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Interventionist Foreign Policy: Uganda's Security Challenges A Study

Submitted in fulfilment for the award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Studies
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

By

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June 2008
Plagiarism Declaration

I, Charlotte Karungi declare that the work that gave rise to this thesis, is my own original work, and that, where work from other scholars is used, it has been clearly referenced. This work has neither been nor is being submitted concurrently in any university or institution for any degree.

Signed: 
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Professor Annette Seegers

Date: 

Co-Supervisor:
Associate Professor James Mulira

Date:
Dedication

My mother Rosemary K. Lwemamu

My husband Julius and my children Claris, Michelle and Mark

To USHEPiA

The program has made a whole world of difference to my career
Acknowledgements

No words are sufficient to express how grateful I am to everyone who directly and indirectly assisted me in my studies. The gratitude I owe my thesis adviser and mentor Prof Annette Seegers is beyond estimation. Her support, guidance and strict requirements were of immense value for this work. She routinely engaged me in intense sessions of theoretical analysis that made my perception of issues much clearer. She provided me with innumerable references and opened her very well stocked library to me. Those who have been to UCT know of her numerous achievements as a scholar and a teacher but those who will read this will note the great influence she has had in directing the successful completion of this doctorate.

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Thank you all.
Abstract

This study set out to answer one critical question, namely, what is the most parsimonious theory that explains Uganda's interventionist foreign policy behaviour in three of its neighbouring states of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC during 1986-2006. Drawing on four theoretical approaches, viz. Constructivism, Poliheurism, Liberalism and the Security Dilemma theory, which is a variant of Realism, this study examines how the interventions manifested in each state. It is argued that, the Security Dilemma theory is the most parsimonious theoretical perspective because it explains multiple exercises of Uganda's interventions in its western neighbouring states. Where the Security Dilemma is unable to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, it requires other theories to complement it to explain all the interventions conclusively. The alternative theories drawn upon to complement the Security Dilemma are Constructivism, Poliheurism and the Utilitarian Liberal position. The study argues that although the use of a single theoretical approach may indeed be able to explain a specific intervention at a given time, it may not be sufficiently comprehensive to encapsulate Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in all three states thus the application of multiple theories. The rationale of using multiple theories lies in their ability to interpret different types of interventions and to complement each other in explaining interventions.

Using a theoretical comparison, the study consisted of two phases. The first phase covered the desktop research, which provided background information on the case as well as historical documentary sources. In the second phase, qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis were used to study the different ways in which Uganda's interventions manifested in the region. More specifically, interviews were conducted with relevant political actors in the region, and quantitative analysis of the censuses were carried out to obtain people's opinions on respective foreign policy actions, thus providing the study with an in-depth perspective on the processes that led up to the different interventions in each state.

Drawing on the Security Dilemma theory, the study established that Uganda intervened in its western neighbours firstly, to stop insurgency and incursions into its territory by rebels that exploited the strategic offensive advantage of the neighbouring states to wage war and carry out terrorist attacks on Uganda. Secondly, Uganda wanted to stop the spill-over effects of the neighbouring states' ethnic violence and struggle for power that affected Uganda's security. Thirdly, it is argued that Uganda exploited the absence of the international community in settling
regional conflicts to intervene as a means of containing these conflicts, which would have been
disastrous not only for Uganda but also for the states where the conflicts were happening.
Another argument that is advanced is that the interventions were motivated by the
misperceptions and mistrust amongst the regional leaders of each other's actions. Shifts in
alliance patterns, a breakdown in relations and differences of opinion regarding the security
matters of states and the regions greatly influenced Uganda's interventionist foreign policy.

It is argued from the Constructivist perspective that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy was
a result of the norms, culture and identity that has been ascribed to Uganda primarily by itself as
well as by other actors in the international community, which compelled it to intervene in states
such as Burundi. From the Poliheuristic perspective, it is argued that Uganda intervened because
its leaders supported interventionism. It is also affirmed that the Utilitarian Liberal perspective
explains Uganda's interventions as motivated by its 'legitimate' economic interests in the region.

The central argument of this study is that the Security Dilemma is the best theory that explains
Uganda's interventions but that it is not a comprehensive theory. Other alternative theories need
to complement it to be able to explain Uganda's foreign policy behaviour comprehensively.
**Definition of terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship crisis</td>
<td>Adapted from Mahmood Mamdani, the term is used to refer to the violent eruption of multiple ethnic based conflicts that occurred at the same time in the neighbouring states of Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware</td>
<td>Military capability of a state that includes both tangible, i.e. weaponry and force structure, and intangible characteristics, e.g. military doctrine and the values that the military holds dear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot pursuit</td>
<td>When troops of one country pursue their enemies and ensure that the distance between the enemy pursued and the territory being protected does not offer any strategic advantage to the enemy for future threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military stature</td>
<td>The rating of a state's military force and capability is given in relation to the rest of the military forces in a region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>National security refers to the total capacity of the state to provide the state and its citizens with a secure environment and protection from threats, both real and imagined, from the external environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preclusive defence</td>
<td>The ability of a state to defend its borders against external attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime security</td>
<td>Term used to describe leaders' behaviours and strategies aimed at securing that they remain in power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security sector</td>
<td>Collective term used to refer to the components of the agencies/groups in a state that provide safety and security, and how these are managed for effective delivery of safety for all citizens of a country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic depth</td>
<td>A state's capacity to prevent attacks from other states because of its geographic area coverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic level</td>
<td>A description of the combined geographic and hardware capacities of a state, which it puts to use in relation to other states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Anti Aircraft Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRE</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSS</td>
<td>African Centre for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADFL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>And-Personnel Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Central Investigations Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Central Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD/FDD</td>
<td>National Council for the Defence of Democracy/Front for the Defence of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>Direct Commercial Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISO</td>
<td>District Internal Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMS</td>
<td>Direct Military Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>District Police Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASBRIG</td>
<td>Eastern African Standby Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPDRF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People's Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESI</td>
<td>Economic Sustainability Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESO</td>
<td>External Security Organisations (ESO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX-FAR</td>
<td>Forces Armees Rwandaise (also known to be the Interahamwe Genocidaires)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EX-FAZ Forces Armées Zaire
FAPC Forces of Armed Congolese
FAZ Forces Armées Zairoises
FEDEMU Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FNI Integrationist National Front
FNL National Liberation Front
FNL-Icanzo National Liberation Forces-Icanzo
FRODEBU Front for Democracy in Burundi
FROLINA National Liberation Front
FUNA Former Uganda National Army
GLR Great Lakes Region of Africa
GPMG General Purpose Machine Gun
MEP Hydroelectric Power
HSM Holy Spirit Movement
ICD Inter Congolese Dialogue
ICG International Crisis Group
ICJ International Court of Justice
IDP Internally Displaced Peoples
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IMET International Military Education Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
INC Indian National Congress
ISO Internal Security Organisations
JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training
KAP Kalangala Action Plan
LDU Local Defence Unit
LMG Light Machine Gun
LRA Lord's Resistance Army
MAD Mutual Assistance in Defence
MFPED Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development
MGL Multiple Grenade Launcher
MISAB  Mission interafricaine de surveillance des Accords de Bangui (Inter-African Mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreements) (Central African Republic (CAR))
MLC  Congolese Liberation Movement
MMG  Medium Machine Guns
MOD  Ministry of Defence
MRC  Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens
MSP-Inkinzo Movement Socialist Panafricanist-Inkinzo
NALU  National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDA  National Democratic Alliance
NDU  National Defence University
NIF  National Islamic Front
NRA  National Resistance Army
NRAC  National Resistance Army Council
NRM  National Resistance Movement
NSC  National Security Council
OAS  Organisation of American States
PAC  Pan African Congress
PARENA  Party of National Recovery
PDD  Presidential Decision Directive
PKM  Russian-make machine gun
PP  Progressive Party
PRA  People's Redemption Army
PTA  Preferential Trade Area
RADESH  Rally for Democracy, Economic and Social Development
RCD  Rally for a Democratic Congo
RCD-ANC  Rally for a Democratic Congo-Armee Nationale Congolaise
RCD-ML  Rally for a Democratic Congo-Liberation Movement
RDC  Resident District Commissioner
RPA  Rwandan People's Army
RPF  Rwanda Patriotic Front
RPG  Rocket Propelled Grenades
SACU  Southern African Customs Union
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC-NAM</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community-Non Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface to Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Self Propelled Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudanese People's Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudanese People's Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPDF</td>
<td>Tanzanian People's Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigrean People's Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBOS</td>
<td>Uganda Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFM</td>
<td>Uganda Freedom Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>Uganda National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNLA</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNLF</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRF I</td>
<td>Uganda National Rescue Front I</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRF II</td>
<td>Uganda National Rescue Front II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uganda People's Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People's Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPM</td>
<td>Uganda People's Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union for National Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URA</td>
<td>Uganda Revenue Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Investigation Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNBF</td>
<td>West Nile Bank Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPDT</td>
<td>White Paper on Defence Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction and Motivation of the Study

This study examines Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in its western neighbours of Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), all of which are located in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. The central question of this study is to establish the most comprehensive theoretical explanation of Uganda's interventions in the GLR states during the Museveni administration of 1986 to 2006. The study is a timely one. Uganda's intervention in the GLR has not only coincided with the international use of force by the US in its military interventions in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2006-7, in Somalia both in 1992 and now in 2007, and in Haiti during 1993-1994, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO)'s intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999. It also comes at a time in the post-Cold War era when there has been a significant increase in military interventions generally by states. Particularly in African states, intervention in conflicts is becoming very common. The legitimacy of intervention in states by other states poses a serious challenge in international politics. Apart from the debate on whether intervention is justifiable or not, there is also a serious debate on who should be allowed to use military force in intervention and when, especially if such interventions are undertaken outside the legal framework of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and if they are in contravention of international law.

The post-Cold War era has been replete with many interventions by individual states as well as regional groups, for example in Liberia (1990-1998), Iraq (1991 and 2003), Burundi (1993-2006), Rwanda (1994), East Timor (1996-2000), the DRC (1996 to 2003), Sierra Leone (1997-1999), Afghanistan (1998), Guinea Bissau (1998) and Lesotho (1998). The causes of these interventions have been observed, measured and described in many investigations and researches carried out on the initiative of many actors - international, regional and national - as well as organisations. This study will explore what motivates states to intervene in other states.

G. Mills quoting Kofi Annan argues that interventions, particularly that of the US in Iraq and its interventions in other African countries have set a precedent, which has led to a proliferation of unilateral and lawless use of force. See G. Mills, "How to Intervene in Africa's Wars: Crimes of War Project", http://www.crimes of war.org/Africa-mag/afir_03_mills_printit.html, accessed on 18 April 2006.

M. Le Pape, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Victims of No Importance" in Weissman, F. (ed). The Shadow of
It will analyse the theories that have been applied to the study of intervention, specifically those that are peculiar to Africa. Using the Ugandan case, the study will examine the motives of its interventions by approaching them at a theoretical level. The aim of this study is thus to establish the most parsimonious theory that can help to explain Uganda's intervention in its neighbouring states of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.

Intervention is one of the many aspects of international politics that faces serious challenges. At the international level, the UN Charter Articles 2(3) and 2(4) prohibit intervention in other states and very explicitly states that "no state shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife of another state"? This prohibition is also contained in the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, which was later reaffirmed in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International law? The UN Charter stipulates that states should settle disputes among themselves by peaceful means instead of using force, and refrain from the use of force in their international relations with each other?

At the regional level, interventions were prohibited in Africa by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) charter. In its Selected Resolutions of the thirtieth regular session in 1976, in Resolution CM/RES. 641 POGO), the OAU declared that peace and security of African states was contingent upon strict adherence to the principles of people's political rights and national sovereignty, non-interference, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and non-use of force in territorial acquisition. It recommended that differences between states were to be settled by peaceful means and within an African context. No justification whatsoever could be used to intervene in another state. In clause 6, the African leaders reiterated their condemnation of the tendency of certain non-African states and other non-state actors to use mercenaries against the security, independence and sovereignty of African states with a view to maintaining their neo-colonial domination on the continent. In clause 7, the members also reaffirmed their will to work towards the elimination of foreign military bases and to oppose all power blocs and

Ibid, p. 286.
diversionist policies that characterised the international system at that time. More specifically in the OAU Article 3(2) member states affirmed their adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other's states. The United Nations Charter, Article 2 paragraph 7, stipulates that states should not intervene in matters, which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. If intervention is to be carried out, it should be mandated by the UN and overseen by the UNSC. This is to prohibit states from unilaterally intervening without close supervision. However, this has been disregarded on many occasions, and states have unilaterally intervened in other states in contravention of the UN and OAU chatters.

In the Cold War era, there were interventions and use of force in some parts of Africa, for example, in Nigeria (1966), Western Sahara (1976-1977), Chad (1977), and Benin (1977). The only advantage the intervenors and those who were invaded had at that time, was the easy scapegoat of 'foreign influence' being used as the main underlying cause. Most interventions were blamed on the former colonial masters' collusion with African opponents or dissidents. In 1961, an over intervention took place in Southern Zaire when the United Nations, the US, using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the French and the Belgians intervened to solve the political crisis that had been caused by the south's attempt to secede. These interventions occurred at a time when there were growing nationalist uprisings and demands for independence, so they were simply seen as an anti-colonial process and a mainly foreign issue. In spite of these interventionist wars, there was relative peace in the first and second decade of independence of the African states, save for the coups and rebel activities that took place in the region. This peace, it could be argued, was because states conformed to the regional regulations and the tacit policy amongst leaders that what happened in a neighbouring state was not important to you and you therefore had no right to intervene. Intervention was still seen as a neo-colonial tool to retain control of former colonies.

The intervention that seems to have set the precedent on how future inter-state interventions would be was Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1978. Ironically, this happened a year after the

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7 Interventions were initially not aimed at overthrowing an 'illegitimate' government but were carried out on humanitarian grounds or to stop an impending secession. However, the fact that Tanzania fought against and overthrew Amin had set a precedent; this meant that in future, if a state was not pleased with the leader of another
OAU had passed the resolution of non-interference in the affairs of other states. An examination of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda has laid the blame on Uganda's earlier incursion into the Kagera region in order to place it under Uganda's jurisdiction. Others have advanced three different reasons to explain this intervention. Firstly, it was suggested that it was caused by the feuds between Amin and Nyerere and that Nyerere was tired of the increasing threats that Amin had made to him. Secondly, Tanzania wanted to protect its territory against foreign invasion and to punish the aggressor. Lastly, it was argued that Tanzania wanted to overthrow a dictatorial regime and replace it with a democratically elected government. However, the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda was clearly a violation of the OAU charter. The failure of the OAU to reprimand Tanzania for this intervention meant that Tanzania got away with this invasion; however, its demands for reparations from Uganda were never upheld. During the Cold War, it could be argued that interventions were kept in check by the ideological differences between states, as no state would risk intervening in the other for fear of incurring the wrath of the former colonial master or the broader ideological camp, especially after what had happened in Zaire-Congo.

In the post-Cold War era, African states continued to face challenges of intervention, albeit this time not from the foreign powers directly (Europe or the US) but from fellow African states. A new willingness has emerged among African armies to engage in conflicts beyond their borders, and this threatens to make armed insurrection, with the help of neighbours, the preferred means of political change in states in Africa. In this study, an in-depth examination is done of Uganda's interventions in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. Drawing on the four theories of foreign policy, viz. Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and Poliheurism, and current debates on intervention, the study examines Uganda's interventions in Burundi, state, it could easily organise an invasion to remove that president from power. This is what has subsequently happened in the GLR and in postcolonial Uganda.


The personal feud between the two leaders lay in Tanzania's refusal to recognise Amin as the legitimate ruler of Uganda and Nyerere's harbouring of Ugandan dissidents, among whom was Obote whom Amin had overthrown.

P. Mutibwa, Ug since Independence, pp. 125-147.

The convoluted intervention in Zaire-Congo had resulted in the death of Patrice Lumumba and in that of Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary General at the time, and led to an intense struggle between the West and the East over who wielded influence in the political arena. From then onwards, Africa states saw intervention as an exclusive preserve of the superpowers.

Rwanda and the DRC. The aim of the study is to establish the theory that best explains Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in the GLR between 1986 and 2006.

Earlier studies that have explained intervention using the theories of Liberalism and Realism and their variants have broadly attributed military and other types of interventions in the world to the anarchic nature of inter-state relations, the insatiable desire for political and regional power, ideological, economic interest and national interests. The Constructivists have argued to the contrary, namely, that interventions are a new behaviour that states have acquired in their socialisation with each other. They further hold that, in the post-Cold War era, states are intervening because they view it as characteristic of the current international system. The military interventions of the United States (US) in Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq are prime examples of this. Unlike the above, the poliheurists attribute intervention to the leaders' foreign policy decisions or their reaction to domestic conditions that threaten their legitimacy and regime.

While all theoretical debates acknowledge the security concerns of states, the humanitarian crises that result when wars spill over from one state to another, and the need to establish good governance as the proximate causes of interventions, the question that remains is: What is the most parsimonious theory that can be used to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in her western neighbours? This study is salient because it comes at a time when there are renewed theoretical debates on what motivates intervention, and whether intervention and use of force in what is claimed to be 'undemocratic' states in Africa, is in fact restoring democracy and peace, as its proponents argue.


1.1 Intervention defined

There is consensus about the definition of intervention as a range of actions used by one state to seek to influence the politics of another state. Such actions may include providing a rebel group, another group or a state with any form of military or economic support on the pretext that it is restoring order or implementing political and economic order to such state. Although this definition does not differentiate between a solicited and unsolicited intervention, it acknowledges the role played by non-state actors as conduits through which the intervenor can influence change in the internee." Another set of scholars define intervention, less charitably, as the dictatorial interference by a state in the sphere of jurisdiction of another sovereign state."

These forms of interventions may be done covertly, or through deployment of troops, or simply by means of cross border incursions. Although this is a harsh definition, it adequately defines intervention; it is limited, though, because not all interventions can be considered dictatorial. For example, an intervention that seeks to stop genocide or mass murders would be a justifiable intervention according to the OAU and the UN, albeit on condition that it is approved by the OAU (now the AU) or the UN. Teson's definition of "humanitarian intervention" as "forcible trans-boundary action undertaken for the purpose of protecting the rights of individuals against violations by their own governments" is a good example of a definition that allows such intervention. Of course, Teson's version raises serious concerns about the rights of states to decide for themselves what is good or bad. This is exacerbated

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17 The term intervene' has been used in this thesis to refer to the state that has been intervened in, either unilaterally or multilaterally.


when states feel that International Law protects them, because states are not permitted to interfere with the internal affairs of other states. Teson vehemently opposes this position and argues that states should not take the advantage of sovereignty to abuse the rights of their citizens because the International Law protects them. In this study, I define intervention as interference by one state (the intervenor) in the internal affairs of another state (the intervenee or target state), whether diplomatically, militarily or by other means, with the express aim of protecting the intervenor and ensuring that the intervenee pays allegiance to the intervenor. It is this allegiance that the intervenor presumes will partly guarantee his safety from external threats, particularly from enemies that may choose to use the target state as a base to destabilize the intervenor. The target state would be a client state in subsequent economic relations and would provide the intervenor with a strategic geopolitical advantage over its adversaries.

1.2 Causes of Intervention

Briefly, interventions have inexhaustible causes that include but are not limited to security causes, economic interests or humanitarian concerns. Historically, interventions have been a common feature of international relations since time immemorial. Finnemore positions interventionist foreign policies of states in the fifteenth century. During this time, the aims of interventions were mainly aimed to protect people in territorial and religious wars or to collect debts owed to their nationals by other states! In the twentieth century, interventions were linked to the decolonization process, in which colonial states were fighting against the mandate system of the League of Nations (LON) and against the trusteeship system of the United Nations (UN) to gain independence. In the twenty-first century, there have been many forms of intervention, the most prominent of these being humanitarian interventions, direct military interventions or indirect logistical and economic support either to the government in power or to the dissidents of a particular government with the ultimate aim of causing a change in the social setup in the intervenee.

Interventions have evolved over time from being restricted to religious wars, as Finnemore points out, to interventions that change entire regimes of other states. In contrast to Finnemore, however, Schroeder argues that interventions have not changed over time but that...

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10 M. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, p.3.
they have always served the same purpose. He does argue, though that the difference between past and present intervention lies in the sophistication with which they are now being carried out. Interventions in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, have increased and are motivated by different reasons. The most common explanation is that they are aimed at serving the political objectives of one or more of the great powers, as well as to maintain secure borders and sovereign control of policy, which has remained a constant concern within the Third World. It is necessary to examine the different types of intervention to analyse the theoretical approaches that are relevant to studying them. The rationale for this that it is clear, from the previous section that certain theories are more suited for explaining interventions of a specific type. The theories themselves further frave variants and revisions that give different interpretations of what causes interventions. A good example is the liberal theory, which has a neoliberal variant. On the one hand, for example, neo-Liberalism favours a state-centric explanation but it also traces intervention to the character of the regime in power. On the other hand, utilitarian Liberalism, which also interprets intervention from a state-centric perspective, puts emphasis on the economic interests of the state. Types of interventions are discussed in the following section.

1.3 Types of Interventions

Military intervention

Military intervention is defined as the direct engagement of soldiers of one state in another state with the intent of either overthrowing a regime or ensuring that the intervenor’s interests are met. In the past, military intervention was often for ulterior motives or for genuine motives, if it had been instigated by international law (UNSC action). In the post-Cold War era, however, it has expanded its role to that of humanitarian assistance in cases of severe environmental disaster or man-made disasters such as genocides or attacks by rebels, or at the request of a falling government. Many scholars have preferred to dissociate military
intervention from invasions and argue that invasion is unsolicited and aims to punish the victim state for an action that it has carried out, with the purpose of forcing it to conform to a certain standard. Instead, they argue that intervention is often preceded by a life-threatening event that cannot be ignored, for example genocide, natural disaster, advanced warfare and threats to use nuclear warfare. Finnemore and Hauss, however, challenge the whole notion of military intervention being different from declaring war on states. They both argue that military interventions in states are aimed at changing the political authority of the target state, and that such intervention requires massive deployment of military forces, an aspect that is not different from a declaration of war."

Military intervention has attracted much research and debate, with overwhelming reference to the US interventionist foreign policy in the Third World and the motivations driving it." However, with many states joining the intervention business, military intervention has now extended to all aspects of international relations. Military interventions in the post-Cold War period have taken on multiple forms, such as unilateral action by the UN or by individual governments, as for example, France in Rwanda and the US and NATO in Kosovo and Somalia. Multi-lateral use of military force to deliver relief or for humanitarian put poses at the request of non-governmental organisations or civil society groups' demands has also become a common feature, particularly in intractable conflicts or complex emergencies such as Somalia, Kosovo, Sudan and Iraq, which were rare in the past." What remains unexplainable is why military force was not used in the Rwanda genocide even when there were similar appeals made by non-governmental organisations and the international community at large. This has raised the question: when and where should military interventions take place?


"M. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, p.20.

28 Innumerable authors and scholars have discussed the Rwandan case and questioned why Rwanda was not treated like other cases that needed help. See, for example, L. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, (London: Zed Books, 2000); L. Melvem, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (London: Verso, 2004); P. Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda, (Oxford: Macmillan Publishers, 1998); J. Beny and C. Briny, (eds) Genocide in Rwanda A...
Humanitarian intervention

Humanitarian intervention is defined as an intervention that addresses an emergency resulting from man-made or natural disasters. It involves the quick removal of people from terrible situations, such as genocides, wars or armed conflict. In the words of a UK Permanent representative to the UNSC, humanitarian interventions are "an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity.' In broader terms, it has been defined as "proportionate trans-boundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government.'

Humanitarian intervention is currently given the biggest coverage and authorship, arguably because of the gruesome murders and human suffering that are portrayed by the mass media and the accounts of such events released in the public sphere by international non-governmental organisations. It is generally agreed by a range of scholars that, irrespective of the impact humanitarian intervention has on the people, it is a form of intervention that can be justified as long as it is undertaken within the framework of international law and the UNSC requirements. However, if these mandates cannot be issued, humanitarian intervention must nonetheless take place! Humanitarian intervention has thus become common. Kofi Annan, former UNSC General Secretary, has described it as a new international norm in favour of


40 Ibid.

intervening to protect civilians and an emerging pattern in post-Cold War international politics."

Critiques of humanitarian intervention are often concerned not about the use of the military, but the way in which humanitarian intervention manifests itself. In some cases where a military force has undertaken intervention, the military often gets involved in a wide range of other non-military components, involving reconstruction of the collapsing state, addressing inadequate social services or even involving themselves in over-hauling war-torn societies and remaking them in accordance with the normatively preferred liberal democratic model. A good example of this is the case of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979. As a result of the military's extension into post-war reconstruction activities, they became entangled in other activities too, for example, engaging in economic activities, and becoming involved in the politics of the intervenee, which compels them to take sides or arguably to protect the ethnic communities that are targeted by their fellow ethnic communities. The consequences of humanitarian intervention often discredit the intervention; in other words, although the initial intervention may have happened for very noble reasons, it may end up discredited and there may be a loss of faith in it by the communities concerned or the international community in general. Examples of such humanitarian interventions include Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998), Kosovo (1998) and Liberia (1990). The principal aims of these interventions were to save people from war and intra-state ethnic strife, or saving people from massacre and abusive regimes that violated their citizen's human rights and yet people were killed in the process."

32 M. Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention", p. 139 cites the Tanzanian case. The inclusion of the Tanzanian invasion as an example here is a little problematic because there is a difference between a state that unilaterally intervenes in another country and remains there after the intervention to reconstruct the intervenee, and a state that is authorised by the UNSC to intervene as part of a peacekeeping force to stay and help in the reconstruction of that intervenee.
Covert intervention

Ransom defines covert intervention as a foreign policy instrument based upon secrecy and deception. Often used by the major powers in their relations with the Third World, covert intervention involves multiple actions by one state against another, aiming at exacting a specific reaction or relationship. This intervention may include secret propaganda, manipulation of foreign electoral processes, overthrowing governments, secret financial assistance, paramilitary operations or assassination of political leaders. Covert intervention, by its nature, is impossible to qualify or prove, but it remains an ominous and sometimes lethal way of dealing with an enemy state or a state, while pretending to be a friendly state. At a regional level, neighbouring states can easily employ covert interventions in support of their neighbours' dissidents, by manipulating a section of the population to rebel against the existing government, or even ensuring that the policies of neighbouring states are sabotaged.

Covert intervention in the Cold War era occurred along the ideological lines, with communist and capitalists supporting different groups of leaders within a state. In the post-Cold War era, covert operations have become even more common, particularly in Africa. Furthermore, it is no longer necessarily foreign powers that undertake such covert operations, but it may be African leaders acting against their fellow leaders. Covert interventions stand in direct contravention of the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law and the subsequent UN Resolution 1373 of 2001 and UN Resolution 1506 of 2004, which prohibit states from aiding or allowing armed bands of other states from committing terrorist acts against their states. International law stipulates that a state that covertly provides active support to armed bands of another state to enable them carry out incursions in another state's territory is an accomplice of unlawful use of force."

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26 Ibid.
Paramilitary intervention

Schraeder defines paramilitary intervention as economic and military aid designed to foster an armed insurgency against a foreign government, usually with the intent of overthrowing said government. Paramilitary intervention often employs the services of insurgent groups based sometimes in another state or in the state itself. It is characterised by covert operations and indirect military interventions. It may include the provision of military weaponry or financial assistance, and in Africa, it sometimes includes the loaning of military troops by one state to another with the express aim of achieving a short-term objective, such as a coup or removing a rebel group from a specific territory.

Diplomatic Intervention

Brecher and Wilkenfeld outline two main types of interventions, i.e. diplomatic interventions and third party interventions. Examples of diplomatic intervention include the periodic negotiations in domestic conflicts, e.g. the US in Cyprus and the US mediation in the Middle East. Others include mediation between leaders e.g. the US mediation between the leaders of Uganda and Rwanda and currently the just concluded South African mediation of Thabo Mbeki between the warring factions in Ivory Coast, in which they signed a peace agreement as well as pledging to hold elections in April (2005). Brecher and Wilkenfeld further perceive third party intervention as "any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself". They limit "Third party interventions" to those by superpowers or multi-lateral organisations, yet there is a significant role played by middle powers like Australia in the Pacific Island and East Timor and an increased role of regional organisations in the Third World. The post-Cold War era has also witnessed the interventions of African states in other African states.

4) Ibid.
5) Ibid.
In all these variants of intervention, it is evident that they can take place for multiple reasons. Irrespective of what type of intervention is undertaken, it is important to note that international law is very specific about when intervention is allowed. Intervention in general is prohibited, and if it must happen, it must be under specific jurisdiction and in specific circumstances. Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Even under the customary law, sovereign states are protected by the rule of non-interference or non-intervention; the law specifies that states must refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. In spite of this, interventions have become even more common and, as Kofi Arian observes, military interventions even more than all other forms of intervention have become an international character of international relations. As the debate continues in the UNSC with regard to when intervention should take place and what best option or type of intervention should be used, the question of who should intervene remains a salient issue in the intervention debate. Should it be an immediate neighbour or any state that has the capacity to intervene? In the following subsection, who should intervene and when is briefly discussed.

1.4 Who should intervene and when?

Whereas there is a consensus that intervention should take place under the auspices of the UNSC to contain intrastate wars, abuses of human rights, ethnic violence, and violent political power struggles in states, in cases of environmental disasters there are divergent views as to who should intervene. When states should intervene and how the intervention should be carried out. The UNSC remains the indisputable intervenor and the main actor in the intervention business. In terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UNSC is mandated either to intervene expressly by sending a peace mission or to delegate a state to intervene on its behalf, or it may sometimes ask states to contribute troops or logistical support. Examples of such UNSC interventions are numerous but good examples are the recent cases where the US was asked to help in Somalia and Haiti, or France to help in in

Senegal and Rwanda." In addition, the UNSC is the only international body that authorises states or regional groups to intervene, although regional actors could sometimes intervene on their own initiative if the situation in a particular state in the region is compromising the stability and security of other states. Nonetheless, it is required that even in such situations, where regional organisations have decided unilaterally to intervene in a specific situation it must be done with the full knowledge of the UNSC and preferably only after the UN has mandated the regional organisation to take action. The UN Charter Article 52 stipulates that states have a right to make regional arrangements to deal with matters of international peace and security and urges them to make "every effort" to settle local disputes peacefully and within the framework of the purposes and principles of the UN. Such intervention by regional groups should not amount to "enforcement actions" unless this has been authorised by the UNSC and is done with regular accounts, giving feedback on such an intervention to the UNSC. Article 52 stipulates.4%

Amide 520) Nothing in the present context precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters as relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for such action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.46

However, given the shortcomings of both the UNSC and regional organisations in addressing crises by delaying interventions or not intervening at all, unilateral intervention by a group of states or a state acting on its own initiative has become a common feature in international politics. While international law placed the responsibility of authorising and legitimating interventions on the UN and on regional security groups, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (and lately, the Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN]), there are circles that argue that states have the right to invite other states to intervene to help them sort out conflicts. They also argue that when states are violating the rights of their citizens to an unacceptable degree, then neighbouring states have the right to intervene and stop this."

In some regional groupings, for example in the Organisation of American States (OAS), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), SADC and ECOWAS, procedural requirements of interventions are well laid out to ensure that they are legitimate. In the African Union, for example, intervention is considered a legitimate alternative, provided it is undertaken within a holistic framework that addresses the root causes and conditions of conflict, and provided it is aimed at building peace and stability. In the UN, similarly, intervention should follow the legal framework and be mandated by the UNSC under Chapter VII. This states that action of the air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace, is permitted. The UNSC can furthermore authoriz intervention under UNSC Article 42. Article 42 specifically provides that the Security Council may authorize intervention by armed forces to maintain or restore international peace and security. Articles 55 and 56 imply an affirmative obligation on member states to take joint and/or separate action to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. It should be noted, though, that all these procedural requirements of intervention ignore the urgency with which a bad situation may become worse. As demonstrated by the Rwandan case of 1994 or currently the Darfur case in Sudan, prompt action may be required. As Museveni argues, there is a need to encourage "bureaucratic and political structures to measure the known price of sticking their necks out and doing something against the less tangible and measurable costs associated with having to pick up the pieces later, human casualties, loss of political prestige, famine and refugee relief, economic reconstruction and peace-keeping." Furthermore, the UN requires interventions undertaken by the UNSC and its regional counterparts to be in a manner that is commensurate with the needs of the time; they must also attempt to be as impartial as possible to prevent an already bad situation from deteriorating into war.

49 Y. Museveni, Parliamentary address on the security situation of Uganda°, 21 November, Parliamentary Hansard (2002), p. 21. Museveni subscribes to the philosophy that, when a neighbour's house catches fire, you have to go out and check or help, or else the fire can easily extend to your own house. Secondly, he argues that a neighbouring state cannot wait until a nation is wiped out in genocide, just because it has to wait for permission from the UN or help from outside.
The literature on who should intervene and when is dominated by the legitimacy of the UNSC and of regional security groups, thereby excluding independent states from interventions. In my opinion this is an error, in that, whatever the conflict, these international organisations should work with the states in and around the regions in question. Without their involvement, little can be achieved by way of pacifying waning groups or stopping an ethnic conflict of the magnitude of Kosovo, Rwanda and the DRC.

1.5 When to intervene: Challenges of Intervention

The timing of the intervention is also controversial because, depending on the conflict, the intervenors and their purposes, the timing of the interventions undertaken is dependent upon the character of the conflict, the type of intervention to be undertaken, the parties involved in the conflict and the ripeness of the conflict. If conflicting parties are not amenable to peace and are in the middle of fighting and a regional group intervenes, it is extremely unlikely that it will solve the conflict; the Israel and Palestine case is instructive here. Similarly, if the parties to a conflict are determined to annihilate each other, then the timing of the intervention is particularly crucial, because it will have to prevent genocide. A delayed intervention results in the situations such as those in Rwanda and Kosovo in which thousands of lives were claimed.

It is assumed that interventions that are requested by a state from their regional organisations or by another state face the least challenges (such as the SADC intervention in Lesotho at the request of Prime Minister Mosisili52 and MISAB intervention in Central African Republic). However, evidence suggests that, no matter whether the state requested to intervene or whether the UNSC or regional groups authorized it, the outcome of interventions sometimes compromises the very peace that the intervention seeks, particularly if it is undertaken at the wrong time. The Rwandan case again is a good example of this.

The UNSC and regional group structures often, have strict procedural requirements that affect the timing of the intervention. The bureaucratic nature of the decision-making process, the


nature of states' foreign policies ('states' here refers to the countries that provide the peacekeeping troops) and the legal requirements of these peacekeeping contributors (as stipulated in those states' constitutions) greatly influence the timing of an intervention." Even when a situation is particularly serious, such as a genocide, the timing of past interventions has demonstrated that delays in making decisions to intervene or the legal hurdles before such actions can be taken have often failed to prevent genocides or serious humanitarian crises."

In some cases, the constitution of a state spells out a particular foreign policy, yet that state may face challenges that force it to revisit its foreign policy. When this happens, it is most likely that states will ignore the legislature and instead evoke clauses within their constitution that favour a particular action. The US interventions, for example, in the three cases of Panama (1989), Grenada (1983) and Cuba (1962) were carried out without congressional approval." Similarly in Africa, states sometimes intervene without full permission from their legislature and executive, based on the justification that the situations at hand was so serious that quick decisions had to be taken and shortcuts had to be found within their constitutions."

The nature of the existing leadership in the state contemplating an intervention also poses a challenge in deciding when the intervention should take place. Leaders of neighbouring states may be reluctant to commit their troops because they are trying to obey international law, which prohibits the deployment of troops in another state without the mandate of the UNSC. However, leaders and states may also focus on ensuring good neighbourliness, and conditions in the neighbouring state may warrant intervention by virtue of its geographical proximity. In the DRC interventions, for example, no leader had obtained permission from either their executive or the legislative arms of government, while some leaders used their constitutional prerogatives to intervene militarily and inform their governments later."
The use of military force in 'humanitarian intervention' poses new and unanswered questions for the intervening nations, especially considering that the intervenors are not direct parties to the dispute that is allegedly justifying recourse to war." Why would states use force in a humanitarian intervention? Why is military force used in some cases and not in others? If NATO was concerned with the plight of the people of Kosovo, then why were areas that were densely populated with civilians bombed? Why did ground troops not directly confront the enemy soldiers whose actions the campaign was supposedly intended to stop? These questions posed by Calhoun are vital to any inquiry into the use of force for humanitarian intervention. She questions the rationale of killing in the name of self-defence, particularly when the mission of the intervention is to save lives. The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in the DRC recently killed the Congolese to reciprocate for the death of their colleagues." The argument they used to justify their action was that "they shot because they were shot at". Although this is a plausible argument, it also ultimately creates distrust in intervenors. Clearly, intervention is a complex issue and its outcomes, though sometimes predictable, are often underestimated. Ebrahim summarizes it well when he argues that

"... intervention is a controversial issue. No matter who intervenes, there will always be different opinions as to whether it was right to intervene or not. Nevertheless, states or the international community should mix towards a situation where, ever without authorization from multilateral bodies, intervention can take place. Saran provisions do not exist, but intervention must be the political will and a shared understanding of how the situation should be done and it must be aimed at preventing humanitarian disaster, whether caused by military behaviour or not."

In the light of this debate of who, why and when states should intervene, the aim of this study is to develop a theoretical explanation for Uganda's interventionist behaviour that is as comprehensive as possible. The study, as has been pointed out before, thus focuses on

58 In March of 2005 MONUC peacekeepers were lollled by one of the military factions in the DRC avenging the MONUC peacekeepers' rape of the Congolese women. In retaliation, MONUC invaded a whole village and lollled people whom they alleged were leaders of the factions and arrested the others on grounds that they had refused to surrender and disarm.
Uganda’s intervention in three of its western neighbours, namely Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC.

1.6 The Problem

Interventionism in Africa has coincided with the onset of the post-Cold War era. Interventions during the Cold War were simply attributed to the ‘Cold War’. They were portrayed as proxy wars sponsored by the superpowers the interventions in the Congo-Zaire and in Nigeria during the sixties and in the Western Sahara, Chad and Benin during the seventies. In the post-Cold War era, African interventions have come to be attributed to multiple factors. On the one hand, they are portrayed as a continuation of the struggle of the superpowers for hegemonic control over Africa, particularly as a struggle between the Anglo-Saxons versus the Francophone axis", using African states as proxies. On the other hand, they are portrayed as motivated by a whole range of factors that are peculiar to Africa. These factors include (but are not limited to) economic interests, humanitarian considerations, political power struggles in intervening states, and geo-strategic security concerns." All of these factors have been advanced to explain many of the interventions in Africa in general, and some of them are mentioned in interpretations of Uganda’s interventions in the GLR.

Uganda’s interventionist foreign policy in the GLR has been attributed to three main factors. The rust is Uganda's economic interests in specific states and its general interest in exploiting the economic advantages of the region as a whole. The second is Uganda's hegemonic ambitions and imperialist attempt to create a Hima-Tutsi empire. The third is that Ugandan's motive was to spread its revolutionary framework, its so-called 'movement brand of democracy to its neighbours. Consequently, the regime changes in the states of Rwanda and Burundi in the GLR have been attributed to Uganda's interventionist foreign policy. Some of

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62 A whole range of literature exists on the interventions in Africa and Uganda’s interventions in particular; a critique of this literature on Uganda’s interventionist foreign policy is done in Chapter Three and for purposes of brevity it is not dealt with exhaustively here.
these motivations have been widely contested by both scholars and the state, both of which provide alternative explanations of its behaviour. Other motives such as Uganda's humanitarian considerations and its national security concerns have been ignored by many scholars, because it was felt that they were used as pretext to conceal its economic and hegemonic ambitions.

An interpretation that has been subsumed in other factors, has been brought to the fore, and has since characterised the debate on motives of interventions. It is the "Crisis in Citizenship" and the spillover argument." Mahmood Mamdani is the proponent of this ethnic conflict model, to which he attributes the trend of interventions in the GLR region. He argues that postcolonial governments used ethnic affiliation to access positions of power and to legitimise themselves. Their governments expelled competing ethnic categories and effectively tried to annihilate them. These victim ethnic categories fled to neighbouring states, where they were further marginalized and not recognised as victims of their repressive governments but rather as intruders seeking to benefit from their asylum states. The struggle for survival in these repressive asylum states and their inability to return to their own states resulted in a struggle to return nonetheless. Mobilizing themselves on ethnic levels, they launched military attacks on their home states and demanded to be treated as natives of these states and recognised as ethnic categories that are entitled to citizenship, access to political power and other services that other citizens in that country were accessing. This history of the ethnic struggle amongst ethnic categories and how it played out in several states (with emphasis on Uganda), as well as its impact on the GLR, Mamdani argues, must be understood if the interventions of African states in the GLR region in general need to be comprehensively explained.

It is against this background that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in the GLR, particularly during the Museveni administration from 1986 to 2006 is examined. It is critical to

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63 For purposes of brevity, the factors that have been advanced to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy are only dealt with superficially here. A detailed literature review of intervention is done in Chapter Three of this thesis.

64 M. Mamdani uses "Crisis in Citizenship" as a term to identify the complex nature of the ethnic struggle for citizenship in the GLR.

understand whether the available theories are sufficient to explain Uganda's interventions. This study thus proposes to examine Uganda's intervention using four theories, the Realist variant known as the Security Dilemma, Constructivism, Poliheurism and Liberalism. The justification for this multi-theoretical approach lies in the inability of each theory to address Uganda's interventions comprehensively on its own.

As Clark notes, Uganda like other interventionist states such as the US grossly underestimates the high risks of interventions and will therefore most likely become entangled in many of its interventions." He further argues that Uganda’s intervention in the DRC, for example, is analogous to the US’ intervention in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s which had serious consequences? This makes Uganda an interesting case. Internationally, Uganda’s military interventions contravene Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in other states, as well as related international conventions and protocols. Those of Uganda’s interventions that have been motivated by altruism equally contravene the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of the State. This declaration prohibits states from intervening directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state it explicitly states that, "... no state shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state"? Uganda’s interventions further contravene the OAU charter and other regional agreements e.g. the Addis Agreement’, which Uganda has ratified.

In this period, from 1986 to 2006, Uganda's foreign relations with its western neighbours have been characterised by unstable relations, inter-state wars, intra-state wan and civil strife both in the neighbouring states and in Uganda itself. Some GLR states are wary of any dealings with Uganda and the country has in fact been sued at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Uganda has intervened in GLR states militarily, diplomatically and covertly to mitigate humanitarian disasters caused by intra-state conflicts. These interventions have been contested

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69 R. Wallace, International Law, p. 286.

69 The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1963 stipulates that there should be mutual respect between states for each other's territorial integrity.
and Uganda's interventionist foreign policy has been challenged. Uganda that has become a central player in African foreign relations has been the focus of debates, conferences, and peace talks that continue to seek solutions to the GLR conflicts. In view of this, it is a particularly relevant to examine the best theoretical explanations of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy with a view to contribute to African international relations literature.

1.7 Justification of the Study

Interventions and the reasons why they take place have been analyzed and studied in various disciplines, for example in law, politics and international relations; this study aims to explore the interventions of African states from a theoretical perspective. This study will contribute to the literature on African international relations as well as to arrive at a better understanding of Uganda's intervention in the GLR states. Uganda has been named as a major actor in the GLR conflicts and its interventionist foreign policy has come under attack from its neighbours, the international community and the citizens of the country themselves. The focus of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy was on the DRC, it is envisaged that the findings of this research will create a greater understanding of Uganda's foreign policy in general. It will not be limited to isolated incidents, such as the DRC intervention, but will also cover the entire interventionist foreign policy of the Museveni administration.

1.8 Scope of the Study

The study focuses on Uganda's foreign policy of the Museveni administration covering the period from 1986 up to 2006, when Uganda lost a court case at the International Court of Justice. 1986 is an important starting point because of the regime change that brought Museveni into power following the overthrow of Tito Okello Lutwa who in turn fraud overthrown a democratically elected' dictatorial regime.' The regime change that ushered Museveni into power also marked the end of the domination of political power by the North' and the shift of political power to the 'South?' His ascension to power was partly aided by Museveni's justifications for waging protracted guerrilla warfare were the rigging of elections and the dictatorial reign of Obote II's reign, which he sought to ready. Although in reality he overthrew Tao Okello Lutwa, who had overthrown Obote, Museveni continues to argue that he overthrew Obote's regime and that of its proteges. 71 The terms North and South are widely used to refer to the regional political division within Uganda. The North is used synonymously with the Northeners to refer to the ethnic categories of the people whose indigenous homes
Tutsi refugee soldiers from Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, as well as by Ugandan peasants whom he used in his war." The success of his guerrilla warfare and subsequent capture of political power marked the beginning of an era of the use of force to change regimes not by 'outsiders' but 'insiders'."

What is crucial about the use of force in the GLR was the reciprocity aspect with which interventions were carried out.' The period is also important because Museveni's successful accession to power led to a spiral of guerrilla warfare, marked the decline of the dictatorial regimes of the western neighbours and the accession to power of leaden supported by Uganda in some of the GLR component states. This study, however, only covers the four expisodes of Uganda's interventions in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. It explains the interventions in the light of how events in these states affected Uganda's western border districts and the state as a whole. (A map of Uganda on page 230 of this thesis shows the rebel affected areas and has arrows indicating the districts that were included in this study.) The reason for such an extensive study of three states is to ensure that Uganda's foreign relations are understood in their totality. Studying an isolated intervention case would limit good theoretical analysis or theory building.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

This study draws on four theories that have been used to explain intervention in international relations. The traditional theories of Liberalism and Realism have been extensively used, but subsequent developments in world politics such as the emergence of aspects such as identity, ideas and norms, and how these have influenced the foreign policy behaviour of states have compromised the theories' ability to explain fully the foreign behaviour of states. These

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The Ugandan peasants had suffered on account of the dictatorial regime, and because war was in their regions, they had two options, either join Obote II to fight the rebels, or to join the rebels to fight Obote II. They chose the latter.

The term "outsider" here refers to the role played by foreign powers in the regime changes in African states, while "insider" refers to intrastate groups mobilizing themselves to overthrow their regimes.

I am using the concept of reciprocity because each leader who received assistance from a military group or from a neighbouring state was expected to render similar assistance to the leader who had given him help. This set up a whole spiral of reciprocity that partly accounts for the conflicts in the GLR region, because every faction that had chosen to use war to gain power hoped to receive support from those it had previously supported or given assistance to.

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traditional theories still account for some aspects of international behaviour but have limitations that alternative theories have attempted to address. These alternative theories that have emerged within international relations, e.g. Constructivism and Poliheurism have not thus far been used to examine African states' behaviour, nor have they been used to analyse Uganda's foreign policy, which is the aim of this study.

This study uses an eclectic approach to examine motives of intervention. This approach is premised on the limitation of either theory (viz. Constructivism or Poliheurism) to address the research question adequately on its own. In addition, as Gent observes, there is a paucity of formal-theoretic work on intervention, which makes such a study of theoretical explanations of intervention extremely important.

The study will be organised as follows: The theories will be reviewed at the beginning of every chapter, highlighting the tenets of the theories. This will be followed by a description of events and, lastly, an evaluation of the theory. The merit of this approach is that, by the end of the discussions, it will be evident which of the theories is most comprehensive and applicable to the Ugandan situation.

1.10 Research Methodology: The Comparative Theoretical Case Study

This study utilised the comparative theory case study design. The selection of this design was premised on the fact that it was most suitable for studying the emerging phenomenon of African states' interventionist behaviour in the post-Cold War era. The information obtained was used to illustrate the four competing theories with an aim of establishing the most parsimonious theory that explains Uganda's interventionist foreign policy. The dependent variable was Uganda's interventions from 1996 to 2006. Uganda was selected because, of all the African states that intervened in others, Uganda has the highest number of unilateral interventions in the region from 1986 to 2006, which makes it a good case to study. Four theories were selected for scrutiny, namely, Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and Poliheurism. The tenets of these theories, which were discussed in Chapter 2, form the

framework on which the study is based. The study was conducted in eight border districts, two central districts and in Uganda's western neighbours of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.

The advantages of using comparative theory are numerous. Firstly, use of many theories allows evidence to be interpreted in multiple ways, which in turn enables the researcher to use the evidence to either confirm a specific theoretical alternative or counter the explanation being advanced by that theory." Secondly, as each theory is analysed and applied to study a specific event, factual depth and comprehensive information is obtained on the case. Thirdly, using multiple theories helps in establishing the validity and reliability of the study results, because both qualitative and statistical data are triangulated to establish whether the qualitative results are consistent with the relevant statistical data or, in the case of international relations, if state actors explain and justify actions in similar ways in different settings. Fourthly, using Uganda as a case study not only illustrates the strength of theories but also helps in refining theories and addressing their limitations." Lastly, it is suited for in-depth analysis and for following leads into new areas or new constructions of theory." In this study, for example, the Security Dilemma theory as a variant of Realism emphasised state actors and looked specifically at how their actions influence each other. This perspective leads to refining the existing theory or developing one would emerge from a question such as, Bow do the leaders perceive themselves? This would be vital because, as states' perceptions or misperceptions of each other are discussed, it establishes from their leaders perceive each other and how this influences the nature of bilateral relations between the states. What emerges from such an analysis is the new alternative or theoretical perspective that focuses on individuals and how this informs their foreign policy behaviour!


Research Phases
The research was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, desktop research and analyses of national, regional, and international documentary sources were carried out at the relevant institutions both in country and international.' As I was cautious of the limitations of documentary sources, I triangulated these with other sources of information to ensure optimal results. The second phase involved field research in the selected central and border districts of Kampala, Ntungamo, Rukungiri, Kanungu, Kasese, Hoima, Kabale, Kisoro, Bundibugyo and Ntoroko. These districts share borders with the states in which Uganda intervened. Interviews were conducted with key informants, security forces, selected members from the communities and government officials working in the study districts in Uganda and the DRC and communes in Rwanda. In Burundi, in-depth interviews were held with critical actors in the peace process, political party leaders and former rebel leaders turned government officials" Appendix 2 provides a full list of the interviewees and their respective organisations. The period of study was replete with inter-state security border meetings, regional and international conferences and seminars on security and good governance, some of which I attended. These conferences and seminars provided first-hand experience of the security situations in the region as well as view points of the protagonists of the conflicts present at these conferences. Aware of the limitations of such fora as sources of information, follow-up interviews were fielded.

Data Collation Methods and Mamas
Qualitative data collection and qualitative data analysis were used in this study because they have the advantage of being flexible, economical and enable the coverage of sufficient ground." They are effective in investigations into foreign policy, which is primarily a communicative subject, and are appropriate when used for uncovering and understanding what lies behind any phenomenon about which little is yet known." Three qualitative data collection

80 Appendix 10 has detailed list of these organisations were research was conducted.
84 Strauss and Corbin reckon that those who have used qualitative research have obtained satisfactory results and appropriate answers to the central research questions they have investigated. See A. Strauss and J. Corbin,
methods were used, namely, in-depth interviews," group methods" and meetings." I also carried out follow-up interviews to clarify some issues that were not clearly understood."

Four instruments were used in the study. Interview guides and interview schedules were administered to the in-depth interviewees. Appendix 6 provides a sample of the interview schedule. The questions in the interview schedule were modified into interview guides that were used in interviews with the focus groups. In addition, a questionnaire was administered to the border communities and refugees of Kisoro, Hoima and Ntungamo to solicit information from those who were unable to express themselves adequately in English (see Appendix 4 for the questionnaire).

**Qualitative Data Analysis**

Data collected using key informants and focus group discussions was analysed using qualitative methods, which included free listing, tabulations, chronicling of events and classification of the information into specific categories." Spradely's data analysis model was used in the final data analysis. In this model, the information obtained from the interviews was presented in three levels, namely, the theory questions (TQs) in the first column, the interview questions (I(?)) in

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87 Five groups were formed, in the districts of Kasese, Bundibugyo, Kisoro and Ntungamo and Hoima. In these groups, a questionnaire was used to discuss the salient issues of security. Those who were unable to fill in the questionnaire were assisted. A conference group organised at the Dar-es Salaam Declaration of 2004 enabled me hold discussions with technocrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of foreign policy malong.
88 Dey and Dentin argue that annotating data and follow-up interviews are critical because they raise questions that were earlier ignored or not aptly answered. See I. Dey, Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists (London: Routledge, 1993) and Dentin, N. K., The Research Act, (New York: Mc Grawhill, 1987).
the second column, and the views from earlier documentary sources in the last column (interventions) (see Appendix 5 for the data analysis sheet).

Quantitative Data Collation and Analysis

Quantitative data collection was used to collect data amongst border communities. There were many participants in the focus group discussions and key informants who wanted to participate, but who had limited time for interviews or preferred unrecorded interviews. A questionnaire was also given to informants with a view to establishing their ranking and to enable a comparison of the primacy of causal factors of the intervention that have been advanced to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy (see Appendix 3 for this questionnaire, with a mark up sheet at the end). The information from the questionnaires and interview schedules were coded and analysed by simple statistical methods, such as means and percentages to establish the rankings of the causal factors of intervention.

Sampling Criteria and San* Design

Given the wide range of interviewees that were available to select from, I deliberately selected the key informants based on their involvement in the peace negotiations, their roles as key actors (as former rebels or opposition in parliament) and government administrators engaged in foreign policy issues. These categories were purposively selected based on their experience and long service in the ministries departments responsible for foreign policy formulations and implementations in different regimes. These often also recommended other informative people who I followed up. A detailed break down of the interviewees is provided in appendix 2. It does not disaggregate between non state actors and state actors but they are all inclusive.

90 Wengraf argues that this is the best data analysis tool for handling large amounts of data. A total of 110 questionnaires and transcripts from the in-depth interviews were analysed using Spradley’s data analysis model. For a detailed explanation of data analysis see T. Wengraf, Qualitative Research Interviewing, pp. 318-319.

91 King warns that there is a danger in working out the frequencies because one can assume that differences in frequencies automatically correspond to meaningful differences within or between transcripts, which is not necessarily the case. Consequently, whilst frequencies were calculated, additional explanations were provided to justify them and their limitations in the analysis of the data see N. King, "Template Analysis", p. 130.

92 Purposive sampling furthermore provided me with the opportunity to select a high quality of key informants. Identification of other respondents by key informants is called snowballing. Miles and Huberman provide tips on how to select key informants, see M. Miles and M. Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis, (Beverly Hills CA: Sage Publications 1994) and R. Kumar, E. Babie and J. Mouton also provides in-depth analysis of snowballing and how it should be selectively used, see R. Kumar, Research Methodology: A Step by step Beginner's Guide (London: Sage Publications, 2005)
Research Ethics

Because the study dealt with particularly relevant but very complex security matters, the interviewees viewed the research as an evaluation of Uganda’s security related concerns and were a little cautious to participate. I emphasised that the study was for purely academic purposes and that it was not in any way affecting state security.” To this effect, I assured those interviewees who preferred anonymity that their information was going to be treated with the confidentiality they deserved. Those that did not want to be recorded were provided with a questionnaire on which to fill in their responses, while the discussions were hand written. I assured them that it was important that a Ugandan wrote about issues on Uganda’s foreign policy. For ethical purposes, the views that these informants provided have not been attributed to them by name; where their views must appear, titles and numbers have been assigned to them.

Problems Encountered

Research in security matters sometimes is misconstrued as an exclusive preserve of the military, the police or other security organs. A considerable amount of red tape was involved in obtaining permission to carry out interviews. The clearances of the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology came in handy and, together with the district criteria of clearance, ADCs often made the work easier by endorsing the relevant letters and providing transport and guides to enable me locate the district personnel selected for interview.

I recorded and transcribed the information, which I would make available to the informants on request. Because many respondents refused to be recorded, some of the information was lost in the discussions and interviews. A few informants were optimistic that I would include their views in my thesis because they hoped that foreigners who read the thesis would know the truth (particularly of the challenges of the peace processes in the GLR states)! I did acknowledge their views and promised to present them as best as I could. I cautioned them, though, that since their information was not recorded I had no way of proving my claims; they

The Practice of Social Research p. 167.
accepted this, but nonetheless remained curious to know how their views would be made available to the world if I did not include them.

I solved the problem of recording in three ways: I took as many notes as possible during the interviews, which I later reconstructed and reviewed against the contact summary sheets. Secondly, I carried out follow-up interviews in which respondents would kindly allow me to revisit certain issues. Thirdly, some of the informants who declined to be recorded were given questionnaires to fill in and the discussions were written out with the help of research assistants as rapporteurs.

Chapter Outline

The thesis as a whole consists of nine chapters. The first chapter, the current one, has given a general background of intervention in the international system. It has briefly discussed the interpretations that have been advanced to explain interventions in general and in Africa more particularly, and it has laid out the theoretical framework drawn on by this study as well as the research methodology. A theoretical literature review in Chapter Two is followed by a review of literature on African interventions and Uganda's interventions in the third chapter. In the Chapter Four presents a history of Uganda starting with the colonial regime up to the current government. It highlights the role of the army in the national security framework as well as the external threats faced by the state. Chapters Five to Eight analyse Uganda's interventions from a theoretical perspective, using four main theories in its analytical framework In the concluding chapter, the general findings of the study are discussed.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERVENTION

2.0 Introduction

This chapter explores four dominant theoretical approaches that explain intervention by one state in another one's territory. The traditional theories of Realism and Liberalism, which have dominated the study of international relations and in world politics, are discussed alongside the more recent theories of Constructivism and Poliheurism, which gained wide use in the 1990s. In this chapter, all four theories are discussed with the intention of developing a framework that can be used later to examine Uganda's interventions in the GLR and particularly its intervention in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC during 1986-2006. This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the central tenets and limitations of the theories are discussed. The second section is a discussion of how they will be used as a framework to explain Uganda's interventions in the GLR. The main conclusion drawn by this discussion is that all these theories need to be used to complement each other's theoretical flaws and limitations when explaining Uganda's interventions.

2.1 Realism

Realism has been the dominant theory in the analysis of international relations between states, as well as in understanding state behaviour. Similarly, in the realm of international politics, Realism has had supremacy over other theories for a long time. Starting with Morgenthau who tried to develop a comprehensive theory of power politics on realist principles of human nature and the role of ethics in foreign policy, Realism slowly gained ground in its use in the analysis of foreign policy. Essentially, the theory takes cognizance of the central role that states play in the international system and holds that, because the world is anarchic, states have to ensure that they maximize their security from attacks that would otherwise have compromised their position and security at both the domestic and international level. The theory also acknowledges that states have an insatiable desire to dominate others, and that morality and reason are...
subordinate virtues in politics and mere instruments for attaining and justifying power." Realism comes in many variants and new dimensions of it include, among others, the neorealist, neoclassical, defensive and offensive realists. A discussion of all these variants is not possible; however, one variant, the Security Dilemma theory, will be examined. This particular theory has been used to explain inter-state and violent ethnic conflict to study why states intervene in others and to understand why in some cases states cannot cooperate to secure themselves.

The Security Dilemma

The Security Dilemma theory is a branch of the Realist school that focuses on the precarious situation states find themselves in when they try to establish security within their own borders, and in the process prompt other states to do so as well. The Security Dilemma theory was initially used by Butterfield and Herz to describe a situation where a state is uncertain about the intentions of another state's actions in world politics! Butterfield describes a security dilemma as follows:

\[
\text{[the uncertainty that decision makers fox in trying to determine rails other' intentions... fear that you have of the other party but you cannot enter S other man's counter fear, or eon. understand, and that you mint nothing fan him sate guarantees for jair own safety; and it is never possible for you to realise or remember fluty that site he cannot see S inside of your mind he am never have the same assurances of your intentions that you haze..."}
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Similarly, Hem used the Security Dilemma as a basic framework to illustrate the history of international relations, by arguing that it was a key factor in these. His basic argument was a psychological one, namely that, if an individual fears that other individuals may be seeking his destruction, it would create a need for self-defence, which in turn would make others feel insecure! Herz extended this sense of insecurity of the individual to groups, subjecting these to a similar analysis! The Security Dilemma analysis has since been expanded to explain how

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"Ibid.
98 Ibid, p. 18.
the efforts of states to secure themselves make it impossible for them to draw accurate inferences about other states' intentions. This results in a cycle of suspicion, which could in turn lead to war! Furthermore, the theory posits that, because the international system is anarchic and security is scarce, states try to secure themselves by maximizing their relative advantage over other states."

Posen and Roe have employed the Security Dilemma theory to explain a historiography of intra-state ethnic conflicts and their resurgence in the post-Cold War era. More recently, scholars like Jervis, Rose, Glaser, Van Evera, Kaufmann, Booth and Wheeler have variously used it to account for major wars, inter-state conflictual relations and increasing insecurity in the world. As a result, the theory has gained wide use as a framework of analysis in the areas of security, strategic and international studies. It has been used as an analytical tool to explain the two world wars, military interventions and inter-state relations in regions like East Asia and the Gulf (see Moller’”), in Israel (see Romirowsky103) and in Asian relations between China and the US (see Siddall).

The Security Dilemma theory has three central tenets: the inability to distinguish offence from defence, the superiority of offence over defence action, and the window of vulnerability and opportunity." The first tenet, i.e. the inability to distinguish offence from defence, presupposes that the military preparations of one state will create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether the preparations are for offensive purposes only (to enhance its security) or whether they are for offensive purposes106 When, for example, state A arms itself, it becomes


apparent to the neighbour or adversary state B that this may be in preparation for a war or another sort of engagement. In fact, state B is not sure whether this arming is being done for defensive or offensive purposes or whether the first state's increase in its military capability may just be routine." Most actions by states to protect themselves simultaneously have a menacing effect on others! The drive for security produces aggressive actions if the other state either has a strong sense of insecurity or feels menaced by the very presence of the other, stronger state." The relative insecurity of states, in other words, is caused by a general feeling of uncertainty about the course of events in each other's states and a lack of capacity to control them, all of which produces a pervasive sense of fear."

The inability to distinguish offence from defence may be a result of states' failure to evaluate each other's incremental increases in military capabilities due to inaccurate evaluations or misperceptions of states' actions due to misinformation." This misinformation is in turn attributed to the role played by interest groups (such as non-state actors, individuals and, sometimes, international non-government organisations) in escalating security dilemmas: these may have an ulterior motive of benefiting from the security seeking states that procure military equipment to improve their capabilities." Glaser further argues that,

*Interests groups that would benefit fan large Averments A military capabilities and/or expansion am often A control of US state's policy; dry then advance self-serving arguments that exaggerate the state's insecurity and the benefits*

Such misinformation is perhaps responsible for the misperception that Jervis and Wheeler describe. They argue that states find it difficult to draw inferences about other states' intentions based on their military posture and capabilities. As a result, a cycle of mutual suspicion is set in motion, which Jervis calls the spiral! This spiral model emerges from the simultaneous increase in the (usually military) capabilities of states. This escalates confrontation to higher and

110 R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p. 64.
higher levels of hostility and, if states feel that their own security is threatened, they may be compelled to intervene in other states that they believe to be compromising their security with the express aim of protecting themselves."

The second tenet, the superiority of offensive over defensive action, is a salient aspect of the Security Dilemma theory." In terms of this, states that choose the offensive, if they wish to survive, may engage in pre-emptive wars against their adversaries." Van Even expounds this tenet further by saying that, when conquest seems easy, the 'more aggressive' state may attempt to control the 'less aggressive' state!' In reaction, however, the less aggressive' state will resist the expansions of the strong, aggressive state more fiercely." This often results in an even more intense security dilemma and in the likelihood of war because five additional causal phenomena are implicit in this situation. He enumerates these as follows: (1) states adopt fair accomplished diplomatic tactics in their political relations; (2) there is much blame shifting because it is not clear which state is responsible for violent clashes in intense security dilemmas; (3) states negotiate less and so fewer agreements can be reached in attempting to resolve a conflict; (4) alliances among ethnic groups in collapsing states tend to form more often, and they become even tighter and unconditional, which makes ethnic civil war more likely; and, (5) states husband information that may suggest offensive capabilities and motives, including their grievances, demands, and political military plans." These additional causal factors are key to defining the security dilemma in states or in inter-state or inter-ethnic state behaviour and form the basis of analysis of a conflict when classifying it as a security dilemma. In a security dilemma as Howard observes, the capacity to deter one's adversary by having available the capacity to inflict on him inescapable and unacceptable damage in return is paramount!

R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p.63.
112 Ibid.
118 The term 'less aggressive state' is used here to refer to states that may not be necessarily weak but, given the prevailing situation, are unable to project a strong military posture. These situations may be intrastate wars, ethnic violence within their states, or civil wars and other problems.
122 Ibid. If Van Evera's steps are critically analysed vis-a-vis the GLR conflict, it is very clear that a security dilemma existed in the region to warrant interventions and counter interventions. More significant is the formation of alliances between ethnic groups. Within the GLR region, there are ethnic groups that created alliances to either resist the wrath of others or to attack them.
The Security Dilemma theory highlights geography and technology as the two characteristics determining the superiority of offence over defence in inter-state, intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic conflicts. The theory posits that political geography will frequently create an 'offence-dominant world' when empires collapse.' From the ruins of the empire will emerge groups that have greater offensive capability because they will effectively surround some or all of the other groups, thereby prompting / forcing the vulnerable groups to seek offensive strategies to contain the offensive from the much stronger group.' In a grimmer situation, Posen holds that

*Where one territorially concentrated group has 'islands' of sediment of its members distributed across the nominal territory of another group, the protection if these islands in the action can seem: extremely difficult These islands may not be able to help one another; they may be submit to blockade and siege, and by virtue of their numbers Maive to *S surrounding population and brain? of topography, they may be militarily indefensible. Thus the Mahon of the strand& group may an to Mine that only rapid *size military action can*

Posen highlights that in such situations as the above, if one side has an advantage that will not be present later, and if security can be achieved by offensive military action, then leaders will be more inclined to attack during this 'window of opportunity' when the defendant is indefensible." In this study, one further aspect of analysis is added to the ethnic dimension of the security dilemma, and that is the 'spill over effect' (which the Security Dilemma theory does not take into consideration) of ethnic conflict, which in turn sets off the spiral of insecurity (in the words of Jervis). As one ethnic group garners support to fight for its state, it sparks off similar struggles elsewhere in the region, and in an effort to stop these conflicts, states create insecurity for each other and a security dilemma emerges. By extrapolating from this example, this study examines how the geo-politics of the GLR represent a security dilemma and how the foreign policy behaviour of the states in this area, and particularly intervention, can be explained by using similar dimensions.

The geo-political location of states in a security dilemma is important, if the offence-defence aspect of the security dilemma is to make sense. States, whose geographic character provides

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123 Ibid, p. 108.
24 Ibid.
them with security, will take advantage of this location to engage in offensive wars. Likewise, states that lack preclusive defence capabilities because of their geographical location are likely to carry out defensive wars to protect themselves. Alternatively, if states that lack preclusive defence capabilities have weak and war-riddled states as their neighbours, they will still be compelled to intervene in these neighbouring states to defend themselves from the spill-over effects of the neighbouring states' wars and conflicts." Romirowsky argues from a military perspective that if a country lacking territorial depth is attacked, it must quickly transfer the battleground to the enemy's land for a better strategic advantage! What this confirms is that the geographical location of states plays an instrumental role in heightening a security dilemma, which in turn often leads to more wars and military engagements across the world.

Another factor that determines the superiority of offence over defence is the level of technology. The Security Dilemma theory posits that states tend to increase their military capability in a bid to improve their level of security. This they do by acquiring better military equipment, increasing military personnel, and ensuring that they maintain a strong force! The result of this increase in military resources in order to defend themselves is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they gain both too much and too little: too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression, but too little because other states that now feel threatened, while on the other they also increase their own arms and so reduce the relative security of the first state." The arms build-up thus expands into an arms race, as states compete for better and more advanced military hardware, which may deteriorate into a standoff between the competing states. The arms race results in the proliferation of sophisticated weapons, which not only increase the destructiveness of war when it does break out, but also compels states to become increasingly involved in each others' affairs because they believe they have the means to do so." Krause adds another dimension to the technological factors that influence the...
nature of perceptions regarding the intentions of states, which include the nature of military
training that troops undertake and the identity of the trainer. If the trainer is a superpower,
then the neighbouring states will be more alert as to the intentions of such training; similarly, if
there is a massive transfer of training at various levels within the army, this too is cautiously
analysed.

Krause observes that the states that receive such military training and weapons develop a
`technological fetish' for expensive, unnecessary, or unusable weapons that diverts resources
from more productive uses, which is a situation that is not peculiar to the GTR states." The
arms race turns intervention into an end result, because states feel strong enough to engage
with each other in war, even when there is no outright cause or misunderstanding between
states to warrant this." Krause continues by arguing that the actions of strong states that
engage in military posturing that resembles that of aggressors, cannot easily be understood by
other states. The latter may be uncertain whether the strong states are preparing for something
more sinister, so they assume the worst and equip themselves in preparation for any
eventuality. This is best described in Jervis's citation of Grey as follows:

\[
\text{In case in armaments that are intended in each nation to pa} \text{r consciousness of strength, and a}
\text{sense of security does not produce strength of nations and a sense of fear. Fear lets suspicion, distrust, and evil imaginings of}
\text{all sorts, until each government feels it sued be criminal and a betrayal of its own country cannot}
\text{take every incaution, while government regards any precaution of every other government as}
\]

Further, Waltz argues that, because states are always sensitive to the changing relations of
power among them, they are forced to project themselves in a way that suggests strength." He
argues, for example, that Japan is made uneasy by the current steady growth of China's military
budget and that this is leading to a prevailing sense of instability in the region." A similar case

\[\text{See A. Waltz, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide, pp. 30-39 and}
\text{I. Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, p. 81.}\]
\[\text{Jervis argues that a war may break out between states as a result of issues of little intrinsic value, such as just}
\text{because the states feel they are strong and can engage each other. See It Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in}
\text{International Politics, p.58.}\]
\[\text{Ibid, p. 65.}\]
of instability arose in the Gulf region because of the general arms build-up among states and the collapse of Iraq in the late 1990s, which was the main military threat in the region. The other states responded by increasing their own strength to fill the gap left by the collapse of Iraq. As each state endeavoured to increase its military capability, however, the imbalance and insecurity between the regional states increased too. Likewise, America's increase in its military presence in Eastern Asia makes China perceive it to mean that America wants to maintain its strategic hegemony in the region, to which China is opposed. The US's increase in arms sales to Taiwan, for example, has been one of the factors that have kept China on its toes. Equally so, when China tries to improve its human and military capability, the US sees China as a potential threat. What would offset such a situation, argues Jervis, would be either to clearly distinguish offensive weapons from defensive ones or to suggest that states cooperate with one another by sharing information as to why they are arming themselves. It is implicit from this discussion, that accusations regarding the proliferation of arms, the use of such arms and their generally increased capability are salient in determining the existence and extent of a security dilemma between states or ethnic groups.

The third tenet of the Security Dilemma theory is the window of vulnerability and opportunity. It has been argued that states that wish to initiate offensive military actions, but that fear outside opposition may move quickly if they become aware of such intentions, may try to choose a moment to act when international organizations and great powers are preoccupied with other problems. They thus take the advantage and strike while the opponent is weak and unable to access resources or military aid from allies, or at a time when the international community or international organizations are too busy and preoccupied to attend to them. When this happens, the offensive gains an advantage over the defensive, because the latter is caught off-guard. Such a scenario will most often result in war.

The application of the Security Dilemma theory to explain inter-state security challenges has become more prominent and most important; it has also gained wider use in the analysis of

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139 K. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", p.32.


pp. 110-111.
ethnic conflicts in world politics. It has been argued by many scholars (the most outstanding of
whom are Barry Posen and Paul Roe), that many ethnic conflicts are a result of ethnic groups
mobilising based on the misperception that the societal requirements of other rival ethnic
groups will threaten their own identity. These misperceptions on either side will feed into war-
cauising situations. Sometimes ethnic groups are very strong and threaten states in which they
are or have the potential to operate from neighbouring states; this poses a threat to their own
state, which puts them in a precarious situation. Kaufmann argues that,

\[
\text{am be approximated if ethnic groups *limey challenge the government's legitimacy and control Goer its territory. If anarchy tracks the point where the government cannot control its lerrtry effectively enough to protect its nee, Chile ethnic-based organizations am, then the ethnic organisations hue enough jibe attributes of sovereignty to create a security dilemma.}
\]

The security dilemma caused by the intra-state ethnic conflicts (examined by Roe and Posen) in
both the Hungarian and the Romanian struggles for sovereignty over Transylvania since the
1950s to date, and the conflict between the Croats and Serbs in the 1990s, are instructive here.

In this study, the Security Dilemma theory will be applied to the interventions in the GLR, is
used because it can be used to explain a wider range of situations, particularly in regions like the
GLR that have complex security situations. Firstly, it has prescriptive richness. For example, it
posits that states with a geographic disadvantage are likely to intervene in their neighbours' states to protect themselves. Secondly, when hostile regimes come into power, nearby states are
forced to intervene because such neighbours are harder to defend against. Thirdly, it
acknowledges that states' abilities to improve their military capabilities compel others to do the
same, which inadvertently results in an arms race and ultimately in an outbreak of war.
Although the Security Dilemma theory does not strongly account for the economic
motivations of interventions, it does acknowledge that greedy states can easily create a security
dilemma and subsequently instigate war because of their greed. The other limitation of the

\[146\] Glaser acknowledges that motives that go beyond security, like greed, often exacerbate the security dilemma and often lead to war. See C. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited", in World Politics, pp. 171-201 and It
Security Dilemma framework is that it does not acknowledge that morality is important in international relations, which makes the framework flawed; if it were used to complement other theories, especially Constructivism, though, this limitation would be easy to address.

The Security Dilemma is salient in analyzing interventions in the GLR because it can be abstracted to explain the security dilemma in dysfunctional or socio-politically weak states that lack effective government structures and institutions. The GLR comprises such states that are often ridden with ethnic conflicts and intra-state instability. Such states' conflicts and poor governance has created a spill over effect of their conflicts, affected neighbouring states and escalated the levels of regional insecurity. As a result the states have increased their military capabilities to contain spill over effects of their neighbours' insecurity. In some cases, states have advertently or inadvertently been used by dissidents of other states as launch pads for their guerrilla warfare. As a result, bilateral relations between states have broken down and mistrust and misperceptions of each other have characterized states' relations. Politics of regional patronage have also emerged in which one state supports the dissidents of another as a pawn to use should the states whose dissidents it assist choose to sponsor the dissidents of the other. Dissidents become the main currency through which insecurity is traded between states further aggravating the region's insecurity. Similarly, states start amassing arms and ammunitions as well as other military equipment sparking of a spiral of arms acquisition by other states consequently a security dilemma emerges.


Samuel Barlon argues that classical realist theory and Constructivism approaches to the study of international relations are not implacably opposed and that we cannot understand ideals without reference to power nor can we understand power without reference to ideals. He proposes that Realism and Constructivism be fused so that a novel international relations perspective emerges. See S. Barkin, "Realist Constructivism and Realist Constructivism" in The Forum (2003), p. 349. Similarly, Patrick T. Jackson and Daniel Nexon argue that Constructivism and Realism should be merged particularly because, as they argue, what actors do in international relations, the interests they hold and the structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions. See P. Jackson and D. Nexon, "Constructivist Realism or Realist Constructivism?" in International Studies Review, No 6 (2004), p. 338.

2.2 Liberalism

The second theory that has gained wider use in explaining interventionist behaviour is Liberalism. Liberalism has been propounded by Teson as an alternative framework within which to analyse state interventions in world politics in the post-Cold War era. There are two divergent liberal perspectives that explain motivations for interventions: Political Liberalism and Economic or Utilitarian liberal. Central to the Political Liberal perspective is the argument that interventions are motivated by the desire to remove 'illegitimate dictatorial governments' from a legitimate state. According to Teson, an illegitimate government is one that abuses the rights of its citizens, fails to control the state, encourages conflict, and is generally dictatorial. Continued prevalence of such conditions makes a state illegitimate and therefore susceptible to replacement or intervention from other democratic states. Adopting the political philosophy of Kant, Teson and Doyle describe an illegitimate state as one characterised by human rights abuses that are so egregious as to violate the *jus cogens* norms of international law. They prescribe that such a state (the illegal state) does not require the right to be free from foreign intervention because it is not only failing to respect the rights of its citizens but is most likely unable to respect the political independence of other states. In their argument in favour of intervention, he contends that:

> the ultimate justification of the existence of states is the protection and enforcement of the natural rights of the citizens, a government that engages in substantial violations of human rights betrays the purpose for which it exists and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy, but its international legitimacy as well. Consequently, foreign armies are morally justified to help thins of tyranny, provided that the intervention is proportionate to the evil which it is designed to suppress... intervention k’s learnt actually or ideally by the victims.

Teson further prescribes that when a government has collapsed and is spiralling into a state of anarchy, or when a democratic regime has been violently and illegally overthrown against the
will of its populace, other states must intervene unilaterally to ensure that they safeguard democracy." Likewise, intervention should be undertaken if it is to remedy egregious cases of human rights violations, such as genocide, enslavement, or mass murder, or to put an end to oppression." He explicitly points out that in cases where the intervention is aimed at safeguarding democracy, the intervenors must respect and uphold the rights of the citizens. The intervention, he points out, must be tailored as narrowly as possible to be an action against the 'illegitimate' government and not its people." Of course, as he observes, an intervention that targets an illegitimate government may unavoidably affect the innocent citizens too. In such a case, the Doctrine on Double Effect has to be evoked.' This doctrine presupposes that if there was no specific intent to kill bystanders but they die by accident in an action, such an intervention is legitimate and the deaths are excusable.

This Political Liberal perspective was used in various studies to justify interventions in the African context, although the focus was more on international law and its concerns about intervention. Lewitt's examples of intervention in the post-Cold War era in Africa would fit the Teson and Doyle model candidate states that qualified for intervention. See the matrix overleaf, in which four of the interventions (that is Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea Bissau (1998) and the DRC (1998)) were undertaken against illegitimate governments. They were aimed at removing dictatorial regimes, which were committing gross abuses of human rights.

155 F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: 
151 F. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law, p. 62.
151 Ibid, p. 63.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervener</th>
<th>Year of intervention</th>
<th>State intervened in</th>
<th>Length of intervention</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ECOMOG     | 1990                 | Liberia             | 8 years                | • Request of a government  
• No pre-intervention consent obtained  
• Was not empowered by Mutual Assistance in Defence (MAD)  
• Based on customary international law  
• For humanitarian reasons |
| Uganda     | 1990                 | Rwanda              | 5 years                | • On invitation of non-state actors (illegitimate) rebels then  
• No prior permission obtained at regional or international level  
• For humanitarian reasons (Customary international law)  
• Regional initiative (but no specific protocol used)  
• At the invitation of the warring groups |
| Uganda     | 1993                 | Burundi             | 12 years               | • For humanitarian reasons (Customary international law)  
• Regional initiative (but no specific protocol used)  
• At the invitation of the warring groups |
| Uganda     | 1995                 | Liberia             | 2 years                | • Part of the UN Peace Keeping force |
| Uganda     | 1996                 | DRC                 | 6 years                | • Civilian population was ambivalent about the rebellion  
• Violated the Article 2(4) of the UN charter  
• Intervened on invitation of Kabila (a rebel leader) |
| MISAB      | 1997                 | CAR                 | 9 months               | • International Mediation committee (MISAB) established to restore order  
• Customary international law followed because MISAB was not mandated by UNSC  
• Request from President Patasse  
• UNSC adopted Resolution 1125 authorised MISAB |
| ECOMOG     | 1997                 | Sierra Leone        | 2 Years                | • Request of an overthrown legitimate government  
• Issued an economic blockade against Sierra Leone  
• Mandated intervention by ECOWAS  
• Mandated intervention by UN |
| Nigeria    | 1997                 | Sierra Leone        | 3 Years                | • Sent forces on request of fallen President Kabbah  
• SOFA between the two states permitted intervention  
• Used ECOWAS revised treaty of 1993 Article 58  
• A bilateral military assistance rendered to an allied nation  
• Norm of customary international law  
• On invitation of the leader  
• General trend in the region |
| Angola     | 1997                 | Congo (Brazzaville) | 5 months               | • On invitation of the leader  
• General trend in the region |

158 UNSC adopted Resolution 1125, which authorised MISAB to take enforcement action to restore security and freedom of movement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SADC   | 1998 | Lesotho | 1 month  | Requested to intervene  
SADC organ and protocol on politics, defence and Security obligated the intervention |
| SADC   | 1998 | DRC    | Period   | Requested to intervene  
SADC organ and protocol on politics, defence and Security obligated the intervention |
| Senegal| 1998 | Guinea-Bissau | 6 months | Intervention at the request of President Vieira  
Intervention based on bilateral defence pacts |
| Guinea | 1998 | Guinea-Bissau | 6 months | Intervention at the request of President Vieira  
Intervention based on bilateral defence pacts  
Under international law  
Pro-democratic right to intervention |
| ECOMOG | 1998 | Guinea Bissau | 6 months | Intervention on request  
Interventional was unilaterally carried out  
UN endorsed the ECOMOG role  
ECOWAS revised treaty of 1993 |
| Angola | 1998 | DRC    | 2 years  | Under international law  
Intervention on invitation of Kabila (a rebel leader) |
| Zimbabwe| 1998 | DRC    | 7 months | SADC is given organ and protocol on politics, defence and Security  
Intervened at the invitation of Kabila (a rebel leader) |
| Chad   | 1998 | DRC    | 7 months | International law  
Intervened at the invitation of Kabila (a rebel leader) |
| Rwanda | 1998 | DRC    | 7 years  | Civilian population was ambivalent about the rebellion  
Violated Article 2(4) of the UN charter  
Intervened at the invitation of Kabila (a rebel leader) |
| Burundi| 1998 | DRC    | 7 years  | Civilian population was ambivalent about the rebellion  
Violated Article 2(4) of the UN charter  
Intervened on invitation of Kabila (a rebel leader) |
| Namibia| 1998 | DRC    | 7 months | SADC was requested to intervene |

199 International law permits states to lend military assistance upon request from the head of state or other authorized agent of a de jure government. States have a pro-democratic right to intervention, which may fall outside the scope of humanitarian intervention.

200 The UN Charter allows for regional organizations to engage in mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, and security, and in 1998 ECOMOG was permitted to intervene in Guinea Bissau.

201 SADC is permitted to provide aid to a member country in case of a military attack. The SADC organ and the protocol on Politics, Defence and Security obligated the intervention.
One criticism levelled against Political Liberalism perspective is that it is not clear who decides that a government is illegitimate. Of course states' compliance to international conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other international conventions on specific aspects of life would be used to measure if a state is legitimate or non-compliant. However, this too is an insufficient measure, because measuring compliance also would be dependent on many other factors, which seem uniform in the international perspective but for some African states may not be the best measure. For example, Teson argues that foreigners have the right to pass judgements about a state's illegitimacy only if there is proof of human rights violations; and yet, he seems to contradict himself by insisting that the illegitimacy of the targeted regime is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the validity of intervention! The only legal hurdle to an intervention in such circumstances is that, regardless of the conditions prevailing in a state (genocide is the exception here), intervention is prohibited because it contravenes International Law. This is also stipulated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which states that:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

Clearly, intervention in another state to remove an illegal government is prohibited, even if the clause to intervene to defend nationals is evoked! This clause would be inappropriate because the nationals being defended must have either requested the intervention (i.e. assistance from the intervener) or they must be of similar nationality as the intervener, in which case the intervention would be interpreted as a mission to save a 'a people in danger!' The 1976 Israeli invasion of Uganda to save Israelites who had been hijacked by Palestinians is instructive here! According to Teson, illegitimate states often prevent interventions against their governments, by arguing that such interventions are not warranted and by in fact embarking on counter interventions on the grounds that they have an 'inherent right' to defend themselves, which is

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164 Ibid, p. 507.
recognised by the customary law of anticipatory self-defence. Perhaps this is why interventions in Africa have often been perceived as illegal, because the illegitimate states are able to evoke international law to defend themselves against such interventions." The other concern that could also be raised to argue against Teson's prescriptions is that in a region such as Africa, where states characteristically have a poor record of handling intrastate conflicts, no strong tradition of handling opposition, and, above all, are authoritarian", what right would a state have to intervene in another without examining its own domestic affairs? Besides, in the case of the GLR, where the various states' politics are extricably tied to each other, it becomes impossible to justify interventions: this is because what happens in one state is often a result of the actions of non-state actors that inhibit proximate states. In such a case, it would be impossible to apportion blame. In spite of its limitations, Neo-liberalism provides a good comparative theoretical framework because it has been advanced to explain the resurgence of intervention in international politics of the post-Cold War era, especially in the Kosovo case of 1990s and now the Iraq case of 2003. In the study it will be used to examine the extent to which Ugandan's claim that it intervened to remove illegitimate governments from its neighbouring states can be qualified as a comprehensive explanation of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy.

The other criticism that Political Liberalism has faced comes from its sister theory, the Utilitarian Liberal position, which positions intervention within the framework of wars over economic resources, which are prevalent internationally. For the Utilitarian Liberals, as well as for their counterparts, the International Political Economists, intervention is synonymous with exploitation of the resources of the intervenee. Their view is that, no matter what the intensity of the humanitarian situation is, states will intervene with the express aim of benefiting from the resources of the intervenee during and after the conflict period with the ultimate aim of developing the intervenor's power and economy! Gilpin argues that a state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further changes are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits! In other words,
states tend to intervene in others because they have gained more power in a region and because they want to use this to extend their control over the region economically and politically.

The ultimate aim of states that intervene in others is to become a region's hegemonic power. Gilpin argues that political power is synonymous with economic power and superior economic competitiveness is accompanied by superior military power. In short, states intervene in others' affairs to enhance and protect their own economic interests or to pursue economic opportunities that the target state offers. Gilpin later revises his position in a later book, arguing that national security and prestige play an equal and frequently an even greater role in motivating the behaviour of national governments. He also observes that the concept of national interest is not limited to individuals who happen to be in power at a particular moment, but that it is based on the interests of those in power and the citizens of a particular state. In short, if states intervene, it is not only to protect their own economic interests but also national interests, such as national security.

The most important empirical contributions to this utilitarian liberal debate in Africa is Gibb's "business conflict model" in which he demonstrates how Belgium, the US and Sweden intervened to gain access to the wealth of the DRC, using the justification that they were restoring order in the new state. Interventions by the US in Latin America, in Asia and in the Arab world have also been attributed to economic interests. For example, Gelb and Betts argue that the US intervention in Vietnam was the predictable outcome of an American drive to secure control over the economic resources of the non-communist world with the ultimate aim of preserving its own position in the world. Similarly, the post-Cold War interventions in Afghanistan (1998), Iraq (1991 and 2003), and the DRC (19978-2003) are collectively being attributed to economic factors and regarded as efforts by intervenors to wield more power in these regions. For Calhoun and Rieff, economic interests, whether real or potential, motivated

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the US intervention in Iraq. Rieff demonstrates empirically (from the research he conducted in Iraq) how the US stationed troops only to protect the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, even when there were other ministries nearby that needed protection too."

Whereas the Utilitarian perspective is attractive for explaining interventions, its main limitation is its inability to explain interventions that have no obvious economic value, particularly in states riddled by violent warfare, genocide or extreme levels of civilian disobedience; such cases include Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Haiti. Secondly, the theory does not differentiate between state interventions that are driven by economic interests and interventions by non-state actors which are also driven by economic interests. A good example of such a difference is the US intervention in Iraq (state intervention) in comparison to a non state actor intervention such as the Cotecna Company Oil-for-food Scandal project intervention in Iraq." Another is the case of the Zaire-Congo, where Gibbs using his business conflict model, demonstrated how unilateral and multilateral interventions in the Congo clearly showed that the intervenors were acting out to protect personal and family business interests. Similarly, the families of some US leaders and that of the Swedish UN General Secretary (for example, Dag Hammarskjold had had conflicting interests in the Congo (specifically in the area of Katanga) that prompted their interventions, although these were simply categorised as state interests. In the GLR, however, the utilitarian perspective on interventions has often been used to describe the regions interventions. Consequently, it is necessary to review this theory and establish the extent to which it could adequately explain Uganda's interventionist policy. The main reason for the inclusion of the Utilitarian perspective is that unlike other perspectives, it benefits from much statistical and quantitative evidence that is used to bolster its use. This reduces the problems that methodological limitations would pose for the method, when it is compared with other theoretical frameworks.


In The Cotecna Company intervention in Iraq to alleviate food scarcity became controversial because it was portrayed as a company that had ulterior economic interests. The company had Kofi Kojo (the former UN Secretary General) as one of its proprietors. For a detailed expose on the case, see "Kofi, Kojo and a lot of shredded documents" in The Economist 2 April 2005.
Both Political Liberalism and the Utilitarian Liberal theory have been used extensively in the literature that has covered interventions in Africa during the post-Cold War era (which will be discussed in the following chapter). In this study, thus, these two theories are used in comparison with the constructivist, poliheuristic and realist theories (in the latter case specifically the Security Dilemma theory), which have not thus far been given sufficient importance in the analysis of Uganda’s interventions in the GLR. However, emphasis has been put on the Utilitarian Liberal perspective because it has featured prominently in the GLR interventions explanations. In the following sections, the constructivist and poliheuristic theories are discussed as possible alternative theories that are salient in explaining the foreign policy behaviours of states.

2.3 Constructivism

Constructivism is a framework that has relevance to the analysis of interventions particularly in the post-Cold War era. Constructivism focuses on how identity, norms and culture influence state behaviour within international politics. Having entered the realm of International Relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s following the changes that were beginning to occur in the international system, and the challenges faced by Realism and Liberalism in trying to explain these changes. Constructivism has gained ground in the analysis of international relations following its development by scholars like Onuf, Wendt and Katzenstein whose works have come to constitute Constructivism as an international relations analytical tool! Constructivism was originally confined to the US but has since become viewed even by Europeans as an important framework for understanding international relations and its practice! To date there are three outstanding books that provide an in-depth analysis of Constructivism and its importance to the field of foreign policy and international politics: Onuf's book, World of Rule-Orientated Constructivism in the Making, and his follow-up article "The Politics of Constructivism", Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics and Katzenstein's edited The


Culture of National Security are the key books on Constructivism. More recently, the edited works of Kubalkova’s *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World* and Fierke and Jorgensen's *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, all provide more grounding on Constructivism. Central to all these books is the argument that Constructivism provides a useful framework of analysis of international relations, although it is not a theory in itself.”

Constructivism has come to be associated with an approach that identifies a causal relationship between ideas and material relations.” Constructivism like Realism posits that states are the principal units of analysis of international politics. The difference between the two is that Realism is opposed to the salience of identities, or norms in differing state actions in international politics, whereas Constructivism is not. Constructivists focus on how norms, culture and identity influence national security matters, as well as how ideas change identities of states and thus their interests and policies.” Norms, they argue, constitute the collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity, which can either define identities (in which case they are "constitutive") or prescribe behaviours for already constituted identities (in which they are "regulative"). The norms establish acceptable behaviour, and who the actors are expected to be in a particular environment. Anything done outside the expected norm is considered a breach of the norm, and anything done in accordance with the norm is upheld.

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181 P. Katzenstein and his group’s Constructivism and style have come to be associated with the “new security studies” branch of international relations. For a commentary on Katzenstein’s “Constructivism” see V. Kubalkova, "Foreign Policy and International Politics, and Constructivism", p. 3.

182 A critical review of all these books is not possible at this time but they are crucial to an understanding of Constructivism and its role in world politics, because they all focus on key items, including but not limited to language, culture, state behaviour and how world politics is structured.

183 See Jorgensen’s critique of Constructivism, in K. E. Jorgensen, "Four Levels and a Discipline", in Fierke, K. M. and Jorgensen, K. E., *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, pp. 36-53.

184 K. M Fierke, "Critical Methodology and Constructivism", p. 121.

185 The exception here is Barry Posen who uses "identity" as an aspect of his analysis of the security dilemma framework. He uses it exclusively to refer to ethnic security dilemmas but does note that even when states face a security dilemma, their identities are important too. See B. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict". See also Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, p. 201.


Identity, which is a salient feature of Constructivism, refers to a "mutually constructed and evolving image of self and other", or to "the images of individuality and distinctiveness ... held and projected by an actor and formed ... through relations with significant others". States project or identify themselves in a distinct way and construct roles that they presume give them special responsibilities in the international system. States believe that their actions (as prescribed by their identity) are publicly understood standards for action that help to address a particular situation, such as conflict management in a generally agreed upon way. In this respect, actors bring meaning to their identities, practices and interactions, which emerge into and create a culture. States will thus try to adhere to this culture and learn to behave in a way or in ways that are mutually acceptable to each other.

Constructivism and Intervention

The main claim of constructivists is that the security environment is cultural and institutional, rather than material. A cultural environment is a product of human beings' relations with their material environment. As human beings interact with the material environment, they create a material culture and a non-material culture. While the material culture is tangible, the non-material culture manifests in ideas, beliefs and philosophies, as well as in a culture of security.

There are two levels of constructivist analysis: the domestic and the international. At the domestic level, they argue that states' responses to certain situations depend on the ideas and identities that characterise these states. For example, some states perceive themselves to be responsible for the security of others, while other states believe that they have a social role to ensure that they cooperate with other states to make the world secure.

25 Ibid.
At the international level, with the development of International Humanitarian Law RILL states are expected to abide by certain rules and regulations set out by JELL to protect humanity. States thus become conscious of humanitarian concerns and of how the political environment affects humanity, and are consequently forced to intervene for humanitarian reasons." This new responsibility to protect humanity accounts for many interventions in the post-Cold War era, and constructivists attribute such states' behaviour to extra-national factors like the structure and expectations of the international system as well as the status of particular states in international society." They argue that the social nature of international politics creates a normative understanding among actors that they should behave in a certain way at particular times." This normative understanding about social roles or rules assigned to people or actors, place limits on the range of actions that are available to them. For example, rules could include how far states can go in terms of intervention, but are not necessarily limited to this example.' In general, constructivists argue that states may only intervene in the business of other states if they are compelled by an accepted norm of intervention, such as a humanitarian disaster, in which many lives would be saved as a result of the intervention. Drawing on Construaivism, Barnett observes, as follows,

> State sovereignty limits state responsibility. Yet state sovereignty is not a fixed category. It is a changing set of practices and obligations. States are nested in a web of international institutions that place legal and normative limits on their actions and impose various obligations. The practices

It is true that, over time, states have constructed rules among themselves about why and when intervention should take place. It is also true that there is a consensus amongst constructivists that, by virtue of states belonging to the UN, interventions motivated by humanitarian concerns are well-founded because they are supposed to bring relief to people afflicted in emergencies,

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such as genocides, intense warfare or natural disasters. What is not clear, though, is why states do not adhere to the rules and regulations set out by the international law on intervention."

Another question is who decides on the norms amongst states to act in certain ways? These questions simply indicate that Constructivism is good in theory but weak in practice, because it is not explicit on how norms emerge amongst states. If they are accepted norms, why is it that some states are able to take up challenges to intervene and others do not? One major characteristic of the constructivist perspective on international obligations, for example, is that some states seem to have more responsibility by virtue of their position on the international stage. For example, the US is often expected by all other states in the world to play a central role in any conflict in the world, and to be more noble and altruistic than any other state.

Constructivists take cognizance of the role of power and economic interests in explaining intervention and the fact that sometimes intervenors' interests change during the course of their interventions. However, they also hold that power and economic interests are immaterial, especially in interventions where humanitarian emergencies like genocides or gross abuses of human rights occur. Drawing on the US intervention in Somalia (1991-1992), they argue that this intervention had no geo-strategic or geo-economic advantage and, in fact, that the US used colossal sums of money to intervene.

The constructivists dismiss the realist claim that attributes motivations for interventions to the anarchic nature of the world, which increases spirals of hostility among states and results in war. On the contrary, they argue that states behave in a particular way, because of their own social practices, which reproduce egoistic and militaristic mind-sets. In relation to intervention, therefore, states will intervene in situations where they perceive themselves to have an obligation to intervene because the social structure of the international system expects them to do so. Constructivism provides a good orientating framework in terms of which states' foreign policy

5 States often evoke the customary international law to justify interventions when international law does not permit them. States assume that because it is noble to save people in genocide then they are justified to intervene in states that try to commit genocide on their citizens.

20 M. Barnett tried to apportion blame in respect to the genocide in Rwanda and argues that the US had a significant role to play, yet it too had its own limitations following the disastrous attempt to manage the conflict in Somalia, see M. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, p. 172.

21 For a detailed expose on constructivists see M. Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" pp. 153-161.

behaviour can be analysed, especially considering that it pays attention to important factors that are often neglected in international relations, such as identity, culture and religion, all of which are indeed salient in foreign policy behaviour." In spite of this, it should be noted that Constructivism has inherent limitations, which compromise its application. Firstly, it would require interdisciplinary methods, which would be complicated, particularly in the field of security studies. Secondly, the constructivist definition of culture is very inflexible, which complicates its analysis. As observed by Seegers and Farrel, studies of culture often lack intellectual rigour and discipline,” which compromises the nature of information collected in a study and how it is analysed. This however does not compromise its usefulness for analysing state behaviour, as these methodological limitations could be dealt with by a careful triangulation of research methods.

2.4 Poliheurism

A theory that has received little attention in the analysis of international politics is Poliheurism, also known as the Psychological Reductionist School. This school attributes foreign policy behaviour and decision making to the particular nature of the leaders of a state. Poliheurism is a new theory in the realm of analysing foreign policy decision-making, which is slightly older than a decade but is already making its mark as a respected theory. Founded by Alex Mintz, the theory addresses the dynamics of decision making in foreign policy and builds on the works during the 1960s and 1970s of Allison Graham”, Hilsman210, and Robert Jervis” predicating foreign policy responses of 1976.” Poliheurism has emerged at a time when foreign decision-

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In this study Constructivism has been described as a theory, but note that much as it provides a good foundation for theories of international relations, it is not a theory per se. See K.E. Jorgensen for a detailed genealogical survey of Constructivism and why it is not considered a theory, in K. M. Fierke and K. E. Jorgensen, "Introduction" in Fierke, K and K.E. Jorgensen, Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, (London: M.E Sharpe, 2001) p. 7.


R. Jervis, Perceptions

making analysis has become an important subfield of international relations and an explanatory framework in national foreign policy behaviour." The theory has been applied to many real world foreign policy situations in which the decisions taken by leaders and key actors in the international system are analysed. The poliheuristic theory, which is contained in an edited book by Mintz, is used to examine renowned poliheuristic foreign policy decisions in international conflicts in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Kosovo (1991) and the ongoing conflicts in Pakistan, Iraq and Israel."

Poliheurism has followed the earlier theoretical perspectives, like the rational choice perspective', which has been used in game-theoretic analysis and the cybernetic decision perspective.216 Cybernetic decision-making attempts to answer the how of foreign policy making while the rational choice theory explains the why of foreign policy decision making. Poliheurism addresses both the how and why by examining how leaders, groups or the elite in a given state make particular foreign policy decisions." As Redd observes,

"Poliheurism has been in existence for a very short while but has made significant strides towards bridging the gap between cognitive psychology and rational choice approaches to the study of foreign policy decision making."

Poliheurism has focused specifically on the role that leaders play as units within the decision-making structures of states. As Liu argues, national leaders are assigned a special role within states to make decisions that translate national interests into discrete objectives, such as power, prestige, wealth, territory and the like. Leaders' decisions are extremely important and, as expected by the state, they have to evaluate different policy alternatives, and behave rationally by

213 Ibid.
211 See Mintz A., (ed), Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003), Chapters 2-5. In these the theory has been empirically tested with results that provide strong support for the theory's relevance in an analysis of international relations and state behaviour.

214 V. Danilovic propounds that in rational choice, decision makers make choices between alternatives with the goal to maximise their preferences. Their choices become rational if their preferences are connected and transitive. See V. Danilovic, "The Rational-Cognitive Debate and Poliheuristic Theory", in Mintz, A. (ed), Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003), p. 128.

216 Ibid., provides an in-depth analysis of the Cybernetic theory. In brief, he argues that decision making within the Cybernetic framework is compromised because decision makers do not consider all alternatives and all possible outcomes due to cognitive computational limitations, environmental uncertainty and incomplete information. See X. Liu, "The Poliheuristic Theory of Decision and the Cybernetic Theory of Decision: A Comparative Examination", p. 142.

218 Ibid.
selecting policy options that will maximise their success in achieving their goals." This theory thus concentrates on leaders and accounts for the ways in which make decisions in foreign policy. The school thus attributes states' foreign policies in general to big men's idiosyncrasies, regardless of whether a policy is good or bad.'

Poliheurism has three central tenets. Firstly, the theory posits that the foreign policy decision-making process follows a non-compensatory two-stage approach, in which the initial stage of foreign policy decision making, cognitive and political factors are particularly important.' Danilovic in explaining poliheurism argues that policy makers usually employ multiple heuristics (cognitive shortcuts, which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions and used by political leader to measure success and failure, costs and benefits, gains and losses, and risks and rewards using political units."

Secondly, the process is guided more by the rules of maximising the utility of the final choice.' At this stage, decision makers switch their decision making procedures to the selection of alternatives, to ensure that they do not compromise the outcome of their actions.' Two key aspects of the two-stage decision-making process emerge from this theory: Firstly, decision makers ensure that the decisions they make or the alternatives they choose, do not compromise their welfare nor hurt their individual as well as state political interests and plans. Secondly, decision making is a group process, and not necessarily a one man process. The key decision maker (leader) thus consults a group that provides him with an in-depth review of the alternatives to enable him to choose the best alternative. A group may comprise the president,

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223 Ibid.


prime ministers, other foreign policy actors, and the president's confidants.' Inherent in such
groups is the fact that members of the 'decision-making group' (like the US President's inner
circle) become central to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. They help the
president to define the nature of the problem and present appropriate options and strategies for
discussion in the complex foreign policy arena. Such dependency of presidents on groups or
specific personalities to advise them on the best policy option in specific circumstances is based
on the assumption - whether true or idealistic - that these advisors have done sufficient
background work to be fully informed about the policies and options they propose." Preston
calls this group-based approach to decision making the "broad-based information gathering
network". This may be done at a formal or informal level. Irrespective of whether it is
informal or formal, the underlying notion of this group's decision-making process is that the
subsequent actions of the state depend on the importance the leader attaches to this group and
the trust placed in their abilities.

The second tenet of Poliheurism holds that decision making in foreign policy is often
multidimensional and non-compensatory.' Mintz argues that decision makers eliminate
alternatives that are below the 'cut off' level on the domestic political dimension, and do not
make tradeoffs across multiple dimensions to compensate for a low score on the domestic
political dimension.225. In other words, if an alternative is good but has inherent limitations, the
decision makers will not only consider the good part of the alternative and choose a matching
positive alternative from another option. Instead, decisions will be made with the ultimate output

226 T. Preston, The President and his Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs,
222 The term "Inner Circle" is used by Preston and Garrison to describe a President's Privy Council or selected
confidants on whom he depends when making decisions and formulating policies. For an extensive discussion of
the role of presidents' groups in decision making, see T. Preston, The President and his Inner Circle: Leadership
Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs and J. Garrison, "Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner
Circle: The President, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda" in Political Psychology, Vol 22
224 The limitation of such reliance on a group to do all the ground work required in a decision making process is that
sometimes the group of "advisers or technocrats" may not do a proper analysis, which in turn affects the outcome
of the decision taken. This has been demonstrated by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003: US troops invaded Iraq on
the grounds that Iraq had nuclear weapons and yet in reality it did not.
229 See T. Preston for a thorough analysis of the decision-making channels of the US leaders. He demonstrates how
each leader arrived at a set of actions that were taken by the US government. See particularly Eisenhower's
intervention in Dien Bien Phu. Preston presupposes that some leaders make decisions after utilizing the group to
collect a wide variety of information regarding the plausibility or feasibility of the action and the likely consequences
of an action they hope to take (pp. 83-96).
236 A. Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making", in Journal of
level that best matches the interest of the leader or his group. For example, if the decision to intervene in a conflict is likely to 'benefit' the intervenor in terms of economic resources but may result in people dying during the military deployments and warfare in the intervene state, the intervenor will not necessarily decide against the intervention because of its potential impact on the populace. He is more likely to authorise the intervention, with the consequences being borne by the actors in the conflict, provided the decision made is likely ultimately to benefit the decision maker.

The third tenet of Poliheurism takes cognizance of the fact that several factors affect the foreign decision-making process. The first factor points to the varied way in which decision makers may present issues in areas about which they must make choices, which may affect the decision especially when determining the best alternatives. The second factor that plays an important role in the decision making itself, in managing tasks and in reaching a final decision are the cognitive characteristics of the national decision makers. Lastly, they also observe that the manner in which decision makers cognitively define and represent situations about which they must make choices leading to national action has important implications for how the same decision makers process information, how they perceive alternative options, how they apply decision strategies, and how they make final choices! It is implicit from this discussion of poliheurist theory that decision-making in foreign policy is a salient aspect of foreign policy that requires a thorough analysis into the leaders. It seems to provide good empirical outcomes if properly utilised. The only limitation that can be discerned from this discussion of the theory is that it requires good data or documentation that is relevant. Yet within the realm of international relations access to documents is sometimes limited especially depending on the laws of the state where such research would be conducted. The available alternatives to such limited access to documentation would be to rely especially on interviews and newspaper material, which equally often have their own biases.

162 Cognitive characteristics include computational skill and the holistic information processing capacity required for rational decision making, so leaders engage in a selective/non-holistic information processing when handling complicated, multifaceted international crises: they lack the computational skill and the holistic information processing capacity required for rational decision making so they engage in a selective/non-holistic information processing when handling complicated, multifaceted international crises.

Politeurism and Intervention

Poliheurism provides a useful framework for analysis on how decisions to intervene in states are made and if these decisions are important as a motivation for the intervention process. This study draws on poliheurism to examine the cognitive factors that influenced Uganda's foreign policy decision-making leaders to pursue an interventionist foreign policy in the region. Poliheurism has been used to analyse the US interventions and what emerged from the studies is that leaders and their groups are very central to the US interventions in states and in influencing the nature of foreign policy that US undertook at particular times. A good example of an intervention that was based on group decision-making is the US foreign policy decision to intervene in the "Bay of Pigs". Scholars argue that there was group pressure to obtain a consensus and refusal to accommodate dissenting views.' This interaction made it impossible for President Kennedy to make sound judgements as to whether it was worthwhile to intervene or not.' If a President considers it a good option and his group "advisers" are positive about it, then the leader will easily commit the army to war. Note, though, that sometimes leaders have a strong view which they impose on their informal group. The action then taken is identified with this group when, in fact, it was the leader's personal preference.

Redd emphasises further that, when leaders make foreign policy decisions, they will measure gains and losses, costs and benefits, risks and rewards, success and failure in terms of the political consequences to their leadership. In other words, leaders are concerned with their level of support, challenges to their leadership, and prospects of their political survival, which in turn affects their foreign policy choices in situations of crisis or in an anarchic international system.'

Another dimension that is close to Mintz's poliheuristic theory is that decision makers will sometimes intervene in other states in order to divert their populaces' attention from internal...
weaknesses and unpopular polices.' Such diversionary military interventions, which are compelled by failing domestic politics, often manifest in three ways. Firstly, presidents will use force to boost their popularity at both the domestic and international levels. Secondly, they will intervene in other states to divert public attention from internally prevailing poor economic conditions. Thirdly, presidents will intervene in conflicts with the ulterior motive of bolstering their public approval rating in an impending election. Baker, for example, cites the 1998 film *Wag the Dog* where a fictional president manufactured a military conflict with a minor state to divert the public's attention from a sex scandal. Baker further notes that interventions are exclusively done by powerful countries and most commonly by the superpowers, although, in the post-Cold War era, even small states have started to play a major role in interventions in spite of being small, weak and, above all, authoritarian.

In the West, it is a commonly used strategy of presidents to embark on interventions that seek to bolster their public approval rating in elections or that seek to divert attention away from bad internal policies. This is because the populace's level of political participation in the West is high and their opinions are important. A case in point is the 2006 Congressional elections in the US in which the Republicans lost to the Democrats because the populace did not perceive the US intervention in Iraq by the George Bush administration in a positive light.

Events in Africa and other parts of the Third World paint a very different picture. States will intervene in others states' internal affairs without fearing that their interventions will make them unpopular or that they will lose elections to the opposition. Particularly in Africa, ruling governments will undertake unpopular interventions without fear because they do not depend on

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24 Though a proponent of this diversionary theory, Baker is the only one who disputes the fact that the attack on Iraq (2003) was designed to bolster the president's popularity or to divert the attention from a lacklustre economic recovery to which many scholars have pointed. See, for example, D. Rieff, *At the Point of the Gum Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention*, p. 218 who succinctly demonstrates that the US intervention in Iraq was economically motivated and aimed at helping Bush gain popularity, which he had lost because of his poor economic policies.

25 W. D. Baker, "The Dog that won't Wag: Presidential Use of Force and the diversionary theory of war".

26 S. Ruken has argued that in the US, contrary to the expectations, domestic political constraints have become less important, and that the individual decision maker has emerged as the pre-eminent determinant of American interventionist behaviour. See S. Ruken, "A Theory of American Intervention Decisions", Ph.D. (University of California, Los Angeles, 2003).
the populace to stay in power. The only limitation of the diversionary school, whose proponents are De Rouen, Baker, Korwa and Ajulu (2002) and Pickering and Kisangani (2002), is that it seems to concentrate on major powers, which undertake interventions to divert their populace's attention from unpopular or bad policies. It is necessary to establish if leaders of African states also intervene in other states in order to distract their populace from unfair domestic policies. The Poliheuristic framework is relevant for analysing African interventions because, while interventions are obviously linked to security, the role of the leader and the influence of domestic politics in interventions are important variables to examine. In this study, the proximate causes of Uganda's interventions are discussed against the poliheuristic framework.

The Poliheuristic school is most relevant in analysing the foreign policies of African states post-independence and in situations where the formulation and implementation of such policies are an exclusive preserve of the president. The only limitation of this school is that it assumes that leaders will carry out a cost-benefit analysis of their actions, and that they will discard those policies that are likely to count against them politically or require considerable financial input, yet the opposite is true in Africa. In most cases, African foreign policies reflect the interests of the president. The school further presupposes that presidents are accountable to their citizens, yet they often do not communicate with their populace and may not even feel obliged to account for their foreign policies, because they can remain in power even if the populace is disgruntled. In Africa, it is also implicit that even when citizens use legitimate channels to protest against their leaders' actions or demand accountability from their leaders, they often do not obtain what they want because their presidents do not feel obliged to explain their actions. Therefore, if interventions are undertaken, they are publicized as part of the broader foreign policies of the state when they actually represent exclusively the interests of the president and his confidants.

A second weakness of the poliheuristic theory is that, while it proposes that states will refrain from actions that are not likely to benefit them, the reality is that this does not always stop them.
The US intervention in Somalia and NATO's intervention in Kosovo are very good cases in point. Although these interventions were allegedly compelled by reports of suffering people and intolerable human conditions, decisions to intervene were clearly going to cost colossal sums of money and manpower. According to the poliheuristic theory, alternatives that may have a negative political effect or that drain economic resources are discarded first and the remaining alternatives are evaluated based on rational calculations. Clearly, this was not relevant in these two cases. It is also questionable whether leaders do in fact carry out such effective or detailed planning with regard to interventions in other states as the poliheuristic theory proposes. If effective planning does occur, then the interventions should have produced better results. Unfortunately, they do not. This weakness notwithstanding, the poliheuristic approach does provide good insight into the role played by leaders in their states' foreign policies, and specifically with regard to interventions.

The main criticism of Poliheurism is that it assumes that decision are made by means of an organized process in which detailed discussions are held and decisions are arrived at in the interest of the state. Other than De Renouen's analysis of the US decision in the Dien Phu case and Allison Graham's analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where US decision-making process was carefully studied, attempts to conduct a similar analysis on other cases, especially in Africa, would be very difficult. Poliheurism has a methodological limitation. Poliheurism's use as a theory nonetheless provides a unique understanding of the poliheuristic decision-making model's ability to account not only for simply situations but also for cognitively demanding and complicated foreign policy decisions that are made in critical areas of world politics. These areas, argues Mintz, include world trade, multilateral aid decisions, global environmental issues, armament and disarmament programs, counter terrorism or the use of force and war and peace decisions.

74 Ibid.
2.5 CONCLUSION: A COMPARISON OF THE FOUR THEORIES

In this chapter, I have discussed the theoretical antecedents to this study and their relevance. The theories discussed in this chapter seem to have one inherent problem that is common to them all, i.e. they all have methodological limitations of varying degrees. Although these are not insurmountable, the use of each as an isolated framework of analysis would not yield the desired results and therefore all of them need to be included to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the case study.

Of the four theories, the poliheuristic theory has the most limitations when used to explain African state's interventions: it is likely to yield only partial results because there is limited documentation available and even if documentation does exist, access to it is likely to be limited. As will be discussed in Chapter Seven when Poliheurism is used in a theoretical case study that examines decision making as a process of foreign policy formulation, it would be unable to yield very good results because it is not yet fully developed. Yet it cannot be completely ignored because the motivations and chokes that prompt leaders to make particular decisions, be it at the domestic or the international level do play a central role in African politics.

In the case of Uganda, the decision-making process is an exclusive preserve of the High Command and the decisions are tacitly made. Evidence of the decisions made is often reflected in presidential speeches, which provides a good basis for analysing the role of leaders in foreign policy behaviour even though it is not sufficient for a detailed analysis: after all, it is possible that a president may be projecting his state policies in a way that is acceptable to people, although it is actually doing the converse. Of course, leaders' decision-making processes are important in determining the foreign policy behaviour of states, particularly in Africa, but the problem with this theory is that it is difficult to find sufficient relevant material to support its position, especially in Africa where decisions are made tactily in secret. An analysis to establish if the leaders have used their cognitive skills to arrive at decisions to intervene in another state or whether they used the non-compensatory pay-off in selecting a specific foreign policy action often requires information that is classified and, even if it is available, may be difficult to find.

The constructivists provide a good explanation of intervention and, unlike the utilitarian liberal position or the Security Dilemma for that matter, Constructivism can explain interventions in states that are not necessarily endowed with economic wealth as well as in states that do not necessarily pose security problems for the intervenor. The weakness of the constructivist approach is only in relation to its methodology. How can norms be measured and on what basis would a norm be regarded as being embraced by all states, especially when some states cannot take up similar responsibility to intervene in states. How can norms be differentiated from the ulterior motives of an individual?

The utilitarian approach does not have any of the problems that Poliheurism and Constructivism present. It is a strong approach and has the advantage that statistical data can be used to defend its position. The only limitation of the theory is that the data provided could be used selectively to augment preconceived positions regarding state foreign behaviour. Data demonstrating economic benefits that accrue from a specific intervention would greatly depend on who collected them and for what purpose. This would require an indepth analysis and an appreciation of the context in which such data was collected, which in turn would influence the evaluation of the theory and its effectiveness in explaining an intervention that is motivated by economic interests. In this study, it is pointed out that the utilitarian approach has been used extensively to account for Uganda's interventionist foreign policy. This study furthermore reviews the position of the theory in confirming or denying what motivated Uganda in its intervention and in establishing whether it indeed developed because of its interventionist foreign policy in its western neighbours.

The Security Dilemma theory overcomes some of the above limitations of all the other theories. It is able to account for interventions that are not necessarily aimed at economic interests, as well as interventions aimed at stopping humanitarian disasters in neighbouring states. It can thus account for the many varied types of interventions that exist. The only drawback of the Security Dilemma theory is empirical. It is problematic to prove foreign policy actions that are shrouded in secrecy and particularly ones that are covertly carried out. Other than data released by the relevant actors, it it difficult, if not impossible, to find data in security matters that are primarily a classified area of international relations. The theory thus relies on speeches and oral accounts of the periodic interventions, which are sometimes impossible to corroborate. Nevertheless, they do provide a starting point for inquiry and they can be used in conjunction with the other theories to explain interventions.
In conclusion, in order to arrive at a comprehensive explanation of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, this study will be using an eclectic approach. The study will examine the theories that best explain the motivations of Uganda's intervention in the GLR from 1996 to 2006. In table 2 overleaf, a summary of the theoretical positions is done.

In the next chapter, the existing literature on Uganda's foreign policy behaviour is discussed with a view to providing a favourable grounding on which the theories will be analysed. This is followed by a chapter on the study methodology and a chapter on Uganda itself. Thereafter, the empirical part of the study that draws on the four theories discussed in this chapter is organised in four chapters, with each chapter discussing the aspects of the intervention that relate to a specific theory.
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<td>States are the main actors in the intervention</td>
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CHAPTER THREE
AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS A LITERATURE SURVEY

3.0 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, a review is done of some of the literature on intervention and Uganda's foreign interventions in the GLR. The chapter discusses the major scholarly contributions to the intervention debate and how these contributions have influenced the way in which Uganda's interventions have been interpreted. By examining studies that have covered several interventions in Africa, the chapter attempts to work out the theoretical and empirical importance of these studies to Uganda's interventions. The central aim of this chapter is to identify, from the wide spectrum of literature available, those theories that can provide a comprehensive explanation of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in its neighbouring states of Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda.

The chapter is divided into three sections: the first section examines general works on the topic of intervention, and the second section looks critically at the literature dealing with Uganda's interventions in particular. The last part is a more general theoretical discussion of the literature, creating a framework for the subsequent chapters on Uganda's interventionist foreign policy.

3.1 AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS: AN OVERVIEW

Interventions have been a common feature of African international relations and African politics. There has been enormous coverage of specific events in Africa. Most prominent of which have been the US intervention in Somalia (1991), genocide in Rwanda (1994), events in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1996, current crises in Darfur and Somalia and what has come to be termed popularly "Africa's First World War", or Africa's deadliest conflict since World War Two, in the DRC.250 From the North to the South, from the West to the Horn of Africa and to the GLR, every government has intervened in another country, either covertly or overtly.251 A

250 literature on intervention in Africa is now replete with several accounts of the DRC war, which has been termed "Africa's First World War", having claimed up to 600,000 lives, based on Amnesty International statistics.
251 C Clapham, "Ethiopia and Eritrea. Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn" in Purley, O. and Roy, M. (eds), African Interventionist States (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), p. 119 argues that in the Horn of Africa alone, all governments except for Djibouti have been deeply engaged in the affairs of their neighbours.
proliferation of literature seeks to explain African interventions that have characterised the post-Cold War era. In particular, the literature addresses intervention as a general trend and examines whether they have in fact solved problems of African states or worsened the situation. Three main collective works have addressed interventionism in Africa with specific case studies covering the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The works focus on theoretical debates that have been specifically framed to suit the African interventionist context, which provides a good basis on which intervention in Africa can be understood.

3.2 PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION

*African Interventionist States*, edited by Oliver and May, is the first book of its kind to explore the willingness of African states to use military means to effect changes in neighbouring states and the challenges involved in doing so. It provides a useful background to intervention in Africa. It points out that the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978 with the aim of overthrowing the government in power set a precedent for African states' interventions in other states. The book covers mainly the causes of intervention, and critiques the legal framework in which they were undertaken. It provides classifications of interventions that are arguably peculiar to Africa although, if further critically analysed, they are akin to the classifications that Schraeder and others have provided in their explanation of the US interventionist foreign policy in the Third World!

Furley and May give a three-fold classification of interventions. The first classification covers *regime supportive interventions* that provide military assistance to a threatened regime! The second category, *regime opposing interventions*, seek to overthrow and destabilise a government in power. Lastly, *state supportive interventions* are undertaken to ensure that a state survives in the face of severe internal disruptions or external aggression." These classifications are important in identifying the nature of intervention although when it comes down to it, whether the intervention is regime supportive or state supportive, the motives will not differ significantly. The major difference between interventions would therefore be whether the intervention

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254 Ibid, p. 2
undertaken is voluntary or solicited, whether it has been undertaken within the framework of the UN Charter, and whether it conforms to international law. There is a consensus amongst the authors that the motives of African interventionist states are common to all intervening states. In their analysis, six main factors emerge. The first common motive, which is given great significance, is the economic interests of the intervenors. Of the countless interventions carried out by African states it could be safely argued that at least 60% of these could be considered resource wars. The most significant examples indicated in the book are the DRC, Angola, Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo. These four examples are analysed in depth, and it is found that they were primarily about the control of wealth, as the military engagements were implicitly centred on mining areas or on areas with economic significance."

The second factor that emerged as a central feature of African interventions is the region’s specific geo-politics. The political upheavals in regions of Africa were greatly catalyzed by the geographic terrain that provided suitable habitat for insurgencies. The book covers the geo-political location of states, which, on the one hand, provide offensive advantages to rebel groups, which forces neighbouring states to intervene to stop such insurgency. On the other hand, porous borders allow spill over effects of civil war and violent conflict, which also force states to intervene to control or contain the threat." The location of natural resources in specific geographic zones is also highlighted as instrumental in causing interventions. Far-reaching empirical research by international non-governmental organisations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and International Crisis Group (ICG) are instructive in this context.

The third factor is that leaders whose revolutionary/guerrilla warfare succeeded were compelled to intervene in other states in support of their fellow guerrilla groups or opposition groups, which they felt needed to be freed from the subjugation of government." For example, Clapham refers to the success of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF) and uses its assistance of the Eritrean People's Liberation Force (EPLF) and of rebels


256 See M. McNulty, "From Intervened to Intervenor: Rwanda and Military Intervention in Zaire/DRC, p. 174.

in Djibouti, in Yemeni territory, as examples of how the success of the EPDRF’s struggle influenced other countries and encouraged intervention. Mel Mc Nulty singled out the success of Uganda’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) as a key factor in that country’s interventions in other conflicts, with Uganda’s Museveni as the "key adviser". Museveni after a successful war provided support to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPCA) of Sudan. Rwanda’s Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) support to Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), Rally for a Democratic Congo-Goma (RCD-Goma) and its alleged support to People’s Redemption Army (PRA) of Uganda has also been attributed to its success in gaining power from the late President Habyarimana of Rwanda. All these cases are instructive here.

The fourth factor that has been advanced by the book as a central feature of African interventions is the hegemonic ambition that leaders in the region have, which compels them to intervene in the hope of gaining political power and influence in the region. However, Clapham observes in the Horn of Africa cases that not all interventions are the result of such hegemonic motivations. He points out that the interventionist states have inherent problems of their own that are not compatible with regional hegemony for example, they are all impoverished, their borders are insecure, and they have internal divisions that not only make the leaders and their states insecure. Hegemony, as highlighted by Susan Strange, requires several key structures, i.e. a knowledge structure, a financial structure, a security structure, and a production structure. A regional hegemonic power, in other words, needs to have the power to shape the frameworks within which states relate to each other; hegemonic states must thus have the power to decide things and be able to take responsibility on behalf of others which African states are not capable of doing.

259 The National Resistance Movement was the administrative wing of the National Resistance Army that waged a guerilla warfare that saw President Yoweri Museveni come to power in 1986.
261 success of the NRA was in turn followed by its assistance to the RPF, AFDL, Rally for a Democratic Congo (RCD)-Kisangani, MLC and other mushrooming groups in the DRC, although much later in the crisis in the DRC.
262 C. Clapham,"Ethiopia and Eritrea Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn", pp. 119-138
264 makes a similar observation to that of Strange. He argues elsewhere that African states are so weak that the leaders of these states are preoccupied with legitimising themselves in power and monopolizing the state, and so their conduct of foreign relations is aimed at strengthening their domestic legitimacy more than becoming regional hegemonies. Clapham provides a detailed examination of the foreign policies of various postcolonial states; see C. Clapham, Africa and the International -systems, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 57-59.
The fifth factor of African states' interventions in each other's states is that they have primarily been a result of the decline in the capacity of the UN to manage or resolve the conflicts. This can be seen, for example, in Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and, more prominently, Rwanda. The failure of the UN has in turn forced African governments to intervene in other's affairs to solve their own problems. In addition, powers like America and France and the international community, have also not only failed but have become loathe to interfere in these conflicts. The concept of "African solutions for African problems" has become synonymous with intervention. Closely related to the new role played by African states with regard to solving their own problems, is the interplay between international politics and regional politics, and its influence on interventions.

The last factor that has motivated interventions in some states is the ideological factor. Using Sudan as an example of this, Woodward argues that Sudanese interventions in its neighbouring states were driven by its interest in spreading Islam, particularly after Hassan al Turabi came to power. Al Turabi felt that Sudan had an obligation to ensure that Muslims were linked together in what he conceived as the "Commonwealth of Muslims; dar al-Islam". As a result, he supported the liberation struggle of the Eritrean EPLF and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) financially and militarily. Woodward's discussion demonstrates how Uganda becomes a victim of the interventionist foreign policy of Sudan and how much the groups supported and sponsored by the Sudanese army affected Uganda. It would have been interesting to compare and contrast the ideological struggle between the Anglo-Saxon and Francophone states with the debate around the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, but this is done elsewhere by Otunu, Wallis and Clark. Three of them in their own studies argue that the interventions in the GLR such as France's intervention in Rwanda and Uganda's intervention initially in Rwanda and later in the DRC were indirectly a struggle for influence and power in the

266 Ibid, p. 7.
267 Ibid.
268 N. McQueen indicates how the cold war influenced developments in Angola a situation that continued and has now characterised the politics of Angola. See N. McQueen, "Angola, pp. 93-117.
269 P. Woodward, "Sudan" pp. 139-152.
region between the Francophone and the Anglo-Saxon states. More specifically, the interventions were perceived as an Anglo-American plot to control the entire GLR. The main contradiction in this argument is its failure to notice that there was a general disengagement from African affairs by the Anglo-Americans. In fact, the genocide in Rwanda, the current stalemate in Somalia, and the crisis in Darfur are all evidence of this disengagement. If strengthening their influence in the region had been the Anglo-American strategy, then their ways of achieving this strategy were perhaps not well conceived.

Furley and May's book provides a very interesting perspective on the motivations of intervention, and although they do not provide a theoretical analysis to explain what motivates states to intervene in others, their case studies provide a useful template on which subsequent comparative analysis of states' interventions can be based. Although the book provides a very informative basis on which one can understand the politics behind the interventions in the region, and the legal framework and legal implications of the interventions', its focus on Uganda's intervention is to say the least wanting. Its coverage of the Ugandan case consists mainly of occasional references to Uganda's role in the rise of Rwandan Tutsi nationalism. Uganda is portrayed as a victim of the Tanzania intervention and as a victim of the Rwandan political crisis of 1959.

3.3 ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION

The African Stakes of the Congo War, edited by John Clark, is an excellent survey of one particularly significant case of intervention, the DRC case. The interventions in the DRC by the states that intervened are presented as inextricably intertwined with each other; for example, to understand Uganda's intervention in the DRC, it is also important to understand the Rwandan intervention in the DRC. Similarly, to understand Rwanda's intervention in the DRC, it is crucial to understand Uganda's and Angola's intervention in the DRC. Despite these complexities, the book provides a good basis from which other interventions in Africa in general can be studied.

Clark's thorough review of the DRC conflict in which nine African states intervened militarily, has analysed the interventions by states at multiple levels. It focuses on the level of states, on the

level of non-state actors and, above all, on the level of international organisations. The authors collectively posit that the motives behind the interventions in the region were convoluted. Not significantly different from Furley and May’s *African Interventionist States*, the authors in this book also attribute interventions to strategic economic interests, hegemonic ambitions, humanitarian concerns, ideological considerations and the geopolitical locations of the respective states. All maintain that the international environment is significant in shaping the nature of states’ foreign policies. For example, they suggest that states intervene because the international community is no longer focusing as much on African conflicts. In particular, they assess the UN’s performance in conflict management and argue that its failure has greatly compromised its role in managing conflict, compelling states and regional organisations to take over its role. The only differences between these two books lie in their ordering of the important factors, but this does not have a significant impact on the information provided.

The articles in the book succinctly demonstrate that, if interventions in Africa are to be understood, three theoretical explanations have to be used to explain the trend of interventions that has emerged in the region. Firstly, they highlight regime ‘trinity’ as paramount in compelling states to intervene in others, particularly in cases where states are threatened either by insurgents based in neighbouring states or by domestic threats to their regimes.”

The second theory, called the *continental trend*, is a salient explanation advanced by Crawford, which not only reflects on a single factor but combines several factors to build a single broader explanation. He combines the emergence of warlordism, economic interests in the natural resources of other states and lust for power."

The important role that leaders play in foreign policy decision-making and the individual interests they have in other states form the third theory that the book advances. The theory of foreign policy decision-making processes is not yet fully developed but Clark nonetheless...
provides a very good analysis of the decision-making character of the President of Uganda; he argues for instance:

Undemanding Uganda’s recent intervention is largely a matter of understanding the person, President Yoweri Museveni, who ordered S UPDF [Uganda People’s Defence Force] into Congo... S decision to intervene was made by the president himself; after consultation with only a few close military advisers... S decision to intervene was made by the president himself is indisputably the key to the decision making in Uganda. However, one cannot completely confident about estimating Museveni’s motivations, and even the president himself may not have been certain what they were.

Although the focus is on Uganda’s President Museveni as a single case, it does provide good parameters in terms of which other leaders’ foreign policy decision-making processes can be analysed. In this study, Clark’s theory is discussed under the heading of the poliheuristic theory, as propounded by Mintz. Drawing on Ayoob, Clark equates African leaders’ foreign policy designs with those of their European counterparts. He argues that the contemporary leaders of the developing African states were emulating their European counterparts whose main goal in the early modern period was to set up their states economically, administratively and militarily with the motive of developing themselves; he points out that one way of ensuring development was by fighting and intervening in neighbouring states. This implies that African states were also embarking on interventions to develop themselves domestically. One disadvantage of this perspective, though, is that it assumes that leaders of states act on behalf of or in the interest of the state, yet literature on state building in Africa has also indicated that, when states intervene in others, such intervention are often not entirely for the benefit of their states. The analogy between the European leaders and the African leaders is good in theory, but it must also be borne in mind that the early modern period did not have many laws and regulations prohibiting intervention, whereas the modern state is faced with international laws and protocols that regulate its capacity to intervene in other states.

With specific reference to the Ugandan intervention in the DRC, some articles in the book underscore Uganda’s desire for regime security and the strategic economic motives that

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277 See the discussion of the Poliheuristic theory in Chapter Two of this thesis.
279 J. Clark used the term regime security to refer to leaders’ interventions in other states’ politics with the express
compelled it to intervene. It does acknowledge, though, that Uganda had minimal security concerns. This is a highly contentious position. If one looks at the period 1990-1999, as the book does, then many security matters are not taken into consideration, which is why Uganda’s security interests are ranked so much lower than other factors. The book also dismisses the arguments that Uganda’s interventions were motivated by the desire to spread democracy - which is a view shared by many other scholars. Many scholars dismiss the claim that Uganda was intending to spread democracy in its neighbouring countries. They highlight Museveni’s current trend of politics, which sidelines the opposition, does not seek legal mandates from its legislature when making important decisions on both domestic and foreign policy matters, violates international law, and does not obtain mandate from the UNSC to authorise its interventions. The issue that emerges very strongly from the literature discussed thus far is that interventions in Africa are motivated by mixed interests and therefore it would be incorrect to attribute an intervention to any one causal factor.

In addition to the books discussed above, a vast range of scholarly literature has focused on specific aspects of African foreign policy and international relations. There has also been a proliferation of a diverse literature on conflicts, wars, inter-state relations, insurgency, genocides, aim of preserving themselves in power. For a detailed discussion on regime security, see J. Clark, “Introduction: Clines and Consequences of the Congo War”, pp. 1-12, and J. Clark, “Realism, Neo-realism and African International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era”, pp. 85-102. Similarly Shearer argues that Uganda wanted to preserve its own regime, see D. Shearer, “Africa’s Great War”, in Survival Vol 40, No 2 (1999), pp. 89-90.

9. Clark, “Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War”, p. 150.

and political history of the region, as well as dealing with intervention during the post-Cold War era." While some of the literature attributes interventions to political power struggles between insurgents and ruling regimes, others emphasise economic interests as the primary causal factor? They also focus on domestic aspects that create insecurity internally, and that compel neighbouring states to intervene because they pose security challenges for them. Drawing on the domestic insecurity that is often a result of ethnic conflicts, intrastate power politics, and regional power politics, they also argue that interventionist wars should be seen as a continuation of the politics of survival on the part of the intervenors, both at domestic and regional level."

Another view of interventions comes from Mamdani 286 who has produced a considerable amount of literature on ethnicity (a few others with similar sentiments include Uvin287, Lemarchand, Chretien 289 Pruner and Reyntjens291. Mamdani has sought to demonstrate

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P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development
that ethnicity is the underlying cause of the insecurity in the region and that it thus accounts for the fundamental cause of the GLR interventions. Mamdani introduced the concept of a "crisis in citizenship" as something that has characterized since the collapse of the Tutsi rule in Rwanda which was marked by the genocide of 1959. The 1959 genocide had had severe repercussions for the Tutsi in Burundi and for those who had fled to the DRC, namely the Banyamulenge, who suffered from state recrimination and discrimination, especially in Mobutu's postcolonial regime. The accounts of the discrimination against the Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda, in contrast with Tutsi refugees in other African countries of refuge initiated the growth of "Tutsi nationalism", which slowly grew into a strong force. The subsequent political and military struggle by the Tutsi to return to Rwanda had sparked off hatred of the Tutsi in the region and led to a grand plan by regional leaders to stop the growth of the Tutsi insurrection, which was spreading not only throughout Rwanda but also through Zaire and Burundi. The central argument of Mamdani in his collective works was that, to understand interventions in the region, the question of citizenship has to be carefully analysed because it is so significant in the contemporary crises in Eastern Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi.

Given this background, it is doubtful that the thesis of Hima-Tutsi empire building advanced by some scholars as a motive for Uganda's interventions in neighbouring states could be realized, given the animosity that the Tutsi in Rwanda, for example, felt for Museveni. In general, though, this literature provides a good background to the genesis of the ethnic conflicts in the region as well as an understanding of the nexus between Uganda's political development and the entire ethnic Tutsi question. Mamdani's works show how inextricably tied Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the DRC are. It is implicit from the literature that Uganda's interventions have come to be associated with President Museveni's ethnic class Hima' affinity for his close neighbours, the Tutsi?, but it is not necessarily applicable to Uganda's interventionist foreign policy.


J. P. Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa : Two Thousand Years of History, p. 343.


M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism and the Genocide in Rwanda, pp. 234-240

Furley and May use affinity to irradicate the closeness of the two ethnic categories, the Tutsi and Hirna.
It is evident therefore from the general literature on intervention in Africa and from specific case studies that interventions have multiple causes. The motivations are similar, though; the most common, according to all the scholars, is that leaders wish to ensure that they remain in power. Other motives, which are of differing relevance in various cases are hegemonic ambitions, interventions that are aimed at creating ideological spheres of influence, and situations where successful revolutionary leaders have opted to help others in their struggles to overthrow authoritarian regimes. In the next section, the literature on Ugandan's interventions is discussed with a view to examining what factors and motivations are attributed to Uganda's interventions in the region.

3.4 UGANDA'S INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICY REVIEWED

Several scholars have produced a substantial amount of literature on Uganda's interventions in the GLR region. There are innumerable journal articles, conference proceeding papers, media articles and reports, as well as edited and unedited books that have focused on the subject of Uganda's interventions. Its interventions have been criticised in the media and by organizations, both international and non-governmental, which have produced enormous research. The aspects of Uganda's foreign behaviour that has received the widest coverage have been its interventions in the DRC, followed by Rwanda and lastly Burundi.

Significant work located both within the realist and the liberal framework has attributed Uganda's interventions to economic and national security interests. Uganda's intervention in the DRC, for example, has been described as "a senseless war", or "Museveni's Vietnam". Such negative perceptions of Uganda's interventions are prevalent, and it is difficult, if not impossible to find studies that portray Uganda's military interventions in any better light. There is literature that focuses on the economic interests of the county, backed by statistical figures of how much income Uganda gained from the trade subsequent to / because of its interventions. Proponents of this view argue that Uganda intervened for economic reasons. They further argue that,

without such trade and considering that Uganda did not have the mineral resources to have earned the amount that accrued from mineral trade during and after the intervention period, Uganda would not have developed at the level it did. The most prominent of such literature are Reno's analyses of the Ugandan geo-economic and domestic politics that, he argues, were central to their interventions. Similarly, the UN Panel of Experts Report of 2001 and its Addendum of 2002 portray Uganda's intervention in the DRC as economically motivated! Note, however, that it may not necessarily be true. Lee argues, for instance, that that there was an overarching effort from the 1990's onwards to develop, which forced African states into multiple regional trade organisations. Uganda too joined all the regional trade organisations, except where the geographic limitations could not be overcome!

Interventions that were conducted to counter threats to national security, which the government advanced as the predominant motive for intervening in its neighbouring states, have received the heaviest criticism from scholars. Few scholars have argued in favour of viewing Uganda's interventions as motivated by its strategic and defence considerations." In fact, this perspective has been widely contested. It appears from some scholars' debates that they cannot comprehend why the Ugandan government expected a neighbouring state like the DRC, whose government had essentially collapsed, to secure its borders when it was evident that it did not have the capacity to do so. Furthermore, it was clear that even Uganda itself had tried and failed"! Others are critical of why Uganda had chosen to intervene in the DRC rather than in Sudan, which has had a record of an overt policy of creating insurgency in Uganda since the inception of the NRM regime in 1986. Some scholars were concerned with the depth of penetration of the Ugandan

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299 FL Campbell, "Democratization, Citizenship and Peace in the Congo, in Mwesiga, B. (ed), The Crisis in the
UPDF into the DRC, and specifically with how it controlled a sizeable amount of the Eastern Congo and particularly the mineral rich areas. Most interestingly, others argue that Uganda "reaped what it sowed" in its exportation of revolutions (evident from its helping other revolutionaries in Rwanda and Eritrea): the repercussions of doing so profoundly affected Uganda too, because other states whose insurgents had been helped by Uganda reciprocated by also sponsoring Uganda's insurgent groups?

Various authors refer to the security concerns that were used by Uganda to justify its interventions. For example, Kibasomba, Nzongola-Ntalaja, Ginyera Pincywa and Mamdani all argue very succinctly that Uganda's intervention were indeed motivated by some security concerns, relating mainly to the DRC's lack of capability to neutralise dissidents or rebels. Sabiti compares Uganda's security dilemma to that of Israel. As is the case in Israel, the fact that Uganda has large neighbours should be viewed as security vulnerability. Sabiti emphasises how the rebels have exploited the porous nature of Uganda's borders to ease their movements back and forth and to use the border areas as launch pads for military action. He enumerates the rebel groups that attacked Uganda using the DRC, but does not include those that use Rwanda and Burundi as operational grounds. Critiques of the proponents of the security argument portray Uganda as an imperialist state that had an expansionist policy of controlling the entire region using ethnic affinities such as the Hima-Tutsi 'nationalism' to build an empire for Uganda's leaders?

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A huge amount of literature attributes interventions to the West's failure to intervene in conflicts at the critical time, and to its failure to support the UNSC in its bid to stop the conflicts. The Western power that has received more than a fair share of the blame has been the US. Its reluctance to engage directly in the conflicts as well as its half-hearted contributions to the UNSC has been attributed to its experience in Somalia but mainly, to its change in policy, shifting responsibility to the African states to find solutions to their problems. The US Disengagement Policy and its development of the African Crisis Response Initiative have been projected as a shifting of responsibility to Africa? France has followed closely behind the US in being apportioned blame, particularly with regard to what happened in Rwanda. An example of this is Linda Melvem's critique of France's decision to provide political and military support when it was sure something bad was happening in Rwanda. Furthermore France's decision to delink from Africa is evidence of the change in France's foreign policy and, as Mitterrand is quoted to have said, "the time has come for Africans themselves to resolve their conflicts and organize their own security". This attitude from Mitterrand was a result of the realization that French intervention simply aggravated the conflicts in the GLR and had come under continuous attack from the international community for its role in the conflict in the region. In a quote that ridicules the French in their role in catalyzing conflict in the GLR, Prunier is quoted as follows, "France's role is like that of a person giving a bottle of brandy to an alcoholic. The drink does not cause the man's death but it contributes"?

The West is also blamed for several specific reasons: Firstly, it is blamed for having supported the authoritarian regimes that abuse the rights of their citizens and engage in kleptocratic behaviour, which provided the ingredients for insurgency and violent conflict that set in motion spirals of conflict in Africa. Secondly, the West's role in supplying military equipment to these African governments are blamed for leading to an escalation of warfare and violence, and subsequently to the increase in interventionist wars? Supplying small arms and light weapons to

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30 A. Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide, p. 204.
the region has had a profound and damaging impact on the region's security. The key scholars on this issue are Alusala and Thusi, Hartung and Mott, Hartung and Montage, Hartung, Berman and Batchelor. All of them have concluded that the insecurity in the region is the result of an indirect reciprocal relationship between Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs)."1

The third issue for which the West has been blamed is its direct or at times indirect influence on the UN, at the decision making and implementation level of its peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities. The most prominent of this literature of blame has looked at the UN role in Rwanda. Barnett and Miskel312 have demonstrated how the UNSC's habit of dragging its feet, being indecisive and getting the wrong information has resulted in the genocide in Rwanda. It can further be construed from their works that many other conflicts have received similar treatment, and that they have thus escalated and claimed lives that would otherwise have been saved, if the UN had acted promptly.

Others scholars have pointed out that the US has long condoned and even encouraged Uganda's interventionist behaviour, by providing massive transfers of military hardware and even training of its officers! In this respect, these scholars argue, Uganda was being built as a new regional

"The Problem with Foreign Military Sales Reinvention, in World Affairs, Vol 164, No 1 (2001), pp. 26-47 and P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, (Westford Kumarian Press, 1998), and works of renowned institutions such as the World Policy Research Centre (US), the International Institute of Strategic Studies (UK), Institute of Security Studies (South Africa), the Small Arms Survey (Geneva), and the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) have provided statistical data on these weapons and arms transfers that are partly responsible for the conflicts in Africa's specific regions.


mini-power by the US to champion the Africa Force. The main reason why the US chose Uganda was the nature of leadership of Museveni and because the US felt it could depend on Uganda as a 'mini power' for geopolitical and ideological considerations?" The refusal of the US to condemn Uganda's abuse of human rights as well as its undemocratic regime on the pretext that Museveni was one of the models of the new kind of leadership that was needed in Africa was a fundamental flaw in US foreign policy."

These scholars attribute the refusal of the US to reprimand Uganda to Uganda's Cold War geo-strategic importance as a US base for keeping a close eye on Sudan. Shivji thus argues that the US would not let go of Africa and would want to make sure that Africa does not subscribe to the "enemy" values propagated by Sudan."

The failure of the UN to act gave the African states a reason to intervene, and influenced the timing of their interventions. For example, Ogenga-Otunu argues that the timing of Uganda's intervention in the DRC (in fact, the same argument could apply to all the subsequent interventions, even the recent case of Somalia) was the failure of the international community to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This failure to act undermined the credibility of the international community, and thus it suffered a profound deficit of legitimacy and moral authority. This gave Uganda the opportunity to intervene before the international guilt could erode."

The analyses of Mamdani, Chretien, Clark, Ogenga-Otunu and Afoaku with regard to the intervention process and its consequences also provided an analytical perspective that is critical to foreign policy analysis. They have argued that the timings of the interventions, the nature of the decisions made and the prevailing circumstances were instrumental to Uganda's interventions. Uganda could have avoided the interventions but, given the nature of geo-politics and regional ethnic violence in the GLR, it had little choice because it is inextricably tied to all

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315 Ibid.
318 O. Ogenga, "Uganda as a Regional Actor in the Zarian War", p. 63.
the other states by virtue of sharing ethnicities across borders. The only limitation with this argument is that other states in the region, like Tanzania and Kenya, also share ethnicities with their neighbours, but even though these neighbours have conflicts and are anarchic with violent ethnic outbreaks, yet they refrain from intervening militarily.

Reviews of the literature discussed above show that there is still a need to study the motives of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, because the existing studies have mainly focused on the case of the DRC because this was the main 'military intervention'. Other studies that focus on Uganda's role in Rwanda have dealt with the intervention in light of its historical relationship with that country. Here Prunier, Gourveitch, Melvem, Wallis and Mamdani are the exception. An intervention that has not been discussed adequately is the Burundi intervention: it is not clear why, but two specific arguments can be made here. Firstly, the Burundi case has not received much attention because Uganda did not intervene militarily, and secondly, because the events in Burundi ran parallel to the violent and highly publicized DRC and Rwandan cases, Burundi was easily ignored.

Literature on decision making in foreign policy is varied and covers decision making mainly in the US and Britain, particularly because their foreign policy documents tend to be declassified, which simplifies research. As Preston and De Rouen have demonstrated, it is thus easy to conduct research into the actual decision making processes. In Africa, however, where the leaders, or elites, play a central role in foreign policy decision making, it is hard to obtain information that reveal the leaders' motivations. This is because, as many studies have established, leaders in Africa are at the centre of decision making in foreign policy, albeit not as heads of governments but most often by making these decisions at an individual level or with the help of their elite groups or family members in a very confidential way. This information is often not recorded nor declassified making it impossible to access accurate information.

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In the chapter, it has been found that a significant amount of literature concentrates on African interventions at different levels, namely at domestic, inter-state, regional and international level. There is a consensus that African interventions are motivated by national security interests, as well as by economic, hegemonic, ideological and geo-political considerations. However, the personal interests of leaders and their bid to legitimise themselves and secure their regimes are critical to understanding African interventionist foreign policies. While some scholars attribute the increased African interventions in other states to the incapability of the UN, the international community and the reluctance of powers like France and Britain to continue engaging in African conflicts, others posit that it is the nature of conflicts and nature of political structures in the region that have made intervention inevitable. Other scholars for example posit that domestic weaknesses greatly influence the nature of foreign policies that states adopt. It is evident from these views that African interventions need to be analysed because African states are increasingly intervening in others. Uganda is good case to study considering that it has emerged as a significant actor in regional politics. From the literature, it was evident that Uganda's multiple interventions in the GLR have been under theorized and the focus has been mainly on intervention in one state. While Uganda's security concerns have been underestimated and often dismissed as negligible, emphasis has been put on "you reap what you sow" or the "sorcerer's apprentices" type of explanation of the repercussions of conflict. There is need to examine the best theory that explains the motivation of Uganda's interventions in the GLR in the period 1996 to 2006.

In this study, Uganda's interventions in its Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are analysed. Based on fieldwork and on site visits to the conflict zones, the study examines the multiple interventions and their uniqueness. The study takes cognizance of the fact that a single framework approach cannot provide a comprehensive view of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy and that therefore an eclectic approach is required. Originally, I felt that a single framework approach would be sufficient and I focused on the Security Dilemma framework, but the findings from both the fieldwork and desktop research revealed that much as the Security Dilemma is the most parsimonious theory to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, there are aspects of interventions that it could not account for. This necessitated the application of other theoretical considerations to be able to have a comprehensive view of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy as a whole.
If the International Relations theories on intervention are compared with the Africanist Interventionist perspectives, it is evident that there is a common strand that runs along the two bodies of literature. Some central tenets of specific International Relations theories are implicit in the Africanist literature. The specific theory's depth of analysis of events surrounding an intervention is what varies. If critically analyzed, the tenets of Constructivism espouse the "Crisis in Citizenship" that Mahmood Mamdani advances. Furley and May who position interventions in the economic war analysis highlight the Utilitarian Liberal position. Similarly, their Realist explanation of interventions as being motivated particularly by the "spill over" effect and the "regime change" further strengthen the Security Dilemma theory that has been used in explaining ethnic conflicts and inter-state conflicts else where other than Africa. The study uses the Security Dilemma theory as an alternative interpretation of Africa's interventionist foreign behaviour. Poliheurism is akin to Clark's perspective on foreign policy decision-making process and as earlier noted in Africa, this theory of foreign policy decision-making processes is not yet fully developed. It is against this background that the study seeks to examine the most parsimonious theory that can be used to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in the following chapters.

In the next chapter, Uganda's security framework is contextualised. It covers aspects of Uganda's security structure as it evolved in the different political regimes. The empirical chapters that follow draw on the four theories i.e. Constructivism, Poliheurism, the Utilitarian Liberal perspective and the Security Dilemma to examine Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in the GLR.
CHAPTER FOUR
BACKGROUND: CONTEXTUALISING UGANDA'S SECURITY FRAMEWORK

4.0 Introduction

In this chapter, a brief history of Uganda's political development is presented. It also discusses Uganda's regional and international relations and demonstrates Uganda's geo-political importance in the region. The chapter also discusses the security structural framework, highlighting the defence structure, decision-making procedures and the financing of this structure. In the last section Uganda's regional and international interests as well as its threats are discussed, showing how these influence Uganda's foreign policy.

The purpose of the chapter is to discuss how Uganda's political, regional and international relations in specific historical periods have fed into the foreign policy decision-making process, that eventually provides a favourable background to understanding Uganda's security challenges in the region. Uganda's regional vulnerability will become clear and provide grounding for the subsequent discussion of Uganda's interventions in its neighbouring states of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. The central argument of this chapter is that Uganda's political development and strategic location, and its leaders' perception of its role in the geo-politics of the region, have made it vulnerable and influenced the nature of its foreign policy.

4.1 A Brief History of Colonial Uganda

Uganda, it has been widely argued, was reluctantly occupied by the British, largely because it lacked any obvious material advantage. Like many other regions, it was perceived as a white man's burden.' Uganda was occupied because of its strategic location in what became the British sphere of influence. Britain had colonized India because of its potential economic value. If India's economic value was to be exploited, the British had to occupy and control the Suez Canal in Egypt, which was a strategic part of the sea-route from Britain to India. To be able to control Egypt, it was important to occupy Sudan through which the Nile passes, and Uganda where the source of the Nile is. Uganda's landlocked position made it necessary for the British to

occupy Kenya too, so that the British had access to the sea. This strategic location of Uganda was to generate other territorial problems for it in the subsequent years (see Map 1). British imperial policy thus regarded Uganda’s occupation as a means to an end: it provided strategic advantage for Britain’s long-term economic interests in the region.

Uganda became a British colony in 1894 and Britain signed several agreements with various kingdoms to consolidate its power, the main ones being Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Busoga. Under colonial rule, the main administration was predominantly of British origin, while the Ugandans were employed as clerks and in other subordinate positions. Following the earlier resistance to colonial rule by some kingdoms, the British had established the indirect rule system, where Africans were responsible for the immediate administration of the territory as clerks, chiefs and heads of regions, while the British oversaw their activities and supervised them. The indirect rule system had its own limitation, however, because in areas where British rule was resisted, they deployed administrators who were ‘Baganda’, which was an ethnic group that collaborated with Britain in its extension of British colonial rule to other regions in Uganda. This led to ethnic misunderstanding between the Baganda and the ethnic groups where they were deployed as administrators, clerks and regional leaders, e.g. among the Bunyoro, Bugisu, Busoga. The Nyangire Abaganda rebellion was thus aimed at the Baganda leaders who were perceived as sub-imperialists. This set the precedent for the subsequent ethnic clashes between the Baganda and other ethnic groups, particularly those that resisted them. The ethnic divisions subsequently influenced the nature of the political struggle for independence. Political parties that were formed to demand independence came to be organised along ethnic lines. While the Baganda manned the administrative sector of the colonial administration, the British employed men from the Northern region to manage the security sector as policemen and soldiers. It is from this

322 Indirect rule was the British colonial method of administering its colonies by using the existing political authorities to govern their vast African empire. The rationale for indirect rule was not to overhaul the indigenous system but to continue with it, so that people would comply with new policies rather than having to be coerced. A detailed examination of indirect rule is done by M. Crowder, “Indirect Rule-French-British Style” in African journal of the International African Institute, Vol XXXIV no 3 (1994) pp, 198-199

323 Buganda collaborated during colonial intrusion and gave little resistance to colonial penetration. They had been used in the subsequent resistance wars in the other parts of Uganda during the colonial process.

324 The ethnic groups from Northern Uganda were employed in the police, in the army and as security guards at big plantations, in the industrial towns etc. The groups included the Kakwa, Acholi, Langis, Iteso, and some Karamojongs. From the outset, the colonialists treated them as the martial groups, which the groups took very seriously. From then onwards, they believed the security sector was their exclusive preserve. The second, third, fifth and sixth presidents of Uganda in fact came from these Northern areas.
time forward that the Northerners' regarded themselves as managers of the security sector and transformed themselves into a military ethnocracy.3

The first political party in Uganda, the Uganda National Congress (UNC), was formed in 1952 by Ignatius Musazi. The party demanded independence from the British. Like the Indian National Congress (INC) and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the UNC pointed out that independence in Uganda was the only way to national development. Considering that it was at a time when other African states were also experiencing a growth of nationalism, the UNC drew its inspiration from and designed demands similar to those of political parties in other African states. It preferred to use non-violent resistance, like the NC, but this was met with stiff resistance from the British. The party nonetheless appealed to many Ugandans because it was all-inclusive and non-ethnic based!

The UNC was undermined from within with the support of the British, because it had drawn some logistical support from the East (China and the Soviet Union). The members who dissociated themselves from it formed other political parties, for example, the Progressive Party (PP) in 1955, the Democratic Party (DP) in 1956, and the Uganda National Movement (UNM) in 1958. Just before independence, Uganda had seven political parties. Their political manifestos were not that different from each other, but all were demanding political power. Alliances and counter alliances were formed amongst some of them, while others became defunct due to limited membership and lack of proper organization. By the time the British granted Uganda independence, there were three dominant political parties: the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), the DP and Kabaka Yekka (KY).

The dominant position of Buganda within Uganda's politics was crucial and for independence to be meaningful, it had to be at the helm of political leadership. It had three main advantages. Firstly, its ethnic category had had an upper hand in the political administration of many parts of Uganda, so they were more experienced in administration and management of affairs of the

321 "Northerners" is the colloquial term for referring to the people who come from Northern Uganda.
323 Buganda's dominant position was perceived by many as sub-imperialism.
state. Secondly, the British had trusted them more than other ethnic groups and so felt more comfortable relinquishing their power to them. Thirdly, the colonial administrative capital Entebbe' was in Buganda, which would reduce the costs of infrastructural development; after all, it was adjacent to Kampala, another administrative town.' The implication of these political and geographic advantages of Buganda led to its demand for political positions to head the newly created Republic of Uganda. The first leader of the first postcolonial government came from Buganda while the security sector remained controlled by the so-called "Northerners".

Postcolonial Uganda

The first leader President Sr Edward Mutesa (former president of KY) was a Muganda Kabaka (king) of Buganda. The Prime Minister Milton Obote came from Lango.' The army commander Shaban Opolot was from Teso332 and the deputy army commander Idi Amin also from the (presumed) martial northern tribe of Kaluva.333 With the new political structure, the independent state of Uganda started the task of rebuilding itself. The president was perceived by many as an honorary president, and therefore power lay in the hands of the executive Prime Minister. The new administration had inherited several problems from the colonial government, the most outstanding of which were the conflicts between particular ethnic groups and the ir overlords, the Baganda, who had been preferentially treated by the British during indirect rule.'

The ethnic groups administered by the Baganda on behalf of the British rebelled against them; some wanted to secede while others wanted to be removed from the kingdom of Buganda, where they had been put coopted into the colonial restructuring. One ethnic group that was vehemently opposed to Baganda control was Bunyoro. The Banyoro insisted they neither wanted the Baganda to rule nor administer their region. This forced the Prime Minister to call for a referendum on the Bunyoro matter. When a referendum was held in 1964 to decide where the

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329 Entebbe was the first administrative town because of its strategic location. It is located on Lake Victoria, which facilitated travel and else of communication. Currently Uganda's only international airport is at Entebbe, and it serves the UNSC operations in Rwanda and the DRC.
330 Kampala has been the capital of Uganda since 1962.
331 Teso is part of Northern Uganda where the core personnel of the security sector of the country came from.
332 Tango is part of Northern Uganda where the core personnel of the security sector of the country came from.
333 Idi Amin had a doubtful parentage and so it was hard to tell whether he was a Kakwa or Anyanya. These ethnic groups have their communities on both sides of the border, respectively on the northern side of Uganda and on the southern side of Sudan.
Banyoro wanted to belong, they voted overwhelming to be part of Bunyoro and not Buganda, to which the British had previously allocated them. This sparked off civil disobedience in other areas. The fact that the Prime Minister was covertly involved in these demands for autonomy led to a constitutional crisis. The President was opposed to the referendum, arguably because his kingdom was going to lose a big region from which it received revenue. The President did not expect a Prime Minister to act without his consent, and thus developed an indirect struggle for power between the two; this became popularly known as the 1966 "Kabaka Crisis". The Prime Minister with the help of the deputy army commander Colonel Idi Amin (hereafter referred to as Amin) overthrew the President, forcing him to flee to England."

The Southerners perceived this coup as a shift of political power from the south to the north because political power now lay in the hands of President Obote who was a Northerner. The security sector continued to be manned by the Northerners. Since this crisis, politics has been perceived in ethnic terms, as presidents increased their hold onto power using ethnic affiliations and immediate family relations.

Postcolonial Regional and International Relations (1962-1970)

Uganda's drive to independence coincided with the demands of other GLR states for independence. The UN declaration that granted independence to Uganda in 1960 seemed to create an advantage for the struggles and growth of nationalism in general. In Rwanda, the struggle for independence had resulted in a massive ethnic clash between the Tutsi and Hutu, which deteriorated into genocide in 1959. The Batutsi took refuge in neighbouring states and Uganda become host to many of them. In Burundi, a similar ethnic clash between the Batutsi and Bahutu occurred with many fleeing Burundi and some finding refuge in Uganda and Tanzania. The Ugandan government did not have any influence inside the borders of Burundi and Rwanda, though, and looked on helplessly while all the ethnic murders and expulsions took place.

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In Zaire, the struggle for independence was extremely violent and because the Prime Minister Obote was sympathetic to their cause, he engineered support for then key nationalist, Christopher Gbenye in his struggle against the colonialists and Mobutu. Uganda intervened to assist the hard-pressed Congolese against Mobutu's troops in 1965. Obote sent Amin to Aru where the Congolese revolutionaries had temporarily established their headquarters. Amin was tasked to act as liaison between the Congolese and Uganda, and was also supposed to procure the necessary logistical requirements for the training of the rebels. Uganda did not only assist the Congolese with logistics, however, but it became involved in the trade in gold and ivory. It is recounted that Amin who had allegedly obtained ivory that he traded in at a customs post at Vurra, had also brought seven bars of gold into Uganda. Congolese revolutionaries contested the purchase of vehicles and equipment by the Ugandan government and alleged that the money raised for their revolutionary movement was being banked in Uganda at different banks. This turned into a national scandal, and parliamentarians demanded that a full inquiry be held. Although the inquiry exonerated the Prime Minister, the so-called "gold scandal" nevertheless continued to embarrass the presidency.

Obote's decision to choose the East as his ideological partner created differences between him and the British. He declared that all private enterprises be nationalized, and in his 'Common Man's Charter' and subsequent Nakivubo settlement declared that the country was pro-East and was going to adopt socialism. The capitalist reaction to this ideological move was to secure those parts of East Africa, for example Kenya, which had not been influenced by socialism. Tanzania had already adopted socialism in their Arusha Declaration in 1967. The capitalist reaction in the GLR was similar to how it had responded in other parts of the world that had become socialist. Uganda had followed suit. In 1971, in what Mamdani has termed an

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337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
341 Those states that that were aligned to the East were often target by the capitalist powers. The US, for example, using a low intensity conflict strategy, would sponsor dissidents against the socialist leader to be overthrown. Good examples of this are the South and North Korean wars of 1950, the Vietnam war and in general the US foreign policy towards Cuba. For details on US intervention in socialist states, see J. Schraeder (ed), Intervention into the 1990: US Foreign Policy in the Third World, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), Chapters 16, 19, 21.
imperialist coup, Obote was overthrown by Amin with the help of Britain and Israel?'

Ironically, however, Amin's coming to power with pomp and ceremony was soon to end in years of immense abuse of human rights and violence towards the country's citizens.

Three significant issues emerge from the political development of Uganda in the first and second postcolonial governments. Firstly, political power shifted from the Southerners to the Northerners while the security sector remained an exclusive preserve of Northerners. This domination of power by the Northerners accounted for the political instability that followed: Firstly, the Northerners had to use force against the Southerners in order to manage them more easily. Doing so led to human rights abuses against anyone who was considered an opponent of the state. Secondly, independence struggles in neighbouring states had generated a mass exodus of refugees that were absorbed into Uganda, later to be integrated into the various structures of the state? Lastly, Uganda's involvement in Zaire's politics, even though it was covert, marked a big shift in Uganda's foreign policy. Although these were not documented policies, it was implicit that a tendency was emerging in which foreign policy decision making had become exclusively the responsibility of the country's leaders?"

Uganda's Second Republic (1971-1979)

When Amin came to power after the coup, it is argued that Uganda had the best civil service in the whole of East Africa and that it would have developed even further had Amin not failed to manage the state. Amin's regime soon slipped into dictatorship, forcing many people to flee Uganda for fear of being killed. He set up a very strong military presence in his regime and ruled by decree, rather than making decisions after consultation. Whereas Obote's administration may have had a foreign policy document that guided foreign affairs, the second republic had no proper foreign policy document that described avenues through which decisions were to be made.

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343 During the Obote administration, the government's assistance to Gbenye of Zaire was never discussed in parliament, and attempts by parliamentarians to demand an explanation from the President on the matter were completely ignored.
taken. Amin's efforts to review the foreign affairs ministry were short lived, as his regime slipped into dictatorship."

On the regional and international front, his foreign relations were unpredictable. In one of his erratic moods, Amin declared that the banks of River Kagera belonged to Uganda and not Tanzania and promised to return them to Uganda. He thus attacked Tanzania. Tanzania reciprocated by invading Uganda in 1978, and fighting Amin's regime until it was overthrown in April 1979. Tanzania harboured a large number of Ugandan dissidents who had unsuccessfully tried to overthrow Amin in 1972. In 1978, when Tanzania reacted against Amin's claim by countering his occupation of parts of Kagera, many of Uganda's dissidents joined the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF). The leader of these dissidents at the time was Milton Obote who had been overthrown by Amin in 1971. This invasion was the first in Africa to remove a president from office and set the precedent of how governments would be changed in Uganda and other parts of Africa."

During his rule, it had been hoped that Amin would be pro-West to enhance the interests of the capitalists after all they had put him in power. It turned out that he did not intend to be loyal to the capitalists nor socialists instead he argued that he borrowed from both ideologies and did what was good for Uganda. Amin had a mixed foreign policy, ranging from dealing with the Soviet Union (SU)344 in increasing his military capability to being an accomplice in the Palestinian hijack of Israel nationals. Amin refused to collaborate with the Israelis to release the hostages, which led to an Israeli attack on Uganda in 1976.345 He provoked Kenya by insisting that part of Uganda's land had been taken by Kenya and that he would get it back. Kenya responded by threatening to stop Uganda's export trade (particularly the transportation of fuel to Uganda).

This would severely affect Uganda, since Tanzania could not be an alternative route to use, because Ant had bad relations with Nyerere. He also made a claim of land extending towards Kagera that was Ugandan but that had been taken over by Tanzania. His military adventures in Tanzania soon ended his dream of proving that he was a regional power, though, and in 1979, a combined force of Ugandan rebels and the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) overthrew him. The Uganda army of the time was poorly trained and educated, particularly the non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. Previously, they had been highly disciplined, although meagrely paid, but when Amin assumed power, the system broke down and there was indiscipline in the army. The army became involved in looting, stealing and terrorising the populace to give it money, watches etc. Besides providing security, the army had been used by Obote and Amin to ensure that they remained in power, to hold in check any potential or prevailing dissidents and to beat up the opposition if they posed a threat to the ruling regime."

Obote II to Tito Okello Lutwa (1980 – 1985)

When Amin was overthrown in 1979, Uganda went through a phase of turmoil and instability. Within two years, there were four rulers. Professor YK Lule ruled for a record sixty-eight days, backed by Tanzania. He was replaced by President Godfrey Binaisa, who ruled for eleven months, and was overthrown by the army commander, Oyite Ojok in May 1980. The military set up a Military Commission to rule Uganda, as it prepared for elections. These were held in December 1980, on a multi-party basis, and Milton Obote became president for the second time. During this period, however, it was hard to speak of a functional government. The civil service had broken down, all the government departments were run down, and the countryside was characterized by insurgency: in short, Uganda was a "failed state". 3

The political parties that lost the election objected to Obote's UPC victory because they felt that the elections had been rigged. Some formed protest groups and others formed rebel groups.

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Following Obote's ousting in 1971, a rift had developed between the Northern region and the Southern region. When Obote came to power once more, he avenged his ousting by hunting down Amin's clansmen and the Southerners (particularly the Baganda) for having celebrated his downfall. These ethnic categories of the south (particularly the local leaders) were tortured and killed on grounds that they harboured anti-government forces. The ethnic groups in the south included the Banyankole, Batoro, Bakiga, Banyoro and Banyarwanda (Batutsi refugees). Throughout Obote's second period of rule, Uganda was plunged into serious guerrilla warfare. Obote was preoccupied with keeping himself in power and was not willing to negotiate with the dominant rebel group, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which was headed by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (a Munyakole) who used the South of Uganda as his operational base. In 1985, following a disagreement on how the rebel groups should be handled by the government soldiers and the persistent refusal to negotiate with the rebels who were exerting considerable military pressure on the government, forced the army commander (then Tito Okello Lutwa) to overthrow President Obote.

On assuming power, President Tito Okello engaged in dialogue and peace talks with the different rebel groups. The rebel groups included the National Resistance Army (NRA), the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU), Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), and Former Ugandan National Army (FUNA) with the aim of returned peace to Uganda In December 1985, during the peace talks held in Nairobi between the then rebel leaders and Tito Okello Lutwa's government, it was agreed that there would be a ceasefire and modes of power sharing, which would be agreed upon between the rebels groups and the government. However, in January of the next year, in contravention of the Nairobi peace agreement, the NRM fought and took power from Tito Okello on the 26th January 1986. It is to the NRM rule that this study now turns. The next section examines briefly how its leadership organised the security sector to ensure national, regional and international security.

From the foregoing historical account of Uganda's political development it is evident that it was characterised by ethnicized power struggles between the north and the south. The Northern and

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333 The Banyarwanda (Batutsi refugees) had settled in Uganda following the 1959 genocide.
Southern dichotomy was applied to all sectors of the state, and the ethnic categorizations became even more pronounced. In addition, foreign affairs and foreign policy was exclusively the sphere of the leader and, in fact, other than the Amin regime, the rest of the regime’s foreign affairs were not explicit as to what they were, what the state’s priorities were or what exactly the leadership planned. Other than Amin having been helped by the Libyans in his war, and the Koreans being identified in Obote Ifs regime, the rest of the relations consisted only of the main formal relations with international financial institutions, the common bilateral relations characterised by exchanges of diplomats etc. The next section briefly discusses the NRM regime. Subsequent chapters will discuss Uganda's interventions in the GLR region.

The National Resistance Movement government from 1986

The NRM led by Museveni came to power in 1986, following five years of protracted guerrilla warfare. The war had been fought by dissidents that were living in Tanzania and other countries, peasants within Uganda and refugee forces, particularly the Banyarwanda Tutsi. The NRM inherited a state whose citizens were victims of guerrilla warfare, who lived in fear of the military and who suffered in abject poverty. The onset of the NRM regime catalyzed the already deep ethnic cleavage between the Northerners (leaders from ethnic groups from northern Uganda who had held power prior to 1986) and the Southerners (who had engaged the previous governments in guerrilla war and taken power from them). Ugandan political, social and economic sectors came to be controlled by the Southerners. The Northerners fought back to regain control and organised approximately six rebel groups, which fought to regain their lost power. The more the Northerners fought, the more marginalised they became, and the more dilapidated the region became. Many people were displaced within the country and moved into camps where they hoped to be protected from the rebels. The plight of these people and the war zone in the north became a concern to many, including the international community. The whole situation in the north came to be termed the "Northern Question"? The Northern Question has dominated Uganda's politics since 1986.

356 The Northern Question is a term that was used to broadly describe the nature of the power struggle between the North and the South. Note that the North is not a homogenous region: there are different ethnic groups within the North that are in turn engaged in inter-ethnic conflicts among each other e.g. the Langi and the Acholi."
4.2 Uganda's Security Framework

Before President Museveni came to power in 1986, Uganda did not have a clear national security policy. The two governments preceding Museveni's government were engrossed in 'regime security' and fighting rebel activity with limited time to design meaningful security policies. Like all other armies in Africa, the Ugandan army was fragmented, characterised by ethnic cleavages among its regular members, most of whom had had limited education.

Uganda's security sector had been manned by the Northerners but with Museveni in power, the army was manned by several ethnic categories, although the dominance of the Southerners was evident. The first security policy embedded in the "Ten Point Program" set out to guard the territory and sovereignty of Uganda, as well as to promote good neighbourliness and regional cooperation in the GLR. In order to achieve these objectives, a new security framework was conceived with the creation of the National Resistance Army Statute of 1992. The National Resistance Army was established as the army of the state. The statute stipulated very clearly the structure of the army and relegated decision making to the National Resistance Army Council (NRAC), ideally the High Command. The statute was more concerned with the conduct of the officers and the men of the army, than how it was to set out to guard the territory and sovereignty of Uganda. It could be argued that the emphasis on the structure of the army, its conduct and its decisions was more crucial at the time, because the government had no immediate security concerns in 1992 when the statute was passed. Although there were

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357 Regime security is a concept borrowed from E. Azar and Chung-in Moon in their "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity; The 'Software' Side of Third World National Security", in E. Azar and Chung-in-Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Man, • ement of Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), pp. 77-102. They use the term to refer to how the leadership of states try to legitimize their power. M. Gasiorowski calls it "regime legitimacy", see M. Gasiorowski, "Regime Legitimacy and National Security: The Case of Pahlavi Iran", in Azar, E., and Chung-in-Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), pp. 227-250. Similarly in the GLR, J. Clark uses 'regime security' as a concept to refer to the way governments frame their national interests. When states intervene in others, they argue that it is in the interest of their own state, when in actual fact they do it to ensure that they remain in power. See J. Clark, "Realism, Neo Realism and Africa's International relations in the Post-Cold War Era", in K. C, Dun and M. T. Shaw, Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory, p.94.

skirmishes on its border with Sudan and although the Rwandan Tutsi in the NRA had invaded Rwanda, these were security concerns that were being contained.

Following the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1995, the government devised a second security policy. The Constitution clearly set out how the security sector was to be organised, and this was operationalised with alternative ways of addressing situations that would arise outside the agreed parliamentary requirements. In this new security framework, security affairs were the exclusive preserve of the security sector. The security sector comprised the UPDF, which was supposed to be in charge of the security of the state as a whole, to protect its borders and to protect the lives and property of the populace. The police was to be in charge of law and order in the state, while the prisons service was to be responsible for the safe custody of criminals, petty lawbreakers and other persons. The paramilitary was to provide complementary services to the UPDF in cases of high levels of insecurity. In Chapter 12 of the 1995 Constitution, Uganda's security is dealt with exclusively as the responsibility of the UPDF. Article 208 (see excerpt below) deals specifically with the character of the army.

Figure 1: Constitutional Excerpt on Defence and National Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence and National Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 208 (1) There shall be armed forces to be known as the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) The UPDF shall be non partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional, disciplined, productive, and subordinate to the civilian authority as established under this constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Members of the Uganda Peoples' Defence forces shall be citizens of Uganda of good character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) No person shall raise an armed force except in accordance with this constitution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Constitution of Uganda, 1995

The invasion of Rwanda had been spearheaded by Rwandan Tutsi soldiers who had served in the different armies in Uganda, mainly in the intelligence wings. In the first government they served in the General Service Unit (GSU) of Obote I, the State Research Bureau (SRB) of Amin, the National Security Agency NASA) of Obote II and in the NRA, they were in the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) and the External Security Organisation (ESO) and other auxiliary forces of the Museveni administration.
Articles 209 and 210 of the Constitution explicitly deal with the structure through which security decisions are made. Appointment, promotion and disciplining the forces are the responsibility of parliament, although a parallel court can discipline the forces after careful analysis of breaches of their duties or other behaviour that is not in consonance with the expectations of the army. As a constitutional requirement, the special committees on Presidential and Foreign Affairs' and the committee on Defence and Internal Affairs' debate key appointments to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). It is not very clear if recommendations from these special committees are considered or if only their opinions concerning key security matters such as potential invasions or deployments of forces are sought (see below for excerpts of the Constitution that directly refer to the functions of the UPDF and the role of parliament). For example, in all Uganda's interventions that were undertaken by the state between 1993 and 1998, it is not clear if the deployment of troops suggested in Article 210(d) was exhaustively dealt with by the parliament. The Constitution also contains an exclusive article on intervention, which allows the government to address a security matter that would otherwise affect the security of the state in a short time frame and then inform the parliament.

**Figure 2: Functions of the Defence Force**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Functions of Defence Force</th>
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<tr>
<td>Article 209. The functions of the UPDF are:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) to preserve and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda;</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) to co-operate with the civilian authority in emergency situations and in cases of natural disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) to foster harmony and understanding between the Defence Forces and civilians and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) to engage in productive activities for the development of Uganda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In article 210, Parliament to regulate UPDF and in particular, providing for |
(a) the organs and structures of the UPDF |
(b) recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline and removal of members of UPDF and ensuring that members of the UPDF are recruited from every district of Uganda |
(c) terms and conditions of service of members of the UPDF |
(d) the deployment of troops outside Uganda

*Source: The Constitution of Uganda, 1995*

360 This committee comprises twenty members with a favourable representation from all political parties.
361 This committee is comprised of sixteen members, four representatives from the UPDF senior officers, as well as members of parliament from the ruling party and the opposition. Ironically, this committee is formed from predominantly the Northern and Eastern ethnic groups (regions where the main security pressure points are), a few from the ruling Western ethnic groups and only one from the central region.
National Defence structure

The structure gives primacy to the Minister and State of Defence as the highest decision makers of the MOD, although in reality it is the Commander-in-Chief (the President). The overall MOD mandate, besides protecting the state from internal turmoil, external threats and ensuring total peace in the country, is also to safeguard the lives of the people, to protect their property and to foster harmony and understanding between the defence force and civilians. It is responsible for designing and managing the sector. The organogram below demonstrates the structure of Uganda's security sector.

Figure 3: Uganda's Ministry of Defence Structure

Source: Defence White Paper, 2004
Decision Making in the Uganda People Defence Force

Although both the organogram and the White Paper on the Defence Transformation fail to state how decisions are made within the component part of the MOD, i.e. the UPDF, and how the security framework works up to the local government level, a provision in the UPDF's Military Statute and the local government structure explains how the two operate. The Military Statute creates a highly centralised leadership structure of decision making. The UPDF comprises two important parts, viz. the Army Council and the High Command. The Army Council in turn comprises the Directors and Battalion Commanders. The High Command, which is the executive arm of the UPDF, comprises the UPDF (the chiefs) and the Division Commanders. There are nine chiefs: the Chief of Personnel and Administration, the Chief of Political Commissar, the Chief Controller of Finance, the Chief Signal Officer, the Chief of Military Intelligence, the Chief of Operations and Training, the Chief of Medical Services, the Chief of Engineering and Logistics and the Chief of Combat Operations! The subsidiary ministries that work with and provide services to the MOD include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Local Government.

The President holds the prestigious title of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and oversees the defence forces' operations and welfare. Decisions concerning the security of the state and particularly the decision to commit soldiers in any security operation, be it domestic, regional or international of any sort, is discussed at the Army Council level, which he presides over as Commander-in-Chief. Once a decision has been reached, the High Command sits to design the details of the intervention and its operationalisation. The dual roles of President and Commander-in-chief put him in the line of inquiry as the first person to be responsible for defence, as well as being answerable to the public and international community as to what actions Uganda has taken in a given state. Critics of this dual role have argued that the President is taking on too much work or responsibility, and that this compromises other sectors of government that are equally crucial. For example, the International Crisis Group (ICG) points out that Museveni sometimes becomes directly involved in combat, which they attribute to his lack of confidence in his commanders and his unwillingness to acknowledge the distinction

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362 One characteristic of this type of structure is the potential emergence of intra-organisational power struggles, which is also true of the UPDF.
363 Interview with UG/MOD 13 held on 24 February 2006, Cape Town.
between strategic operational and tactical levels of command that enable effective political and military synergy?" Ideally, they propose that presidents should remain at the levels of strategic planning and not at the combat levels. This, of course, is an idea that fails to consider Museveni’s background as a soldier and his personality of being someone who prefers direct supervision of the work of the soldiers."

In terms of Article 124 of the Ugandan Constitution, declaration of war is permitted subject to the approval of parliament with a two-thirds vote. However, the Constitution also grants the President the power to use his discretion to decide to declare war and to inform parliament afterwards, though this must happen within seventy-two hours of declaring war. This is expressly permitted on the understanding that emergencies that put state security at stake would require prompt action, which would be delayed if the President had to wait for permission from the parliament. It is, however, implicit from Article 124 that the President will make security decisions in consultation with Parliament, and only if there is not enough time, is he provided with an alternative article that empowers him to take action and inform Parliament later. In this situation, it is not the Parliament, which determines the national security interests but rather the President in consultation with the MOD." This partly explains why it has been common practise that war is declared first and that Parliament is informed later: it is the President who decides when a national interest warrants military action.

This dominant role of the President also applies to setting priorities for the security interests. Until 2001, the President and UPDF had the exclusive power not only of determining security interests but of also prioritising these interests for the state. Furthermore, the President and the UPDF assessed the threats, formulated security strategies and implemented the security policy. Furthermore, this extensive role of the President does not extend to the army alone, but also to other policy issues in the economic, political and social sector. Akin to the Preston model of the

365 The President's acceptance of responsibility for his actions and his willingness to fight alongside the army in war not only boosts the confidence of the army but provides a better understanding of the army’s operation than only listening to military advisors and commanders. The President's willingness to fight in the army himself has helped him to identify the main problems that have characterised the army, like corruption, ghost soldiers on pay rolls and unscrupulous procurements.
366 The President has a dual role as head of state and as commander-in-chief of the armed forces to take charge of the national security of the country.
head of state being a "Director"\textsuperscript{367} the President, because of his strong need for power and control, tends to control policy processes and prefers to become involved in all of these. He makes decisions within a tight inner circle of advisers (mainly his proteges and relatives), advocates his own preferences regarding specific policies and personally guides policy along a path consistent with his own personal principles, views or experiences, irrespective of whether they are good or will undermine the state." Examples of such decisions on policy are his recent decision to degazette important ecosystem and give them to "foreign investors" for development, even though the Environmental Impact Assessments have indicated that the degazetting of these areas is going to have adverse effects on the climate of Uganda as a whole. He has since rescinded this decision because of the public outcry. In one of the national strikes against this decision, an Indian national was killed. This gave Uganda bad publicity yet it was going to hold the Common Wealth Conference in 2007.

After the defence review in 2001, other stakeholders have been included in the formulation of some of the security strategies and policies. The underlying motivation for this lies in the interdependence of various sectors in achieving set security goals. It was realised that the MOD could not design all policies and implement them without receiving input from other ministries that are contingent in the development process. This does not mean, however, that other ministries were not involved in the past: they were involved, but only as far as the MOD affected their ministries' budgets. It could be argued that the inclusion of the other stakeholders was mainly donor driven', to ensure that the MOD was accountable and efficient in its provision of security to all the people irrespective of their location and ethnic composition.

Government may also have realised that there are stakeholders whose input was of immense value if Uganda was to have a sound security framework. These stakeholders include the private sector, key investors in regions of insecurity and opinion leaders who hail from various part of

\textsuperscript{367} For a discussion on the types of presidents and their character see T. Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs, pp. 15-19
\textsuperscript{368} T. Preston discusses the four dominant types of presidents and how they manage their presidency. In his typology, presidents exhibit the characters of directors, magistrates, administrators and delegators. It is not possible to discuss the typology here, but if closely analysed, the presidential system of Uganda since 1986 conforms to the Director type of system. For a detailed discussion see T. Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs, pp. 15-19 and pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{369} Uganda depends on multilateral agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) for part of its budget. These agencies have put conditionalities on the MOD like demobilization, limited expenditure and the inclusion of other stakeholders on its planning committees to be able to access the aid. See Omitoogun, Wuyi, on military expenditure in Military Expenditure Data in Africa: A Survey of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, (SHIRT Research Report 17: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 95-106.
the country. Whereas they are not included in the administrative structure of the national security framework, they are nonetheless involved at the planning committee levels. The national defence organogram indicates how the Ministry is organised, planned and linked to various components of the organisation. It is instructive to analyse this defence structure with a view to understanding the chains of command and how these were operationalized during the intervention period.

The National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) is another salient section of the security sector. Prior to the 2000, Articles 219 and 220 of the Constitution described and provided the composition and functions of the NSC but how it was operationalised was not so clear. Despite the fact that the NSC is an important part of the security framework, it is not represented on the structure nevertheless it is the link between the military, the district security set up and the External Security Organisations (ESO) and Internal Security Organisations (ISO). The NSC advises the President in security planning and is responsible for gathering intelligence information on which much of the nation's security depends.

Functions of the National Security Council include:

- To inform and advise the President on matters relating to national security;
- To co-ordinate and advise on policy matters relating to intelligence and security;
- To review national security needs and goals;
- To receive and act on reports from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and
- To carry out any other functions as the parliament may oblige to the council."

At the district level, members of staff seconded from the President's office are the link with the NSC. These are responsible for security and development and have an established structure. They include the district administrator attached to the President's Office; the Resident District

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370 A. Seegers notes that when authoritarian states create National Security Agencies, state repression worsens, and acts of political opposition are easily described as threats to national security. It is critical to establish the role that ESOs and ISOs play in the internal politics within the state, particularly in the conflict between the former ISO boss and government. See A. Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, (London: Tauris Publishers, 1996) p. 304.

371 The National Security Council is still being re-organised to be able to serve its purpose optimally. Currently, the link between the district and the central government is not so obvious and is characterised by unclear policies, which affects the effective management of security in general.
Commissioner (RDC) who is charged with the security welfare of the district. Below the RDC are the District Internal Security Officer (DISO), the District Police Commander (DPC), the Central Investigations Department (CID), and the Local Council V, III, II and I chair persons and the secretaries of defences at each of the Local Council levels. It is through this hierarchy that citizens are sensitized about security at village local council meetings. They are told to be alert to detect any strangers and questionable people settling amongst the population. As a result, they are very active in identifying new people and questioning them on why they have moved to a new area. As a result, the rebels who have infiltrated villages have been reported to the authorities; those who succeed in camouflaging themselves as refugees are taken to the UNHCR district units or to the Red Cross for onward transfer to the refugee camps managed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

At the borders, the MOD deploys a UPDF liaison officer who works with the Border Police post, the Immigration Unit and the Customs Department to ensure security at the border and prevent the proliferation of illegal products or arms and ammunition entering Uganda. The border administration is part of the Local Council security set up of the district. It is responsible for precisely identifying those sections of the borders that are problematic or potential areas of concern. They are also supposed to carry out investigations on where rebels are operating from and to inform the district security officer, who in turn informs the RDC. Information is relayed to the area’s UPDF commander at the district who then decides on the best course of action. This structure has been very vigilant in the Western border regions in identifying the areas of potential threats to peace. The FGDs at the borders identified weaknesses in this information flow system, which had resulted in a compromised security situation. They indicated three main limitations in their work. Firstly, there was slow response from the centre when a security issue was raised. Secondly, the limited logistical resources and the delays in transmitting the resources impeded their work. Thirdly, the inadequate information about regions, and delayed communication with their neighbouring security counterparts sometimes led to disastrous consequences like the raiding of villages by a group of armed thugs, isolated attacks on households and petty theft on market days.

From here the refugees escape into the rest of the population to reorganise their clandestine movements.

Focus Group Discussions were held at the border districts of Ntungamo, Kisoro, Kasese, Bundibugyo, and Hoima during 2005.
On one occasion during fieldwork, I encountered a district that had been attacked by armed thugs. The local people reported to security the intrusion of armed thugs (the thugs were well known to the village for terrorising people, stealing their property and sometimes killing others). On this occasion when information was relayed, the DISO took charge of the field operation of arresting the armed thugs. However, he was put out of action in the process because of the delayed responses from their counterparts, namely, the police. It was evident that there had been inappropriate reporting on what weapons the armed gang men had and how many they were. Because of this missing detail, the DISO was killed. Nevertheless, the case does indicate how security is now a responsibility of all the people, irrespective of what position they hold at the district. It also shows that the security sector faces serious challenges. There is often poor communication or even a breakdown in communication between the different levels of the security structure, which inhibits good planning and affects their operations. Another case is the Barlonyo massacre in which civilians were massacred because information received was not properly disseminated. Overall, however, the UPDF has a better record of military effectiveness and conduct under the current Museveni government than the armies Uganda has had in the postcolonial era.

Paramilitary Groups in Uganda's Defence Sector

Another arm of the UPDF that is not included in the defence structure is the paramilitary. Originally, these auxiliary forces were recruited from the local populace to complement the UPDF in areas with severe rebel activity and in the cattle-rustling region of North East and Eastern Uganda. They include home guards, vigilantes or local defence units. Examples of these include the Arrow boys in Teso (Eastern Uganda), the Amuka group, the Rhino Group and the La Becca group in Gulu, who are responsible for protecting roads and the camps where the Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) live. In the earlier days, these forces were neither formally

374 The Ntungamo District Security Officer, Patrick Edmacu was killed on 28 August 2005 in a crossfire with Rwandese armed thugs. Two of the thugs were killed and their live ammunition was recovered, but one thug ran away.

375 Some people in the army have blamed his death on the tactical combat error of attacking a house without first establishing the number of armed gangsters inside, instead of ambushing them and attacking them later. At the logistical level, the police's delay in coming to his rescue was caused by a lack of fuel. What the incident demonstrates is that district security structures should be provided with proper and sufficient logistical resources to enable them work effectively. In addition, there is a laxity in information flow and a duplication of roles that need to be streamlined if they are to be effective.


organised nor paid a salary but just a little token of appreciation. Following their deployment in many operations in the insecure north, they have since been integrated into the army, given military training, allotted numbers, and are now on the pay roll.

These groups operate alongside the UPDF. One example was "Operation Iron Fist", launched in April 2004 to root out the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda.' In the DRC intervention, some of these Local Defence Units (LDUs) veterans of the liberation struggle and demobilised soldiers were deployed to beef up the UPDF, which was overstretched because of the multiple deployments in the DRC, in Western Uganda border districts and in Northern Uganda at the border with Sudan to oversee the LRA pressure points. Contrary to the Constitution, which spells out that recruitment of these soldiers should be based on districts and must be overseen by the parliament; the recruitment of these paramilitary groups is in fact done by the UPDF, thereby contravening the Constitution. Other paramilitary groups that have not been visibly related to the state but have links to the ruling party are the Kalangala Action Plan (KAP) and the Popular Intelligence Network (Nyekundire)." These are also referred to as the "electioneering arms" of the ruling party, as they ensure that the ruling party is voted back into power.' The KAP has been cited in many human rights violations against those citizens who demonstrated their opposition to the ruling party.

The organisation of the security sector demonstrates an interesting set up, in that the legislature is assigned roles to oversee recruitment, management and general organisation of the defense and police security but that other than the police, the legislature does not seem to have adequate control over the defence sector.

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378 'The governments of Uganda and the Sudan signed an agreement in terms of which the UPDF were allowed to operate in Southern Sudan to root out the LRA. 'The area covered by the UPDF was limited, so the paramilitary groups were supposed to fight alongside the UPDF to capture the Luhanga-Tek LRA base that was well equipped with vehicles, radio communications and advanced weaponry - ironically all provided by the Khartoum government to the LRA.

379 Okuku observes that KAP and Nyekundire recruitment, training and existence are not included in the UPDF bill, although they were instrumental in the state's security operations. See J. Okuku, Beyond Third-Term Politics: Constitutional amendments and Museveni's quest for Life Presidency in Uganda, (Institute for Global Change, Occasional Paper no 48, 2005).

380 Ibid.
Financing the army

Financing of the defence sector occurs mainly through the government, which receives its money from revenue from the state, bilateral donor subsides, aid and grants from multilateral donor agencies. In Article 11 of the Ugandan Constitution, parliament is responsible for analysing programmes and policy issues that affect the national budget and economy and, where necessary, for recommending alternative approaches that government can use to obtain resources for the MOD (the UPDF in particular). The MOD is required to provide parliament with its annual budget and defend it, if the need arises. The budget is divided into two parts, viz. the recurrent budget and the capital budget. Often its display includes the recurrent and capital development military expenditure as percentages of the central government expenditure and the totals. When the budget is exceeded, parliament has the prerogative of permitting the MOD to find supplementary funds with a limit of 3% from the state treasury. The committee on Finance, Planning and Economic Development thereafter vets, adjusts and recommends the MOD budget following the constitutional limits set on the defence spending. See Figure 4 below for an excerpt of Article 12 of the Constitution, on defence spending and supplementary expenditure.

**Figure 4: Constitutional excerpt of Ministry of Defence expenditure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) The total supplementary expenditure that requires additional resources over and above what is appropriated by Parliament shall not exceed 3% of the total approved budget for that financial year without prior approval of Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Where funds are expended under subsection 1) supplementary estimates showing the sums spent shall be laid before parliament within four months after the money is spent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Any reallocation of funds shall be made in consultation with all the affected Ministries, Departments, Institutions or Organisation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Uganda Constitution, 1995*

From the above article, the rules are clear, although the figures may be changed. However, in unavoidable situations these rules are revisited depending on the security problem at stake and provided the Ministry obtains permission to adjust them. For example, when the threats from insurgent groups grew in 1998 and 1999, the government exceeded its limits and the donor
agencies suspended aid. In 2002, in contrast, the donors permitted the increment in expenditure" and although the rebel incursions remained only in the north, the defence spending increased further because of the changes in the nature of guerrilla warfare." The scorched earth policy and abductions the guerrillas were using changed to surprise attacks on relief agencies, the local population, and displaced people's camps. This has continued to date. The LRA rebels have also joined the regrouping Allied Democratic Front (ADF) and PRA in the Eastern DRC, who are ready to attack Uganda. These immeasurable and unpredictable rebel incursions require a matching readiness of the UPDF to address the impending insecurity concerns, which in turn requires colossal sums of money to equip and run the daily surveillance on the rebels. An abridged series of the military budget running from 1992 to 2005 is supplied in Table 3 below.

Table 3: The Military Budget covering the period 1992-2005 in Uganda shillings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recurrent Budget</th>
<th>Capital Development</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992/1993</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/1994</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/1995</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1996</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>103.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/1997</td>
<td>127.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>139.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/1998</td>
<td>119.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>129.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/1999</td>
<td>147.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>164.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>166.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>213.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2003</td>
<td>250.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>261.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/2004</td>
<td>296.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>307.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/2005</td>
<td>331.8</td>
<td>16.15</td>
<td>347.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics generated from Ministry of Defence Policy Statement for selected Financial Years

From Table 2 above, the average MOD expenditure between 1992 and 2005 is on average approximately 161.4 billion Ugandan shillings for the recurrent budget while capital development only received 17.6 billion. From the budget, it is indicative that there has been an average increment of up to about 0.23% per year, approximately 23 billion annually, except for the 1996-1998 period when there was a slight decrease in expenditure. Although at this time there was a


marked increase in rebel insurgency, the multilateral agencies declined the government’s request to spend more money. A MOD official who has been closely involved in the budgeting stated that IFIs were under pressure from the EU and the international community not to give Uganda money for security. That IFIs felt that Uganda was engaged in a war that was no longer due to its insecurity but one whose agenda was unclear, whose effects were gruesome and its end harder to predict. What can be drawn from the IFIs reluctance to give Uganda money is that; these agencies were not convinced that Uganda had security concerns worth addressing by increment in its funding.

To be able to control the MOD expenditure and systematise the irregular structure in decision making regarding budgets and the fraudulent procurement processes in which the MOD was losing colossal sums of money, a Budget Act was put in place. It was envisaged that this Act would regulate the Budgetary Procedure and establish a systematic and efficient budgetary Process and other matters connected thereto. The Act was to come in effect on 1 July 2001. This followed the much decried over-spending in the military sector. The Budget Act was also aimed at implementing an earlier legislation in the Constitution in which the parliament had been mandated to vet the expenditure of the MOD. The legislation had not been adequately implemented, which resulted in a demand for parliament to use its powers to vet the MOD spending, as this was having a severely negative effect on the national budget. The Act was somewhat related to a donor demand to ascertain how resources were being used to procure inferior equipment, which cost the government large sums of money in three procurement scams that were made public. These included the purchase of junk helicopters, expired food and military fatigues that did not fit the officers and men of the defence forces, and lastly the arms purchase scandal that extended to South Africa and the Ukraine and that involved shoddy arms exporting firms in Britain.

What is peculiar about the financing of the army and the decision-making process is that the army did not seem to have a well-established decision-making structure. Some UPDF members recounted that orders of how money had to be dispensed or used were made erratically by the respective departments, with lack of proper checks and balances. As a result, there was inconsistency in what the budgets were and in what actually was spent. Priorities were never harmonized, and money was disbursed depending on which chief wielded more power (meaning

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383 Interview with a UG/MOF 4 Budget drawer, Ministry of Finance held in Kampala on 18 December 2005.
who was closest to the President). In fact, the Commander-in-Chief often dictated what he wanted once the budget had been passed, and his priorities often ranged from military equipment to military combat. He would instruct that he wanted the following: "I want hangars, armouries, and bankers, ... some of it should go to the Israel contractor and of course we need some for classified use." From interviewee UG/MOD 13’s comments, it was evident that there was no proper planning, budgeting or decision making in the UPDF: commands were sent via phone, instructions were sometimes communicated by word of mouth or small chits of paper were passed around from office to office, which made responsibility impossible to establish if anything went wrong. The civilians who worked in the top positions in the army sometimes made decisions blindly without consulting the technocrats on the matters. A specific example of this was the army’s then permanent secretary Dr Ben Mbonye (a medical doctor by profession). He often made decisions on what he thought were the best interests of the state or the army without considering or discussing issues with the respective chiefs of departments." Yet he wielded considerable power and was a so-called "right hand man" of the president? What made the information flow more complex was what an army officer referred to as a "civilian army" decision-making process! An interviewee recounted a scenario that was a common example of how the army dealt with transactions (see the excerpt below).

Figure 5: Financial mismanagement in UPDF institution

One day a junior finance officer was accounting to his senior how much money he had spent, how much was left and how he proposed to use it. The senior officer asked him in Kiswahili,

"Kumbe olisima ati olisoma wapi?" the officer answered, "Ndi soma Makerere" the senior officer told him,

"Kama olisoma Makerere, olisoma degree yako wakuli, we letra peca yanga!" This directly translated means,

Question: "Where did you say you went to school?"

Answer: "I went to Makerere" the officer replied.

Officer: If you went to Makerere, then you must have got your degree at night! Bring my money here.

Source: Interview with UG/MOD 13 held on 24th February 2006

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384 Interview with UG/MOD 13 held in Cape Town on 24 February 2006.
385 Interview with UG/MOD 13 held in Cape Town on 24 February 2006.
386 Dr Ben Mbonye is also a Rwandese Tutsi whose name often came up in all the arms purchase scandals.
387 Interview with UG/MOD 13 held in Cape Town on 24 February 2006.
This excerpt demonstrates three aspects of concern in the army: the level of illiteracy that characterises the army, particularly at the higher ranks; the lack of accountability and finally, the poor level of planning. It is little wonder, then, that the army has been characterised by so-called ghost soldiers, inappropriate military expenditure and sometimes compromised combat operations. By 2006, the Court Martial was handling, among others, cases where 28 army officers were on trial, allegedly for swindling money; one case involved approximately 379 million Ugandan shillings, meant for 650 soldiers in 2000. In his message, Museveni read out a list of individuals who would be court-martialled. These included high ranking military officers, such as Maj. Gen. James Kazini, Maj. Bakirana, Brig. Henry Tumukunde, Brig. Steven Kashaka, Brig. Nakibus Lakara, Brig. Julius Oketta, Col. Poteli Kivuna, Col. John Mugume, Col. Fred Tolit, Col. Mark Kodil, Col. Andrew Gutti, Lt. Col. Dura Mawa Muhindo, Col. Steven Rwabantu, and Lt. Kenneth Ayebare. It was alleged that they had all been involved in the misappropriation of military resources, and that they were implicated in the loss of huge amounts of money that had been intended as salaries for soldiers or in general for financing the security sector. Brig. Tumukunde has since been acquitted of swindling and of subversive acts against government: at the time when he was a 4th Division Chief in Gulu, it had been alleged that he had misappropriated up to 379 million Uganda shillings meant to pay the salaries of 650 soldiers. He has since been acquitted of all charges. These issues notwithstanding, financing of the security sector still remains low, despite the many security challenges faced by the state.

It can be concluded that Uganda, like many other African states, has a weak defence budgeting system, which is characteristic of many governments emerging out of liberation struggles. The inability to account for defence resources is not peculiar to Uganda: in fact, as Rupiya and Henk observe, African countries lack a transparent process based upon national consensus, for defining security, forming coherent national security strategy policy, allocating resources according to the strategy, and then overseeing its implementation. The reason why Uganda tends to exhaust its defence budget before the end of the financial year, is because it does not

384 Ghost soldiers is a term that has been used to describe the corruptive tendencies of the civil service that produce fictitious employee names and records with the intention of drawing their salaries and other benefits for themselves. This has been a common practice not only in the army but in other ministries.

385 See for example a story on the army "uncovering the ghosts in UPDF", published in The Monitor on 7 December 2003.


seem to allocate its defence resources according to rigidly defined structures and because there is misappropriation of resources as evidenced by the interviewees."

With limited transparency with regard to the procurement of equipment and limited accountability, if any, the potential of over-spending in the army is highly likely. The implication of this in the search for genuine security of the state means that the latter is highly dependent upon proper communication and dissemination of information and, above all, on the coordination of resources that are required to address security. Uganda's over-expenditure in the defence sector is not peculiar to the country; it is typical of countries with a history of militarized liberation. Common to these countries is the allocation of resources in areas of priority that are not necessarily based on ensuring the state's national security but are instead linked to "individual interests", which are rationalized by those in control of the army as crudely linked to the nation's security interests.

4.3 Uganda's Security Interests

Prior to Museveni coming to power in 1986, Uganda's security interests mainly involved the protection of the state from external aggression, especially after the Tanzanian invasion of 1978 and the subsequent overthrow of Amin's regime in 1979. The successive governments after that were embroiled in power struggles and initially depended on the Tanzanian soldiers and a limited number of Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) soldiers for territorial protection. When elections were held in 1980, the TPDF returned and left the UNLF in charge of Uganda's security. The rejection of the election results by some political parties forced some leaders of political parties to wage guerrilla warfare against the government of Obote II. Among these were the Uganda People's Movement (UPM), which formed the National Resistance Movement, with its military wing being the National Resistant Army. The DP in turn formed the UFM and the FEDEMU. Increased incursions into the state by these rebel groups and the subsequent guerrilla warfare of Museveni forced the ruling governments of neighbouring states to secure themselves in power. Their core national interests became defined by how best their regimes could be secured and not necessarily by taking into account the protection of the people per se.

393 Most of the interviewees in the Ministry of Defence echoed the view that there was misappropriation of resources in the army.
During Museveni's regime, new developments of GLR geopolitical conflicts like the Burundian coup of 1986, the genocide of 1993, the Rwandan invasion of 1990 and the subsequent genocide in that country during 1994, forced Uganda to redefine its national interests. By 1987, rebel activity against the NRM government had commenced in Northern Uganda, and by 1994 there were potential threats on the western flank that bordered Rwanda and the DRC. Uganda had to develop a better security strategy to contain the conflicts in all these neighbouring states. At the formal level, national security was prioritised and embedded in Chapter 12 of the new 1995 Ugandan Constitution. In this constitution, National security was defined in the traditional sense as security from foreign attacks or infiltration from neighbouring states and encompassed freedom from fear, intimidation and other pressures or threats, real or potential, from whatever source that would undermine the basic rights, welfare and property of the people of Uganda."

Uganda's national security interests were categorised into national, regional and international interests subsequent to the defence review in 2001. At the national (domestic level), Uganda's security interests are contained in the White Paper on Defence Transformation (WPDT) and cover a wide range of areas. Figure 6 below is a summary of the national security interests. These security interests were arrived at after consultations and discussions, which led to the WPDT. In Figure 6 below, the six specific threats to Uganda's national security are highlighted.

**Figure 6: Uganda National Security Interests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Security Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) A society that functions according to principles of Justice, Freedom and Democracy, where</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fundamental Human Rights are promoted and protected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) A political environment in which power is exercised by a democratically-elected leadership,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and where the military is subordinate to civil authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) A state that empowers the active participation of all Ugandans in the governance process,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and works to meet their basic needs such as health, education, shelter, clean water and food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) A country that is secure and united, where everybody is free to participate in actions to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>develop economically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) A nation that has the capacity to defend herself from external threats and to maintain her</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Sovereignty, Independence, and Territorial Integrity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) A country at peace with her neighbours and supports regional/global efforts to maintain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peace and stability, and which fulfills her international obligations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: White Paper on Defence Transformation, 2004*

3 The previous governments did not clearly delineate in official documents what Uganda's security interests were.
According to the above figure, national security can be seen from two general perspectives. On the one hand, it covers the traditional military and state centric view (parts e and f) while on the other, it is defined rather rigidly to cover a wide range of perceived non-military issues. This study seeks to examine the last two national security interests mentioned in the figure (e and f). A nation that has the capacity to defend itself against external threats and to maintain its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity ought to have both a clearly structured security sector and communication channels. As noted earlier, though, the system is characterised by inadequate information flow and disarticulated communication links. To be able to address these problems, Uganda has initiated development programs within the MOD and particularly the UPDF to build capacity and to professionalize the army in preparation for its multifaceted roles at national, regional and international levels.

Regional and international interests

Museveni’s coming to power in 1986, following a time of civil and guerrilla warfare, greatly influenced the nature of regional relations. Firstly, the civil and guerrilla warfare had had severe repercussions for the GLR as a whole because, as Chretien argues, the Museveni regime served as a prelude to the general conflagration in the 1990s. Chretien describes Museveni as follows:

Museveni ultimately imposed his will on each of his neighbours; he was feared by the Kenyan and Zairian dictators...; he irritated the Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, whose protégé vats

Ugandan leader despised. 396

Given these kind of perceptions of Museveni, it is little wonder that all his efforts to establish regional relations, regional cooperation or regional integration were always perceived by other leaders as being motivated by ulterior motives. In fact, Chretien attributes the change in the region’s established order to Museveni’s coming to power in 1986: this event convinced the existing regional leaders, like Mobutu and Habyarimana, that it would spark off attempts to


restore the rule of law and to initiate dangerous competition for political power.' In retrospect, it is clear that Museveni's coming to power did truly spark off political power struggles in the region. What emerges from this analysis is that Museveni's coming to power did not necessarily result into the political struggles in other countries but rather that these moves to gain power by competing groups was prevalent and became subtle after Museveni's ascension to power.

At the regional and international level, Uganda's commitment to peace and stability was prioritized as its core interest, as was cooperation in all regional and international initiatives of peace and development. This is evidenced by its undertaking of new military programs and opening up of many bilateral relations with states in Africa and, in fact, with the rest of the world. In its immediate neighbour of Sudan, Museveni's relations with Al Bashir were dependent on how Museveni would relate with the SPLA. Museveni's choice to support the latter was to have a negative impact on the relations between Museveni and Al Bashir. Museveni's relations with the regional leaders were based on a tacit reciprocity arrangement in which they helped each other to address each other's security concerns. The phrase "You watch my back while I watch yours" characterised these regional relations. Museveni's relations with the RPF, AFDL and SPLA compromised his relations with the Rwandan government, Mobutu government.

In other liberation struggles elsewhere in Africa, Uganda provided support to the Africa National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) in their fight against South Africa's apartheid regime. The ANC had a force of four thousand fighters who trained at Kaweweta in Luweero district, while the PAC force of only forty-nine were trained at Kabamba.

At the diplomatic level, Uganda is a signatory to many regional and international conventions, optional protocols and declarations that are aimed at preserving peace and solving the security problems that affect the GLR region as well as the international system as a whole. The Kampala Document (1991), the Summits on the Congo, the Conference on Security, Stability and Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA, 2000), NEPAD (2001), Intergovernmental Authority

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398 These revelations were made by Amama Mbabazi (Former Minister of Defence) to the International Court of Justice court session held on 18 April 2005 at the Hague.
399 Numerous summits were held in regard to the GLR conflicts, for example, the Victoria falls summit, the Lusaka Peace Accord, the SADC-Non Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Durban and the summit in Mauritius to mention but a few; however, a detailed account of these cannot be discussed here for purposes of brevity, but they do represent a positive approach of the GLR states towards peace in the region.
on Development (IGAD) (2003) and the Dar es Salaam Declaration (2004) all demonstrate Uganda's core security interests. Uganda has undertaken joint security ventures to finding solutions to security concerns in the GLR. It has participated in summits, made its position known on the region's key security concerns, specifically on Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. For example, it participated in the Summits at the Victoria Falls, at the Southern African Development Community-Non Aligned Movement (SADC-NAM) (Durban) and in Mauritius, when efforts were underway to end the war in the DRC. It has also been involved in joint military commissions aimed at coming up with common standards on security issues. For example, MEDFLAG a US-Kenya, Uganda and Tanzanian joint medical exercise that gave medical care to the citizens of each of the member countries. Other projects are Exercise Natural Fires, which commenced in 2004, Joint Range Exercise-range shooting for Marksmen, and a Joint sports exercise initially scheduled for 2005 is underway.

Under the regional efforts towards peace and stability, Uganda supports the establishment of the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), which is a unit of the African Stand-by Force responsible for addressing security problems and charged with security operations where insecurity breaks out and threatens the lives and peace in general.' EASBRIG comprises a regional division force stationed at the Gadaffi Barracks in Jinja (Uganda). The region is also developing a continental early warning system to address conflicts at an early stage to avoid instability. This international engagement has reiterated Uganda's commitment to regional security. Similarly, the US in 1997 provided Uganda with a contingent of American troops to train a battalion of the UPDF in peacekeeping in Africa!' The US also sent more troops to train the UPDF in different types of training and provided equipment that was intended to enhance Uganda's capability, with the aim of enhancing its capacity to serve as a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan and the region as a whole.' Russia, Israel, America and China are also training the UPDF in different aspects of security management.

Whereas the GLR states have not signed any defence pacts, they do seem to have semblances of quasi-regional alliance systems and bilateral defence pacts. An example of this is the joint military intervention in the DRC and the diplomatic intervention in Burundi's intra-state conflict. These

400 See the detailed report of the Summit of Eastern African Heads of State and Government on the establishment of the EASBRIG held in Addis Ababa, 2005.
are all indications of generally agreed frameworks of operation. These quasi defence alliances are not often sustained, though, firstly because of poor bilateral relations and secondly, because of personal differences between leaders over specific aspects of security, like common strategies or the best way to approach intrastate or inter-state conflicts.

Under the Nairobi Protocol and Declaration which became effective in 2004, Uganda has joined the rest of the GLR states and the Horn of Africa as a member to curb the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). Uganda has a National Focal Point Committee, which established a National Action Plan in 2001 to collect and destroy illicit firearms. This has supplemented its disarmament project in Eastern Uganda, although there are still many challenges. Together with other states in the region, Uganda has established a national survey and mapping strategy and an information gathering strategy through which information on illicit weapons is gathered.

Currently, Uganda is considering sending troops (under the auspices of IGAD and the AU) to war-ravaged Somalia—a proposition that is contested by some sections of the population particularly the opposition. Those opposed to the intervention argue that Uganda's image in intervention has been compromised by events in its intervention in the DRC. The negative publicity regarding the proposed intervention in Somalia has been attributed to Uganda's loss of the case to DRC at the International Court of Justice regarding its intervention in the DRC.

At the international level, the increase in transnational forces, particularly non-state actors like terrorists, drug traffickers and people trafficking internationally, has compelled Uganda to review its international interests and their influence on its national security. Uganda has thus joined the rest of the world in fighting terrorism, particularly after it was subjected to terrorist attacks between 1996 and 1999. It has ratified multiple international conventions and their respective optional protocols. It has also participated in regional as well as international fights against disease and arms proliferation and engaged in peace missions. For example, it sent peacekeepers to Liberia in 1996. It provides operational strategic bases for UNSC peacekeeping programmes, for example, by making available an air base for the United Nations Mission in the Democratic

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Interview with UG/MIA 15 held in Kampala on 4 October 2004 at the conference on The Security Challenges of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Africa, held in Kampala, 2-10 October 2004.

Actually, Uganda has already deployed in Somalia, despite warnings from Eritrea and Ethiopia that it had done so prematurely and would suffer severe consequences.
Republic of Congo (MONUC) and UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peace missions at Entebbe airport and other airstrips when the need arises.

Elsewhere, Uganda has established international relations with Asia, particularly with China. At a meeting with a Chinese Deputy Director of Information General Li Zhongli, the UPDF reiterated its interest in engaging in security locally and regionally because of its strategic role in the region. The UPDF Commander-in-Chief stressed the UPDF's desire to upgrade the military to match standards that were required to undertake international peace operations and to enable the UPDF to be a stabilizing force in the region."

From this discussion, it is evident that Uganda's commitment to regional peace and security has been part of its broader regional peace program. Uganda's assumption that it has a strategic role in the region and the military support it has received from the US and other states to its army have bolstered its military ego and emphasised even further its perceived role in the region. This perception of itself has greatly influenced its foreign policy behaviour. One feature of the regional relations is the belief that signing protocols and agreements and setting up a regional force and regional bodies would lead to successful mitigation of conflicts in the region, which has proved impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, it demonstrates a willingness to employ peaceful means to resolve conflicts and the willingness to cooperate in face of common threats to peace in the region. Metz would argue that such willingness to cooperate is peculiar to the African culture, which places much value on collective action through regional organisations and sharing of problems as a region."

Uganda's threat perceptions

At the official level, Uganda highlights nine internal and external threat categories. The three most critical threats relate to external factors and include the threat of a "full scale invasion" by the army of a neighbouring state or "cross-border raids" by smaller insurgency forces. Illegal movements of people such as refugees or criminal elements that could disrupt security and

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5. For a detailed discussion on how African culture is leading towards regional security cooperation, see S. Metz, "Refining American Strategy in Africa", in Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, February 2000.
hostile political and economic policies of other states are also included on the threat list."

Among the potential internal threats acknowledged by government poor governance and political power competition, which seem more severe because they tend to disrupt the proper function of government. Other potential threats are environmental disasters and resource constraints that could easily affect the livelihood of the people and affect the informal and formal economic base of the people.

Competition over natural resources at an intrastate level is highlighted too, but it manifests mostly in ethnic conflicts over land and, more recently, in conflicts between government and the people over exploitation of forests and other natural resources in the name of development. A significant aspect of natural resource competition that was excluded from the threat list, although it has already had serious consequences, is the slow but subtle conflict over water resources (mainly with regard to the Nile), which is affecting the broader human as well as national security of the state. Already the impact of the Nile on the generation of hydroelectric power (HEP) for industries and domestic use is causing many disruptions. The discharge needed to produce the HEP from the Owen Falls dam was initially regulated but has now greatly deteriorated, which could lead to further reduction in industrial output. It has been argued that, given the current reduction in the water levels, Uganda faces more severe threats than do any of the other Nile riparian states, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi or even Rwanda for that matter."

Government also highlights social polarization as a critical internal threat, which it attributes to colonial legacy and neo-colonialism. Ironically, government does not consider common banditry, political repression, armed insurgency and civil disobedience as critical. The White Paper does not even include terrorism as a threat, even though this document was developed in an era when terrorism was affecting the region. All of the above factors have in fact been disruptive and continue to be a threat to the state as a whole, even though they are not included in the White Paper.

These threats have been extremely problematic at both internal and external level because they have resulted in a lack of trust between states and in the limited sharing of security information between states. This has consequently limited interactions between states and, worst of all it has

compelled states to harbour each other’s rebel groups as bargaining chips or security ransoms. This issue will be discussed in the following chapters. Because of the nature of the threats just outlined, Uganda in its White Paper of 2004 developed a new comprehensive security policy and strategy that addresses these threats at a regional diplomatic level, at a bilateral level, as well as at a national level. To understand Uganda’s interventionist foreign policy, it is imperative that its interventionist episodes be examined. In the section below, Uganda’s interventions in the GLR have been summarised with a view to provide a favourable background to the discussions in the subsequent chapters.

**Uganda’s interventionist episodes in the Great Lakes Region**

It was discussed in the preceding section that Uganda’s threat perceptions were mainly external. These greatly determined his foreign policy formulations. In this section a brief overview of Museveni’s interventions into the neighbouring states is done. When Museveni came to power, the interventionist foreign policy he adopted in the region was motivated by multiple factors. From the time he came to power in 1986, those who had lost power to him challenged Museveni’s regime. While others formed rebel groups to fight his regime, others joined the opposition with the hope that they could influence his policies. The Ugandan rebel groups that formed used Sudan, DRC and later Rwanda as bases from which they launched their attacks on Uganda. During this time the GLR was also characterised by dysfunctional states that had inter-state and intra-state conflicts that put the region in a precarious situation. In reaction to this, Uganda had to reconstruct itself and review its policies particularly the foreign policy to ensure that it contained the situation so that it embarks on other development policies. One such foreign policy was intervention. Uganda intervened in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC as a means to address the GLR regional challenges.

Uganda intervened in Rwanda in October 1990 and continued through the regional initiatives to support the peaceful resolution of the intra-ethnic conflict. Attempts at signing a power-sharing agreement in 1993 between the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda followed suit. The rebels and government all agreed to the establishment of a transitional government in which the two ethnic

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*In interviews with the RDC 1 and DISO 3 it was emphasised that there is a strong link between the internal and external threats, particularly because the poor information flow between states regarding the movement of dissidents and other non-state actors has affected the security of states, especially in neighbouring states. Similar views were expressed in a cross border meeting held between Rwanda and Uganda in August 2005 (Minutes available on request).*
groups would share power despite the demographic imbalance. Unfortunately, the agreement also known as the *Convention of Government* did not hold. Instead, genocide broke out following the plane crash in which President Habyarimana died in 1994. Uganda intervened again to stop the genocide.

Ugandan’s overt intervention in Burundi commenced in 1986 and became more pronounced in 1993 after the assassination of president Ndadaye. Museveni through the regional initiative urged Barundi to stop fighting but the ethnic war ravaged on. Initiatives to resolve the conflict in Burundi became internationalised and in 1995 the Cairo Conference co-sponsored by Jimmy Carter was held with the express aim of establishing a regional group that would initiate the peace process. The Arusha group was formed and entrusted with the responsibility of mediating between the two dominate ethnic groups the Hutu and Tutsi. The Tunis Conference held in Tunisia followed shortly and during this conference, Nyerere was appointed to head the negotiations for the Burundi Peace process. Whilst the negotiations were on track, the former president Pierre Buyoya of Burundi overthrew the Convention government forcing the regional peace initiative to impose sanctions on Burundi. In 1997, the peace initiative made head way as exemplified by the Pre-Ceasefire Agreement between Buyoya and Nyangoma the Hutu rebel. In 1998, Buyoya together with the National Assembly agreed to have an internal partnership for peace. This marked the beginning of the Burundi Peace Negotiations in Arusha under the auspices of Nyerere.

Uganda’s intervention in the DRC started in 1996 when rebel leader then, Laurent Kabila attacked Zaire. Uganda’s intervention had been requested by Kabila when he was a rebel and later when be became president. Kabila needed military assistance to enable him bolster his security in his vast state. Both presidents had mutually agreed that while Museveni used eastern DRC as a base to fight Ugandan rebels that had positioned themselves in eastern DRC, Uganda would also protect Kabila from Zairian rebels. This permission had been sealed with a Protocol signed by both presidents in 1998. From November 1996, Uganda had suffered ADF attacks on it its first attack from the ADF a rebel group allegedly supported by Sudan and Islamic fundamentalists like Al Qaeda. The rebels attacked Western Uganda and continuously used the DRC as a base from which they launched their attacks.

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410 Documentary evidence puts Uganda’s intervention in Zaire to 1993 when it promoted low intensity conflict at the border areas with Zaire. In this study 1996 is the working date for the discussions but that archival materials has been used to cover the intervention from its inception.
In a series of attacks that followed ADF were able to abduct, kill and maim Ugandans. In reaction, Uganda sent in its troops to control the DRC government installations, such as airports, airfields and big towns in eastern DRC. The rationale for this was that Uganda had to ensure that all the multiple supply lines were blocked, destroyed or under regular surveillance. The intervention in DRC in 1998 had been agreed upon between Kabila and Museveni as well as the third president of Rwanda Kagame. However, following disagreements between presidents Kabila and Museveni and Kagame, a full war broke out between Uganda and Rwanda on one side against the DRC that had been an ally. This war that ravaged on for four years drew in many other states either in support of the DRC or on the side of Uganda and Rwanda. In the next chapter, an analysis of Uganda’s interventionist foreign policy will be done drawing on four main theoretical frameworks, Constructivism, Poliheurism, Utilitarian Liberal policy and the Security Dilemma. See Appendix A the chronicle for a detailed breakdown of the interventions and attempts at resolving them in all the states where Uganda intervened.

4.4 Summary

The aim of the foregoing discussion was threefold. The first aim was to give a brief history of Uganda’s political development from colonial rule to the postcolonial era. The second aim was to examine Uganda’s security framework and its operation, and the last was to discuss Uganda’s security interests in the wider regional framework. What emerges from the history is Uganda’s regional division, which exacerbates the ethnic differences that have characterised Uganda’s political development. The power shifts between the Northerners and the Southerner have had a serious impact on the security of the state and are to blame for the longest civil war in the region, viz. the so-called "Northern Question". The chapter has also shown how Uganda’s entire security structural framework is characterised by strong presidential and high military personal influence in decision-making on security related issues. Whilst the Constitution is explicit on procedural matters concerning the army and decision-making on matters of national security, it is evident that this legalistic approach is not often used in reality. Even when the Constitution allows the UPDF not to follow the decisions of the presidency, the actual practice is that they do. They believe the President is above the Constitution when it comes to the army’s activities, and furthermore believe that they are responsible only to the President. In fact, there is lack of a clear policy on how communication flows from one section to the other, and many of the operations seem to be based on tacit policies. Because Uganda is a presidential system, the institutions are...
set up in such a way as to encourage a concentration of power at the top. Uganda’s success in addressing the threats highlighted above would therefore depend greatly on a clear command structure through all the ranks, and an explicit operational structure on the ground. The chapter has described a security framework that is highly centralised, which is common to many revolutionary governments. It has also demonstrated how Uganda's high regard in regional and international security matters has shaped its perceptions of itself. Uganda regards itself as of strategic importance to the GLR region as a whole. It is evident from this chapter that, much as Uganda has an important role to play in the region's geopolitics, it is equally vulnerable because of the anarchic regional environment. The chapter has also provided an overview of the interventions undertaken by Uganda in the GLR. In the next chapters, an examination of Uganda's interventions will be done with a view to establishing a comprehensive theoretical explanation of its interventionist foreign policy.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided the basis for drawing some general conclusions about Uganda's security sector framework. The security sector under the Museveni administration (compared to all the leaders before him) demonstrates quite literally (from the organogram) a highly organised and well structured security sector with an implicit smooth flow of information, vertical decision making structures, and decisions that are made after proper consultation. In reality, though, decision-making does not seem to be that systematic and in fact it is highly personalised. From the views expressed by the interviewees, it is evident that procurement of military materials is done in an adhoc manner, which would be representative of other policy decisions across the board. Based on its declared foreign policy, however, Uganda under the Museveni administration perceives itself as having a regional role to play and to be committed to cooperation with other states in security matters.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONSTRUCTIVISM: NORMS AND TRENDS IN INTERVENTION

If the neighbour's house catches fire, the fire can spread also to your own house; if there is fire in the next house you get out and see what is happening... "

[I] don't accept Western guarantees. The people of African must guarantee their own future.

5.0 Introduction

In this chapter, Uganda's motives for intervening in its neighbouring states are analysed. Drawing on the constructivist framework the study aims at answering three critical questions. Was Uganda's interventionist foreign policy part of an emerging trend of interventionism in Africa? Did Uganda intervene in its western neighbouring states for altruistic reasons? To what extent could we argue that Uganda's interventions were aimed at gaining a hegemonic position in the GLR region? Constructivism is presented as an alternative approach to the dominant traditional approaches of Liberalism and Realism in explaining international relations.

The chapter first discusses Constructivism and its application to intervention. In the following section, specific interventions that conform to Constructivism are discussed to demonstrate the relevance of the attributes of Constructivism in explaining intervention. This is followed by a discussion of the relevance of Constructivism as an approach to studying intervention in the Great Lakes Region (GLR). The central argument of this chapter is that leaders intervene in the affairs of other states because this has emerged as an acceptable route: as was explained in the previous chapters, norms and culture have emerged in the post-Cold War era, which have led to intervention becoming a common feature of the international system. More specifically, it is argued that, in the GLR, Uganda's intervention are part of the norm that has been set, firstly by the challenges of the international system and secondly, by the demands of the region. It is argued that Uganda's motives were part of a general trend emerging in Africa, in terms of which states feel obliged to intervene to prevent humanitarian disaster and ensure that peace prevails in the region as a whole. Of course, the focus on humanitarian considerations as motives of

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411 Museveni's address to the Sixth Parliament on 16 September 1998, Hansard, p. 4907.
412 President Museveni's statement at the National Mourning Ceremony of Dr John Garang, the SPLA leader at Kololo Independence Grounds, Uganda, following the death of Garang on 30 July 2005, available on request.
intervention is inconsistent with the dominant theories like Realism, which focus on the centrality of national security in explaining interventions, or the Utilitarian Liberal view, which interpret every intervention in economic terms.

5.1 Constructivism and Intervention

Constructivism advances norms, identity and culture as the three salient variables that influence the foreign policy behaviour of states. Firstly, constructivists attribute state behaviour to the social nature of international politics, which creates a normative understanding among state actors that they should behave in a certain way, particularly when conditions such as genocide, environmental disaster or violent conflict emerge to threaten humanity. In essence, constructivists argue that what states do in international relations, the interests they hold and the structure within which they operate are all defined by social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions! In other words, states have a social role to play towards each other; therefore, they are permitted to intervene in each other's affairs to address a precarious situation. This kind of responsibility assigned to states translates into a norm that they adhere to at given times and in specific conditions. The constructivist approach further posits that norms operate within well-defined acceptable parameters; these state explicitly who the actors should be (in this case, the state remains the key actor although constructivists also acknowledge that international organisations and the "international community" are actors too) and what these actors should and should not do under specific circumstances.

The second perspective advanced is the salience of identity and culture in international relations rather than material considerations like power and economic considerations. It is argued that states project themselves in ways that are distinct and assign themselves roles that become identified with them. The states assume that their identity, particularly referring to the way they carry out activities, is distinct and therefore presume they have special roles or responsibilities that are uniquely assigned to them by the international system! As earlier noted, states believe that their actions (as prescribed by their identity) are publicly understood standards for action that help address particular situations in a generally upon agreed way! Lastly, they argue that,

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actors attach meaning to their identities, practices and interactions' which emerge into a culture. They try to adhere to this culture and behave in a way that is mutually acceptable to each other. 417

Constructivists' central thesis is that security of states should be understood from cultural and institutional rather than material considerations like economic and power interests. When states intervene in others, therefore, it is argued that they are motivated by considerations of national security and because the culture and norm that is characteristic of their environment or peculiar to them as individual actors compels them to. They argue that states will intervene in others because they have assigned themselves roles to be custodians of security on behalf of others implying that they can intervene in others' states with the intention of solving an outstanding problem.

Whereas the constructivists like realists acknowledge the centrality of national security considerations, their perspective is inconsistent with the realist claim that attributes motivations of interventions to the anarchic nature of the world, which increases spirals of hostility among states and result into war. On the contrary, they argue that states' behaviour that results in insecurity of others or their own states is a result of those states' social practices that reproduce egoistic and militaristic mind-sets. 418 In relation to intervention, therefore, states will intervene in situations where social practices of states have produced precarious situations for humanity. Therefore, they perceive themselves as having an obligation to intervene because the social structure of the international system expects them to and the conditions of the target states warrant intervention. In summary, the constructivist approach to interpreting interventionist foreign policies of states is relevant to the African situation. The approach clearly demonstrates how norms develop within regions or individual states and the identities these actors develop over time. The trend of interventionism that has emerged in the region could be attributed to these developments.

5.2 New African Philosophy
Uganda intervened in Rwanda from 1990 up to 1995 when municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in which President Kagame became the president. It intervened

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417 K. Fierke, "Critical Methodology and Constructivism" p.122
in Burundi starting in 1986 but more markedly in 1993 following the assassination of the first democratically-elected Hutu President Ndadaye and 1996 when it called for sanctions against President Buyoya. The intervention continued up to 2005 when the second democratically-elected Hutu President Pierre Nkrunzinza took power. Similarly archival records indicate that Uganda’s intervention in the DRC and DRC incursions in Uganda started in 1993, but the general literature has put the intervention as starting in 1996 and continuing through to 2003 when it officially withdrew from the areas it controlled in Eastern DRC. 419

In the three states -- Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC Uganda’s motives for intervention were similar in some aspects, while in others they were specific to the particular intervenee. One common feature of all these interventions is the fact that they were motivated by the prevailing norm in which states were intervening in others to address certain issues. A trend emerged in the Post Cold War era in which Africa issues were no longer of primary importance to the superpowers. The international community ignored the conflicts that had ensued between states or within states. Because Africa was no longer on the priority list of the European powers, the US or the international community in general, this resulted in an undertaking by African states to address their own problems. This new undertaking, popularly referred as the "New African Philosophy", marked the beginning of an African approach to their problems. This new philosophy has translated into a culture and a norm that African states and regional groupings have embraced to address their concerns in the region.

Uganda's interventions have been broadly attributed to its centrality in this new philosophy and the identity it has constructed for itself within the region as a whole. Some interviewees argued that Museveni’s interventionist foreign policy must be seen from his commitment to the new philosophy of African solutions to African problems. One respondent argued as follows,

*Museveni’s leadership was visible in Africa and the GLR. He was very crucial and extremely positive about conflict resolution involving Africans who best knew what was best for them. He had not only mediated in Burundi but had been instrumental in Somalia and Sudan. Uganda’s interventions had a lot to do with Museveni’s personality because Uganda could have had a president who feels that it was not wise to invoke the state in conflicts in neighbouring states. Museveni, on the other hand, was very positive about conflict resolution in the region."*

419 For a chronological review of key events in the GLR regional relations, see the chronicle appended as A.
420 Interview with UG/FA/BU 3 held in Bujumbura Burundi on the 27th October 2005.
The fact that Museveni was the "first guerrilla" to overthrow a sitting government and that he brought "peace" to the country, was seen as one of the success stories of this new African philosophy of African leaders solving African problems. Museveni also demonstrated, albeit through protracted guerrilla warfare [which is not exactly a nice way of solving problems] that he was capable of resolving Uganda's political crisis and stopping massive human rights violations. In addition, he led Uganda to significant economic growth when it subscribed to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were advocated by the IMF and World Bank for developing nations. These achievements led to Uganda becoming a model against which other states were measured to establish whether the SAPs were viable. It has been reported that Museveni's Structural Adjustment Programs have performed remarkably well. Growth averaged 7% between 1986 and 1996, reaching as high as 11.2% in 1996. Inflation had been brought into the single digits and, in 1996, it stood at 5 to 7%, having decreased from more than 200% in the pervious years. The per capita gross domestic product had approached an all-time high at $290, regaining ground lost during the 1970s. Museveni had demonstrated a capacity to deal with crises and to bring about peace. His achievements in restoring order in Uganda came to be associated with what was referred to as the "New Breed" of African Leaders, and he was often regarded as the new "beacon of hope" by the US.  

Museveni's innumerable achievements in the political arena compelled him to intervene in other states, ostensibly to share his experience with them and to assist other states to deal with civil wars in their liberation struggles. His commitment to the new philosophy of "African solutions to African problems" boosted his ego and, as his protege Kagame described him, Museveni was overwhelmed by his importance in the region and felt that he had to be part of all geopolitical events! He was at the helm of finding viable strategies that would lead to stability in the GLR


423 Interview with Burundi embassy official 2 held on 27 October 2005 in Bujumbura. There was significant unanimity among the interviewees that Museveni believed that he understood the problems of Africa better and was convinced he knew how best to solve them. Kagame believed that Museveni elevated himself too much and argued that, "Museveni assumed that he knows everything about everything, every time... " See Appendix 8 for Kagame's position regarding Museveni's position in regional politics. Similar views were expressed by IO/MONUC in an Interview held in Kampala on the 21 September 2005.
region in particular and in Africa in general, especially through his contribution to the general debate on peace and good governance in Africa.” His guerrilla warfare style and tactics were copied by other African rebel leaders and neighbouring states dissidents with mixed results. Leaders like Kagame, Zenawi and Kabila also used Museveni’s methods to come to power. A new perspective emerged amongst these leaders with regard to how Africa would solve its problems. They all subscribed to the view that Africa had the capacity to solve its own problems rather than having to rely on European states / on the West to solve them. In the next section, Uganda’s interventions in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are discussed.

In Burundi, Museveni engaged with Burundi as early as 1986 when he came to power. His overt intervention in the ethnic conflict was in 1993 when the first democratically elected Hutu President Ndadaye was assassinated. He premised his intervention on the basis that he understood the ethnic conflict better than the existing political leadership and that he could use his experience in dealing with both ethnic groups to arrive at an acceptable solution. Firstly, he insisted that a diplomatic rather than military approach be used to resolve this conflict, as Kenya had suggested. Diplomatic means would greatly reduce the possibility of continued violence in the region.’ Secondly, those involved in the negotiations were originally opposed to Buyoya’s participation in the process, but Museveni warned against his exclusion. He argued that Buyoya was invaluable for the Burundi peace process and that he had to be included if peace had to hold.’ He further argued that Buyoya had been in control for such a long time, that he could not easily be ignored without dire results.’ Buyoya’s supporters included many royalists and those in charge of the army. Whereas Buyoya was feared and hated by the Hutu as well as by his own ethnic tribe, the Tutsi, he nonetheless commandeered power and had a section of Hutu who revered him.’ It is against this background of Buyoya’s strength and powerful influence in the political system that Museveni insisted on the use of diplomacy to resolve the ethnic struggle for power in order to prevent an impending genocide. This intervention eventually yielded positive results.

425 He was chair to the Kampala Document, which says that peace is sustainable if democracy is practiced. The forum convened in Kampala on the 19-22 May 1991. The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa was an initiative of the African Leadership Forum, which is comprised of former heads of state and prominent Africans from many countries.
426 Interview with UG/FA 4 held on 18 December 2005 at Kampala, Ministry office.
427 In an explanation of Museveni’s position on Burundi by a UG/FA 4, who argued that Museveni had carefully outlined the issue of Buyoya to the members of the negotiation team during the proceedings of the negotiations. Interview held on the 18 December 2005 at the Ministry Offices.
428 Ibid
429 Ibid

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In 1996, three years later however, when Buyoya overthrew the "Convention Government" that had been put in place by the GLR states earlier negotiations, Museveni requested that the GLR impose sanctions on Buyoya. Museveni’s rationale for the sanctions was three-fold. Firstly, Buyoya had contravened the principle of peace to which the GLR subscribed. Secondly, the sanctions would prevent the genocide that had allegedly been planned by either ethnic group to annihilate each other. Lastly, the sanctions would force the Buyoya government, the opposition parties, and all insurgent groups to return to the negotiations that Buyoya’s coup had interrupted. The sanctions were accordingly instituted on 31 June 1996 by the rest of the GLR states.

This decision to impose sanctions on Burundi (referred to as a "tactic" by interviewees!) did not only earn Museveni respect from the rebel groups and political parties, but also ensured that the warring factions gained confidence in the peace process. This was because the Tutsi, who had hoped that Museveni would favour them in the peace negotiations, were disappointed with his impartiality and shocked that he would treat Buyoya (a Tutsi), with whom Museveni had ethnic affinity, as if he were a "Hutu". The sanctions forced Buyoya and Leonard Nyangoma, a Hutu rebel leader, to return to the negotiations. Thereafter, a pre-cease-fire agreement was signed, in which they agreed to an Internal Partnership for Peace. Nyerere was chosen by the GLR initiative to head the peace negotiations, which would be held in Arusha. The selection of Nyerere was not acceptable to some Tutsi who feared that Nyerere would be partial and favour the Hutu. Nevertheless, the negotiations commenced. Some Tutsi protagonists involved in the negotiations insisted that Nyerere was biased and initially refused to participate in the talks. It was fortunate for these groups, then, that Nyerere’s illness required a new head to replace him. At first, President Mandela of South Africa was his replacement, but he was in turn replaced by South Africa’s Vice-President Jacob Zuma, also for health reasons.

The success of the peace process marked by the completion of the Burundi Arusha Peace Agreement in 2004, and the subsequent transition to democracy following the elections held in

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430 The interviewees in Burundi were convinced that Museveni being a "Hima", an ethnic category that is close to the Tutsi, would side with the Tutsi, and even when the Tutsi held a wrong position he should have simply supported them because they were Tutsi.

431 Historical facts to fill the gaps of the interviewees on Burundi were drawn from a first-hand report by Fabienne Hara. See a detailed account of the role of non governmental organisations as third party mediators in F. Hara, "Burundi: A Case for Parallel Diplomacy", in Crocker, C., Hampson, F. O. and Aall, P., Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), pp. 135-158.
2005 has been attributed to Museveni's role in the negotiations. Burundian respondents argued that, without Museveni at the negotiation table, no one would have been able to convince the Tutsi and Hutu to share political power and to sign the Arusha Peace Agreement. Also, because many of the Burundi rebel groups respected him, Museveni used this to get them to accept the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement, which they had previously refused to endorse. In the end, he succeeded in convincing nineteen rebel groups and political parties to sign the peace agreement. These included National Council for the Defence of Democracy/ Front for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD/FDD), which was the strongest opposition to the Ndayizeyi government. Others included Rally for Democracy, Economic and Social Development (RADESH), National Liberation Front (FROLINA), National Liberation Froces-Icanzo (FNL-Icanzo), Palipe-Agakiza, Party of National Recovery (PARENA), Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens (MRC), Union for National Congress (UPRONA), Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), and MSP-Inkinzo parties. They signed the global peace agreement in spite of their reservations. Museveni was able to convince all the warring parties to settle for an ethnic distribution in the army of 50% Tutsi/50% Hutu in order to prevent genocide and to ensure sustainable peace. He also made them appreciate the fact that peace is indivisible, in the sense that one ethnic group cannot obtain peace if another does not have it. He argued that it was thus incumbent upon them to embrace the peace process and develop their state. Museveni's success was attributed to his diplomacy, cultural connections, and transnational links. One political party leader argued that:

Museveni it was very big role because I cart tell you tun for that signature all big presidents of this area and the world like Clinton etc was there. It was wry hard to get the signatories of our political groups. And I am tell you that; it's Museveni and Kagame who solved the problem probably because zee are ah... Uganda even zee do not have a border with Uganda something is there which can be... eh... it's like that zee are brothers, zee are not eh... you know historically, I think, some Burundi people Wen to Uganda and we have many things together in terms of culture and behaviour and then as zee are like Rwanda. Rwandans is in Uganda and Uganda cannot be happy getting Rwanda stable and Burundi in war. So in terms of sub-region Uganda has a wry big Aux and I

432 Interview with a UG/FA/BU 4 held on the 29 October 2005 at Bujumbura.
433 See Appendix 9 for the table of some of the political parties in Burundi that engaged in the peace negotiations. Some had military wings, while others did not. This enabled an easier approach and negotiations because those that did not have military wings had no force to fall back on and so were forced to accept the settlements.
434 Burundi Opposition respondents insist that the final Arusha Peace Agreement they signed was not the working document that they had originally debated. They demanded that issues that had not been included in the final document be addressed, and signed with that understanding. Apparently, these issues have not been included in the implementation and have become a central point of concern.
435 Ibid.
436 Interview with a UG/FA/BU 1 held in Kampala on 29 July 2005 and 10 August 2005. Similar views were expressed by UG/FA/BU 3 Burundi Embassy official 3 in an interview in Bujumbura on 27 October 2005
think Museveni knows that and was obliged in teens of funds, in terms of cooperation because in this years you cannot be alone even you think you area big country ... 437

Some of the Tutsi interviewees were vehemently opposed to Museveni's 'handing over power to the Hutu', as they referred to it. One interviewee had this to say:

investigations be done to establish who killed Ndadaye and ensure that any person responsible for genocide in 1993 and thereafter was not given political poser. He favoured Hutu against the Tutsi, because Hutu is majority and they call that democracy... democracy is different from ethnicity...

The person who made this statement was clearly oblivious of what Museveni had done, namely, to insist on sanctions against Buyoya, a 'fellow Tutsi', 439 and that this position was indicative of his commitment to the peace process. The claim that Museveni's negotiation team had not set up a full inquiry into Ndadaye's assassination, which would bring the culprits to book and prevent them from gaining power in the new government, was equally baseless. Another interviewee argued that those who assassinated President Ndadaye were Tutsi, and that the Tutsi's conspiracy theory that was designed to convince the world that the radical Hutu had stage-managed the assassination so that the Tutsi would be blamed for it, was not true.' The interviewee further argued that denying the culprits (if they were identified) political power was immaterial at the time, since both the Hutu and the Tutsi were implicated in the assassination. An inquiry into the assassination would not only have stalled the peace process, but would also have undercut any achievements that the peace initiative team had made.' Furthermore, the claim that Museveni had supported the Hutu against the Tutsi was also unfounded because of his fundamental argument that peace could not be achieved on divisive ethnic lines 442 Museveni had insisted throughout that, if peace were to come to Burundi, it would only last if the two

437 Interview held in Bujumbura UG/FA/BU 4 on 27 and 28 October 2005 with a former political party leader currently working for government. The interviewee's political party did not get any seat in the new Burundian government, yet he still cherished the role that Museveni as an individual played. He was a little disgruntled that Museveni had not helped them (Tutsi) parties in the negotiations but appreciated the position that Museveni was in.
438 Interview with UG/FA/BU 3 held on 27 October 2005, in Bujumbura.
439 There is a general view in Uganda that Museveni is a tutsi and so is expected to support tutsi wherever they are.
440 Interview with UG/FA 4 held on 18 December 2005, in Kampala.
441 Ibid.
442 Some Burundi Tutsi interviewed were convinced that Museveni had sided with the Hutu because of the falling out of the Tutsi leadership in Rwanda with Museveni. He no longer trusted the Tutsi. However, Uganda officials involved in the negotiations and Burundi's chief negotiator insisted that Museveni in Burundi was impartial and believed that what was good for the Tutsi was good for the Hutu, so the Tutsi insistence to continue dominating Burundi was not feasible in the proposed new Burundi: if peace was to hold, both had to share power.
dominant ethnic groups accepted that they had to work together. This position has since yielded positive results, although it is still too early to judge the success of the peace process and the commitment to the new government. In steering the Burundi peace negotiations up to their positive completion, Museveni was inadvertently assigning himself a role of arbiter, negotiator and peacemaker in the region. With regard to Uganda's role in ending the Burundi conflict, it should be noted, though, that other actors (i.e. regional leaders, non-governmental organisations and faith-based organisations) were also part of the diplomatic negotiations. Their role was crucial, although an analysis of their contribution is beyond the scope of this study.

In Rwanda, unlike in Burundi, Uganda's initial intervention was covert and in support of the Rwandan Tutsi rebels who had invaded Rwanda in 1990 using Uganda as a military base. Museveni feigned ignorance of the initial attack that the RPF had launched on Rwanda's Hutu dominated government and insisted that he did not support the attack: in his address to Parliament he argued as follows:

"Earlier on, I was telling you that our involvement with the problems of the Great Lakes Region started with Rwanda. 4,000 young Rwandese who had been part of our army, again contrary to my advice - because I tried to advice them not to go into Rwanda to fight - escaped and attacked the Late Habyarimana's Government. They escaped I repeat "escaped"..."

Of course, Museveni's claim has been contested and, in fact, it becomes more impossible to believe because the defence structure is such an extremely closed system that it would be implausible that such an invasion could have happened without his knowledge. And yet, considering that the Rwandan Tutsi were in charge of the intelligence system, it is also entirely plausible that they could have planned strategically to attack Rwanda on 1 October 1990, when President Museveni was away on a visit to Norway.

This notwithstanding, there are indications that Museveni engaged in diplomatic talks with President Habyarimana negotiating the possible return of the Tutsi prior to this invasion of 1994.

Elsewhere in Africa, Uganda was involved in the peace negotiations of Sudan between Al Bashir's government and the SPLA's Garang. He seems to have been critical to the signing of peace agreements because in his eulogy to Garanga on 5 August 2005 he highlighted how he had been asked to persuade Garanga to sign the agreement. He recounts that Danforth, the representative of President of the US George Bush to the negotiations, had called Museveni to report Garanga's uncompromising position. Museveni recalled that he spoke to both Garanga and Danforth and realised that Garanga was right in refusing to sign the agreement. Museveni states that he asked President George Bush to instruct his group to stop pressuring Garang. A complete transcript of this eulogy is available on request.

In the abovementioned address to Parliament, Museveni further indicated that the Ugandan government had adopted a dual position. Firstly, Museveni negotiated for the return of the Rwandan Tutsi to Rwanda and a political settlement in which the Tutsi would be allowed to hold power. Secondly, the Ugandan government assisted the Tutsi materially so that they could defeat the Rwandan government troops militarily. A military defeat of the Tutsi would have necessitated their return to Uganda, which would in turn have caused problems for Uganda.”

Uganda took part in further negotiations initiated by the GLR leaders. These diplomatic negotiations sought to resolve the citizenship issue in terms of which the Tutsi would be allowed to return to Rwanda and to have their citizenship rights as Rwandans recognized. The negotiations led to the 1992 agreement at N'Sele, in which it was agreed that the Rwanda government would look into the return of the Rwandan Tutsi. Subsequent negotiations were held in Dar es Salaam in August 1993 at which the Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed: This aimed to restore the respect for human rights of the Tutsi within Rwanda, as well as to address demands of political power sharing. It had also been agreed in principle in the Accord that the RPF troops be integrated in the Rwandan army. However, this agreement was breached by Habyarimana in 1993, and at a follow-up negotiation in which the GLR condemned Habyarimana for violating the agreement, Habyarimana died in a plane crash on his way from the meeting. Unlike the Burundi negotiations, the Rwandan diplomatic interventions did not yield the desired goals. The conflict in Rwanda soon became intractable and deteriorated into genocide. As a result, Uganda had to intervene to stop the genocide, which it did in April 1994 in April right up to 1995 when the UN presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections were held.

The DRC case was even more problematic than the situations in Burundi and Rwanda discussed above. Following the success of the RPF in taking power in Rwanda and the Interahamwe fleeing to Zaire, where they opened bases in refugee camps, from which they attacked Rwanda, Uganda had to intervene to protect the populace that was at the centre of the war between the RPF and the Interahamwe genocidaires, who were being assisted by the Zairian forces. Whereas Uganda’s intervention was aimed at resolving the problems of the DRC, in this case, Uganda had been part of the "problem", i.e. it had supported the ADFL attack on Mobutu's government as argued by an OAU representative.” Its intervention thus could not be seen from a better

445 Ibid.
446 OAU Reprentative, "Towards a Ceasefire and the Resolution of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of
perspective. Uganda's efforts to bring warring factions in the DRC together did not yield positive results. Nevertheless, by means of several summits and conferences, Uganda did try to engage the various groups in negotiations.

Critics of this diplomatic ploy to resolve the conflict in the DRC have pointed to Museveni's failure to do the same in his own state, particularly with his own rebel groups. The critics underestimated Museveni's diplomatic initiative in the DRC because they argued that he had ulterior motives of intervening in the first place. Regardless of this view, it should be noted that the success of negotiations depends on many factors and Uganda's case illucidates this best. Firstly, the parties must agree to come to the table to negotiate. In the case of Uganda's rebels, their willingness to engage in dialogue with government depended significantly on their ability to survive. Those that were severely strained by the guerrilla warfare decided to give up fighting and returned to negotiate. In fact, evidence from the field indicates that Museveni did engage the rebels in talks and persuaded them to give up insurgency and return to Uganda. Some did and have since settled. One ex-rebel had this to say,

"come down to negotiate but zee did not surrender. We were called for a dialogue after realising that there wets a mistake and the mistake has already been given that is why zee have come to settle. And our settlement now is a permanent resettle."

This is evidence of government's initiative to dialogue with rebels. New developments since 2004 have demonstrated that Museveni is currently engaged in negotiations with the dominant rebel group, the LRA. With the multiparty mediation, the LRA and the Museveni administration seem to be heading for an end to the insurgency.

In addition to the above scenarios, the Museveni administration has not only engaged in diplomatic interventions (e.g. in Burundi and Rwanda), but it has also engaged in humanitarian interventions, as is discussed in the following section.
5.3 Humanitarian Issues

The nature of international politics of the time 1990-2006 greatly influenced the nature of Museveni's interventions. It is vital to examine the timings of Museveni's interventions at this point. The first decade of the post-Cold War Africa, 1990-2000, was replete with unilateral and multilateral interventions and counter-interventions in many African states. Intervention, as has been pointed out in previous chapters of this thesis, was a kind of "norm" that had emerged in the post-Cold War era, permitting states to intervene in other states for reasons ranging from the humanitarian to the political. The latter ranged from overthrowing sitting governments to protecting authoritarian regimes that were on the verge of collapse or ousted by insurgent groups. An updated version of Lewitt's intervention matrix is instructive here. The updated version of the matrix can be found in Chapter Two (page 38).

African interventions reflected in the matrix are an indication of the increased interventions in the decade of 1990-2000 and indicative of the fact that interventions are regarded as an acceptable means of solving problems, even though some of them have obviously violated international law. Interventions that did not violate international law were those spearheaded by African regional organisations. These included: the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau; the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in Central African Republic; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Lesotho and the DRC, following the UN Charter. The UN Charter Article 52(1) stipulates that nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, as are appropriate for regional action if such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes of the UN. It is also stipulated in the UN Charter Article 52(3) that the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. Also in Article 53(1), it is emphasised

448 The use of 'norm' here presupposes that states act out of their perception of what is expected of them when grave danger, such as genocide, occurs. States intervene, for example, to prevent a death-threatening situation, and are forced to deploy militarily in contravention of international law with the express aim of saving people's lives. States also base their legitimacy in undertaking these kinds of interventions from "international customary law", which recognises these interventions as driven by states values and respect for life.

further that the Security Council shall, "...where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. However, no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state...."

It could be argued, though, that Uganda's unilateral interventions that did not get an express mandate from the UN, as in the Rwandan and DRC cases, obtained their legitimacy from the customary international law. Uganda's mainstream argument when it defends itself in the international community is that its interventions in the GLR neighbouring states were motivated by humanitarian considerations, which were conditioned by the anarchic nature of the GLR. In the decade 1990-2000, there were nineteen interventions in Africa, with Uganda having the highest numbers of interventions and the biggest number of years of involvement with the intervene states. It can be argued from this statistic, that Uganda has assigned itself a role of "policeman in the region". The increased intervention of African states in each other's affairs demonstrates that the concept of regional collective security in Africa has changed and that it is continuing to evolve. Interventions are African states' attempts to solve the region's humanitarian problems.

In this case, Uganda's interventionist foreign policy has much to do with the timing of the intervention in relation to the international community's reaction to what was happening in the GLR in general. This is what Smith and Hay have called the Cable News Network (CNN) effect. Uganda was compelled to intervene because of the genocide in Burundi and Rwanda, the violent ethnic clashes between the Bahema and Balendu in the Eastern DRC, and the intra-ethnic clashes in the DRC, particularly among the Banyamulenge and indigenous communities around them. Since Uganda was the nearest neighbour in all of these cases, it had to help rescue

450 The United Nations Charter.
451 In their analysis of the motivations that drive interventions, Smith and Hay argue that, in some cases, states do not intervene because they are oblivious to international law or have ulterior motives, but because the media projects the states experiencing conflict as being in a very grievous situation, which forces other states to intervene to stop these situations. For a more detailed discussion of the role of the media in enhancing the likelihood of intervention, see G. Smith and J. Hay, "Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire", in Crocker, C., Oster, H., Aall, P. (eds), Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, (United States Institute of Peace: Washington D.C, 1999), pp. 102.
452 The Bahema and Balendu ethnic clashes have not been regarded as genocide even though over 300,000 people were reportedly killed in one year. A detailed discussion of Uganda's intervention in the Bahema and Balendu ethnic conflict is done by C. Karungi and D. Rupinyi, "Chauvinistic Ethnonationalism in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Regional Dimension" in Mukwaya, K. (ed), Uganda Riding the Political Tiger: Security and the Wars in the Great Lakes Region, (Makerere University Printery: Kampala, 2004), pp. 105-113.
the local populations faced with genocide and ensure that the spill over effects of these mass ethnic violent reactions were contained. Museveni has argued that, although he is aware that international law prohibits states from interfering in each other’s affairs, he is opposed to such a law if governments evoke it as a means to annihilate a population. In his defence of his intervention in Burundi, he said:

"I would like however, to clarify to the Ugandans that in my opinion, internal affairs should not be affairs which cannot be interfered with cannot include genocide. You have no right to commit genocide and say, that this is internal affairs. This is not acceptable."

This is why we have not accepted the regime of Burundi. The regime of Burundi has been using this argument that, "this is internal affairs. We can kill Hutus as we like". No zany. We are not going to allow it. If it is near here where I can walk, certainly, you are not going to do it. If it is far where you need planes, I may not reach there. But here, we shall be there where they are Dying to exterminate people, we shall be them...

My appeal to the NRM is that all sane human beings and NRM should support intervention, Stop genocide, g' necessary. That is why we are intervening against Burundi; we are putting sanctions on Burundi because of the threat of genocide... If the neighbour's house catches fire, the fire can spread also to your own house; if there is fire in the next house, you get out and see what is happen*. 454

Uganda’s intervention should also be seen as part of the broader role that the UNSC has given to regional groups to complement it in its peace initiatives. Its willingness to intervene and the timing of some of its interventions in the region have coincided with UNSC Resolution 1078. This Resolution had called upon member states to prepare for a possible military intervention, because the regime in charge of the genocide, which had escaped Rwanda, was returning to the camps and invading Rwanda by using the DRC as a base. Uganda’s intervention was furthermore part of the tacit policy that the GLR followed, which was for African states to find their own solutions to their problems. The underlying notion of the GLR initiative in Burundi was premised on the grounds that Africans should champion conflict resolution because they are

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453 Note the emphasis on the person.
454 In Museveni’s address to the Sixth Parliament on 16 September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard, p. 4907.
455 See Kofi Annan’s "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa", Secretary General’s report to the UNSC, April 1998.
more conversant with the problem. A Burundian's view of this approach supports this position. He stated:

> [W]ell there is an opinion or strong opinion in the African leadership of today that Africans must be involved in conflict resolution in Africa. And this was said in Arusha by Ugandans, South Africans, by Tanzanians, by everybody and I think it's a new philosophy which is very good'

The strength of African involvement in the peace process lay in the fact that Africans would be better able to understand their complex histories and, therefore, would be better brokers of any peace deals. Evidence in earlier interventions had indicated that, when foreigners intervened, the cases became more complex and conflicts became intractable. In the African Leadership Forum, the African states realised that they had a significant role to play in resolving conflicts in Africa. They thus resolved to set up a mechanism for mediation, conciliation, and arbitration in the Security Calabash of the Kampala Document of 1991, which was urgently required to prevent conflicts and disputes from escalating into armed hostilities. The Burundi conflict was the first beneficiary of this enterprise.

In the absence of permission from the UNSC or a mandate to undertake an intervention, states still have recourse to use customary international law. It could be argued that, whereas Uganda did not work under any regional group, it intervened because it had an international obligation or responsibility to stop genocide and address the humanitarian crisis that had emerged from the genocide in Rwanda and the massacres amongst the Hema and Lendu of the DRC. Like interventions elsewhere in Kosovo and Somalia, Uganda's intervention in its neighbouring states was part of its regional contribution to contain disastrous consequences of inter-state and intra-state political problems on the region. As Museveni stated above, it was part of African culture to be respond to one's neighbour's problems: "If the neighbour's house catches fire, the fire can spread also to your own house; if there is fire in the next house you get out and see what is happening... " As Bellamy notes, and as has been pointed out in previous chapters, a new consensus has emerged among liberal states, including African states, that there is a moral right to intervene even without UNSC authorization in extreme cases, because states are sanctioned by their compelling moral purpose to save lives."

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457 Interview with UG/FA/BU 3 held on 27 October 2005 in Bujumbura.
458 A. Bellamy, "Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur", Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol 19, No2 (2005), pp. 34
Another important aspect of Uganda's interventions that has to be noted is that, regardless of its humanitarian considerations, its belief in humanity and its respect for the norms of the region in respect to assisting neighbours that have problems, Uganda's interventions in Rwanda in 1990 and the DRC in 1997 and 1998 are considered illegitimate interventions. It did not adhere to its 1995 constitutional obligations to respect international law and obligation and to coexist peacefully with its neighbours. The President is not oblivious to the law and he acknowledges it in justifying the intervention in Burundi but that he did not evoke the relevant international law to protect his actions makes his humanitarian concerns gain less appreciation. Actually, several interviewees asked to rank the motives of Uganda's interventions in three states in order of importance revealed an interesting picture of their perceptions of Uganda's foreign policy. See figure 7 below.

Figure 7: People's perceptions of the causes of Uganda’s interventionist foreign policy

Source: Data extracted from Interviews held on Uganda's interventionist foreign policy

The general picture created by Figure 7 above is that the potential of Uganda to be a regional power is perceived to have had less of an influence than did its humanitarian concerns or transnational links. In addition, the hegemonic ambitions of its leaders are perceived as being less
important than the threats to regional stability or Uganda's security concerns as a whole. A
general conclusion can be drawn from the figure that the interviewees felt that Uganda may have
had hegemonic ambitions, but that these did not influence its intervention as much as other
salient issues did, such as humanitarian concerns, security of the state and stability of the region.

Museveni's style of addressing and managing problems in conflict and post-conflict states, as
evidenced by his diplomatic intervention in Burundi and Rwanda, introduced a new dimension in
intervention, which demonstrated that whereas irredentist personal ambitions may be important
in motivating intervention, sometimes leaders are driven by altruistic reasons.

5.4 Summary

Uganda's interventions in the GLR are similar to many other interventions of the post-Cold War
era. It is evident from the updated intervention matrix of Lewitt' that Uganda's intervention
occurred at a time when similar diplomatic and humanitarian interventions were being
undertaken by other African states, using bilateral agreements and regional organisations
protocols.

The discussion has also shown that Uganda only intervened in other states if there was genocide
or a threat of genocide or an evident threat to regional peace. The country's geographic
proximity to conflict-ridden states increased the likelihood that Uganda would intervene, but it
did also offer to intervene militarily, diplomatically, or by contributing troops to UN peace
missions in states that were far way, such as Liberia. The current deployment in Somalia in 2007,
this time under the auspices of the AU is evidence enough of Uganda's commitment to regional
peace. Further, although many African states had promised to send troops to Somalia, it is only
Uganda that has lived up to its pledge(Though Ethiopia's effort to address the violent conflict in
Somalia is also noted).

Lewitt's original intervention matrix can be viewed in J. Lewitt, "African Interventionist States and International
Law", p. 17.
5.5 Theoretical Implications

This chapter has shown that the constructivist approach is useful as an alternative approach to understanding the behaviour of states in the international system. Constructivism is also able to account for why African states became more positive about intervention and more involved in conflict resolution, which had previously been the exclusive preserve of the superpowers, especially in the Cold War era. It also accounts for the numerous interventions and the timing of those events, which it attributes to the general norms of the region at that specific time. Constructivism exhibits similar tenets to Political Liberalism, which equally lays emphasis on the intervention based on the inability of states to protect its citizens. Like Constructivists, the Political Liberalist perspective attributes interventions to the desire to protect citizens of one country from war, suffering and provision of humanitarian relief. In general, constructivists argue that states may only intervene in the business of other states if they are compelled by an accepted norm of intervention, such as a humanitarian disaster, in which many lives would be saved because of the intervention. Constructivists would thus argue that intervention was acceptable because its aim was to save lives.

The constructivist approach is akin to the global liberal governance perspective. Both focus on the humanitarian disasters that make interventions obligatory, no matter what international law stipulates. Similar to the European states which responded to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, African states have shown that, when genocide or mass murders occur, they do not need to wait for the UN or regional bodies to grant them permission to intervene. Unfortunately, this makes the legality of intervention a highly contentious issue, even if legitimacy is presumed in humanitarian interventions. The constructivist approach shares with the poliheuristic approach the idea of the "role of a leader", as what is expected of him or her by the international community in situations of humanitarian disaster.

The only limitation of the constructivist theory is this: If, as the constructivists posit, a norm and culture exist amongst states that makes them responsible to themselves and to others to ensure peace in a region, then it is unclear clear why some states are unable to intervene even in glaring emergencies, such as the genocide in Rwanda. Of course the constructivist could argue that, because of their stature and position in the international system some states have more

responsibility towards other states, but this is not entirely correct. After all, a state like Tanzania, which is at the centre of the diplomatic negotiations about conflict in the GLR and which, like Uganda, is close to the conflict states, refuses to intervene militarily. For Constructivism to be more effective in its interpretation of state behaviour, it should take cognizance of the structures of states and their influence on intervention. A good place to start would be the constitutions and the decision-making processes in the foreign policy sphere of states.

It is clearly necessary to review constructivist's generalisation of norms emerging in regions and the expectation that states will automatically embrace these norms to engage in humanitarian interventions. Eyre and Suchman point out in respect to norms and the proliferation of weaponry, that "norms do not directly cause the acquisition of a particular weapon". Likewise, we could argue that norms do not cause states to intervene but rather that norms become relevant as states interact and see in themselves values or cultures that are peculiar to them. These realisations and appreciation of their perceptions of themselves is what makes it more likely that they will intervene. The second limitation, as noted earlier in the theoretical literature review, concerns the definition of culture that the constructivists subscribe to, which is difficult to study. The theory has methodological complications around the measurement of a culture or a norm. Nonetheless, Constructivism provides a good orientating framework against which the foreign policy behaviour of states can be analysed, especially considering that it pays attention to important factors that are often neglected in international relations, such as identity, culture and norms. However, other theories do overcome some of the theoretical and methodological limitations of Constructivism. One such alternative theory, Poliheurism, is discussed in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER SIX

POLIHEURISM: LEADERS AND FOREIGN POLICY

6.0 Poliheurism

This chapter draws on the Poliheuristic theory to analyse the motives of Uganda's interventions in its neighbouring states. The chapter seeks to answer two questions; first, did Museveni's decision-making style influence the decisions he made to intervene in the neighbouring states? Second, what were Museveni's domestic and foreign considerations in his foreign policy formulation? The central argument of this chapter is that Museveni's presidential decision making greatly influenced the foreign and security policy that Uganda adopted. It is argued further that, whereas Ugandan interventions did reflect the leaders' interests, which constituted critical national security interests, the motivation to build a foreign policy image could not be ruled out either. The chapter first discusses the tenets of the Poliheurism that explain the individual leader's role in shaping the foreign policy behaviour of his state. This is followed by an examination of the interventions, to which Poliheurism is applied, and lastly the chapter concludes with a theoretical evaluation of Poliheurism as an important framework for understanding Ugandan's interventions in the GLR.

6.1 Poliheurism and Intervention

This study draws on the poliheuristic theory, which centres on the individual leader's style of decision making in the foreign domain. Poliheurism firstly presupposes that leaders make decisions to intervene in other states after carefully considering that these interventions will translate into national interests. Secondly, the theory posits that, in choosing policy options, leaders will evaluate different options available in two steps. The first step is to review the options depending on their domestic pay-off, and to select the best policy option depending on other important dimensions such as the foreign considerations! As a second step, the two dimensions, domestic and foreign, are compared and a decision is made as to which would offer better pay-offs in terms of national interests, or individual considerations, or which would

minimise costs yet yield better results." At the end of this two-step process, leaders then make their decision to intervene or not to intervene. The two primary criteria are that the chosen option must have a better pay-off than the other options, and that it must not hurt the leader politically at the domestic level.

One variant of the Poliheurism argues that a leader's decision to intervene in other states militarily is aimed at diverting the populace's attention from the leader's failure in some domestic policies. Such a leader is hoping that the intervention will cause the populace to become preoccupied with the events of the intervention and thus to condone government's failure to deliver favourable polices or much needed services.' Poliheurism takes cognizance of the role that groups or advisers play in the selection of choices, but argue that the leaders make the final choice. Often this choice is based on consideration that do not compromise the benefits expected from the intervention nor are they likely to affect the leader's political position. A key assumption of Poliheurism is that leaders have the cognitive skills to make rational choices in their foreign policy decision making. Cognitive skills include computational skills and the holistic information processing capacity that is required to make rational decisions. Leaders are expected to be selective in processing information rather than indulging in an exhaustive search and comparison process when making foreign policy decisions.' Given this background on Poliheurism, it is argued that the decisions of Uganda's leader to intervene were carefully thought out and cautiously compared against the best domestic and foreign dimension pay-offs.

6.2 Decisions to intervene militarily in Rwanda and the DRC

Events in Rwanda and the DRC after Museveni came to power in Uganda started to take on a different shape. As Chretien has argued, Museveni's leadership sparked off uncertainty amongst his neighbours as to what his next move would be. "Because uncertainty causes decision-makers to be fearful of others' intentions, every proposition Museveni made to his fellow regional leaders was interpreted as malevolent. For example, the immediate request by Museveni to Habyarimana to solve the citizenship question of the Rwandan Tutsi and the subsequent

466 J. P. Chretien, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, p. 343.
demands from him to Mobutu to consider the Congolese Tutsi as having Congolese nationality were interpreted by both leaders as the beginning of Museveni's interference in the affairs of its neighbours.

Following the Rwandan Tutsi attack on Rwanda in October 1990, and the subsequent genocide that broke out, Mobutu construed this as a signal for him to review his domestic politics and address the marginalization of ethnic communities, particularly the Banyamulenge. He was aware that the Banyamulenge had been recruited in the RPF ranks, which compounded Mobutu's political problems. His reaction was initially to assist Habyarimana's regime against the RPF attack but also to try to target the Banyamulenge and use the law to marginalize them further. The Banyamulenge had already joined forces with the ADFL to fight Mobutu. Museveni's perception of all these developments greatly determined his reaction. Using the theory of Poliheurism, it is clear from Museveni's address to Parliament in 1998 that he had weighed up his options. His options were either to intervene in Rwanda and the DRC or not to intervene and to let the two states handle their insurgency. At the level of foreign relations, he had weighed up his options and made the best decision in the circumstances.

With regard to Uganda's foreign relations with its neighbouring countries, Museveni's decision to intervene in Rwanda in support of the Rwandan Tutsi was motivated by the inaction of the international community. He argued as follows;

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\text{Me decided to approach the Late President Habyarimana to reach a political settlement with these young people (referring to the RPF) and the force they were representing... These young boys had been in exile for 33 years... what had the international community done to solve that problem of Rwanda? What had the UN done to solve that problem? What had the European Union done to solve that problem? So if the adults do not solve the problem, then the children solve it and they solve it in their own way.}
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In the case of Burundi, he advanced a similar argument related to the failure of the Europeans to intervene to assist the Barundi in their political crisis. He stated:

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\text{These Europeans have been coming here. They said \text{"Burundi". I told them, \text{"there will be no genocide in Burundi and I can tell you this again, there will be no genocide in Burundi, because we are not going to permit it. The moment they attempt...\}}}
\]

From the above statement we could argue that his decision to intervene in Rwanda and Burundi was based on the failure of the "adults" (in other words, the Europeans or, more broadly, the international community) to act. Museveni seems to have realised furthermore that Uganda's intervention would most likely not be challenged by the international community, as it had after all failed to intervene to protect the people of Rwanda or Burundi. Museveni's intervention did however violate international law, which prohibits unilateral intervention by states. The law specifically prohibits the use of force in other states. An analysis of the full legal implication of this intervention cannot be done here. Nonetheless, in principle, Uganda's intervention could be justified by using international customary law, which permits interventions to stop genocide. What should be noted though is that the decision to intervene was made by the President and his High Command. It is implicit from his use of persona "I told these Europeans that there will be no genocide in Burundi... They thought I was joking...". Interviews with interviewees engaged in these wars also indicated that they got explicit instructions to intervene from the President. Similarly the emphasis put on Museveni as mediator and his role in Burundi by a wide range of interviewees in Burundi also spells out his saliency in the peace process in Burundi.'

In the DRC, the repercussions of the Rwandan genocide on neighbouring Zaire (later renamed DRC) were severe. Most importantly, the Rwandan genocide sparked off demands from Congolese marginalised groups to participate in the governance of the state. It also rejuvenated old animosities between the Mobutu and anti-Mobutu forces that used the total decline of Mobutu's rule to attack that country. The attacks by various rebel groups on Zaire from 1994 to 1997 weakened that country further and led to the collapse of Mobutu's rule. The decision of Uganda's NRM government to intervene in the war in the Zaire/DRC initially seems to have been carefully considered because, according to Museveni, President Kabila of the DRC had requested Museveni's troops to help him with his insurrection against Mobutu. Museveni had refused on the grounds that he could not give him troops and that Kabila needed to build his

Ibid

Transcripts of these interviews are available on request.
own capacity rather than rely on foreign troops." Museveni argued that he did not believe in depending on foreigners to fight. Ironically, Museveni had depended greatly on foreigners (Rwandan Tutsi) to fight his guerrilla warfare that brought him into power. It is not clear from the President's address whether depending on any foreign troops was bad or rather depending on Rwandan soldiers in particular was bad; nevertheless, according to Museveni, depending on Rwandan soldiers was bad."

Museveni's later decision to intervene militarily in 1997 was, so he argued, premised on his analysis of the situation in the GLR and his realization that the Rwandans had continued to help Kabila. He thus presented three reasons to justify the NRM government's decision to intervene in the DRC, to which he had been so vehemently opposed initially:

- to stop the incursions of rebels that were using the DRC to attack Uganda;
- to stop the genocide against the Banyamukne, and the ethnic violence between the Henna and the Lend and
- to ensure that the mutiny and war in the DRC did not spill over to Uganda. In Goma, vans had been filed by the Ugandan consulate in Gana that eight Congolese battalions had mutinied so Museveni had to intervene to stop the Tzar because of the potential impact it would have on Uganda."

It emerges from Museveni's presentation to Parliament in 1998 that, in every undertaking, "the NRM government" had made the final decision. By implication, the DRC intervention case shows that when Rwanda intervened, it became obvious that Uganda would intervene too. Ironically, not a single parliamentary session had sat to consider some of these decisions. Similarly, no reports had been given to Parliament as required by the law until the intervention had been internationally condemned. The excerpt below from the Constitution explicitly states that declaration of war must be done within the framework of the law.

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470 Ibid.
471 In his speech to Parliament, Museveni stated that he had warned Kabila against relying so much on the Rwandese to fight for him. At one time he argued that he had almost convinced the Rwandese not to fight for Kabila, but that Kabila insisted on using them. For further detail on his matter see Parliamentary Hansard, Museveni's parliamentary address on 16 September, Sixth Parliament (1998), pp. 4916-4917.
472 Ibid.
Even the alternative clause 3, which allows the President to declare war and inform Parliament later, was not adhered to. From the chronicle (Appendix 1) it is evident that Parliament was not briefed until 182 hours after war had been declared on 13 August 1998 and subsequently ended on 8 September. This was in direct contravention of the Ugandan Constitution.

It is important for this poliheuristic analysis that the phases of the decision-making process are recognised. In the first phase, Museveni had used his cognitive abilities to select the best option available from the two available options, i.e. to intervene or not to intervene. Initially, he had chosen the latter. In a quick shift in his foreign policy, however, Museveni then decided to intervene. His choice must have been made in consideration of the foreign affairs dimension because at the domestic level, intervening or not intervening would not have hurt him politically. If he intervened and the situation in either state improved, he would most likely gain further repute in solving African problems. The intervention also reveals that, in accordance with the central tenet of Poliheurism, leaders use their cognitive abilities to make choices or follow the advice of their technocrats. In this regard, the intervention in the DRC had been properly thought about because the security problem of Uganda would have been resolved by intervening, or at most contained for a while. The decision to intervene would not have affected Museveni politically either way. Nonetheless, much as the intervention was a high-risk option, it was still chosen as a non-compensatory pay-off. The poliheurists would argue that sometimes choices do not necessarily depend on a careful consideration of cause and effect. Before a state intervenes, for examples, it may discover that the intervention will be very costly and that lives will be
destroyed in the process, yet it will still intervene, as long as its national security would be protected and its international and domestic political image is not hurt. In the next section, it is argued that Museveni's decision to intervene must also be understood from his considerations at the international level, particularly with regard to how other GLR states viewed Museveni.

6.3 The Role of Foreign Powers in Uganda's Interventions

In terms of Poliheurism, Museveni's foreign policy choices to intervene in the neighbouring states of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are a reflection of a carefully drafted response to regional crises. Uganda's perception of its role in the region as arbiter, mediator and intermediary and the central positions it holds in regional geopolitics has been greatly bolstered by US and British support towards its roles in the region. These powers have a high regard and probably still do, for Museveni's leadership, and respect him as someone who can be given the responsibility to help sort out geopolitical problems in Africa. Some of the people interviewed for this study regarded Museveni's central role in the regional politics and the support of the US and Britain as indicative of him being a hired hand of British and American neo-colonialism. The interviewees felt that the support for his interventions that he had received from Britain and US was merely aimed at protecting those nations' political and economic interests in the region. It is not clear though if this view still holds, given the change in the US National Strategic Framework in 1998 and subsequently following the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US. Subsequent developments in Africa have marked a distinct shift in US foreign policy towards Africa. The US has been encouraging African nations and leaders to develop their own capacity, to empower themselves to handle their own anarchic situations and to resolve their own problems in a way that suits the African setting.

The disastrous US intervention in Somalia from 1991 until 1993 was the precursor to the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and later the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). Uganda

473 Interview with DP 1 opposition member of Parliament held on 20 October 2005 and UPC 1 opposition member of Parliament interviewed on 14 November 2005 in Kampala respectively. The opposition argued that the visits of President Clinton, his wife and his Secretary of State Albright to Uganda were the reason why Museveni perceived himself as a hegemonic power, because he felt favoured and thus felt he should be key to every general development of the GLR geopolitics.

474 This was the general view held by the opposition in Museveni’s administration.

475 Steven Metz noted that, since 1996, Africa was no longer a top priority in the US 1998 National Security Strategy. US security interests in Africa were very limited. For a detailed discussion of the New US National Security Strategy, see S Metz, "Refining American Strategy in Africa", in Strategic Studies Institute monograph (February 2000).
was a beneficiary of the ACRF and it could be argued, greatly influenced Museveni’s behaviour in the region. For Ugandan forces to be trained as ACRF was indirectly warranting Museveni to assume a big role and undertaking foreign policy choices of intervening in its neighbouring states of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. Uganda’s perception of its role in the region as arbiter, mediator and intermediary and the central positions it holds in regional geo-politics is greatly bolstered by US and British support of its roles in the region. Following the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) of 1994, which urged that US involvement in peace-keeping be selective and more effective, the US preferred not to intervene in intra-state violent conflicts but merely to provide the necessary framework for the peacekeeping initiatives of the African states. From what Rothchild has termed the "Stable Democratic States", the US selected a well-equipped, deployable, inter-operable, and committed force, which would respond to peace-keeping challenges on the African continent. Of the GLR beneficiaries of this ACRI strategy, Uganda was the first state to receive ACRI training and equipment. It had the largest number of recruits, followed by Rwanda. The US Department of Defence (DOD), the National Defence University (NDU), and the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) initiated three projects for the ACRF’s new role. The first project was military training under the International Military Education Training (IMET) and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). The second project involved procurement of military equipment, arms and weapons under the Direct Military Sales licensing (DMS). Lastly, through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements, the beneficiaries of the program were able to access further military equipment.

They US provided Museveni’s administration with the necessary training and logistics in preparation for a regional role. With this perspective in mind, Museveni embraced a new role in the region, that of ‘regional policeman’. Subsequent significant events in the GLR conflicts came to be dominated by Museveni and his protege Kagame. An analysis of the military aid and other forms of support provided to the region in general and Uganda in particular illustrate the US strategy to build a strong regional group that would intervene to assist in the region’s emergencies. Uganda's interventionist foreign policy is thus attributed to the US bilateral


relations and the support given by other powers to Uganda, which greatly bolstered Museveni's perceptions of himself and his government as a major actor in the region's development. See Tables 4 and 5 and figures 9 below on military aid illustrate the level of military help received by Uganda from the US, which - it is argued herein - contributed significantly to its interventionist foreign policy.

Table 4: Military Assistance and Training to States that intervened in the DRC in US dollars 1000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>DC Licences</th>
<th>FMS</th>
<th>IMET</th>
<th>JCET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3872</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arms Trade Insider; the Conventional Arms Transfer Projects of 16 November 1998

Table 4 shows that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) were highest for Uganda in 1996, but dropped remarkably in the subsequent years. It is further clear from the table that, whereas Uganda received the highest proportion of IMET resources in 1997 and 1998, it received the second highest assistance (after Rwanda) from the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) in 1997 and 1998. This aid was instrumental in boosting Uganda’s military capacities and subsequent engagements in neighbouring states. Similarly, in Figure 9 overleaf a clearer image of the IMET program is depicted.

479 The figures are drawn from studies carried out on US-African projects by the Foreign Policy Institute of Research. They are used in this study because of the dearth of readily available case-to-case data on US military aid to African states in Uganda's varied sources.

479 FMS is a government-to-government agreement negotiated by the Pentagon and the purchasing country. DCS is an agreement negotiated between the manufacturing company and the purchasing country and then licensed by the State Department. They include the sale of SALWs, logistics, and communications equipment.
Figure 9 overleaf covers the period 1997-2005 of the IMET program. It demonstrates that Uganda received substantial amounts of aid, even though Rwanda received the most military aid during the time of what has come to be referred to as "the first African world war". Uganda came second in this period, except in 2003, when it received slightly more aid than Rwanda, and in 2005, when the program was phased out. When this figure is compared with the tables 3 and 4 in the subsequent sections, it can be argued that, after the regional war in the DRC in 1998 August, the US gave aid on a uniform basis during the second half of the decade.

Similarly, Table 5 overleaf shows that the ACSS had relatively uniform figures of expenditure, although there were a few exceptions. Uganda received the biggest share compared to the other states, while the DRC and Sudan got less than Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Rwanda. Table 5 also provides details of the JCET and ACSS training for two years, 1998-1999, when the war was at its most intense in the GLR between Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi against the DRC and the war between Uganda and Rwanda. It demonstrates that Uganda obtained the highest amount of US military training in 1999 compared to the other GLR states and amongst those that were engaged in the DRC war.
From Table 5 overleaf, it is evident that Uganda continued to receive a substantial amount of military training and military supplies even after the 1998 interventions in the neighbouring GLR states. From 2003 to 2005, commercial and arms transfer sales to Uganda, too, were much higher than in the other states. The exception was the DRC, which had obtained the highest arms transfer foreign military sales between 1998 and 2005.

Table 5: Military Assistance and Training to Countries in the Congo civil war in $1000 units

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3,856,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>121.30</td>
<td>1,517,000</td>
<td>9,903,000</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1,425,000</td>
<td>162,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>58.00</td>
<td>324,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1,324,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>36.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1,229,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>250.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,151,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>58</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Combined Figures from Hartung and Montague (2001) and the Arms Trades Insider

It is on the basis that we could argue that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy was greatly influenced by US relations with Uganda, particularly through the development of Uganda's military capability and massive arms sales and military training. The Arms Trade Insider augmented this position in their report, which points that all the Ugandan graduates of the JCET and IMET programmes were deployed in the DRC to fight alongside the Rwandan troops and later to fight independently for Uganda's "national interests". It is important to emphasize here that, whereas the US programs discussed (IMET, JCET, FMS, and DC) have always been part of US foreign policy, what the recipient states of these programs do with the forces trained remains the exclusive preserve of the recipient states. Decisions on deploying the same ACRI troops in the regional conflicts or in the misadventures that these states were engaged in were entirely the

responsibility of the leaders of these states, although the US does indirectly have an influence on the recipients' decisions to intervene because it had created the ACRI in the first place.

Museveni in turn exploited his relations with the US and the British to build his regional power status. He used his favoured position to bolster Uganda's importance in the region and as a foundation from which he would continue intervening in other states. Uganda continued to obtain massive transfers of military aid while it was intervening in other states because of its assumed role as the region's police officer, even though it was clear that these interventions violated international law and had caused enormous suffering to the people in the Eastern DRC.

Museveni's decisions to intervene militarily in the Rwanda and particularly in the DRC were strongly condemned by the international community, and the US was called upon to reprimand Uganda. The international condemnation of the US's implicit support for Uganda forced the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Susan Rice, to make a statement to the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Africa. In her rebuttal of the perceived role played by the US in enhancing Museveni's hegemonic designs of intervention, Susan Rice dismissed these claims. She said:

\[
\text{policy objectives in the Congo have been consistent and clear. We have sought peace, prosperity, democracy and respect for fundamental human rights. We have worked to counter those} \\
\text{political transition that would end the cycle of violence and impunity, build respect for the rule of law and human rights and ovate the conditions for a credible democratic transformation, economic} \\
\text{have been committed to a policy of engagement in support of the Congolese people, w1 sic fered so}
\]

481 Former American Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen, reemphasised Uganda's favoured position when he stated that Uganda had legitimate reasons for intervening in the Congo because it was destabilising Uganda and was a source of regional instability. See Cohen's statement cited in H. Campbell, "Democratization, Citizenship and Peace in the Congo", in Baregu, M. (ed), The Crisis in the DRC (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1999), pp. 21-36.

482 Interview with UPC 1, an opposition party member, held on 23 July 2004.


484 Susan Rice was the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Clinton Administration. In her Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC she insisted that the US policy was clear regarding Uganda's intervention in the DRC. The US did not in anyway condone Uganda's actions. Her (address on September 15, 1998) is available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/rice.htm
much under Mobutu Sese Seko's tyranny. We have sought to do this notwithstanding the US had in working with the new government in Congo, as some have suggested. This is a specious and ridiculous accusations that I want to lay to rest once and for all. We had indicated to both Uganda and Rwanda that we fully understand their legitimate security interests in countering insurgent attacks from Congolese soldiers. We also share regional and international frustration with the Kinshasha government's failure with respect to both the democratisation and human rights. Nevertheless, we had finny expressed the United States' conviction that foreign intervention to topple the Government of the DRC is not acceptable... .To emphasize our concern, we withdrew a short-term training team and an assessment team that were in Rwanda at the time.485

Rice's address is very significant as a general explanation of US-Uganda relations in the history of Uganda's interventions. It showed that the US was apprehensive about the interventions, although it acknowledged Uganda's security concerns. It is not clear from Rice's presentation, however, what type of government Uganda and its proteges toppled in the DRC. Did the US consider the prevailing regime of Mobutu to be legitimate or illegitimate? If it is the former, then there is inconsistency in the US policy: after all, the US had not come out openly to condemn Uganda's involvement in the Rwandan invasion of the Habyarimana's regime in the 1990 invasion. Yet it now seemed to be concerned about Uganda's intervention in the DRC.

Echoing Rice's presentation discussed above, the US again defended its position regarding the claims that it had supported Uganda's interventions. James Rubin, Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, insisted that the US had raised its concern over the reports of military preparations, including the movement of troops and material by forces on both sides of the DRC by Uganda and other states like Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Chad. Rubin stated that the US was concerned about these interventions because they undermined human rights and violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Rubin reported further that, contrary to the perception that the IMET program had enhanced the interventions, the US program had been aimed at fostering close cooperation between the US and Uganda. It was also aimed at serving the national interest of the US, as it sought to create stability in the region, advance closer military-to-military relations, professionalize the UPDF, and promote human rights. Nonetheless, the training was later suspended indefinitely, following Uganda's intervention in the DRC.486

485 Ibid.
486 Rubin in his report to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of 2002 September 1998
Critics of the US foreign policy in the GLR argued that the US should have done better. The withdrawal of the training team was not sufficient action. It should also have suspended all other forms of aid to all the states involved in the DRC, and it should have overtly condemned the invasion. However, the US continued to provide aid, grants, and training to the countries involved in varying degrees. It continued to provide training to the governments' officers and men sent to US institutions, as well as to sell arms and ammunition to these states. Figures of military assistance in form of aid, grants, and training quoted from the Foreign Policy Research Institute indicate that the US has in fact given vast amounts of military aid to the Ugandan government. This, despite the fact that Museveni, Uganda's leader (who had been embraced as the new brand of leader who had the potential to solve Africa's problems), was in fact spearheading the destabilisation of the region, ironically contrary to the US Clinton Administration's expectations.

Further, the US's refusal to reprimand Uganda and demand its unconditional withdrawal from the DRC must be seen in the context of broader US policy towards Africa following the Rwandan Genocide and events in Burundi. The US had not assisted in either of the cases, despite the expectations of the international community. Therefore, it could be asked legitimately, on what basis would the US have stopped the Ugandan interventions in the DRC, if it had not done so in Rwanda and Burundi?

6.4 Domestic Motivations of Interventions

The central tenet of the poliheuristic school is that interventions are regarded as a strategy by heads of state to divert public attention from their failing domestic policies in order to ensure that they remain in power. In this section, we examine the domestic dimension of Uganda's foreign policy.

488 Respondents who pointed to this sentiment insisted that the US should have stopped any kind of aid or support to the states involved in the Congo war, at least as per the expectations of the international community.
489 An analysis of US military assistance to Uganda for the period 1996-2004 is done later in this chapter. Figures are drawn from Hartung and Montague's (2001) empirical reports, which indicate how US policy openly supported the "undemocratic regimes" of Kagame and Museveni based on the grounds that they were the new kind of leadership that Africa needed to, solve its problems.
490 In an interview with a UG/FA/US held in Kampala on 10 December 2005, the official argued that the US's treatment of Uganda should not be considered separately but as part of a general US policy towards states anywhere in the world. US interests are similar but vary in magnitude from continent to continent.
Uganda's interventions were seen by some interviewees' as Museveni's way of bolstering his image in the region following the unpopular Rwandan intervention of 1990 and the subsequent genocide of 1994, which they (the interviewees) argue had broken out because of the initial intervention of 1990. They also argued that, in view of the pending elections of 1996, Museveni had campaigned for presidency on the ticket that he would strengthen Uganda's security. He was constantly campaigning against the multi-party political system in favour of a system of individual merit. The interviewees also argued that Museveni was able to win the 1996 elections because he was in control of the army, which meant that he had better chances of providing security against rebel attacks than the other presidential candidates. His overwhelming victory of 74% had been well earned, because Museveni at that time was still popular and Uganda was still making huge strides in development.

Uganda's interventions have also been attributed to the domestic demands by interest groups to access political power. As Museveni had been the President of Uganda for fifteen years, other groups in the country started to demand that he relinquish power and allow other people to rule Uganda. When Colonel Besigye, a retired army officer from Museveni's own party, emerged as a popular competitor, it meant that Museveni had to work on his image to win the election. His image had been marred by his attitude towards his competitors, particularly Besigye, with whom he had had a very good relationship during his service in the army. Not only did the Museveni government harass supporters of Besigye, but Museveni's party implemented the Kalangala Action Plan' to coerce people to vote for Museveni as President, thereby violating the rights of the opposition. A rebel group was formed by the disgruntled UPDF officers who had been supporters of Besigye. During the presidential campaign of 2001, the PRA became the new rebel group fighting the government. For the second time, Museveni gained power in the 2001 elections, with 65% because people believed that he would provide them with security despite his inherent flaws as an individual and the flaws of his regime.

The members of the opposition alluded to this view.


The Kalangala Action Plan (KAP) was a paramilitary unit formed during the presidential campaigns of 2001. It used violence against some people in areas where the President did not marshal up votes or in regions that were clearly anti-Museveni. It has been one of the units that has been sued in front of the Uganda Human Rights Commission for its abuse of the rights of the citizens.
If the Poliheuristic theory of diversion is to find a place in the politics of Uganda, then the last intervention in the GLR in 1998-2001 and the subsequent wars in the DRC need to be examined. Following the general populace's demand for a change in political leadership, it is revealing that a well-calculated move occurred to change the Constitution to change the number of terms that presidents can remain in office, in order to enable the ruling party and Museveni to continue in power. When the Constitution had been drafted in 1995, it had been very carefully specified that the President's term of office was five years, which could only be extended twice. As the interventions in 1996-2000 in the neighbouring states fell within the first term of office, it is unlikely that the President was motivated by interests to stay in power. After all, he did have a constitutional mandate at the time.

Similarly, in the subsequent interventions in the DRC that ended in 2002, he had won a second term in office. If other interventions had taken place at that time, though, it would have been possible to interpret them as deliberate attempts to remain in power. In that regard, during the 2001 Presidential Elections campaigns, the Government of Uganda established a Constitutional Review Commission to review the Constitution of Uganda. The Commission submitted a report of its findings and recommendations in December 2003. The Uganda Cabinet, after studying the report, prepared a Government White Paper in September 2004. The Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee of the Ugandan Parliament considered the Government White Paper and submitted its report in December 2004. Parliament subsequently passed the Constitution (Amendment) Act, in August 2005. Among the various amendments made to the Constitution of Uganda was one that eliminated the restrictions on presidential terms of office. Previously, the Constitution had limited the President to two five-year terms in office. This provision was contained in Article 105(2), which stated: "A person shall not be elected under this Constitution to hold office as President for more than two terms as prescribed by this article." This position was changed by replacing Article 105(2) with the following provision: "A person may be elected under this Constitution to hold office of the President for one or more terms as prescribed by this article." The above amendment thus allowed an incumbent to hold office for more than two terms. This cleared the way for Museveni to run for president again in 2006.

In light of this, the timing of the interventions in the DRC was perfect; throughout 2005 and early 2006, the LRA had moved back and forth from southern Sudan and the Garamba forest in the DRC, making fresh attacks on tourists, foreigners, and aid workers. The ADF was regrouping; the PRA had deployed in the Eastern DRC in collusion with the LRA and were
preparing incursions into Uganda. Arrests and counter attacks of rebels showed the population that Museveni needed to be re-elected so that the development so far attained in the last twenty years would not be lost and security guaranteed. The election results of 2006 indicated that the domestic pressure on the political power distribution was even higher though Museveni was still 1, riding ahead of the rest of his competitors.

Another domestic dimension that is critical to Uganda's interventionist foreign policy is the internal military politics and power struggle in the High Command and amongst the regular members of the UPDF. The interviewee argued that there were squabbles in the UPDF between the top military cadres regarding who had more power and an intense debate on who was to succeed Museveni in power. There was a rift between the elite in the UPDF and the semi-literate soldiers in UPDF: the elite, though better placed to be in charge of the army were not given powers to man specific posts. Instead, some of the semi-literate officers who were also related to the President were appointed to the high command. The latter had greater military power and wanted to suppress the former. Museveni's solution to defuse the power struggles in the military was to give responsibility to some of the semi-literate officers to take charge of the DRC intervention. This tactic of engaging them in such inexhaustible "lucrative ventures" solved the power struggles in the short run, but had dire consequences for the DRC. The UPDF officers who led a contingent of soldiers to the DRC engaged in trade and exploited the resources in areas they controlled. The President's delay in stopping the exploitation of the DRC and the subsequent delay in bringing to justice these officers implicated in these activities have also been attributed to his covert plan to undercut a potential coup, which would have resulted from the rift in the UPDF.

494 This analysis does not negate the fact that the rebel groups, like ADF, LRA and PRA, existed but points out that they were used to justify why the ruling party should remain in power.

495 Interview with UG/MOD 13 held in Cape Town, February 2006.

496 Lucrative ventures refer to the business that the UPDF officers carried out in the areas of Isiro, Bunia, Beni, Bumba, Bondo and Buta, all of which were under their control. For details of the business enterprise see the Porter Report, p. 89 and the UNSC report S/2002/1146 by the Panel of Experts Report, p. 22.

497 The Panel of Experts report recommended that the governments of the countries where the individuals were from should prosecute them for the illegal exploitation of the resources in the DRC. For detailed recommendations, see Report, p. 31, in International Crisis Group, "Rwanda/Uganda: A Dangerous War of Nerves", Africa Briefing (Nairobi/Brussels, December 2001), p. 12. Similarly the UN Panel of Experts Report, 2001 and its Addendum Report, 2002 upheld its position with regard to those found guilty of exploiting DRC's resources.

498 In an interview with UG/MOD 13 held on 23 February 2006 in Cape Town, the interviewee indicated that Kazini, the Commander-in-Chief of the UPDF in the DRC was weary of his position in the army and demanded that he be put in better command position. He was opposed to all "literate" UPDF and tried to subjugate them. For fear that he could easily institute a coup against the President, he was made commander in the DRC. This was done to soothe his ego and keep him busy, a tactic that paid off. Interview held on 23 February 2006 in Cape Town.
6.5 Regional Hegemony or Warmonger

Uganda's interventions in the neighbouring states have been associated with, on the one hand, Museveni's intention to create a regional hegemony', and on the other, they have been interpreted as being part of his personality as a warmonger.' The interventions in Rwanda, Burundi and, later, in the DRC in support of the Banyamulenge (a Tutsi generation that had settled in the DRC) has been construed as motivated by Museveni's imperialist design of creating a Tutsi empire in the region.' The proposed Hima-Tutsi imperial design was reported on by many media houses. In 2004, for example, a media house in Kenya wrote:

For more than six years, Museveni actively plotted to overthrow the Moi government while Moi acutely engaged in counter-insurgence sending his intelligence officers on cattle raids into Eastern Uganda... According to Museveni's plan, pieced together by the Sunday Standard after intensive in &rya was supposed to be the first government to fall in a domino-like chain of military takeovers in the region covering Rwanda, Zaire and Sudan. The Kenyan troops would then be used in the operations in Rwanda, then Zaire and then Sudan... but these imperial designs were checked by a lack of credible Kenyayn leaders willing to lead the assault on Nairobi... 502

This media report highlighted the empire-building design and the domino-like chain of coups that were to start in Kenya, then Rwanda and finally Zaire. Although Kenya did not fall, there were two coup attempts orchestrated by the Mwa Kenya, a Kenyan dissident group, possibly supported by Uganda. In Rwanda and Zaire, however, the regimes were overthrown in 1994 and

4- R. Keohane and J. Nye define hegemony as a system when one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing inter-state relations and willing to do so. See R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd Ed (New York Longman, 2001), p. 38.
505 This position is shared by interviewees who were in the opposition of Uganda's seventh parliament. Some scholars have also pointed to this view of the hegemonic dominance by a Hima-Tutsi empire. See Melvern, for example, who argues that, in Paris, Uganda's intervention in Rwanda was considered to be part of a Ugandan plot to create Tutsi-land. It was taken for granted that Museveni wanted a Tutsi empire. Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, p. 30.
1997 respectively. Although these events mean that the argument is feasible, particularly given Museveni’s statement in 1966 (see the epigraph at the start of this chapter), a few questions remain: Firstly, was it feasible to create such a transnational empire based on one ethnic category in such a large region and given the international system of the time? Secondly, did Uganda have the prerequisites for creating such a hegemonic power during the period of these interventions? Lastly, is it not likely that there would have been a clash of interests with other leaders who had similar designs of becoming the dominant power in the region?

Some interviewees in Rwanda and Burundi have dismissed the hegemonic design of a Hima-Tutsi empire as speculation and even as Francophone propaganda to discredit Museveni’s role in the region, because the French were losing their grip on the region as their proteges were being overthrown. The respondents also argued that it was Rwandan Tutsi who had put Museveni in power and therefore doubted his ability to extend his role in Post-genocide Rwanda. Even if the debate around the regional hegemony were plausible, Museveni lacked the capacity to assert himself over Rwanda, which had not entirely adopted the policies he had recommended for that country. In the DRC, similar attempts to influence the political development of Kabila’s regime were obstructed by Rwanda, which had similar interests. The clash of interests between Rwanda and Uganda further alienated both states from Kabila and their influence became greatly reduced. Instead, Uganda settled for relations with the rebel groups in order to give it the opportunity to further its interests in the region.

Burundi and Rwanda were experiencing similar political upheavals. Considering that Museveni’s intervention in Burundi was diplomatic, but perceived as favouring the Hutu, the possibility that

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503 Interview with a UG/FA/BR held in Kampala on 8 December 2005.
504 Interview with a UG/FA/BU 4 (also the leader of a political party) held on 27 October 2005 in Bujumbura. He argued that the French were affected by the loss of political power by Francophone leaders to Anglophone-supported leaders in the GLR. As a result, the French fabricated the Hima-Tutsi claim to discredit Museveni who was seen as the main architect of this loss of power of the Francophone leaders. Similar views were expressed by O. Ogenga, “Uganda as a Regional Actor in the Zairian War” p. 50, who also pointed to Uganda’s interventions in the region as a Tutsi-ethnic expansionist nationalism supported by the US and Britain.
505 Interview with UG/FA/RW 3 held on 30 October 2005 in Kigali.
506 Museveni’s attempt to have a say in Rwanda’s issues was ridiculed outright by Kagame, who argued that Rwanda was not obliged to listen to Museveni or to anybody else. In a highly heated defence of Rwanda, Kagame insisted that Museveni referred to them as “... these young boys. These Rwandese don’t listen to me. These boys I trained personally... “, which was not warranted and therefore Rwanda had no obligation to listen to him. For a full text of this expose, see Appendix 6. In contrast, some DRC rebels perceived Uganda to be a hegemonic power that had the capacity to do much for the DRC but that it was not doing enough to end the DRC conflict because Museveni was being confused by Rwanda. A former Congolese rebel leader insisted that if Uganda was to help the region, it had to build a machine that projects power and stave off proxy wars being fought against it by Rwanda.
he would rely on Burundi to be part of his empire was extremely slim. Given such an atmosphere, it was highly unlikely that Museveni could pursue hegemonic interests in a region where his fellow leaders were challenging his influence. Museveni himself dismisses the Hima-Tutsi Empire claim as rubbish, arguing as follows:

"Then the misperceptions which are being peddled by those against NRM, they say that Museveni wants to build a Hima Tutsi Empire. This is colonial trash... I think this is colonial trash, it is absolute rubbish. In the first place, there has never ken a Hima-Tutsi empire because these two groups have never been rulers... Hima and Tutsi are cattle keepers, they are always looking after cows in the bush. You cannot build an empire in the bush when you are looking after cows, you must be in the palace because that is where they build empires."

The other aspect of the regional hegemony design that makes the claim weak is the nature of Uganda's capabilities at that time. Did Uganda have all the prerequisites of a regional power? There are four prerequisites that a state must have to hold a regionally hegemonic position. Firstly, the state must have a good geographical position. Secondly, it must have natural resources and technological endowments. Thirdly, it must have immense industrial and military capabilities compared to other states in the same region. Lastly, it must have intangible resources, such as a national morale, and a high quality of government and diplomacy. To this, we could add a fifth prerequisite: it must be internationally accepted as having a central position in a specific region.

Uganda fulfilled only one of the requirements, which helps to explain why its bid to hold a regional hegemony cannot be convincingly defended. Geographically, Uganda is a landlocked country that depends on Tanzania and Kenya for most of its trade. This makes it vulnerable and unable to extend its power even if it wanted to. Secondly, although it is endowed with natural resources, it lacks the technological capacity to exploit them optimally. Resources, like copper, that were once profitably exploited are nearly exhausted and its exports of other resources, like hydro-electric power, are also lagging. Whereas it could be argued that Uganda has a high quality of government by World Bank standards, these have not translated into better public welfare for its citizens. The last prerequisite, a military capability, could indeed be claimed by Uganda claim. However, events in the GLR have also demonstrated otherwise, particularly given the economic strain the GLR wars have placed on Uganda and the successive defeats it has suffered in the

507 Y. Museveni in his address to Parliament during the Special session of 16 September 1998, Hansard, p. 4914.
three wars of Kisangani. A further analysis of the military capacity of the states in the region puts Uganda second to Sudan. See Table 6, which compares the military capability of selected regional states.

Table 6: Military Structure of Five GLR States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Military component</th>
<th>Military service age</th>
<th>Manpower available for military service</th>
<th>Manpower fit for military service</th>
<th>Military expenditure in dollars</th>
<th>Military expenditure as % of GDP</th>
<th>State’s Area in Square miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Navy, air force, army</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,379,793</td>
<td>693,956</td>
<td>$38.7m</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>27,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Navy, air force, army</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,103,823</td>
<td>2,004,756</td>
<td>$50.1m</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2,345,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Army, air force</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8,291,695</td>
<td>5,427,474</td>
<td>$587m</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>26,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Army, navy, air force</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5,012,620</td>
<td>2,889,808</td>
<td>$179m</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>236,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled using the Central Intelligence Agency World Fact sheets, 2005

The security structure above can be used to compare the military capacities. If Uganda did indeed have designs of becoming a hegemonic power, it would have required a high calibre of soldiers, a maximally equipped military, a strong military capability and colossal sums of money to address the security problems of the region.” Yet from the above table, it is clear that Uganda’s military expenditures” is far lower than that of Sudan. Considering that Uganda received training from the US, particularly for the ACM, we could argue that it used this as a premise for its interventions, although military-style interventions were not the sole interventions undertaken by Uganda. We could argue that it was more the role that the US gave Uganda through the ACM rather than the President’s own hegemonic ambitions that motivated it to intervene in the neighbouring states.

509 There are no figures in the DRC column because data could not be collected due to the wars and the political transition of the state.
511 The actual figures of the Ministry of Defence expenditures are far greater than this source quotes. The Ministry often negotiates for more money using the justification that it is addressing the security situation in Uganda and that it must stave off enemy forces attacking Uganda.
Museveni’s interventions in Rwanda in 1990 and the later intervention in the DRC have also been attributed to his nature as a kingmaker” and as a warmonger. Some think that Museveni intervened in other states because he believed these lacked the capacity to manage their own affairs. Ironically, his patronizing behaviour and belief that he was a regional policeman had involved Museveni in every conflict in the GLR. Museveni disputed claims that he was patronizing, however, and argued that these reasons were too simplistic to explain Uganda’s interventions. He pointed out that regional leaders, like Kabila, had approached him during their earlier struggle to request military support, which he initially objected to giving. He argued that he was not a warmonger and dismissed the hearsay that Uganda had fought Rwanda in 1999 and later in 2000 over trivial issues, such as the trading of insults. In his own words, President Museveni said:

*I have, however, been told that the differences between Uganda and Rwanda are caused by Ugandans looking down upon Rwandese. I was told by one of the senior leaders of Rwanda that that Brigadier Kayumba, the RPA Chief of staff; was a Sergeant in Uganda... therefore, if somebody can really believe that those are the kinds of issues that can cause people to shoot at each other, there must be something wrong with our ideas! I told the leaders of Rwanda that some Rwandese are always abusing me, even in the newspaper, but I cannot take that as a national policy. Even if somebody abuses me, so what? That is his problem, not mine. If I pick a gun and shoot people just because somebody has said that Museveni is senile, as they have been saying...*516

Irrespective of his position that he was not a warmonger, there was a consensus among the opposition and some embassy officials that Uganda had not intervened in other states until Museveni came to power. They thus mentioned Museveni’s support to the SPLA of Sudan, and his interventions in Rwanda in 1990 and 1994 to support their view that Museveni was a warmonger. Museveni's insistence that Ugandan leaders before him had intervened in

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512 Onyango Obbo remarked that, "We (implying Uganda) perceived ourselves as the Great Lakes King makers, best illustrated by the private views many people held (and some still hold) of Rwanda as Uganda’s outback... Haruna Kanabi, editor of the Shariat (a local newspaper), expressed this view publicly regarding Uganda's expansion into Rwanda describing it as Uganda’s 40th district where Pasteur Bizimungu was the "Resident District Commissioner". This joke landed him in prison, but it reflected the kind of views some people held of Uganda". See 0. Onyango, ‘Museveni: Foreign Policy Schemer Or just Getting By?’ The East African, April 28-May 4 (1997)

513 Museveni used this term to express his annoyance at how people (particularly the opposition) referred to him. See Museveni’s address to Parliament in September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard, p. 4906.

514 Kagame, in his interview with a Monitor scribe, argued that Museveni’s interventions were motivated by Museveni’s conviction that no one knew better than he did and that he perceived himself as best suited to solve the problems of Africa. See the full interview that appeared in the Monitor publication in Appendix 8.

515 Museveni reported to Parliament, presented on 16 September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard, p.4909.

516 Museveni's address to Parliament, held on 28 May 2000, "Uganda's Involvement in the Great Lakes Region," p. 25. (On some occasions, when President Museveni addresses the Uganda Parliament the address is published into a booklet. The booklets are regarded as Parliamentary Hansard but are not necessarily given numbers).
Zaire/Congo was meant to justify his intervention in the DRC. It should be understood though that, whereas the Congo was the only state that Uganda had intervened in throughout the entire Cold War era (i.e. from 1963-1965). Museveni in the space of twenty years (i.e. from 1986 to 2006) had intervened eleven times in neighbouring states, both unilaterally and through the collective regional arrangements.

Further support for the argument that Museveni is a warmonger has been drawn from the decision to intervene in Rwanda in 1990: the Rwandan Tutsi, who were formerly in his army, attacked Rwanda and over-ran the Eastern part of Rwanda for a couple of days. It is claimed that Uganda facilitated the return of the Tutsi emigres to Rwanda, using Ruhama as the base in the Mirama hills. The Tutsi obtained logistical as well as financial support from Uganda to wage a war on Rwanda's Hutu-dominated regime of Habyarimana. Uganda's support has been ably demonstrated by an interviewee as follows:

| Ntungamowa | Tactical and signal base and communications point that the RPF used. Kazingo in Ngoma sub-county was another tactical base and front that the RPF used in entering Rwanda. They entered through Nyakatara (local as Nyagatara in kinyarwanda). Secondly, from a sociological point of view, the sub-counties of Ntungamo, Ruhama, Rwechiniro and Ruhama were dominated by Ruandese of Tutsi origin who had fled in the 1959 and 1972 annihilation attempts by the Hutu government. This provided the RPF with social support as well as fall back bases in case of hot pursuit. Another entry point was Kamwezi in Kabale. This was the main route of the RPF recruits. Ntungamo was the draw back centre following the initial defeat of the RPF until they regrouped to attack Rwanda again.

What emerges from this account of the 1990 attack on Rwanda is that it was a well co-ordinated war, which must have been aided by Uganda as a state. The President denied complicity in this attack, although critics insist that such an attack could not have been orchestrated without his full knowledge. It is clear from his address to Parliament that plans to invade Rwanda were known to him and that, as he states, he advised them [my emphasis] at the preparatory stages. He confirms his complicity in the subsequent narration of events preceding the invasion as follows:

517 Interview held with a Rwandese Tutsi former combatant of the 1990 Rwandan invasion, held in Kabale, on 19 October 2005.
518 The timing of the attack could have been without his knowledge and that explains one respondents confession of how ill prepared they had been that time.
President Habyarimana to reach a political settlement with these young people and the fora they were representing. At the same time, we derided also to support these young people materially so that they would not be defeated militarily. In which case, they would be forced to come back to Uganda and that could cause us a lot of problems. So [zee] adopted a dual strategy. On the one hand give them material support; so that would not be defeated but on the other hand negotiate so that we get that the Rwandese of Tutsi origin return to their country. What had the UN done to solve that problem?... We supported Rwanda materially. Again we gave them materials to defend themselves against these barbaric groups supported by Mobutu. But we refused to involve our own troops for the reasons I have mentioned above... 519

This claim that he refused to involve Ugandan troops has been highly contested, and many scholars' have argued that Uganda did intervene directly by providing military troops as well as covertly aiding the invasion logistically. Logistical support to a group of dissidents to overthrow a seated government is often motivated by many factors but, in the case of Uganda, it has been attributed to Museveni’s character as a warmonger. Some interviewees pointed to a reciprocal arrangement between Museveni and the Rwandan Tutsi to put him in power in return for support to put them (the Rwandan Tutsi) in power.

6.6 Summary

The general view presented in this chapter is that interventions are a result of leaders' individual decisions. In other words, the leader will choose policy options depending on what he perceives as important to the state, or to his regime. The decision to intervene, for example, is arrived at after the leader weighs the available options depending on the factors that matter most to him. The decisions arrived at may not be entirely the best, but are chosen based on their pay-off and the fact that they are unlikely to hurt the leader politically. It is argued that Museveni’s decisions to intervene in the neighbouring states was mainly a result of what he perceived as the best option in his view and based on his claimed experience in the geo-politics of the region. Museveni’s perceptions of himself as an important leader in the region and the implicit role that the US, Britain and other European states gave him as a police officer of the GLR greatly influenced his decisions. It also influenced his belief that his interventionist foreign policy was

519 Museveni’s address to Parliament on the 16th September 1998
merely a benevolent attempt to fill the gap that the failure of the "adults" (in other words, the West and the international community) had left in their overt decisions not to intervene in African conflicts.

This chapter has shown that, whereas interventionist foreign policies may be motivated by attempts to divert attention away from domestic demands for power re-distribution and pressure for internal reform in political organisations, these were not significant in influencing Museveni's decisions to intervene. This is because Museveni has a powerful control over the government of the country, he has a loyal army despite the squabbles among its officers, and he has the majority seats in Parliament, which he uses to retain power. He thus did not need to divert attention away from any domestic problems of inequitable power sharing. Note that power sharing in Uganda is non-existent, after all. Opposition, and political opponents are actively discouraged, if not threatened. Thus it can be argued that Museveni is so powerful internally, that he embarks on interventions in his neighbouring countries, because he knows that as long as the country is fighting wars externally, the population will want to keep him in power - knowing that if he is voted out or deposed, then they will be even worse off.

6.7 Theoretical Assessment

The poliheuristic theory used in this analysis of interventionist foreign policy is an appropriate approach because it emphasises the centrality of the individual leader, highlighting how his decision-making procedure informs his decisions. The focus on the decision-making processes is also vital because, as drawn from the experience with which these interventions were taken, it is evident that they were chosen cautiously with a view to minimise the negative effects they would have on the leader's geopolitical position at home, regionally and internationally. They were undertaken with the intention to solve what the leader argued were obvious security concerns. Other ambitions cannot be ruled out entirely though. The strength of Poliheurism lies in its ability to explain why Uganda intervened in Burundi, which at the time had no immediate or direct impact on Uganda's security. The poliheuristic theory implies that leaders have calculated their options and chosen the option that most favours their political position. It may be correct to insist that leaders play a central role in determining foreign policy but, at the same time, both the nature of regional politics and the timing of major regional events and that leaders' foreign relations are equally influential in the ways the leaders project their foreign policies. Poliheurism is a good theory because it can be used to explain not only military
interventions, but also other forms of interventions, as well as explaining why states may decide not to intervene in others.

Whereas Poliheurism provides a viable interpretation of states' interventionist foreign policies especially in as far as leaders use their cognitive abilities to make decision, it is not nearly comprehensive enough to cover all perspectives of these interventions because of its methodological limitations. There is a dearth of documentary evidence with regard to decision-making processes, particularly in Africa where decisions are made 'behind closed doors' / in secret. This makes it impossible to review whether leaders made choices using their cognitive abilities given specific in the foreign policy arena. For example, in studying a leader's decision-making process it does not help us understand why interventions result in wars, which were initially supposed to be avoided. A good case here are the Kisangani wars between Uganda and Rwanda in the DRC, it was evident that these clashes would negatively affect the local population and would lead to military losses, and yet the military commanders went ahead with fighting.

When Poliheurism articulates how leaders make their decisions, it does not take cognisance of the other role-players, like military commanders who often take power into their own hands or advisors who give the wrong advice, which often makes interventions disastrous mistakes. As De Rouen has noted, "the methodology of theory-orientated case studies of foreign policy derision making is still in its infancy... [and] much 'work needs to be done before the method becomes a reliable intellectual tool". Inspite of this limitation, Poliheurism remains a good approach. The methodological limitation is possible to control by triangulating sources. These sources could include mass media reports, investigative reports by organisations outside the state and presidential speeches. In this study, these sources were invaluable. Other theories can also bridge the gap that Poliheurism leaves unfilled. In the next chapter, one such theory is discussed.

CHAPTER SEVEN
LIBERALISM: UGANDA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION

In some cases, to get the economy going, you need some wars to change the situation, otherwise
the situation does not change the economy will never grow.\textsuperscript{522}

\textit{All intern. tons invoke the exercise of power, all involve, in one way or another taking sides in
local political conflicts, and the motives for all interventions are mixed.}

7.0 Introduction

This chapter analyses the major interpretation that has characterised the debate on Uganda's motives for intervening in neighbouring states. Uganda's interventions have been interpreted as being driven by imperialist designs to occupy and control the natural wealth of collapsing states.\textsuperscript{523} Its intervention in the DRC in particular has been criticised as being Museveni's 'rational plan' to build Uganda's economic and military prowess in the region by using the DRC's wealth as the main base for this project, which would subsequently lead Uganda to become a regional hegemonic power.\textsuperscript{524} Secondly, Oxfam described the DRC intervention as a collective scramble of unscrupulous neighbouring states for the wealth and spoils left unclaimed.\textsuperscript{525} These interpretations contrast sharply with Uganda's emphasis on its geo-security being the main motivation of intervention.

\textsuperscript{522} Yoweri Museveni's address to the Special Session of Parliament, held on 16 September 1998, Hansard p. 4916.
\textsuperscript{526} ibid.
The chapter draws on the utilitarian liberal theory, which presupposes that interventions are wars over resources, regardless of the intensity of the humanitarian situation in these states. Gilpin and Gibbs' theory further posits that states will intervene in others to ensure that their own economic interests are served. Gilpin argued, for example that, "a state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further changes are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits". Ideally, when states gain more power in a region, they will seek to extend their territorial control by influencing the political and economic arena of the region. States thus endeavour to expand with the motive of becoming regional economic powers, until they realise that the cost of further expansion exceeds or is equal to the benefits of such expansionist policies. Political power is synonymous with economic power, and superior economic competitiveness is accompanied by superior military power. In short, Gilpin argues that states intervene in others to enhance and protect their economic interests.

The central argument of the chapter is thus, that whereas the economic motives of Uganda's intervention cannot be completely ignored, the complex nature of the conflicts that occurred in the states proximate to Uganda, had a greater influence in forcing Uganda to intervene than did the economic motives. It is further argued that the illicit trade, which was most likely / probably started by Uganda's military officers at the border, was in fact part of the already existing nature of cross-border trade, and that this was merely amplified by the involvement of Uganda's military actors who occupied the region. The third argument advanced in this chapter, based on primary research and investigative reports of the intervention period, is that Uganda's improved economic performance during this time was due to its intrastate economic policies, partnership with key economic organisations and inter-state trade relations, and that economic exploitation of the DRC had contributed minimally to its economic growth.


528 R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 87.

529 Ibid, p. 53.

530 The fact that both Rwanda and Uganda fought each other in the DRC, and that Kisangani is a diamond trade centre is implicit of economic motives. C. Gray has described the Kisangani wars as the first time since the World War II that foreign regular armies engaged themselves in the territory of the a third state arguably with a view to appropriating that state's wealth, see C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 63.
7.1 Uganda's Economic and Security Nexus

In the late 1980s and 1990s, Uganda faced two main challenges in the region. Firstly, the insecurity caused by conflicts in the neighbouring states affected Uganda's economy, and particularly people's livelihood and trade in the border districts. Secondly, Uganda had drawn up an economic strategy, which would require it to enhance its regional economic relations, yet the geopolitical character of the region inhibited this strategy. If the region was to develop economically, the insecurity being caused by insurgent groups thus had to be addressed. Ironically, some of the areas occupied by the insurgent groups were the same areas that were richly endowed with natural and mineral resources. This gave rise to a dilemma for Uganda. Was Uganda going to secure Uganda's borders without exploiting the economic opportunity this region offered?"

The findings of the study indicate that there was a deliberate decision among the leaders of the GLR states of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC to secure the region against the many insurgent groups in return for economic control of some parts of the DRC. The interviewees believed that Uganda had a general desire to see the region develop and especially to engage in mutually viable economic relations, although there was an undercurrent of scepticism, as to whether Uganda genuinely had such noble interests? Interviewees argued that Uganda’s intervention

531 In an interview with UG/FA/SA 1 held on 25 July 2005, he pointed out that, whereas Uganda wanted to safeguard its borders, to intervene for commercial reasons was also on its agenda. The UPDF supported rebels in the DRC who thrived and survived because of the illegal commercial trade in the DRC. The interviewee further stated "Bembe (referring to Pierre Bembe the rebel leader of MLC group in the DRC) one of the rebel leaders and former war lords made a lot of money from the trade and was able to have a big armed group because of the benefits of the trade. Bosco (referring to Bosco Taganda) another rebel who made money and supported war is being sought by the UN. The UN would like to see him arrested but all these people move around in Kampala and we see them", the official emphasised. The latest Security Council Group of Experts on the DRC Report of 18 July 2006, S/2006/525 highlighted that Bosco had been put on financial sanctions and travel bans but that none of the GLR states and complied with upholding these sanctions by taking any action against Bosco, although he was reportedly seen trading back and forth between Uganda and the DRC. See report p. 44.

532 Uganda's strategic location near DRC's rich Ituri region particularly near the Okimo pit mines, Sezere mine and Mongbala environs, were a significant attraction. See detailed geographic explanation by Casoliva, J. and Carrero, J. "The African Great Lakes: Ten years of suffering, destruction and death", in Cristianisme i Justicia, Roger de Llúria 13, 08010 Barcelona (Spain), http://www.fespinal.com/espinal/lib/er93.rtf, accessed on 12 June 2004.

533 In interviews with UG/MOD 1, interviewed on 30 July 2005, Kampala, UG/MOD 8, interviewed on 8 August 2005, Kampala and UG/MOD 2, interviewed on 5 October 2005, Kanungu/Ntungamo, all argued that Museveni, Kagame and Kabila had agreed on some form of economic cooperation in which Uganda and Rwanda would exploit certain areas' resources.

534 From many of the interviewees particularly those from MOFA and MOF, Uganda had an insatiable economic drive to develop itself and the region in general. They quoted Uganda's regional trade initiative in trade organisations set up in the region for example, Preferential Trade Area (PTA), Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC). Uganda's African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) bid, NEPAD plans, and the setting up of Uganda Investment Authority that was responsible for co-ordinating foreign
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was partly economically motivated and that this was consistent with the President's desire for mutual trade with the regional states. A highly placed interviewee revealed:

After Kabila became President; Museveni selected us, a group of ten cabinet ministers; in 1997,

with the purpose to have economic "dominance" of the Eastern Congo and he had proposed a road from Mombasa to Kisangani so that trade and commerce would flourish but under Uganda's dominance. Museveni was pushing for Uganda's businessmen to harness the wealth of the... aah Eastern Congo. This did not happen because Rwanda tried to control the Kinshasha government. It tried to colonise the Kinshasha government. Kinshasha government resisted Rwanda's dominance and of course Uganda opposed Rwanda's policy in the DRC. This was the beginning of the... 

The control of Eastern Congo that had been agreed upon by the Ugandan ministerial visitors and Kabila did not take place, as had originally been planned because Kabila repudiated the tacit agreement. Instead, Uganda's UPDF ended up controlling parts of Bunya and Kisangani, in which the ADF and PRA operated, but which were also a lucrative business areas. Other areas controlled by Uganda where trade was carried out on a large scale, included Buta and Isilo, all the way up to Mahagi and Am. Uganda also occupied and exploited North-Eastern Congo's gold-rich Orientale Province areas of Haut u'ele' district, and the Watsa territory, covering the gold mines of Gorumbwa, Durnba and Agbarabo.'

That said, though, the trade that emerged from this acclaimed ministerial visit did not turn out to be what the President envisaged. Instead, the trade was carried out contrary to the operational orders of Museveni; the people Museveni warned not to indulge in trade ironically became the key players in exploiting the resources of the DRC. One of the interviewees continued to argue that:

From the joint military operations agreed upon, it was envisaged that Uganda would control the Eastern part and ensure that trade was carried out by Ugandan businessmen and that there were to direct investment and attracting foreign investors were further examples of its economic bids.

535 Interview with UG/FA 1 held on 16 November 2004 in Kampala at the Ministry office. In a corresponding report by the Human Rights Watch, they argue that because of the business arrangements between the two presidents, Uganda occupied North Eastern Congo from 1998 to 2003 its soldiers took direct control of the gold rich areas and coerced gold miners to extract the gold for their benefit.

536 Interview with UG/MOD 7 held on 17 October 2004 at Kimaka, Jinja.

537 Ibid, the places the UG/MOD referred to were also contained in subsequent reports by Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic Of Congo: The Curse Of Gold, (HRW, New York: 2005) p. 15.

538 Ibid, p. 15.

539 This joint military operations protocol is referred to in many encounters with interviewees involved in the DRC-Uganda relations but its physical appearance has not yet been verified. From different sources, this joint operations...
be mutual benefit for all the parties... unfortunately, when commanders Muzoora, Kazini, Colonel Sonko, Colonel Otufire and a few others when they got there, they got excited Saleh and Jovia found a state "raped" economically and forgot the mandate (operational order we call it in the army) from the president. They looked at the Colton, tinter, money, women, they were diverted. This they did as individuals, those were not orders or objectives or policies that the president had given them in the operational order in the DRC. So if they exploited, they were doing it on individual capacity.

Museveni's response to the Judicial Commission's inquiry explicitly details the kind of trade that the President had in mind. An excerpt from the full transcript of the Justice Porter inquiry below attests to Museveni's position.

Figure 9: Excerpt from the Porter Report

... when my army went into Congo, I had to give them terms of reference on all major matters; there is no major matter which we did not regulate by a document. For instance, on the 15th of December 1998, no, on the 19th of December, 1998, at 1500hrs, I sent a message myself to all army units in Congo, which I could read for their Lordships: "From President for Chief of Staff, Inform Army Commander, Minister of State for Defence, and All Stations. (All stations means all units).

Ensure that there is no officer or man of our forces in Congo who engages in business. Also report to me any other public servant, whether currently in Congo or not, who tries to engage in business in the Congo. However, other Ugandan businessmen (who are not soldiers or public servants, including all politicians or their families) . "should, given the fluid security situation in Congo, be assisted, if necessary, to do business there in order to alleviate the acute needs of the population..." (of the population in Congo). And also to establish links for the future. The purpose of this directive is to erase the feeling that I ordered our forces into Congo because we wanted to loot minerals from Congo, and not to defend our security interests (President Museveni in an interview with Justice Porter).

Source: Judicial Commission of Inquiry Report, Legal Notice NO. /2001, p.29

It emerges from President Museveni's submission to the Porter commission that, even though President Kabila had revoked the arrangements made earlier, permitting Uganda to control and exploit parts of the DRC, some Ugandans had followed through on the earlier arrangement.

Protocol was signed on 27 April in 1998 and it provided for the joint action by Uganda and Congolese armed forces in the DRC to stop armed irregulars in the border region.

54 Interview with UG/FA 1 held on 16 November 2004 in Kampala Ministry Office.

541 The Judicial Commission of Inquiry (here after referred to as Porter Commission) was set up by Uganda to investigate the DRC allegations that Uganda had illegally exploited DRC mineral and natural resource wealth. While appearing in front of the Porter Commission, Museveni in his defence of Uganda and himself in regard to the economic exploitation in the DRC argued that he had warned the UPDF and any of their relations not to take part in trade.
Additionally, the President knew that trade was being carried out by the UPDF officers contrary to his orders.

President Museveni's insistence that trade could be carried out by businessmen to take supplies to the population was in itself not carefully thought out. This is because, in a bid to take supplies to the ordinary population, the "politicians, soldiers and their families" who became traders, could easily hide their identities - and that is what they did. 542 In fact, the soldiers used military aeroplanes to carry out trade in these areas for three years, despite the fact that the President had prohibited this explicitly:

Figure 10: Excerpt from the Porter Report

![Excerpt from the Porter Report](image)

Justice Porter. Yes. What was worrying us is that nearly four thousand businessmen travelled back from the Congo, over the three years that we are talking about, on military aeroplanes; and we did not think that your radio message authorised that....

the President; No no, No, that is a separate matter; I was not talking about that.

Justice Porter Right. Because those who authorise actually rely on this radio message....

RE The President: But what I was saying was that; soldiers, politicians or their families should not do any business in Congo, because if they do, first, they would be diverted. (This one, of course, I did not have to say all this in the message). They would be diverted from their work and they may be involved - you know, because business always involve conflict and so on and rivalries and they would be involved in all that. But business people - Ugandan business people - should, if necessary, be assisted to do business; with security because of the insecurity there because, I mean, there was also insecurity there....Because here, we had ... I was bearing in mind that a town like Kisangani is a town of half-a-million people. If they go on without supplies for two weeks, three weeks, you can have a humanitarian disaster....


President Museveni's statement elucidates the situation on the ground and confirms that he was aware that business was good and that he had encouraged it. His insistence, though, that the military, politicians and their families should not engage in trade or business implies that there were already reports about their involvement. Regardless of whether or not the UPDF engaging in trade overlooked his commands or were in fact defiant of the President, it is clear from the

542 Salim Saleh's wife Jovia Akandanaho had shares in diamond smuggling companies in the DRC, and had commercial dealings with key business actors named in the exploitation of the region, for example, Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim a Lebanese, see The Panel of Experts Report, S/2002/1146, pp. 21-22 and Porter Report, p. 88.
543 Justice Porter's observation to the president in the Porter Report, see p. 31.
Porter report that the President did not have control over the Eastern Congo or over his army. It can be confirmed, however, that he supported an intervention in the region with a view to establish trade between Uganda and the DRC.

In Burundi, the diplomatic intervention may have been aimed at improving the economy of the area. Whereas Burundi had no obvious natural or mineral resources that Uganda would exploit, it nonetheless offered potential economic partnerships, which required a stable environment for mutual economic relations to be realised.' As the political situation in Burundi was not conducive to trade, Uganda intervened to address the instability. Museveni was thus also pushing the East African Community (EAC) council quickly to consider the inclusion of Burundi in the EAC in order to consolidate the regional economic organisation as well as to stabilise trade.'

Rwanda's economic attractions (or lack thereof) were similar to those of Burundi. Uganda's intervention in Rwanda was primarily aimed at restoring peace following the genocide. Those who had supported the intervention logistically, particularly the "Rwandan Tutsi", however, expected to benefit from Rwanda's new government in the end. They planned to expand their Ugandan businesses into Rwanda and to establish new branches of their companies in lucrative business areas.'

It should be noted that, unlike the case in the DRC, Rwandan refugees who were successful business people in Uganda predominantly supported the Ugandan intervention in Rwanda. During the final intervention in 1994, the first batches of Ugandan-based Tutsi who went and settled in Rwanda were Rwandan businesspersons who had operated in Uganda.' One interviewee referred to well-known people like, Mugabe’, Mugisha549 Emma Kato550, and many

544 Confidential interviews with IO/UNHCR held on 7 September 2005, in Hoima, Uganda.
545 Interview with UG/FA/BU 1 held in Kampala, 29 July 2005. He further argued that, "Being part of the Great Lakes region, a neighbour of the DRC, Rwanda and Tanzania, Burundi shares in the trade it is a member of COMESÀ so if one of the countries gets insecure it affects the trade in the region as a whole. Burundi and Rwanda joined the East African Community in November 2006."
546 Interview with UG/FA/RW 1 held on 24 October 2005 in Kigali.
547 Ibid.
548 Mugabe is a name that features in the Panel of Expert's Report Addendum as having been involved in the illicit trade in the DRC.
549 Joseph Mugisha is in-charge of a lot of Rwanda's reconstruction tenders in the new Rwandese government.
550 An arms dealer involved in Rwanda and Uganda's military procurement scams, see for example President Museveni's probe into an arms deal. Vision Reporter, "Museveni begins probe into tank purchase", The New Vision, 2 January (Kampala, 1999).
others. The other Ugandans who returned to Rwanda were described as "economic refugees" who sought jobs and other minor engagements in Rwanda.

Uganda's economic interests in the region are also further supported by the graphic representation of people's perceptions of Uganda's intervention in the three states. The results of interviewees' perceptions regarding the question which of the three countries was of more economic value for Uganda varied significantly, as can be seen from the pie chart below.

Figure 11: People's perceptions of Uganda's economic interests in selected GLR states

Source: Census Results explaining Interviewees' Perceptions of Uganda's Economic Interests in the GLR.

The DRC's economic attraction for Uganda's intervention ranked highest, as compared to Rwanda and Burundi. What is puzzling about the results is why the interviewees thought that Uganda had higher interests in maintaining economic relations with Burundi than Rwanda when Burundi is located further away from Uganda.

During in-depth interviews, policy makers, the military and ministry official interviewees were asked whether Uganda had intervened because of its economic interests or because it had other

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551 Interview with UG/FA/RW 3 held on 30 October 2005. It should be noted, however, that the Ugandans referred to here are mainly the Rwandese who had been in Uganda initially as refugees, but after gaining an education they joined Uganda's civil service and the army. Those in private companies sought to set up branches in Rwanda.
interests (these other interests were also outlined in the schedule, see Appendix 2). The response was that, compared to other interests, the economic interest was ranked highest, when tabled against the other factors included in the schedule. See the chart below.

Figure 12: Chart showing causes of Uganda's Intervention in the GLR States

![Chart showing causes of Uganda's Intervention in the GLR States](image)

*Source: Census Results from In-depth Interviews comparing the various Motivations of Intervention*

The general perception of Uganda's intervention was that economic interests had been more important than its interest in the ruling parties of the neighbouring states or the fact that it had an opportunity to intervene. The claims that Uganda intervened because it had interest in the parties that ruled in either state were rated less important than geographical proximity, except for Burundi. For Rwanda, interviewees thought its proximity and economic interests that Uganda had in it drove Ugandan's intervention.

Note that security was not included in this calculation because it was worked out separately in the overall assessment in Chapter Seven.
Although the President on numerous occasions reluctantly refused to acknowledge that economic motives were also a factor in Uganda's interventions, it was evident from his addresses that he perceived economic intervention as an exclusively Ugandan characteristic of international relations. He often drew on the 1965 Uganda intervention in the Congo to augment his argument that Ugandan governments had always had interventionist foreign policies.

Drawing from Ugandan history, he cited an incident in which Uganda had been involved in a Gold Scandal in the Congo in 1965: the implication was that there was a pattern of intervention by Ugandan governments in the past, and that they frequently became involved in regional issues of other states. It is clear from the findings that Museveni's interventionist foreign policy is premised on the hope that bilateral trade would flourish and that regional trade would develop and be better organised. He did not anticipate that trade in the GLR states would lead to negative inter-state relations, which happened in the case of the DRC. The interventions were aimed at ensuring that Uganda's strategy to develop economically was not hindered by poor bilateral relations, which were creating insurgency in the region. Museveni's support of the defunct Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and its subsequent replacement Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and EAC trade partnership is clear testimony of this interest. Uganda continued to trade with all three neighbours despite being criticized for intervening in these states. The DRC continued to import more merchandise from Uganda in the intervention period, while Rwanda and Burundi had varied performance from year to year as can be seen in tables 9, 10 and 11.

552 President Museveni often boasted that Uganda had phosphates in Tororo, iron ore in Muko and oil in the Western Rift Valley that it had not yet exploited because of financial limitations. He argued that it was more reasonable to exploit Uganda's natural resources than the much harped-about minerals in the DRC and that he was persuading Americans based in South Africa to come and invest in Uganda. See for example his address to Parliament on 28 May 2000 in Kampala, "Speech on Uganda’s Involvement in the Great Lakes Region", pp. 6-7.

55a See Museveni’s address to parliament on 16 September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard, p. 4906.

555 In 1965, Uganda intervened in the Congo in support of Patrice Lumumba and provided military equipment and training to Lumumba's men. In exchange, the military commander then "Idi Amin" (later to become president of Uganda in 1971 following a military coup against Obote) was allegedly given some gold bars that he appropriated for his own personal use. When the Parliament moved for a vote of no confidence in Obote because of his covert operations in the Congo, it is alleged that he instructed Amin to raid the King’s Palace and what ensued was the Kabaka Crisis of 1966, in which the gold scandal was highly implicated.

556 From the time Museveni assumed power, he argued that the African states' problem was their failure to transform the economic base and to have access to large markets so that the African producers would sell sustainably into the international and regional markets. See his Key Note Address at a Symposium on the Great Lakes Region commemorating President Mwalim Nyerere, delivered on 8 April 2002, International Conference Centre: Kampala (This document is available on request).
7.2 Reflections on Uganda's Economic Relations

Uganda, like many other African states, has been increasingly marginalised from the world economy, with their total share of global trade and capital falling from 7 percent in the 1950s to 6 percent in the 1960s, down to 1 percent today. The Economic Sustainability Index (EST) that was created by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) shows that of all the states that intervened in the DRC, Uganda was among the ten worst performers, together with Chad, Burundi, Ethiopia and the DRC. Uganda's strategic location next to Sudan and the DRC, both of which are big countries, has not improved its economic relations with these two states. As Herbst and Mill observe, Sudan and the DRC in fact pose a continual threat to their neighbours since their bad economic record has had a dampening effect on the dynamism of the region.

In fact, the conflicts in these two countries have spilt over in multiple ways, such as causing increased refugee populations, increased crime rates and enormous Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) proliferation. These outcomes have aggravated insecurity in the region and, in turn, have affected the economic development of the region as a whole. In spite of this, Uganda continues to trade with its neighbours at bilateral level through local trade at border crossings and at regional level with other trade zones like the COMESA and EAC.

Local Trade

At local level, trade across borders often occurs on established market days that are held in gazetted places, except for the small retail shops that are dotted around the communities. At this level, trade between communities is often managed and overseen by district personnel. Rwandans and Congolese bring in specific merchandise, such as fuel, cloth, food stuffs and other household commodities. Sometimes it involves expensive sales in livestock, cars, and land. Ugandan communities also trade in more or less similar merchandise, such as second hand clothes, new Chinese fabrics (often much cheaper than the new clothes from other countries),

558 Ibid., p. 19.  
559 Ibid.  
560 Ibid., p. 20.  
561 Focus group interviews held with border staff at Uganda Revenue Authority and local council leaders. See details of these interview dates (focus group discussions held on 15 August 2005 in Bunagana, Kisoro border with the DRC and another at Kyanika (Chamika) Kisoro, border with Rwanda held on 16 August 2005). This information is corroborated by trade records released by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS).
match boxes, paraffin, food stuffs and other household commodities. Sometimes, if the Congolese or Rwandan have relatives in Uganda, they may even buy land from Ugandans neighbouring their relations to enable them carry out agriculture or set up small businesses."

The common currencies used in the trade between Uganda and the DRC are Ugandan shillings and US dollars. The latter are used in local transactions and exchanged at gazetted places by mobile personal handling forex bureaus (i.e. money changers) on the Uganda-DRC border. On the Rwanda-Uganda border and in Uganda-Burundi trade, either Ugandan money or Rwandan or Burundi francs are used. In all the local currencies, the Uganda shilling is by far the weakest at a ratio of Rwanda: Burundi: Uganda, 3:2:1.'

Figure 7: Trade Items across the borders of Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC

![Chart showing trade items across the borders of Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC](chart.png)

562 Interview with UG/MOLG 25 of Ntungamo held on 5 October 2005.
563 Rwanda's francs are also called mafaranga Kinyarwanda, while those of Burundi are called mafaranga Kirundi.
564 The ratio of the exchange rate presented here is calculated from my experience as a researcher. I had to purchase local currency for the respective states I was visiting.
Figure 13 shows that there was and continues to be active trade between border districts, mainly in food and livestock. Trade of minerals and timber was highest in Kabale and Bundibugyo respectively." The trade in guns and ammunition was very limited, although, considering that it was done in a clandestine manner, it was not possible to establish accurate figures or the contact points of the traders." Further, the mineral trade was not recorded at the border points because these items were transported using air carriers, which took the minerals directly to the buyers.\footnote{567} When the traders used road transport, the minerals transited through the border checks as classified goods." The respondents also mentioned that trade in items like arms and ammunition usually involved security and military personnel who conducted the trade in an illegal manner. This meant that such trade was not recorded because it had been carried out in a covert manner. This contrasted with the situation at the Northern Uganda border with Sudan and the eastern border with Kenya, where, although no records were kept of trade in guns and ammunition, these items were sold in open markets in small piles. A gun cost the same as a chicken in Uganda (approximately $3)\footnote{569} at such open market places.

The respondents from the border communities regarded the existing GLR trade relations as cordial. Their only complaints about the local trade were the exorbitant taxes that traders were being charged at both country borders and the confiscation of smuggled goods by border customs revenue posts.\footnote{565} There were also petty thefts and smuggling of goods on both Rwanda and DRC borders with Uganda, which sometimes created some minor insecurity for the border communities.

\footnote{565} There were no corresponding indications that these transactions in minerals or timber were recorded by the Uganda Revenue Authority. The other merchandise particularly from Uganda into Rwanda, Burundi and DRC was taxed and clearance provided to the traders. The entries were mainly of large consignments of merchandise, excluding the bicycle traders and head potage traders.

\footnote{566} The reasons why minerals and arms were least projected in the table as interviewees’ responses were because the trade involved high security personnel or well protected illegal networks that eluded the police and border administrators.

\footnote{567} The respondents at the border posts speculated about this possible mode of transport but it was reflected in the UN Panel of Experts Report on trade in the DRC.

\footnote{568} Confidential interviews with UG/MOLG 36 in charge of customs at the borders of Kabale, Kanugu and Bundibugyo.

\footnote{569} In a confidential interview with UG/MOLG 12 held in Ntungamo on 3 October 2005 he argued that the guns and ammunition trade was not recorded but was overtly done with the full knowledge of the security operatives in the region.

\footnote{570} There are numerous security threats that affected the inter-border trade but these are dealt with in Chapter Nine.
Regional and International Trade

At the regional level, Uganda has legitimate trade relations with the GLR states and more specifically with its western neighbours of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. Regional trade is controlled at the official level by the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry through the various boards of trade. The nature of the goods that Uganda and her western neighbours trade in do not vary greatly. Considering that they are all raw material exporters, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda compete for more or less the same international market for coffee and other raw materials. The only advantage that Uganda has over Burundi and Rwanda is its proximity to the main trade port of Mombasa, despite its land-locked nature. The DRC has a comparative advantage over the trio because it has an unrivalled access to the international markets of extremely highly priced metals, stones and other resources, including gold, diamonds and other special yet crucial minerals like coltan, copper, uranium and others. At the regional trade level, Burundi depends heavily on Uganda and Rwanda's commodities exports. Uganda imports far less from Rwanda and Burundi than what it exports to these states.

The GLR trade occurs within an established framework of COMESA and now EAC. The inter-state trade relies on controls established and operated by each member state at the border trade points where the imports or exports leave the territory of one state and enter the territory of another. Achievements of this interdependence require a high degree of mutual confidence and trust between the states', factors that are greatly compromised by the current geo-political conflicts.

Uganda trades with many other states and regions. The European Union', for example, has remained the major trading partner throughout 1996-2005. With a total market share of 26.3% in 2003, it is second to COMESA, which has a market share of 27.7 percent of trade. COMESA member states altogether contribute 79% of Uganda's market share. The other trade partners

571 Interview with a UG/TTI 1 held in Kampala on 23 November 2005.
572 By the end of 2006, Rwanda and Burundi had joined the East African Community, which was followed by the ratification on 18 June 2007.
573 There is great mistrust in the region amongst the leaders, as each leader accuses the other of harbouring dissidents and providing bases from which these dissidents carry out subversive activities against their regimes.
574 The EU trade partners in order of market share are Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium. See UBOS Report of 2003.
575 See the comparative trade figures in the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report up to 2005.
are North America, which has 2.7 percent’ of the market share and the Asian continent’ with a 9.3 percent market share. Uganda exports, among others, coffee, vanilla, roses, cut flowers, fish and fish products. In the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) region, Uganda trades with South Africa (currently, a key investor) and Swaziland. Egypt contributes to Uganda's market share too.'

7.3 Uganda's Trade and Economic Performance in the Intervention Period

The findings of the study demonstrate that Uganda's interventions did not necessarily lead to tremendous economic development during its interventionist era of 1996-2002\textsuperscript{579}, as the figures reported by the United Nations Panel of Experts and other critics have claimed. It is argued that Uganda's economic performance improved during that period, and that Uganda's strategy of improving its trade and developing its economy were therefore achieved as a result of its interventions and with the emergence of illegal trade and illegal exploitation of the resources of its neighbouring states.' Uganda's regional trade contributed greatly to Uganda's economy and trade figures indicated that there was no overwhelming difference in these figures during the period of intervention compared to when Uganda was not intervening. Furthermore, the economic exploitation of the region that Uganda's critics allude to ignores the fact that such exploitation and second economy' existed even before the intervention period. What the interventions did was to expose this illicit trade and enlist new players. In order to establish Uganda's economic performance during the intervention period of 1996-2005, it is thus necessary to first examine Uganda's economic interests and relations in the region and then analyse its trade performance.

\textsuperscript{576} Trade with the United States of America has increased with the establishment of AGOA, see Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report of 2003.

\textsuperscript{577} In Asia, Uganda’s trade partners are Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong; for more detail see the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report of 2005.

\textsuperscript{578} No figures were available for the trade between Uganda and Egypt.

\textsuperscript{579} See Panel of Experts Report Addendum of 2002. The Panel of Experts was a selected UNSC investigative group assigned to establish that the states that intervened in the DRC had illegally exploited the DRC and intervened for economic exploitation purposes. See also Reno’s analysis of Uganda’s hard pressed rulers who used theft from neighbouring states to consolidate domestic political gains, in "Uganda's Politics of War and Debt Relief", in Review of International Political Economy, pp. 415-416 and pp. 421-222.

\textsuperscript{580} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{581} The term "second economy" is borrowed from MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga. It is used to refer to activities people carry out to survive the hardships of poor states. These activities are unmeasured, unrecorded and are carried out outside or on the margins of the law and deprive the state of revenue, see J. MacGaffey and R. Bazenguissa-Ganga, African Issues: Congo-Paris Transnational Traders on the Margins of the Law, (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), p. 4.
Uganda’s Trade Performance 1996-2005

Uganda’s interventions in the GLR states were aimed at improving its economy and reports from the Panel of Experts indicate that Uganda’s trade and exploits from the DRC not only improved its economy but helped it ease the burden of its growing current account deficits in 1997. This was because gold and gold compounds were Uganda’s second largest export earnings after cooper during 1997-2001. Uganda’s trade in the region had greatly improved its revenue and the general economic performance between 1997 and 1998. What the available figures do not tell us with any degree of accuracy is whether trade between Uganda and other states like Rwanda and Burundi was affected. Specific focus on these states does not provide sufficient proof of how their trade led to an improved economic performance. An examination of the revenue from all these states is crucial to show which country’s trade has brought more revenue and in which year. Data on Uganda’s mineral exports between 1994 and 2000 indicate that the highest exports were during the intervention period 1997-2000. See Table 7 below.

Table 7: Uganda: Mineral exports and production, 1994-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gold (tons)</th>
<th>Tin (tons)</th>
<th>Coltan (tons)</th>
<th>Cobalt (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Mineral exports (tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>67.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Mineral production (tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>3.704</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>4.289</td>
<td>1.824</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>0.0082</td>
<td>1.102</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.0047</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>287.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

583 Ibid. The UN Panel of Experts quote these figures to argue that Uganda benefited from the exploitation of the DRC.
According to the table, Uganda exported more gold than it produced between 1999 and 2000 despite the marginal drop. This has been explained by the fact that huge amounts of gold exited Uganda's trade customs points so it was recorded as re-exports from Uganda even though the states of origin of the gold were not Uganda. Similarly, Uganda exported Coltan between 1997 and 1999 even it did not produce it. These exports have been used to explain Uganda's economic intervention in the regional (more specifically the DRC) with a view to exploit the region to its economic advantage. Diamond sales have also been used to bolster the argument that Uganda benefited economically from the exploitation of the DRC, see Table 8 below.

Table 8: Uganda: Rough diamond exports, 1997-October 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volume (carats)</th>
<th>Value (United States dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1 511.34</td>
<td>198 302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11 303.86</td>
<td>1 440 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11 024.46</td>
<td>1 813 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9 387.51</td>
<td>1 263 385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Diamond High Council

The graph below illustrates this even more clearly:

Figure 14: Uganda: Rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997-October 2000

Source: World Trade Organization (aggregated data)
It is indisputable that Uganda does not have diamonds yet records from the world trade indicated that it exported diamonds. Interviewees explained that the trade in diamond was not necessarily carried out by Ugandan's perse. The diamond trade revenue that accrued was obtained from the foreign companies traders at Uganda’s ports of entry and exit. Further, other companies that belonged to other states and did not necessarily belong to Uganda registered the diamonds that exited Uganda. It was clear that Uganda was a conduit through which diamond was traded in but there were interviewees who pointed out that the government was aware that this trade was being carried out. Another mineral from the DRC that increased Uganda's revenue was niobium. The Panel of Experts argued that Uganda exported great quantities of niobium between 1997 and 1999, but that it did not export any niobium prior to 1997 (see figures below).

Table 9: Uganda: Niobium exports, 1995-1999 (thousands of United States dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Niobium Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Trade Organization (aggregated data)*

The graph overleaf portrays a clearer picture of this.

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584 Interview with UG/TTI 2, held at Ministry office on 23 November 2005. The Ministry official also commented that the Ministry had no concrete figures on diamonds as an export of Uganda so it was not possible to explain the figures.

585 In all the trade figures discussed in this section, no follow-up figures were provided by the Panel of Experts report that explained Uganda's economic exploitation of the DRC, therefore, it was impossible to examine the trends to be able to arrive at a conclusion that would verify that in fact Uganda did not continue to export as much of mineral or other trade items at international trade level.
From the tables and graphs' above, Uganda's export of gold', diamonds and niobium mineral in the late 1990s exceeded its exports of the early 1990s by far. The tables also show that these increases in exports were higher than production and coincided with Uganda's occupation of the Eastern DRC. The findings of the study indicate that, although the increase in exports coincided with Uganda's occupation of Eastern DRC, Uganda's economic performance during this period can be partly attributed to internal economic adjustments and policies. Uganda established a new trade liberalization policy in 1996, which gave more opportunity to conduct export trade by removing restrictions. Proof of the impact of the trade reform on increasing market access was not only limited to the non-traditional exports for example gold, diamonds or other minerals but also to the traditional exports for example coffee, tea and other agricultural products.."

These graphs and tables are extracted from the Panel of Experts Report to the UNSC regarding the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC. Corresponding figures were also obtained from the Panel and from the Ugandan-DRC customs border posts records for 1998, 1999 and 2000.

The Panel of Experts reported that the Central Bank of Uganda officials reportedly acknowledged to IMF officials that the volume of Ugandan gold exports did not reflect Uganda's gold production levels but rather that some gold exports might have been "leaking over the borders" from the DRC. The central bank reported that, by September 1997, Uganda had exported gold valued at $105 million, compared with $60 million in 1996 and $23 million in 1995. The difference in the exports has been accounted for by Uganda's re-exports, i.e. goods that entered Uganda and exited Uganda as if they were Uganda products/goods.

For a detailed explanation of this economic policy, see O. Morrissey, N. Rudaheranwa and L. Moller, Trade Policies, Performance and Poverty in Uganda, (ODI, EPRC, and Nottingham Report, 2003), p. 3. They argue that in the early 1990s Uganda had a strong protectionist and highly distorted trade regime, with taxes on coffee (the major export) and high tariffs and restrictions on imports.

Interview with UG/MOF 3, held on 12 November in Kampala, Ministry offices.

Trade figures from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) explain performance in the period 1990-2001 more clearly. Table 9 provides a comparison of the export trade of both traditional and non-traditional goods. Whereas the table indicates that gold, gold compounds and other precious compounds performed very well, there were variations from year to year. (There are also contradictory figures: for example, in 1999, the government reported that it had exported 7.0 percent whereas the Panel of the Experts Report indicated that it exported 11.45 percent as can be seen in Table 10 overleaf.) Despite the discrepancy in the percentages, Table 10 does provide an overall picture of Uganda’s trade performance. Traditional exports, such as coffee, cotton, tobacco and tea, and non-traditional exports contributed enormously to this performance.

Argument that by the end of the 1990s, a more liberal trade regime was in place, with duty and tax exemptions and concessions as incentives to increase the volume and diversity of exports. For a clear picture of the trade figures, see the Panel of Experts Report Addendum of 2002, p. 16.
In Table 10, minerals are generally referred to as precious; this conceals much information regarding particular minerals, but nevertheless serves the purpose of comparison. Gold, gold compounds and other so-called 'precious' compounds brought in as much as other products. The benefits in terms of taxes received by Uganda were marginal, but this is because the minerals usually transited through different points where the revenue collection could easily be corrupted.\footnote{One limitation to the effective recording keeping at the revenue collection points cited by interviewees at border trade entry and exist points, was the concealment of trade items to evade taxation.} Therefore, no proper records were kept.' All these factors notwithstanding, the

\footnotesize\textit{Source: Morrissey, Rudaheranwa and Moller, 2003: Computations from various years from the Background to the Budget (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and Uganda Bureau of Statistics)\"}

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<td><strong>Traditional exports</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
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<td>65.0</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>66.9</td>
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<td>55.1</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<td><strong>Non-traditional exports</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<td>Beans and other legumes</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fish and fish products</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cattle hides</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<td>Sesame seeds</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>Soap</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electric current</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cocoa beans</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goat and sheep skins</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoes and hand tools</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roses and cut flowers</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold and gold compounds</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other precious compounds</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other products</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-traditional exports</strong></td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UN continued to argue that the lure of natural resources became the primary motive why Uganda stayed in many areas of the Eastern DRC.594

The regional trade results give a far clearer picture regarding the revenue Uganda obtained and spent. See the tables and figures below to establish the recorded revenue.

Table 11: Uganda’s Exports Value to the GLR states in US $m for the years of 1996-2004

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td>887,165</td>
<td>338,845</td>
<td>1,211,089</td>
<td>703,856</td>
<td>2,543,401</td>
<td>2,135,008</td>
<td>6,624,016</td>
<td>11,726,797</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,313,975</td>
<td>2,746,121</td>
<td>276,969</td>
<td>881,055</td>
<td>1,161,311</td>
<td>615,315</td>
<td>1,250,050</td>
<td>1,565,722</td>
<td>2,573,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,872,818</td>
<td>18,521,698</td>
<td>10,517,817</td>
<td>4,505,859</td>
<td>1,551,056</td>
<td>4,525,092</td>
<td>1,565,910</td>
<td>2,871,656</td>
<td>3,153,823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report, 2005

From Table 10 it is evident that, during the intervention period, Uganda’s exports to the GLR region were predominantly in Rwanda, rather than in the DRC and Burundi. A comparison of Uganda’s exports and imports in the region are important for creating a true picture of Uganda’s economic motives of intervention. Table 11 below shows Uganda’s imports from the region.

Table 12: Uganda’s Imports from the Great Lakes Region - selected states in US $m for the years 1996-2004

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td>249,612</td>
<td>69,257</td>
<td>9,827</td>
<td>249,612</td>
<td>47,927</td>
<td>1,361,47</td>
<td>47,927</td>
<td>25,544</td>
<td>71,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td>82,198</td>
<td>369,785</td>
<td>1,473,086</td>
<td>82,198</td>
<td>108,167</td>
<td>38,25.84</td>
<td>108,167</td>
<td>301,280</td>
<td>2,274,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td>301,628</td>
<td>806,741</td>
<td>1,372,825</td>
<td>301,628</td>
<td>693,622.46</td>
<td>351,836.93</td>
<td>693,622.46</td>
<td>535,656.00</td>
<td>636,975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report, 2005

Note should be taken that it was the military officers who engaged in this trade, so the minerals could have been declared as "classified products". If done so, the customs officials were not permitted to question nor see them.

If only the figures of 1997-2000 are examined,’ it is evident that Uganda received far more revenue in its trade with Burundi, DRC and Rwanda in those years than in other years. It also received more revenue from exports to Rwanda than to Burundi and the DRC. Similarly, it imported more from Rwanda than it did from Burundi and the DRC combined. What we can conclude from these figures is, firstly, that Uganda’s trade with the GLR enabled it to obtain a significant amount of revenue as compared to the revenue it earned from the sale of minerals mined in the DRC and the re-exports respectively. Secondly, contrary to the view that Uganda’s motives to intervene were economic and that Uganda benefited greatly from the interventions, the subsequent trade figures show a trend that negates the claim that Uganda’s economic development was mainly a result of the exploitation of resources in the DRC between 1997 and 2000. The subsequent figures in Tables 10 and 11 are an indication that even when Uganda was not intervening in its neighbouring states, it continued to generate considerable revenue from its GLR trade.

**Trade and Insecurity**

Whereas all the districts indicated that trade was carried out amicably, there were massive interruptions at certain times. This compelled Uganda to stop the incursions that were detrimental to the general welfare and economic development of these districts. Statements from the Local Council and the DISO operating in the Western districts of Kasese, Ntoroko and the Bundibugyo region dismissed the notion that Uganda benefited economically in the Congo.” They argued that their districts were severely ravaged by the eight years of war and that opportunities for trade were minimal if not impossible. A Ugandan security officer’ (also involved in the combat with the ADF and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels) argued that there was no business in the DRC for Uganda in the districts of Bundibugyo and Kasese, for example. The war had affected farmers who depended on the sale of their produce in urban markets, but they abandoned their crops and stopped trading when the war started. This interrupted food supplies to the towns. The disruption of trade between urban and rural areas, together with the disruption of commercial circuits on a local and regional scale, contributed to

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595 The selected years are comparable to the ones that have been used in the analysis of the revenue that the Panel of Expert Reports to confirm the importance of the illegal trade on Uganda’s economy.
596 Focus group discussion with the Local Council officials of the districts of Ntoroko, Bundibugyo and Kasese.
597 Interview with UG/MOLG 12 held in Ntungamo on 3 October 2005.
the emergence of food shortages, not only in the districts directly affected by the war, but in the country as a whole. In fact, they argued, it was the DRC that depended on Uganda. For example, the Congolese depended on Uganda for their livelihood', because of the war in the area. However, since the ADF had disrupted trade, blocked trade routes, massacred people, and robbed them of their property, trade had been greatly curtailed."

Another problem that traders faced in the region was the stringent trade regulations of states like Rwanda. These regulations included the prohibition of selling alcohol, particularly Waragi and any merchandise that was not thoroughly checked by the border trade posts. In this regard, the interviews conducted amongst the communities at the borders revealed that Uganda traders were more interested in trading with the DRC than with Rwanda because of the stringent conditions of entry at the customs posts and greater flexibility at the DRC customs posts. Also, the bargaining power of the Congolese was far better than that of the Rwandan because the former transacted in dollars, which the Ugandans preferred to Rwandan francs.

The third problem was the bad treatment from trade officials at some border posts, particularly because it was preventing smuggling. Because the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) interfered with these so-called "second economy" activities, traders sought state intervention. One newspaper reported:

Sir I wish to pretest at the 'my the URA officials at the Congo-Bwera border handle business people. If you are caught with smuggled goods from Congo, he or she is beaten thoroughly and all his goods taken away firm him. If he follows them, he is charged a fine 'which is more than what he bought them. So most people decide not to follow their goods once they are impounded.. Let the

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598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
600 Rwanda prohibited the importation of Waragi, a potent brew that often makes people who take it addicted to it and prevents them from carrying out their work. Whereas Rwanda prohibited its sale or importation into Rwanda, they allow those who wanted it to cross over and drink it. They could "Carry as much as they wanted in their Stomachs" (said a Rwandan officer), provided it was not in a bottle. The prevention of the sale of Waragi was a key issue in cross border meetings between Rwanda, represented by the Province of Ruhengeri and Uganda, represented by Kisoro District. This was revealed in an inter-state security meeting.
601 "Second economy" is a term borrowed from J. MacGaffey and R. Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris Transnational Traders on the Margins of the Law, (Africa Issues Bloomington: Oxford and Indiana University Press, 2000) who use it to characterise the illegal economy (trade) that people depended on as a coping mechanism of a bad regime in which their social and economic security were not guaranteed.
The fourth problem was the clash of interests between states. Museveni and Kagame temporarily severed relations following the clash over Kisangani, an area of intense economic activity, which resulted in military engagements between the two armies in 1999 and 2000. The military clash between the two states has been attributed to economic interest in controlling this mineral-rich zone. Contrary to this interpretation, findings demonstrate that the clashes of the two armies were actually caused by indiscipline rather than economic interests. They were not fighting to protect the vulnerable Congolese populace, but to control the air bases and areas of "occupation", which is akin to the imperialist's "spheres of influence in the early colonial days". This underscores the salience of the economic motives of intervention. Related to this, an interviewee's account of Uganda's economic involvement in the DRC leads to the conclusion that Uganda may not have sanctioned the illicit trade carried out by its military officers, but that it was nonetheless responsible for failing to stop them from engaging in such economic activities. As a result, Uganda bore the brunt of having intervened for economic reasons, particularly in the DRC.

Three conclusions may be drawn from Uganda's economic relations in the region. Firstly, Uganda intervened to ensure that it created an atmosphere conducive for trade, especially in those areas in the neighbouring states affected by conflicts and insurgency. Secondly, Uganda intervened to stop conflicts and wars because it thought that once these were removed, then amicable trade would commence between and among states. Thirdly, the "illicit trade" that the UPDF carried out, had already existed before and simply became more exposed. The prevalence of many smugglers other than soldiers, who demanded protection from the state, reveals much about what the state was expected to do or what it was in fact doing.

7.4 Summary

The findings of the study do not establish facts very different from the earlier arguments cited in the first part of this chapter that Uganda's motives of intervention were economic. This study, however, has provided clearer information on how Uganda's intention to prevent insecurity and genocide in the GLR states was mixed up with the economic activities and political designs of the major actors on the ground. The chapter has also shown that Uganda's economic relations

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603 Kisangani has the greatest number of gold deposits in the Eastern DRC.
604 Considering that the state was protecting the UPDF officers in their illicit trade, the other local smugglers saw no reason why they should not be protected.
with the GLR states provided it with revenue at both the official level and the informal level. The only difference is that the official trade reports declared financial benefits that indicated economic development, while the unofficial trade lacked records that could have been used to argue that Uganda's economy improved greatly because of the intervention.

The DRC case was given more prominence throughout this analysis of Uganda's economically motivated interventions. Limited reference was made to Rwanda and Burundi because their trade with Uganda was not as volatile as that between Uganda and the DRC, and because it did not require an official inquiry like that between Uganda and the DRC. The DRC trade was "characterised as illicit and illegal" and thus necessitated an inquiry in both state and non-state actors to establish whether Uganda was responsible for the illegal mass exploitation of natural resources and the illicit trade that DRC had reported to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Because of the many actors in the DRC trade, including the UPDF officers, and in other states like Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Angola, and its anarchic nature during this period, the DRC received more coverage than Burundi and Rwanda combined.

While the Judicial Commission's report that acquitted Uganda of the charge of systemic and systematic exploitation of resources in the DRC (see Judicial Commission of Inquiry Legal Notice no. 5/2001 p.85). The ICJ found it guilty of illegal exploitation of resources, mass abuse of human rights and a range of other crimes committed against the state. The judgements in both cases disregarded the fact that the exploitation of these materials and their exports could not have occurred without the assistance or acquiescence of the local Congolese rebel leaders who depended on these raw materials for their logistical weaponry supply and the cooperation of Western corporations, which needed these raw materials to supply their high-tech industries, space exploration and sophisticated defence projects. Although this does not legitimate

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605 In paragraph 85 of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, Legal Notice no. 5/2001, p. 85, the Ugandan government was acquitted of the charge of Systemic and Systematic exploitation by government, and the blame was put on to individuals, mainly top army commanders. In spite of this, the judge condemned Uganda's complicity because there was evidence that the political establishment knew what was going on, especially considering the amount of trade and the level of use of MOD airplanes and private airplanes on the military air bases and yet did nothing to stop it.

606 The International Court of Justice ruled on Monday 19 December 2005 that Uganda had violated the sovereignty of the DRC during the War of 1998-2003, that it had violated the principles of non-use of force and non-intervention in international relations, and that it violated its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law and other obligations owed to the Congo.

Uganda’s engagement in the DRC trade, it helps to explain Uganda’s engagement in this illicit trade as part of a broader exploitation process that characterises the global economic system. The support system encourages the economic exploitation of states by other states. The UN does little to reprimand states that conduct such actions (e.g. sanctions were never imposed on Uganda because of its trade with the DRC). The international financial institutions too did not condemn Uganda for plundering other states. States like Uganda often got away with such acts.

In this chapter, Uganda’s economic motives of intervention in the GLR states are not contested per se. Three salient issues of Uganda’s interventionist foreign policy emerge from this chapter. Firstly, Uganda’s motivations for intervention were mixed. It intervened to ensure that its national security was guaranteed, and it occupied areas of the DRC to ensure that the security pressure points were controlled. However, Uganda also conducted trade and exploited the resources of the DRC because the insecure region of the Eastern DRC had plentiful natural resources. So, while Uganda fought to secure its territory, it became embroiled with the exploitation of the resources in the regions under its control.

Secondly, the findings demonstrate that the volume of Uganda’s trade in the region increased with the interventions, although its official revenue collection was marginal. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that Uganda’s exploitation of the DRC improved Uganda's deficit budget as claimed by critics earlier. The increase in the volume of trade that Uganda experienced during the intervention period was not only a result of Uganda’s interventions but also a result of the intra-regional trade reforms it established and the general good economic relations it had in the GLR, as indicated by the on-going economic integration efforts in the COMESA and EAC. The "illicit" trade, which is supposed to have been established by Uganda and is alluded to as being responsible for solving part of Uganda's deficit budget, already existed before. It was merely amplified by the involvement of Uganda's military actors who were in charge of the occupied regions.


* Whereas it is Ugandan individuals who were responsible for the exploitation of the resources in the DRC, the study here treats them as part of the state. So the state is regarded as being responsible for the individuals’ acts in the DRC.
Thirdly, underlying Uganda's intervention was the notion that stability and peace in the GLR component states would lead to better economic relations and subsequent economic development for Uganda and the entire region combined. The regional instability that characterised the GLR for the decade of 1996-2006 greatly affected the welfare of states. It increased the number of refugees, depleted resources of the states, and severely disrupted the livelihood of the populace in each GLR state.

The study also reveals that the level of intervention varied from state to state. It was sheer coincidence that the DRC not only posed an enormous security threat but that it was also endowed with natural resources. Efforts to control the rebel groups necessitated the occupation of the bases that were sustaining the rebel groups' wars. This occupation provided Uganda with two advantages: (1) it was able to control the rebel incursions into western Uganda and parts of northern Uganda, and (2) Uganda's military officers at the High Command deployed were able to exploit the local resources. In comparison, Rwanda and Burundi, which have similar trade patterns but fewer exploitable natural resources, experienced limited interventions. Furthermore, irrespective of the prevalence of natural resources to exploit, the inability of states to solve their inherent political problems often made them more vulnerable to intervention by other states. Rwanda and Burundi were more organised than the DRC, especially during the second intervention of 1998. Uganda and other states that intervened in the DRC had more opportunity to exploit the insurgency in it and insist on occupying parts of its territory to protect their own countries. Uganda did just that.

The final point to be derived from this study is that there was no conspiracy by Uganda to exploit the natural resources of the DRC: it was individuals in the army who were principally involved in such exploitation. There was a strong local base of Congolese who were in political positions and who provided the Uganda army with the necessary network that allowed them to carry out the exploitation and illicit trade. This does not seem to come out clearly in the Panel of Experts reports or in the final judgements of the ICJ in the Ugandan case. "The fish stinks from the head", is a Ugandan ethnic group saying, which means that the President as head of state bears the brunt of what went wrong in the DRC. Whereas the state can be exonerated from its officers' activities of greed and wealth-amassing, the legal framework that allows intervention would still find the state culpable because of Article 8 of the International Law Commission 2001 on (Attribution to the State of the Conduct of persons acting in fact on behalf of the state) which states that "The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a
state under international law if the persons or group of persons in fact act on the instruction of or under the direction or control of the state in carrying out the conduct."

7.5 Theoretical Implications

In this study, we have seen that the Utilitarian Liberal theory is helpful in explaining Uganda's economic intervention in the GLR states. The strength of the theory is the quality of facts that it demonstrates both statistically as well as in form of policy, which gives it a methodological strength that is greater than that of the other theories discussed in the previous chapters. The advantage of quantitative data is that it is possible to calculate if the figures substantiate claims that the economic performance of states has been improved by interventions. The only weakness of the theory is its inability to explain interventions like those of Rwanda and Burundi that had no outright economic benefits. The trade income accruing from trade with Rwanda and Burundi, which was allegedly responsible for Uganda's economic development, was pre-existing trade that had already existed between the three states before the interventions. In fact it does not take cognizance of the domestic economic policies that were responsible for much of the economic development. It also does not account for Uganda's economic development outside the intervention period to show that, when Uganda did not intervene, its economy declined. The advanced utilitarian position of Gibbs, namely the Business Conflict Model, accounts for the role of non-state actors in the economic motivations of intervention. Special attention is paid to the multinational corporations of the industrialized states and to other non-state actors that are highlighted in many of the UN reports on the DRC conflict. The evidence demonstrates that the individuals' use of the state as an avenue to intervene and then to exploit the intervene for personal aggrandisement is prominent in this form of economic imperialism, particularly in the case of the DRC. The utilitarian liberal perspective is a good theory but can be improved if complemented with another approach. In the next chapter, the Security Dilemma as an alternative framework is discussed.

CHAPTER EIGHT:
THE SECURITY DILEMMA: UGANDA'S INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICY

Interests are often not obvious, and much of politics is a struggle to define them. States and the people in them spend a great deal of time and energy arguing about what their national interests are. They also spend a great deal of time and energy trying to persuade other people in other states what their national interests are. Much of international politics is about defining, rather than defending.

8.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the motives behind Uganda's interventionist foreign policy by drawing on the Security Dilemma theory. The chapter examines three central questions. First, what threats did Uganda's western neighbouring states pose for Uganda to warrant intervention? Second, what role did Uganda play in creating instability in the region that in turn contributed to its precarious situation? Lastly, discuss the view that Uganda's interventions have been attributed to regime security interests of president Museveni and not necessarily to his continue claim of ensuring regional security. The chapter examines these questions drawing on the different types of intervention that Uganda undertook. In the first part, the tenets of the Security Dilemma are discussed, followed by an analysis of the interventions in the second part. The last part concludes with an evaluation of the Security Dilemma theory in explaining states' foreign interventionist behaviour.

8.1 A Brief Review of the Security Dilemma Theory

The theory has three central tenets. Firstly, states are unable to distinguish offensive and defensive actions of each other's military postures and military capabilities. The inability to distinguish offence from defence presupposes that the military preparations of one state create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether the preparations are for

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610 M. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, p. 49.
defensive purposes only (to enhance its security) or whether they are for offensive purposes.” Suspicion is created because states are incapable of drawing accurate inferences about why other states exhibit specific military postures and particular military capabilities, and states are then drawn into competitive acquisition and development of better military capability to offset each other’s intentions. This creates a spiral of competition between states to improve their respective military capabilities.” The spiral of arms race that emerges from states and the increase in their capabilities intensifies which in turn leading into a dilemma. This dilemma escalates and could deteriorate into war, particularly if the drive for security produces aggressive actions or is interpreted by other states as compromising their security.' The ability to distinguish offence from defence may be hampered by either misinformation regarding a state’s military capabilities or inaccurate evaluations or misperceptions of states’ actions by others. Irrespective of the source of the misperception, the main issue that characterises the Security Dilemma theory is that states seek to build their military capability, which compromises their inter-state relations, as each is cautious of the other.” In a bid to offset any attack, states are thus compelled to intervene in other states, which they are sure are intent on attacking them.

The second tenet posits the superiority of offence over defence as a key character of inter-state relations.” States that perceive themselves as strong tend to become aggressive towards weaker states and are likely to engage in pre-emptive wars against them.” The weaker states in turn resist the advance or the control of the stronger states, thereby creating intense security dilemmas in their relations, which could result in war, or in interventions into each other’s territories.” As each state tries to increase its own national security, it acquires weapons. This causes an arms race, as states signal that they are prepared to fight, which further intensifies the security dilemma.' The animosity between such adversaries reduces the chances of amicably settling disputes because neither state is interested in negotiating. The possibility of states forming alliances in a situation of a security dilemma is more feasible, and these alliances tend to

613 Ibid, p. 63.
616 Ibid
617 S. van Evera, "Offense, Defense and the Causes of War", p. 10.
be characterised by secrecy. The states become extremely secretive about their security plans, their alliance intention and above all, their foreign policy actions. Offence may have the advantage over defence because of two salient factors, i.e. geography and technology. Whilst geography plays a central role in determining a state's capacity to attack (offence) or in favouring another state to deter the advance of its attackers (defence), technology may favour offence over defence or vice-versa. Technology includes the military hardware and the nature of military training that troops undergo; Krause argues that these are important in shaping the perceptions states have of each other.

The third tenet of the security dilemma is the window of vulnerability and opportunity. Posen argues that, when states are in a security dilemma, they take advantage of a defendant's indefensibility to attack. He argues further that, when states realise that an opportunity has availed itself and may not be there later, they will take advantage to gain as much from their attack as they can. They take the advantage to strike while the opponent is weak and cannot access resources or military aid from allies, or they may attack at a time when the international community or international organizations are too busy and preoccupied to attend to them. When this happens, the offensive position gains an advantage over the defensive one, which most often results in war.

In the study it is discussed that leaders' perception and misperceptions of each other's actions and intentions towards political developments in each other's states may cause a security dilemma. Leaders may carry out foreign policy actions that signal war or intentions to engage each other. They may form tacit alliances breaking older alliances, which intensifies their individual insecurity as well as that of their regimes. The consequence of this on the interpersonal relations of these leaders is a security dilemma. Leaders will therefore intervene in each other's states to either pre-empt any actions against them as individuals or against their states or to ensure that they displace the other before the adversary organises to wage war on them. It is against this background that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in its westerly neighbouring states is discussed at three levels. At the first level the Security Dilemma theory is used to

619 Ibid.
622 Ibid., pp. 110-11.
explain how the inter-state relations and conflicts resulted into Uganda's interventions. At the second level, the security dilemma that resulted from inter-ethnic violent conflicts and wars are discussed to demonstrate that these inter-ethnic conflicts greatly contributed to Ugandan's interventionist foreign policy in the region. At the third level, the impact of the states’ security dilemma on the inter-personal relations of leaders of the states is done with a view to show that misperceptions between actors was not at the state level alone but equally influenced the inter-personal relations between the leaders. These inter-personal relations in turn created a security dilemma amongst their states.

In the study, security dilemma has been used to explain Uganda's precarious situation that compromised its national security. National security is used to refer to the total capacity of the state to protect the state and its citizens and provide a secure environment from external threats that are real and imaginary. The study demonstrates how Uganda's national security was challenged by various state and non state actors and how its lack of preclusive defence compelled it to intervene to stop the external attacks and spill overs of its western neighbours conflicts from affecting it.

8.2 Ugandan's Geo-political Position in the Great Lakes Region

Uganda lies astride the Equator, between latitudes 4° 12' N and 1° 29' S and longitudes 29° 34' W, and 35° 0' E. More than two-thirds of the country is a plateau, lying between 1 000 - 2 500 metres above sea level. Uganda has a total land area of 241 548 km².

To the North, Uganda borders on Sudan, with the boundary between the two countries stretching about 438.16 km, from geographical coordinates 30° 51" E and 3° 29" N to 33° 59" E and 4° 14" N. To the East, Uganda borders on the Republic of Kenya, with the boundary between the two countries stretching about 711.67 km from geographical coordinates 33° 59" E and 4° 14" N to 33° 55" S and 10° 03" S. To the South, Uganda borders on Tanzania and Rwanda and the boundary stretches 1082.11 km, between from geographical coordinates 29° 35" E and 1° 23" S and 33° 55" S and 10° 30" S. To the North, Uganda borders on the Democratic

623 In this study, national security has been used in the traditional term to refer to the external factors that affect a states security.
Republic of Congo, with the boundary between the two countries stretching about 710.46 km from geographical coordinates 30°51' E and 30°29' N to 29°35' E and 1°23' S. (Overleaf is a Map of Uganda showing its location in relations to the GLR. The purpose of the map in this text is to illustrate the salience of the inter-state borders in light of each state’s security concerns).
Uganda's western border security concerns

Uganda's narrow geo-strategic depth and lack of preclusive defence aggravated its insecurity because it was easy to over-run once attacked. The rebels were able to leave forests in the DRC, attack Uganda's western districts, destroy lives, property and loot and return to DRC before they could be pursued. The ADF, were able to occupy parts of Kasese district (for a short time though) near Rwenzori Mountain, using it as a base to consecutively carry out terrorist attacks and wage guerrilla warfare in the districts of Kasese, Fort Portal, Hoima, Bundibugyo and Ntoroko in Western Uganda. In the DRC, the Butalinga district, which is virtually an overhang of Uganda's Bundibugyo district is only approximately 250 miles from Kampala, this provided the rebels with an offensive advantage over the UPDF. This situation was worsened by Uganda's porous borders. The forests, as indicated earlier, inhibit easy patrol of the borders. Where there are no forests, there are few gazetted points that are patrolled by Uganda. Border points like Chanika (Uganda-Rwanda) and Bunagana (DRC-Uganda) are controlled in Kisoro district, which leaves large expanses of land underpatrolled and unprotected. For example, Busanza is currently used as an entry point that Ugandan rebels with the help of the Interahamwe use to attack the region. In Ntungamo and Kabale districts, there are many entry points that are not gazetted, which provided safe corridors for the rebels to penetrate Uganda. In Kanungu (Butogota area), the rebels penetrated Uganda through the Bwindi forest. The rebels had a strong strategic advantage because they ailed easily with other rebel groups to fight the target government; they lent each other forces and sometimes even provided hiding places for the other. This partly explains the precariousness of the security situation of the region. It turned out that Uganda, for example, was not fighting particular rebel groups at certain times but a whole coalition of rebels. This is what made the region a theatre of war, as it has been described (see Table 13 overleaf showing some of the rebel groups that fought against and within the borders of Uganda).

628 "Narrow strategic depth" refers to when the area a state has to prevent attacks from other states is geographically narrow, making it susceptible and vulnerable to attack.
629 "Preclusive defence" refers to the ability of the state to defend its borders from external attacks. In this case Uganda lacked the ability to defend its borders from foreign attacks.
630 The ADF was an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisation led by Sheikh Jamil Mukulu, which commenced its activities in the 1990s and continued them until 2003.
631 Butalinga district, which is covered by large tracts of forest and a game reserve, was one of the areas where the Ugandan rebels camped, which were highlighted as a pressure point in an interview with UG/MOD 11 held in Kampala, 28 July 2005.
632 One of the terrorist attacks which claimed eight European tourists was orchestrated using this Bwindi forest corridor as a passage to Uganda.
Uganda is a landlocked state that depends on its eastern and southern neighbours Tanzania and Kenya for most of its export and import trade. It neighbours the resource-endowed but anarchic DRC to the west and north-west. In the south, it borders Rwanda which is ridden with intense ethnic dissensions and while it does not share a common border with Burundi, it provides Burundi with an access route to the ocean. It shares ethnic communities with Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. The colonial powers had drawn boundary demarcations in 1894 that divided these ethnic communities with some settling in one state directly opposite from their nexts of kin that settled in the opposite neighbouring state. Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC also share
geographic features that are critical to each state. The Mugahinga forest, an extremely vital forest, extends into Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC but with the biggest share of the forest on the DRC side. Ituri forest which is equally critical extends to Aril near Uganda's border. Virunga Mountain which is covered by dense forests, also extends across all three countries. All these ecosystems are critical to the security of the region.

This geographic character of the region gave the rebels a strategic offensive advantage over Uganda's UPDF and other states' armies. Large numbers of rebels from different states were able to inhabit and depend on Mugahinga forest and the forests surrounding Virunga because of their vast resources and space. The Ugandan rebels in particular used these bases in the forests to attack the western districts of Uganda and return to their safe havens, which hid them from the UPDF, the Rwandan People's Army (RPA) and the Congolese army. Out of the nine rebel groups that attacked Uganda between 1987 and 2000, six had their bases in the DRC (see a detailed table 13 of the rebel groups on page 218. Rebels such as the ADF and PRA operated between Rucuru, Kiwanja, Namusengera and Vicumbi. Other rebels that did not directly attack Uganda but provided military back-up to Uganda's rebels, also used the DRC as their military base. These included the Interahamwe and RCD renegades who occupied Mt Nyamurangira-North of Goma and Rucuru road. The rebels that had their bases in Sudan used the DRC as an alternative route from which they accessed and attacked Uganda once they were repelled by the UPDF in the Northern section.

The rebels benefited from the terrain because the forests, mountainous areas and expansive Virunga national park from Bukavu up to Kisangani, from which they operated, were dense and impenetrable. This delayed the Ugandan forces' advance when they pursued the rebels. This provided the rebels with a strategic advantage over the Ugandan UPDF. The region also provided the rebels with an economic advantage because they were able to replenish their supplies and use the resources from the areas they occupied to purchase arms and other logistical supplies. The rebels engaged in lucrative business and, because the area was also populated with many foreigners, the rebels were able to exploit the advantage of communication from the foreigners to whom they provided security. Lack of proper management of these forests meant that the rebels were able to establish firm bases without being stopped. In the DRC, for example, there were no proper policies and laws in place to regulate access and use of the forests by rebels. The DRC also lacked the manpower to supervise access to the forests and prevent rebels from
settling there. Apart from that, it was preoccupied with civil disobedience, intrastate ethnic wars and power struggles, so it could not police this region well. To describe it well, an interviewee said that, rebel groups could have even set up their own states within these forests without the government in Kinshasa knowing that there was another "state". All these limitations enabled the rebels to entrench themselves in these areas.

The ungazetted border points like Busanza in Kisoro and Kisanza in Ntungamo were used by the Ugandan rebels and rebels of its neighbours to enter Uganda. Whilst Uganda was disadvantaged by the physical and geographical features that concealed these rebels, it was simultaneously able to provide military aid to rebels of the neighbouring states that would provide them with the required information regarding its rebels' troop formation, deployments and areas of operation. The groups Uganda allied with in the interior of the DRC include RCD-Kisagani based in Rucururu, initially led by Wamba dia Wamba, and later by Mbusi Nyamwisi, and RCD-Goma now led by Banyamulenge. These provided Uganda with the necessary intelligence regarding the position of the ADF and other rebel groups operating in the DRC and Sudan, in return for Uganda's reciprocal management of these allies' inadequacies.

The districts that suffered rebel incursions were Kitugum (borders with Sudan), Kanugu, Bundibugyo, and Kasese on the border with the DRC. They have been susceptible to attacks from RCD-Goma and other mercenary groups from the DRC. Other areas of Uganda that have suffered most, have been Botogota, Kihembe and Ishasha, where the rebels of RCD-Goma loot drugs, phones and money from health centres (Kanugu district) and Ntoroko, Rwebisengo and Karugutu in Bundibugyo District, where rebels carried out terrorist acts, massacres and banditry. Other than Kabale and Ntungamo where there are minor rebel incursions from Rwanda, the districts bordering Rwanda have been a little more secure, save for the few incidents with armed thugs and massive inflow of illegal migrants, which is likely to affect the welfare of Uganda's indigenous population. (See map 4 of Uganda overleaf page 211 showing the districts that the rebel groups targeted. They are marked with arrows).

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624 In an interview with UG/MOD 11 held on 28th July 2005 held in Kampala.
625 Byamulenge RCD-Goma is also supported by Rwanda. Following the differences between President Kagame and President Museveni, the RCD-Goma is no longer aided Museveni because it was loyal to President Kagame.
Uganda intervened in the DRC in hot pursuit of the rebels to ensure that they were unable to create a favourable base from which to operate in the DRC and in Rwanda. Uganda thus occupied Kisangani to ensure that the distance between the enemy pursued and the territory being protected did not offer any strategic advantage to the rebels who were attacking Uganda. However, because of the infrastructural underdevelopment of the Eastern DRC, it was also necessary to ensure that the rebel bases were watched and controlled, and that the supply lines for arms and resources were cut, an issue that could not be achieved if Uganda had simply stopped at the DRC-Uganda border. Arms and other logistical supplies were being airlifted from Khartoum to Juba and from Khartoum to the airfields and airport of Kapalata, Bangoka and Kisangani. In principle, the control of the DRC airports of Bangoka and Kisangani by Rwanda and Uganda were aimed at denying the rebels bases from which to receive the military assistance that could be used to attack these countries. Uganda furthermore occupied areas overlooking the rebel strongholds of the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ), Mai Mai, People's Redemption Army (PRA), Allied Democratic Front (ADF) and Rally for a Democratic Congo based in Goma (RCD-Goma). These areas included the Mai Mai controlled areas like Rucuru, Lusela, Goma, Benza sub-county and Kibirizi, a prominent location in the Virunga mountain region (see Map of the DRC on page 207 where the arrows indicate the UPDF military bases and areas of operation).

626 "Hot pursuit" is a military term used to refer to a situation where troops of one country pursue their enemies and ensure that the distance between the enemy pursued and the territory being protected does not offer any strategic advantage to the enemy for future threat.

627 In interviews with Major 1 held on UG/MOD 11 on 27 and 28 July 2005 in Kampala, and UG/MOD 13 held on 24 February 2006 in Cape Town, they argued that the occupation of Kisangani was warranted because of the effectiveness of 'hot pursuit'. The occupation of Kisangani has been highly contentious because it is highly resourced and as such economic interests can not be ruled out.
Map 4: Districts of Uganda affected by Rebel Insurgency
Table 13: Uganda’s Security Matrix: Rebel Groups operating in Western and Northern Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Group</th>
<th>Operation bases</th>
<th>Source of support</th>
<th>Weapons used and tactics</th>
<th>Reasons of insurgency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **LRA**     | Uganda: Gulu, Kitgum, Lango region, Eastern Uganda and Pader districts  
              (1994 to date)  
              Estimated no: 2000-2500  
              Sudan: Camps in Southern Sudan in Rubaga-Tek, Jabilin, Kempsaco and Burunki in West of Nistin across River Kue.  
              No distinct base in the Eastern DRC but are assisted by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to fight with and under the FAC in the DRC in Kirishaba, Mbandaka, Kananga and Kamina.  
              Also used to operate with FAC in Isiro and Busanga. |
|             | Sudan (main) source of logistical material  
              Local mobilization  
              Conscripts: UNLA, UPDA, FSEM | Land mines  
              Minefields  
              Remote areas |
|             | Weapons: Kituuka of 60, 84, 02 barrels each,  
              ... (SPG) 5 Self Propelled Gun  
              B-10  
              Mortars (60 mm, 81 mm and 82 mm)  
              12.7 mm Anti-aircraft guns  
              PKM (Russian FX machine gun)  
              Anti-tank mines (ATM)  
              Anti-personnel mines (APM)  
              Rocket propelled grenades (RPG)  
              Light machine guns (LMG)  
              AK-47 Kalashnikov-pattern  
              Multiple grenade launchers(MGL) | Initially, the LRA hoped to overthrow government by force of arms.  
              Establish a theocratic state because the current leadership was corrupt and inept.  
              Kony the leader had a passion of leadership and believed he was continuing the struggle that his cousin rebel Alice Lakwena had fought and failed.  
              Government neglect of northern Uganda. |
| **ADF**     | DRC: Eastern Congo, Mwanga, Bunagana and Gombe. include  
              Kibara, Mumbiri, Ruzegere,  
              Mutwanga, Kikang, Kinde, Maghina, Bunagana, Kamuntu, Bukindir,  
              Nyanzula, Kikyo, Kasde, Kakeleya,  
              Karuguzin and Rwacurumbe | Sudan “Arab allies” (at one time rumored that Osama bin Laden had sponsored the group.  
              National Islamic Front (NIF) of Sudan. |
|             | Terrorist attacks on civilians  
              Ambushes |
|             | Weapons:  
              AK-47 Kalashnikov-pattern  
              MGs 60 mm,  
              APMs |
|             | Most organized rebel group with a clear organizational and military command structure the semblance of a state military structure. |


634 ADF was an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisation, which commenced its activities in 1994 by setting up a terrorist training camp in Buseruka in Western Uganda. With a strength that exceeds all other rebel groups, the ADF posed the greatest security threat to the state and its territorial integrity. Some sources put the starting date of their activities as 1990.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Group</th>
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<th>Reasons of insurgency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Large quantities of arms and ammunition to ADF camps in Eastern DRC by Sudan airdropped at the Airports in Beni and Butembo. Local support from some Balagor ethnic group agitating for a kingdom in the region.</td>
<td>Machine guns 12.7 mm AAC, RPGs, 82 mm mortars, SPC-9, Bombs SUD-36-96.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNRF (1989)</td>
<td>Sudan: Juba, Yi, Kaya, and Butem, DRC: Kivu, Mbuji Muyi and Kamungo Sectors as well as in Kindu and Ibira, Uganda: West Nile. (The operation base changes depending on the circumstances)</td>
<td>Sudan DRC. Talban Amin later led a group of Congolese troops loyal to APDL to attack Ugandan troops in Eastern Congo.</td>
<td>Weapons: AK-47 Kalashnikov-pattern, Hand grenades, Mortars (60 and 80 mm), RPGs, 81 mm ATGMs, APM, SPC-9 guns, MGL.</td>
<td>Overthrow of the government by force of arms using Kivu in the DRC as their base. Fully fledged military commands for operation and administration. Two wings, the military and political wings. Composed of former Talban Amin's soldiers led by Talban Amin (Talban Amin's son) and Col. Julius Ongi based in Juba (Sudan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRF II (1979)</td>
<td>Sudan: Arua, Local community support and logistical supplies</td>
<td>West Nile is highly militarized, the area is full of Amin's remnants. They argued that they also got arms from the UPDF during warfare.</td>
<td>Weapons: AK-47 Kalashnikov-pattern</td>
<td>To overthrow the NRM government and be in power again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>DRC: Rwanda, Uganda: Nalwango, Kiruhura, Kabale, Rukungiri, Bwindi,</td>
<td>Ugandan government alleged that the PRA got arms from Rwanda, Sudan and the DRC but no substantial reports could be varied as proof of these arms.</td>
<td>PRA is alleged to be joining the defunct ADF and sharing the command. Some of the members of PRA are still answering treason cases in courts of law in Uganda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NALU</td>
<td>DRC: Kamanyu, Busoro, Buhwa, Muvambya, Kimbaga, Kafu Dist.</td>
<td>Joint attacks</td>
<td>To capture power by use of arms and to foster the secession of Kagame.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Group</td>
<td>Operation bases</td>
<td>Source of support</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1982-1998)</td>
<td>Urum, Ngeni, Beni and Bunenbo</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Weapons: AK 47 rifles, LMG</td>
<td>(Baldozo) from the Torn Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated no: 502</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fused with UNIF to form the ADF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNA 1980</td>
<td>DRC North East, Tumbila, Aruwara, Tshirika, Waza, Biringi and in Buma deployed in Kinshasha, Mbuyi Mayi, Bandundu, Kamanga, Kinshasa and Iteso</td>
<td>Sudan: DRC</td>
<td>Joint attacks</td>
<td>Minimal raids into West Nile region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons: AK 47 rifles</td>
<td>Some got integrated in UPDF and/or fled to DRC and Sudan to resume armed rebellion against the New NRM administration. Aimed to bring Amin back to power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General purpose machine guns (GPMGs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Links with LRA, WBNF, and FAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LMG</td>
<td></td>
<td>SAF allied to WBNF, UNFRILI and Sussex with Idi Amin and InterKhmer/Ex PAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPRII 1989</td>
<td>Split from WNBPI/7 officers 400-500 in Rojo</td>
<td>Sudan: Other unspecified Arab countries</td>
<td>Joint attacks</td>
<td>To regain power, and return Idi Amin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated no: 400-500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons: AK 47 rifles, Mortars (60 and 80 mm)</td>
<td>Links with FUNA, WBNF, LRA and ADF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AAC guns (12.7 mm and 14.5 mm)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium machine guns (MMGs)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>LMG</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RPG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex Far 1998</td>
<td>Bukabula Area in Eastern DRC</td>
<td>Eastern DRC: Rutshuru, Walikale, Lubero in areas of Millili, Bulindo, Luvungi, Biringi, Bumbyangombo, Vungu National Park.</td>
<td>Eastern DRC: Rutshuru, Walikale, Lubero in areas of Millili, Bulindo, Luvungi, Biringi, Bumbyangombo, Vungu National Park.</td>
<td>Overthrow the governments of Uganda and Rwanda and to destabilize Uganda. Territorizing the civilian population in the South western areas of Kisoro (Bunana, Nyunzu, Buhansi, and Nkoko) as well as Ishasha in Rukungiri and also carry out the war with and widely publicized attack on the Bwindi Forest park on March 1st 1999 killing foreign tourists (Americans). Ambushes in Gombe-Kanyabubunga road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated no: 15,000-20,000</td>
<td>Allied with Congolese government, Sudanese government, Burundi extremists rebels of GEPO, FDD and FNL who are active in Bukavu and Moba and were involved in fighting in Peps while others were deployed in Manono by FAC and Malawi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1998 integrated in FAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1998 integrated in FAC</td>
<td>Scratched earth policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons: AK 47 rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortars (60 and 80 mm)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AAC (12.7 mm and 14.5 mm)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MMGs and LMGs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Grenades</td>
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<td>APM</td>
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<td>ATGM</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>MGL</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Man-portable comm. Equipment: RPG</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Armoured Personal Carriers (APC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortars of different calibers, Anti-tank weapons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spears, sticks and machetes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA: National Freedom Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very sectarian and limited in number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994-1995 headed by a former NRA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Group</td>
<td>Operation bases</td>
<td>Source of support</td>
<td>Weapons used and tactics</td>
<td>Reasons of insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda Peoples Army (UPA)</td>
<td>By 1985-1987 they were fighting up to 1989 is when they started to surrender to government and getting Amnesty commission trying to negotiate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>soldier Major Herbert Bourga, main motivation to meet with the President. Wasted recognition so that he gets appointed into a senior position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erega</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Erega was a former soldier in the past regimes and also wanted political power; he believed that the power was shifting into Banyarwanda hands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Key players Muzi Ecwen and Col Omari Col Peter Otai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(These have been integrated partly in the current government.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The information in this table was compiled using the information obtained from interviewees with former rebel and government combatants and from UPDF reports of the Ministry of Defence

From the above table, it is evident that insurgency commenced immediately after Museveni took power and the rebel groups shared a common motive, i.e. to overthrow Museveni's regime. It is also evident from the table that Sudan and the DRC played a significant role in providing logistical support, such as assortments of small arms and light weapons, which were used in rebel incursions, with the exception of UNRF II, PRA, NPA and UPA. Sudan and the DRC also provided strategic bases from where the rebels could launch their attacks on Uganda. The rebels were predominantly from Northern Uganda with the exception of the ADF and PRA, which indicates that the struggle for power was predominantly between the Northerners and the Southerners. From the table above, it is also evident that the rebels used a wide array of tactics. Terrorism used by the ADF is discussed in detail in the next section because of the salient role it played in creating insecurity in Uganda as a whole.
Terrorism in Uganda

As the Security Dilemma theory posits, aggressive states seek to conquer less aggressive states, which in turn resist the advance of the aggressive or stronger states. Superiority of offence over defence is enhanced by the character of the geographical area in which the states are located and their level of technology. It is possible to extrapolate this into the GLR region, where the prevailing circumstances were evidence of a security dilemma. The fact that militarily strong Sudan neighboured Uganda meant that Sudan was its main adversary, with an opportunity to attack it easily using rebels and other insurgent groups. Uganda suffered incursions from the rebels who were supported by and using Sudan as a base and as a source of military hardware. Sudan also provided support to other rebels that did not necessarily use it as a base but that used the country as a conduit to reach Uganda.

Terrorism has been defined by Schmid as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi-clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons. Terrorism in Uganda has been traced back to Sudan and the DRC, with the latter acting as a conduit through which the terrorists sponsored by Sudan operated. It is argued that the rebels inhabiting the DRC forests took advantage of Uganda’s permeable borders and the forest terrain to launch terror attacks on Uganda. By 1998 alone, ADF terrorists had exploded a total of 38 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) bombs in Kampala and Jinja, killing 82 and wounding 236 others. A total of 184 ADF rebels were arrested and 125 were charged with terrorism. The ADF (Tabliques) who were responsible for the wave of terrorism in Uganda attacked urban centres of Kampala and Jinja. In these urban centres, the terrorists placed grenades and bombs in drinking places with the claim that the drinking of alcohol was not an Islamic practice. See Appendix 1 for a detailed chronology of the terrorist attacks on Uganda.

635 "Military hardware" refers to the military capability of a state or an insurgent group that includes both the tangible i.e. weaponry, force structure, and intangible characters like military doctrine and values the military holds dear.
636 There are many definitions of terrorism but in this study, Schmid’s definition of terrorism is used. See A.P. Schmid, Report to UN Crime Branch, 1992.
637 Interview with UG/MOD 12 held in Kampala, 28 July 2005. Similar views were expressed by UG/MOD 3 in this interview in Ntungamo on 4 and 5 October 2005.
638 Tabliques belonged to an Islamic sect that was engaged in a religious war with other Islamic groups in Uganda such as those that belonged to the Muslim Supreme Council.
639 It is not possible that the Tabliques were motivated by Islamic law as they claimed to attack Uganda so the argument of bombing people in bars because they were taking alcohol was beside the point.
Uganda's attacks were carried out before the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998. However, following the embassy bombings, the terror attacks increased in the districts of Kasese, Bundibugyo and Hoima and in the North and North-western parts of the country. The ADF and LRA attacked and burnt up houses, killed and maimed people, abducted children in large numbers and took others hostage. For example, the first attack on Buseruka and the second major one at Mpondwe in Kasese claimed over one hundred lives. In areas where the LRA operated, the death toll was equally high and abductions of women and girls very common. All the rebel groups that carried out terrorist attacks were funded by multiple agencies. It was not established with documentary proof whether Al Quaeda was funding the ADF. Highly placed interviewees in charge of intelligence however insisted that ADF's terrorist actions were part of the wider terrorist acts that the Al Quaeda had unleashed in the region.

Terrorism elsewhere has been attributed to repressive governments with unfair economic and political policies. In Uganda, the government attributed terrorism to three main factors. Firstly, it was sponsored by Sudan to create instability as a reaction against Uganda's support for the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Sudan's intention was to create another security threat that would keep the Ugandan government engaged on different fronts, in the hope that this would undercut Uganda's assistance to the SPLA. Secondly, they argued that terrorism was launched to establish bases from which the ADF could operate easily, because the war in the DRC was obstructing the ADF operations. Lastly, the rise of terrorism in Uganda, particularly by the ADF that claimed to be funded by the Islamic fundamentalists, was contemporaneous with the increased terrorist actions at an international level. The ADF terrorists were part of the bigger Al Quaeda network operating in the world. Evidence unearthed (from the rebel bases in Rwenzori Mountain) by the UPDF revealed that ADF had links with Al Quaeda. The Al Quaeda wired money to their links in Kenya, where the East African base was, and provided ADF military training and training in assembling bombs. Of the Al Quaeda group operating from

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640 Note that the UPDF interviewees argued that they had evidence but insisted that this was classified information that could not be given to the researcher. Similar evidence the UPDF alluded to is referred to as an exhibit in the International Court of Justice Court sessions of the Uganda-DRC case.

641 Interview with UG/MOD 12 held in Kampala, on 27 July 2005 and a follow-up interview on 28 July 2005 and UG/MOD 1 was interviewed on 30 July 2005 in Kampala.

642 T. Reid, Crime and Criminology, (Dubuque: Brown and Benchmark, 1994)

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Africa, at least eight Ugandan names came up (see summary of record below from the Central Military Intelligence).

The ADF was an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisation led by Sheikh Jamil Mukulu, Commenced their terrorist campaign in 1990 in Kampala
It was nurtured by the National Islamic Flynt (NIF) in Sudan (closely linked to Al Quaed).
1996 1997 Six ADF operatives were trained in Khartoum in Sudan in bomb assembling, While others trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
1, Abdul Kassim Mulumba
2, Mohammed Bossa
3, Hussein Muhammad Senkisa
4, Abdul Majid Tiger
5, Yassin
6, Twahir Zubair Seibiyo
In November 2000, Abdulla Kasuja together with Jamil Mukulu acquired a safe house in Pangani area in Nairobi, Kenya in which a group of 26 Ugandans were trained in assembling explosives (IED) The gimp later detonated twelve (12) IEDs in Kampala and Jinja between January and July 2001.

In February 2001, a suspected Al Qaeda operative in Saudi Arabia called Omran A Alomrani wired funds to an ADF terrorist cell in Kampala, on behalf of Sheikh Jamil Mukulu.

Source: ADF fact file sheet, courtesy of Central Military Intelligence

From this information, the UPDF argued that Al Quaeda's assistance to the ADF was part of a strategy used by Al Quaed to create more terrorists and spread them out to create terrorist networks. East Africa did not yet have an established network, and so the ADF would be the link together with the prevailing link in the Sudan that would mint out terror attacks on the region."

Terrorism in Uganda was intended to punish the Museveni administration for being sympathisers of the US and to create an international picture that Uganda was after all not as safe as it portrayed itself to be in the international community. An analysis of Museveni’s reaction to the US embassy bombings and his condemnation of Sudan shortly after the US secretary of State Madeline Albright's condemnation of Sudan during her visit to Uganda could have influenced Sudan's further support of terrorism in Uganda. We could argue that Uganda's relations with Sudan became strained because of Uganda's attack on Sudan, yet the two had just endorsed an

64 Interview with UG/MOD 12 held in Kampala on 27 July 2005.
agreement in terms of which Sudan permitted Uganda to operate inside Sudan to weed out the rebels of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) under the "Operation Iron Fist".

Contrary to all these explanations, critiques of the Museveni administration and tentative academic discourse in general point to the fact that terrorism is a result of poor governance; they also attribute it to the nature of Uganda's political structure, which excluded other political parties from taking part in active politics. The interviewees argued that the terrorists wanted to take part in politics and that Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) prevented this. These "terrorists", who were predominantly from the radical Moslems called "Tabliques", eventually joined the ADF. Terrorism in Uganda was also linked to the dissatisfaction of the leadership in the Moslem Supreme Council and was neither related to the "nature of leadership" in the country nor any influence from outside, as other views claim. Furthermore, there were intra-faith leadership squabbles amongst the Muslims. The illiterate and radical Moslems wanted to control the mosques and head the Islamic faith. Fighting ensued and when government intervened, it sent the radical Tabliques to prison. When these got amnesty, they camped at what is popularly referred to as the "container village". They became involved in business; it is not clear from the accounts of some of the remaining Tabliques how they came to be in the Rwenzori Mountains and joined the ADF, but it is apparent that the Islamic fundamentalists of Sudan who armed them and provided them with logistical support to terrorise Uganda identified them. The terrorism that broke out in different parts of the country was of serious concern to government. Attempts to address it required that the ADF responsible for the terror attacks be rooted out from their bases in the DRC. Intervention in the DRC to root out the terrorists was thus one approach Uganda adopted.

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645 Interview with opposition UPC 1 held in Kampala on 14 November 2004, UPC 2 in Dar es Salaam on 18 November 2004, and opposition DP held in Kampala on 20 October 2005.

646 Interview with UG/MOD 3 held in Ntungamo on 4-5 October 2005.

Ibid.
8.2 Proximity to a volatile neighbourhood

Uganda's insecurity was aggravated by its geographic proximity to the anarchic states of the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda. In all these states, there were citizenship crises, which had resulted in violent ethnic conflicts and political power struggles that caused wars and a mass exodus of refugees into Uganda.

As Posen and Roe have argued, when ethnic groups develop misunderstandings and the state that held them together breaks down, a security dilemma emerges. As each ethnic group misperceives each other's intentions, inter-ethnic conflict ensues. Ethnic groups that are strong threaten the weaker ones, and often this leads to war; sometimes, it even deteriorates into genocide, as the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo have shown. Sometimes the weaker ethnic group pre-empts the attack from the demographically stronger ethnic group, leading to a further security dilemma. The impact of these ethnic conflicts on regional stability is immense, particularly in a region like the GLR, where they destabilise the entire region and cause security concerns for the individual states. The Hutu-Tutsi ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi, and in the DRC the Banyamulenge versus other ethnic groups and the Hema-Lendu ethnic conflict spilt over into Uganda, causing further insecurity. On the one hand, the Ugandan rebels exploited the ethnic conflicts in these states to attack Uganda on the pretext that the ethnic groups were fighting each other. On the other, the failure of these states to address their own ethnic conflicts and control their territories also provided Ugandan rebels with the required bases from which to carry out terrorist and military attacks on Uganda.

In each of these states, Uganda intervened to address the ethnic conflicts that were of grave humanitarian and epidemiological concern in the region, and to prevent Ugandan rebels that

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648 "Citizenship crisis" is borrowed from M. Mamdani, who uses the term to refer to the intricate nature of the ethnic conflicts in the GLR and how these shaped the security systems of the region. See two of his invaluable works, M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001a) and M. Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu, (SAPES, 2001b).

649 A detailed review of the causes of these ethnic conflicts and their manifestations in the region cannot be adequately covered here; however, a summary has been provided for purposes of the discussion. Detailed coverage of these ethnic conflicts has been done by many scholars who include but are not limited to P. Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda; G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide; P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda; M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda; and M. Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu, (SAPES, 2001b).
were using the ethnic conflicts in these states as a pretext to attack Uganda. Below is a summary of the refugee population in Uganda covering a decade of its manifest interventions in the region. It was estimated that Uganda from 1993 to 1998 hosted approximately one million refugees from the neighbouring states." Table 14 below shows the refugee population in Uganda from 1996 to 2005. The figures do not necessarily paint the entire picture of the refugee crisis, nor do they indicate the deaths that occur in the camps; but international organisations operating in the region provide supplementary statistics that can be drawn on to complete the picture of the security situation of the region as a whole.

Table 14: Refugee Population in Uganda from Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>1,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>26,611</td>
<td>14,246</td>
<td>5,350</td>
<td>7,987</td>
<td>9,019</td>
<td>7,615</td>
<td>8,848</td>
<td>11,680</td>
<td>14,982</td>
<td>20,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>11,236</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>7,497</td>
<td>7,983</td>
<td>13,740</td>
<td>14,288</td>
<td>18,937</td>
<td>19,604</td>
<td>18,902</td>
<td>25,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>1,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>223,720</td>
<td>162,365</td>
<td>189,840</td>
<td>200,565</td>
<td>212,156</td>
<td>176,766</td>
<td>188,194</td>
<td>198,281</td>
<td>214,673</td>
<td>212,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>254,216</td>
<td>188,426</td>
<td>204,450</td>
<td>217,887</td>
<td>236,269</td>
<td>199,580</td>
<td>217,103</td>
<td>230,774</td>
<td>250,309</td>
<td>257,106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNHCR Statistical Year Book, 2005*

From Table 13 above it is evident that Sudan produced the greatest number of refugees at any one time. Sudan was followed by the DRC and Rwanda, all of which produced a large number of refugees. There was also a marked increase of refugees from Somalia from 1996 to 1998. Although Burundi had few refugees in general, the numbers increased from 2002 to 2005. On average, Uganda received approximately 230,000 refugees a year. It should be noted that these are the documented refugees; others who settled outside camps and those who eluded the immigration departments by using the ungazetted border posts of entry are not included in these statistics.

*Uganda has ten refugee camps managed by the UNHCR, each with an average of 100,000 refugees from Burundi, Rwanda, DRC and Sudan alone.*
Uganda intervenes in the Great Lakes Region states

In Burundi, the Museveni administration was convinced that the ethnic violence that erupted following the assassination of Hutu President Ndadaye put the Hutu in Burundi in danger because the Tutsi were determined to annihilate them. The Tutsi were far stronger economically and politically, so they wielded more power. The political parties that had military wings thus engaged each other; for example, troops loyal to the National Council for the Defence of Democracy/ Front for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD/FDD), National Liberation Front (FNL) and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), National Liberation Front (FROLINA) and National Liberation Forces-Icanzo (FNL-Icanzo), Palipe-Agakiza, fought each other. Political parties that did not necessarily have military wings were equally drawn into the civil war; for example, Rally for Democracy and Economic, Social Development (RADESH), Party of National Recovery (PARENA), Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens (MRC), Union for National Progress (UPRONA) and MSP-Inkinzo (a detailed list of these political parties is provided as Appendix 9).

Museveni as Chairman of the Great Lakes Initiative on Burundi together with the negotiating team intervened diplomatically to address the violent ethnic struggle for power and contain a situation that was deteriorating into genocide. Museveni was cautious not to elevate the Tutsi against the Hutu, as he believed that the two ethnic communities had to realise that they had to co-exist and that this delicate balance could only be achieved if they all shared power equally. Of course, neither party appreciated this option, but the most crucial issue was that their ethnic dissensions had led to genocide and had jeopardized the security of the entire region. Museveni argued that if a problem broke out in Burundi or Rwanda, this affected Uganda and other countries of the region.

In Rwanda, the 1995 genocide and subsequent war between the Rwanda Patriotic Army and the Habyarimana regime had also led to massive involuntary migrations into Uganda. Uganda's porous borders allowed former genocidaires, the Interahamwe, to penetrate and occasionally kill a few Ugandans, loot food and medicine and return to their forest bases. Initially the RPA had used Uganda as a base to fight the Hum-dominated Rwandan government of Habyarimana. This had led to spill-over effects in Uganda. Even when the RPF broke into the factions of Kagame and Bizimungu, Uganda was indirectly affected, firstly because Bizimungu sought asylum in
Uganda and secondly, because Rwanda alleged that there were troops disloyal to RPF that were hiding in Uganda. Uganda also accused Rwanda of aiding its rebels of the People's Redemption Army (PRA). The mistrust that Kagame and Museveni had for each other and the potential threat they posed for each other put each state in a precarious situation. For Uganda, it meant ensuring that no attack occurred from Rwanda’s side, while Rwanda's RPF ensured that no attack occurred from Uganda's side. They both occasionally deployed troops at their borders as signals of war but were quick to retreat, following internal negotiations and external diplomatic third party mediation of their conflict by Britain and the US.

The inter-ethnic clashes in the DRC, particularly in the fight by the Banyamulenge for citizenship rights, the Bahema-Balendu ethnic conflict over resources, and the overall declining control of Mobutu over the entire state had led to war in that country. The advance of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) and the subsequent taking of power from Mobutu by the ADFL ultimately affected Uganda. Firstly, Laurent Kabila's government was too preoccupied with the inter-rebel wars to have enough time to focus on Uganda's security needs. The widely argued agreement that the three leaders (Kabila, Museveni and Kagame) had tacitly agreed to a security plan to ensure the security of Uganda and Rwanda had not been fulfilled; consequently, the rebels continued to operate from within the DRC in attacking Uganda and Rwanda. The vastness of the DRC (discussed in detail under the geopolitical implications in the first part of this chapter) provided Ugandan rebels with a base to attack Uganda. Consequently, Uganda intervened, initially diplomatically and later militarily with the aim of overrunning the rebel bases in the DRC.

Uganda directly intervened to fight its rebels that were using the DRC forests as bases from which to attack it. The main reason for this was that the sitting government in the DRC (if there was any to speak of at this time) was not in a position to control the Eastern DRC. This was a vast region with a habitat that clearly favoured terrorist groups. To be able to check the advance of the rebel groups and counter their insurgency, Uganda had to block potential logistical supply routes that the rebels were using. This was not a feasible undertaking because of the geographical character of the region. The DRC's Eastern regions of Beni, Butembo and Ituri were impenetrable and had a very poor infrastructure. The alternative was for Uganda to occupy parts

See map of the DRC on page 212 the arrows indicate the areas that Uganda occupied.
of Eastern Congo, particularly those with air bases, which were used as conduits by the Sudanese government to deliver food, arms and ammunition as well as other logistical supplies to the Ugandan rebels. Sudan airlifted supplies from Khartoum to Juba and from Khartoum to the airfields and airports of Bangoka and Simi Simi in the Eastern DRC. For Uganda to control the airports effectively, particularly in North Kivu, Kisangani had to be occupied. There has been much debate regarding the depth of Uganda's penetration into the DRC particularly the occupation that extended up to Kisangani. What should be clear at this point is that the geographical region between Uganda and Kisangani offered the rebels better hide-outs and good vantage points of offence as well as defence against Uganda. Uganda would need a firm base that was equally accessible and operable to be able to hunt down the rebels in between Kisangani and Bundibugyo and Hoima and access to the airfields that were being used to deliver logistics to the rebel groups."

As the DRC war continued, Uganda extended its security bases further into the interior to be able to focus on potential security pressure points being used by the rebels."

The UPDF's hot pursuit of these rebels and over-running of their bases forced them to find alternative bases from which to wage a guerrilla war on Uganda, including Buhira, Ngoma, Bugoye, Kahinda ngoma and Kiddeyda in the DRC. These too were blocked by Uganda. This not only delayed supplies to these rebels but also undermined the rebels support among the communities that they sought refuge from. The communities were wary of keeping the rebels because they bore the brunt of the UPDF attacks. Consequently, the rebels carried out isolated attacks on UPDF bases to obtain arms and ammunition and looted village retail shops and drug shops for supplies. In his speech, President Museveni defended Uganda's intervention in the DRC as follows:

\[\text{... as I said when I last addressed you on the issue, the following were the reasons why Uganda Free militarily involved in the Congo:}\]

\[1. \text{To maintain forces in Congo in order to secure Uganda's security interests by denying the Sudanese government an opportunity to destabilize Uganda through Eastern Congo. We have done this and that is why the ADF is no longer able to get (sic) supplies.}\]

\[2. \text{To deny habitation to Uganda dissidents such as the ADF:}\]

\[3. \text{To ensure that the political and administrative instability arising from rebel and government dashes in Eastern Congo do not destabilize Uganda;}\]

\[\text{...}\]

652 Interview with UG/MOD 11 held on 28 July 2005 in Kampala.

653 Ibid. Similar views were expressed by other Interviewees, UG/MOD 7 held on 17 October 2004 at Kimaka, UG/MOD 1 held on 30 July 2005 in Kampala, UG/MOD 4 held on 19 September 2005 in Kampala and UG/MOD 6 held on 30 July 2005 at Kimaka, Jinja. All the interviewees were engaged in combat during the war in the DRC.
4. To demobilize elements of the interahamwe and ex-FAR and pram: them fare terrorizing Uganda and Rwanda;
5. To protect Uganda's territorial integrity from invasion by Kabila's force.

Museveni’s position regarding the DRC’s role in creating insecurity in Uganda is augmented by a statement by a Congolese DRC transitional government party leader as follows:

"We all know that what brought Ugandans to Congo ‘teas the issue of Ugandan rebels here (in Congo) 71 se rebels are still in Ituri. Unless we face reality, a problem still lies ahead." Kisembo told a meeting organized last week by the MONUC... Hema and Lendu (at this Bunia) meeting agreed on the cantonment of their forces Kiser& said ADF, RPA and Taban Amin had bases in Ituri. PRA were supported by Rwanda but mixed among fighters of Union of Patriotic Congolese UPC of Thomas Lubanga and that PRA are now based near Nyachucbu, south of Bunia town but closer to Ugandan border. The ADF were regrouping in the areas of Kamango and Eringeti. Congolese were holding Ugandan rebels (especially the Lendu)..."

This summarises the nature of the security concerns that Uganda had in the DRC. The security concerns with Rwanda were more in fear of a coalition between Rwanda and the DRC against Uganda. Although this never materialised, it is still looming. In Burundi, security concerns were more about the spillover effects of refugees and concerns of a potential genocide by either ethnic group, given that they were being forced to share power. The diplomatic intervention went on for a very long time and was primarily aimed at stopping an impending genocide and returning the country to democracy and the equitable distribution of political power between the two ethnic communities.

The Sudan Factor

To understand Uganda's security challenges in the GLR states, it is important to understand the Sudanese factor in the geo-politics of the region and in Uganda’s regional relations. Uganda’s security challenges are inextricably tied up with Sudanese domestic conflicts and wars between Southern Sudan and the Arabised or Islamised dominated north that controls political power. President Museveni provides a brief historical account of Uganda's security challenges as follows:

"Uganda's security trouble dates as far back as 1986 .... At one time you remember we had some problems.... With Sudan, we had been in Government for only six months and on August 22nd..."

654 President's address to Parliament on 28 May 2000.
1986, the Sudan army attacked us with rebels at Bibia. We have been having problems with Sudan all that time. We had problems with Rwanda under the late Habyarimana, and we had call foreign troops to come and help us deal with our problems. Therefore, the propensity for the foreigners to be involved in Congo is directly proportional to the internal weaknesses—both organizational and ideological (and in a later part of his presentation he reemphasized that)...

Uganda's security interest in the Congo has always been the problem of Sudan using Congo to deliver terrorists into the country. Security problems of neighbours should be handled correctly and on a durable basis. Otherwise, they will invite interventions from these regional states, or there will...

Uganda's initially covert support and later overt intervention in Sudan's affairs in support of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army has been attributed to Uganda's attempt to reciprocate Sudan's assistance to Ugandan rebels. Sudan government reportedly provided military training and logistics to Ugandan rebels and alternative bases from which to attack Uganda. Ugandan rebels were trained in areas like Ikotosh, and Magwii, which bordered Southern Sudan, and records indicate that Sudan provided military equipment and other help to all the rebels groups except those in central Uganda and Eastern Uganda as a trade-off for Uganda's support to the SPLA.

Sudan supported various rebel groups in Uganda from 1986 to 2001. These included; Uganda People's Army (UPA), Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF I), Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF II), West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF). See Table 12 on page 213-216 that provides a summary of their interests and sources of logistical and financial support. Sudan extended support to Uganda's rebels even in their rebel bases in the DRC and provided military equipment to them. In his address to Parliament, Museveni reported that the UPDF had captured from the rebels multiple weapons which included, 82 mm recoilless cannons; Self Propelled Guns (SPG-9), anti armour guns; SAM-7 (Surface to air missiles) and Igla surface to air-missles (hand held); 12.7 mm (anti-air-craft machine guns); land mines (anti-Vehicle; anti personnel mines (for chopping off people's feet); 60mm and 82mm mortars, multiple grenade launchers; and machine guns known as G-2s (which

656 Y. Museveni's parliamentary address on 16 September 1998, see Parliamentary Hansard, Special Session, p. 4907 and 4910.
657 Interview with UG/MOD 7 held in Kimaka, Jinja, 17 October 2004.
were fired against the President in Gulu Barracks). Thirteen sub-machine guns an Rocket
propelled grenades (RPGs) optic sight, one medium Machine gun, fifteen fully-loaded SMG
magazines and eight empty ones had been recovered from West Nile. Five RPG bombs with one
fuse, 14 anti-personnel landmines with ten fuses, seven tortoise grenades and an anti-tank
landmine were recovered in Yumbe; it is alleged that these had been provided by Sudan. The
security matrix on page 213-216 details the weapons that each rebel group fighting Uganda had
and the possible sources of these weapons."

8.3 Uganda's role in destabilising the region

Museveni's position regarding the security of the GLR had always favoured peaceful resolution
of conflicts through dialogue: in short, a diplomatic approach to issues. As Mamdani points out,
when Rwanda decided to provide foot soldiers to spearhead the anti-Mobutu rebellion in 1996,
the main objection to this move came from President Museveni. Why then did President
Museveni shift his policy from his cherished diplomatic approaches to military intervention in
the DRC? In examining this change in policy, two issues emerge. Firstly, each state in the GLR
played a role in destabilizing the region in one way or the other. Secondly, Uganda's change of
policy was driven by its national security concerns and the potential impact this DRC
intervention would have. The main character of the GLR in the post-Cold War era was that
states provided bases for each other's rebel groups through some kind of reciprocal revenge-
based arrangement of "An eye for an eye". Uganda's role in contributing to the insecurity in the
region should not be underestimated. In pursuit of its security interests, it affected others along
the way. Uganda covertly provided logistical and financial assistance to the rebels of other states,
thus creating its own precarious position because other states retaliated by assisting Ugandan
rebels. Although covert interventions are more subtle and yield better results, as Howe argues,
they lead to more insecurity and distort relations between leaders, a result that Van Evera argues
is characteristic of a security dilemma."

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of weapons were provided by the following scholars, and implicitly point to similar arms in the region. See R. Doom
and K. Vlassenroot, "Kony's message: A new Koine? The LRA in Northern Uganda", in African Affairs, Vol 98,
No 390 (1999), pp 5-36
659 M. Mamdani, "Rwanda-Uganda Intervention in the Congo", in Mandaza, I., (ed), Reflections on the Crisis in the
660 For an in-depth view of covert interventions, see H. H. Ransom, "Covert Intervention" in Schraeder, J. P.,
Evidence from districts bordering the DRC indicates that Uganda had thus destabilised the GLR, and thereby made its own position more precarious. As early as 1994, reports indicated that the Museveni administration had adopted military postures signalling war, which sent warning messages to the DRC. Uganda pointed to the incident on 4 October 1994, in which the FAZ had conducted a military exercise at Kyeshero/Butogota near the Ugandan border, an act that caused great panic among the local communities. A mortar shell was fired into Uganda by FAZ at Kabuiyiri near the Mpondwe border post and suspected Zairean intelligence agents were arrested on Uganda's border at Butogota. In May 1995, a regional border meeting held from 28 to 31 May in Mbarara (Uganda) revealed that both Uganda and the DRC carried out activities that compromised each other's security. In their reports, each state detailed the magnitude of insecurity caused by the other. Uganda had deployed troops at Rukungiri in Kanyatorogo on Bugiri hill, in Kasese facing Kasindi and in Bundibugyo facing the DRC to reduce the insecurity at the borders of Bundibugyo, Bushenyi, Kasese and Rukungiri. On 13 June 1995, a Zairean captain from the Kasindi army unit crossed into Uganda and threatened the western brigade by saying that he would launch an attack against Uganda. Uganda also noted that Zaire had continued with acts of aggression, such as the mobilization of training and arming of Ugandan rebels.

The DRC was concerned with the insecurity at Goma, Ituri and North Kivu. Zaire in its report indicated that it was aware that Uganda and Rwanda were jointly training rebels to overthrow Mobutu. They were also inciting ethnic cleavages in the region of Kivu, particularly among the Banyamulenge who were related to the Tutsi of Rwanda. Uganda had deployed at the border, which covertly assisted Zairean outlaws. The Zairean report argued that the deployments were heavy and threatened the state, because they were interpreted as preparations for an invasion. The DRC alleged that intelligence reports it had obtained revealed a grand plan by Uganda, Sudan (Zaire must have meant the SPLA because Uganda had relations with SPLA and not the Sudanese government) and Rwanda to overthrow Mobutu, during a secret meeting in

Kampala.' Secondly, Uganda had constructed airfields in Lamia (Bundibugyo) and in Kinyonzo (Rukungiri) to assist the rebel groups it was supporting. Uganda was using the existing Zaire-rebels (supported by Uganda) to carry out intelligence. These were arrested in Kivu and Goma.

The failure of the two states to address these problems even after the diplomatic cross-border meetings resulted in more animosity on both sides. As evidence unfolded on how each state was preparing for war on the other, the possibility of any meaningful diplomatic decision was further reduced. By 1996, the ADFL rebel war commenced and was later joined by the Rwandans and Ugandans. This war took the ADF by surprise, and forced them to make a premature attack on Uganda with a plan to obtain a base to operate from since the ADFL was now sweeping towards their hideouts. The events that followed have been covered in much of the literature, but what is important at this point is to establish why Uganda decided to intervene militarily in the DRC.

The preceding report on Uganda's actions at the border of the DRC is the underlying reason for Uganda's insecurity. Whereas Uganda's subsequent intervention in the DRC has been attributed to the fact that the DRC was providing the rebels with a base from which to attack Uganda, it could also be argued that Uganda had created its own instability by instigating war in the DRC through its proxies (the rebel groups in the DRC). Irrespective of who started it all, whether it was Museveni or Mobutu, they are all responsible for the insecurity in their own states. Uganda intervened in the DRC-occupied parts of Eastern Congo and the air bases that were the main conduits for the rebel logistical supplies that were being airlifted from Khartoum through Juba and brought to Eastern Congo for the rebels. To secure itself, Uganda extended its security bases further into the interior to be able to focus on potential security pressure spots (rebel areas)." It also cultivated good relations with the local populace in Eastern Congo. These acted as whistle blowers and informed the UPDF of the movement of the Ugandan rebels. To be able to sustain this supply of information, Uganda allied with Congolese rebels, particularly

661 The report indicating Zaire’s security concerns is available on request. Zaire’s fear of a coup came true just a year after this report was released.
662 This report is available on request.
663 The depth of Uganda’s penetration into the DRC has been strongly contested, particularly regarding the occupation that extended up to Kisangani. What should be clear at this point is that the geographical region between Uganda and Kisangani offered the rebels better hide-outs and good vantage points of offence as well as defence against Uganda. Uganda would need a firm base that was equally accessible and operable to be able to hunt down the rebels between Kisangani and Bundibugyo and Hoima. These had to be permanent bases if security was to be ensured.
RCD-Kisangani, Lendu Militias led by Foribert Njabu of the Integrationist Front (FIN), Forces of Armed Congolese (FAPC) of Commander Jerome Kakwava and the Party for the Safeguard and Integrity of the Congo of Chief Kahwa and the Rally for a Democratic Congo -Liberation Movement (RCD-ML). It also supported Rally for a Democratic Congo-Kisangani new leader Mbusa Nyamwisi64 who was interested in controlling Beni and North Kivu. He did not want the UPDF to leave the DRC because he benefited from Uganda and would use them to fight his own battles.

It has been discussed from the foregoing that Uganda played a role in creating its instability, but it should also be noted that military interventions were not the only mode of intervention undertaken by Uganda. Efforts to resolve conflicts and misunderstandings diplomatically preceded the use of military force. Joint communiqués were endorsed as a means of addressing the insecurity in the region. One common feature in all these communiqués was the willingness of the states to use mutually agreed strategies to address security problems that pervaded the GLR. Whereas the implementation of these agreements is questionable, it serves to show that although military options were taken, they were preceded by diplomatic efforts. For example, in the Joint Communiqué of 1997, the DRC and Uganda agreed to address the NALU, Forces Armées Zaire (EX-FAZ), Forces Armées Rwandaises (EX-FAR) and the Interahamwe groups in the Rwenzori mountains, which were creating insecurity for both states.

These bilateral relations were continuously dogged by failures of both states to uphold resolutions and recommendations made in many of the security meetings. In July 1997, for example, attempts were made to harmonize and consolidate the good neighbourly relations between North-Kivu Province and Uganda's Western districts of Kisoro, Kasese, Rukungiri and Bundibugyo. Central to this meeting were concerns over the activism and provocations from the NALU dissidents, the repeated incursions of Uganda's regular army into the DRC, and the violation of territorial borders and death-threats towards traditional and local authorities. Included were police harassments and bad treatment of the Congolese in Uganda and Congolese torture of Ugandan businessmen. All these were discussed, but the two states did not live up to stopping them. We could argue that the failure to cooperate was because either state did not

64 Another interviewee pointed to the fact that Mbusa Nyamwisi was actually a Mukonjo and that he was thus able to use the region to his advantage (Interview held in Ntungamo, 24 October 2005).
have control over their soldiers on the ground, or because communication between those at the
top and those actually in the war zones was non-existent. A summary of the communiqués
below demonstrates the diplomatic effort undertaken by the GLR states.

Figure 16: Regional Communiqués

| List of bilateral, Tripartite and regional communiqués endorsed by the GLR states of Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC |
| 1996: 13 June: Joint Communiqué between Uganda and the DRC at Kisoro. |
| 1997: 7-8th July: Joint Communiqué Uganda and the DRC on mutual suspicion and mistrust between the two states. |
| 1997: 3rd December: Joint Communiqué between Uganda and Rwanda on Security. |
| 1998: 8th June: Joint operations along the common borders (DRC and Uganda) |
| 1998: 18th May: Joint Communiqué on the exchange of information/Intelligence on security along common borders. |

Source: District Archival Material

One salient factor emerges from these diplomatic efforts to address insecurity. 'Whilst it is true
that border administration met to agree on a few security arrangements, it was not clear from the
field studies whether the leaders were advised about these communiqués and the obligations
expected of them. Of course, records indicate that the governments were represented from the
highest security offices, and that other than these communiqués cited, there were many more
(see chronicle Appendix 1) but it is unclear what then caused these communiqués to fail to
achieve their goals. The failure of these communiqués and attempts to cooperate in security
matters has been attributed to the character of the leaders in the region and their competition for
power, authority and economic interests. The competition of these leaders is at two levels. At
the first level, the military commanders of Rwanda and Uganda who were in charge of the troops
in the DRC were opposed to each other and engaged in war out of their own differences. At the
second level (this is dealt with in detail in the subsequent section) the Presidents of the three
states Rwanda, DRC and Uganda were all competing for regional power. Most prominently
were the leaders of Rwanda and Uganda who indirectly engaged each other through their proxies
and used the DRC as the competitive base. Evidence of this animosity between the two leaders
is evident in Appendix 8 which illustrates President Kagame’s interview with a journalist on the Kisangani clashes and President Museveni’s address to the Ugandan Parliament of May 2000 the two must be read together to appreciate the tension that existed between the two leaders. At a more subtle level, the leaders in the region, Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC engaged in arms acquisition as a means to prepare themselves for any eventuality. These are discussed in the next section.

**Regional Competitive Arms Acquisition in the GLR**

One consequence of the security dilemma created by ethnic conflicts and political power squabbles in the region, is the arms build-up, not only by the states, but also by the rebels and ethnic groups as a means to secure themselves. The increase in competitive arms acquisition\(^6\) or armament of the region and states enormous procurements of weapons during this period aggravated the security dilemma in the region. As Posen, Jervis, Roe, Van Evera and Glaser point out, increases in resources by states in order to defend themselves result in states getting both too much and too little: too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression, and too little because those being threatened will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state’s security.\(^6\) In this way, the arms build-up expands into an arms race, as states compete for better and more advanced military hardware, which may deteriorate into a standoff between the competing states. Tables overleaf showing the massive flow of arms through purchases and military expenditure in the region, demonstrate the magnitude of the military build-ups that were responsible for the security dilemma.

In Uganda, the increase in its military capability has been attributed to three factors.\(^6\) Firstly, the security challenges that resulted from the rapid incursions of Uganda's borders by the Ugandan insurgent groups and the discovery that the rebels had advanced weaponry compared to the UPDF forced it to increase its military strength with the rationale that they would counter the

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\(^6\) Competitive arms acquisition has been used in place of the arms race which is one of the characters of a security dilemma. The time series of the conflict in the region can not warrant an analysis of an arms race because it is so short a time.

\(^6\) R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p. 64. Other scholars express similar views to that of Jervis with regard to the arms increment amongst states.

\(^6\) Evidence of Uganda's arms build-up was inadvertently revealed by some highly publicized hitches in the acquisition of arms in what has come to be known as the “arms scandal”. 

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insurgents' military capabilities." Secondly, because of the increased insurgency regionally, Uganda felt that it had a salient role to play in restoring stability in the region. This necessitated that Uganda acquire more military hardware. Lastly, the military build-up and arms procurement were a direct result of inappropriate behaviour on the part of the officers who sought to gain from the procurement procedure for personal aggrandizement."

Reports revealed other military purchases in 1999: Uganda bought T 55 tanks at US $30,000 each, which was the cost of a car." Whereas previous researches have attempted to link the increased expenditure on arms to the regional wars that broke out between 1994 and 2000, it is apparent that Uganda's procurement of weapons continued to increase, particularly between 2003 and 2005, even when rebel activity had subsided. In 2005 alone, Uganda planned to acquire Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) from Russia's Arzamas Engineering plant, which had put up a weapons show at the IDEX 2005 in Abu Dhabi. Uganda planned to buy 14 BTR 80 APCs; Sudan retaliated by ordering thirty APCs for its own army. The table of military expenditure explains this clearly. The statistics used in this study were obtained from documentary evidence from the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London), the Small Arms Survey (Geneva) and the African Centre for Strategic Studies (Washington DC) these are reputable research institutions.

The impact of Uganda's military build-up on the neighbouring states sparked off similar attempts by these to procure even more weapons, setting in motion a rapid arms acquisition between states. Another factor that greatly contributed to the military build-ups but that has not been given sufficient treatment is the US role in the region. Whereas it was obvious that the US did

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668 In his Address to Parliament Museveni said that weapons captured from the rebels were far better than what Uganda had. He used similar arguments to justify the increase in the budget of the Ministry of Defence. See Museveni's Parliamentary Address of 22 November 2002 in Parliamentary Hansard, 2002.
669 The New Vision, "Museveni begins probe into tank purchase", Kampala 2 January 1999 and P. Harris, "Uganda pays over the odds for tanks that will not work", in Jane's Intelligence Review (1999). Through the connivance of top military officials and civilian business middle men, the Ugandan government procured weapons and helicopters of substandard quality, which cost the government colossal sums of money. A highly publicised case in which Lt General Salim Salem, Kampala businessmen Kwame Ruyondo and Emmanuel Kato revealed that bribery and corruption had been a common character of the UPDF involving sums of bribery as high as 1.4 billion Uganda shillings. Evidence elsewhere suggested that the supplier of the arms in Uganda had also sold similar junk helicopters to Rwanda.
671 The Plant's director Valentin Kopalikin, reported in The New Vision of Friday, 25 February 2005.
not support a regional war, its earlier and continued military sales to the GLR states nonetheless provided them with the opportunity to equip themselves for war. The more arms one state purchased, the more the rest acquired. In Africa, the US continued to sell even more weapons through its two main programs - the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). In Chapter Six, it was discussed in detail how the US sold large amounts of military equipment and trained many soldiers. The aid and training inadvertently led to an increased arms acquisition and a willingness among the states to engage in war, because they believed they had sufficient military capability to sustain it. Uganda thus became strong enough to intervene in other states because the training and the military procurements had improved its military capability.

Other avenues through which the region was militarized included the direct aiming of rebels by neighbouring states. Arms trafficking continued to be a common feature of the militarization of the region, and Uganda became a hub of weapon transmission in the region. Corresponding research indicates that the majority of weapons purchased by the DRC militia were organised through Uganda's secondary trade arrangements. Uganda provided the intermediary points of arms trafficking, and is continues to supply arms and ammunition to other states through its arms factory in Nakasongola. Arms were sold to the rebel groups with which Uganda sympathised, for example, Bembe's group in North Eastern Congo, while the rest were sold in Kinshasha for about US $200 dollars each." More evidence of the arms acquisition is provided on states like Rwanda', although it is not the central focus here.

This competitive acquisition of arms depicts a security dilemma. As Jervis points out, a security dilemma is caused by the military preparations of one state, which creates two situations. On the


674 Small Arms Survey, Special Report, April, 2002, pp. 33-34.

one hand, the arms race creates an unreasonable uncertainty in the mind of another state as to whether the arms build-up is for defensive or offensive purposes.' Van Evera argues that when such an arms race occurs and states increase their military capabilities to their advantage, they encourage styles of diplomacy that increase the probability of war because states negotiate less and are more likely to use *fait accompli* tactics.' This is precisely what happened in the GLR: the increased amounts of armaments in the region led to wars between allies, like the Kisangani wars between Uganda and Rwanda, and regional wars such as the DRC war between Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad in support of the DRC and Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda's coalition forces in 1998 and 1999. The competitive acquisition of arms led to increased military spending and further instability in Uganda. In a critique by a Small Arms Survey Specialist, Uganda's acquisition of arms was not necessarily because of only the security challenges particularly counter-insurgency it had but rather simply amassed weaponry with an underlying motive of projecting its military as top of the range. The specialist had this to say,

*Think about the material procured by Uganda. Was it suitable for a counterinsurgency operation against the LRA?... the answer is, for the most part, no. And this is very important; the LRA at no time outgunned the UPDF. There was nothing sophisticated about the weapons that they had.*

From this communication it is evident that not all the weapons acquired were necessarily for immediate security use (here equipment such as night vision and radio sets for small unit bush operations are the exception) but rather for military preparedness as well as for projection of power in the region. Overleaf is Uganda's defence budget over six years.

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676 R. Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*, pp. 63-64.
677 S. van Evera, "Offense, Defense and the causes of War", pp. 10-12.
678 Small Arms Survey Specialist, Email correspondence and discussion, November 5, 2007
It could be argued from the defence budgets for these six financial years that, whilst the budget was increasing, the security of Uganda was not necessarily improving. The figure also indicates that, in 1998, in spite of increased external threats, wars and local insurgenciesm the defence expenditure was progressively reduced, from about 40% of recurrent expenditure to 19% (Minister of Defence: 1997/1998 Policy statement) but this changed into a drastic expenditure increase, which was most likely a result of the precarious situation in the subsequent years. In his address to Parliament, President Museveni explained the common question that was being raised by the opposition and other citizens.

**IS UGANDA WASTING MONEY IN CONGO?**

*I am always hearing false arguments by some people to the effect that we are wasting money in Congo. Of course we are spending money, but we were spending money anyway because we were fighting banditry hem in Uganda, only that we did not have a chance to solve this problem conclusively. We would operate on the Uganda side but the bandits would be on the Congo side and*

679 Efforts had been made to increase the budget but the International Financial Institutions had refused and had forced Uganda to stick to its previous budget. Critiques of this expenditure pattern showing a decrease in expenditure argued that, whereas the Ministry had declared that it the budget was as required by the donors, there were indications that some discretionary spending had been made.
spending money, but we are now doing so profitably. That is how we have been able to capture the bandits in Congo. Therefore, the argument of spending money does not hold miter because even you do not operate outside your borders, if you have security problems, which are part of the old security problems of our country, you will spend money within your country. However, you will have fewer chances of resolving the problem if the people on the other side do not co-operate.

From the graph, it can also be seen that there was an increment in the budget every year even though there was a very marginal increase in the capital development. It should be noted that whilst the increment in the budget can be justifiably defended, as mainly a result of insecurity, there were incidents when some of the resources were used for personal aggrandisement through shoddy military expenditures that were never accounted for. The earlier reference to the purchase of substandard military hardware is but one of the many examples of misappropriation of military resources that has characterised the Museveni administration.

The increments in the defence budgets were not peculiar to Uganda; other GLR states also increased their military spending, indicating that there was indeed a security dilemma. Below are two detailed breakdowns of military procurements and expenditure in the Great Lakes Region of Africa in the period of intense insecurity from 1995-1999. The tables provide comparative views of the defence spending in the region. The purpose of Table 15 is to demonstrate that the increment in military expenditure was not confined to Uganda but also relevant to the other states in the region, most probably because of the security dilemma in the region. The table demonstrated that there was deliberate acquisition of arms and weapons not only for counter-insurgency but also for conventional warfare which is akin to one main characteristic of the security dilemma arms race.

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Museveni’s Speech to Parliament on 28 May 2000, held at the International Conference Centre, Kampala Uganda.
Table 15: Arms orders and Deliveries to Great Lakes Region of Africa in the inter-war period 1995-1999

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**Source:** Compiled using data compiled by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance Reports, 1995-1999
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Source: Compiled using data compiled by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance Reports, covering the period 1996-2002
8.4 Perceptions and misperceptions of Uganda's regional actions

Uganda's interventionist foreign policy was a product of shifting alliances and diplomatic oversights that characterised the leaders' relations in the GLR states. Right from the time that Museveni came to power with the help of Ugandans opposed to the regimes of Amin and Obote II and with the help of ethnic Tutsi of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC refugees, his neighbours were afraid that he would help their ethnic minorities to struggle for their return, a fear that indeed came true.

Initially, Museveni's relations with the leaders of the neighbouring states were cordial, though, and it is recounted that the presidents shared each other's problems and consulted on central issues that concerned the region. They attended each other's ceremonies, such as swearing in ceremonies, and met often to discuss issues of mutual interest. However, these relations broke down when the Rwandan Tutsi refugees in the National Resistance Army (NRM) of Uganda attacked Rwanda in 1990. This Museveni argues was the beginning of Uganda's problems in the GLR region. It sparked off mistrust for Museveni in the region and strained his relations with other regional leaders, particularly Habyarimana and Mobutu. The consequences of the RPF invasion of Rwanda using Uganda as a base were many. The leaders in the neighbouring states perceived this invasion as a precursor to their own invasions.

Museveni's insistence that Habyarimana and Mobutu address the citizenship questions of their refugee minority ethnic groups, which had been caused by the colonial legacy, caused animosity between Museveni and his counterparts. The differing view on how this crisis in citizenship had to be addressed was partly what brought out the differences between Museveni and other leaders in the region. Museveni's approach was to let the ethnic communities return to their states of origin and share political power with the ruling ethnic groups, but this option was rejected. The second option was to naturalize them in Uganda and the DRC, an option the ethnic groups (refugees) vehemently opposed and one that the Habyarimana and Mobutu...
governments supported. As covert diplomatic negotiations to solve the problem stalled, the Rwandan Tutsi who were in Uganda’s army attacked Rwanda in 1990 with the intention of overthrowing the sitting government.

In Burundi the assassination of the first elected Hutu president by Tutsi and the taking over of Burundi by a Tutsi was viewed as a follow-up of the Rwandan ethnic conflict in which the Tutsi were fighting to dominate the Hutu. In the DRC, ethnic dissensions commenced on the Uganda-DRC border and on the Rwanda-DRC border with the Tutsi there demanding recognition by the DRC government. These circumstances created animosity in the region, which deteriorated into regional wars in all the three states. Museveni on several occasions admits that he covertly helped the liberation struggles in the neighbouring states. In one instance, Museveni reported that Kabila asked him for troops to help him in his war against Mobutu but that he had declined and instead gave him materials because he preferred Kabila to build his own capacity. Similarly, rebel leaders in the DRC and in Burundi all acknowledge that Museveni was the point of reference in their struggle to overthrow their leaders. In the DRC the renowned rebel Ondekane, then Commander and Deputy President of the mainstream Congolese rebel faction RCD-Goma, had this to say:

"At the beginning of our struggle I met President Yoweri Museveni in Gulu. He had his generals. We went to see whether he could help us; we Congolese. The way the war began was very good. Uganda provided us with logistical support to liberate ourselves.... We did not know that I give Bemba a place with the RCD, so he I one of the leaders.... Museveni provided me with guns and food for soldiers for two months. For that, and because he is an elder, we are really gra* to him even if things have turned sour ... ."

Museveni’s relations with leaders of the neighbouring states were shrouded in mistrust. Museveni’s was perceived as the "king-maker state" responsible for the attempted changes in leadership in the neighbouring states through use of military force. In the subsequent years that followed the completion of the liberation wars in Rwanda and the DRC and of the diplomatic negotiations in Burundi, saw the formation of an alliance amongst the new leaders of Rwanda,

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the DRC, Burundi and Uganda. Initially they allied to fight rebels in the region and help themselves secure their regimes." This alliance developed cracks, following initial misunderstandings between Rwanda's Kagame and the DRC's Kabila. Kabila's decision to stop the Rwandans from providing him with security and his demand that all foreign troops return to their respective states created animosity between him and Rwanda. The allies of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda became suspicious of Kabila's moves. For example, when the seven presidents met in Harare to discuss the Congo crisis, it became apparent that Kabila was covertly seeking new alliances and had had a meeting prior to the one in Harare with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of South Africa, the results of which meeting Kabila never revealed at the Harare meeting. The subsequent meeting in which only four countries met to discuss the DRC chaired by Mugabe became even more suspect to the former allies of Kabila.

A counter-meeting to discuss this new Kabila strategy to seek new allies was called in Kigali with the main agenda of discussing Kabila's alleged plan to expel the Banyamulenge from government. The decision to expel the Banyamulenge would have severe consequences for Uganda because their expulsion would further intensify Uganda's insecurity on the Eastern border. The Banyamulenge acted as a bulwark against the rebel-infested region in the Eastern Congo and were helping Uganda comb out the ADF from the region. Kabila's hurried expulsion of the Banyamulenge and other Rwandans guarding him, and the Kabila's supporters attack on Uganda's Congo embassy in mid-August of 1998 coincided to change the alliance system in the region. It became apparent to Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda that Kabila had severed relations with his former allies.

Another source of mistrust was Kabila's style of diplomacy. Rather than raising his concerns with Rwanda and Uganda over what he did not agree with in their relations, he openly choose to carry out plans that were inherently a threat and problematic to the alliance. For example, his initiative to persuade the SADC countries to give him soldiers to fight what he termed the

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685 The concept of the "new leaders" was used by Ottaway to describe the leaders who had come to power after coups and guerrilla warfare and professed democracy etc. In the GLR region these included Museveni and Kagame. Kabila was never included among the new leaders given his discredited background. For a detailed discussion on the new leaders see M. Ottaway, Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

686 Kabila was scared that Rwanda would overthrow him because Rwandese were in charge of his security, despite the fact that the Rwandese known to have relations with the Congolese rebels.
"foreign aggression of Rwanda and Uganda", angered his former allies. Secondly, the situation was aggravated when he secretly visited Sudan en route to Zimbabwe and later Tripoli in mid-September 1998. It was revealed (no sources of this revelation were confirmed) that during Kabila's visit to Bashir, they had agreed to cooperate in ending the rebellion in the DRC. Bashir's decision to help Kabila was premised on the fact that Israel and the US were helping Uganda and Rwanda, so he would retaliate by helping Kabila. Note that according to Van Evera, when states are in conflict with each other, then a security dilemma will emerge, because these states will mistrust each other and shroud their policies in secrecy to prevent their adversaries from knowing what they are planning." This is what happened in the GLR, and it undermined the already fragile peace in the region. Van Evera argues further that states will reach fewer agreements and that diplomatic initiatives to resolve conflict will not yield any positive results.

Reflections in the daily reports on the deteriorating situation that eventually led to war indicate that agreements between Kabila and his former allies were impossible to arrive at and in fact, Kabila had carefully played his former allies into a trap, in that his new allies of Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Libya and Sudan enabled him win his war against his original allies. An advance party to understand the conflict between Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC commissioned by SADC following the Mauritius summit had not yielded anything. Following the declaration by nine French speaking African countries that Uganda and Rwanda were aggressors and their demand that peacekeeping troops be deployed, led to a further breakdown

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687 Interview with UG/MOD 12 held in Kampala on 27 July 2005.
688 Ibid.
690 A chronology of the events covered by a Ugandan daily newspaper was developed in this study. The information in this discussion is derived from these chronologies.
691 Libya was not only arming Chad but was arming and bankrolling Kabila and his allies. See A. Mwenda, "M7 in Libya", in The Monitor, 30 September 1998. There were speculations that Libya's support to Kabila through Chad was aimed at protecting Libya's economic interest in the Congo. For details on the Chad-Libyan relations, see a full report, "Chad sends 1000 Troops to Congo" in The Monitor, 27 September 1998. Note that in the geopolitical relations of the GLR, Uganda was known to have very good relations with Libya and that Muammar Gadaffi had visited Uganda twice in a space of six years (1995-2001). So a shift in relations, even though Libya was doing it through a proxy state, was to influence how Uganda approached the entire problem at hand.
692 Monitor Reporter, "Summit disappoints Kabila", in The Monitor, 16 September 1998. At this meeting President Chiluba of Zambia had been mandated by the Mauritius SADC summit to visit Uganda and Rwanda and to establish the cause of the misunderstanding between the former allies.
693 These French speaking African states that condemned Uganda and Rwanda had had a summit at Libreville in Gabon on 25 September 1998. They included Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad, CAR, Namibia and Angola. See Monitor Reporter, "African leaders hand Kabila big victory", The Monitor, 26 September
in Kabila's relations with Museveni and Kabila. A war thus broke out, which attracted eight of the DRC’s neighbours, both immediate and in Southern Africa. The war had severe repercussions for the region because about 11,000 Hutu crossed from Congo Brazzaville and joined Kabila’s forces to fight Rwanda. Sudan opened up attacks on the SPLA and simultaneously provided more military aid to the Ugandan rebels to enable them to fight Uganda. Sudan believed that this would undercut Uganda's assistance to the SPLA, since it was already engaged in a war with the DRC. The neighbouring states' leaders' reciprocated by arming Uganda's rebels.

It can be concluded from the shifts in alliances and how these led up to the war that misperceptions of leaders' actions and strategic plans by each other greatly hinder the cooperation between states. The magnitude of such misperceptions provided the window of opportunity that states exploited to intervene and fight each other. It is also evident from the events in the GLR that intervention was an intricate undertaking. As Finnemore correctly points out, interests are often not obvious, and much of politics is a struggle to define them. The same could be said of Ugandan's motivations to intervene in the GLR. Uganda's actions, both covert and overt, and its bilateral relations created mistrust between states and leaders, and ultimately destabilised that country. Consequently, Uganda in its efforts to contribute to the liberation of other states created its own instability.

Summary

From the foregoing discussions on Uganda's interventions in its Western neighbours, it is evident that Uganda's security challenges were inextricably tied to the geo-politics of the region and intrastate ethnic conflicts of the region as a whole. It was also discussed that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy can be attributed to its proximity to anarchic states, particularly where ethnic conflict and violence was intense, and to the nature of inter-personal relations between the leaders in the region. It is argued that the security dilemmas that characterised this
region account for Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in all the three states in which it intervened. Uganda's security challenges may be a result of external state and non-state actors, but it was also discovered that Uganda had a significant role to play in creating its own insecurity in the region as a whole.

**Theoretical implication**

Whereas the Security Dilemma theory focuses on state actors in its traditional form, the links between state actors and non-state actors becomes important in accounting for state actions. Non-state actors emerge as a salient conduit through which states carry out their foreign policy towards each other. It demonstrates that these non-state actors seek support from the official leadership of the states and that they exploit the poor inter-personal relations between such leaders to carry out their subversive activities against them with little or no reproach from the states in which they operate. Misperception of states of each other's actions extends to the leaders' misperceptions of each other's intentions, which creates a security dilemma at two levels, at the level of the state and at the level of the leaders. The strength of the theory lies in its capacity to account for the ethnic conflicts that characterised the region and that compelled Uganda to intervene in the affairs of its Western neighbours. The theory posits that when a state that held together diverse ethnic groups collapses, ethnic conflicts ensue and these deteriorate into violence and genocide, which demands interventionist action by the neighbouring states.

The Security Dilemma theory provides a convincing explanation of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy between 1986 and 2006, and provides important insights into how Uganda has developed its national security policies during Museveni's administration. The theory has been able to explain an array of important issues of Uganda's interventions in an interesting new way. For example, it acknowledges that geography plays a central role in creating insecurity and that permeable and defenceless borders are likely to intensify the security dilemma of landlocked states. It acknowledges economic motivations too, although it argues that these motivations are peculiar to greedy states that project themselves as security seekers, which Uganda cannot claim not to be especially considering the economic exploitation of resources in the DRC by its military officers.
The greatest weakness of the Security Dilemma theory is its failure to account for the role of morals, norms, culture or identity as critical to state behaviour. These ideas and values as motivations are generally consistent with other theories though, for example, the poliheuristic and constructivist theories that complement the Security Dilemma theory in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states. This notwithstanding, the Security Dilemma has better predictive power for the region as a whole. States are more likely to intervene in states that compromise their security but also if their own internal conflicts affect their neighbouring states, the propensity to intervene is high. The conclusion of this chapter is that Uganda's security concerns continues to be an essential ingredient of its interventionist foreign policy, be they caused by state actors or non-state actors and that a comprehensive theory that explains Uganda’s interventionist foreign policy can be derived from using multiple theories namely, the Security Dilemma, Constructivism, Poliheurism, and Utilitarian Liberal theory. The study argues further that, of the four theories, the Security Dilemma theory provides the most parsimonious theory that best explains Uganda’s intervention in its western neighbouring states.
CHAPTER NINE:
CONCLUSION: UGANDA'S INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICY

9.0 The Study

When should states intervene in others and for what reasons has remained a challenging debate, especially in Africa where intervention has become a common phenomenon in the post-Cold War era. Intervention is also contentious because of the legal challenges of international law and because of the repercussions of interventions on the intervenee states and regions as a whole. Thus, it is against this background, that the study sought to examine the most parsimonious theoretical explanation of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in its Western neighbours of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. The study covered the Museveni administration from 1986 to 2006, when Uganda lost its first case at the ICJ for intervening in the DRC. Uganda was studied because of all the countries in Africa; it has conducted the greatest number of unilateral interventions than any other African state in the period 1990-2006 which makes it a good case study. The study examined Uganda's interventions based on five intervention models, military intervention (when Uganda directly engaged its soldiers in neighbouring states), humanitarian and diplomatic intervention, covert intervention and paramilitary intervention (which were used alongside military intervention). These models were selected because Uganda employed multiple interventions in states at different times.

The decision to study intervention using comparative theory was based on the fact that, Uganda's interventions were under theorized. Literature on Uganda's intervention focuses mainly on the intervention in the DRC. Against this background, studying Uganda's interventionist foreign policy was premised on the fact that its interventions in its neighbouring states were contemporaneous with the anarchic nature of the geopolitics of the GLR region. Like many

696 This study of course excludes the intervention in Somalia during late 2006 March 2007 and the intervention in Liberia in 1996 because Uganda intervened under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and followed the required legal requirements of the UNSC and AU mandates of intervention.
other unilateral interventions and regional group interventions in Africa, Uganda's intervention played a key role in shaping the geopolitics of the region and the nature of inter-state relations amongst the GLR states.

9.1 Uganda's Interventions: An Audit

As indicated above, this study was guided by four dominant theories, Security Dilemma, Constructivism, Liberalism and Poliheurism. The use of these theories was premised on the realization that just one of these theories on its own would not be able to address the research question fully. The theories were thus weighed against and compared with each other with the aim of establishing the most parsimonious theory that explains Uganda's multiple interventions. The study established that, attempting to disaggregate the dependent variable ie Uganda's interventionist foreign policy into specific interventions in the GLR, paused theoretical limitations because no single theory was sufficient to account for all the interventions. It was evident that specific interventions conform to specific interventions and others do not. The study showed that all the theories are mutually reinforcing, where one theory can not explicitly account for an intervention, the other theories can.

Constructivism for example that centers on the role ideas and culture play in determining whether states should intervene or not gained more relevance in the intervention in Burundi as well as in Rwanda in 1994 when the genocide broke out more than the interventions in the DRC. Constructivism demonstrated a close relationship with Political Liberalism; they both attributed intervention to states failure to protect citizens and in some extreme cases to states committing genocide on sections of their population. This compelled neighbouring states to intervene to protect and to provide citizens with humanitarian relief.

It was also evident from the findings that, the Utilitarian Liberal theory was helpful in explaining Uganda's intervention in the GLR states. The statistical data on trade activities flow of trade and expenditure on the economic sector demonstrated that the economic interests could not be ruled out in the interventions that Uganda undertook. The findings of the study were also able to disconfirm a widely held notion that Uganda's leader Museveni had a "rational plan" designed to build Uganda's economic and military prowess in the region by using the DRC's wealth as the main base for this project. The alleged plan was that he would use the DRC's natural and mineral
resources to build his hegemonic power in the region. Furthermore, it was suggested that Uganda had benefited greatly from the exploitation of the DRC, in particular from the diamond and gold trade, which supposedly alleviated Uganda's financial crisis and funded its economic development programs. On the contrary, the findings demonstrated that Uganda's economic development was not influenced by its exploitation of the DRC but rather by macro-economic policies that the state undertook. Further, if any economic accruals from the exploitation were indicated, they had benefited non-state actors like big regional trade cartels to which Ugandan soldiers belonged and other big renowned corporations. Details of these beneficiaries are widely publicized. It was found that Uganda's improved economic performance during the intervention period was due to its intrastate economic policies, partnerships with key economic organizations and inter-state trade relations, which Uganda and other GLR states, particularly those in the East African Community had sought to develop further in their regional economic relations.

In the study, the findings demonstrated that Poliheurism provided a good perspective to Uganda's interventions in the region particularly because it proved that Museveni's decisions to intervene were driven by his own whims and that of his privy. His decisions to deploy Ugandan troops in foreign territories was traceable to him in the absence of a clear communication protocol in the military structure of Uganda's security framework and lack of legislative clearance of such critical diplomatic undertaking. Evidence of the study demonstrated that Museveni wielded a lot of power in Uganda and in the region in the period of study such that his involvement in conflict states' conflict mitigation or peace negotiations was interpreted to mean that, it was his commitment to regional peace and security. Burundi provides the most outstanding success story of his mediation role in conflict resolution that saw the coming to power of a Hutu and of equitable distribution of political positions between the two warring intra-ethnic communities, although this still awaits the test of time.

Whereas Poliheurism provided a viable interpretation of states' interventionist foreign policies especially in as far as leaders use their cognitive abilities to make decisions, and consider domestic payoffs in the long run, it was evident that Museveni reflected more on the international payoffs in his interventions in Burundi in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994 and 1995. The exceptions were the DRC intervention and Rwandan intervention in 1990, where it has been argued that internal power squabbles in the security sector particularly in the army over political
positions compelled Museveni to avert an "impending coup" by ensuring that he supports the Rwandese military in his army to return to Rwanda and in the case of the DRC deploying military officials in DRC conflict to occupy them as well as appease them.

Unlike in other states where intervention is aimed at diverting the attention of the populace over a failing social or economic policy, in Uganda Museveni did not attempt to divert the attention of his populace in an impending election because he was sure that there were other processes through which obtaining a lead in a political contest did not require intervention in another state. Already he had made an imprint in the minds of the Ugandan citizens that he was indispensable since he was the only one who knew how to "protect" Ugandans from terrorists, rebel incursions etc. There were isolated incidences when decisions to intervene had been made close to an election but these too were not conclusive because they selectively refer to the intervention in the DRC. It is also implicit that Museveni's interventionist policy was calculated more on the foreign diplomatic pay off such as gaining a better image in the region and internationally than for any outright domestic pay off. He drew a lot of strength for his interventionist policy from the support from U.S.A and United Kingdom and through his bilateral and multilateral diplomacy he intervened because of the status Uganda had at the international front. As was noted by De Rouen, referring to poliheurism, the methodology of theory-oriented case studies in foreign policy decision making is still in its infancy particularly when abstracted to explain interventions by dysfunctional states that have no clear communication protocol. Nonetheless, it provides a useful framework for understanding Uganda’s interventions foreign policy in the region.

Based on the foregoing, it is concluded in this study that the Security Dilemma is the most parsimonious theory for explaining Uganda's interventionist foreign policy. Uganda intervened in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi to guarantee its security, particularly because of its geo-political location in a region that is riddled by conflict. It intervened to prevent anarchy from having severe repercussions on Uganda and other neighbours. Uganda's security dilemma at her Western flank, Northern flank and minimally at the Eastern flank played an instrumental role in compelling it to intervene. Uganda's lack of preclusive defense, in the face of adversaries that were taking defense postures, increasing their military capabilities and adversaries that were providing Ugandan dissidents with opportunities to launch attacks on Uganda greatly compelled it to intervene. Even if Rwanda and the DRC did not necessarily pose a security threat for
Uganda, its proximity to these conflict states made intervention inevitable because the "Crisis in Citizenship" that had caused genocide, massive unrest and an exodus of refugees had repercussions on Uganda. Similarly, in the case where Uganda does not share a border (e.g. in the case of Burundi), it had to intervene to protect itself from the spillover effects of intrastate violent conflicts particularly in Burundi.

It is the final conclusion of this study that, no single theory is sufficient to account for all the interventions that Uganda carried out. To understand Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, multiple theories have to be utilized because they reinforce each other. In some interventions the constructivist explanation is most plausible in other interventions realist or poliheurist interpretations are more explicable. This said though, the most parsimonious theory to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy is the Security Dilemma theory. From the discussions in these chapters, it is evident that to arrive at a theory that can comprehensively explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, the central theory, viz. the Security Dilemma theory, has to be complemented with the constructivist, utilitarian liberal position and poliheuristic theories.

9.2 Future Research Prospects

Interventions and the question why they take place have been analyzed in disciplines such as law, politics and international relations; this study explored African states' interventions using comparative theory. This study thus contributed to the literature on theoretical perspectives of intervention in African international relations. Secondly, this study's general objective was to contribute to a better understanding of Uganda's intervention in the GLR states. Uganda has been named as a major actor in the GLR conflicts and its interventionist foreign policy has come under attack from its neighbours, the international community and the citizens themselves. The focus of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in available academic discourse has been mainly on the DRC and Rwanda, with limited coverage of its role in Burundi. It is envisaged that the findings of this research will contribute to the general understanding of Uganda's foreign policy in the region as a whole, which would in turn place Uganda's interventions within an African international relations perspective. There are mainly three areas that would benefit from further research. Firstly, at the theoretical level, the poliheuristic and constructivist theories require further development because in the study they provided interesting perspectives that would benefit from research into the role of leaders in foreign policy decision-making processes that
lead to intervention and how norms and a culture had emerged in the region, which accounted for many of the interventions.

Secondly, outliers that emerged from the study suggested that there were potential conflict and insecurity areas that needed attention because they would once again result in war in the region if no attention were paid to them. They were raised during the fieldwork by communities and border administrators on the Ugandan side. An emerging and extremely disturbing trend that had characterised the region was the increases in the refugee population. Uganda’s permeable borders were being used by fleeing Hutu and other ethnic communities from the DRC, who entered Uganda at illegal border crossings. The average number of fleeing Hutu and other communities totaled to approximately 500 a month. Crudely calculated, since 2004 when this study commenced, Uganda has harboured approximately 25,000 undocumented and illegal immigrants from the GLR region alone. This calculation is based on only two borders where the researcher encountered the buses that the Hutu were using to flee Rwanda and the DRC. However, all border districts visited raised their concerns over the issue of Hutu entering Uganda and settling amongst Ugandan communities. A particular region was highlighted: the Kiboga district where the Hutu are settling because of the vast land available there. This is a very salient issue and an emerging threat. Uganda’s insecurity may soon be aggravated because neighbouring states are suspicious of why it harbours all these ethnic groups that may not necessarily be responsible for the Rwandan genocide but who if not monitored carefully could be a source of another genocide. Planning genocides cannot be put past communities that are large and are given space from which to plan effectively.

These immigrants or fleeing communities have the potential of causing ethnic strife for the already marginal land resources. Uganda already has violent ethnic conflict over land in the districts of Kibaale, Teso and Kumi, and by allowing immigrants from other states to take over such land, it is likely to break out into further mass ethnic violence, which could easily be avoided if the immigrations were checked. Currently, this is mainly speculative; however, further research is needed into these issues, which are increasing regional insecurity. The issues of natural resource use and population growth are also fundamental if Uganda’s security challenges are going to be resolved. During the study, it was evident that the population in general was concerned that there was a conspiracy by the leaders to let Hutu genocidaires and Hutu fleeing Kagame’s regime enter Uganda and occupy large tracts of lands unabated. Whereas this issue was
not central to the study, it emerged as a critical factor that could seriously affect regional relations and result in other interventions.

Thirdly, a natural resource conflict area that needed further research was the claim that Rwanda and the DRC were domesticating mountain gorillas so that they could tap more revenue for their tourist industry. This was compromising other states' tourist industries: tourists preferred to visit the mountain gorillas in accessible areas, rather than tracking them in wild bushes for a long time. Although discussions with border communities showed that this matter seemed trivial, the key administrators argued that it was subtle and needed quick state intervention. Prior research into these areas of potential insecurity would pre-empt ethnic violence and conflict identified in this study, as this is extremely critical to preventing regional insecurity.


697 In this section, names that can not be differentiatated as surname and first name have been presented as full names.


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Appendix 1: Chronicle of Events

1986

26 Jan 1986  President Museveni comes to power in Uganda.

Mar 1986  Former Ugandan army soldiers enter Sudan with 6 helicopters and approximately 11,000 weapons. Sudan returns the helicopters but the weapons are not returned.

Aug 1986  A Sudanese army officer lieutenant Colonel Clement returns all arms to the former Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers who had taken refuge in Sudan; it is an indication to Uganda that if they support the SPLAY, the Sudanese army will in turn support the UNLA against the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government.

UNLA soldiers with Sudan army attack Uganda with the rebels at Bibia, with intention of taking Gulu and onwards to Kampala to overthrow the NRM government. The soldiers are overrun and the attack is quelled.

Insurgency commences in Northern Uganda with ambushes in all northern towns of Gulu, Chwero, Opit, Kitgum, Puranga, Patong, Lira, Pajule and Pajimu, all in Northern Uganda.

1987

18 Jan 1987  First major military engagement of National Resistance Army (NRA) with rebels in Northern Uganda at Corner Kilak in Gulu.

The Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) of Alice Lakwena follows suit in their attack against the NRA, as the Ugandan army was known, then engages the HSM at Soroti, Kanyum, Mukongoro, Kariti, Iyolwa, Muterere, Magamaga, all in Eastern Uganda.

1990

01 Oct 1990  Rwandan Tutsi rebel force of 4,000 attacks Rwanda, using Uganda as a base.

1991

29 Mar 1991  Cease-fire signed at N’Sele between Rwanda’s government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF); Uganda and other regional states oversee the ceasefire agreement.

Apr 1991  RPF and Rwanda government talks continue in Dar es Salaam.

Aug 1991  Regional efforts to resolve conflict continue with a regional summit in Dar es Salaam.

1992

July 1992  Ceasefire agreement between the Rwandan People’s Army (PA) and the Rwandan government is reached with the help of OAU.

1993

Aug 1993  Rwandan government and the RPA sign a comprehensive Peace Accord in Arusha, Tanzania.

21 Oct 1993  In Burundi, the first democratically elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi is assassinated, allegedly by a Tutsi faction in the Burundi Army. Civil War breaks out in Burundi and approximately 200,000 to 300,000 lives are claimed. This is interpreted as genocide against the Tutsi. The genocide does not get publicity because it happens covertly and in isolated incidents.
In Rwanda a power-sharing agreement between the Tutsi and Hutu is signed, in which a transitional government is set up with a Hutu President and a Tutsi Prime Minister. This agreement is also known as the "Convention of Government".

United Nations approves UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) mission to, among others, watch Uganda’s border.

Habyarimana indicates that the Rwandan government is not committed to the agreement by arguing that it was, after all, just a piece of paper. This is followed by preparations for ethnic divisions and hatred, as radios start to indicate that the Tutsi have to be wiped out.

President Habyarimana and President Ntibantunganya of Burundi are killed in a plane crash on their way home from a summit in Tanzania.

Rwandan genocide commences, approximately 800,000 die in the genocide. The RPF wage a full war against the Rwandan government.

UN prepares for municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections in Rwanda.

Cairo Conference on Burundi co-sponsored by Jimmy Carter leads to the creation of the Arusha Group.

Tunis (Tunisia) Conference on Burundi is attended by the regional heads of state; Julius Nyerere is appointed to lead the negotiation for the Burundi peace process.

Pierre Buyoya leads coup against the Convention Government; the regional states of the GLR impose sanctions on Burundi for Buyoya’s action, because it violated the principle of peace to which the GLR subscribed.

GLR states impose sanctions on Burundi for Buyoya coup against the Convention Government.

Allied Democratic Front (ADF) attack Mpondwe by a group prepared by the Sudanese at Kaya. They use Zaire as a base with the full knowledge of President Mobutu.

Pierre Buyoya and Leonard Nyangoma, a Hutu rebel leader, sign a pre cease fire agreement.

President Kabila invites Uganda to station its forces in eastern Congo to pursue and subdue the rebel bands that attacked Uganda from Congolese bases. This invitation was reconfirmed in the written Protocol of 27 April 1998, signed by Uganda and the DRC.

Buyoya government and the National Assembly agree to an Internal Partnership for Peace, which marks the beginning of the Burundi Peace Negotiations in Arusha under the auspices of Nyerere.

The President of Uganda noted this in his Presentation to Parliament on 16 September 1998, see Parliamentary Hansard, p. 4912.
08 Jun 1998  Attack on Kichwamba Technical School (Uganda) by an alliance between Congo, Sudan and the 
ADF, and a Uganda army detachment at Kanyamura was attacked. The rebels abducted 
200 civilians and set ablaze a locked dormitory with an estimated eight students who were fleeing 
the rebels.

10 Jun 1998  Kichwamba attacked again and five Ugandans killed by the ADF.

26 Jun 1998  ADF attacks Banyangule village in Bundibugyo district, killing ten and wounding others.

05 Jul 1998  ADF attack Kiburara in Kasese district abducts 19 seminarians from the St. John's Seminary.

27 Jul 1998  President Kabila's decree of 27 July 1998 formally expels Rwandan soldiers (this is later 
overturned by Kabila to say that it included the Ugandan soldiers).

The Russian T-55 tanks allegedly belonging to Uganda are found near Kitona; note, however, that 
each state in the region owned the same Russian T-55 model tank.

Jul 1998  Sudan deploys several thousand of its own troops, along with thousands more Chadian troops, in 
eastern Congo. Isolated aerial attacks on Western and Northern Uganda commence.

The Sudan assists the anti-Uganda groups to merge with the Congolese armed forces. Taban Amin, 
son of Idi Amin and a leader of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), a Ugandan rebel group, is 
made Major General in the Congolese army and appointed to head the resident division of 
Kabila's government in Kinshasa. The Sudan airlifts its own troops into several locations in 
Eastern and Northern Congo, and begins to take control of all airfields in those parts of the 
country, at the invitation of President Kabila.

Aug 1998  Uganda embassy in Kinshasha is attacked by the Congolese forces. Uganda launches a major 
diplomatic effort to end the conflict in the Congo. Uganda's diplomatic initiative resulted in a 
series of summit meetings.

01 Aug 1998  ADF attack Kasese town, burning shops and houses, and killing three people.

02 Aug 1998  Diplomatic initiative to end DRC conflict commences with the Pretoria Summit.

06 Aug 1998  ADF attack the town of Kyarumba near Kasese, killing 33 people.

07 Aug 1998  Uganda is attacked by ADF and some Congolese army elements at Beni.

The ADF attack and burn up houses, kill and maim people, and take others hostage. The attacks 
in Busenuka and the second major one at Mpondwe in Kasese claim over 100 lives.

In North and North West part, the LRA also burns houses, maim people, and abduct children, 
men and women in large numbers. All the rebel groups that carried out terrorist attacks are 
funded by multiple agencies.


07-08 Aug 1998  Summit meetings at Victoria Falls I, Harare (Zimbabwe) to discuss the deteriorating situation. A 
Joint Communique on the security concerns of the neighbouring states and the need to address 
them is part of an effective settlement.

13 Aug 1998  Uganda retaliates by pursuing the rebels and occupies Bunia Airport.


15 Aug 1998  Uganda deploys substantial troops into Eastern Congo in self-defence against the attacks of the 
ADF and their Congolese allies.
Kabila while in Khartoum reaffirms his military alliance with Sudan and arranges for more Sudanese brigade to take up positions hostile to Uganda in Eastern Congo.

President Museveni declares that, "if unilateral action intensifies, Uganda may be forced to take its own independent action to protect its own security interests" because of the threat that interventions of other states into the ARC posed for Uganda and the opportunity such interventions would give the dissident groups to attack Uganda.

Sudanese Antonov aircraft bombs positions of the Ugandan army at Bunia, just across the border with Congo.

Sudanese Colonel Ibrahim Ismail Habiballah delivers a planeload of weapons to the Congolese army in Gbadolite for use by UNRE II units that had been incorporated into the Congolese armed forces.

The High Command (Uganda) decides to intervene in the ARC.

A Sudanese army brigade of approximately 2,500 troops, under the command of Sudanese Lieutenant General Abdul Rahman Sir Khatim arrives in Gbadolite; the brigade deploys in the Businga area, and prepares to engage with the Ugandan forces in Eastern Congo. President Kabila's aide announces that the ARC and Sudan jointly agree to reinforce their deployment along the Congo's borders with Uganda and Rwanda.

President Museveni addresses the Sixth Parliament of Uganda on Uganda's intervention in the ARC. Parliament's special sitting was aimed at briefing the members about the security situation of Uganda.

President Kabila again goes to Khartoum, where he receives pledges of additional Sudanese troops and military equipment; he also meets there with leaders of the AAE, WNBE, UNRE II and LRA.

Uganda's occupies Isiro as a counter measure to prevent attacks from the ARC, Sudanese and armed groups coalition forces and to prevent their occupation of strategic positions from which they would continue their attacks on Uganda.

Uganda occupies Buta.

Uganda occupies Bumba.

Uganda occupies Lisala and airfields of Eastern Congo to prevent the ARC and Congo coalition forces being reinforced and providing logistical support to the Ugandan rebel groups based in the ARC.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopts its first resolution on the War in the ARC; the Sire Agreement (signed in Libya), brokered by Muammar Gaddafi between Kabila and Museveni and calling for a ceasefire, is signed.

Rwanda declares a unilateral cessation of hostilities, which the US uses as an example to press others to stop the military engagements. Two days later, however, it is alleged that Rwanda had fired at the rebel posts in the ARC.

Uganda's forces take control of the airfield at Gbadolite, and expel Sudanese and Chadian forces. Uganda's military intervention in the ARC ends and preparations begin for disengagement.

Lusaka Peace Agreement (LPA) is endorsed and takes shape a few months later. LPA promises Uganda and other foreign forces in the Congo to disarm, demobilise, resettle and reintegrate the armed groups that were using the Congolese territory as a base of operations in their states.
Kampala Aisengagement Plan is released, laying out the plan to manage the Ugandan rebels to be handled by Uganda and the ARC Kabila government.

04 Aug 1999 Sudanese planes bomb Makanza and Bogbanga, rebel-held villages north-east of Kinshasha, and killing approximately 500 civilians.

06-17 Aug 1999 Uganda and Rwanda clash in Kisangani ARC. Multiple causes but mainly because the RPA wants to block the verification exercise that had been agreed upon by the Summit of the Heads of State that has signed the Lusaka Accord.

Museveni and Kagame meet at Mweya and sign a ceasefire agreement that includes the demarcation of Kisangani into two zones. The North-East to be under Uganda’s control, while the South and West are put under Rwanda’s control.

2000

14 Apr 2000 Lusaka Peace Accord to be operationalised. It is agreed by the Joint Military Commission and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) that 30 kilometres be the disengagement zone along the agreed confrontation line.

05 May 2000 Another clash between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani over strategic territorial control. Uganda’s interest to control Kapalata and the Lubutu-Bafwasende Road is in contravention of the Rwakitura and Mweya agreements.

Another non-military cause of the war that is advanced is the fight between the military commanders of both states over a beautiful "Munyamulenge" woman whom both wanted to court. The decision by the woman to honour a visit requested by the Ugandan commander was construed by the Rwandan commander as rejection and following some "unverified rumours" to the Commander-in-Chief that Uganda wanted to attack Rwandan outposts. In a quick way to justify his story, the Rwandan commander commences attacks on the Ugandan posts in Kisangani and war ensues. Like Helen of Sparta, the states fight over two military officials' love wrangles, which may also be part of national security.

08 May 2000 Museveni calls a meeting at Rwakitura between UNSC and Kagame (consultation on phone), and both agree to demilitarize Kisangani.

14 May 2000 Benjamin Mkapa, President of Tanzania, holds a meeting between Uganda and Rwanda, during which it is agreed that Kisangani be demilitarized.

21 May 2000 Military commanders of Uganda and Rwanda sign an implementation order for the withdrawal and redeployment of their forces - all forces, including the rebel forces from Kisangani. MONUC is to deploy its forces to exercise neutral control of the region, particularly the airports in replacement of the Ugandan and Rwandan forces.

28 May 2000 President Museveni addresses parliament on the new developments surrounding the second Kisangani war of 5 May 2000.

16 Jun 2000 UNSC Resolution 1304 orders both Uganda and Rwanda to desist from military engagements in the region.

19 Jun 2000 ARC makes a request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that provisional measures be put in place to prevent Uganda from fighting in the ARC.

01 Jul 2000 The ICJ makes an order that contains the provisional measures in the case concerning Uganda and the ARC.

28 Aug 2000 The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi is signed. The implementation commences a month later.
2001

The London meeting (2001) is the fourth in the year to resolve the conflict between Uganda and Rwanda. A verification committee is established with the participation of the UK as a third party.

27-28 Oct 2001 A joint military verification committee, agreed on in Durban, is established. Colonel Charles Kayonga for Rwanda and Major James Mugira for Uganda head it.

29 Oct 2001 Amama Mbabazi of Uganda and Colonel Emmanuel Habyarimana of Rwanda meet for six hours in Kabale. Their official communiqué announces that both countries will relocate the dissident RPA; they call for transparency and prior notification of any new troop deployments in their own countries and in the ARC.

01 Nov 2001 Transitional government is set up in Burundi with the setting up of the Transnational Assembly and the Transitional Senate in January 2002.

2002

06 Sep 2002 Luanda Agreement between Uganda and the ARC is endorsed. The agreement takes cognisance of the growing threat to Uganda of armed groups attack. The ARC permits Uganda to stay and protect its territory, while the ARC increases its military and police patrols in the border region. The withdrawal timetable of Ugandan troops is agreed upon but subject to revision, if the ARC is not satisfied with its preparations for securing the Eastern part from the Ugandan armed groups. So a battalion is authorized by the ARC to remain at the slopes of Mt. Ruwenzori. A joint pacification committee is established for the troubled region of Ituri in the Northern ARC.

Sep 2002 Kony, using Southern Sudan as base, attacks Eastern Uganda and loots drugs worth Shs 400,000 from the Awach Health Unit, disarming 16 Karamojong warriors and castrating others.

Oct 2002 Sudan permits Uganda to launch Operation Iron Fist in Southern Sudan to root out the IRA.

2002 The Sun City Agreement is endorsed, commencing the formation of the transitional government.

Oct 2002 Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICAO) protocols are signed, while Mai Mai mercenaries occupy Uvira and the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) occupies Bunia.

21 Nov 2002 President Museveni addresses Parliament on the security situation of Uganda.

17 Dec 2002 Pretoria Agreement between the five parties of the ICAO with the help of the South African government, the ICD UN special envoy Moustapha Nyasse (former Senegalese Prime Minister) and the five parties of the ICED. Principle objective: to share power during the transition period.

2003

03 Jun 2003 Constitution of transition and a protocol on the reform of the security services (the security structure of the envisaged national army) are agreed upon.

02 Apr 2003 Sun City: Ratification of the Constitution of transition and the protocol on the reform of the security services.

May 2003 Uganda starts withdrawing troops from the ARC with the supervision of the Joint Military Commission (JMC).

02 Jun 2003 The last contingent of Uganda leaves the ARC.

2004

18 Apr 2004 President Museveni has a meeting in Dar es Salaam with the Ugandan delegation to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. He highlights issues of "citizenship" as being responsible for insecurity in the region.

Oct 2004 A Tripartite Joint Commission composed of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda commences operation.

Nov 2004 The Dar es Salaam Declaration, drawn up between the GLR states, agrees on the security measures between states. The Declaration is overseen by the International Community.

2005

03 Feb 2005 US President mediates ARC talks between the three countries on the ARC.

25 Mar 2005 An Antonov 28 plane from Kyrgyzstan is impounded at Kanombe International Airport in Rwanda. The crew (six Russians and two Congolese) are jailed in Kigali.

18 Apr 2005 The DRC case against Uganda continues at The Hague in The Netherlands. The ARC claims that Uganda failed to take the necessary steps to prevent that plunder the natural resources of the ARC, including by its own military officers, as it was required to do under the general principles of international law.

Aug 2005 The new government is led by a Hutu President Pierre Nkurunzinza, who is sworn in in Burundi. In terms of agreement, Hutu and Tutsi agree to share power and the army equitably.

2007

26 Mar 2007 The UPDE kills 34 ADF rebels and captures five in a battle in Bundibugyo. The fighting is along River Sempaya in Semliki Game Reserve in Bundibugyo, 15 to 20 km from the Congolese border.

Jun 2007 Rwanda and Burundi formally join the East African Community ratifying the treaty in Uganda.
# Appendix 2: Detailed List of the Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Codes</th>
<th>Position held</th>
<th>Place of interview</th>
<th>Place of interview</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Uganda People's Defence Force)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UGIMOD 1</td>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>30th July 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGIMOD 2</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Kanungu/Ntungamo</td>
<td>5th October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGIMOD 3</td>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>Ntungamo</td>
<td>4th -5th October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Lieutenants</td>
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<td>29th July 2005</td>
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<td>Lieutenants Colonel</td>
<td>Kimaka</td>
<td>17th October 2004</td>
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<td>Kampala</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>17th October 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGIMOD 11</td>
<td>Major (Former Sector Commander)</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>27th and 28th July 2005</td>
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<td>Acting head CHI</td>
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<td>27th July 2005</td>
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<td>UGIMOD 13</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>24th February 2006</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UG/FA 1</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>16th November 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kampala</td>
<td>18th July 2005</td>
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<td>UG/FA 3</td>
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<td>Bwindi Uganda/DRC border 7th October 2005</td>
<td>(Butogota)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

699 I am greatly indebted to interviewee UG/FA/BU 4 who hosted me and shared with me his views during my stay in Bujumbura. He also acted as a guide and through his efforts I was able to talk to highly placed Barundi, both Hutu and Tutsi.
### Ministry of Internal Affairs

**(Police)**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Code</th>
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<th>Date</th>
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<td>UGIMIA 3</td>
<td>DPC Ntungamo</td>
<td>Ntungamo District Offices</td>
<td>6th October 2005</td>
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<td>DPC Hoima</td>
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<td>UGIMIA 7</td>
<td>DPC Kasese</td>
<td>Kasese</td>
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### Ministry of Local Government

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</tr>
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<td>Resident District Commissioners</td>
<td>Hoima</td>
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</tr>
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<td>UGA4OLG 7</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Local Council V</td>
<td>Kasese</td>
<td>11th August 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA4OLG 9</td>
<td>Local Council V</td>
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<td>16th August 2005</td>
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<td>UGA4OLG 10</td>
<td>Local Council V</td>
<td>Bundibugyo</td>
<td>6th September 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>UGA4OLG 11</td>
<td>Local Council V</td>
<td>Hoima</td>
<td>8th September 2005</td>
</tr>
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<td>Local Council V</td>
<td>Ntungamo</td>
<td>3rd October 2005</td>
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<td>Local Council V</td>
<td>Kanugu</td>
<td>6th October 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA4OLG 14</td>
<td>Local Council V</td>
<td>Rungungiri (deputy RDC)</td>
<td>7th October 2005</td>
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<td>District Security Officer</td>
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<td>10th August 2005</td>
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<td>UGA4OLG 16</td>
<td>District Security Officer</td>
<td>Kisoro</td>
<td>16-18th August 2005</td>
</tr>
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<td>UGA4OLG 17</td>
<td>District Security Officer</td>
<td>Ntoroko</td>
<td>2nd September 2005</td>
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UGA4OLG 18 District Security Officer Bundibugyo 7th September 2005
UP/MOLG 19 District Security Officer Hoima 8th September 2005
UGA4OLG 20 District Security Officer Ntungamo 3rd and 5th October 2005
UG/MOLG 21 District Security Officer Kanugu 6th October 2005
UG/MOLG 22 District Security Officer Runkungiri 7th October 2005
UGA4OLG 23 Border Administrators Kasese 10th August 2005
UP/MOLG 24 Border Administrators Kisoro 16th August 2005
UP/MOLG 25 Border Administrators Ntungamo 5th October 2005
UP/MOLG 26 Border Administrators Kanungu 6th October 2005
UG/MOLG 27 Border Administrators
UG/MOLG 28 UPDE Liaison Officers Kisoro 16th August 2005
UGA4OLG 29 UPDE Liaison Officers Kabale 23rd October 2005
UP/MOLG 30 UPDE Liaison Officers Ntungamo 3rd October 2005
UP/MOLG 31 In-Charge Immigration Kasese 11th August 2005
UG/MOLG 32 In-Charge Immigration Kisoro 16th August 2005
UG/MOLG 33 In-Charge Immigration Kisoro 16th August 2005
UG/MOLG 34 In-charge Customs Kisoro 16th August 2005
UG/MOLG 35 In-charge Customs Ntungamo 3rd October 2005
UG/MOLG 36 In-charge Customs Kanungu 6th October 2005

Ministry of Finance

UG/MOF 1 Assitant Commissioner Kampala 10th November 2005
UP/MOF 2 Permanent Secretaries office Kampala 12th November 2005
UP/MOF 3 Officer (Auditor's office) Kampala 18th December 2005

Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry

UG/ITI 1 Ass. Commissioner Level Kampala 23rd November 2005
UG/ITI 2 Ass. Commissioner Level Kampala 23rd November 2005
UG/ITI 3 Permanent Secretaries office Kampala 23rd November 2005

International Organisations

IO/AU 1 UN Kampala 20th November 2004
IO/AU UN Tanzania 7th September 2005
IO/AFRIKATION AERIKATION Hoima 8th September 2005
JO/RED CROSS RED CROSS Kampala 15th December 2005
IO/MONUC MONUC Kampala 21st September 2005

Legislature (Political Parties Representatives)

UPC 1 Kampala 23rd July 2004
UPC 2 Kampala 14th November 2004
UPC 3 Tanzania 18th November 2004
DP 1 Kampala 20th October 2005
DP 2 Kampala 20th October 2005
NRM 1 Tanzania 18th November 2004

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Appendix 3: Questionnaire with a mark-up sheet at the end

Name of Respondent: ________________________________
Age: 
Organisation: 
Title: 

Date of interview: 
Place of interview: 
Time of interview: 

Question Guide

Section A: National Security Strategy

• What is Uganda's national security strategy?
• What is Uganda's security concern in the Western border and how does this change over time?
• What is Uganda's regional security concern (East African region, Great Lakes Region, and Africa as a whole?)
• What is the mandate of the military in border security and how does this influence their action in a conflict situation? Focus on the Western border?

Section B: Non-State Actors in Western Uganda

• What were the main groups on the western border that were involved in destabilizing Uganda?
• How old were their operations?
• What were their mobilization aspects
• Timing
• Motivation
• Philosophy
• About how many were they and how were they spread?
• What were their main arms of combat?
• What were their main areas of operation?
• What problem did they pose for the region in which they operated?
• Any other information about the non-state actors you find salient that should be noted?
Section C: Arms and Weaponry

- What were the main arms that these non-state actors use? SALWs or Heavy military weapons?
- What do you think was the main source of these weapons?
- What were the main transfer centres of these arms or areas of exchange?
- What other transfer centres were used by these groups to access arms?
- Is there any observation you made during this period that you find important to the fact of the weapons on Uganda's security interests.

Question guide: Mark up sheet

What would you argue in order of preference is the main factor that explains Uganda's foreign policy in the following countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda's proximity to the intervenee</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda is a potential regional power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda had hegemonic ambitions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda viewed the conflicts as threatening regional stability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda was concerned with the humanitarian concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda had interest in the parties and issues involved in the conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda's size in comparison to the conflict states</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda had trans national economic, military, educational,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social and political linkages</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>It was because of the end of the cold war.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda was upholding human rights</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda’s security concerns/threat crisis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda simply wanted an opportunity to intervene</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Country specific discussion: Burundi/Rwanda/DRC

- What is Uganda's foreign policy towards Burundi since 1986?
• What are the events in Burundi that Uganda has responded to and how?
• Why did Uganda respond the way it did and how?
• How would you describe the relations between Uganda and Burundi currently?
• What was Uganda and Burundi's relation in the events in Rwanda and the DRC?
• What was Uganda and Rwanda's relation in the events in Burundi and the DRC?
• What were Uganda's relations with the Zaire/DRC in the events in Burundi and Rwanda?
• What is the Great Lakes alliance and who comprises this alliance? What are key alliance components or structures?
• Why in your opinion do you think Uganda goes to other states? A) Burundi B) Rwanda C) DRC
• Any thing you think you would like me to note regarding Uganda's regional relations.
Appendix 4: Questionnaire for the Communities

Uganda's foreign policy in the Western Neighbouring States

1 Name of organisation

2 Position held in district/organisation

3 Do you know of any cross border conflicts? List them

4 What kind of conflicts do you normally handle?

5 How often do these conflicts occur?

6 What are the main causes of these cross border conflicts in this area?

7 How does your district handle cross border conflicts?

8 Are there any rebel groups operating in your neighbourhood?

9 What rebel groups operate in your neighbourhood? And what are their main areas of operation
10 Have rebels ever attacked villages in your district? Which specific places?

11 Where did the people take refuge when the rebels attacked?

12 How did the administration deal with the situation?

13 Are there ethnic conflicts at the border?

14 What ethnic groups fought each other at this border and why?

15 Briefly explain the impact of this fight on the village.

16 What was done to resolve the conflicts between these ethnic groups?

17 What problems did the administration face in addressing the conflict?
18 Give the strengths of your administration in dealing with the problems in the region?

(i) 

(iv) 

(v) 

19 Who keeps records of the main conflicts and their effects on the region/people and property?

(iv) 

20 Is there any trade conducted between your district and the neighbouring countries?

21 What are the main trade items in which your district interacts with neighbouring countries?

(iv) 

(v) 

(vi) 

(vii) 

(ix) 

22 How did the conflicts/wars affect your relationship these countries' interactions?
Appendix 5: Contact Summary Sheet

Contact Code: 

Name: 

Title: 

Phone No: 

Contact Date: 

Interview Venue: 

Organisation: 

Time of interview: 

Main issues raised: 

Concerns and areas not covered: 
Appendix 6: Interview Schedule

• What were the main problems your country faced that led up to the civil war between the Hutu and the Tutsi?
• What were the main problems between the warring parties?
• What in your opinion is the comment that Museveni's intervention in your struggle was calculated to expand his power in the region?
• Did Museveni favour the Tutsi, since it is claimed he had links to the Tutsi?
• What, on the whole, was Uganda's role in your conflict?
• Why do you think your country allied with Uganda in its war in the DRC?
• What would you argue is the status of the relations of Museveni's administration with your country?
• What are your views on the peace agreement that you endorsed?
• Do you think the new regime will observe democracy?
• What would you like the new regime to do?
Appendix 1: Qualitative analysis documentation form

Research Issue: The non-state actors creating a security challenge for Uganda

Analyst: Karungi Charlotte

Date: ________________

Form No: Response sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Code</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Mainstream argument</th>
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<td>What is Uganda's national strategy?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was Uganda's security concern in the Western Border and how has this changed over time?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the mandate of the army and how does this influence their actions in a conflict situation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
|                  | What is Uganda's regional security concern?  
- East Africa level  
- Great Lakes Region  
- African region | East African  
Great lakes region  
African region |                     |
|                  | What are the main rebel groups operating in the western region that affect Uganda's security? | Western  
Eastern  
Central |                     |
<p>|                  | Main Areas of Operation |         |                     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues for further investigation should include</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What was the main source of problem in the DRC?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What were the reasons for intervening in the DRC?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sudan's role seems to be the dominant source of destabilization of Uganda, what is Sudan's response?
Appendix 2 Interview with Kagame

Kazini just apawn — Kagame

Others hiding behind him

"Can you imagine what it means for a leader of another country to address people, insulting citizens and leaders of other countries? This kind of attitude, this kind of behaviour underlines all the problems we are having."
Appendix 3: Table showing Burundi political parties involved in the Peace Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Council for the Defence of Democracy</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Pierre Nkurunziza</td>
<td>Hutu party and armed wing of the FDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conseil National pour la Defence de la Democratie</td>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Leonard Nyangoma</td>
<td>Hutu dominated party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Forces-Impanza</td>
<td>FNL-Ikanzo</td>
<td>Alphonse Rugambirara</td>
<td>Hutu dominated party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front for Democracy in Burundi</td>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Jean Minani</td>
<td>Hutu dominated party, to which the assassinated President Ndadaye belonged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>Joseph Kanumba</td>
<td>Participated in the peace process, no clear record on operations of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Labour Party</td>
<td>ILP</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in the peace process, no clear record on operations of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaze Forces for the Defence of Democracy</td>
<td>KAZE-FDD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in the peace process, no clear record on operations of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens</td>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Epitace Bayaganakundi</td>
<td>Tutsi dominated party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Democracy and Reconciliation</td>
<td>PADER</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in the peace process, no clear record on operations of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Justice and Development</td>
<td>PAJUDE</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in the peace process, no clear record on operations of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People</td>
<td>PALIPEHUTU</td>
<td>Agathon Rwasa/ Dr. Etienne Karatasi</td>
<td>Hutu dominated party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of National Recovery</td>
<td>PARENA</td>
<td>Jean Baptiste Bagaza</td>
<td>Tutsi dominated party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Party</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Shadrack Niyonzima</td>
<td>Tutsi dominated party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Reconciliation Party</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Deo Niyonzima</td>
<td>Tutsi dominated party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Peace, Democracy, Reconciliation and Reconstruction</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Godfrey Habyarimana</td>
<td>Participated in the peace process, no clear record on operations of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally for Democracy and economic, social development</td>
<td>RADESH</td>
<td>Joseph Niyonzima</td>
<td>Tutsi dominated party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Peace and Development</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in the peace process, no clear record on operations of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for National Progress</td>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Jean Baptiste Mtwatwanyi</td>
<td>Tutsi dominated party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>