Household and Community Effects of Contract Farming after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme: a case study of Mazowe tobacco farmers

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Thesis presented for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department of African Studies
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

Supervisor: Professor Horman Chitonge

February 2019
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Abstract

This study investigates the household and community effects that arise from tobacco farmers’ participation and performance under tobacco contract farming arrangements in Mazowe District. The provision of land to A1 Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) beneficiaries, attracted the re-entry of capitalist agriculture system and revitalised of smallholder tobacco production. Access to land was central to farmers’ participation, performance and outcomes from tobacco production. The study used the access theory framework, to track mechanisms and processes farmers followed when negotiating the use of productive resources to participate and generate income from contract farming. The study further tracks how this income was used and with what effect to the household and community. A case study using a mixed method approach was used with the qualitative aspect assessing and explaining the contextual, historical and contemporary phenomena surrounding farmer participation, performance and the use of the contract farming proceeds, all this with the aim of establishing causal links of contract farming to community effects. A quantitative analysis, based on a survey questionnaire and a sample of 150 farmers, measured the production and income outcomes of the farmers. Regression models and descriptive statistics using SPSS were used to analyse data from a survey questionnaire. The study found that contract farming benefited the household and had positive spillover effects within the community of Mazowe. Contract farming arrangements had a positive effect on employment, service provision and food security. Provision of staple food inputs, helped increase food production which was exchanged for labour. Increased income resulted in contract farmers diversifying cash crop production and investment into nonfarm activities which generated employment and service spillovers within the community. The paradox, however, is that most farmers struggled under contract farming, were indebted and dependent on the contractor, in a captive relationship, for continued tobacco production. Those who struggled had difficulty accessing cash advances for labour and assets needed to produce a quality crop. Logit results showed that resource-rich farmers were more likely to participate, stay and perform well in contract farming arrangements while the poor exited. Initial resource endowments of farmers were an important determinant of the participation, production and income outcomes of participating farmers and that this was a source of social differentiation in Mazowe. FTLRP beneficiaries outperformed their communal counterparts in welfare measures tested, indicating the importance of land in rural livelihoods. After the FTLRP there was a tenfold increase in smallholder farmers producing over 84 percent of the tobacco under contract. The shift in land ownership from large scale farmers to peasants forced agribusinesses to negotiate resource providing contracts with small scale farmers. The contracts provided partial resources with the farmer needing to provide supplementary inputs and services. Prices were determined by market forces and were deemed unfair by farmers. Farmers responded to these challenges through social relationships. Access to land by deficient households, labour, production resources and better prices were negotiated through networks and social ties. Again, A1 FTLRP beneficiaries wielded more power in navigating the social relationships to their benefit, which could be attributed to their large land holdings. This study contributes to the literature by showing that contract farming benefits both the household and community. Tobacco production was revitalised by the re-entry of capital into smallholder sector, and small scale farmers mitigated the exploitative forms of capital through social relationships. For contract farming to contribute to rural livelihoods, there is a need for research to address resource endowment, power imbalance gaps and institutional arrangements that help build the poor’s asset holdings.
Acknowledgement

This project was a success because of the invaluable support and assistance from my supervisor Associate Professor Horman Chitonge. I am forever grateful for his challenging questions, insights and guidance throughout the study and developing me into a scholar as I am today. I humbly acknowledge the contribution made by academics and colleagues in the department. To Professor Lungisile Ntsebeza, thank you for the incisive and thought-provoking questions and advice and for nominating me for NRF funding in my final year; it made the write-up an enjoyable experience. Associate Professor Frank Matose, insights into my proposal and Dr June Bam-Hutchison for reading the whole thesis and particularly valuable comments on the methodology. A special thank you to Jessica Williams for reading the full thesis and helping bring clarity to my work. I am grateful to Professor Rajen Govender for taking me into his Survey class; it real helped with data analysis. Dr Joseph Olusegun Adebayo for the motivation, comments on my work and advice whenever I was low and Dr Toindepi Shonhe, thank you for your input on my empirical chapters. All my colleagues Akanlu Louise, Kabinga Moonde, Marewo Malvern, Msomi Zuziwe, Nsama Priscilla, Dr Ncube Senzeni, Ramalefane Thotoane, Dr Rusenga Clemency, Tabot Elizabeth, Tsawu Simphiwe, and many others thank you for valuable contributions to my work during our seminar series; your contributions were real motivating. This thesis benefited from personal discussions with Dr Gracian Mkodzongi, Professor Shukpal Singh, Professor Yeros and Dr Perez Nino during the the International Symposium on Contract Farming held in Harare, 8-9 November, 2018. They provided insights from other countries and the Global South. Nobuhle Mpofu who assisted with ideas on designs. The support I got from the administrative staff, namely Noma-Afrika Maseti, Mrs Vuyelwa Mnqaneni, Sylvia Chauke, Lameez Mota and Glynnis Johnson made my stay at UCT a memorable one. Professor Shahid Vawda, thank you for the care and encouragement.

And surely this research could not have been possible without the people of Mazowe, a great community I will always proudly associate with. In Harare, the staff at TIMB, contractors, bankers and union representatives all made my study a success.

And more importantly to my wife Angelina, for the support and care during the period of my study, taking full care of my financial and family needs was just what I needed to concentrate on my study. My two little boys, Bradley and Brendon, for being by my side every day, it made me feel at home and showed me family and studies are compatible.
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRITEX</td>
<td>Agricultural Technical and Extension Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAT</td>
<td>British American Tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>The British South African Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Commonwealth Development Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFU</td>
<td>Commercial Farmers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Environmental Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCTC</td>
<td>Framework Convention on Tobacco Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTLRP</td>
<td>Fast Track Land Reform Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>Good Agricultural Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMB</td>
<td>Grain Marketing Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA</td>
<td>Intensive Conservation Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>Land Reform and Resettlement Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCF</td>
<td>Large Scale Commercial Farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASDT</td>
<td>Mobile Agri Skills Development and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>New Institutional Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF ZAPU</td>
<td>Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMB</td>
<td>Tobacco Industry Marketing Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRB</td>
<td>Tobacco Research Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZBC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIDERAP</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMSTAT</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Statistical Agency</td>
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<td>ZTA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Tobacco Association</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.0 Introduction and Problem Statement

The effect of contract farming (CF) on farmers’ participation in agricultural markets, income and production at the household level has been widely studied, though results are mixed, inconclusive and contested. Research has focused on factors that affect farmers’ participation in contract farming and effects on income, yet the question of land reform and its effects on livelihoods have remained on the periphery. This is despite the recognition that post-colonial land reform, accompanied by commercialising agriculture through contract farming, has positive expenditure and employment spillover effects on rural communities (Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017). Furthermore, redistributive land reforms such as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) changed agricultural production relations, market operations and peasants’ livelihoods (Moyo 2011a; Scoones et al. 2011). Central to debates on the poor performance of agriculture is peasant farmers’ lack of access to productive resources, land and markets, which constrain their participation in high value cash crop production. Though access to land is important for farmers’ productivity and the diversification of livelihoods (Chitonge and Ntsebeza 2012), scholars have skirted debates linking land, asset endowments and contract farming. Yet the need to industrialise African agriculture through improved technology and modern input use is a necessary condition to increase production for farmers with access to land (Mafeje 2003). As a result, contract farming is proffered as a solution without a clear understanding of the linkages between contract farming, land, livelihoods and the effects of ex-ante/ex-post resource endowments. This study has investigated the household and community effects of contract farming using rural livelihoods indicators in the context of the FTLRP, which resulted in a surge in the number of tobacco producers with an increasing number of farmers producing under contract with varied outcomes. Further, this was accompanied by competition for contracts and resources among farmers (Moyo 2011a). The study has looked at mechanisms farmers use and processes they go through to access productive resources and markets to generate income, and how all these affect farmer participation in contract farming in Mazowe. This was done using a mixed method approach to explore context-specific farmer and contract farming dynamics within the Mazowe case. An access theory analytical framework was used to gain an understanding of the flow of benefits within the community (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

The study found that contract farming positively affects household livelihoods in Mazowe, that is, some farmers earned large cash lumpsums, expanded and diversified their agricultural and non-farm activities, hired labour and provided business services that benefited the community. A paradox to this
finding is that most farmers were dependent and struggled under contract, were just breaking-even and debt-ridden. This study shows that initial asset/resource endowments provided incentives for farmers to participate and/or determined the outcomes of participation in contract farming arrangements. It was observed that farmers who accessed land through FTLRP and acquired assets had better participation outcomes in contract farming and generated more benefits for the community. Further, FTLRP gave rise to a large pool of small scale producers who transformed labour markets in Mazowe. Land ownership structure shifted towards black indigenous farmers. This deprived tobacco oligopsony buyers of supplies from Large Scale Commercial Farmers (LSCF) who were the traditional suppliers to the tobacco auction floors. LSCFs tobacco operations were financed by commercial banks, who could not fund the FTLRP beneficiaries due to lack of collateral. The oligopsony was then forced to re-enter agriculture finance as contractors through their agribusiness wings. Agribusinesses supply partial resources and farmers complement these by negotiating access with actors who control land and resources in the agricultural industry, which turned-out to be the main source of differentiation among farmers. Farmers responded to the exploitative re-entry of capitalist systems in agriculture, after the FTLRP, through innovative social relationships which enabled them to supplement the partial resources and minimise the exploitative pricing tendencies of capital.

1.1 Background

Agriculture is the backbone of rural livelihoods in most developing countries, however, poor access to agricultural resources such as land, credit, markets and labour affect smallholder (peasants) productivity and growth within this sector (Díaz-Bonilla 2015). In southern Africa, colonial governments forcibly settled indigenous people on marginal-poor-infertile land. This was followed by policies that penalised peasant agriculture, particularly urban bias in the distribution of infrastructure and other public goods such as education and skewed and uneven access to technology and exchange opportunities. As a result, access to land and agricultural resources became a contested arena. Berry (1993) details how historical colonial events and dynamism within African communities affect the negotiation and access to productive resources needed for livelihood sustenance. In Zimbabwe, peasants were excluded from participation in such markets by colonial governments through discriminatory land reforms and legislation, which confined peasants to marginal land and markets (Moyo 1995).

The government at independence sought to reverse land and market imbalances through the 1980s’ willing-buyer-willing-seller land reform coupled with input-output institutions that supplied modern farming inputs, services and incentivised markets to smallholder farm-gates (Eicher 1995; Mabeza-Chimedza 1998). After 2000, FTLRP provided land to majority peasants who responded by producing for the market (Moyo 2011a; Scoones et al. 2011). However, despite accessing land, peasants still faced challenges in accessing capital, which was under the control of neoliberal international and local finance capital. This was worsened by the unprecedented nature of the radical FTLRP, which Moyo and Chambati (2013) claim to be one of its only kind in recent times. The FTLRP in Zimbabwe brought
with it new dimensions of land tenure insecurity risks and uncertainty in agriculture for both farmers and firms. The uncertainty and risks disrupted livelihood patterns in most rural areas, leading Dekker and Kinsey (2011) to argue for more detailed studies on the role contract farming could play to improve rural livelihoods. Simmons (2002) believes that contract farming could be of mutual benefit to agribusinesses and farmers, as they seek to tackle risks, uncertainty and build on the successes of the 1980s.

The government’s (1980-90) institutional support to communal and resettled farmers led to phenomenal growth in agricultural production, particularly staple crops and the welfare of the smallholder farmers in what is now referred to as Zimbabwe’s agricultural revolution (Eicher 1995). However, this was short-lived as policy reversals in response to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), deteriorating economy and FTLRP all combined to worsen the peasant farmer’s access to agricultural productive resources and, with it, a decline in rural economic activities and livelihood options (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998; Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). Following the 1990s’ market-oriented SAP and the 2000s’ land reform in Zimbabwe, agricultural institutions, such as extension services, farmer organisations, credit, input and output markets, were left dysfunctional. Rukuni et al. (2006) argued that these key agricultural institutions were systematically undermined since the start of the FTLRP leading to an unprecedented fall in productivity in all sectors. Further, both international and local capital were hostile to FTLRP, thus limiting sources of finance available to beneficiaries of the programme. This led to an uneven access to farming resources, services and markets for smallholder farmers. Consequently, there was a reversal of the 1980-90 boom in smallholder agricultural productivity and living standards, as farmers with little resources could not sustain agricultural production. The problem was compounded by the worsening, hyperinflationary (89.7 sextillion per cent by 2008) economic environment (Hanke and Kwok 2009).

Faced with deteriorating agricultural production, unprecedented inflation and the collapse of the economy, Zimbabwe adopted contract farming as a financing model to boost agriculture production through government-sponsored initiatives spearheaded by the central bank, and then the private contract farming initiative in 2004 for the tobacco crop (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). Even though government reverted to a free market in 2009, access to finance did not improve with the dollarization of the economy due to unsustainable government budget deficit and uncertainty about land ownership as collateral (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). This necessitated the continued promotion of contract farming as an agricultural financing model to reduce fiscal burden (Setboonsarng 2008). Contract farming was introduced to farmers with diverse and changing livelihoods due to differential effects of FTLRP (Scoones 2015; Scoones et al. 2011) with different outcomes. Contracting arrangements were henceforth negotiated between FTLRP beneficiaries and powerful, hostile and suspicious (of FTLRP) representatives of finance capital (some were white farmers who lost their land).
In 2016, government extended contracting arrangements, collaborating with the private sector in its command agriculture programme to improve resource access by farmers.

Access to productive agricultural resources have a proven history of success in Asia and Latin America’s Green Revolution where governments providing public goods partnered with the private sector in providing services to the poor, which led to phenomenal increases in yields. It is within this framework that Africa through NEPAD adopted contract farming, which was heralded as a panacea to problems facing sub-Saharan African agriculture (NEPAD. 2013). In many ways, contract farming was seen as a launch-pad to Africa’s own green revolution, which would reduce rural poverty and promote economic growth, and partnering with private agribusiness, which is believed to facilitate access to resources to smallholders, thus boosting agriculture. In all this, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has called for responsible investment in agriculture, that is, investment that supports food security of communities, among other positive community effects (Committee on World Food Security (CFS) 2015). In Zimbabwe, contract farming was adopted to correct deficiencies in the supply of agricultural inputs and services, which arose from the backlash to Zimbabwe’s chaotic FTLRP and marketing of output, so that smallholder farmers could improve their livelihood options.

Early contract farming interventions involved state-business partnership in Zimbabwe (Jackson and Cheater 1994; Sachikonye 1989, 1991) and, after the FTLRP, agribusiness contracting arrangements with little government involvement have dominated cash-crop production (Moyo 2011a; Sachikonye 2016), until 2016, when government partnered with the private sector for staple crop contracting. In Zimbabwe, tobacco contracting arrangements deviate from standard contracts described for other crops in that prices are determined by the auction market. Little and Watts (1994:9) define contract farming as

…forms of vertical coordination between growers and buyer-processors that directly shape production decisions through contractually specifying market obligations (by volume, value, quality, and, at times, advanced price determination); provide specific inputs; and exercise some control at the point of production (i.e. a division of management functions between contractor and contractee).

This thesis applies this definition because of its focus on the intervening effects in the contract farming arrangements. Further, the definition views contract farming as an institutional arrangement, providing conditional credit in the form of cash, inputs and services (for example markets, extension; technology and transport), where all these activities are coordinated and controlled by the agribusiness, in exchange for agricultural commodities produced by peasants selected on a criterion set by the agribusiness. Contract farming supports agricultural activities and production, a source of rural livelihoods, by providing farming resources and services through private and/or government institutions to smallholder farmers. Examples of these institutions include input-output markets, research and extension services,
and farmer groups that are involved in farming and yet benefit the broader community who can gain access to other livelihood activities emanating from contract farming activities. Social ties and cognitive effects create externalities in rural communities through information sharing. Despite the possibility of these spillover effects, scholars have focused on participating farmers and neglected the broader community, including contracted farmer-labour relations and the income effect that arises. This study extends the analysis of contract farming effects beyond the household to community.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The objective of this study is to investigate the household and community effects that arise from farmers’ participation in contract farming arrangements. The supplementary objectives are:

• Farmers’ production and income outcomes and how this can be explained by
• Factors that influence contractors and farmers’ decision to participate in contract farming arrangements

1.3 Research Questions

The main research question is: What are the household and community effects of contract farming arrangements in Mazowe?

The following are the sub-questions:

a. What are the effects of contract farming on tobacco farmers’ production and income outcomes?

b. How does the expenditure and investment of tobacco income affect household and community economic activities in Mazowe?

c. How do factors that determine farmers’ selection and participation in contract farming arrangements affect the household and the community’s economic activities?

1.4 Significance of the Study

The access theory approach detailed in chapter 2 and findings of this study will redound (greatly contribute) to the understanding of processes and mechanisms that generate community benefits in a contract farming arrangement. The study argues that participation in contract farming, results in positive spillover effects to the community as farmers diversify their farm and non-farm activities. These spillover effects generate jobs and services that benefit the community. A data analysis based on Ribot and Pefuso’s (2003)s access theory showed how processes and mechanisms farmers undertook to access
contract farming generated jobs and investments in farm and non-farm activities that benefited the community. Further, this analytic approach revealed that contractors preferred resourced-farmers (with initial asset endowments), most of which were generated from access to land from the FTLRP, power, social relations and identities held by successful farmers. These issues are often neglected in contract farming studies, yet there are a necessary condition and complementary assets to the partial inputs provided by contractors for farmers to participate in capital intensive crops like tobacco. The study compared A1 and communal farmers (see pages 8-9 for justification) who share similar production relations, from the same ecological zone, a departure from most contract farming studies that lumped A1 and A2 FTLRP beneficiaries thus clouding land reform and contracting benefits accruing to smallholder farmers.

The study found that contract farming benefited the Mazowe community by providing employment, assured food security, new markets and services. Most farmers were dependent on the contractor and struggling under the exploitative contracting terms offered by the contractor. Those who struggled had limited access to cash advances for labour and had fewer assets. Again, access theory allowed the research to reveal that by expending resources to participate in contract farming both successful and struggling farmers generated employment and the successful ones’ used their lumpsum payments to invest in farm and non-farm activities that benefited the community. Contract farming provided additional resources/credit that enabled successful farmers to diversify their economic activities for the benefit of both the household and community.

Access theory provides a critical perspective from which to analyse benefit streams from contract farming in a community and recognises the role of power and social relations in accessing resources. Complementary resources or initial asset endowments affect peasant selection, participation and performance in contract farming. A clear definition of enhancers/barriers to participation provides room for assessing who benefits or loses, how they invest or earn a living after participating in contract farming and how this affects the community. By so doing, the study expands the horizon of studying contract farming from the current approach, where most studies focus on the household, to a community level with its complex social relations. Insights into these processes contribute and expand scholarly literature on how benefits of contract farming are generated and distributed in a community.

While showing the importance of the FTLRP in building assets, accessing contract farming and livelihood dynamics thereof, the study opens debate on how farmers can raise initial assets that improve their contract farming participation outcomes. This is important if the insertion of capital is to benefit both the rural elites and the poor. For researchers, this calls for further study on dynamics of initial endowments and contract farming participation, particularly post-FTLRP. This calls for research to inform policy makers on all the strands through which complementary resources can be provided in a contract farming arrangement.
1.5 Research Methodology

This study investigated and explained two broad propositions about the effects of contract farming on rural livelihoods, namely:

- Participation in contract farming is affected by contracting terms and initial resource endowments of farmers.

- Contract farming leads to increased income, assets and capital holdings that benefit the community.

The researcher tested these propositions within the limits of access theory framework developed in Chapter 2. Access theory is “the ability to derive benefits from things,” (Ribot and Peluso 2003:153). To benefit from ‘things’ one needs to expend resources to gain and maintain access which involves negotiations with those who own/control the resources. In doing so, this affects livelihoods, as parties get to expend and receive benefits and these processes deplete/enhance welfare of the parties. The theory argues that all this depends on the bundles of powers held by the contracting parties and often negotiations are multifaceted. A realist methodological approach was used to track the ‘processes and mechanisms’ envisioned in figure 2.1 to ascertain how there could generate community effects (Emmel 2013; Maxwell 2004b; Patton 2015).

The literature review shows that contract farming research is dominated by micro studies that focus on effects on the contracted farmer and the case study is the main approach used. Studies that comprehensively analyse the cases studied to include mechanism and processes involved before and after accessing contract farming are scarce. For instance, community effects arising from negotiating for resources and use of income are often neglected. Though Scoones et al. (2018) describe livelihood effects in Mvurwi using statistics and qualitative methods, they do not delve into processes involved in negotiating access and distribution of the resultant value. Further, the cases generally apply either qualitative or quantitative analysis. This study applies a case study approach where a mixed method embedded in a realist approach⁶ (Patton 2015; Emmel 2013) is used to gain a better understanding of the effects of contract farming than one single method can provide (Creswell and Clark 2007). This helps understand the effects of contract farming on processes of agrarian transformation and social change (Oya 2004:315) and rural livelihoods (Scoones 2009). The rest of the section describes the research design, case study area and the methods used to collect and analyse data.

1.5.1 Research Design

Creswell (2018: 4) defines mixed methods as

...an approach to inquiry involving collecting both qualitative and quantitative data, integrating the two forms of data, and using distinct designs that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks.
In a mixed method approach, qualitative and quantitative approaches complement each other and allow for ‘multiple view points’, an issue that is important when trying to infer causality in a study (Jick 1979). A mixed method approach provides better understanding of the phenomenon under study where breadth and depth are provided by quantitative and qualitative methods, respectively (Palinkas et al. 2015). According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), mixed methods help deepen a researcher’s understanding of a phenomenon under study. Jick (1979:603) observed: “…it can also capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the unit(s) under study”. This was done through within-method or between-method triangulation that strengthened reliability and validity, respectively. The impact of interventions in a community can have various causal paths that might not be explained by figures or qualitative data alone; quantitative data helped measure and quantify trends and the status quo, while the study benefited from insights from beneficiaries through interviews. In this study, the beneficiaries are the ones who identified the real perceived source of their benefit or lack thereof, how they responded to FTLRP disruptions, and who ascertain the value added to their livelihoods (Scoones 2009). Therefore, integrating the two increased validity and acceptability of the findings for policy purposes. This was achieved through a detailed analysis of the Mazowe case study, where the researcher sought to understand the changes that occurred in tobacco production outcomes and livelihood strategies due to the integration of farmers into contract farming. A convergent mixed method approach was used for this study, and data collected, analysed and interpreted as described by Creswell (2018).

Applying a mixed method approach is important in capturing the ‘heterogeneous’ nature of rural communities (Oya 2004), their differential response to technology and market integration. Further, qualitative data could be used to infer causality (Prowse and Camfield 2009; Maxwell 20004b) to remedy quantitative analytic deficiencies arising from selection bias. Most of the studies are concerned with the welfare of contracted farmers or comparisons with non-contract farmers, while this study set out to explain the effects of contract farming on both household and community livelihoods; issues that can be explained using a mixed methods approach. In this study, contextual and contemporary issues were understood from the ‘voice’ of the participants, while there was need to measure production and income using quantitative data. Furthermore, the study was conceptualised within an access to resources lens and Creswell and Clark (2007:12) argue that in such scenarios a mixed method approach is more appropriate and further observe that it “provides a bridge across the sometimes-adversarial divide between quantitative and qualitative researchers”. As discussed in the data collection sections, the researcher noticed that mixed methods require communication skills and time in dealing with a varied social group.

1.5.2 Case Study Area

A case study approach was used to unpack the above propositions. Mazowe district, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 7, was selected as the case study area to capture the A1-communal structural dualism
that exists within the area among peasants within the same environment. The objective of the study is to test the effects of contract farming at the household and community level after FTLRP, and hence selection of households that shared similar living conditions before the FTLRP. As discussed in chapter 7, page 110 these communities are managed by similar traditional authority structures. Thus a comparison of A1 and communal presents a natural experiment. Further, no resource requirements were needed to join A1 scheme. This makes them similar to communal areas where most A1 farmers originated and hence the two communities are comparable. A2 farmers required a minimum set of resources, skills or income before joining the scheme, and hence are not comparable to the two communities. Further this allows the researcher to isolate the effect of land on accruing benefits.

Tobacco production among peasants is on the upward trajectory having been the preserve of large-scale commercial farmers (LSCF) prior to land reform in 2000 (Scoones et al. 2018), which provides an interesting case of how peasants integrated into capitalist markets after accessing land under FTLRP. Mazowe is an interesting case given the historical responsiveness of the people to the moral economy documented by Bessant and Muringai (1993). Further, tobacco was first produced on a large scale by smallholders after the land reform, which provided an opportunity to test how farmers responded to the disruptive tendencies of the FTLRP. In most areas of Mazowe, communal areas exist side-by-side with former commercial farms which were allocated to A1 farmers who are largely peasant. There is a historic symbiotic relationship between A1 farms and communal areas as far as livelihoods are mediated, negotiated and dependent on access and control of land. Further, the influx of people from other regions into Mazowe A1 farms created complex cultural and social structures, which resulted in fluid and changing livelihood strategies. The introduction of capital through contract farming arrangements provides fertile ground to test the effects of contract farming within the access theoretical framework. A case study undertaken using a mixed method approach is therefore more appropriate in analysing the complex contemporary issues unfolding in Mazowe, (see a detailed discussion in chapter 7), which could also have widespread application to other regions given the diversity of people in the area.

Scholarship in case study analysis (Yin 2013; Simons 2009) has argued that the choice of research methods depends on three things, namely: the research question posed, the researcher's degree of control of behavioural events, and the extent that the research question focuses on a ‘contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context’ or historical events. While all five-research methods (experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and case studies) can answer the questions 'how' and 'why' demanded by the research question in this thesis, only experiments meet all these standards. However, the expense and feasibility of carrying out an experiment to address a social phenomenon eliminated it in this study, while history and archival analysis fall short on their focus on contemporary issues. Though a historical analysis would utilise the same techniques as a case study, the latter is superior as it utilises direct observation and interviews of actors involved in the case (Yin 2009). Simons (2009:123) adds they are “…useful
for exploring and understanding the process and dynamics of change”, which this case seeks to investigate. Therefore, this study uses an explanatory case study with an embedded survey used as a data collection tool to investigate the contemporary phenomenon described by (Yin 2009:18).

1.5.3 Data Collection

Quantitative and qualitative data collection was done concurrently according to the dictates of the mixed methods approach adopted for this study (Creswell 2018; Creswell and Clark 2007). Furthermore, triangulation (use of several techniques) within methods was used; for instance, in qualitative data observations, life history, interviews and document analysis were used, while for quantitative data, the survey questionnaire was complemented with secondary data from TIMB and Zimbabwe Statistical Agency (ZIMSTAT). Prowse and Camfield (2009) found life history to be strong complements to survey data in explaining causal relationships. A concurrent triangulation method, that is, simultaneous collection of data using both qualitative and quantitative techniques was used to collect data, “…in an attempt to confirm, cross-validate, or corroborate findings” (Creswell et al. 2003:183). For the peasants, data was collected for the same variables, and concepts detailed in the structured questionnaire to allow for complementarity within the data sets, validation, verification of facts and breadth and depth and understanding of the phenomenon under study. However, in-depth interviews with key informants inquired about processes of social change, implications on policy, livelihoods and how development could arise from contract farming interventions given power imbalances among the actors. This section describes the data collection techniques applied, and methods used to select participants.

1.5.3.1 The Sample

According to the Zimbabwe Statistical Agency, Mazowe has a population of 232 885 and 55 997 households with an average family size of 4.1. These households are spread over 35 wards (ZIMSTATS 2012). On average, each ward consists of 1 600 households, which provided a sampling frame at the ward level. However, not all wards are involved in tobacco production thus necessitating purposive and multi-stage probability sampling techniques (Creswell 2018; Teddlie and Yu 2007) to select wards and then participants and actors who would best help answer research questions for this study. All this was driven by the propositions under investigation and as per realist sampling techniques (Emmel 2013; Patton 2015). Purposive and probability sampling were used for qualitative and quantitative data collection respectively and at times both techniques were applied depending on the data needs. Selection of the sample started with purposively identifying five wards that met the researcher’s information needs. For instance, wards that were involved in contracted and non-contracted tobacco production, A1 settlements that exist side-by-side with communal areas and areas where multiple livelihood strategies existed (for example farming, mining) and served by the same institutions and infrastructure. Ward 9 is a communal settlement with established irrigation infrastructure (which is important for agricultural based livelihoods). While Ward 10 is communal and relies on rain-fed
agriculture, Wards 15 and 32 are predominantly A1. The community court presided over by the chief sits at Gweshe Business Centre in Ward 12, which was selected to capture customary structures that affect agricultural production. Given the set-up described in this paragraph, the sample allows the researcher to test the effects of contract farming on community economic activities.

At the ward level, household registers kept by agricultural extension officers were used to identify participants. The extension officers had household data segregated by type of crop produced as well as by contract or non-contract farmer. Each agricultural extension officer is responsible for 400-500 households, and on average four officers were allocated to a ward. One-hundred-and-fifty participants were selected from the five wards for the survey questionnaire. Each ward contributed twelve contracted farmers, twelve non-contracted farmers and six non-tobacco or farm workers. The distribution of the sample was meant to address spillover effects and the direct effects of contract farming on tobacco and non-tobacco producers alike. A simple random sample was drawn from the register kept by the ward extension officers. This was done after extracting the different farmer categories based on the order (Stratified Sampling) they appeared in the register. This was done to ensure that the three groups are represented in the sample (Teddlie and Yu 2007) and to also allow for generalisability of the study’s findings (Palinkas et al. 2015). Though all tobacco farmers are expected to register with the TIMB, a sizeable number in the sample did not have grower numbers and were therefore included among the non-contract tobacco farmers.

1.5.3.2 Qualitative Sampling Techniques

From the large quantitative sample, a simple random sample was drawn to select one participant in each category to allow for comparability of quantitative and qualitative data as well as to allow for the representation of each group when doing in-depth interviews and/or participant observation. Field observations often exceeded the one person selected. As farmers moved in groups when marketing their crops, seedling gardens were in close vicinity near water points and some routines were done in groups. To enable the researcher to capture extreme cases and outliers, purposive sampling of three participants per ward was done based on referrals (snowballing technique12) from the extension officers. These participants did not need to necessarily come from the randomly selected group as the major criteria were that they were outliers in terms of agricultural productivity and ownership of assets. The aim was to assess the success/limitations that affected these extreme cases in order to get rich information that characterised them. Where data saturation was not reached, snowballing continued.

The researcher further used purposive sampling to identify key informants for in depth interviews at TIMB, Tobacco Research Board (TRB), Farmers’ Union, government officers and the farming community. Purposive sampling was used to select “information rich” participants (Patton 1990) who are experts and practitioners in agriculture production and development (Creswell et al. 2011).
instance, officers at the farmers’ union and extension officers referred the researcher to high performing farmers. In addition to their extension work, they act as advisors on political (collective action) and livelihood strategies pursued by communities and hence were also key informants.

1.5.4 Quantitative Data Collection

Primary and secondary data were used for this study. Comparative quantitative secondary data from the TIMB on tobacco farmers and census data from Zimbabwe Statistical Office (ZIMSTATS) was used. Quantitative data were collected using a survey questionnaire (Appendix 4). The survey helped the researcher collect “structured or systematic set of data” through a questionnaire, interviews and other techniques (De Vaus 2002). What was important was to collect the same attributes for each unit of analysis. This allowed the researcher to be able to describe the unit of study and explain any causes of emerging issues. The survey questionnaire covered the demographic data of the participants, the use of inputs in agriculture, tobacco sales and expenses, investment patterns and preferences, use of finance services, assets, education, health, household expenditure, the sources of income, and community facilities attributed to contract farming. The survey questionnaire was administered to contract and non-contract farmers, farm workers and non-tobacco producers. The questionnaire was administered to participants at their homesteads, gardens and other places of work or leisure and consent was sought and confidentiality guaranteed, which constituted part of the greetings and introduction of the purpose of the researcher’s visit. Participants were not comfortable to provide their names and identification details and hence some columns in the household roster were omitted. Surveys have been criticised for their structured nature, however, in this study, multiple sources described in the next section were used to increase external validity.

1.5.5 Qualitative Data Collection

Interviewing was the key instrument for qualitative data collection with embedded participant observations and document analysis to verify and cross-check facts. The purpose was to triangulate, complement and validate information from survey results as well as to obtain new insight into issues that relate to contract farming. Further, the researcher used interviews to track “…causal processes” and mechanisms that gave rise to observed effects in the household and community (Prowse and Camfield 2009:20)

1.5.5.1 Participant Observation

Kawulich (2005:1) describes participant observations as a “…tool for collecting data about people, processes, and cultures in qualitative research”. In this study, participant observation was embedded in interviews that were undertaken by the researcher where some participants were interviewed at their workstations or homesteads. This allowed the researcher “…to check description against fact and, noting discrepancies, become aware of systematic distortions made by the person under study; such
distortions are less likely to be discovered by interviewing alone” (Becker and Geer 1957:31). For instance, observation of tobacco marketing at auction floors was done after the questionnaire and structured interviews were administered to tobacco farmers. Further observations were also an active part of the researcher’s routine during fieldwork. Probing during interviews was a result of observations of visible assets such as vehicles, and operations in the seedling gardens and in curing barns. These are physically visible and accessible and hence Musante and DeWalt (2010:vii) observed that fieldwork involves “…active looking, improving memory, informal interviewing, writing detailed field notes, and perhaps most importantly, patience”. All this allowed the researcher to establish causality and explain why certain processes and mechanisms led to observable outcomes. The researcher’s questionnaires were administered to participants while actively observing the context and environment that the participant lived in. Where necessary, structured questions were asked, and brief notes jotted on the questionnaire to capture the life history of the respondent. The iterative processes provided a better understanding of the context, for instance, of how tobacco was marketed and the actor constellation at the auction floors. In homesteads, interruptions during interviews by visitors from the community also provided opportunities to observe interactions between participants and fellow community members. People visiting to ask for or pass on information, share farm implements issues, and so on, were an important resource for measuring social networking and capital in the community.

According to Musante and DeWalt (2010:264) this “…enhances the quality of the data obtained during field work and it enhances the quality of the interpretation of data” as it complements other data collection tools making it possible to triangulate. Becker (1983) suggests that it could be a yardstick to measure the completeness and accuracy of data accessed by other methods or tools, at the same time noting distortions and discrepancies emanating from the interview process (Becker and Geer 1957:32).

The researcher was therefore able to observe the context within which transactions occurred at the auction floors, the power dynamics, how they were negotiated, underhand deals, how farmers interacted with urbanites and emerging livelihoods and the processes involved in bringing tobacco to the market until the final sale. In the agricultural fields, barns and gardens, the researcher observed the production processes, grading and relations of farmers and workers, while, during interviews in homesteads, assets and social networks were observed, which helped complement the questionnaire and in-depth interviews.

1.5.5.2 Document Analysis

According to Bowen (2009:29) “…documents can provide data on the context within which research participants operate” and “…such information and insight can help researchers understand the historical roots of specific issues”. Accordingly, in this study, the researcher used document analysis to understand the development of dual structures and social differentiation in rural areas, and how they impact on technology adoption and market integration of peasants. Through document analysis the
study also picked up on conditions that affected development of contract farming arrangements in communities. The study analysed documents such as *Zimbabwe Tobacco Today* (a Zimbabwe Tobacco Association publication with rich data on tobacco production and issues affecting tobacco farmers) *Flue-Cured Tobacco Production Field Guide* (a Tobacco Research Board publication detailing best farming practices) TIMB reports, government policy documents, ZIMSTAT 2012 Mashonaland census report, tobacco contracts and newspaper articles.

1.5.5.3 Interviews

The researcher conducted face-to-face structured and unstructured interviews in Mazowe and Harare to benefit from “…synchronous communication in time and place” and observe “social cues” emanating from the interview process (Opdenakker 2006:2). This was particularly important in Mazowe, where extra information was observed and illustrated by the farmer during interviews, examples of which included seeded operations, tobacco grading or even cues on how prices at the floor were influenced. Life history interviews, coupled with observations (described above) generated “…quantitative, qualitative and visual data” which enable the researcher to track processes that gave rise to certain outcomes (Prowse and Camfield 2009:21). Interviews were recorded with the consent of interviewees; however, some respondents refused to be recorded and notes were taken. The interview protocol was prepared to provide for a conversation that captured the research question within the context of the respondent (Castillo-Montoya 2016). Informal conversations with community members in their areas of entertainment also provided meaningful information about people’s livelihood strategies. This was made possible by extension officers and Tindo (see Appendix, 6), who introduced me as a researcher in these platforms, and hence people opened up on their livelihoods.

The interview used open-ended questions and in-depth interviews with key informants, to allow for exhaustive discussion about their technical knowledge and how it has panned out in the communities they served. This allowed for the sourcing of valuable information on such issues as the dynamics of the land-contract farming nexus and the farmer’s life history.

1.6 Data Analysis

Bryman and Burgess (2002:224) propose that a researcher should “…articulate as fully as possible the processes associated with data analysis”. This section describes these processes for both the quantitative and qualitative data. Themes were developed for the two sets of data based on the structured questionnaire and the theoretical framework. The aim was to fit the analysis to the purpose of the study which is largely to examine the broad community effects of contract farming. However emerging themes from key informant interviews, document analysis and observations were captured wherever these helped provide insights into the research question.
1.6.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

To infer relationships, there is a need to establish causal trends in the data. This was achieved using analysis of variance and simple econometric data analysis in SPSS to establish the relationships between variables. Descriptive statistics were used to compare national indicators and those from the study to facilitate effective comparative analysis within the emerging trends. Variables covered in the questionnaire were tested using descriptive and univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA), logit and linear regression model.

1.6.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

Qualitative data was analysed using both deductive and inductive approaches. In this dual approach data analysis is intertwined with data collection so as to establish emerging trends, and where necessary, issues were re-visited during the process of the research (Burnard et al. 2008; Mason 1994). Given the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches emerging issues were revisited either through triangulation or search for more information. Again, given that data were collected retrospectively, there was a need to check and cross check information so that emerging causal effects could be attributed to the contract farming intervention. I adopted Mason ‘s (1994) two-stage approach where the first stage involved identifying themes for ease of data management and retrieval. This was followed by the ‘creative’ part where conclusions and findings were generated through searching the “…data set for comparisons which help not only to flesh out the theory, but also to sharpen and test it” (Mason 1994:103).

1.7 Limitations of the Study

Legal provisions restricted the researcher’s access to the Tobacco Industries Marketing Board (TIMB) database, which has information on farmers’ sales records and stop orders, and the data used was self-reported by farmers. The self-reported income data included farmers with no grower numbers, avoiding debt repayment or side marketing. All this compounded contested limitations inherent in a case study approach in regard to the generalisability of the findings (Flyvbjerg 2006). There were also time and financial constraints mitigating against undertaking rigorous investigation within the timeframe for this dissertation. Assessing the ‘effects of contract farming’ would have ideally required baseline data which were not available. The researcher mitigated these limitations through concurrent triangulation design, seeking convergence and collaboration of data sources. Data were further augmented by context-specific details as actors described and exemplified their daily activities in their lives.

1.8 Research Ethics and Field Challenges

Mouton (2001:238) argues that research on humans should be guided by “…acceptable norms and values”. This is critical for research in rural communities where social relations are considered
important and leadership structures are highly regarded. Community issues and events are normally in the public domain and hence to do research in the communities’ local leadership are important as an entry point. The University of Cape Town’s code of ethics was observed in its entirety. The principle of anonymity was observed, and pseudonyms are used in this thesis.

Kruger, Ndebele, and Horn (2014) noted that respondents must be treated with respect and their full rights observed. This includes right to knowledge about the research, its purpose, aim, benefits, implications and risks associated with participant involvement. The participants had the right to ask questions which the researcher then answered. An informed participant then made a choice to either participate or withdraw from the interview. The researcher accorded the participants the protection in terms of confidentiality and anonymity they required. Creswell (2014), quoting Sarantakos (2005) also provides a list of issues that should be highlighted as part of gaining consent. This research observed such recommendations during the research process. Further, the researcher followed the university’s standing research protocols and read out a request to interview the participants (see questionnaire, Appendix 4).

In Mazowe, a cordial atmosphere prevailed throughout my field research, which was also aided by people such as some extension officers who associated me with their clan. Dealing with officers at the Ministry of Agriculture was rather difficult, as I spent considerable time being shuffled from one office to another. This could have been because of the sensitivities involved in discussing the unfolding command-agriculture discourse (new thinking by Zimbabwe government of financing agriculture production), where its operation and success were subject of intense political contestations.

1.9 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into ten chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework for this study. In this study, contract farming arrangements are analysed within Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) access theory and Berry’s (1993) access to resources approach. This chapter describes mechanisms and processes farmers go through to access resources and eventual contracts. The chapter shows that farmers must expend resources in order to share in the value generated. The expending of resources has community-wide effects. The concepts of contract and livelihoods are discussed within the access to resources framework. Resources are identified as central in accessing contract farming and generating livelihoods, hence the three concepts feed into each other.

Chapter 3 reviews literature on ‘the land question’ from an international perspective. The chapter discusses history of land reform in the global south, arguing that land reform is a result of unfair land distribution where the elites hold disproportionately large tracks of land which are underutilised. Therefore, land reform based on efficiency of small farms and equity considerations were instituted. The chapter then discusses redistributive and tenure systems showing that these affect resource access.
by those who benefit from the reforms. The chapter concludes with a discussion of approaches to land reform that is state-led, market-based and participatory. In all this the influence of peasant movements is highlighted.

Chapter 4 continues the discussion on land reform but more from a Zimbabwean perspective. In this chapter, it is shown that land reform supported with resources results in improved market integration and livelihoods. In contrast, Chapter 5 shows that radical land reforms that alienate capital result in declining productivity at first. However, the chapter shows that over time, farmers improve productivity as they build assets from the acquired land. The process is enhanced by insertion of capital from agribusinesses which provides supplementary resources. These two chapters show that land is important for commercialising agriculture. Access to land by smallholders resulted in finance capital penetrating agriculture through contract farming.

Chapter 6 describes tobacco production and its role in rural economies, showing that it creates linkages and spillover effects that result in community-wide effects. This manifests through labour, production and value chain activities. However, smallholder farmers face constraints that limit their participation in tobacco production. This is shown by developments in Zimbabwean agriculture where supply of capital and resources were compromised during the FTLRP. Tobacco production is described to show the effects of commercial agriculture on rural livelihoods and the complexities in commercial production. Navigating these complexities involves expending resources that generate benefits and livelihood for the community through labour hiring, up-downstream activities and diversification into off-farm activities. This is the subject of Chapter 7. Chapter 7 describes livelihoods in Mazowe. This is shown through illustrations of the geographic and labour positions of Mazowe community. Central to the various livelihoods in Mazowe is access to land of which the FTLRP transformed access modalities. For communal land, access is through the traditional authorities or patriarchal route as detailed in chapter 7 ([Steen 2011]). Chapter 7 describes the fathers’s responsibility to provide their sons with land and as a result this leads to subdivisions, in a process I term patriarchal route. The chapter concludes by discussing insertion of capital in Mazowe.

Chapters 8 and 9 present the findings of the study. Chapter 8 shows that farmers and the community benefited from contract farming and shows that resource endowments are critical in production and income outcomes of the farmers. During production, farmers employ locals, which generates income for the poor. The chapter shows that the income earned by the farmers is invested in diverse economic activities that benefit the community. However, despite this glossy picture, the two chapters show that the poor are marginalised and suffer under contract. Marginalised as they are, they also contribute to community welfare as they expend resources in hiring labour. Chapter 9 explains the results observed in chapter 8. Household characteristics heralded by resources endowments are fundamental in farmers’ participation and stay in contract farming. This is important, as it builds farmers’ initial asset
endowments and shapes the bundle of powers that determine the farmer’s stay or exit from contract farming. The chapter concludes by noting that power imbalance exemplified by uneven resource holdings affect the participation outcomes of farmers.

Chapter 10 concludes the study by providing a summary of the key issues in the study. A discussion of the findings revealed that the FTLRP provided a launch-pad for successful participation in contract farming, which is in line with scholarly work in the field of land reform. It was also shown that access theory provided an understanding through which the interaction of contract farming and the FTLRP operated to generate community level effects. Through control and maintaining access, livelihoods are earned as farmers expend resources which become benefits to others. The chapter provides a summary of the findings and areas for further research, observing that contract farming benefited the Mazowe community, despite the majority struggling under contract.

1.10 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the thesis, identifying resource endowments as the epicentre of contract farming. As a result, the research seeks to investigate how contract farming participation and outcomes are affected by, resource endowments of Mazowe farmers. Contract farming was introduced and defined, and the deteriorating input-output markets in Zimbabwe described as the reason behind contract farming arrangements and differential asset holdings of farmers. However, FTLRP redefined production relations between farmers and finance-capital which shaped contract farming negotiations.

The poor institutional arrangements have destroyed the once prosperous agricultural system in Zimbabwe. The institutions could have possibly been destroyed by political machinations that did not support development. By studying the effects of contract farming arrangements in Mazowe, the study contributes to the body of literature on development of capitalist agriculture in rural areas; specifically, how contract farming affects the household and broad community through, for instance, the development of local bourgeoisies who can invest locally, create employment and other economic activities that impact on rural livelihoods.

The chapter then described the study area and the methodology used. The study uses a case study approach, where a mixed method approach is used. The processes followed in gathering and analysing data were described in this chapter.
Chapter 2

Conceptualising Contract Farming and Community Effects: Access theory approach

2.0 Introduction

Contract farming arrangements discussed in this study are a component of vertical coordination in capitalist agrarian relations involving agribusinesses that provide capital and farmers contributing labour, land and at times capital. In this relationship, the agribusiness as an entrepreneur aims to access inputs for his industrial activities at a cost which is beneficial to the business while farmers’ (peasants in this case) concern is to access productive resources and markets for their produce. The farmer aims to receive a just reward for his/her labour from his prime source of livelihood, land, while the firm aims to maximise profits/value from the contractual relationship. The tension subsequently leads to contestations which arise with regard to the share of profits/value that arise. At the farm level, hired farm-workers are entangled in wage negotiations with contracted farmers, creating a web of value extraction at different levels resulting in community-wide effects. The relations described in this paragraph are often analysed from a capitalist system perspective, centered on the property paradigm and power relations. This tends to be inadequate where capitalist systems are not fully developed, and economic activity is driven by social relationships. Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) access theory used in this study, provides a lens of incorporating social relations in the analysis of contract farming. Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) access theory argues that benefits are a function of ‘a bundle of powers’ held by agents in socio-economic transactions. In a production and marketing relationship like contract farming, ‘a bundle of powers’ constitutes the various attributes held by agents for example assets, labour, education, identity and so on that can influence the use or exclusion by the agents.

Bernstein and Oya (2014) classify contract farming as a post-Washington Consensus disciplined market intervention, which they refer to as” “market-plus”, accounting for the various roles played by agents in the arrangement. Following Ribot and Peluso (2003), this study analyses how, and under what conditions, farmers access resources needed to participate in contract farming and the effects of the same on production and income as well as on the farming households and broader community. According to Bernstein and Oya (2014:14), such exchanges should be viewed from the perspective of real markets and actors viewed “…in terms of their position in the social hierarchy and their relative power vis-à-vis others”. This implies that access to, and benefits from, productive farming resources and markets are differentiated by position in society, and hence, contract farming effects could follow the same trend.
To understand the effect of contract farming within a community, the interaction of actors, and the distribution of cost and benefits, this thesis is guided by Bernstein and Oya’s (2014:5) questions on agrarian political economy. The questions seek to understand, who owns, does and gets what from a contract farming arrangement. These issues have been addressed in contract farming literature from various perspectives though neglecting land, livelihood dynamics and the social relations in communities. This study further explores the fourth question: “What do they do with it?” Literature on contract farming has been scarce on this last question, yet it helps us to understand how the intervention influences the agrarian and rural economy landscape. Scoones et al. (2011) and Moyo (2009) observed that the FTLRP improved peasants’ livelihoods, asset ownership and participation in agricultural markets, yet few studies have analysed land reform as a facilitator of farmers’ entry into contract farming.

The study applies Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access to contract farming, land and rural economy dynamics. Access analysis allows for the tracking of strands, mechanisms and processes farmers follow in order to participate in contract farming. The access analytic framework strongly complements the qualitative causal data collection techniques described in Chapter 1. This relationship is anchored in resource gaps between the contracting parties within their space and context, which necessitates innovative mechanisms to access contracts and benefits (Ribot and Peluso 2003). This chapter discusses the theoretical basis of this study, that is, access theory (section 2.2) and contract farming (section 2.3)

## 2.1 Approaches to Contract Farming Studies

Various approaches have been used to study contractual relations between farmers and agribusinesses of which Prowse (2012:26-36) identifies seven theories, namely life-cycle, convection, competency/capability, value chain, transaction cost, contract enforcement and the political economy of agrarian change. However, these approaches have not embraced the complexities involved in contract farming. For instance, they approaches skirt contract farming-livelihood linkages and “place and context dynamics” and, as a result, Bernstein and Oya’s (2014) questions on agrarian political economy remain unresolved. Such questions can be answered through a resources access lens, to allow for the understanding of the effects of land reform processes on peasant asset endowment and their subsequent participation in market-based agriculture. By looking at “…constellations of means, relations, and processes that enable various actors to derive benefits from resources” (Ribot and Peluso 2003:153), we can understand how resources (including income) are used to derive benefits for both the household and community at large. Through various mechanisms, actors in a contracting arrangement extract value from each other. Below, I provide the focal point of the main approaches pointing to their (in) appropriateness to this study.
2.1.1 New Institutional Economics Approach (NIE) to Contract Farming

This is the dominant approach to the analysis of contract farming arrangements and it draws from neoclassical principles centering on the utility maximising individual (Kherallah and Kirsten 2002). Neoclassical assumptions such as perfect information, zero transaction cost and rational being are relaxed. As shown by Bernstein and Oya (2014), this emphasises market imperfections that can be solved through institutional means and, at times, in partnership with government to facilitate the poor’s participation in markets. This work is informed by transaction cost economics, which argues that there are costs to transactions, which inhibit agents from contracting (Coase 1937; North 1990; Williamson 2007). Eaton and Shepherd (2001) argue that this is important in that it provides access to resources and markets to farmers. However, the focus is often on contracted farmers, neglecting the relational issues in a community, in which these farmers live. Bernstein and Oya (2014) opine that such an approach is oblivious to the perils of globalisation and the threats that it can cause to the local economy; for instance, their effects on community livelihoods. The dynamics of farmer selection and the participation of farmers are at times reduced to selection or self-selection bias without understanding the fundamental political and contextual dynamics at play. For example, most studies on contract farming acknowledge land as an asset that is critical for farmers’ participation (Scoones et al. 2018), the underlying social dynamics of land access, however, have remained at the periphery. Despite these methodological deficiencies, NIE has been an informative approach to understanding the benefits and cost accruing to participating households. It has provided valuable insights into identifying the questions of who does what in contracting arrangements and has been used to quantify household cost and benefits of contracting arrangements.

2.1.2 Global Value Chain Approach to Contract Farming

Value chain is defined by Kaplinsky and Morris (2000:4) as

…the full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use.

However, an extended value chain would capture and influence a broader number of actors. Bernstein (1996) and Raikes, Friis Jensen, and Ponte (2000) allude to the actors as political and contextual issues affecting the chain. Key within the chain is the generation and distribution of value; first among the actors directly involved in the value chain and broadly, within the community where spillover effects will lead to broader benefits for the whole community. Introduction of contract farming arrangements will permeate the whole value chain impacting on activities and services needed to support production and consumption in the community. However, it is not clear how the social structures are affected. Its
main contribution to value chain analysis is the idea of upgrading by either taking a superior position along the value chain or by improving quality through the adoption of better technologies (Bolwig, Gibbon, and Jones 2009). However, its main drawback is that it has “…not considered the broader issue of the terms on which poor or marginalised people participate in value chains” (Bolwig, Gibbon, and Jones 2009:4).

### 2.1.3 Political Economy Approach to Contract Farming

The political economy approach analyses contract farming from the perspective of class relations among actors and has been critical of the mainstream approach proffered by the NIE. The focal point has been on the power imbalance between the contracting parties and social differentiation arising from participation of farmers in such contracts due to capitalist tendencies to maximise profit through the exploitation of labour (Little and Watts 1994; Wilson 1986). Recent work by Bernstein and Oya (2014:15) points to the importance of resource differential within communities, which affects participation in agricultural markets. This is contrary to a focus on big-small farmer as the determinant of participation (Prowse 2012), which does not address intergroup differences. The major drawback of the political economy approach is that it does not delve into the distribution of value and flow of benefits in a contract farming arrangement.

### 2.2 Access Theory Approach to Contract Farming

Access is a concept with strong roots in common natural resource management systems, such as forestry (Ribot (1998), fisheries (Schlager and Ostrom 1992) and land-based resources (Shipton and Goheen 1992; Berry 1989b) and is not one of the commonly used conceptual frameworks in contract farming, identified by Prowse (2012). It has rarely been used to analyse contracted annual crops. Natural resources are recognized as one of the livelihood capitals necessary for the production of food (Cotula 2008). According to Cotula (2008:17), “…institutions and processes that address power imbalances” could facilitate access to assets and productive resources by the poor. Access analysis provides a platform to understand how institutions such as contract farming provide resources to farmers and with what effect to the farmers. Alternatively, it also addresses questions of how farmers access contract farming, through what channels, cost and with what effect.

Access theory seeks to explain means through which actors get to benefit from resources. This the theory argues is through ‘a bundle of powers’ held by the actors. As will be expanded on in the next section, ‘a bundle of powers’ can be understood as the qualities held by the actors which gives them control over use and enjoyment of resources or service and/or deprivation of other actors. The qualities could be shaped by assets, education, socio-political standing among other things. It is these variables that the study measures to determine the ability of households and communities to benefit from contract farming. The strength of access theory lies in its predictive power where social relationships dominate
exchanges and capitalist systems are not fully developed. As discussed in Chapter 1, agricultural commercialisation through contract farming benefits rural communities and, using access theory, this study tracked how the benefits were generated and distributed.

2.2.1 A Theory of Access

Access is defined as “…freedom or ability to obtain or make use of something” (Merriam-Webster online) while the Oxford online dictionary defines access as “…the right or opportunity to use or benefit from something”. Common to the two definitions is the word “use”, which connotes that access results in some form of value or benefit to the party who has it. Hence, Ribot and Peluso (2003) define access as “…the ability to derive benefits from things.” As noted by Ribot and Peluso, access is closely related to property which, according to the two dictionaries, relates to ownership of something legal or some form of bestowed right or “…enforceable claim to some use or benefit of something” (Macpherson 1978:3). According to MacPherson, the benefits are derived from “enforceable rights” held by a legal person (that is, natural individuals or artificial persons) on a given object. He dismisses the concept of “things” as loose language. Agrawal (1996:3) lends support to MacPherson’s perception of property when noting it is “…the right and the capacity to use, dispose, exclude or another action seen fit by the holder. The enforceable claims give rise to access as a bundle of rights.”

According to Ribot and Peluso (2003), benefits are derived from “things”, which they say “…include material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols”. MacPherson argues that it is the “rights” enshrined in the “things” that give rise to benefits. Ribot and Peluso extend the notion of rights to include benefits arising from “powers” held by the actors. Powers are enshrined in law, custom or through norms, as well as “…a wide range of social relationships that can constrain or enable people to benefit from resources” (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 154). Berry (1993:15-17) argues that access is a negotiated process through social networks which are shaped by “…social identities and relationships”. Berry (1993:15) notes that the “…ability to mobilize a following” was critical in accessing resources and was a source of power. As a result, scholars such as Berry (1989b) and Ribot and Peluso (2003) view access as “a bundle of powers” which extends benefits accruing from property even to those who do not own it, who can get access through various other social means whether they have property rights or not. For instance, De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford (2001) document various land tenure systems where peasants benefited though they had no property rights. Sikor and Tuong Vi (2005) also show that access to resources could be achieved by both de jure and de facto means. In Zimbabwe, Mutopo (2011) showed that women in Mwenezi district accessed land and markets through de facto means. Recent work by the CFS (2015) highlights responsible investment as one that generates positive externalities for actors, for instance food security, implying benefits that accrue to communities.

Macpherson (1978:8) identifies three classes of property: that is, private, state and communal. In this study the focus is on private and communal property where private represents rights held by contractors (individuals) and communal property represents powers over land held by individuals in a community.
Ownership of “things” in communal property is both individual and communal, which gives credence to the notion of “powers” as a source of benefits in communities. For instance, Berry (1989a:2) alludes to the importance of “…social affiliations and socially constructed identities” in negotiating access to land and productive resources. She also notes that access to land is interwoven with access to productive resources that are labour and capital. Okoth-Ogendo (1989) argues that communal tenure systems go beyond the property rules and involve the allocation of power according to social relationships within a community. Evidently, access to land and productive resources is a negotiated process within the framework of community institutional arrangements. The commercialisation of agriculture through contract farming has meant that communities negotiate with agribusinesses (contractors), who operate within the ambit of property rights, causing daunting challenges in both land use and access to resources. Madagascar provides a case in point for Africa (Burnod, Gingembre, and Andrianirina Ratsialonana 2013) where both de jure and de facto processes of access were at play, with disastrous consequences.

At the centre of access analysis is the distribution of value derived from “things” either accessed by de jure or de facto means. As shown in this definition, Ribot and Peluso argue that this arises from “a bundle of powers”. To gain, control or maintain access, actors dispense benefits – a process that leads to the share of value in resources in question. In contract farming arrangements, contractors and farmers come together in a contract that seeks to distribute value from agricultural produce. This value emanates from the various rights and capacities held by the actors. Viewed from Agrawal (1996)’s topology, FTLRP beneficiaries have, for instance, lower capacity to use land as collateral, while the contractors have the capacity to unlock finance capital, technology and markets, which makes land beneficial to the farmer. This then defines flow of benefits among the actors. According to access theory influencing various “mechanisms” has the potential to increase share of the accrued value. From the foregoing discussion in this study access theory can be understood as:

The ability of farmers to earn income (benefit) from tobacco contract farming (thing): This depends on:

- Factors of production held by the farmer: land, assets like ox-drawn ploughs, cattle, barns, labour, technology, skills and other production resources. To get these, farmers need ownership or finance to pay for the use or acquisition of the factors of production. Further, farmers can get this through their social networks, powers derived from political affiliation or illicit activities, cultural relations and status/identity earned through either age, education, gender and so on. What the farmers possess constitute their portfolio of ‘a bundle of powers’. Access theory then predicts that the level of income (benefit) depends on ‘a bundle of powers’ controlled by the farmer. This could be depicted mathematical as:
Y (income) is influenced by X (‘a bundle of powers’) held by a farmer; where X is represented by all the factors discussed in chapter 9.

2.2.2 Deriving Benefits from “Things”

Access is about “…gaining, controlling, or maintaining benefits from resources” (Ribot and Peluso 2003:164). These could be accessed through property rights (Agrawal 1996) or “…extra-legal mechanisms” (that is to say, through social identity, social relations, coercion and trickery, material wealth and location or stature) (Ribot 2005). This section discusses land and productive resources access mechanisms described by Ribot and Peluso. This extends to those with no land rights and yet they still benefit from that land as producers on the land. An example of “extra-legal” means is found in Mkodzongi’s (2018:205) study in Mhondoro Ngezi where people disregarded “…state-imposed cadastral processes” and extended allocated plots to benefit from land while others informally settled themselves. He even reports sale of A1 land under what Chimhowu and Hulme (2006) called vernacular land markets, all being mechanisms of access. Mechanisms are understood to mean “…means, processes, and relations” (Ribot and Peluso (2003:160). The mechanisms include both legal and extra-legal ones as described by Berry (1989b); Ribot (2005). The key actors in contract farming are the contractors and farmers, who are the focal point in this study. Access to contract farming is determined by “a bundle of powers” held by the contractor or farmers as discussed in the sections below.

2.2.2.1 Controlling Access to Contract Farming Arrangements

Control, often enshrined in powers and authority over resources, mediates access to resources by users and those who intend to derive benefits. Control entails power over other actors. For instance, contractors control the channels to finance capital that is necessary for the provisioning of inputs, herbicides, paying wages and services, as well as the technology required to make the land productive. Further, contractors control access to markets and the value arising from the auctioning system of tobacco. Control of markets enable contractors to determine input and output prices, thus setting in motion an exploitative relationship, based on unequal power balance. Contractors access finance capital from their oligopsony network and suffice is to say that this is through processes of insertion of international capital into developing countries’ agriculture. However, to create value, that is to get tobacco produce, they need access to land and labour controlled by the farmers. Without the finance capital provided by the contractors, farmers could possibly neither benefit from the land nor gainfully enter markets controlled by the oligopsony buyer that owns the same contractors. Therefore, farmers go through two processes to negotiate access to capital, land and labour.

Berry (1993) observed that access to land is a negotiated process, the outcome of which is determined by “a bundle of powers” held by people, for instance, social identity or wealth. According to Shipton and Goheen (1992:307), land is used not only “…to produce the material conditions of survival and
enrichment, but also to gain control over others, and to define personal and social identities”. As shown in Figure 2-1 (dotted arrow), farmers dispense benefits to other parties to establish and maintain control within the community. Land reform, discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, is also one access mechanism that resulted in large numbers of peasant farmers controlling land. In Zimbabwe (Chapter 5), the FTLRP changed the power relations in land access as well as access to all productive resources, often resulting in contested land claims (Moyo 2011a). Heterogeneous groups of farmers in A1 farms gained access through various activities including patronage, passive resistance and initial wealth from rural homes (Mkodzongi 2018). After the FTLRP, control of finance capital remained with the traditional financial institutions, which necessitated new forms of agriculture finance, such as contract farming. Therefore, contractors became the mediators to finance capital access. Farmers’ lack of title deeds weakened land as a means of control and mediation to finance capital, which hypothetically tilted the power balance towards the contractor. However, for smallholders, this did not matter much as they did not have collateral. Yet, as observed by Sikor and Tuong Vi (2005) in Vietnam, access to land became an important mediator in negotiating access to markets. While the FTLRP weakened control over mediation with capital, it strengthened control over other local resources such as labour and non-farm activities.

2.2.2.2 Gaining Access to Contract Farming Arrangements

To access “things”, “a bundle of powers” matters. For instance, to participate in agricultural markets, Sikor and Tuong Vi (2005) observed that access to productive resources (that is, wealth) was important to farmers’ integration in commodity markets. Sachikonye (2016) and Moyo (2011) observed increased uptake of cash-crop production by smallholder farmers after they had accessed land during the FTLRP. Ribot (2005) identified wealth and social relations as some of the extra-legal access mechanisms. As observed by Shipton and Goheen (1992), overlapping land rights and affiliations mean that even those without land can negotiate access and participation in agricultural markets. Thus, for Mwenezi district, Mutopo (2011) showed that women, by negotiating with their husbands, gained access to vegetable plots and subsequent markets in South Africa. All this points to access to land as an entry mechanism to commercial agriculture.

Literature on contract farming also points to social relations as mediating access to contract farming where contractors use local networks (Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). In Malawi, Prowse (2009) provides evidence of a farmer who accessed capital from a relative and another through non-farm activities. The two farmers relied on their control of family labour to grow their tobacco business. As discussed under contract farming studies have found extra-legal mechanisms as contributors to participation in contract farming. For instance, Kruijssen, Keizer, and Giuliani (2009) found that Thai women involved in processing tropical fruits in Thailand were able to purchase valuable equipment that allowed them to enter foreign markets. In Tanzania, Sulle (2017) found that elites used their powers to
access lucrative sugar contracts, including even negotiating favourable contracts. Remittances can also result in “…differential access not just to capital but also to livestock and land” (Shipton and Goheen 1992:310). All this implies that power plays an important part in accessing economic opportunities such as contract farming and can be understood from an access analysis perspective, which tracks access processes to determine how value is determined and distributed.

2.2.2.3 Maintaining Access to Contract Farming Arrangements

Berry (1993) observed that access in communal property is maintained through one’s ability to mobilise a following, status and command over wealth. For instance, land can be accessed through group membership, labour, or purchases or a combination of all of these (Shipton and Goheen 1992). Mobilising a following and maintaining status requires expending resources through gifts and, at times, bribery (see flow of benefits in Figure 2-1). In agriculture, new quality demands in value chains mean that farmers need to spend money on technology and capital investments to maintain a high-quality crop. Though criticised, access can be gained from contractors who provide and enforce the use of modern inputs and extension services that benefit communities (Baumann 2000; Kumar and Kumar 2008). For instance, Eaton and Shepherd (2001) report on technology transfer through training, fieldwork and demonstration plots. In communities, there is the possibility that fieldwork could lead to the transfer of technology through social networks, which could improve the whole community as production improves. Following Ribot and Peluso (2003), technology could also be accessed through social structures in communities as farmers respond to new methods and governance structures of resource use. Singh (2002) criticises agribusiness technology transfer processes and labels it “appropriationism”, implying it is only for the short-term benefit of the agribusiness. He acknowledges that it would lead to short-term benefits with long-term damage to the community’s agricultural potential. This is a view propounded by the food first school of thought (Collins and Lappe 1977). However, long-term contracting relations could enable farmers to invest their lump sum earning in new technologies if they are assured that working capital would be provided by the contractor.

It also means investment in relations to maintain adequate supplies of labour. This could be problematic for community members who do not command wealth and status in a community and hence, might find it difficult to maintain status in contract farming arrangements. Narayanan (2013) refers to this as “involuntary exit”, because those farmers might fail to maintain access due to poor resource endowments. Poor resource endowments might lead to failure to comply with contractor requirements leading to farmer attrition from projects. Also, De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford (2001) have shown that, to maintain property, farmers have had to rent out land. These issues are further discussed in sections below.
2.2.3 Mapping the Nodes of Access in a Contract Farming Arrangement

From the discussion in the preceding section, ownership/control of resources legal or illegal, coupled with social relationships together with ability to expend resources can generate benefits for holders, while non-holders benefit from expended resources. This section maps this relationship. As discussed in the above section, access to contract farming involves a web of negotiations and flow of benefits between those who control resources and users. Figure 2-1 shows the actors (nodes) involved in negotiating, paying and receiving payment in order for farmers to access contract farming arrangements. For instance, contract farmers negotiate with nine actors in order to access resources needed to participate in contract farming. The double continuous arrow (Figure 2-1) linking the actors shows this. The single dotted arrow shows the flow of benefits paid by farmers to gain or maintain access to contract farming arrangements, while the double dotted arrows show the distribution of value generated at the auction floors by national government, contractors, TIMB, service providers and farmers. Each party receives a share proportional to their bundle of powers.

Tobacco farmers negotiate for licenses (grower numbers) with TIMB, the regulator, by paying an annual fee of ten dollars, and these are only granted after negotiations with local leadership, as discussed in Chapter 7. However, poorer farmers might fail to raise the fee and other complementary resources such as equipment and capital required to participate in contract farming (Ribot 2005). Figure 2-1 maps the access mechanisms, distribution of value and flow of benefits as suggested by Ribot (1998). Such access gives rise to production of tobacco either under contract or non-contract farming in Mazowe, issues this study aims to test: for instance, how social relations, means to pay for flow of benefits, and rents affect participation. One such means is wealth to pay for productive resources necessary to be considered by contractors’ service providers (extension officers). As noted by Ribot (1998), access to such resources depends on “…inter-related mechanisms including legal property, social identity, social relations, coercion and information control”. These could be exerted by those actors shown as receivers of benefits by the dotted arrow (see Figure 2.1). For instance, contractor extension officers may favour those who pay gifts, while local authorities may demand bribes to issue land access letters, which are described in Chapter 7. Access analysis allows for a deeper political economic scrutiny of the processes in play, beyond the NIE focus on cost and household, which could obscure both the understanding of benefits and participation in contract farming. Access analysis allowed the study to pay attention to power dynamics at play in the allocation of contracts, identifying who benefits/loses, and how.

Tobacco farmers could access resources through rights enshrined in communal ownership of land and other natural resources. However, for those with no land allocations under either the FTLRP or communal tenure, social relations-based access mechanisms become important. Again, social relations are important in the control of labour which requires spending resources, which could exclude those who are poorly resourced.
2.2.4 A Critique of Access Theory

As per Koch’s (2008) critique, Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) access theory could have benefited immensely, if they had built on earlier works by Sen (1982) and Leach, Mearns, and Scoones (1999). For instance, Sen makes insightful contributions with his entitlement mapping argument. This is important as it shows the origin of ‘power’ which Sen calls, ‘bundle of ownership’, which influences ‘exchange entitlements’ of which the latter is akin to benefits arising from accessing resources described by Ribot and Peluso. Further ‘entitlement set’ could shed light on resources required for farmers’ production needs. It is not surprising that Koch (2008) criticises access theory as weak on its theorising of ‘origins of power’ and the ‘mechanisms of access’. Power could be gained through various channels.
as Mkodzongi (2018) noted regarding Mhondoro Ngezi where the poor resorted to ‘weapons of the weak’ described by Scott (2008). Collective action is also another source of power. Despite these shortcomings access theory is an important analytical tool, where contractual arrangements are in place. It provides a basis for tracking the flow of resources and benefits to users which can easily be extended to community analysis, as the community members respond to this. It provides a clear route to tracking and separating the causes of insertion of contract farming, showing who gains what and why thus establishing a robust cause-effect analysis.

### 2.3 Contract Farming Model

Contract farming could be viewed as a means of access to various economic benefits. For instance, White (2005) found that contract farming was used as a means to access land rights in Upland West Java. Most studies report contract as a means of accessing inputs for agricultural and market integration into commodity markets (Sikor and Tuong Vi 2005) and agrarian transition (White 2005). This allows farmers to participate in commercial agricultural markets in a way that helps build their livelihood capitals. However, the problem arises in understanding the distribution of value, which might not reflect value added at given points in a contract farming arrangement (White 2005). White (2005:232) notes that small farmers, in addition to the exploitative nature of contractors, fall prey to “social-political predators” in their communities, who extract rents from the poor farmers. Figure 2-1 shows the flow of benefits (dotted arrow) where benefits flow to players who are not involved in production; this includes local leadership and elites. This clearly illustrates the potential of contract farming to have community-wide effects; an issue most studies skirt when discussing the benefits of contract farming.

Contract farming is broadly viewed as an institutional arrangement governing the production and/or marketing of agricultural produce between a farmer(s) and contracting firm (Bijman 2008; Minot 1986). Cook, Klein, and Iliopoulos (2008) described how this governance structure came into being, underpinned by various theoretical propositions that supported its existence. In studying contract farming, no evidence was found of a scholar who developed a stand-alone theory on this growing agricultural institutional arrangement; studies have relied on a choice of an array of multidisciplinary concepts, approaches and theories highlighted above depending on the type of contract under study. Contract farming is based on contract law and hence it is regarded as an agreement between two equal consenting parties. However critical political economists have shown that parties are differentiated by the power base and resource holdings which creates an imbalance of power in the negotiations.

Often these contracts are underpinned by the theory of agency which provides for the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. Under the agency theory paradigm contracts could be framed on the basis of property rights discussed above. As discussed under contract design, contracts are generally framed within the incomplete contract paradigm which lends them to re-negotiation and interpretation.
by the courts. In such situations Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘structural and relational mechanisms’ come into play as parties apply their ‘bundles of powers’ to negotiate contracting terms and enforcement. To understand contract farming there is need to first understand or define the nature of the institutional arrangement under consideration, second, the type of contract being studied and third the model being followed. All of which shape the final contract between the farmer and the firm.

2.3.1 The Contract Farming Institutional Arrangement

Following the definition given in Chapter 1, contract farming is viewed as a multiparty institutional arrangement, which provides credit to farmers enabling them to access production resources, services and markets under conditions of imperfect markets and differential power balance. Drawing from access theory, access in such an arrangement is largely based on ‘structural and relational mechanisms’ and the partial contracts paradigm. Such ‘structural mechanisms’ include “…technology, capital, markets, labor, knowledge, authority, identities, and social relations”. Of which contractors own capital, markets and knowledge while farmers own the reminder. As observed by Sen (1981) ownership structure influences outcomes of an exchange. This view embraces and acknowledges the bundle of powers inherent in accessing contract farming arrangements. This is so because, to reach an agreement, parties consult and expend resources within a community for it to be socially binding. It is “socially binding” because it accounts for social relations and captures the norms and cultural values of communities that could derail a contract farming agreement. Hence Prowse (2012:8) observed the need for third parties to “…act as arbiters and referees”. The view captures the inclusiveness of contract farming as a “…business model that offers the benefits of a diversified livelihood, and an efficient connection of smallholders to commercial agricultural value chains, without land dispossession” (Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017:528). Further, the “heterogeneity” of contract farming as “a diversity embracing crops, actors, production relations and institutional links” (Little and Watts 1994:5) justifies a definition that is inclusive of actors and institutions in a community where customary land tenure exists. To balance our understanding of contract farming relations there is a need to understand the conditions, struggles and characteristics of participating farmers and actors within their social and contextual environment and the power relations prevailing (White 2005). For instance, farmers who accessed land under the FTLRP in Zimbabwe accessed contracts through different processes compared to those reported in the mainstream contract farming literature. Wang, wang and Delgado (2014) cite technology, risk, credits and markets as some of the reasons why farmers join contract farming, which tends to affect the type of contract farmers enter into.

2.3.2 Types of Contracts

Bijman (2008:5), citing Mighell and Jones (1963), classifies contract farming arrangements into “…market-specification, production-management and resources providing contracts”. Market specification contracts focus on the uptake of farmers’ produce after harvest and have no effect in
production matters, which dominate production management contracts (Kunkel and Larison 1988; MacDonald et al 2004). The contract specifies the quality and quantity of product to be delivered (Wilson 1986) price, location and timing of product delivery (Key and Runsten 1999; Will 2015). The contracting firm has no say in the production processes of the farmer, who operates independently, and Wilson (1986) sees them as future purchase agreements meant to guarantee the uptake of the farmer’s produce; however, control can always be exercised in the determination of grades and quality.

Resource providing contracts address both production and marketing issues, ranging through the product to be produced, the supply of inputs, farm management, technical know-how, and the marketing of output, and the costs are deducted from the sale price (Mackintosh 1977; Wilson 1986). Resources to be used and, more often, extra crops and non-farm activities undertaken by the farmer are specified in the contract; thus the farmer is reduced to a semi-proletarian (Clapp 1994). Reducing farmers to semi-proletariats diminishes their bargaining power in such contracts. This type of contract is closely linked to production management contracts, which further specify production regimes and husbandry practices, thus exercising intense control over farm operations (Little and Watts 1994; Mackintosh 1977; Wilson 1986). This is the most dominant type of contractual arrangement in Africa, understandably, because it addresses Africa’s major deficiencies in agricultural production such as resources and technology deficiency. Mackintosh (1977) argues that the relocation of production to less developed countries was motivated by international capital’s desire to extract more capital from impoverished farmers with little bargaining power.

Singh (2002) in line with Wilson’s (1986) “continuum” argument suggest that the three types of contract should be: procurement contract specifying sale and purchase conditions; partial contract where the part of the resources provided by the/a contracting firm and the price of produce are set; and a total contract which is basically a resource and production management contract described above. The degree of control on the farmer increases with the amount of resources committed by the firm (Goodhue and Simon 2016; Goodhue 1999).

What is important is to note that these types of contracts provide for responsibilities and obligations which are enforceable at law. However, most contracts in developing countries have been more of relational contracts due to the high cost of enforcing contracts. Also, the reason for contracting, cost and crops involved in contracting determine the model a contract farming arrangement takes.

### 2.3.3 Contract Farming Models

Eaton and Shepherd (2001) identified five models of contract farming (described below). They go further in specifying the contractual arrangement between firm and farmer(s), the product; nature of vertical coordination and their relations, as well as parties to the contract which are dependent on the
crop to be produced (Bijman 2008; Will 2015). The models, which specify different resource and market access conditions, are:

- The centralised model, which is a vertically coordinated model that normally involves a firm/processor and large number of smallholder farmers. Production quotas are normally allocated at the beginning of the farming season. Resource supply and support ranges from minimal (where seeds are provided) to total support, which also determines the degree of control the firm has on the farmer (Will 2015). Eaton and Shepherd (2001) posit that this model is suitable for crops such as tobacco, tree crops, cotton, tea, and sugarcane, among others. Goodhue and Simon (2016) argue that the degree of control in such a model ranges from basic to a restrictive contract defined by resource provision and the control of production processes.

- The nucleus estate model pioneered by CDC is one in which the firm has its own plantations that guarantee supply to its processing plant, but which can also buy from many farmers, as in the centralised model. This model also supplies inputs to farmers and is suitable for tree crops. Jackson and Cheater (1994) describe such a model in sugarcane production in the Triangle and Hippo Valley estates and tea in the Agricultural Rural Development Authority following resettlement programmes around the schemes.

- The multipartite model is a joint venture, which could involve a public entity partnering with a private firm(s) in the provision of services to farmers and the marketing of their produce. Little and Watts (1994) noted that this was the dominant arrangement during the structural adjustment era. It could take the form of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) or joint ventures as described by Eaton and Shepherd (2001:50-52).

- The intermediary model involves the processor, agent and farmer. The agent acts as a middleman between the farmer and contracting firm.

- The informal model, as the name suggests, is a loose arrangement between farmer and firm with few services on offer. The firm makes minimal investments under this model, and often depends on government or other institutions to support farmers. Crops produced under this model require little specialisation.

The study focuses on the centralised model, a model that is practised in Mazowe, the area of study. In a centralised model, contracting firms contract with many smallholders and, in theory, transmit benefits through the provision of capital, knowledge, technology transfer and markets to rural communities for the betterment of resource-constrained rural households’ livelihoods options. Evidently, this is in line with the ‘structural and relational mechanisms’ described by Ribot and Peluso (2003). Tobacco, the contracted crop in Mazowe, requires good husbandry practices and specialised assets for curing, which most peasant farmers’ lack. Again, production by peasants only started on a large scale after the FTLRP
in 2000. Access to land for tobacco production by firms and the lack of resources among peasant farmers could have been the reason for the adoption of this contract farming model. In Zimbabwe, the model was necessitated by the massive transfer of land under the FTLRP to smallholders that choked the traditional supply from LSCFs. In this model, actor constellation and contestation is high, given the differential power bundles held by the actors. Further, farmers contend with various stakeholders (see Figure 2-1) in accessing resources, such as labour from the community, service providers and local authorities, among others (White 2005). The aforesaid provides a strong case for using access analysis, which provides for multiple actor analysis, and further, in dealing with these stakeholder farmers expending benefits before they share in the distribution of value at the marketing stage of their crop.

Tobacco contract farming is unique in that it is led by an international oligopsony buyer, which faces censure from various quarters such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), lack of support from development donor agencies and restrictive laws from various governments, because it is viewed as a public ‘bad’. For instance, tobacco production involves intensive use of natural resources, such as fuelwood and earth for brick-making, which has negative environmental effects and is considered a health hazard. As a result, tobacco farmers are excluded from donor finance programmes. When financing is availed, it is on commercial terms. In developing countries, the situation became critical after the structural adjustment programme took effect. Further, land reform programmes in developing countries, such as Malawi and Zimbabwe, have seen increased uptake of tobacco by poorly resourced peasants, who often rely on industry support. Again, apart from the oligoponsony, there are no other alternative markets for the farmers, unlike in most other food chains. As articulated by Ribot and Peluso (2003) control of resources, such as markets, increases bundles of power; Ribot (1998) showed that those who controlled the charcoal market in Senegal got the biggest share of the shared value.

2.3.4 Designing Contract Farming Arrangements

“Markets rest upon institutions” and one such institution is contract design, which also rests on the development of markets (Greif 2005) creating an egg-chicken paradox. However, access theory proponents argue that contract design depends on differential bundle of powers held by parties to the contract. Hamilton (1995) and Pultrone (2012) provide details of the legal aspects of contract farming, and, as noted by Hamilton, self-interest in line with wealth-maximisation is of paramount importance to people who design contracts. Fehr and Schmidt (2001) have argued that not all contracting circumstances can be explained by self-interest; instead, there is evidence pointing to fairness and reciprocity in contract design. This could arise due to social relations that govern actors’ interaction. Contract farming studies have focused on power relations between the contracting parties and have argued along the self-interest hypothesis. The objective of the firm is to minimize transaction costs and hence to participate in contracts where it would acquire the crop at below market cost (Key and Runsten 1999). This could also lead to farmers lowering their costs if the contractor were to pass on economies
of scale gained from the sourcing of inputs. However, the benefits to farmers could be proportionally lower than that accruing to the agribusiness. For instance, farmers with no alternative access to capital such as FTLRP beneficiaries, have lower bargaining power. Farmers in such situations tend to accept unfavourable contract terms, which lead to farmers working long hours and hence exploitative relations through extraction of surplus labour.

In developing countries particularly, peasant farmers’ contracts are developed by agribusinesses and farmers are offered contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, a situation that creates contractual bias from the onset (Setboonsang 2008). To mitigate this challenge, Setboonsarng (2008) argues that there is a need for a comprehensive legal framework that supports the successful implementation of the contract, a role that the government can play by enacting legal instruments that support both farmers and agribusinesses, a proposition supported by Wu and Roe (2007). Further, they find that, where government enforcement is missing, parties maintain social efficiency through private contracting, a gap that could be filled by contracting parties with the help of community leaders and a proposition of access theory where relational issues matter. However, incomplete contracts seem to dominate most contractual arrangements necessitating effective enforcement and coercive institutions that promote smooth exchange which, Schieffer and Wu (2006) believe, are welfare enhancing. Incomplete contracts could be welfare enhancing given the flexibility inherent in the contract that leaves room for re-negotiation whenever contingencies arise ex-post. The fairness of such negotiations, however, will depend on the power bundles held by the parties.

Pultrone (2012) argues that this document coordinates the implementation of the contract and sets the stage for enforcement mechanism for all obligations stipulated in the contract. Enforcement and dispute resolution details are also part of the contract, which could be litigation, mediation or arbitration and when, where and who can initiate what action. A contractual agreement between farmer and agribusiness is also a reflection of the prevailing market conditions, which will help to define the bargaining power of the parties and the potential to enter into contractual arrangements. Peasant farmers enter the contract arguably because of exclusionary markets, while agribusinesses enter to lower costs that threaten supplies to, and the profitability of their business venture. The market conditions attract different transaction costs that affect the contract, added to this, moral hazard and adverse selection problems might set-in. Such costs include benefits expended by farmers as they negotiate for access with various actors and are rarely analysed by researchers. As noted above, land reforms tend to be disruptive, which could either strengthen or weaken farmers’ position when negotiating with finance capital owners, which affects costs of access.

The power imbalance and exploitative argument has been strongly debated (Grosh 1994; Little and Watts 1994; Melese 2012; Sachikonye 2016) and hence the need for supportive institutions, legal instruments or social structures that support the weaker peasants in entering contractual arrangements.
For such interventions to work there is a need to understand the source of “power imbalance”, which could be differential “power bundles” among actors discussed by Ribot and Peluso (2003). We deliberately use the term “entering” contracts given that, in developing countries, peasant farmers are contract-takers and rarely negotiate, and agribusinesses are shifting production from developed to developing countries partly to escape stringent contracting rules and enforcement by states and an informed farming community. Contracting involves three aspects: distribution of duties, responsibilities and risks; monitoring, grading and pricing of final product; and ex-post enforcement of the agreement. All these are negotiated within the FTLP framework which redefined farmers’ production and marketing relations. Farmers could effectively deal with these issues when acting collectively and drawing from accumulated social capital (trust, social norms and local institutions) (Lyon 2000) and agribusinesses are behaving in a fair and reciprocal manner. For instance, Setboonsarng (2008) and Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) observed the importance of employing locals in managerial positions as part of building successful contract farming arrangements and understanding local political dynamics, which might correct power imbalances between the contracting parties.

2.3.5 Contract Terms, Enforcement and Farmer Participation

When agribusinesses and farmers act in a fair and reciprocal manner there is also the opportunity to have self-enforcing contracts with built-in private benefits and penalties (Gow 2001). This principle, based on social relations, has been widely used in microfinance and is behind the success of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank. The agribusiness could build in incentives that enhance the performance of contractual responsibilities such as increased credit or bonus accruing after-sales. For instance, in South Africa, British American Tobacco (BAT) started a multi-cropping incubator programme for its tobacco farmers (MASDT 2018). While contract farming is meant to be a risk-sharing mechanism, farmers could carry bigger risks due to lack of knowledge and manipulation by firms (Adjognon 2012). As a result, the farmer is likely to be exploited. This has more often been cited by farmers in quality and price determination during the marketing stage. Yet, it is possible that the final price paid to the farmers might be below the ruling world prices. Zhang (2012) suggests that contracting firms can violate contractual terms, given their dominant position, however, he notes the importance of strong legal institutions for the protection of both parties in China. Goodhue and Simon (2016) and Goodhue (1999) argue that effective input and production control could enhance quality, which is beneficial to farmers. Those that are for or against contract farming seem to point to institutions as the overarching issue, for example, power balance alluded to by Little and Watts (1994). Institutional economists will argue that these contestations and problems emanate from weak institutions that need corrective measures to strengthen the bargaining power of smallholders. This study argues that it is inferior ‘bundle of powers’ that result in low bargaining power: if farmers were well endowed with resources, their negotiating power would improve (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Grosh (1994) believes that governments have powers to curtail the exploitative tendencies of the contracting firms through policies and regulations.
Markelova and Mwangi (2010) noted that the agricultural production systems landscape has undergone huge transformation due to the growth of supermarkets that brought new opportunities and constraints. They argue that there is a need for farmer groups that should act collectively to meet these challenges. Yet Birner and Resnick (2010) highlight the need for policies that are pro-smallholder farmers to avoid the exclusion of the poor from interventions meant to benefit communities. Institutions take care of policies that facilitate and solve problems through policies, laws and rules that help with contract enforcement. The collective action proposed by Markelova and Mwangi (2010) also implies the setting up of institutions at the grassroots level where the smallholder farmers are found. This entails the development of farmer organisations and social capital issues recognised by Scoones (2009) as important for rural livelihoods. Korovkin (1992) describes successful farmer organisations in Chile, which helped farmers reap substantial benefits from contractors as well as negotiate favourably in various markets. In a study in Honduras, Imbruce (2008) found that contract farming worked better when farmers had alternative markets, a sign that equal power balances leads to better contracting arrangements. However, Sivaramkrishna and Jyotishi (2008) argue for farmer organisations that strengthen the competitiveness of its members through promoting better farming practices, sourcing inputs competitively and supplying quality produce to buyers to counter power imbalances. All these arguments recognise the importance of collective action in shaping power bundles for individuals based on group action.

In a case study of tea and sugar out grower schemes in Zimbabwe, Sachikonye (1989) observed uneven power balances between the contracting firms and out growers, characterised by unfair terms of contracts, the exploitation of rural labour throughout growers, and limited access to resources. Quality determination and payment forms were said to be too complex for the poor smallholders to comprehend. Added to this were the tight control of production systems for both tea and sugar out growers. Jackson and Cheaters (1994), reviewing the same schemes, concluded that the production and processing of both crops was capital intensive, which could disadvantage the poor growers. However, they find those participants’ livelihoods improved. Tea and sugar are export crops and are very sensitive to world prices that work against small-scale producers. The sugar scheme reduces the farmer’s powers as the land is mortgaged, and the terms tie the small farmer to sugar production. While acknowledging that farmers under contract increased their income, Moyo (2011) remains sceptical about the capitalist arrangement.

### 2.4 Implications of Access Theory/Contract Farming on Community Economic Activities

From the discussion on contract farming and access theory it is clear that there is an interdependence between land and contract farming and hence this provides a basis for the analysis of ‘benefits’ and ‘resources’ flows accruing to the actors. Sen (1981) enriches this proposition as he shows that
‘ownership bundles’ determine ‘exchange entitlements’ each actor gets. For instance, contract farming based biofuel studies have shown a positive link with farmers’ welfare, while White (2005) has shown the link between access to land and contract farming. All this shows that contract farming enhances land productivity and land facilitates contract farming. All this results in cause-effect, where access to land provides for the building of resources which allows for participation in contracts and vice-versa. This in turn reinforces investment in land and other economic activities with the community, all resulting in benefits occurring due to ‘exchange entitlements’ if one borrows Sen’s jargon. As shown in discussions on land reform, capital and other agricultural services are critical for effective use of land, and this is provided through contract farming; hence the complementarity between the two. In chapter 8, the study provides empirical evidence to show the effect of access to resources for the farmers and communities through an analysis of the flow of resources and benefits akin to Sen’s entitlement mapping. The mechanisms of access to resources that is factors that affect access to markets, technology and services embodied in the contract are then discussed in Chapter 9 to explain the results in Chapter 8.

2.5 Relevance of Access Theory to Contract Farming Participation and Outcomes

Analysis of factors affecting participation in, and outcomes from, contract farming are generally based on the property-rights paradigm and class analysis all focusing on the household. Access theory builds on this in the following ways:

- Allows for deeper analysis of community level effects through tracing of various mechanisms of the flow of benefits, seeing who pays and receives
- Provides for clarity on how complementary resources are accessed, looking at the power play as people negotiate, again allowing for tracking of the financial or social flow of benefits or expenses
- Allows for the tracking of livelihoods changes as community members exchange benefits in order to benefit from things
- Recognises the presence of multiple actors and the objective of analysis which, in this case, is the distribution of value from contract farming

Wang, Wang and Delgaldo (2014:1259) makes a strong case for establishing a causal effect in contract farming studies, when noting that, “…it is vital for researchers and policymakers interested in exploring the welfare impacts of CF to understand which factors are associated with farmers’ willingness to contract”. This study applies this approach to analyse the distribution of value within commodity production. Access analysis is applied in this contract farming arrangement to understand how value is generated and distributed, the social and political processes peasants go through in negotiating access
to these resources so that they can partake in market-based agricultural production (Berry 1993). In Zimbabwe, access to, and the use of, land under the FTLRP had its own unique dynamics including localised institutional control of resources (Moyo 2011; Murisa 2014; Mkodzongi 2013). Hence, access theory is important in unpacking the processes involved and how they affect participation and contracting outcomes.

### 2.6 Conclusion

A synopsis of the three approaches that dominate the study of contract farming, namely, NIE, value chain, and political economy was provided. In this study, access theory is the chosen lens through which contract farming is analysed, mainly because it allows for the analysis of the bundle of powers behind contracting decisions, that is, the resource allocation decisions and choices deriving from ownership, control and the use of assets held by the parties. The chapter illustrated the distribution of value as farmers transfer benefits to those who control labour and other resources. This allows farmers to access and maintain their stay in contract farming arrangements. The transfer of the benefits among actors benefits the community via the income effect route.

This chapter defined the concept of contract farming, noting the importance of situating it within the realm of community social relations and the FTLRP. Five models of contract farming were discussed, and the centralised model was singled out for this study, since it provides resources for the farmers, which were identified as the major constraint in Chapter 1. The chapter then discussed contracting terms and how they affect the participation and performance of farmers under contract, the decision-making by farmers and how all of this is influenced by the resource endowments of the farmers. Redistributive land reforms, like the FTLRP, affect bundles of powers held by farmers which affect their bargaining power, participation and outcomes in contract farming. It was shown that, through access theory, by analysing and tracking how actors expend resources and use the value shared, the study could understand how community level effects are generated in contract farming. In the next chapter, land reform is discussed, and it is argued that it is an important process for smallholder farmers to participate in contract farming activities since it allows farmers to access agricultural resource endowments and build assets.
Chapter 3

Land Reform in the Global South

3.0 Introduction

Land concentration, poverty, social injustice, deteriorating rural livelihoods, agricultural inefficiency and lack of development are key issues that are often cited as reasons for land reform in developing countries (Byres 2004; Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; UNECA 2004; Moyo 2008). Borras Jr (2005:119) argues that land reform is “…redistribution of wealth and power from the landed elite to the landless poor peasants” and Lipton (1993:644) defined it as “…land transfers to the poor that shift rural income, or power, toward poorer…rural groups”. It is agreed that land reform involves the transfer of power inherent in land ownership/use from the landed elites to the landless to address equity discrepancies, agricultural productivity concerns, increasing poverty and population; what is contested is the mechanism of transfer and what constitutes land reform and the accompanying processes. This definition suggests that land reform is a rural phenomenon, however scholarship from South Africa has shown that it is an urban inasmuch as it is a rural (Walker, 2005; 2007; Hendricks, Ntsebeza and Helliker, 2005) though they fall short of providing an inclusive working definition of land reform.

As discussed in Chapter 2, transfer of land to smallholder farmers increases their “bundle of powers”, which helps them negotiate their livelihoods. Neoliberals dominating land policy in various developing countries favour a market-oriented approach (Deininger 2003; Deininger 1999; Deininger andBinswanger 1999). Those of socialist orientation oppose market-based reform on the basis of its inadequacy in addressing the land-labour “relational” issues (Byres 2004). They argue for expropriation of the land because it allows for restructuring the distribution of land and redress of the source of land question (Borras Jr 2005; Moyo 2008). The institutional school of thought prefers to focus on institutional deficiencies in an attempt to aid the transfer of rights. These contestations further manifest in proposed post-reform agriculture production relations, where neoliberals and institutional economists favour market-oriented value chain approaches such as contract farming. Political economist argue that such production relations are littered with power imbalances and propose government supported agriculture anchored on local (Bernstein and Oya 2014). Whatever approach, land reform is by nature a disruptive process, which affects the way people access and use resources and markets in a positive or negative manner.

Chang (2012:487) contends that successful land reform processes should be “…combined with complementary measures to increase agricultural productivity” that will lead to better welfare outcomes for the poor. Walker (2005) argues for a “Re-orienting the debate on land reform to engage with a larger
context and set of concerns …” for successful land reforms. These complementary measures include access to institutions that support land administration, and which service the poor through the provision of agricultural services such as infrastructure, inputs, knowledge, and markets for their products, which could be provided through contract farming arrangements. Further, human capital and political interventions that promote social capital and collective action by smallholder farmers are important for their empowerment and protection of land rights, as well as for negotiating entry into contract farming arrangements. Further consideration should be on the “need and focus” for reforms given demographic structural changes, resource constraints and demands of the overall economy (Walker 2005). The aforementioned is important given the primary objective of poverty reduction and equity, which needs to be complimented by increased agricultural production.

So who are the peasants? Edelman (2013) has shown that the term ‘peasant’ has various meanings to it, stretching to relations with land, livelihoods and political orientation. In this study peasants are smallholder farmers who produce for subsistence and markets using either family labour and or hired labour. Narotzky (2016) and Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010) argue that this relationship with the land is for earning a livelihood from farming or otherwise, but, more often, peasants are oppressed by the well-off capitalists who extract capital from their labour through coercive means, legal or otherwise. Masst (1994) emphasises that peasants are both a consumption and production unit and earn most of their income from agriculture, though they can earn income from other activities. Therefore, peasants are in a struggle with forces that suppress them as manifested by the proliferation of peasant movements such as Via Campesina, which has a presence in 79 countries in what is said to be a class struggle for power and control of resources (Bernstein and Oya 2014). The peasant struggle is therefore for the control of ‘access’ as described by Ribot and Peluso (2003); to benefit from land-based resources. This chapter reviews literature on land reform objectives and processes, tenure systems and institutions that support land reform beneficiaries showing that, these affect the integration of smallholders in agricultural markets.

3.1 History of Land Reform: a global perspective

Land reform peaked after the Second World War due to declining food production, poverty and simmering tensions among a growing population of landless and peasant-worker coalitions against the landed elite forcing government interventions in most parts of the developing world (Carter 1972; De Janvry and Ground 1978; Moyo 2004). The situation worsened after the 2007/8 food crisis (Borras Jr 2009; Zoomers 2010). De Janvry and Ground (1978:108) aptly summed-up reasons for reforms when writing that the agrarian crisis was caused by “…sharply uneven development among farms, crops, and regions and in massive rural poverty and political tensions”. Therefore, land reform has been, and will be, a question of power relations, control and ownership of resources and a struggle for land between the landed elite and the poor peasants (Berry 1993; Moyo 2004).
Land ownership rested with a few, for instance 10% landlords owned 90% of the land in Latin America (Carter 1972), and colonial settlers owned most of the fertile land in Southern Africa (Moyo 2004). Pre-land reform, elites such as latifundistas (5 per cent of all landowners) in Latin America controlled 80 per cent of the land. In China “…3.8 per cent of rural households…owned 30 per cent of the Land” (Griffin, Khan et al. 2002:310), and in Zimbabwe, about 6 000 farmers controlled about 42 per cent of the land mainly in the most productive regions of the country (Palmer 1990). Land inequalities all seem to originate from an act of war or the domination by one group over the other. In Latin America, Carter (1972) reports that large amounts of land (mercedes) granted to soldiers and encomiendas defined the future of large private farms that were to form and ultimately define the land struggles, power relations and tenure systems to this day. Most land dispossessions followed violent expropriation and alienation of land from the indigenous people by colonial powers, who quickly established exploitative land tenure systems meant to extract surplus from the indigenous people’s labour, for instance, in Zimbabwe (Palmer and Parsons 1977; Tshuma 1995; Mnangagwa 2017 May).

Land reform has since taken a political and economic dimension: politically, to change the class structure in the ownership of means of production and redefine power relations, and, economically, to address productivity concerns in agriculture (De Janvry and Ground 1978). To date, reforms have taken different shapes and forms across the developing world. For example, successful foreign initiated reforms in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, a radical 1959 revolutionary reform process in Cuba, and Latin America’s struggle with reforms aimed at transitioning to egalitarian capitalist agriculture (Carter 1972; Kay 2002). Zimbabwe engaged in an unprecedented most disruptive FTLRP ever witnessed since the end of the Cold War with widespread economic consequences for beneficiaries and the population in general (Moyo and Chambati 2013).

In Africa, reforms were generally influenced by the nature of colonial rule where, for instance, in southern Africa, the land question emanates from the history of dispossession by colonial masters, and the rest of Africa has a tenure problem (Mafeje 2003). As a result, reforms have taken different pathways with different outcomes: for instance, a revolution such as in Cuba changed dominant social relations while De Janvry (1981:484-85) believes reforms are only an institutional intervention that changes “economic and or political contradictions”, such as reforms in Latin America, Asia and Africa where the underlying economic models were not changed. Therefore, most reforms discussed here are institutional interventions instigated by the state, peasants and/or workers.

After the Second World War, the polarised political environment, namely, the socialist/communist versus capitalist ideology, was to define the direction of land reforms in developing countries. In Latin America, for instance, the Cuban revolution gave impetus to Latin American land reforms of the 1960s more often with the support of capitalist states such as America (Carter 1972; De Janvry 1981; Kay 2002). America was also to play an important role in the Asian land reforms, particularly of Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan, where individualised plots were established and backed by strong government support in terms of land acquisitions and agricultural support (Kay 2002).

Ideological differences explain the different land reforms and outcomes that emerged, for instance, collective farms in Cuba, the Soviet Union and China, and market-based land reforms in Latin America and Asia. Africa was caught in-between this ideological rock and a hard place, and reforms were based on Eurocentric approaches with strong influence of the developmental state phenomena trending at the time, a situation Mafeje (2003) believes compromised the success of land reforms in Africa. Mafeje reckons reforms should have been made within the parameters of the African context, culture and norms.

China has transformed its agriculture from collectivism to current individualised tenure system since the 1950s, focusing more on land use rights (Chen and Davis 1998). The reforms first established family farms, which were then abandoned in the mid-50s in favour of collectivist farms known as the People’s Commune, which were a failure. Then, in the 1970s, reforms reverted to family farms called the House Responsibility System (Chen and Davis 1998). This is a contract-based system that allows active farmers to till the land for a given period, issues Chen and Davis think have resulted in tenure security problems, distorted rural labour markets and uncertainty as the contract approaches its end-date. Despite the successes reported in Chinese agriculture, simmering equity and efficiency concerns continue to form the basis of further land reforms (Chen and Davis 1998). Chen and Davis (1998) believe land reform needs to be integrated in the whole rural economy and its rural industrialisation trajectories.

In Latin America, land reform has remained an unfinished business, and current efforts by the World Bank to sponsor the market-assisted approach have not led to the intended successes. More importantly, the region has witnessed the emergence of powerful peasant landless movements, for instance, Via Campesina in Brazil, which has redefined and radicalised peasants and the land reform agenda (Edelman 2013; Narotzky 2016). Africa’s land pressure continues to be pushed by increases in population, hunger and low agricultural productivity and, in southern Africa radicalism is also on the increase mainly targeted at the white minority landed elite, who still control the bulk of the fertile land (Moyo, 2004). Zimbabwe is the exception having gone through the FTLRP without the support of donors, with dire consequences on agricultural production, which it now tries to correct through contract farming in partnerships with the private sector (Mnangagwa 2017). Africa is the only region where food production and poverty indicators still lag behind the rest of the developing world, creating food security concerns, which food first activists believe can be solved through wealth redistribution and the land, in particular. However, there are concerns that contract farming could result in increased food insecurity, unfair distribution of resources and a differentiated community (Clapp 1994; Glover 1994; Kirsten and Sartorius 2002; Rehber 2000),
Land grab by international capital for the production of industrial crops, such as jatropha, is emerging as a new phenomenon in the land question in most developing countries (Hall 2011; Zoomers 2010; Vander Stichele 2015). This could result in a new form of land dispossession or changing of tenure systems (particularly land use) to the detriment of food production in most developing countries. International capital, through contract farming arrangements and with explicit support by governments, is spearheading the commercialisation of agriculture and determining cropping patterns of rural households in most developing countries, impacting on their livelihoods strategies and coping mechanisms. Notably, this would affect the evolution of agricultural transformation, institutions, and livelihoods in rural communities (Moyo 2004; Platteau 1996) as shown by the unfolding customary tenure transformation in both Zambia (Chitonge et al. 2017) and in Malawi (Chirwa 2008).

3.2 The Case for/against Land and Agrarian Reform

3.2.1 Viability/Inverse Relationship Argument

Redistributive land reform is generally desirable on the basis that small farms that are owner-farmed are more productive than LSCFs (Lipton 1993; Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002; Berry and Cline 1979); however, the foundations of this notion are empirically and theoretically disputed (Byres 2004; Dyer 2004). This argument is based on the inverse relationship between its basis on labour productivity and management of family labour. Proponents of the inverse relationship argue that owner-managed farms have low transaction costs (in the use and supervision of labour) and a high rate of effort exerted by the owner, which results in high productivity per hectare (Byres 2004; Lipton 1993) and intense application of inputs (Cornia 1985). The inverse argument is also the basis of that put forth by agroecologists who further argue that smallholders are also sustainable and bio-sensitive farmers that are protective of the environment (Altieri 2009; Rosset 1999). Further, polyculture practised by smallholder farmers tends to increase overall farmer profitability per hectare. The polyculture argument is further supported by Carter (1984) in a study in India, where he tried to explain the source of the inverse relationship for the poor. Agroecologists criticise LSCFs for their heavy use of industrial chemicals, monoculture and their obsession with profit, which has resulted in skewed crop production towards industrial crops such as sugarcane. This, they argue, perpetuates food security problems in developing countries and, given that the highest portion of the poor’s income is spent on food, poverty tends to increase with food insecurity and shortage.

The inverse relationship argument rests on the existence of a dual labour market in less developed countries, application and supervision of family labour and thus, it could be plausible to explore how this increases farm productivity. According to Lipton (1993:645), “…because small family farmers avoid most transactions costs in labor markets (search, screening, supervision), it pays them to use more labor per hectare, and thus to produce more gross output per hectare year.” Feder (1985:298) further
claims that family supervised hired labour is more productive and working capital flows for farming households are “positively related to the amount of land …” owned. The inverse relationship argument is strongly anchored in new institutional and transaction cost economics where, given the imperfect rural labour markets smallholding are thought to have comparative advantage. Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz (2002) noted that small size farms have a higher total factor productivity than large farms. In most rural areas, population increases create labour surpluses which could be used productively in accumulating capital if land was availed to rural household in line with Lewis’s (1954) capital accumulation model, suggesting that land reform has the potential to generate broad community effects.

Land reform is designed with household numbers in mind and farm sizes matched with the optimal family size that can farm it. Consequently, inverse relationships can hold to a certain level and then start diminishing when the viable farm size is exceeded. Land reform in countries with surplus economically active labour will lead to labour increasing its marginal productivity as land holdings increase and labour is fully employed. The assumption is also that the beneficiaries will be well resourced with modern inputs, technology and support to facilitate their working of the land.

The inverse relationship argument for land reform has been strongly criticised by political economists, such as Dyer (2004); Sender and Johnston (2004) and Byres (2004). Byres has argued that this phenomenon is applicable to pre-capitalist economies, while others posit that the concept is fallible when one considers technological adoption and developments, Sender and Johnston (2004) point to methodological flaws and lack of empirical evidence, particularly for Africa. While the theoretical foundation of the inverse relation is appealing, a general view of the problems bedevilling developing countries’ agriculture brings it into question. For instance, thin markets, infrastructure, human capital and information asymmetry are said to affect smallholder productivity (Place and Hazell 1993). Trends in a globalised world, where international capital is now making inroads into agriculture, demands that the inverse relationship be looked at from another angle. For instance, agribusinesses are increasingly involved in financing smallholder agriculture through contract farmers, who, in most cases, are land reform beneficiaries. While this might increase total factor productivity and labour in particular, it could lead to the exploitation of labour as the capitalists accumulate most of the surplus leaving smallholders with subsistence income, a criticism advanced against contract farming. Further, Berry (1993) has shown the declining levels of labour and a shift towards the use of wage labour in Africa. Contract farming, for instance, will worsen this situation given that most cash crops are labour intensive. Ultimately, solving this will require complementary resource endowments.

The other challenge with the inverse relationship argument is that it does not emphasise the contextual issues that could have given rise to the demand for reform in the first place. In Africa, Sender and Johnston (2004) found no evidence or theoretical basis for inverse relationship in land reform outcome. This could be a reflection of the level of development of capitalist agriculture in Africa which has
always favoured the landed elite with access to agricultural markets (Byres 2004). Recent evidence shows that household asset endowments are important in market-based agriculture (Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton 2006; Boughton et al. 2007), showing the complementarity of assets to labour productivity. In Mazowe, Zikhali (2010) showed that FTLRP beneficiaries increased productivity through intensive use of modern inputs and hired labour. With such differences of opinion, it is critical to consider the socio-economic, political and environmental objectives of a government in deciding on the need for a land reform. Efficiency alone could be an inadequate argument, particularly in highly marginalised and differentiated poor communities, where the poor have no access to any means of production except their labour.

3.2.2 Equity, Economic Growth, Development and Poverty Reduction

Income and land inequality are not good for poverty alleviation and economic growth (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and van den Brink 2009; Alesina and Perotti 1996). Inequality affects poverty and growth in various channels, such as the expenditure, savings and even fiscal policy outcomes, which affect the provision of public goods. For instance, the poor have little accumulated capital and hence, are not able to participate in the economic activities of their communities or country, and yet, those holding vast amounts of accumulative capital rarely use it for public good (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and van den Brink 2009). As shown by Moyo (2004), inequality in land causes social upheaval, which, in itself, is not good for growth and development. Inequality in land also affects the choice of crops, asset holdings and livelihoods of those working and living on it. This is so because land provides a platform for their (non)agricultural activities, that is, “…arable production, fodder for livestock, and an array of biotic and abiotic resources” (Shackleton, Shackleton, and Cousins 2000:1), allowing inhabitants to earn a living. Understandably, social differentiation emanating from land inequality has been reported as the cause of conflict and struggles over land in various countries of the developing world, which is understandable, given that most people in the developing countries depend on farming for their livelihood.

Land reform is therefore a political institutional process aimed at correcting this social injustice, which also has strong economic support. Development literature argues that if the economically active poor gain access to productive assets then they are equally or even more productive and this would take them out of poverty. Further resources are likely to be optimally used. The inverse relationship argument and equity in land holdings proves that small family farms could be productively put to use. According to Nnadozie (2003:71), “…putting idle resources to work, allocative efficiency, and comparative advantage” will lead to economic growth. Most large farms are rarely operated to the maximum and egalitarian reforms will put this idle land to productive use, thus adding to the national output. Optimising resource use should, therefore, lead to prosperity at the individual and national levels, as output increases and other factors of production are brought into economic use. The Asia land reform
successes (South Korea and Taiwan) taught us that surplus from agriculture was important in financing industrialisation.

Levine (1999) showed that finance is an important component of growth and, hence, a nation that enhances savings can invest in capital goods that support industrial process, as happened in Asia. In South Korea and Taiwan, savings increased among the peasant farms, thus generating a surplus to support industrialisation. In Japan, former landlords used their entrepreneurial skills to invest income from land sales in establishing financial institutions that supported industrialisation and, hence, economic growth. This shows that equitable redistribution creates avenues that promote economic growth. Increases in output for the poor also means substantial savings on welfare expenditure and foreign currency used to import food. This foreign currency can be diverted to importation of either agricultural equipment or industrial goods that further increase output and, hence, economic growth.

Lipton (2009:2) observed that increasing the land holding of the poor can raise their income through, “…farm labour, land, and enterprise; via non-farm activity, and through economy-wide effects on growth and distribution.” Further resource endowments, such as land, have been associated with market participation by farmers (Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton 2006; Boughton et al. 2007). Where inequality is high the elites grab the economic opportunities that arise, thus exacerbating social differentiation (Sulle 2017). Yet, drawing from the inverse relationship discussion, land reform will lead to vibrant rural markets which increase rural incomes, for instance, increased demand for labour and local produce, as local incomes increase (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and van den Brink 2009). In Zimbabwe, Scoones et al. (2011), Scoones et al. (2018) and Moyo (2011) posit that the FTLRP transformed the rural landscape, and farmers improved their livelihoods through participation in markets. Increasing rural incomes also leads to an increased demand for manufactured goods within rural communities. This effectively leads to the stimulation of first backward and then forward industries that support agriculture, and commercial industries that supply manufactured goods demanded by the local communities.

Political economists (De Janvry 1981; Moyo 2004) posit that such inequality in rural areas has its origins in land alienations and dispossession, which need to be corrected through land reform processes. Changing the social relations of production in the countryside is believed to be important for the productive use of the land and other natural resources that come with it. This requires concerted efforts from the government to stimulate “…a variety of economic, political and institutional mechanisms” necessary for development and productive use, as happened in South Korea and Taiwan (Kay 2002: 1092). To establish equity, the land reform would need access to other forms of “accumulated capital” (Alesina and Perotti 1996), such as finance and technology, to successfully farm the land. One of the other outcomes of inequality is conflict (Moyo 2004), which tends to create instability even for the
landed elite. Therefore, land reform is important as political processes that correct such social relations and redefine power relations and assets within communities.

However, there is a need for a lasting solution for intergenerational transfers of land to avoid recurring conflict. For instance, in Zimbabwe by 1977, the communal lands exceeded their land-carrying capacity by two-and-a-half times, with 675 000 households and over two million people living and earning their livelihoods from this marginalised land (Riddell 1980). Herbst (1991) reports that forty thousand families were being added to communal areas thus, making the government’s objective of settling 162 000 a drop in the ocean that would not fully address the land question permanently as rural households exponentially increase. After the FTLRP, fewer than 127 192 families were settled (Utete 2003), yet population is expected to double by 2025. This would also compromise national stability as surely happened in 2000 when the land question became radicalised and a process of violent repossession followed. However, if the demographic trends continue, as reported by Herbst (1991), the question is whether the latest reforms will solve the land question for good. Walker (2005) suggests that all alternatives be explored to assess the needs of the changing population, which for instance might demand land for housing and jobs.

3.3 Types of land Reforms

Types of land reform vary in different jurisdictions; for instance, in South Africa there is restitution, redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe, tenurial reforms in most African countries (Mafeje 2003) and farm consolidation (Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2010). In this section, I focus on redistributive and tenure reforms, which are the dominant types of land reform.

3.3.1 Redistributive Land Reform

Redistributive land reform is viewed as “…public programs that seek to restructure equitably and rationally a defective land-tenure system by compulsory, drastic, and rapid means.” Borras Jr (2005), citing Tai, 1974:11–12). Borras Jr (2005) emphasises the scale of compensation (from zero to full market or more) paid to the landlords by the peasant/government as the critical defining variables in the definition of a redistributive reform. The closer the amount is to full payment, the less it becomes a redistributive reform. The latter scenario would not lead to a change in power relations and control but only social relations of production at farm level, which would still favour the landed elite. As noted by De Janvry and Ground (1978), land concentration and land reform border on the control of peasant labour, hence, changes to the social relations of production that are not met with changes in the directional flow of power could easily lead to the reversal of the reform process. While arguing for redistributive land reform in South Africa to correct apartheid induced-inequality, Kepe and Cousins (2002) note that there is a tendency for elites to capture the benefits of reforms if there is no decisive
shift in power relations towards the peasants. For instance, Borras Jr (2005) cites the Philippine case as an example of a failed reform because full payment has a tendency for the landed elite to regroup through their financial power to reverse the gains of the reform.

Dai and Tai (1974) view of a land reform also connotes strong elements of radicalism as happened in Zimbabwe’s FTLRP recently, the Cuban revolution and other peasant-led violent land uprising. The justification for such action normally rests with the view that land dispossession was violent and with no compensation in the first place. However, the equity and efficiency objectives of a land reform are important issues in determining the course and approach to land reform. No doubt, a radical reform can lead to an equitable redistribution of land, but land on its own cannot lead to improved productivity and poverty reduction in rural communities, neither can full compensation market-based reforms achieve the same without a supporting environment (Walker 2007).

A successful land reform is viewed as one that would lower social differentiation, both in terms of land and wealth gini coefficient (Borras Jr 2005). Following Cousins and Scoones (2010), one option is to apply the viable farm concept, thus going beyond the narrow efficiency and equity proposition of the market-based approach to include socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions of land reform. This will ensure that post-land reform benefits include “…qualitative gains, such as an enhanced sense of justice, self-esteem, security, dignity, and self-respect” (Chitonge and Ntsebeza 2012:88), which captures the contextual and value systems of reform beneficiaries. Walker (2005) proposes a land reform driven by capacity. Borras and McKinley (2006) noted that the failure of state- and market-based reforms to deliver on the objectives of land reform were due mainly to the limited scope of the policy prescriptions. They recommended an alternative inclusive redistributive approach based on four pillars, which, they believe, will lead to successful land reforms. The principles are based on participatory and bottom-up approaches which, when successfully applied, could cater for peasants needs. These pillars are: formation and participation of peasants’ organisations in planning land reform processes; alliance-building by peasant organisations with actors sympathetic and supportive of land reforms to increase political muscle; increased government support and infrastructure development that support reform beneficiaries; and a pro-poor macroeconomic environment. An inclusive approach advanced by Borras (2015) could lead to positive institutional development in peasant societies capable of influencing and mobilising resources for post-land reform environment. Further, beneficiaries input in such policy issues as land ceilings and tenure systems could be solicited and used to develop policies favourable to all. Should this be applied, then it would result in the government governing with the people and for the benefit of the people.

3.3.2 Land Tenure Reforms

Maxwell and Wiebe (1998: 4) define land tenure as “…social relations and institutions governing access to and ownership of land and natural resources”, which are enshrined in the country’s statutory and
customary laws. Land use rights are broadly referred to as property rights, which define the purposes that land can be used for and the power held by person(s) owning the land (Feder and Feeny 1991). A land tenure system has two components: the laws (written statutes) or community laws (norms, practices) governing the use and transfer of land; and institutions enforcing and managing the various land rights allocated to various parties, for instance, land registration and titling, and adjudication. In communal areas, land tenure rights are negotiated between users and those in control (Berry 1997). It is from these two components that the Property Rights School (Coase 1960; Demsetz 1968) and the Customary School emerged, with the former viewing the latter as inferior and retrogressive insofar as development and economic growth is concerned, leading to De Soto (2000) to declare property in customary tenure “dead capital”.

Moyo (2004) citing Lastarria-Cornhiel (2002) argues that forms of land tenure are ‘interwoven’ in socio-economic structures and context of communities. Social relations and institutions are themselves derived from power relations, levels of agricultural development, technological change, and markets prevailing within society, and exhibit tendencies by the elites (state and the landed) to exercise control and retain power at the expense of the peasantry and working poor (Feder and Feeny 1991; Moyo 2004). Consequently, contestations and power struggles tend to dominate land tenure reforms. For instance, the development of peasant movements had a considerable influence on land tenure systems in Brazil, while the settler colonial system defined the tenure system in southern Africa (UNECA 2004), and the radical FTLRP has drastically changed the land tenure system in Zimbabwe. Capital, through contract farming, is also redefining land use access patterns as it seeks to make use of the most fertile land (Eaton and Shepherd 2001). It is evident, therefore, that as power dynamics change, land tenure regimes respond accordingly within the political and ideological framework pursued by the contesting actors and influenced by globalisation dynamics in line with what Platteau (1996) labelled Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights.

Land tenure in developing countries was greatly affected or influenced by the colonial land policies which generally remodelled even the customary land laws in settler colonies, resulting in a dualistic land tenure system (UNECA 2004; Moyo 2004). After the Second World War, land tenure was shaped by the ideological battles of the socialist and capitalist groups leading to collectivist systems in China, the Soviet Union and Cuba, while the United States promoted individualised tenure systems in countries such as Japan, South Korea and Thailand. In Africa, state domination and control of agriculture resulted in a mixed-tenure system comprising the “corrupted” customary land tenure system (Chimhowu and Hulme 2006) and the Western-based market-oriented version. UNECA (2004) noted that various tenure systems coexist in most jurisdictions.

Sjaastad and Cousins (2009:2) identified “…land scarcity, increasing land conflicts, and increasing individualisation that eventually flow from growing populations and agricultural commercialisation” as
the main drivers of the evolution of land tenure in most developing countries (see also Platteau, 1996). The flow of international capital into agriculture transformed production relations in the countryside from subsistence production to market-oriented production, which has resulted in the redefinition of land use patterns and competition for land. De Soto (2000)’s work, Mystery of Capital, also contributed to government initiatives to transform land rights in the countryside with the hope of reaping benefits associated with land titling, such as access to credit, technology and high potential markets. Evidently, the power of international donor organisations, such as the World Bank and other donor countries, have helped in the evolution and transition of land rights in the developing world. These efforts have been contested on the grounds of the inappropriateness and neglect of customary and local-context systems of land use and rights (Mafeje 2003).

Four categories defining property rights, namely, open access, communal property, private property, and state, are clearly articulated and described by Feder and Feeny (1991:137) and also UNECA (2004), and will not be repeated here. Land tenure systems have considerable impact on the agricultural outcomes of a country, and scholars generally believe they have influence on land use, on-farm investment and access to farming resources, such as credit, inputs and extension services (Feder and Feeny 1991). It is from this perspective that the neoliberal approach argues for individualised rights to land, which are viewed as superior when it comes to the allocation of resources, incentivising on-farm investment and the development of agriculture. However, empirical evidence has shown that individualised property rights are not superior insofar as investment, access to credit and agricultural production are concerned (Sjaastad and Cousins 2009).

Exclusive property rights based on colonial land policies and elite capture are the source of land inequality and poverty in developing countries (UNECA 2004; Moyo 2004), which has necessitated land tenure reform. The coexistence of the four categories of property rights impacts the use of land as a development and poverty reduction tool by the poor, who are normally relegated to the less favourable tenure system. The problem has continued even after independence due to the State’s “…overriding interest in access, control and management of rural land” (UNECA 2004:12), large farmer bias (Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002), and the power of the landed elite (Moyo 2004), which has tended to perpetuate dualistic land tenure systems in developing countries.

The neoliberal approach to correcting these anomalies focuses on the land tenure reforms that are based on the market system, which, it is believed, would allocate land use to the efficient user either through outright purchase or an efficient rental market. This approach looks to the government as a facilitator through institutional and regulatory interventions that should lower transaction costs between those involved in these transactions. This is clearly a commercial-based approach which is demand-driven. Following Lipton (2009)’s definition of land reform, this would not accommodate the very poor who live on less than $1.25 per day and find it costly to participate. Hence, such a reform would not
necessarily address equity and efficiency issues in land distribution. Kay (2002) proposed a comprehensive and inclusive approach to land tenure reform that involves all stakeholders in designing reforms that would lead to a successful agrarian transition, poverty reduction and economic growth as happened in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Although they were capitalist in orientation, reforms in these countries were affordable to the beneficiaries and well supported by the government – an aspect that might need to be accommodated in the market-based tenure system.

The allocation efficiency argument of markets has been brought into question by empirical evidence that has shown that land registration and titling do not necessarily lead to increased access to farming resources and increased productivity in smallholder farming (Barrows and Roth 1990; Feder and Feeny 1991; Place and Hazell 1993). Further smallholders at times find no incentives to participate in land registration and titling and, in Kenya, research has shown that some communities reverted to communal systems after previously titling their land (Place and Hazell 1993). While titled and registered land is a form of collateral, the allocation of credit, which is key in supporting agricultural production, is dependent on various factors, such as entrepreneurial abilities, information asymmetry, weather, and risk disposition of the individual. Even strong proponents of the land-market allocation power, Deininger (2003) and Deininger and Binswanger (1999), have alluded to the need to contextualise land tenure systems.

Mafeje (2003) criticises the Eurocentric market-based land tenure reforms for their unsuitability to the African context, which, he argues, is their failure to address Africa’s land tenure problems. Mafeje, like UNECA (2004), also observes the distortions created by colonial land tenure systems, and Cheater (1990:188) notes that, through legislation, colonial distortions of land tenure were enshrined and further “…selectively strengthened after independence” presumably as a power base of the independent states. In fact Nuesiri (2014) has noted the decline and re-emergence of customary authority in land tenure administration, a process that coexists with state institutional arrangements in some African countries such as Malawi (see also Chirwa 2008).

Though corrupted by colonial and international capital (Moyo 2004), customary land tenure systems in Africa exhibit a degree of dynamism and complexity (Chitonge 2015; Chitonge et al. 2017; Migot-Adholla et al. 1991), where both communal ownership and private ownership (though not titled) coexist, with an array of administrative controls (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006; Platteau 1996). For instance, homesteads are privately owned by the household while pastures are communally owned and there is evidence that the private homesteads and agricultural fields were offered in informal land markets (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006). It is this private ownership of homesteads, family assets that De Soto (2000) believed could be registered and titled so that they could be used in market transactions. Chitonge et al. (2017) provide recent evidence of land sales in Zambia’s communal lands of Bunda Bunda and Munguleand and Nkomesha, where the law allows for the conversion of communal land to
leasehold after being held for a period of five years. This is critical for participation in the mainstream neoliberal credit markets if peasants are to access agricultural resources needed to increase productivity and fight poverty. However, the Zambian case reported by Chitonge et al. (2017) does not delve into the effect that land sales have on the access to livelihood-enhancing resources, such as credit, tenure security, markets and viability of remaining landholding. There is the risk that the poor might end up landless and reverting into poverty, thus creating a vicious poverty cycle.

It is important, then, to have statutory regimes that recognise and empower customary institutions that are in harmony with the evolution and dynamism of the African communities and in line with the devolution of power; local leadership could then facilitate the registration of land starting with homesteads in their areas. Findings by Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) and Place and Hazell (1993) and others showing that indigenous (customary tenure) laws that do not constrain agricultural production need to be followed-up with institutional support to these communities to build a capacity to handle new waves of capital investment flowing in from agribusinesses into rural smallholder farmers. For instance, contract farming has been on the rise in recent years and is being promoted by African governments (NEPAD. 2013). This could also be supported by dispute-resolution mechanisms to facilitate the uptake of new technologies and the entry into new markets by smallholders. The Zambian case reported by Chitonge et al. (2017) has such dispute-resolution mechanisms, which could be developed to suit transition to capitalist agrarian systems. However, the power balance emerging in the communities affected would need to be supported by strong evolving institutions. Also, this would facilitate orderly transition into the production of cash crops and changes in land use arising from the commercialisation of agriculture.

3.4 Approaches to Land Reform

The approach to land reform affects institutions, land rights that emerge and the enforcement thereof (Chang 2012). Chang (2012) posits that institutions matter and that the state can provide the necessary context/environment for a successful land reform process that benefits smallholder farmers. Public policy is important in the allocation of resources, including public goods and agricultural resources to smallholders. In any case, all approaches to land reform recognise the central statutory role of the state, however, the participatory approach believes involvement of beneficiaries will lead to sustainable and successful reforms.

Hall (2009) argued for a land reform process that is supported by sound institutions that lead to the attainment of land reform objectives. Land reform is meant to benefit socially differentiated societies with varying capacities and resources at their disposal. For instance, communities may have limited access to finance, farming knowledge, and input and output markets, which compromise their ability to effectively and equitably use land. Further, smallholders lack the experience and know-how to produce
commercial crops that will increase their income. It is the provision of these farming resources that are the basis and source of contestations post-land reforms. Neoliberal approaches assume that markets (both rental and sells) will effectively allocate these resources and, hence, land should be individualistically titled and owned.

3.4.1 State-led Land Reform

Government plays a critical role in pre-and post-land reform process and success. Through public policy, the government engages actors with competing needs, at times being both judge and actor, while advancing its political and economic motives where the prime motive might be to retain power by appealing to the biggest constituent, which is the poor. In short, Barraclough (1999) says it is a political process and Chavunduka and Bromley (2013:670) say it can be “…a productive asset, political instrument, symbol of belonging, and as a safety net for the poor”. Hence land reform is a power game over the control of resources, constituencies and at times the economy and hence, the need to identify the actors and their interests from the onset. The state (loosely used to mean executive, judiciary and the legislator) is the key player through its power to make laws and enforce them. The landed elite derives their power from the control of land and economic power and, at times, their influence over the state and the landless peasants who are poor but, in a democracy, have a strong voting power. Lipton’s (2009) definition of land reform emphasises the legal aspect of the reform, which gives credence to the central role of the state in regularising any land reform programme irrespective of the initiator. The state, landed elites and peasants are the main players; but in a globalised world, international capital through the World Bank, international institutions, civic organisation and agribusinesses have become important players, particularly with their influence on policy formulation processes. This has defined the path governments have followed in executing land reforms.

Barraclough and Morrow (2010) describe various initiators of land reforms in Latin America, for example, social/peasant movements in Mexico, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua China and Vietnam; insurgencies in Peru and El Salvador, authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Taiwan, and democratically elected governments in Puerto Rico, Guatemala, Venezuela and Chile. In all these, reforms were centred on the plight of the peasants, which eventually involved the state in its regulatory role. Pre-reform, the state has a critical role of identifying, reconciling and shaping the direction, financing and institutional arrangements of land reform depending on its treatment of and resolution of power demands of the various constitutions.

However, the key role of the state emerges post-reform if the process is to be sustainable. A sustainable reform should not recede into its pre-reform state but must transfer power to potential beneficiaries and lead to general improvement and welfare of the beneficiaries and future generations. Further, mechanisms and institutions for intergenerational land transfers must be provided for. This demands a well-balanced statutory framework and post-reform services that address infrastructural and agricultural
needs of the beneficiaries. It is, however, these institutional arrangements, and their efficiency and effectiveness of transferring land from the elites to the landless that are contested by the market-assisted approach as they believe the process should be left to the power of the markets to resolve and state should limit its functions to regulation and facilitation of the interest of the parties involved in reforms.

3.4.2 Market Based Land Reform

Neoliberals, basing their argument on the Washington Consensus, have been pushing for market-driven land reform processes in developing countries in order to correct ‘distortions’ that resulted in the creation of large farms (Binswanger and Deininger 1993). They see the state as perpetuating distortions and, hence, its role should be minimised in land reform processes. Instead, the pro-market proponents believe that land reform can be achieved through incentivising large farm holders to sell to landless peasants through negotiated transactions (Byres 2004). This is despite the power imbalance between the parties and the risk that government officials would most likely align with large farmer interest. In South Africa, Binswanger and Deininger (1993:1452) noted the desperate and urgent need for land reform and believed it could be “…accomplished using judicial and market-assisted processes for the transfer and resettlement of land”. Because of their obsession with ‘markets’, neoliberals are concerned with land tenure reforms (discussed above) without addressing fundamental social relations of production (Borras Jr 2005; Moyo 2004).

In Zimbabwe, the Lancaster House agreement enshrined the willing-buyer-willing-seller concept. The willing-buyer-willing-seller concept has its roots in the protection of property rights, a key principle of a capitalist economy. Property rights founded on the neoclassical theory argue that individualised land rights will lead to improved access to farm credit and resources, thus leading to positive agricultural outcomes. Landowners with secure title deeds are perceived to be keen to invest on their plots (Feder and Nishio 1998; Deininger 1999), though there is empirical evidence that discounts this perception (Atwood 1990; Place and Hazell 1993). Security of tenure in certain communities goes beyond titling and registration of land particularly where customary ties and lineage are strong. One is then inclined to think that the level of economic transition towards a capitalist state becomes an important factor.

While acknowledging the role of the state in land reform, the market-based proponents believe that the state should be restricted to creating and promoting the smooth operation of land markets. Otherwise, the state should intervene inasmuch as it reduces transaction costs in the land markets, such as ensuring that land titling and registration is facilitated, and dispute resolution mechanisms are provided through courts. In a neoclassical worldview, markets would efficiently allocate resources pre-and post-land reform and hence those that are capable farmers will demand land, which will lead to efficient production on the farms.
As propounded by Deininger (1999) and Binswanger and Deininger (1993), prior to land reform, the state should set market mechanisms that allow would-be beneficiaries of land reform to access credit. The World Bank has been pushing for a market-assisted land reform in Africa, and already it has been implemented in Brazil, South Africa and Guatemala (Gauster and Ryan Isakson 2007) with very little success. The concept of market-assisted land reform was clearly articulated by Deininger and Binswanger (1999), the prime movers and proponents of the concept, and Gauster and Ryan Isakson (2007) who critiqued the idea. Here key concepts are highlighted to facilitate the discussion.

The core of the market-assisted approach is the elimination of ‘distortions’ inherent in state-led land reform, which would allow the markets both land and credit to operate smoothly, thus facilitating equitable access and acquisition of land and credit. To achieve this there is a need to assist the poor to gain access to these markets and hence, Deininger (1999) proposed inclusive financial institutions that provide finance to groups of farmers.

Empirical evidence has shown that markets did not form or respond as perceived by the proponents of market-assisted land reforms (Gauster and Ryan Isakson 2007). South Africa, one of the countries that adopted the system, is currently debating a move towards land expropriation without compensation. There is ample evidence that shows that peasants respond to incentives that improve their livelihoods (Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002), which then begs the question why the uptake and success of this new institutional innovation has been sluggish. Critics have pointed to the commodification of land as the problem (El-Ghonemy 1999). In developing countries land is a symbol of social relations in communities, which go beyond neoliberal market forces (Mafeje 2003). Borras Jr (2005:94) observed that land has a multidimensional function and hence cannot be understood “…in purely monetary terms; and … requires the intervention of the state to achieve the desired multiple goals of land reform policy”.

He further notes that the huge financial resources required for such programmes are beyond the fiscal means of developing countries and their citizens. Furthermore, it is critical to look at the source of land alienation and the processes of dispossession, which, to this day, inhibit poor indigenous people from participating in such markets. For instance, land reform that benefited former tenants in Latin America could have different outcomes to those that benefited former workers. Deininger (1999) has argued that this is because of differentials in entrepreneurial disposition. This is the situation in settler-induced land dispossession, where most landless people were farm workers or subsistence producers in marginalised lands.

The World Bank more often reports that the poorest people in developing countries live on a dollar a day which makes it incomprehensible how such people can participate and repay loans in a land market (Carter and Mesbah 1993). This may indicate that the target group is the rich rural peasants, which would mean social differentiation is exacerbated. From a neoliberal perspective, the big question is who should benefit from land reform. Clearly what the market-assisted models propound is production for
the market as it emphasises the design of business plans (Deininger 1999), but most of the poor produce primarily for subsistence.

Since the end of World War Two, interventions in land reform by foreign states, such as America in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, were meant to ward off the spread of socialism and, by default, entrench the ethos of capitalism (Kay 2002). From this perspective, neoliberal-oriented land reform should be viewed through an individualistic capital accumulation lens, which implies it would always be designed for those with a profit motive, namely, the well-off in rural areas or economically active poor, who would be able to transit from subsistence to commercial agriculture. This then brings into question the notion of egalitarian land reform as articulated in the market-assisted approach to land reform. For instance, it is a fallacy to believe that the rural poor with limited human capital can cope with “…titling process used, the rights of different parties, the rules of evidence, and the benefits of the appeal” (Deininger and Binswanger 1999:260).

This Eurocentric approach will be difficult for communities anchored on kinship and lineage land rights as articulated by Mafeje (2003). For this to be attained, communities’ social relations of production need to transit to a capitalist level, which is compatible with Deininger and Binswanger (1999)’s prescriptions, with rural institutions geared towards managing such processes. As discussed by Berry (1993) and Ribot and Peluso (2003), access to resources involves negotiation between those who control and users, which is affected by historical, contextual social relations. However, land and credit markets are thin in developing countries (Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002) and institutions have not formed to meet the demands of the new production system arising from the land reform process. It is not surprising that the market-assisted reform has left a trail of indebted beneficiaries and high desertion (Gauster and Ryan Isakson 2007). Again, corruption and power dynamics immediately manifest, which all works to the disadvantage of the poor (Byres 2004). This has resulted in calls for reforms based on, and involving, participants’ needs.

### 3.4.3 Bottom-up and Participatory Reforms

The weaknesses in the state- and market-based reforms have resulted in a call for participatory land reform processes that draw on the needs, context, and skills of the local people. Ng’ombe et al. (2012:1777) observed the benefits of the “…bottom-up approach where every stakeholder is involved in decision making so that they are empowered by way of increasing their level of knowledge, influence, and control over livelihoods and activities.” This comes from the realisation that peasant/community organisations are an important cog in the development of institutions that support pre- and post-land reform in rural areas. Moreover, the need for an integrated rural development approach demands that communities decide on the nature of land reform since it affects multiple land-based livelihoods. There is a belief that a hybrid (devolution of state function plus market) coupled with beneficiary participation

Quan (2005) reports of Farm Africa involvement with Northern Cape farmers, where the non-governmental organisation was involved in facilitating the participatory processes post-land reform. By providing skills and knowledge, the NGO helped farmers improve their human capital, which enabled them to engage with other market players on an equal footing. In Latin America, social movements have taken up the advocacy role rather more forcefully, thus attracting government attention and participation in pre-land reform, as in Brazil, where these movements are involved in land occupations and negotiation of reform modalities (Wolford 2010). Wolford gives a detailed account of how landless movements, such as the Landless Workers Movement (MST) and the Catholic Land Pastoral (CPT), influenced the pattern of land reform and forced National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) to negotiate with them as equals. By including the voice of the beneficiaries in the reform processes, the power balance would tilt towards the poor, and institutions that speak to their needs could form.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed land reform from a global perspective, highlighting the origins and history of the land question where through colonisation and feudal systems land dispossessions were being resisted by the oppressed. The economic and justice aspects of land reform were discussed, and the inverse relationship argument advanced as critical for alleviating poverty, since land reform will lead to an increase in smallholder productivity, though concerns remain due to differential asset endowments. As a result access to complementary resources are seen as important for a successful land reform. The ‘justice’ argument is based on correcting the wrongs of the past, which saw indigenous people being deprived of their land. The chapter then reviewed the key approaches to land reform, namely, market-based, state led and the participatory approach. Financial institutions have been funding market-based reforms, which they believe will correct deficiencies in agriculture thus promoting agricultural development, a case strongly opposed by the justice school which believes expropriation (at its extreme, without compensation) is the right approach. This leads to the various types of reforms proposed by the different schools: redistributive for the ‘justice’ school and more tenurial market-assisted reforms for neoliberals. Tenure systems are important for agricultural production, though the type of tenure and its effect on production and access to resources is contested, secure and stable tenure rights are considered important for agriculture investment and productivity. A good tenure system facilitates both access to land and productive resources. What emerges from this chapter is that land is a contested resource and that access to it comes through negotiations, which are, at times, violent. However, it is also evident from the discussion that complementary resources are needed for a
successful land reform and that these are affected by differential power balance among actors. Elites tended to benefit in land reform processes due to the influence and resources they commanded. In the whole land reform is important as it enables the poor to access and benefit from land for their sustenance and participation in mainstream economy and agricultural market as envisaged by access theory discussed in Chapter 2. Distribution of land among many peasant-households is likely to stimulate rural economies with widespread community effects. However, this chapter showed that depends on balancing land reform objectives and access to capital by beneficiaries. The issue of the Zimbabwean land reform, which will be discussed in the next chapter, exhibits twists and turns in the redistributive and market approach arena and illustrates the land reform and capital nexus.
Chapter 4

Land and Agrarian Relations in Zimbabwe 1890-2000

4.0 Introduction

The legacy of colonialism left permanent footprints in the history and future of Zimbabwe’s land, agrarian structure, livelihoods and the economic wellbeing of its population; footprints which can be traced from the arrival of the Pioneer Column in 1890 to post-independent Zimbabwe’s land reform (Roth and Bruce 1994). Through coercive power and legislative manipulation, Zimbabweans were dispossessed of their land (Moyana 2002; Palmer and Parsons 1977; Riddell 1980; Tshuma 1995), a process some scholars have argued repeated itself during the land repossession process (Chitiyo 2000; Sachikonye 2005). Land dispossession affected asset holdings and the livelihoods of indigenous Zimbabweans, justifying the need for reforms. The need for land reform is a universally agreed principle; what differs are the processes and mechanisms of achieving the reforms. In Zimbabwe, these were clouded by the changing government position after the expiry of the Lancaster House agreement in 1990, as articulated in Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman (2018). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, equity, justice, land shortage and poverty necessitated redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe. The failed willing-buyer-willing-seller process (1980-90) was followed by a violent FTLRP in 2000. Though broadly, Zimbabwe undertook land reform as described in Chapter 3, there are unique nuances detailed in this chapter.

This chapter traces land dispossession and the processes of alienation by settler colonial powers, how it affected indigenous people’s access to resources, resource endowments, livelihoods, and their participation in agricultural activities and non-farm wage-earning employment. It is shown that land reform with complementary resource-provision increased the welfare of resettled farmers, market participation and staple food supply in the country. The historical analysis shows that, over time, peasants were disenfranchised and were not able to build any meaningful asset endowments to sustain agricultural production. However, as noted by Arrigh (1970), increased income was often accompanied by increased discretionary consumption for instance of durable goods like cars, bicycles, motor bikes and furniture.

4.1 Zimbabwe’s Land Question: the Legacy of Colonialism

There is no denying that the colonial land grab and the related legislation that marginalised indigenous people were key in defining the nature of the land question in Zimbabwe today. At the heart of the land question is the deprivation of livelihood strategies for the local indigenous people through violent and coercive means and the forced creation of a labour reserve, which the colonial power could exploit in
the generation and accumulation of capital (Arrighi 1970). Indigenous Zimbabweans depend on the land for their socio-economic and cultural wellbeing, and land has multidimensional purposes (Mufema 1997; Borras Jr 2005). Scholars, such as Rukuni (2000), for example, thus identify socio-political integration together with economic growth as some of the key objectives of land reform, a view shared by the Zimbabwean government during the failed 1997/98 planning process (Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman 2018). Land issues have had a polarising effect on Zimbabwean people both pre- and post-independence, particularly because of the violent nature which accompanied both the dispossession and repossession of land from 1890 to the recent FTLRP (Cliffe et al. 2011; Sachikonye 2005; Chitiyo 2000). Efforts to execute successful land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe, as in other developing countries, have failed partly because of the need for a “…thorough understanding of the complex social and political contradictions, which have ensued from colonial and post-independence land policies” (Moyo 2008: 1).

Post-colonial governments largely followed neoliberal approaches to land reform (Moyo 1995), which have not accounted for the social and cultural dimensions of the indigenous people. The Lancaster House agreement prescribed the willing-buyer-willing-seller approach, which was largely applied until the onset of the FTLRP in 2000. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the FTLRP is a hotly contested process devoid of proper plans that could address fundamental socio-economic needs of the resettled farmers (Palmer 2000). The effect is that land has remained a contentious issue to this day because livelihood issues that gave rise to land reform still trouble peasants currently.

4.2 Land Dispossession: Historical perspective and Lancaster House Compromise 1890-1980

The land question in Zimbabwe arises from colonial land dispossession, discriminatory land reforms and legislated land alienation since 1890 (Moyo 1995), an issue exacerbated by competition among white settlers for labour in mines, industry and agriculture during the whole imperialist rule (Tshuma 1995). This section describes the various activities, legislation and other tactics used by the colonial settlers to marginalise and exploit indigenous people in Zimbabwe, resulting in the destruction of indigenous agriculture, which was flourishing when the white settlers arrived (Cousins 1991). More importantly, it negatively affected indigenous people’s capacity to generate assets necessary for agricultural development and livelihood sustenance.

4.2.1 Land Dispossession and Alienation

History suggests that land dispossession started with the signing of the Rudd Concession in 1890, and what followed was a trail of systematic land dispossession of the indigenous people till independence in 1980. The British South African Company (BSAC), equipped with the Lippert Concession of 1889, started the process of expropriating indigenous land, seizure of indigenous cattle, and, in 1898 through the The Native Order in Council, the formation of native reserves and settler settlements on racial lines.
took effect (Zimbabwe 2000). As shown on Figure 4-1, land distribution never accounted for demographic patterns existing throughout the colonial period. The seizure of assets was accompanied by taxes and levies meant to dispossess indigenous people of their assets through forced sales of cattle and cheap labour in settler mines and agriculture.

Blacks became tenants on their own land and were forced to pay rent in cash or kind wherever they remained on European land. During this time, Europeans were preoccupied with mining, and, when these ventures failed, they turned to farming in great numbers and, by 1930, the numbers had swelled from 1 324 in 1911 to 2 355 in 1921 (Arrighi 1970; Tshuma 1995). This marked the beginning of competition between indigenous farmers and settler farmers in the agricultural markets necessitating the establishment of statutory discriminatory marketing boards and the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, consolidating the racial division of land, which, in 1930, was as shown in Figure 4-1.

When the settler whites arrived in Zimbabwe in 1890, they wanted to pre-occupy themselves with mining of gold. Agriculture was not a priority and land that was allocated and sold to Europeans was held mainly for speculative purposes. Around 1890, when it became apparent that gold was not as abundant as in the South African Rand, white settlers were encouraged to take up agriculture. At this point, African farmers were already profitably farming and trading their agricultural produce at the mines, and hence, they were an immediate threat to the viability and profitability of white farmer agriculture, which had just started (Tshuma 1995). The settlers responded to this competition by imposing taxes and levies and further marginalising blacks through further land dispossession and alienation primarily meant to force them to participate in wage-employment (Arrighi 1970). For instance, in 1931, the Maize Control Act and the Cattle Levy Act were enacted with the prime aim of forcing Africans to provide labour as a means of accumulation by the settler government. This legislation was followed by the Native Husbandry Act of 1951; all meant to tacitly or directly remove the indigenous people from the land. Added to all this changing ‘discretionary’ consumption on the part of Africans changed labour and production relations to meet expenditure for the new necessities (Arrighi 1970). Economic rationality, at times, forced the indigenous people to move to the designated communal lands, which were already congested. The relocation of blacks from European lands continued until the 1970s, effectively ending land rental on European farms (Tshuma 1995).

Two tools were then used to remove the indigenous people from the land. First, livelihood deprivation was achieved through discriminatory prices, taxes and levies imposed on indigenous farmers such as the 10 percent maize levy of 1931. Second, blacks were forced to migrate from their land, through evictions by white farmers taking up farms, which were now rented to blacks though they were not fully utilised by white settlers. This changing tenure system was to define the livelihoods of indigenous people; institutions that governed their land affairs and power relations between the colonisers and the indigenous people. Population pressure on marginalised lands also meant that subsistence production
took precedence over cash-crop farming, as the land was no longer adequate to support the growing population. The power relations were to change in line with political events in the 1950s, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and subsequently, in the post-colonial era.

The 1930 Land Apportionment Act and Native Husbandry Act of 1951 were key legal instruments used by the settler government to define the emerging land tenure system. Figure 4-1 shows the various categories of land tenure systems that emerged from the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, where freehold land was for the whites and communal lands largely for blacks. The Native Purchase Areas were for affluent blacks that could afford to buy land; however, these operated as more of a buffer between white freehold land and the communal land in the Tribal Trustland managed by the Native Commissioner (Tshuma 1995; Matondi 2012; Cousins 1991). This period marked the beginning of a dual agricultural system in Zimbabwe and social differentiation at three levels, settler versus indigenous, indigenous in Native Purchase Areas versus indigenous in communal areas, and within the communal area itself, thus defining emerging class structures in Zimbabwe, which have continued to exist in post-independent Zimbabwe. Further, this defined mechanisms and processes through which livelihoods were to be negotiated. For instance, within the communal areas, differentiation in land ownership, and subsequently in wealth, depended on the ownership of assets, particularly a plough and cattle, which enabled those who possessed these to farm large swatches of land and, during good seasons, market surplus produce. In rural areas, land was not distributed equally, but more often by one’s ability to use it. Again, those indigenous people who worked for settlers also managed to buy ploughs and cattle to further improve themselves through investment into retail of manufactured consumables. Through this process, differentiation in rural areas took root, effectively defining the social relations of production and livelihood strategies in the communal areas as well. For instance, those with assets could rent out their ploughs and assets and employ labour as well. All this defined new resource access mechanisms for indigenous people.

The Native Commissioner was tasked with managing land issues in communal areas; however, chiefs and headman were co-opted into the system to help the commissioner to exercise power in the communal lands. This gave rise to new power relations in rural areas with customary land ownership defined from a Eurocentric perspective, meant to perpetuate Europeans’ hold on power, while at the same time, marginalising the indigenous people. Again, class formations responding to the new order emerging from the capitalist mode of production started emerging as competition for land, a once abundant resource, increased. New institutions to manage land emerged with the chiefs now fronting the Native Commissioner and ensuring that colonial land policies were implemented.

In 1951, The Native Husbandry Act was passed to control land use partners and the ownership of land along a freehold system, a system meant to develop African agriculture along European lines of property rights (Machingaidze 1991). Indigenous people, who perceived it as worsened suppression by the
colonial rulers, met this with full aggression. The segregatory nature of The Native Husbandry Act gave impetus to the struggle against white rule, as both the landed blacks and landless felt threatened by the Act, and the anticipated absorption of blacks into wage labour did not materialise. Conciliatory land reforms of the 1950s by Todd, the then Prime Minister, were short-lived as the more liberal Rhodesians lost power in 1962 to the Rhodesian Front, which was keen on strengthening racial segregation on land ownership. After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith in 1965, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 was replaced by the even more segregatory Land Tenure Act of 1969, which divided the land equally between races, further marginalising blacks (Palmer and Parsons 1977).

4.2.2 Uneven Development and Differentiation

Land dispossession forced labour and repressive legislation all set the tone for uneven development and differentiation in Zimbabwe. The self-provisioning of high-quality land and exclusion of indigenous people from markets ensured unhindered capital accumulation by white colonial settlers (Shonhe 2017), while the majority of the blacks were pushed into reserves where accumulation was next to impossible. Legislation, such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, Maize Act and Native Husbandry Act of 1951, all pushed the indigenous people to the margins and hence, the creation of the centre and periphery and the entrenchment of uneven development. As Arrigh (1970) noted, reserve labour from the communal lands was exploited both in the mines and on large-scale farms for the benefit of white farmers, miners and industrialists. Subsidies also helped to enshrine white supremacy in Zimbabwe. This took the form of discriminatory state support for agriculture, for instance, and the concentration of cash crop production in white settler farms (Masst 1994). Further, there was general segregation in the production and marketing of cash crops. For instance, during the 1940s, the whites were producing tobacco and other high-value crops for export, while indigenous people produced 5 percent of marketed maize and 10-15 percent of cotton. Huge differentials of up to 40 times in wages between the races were common (Masst 1994), which worsened racial differentiation.

Differentiation among the indigenous people was also a product of the colonial set-up. For instance, those who managed to acquire assets, such as the plough, through working in the mines and on farms, instantly acquired a new status in the communal lands where they too could increase land ownership and production and accumulate capital at the expense of their fellow blacks. The acquisition of assets and cyclical labour migration allowed worker-peasants to engage in expanded production, allowing them to create exchange value while the rest were in simple reproduction for subsistence (Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 1992). The Native Purchase Areas also provided a valve for the further differentiation of indigenous people through the creation of an indigenous bourgeois class, also accumulating through exploitation of fellow indigenous labour and access to better land and farm implements. It is from this class that the source of nationalism also originated. Other programmes, such as the Master Farmer training, also provided avenues for select blacks to take opportunities created by
the capitalist sector. These programmes were spearheaded by Emory Alvord, starting at Makoholi (now Alvord Training Centre) where he introduced the 'Gospel of the Plough' thus marking the westernisation of agriculture in the 1920s (Sadomba, 2008). The well-off indigenous people were also able to invest in education, setting the basis for better opportunities for their children. This historical background sets the basis of differentiation in the independent Zimbabwe.

As Cousins, Weiner, and Amin (1992) noted, the historical tendencies in the use of remittances or money for reproduction in communal areas have continued, further exacerbating differentiation within communal areas. The issue becomes critical when one considers the high levels of unemployment in the formal sector and the general economic challenges that worsened since the start of the SAP. Differentiation and the subsequent uneven development within communal lands were driven by remittances from off-farm income, asset ownership, and political power (Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 1992), which could have increased through the land reform processes. Across communal lands in Zimbabwe, differentiation emanates from the quality of land holding and the ecological region, where rainfall patterns become an issue. Hence Masst (1994) notes that most of the marketed maize after 1980 was concentrated in the Mashonaland and Midlands regions, while the communal areas in Regions Four and Five were dependent on government welfare programmes.

4.2.3 Zimbabwe – Britain and Donor Approach to Land Reform in Zimbabwe

As discussed above, Zimbabwe inherited a dual agricultural system in 1980, which was perpetuated by the Lancaster House constitution. This limited land redistribution to market-based willing-seller willing-buyer principles instead of the liberation movements’ (ZANU PF and PF ZAPU) preferred radical approach (Palmer 1990). Land reform has become a contested diplomatic area between Britain and Zimbabwe since the negotiated Lancaster House Constitution of 1980, and the failed 1998 donor conference on land reform culminating in Zimbabwe unilaterally engaging in the 2000 FTLRP leading to the current economic decline in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe agreed to the willing-buyer-willing-seller principle negotiated in the Lancaster House constitution purportedly under pressure from the Frontline States who were eager to end the war, which had drained most of their resources and affected their economies (Palmer 1990). Further, the constitution all but guaranteed the continuity of bureaucratic institutions administering government and land issues; even the Minister of Agriculture, for example, was from the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU). From the onset, government was facing institutional bottlenecks deriving from the constitution, deeply unequal-racialised land ownership, and “…acute land scarcity and growing landlessness in some areas alongside unused and underutilised land in others” (Riddell 1980: 2).

Land demand was a big challenge for a government emerging from the war with an expectant population, and hence, the Lancaster House agreement provided a compromise, which would allow the government to stabilise the economy and balance the competing economic and equity needs, at the same
time kick-starting the land reform. Kinsey (1982:94) noted the third point (importance of agriculture to the economy) as crucial, given the “...disparity in production and economic importance between the commercial and peasant sub-sectors of agriculture”, and its implications on resettlement and the state of the economy as a whole. This demanded immediate institutional interventions. However, it is surprising that, despite these challenges, the government only came up with the first land legislation in 1985, having implemented the reforms via policy prescriptions since September 1980. The Lancaster House agreement has been blamed for the slow land reform process due to insistence on market-based land transfer system paid for in foreign currency. Further the revolutionary parties failed to extract firm commitments for land payments from colonial powers (O’Donogue 2009).

This added to challenges for a government facing massive reconstruction needs for an economy that had been ravaged by war and with most of its people homeless. Again, as has already been observed, the government also acted slowly in crafting legislation that could at least facilitate land acquisition. Whether this was to be the Achilles heel for land redistribution, is then debatable. As will be seen in the next section, land reform targets were not met by the end of the Lancaster House constitution, and yet negotiations continued with the British, who seemed keen on pacifying the Zimbabwe government so that they could retain the willing-seller-willing-buyer principle. The processes leading to the well-attended (over 40 countries and organisations) 1998 conference all but pointed to a market-oriented land reform. In 1998, negotiations were resuscitated, culminating in the 1998 land conference, which seemed to bring hope of international donor community participation in the reform process. Even the communiqué (International Donors’ Conference 1998) all pointed to a market-assisted reform; however, the process was stalled, as the Zimbabwean leader castigated the West at every possible opportunity. The gloves were off and international diplomacy firmly in the dustbin as President Mugabe told Prime Minister Blair, "Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe." (Mlambo and Chitando 2015:8). Since 1998, Zimbabwean land reform processes have been an internal issue funded from the Zimbabwean fiscus, land expropriated and the ‘people’ leading their resettlement efforts. New agrarian relations emerged divorced from the yoke of the Lancaster House agreement; the big question was how agriculture transformation would shape-out. In the next sections, post-independence land reform is discussed; the processes involved, challenges, successes and lessons learnt since 1980.

4.3 Land Reform and Resettlement 1980-90

Zimbabwe’s liberation war was fought to reclaim land that was violently and systematically taken from the blacks from the onset of colonisation (Moyo 1995). The ‘dispossession’ and subsequent ‘repossession’ of land has been characterised by acts of violence creating “…a society traumatised by fear, withdrawal, and collective depression based on past memories of violence, intimidation and harassment” (Sachikonye 2011a:xvii). Violence since the colonial times has shaped Zimbabwean
society, its political structure, institutions and the livelihood of its people. Sachikonye (2011b) articulates how a history tainted with violence compromises the development agenda. Chitiyo (2000) similarly notes that violence could lead to flawed agrarian policies that compromise development. Despite this violent past, the then Zimbabwean Prime Minister, Mugabe, announced a policy of reconciliation, a policy which was lauded as progressive and which was to shape Zimbabwean economic programmes for the next decade, land reform included.

Figure 4-1: Land distribution at independence
Source: Cousins, 1991

In 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a land ownership structure, which was inequitable, as shown on the figure 4-1 above, and hence, the international community could have expected a radical takeover by the landless Zimbabweans, who had suffered iniquities since 1890. Figure 4.2 shows that the land distribution patterns had not changed by 2000. However, the violent culture inherited from the settler colony remained bottled, to explode only in the 2000s due to the slow land reform process. Moyo (1995) notes that the land question remained an unresolved issue during the 1980s and, by the 1990s, had developed a new dimension where interest groups, such as black capitalists, women and urban-based activists, were beginning to make claims to land. This led Moyo (1995:11) to argue for a transparent and equitable land reform “…focused on the productive use of land for agro-industrial and other development processes”. More importantly, these competing interest groups would also have different lobbying powers for agricultural production resources, such as finance, with potential for further marginalising the smallholder farmer in communal and resettlement areas. This situation evidently prevailed during and after the FTLRP.
4.3.1 Resettlement Models: Structure, Selection and Administration of Scheme

According to Moyo, (2009:343), there are three types of land reforms:

These are the “state,” “market,” and “popular” models, and they entail five elements: (1) the selection of land, (2) the method of acquiring land, (3) the selection of beneficiaries, (4) the method of transferring land to the beneficiaries, and (5) support to beneficiaries.

The state and market were discussed in Chapter 3, and Moyo posits that the popular version emanates from the actions of the land poor through squatting and illegal occupations, all of which were witnessed in Zimbabwe since independence, resulting in state-led land reform. The path taken depends on the objectives and nature of the land reform (Moyo, 2009), for instance, the self-selection of beneficiaries in market-assisted reforms exemplified in South Africa (Lahiff, 2007) and the state-led models, in which the state plays a critical role (Kinsey 2004; Moyo 2009). Consequently, this impacts on the quality and cost of land access by beneficiaries; for instance, market-assisted programmes could lead to increased participation by beneficiaries in all the five elements identified by Moyo (2009), while, in a state-led approach, the beneficiaries might incur fewer expenses and would generally be passive recipients of the land. In Zimbabwe, the planned state-led model dominated until 2000, when the state was responsible for all the five elements mentioned above; but during the FTLRP, the state, while playing a critical role, was mainly responding to the ‘popular’ demands of land occupiers. Whatever process is followed it is important that beneficiaries have secure tenure, dispute resolution mechanisms and support to facilitate the attainment of reform goals, such as reducing poverty, equity and conflict management.

Figure 4-2: Land Ownership Patterns Prior to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (as at 30 June 2000)

Source: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Development
Zimbabwe’s land reform objectives have evolved over time, first focusing on the poor and landless. Roth and Bruce (1994:23) identified these as “…(a) having no land or too little land, (b) not employed, (c) poor, (d) married or widowed with dependents, (e) aged 18 to 55 years and physically fit, (g) returned Zimbabwean refugee, or experienced and master farmer”; other beneficiaries must give up their communal plots, see also (Gonese and Mukora 2003). The net was expanded to include skilled and better equipped peasants into the A1 model and the commercialisation of agriculture by involving elites into large-scale commercial farming (Moyo 1995). In 1990, a new National Land Policy emphasised agricultural productivity and was tilted towards capable small commercial farmers (Chitsike 2003), a position reflected even in the 1998 donor conference document. However, when the FTLRP started in 2000, the landless poor were a major part of the whole occupation movement. Model C catered for outgrower farmers in tea and sugar plantations (Moyo 1995). Other models, B, and D schemes were not successfully implemented, and very little information is available (Kinsey, 2004). The model A scheme, which was popular and has been used even during FTLRP, will be discussed in detail below.

Since independence, over 90 percent (71 000) of resettled families were in this A-scheme (Kinsey 2004). It is a nucleus village settlement of 500 families comprising a homestead of 2 500 square metres, communal grazing area supporting a herd of five to ten cattle and a five-hectare piece of arable land (Moyo 1995; Roth and Bruce 1994). Beneficiaries of this scheme were issued with three permits in line with the Rural Land Act and the three-land uses mentioned above. However, security of tenure remained a problem, given that the ability to remain on the scheme rested with the Ministry of Lands and the permits were open to abuse by authorities. The model A scheme was well supported with infrastructure, credit and extension services, which were developed as part of the resettlement programme. Contrasted to this model is the accelerated resettlement programme, which was a response to squatter settlements and hence lacked the services offered to the planned model A programme (Tshuma 1995). Such an accelerated resettlement programme resembles the modified model A now referred to as A1 under the FTLRP, which lacked planning and government support. These resettlement initiatives shared the same objectives; implementation was the only difference.

4.3.2 An Evaluation of the 1980s Resettlement Programme

In 1980, the Zimbabwean government embarked on land reform constrained by the Lancaster House-based constitution, which required that a neoliberal approach of willing-buyer-willing-seller be used in the acquisition of land. Understandably, this derailed the aspirations of the Zimbabwean government to speedily distribute land and possibly change institutions to support this cause. However, it is interesting to note that, with these restrictions and constraints, various authors have documented early successes of the land reform that led to increased marketed output by smallholder farmers (Sachikonye 2003). The Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and Comptroller and Auditor General (Zimbabwe) reported an impressive economic rate of return for the land reform programme, noting the welfare gains
of the beneficiaries (Cusworth 2017; Chitsike 2003). The early successes were attributed to the policies and programmes that were put in place by the Zimbabwean government in 1980.

In 1980, the Zimbabwean government levelled and opened the agricultural playing field by improving access to farming resources and markets, which catalysed smallholders’ production. Apart from increasing access to already existing institutions and organisations, the Zimbabwean government never substantially reformed the agriculture sector to meet the demands of smallholder farmers. Credit, an important aspect of agriculture, continued to be supplied by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (a pro-white commercial farmer institution), which later ran into viability problems due to non-performing smallholder farmers loan books. Furthermore, pre- and post-independence Zimbabwean agriculture was strongly interlinked with international capital, which the state failed to untangle (Sachikonye 1991). The question arises as to whether this was the proper platform and approach to an egalitarian land reform targeting the lower echelons of a highly differentiated rural community.

Kinsey (1982) points to several omissions; problems bedevilling the planning and implementation of Zimbabwe’s early land reform processes. Karumbidza (2004) has strongly questioned the success of the 1980s reform programme citing several institutional and planning deficiencies and, like Kinsey (1982), observes several problems with the whole system. Some of these omissions include the lack of consultation and participation of beneficiaries that were to be resettled and analysis of contextual issues that also included administration issues necessary for the successful implementation of the programme. Alexander (1994) observed that institutional deficiencies and lack of skills resulted in the new government adopting precolonial programmes, such as the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) provisions. Kinsey (1982) notes that the process involved learning and doing during planning and implementation.

Kinsey’s (1982) article brings to the fore the dilemma that Zimbabwe faced, namely, the need to address land inequalities and poverty, while at the same time increasing economic growth to help fund these processes. As documented by Sachikonye (1991), the institutions and structure of Zimbabwe’s economy and agriculture were controlled by, and favoured, international capitalists. This position was further consolidated during the structural adjustment era. These dilemmas seem to have continued to hound the Zimbabwe government till the 2000s, when it embarked on the FTLRP which was subsequently followed by unprecedented economic turmoil, when international capital withdrew from agriculture in protest.

The key question is whether the policies adopted then were suitable for the rural poor with no farming resources, knowledge and expertise in producing marketable farm produce. Indeed, this policy worked well for the colonial settler farmers who were fully supported by a vibrant CFU and enjoyed preferential treatment from the regime of the day. These institutions guaranteed sustainable access to finance capital
and markets for the commercial farmers. Chang (2012) argues that government support is important for agricultural development. Following Chang’s argument, an egalitarian land reform must provide farming resources and services within the constraints and capacity of the beneficiaries, particularly considering social differentiation in communities. One such mechanism could be the provision of free inputs that would relieve debt burden on the poor and allow them to build their asset base.

It is important to note from the onset that the 1980 resettlement programme was implemented under the auspices of the Lancaster House constitution that allegedly compelled Britain [O’Donogue, (2009) disputes this] to provide funding for the programme on a 50-50 basis with the Zimbabwean government (Karumbidza 2004; Kinsey 1982). Further donor support for development in resettlement areas was made available [Karumbidza (2004) citing Rukuni and Jensen, 2003:248]. This ensured that “land and money”, identified as important by Masst (1994), were available to the farmers in reasonable proportions leading to possible success of the programme. Participation of the donor community in the 1980s resettlements could have provided the much-needed institutional support as well as building strong oversight, though of a temporary nature, given the fluidity of international capital.

Eicher (1995:805) attributed the success of the resettlement programme and the accompanying maize revolution in the 1980s to “…hybrid maize varieties, expanded access to credit, higher guaranteed government maize prices, and marketing subsidies”; a view shared by many other scholars (Gunning et al. 2000; Kinsey 2004; Eicher 1995; Mabeza-Chimedza 1998). Arguably, this shows the supremacy of institutions in the transformation and evolution of agricultural practices. A response to a policy of this magnitude was also accompanied by changes in norms and farming practices among smallholder farmers. Changes in policies by the Zimbabwean government improved access to markets and the restoration of peace in 1980 all triggered agricultural activities in the country-side. It is the sustainability of these institutions that is questionable, as the supply of credit, extension services and markets were compromised starting from the 1990s.

Despite the purported resounding success of the Zimbabwe land reform programme in the 1980s, sceptics were on board to discredit the increased levels of productivity among smallholders (Karumbidza 2004). Chimhowu and Hulme (2006), in a study of Rengwe (spontaneous settlement) and Nyamakate (government sponsored resettlement), noted the convergence of livelihood strategies following the withdrawal of government support due to the failure of beneficiaries to cope with risk, which, at times, led to their withdrawal to communal areas. The early successes of the agricultural miracle couldn’t be sustained into the 1990s. The poor repayment of loans led to the collapse of the credit system to smallholders. The agricultural and resettlement financing models that neglected smallholder farmer risk coping mechanisms never allowed poor farmers to build assets, leading to
subsequent repayment problems. Risk is an important element of farming, and it becomes worse for smallholders with little knowledge of producing marketable crops and livestock.

Kinsey reported poor planning as a concern for the success of reforms, an aspect that was clearly visible during the FTLRP discussed in Chapter 5. While lauding the resettlement programme, the ODA evaluation report also noted flawed institutional support to beneficiaries in the provision of credit, extension services and access to input-output markets. Added to this was the plight of those settlers who lacked productive assets (Cusworth 2017), which was also the main handicap of the FTLRP’s A1 model. Chitsike (2003) also notes that the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report observed poor coordination among the various ministries involved. Political interference and lack of capacity impacted negatively on implementation of land resettlement, and further, they suggested this could be solved by beneficiary contribution more like the market-assisted land reform articulated by Lahiff (2007) for South Africa.

In his assessment of the overall performance of the 1980s resettlement programme, Moyo (2005) believes that it failed to meet its major objective of poverty reduction because of the poor-quality land, and reduced state assistance to farmers after SAP, and a land market controlled by landlords; as well as restrictions imposed by the Lancaster House agreement (Moyo 1995). To Moyo, poverty and equity problems were not resolved due to contradictions of the neoliberal agenda, which was in place during the first two decades and which deprived peasants of the land and resources needed to increase productivity of the land.

4.3.3 Debates around Resettlement Processes 1980-90

As Palmer (1990:165) noted, the revolutionary parties, ZANU and ZAPU, were keen on a “radical land reform on achieving political power”, however due to the limitations imposed by the Lancaster House agreement, the reforms were to proceed along the willing-seller-willing-buyer route, managed by a bureaucratic process that was fully anchored in colonial systems of governance. To implement the reform programme needed the coordination of over 19 government ministries or departments (Chitsike 2003) and high levels of skill – a capacity the new government did not have. Kinsey (1982) also reports of early planning deficiencies, which improved as the programme progressed. Bureaucrats were tasked with acquiring land and surveying and demarcating it to ready it for settlement. This included identifying both infrastructural needs and the resettlement of beneficiaries in line with set criteria. When the resettlement programme started five months after gaining independence, the objective was to resettle 18 000 families on 1.2 million hectares, a figure that was later increased to 162 000 in the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982 (Roth and Bruce 1994). In 1981, the Growth with Equity policy document also prioritised the development of agriculture, while alluding to the need to deal with iniquities in the sector (Zimbabwe 1981). In 1985, the Land Acquisition Act was enacted with more
powers for government, though it maintained the willing-buyer-willing-seller principles (Roth and Bruce 1994). It is these institutional arrangements that generated debates in the early days of land reform in Zimbabwe.

Alexander (1994) elaborates on how Zimbabwe adopted pre-colonial institutions and programmes in delivering the land reform programme; in a way, institutions “fit for purpose” were retained by the Zimbabwean authorities. The appointment of Denis Norman as Minister of Agriculture helped cement ties with the CFU, an organisation which was to influence policy in the first decade. For instance, Mufema (1997) reports that the 1971 Licensing and Levy Act is still in use in the administration of farmer organisations, as are other laws and practices that were subject to contestations between smallholder black farmers and the colonial regime. Sachikonye (2003) noted the socialist orientation of Zimbabwe’s development policy and yet, in practice, neoliberal policies were being implemented; for example, collectivism was overshadowed by the individual A1 resettlement scheme since 1980. This approach by the Zimbabwean government in 1980 provides a basis and context for debates and the evolution of agricultural institutions that are in place today.

Moyo (2011a) posits that debates on land reform have been polarised, hence leaving critical issues un debated. Debates on the desirability of land reform centred on economic efficiency and moral arguments, with opponents believing landless peasants were less efficient and could spell economic disaster, and hence, the need to retain the current large-scale commercial farming system. Scholars such as Moyo (1995), noting the underutilisation of land in large-scale farms, argued for a broader land holding base to empower blacks and hence pushed for reforms even without proper tenure systems. Further, Moyo and Yeros (2013) believe it was important to radically take over land first before issues of institutions and productivity could be addressed, arguing that this was people power. As it turned out, Zimbabwe went this route in 2000 with disastrous consequences experienced to this day. It is within this framework that institutions emerged and formed. Given the fluidity and contestations within the Zimbabwean political sphere, institutions could possibly reflect short-termism to save the needs of the authorities rather than the poor.

### 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter showed that access to land supported by resource provisioning institutions increased farmers’ productivity and income both for colonial and smallholder farmers post-independence. Since its occupation of Zimbabwe, the colonial government provided large-scale white farmers with financial, technical and marketing assistance, which helped farmers improve their performance. Indigenous farmers, who managed to access land through the Native Purchase Areas, also performed better than their counterparts in tribal lands. Central to this differential agricultural performance were
discriminatory laws in the access to markets and productive resources. This resource-induced performance differential was observed among post-independence land reform beneficiaries, who led the Zimbabwean green revolution. The introduction of SAP was followed by a dip in agricultural production and livelihood options due to constrained access to resources. The chapter showed that land dispossession and discriminatory laws retarded asset accumulation by indigenous people, which affected their integration in markets. Chapter 5 builds on this story and shows that land reform needs complementary resources and support for its beneficiaries to improve their income and livelihoods.
Chapter 5

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme and Agrarian Transition in Zimbabwe

5.0 Introduction

The effects of the FTLRP on equitable land holdings are debatable; however, consensus is developing that beneficiaries improved their livelihoods due to better land holdings, which allowed them to access markets as well as acquire assets (Moyo 2011a; Scoones et al. 2011; Scoones et al. 2018). As identified by Moyo (2008), low levels of food security and high poverty experienced after the economic SAP still persist in Zimbabwe debatably at a larger scale now, given the high unemployment levels, informalisation of the economy and severe cash shortages that have made life unbearable for the rural poor. Despite this, Mkodzongi (2013) has argued that beneficiaries gained access to multiple livelihoods derived from the land. The former farm workers’ plight, which was ignored during resettlement (Sachikonye 2003), the uncertainty facing land beneficiaries (Dekker and Kinsey 2011) and the perception that only ZANU PF supporters benefited (Palmer 2000) are issues that remain unresolved.

However, despite the gloomy picture painted, there is the realisation that farmers are beginning to increase production (Zikhali 2010). Land conflicts and contestations about land ownership are ongoing struggles, indicating that land reform is unfinished business in Zimbabwe. Despite all this, FTLRP provided farmers access to bigger plots, of which some farmers used to build initial capital and venture into agricultural markets. This chapter discusses those aspects of the FTLRP that impact, or impacted on farmers’ integration into agricultural markets.

5.1 Events Leading to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme

By the late 1990s, Zimbabwe was facing severe fiscal constraints, and agriculture financing received little attention from government, yet it was important both as a political tool and for the poor with diminishing livelihood options (Sachikonye 2003). Farmers faced challenges in accessing input-output markets and urbanites, who lost their jobs in towns, relocated to rural areas, further stretching the few resources in these communities. Moyo (2005) narrates the explosion of the Zimbabwean economy in the mid-1990s following the currency collapse, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and deteriorating relations with international donor organisations, which triggered massive retrenchment and poverty, leading to unprecedented strike action in 1998 as food prices rose. According to Gonese and Mukora (2003:1) “…limited livelihood and productivity opportunities, and general poverty provided impetus for popular demand for greater access to the land and other natural resources to ameliorate declining livelihoods”. Given the dependency of the rural population on remittances from
urbanites, poverty was both an urban and rural phenomenon. This laid the ground for radical land reform. Presumably, the peasant-worker group had been stretched to the limit and this was an attempt to restore and regain their livelihood base. Again, Moyo (2005) has shown that SAPs marginalised rural areas, as the demand and competition for communal land increased and conservancies were established, further marginalising people from both arable land and access to natural resources.

Selby (2006) documents fractures that developed between the CFU and the state, which were optimised by the tobacco levy in 1996, at a time when farmers were supposed to be getting export incentives in line with 1990 SAP provisions. An alliance was developing between war veterans and the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) lobby group, one which was reminiscent of earlier alliances that developed in the 1970s to resist marginalisation by the Rhodesian government. These alliances were to later incorporate peasants, new capitalist farmers and proletariat (Moyo 1995). The alignment of the CFU with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) during this period was to shape agricultural programmes and institutions for the next decades to come, as the ruling party partnered with war veterans and BEE to unleash compulsory land acquisition during the FTLRP (Laurie and Chan 2016). Mufema’s (1997) categorisation of land as both an asset and a political tool helps explain the changing face of the government and the development of alliances and institutions. This explains the politicisation and contestations characterising land reform in Zimbabwe since the colonial period.

Matondi (2012:19) noted that “…the need to address poverty in communal areas, landlessness, homelessness, and the need to de-racialise commercial agriculture” continued to be government priorities; however, he documents simmering pressures that contributed to 2000 FTLRP occupations. The period from 1990 to 1999 is full of contestations and political manoeuvres, alliances and changing power relations that led to violent occupations of white-owned land in 2000. During this period the British Labour government also broke tradition and abrogated its responsibility to contribute funding for the land reform (Laurie and Chan 2016). Peasant radicalisation, which emanated from excruciating poverty after the adoption of SAP, led to peasants in the Svosve communal lands invading nearby farms on 18 June 1998 (Nyandoro 2012; Matondi 2012). Stemming from this are Zimbabwe’s deteriorating economic fortunes and its isolation from the international community. Further, Britain’s refusal to support land reform, poor response from the donor community, legal challenges by white farmers with listed land and the rejection of the 2000 constitution all ignited the FTLRP (Moyo 2006).

Despite engaging donors on what looked like a promising donor’s conference on land and resettlement, Zimbabwe later decided to go it alone and engage in the compulsory acquisition of land (International Donors’ Conference 1998; Moyo 2006). The government blamed the donor community and LSCFs contestations for the failure of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II¹⁹ (LRRP-2) inception stage and decided to quicken resettlement through the ‘Fast Track’ route (Government of Zimbabwe 2001).
5.2 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme

Events detailed in the section above provided a fertile ground for the start of farm invasions after the government lost in a constitutional referendum in 2000, of which land expropriation was one of the proposed amendments. Three years earlier (1998), government had used force to stop Svosve land invasions and hence, scholars (Sachikonye 2011a; Sachikonye 2011b) argue that political machination was at play, as government used land to solicit support for political power in elections (Laurie and Chan 2016). However, not in dispute is the fact that access to land and land demand from people who had lost a livelihood in urban areas, marginalised communal dwellers, and aspiring agricultural entrepreneurs fueled the invasion process and provided popular support that ignited the programme. A senior war veteran intimated that they told the then president that “It’s either you lose power or white farmers lose land” (Interview 16 July, 2017). This position is in line with Sadomba’s (2008:57) observation that the president thought the war veterans and the surging land revolution were an asset in maneuvering around this impending political loss. As it turned out, the white farmers who had enjoyed the president’s support since 1980, lost the land, confirming Mufema (1997)’s assertion that land can be an asset or a political tool.

5.2.1 Objectives of Fast Track Land Reform Programme

The objectives of the FTLRP were derived from the LRRP-2 objectives but strongly anchored in the political climate prevailing in 2000, which Laurie and Chan (2016) claim were a smokescreen to government’s power retention agenda. Phase Two aimed to decongest the crowded rural communities, mitigate poverty and integrate indigenous black farmers in commercial agriculture, among other things (Zikhali 2010). According to Moyo (2004), this second phase started in 1997, with the aim of compulsorily acquiring five million hectares of land from white commercial farmers and redistributing it to address land imbalances and poverty and increase the base of productive agriculture utilising idle land (Zimbabwe 2000; Kinsey 1999). The aim was to settle 150,000 land-constrained peasant families from congested rural areas and commercial oriented farmers (Gonese and Mukora 2003). The indigenous-black commercial farmer objective was targeted at agricultural graduates and resourced individuals who wanted to get into commercial agriculture. For A1 farmers, the objective was primarily social, aimed at subsistence production (Matondi 2012). The programme then coined ‘fast track’ due to the accelerated nature with which it was to be executed. The FTLRP then started with the minimal objectives of compulsorily acquiring and demarcating land and settling people with minimal infrastructural development (Government of Zimbabwe 2000). In practice, even the minimal infrastructure and perceived institutional setup was lacking and the whole process was spearheaded by formal and informal institutions. This had a considerable effect on the uptake of land by farmers, productivity and general outcomes of the programme (Utete 2003). Visible outcomes included
economic decline and decline in agricultural production, and hence, the effects of the FTLRP have continued in scholarly literature, focusing on livelihoods and how to get agricultural production back on track (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). Access to resources by smallholder farmers was then to be understood from this policy stance, which was exclusionary when it came to resource allocation. For instance, the mid-2000 government input and equipment schemes favoured A2 farmers (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). It is not surprising that contract farming became an attractive channel of resource access and participation in agricultural markets for the elites and subsequent competition for contracts (Moyo 2011).

5.2.2 Chaotic Encounters (Jambanja)

Land invasions started in Masvingo, and quickly spread throughout the country (Sadomba 2008; Mamdani 2009), with war veterans in alliance with government structures, also manned by war veterans. For instance, institutions, such as the police, army and prisons, were headed by war veterans, which helped with the coordination of invasions both at a social group and government level. The invasions proceeded in a violent fashion, which became popularly known as Jambanja. Night parties, dancing and singing at bases resembling guerilla war night vigils characterised Jambanja. Whether this was through coercion or voluntarily is debatable, as the same strategy was to dominate ZANU PF’s campaign for political office from 2002 to 2008. People moved in groups from one farm to another owned by white farmers. The invasions involved people of different persuasions, playing different roles: some as negotiators leading the invasions, others as suppliers of provisions such as food, airtime to facilitate communication and transport for the leadership, among other things (Interview 16 July 2017). The roles differed according to powers and resources held by participants. However, peasants were the foot soldiers camping at bases night-in-night-out. In a guerrilla military style, war veterans led the surge on farm invasions, mobilising support from local and government leadership. Though the invasions were generally chaotic, some areas, such as Mhondoro Ngezi (Mkodzongi 2013), experienced peaceful, negotiated take-overs. Incidents of extortion, or leases involving fee payments (for elites) through negotiation or coerced were wide spread (Laurie and Chan 2016; Muronzi and Mambo 2017 December). War veterans’ sterling role in the invasion process were to set them in pole positions in decisions to identify, allocate or sanction “…the majority of Model A1 settlers” when the resettlement process was formalised (Gonese and Mukora 2003:11). For instance, war veteran structures, such as the Committee of Seven, became part of the district land committees, working together with chiefs, district officials and other local government institutions at the districts. Access to land was negotiated in such an environment, which the critics then argued was spoiled by patronage.

5.2.3 Towards Regularisation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme

Under pressure and desiring to take ownership of the chaotic land reform, the government launched the LRRP-2 on July, 15 2000 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2000). The FTLRP aimed to identify and
compulsorily acquire land, demarcate it and resettle people, with minimal infrastructural development. The government introduced the A2 scheme to create an indigenous-based commercial farming system, paying attention to the emerging forces of the BEE alliance. This group of farmers was expected to be skilled, resourced and ready to take up commercial production with the assistance of government in resource provision (Gonese and Mukora 2003). For the A1 model (the focus of this study), the FTLRP aimed to decongest rural areas, increase the productive agricultural base, and provide basic infrastructural and administrative services. Zhikali (2010) argues that A1 was mainly for subsistence production with marketable surplus in good years. True to its ‘Jambanja’ nature, the rules of the game kept changing in response to any legal challenges thrown at the government by the commercial farmers. The constitution was amended and various amendments to constitution and realignment of the judiciary followed (Mamdani 2009). The judiciary was reconfigured to meet the demands of the government land acquisition strategy and Chief Justice Antony Gubbay unwillingly took early retirement in March 2001. A charismatic war veterans leader had this to say on Gubbay’s retirement: “I talked to him personally and I told him to vacate the office today. No one is above the law,’ Mr Chinotimba said afterwards. ‘We ought to teach him how cases are finalised here. We will declare war”’ (McGreal and Osborn 2001 March). All this made local and foreign financial institutions hostile (traditional sources of agriculture finance like banks refused to fund new farmers), to the FTLRP, and farmers then found it difficult to access productive resources.

Ad hoc administrative systems were put in place from ministerial to ward level to identify land, settle people and attend to disputes on the farms (Zimbabwe 2001). At the district level, the Committee of Seven was integrated into district structures with some participating in district land committees. At national level, a Land Commission was set up, which, as at 2018, was still tasked with the issue of land audits and normalising land ownership in resettlement areas. In Chapter 7, the study discusses a typical A1 model and a replica of the processes involved in issuing A1 permits to land beneficiaries.

5.2.4 Resettlement Models

In 1980, Zimbabwe preserved the colonial land tenure (Roth and Bruce 1994) of freehold land alongside the customary land tenure system; however, a permit system for model A resettled farmers, which specified land use patterns, was instituted. This permit system described in section 4.3.1 was used, with modifications, for the A1 resettlement model (villagised) during and after the FTLRP alongside a self-contained version established after 2000. The self-contained model provides for grazing, homestead and arable land for the farmer and is more like the smaller A2 commercial farms, the difference being that permits specify the conditions of land use as in the ordinary villagised A1 model. The selection of farmers under the FTLRP was heavily influenced by war veterans who had set up infrastructure in commercial farms to coordinate the farm invasions, and, in most cases, did not stick to policy guidelines (Gonese and Mukora 2003). Zikhali (2010), like Gonese, also identifies problems around multiple and
differential interpretation of rules on selection, which, at times, negated the set goals, for instance, rural decongestion. The differential application of the selection rules affected women, youth and farm workers who were often discriminated against and excluded from the programme. This affected their potential to independently participate in agricultural economic activities. For beneficiaries, the “…many different types of temporary licenses” resulted in tenure security problems (Zikhali and Chilonda 2012:144) with consequences on how farmers accessed resources and accumulated assets.

As shown in Table 5.1, 145, 775 farmers were settled under A1 and 16 386 under A2. Figures on how many and who benefited are contested, as government and researchers make counter claims on the success of the programme [for example, Mamdani (2009), puts the figures at 72,000 A2-farmers on 2.19 million hectares and 127,000 A1-farmers on 4.23 million hectares]; however, the Utete report showed that the FTLRP component achieved modest success, even questioning the uptake of plots by farmers. The main reason cited for low uptake initially were poor infrastructure, lack of services and security of tenure. The A2 model, introduced after 2000, is self-contained commercial farms where land use is flexible. These were allocated to well-resourced individuals with assets elsewhere; however, this system discriminated against women, most of whom had no assets registered in their names (Matondi 2012). The A2 model farms averaged 30 hectares (small), 100 hectares (medium) and 300 hectares (large) and are expected to be allocated on 25- or 99-year lease. A 99-year lease is issued to a beneficiary who opts to buy farm improvements existing on the farm at the time of allocation (Matondi 2012). The leases are renewable.

By the end of the FTLRP, about eleven million hectares of former white commercial farming land had been redistributed, which helped to reduce racial injustices and equity issues. One of the questions that remains to be asked is whether or not there was gender equity in the land reform. Did all the socially differentiated classes benefit? Moyo (2011a), for example, reports that, among the beneficiaries of the land reform process, only 14% were women. This is important given that women are the most marginalised group. Women also play an important role in the welfare and upkeep of the household (Mutopo 2011). Mutopo notes that the FTLRP allowed women to access land through “intra-household negotiations”, which enabled them to participate in economic activities. While the desired outcome that Mutopo alludes to was realised, the question of how equitable the redistribution was remains unresolved. Sachikonye (2003) has also documented the plight of the former farm workers who were largely excluded from the FTLRP process, again pointing to weaknesses of the distributive policy. As a result, these groups found it difficult to participate in market-based agriculture, such as contract farming.

The processes of land reform described above affected the way resources were accessed in A1 farms; a culture of patronage took root, as farmers coalesced around war veterans and government officials who were in control of the process (Zamchiya 2011). This is shown by the small percentage of women
beneficiaries and as a result, for this group, access to productive agricultural programmes, such as contract farming, was compromised. Scholars are, however, divided regarding the transparency of the whole land access process. For instance, Moyo and Chambati (2013) argue that the systems put in place by government were transparent, while others argue the whole process was politicised (Marongwe 2009). Whatever view one takes, it is evident that the processes shaped how resources were negotiated and accessed.

5.3 Lack of Support for A1 Fast Track Land Reform Programme

Debates on the FTLRP have been extensively covered (Cliffe et al. 2011; Moyo 2011a; Laurie and Chan 2016) and it will suffice here to refer to institutional developments that evolved to support beneficiaries’ access to resources (Mkodzongi 2016). From the onset, government perceived a situation where it would support A2 farmers with resources to engage in commercial agriculture but there was no clarity on how the A1 beneficiaries were to be effectively supported (Gonese and Mukora 2003; Zimbabwe 2000). Consequently, A1 and communal farmers received minimal support from the government. This was mainly due to budgetary constraints and dwindling multilateral financial institutional support.

Just like after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, the unilateral land reform agenda adopted by Zimbabwe in the 2000s attracted targeted sanctions from the West and withdrawal of funding by multilateral financial institutions, leading to substantially reduced agricultural support. The spat between Zimbabwe and Britain worsened Zimbabwe’s international relations. The United States removed Zimbabwe from African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and introduced the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (S. 494) (ZIDERA). Zimbabwe pulled out of the Commonwealth. All this culminated in Zimbabwe’s suspension from international donor agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund. All this put the country in a precarious position in the implementation of its agrarian reforms. This meant Zimbabwe had to go it alone in its land reform programme “…in a context of increasing economic decline and international isolation” (Moyo, 2005:350). As already indicated, Zimbabwe was already facing fiscal challenges and hence, was in desperate need of financial support. This became the biggest challenge in financing agricultural activities. Zimbabwe was at a crossroads, fighting the neoliberal Washington Consensus agenda they fully operated within.

Neoliberalism, even the moderated post-Washington Consensus version, is strongly anchored in the supremacy of property rights at any level of social strata (Spiegel and Stiglitz, 2008). This is the contradiction that Zimbabwean agriculture found itself in since the 2000s, a financial structure that is
fully capitalistic and expected to support an egalitarian land reform agenda. Donors refused to work with the government in funding FTLRP beneficiaries, opting to circumvent government structures when assisting communal farmers (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). The government, in turn, focused on FTLRP beneficiaries through the Reserve Bank’s input schemes, coordinated by war veterans and the army (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). The military style operations that followed did little to stimulate agricultural production in the face of hyperinflation and the deteriorating macroeconomic environment.

In its first decade, the FTLRP was generally considered a failure because agricultural productivity and output levels had reached all-time lows (Chavunduka and Bromley 2013). Rukuni et al. (2006) attributed this decline to the collapse of institutions that supported and facilitated the provision of the six prime movers to which he had earlier attributed the 1980s agricultural revolution successes. A host of other scholars blamed the free-fall on agricultural production to the ‘chaotic’ FTLRP, with neoliberals pointing to the property rights violations and severing of ties with the international community (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012; Richardson 2005). Zimbabwe’s agriculture, interwoven as it was into fluid capitalist capital, could also explain the free-fall. Yet there is also evidence of the abuse of the Reserve Bank’s supplied inputs and equipment by the resettled farmers (Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera 2012). Why would land-hungry farmers who had fought bruising land repossession misuse resources? There is no definite answer, but the whole set-up points to macroeconomic and institutional weaknesses, and culture and beliefs of the beneficiaries. Lack of coordination and enforcement, and vision and basically not knowing what to do with the land after the successful take-over contributed to wanton abuse of resources (Hall 2009).

Lack of foresight could have serious economic repercussions: the “…popular land self-provisioning and elite grabs” (Moyo, 2011a:260) were in no way in line with government plans. Moyo (2011a) documents the government’s reactive behaviour in trying to respond to the unfolding situation, as it promulgated laws as the BEE, war veterans and peasants repossessed land. This shows the underlying problem could have been institutional. Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera (2012) have indicated that Zimbabwe’s agriculture needs reconstruction, that is the development of its infrastructure, capital and human resources base. This is necessary if land reform is to have meaning to beneficiaries; the desired structural change should be articulated, coordinated and diffused to all concerned parties. For example, the agricultural financing model.

Six years after Anseeuw, Kapuya, and Saruchera’s (2012) report, Zimbabwe is still grappling with land-reform induced agricultural productivity problems. For instance, in the 2016/17 agricultural season, the government introduced Command Agriculture, a five-hundred-million-dollar programme executed by 2000 farmers (Freeth 2016). Suffice it to say that such an intervention was in place in 2006, with little
success. Freeth (2016) is pessimistic about its success, but time will judge. However, what is needed are long-term and sustainable institutions that will support land reform beneficiaries to transform Zimbabwean agriculture.

The processes that unfolded during the FTLRP considerably affected farmers’ access to agricultural production assets and markets, which were previously mediated by private financial institutions and mostly through white commercial farmers’ establishments. The magnitude of the programme meant that government was overwhelmed in the supply of extension services, and the shrinking economy affected input supplies to farmers, while the hyper-inflationary conditions made it profitable to trade inputs/equipment in neighbouring countries. All this necessitated the introduction of contract farming to stabilise agricultural production.

5.4 Post-FTLRP Experiences in Zimbabwe

A key outcome of the FTLRP is that it “…has reconfigured Zimbabwe’s agrarian question, reflecting new problems for the transformation of agriculture and industrialisation, including the trajectories for technical change, productivity, labour utilisation, mechanisation and support institutions in the public and private sphere” (Moyo 2005:362), deepening poverty and continuing polarisation in the country’s economic development discourse. Land reform remains a politically contested issue within Zimbabwe. In a campaign rally in Marondera, for example, the former president raised the issue with the early 2000s vigour. Despite Mugabe’s claims, the opposition believes that what remains to be done is to provide the necessary support to existing farmers (Phiri 2017 July). Indeed, challenges in agriculture are big and daunting. As will be discussed in the next chapter, agricultural production has yet to reach pre-FTLRP reform levels; however, more importantly “…practices and people’s responses on the ground are what define the character of the reforms and their future” (Matondi 2012:2).

Without establishing causality, it is now known that Zimbabwe’s macroeconomic situation deteriorated rapidly between 2000 and 2008 with annual inflation reaching 89.7 sextillion percent on November 14, 2008, before inflation stabilised after dollarisation in 2009 (Hanke and Kwok 2009). Agricultural production declined by 45 percent between 2000 and 2008, and the Zimbabwean government has been importing food over these past years. The economy’s formal sector has continued to decline to this day, with the situation of high unemployment being blamed by critics on the land reform. Yet recent studies have shown the upward trends in agricultural production and welfare of land reform beneficiaries (Cousins and Scoones 2010; Moyo 2013). For instance, the 2018 tobacco output was 252,603,251 kilograms, surpassing the 236,946,295 kilograms achieved in 2000 at the onset of the FTLRP (ZTA 2018). From the start of the FTLRP, there was no clearly defined policy to benchmark the reforms. Hence, it is often judged by pre-land reform scenarios on agricultural output, macroeconomic performance, poverty levels, reform processes, the aborted LRRP-2. The government of Zimbabwe
blamed the international donor community for reneging on the funding of LRRP-2 hence its collapse. Consequently, the valuation of the FTLRP varies depending on the disposition of the researcher or evaluator.

A starting point could be to look at changes in the land ownership structure. As indicated earlier, however, land reform is a continuing process and the figures often vary depending on the source (Cliffe et al. 2011). Table 5.1 shows land that was acquired from LSCFs and allocated to black farmers since 1980. As can be seen in Table 5.1, a massive 12 404 196 hectares of land changed hands during this period, with 1 095 805 remaining with white/black farmers who held freehold land. Since 1980, about 60.82 percent of land has been transferred from the white commercial farmers to peasant farmers. Table 5.1 shows land transfers per category of farmers during the two phases of land reform. The landed LSCF lost land to the indigenous farmers namely A1 and A2 farmers as shown on table 5.1.

Table 5-1: Distribution of Land after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resettlement Phase</th>
<th>Number of Farmers</th>
<th>Land Acquired (in Hectares)</th>
<th>% Acquired</th>
<th>Balance Held by LSCF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Scale Commercial Farmers (LSCF) land in 1980 which was distributed</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 (1980-97)</td>
<td>71 000</td>
<td>3 498 444</td>
<td>22.57</td>
<td>12 001 556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inception Phase (1998-2000)</td>
<td>4 697</td>
<td>168 264</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>11 833 292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II A1 Resettlement (2000-08)</td>
<td>145 775</td>
<td>5 759 154</td>
<td>37.16</td>
<td>6 074 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II A2 Resettlement (2000-08)</td>
<td>16 386</td>
<td>2 978 333</td>
<td>19.22</td>
<td>3 095 805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>1 095 805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate remaining farmland held by LSCF (includes indigenous-owned, white-owned land, institutions and estates) excluded companies and estates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>1 095 805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Matondi, 2012a

A study by Matondi (2012) presents qualitative analysis of land allocation by class. Most of the high potential farm land in Mazowe went to commercial A2-farmers while A1-farmers were allocated land on the periphery, where land quality is low. As Matondi (2012:10) noted, “…Shamva and Mangwe, A1 dominated, demonstrating a planning frame that aimed to appease the ‘the poor’ in nonstrategic pieces of land” see also (Cliffe et al. 2011). This is at variance with the efficiency argument discussed in Chapter 3 and can dampen poor peasants’ participation in commercial agriculture, particularly if such
a situation was replicated throughout the country. Surely, if smallholder farming is efficient, then allocating quality land to peasants would lead to a better performing agricultural sector.

Moyo (2013), Scoones et al. (2011) and Matondi (2012) report that overall, the land reform benefited ordinary people in Zimbabwe; however, Scoones et al. (2011) note problems with data that could lead to inaccurate information. Difficulties in classifying beneficiaries also make it difficult to determine the origins of beneficiaries, whether urban or rural, as well as knowing who was ‘ordinary’. This is important if we are to assess the objective of decongesting rural areas where population pressure has continued to mount, as well as the desire by the government to have qualified agricultural personnel tilling the land as per LRRP-2. Reports by authors cited in this paragraph indicate that substantial numbers of urbanites were allocated land, which could compromise these twin objectives. Zamchiya (2011) reports of patronage-based allocation of land in Chipinge, while Zikhali (2008) laments the gender imbalance against women in the allocation of land, which is estimated at 18 percent for the A1 and 12 percent for A2 schemes, this even though women constitute over 50 percent of the population.

Neoliberal literature emphasises the importance of land tenure in agricultural production decisions, farm investments, access to credit and farming resources; hence, Richardson (2005) attributed the decline in Zimbabwean agricultural productivity to the FTLRP. Scoones et al. (2011:989) recognised the importance of land tenure and recommended that “…a flexible system of land administration is required one that allows for expansion and contraction of farm sizes, as well as entry and exit from farming”. This was also supported by Zikhali (2008)’s study in the Mazowe district of Zimbabwe, which, using the ordinary least squares method, found that the FTLRP had created insecurity among reform beneficiaries and that this affected their investment in soil conservation. However, she notes that households, who believed that farm investment enhances tenure security, were likely to invest in land improvement. In Mhondoro Ngezi, some farmers invested in retail shops as their land security became assured. From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that Zimbabwean land tenure needed to balance the need for productivity/efficiency and equity in order to address the demands for land by its citizens.

Despite the issuing of permits and leases, land tenure in Zimbabwe continues to be characterised by uncertainty, disputes and politicking around land ownership; for instance, the recent comments by the former President threatening the appropriation of white-owned farms and reducing farm sizes to cater for those who missed-out. On February 27, 2015 former President Mugabe was quoted in the Herald saying: “The A2-farmers, I think the farms we gave to people are too large, they can’t manage them,” he said. ‘You find that most of them are just using one third of the land’ (Machivenyika 2015 February). There is a need to bring to finality the land reform process in Zimbabwe and develop institutions that would replace district land and other ad hoc-committees set up to distribute land.

Institutions that govern land reform and tenure processes are important determinants of partnership arrangements that arise between farmers and agribusiness that want to enter into partnerships. These
institutions help define rights, obligations, security and enforcement mechanisms that are necessary for the efficient and effective running of the partnership. For instance, a good land tenure system defines land use rights that allow both parties to know what crops or livestock contract farming arrangements to engage on in plots. Land rights held by smallholder farmers also affect the longevity and capital investment of contract farming arrangements.

5.5 Agrarian Relations in Fast Track Land Reform Programme

Settlements

The processes discussed above were not within the dictates of capital and, as a result, financial institutions withdrew financial services to the agricultural sector arguing that there was no collateral. Shonhe (2017) provides a detailed analysis of the reaction of capital after the FTLRP, which was largely negative. The most affected were the A1 farmers who could not access finance from the government through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s quasi-fiscal activities. As a result, A1-farmers were constrained when it came to acquiring assets. International capital responded to the FTLRP crisis by changing agriculture-financing modalities. The government of Zimbabwe responded to the financing crisis by engaging the Brazilian and Chinese governments (Mukwereza 2013) and the latter introduced massive tobacco farming ventures in Zimbabwe. This, together with pioneers of tobacco contract farming, Tribac and BAT, shaped tobacco production relations in Zimbabwe since 2004 along international practices described below. All this together with the processes of the FTLRP changed the livelihoods of farmers and the communities where production took place. Scoones et al. (2011) widely report such changes in Masvingo and, later, in Mvurwi.

5.5.1 Labour Relations after the FTLRP

The exclusion of most former farm workers from the FTLRP created new labour relations dynamics in Zimbabwe. Mechanisms of accessing labour and workers livelihoods changed. Former farm workers faced many challenges: they lost their permanent employment status and many sources of livelihoods including housing, schooling for their children and health facilities (Sachikonye 2003). Most farm workers are now engaged in contract or piece work, working for poorly resourced FTLRP-beneficiaries (Sachikonye 2003); others earn their livelihoods from a variety of activities ranging from trading, illegal mining, and farming on unallocated land (Magaramombe 2010). This has defined their relations with the new land owners, who have resorted to various means of negotiating with farmers, including land and barter exchanges involving labour services. To alleviate some of these problems and create access to livelihood resources, Moyo, Rutherford, and Amanor-Wilks (2000) suggested a transformative land reform that could provide former workers with a residential and subsistence agricultural plot together with recreational land and access to forests for fuelwood. This seemed logical, given that it enabled
farm workers to build their bundle of powers (Ribot and Peluso 2003), which they could bring to the table when negotiating with farm owners. To this end, Moyo and Chambati (2013) contested the thesis that farm workers were heavily marginalised and were victims of the FTLRP, pointing to the 8 percent who got land, some resettled in rural areas and those that remained in A1-farms were absorbed in various agricultural activities in farms. It is those that remained that this thesis is concerned with. Scoones et al. (2018) find that those who remained had small plots, received little remittances, and were engaged in subdued production for the markets.

Those that remained provided labour to farmers and several studies recognise that this was through part-time or contract labour (Scoones et al. 2018). However, due to social differentiation, these farmers found it difficult to match their resourced counterparts, providing room for exploitation. Apart from drawing labour from former farm workers, new farmers also drew labour from LSCF’s traditional labour reservoir in surrounding communities. All this required negotiating access, depending on networks that were established during and after the FTLRP. This also shaped farmer integration in commercial agriculture, such as contract farming. All this involved competition with communal farmers involved in cash-crop production as shown by the TIMB (2017) data.

5.5.2 Private Financial Support to Smallholder Agriculture after the FTLRP

A new form of capitalist infusion in agriculture is shaping agricultural production, distribution, marketing, food and income security of the poor; arguably contract farming is the institutional arrangement fronting this capitalist development (Clapp 2014; Clapp and Helleiner 2012). The development of agriculture after the 2007-8 food crisis has attracted new players, changed the form of foreign direct investment, as financialisation transformed agricultural production, land ownership, consumption, production and power relations particularly among peasant agriculture as capital seek to extend their horizons of capital accumulation (Burch, Dixon, and Lawrence 2013; Burch and Lawrence 2009; Clapp 2014; Clapp and Helleiner 2012). Cotula (2013) and Hall (2011), as discussed earlier, noted increased land grabbing as corporates seek to grow industrial crops, while Reardon and Barrett 2000 and Reardon and Timmer (2007) describe involvement of supermarkets through vertically integrated production and marketing processes, a process referred to as agro-industrialisation of food production. A few firms now control a bigger chunk of the agricultural value chain, from input and equipment supplies to distribution and marketing (Burch, Dixon, and Lawrence 2013). In industries, such as tobacco, for example, only five conglomerates control more than half of the world’s production, distribution and marketing system (Scoones et al. 2018). At the farm-gate level, contract farming arrangements have been used as the main drivers of agro-industrialisation, an approach, which, as discussed earlier, is seen by most governments as attracting private sector capital into agriculture. FTLRP beneficiaries were caught up in this international arrangement and, in Zimbabwe, this manifested strongly in tobacco and cotton production (Sachikonye 2016; Moyo 2011a).
The objective of agro-industrialisation from a capitalist perspective is to earn profits for shareholders of the stock-exchange-listed companies (Vander Stichele 2015), while governments view it as an agriculture growth strategy. This obviously has effects on the portfolio of food crops produced, food security and the integration of smallholders into such systems. Burch, Dixon, and Lawrence (2013:216) describes how “…supermarkets are coming to determine what is produced, where, to what standards and price, and the outlets from which food is to be sold” through their control of financial resources, limited in-store shelf-space, quality, and branding, among other things. This is the same scenario with none-food products, such as tobacco, where branding and product modification influence tobacco production by farmers. For instance, preferences in the quality of tobacco differ in different markets. While Chinese markets might prefer lemon flavour, Europeans prefer orange flavour, issues that are not known by smallholder farmers at the production stage. Also, unilateral decisions made by big-agribusiness, such as the ban on coal-cured tobacco in certain markets, affect smallholder farmers in developing countries (Marufu 2018 January).

That Zimbabwe needs investment is not debatable. However, the question is: Which investment is more suitable for its post-FTLRP agriculture? Hallam (2009) proposes investments that meet host country needs. For example, investment through contract farming tends to involve smallholder farmers and have more spillover benefits to local communities (Smalley 2013), while outright land purchases deprive locals – mainly smallholders – of their land, which could have minimising effects on their livelihoods, more so given that the produce is consumed elsewhere (Cotula 2013; Hall 2011). It is within this logic that contract farming after the FTLRP was viewed as beneficial to communities that engaged in it.

It is important to identify the farmer’s need for finance if the right model is to be achieved. For example, credit might be required for inputs, transport, tilling, labour or infrastructure, which demands specific financing models. In Zimbabwe, Pearce (2003) reports a supplier-based input scheme where CARE (a non-governmental organisation) worked with rural traders to supply inputs on credit to farmers through its AGENT programme. Yet long-term infrastructural projects, such as irrigation activities, could be effected through Public Private Partnership, such as the Negomo Irrigation Scheme in Mazowe, where German investors partnered with the Zimbabwean government to construct the dam and establish an irrigation scheme for peasants. A financing model tailored to the farmer’s needs is likely to address information asymmetry and institutional deficiencies associated with traditional financing models (Hoff et al. 1994; Stigler 1967).

Literature on contract farming has burgeoned in the post-Washington Consensus era. Except for recent studies in Zimbabwe, however, no notable efforts have been made to situate it within land reform dynamics (Sukume et al. 2015; Scoones et al. 2018). In most jurisdictions, smallholder contract farming was a post-land reform intervention, examples of which include the Kenyan Tea Development Association, tobacco contract farming in Malawi, tobacco contract farming in Zimbabwe (Scoones et
al., 2018) and the growth of contract farming after the Housing Responsibility System and Bananas in the Eastern Caribbean (Grossman 2000). Despite evidence that shows that land (tenure) reform preceded contract farming in most jurisdictions, it is rarely articulated as a context within which contract farming is occurring, which obscures our understanding of resource access dynamics, which are anchored in history and community livelihoods. Land reform provides the context within which peasants negotiate and access asset ownership and use, and (dis)incentives for contracting by firms.

5.6 Conclusion

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme drastically changed the agrarian landscape in Zimbabwe, yet there is still uncertainty whether the land question has finally been resolved. The agricultural sector still faces challenges and agrarian transition is still a work in progress. The issue of tenure security is yet to be fully resolved and this has affected investment decisions in farms; however, work by Scoones et al. (2018) has shown that there is potential for agricultural development and accumulation. What is not clear, though, is how far behind or ahead the current farmers are in terms of pre-2000 production levels. Scoones et al. (2018) and Sachikonye (2016) have shown an increased uptake of cash crop production after the FTLRP, which they attributed to increased landholdings and access to private capital by smallholder farmers. Tobacco is one cash crop where the number of producers increased more than ten times. The next section discusses the dynamics of tobacco production.
Chapter 6

Tobacco Production Dynamics after FTLRP

6.0 Introduction

FTLRP provided the land for peasant farmers to venture into cash crop production in large numbers. This, even though farmers faced serious credit constraints and the know-how to produce crops such as tobacco. Farm workers who remained in the resettled farms provided the necessary technical know-how to produce the crop, though most of the knowledge was restricted to routine tasks as most managerial functions were done by the white farmers. Despite this drawback, the spread of cash crop income among many farmers presented an opportunity for equitable distribution of cash-crop income and assets. For example, tobacco is a labour-intensive crop, and its adoption by large numbers of peasants generated employment for the household and hired labour and supported (up) downstream economic activity and rural livelihoods. Further, the income generated from tobacco production is shared among many farmers, who benefited from the FTLRP. The number of producers increased more than tenfold. If the inverse relationship discussed in Chapter 3 holds, then tobacco production would have strong community effects as farmers hire local labour and expend resources in the local economy. This is contrary to LSCFs, who have the capacity to access labour both locally and nationally, as happened during the colonial times (Rubert 1998). This chapter discusses tobacco production dynamics, including its history and the move from bank finance to contracting arrangements. As postulated by the access theory

6.1 History of Tobacco Production: a global perspective

Tobacco has four varieties produced around the globe of which over 80 percent is used in the production of cigarettes, and the rest goes into cigars, (Van Lien 2002). The varieties are flue-cured virginia, burley, oriental, dark air cured tobacco, of which in 2018 only virginia was produced and marketed in Zimbabwe (TIMB 2017). History shows that tobacco production started in the Americas; however, recent trends show a shift in farming of the green leaf and cigarette smoking to less developed countries, while the concentration of manufacturing is still in developed countries (Jacobs et al. 2000). Capital, therefore, continues to accumulate in developed countries while the hazards of production and consumption are borne by citizens of developing countries. One percent of the world’s agricultural land is under tobacco farming; however, there has been a shift of leaf production to the global south, where land under tobacco has more than tripled, while in the west, it is on the decline. China, the biggest tobacco leaf producer, has seen an exponential growth in farmland under tobacco, which more than tripled; the same applied to impoverished countries, such as Tanzania and Malawi (Eriksen, Mackay
and Ross 2013) and, for Zimbabwe after land reform, the more than hundred thousand smallholder farmers have even more land under tobacco farming. Apart from the many hours of family labour diverted to tobacco farming, food security and supply to the community could also be jeopardised because of land of high agricultural potential being used for tobacco production see agroecological zones Figure 6.1 and tobacco production regions Figure 6.2), all this with significant effects on rural livelihoods. It has been noted, from a pack of tobacco cigarettes (the final product), only two cents accrue to the leaf producer, while forty-nine cents go to the oligopsony. According to proponents of tobacco control, contracting arrangements under which most tobacco is produced, have increased smallholder farmers’ indebtedness to the oligopsony buyer, which finances the crop and which has locked farmers to the unfair practice (Nsiku and Botha 2007; Leppan, Lecours, and Buckles 2014). Where land is scarce, tobacco could lead to declining food production and food security concerns for the community.

6.2 History of Tobacco Production in Zimbabwe

Flue cured Virginia tobacco was first grown in Zimbabwe in 1890 after colonisation by BSAP, and the industry soon experienced growth, though in certain years interrupted, underpinned by strong government support and effective collective action by farmers (Rubert 1998). Access to coerced labour (Chibaro), large tracks of virgin land suitable for tobacco farming and plentiful markets enabled colonial settlers to establish profitable tobacco commercial farms (Rubert 1998). African labour was, next to the purchase of the land itself, arguably the most important factor in establishing a tobacco farm, and the exploitation of labour became the trademark of the success of a tobacco farmer (Prowse 2009). Until 2002, tobacco was largely produced by white farmers and fewer than 8 000 smallholder farmers, who produced the less lucrative burley tobacco, which is air cured. During this period tobacco was financed through private bank finances supported by freehold land collateral. LSCF were thus able to benefit from the land because they controlled and had access to productive resources either by coercion or legal means as per Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) access theory.

After the land reform, smallholder farmers took up Virginia tobacco production in large numbers with the 2018/19 registered producers increasing by 65-percent from 98 000 to over a 160 000 (Chikwati 2018 November). This development means that tobacco production has a big impact on community livelihoods in terms of resource access, self and hired labour, income effects and the general way people earn a living in rural areas. However, after FTLRP banks stopped financing tobacco production due to lack of collateral and land tenure security problems described in the last three chapters.
6.3 Organisation of Tobacco Production and Marketing in Zimbabwe

The tobacco industry in Zimbabwe is regulated by TIMB, and TRB provides research services to the industry. Various other players complement these two government institutions, which include contracting firms (20 in 2017), transporters and input suppliers who serve leaf producers. At the agro-processing level, there are processors who prepare the crop bought at the auction and contracting floors for export; these have no contracts with leaf producers. TIMB, as the regulator, registers all players in the tobacco industry; that includes producers, contracting firms and transporters at a fee of US$10 (for farmers) or more depending on the timing of the registration. For other categories, fees vary.

In Zimbabwe, a dual marketing system is in place, where an auction system operates alongside contracted production. The two systems, however, both depend on ruling international market prices on the day of sale in determining the sale price. This system is translated into local price structure through TIMB’s price matrix, which is released daily during the marketing season and forms the basis of auction prices; however, for contracting firms, their prices cannot be below the auction price (which is their minimum benchmark), it can only be the same or higher. The auction system is demand-driven. At the floors, bidding is initiated by a Starter, who calls out the start bidding price. The auctioner then takes over until only one bidder is left.

Figure 6-1: Zimbabwe’s Agroecological regions

Source: FAO 2006
Tobacco is mainly produced in agroecological regions I, IIA, IIB (see figure 6-1 on page 92). As shown on Figure 6.2, most of the tobacco growing areas are in high potential agricultural zones I, IIA, and IIB. This can threaten the country’s food security as most small scale farmers shift to tobacco production. However, due to perceived high income, farmers in all farming regions have now taken up the production of the crop. Eighty-three percent of registered A1 and communal farmers produce 54.6% of the tobacco crop and farm 70.4% of the total hectarage under tobacco in Zimbabwe; however, they earned only 48.7% of the income generated from leaf tobacco sales in 2016 and 55% in 2017 (TIMB 2016b, 2017). A1 and communal farmers also constitute the rural peasantry where the majority have poor access to agricultural productive resources. However, poor access to productive resources resulted in low productivity (1 137kgs for communal and 1 280kgs for A1) compared to 2 561 kgs for A2 commercial farmers. This is also reflected in low average prices. There is a marginal difference in average hectares (0.04 ha), yield (0.143 kg) and price (1 cent) for communal and A1 farmers, which shows the two groups are almost homogenous and comparable in terms of their tobacco agricultural production.

**Figure 6-2: Tobacco Growing Areas of Zimbabwe**

Source: Tobacco Research Board, 2017

Table 6-1 below shows the various classes of tobacco leaf producers in Zimbabwe and their contribution to the tobacco industry; A2 commercial farmers contribute the most despite their smaller numbers and total area under tobacco, and the data show that their yields are more than twice those of communal and A1 farmers.
Table 6-1: 2015 Grower Distribution by Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grower Sector</th>
<th>No. of Growers</th>
<th>Mass Sold in kgs</th>
<th>USD Value USD/kg</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Average hectares per farmer</th>
<th>Yield in kgs per hectare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>27 282</td>
<td>51 283 419</td>
<td>135 149 635</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>40 072</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>6 982</td>
<td>70 892 762</td>
<td>237 697 628</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>27 662</td>
<td>3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>35 253</td>
<td>57 290 484</td>
<td>150 493 984</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>50 367</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-Scale Commercial Farmers</td>
<td>5 875</td>
<td>19 867 426</td>
<td>62 756 241</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>10 352</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>75 392</td>
<td>198 954 849</td>
<td>586 444 231</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>128 454</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMB (2015)

Tobacco products manufacturing and marketing are controlled by a small cartel of multinational companies, namely, Philip Morris, R J Reynolds, BAT, Imperial Tobacco, and Japan Tobacco. Not only have multinationals defined the nature of tobacco products manufacturing and marketing the world over, they also have subsidiary companies (contractors) in countries producing the raw tobacco (Poulton, Kydd, and Kabame 2007). Recently, Chinese tobacco companies have also come on board. For instance, Scoones et al. (2018) have shown that most contracting firms, such as Tribac (a subsidiary of Japan Tobacco), Northern Tobacco (BAT) and Mashonaland Tobacco Company (Alliance One International) in Zimbabwe, are owned by these multinationals. The twenty contracting firms therefore operate at national level as agents for the big multinational companies, financing production, buying the tobacco and exporting it to the parent or principal companies. Therefore, consolidated international capital is responsible for financing production operations in developing countries and in Zimbabwe with 84 percent of tobacco produced under contract (TIMB 2017). Again, the multinationals have established processing and handling plants in grower countries leading efforts to support tobacco production, such as in Zimbabwe, where companies, such as Tobacco Processing Zimbabwe founded in 1987 and owned by Northern Tobacco Company (Pvt Ltd), Inter-continental leaf Tobacco, and Tribac process tobacco on behalf of the multinationals. This is a manifestation of the collusion and concentration of capital within the tobacco industry and continued alliance building for the extraction of capital through exploitation of poorly-resourced peasants who now dominate the production of the crop.

In developing countries, such as Zimbabwe, tobacco production is dependent on foreign capital and the farmers are exposed to international markets (Scoones et al 2018). Furthermore, tobacco production is a highly specialised, input-intensive process (labour, fertilisers and pesticides) and requires specialised curing facilities, such as curing barns, which, in turn, demand huge initial financial outlays (Poulton, Kydd, and Kabame 2007), which means it affects various structures of the community as people converge to provide these services. Surplus labour and a conducive climate in Zimbabwe, for instance, has meant that it has a comparative advantage in producing tobacco, and hence, multinationals position themselves to extract capital that emanates from this comparative advantage. Despite the input intensity
and capital requirements, tobacco has remained lucrative because of its high returns compared to staple crops. Mut and Foti (2008) estimate that its returns are six times that of staple crops. The inclusion of smallholder farmers into commercial tobacco production and land reform processes that transferred land to the poor necessitate (due to lack of financing for small farmers) the establishment of contract arrangement schemes in developing countries; this is also coupled with declining production in developed countries due to health risks associated with tobacco production.

In Zimbabwe, multinationals release financing to their subsidiaries, who then register with TIMB as required by the country’s regulations before they contract with tobacco farmers to produce on their behalf. In 2016, 16 firms were contracting farmers in different parts of the country (Scoones et al. 2018) and 84 percent of tobacco was produced under contract. The main actors directly involved with contract farming in Zimbabwe are the TIMB (the regulatory authority), agribusinesses and farmers that are described in Appendix 1. While the state is said to have played a negligible role, its functionaries (such as the police and extension officers) actively assisted with the selection of beneficiaries (Scoones et al. 2018). Ribot and Peluso (2003) have classified such access channels as illegal and based on coercion while Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999) identify them as institutions that facilitate access. All this influence production relations on farms.

### 6.4 Tobacco Production

In the foreword of the *Flue-cured Tobacco Production Field Guide*, Masuka writes: “Tobacco production is labour-demanding and skills-intensive, in addition to requiring higher inputs per hectare than most crops” (Tobacco Research Board (TRB) 2011). In this guide, TRB articulates a production cycle starting from the seedbed until the tobacco is sold in a marketing season, which could stretch to over six months starting around March of every marketing season. This overlaps with a long farming period of up to nine months or twelve months, if one considers all the preparatory work that goes into tobacco production that helps create more jobs than most seasonal agriculture (Rubert 1998). For instance, during the marketing season in March and April, the farmer could be grading tobacco, ploughing and clearing the tobacco fields to contain diseases; this is in addition to other farming chores for smallholders, who use their family labour.

Tobacco production begins with land preparation around March before the last rains end, followed by nursing of the seedlings from July to September, and their eventual transplantation to the field from September to December, where ridges would have been prepared in advance. The application of fertilisers and chemicals and the maintenance of the plant through weeding, pruning and disease management and thereafter, reaping, is followed by curing of tobacco in the barns (TRB 2011). Transplanting seedlings from seedbeds to the field is a labour-intensive process that involves the examination of each seedling for quality, transporting it to the field, making holes, applying basal...
fertilisers to each hole and plant, as well as watering each plant depending on the weather. For a hectare of tobacco, fifteen thousand plants are transplanted; a taxing activity for a farmer using family labour, and hence, access to labour becomes the most critical resource in determining acreage allotted to tobacco farming (Rubert 1998). To obtain a uniform plot of tobacco, transplanting should be completed within a day or two, thus necessitating long hours and even working in the rain to ensure the successful completion of the task. Also, during harvesting, curing and grading, labour is important to speedily prepare tobacco for the barns, and there is a need for constant monitoring of barns to ensure that there is a constant supply of firewood to the furnace. Delays in curing the tobacco compromise quality. The handling of the tobacco leaf, chemicals and fertilisers is also associated with diseases, such as green tobacco sickness, added to this it has devastating effects on the environment, deforestation and soil fertility depletion (Keyser 2002).

Apart from labour, tobacco farming demands ownership of assets that are hard to lease in a community of tobacco farmers, such as draught power and scotch carts to transport the tobacco. Ownership of enough barns is also important, given that tobacco takes seven days to cure and harvesting is a weekly activity. The green leaf cannot be warehoused; it loses quality and hence, everything that doesn’t go into the barn within 24 hours is normally disposed of. Most smallholders use ox-drawn ploughs and scotch carts for ploughing, ridging and transporting harvested tobacco for curing.

Tobacco curing is a process that should be done meticulously, as this defines the quality of tobacco, its colour, texture and presentation at the market; for instance, inadequately cured tobacco could have green portions on the leaf, which could affect its classification at the auction floor. Soon after harvest, tobacco should be transported to the sheds and tied and prepared to be placed in the barn for curing. The barns are fired by coal or firewood; however, these are environmental depleting methods on the ozone and forest. The processes described above require labour, maintenance of barns and assets, and that generates employment for the community. In a study of tobacco farmers in Mount Darwin, Mashonaland Central, tobacco farming was said to be viable, and the authors encouraged the uptake by smallholder farmers, despite noting the negative environmental effects (Masvongo, Mutambara, and Zvinavashe 2013). However, this depends on the ability of the farmer to access labour and other productive resources as discussed in chapter 2 and depicted on Figure 2 on page 29.

There is also strong lobbying against the production and consumption of tobacco on health and economic reasons spearheaded by the World Health Organisation, under the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), of which most of the tobacco-producing countries are signatories. As a result, this has led to policy contradictions when implementing tobacco control measures at the same time as pursuing poverty alleviation and economic growth objectives (Barraclough and Morrow 2010), and hence, the sustainability and role of tobacco in meeting the twin government objectives of economic and peasant development can be constrained by the FCTC. The distribution of value in this chain could
also reflect capitalist development in the global south *vis-a-vis* the western world, which could lead to
exploitation of the periphery by the centre through uneven development and accumulation processes.
The processes described above show the capacity of tobacco production in the absorption of labour and
generating income for economically active members in tobacco-producing areas, which could benefit
the community at large.

### 6.5 Livelihood Effects of Tobacco Production

In 2011, 1 066 287 Southern Africa Development Community tobacco farmers employed 3 661 914
workers, who, in turn, supported 16 959 332 dependants from income earned from tobacco leaf; another
quarter of the workers were employed within the value chain, which numbers exclude support industry,
such as transport, financial services, and input suppliers (NKC African Economics 2012), which shows
the importance of tobacco in livelihoods. About two-thirds of these farmers, employees and dependants
are in Malawi and Zimbabwe, the major regional producers and exporters of leaf tobacco, and arguably
the poorest countries in the region (Diao et al. 2002). The same scenario obtains in other major tobacco-
producing countries from less developed countries, such as Brazil (FAO 2003). These positive effects
on employment benefit communities through income effects, which allow people to access food and
other livelihood capitals. Further downstream and upstream industries directly benefit through transport
and other service provisions further creating employment for rural communities. The FTLRP provided
land to some of the communities, which allowed them to participate in tobacco commercial production
and hence reap primary benefits in the share of income. Evidence from tobacco-farming regions shows
that farmers benefited. This is in line with observation that tobacco is a major employer in the
agricultural sector.

Tobacco contributes 25+ and 50+ percent to foreign currency earnings, and 10 and 15 percent to GDP
for Zimbabwe and Malawi, respectively, yet the impoverished rural population of the two countries has
the highest levels of malnutrition (FAO 2003; NKC African Economics 2012; Nsiku and Botha 2007).
There is no doubt that tobacco generates foreign currency and revenue for government, despite known
health and environmental challenges (Keyser 2002). The major question is who benefits from tobacco
production if the same peasants who produce the crop are languishing in poverty. Critics of tobacco leaf
production argue that the main beneficiaries are the oligopsony buyer and political elites, the latter
benefiting from patronage and lobbying fees, while the poor in developing countries are enticed into
tobacco production and consumption for the benefit of the oligopsony. Further, because of the long
hours, days and months needed to work on tobacco, it is alleged that this compromises food security
and nutrition for these poor farm workers, as family labour is diverted to tobacco to mitigate constraints
inherent in tobacco production, though this was not the case in Mazowe as will be shown in chapter 8.
However there is evidence that cash crop production support food security as shown in this paragraph. Cash crop production supports food security through improved supply to modern inputs, farm implements (income effect) and training (Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro 1999). In studies in Mozambique, Kenya and Zimbabwe, (Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro 1999) found that cash crop production complements staple crop production, as farmers’ access cash to pay for modern inputs. This study observed that contract farming provided staple food input that increased food production. This trend seem to be taking root among the tobacco oligopsony buyer as evidenced by BAT’s mixed farming incubator model for tobacco and food crops in South Africa (MASDT 2018). Govereh and Jayne (2003) also found similar results in Gokwe North in Zimbabwe, itself a product of land reform, which provided farmers access to larger virgin and fertile plots. As in these studies, this study also noted spillover effects to people who were not involved in cash crop production. This is what Sen (1981) argues creates favourable ‘exchange entitlements’. The supply of staple food inputs is one way of commercialising agriculture as envisaged by Von Braun (1995) through adoption of modern inputs, technologies and markets. Thought of in terms of access theory, contract farming provided a financial ‘strand’ that allowed farmers to use modern inputs to boost food production. Use of modern inputs and hired labour was also found to be a contributing factor in increasing FTLRP beneficiaries’ production and income (Zikhali 2010; Riera and Swinnen 2016).

6.6 Constraints to Tobacco Production

Zimbabwean smallholder farmers have had mixed experiences since the British South African Company (BSAC) took over the administration of what was then Rhodesia in 1890. From that date until 1980, agricultural institutions were established that supported the settler white farmers, explicitly excluding blacks, who were in marginal agricultural lands. The consistently discriminatory, pre-independence agricultural policy formed the backbone of early successes in the commercialisation and capitalisation of the sector in general and for particular crops, such as tobacco. Rubert (1998) reports that this was achieved through targeted capitalisation, marketing, production and labour policy aimed at sustaining white tobacco farmers. During this period, the formation of the CFU, commodity-based associations, such as Zimbabwe Tobacco Association and financial institutions, such as Agricultural Finance Cooperation, were meant to cater for colonial farmers’ needs. Also, clear subsidy policies ensured the successful commercialisation of targeted crops. Yet government maintained such discriminatory policies. All this deprived indigenous farmers the opportunity to acquire experience, technology and market know-how required in the production of tobacco.

However, peasant farmers responded to market exclusion through local initiatives which Bessant and Muringai (1993) referred to as a moral economy. This resulted in Mazowe farmers fruitfully participating in maize markets during the colonial era. Mafeje (2003) argues that the ‘middle peasant’
emerged at the back of investments from non-farm activities. In Zimbabwe, colonial institutions, such as research and extension services, formed the launch pad of Zimbabwe’s agricultural revolution. Indigenous people were differentiated through such programs as the master farmer and small-scale resettlement. At independence, the Zimbabwean government adopted a policy of growth with equity that was aimed at promoting smallholder farmers through resettlement and agricultural intensification. For a decade, the Zimbabwe government established institutions, such as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), in rural areas to distribute inputs and buy agricultural outputs from smallholder farmers (Mabeza-Chimedza 1998). The proximity of the institutions to farmers led to equitable access and the increased use of hybrid seeds, fertilisers and extension services resulting in the doubling of agricultural production. All of this allowed farmers to build assets that supported their agricultural productivity and livelihoods. However, the government found itself perpetuating the same policy thrust that supported white commercial farmers, and no sustainable growth-enhancing institutions were put in place to support smallholder agriculture. For instance, the financial support extended through Agricultural Finance Corporation only reached a few farmers and the financing model was not sustainable and hence, it collapsed. Other interventions, such as subsidies were also not sustainable and collapsed under the economic SAP. Notable in Zimbabwean policies was the lack of clarity on the economic model pursued, whether it was capitalist or socialist, and the government seemed to shift policy depending on political prudence.

Institutions that were developed in the 1980s to support communal and resettled farmers with input and with output markets faded in the 1990s, when the failed SAP started. Incentives to smallholder farmers were withdrawn, as the government’s weak fiscus could not sustain agricultural institutions in rural areas, leaving farmers exposed to free market operations. This was followed by the declining use of modern inputs, extension services and the elimination of incentivised marketing services, which were replaced by private agribusinesses. Low agricultural productivity meant low income, poor nutrition and health, and low capacity for rural households to earn assets for the diversification of livelihoods. Agricultural virtually collapsed after the FTLRP forcing the government to promote contract farming arrangements as discussed in chapter 5.

6.7 Tobacco Contract Farming in Zimbabwe

Until 2004, tobacco production was financed through commercial bank credit, all this changed with the changing tenure system which gave rise to unbankable 1999-lease agreements to A2 farmers and permits to A1. Most A1-farmers were excluded from bank credit. Consequently, the government promoted contract farming to reap benefits alluded to by proponents of contract farming. Proponents of contract farming argue that agribusiness firms provide resources, services and markets for farmers to produce cash crops that meet their requirements (Minot and Sawyer 2016). The resources and services said to be beneficial to farmers include:
• Supply of farming inputs, fertilisers, and herbicides

• Advice and extension services to farmers

• Technology on production of new crops

• Guaranteed markets for the farmer’s produce

• Credit without the need for collateral and rigorous credit worthiness checks

Indeed, these benefits, though contested by most political economists, were observed in Mazowe (Scoones et al. 2018) and among tobacco producers in general. Production increased, contract grower numbers swelled, farmers accessed finance and agronomic advice (Sachikonye 2016)

Despite these perceived benefits and the dire need of finance by FTLRP farmers, scholars still doubted and questioned contract farming as a viable arrangement. For example, Sachikonye (2016) points to the contemporary issues raised by critical political economists. These include pricing, dependence and ecological disaster that could threaten sustainable agriculture.

In this way tobacco contract farming has taken the same trajectory critical scholars have observed in contemporary debates. These scholars point to the profit motive of contracting firms, which always leads to an inclination towards exploiting the uninformed, poor smallholder farmer. At a macro-level, Mafeje (2003) has questioned the appropriateness of market-based approaches to commercialising rural agriculture, suggesting rural smallholder farming could be developed through the local-based harnessing of resources and access to markets. Mafeje (2003) observed banding as one such method used by peasant farmers producing for markets. He argued that this will lead to farmers negotiating and participating in markets as equals. Farmer dependence on contractors also leads to an exploitative relationship (Yeros 2018).

At the micro-level, Sachikonye (1989) and Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) all hone in on the exploitative nature of contract farming, pointing to the self-exploitation of labour by smallholders. They argue that it can increase differentiation in communities and exploits the poor smallholder due to an unequal power balance in contract negotiation. This unequal power balance extends to farmers’ negotiations with labour. Indeed, Ribot and Peluso (2003:153) argue that “a bundle of powers” affect access to resources which could lead to differentiation. This is a pertinent observation considering that contract farming provides only partial resources and that farmers have to negotiate for complementary resources. In Zimbabwe, FTLRP resulted in the reconfiguration of power, resources, and market access opportunities for communities, which ultimately affected their livelihoods (Moyo 2011a; Scoones et al. 2011; Scoones et al. 2018).

As Sachikonye (2016), observes tobacco production reached an all time low after FTLRP due mainly to lack of productive resources among a highly differentiated farming community. Work by Bernstein and Oya (2014) has shown the effect of rural social differentiation in accessing markets, indicating the
role initial assets play in accessing contracts (Vicol 2015). In Mozambique, asset endowments were found to be important in accessing markets, showing the importance of initial livelihood conditions where the rural elite have a better chance of getting into contract farming compared to the rest of the poor community members. All this exposed farmer to exploitative contracting conditions as discussed in chapter 7

The biggest Chinese contractors preferred contracting with large A2 farmers (Sachikonye 2016, Mukwereza 2013). Selection bias in the process of choosing participants excludes smallholders really in need of assistance. This also took an access dimension where coercion and patronage play a part in accessing resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003; Leach, Mearn and Scoones 1999). Scoones et al (2018) provides an example of this in Mvurwi, noting the role state agency played in accessing contracts. Questions also arise as to whether smallholder farmers receive a fair share of the prevailing international prices from the value chain. Simmons (2002) has argued that the contracting firm and smallholder farmers aim to reduce transaction costs in entering contract farming arrangements, meaning the poorer members of society viewed as risky will be excluded and/or marginalised. As a result, poorly resourced farmers may not participate and when they do, may not sustain the demands of contract farming. Despite this, contract farming is viewed as an institutional arrangement that has the capacity to provide resources, modern technology and markets for smallholder farmers, thus creating community bourgeoisies that can facilitate the development of capitalism in rural areas (Kennedy 1994). Increased economic activity could have wider community-effects through employment and income effects.

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter discussed tobacco production in Zimbabwe. Tobacco production was historical dominated by white commercial farms who were ably supported by government institutions and farmer organisations. These institutions provided services that equipped farmers with production and marketing skills. However, after independence government maintained policies that were biased against smallholder farmers and hence were deprived of the necessary knowhow and experience to produce tobacco. This effectively put them at a disadvantage and they faced constraints in the uptake of tobacco production. This was despite the fact that tobacco production was beneficial both to the people at government. The chapter shows that farmers benefited from tobacco production whenever they had access to productive resources like labour, finance and institutional support as argued by Ribot and Peluso (2003). After FTLRP, contract farming was promoted as an intervention to promote access to finance and technology for the FTLRP beneficiaries and tobacco farmers in general. Contract farming is reportedly helping farmers deal with constraints such as the lack of technology, finance and insurance. However, the old tendencies of farmer exploitation persist. The next chapter shows that Mazowe is an area suitable for tobacco production, however farmer participation was affected by power imbalances that favoured the contractor.
Chapter 7

Land, Agriculture and Livelihoods in Mazowe

7.0 Introduction

Agriculture is the main source of livelihoods in Mazowe, supporting subsistence and cash needs of the community. Other livelihoods include gendered non-farm activities, such as beer brewing and trading by women, and mining, fishing and brick-making by men. Access to land is important for people to access natural resources, such as firewood, minerals and participation in contract farming activities; however, access to capital has been the major constraint resulting in farmers seeking to join contract farming. Capital was recently introduced to the community in the form of contract farming arrangements, the injection of artisanal mining capital for smallholder peasants, and irrigation schemes, such as the Negomo Irrigation scheme financed by the Zimbabwean government and German investors. All this has shaped the way livelihoods are gained, controlled and maintained through various channels, such as kinship, social relations and political association, shaped by historical and contemporary developments as suggested by Ribot and Peluso (2003) and Berry (1993). In maintaining access, for instance, benefits are transferred to other actors giving rise to community level effects as discussed in Chapter 9.

This chapter describes the case study area, Mazowe, and the processes that affect it, such as demographics, infrastructure, land (particularly FTLRP), the state of agriculture, livelihoods, and markets. All of these affect farmers’ participation in contracting arrangements in Mazowe, as farmers harness them to build assets and access to resources. In doing so, there are community wide effects that arise.

7.1 Mazowe Infrastructure, Natural Resources and Climate

This case study is in Mazowe, one of the seven districts in Mashonaland Central, Zimbabwe. Mazowe lies between 40 and 107 kilometres from the capital city and Concession, the administrative centre, is 60km north of Harare. A tarred road cuts across the district linking the farming districts of Centenary and Mount Darwin further north, and another tarred road linking Mvurwi and Centenary to the west and Bindura (provincial capital) to the east; gravel feeder roads connect the farming community to tarred roads. The roads link the modern urban settlements fast developing in Concession, where government offices are located, Aspindale, Nzvimbo growth point and Mvurwi, which Scoones et al. (2018) described as a vibrant centre, and, further north, Chaona growth point. This infrastructure facilitates good accessibility to and from farms and markets in Harare, which makes the area a preferred
destination for agribusinesses and commercially oriented farmers. The district covers an area of 453 892 hectares and, as shown on the map, about a quarter of the area (210 000 acres) is communal, sandwiched by former LSCFs. After the FTLRP, most A1 farmers were settled on farms bordering the communal areas, creating a symbiotic relationship between these villagised communities.

Mazowe lies in natural regions II and III (see Figure 6.1 page, 92) 1 249m (4 097ft) above sea level on 17° 30’14” S latitude and 30°58’25” E longitude with average rainfall of 750-1 000 ml, which is suitable for various crops and livestock production. The good soils and rainfall patterns allow for diverse cropping and animal husbandry activities; such good ecological conditions attract contracting firms. Over 60 percent of peasants who were interviewed or surveyed indicated that they were involved in multiple cropping activities to supplement and diversify their income options. These activities include crop production, horticulture, citrus, wildlife, seed production and dairy (Sukume et al. 2015) practiced by the various land owners. For instance, survey data showed farmers producing cash crops (60 percent) were involved in market gardening (70 percent) and 99 percent of respondents produced staple crops, which occupied over 70 percent of the land holding of the household. Evidence from Mazowe indicated that farmers produced tobacco because it was the most profitable crop, with a ready market at the auction floors. Matondi (2012) observed that farmers in Mazowe had 50 percent of their arable land under maize production. Crop diversification was mainly aimed at developing alternative sources of income in the case of crop failure. Hence, the integration of farmers into contract farming arrangements should be viewed as a livelihood strategy.

The rainy season stretches from November to April and the dry season sets in from June till October. Rain-fed agriculture occurs during the rainy seasons and is concentrated in region III, however, irrigated horticultural production continues in areas such as Negomo and farms in region II such as citrus in Mazowe. Sukume et al. (2015:12) describe the farming zones in Mazowe as “…technically divided into four Intensive Conservation Area (ICAs)24, namely the Barwick, Marodzi-Tatagura, Mvurwi and Glendale ICAs” with different soil types. The sand to sandy loam soils are suitable for tobacco production and these soils are found in all the ICAs except Marodzi-Tatagura, which has red clay soils. The ICAs managed environmental issues within a given ecological area, ensuring the cropping patterns and natural resources were used in a sustainable manner.

Mazowe’s ecological region also boasts a vegetation that is supportive of tobacco production, where curing energy is needed. A farmer in Ndire noted: “Our forests are gone. We have been paying a reforestation levy to TIMB for the past few years but nothing is being done for us. One day we will have no firewood to cure our tobacco.” Deforestation is so severe that mature Brachystegia spiciformis (musasa), Julbernardia and globiflora (mutondo) varieties, which are used as curing energy, are hard to find within the village. After the FTLRP, the demise of ICAs meant there was no peer enforcement
of environmental concerns; however, in Mazowe, attempts to resuscitate ICAs were observed and are being spearheaded by local leadership through ward-based resource officers.

Figure 7-1: Mazowe Map showing Ward boundaries

Source: Sukume et al., 2015
The Great Dyke belt, which has vast mineral deposits, such as gold and lime, cuts across the district, and a couple of mining activities also contribute to livelihoods and economic activities in addition to commercial and subsistence agriculture.

The map in Figure 7-1 shows Mazowe district. To the right and north of the green line lie the Chiweshe communal areas, bordered by Bindura to the east and Centenary to the north; the rest are former commercial farms. Most A1 settlements are on boundaries of communal areas, with the exception of the Forester farms, which are owned on bilateral agreements between the German and Zimbabwe governments. Mazowe has good infrastructure, such as Howard Hospital in the Chiweshe communal area, and other public goods that support agriculture. The provision of public goods has also attracted agribusinesses to the area, as discussed in chapter 8.

7.2 Mazowe Demography and Labour Supply Dynamics

Mazowe’s population is largely of a diverse African origin, with people coming from all over the country since the advent of the land reform. As in most FTLRP resettlements discussed in Chapter 5, former-farm workers remained on the farms with no alternative livelihood options and hence, they feel compromised when negotiating labour contracts. A former farm worker confirmed this, as follows:

My parents came from Malawi and worked as farm workers. I grew up working in these farms. After the farms were taken by war veterans, I remained in the compound. The new farmers hire us for a fee of US$3 a day; they need our skills because they don’t know how to farm tobacco thus why they allowed us to stay. The problem is they don’t pay well.

Since 2002 the population has grown by 22% due to FTLRP-induced inward migration (Sukume et al., 2015) increasing the supply of labour in the community. There are 233 450 people of whom 49.8 and 50.2 percent are male and female, respectively; 90.8 percent of the people live in rural areas, and 104 809 (44.9%) are economically active (ZIMSTATS 2012) and derive their livelihood from agriculture or natural resources, such as mining. While Mazowe is predominantly rural, it has a young economically active population in paid employment (37.2%) and 43.8 percent are own account workers. On average, 4.2 people live in a household where 72.9 percent are headed by males and the adult population (from 15+) literacy rate is 96 percent. Men dominate economic activities, such as cash crop production, participation in contract farming and mining. Though there are generally more females than males in Mazowe, the distribution shows that there are more males in A1 settlements where the percentage of the population is above 50%, a sign of the patriarchal nature of the community and bias in the distribution and access to economic activities.

A1 communities are a diverse group from different parts of the country, both rural and urban areas. Occupations range through formal employment, farm workers, miners, former farm workers, rural
peasants who are dependent on the sale of their labour for subsistence, and government workers (teachers, nurses, policemen, and soldiers) who dominate the working class and double up as farmers often investing their income from salaries in agriculture. This is in line with other rural-based workers: for instance, Randela (2005) observed this in a study of Moutse and Nkomazi in South Africa. These workers were attracted to Mazowe by the favourable agroecology, proximity to Harare and mineral deposits found in the area. However, this has implications on the share of value generated from Mazowe land. For instance, interviews revealed that farmers from other regions drew labour from their former homelands while also reinvesting income generated in the same pattern thus minimising positive community wide effects of contract farming in Mazowe.

Most of those in formal employment live in urban set-ups within the district, such as Concession, Glendale and Nzimbo, and shuttle to and from their farms. The colonial government forcibly settled black peasants in these communal lands, near the white farms so that they could be a ready source of labour. Consequently, most people in Mazowe worked in commercial farms producing cash crops, gaining skills they now apply as labourers or cash crop producers in their own plots. This pool of knowledge is attractive to both the contractor and contracted farmers who have access to trained labour who are ready to produce tobacco. All this has affected how access to labour is negotiated, with those in professional jobs and elites using their social status and identity to negotiate for labour services.

Labour is negotiated through various informal social structures that link the A1 and communal communities, for instance, women’s clubs, churches, socialisation during beer drinks, referrals, lineage structures and immediate family. The binding force in the negotiations seems to be the need to access resources, such as land, for production purposes, which has given rise to some form of share cropping arrangements, or exchange of inputs, tillage services and, at times, food for subsistence purposes.

Most labour arrangements were part-time, though mostly repeated over various tasks and seasons. For instance, respondents, who reported that they did not have enough food, exchanged their labour for food and inputs within their social networks; for example, in 2015, Tindo weeded a half acre of tobacco crop for two turkeys (birds) for breeding purposes. At the time of the field work in July 2017, the turkeys had multiplied to 50 and he was selling them to meet his children’s school fees (see Appendix 6).

Tobacco farmers, mainly new heads of households with no resources, worked for the well-off farmers in exchange for tobacco seedlings, tillage services and assistance with marketing of their tobacco at the auction floors. This formed some of the complex mechanisms through which people accessed resources to earn a living. For instance, the well-off used their resources to access labour for their contract farming activities, while the vast pool of labour benefited from employment opportunities arising from contract farming initiatives. As will be shown in Chapter 9, these are some of the various ways through which community wide effects manifested in Mazowe.
Community Infrastructure and Public Goods

Mazowe is endowed with a robust physical infrastructure that supports farming activities in various respects, such as transportation of inputs and outputs to markets. The good road network facilitates trade with Harare markets and has also attracted a considerable number of well-off people, who double-up work in urban areas and commercial crop production. For instance, most people, who rented land for cash crop production, commuted from Harare as and when certain tasks needed to be completed. Horticultural farmers were also attracted by the good road network and the district’s proximity to Harare, and hence, most horticulture ventures concentrated on the southern part of Mazowe, which is close to Harare. Since the advent of the FTLRP, tobacco production has increased in Mazowe and now the district is the third-highest producer behind traditional tobacco producing districts, such as Hurungwe and Makoni. This is mainly because of its proximity to Harare, which reduces transport costs for the farmers and contracting firms.

Communication infrastructure is also in place, and most places that we visited had network connectivity for both data and voice allowing for extensive cell-phone use in the district. The availability of communication services is important for farmer organisation information-sharing initiatives. For instance, ZTA had a farmer WhatsApp group to “…disseminate relevant information to Zimbabwe’s tobacco growers” (Zimbabwe Tobacco Association 2017: 2). The good cellphone network coverage allowed for easy payments through mobile phone platforms, such as Ecocash, as well as easy bookings for the tobacco sales and coordinating of inputs deliveries. An extension officer with a contractor had this to say about the infrastructure:

I enjoy working with Mazowe farmers; the roads are good, the network coverage is perfect, which makes communication with the farmers easy: a group message and all my work is done. Some of my farmers have smart phones and we share pictures about the crop, which allows for prompt advice to reach the farmer (Interview October 7, 2017).

Barrett et al. (2012) observed that good infrastructure attracted agribusinesses to communities because it reduced transaction costs, a factor which could be attracting contracting firms to Mazowe. The proximity of the district to major urban areas also made it possible for contractors to attract specialised extension officers, who could easily work from the comfort of the urban settlements.

Mazowe has good water bodies, such as Mazowe River, and various dams, which were constructed on various farms by former commercial farmers in the district. Borehole water can also be accessed within 40-50 metre depth thus providing supplementary water sources. This sets the district on a sound agricultural path; however, this has been compromised by the destruction of irrigation equipment during the FTLRP and contestation on use rights of the water bodies given that farms were subdivided into smaller units among owners from different regions and persuasions. Despite a government directive
that existing farm infrastructure should be shared, the use of communal water bodies is compromised by weak institutional arrangements. Households have generally good access to water for agricultural and household use (Towindo 2017, June; ZIMSTATS 2012), which allows them to partake in market gardening and tobacco seedbed operations, which require watering three times a day. Contestations and power imbalances have tended to marginalise peasant farmers’ access to water resources and hence, the participation in market-based agricultural activities. Also, the power game among the elite and poor peasants comes into play in the distribution of electricity.

Use of other agricultural infrastructure, such as tobacco barns left by displaced former commercial farmers, has been highly contested and, at times, was a source of conflict. At Thorncreek, such farm houses were being converted to schools and barns were being rented-out, however nobody took responsibility for maintaining these structures which were being slowly run-down. As a result, such infrastructure did not benefit the community.

Though Mazowe has a good infrastructure, its use has been compromised by institutional deficiencies and political power imbalances, which continue to favour the rich, as in colonial times when infrastructure use was tilted against the black rural community. The exclusion of the poor from such infrastructure as water and electricity also tends to exclude them from market-based activities, such as tobacco contract farming arrangements, where water is critical in irrigating or seedbed management. Like agribusiness, the community has invested in short-term social institutions at the expense of investment into access to infrastructure management institutions, possibly because of the unpredictable nature of the state and the state’s role in access to resources. However, according to one agribusiness representative in Harare, good infrastructure in Mazowe was one of the main reasons that they established contracting arrangements in the area (Interview September 24, 2017).

### 7.4 The FTLRP: Differential Access to Land among Peasant Farmers

Land is the most significant asset that people in Mazowe depend on for their agricultural and non-farm activities in a community where livelihoods straddle agriculture and non-farm activities. Land also defines who gets access to what economic resources. The processes and outcomes of the FTLRP have been broadly assessed and documented, and Mazowe has been fertile ground of such research (Chiweshe 2011; Matondi 2010; Matondi 2012; Scoones et al. 2018; Sukume et al. 2015), where issues relating to access, use and the welfare of land reform beneficiaries were the focal point. This section describes land access in Mazowe from the colonial to the recent FTLRP era.

#### 7.4.1 A1 Farmers Settle in Mazowe

Mazowe’s large-scale commercial farming community was not affected by the Lancaster House prescribed land reform of the 1980s, and symptoms of discontent started appearing in 1998 (Sadomba
2008; Sukume et al. 2015). Sadomba (2008) documents increased movement towards reclamation of land during the period before the FTLRP, led by spirit mediums and war veterans, whom he claims, mobilised local people towards the reclaiming of their forefathers’ land. However, he also notes the broader alliance war veterans sought from farm workers bringing into question the role of spirit mediums. At the start of the FTLRP, peasants in Mazowe did not enthusiastically occupy farms bordering the communal area as seen by the number of beneficiaries observed in this study (39% of the sample were from Chiweshe). Matondi (2010:iii) notes that “Chiefs from Chiweshe communal area argued that land reform had not benefited ‘vana vemuChiweshe’ (the people originating from Chiweshe)”.

This could have been due, in part, to the fact that war veterans leading the invasions originated from areas outside Mazowe and failure by local leadership and spirit mediums to mobilise people for the invasions. Sadomba (2008:136) suggests *kuramwa* (to become impatient) by spirit mediums could be a possible cause. In 2000, when the wave of farm invasions was at its peak, farm invaders came from Chiweshe and surrounding districts, and urban centres. A war veteran who originated from Masvingo described how they came to Mazowe, thus:

> In 2000, I and a few comrades from Harare and other districts invaded this farm. We were later joined by a few locals we invited to our base to boost our numbers. When we pegged the plots, people who were here at the base participated in the lottery to pick plots (Interview November 10, 2017).

A farmer at Thorncreek, who originated from Mount Darwin, had this to say:

> People from Mount Darwin moved in groups southwards in search of farms which were not occupied. When we got to a farm, some occupied and others who could not fit on that farm moved on. Our group finally settled on this farm. When time came for the District Administrator to peg and allocate the land we got the first preference because we had already settled (Interview July 15, 2017).

Most of the farmers at Thorncreek farm were from Mount Darwin. A few former farm workers who joined the war veterans also got land, though there was discrimination against those of foreign origin, who remained landless and confined to the farm compounds.

### 7.4.2 Access to Land in Mazowe: post-FTLRP

The processes of land allocation during and after fast track followed standard application procedures through the local authorities, with invaders drawing lots at the farms they occupied, and others going through local authorities or direct to the district administrator’s office. Consequently, those already
occupying farms had a better chance of being allocated land, as one A1 farmer from Mount Darwin observed:

When we invaded this farm, Chiweshe people thought it was a joke which would be reversed and hence, they saw no need to waste time. We arrived at this farm in 2000 and established our base next to the workers’ compound. After a few months, the District Administrator came and, asked us to draw a lottery where we picked our farms. We then got the offer letters. (Interview July 23, 2017).

Farm invasions became a mechanism of access, including those who participated, while marginalising and excluding those who remained home. The Chiweshe communal areas remained congested and short of arable and grazing land affecting their livestock herd, which is a source of draught power and participation in market-based agricultural activities.

Due to land shortages in the communal areas there is still talk among politicians to repossess land for further subdivisions into smaller units to accommodate more beneficiaries (Towindo June, 2017), thus bringing to the fore viability concerns that need to be considered in setting farm sizes in relation to land potential and population size (Cousins and Scoones 2010). In July 2017, communal peasants were registering for land with the hope of getting it through fresh land grabs and the former president was propagating for this during his Youth Interface rallies. This shows the importance of political power in allocation of land, and hence, using bundles of powers vested in the office of the president such proclamations could result in access to land though as suggested by access theory recipients have to play the patronage card.

As in the 1950s, traditional authorities are working hand-in-glove with government structures to deal with land distribution and management issues. This is also in line with the constitution and various Acts that govern the administration of communal lands. Emerging land governance issues in A1 schemes show that the land reform is but an extension of communal areas, given the recent extension of traditional authority structures to these areas. This is even more so if one considers the Zimbabwe constitution definition: “Communal Land, means land set aside under an Act of Parliament and held in accordance with customary law by members of a community under the leadership of a Chief” (Zimbabwe, Government of 2013). The extension of communal structures to A1 communities where traditional authority structures, Village Development Committees, Ward Committees and transformation of Committees of Seven into development units, as in communal lands, attests to this extension. In both jurisdictions land is held under permit from the District Administrator. It is the governance structure under chiefs (though contested [Matondi, 2010; Matondi, 2012]), which was observed in Mazowe. A scenario observed by Chipenda (2018) in neighbouring Goromonzoni district, which has “…reinstated the juridical, political and social powers of the chief over land which included its allocation, resolution of disputes and use” (Murisa 2018: 6), is underway in Mazowe. By extending
the chief’s authority to A1 settlements, it is, by default, extending the communal area boundaries to these settlements. Mkodzongi (2016) reports such processes in Mhondoro Ngezi, where chiefs have laid claim to their ancestral land and with it, administrative roles.

There is an emerging land rental market in A1 and communal areas driven by the ever-declining land holdings in rural areas in which rentals are paid for in cash or kind in the form of inputs, or some form of sharecropping. At Thorncreek farm, an A1 beneficiary of the FTLRP indicated he earned a living from renting out portions of his six-hectare plot for a fee ranging from $90 per-hectare for a cropping season or ten to twenty-percent of the harvest, depending on demand. Most of his customers were former farm workers and urbanites from Harare (Interview July 20, 2017). Farm workers in the area confirmed this arrangement and this is also in line with survey results that showed 20 percent of farm workers, urbanites, and farmers in communal areas actually rented agricultural land for their cash crops. For communal people, land was rented to facilitate tobacco contract farming production and rotation as their farm sizes were small and prone to diseases; as Kevin Cooke notes: “It doesn’t allow for the inevitable drop in yield for growers planting the same land for the 10th year in a row” (ZTA 2017:3).

To diversify their incomes, communal peasants rented land mainly, but not exclusively, from A1 farmers. Five A1 farmers also reported renting land from fellow A1 farmers, who were largely rich peasants who were accumulating above average in the community.

This section shows that access to land was achieved through violent means (involvement in invasions), rentals based on one’s wealth and social relations, and customary routes where local authorities took centre stage. This confirms access theory propositions discussed in Chapter 2. Both *de jure* and *de facto* means were used to access land (Berry 1993; Ribot 1998; Ribot and Peluso 2030). As a result, rentals and labour-land exchanges had broader community effects, as people were able to access land for cash or staple crop production.

### 7.4.3 Structure of Land Ownership in Mazowe

Mazowe district has a land ownership structure which comprises communal, villagised A1 resettlement, old resettlement and commercial A2. The land is characterised by differential use ranging from mechanised commercial production in A2 and some A1s to ox-drawn ploughs for the majority of A1s and communal areas; communal grazing facilities for A1 and communal areas and A2 that can largely be described as self-contained. This land ownership structure has its roots in colonial land dispossession, which created a dual structure, and, in correcting the dualism, the FTLRP resulted in Mazowe having an A1, A2 and communal land holding structure and, further north in Chaona, the old resettlement scheme.

Before the FTLRP, Mazowe had a dual land ownership structure: the large commercial farms alongside the communal areas, which were embedded within the commercial farming areas. On the map (figure
7.1, the green triangular part, which mainly consists of wards 1-15, known as Chiweshe Reserves, was a creation of the colonial government. Surrounding Chiweshe were about 450 large commercial farms (Chiweshe 2011), which generally drew labour from the communal areas. The FTLRP, resulted in homogenous six-hectare villagised A1 settlements, which are largely communal in terms of their *modus operandi*, the main differences being the land size, the offer letter held by A1 beneficiaries and the high influence of political and government bureaucratic management of these settlements.

The communal areas have varied land sizes, the ownership is a product of colonial, patriarchal or traditional authority allocation control of which has been retained in the hands of traditional authorities as it was during the colonial times. Due to the patriarchal nature of the Chiweshe community, land continued to be subdivided to accommodate marrying sons, who were ready to start a family. This practice has continued to this day and land per household has shrunk to an average of 0.6 hectares (Steen 2011). This leads to the break-up of household assets (Foster and Rosenzweig 2002) and diminishing land holdings for the households. Over 80 percent of those from the communal areas, who responded to a survey questionnaire, indicated that land was not enough to meet their farming needs; an observation that was also made by all community leaders interviewed. Survey data also show that fewer people from the communal areas were in tobacco production because of inadequate land for required rotation.

The shortage of grazing land in the communal areas was also a source of on-going conflicts with neighbouring commercial farms. The researcher observed cattle that had strayed into a nearby commercial farm being confiscated, pending payment of a fine, failure of which could lead to the loss of livestock. This has implications on the number and quality of cattle owned by people in communal areas. It also increases the need to herd cattle all day and thus withdraws labour from other productive farming and non-farming activities. Ownership of cattle is important for risk management as well as for draught power; in fact, it is one of the most important assets in negotiating rural livelihoods, for example, drawing scotch carts for firewood, water, and during harvest and even carrying the sick to hospitals.

7.5 Livelihoods

7.5.1 Livelihoods in Mazowe: a Historical Perspective

People in Mazowe earn their livelihoods from an assortment of activities, such as agriculture, mining and services (Sukume et al. 2015). Most of the people are own-account workers in agriculture, which is the main source of livelihoods. Before the 2000 FTLRP access to economic activities, resources and markets were primarily defined along colonial patterns of accumulation and hence, to understand the emerging profile of economic activities, there was a need to do a historical analysis through document analysis as well as oral evidence from senior citizens in Mazowe. These included kraal heads and
peasant farmers in their seventies, who, through narrating their stories, revealed the changing forms of access to economic assets, such as land, labour, capital and natural resources, which are important in participating in contract farming. A historical analysis, as detailed by Bessant and Muringai (1993), provides succinct details of the Mazowe “moral economy” and describes processes that define agricultural production in Mazowe communal areas, which were also supported by elders. Bessant (1992) notes that the Chiweshe peasants were always quick to respond to changing economic activities, citing the way they integrated into the maize marketing programme spearheaded by Wane (Native Commissioner) and their adoption of rice production when prices changed. After the FTLRP, availability of land in nearby A1 farms and encouragement from the government triggered the adoption and production of tobacco by peasants, some of whom went on to rent land in A1 schemes. It is important to note that these developments shaped the adoption and integration of peasant farmers into the cash economy, where, through the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, restrictions were put on African agricultural activities.

Bessant and Muringai (1993) have shown how the diverse Chiweshe communal part of Mazowe moved towards the individualistic capitalist mode of accumulation as the community responded to the infusion of the capitalist cash economy. The co-existence of LSCFs and peasant community defined the labour market, which is evident to this day, where ZIMSTAT (2012) census shows 37% of the economically active population is involved in paid labour driven by historical experiences, fluid social identity and status (Berry 1989). Mazowe community’s livelihoods have remained intertwined with commercial farming activities as suppliers of labour as shown by the survey data, with tobacco farmers employing labour from communal areas and former farm labourers in A1 settlements, showing a considerable decline in reliance on family labour.

Interviewees from the five wards indicated that there was a close relationship between the communal and their sister communities in A1 settlements, and resources flowed within these communities. A 77-year-old man confirming these historical ties, observed:

These commercial farms have always been a source of our livelihoods, since the times of white commercial farmers, and even today our children seek livelihoods there. People work in farms for cash or exchange of commodities we need (Interview August 8, 2017).

He observed that the main difference now is that the tractors and lorries that used to transport workers between communal and commercial farms are long gone and negotiation for labour is primarily on an individual basis. During colonial times, “rich farmers” diversified into other activities, such as retail shops, using income from marketing tobacco, a trend which the current cash farmers have adopted. Agriculture was the main source of revenue facilitating diversification into non-farm activities and absorbed most labour into agricultural employment.
7.5.2 Non-Farm Livelihoods

Several livelihoods straddling the A1 and communal communities were observed during the study; such as wage-based, trade in beer, staples and vegetables, and services such as artisanal work involving building houses and barns, vehicle repairs, and transport services, and exchange of natural resources, such as firewood among other things. Mazowe community is also closely integrated with urbanites from Harare, who trade in second-hand clothing and/or groceries in exchange for crop staples, such as maize and sweet potatoes. Contract farming invigorated these activities as reported in chapter 9. Barter trade was a major source of livelihood facilitation both within the community and with urban areas, creating strong linkage in urban-rural livelihood strategies. This practice has taken root in Zimbabwe since the cash crisis deepened, (Zivira 2017, September; Butaumocho 2015, April). Retailers and other traders from Harare would exchange commodities for maize, which they sell at GMB depots for a profit, leading to government introducing controls on maize marketing to curb side marketing (Butaumocho 2015, April). While this practice was caused and necessitated by cash shortages, it also speaks to thin markets in rural areas, which form fertile ground for the exploitation of the poor peasants, who are excluded from the financial system and hardly use other modes of payment or receipt of payments. The well-off in rural areas took the opportunity to accumulate assets that included animals.

7.6 Access to Resources through Extension Officers and Collective Action in Mazowe

As discussed in section 7.1, Mazowe consists of diverse people, which has made collective action difficult to form beyond the single goal of claiming land from the white commercial farmers. Consequently, this lack of social relations is manifested through individualised access to such resources as labour, assets and contracts. Collective action observed in Mazowe was thus driven by institutional formations operating in the area, such as contractors and extension officers. Bessant and Muringai (1993) report that even the communal areas responded to markets through more individualistic efforts.

Before the land reform, farmers organised themselves in groups, a notable group being that of Burley tobacco producers. The Burley tobacco farmers were coordinated by the now defunct Burley Marketing Zimbabwe. The company organised field work, brought farmers together, and bought tobacco from the farm-gate. This relationship resulted in farmers contributing to the construction of the auction floor in Harare as shareholders. A farmer who produced Burley tobacco recalled how they organised themselves in the 1990s:

We formed groups of about twenty Burley farmers and every season we would have specialists from Burley Marketing Association teaching us about tobacco production, from the farm to packaging. At first, they would come and buy the tobacco as soon as it had dried. Our crop was
almost uniform because we used the same inputs, and everything was organised (Interview September 11, 2017).

As Bratton (1986) observed, farmer organisations formed to gain information and market access, which was the main motivation for the Burley producer. Another form of collective action reported by Bessant (1992) are the work parties in Mazowe. During work parties, farmers shared use of assets, such as cattle-drawn ploughs during tilling, hoeing labour and scotch carts. However, this waned over time, as people became more individualistic with the development of capitalist markets in Mazowe. The organisation of peasant farmers was generally at the instigation of government, either for resource provisioning or marketing purposes, which was done through extension officers with the support of non-governmental organisations. One farmer did not see the benefit of joining such organisation, he commented:

> It is of no use joining a group; politicians lie, and their promises come to nothing. In the past, NGOs would organise us and we knew we were going to get something. (Interview November 18, 2017).

In the survey, 95% of tobacco farmers reported that they did not belong to any farmer organization; however, farmers were involved in various activity-based groups, such as seedbed demonstration plots, field days and rocket barn construction as reported in Chapter 8. However, interviews with farmers at these plots indicated that it all ended with activity at hand, and never extended to other farming activities. Bratton (1994) referred to such farmer organisation as voluntary associations. The tobacco crop did not attract much support from non-governmental organisations and hence, they did not organise farmers into groups. In A1 farms, civic organisations did not participate or offer support because of the contested nature of the land.

The Mazowe community generally needed some nudging for them to work as an association, suggesting heightened contestation for resources. This reflects the model (Figure 2-1) described in Chapter 2 where benefits are only accessed by expending/transferring benefits to those who hold resources. However, this is negotiated through prevailing social networks and long-held social relations based on social identity and status in society (Agrawal 1996)

### 7.7 The Emergence of Agribusiness Capital in Mazowe

Contract farming in Mazowe is a recent phenomenon. Literature shows that it started at Negomo irrigation scheme in 1994, when Selby contracted farmers to produce vegetables for its export market. This is even though agribusiness-state capital injection into smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe through contract farming arrangements dates to the 1950s (Jackson and Cheater 1994). In 1996, the completion of Negomo Dam resulted in 296 smallholder farmers, each on 1.2 hectares, producing under contract for the export market. This project was supported by German donor funds and the Zimbabwe
government. However, the FTLRP resulted in the withdrawal of the Germany donors and the collapse of the contracting arrangement at the same time as funding for tobacco through commercial banks dried-up. There have been few contracting activities in Mazowe; first, before the FTLRP, large farmers financed their operations through bank finance using land as collateral and, after the land reform, donor communities did not support activities in resettled areas. However, marketing contracts for flowers and other horticultural produce were reported in farms closer to Harare; Matondi (2013)’s study in Mazowe and Goromonzi reports a very limited number of women involved in horticultural contracts. In Mazowe, contract farming has been associated with donor-assisted projects, and tobacco was one initiative fully funded by the private sector in the area. Consequently, farmers in Mazowe had no experience dealing with agribusiness as contractors, having been accustomed to spot markets for trading their agricultural produce. The massive growth of tobacco contracts was therefore a learning experience, which is still ongoing.

Until 2000 and the start of the FTLRP, tobacco was produced and marketed under different financing conditions through private banks. In 2004, tobacco was produced under contract following the collapse of supplies of flavour flue-cured Virginia tobacco to oligopsony buyer markets and new emerging markets, such as China, though on limited scales. The CFU representative observed that “…it was a business deal to bring the product to the market” (Interview September 24, 2017). BAT and TRIBAC led the way in facilitating tobacco contracting. Recent work in Mvurwi has shown how capital has transformed the agrarian landscape (Scoones et al. 2018; Sukume et al. 2015). This study builds on such work, focusing on the effects of capital on A1 and communal smallholder communities, which are similar in terms of mode of production and livelihood strategies. Recent events point to government-supported tobacco contract farming through its command agriculture brand.

Tobacco contract farming started in 2004 on a very limited scale and was concentrated in the Mvurwi area, where most of the tobacco was traditionally grown. After signing a memorandum of understanding with TIMB, contracting firms set up their operations in targeted areas. In Mazowe, contracting firms reported approaching the District Administrator and then local councillor, where they introduced the agribusiness extension officer, who would coordinate the recruitment of farmers in the area. Several contracting firms operate within the same area, contracting communal and A1 farmers.

7.8 Implications for Contract Farming Arrangements

As discussed in Chapter 2, land is one of the important considerations for firms that want to maximise profits using the best land and agro-conditions prevailing. This brings into question competing land use regimes, with contract farming critics arguing the best land used by locals for food production is diverted to cash crops, an issue discussed in Chapter 9. For instance, Scoones et al. (2018) observed that tobacco production has reduced the amount of staple food production in Mazowe with obvious
consequences for food security. Inasmuch as the geographic conditions are the same, land size differentials between FTLRP beneficiaries and communal areas affect land allocation to tobacco production and the probability of a farmer being offered a contract. This also affects tobacco farmers’ access to other productive resources, such as labour; for a resourced farmer access to labour through contracts would not be an issue given a pool of experienced farm labour in Mazowe (Scoones et al. 2018). However, for farmers, who fail to access contract farming arrangements, weak institutions in Mazowe might affect their access to production-enhancing institutions, such as extension services and farmer associations that could potentially help organise services.

The land differentials between A1 and communal areas discussed in this chapter consequently affect access to contracts and economic opportunities. As a result, the effects of contract farming within Mazowe reflect the differences in productive resource holdings of farmers aided by participation in contract farming arrangements discussed in Chapters 8 and 9.

### 7.9 Mazowe Farmers’ Participation in Tobacco Contract Farming

In chapter 6 it was shown that tobacco produced under contract was increasing, though with mixed outcomes, due to varied contract terms offered by contractors. This section discusses contracting terms offered to farmers and how farmers perceive these terms. As discussed in Chapter 2, contracting terms are influenced by “bundle of powers” held by the actors, which, in turn, affect acceptance or rejection of contracts by the farmers and subsequent household and community effects. This section demonstrates the power dynamics and processes behind the designing of contracts and contracting terms. Resources were provided to farmers under the centralised model, though with differential access by different categories of farmers. It was observed that the contracting terms favoured contractors, and among farmers, the asset-rich were more likely to be selected for the contract farming arrangement. However, contract terms that provided staple food inputs resulted in increased supply of food, which had positive community nutritional effects (see Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion). Power imbalances were observed between contractors and farmers, as well as within the farmer class, in negotiating and accessing contracts. As shown in the model developed in Chapter 2, this involved the flow of benefits from farmers to other actors as the farmers tried to maintain access to contracts. Simmons, Winters, and Patrick (2005) emphasise the importance of understanding contract terms and design, which, in a way, determines the selection and participation of farmers in these arrangements. This section shows that the contracts offered to farmers were unfair, but farmers accepted the contracts because they had no alternative sources of credit or productive resources to grow tobacco.

#### 7.9.1 Contract Terms

All contracting firms operating in Mazowe used the centralised model. Farmers are offered individual one-year renewable contracts, which are resource providing. By this is meant that the contract provides...
seedlings, fertilisers, chemicals, curing energy, extension services and, at times, cash advances for labour, which are deducted at the point of sale. The farmer largely determines his production protocols after receiving the inputs. This is contrary to Shonhe (2017)’s observation in Wedza, where some contractors were fully in control of farm operations, a difference which could be explained by Goodhue and Simon (2016)’s consideration of basic and restrictive types of contracts discussed in Chapter 2.

Interviews with farmers showed that they determine when to nurse tobacco seedlings, transplant, weed, harvest and cure their tobacco, with the extension officer providing advice where necessary, which showed a tilt towards a basic contract. Swain (2012:174) provides a description of a typical gherkin crop restrictive contract, where the firm was in control from “…the stage of seed planting to crop harvesting” with standard operational guide lines, which also included extension teams carrying out some tasks and record keeping by farmers. Farmers in Mazowe had no records of their crop regime, neither was the monitoring by the extension officer as intensive as in the gherkin crop; it was random and dependent on the farmer’s request. Such terms of a contract are important determinants of the final quality of the crop, as Goodhue and Simon (2016) observed that farmers on a restrictive contract performed better in terms of quality due to the intense extension services received. The opposite could be true about a basic contract where wide variation in product quality could be expected, as observed in Mazowe. The performance differentials could be partly due to farmers’ unobservable characteristics, such as skill- or resource-endowment in tobacco production, where initial investment in specific curing facilities is needed. This is more likely given that experience was a prerequisite for engagement into contract farming.

The contractor, within the framework set by the regulator (TIMB), determines some contract terms, such as quality and prices. Prices are derived from prevailing international prices as reflected by the auction price. Contract enforcement and monitoring issues are not specified within the contract, with the contract appearing more like a symbolic reflection of the relationship binding the parties. Within the community, contractors provide resources to farmers depending on past performance, with asset and land holdings as the determining factors. Consequently, farmers have differential access to resources from the contractor, which affects their production outcomes.

The contract is initiated by the contractor and offered to farmers, who either reject or accept and sign the contracts to participate in contract farming. This is the common practice observed in most contract farming arrangements regardless of which, however, the contract is biased in favour of the firm that designed the contract. This is similar to Swain (2012)’s observation in India. Contracts offered to A1 and communal farmers are homogeneous, though differences can arise on the amount of inputs, cash and acreage contracted and the contractor contracting the farmers. The inputs and financial support provided are often not enough for the plot size contracted; an officer from one leading agribusiness indicated the quantity of inputs and financial support was dependant on the risk and capacity profile of the grower (Interview February 15, 2018). The differences also reflect the performance of the farmer,
where some high performers are upgraded, and the poor performers are downgraded [what Narayanan (2013) calls involuntary attrition] to accommodate the risk profile of the farmer. The contractor charges a mark-up to cover expenses, such as the transportation of inputs to a central point for collection by farmers and extension services.

There is generally no transparency on how these costs are calculated and passed on to the farmer. The Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA) believes this lack of transparency compromises farmer viability, and hence, applauds agribusinesses that make cash transfers to farmers, who can then source inputs at competitive rates (ZTA 2011). However, in an interview with an officer of a farmer organisation, it was revealed that the organisation preferred a situation where farmers were consulted on their input needs, particularly with regard to how they were sourced and paid for (Interview 2017). Such arrangements are viewed as effective in improving farmer welfare where they supply to a monopsony or oligopsony, as in the case reported by Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi (2008). For instance, an association could negotiate the pricing of various inputs and services offered by the contractor, which could then be specified in the contract. Further, contract farmers did not know that extension services were charged for, neither did they know how the price of fertilisers, chemicals and coal were calculated. The contractor delivers inputs to a central point within the ward, where farmers collect their allocation as per their contract. The ZTA is of the belief that the services provided should be negotiated and agreed to by the contractor and farmer. A former ZTA chairman observed:

"…growers must have input into the decision-making process of which inputs are bought at what price and there must be total transparency between growers and companies on what handling fees/mark-up are being charged" (ZTA, 2017:4).

Document analysis revealed that this lack of transparency resulted in a situation where the contractor’s inputs were priced at a premium for a half hectare, the expected cost is estimated at US$473 for inputs and yet the contractors charged anything in the region of US$850 plus, and farmers were not informed about how the costs were calculated. As a result, this reduced both the farmers’ income and growth potential. The middle farmers said they were tied to the contracting arrangement since they could not raise enough capital to self-finance future crops from profits, a position that the contractor exploited in this skewed contractual arrangement.

While it seems prudent that the agribusiness avoids excessive risk exposure to the farmer, the flip side of the story is that it sets the farmer up to fail, as inadequate inputs also mean a low-quality crop. For instance, with no cash to pay for curing energy, labour, planting, harvesting and grading, all these become difficult, which often leads to differential growth of plants due to planting over long periods, and loss of leaves due to mismatch during harvest and curing. Furthermore, there is no clarity on the pricing of input and produce. All respondents to the survey indicated that the contract did not specify a
pricing model. Inputs were specified on the addendum to the contract and their deliveries were reported to be satisfactory.

Despite these shortfalls, however, farmers accepted the contracts. In a survey of 109 respondents, farmers provided the reasons tabulated below (figure 7-2) for accepting the contract, which show that they went into contract farming for inputs and the premium price offered by the contractor. Further interrogation showed that farmers wanted assured supplies of inputs, given the horrific experiences of the inflationary years when inputs were difficult to obtain. Lending credence to the survey, a farmer said; “Getting inputs was a nightmare, and the contractor assured us with supply of inputs though they are expensive (Interview September 25, 2017). While this seems to confirm findings on farmer participation in contracts (Abebe et al. 2013; Masakure and Henson 2005), the major push for accepting the contracts seems to be market failures compounded with deep mistrust and fear of a repeat of the hyperinflationary environment experienced after the FTLRP. This fear was confirmed after the surrogate currency lost value against the United States dollar, trading at US$ to 6 bond notes in October 2018 contrary to the official position which put the two at par (Mhlanga et al. 2018 October). Willems (2014), using Zimbabwe Rural Households Dynamics Study, found that 50% of tobacco farmers used purchased seed while the others relied on gifts, a strong indicator why most farmers wanted to access inputs from contractors. On page 106, I also explained that other farmers exchanged their labour for inputs.

The question is whether this is a viable option for smallholders with competing livelihood challenges. The contractor cost of eight bags of fertilizer and other chemical applications for a half-hectare crop and coal were estimated at US$850 to US$950 depending on contractor. However, retail prices of eight bags of fertilizer, chemicals and coal were estimated at US$600, which meant the contractor charged from 30% to almost 60% more for the services offered. This threatens farmer profitability and viability, as it increases indebtedness and reliance on the agribusiness.
Survey results showed that all contracted farmers combined agribusiness finance and self-financing to see-through the production of their crop. This was caused by two things: first, the inadequacy of the package offered by contracting firms that excluded labour costs and/or other on-farm expenses, and secondly, the fact that farmers increased hectarage above the contracted level to a level they thought was an economically viable plot size for a tobacco crop. For instance, the capacity of a tobacco barn was the key determinant of economically viable tobacco plot. Tobacco barns observed in the study area were designed to cure tobacco from a one hectare plot.

The contract terms described in this section were both inclusionary and exclusionary, in that, without the necessary resources prescribed by the contractor, farmers could not participate. Further, the majority who participated struggled to maintain their position in contract farming because of the inadequate supply of resources by the contractor, which they could not self-provide due to lack of capital. Yet, for those with access to other or their own resources, facilitated effective participation and sharing of the value generated.

### 7.9.2 Competition among Contractors

Contractors seek to attract the best farmers. Four contractors operate in the study area, and all offer standard services described above with differences in cash advances for labour, curing energy and input supply for staple crop production. Notably, Chinese firms offered higher prices and attracted the best farmers. According to Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro (1999), this is because contractors hope to reap
benefits from the complementarity between food and cash crop production. The provisioning of inputs for food crops is meant to mitigate food security concerns of the farmer and is in proportion to the contracted acreage, these incentives help retain and attract good farmers, a point made by Goel (2014). Further, they have broader effects on supply of food within the community. These extra contract provisions have also seen farmers shift from one contractor to another and this has increased competition among contractors. For similar cases, see Swinnen, Sadler, and Vandeplas (2007), Swinnen and Maertens (2007) and Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007). The increased competition has been beneficial to the farmers in terms of input supplies (Swinnen and Vandeplas 2011) and technology transfer to both the cash and staple crops (Kuijpers and Swinnen 2016). One farmer who had a successful 2016/17 cropping season changed contractors “…to access more funding, for tobacco and food crop production” (Interview October 23, 2017).

Contracts in Mazowe cater for production and incentivise farmers to produce tobacco by providing inputs and price premiums. This is important, as it provides start-up credit (in the form of working-capital) for poor farmers to partake in tobacco production. Though the working capital is not adequate, it does provide some financial additionality (Moyo 2014) that complements the farmer’s own resources, as shown by contract farmers who extended their plots after going into contract farming. For example, a farmer at Thorncreek farm noted:

I started with half a hectare of plot using my own resources, when I got into contract farming I extended to one hectare. I am happy I can sell at better rates compared to those at auction (Interview August 4, 2017).

The provisioning of inputs is in line with other annual crop schemes, where farmers are provided with inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers and chemicals (Ton et al. 2017). This is a form of quality control in production as the use of the right inputs is perceived to provide the desired quality (Goodhue and Simon 2016; Goodhue 1999). Contractors provide inputs for staple crops to support farmers’ food security; furthermore, to ensure that farmers use tobacco inputs for the contracted crop, thus dealing with the problem of diversion of inputs to other crops.

A contractor in Harare indicated:

We provide our farmers with enough inputs so that we are assured of a good quality crop. In addition, we provide them with fertilisers for their maize to ensure that they have enough food for the year to feed their family and workers. Tobacco work involves long hours, and this requires a full stomach (Interview November 22, 2017).

Cockburn and Eaton (2013) report on crop diversification by tobacco contracting companies in Fiji and Indonesia. They argue such contracts are sustainable and welfare-enhancing with potential spillover effects to community. A similar package is reported for Malawi tobacco contract farmers by Shaba et
al. (2017). This is the same trend tobacco contractors in Mazowe seem to be adopting, in order to ensure increased staple food supply and food security for the farmers and the community.

7.9.3 Enforcement of Contracts

Contract enforcement is important for the reduction of holdups, the transfer of technology (Kuijpers and Swinnen 2016) and the overall success of the contract, as discussed in Chapter 2. The contract offered to farmers had no explicit enforcement mechanisms stipulated. Contract enforcement at the marketing stage of tobacco is a highly contested process, which the farmers believe is littered with corruption and biased against the farmers, who always lose against the contractor. A farmer noted, “Even if you complain nothing changes, its only small-small change in price” (Interview August 16, 2017). This emanates from contested grades and classifications. TIMB is the enforcing agent at the floors; farmers follow appeal processes stipulated by TIMB, and the contractor becomes a passive principal. However, an independent arbitrator, as proposed by Larsen (2002) could improve contract enforcement.

Contract enforcement is also important to minimise negative externalities that can harm society. Within the community the enforcement of good agricultural practices are of concern to local leadership and the community at large. For example, a headman complained: “They just come in my area and mess up everything. Their farmers don’t want to listen to us and just leave their fields uncleared” (Interview August 21, 2017). Interviews in the study area revealed that farmers were concerned about the uncleared tobacco stalks, the wanton cutting of trees and the pollution of shared water sources, which were blamed for environmental degradation and threats to livelihoods. The contract ignored the environmental and social effects of the production of tobacco in the community, a task that was taken up by community leadership, as this affected the community’s access to livelihood activities, such as access to firewood, clean water and agricultural related diseases in their fields.

There was general apprehension in the way the contracts were designed, as farmers feared for the loss of their assets if repayments were not met. The contract empowered the contractor to attach assets as a form of closure to credit advanced, yet farmers felt that the weather and farm conditions should be taken into account before enforcement. However, in the study area, no attachments of assets were reported during the period of study.

A day at Chief Negomo’s traditional court revealed the intricate roles that the court played in directing the use of resources and enforcement of social relations in the Mazowe district, however, there were no formal agreements involving the contracting firm and local leadership in modalities of enforcing of the primary contract’s consequential effects on the environment. Private enforcement emanates from contractual arrangements entered into by the contracted parties in their pursuit of the objectives of the primary contract. Other alternative contract enforcement processes noticed include the clearing of stalks.
after harvest and the cutting of trees, which the government extension officers reported to local authorities for enforcement.

As seen in this section, contract enforcement was also a deterrent to contract farming, particularly for the risk-averse farmers who feared losing their assets. These are the majority of farmers in the community. As a result, unfavourable contract terms could dilute positive community effects that are likely to accrue through participation in contract farming. This also reflects Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) argument that those who are not endowed with wealth and social relations (capital) would not be able to negotiate their way into contracts. This is clearly reflected in the discussion on factors that affect farmer participation in contracts in Chapter 9.

7.10 Conclusion

This chapter provided a synopsis of Mazowe, the case study area, and its physical and human geography. It was noted that the area is endowed with good soil, minerals and good weather, which are suitable for production of various cash and staple crops. Because of its good geography Mazowe attracted a diverse group of people who settled there for economic reasons. Contractors also seem to be attracted to the region by the good geography. The chapter also discussed infrastructure, natural resources management and enforcement by traditional courts, which are important in tobacco production.

The Mazowe community derive their livelihood from land where they produce both their staple crop and cash crops to earn income. However, in communal areas, it was observed that land was in short supply and access was through the patriarchal route. The study described how the A1 farmers settled in Mazowe and their land holdings were formalised. In all this, access to land takes the form described by Ribot and Peluso in their access theory, where bundles of powers play an important part. For example, political connections and party affiliation were said to be very important in accessing land, in this case social relationships and political activism were key ‘bundles of powers’.

Extension Officers are a key institution in Mazowe, which facilitates both agricultural production and rural livelihoods. Ad hoc farm-level institutions also form on demand, for instance, demonstration plots, field days and training groups emerge at various times of the year, yet farmers are not organised as a farmer organisation. These are important in nudging farmers to engage in collective action. The chapter concluded with the insertion of capital in Mazowe, which has shaped Mazowe’s agrarian and livelihood structure, which we discuss in the next three chapters. Participation of farmers in contract farming was heavily influenced by power imbalances, mainly deriving from resource endowments differentials. This resulted in differential household and community effects discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 8

Effects of Contract Farming on Tobacco Production and on Mazowe Community

8.0 Introduction

This chapter identifies and explains the effects of farmers’ participation on household income and production, and effects on the Mazowe community. Winners and losers of the contracting arrangement were differentiated by initial resource endowments with the former using contract farming to build on their privileged positions while the latter with poor asset portfolios struggled to establish viable economic activities. According to Key and Runsten (1999:381), “…contract farming may also create positive multiplier effects for employment, infrastructure, and market development in the local economy”. Yet there is a possibility that it can harm other actors within the community (Little and Watts 1994; Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). Evidence from this case study shows that there were primary and secondary (multiplier) effects, for instance, primary effects on income and production, while secondary effects arose from investments by accumulators, which affected service provision and employment. Assured input supplies allowed resourced-contract farmers to relocate cash lump-sum earnings into investment in income-generating activities, while the poor invested in household consumables. As discussed in Chapter 2, community effects developed as actors extracted and appropriated value from each other and through spillover effects arising from networks and interaction of actors. This chapter focuses on contract farming outcomes and answers the following questions:

- What are the effects of contract farming on tobacco farmers’ production and income?
- How does income from tobacco contract farming affect household and community economic activities?

This chapter shows that some contract farmers increased their production and income and diversified their income-generating activities, investing in agriculture and non-farm activities that created employment for the community. Some barely sustained production through the self-exploitation of household labour and perpetual indebtedness to the contractor, while losers exited and resorted to employment and miniature trading for survival. Further notable spillover effects were observed in technology transfer, food production and distribution systems. Both A1 contract and non-contract farmers outperformed their communal counterparts. This better performance by A1 farmers could be explained by access to land under the FTLRP. This chapter shows that the FTLRP was central to successful tobacco production and the performance outcomes of farmers once under contract.
8.1 Effects of Contract Farming on Tobacco Production

This section argues that access to contract farming after farmers accessed land under the FTLRP allowed for improved productivity through the use of modern inputs in adequate proportions, expansion of area under production and quality improvement of the tobacco crop. This is borne out by the 66 percent of contract farmers, who ranked the contractor the highest source of finance, against 34 percent who said personal savings. This shows the importance of contract farming in the provision of capital for tobacco production after the FTLRP. Interviews revealed that some farmers who ranked the contractor highest had inadequate inputs, no alternative resources to finance tobacco production, thrived on the self-exploitation of labour and were more likely to be exploited by the contractor, who benefited from the long hours (often not factored in production costs) the farmers put to generate surplus value. However, farmers were in contract farming for supplementary purchased inputs, while labour and curing energy were accessed through alternative channels. Access to resources that is, land, inputs, technology and extension services explain the different benefits accruing to farmers.

8.1.1 Effects of Contract Farming on Plot under Tobacco: Output and Income

After joining contract farming, farmers increased plots under tobacco by 54 percent, output by 95 percent and income by 118 percent, while non-contract farmers increased marginally as shown in Table 8-1. Most of these contract farmers were FTLRP beneficiaries. Higher productivity observed in FTLRP land is consistent with Zikhali (2010)’s finding in Mazowe that FTLRP farmers are more productive than communal because they used more fertilisers and hired labour (in this case provided by the contractor). Evidence from interviews suggests that farmers used the extra inputs and credit provided by the contractor to expand acreage and production, which had a positive effect on both output and quality, as reflected by the more than doubling of income. The study supplemented these descriptive statistics with a realist approach (see endnote 4) to establish causality, where, observations and life history with contract farmers revealed that contract farming was the reason for increased acreage and better performance of farmers.

Table 8-1: Changes in Plot size, Output and Income after Adoption of Contract Farming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Farmer</th>
<th>Year 0</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of plot in hectares</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-contract</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco Output in Kilograms</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>1 293.00</td>
<td>1 776.00</td>
<td>2 519.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-contract</td>
<td>1 000.16</td>
<td>1 063.55</td>
<td>1 328.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco Gross Income in US$</td>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>3 430.56</td>
<td>5 032.41</td>
<td>7 482.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-contract</td>
<td>2 723.39</td>
<td>2 803.23</td>
<td>3 787.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Year zero=first year of tobacco production; year 1 = year zero + average year before joining contract; 2017 is year of study

Source: Author, compiled from Survey data
From this data, it can be argued that contract farming positively influences the quantity and quality of tobacco produced, given that non-contract farmers experienced minimal changes. Observable and unobservable factors have been known to cause selection bias in production outcomes of farmers. Though the study did not apply stochastic approaches to deal with selection bias, Chapter 9 will show that selection into contracts was non-random, and was based on relational consideration (status, identity and wealth) and hence could affect the outcomes of contract farming. However, as alluded to above observations and interviews with farmers confirmed that contract farming was the cause of the increased productivity.

Communal farmers said that land size limited both the size of the plot under tobacco and the capacity to expand, while A1 farmers increased plot size because farmers had enough land and extra capital to invest in their operations. An A1 farmer said: “I have been in tobacco for many years, but my business was not growing though I had the land. I had no capital, so when I got into contract farming I took the opportunity to expand my tobacco plot” (Interview August 30, 2017). The farmer used the extra financial resources to extend the plot under tobacco, construct extra tobacco rocket barns, and build a grading shade and to buy a used car. It was also observed that those with resources constructed rocket barns resulting in the supply of a better-quality crop to the contractor. This result confirms the prescriptions of the access theory (Ribot and Peluso 2003) framework described in chapter 2.

Figure 8-1 shows pictures of the traditional barn on the left and rocket barn on the right. The main difference is in efficiency and safety of the barns, for instance rocket barns use about 18m$^3$ of wood and have higher energy conversion compared with 43m$^3$ for the traditional barn, which gives an efficiency advantage to elite A1 contract farmers (Munanga et al. 2014). According to a TRB expert, the rocket barn maintains relatively constant temperatures, which results in even curing of the leaf and good quality as a result, compared to wide fluctuations from the traditional barn (Interview 27 November, 2017). The rocket barn is expensive to erect, and a few resource-rich farmers afforded them. Hence, farmers cited financial challenges as the main reason for failing to construct modern energy-saving barns and sheds and they wished that the contractor could provide adequate finance to cover fixed costs. One farmer said:

I wish the contractor could provide us with long-term loans to build rocket barns, sheds and other farm infrastructure. Banks will never give you such loans and, without this infrastructure, you cannot produce a quality leaf (Interview September 11, 2017).
Figure 8-1: Traditional barn (left) and Rocket barn (right) showing heat movement

Source: ProBEC/GTZ (2006)

An agronomist suggested that, for any parcel of tobacco produced by a farmer, they needed at least two tobacco barns, since tobacco was harvested every week during harvest time and curing take up to eight days. The curing, grading and classification of tobacco is a crucial step in readying the crop for the market, and at this stage, most farmers fall short.

On average, contract farmers had 1.05 curing barns compared to 0.51 for non-contract farmers, which was significant (F 1, 106) =8.722, p=.004) at 0.05 level of significance. Contract farmers had, on average, enough barns to cure tobacco from a one-hectare plot, though most were traditional barns. This helped to increase their income. However, for some, it was observed that the barns were not of the standard suggested by TRB and used considerable amounts of energy.

Though descriptive statistics paint a glossed-over picture for contract farmers, interviews revealed that most contract farmers were undercapitalised. The middle farmers described in section 8.3.2 had fewer and inefficient and inadequate traditional barns, which increased their operational cost and loss of tobacco leaf. As explained in page 96, section 6.4 leaf must be loaded in the barns delays in curing can
lead to loss of the leaf and pure quality. However, due to data limitations the study could not ascertain the net loss of the leaf as farmers did not keep records. The further expansion of area under tobacco was accompanied by inadequate use of inputs, which affected quality for the middle farmers. Average income figures reflect the high contribution of resourced-farmers among the contract farmers.

8.1.2 Effects of Contract Farming on Quantity of Tobacco Output

This section presents results of variables that affect tobacco output. These factors are explained in section 9.1 starting from page 157 onwards. The study hypothesise that the quantity of tobacco sold (dependent variable) is positively affected by casual labour, extension services, plot under production, farmer status, gender, age, occupation, cattle, scotch carts, ox-drawn cart and barns. These variables are all needed in the production of tobacco. Tobacco production gives rise to the quantity of tobacco the farmer takes to the market. Both correlation (Table 8-2) and econometric model (Table 8-3) show that factors that affect participation in contract farming (farmer status), influence the output a farmer gets from his/her plot.

Table 8-2: Factors affecting Quantity of Tobacco Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Casual labour</th>
<th>Extension services</th>
<th>Plot under tobacco</th>
<th>Farmer status</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Scotch Cart</th>
<th>Ox-drawn cart</th>
<th>Barns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quantity of tobacco sold</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>-0.503</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-0.398</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson correlation</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig (2-tailed)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author from survey data

The Model

In this section, the study tested the model, $Y = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_3 x_3 + \cdots + \beta_n x_n$, where $Y$ is the dependent variable (Quantity of tobacco sold) and the predictors represented by $X$ are: tobacco contract and non-contract farmers, size of plot under tobacco, gender and age of respondent, number of casual labour, education level of household head, and farm assets. The study hypothesises that contract farming positively influences the predictors in the model thus increasing quantity of tobacco sold. The results of the Multiple Regression show a model based on these predictors could predict 78.7% (58.4% adjusted) of the variance in quantity of tobacco sold significantly better than zero [$F(7, 76)= 17,631$, $p<.001$]. Table 8-3 shows that the predictors, tobacco contract and non-contract (negative), size of plot under tobacco, number of casual labour, education level of household head and farm assets, significantly explained the variance in quantity of tobacco sold. The size of plot under tobacco had
the biggest positive effect, showing the importance of the quality and size of land in tobacco production, where rotation is important for soil fertility and maintenance over time.

The results show that, given differential holdings of farm resource endowments, farmers’ benefits would vary, with substantial differences in quantity of tobacco sold. Qualitative data provide supporting evidence that these predictors influence production outcomes. For instance, farmers provided with cash advances to pay for labour reported timely planting, weeding, harvesting and grading, which allowed them to deliver a quality crop to the contractor. As discussed in the next sections, this allowed them to get better prices and income compared to non-contract farmers. Age and gender did not explain the variance occurring in tobacco production.

Table 8-3: Multiple Regression Model Summary: Determinants of Tobacco Production Output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta (β)</th>
<th>R = 787** R-square = .619 Adjusted R = .584</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco contract non-contract farmers</td>
<td>-625.751</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of plot under tobacco</td>
<td>596.971**</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender of respondent</td>
<td>87.335</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of respondent</td>
<td>-2.281</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of causal labour</td>
<td>108.237**</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level of household head</td>
<td>206.208*</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm assets</td>
<td>27.477*</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept = 153.270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author from survey data

The high adjusted R (58.4%) confirms the proposition that contract farming influence the productivity of initial asset endowments held by farmers and these were critical in the participation and performance of farmers under contract. For instance, in section 8.1.1, it was noted that access to land via the FTLRP allowed farmers to access contracts, expand production and earn more income than non-contract farmers. Farm assets and education significantly explain tobacco production. What is more revealing is that the size of plot under tobacco is also significant, showing the complementarity between contract farming and household asset holding in tobacco production. Farmers with both access to resources had bigger plots, more tobacco barns and farm assets which are significant in this model. Overall, the model shows that farmers’ asset endowments, such as access to land and household assets, complemented by contract farming resource provisioning, explain most of the tobacco output generated by farmers. This formed the basis of differential incomes discussed in the next section, which show the importance of contract farming. Interviews with farmers collaborated this, with both contract and non-contract saying
their production outcomes were determined by their asset holdings and access to contract farming. For example, a contract farmer said, “I bought my cattle from the proceeds of the land I got during ‘Jambanja’ and this enabled me to get into contract farming. This boosted my tobacco production and family income.’ (Interview August 21, 2017). This shows the interdependence between land and capital provided by the contractors. Chapter 9 provides a detailed analysis of the effect of these predictors on farmer performance.

8.2 Income Effect: a Comparative Analysis by Farmer Category

Contract farmers earned more income from tobacco production than non-contract farmers, and also earn higher income from other cash crops and non-farm activities than all other groups. The ANOVA results show that the difference is significant at the 0.01 (p = .000) confidence level. However, there were wide income differentials observed within the groups, with a range of $24 500.00 for A1 contract farmers showing the intensity of the differentials within the groups, this differential is evident as shown on Table 8-4 below.

Table 8-4: Comparative Tobacco Income for Mazowe Farmers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>A1 contract farmer ($)</th>
<th>A1 non-contract farmer ($)</th>
<th>Communal contract farmer ($)</th>
<th>Communal non-contract farmer ($)</th>
<th>ANOVA results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income from tobacco</td>
<td>8 993.24</td>
<td>3 087.78</td>
<td>4 526.09</td>
<td>2 479.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>5 776.07</td>
<td>2 730.33</td>
<td>2 853.52</td>
<td>3 151.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>245 000.00</td>
<td>2 857.14</td>
<td>95 000.00</td>
<td>175 000.00</td>
<td>F(5,144) = 11.058, p = .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author from survey data

Furthermore, mean income shows that contract farmers with better initial asset endowments are better off than non-contract farmers, though farmers in A1 (contract) settlements outperform those in communal areas as shown in Table 8-4. Land and contract farming intervention are two observable differences among the farmers that could explain within and/or between group differences. For instance, contract farmers are differentiated by their access to land provided through the FTLRP, while, between contract and non-contract farmers’, contractor resources are the main difference. Yet there could be unobservable factors giving rise to income differentials. Between the A1 and communal areas, for example, land is the main source of income differential in that the FTLRP allowed contract farmers to build more assets compared to non-contract farmers. Table 8.4 showed that A1 farmers (contract and non-contract) had bigger plots, more land under tobacco production, and the difference in land holdings was statistically significant at the 0.01 (p=.000 confidence level. As discussed in section 8.1.1, contract farming provided additional financial resources that allowed resourced contract farmers to put more land under tobacco production, which increased their output and subsequent income. These differentials are shown in Figure 8-2, as more contract (both A1 and communal) earn more income in dollar terms. Further, the density curve shows the importance of access to land under FTLRP, as more A1 farmers
earned more income in their respective categories. This shows the importance of resources provided by the contractor, which also confirms observations in Mhondoro Ngezi and Mazowe, respectively, where resourced farmers outperformed the poor (Mkodongi 2013; Zikhali 2010). The density curve in Figure 8.2 shows that access to both contract farming and FTLRP plots resulted in superior income by A1 contract farmers compared to all other groups of farmers.

Figure 8-2: Comparison of Farmer Performance by Class and Location
Source: Author, compiled from survey data

Further histogram density curves in Figure 8-3 show that contract farmers outperformed non-contract. The differences in income observed among tobacco farmers could also be explained by the differential access to productive resources, as one A1-non-contract farmer noted:

I don’t have enough inputs for my tobacco, and the quality is not of high standard. I wish I could get a contract like my neighbour so that I produce a similar crop and get better prices (Interview September 22, 2017).
Interviews with non-contract farmers showed that access to and use of inputs were sporadic and, at times, compromised by unexpected expenses faced by the family, resulting in low quality crop and income, as shown by the density curve in Figure 8.3. The better performing contract farmers had alternative sources of income, such as remittances, other cash crops and non-farm activities, which complemented contractor credit (see chapter 9). The finding is also in line with the observation that contractors favour resource-rich farmers, who go on to outperform the poor and discriminated-against non-contract farmers.

The density graphs above show gross earnings of farmers. The cost of production for contract farmers is high. For instance, TRB (2011) estimates indicate that smallholder tobacco production cost is US$1404 per hectare, but contract farmers produce at US$2000.00 per hectare. If labour, maintenance and tillage costs are added, this figure increases to US$3500 to US$4000, approaching the commercial farmers’ production figure of US$5200 reported by TRB. Interviews showed that tobacco farmers, such as large-scale farmers, use almost the same production system as Large Scale farmers and hence, farmers earning below US$6000 struggle, given that, on average, contract farmers produce 1.3 hectares as shown in section 8.1.1. Above US$6000, interviews showed that farmers produced tobacco on two-hectare plots, which pushes their expenses to +USD6000. In section 8.3.2, these farmers are described as middle-farmers, who are struggling to cope under contract.

Non-tobacco farmers have more income from other crops and non-farm activities (though not statistically significant) than A1 and communal non-contract farmers, showing the resource strain faced
by the non-contract tobacco farmers, as they spread their resources to the cash demanding tobacco crop. This shows that the ability to access and benefit from productive resources is critical. One possible explanation is that the personal resources of A1 non-contract farmers are concentrated in tobacco and maize production, and, unlike the communal groups, they do not participate in labour market or other resource-based activities, such as brick moulding, firewood sales and fishing. Also, the fact that they are relatively new within the Mazowe community might explain the lack of social capital required for tradables, which could be dominated by communal areas.

The fact that farmers used personal savings, added cropping area to the contracted plot, and mixed sales (some including friends’ outputs) makes estimation of the causal effect of contract farming complex and difficult to control even for observable differences. As a result, I used correlations coupled with life history interviews and observations to assess the degree of association between tobacco income and variables that contract farming studies associate with income-effect. For instance, Miyata, Minot, and Hu (2009) controlled for labour, education, farm size and technical assistance, while Boughton et al. (2007) emphasised the importance of asset holdings as a strong correlate in contract farming. As shown on Appendix 2, assets are correlated with tobacco income showing that the farmer’s resource endowment and income diversification strategy are important contributory factors in increasing tobacco income. Contract farming, however, provides additional finance which allows for on-farm growth, as shown on Table 8-1. As discussed in section 8.5, contract farmers participate in high-value non-farm activities, which require substantial capital, such as passenger transport, and most are more educated and in formal employment, which provides them with extra resources for tobacco production. This is in line with Reardon, Crawford, and Kelly (1994:1175) observation that “…education also tends to be correlated with ability to mobilize capital through nonfarm activities.”

Analysis of data from TIMB (2017) documents shows that 7 583 Mazowe tobacco farmers earned US$48 914 886 in 2017. Contract farmers contributed 84 percent of the earnings, which is in line with the data presented above. Sukume et al. (2015) observed a similar trend, where earnings of US$48 937 072, 72 percent were from contract farmers (Appendix 3). The increased cash in flows (Appendix 3) resulted in investment in various business activities, with community-wide effects manifesting through secondary effects in service and commodity markets. Further, tobacco income was received as lump sum cash payments, which resulted in increased, though differential, expenditure by contract and non-contract farmers. As discussed in Chapter 5, tobacco is an important livelihood source for tobacco producing communities. The next section discusses how this manifested for different classes of Mazowe residents.
8.3 Farmers’ Investment and Livelihood Patterns: Accumulation and Diversification

It was observed that contracted farmers were more likely to invest in high-value businesses than non-contract farmers and farm workers. Cash lump sum earnings from tobacco and other economic activities determined farmers’ diversification strategies. This finding is in line with Scoones et al. (2018) for Mvurwi, however, including communal farmers in the analysis strengthens the argument that the FTLP is indeed the main driver of such accumulation. As in Scoones et al. (2018) in Mvurwi, and Mkodzongi (2013) in Mhondoro Ngezi, and Buch-Hansen and Marcussen (1982) in Kenya, three similar categories of farmers (described below) were observed in Mazowe, namely:

- Accumulators: prospective capitalists
- Middle farmers: challenges coping under contract
- Poor peasants, capitalist misfits, struggling to survive

8.3.1 Accumulators: a Case of Successful Capitalist Integration

Accumulators, or aspiring capitalists, were farmers who earned surplus income above US$3500 production costs for contract farmers as a whole. This income came from employment, other cash crops and tobacco contracting. Most of them were FTLP beneficiaries, and involved in multiple agricultural and non-farm activities (see Appendix 5 for a typical case), which qualifies them as capitalist (Korovkin 1992) or rich peasants (Mkodzongi 2013). Income per hectare from their contracting activities (mean of US$4 526.09) showed profits well above the TRB tobacco production budget of US$1 408 per hectare. However as seen in section 8.2 this figure was over US$3 500 for contract farmers. They also received favourable tobacco contracts (see section 7.9), which provided inputs, cash advances for labour and contract on bigger plots. This group relied on hired labour and some had permanent employees attending to off-season operations, such as land preparation and stalk clearing, in preparation for the planting season. The group also produced other cash crops, such as maize, using staple food inputs provided by contractors. For some, the six-hectare plot was not enough and they rented land within the A1 farming community; a few communal farmers did the same. The favourable contract terms allowed these farmers the freedom to exercise their entrepreneurial abilities using the high income, particularly in the form of cash lump sums after tobacco sales (shown in section 9.2). The lump sum cash payments were invested in income-generating assets and cost-reducing farm consumables described below. Non-contract farmers with no alternative sources of inputs bought farm-consumables, such as fertilisers and chemicals, for the coming season. Contract farming provided credit, which resulted in differential investment and expenditure among contracted and between contract and non-contract farmers. For instance, some contract farmers used chemicals to clear weeds, saving on hoeing-labour. A farmer commented on his operation thus:
I operate my plot commercially. I apply labour saving chemicals instead of hoeing. This has helped release labour to more demanding operations, and my income has more than doubled since I joined contract farming. I managed to invest in the popping machine, farm equipment and my children are in boarding schools (Interview September 19, 2017).

This group sends their children to boarding schools with better quality education and where fees are US$2000 plus per annum, helping build human capital for the community. As shown in Table 8-5 contract farmers have the capacity to send their children to expensive schools and higher institutions of learning. One contract farmer said: “My tobacco income enabled me to send my son to a university in South Africa” (Interview September 23, 2017). A1 households had both high household size and dependents. The big household was a source of family labour.

Table 8-5: Household Size and Expenditure on Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>A1 contract farmer</th>
<th>A1 non-contract farmer</th>
<th>Former farm worker</th>
<th>Communal contract farmer</th>
<th>Communal non-contract farmer</th>
<th>Non-tobacco farmer</th>
<th>ANOVA results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Expenditure on Education Mean (US$)</td>
<td>2085.86</td>
<td>519.12</td>
<td>17.72</td>
<td>1562.57</td>
<td>400.91</td>
<td>177.5</td>
<td>F (5,25) = 2.721, p = .043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD (US$)</td>
<td>2072.88</td>
<td>854.92</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>1776.55</td>
<td>1061.32</td>
<td>179.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent members of household Mean</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>F(6, 142) = 2.640, p = .019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size Mean</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>F (6, 143) = 5.999, p = .000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, compiled from survey data

In wards 10 and 15, some contract farmers contributed US$6 000.00 to buy an electricity transformer which they said was important for curing tobacco. This, they said, would save on firewood, which was becoming difficult to get. A connected farmer said:

We teamed up with fellow farmers and contributed towards the purchase of the transformer and we were connected. Anyone who wants to connect to the grid must now pay US$6 000.00 (Interview July 19, 2017).

However, the elite benefited at the expense of the poor, as illustrated by a resident who felt cheated by community leaders and noted:

We contributed five dollars at the start of this project, bought poles and wires, but the cost kept going up and now they don’t have the decency to reimburse our contributions. Some of us will never raise the money they want (Interview July 19, 2017).

The project was conceived for the whole community and the grid was intended to pass through most households, however, households who could not afford the transformer fee were not connected.
These businesses were also employing more labour and serving the community, for instance, haulage and traction services, and passenger transport added to the community’s welfare. Survey results showed that some contract farmers acquired high-value assets, such as tractors and haulage trucks, transport business and had generally diversified their income-generation activities beyond agriculture to non-farm activities. Figure 8-4 below shows investment in productive assets and business ownership by farmer category. Investment in tractors and haulage trucks, while they were complementary business activities to tobacco growing, also showed the differential capital intensification and diversity of earning potential of tobacco producers. These assets also earned the farmer extra income through hiring out tractors for tillage and transport of farm produce within the farm. Haulage trucks, for example, are hired-out to transport tobacco to the auction floors serving both contract and non-contract farmers. They also transport other cash crops, serving those producers. It was also observed that most routes were well served by eight to 18-seater commuter minibuses. The address details on the vehicles and conversations with drivers revealed that the vehicles were locally registered and owned by tobacco farmers. When I inquired about a taxi to Ndire at Gweshe Business Center, one tout shouted, “Get in this successful farmer’s taxi; it will take you to your door-step because he is a local” (Interview July 19, 2017). Later, a conversation with the driver revealed that the owner was a contract farmer who owned five 18-seater taxis and two 8-seaters, the latter plying the short route from Ndire to Gweshe; the 18-seater taxies, plying the Harare route because there was need for a licence (Interview July 15, 2017).

Interviews with some contract farmers showed that they exhibit capitalist accumulation tendencies for more surplus through investing in diversified portfolios (Patnaik 1971). In wards 32 and 15, for example, a maize popping machine and freeze-it (soft drink) making machine owned by a contract farmer were producing snacks. The community brought their maize, which was popped at a cost of US$2.00 per 20-kilogram bucket thus providing snacks for learners. A woman who had just completed popping her maize indicated that a twenty-kilogram bucket was enough for her three children for the month.

These business endeavors had beneficial effects to the community, such as increased employment, incomes from which had further spillover effects to downstream industries. The proprietors of these businesses were contract farmers operating in A1 settlements where they operated at workshops left behind by the former commercial farmer. The popping machine operator explained: “I started this business after realising there was demand from local students, and maize was in abundance from FTLRP beneficiaries at a reasonable price, so I decided to rent the workshop from the Committee of Seven” (Interview July 21, 2017). The farmer explained that he bought the machinery after getting a lump sum payment from the contractor and he decided to invest it in an income-generating project since he was assured of inputs from the contractor. The farmer had adequate farm implements, sheds and barns, which were financed from his maize crop after he moved to the A1-scheme.
It is evident from the discussion above that income from tobacco contract farming was central to the farmers’ investment patterns. The above stratum of farmers represents a small percentage who were doing well and investing in high-value activities, compared to the majority who earned only enough to reproduce the household. These farmers as per access theory, because of their high income and land, had control over labour and which allowed them to benefit from contract farming. I discuss this group next.

8.3.2 Middle Farmers: Not all Contract Farming Participants Benefit

For most contract farmers, contract farming had minimal effects on their agricultural activities and livelihoods. These farmers were just breaking even. These farmers were characterised by a low asset-base and received inadequate inputs from the contractor that negatively affected their farming operations. This is the group Yeros (2018) said was dependent on the contractor because of high opportunity costs of diversification. In Mhondoro Ngezi under the FTLRP, Mkodzongi (2013) noted that this group could not fully develop their plots, a scenario observed in Mazowe. Compared to the elites described above, this group of farmers was not coping under contract farming but hung on in contracts because they did not have alternative access to productive resources and had low initial asset holdings, which compromised investment in productive assets (see Tindo life history on appendix 6). They received small lump sum payments after sales, as most of their income covered their debts with the contractor and workers accrued during the farming services. Whatever remained was used to buy
manufactured foodstuffs, which were often bought in bulk. In Figure 8-4, they constitute the bulk of farmers with no investments.

Like all tobacco farmers, these farmers employed casual labour, which was strongly supplemented with family labour, who worked for long hours in the fields to complete tobacco production tasks. For most of the tasks, such as tobacco curing, the farmer used family labour. This group includes farmers contracted on half-hectare plots and are provided with inputs, but which exclude cash advances for labour. As a result, they finance part of the contracted crop. Like the above group, some are provided inputs for the staple crop; however, their labour resources are stretched as they need labour for the intricate tobacco procedure describe in Chapter 6 in addition to hoeing for the staple crop. As a result, to complete the tasks, the household works long hours, thus self-exploiting family labour.

The farmers hang on to contract farming for guaranteed inputs and credit despite mounting debt and overpriced inputs. Further, the farmers were tied to contracts by asset-specific investments, such as tobacco barns, from which they hoped to get a return through the premium price paid by the contractor. However, the premium price was often below the interest charged on the credit advanced because of the stringent quality requirements applied by the contractor. To survive under contract, some farmers resorted to side-marketing to evade debt repayment, access better prices and manage price fluctuation risks. A household head said: ‘My wife and son both have grower numbers. If I have too many deductions, I sell through my son at the auction or another contractor. At worst I sell through friends, if I suspect the extension officer can pick on us.” (Interview 29 August, 2017). Farmers colluded with peers and middlemen, popularly referred to as makoronyera, in order to get a better price more often from the contractor. This was also observed by Sakata (2018) in Mashonaland East, Zimbabwe.

Among this group are non-contract farmers, financing their tobacco from personal resources. Unlike the accumulators, this group spends less on education and their children attend local government schools where fees are around US$50 and US$150 per annum for primary and secondary schools respectively. However, these households live from hand-to-mouth, invest in low value microenterprises, and at times, sell their labour when they have unexpected expenses. Vicol (2015) referred to such farmers as the middle farmers, who could be said to have an income elasticity closer to 1 if we apply Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) surplus-deficit farmer categorisation in southern Africa. Their major source of livelihood is agriculture; however, they generate very little surplus to embark on investment outside agriculture and their consumption pattern is biased towards normal goods.

Most of these households rely on natural resources for their income-earning activities. For instance, a contract farmer said: “For curing tobacco, I use firewood. Even though the contractor provides coal, my barn is not suitable” (Interview November 10, 2017). Other households also traded firewood, local in-season naturally occurring fruits such as sugarplum, mushrooms and honey that were traded in surrounding urban centres and in Harare. They also traded farm produce, such as groundnuts, sweet
potatoes and roundnuts, in markets in Harare, such as Mbare Msika. All this supplement their incomes and supports their agricultural activities. A builder was optimistic about contracting activities in the area and shared the source of his joy: “This year is ending well. I got several contracts to build rocket barns because the contractor said it will only recruit farmers with such barns” (Interview November 10, 2017). Some in this group are involved in artisan work, crafts that require little working capital and are often carried out by individuals. Some of these activities were financed through microfinance activities undertaken by women, such as savings and lending schemes, which had too little capital to finance high-capital projects. These farmers lacked alternative sources of finance, which constrained their livelihood diversification activities, and hence, invested in reproducing the family from their agricultural services. Investments were tailored to maintaining their status quo in contract farming, and those, who aspired to enter, invested to meet the selection process, a negotiation strategy (Ribot and Peluso 2003). This group relied on social relationships to access labour, some productive assets and better prices from the market. However, this group was beneficial to the community as it also assured a proportion of employment for the poorer members of the community not involved in tobacco production.

### 8.3.3 Poor Peasants Languishing in Poverty: Capitalist Misfits

Farm workers and young households in communal areas dominate the poor peasant group (see Mr Banda case Appendix 7) group. They own few assets (for instance data show that most of them have no cattle or scotch carts), have no draught power for reproducing the household, send their children to public schools but often pay in kind either by offering their labour to the school, or maize, which is accepted as a form of payment by most schools in the area. While they produce their staple crops, it is not enough to last the whole year and they must sell their labour to the well-off farmers to survive. The group neither has adequate land to produce cash crops nor finance to acquire the necessary assets required to access contract farming. These are the households Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) referred to as “deficit” producers. They also dominate the miniature microenterprises, such as vegetable vending, firewood sales, fishing, beer-brewing and brick-making. The group rarely receives any lump sum payments from their trade, nor do they have sustainable remittances. In contract farming arrangements, this group offers labour services to contracted farmers; however, contract farming studies often neglect them. A woman in Ndire reported making about US$25 a month from beer sales, she said:

> My husband died three years ago from AIDS and life has never been the same. I withdrew the children from school because I cannot afford to pay from the US$25 I make from brewing beer. We are not even able to produce anything from the plot, which has been lying idle since my husband’s death (Interview July 20, 2017).

Her elder son works for an A1 contract farmer, where she claimed, he earns US$50 per month with an allowance of maize, which his family uses for food. Some work even for used clothing. The plight of
this woman confirms the importance of complementary resources in agricultural production. Again, the group is heterogeneous, with some working themselves out of poverty. Through barter transactions some managed to produce tobacco, which they sold through other farmers’ grower numbers. In Chapter 9 the study reports on farmers selling their labour for tobacco seedlings and other farming inputs, which brought these farmers into the agro-markets.

The high traffic flows attracted roadside businesses, such as roasted mealies (from Negomo Irrigation Scheme), tomatoes, fruits (mainly oranges from Mazoe citrus sales) and nuts, among other edibles, which could be sold in their raw state or easily prepared by the road side. This created opportunities for the less-resourced members of the community to establish microenterprises. Young men made a living as touts, organising commuters at taxi ranks. It was evident that they benefited from the offshoots of accumulators’ investment, though they could barely save. This group earned income from contract farming as suppliers of labour; though agricultural wages are inelastic, provision of maize as part of a barter exchange guaranteed them adequate food supplies. In chapter 2, page 27-28 and figure 2.1, this is the group shown as the community which receives payments from tobacco farmers in exchange for their labour and other services. This stabilised their consumption through the thin seasons. According to Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989), increased income from agriculture is associated with an increase in demand for labour, and hence, the increased cash inflows to Mazowe would have a positive effect on the employment prospects of these farmers.

8.4 Community Effects of Contract Farming

Community effects discussed in this section, arise when increased income leads to increased spending on various commodities and services that prompts increased investment in supply of the same, thus generating a virtuous cycle. As observed in Mazowe, this resulted in increased income, employment and diversification into other economic activities. This is important, given the interlinkage between cash crop and staple crops discussed by Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro (1999). Contract farmers diversified their cropping and livestock production because of the additional credit from contractors allowing them to exploit these new markets.

8.4.1 Farmers Benefited from Contract Farming Networks

Non-contract tobacco farmers, workers and some members of the community benefited from spillover effects of contracting activities. For instance, contractors supplied seedlings in hectare-equivalent packets and farmers, who planted half-hectare plots, exchanged the extra seedlings for labour, thus benefiting poor farmers, who could otherwise not access the inputs. Further, 97.8 percent of the farmers shared knowledge about best farming practices while attending demonstration plots, which were open to all members of the community as discussed in the next section. Descriptive statistics also show that farmers shared equipment, like scotch quarts, ploughs and sheds, and this was confirmed by 97.3 percent
of the respondents. The popular way of sharing was in form of pooling resources (62.5 per cent) among the less resourced farmers. A farmer had this to say, “I and my friend each have a cow each, so we work together to plough the fields, we also share tobacco barns because we do not have enough” (Interview, 29 July 2017). Forty percent of the contract farmers said they helped others who worked for them, one farmer said some of his workers borrowed his equipment like ploughs or even cows. This was however, in exchange for labour service. Through social ties, farmers also assisted each other to market their tobacco through side-marketing, as described above. Side marketing was practiced by 93 percent of the farmers, though in most cases better-off farmers were the major beneficiaries. These farmers also indicated that they pooled resources in transporting tobacco to the market. However, to the farmers this provided an access channel to sell their tobacco at the best price, which benefited farmers who would otherwise not have access to contractors. In most cases these were non-contract farmers selling through contracted farmers where the prices were at a premium. For instance, survey data showed that farmers sold their tobacco to the best paying floor.

8.4.2 Effects of Contract Farming on Technology Adoption and Transfer by Smallholders

Technology transfer took various forms, such as moving to rocket barns, moving from seedbed nurseries to float trays, use of modern inputs and the use of less harmful fertilisers, access to which all foster ‘Good Agricultural Practice’ (GAP). In ward 10, the researcher observed farmers being trained in rocket barn construction, a demonstration that was funded by the contracting firm. This also involved training builders on how the barn was constructed, the materials required and how it was fired. Building skills learnt from barn construction are transferable. Farmers also learnt how tobacco leaves were to be hung in the barn. The demonstration was open for both contract and non-contract farmers.

At Thorncreek, contract and non-contract farmers attended a float-tray seedbed technology demonstration sponsored and arranged by the contractor. The extension officer had this to say:

In a community, it’s difficult to exclude people who just walk in when doing such training, but for me it’s important because it increases the pool of potential farmers I can recruit as contract farmers without the need to retrain them. We brought TRB so that our farmers can learn the best practices in nursery management, a quality crop begins here (Interview September 12, 2017).

The lead farmer in the demonstration plot indicated that he would share the seedlings with some of the farmers who helped with the watering of the seedbed and were going to help with the transplanting, thus further transferring technology use. Neighbours learned from each other and through experience as they nursed, planted, harvested and cured their tobacco. Farmers were hesitant to change their production system partly because of the cost involved in setting-up the new system. The rocket barn
costs more than US$1 200 to construct, while the float tray needed US$357 to set up. For example, a contracted farmer highlighted financial constraint as the major limitation and saying: ‘It is good to have these new barns and float trays, but some of us can simply not afford them without credit” (Interview September 22, 2017).

By providing modern inputs, contract farming fills an input supply gap in tobacco, which was observed to be around 50 percent by Willems (2014) in a study based on Zimbabwean Rural Households Dynamics Study (ZRHDS) collected from 1993 to 1997. The middle farmers, while exposed to the new technology, could not adopt it due to resource constraints and hence most continued to rely on the inefficient traditional barns and seed-beds. Consequently, the poor initial resource endowments of middle-farmers meant that they could not finance and adopt the new technology, while elite resourced-farmers were able to adopt and benefit from it.

8.4.3 Increased Food Production and Food Security

Contract farming had positive effects on food crop production and distribution, which contributed to food security in Mazowe. It was observed that contract farming had positive spillover effects on staple crop production through the provision of staple food inputs, cash advances for labour and extension services to farmers who were encouraged to do crop rotation. Further, maize yields increased due to residual fertiliser remaining in the soil during crop rotation. Use of fertilisers increases output, as observed by Zikhali (2010) for FLRP beneficiaries in Mazowe. The increased food production enhanced food security through improved food availability, access, stability and utilization. Also, food-for-work exchanges and wage-employment from contractors ensured food access by the poor.

In this study, food security concerns were addressed on two fronts, through provisioning of staple crop inputs, and putting a bigger parcel of the plot under staple food and other consumable crops, as reported earlier. Some contractors made conscious decisions to support the food security of their contracted farmers, which had spillover effects to landless people who could not produce their own food. Further, the price of a bucket of maize remained stable at US$3, which was cheaper than buying processed maize meal which was three times this price. Contract farmers, who participated in this survey, had adequate stocks of maize and all indicated they had enough food to last until the next harvest, and some had enough surplus to trade in exchange for labour services. This increased the community’s ability to obtain food, which was readily available. However, this finding is contrary to Mazwi, Chambati, and Mutodi (2018)’s finding in the neighbouring districts of Zvimba and Goromonzi, where they found that contract farmers faced food security risks.

Added to the adequate production of staple crops, increased income from contract farming (discussed in section 8.2) had positive secondary effects on the purchase of manufactured consumables. Most
contract-farmers reported stocking enough manufactured goods during the marketing season. A female contract farmer described her shopping habit:

Lump sum cash from tobacco provides us with the cash we need to buy agricultural inputs and non-perishables like sugar, cooking oil, soap, tea leaves, and kapenta fish. In a good season we buy assets as well (Interview September 29, 2017)

She indicated that prices were now the same in Mazowe as Harare, though she preferred to buy from Harare where she could use her bank-card. Some wholesalers and traders set up shop at the auction floors during the marketing season; some agricultural suppliers rent space at the auction floors, while food stuff retailers sell from mobile trucks and trailers. The researcher observed farmers loading groceries and farm inputs for their journey back home.

Since 2000, the land under tobacco production (nationally) has increased by 22 689 hectares (26.74%) (TIMB 2017). In Mazowe, Scoones et al. (2018:5) report that, before FTLRP, “…large-scale farms grew flue-cured tobacco on 8,157 hectares in Mazowe district”, which has since increased by 52 percent to 12 362 hectares (TIMB 2017). This is due to advantageous climatic conditions, proximity to markets and high uptake by communal farmers, who were not producing the crop before. These good conditions resulted in above-national-average growth in grower numbers and area under tobacco in Mazowe. This did not dampen food production in Mazowe; contract farmers, who benefited from the FTLRP, had bigger plots and access to modern inputs from contractors, which more than compensated for land loss to tobacco. An A1 farmer remarked: “With more land, I am now able to plant more of every crop, but my tobacco gives me more income to finance the increased acreage in my staples and market gardening activities” (Interview November 15, 2017). This shows that farmers invested income from contract farming in staple crop production, a further sign of spillover effects of contract farming.

All respondents indicated that they produced their own staple crops, on their own plots, rented plots or unallocated spaces in the hills or swamp areas. However, the adequacy of staple crop varied with size of plot cultivated. One of the major concerns about contract farming is that it compromises food security through mono-cropping and changes in the land tenure system in the contracted region (Baumann 2000). This concern is given credence by the few studies linking food security and contract farming (Ton et al. 2017). Contracted farmers had, on average, less than 30% of their plots under tobacco production, and hence, the question of mono-cropping did not arise and was not a requirement by the contractor. As observed by Goldsmith (1985:1131), “…companies put a ceiling on contracted acreage, which allowed farmers to leave some of their land in food or other crops”. The ceiling in Mazowe was in the amount of inputs provided.

However, among non-contract farmers the priority was farm inputs before buying of manufactured foodstuff, as indicated by one male-farmer, “I secure my inputs first. At times, the money is not enough, and we just buy what we can during the year. We work for some of these manufactures” (Interview
August 19, 2017). This differential was also observed among contract farmers, some of whom were just breaking-even, while others left the floors with very little. For example, a 24-year old farmer said:

All my sales went towards covering my debt I only got US$100, yet people who worked for me are waiting for their payments. At least I will get inputs next year, and I hope I will get it right (Interview August 19, 2017).

Food-deficient farmers catered for this through working for contract farmers to smooth their consumption during lean periods, another sign of spillover effects. On average it was observed that contracted farmers were more food secure and had surplus maize stock and enough manufactured food stuffs, such as sugar, flour, cooking oil, soap and tea to last the year. This looks plausible, given that contract farmers had access to supplementary staple crop inputs and higher incomes they could use to acquire more inputs.

### 8.4.4 Labour Market Development

Contract farming resulted in employment opportunities induced by spillover effects, creating a diverse labour market straddling farm and non-farm sectors, though agriculture remains the main employer in Mazowe. For example, Table 8-6 shows that contract farmers employed more people during the tobacco farming season than non-contract farmers. Interviewees reported that tobacco-related jobs were barn construction and maintenance (which is a seasonal activity) part-time construction jobs and driving haulage trucks. This has created opportunities for the community to generate income that supports most of their livelihoods outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8-6: Hiring of Labour by Class of Farmer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statistic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual labour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, compiled from survey data

Business people reported a high number of non-farm jobs in passenger transport, gold panning, and service sector jobs in shops and garages, particularly during peak periods. All of this was attributed to spillover effects of contract farming. For instance, interviewees indicated that, before the onset of contract farming, there were two buses plying the Mazowe route via communal areas. However, contract farmers invested in 18-seater taxis that employ many locals that now ply tarred and gravel roads in Mazowe. A business health inspector also had this to say: “The growth of contract farming has seen growth in the number of retail outlets being licensed. These include beauty salons, food outlets,
garages and general dealer shops” (Interview November 11, 2017). The availability of these services were confirmed by 92 percent of the respondents to a survey questionnaire, who however said the government and contractor had not provided any services to the community. A contractor was said to have bought school uniforms for a football team which was deemed not enough. The activities created employment in Mazowe.

On average, casual workers earned three dollars for a day’s work, reaching sixty to ninety dollars per month, depending on the number of days worked. Most people from the local community preferred to work part-time reserving time to produce staple crops in their own fields; even some former farm workers would work on undesignated or rented land to produce their staple crop. In communal areas, working for others was a means to an end, mainly to raise finances for farm inputs, and household consumables. All this shows the strong spillover effects arising from contract farming as the income generated was also spent in the community.

All farm workers interviewed indicated that they belonged to no organisation; that is, they were not unionised. This also applied to casual workers, who preferred to negotiate as individuals. As such, ascribed social status and identity played a critical role in negotiating employment relations. Contract farmers were preferred employers because there was a general notion that they held more assets, were better funded, and hence could afford to pay wages. The individualistic approach to negotiating access to labour is in line with Berry (1993)’s characterisation of access to labour. However, in communal lands, labour was also negotiated informally between kith and kin (family arrangements) and were not regarded as paid-work. For instance, Tindo’s wife believed that it was part of her responsibility to draw water, fetch firewood or even help her in-laws with field chores, which they believed was the norm in the village. A 57-year-old woman, trained in tobacco production, indicated that she helped grade her brother-in-law’s tobacco at no cost and, at times, would be rewarded in kind; as she observed: “We are family. He helps with a lot of things” (Interview July 23, 2017). The family worked in the fields as a unit and, at times, children would help with some tasks, particularly in those families that could not afford to hire enough labour. A farmer indicated they could not afford to hire labour and the family helped in the planting and harvesting of the tobacco. He commented: “My children are very helpful when it comes to planting: I dig the holes and using five-liter containers they put water in the holes and then seedlings. These are light tasks and they also learn farming at early age” (Interview July 30, 2017).

The situation was different in A1 settlements, where former farm workers with no plots to sustain subsistence relied mainly on the sale of labour to access livelihoods, though they also preferred piece work just as their communal compatriots did. Magaramombe (2010) provides a succinct description of former farm workers’ labour practices in ward 20, which was also observed in ward 32. However, in ward 32, it was observed that negotiating access to labour was intertwined with access to resources,
such as land use and household consumables. Payments were also barter-based and, in a few cases, cash.

8.4.5 Increased Business Activity in Mazowe Community: Income Effect

‘Business is booming’ is the sense that one gets on a visit to Mazowe during the tobacco-marketing season. According to a councillor in Chiweshe, tobacco production, together with contract farming, has been a major business stimulant in the area because of the spending patterns of farmers and workers during tobacco-marketing season (Interview July 25, 2017). A hive of activities was observed at retail outlets, for example, which were fully stocked with a variety of consumer goods, and loud music played at every store and market stalls that form during this period as businesses enticed customers. This is not surprising, given the positive agricultural income effect observed by Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) for southern Africa. Again, in Chapter 6 it was shown that tobacco supports livelihoods of a large population in Zimbabwe. Consumption of manufactured goods and luxuries increase due to income elasticity associated with these goods. This is more so given that maize is readily available at stable prices (Nieuwoudt and Vink, 1989). As reported in Chapter 9, tobacco workers get paid during the marketing season. In July, during tobacco marketing season, high volumes of traffic (passenger carriers), and brisk business at bottle stores, informal market stalls selling used clothing, and retail outlets within the tobacco farming community were observed. As explained by Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989:169), “…expenditure on clothing increases significantly as income increases”, so too the other luxuries. This conspicuous expenditure confirms Prowse’s (2009) observation in the central region of Malawi where tobacco farmers went on a ‘cooling-off’ (conspicuous consumption) spree after receiving lumpsum payments for their tobacco. When the researcher returned to these areas in November (after the tobacco marketing season) the center were almost deserted. In a way, tobacco production opened more access channels for the community to earn a livelihood, these channels ranged from diversified investment in crop production, poultry businesses, and services and manufacturing as described above. Those involved in poultry production supplied local retail outlets and local communities, thus providing a source of protein for the community.

However, farming input markets were depressed due to the modus operandi of contractors that included delivery of inputs to farmers. This resonates with Little and Watts’ (1994:226) observation that “…contract farming schemes rely on external inputs and markets and do not maintain strong linkages to the regional economy, except with labor markets”. A retailer noted: “Agricultural inputs have no market here because the contractor supplies everything; now they even supply maize-seed we used to sell” (Interview November 21, 2017). However, the stockists of seedlings and fertilizers were found in bigger centers, such as Concession and Glendale, which were reachable by public transport at an average cost of US$4 for the return journey. One of the councillors, a retailer, indicated that three points explained the lack of inputs at retail shops: first, the proximity and ease of access to Harare; second,
most inputs were supplied to the farm gate by the contractor; and third, farmers sourced their inputs in Harare soon after the tobacco sales for the coming farming season.

The Tobacco Industry Development Support Institute for Southern Africa (TIDSI) has been calling for the decentralisation of tobacco auctions to growing regions (Nyoni 2018, February) to cut transport costs and this could also assist with the development of markets. For instance, people within the district could operate food stalls, and sell used clothes and farm implements, as was observed in Harare. The decentralisation of tobacco marketing has been caught-up in bureaucratic chains since 2012, when the Minister of Finance announced:

     Government together with TIMB are exploring alternatives for decentralising the marketing of tobacco to provinces and districts following concerns related to high transportation costs and congestion at the current auction floors (Biti 2013).

Decentralisation creates overheads for agribusinesses and reduces business opportunities for big business, for instance transport issues, which could be affecting the adoption of this long-standing initiative. However, the lack of decentralisation has not dampened local farmers’ investment initiative, as discussed in the next section.

Apart from tobacco contract farmers’ investments, a private school was established near Negomo Irrigation Scheme by two local brothers, and the main attraction for the school was said to be the high incomes from contract farmers, who were now demanding better education for their children (Interview October 24, 2017). As shown in Table 8-5, on average, tobacco contract farmers spent more on education. Other businesses, such as motor vehicle service provisioning and the sale of spares, were also set-up in response to the increased volume of traffic in the area. A Negomo irrigation horticultural farmer at Rosa business center opened a garage, which now employs two people. He said: “I noticed an increased number of vehicles and equipment people were buying and servicing in Harare and decided I should open this garage. Most of my clients are tobacco farmers, who are contracted by firms operating here” (Interview October 27, 2018). This is in line with Reardon and Barrett (2000) observation that such an increase in equipment and agro-processing industries gave rise to rural non-farm activities. Similar accumulation patterns were also observed by Scoones et al. (2018), which they attributed to tobacco farming. All these had employment spillover effects within the community.

8.4.6 Access to Markets at the Auction Floors

Successful contract farmers used cash inflows from contract farming to produce other cash crops and engage in trade, which resulted in the creation of secondary markets in Harare and Mazowe. Furthermore, drawing from TIMB (2017) secondary data, this thesis shows that a tenfold increase in the number of smallholder tobacco farmers, of which 84 percent produce under contract, resulted in the formation of vibrant informal markets at auction floors and in Mazowe. According to economic
rationality, income and population concentration are important variables in the formation of markets, a phenomenon that arose due to contract farming in Mazowe. Farmers responded to the secondary markets as described below.

Figure 8-5 shows that more contract farmers produced high-value vegetables for the market compared to non-contract farmers. Despite the disappointment in classification and the pricing of their tobacco, auction floors present farmers with opportunities to market some of their agricultural produce, create networks and source commodities from the vibrant informal markets that develop during the selling season. A farmer said: “I sell maize, indigenous chickens and vegetables to ladies running these food market stalls for cash, even if am not selling tobacco” (Interview October 19, 2017). Various other items are on sale at these informal stalls and even some manufacturers display their products for the farmers. Relationships develop where some traders from Harare use farmers as entry points into rural markets to sell their used clothes, and at times formed partnerships to open similar market stalls in the rural areas. A farmer I accompanied to the floors said, “I established connections and now I even supply home grown-chickens to some of the food vendors who have operations at Mereki (a popular braaiing place in the high-density suburb of Warren Park D)” (Interview July 17, 2017). At Gweshe business-centre, market stalls were observed during the peak of the tobacco seasons, and urbanites were the suppliers of used clothing bales sold at these stalls. These urbanites employ locals to work on the stalls.

![Number of Farmers Producing High Value Vegetables for the Market by Class](image)

Figure 8-5: Number of Farmers Producing High Value Vegetables for the Market by Class

Source: Author, compiled from survey data

Contract farmers were the major beneficiaries because of their diversified cropping systems. A contract farmer said, “I produce a variety of edible cash crops, which I sell at Mbare Msika and restaurants in Harare; but during the tobacco marketing season I have a lucrative market at the auction floors, where I sell to direct users at a better price for cash” (Interview September 19, 2017). This farmer invested in
water pumps and borehole and had a flourishing market garden producing high-value produce, such as butternuts, peas, onions and okra, among others. He attributed this to income generated from contract farming activities, which, he said, released finances for other things. This created opportunities for employment-multiplier effects as observed by Key and Runsten (1999). This position was reflected by the survey data, which showed that more contract farmers were involved in market gardening, (see Figure 8-5). Though non-contract farmers produced for the market, they produced traditional vegetables, such as tomatoes, with low returns due to the flooded market, which they preferred to sell at Mbare Msika.

All entrepreneurial oriented tobacco farmers combine their tobacco sales with either participation in markets as buyers or sellers. As buyers the auction floors provides them an array of commodities needed for farm level activities, such as ploughs, scotch carts, tobacco curing pipes and even foodstuffs. In Mazowe, locals responded to the increased number of farmers and income by providing income-generating services. Due to the demand for commodities, such as firewood, barn maintenance and other non-farm service, there was an increase in the number of ‘own-account workers’ responding to the demand of such commodities. For instance, while, Tindo keeps stocks of bricks for resale on demand, other villagers also keep stacks of firewood ready to sell during the peak season when the demand for curing firewood increases. We also observed women brewing the local version of distilled beer, called kachasu and bartering for food or natural resources, such as firewood. Though it amounted to excessive working hours, most people in the area were involved in some form of economic activity throughout the year as permanent, casual or own-account workers.

8.4.7 Land Market Development: Enhancing Access to Productive Land

A land rental market is developing in Mazowe, driven by inadequate land to meet subsistence needs, diversification/expansion of cropping mix, and participation in cash crops, such as tobacco contract production. This resonates with Akram- Lodhi’s (2005) reasoning on why farmers rent in and out land. Renting in land was driven by profit motive for farmers who wanted to expand their tobacco plots and still various other staple and cash crops. The farmers who rented out land had resource access challenges, did not have drought power or a plough. The development of the rental market is characterised by individualised informal agreements, paid for both in kind or cash, and involves the poor and rich. All interviewees who said they paid fixed rentals for land were contract farmers and wanted to expand plot under tobacco, and the poor were involved in some form of sharecropping based on labour exchange or sharing output. A member of the Committee of Seven, indicated that they were aware of the practice; however, it was necessary, because “…they all want enough for survival” (Interview August 25, 2017). However, he indicated that land rental was illegal but only became ‘commercialised’ out of greed after people realised that farmers were making money from contract farming. The communal and A1 land tenure system does not allow for land rentals, hence most of the
transactions are informal. This is because of the customary and permit tenure (see section 3.4.1 and 5.2.40 system that operates in A1 and communal system). Further discussions revealed that A1 farmers rented-out land to keep the farm productive for fear of repossession.

Three categories of people renting land were observed:

- **Landless urbanites**, generally to embark on cash crop production. These had access to resources, such as cash and contract farming, which they accessed through illicit means, and rented land from A1 farmers. One farmer indicated he was brought into the scheme by a friend, who is the extension officer in the scheme, and they decided to start this partnership. The partnership worked well because of insider trading which normally meant their tobacco attracted a better price (Interview July 30, 2017).

- **Communal people** expanding into cash crops and were short of land. These rented land from communal areas and A1 farmers to allow for crop rotation and increased plot under tobacco production after getting into contracts. In addition, there were communal farmers involved in some form of share-cropping, where they worked plots of rich peasants in exchange for a small plot to produce staple crops. A communal farmer in Ndire, who was producing under contract, rented all the plots where he produced his tobacco. A letter of introduction to TIMB that allowed him to get a grower number was based on his communal plot, as he noted, “…nobody makes a follow-up” and hence, anybody could get a letter of introduction from the headman even if they didn’t have land (Interview July 16, 2017).

- **A1 farmers** expanding operations rented land from fellow A1 farmers. These produced multiple cash crops, such as beans and soya beans, and were involved in command agriculture as well as tobacco contract farming. These were also among the accumulators observed in the cases above. Through patronage, they had good access to resources; some were said to be active in politics as sponsors, though themselves never occupied political office. Some of the favours included transporting people to political rallies.

An A1 farmer, who rented out his plot, indicated that he had no resources or knowledge of farming, had no job and hence he was reaping fruits of his participation in *Jambanja* through renting out his plot (Interview July 16, 2017). Access to resources and asset endowment were key drivers of the developing land rental market and the sharecropping arrangement (De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Zhu 2005), and hence, those able to access resource-providing institutions or draw from personal resources were able to participate in rental markets. The distribution of benefits, household and community effects were affected by power imbalance which are discussed next.
8.5 A Case of Power Imbalance in Contract Design

Survey data show that no respondents participated in the drafting of the contract, a case of power imbalance discussed in Chapter 10. All farmers said that contracts are clear on the amount of inputs, acreage and contractor rights on debt recovery. However, 82 percent said the contracts were silent on the resolution of disputes, though they had never had disputes. Risk-sharing mechanisms (98%), and pricing and grading (98%) were the main contested processes. As was discussed in the literature review, critics of contract farming arrangements (Little and Watts 1994; Wilson 1986) cite such issues as the source of the exploitative nature of contracting arrangements being power imbalances.

The grading and classification of tobacco at the floors was a highly contested issue and often led to confrontation due to unclear classification standards. According to TIMB rules, the contractor is expected to grade and classify the tobacco and then insert a price that should not be less than the auction price prevailing the previous day. Hence, 86 percent of contract farmers felt that the grading system was neither transparent nor fair, as they were at the hands of the contractor who was at liberty to manipulate the grades. A complex grading system with a possibility of generating near infinite grades is used in the classification of tobacco. One farmer complained: “The contractor does not even specify the tobacco quality he wants, we are only told this is low quality” (Interview 2017). As observed by Eaton and Shepherd (2001), grading, classification and pricing is of great concern and, in Zimbabwe, farmers resort to industrial action to attract government attention. Larsen (2002) observed the use of independent arbitrators in the cotton sector in Zimbabwe as a possible remedy for grading disputes, a practice that TIMB could also adopt. The other contentious issue was the payment for the tobacco that goes through the integrated TIMB payment system. The problem here, though, is the shortage of cash within the economy and some cases of unauthorised deductions, which then require the farmer to rectify with TIMB, who run the system.

Most contracts provide inputs that are enough for the contracted plot. However, two issues were of concern to the farmers:

1. The lack of transparency in the grading and pricing of tobacco, which farmers felt could be spelt out in the contract prior to the start of the farming season. The quality of tobacco is dependent on field operations and curing in the barn which produces the two colours mainly traded in Zimbabwe, either orange or yellow; yet farmers are not informed of the desired quality which eventually affects grading and prices at the auction floors.

2. The input and services charges. Most farmers were not aware of the cost structure.

One motivation for contract farming is that the contractor and farmer would share market and production risk, which could potentially increase the farmer’s profit (Key and Runsten 1999; Simmons
The contract offered to Mazowe farmers, however, leaves them fully exposed to price and production risks. For instance, document analysis revealed that prices are fully dependent on the market forces and are only known on the day of sale. The contractor bears no production risks arising from natural phenomena that may cause crop failure. The contractor does not insure, nor do they expect farmers to insure, their crops against any potential risks, as reported by 100% of the contracted farmers. Contract farmers reported that market failure was dealt with through negotiation (65%) and the rescheduling of risk (85%); alternatively, 69 percent of farmers invested in other assets and multi-cropping to cater for risk. There were no reports of legal action on defaulting farmers. The farmers who involuntarily exited the contracts and had outstanding debts, still negotiate for repayment. They were not expecting any legal action from the contractor. This arrangement is what Narayanan (2011) refers to as relational based contract.

As discussed above, the contractor designs, administers and adjudicates over the contract within the broad prescriptions provided by TIMB. For instance, rule 2.2 (TIMB 2017) states: “The contractors should not buy tobacco that they did not finance its production”; however, the contract does not mention the tonnage expected from the contracting arrangement; yields from contracted plots vary in line with agro-ecological conditions and farm management practices. This is contrary to standard contract features suggested by Eaton and Shepherd (2001). Consequently, side marketing was rampant, as contracted farmers sold tobacco from other farmers as well as their extended plots, since there was no output quota. Another TIMB (2017) clause stipulates:

Pricing of tobacco will be based on an agreed grade-price matrix using TIMB classification system. In the event the agreed price paid for the same tobacco at the auction floors the grower shall be paid the higher price prevailing at the auction floor at the time

This effectively means that the pricing model is auction price plus a premium which is provided at the discretion of the contractor. Yet this is not known to the growers, as shown by 100% of respondents who indicated that the contract did not specify the method of determining the tobacco price. What is problematic is that the same contractors are also active participants in the auction floor purchases, posing a risk of price manipulation in favour of the contractor. Contractors are buyers at the auction and hence set the auction price, which becomes the benchmark in the determination of the contract price. Such mechanisms of price determination for tobacco are done in Tanzania, but the farmers are made aware of the price determination mechanism and their cooperatives or farmer organisations are active participants in the process (Sambuo 2013).

The farmers bear the cost of any market and production risks, such as the fall in international prices below cost. Again, all respondents indicated that the contract did not provide for such unforeseen risks as hailstorms, drought or prices falling below cost. The auction price is driven by the world market-price prevailing on each selling day and can be below production cost depending on the forces of
demand and supply. As shown in section 7.9, the power balance in the contractual arrangement is skewed against the farmer; all the variables are determined by the contractor and the farmer is a taker of the contract terms. Again, the contractor is the enforcer of the contract, as TIMB also gives the right to recover credit advanced to the farmer before any payments are made to the farmer.

The contract strongly favoured the contractor against farmers who were restricted to grade and price taking with little recourse to any remedies. The contracts offered to farmers are substantially incomplete in respect of material issues of a contract, that is, quality and price determination, enforcement mechanisms that are left to the discretion of the contractor and or the regulator, and risk-sharing mechanisms. This confirms Prowse’s (2012) observation on incomplete contracts. This impinges on the sharing of the value generated and dilutes any benefits accruing to farmers.

8.6 Conclusion

The chapter presented data that showed that contract farmers had higher tobacco production output, income and livelihood options compared to all other groups. This was mainly driven by their access to land after the FTLRP, and extra agricultural financing, which helped them hedge against risks, adopt better technologies, and expand their farming operations. Assured inputs also allowed the farmers to diversify their farming activities as well as venture into non-farm activities. Because of the high income they earned they tended to invest in high-value non-farm microenterprises. Non-contract farmers and other groups were involved in low-value microenterprises, such as street vending, artisanal work and natural resource-based activities. They benefited from employment and services provided by the contracted farmers, which also had a positive effect on their agricultural activities and, for some, participation in cash crop production. Technology was transferred to non-contract farmers, though the lack of finance constrained its adoption. Contract farming had positive effects on the quantity and distribution of food in the community through barter exchange of labour for maize and consistently uniform prices throughout the year. Tobacco production was also a source of finance for food crop production, all this courtesy of access to land after the FTLRP.

Farmers adopted side-marketing strategies to manage price differentials among contractors and auction floors through sound local networks, helping each other sell tobacco in better rewarding contract or auction markets. Again, the well-resourced benefited from such transactions, which helped them reduce transaction cost by tying such arrangements to labour negotiations. Contracting arrangements provided a platform to cover financing risks emanating from bad weather and subsequent poor sales; as farmers noted, they were assured of inputs to continue production, which allowed farmers to diversify their livelihood activities into non-farm investments that benefited the community. Power imbalance influenced the distribution of benefits in the community.
Chapter 9

Factors which Influence Farmer Participation in Contract Farming in Mazowe

9.0 Introduction

This chapter reports on factors that influence farmer participation in contract farming and the subsequent effects of household and community economic activities. There is evidence that these are the causal factors to the household and community effects reported on in chapter 8. The chapter draws from Wang, Wang and Delgaldo (2014)’s conception that to understand the effect of contract farming a researcher needs to understand the causes. In reporting on the factors in this chapter the study draws from Ribot and Peluso (2003:162) conception of ‘structural and relational mechanisms’ of benefit-resource nexus discussed in chapter 2. Contractors and farmers hold resources in different proportions which affects participation and benefits accruing from contracting. Sen (1982) argues that ‘ownership’ would result in ‘exchange entitlements’ which are akin to benefits in access theory. This chapter is about how ownership of various endowments and actor attributes explain the effects reported on in chapter 8.

Participation in contract farming arrangements is influenced by contractor and farmer attributes, endowments (for instance assets, education, networks and so on) which constitute the ‘bundle of powers’ held by the parties. In a production relationship, the bundle of powers can therefore derive from the control of the various factors of production and how agents get to use them. In Mazowe, it was observed that contractors had control over the design of contracts, which defined the conditions of participation as discussed in chapter 7. Farmers, on the other hand, owned land and other assets, which influenced their decision to accept, participate and stay in contracts. Contrary to most arrangements discussed in literature that involve the government, farmer organisations, multilateral institutions and donors, (Glover and Kusterer 2016; Barrett et al. 2012), the contracts were negotiated between the contracting firm and the farmer with little third-party involvement. According to a CFU official, this business relation was an initiative of business, motivated by serious product supply bottlenecks experienced after the FTLRP, a condition that Goodhue and Simon (2016) argue can give rise to contracting arrangements. In this case, businesses were keen to get Virginia tobacco leaf while smallholder farmers wanted access to productive resources.

The rest of the chapter presents and discusses factors and mechanisms of resource access that gave rise to the effects of contract farming in Mazowe, using qualitative data from interviews, descriptive statistics and a logit regression model. Evidence from the study suggests that the initial capital
endowments of farmers influenced farmer participation and outcomes from tobacco contract farming and that asset-rich farmers are more likely to stay in these contracting arrangements while the poor exit. As discussed in Chapter 2, access theory predicts that those who control and can expend benefits can benefit from such interventions as contract farming. This result was confirmed by both the quantitative and qualitative data sets.

9.1 Factors Influencing Farmer Participation in Contract Farming

The contractor uses a selection criterion, which favours those who have assets, are in social or professional networks, experienced and landed, which is exclusionary to young, and communal farmers with little land holdings. The section further provides evidence that shows that these factors affect the farmers’ ability to maintain their position in contract farming. The poor, who are the majority, struggle, while the well-off smoothly negotiate and pay their way to a bigger share of the value generated. As shown in Chapter 8, this is further invested in activities that benefit the household and community. All this is done as they seek to maintain and expand their hold on contract farming and hence, become the contractor’s preferred farmers.

The contracting firm has standard selection criteria for all potential beneficiaries. They include experience in tobacco production, and that one be a registered tobacco grower with TIMB and have assets that include land, draught power, ploughs and labour, which the extension officer is supposed to check and verify through local authorities. Because contractors prefer farmers with larger farms and assets, better-off farmers are more likely to get contracts on favourable terms, such as cash advances for labour. When contracted farmers (N=63) were asked about the contractor’s requirements to join contract farming, farmers responded as shown in Figure 9.1. Figure 9.1 shows that farmers perceived holding assets, such as cattle, barns, and scotch carts, as an important consideration for participating in contract farming. These constitutes ‘a bundle of powers’ held by the farmer. Education and experience reflect the ability of farmers to enter into networks that improved farmers’ productivity.

From the sample, 37 FTLRP beneficiaries (A1) with bigger land holdings, better assets and education got contracts compared to 26 communal peasants and hence, a communal farmer noted:

Most of us in the communal area are excluded from these contracts because we have no land; even if we wanted to, where will we plant our food crops? Even the government’s command agriculture is for the rich” (Interview July 21, 2017).

To the farmer, being rich was also associated with big land holdings and power and hence he thought contracts were allocated to the influential members of society. A 23-year-old farmer indicated that he applied but the extension officer rejected his application because he had no plot or assets of his own. He narrated his story thus:
My father allocated me this plot, which is less than a hectare, where I built my house. I wanted to use half of my plot for tobacco, but the extension officer refused saying I had no experience or resources and I could not use my father’s assets who is also a contract farmer (Interview August 28, 2017)

![Figure 9-1: Requirements to join contract farming as perceived by the farmers](image)

Source: From author’s survey data.

This is supported by survey data which showed people were excluded due to lack of farming implements. Youth, particularly those under 30 years old, had difficulty getting contracts due to lack of trust, as they were viewed as more mobile and unsettled. This is in line with Bolwig, Gibbon, and Jones (2009) observation that households’ endowments are important predictors of contract participation leading to the non-random selection of farmers into contracts. Adjognon (2012) explained that “…the unequal access to contract farming schemes may even reflect to some extent the prevailing inequality in the society”. A contractor extension officer explaining the non-random selection noted: “You cannot experiment with the youth; they are adventurous and still looking for better income opportunities. For instance, if gold is discovered, they easily leave tobacco.” (Interview August 29, 2017). All this explains the uneven and differential access to benefits observed in chapter 8. The next subsections discuss the factors highlighted in Figure 9-1.

**9.1.1 Household Composition Influences Participation in Contract Farming**

The composition of the household, that is, its size, age of members and sex, affect economic and livelihood decisions taken. For instance, access to land showed a bias against women, as shown in Table 9-1 where 115 households were male-headed and 35 female-headed. Interview results revealed that
those decisions on the cropping mix, allocation of resources and whether to participate in contract farming or not were taken by the household head. Surprisingly, ANOVA results show that there is no significant difference in terms of age and sex. However, contract farmers had higher average age. Interviews with contractors and farmers indicated that male farmers over 40 years got preference compared to the under 40s. It is plausible that the variables explain participation, given the ownership structure of assets in a family.

Age is an indicator for experience and position of the household’s life cycle (Randela 2005), and, for a crop such as tobacco, older farmers are expected to join contract farming to take advantage of premium prices observable at the auctions. Barrett et al. (2012) found that age was negatively associated with contract farming participation. With age, people acquire assets and information that allow them to ‘go it alone’; however, the deteriorating and uncertain macroeconomic environment in Zimbabwe forces farmers to join contract farming. Mazowe farmers needed to invest in tobacco production to be considered for tobacco contracts. This observation is in line with Simmons et al.’s (2005) observation that demographic factors affect contract participation according to crop type.

Descriptive statistics show that men dominate tobacco contract farming. In A1 farms, 13 women said that they were in contract farming; however, some were fronting their husbands engaged in full-time employment in Harare and the surrounding towns, who often remitted cash to support agricultural ventures. This is in line with the number of male-headed households and the proportion of 12% women land beneficiaries, showing male control of household resources (Moyo 2011; Mutopo 2011). A woman farmer said:

The contract is in my husband’s name. He organises everything with the contractor: input deliveries, implements, the marketing, and hiring of labour. We pay our workers from the money he sends (Interview September 17, 2017).

With no-support, fewer women ventured into cash crop production and only three A1-war-veterans receiving a pension were involved as tobacco non-contract farmers. Female farmers are generally discriminated against in contract farming arrangements, and those who participate derive fewer benefits than their male counterparts which confirms Barrett et al.’s (2012) conclusion from a review of the literature. The discrimination against women manifests in the control of resources, which is vested in men in patriarchal societies. For crops such as tobacco, the demanding curing schedule needs overnight attention to maintain temperatures, and initial investment in assets might act as a deterrent to a poorly resourced female-headed household, an observation that confirms Heald (1991) findings among Kuria tobacco farmers in Kenya.

The variable, economically active members of the family, was significant. Contract farmers had larger households due, in part, to the high number of permanent employees they engaged. According to the inverse-farm theory (Heltberg 1998), farms worked on by household members are more efficient and
productive than those operated through hired labour. It was observed that the more economically active members in a household, the more productive the household, possibly given the reduced cost of supervision and moral hazard.

Table 9-1: Demographic and Household Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>A1 contract farmers</th>
<th>A1 non-contract farmers</th>
<th>Former farm workers</th>
<th>Communal contract farmers</th>
<th>Communal non-contract farmers</th>
<th>Non-tobacco farmers</th>
<th>ANOVA results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male Number</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>F(5,144) = .844, p = .521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Number</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>F(5,144) = 1.539, p = .185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Mean</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>F(5,110) = 4.533, p = 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically Active Mean</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author. Compiled from survey data

This shows that farmers with more economically active members were in a good position to participate in tobacco contract production due to their access to an adequate labour supply needed in tobacco production; an observation further confirmed by the logit model in section 9.2. Miyata, Minot, and Hu (2009), using a probit model, found the variables, age and economically active members of the household, insignificant factors in explaining the participation of farmers in onion and apple contracts in China. Similarly, Miglani (2016), though noting the ambiguity in these variables, also used them and found mixed results. Ton et al. (2017)’s systematic review quotes several scholars who applied the same variables and others used in this study with differential outcomes, which goes to show that crop type matters.

### 9.1.2. Asset Holding

Table 9-2 shows that there is a statistically significant difference in asset holdings and that, on average, contract farmers have higher asset holdings, followed by tobacco non-contract farmers, due mainly to their participation in cash crop production. Farm workers who are not involved in cash crop production have the least assets. Initial asset holdings play a major role in tobacco production and admission into tobacco contracts, and hence, members of the community with no assets were excluded. Most contract farmers indicated that they had accumulated assets, such as tobacco barns, cattle and scotch carts, before they joined contract farming. In Mvurwi, Scoones et al. (2018) noted that the ownership of assets was a source of exclusion or inclusion in contract farming, and that richer households participated more in such contracts.
Using an asset-based approach in Mozambique, Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton (2006) showed initial asset holdings were important for farmers’ participation in higher return markets. The contract designed by Mazowe contractors favoured experienced farmers with tobacco producing assets, such as barns, acquired during their earlier years as non-contract farmers. It is not surprising that the well-resourced farmers participated in contract farming and were offered better contracts compared to the poor. This allowed them to generate benefits at the household and community level. As observed by Barrett et al. (2005), household asset endowments play an important role in the choice of livelihood strategy and hence, options available to diversify. Poor farmers who could not raise capital for barns and other tobacco implements would self-select out of contracting, not by choice but due to lack of assets.

### 9.1.3 Tobacco Farming Experience

On average, contract farmers got contracts after 4.8 (A1) and 4.9 (communal) years of tobacco farming, and an analysis of variance showed the mean difference was significant ($F (4.103) = 3.824, p = .006$).

Overall, contracted farmers had 9.5 and 10.10 years of experience compared to 6.5 and 6 years for non-contract farmers in A1 and communal areas, respectively, and the analysis of variance was statistically significant ($F (1.14) = 7.301, p = .017$). According to Goldsmith (1985), experience allows for farmers to adopt good farming practices learnt over time, through networks and informal learning. As time-based variables, experience and age tend to be highly correlated and can be used interchangeably.
Experience in tobacco production is assessed through the number of years the farmer delivered tobacco
to the auction floors; again, the grower authorises the contracting firm to access his records held by
TIMB to confirm his/her trading record. Some contracting firms do a credit check through local
leadership, assessing the risk profile of the farmer. Experience is a package of household factor
endowment (Barrett et al. 2005), which is important for self-selection into contracting schemes, given
that historical ties come to bear. In Mazowe, farmers producing tobacco shared experiences at the
auction floors, during field days and on other informal platforms, thus building some form of social
capital. This became handy as farmers in the same circle get into contracts through referrals, as shown
in section 9.1.7, where, through snowballing, the extension officer recruited farmers into contracts. It
also explains the exclusion of the poor who, Barrett et al. (2005: 28) explained, “have less human and
social capital on which to draw”. Networks are important in agriculture and are formed through working
together over long periods, a situation observed in Mazowe, among tobacco farmers and working
professions who used the networks to access resources. The poor were excluded from such networks
though most of them had experience in producing tobacco as workers. This is a form of capital
workers/poor could not build on because it was not backed by complementary productive assets, and
hence, some made it through patronage. This involved negotiating for resources through labour and
resource exchanges as shown in Figure 2-1 in Chapter 2. This explains the accumulator, middle farmer
and poor peasant categorisation described in chapter 8.

9.1.4 Plot Size

An agribusiness officer in Harare indicated that land size was an important determinant in decisions on
whether to offer a half-hectare contract or more. This is not surprising given that the question of access
to land has been described as an important facilitator to alternative livelihood strategies and economic
opportunities (Chitonge and Ntsebeza 2012; Scoones et al. 2011). Access to land also enables the farmer
to handle different crops’ agro-ecological demands and their food requirements. In arriving at this
decision, the contractor considers the farmer’s food crop production needs, the need for crop rotation
and the labour at the farmer’s disposal to work on the tobacco crop (Interview November 15, 2017).
This was also observed in Kenya, where BAT allocated contracts based on land size to allow for crop
rotation, and different crop uses (Heald 1991). Survey results showed that less than 30 percent of the
farmer’s plot holdings were allocated to tobacco production. On average, farmers were con
tracted on
less than 20 percent of their plot, however, the farmers increased acreage without the consent of the
contractor, financing operations from personal resources.

The selection of farmers into contracts was always intended to leave them with enough land for other
crops. Contracted farmers also concurred with this selection process, though they alleged it was littered
with corruption due to jostling for participation, therefore peasants in Mazowe are contract-takers and
have no say in the contractual relationship. Initial contracts were for a half-hectare plot; however, high
performers with land were rewarded with increases in hectarage and finance to cover labour costs on the renewal of the contract. This speaks to the importance of land in accessing productive resources and contracts. Literature on the adoption of cash crop production shows that land is an important determinant in cash-crop production and is intertwined with the farmer’s food security concerns (Fafchamps 1992; Jayne 1994). Therefore, the size of a household’s plot becomes important in decisions about its crop diversification strategy.

Table 9.3 shows that land sizes are significantly different for the farmers. For A1 farmers the mean plot size is almost the same, showing the uniform size of land allocated during FTLRP. However there are wide variations when it comes to communal farmers, interviews revealed that this was due to continuous subdivision of land as fathers allocate land to their sons. As a result A1 farmers were more likely to join contract farming compared to communal. This trend is manifested in plot under tobacco where A1 farmers have bigger plots compared to communal. Interviews with farmers showed that farmers prioritised staple food production before cash crops which could explain the smaller plots allocated to tobacco by communal farmers. Land differentials were very high in communal areas as shown by the high figure of the range.

Table 9-3: Plot Size in hectares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>A1 contract farmer</th>
<th>A1 non-contract farmer</th>
<th>Communal contract farmer</th>
<th>Communal non-contract farmer</th>
<th>ANOVA results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of plot</td>
<td>Mean 5.79</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>F(4,100) =3.333, p =.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 0.98</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot under tobacco</td>
<td>Mean 1.44</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>F(4.99) =7.926, p =.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 0.62</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot under other crops</td>
<td>Mean 4.31</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>F(4,100) =5.218, p =.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 1.11</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from survey data

As observed in Mazowe, all farmers allocated a bigger portion of their land to staple/other crops as shown in Table 9-3 below. For instance, non-tobacco farmers with a mean plot size of 1.45 said they could not embark on tobacco production, neither could they qualify to enter into contracts due to inadequate land holdings. In tobacco, land is important for crop rotation, farmers also need to set-aside land for staple crop production, which, Cai et al. (2008) noted, affects land under cash crop production. Consequently, there were five farmers who said they were renting land because they owned none or that what they had was not enough. The more affluent farmers also rented land to expand their commercial production. This was necessitated by the introduction of command agriculture which
required more land and hence, a farmer said: “I rent land from fellow A1 farmers who cannot use it, because I need more land to produce soya and maize under command as well as for my tobacco contract. I cannot forgo these opportunities” (Interview September 13, 2017). As noted by De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Wolford (2001), land rental is motivated by “…unequal ability between owner and user to access credit, own machinery, bear risk, and engage in contract farming” and uneven resource endowments among households. In Mazowe, A1 farmers were renting out land for fear of losing it, if it was seen to be unproductive. As discussed in chapter 3 and 4, successful land reforms need to be accompanied by resource provisioning strategies which guarantee access to farming resources. This differential in land and asset holding affected farmers’ access to contract farming and benefits accruing to the household and community.

The maximum contracted plot size was 3 hectares and most farmers were contracted for half a hectare, though tendencies to increase plot under cultivation financed from personal resources were observed in both the A1 and communal areas. A farmer explained why they increased the parcels under tobacco:

It is not economic to produce a half hectare; first, the seedlings and chemicals are sold in hectare packs. The barns we construct are big enough for a hectare and a harvest from a half-hectare might not be enough to fill a barn, as a result, you end up mixing and compromising quality” (Interview September 11, 2017).

Another farmer had another reason:

I started producing tobacco from my own resources on a half-hectare. When I got on contract I expanded production to increase my revenue since I had more capital (Interview November 10, 2017).

Farmers in communal lands did not enjoy this privilege because of their small landholding; some could not even participate in cash crop production due to land shortages. This shows that FTLRP beneficiaries with enough assets and labour had better chances of participating in contracting arrangements compared to communal farmers. This is also consistent with the inverse-farm relationship argument for land reform proffered in Chapter 3 (see also Heltberg 1998). It is not surprising that most farmers who received more income and invested in farm and non-farm activities were from A1 farms. From this discussion, it is evident that access to land under FTLRP was crucial for farmers’ outcomes in tobacco production,

9.1.5 Effect of Occupation and Education on Farmer Participation in Contract Farming

Figure 9-2 shows the main occupations of the respondents by farmer category. Six A1 farmers doubled up as formal employees and contract farmers and their full-time work provided extra funding sources for tobacco and agriculture infrastructure, and hence, one woman indicated that her husband’s salary
was an important source of infrastructure funding for their tobacco production. This is in line with the asset-based approach, which sees factor endowments as a prerequisite to expand one’s operation (Carter and Barrett 2006; Boughton et al. 2007). Most of them who were in the ‘own farm’ category were pensioners and were better connected to resource-providing networks, contrary to non-contract farmers who were bound by lineage networks. Farm workers represented the least educated group with low-level occupations and had no formal access to land. A similar trend was observed by Scoones et al. (2018) in Mvurwi.

![Figure 9-2: Occupation of Respondent](image)

Source: Author, compiled from survey data

Figure 9-3 shows that contract farmers are more educated than other members of the community, however correlation data shows that there is no significant relationship with contract participation. This result is in line with multinomial logistic regression results in Table 9.5 on page 172. However, education was found to be an important variable in explaining farmers’ decision to participate in contract farming as observed in scholarly work indicating the allocative efficiency of education.
Narayanan (2011)’s findings are revealing, as they show that the importance of education depends on the crop. For papaya, for example, she found a positive relationship, while marigold was negative. Papaya is an export crop with no local market while marigold has a strong local market, and hence, tobacco, an export crop, is influenced by education levels. Boughton et al. (2007) also found a similar result for tobacco farmers in Mozambique.

Figure 9-3: Education Levels of Household Head

Source: Author compiled from survey data

However, interviews with farmers showed that education mattered in decision-making and access to complementary resources. The findings from interviews were not surprising, given the importance of social networks observed in Mazowe, which were based on people’s professions and, by default, education, which could cause much information asymmetry. While education supports innovativeness and productivity (Swain 2012), tobacco is a crop where tacit knowledge is an important aspect of transferring knowledge, and hence, statistical results observed in this study. Kalirajan and Shand (1985)
distinguish between formal and informal education and find that the latter is more important in agricultural production and they say even the illiterate can improve production with good extension services.

### 9.1.6 Other Sources of Income

In Mazowe, ANOVA results showed that income from other cash crops or non-farm activities was statistically insignificant. However, interviewees reported other sources of income as important sources of start-up and working capital in tobacco production and subsequent participation in contract farming. The income range was huge though ANOVA results show that this was not significant, indicating inequality within the community of Mazowe. As shown in section 8.3.1 a few farmers were successful. This also means that investment in assets would be differentiated along the diversity in earnings observed.

#### Table 9-4: Comparative Income of Mazowe Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>A1 Contract farmer</th>
<th>A1 non-contract farmer</th>
<th>Former farm worker</th>
<th>communal l contract farmer</th>
<th>Communal non-contract farmer</th>
<th>Non-tobacco farmer</th>
<th>ANOVA results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income from other crops</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2362.16</td>
<td>512.5</td>
<td>1761.36</td>
<td>178.79</td>
<td>1099.4</td>
<td>F(4,30) =1.646 p = .189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>3354.05</td>
<td>1035.29</td>
<td>2153.06</td>
<td>543.57</td>
<td>2310.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>3900</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from non-farm</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4464.86</td>
<td>836.24</td>
<td>357.27</td>
<td>4226.96</td>
<td>920.65</td>
<td>991.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>6345.75</td>
<td>1568.91</td>
<td>209.05</td>
<td>5658.09</td>
<td>3229.76</td>
<td>2482.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>30000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>23000</td>
<td>16000</td>
<td>10500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, compiled from survey data

Tobacco income was significantly different among the groups. To enter tobacco contracts, one would have been tobacco farmers’ ex ante, and hence income from tobacco explains the probability of a farmer getting into contracts better than the other sources of income. Household expenditure is also significantly different showing the income effect of tobacco. Farmers invested income raised from tobacco sales before joining contract farming; for instance, a farmer said: “I started producing tobacco five years ago and, from the lump sum I got over the years, I built my barns and bought cattle that allowed me to join contract farming” (Interview November 19, 2017). Such organic investments were necessary for farmers to meet the needs of the contractor, and hence, tobacco income and assets could be correlated.

### 9.1.7 Social Capital: network effects of contract farming

Social capital in this thesis means networks and social relationships among actors in the community. The selection of farmers into contracts, sharing of inputs and assistance with marketing of neighbours’ tobacco are some examples of the role of social capital emanating from the introduction of contract
farming arrangements in Mazowe. Sutherland and Burton (2011) describe the importance of social capital in farm-level operations, which included sharing assets and assisting each other. In Mazowe, farmers self-selected into contract farming according to their social class and networks, along social groups observed by Scoones et al. (2018), and, as discussed in the earlier, shared seedlings in exchange for labour and assisted each other with marketing of tobacco (Chapter 8), all signs of social capital aimed at achieving farm level goals. Farmers were either invited into contract farming by a local leader (12.3%) or contractor (74.4%) or by personal application (10.5%). The contractor and local leader relied on a system of networks within the community, which drew on social relations in it. Following Bourdieu’s (1986) conceptualisation (see section 10.2 for detailed explanation) of social capital Sutherland and Burton (2011) characterise this as farm-level cultural capital transforming into social capital. For instance, gifts, such as home-grown chickens and agricultural produce given to extension officers attracted reciprocal favours, which led to consideration or referrals for contracting arrangements. The allocation of contracts also showed relations stretching into sports clubs, church groups, political associations or even socialites’ networks.

Social capital played an important part in enrolling farmers as shown by data in Figure 9-4. Most respondents (75.4%) indicated that they were invited by the contractor, showing the snowballing effect in the recruitment of farmers. Entry into the community by the contractor is through government officers who have records of tobacco producers, which are used to recruit the first set of farmers. Non-contract farmers (48%) indicated that they were not enrolled because 74.5 percent lacked farm implements, 53.8 percent had no draught power and 19.7 percent had no experience in tobacco production; an observation which is in line with asset endowment discussed in the preceding sections. A few respondents, 4.2 percent, said that they did not have an established source of income, while 11.1 percent said they were excluded for other reasons to do with their social status. These reasons were also advanced by both contract farmers and contracting firms as requirements for selection and participation into contract farming. While assets played a central role in participation in contract farming arrangements, interviews with farmers also revealed that contracts were also accessed through influential people, such as politicians and local leaders, some of whom had good working relations with the extension officer, who had the sole mandate of recruiting farmers in his jurisdiction though within a given budget from the head office. Relations with the extension officer were also cited as an important factor, and these were built around social networks at clubs and churches as well as through gifts, such as home-grown chickens and farm produce. Invitation by a contractor or local leader showed one’s position in social networks.

Apart from this standard selection process, agribusiness extension officers reported contracting farmers referred to them by local leadership, both traditional and political, a decision one officer said “was politically correct” and allowed for smooth operations in the field (Interview 2017). In Ndire, two farmers with no assets and rented land accessed contracts through their political connections. Initial
selection processes were also reported to have been heavily influenced by local leadership. This is similar to Scoones et al. (2018: 6)’s observation: “State functionaries—whether agricultural extension workers or the police—are, however, involved in tobacco value chains, through helping to establish and negotiate contracts or enforce them”. They further note in their research in Mvurwi that farmers entered contracts through various channels. During the researcher’s stay in the wards it was observed that networks and socialisation was more on class basis: teachers and extension and police officers, among other professionals, socialised with other influential people in the community and, in such circles, lobbying for resources was done. In a conversation with an Apostolic sect member at Ndire shopping centre, it was indicated that, though his church forbids hanging out in beer-halls, he frequented the place at night to socialise with these professionals because they have the “…latest news, so [he did not] want to be left behind in important projects” (Interview July 23, 2017). Ownership of assets tends to ascribe people to certain classes and networks, and, in most cases, contracts were allocated through these networks. The selection process was influenced by social networks, which, are in turn, influenced by social status, identity, assets and professional circles in a community, which, by default, excluded the poor who could not enter these social networks. To enter into contracts, access to assets and influential social networks is very important in Mazowe where contracts are offered on an individual basis. This exhibits a strong self-selection bias of farmers into contracts, with its consequent bias in resource allocation and performance of farmers involved in contract farming. Simmons (2002) argued that farmers with the highest incentives enter contracts, suggesting that the most constrained would self-select to join. However, in the Mazowe case, the well-resourced self-selected and muscled out the poor, presumably because the contract offered premium prices and supplementary resources.

Figure 9-4: Channels used by Farmers to Access Contract Farming

Source: Author compiled from survey data
9.2 Factors that Impact Participation in Contract Farming

This section reports the results of a multinomial logit regression that tested the proposition that contracting terms, household characteristics and initial asset endowments influence the probability of farmers taking up contract farming in Mazowe. The model includes farm assets, such as cattle, barns, scotch carts and ploughs, because these are the key production resources needed by tobacco growers. These assets are difficult to rent or lease during the tobacco production period, and hence, ownership is critical, and further, the contractor expects farmers to have these assets. Tobacco barns are specific to tobacco curing and have little value in any other agricultural activity. Asset specificity is expected to influence the probability of a farmer’s deciding to produce or stay in a contracting arrangement (Lajili et al. 1997; Key and Runsten 1999; Bijman 2008; Simmons, Winters, and Patrick 2005); it might also lead to outright exclusion as farmers fail to raise the initial capital required for barn construction (Narayanan 2014). Cattle play multiple roles in a household’s livelihood strategies: as a source of draft power and working capital, or social identity. Cattle also serves as a source of manure, which is important for soil fertility and maintenance (Eghball 1999). The ownership of cattle is important for farmers who use the plough as the main means of tilling the land; it can also be a source of cash for starting tobacco production and investing in productive assets required for tobacco. Consequently, contract farmers with high average number of cattle are expected to participate in contracting activities.

A contracting firm that tries to minimise transaction costs will most likely contract with resource-rich farmers to reap the benefits described above. I therefore hypothesise that farmers who are resource-rich will access and participate in contract farming arrangements. There is also a possibility that these farmers will self-select (Simmons et al. 2005), given the social capital that builds in the community (Lyon 2000; Sutherland and Burton 2011). Contract farming literature shows that farmers join contract farming to access credit, even if contracting terms are skewed against them. If this is the case, it defeats the underlying assumption that farmers are rational beings who would accept contracts that maximise their welfare. Barrett et al. (2012:719) commented thus: “A smallholder’s participation in the CFA does not imply, however, that he perceives the contract as fair. It merely implies that the smallholder expects to be better off with than without the contract.” Some studies on the determinants of contract farming participation use nonlinear binary response models, such as binary logit (Saigenji 2012; Abebe et al. 2013; Swain 2012) and probit (Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton 2006; Boughton et al. 2007; Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009). A logit model is chosen because “…with its maximum likelihood method it is often preferred due to its consistency of parameter estimation associated with the assumption that error term v in the equation has a logistic distribution” (Saigenji 2012) citing Ravallion, 2001. Compared to probit, a logit model is preferred for small samples for its robustness against multivariate normality.

Studies on contract farming often compare contract against non-contract farmers. While the definition of a contract farmer is clear, the identity of the non-contract farmer remains a grey area. For instance,
Swinnen and Maertens (2007) refer to “non-contracted activities”, while most studies focus on the comparison of contract and non-contract for a similar cash crop. This study uses a multinomial logit model to capture a third category that is parties interested in contracting activities, but often not directly referred to in other studies. Contract farming is about producing cash crops. Normally crop-specific analysis tends to compare people involved in cash crop production leaving out members of the community who could have wanted to participate in cash crop production but, either out of preference or other conditions, do not. Interviews in Mazowe showed that people not producing tobacco were also interested but that they could not clear the first step of getting into cash crop production due to the lack of specific assets needed in tobacco farming. I include this group as non-tobacco farmers in the model. This creates a dependent variable with three categories non-contract, non-tobacco farmer and contract farmer that is my reference category.

In the preceding section Pearson correlation, results were presented and variables that were significantly correlated with farmer status and applied to three categories of farmers in the dependent variable were selected for the logit model. I therefore postulate that farmer status \((y)\) is positively affected by independent variables \((x_i)\) where \(x\) is education of household head, economically active members of household, A1 or communal area (a proxy for land) and assets categories (livestock, household and agricultural assets) which are used to perform a multinomial logistic regression at .05 statistical significance level. The study tested the model of the form:

\[
\text{logit}(y = 1) = \log \left( \frac{p(y = 1)}{1 - (p = 1)} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot x + \beta_2 \cdot x_{i2} + \cdots + \beta_p \cdot x_{i2} \text{ for } i = 1 \ldots n.
\]

The model fit was significant at \(X^2(16, N=109) =114.212; \text{Nagelkerke of 74.6%}, p < .000\). The Likelihood Ratio Tests showed that all variables chosen explained the model, and as shown in Table 9.5, significantly explain the likelihood of farmers joining contract farming. For non-contract farmers the settlement area was significant and it explained 46.9 percent of the odds of a farmer joining contract farming. Settlement area was insignificant for non-tobacco farmers, indicating that some people were in non-farm activities or not interested in tobacco production. Farmers who owned livestock were more likely to join contract farming as shown in table 9.5. Household and agricultural assets showed that farmers were less likely to join contract farming with a higher magnitude for non-tobacco farmers.

The model indicates that farmers with more assets and land were more likely to participate in contract farming than those who are constrained, which confirms earlier studies by Boughton et al. 2007 in Mozambique. This also confirms interviews with non-contracted farmers who indicated that they were excluded from contracting due to lack of assets, showing that, for contracts to be inclusive, there is a need to build poorer members’ assets base, such as cattle ownership, ploughs and land. FTLRP
beneficiaries with more land used the opportunities to diversify their livelihood activities including participation in market-based agricultural production of other crops, which provided complementary income to support tobacco production.

Education level of the household head is not significant for both non-contract and non-tobacco categories, which might indicate that education has no effect as a determining factor in joining contract farming. However, qualitative data showed that farmers networked according to their professional roles and status, all of which are proxies of education. For non-contract tobacco farmers the variable economically active is significant, indicating the importance of family labour in tobacco contract farming.

Table 9-5: Multinomial Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B(SE)</th>
<th>Odd ratio</th>
<th>Lower 05% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-contract tobacco vs contract tobacco farmers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>.189 (.064)**</td>
<td>1.208</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Assets</td>
<td>-.843(.303)**</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Assets</td>
<td>-.557(.232)**</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Area</td>
<td>2.469(.656)**</td>
<td>11.809</td>
<td>3.269</td>
<td>42.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
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<td>603429.342</td>
<td>9659046.757</td>
<td>136335487.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household Head</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically Active</td>
<td>-.514(.232)*</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-tobacco farmers vs contract farmers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>.338(.091)***</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Assets</td>
<td>-2.121(.600)***</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Assets</td>
<td>-1.754(.525)**</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Area</td>
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<td>4.39E-08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>4.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Head</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically Active</td>
<td>-.202(.374)</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>1.698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** = .05 significance level; *** = .01 significance level

Source: Author compiled from survey data

### 9.3 Staying or Exiting the Contract

When asked whether they wished to produce under contract in the coming farming season (Figure 9-5), seven (11%) A1 and communal contract farmers indicated they were quitting contract farming, while twenty-one (54%) of non-contract farmers said that they do not intend to join contract farming. The reasons advanced by this set of farmers were similar and mainly resulted from dissatisfaction with the contracting arrangement. Non-contract (48%) and non-tobacco (75%) farmers who wanted to join contract farming shared the same view that they wanted to access resources. Five farmers in the contract group changed contractors for want of better service and six moved out to join command agriculture.
One contract farmer did not produce tobacco for two successive seasons due to death in the family. He said:

I used all my tobacco income, and sold cattle to pay for the funerals, I cannot even raise the necessary resources to look after the extended family, pay for wages or repair my barns.

(Interview August 8, 2017).

Risk exposure is a documented constraint in rural agriculture; death in a family can result in withdrawal from cash crop production, as happened to the farmer quoted here. Narayanan (2013) explored the dynamics of farmer attrition from contract farming in India; the broad categories of risks she observed in India were also advanced by farmers in Mazowe.

![Figure 9-5: Farmers’ Production Status Next Season](chart)

Source: Author from survey data

In Mazowe, poorer farmers were forced out of contract farming due to defaulting on repayments of credit advanced in kind by the contractor. I tracked some of the farmers for in-depth interviews that revealed that these farmers joined contract farming without the requisite resources needed for tobacco production. Five of these farmers had no tobacco barns of their own; they rented from friends. All the farmers who exited had small plots, no scotch cart, cattle or any source of draft power and they relied on hiring-in such services. They also did not have enough income to hire-in these services and relied on selling or exchanging their labour for these services. They planted, harvested and cured their tobacco...
late, which in most cases had no adequate inputs applied. As discussed in Chapter 2, these farmers had no resources to transfer benefits to those who controlled access to productive resources such as capital and labour. One of these farmers, who got into contracting through his chairman said:

I had no experience in tobacco production, so many things went wrong. I have no cattle or money to pay for tillage or workers. I sold some of the inputs, because I thought we would be protected and now am in trouble (Interview August 8, 2017).

Another said:

I did not have enough resources to farm a half-hectare, so when my tobacco harvest is small, I avoid deductions by selling through my neighbour since the contractor refused to renew my contract. (Interview August 12, 2017).

In Chapter 5, the study described the intricate details of tobacco production, which a farmer with no resources finds difficult to cope with. Some farmers left contract farming because of setbacks that they could not recover from.

It was interesting that some non-contract farmers did not intend to join contract farming. Most of these felt that the contractor was exploitative and cited the potential of losing assets as a risk they would not like to take. An elderly farmer said, “I worked very hard to get to where am; I don’t want to wake up with nothing. Out of contract I produce what I can and no one pushes me” (Interview September 13, 2017).

Another small group moved in and out of contract based on their socio-economic position at the time, particularly shocks, such as death in the family, discontentment with the contractor or investment into other failed economic ventures. For instance, one farmer who shifted to command agriculture was back into contract production for the 2017/2018 season because of the uncertainty in delivery of command agriculture inputs. This farmer had this to say:

“Farming is about prompt delivery of inputs, everything must be done in time, so I came back to contract farming where am assured of inputs in good time” (Interview October 23, 2017).

Non-tobacco farmers from communal lands indicated that, as much as they wanted to produce cash crops, land was the limiting factor. Statistically, this group has significantly less land compared to other farming categories.

Though attrition was observed along the lines observed by Narayanan (2013), farmers remained involved in agriculture as either tobacco, staple or cash crop producers, and no farmer from the sample left agriculture for exclusive non-farm activities. Some upgraded their farming activities to include traction services that were hired to other farmers, a scenario similar to what Imbruce (2008) observed
in Honduras and Scoones et al. (2018) describe as accumulation from below in Mvurwi. The distinguishing fact was access to alternative resources, which helped farmers cope with risks.

9.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented results on farmers’ characteristics, selection and participation of farmers into contract farming arrangements. It showed that household composition, asset holding, experience, plot size, education, other sources of income and social capital affect participation in contract farming. These factors interact and are driven by asset endowments of a family. It was observed that access to contracts is differentiated along asset holdings of the farmers, and that the networks ascribed by the holding of these assets (meaning those with better initial asset holdings) were more likely to enter and successfully participate in tobacco contracts. Contracting terms favoured those farmers with large tracts of land, and these were mostly FTLRP beneficiaries. FTLRP beneficiaries had more assets derived from the land, which influenced them to join contract farming because they had enough land to allocate to tobacco while retaining some for subsistence production.

This has implications on social differentiation within communities as the poor are excluded for lack of assets creating social strata where the better-off become employers and the poor are workers, as discussed in Chapter 8. In Chapter 8, the study showed that the differential access to contracts resulted in differential outcomes in tobacco output and income. The discussion in this chapter sets out the basis for exchanges that evolved and were discussed in chapter 8, as Sen (1981) observed exchange benefits are best understood from the ‘ownership bundles’ which are the factors described in this chapter. This chapter showed that ‘a bundle of powers’ held by a farmer were the key determinant of their participation and performance under contract, showing the predictive power of access theory.
Chapter 10

Findings, Discussion and Conclusion

10.0 Introduction

This study set out to investigate household and community effects of contract farming within the context of the FTLRP. Specifically, how peasant farmers got to negotiate participation into capitalist agricultural production and the effects of such participation on the contracted households and the community at large. The research question framing this case study aims to extend the dichotomous microanalysis of contract farming to broader community livelihood effects, thus extending the “threshold effect” (Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton 2006) analysis from household to community. To achieve this, this thesis answered the research question; “What are the household and community effects of contract farming arrangements in Mazowe?” The question was aimed at understanding the processes that farmers follow to get into contract farming, their performance and ultimately the impact of participating in contract farming. The change in land ownership from LSCF (who produced 95% of the tobacco before FTLRP) to A1 and A2 farmers after the FTLRP resulted the re-entry of capitalist agriculture system in tobacco production. This revitalised smallholder tobacco production, and benefited the Mazowe community. Access to land was central to farmers’ participation, performance and outcomes from tobacco production.

This study was done within an access theory framework (Ribot and Peluso 2003) to allow for the tracking of mechanisms and processes of access, role of resource endowment in participation and outcomes of contract farming, and the distribution of value among contracting parties and the community in general. The study hypothesised that contract farming benefits households and rural communities. The study tested this using access analysis to gain a deeper understanding of economic and socio-political power relations governing multiple actors’ roles, participation and outcomes from contract farming. As predicted by the access theory framework, the study found that social relationships were important in farmers’ participation and exchanges with the capitalist system of contract farming.

Mazowe is a dynamic heterogeneous, rural community comprising FTLRP beneficiaries and communal lands that provided an ideal setting for testing the effect of capital injection on livelihoods in a dual rural set-up with differential land holdings. The FTLRP resulted in redistribution of land, which consequently increased farmers’ land holdings and became one “strand” that facilitated participation of peasant farmers in contract farming arrangements (Sukume et al. 2015; Scoones et al. 2018; Sachikonye 2016; Moyo 2011a), and, as observed by Sachikonye (1989), performance was influenced by class and the capitals held by the farmers. This study used a case study approach, given that contract farming is
deemed context-specific (Scoones 2009) and resource access dynamics are space-specific (Ribot and Peluso 2003), coupled with mixed method data collection and analysis techniques. All this from a realist approach (Maxwell 2004a) to gain deeper insights from respondents on how contract farming affected their livelihoods. A concurrent triangulation design was used to collect data, which was then merged at the analysis stage. It was observed that tobacco farmers are a heterogeneous group whose participation, performance and outcomes (including livelihood strategies) from tobacco production and marketing are influenced by access to initial resource endowments. Access to productive resources was both uneven and contested, with visible competition and contestation among various classes, mainly due to dysfunctional input and output markets (Moyo 2011a).

The data revealed that A1 contract farmers outperformed communal ones, and a similar result was observed for A1 non-contract farmers’ vis-à-vis the communal, though the difference was marginal. In chapter 9, it was shown that the factors of production which constitutes ‘a bundle of power held by the farmers favoured FTLRP beneficiaries with those contracted benefiting the most. This shows the importance of resource-backed access to land under the FTLRP. Resource endowments provide a ‘strand’ through which farmers gain and maintain access to contract farming, at the same time establishing control over the use of income that arises from participation in it. For instance, the FTLRP was central in availing land used by farmers for commercial tobacco production, as well as building assets before they joined contract farming. Access analysis allows for the analysis of ‘mechanisms’ and ‘strands’ through which FTLRP-induced interaction of local livelihoods strategies affect dynamics of contract farming participation and outcomes. From this perspective, the thesis argues that household resource endowments are the key drivers of contract farming participation and the resultant outcomes. Consequently, the success and outcome of contract farming is dependent on farmers’ access to productive assets (Scoones, Mavedzenge, and Murimbarimba 2017).

This study shows that resource-rich farmers benefited from contract farming and invested their lump sum cash earnings, which had strong spillover effects to the community through income effects and related consumption decisions. The majority middle farmers were dependent on the contractor; and struggling to cope with the demands of contract farming because of limited access to productive resources. The middle farmers had no other alternative sources of capital besides the contractor and their minimal household resources. The struggles of the middle farmer reflected the unfair contractual arrangement, which favoured the contractor, who held disproportionate power in the determination of the credit/input quantum, cost of input/service supplied, and grading and pricing of produce, all of which led to indebtedness by the farmers. The aforementioned problems show that the re-entry of capital in agricultural production has not changed as it continue to supply minimal resources, with farmers still bearing risks as was in earlier tea and sugar contract farming relations (Sachikonye 1991; Jackson and Cheater 1994). For tobacco what has evidently changed is the over tenfold increase in farmers after
FTLRP, and the financing model. The high number of producers benefited the community; from improved access to services, food security and employment availed as a result of community members participating in contract farming. This chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary of key findings, brief discussion of empirical findings, contribution, policy implications and areas of further research.

10.1 Summary of Key Findings

The re-entry of capitalist system and the change in the financing model (contract farming) for tobacco production had mixed outcomes for farmers and community as presented in this findings section. Through social relationships, some farmers participated and benefited from contract farming through legal or illicit means, while the majority struggled. Those who struggled, were sustained through their social relationships with their compatriots. Farmers with access to resources accessed contract farming, and depending on the quantum of their resources benefited or stayed in exploitative contractual arrangements because they had no alternative sources to finance tobacco production. A comparative analysis of the results revealed that A1 beneficiaries outperformed their communal counterparts in production and marketing outcomes. This trend was also observed in the influence A1 farmers had in negotiating access to resources such as labour and barter exchange transactions. This showed that access to land through the FTLRP enhanced A1 farmers social relationships, and gave them a leverage in negotiating for resources

10.1.1 Contract Farming Benefited the Community

Contract farming had positive effects on food security and rural employment, due to the network, income and expenditure effects of contract farmers. Further, investments in complementary agricultural services, transport and retail activities provided employment to the community thus creating a virtuous cycle of development through spillover effects within the community. The findings reflected a ‘strand’ which could be traceable from resources to effects of contract farming as described by Ribot and Peluso (2003). Asset endowments, power, and social relations were the key drivers of both households and community effects which confirmed the prescriptions of access theory discussed in chapter 2. Contract farming provided vital resources which differentiated household performance and their impact on community economic activities. However, in all this power imbalances resulted in unfavourable contracting terms which subdued some of the positive household and community effects from contract farming.

10.1.1.1 Contract Farming Improved Food Security

Contract farming had a positive effect on food security for both contracted and non-contracted members of the community. This was made possible by the supply of staple food inputs by the contractor, and
the interlinked barter exchange market for food, land and labour. The price of staple food remained at US$3 a bucket throughout the year and was below the market price, which enabled the poor to access food either through food-for-work or outright purchase. This finding is contrary to critics of contract farming, who argue that it causes food insecurity. For example, Mazwi, Chambati, and Mutodi (2018), observed that contract farming threatened food security and contract farmers in Zvimba and Goromonzi were reported being food-deficient. The differences in findings are interesting; however, two issues could explain the difference: first, the supply of staple food inputs and, second, the 45 percent of land allocated to tobacco against the average 30 percent in Mazowe. As postulated by access theory, the ability to access to inputs was important for increasing productivity. However, the increased production and income noted in the Zvimba/Goromonzi study could compensate for staple food production deficiencies if the Pinstrup-Anderson (1983) criteria detailed on page 181 above are met. Further, it could improve food security, as discussed in section 10.2.5.1.

In addition to the primary effects through the direct production of food, benefits were also observed in secondary food transactions. Production and market synergies were also observed in Mazowe with the poor exchanging their labour for staple food or inputs, which improved food security in the area. This trend reflects the distribution of a stream-benefits depicted by Figure 2.1. This shows that by expending resources farmers generate benefits as suggested by access theory.

10.1.1.2 Community Benefited from Networks Spillover Effects

Contract farming resulted in dissemination of information and knowledge among tobacco producers and would-be producers through field days and demonstration plots, which were open to all farmers in the community. Following these demonstration plots, farmers with surplus inputs shared with those who could not afford to run a seedling nursery, thus further benefiting disadvantaged members albeit in an input-labour exchange arrangement. The transfer of technology extended to cash crops because of food crop input supplies.

Farmers with no grower numbers, indebted, and those who simply wanted to get a premium price from contractors, sold their tobacco through contracted farmers. This helped integrate the poor into markets, though in an informal way. As a result, some among the poor managed to slowly accumulate assets and register as independent growers. This relationship favoured the contract farmers, who were paid a commission for providing this service. Through networks, farmers accessed resources, such as tilling services, firewood transportation, tobacco grading and sharing of other farm assets, most of which were linked to labour exchanges which benefited the resource-rich smallholders the most. The Community benefited through artisanal skills training like building.
10.1.1.3 Investment by Contract Farmers had Positive Externalities on the Community

Contract farmers accounted for most benefits accruing to the community through on-farm jobs created as farmers diversified and expanded their cash crop production. Further, these farmers invested in non-farm activities that provided employment and services that provided income to the poor who managed to smooth their consumption. Other community members responded to the increased flow in income by establishing businesses, such as schools, garages and retail outlets. This further created jobs and income for the community.

10.1.2 Farmers Investment Patterns were Influenced by Resources

Differential tobacco income and resource endowments affected the investment pattern of community members, who could broadly be categorised as accumulators, middle farmer and subsistence, that is those who were living from hand to mouth. This thesis showed that accumulators had diversified investment portfolios ranging from agricultural enhancing assets and non-farm assets and businesses, while the majority middle farmers invested in activities that reproduced the family, and their non-farm activities were of minimal value. The third group lived from hand to mouth, with a few who were investing in improving their housing.

Differentials in human capital investment were telling: accumulators were able to send their children to better schools and tertiary institutions thus perpetuating social differentiation within the community. Education is a facilitator of entry into non-farm employment and activities, which is deemed better rewarding. The lower group which was just surviving sent their children to local schools; but of concern, was the fact that these children were, at times, withdrawn to provide labour during school hours further diminishing their opportunities of climbing the livelihood ladder. However, they benefited from investments made by the elite group that provided them with employment opportunities and other livelihood supporting exchanges, such as labour-maize barter.

10.1.3 Access to FTLRP Land and Inputs Allowed Farmers to Build Assets and Expand Production

On average, A1 farmers had bigger plots, accessed during the FTLRP. It was observed that some of these farmers used these plots to build more assets before and after joining contract farming. These farmers had bigger plots under tobacco, produced a variety of cash crops and had surplus staple food. Large plots enabled them to practice crop rotation thus managing the prevalence of diseases and improving their yields and quality of tobacco. This earned them better prices at the auction floors.

These farmers got favourable contract terms in terms of input supply due to their good performance. Access to these inputs allowed them to diversify economic activities, both farm and non-farm. As a result, they generated more community benefits as reported above. Ownership of land therefore created
a virtuous cycle of asset ownership, good exchange entitlements and control of labour within the community. This ‘virtuous cycle’ is typical of the access theory model described in chapter 2, and depicted in Figure 1. As shown in access theory this multifaceted control of resources increases holders’ benefits.

10.1.4 Initial Asset Endowments Increased Likelihood of Farmer Participation in Contract Farming

Initial asset endowments of farmers increased the probability of farmer participation in tobacco contract farming and asset-rich farmers were more likely to enter and stay in these contracting arrangements while the poor exit. Those who acquired land after the FTLRP had better chances of enrolling and participating in contract farming activities. First, the contracting terms offered by the contractor required farmers with assets and experience in tobacco production, which meant a farmer would have acquired specific assets, such as tobacco barns, and generic agricultural assets, such as scotch carts and cattle necessary to produce tobacco. This study showed that those with more cattle and other agricultural assets got into contract farming given the start-up capital required to start tobacco production. For non-tobacco farmers, lack of access to land was one of the most critical assets that affected their entry into contract farming. Most non-contract farmers in communal lands had inadequate access to land, preventing them from entering or expanding tobacco production. This thesis showed that this was because land was important for crop rotation and food production, which was always a priority, and hence, non-tobacco farmers never attempted to join contract farming or diversify their cropping patterns, while non-contract farmers prioritised food crop production. It was argued that contractor and farmer-self-selection bias influenced the selection of farmers into contracts, given the use of a referral system in picking beneficiaries, which excluded the poor who lacked social capital endowments. Contractors preferred farmers with access to productive resources. While this is understandable for a crop with asset-specific investments, such as tobacco, the poorer members of the community are generally excluded from contracting activities.

Access to contract resources, such as inputs, was based on prior-year farmer performance, which determined the set of inputs advanced on credit. This affected the farmer’s performance and continued stay in contracting activities. The differential provision of credit resulted in differential production outcomes and emerging social differentiation among and within farmer groups. This thesis showed that the middle farmer was into contract farming for the inputs, showing their need for credit if they were to effectively participate in cash crop production. However, the elite farmers were more concerned with the supplementary resources and price premium offered by the contractor.

10.1.5 Contract Farmers had Superior Production and Income Outcomes

On average, contract farmers had superior production and income outcomes, this confirms similar observations by Scoones et al. 2018 for A1 farmers in Mvurwi. Due to selection bias problems causality
could not be conclusively established from regression analysis. However, using life history and field observations farmers confirmed the importance of contract farming in their income and production outcomes. Underlying higher production was access to land, which enabled farmers to expand production plots when credit was advanced by the contractor. For example, FTLRP A1-contract farmers realised better incomes (mean US$8993.24) compared to communal contract farmers (US$4526.09) due to high output. The resultant high output maximised the use of other assets, such as barns, and hence, the quality of the tobacco produced, which attracted better prices at the auction floors. Those with small plots could not expand production even if credit was available, leaving them with low output to take to the market.

The grading and classification of tobacco at the auction floors affected the price offered at both the auction and contract floors. Again, this could be traced back to lack of resources on the part of farmers who had no grading sheds, or adequate curing facilities or labour to handle their crop, on time which is sensitive to time and exposure to weather. At the floors, it was observed that elite farmers were paid above-average prices, while most peasants were paid average to below-average prices, which was attributed to poor handling and grading of their tobacco. Prices were further distorted by the poor market transmission price mechanism (FAO 2014), dwindling quantities offered at auction floors, and the domination by contractors in both markets distorted the prices.

Peasant farmers responded to the average to below-average prices through collaborations where farmers assisted colleagues sell to the highest buyer in a process they called *kuberekana* (see also Sakata 2018). This study argued that this was beyond side-marketing and more of a price risk management tool that helped farmers improve their earnings. It was a response to deemed unfair pricing by contractors. It was argued that it helped poorer members of the community, who produced tobacco either through share-cropping, independently or as part of a labour-land rental arrangement, participate in markets. Through networks, peasants were able to improve their livelihood options.

It was shown that, added to contested prices on grades, farmers were also disgruntled by the lack of cash payments, which they claimed were important for transacting purposes in rural areas. The study has shown that this affected their capacity to access services in communal areas, as a result being charged premium prices when paying for goods at retail outlets who applied a three-tier pricing system. Overall, non-contract farmers had a risky journey to the floors, starting with transport arrangements, putting-up with middle-men who demanded bribes to facilitate good prices, and spending time at the floors. Contract farmers benefited from the facilitation of the contractor. It was observed that the marketing process disadvantaged non-contract farmers in terms of the take-home price through payment of bribes, and, at times, commission for the assisted sales, compared to contract farmers for whom prices were generally higher. This affected non-contract farmers’ livelihood options and investment in agriculture and non-farm activities.
10.1.6 Farmer Characteristics Affect Selection and Participation in Contract Farming

In this study, gender and age were not correlated with contract farming participation. This was surprising, given the importance of land, and the fact that the FTLRP discriminated against women and the youth (Moyo 2011a; Mutopo 2011). Evidence from interviews, however, showed that these variables matter in negotiating access to contract farming and building networks. This confirms Mutami’s (2015) findings that household characteristics influence agriculture. For instance, if women were discriminated against during the FTLRP, they would not have enough land to engage in agricultural based production to generate income and assets on like their male counterparts, which, in turn, led to discrimination in contract farming arrangements. Household characteristics, such as education and profession, played an important part in accessing resources through social networks. In this study, it was argued that contractors’ agents played an important role in the selection process of farmers, a finding that resonates with Sakata’s (2018) observation in Mashonaland East, Zimbabwe. As a result, farmers who met contractor specifications were included in schemes, which often excluded the poorly resourced farmers and women with no assets. In Chapter 7, it was shown that contracting terms favoured the contractor and were favourable to those with resources hence this was telling in allocation of resources.

Farmers had little discretion in the choice to participate in contract farming. This was mainly due to credit market failures within the Zimbabwean economy, which resulted in competition for contracts offered by the contractors. The influence of the contracting arrangement is evident, as 84 percent of farmers now market their produce under contract, and the number of contractors and contracted producers is on the increase (TIMB 2017). For poorly resourced peasants, the need for inputs resulted in farmer-dependence, indebtedness and stay in exploitative contract farming arrangements.

10.2 Discussion

This section provides a discussion and interpretation of findings of this thesis. The mixed methods approach produced results that converged to the importance of initial asset endowments in farmer participation and contract farming outcomes. Isolated divergent findings are discussed in the relevant sections. Using the access theory framework (Ribot and Peluso 2003) together with realist techniques (Maxwell 2013; Patton 2015; Emmel 2013) like life history and observations (Prowse and Camfield 2009); the study tracked processes and mechanisms of which the observed outcomes were attributed. The study confirms the importance of social relationships in accessing production resources, contract farming, and farmers responses to exploitative exchange relations as suggested by access theory (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Social relationships are a form of social capital as described by Sutherland and Burton (2011). It involves knowledge, identities and status which are said to form cultural capital and is important in accessing resources like labour, finance and technology through interactions within a
community. This is important for facilitating economic transaction as observed in Mazowe. Further, the results show that farmers resorted to social relationships to fight back unfair pricing by contractors, gain entry and maintain status in contracting arrangements. As argued by Berry (1993) farmers relied on social relationships, networks and identity to access labour and other opportunities in tobacco marketing. The results show that those who accessed land during the FTLRP benefited the most from contract farming, were more likely to acquire productive assets and fruitfully participate in contract farming arrangements. All this constituted ‘a bundle of powers’ held by farmers which was important for their participation in contract farming. The interdependence of contract farming and FTLRP was evident throughout this study. The high number of FTLRP beneficiaries engaged in tobacco production employed more people and demanded more services (Moyo 2004), all which benefited the community. However, this depended on their ability to negotiate various mechanisms and strands of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

According to (Moyo 2004: 4), “lack of access to land and, inadequate strategies to mobilize financial and human resources to effectively develop the land economy are a fundamental constraint” to smallholders’ quest for a better livelihood and fight against poverty. This study shows that the FTLRP and contract farming helped provide a platform to a possible resolution of this concern, though with differential effects, influenced by political and socio-economic factors affecting access to resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003; Berry 1993). Results of this study confirm the interdependence of capital and land reform discussed in chapter 3, 4 and 5.

The FTLRP was the major determinant in farmers’ participation in contract farming. As observed by Zikhali (2010), A1 farmers were more productive than their communal counterparts. It provided the land to farm and build assets, all of which were a requirement to join contract farming. Further, it was the main factor in the ‘bundle of powers’ that attracted contractors to Mazowe, and hence, the growth in grower numbers (45.88%) was well above the national average (32%). This showed that quality of land was a pull factor for contractors, which could also explain the increase in uptake of tobacco crop by beneficiaries of the FTLRP. It also explains the re-entry of capital and its incorporation of smallholder farmers who were now controlling the land. To make profit capital had to mutates to the dictates of the new land holding structure.

As shown in this study, land was central to the performance of the elite farmers, which underlines the importance of land reform complemented by adequate building of farmers’ productive assets. Access to land is important for smallholder integration in agricultural markets, as shown by Sikor and Tuong VI (2005) in the case of Vietnamese farmers. The downside to lucrative tobacco contract farming could be land concentration and exclusion of the poor from tobacco contracts (Carter and Mesbah 1993, Singh and Prowse 2013). The development of a land market observed in this study could result in land concentration as elite farmers rent-in more land. This study showed that FTLRP beneficiaries were able
to practice crop rotation, which helped maintain soil structure and fertility and expand production, which helped farmers increase income. FTLRP distributed land among many small scale farmers, leading to increased uptake of tobacco production under contract, and employment of more labour thus benefiting the community members (Moyo 2004).

Contract farming participation and outcomes are driven by initial resource endowments of the farmer, of which most are derived from the land. As per access theory, the elites who controlled these resources captured most of the contracts and benefits, while most of the peasant contract farmers were just breaking even, and the poor were excluded. This is not surprising given Mafeje’s (2003) characterisation of rural communities with ‘middle’ and ‘poor’ peasants, with the former accessing and controlling more productive resources. Mafeje argues that the poor have poor agricultural outcomes only because they lack productive resources, a scenario observed in Mazowe. This differential asset-base was observed by Moyo (2011) in Zimbabwe after the FTLRP. The FTLRP provided a critical asset for smallholder integration into markets resulting in “…enormous expansion in contract farming arrangements” (Sachikonye 2016: 87) and enormous transformation of the labour market as more than ten fold smallholder capitalist tobacco producers hired more labour (Moyo 2004).

Some of those who accessed land during the FTLRP and acquired productive assets, attracted contractors who offered lucrative contracts which included tobacco and staple food inputs. These farmers hired labour thus creating employment for the community. For instance, as discussed in section 8.1.1, those with land were able to expand plots under tobacco production without compromising their food production. These farmers were also able to control community labour using maize as a mechanism of access. Some were forced to negotiate land rentals or sharecropping in exchange for labour or food in a virtuous circle that favoured the landed. Further, informal land deals (Mkodzongi 2018) provided access to land. Therefore, land became a multidimensional mechanism of access to resources, such as contracts, labour and staple food, reflecting Berry (1993)’s proposition on elites commanding a following and, more important, it generated spillover effects for the community.

In this study, there is evidence that initial peasant capitals (derived from the FTLRP) affects contract farming participation and outcomes, which affects choice of livelihood strategies adopted by farmers’ post-contract farming. Providing inputs on credit, contract farming allows resource-rich farmers to invest their lump sum earnings in diverse income-generating portfolios. However, resource-poor ‘middle-farmers’ discussed in Chapter 8 could end up in a debt trap and dependent on the contractor (Yeros 2018) to continue in tobacco production because they have no viable livelihood alternatives. However, despite struggling under contract, these farmers contributed to community through employment generation. Literature shows the importance of asset endowments (Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton 2006; Boughton et al. 2007; Scoones et al. 2018) and elite capture of rural development initiatives (Bernstein and Oya 2014; Sulle 2017; Swain 2012), which explains the differential benefits
accruing to contracted farmers. While this explains the differentials observed among contract farmers, elements of conspicuous consumption could also explain why poor farmers fail to build capital (Prowse 2009). This points to the importance of the five capitals (Bebbington 1999; Chambers and Conway 1992; Scoones 1998) which Vicol (2015) interrogated in a thesis based on potato farmers in India. Results from this study show that land reform as described in Chapter 3 provides a platform for smallholder accumulation.

10.2.1 Community Spillover Effects of Contract Farming

As discussed above FTLRP resulted in large numbers of farmers producing for the market and with resources provided by contractors, they provided jobs and services that benefited the community. Contract farming affects communities through spillover effects that emanate from efficiency and equity effects resulting from resource provisions by the contractor (Swinnen and Maertens 2007). Contract farming is central to farmers’ accumulation patterns, as it releases complementary finances to diversify their portfolios and fills in a gap in their ‘bundle of powers’. Financial additionality was central to this accumulation pattern (Moyo 2014) and changing livelihood strategies within the Mazowe community. It was observed that this expenditure pattern resulted in changes in labour markets, access to services and developing microenterprises, all riding on the success of tobacco contract farming in the community.

Evidence from interviews showed that contract farmers produced surplus food, which was traded in exchange for labour or outright cash transactions thus guaranteeing food security for the community. This was a result of technology and staple-food input supplies by the contractor, with spillover effects to food crop production (Swinnen and Maertens 2007). Yield of maize increased due to fertilizer retained in the soil after crop rotation. Contract and non-contract farmers attended field days together, thus benefiting from teachings arranged for by the contractor. This shows the importance of social relationships that generated positive cognitive effects, and access to capital in the form of contracts. Inasmuch as there was competition for contracts in Mazowe, contractors also competed for the best farmers, thus creating further spillover effects in the form of inputs and services accruing to farmers (Swinnen and Vandaplans 2006) and subsequently to the community through social learning effects (Krishnan and Patnam 2013).

The scenario in Mazowe fits the four criteria pathways through which export crops, such as tobacco, affect nutrition. They are “…(i) food availability; (ii) ability of the household to obtain food; (iii) desire to obtain food; and (iv) intra-household food distribution” (Pinstrup-Anderson 1983:3); all of which were met in Mazowe. While there is no counterfactual data to the contrary, contract farming, as reported by Scoones et al. (2018), played a major role in this situation.
Food first proponents argue that food security is compromised by “…contracting rich, fertile land” to produce food that is not consumed locally (Collins and Lappe 1977:4,7), which could be accompanied by reduction in area under food production. Unlike the Lappe and Collins’ concern, however, the provision of inputs and crop rotation of tobacco ensured stable maize production. Further, farmers had access to more fertile and larger size plots, which allowed them to maintain or even surpass staple food production before the FTLRP. However, as noted by Mafeje (2003), only 20 percent of African land is fertile and suitable for agricultural production, which could mean continued that expansion of tobacco contract farming could impact national food production in the long-term. Weak land tenure systems could also contribute to food security concerns (Cotula, Dyer, and Vermuelen 2008) as demand and competition for productive farm land increases. Research still need to inform this.

Increased income had a positive effect on the consumption of manufactured products (Nieuwoudt and Vink 1989; van Zyl et al. 1991), which allowed even the poor to access food either through exchange of their labour for commodities or earned income. Access to food was assured through improved productivity, income and employment opportunities offered to the poor, albeit through self-exploitation by the latter. As shown by van Zyl et al. (1991) and Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) for South Africa, increased agricultural income has a positive effect on consumption and, by extension, investment in the supply of consumer goods. This was the case in Mazowe as locals, both tobacco and non-tobacco farmers, responded to the increased tobacco income investing in different activities to service the community, a process that led to spillover effects discussed below.

Elite contract farmers diversified their agricultural and non-farm activities, intensifying their commercialisation efforts and, in the process, hiring more labour and providing services to the community. Farmers’ expenditure contributes to community development, absorbing the poor as labour, and through networks providing farming inputs to workers in exchange for their labour. The contractor provided staple food inputs, which also supported food security within the community.

The superior income received by contract farmers was invested in agricultural development and non-farm microenterprises, which influenced the household’s reproductive and accumulation capacity (Scoones, Mavedzenge, and Murimbarimba 2017; Bebbington 1999). Nieuwoudt and Vink (1989) argued that such households (surplus producing) invest in agriculture-enhancing activities further employing more labour. This study showed that contract farmers with more income invested in diverse cash crops, which found a market at the auction floors in Harare. Some of these investments had spillover effects to the community due to their service- and employment-generating capacity. Heald (1991), in a study of tobacco farmers in Kuria, Kenya, observed that levels of investment were class-related and are related to the level of surplus generated, as the Mazowe case. Similar class-related investment was observed by Scoones et al. (2018) in Mvurwi, Zimbabwe, and they showed that different social groups benefited differently from tobacco at the back of their resource holding and access to
contract farming. Mutenje et al. (2010), in a Zimbabwean study found that household resource endowments influenced their investment in non-farm activities, a result confirmed by this study for farmers diversifying their livelihoods.

Daniels (2003), in a study in Zimbabwe, observed that participation in small-scale industries depended on farm income and those with higher incomes tended to invest in capital-intensive enterprises, just like the Mazowe top earners. However, certain activities depend on labour held by the household who invested in low-value microenterprises, such as vegetable sales and roadside vending. In Mazowe, investments by farmers were in line with farmers’ income levels, and contract farmers tended to invest in capital-intensive activities compared to their counterparts in the sample.

Investment patterns among elite farmers showed traits of accumulating from below (Sachikonye 2016) and the formation of a rural capitalist class (Kennedy and Cogill 1987). However, the majority were breaking even and hung on to contract farming for the inputs to ensure household reproduction. The communal farmers performed the worst, presumably due to low land holdings, though a TIMB (2017) report shows an upward trajectory in the share of production by communal farmers. This shows that, through experience, technology adoption affects accumulation from below, which is gaining momentum courtesy of contract farming, which has also had positive effects on food security. Over time there is possibility of the ‘middle’ farmers catching up considering that they managed to build enough capital to enter contract farming.

This study showed that transport businesses, market stalls and roadside activities created wage-based livelihoods for the community. These are examples of spillover effects. On-farm activities, such as barn servicing and construction of rocket barns, were also a source of artisanal jobs, which complement jobs in service industries, such as vehicle maintenance. All this was made possible because of the 72 percent cash injection by contractors in the Mazowe economy. Discussion on access theory (Ribot and Peluso 2003) showed that actors in contract farming were able to extract benefits from the value chain, as farmers transfer/pay to access services.

Investment in businesses improved mobility within the community allowing for the ease of movement of goods to markets. This thesis showed that tobacco farmers sold other agricultural products to markets in Harare and that contract farming was an enabler as it provided the extra financial resources that allowed farmers to expand into these operations. However, livelihood activities were class related with the elite involved in high value commerce activities while the poor engaged in natural resource-based trading. This exacerbated social differentiation, though food security was assured.
10.2.2 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme Determined Initial Asset Endowments of Farmers

Initial asset holdings were important for farmer selection, participation, stay and performance in tobacco contract farming in Mazowe. Evidence presented in Chapter 9 shows the complementarity of farmers’ initial livelihood conditions and contract farming participation, which, ANOVA and logit results showed, were significantly different, and those with assets were more likely to be in contract farming. This is in line with Benfica, Tschirley, and Boughton’s (2006) and Boughton et al.’s (2007) studies in Mozambique, which showed that asset endowments were important for farmers’ participation in agricultural markets. Adjognon Adjognon (2012:15) summed it up when observing: “…higher income per capita in contract farming may merely reflect the fact that more industrious or more skilled farmers have a greater likelihood of becoming contract farmers.” Land is an important initial asset and, in Zimbabwe, access to land through the FTLRP resulted in increased participation of peasant farmers in contract farming (Moyo 2009; Sachikonye 2016; Scoones et al. 2011).

Farmers in A1 resettlements built-up agricultural productive assets from land acquired from the FTLRP prior to joining contract farming (Scoones et al. 2011; Scoones et al. 2018; Moyo 2011a). Zikhali (2010), using descriptive statistics and econometric models, showed that A1-resettled farmers were more productive and were accumulating assets at a faster rate than their communal counterparts within a similar agroecological zone. She attributed this to differential use of fertilisers, labour productivity and some unobservable factors. Mkodzongi (2013) attributed differential farmer-performance to patronage and initial wealth at the time of farm invasions. This study compared like with like, for instance, contract farmers with similar input packages from the contractor, and still found A1 to be more productive, suggesting that one of the unobservable factors in Zikhali (2010)’s study could be access to better quality, bigger plots of land provided under the FTLRP, and initial assets (Mkodzongi 2018). Consequently, FTLRP beneficiaries used their control of land and assets to access productive resources that allowed them to benefit from land and generate benefits for the community as discussed in Chapter 2.

Evidence from Chapter 9 showed that farmers with good social standing and access to assets and networks were more likely to join and benefit from contract farming in Mazowe leading to better incomes. This finding contradicts findings by Shonhe (2017) and Vicol (2015) in Wedza and India, respectively. However, the finding in this study is consistent with the middle farmer characterisation (Heald 1991; Mafeje 2003; Mkodzongi 2018) and Moyo (2011a)’s observation of the uneven access and competition for inputs among elite and poor farmers after the FTLRP in Zimbabwe. This is also consistent with access theory wherein the control of access mechanisms by
the elite allowed them to benefit from contract farming. Further, the FTLRP’s disruptive tendencies left farmers with no alternative finance capital.

Income from other sources show the same pattern where A1 contract farmers dominate. In addition to the FTLRP, remittances and other non-farm activities facilitated accumulation of initial capital by elite farmers (Mafeje 2003), who participated in contract farming. In Mvurwi, (Scoones et al. 2018:9) noted that “…those able to afford inputs, gain access to contracts, and grow sufficient maize to cover food needs can profit significantly from tobacco”, a trend observed in Mazowe. This shows that family labour efficiency alone propounded under the inverse-farm relationship (Chapter 3), is not enough; farmers need resources to access labour, for instance. Further, Zikhali (2010) indicated that A1 farmers got preference in government input schemes, which could have set them on a good trajectory to acquire assets at a faster rate than the communal farmers. As observed by Ribot and Peluso (2003), access to such resources is a negotiated process between those who control and users, which is normally contested, as observed by Moyo (2011) after the FTLRP. This also accounted for the differentiation of farmers and the community at large. In Zimbabwe, Scoones et al. (2018) observed that FTLRP beneficiaries improved and diversified their livelihoods due to their increased land holdings, an important asset in cash crop production. More important was that the FTLRP allowed farmers to acquire complementary assets before entering contracts. TIMB (2017) records show that, despite 83 196 smallholder farmers producing on 66.45 percent (75 836 hectares) of land under tobacco, they get 55 percent of income, and 13 870 FTLRP-commercial farmers producing on 33.55 percent (34 977 hectares) take 44.99 percent of the income. Access to contract farming by smallholders improved the share of income as the reverse was true in prior years (TIMB 2016b).

Land is important for crops such as tobacco, which thrive on crop rotation, and the size of land holdings becomes an important variable both for participation decisions and performance of the farmer. It was then not surprising that, among the contracted farmers’, higher performers were in FTLRP settlements areas, where plots are bigger than in communal areas. Some came from urban areas, while some of these farmers were local, emerging ‘middle farmers’ keen on investing and diversifying their economic portfolios (Jayne et al. 2016). However, it was evident that land reform with no complementary resource provisioning (discussed in Chapter 3) will not result in instant success for the poor peasants; it can only benefit the rich peasant. Hence Mamdani (2009:8) observed that success of land reform “… depends on providing subsidise to small farmers”. Through time, the FTLRP allowed farmers to build assets, though at differential rates. The differential rate of accumulation could be explained by tenure security concerns of farmers during the initial stages of the reform (Zikhali 2010), and differential access to government resources as reported in Chapter 5.

Contractors provided working capital to farmers in the form of inputs and cash advances for labour, which augmented farmers’ resources, leading to better performance. For a crop such as tobacco, which
requires specific assets such as barns, initial investments from the farmer’s own resources become critical and the very poor, who could not invest in these assets, opted out or hung on after poor performance. According to transaction cost economics, asset specificity could tie producers to contracts or the production of a crop. In this study, it created a dependence relationship. Mazwi, Chambati, and Mutodi (2018) made a similar observation in a study of tobacco farmers in Zvimba and Goromonzi, citing problems of power imbalance. In Latin America, Yeros (2018) observed that it creates dependence on the contractor. In communal areas, assets acquired through generations, for instance, during colonial times in the master farmer programme in Chiweshe (Bessant and Muringai 1993), put farmers in a good position to negotiate and access more assets using historical ties (Berry 1993; Ribot and Peluso 2003).

Social capital through networks were critical in accessing contracts. This is in line with observations in Tanzania and in Zimbabwe, where Sulle (2017) and Scoones, Mavedzenge, and Murimbarimba (2017), respectively, chronicle how elites with more resources dominated sugar contracts, a position Swain (2012) noticed in India. This confirms Ribot and Peluso (2003)’s assertion that those who control resources benefit the most, as observed in Mazowe. This study argued that even though the elites were the major beneficiaries from contracting activities, all contracted farmers employed more labour, which benefited the poor. The community enjoyed direct farm benefits, such as employment, which were based on the social networks within the community. Neighbours learned from each other and through experience (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995) as they nursed, planted, harvested and cured their tobacco. Glover (1984) noted that contract farming transferred technology through input provisioning schemes. Kuijpers and Swinnen (2016) emphasise market failure as a condition that allows for technology transfer, a push factor for farmers who wanted inputs or premium prices from the contractor. As noted by Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2007), farmers need some ‘nudging’ for them to use technology, such as fertilisers, payable at harvest time, which contract farming did. While this is an apparent case of community spillover effects brought about by contract farming, which Govereh, Jayne, and Nyoro (1999) and Govereh and Jayne (2003) say are fruits of commercialisation in agriculture, its uptake was limited by lack of supplementary sources from interlinked credit. Studies by Maertens and Swinnen (2009) in Senegal show that resource endowments and technology were not a critical aspect of contract farming participation and outcomes. The groundnut crop required traditional technologies and farm implements, a sign that benefits from contract farming are crop-specific.

High initial asset endowments also meant that those who had this privilege had better access to labour, which further enhanced their productive capacity. As Moyo (2011a:945) noted, “…those who were educated and employed were better placed to negotiate political power and mobilise resources”, a privilege that could be utilised by landowners under the FTLRP. Survey data showed the poor peasant-workers preferred to work for such elites, and hence, poorly resourced farmers had difficulties in competing for labour and other resources.
10.2.3 Community Effects of Contract Farming: Inequity and Uneven Distribution of Resources

Results from this study show that equity and distribution of value were affected by the location of the farmer, that is, whether on communal or FTLRP land, and the contracting terms offered to farmers that were differentiated according to performance. For instance, Scoones et al. (2018) observed that FTLRP beneficiaries were acquiring assets, which explains the differences with their communal peers, while within-group differences arise due to types of inputs used, assets and farm investment. Between the farmers and contractors, evidence showed that power imbalance resulted in contractors benefiting through price and grading manipulation. This, Warning and Key (2002) argue, is due to unequal power relations between the actors.

In this study, resourced farmers with experience had a higher probability of participating in contract farming compared to the poor, considering the selection process followed by the contractor. The contract terms and selection process favoured the elite in a rural community, which Cousins, Weiner, and Amin (1992) described as exhibiting land social differentiation. In Chapter 8, three community groups were identified, differentiated by land ownership, productive assets and income, which affected participation in contract farming and livelihood activities. The poor were concentrated in the communal areas, where land quality and size were not enough for profitable tobacco production. For contract farming to have broader effects in communities, there should be equitable and inclusive access to contracts (Fréguin-Gresh and Anseeuw 2013; Baumann 2000; Warning and Key 2002), and conditions of farmer participation and attrition should receive due attention (Narayanan 2013), putting the focus on the selection and maintenance of farmers once under contract. For instance, the poor peasants could not access contract farming due to their lack of assets and financial resources needed to make initial investments (Swinnen and Maertens 2007), for instance, tobacco barns. This increased social differentiation in the community. Social differentiation, as exemplified by access to land, inputs and labour resulted in the poor being excluded from contracts and those that participated performed badly under contract, like the tea outgrowers reported by Sachikonye (1989). While quantitative data paint a glossy picture of high-performing contract farmers, qualitative data showed deep underlying social differentiation problems driven by differential asset holdings. All this was underpinned by poor resource access capabilities of poor farmers, who could not transfer benefits, as shown in Chapter 2. This shows the problems of singular methods as laws of averages and perceptions tend to conceal such issues.

Equitable access and retention in contracts could be achieved through agricultural-association-led contract negotiation (Korovkin 1992). This could narrow the divide between big-farmer versus small-farmer (da Silva and Shepherd 2013) or resourced farmer vs poorly resourced (Boughton et al. 2007), which could be handled through asset sharing within the community negotiated by associations and facilitated by the contractor. For contract farming to bring equity in land reform communities, equitable land distribution (discussed in Chapter 3) is needed to address resource access concerns of the
community. Labour, an important creator of value, could increase their negotiating power if they had land to produce for subsistence, hence Moyo, Rutherford, and Amanor-Wilks (2000) proposed that farm workers be allocated subsistence plots.

Though contractors influenced production protocols nudging farmers to use modern inputs (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2007), farmers had the freedom to hire and determine the remuneration of workers, which took various forms ranging through commodity barter exchanges, cash or short-term land leases. As in the sugar and tea outgrower schemes, these workers were poorly remunerated (Moyo 2004; Sachikonye 1989), which negatively affected the distribution of income within the community. However, farmworker conditions could be improved through farmer-worker association-level negotiations. In this study, it was argued that elite farmers provided employment, which helped the poor access resources and livelihoods, though it was highly differentiated. Workers and farmers that self-exploited through long hours of work, earned income that reproduced their households. Those in contract farming were trapped in debt and the lump sum payments from their tobacco sales were spent on debt repayment and little on new productivity enhancing technologies. Further, while the farmers were exposed to asset-based technology, they could not adopt it due to debt-trap and unfavourable contract conditions. This technology is complementary to modern inputs. The contractors indirectly benefited from this exploitation of labour and the poor members of the community who comprised the labour pool.

10.2.4 Farmers’ Performance under Contract Farming

In this study, evidence shows that credit provision resulted in financial additionality, which led to elite farmers expanding plots under production, improving quality and doubling their income. Various scholars on contract farming report on this benefit (De Vaus 2002; Minot and Sawyer 2016; Miyata, Minot, and Hu 2009), which results in farmers investing in their farm/non-farm activities, which are examples of spillover effects. In Mazowe, the benefits were tilted towards those with better initial resources, remittances and alternative sources of income, whom we can call the rural elite (Sulle 2017). As observed by Moyo (2011), the elites were able to capture the benefits of the FTLRP because of their strong negotiating power, a trait emphasised by both Berry (1993) and Ribot and Peluso (2003). In Chapter 8, evidence was presented that showed that most farmers were just breaking even, and their lump sum cash earnings were spent on loan repayment. For capital-intensive crops, such as tobacco, poor farmers find it difficult to raise the necessary resources to construct barns and acquire other assets needed to produce a quality crop. Sachikonye (1989)’s categorisation of farmers in accordance to education, position in community and resource is informative in understanding production and income outcomes of farmers in Mazowe. As in Sachikonye’s tea study, those in the upper echelons of these social structures performed well in contract farming and participated as part of the investment diversification process. A similar categorisation was made by Mkodzongi (2013) in the case of A1
farmers in Mhondoro Ngezi. Interviews with these farmers revealed that this was made possible by the bundle of powers that came with their position, which made it easier for them to negotiate access to resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

National data from TIMB show an exponential increase in tobacco sold under contract. This study argued that this could be a result of side-marketing and increased contracted production. Sakata (2018) reports similar observations in Mashonaland East, which confirms the importance of global capital in the integration of farmers in markets though under unfavourable exchange conditions. Side marketing, as observed by Sakata (2018), was also prevalent in Mazowe, showing the risk-coping mechanism of farmers faced with the adversities of contractors. Side marketing was also a response to the unfavourable exchange relations with the contractor, which Sen (1982) refers to as exchange entitlements derived from ownership bundles. The major beneficiaries of such a system are the elite farmers, showing the importance of resources in marketing outcomes. This calls for interlinked financial arrangements to empower the poor farmers, which were lacking in Mazowe, possibly because of the prevailing credit-constrained macroeconomic environment. As a result, most farmers in the ‘middle’ were dependent on the contractor for continued tobacco production.

This study found that contracted farmers, particularly the elite, improved quality and income due to their use of better technologies, which lowered their costs and thus increased their profits in a pattern suggested by Goodhue and Simon (2016). National production and income data are supportive of the thesis that initial resource endowments matter, as commercial farmers had yields almost double (2 392 kg per hectare) compared to smallholders (1 353 kg per hectare) and better prices (TIMB 2017). This was due to differential access to inputs (see also Mukwereza, 2013 on credit terms offered by Chinese contractors), a scenario reflected within the smallholder group, where the rich peasant received favourable terms and outperformed the poorly resourced farmers.

Production outcomes were skewed against poor farmers and workers, a group of the community associated with poor resource endowments. Elite farmers had access to alternative financial resources from employment and other non-farm activities, which differentiated them from the rest of the farmers in terms of production and income. Sachikonye (2016) argues that contestations in contract farming arrangements remain a thorny issue and, in this thesis, grading and input pricing were cited as examples. Though Sachikonye (2016) does not refer to class of producers, it was evident in this that the poorly resourced farmers were the main victims, as they had no alternative financial fall-back, which tended to affect cost-reducing and quality-enhancing technology. For the poor workers, contract farming provides a source of employment though wages, and working conditions have remained poor (Sachikonye 1989). Sachikonye (2016:96) asserts that the process of “accumulation from below” has started due to increased tracts of land that allow farmers to expand production; this thesis found that this process is surely underway for the elite rural farmers.
10.2.5 Unfavourable Contracting Terms: a Case of Power Imbalance

Chapter 2 discussed farmers’ dependence on the contractor, driven by opportunity cost in accessing credit and markets for their production, which creates an asymmetrical relation in contracting. Survey data show that no respondents participated in the drafting of the contract, price negotiation and all other terms of the contract and as a result the contracts lacked basic details needed for a good contract (Prowse 2012). Interviews showed that, given the limited contract offers, farmers competed to enter contracting activities. All of this played out behind the different “bundle of powers” held by each actor, which either diminished or enhanced their negotiation capacity (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Swanepoel ZTA, (2017:4) aptly showed the power imbalance when commenting: “The contractor is the financier, input provider, jury, judge and executioner.” The skewed ‘power bundles’ and competition affected the distribution of contractor resources among farmers, and the profit margins added to the supplied inputs; for instance, farmers were charged over 30 percent above the prevailing market price of inputs [see also Mazwi, Chambati, and Mutodi (2018)]. Further, determination of grades, prices and costing of services offered were at the discretion of the contractor. This brings into question the fairness of the input supply system and results in contestations (Sachikonye 1989). Scholars from a political economy school of thought are critical about such an asymmetrical balance of power, which arises from differential “bundle of powers” held by the parties, which they deem exploitative of farmers (Little and Watts 1994; Sachikonye 1989). Despite the exploitative nature of contracts, farmers remained under contract due to their dependence on the contractor for resources (Yeros 2018).

At the core of the power balance problems are the skewed resource endowments of the parties, a scenario Mafeje (2003) argues might be resolved through an increased government facilitator role. Further government facilitation of farmer organisation could also lead to farmers self-provisioning resources and services (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi 2008). The contractor tables a give-and-take contract; however, terms of a standard contract farming arrangement are missing. For instance, da Silva and Shepherd (2013:127) speak of “…pre-set specifications that can include mutually agreed conditions on prices, production technologies, quality characteristics, and production delivery dates”. This was made possible by the individually negotiated contracts and the absence of a farmer’s organisation. Farmer associations are regarded as important in negotiating contracts and improving services to farmers (Korovkin 1992; Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi 2008), yet farmers in Mazowe preferred arm’s-length transactions because of this lack of trust, despite well-documented welfare-enhancing evidence (Fischer and Qaim 2012; Key and Runsten 1999). Shaba et al. (2017:2) in a study in Malawi noted:

…contract farming contributes to reduced monitoring costs, as farmers work in groups and monitor each other’s activities, such as baling of the tobacco leaf, which ensures better quality tobacco being offered under contract.
In Mazowe, such benefits were disregarded due to a lack of trust. As was discussed in Chapter 7, the political arm in a farmer organisation could have further destroyed trust. Another issue explaining the dearth of farmer organisation in the tobacco industry is the lack of support from non-governmental organisations (Baumann 2000), which consider tobacco a health hazard. Where tobacco farmers have been organised, as in Tanzania and Malawi, the government has lent an organising hand (Sambuo 2013; Shaba et al. 2017), which is lacking in Zimbabwe, where there are direct contracting arrangements, as in Mozambique (Pérez Niño 2016). Unlike in colonial times (discussed in Chapter 4) farmers did not form associations to lobby contractors or TIMB, purportedly because these were not viewed in the same light as colonial oppressors. In Mazowe, institutions that emerged were ad hoc in nature and more suited to contractors’ modus operandi, for instance, demonstration plots, field days for training, and input and output distribution. According to Bingen, Serrano, and Howard (2003), agribusiness forms such institutions to enhance their profit agenda and ensure that they are in control of participating farmers thus stifling farmers’ ability to organise, political power and voice for collective action. While Murisa (2014) and Mkodzongi (2013) report on FTLRP-initiated institutions in A1 settlements, these did not transform themselves enough to negotiate with contractors. Instead, it was clear that farmers within these institutions were in dysfunctional competition for contracts with agribusinesses. However the farmers extensively used social relations to extract the best price from the contractor once under contract. As a result, because of power imbalances and competition, grading, pricing and input prices remain contested issues, yet they are central to the success of contract farming arrangements and the accumulation of assets by farmers. According to critics of contract farming, this is the source of an exploitative relationship (Sachikonye 1989; Little and Watts 1994).

Central to solving the power imbalance and an exploitative relation is rectifying an asymmetrical bundle of powers, which include control of credit, input-output markets, and technology. The control of these entails the control of productive assets such as farm implements, land and labour. According access theory, Ribot and Peluso (2003) control either legal or illegal is a determining factor in value distribution, and those who control accrue more benefits as discussed in chapter 2. Farmer associations could open opportunities to access credit, input and new technologies through farmer-led access mechanisms, which strengthen their bargaining power. At farmer level, the rich used their networks to elbow the less resourced out of contracts. FTLRP-induced competition for finance capital favoured the rich peasants. Further barter exchanges with workers were often not favourable to the worker, who got left-over inputs. In most cases, the elite farmers used their influence to access resources, such as fuelwood, at a cheaper price. The payment of benefits to those controlling resources favoured elite farmers, as shown in figure 2-1.
10.3 Contribution of the Study

This study shows the uneven development and exploitative effects of the re-entry of the capitalist system into smallholder agriculture after a controversial land reform exercise. The subsequent response by the peasantry through social relationships shaped the flow and access to benefits of contract farming. First, the study shows that contract farming is beneficial under conditions of asset availability, hence most accumulators were farmers who accessed land under FTLRP and used it to build more assets. These farmers who were favoured by the capitalist system, thrived when additional finance was provided by the contractor. The majority of farmers who did not have adequate assets were dependent on the contractor in an exploitative relationship for continued production and rarely invested beyond their subsistence needs. Access to land and contractor-finance increased the farmer’s ability to benefit from tobacco production, diversify into other cash crops and non-farm activities; all of which benefited the community through employment and service provision.

Secondly, farmers responded to the re-entry of capitalist system through use of networks and social relationships to either gain entry into contracting arrangements or side marketing networks to access better prices from the contractor. The study showed the importance of access theory as an analytic tool, in unpacking capitalist-peasant relations in underdeveloped capitalist systems, yet, the theory is rarely applied in the study of contract farming arrangements. Most studies focus on the welfare and power dynamics of the contractor and farmer, neglecting farmers’ community social relationships that shape production and welfare outcomes for the household and community. Using access theory, benefits arising from contract farming were unpacked from the household to the community level. The study showed that social relationships manifested through ‘side-marketing,’ barter labour-land exchanges and resource pooling were an important component of the successful farmers’ ‘bundle of powers’ More important, the study showed that even those farmers who were dependent on the contractor and were struggling, generated positive community effects through employment creation, derived from social relations in the community. Farmers benefited from innovative marketing strategies based on social relationships. This is important for policy, as it shows the need to capacitate and or subsidise smallholder agricultural production for the good of the community. Further, resettlement areas need programmes that build social relationship.

Thirdly, lack of farmer organisations weakens the bargaining power of farmers. Dependence on the regulator only favours the contractor especially in an environment where farmers lack alternative resources.
10.4 Conclusion

Using insights from access theory, this case study revealed that contract farming benefited the Mazowe community. Through the access theory lens this study was able to explain the interdependence and subsequent effects of contract farming and FTLRP, how this interplay generated and distributed benefits within households and community. For participating farmers it was shown that those with resources benefited from contract farming and these benefits had spillover effects to the community. The majority who could not expend resources to generate more income were dependent on the contractor in an exploitative relationship for continued tobacco production; however, they also hired labour which benefited the community. This study brought to the fore the importance of initial resource endowments and social relationships in participation and performance under contract farming. Central to this was land; some FTLRP-beneficiaries built assets from the land, which they used as a launch pad for further accumulation under contract farming. The study shows the importance of redistributive land reform as a major access route in building initial assets and integrating smallholder farmers in contract farming arrangement. Peasant farmers, beneficiaries from the land reform often lack capital which is provided through contract farming. Access to resources is a contested issue, with stark competition between the elites and the poor, a battle which always favours the elite. It is therefore apparent that the government needs to intervene in building the assets of the poor through farmer associations and other resources, providing activities to allow the poor to engage in market activities. Farmers used social relationships to fight back on unfair exchange relations with the contractor through side marketing to avoid debt repayments and access better prices.

The study showed the robustness of access theory as an analytic tool which was able to trace the flow of benefits from farmers through to the community. The study showed that apart from using partial resources provided by contractors, contracted farmers expend resources. This ultimately benefits the community through employment and diversification spillover effects, as farmers invest in other activities to maintain their benefit from contract farming. However, while the community benefited, poorly resourced farmers struggled, as they had few resources to expend when negotiating for resources, and hence, their product quality suffered. Again, farmers relied on social relationships to sustain their tobacco production through pooling and sharing of resources.

Overall, the study showed that participation in contract farming generates positive community effects through spillover effects as farmers expend resources and diversify farm and non-farm activities, create employment, and provide services that benefit the community. Most of the spillover effects were generated by resourced-farmers, mostly those who benefited from FTLRP and improved their asset-portfolios. The successful farmers invested in transport, retail and service businesses that provided
employment and commodities. This shows the importance of initial resource endowments if contract farming interventions are to benefit farmers and communities.

10.5 Recommendations and Areas of Future Research

In communal land tenure systems contract farming provides farmers with credit they would otherwise not access due to lack of collateral. In this thesis, it was shown that the efficiency of contract farming is based on access to resources or resource endowment by farmers, which suggests that government and development agents should support resource/asset augmenting strategies for the poor to improve their participation and outcomes from contracting arrangements. Policies should address resource endowments challenges that complement contract farming in segments not covered, such as capital expenditure. To build on the assets of the poor, the government and development partners should provide credit for capital investments, such as barns, cattle and grading sheds, which would be interlinked to the contract farming marketing system. Further, programmes, such as asset sharing, for small groups could be promoted in conjunction with contracting firms, who can provide institutional back-up and coordination. This will help increase the farmers’ ‘bundle of powers’ and hence their ability to benefit from the land and integration into agricultural markets. Farmers willing, and with the incentives, to take-up cash crop production would use such a scheme. In turn, this would increase farmers’ capacity to save as they become certain of the available channels of accessing resources. Such areas need further research to determine how they can be implemented.

The promotion of crop-based farmers associations, which are empowered through training, could improve participation of their members and contracting outcomes through efficient organising of inputs and other services, such as the case in Chile reported by Korovkin (1992). This will address challenges, such as input price distortions and poor market transmission mechanism of the tobacco markets, leading to profitability and farmers staying longer in contract farming. Farmer associations deal with selection bias within communities thus making contracting more inclusive for the poor, who are selected to the contract through their associations, rather than being discriminated against on asset holdings. Farmer organisations can also help enforce quality standards, making the whole contracting practice more viable. For instance, farmers’ planting, harvesting and curing practices could be coordinated through the farmer organisation and grading and classification supervised. Farmer organisations could also help standardise employment practices among members thus benefiting the community at large and contracting become welfare-enhancing for the whole community. Broadly, farmer associations allow for effective access to productive resources and markets. Where they are absent, there is a tendency for uneven access to resources by farmers, depending on their initial conditions. However, the functioning of farmer associations in private firm-led contracting arrangements still needs to be researched to build on previous work where government was central to contracting activities. Research is needed to inform these asset-augmenting mechanisms.
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### Appendix 1: Tobacco Value Chain in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Operating Environment</th>
<th>Role and Linkages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution and Retailing</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Marketing of final product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinationals</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Political lobbying of national governments and big donor organisations, such as the World Health Organisation; marketing; research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processors</td>
<td>National subsidiaries</td>
<td>Two levels: manufacturing of final product consumed such as cigarettes, snuff; processing of leaf in leaf-producing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyers</td>
<td>National Subsidiaries</td>
<td>Buying at auction floors; contracting firms representing multinationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers/farmer organisations</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Consists of small- and large-scale engaged in the actual farming of tobacco under contract or independently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input suppliers</td>
<td>Global and National</td>
<td>Suppliers of seedlings, fertilisers, agrochemicals, paper and other resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco Industry Marketing Board</td>
<td>Global and National</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco Research Board</td>
<td>Global and National</td>
<td>Research and provision of seedlings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author from Qualitative data
### Appendix 2: Income from Tobacco Correlates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income from tobacco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from tobacco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural assets</td>
<td>.430**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>.287**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household assets</td>
<td>.316**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension services provider</td>
<td>.297**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of household head</td>
<td>.394**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of household head</td>
<td>.327**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer status</td>
<td>-.379**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barns</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal or A1 area</td>
<td>.304**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of casual labour</td>
<td>.383**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of plot under tobacco</td>
<td>.552**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where farmer sold tobacco</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Source: Author compiled from survey data
Appendix 3: Monthly Flue-Cured Tobacco Revenue Cash-Inflow into Mazowe District – 2013 Season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Contract farmers (US$)</th>
<th>Non-contract farmers (US$)</th>
<th>Total Inflow</th>
<th>% of total inflow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>4 420 100.00</td>
<td>1 152 197.00</td>
<td>5 572 297.00</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>9 032 443.00</td>
<td>4 558 144.00</td>
<td>13 590 587.00</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>10 746 297.00</td>
<td>4 948 072.00</td>
<td>15 694 368.00</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>6 600 188.00</td>
<td>2 668 723.00</td>
<td>9 268 910.00</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2 598 982.00</td>
<td>329 376.00</td>
<td>2 928 358.00</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1 555 733.00</td>
<td>103 212.00</td>
<td>1 658 945.00</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>173 062.00</td>
<td>16 320.00</td>
<td>189 382.00</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>34 225.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34 225.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Season total</td>
<td>35 161 030.00</td>
<td>13 776 044.00</td>
<td>48 937 072.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sukume et al, 2015
Appendix 4: Tobacco Contract/Non-contract Farming Questionnaire

Date of interview__________________________________________

Hello, am Moses Moyo, a PhD student at the Centre for African Studies at University of Cape Town. I am here to conduct a survey on tobacco contract farming, may I please ask you questions related to your tobacco farming operations and how you earn a living particularly from tobacco. We will also talk about changes tobacco contract farming has brought to your community. By answering questions in this questionnaire you will provide me with information I will use to write my thesis titled “Effects of contract farming on rural institutions and livelihoods: A case study of Mazowe”. The results of the interview will be used for academic purposes and will be confidential, you are free to ask or withdraw from this interview at any stage during our interview. Should you have any questions at any given time you are free to contact me at myxmos003@uct.ac.za or telephone 0026 3 77241 6529 or Assoc Prof H. Chitonge, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, +27 (0) 21 650 4056 or horman.chitonge@uct.ac.za. The interview will take approximately 1 hour. With your consent we can start the interview.

Section A: Demographics/Household Roaster

Instructions: Circle the appropriate code or write the response in the spaces provided

A1:  Farmer status:  1=Contract farmer  2=Non-contract farmer  3 =contract Drop-out

A2.  Respondent status in the Household ________________________________

A3.  Household Roaster: Household members are the people who live at same homestead, eat from same pot and share expenditure for more than nine months in a year.

Codes to Questions

A3.3  Relation to Household head

Resident Head ……………1;  absent head ……….16;  Wife/Husband ……2;
Child/adopted child.. 3  Parent of head………….4  Grand Child……………..5
Grand Parent……………..6  Sister/brother………….7  Son-/Daughter-in-law……8
Mother-Father-in-law…….9  Brother-/sister-in-law……10 Nice/Nephew………….11
Great-grand Child………12  Other Relatives………….13  Workers/Relative…………14
Other (specify)………………………………………………15

A3.6.  What does [……………………………] do for a living?  Formal job……1;
        Casual Work…..2;  Self-employed…3;  Unemployed……4;  Own Farm…….5
        Farmworker……6  Studying………….7  Government……8
        Retired………….9  Housewife…….10 other (specify) …………...
A3.7 What is [………………]’s marital status? Married………….1
Divorced…………….2 Separated……….3 Widow(her)…….4 (>> Q10)
Never married…..5 (>>Q10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERS</th>
<th>ON ID</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Q5</th>
<th>Q6</th>
<th>Q7</th>
<th>Q8</th>
<th>Q9</th>
<th>Q10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sex</td>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>Ask Qs</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male...1</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Relation to HH head</td>
<td>How old is [……]</td>
<td>Today? Years</td>
<td>Date of Birth:</td>
<td>What does [……] do for a living?</td>
<td>Wh at is [……]’s marital status?</td>
</tr>
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</table>

A3.14 What was his highest education attainment? 1=No formal 2=No formal can read and write; 3=Pre-school 4=Primary; 5=O-level; 6=A-level 7=College; 8=Degree

|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|

231
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSON ID CODE</th>
<th>Is the natural father of [...] living in this household? COPY ID CODE FROM PART A</th>
<th>Yes……1</th>
<th>No……2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the father of [...] still alive?</td>
<td>Yes……1</td>
<td>No……2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the father of [...] attend school?</td>
<td>Yes……1</td>
<td>No……2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What was his highest education attainment?</td>
<td>SEE SCHOOLING CODES</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the natural mother of [...] living in this household? (copy id code for father from part a)</td>
<td>Yes……1</td>
<td>No……2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the mother of [...] still alive?</td>
<td>Yes……1</td>
<td>No……2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the mother of [...] attend school?</td>
<td>Yes……1</td>
<td>No……2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What is [...]’s population group?</td>
<td>African</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which household members make decisions about various things? E.G. BUY FOOD, SENDING CHILDREN TO SCHOOL, BUY FURNITURE etc</td>
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</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person code</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>Father live</th>
<th>Father edu.</th>
<th>mother</th>
<th>Mother edu.</th>
<th>Mother live</th>
<th>Mother edu.</th>
<th>race</th>
<th>Decision maker</th>
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</table>

A5. Number of employees working in your tobacco who are not part of the household: ______

A6. Dwellings: How many bedrooms _____Dining room _____Lounge____ Kitchen_______Toilets/Bath room ____________Other_________

A7. Type of roofing _______________Type of building (e.g brick cement mortar; earth) ______

A8. Type of cooking energy _______Lighting source ___________General power_________

A9. Source of Water: 1=own borehole; 2=community borehole; 3=tape water; 4=River/Dam; 5=Well

A10. Other structures: Kraal____ Fowl run ______ Other

A11. Is the property fenced/enclosed 1=Yes 2=No

A12. Do you have another home in the communal or resettlement areas? 1=Yes 2=No

A13. If yes, who stays in that home? __________________________________________

A14. Do you own a property in town? 1=Yes 2=No

A15. If in a resettlement area from which district did you come from?

A16. When did you settle at this homestead? _______________________________________

**Section B   Expenditure and wellbeing**

B1   Does the income your household receives from tobacco meet your family’s needs?
Are there days when you go without food in your house? 1=yes; 2=no

If yes to D2; how did you cope? ____________________________________________

What other farming activities are you involved in? List 1=Market gardening 2=other cash crop 3=staple crop 4=other ______________________________

Do you produce your own staple food crops? 1=yes; 2=no

Do you have enough land to produce your staple crops? 1=yes 2=no

Who provides you with inputs for these activities? 1=self-financed 2=Presidential input scheme 3=command agriculture 4=agribusiness 5=family 6=other ______________________________

If you produce your own staple crops, do there last you until the next harvest? 1=yes 2=no

If you don’t produce your food, where do you buy from? 1=supermarket 2=from community 3=Both____________________________

Have you ever been diagnosed of any sickness related to your work in tobacco production? 1=yes 2=no

What would you say caused this illness? 1=handling of chemicals 2=handling green leaf 3=other ______________________________

Do you have safety clothes needed in the production of tobacco? 1=yes 2=no

Do you smoke? 1=yes 2=No

Is it because you produce tobacco? 1=yes 2=no

Are there any people or organisations that try to discourage you from producing tobacco? 1=yes 2=no. What do you think about these organisations? ______________________________

What is your view about B15? ______________________________

List any income generating projects you are involved in if any 1=run passenger transport 2=haulage 3=manufacturing 4=retail 5=services 6=other ________

Tell us about any social or leisure activities you are involved in within your community____

On average what is your income and expenditure per month on the items listed on the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income:</th>
<th>Tobacco Sales</th>
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<td>Wages</td>
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<td>Remittances</td>
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<td>From business</td>
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<td>Other specify</td>
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<td>Food</td>
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<td>Water, electricity and rates</td>
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<td>Rent</td>
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<td>Transport</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Clothing</td>
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<td>Telephone/cellular phone</td>
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<td>TV/DSTV</td>
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<td>Entertainment</td>
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<td>Wages</td>
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<td>Loan repayment</td>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>Donations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other specify</td>
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</table>

B20 Do you have a bank account? 1=Yes 2=No

**Section C Community Module**

C1. Is this a: 1=communal area 2=A1 resettlement (fast track) 3= old resettlement

C2. Distance from tarred road in kilometres (estimate using google maps) ____________

C3. Comment on the state of roads: 1=very good tarred 2=good tarred 3=tarred with potholes 4=gravel 5=bad gravel

C4. Is there a community clinic within your community? 1=yes; 2=no

C6. Do you always get medication and medical care you and your household needs from the clinic? 1=yes 2=no

C7. Are there transporters within your community who can transport your tobacco and inputs?
1=yes  2=no

C8. Are there stores, organisations and institutions that provide you with:

agricultural inputs 1=yes  2=no; finance 1=yes  2=no
extension 1=yes  2=no services within your community?

C9. Are there any taboos that you must observe when working on your tobacco? 1=yes  2=no

C10. How does this affect your work on the tobacco crop?  1=cannot work in the field
            2=other ________________________________

C11. How many kilometers is the nearest school from your homestead? __________________

C12. How many kilometers is the service center from your homestead? __________________

C13. Do you have access to any of the services?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Credit/finan</th>
<th>training</th>
<th>Water for</th>
<th>Entertainment</th>
<th>Shopping</th>
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<tr>
<td>1=yes</td>
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<td>2=no</td>
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C14. List any businesses that were set up by locals since the start of contract farming in your area
___________________________________________________________________________

C15. Who set up business  1=local tobacco farmers  2=investors from other regions
            3=big agribusiness  4=supermarkets  5=other ________________________________

C16. Are there any investors who came to invest in your area because of contract farming 1=yes 2=no

C17. Are there any changes in your community you would say happened because of contract farming? 1=yes  2=no give examples (e.g., social life, education, etc.) ________

C18. Has the contracting firm contributed anything for community development? 1=yes  2=no Give examples? __________________________________________

Section D. Livestock and Assets

C1. How many of these assets and livestock do you own? (Write 0 if none)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Source of asset: Given=1 Bought=2 Inherited=3</th>
<th>Date purchased</th>
<th>How many in 2004</th>
<th>Comment if any</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
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<td>2004 2009 2017</td>
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<td>Sheep</td>
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</table>
Goats

Donkeys

Scotch cart

Ox drawn plough

Tractor

Motor vehicle

Motor bike

Bicycle

Generator

Water pump

Barns

Cellphones

Television

Sprays

State other

D2. List any home improvement you undertook since 2009. ________________________

D3. List the sources of funds you used to improve your home.  1=income from tobacco
       2=part-time work  3=full-time work  4=remittances  5=other cash crops
       6=other__________________________

D4. Do you have irrigation facilities for your tobacco? 1=yes  2=no

D5. How many acres can you irrigate at a given time using this system? ________________

D6. How did you pay for your irrigation system if any?  1=tobacco income  2=loan from
       agribusiness  3=income from employment  4=remittances  5=income from other cash
crops 6=other ______________________________________________________

Section E: Selection of participants

E1. How did you join contract farming?  1=Was invited by the firm  2=Was invited by local
       leader  3=Made personal application  4=Offered to us as community  5=Other
       specify ______________________________________________________
E2. Were there any requirements you needed to fulfil to qualify to join contract farming? 1=yes 2=no

E3. If yes to C2, what were the conditions? List 1=Assets 2=experience 3=Education 4=land size 5=other ____________________________________________

E4. When did you join contract farming?

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1=was member 2=Dropped out 3=Stopped tobacco farming 4=Joined another firm 5=Re-joined contract farming

E5. What made you join contract farming? 1=access inputs 2=Better prices 3=Access market 4=extension services 5=better farming methods 6=other ____________________________________________

E6. If you dropped out, stopped farming, or joined another firm explain why? 1=poor prices 2=exploitative contractual exploit 3=Built enough capital to go it alone 4=my contract was not renewed 5=shortage of labour 6=other ____________________________________________

E7 If you are not a contract farmer, do you wish to join contract farming? 1=yes 2=no

E8. Are there any requirements for you to join contract farming 1=yes 2=no

E9. If yes to C6, what are the requirements? 1=farm implements 2=draught power 3=experience in tobacco farming 4=established source of income 5=other ____________________________________________

E10. Do you meet these requirements? 1=yes 2=no

E11. Do you think some people are excluded from contract farming? 1=yes 2=no

E12 If yes to E11 Explain. 1=lack of farm implements 2=lack of draught power 3=lack of experience to produce tobacco 4=no established source of income 5=bad reputation 6=other ____________________________________________

E13 Explain why this might have been happening? 1=Quality of my crop changed 2=World market prices changed 3=quantity of tobacco is increasing/decreasing 4=we are ripped-off 5=other ____________________________________________

SECTION F: Tobacco farming
F1  Size of plot ______________ area under tobacco ______________ Food crops ________

F2  Do you practice crop rotation?  1=yes  2=no

F3  If yes, why?  1=disease management  2=soil fertility management  3=required
by contract  4=other _____________________________ ___

F4  If no, why?  1=no enough land  2=not allowed by contract  3=no resources to
prepare new land  4=other _____________________________

F5  How do you rid your tobacco plot of disease?  1=burning plot  2=apply chemicals
3=leave fallow  3=crop rotation  4=other _____________________________

F6  Which year did you start growing tobacco? ____________

F7  Have you been growing tobacco since then 1=yes; 2=no

F8  If no, Give reasons?  1=poor prices  2=exploitative contractual exploit  3=Built
enough capital to go it alone  4=my contract was not renewed 5=shortage of labour
6=other______________________________

F9  Do you produce other cash crops?  1=yes; 2=no  Why?  1=supplement income  2=risk
management  3=abundant land  4=other______________________________

F10. How many people worked in your tobacco growing/production fields in the years below?

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1= HH members  2= casual from community  3=Permanent workers  4= casual from other communities

F11  How did you pay for the service in C1?

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1. Cash  2. Did not pay  3. In kind  4. Will work in their field in return

F12  If you paid cash, what was the source of funds? Pick from below and write the number in the box
F13. Rank the sources of finance for your tobacco farming activities for these seasons. Rank 1 is the source which provides most.

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</table>

1. HH member
2. Casual
3. Permanent
4. Donor
5. Government
6. Local money lender
7. Other

1=Government grant  2=Government loan  3=Bank loan  4=Contractor  5=Personal savings
6=Remittances  7=Local money lender  8=Other

F14. Have you ever taken credit or loan to pay for your tobacco growing?

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1=Bank  2=Government  3=Contracting firm  4=Friends/family  5=Local money lender  6=Donor
7=Other

F15. Who provides you with extension services during the years indicated below?

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1=Government extension workers  2=Contractor extension workers  3=Both  4=None

F16. Did you pay for the services?  1=Yes  2=No

F17. Will you be prepared to pay for extension services in future?  1=Yes  2=No  3=Not Sure

F18. What were your sources of inputs (seeds/seedlings, pesticides/herbicides, fertilisers) for the
F19. Have you attended any tobacco production training courses? 1=Yes 2=No

Training type: ____________________________________________________________

Trainer: ________________________________________________________________

F20. How many acres of tobacco did you plant for each of the seasons below?

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F21. Indicate the quantity of inputs you received from the contracting firm for the past three farming season:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of input</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Were all inputs used on tobacco</th>
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<td>Yes   No</td>
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F21 If no, how did you use the other inputs? 1=on other crops 2=sold them to meet operational cost 3=gave to family/friend 4=other ______________

F22. How many kilograms of tobacco did you produce and sale in each year indicated below?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kgs produced</th>
<th>Kgs sold</th>
<th>Income received</th>
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F23 Do you hire an equipment/draft power like tractors for your farm operations? 1=Yes 2=no.
Section G: Reasons for Participating in Contract farming

G1. What are the advantages of contract farming? 1=Source of finance 2=Access to markets 3=Extension services 4=New technology 5=Other________________________

G2. Are you going to/would you consider producing tobacco under contract next season?
1=No 2=Yes 3=Not decided yet

G3. What are the disadvantages of contract farming? 1=new technology and skills; 2=ready market 3=inputs 4=extension services 5=reduces some of the risks I face as farmer 6=offer credit 7=all these 8=other__________________________

G4. Where do you sell your tobacco?
1=Contractor 2=Auction 3=Both

G5. Do you insure your tobacco? 0=No 1=Yes

G6. Are there insurance companies in your area? 1=yes 2=no

G7. Does the contracting firm require you to take insurance? 1=yes 2=no

G8. How do you protect yourself against floods, drought and other risks that affect your tobacco?
1=have insurance 2=invest in other assets 3=social networks 4=works programmes and government assistance 5=other__________________________

G9. If your sales can not cover your credit and input costs from the contracting firm how do you pay your debt?
1=sell assets 2=reschedule debt 3=borrow to pay debt 4=other___

G10. Are there any risks you face in your tobacco operations?
1=yes 2=no

G11. Explain how you mitigate the risks mentioned in E10.
1=have insurance 2=rely on social network 3= negotiate with contractor 4=other__________________________

Section H: Tobacco Curing, Grading and Marketing

H1. What is do you use to cure your tobacco? 1=coal 2=firewood 3=other_____________________

H2. Where do you get your firewood/coal? __________________________

H3. What do you do to ensure that the firewood/coal you use will always be there to help you cure your tobacco?
1=plant trees 2=buy coal 3=not sure 4=other__________

H4. Who grades your tobacco? 1=myself 2=hire specialist graders 3=my workers

H5. Were you trained to grade tobacco? 1=yes 2=no
H6 At the selling point do you understand how the buyers grade/classify your tobacco?

H7 Where do you sell your tobacco? 1=auction floor 2=contractor 3=where I can get best price

H8 Why do you think your tobacco from same field and crop gets paid different prices? _____

H9 Are there any other issues you think affects the price of tobacco at the auction floor? __

H10 How do you transport your tobacco to the auction/selling point? 1=use own truck 2=hire transport 3=contractor collects 4=other_____________________

Section I: Contract farming: terms and enforcement

I1. Did you sign a contract with the agribusiness firm? 1=yes 2=no

I2. Did you or anybody representing your interest participates in the drafting of the contract? 1=yes 2=no

I3. Was the contract explained to you or you understood it by yourself? 1=yes 2=no

I4. What is the duration of your contract? ______________________

I5 Does your contract specify the quantity of tobacco or acreage to be cultivated?

I6. Under what conditions can your contract be terminated? 1=bad reputation 2=poor performance 3=repeated delivery of low quality tobacco 4=other____

I7. How do you resolve contractual disputes? 1=never had disputes 2=mediation 3=arbitration 4=litigation 5=negotiation 6=government intervenes 7=other____

I8. Do you feel that the contract clearly specifies and cover all your requirements? 1=yes 2=no

I9 If no which issues are not clear? 1=duties of the contractor 2=my duties 3=contract enforcement mechanism 4=grading, quality and pricing of tobacco 5=production process 6=monitoring of farming 7=risk sharing 8=other ______

I9 In case of unforeseen events, like drought, hailstorm what are the provisions in your contract that protect you? 1=none 2=insurance 3=renegotiate contract 4=debt write-off 5=share expenses 6=other_____________________

I10 In case of prices falling below production cost what does your contract say? 1=not included in contract 2=there is a base-price set in contract for each grade of tobacco 3=carry the risk 4=share the risk

I11 Does your contract provide details of inputs, delivery times, quantity and quality required to match the quantity and quality of tobacco to be delivered? 1=yes 2=no

I12 In your contract, are results of soil tests included to determine the inputs or quality of tobacco likes to come from the plot. 1=yes 2=no
I13 Does the contract specify the method of determining the price of tobacco you deliver to the contracting firm? 1=yes 2=no

I14 What remedy do you have if the contractor delays delivery of inputs or payment of advanced loans needed for growing tobacco? 1=none 2=contractor compensate for possible effects 3=contract is silent 4=have recourse to contract enforcement mechanism 5=other ________________________________

Section J: Membership to organisations

J1. Do you belong to any farmer or community organisation? 1=yes 2=no

J2. If yes what is the purpose of your organisation? 1=negotiate contract terms 2=assist with sourcing input/delivery of tobacco 3=lobbying other stakeholders 4=other ________________________________

J3 Is your organisation registered with any government department? 1=yes; 2=no

J4 Which one? ________________________________

J5 Do you pool your resources for tobacco farming purposes? 1=yes; 2=no

J6 If yes explain. ________________________________

J7 Does your organisation have any relationship with the department of agriculture? 1=yes; 2=no.

J8 Explain. ________________________________

J9 How do you think the government can help you and your community improve tobacco production? ________________________________

J10 Do you think an organisation is necessary when you are dealing with contracting firm? What should be its role? ________________________________

Section K: Multiplier Effects

K1. What benefits would you say contract farming brought to your community? ____________

K2. Do you share tobacco farming methods you learn from the agribusiness with friends 1=yes 2=no

K3. Do you offer any help to community members as a contract farmer? 1=yes 2=no

K4 Give us examples? ________________________________

K5 Do you help community members with the marketing of their tobacco? How do you help? ____________

K6 Which services in your community would you say were brought about because of contract farming? ________________________________
K7. Has the government done anything (like roads, dams) because the agribusiness lobbied for it?
   1=yes    2=no

K8. Are there organisations or government departments that have set-up offices or shops to help
    you as contract farmers or the community at large? 1=yes    2=no.

K9 If yes to K8, name them
   _______________________________________________________

K10 Has any of the farmers in your area established agriculture retail outlet to service tobacco and
     other farmers? _________________________________________

K11 What other agroindustries would you say developed because of tobacco contract farming in
     your area? _____________________________________________

Section L: General

L1. List services you wish to receive from TIMB, Government and contractor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIMB</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
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L2. Which organisations or companies were established in your community since the start of
contract farming? _____________________________________________

L3. Does the contracting firm contribute to school, health or other social activities in your
community? __________________________________________________

L4. Do you or your organisation participate or contribute to the development of school, health
or social activities in your community? _____________________________

L5. Are there any infrastructure projects that were done in your area to support contract
farming activities? _____________________________________________

L6. Do you have any comments you have about tobacco production? ____________________________
Appendix 5: A case of successful farmer

Mr Rancher, is a 32 year son of a rich-peasant. His father accumulated wealth through trading and farming. He said his father produced cash crops, and acquired cattle some of which was farmed out to poor peasants in the region to enable easy access to grazing land. Mr Rancher has a herd of 52 cattle. His father gave him a gift of 5 cattle soon after he had completed his O-levels in 2003, he decided to move to A1 scheme in search of new pastures, through his father’s influence and assistance he bought more cattle from displaced white farmers. In 2009, he joined contract farming and now farms two hectares of tobacco, which gives him an average of US$21 000 per annum. He trades his steers at local cattle market and claims each beast fetches upwards of US$1000 and in a good year he can sell up to 20 beast.

Mr Rancher said he was approached by the contractor to produce tobacco for the company. He said is provided with all the inputs, cash for labour and credit when he needs it. He claimed this has made his farming activities easier. The contractor proposed that Mr Rancher increased his acreage, an offer he said he would take in the next marketing season. Mr Rancher said he has good access to labour because he assists a lot of people in the area when ever there are problems like illnesses, deaths. He said, “in rural areas we live for each other, thus the only way you can make it.

Mr Rancher’s success is visible for all to see, he owns two cars, has a furnished three bedroomed house, a tractor among other farm implements. He also bought a house in Harare, and goes on holiday around Zimbabwe after every tobacco marketing season. He is currently constructing a feeding lot for cattle fattening and looks forward to be buying maize and soya beans from other local farmers for the fattening of his cattle.

The expansion of his farming enterprise resulted in the employment of a tractor driver and five permanent farm workers, and a maid. The tractor is hired out within the community. The cattle feeding programme will generate three more jobs and around five for the people who would mix the feed in the milling machine. A truck driver and assistant who would go round the farms buying produce. He believes, just like his father before him, all this benefits the community and more importantly his business.
Appendix 6: Use of social relationships to access resources

Mr Tindo is a 43-year old farmer, married with six children. Mr Tindo was born out of wedlock and had to stay with his maternal grandparents when his mother married. He grew up in the Chiweshe community, but never went to school because he was not considered part of the family, since he was not a member of the patriarchy. His early years in life were therefore spent herding his grand father’s cattle, doing household chores. He also felt discriminated as he saw his age mates go to school. The excuse given by his uncles was always that there was no money for school fees.

In 1997, Tindo lost his grand father. This was unbearable for him as the remaining uncles illtreated him. Under these harsh conditions Tindo confronted his mother and demanded to know his father. His mother was not forthcoming, however in search of his father Tindo managed to get leads to a hotel in Harare where his father once worked and met his mother. Unfortunately he only found out that his father had died five years back. Sensing that he would have a change of fortune among his father’s people, Tindo moved to his patriarchal family in 1998. He married, from his new homeland, however things turned for the worst as conflicts over farm land with his father’s cousins took their toll.

In 2006, he went back to Chiweshe where his grand mother allocated him a quarter of a hectare of land to build his homestead. Tindo had missed out on land invasions and subsequent land reform. He continued with his old profession working for farmers in both the communal areas and A1 settlements. He also moulded bricks for A1 farmers, learnt how to build tobacco barns. Together with his wife they had a small market garden by the river to supplement food needs and raise income. In 2009, he worked for a tobacco farmer who paid him in kind with two turkeys (birds), in 2018 at the time of the study the turkeys had multiplied to fifty. Tindo sold his turkeys to buy fertilisers for his newly rented tobacco plot, pay school fees and build a third hut. He also bought three goats. He sold his tobacco through the farmer whom he worked for in a labour-land rent exchange. He also had access to the farmer’s cattle for draught power, barns for curing. His only complaint was that all his tasks were done after his landlord’s tobacco has been worked on. This affected the quality of his crop and retains from sales floor. In the 2018, tobacco marketing season, Tindo was planning to buy a cow and possibly a plough. He was hoping to pool resources with his cousin, who also had a cow. Tindo was excited about the opportunities brought about by tobacco. He was only concerned that land was going to limit his progression, he summed it up, ‘...with land everything is possible, I only wish I can get my on and farm my way out of poverty”. Tindo offered the researcher accommodation, and this exposed the researcher to dailstruggle poor peasants go through.
Appendix 7: Struggling for survival after FTLRP

Mr Banda (70-years old) migrated from Malawi in 1972, first settling in Karoi working as a farmer worker, five years (1976) latter he moved to Mazowe where he has lived the rest of his working life as a farm worker. Just before the land reform Mr Banda said he had been promoted to work in the horticultural division. He was rewarded with a three bedroomed house at Ardura roofed with asbestos where he stays to this day. He recalls how badly there were treated before Zimbabwe gained independence at times going without pay, because they failed to meet required targets. However he is quick to mention that things improved after independence when he started working for a new farmer who eventual gave him this house. Since FTLRP, life has become unbearable, he lost his small piece of land which he says was incorporated in an A1 farm, lost his job and now depends on working part time for the small scale farmers in the area, however the problem is that they don’t pay after the job is completed. At the time of the study Mr banda was employed in a wheat farm, to frighten birds which were preying on the farm’s wheat. He used a bell and drum to chase away birds He believes has has become poorer by the day but has nowhere to go except wait for his death at the farm compound. Unlike his compatriots who are involved in trading of vegetables and other food stuffs, he says he no longer has the energy, in fact he says he has become immobile because of an injury he sustained on his left leg, and can only do light tasks. He claimed the local clinic has no medicine and is not thinking of going to Harare because he doesn’t have the money.

Mr Banda’s children are now scattered in the neighbouring farms. He says they are also struggling as the only job they knew was farm work, and the new farmers were not paying enough for their survival. Mr Banda rents out his two bedrooms for twenty-dollars. He uses this money to buy staple food and his small garden at the back of the house provides vegetables. His pension from National Social Security Authority (NSSA) has also been processed, because he did not know how to access it. His former employer deducted employee contributions. Mr Banda was excited that he had learnt about how to access his pension and said he was going to camp at the NSSA offices waiting for his pension.
Endnotes

1 Livelihoods: activities and resources the community engage with to earn a living

2 Fast Track Land Reform Programme: a radical redistributive land reform process which Moyo and Chambati (2013) argue was the only one of its kind since the end of the Cold War. Elsewhere in Africa there was one in Ethiopia (Pausewang, 1983).

3 Community: This study adopts Oxford online definition: A group of people living in the same place or having a particular characteristic in common

4 Partial resources: Most contract farming studies report on agribusiness supplying inputs and extension services and rarely are production assets provided though there might be a necessary condition for one to produce cash crops.

5 Cognitive effects: In this study refers to processes involved in transferring knowledge, skills, technology, learning, and understanding of agricultural practices and adoption of new livelihood strategies. In poor communities this often happens through social relationships, interactions and common tasks the community undertake, be it religious or other rituals

6 Realist Approach: a research approach where qualitative data is used to establish causality based on the tracking of processes and mechanisms to explain observed outcomes. For example using life history interviews and observations respondents can explain the processes that they followed to get to whatever outcomes. This approach ‘values’ context which could be important in understanding outcomes.

7 Moral economy Understood “…as obligations and responsibilities among and within families” (Bessant and Muringai 1993: 552). These obligations and responsibilities are based on social relationships within the community. The social relationships allow people to transact economic activities

8 Ward: The smallest governance structure in local government structures, covering villages or particular suburbs in urban areas. In this study the size of a ward was 1600 households

9 Realist sampling techniques Sampling techniques popularised by Realist researchers, who seek to establish “causality” based on connectivity of events, selecting cases that speak to the theory and objectives under study. See Emmel, N. (2013). Sampling and choosing cases in qualitative research: A realist approach. Sage.

10 Purposive sampling is a non-probability sample selected on the basis of the research question or objectives to pick the desired population characteristics

11 Probability sampling is a method of picking a sample where every member in the population has an equal chance of being picked. The sample is picked randomly using statistical theory.

12 Snowballing technique is a sampling technique based on referrals
Agribusinesses firms that produce, exchange and/or process agricultural commodities and/or services.

Studying real markets, according to Bernstein and Oya (2014), investigates market exchange relations from a perspective of different power relations among actors. In this study, actors refer to farmers, contractors and other industry players.

De jure used here to mean “based on laws or actions of the state” (Merriam-Webster online dictionary)

De facto is understood here to mean: “resulting from economic or social factor:s rather than from laws or actions of the state” (Merriam-Webster online dictionary).

Insertion of international capital in agriculture: Sachikonye (1989, 1991) provides details of how this process leads to exploitation and marginalisation of labour due to power imbalances in negotiating contracts.

Oligopsony: Oxford online dictionary defines it as “a state of the market in which only a small number of buyers exists for a product.” this is the meaning used in this study. While there are 20 contractors operating, these are controlled by five big processors, and in most cases are subsidiaries.

Land Reform and Resettlement Programme-2 (LRRP-2), a land redistribution plan presented to the donor conference in 1998 as a successor to the Lancaster house agreement on land. Donors were expected to avail funding for the resettlement programme.

Jambabja: A Shona word for violent, chaotic encounter which is resolved through extreme force.

Committee of Seven, a war veteran dominated committee that oversaw land settlement issues at the invaded farm. The issues included negotiating with the farm owner, vetting of beneficiaries.

Community-based livelihoods: Livelihoods that are derived from the common pool of shared resources in a community for example, forests, rivers and wide fruits. This concept is popular in Natural Resource management programmes.

Banding according to Mariam-Wbster online dictionary is “to form a group in order to do or achieve somethings”. This is common in moral economies like the one described by Bessant and Muringai (1993) in Chiweshe where households come together to perform particular tasks (see note 7).

ICAs are voluntary local groupings of farmers within an ecological setup, which were operationalised in the 1940s after the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Act of 1941. Child &Child (2015) describe how, through persuasion and peer pressure, ICAs were critical in the preservation of the soil, vegetation and animal population through enforcement of good farming practices.

According to ILO: “Own-account workers are those workers who, working on their own account or with one or more partners, hold the type of job defined as a self-employed job, and have not engaged on a continuous basis any employees to work for them during the reference period.” International Labour Organisation 1993). In Mazowe these workers employed part-time workers to execute specific tasks as piece workers.

GAP also known as best agricultural practice in that is meant to protect the environment and is sustainable.