This paper attempts to estimate the causal effect of government enforcement on compliance with minimum wages in South Africa, a country where considerable non-compliance exists. The number of labour inspectors per capita is used as a proxy for enforcement, whilst non-compliance is measured using an index of violation that measures both the proportion of individuals violated, as well as the average depth of individual violation.
Reference:
Bhorat, H., Kanbur, R., Mayet, N. 2011-12. Estimating the Causal Effect of Enforcement on Minimum Wage Compliance : The Case of South Africa. Development and Poverty Research Unit Working Paper Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 11/145. University of Cape Town.
Bhorat, H., Kanbur, R., & Mayet, N. (2011). Estimating the Causal Effect of Enforcement on Minimum Wage Compliance : The Case of South Africa (Development and Poverty Research Unit Working Paper Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 11/145). University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11427/7291
Bhorat, Haroon, Ravi Kanbur, and Natasha Mayet Estimating the Causal Effect of Enforcement on Minimum Wage Compliance : The Case of South Africa. Development and Poverty Research Unit Working Paper Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 11/145. University of Cape Town ,Faculty of Commerce ,Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/7291
Bhorat H, Kanbur R, Mayet N. Estimating the Causal Effect of Enforcement on Minimum Wage Compliance : The Case of South Africa. 2011 [cited yyyy month dd]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/7291
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International