰ  
 οὕτω(ι) λα[λ]ώ[ν]τες, κα[ὶ]  
 ἐν ἐκκλη[σ]ίαις καὶ δικασ-  
 τηρίοις εἶ [ἀ]παλλάττε[σθαι],  
 οὐ συνορῶ[ν]τες, ὅτι [οὐ]-  
 δ' ἂν ἠγέσχοντο, εἰ [ἐν ἐκ]-  
 [κ]λησίαι καὶ] δικαστη[ρί]-  
 ω[ι] [οὕτω(ι) λαλοῦντος  
 ἤκουον

*Rh. 3 PHerc. 1426 coll. IV<sup>a</sup>.14-V<sup>a</sup>.2 = PHerc. 1506 coll. LI.24-LII.4 (Hammerstaedt, 28-31)*

and when they listen in this way, they do not pay attention to whether *what* is said is to their advantage or not, or whether it is altogether true or not, but because they experience psychological transportation by the sound alone, by the periods, the precisely balanced clausulae, the antitheses, and the homoeoteleuta, they come to expect that if they babble in the same way in assemblies and courts they will make a good impression, not realising that they would not have endured it if they heard (someone else) droning on like this in an assembly or court.

It is important to bear in mind the context of the passage here. Philodemus is invoking Epicurus to account for what happens to gullible students of rhetoric who have been persuaded to part with their money in order to learn from rhetors how to speak convincingly in assembly and court. The students are given the impression, for want of experience, that what they feel within themselves at the displays of the rhetors in the classroom is conviction. Their error lies in mistaking what is a purely aesthetic experience, a response to the *sound* of the discourse, for conviction. But there is no conviction: not only do they pay no attention to the *content* of what is said, but if they were themselves transferred to a real context where

conviction is at issue they would immediately realise that something is terribly wrong. Their appreciation of the discourses they attend in class would be very different if those same discourses were declaimed in court or assembly. Once again we see the distinction between sound and thought which we have already noted in Philodemus' discussions of music and poetry. In the context under consideration, Philodemus insists that it is the sound-effects alone which produce *psychagogia*. Do these statements contradict what Philodemus maintains in the case of poetry, that it is *thoughts* that stir us, not pure sounds?

To answer this question we must take into account the polemical aspect of Philodemus' assertions both in *De poematis* and in *On Rhetoric*. In *On Rhetoric* Philodemus is attempting to explain a passage of Epicurus where the Founder gives some credit to the ability of discourse to produce *psychagogia* in an audience. Since he does not try to argue that the passage of Epicurus is spurious, we must conclude that there is no question as to the authenticity of the passage, and that Philodemus does not detect a problem of contradiction. On the other hand, Philodemus is in all likelihood employing the Epicurean passage in a manner which its author could never have foreseen: that is, as a weapon in a polemic which has been influenced by developments in the understanding of aesthetics and psychology, and more specifically, the euphony theories of Hellenistic poets and rhetoricians.

Epicurus, then, has established that in epideictic speeches, the audience is not paying attention to content, and the context allows them to listen and appreciate the composition in a manner that is different from other settings. Therefore if Epicurus says that *psychagogia* does occur, Philodemus seems to conclude that its cause must lie in what is left over when content is removed, that is *sound*.

There is no serious contradiction if we bear in mind that in his *De poematis* Philodemus was trying to minimise the effect of sound in poetry for polemical purposes, while in his *On Rhetoric*, Philodemus is trying to refute those who claim that rhetoric has the power to convince and that sound plays an important role in achieving that goal. So poets and rhetors are making slightly different claims for the sound component, or *synthesis*, in their disciplines, and Philodemus' approach in his refutation is adjusted accordingly:

- a) the poets claim that it is sound which moves the audience and makes poetry distinctive; Philodemus states that this is nonsense, and that it is the thoughts signified by the language which play the most important part in achieving this effect
- b) the rhetoricians claim that sound makes a significant contribution to the persuasive outcome of a speech, and makes speeches effective; Philodemus rejects this by asserting that it is the thought expressed in the speech which an audience attends to when deciding what action to take.

The most important point is that students of rhetoric are at fault: they have mistaken the context of epideictic for a universal one; isolated within an environment which is not responsible to social and political reality and is able to define its own aesthetic rules, the students are programmed to appreciate and take notice of sound precisely because their educational setting has attributed undue significance to that aspect of language; they have learned to accept certain patterns, manipulations, and rhythms as aesthetically compelling, and assume that what is aesthetically compelling is inevitably persuasive as well. Therefore the *psychagogia* of sound is a sort of self-fulfilling system, but a closed one: it breaks down

once it is transposed to an inappropriate context, and so, to a certain extent, it is superficial and synthetic.

In this chapter I have attempted to argue that the three main branches of acoustic artistic production, music, poetry, and rhetoric, should not be considered separately from each other when we are studying Philodemus' works. Philodemus' treatment of all three displays an underlying doctrine of the effect of sound and language on human beings. It would appear that in his discussion of these activities Philodemus has been compelled by his own intellectual context to adjust and refine the Epicurean position. At times he is faced with the problem of interpreting the writings of the Founders to secure their support and maintain his own claims to orthodoxy. In addition, Philodemus' view of *psychagogia* is another example of the Epicurean faith in an individual's freedom of will: it is senseless for a person to fear that he or she will be compelled to a particular conviction simply by an orator's skillful manipulation of sounds and words. From this, as from sorcery, prophecy, or astrology, there is, in fact, nothing to fear.

## CONCLUSION

The Romans desire Greek *paideia* in order not to be at its mercy, and systematically imitate it; yet the very action of imitation keeps provoking them into the uneasy awareness that this *paideia* is not native, so that a complex process of inclusion and exclusion is always under way.<sup>1</sup>

A close examination of the surviving portions of the first two books of Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* reveals that it constituted a carefully-structured and systematic treatment of the issue of sophistic rhetoric's status within orthodox Epicureanism. Since we do not possess the writings of earlier or contemporary Epicureans on the subject, it is difficult to judge whether Philodemus is introducing an innovation or is reaffirming a view which was actually held by Epicurus and the Founders of the School. However, the subtlety of his arguments and his reliance on abstruse terminological distinctions regarding the words τέχνη and ῥητορική suggest to me that Philodemus' stance was not the most obvious one for an Epicurean to adopt. For all its belligerence, and while acknowledging that portions of it are a *reply* to an attack from the Rhodian Epicureans, Philodemus' assertions have a rather defensive appearance.

Yet, even if we were in a secure position to judge that Philodemus has stretched the evidence available from the writings of the Founders to suit his thesis, we would no doubt find it difficult to challenge his orthodoxy seriously. If anything, Philodemus is supplementing a lacuna within Epicurean doctrine, an absence which has opened under the steady insistence of cultural and social change. For, by the time of Philodemus, rhetoric (an art once synonymous with notions of civic participation)<sup>2</sup> could be conceived as a basic science of discourse, an end in itself, divorced, if need be, from practical application in assembly or court. Philodemus

<sup>1</sup> Feeney (1998), 68.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the terms πολιτική and δικαστική which not only denote the art of speech in civic contexts but also connote all aspects of activity in those spheres.

seems to intimate that he is aware of this when he suggests that rhetoric forms part of a person's basic education. As an art of prose, the medium in which even Epicurean philosophers are forced to write, it need be no more objectionable than the art of learning to read or write.

Of course, if Philodemus is not simply reasserting a view explicitly formulated in the works of the Founders but is actually making a creative contribution to Epicurean thought, the assessment of him as a derivative intellect, which is often made, might have to be re-examined. As I suggested in chapter 5, from the manner in which he comments on the citations from the Founders there might be grounds to doubt that his treatise is substantially an echo of Zeno's work. It should not surprise us that Philodemus is anxious to stress the link between himself and the Athenian scholar in a context where orthodoxy is at stake. But Philodemus is equally explicit on the point that Zeno did not compose a formal treatise on the matter under debate.<sup>3</sup> We are therefore left to speculate whether he worked entirely from the notes he might have taken during Zeno's lectures or whether he composed his own exegesis on a series of Epicurean lemmata which Zeno might have assembled previously. At least the discussion of the *Symposium* citation is likely to represent Philodemus' own efforts, because it is to this work that the Rhodian refers on the basis of reports from visitors who have returned to the island from Athens. Philodemus, as I understand him, indicates that the *Symposium* was never intended to be part of the textual support for the thesis that sophistic rhetoric is an art. It should also be remembered that Philodemus was a literary figure, and it is quite possible that he devoted more attention, and took a more original approach, to questions of artistic discourse (in prose as well as poetry) than many other Epicureans before him.

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<sup>3</sup> Rh. 2 PHerc. 1674 col. LIII.12-13 (Longo, 153).

In the first two books of the treatise Philodemus spends less time explaining what sophistic rhetoric is than in pointing out what it is not. The error lies not in the art itself, but the opinions held about that art by its teachers and their students. The significance of Philodemus' point thus concerns not only sophistic rhetoric's true status but also the student's perception of that art. Since there is no secure evidence that any Epicurean groups included instruction in rhetoric within the curriculum of study, we must suppose that Philodemus imagined that his own students had, and would continue to, attend the schools of rhetoricians if they wished to acquire skill in sophistic rhetoric. From this angle, Philodemus' whole discussion of the issue of sophistic assumes an abstruse appearance, of interest to only the most senior members of the Epicurean community, although Philodemus seems to expect that his work will enjoy an international circulation.<sup>4</sup> The passion and stamina which Philodemus displays in his treatment of the subject are fuelled, perhaps, by a desire to justify his own inordinate interest in the aesthetic properties of prose and verse. However, if we assume that Philodemus' geographical location is at all relevant, and that he composed the work in the belief that some of its readers would be Romans, then we might be tempted to search for indications of relevance for that audience. I suspect that Philodemus was largely content to undermine a discipline which constituted philosophy's greatest educational rival at Rome, and to ensure that Romans, who might have travelled to Rhodes and encountered the 'renegade' Epicureans on that island, did not absorb 'unorthodox' views. Perhaps it was even hoped that the confidence and erudition of the treatise would induce prospective Roman students to associate with Campanian Epicureans and not travel abroad.

There are no explicit allusions to a the Roman context in the surviving portions of books 1

<sup>4</sup> [ἀλλὰ χρεῖστα γ' ἔχει λόγου τρυφεῖν. // καὶ πασ[ι]ν τοῖς κα[θ] ἡμᾶς [φιλοσοφοῦσιν], *Rh.* 2 *PHerc.* 1674 coll. LVII.33-LVIII.2 (Longo, 161, 163).

and 2,<sup>5</sup> but Romans who tended to associate intellectual activity with *otium* might have found the general tenor of Philodemus' thesis on sophistic rhetoric appealing. In Epicureanism, Philodemus offers a school of Greek philosophy which does not threaten to infect the institutions and procedures of Roman civic life with foreign innovations. The rejection of political and forensic rhetoric may even signify that Epicureanism is politically neutral, and that its Campanian proponents are not to be alligned politically with prominent Roman figures.<sup>6</sup> If this is indeed the case, Philodemus has proved himself a sensible tactician: he has managed to convey the message that Epicureanism offers no threat to Rome's institutional fabric, yet insists upon the distastefulness of the active life which political and forensic rhetoric are supposed to serve. Epicureanism emerges as a viable alternative, in that it construes leisure as a sphere of virtuous activity. In a sense then, though books 1 and 2 of *On Rhetoric* focus on a recondite aspect of Epicurean doctrine, they also serve as a protreptic to the life of an Epicurean. Had he been watching, even the Founder would have approved.

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<sup>5</sup> Apart from *Rh. 2 PHerc.* 1674 fr. 5.5-10 (Longo, 31); the coupling of Romans and Spartans is probably meant to be flattering, cf. Rawson (1969), 100-104 on Laconism in Roman political thought of the second and first centuries B.C.

<sup>6</sup> Gigante (1984), 289-290 has already argued that Philodemus' *De bono rege*, written for Piso, avoided both a pro-Caesarian and an anti-Antonian position.

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