Amnesty and accountability : a study of the South African amnesty in the light of the Nuremberg Tribunal

Master Thesis

2004

Permanent link to this Item
Authors
Journal Title
Link to Journal
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Publisher

University of Cape Town

License
Series
Abstract
The topic of this Masters mini-dissertation is amnesty and the principle of individual accountability for gross human rights violations. The field in which this topic is located is that of transitional justice. The issue with which this mini-dissertation is concerned is the practical, political and moral problems which states in transition from authoritarian regimes to newly established democratic government based on human rights have experienced in the last three decades when seeking accountability for the past atrocities. These state transitions have significantly employed amnesty as a means to address the need for peace and stability at the end of conflict, but this has tended to foreclose the possibility of holding the previous regime accountable for its legacy of human rights abuse. The historical context of this enquiry is the the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) in Germany 1945 1946, which established a precedent for individual criminal accountability for crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg precedent fundamentally assumed that individuals at every level of the authorisation of crime are accountable for their own actions. Since the Milgram experiment on obedience to orders in the 1960s, social science experiments have shown, however, that individuals acting under orders do not perceive of their moral autonomy as clearly as previously assumed. In the light of the historical transitions since Nuremberg, the recent innovation in the South African Constitution in 1995, which introduces the notion of conditional amnesty, represents a novel attempt to hold individuals accountable. It required individual acknowledgement and full disclosure in public of the responsibility for heinous deeds. This framework also grants amnesty for gross human rights violations committed in the execution of an order of, on behalf of or with the approval of a political organisation. Few commentators have addressed the question of whether such conditional amnesty may be compatible with the Nuremberg model of accountability. The specific task which this mini-dissertation sets out is, therefore, to 1) clarify the concept of accountability, 2) determine in which senses one may hold individuals accountable for their actions, and 3) assess whether, to what extent and how the South African amnesty may achieve the accountability required by a liberal-democratic framework which upholds the moral principle that individuals are responsible for their actions.
Description

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-106).

Reference:

Collections