The Role of Planning in New Urban Settlements:

The case of Nyagatare in post-conflict Rwanda

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Abstract

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The study of urban planning in post-conflict settlements is an area of research that has not yet been thoroughly explored. Yet planning occupies a unique position at the interface between communities, the state, and the physical environment, and is strategically located to deal with many common long-term impacts of conflict in societies. As such it deserves greater attention and consideration for the contribution it can make to reconstruction and peace-building.

This study interrogates the notion of post-conflict urban planning within the case of Nyagatare, Rwanda, a town that has been almost entirely settled by returned refugees and post-conflict migrants since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The town has seen rapid population growth and this year was designated as one of six secondary cities selected for focused investment and further population growth: this post-conflict rise from village to secondary city in less than two decades is unprecedented in Rwanda. Field research was conducted and qualitative data collected through interviews in the field. Further information and analysis came from NGO and government reports, as well as drawing from work by previous researchers. The research found that there are still several lasting impacts from conflict, including disputes over land, weak civil society, weak local democratic process, lack of social cohesion and high rates of social distrust, and suspicious attitudes towards the state. Nyagatare is likely to be a hotspot for resettlement, voluntary or otherwise, of returning refugees who have lost their protected status under the recent invocation of the refugee Cessation Clause by the Government of Rwanda and the UNHCR. Post-conflict impacts are thus likely to be compounded with ongoing influxes of population, both through refugee resettlement and domestic migration. Yet current spatial planning fails to address these impacts of conflict as well as failing to appropriately anticipate the needs of future populations of the town.

This study thus seeks to propose an alternative framework for planning that directly addresses the lasting impacts of conflict. Recommendations for planning include adapting co-production and strategic spatial planning to the local context, incorporating traditional mediation structures to allow for a safe venue for engaging communities. Focused strategic interventions, rather than a master plan, are recommended in order to allow for flexibility and uncertainty as the town grows and society stabilises.

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List of Acronyms

BDC	Business Development Centre
CBD	Community-Based Development
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CLGF	Commonwealth Local Government Forum
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICT	Infromation and Communication Technology
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Integrated Development Programme
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
KCMP	Kigali Conceptual Master Plan
KIST	Kigali Institute of Science and Technology
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government
MININFRA	Ministry of Infrastructure
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NISR	National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda
NSFWUS	National Science Foundation Workshop on Urban Sustainability
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
REMA	Rwanda Environmental Management Agency
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SACCO	Savings and Credit Co-Operative
UN	United Nations
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Chapter 1
Introduction

Dealing with the demands and consequences of ethnic polarisation is probably the most difficult moral dilemma that faces relief and development agencies, as well as urban and social planners, when working in post-conflict reconstruction... in the push to supply relief and implement rehabilitation projects to alleviate people's suffering, we often overlook the potential that physical reconstruction has as a catalyst for peace-building.

Sultan Barakat 1998, 13

Modern-day Rwanda presents a unique case in post-conflict reconstruction and development: despite almost complete devastation from decades of struggle culminating in civil war and genocide, it has managed to recover itself within a relatively short time period so much so that it has one of the strongest economic growth rates in Africa. It also has one of the most rapid urbanisation rates in the world, which has increased exponentially since the genocide of 1994. As a result, there has been greater attention to urban planning in recent years, as part of a twenty-year vision to advance the country to middle-income status in an effort to become the Singapore of Africa.

The country has also been widely lauded for establishing peace and rule of law relatively quickly. This year, in a strong move to demonstrate the country's return to stability, the UNHCR invoked the refugee Cessation Clause, revoking the refugee status of all Rwandan refugees who fled the country between 1959 and 1998. The Government of Rwanda has urged all refugees to return and resettle in a new, united Rwanda. However, despite rapid economic growth and relative stability, there are still many deep and lasting impacts of conflict that lie just below the surface of Rwandan society, and the invocation of the Cessation Clause, in addition to recent conflict with neighbouring DRC, has resulted in increased scrutiny and criticism of the political and security situation in the country.

Within this context, Nyagatare, a relatively young town in the north-east of the country, has emerged as one of six secondary cities designated as focal points for investment and population growth. The town has a unique post-conflict history, in that it has been almost entirely settled since the genocide of 1994, and largely by returning refugees. Since then, the town has also seen many lasting impacts remaining from the conflict: lack of social cohesions, land disputes, rapid population growth, and lack of democratic representation in local government. The town has also been the recipient of a recent comprehensive master plan, in anticipation of future population and economic growth.

The case of Nyagatare has been selected to evaluate the central research question for this dissertation: *what is the role*

of planning in post-conflict settlements? The examination of post-conflict reconstruction is a growing topic of study, although there remains a lack of literature on post-conflict reconstruction in Africa, and especially literature on urban planning in post-conflict contexts. The objective of this dissertation is thus to evaluate the role of planning in a specific post-conflict context, considering precedent and available literature, with the intent of proposing an alternative set of principles for planning in post-conflict contexts.

This document proceeds in six further chapters. Chapter 2 describes the research methodology and particular challenges presented by this case. Chapter 3 sets out available literature on post-conflict reconstruction (broadly), and planning in post-conflict contexts, in an effort to contextualise the current case and to evaluate existing theory. Chapter 4 presents the national and regional context of the study area, paying particular attention to the history of conflict and genocide and the ongoing impacts of conflict on modern society. Chapter 5 presents the case of Nyagatare, an analysis of the study area and a description of resident interviews and field research. Chapter 6 then evaluates and critiques the current master plan for the town, and proposes an alternative framework for post-conflict planning within the context of Nyagatare. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes, ending with recommendations for future research.

Chapter 2
Research Methodology

This chapter describes the methodology used to research the case study of urban planning in Nyagatare, Rwanda, guided by the central research question of: *What is the role of planning in post-conflict settlements within the context of Nyagatare, Rwanda?* The chapter is divided into three sections: first, a description of case study research with a discussion about limitations and justification for it's use for this particular study; second, a presentation of the case, the study area, problems to be investigated, and philosophical position; and finally, a presentation of the research, with a description of the steps taken as well as specific challenges and limitations.

2.1 Case Study Approach

A case study approach was chosen to address the research question. Flyvbjerg (2011, 301) provides the following description: a case study focuses on an "individual unit of study" with set boundaries; it is intensive and carries more depth and detail than a cross-unit study; it stresses "development factors" or the evolution of the case over time; and it is positioned in relationship to a particular context. A case study approach is particularly appropriate in planning research as it allows for the contextual, practical and location-specific testing of planning theory, as well as contributing to planning knowledge.

2.1.1. Limitations

Flyvbjerg (2011) presents five common misunderstandings of case research: that it is not as valuable as theoretical knowledge; that it cannot be generalised and therefore cannot contribute to scientific development; that it is most useful for generating hypotheses; that it contains a bias towards verification; and that it is difficult to develop general theories from specific case studies. While these do present some limitations, Flyvbjerg argues that these factors are not as limiting as commonly understood. First, he argues that case research is more valuable than theoretical knowledge in human affairs because it allows for concrete, context-specific knowledge. Second, he asserts that "formal generalisation is overvalued as a source of scientific development" (Ibid., 305), and that generalisation is not necessarily applicable to the social sciences, as "there does not and probably cannot exist predictive theory in social science" (Ibid., 303). Third, he believes that case studies can both generate and test hypotheses, but is not limited to either of those activities. Fourth, he argues that case study does not contain a greater bias towards verification than any other research methodology, and in fact, from experience, case study shows a greater bias towards falsification of preconceived notions. Finally, he

agrees that it is difficult to summarise and generalise case studies, but that it is not always desirable to do so because case studies are meant to be context-specific. Additionally, case research cannot be generalised to other cases, but it may be generalised to support theories or concepts. Despite the possibility of limitations, case studies do contribute to contextual and practical knowledge that offer an added dimension of applicability through testing theories.

2.1.2. Justification for Case Study Research in Nyagatare, Rwanda

A case study is particularly appropriate for the study of planning in Rwanda. Although Rwanda is similar to other global South countries and faces some similar difficulties to planning and urbanisation, it is unique in its history of conflict (and particularly the nature of conflict) which still pervades all aspects of life, despite the fact that it has been nearly twenty years since there was significant conflict. As theory surrounding planning in post-conflict urban settlements is still quite sparse, a Rwanda case would provide an opportunity to test and suggest modifications or reinterpretations of theory to improve its applicability. And while it may be difficult to generalise principles as in any case study, a Rwanda case would allow for a more robust and complex exploration of different theories.

The particular case of Nyagatare further provides the opportunity to test planning principles and theories in a non-primary city. Kigali has been the focus of attention for planning policy and practice for quite a while, but in Rwanda the secondary cities are beginning to see a significant increase in population and investment, requiring more attention to planning policies. To apply a case study methodology to the study of a non-primary city allows a closer examination of the sorts of post-conflict urban issues that occur in up-and-coming urban settlements that exist outside of the areas of focus of international (and often national) attention. As most development aid and research has focused on either Kigali or rural areas, case research is a valuable means of understanding the specifics of a secondary city (particularly one that stands at the intersection of national urbanisation and economic trends and lasting post-conflict impacts of social distrust, refugee return and competition over land) in order to evaluate planning and post-conflict theory within a very practical context.

2.2 The Case

Nyagatare, Rwanda, is a unique case, as it is a new town established by the return of refugees after the 1994 genocide. Since then it has grown rapidly, and is currently one of the largest secondary cities in Rwanda. It continues to attract significant in-migration, both through continued refugee return as well as domestic migration, often for economic reasons. This year the town was named one of the six secondary cities in Rwanda designated to act as focal points for economic and population growth in order to spread services evenly and draw population growth away from Kigali. Nyagatare is the only town among the six secondary cities to not exist as a significant urban settlement prior to the genocide, and it exhibits the second fastest population growth rate among those towns, as well as being the sixth fastest-growing sector in the nation, in a region exhibiting some of the highest overall growth rates. However, the



Figure 2.1: Map of Rwanda (Source: author; base map sourced from http://d-maps.com/pays.php?num_pay=49&lang=en)

town is effected by many lasting impacts from decades of conflict, including social distrust, competition over land and resources, and lack of local political representation. As population continues to grow rapidly these problems are likely to become more compounded. Nyagatare is also one of several towns to have completed a master plan in recent years; however, the master plan fails to address post-conflict issues and in some cases proposes interventions that may actually exacerbate these issues. Although there is not a great deal of study that has gone into planning in post-conflict communities, planning is well-situated to deal with some of the ongoing impacts of conflict. Nyagatare presents an important locus for exploring theory about post-conflict planning, as it is emerging as an increasingly significant settlement within the region.

2.2.1. Study Area

Nyagatare town is located within Nyagatare Sector, Nyagatare District, in the Eastern Province of Rwanda (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The District borders both Uganda and Tanzania, and Nyagatare town is located close to both borders.

The town has greatest functional connectivity across the Ugandan border, through both formal and informal border crossings. The town is located in a region that historically has remained very sparsely populated and almost entirely rural, but because of returning refugees, and migrants escaping land scarcity in other parts of the country, the region has seen some of the highest population growth rates in the country. Nyagatare town is the largest and most significant urban settlement within this quickly-growing region, although it still remains very sprawling and rural and agricultural in character. As there are no official town boundaries, it is difficult to define exactly the study area, but for clarity and continuity, the study area for this research will constitute the area within the boundaries defined by the 2009 Nyagatare Master Plan (see Figure 2.3). This is distinct from other potential boundaries, particularly the Sector boundary, or the District boundary, or the urban area boundary defined by the National Land Use Plan. The study area thus incorporates not only the town proper, but a large peri-urban area, several villages, and a trading centre (Ryabega) that is formally considered part of the town. The study area is also considered in relationship to its surroundings, as it maintains strong rural-urban links, especially as it is the regional centre for many facilities and services throughout District.



Figure 2.2: Map of Eastern Province (Source: author)

2.3 Philosophical Position

In describing my philosophical position as a researcher, it is important to first acknowledge that I am approaching this case as an outsider. In addition to six weeks spent in Rwanda to conduct field research for this dissertation, I previously lived in Nyagatare for a year in 2009, so I am familiar with the area. Despite familiarity, however, I am still disadvantaged by the fact that I am not Rwandese, I do not speak Kinyarwanda, and I have not had the same significant life experiences that most Rwandese have, particularly around conflict and genocide. So it is important that I acknowledge that my understanding of some issues lacks the intimate knowledge and involvement inherent in membership within the country or community. However, I also believe that my position as an outsider offers some advantages, particularly as I may have more freedom to publicly discuss issues that may be branded as contentious (see Section 2.4.3.1 for more discussion about this and specific challenges of conducting research in Rwanda). Additionally, I hope that my research shows rigour in considering the stated opinions and analyses of residents, leaders, and previous researchers (both Rwandan and outside researchers) to arrive at conclusions. The following sections further describe the values that inform this research.



Figure 2.3: The study area (Source: the author).

2.3.1. Governance, Conflict, and Urbanisation

Additionally, considering the case, it is important to also state values that may specifically relate to a post-conflict context. I believe that it is critically important for the sustainability of society and settlement for residents to be able to express agency in their involvement in the city, and for planning policies and interventions to thus maintain a careful balance between creating necessary restrictions and guidelines in response to macro concerns and allowing for freedom of expression and involvement in the city. This presumes a degree of democratic representation at the local level. However, I also believe it is important to evaluate democratic values on a case-by-case basis, and the case of Rwanda offers some specific challenges to full and free democracy, specifically the potential for ethnic conflict and ethnic-based voting. As such, it is understandable to a point that local representation is not fully democratic, and that decentralisation has been moving at a snails pace compared to other national structural changes. However, governance in Rwanda has trended

towards more authoritarianism and not less, calling into question whether the notion of democratic representation is even being considered as a long-term goal. This dissertation is thus guided by a recognition of the value of democratic representation, appropriately interpreted for the specific context of a society still struggling with past ethnic conflict, but with the goal of gradually becoming more democratic. Urbanisation and urban governance has an important role to play in this transition towards democracy.

2.3.2. Social Sensitivity

Similarly, it is important to recognise the sensitivity of issues that are being dealt with here, particularly social cohesion and distrust. In Rwanda, killings were not conducted primarily by the government, an army or a militia, but by average people who were in many cases coerced to kill those in their community. As a result, the impacts of violence have intricately and complexly affected nearly everyone. A study on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in Rwanda found that 94.1% of respondents reported witnessing at least one traumatic event (Pham, et.al. 2004), while another study in 2008 found that 40% of respondents reported witnessing the murder of a close family relative (Cowen 2012). Today victims and killers live side-by-side, as the death penalty was abolished after the genocide, and perpetrators often go back to their home communities once they are released from prison. Thus the reality of genocide lives on almost twenty years on, and will likely continue to be a significant element in Rwandan life for several generations to come. This is important to note as it has significant implications for social life in Rwanda, and consequently for planning policies that may assume strong civil society. The impact of violence and conflict on community cohesion and involvement should thus not be taken for granted, if for no other reason than because an inconsiderate approach may put too much of a strain on peace and actually exacerbate problems.

2.3.3. Sustainability

Broadly, sustainability also forms a primary value guiding research. Sustainability here refers to the preservation and maintenance of reproduction of ecological, economic, and social aspects. Sustainability extends beyond purely ecological functions, as ecology, economy, and society represent complex and interconnected systems that have significant impacts upon each other. Edgar Pieterse notes that current understandings of sustainability often presuppose an end goal (that is, 'development') as well as rely too heavily on "extractive capitalism", while in fact "the very model of ever greater consumption is treated as an economic non-negotiable even though it has and will continue to destroy various ecosystem service systems beyond repair or adaptation" (Pieterse 2011, 310). He proposes a different definition of sustainability that focuses not on sustainable development, but on sustainable lives and livelihoods. This refers to "processes of social and ecological reproduction situated within diverse spatial contexts" (NSFWUS 2000, 7). This definition redirects from extractive processes and towards reproductive processes, which better enables actual sustainability. Particularly in the case of Rwanda, where competition over land and resources is considered to have been one of the causes of conflict, a rigorous understanding of sustainability is critical.

2.4. Research

The following section describes the steps taken to conduct research. Research included a review of relevant literature, analysis of quantitative data, and field research consisting of several interviews with residents, professionals and community leaders.

2.4.1. Literature Review

The literature review consists of an overview of relevant literature found on post-conflict reconstruction, urban planning for post-conflict contexts, and urban planning for specific issues relevant to post-conflict communities. As there is very little theory available on post-conflict planning, much of the literature reviewed consisted of descriptive analysis or case studies. Theories around social capital and co-production were also evaluated for their relevance to conflict-related issues of social fragmentation. The following keywords were used in various combinations to search for relevant literature: *urban planning and post-war, post-conflict, refugees, post-conflict migration, migration, immigrants*, and *social capital.* Additionally, the following keywords were used in various combinations to search: *public space, social cohesion, social capital, reconstruction, urban society, migration, refugees, urban violence, land reform, genocide and environment, urban complexity, global South, repatriation, settlement*, and *returned refugees*. Specific case studies were also searched for and selected based on their relevance to the case of Nyagatare. Besides the case studies in Afghanistan and Burundi that are presented in the literature review, case studies in other post-conflict societies were considered, but were not included for lack of space or lack of relevance. Other case studies considered include Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Juba, Somalia and Somaliland, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon.

2.4.2. Data Collection

All primary research was qualitative, in the form of interviews conducted during field research. Quantitative data was sourced from government statistical surveys, reports, and NGO reports, as well as data from the CIA World Factbook, UN, the World Bank and other international organisations. Given the political climate in the country there are certain topics that are taboo and therefore there is a lack of legitimate data for these issues, particularly regarding ethnicity.

2.4.2.1. Interviews

Interviews were conducted over the course of six weeks in June and July of 2013. There were four sections of interviews: resident interview/surveys, focus groups, local authority interviews, and planning professional interviews. Additionally, there was information gathered through observation and informal conversations.

Resident interviews

For resident interviews, fifteen residents were interviewed. Prior to conducting interviews, objectives were set for who to interview in order to gain a broad perspective from a wide variety of residents. However, some of these people

were not available to be interviewed, and others players emerged as important during my time in town. The following residents were interviewed:

Resident 1.	Market worker
Resident 2.	Market worker
Resident 3.	Market worker
Resident 4.	Market worker
Resident 5.	Market worker
Resident 6.	University student
Resident 7.	University student
Resident 8.	University student
Resident 9.	Moto driver
Resident 10.	Moto driver
Resident 11.	Restaurant owner
Resident 12.	Shop owner
Resident 13.	Farmer
Resident 14.	Farmer
Resident 15.	Farmer's son and university student

Focus groups

Two focus groups were conducted at a secondary school: one group with teachers, and another group with students. The teacher focus group was a round-table discussion about students, staff, and education. The student focus group was conducted as a workshop, with mapping, analysis, and visioning exercises, in an attempt to understand how youth engage with their environment. Both focus groups were conducted entirely in English.

Local authority interviews.

There were five local authority interviews conducted in Nyagatare:

1. An employee at a state-sponsored savings and credit cooperative (SACCO)
2. A manager at a local dairy
3. A manager at Nyagatare Business Development Centre (BDC)
4. Secondary school headmaster
5. Executive secretary of Nyagatare Sector.

These interviews did not follow a set list of questions, but were intended to gauge how such authorities viewed the town, how their specific industries or services might benefit the town or benefit from the town, and what particular problems they might see in town. All local authority interviews were conducted in English.

Planning professional interviews.

Planning and design interviews were conducted with a variety of people in Kigali who could give insight into national

trends of planning and design. These interviews were:

1. Advisor to the Minister of Infrastructure
2. Former land appraiser and wife, who works in the education sector
3. Foreign architectural professional and lecturer at Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST)
4. Current architecture student at the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST)

These interviews and conversations were conducted entirely in English.

Notable omissions:

Despite repeatedly attempting to make contact, I was not able to sit down for a meeting with any staff responsible for land use or planning in the Nyagatare District office.

Ethics

All interviewees were given an ethics form or were explained verbally the contents of the ethics form, and verbal consent was received prior to continuing with interviews. Copies of ethics forms were left with respondents if they requested it. For interviews conducted in Kinyarwanda, the ethics form was explained by the translator, and consent received through the translator. Prior to conducting any interviews, the translator was fully briefed on the importance of explaining the ethics form and receiving consent. All interviewees agreed to the terms of the ethics form.

2.4.3. Problems and Challenges

Time was a limitation to the study: full-time work on research and writing was limited to five months between May and October, and field research was limited to six weeks. Additionally, there is the limitation of language: Kinyarwanda, English and French are used widely throughout Rwanda - many Rwandans speak English, but many do not speak it fluently enough to comfortably engage in interviews in English. As my Kinyarwanda and French are even more limited, I hired an interpreter who assisted for a week and a half during the bulk of the resident interviews in Nyagatare. Additionally, some government documents are only available in French, including the Nyagatare Master Plan. For these I utilised internet translation services and relied on the help of some French-speaking friends for added assistance.

2.4.3.1. Difficulties of Conducting Research in Post-conflict Rwanda

Because of the nature of the impact of conflict on Rwandan society, there are some very specific difficulties in conducting research there. Political repression is a significant concern in Rwanda, and based on reports (Gettleman 2010, Buckley-Zistel 2006) as well as prior personal experience, most people do not feel free to openly discuss matters relating to history or politics. “Ethnicity” has been banned, and as such, individuals may not openly identify themselves as one ethnicity or another out of fear of imprisonment (Lacey 2004), and I as a researcher am not able to ask what someone’s ethnicity is. In 2008 the government passed a law criminalising the perpetuation of “genocide ideology”, a vague and

controversial piece of legislation that has been used to justify the questionable imprisonment of many people (Amnesty International 2010). People are often detained or imprisoned on trumped-up charges or for extremely minor infractions – a reality I personally saw during my previous time in Rwanda. Emails and phone calls are rumoured to be under state surveillance. Researchers, both foreign and national, have been known to be blacklisted for producing contradictory or controversial research (see Ansoms 2009, 290); Alison des Forges, a prominent researcher on Rwandan history and an expert witness for the ICTR, was blacklisted after being accused of 'genocide ideology' over her research that found that "progress in the justice sector was insufficient to assure fair trials in high-profile genocide cases" (Amnesty International 2010, 30).

As a result of such stringent controls on expression, there is a tangible sense of reservation in discussing matters freely, and as a result, it was clear from the start of this research that it may not be possible to rely on resident interviews for particularly in-depth information. What I found when I conducted interviews was that people tended to toe the line in their responses. That I was unknown to interviewees and that I arrived at interviews with a signed ethics form, a voice recorder, and permission from the local government office to conduct research, likely did not set respondents' minds at ease. As a result, while there was some useful information gathered in interviews, topics of conflict and reconstruction were hardly touched on, and instead responses focused more on very a-political matters of daily lives. By contrast, I found that informal conversations with people I had known previously were surprisingly revealing, likely exactly because they were not recorded, and because I was known and trusted.

I anticipated that asking pointed questions about conflict and reconstruction might instantly alienate respondents and likely would not be approved by the official who granted me permission to conduct research. So questions were intentionally formulated to deal more indirectly with residents' lives and engagement with the town. As a result, I accept that as a researcher I did not have as much control over the direction of the interviews, and was relying heavily on the respondents to direct topics and to raise issues. Their responses have proven to be a much more significant input to *planning* objectives, while lending indirect support to the *post-conflict* argument. However, the avoidance of topics of conflict and genocide is also telling, as it supports Veale's (2000) findings in her research regarding the notion of 'community' in post-conflict Rwanda that people tend to actively avoid expressions of disagreement, and that "giving voice to 'difference' is too psychologically threatening" (Ibid., 238). As conflict in Rwanda was deeply rooted in identity and perceived interpersonal differences, and as post-conflict community has been challenged by "tensions as people situated their identity within communities with respect to past violence, either as a survivor or perpetrator" (Ibid., 236), even a nominal discussion regarding conflict and genocide puts people in a place of felt insecurity and discomfort. In contemporary Rwanda, the public discourse around genocide (and memorialisation of genocide) is tightly structured: every April the "Genocide Against the Tutsi" as it is officially called, is commemorated with billboards, speeches, memorial services, and banners mounted on countless school fences, government buildings, and other public facilities throughout the country. Perhaps the only known arena for open debate was in community *gacaca* courts, which are now closed. The strict structuring of public discourse about the genocide thus leaves little room for expressions of individuality, let alone differing opinions, no matter how slight. That interviews overwhelmingly sidestepped this issue is thus not particularly surprising.

Conclusion

The research methodology presented in this chapter has guided the development of this dissertation. Using a case study approach, this study seeks to answer the question: *What is the role of planning in post-conflict settlements within the context of Nyagatare, Rwanda?* There were several limitations to the research, particularly the field research and interviews, although these limitations are in line with other researchers' findings and experiences in Rwanda. While they presented a problem to the use of primary research for drawing conclusions, there was enough content available in the interviews as well as other secondary research to support evidence of post-conflict issues in Rwanda.

The following chapter will present a review of relevant literature selected to guide the understanding of planning in post-conflict contexts.

Chapter 3
Literature Review

While rebuilding settlement and society after war and conflict has been a significant challenge in recent decades, particularly in Africa, there is a gap in the literature around settlement planning in post-conflict contexts. The complexity of planning in such contexts is especially pertinent since recent conflicts are characterised as being largely intra-national and identity-based; such conflicts have huge implications for social cohesion and the process and implementation of the design of cities that must be built or re-built for a society that was previously at war with itself. However, planning is strategically positioned to have a significant impact on the long-term stability and sustainability of settlements, and subsequently the long-term stability of society.

This chapter thus seeks to contextualise the complexities of planning for post-conflict settlements in two parts. The first section will consist of an examination of post-conflict reconstruction literature. As the literature is extremely broad and multi-faceted, this section will present a very brief overview of processes and issues raised in post-conflict reconstruction, followed by a more focused look at issues in social and physical reconstruction. The second section will piece together what available literature there is on post-conflict planning, with a focus on a few case studies, and an examination of the process and plan for post-conflict settlements.

3.1 Post-conflict Reconstruction Literature

Literature and research around post-conflict reconstruction has steadily become more robust in time, seeing a period of growth especially following the outbreak of wars in the early 1990s, and particularly looking at such places as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and later Iraq. As research interest in the field of post-conflict reconstruction has grown, there have been more and more calls for greater understanding of the specifics and complexities of rebuilding after large-scale social, physical and political disruption. Even though modern conflicts tend to occur primarily within national borders, the increased involvement of the international community (in humanitarian and military aid), as well as the many impacts on larger regions (particularly as a result of refugee movement) has contributed to this interest in research. However, there still remains a paucity of research on post-conflict reconstruction in Africa, where conflicts are not only often identity-based and intra-national but are also characterised by pre-existing high levels of migration, weak states, and high levels of informality.

Barakat and Zyck (2009, 1071-1072) describe the aim of post-conflict recovery as “to reactivate economic and

social development... and to create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence." Post-conflict reconstruction is generally considered to occur in three stages: first, the initial, emergency response that may include military intervention, basic security, and emergency humanitarian aid; second, the transition phase as institutions, economy, social services, and settlements and infrastructure are rebuilt; and third, the development or sustainability phase, as focus turns to long-term stabilisation and the prevention of future conflicts (Anderlini and El-Bushra 2004, Kimathi 2010). NEPAD (2005, 3) offers the following definition for post-conflict reconstruction:

> Post-conflict reconstruction is understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoiding a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction is ultimately aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction systems proceed through the broad phases, namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase: however, they should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear boundaries.

This ambiguity in temporal and spatial boundaries is complicated by the objectives of post-conflict reconstruction. As Kimathi (2010) points out, the end of the post-conflict era is often marked by a return to normalcy, or in other words, an end to the characteristics that distinguish a society at conflict from a society at peace. However, a return to normalcy may be difficult to designate for regions that have been subject to violence and unrest for much longer than the actual conflict period. In such cases, the post-conflict era "might therefore be arbitrarily demarcated for various reasons, including donor fatigue or new emergencies occurring elsewhere, at which point national governments and local actors are left largely on their own to continue with the reconstruction agenda" (Kimathi 2010, 3), and, specifically in Africa, "the return to normalcy theory... is likely to be contested and therefore by extension the conventional notion of post-conflict reconstruction" (Ibid., 4).

This uncertainty as to the 'end of post-conflict recovery' is also present throughout post-conflict reconstruction literature, as most authors tend to focus on the period of international aid and initial stabilisation. As there are undoubtedly conflict-related issues in post-conflict society that perpetuate far beyond the reach of humanitarian aid, it is important to draw some attention to the *development* phase of post-conflict reconstruction, and particularly the stabilisation and sustainability of society and institutions. This phase may present the most daunting challenges as it is imperative to develop not only functioning systems that are increasingly dependent from international aid, but also to focus on the prevention of future conflict. Bigombe, et.al. (2000) observe that globally, 31% of conflicts re-start within ten years of the initial peace, while in Africa, half of all conflicts resume within ten years. As such, "the harder task is probably not to reach peace but to sustain it" (Ibid., 323).

Post-conflict reconstruction literature thus offers a broad range of solutions for long-term reconstruction and stabilisation. The UN's (1996) *Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities* lists as long-term reconstruction activities the design of economic policy, physical settlement rebuilding, capacity-building, management of environmental issues

and rehabilitation of civil society. Others argue for an understanding of the complexity of issues that led to conflict and hence influence the track of reconstruction. Barakat and Chard (2002, 818) point out that war "is not a single catastrophic event but a devastating way of life closely associated with chronic poverty and social injustice. Peace is not a quick fix but a development process that begins and can be nurtured long before ceasefires are brokered, and which needs to be sustained through years of 'post-war recovery'." Barakat and Chard also call for more vigorous interrogation into the concepts of capacity-building, institutions, governance and civil society in a post-conflict context. Both Brauer and Dunne (2011) and Pelling, et. al. (2002) argue for an increased understanding of the deep and long-lasting economic impact of disasters and subsequent influence on peace and stabilisation. The issue of land-related conflicts is also explored, with a UN-HABITAT (2007) handbook on land administration pointing out that the perception of land as a dwindling resource (a perception exacerbated by post-conflict migration and population growth) can often contribute to violent conflict.

However, what is most pertinent for this study is not necessarily the concepts of institutional or economic reconstruction or the involvement of international donors, but the nature of social reconstruction and the relationship this has with the built environment. The following section will examine the social factor within post-conflict reconstruction literature, which will contextualise the literature on planning and settlement-building in post-conflict societies.

3.1.1. Social Recovery

A more complex understanding of the social factor is critical in the challenge for reconstruction. In identity-based wars where conflict may have been focused around the intentional breakdown and marginalisation of social relations, this attention to social complexity is especially pertinent, as neglect may seriously undermine long-term stabilisation efforts. Barakat and Chard (2002, 826) assert that:

> The circumstances of a war-torn society are only 'special'... compared with those of countries devastated and impoverished by economic crisis or natural disasters, in one key aspect: the extent of the damage done to social relations by the violence and therefore the fragility and fragmentation of its institutions, from the family, the traditional organisation of local communities, to the institutions of government... The other less tangible but more significant aspect is the breakdown of trust in human relations and confidence in planning for the future.

Similarly, the UN *Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities* points out that as conflicts increasingly stem from social origins, "The need to heal the social fabric of societies, to foster the re-establishment of relations among groups that were previously in conflict, to strengthen the civil institutions that represent them and to promote participation of the population in the formulation of rehabilitation programmes may be decisive in avoiding a recurrence of the conflict" (UN 1996, 59).

However, *how* to 'heal the social fabric of societies' is a point of debate. It's generally considered that community reconstruction is more easily accomplished among "homogeneous, tight-knit communities" (Storr and Haeffele-Balch 2012, 296), and community attachment leads to high levels of social cohesion, less fear of crime, and "more outward signs of physical revitalisation" (Manzo and Perkins 2006, 338). Yet many post-conflict communities are characterised by a lack of social cohesion compounded by poverty, insecurity, and significant demographic change and migration. In addition, needs and motivations of individuals in response to conflicts are often widely varied and complex, particularly for vulnerable populations. An unfortunate side-effect of conflict is often the increase in vulnerability of women and children. Koen (2006, 1) points out that, in armed conflict, "women and children are more likely to be subjected to disappearances, hostage-taking, torture, imprisonment, sexual- and gender-based violence, forced recruitment into the armed forces and displacement." The marginalisation and victimisation of women and children, and in many cases the loss of men in conflict, severely undermines social order and acts as a hindrance to reconstruction. In her report on the impact of conflict on children, Graça Machel (2000, 43) declared that reconstruction must "look beyond physical structures and establish a culture of human rights that provides a safe, nurturing environment for children and promotes social and economic policies that protect them." UNICEF's ten-year review of Machel's report went further in asserting that "Children and young people must play a key role in this process [of building peace] – not only because peace and security are basic ingredients for the full realisation of children's rights but because children are such a large proportion of the world's people" (UNICEF 2009, 172). Furthermore, the presence of a diaspora often contributes to the undermining of security. Examining the recent phenomenon of the modern African diaspora, Mohamoud (2006) argues that a country with a large diaspora is more likely to experience prolonged conflict. He asserts that diaspora populations are widely diverse and that "diaspora groups, thanks to inexpensive transportation and rapid communication, are exerting increasing influence on the politics of their homelands, sometimes with destructive consequences" (Ibid., 2). The contribution of diaspora communities to ongoing conflict is also pointed out by Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000).

Despite the apparent advantage of homogeneous communities in reconstruction, Storr and Haeffele-Balch (2012, 297) argue that "it is possible for heterogeneous, loosely connected communities not only to gain access to the resources that they need to bring about community rebound but also to overcome the collective action problem that often complicates recovery in post-disaster contexts." Storr and Haeffele-Balch are writing here about reconstruction after natural disasters, which admittedly is faced with very different social and communal challenges than post-war reconstruction. But their assertion does have a point for post-conflict reconstruction, in part because loose social and communal organisation implies that members within the communities are often connected to resources outside of the community that may assist in rebuilding. Building community-based organisations can help to make use of these outside connections in harnessing assistance for reconstruction for the whole community.

Essentially, Storr and Haeffele-Balch are arguing for the importance of recognising *social capital,* or "the resources that are associated with membership in some particular network that individuals use as they pursue their goals" (Storr and Haeffele-Balch 2012, 298). Based on Woolcock's (2001) definition of social capital, they identify three types of social capital: *bonding*, or "the strong links that exist between like-minded individuals in homogeneous groups"; *bridging*,

or “the weak ties that exist between the members of heterogeneous groups”; and *linking*, “the connections that exist between individuals from completely different social settings or communities” (Storr and Haeffele-Balch 2012, 298). Rydin and Holman (2004) offer a similar understanding of social capital, but rather than a third element of linking social capital, they contribute the notion of *bracing* social capital, which is “primarily concerned to strengthen links across and between scales and sectors but only operates within a limited set of actors. It provides a kind of social scaffolding” (Ibid., 123). The distinctions between bonding, bridging, and bracing social capital are described in Table 3.1. Specifically, bridging capital is meant to fill in the gap between bonding and bridging capital, filling the role of:

> ...the cross-sectoral, cross-scale horizontal and vertical linkages that are involved in many partnership or governance initiatives. Such linkages go beyond the bonding of any specific group but are more specific than suggested by the rather broad concept of bridging. The use of bracing capital encourages common values and norms among those linked together, but may be more strategic and less all-embracing than suggested in the case of bonding capital (Ibid., 123-124).

	Bonding Social Capital	**Bridging Social Capital**	**Bracing Social Capital**
Key metaphor	A kind of ‘glue’ used to bring people closer together and make them one entity	Bridges are built out to other people and places, often unknown and different people and places	An engineering metaphor suggesting the strengthening of a ‘scaffold’ of connections between a limited group of people or places, some closer together and others further apart
Nature of network involved	Dense, relatively limited network	Extensive; lots of contacts; not very dense	Not extensive; variably dense across the network
Role of norms and values	Common norms central to binding actors together	Given less emphasis on the network of linkages	Common norms important in making relationships effective but often strategic in nature
Boundaries involved	Central to defining who is within the group to coalesce	Less significant: bridging can occur across several boundaries	Boundary defined by those required for policy problem at hand
Role of place and territory	Often group is territorially based	Less significant	Policy problem may be location specific but actors need not be
Scales of operation of social capital	Macro *or* micro; often micro	Macro *or* micro	Tends to be cross-scale
Type of linkage involved	Horizontal	Horizontal	Vertical and horizontal
Involvement of sectors: state/economy/civil society	Usually one sector	One sector or multi-sector	Usually multi-sector

Table 3.1: A typology of social capital (Source: Rydin and Holman 2004, 123)

Rydin and Holman point out that most previous foci on social capital in community projects has looked primarily at bonding, or strengthening connections within communities. They warn that this can be harmful, as it ignores the

"potential 'dark side' of social capital", or social capital "based on fear, mistrust, hate and a desire to protect a group from the outside", rather than social capital based on "trust, understanding, compassion and inclusion" (Ibid., 119). Rydin and Holman's point is particularly important to note in cases of recovery from identity-based conflict, where strengthening bonding social capital could actually lead to further social splintering.

However, both Storr and Haeffele-Balch and Rydin and Holman point out that different types of social capital may be beneficial in different development circumstances. In a case study looking at recovery in a community damaged by Hurricane Katrina, Storr and Haeffele-Balch demonstrate that despite the diversity and loose connections of the community, linking social capital was leveraged so that the community was able to recover more quickly than other, more tightly connected communities. Stewart (2011) reinforces this notion in her examination of agency among Guatemalan refugees: she found that refugees were able to exhibit agency and self-improvement in exile, and their development of bonding and linking social capital assisted in development in their home country upon their return:

> In exile, refugees developed close bonds with one another and formed an array of organisations that created the convergence of interests and identity. The resultant associational density known as bonding capital was critical in leveraging their political capital. But this associational density did not develop in a vacuum. Through their connections with the Catholic Church, the United Nations, the Mexican government, and an array of NGOs, refugees had access to resources and ideas that allowed them to congregate, develop consensus, and build a political platform. Without this crucial linking capital these other accomplishments would not have been possible (Stewart 2011, 250-251).

Rydin and Holman assert that bonding capital is well-positioned to support grassroots development and community participation, and bridging capital may offer more opportunities to connect with agencies and NGOs. In short, "social capital is not really one tool at all but rather a variety of strategies, each of which needs to be tailored to the specific policy problem at hand and the specific local context" (Rydin and Holman 2004, 131).

The following section will narrow focus onto planning for post-conflict settlements, and the issue of social capital within reconstruction efforts will be revisited there.

3.2 Planning in Post-conflict Settlements

Planning in post-conflict settlements poses several challenges, given the unique impact of conflict on urban areas. Urban populations are more dependent on their infrastructural environment and thus more vulnerable to the impact of conflict on built environments. After conflicts there is often an influx of population, particularly as returning refugees have been shown to predominantly prefer to resettle in urban areas, even when they previously lived in rural areas (Stepputant 2004, 17). Conflicts can also often be caused or exacerbated by resource and land constraints in both rural and urban areas. Unfortunately, literature on settlement-planning in post-conflict societies is harder to come

by. Most available literature is in the form of handbooks and guides and focuses primarily on emergency measures for infrastructure reconstruction or housing (emergency, transitional and permanent) provision. While there is no theoretical literature on post-conflict planning, there is some descriptive literature around planning and city-building in post-conflict Balkans (Hackenbroich, et.al., 2008) and Afghanistan (Barakat 1998, Vöckler 2008), as well as the post-war planning effort that emerged in Britain after World War II (Taylor 1998). There are also some useful case studies from Kabul and Burundi, detailed later in this section.

Despite the scarcity and broadness of the literature, there are lessons that can be drawn from these pieces. Taylor (1998) describes post-war planning in Britain as primarily emphasising the physical design of cities, and decidedly not concerned with economic, social, or political planning. Utopianism in urban design was popular during that time, as was the idea that planning for towns and cities must be done comprehensively, and "showing the same degree of precision in the spatial configuration of land uses and urban form as the 'end-state' blueprint plans produced by architects or engineers when designing buildings" (Ibid., 5). Similarly, there was little consideration for maintaining existing settlements, as these were seen as so "deficient" that "it was better to clear everything away and plan 'from a clean state'" (Ibid., 25). Although there were several criticisms that emerged in response to this style of planning, perhaps the most pertinent for the purposes of this review is the critique of the way existing social lives were handled in re-establishing communities. Taylor points out that the principles of planning were considered to be 'common sense' and widely shared throughout society, so planning theorists did not consider the challenge of planning to be anything greater than "finding the 'technical' means to achieve given objectives, not debating these objectives themselves" (Ibid., 34). However, it was asserted that, while people often had better environments to live in as a result of planning projects, they frequently lost social networks as a result of planned displacement. Additionally, planning tended towards physical determinism, an over-reliance on the assumption that community could be created by social facilities, that "the layout and form of the physical environment would shape, even 'determine', the quality of social life" (Ibid., 42). The Labour Minister for Town and Country Planning at the time was quoted as saying "I think it is necessary to lead the citizen – to guide him. The citizen does not always know exactly what is best" (Ibid., 43). When concerns for local community did begin to make their way into planning in the 1960s, it was still common to consider 'the public' as a unified group. As a result, planning theory "was accused of failing to appreciate the differential distributive effects of planning action on various social groups holding different, and sometimes conflicting, values and interests" (Ibid., 51).

Hackenbroich, Fuchs and Vöckler (2008, 152) assert that "Planning in post-crisis situations goes far beyond the creation of more secure and improved living conditions and includes the promise of a better future." Yet the speed of rebuilding after conflicts often overlooks inhabitant's visions of the future and instead development takes the shape of "Dubai-style" commercial buildings. But "an urban vision cannot be implemented everywhere as a modernistic tabula rasa fantasy (as continues to be done today in the form of hardly feasible megaprojects for and by local city governments), but must rather be adapted to relevant varied cultural, social and economic parameters" (Ibid.).

It is also critical to note the challenge of *uncertainty* placed on planning in post-conflict contexts. Bollens (2008, 1257) calls this "urbanism amidst uncertainty and flux" and draws a strong connection between the formation of democracy

and the planning and management of city spaces. He points out, however, that this context of uncertainty may actually be useful in determining the role of planning and urban settlements in rebuilding (Ibid.):

> I have found in earlier research on ethnically contested and unsettled cities... that extreme circumstances reveal ordinary truths. Unsettled urban contexts can illuminate the basic relationships between urban policy and political power far better than in more mature, settled contexts when these relationships become obfuscated and of greater complexity.

Further, based on his research in Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Belfast, Cyprus, Spain, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jerusalem and Beirut, Bollens (2012) puts forward a set of seven urban planning principles intended to mitigate tension in cities engaged in inter-group conflict. They are (quoted and summarised here from pages 236-249):

1. Engage in equity planning that addresses underlying root issues: Policy-making aimed at the urban symptoms of inequality should be linked with policies that directly confront the structural power imbalances that are at the root of inter-group conflict and violence.
2. Use planning process and deliberations to empower marginalised groups: The planning process should be positioned not as a technical exercise, but as a social, political, and organisational mechanism that can increase feelings of inclusion, recognition, and group self-worth.
3. Create flexibility and porosity of urban form: Creating flexibility and porosity of urban form should not be confused with integration of individuals and groups. Indeed, inter-group segregation is an important means for stability in the short term.
4. Intervene in city landscape with sensitivity to differences across sectarian geographies: Planners should be cognisant of differences between urban ethnic homelands and frontiers and between 'hard' and 'soft' interfaces.
5. Protect and promote the collective public sphere
6. Emphasise short-term tactical physical interventions while articulating a peace-promoting long-range strategic vision: Long-range visions should clearly demarcate a break from the past and articulate a shared city, while short-term physical interventions should make visible principles of inter-group coexistence and tolerance.
7. Encourage the diffusion of grassroots peace-building initiatives

3.2.1. The Post-conflict Plan: Process

Social capital, as described in the previous section, is an important concept to consider in planning for post-conflict settlements. Manzo and Perkins (2006) focus on the concept of *place attachment* and the significance of the relationship between social connection, community development, and psychology of place. They point out, importantly, that "the sharing of a common neighbourhood space by diverse groups does not inevitably lead to a sense of community" (Ibid, 338). However, "Many studies of urban crises are rooted in a perspective that views individual place experience, social movements, and the political economy as separate systems... [but] we need a more integrated view of community life...

that recognises the value of personal experience, attachments, and meaning on one hand and larger political-economic forces on the other" (Ibid., 340). The authors recognise participation as a behavioural manifestation of both community and place attachment, and draw attention to both Davidoff's assertion that planners should act as advocates in order to incorporate the needs of under-represented groups, as well as Sandercock's and Forsythe's argument for advocate planning for "multiple publics" (Sandercock and Forsythe 1992, 45). Manzo and Perkins argue that social capital can be used and created through participatory planning, pointing out that formal participation may be particularly useful for creating social capital in contentious communities, as "it is easier for community members to come together in formal associations when they focus on their shared investment in the local environment and its value in their lives as residents" (Manzo and Perkins 2006, 342). Additionally, Bollens points out that "In cities of nationalistic group identities, public participation from the start is vital in urbanism processes. Independent of the project's benefits themselves, this participation in deliberations is of vital significance in reconstructing a traumatised or torn city because it demonstrates how democratic process works" (Bollens 2012, 238).

Two case studies in post-conflict planning and reconstruction illustrate this last point well. Barakat (1998) describes a project in Kabul, where architects and engineers working for the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) focused on both physical rehabilitation and peace-building. The programme worked with urban management institutions to launch a neighbourhood action programme to repair infrastructure. But "an important secondary aim of this programme was to help restore a degree of social organisation in the involved communities... urban families can come together to identify their own needs and implement small-scale activities in a manner that will be compatible with the broader process of urban management" (Ibid., 14). The project, though small to start out, evolved into a broader and more expansive programme in response to community need. The community's expectations and commitment increased as they witnessed the urban environment improving, and "as the benefits became manifest and the news spread, the programme was in a position to attempt to bridge the ethnic and political gap between communities" (Ibid., 15). Barakat points out that the intervention "needed little technical or financial input but a great deal of cultural understanding and mediation skills" (Ibid.).

In another case in Burundi, Vervisch et.al. (2013) evaluated several NGO interventions and interrogated the assumptions about social capital that informed the projects. The projects relied on a community-based development (CBD) methodology, which integrates local participatory structures in order to increase social cohesion. However, the authors criticise the projects for accepting the notion of social capital without interrogating it, assuming that building community organisations means building social capital. The projects assumed that low social capital leads to conflict, but in reality it is *weak* bridging and linking capital and *strong* bonding capital that leads to conflict. The authors then evaluated the types of goods delivered in these projects, finding that "the type of resources delivered through NGO interventions proved to be a strong predictor of the failure or success of CBD to improve social cohesion and rebuild local stocks of social capital" (Ibid., 162). The authors created a typology to assess the findings, broken into two axes: public/private goods and strategic/non-strategic livelihood assets (see Figure 3.1).



Private Goods	Club Goods	Common Pool Goods	Public Goods
Rival Excludable	Non-Rival Excludable	Rival Non-Excludable	Non-Rival Non-Excludable

Figure 3.1: Project Components According to Resource Typology (Source: Vervisch, et.al., 2013, 164)

The authors define *private* goods as being rival and excludable: "for example, the consumption of food diminishes its availability to others... and it is easy to deny others access to your food" (Vervisch, et.al., 163). *Public* goods are non-rival and non-excludable: "for example, individual use of a rural road does not diminish its availability to others and it is difficult to deny access" (Ibid.). Strategic and non-strategic distinguish between "assets that deliver a strategic individual advantage to cope with short-term needs, stress and shock situations, and assets that provide opportunities for long-term livelihood strategies" (Ibid.). The authors found that the project provision of private/strategic goods had a negative impact (see Figure 3.2), as:

> These components were characterised by serious information barriers between mediators and the local population (labelling them as 'secret' activities), while sparking new conflicts because of unfair distribution or access (frustrating bonding and bridging social capital), which also decreased levels of trust in local administration (undermining linking social capital) (Ibid.).

On the other hand, the provision of public/non-strategic resources had the opposite effect:

> These components were characterised by effective information flows and the reduction of existing conflicts as a positive outcome (improving bonding and bridging social capital of community members), while offering opportunities to improve relations between the community and their local administration (improving linking social capital) (Ibid., 164-165).

Essentially, the research finds that "the 'use value'... of social capital is clearly determined by the economic resources that are distributed... Social capital is context dependent, bound up with a broader capital portfolio, interacting with and shaped by cultural and economic forms of capital" (Ibid., 167-168).

What these cases demonstrate is that it is not only important to involve local communities in participatory reconstruction, but to pay attention to the relationship between the *types* of material projects implemented and the *types* of social capital to be strengthened. Further, Barakat, Chard, and Jones (2005, 85), argue that the evaluation of reconstruction programmes should also be participatory, as this "enables those recovering from war to negotiate an 'end-state' or shared vision for themselves that will meet their needs and aspirations in a way that is politically and culturally acceptable to them and therefore more likely to be sustainable." However, Vervisch et.al. (2013) argue for care to be taken in the participation projects, as existing power structures may complicate the process, particularly in the form of 'elite capture', or the biased mediation by local elites that leads to limited participation and a one-side view on community needs. Funder (2004, 83) similarly warns against viewing participation as a neutral endeavour, pointing out that "participation could be used to legitimise ill-intentioned external interests", and "even well-intentioned participatory approaches incorporate asymmetrical power relations."

In part a response to the difficulties of participation in planning, *co-production* has emerged in recent years as



Figure 3.2: Impact of Project Components on Community Cohesion According to Resource Typology (Source: Vervisch, et.al., 2013, 165)

a framework for service delivery and planning participation. Mitlin (2008, 340) defines co-production as "the joint production of public services between citizen and state, with any one or more elements of the production process being shared." The concept was first developed by Elinor Ostrom in the U.S., with research also conducted in Brazil and Nigeria, in situations where citizens were actively engaged in producing public goods. She found that "citizens need not be passive" and she arrived at the conclusion that "co-production was often the missing ingredient that only citizens could provide" (Albrechts 2012, 3). From this basis the notion evolved from merely a strategy to deliver services to a political strategy (Ibid.). Albrechts (2012) discusses co-production partnerships in the UK, describing them as shifting power balances to engage citizens in the active production of their spaces, recognising "that citizens are not merely repositories of need or recipients of services; they are assets" (Ibid., 5). He quotes Boyle and Harris (2009, 11): "Co-production means delivering public services in an equal and reciprocal relationship between professionals, people using services, their families and their neighbours. Where activities are co-produced in this way, both services and neighbourhoods become far more effective agents of change." Mitlin (2008) argues that, especially in the global south, co-production is used as a political strategy for community organisation in order to effectively engage with the state to address needs and negotiate for benefits. She suggests that, while prior research into co-production has focused on the role of the state as a key instigator in co-production, in reality the role of the state is much more ambivalent and that "social organisations have managed in spite of the state rather than because of them" (Ibid., 355). Although more recent literature tends to favour such spontaneous forms of community agency in producing space and services, Joshi and Moore (2004) previously warned not to discount institutionalised co-production as a means of service delivery. They define institutionalised co-production as "the provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions" (Ibid., 40).

3.2.2. The Post-conflict Plan: Product

Bollens (2008) argues that cities provide a significant opportunity for the restructuring of social relations at a grassroots level, in part by creating "physical and psychological spaces that complement and encourage intergroup reconciliation" (1286) and that cities are uniquely positioned to be able to accomplish such reconciliation at a more progressive rate than at the national scale, thus becoming a leading element in the establishment of long-term peace and stability. He quotes Aibar and Bijker (1997, 23): "Instead of viewing the city as a mere geographical locus for social or technical phenomena, it is a powerful tool in building new boundaries between the social and the technical, and, therefore, in building new forms of life." Additionally, "Urbanists and planners have power emanating from the fact that they engage at the interface between the built environment and political processes. Urbanists have the ability to connect the local/urban level to the national level, to link everyday problems faced by city residents to unjust political structures that underlie and produce these urban symptoms" (Bollens 2012, 237). As such, the city provides the opportunity to carry the social process of community development forward, actualising social reconciliation through the production and use of space, rather than awaiting national-level peace-building to trickle down to localities. Bollens (2008, 1258) asserts that:

> During the turbulence of transitional uncertainty and amidst the legacy of group-based conflict, the intertwining of the technical and political may be at its most intense because city-builders and political leaders are forced to contemplate the city as a physical artefact having explicit and potent social and political import. During the early days of democratisation social and economic interests may adhere to the objective and technical methodologies of urbanism and employ city-building as a key operational field in their efforts to actualise openness and tolerance. The technical reworking of the city becomes a key test and indicator of new political projects.

Thus, it is important to evaluate some key tools that planners employ for their applicability in post-conflict contexts. Pantuliano (2009) argues that post-conflict land interventions are generally focused on the aspects of resettling or restoring land rights to returnees, often ignoring structural issues in land management systems, the land-related elements that contributed to conflict to begin with, and the needs of resident populations. This emphasis "fails to take into account pre-conflict land issues and the processes of change that occur during crises; attempts at return and reintegration will therefore fail in the long term if underlying competition for land and poor systems of land governance are not tackled" (Ibid., 203). Augustinus and Barry (2006, 675) also argue this point, asserting that

> The needs of internally displaced persons..., refugees and returnees are likely to be placed at the top of the agenda for land officials to deal with, rather than strategically re-building the system itself. The focus may well be on the urgent restitution of houses, rather than strengthening a land administration system to manage the tenure security of people in these houses over the long-term.

As a result, "Managing these issues effectively in a peace process is crucial to prevent continued instability and to sustain reintegration, including people's re-engagement in traditional land uses that sustain the agricultural production, food security and trade on which recovery can be built" (Pantuliano 2009,203).

Part of the problem of managing urban space after conflict is in dealing with uncertainty: post-conflict societies are often characterised by political, social, and economic instability, with migratory populations at varying stages of recovery and often traumatised to varying degrees. That institutions, civil society and social networks often lack the longevity and stability present in societies without a history of conflict adds to this uncertainty for the future. And unpredictable influxes of returned refugees and migrating residents to urban spaces particularly contributes to an uncertain environment for planning.

As a result, Augustinus and Barry (2006) suggest that traditional land management systems are inappropriate in post-conflict contexts because they present too rigid a framework, incapable of responding to uncertainty. Since different institutions and hierarchical levels of government are often in a state of flux as they are developed unevenly after conflict, Augustinus and Barry propose a soft systems approach to land administration that prioritises macro-environmental factors (social stability and the reduction of conflict) over the immediate modernisation of the cadastre. They propose the short-term development of a deeds system that grants deeds ("no more than an affirmation of rights in land", 677)

rather than titles ("a data item that describes land rights... is created once and stored once and the ownership and encumbrance information relating to a particular land parcel is rigorously cross referenced through a system of unique key identifiers", 677). A deed system thus provides a much more flexible temporary framework that allows for the more gradual technical design of a permanent database system. Such a system is particularly relevant for communities with conflicting land claims (Ibid., 678):

> Under a 'title' system, the curtain on underlying claims and legal evidence is drawn and only the evidence on the land record is used. This means that the trails of evidence that would show off-record claims would not be considered valid. In post-conflict environments, overlapping rights and claims are extremely common, and central to the conflict. In fact, institutions set up for restitution of land and houses often go well beyond the cadastral evidence when reaching a decision (Kosovo). To ensure a credible land administration system and to decrease conflict in the country, the trails of evidence associated with 'deeds' would need to be retained in the medium term to facilitate adjudication during technical processes and the restitution of property.

Augustinus and Barry also touch on the issue of the human-technical interface in land administration, pointing out that a soft systems approach would be better equipped to deal with potential lack of legitimacy in the public eye when staff may be accused of being impartial or processes not transparent. The flexibility of a soft system would enable the expenditure of time and resources in an effort to improve legitimacy of the system.

Bollens (2012) further explores concepts of urban space creation and city-planning in contexts of ethnic- and identity-based conflicts. He argues for strategic interventions, or "urban acupuncture", defined by Frampton (1999, 79) as: "catalytic, small-scale interventions, with the condition that they should be realisable within a relatively short period of time, and capable of achieving a maximum impact with regard to the immediate surroundings." Bollens suggests that these interventions should occur at "strategic points in urban fabric – points of hardening, stagnation, trauma, and dysfunction" in order to "increase production of flow, connectivity, and community health that can be a foundation for more functional urban development in the future" (Bollens 2012, 247). Such interventions allow for innovation in response to site-specific conditions, and thus are more appropriately suited for cities in conflict than for more stable cities and master planning "with its efforts at control, completeness, fixing, and order" (Ibid., 248). Bollens further suggests that it is not necessary to encourage ethnic hybridisation of the entire city, and that, especially in the short term there may actually be benefit to allowing ethnic separation in the city. However, urban interventions should focus on those areas where people may inter-mingle, such as at borders and edges, as well as in public spaces: "Here, there is a push for mixed public spaces rather than mixed neighbourhoods. The goals is to enable increased cross-ethnic mingling in non-hostile, non-polarising public environments rather than trying the more inflammatory approach of having different ethnicities co-habitat residentially" (Ibid., 246). This is important to consider particularly as city-building in post-conflict society is considered in the long run: that immediate and comprehensive reconciliation of differences in urban space is not likely, but that a strategic framework can be initiated early on to allow for gradual de-compartmentalisation of settlements. Full reunification in space may not completely materialise for several generations,

but engaging appropriately with urban space, recognising the way current generations utilise that space, and avoiding the coercive use of planning policies help to establish a trajectory towards peaceful city structures. Finally, Bollens warns against over-reliance on urban policies to create peace, but also argues that urban policies contribute valuable elements to peace-building (Bollens 2012, 235):

> Practitioners must not fall into an environmental determinist frame, believing that changes in the physical environment shape social behaviour so extensively that urban peace will result. Planning actions and principles will not turn around a society that is politically splintered or unravelled; they cannot create peace where it does not exist in people's hearts and souls. What urban policies can do, however, and it is significant, is to create physical and psychological spaces that can co-contribute to, and actualise, political stability and non-belligerent co-existence in cities. Deeply entrenched problems of nationalistic conflict are certainly not amenable to simple, one-dimensional solutions. Thus, urban planning interventions need to be part of a broader and multi-faceted approach addressing root issues of political grievance related to political dis-empowerment and institutional bias.

Conclusion

While post-conflict reconstruction is broadly defined and encompasses a wide range of activities over a varying time and scale, the focus of this chapter has been on the later, development phase of reconstruction, and particularly the role that settlement planning can play in the process. The reconstruction process (broadly), as well as the planning process for post-conflict settlements are best reinforced through attention to complexities of post-conflict society and the importance of appropriate strengthening of social capital. Harnessing and building social capital in a structured participatory process to build space and services within a settlement thus provide an important venue for the long-term stabilisation of society and prevention of future conflict. Additionally, creating systems (such as Augustinus and Barry's soft-system approach to land administration, and Bollens' strategic interventions through urban acupuncture) that are flexible at least for the short- to medium-term allow for a more appropriate response to the complexity and uncertainty inherent in post-conflict society.

Chapter 4
National and Historical Context

This chapter will provide the national and regional context for the study area of Nyagatare, particularly in terms of national trends and post-conflict history that have an influence on the development of Nyagatare. This chapter will be divided into five parts: first, history and overview of the country, particularly focusing on the history of conflict and reconstruction; second, a brief economic and governance context; third, a strategic social analysis; fourth, a strategic land and settlements analysis, and finally, an examination of the current role of planning in Rwanda.

4.1 Rwandan History and Overview

Rwanda is a small, land-locked country in the Great Lakes region of East and Central Africa, and is among the most densely-populated countries in Africa. It is home to Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa peoples who speak a common language (Kinyarwanda), and who have historically co-existed in mixed communities. The difference between groups has been the subject of debate, but is commonly understood by scholars to be a difference in social status and power hierarchy more than ethnicity, with the minority Tutsis forming the aristocratic class, and majority Hutus and Twas the working classes (Prunier 1995)[1]. Rwanda was colonised (jointly with Burundi, as Ruanda-Urundi) by Germany, and later by Belgium. The colonial capital of Ruanda-Urundi was Bujumbura, with an administrative outpost in Butare (know known as Huye). Rwanda gained independence on 1 July, 1962, and selected as its new capital the city of Kigali, which was chosen over Butare for its central location. Newbury (2005) notes that throughout Rwanda's history, borders have remained relatively porous, with people of Rwandan culture (defined as first-language Kinyarwanda speakers) migrating widely across the region, seeking economic opportunities and fleeing from conflict.

4.1.1. Conflict and Reconstruction

The history of the Rwandan genocide is widely documented elsewhere, and so it will only be briefly described here. Ethnic tensions date back several decades and while there is some variation in analyses regarding the root of conflict, it is generally understood that ethnic tension is a result at least partially of colonial power alignments with the minority, the aristocratic Tutsi, and subsequent democratic revolt by the majority Hutu. Thus, the first wave of Tutsi exiles fled the country in 1959 as anti-Tutsi massacres began occurring in the run up to independence. After independence,

1 The Rwandan government has built on this analysis by asserting that ethnicity was therefore "invented and politicized by colonial occupation" (Buckley-Zistel 2006, 143). As a response, the post-genocide government has moved to make ethnic designations illegal, emphasising instead an inclusive "Rwandaness."

subsequent Hutu-majority governments systematically marginalised and oppressed the Tutsi minority, leading to several waves of Tutsis fleeing from the country, often specifically fleeing targeted killing and ethnic cleansing. These early exiles and refugees who fled prior to 1994 are known as old case refugees: their right to return was continually denied by pre-genocide governments and most of them spent decades in exile in neighbouring countries or abroad. This denial of the right to return was in part what influenced several exiles living in Uganda to form a rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF, headed by Fred Rwigyema, and later Paul Kagame after Rwigyema's death in 1990, invaded northern Rwanda from Uganda on 1 October 1990, initiating a four-year civil war between the RPF and the national Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR). A ceasefire and power-sharing agreement under the Arusha Accords was brokered in 1993, but the ceasefire was broken on 6 April 1994 when Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana's plane was shot down over Kigali by an unknown party, killing Habyarimana and the president of Burundi, who was also on board. This initiated 100 days of killing in a genocide, said to be planned by an elite group called the *Akazu* and carried out by the military as well as the *Interahamwe* militia and scores of civilians. In around three months, around 1 million people (Tutsis and some moderate or sympathetic Hutus) were slaughtered, leading to another mass exodus of refugees: new case refugees, or those who fled in 1994 and after. In one case, on 29 April 1994, an estimated 250,000 people fled Rwanda within a 24-hour period over a single bridge over Rusumo Falls on the border with Tanzania. This has been called "the most abrupt, massive refugee movement of this scale ever known" (Newbury 2005, 258). As the killings continued throughout Rwanda and as the international community proved largely ineffective in ending the genocide, the RPF began to advance again from the north, eventually taking Kigali on 4 July 1994 and the rest of the country on 18 July. A transitional government was sworn in under President Pasteur Bizimungu, and the country began the long process of reconstruction.

Initial challenges of reconstruction included physical rebuilding, establishing a functioning government, and reintegrating hundreds of thousands of returned refugees. Immediate post-conflict reconstruction was complicated by ongoing insecurity caused by conflict in neighbouring countries (DRC and Burundi) as well as intermittent attacks by the *Interahamwe* and RPF counterinsurgency. The refugee crisis also contributed to regional insecurity, particularly in the Eastern DRC where refugee camps were riddled with disease and ethnic conflict. Immediately after the RPF took control of the country, old case refugees began flooding back, settling where they could. In 1996 new case refugees began to return en masse, only to find that many of their homes had been taken over by old case returnees, leading to conflict over land. This led to the informal institution of *Imidugudu* (villagisation) villages, initially justified as a means of resettling returnees and settling land conflicts, as well as protecting returnees against sporadic *Interahamwe* attacks (IRIN 2004).

In addition to emergency reconstruction, the transitional government was faced with the challenge of rebuilding the social fabric of the country – a challenge that has continued with the current government. The impact of decades of ethnic conflict, exile, oppression, and all-out war was (and remains) an enormous hurdle for the psychological and social health of Rwandan people. Pham, et.al. (2004) found that of a sample of over 2,000 Rwandans surveyed eight years after the genocide, 94.1% reported witnessing at least one traumatic event, and 24.8% met the criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The challenges of reconciliation among a traumatised population were therefore

great, especially given that, in many cases, killers and victims came from the same community and survivors often had to go back and live next door to the very people who had killed their loved ones. Additionally, the magnitude and widespread contribution to the killings meant that there were far more genocide suspects than could ever be handled by the justice system. By 2001, there were about 120,000 genocide suspects crammed into Rwandan prisons, and 10,000 other detainees had died in prison since 1994 (Clark 2012). Rwanda's prison population thus amounted to approximately 1.5% of its total population (8,128,553 in 2002). In order to process suspects more quickly, and in an attempt to assist with community reconciliation, the Rwandan government revived a traditional community justice system known as *gacaca*, Kinyarwanda for "justice on the grass." Suspects would stand trial in front of local elders within the community, and sentences (usually prison terms and community work) were handed out, entirely within a community context. *Gacaca* courts lasted until 2010 and ultimately prosecuted 400,000 people. There have been many critiques of the *gacaca* system: that it did not allow the trial of Tutsi suspects nor did it recognise the victimisation of Hutus, and that it was negatively shaped by local power dynamics (Thomson 2011); that it exposed deeper conflict and resentment and became an excuse for revenge (Rettig 2008); and that the process was burdened by lofty expectations (Clark 2012). However, it has also been argued that it was better than the alternative of allowing suspects to rot in prison as they awaited a formal trial (Rettig 2008), that the majority of cases have been successful, and that the process has fostered healthy community debate and allowed for local agency in dealing with justice and reconciliation(Clark 2012).

4.1.2. Uncertainty of the Future

As noted by NEPAD (2005), it is difficult to define exactly the temporal boundaries for each stage of post-conflict reconstruction. However, for Rwanda, the years 1999 to 2001 marked a turning point in reconstruction, when some emergency/transitional practices were formalised in law (*gacaca*), or began to resemble long-term development programmes (*imidugudu*), and several long-term strategies designed for development and stabilisation were formed. The most significant of these strategies has been Vision 2020, which put forward a three-phased plan to stabilise the Rwandan economy and move towards middle-income country status by shifting from an agriculture-based economy to a service-based economy. Rwanda's recent history has seen massive economic growth and, at least on the surface, a return to peace and stability. However, there are still many long-term repercussions of conflict (refugee return, migration, rapid urbanisation, social conflict, and threat of conflict with the DRC), and thus any projections and plans for the future must take into account high levels of uncertainty.

The following sections will provide contextual and strategic analyses of current realities in Rwanda, particularly focused on the long-term impacts of conflict.

4.2. Economic, Governance and Development Context

In recent years, much attention has been paid to Rwanda's rapid development, economic growth, and strategic policies designed not just to correct the damage wrought by genocide and conflict, but to establish the country as an economic powerhouse in East Africa, with the objective of becoming the Singapore of Africa. As the most densely-populated country in Africa, with limited land and natural resources, and high levels of poverty and inequality, this is no easy feat. But through several ambitious policies, the country intends a full transformation, and in many ways is progressing rapidly towards that goal. However, progress has not been achieved without some drawbacks.

4.2.1. Economic Context

The most significant strategy that was put forth after 1994 was Vision 2020 (Republic of Rwanda 2000), a document intended to guide development between 2000 and 2020. The specific goal of this document has been to transform Rwanda from an agricultural-based economy to a service-based economy and a middle-income country, in an effort to address the increasing problem of lack of land and natural resources. This has been implemented via a series of three phased strategic plans, namely the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP) released in 2002, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) covering 2008-2012, and the new EDPRS II, covering 2013-2018. The PRSP sought to correct the economic downturn of the early 1990s and to provide a way out of the emergency/ transition era; the first EDPRS sought to stabilise the economy and reduce poverty, and EDPRS II now seeks to provide a roadmap for the final transition from a low-income agricultural-based economy into a middle-income service-based economy.

As part of Vision 2020, several key indicators were set at the time of the initial document, but upon review in 2012, it was discovered that many of these indicators had already been achieved, and many others were close to being achieved. Others showed a significant lag. As a result, key indicators were revised for the remaining 8 years of the strategy (Karinganire 2012). Table 4.1 details a notable few of these indicators to be revised.

Indicator	2000 Status	2012 Status	Vision 2020 Target	Revised Target
Avg, GDP growth rate (%)	6.2	8.3	8	11.5
GDP per capita, in US $	220	540	900	1240
Growth rate of the agricultural sector (%)	9	5.8	6	8.5
Growth rate of the industry sector (%)	7	8.8	12	14
Growth rate of the service sector (%)	7	10.5	11	13.5
Access to electricity (% of the population)	2	10.8	35	50
Percentage of population under poverty line	60.4	44.9	30	20
Gini Coefficient	0.45	0.49	0.35	0.35
Life Expectancy	49	54.5	55	66
Population growth rate	2.9	2.9	2.2	2.2
Urban population (%)	10	14.8	30	35
Literacy rate	48	83.7	100	100

Table 4.1: Comparison of original and revised Vision 2020 indicators (Source of data: Republic of Rwanda 2012b)

In many of these cases, ambitious targets first set out for 2020 have been re-set at even more ambitious levels. For instance, the average GDP growth rate target has been raised as the previous rate was already met, and the new projected growth rate is intended to outperform China (Cyr and Kyarisiima 2013). Some of these revised targets seem hardly justifiable, such as the significant hike in the target of access to electricity from 35% to 50%, despite the 2012 status having achieved not even half of the original target. Similarly, urban population rate was revised to 35%, despite it having achieved less than 5 percentage points out of the projected 20 by 2012. The new Urbanization and Rural Settlement Sector Strategic Plan (Republic of Rwanda 2013c) warns that this target of 35% urbanisation by 2020 is not only unachievable, but would be so rapid as to be unwise. However, the Rwanda Housing Authority (responsible for local planning in Kigali) still asserts that this target is achievable (rha.gov.rw 2013). Notably, the Gini coefficient trends show that levels of inequality has gotten worse, revealing a negative side to such massive economic growth. Current trends in inequality are particularly a cause for concern when it's considered that pre-genocide rates were much more favourable – the World Bank puts Rwanda's Gini coefficient at 28.9 in 1985 (data.worldbank.org 2012). Many observers have expressed concern over the new targets arguing that it is infeasible or simply too much too soon (Kagire 2013b). Regardless, the message is clear: 'development' is of critical importance to the government.

4.2.2. Governance Context

In 2001 the Government implemented a National Decentralisation Policy with the express goal of devolving power and responsibility to local governments over a period of time. This entailed the creation of a hierarchy of local administrations: *intara* (province), *akarere* (district), *umurenge* (sector), and *akagari* (cell). In 2006, in an effort to break up past centralised structures and to create new multi-ethnic administrative units, previous administrative boundaries were dissolved and new ones redrawn (news.bbc.co.uk 2006). The previous twelve provinces or prefectures were abolished and replaced with five new ones: Kigali, Northern, Western, Southern, and Eastern Provinces (See Figure 4.1).



Figure 4.1: Pre-2006 and post-2006 administrative boundaries (Source: author; base maps sourced from http://d-maps.com/pays.php?num_pay=49&lang=en)

The original National Decentralisation Policy intended the creation of urban local governments which would set up separate administrative divisions for towns depending on their population size, although the actual function of the urban local governments did not significantly differ from rural governments (Republic of Rwanda 2001). However, the latest revised version of the Policy (Republic of Rwanda 2012d) acknowledges that the creation of urban local governments has been unsuccessful to date, in part because of a lack of local capacity. A report on local government in East Africa describes the current functions of levels of government as (CLGF, et.al., 2012, 12-13):

> The District is charged with facilitating local economic development, planning and coordination of service delivery. The Sector is the focal point for local service delivery and is also charged with coordinating community participatory development and collecting statistical data. The Cell is responsible for needs assessment, prioritisation of local development needs and mobilising community action. Meanwhile, the *Umudugudu* is charged with building cooperation, collaboration and solidarity among members of the community.

The current government is widely considered to be highly authoritarian, and President Kagame has proven to be a highly controversial figure. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index gave Rwanda an overall democracy score of 3.36 in 2012 (down from 3.82 in 2006), putting the country solidly within the "authoritarian regime" category (EIU 2012). The country also ranks lower than all of its neighbours with the exception of the DRC, although the DRC still manages a better score at electoral process and pluralism and an equal political participation score (see Table 4.2). Civil society is still considered to be significantly weak (CLGF 2012, 17), which was also a considerable problem prior to the genocide and likely one of the reasons the genocide was successful: Verwimp describes pre-1994 civil society as "usurped," and "incapable of making a fist when most needed" (Verwimp 2011, 400).

Country	Rank	Type of Democracy	Overall Score*	Electoral process and pluralism*	Functioning of government*	Political Participation *
South Africa	31	Flawed	7.79	8.75	8.21	7.22
Tanzania	81	Hybrid regime	5.88	7.42	4.64	6.11
Uganda	94	Hybrid regime	5.16	5.67	3.57	4.44
Burundi	125	Authoritarian	3.6	3	2.57	3.89
Rwanda	132	Authoritarian	3.36	0.83	4.64	2.22
DRC	159	Authoritarian	1.92	1.75	0.71	2.22

*Number is out of 10: 0 = low and 10 = high.

Table 4.2: EIU Democracy Index: comparison of selected countries (Source of data: EIU 2012)

4.2.3. Development Context

Despite Rwanda's progress, it still scores considerably low in several international development indicators. As mentioned previously, inequality is high (and worse than in 2000), with a Gini coefficient of 0.49 in 2012. Rwanda comes in 167th

out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index, with a low score of 0.434 in 2013, which is adjusted only to 0.287 when inequality is factored in (UNDP 2013). A report on local governments in East Africa notes that despite the guidance of Vision 2020 there have not been real results addressing local development, and that "national data is normally aggregated with little evidence on the severity of the poverty and inequalities that prevail in localities" (CLGF 2012, 10).

4.3. Social Analysis

This section will examine the long-term social impacts of conflict in Rwanda. The particular social challenges that Rwanda faces are closely intertwined with institutional and settlement structures, and as such a full understanding of social implications is critical for an examination of how people live together in settlements. This section will be followed by an analysis of land and settlements.

4.3.1. Demographics and Refugee Return

Rwanda's population as of the 2012 Population and Housing Census was 10,537,222 (Republic of Rwanda 2012a), and a more recent estimate puts the current population at 12,012,589 (cia.gov 2013). The country's population is among the fastest-growing the world (ranked 21st, cia.gov 2013), and the urban population, although still low (at 19%), is growing rapidly at an average rate of 4.4% per year (Ibid.). Rapid urban growth dates back to the early 1990s, likely in response to increased insecurity in the rural areas and particularly the north (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3).

Figure 4.2: Urban population growth in Rwanda (Source of data: esa.un.org 2013)



Figure 4.3: Rural and Urban population as percentage of the whole. (Source of data: esa.un.org 2013)

Between 2002 and 2012, the Eastern Province saw the greatest amount of increase in population. Of the top twenty fastest growing sectors nation-wide (out of 416 sectors total), six were located in the Eastern Province, four of which were in Nyagatare District; Nyagatare Sector was the sixth fastest growing sector in the country and is adjacent to the fastest growing (see Figure 4.4). There are high levels of migration within the country as well, with reportedly 19% of the population migrating within the country between 2008 and 2012 (Republic of Rwanda 2013a, 37).

Likely to be a significant factor in the near future is the ongoing influx of returned refugees from neighbouring countries. A little over a year after the genocide, there were an estimated 1.7 million new case refugees living in camps in the DRC, Tanzania, and Burundi, with 750,000 old case refugees already returned and many more returning by the week (Republic Rwandaise 1995). Over time, over 3 million refugees have returned (Government of Rwanda 2013, Kagire 2013c), but to date many refugees (old case and new case) remain outside of the country. As of January 2013, there



Figure 4.4: Growth rate by Sector, 2002-2012 (Source of data: Republic of Rwanda 2012a)

were still over 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers of Rwandese origin residing outside of Rwanda, nearly double the amount of refugees of other origin currently hosted in Rwanda (unhcr.og 2013, see Table 4.3). The UNHCR along with the Government of Rwanda have been pushing for the voluntary return of Rwandese refugees, and, after a few years of delays and logistical setbacks, invoked the refugee Cessation Clause on 30 June 2013, which strips all Rwandese who fled the country between 1959 and 1998 of their refugee status, requiring them to either pursue naturalisation in the country where they have settled or return and resettle in Rwanda. The Cessation Clause must be recognised by host countries in order to be effective, and so far only a handful of countries have agreed to it, namely Malawi, Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The DRC and Uganda did not immediately invoke the Clause but agreed to a phased implementation, while South Africa has expressed reservation over the situation and has chosen to conduct their own research regarding the potential safety of returned refugees, a move that has been met with the approval of Rwandese refugees living in South Africa (IRIN 2013). Tanzania has not formally implemented or invoked the Clause, but following a disagreement with Rwanda, evicted around 20,000 Rwandese in July 2013, even though many had legal status in Tanzania (Mitscherlich 2013).

Refugees & asylum seekers originating in other countries, residing in Rwanda	59 689
Refugees originating in Rwanda who returned in the previous calendar year	11 249
Refugees & asylum seekers originating in Rwanda, residing in other countries	107 710

Table 4.3: Refugees and asylum seekers in and from Rwanda, as of January 2013. (Source of data: unhcr.org 2013)

However, there are a wealth of voices protesting the invocation of the Clause, citing concerns over the lack of transitional support, a poor track record of protection for refugees in other Cessation Clauses invoked in Africa, and concern over the fear of persecution of refugees in their host countries or in Rwanda (ICVA 2013). Many also consider the invocation to be little more than a ploy to boost Rwanda's international reputation, as the government continues to tout the Clause as evidence of an improved security situation (Cole 2013). Many of the more than 100,000 refugees who remain outside of the country have so far declined to come back because they fear persecution by the government (IRIN 2013), or they do not trust the state to provide them with protection (Cole 2013). The level of trauma often experienced by refugees is illustrated in a recent article for the Mail and Guardian (Tolsi 2013), and many recent news reports describe nervous refugees as feeling involuntarily forced back to Rwanda following the cessation clause (see Gashugi 2013, Nyange 2013, Rwembeho 2013d, Tolsi 2013). Those refugees who are not involuntarily repatriated are being confronted with shrinking support in the international arena (Cole 2013, Nyange 2013). For refugees who do return, they are faced with many of the same difficulties that current residents must deal with, namely lack of employment, scarcity of land (Kagire 2013c), and low levels of security and political participation (see following section). In addition, they also often lack social networks, cultural or linguistic connection to Rwanda, and many must even return without husbands, wives, children, and other close family members.

Although there appear to be no explicit programmes that resettle new returnees in any particular areas, it is likely that the Eastern Province, Nyagatare included, could continue to be a hotspot for returnee-resettlement (even voluntary resettlement) given the low population densities and proximity to previous homes in Uganda and Tanzania. In response

to an increase of recently-evicted refugees and their herds of over than 2,000 head of cattle from Tanzania, the Rwanda Agriculture Board has earmarked 300 hectares of grazing land in Nyagatare and Gatsibo districts for returning livestock farmers (Rwembeho 2013d). The impact of this influx of returnees on existing settlements and agricultural land could be significant (in mid-August it was reported that more than 3,500 Rwandans have returned from four districts in Tanzania alone – Ibid.), both in terms of strain on existing physical, infrastructural, and ecological capacities, as well as in terms of social cohesion and sense of citizenship and security. This impact may be particularly strongly felt in the Eastern Province (in areas like Nyagatare and Ngoma) where settlements are still relatively young and relatively sparsely-populated, and the influx of returnees could account for a significant percentage of population increase. This scenario presents a particular challenge to planning for small urban areas: first in the provision of adequate infrastructure and services, but perhaps more importantly (and with greater difficulty) social inclusion and the facilitation of community cohesion. The real challenge for planning then is how to involve the participation of a newly-arrived migrant population that are expected to integrate, but may still feel particularly insecure and vulnerable, afraid of the potential for both violence and eviction. Successful resettlement, then, must be a much more involved process than merely allotting land or increasing service provision.

4.3.2. Social Cohesion and Instability

In addition to the ongoing challenge of refugee return and resettlement, Rwanda is still plagued by lack of social cohesion and insecurity. The return of refugees to communities that are already experiencing high levels of social conflict and distrust could very likely contribute to increased proliferation of strife. Social instability is a result of both interpersonal/intra communal conflict (often relating to land, ethnicity, or *gacaca*, Wendel 2012), as well as a result of increased perception of state authoritarianism.

In recent years, Rwanda has had a consistently low rank under the Global Peace Index (in 2013 it is 135th out of 162 countries). Supporting indicators are similarly low (see Table 4.4), illustrating a decline in electoral competition, civil liberties, and equality; an increase in perceived criminality in society, access to weapons, political instability, internal and external conflict; and a consistently low level of political participation on the part of citizens (visionofhumanity.org 2013). A Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) assessment report on Rwanda's stability also argues that while to a certain extent the government's aversion to political competition is understandable, "as time passes, this reluctance will in fact put Rwanda's stability at greater risk. The danger is a vicious cycle in which RPF repression breeds resentment, mounting resentment imperils the RPF, and the RPF's sense of vulnerability drives even greater levels of repression." (Cooke 2011, 19). The report warns that continued repression would need to be increasingly coercive, which could lead to violence, although it is unlikely that 1994-levels of violence would be repeated. The report explores several hypothetical scenarios should current political inflexibility continue, among them the possibility of heightened tensions between the DRC and Rwanda as opposition forces base themselves in the eastern DRC (Cooke 2011). Current relations between the DRC and Rwanda are particularly tense, in part due to recent cross-border shelling and, as such, this potential scenario seems all too possible.

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	TREND
Country rank	66/138	81/143	96/148	112/153	126/158	135/162	Worsening
Organise conflict (internal) (1)	2/5	2/5	2/5	3/5	3/5	3/5	Worsening
Violent crime (2)	3/5	2.5/5	2.5/5	2.5/5	3/5	3/5	Worsening
Violent demonstrations (3)	3/5	3/5	3/5	2/5	2/5	2/5	Improving
Political instability (4)	2.3/5	2.5/5	3/5	2.8/5	2.8/5	3/5	Worsening
Political terror (5)	2/5	3/5	2/5	2.5/5	2.5/5	3/5	Worsening
Electoral process (6)	3/10	3/10	3/10	0.8/10	0.8/10	0.8/10	Worsening
Political participation (7)	1.7/10	1.7/10	1.7/10	1.7/10	1.7/10	1.7/10	Stagnant - low
Civil liberties (8)	5.3/10	5.3/10	5.3/10	4.1/10	4.1/10	4.1/10	Worsening
Freedom of the press (9)	58.9/100	50/100	64.7/100	81/100	81/100	55.5/100	Worsening (until 2013)

Description of indicators:
(1) Ranked 1-5 (very low to very high)
(2) Ranked 1-5 (very low to very high)
(3) Likelihood of violent demonstrations Ranked 1-5 (very low to very high)
(4) The degree to which political institutions are sufficiently stable to support the needs of citizens, businesses and overseas investors. Ranked 1-5 (very low to very high)
(5) Ranked 1-5 (very low to very high)
(6) Elections are competitive in that electors are free to vote and are offered a range of choices. Ranked 0-10 (very low to very high).
(7) Voter participation/turnout for national elections, engagement w/ politics. Ranked 0-10 (very low to very high)
(8) Free electronic media, free print media, freedom of expression and protest, free to form organisations and trade unions. Ranked 0-10 (very low to very high)
(9) The state of press freedom, reflecting the degree of freedom journalists and news organisations enjoy, and the efforts made by the state to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. Lower score indicates a higher degree of press freedom

Table 4.4: Peace indicators (Source of data: visionofhumanity.org 2013)

Political repression is felt strongly, although it is most apparent in discussions with current refugees who may feel more free to express their opinions. New case refugees in particular are more likely to be suspicious of the government (Newbury 2005, Wielenga 2012). In turn, there is a tendency for new case refugees to be seen as responsible for the genocide and their reluctance to return a symptom of their guilt and fear of justice, even though Newbury (2005, 279) estimates that only about 5% of new case refugees were directly involved in the genocide. Many refugees fear persecution and feel that their main source of concern in potentially returning is repression or outright violence on the part of the government (Leslie 2011, Wielenga 2012).

During field research in 2003-2004 in Rwanda, Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006) found that in discussions about the past, interviewees often explicitly left out parts of their stories, and she found that "some of the interviewees, in particular those engaged in reconciliation efforts, cautioned me not to trust my impression of peaceful coexistence; they suggested that people hide their true feelings, especially from an outsider like myself" (133). She calls this *chosen amnesia*, and describes it as a deliberate action of choosing not to recall specific aspects of the past as a coping mechanism. Buckley-Zistel also demonstrates that the topic of genocide has become largely taboo in day-to-day lives, and that it is likely that people may not feel free to speak about it for several generations. Regarding indicators of peaceful co-existence (intermarriage, helping neighbours, drinking together), "it soon becomes apparent that most interviewees

do not, themselves, have much confidence in these signs" (Ibid., 142). Rather, co-existence is a product of government coercion, fear of the other group, and/or pragmatism. Buckley-Zistel found that many people 'forgive' because they feel that they have no choice, and that "mistrust prevails in many places. Fear of the other group still exists, albeit hidden" (Ibid., 143). Heightened mistrust and insecurity has come from the release of genocide prisoners, as well as in engagements with *gacaca*. One interviewee told Buckley-Zistel "We don't have problems living together. But we also don't have a choice. If we don't live together the genocide will start again" (Ibid., 144). Buckley-Zistel calls this "pretending peace" and asserts that "mutual suspicion leads to a separated way of life, as much as possible, where each family stays in its own corner" (Ibid., 145).

A 2007 survey conducted by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda(NURC 2008) found that levels of distrust nationwide were relatively high and increasing, with the highest levels of distrust reported among the very poor and the very rich, while middle-income people were not as distrustful. This may be explained in part by increasing inequality in the country, and it is important to note this since inequality continues to be severe. There were mixed concerns about *gacaca*,with some agreeing that it was instrumental for reaching unity and reconciliation, but with others fearing retribution (particularly during the process) and many concerned with the integrity of the process. Civic engagement was considered, and about a quarter of respondents were found to be involved in an elected body, and nearly half of respondents had attended a community meeting in the past month. However, there was no mention of voter turnout or political engagement beyond those holding office, so it is not clear how widespread political involvement is for residents (although the Global Peace Index suggests that it is low). Feelings of interpersonal distrust were particularly high in the East, although the East also reported higher rates of willingness to work together despite distrust (NURC 2008).

Angela Veale (2000) undertook an interrogation of the notion of 'community' in Rwanda in 2000, and found that fragmentation and lack of cohesion were significant issues. Conflict over land and chronic poverty were both considered to be impediments to cohesion, as were "tensions as people situated their identity within communities with respect to past violence, either as a survivor or perpetrator" (Ibid., 236). She also found that the desire for avoidance of conflict was strong, and that conflict was generally handled through tightly structured hierarchical and authoritarian relations. As such, spontaneous community organisation was unlikely. Particularly, there was a "palpable sense that giving voice to 'difference' is too psychologically threatening" (Ibid., 238) and "there is a fundamental tension between an agenda of 'recognition of difference' in a post-conflict society, and pressures for unity" (Ibid., 239). Increasing interpersonal distrust is particularly a concern as *gacaca* ended in 2010 and although it was controversial, its closure left a void in the justice system without a clear means of community-wide mediation (Kok 2012). The establishment of a system of traditional *abunzi* mediators that took its place has been fraught with its own problems, with claims made that it is superficial and lacks cooperation (Mutisi 2012).

As such, social tensions and conflict continue to be a significant concern even nearly two decades after the genocide, and institutional arrangements and power structures are proving to be problematic for the resolution of conflict. The expected influx of refugees will likely further destabilise community relations, and without adequate means of

mediation within communities, it is unlikely that significant progress will be made towards the encouragement of social cohesion.

4.4. Land and Settlements Analysis

The following sections examine three aspects of land and settlement in Rwanda: current land management and registration trends, and urbanisation and settlement trends. This is to contextualise some of the settlement-related policies and practices that are informing settlement-building in Rwanda, and particularly Nyagatare.

4.4.1. Land Management and Registration

Until recently, there was no comprehensive land law in Rwanda. In 2004, after years of debate, the National Land Policy (Republic of Rwanda 2004) was set, and the Organic Land Law (drafted in 1999) was published the following year (Republic of Rwanda 2005b). The policy sets out a system of land administration that includes the establishment of a national land registry and a reformed cadastral system, along with the establishment of guidelines for land use planning. The policy acknowledges the potential for land scarcity to lead to conflict, and as such proposes that a comprehensive land management system would be instrumental in preventing land-related conflict. The policy calls for the initiation of a national land register, described as:

> ...both a list or a registry of land values (owned plots) and their owners and representation of the territorial layout. For each administrative entity, it comprises a cadastral matrix which describes, for each apparent owner, the list of property that he/she owns; a cadastral plan (computerised or not) drawn using topographic methods that covers all numbered plots; and a section status, which is a list of plots with their numbers and owners by administrative subdivision. The land registry should at least contain a description of the plots and land rights, and incorporate a number of other elements such as soil, topographical and other land-use management maps. The land registry serves as a tool for establishing land tax and the registration of title deeds (Republic of Rwanda 2004).

A land tenure regularisation programme was thus initiated in 2010 to carry out the registration of all plots within three years' time, to be completed by the end of 2013. Although the intention is to issue titles within a highly structured management programme, Payne (2011) notes that procedures are in place to deal with conflicting claims (usually involving the help of *abunzi* mediators) and that the programme relies heavily on local involvement and community participation. However, Payne also notes that the speed at the which the programme is to be carried out - registration of eight million parcels in three years, or an average of more than 10,000 every working day - as well as the severe shortage of capacity at a local level could seriously undermine prescribed processes. He points out that:

> Due to the pressure of this process, it is inevitable that there will be many demarcation mistakes. Land

> parcels will be demarcated, but the quality is likely to be poor and this will be costly in terms of time and money spent to rectify mistakes. Also, disputes are likely to increase due to increased pressure on staff and the Adjudication Committee will not have sufficient time to resolve land related disputes or organise hearings. This will obviously affect other organs such as local mediators known as 'abunzi'. There is a real risk that the three year programme will create a backlog of land disputes which the 'abunzi' will not be able to settle (Payne 2011, 35).

The land registration programme was announced to have finished in 2012 (Kanyesigye 2012), although issuance of land titles had not yet been complete. Of 10.3 million parcels registered, 10,600 land disputes were recorded (Ibid.) - such disputes, having failed to be resolved immediately, would have been referred to the *abunzi* (Payne 2011). Despite high levels of community participation (Santos et.al., 2012), reports show that land is still a significant source of conflict, despite the registration programme (Nsanzimana 2013b, Land Tenure and Property Rights Portal 2013), and an unnamed MP told a reporter that the majority of disputes were caused by negligence of local authorities (Nsanzimana 2013b).

There have been further critiques of the land law. The law requires a minimum plot size of 1 hectare for rural plots, in order to encourage farm consolidation and mono-cropping for commercialisation. In addition to mono-cropping being unsustainable and environmentally unfriendly (Rees 2002, Sundkvist, et.al., 2005), this could lead to the loss of land for many small-scale farmers (Pottier 2006), which in turn is likely to increase rural-to-urban migration of the very poor, intensifying slums and informal settlements in cities and towns (Musahara and Huggins 2005, 314). Post-conflict agricultural policies favour farm consolidation and commercialisation, which is likely in part a response to pre-genocide agricultural policies: prior to 1994 anti-Tutsi governments justified prohibiting Tutsi refugees from returning by claiming that there was not enough land or resources to accommodate them, and that in fact, famine was a direct result of population growth (Verwimp 2011). It is not surprising then that the current government would make agricultural maximisation a priority. However, consolidation and commercialisation policies are impacting negatively on the poor. Also, Pottier notes that there are strong concerns that old case refugees may be favoured in land allocation, as they are specifically called out as a vulnerable, landless group, while other vulnerable groups are not so specifically identified. This could potentially have a negative impact on social cohesion and could lead to greater land disputes.

So while the government has put in place some policies that are encouraging (i.e. the participatory process of land registration), other policies and the practical application of land management have led to continued conflict over land, rather than reducing land conflicts. The rigidity and speed of the programme have left little room for disputes or the flexibility to deal with problems, as Augustinus and Barry (2006) argued would be the case in such situations (see Chapter 3 of this document). As the programme stands now, the structural flaws, rigidity of process, and problems of implementation have placed the burden of conflict mediation on local *abunzi* mediators, rather than *reducing* the amount of land conflicts as originally intended.

4.4.2. Urbanisation and Settlement Trends

Urban policies and plans are still in process in Rwanda, and only in the last couple years has there been a strong attempt to develop a robust set of strategies and legislation around urban issues. The Kigali Conceptual Master Plan (KCMP) was developed in 2007, and is currently in the process of being implemented, by way of local district plans. There have been several fragmented pieces of legislation regarding urbanisation to date, but this year the Ministry of Infrastructure released an Urbanization and Rural Settlement Sector Strategic Plan (Republic of Rwanda 2013c) that attempts to provide a comprehensive strategy aligned with EDPRS II, cognisant of the many gaps and discrepancies in previous plans and legislation. There is increasing focus on two particular weak spots: sustainable urbanisation and construction, and participatory planning (Interview with MININFRA advisor, 2013). However, although these issues are gradually making their way into legislation and plans, they are still in the early stages.

As noted above, urban population in Rwanda, while still relatively small, is growing rapidly. A major concern in the rapid urbanisation rate has been the pressure on Kigali as the primary city, and as a result policies have gradually been developed to promote urbanisation and collective settlements throughout the country. This has resulted in two strategies that particularly have an impact on Nyagatare: the development of secondary cities and the ongoing promotion of *Imidugudu*. The following sections will thus evaluate these two inputs.

4.4.2.1. The Secondary City Strategy

The desire for the development of secondary cities as a means of alleviating population pressures on Kigali has been expressed in policies and documents since the genocide: the potential for secondary cities was mentioned in the action plan for the reintegration of refugees (Republic Rwandaise 1995). Additionally, it was mentioned in the National Land Policy (Republic of Rwanda 2004), although it was not formalised in strategy until this year, in the Urbanization and Rural Settlement Sector Strategic Plan (Republic of Rwanda 2013c). Both the Sector Strategic Plan and the EDPRS II refer to secondary cities as 'poles of growth', although it is not clear if this is meant to follow the classical model of



Figure 4.5: Urban Hierarchy (Source: Republic of Rwanda 2013c, 36)

growth pole theory as originally advocated by Francois Perroux, John Friedmann and others. These 'poles of growth' are, however, intended to attract some of the population growth away from Kigali, and are intended to be centres for intensive investment and urbanisation, in order to distribute development evenly and to address regional imbalance. The secondary cities also form the second stage in an urban hierarchy that spans from Kigali to the *imidugudu* (see Figure 4.5). The six secondary cities that were selected are Huye, Muhanga, Musanze, Nyagatare, Ruvabu, and Rusizi (see Figure 4.6) Of these cities, Nyagatare is the only one located in the Eastern Province, and is likely to be a magnet for population growth for much of the East.

As noted, participatory planning is not greatly emphasised, nor is there much consideration for social realities in communities that may impact on the implementation of plans and the success of urbanisation and community cohesion. However, this may be partially due to a lack of capacity at the ground level and incomplete decentralisation: hence, planning is initiated at the national level and there are few opportunities to engage at a grass roots level.



Figure 4.6: Map of Secondary Cities (Source: author; base map sourced from http://d-maps.com/pays.php?num_pay=49&lang=en)

4.4.2.2. Imidugudu

Imidugudu, or villagisation, has been continuously promoted since the initial resettlements in 1994. Notably, by 2000, the justification for the policy shifting from being a means of settling land conflicts and emergency protection, to being a comprehensive rural development strategy designed to resettle all rural populations in efficiently-serviced clusters (van Leeuwen 2001, Newbury 2011). Ansoms (2009) argues that *Imidugudu* is one policy among many that constitutes a large-scale social engineering project disguised as rural development. Several (Newbury 2011, van Leeuwen 2001, and Hilhorst and van Leeuwen 2000) note that *Imidugudu* bears strong resemblance to James C. Scott's (1998, 4) 'high modernism', a :

> ...strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws.

Regardless of the intentions at the top, Newbury (2011) argues that many households are actually worse off under *Imidugudu*, and that land pressures and land conflicts have in many cases gotten worse. Many households have not been given sufficient financial support for relocating, and financing relocation was particularly difficult for female-headed households (Ibid.). Although villages were meant to be of mixed ethnicity (IRIN 1999), a Human Rights Watch report showed that in reality there was very little ethnic mixing in *imidugudu* (Human Rights Watch 2001). van Leeuwen (2001) describes how implementation has been particularly problematic, as settlements were poorly planned and not responsive enough to local complexities, and although the policy was not meant to be mandatory, it was found that many people felt they had no other option or were given no other option by local authorities than to move into villages. In conversations during field research, several people mentioned that it was problematic having to live far from their land and having to walk far to tend to their crops and livestock. Additionally, two people mentioned in conversation that when farmers live on their farms, food waste and water from cooking is often discarded into the fields, allowing for the reuse of resources as well as enriching the soil. Requiring people to live far from their work (in a sort of rural attempt at modernist land use separation) thus discourages traditional methods that would enhance the sustainability of settlement.

However, despite these critiques and many others, *Imidugudu* continues to be an integral part of settlement policy in Rwanda, and are included in the Urbanization and Rural Settlement Sector Strategic Plan under the new title of "IDP (Integrated Development Programme) Villages". The IDP Village plan moves beyond past *Imidugudu* policies by promoting greater settlement integration, servicing, and promotion of livelihoods within villages, rather than just the clustering of households. The plan further expects to see an increase in numbers of villages. However, the Sector Strategic Plan does not address previous criticisms, particularly in regards to the process of relocating and resettling households, except for adding a single sentence: "More emphasis will be on a participatory planning" (Republic of Rwanda 2013c, 37).

4.5. The Current Role of Planning

The current status of planning in Rwanda is primarily focused on national-level policies and planning in Kigali. Due to the lack of local planning capacity, secondary city or district plans are generally contracted out to international firms, and many permanent positions within planning institutions are filled by foreigners. Comprehensive master plans are favoured for the areas that have been planned thus far, and this is likely to continue.

The current planning effort is massive given the relative youth of both the government and urban settlements. Additionally, undertaking urban development in a comprehensive country-wide hierarchy of settlements, rather than strategically and over a longer time period, is ambitious, to say the least. However, as urbanisation rates are soaring, strong planning is needed from the earliest stages manageable, and fortunately the Government of Rwanda has taken note of this and there is increasing political will behind urban planning, development, and management. But the current reliance on outside experts and consultants puts planning at a disadvantage because it is not as well-equipped to incorporate traditional practices and values nor is it as responsive to culture and community. Other post-conflict policies have attempted (with varying degrees of success) to incorporate at least some elements of traditional practice (perhaps most evident in *gacaca* and *abunzi*). Yet modern planning practice seems almost singularly concerned with modernisation and economic development, with little obvious concern for how residents might actually prefer to use settlements and spaces, and the impact of the built environment on social cohesion and vice versa. Two specific

Photo 4.1: A busy market street in the centre of town, a block from Kigali City Tower. (Source: the author)

examples of this are evident in recent planning in Kigali: first, the high levels of expropriation (with, in many cases, woefully inadequate compensation) to make way for new developments (Doherty 2013, Kagire 2013a). Despite high levels of urbanisation throughout the country between 2002 and 2012, five of Kigali's thirty-five sectors actually had *declining* population growth in that time (Republic of Rwanda 2012a); three of those sectors (Kimihurura, Muhima, Nyarugenge) are centrally located and in areas that have also seen significant expropriation (Asiimwe 2011, Ilberg 2008, independent.co.ug 2012). Second, the development that is occurring significantly alters the way people interact with the city. For instance, current developments in Kigali city centre have led to the clearing of many small-scale, centrally-located businesses to make way for gleaming office towers. The character of streets have been significantly altered; what used to be bustling and busy streets are now deathly quiet (see Photos 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3), and the towers that replace the hustle and bustle stand half-empty, out of the economic reach of many ordinary Rwandans. In fact, despite a boom in building office space in Kigali, including the recent opening of Kigali City Tower, the tallest building in Rwanda with eighteen gleaming stories of retail and office space, there is reportedly a significant shortage of available office space for normal business people in Kigali (Esiara 2013).

So despite increased focus on urbanisation and urban planning, plans and strategies are more involved with the creation of a modernist vision; leading to what a foreign architecture professional described as "a dichotomy within Rwandan urbanism; the reality (informality and self-built/forbidden) and the mythology (the masterplan and a generic, globalised modernity)" (Email, foreign architecture professional, 2013). Lack of participation in planning processes to

Photo 4.2: The changing nature of the street with the opening of Kigali City Tower (on the right). This stretch of street previously closely resembled Photo 4.1. (Source: the author)

date likely contribute to this. Participation in the KCMP was limited to education of the public and questionnaires (OZ Architecture, et,al., 2007), without any structured process of design and feedback. Similarly, the Nyarugenge sub-area plan mentions the intention to involve participation through stakeholder meetings, focus groups and public exhibitions, but goes into no more detail than that (City of Kigali 2010). In an interview, an architecture student at the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) asserted that "Planning is dictated by people in the offices" and that it is intended to serve the wealthy (Interview with KIST student, 2013). The advisor to the Minister of Infrastructure expressed that the KCMP is being followed almost too inflexibly (Interview with MINIFRA advisor, 2013). Thus, planning in Rwanda has been characterised by over-emphasis of modernisation and economic development, inflexibility, and a disconnect between those doing the planning and those impacted most by planning.

Kigali's planning has implications for other towns as well. As a former land appraiser in Kigali noted, cities in Rwanda are intended to become "mini Kigalis" - with enough services available that residents will no longer need to go to Kigali for their needs (Interview with former land appraiser, 2013). The architecture student also noted that the Kigali model is likely to be replicated, since there is a lack of planning capacity: "If one thing is done, it's just repeated for another place" (Interview with KIST student, 2013). And the advisor to the Minister of Infrastructure pointed out that Kigali becomes a default precedent to an extent, as its planning and development often precede and therefore influence national legislation (Interview with MININFRA advisor, 2013). As such, it is important to evaluate current planning in Kigali as it may influence the direction of planning in Nyagatare.

Photo 4.3: Former long-range bus terminal in the centre of Kigali. This used to be one of the busiest streets in the city, and is now virtually empty since buses and street traders were cleared out after the opening of Kigali City Tower, seen on the left. (Source: the author)

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a contextual analysis of post-conflict reconstruction, social and settlement trends, and the current role of planning in contemporary Rwanda. While there are many challenges for reconstruction and development, the Government of Rwanda has managed to produce some good policies and strategies, although there have been implementation problems. There is however, a significant disconnect between planning and the needs of post-conflict settlements. Planning is overly strict and not responsive to local communities, and in fact lacks the structure and the institutional capacity to engage at a community level. Furthermore, it fails to recognise significant social fragmentation and pursues policies and practices that, contrary to intention, serve to increase and perpetuate land-related conflicts, rather than to ease communal conflict.

It is within this national context that Nyagatare sits as a focus not only for increased investment and development but also significant population growth. The next chapter will examine research findings in Nyagatare, to be followed by a discussion about the role of planning in post-conflict Nyagatare.

Chapter 5
Local Analysis and Research Findings

This chapter will present the study area and findings from the field research. Because the actual boundaries of the town are not clear, for the purposes of this document, the study area will encompass the area covered by the 2009 Master Plan. This area is much broader than just the town itself, and includes the surrounding peri-urban and rural areas and several small villages, so the study area is considered to be more of a region than an urban area (refer back to Figure 2.3). However, the urban area of Nyagatare town remains the focal point.

This chapter is divided into three sections: first, a contextual analysis of the study area, including history and current realities, as well as a comparison with other secondary cities. The second section will present the findings from resident interviews in the town, with key points and ideas drawn out. The third section will summarise and discuss findings, identifying particular challenges relating to population growth and in-migration, pressures on resources, and finding 'normalcy' in the face of uncertainty.

5.1 Nyagatare

5.1.1. History

Nyagatare is a young town and does not have a long recorded history. Part of the difficulty in tracking change in the region comes from several iterations of administrative restructuring that have redrawn boundaries and re-set statistical areas – the historical Mutara region was originally part of Byumba Prefecture, then Umutara Province was formed in 1996 and lasted ten years until administrative restructuring in 2006, when it was enveloped into the much larger Eastern Province, and modern-day Nyagatare District was formed (see Figure 5.1). The town of Nyagatare was formerly known as either Umutara or Nyagatare. The following descriptive history will track through these iterations.



Figure 5.1: Administrative change in the north-east region of Rwanda, 1994-2006 (Source: author)

There is not much information about the settlement prior to 1994: at the time of the 1990 civil war, Nyagatare was little more than a small village. A U.S. Embassy report on a trip to the region in 1990 (U.S. Embassy 2003) describes the aftermath of a recent short but destructive bout of fighting between RPF and FAR forces in the area. The RPF had managed to capture part of Umutara and Akagera National Park, but they were quickly pushed back by the FAR and Zairean forces (Plumptre, et.al. 2001). The trip report depicts Nyagatare as a settlement of only 30 to 50 buildings, and at the time recently designated as the FAR command centre for the Umutara region. The report describes evidence of fighting and notes that residents who fled were returning to their home, except for those from Nyagatare, "which remains deserted" (U.S. Embassy 2003, 6).

During the genocide many people fled across the border to Uganda or Tanzania, and immediately after the RPF gained control in July 1994, refugees began to return, many of them settling in the Umutara Region. It was at this point that the region and Nyagatare town began to see a dramatic increase in population and settlement. Many returnees brought herds of cattle with them, and began to settle wherever they could find space. Much of the land in Umutara had been incorporated into Akagera National Park and the contiguous Mutara Hunting Reserve, and in response the increasing



Figure 5.2: Map showing the major national parks in Rwanda (Source: author; base maps sourced from http://d-maps.com/pays.php?num_pay=49&lang=en and MININFRA 2011)

settlement by returnees, these boundaries were pushed back in order to accommodate the population boom.

As a result, one of the earliest and most deleterious impacts of post-conflict resettlement in the region was the loss of wildlife and biodiversity. Akagera is one of three major national parks in Rwanda (see Figure 5.2), and was established and gazetted in 1934 by the Belgian colonial authority (Insitut des Parcs Nationaux du Congo Belge), and an adjacent plot of land was gazetted in 1957 and established as the Mutara Domaine de Chasses (the Mutara Hunting Reserve) (Bch-cbd.naturalsciences.be, 2005). After the elimination of the Mutara Hunting Reserve and the revision of Akagera's boundaries by gazette in 1997 (Republic of Rwanda 2003) and revised again in 2010 (Law No.33/2010 of 24/09/2010), the park was reduced to less than half its original protected area (112,193 hectares out of the original 267,000 hectares – see Figure 5.2). Although the majority of conflict in the early 1990s occurred in other parts of the country, according to Plumptre, et. al. (2001), the impact of the civil war and genocide left a severe mark on the habitats and biodiversity of the park. During the civil war many animals were killed by military personnel who hunted for food, and following the genocide, human encroachment lead to significant habitat loss. Between the hunting and habitat loss, it was estimated that 30 percent of large mammals were lost in the park between 1991 and 1997/98 (see Figure 5.3), and at the time of the 1997 boundary re-delineation it was predicted that such loss of protected land would cause "the loss of 15 percent of tree and shrub species, 20 percent of herbaceous species, and about 13 percent of bird species from the park" (Plumptre, et. al. 2001: 17). While other other parks in the country also saw loss of biodiversity and species during the 1990s (Nyungwe National Park lost much of its forest cover for firewood for refugees and internally-displaced persons, and endangered mountain gorillas in Volcanoes National Park were further threatened by military action), Akagera has been the most threatened specifically by the return of refugees and the sprawl of settlement throughout the East (see Figure 5.4).



Figure 5.3: Changes in large mammal population in Akagera National Park between 1991 and 1997/1998 (Source: Plumptre et.al., 2001, 18)



Figure 5.4: Map showing the growth of settlement across former boundaries of Akagera. (Source: REMA 2009, 82.)

As a result of the increased pressure on land and resources, the Nyagatare area became a focal point for some initial settlement policies and planning, including the practical application of Rwanda's *Imidugudu* policy. In fact, Umutara Province, along with Kibungo Province to the south, saw some of the most extensive villagisation in the country. By 1999, 80% of households in Umutara and Kibungo Provinces were in grouped settlements (Newbury 2011), and by 2005 this number had increased to 90% (Bruce 2007). That villagisation was considerably more prevalent in this region reflects the early objectives for resettling returnees, indicated by "the large number of Tutsi who fled to Uganda and who, when they returned, were accommodated in the villages" (Ibid., 16). The most intensive period of villagisation was between 1996 and 1999, and in addition to merely housing landless returnees, the programme was used to mediate disputes between old-case Tutsis who returned in 1994 and new-case Hutus who returned in 1996 (Newbury 2011). *Imidugudu* houses were required to be located along roads and in villages, and while some assistance was available for house-building, most people were responsible for building their own houses (Ibid.). In some cases, an ad hoc policy of land sharing was pursued in the east (originating in Kibungo and spreading sporadically through Umutara and Kigali rural), in response to old-case/new-case disputes (Bruce 2009, Newbury 2011).

Nyagatare town began to emerge out of this environment as a more significant settlement, after MININFRA and the District developed a plan for a town of three hundred houses and other buildings that would serve as a sort of urban centre for the wider region (EDGL 2009). The 2009 Nyagatare Master Plan also notes that early agricultural projects helped to spur the growth of the town, because the town was designated for the establishment of services and structures to support the project. However, these projects date back to the 1970s (worldbank.org 2013a and 2013b), twenty years before the town began to grow rapidly, so it is likely that their impact on the growth of the town wasn't particularly significant, and certainly not nearly as significant as the end of the war and the return of refugees.

The region first appeared as a separate area in the 2002 census, and even though Umutara Province had the largest land area of all provinces, at that time it had both the lowest urban population and the lowest population density in the country (Republic of Rwanda 2005a – see Table 5.1).

Province/City	Total Population	Population Density (persons sq. km.)	Urban Population (% of total pop.)
Ruhengeri	891 498	619	8.0
Gisenyi	864 377	594	7.8
Gitarama	856 488	406	16.1
Kigali Ngari	789 300	307	6.5
Butare	725 914	386	18.9
Byumba	707 786	416	9.4
Kibungo	702 248	247	12.9
Cyangugu	607 495	528	9.7
Kigali City	603 049	1924	100.0
Gikongoro	489 729	318	6.6
Kibuye	469 016	350	9.9
Umutara	421 623	134	2.0
Rwanda Total	**8 128 553**	**378**	**16.9**

Table 5.1: Synthesized 2002 census information (Source of data: Republic of Rwanda 2005a)

The 2002 census data also paints the picture of a region with largely informal and traditional housing, almost no electricity, and a high percentage of migrants. At the time Umutara Province hosted the highest percentage of migrants in the country – 48% of the total population, the majority of whom had come from Uganda, while others came from Byumba, Ruhengeri, Kibungo Provinces or Kigali Rural. There were very few people originating from Umutara who were found to have migrated to other parts of the country (Republic of Rwanda 2005a). By 2006, the average land size per household in Umutara Province was 1.14 hectares, which was the highest average in the country – other areas ranged from 0.34 hectare (Cyangugu) to 1.09 hectares (Gitarama) (REMA 2009).

Between the 2002 and 2012 censuses, Nyagatare Sector was the sixth fastest-growing sector in the country, with an annual average growth rate of 10.3% (Republic of Rwanda 2012a). This growth likely happened as a result of ongoing refugee return since the District has continued to focus on construction of houses for returnees (Republic of Rwanda 2012e, 25), as well as from migration from within the country in response to low population densities and economic opportunity (Resident interviews 2013).

5.1.2. Current Realities

After nearly twenty years of rapid growth and in-migration, this year Nyagatare was named one of the six secondary cities targeted for increased population and economic growth in Rwanda. Based on personal experience there in 2009 and again in 2013, the town is noticeably and quickly growing and appears to be a hotspot for people migrating to look for new economic opportunities. Given its designation as a secondary city, it stands poised for even greater potential change than before.

The following section will describe the current state of the town. Unfortunately there is no current statistical data available at the town level, since Nyagatare town has not been designated as a separate administrative unit. Most data available is only at the District or Sector level. District-level data can really only be used here to contextualise the town, since a significant portion of Nyagatare District is rural. A good portion of the Sector is also rural, but Nyagatare town dominates the Sector in terms of function, population, and services, so Sector-level information is still useful, if not completely accurate for the purposes of this report.

5.1.2.1. Demographics and Population

As of 2012, Nyagatare District was home to 466,944 people, 52,125 of whom reside in Nyagatare Sector, and between 2002 and 2012. Average household sizes across the District are 5.1 persons (Republic of Rwanda 2012c). Neither current urbanisation rates nor cell-level population data have been released yet. The only population figure available for the town itself is found in the 2009 Master Plan, which describes the population at the time at 23,188, although it is not clear how accurate this number is, and as the Master Plan also declares the District population to be 291,452 (compared to 466,944 in 2012), this figure is likely woefully out of date. However, it is the only number available to work with. If

the 10.3% average annual growth rate for the sector is applied to this, the figure for the town's population becomes 34,321 for the year 2013. However, this is still likely to be a conservative estimate, as the majority of population growth has occurred within the town itself, and thus the town's growth rate is likely much higher than 10.3% and significantly higher than the rural areas of the sector.

5.1.2.2. Economy

The District's economic activity is dominated by agriculture, and although there are no figures to say what the rural/urban breakdown of economy and employment are, it is likely that many town residents or workers are involved in agriculture to some extent. Off-farm employment for the District low, at 17.5%, compared to a national average of 26.6%. Informal employment is high at 81%, compared to a nation average of 69.5% (Republic of Rwanda 2012f). According to the secondary city selection criteria, there are very few (fewer than five) large firms (defined as employing more than 30 people) in the town, but there are more than 4,000 micro or small enterprises (Republic of Rwanda 2013b). This economic characterisation of high levels of informality and a proliferation of small businesses is likely a product of the high levels of in-migration because of perceived economic opportunities.

There was no data found on the specific types of predominant business or employment in town, but based on observation the most significant new economic activities include milk production co-ops and dairy, maize milling, rice growing, and a growing hospitality sector (i.e. guest houses and restaurants). Long-standing businesses include the market (although it is being moved into a new facility), shops and small supermarkets, an industrial sector that includes woodworking, metal-working, brick-making and auto repair, and the construction sector is very healthy although it appears to be largely informal and loosely organised. There is very little economic activity that would suggest that Nyagatare is achieving the goals of Vision 2020, as most current activities are either basic economic functions generic to any town, or primary and secondary sector activities related directly to agriculture and cattle keeping. New public investments seem almost exclusively focused on such activities as well.

Nyagatare residents fare reasonably well in terms of poverty (with 37.8% below the poverty line as compared to a national average of 44.8%); however, it was also found that throughout the Eastern Province, people self-reported the second highest levels of poverty in the country (NURC 2008), so while people may not be especially poor, they feel poor. This may have some bearing on the higher levels of distrust reported in the area as well.

5.1.2.3. Government and Institutions

Nyagatare town sits within both Nyagatare District and Nyagatare Sector, although the Master Plan designates the town area as encompassing parts of four sectors (Nyagatare, Rwimiyaga, Rwempasha, and Tagabwe), so presumably it is intended for the town to be jointly administered between these four sectors in the long term, which could strain the administrative capacity of these sectors. The District is responsible for local economic development, planning and

infrastructure development; while the Sector is responsible for service delivery, statistical collection, and community participation. Within the town are individual *akagari* and *imidugudu* which carry out local-level community organisation. Land use and economic planning currently is carried out at the District level, and as in other districts a one stop shop is to be developed to deal with land use and construction permitting. This administrative structure could prove difficult in the long run, as Sectors are responsible for service delivery and statistical collection, but as the four Sectors that make up the Nyagatare town (master planned area) bridge both rural and urban areas, there is a significant possibility of duplication of responsibilities and inefficiencies in terms of capacity. In theory under decentralisation there should be an elected town council, but it does not appear that this has been implemented in Nyagatare town.

Currently, local government is not very democratic. Executive secretaries at the sector level either are given the position after going through a transparent interview process, others are elected after being nominated by local opinion leaders. Mayors are appointed from above, and must be highly qualified academically. Such government positions are carefully screened to prevent future ethnic conflict – as a local leader noted, "this country has a history of ethnic hatred which will not die overnight, so whoever wants to go into politics has to be a 'positive' person, well accepted in community and a role model in village of origin" (Email, local leader, 2013). There are very few international NGOs present in the town, although there are many local organisations such as co-operatives for specific professions, which are either government-initiated (as is the case for the dairy and SACCO co-operatives that are discussed in resident interviews) or formed by locals.

5.1.2.4. Community

Ansoms (2008) notes that the former Umutara region has some of the greatest ethnic disparities in the country. Social cohesion in the area is also impacted by high rates of in-migration. This is in part the cause of the Eastern Province reporting the highest levels of interpersonal distrust in the country: 61% of respondents agreed with the statement that "it is naïve to trust others," an increase from 45% of respondents agreeing just two years prior (NURC 2008, 29). However, Eastern Province residents also largely feel that they can work together anyway, with only 39% agreeing to the statement "In my neighbourhood, one does not easily think of working together to resolve a new problem" (Ibid., 30). Similarly, an increasing percentage disagree with the statement that "We are not able to implement a community development project at cell level because people distrust each other too much to work together", with 54% disagreeing in 2005 and 67% in 2007 (Ibid., 31). This is consistent with Veale's (2000) analysis that people are more willing to work together in structured social environments, and avoid spontaneous community organisation.

Perhaps as a symptom of this tendency to be drawn towards structured social environments, the town is structured so there is very little public space, besides streets. And while the town centre is pedestrian-friendly, with shops bordering the street and pockets of shade, it is not common to see people lingering in the street. There are no street traders, except for a few kiosks where airtime is sold, and so activity on the street is almost entirely based on movement and not gathering. The market and taxi park, likely the closest thing to public space, do not seem to attract much activity beyond

shopping or waiting for a taxi – this may be in part because of a lack of shelter in both areas, a common complaint among interview respondents. Residents seem much more likely to gather either in private dwellings (in visits that can last for hours), businesses (restaurants, shops), or more structured social environments (such as cell or *umudugudu* offices, schools, or churches).

5.1.2.5. Settlement

The current town of Nyagatare is made up of a town centre, a collection of *Imidugudu* villages and growing residential neighbourhoods. The town is reached via Ryabega, a small trading centre located at a turn-off from the main north-south road, the Kayonza-Kagitumba Road. The Ryabega-Nyagatare Road primarily serves Nyagatare; it is only paved until it reaches the border between Nyagatare and Barija, where it becomes a rough road and continues through to Nsheke village. The majority of the town is located between the Umuvumba River and Mount Busana, and the former *umudugudu* of Barija forms a northern residential suburb that is expanding.

The area around Nyagatare that falls within the study area includes a larger peri-urban and rural area and several *Imidugudu* villages (Busana, Mirama, Bugaragara, Nyagahita and Nsheke), as well as some scattered rural houses, and several clusters of roadside settlement that do not appear to fall within the larger villages. The area also incorporates



Figure 5.5: Current settled area, Nyagatare (Source: the author)

the trading centre of Ryabega, which is at the junction between the main Kayonza-Kagitumba Road and the Ryabega-Nyagatare Road. A progress report on the National Human Settlement Policy reports that current villagisation rates in Nyagatare District are among the highest in the country, 93.5% as of February 2013 (MINALOC 2013). The villages within the study area follow a very structured grid pattern, with similar house and plot sizes. Although Nyagatare town represents the largest settlement, the villages have a higher built area density than much of the town, which tends to be quite sprawling and feature larger houses and larger plots (see Figures 5.5, 5.6).

Most buildings in Nyagatare are single story, with a few taller buildings in the business area near the main road, near the District Offices, or near the University (see Photos 5.1-5.8). Most houses are detached, single-family, on sizeable plots, some of which are used for crop-growing, even in town. There are also quite a few smaller row-house type buildings made up of several one-, two-, or three-room units, home to single people or young families. These typically are either on the plot of a larger single-family house or are grouped together around a common courtyard, with common kitchen and bathroom facilities. There is a shortage of cheap accommodation, and most new housing construction is in the form of large, expensive single-family dwellings on large plots. Many of these new houses are being funded from outside of Nyagatare, by investors in anticipation of an economic and population boom. Currently, however, it is difficult for owners to rent these houses out, as they are too expensive for average households in Nyagatare (Resident interviews 2013).



Figure 5.6: Built density comparison within the study area (source: the author)

Photo 5.1: The main road (Source: the author)

Photo 5.2: The new taxi park (Source: the author)

Photo 5.3: A recently-paved road (Source: the author)

Photo 5.4: Outside the new taxi park (Source: the author)

Photo 5.5: The temporary market (Source: the author)

Photo 5.6: The future market (Source: the suthor)

Photo 5.7: In the town centre (Source: the author)

Photo 5.8: Near the university (Source: the author)

Photo 5.9: Collapsed building (Source: Ndaka 2013)

In May of this year, a four-story building under construction on the main road collapsed, killing six (Nsanzimana 2013a, see Photo 5.9). The cause of the collapse was found to be poor materials and shoddy engineering, and there were reports that the building did not have appropriate clearance to be constructed (The New Times 2013). This building would have been one of the tallest in town, and would have joined the other largest buildings in town: the recently-built Hostel 2020 (see Photo 5.10), student accommodation for the University built in response to accommodation shortages, but unable to be fully rented out as it is too expensive for students; and the yet-to-be-completed EPIC Hotel

Photo 5.10: Hostel 2020 (Source: realcontractorsltd.com 2013a)

(see Figure 5.7), a new luxury hotel being constructed on the edge of town.

5.1.2.6. Services and Infrastructure

The area has considerably lower rates of access to an improved water source than the rest of the country (42.3% compared to the national average of 74.2%) (Republic of Rwanda 2012c). But even those who do have access to water infrastructure have to deal with frequent service cuts, especially in the dry season, so many households must rely on rainwater collection or surface water collection as a backup. Access to electricity is about commensurate with national averages, although there are often power cuts (as there are throughout the country), sometimes daily. Based on observation and resident interviews, these services do not appear to have improved between 2009 and 2013. Nyagatare town is connected to the national fibre-optic network and thus has the capacity for high-speed internet, although the District has some of the lowest rates of computer literacy in the country, so this is a service that is not widely used.

5.1.2.7. Natural Environment

Nyagatare town is located in the eastern Savannah grasslands and is hotter, drier, and lower-lying than the rest of Rwanda. It is located within the watershed of the Umuvumba River, a tributary of Lake Victoria and, subsequently, the Nile River. The climate, terrain and vegetation are perhaps more similar to neighbouring Uganda and Tanzania than the remainder of Rwanda. Given its climate, Nyagatare is prone to drought and falls within the "rainfall deficit risk zone" and it is also particularly prone to overgrazing, leading to soil erosion and the loss of natural biodiversity (REMA 2009).

Figure 5.7: EPIC Hotel (Source: realcontractorsltd.com 2013b)

5.1.2.8. Land management and use

Despite relatively low population densities in the East, conflicts over land have been a problem since the end of the genocide. Huggins (2011) remarks that post-conflict land issues often include land grabbing by those in power, discriminatory land policies, conflicting claims between original occupants and returned refugees, and competing power imbalances between local actors and the central state. All of these factors are evident in land issues in the East.

In 2008 the Presidential Land Commission in the Eastern Province oversaw the reallocation of large plots of land that were in the possession of several Rwandan elites. Officially, the reallocation targeted those holding more than 25 hectares of land in Nyagatare, Gatsibo, Kayonza and Kirehe Districts, and redistributed parcels to returned refugees and those evicted from Akagera National Park and Gabiro School of Infantry (Musoni 2008). Former land holders were allowed to retain 25 hectares of land, although many ended up with more, either because of the landholders' "various investments...established on that land" (Kimenyi 2008) or because of extended family who were allotted additional land (Huggins 2011). However, Huggins argues that most of these land owners first gained control of this land by grabbing it, and thus the exercise unfairly awards a disproportionate amount of land back to land grabbers, reinforcing unequal land distribution in the process[1]. The Mayor of Nyagatare District at the time warned that not *all* these properties had been grabbed, and asserted that "the commission does not consider how one acquired the land. What we are stressing is sharing land with the landless irrespective of the mode of acquiring it" (Ntagungira 2008a). Huggins furthermore points out that there is no basis in law to support a maximum size of 25 hectares per landowner, nor additional land for family members. And despite it being reported at the time that "according to the new land policy no one will be allowed to possess more than 25 hectares of land" (Kimenyi and Ntagungira 2008a), there is nothing in the land policy to suggest this. Ansoms (2011) argues that land grabs by elite Rwandans still occur, but under the guise of farm consolidation and "the opportunities provided by the new discourse on agriculture as a motor for development to secure their control over space" (Ibid., 10). Huggins expresses concern over the dangerous precedent that allowing land grabbing to go unpunished (and questionable interpretation of the law) has set, and Ansoms demonstrates that this precedent has allowed land grabbing to continue under the rationale of economic development.

However, many most recent 'land grabs' in the East and in Nyagatare town have been conducted via official evictions in order to secure land for large development projects. Many of these evictions have been called out for being unfair or illegal. Several families were made to move to accommodate the expansion of Umutara Polytechnic University (Ntagungira 2006a, Ngabonziza 2011c), more than 100 families were evicted from Nyagatare town and relocated to "remote areas" to accommodate public/private development of infrastructure in town (Ntagungira 2006b), and a village across the river from the town was ordered to be demolished without consulting residents because "for the sake of beautifying the town of Nyagatare, mushrooming slums and shanties would not be allowed" (Rwembeho 2009). There are many more examples of such evictions (Gahigana 2008a, Ngabonziza 2009, Ntagungira 2007a, Nuwamanya 2006). All of these support Huggins' (2011, 253) claim that:

1 Huggins points out that inequality in land distribution has been steadily increasing, from a Gini coefficient of 0.43 in 1990 to 0.594 in 2002 (Huggins 2011, 255).

> many post-conflict interventions in the land sector focus on strengthening existing dispute-resolution mechanisms at the local or national level... This may strengthen the 'rule of law', but it also may alter the balance of power between local actions (e.g. land users, customary leaders, and local authorities) and the central state. In some cases, land reform is designed to undermine local-level 'competition' to central state power and increase the extent and depth of state control.

This argument is also supported by numerous reports of government control over precise land use (including dictating what crops should be grown), with threats of eviction if landowners do not comply, even after rights have been granted (Rwembeho 2012a, b, Umworozi.com 2012).

Huggins points out that the 2008 commission was also particularly problematic as the government did not have the legal authority to carry out expropriations, nor did it comply with procedural requirements. There were conflicts of interest as some people sitting on the commission were subject to expropriation, and that there was no public participation and even local leaders were not well-informed about the exercise (Huggins 2011 259-260). There are also reports of residents' accusation of bias in the allocation of land and enforcement of agricultural policy and land use, particularly the requirement for "livestock farmers to sell off their local cattle breeds in order to rear exotic cattle breeds, and adoption of modern ways of farming" (Gahigana 2008b). The process of determining residents most in need of land during redistribution was also met with accusations of bias, with one resident stating that "We don't understand the procedure the authorities are applying in the selection of those to benefit from the process because many people who are really desperate for land were not put on the list... Their integrity is questionable. Many of us came to this district in 1994 and we were not considered" (Ntagungira 2007b). Cooke (2011, 13) asserts that "tenure of scarce arable land has been used by the political elite to punish or reward since the early days of collusion between the monarch and colonial administrators," and the many issues of post-conflict land redistribution will likely exacerbate political problems.

Finally, the issue of land conflicts between new and existing residents has been an ongoing theme. From the outset, returned refugees have been given priority for the allocation of land. This was particularly noted during the 2008 reallocation exercise (Gahigana 2007, Mugabe 2008, Musoni 2008). Re-allocating land for returnees has since been an ongoing effort (Namara 2008, Republic of Rwanda 2012e, Rwembeho 2013d), although official policy as well as the Protocol of the Arusha Peace Accords does not grant restitution to returnees who have been out of the country longer than ten years (Republic Rwandaise 1995, Republic of Rwanda 2004), so returnees are being resettled in other areas. This has led to another set of problems, particularly as there are mixed messages about returnees' land rights. A brochure distributed to answer questions about the Cessation Clause states that returnees will be granted the full rights to their land, and that they must register their land to reclaim it. Where there might be conflicting claims, the returnees are to consult with *abunzi* or other local mediators (Republic of Rwanda 2011b). However, *all* refugees returning under the Cessation Clause by definition will have been out of the country longer than ten years since the Clause only covers returnees from 1998 and earlier, so it is not clear how they may lawfully reclaim land from before, particularly if it wasn't previously registered. Since previously Kigali was the only place to have land titles, rural and secondary urban areas are left open to such confusion over land claims. Recent news reports show that this confusion occurs at the ground

level for returnees. One recent returnee evicted from Tanzania discusses unsuccessful attempts at reclaiming familial land, leaving her now vulnerable: "I know I entirely belong to the Rwandan government. It will decide what to do with me" (Kagire 2013d). Returnees evicted from Uganda in 2007 tried to resettle in Nyagatare, claiming familial origin, but officials claimed returnees were just "inveterate liars" and were "looking for land" and did not actually originate from Nyagatare, and as a result they would be resettled throughout other parts of the country (Ntagungira 2007c). Other returnees in Nyagatare District were treated sceptically, as officials asserted that they were falsely claiming to be evicted from Uganda so that they could benefit from upcoming land redistribution (Ntagungira 2008b). However, the law only states that refugees gone for longer than 10 years have no rights to reclaim previously-owned properties, not that they do not have the right to resettlement. In fact, for those who do not meet the ten-year requirement, the land policy specifically states that "the Government should provide them with land to enable them to resettle and lead a decent life" (Republic of Rwanda 2004, 27) and that they should be given land according to their needs. Particularly with the recent push for return that has accompanied the Cessation Clause, the state is stressing that there are enough land and resources for everyone, and no one should be left without land when they return.

In summary, although the land registration process has been completed (although actual titling appears to still be in process) the East and Nyagatare have consistently been home to competition over land. This competition is a result of many different parties claiming rights to the land, although long-standing 'ordinary' residents seem to be given the lowest priority for land ownership (below large-scale landowners and newly-arrived returnees). While the real competition may exist between individual actors, frustrations seem to be largely vented against the government over the way that it handles conflicting land claims. As the government continues to advertise land for returnees, and as it pushes for farm consolidation, conflict over land will likely continue, especially as small-scale long-term farmers find themselves with less access to land and less freedom to work the land they have as they see most fit. Confusion over claims for returnees may continue to be a problem as well, particularly as the state seems willing to overlook questionable claims to land of large land-holders, but do not always demonstrate willingness to accommodate returnees. Although landholders are given freehold tenure, they are still subject to eviction, particularly if they do not use their land appropriately, and Nyagatare has a lower than average percentage of households (77.9% compared to a national average of 84%) that have the right to sell any of their land or use it as a guarantee (Republic of Rwanda 2012g). However, there is nothing in the land policy to suggest that such eviction might be legal, and the issue of fair compensation for eviction is also deeply problematic as there are claims that the government is not paying out the full value of the property (Interviews with former land appraiser and architecture student 2013; Ngabonziza 2011). This reality of landholding in Nyagatare does not bode well as more people migrate to the East, and as Huggins notes, previous dubious interpretations of land law set a dangerous precedent as to how future competition over land may be dealt with.

5.1.3. Secondary City Comparison

It is difficult to compare Nyagatare to other towns and cities in Rwanda because of its unusual history and rapid growth. However, because it has recently been thrown into the ring with five other significant settlements in Rwanda, it may be most appropriate to conduct a brief comparative analysis for Nyagatare in relationship to these towns. At the Sector[2] level, it is most interesting to compare the relative sizes of the towns (see Table 5.2). Nyagatare is fairly average in terms of Sector population, but with an exceedingly larger footprint, indicated here by a significantly lower population density. Next to Rubavu, Nyagatare has the second highest growth rate, and previously had the smallest population. Two of the Sectors saw a decline in population between 2002 and 2012, which is surprising given the significance of these towns.

	Nyagatare (Nyagatare Sector)	**Rusizi** (Kamembe Sector)	**Rubavu** (Gisenyi Sector)	**Muhanga** (Nyamabuye Sector)	**Huye** (Ngoma Sector)	**Musanze** (Muhoza Sector)	**All Rwanda**
2002 Population	19 475	29 895	20 161	34 035	28 828	35 816	8 128 553
2012 Population	52 125	27 091	54 133	44 831	28 145	52 640	10 537 222
Average Annual Growth Rate (2002-2012)	10.30%	-1.00%	10.40%	2.80%	-0.20%	3.90%	2.60%
Population Density (s.km)	317	1 878	4 845	1 509	1 366	2 489	416

Table 5.2: Secondary city comparison (Source of data: Republic of Rwanda 2012a)

There is not much further information available at the Sector level. However, at the District level, Nyagatare's sprawling settlement patterns are further implied by higher use rates of public transport in Nyagatare District compared to the other towns, as well as greater bicycle ownership (Republic of Rwanda 2012j). Nyagatare District also features high rates of money transfers that are sent outside of Rwanda – 7.7% of households compared to a national average of 3%, and second among the secondary cities only to Rubavu, where 10.3% of households transfer money abroad (Republic of Rwanda 2012h). Such high remittance rates suggest that Nyagatare residents are more likely to remain connected to social networks across borders. Compared to the Districts of the other secondary cities, Nyagatare has a much lower rate of off-farm employment and a much higher rate of informal employment (Republic of Rwanda 2012f – see Table 5.3). Nyagatare compares most negatively in terms of access to improved water sources, with less than half of households with access, compared to a range of 72.8% to 93.4% in the other towns, and a national average of 74.2%. Nyagatare residents also reported the highest average walking time to an improved water source, and not surprisingly, residents reported the lowest levels of satisfaction with access to water.

2 A note about Sector level data: some of the secondary cities sprawl beyond the borders of a single sector. However, for ease of comparison, only one sector was selected, in each case the sector that contained the majority of the town.

	Nyagatare District	Rusizi District	Rubavu District	Muhanga District	Huye District	Musanze District	All Rwanda
Percentage of households with access to improved water source (j)	42.3%	72.8%	93.4%	84.4%	91.0%	74.0%	74.2%
Average walking time to an improved water source (j)	17.6 minutes	10.6 minutes	12.8 minutes	9.6 minutes	13.9 minutes	9.7 minutes	14.4 minutes
User satisfaction with main drinking water source (% of households satisfied) (j)	39.6%	61.3%	76.4%	59.5%	58.0%	47.2%	53.9%
Off-farm employm'nt as a main job (percentage of employed people over 16 years) * (f)	17.5%	30.4%	47.7%	20.6%	2.1%	32.3%	26.6%
Informal employm'nt (percentage of employed people over 16 years) (f)	81.0%	64.4%	76.2%	71.9%	64.8%	76.6%	69.5%

*This category includes both "wage non-farm" and "independent non-farm" categories in the source document
Sources:
(f): Republic of Rwanda 2012f
(j): Republic of Rwanda 2012j

Table 5.3: Selected comparison of Districts housing secondary cities.

Nyagatare thus fits well as a secondary city in terms of population growth and population size, but still lags behind the other secondary cities in terms of built density, utilities, and opportunities for off-farm and formal employment.

5.2 Resident Interviews

As mentioned in Chapter 2, it was quite difficult to ask directly about conflict and related issues during resident interviews, in part because it is has become something of a taboo topic of conversation (see also Buckley-Zistel's analysis presented in Chapter 4), and in part because of my position as an unknown outsider. The following sections thus represent what was gleaned from interviews about current realities in town, primarily regarding social relationships and attitudes towards leadership. This is followed by a short discussion of other findings regarding conflict, based on informal conversations and observation.

5.2.1. Resident Origin and Reasons for Coming to Nyagatare

Of the residents that were interviewed (in resident interviews, focus groups, and local authority interviews), the majority identified their place of origin as being elsewhere (place of origin being defined for this study as previous places to have lived, not necessarily as place of birth). Several people expressed having lived in Uganda previously, and several others had previously lived in Kigali. Other places of origin include Nyanza, Rwamagana, Gatsibo District, Matimba (in Nyagatare District) and Huye. No one stated that they were born in Nyagatare; it is possible that those that did not specify another place of origin did so because they are life-long residents of Nyagatare, or perhaps they did not feel comfortable discussing past homes (see Table 5.4).

Interviewee	**Place of origin**	**Current home**	**Do they plan to stay or leave in the long term?**
Resident 1	Uganda, as a refugee	Barija	Stay
Resident 2	did not specify	Barija	Not sure
Resident 3	Kigali	Mirama	Will stay if Nyagatare develops
Resident 4	Did not specify	Nyagatare	Stay, but move to Barija
Resident 5	Nyanza	Barija	Stay
Resident 6	Kigali & Kampala	Nyagatare	Leave
Resident 7	Kigali	Nyagatare	Leave
Resident 8	Kigali	Nyagatare	Leave
Resident 9	Uganda	Mukama Sector	Not sure: “We Africans, we are used to shifting”
Resident 10	Did not specify	Nyagatare	Not sure
Resident 11	Kigali	Nyagatare	Not sure
Resident 12	Uganda	Nyagatare	Stay
Resident 13	Gatsibo	Nsheke	Did not specify
Resident 14	Uganda, as a refugee	Nsheke	Stay
Resident 15	Did not specify	Nsheke	Leave
Teacher 1	Rwamagana	Nyagatare	Not sure
Teacher 2	Uganda	Nyagatare	Leave
Teacher 3	Uganda	Nyagatare	Leave, after two more years
Teacher 4	Matimba	Nyagatare	Not sure
Teacher 5	Nyagatare	Kigali/Nyagatare	Not sure
Teacher 6	Uganda	Nyagatare	Stay
Dairy Manager	Huye	Nyagatare	Did not specify
BDC Manager	Rwamagana	Nyagatare	Did not specify
SACCO Employee	Did not specify	Did not specify	Did not specify

Table 5.4: Resident origin (Source: Resident interviews 2013)

Many residents came in search of business opportunities: for instance, Resident 3, from Kigali, came to start a business selling vegetables in the market, and Resident 5, from Nyanza, also came to sell in the market. Resident 11, from Kigali, came to take over a larger business on the main road. He describes Nyagatare as a “place where you can build your muscle, your financial muscle”. Now that he has had some years of doing business he may return to Kigali. Many of

the teachers interviewed were from Uganda and had come specifically to teach. The Dairy and BDC Managers came specifically to work in their respective jobs.

Several residents also reported arriving in Nyagatare after returning as refugees, all from Uganda, and Resident 12 pointed out that one reason he stays in Nyagatare is because he still has family on the Ugandan side of the border. Of the four university students interviewed (Residents 6, 7, 8, and 15), three came to Nyagatare from other places just to attend university – the fourth already lives in Nyagatare. All four university students are eager to leave Nyagatare for Kigali as soon as possible. Two residents (13 and 14) came for the opportunity to own agricultural land. Resident 13 moved to Nyagatare from Gatsibo, and describes Nyagatare's soil as "fresh and new", compared to the soil in Gatsibo, which is overworked and no longer fertile.

Whether residents will remain in Nyagatare or will go elsewhere varied widely. Residents that gave a reason for their preference almost overwhelmingly cited economic motivations behind their decisions – most said they would leave if another good job opened elsewhere. The university students seemed to be bored with the town, feeling it was too quiet or too backwards. Only one person (resident 12) cited close connections to his family nearby as a reason to stay.

5.2.2. Resident Attitudes Towards Other Residents and Towards Outsiders

Residents almost overwhelmingly had negative things to stay about other residents, with a few key exceptions. Several residents (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13), were particularly concerned with security and theft, saying that this was a problem. The student focus group resulted in comments that a weakness among residents was "cultural beliefs" - a focus on cattle-raising instead of business; that residents are ignorant, and unpatriotic. Resident 6 believes that residents are uneducated, un-civilised, without good business ethic, and residents 7 and 8 similarly believe that residents are suspicious of outsiders, they are primitive and backwards, and that they have no business ethic. Resident 13 says that other residents are not open-minded (particularly regarding business), as in Uganda. Several remarked that Nyagatare residents did not understand customer care. Resident 3 sees his ability to provide customer care as a personal advantage of doing business in Nyagatare, so while his view of other residents is negative, he capitalises on it. Resident 6 says there is no customer care, as does resident 7, who also adds that "you go and buy things and they despise you, that you have cows," implying that residents are suspicious of wealth.

A few describe residents as being 'like children' – resident 11 argues that this is why Nyagatare must be planned for (unlike Kigali, which is mature), and the SACCO employee says that he sees his cooperative as being like a parent for undisciplined children, forcing them to save money. The SACCO employee also describes how it is often very difficult to "convince" residents to take out loans.

Residents 3 and 11 both had mixed responses – although they both have very low opinions of the business capacity of residents (no customer care, and resident 11 points out that residents are little more than subsistence farmers),

they both value the business relationships they have fostered in the town. As both of these residents have been fairly successful economically (resident 3 had recently purchased a house, and resident 11 ran a thriving main-road business), it is likely that these positive opinions of business relationships are at least in part a function of their advantageous position and their ability to turn a profit. There was only one interviewee who had only good things to say about residents: the BDC manager praised residents for their eagerness in attending business trainings, and their willingness to pay for such a service.

Resident attitudes towards outsiders were more mixed – however, a pattern emerged, in that residents who express the most openly hostile views towards other residents also tended to be more favourable towards outsiders. Residents 6 and 7, who expressed quite harsh views towards other residents, both believe that new people would be good for the town. Resident 6 specifically says that civilised, educated people should be brought into Nyagatare. Resident 11, who had mixed opinions about residents, also has mixed opinions on outsiders. On the one hand he was concerned that it would not be good that the new market space would attract outsiders to come in and sell. But on the other hand, he stated that what Nyagatare needed was to be better linked to people outside. He specifically meant through better infrastructure and mobility, however, so it is possible that his suspicion towards outsiders only extends towards people who will move to Nyagatare, or else people who are less mobile (and likely less wealthy). Resident 2 explicitly expressed concern with having to get along with outsiders who come to sell in the market.

5.2.3. Resident Attitudes Towards Leadership

There were no overtly positive opinions expressed towards current leadership, although several contended that good leadership was necessary to improve the town. The student focus group resulted in comments that current leadership is poor, and that there is corruption and nepotism. Two market sellers were suspicious that their taxes would be raised significantly in the new market, and resident 1 even asserted that the government would benefit more from the market than citizens. Resident 6 said that the leadership was no smarter than the residents. Resident 9 said that leadership changes too often and is weak, and that it provides a poor environment for investment. The dairy manager says that the current leadership is OK, but it changes too often, and that a big challenge is the implementation of plans.

5.2.4. Suggested Improvements

Most suggestions for improvement fell into one of three categories: improving leadership, improving human capacity, and improving business. Most residents (2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15) believe that with hard work, education, better security, and/or “changed minds”, the town will develop. Four residents (1, 5, 6, 9) specifically named good leadership as a necessity for improvement. The student focus group repeatedly pointed out that cooperation, communication, and good leadership were important for development. So while there may be low opinions for one another, at least at a theoretical level there is the expressed value that human capacity and community, with good leadership, will contribute

to development.

5.2.5. Other Observations

That there was very little open discussion about the war and genocide aligns with Buckley-Zistel's (2006) findings that this is not a topic that is freely discussed, and particularly not with outsiders (See Chapter 4). However, outside of interviews and in private, I found that some people spoke of matters of ethnicity and genocide without prompting. Discussions were only held among close, trusted company and still seemed a bit cautious, although there was no negative discussion regarding the "other" ethnicity. In some cases I left the conversation still uncertain as to the ethnicity of the person I was speaking to. But there was expressed fear over the possibility of a reprisal in ethnic violence, even though there was an appreciation for reconciliation efforts. There were specific concerns about the wisdom of marrying someone of the other ethnicity, since husbands had killed wives before over ethnic differences, so there is no assurance that it might not happen again. It is unlikely that families would be open to welcoming inter-ethnic marriages as well, a sentiment also recently reported in the New York Times (Kron 2010). There was also concern expressed over the possibility that Kagame may not step down from power in 2017 as promised, and if he does not it could lead to significant problem. And finally, although ethnic ethnic identification is illegal, it is not uncommon for peoples' ethnicity to be known. However, people born since 1994 may not even know their own ethnicity.

5.3. Discussion of Findings

Nyagatare exhibits many signs of a post-conflict town: rapid population growth, a large informal economy, rapid construction, social distrust, and a strain on resources. Given its designation as a secondary city, it is critical to understand the current constraints the town is faced with, as these can easily become magnified as the town grows.

5.3.1. Potential for Ongoing In-migration, and Challenges

Given political, demographic, and economic trends, it is highly likely that Nyagatare's booming growth rate will continue. However, the reasons for peoples' migration to the town and the forces that attract them are complex. Based on research findings, reasons for in-migration could be broken down into four categories:

Returning refugees. This category presents probably the most complex group of people. As described in Chapter 4, many people who are returning to the country (either voluntarily or involuntarily) lack social networks and have been gone for so long that they sometimes also lack a basic cultural or linguistic connection to Rwanda. Many returnees, particularly those currently being forcibly expelled from Tanzania, may have been forced to leave behind close family members, and many also have been forced to leave behind livestock or personal property. Those who are voluntarily repatriating may be doing so willingly or else because they feel they have no other option. There is also potential for

great variation in economic capacity of voluntary returnees – some may be arriving with a good amount of personal property and financial means, but likely most are arriving with very little and are dependent on the government to assist them with immediate resettlement and food aid. Voluntary returnees too may be experiencing a wide variety of feelings about their return – from relief to be finally coming home, to suspicion, wariness or fear for their security and ability to integrate. Nyagatare is likely to be a hot spot for resettlement, either voluntary or government-sponsored. The government may encourage people to resettle in Nyagatare as a means of enforcing the secondary city strategy and *Imidugudu*, and indeed, the government has already earmarked land in the district for returnees. Returnees may also be likely to voluntarily settle in Nyagatare either immediately, or in the long run because of the combined factors of economic opportunity, available land, and proximity to the borders of Uganda and Tanzania. It is also entirely possible that Nyagatare may prove to be attractive because it has a much less intense history of settlement, and may perceive to be free of the land- and ethnic-related conflicts that existed in other parts of the country and which resulted in war and genocide. However, as more people arrive and as the community becomes more diverse, the likelihood of *post-conflict* struggles over land and resources in Nyagatare are likely to increase, particularly as practice till now has shown favouritism towards old-case returnees as well as large-scale landowners. An influx of returnees thus presents a complex challenge for urbanisation in Nyagatare, as they may contribute to lack of social cohesion, and are extremely likely to be confronted by suspicion from current residents. Additionally, their complex and varying needs, abilities, and desires would require care and consideration, rather than an unvarying, blanket response by institutions.

Economic migrants. Economic migrants are people who are coming specifically for the economic opportunity presented by a booming new town. That economic migrants are such a significant contributor to current population growth dates back to the stated objectives for resettlement in 1995 (Republic Rwandaise 1995) that sought to handle mass urbanisation and refugee return through the creation of secondary cities. This objective is finally being realised in strategy and now is likely to have a continuous and lasting impact on Nyagatare, as people flood in search of opportunity. Economic migrants bring a broad range of skills, education, and financial capacity. They are not only Rwandese, but in many cases are foreigners from neighbouring countries who are attracted to opportunities, particularly in trade and the service sector.

Rural-to-urban migrants. This class of migrants comprises of people who move gradually closer to the town from surrounding rural areas. From field research it appears that the majority of rural-to-urban migrants will be young people. However, the research also suggests that young people are more likely drawn to Kigali or other big cities abroad, so the town may struggle to retain young populations. Further concern has been expressed over a plan by the national government to unify six universities in the country (including Umutara Polytechnic), with each campus re-configured into a specialist college, eliminating duplication of programmes across the country (Karuhanga 2013). Under such a scheme, Umutara Polytechnic University may have to discard its popular business and ICT/technology programmes in favour of focusing on less-popular agricultural and veterinary studies. Concerns have been expressed that with the loss of these programmes, young people would be less inclined to migrate to Nyagatare in the first place, let alone settle there (Resident interviews 2013). The lose of youth may have significant implications for community cohesion in Nyagatare, as it is widely assumed that there is greater potential for reconciliation among the youth because they have

been less directly and less intensively impacted by conflict and genocide.

Agricultural migrants. Agricultural migrants are people who come primarily for the availability of land, to cultivate and graze cattle. These people are not migrating specifically to Nyagatare town, but since post-conflict agricultural policies favour consolidation and thus there will be less access to land for small-scale farmers, these migrants may end up settling in Nyagatare town. The town then could be settled with individuals better equipped to farm but without the means to do so, which could add to both unemployment and poverty in the area.

Migration to Nyagatare is therefore likely to produce an extremely complex and diverse population, with varied goals, social networks, and levels of attachment. As current residents already express suspicion towards others, there is significant potential for social fragmentation, which may also be fuelled by past difference, ethnicity, trauma and poverty. Kasard and Janowitz (1974) describe long-term residence in a place as a key factor for community attachment and creating social bonds, so the challenge for Nyagatare (as it is for many post-conflict settlements) is in navigating different degrees of community attachment with a history of conflict, particularly as there is an influx of newcomers.

5.3.2. Constraints on Land and Resources

Constraints on land and resources have been a consistent problem since early resettlement post-1994. Initial returns severely damaged protected wildlife and habitats, and with an influx of new returnees (many bringing cattle) the danger of further habitat and biodiversity loss is again possible. Current land uses are sprawling and although the population size of Nyagatare town rivals other large towns in the country, it is inordinately more sparsely built. Without measures in place to restrict urban footprint growth, land conflicts could quickly become even more problematic. There is also potential for greater conflict among land uses, given the competition over resources by rural and urban activities. Urban sprawl threatens agricultural uses, and there is struggle over agency in the use of agricultural land. Similarly, access to water continues to be a major problem, and is compounded by competition by different uses. Both the scarcity of water in the dry region, as well as a significant lack of improved water sources for human consumption, threaten the sustainability of ongoing settlement in the area.

5.3.3. Conflict

As per Veale's (2000) findings, residents of Nyagatare seem more comfortable expressing frustrations in complaints against the local government, especially over land problems. However, this is not entirely reassuring, as Cooke (2011) warns that current cycles of repression and resentment in state-citizen relations in Rwanda could potentially give rise to disruptive and possibly violence responses. Additionally, there have been reports of residents being killed over land disputes despite mediation (Ngabonziza 2011b, c). Cooke (2011, 13) also warns that ethnic resentment is still strong, and that Tutsi have benefited from "extralegal allocations" of land upon returning to the country. Based on personal

observation, there are still explicit acts of interpersonal violence based on ethnic difference, although effort is made to keep these acts silent, and they are not freely discussed in public.

5.3.4. Uncertainty and Normality

The rhetoric around refugee return has been marked by a sense of finality and abruptness: including declarations that the "Government of Rwanda is determined to resolve, once and for all, the problem of Rwandan refugees" (Republic of Rwanda 2011a, 11). A report on the resettlement of returnees in Nyagatare District cites the mayor as admonishing returnees to forget their "exile memories" and focus on development: "I know you lost a lot of properties, but its [sic] time for you to feel at home and work hard for your mother land for better and bright future [sic]" (Namara 2008). Along with the rush to finalise land registration (as Augustinus and Barry warn against) and promote 'development', what emerges is a culture of coerced normality, where the past is abruptly shoved aside in an effort to be stable. Ansoms (2009, 304) describes development policies and the messages communicated to residents, particularly in rural areas, as an "imposed modernity", amounting to little more than the "cosmetic upgrading of rural life." However, Nyagatare represents perhaps one of the most severe examples of a break from pre-conflict normality, and as such it needs to be carefully considered and understood for the complex case that it is. With the potential for ongoing in-migration, uncertainty over issues of social cohesion, rate of population growth, and environmental sustainability is high. Planning then must face the challenge of helping to establish long-term stability in the face of uncertainty.

Conclusion

Nyagatare thus shows several characteristics of a post-conflict settlement, and many of these impacts are ongoing and self-perpetuating. The town and larger area has a history of conflicts over land, even though it has one of the lowest population densities in the country. The initial growth of the town was initiated by massive returns of refugees in the mid-1990s, and population growth has kept up the momentum ever since with ongoing returns and in-migration from other parts of the country. Population growth has contributed to strained resources and sprawling settlements, which could lead to ever-increasing conflicts over land and resources. There is social fragmentation and distrust, both towards other residents and newcomers and towards the government, as well as fear of conflict and insecurity, which is compounded by a potential influx of diverse groups of vulnerable returnees and economic migrants who lack local social networks and may also be poor and dependent on government aid.. And there is incomplete decentralisation and local government that is not fully democratic for fear of ethnic dominance, leading to somewhat one-sided and authoritarian governance. Planning in such environments can be a challenge, particularly because of the level of uncertainty in how the town will grow and what sort of people it may attract, as well as dealing with biased engagements as a result of felt insecurities and social distrust.

In light of this analysis of the challenges present in Nyagatare, the next chapter will thus present the most current planning response, the 2009 Nyagatare Master Plan, along with a critique and planning proposals.

Chapter 6

Critique and Proposals for a Different Post-Conflict Approach

This chapter will review and critique the current master plan for Nyagatare, and then develop an alternative framework for a post-conflict planning approach for Nyagatare informed by current literature and precedent. This chapter will thus be presented in three parts: first, the presentation of the current master plan, broken down into process, spatial plan, and subsequent developments; second, a critique of the plan, also broken down into process, spatial plan, and subsequent developments; and third, proposals for a different approach to post-conflict planning.

6.1 Current Master Plan

Recent planning for Nyagatare has been shaped by the 2009 Master Plan (EDGL 2009), and recent national policies (Urbanization and Rural Settlement Sector Strategy and EDPRS II) are anticipated to have a further impact on planning in Nyagatare in the near future. This section will present the 2009 Master Plan, followed by a discussion about subsequent developments and anticipated response to recent legislation.

The 2009 Plan, drawn up by EDGL in Kigali in conjunction with Tecsult in Montreal (a firm that has since been absorbed into AECOM), is intended to cover the development of the town until 2020. The plan was designed to follow EDPRS I, the 2008 National Urban Housing Policy, and the 2009 National Human Settlement Policy as well as Vision 2020. The plan is intended to cover both a short term timeline (2007-2012) and long-term timeline (2013-2020). The spatial extent of the plan covers a significant area bordered by the Umuvumba River to the west, up to Nsheke to the north, to the main Kayonza-Kagitumba road to the east, the the Ryabega-Nyagatare road to the south. The majority of this area is located within Nyagatare Sector, but also incorporates small portions of neighbouring Rwimiyaga Sector, Rwempasha Sector and Tabagwe Sector (see Figure 6.1).



Figure 6.1: Master plan area over Sectors and Cells (Source: NISR 2010, compiled by the author).

6.1.1. Process

The planning process occurred in two phases. The first phase included information gathering, development of survey instruments, analysis of the situations of different actors, and establishing the status of projects, urban and regional issues and a socio-economic analysis. It is not clear if the socio-economic analysis was conducted by the state or the consultants, but it is noted that it was difficult to source all of this information in the field, so the consultants relied on analysis by other experts (although this point also lacks clarity). Also involved in this part of the process was public consultation and the establishment of urban areas. "Public consultation" was not elaborated upon besides a note that this proved to be a challenge as it was difficult to establish appropriate stakeholders. The second phase involved the collection of field data and creation of the plan and recommendations.

It is noted that the plan was developed in response to the Urban Development Law No.04/81 of 29 January 1981; the plan notes that this law defines urban planning as distinct from local development planning, in that an urban plan services as a blueprint to plan overall development, whereas local development plans focus on the technical and legal aspects of land use. A report for USAID on environmental threats and opportunities in Rwanda defines the Urban Development Law further: the law calls for urban master plans that must "define the principles of habitat; establish a public investment program; coordinate administrative action" and must include "a presentation report; a description of the current state; a plan of priority first-phase operations" and "a plan for investments and public action" (Chemonics 2003, 42).

6.1.2. Spatial Plan

Since the plan is a master plan, it is intended to provide a comprehensive scheme for development (see Figure 6.2). It is meant to be largely conceptual, with the assumption that local development plans will follow to provide more detail. However, it does not appear that these plans have been completed.

The spatial plan covers an area significantly larger then the current town, and may realistically be considered more of a regional plan than a town plan, since it also includes surrounding villages and peri-urban areas. The plan calls for quite extensive restructuring of the existing urban elements, through the creation of several new cities. In Phase I, the first 'new city', to be implemented beginning in 2012, is to be located at the current prison, on the edge between Barija and Nyagatare town. This new city will become the new urban centre, with administrative activities, banking and services around a central plaza, and will be bordered to the north-east by a new artificial lake. Also to begin implementation in 2012 is a 'knowledge city', which will encompass the current Umutara Polytechnic University and Nyagatare Hospital, and will be the site for all higher education and applied research activities. Between this 'new city' and 'knowledge city' there will be a plaza that will run up the hill from the Umuvumba River to the designated green space of Mount Busana.



Figure 6.2: Master Plan (Source: EDGL 2009, 38. Annotated by the author for clarity)

Phase II, slated for 2015-2020, involves the extensive expansion beyond the current footprint of the city, with residential development and a genocide memorial along the Ryabega-Nyagatare Road and on the western side of the Umuvumba River, as well as a new 'tourist city' near the artificial lake, with various recreational activities including a golf course, hiking trails, hotels, etc.

Additional restructuring for 2020 includes the organisation of the peri-urban area, particularly between Nyagatare town and the Kayonza-Kagitumba road. This includes the designation of Ryabega as a trading centre for the purpose of supporting the scattered villages and agricultural activities in the peri-urban area. The *umudugudu* of Busana will also hold some sort of significant peri-urban role for the region, although the Master Plan does not make clear what exactly this role will be. As part of the peri-urban restructuring, nine new villages (called here Integrated Development Units) will be developed within the peri-urban area in very garden city-esque arrangements. Each unit will contain 100 households on 4 hectares (see Figure 6.3). There is little description of the plans, but it appears that each unit will contain centralised services and social facilities, surrounded by "co-housing village clusters" of detached single-family homes, and surrounded again by agricultural and industrial areas, divided by specific use (cereals on one side of the



Figure 6.3: Village Plans (Source: EDGL 2009, 40.)

village, fruits on the other). Cowsheds stand at the edge of the agricultural areas. It is not clear how land ownership will be managed in these units, as presumably an average household may have to maintain four separate land areas in each village: their house, a plot of land for vegetable-growing, a plot of land for cereal-growing, and a portion of a cowshed plus land for grazing.

Additional conditions of the spatial plan include the development of a regional transportation network and upgrade of existing infrastructure, with the development of a bus terminal at Ryabega; the construction of a new market; efficient waste water management, drainage, and waste management; and increased water supply through the creation of an artificial lake. The plan notes the importance of environmental sustainability and suggests five areas of focus for sustainable management: sanitation and waste management, preservation of flora along the river, preservation of historical heritage, siting of a landfill, and recreational activities. However, with the exception of sanitation and waste management, and the proposal of extensive recreational space, there is not much elaboration on these aspects of sustainability.

Existing electricity and telecommunications infrastructure is deemed adequate. There is also a note at the end of the document on rehabilitating the former airfield of Ngarama, a town about 40km south of Nyagatare town on the road to Byumba, outside of Nyagatare District. The economic strategy of the plan seems to be centred primarily on agriculture. Agricultural production (chiefly the promotion of rice cultivation along the Umuvumba River and the increase of milk production) is expected to increase, which will create new activity in the private sector, in business and industry. Additionally, the plan proposes the development of tourist sites to attract visitors, in addition to hotels and other infrastructure to support tourism. The plan notes other economic activities (mining/quarrying, crafts and trades,

services) but does not propose any plans for these activities.

In order to accomplish the plan, it is assumed that Nyagatare's legal status as a city will make Nyagatare an autonomous entity, which will make it easier to mobilise funds for development. However, at the time the plan was published, it is noted that the administration of the town still falls under district, sector, and cell administrative structures, with spatial planning the responsibility of MININFRA. There is no clear guidelines about planning for land administration, as this is expected to be carried out within subsequent local development plans.

6.1.3. Subsequent Developments

Despite a defined timeline within the document, implementation is proceeding quite slowly. The Executive Secretary of Nyagatare Sector noted that they are not working on a set timeline currently, and the advisor to the Minister of Infrastructure also noted that plans outside of Kigali tend to proceed much more slowly, in part due to a lack of local capacity in implementation.

In an interview, the Executive Secretary noted that the following developments are currently under way as part of the Master Plan:

- Part A – four-star hotel (EPIC Hotel), residential development, shopping mall and park near Mirama
- Part B – behind the District office (around Mt. Busana), a Chinese-built water treatment plant, relocated District offices, police station, and residential development
- Part C – Development beyond the University (around Mt. Busana).

Visible developments that indicate that the master plan is partially being implemented include:

- Improvement of road grading and drainage on the rough road leading up to the proposed centre for the New City (but there is no paving or any other noticeable progress towards the creation of a new city)
- Initiation of large-scale rice farming along the Umuvumba River
- Beginning construction on a four-star hotel in the area of Mirama
- Potential expansion of the university
- What appears to be an initial expansion of a transit area at Ryabega
- The construction of a new market, completion expected in April 2014
- Dairy industry expansion
- Ongoing residential and commercial construction throughout the town

The administration of Nyagatare town seems not to have changed since the creation of the plan. Only part of the area determined to be part of Nyagatare town by the Master Plan is classified as 'urban' under the District's administrative division (Nyagatare.gov.rw 2011); the majority of the 'town' is still classified as rural, including Barija, Mirama, Nsheke, and most of Ryabega. There is no town council but the development of the capacity of local administrations is being

encouraged from the national level (Republic of Rwanda 2012d; Email, advisor to the Minister of Infrastructure, 2013).

As Umutara Polytechnic University may be restructured under the united University of Rwanda plan, Umutara Polytechnic may thus direct its focus on agricultural and veterinary science programmes, which may impact negatively on the Plans' intention to create a Knowledge City.

It does not appear that any local development plans have been formed or released yet, as prescribed by the Master Plan.

Since the Plan was developed, EDPRS II and the Urbanisation and Rural Settlement Sector Strategic Plan have been released. It is not expected that the Plan will change significantly, although there may be some modifications to bring it in line with these strategies, as well as to bring it in line with a Green Growth Urbanisation Strategy to be developed in the short term (Email, advisor to the Minister of Infrastructure, 2013).

6.2. Critique

The 2009 Nyagatare Master Plan does not acknowledge the post-conflict situation of the town, and therefore does very little to deal with the impacts of conflict on the settlement. There is little consideration of land issues, demographic issues, preservation of natural resources, nor institutional capacity. As a result, the plan constitutes a very generic fixed vision of the future without consideration for uncertainties inherent in a post-conflict settlement. However, given the deep impacts of conflict that are still present in the town, the plan should be informed by post-conflict realities, especially given the high rate of reprisal of conflict in Africa (see Bigombe, et.al., 2000, in Chapter 3). The following sections critique the process and plan of the document, followed by a brief critique of subsequent developments.

6.2.1. Process

As the planning process or methodology is not well-articulated, it is difficult to give it a fair assessment. However, it is apparent that public consultation did not factor in strongly to the finished product, seemingly because of difficulty in working out who to involve. Perhaps time was too great a constraint. But in consideration of the findings of Chapter 3, without participation, the plan (and planners) run the risk of making the same faulty assumptions that Taylor (1998) highlights in his examination of post-war planning in Britain: that objectives are viewed as "common sense" without interrogation or consultation, and that planning amounts to a technical exercise intended to create a better built environment. However, as Bollens (2008) asserts, planning (and particularly planning in post-conflict cities) provides the opportunity for a re-determination of the social-technical interface, and that "unsettled urban contexts" (1257) allow for an interrogation of basic interactions between policy and power. Although the plan was guided by an outdated urban planning law, it has been noted that since 1994, application of the law has generally been adapted to current realities, particularly around the issues of resettlement of refugees (Chemonics 2003, 43). There is no reason then for

the drafters of the Nyagatare Master Plan to ignore the effects of conflict, and in fact the plan misses an important opportunity to interrogate and interpret the goals of a post-conflict state at a local level, as well as to involve residents in the effort of peace-building through reconstruction and development.

This lack of consideration for the historical, political and demographic context of the town results in a plan that speaks very little to the local context and character and anticipated change. It also neglects the current challenges of planning in the East, particularly the need to address land and resource scarcity and continuous in-migration of returnees, as well as ongoing social instability.

6.2.2. Spatial Plan

The spatial plan constitutes a very generic design that reflects a desired end state, informed more by national aims of economic development and middle-income status and less by the reality of the locality and its history.

6.2.2.1. Economics, Poverty and Inequality

The plan apparently assumes that the population of Nyagatare in 2020 will have achieved middle-income status, in line with the goals of Vision 2020. EDPRS I (Republic of Rwanda 2007), which was a guiding document for this plan, however notes that although poverty rates were declining at the time they were not falling at nearly a rapid enough rate to meet 2020 targets. And while urban areas outside of Kigali experienced a small decline in overall percentage of poverty, they saw a rise in poverty head count (from 290,000 in 2000 to 360,000 in 2006 nationwide) as well as extreme poverty head count (from 180,000 in 2000 to 220,000 in 2006) (Ibid., 13). So the plan seems to discount contemporary trends of poverty, and in fact doesn't even note the existing degree of poverty in the town.

The economic strategies presented in the Plan focus on agricultural development and investment, although there is no real plan for how to transition from an agricultural-based economy to a service-based economy as per Vision 2020 goals. Perhaps the assumption was made that as Nyagatare was home to some significant agricultural projects that brought about some population growth, the town would continue to have success with agriculture as an economic driver. However, as noted in the previous chapter, these agricultural projects were launched in the 1970s, and Nyagatare's growth only took off after the conflict two decades later. And now, nearly two decades after that, Nyagatare's economy is still dominated by the informal sector, suggesting that there is no precedence locally for agriculture as a driving force behind formalisation and the development of a dominant tertiary sector. Similarly, there is a disconnect between the economic drivers discussed in the document and the spatial layout of the plan: although a sizeable area of land within the city centre is designated for future business and services, there is no discussion about what sort of businesses may be developed or how they may come to be. There is discussion, however, of secondary-sector activities (processing raw materials, etc.), however there is no space actually allotted for these activities within the plan itself – they are relegated to an 'agro-industrial zone', a general area just beyond the limits of the urban/peri-urban. So it is not clear

how agricultural and industrial activities are intended to promote urbanisation rather than further cluster developments and rural sprawl.

6.2.2.2. Demographics

The plan also does not fully address the issue of demographics, and it lacks even a discussion of the challenge of addressing mass urbanisation as a result of conflict. Population projections are simplistic at best and lack justification, and there is no consideration for why people might move to the town, nor who these people might be. This lack of consideration seems most apparent in the unrealistic expectations about the economy and the financial capacity of future residents: the plan is biased towards higher-income individuals, but there is no evidence to suggest that wealthy people might migrate to the town at all (let alone constitute a majority of migrants) nor is it likely for current residents' financial capacity to significantly increase under the plans' economic strategy. What is more likely is that the town will continue to be attractive to small-scale entrepreneurs and returnees, suggesting that population growth will be driven by an influx of low- and middle-income people, which likely has much greater implications for the informal economy than the formal. If the drafters of the plan had been more stringent about investigating actual demographics (both locally and nationally) and soliciting participation, rather than merely creating a technical plan that represents a final fixed physical form of the objectives of national economic strategies, then the plan might be a bit more realistic in its expectations.

6.2.2.3. Urban Growth and Form

Since there is no clear strategy for increasing the economic capacity of the town, and as the planners did not give much thought to the type of migration that might continue to activate population growth, it is unlikely that the remainder of the plan would actually be appropriately responsive to the needs of the town. The proposal of several 'new cities' is misguided and unnecessary, and will do little to deal with the current and future poverty of the town. These new cities do not appear to follow the same set of self-containment goals that inform many of the up-and-coming and highly controversial new cities throughout Africa (Lumumba 2013, Kermeliotis 2013). However, they do appear to have similar principles underlying them, particularly the idea that by creating new urban centres and new developments, past urbanisation problems (i.e. informality, overcrowding) can be avoided. However, rather than correcting urban problems, a new city approach runs the considerable risk of attracting all investment and attention away from existing areas, essentially ignoring and isolating not only existing settlements but existing residents as well. The threshold of involvement in new cities would likely be quite high as most residents would probably not be able to afford to live or shop there. As a result, it is unlikely that massive new developments would be efficiently utilised, as they would be likely to stand largely empty as they would outpace the general financial capacity of residents. This is already happening, as many big houses and the university hostel remain empty because they are not affordable for residents. The creation of new cities will also serve to increase inequality, as it separates the elite further from average residents, and this in turn increases the risk of social distrust and fragmentation as well as conflict over resources.



Figure 6.4: Comparison of current settled area and planned settlement area (Source: author)

The proposed urban form also contributes significantly to the lack of sustainability as well as the marginalisation of lower income groups. There is no mention of containing settlement or restricting sprawl, except for a brief note that recommends mixed-density developments for efficient servicing. The plan itself is quite sprawling, taking up considerably more land than the existing settlement (see Figure 6.4). The majority of the built-up area is pegged for medium-density housing, and constitutes more than double the area of current medium-density housing. High-density housing is only allocated a small area of land that is no bigger than the current town centre. Yet a sizeable area of the town is allocated for a golf course (which also presents a massive strain on water resources). And while the plan presents spatial limits to development (at least until 2020), there is no discussion of an urban edge or any other tool to inhibit the sprawl (planned or unplanned) of development. According to the map detailing investment directives for MININFRA under



Figure 6.5: Comparison of urban edge boundaries of Kigali & secondary cities (Source: MININFRA 2011, compiled by the author)

the national land use plan, Nyagatare has an urban boundary nearly the size of Kigali's, and the most extensive of all secondary cities (see Figure 6.5). Plans for transportation also seem to encourage sprawling settlement. The bus station/park-and-ride is being located far from the main town centre[1] at the turn off at Ryabega with no proposed replacement in town, meaning that the majority of the town's population will be located over 10km away from the bus station (see bus station location in Figures 6.2 and 6.4). This will thus have a two-fold impact on the population: first, in encouraging those with means to depend on a car to get around, and second, in diminishing accessibility and mobility of those without means. This disconnect between urban form and transportation planning will thus contribute both to inequality as well as to a greater dependence on private vehicles, striking a blow to social and ecological sustainability.

Curiously, villages under *Imidugudu* seem to be more prone to current densification than the urban settlement of Nyagatare. However, the new Integrated Development Units (or *imidugudu*, or IDP villages under the Urban and Rural Sector Strategic Plan) also present several challenges as they still manage to support fragmented and inefficient land use, despite their higher densities. As Huggins (2009) points out, traditional agricultural practices in Rwanda are more holistic and sustainable, as they allow for a mix of both subsistence and commercial production, help to reduce

1 Kigali also recently re-located their bus stations out of the town centre, consolidating all buses into two existing stations, at Nyabugogo and Remera. Now there is no convenient bus link to the town centre, which makes transport more inconvenient for people reliant on buses, and promotes private vehicle use for those who can afford it.

soil erosion, improve food security, and generate income. The focus on mono-cropping in the new villages is not as sustainable and exposes farmers to greater risk. Huggins also points out that current agricultural policy does not grant landowners the right to use land as they see fit, and thus farmers are subject to government aims to commercialise and professionalise the agricultural sector by consolidating farm land, which could leave many current small-scale farmers landless and unemployed. Land ownership and land rights remain ambiguous in the new villages, as it is not clear how land will be administered in such a fragmented form. In a survey, nearly half of respondents identified lack of access to land as the main reason they cannot get out of poverty (Republic of Rwanda 2007, 14). The combined forces of agricultural commercialisation and farm consolidation even within the new villages will contribute to even less access to land for residents and thus potentially increase poverty and household vulnerability.

The drafters of the plan miss the mark then, in putting tighter land restrictions on the villages (which are meant to be agricultural-focused) then on the town itself. As the villages are already restricted to a certain number of households but the town is not, the villages realistically are not in danger of sprawling much. But the town is given no restrictions and thus poses a significantly greater threat than the villages and is a much more apt example of poor land use. Additionally, the planners miss an important opportunity to promote good density in the urban areas, by setting up guidelines for good design of public spaces, good accessibility, a focus on mixed uses, and other tools to ensure that the creation of a dense built environment does not preclude residents' enjoyment of the space. Recalling Bollens' advice in Chapter 3, a post-conflict settlement should focus on the creation of public space at borders and central areas in order to provide neutral spaces between neighbourhoods rather than forcing integration within neighbourhoods. Instead, the Nyagatare Master Plan reconfigures space completely, neglecting existing settlements and reorienting spatial patterns entirely. So not only does the plan not establish appropriate restraints, it also does not appropriately address the use of space within those restraints.

6.2.2.4. Environmental Sustainability

While the plan recognises the importance of environmental sustainability, and makes a point to avoid past mistakes and create a sustainable settlement, its proposals for environmental preservation and natural resource management are weak and fragmented. Of the two most pressing environmental concerns that emerged from the impacts of conflict, the risks of biodiversity loss is mentioned but not elaborated upon, and the issue of water scarcity is explored and as a solution it is proposed to create an artificial lake. This lake is also intended to support ecotourism and fishing. However, there is no evidence presented to support the sustainability of an artificial lake, as water is to come from the Umuvumba River, which is already over-used and runs low in the dry seasons. There was also concern expressed by one resident over the creation of a lake by damming the Umuvumba, as the river constitutes part of the tributaries of Lake Victoria and subsequently the Nile, and there is concern that this may lead to unintended international political consequences (Resident interviews 2013). Other new water sources for urban use are explored, but nearly all are in Bwisige, Gicumbi District, some 35 km away. There is no discussion here of potential conflicts with other settlements over water use. Both of these solutions present problems for the ongoing sustainability of water resources in the area. And considering that scarce water resources are a primary source of conflict among rice farmers in Rwanda (Kathiresan

2010, 13), the promotion of rice farming along the Umuvumba is likely to further complicate issues.

It seems that the only explicit (or apparent) attempt to address the town's post-conflict status is in the provision of a site for a genocide memorial near the *umudugudu* of Mirama. But even the provision of a genocide memorial should not be proposed without careful consideration. Meierhenrich (2011) found that the issue of memorialising the genocide through the creation of designated locations have often led to unintended consequences for Rwandans. While genocide survivors may express preference for national memorials (where remains are usually displayed), Meierhenrich found that this preference was "regularly associated with a sense of safety and security that only national genocide memorials were seen to be able to provide (because they tend to be more vigilantly guarded)". However, "when pressed, and after having gained a modicum of their trust, a considerable number of survivors appeared to favour home burials. In fact, several respondents bemoaned the government's prohibition on private burials in the immediate vicinity of people's homes." (Ibid., 290). This analysis presents two major implications for Nyagatare: first, as the proposed memorial will likely not hold the status of the 'national' memorials (such as the national memorial in Kigali or specific memorials throughout the country at significant massacre sites), it may actually present a potential point of insecurity for residents, as it will not be so 'vigilantly guarded.' And second, it may not actually respond to the needs of residents to memorialise the past, since home burials are preferred, and since most of Nyagatare's current residents did not have a connection to the area at the time of the genocide and therefore may not feel the need to memorialise site-specific tragedies (as is the case with other memorials throughout the country). This is not to suggest that the town does not need or want a genocide memorial; it is only to suggest that such a proposal needs to be very careful about examining potential impacts, especially if it remains the only express means of dealing with issues of conflict.

6.2.3. Subsequent Developments

As mentioned previously, the plan is not proceeding very quickly. However, the current developments that are described as being part of the plan (hotel, residential, shopping mall, new District offices) are almost all reflective of a 'new city' conceptual base that focuses on new development over improved existing development. Very little of these new developments actually responds to current residents' concerns (as discussed in resident interviews) and likely could contribute to greater inequality by funnelling investment to exclusionary projects. Some of the projects arguably don't satisfy demand at all in town: it is questionable how a four-star hotel and shopping mall may be supported in such a small town that is still largely poor and informal. However, there are some promising developments, such as the market and the water treatment plant - these do respond directly to needs on the ground. But there still must be a greater focus on pro-poor planning policies, as diverting funds to more up scale developments may serve only to increase local inequality and contribute to even greater social distrust and fragmentation.

6.2.4. Discussion

Aside from the genocide memorial, the plan does nothing to address the significant issues that have developed in settlement since the conflict, even when these issues overlap basic urban planning challenges (preventing sprawl, ensuring environmental sustainability). Although there is some confusion around the scale of the plan (it calls itself a 'city' plan but really operates at a regional scale), it is positioned well to mediate national goals and policies within a local spatial and social context, but unfortunately this opportunity is largely wasted. Further, it is unrealistic in its expectations for the stability of the future, creating a fixed end-state plan that does not account for the uncertainty inherent in post-conflict and peace-building contexts.

The next section will attempt to address some of these issues by proposing specific planning tools and methodologies that can be used in post-conflict contexts.

6.3. Planning Proposals: An Alternative Approach

Part of the difficulty in establishing post-conflict reconstruction for Rwanda has been the search for culturally-appropriate means of peace-making and -building. 'Home-grown' solutions such as *imidugudu*, *gacaca*, and *abunzi* mediators have received criticism for failing to adequately meet international standards. But more sympathetic critics are also apt to point out that Rwanda presents a very unique case for reconstruction and therefore should not be expected to always conform to international precedent. Mahmoud Mamdani quotes a conversation he had with a government minister in 1997, who, in comparing the Holocaust to the Rwandan genocide, told him "In Germany, the Jews were taken out of their residences, moved to distant, faraway locations, and killed there, almost anonymously. In Rwanda, the government did not kill. It prepared the population, enraged it and enticed it. Your neighbours killed you" (Mamdani 2001, 28). In evaluating *gacaca*, Phil Clark (2012, 5-6) recognises and affirms critiques, but also points out that

> Justice through *gacaca* reflects the high degree of popular participation in genocide crimes (not just the role of elites), assigns to the population a central role in persecuting genocide cases (rather than promoting the participation of professional lawyers), and is sufficiently flexible to pursue locally defined objectives (rather than focusing exclusively on punishing perpetrators).

Although *abunzi* has been institutionalised in law since 2006, there is not yet much study to show it's effectiveness. About *abunzi* processes, Mutisi (2012, 68) points out that "what cannot be ascertained is how far they have gone in facilitating social cohesion, group unity, reconciliation and healing. It is even more difficult to ascertain these issues by directly asking Rwandans at the grassroots level and in civil society because of the limited social and political space in post-genocide Rwanda." However, while taking into account criticism and potential pitfalls of the process, she also asserts that (70):

> it is important to acknowledge the potential of the *abunzi* system if it is delivered well... Ultimately, the synergy between the *abunzi* mediation committees and the formal system beckons the possibilities that lie ahead when traditional institutions of conflict resolution are institutionalised and acknowledged by law, yet de-politicised and left to operate independently. Given the foregoing, Rwanda could well be cited as a *sui generis* case study reflecting the hybridisation of state and traditional approaches to conflict resolution, in the context of a post-conflict society.

This is not to say that criticisms of peace-building processes should be ignored, and in fact there are some quite disconcerting trends in post-conflict Rwanda that demand consideration (not least of which are rising feelings of insecurity, state repression, and distrust). However, the appropriate response is not to demand compliance with one-size-fits-all peace-building regimens without evaluation for contextual appropriateness, and in fact the practice of adapting traditional methods for contemporary conflict-related issues may constitute a necessary link to the past in a society that has undergone mandatory de-ethnicisation.

Planning policies currently completely ignore the past, wiping out tradition in favour of modernisation and 'development'. The difficulty for planning then is in determining how to bridge not only the gap between the tradition (rural) and future (urban) of settlements, but to do so in a way that recognises and addresses the widespread impact of conflict. Contemporary trends and theories demand a more involved role for planning that goes far beyond mere technical expertise, recognising the necessity of engaging individuals and communities in city-building and in establishing sustainable solutions for long-term growth. But how are these processes impacted in settlements emerging from conflict, and, in fact, what specific role is there for planning in post-conflict settlements?

The following sections offer a response to this question in the form of proposals for planning principles and guidelines for post-conflict settlements, beginning with proposals informing the process of planning, followed by proposals for the product of the planning process. These are guided by Bollens' (2012) principles for planning in post-conflict settlements (from Chapter 3):

1. Engage in equity planning that addressed underlying root issues
2. Use planning process and deliberations to empower marginalised groups
3. Create flexibility and porosity of urban form
4. Intervene in city landscape with sensitivity to differences across sectarian geographies
5. Protect and promote the collective public sphere
6. Emphasize short-term tactical physical interventions while articulating a peace-promoting long-range strategic vision
7. Encourage the diffusion of grassroots peace-building initiatives

6.3.1. Process

As discussed in Chapter 3, building positive social capital is critical to peace-building activities. As Manzo and Perkins (2006) pointed out, participation is a useful tool for creating social capital in contentious communities. Rwanda has a weak history of fostering participation in planning, and although there is legislation in the works to make participation mandatory, it is critical to examine what sort of participation is appropriate for communities still struggling with reconciliation and cohesion.

Co-production (as discussed in Chapter 3) provides a useful framework for engaging participation in planning in Rwanda. However, given the existing power structures, distrust, and history of ethnic conflict in Nyagatare (and Rwanda), neither Joshi and Moore's co-production from the top nor Mitlin's co-production from the bottom would likely prove sufficient. There are inherent difficulties in engaging co-production from either level in Rwanda; the following sections explore these difficulties further.

Although reconciliation and unity are strongly emphasised throughout Rwandan society, trauma and distrust are still deeply felt, as demonstrated by Veale (2000), Buckley-Zistel (2006), and the survey findings of NURC (2008). In such an environment, future violent flare-ups are a distinct possibility, and giving too much freedom to civic engagement may also provide space for hostilities to take form. That Rwandans feel more safe interacting through highly-structured authoritarian hierarchies is an important point to note.

But while interacting with and through the government provides a forum for citizen engagement that feels safer and less conflict-ridden than openly engaging as a community, there are problems with state involvement, and the state is usually the target of resident frustrations (which is also likely a result of residents' preference to avoid interpersonal conflict in community). And given the state's poor track record in showing favouritism in land allocation, threats of eviction (and actual evictions), coercive interactions with residents, and lack of democratic representation at a local level (as well as lack of political competition nation-wide), residents are vulnerable, at the mercy of the state and with little recourse for action against injustices. So even though there is willingness to engage with the state, it is a flawed and woefully one-sided power relationship.

The problem for co-production in Rwanda then is that civil society is not strong enough (or free enough) to effectively initiate bottom-up co-production, and the state is too strong to actually enable top-down co-production. However, Mitlin argues that the strength of co-production is that it not only just responds to immediate needs but it "prepares communities for a more substantive engagement with the political system" (2008, 353). So the challenge for co-production in Rwanda is not so much how to engage with the state, but how to build cooperation at a ground level so that residents can more effectively engage with the state. Part of this challenge includes building community cohesion from the start, allowing a strong civil society to emerge in part by allowing NGOs to operate.

Residents do seem willing to work in cooperatives and community groups, some government-sponsored and some not. This supports NURC's (2008) very important finding that even though residents report very high levels of distrust, they are willing to work together on development projects. This willingness to work together towards common goals offers a significant point of entry for planning, as it symbolises the seeds of bridging social capital that can be capitalised upon to develop a healthy forum for residents to *engage as a community* and *with the state*. Additionally, although Nyagatare's relative youth as a town and large population of recent migrants have left it with weaker bonding and bridging social capital than other areas of Rwanda, there is also evidence to show that the town has stronger linking capital than other parts of the country, giving it an advantage to reconstruction as per Storr and Haeffele-Balch's (2012) and Stewart's (2011) arguments in Chapter 3.

However, this is not to gloss over the very real problem of interpersonal tensions, often still related to ethnicity. This is the issue that prevents community organisation that is effective enough to give resident voice to state-sponsored development projects, and this is where planning may become most effective to facilitate and mediate community interaction. It is here that Rydin and Holman's (2004) *bracing* capital becomes critical: planners in post-conflict situations where there is deep community distrust as well as flawed community-government relations may be best utilised in a *bracing social capital* position, as one who can "strengthen links across and between scales and sectors," a kind of "social scaffolding" (Ibid., 123). Planning must occupy this position as a bracing element in community-state building, particularly as in post-conflict settlements the inclusion of a mediating element is critical to maintaining community engagement that is peaceable even as it becomes more involved. Positioning planning as a *mediator* and not just a facilitator helps to open up safe avenues for exploring participation through co-production. Kiwuwa (2012, 164) argues that:

> There is a need for a new partnership between governments and the masses in transitioning countries in general and Rwanda in particular. This should be based on the realisation that people in their social groups, in mass organisations and as individuals must be considered as socio-political partners. This, however, entails a degree of trust of the general populace, developing and enhancing confidence in the society, transcending colonial mentalities and stereotypes. A renewed active engagement with the people calls for an institutionalism and continuous dialogue based on mutual trust and open debate between government and its people. However, even though active political participation comes with rights and privileges, it also entails a degree of sacrifice on behalf of the people to achieve an appreciable degree of transformation.

Within this scenario, planning becomes a point where all parties can concede a bit, compromising to come together on development projects. Planning also becomes a critical activity that, if considered carefully, can become a venue for exploring the continuation of reconciliation efforts through development projects. As well, it assists in creating a space for expressing difference without devolving into violence. As Bollens (2012, 239) posits:

> The goal of inter-group policy deliberations in polarised cities is to move towards an 'agonistic' form of planning and politics, where the 'other' is perceived as an adversary within a mutual acknowledgement

of the right to differ. This is a distinct move from the politics of 'antagonism', where the other is perceived as an enemy to be dominated.

As current peace-building in Rwanda has reached the point where *gacaca* has come to an end, and formal means of community reconciliation through justice have drawn to a close, it is critical for other institutions and practices to step in and ensure that there continue to be structured venues for pursuing ongoing reconciliation. Although it's entirely possible that Rwandans may not *feel* completely reconciled for a few generations yet, and although there is still deep distrust, planning can help to smooth the way from explicit justice activities towards normalising and stabilising relations. Referring back to Chapter 3, Vervisch, et.al. (2013) demonstrate the impact of service provision on social cohesion in neighbouring Burundi, perhaps the one case study that most closely resembles Rwanda in terms of history and reconstruction. Engaging communities around development projects through co-production thus provides an opportunity to build cohesion, even in a fragmented society.

However, it may be a challenge in Rwanda to fill a bracing capital role that gets around the difficulties of pursuing co-production from purely a top-down or bottom-up position. It may be appropriate here to borrow from other traditions, particularly *gacaca* and *abunzi*, to provide the capacity to fill the role of planner/mediator. Both *gacaca* (in the past) and *abunzi* (currently) rely on local leaders to engage communities in justice and mediation activities. These leaders are respected individuals who are granted the authority to carry out justice based on national legislation, but as they are closer to the conflict and therefore more knowledgeable, are more adept at handling local conflict than the court system, which allows for a strong link between national programmes and local implementation. *Abunzi* mediators are laypeople, with strong mediation skills, and are well-received by Rwandans (Mutisi 2012). To adopt a similar role for local planning would allow for participation through co-production to make inroads even though local capacity for technical urban planning is low. It would also allow for co-production to be initiated and facilitated by an individual or group that is respected by the local community as well as seen as legitimate by the state.

Adopting a local planner/mediator role in the style of *abunzi* in implementing co-production in Nyagatare would thus allow for community participation in a culturally-appropriate manner that also incorporates conflict mediation should it occur. By borrowing from a local conflict-mediation model to engage in planning, there is some structural and institutional continuity between strict justice/reconciliation activities and more long-term, peace-building development activities through settlement planning. Communities can retain structured environments to engage with the state and explore development projects together, facilitated by planner/mediators who know the community and are known by the community and can thus guide conflict mediation where necessary. This also assists in localising planning, as it will be more difficult for an outside consultant to take over the entire planning process. However, outside consultants would still be useful in providing technical expertise, and they may find that a planner/mediator co-production structure may be an efficient institution to engage with communities through, thereby addressing one of the stated problems of accomplishing participation in the 2009 Nyagatare Master Plan. Finally, the planner/mediator co-production structure provides a flexible framework for community engagement as Rwanda develops local capacities and democratic processes. It does not require significantly more robust institutions in the short run, but allows for

the development of institutions (government and civil society) while maintaining a mechanism for engagement, local agency and communication throughout.

The planner/mediator co-production structure, modelled after existing mediation institutions, thus offers a planning framework that can be tailored specifically to the needs of a post-conflict community, to create a safe place for expression, engagement, planning and implementation jointly between communities and the state.

6.3.2. Spatial Plan

A spatial plan for a post-conflict settlement should incorporate both strategic, flexible interventions, as well as a focus on the creation of neutral, shared public spaces within larger urban areas. Incorporating strategic interventions while also engaging communities in co-production and mediated participation further enhances the continuum from strict reconciliation transitioning into development and peace-building. Bollens posits that this a particular strength of urban areas in dealing with post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation:

> ...many immediate and existential foundations of inter-group conflict frequently lie in daily urban life and across local ethnic divides and, importantly, that it is at this micro-level that antagonisms can be most directly influenced by government interventions aimed at their amelioration. After overt conflict and war, debates over urban space and its remaking can become potent proxies for addressing unresolved and inflamed socio-political issues that are too difficult to confront directly after societal breakage. (Bollens 2012, 227)

Further, “Peace-building in cities seeks not the well-publicised handshakes of national political elites, but rather the more mundane, yet ultimately more meaningful, nods of respect and recognition of ethnically diverse urban neighbours as they confront each other in their daily interactions” (Ibid., 228).

6.3.2.1. Strategic Interventions

In developing a post-conflict plan it is critical to recognise inherent uncertainty in settlement building. In the case of Nyagatare, it is fair to make certain assumptions about population growth and types of in-migration. However, given the relative instability of society overall, particularly with new influxes of returnees, there is still a high degree of uncertainty as to how the town may develop in the future. Since many refugees are currently being hastily expelled from Tanzania, forced to return often without their families, the future may see another mass exodus as these refugees attempt to return to their families in Tanzania, or there may be another influx as returnees find ways to bring their families across the border into Rwanda. There is wide variation in possible scenarios for the future. It is critical then that towns engage in focused, strategic interventions (‘urban acupuncture’) that can catalyse long-term development while explicitly, visually (and, in some cases, symbolically) deal with short-term material needs. These interventions contribute towards short-term stabilisation which then may enable the gradual adoption of longer-term plans that may provide more

ordered, systematic, comprehensive strategies that are more appropriate for stable, established societies. Similar to a planner/mediator co-production planning structure, a post-conflict plan that intervenes strategically provides a basic, continuous framework that allows for fluctuations, uncertainty, and gradual stabilisation and maturation of planning and settlement systems, as opposed to a blueprint master plan.

In order to do this, a strategic spatial planning approach would be a far more appropriate response to planning in Nyagatare. UN-HABITAT (2009, 15) describes strategic spatial planning as "a directive, long-range spatial plan consisting of frameworks and principles, and broad and conceptual spatial ideas, rather than detailed spatial design. The plan does not address every part of a city – being strategic means focusing on only those aspects or areas that are important to overall plan objectives." Albrechts (2006, 1152) further defines strategic spatial planning as:

> ...a transformative and integrative, (preferably) public-sector led, socio-spatial process through which a vision, coherent actions, and means for implementation are produced that shape and frame what a place is and what it might become... This strategic spatial planning is presented not as a new ideology preaching a new world order but as a method for creating and steering a (range of) better future(s) for a place based on shared values.

Strategic spatial planning would provide a point of entry for planning to begin to stabilise and gradually develop into more long-term and orderly systems as society also stabilises. Engaging Bollens' "urban acupuncture" to begin with, strategic spatial planning as a more long-term planning framework allows the city to act as a venue for stabilisation and democracy, rather than establishing strict urban form in spite of social fragmentation. This approach also allows for flexibility in response to uncertainty, and focuses on long-term, integrated strategic interventions that are jointly developed through participation, guided by a shared vision.

Planning in Nyagatare should then prioritise strategic interventions in those areas that are most prone to causing conflict and division, particularly around natural resources. A strategic spatial plan responding to the threat of conflict should begin by defining development restrictions, by demarcating natural areas for protection, particularly around water resources, as well as establishing urban growth boundaries to prevent unnecessary sprawl. The plan would next define public space, movement routes, and small-scale retail areas to provide a spatial structure that may be extended as the settlement grows, followed by short-term key social facilities connected to these structuring movement routes. Establishing this basic framework allows for flexible growth and basic gathering points for social integration in structured public spaces.

Once this framework is in place, land management can be better addressed. Although registration and titling of the current land administration programme are intended to be completed by the end of this year, Augustinus and Barry's (2006) soft systems approach may be adapted to engage with further land management and administration in an effort to minimise conflict and accommodate increasing in-migration. At the very least, land management systems can be re-oriented to prioritise the macro-environmental factors of social stability, reserving the full modernisation of the

cadastral system until society has stabilised and local capacity has increased. This may call for a greater role for *abunzi* mediators in moderating disputes in the interim, but this also provides an opportunity for communities to engage in the processes of land management and to have a voice in the process rather than remaining silent recipients. Engaging land management through conflict mediation systems also recognises the ongoing tension over land and resources and appropriately positions it within institutions that may deal with potential inter-personal conflict.

Albrechts (2012) argues that co-production and strategic spatial planning are well-suited to work together, particularly around co-production of a vision. In engaging co-production in envisioning for the future, actors "assess together and co-construct spaces of possibilities or impossibilities" (quoting Forester 2010, 172). Co-production of the vision allows for the expression of multiple publics, enabling a shared vision that reflects broader values rather than merely the dominant/state vision. Albrechts warns that "envisioning does not claim to eliminate uncertainty with predictions; instead, it seeks to work with uncertainty as well as is possible, and to enable people to make decisions in view of a better future or futures. Envisioning is above all a state of mind (imagination and anticipation) that leads to behaviour (hope and will)" (Albrechts 2012, 10). Strategic planning through co-production thus offers another opportunity for residents in cementing reconciliation through every-day practices. Importantly,

> The transformative power comes when citizens who are usually on the receiving end are actively involved. Strategic planning no longer obsessively looks inwards to targets and procedures, but increasingly looks outwards to local neighbourhoods to create supportive socio-spatial places, seeking out local energy where it exists to help deliver and broaden policies, actions or projects and seeing citizens for what they can do, not just what they need. (Albrechts 2012, 11).

6.3.2.2. Creation of Space

Finally, as Bollens suggests, it is important to engage with the actual creation of space, particularly public space, in planning for post-conflict cities. As noted in Chapter 3, Bollens does not necessarily argue for comprehensive ethnic integration throughout the city, particularly in the short term, and he asserts that maintaining some separation in the short run may actually be prudent. However, urban interventions may best occur in boundaries and edges between communities and in public spaces, in order to engage across ethnic/social boundaries without violating the sense of security residents may feel within the residences or immediate neighbourhoods.

Although it is difficult to know exactly how ethnically mixed Rwandan communities are, because of the ban on ethnic identification, it seems apparent that although the government encourages ethnic mixing, this does not always occur (at least in *imidugudu*). Where different ethnicities live together there is co-existence out of necessity but not necessarily a sense of community (Buckley-Zistel 2006). Planning thus has the opportunity to engage in space-making differently than is currently practised: by re-focusing away from integrating neighbourhoods and towards the creation of public spaces that offer a meeting ground between different groups. This not only takes the pressure off of current communities, populated largely with people who were directly impacted by the genocide, but it allows for more spontaneous interaction between individuals in future generations, regardless of ethnic identity. Nyagatare lacks good

public space, and therefore it is easy for individuals and families to remain separated. The lack of public space also puts the onus on individuals to integrate within neighbourhoods and households. And while Buckley-Zistel demonstrates that Rwandans are generally willing to integrate and reconcile, they still may find it quite difficult and fraught with trauma. But by opening up spaces for integration at strategic points within neighbourhoods and along edges and in the city centre, there is still important space to engage despite ethnic differences.

6.3.3. Challenges

These proposals for urban planning in post-conflict societies are not without potential problems.

- Lack of local capacity may mean there is not the technical expertise to back up participatory/co-production processes.
- Although co-production through a mediator may better take into account existing power relationships than traditional planning or participatory practices, co-production is also not immune to imbalances in power and it therefore requires broad buy-in by all stakeholders as well as a keen and balanced mediator to help prevent elite capture, state domination, or ethnic splintering
- It may be difficult to convince the national and local governments to cede some power and authority to residents
- Similarly, it may be difficult to convince residents to engage actively with a government that has not traditionally welcomed widespread engagement and feedback
- It will be difficult to break the tendency for participation in Rwanda (where it occurs) to involve little more than 'education'
- Co-production and strategic spatial planning take time – and even 'urban acupuncture'/strategic short-term interventions may take time where there is not the capacity or resources to proceed quickly. The government may not be amenable to spending the time it takes to fully engage citizens.
- A national focus on development and modernisation may deter stakeholders from engaging with less-exciting processes of sustainability and peace-building, and it may be difficult to divert funds away from the cosmetic projects (shopping malls, etc.) to much needed basic projects
- Ethnic tensions and possibility of violence are always a concern
- It may be difficult to gain political will to move away from comprehensive master planning and towards a more appropriate strategic approach to planning
- Previous development strategies tend towards physical determinism; it may be difficult to avoid this even in strategic spatial planning

These proposals provide a broad framework for planning in post-conflict settlements: first, a process that engages existing reconciliation efforts to transform social engagement from reconciliation to development; and second, a spatial planning framework that allows for flexibility as the town (and country) stabilises and grows, while engaging with urban space to provide venues for integrating across ethnic divides. To quote Bollens again:

> What urban policies can do... and it is significant, is to create physical and psychological spaces that can co-contribute to, and actualise, political stability and non-belligerent co-existence in cities. Deeply entrenched problems of nationalistic conflict are certainly not amenable to simple, one-dimensional solutions. Thus, urban planning interventions need to be part of a broader and multi-faceted approach addressing root issues of political grievance related to political disempowerment and institutional bias (Bollens 2012, 235).

Chapter 7
Conclusion

> Reconciliation is, ultimately, about restoring sociality, about establishing the trust necessary not just to tolerate but to cooperate in partnerships that can survive even the threat of failure. (Last 2000, 329).

This dissertation has sought to answer the question: What is the role of planning in post-conflict settlements within the context of Nyagatare, Rwanda? The interrogation of the concept of post-conflict planning began with a review of available literature in Chapter 3, which focused on challenges of post-conflict reconstruction, particularly in the development phase. Further literature on planning in post-conflict contexts was examined, with a focus on several case studies as well as the social and spatial impacts of conflict and proposed solutions for addressing these impacts.

Analysis of the case began with and investigation of the national and historical context in Chapter 4, with a focus on the specific post-conflict impacts influencing the development of Nyagatare, including the ongoing return of refugees since 1994, rapid urbanisation, focus on economic development, worsening trends in democratic representation and stability, and trends in land management and settlement planning, including the new secondary city strategy and ongoing villagisation. The local context was analysed next in Chapter 5, with an examination of the specific issues facing Nyagatare, including social distrust and lack of cohesion, land disputes, increasing strain on land and water resources, and lack of local democratic representation. Resident interviews further revealed suspicious attitudes towards local leadership, as well as negative views of other residents and of newcomers. Through informal conversation it was found that fear of conflict is still present.

Chapter 6 then presented the current master plan, which was critiqued for being too inflexible, not responsive enough to local needs nor considerate of future needs, and ultimately, completely neglegent of the lasting impacts of conflict within the community. Proposals were presented with the goal of finding an alternative approach to planning in post-conflict communities. It was recommended that theories of co-production and strategic spatial planning be adapted to the local context, particularly engaging with local mediation structures in an effort to provide a safe venue for participation and interaction among communities and between communities and the state. Additionally, it was recommended that strategic spatial interventions focus on creating a flexible spatial framework that anchors urban growth and development despte an uncertain future. This presents a more appropriate approach to planning than the current master planning approach, which is not conducive to the needs of an uncertain future.

These are solutions that allow for increasing the resilience of planning through participation, while still working with current institutional constraints and incomplete democracy and decentralisation. Further, these solutions (including co-production and strategic spatial planning), adapted to the local context, are well-situated to gradually promote democratisation in a progressive manner, granting agency to local communities rather than assigning to them a passive, receptive role. Although the history of ethnic conflict and ongoing social distrust are impediments to a fully free and stable society, engaging local communities in planning processes will help to strengthen institutions and civil society, which contributes importantly to preventing a reprisal of conflict in the future. Furthermore, by establishing focused, strategic interventions within the urban form that offer the opportunity for flexible growth, Nyagatare is better equipped to deal with the uncertainties of the future.

Nyagatare presents one case where post-conflict planning may be conducted through adapted planning structures. There are many further opportunities for research in this field. Particular issues that deserve some attention include the use of co-production in larger post-conflict cities, where there may be further challenges to social cohesion and social capital building. Along the lines of Vervisch, et.al.'s work in Burundi, more investigation into how specific types of spatial and infrastructural interventions impact on peace and stability would be extremely useful. And in order to flesh out the field of research into post-conflict planning, more case studies in diverse post-conflict scenarios would prove indispensable in further evaluating the appropriateness of co-production, strategic spatial planning, and other post-conflict planning strategies.

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Appendix: Ethics Approval

Zulpha Geyer

From: Zulpha Geyer
Sent: 02 August 2013 11:42
To: Carmel Gregory
Cc: Vanessa Watson
Subject: Ethics application Carmel Gregory

Dear Carmel,

This serves to let you know that your ethics application has been approved. You may commence your research. I will get the signed form to you shortly.

With Kind Regards,

Zulpha Geyer: Centre for Research in Engineering Education | Chemical Engineering Building | Upper Campus | University of Cape Town |

Tel: +27 021 650 4791 | Fax: +27 021 650 5501 |

"Promoting Research in Engineering and Science Education"

EBE Faculty: Assessment of Ethics in Research Projects (Rev2)

Any person planning to undertake research in the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment at the University of Cape Town is required to complete this form before collecting or analysing data. When completed it should be submitted to the supervisor (where applicable) and from there to the Head of Department. If any of the questions below have been answered YES, and the applicant is NOT a fourth year student, the Head should forward this form for approval by the Faculty EIR committee: submit to Ms Zulpha Geyer (Zulpha.Geyer@uct.ac.za; Chem Eng Building, Ph 021 650 4791).
NB: A copy of this signed form must be included with the thesis/dissertation/report when it is submitted for examination

This form must only be completed once the most recent revision EBE EiR Handbook has been read.

Name of Principal Researcher/Student: Carmel Gregory Department: City & Regional Planning

Preferred email address of the applicant: carmel.gregory@gmail.com

If a Student: Degree: MCRP Supervisor: Vanessa Watson

If a Research Contract indicate source of funding/sponsorship:

Research Project Title: The role of planning in recently-occupied urban settlements: the case of Nyagatare in post-conflict Rwanda.

Overview of ethics issues in your research project:

Question 1: Is there a possibility that your research could cause harm to a third party (i.e. a person not involved in your project)?	YES	(NO)
Question 2: Is your research making use of human subjects as sources of data? If your answer is YES, please complete Addendum 2.	(YES)	NO
Question 3: Does your research involve the participation of or provision of services to communities? If your answer is YES, please complete Addendum 3.	YES	(NO)
Question 4: If your research is sponsored, is there any potential for conflicts of interest? If your answer is YES, please complete Addendum 4.	YES	(NO)

If you have answered YES to any of the above questions, please append a copy of your research proposal, as well as any interview schedules or questionnaires (Addendum 1) and please complete further addenda as appropriate. Ensure that you refer to the EiR Handbook to assist you in completing the documentation requirements for this form.

I hereby undertake to carry out my research in such a way that

- there is no apparent legal objection to the nature or the method of research; and
- the research will not compromise staff or students or the other responsibilities of the University;
- the stated objective will be achieved, and the findings will have a high degree of validity;
- limitations and alternative interpretations will be considered;
- the findings could be subject to peer review and publicly available; and
- I will comply with the conventions of copyright and avoid any practice that would constitute plagiarism.

Signed by:

	Full name and signature	Date
Principal Researcher/Student:	Carmel Greg	30 May 2013

This application is approved by:

Supervisor (if applicable):	V. WATSON	3-/5/13
HOD (or delegated nominee): *Final authority for all assessments with NO to all questions and for all undergraduate research.*		
Chair : Faculty EIR Committee For applicants other than undergraduate students who have answered YES to any of the above questions.		28/05/2013

ADDENDUM 2: To be completed if you answered YES to Question 2:

It is assumed that you have read the UCT Code for Research involving Human Subjects (available at http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/educate/download/uctcodeforresearchinvolvinghumansubjects.pdf) in order to be able to answer the questions in this addendum.

2.1 Does the research discriminate against participation by individuals, or differentiate between participants, on the grounds of gender, race or ethnic group, age range, religion, income, handicap, illness or any similar classification?	YES	NO
2.2 Does the research require the participation of socially or physically vulnerable people (children, aged, disabled, etc) or legally restricted groups?	YES	NO
2.3 Will you not be able to secure the informed consent of all participants in the research? (In the case of children, will you not be able to obtain the consent of their guardians or parents?)	YES	NO
2.4 Will any confidential data be collected or will identifiable records of individuals be kept?	YES	NO
2.5 In reporting on this research is there any possibility that you will not be able to keep the identities of the individuals involved anonymous?	YES	NO
2.6 Are there any foreseeable risks of physical, psychological or social harm to participants that might occur in the course of the research?	YES	NO
2.7 Does the research include making payments or giving gifts to any participants?	YES	NO

If you have answered YES to any of these questions, please describe below how you plan to address these issues:

ADDENDUM 3: To be completed if you answered YES to Question 3:

3.1 Is the community expected to make decisions for, during or based on the research?	YES	NO
3.2 At the end of the research will any economic or social process be terminated or left unsupported, or equipment or facilities used in the research be recovered from the participants or community?	YES	NO
3.3 Will any service be provided at a level below the generally accepted standards?	YES	NO

If you have answered YES to any of these questions, please describe below how you plan to address these issues:

ADDENDUM 4: To be completed if you answered YES to Question 4

4.1 Is there any existing or potential conflict of interest between a research sponsor, academic supervisor, other researchers or participants?	YES	NO
4.2 Will information that reveals the identity of participants be supplied to a research sponsor, other than with the permission of the individuals?	YES	NO
4.3 Does the proposed research potentially conflict with the research of any other individual or group within the University?	YES	NO

If you have answered YES to any of these questions, please describe below how you plan to address these issues:

Carmel Gregory

UCT MCRP Dissertation 2013

Dissertation Proposal

24 May 2013

WORKING TITLE

The role of planning in recently-occupied urban settlements: the case of Nyagatare in post-conflict Rwanda.

PRECISE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER

Problem or issue to be investigated

I'm interested in investigating the potential role of city planning in assisting resettlement in post-conflict situations, specifically in the context of long-term settlement within the relatively new community of Nyagatare, Rwanda. Within this context I hope to better understand the reality of urban life in light of post-conflict migration, and rapid urbanisation and population growth, and propose strategic interventions that may assist in the process of regaining security and permanent settlement.

I hope to investigate the following topics: post-conflict migration and resettlement; land ownership and tenureship; new land registration and land use policies; varying relationships with land based on gender and age; land and community productivity; perceptions of influence over policy and government functions; trajectory of community-land relationships including past realities and hopes for the future; possibly an element of diaspora attitudes towards land in Rwanda.

Your philosophical and/or ethical position

As an outsider doing research in a place I'm familiar with but am not actually from, I hope to draw as much information as I can from interactions with residents. I will be approaching the topic from a position recognising the significant social elements of place-making and city-building, with particular sensitivity to the historical issues of conflict that are present in this particular study area. Ultimately I hope for my plan to reflect as closely as possible the expressed needs and desires of residents.

The types and potential uses of the proposals or recommendations

I intend to produce a spatial development framework providing proposals for strategic intervention.

The theoretical field/s likely to be most relevant to your project

My research will be informed in part by Leonie Sandercock and John Friedmanns' theories of collaborative learning, as well as post-conflict planning theory of Oren Yiftachel. I also plan to draw from global south planning theories of Edgar Pieterse, Vanessa Watson, and Ananya Roy, among others.

THE STUDY AREA

I plan to focus research around the community of Nyagatare (formerly known as Umutara) in the Eastern Province, near the borders of Uganda and Tanzania. Nyagatare is made up almost entirely of migrants: either refugees who fled to Uganda before and during the genocide and pre-genocide massacres and who have resettled in the past few decades, or recent migrants in search of available land in an increasingly densely-populated country. The community as it exists now is relatively new, only really becoming established as a town after the 1994 genocide, and is marked as being one of the fastest growing settlements in the fastest growing district in a rapidly-urbanising country. Although it is still quite small and somewhat rural, it is not unlikely that it will continue to urbanise at rapid rates because of continued population pressures. A further pressure to the town is its proximity to Kagera National Park, a significant conservation area and part of a proposed transfrontier conservation area in conjunction with Tanzania. Kagera has already shrunk in size significantly due to increased migration to the area, so its continued preservation is critically at risk.

Following is a map locating Nyagatare within the context of Rwanda:



Source: www.nationsonline.org

DRAFT WORK PROGRAMME

The central question to be investigated

What is the role of planning in post-conflict settlements within the context of Nyagatare, Rwanda?

Subsidiary research questions
None, yet.

Research method/s to be used

I plan to make use of a combination of several research methods. My primary method will be case study, supported by storytelling and discourse analysis. I also hope to make use of Participatory Action Research (albeit a limited version given time constraints), if I can gather a focus group to conduct research with once I am in the country.

The tasks involved, including research techniques and analytical 'tools'
For research techniques, I plan to rely on interview, literature review, and graphic/mental mapping exercises, especially in cases where there may be a significant language barrier.

Time allocated to each task
The following is a broad workplan (see attached document for more detailed workplan)

Week of May 20 – finalisation of dissertation proposal
Late May through early June – literature review & research prep
8 June through 19 July – travel to Rwanda & field research; interviews and data collection
Late July through early October – compiling & processing field research; supplemental literature review; drafting dissertation
October – final edits and submission

Carmel Gregory
UCT MCRP Dissertation 2013
Proposed interview questions for field research

My field research in Rwanda will consist of two types of interviews: unstructured conversation around given topics (with authorities and town leaders), and structured focus group interviews with groups of residents. The following depicts the topics of conversation for authorities and leaders and the proposed interview questions for focus groups.

Authorities/leaders conversation topics

- Nyagatare sector or district government official - re: Nyagatare District Land Bureau and land use planning and registration processes, history of Nyagatare, issues and needs, forseeable future/population projections and planned development and interventions, role of the town in the broader region, success of national programmes, Nyagatare Master Plan

- Headmaster @ local school - re: intro to town, review of topic, information on town development and sector roles, issues and needs, success of programmes

- Faculty or staff member at local university: development of the town, economic sectors, agricultural development & role of the town in agricultural support

- NGO staff, doctors, tourist sector employees, conservation employees: role of the town, potential of the town, particular needs and issues

- Kigali - official in the National Land Centre - re: National Land Use Master Plan, Kigali Master Plan, Nyagatare Master Plan

- Civil society advocate for land registration - re: land reform and registration, issues of familial ties with land and resettlement

- University lecturer/architecture - post-conflict settlement, thatched houses and building codes

- Someone in the GIS centre - re: land registration, mapping, and the potential role of planning/geography

Resident focus group questions

- Where is home? And where do you stay now? Is home here or somewhere else?
- Do you own your land or occupy someone elses land? Do you feel secure or do you feel that you could be asked to leave the land?
- What are some problems with the area where you live now? What are some problems with the town of Nyagatare?
- What is better about this place than where you used to stay? OR what do you like about this place?
- What do you think could improve this place?

ADDENDUM 1:
Please append a copy of the research proposal here, as well as any interview schedules or questionnaires: